DIPLOMACY OF DOUBLE MORALITY

PETER G. STERCHO

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

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DIPLOMACY OF DOUBLE MORALITY

EUROPE'S CROSSROADS IN CARPATHO-UKRAINE

1919-1939

Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves, and under a just God will not long retain it.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

DIPLOMACY
OF
DOUBLE MORALITY

Europe's Crossroads
in
Carpatho-Ukraine
1919-1939

By

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TO MY WIFE IRENA YULIA
AND OUR CHILDREN
OLENA WANDA, YURIY PETRO,
MARIA IRENA

PREFACE

This study has been undertaken from the point of view of application of the Wilsonian principles of national self-determination in the case of Carpatho-Ukraine. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 accepted these principles as the foundation for the establishment of a just and lasting order in Europe. The Conference explicitly recognized the right of self-determination for Carpatho-Ukraine and authorized the League of Nations to be the guardian over implementation of her autonomous rights.

Most oppressed nationalities of the former Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires had seen hope for liberty and safety to develop as members of the family of free nations. Others, however, seized this opportunity to establish their domination over other ethnic groups. Thus, out of the fragments of two multinational Empires, Austria-Hungary and Russia, several new heteronational States were established, characterized by frictions between constituent nationalities.

The double standards in application of the principles of national self-determination with regard to the Central-Eastern European nationalities led to the lack of stability in that area. This, in turn, encouraged some of the imperialistically-minded nations to utilize the existing situation for their own aggrandizement which resulted in the European crisis of 1938-1939 focused upon Czecho-Slovakia.

The dismemberment of the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia in March of 1939 could be correctly considered a prelude to the beginning of World War II. This has been broadly discussed in numerous publications in various languages. These publications basically focus on the German-Czech conflict and partially upon the Slovak-Czech differences. The problem of the third constituent part of the federated Republic, namely that of the autonomous State of Carpatho-Ukraine, has been touched upon only in general terms. Also the participation of Hungary and Poland in the liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia has hardly been investigated.

Therefore, I feel that there is a need for serious study and analysis of these problems as well as for a scholarly publication in order to fill the existing gap in historical literature. I am indebted to the late Professor Waldemar Gurian, of the University of Notre Dame, Professor Michael S. Pap, of John Carroll University, and Professor John Fizer, of Rutgers University, for their encouragement to undertake this study, as well as to Professor Richard Conrad, of Drexel University, for his inspiration at the advanced stages of manuscript preparation.

While attention is focused upon the developments between September 1938 and March 1939, Chapters I and II, written at some length, introduce the reader to the problem. Chapters III and IV outline the internal conditions within the atonomous State of Carpatho-Ukraine, 1938-1939, while Chapter V deals with the intensive Hungarian revisionistic campaign between the two world wars. The remaining Chapters discuss the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine as treated in international diplomatic circles.

Although there are generally available public documents on the international bargainings over the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine in the influential and directly interested capitals, the gathering of source material for the inquiry of the internal developments in Carpatho-Ukraine during the period under investigation was a difficult task. The source material concerning the latter events has been taken either from the periodicals of that time, or from various publications on other problems which for some reasons also touched on some aspects of the developments in Carpatho-Ukraine.

There is considerable English literature presenting the Hungarian point of view and the Hungarian claim for the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine. Also numerous publications in English, presenting the Czech viewpoint from the time between the two World Wars, are available. On the other hand, there is almost no English presentation of the Carpatho-Ukrainian side of the story. Thus, the Ukrainian point of view has been taken basically from Ukrainian and Czech publications and from a scant number of brochures and articles published in English.

However, due to the generosity of private collectors, I was privileged to use rare documents and materials dealing with the developments in Carpatho-Ukraine. Therefore, I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Avhustyn Shtefan for placing the archives of the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine as well as his personal collections of rare Carpatho-Ukrainian and other newspapers at my disposal; to the

former Governor of Carpatho-Ukraine, Gregory Zhatkovych, who allowed me to use his unique collection of the newspaper Rusyn; *to Drs. Stepan Rosokha and Marko Antonovych who placed their collections of rare periodicals at my disposal; to Mr. Antin Dragan, Editor of* Svoboda, *for permitting me to use the archives of that Ukrainian daily; and to Rev. Fintan R. Shoniker, O.S.B., of St. Vincent College, and Dr. Yaroslav Shawiak, of the Library of Congress, for their library services offered to me in research.*

Also a vast letter exchange between the author of this study and former Carpatho-Ukrainian officials, especially with Prof. Avhustyn Shtefan, Mr. Yuliyan Revay, and Dr. Stepan Rosokha, was helpful in clarifying certain questions that were otherwise unanswerable.

Finally, I wish to thank Mr. Mykhaylo Urban for drawing all of the maps used in this book and to the Carpathian Research Center for bearing the publication costs of this study, although all costs of doing research and writing were covered by myself.

However, my deepest gratitude is reserved for my wife, Irena Yuliya, for the sacrifices during my research and writing this book. Besides being the greatest encouragement to me in every respect, she denied herself as well as our three children several deserved vacations and many other leisure conveniences during many of these years of my research, writing, proof reading, etc.

In accordance with an established custom, I wish to state that I alone bear full responsibility for the conclusions expressed and for any errors of fact or interpretation which may have occurred in this study.

PETER G. STEROHO

Narberth, Pa., April 27, 1971.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The system used in this study for the transliteration of Ukrainian and Russian names and words is basically that employed by the Library of Congress. However, some deviations from this system in transliteration of Ukrainian names and words were made.

First of all, there is a difference between "и" and "і", the first being transliterated as "y" and the latter as "i". Example: Іван Ґрига transl. as Ivan Gryga. Ukrainian "й" also had been transliterated as "y", especially in the endings and in conjunction with nouns, thus creating Ukrainian sounds "ya" as in "yard"; "ye" as in English "yes"; "yi" as in "year"; and "yu" as in "Yukon". Examples: Юліян Ревай, Яків Зозуля, Михайло Бращайко transl. as Yuliyan Revay, Yakiv Zozulya, Mykhaylo Brashchayko. Ukrainian endings "ій" and "ий" are transliterated as "iy" and "yy" respectively. Ex.: Юлій Бращайко, Великий Бичків are transl. as Yuliy Brashchayko, Velykyy Bychkiv.

The Ukrainian apostrophe is not used. Instead, the apostrophe "'" is used to indicate the soft sign "ь" following the consonants "d", "z", "l", "s", "t" and "ts". Ukrainian "нь"is transliterated as "ń". Ex.: Василь Гренджа-Донський, Іван Гриць, Торунь are transl. as Vasyl' Grendzha-Dons'kyy, Ivan Hryts', Toruń. Also there is distinction made in the transliteration of Ukrainian "г" and "ґ". The first symbol has been transliterated as "h" — as in English "how" —, while the latter as "g" — as in English "go". Ex.: Губернатор Константин Грабар transl. as Gubernator Konstantyn Hrabar.

For additional examples, see the Index in this book, pp. 465 - 490.

The Czech, German, Magyar, Polish and Slovak names and words were written as they appear in these languages.

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INTRODUCTION

The author of Diplomacy of Double Morality *has accomplished a major feat in writing an important treatise on a very perplexing problem. Carpatho- Ukraine, a part of the Kingdom of Hungary for almost a thousand years until World War I, except for a few short periods, came into history's limelight during the world crisis of 1938-1939.*

It is indeed a miracle that the inhabitants of this region were able to retain their ethnic identity by adhering to the Eastern Rite Catholic Church, which used Church Slavonic in its Liturgy during the long years of occupation. Adding to their plight, was the century-old Magyarization process, which perpetrated wide-spread illiteracy, and the sense of hopelessness and helplessness, climaxing before the outbreak of the First World War.

Professor Stercho traces the development of the Trans-Carpathian region of Ukraine since the end of the 9th century, and presents documentary evidence, proving that the policy of denying proper identity to a subdued people by its oppressor breeds a desire to preserve such an identity. This proof lies in the heroic tale of the unusually rapid growth of national consciousness among the Carpatho-Ukrainian people, their quest for free national development and, most of all, their compelling desire to join their kin brothers across the Carpathian Mountains in one free nation. The story climaxed with their determined demand for the right of self-determination at the end of World War I.

When Ukraine fell prey to her Eastern and Western neighbors in 1919, the leadership of Carpatho-Ukraine decided to unite the province with the newly-formed democratic Czecho-Slovak Republic as an autonomous Ruthenian State. With freshly-won freedom, the people of Carpatho-Ukraine quickly recovered from the oppressive conditions of the past and began to develop their new life based on the principles of self-rule.

In his evaluation of this struggle for political and cultural autonomy, the author provides evidence that a minority people in any

multinational state are forced to fight for their national identity, since the dominating nationality generally tries to assert its overlordship. He shows how this occurred in Carpatho-Ukraine.

The solemn promises of the President of Czecho-Slovakia, Thomas G. Masaryk, to respect the territorial autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine in all Carpatho-Ukrainian ethnic areas, guaranteed by the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, were not respected by the Czech regime and the provisions of the peace treaty were not implemented. Therefore, Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders and their elected representatives to the Czecho-Slovak Parliament fought an up-hill battle to secure these autonomous rights and privileges for their country. The author also points out the abuse of power by the central government in Prague, their attempt to hinder educational processes in the region, and to limit the development of intellectual and political leadership. In the opinion of the author, the only reason that the idea of self-determination was not openly rejected by the Czechs is that Czecho-Slovakia was known to be a state based on democratic principles. His treatment of Carpatho-Ukraine as a Federated State within the reorganized Czecho-Slovak Republic, that emerged in 1938 after the Munich Conference, generates great interest.

The most significant part of this penetrating book deals with the emergence of independent Carpatho-Ukraine, proclaimed in March of 1939 in direct opposition to the wishes and desires of the "almighty" Hitler of Nazi Germany. Here, for the first time in the English language, Professor Stercho describes and analyzes the united Hungarian and Polish effort to destroy Carpatho-Ukraine and establish a common Polish-Hungarian boundary.

The author traces the diplomatic maneuverings to prevent a free Carpatho-Ukraine, not only on the part of Hungary and Poland, but also by Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and the Communist Soviet Union. The attitudes of British, French, Rumanian, and Yugoslav governments concerning this matter are uniquely brought to light. The facts are indeed revealing.

In early March of 1939, Nazi German leadership arranged to "give" the Trans-Carpathian province of Ukraine to Hungary as a prize for Horthy's alliance with the Berlin-Rome Axis. Berlin "advised" the Carpatho-Ukrainian government under the leadership of President A. Voloshyn, of the imminent Hungarian occupation and about the Nazi dictator's desire for them to accept it peacefully. In complete defiance of Hitler's wishes, the Carpatho-Ukrainian government proclaimed the country's independence, and immediately

mobilized resistance forces against the impending invasion. It is an irony of history that the well-organized, well-equipped Czecho-Slovak army offered no resistance to Nazi occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March of 1939. The Carpatho-Ukrainian people, on the other hand, took up arms and defended their newly-won independence, sacrificing the best elements of their region in an uneven struggle.

The Carpatho-Ukrainian government appealed to the conscience of the world, begging for moral support in the struggle against foreign tyranny, led by Horthy with Hitler's blessing. It was of no avail! Dr. Stercho points out that the shortsightedness and selfish interests of countries professing respect for their neighbors' sovereignty, obscured given promises, treaty obligations, and noble principles of self-determination during the Carpatho-Ukrainian crisis.

The occupation and the attempt of the Hungarians to turn the clock of history back and make the people of this Ukrainian province loyal Hungarian subjects failed. Later, the attempt to restore Carpatho-Ukraine to the Czecho-Slovak Republic by Edvard Beneš and his government-in-exile fell through.

During World War II, Carpatho-Ukraine was a political football, tossed around by Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, and the Soviet Union. To appease Stalin, the Czecho-Slovak government-in-exile, headed by Dr. Beneš, expressed its willingness to hand over this territory as a gift to the Kremlin for Stalin's alleged generosity in liberating the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia. Stalin refused to accept this offer. However, in June of 1945, Carpatho-Ukraine was incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The author rightfully concluded that the people of Carpatho-Ukraine finally realized their dream of reunification with their kin brothers in Ukraine, in spite of the fact that this was accomplished by the Soviet Communist totalitarian government. The Carpatho-Ukrainian region ceased to be a political football and now shares the fate of all Ukrainians. Any desire in the future to separate this province from Ukraine will meet resistance of the whole nation and will prove to be a futile attempt.

Historians, as well as political scientists, will benefit immensely from this scholarly work. It provides an answer to the basic question about the most cherished desire of nations — to establish their sovereignty and to live as equals among equals within the framework of an association of free nations. No domination of a nation over another can be considered permanent in nature. Even one thousand years

of systematic destruction of traditions, values, and hopes did not eliminate the basic desires of the Carpatho-Ukrainians.

Another lesson derived from this well-balanced presentation is that equality and liberty are the only ideals for which nations will offer the highest sacrifice. Professor Stercho's book fills the vacuum in scholarly research in this neglected area. The author's systematic, meticulous, investigative, and well-documented approach enriches us with a truly unique publication on this subject.

I am positive that this book will serve as standard reference for students and the general public alike, and will help to eliminate the illusion that a government forcibly imposed on a people has any lasting permanency. It also provides ample evidence of the reservoir of nations, who secured their existence in spite of overwhelming obstacles. The representatives of those nations harboring imperialistic tendencies will find no comfort in reading this book! They may find themselves wondering if their imperialistic plans and actions might not be frustrated some day by those who endure their tyranny in silence, but contempt. When a chance arises, as the case of Carpatho-Ukraine indicated, the bonded people will undo their oppressors and assert their rights to freedom.

This book is partially an eye-witness account. The author was born in the region, where he received his preliminary education, although he completed it at universities elsewhere in Europe and the United States. Having at his command the knowledge of various languages, he was in the position to utilize primary sources to their fullest extent, thus richly contributing to the scholarly works on the history of a region of Ukraine which was once called a "forgotten land."

MICHAEL S. PAP, Ph.D.,
Director, Institute for Soviet and East European Studies,
John Carroll University

April 5, 1971

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
CARPATHO-UKRAINE
VIENNA AWARD BORDER
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
POLAND
HUNGARY
ROMANIA
CARPATHIAN MTS.
Scale 1:700,000
0 5 10 15 20
Km
Uzhok
Volosyanka
Vyshka
Tykhe
Lyuta
Velyke BEREZNE
Male Berezne
Chornoholova
Bukovtsyvo
Lumshury
Polonyna Rivna
Likitsary
Turychky
PERECHYN
Simir
Turya Remeta
Turya Polyana
Poroshkivo
Turya Bystre
Antaliv's'ka Polyana
UZHHOROD
Horyany
Khudlyovo
Kuzmyno
Vysh. Vyznytsya
Seredniye
Kalnyk
Bobovyshchi
Chinadyovo
Velykyy Dil
MUKACHIV (Mukacheve)
Nove Davydkovo
Vel. Luchky
Strabichovo
Goronda
Barkasovo
Zhnyatyno
Fornosh
Barbovo
Makaryovo
IRSHAVA
Ardanovo
Dorobratovo
Zatuzh
Brid
Il'nytsya
Bilky
Lukovo
Imstychevo
Vel. Rakovets'
Mal. Rakovets'
Loza
Silitse
Kivyazhd
Khmil'nyk
Vlakhovo
Chengava
Vel. Komyaly
Vyshniy Shard
Onok
Rokosovo
Vel. Kopanya
Berehy
BEREHOVO
Shalanky
Chotyry Polok
Kvasovo
Oroshyevo
Muzhiyevo
Borzhava
Vary
Vasarosnameny
Turpa
Choma
Oleshnyk
Matiyevo
Ardovets'
Fanchykovo
Nove Selo
Vitok
Trosnyk
Sirma
Sasovo
Petrovo
Chepa
Vel. Palad
Dyakovo
(Vynohradiv)
SEVLYUSH
Veryatsya
Korolevo n.T.
Chornao
Novoselytsya
Gudyaa
Velyatyn
Vyshkova n.T.
Chornyy Ardiv
KHUST
Danylovo
Sokyrnytsya
Kravnykovo
Saldobosh
Iza
Nankovo
Zolotarevo
Koshelyovo
Horinchovo
Kopashnyova
Nyzh. Selyshche
Monastyr
Berezovo
Lypcha
Lypets'ka Polyana
Zadne
Dovhe
Sukha Broňka
Kushnytsya
Lysychovo
Rozsoshe
Kerets'ky
Kamyanka
Zahatya
Zavydovo
Kolodne
Yablonovo
Lalovo
Velykyy Bereznyk
Stroyne
Pasika
Holubynne
Suskovo
Sasivka
Nelipyno
SVALYAVA
Polonyna Borzhava
Polonyna Kuk
Richka
Tyushka
Repynne
Lozyanska
VOLOVE (Mizhhirya)
Soymy
Maydan
Bukovets'o
Huklyve
Votivets'o
Vys. Veretsky
Nyz. Veretsky
Zavadka
Verbyazh
Pidpolozya
Vys. Studene
Nyz. Studene
Skotars'ke
Pylypets'
Izky
Kelechyn
Holyatyn
Toruno
Pryslop
Novoselytsya
Vyshnye Bastre
Synevirs'ka Polyana
Synevir
Kolochava
Vuchkove
Lazy
Vilshany
Nyzh. Bystre
Tereblya
Polonyna Krasna
Zabrod'
Orahovo
Tiomalyovo
Krychovo
Kolodne
Novoselytsya
Vul'khivtsi
Neresnytsya
Tereblya
N. Barovo
Dulovo
Uhlya
Danylovo
Pidplesha
Hanychi
Ternove n.T.
Vonihovo
Rus'ke Pole
Bushtyno
TYACHIV
Bilovarets'
Kryve
Bedevlya
Teresva
Hrushovo
Nyz. Apsha
Ser. Apsha
Vysh. Apsha
Solotvyns'ki Kopal'ni
Solotvyno
SIGHET
Bila Tserkov
Vel. Bychkiv
Rosishka
Kosivs'ka Polyana
Trebushany
Pip Ivan 1940
Slib 1655
Chornohora 2026
Bondan
RAKHIV
Luhy
Bila Tysa
Bilyn
Kvasy
Hoverla 2058
Menchul 1294
Kostrivka
Chorna Tysa
Yasinya
Lazeshchyna
Kukul 1542
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Brustury
Nimets'ka Mokra
Ruska Mokra
Ust'chorna
Polonyns'kyy Svidovets'
Delyatyn
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Mándok
Hat'
Rafaylovo
Borkrad'
Batyovo
Esen
Chop
Mala Dobroń
Vel. Dobroń
Shom
Helmya
Popovo
Kosyno
Blazhiyevo
Yanoshovo
Nove Selo
Didovo
Vasarosnameny
Turpa
Choma
Vary
Borzhava
Muzhiyevo
Kvasovo
Oroshyevo
Chotyry Polok
Shalanky
Berehy
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Ardovets'
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Pidplesha
Hanychi
Ternove n.T.
Vonihovo
Rus'ke Pole
Bushtyno
TYACHIV
Bilovarets'
Kryve
Bedevlya
Teresya

Chapter One

IN QUEST OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The territory which now constitutes the Trans-Carpathian Region of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is probably the least known area in Central Europe.[1] Since the end of the nineth century it was connected in some form with the Kingdom of Hungary. With the application of Wilsonian principle of self-determination, this territory came into political prominence, first after the end of World War I and later during the gradual disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938-1939.

Throughout its history, this land was known by various names. In the eleventh century it was called *Marchia Ruthenorum*[2] and its prince, Emericus, used the title *Dux Ruthenorum*.[3] In the fourteenth century, Theodore Koriyatovych, the Prince of Podolia, became lord of the territory and his dominion was called the Principality of Mukachiv and Makovytsya.[4] After the Kossuth Revolution of 1848, the *comitates* Zemplyn, Uzhhorod, Bereh, Uhocha, and Maramorosh were joined together to form a *Ruthenian District* of which Adolph Dobryans'kyy became governor.[5] During the second half of the nine-

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[1] The territory of Carpatho-Ukraine is located in the center of Europe, between the 47°8' and 49°5' of the northern latitude, and the 21° and 24°6' of the eastern longitude. In general, the territory occupies the southern slopes of the middle part of the elbow of the Carpathian Mountains and the highland which gradually goes over into the great Hungarian Plain. See Dr. František Machat, *Československá Republika: mapa příručni a statistická* (Prague, no date of publication, but sometime between 1919 and 1939).

[2] Dr. N. A. Beskid, *Karpatorusskaja Pravda* (Homestead, Pa., 1932), p. 202.

[3] Vasyl' Pachovs'kyy, *Istoriya Zakarpatya* (Munich, 1946), p. 37. Hereafter cited as: Pachovs'kyy.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[5] Dr. Stepan Baran, *Vesna Narodiv v Avstro-Uhors'kiy Ukrayini* (Munich, 1948), p. 30.

teenth century the country was called unofficially *Uhors'ka Rus'* [6] or Hungarian Ruthenia, whereas the Hungarian Government called this territory *Verkhovyna* (Highland) [7] and in 1918 as *Ruszka Krajna* (Ruthenian Country).[8]

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Carpatho-Ukraine was called officially *The country of the Ruthenes to the south of the Carpathians* or *The territory of the Ruthenians south to the Carpathians.*[9] After this territory was incorporated as an autonomous part of Czecho-Slovakia, the country became known as *Podkarpatská Rus.*[10] In some official and semi-official publications also names *Rusínsko,*[11] *Russinia,*[12] and *Carpathian Russinia* [13] were used, but on April 20, 1920, the Czecho-Slovak Council of Ministers in Prague ordered that the officially established name *Podkarpatská Rus* was not to be translated in the official Czecho-Slovak publications in foreign languages.[14]

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[6] Pachovs'kyy, p. 166. See also Ol. Badan, *Al'manakh suchasnykh pys'mennykiv Zakarpats'koyi Ukrayiny* (Kyyiv, 1929), cited in Antonín Hartl, *Literární obrození podkarpatských Rusínů v letech 1920-1930* (Prague, 1930), p. 10, and Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, *Podkarpatskaya Rus' za hody 1919-1936* (Uzhhorod, 1936), p. 7.

[7] Augustin Stefan, *From Carpatho-Ruthenia to Carpatho-Ukraine* (New York, 1954), p. 17. Hereafter cited as: Stefan, *From Carpatho-Ruthenia.*

[8] László Balogh-Beéry, *A Ruthén Autonómia* (Pécs, 1937), p. 23.

[9] David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris with Documents* (New York, 1924-1926), XIII, 245ff. Hereafter cited as: Miller, *My Diary.*

[10] This official name was first established by the General Statute for the Organization and Administration of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, No. 26.536, of November 18, 1919, and later by the § 3 of the Czecho-Slovak Constitutional Charter of February 29, 1920. See Dr. Emil Sobota, *Národnostní právo československé* (Brno, 1927), pp. 69-70. Hereafter cited as: Sobota, *Národnostní právo;* and Dr. Leo Epstein, *Studienausgabe der Verfassungsgesetze der Tschechoslowakischen Republik* (Reichenberg, 1923), pp. 665-668. Hereafter cited as: Epstein, *Verfassungsgesetze.*

[11] Epstein, *Verfassungsgesetze,* p. 667.

[12] Jiří Hoetzel and V. Joachim, eds., *The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic* (Prague, 1920), p. 22. Hereafter cited as: Hoetzel, *Czechoslovak Constitution.*

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 22.

[14] *Verordnungsblatt des Ministeriums des Innern der Čechoslovakischen Republik* (Prague, 1920), p. 138. Note the two variants of spelling: *Czecho-Slovakia* and *Czechoslovakia.* The first variant has been used officially in the documents of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and re-introduced in October, 1938, in the process of restructuring Czecho-Slovakia as a federation of three equal autonomous States and throughout the Constitutional Act No. 328 of November 22, 1938. Otherwise, the other spelling was in the use.

Between the two World Wars, the country was also called *Pidkarpatya* (Sub-Carpathia),[15] *Zakarpatya* (Trans-Carpathia),[16] *Karpatskaja Rus'*,[17] *Zakarpats'ka Ukrayina* (Trans-Carpathian Ukraine),[18] and *Karpatho-Ukraina.*[19]

Some foreign writers used the names *Ruthenia,*[20] *Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia,*[21] *Carpatho-Ruthenia* [22] and *Ukrainian counties of northern Hungary*[23] in English, and *Ruthénie* and *L'Ukraine subcarpathique*[24] in French, while some of them translated the name *Podkarpatská Rus* as *Sub-Carpatho-Russia* or *Carpatho-Russia* in English,[25] *L'Russie subcarpathique* in French [26] and *Karpathenrussland* in German.[27]

It should be stated that some sources used the name *Ukraina* for this territory long before the term Carpatho-Ukraine was accepted. In a letter of 1619, the Polish King Sigismund called the territory *Hungarian Ukraine,* and the Jesuit priest in Mukachiv, Rev. S. Miley, in his letter to Father M. Mitkevich in Cracow of October 3, 1662, wrote of *Muncaciensis Ukraina.*[28]

Most of the enumerated names were given to the country by foreigners. The term *Carpatho-Ukraine* was introduced by the auto-

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[15] Pavlo Yatsko, "Spomyny pro pershi zbory Prosvity" in Z *nahody desyatylitnyoho yuvileyu istnovanya Prosvity na Pidkarpats'kiy Rusy* (Uzhhorod, 1930), p. 3.

[16] Osyp Rostots'kyy, "Zakarpatya," *Rozbudova Natsiyi* (Prague, 1931), IV, p. 79.

[17] Delegacija Karpatorusskoho Sojuza, *Karpatskaja Rus' v Češskom Jarmi.* A pamphlet published in the USA, without date and place of publishing.

[18] A. Hartl, *op. cit.,* p. 3; also Pachovs'kyy, p. 170.

[19] Dr. Dmytro Lewicki, "Die ukrainische Frage," *Nation und Staat* (Vienna, October 1927), I, 271.

[20] C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (London, 1937), p. 200. Hereafter cited as: Macartney.

[21] Oscar Jászi, "The Problem of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia" in Robert J. Kerner, ed., *Czechoslovakia: Twenty Years of Independence* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1940), p. 193.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 193.

[23] Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1953), p. 53.

[24] Benoist-Méchin, *L'Ukraine* (Paris, 1941), p. 118.

[25] Michael Yuhasz, Sr., *Wilson's Principles in Czechoslovak Practice* (Homestead, Pa., 1929), p. 7.

[26] L'Office de Statistique de la République Tchécoslovaque, *Recensement de la population dans la République Tchécoslovaque* (Prague, 1925), Tome II, 3e partie, p. 49.

[27] Hans Ballreich, *Karpathenrussland: ein Kapitel tschechischen Nationalitaetenrechtes und tschechischer Nationalitaetenpolitik* (Heidelberg, 1938), p. 1. Hereafter cited as: Ballreich.

[28] Stefan, *From Carpatho-Ruthenia,* p. 18.

nomous Government,[29] which ruled the country from October, 1938, until the Hungarian occupation in March, 1939. Consequently, we shall use the name Carpatho-Ukraine and refer to the native population as Ukrainians or Carpatho-Ukrainians, thus distinguishing them from Ukrainians of other territories.

The political boundaries of Carpatho-Ukraine were established by the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. In the North and the East they were identical with the old boundaries established between Hungary and Galicia in 1387, and in 1919 between Czecho-Slovakia and Poland.[30] In the South her border with Rumania extended from the peak Stih (1655 m.) in the Carpathian Mountains south-westward to the junction of the Vyshava River and the Tysa River, proceeded westward along the Tysa River to a point West of the town of Tyachiv, where the boundary turned South of the Tysa River. The boundary then followed the chain of Gutyn Mountains to a point about 15 km South of the city of Khust, where the border turned South-West to the Tur River. The border with Hungary began on the Tur River and turned North to the Tysa River, extending approximately 20 km westward along the Tysa River to the 22°57' eastern longitude. Here the border turned north-westward to the Borzhava River about 15 km West of the city of Berehovo, and then turned North-West along the Borzhava River Valley to the city of Chop. Near Chop there was a junction of the Carpatho-Ukrainian, Hungarian and Slovak borders.[31] These boundaries of Carpatho-Ukraine were identical with the Czecho-Slovak boundaries in that part of the Republic, and now they are identical with the present border between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Hungary and Rumania.

The Western temporary border between the autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine and Czecho-Slovakia proper[32] was established as a demarcation line by the Territorial Commission of the Paris Peace Conference and extended from the city of Chop along the Uzh River

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[29] Dr. o. Avhustyn Voloshyn, Premier Minister, "Do Hromadyan Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny" — a proclamation signed on November 3, 1938, — in *Natsionalist* (New York), November 16, 1938.

[30] Stefan, *From Carpatho-Ruthenia,* p. 14.

[31] Dr. František Machat, *op. cit.*; see also H. W. V. Temperley, ed., *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1921), V, pp. 185-186.

[32] In the beginning, Czech and Slovak leaders thought only to establish Czecho-Slovak State on the territories of historical Kingdom of Bohemia, Marchduchy of Moravia, and Slovakia. The question of inclusion of Carpatho-Ukraine in that State was brought up by T. G. Masaryk only "after the defeat of Russia." See Thomas G. Masaryk, *The Making of a State* (London, 1927), p. 239.

to the Carpathians.[33] This demarcation line remained as a temporary administrative border between the *Land Podkarpatská Rus* and the *Land Slovensko* until the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia in March, 1939.

This border was the subject of a permanent dispute along with Ukrainian demands for the realization of legal provisions for Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy. In 1930, in the administrative territory of Slovakia westward of the above-mentioned border, 213,725 Greek Catholics were residing,[34] and they were claimed by the Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders as Ukrainians.[35] However, the official census of 1930 showed only 91,079 Ukrainians living in that territory, popularly called *Pryashivshchyna, Pryashivs'ka Rus', and Pryashivs'ka Ukrayina.*[36] Thus, the Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders claimed that the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine should have also included the Sharysh-Zemplyn region or Pryashivshchyna of about 2,000 square miles, as well as the Maramorosh Syhit region of about 500 square miles which had been held by Rumania since 1919.[37]

> These three parts, divided by boundaries of three states, but forming historically, geographically and economically an integral unit, constitute the minimum area of Carpatho-Ukraine. The whole covers about 7,500 square miles and has over 1,200,000 inhabitants, of which nearly 75% are Ukrainians.[38]

However, there are other areas which were historically, religiously and racially united with Carpatho-Ukraine, but which lost their Ukrainian character because of assimilation, which began in the middle of the nineteenth century. These are: the Spish area in Czecho-Slovakia, the Maria Pócs area of the Haydudorog Diocese in

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[33] Sobota, *Národnostní právo,* p. 69.

[34] Statistisches Staatsamt, *Statistisches Jahresbuch der Čechoslovakischen Republik* (Prague, 1934), p. 12.

[35] "Memorandum presented to Lord Runciman in Prague on the 13th of September, 1938, by Peter Židovsky and Dr. Ivan Pješčak, members of the Czechoslovak Parliament" in Delegacija Karpatorusskoho Sojuza, *Karpatskaja Rus' v Češskom Jarmi,* pp. 23-25. See also Yuhasz, *Wilson's Principles in Czechoslovak Practice,* pp. 37-38.

[36] Stefan, *From Carpatho-Ruthenia,* p. 12.

[37] *Ibid.,* p. 12; see also Yuhasz, *Wilson's Principles,* pp. 37-38; Beskid, *Karpatskaja Rus',* p. 19; and "Memorandum presented to Lord Runciman by Peter Židovsky and Dr. Ivan Pješčak," *op. cit.*

[38] Stefan, *op. cit.,* p. 13.


Ukrainian S S R
Carpatho-Ukraine
(shaded)
Scale 1:4,500.000
U K R A I N I A N
R S R
P O L A N D
R O M A N I A
M O L D A V I A N S S R
C z e c h o - S l o v a k i a
H u n g a r y
S S R
R S F S R
K y i v
Zhytomyr
L'viv
Ivano-Frankivs'k
Uzhhorod
Mukachiv
Tchernivtsi
Kirovohrad
Kryvyy Rih
Dnipropetrovs'k
Zaporizhzha
Poltava
Kharkiv
Luhans'k
Donets'k
Mykolayiv
Khersون
Odesa
Simferopil'
Kerch
O z i v s'k e
M o r e
C h o r n e
M o r e
Wisła
Dnister
Prut
Dnipro
Bug
Donets
Don
Vorskla
Sula

Hungary, and a narrow strip around Biskad in Satu Mare county in Rumania.[39]

We shall deal primarily with that area which according to Czecho-Slovak Law Nr. 125/27 Sb. z. a n. of July 14, 1927, was known as administrative Land *Podkarpatská Rus*, and according to the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of November 21, 1949, constitutes the Trans-Carpathian Region of the Ukrainian SSR.

POPULATION

Carpatho-Ukraine is overwhelmingly populated by Ukrainians; however, she has several national minorities of considerable size that are concentrated in the cities. There is, for example, a rather sizable Hungarian minority which, between 1920-1938, was concentrated in the border area of the city of Berehovo as well as in the cities of Uzhhorod and Mukachiv. Due to the pre-World War I policy of the Hungarian government, the Magyar minority was economically, culturally, and socially in a privileged [40] and therefore stronger position in comparison with the native Ukrainian population. This minority also had a full opportunity to maintain its cultural, economic, and social position after World War I, because of guarantees of the "Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czecho-Slovakia" signed on September 10, 1919,[41] on the one hand, and of their ability to make use of all democratic institutions of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, on the other hand.

The second largest national minority in Carpatho-Ukraine are the Jews. The Jewish settlements in Carpatho-Ukraine are comparatively recent. They came in large numbers in the nineteenth century from Poland,[42] and spread throughout the Ukrainian population as

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[39] *Ibid.*, p. 13; see also: Yuhasz, *Wilson's Principles*, p. 46; Oscar Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago, 1929), pp. 163, 257, 317, and 327; Hereafter cited as Jászi, *Dissolution of Monarchy;* Dr. Volodymyr Kubiyovych, "L'udnist" in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina: Geografiya — Istoriya — Kul'tura* (L'viv, 1939), pp. 38-39; and Dr. Robert Nowak, *Der kuenstliche Staat* (Oldenburg i. O., 1938), pp. 27, 38, 44.

[40] Jászi, *Dissolution of Monarchy*, pp. 327 ff. and 440 ff.

[41] "Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czecho-Slovakia, signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, September 10, 1919" in H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1921), V, p. 461. Hereafter cited as: *Treaty of St. Germain.*

[42] According to Prof. Dr. A. Petrov, *Příspěvky k historické demografie Slovenska v XVIII — XIX století* (Prague, 1928), p. 14, there were in the whole Kingdom of Hungary in 1785 only 75,000 Jews (0.95% of the population),

shop-keepers, craftsmen, and sometimes as farmers. The largest Jewish communities were concentrated in the towns. In 1921, among the citizens living in the city of Mukachiv there were 42.75% Jews, in the city of Uzhhorod 19.37% Jews, and in Berehovo 21.56% Jews.[43] Because the 1910 population census of Austria-Hungary did not list the Jews as a separate nationality, the percentage of Magyar nationality had increased, especially in the major cities. The number of Jews decreased during World War II as a result of the policies of the German Nazi forces.

In four villages, Serednya Apsha, Nyzhnya Apsha, Bila Tserkov, and Solotvyna, located on the right bank of the Tysa River, approximately 13,000 Rumanians are living. They maintain cultural relations with their kin across the Rumanian border.

German colonists, numbering 13,249 (in 1930) were concentrated in the villages of Nimets'ka Mokra and Ustchorna in the Teresva River valley, and several other small villages in the Latorytsya River valley.[44] Throughout the centuries, the German settlements "retained their national character almost untouched." [45]

The Czechs came to Carpatho-Ukraine only after World War I. Initially they came as officials, settling in the administrative centers which were at the same time business centers. About 51% of them were living in the twelve district (*okres*) centers, the rest in the rayon notariate centers. After the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia in March, 1939, and the Hungarian occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine, the Czechs were forced to leave the country.[46]

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and in 1880 the number of Jews increased to around 600,000 or 5.11% of the total population. And, according to Dr. Jiří Kral, *Podkarpatská Rus* (Prague, 1924), p. 61, at the end of the seventeenth century there was only one single Jewish family in the Comitat of Uzhhorod, in 1783 there were counted on the same territory 1,460 Jews, in 1830 — 5,627 persons of Jewish nationality (5.33% of the total population). As far as we know, in 1930 there were 91,229 Jews in Carpatho-Ukraine or 12.87% of her total population.

[43] Statistisches Staatsamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Čechoslovakischen Republik* (Prague, 1937), pp. 580 — 586.

[44] Dr. Volodymyr Kubiyovych, "L'udnist" in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina: Geografiya — Istoriya — Kul'tura* (L'viv, 1939), p. 36. Hereafter cited as: Kubiyovych in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina.*

[45] J. B. Heisler and J. E. Mellon, *Under the Carpathians: Home of a Forgotten People* (London, 1946), p. 70. Hereafter cited as: Heisler, *Under the Carpathians.*

[46] Volodymyr Kubiyovych, *Geografiya Ukrayins'kykh i Sumezhnykh Zemel',* 2nd ed. (L'viv, 1943), p. 327. Hereafter cited as: Kubiyovych, *Geografiya.*

Since the Czecho-Slovak censuses of February 15, 1921, and of December 1, 1930, listed Czechs and Slovaks as a single Czecho-slovak nationality, we do not possess official statistical data about Slovaks living in Carpatho-Ukraine during this time. According to the Hungarian census of 1910 there were only 4,057 Slovaks in the

TABLE 1

POPULATION OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE
ACCORDING TO ITS NATIONALITY AFFILIATIONS[1]
IN THE YEARS OF 1910, 1921, 1930 AND 1938

Nationality of citizens	Absolute numbers of inhabitants			
	1910	1921	1930	1938[2]
Ukrainians	319,361	372,500	446,916	413,481
Magyars	169,434	103,690	109,472	25,894
Jews[3]	——	79,715	91,225	65,828
Czechs and Slovaks[4]	4,057	19,775	33,961	17,495
Germans	62,187	10,326	13,249	8,715
Rumanians	15,387	10,810	12,641	12,641
Gypsies	——	——	1,357	——
Poles	——	298	159	78
Yugoslavs	——	——	69	——
Other	1,062	617	50	627
Total of citizens	571,488	597,731	709,129	544,759
Foreigners	——	6,862	16,228[5]	——
Total of inhabitants	571,488	604,593	725,357	544,759

[1] Basis for nationality affiliation taken as follows: in the census of 1910 the language of communication; in the censuses of 1921 and 1930 the mother tongue.

[2] Estimates on the basis of 1930 census, Dec. 1, 1938.

[3] In the Austro-Hungarian census of 1910 the Jews were not counted as a separate nationality; they were listed either as Germans or Magyars.

[4] In the census of 1910 this number was listed as Slovaks; in the censuses of 1921 and 1930 both the Czechs and Slovaks were listed as the Czecho-slovaks.

[5] The 16,228 foreigners were citizens of the following countries: Hungary — 4,747; Poland — 4,670; Rumania 2,965; Yugoslavia — 290; USA — 204; Italy — 164; Austria — 152; Bulgaria — 129; Germany — 78; USSR — 58; others — 152; and Stateless (including citizenship not declared) — 2,579.

Sources: L'Office de Statistique de la République Tchécoslovaque, *Recensement de la population dans la République Tchécoslovaque le 15 février 1921* (Prague, 1925), II, 362-363; Statistisches Staatsamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Čechoslovakischen Republik* (Prague, 1934), p. 11.

[47] Yuhasz, *Wilson's Principles*, p. 48.

territory of Carpatho-Ukraine (East of the administrative Czecho-Slovak border). It is to be assumed that among the numbers of Czechoslovaks listed in 1921 as 19,775, and in 1930 as 33,961, Slovaks are included but their numbers were far below those of the Czechs, because the number of Czechs in the civil service in Carpatho-Ukraine was much higher than that of the Slovaks.[47]

TABLE 2

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE IN THE YEARS OF 1910, 1921 AND 1930 AND AFTER CESSION OF TERRITORY IN 1938

Nationality	Percentages of total of inhabitants			
			1930	
	1910	1921	before cession	after in 1938
Ukrainians	55.88	62.32	63.02	75.90
Magyars	29.65	17.34	15.44	4.75
Jews	—	13.34	12.78	12.08
Czechoslovaks	0.71	3.31	4.79	3.21
Germans	10.88	1.73	1.87	1.60
Rumanians	2.69	1.81	1.78	2.32
Gypsies	—	—	0.19	—
Poles	—	0.05	0.02	0.02
Yugoslavs	—	—	0.01	—
Others	0.19	0.10	0.01	0.12
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Sources: As indicated in Table 1.

Among other ethnic groups, Table 1 shows that in accordance with the 1930 census, 1,357 Gypsies were living in Carpatho-Ukraine. This small number of Gypsies is worth mentioning, because their status in Carpatho-Ukraine was unique. Like their kin in other countries in Central Europe, many of them lived a semi-nomadic life, but there were also Gypsy settlements with permanent residents on the outskirts of Uzhhorod and other larger towns of Carpatho-Ukraine.[48] The small number of Poles, 159, and Yugoslavs, 69, were

[48] Heisler, *Under the Carpathians*, pp. 88-94; see also *Nova Svoboda* (Khust), February 10, 1939. Gypsies came to Carpatho-Ukraine in the XIII century, and they entertained the public playing on musical instruments, fortune-telling and, occasionally, working as blacksmiths. But Carpatho-Ukraine was the only country, where Gypsies had their own national school, namely in Uzhhorod, with their Romany language of instruction, and a systematic education. There were Gypsies in Carpatho-Ukraine by 1938 who already possessed academic degrees.

insignificant among the national minorities of Carpatho-Ukraine. Most of the Bulgarians lived in the cities of Uzhhorod and Mukachiv and cultivated vegetables for the local market.

As has been shown in Table 1, 16,228 foreigners were living in Carpatho-Ukraine. According to the census of 1930, the nationality affiliations of these non-citizens were as follows: 39.03% Magyars, 24.70% Russians and Ukrainians, 23.13% Jews, 3.42% Germans, 3.39% Czechoslovaks, 2.78% Poles, and 3.55% of other nationalities.[49]

"The bulk of the population" of Carpatho-Ukraine "is and always has been Ukrainian." [50] It is "a small branch of the Ukrainian people." [51] They are of the same stock as the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia, from whom they were divided by the Carpathians.[52] The political and administrative separation between the Ukrainian population of Carpatho-Ukraine and Galicia resulted in different living conditions, and also some frictions in Carpatho-Ukraine. The pre-World War I Hungarian policy of Magyarization created the basis for the Russophile tendencies among the Carpatho-Ukrainians, and the Russian propaganda, without any doubt, played a part in it.[53] The cultural backwardness [54] and the economic poverty [55] of the population hampered the development of a national unity.

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[49] Statistiches Staatsamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Čechoslovakischen Republik* (Prague, 1927), p. 9.

[50] Clarence A. Manning, "The Linguistic Question in Carpatho-Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* (New York, 1954), Vol. X, p. 247.

[51] Heisler, *Under the Carpathians*, p. 7. Also see Volodymyr Hnatyuk, "V spravi literaturnoyi movy pidkarpats'kykh rusyniv" in Mykola Mushynka et al., ed., *Naukovyy Zbirnyk prysvyachenyy pamyati Volodymyra Hnatyuka* (Svidník, 1967), pp. 17-27.

[52] Edvard Beneš in his speech on February 5, 1919, at the Paris Peace Conference; see Miller, *My Diary*, XIV, p. 211; also Jászi, *Dissolution of Monarchy*, pp. 391 — 393.

[53] Jászi, *Dissolution of Monarchy*, pp. 392-393.

[54] Stanislav Klíma, "Zeměpisný obzor Podkarpatské Rusi" in J. Chmelař, *Podkarpatská Rus* (Prague, 1923), on the page 24 writes that in 1910 there were in the District Uzh 53%, in the District Bereh 57%, in the District Uhocha 48%, and in the District Maramorosh only 27% of the people over six years of age able to read and write.

[55] For the economic situation in Carpatho-Ukraine at the end of the 19th century see Edmund Egan's *Memorandum*, published partly in Pachovs'kyy, p. 175, and in Volodymyr Ohonovs'kyy, "Vozzyednana Zemlya," *Zhytya v Zakhidnykh Oblastyakh Ukrayiny* (Kyyiv, 1946), Vol. II, pp. 12-13; also Jászi, *Dissolution of Monarchy*, pp. 220-239.

Long after the population of Galicia became conscious of their national identity, far too large a part of the population of Carpatho-Ukraine was still content to call themselves Rusins, Rusnaks or even natives and avoid too clear definition of their racial stock.[56]

TABLE 3

POPULATION OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE ACCORDING TO ITS PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS IN THE YEARS OF 1921, 1930 AND 1938

Profession	Feb. 15, 1921		Dec. 1, 1930		Dec. 1, 1938	
	Persons	%	Persons	%	Persons	%
Farming, Forestry and Fishing	410,705	67.7	480,856	66.3	402,710	72.9
Manufacturing	64,100	10.6	86,590	11.9	55,240	10.0
Commerce	43,230	7.1	41,550	5.7	23,892	4.3
Communication			23,094	3.2	15,917	2.9
Public Service and Free Professions	25,974	4.3	30,072	4.2	18,021	3.3
Military Forces			7,703	1.1		
Household and Personal Service			4,101	0.6		
Other occupations	62,554	10.3	26,056	3.6	36,344	6.6
Unknown			25,335	3.4		
Total	606,568	100	725,357	100	552,124	100

Sources: The data per February 15, 1921, were taken from Statistisches Staatsamt, *Statistische Uebersicht der Čechoslovakischen Republik* (Prague, 1930), p. 21. There is a slight difference in the population total of Carpatho-Ukraine shown in this official source and the official source cited in the Table 1, above, regarding the census of February 15, 1921.

The data per December 1, 1930, and per December 1, 1938, taken from Kubiyovych in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina*, p. 46. Again, there is a slight difference in total numbers of the population in Carpatho-Ukraine after the cession of territory to Hungary on November 2, 1938, between this source and Joseph S. Roucek, "Czechoslovakia and Her Minorities" in Robert J. Kerner, *Czechoslovakia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1940), p. 187, which shows the total population of Carpatho-Ukraine after the cession of territory to Hungary, numbering 544,759 persons. Since there was no official census of the population taken in Carpatho-Ukraine by that time, the numbers in both sources should be regarded as the estimations.

[56] Clarence A. Manning, "The Linguistic Question in Carpatho-Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* (New York, 1954), X, p. 249; see also Dr. Ivan Pankevič, "Jazykova otázka v Podkarpatské Rusi" in J. Chmelař, *Podkarpatská Rus* (Prague, 1923), p. 31. The identity of the population of Carpatho-Ukraine with that of Galicia is proved by the fact that on both sides of the Carpathian Mountains are living the same ethnic kins, *Hutsuly*, *Boyky*, and *Lemky*.

According to the Czecho-Slovak census, the percentage of the Ukrainian population in the four individual districts (*župa*) of Carpatho-Ukraine before the annexation of certain territory by Hungary in November, 1938, was as follows: in the district of Uzhhorod — consisting of four counties (*okres*) 71.25%; in the district of Mukachiv — consisting of six counties — 80.33%; in the district of Maramorosh — consisting of three counties — 72.66%; and, in the three counties of the district of Berehovo — 75%, whereas in two other counties of the district of Berehovo, namely the county of Berehovo itself and the county of Kosyno, the Ukrainian population was in a minority of 13% and 2% respectively.[57] These two counties were ceded to Hungary in November, 1938.

In the autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine at the end of 1938 and in the early part of 1939, there were twenty-one communities (from a total of 390) that possessed a Ukrainian minority. There were four Rumanian villages, seven small German colonies, and four communities with a Magyar majority (in three of these, the Magyars constituted relative majorities). The Czechs and Slovaks together were in the majority in five communities, and the Jews possessed a relative majority in one community.[58]

According to the census of 1930, there were the following religious denominations: 359,167 Greek Catholics or 49.52% of the total population; 69,262 (9.54%) Roman Catholics, thus, summarily there were 428,429 Catholics or 59.06% of the total population; 112,034 (15.44%) Orthodox, 102,542 (14.14%) Jewish, 74,173 (10.23%) Protestants of various denominations,[59] 4,953 (0.68%) Confessionless, and 3,226 (0.45%) others.[60]

The Greek Catholics and Orthodox were of Ukrainian nationality, the Roman Catholics were of Czech, Slovak, Magyar, and German nationalities, and almost all Protestants were Magyars.[61]

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[57] Osyp Rostots'kyy, "Zakarpatya," *Rozbudova Natsiyi* (Prague, 1931), IV, p. 81.

[58] Kubiyovych in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina,* p. 28.

[59] Among the Protestant denominations, by far the most numerous were the Reformed, numbering 70,833, mostly Calvinists; there were also 933 Bohemian Brothers, and 85 German Evangelics.

[60] Statistisches Staatsamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Čechoslovakischen Republik* (Prague, 1934), p. 12. Among the "others" there were 2,218 persons, mostly Czechs, belonging to the so-called Czechoslovak religion, a kind of civic religion.

[61] Osyp Rostots'kyy, "Zakarpatya," *Rozbudova Natsiyi* (Prague, 1931), IV, p. 81.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS UNDER HUNGARIAN DOMINATION

Before World War I, Carpatho-Ukraine was integral part of the Kingdom of Hungary. The Ukrainian people "were without doubt the most backward element of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, a real stepchild, in a state of slow starvation, alcoholism, and enormous illiteracy." [62] An English observer, C. A. Macartney, wrote in 1937:

> Ruthenia was really treated by the Magyars as a great deer-forest..... The Ruthenes were not thought fit for any better employment than lumbering, acting as ghillies on the huge deer forests which covered most of the country, or scratching a miserable livelyhood out of the tiny plots left to them under the shadow of the trees. Only the nobleman or his bailiff driving to the castle passed between long rows of cabins built of log or clay, with floors of beaten earth and chimneyless roofs of decaying thatch; the smoke, eddying through the single room, revealed dim outlines of a promiscuous crowd of cows and children, geese and grandparents.[63]

Another observer, the Irishman Edmund Egan, studied the economic situation of the population, and in 1897 prepared and submitted to the Government a Memorandum concerning the situation of the Ukrainian peasants in Hungary. He wrote:

> The whole Hungarian Subcarpathia is inhabited now by the landless peasants, who do not possess enough farming land needed for the supply of the food for their families. These poor peasants could live on the breeding of the cattle, but they do not have enough pastures, nor meadows... These peasant people die. The Ruthenian peasant does not eat the year round either meat, or eggs, save he drinks some milk, and on the great Holyday he eats a piece of rye or wheat bread. Otherwise, his food consists of oat bread and, as long as he has, potatoes. One falls in despair seeing these dying people.[64]

Noticing the mass emigration of the population to the oversea countries, this same writer observed in the cited document: "Now, one could already predict the day, in which the last Ruthenian will run away from the country." At the same time, there existed large *latifundies* of 341,280 acres held by Count Schoenborn which were used exclusively for hunting purposes. The Schoenborn estate, "like

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[62] Oscar Jászi, "The Problem of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia" in Robert J. Kerner, *Czechoslovakia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1940), p. 196.

[63] C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (London, 1937), pp. 202 and 205.

[64] Pachovs'kyy, pp. 174-175; see also Ohonovs'kyy, *op. cit.*, p. 12, and J. Chmelař, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

a little medieval state, included some two hundred villages" and "the most vital interests of 70,000 Ruthenian peasants were sacrificed to the estate." [65] An influential publicist of Hungary, Nicholas Bartha, who was close to official Magyar politics, wrote in 1901 about the extensive hunting economy and carelessness of the officials concerning the living conditions of the Ukrainian peasants as follows:

> The sovereign stag should not be disturbed in its family affairs... What is a Ruthenian compared with it? ...only a peasant... The hunting period lasts two weeks... For this pastime, 70,000 Ruthenians must be doomed to starvation by the army of the officials... The deer and the wild boar destroy the corn, the potatoes, and the clover of the Ruthenians (the whole harvest of his tiny lot of half an acre)... Their whole yearly work is destroyed... The people sow and the deer of the estate harvest... It is easy to say that the peasant should complain... But where and to whom? Those who have the power he sees always together. The village chief, the deputy sheriff, the sheriff, the district judge, the tax-officer, the forester, the steward, and the manager, all are men of the same education, of the same social pleasures, and of the same standard... From whom could he hope for justice? [66]

As a result of this situation, the Ukrainian peasants had begun by 1880 a mass emigration first to Brazil, and then to the United States of America and Canada. By 1897 about 200,000 Carpatho-Ukrainians had already settled in Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Kentucky, Illinois, and Indiana, as well as in the Province of Alberta in Canada.[67] It should be noted, however, that following the report of Edmund Egan, the Hungarian Minister of Agriculture, Darányi, introduced some reforms intended to improve the economic conditions of the peasants in the districts of Bereh, Maramorosh, Uzh and Zemplyn.[68]

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[65] Jászi, *Dissolution of Monarchy,* pp. 234-235.

[66] Nicholas Bartha, *In the Land of the Kazars,* published in 1901 in the Hungarian language, cited in Jászi, *Dissolution of Monarchy,* p. 235. The "Kazar" was the nickname for the Jewish usurers. The extent of the usury may be shown by the simple fact that the usurers loaned money to the peasants at a rate not less than 30% interest. Edmund Egan in his above cited Memorandum stated that the Jews "having in their hands the whole trade of the country, they control the whole economic life of the Ruthenian peasants. In every village, even the smallest one, there is a certain number of Jews, ...who divided the simple peasant population among themselves, and every Jew has his own peasants, while every peasant has his own Jew, without whom he cannot either buy or sell anything." This citation taken from Prof. Dr. Karel Kadlec, *Podkarpatská Rus,* p. 20, cited in S. Klíma, "Zeměpisný obzor Podkarpatské Rusi" in J. Chmelař, *Podkarpatská Rus* (Prague, 1923), pp. 24-25.

[67] Pachovs'kyy, pp. 169-170.

[68] *Ibid.,* p. 176.

AMERICAN RUTHENIANS FOR LIBERATION OF THEIR NATIVE COUNTRY

The representatives of the Ruthenian organizations met on July 13, 1918, in McKeesport, Pennsylvania, and decided to establish the Ruthenian National Council of America, which would represent the political interests of the Ruthenian people. This meeting was prompted by important events of the era: the defeat of Austro-Hungary was a fast-approaching reality, and President Woodrow Wilson had enunciated his Fourteen Point Program to the Congress on January 8, 1918. In Point Ten of this message the President had stated that "the peoples of Austro-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." [69] President Wilson had also proclaimed the Four Cardinal Principles for the peace settlement (address to Congress on February 11, 1918) and had thus established the basis for the principle of self-determination of peoples.[70]

Ten days later, on July 23, 1918, the representatives of the Ruthenian communities in the United States met in the first Congress of the Ruthenian National Council of America in Homestead, Pennsylvania, and accepted the following resolution:

1. The Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians should be granted full independence. If this would be impossible, then
2. the Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians should be united with their brethren in Galicia and in Bukovyna. In case this also would not be possible, then they should
3. receive their autonomy.[71]

On October 21, 1918, the Presidium of this Council headed by Gregory I. Zhatkovych presented a Memorandum to President Woodrow Wilson together with the Minutes and the text of these resolutions of the American Ruthenians, asking him for support for their cause. President Wilson replied that, in his opinion, neither the first nor the second proposal of the American Ruthenians for the solution of the Carpatho-Ukrainian problem would receive the

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[69] The Union League Club of Chicago, *The Bases of Durable Peace as Voiced by President Wilson* (Chicago, 1918), p. 16.

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

[71] Epstein, *Verfassungsgesetze*, p. 90.

support of the Allied Powers at the Peace Conference.[72] Thereafter, Zhatkovych concentrated his efforts to secure at least an autonomy for Carpatho-Ukraine.

Point Three of the resolutions adopted at the Ruthenian Congress in Homestead, Pennsylvania, did not specify in which state the autonomy to Carpatho-Ukraine should be given. This fact gave a free hand to the leaders of the Ruthenian National Council of America to approach Professor Thomas G. Masaryk and seek the union of Carpatho-Ukraine with the future Czecho-Slovak State. On October 23, 1918, the Ruthenians joined the Mid-European Union led by Thomas G. Masaryk, and were represented in it by Gregory Zhatkovych, who along with the representatives of other Mid-European nationalities signed on October 26, 1918, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the Declaration of Independence of the Oppressed Mid-European Peoples.[73] Soon after his arrival in the United States, Thomas G. Masaryk contacted the Ruthenian leaders. On October 25, 1918, Gregory Zhatkovych met with Professor Masaryk in the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. These men decided to initiate steps toward the incorporation of Carpatho-Ukraine into the new Czecho-Slovak Republic on an autonomous basis.[74] The decision of this meeting resulted in the Second Resolution of the Ruthenian National Council of America of November 19, 1918, adopted at Scranton, Pa., containing the following:

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[72] Dr. Edvard Beneš, *Rech o podkarpatorusskoy probleme* (Uzhhorod, 1934), p. 15. It is assumed that President Wilson's position in this matter has been influenced by Thomas G. Masaryk, who arrived in the United States from Russia and Ukraine. In Ukraine, Masaryk discussed the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine with the Ukrainian State leaders. See Dr. T. G. Masaryk, *The Making of a State* (London, 1927), pp. 238-241; also Ballreich, p. 9.

[73] Masaryk, *op. cit.*, p. 239. To the Mid-European Union belonged: the Albanians, Carpatho-Ukrainians, Greeks, Italian Irridentists, Lithuanians, Palestine Jews, Poles, Rumanians, Slovaks, Ukrainians, and Yugoslavs.

[74] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 15. Masaryk stated in his above cited book (p. 239) that Nicholas Pachuta was the one who first approached him with a proposal of joining of Carpatho-Ukraine with Czecho-Slovakia. N. Pachuta "belonged to the pro-Russian school," and it is to be assumed that his primary interest was to prevent the union of Carpatho-Ukraine with the Western Ukrainian Republic, establishment of which has been decided by the Ukrainian National Council in L'viv on October 19, 1918. The Ukrainians claimed the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine and sent their troops to occupy it. See Jan Opočenský, *Konec Monarchie Rakousko-Uherské* (Prague, 1928), pp. 753-754; and, Dr. Robert Nowak, *Der künstliche Staat* (Oldenburg i. O., 1938), p. 179.


ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF HUNGARY IN 1914
with
UKRAINIAN ETHNIC DISTRICTS and
DISTRICTS with MAGYARIZED and SLOVAKIZED
RUTHENIAN POPULATION
SCALE 1:2,500,000
AUSTRIA
ROMANIA
JUGOSLAVIA
ADRIATIC SEA
WIEN
Bratislava
Budapest
Beograd
Graz
Ljubljana
Zagreb
Bucuresti
ARVA
LIPTO
SPISH
SHARYSH
ZEMPLYN
TURÓC
TRENCIN
NITRA
BARS
ZVOLEN
GEMER
ABAUJ TORNA
UZH
BERGEN
MARAMOROSH
HONT
NÓGRÁD
NEVES
HEVES
SZABOLCS
SZATMÁR
MOSON
SOPRON
GYŐR
KOMÁROM
ESZTERGOM
MAJUR
JÁSZ NAGYKUN SZOLNOK
BIHAR
SZILÁGY
SZOLNOK DOBOKA
BESZTERCE NASZÓD
VAS
VESZPRÉM
FEJÉR
PEST-PILIS-SOLT-KISKUN
KOLOZS
MAROS TORDA
CSIK
ZALA
SOMOGY
TOLNA
BÉKÉS
CSONGRÁD
ARAD
TORDA-ARANYOS
ALSÓ-FEHÉR
KÜKÜLLŐ
UDVARHELY
VARAZD
BJELOVAR
KRIŽEVCI
BARANYA
TEMES
HUNYAD
NAGY-KÜKÜLLŐ
HÁROMSZÉK
SZEKELY
FOGARAS
BRASSÓ
ZAGREB
VIROVITICA
BÁCS-BODROG
TURONTÁL
KRASSÓ-SZORÉNY
MORBUS-FIUME
POZSEGA
SZERÉM
LIKA-KORBAVA

The Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians join the Czecho-Slovak Republic as a State on the federative basis with far-reaching autonomous rights, under the condition that all originally Ruthenian Sub-Carpathian Districts, namely Spish, Sharysh, Zemplyn, Abauy, Gömör, Borshod, Uzh, Uhocha, Bereh and Maramorosh must belong to our country.[75]

Thereafter, the Ruthenian National Council of America put the question "With which state should the Hungarian Ruthenians, as an independent nation with fullest degree of self-government, unite: the Czecho-Slovak Republic or the Ukrainian Republic?" in a plebiscite to the Carpatho-Ukrainians in the United States organized in their religious, fraternal, and civic societies. Each religious congregation and each society having a membership of fifty or less was entitled to cast one vote in the plebiscite, and for every additional fifty or fraction thereof one additional vote. The mailed ballots were counted on December 24, 1918, and the following results certified by Julius G. Gardoš and Geo. N. Komlos: for the union with the Czecho-Slovak Republic 732 votes, and for the union with the Ukrainian Republic 310 votes were cast; 27 votes were given for "total independence of Uhro-Rusyns," while 13 votes were cast for the unity of Carpatho-Ukrainians with Galicia and Bukovyna whose Constituent Assembly in L'viv proclaimed on October 19, 1918, national sovereignty. Additionally, one vote was cast for the unity with Galicia, while 10 for the unity with Russia, and only 9 votes out of total 1102 were cast for the continuation of the Magyar rule in Carpatho-Ukraine.[76]

The American Ruthenians sent Dr. Gregory Zhatkovych and Julius Gardosh as their delegates to the Paris Peace Conference, and this delegation "actually was of decisive importance"[77] for the solution of the Carpatho-Ukrainian question because it "secured the help of President Wilson" [78] for its cause. From the legal point

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[75] Epstein, *Verfassungsgesetze,* p. 91.

[76] For a detailed study of this problem, including available documentation and detailed voting results, see Joseph Danko "Plebiscite of Carpatho-Ruthenians in the United States recommending union of Carpatho-Ruthenia with the Czecho-slovak Republic," *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States* (New York), Vol. XI, No. 1-2, pp. 184-207.

For the copy of the questionaire used in the plebiscite, see Ivan Vanat, "Zakarpatya i utvorenya Chekhoslovatchyny" in *Druzhno vpered* (Pryashiv), XIX, 1 (246), pp. 22-25.

[77] Prof. Dr. Karel Kadlec, "O právní povaze poměrů Podkarpatské Rusi k Republice československé" in J. Chmelař, *Podkarpatská Rus* (Prague, 1923), p. 9.

[78] J. Borovička, *Ten Years of Czechoslovak Politics* (Prague, 1929), p. 20.

of view, however, the decision of the American Ruthenians could not be recognized as binding for the country itself. The will of the people in the country could not be disregarded entirely.

THROUGH SELF-DETERMINATION TO UNITY WITH UKRAINE

In Carpatho-Ukraine itself, the Ukrainian leaders attempted to solve the problems of their country. As Edvard Beneš observed:

> The World War brought to the Sub-Carpathian Ruthenian people heavy sufferings, first of all in the form of political persecutions... Ruthenian clergy was under police observation; in the two Ruthenian Dioceses at the beginning of the war over one hundred priests were jailed, and one half of them remained banned until the end of the war in various Hungarian cities.[79]

Before the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,[80] Rev. Avhustyn Voloshyn and his associates took upon themselves the task of defending political rights of Carpatho-Ukraine, including the incorporation of the province into the Ukrainian State. Another group led by Rev. Symeon Szabó attempted to obtain as many rights as possible for Carpatho-Ukraine within Hungary.

At a meeting held on November 9, 1918, in Uzhhorod a Ruthenian National Council was organized. Rev. Symeon Szabó became its president, Rev. Yuliy Grigashiy secretary, and Avhustyn Shtefan an assistant secretary. The President of the Council soon started

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[79] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[80] Under pressure of the independence movements of various nationalities composing the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, on October 17, 1918, the Emperor Charles issued a Manifesto which, with certain reservations, authorized the transformation of the Monarchy into a federal state. The promise of federalization no longer satisfied the ambitions of the non-German and non-Magyar speaking nationalities. In Hungary itself, in the middle of October, 1918, the Alexander Wekerle's government resigned and the crisis lasted until October 31, 1918, when under the pressure of the Hungarian National Council and the revolting troops in Budapest, Archduke Joseph appointed Count Michael Károlyi to the post of Prime Minister of Hungary. Archduke Joseph was sent to Budapest by the Emperor Charles with full powers to handle the Hungarian political crisis. Count Károlyi formed his Cabinet out of the Radical and Socialist elements, and denounced loyalty to the Sovereign and on November 16, 1918, Hungary was proclaimed an independent Republic, without any ties with Austria. At that time, the Hungarian political power in Carpatho-Ukraine was still maintained. See Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1943), pp. 3-14; and, Jászi, *Dissolution of Monarchy*, pp. 14-23. For the text of the Manifesto of the Emperor Charles see Epstein, *Verfassungsgesetze*, pp. 50-51.

negotiations with the Hungarian Government. As a result of his efforts, as well as a result of the difficulties in Hungary itself, Michael Károlyi's Republican Hungarian Government issued on December 21, 1918, "The People's Law No. X of the Year 1918 regarding the Autonomy of the Ruthenian Nation living in Hungary."[81] The autonomous province was named *Ruszka Krajna* (Rus'ka Krayina) and its administration was set up. Dr. Orest Szabó was appointed the Minister for Rus'ka Krayina in the Hungarian Government, while Dr. Avhustyn Shtefan became the President of the Directorium of Rus'ka Krayina. The Directorium was to serve as the administrative body of the autonomous province.[82] A Ruthenian National Assembly was called into existence. However, this Assembly in its only session "declared itself unsatisfied with the territorial provisions of the autonomous province and directed new demands against Budapest." [83] These Hungarian efforts came too late, because by that time the majority of the Ruthenian leaders had made up their minds as to the severance of all ties with Hungary.

When on December 10, 1918, a pro-Hungarian group met in Budapest and sought to adopt a loyalty declaration, on the motion of Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, Rev. Mykhaylo Medve, Stepan Klochurak, Yuliy Tchuchka and Mykola Dolynay the participants instead adopted a resolution stating that the final decision was to be made by the people at home, in Carpatho-Ukraine. After this failure, the pro-Hungarians convened a meeting in Sighet on December 18, 1918, but the Chairman, Dr. Hoshchuk, was prevented from delivering his speech, because the majority of the participants wanted to hear Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko who was an anti-Hungarian. The meeting expressed its wish to unite Carpatho-Ukraine with the Ukrainian State, and set up the Ruthenian National Council of Maramorosh. It was also resolved to call an All-National Ruthenian Congress to Khust for January 21, 1919.[84]

Several weeks before these events, on October 21, 1918, the leader of the pro-Ukrainian movement, Rev. Avhustyn Voloshyn, sent Professor Avhustyn Shtefan to Vienna with instructions to

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[81] László Balogh-Beéry, *A Ruthén Autonómia* (Pécs, 1937), pp. 23-26. This Act has been published in the *Országos Törvénytárnok* in Budapest on December 25, 1918. For full text see Appendix I.

[82] Hungarian Frontier Readjustment League, *Minority Grievances in Russinsko* (Budapest, 1927), pp. 9-10.

[83] Ballreich, p. 12.

[84] Stefan, *From Carpatho-Ruthenia*, pp. 20-21.



Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn

establish contact with the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation of Galicia and Bukovyna in the Austrian Parliament and to confer about the methods to be used for the realization of the union of Carpatho-Ukraine with the Ukrainian State. A. Shtefan conferred with the Ukrainian representatives[85] and they agreed that the union should be accomplished by means of the expression of the will of the people.

On November 2, 1918, under the leadership of two brothers, Yuliy and Mykhaylo Brashchayko, the Ruthenian National Council in Khust was organized and "at its meeting decided in favor of the Ukrainian solution of the problem of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia."[86] On November 8, 1918, several hundred delegates representing the Ukrainian communities of Lyubovnya, Bardiyiv, Svidnyk, Stropkiv, Mezhylaborci, Humenne, and Spish area convened in Lyubovnya. Rev. Omelyan Nevyts'kyy, pastor of Uyak, addressed the Congress, and he stated: "We firmly believe in the force of Woodrow Wilson's principle of national self-determination... Our people desire freedom, democracy, peace, and therefore we desire to join the country of our brethren — Ukraine."[87] The Congress created a Ruthenian National Council and "proclaimed the union with Ukraine."[88] The Council headed by Rev. Nevyts'kyy issued a Manifesto calling all Carpatho-Ukrainians to defend their rights and to fight for their freedom.[89]

Exactly one month later, the delegates of the Svalyava area met and organized a Carpatho-Ruthenian National Council under the leadership of its Chairman, Mykhaylo Komarnyts'kyy. The participants adopted at this meeting a resolution which read in part:

> The Carpatho-Ruthenian National Council desires to free the Ruthenian people from Hungarian slavery, which they suffered for many hundreds of years, and desires to unite the Carpatho-Ruthenian land with all other Ukrainian-Ruthenian lands. It also desires to join the Ukrainian Councils in L'viv and Kyyiv.[90]

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[85] Avhustyn Shtefan conferred with Dr. Yevhen Petrushevych, K. Try-l'ovs'kyy, Dr. S. Smal'-Stots'kyy and Dr. L. Bachyns'kyy.

[86] Josef Chmelař, "Politické poměry v Podkarpatské Rusi" in J. Chmelař, *Podkarpatská Rus* (Uzhhorod, 1923), p. 186.

[87] Stefan, *From Carpatho-Ruthenia*, p. 19.

[88] *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

[89] *Ibid.*, p. 20. Besides Rev. O. Nevyts'kyy, there were the following members of the Council in Lyubovnya: Dr. E. Torons'kyy, P. Shima, I. Rybovych, I. Murtsko, J. Chanda and Dr. Zavads'kyy.

[90] Stefan, *From Carpatho-Ruthenia*, p. 20. On December 18, 1918, a twenty-two member delegation of the National Council of Svalyava led by its Chairman,

The climax of the efforts of the pro-Ukrainian movement was the All-National Ruthenian Congress held on January 21, 1919, in Khust. The Congress was initiated by the Ruthenian National Council of Maramorosh headed by Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko, who was elected Chairman of the Congress. This Congress "elected a delegation with the aim to go to Kyyiv in order to put the union of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia with Ukraine into reality."[91] A delegation headed by Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko was sent to Stanyslaviv to settle this problem with the Western Ukrainian leaders.[92] The All-National Ruthenian Congress in Khust was held one day prior to the celebration of the Union of all Ukrainian lands in the united Ukrainian State.[93]

Ukrainians of Hutsulshchyna manifested their desire to be incorporated in the Ukrainian State not only by means of political meeting, but also by organizing their own military force. On January 8, 1919, approximately 160 local Hutsuls attacked and disarmed Hungarian troops and seized control of Yasinya. This action was carried out under the leadership of young students, the most important of whom were the three Klempush brothers — Vasyl', Ivan, and Dmytro, — Stepan Klochurak, and Oleksa Mochernyak. These men had been in close contact with Ukrainians in Galicia. They mobilized male population in Yasinya and captured the surrounding villages as well as the city of Rakhiv. On January 16, 1919, these military detachments captured the city of Syhit on the left bank

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Mykhaylo Komarnyts'kyy, visited the Czecho-Slovak representative in Budapest, Dr. Milan Hodža, in order to present to the Allied and Associated Powers complaints concerning the injustices done by the Hungarian officials in the province. There has also been prepared a Protocol in which the delegation declared itself strongly against Hungary, even if Hungary would grant an autonomy to Carpatho-Ukraine. The delegation demanded a union of their country either with Ukraine or with Czecho-Slovakia. For full text of the Protocol see Dr. Hermann Raschhofer, *Die tschechoslowakischen Denkschriften für die Friedenskonferenz, 1919-1920,* 2nd ed., (Berlin, 1938), pp. 217-218. Hereafter cited as: Raschhofer, *Denkschriften.*

[91] Josef Chmelař, "Politické poměry v Podkarpatské Rusi" in Josef Chmelař, *Podkarpatská Rus* (Prague, 1923), p. 186. For the text of resolutions adopted at this Congress see Appendix No. II.

[92] Stepan Rosokha, *Soym Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny* (Winnipeg, 1949), p. 13. Hereafter cited as: Rosokha, *Soym.* Mr. Sydorenko, head of the Ukrainian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, asked the Peace Conference to incorporate Carpatho-Ukraine into Ukrainian State on ethnic grounds as well as on the basis of the right of self-determination expressed by the Congress at Khust.

[93] This celebration was held on January 22, 1919, in Kyyiv.

of the Tysa River. However, the Rumanians counterattacked by moving a whole division of soldiers, and after a long and fierce battle, forced them back to the right bank of Tysa River. Meanwhile, Western Ukraine was at war with Poles and cut off the Trans-Carpathian Hutsulshchyna; therefore, the Hutsuls organized an independent State. They elected a Parliament of forty-two members, including two Jews and two Hungarians, and appointed a four member Government. This Republic lasted until June 11, 1919, when the Rumanians captured Yasinya.[94]

THE CARPATHO-UKRAINIAN PROBLEM AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

As has been shown, following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy there were only two political movements in Carpatho-Ukraine, namely the pro-Hungarian and the pro-Ukrainian. After the Czecho-Slovak leaders decided to incorporate Carpatho-Ukraine into Czecho-Slovakia,[95] a third movement, i. e. the pro-Czecho-Slovak, was initiated.

On December 6, 1918, the head of the Allied Military Mission in Budapest, French Lieutenant-Colonel Vyx, notified the Hungarian Government about the decision of the Allied Powers according to which Slovakia should be evacuated and transferred to the Czecho-Slovak authorities. As a result of this action, Slovakia was freed and on January 12, 1919, the first Czech military forces arrived also in Uzhhorod.[96] In this new situation, a Ruthenian National Council was organized in Prešov, headed by Dr. Antin Beskid. At its meeting of January 7, 1919, this Council decided to work for unity with Czecho-Slovakia of all territories inhabited by Ukrainians South of the Carpathians as well as the territories North of the Carpathians up to the Syan River "in order to create one common autonomous State" which should be "tied with the Czecho-Slovak

[94] Michael Winch, *Republic for a Day* (London, 1939), pp. 105-107. Hereafter cited as: Winch. Also see Avhustyn Shtefan, "Ukrayins'ke viys'ko v Zakarpatyi" in *Visti Kombatanta* (Toronto — New York), No. 3 of 1966, pp. 5-12; No. 4-5 of 1966, pp. 58-68; and No. 1 of 1967, pp. 39-48.

[95] Thomas G. Masaryk, *The Making of a State* (London, 1927), p. 239. As early as on April 15, 1915, Thomas G. Masaryk submitted a memorandum to the British Foreign Office in which he demanded the joining of Carpatho-Ukraine to Czecho-Slovakia.

[96] E. Beneš, *Ryech o podkarpatorusskoy probleme* (Uzhhorod, 1934), p. 19; and Dr. E. Beneš, *My War Memories* (Boston and New York, 1928), p. 478.



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Republic on fixed conditions as an autonomous part with the clearly Ruthenian character." [97] The minutes of this meeting, as well as the Protocol prepared by the delegation of the Svalyava National Council to Dr. Milan Hodža in Budapest, were used by Dr. Edvard Beneš at the Paris Peace Conference as a proof that the Carpatho-Ukrainian population desired the unity with Czecho-Slovakia.[98]

At the end of January, 1919, Dr. Antin Beskid went with the Czecho-Slovak delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. On February 13, 1919, the delegation of the American Ruthenians, consisting of Gregory Zhatkovych and Julius Gardosh, arrived in Paris. They established contacts with Czecho-Slovak Prime Minister, Dr. Karel Kramář, and the Foreign Minister, Dr. Edvard Beneš, and conducted the negotiations concerning the legal basis for the union of Carpatho-Ukraine with the Czecho-Slovak Republic.[99] In the mid-

[97] For the photo-static copy of this document see *Druzhno Vpered* (Pryashiv), XIX, 1 (246), pp. 23-25. Also see Raschhofer, *Denkschriften*, p. 221. For the French text officially presented at the Paris Peace Conference, see Appendix IIIB.

[98] Raschhofer, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-223. For the French text officially presented at the Paris Peace Conference, see Appendix IIIA.

[99] Prof. Dr. Karel Kadlec, "O právní povaze poměrů Podkarpatské Rusi k Republice československé" in Josef Chmelař, *Podkarpatská Rus* (Prague, 1923), p. 9; also see Yuriy Borzhava, *Vid Uhors'koyi Rusy do Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny* (Philadelphia, 1956), p. 25.

dle of March, 1919, the American Ruthenian delegation arrived in Carpatho-Ukraine and

after a short informative and propagandistic action achieved the result that the Central Ruthenian National Council, which has been established on May 7, 1919, through the amalgamation of the three National Councils: of Prešov, Uzhhorod and Khust, adopted American (Ruthenian) resolution about incorporation of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia into the Czecho-Slovak Republic, what was demanded in Paris.[100]

A special commission headed by Dr. Ilya Hadzhega was selected in Uzhhorod to formulate the conditions under which Carpatho-Ukraine would join Czecho-Slovakia.

The Central Ruthenian National Council under the leadership of its President, Dr. Antin Beskid, and the Vice-Presidents, Rev. Avhustyn Voloshyn and Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, was summoned to its session on May 15, 1919, to Uzhhorod and adopted resolutions worked out by Hadzhega's Commission. The most important points of these resolutions were as follows:

1. The Ruthenians constitute within the Czecho-Slovak Republic an independent State.

2. The boundaries of the Sub-Carpathian Ruthenian State will be established in the way, in which the delegates of the Sub-Carpathian Ruthenian State and the representatives of the Czecho-Slovak Republic will agree.

4. The Sub-Carpathian Ruthenian State constitutes an independent State in all autonomous and internal affairs.

12. The above mentioned conditions and other agreements and treaties, which the existence and the development of the Ruthenian State and of the Czecho-Slovak Republic require, shall be comprehended in Treaty which shall be concluded between the legal plenipotentiary representatives of the Ruthenian State and those of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

13. Until the definitive Treaty is signed, there will be established a provisional or de facto Ruthenian State or a Territory which consists of the following territories:

Bordering with Rumania: the line which will be established by the Peace Conference.

Bordering with Hungary: the line which will be established by the Peace Conference; on this line until the point where this line meets the Western boundary of the Szikszó county; farther, the West and the East boundaries of the Szikszó county up to the Hernad River; then, upstream the Hernad River to the mounth of the Torysa River; farther, northward the Torysa River up to the point where this River crosses the boundaries of the Districts of Spish and Sharysh; from here, the Southern boundary of the Héthársi county and that of the District of Spish, the Western boundary of the Lyubovnya county up to Poprad.

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[100] Josef Chmelař, "Politické poměry v Podkarpatské v Rusi" in J. Chmelař, *Podkarpatská Rus* (Prague, 1923), p. 186.

This provisional or de facto Ruthenian State shall be governed by a Ruthenian Minister who shall be appointed by the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. This Ruthenian Minister shall appoint all other Officials necessary for the Administration and the Government.

14. In every controversial question, as well as regarding the interpretation of this treaty, the Czecho-Slovak Republic as well as the Ruthenian State is entitled to ask the highest authority which is authorized to decide in such questions, i. e. the League of Nations. The decision of the League of Nations is binding for both parties.[101]

A special delegation consisting of one hundred and twelve members led by Rev. Avhustyn Voloshyn was sent to Prague and on May 23, 1919, it presented a copy of the Minutes of the Central Ruthenian National Council of May 15, 1919, together with the above cited fourteen point resolution to the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Thomas G. Masaryk. These documents were also forwarded to the Paris Peace Conference for consideration.

The decision of the Central Ruthenian National Council in Uzhhorod was important for the Czecho-Slovak efforts to incorporate Carpatho-Ukraine into their new State. The Czecho-Slovak delegation at the Paris Peace Conference could then prove that it demanded the territory on the basis of the will of the people.

The leader of the Czecho-Slovak Independence Movement, Thomas Garrique Masaryk has already planned in 1915 to incorporate Carpatho-Ukraine into the future Czecho-Slovak State.[102] The decision of

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[101] Epstein, *Verfassungsgesetze,* pp. 92-93. Not all of these conditions were incorporated into the Articles 10-14 of the Treaty of St. Germain of September 10, 1919. Especially, the territorial demands of the Central Ruthenian National Council were not fulfilled.

[102] Thomas G. Masaryk, *The Making of a State* (London, 1927), p. 239. Masaryk states that during his presence in Ukraine he discussed the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine with the Ukrainian leaders, and they "raised no objection to the incorporation of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia in our (Czecho-Slovak) State." On the other hand, "The Minutes of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held on May 23, 1919," read that "there were already Ukrainians in Paris who laid claims to the territory of the Hungarian Ruthenians." See Miller, *My Diary,* XVI, p. 348.

For the text of the note of Delegation of the Ukrainian National Republic to the Paris Peace Conference dated February 10, 1919, see Dr. Matviy Stachiw, *Ukrayina v dobi Dyrektoriyi UNR* (Ukraine during the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic), Scranton, Pa.: Ukrainian Scientific Historical Library, 1964, Vol. IV, pp. 257-260. The Delegation was headed by Hryhoriy Sydorenko; Dr. Vasyl' Paneyko was its Vice Chairman, and Prof. Oleksander Shul'hyn, Arnold Margolin, M. A. Kushnir, and Prof. Mykhaylo Tuhan-Baranovs'kyy served as its members. Later served as members of the Delegation also Dr.

the American Ruthenians was taken under the consideration of T. G. Masaryk, who in his first address in the capacity of the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic on December 22, 1918, in Prague stated:

The Hungarian Ruthenians through their representatives in America made a motion that they would like to be an autonomous territory of our State. We had an identical offer from the so-called Carpatho-Russians. Of course, I had no right to settle this affair, but I expressed my willingness for this union. According to our information, it is to be assumed that the Ruthenian people in Hungary will accept this motion without any doubts.[103]

At the Paris Peace Conference, the problem of the union of Carpatho-Ukraine with Czecho-Slovakia was brought up first by the American Delegation on January 21, 1919, with a recommendation that Carpatho-Ukraine should be either

a) placed as a separate state under the protection of Czecho-Slovakia as a mandatory of the League of Nations, or
b) incorporated in the Czecho-Slovak State.

It is undesirable that the Ruthenians of Eastern Hungary should continue under Hungarian rule. They have suffered particularly from Magyar oppression, which has led to intensive hatred of Hungarian government and to a strong movement of emigration... The physical weakness of Ruthenia and the political incapacity of its inhabitants seems to forbid the possibility of its becoming a completely independent state. The political control of Czecho-Slovakia over Ruthenia has been advocated by the Ruthenian representatives...[104]

At the meeting of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, held on February 5, 1919, Edvard Beneš spoke as the Czecho-Slovak representative about the Czecho-Slovak territorial claims. Among

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Borys Matyushenko, Dmytro Isayevych, Serhiy Shelukhyn, and Prof. Stepan Tomashivs'kyy. Also Prof. Aleksander Kul'chyts'kyy, Dr. Mykhaylo Rudnyts'kyy, and Ivan Petrushevych participated in the work of the Mission.

[103] Epstein, *Verfassungsgesetze,* p. 90. It is to be assumed that T. G. Masaryk has had in mind Nicholas Pachuta and his associates — the Ruthenian Russophiles in the United States — when he mentioned "the so-called Carpatho-Russians." By then there was no pro-Russian movement in Carpatho-Ukraine. The two leaders who first came in touch with the Czecho-Slovaks were Mykhaylo Komarnyts'kyy, who was of Ukrainian political and cultural orientation, and Dr. Antin Beskid who was concerned with the "future of the Ukrainian nation" and only after the seat of his Council, Prešov, was occupied by the Czech troops turned pro-Czecho-Slovak. Later on, he became a Russophile culturally.

[104] Miller, *My Diary,* IV, pp. 231-232. It is interesting to note that this recommendation was made on the same day on which the All-National Ruthenian Congress at Khust decided to unite Carpatho-Ukraine with Ukraine.

other things he made suggestions related to the Ruthenians in Hungary who are of

the same stock as the Ruthenes of Eastern Galicia, from whom they were divided by the Carpathians... They did not wish to remain under Hungarian control and proposed to form an autonomous state in close federation with Czecho-Slovakia... It would be unjust to leave them to tender mercies of the Magyars, and though Czecho-Slovakia made no claim on their behalf, he had undertaken to put their case before the Conference.[105]

At the same time, Edvard Beneš presented to the Peace Conference Memorandum No. 6 regarding the "problem of the Ruthenians in Hungary" supporting it with two documents: a Protocol of a Delegation of the Ruthenian National Council in Svalyava, prepared and signed by Mykhaylo Komarnyts'kyy in Budapest on December 18, 1918, and the Minutes of the meeting of the Executive of Ruthenian National Council in Prešov of January 7, 1919. Besides the statistical data and the description of the ethnic, political and social conditions in Carpatho-Ukraine, the Czecho-Slovak delegation also dealt in this Memorandum with various possible solutions of the problem as to the future political status of the territory. Either "the Ruthenians in Hungary," on the basis of the nationality principle, would constitute a part of Eastern Galicia, or because of their geographical location they would be separated from the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. If the Carpatho-Ukrainians would be united with the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia, they would have to share the future fate with them, i. e. live in a Ukrainian State, or to be occupied by Russians or Poles. If they would be separated by the Carpathians, they could stay with Hungary or join Czecho-Slovakia. The last solution, i. e. "the incorporation of the Ruthenians into the Czecho-Slovak Republic as an autonomous province seems to be most favorable in the existing situation" but "the desire for this has to be expressed by the Ruthenian population of Hungary itself" concluded the Memorandum.[106] The Supreme Council referred the problems raised by Dr. E. Beneš on the Czecho-Slovak territorial interests in the peace settlements to a special Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions composed of two representatives each of The United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.[107] This Committee was authorized to consult representatives of the peoples concerned.

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[105] Miller, *My Diary*, XIV, pp. 211-212.

[106] Raschhofer, *Denkschriften*, pp. 57-59 and 206-223.

[107] The Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions was composed as follows: The United States delegated Dr. Charles Seymour and Allen W. Dulles; British Empire — Sir Joseph Cook, Harold G. Nicolson (and Sir Eyre Crowe as technical

The delegates of the American Ruthenians arrived in Paris on February 13, 1919. At that time, Dr. Antin Beskid, President of the Ruthenian Council in Prešov, was already in Paris. Gregory Zhatkovych and Julius Gardosh together with Dr. Antin Beskid organized a Ruthenian Delegation which on February 24, 1919, discussed the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine with a French delegate, André Tardieu, and the American Colonel Edward M. House. As a result of the efforts of Ruthenian and Czecho-Slovak delegations, the Council of Five [108] decided on March 3, 1919, to put the problem of the future political status of Carpatho-Ukraine on the agenda of the Peace Conference.[109] In reality, however, a Sub-Committee

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advisor); France — Jules Cambon, Jules Alfred de Laroche (and General Le Rond as technical advisor); and Italy delegated Marquis Salvago Raggi and Augusto Stranieri. In its meeting on February 27, 1919, the Committee elected Jules Cambon as Chairman and Marquis Salvago Raggi as Vice-Chairman. It appointed a special Sub-Committee to elaborate proposals for the future Czecho-Slovak frontiers, to which the United States delegated Allen W. Dulles, assisted by Major Douglas Johnson; British Empire — Harold G. Nicolson, assisted by Lieut.-Col J. H. M. Cornwall; France — General Le Rond; and Italy — Augusto Stranieri, assisted by Captain E. Romagnoli. The Sub-Committee appointed Gen. Le Rond as its Chairman and in its seven meetings dealt with the problem of Czecho-Slovak frontiers. The Sub-Committee submitted a report to the Committee which has been adopted by the Committee unanimously. See excerpts from "Report Submitted to the Supreme Council by the Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions, March 12, 1919" in F. Deák, *Hungary at Peace Conference* (New York, 1942), pp. 411-412.

[108] Concerning the organization of the Peace Conference and its organs see H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1920), I, pp. 236-278 and 499. The Council of Five or the Council of Foreign Ministers was composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, British Empire, France, Italy and Japan.

[109] Ballreich, *Karpathenrussland*, p. 15. The question as to what extent the Ruthenian Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference by that time represented the desire of the population of Carpatho-Ukraine is controversial. Zhatkovych and Gardosh were representing the will of majority of those Ruthenian immigrants in the United States who participated in the referendum held in November 1918. The majority of them were already citizens of the USA, including Zhatkovych. On the other hand, Beskid represented only one out of seven active Ruthenian Councils in the country itself and acted contrary to the decision of the All-National Ruthenian Congress held on January 21, 1919, in Khust. This Congress, as was mentioned already, decided to unite the country with Ukraine. But, as late as the middle of March 1919 a pro-Hungarian group met in Mukachiv and resolved to enjoy the autonomous rights granted to Rus'ka Krayina by Hungarian Government on December 21, 1918. See Josef Chmelař, "Politické

which had been assigned by the Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions to elaborate proposals for the future Czecho-Slovak frontiers, already on February 28, 1919, at its second meeting decided "to advocate in principle the formation of an autonomous state to include the Ruthenians of Hungary, which should be under Czecho-Slovak protection."[110] In the following five meetings, the Sub-Committee elaborated proposals for the Czecho-Slovak frontiers, including proposals for the frontiers of Carpatho-Ukraine. The report of the Sub-Committee had been accepted by the Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions unanimously, and consequently the Committee submitted on March 12, 1919, a report to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. Besides recommendations about the frontiers of the "Ruthenian Territory South of the Carpathians" with Czecho-Slovakia, Eastern Galicia, Rumania and Hungary, Chapter III of the report was dedicated to the future political status of the "Ruthenes South of the Carpathians," in which we read:

> The Committtee considered that the interests of the Ruthenes themselves require their union, under some form of autonomous government, with the Czecho-Slovaks... This solution, which has been anticipated by certain elements of the Ruthenian population, will give to this population the best opportunity for economic and political development.
>
> It will rest with the Supreme Council of the Conference to determine in what form this autonomy can be realized.[111]

The Supreme Council approved the report and referred it to the Council of Foreign Ministers for further consideration.

On May 8, 1919, the Council of Foreign Ministers decided to ask the Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions to submit recommendations as to the degree and the form of autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine within the Czecho-Slovak Republic. In line with these instructions, the Committee met on May 15, 1919, and invited Dr. Edvard Beneš to present views and intentions of the Czecho-Slovak government regarding this problem. Dr. Beneš explained that it was the general policy of the Czecho-Slovak government to "encourage throughout the Republic a process of evolution toward some

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poměry v Podkarpatské Rusi" in Josef Chmelař, *Podkarpatská Rus* (Prague, 1923), p. 186.

[110] Miller, *My Diary*, XVII, p. 94.

[111] "The Report Submitted to the Supreme Council by the Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions, March 12, 1919," cited in Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1942), pp. 411-418.

form of federal organization." [112] The Committee thereafter asked Dr. E. Beneš to submit a written memorandum embodying the form of autonomy which the Czecho-Slovak government would itself suggest. Edvard Beneš submitted on May 17, 1919, to the Committee the "Memorandum on the Juridical Situation of the Ruthenians South of the Carpathians whose Territory forms part of the Territory of the Czecho-Slovak State."[113] At the meeting held on May 17, 1919, the Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions examined this memorandum and in their "Report on the Degree of Autonomy to be Accorded to the Ruthenes of Hungary" on May 20, 1919, unanimously recommended to the Council of Five that "the scheme prepared by Dr. Beneš should be adopted as the basis governing the future relations between the Ruthenians and the Czecho-Slovak Republic," [114] and suggested that if their report will be approved by the Council of Five, it should be forwarded to the Committee on New States which should be asked to embody Dr. Beneš's proposals in a treaty.

The Council of Foreign Ministers discussed the proposals of the Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions on May 23, 1919. There were no objections to the principles for Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy proposed by Dr. Edvard Beneš on behalf of the Government of Czecho-Slovakia. However, the Secretary of State of the United States, Robert Lansing, referred to Article 5 of the Memorandum and expressed the wish that the "functionaries wherever possible be chosen from the Ruthenian population," because in the past all officials were Hungarians and the people had no opportunity to acquire the habit of self-government. Secondly, Mr. Robert Lansing pointed out that the Ruthenians, although they would have some form of autonomy, would nevertheless be subject to a State, the majority of whose population would be alien to them. He questioned, therefore, whether it would not be desirable to include a provision enabling them to appeal to the League of Nations "in any case in which the sovereignity of the Czecho-Slovak Republic was exercised in a manner regarded by them as in conflict with their rights"[115] Mr.

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[112] Miller, *My Diary*, XVI, pp. 358-360.

[113] Miller, *My Diary*, XIII, pp. 93-95. For the text see Appendix No. III.

[114] Miller, *My Diary*, XVI, pp. 358-360.

[115] For the text of the Minutes of this meeting see Miller, *My Diary*, XVI, pp. 348-350. In the discussion on the problem of autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine at this meeting participated: French Foreign Minister, Stéphen Pichon, who was Chairman at this meeting; Secretary of State of the USA, Robert Lansing;

Lansing's first amendment was accepted and later even included in the Treaty of St. Germain. His second suggestion was regarded by Baron Sonnino as too dangerous to be stated openly since "it might be better for the League of Nations to intervene whenever necessary on its own initiative." The French delegate, Jules Alfred de Laroche, pointed out that the status of Carpatho-Ukraine was going to be settled by a Treaty between the Allied Powers and the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Treaty would give the League of Nations the right to intervene. It was decided to refer this problem to the Committee on New States [116] for more precise consideration. On the same day, the Secretary General of the Peace Conference sent the report of the Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions and Dr. E. Beneš's memorandum concerning the degree and form of autonomy for Carpatho-Ukraine to the President of the Committee on New States, M. Berthelot. Also included in this report was Mr. Lansing's amendment which was formulated as follows: "The officials of the Ruthenian territory, except the Governor, shall be as far as possible chosen from among the Ruthenians." [117]

The Committee on New States had already worked on the Czecho-Slovak problems. Upon request of the Committee, on May 20, 1919, Dr. Beneš submitted a written Note outlining in its nine points the future system of government of Czecho-Slovakia, emphasizing especially the rights of national minorities. E. Beneš promised that "it will be an extremely liberal régime, which will very much resemble that of Switzerland." [118]

The problem of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy had been discussed by the Committee on New States at its meeting of May 27, 1919,in the light of Dr. E. Beneš's memorandum of May 17, 1919,[119] and draft articles to be inserted into the minorities treaty with Czecho-Slovakia were tentatively approved at its meeting of May

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British Foreign Secretary, Earl A. J. Balfour; Italian Foreign Minister, Baron Sonnino; and, French delegate to the Peace Conference, Jules Alfred de Laroche.

[116] The Committee on New States was also called Committee for Protection of Minorities in New and other States. It was established by the Supreme Council on May 1, 1919. French delegate Philippe Berthelot was its President. The main purpose of the Committee was to study the problems of protection of national minorities and to elaborate the provisions concerned for the treaties to be signed with new States.

[117] Miller, *My Diary*, XIII, pp. 90-91.

[118] Miller, *My Diary*, XIII, p. 69.

[119] Miller, *My Diary*, XIII, p. 89.

29, 1919.[120] The final draft was approved by the Committee at its twenty-second meeting, held on June 16, 1919.[121] The provisions for the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy were embodied in four articles which later were incorporated as Articles 10-13 into the "Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czecho-Slovakia, Signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, September 10, 1919."[122] The wording of the Committee's final draft was as follows:

Article 10. Czecho-Slovakia agrees to constitute the Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians within frontiers delimited by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers an autonomous unit within the Czecho-Slovak State, and to accord to it the fullest degree of self-government compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak State.

Article 11. The country of the Ruthenes south of the Carpathians shall possess a special Diet. This Diet shall enjoy legislative powers in all linguistic, scholastic and religious questions, in matters of local administration, and in other questions which the laws of the Czecho-Slovak Republic may attribute to it. The Governor of the country of the Ruthenes, who shall be appointed by the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, shall be responsible to the Ruthene Diet.

Article 12. Czecho-Slovakia agrees that officials in the country of the Ruthenes will be chosen as far as possible from the inhabitants of this territory.

Article 13. Czecho-Slovakia guarantees to the country of the Ruthenes equitable representation in the legislative assembly of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, to which assembly it will send deputies elected according to the constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. These deputies will not, however, have the right of voting in the Czecho-Slovak Diet upon legislative questions such as those attributed to the Ruthene Diet.[123]

This draft was finally approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers on August 6, 1919, and communicated to the Czecho-Slovak Delegation.[124] On the same day, the Czecho-Slovak Delegation suggested to the Commission on New States that the language of the treaty provisions granting the Ruthenian Diet legislative powers

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[120] *Ibid.*, p. 96 and 98.

[121] *Ibid.*, p. 160.

[122] For the full text see H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1921), V, pp. 461-470. The Principal Allied Powers who signed this treaty with Czecho-Slovakia are: The United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy and Japan. The Associated Powers: Dominion of Canada, Commonwealth of Australia, Union of South Africa, Dominion of New Zealand, and India. For Czecho-Slovakia signed Karel Kramář and Edvard Beneš.

[123] Miller, *My Diary*, XIII, pp. 245-246.

[124] *Ibid.*, pp. 378 and 380.

"in questions of *local administration*" be changed to *"communal* administration." This motion, which would have changed completely the meaning of autonomy, was rejected by the Committee at its forty-fifth meeting, held on August 12, 1919.[125] Before the treaty was signed on September 10, 1919, at Saint Germain-en-Laye, some stylistic changes were made in the text, including one significant change, i. e. in the designation of the status of Carpatho-Ukraine from "the *country* of the Ruthenes" used in the originally approved draft to "Ruthenian *territory*" in the final text of the treaty.[126]

The divergence between the memorandum submitted by E. Beneš to the Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions on May 17, 1919, and the draft proposed by the Committee, as well as the final text of the treaty itself, is considerable. The omissions from the draft of concessions originally offered by E. Beneš on behalf of the Czecho-Slovak Government whittled away much of the guarantees of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy.[127] In its report dated June 15, 1919, the Committee on New States explained the meaning of the articles proposed for the safeguarding of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy as follows:

> The Committee have had before them the proposals put forward by M. Beneš on behalf of the Czecho-Slovak Government. These proposals are very far-reaching and seem of such a nature as to fulfil the intentions of the Conference. The Committee in their draft clauses have followed very closely the proposals, and to a large extent the actual words of M. Beneš; in some cases,

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[125] G. de Lapradelle, ed., *La Documentation internationale: La Paix de Versailles* (Paris, 1930-1939), X, p. 288.

[126] Compare the draft of the Committee on the Czecho-Slovak Questions cited in this study with the Treaty text published in H. W.V. Tempereley, *op. cit.*, p. 465.

[127] The following guarantees, originally suggested by Dr. E. Beneš, were omitted from the Committee draft and, consequently, from the treaty itself: that the Governor of Carpatho-Ukraine shall represent the final authority in all linguistic, scholastic, and ecclesiastical matters and in questions regarding internal administration; that subordinate officials be appointed by the Governor; that in the ministries of the central Czecho-Slovak government a special Carpatho-Ukrainian section would be created; that Carpatho-Ukraine would be represented in the central Czecho-Slovak Government by a minister without portfolio; that a special Carpatho-Ukrainian appellate court shall be established. The proposals of Beneš's memorandum were very much similar to the Hungarian Law No. X of December 21, 1918, regarding the autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine, as well as they were similar to the demands of the Central Ruthenian National Council of May 15, 1919. Later, even Gregory Zhatkovych, who first very strongly advocated the unity of Carpatho-Ukraine with Czecho-Slovakia on a federative basis, was disappointed.

however, his proposals went into considerable detail, and the Committee thought it was neither necessary nor desirable to bind the Czecho-Slovak State in a treaty too closely as to details.

The clauses submitted herewith are believed by the Committee to give the fullest guarantees for Ruthene autonomy.[128]

The meaning of Articles 10-13 of the Treaty of St. Germain as explained in the above cited document is based on Dr. E. Beneš's memorandum of May 17, 1919. The details were omitted by the Committee because it was believed that "they will be accepted without any demour by the Czecho-Slovak Government," as the Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions explained why the "propositions which are included in the draft Treaty are so moderate."[129] On the other hand, Dr. E. Beneš "was summoned as a witness before the Sub-Committee" [130] therefore he had an influence upon the formulation of the provisions in the interests of Czecho-Slovakia. There is another point which should be mentioned here. The draft Treaty was prepared by the Committee in such a way that the provisions for the guarantee of the League of Nations of the Treaty obligations on the part of Czecho-Slovakia were not extended to the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy. They were put before Chapter II of the draft Treaty, which included the articles concerning Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy. Only in the twenty-second meeting of the Committee held on June 16, 1919, upon the insistence of the British representative to the Committee, were the League of Nations provisions put at the end of the Chapter II, as Article 14.[131] Thereafter, and before the Treaty of St. Germain had been signed on September 10, 1919, Dr. Edvard Beneš signed the following declaration on behalf of the Czecho-Slovak Government:

Czecho-Slovakia undertakes to incorporate the obligations of Chapter I and II above (in the Treaty of St. Germain) in her fundamental laws, as a declaration of rights, with which no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere, and over which no laws, regulation or official action shall prevail. The consent of the League of Nations shall be necessary for any modification of these obligations.[132]

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[128] Miller, *My Diary*, XIII, p. 163.

[129] *Ibid.*, p. 162.

[130] "Report Submitted to the Supreme Council by the Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions, March 12, 1919" cited in Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1942), p. 412.

[131] Ballreich, p. 19.

[132] Miller, *My Diary*, XIII, p. 235.

The political status of Carpatho-Ukraine was decided at the highest international level at that time, the Peace Conference. The participation of the representatives of the Carpatho-Ukrainian people in the solution of the problem, especially in the negotiations at Paris, was minimal. The decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers of May 8, 1919, stating that "the territory of the Ruthenians be ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers"[133] formally severed Carpatho-Ukrainian ties with Hungary. By signing the Treaty of St. Germain on September 10, 1919, Carpatho-Ukraine was established as "an autonomous unit within the Czecho-Slovak State" with the "fullest degree of self-goverment compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak State." [134] Thus, this political status of Carpatho-Ukraine was "placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations" and it was agreed that "any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction" of the autonomous rights of Carpatho-Ukraine.[135]

[133] Miller, *My Diary*, XVI, p. 223.

[134] "Treaty of St. Germain," Article 10, in Temperley, *op. cit.*, V, p. 465.

[135] "Treaty of St. Germain," Article 14, in Temperley, *op. cit*, V, p. 466.

Chapter Two

STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY

Some parts of the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine had been occupied by the Czecho-Slovak troops even before the signing of the Treaty of St. Germain on September 10, 1919. On January 12, 1919, these troops appeared in Uzhhorod. The territory East of the Uzh River was still occupied by Hungarian military detachments.[1] Certain parts of Carpatho-Ukraine, especially the Northern regions of the country, were under the protection of the military forces of the Ukrainian State.[2] In the Eastern districts, called Hutsulshchyna, local Ukrainians under the leadership of the Klempush brothers disarmed on January 8, 1919, Hungarian troops in Yasinya and subsequently also took the region of Rakhiv under their control. They maintained their own administration until June 11, 1919, when Rumanians occupied the territory.[3]

On March 20, 1919, French Colonel Vyx, head of the Allied Military Mission in Budapest, notified the Hungarian Government of Michael Károlyi about the decision of the Peace Conference in Paris concerning the future Hungarian boundaries and demanded the evacuation of military detachments from Carpatho-Ukraine. On the next day, Károlyi's Government resigned and "the Hungarian soldiers on Ruthenian territory dispersed." [4] The Czecho-Slovak army now resumed military operations and occupied the evacuated ter-

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[1] Hungarian Frontier Reajustment League, *Minority Grievances in Russinsko,* Publication No. IV (Budapest, 1927), p. 10. Hereafter cited as: Hungarian League, *Russinsko.*

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 11; also see Avhustyn Shtefan, *Ukrayins'ke viys'ko v Zakarpatyi* (Toronto — New York, 1969), pp. 17-19.

[3] Michael Winch, *Republic For a Day* (London, 1939), pp. 105-107. Hereafter cited as: Winch. For detailed description, see Avhustyn Shtefan, *op. cit.,* pp. 11-21.

[4] Hungarian League, *Russinsko,* p. 8.

ritory. On the other hand, the Rumanian troops, who were already engaged in a war against Hungarian Communist forces of Béla Kun,[5] advanced from the East and met the Czecho-Slovak troops in May, approximately in the center of the autonomous territory of Carpatho-Ukraine.[6] The Hungarian Communist forces, in their endeavor to unite with Russian Bolsheviks, attacked Czecho-Slovakia.[7] In this situation, the Rumanians were considered allies of the Czecho-Slovaks and as such remained in the Eastern part of Carpatho-Ukraine.

Even after the Treaty of St. Germain had been signed, Rumanian troops remained in the country and, from September 1919 until the end of May 1920, Czecho-Slovakia administered only the Districts of Uzhhorod and Bereh, as well as the county of Volove of the District of Maramorosh. Other counties of the District of Maramorosh as well as the whole District of Uhocha were taken over by the Czecho-Slovaks from the Rumanians only in June 1920.[8] These factors led to the gradual development of Czecho-Slovak administration in various parts of Carpatho-Ukraine.

LEGAL PROVISIONS FOR ADMINISTRATION

After the collapse of the Hungarian administration in Carpatho-Ukraine, no political parties or organizations existed which could take over the administration of the autonomous country. The Central Ruthenian National Council, established in Uzhhorod on May 7, 1919, was considered in the beginning as the only political organ, which "could at least represent the desires of the population."[9] Therefore, the Czecho-Slovak administration was in close contact with its leaders.

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[5] H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1920-1924), Vol. V, pp. 353-355. Hereafter cited as: Temperley.

[6] Hans Ballreich, *Karpathenrussland: ein Kapitel tschechischen Nationalitätenrechtes und tschechischer Nationalitätenpolitik* (Heidelberg, 1938), p. 12. Hereafter cited as: Ballreich.

[7] Temperley, IV, p. 489. For the detailed account of these events, and especially Béla Kun's attempts to establish the Slovak Soviet Republic proclaimed in Košice on June 16, 1919, see V. Marina, "Revolyutsionnoye dvizheniye v Slovakii v 1918-1919" in A. Ia. Manushevich, ed., *Oktiabrskaya Revolyutsiya i Zarubezhnyie Slavyanskiye Narody* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 233-270.

[8] Stanislav Klíma, "Zeměpisný obzor Podkarpatské Rusi" in Josef Chmelař, *Podkarpatská Rus* (Prague, 1923), p. 20.

[9] Josef Chmelař, "Politické poměry v Podkarpatské Rusi" in Josef Chmelař, *Podkarpatská Rus* (Prague, 1923), p. 187. Hereafter cited as: Chmelař.

On August 12, 1919, Gregory I. Zhatkovych, leader of the American Ruthenians, notified the Central Ruthenian National Council in Uzhhorod that he had been appointed Chairman of a provisional autonomous Carpatho-Ukrainian Directorium, consisting of five members. This body would administer the country, together with French General Hennocque, the commander of the allied military forces on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine, until final decisions of the Peace Conference would be reached.[10] The prominent leaders of the Council, Rev. Avhustyn Voloshyn, Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, Dr. Omelyan Torons'kyy and Rev. Hadzhega, were appointed members of the autonomous Directorium.[11]

Soon after the Treaty of St. Germain had been signed, on November 7, 1919, the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic issued "The General Statutes regulating the Organization and Administration of Podkarpatská Rus, No. 26,536 m.r. 1919." This document had been published by General Hennocque as a military Ordinance,[12] and its wording was as follows:

After consultations with prominent citizens and representatives of the people in Podkarpatská Rus, the Government issues the following basic principles for the Organization and Administration of Podkarpatská Rus:

I

At the Paris Peace Conference the following Treaty has been signed between the five Principal Allied Powers and the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

(Articles 1-4, identical with the Articles 10-13 of the Treaty of St. Germain)

II

The Territorial Committee of the Paris Peace Conference has established the boundaries as follows:

a) The demarcation line between the Slovaks and Ruthenians goes directly from the city of Chop towards the Northern part of the city of Uzhhorod, so that the railroad shall stay in Slovakia and the city of Uzhhorod in Sub-Carpatho-Ruthenia; from here upwards the Uzh River to the Carpathians. The whole territory in the East of this line is to be considered as autonomous Ruthenian territory.

b) The Southern border of the autonomous Ruthenian territory has been settled by the Peace Conference so that the boundary with Hungary goes from Chop to the South; from here eastwards, the boundary goes South of the railroad leading from Chop to Maramorosh Syhit; the city of Maramorosh Syhit shall go to Rumania; further, the boundary goes partly upwards the Tysa

[10] Ballreich, p. 51.
[11] Chmelař, p. 188.
[12] Ballreich, p. 51.

River up to the Northern boundary, which is identical with the former boundary between Hungary and Galicia.

c) Whereas a part of the Ruthenian people constitutes a minority on the Slovak territory, which has been established by the Peace Conference, the Czecho-Slovak Government recommends to the representatives of both peoples to reach an agreement regarding the incorporation of the compact Ruthenian territory into the autonomous Ruthenian territory.

III

1. NAME AND LANGUAGE

Until a final decision will be reached by the elected Diet, the historical name "Podkarpatská Rus" is to be used; besides this name, the name "Rusínsko" also may be used.

2

The language of the people shall be the language of instruction in the schools, as well as the official language in general.

The necessary Ruthenian schools are to be organized as soon as possible. The Ruthenian language shall be the language of instruction in the first grades, and will be introduced gradually in the higher grades of all schools. Temporarily, in the higher grades of the hitherto existing schools the Hungarian language shall remain in use, but the Ruthenian language shall be taught as an obligatory subject.

The schools of the Magyar minority, as those of all minorities in the Republic, are protected by the Articles concerning minorities in the Peace Treaty as well as by Laws and Orders of the Republic.

IV

In order to restore order in the territory and to establish the basis for the new state and autonomous administration, in accordance with Article 1 of the Treaty, the Government appoints temporarily an Administrator, to whom the necessary number of officials shall be given.

The Government appoints a "temporary Ruthenian autonomous Directorium." The Directorium shall be an advisory body for: a) legislation, and b) administration in all linguistic, educational and religious affairs, as well as for the affairs of local administration. The advisory activity of the Directorium is extended also to the appointment of all officials and civil servants, who shall have executive and administrative powers in the above indicated affairs. These officials shall be appointed by the Administrator. They are subordinated to him and responsible before him.

In case of conflict between the Directorium and the Administrator regarding any of the above indicated affairs, the controversial affair shall be placed before the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic or any other person, except the Administrator, to whom the President may assign the power for the specific affair. The decision of the President or his plenipotentiary repre-

sentative shall be final and binding. Until this decision is reached, the controversial affair shall be considered as unfulfilled.

The Directorium is divided into activity branches. The Directorium may be heard also in affairs concerning common affairs of the State.

The necessary officials (civil servants) for the execution of the affairs of the Directorium will be appointed by the Administrator.

After the Ruthenian autonomous administration which shall be based on the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference will be realized, the Office of the Administrator and that of the autonomous Directorium shall be abolished. The election of the members of the Ruthenian Diet shall be held not later than ninety days after the general elections to the National Assembly of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

The functions of the Administrator as well as of the Directorium are temporary and provisional; their powers and obligations do not establish any precedence for the future.

Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia shall have her own public finances. Until final regulation will be made, the State covers all spendings of the administration; these spendings shall be specially accounted.[13]

According to the provisions of the General Statutes, the Czecho-Slovak Government appointed Jan Brejcha, a Czech, as the Administrator,[14] who, with the provisional autonomous Ruthenian Directorium, as an advisory body, fulfilled the administrative functions in the country. Also, a Czech and a Slovak were appointed as the *Župans* of the Districts of Uzhhorod and Bereh.[15] The appointment of Czech officials to the highest positions in the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomous administration created dissatisfaction among the local Ukrainian leaders. The Central Ruthenian National Council, under the leadership of Rev. Avhustyn Voloshyn, adopted on January 18, 1920, a declaration which was presented to the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Thomas G. Masaryk. The Council insisted upon a "substantial increase in the powers of the Directorium and a concentration of the administration of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia in its hands" as well as that "the rights of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia for legislative and administrative autonomy shall be secured before the final legislative adoption of the constitution by the (Czecho-

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[13] Dr. Leo Epstein, *Studienausgabe der Verfassungsgesetze der Tschechoslowakischen Republik* (Reichenberg, 1923), pp. 665-668. Hereafter cited as: Epstein, *Verfassungsgesetze*. The text of the General Statutes was not published in the "Sbirka zákonů a nařízení Republiky československé," but Dr. Epstein obtained the original text in Czech language from the Ministry of Interior of Czecho-Slovakia.

[14] Chmelař, p. 188.

[15] Dr. Robert Nowak, *Der künstliche Staat: Ostprobleme der Tschecho-Slowakei* (Oldenburg, 1938), p. 181. Hereafter cited as: Nowak.

Slovak) Parliament and by the autonomous (Carpatho-Ukrainian) Diet."[16]

On February 14, 1920, a delegation of Village Farmers from Carpatho-Ukraine presented a memorandum to the Czecho-Slovak Government in Prague, in which it demanded final establishment of the Slovak-Ruthenian border, removal of the Rumanian occupational forces from Carpatho-Ukrainian territories and other demands concerning the autonomy of the country.[17]

The newly appointed Administrator and the two Župans appointed Czechs to the lower official positions and introduced from the beginning the Czech language in the country's administration. "The Prague government has been sabotaging the Autonomy from the very first minute." [18]

The above mentioned demands of the Central Ruthenian National Council concerning constitutional provisions were disregarded and "meanwhile the Prague Czech Parliament without one Rusin representative drew up Constitution" [19] of the Czecho-Slovak Republic which was adopted on February 29, 1920, without the participation of Carpatho-Ukrainian representatives. The provisions concerning the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy were expressed in § 3 of the Constitutional Charter of the Czecho-Slovak Republic as follows:

1. The territories of the Czechoslovak Republic shall form a united and indivisible unit, the frontiers of which may be altered only by Constitutional Law.

2. The autonomous territory of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, which shall receive the widest measure of autonomy compatible with the unity of Czechoslovak Republic, shall be an integral part of this unit by the terms of its voluntary declaration set forth in the Treaty between the Allied Powers and the Czechoslovak Republic of September 10th, 1919.

3. Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia shall have its own Diet, which shall elect its presiding officer and other officials.

4. The Diet of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia shall legislate in linguistic, educational and religious matters, in matters of domestic administration and in such other matters as may be assigned to it by the laws of the Czechoslovak Republic. Laws enacted by the Diet of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, and signed by the

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[16] Chmelař, p. 188.

[17] Chmelař, pp. 188-199.

[18] Michael Yuhasz, *Wilson's Principles in Czechoslovak Practice* (Homestead, Pa., 1929), p. 22. Hereafter cited as: Yuhasz, *Wilson's Principles*.

[19] Yuhasz, *Wilson's Principles*, p. 23; see also Zákon čís. 121 ze dne 29. února 1920, kterým se uvozuje Ústavní listina Československé republiky. See: *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení Republiky československé* (Prague, 1920), Zak. čís. 121/20. Hereafter cited as: *Sb. z. a n. R. čsl.*

President of the Republic, shall be published in a separate collection (series) and shall be signed also by the Governor.

5. Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia shall be represented in the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic by equitable number of Deputies and Senators elected according to the general suffrage law of the Czechoslovak Republic.

6. The head of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia shall be a Governor, appointed by the President of the Czechoslovak Republic on the recommendation of the Government, and shall be responsible also to the Diet of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.

7. Public officials in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia shall be, in so far as possible, selected from the population of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.

8. Details as to the right of suffrage and eligibility to the Diet shall be defined by special legislation.

9. The law enacted by the National Aseembly defining the frontiers of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia shall form part of the Constitutional Charter.[20]

According to a declaration, signed by Dr. Edvard Beneš on behalf of the Czecho-Slovak Government at the Paris Peace Conference, Czecho-Slovakia was obliged "to incorporate" the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain concerning autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine "in her fundamental laws, as a declaration of rights, with which no law, regulation, or official action shall conflict or interfere, and over which no law, regulation or official action shall prevail."[21] These provisions "constitute obligations of international concern" and "they shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations." [22] In reality, the provisions as stated in § 3 of the Constitutional Charter deviate from provisions of Articles 10-13 of the Treaty of St. Germain in the direction of decreasing the powers of the autonomous Carpatho-Ukrainian organs. Paragraph 3, Section 6, of the Constitution prescribes that the Carpatho-Ukrainian Governor shall be appointed by the President of the Republic "on the recommendation of the Government," whereas the Treaty of St. Germain (Article 11) left this question open and did not exclude the possibility of recommendation by the autonomous Diet. According to Article 11 of the Treaty of St. Germain the Governor "shall be responsible to the Ruthene Diet," whereas § 3, Section 6, of the Constitution stated that he "shall be responsible *also*

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[20] The wording is taken from Dr. Jiří Hoetzel's official English translation of the Czecho-Slovak Constitution, "The Definitive Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic" in *The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic* (Prague, 1920), p. 12. Hereafter cited as: Hoetzel, *Constitution.*

[21] David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris with Documents* (New York, 1924-1926), XIII, p. 235. Hereafter cited as: Miller, *My Diary.*

[22] Article 14 of the Treaty of St. Germain. See Temperley, V, pp. 465-466.

to the Diet." This modified provision could be interpreted in such a way that the Governor was responsible to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet besides his responsibility to the President of the Republic, who appointed him, and to the Government, upon whose recommendation he shall be appointed, although Article 11 of the Treaty of St. Germain stated undoubtedly that he "shall be responsible to the Ruthene Diet" only. As indicated, in the memorandum of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of May 17, 1919, outlining the scope of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy, there was no provision that the Governor should be appointed upon the recommendation of the Government. It was clearly stated that he "shall be head of the administration of the country" and be "responsible to the Diet." [23] The provision of Article 13 of the Treaty of St. Germain that the Carpatho-Ukrainian deputies in the legislative assembly of the Czecho-Slovak Republic "will not... have the right of voting in the Czecho-Slovak Diet upon legislative questions of the same kind as those assigned to the Ruthene Diet" was not incorporated into the Constitution in any form. Actually, the deputies and senators elected in Carpatho-Ukraine were admitted to participate in all acts of the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly.[24] Article 11 of the Treaty of St. Germain reserved legislative power to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet to issue laws within the framework of autonomous affairs. However, the Diet was not elected until February 12, 1939, and the Prague National Assembly legislated for the entire territory of Czecho-Slovakia, including that of autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine.[25] The conditions under which American Ruthenians in agreement with T.G. Masaryk decided on November 19, 1918, at their Congress at Scranton, Pa., to "join the Czechoslovak Republic as a State on federative basis" [26] as well as such conditions made by the Central Ruthenian National Council in Uzhhorod on May 15, 1919, that the "Sub-Carpathian Ruthenian State constitutes an independent State in all autonomous and internal affairs," [27] were disregarded by the Czech

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[23] For the provisions of the Articles 10-13 of the Treaty of St. Germain see above, pp. 35-37; for the cited memorandum see Appendix Nr. II below; and for § 3 of the Constitution see above, pp. 44-45.

[24] Hoetzel, *Constitution,* p. 12.

[25] Franz Adler, *Die Grundgedanken der tschechoslowakischen Verfassungsurkunde in der Entwicklungsgeschichte des Verfassungsrechtes* (Berlin, 1927), p. 77. Hereafter cited as: Adler, *Die Grundgedanken.*

[26] Epstein, *Verfassungsgesetze,* p. 85.

[27] *Ibid.,* p. 92.

writers of the Constitution. This created the suspicion that "not for one moment did Prague Government intend to respect its treaty" and other "obligations."[28]

Together with the Constitutional Charter the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly passed the Act No. 122/1920 in pursuance of § 129 of the Constitutional Charter establishing the principles of language rights within the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Paragraph 1 of this Act provided that "the Czechoslovak language shall be the state, official language of the Republic." In § 6 of this Act formal reservations were made as to the use of official language in autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine as follows:

> The Diet which shall be set up for Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia shall have the power reserved to it of resolving the language question for this territory in a manner consonant with the unity of the Czechoslovak State. Until this decision has been made this law shall apply, due regard, however, being paid to the special circumstances of that territory in respect to the language.[29]

In addition to this language law, on June 8, 1923, the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly passed the Act No. 137/1923, Paragraph 1 of which required that the Czechoslovak language be taught in all secondary schools and teacher colleges of the country. Concerning the application of this law in Carpatho-Ukraine § 7 stated: "Until the Diet of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia decides otherwise, this law shall be valid also for the territory of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia." [30] This Constitutional Act, although applied from the beginning, was formally enforced by Executive Ordinance No. 17/1926 of February 3, 1926, Article 1, Section 1, of which read as follows:

> All courts, offices, institutions, enterprises and organs subordinated to the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Finances, Industry, Commerce and Trade, Public Works, and of Public Health and Physical Education as well as public corporations subordinated to these Ministries of the Czechoslovak Republic, shall use in their offices, shall publish their anouncements, as well as their names on their buildings in the state, official language.[31]

Article 60 of this Executive Ordinance provided that these public agencies should employ only persons "who had a thorough knowledge

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[28] "Ödön Tarján and Dr. A. Fall, *Hungarians, Slovaks and Ruthenians in the Danube-Valley* (Budapest, 1938), p. 21.

[29] Zákon čís. 122/20 ze dne 29 února 1920 podle § 129 ústavní listiny, jímž se stanoví zásady jazykového práva v Republice československé. *Sb. z. a n. R. čsl.* (Prague, 1920), Document 122.

[30] Zákon čís. 137/23, *Sb.z.a n. R. čsl.*, Doc. 137.

[31] Vládní nařízení čís. 17/1926. *Sb. z. a n. R. čsl.* (Prague, 1926).

of the official language" and Article 71 provided that all communal self-governments were obliged to reply in Czechoslovak language to all oral and written questions received in that language. Besides this, Article 73, Section 2, insisted that all communities with 3,000 inhabitants or over were obliged to employ "a sufficient number of officials with the knowledge of state language in word and writing, but in any case at least one." Article 100 of this Executive Ordinance in Section 1 provided again that "Until the Diet of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia will regulate the problem of language for Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, the provisions of this Ordinance are valid also in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia." Sections 2 and 3 of Article 100 provided that "besides the state language" under which is to be understood the Czech language, in all private and public offices in Carpatho-Ukraine may be used also "Ruthenian (Little Russian)" i. e. the Ukrainian language. But Section 4 of Article 500 prescribed that "State officials of the Županate administration and other civil servants were subordinated to the provisions valid for the State officials." [32] This Executive Ordinance was published on February 4, 1926, and became effective the same day.[33] All these linguistic provisions were of a provisional character. However, the autonomous Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine was not elected until February 12, 1939. Therefore, these provisions remained valid for some time in the autonomous country.[34]

Together with the Constitutional Charter, the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly issued on February 29, 1920, two Constitutional Acts: No. 123/1920 regulating the Organization and Jurisdiction of the Chamber of Deputies of the National Assembly, and No. 124/1920 regulating the Organization and Jurisdiction of the Senate. According to Article 13 of the Treaty of St. Germain "Czecho-Slovakia guarantees to the Ruthene territory equitable representation in the legislative assembly of the Czecho-Slovak Republic." [35] This provision was included into Czecho-Slovak Constitutional Charter, and detailed provisions for the representation of Carpatho-Ukraine in

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[32] *Ibid.*, Doc. No. 17/1926.

[33] Dr. Emil Sobota, *Národnostní právo československé* (Prague, 1927), p. 192. Hereafter cited as: Sobota, *Národnostní právo.*

[34] There are no known legal provisions issued by the Czecho-Slovak legislative or executive organs which would require the knowledge of the Ukrainian (officially Ruthenian) language for civil servants on the territory of autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine.

[35] Temperley, V, p. 465.

the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly were prescribed by Constitutional Acts No. 123/1920 Sb. z. a n. and No. 124/1920 Sb. z. a n. According to § 1 of the Act No. 123/1920, the Chamber of the Deputies consisted of 300 members, and according to Act 124/1920 the Senate was composed of 150 members. Paragraph 9 of Act No. 123/1920 provided that the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine constituted the 23rd Election District for the elections to the Chamber of Deputies, and that from that district 9 members were to be elected to the Chamber of Deputies. Paragraph 9 of Act No. 124/1920 provided that the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine constituted the 13th Election District for the elections to the Senate, and prescribed that 4 members of the Senate were to be elected from that district.[36] Paragraph 8 of the Constitutional Charter provided that the 300 members of the Chamber of Deputies, and § 13 of the Charter prescribed that the 150 members of the Senate shall be "elected according to general, equal, direct and secret suffrage on a basis of proportional representation."[37] However, contrary to these provisions, in the election district of the city of Prague, with a predominantly Czech population, one Deputy was elected to represent 38,699 inhabitants, whereas in Carpatho-Ukraine one Deputy was to be elected to represent 67,303 inhabitants.[38] This incongruity was provided by the distribu-

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[36] See Documents Nos. 123/20 and 124/20 in *Sb. z. a n. R. čsl.* (Prague, 1920). According to special provisions of both these Acts the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine was excluded from participation in the first elections to the Chamber of Deputies held on April 18, 1920, and to the Senate held on April 25, 1920. Supplementary elections to both Chambers of the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly were held in Carpatho-Ukraine on March 16, 1924. See Statistisches Staatsamt, *Statistische Uebersicht der Čechoslovakischen Republik* (Prague, 1930), pp. 261, 266; and, C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (London, 1937), pp. 239-240.

[37] Hoetzel, *Constitution*.

[38] Dr. Karel Braunias, "Das parlamentarische Wahlrecht der europäischen Staaten und die nationalen Minderheiten," *Nation und Staat* (Wien, 1927-28), Jahrgang I, Heft 8, p. 561. According to the Czecho-Slovak census of 1921 the population of Czecho-Slovakia was 13,374,364; if divided by 300 (the number of Members of the Chamber of Deputies), in average one Deputy was to be elected from among 44,548 citizens. However, in Prague 5,849 citizens below the average, and in Carpatho-Ukraine 17,662 citizens over the average were required for the election of one Deputy. If the provisions of the Constitutional Charter, which seemed to guarantee equal rights to all citizens of the Republic, would have been respected and applied, then Carpatho-Ukraine with a population of 597,731 citizens (6,862 foreigners excluded) would have been entitled to elect at least 13 Deputies (with a remainder of 18,607 citizens unrepresented, on the basis of one Deputy for each 44,548 citizens) instead of 9; and 7 Senators

tion of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies in Act No. 123/1920 sb. z. a n. Similar disproportions between representation from Czech territories and Carpatho-Ukraine were also established for the elections of the members of Senate.[39] This was a violation of the rights of the Carpatho-Ukrainian population as citizens of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, who according to § 128 of the Constitutional Charter "shall be in all respects equal before the law and shall enjoy equal civic and political rights." [40] It was also in conflict with § § 8 and 13 of the Constitutional Charter.

As has been indicated above, on April 18, 1920, elections to the Chamber of Deputies were held and one week later, on April 25, 1920, the members of the Senate were elected. The elections to the autonomous Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet should have been held "not later than ninety days after the general elections to the National Assembly of the Czecho-Slovak Republic." [41] Instead of preparing for elections to the Diet, which had to be held before July 25, 1920, the Czecho-Slovak Government issued on April 26, 1920, an Executive Ordinance No. 356/20 Sb. z. a n. concerning a change of the General Statutes of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia No. 26,536. In its § 17 this Ordinance was called *Provisional Statute.*[42]

The Provisional Statute referred to § 3, Section 8, of the Constitutional Charter[43] and pretended to create a basis for the enforce-

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instead of 4 as was provided by the Acts. On October 15, 1925, Act No. 123/1920 Sb. z. a n. was amended by Act No. 205/1925 Sb. z. a n., and Act No. 124/1920 Sb. z. a n. by Act No. 206/1925 Sb. z. a n. However, the existing disproportion between the representation of Bohemia and Carpatho-Ukraine was changed even worse: 35,147 citizens of the Prague District A were entitled to elect one Deputy, whereas in Carpatho-Ukraine one member of the Chamber of Deputies was to be elected to represent 64,210 citizens.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 563.

[40] Hoetzel, *Constitution.*

[41] General Statutes for the Organization and Administration of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia No. 26,536. See above, pp. 41-43.

[42] Nařízení vlády Republiky československé ze dne 26. dubna 1920, jímž se mění a doplňuje Generální Statut pro Podkarpatskou Rus. *Sb. z. a n. R. čsl.*, čís. 356/20. Hereafter cited in text as: Provisional Statute.

[43] Paragraph 3, Section 8, of the Constitutional Charter reads as follows: "Details as to the right of suffrage and eligibility to the Diet shall be defined by special legislation." Reference made to this provision has no basis, because: a) Government had no authority to legislate; and b) the Provisional Statute did not deal with the provisions of § 3, Section 8, of the Constitutional Charter, since it rather delayed the calling of the Diet into existence than prescribed preparatory steps for it.

ment of its provisions. It called into existence three organs of the autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine, namely the Governor, the Vice-Governor and a Gubernatorial Council. Paragraph 17 provided that after the formation of the Gubernatorial Council, the authority of the Ruthenian Directorium as well as the powers of the Administrator would expire.

Paragraph 1 of the Provisional Statute provided that

> at the head of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia shall be a provisional Governor, who shall be appointed by the President of the Czechoslovak Republic upon the recommendation of the Government, until the Sub-Carpatho-Ruthenian Diet is constituted.

Paragraph 2 of the Provisional Statute dealt with the powers of the Governor. These powers may be divided in two groups, namely those that entitled him to execute his powers alone, and those in which his powers were checked by the Vice-Governor. The Governor alone was entitled to represent Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia in relations with the Czecho-Slovak Government; he was the Chairman of the Gubernatorial Council; and he had the authority to sign all regulations and ordinances of a normative character, which were issued by the Civil Administration and were concerned with the problems of Carpatho-Ukraine. To the second group of the Governor's competences belonged appointments of civil servants of certain types, non-state school teachers, and judges; authority to promote judges and state officials to the seventh rank, and authority to recommend to the Government the promotions of judges and state officials in Carpatho-Ukraine to higher ranks. In execution of these competences the Vice-Governor also participated. He also counter-signed all proposals made by the chiefs of bureaus. Besides, the Governor was entitled to receive oral and written reports from the Vice-Governor and, through the office of the Vice-Governor, from the chiefs of bureaus, about all affairs regarding Carpatho-Ukraine. According to § 2, Section 6, the Civil Administration was obliged to notify the Governor about all contemplated governing regulations, especially if they were of a political nature. The Governor was entitled to suspend every order given by the Vice-Governor, in which he judged that it was in violation of the Constitution or other laws, or injurious to the interests of Carpatho-Ukraine. However, he was obliged to report every such case to the Government and obtain from it a final decision. In the meantime, the Vice-Governor was entitled

to issue a temporary order in matters which, in his opinion, could not be delayed.

Paragraph 3 of the Provisional Statute dealt with the office of the Vice-Governor.[44] He was to be appointed by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the Government, and substituted for the Governor in the event of sickness, absence or inability to perform his functions, or a temporary vacancy. He was the immediate superior for all referents of the Carpatho-Ukrainian civil administration as well as for the offices and institutions subordinated to the civil administration. He was the channel of communication between these agencies and the Government. He countersigned all official acts of the Governor.

In case of a disunity of opinion between the Governor and the Vice-Governor in any question, the affair was to be referred to the Government for decision.[45] The Vice-Governor was to be substituted, in case of his inability, by the highest ranking official of the civil administration.[46]

According to § 4 of the Provisional Statute, the Gubernatorial Council was composed of the Governor as its Chairman and the

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[44] Neither the Articles 10-13 of the Treaty of St. Germain, nor the Czecho-Slovak Constitution have any provisions as to the office of the Vice-Governor. It is interesting to note that there was no Vice-President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. There could be no objections to such an office, if he would just substitute for the Governor in case of necessity and would have been responsible to the Governor. In this case, however, the office of the Vice-Governor was established with broad competences which weakened the powers of the Governor as well as the autonomous rights of Carpatho-Ukraine in general. It may be considered as of being in conflict with the spirit of the Articles 10-13 of the Treaty of St. Germain.

[45] This provision as well as that of § 2 which entitled the Vice-Governor to issue temporary orders under his own responsibility against the will of the Governor placed in his hands powers which were not provided by the Treaty of St. Germain. These provisions, actually, established an equality between the powers of Governor and Vice-Governor, with some superiority of the Vice-Governor's powers: The placement of all Carpatho-Ukrainian public administration under his immediate control actually put him over the Governor who should have been "the head of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia."

[46] Experience had shown that to the office of the Governor always were appointed Ukrainians, first Gregory Zhatkovych, an American citizen of Carpatho-Ruthenian descent, then Dr. Antin Beskid, and lastly Rev. Konstantyn Hrabar. On the other hand, to the office of the Vice-Governor always were appointed Czechs — Petr Ehrenfeld and Antonín Rozsypal. Having important administrative powers, these Czech Vice-Governors controlled the administration of Carpatho-Ukraine and checked the Governor's actions.

Vice-Governor as its Vice-Chairman, and of ten elected members as well as of four members appointed by the Government. Additionally, § 10 entitled and obliged the political, financial and cultural referents of the civil administration to participate in the sessions of the Gubernatorial Council with voting rights. Besides, the Vice-Governor was entitled to appoint from time to time a maximum of three additional officials who would have full voting power. All other referents would participate in the meetings with advisory power. Thus, the Gubernatorial Council consisted of 10 elected and 10 appointed members with voting powers, plus Governor and Vice-Governor *ex-officio*.[47] Paragraph 15 of the Provisional Statute provided that the Gubernatorial Council was entitled to deal with all affairs regarding Carpatho-Ukraine which were put on the agenda by the Government, the Governor or the Vice-Governor. Specifically, the normative ordinances of the civil administration were to be placed before the Gubernatorial Council, but in case of an emergency a normative regulation could be issued "before the opinion of the Gubernatorial Council has been heard." [48] Paragraph 16 stated that in case of dissolution of the Gubernatorial Council, the Government was to take necessary measures, after consultation with the Governor in order to constitute a new Gubernatorial Council within two months.[49]

In the partial enforcement of Provisional Statute No. 356/1920, the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic appointed on May 5, 1920, Gregory Zhatkovych, who was the Chairman of the provisional Ruthenian Directorium, to the office of the first provisional Governor and Petr Ehrenfeld, a Czech, to the office of the Vice-

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[47] First impression was that in the Gubernatorial Council the 10 elected members were in a great majority. However, besides them, 4 members were jointly appointed by the Governor and the Vice-Governor; 3 referents were members *ex-officio*, and other 3 referents were appointed by the Vice-Governor. Here again are shown superior powers of Vice-Governor.

[48] Neither the provisions of the Articles 10-13 of the Treaty of St. Germain nor § 3 of the Constitution foresaw the existence of a Gubernatorial Council. They provided for an autonomous Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet with legislative powers in autonomous affairs. Instead, a Gubernatorial Council was created with advisory powers only.

[49] According to § 5 the Government was to issue special regulations as to the establishment of the election districts and electoral procedure for the election of the 10 elective members; only communal mayors were to vote. However, the Czecho-Slovak Government never issued the necessary regulations, and, consequently, members of the Council never were elected. See Ballreich, p. 59.

Governor.[50] The Gubernatorial Council was not called into existence,[51] and actual control of the country was placed in the hands of the Vice-Governor who received "much broader and much more important powers in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia than Governor. To the latter actually remained only authority of external representation,"[52] which, in the existing situation, was meaningless. Gr. Zhatkovych, as the Governor, tried to implement the provisions for Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy guaranteed by the Treaty of St. Germain. He soon realized, however, that the Czecho-Slovak Government was not inclined to fulfill its obligations and, on March 16, 1921, he resigned his post. Subsequently, he published an *Exposé* in which he set forth the reasons for his resignation and gave details of the anti-autonomous policy of the Czecho-Slovak Government toward Carpatho-Ukraine.[53] No successor was appointed until 1924, and the administration of the country was concentrated in the hands of Petr Ehrenfeld.

In the meantime, at the end of June 1919 the Rumanians occupied Hutsulshchyna, which — as has been indicated already — had been administered as an independent region, and after an agreement between the Czecho-Slovaks and Rumanians the latter evacuated (on June 30, 1920) all their occupational troops from the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine.[54] During the administration of Petr Ehrenfeld, the process of centralization and strengthening of Czech control in Carpatho-Ukraine continued. The country was organized in three Districts with their seats in Uzhhorod, Mukachiv and Sevlyush. The elective District Assemblies were abolished and "the powers of these organs" were "transferred to the Vice-Governor and to a Government-appointed Lord-Lieutenant (*Župan*) in each" District.[55]

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[50] Chmelař, p. 189. See also Ballreich, p. 56, who states that Gregory Zhatkovych has been appointed to the post of the Governor for propagandistic reasons.

[51] Ballreich, p. 59.

[52] Ballreich, p. 56.

[53] See "Gubernator rezygnoval," *Rusyn* (Uzhhorod), March 19, 1921. For the partial reprint of Zhatkovych's address delivered on March 17, 1921, in Uzhhorod see Petro Stercho, *Karpato-Ukrayins'ka Derzhava* (Toronto, 1965), pp. 230-231.

[54] Chmelař, p. 189.

[55] C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (London, 1937), p. 223. Hereafter cited as: Macartney. On June 7, 1923, the Czecho-Slovak Government referring to § 3, Section 8, of the Constitution issued a new Ordinance, No. 113/23 Sb. z. a n. which again "until the definitive legislation is passed" established a "provisional" administrative system: the three Districts were

In 1924, after the communal elections had been held, a new Carpatho-Ukrainian Governor was appointed in the person of Dr. Antin Beskid, who had been President of the Prešov Council which had first voted for union with Czecho-Slovakia. To the post of the Vice-Governor was appointed again a Czech, Antonín Rozsypal,[56] who kept his position until the administration reform of 1927. Thereafter, on March 16, 1924, the first additional elections to the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly were held in Carpatho-Ukraine. The population supported the political parties of the "radical opposition" in order to express "its dissatisfaction with the Czech rule" in Carpatho-Ukraine.[57]

The process of centralization of the administration in Carpatho-Ukraine was climaxed by the Administration Reform Act. No. 125/27 Sb. z. a n. R. čsl. of July 14, 1927.[58] Before introducing it in Carpatho-Ukraine, the Czecho-Slovak Government issued on June 4, 1926, the Executive Ordinance No. 84/1926 as a preparatory measure for the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine. According to § 1 of this Ordinance, all three Carpatho-Ukrainian Districts, namely Uzhhorod, Mukachiv and Sevlyush, were united in a single District with its seat in Mukachiv.[59] This Ordinance was enforced on July 1, 1926, by the Czecho-Slovak Ministry of Interior in cooperation with other ministries concerned.

The Administration Reform Act No. 125/27 Sb. z. a n. R. čsl.

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headed by Lord-Lieutenants (*Župans*) who were civil servants and appointed officials responsible to the Vice-Governor. Subordinated to them were County Lieutenants (*ogresní hejtmans*) who were in charge of the counties (*okres*). Another Executive Ordinance, No. 171/23 Sb. z. a n., of August 7, 1923, subordinated the cities possessing home-rule, Uzhhorod and Mukachiv, to the control of the respective District Lord-Lieutenants (*Župans*); and, established the positions of Notaries (*Notářs*) who were appointed civil servants. Besides, according to this Ordinance, the mayors of the cities of Uzhhorod and Mukachiv were to be appointed by the respective District Lord-Lieutenants (*Župans*) instead of being elected.

[56] Macartney, p. 225.

[57] Nowak, p. 182; also Macartney, pp. 239-240, who states the following results of the elections to the Chamber of Deputies: Communists received 100,000 votes; Kurtyak Party — 21,000; other Ruthenian parties — 60,000; and, Magyar and Jewish parties — 55,000 votes.

[58] Zákon ze dne 14. července 1927, jímž se unifikuje civilní správa Republiky československé, *Sb. z. a n. R. čsl.* 125/27. (Prague, 1927), Doc. Nr. 123/27. Hereafter cited as: *Administration Reform Act.*

[59] Nařízení vlády Republiky československé ze dne 4. června 1926, jímž se reorganisuje župní správa na území Podkarpatské Rusi. *Sb. z.a n. R. čsl.* (Prague, 1926), Document No. 84/26.


HUNGARY
and the RUTHENIAN GREEK-CATHOLIC EPARCHY of MUKACHIV
(shaded) 1771
PRYASHIV
MUKACHIV
HAJDUDOROG
Budapest
Duna
ADRIATIC SEA


THE RUTHENIAN GREEK-CATHOLIC EPARCHY of MUKACHIV
in 1771
1. Boundaries of the Eparchy extended throughout 13 Districts of Northeastern Hungary
2. The Eparchy was divided:
a. in 1818 the Eparchy of PRYASHIV was erected
b. in 1912 the Eparchy of HAJDUDOROG was erected
Symbols:
MUKACHIV
(later located in UZHHOROD)
PRYASHIV
HAJDUDOROG
Monastery
Pryashiv
Hajdudorog
MUKACHIV
UZHHOROD
KRASNYY BRIB
M. BEREZNE
HRUSHIV
Vel. Bychkiv
Sybit
Mosyayiv
Baia Mare
Szatmár
Nyiregyháza
Tokaj
Miskolc
Nim. Sobota
Zavadka
Lavoča
Spisk
Sharysh
Zhariv
Stropkiv
Humenne
Vasenie
Vornoe
Kosice
Trebyshiv
Sarospatak
Kisvarda
Svrednye
Lavky
Dobrovyshchi
Rosnyguva
Derekratsevo
Ardanovo
Ivnytychevo
Iza
Khust
Svetyush
Transylvania

introduced the unified administration system in all territories of Czecho-Slovakia, including that of legally autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine. Administratively, Czecho-Slovakia was divided into four Lands, namely Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, Slovakia, and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Each Land was divided into counties (*okres*), while the mediate units, the Districts (*župa*), were abolished.[60] Each Land was headed by a Land President, and each county by a County Chief (*okresní hejtman*). They were appointed civil servants and responsible gradually, the County Chief to the Land President, and the Land President in turn, to the Government of the Republic. Since § 7, Section 4, made the Land President responsible for the entire administration of the Land concerned, the Act gave him also very broad powers: he was superior to all Land administration servants, he was entitled to appoint them and to remove them from the service, and he possessed also very broad decision-making powers in the affairs of administration.

The Administration Reform Act also called into existence a Land Assembly, a Land Council, and Land Committees in each of the four Lands. Analogically, in the Counties were created County Assemblies, County Councils, and County Committees.

The Carpatho-Ukrainian Land Assembly was to be composed of 12 elected and 6 appointed members. However, § 21 entitled the Land President, who was *ex-officio* Chairman of the Land Assembly, to exclude any member from participation in the Land Assembly sessions and to invite officials of the Land administration to take part in the sessions with voting power. The Land Assembly was to elect from among their own members the Land Council consisting of 6 members. The Land President who was to be also Chairman in the Land Council could transfer the Chairmanship to the Land Vice-President. The Land Assembly was entitled to appoint special Land Committees according to its needs. These Committees consisting of specialists were to fulfill certain advisory and auditing functions in the public agencies.

All sessions of the Land Assembly, Land Council, and Land Committees were to be summoned by the Land President, who was entitled also to prepare the agenda; however, under certain conditions the members of the Land Assembly were also entitled to de-

[60] The 12 counties of Carpatho-Ukraine were: Berehovo, Irshava, Khust, Mukachiv, Perechyn, Rakhiv, Sevlyush, Svalyava, Tyachiv, Uzhhorod, Velyke Berezne, and Volove.

mand that the Land President summon the session and place their problems on agenda. The Land President was to enforce the decisions of the Land Assembly and was to be responsible to this organ for his actions. In case of a negative vote by the majority of the members of the Land Assembly, the affair was to be referred to the Ministry of the Interior for final decision. The Land President was entitled to veto any decision of the Land Assembly which in his opinion was in conflict with law. In this case each member of the Land Assembly, Land Council, or Land Committee was entitled to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court.

The Administration Reform Act went into effect in Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia on July 1, 1928, through special Executive Ordinances Nos. 93/1928 and 95/1928 both dated June 28, 1928, which also drew up the county borders in both Lands.

The administrative system in Carpatho-Ukraine was organized as follows: the Land was divided in 12 Counties, which consisted of 130 Notarial Regions (*notářský obvod*) under whose direct supervision were 487 self-administrative communities. Eleven Court Districts were established with 3 Courts of the Second Instance. The 12 School Districts were not identical with the 12 administrative Counties.[61]

To the post of the Land President the Czecho-Slovak Government appointed Antonín Rozsypal, who was the Vice-Governor. The Administration Reform Act did not mention the autonomous rights of Carpatho-Ukraine, including the Diet and the Governor, at all. The position of the Governor was not abolished by any specific Act or Ordinance, but the Governor was left without effective powers.[62] Dr. Ernst Flachbarth, an expert in the Administration and Minorities problems, expressed the opinion that the Administration Reform Act "finally abolishes the Carpatho-Ruthenian autonomy, which has been guaranteed internationally." [63] Therefore, the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomists in the Prague National Assembly fought bitterly

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[61] Statisches Staatsamt, *Statistische Uebersicht der Čechoslovakischen Republik* (Prague, 1930), p. 261. Note: in Carpatho-Ukraine there were 138 Gendarmery Posts and 3 Police Commissariats for a total population of 725, 357, whereas in Bohemia with a population of 7,109,376 there were only 6 Police Commissariats. Similar disproportion existed in the numbers of Finance Directorates, which supervised the collection of taxes: 5 in Carpatho-Ukraine, and 12 in Bohemia.

[62] Ballreich, p. 69.

[63] *Prágai Magyar Hirlap* (Prague), June 10 and 11, 1927.

against the adoption of this Act.[64] However, this administrative system was established over the protest of the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomists and lasted in the country until the reorganization of the Czecho-Slovak Republic on a federative basis in the autumn of 1938. After the death of the Governor, Dr. Antin Beskid, in June 1933, the office of the Governor remained vacant for several years, and the Land President, Antonín Rozsypal, administered Carpatho-Ukraine as the head of the Land in every respect.[65] "During Rozsypal's rule" in Carpatho-Ukraine "the Czechization of the country was carried out without regard for anything" and "there was no more talk about autonomy" [66] in official Czecho-Slovak circles.

Since 1919 the Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders continuously demanded the execution of the internationally guaranteed provisions of autonomy,[67] and the American Ruthenians supported them.[68] In the early 1920's the Czecho-Slovak officials gave as their reason for not introducing autonomy in Carpatho-Ukraine that in such case the Magyar, German and Jewish minorities would dominate over the Ruthenians in the country, since they were economically stronger and better prepared for political activities.[69] Thereafter, in the 1930's — after admitting that progress had been made in cultural, economic and political respects — they blamed the local leaders for disunity and insisted that the granting of full autonomy had to be delayed until unity would be achieved.[70] The leaders of both most important

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[64] Nowak, p. 183. As a result of the strong position of the Sub-Carpatho-Ruthenian members in the Prague Parliament against Czecho-Slovak centralization, which was to be introduced by this Act, some of the autonomists, as Ivan Kurtyak and Michael Demko, were jailed by the Czecho-Slovak authorities.

[65] Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko, "Shcho mayemo skazáty p. ministrovi Beneshovi?" in *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), April 19, 1934.

[66] Nowak, p. 182.

[67] Konstantyn L. Hrabar, "Nakanuni avtonomiyi" in Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, ed., *Podkarpatskaya Rus' za hody 1919-1936* (Uzhhorod, 1936), pp. 9-10.

[68] Yuhas, *Wilson's Principles,* deals with this problem.

[69] A Report of the Czechoslovak Government of November 15, 1923, to the League of Nations concerning the situation in Sub-Carpatho-Ruthenia. *League of Nations Documents* (Geneva, 1924), Doc. No. C.608 M.231, 1923, I.

[70] Dr. Edvard Beneš, *Rech o podkarpatorusskoy probleme* (Uzhhorod, 1934), pp. 34-40. Dr. E. Beneš, as Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, in his anti-Revisionist action, visited in the Spring of 1934 Carpatho-Ukraine and delivered a political speech in Uzhhorod, capital of Carpatho-Ukraine. In his address, he referred to the linguistic, cultural and political disunity among Carpatho-Ruthenians.

After World War I, the Central Ruthenian National Council identified

cultural and political movements, the Ukrainian, represented by the First Central Ruthenian (Ukrainian) National Council under the leadership of Rev. Avhustyn Voloshyn, and the pro-Russian, represented by the Russian Central National Council headed by Dr. Josyf Kaminskiy, echoed Beneš's call for compromise, and on November 28, 1936, jointly drafted and unanimously adopted a joint "Project of the Act concerning the Constitution of the autonomous Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia." [71] A joint delegation presented it to the Czecho-Slovak Prime Minister, Dr. Milan Hodža, who on that occasion declared that "autonomy will be established one hundred percent in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain and the Constitution." [72]

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itself culturally and linguistically with the Ukrainian movement. President Masaryk supported it in the beginning. However, at that time quite many Russian Tsarist emigrées were living in Carpatho-Ukraine, who united with the pro-Russian emigrées from Galicia and under the leadership of Andrey Gagatko tried to impose the pro-Russian trend in the Council and in the country. The Council resisted. Thus, on October 9, 1920, a separate organization was constituted which, too, used the name of the already existing Central Ruthenian National Council headed by Dr. Antin Beskid. Thus disunity became a fact, since some "conservative" elements supported Beskid's Council, while the majority of intelligentsia as well as the schools remained in line of the Ukrainian movement under leadership of Rev. Avhustyn Voloshyn.

The real influence in cultural respect may be judged by the fact that in June 1934 there were in Carpatho-Ukraine 1,874 teachers in the "Ruthenian" schools, of whom 1,318 belonged to the Ukrainian Teachers Association headed by Rev. A. Voloshyn. There also existed a Carpatho-Russian Teachers Association with a much smaller membership.

The Czechs supported in the beginning the popular Ukrainian cultural movement, later the pro-Russian, and in 1930's they liked best the movement of the "local native Ruthenians" who preferred not to be identified with the Ukrainians or Russians. This so-called third movement had relatively few followers. Especially the younger generation identified itself either with the Ukrainians or with the Russians.

See: Macarthey, pp. 228-234; Oscar Jászi, "The Problem of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia" in Robert J. Kerner, ed., *Czechoslovakia* (Berkeley, 1940), p. 206; Antonín Hartl, *Literární obrození podkarpatských Rusínů v letech 1920-1930* (Prague, 1930), p. 5; Stepan M. Chehyl' "Narodoprosvetitel'naya rabota na Podkarpatskoy Rusy" in Dr. E. Bachynskiy, *Podkarpatskaya Rus'* (Uzhhorod, 1936), pp. 113-120; and Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko, "Tertium Non Datur," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), January 18, 1934.

[71] *Proyekt Zakona Tsentral'noyi Rus'koyi Narodnoyi Rady pro Konstytutsiyu avtonomnoyi Pidkarpats'koyi Rusy* (Uzhhorod, 1937). Hereafter cited as: The Autonomy Bill.

[72] Nowak, p. 185.

The Autonomy Bill was divided into seven Chapters. In the first Chapter, §§ 3 and 4 defined the territory of autonomous *Pidkarpats'ka Rus'* [73] providing for the incorporation of the territories West of Uzh River with a Ukrainian majority into autonomous Pidkarpats'ka Rus'. Paragraph 5 defined the common affairs with Czecho-Slovakia as follows: the President of the Republic; citizenship; foreign affairs; national defense; public finances with the limitation established by § 50, according to which the autonomous Diet was to levy taxes on the autonomous territory and the taxes collected there would be used by the Autonomous Executive; monetary system, measures, and the patent and authorship rights; business legislation; public roads; post, telephone and telegraph; and the tariff and public monopoly legislation. Paragraph 6 provided that all other powers were reserved for autonomous Pidkarpats'ka Rus'. The official language was to be Ukrainian, and the residents of Carpatho-Ukraine who were obliged to military service were to serve on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine.

Paragraph 11 regulated the Carpatho-Ukrainian representation in the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly as follows: the autonomous Diet would send 14 members to the Chamber of Deputies and 7 Senators provided that these numbers would increase proportionally to the population of the territories West of the Uzh River which were to be incorporated into the autonomous territory. The Deputies and Senators from Carpatho-Ukraine in the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly were to have voting power only in matters which were beyond the competences of the autonomous Diet.

Chapter III, including §§ 12-38, dealt with autonomous Legislative Authority. Paragraph 12, Section 1, read: "The legislative organ of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia is the Diet." The Diet was to consist of 45 elected members. The first elections to the Diet were to be held not later than six months after the publication of this Act. The sessions of the Diet were to be summoned by the Governor, who was also obliged to be present at the sessions, if demanded by the Diet, and answer all questions concerning the administration of the country. The Bills passed by the Diet were to be signed by the Governor and the President of the Republic. However, in the event

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[73] Pidkarpats'ka Rus' is the Ukrainian spelling and pronuciation of the official name of the autonomous country of that time. The Autonomy Bill available is published in Ukrainian. The same text, however, was published also in Russian.

of a Presidential veto, according to § 36, a majority of 2/3 in the Diet could overrule such a veto and the Bill would become an Act and would be published with the signature of the Governor. In the time between the two yearly sessions of the Diet, the Permanent Committee was to legislate with certain exceptions in very important affairs of the country.

Chapter V, including §§ 43-48, dealt with the Autonomous Executive, in whose hands all executive powers were to be placed within the limits of autonomy. According to § 44 at the head of the Autonomous Executive was to be the Governor appointed by the President of the Republic from among three candidates recommended to him by the Diet. He was to be responsible to the Diet and so were also the other members of the Autonomous Executive, whose competences were to be defined by the Diet.

According to § 53, in the Czecho-Slovak Government a special Ministry was to be established for Carpatho-Ukrainian affairs, headed by a Minister without portfolio, who was to be a Carpatho-Ukrainian. The Minister was to function as a liaison between the Governor and the President and Government of the Republic and was to see that the Acts of the National Assembly and those of the autonomous Diet would not be in conflict.

Paragraph 54, Section 1, stated that this Act amended the Constitutional Charter of Czecho-Slovakia and invalidated the previous provisions of all Acts of the Czecho-Slovak Republic which were in conflict with this Act.[74]

This Autonomy Bill was not accepted. Meanwhile, under Carpatho-Ukrainian pressure[75] on April 4, 1937, the Czecho-Slovak Government introduced in the Chamber of Deputies its own Bill, which had been accepted in the National Assembly against the opposition of Carpatho-Ukrainian representatives, the Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party and the Magyar parties.[76] This became known as Act No. 172/37 Sb. z. a n. R. čsl. of June 26, 1937, concerning the first stage

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[74] The Autonomy Bill was signed on behalf of the Central Ruthenian National Council by the following political leaders: Rev. Avhustyn Voloshyn, Dr. Yosyf Kaminskiy, Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko, Andriy Brodiy, Vasyl' Shcherets'kyy, Dr. Mykola Dolynay, Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, Petro Hayevych, Dr. Ivan Zhydovskiy, Mykhaylo Demko, Mykhaylo Popovych, Mykhaylo Vasylenko, Stepan Klochurak, Myron Stryps'kyy and Yuliy Feldeshiy.

[75] Dr. Stepan Rosokha, "Narodzhenya Derzhavy" in Ukrayins'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Boroť bi* (Vienna, 1939), p. 6.

[76] Nowak, p. 186.

of autonomy.[77] The First Stage of the Autonomy Act differed considerably from the Autonomy Bill prepared and presented by the Central Ruthenian National Council.

The most important provisions of the First Stage of Autonomy Act No. 172/37 were as described below. Paragraph 1 provided that the Governor was to be appointed by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the Government and was responsible to the Government and, after the establishment of an autonomous Diet, responsible also to the Diet. He was entitled to present recommendations and to express his opinion regarding all affairs concerning Carpatho-Ukraine. He could be invited to the meetings of the Czecho-Slovak Government.

All competences in religious affairs on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine, which until now were with the Land Administration, were to be transferred to the Governor. However, in case of any financial claims against the State, he was to consult the Land Administration.

In linguistic affairs the Governor was entitled to make proposals and express his opinion to the Government regarding these matters in Carpatho-Ukraine. He was to grant permits for the use of textbooks in Carpatho-Ukrainian schools, but only in regard to their language and not their contents. The Governor was to appoint and promote the school teachers on the recommendation of the Referat of the Ministry for Education in Uzhhorod. He was to appoint also the School Inspectors. In all financial affairs connected with education and art, the consent of the Referat of the Ministry of Education was necessary.

The provisions of the Administration Reform Act No. 125/27 concerning the Land President, Land Assembly and Land Council were to remain valid except for a few changes. The Governor would be the Chairman in the sessions of the Land Assembly and the Land Council. He was to sign all acts of the Land Assembly, which could be vetoed by the Land President only with the consent of the Governor. The Governor would also appoint the mayors of the cities of Uzhhorod and Mukachiv, and would cooperate with the Land President, the city and regional notaries. He also possessed authority to influence the selection of civil servants.

Paragraph 9 provided that the Vice-Governor should be a civil

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[77] Zákon ze dne 26. června 1937, jímž se normuje prozatímní právní postavení guvernéra Podkarpatské Rusi, čís. 172/37 Sb. z. a n. R. čsl. (Prague, 1937). Hereafter cited as: *The First State of Autonomy Act No. 172/37.*

servant and should be at the same time the Land President. The Land Administration was to be under his direct supervision. A kind of dualism of competences was created because the Land President, who was also the Vice-Governor, was to keep almost all the powers given to him by Act No. 125/27, and the new Act No. 172/37 placed them also in the hands of the Governor. Paragraph 8 stated that in event of competence conflicts the consent of both, the Governor and the Vice-Governor, was necessary. If the unity of opinion of both could not be reached, the affair should be referred to the Ministry of Interior or other pertinent Ministry for the final decision.

Paragraph 17 of the First Stage of Autonomy Act 172/37 provided for the establishment of a Gubernatorial Council as an advisory body to the Governor, which was to work until the constituting of the Diet. The Gubernatorial Council was to consist of 24 members as follows: the 6 members of the Land Council who were elected by the Land Assembly, 9 members elected as such by the Land Assembly, and 9 members appointed by the Government upon the recommendation of the Governor. The Governor was to be the Chairman of the Gubernatorial Council and was to summon it for at least four sessions each year. The Governor prepared the agenda. The extraordinary sessions were to be summoned by the Governor upon the request of one half of the Gubernatorial Council members, who in such an event were obliged to present also an agenda. The Government was entitled, after consultation with the Governor, to dissolve the Gubernatorial Council. However, it was obliged to provide that no later than three months after dissolution a new Gubernatorial Council would be constituted. Although the Gubernatorial Council was only an advisory body, the Governor was obliged to respect its decisions in basic religious, educational, linguistic and local administration matters.

The First Stage of Autonomy Act No. 172/37 was enforced — accompanied by sharp protests from the politically active population in Carpatho-Ukraine[78] — on October 26, 1937. But in reality the situation in Carpatho-Ukraine remained almost unchanged. It looked *pro foro externo* as if the Czecho-Slovak Government would seriously try to fulfill the provisions of autonomy step-by-step, but in reality the Land President remained as he was before the representative of the Prague Government, and concentrated in his hands

[78] Nowak, p. 186.

control over the country.[79] Although the newly appointed Governor, Konstantyn Hrabar, expressed his feelings of gratitude to the Czecho-Slovak Government for the enforcement of the first stage of autonomy, as well as his confidence that soon all provisions for autonomy would be a reality, "throughout the country a storm of protests was raised against this mock-autonomy" and the political leaders as well as "the population demanded the elections to the Carpatho-Ruthenian Diet as the legislative organ."[80] However, no change was made until October 1938.

INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1919-1938

From May 7, 1919, on the Central Ruthenian National Council in Uzhhorod was considered as the political representation of the Ukrainian population in the territory South of the Carpathians.[81] There were no other political organizations, no independent political parties in existence. This Council united in itself predominantly those political leaders who were working for the unity of their country with the Ukrainian State and gradually developed under the leadership of Rev. Avhustyn Voloshyn into the Ukrainian movement of Carpatho-Ukraine.[82] The cultural and linguistic aspects of this movement were supported in the beginning not only by the Governor, Gregory Zhatkovych,[83] but also by the President of the Republic, T. G. Masaryk,[84] as well as by the Czecho-Slovak Academy of Sciences in Prague.[85] The Ukrainian cultural movement was organized in the Society "Prosvita" called into existence in Uzhhorod on April 29

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[79] Ballreich, p. 76.

[80] Nowak, p. 186.

[81] Josef Chmelař, "Politické poměry v Podkarpatské Rusi" in J. Chmelař, *Podkarpatská Rus* (Prague, 1923), p. 187. Hereafter cited as: Chmelař.

[82] *Ibid.*, p. 187.

[83] Augustin Stefan, "Myths About Carpatho-Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* (New York, 1954), X, Nr. 3, p. 224.

[84] T. G. Masaryk, *The Making of A State* (London, 1927), p. 256.

[85] In order to explain the linguistic provisions of the General Statute for the Organization and Administration of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia (see above, pp. 41-43), the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in Prague adopted in 1919 a resolution, the first sentences of which read: "Because the local Rusin dialect of which the Statute speaks, is indisputably a Little Russian dialect, (therefore) as the literary language for the population of that area (Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia) is to be recognized the literary Little Russian language, which is used by its nearest neighbors and kindred stocks..." See *Masarykova vědecká encyklopedie* (Prague, 1931), Vol. V, p. 781.

and May 9, 1920.[86] *Prosvita* united "experienced cultural leaders" and started immediately to organize its branches throughout the country,[87] so that soon after the meeting in Uzhhorod there were organized branches of *Prosvita,* with the typical reading rooms, in Perechyn, Lalovo, Rus'ka Mokra, Kosivs'ka Polyana etc. By May 1, 1923, over 100 branches were already existing and functioning in the towns and villages of Carpatho-Ukraine.[88]

The main aims of the *Prosvita* workers, who consisted predominantly of school teachers, were to raise the feelings of national consciousness of the population, to destroy the Magyar imposed inferiority complex, and to develop the country economically.[89]

Already on October 9, 1919, an anti-popular opposition against the Central Ruthenian National Council met in Uzhhorod and organized the Russian Central National Council under the leadership of Dr. Antin Beskid and Andriy Gagatko.[90] These elements professed to be conservatives and denied the existence of the Ukrainian people as a separate national entity. They wanted to introduce the Russian language in the Carpatho-Ukrainian schools and obtained support in this respect from the following Czech political parties: National Democrats under the leadership of Karel Kramář and Dr. Hajný, the Agrarian Party led by Antonín Švehla, the National Socialists led by Klofáč and later by E. Beneš, the Old-Slavonic group of

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[86] Pavlo Yatsko, "Spomyny pro pershi zbory 'Prosvity' " in *Z nahody desyatylitnoho yuvileyu istnovanya Tovarystva "Prosvity" na Pidkarpats'kiy Rusy* (Uzhhorod, 1930), pp. 3-8.

The meeting for the organization of "Prosvita" was summoned for April 29, 1920; however, it had to be postponed because of disorder caused by Andrij Gagatko, Ilarion Tsurkanovych, Vladimir Gomichkov and Dr. Antin Beskid, the local Russophiles, until May 9, 1920. Under chairmanship of Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, the Society was founded and its first Supreme Executive consisted of the following persons: Dr. Yuliy Brashchsyko was elected President; and Rev. A Voloshyn, Dr. Mykola Dolynay, Dr. Ivan Pankevych, Volodymyr Shuba, Avhustyn Shtefan, Victor Zheltvay, M. Tvorydlo, Dr. Vasyl' Hadzhega, Porfiriy Medvid, Dr. Hiyador Stryps'kyy, and Stepan Klochurak — members. Reserve members: M. Polyans'kyy, I. Chulak, A. Tovt, Pavlo Yatsko, and Osyp Bokshay.

[87] Stepan Chehyl' "Narodoprosvetitel'naya rabota na Podkarpatskoy Rusy" in Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, ed., *Podkarpatskaya Rus' za hody 1919-1936* (Uzhorod, 1936), p. 115. Hereafter cited as: Chehyl in Bachynskiy, *Podkarpatskaya Rus'.*

[88] Pavlo Yatsko, *op. cit.,* p. 12.

[89] *Ibid.,* p. 9.

[90] Antonín Hartl, *Literární obrození podkarpatských Rusínů v letech 1920-1930* (Prague, 1930), pp. 4-5.

Kusák and other.[91] The Ukrainian-Russophile struggle continued until 1938. The dualism was created in almost every field of cultural, political and educational life. "As counter-balance to the Ukrainian movement" [92] the Russophiles organized in 1924 their Society of Alexander Dukhnovych. The Ukrainian Scout organization of young boys and girls, *Plast,* which worked especially among the students of various schools since its installation in Berehovo on November 1, 1921, under the leadership of Andriy Didyk,[93] soon was counterbalanced by the Russophile Scout organization. There was also a division between the Ukrainian and Russophile teachers etc.[94]

The first political party, as such, was organized in February, 1920, the "Rus'ka Khliborobs'ka Partiya" (Ruthenian Farmers Party), with a program to serve the interests of small farmers who constituted the majority of its membership. Linguistically and culturally, this party was in line with the Central Ruthenian National Council. The President of the party was a farmer, Andriy Tovt of the village of Dravtsi, while Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko was its leader. Other prominent members were: Rev. A. Voloshyn, Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, Avhustyn Shtefan, a popular writer Demyan Lukach, and other well-known persons of the pro-Ukrainian movement. The party's organ was *Rus'ka Nyva* (The Ruthenian Field). In 1923, the name of the party was changed to *Khrystiyans'ko-Narodna Partiya* (The Christian People's Party) and Rev. A. Voloshyn became and remained its leader until 1939. Other members of the Party Presidium were elected: Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko as Vice-President, Dr. Mykola Dolynay as Secretary General, and Dr. Vasyl' Hadzhega, Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, Rev. Vasyl' Lar, Ivan Gryga and other leaders of the All-National Ruthenian Congress held at Khust on January 21, 1919. The Party's organ *Svoboda* was published in the Ukrainian literary language. Its leader, A. Voloshyn, in the March 16, 1923, elections was elected as a member of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czecho-Slovak Parliament.[95]

The left wing Russophiles organized themselves in the *Russkaya Trudovaya Partiya* (Russian Labor Party) under the leadership of

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[91] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[92] Chehyl in Bachynskiy, *Podkarpatskaya Rus'*, p. 115.

[93] M. V. Kopans'kyy, *Yak pobidyv narodovets'kyy rukh v Staromu Krayu, b. Pidkarpats'kiy Rusy* (Bridgeport, 1950), *p. 3.*

[94] Macartney, p. 241.

[95] Chmelař, p. 190; see also Stepan Rosokha, *Soym Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny* (Winnipeg, 1949), pp. 14 and 22-23. Hereater cited as: Rosokha, *Soym.*

an immigrant from Galicia, Andriy Gagatko, who together with another immigrant, Illariy Tsurkanovych, actually started the "linguistic struggle."[96] The party published its organ *Russkaya Zemlya* (The Russian Land).

The Ruthenian group with pro-Hungarian orientation under leadership of Dr. Yosyf Kaminskiy, former representative of Béla Kun's Hungarian Communist regimé on the territory of *Rus'ka Krayina*, organized iself politically in the *Karpatorusskiy Zemledil'skiy Soyuz* (the Carpatho-Russian Farmers' Union) and in the linguistic question accepted the position of the local independent Ruthenian dialect. The official organ of the party was *Karpatoruskiy Vistnyk*, a weekly, while the unofficial but actual organ was a daily published in the Hungarian language *Kárpáti Futár*.[97] In 1923 there was a split in this party. One part of the party leadership joined the Czecho-Slovak Agrarian Party, while the other organized itself in the *Avtonomnyy Zemledil'skiy Soyuz* (Autonomous Farmers Union) under the leadership of Ivan Kurtyak and Andriy Brodiy. The main purpose of the party officially was to seek the fulfillment of the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain regarding the autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine.[98] In reality, however, the leaders were financially supported from the beginning by the Hungarians and wanted to return the country to Hungary.[99]

Another locally organized political party in 1921 was the *Respublikans'ka Selyans'ka Partiya* (the Republican Village Farmers' Party) under the leadership of a farmer from the village of Velyki Luchky, Yurko Balogh. This party was based on the neutrality principle as far as linguistic and religious differences were concerned, but otherwise strongly supported the policy of the Czecho-Slovak Government.[100] The party published *Selo* (The Village) and concentrated its attention upon the production and living conditions of the small farmers. Since the party was organized with the support of the

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[96] "Yazykova borba na Podkarpatskoy Rusy" in o. Valentin Balogh, ed., *Kalendar Prosvity na rok 1931* (McKeesport, Pa., 1931), p. 189.

[97] Chmelař, p. 190.

[98] Macartney, p. 239.

[99] Rosokha, *Soym*, p. 16; also Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Four Fighting Years* (London, 1943), p. 166; Macartney, pp. 242-243; and A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történettudományi Intézete, *Magyarország és a Második Világháború: Titkos diplomáciai okmányok a háború előzményeihez és történetéhez*, második kiadás (Budapest, 1961), Document No. 47, p. 144. Hereafter cited as: *Hungarian Documents*.

[100] Chmelař, p. 190.

Czecho-Slovak Agrarian Party, it became officially an integral part of that party before the first elections in the country in 1923.[101]

The *Sotsiyal-Demokratychna Partiya Pidkarpats'koyi Rusy* was established in Uzhhorod in 1920 by her leaders Yatsko Ostapchuk, Yevhen Puza and Stepan Klochurak, first as a locally organized group, but in its Congress held in September 1922 amalgamated with the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party. This party Congress adopted a resolution in which the party declared itself for a gradual introduction of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy. The party organ *Vpered* (Forwards) was published in Ukrainian. The party supported from the beginning the Ukrainian cultural movement. Since the party had also a strong Magyar group, it published its organ *Ruszinszkoi Népszava* in the Magyar language. This party had a strong influence in the Carpatho-Ukrainian school system in the 1920's.[102]

The Communist International Party was established in Carpatho-Ukraine mainly by the followers of Béla Kun's regime in Hungary, and her orientation was "entirely Hungarian. The party leader Dr. József Gáti, the Secretary János Mondok, and Ernö Seidler were Magyars."[103] During the whole period between the two world wars, the leadership of the party was concentrated in the hands of Magyars, Jews and Czechs, although in the late 1930's it was formally headed by a local lumber worker, Oleksa Borkanyuk. Some of the Communist leaders and agitators were trained in the Soviet Union. The party published one of its organs *Karpats'ka Pravda* first in Russian and since 1926 in the Ukrainian language. On the question of the most important internal political issue of Carpatho-Ukraine, the realization of autonomy, the Communist party maintained neutrality and did not participate in the anti-Russophile struggle of the Ukrainian movement.[104]

The locally organized *Zemledil's'ka Avtonomna Partiya* (The Farmers' Autonomous Party) in the years between 1921-1923 under the leadership of a local farmer, Mochkosh, soon diminished under the pressure of financially stronger groups.[105]

Some years before the general elections to the Czecho-Slovak

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[101] Macartney, p. 239.

[102] Rosokha, *Soym*, p. 19; also Chmelaf, p. 190.

[103] Chmelaf, p. 191.

[104] Rosokha, *Soym*, pp. 18-19; see also Volodymyr Ohonovs'kyy, "Vozzyednana Zemlya," *Z zhytya v Zakhidnykh Oblastyakh Radyans'koyi Ukrayiny* (Kyyiv, 1946), Nr. 2, p. 16.

[105] Chmelaf, p. 190.

National Assembly of 1935, Dr. Stepan Fencyk organized a new *Russkaya Natsional'no-Avtonomnaya Partiya* (Russian National Autonomous Party) which combined "the advocacy of autonomy with the propaganda of what are often vaguely described as Fascist ideas: strong methods, the principle of 'leadership' and a dash of anti-Semitism."[106] Fencyk's publications, *Karpatorusskiy Golos* and *Nash Put'* were connected with Polish interests.[107] He and his followers dominated the Russophile cultural Society of A. Dukhnovych, and openly supported the idea of Great Russian nationalism, but secretly were interested in the Hungaro-Polish revisionist movement.[108]

There were also local branches of almost all Czecho-Slovak political parties. A considerable role was played by the Russophile branch of the Beneš's Czechoslovak National Socialist Party in Carpatho-Ukraine. The branch was dominated by the leaders of the Russophile Teachers Society, Michael Vasylenko, Stepan M. Chehyl', Michael Mykyta and others. Under their influence, the Presidium of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, in 1930, sent a memorandum to the Czecho-Slovak Government urging it to suppress the Ukrainian language in the schools and to substitute it with Russian.[109] By that time, Beneš's party had become more influential and soon besides the generally used Ukrainian textbooks, also textbooks written in Russian language were approved by the Ministry of Education. The Russophile tendencies became so strong among some Czech official circles that "the Ukrainian language, which is the native tongue of the people of Sub-Carpathia, was called 'irredentistic' and those who worked with the people for its national consciousness

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[106] Macartney, p. 239.

[107] *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), No. 104 of March 21, 1935. *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* accused in its No. 21 of 1933 Dr. S. Fencyk and his organ, *Karpatorusskiy Golos*, of being in the Polish services and being financed by the Polish diplomatic representative in Czecho-Slovakia. Dr. Fencyk sued *Ukrayins'ke Slovo*. In the Land Court at Uzhhorod, the defendant presented a letter from A. Beskid to Dr. Fencyk stating that the Polish Ambassador in Prague, Mr. Grzybowski, gave 40,000 Czecho-Slovak Crones for the publication of *Karpatorusskiy Golos*. This sum of money was the first payment, and the letter contained a promise to pay regularly. Dr. Fencyk was found guilty, and the newspaper was discontinued.

Also the Polish Consul in Uzhhorod, Mr. Swierzbyński, contributed to Fencyk's other organ, *Nash Put'*, a series of articles violently attacking the country to which he was accredited. See Macartney, pp. 249-250.

[108] Macartney, pp. 249-250.

[109] *Ibid.*, p. 232.

were labeled 'irredentists.'" [110] Yet, "the Ruthenians did defend themselves against the Russification which was to be imposed upon them for foreign policy reasons" [111] However, the leading positions in the school system were assigned to the pro-Russian Czech officials and the "language struggle" was once more deepened.

There were also organized political parties of the Magyar minority in Carpatho-Ukraine. The Magyar nationalist extremists under the leadership of Dr. Endré Korláth united in the *Jogpárt* and published in Uzhhorod a daily, *Uj Közlöny*. The Magyar farmers established their *Magyar Kisgazda Párt* under the leadership of a landowner, Ferencz Egry of Velyki Geyivtsi, and Dr. Gábor Bakó as the party's President. Its organ was the weekly *Kárpátaljai Magyar Gazda* published in Uzhhorod. Another extremist Magyar nationalist political party was the *Keresztény Szocialista Párt* (Christian Socialist Party) under the leadership of the lawyers Dr. József Eperjessy and Dr. István Kerekes. Its organ was the weekly *Határszéli Ujság*.[112] These parties were less harmful to the rebirth of the Carpatho-Ukrainian political life than those which nominally were Ruthenian, but in reality were parties in the service of Hungarian, Polish or International Communist causes, because the Magyar parties were not able to get the support of the local Carpatho-Ukrainian population, whereas the masked "Ruthenian autonomist" and the Communist parties did find their ways to the local population in order to get its votes.[113]

In the 1930's two more Ukrainian political parties were organized, but they played no important role in the political life of the country. In 1934, the prominent members of the Czecho-Slovak Agrarian Party, Stepan Klochurak, Avhustyn Shtefan and Yuriy Perevuznyk, organized the Ukrainian faction of that party and since published their weekly *Zemlya i Volya* (The Soil and Freedom).

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[110] Pavlo Yatsko, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[111] Nowak, p. 187.

[112] Chmelař, p. 191.

[113] Rosokha, *Soym*, p. 15; also Dr. Stepan Rosokha, "Narodzhenya Derzhavy" in Ukrayins'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi* (Vienna, 1939), p. 7. Some political parties have had secret sources of income and mailed their publications free to the prospective voters. They presented themselves to be the only true defenders of the rights of the people. In the election campaigns, their agitators used not only never-kept promises but also money to buy votes. This resulted in a political demoralization to such an extent that some "politicians" belonged simultaneously to several parties in order to get favors from each of them.

This faction was able to obtain some 12,000 votes in the 1935 elections to the Land Assembly. The faction pursued an independent policy, especially regarding the internal Carpatho-Ukrainian affairs, which was out of the official line of the Party's Central Committee in Prague.[114] The *Ukrayins'ka Selyans'ko-Robitnycha Partya Pidkarpats'koyi Rusy* (Ukrainian Farmer and Labor Party of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia) was organized in 1936 under the leadership of the prominent women leader, Madame Irena Nevyts'ka. Other prominent members of the party were: Vasyl' Kuzmyk, Mykhaylo Tulyk, Yulian Khymynets', Ivan Hryts' and others. This party only added one more splinter group to those already existing. About 35 parties participated in the 1935 elections to the Land Assembly.[115]

Besides the legal political parties, there existed in Carpatho-Ukraine an underground branch of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a revolutionary all-Ukrainian liberation movement.[116] The mouthpiece of this movement on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine was the magazine *Proboyem* published in Prague by Stepan Rosokha.

The political parties did not play the most important role in the internal political and cultural affairs of the country. They were active during the election campaigns, when they sent many of their agitators into the towns and villages of the country in order to get votes. Otherwise, their leaders did not pay much attention to the cultural and economic situation of the population.[117] The cultural and social work among the population was concentrated in the Ukrainian cultural society *Prosvita* and its affiliated organizations, and in the Russophile Dukhnovych's Society. These two organizations represented both opposite movements, and struggled for a position of influence among the relatively backward population.[118] In these two organizations leaders and members of various political parties regardless of their party political programs were united.

The leaders of the Christian People's Party, Rev. A. Voloshyn, Drs. Mykhaylo and Yuliy Brashchayko, worked for the cultural, social and economic development of the country through *Prosvita*.

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[114] Rosokha, *Soym*, p. 17.

[115] *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

[116] Mykola Vayda, "Zakarpatya i OUN pid provodom polk. Ye. Konovaltsya," *Novyy Shlyakh* (Winnipeg, Canada), June 30 and July 7, 1958; also Rosokha, *Soym*, p. 20.

[117] *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), May 16, 1935.

[118] Chehyl in Bachynskiy, *Podkarpatskaya Rus'*, pp. 113-120.

Here, these fierce advocates of Christian and National principles cooperated with the Social Democrats, Yuliyan and Fedir Revay and Yuliy Husnay, as well as with the secret members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) of the younger generation among whom were Stepan Rosokha, Ivan Rohach, Yuliyan Khymynets', Vasyl' Kuzmyk and others. Also the prominent members of the Ukrainian faction of the Agrarian Party, Avhustyn Shtefan, Stepan Klochurak and Yuriy Perevuznyk, as well as influential persons without political party affiliations, like the well-known poets and writers Vasyl' Grendzha-Dons'kyy, Yuliy Borshosh-Kumyats'kyy and humorist Marko Barabolya supported aims of *Prosvita* and actively participated in its activities. Greek-Catholic priests, like Rev. A. Voloshyn and Rev. Viktor Zheltvay, were united with prominent Orthodox members like A. Burkats'kyy, Dr. Y. Zozulya and M. Tulyk. "*Prosvita* was the common platform for all of them." [119] The political parties, the leaders of which supported the *Prosvita* cultural movement, belonged to the Czecho-Slovak Governmental coalition.[120]

The Society of Dukhnovych assembled, on the other hand, very dissimilar elements also. In the first line, in it were united elements of two extremist opposition groups, namely that of Ivan Kurtyak and that of Stepan Fencyk. However, to the Dukhnovych Society belonged also Mykhaylo Vasylenko of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party as well as Edmund Bachynskiy of the Agrarian Party.[121] Having various political aims, these elements never were able to establish a unity. The only thing that kept them together was the common struggle against the Ukrainian national movement. And, in this struggle they were strongly supported by the political parties of the Magyar minority as well as by the Slovak Hlinka Party.[122]

The political aims of the Ukrainian elements, which in the cultural field were united in the *Prosvita,* were represented jointly by the First Central Ruthenian/Ukrainian National Council which was

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[119] Macartney, p. 241; see also: "Khto maye nas zastupaty v Prazhs'kim Parlamenti," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), May 16, 1935, and "Zahal'ni Zbory tov. Prosvita," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), August 29, 1935.

[120] "Politychni narady v Uzhhorodi," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), September 19, 1935.

[121] *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), June 20, 1935.

[122] Macartney, p. 241. See also "Boyi mizh katsapamy" in *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), February 7, 1935; "Khto z kym pobratavsya?" in *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), April 25, 1935; "Lysh Prosvity nay tam ne bude" in *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), February 21, 1935; and *Az Őslakó* (Munkács), July 8, 1934.

headed since October 9, 1919, by Rev. A. Voloshyn. The Russophile elements united in the Russian Central National Council under the leadership of Dr. Yosyf Kaminskiy.[123] While the Ukrainians were consolidated, the leaders of the Russophile Council were almost permanently in a struggle for control among themselves, especially Fencyk's followers fought the Kurtyak-Brodiy elements who took the Council under their control on May 8, 1934.[124]

In the summer of 1935, a so-called Third linguistic movement was organized in Carpatho-Ukraine, which on October 6, 1935, published the first issue of its organ *Nedyilya* under the editorship of Emilian Bokshay. This group was supported by the Greek Catholic Bishop, Most Rev. Alexander Stoyka, who tried to find a middle-of-the-road solution for the Ukrainians and the Russophiles. The group proclaimed that the Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians were a separate nation and were not a part either of the Ukrainian or of the Russian nation.[125] Therefore, *Nedyilya* started to use the local dialect, and soon received support from the Czecho-Slovak official circles.[126] However, this group had no success because the younger generation was "Ukrainian or Russian to a man." [127]

A British scholar, C. A. Macartney, who spent considerable time in Carpatho-Ukraine for research purposes, in 1937 described the relationship of the strength of both the Ukrainian and Russophile movements as follows:

> Of the two parties, the Ukrainian seems the stronger, although, oddly enough, both the main autonomist parties, the Kurtyak and Fencig parties, are Russophile. Neither of them is, however, solely interested in this particular question, over which many of the followers of both probably take a different view from their leaders... The Ukrainian movement.. has shown extraordinary energy and perseverance which has met its reward. The Prosvita is a much larger organization than its Russian rival and its "National House" in Užhorod contains a museum, a library, and even a theatre. Vigorous propaganda is con-

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[123] "Dvi Tsentral'ni Rus'ki Narodni Rady" in *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), May 17, 1934.

[124] "Zbory Tsentr. Russkoy Nar. Rady v Uzhhorodi" in *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), May 17, 1934.

[125] *Nedyilya* (Uzhhorod), October 6, 1935.

[126] "Nova Sproba Rusynizmu" in *Ukrayin'ske Slovo* (Uzhhorod), February 7, 1935; also "Zayava Soyuzu Pidkarpats'kykh Universytets'kykh Studentiv, Filiya v Bratislavi" signed by Vasyl' Ivanovchyk, President, and Osyp Sitch, Secretary, published in *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), December 13, 1934; and Dr. E. Bachynskiy, *Podkarpatskaya Rus'*, p. 8.

[127] Macartney, p. 241.

ducted, even in the remotest villages, and the press is well organized. The Ukrainians are strongly represented in the educational system.[128]

The mutual relations between the two struggling groups for political and cultural influence, i. e. between the Ukrainian national and the Russophile movements, may be divided into the following three basic stages: The first stage of mutual denial which lasted up to 1930-1931; during this stage there was no contact between these two groups. The second stage of recognized parallelism in activities characterized by a kind of co-existence policies. The third stage started in the years of 1934-1935 with the emphasis on the need for co-operation, especially on such questions as autonomy and anti-Czechization actions.[129] The initiative was taken by Rev. A. Voloshyn in an article published in his party organ *Svoboda* (Freedom) in which he stated that "on our part there are no obstacles against the brotherly agreement" with the Russophiles who were honestly striving to raise the well-being of the Carpatho-Ukrainian population.[130] The majority of the Russophile leaders echoed this invitation, and soon both National Councils established a joint commission which prepared the above discussed joint "Project of the Constitution of Autonomous Pidkarpats'ka Rus'." On November 28, 1936, this document was signed on behalf of a joint Central Ruthe-

[128] Macartney, p. 241. Also see Chehyl in Bachynskiy, *Podkarpatskaya Rus'*, p. 116, as well as the Czech and Magyar language papers, which openly admitted that they were in favor of the Russophile movement in Carpatho-Ukraine, namely: *Podkarpatské Hlasy* (Uzhhorod), July 4, 1934; and *Uj Közlöny* (Uzhhorod), July 4, 1934. These papers admitted the superiority of the Ukrainian movement in many respects over that of the Russophiles after the comparison of the All-National Dukhnovych Society Congress held in Mukachiv, the centre of the Russophile movement in Carpatho-Ukraine, on June 6, 1934, and the Second Congress of the *Narodovtsi* (Ukrainian) Youth held also in Mukachiv on July 1, 1934.

[129] Chehyl in Bachynskiy, *Podkarpatskaya Rus'*, p. 114.

[130] o. Avhustyn Voloshyn, "Vsim Rusynam Dobroyi Voli," *Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 25, 1934. The leader of the Ukrainian movement took this step after Dr. E. Beneš repeatedly stated in his address held on May 3, 1934, in Uzhhorod that the most important reason why the Czecho-Slovak Government does not grant autonomy to Carpatho-Ukraine is the disunity among the political leaders in the two most important camps: the Ukrainian and the Russophile. The leaders of the Ukrainian nationalist youth, Adalbert Geletka and Dr. H. Nevyts'kyy, opposed this move (see "Lyst do pana dyrektora Avhustyna Voloshyna" in *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), November 8, 1934), while another prominent Carpatho-Ukrainian leader, Professor Avhustyn Shtefan, supported the initiative of Rev. A. Voloshyn (see A. Shtefan, "Modus Vivendi," *Zemlya i Volya* (Uzhhorod), February 14, 1935.)

nian National Council, and a joint delegation presented it later to the Czecho-Slovak Government.[131] Several other joint political actions were undertaken in relations with the Czecho-Slovak authorities, especially in demands for autonomy until the first coalition autonomous Carpatho-Ukrainian government was called into existence on October 8-11, 1938.[132] However, after the common cause with regard to the Czecho-Slovak authorities was achieved, this tactical unity was again disrupted.

STRUGGLE FOR LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS

After the occupation of the Western half of Carpatho-Ukraine in March 1919 by Czecho-Slovak troops under the command of French General Hennocque, military rule was established. In order to carry out the most important administrative functions, "some Czech officials had been hurriedly sent down" [133] to Carpatho-Ukraine. Returning from Paris on July 25, 1919, Gregory Zhatkovych resumed his efforts to get a settlement of all questions concerning the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy, including the boundary with Slovakia. He proposed to the President of the Republic, T. G. Masaryk, a "temporary contract," under which all territory East of the Uzh River ceded by Hungary to Czecho-Slovakia should be definitely assigned to Carpatho-Ukraine, while that territory West of the Uzh River marked as Ruthenian on Tomashovs'kyy's ethnographical map should be called "disputed territory." In this area a census should be taken by a mixed commission, between May and August 1920, and a final boundary laid down on the basis of ethnic, economic,

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[131] See footnotes Nos. 71 and 74 on pp. 61 and 63 respectively. From among the Ukrainian prominent leaders this document was not signed by Yuliyan Revay, a Social Democratic member of the Chamber of Deputies. On the other hand, from among the Russophile leaders, Senator Edmund Bachynskiy of the Agrarian Party did not put his signature under the document. Both belonged to the Governmental coalition. However, it is interesting to note that the leader of the oppositional Russian National Autonomist Party, Dr. Stepan Fencyk, did not sign the document. He was against co-operation with the Ukrainians, on the one hand, and also there were many difficulties between him and other Russophile leaders.

[132] Dr. Stepan Rosokha, "Narodzenya Derzhavy" in Ukrayins'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi* (Vienna, 1939), pp. 10-11; see also Delegacija Karpatorusskoho Sojuza, *Karpatskaja Rus' v Češskom Jarmi* (a pamphlet published in the USA, without place and date of publication, probably in 1938), pp. 16-17. Hereafter cited: *Rus' v Češskom Jarmi*.

[133] Macartney, p. 221.

geographical, and administrative considerations. Masaryk objected to the form of "contract" but consented to conclude an agreement.[134]

Zhatkovych, who was a citizen of the United States, wanted to return for a short time to the USA, and therefore, failing to conclude the agreement in time, drafted a "Proclamation" dated August 12, 1919, in which he touched the most important points concerning the autonomous administration of Carpatho-Ukraine, especially the territorial claims, according to which all the Districts of Bereh, Maramorosh, and Uhocha and the parts of the Districts of Uzhhorod, Spish, Sharysh and Zemplyn which were inhabited by a majority of Ruthenians would definitely belong to autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine. The other areas of these Districts should remain neutral until a census was taken by a mixed Ruthenian-Czechoslovak Commission. The country was to be temporarily administered by an Autonomous Directorium of five members, in conjuction with General Hennocque. Zhatkovych made public in this Proclamation that he himself has been appointed Chairman of the Ruthenian Directorium. This Proclamation was approved by the Office of the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.[135]

However, after the "General Statutes for the Organization and Administration of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia" were issued, on November 18, 1919, a Czech, Jan Brejcha, was appointed to the office of the Administrator of Carpatho-Ukraine.[136] His powers were superior to those of the autonomous Ruthenian Directorium and its Chairman.[137] Jan Brejcha concentrated all administrative powers in his hands and acted from the beginning as a dictator. This created tension between him and the Ruthenian Directorium headed by Zhatkovych, who in the meantime had returned from the United States in October 1919.[138] Having the first experience with Brejcha's administration, the Central Ruthenian National Council in Uzhhorod adopted on January 18, 1920, a resolution which was presented to President Masaryk, in which the Council demanded the extension of the administrative and decision-making powers of the autonomous

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[134] "Exposé of the Sub-Carpatho-Ruthenian Ex-Governor, Gregory Žatkovič" cited in Macartney, p. 221. Hereafter cited as: Zhatkovych's Exposé in Macartney.

[135] *Ibid.*, p. 221; also Chmelař, p. 187; and Ballreich, p. 51.

[136] Chmelař, p. 188.

[137] See Article IV of the General Statutes for the Organization and Administration of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, above pp. 41-43.

[138] "Dvi Tsentral'ni Rus'ki Nar. Rady," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), May 17, 1934.

Directorium as well as assurance for the introduction of full autonomy before the adoption of the Czecho-Slovak Constitution.[139] These demands, among others, emphasizing the final settlement of the boundary between Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia, were supported by a Village Farmers Delegation in its memorandum presented on February 14, 1920, to the Czecho-Slovak Government.[140] However, the Ruthenian demands were put on file in Prague, and Jan Brejcha continued to appoint more Czechs and Slovaks to various offices in Carpatho-Ukraine. Besides, he associated himself with the dissatisfied former President of the Prešov National Council, Dr. Antin Beskid, who was not appointed to the autonomous Ruthenian Directorium, and with a group of Russophile immigrants from Galicia and Bukovyna led by Andriy Gagatko. This group started a campaign against the autonomous Ruthenian Directorium.[141] Jan Brejcha, first Czecho-Slovak provisional Administrator in Carpatho-Ukraine, introduced a policy of *divide et impera*. When the Central Ruthenian National Council in Uzhhorod, under the leadership of Rev. A Voloshyn, called a public meeting for May 9, 1920, with the intention of observing the first anniversary of the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy in Czecho-Slovakia and to protest against the "dictatorial administration of Jan Brejcha," Andriy Gagatko, in accordance with the desires and by an active support of the Czecho-Slovak Administrator himself, summoned for the same day and the same time a similar meeting. This meeting, under the leadership of Dr. Antin Beskid, declared itself to be the Central Ruthenian National Council. This was the first organized division of the two groups: the Ukrainian and the Russophile, who did not extend any recognition to one another and who pretended to be the sole political representation of the Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians.[142] The struggle between these two groups was intensified in the years to come and persisted until World War II.

The Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic was prepared and adopted on February 29, 1920, without the participation of the Carpatho-Ukrainian representatives[143] and the demands of the Central Ruthenian National Council of January 18, 1920, were disre-

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[139] Chmelař, p. 188.

[140] *Ibid.*, pp. 188-189.

[141] *Ibid.*, p. 189; also Pavlo Yatsko, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-6.

[142] "Dvi Tsentral'ni Rus'ki Nar. Rady," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), May 17, 1934.

[143] Hoetzel, *Constitution*, p. 12.

garded. Gr. Zhatkovych and other members of the autonomous Ruthenian Directorium renewed negotiations with the Government. When, however, their efforts met with no success, Zhatkovych and other members of the Directorium resigned.[144] Thereafter, in order to meet at least partially Ruthenian demands for autonomy, the Czecho-Slovak Government issued on April 26, 1920, the above discussed (pp. 50-54) Provisional Statute No. 356/20 Sb. z. a n. R. čsl., and in accordance with its provisions appointed on May 5, 1920, Gregory Zhatkovych to the office of the first Governor of the autonomous country.[145] A few weeks later, Petr Ehrenfeld, a Czech, was appointed to the post of the Vice-Governor, but the Gubernatorial Council was not established.[146] Thus, the actual administrative powers were in the hands of the Vice-Governor, a Czech, and this deepened the dissatisfaction of the Governor, Gregory Zhatkovych, as well as of the other native leaders.[147]

The newly appointed Governor took his office very seriously and set to work at once on drafting a Constitution for autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine and an election law for the elections to the autonomous Diet. After being in office for three months, Governor Zhatkovych made a report about the situation in Carpatho-Ukraine to the President of the Republic, T. G. Masaryk, which thereafter was discussed and examined by a conference in which all members of the Czecho-Slovak Cabinet under the chairmanship of Dr. Jan Černý, Minister of the Interior, participated. At this meeting Governor Zhatkovych urged that the elections to the autonomous Diet be held as soon as possible, and as a result of his efforts it was unanimously decided to hold these elections in January 1921.[148] Several days later, the Czecho-Slovak Prime Minister, Vlastimil Tusár, discussed his

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[144] Zhatkovych's *Exposé* in Macartney, p. 222.

[145] Chmelař, p. 189.

[146] Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko, "Mayemo gubernatora," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), February 28, 1935.

[147] In the beginning of May 1920 a delegation of the Central Ruthenian National Council protested in Prague against the behavior of Jan Brejcha as the Administrator of Carpatho-Ukraine. Thereafter, he was recalled and Petr Ehrenfeld was appointed to the office of the Vice-Governor. Ehrenfeld discontinued the policy of his predecessor to some extent and tried to understand and support the needs of the country's population. He also learned soon the Ukrainian language but did not remain in the office very long. He was recalled in 1924. See Pavlo Yatsko, *op. cit.*, p. 6; and Yuhasz, *Wilson's Principles*, p. 23.

[148] Zhatkovych's *Exposé* cited in Yuhasz, p. 46.

"private proposal" of the Constitution for autonomous Carpatho Ukraine with Governor Zhatkovych; however, Tusár's outline was not congruous with the desires of the Ruthenians and the Governor did not accept it. Then, on October 24, 1920, Governor Zhatkovych handed to the President and the Government of the Republic his project for the autonomous Constitution as well as his outline concerning the methods for fulfilment of all the provisions of the internationally guaranteed autonomy. Zhatkovych's proposals were rejected by the Czecho-Slovak Government. After further futile efforts during the next five months, Gregory Zhatkovych resigned his post on March 16, 1921, and his resignation was accepted on May 13, 1921.[149] G. Zhatkovych then returned to the United States.

No successor was appointed immediately, and the administration remained in the hands of the Vice-Governor, Petr Ehrenfeld, who believed that before the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain concerning autonomy could be successfully exercised by the local population, the cultural and economic standards had to be raised. He organized the school system under the control of the School Referat for Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, and on September 17, 1921, a Czech, Josef Pešek, was appointed as the Superintendant. Josef Pešek's first and most important aim was the de-Magyarization of the school system and he succeeded in his work. At the end of 1921, there existed in Carpatho-Ukraine 530 elementary schools, 357

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[149] *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47. One of the most important points in the demands for autonomy was the settlement of the Slovak-Ruthenian boundary. The Slovakization of the public schools in the predominantly Ruthenian settlements West of the Uzh River was introduced already in 1919. The 112 member delegation of the Central Ruthenian National Council already on May 23, 1919, protested against Slovakization and dismissal of the Ruthenian teachers by the School Superintendant for Slovakia, Antonín Štefánik, on the recommendation of the Prešov school inspector, Hallo. The delegation was in Prague to present the conditions under which Carpatho-Ukraine was to join Czecho-Slovakia.

Already before the population census of February 15, 1921, was taken, the *župan* (Lord-Lieutenant) of Prešov, Michael Slavík, issued a known Circular No. 1851 of 1921 in which he stated that "in Slovakia there are no Rusins neither there are Rusinky (Ruthenian men and women);" that the Ruthenians in Slovakia were invented by the pre-War Hungarian Government... The census was taken without the participation of Ruthenians, and objections were made as to the fairness of its results. See Dr. Ivan Zhydovskiy, "Pryashevskaya Rus' v borbi za svoyi prava" in Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, ed., *Podkarpatskaya Rus' za hody 1919-1936* (Uzhhorod, 1936), pp. 87-91; Yuhasz, *Wilson's Principles*, p. 38; and Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko, "Nad mohyloyu gubernatora Antona Beskida," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), July 1, 1933.

of which were already de-Magyarized and had Ukrainian as their language of instruction. In accordance with the principles of the rights of national minorities, besides Ukrainian schools there were also 118 Magyar, and 9 German as well as 17 schools with Ukrainian and Magyar languages of instruction. In secondary schools, too, Ukrainian was introduced as the language of instruction. The majority of students came from village populations and children of poor parents received Governmental support.[150] During that period, A. Voloshyn, President of the Teachers College in Uzhhorod, and other educators prepared textbooks for various schools. These were approved by the Ministry of Education in Prague.[151]

When in 1924 Dr. Antin Beskid was appointed Governor of Carpatho-Ukraine, Petr Ehrenfeld was recalled from his position as Vice-Governor, and replaced by another Czech, Antonín Rozsypal.[152] The Governor strongly supported, especially financially, the Russophile movement and was interested mainly in his personal affairs. Except for having a certain amount of public money for his disposal and distribution, A. Beskid exercised almost no other competences in the country's administration.[153] The real administrative powers in the country were placed in the hands of the new Vice-Governor, under whom the centralization and the unification of the administration was introduced.

When, as a preparatory step to the entire centralization and unification of the adminisration in the Republic, the Ordinance No. 84/26 Sb. z. a n. was enforced, on July 1, 1926, Dr. Lev Jech was appointed the *Župan* of the single District of Carpatho-Ukraine with its seat at Mukachiv. After the Administration Reform Act was enforced in Carpatho-Ukraine on July 1, 1928, Antonín Rozsypal be-

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[150] Viktor Klima, "Shkolnoye dyelo i prosveshcheniye na Podk. Rusy" in Dr. E. Bachynskiy, ed., *Podkarpatskaya Rus' za hody 1919-1936* (Uzhhorod, 1936), pp. 101-105.

[151] Magyar political parties of Carpatho-Ukraine sent in 1920 a memorandum to the League of Nations protesting among other things against the changes undertaken by Petr Ehrenfeld in the Carpatho-Ukrainian school system. See Lajos Steier, *Ungarns Vergewaltigung* (Vienna, 1929), pp. 997-1004.

[152] Macartney, p. 224.

[153] "Nad mohyloyu gubernatora Antona Beskida," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), July 1, 1933. Political orientation of A. Beskid may be judged from the fact that he deposited around 4,000,000 Kč in the banks of Budapest, Hungary. See *Kassai Ujság* (Košice), November 4, 1933.

came the Land President and Dr. Lev Jech the Land Vice-President.[154] A British observer described the new situation as follows:

> Ruthenia was placed in precisely the same situation as the other three provinces (Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, and Slovakia) of the Republic, with the sole differences that its position was still in theory provisional, and that it still sports a gentleman bearing the honoric title of Governor, who is housed, appropriately enough, in the local museum.[155]

To remedy this situation, the Central Ruthenian National Council handed a memorandum to the President of the Republic and the Czecho-Slovak Prime Minister dated February 9, 1927, in which the Council repeatedly stated that

> As yet nothing has been done towards the realization of self-government. The elections for the autonomous Diet have not been ordered to be held, either after the first or after the second General Elections, not even has preparatory work been started for the realization of this obligation of the Government... The planned Administrative Reform Bill is in contrast to the Treaty of Saint Germain and with the basic principles regarding the Ruthene Autonomy, laid down in the fundamental laws of the Republic.[156]

The Council demanded the realization of full autonomy with all organs and powers guaranteed by the Treaty of St. Germain. Also the autonomist representatives in the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly demanded autonomy instead of the proposed reform of administration.[157]

On April 1, 1934, the Land-President, Dr. Lev Jech, who was of Czecho-Ukrainian descent, retired. His successor, Dr. Jaroslav Mezník, another Czech, arrived in Uzhhorod without previous notification and was nominated to that position by the President of the Republic despite the protests not only of the political parties but also of the Land Assembly. In its session of March 26, 1934, under the chairmanship of Antonín Rozsypal, this body protested against the nomination.[158] However, these protests were disregarded by the Prague Government, and after the death of Antonín Rozsypal, Dr. Jaroslav Mezník became the Land President.

Governor Antin Beskid died on June 16, 1933, in Uzhhorod, and the office of the Governor remained vacant until March 1, 1935,

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[154] *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), March 29, 1934.

[155] Macartney, p. 224.

[156] Yuhasz, *Wilson's Principles*, p. 47.

[157] Nowak, p. 183.

[158] *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), March 29, 1934, and the issues of April 5, 1934, and September 6, 1934.

when Konstantyn Hrabar, until then the mayor of Uzhhorod, entered the Governor's office on the basis of his appointement of February 25, 1935, by the President of the Republic.[159] This appointment was the result of constant demand of the Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders for almost two years. The Carpatho-Ukrainians were afraid that even this last symbol of the autonomous rights of their country would be abolished. Therefore, during Dr. E. Beneš's visit in Uzhhorod on May 3, 1934, not only the autonomist party, but also the leaders of the Governmental coalition parties handed him a memorandum demanding the appointment of a Governor as soon as possible. They also demanded the establishment of a special ministry in the Czecho-Slovak Cabinet for Carpatho-Ukrainian affairs.[160] The new Governor, K. Hrabar, tried to make use of all existing legal provisions concerning his competences as well as his power of prestige for the well-being of the country's population. Nevertheless, the actual administrative powers remained in the hands of the Land President.[161]

On the basis of available sources it may be assumed that the administration of Antonín Rozsypal was not favorable for the country. Senator Václav Klofáč, leader of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, in his speech in the Czecho-Slovak Senate of December 14, 1926, related among other things as follows:

> The situation in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia today is such that everybody is against the Republic... We did not understand the religious spirit of the people... By introducing the language question we commited a great crime. We ourselves are creators of irredentism... Forests representing millions of

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159 Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko, "Mayemo gubernatora," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), February 28, 1935; also *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), March 7, 1935.

160 Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko, "Shcho mayemo skazaty p. min. Beneshovi?" in *Ukrayins'ke Slovo,* April 19, 1934; and "Memorandum politychnykh partiy ministrovi E. Beneshovi," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo,* May 10, 1934.

161 In the Carpatho-Ukrainian budget of 1935 with total expenditures of 133,996,222 Kč (Czecho-Slovak Crowns) the Governor was given only Kč 77,800. The most important appropriations were: a) the finance administration, Kč 32,399,100; b) education and administration of the school system, Kč 58,883,572; c) religious affairs, Kč 6,988,100; and d) public administration, Kč 35,725,450 which were distributed as follows: Kč 77,800 for the Governor, Kč 13,643,800 for the Land President and the administrative agencies under his supervision, Kč 5,702,000 for the police of the cities of Uzhhorod and Mukachiv, and Kč 16,301,800 for country's gendarmery. See "Prybutky i vydatky Pidkarpats'koyi Rusy v derzhavnomu byudzheti na rik 1935," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod) November 22, 1934.



Konstantyn Hrabar

Czechoslovak Crowns are rotting, there is no work for the people, there is famine, and where there is famine it is very difficult to continue a State policy... Great mistakes are committed by the Prague central offices. ...I am convinced that Vice-Governor Ehrenfeld had good intentions but orders of Prague crossed his way. It is possible that even Rozsypal, whom I attacked so bitterly formerly,

is not the really guilty one because he is a mere executor of the orders of Prague, which proves again the utter ignorance concerning the situation in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.[162]

Thus, the existing antagonism between the Czech administration and the Ukrainian population in Carpatho-Ukraine was openly admitted and the Czech official circles, especially the leading members of the Agrarian Party, were blamed for their policy of Czechization of the country. This antagonism was "everywhere, in each field of the social life" because "the Czechization increased very rapidly in every field of official policy in Sub-Carpathia."[163] The only solution for re-establishment of friendly Ukrainian-Czech relations was seen in the entire fulfilment of provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain concerning autonomy. Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko, a Ukrainian leader in Carpatho-Ukraine, in an open letter addressed to the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Edvard Beneš, before the latter's official visit in Uzhhorod on May 3, 1934, described the existing situation.[164] The first complaint of the Ukrainians was that the office of the Governor was not occupied since June 16, 1933. The Carpatho-Ukrainians demanded the appointment to this position as soon as possible of a native Ukrainian, who was to be empowered to undertake the preparatory steps for the realization of autonomy. Autonomy was to be introduced with the co-operation of Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders. The second complaint was against the official and financial support of the "artificially created anti-popular Russophile movement resulting in the introduction in our country of a terrible linguistic chaos in the school system." This, in turn, hindered the cultural development of the population and consumed much of the national energy to fight against it. "In the cultural affairs there was another grievance, namely the Czechization of the country." There were Czech schools in communities without Czech children, or where there were only 2 or 3 of them. By that time there were already 158 Czech schools and 499 Czech teachers in the country. On the other hand, there existed 491 Ukrainian public and parochial schools with 1820 teachers. As to the Junior High Schools, there were by that time 15 Czech with 85 teachers, and 16 Ukrainian with 102

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[162] Cited in Yuhasz, *Wilson's Principles*, p. 24.

[163] "Ukrayins'ko-ches'kyy antagonism na Pidkarpatti," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), April 15, 1932.

[164] Dr. M. Brashchayko, "Shcho mayemo skazaty p. min. Beneshovi?" in *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), April 19, 1934.

teachers.[165] The next complaint of Carpatho-Ukrainians, as expressed by Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko, was that

in governmental agencies and courts the official language is Czech, the officials do not know our (Ukrainian or Ruthenian) language, all official acts are written in Czech, and our language is ignored in general. Our lands are colonized by Czech legionars from the historical (Bohemian and Moravian) lands... Our people demand the introduction of our native Ukrainian language in all schools, governmental offices, and courts, as well as demand the removal of all Czech schools from Ukrainian communities and to stop the policy of Czechization and colonization in general... The country's administration belongs to us and all officials should be selected in the first line from among our people. This principle was not respected. All higher and responsible positions are occupied almost entirely not by our people. The department chiefs, too, appoint to the lower positions persons from the historical territories, and by now not only the posts requiring high qualifications but also those subordinated, lower positions, including the janitors, are occupied by them, and only seldom do we find among them our countrymen.[166]

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[165] During the school year of 1936-37 there were in Carpatho-Ukraine the following schools: a) elementary schools: 463 Ukrainian and Russophile; 177 Czech plus 188 affiliated, totally 365 Czech schools; 117 Magyar, 24 German, and 4 Rumanian; b) Junior High Schools: 21 Ukrainian and Russophile; 23 Czech, 5 Magyar, and 1 German; c) Gymnasiums (secondary schools): 5 Ukrainian, 3 Czech, 2 Hebrew, and 1 Magyar; d) Teachers Colleges: 3 Ukrainian, including 2 private; 1 Czech. There were employed 2,622 Ukrainian and Russophile, and 928 Czech teachers; 99,731 pupils were enrolled in the Ukrainian and Russophile schools, while 21,325 attended Czech schools. The nationality affiliations of the pupils attending the Czech schools were as follows: 4,761 Czechoslovaks; 12,564 Jewish; 1,756 Magyar; 1,749 Ukrainian, and 495 others. See *Representační sbornik veškerého školstvi na Podkarpatské Rusi* cited in *Rus' v Češskom Jarmi*, p. 10; for statistical data of 1927-1928 see Statistisches Staatsamt, *Statistische Uebersicht der Čechoslovakischen Republik* (Prague, 1930), p. 242.

[166] Dr. M. Brashchayko, *op. cit.*;

The question of officials was brought up by the Central Ruthenian National Council in a memorandum to the President of the Republic, T. G. Masaryk, dated February 9, 1927, in which the Council protested against Czechization. According to the data of this memorandum the national affiliation of the public servants in Carpatho-Ukraine at that time was as follows: a) in the Postal and Telegraph Service: 109 Ukrainians, 306 Czechs and Slovaks, and 48 others; b) in the Public Finance Service: 41 Ukrainians and Russophiles, 1,192 Czechs and Slovaks, and 87 others; c) in the civil administration: 151 Ukrainians and Russophiles, 328 Czechs and Slovaks, and 84 others. Summarizing the above data, there were in public services in Carpatho-Ukraine at that time: only 301 Ukrainians and Russophiles, and 1,826 Czechoslovaks (out of them only 65 Slovaks, and 1,761 Czechs). Additionally, there were some officials of other nationalities. See Yuhasz, *Wilson's Principles*, pp. 47-48.

In accordance with the Czecho-Slovak laws concerning the agrarian re-

Since Dr. E. Beneš visited Carpatho-Ukraine in order to unite the country's population for the Czecho-Slovak anti-revisionist policy, Dr. M. Brashchayko stated in his open letter that the fulfilment of all enumerated demands would be the best defense against the Hungarian revisionist attempts as far as Carpatho-Ukraine is concerned.

Minister Beneš, in his speech at Uzhhorod on May 3, 1934, "categorically" stated to the Carpatho-Ukrainian political and cultural leaders that

> the Czecho-Slovak Government has never forgotten and never will forget its obligations, and all provisions of the Peace Treaties will be fulfilled in all circumstances. Autonomy, the granting of which the Czecho-Slovak Republic obliged herself and that obligation incorporated into her Constitution, will be realized in the near future, namely gradually and conscientiously, in agreement with all of you, step-by-step, gradually, as soon as all necessary preparations are completed.[167]

This declaration decreased the tension to a great extent between Czechs and Ukrainians, and additional declarations made by the Czecho-Slovak Ministers, Dr. Ivan Dérer and Dr. Kamil Krofta, in their speeches in Uzhhorod on October 27, 1934, during the celebrations of the 16th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence of Czecho-Slovakia, that autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine soon would be realized brought many hopes.[168]

However, while the capital of Carpatho-Ukraine, Uzhhorod, was decorated with the country's flags along with the Czecho-Slovak state colors on the "Day of Freedom," the use of blue and yellow colors in other towns and villages of the province was suppressed. This fact added another reason for the revival of the Ukrainian-Czech

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form, specified by the Governmental Decree No. 19/1920 Sb. z. a n. of December 30, 1920, some 239,000 hectars (ha) of land were taken for the distribution to the needy population. Out of this, 36,000 ha. were left to the former owners, and up to 1935 only 61,000 ha. were distributed among 32,000 farm families, including some purely Czechoslovak colonies, like Svoboda, Batyovo, Bovtrad, Dercen, Beregsom, Nagylonya, Choma n. T. The undistributed land was given under administration of 14 Czech and 2 Jewish families. See: Yosyf Yirkovskiy, "Zemelnaya reforma na Podk. Rusy" in E. Bachynskiy, ed., *Podkarpatskaya Rus'* (Uzhhorod, 1936), pp. 47-50; also Hungarian Frontier Readjustment League, *The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States* (Budapest, 1927), pp. 76-77; and *Rus' v Češskom Jarmi*, pp. 12-13.

[167] Dr. Edvard Beneš, *Rech o podkarpatorusskoy probleme* (Uzhhorod, 1934), p. 28.

[168] *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), November 8, 1934.

antagonism and led to the struggle for the right to use the blue and yellow flag of the land. The argument was presented in the following way: The tradition of these colors of Carpatho-Ukraine goes back to the 14th century when Prince Fedir Koriyatovych, the ruler of the country, used this flag. The blue and yellow were colors of the District of Maramorosh, of the cities of Uzhhorod and Prešov, as well as the colors of the two Greek Catholic Dioceses, of Mukachiv and Prešov. These colors were used by the Ruthenian National Councils in 1918-1919 in the country itself as well as by the Ruthenian National Council of America. Under this flag the decision of the Central Ruthenian National Council in Uzhhorod was taken, on May 8, 1919, to unite Carpatho-Ukraine with Czecho-Slovakia. This flag was also raised at Hradčany, the residence of the President of Czecho-Slovakia, in Prague on May 23, 1919, when the delegation of the Council arrived there to declare its desire to join Czecho-Slovakia. During the first post-World War I years the governmental agencies in the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine hoisted the blue and yellow colors, as the banner of the land, besides the Czecho-Slovak state banners on all official occasions.[169]

On July 11, 1934, the Office of the Land President issued an order according to which the use of blue and yellow colors in Carpatho-Ukraine was forbidden because "blue and yellow are colors of the Ukrainian nation." [170] An additional forbidding order concerning the use of the blue and yellow banner in the Carpatho-Ukrainian schools was issued on October 5, 1934, under No. 160.480/1934 by the Land Inspector of Education, Jan Vondráček.[171] This created dissatisfaction, and Ukrainians used the blue and yellow colors on October 28, 1934, "the Day of Freedom," contrary to these orders.[172]

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[169] Memorandum Pershoyi Tsentral'noyi Rus'koyi Narodnoyi Rady do pravytel'stva ChSR," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), December 6, 1934.

[170] *Ibid.*

[171] *Ibid.* Already several months before the forbidding decree was issued officially, Jan Vondráček ordered the removal of the blue and yellow colors from a hall during a teachers conference of the County of Irshava in spring 1934. *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), December 27, 1934.

[172] In some towns and villages, for instance in Tereblya, the Czecho-Slovak gendarmery removed the blue and yellow colors exhibited on October 28, 1934. The Decree of July 11, 1934, provided that persons violating the forbidding provisions of the Decree were to be considered guilty against § 14 of the Act for the Defense of the Republic of 1923 and were to be reported to the proper Czecho-Slovak authorities and tried in the courts. See *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), November 1, 1934.

The First Central Ruthenian National Council sent a memorandum to the Czecho-Slovak Prime Minister, Jan Malýpetr, in which the Council explained its stand declaring that the blue and yellow colors were the traditional and legal colors of the country, and vigorously protested the dishonoring of them by the Czecho-Slovak officials and gendarmery in the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine. Rev. A. Voloshyn, President, and Dr. Mykola Dolynay, Secretary, on behalf of the Council expressed the belief that the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic would not give a reason for the struggle against the authorities for the right to use the flag. "In such a struggle we would have to go to extremes, and we believe that this would not be in the interests of the Republic, neither of the Government, nor for us." [173]

The Czecho-Slovak Government referred this problem to the Land Council in Uzhhorod for solution according to the demands of the First Central Ruthenian National Council. Thereafter, Land President Antonín Rozsypal issued Decree No. 17.688 of December 15, 1934, according to which the blue and yellow colors were established as the legal flag of the Land of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, and could be raised together with the Czecho-Slovak state flag on all official celebrations.[174]

As some of the described facts show, there was some difference in the attitudes concerning the interests of the Carpatho-Ukrainian population of the Czech Governmental leaders in Prague and those in Carpatho-Ukraine. While in the summer of 1932 the Czecho-Slovak officials in Prague were working on an autonomy-enforcing bill,[175] the local administrative officials disregarded not only the legal provisions for autonomy but also the existing positive legal regulations concerning the official language in Carpatho-Ukraine etc.[176] Similar differences also arose between these two groups of

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[173] "Memorandum Pershoyi Tsentral'noyi Rus'koyi Narodnoyi Rady do pravytel'stva ChSR," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), December 6, 1934.

[174] "Rozporyadok Prezydiyi Krayevoho Uryadu v Uzhhorodi chyslo 17.688 z dnya 15. hrudnya 1934," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), January 3, 1935.

[175] *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), September 1, 1932.

[176] *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), April 1, 1932. František Hoser, notary of the region of Velyke Berezne, published an announcement in *Hlas Východu,* March 10, 1932, about an opening for a position of the secretary of the notariate. Among other requirements were the following: "The candidates must have complete knowledge of the Czechoslovak language in word and writing; preference has he who knows also Magyar or German language." There was no mention of the native language of the majority population, the Ukrainian, which

officials concerning autonomy, and as to what political groups were to be supported in the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine. While the Ministry of Education in Prague approved Ukrainian textbooks for the Carpatho-Ukrainian schools and disapproved the use of the unapproved textbooks,[177] the Land School Inspector, Jan Vondráček, in Uzhhorod permitted the Russophile teachers to use their textbooks, which were not approved by the Ministry of Education in Prague.[178]

The cautious attitude of the Czecho-Slovak Government regarding the realization of full autonomy had some good reasons. The most important reason was that the majority of the Carpatho-Ukrainian population had no previous experience in democratic self-government and actually was not politically conscious during the 1920's.[179] The other important reason was the fact that the leaders of the two autonomist parties, Ivan Kurtyak and Stepan Fencyk, had some secret ties with the anti-Czecho-Slovak revisionistic states.[180] This

was required for every official in Carpatho-Ukraine according to the Language Law Nr. 122/20 Sb. z. a n. R. čsl., and the Ordinance Nr. 17/26 Sb. z. a n. of February 3, 1926. The Ukrainians vigorously protested against the disregard for their language.

[177] *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), September 1, 1932.

[178] *Ibid.*, January 3, 1935.

[179] Some facts: The inhabitants of the mountainous village Capovci "in corpore" changed four times their party affiliations during a considerably very short time in 1934. Each party agitator paid some village leaders for organizing meetings, and the participants at the meetings were given beer. See *Ukrayins'ke Slovo*, September 20, 1934. Of course, it would be unfair to generalize the whole situation on the basis of the behavior of the population of a single village. However, the commentator of the elections held on May 15, 1935, pointed out that the demagogues who made the most irresponsible promises to the population had achieved the greatest success. See *Ukrayins'ke Slovo*, May 23, 1935.

[180] Ivan Kurtyak, the founder and leader of the *Avtonomnyy Zemledil'skiy Soyuz* (the Autonomous Farmers Party) was a teacher before World War I. After the incorporation of Carpatho-Ukraine into Czecho-Slovakia he refused to take the oath of allegience to the new Republic, and was dismissed from the teaching position. He pretended to be a "true" Ruthene of the Russian linguistic orientation, but he educated his sons in Magyar schools in Komárno and both of them belonged to the Hungarian youth organization "Levente" in Hungary because this organization did not exist in Carpatho-Ukraine. After his death on January 2, 1933, Andriy Brodiy became his successor and leader of this oppositional party. The party was financially supported from Hungary. See *Ukrayins'ke Slovo*, July 15, 1932; January 15, 1933; and March 21, 1935, as well as Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Four Fighting Years* (London, 1943), p. 166. Also *Hungarian Documents*, Doc. 47, p. 144.

Concerning Fencyk's connections with Polish authorities see above, footnote No. 107.

was the reason why at the beginning of 1932 the circles of the First Central Ruthenian/Ukrainian National Council stated: "We do not want the kind of autonomy that these men want. We want a real autonomy, popular and headed by our people." [181] It may be assumed that even Governor A. Beskid constituted an obstacle on the way to the realization of autonomy.[182]

The new Governor, Konstantyn Hrabar, as a loyal citizen of Czecho-Slovakia, was respected by the Prague Government and most of his moderate interventions on behalf of the Carpatho-Ukrainian interests were successful.[183] He assured the population of the country that the Czecho-Slovak Government was willing to realize the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy. On the other hand, he tried to persuade the Czecho-Slovak Government that the realization of autonomy would lead

not only to the internal consolidation, but also would strengthen the positive expression of a high State patriotism because defending our rights, at the same time we will be obliged to defend also the Czecho-Slovak Republic, within which we received these rights; we make use of these rights and we will continue to do so.[184]

In August 1935, Carpatho-Ukrainian Deputies and Senators belonging to the Governmental coalition parties organized a special

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[181] "Na temu avtonomiyi Pidkarpatya," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), February 15, 1932.

[182] As indicated above, p. 84, the Governor's office received annually Kč 77,800 from the treasury. Dr. A. Beskid was in the office for about ten years. He owned no profitable business. Yet, he deposited in Hungarian banks in Budapest some Kč 4,000,000 (see p. 82 above). Concerning his ties with the Poles see footnote No. 107, p. 71 above. These facts were disclosed after his death.

[183] Soon after entering his office, Governor Hrabar visited Czecho-Slovak Prime Minister Malýpetr and discussed the Czechization of Carpatho-Ukrainian schools East of the Uzh River, and Slovakization in the West. Malýpetr declared that his Government is against such policy of the local officials. As a result of this intervention, the Ministry of Education invalidated the Ordinance No. 5.816/34 of December 10, 1934, issued by the School Inspector in Bardejov, B. Krpelec, according to which even the Greek-Catholic religion was to be instructed by the Ruthenian priests in the Slovak language. Also the Ministry of Education in its Decree No. 33.666/35-1/2 of March 23, 1935, ordered that according to the wish of the population, the Slovak was to be replaced by Ruthenian as the language of instruction is 35 parochial Greek Catholic as well as in 21 public elementary schools. See *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), December 27, 1934; April 25, 1935; and July 18, 1935.

[184] Konstantyn L. Hrabar, "Nakanuni avtonomiyi" in Dr. E. Bachynskiy, ed., *Podkarpatskaya Rus'* (Uzhhorod, 1936), p. 10.

Council, headed by Senator Edmund Bachynskiy, as President, and Deputy Yuliyan Revay, as Secretary. This Council issued a proclamation to the people stating that they would do everything possible to satisfy the needs of the local population, and especially to see that autochthone candidates would be appointed to all open positions in the governmental agencies on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine.[185] The Council summoned a coalition parties conference held in Uzhhorod on September 16, 1935. This conference adopted among others a resolution demanding that all officials and civil servants on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine, especially those who came from Bohemia and Moravia, should be summoned for an examination in Ukrainian.[186] The resolution also demanded the broadening of the powers of Governor. These resolutions were handed to the Prague Government.

On October 25, 1935, Dr. Milan Hodža was appointed Prime Minister of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, and in the second half of November 1935 he declared that the Government would fulfil its obligations of the Treaty of St. Germain regarding Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy through a special Statute.[187] On November 28, 1935, the Juridical Committee for Constitutional Questions of the Czecho-Slovak Parliament headed by Dr. Patejdl and in the presence of Dr. I. Dérer, Minister of Justice, discussed the problem of autonomy for the first time since the adoption of the Constitution on February 29, 1920. The main speaker at the meeting was the Carpatho-Ukrainian Deputy of the Czecho-Slovak Social Democratic Party, Yuliyan Revay, who informed the Committee about the situation in the coun-

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[185] *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), August 29, 1935.

[186] *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), October 3, 1935. Since there was difference in opinion as what was to be understood under the generally used expressions *Rusyn, Rusynka, Rusnak, Rusnachka* as well as to the exact meaning of *Rus'ka mova* or *Rus'kyy yazyk,* on October 12, 1932, members of the Land Assembly, Michael Demko and A. Popovych, both representing the Autonomous Farmers Party, moved in the session of the Land Assembly to identify the people's language with the terminology *Russkiy,* i. e. Russian (Great Russian). This term was to replace the hitherto used legally established term *Rus'kyy, Malorus'kyy,* i. e. Ukrainian (Little Russian). The voting was taken under the chairmanship of the Land President, Autonin Rozsypal, and this proposal was defeated. The result of this voting in the Land Assembly was: 7 members supported this proposal which would identify the people's language with Russian, while 10 members voted against it. The Chairman, a Czech, did not vote on this question. See *Lidové Noviny* (Prague), October 15, 1932.

[187] *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), November 28, 1935.

try. As a result of the discussion, the Committee adopted his resolution of the following wording:

The Juridical Committee for Constitutional Questions of the Parliament in its meeting of November 28, 1935, decided to urge the Government to speed up the preparatory work regarding the enforcement of § 3, Sections 3, 4 and 8, of the Constitutional Charter concerning the Diet of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.[188]

This step was accepted with relief in Carpatho-Ukraine, especially by those elements who supported the Governmental coalition parties, because the most dangerous weapon of the extreme opposition parties was partially taken away from them. However, the Government was not yet willing to establish the Diet with its legislative powers, but started to prepare the First Stage of Autonomy Bill No. 172/37 Sb. z. a n. This again activated the Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders and they handed to the Government the above discussed Autonomy Bill[189] which was rejected by the Government. As indicated already, the First Stage of Autonomy Act 172/37 Sb. z. a n. broadened the powers of the Governor and Konstantyn Hrabar was given some new competences. However, at this time again a Czech, Dr. Jaroslav Mezník, was appointed to the post of the Vice-Governor. Another reason for dissatisfaction was the fact that although in accordance with the provisions of this Act a Gubernatorial Council was called into existence, it never was summoned to its session despite the fact that it was announced that its first session would be held in March 1938.[190] Thus, the Government delayed the enforcement even of these few provisions of the First Stage of Autonomy Act 172/37 which it previously itself proposed.

On May 29, 1938, the First Central Ruthenian/Ukrainian National Council stated in a resolution that "although eleven months passed since the First Stage of Autonomy Act No. 172/37 was to have been in force, the Act was not enforced in reality" and sent a memorandum to the Prague Government with the demand for an

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[188] "Sprava nashoyi avtonomiyi," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), December 5, 1935. For the provisions of § 3 of the Constitutional Charter see above, pp. 44-45. Revay's resolution in the Committee was supported by Dr. Markovič of the Slovak Social Democratic Party, Dr. Dolánský of the Czech National Party (Lidovci), and M. Richter of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party.

[189] See above, pp. 61-63.

[190] Dr. Stepan Rosokha, "Narodzhenya derzhavy" in Ukrayins'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Boroť bi* (Vienna, 1939), p. 6.

immediate realization of the "broadest territorial autonomy." [191] In the meantime, on May 13, 1938, a Delegation of the Carpatho-Ruthenian Union of America consisting of Joann Popp, as President, Rev. Joann Yanchishin, and Dr. Alexey Gerovskiy, arrived in Uzhhorod and together with both National Councils and the leaders of political parties in Carpatho-Ukraine proceeded with efforts to achieve the intensely desired autonomy. On July 9, 1938, before the Delegation of the American Ruthenians left Prague for Paris on its way back to the United States, the Czecho-Slovak Prime Minister, Dr. Milan Hodža, in a letter addressed to Dr. A. Gerovskiy, the Delegation Secretary, assured the Carpatho-Ruthenians in America that he personally stood for

> granting autonomy to Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia as soon as possible to the full extent of the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain, which were incorporated into the Constitution of the Republic. Some of these provisions were incorporated in the Act No. 172 of 1937, ... and now the Government of the Republic desired that the elections to the autonomous Diet would be held as soon as possible.[192]

However, internal and external developments moved too fast in the following three months, and autonomy was granted to Carpatho-Ukraine in a considerably changed situation.

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[191] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[192] Delegacija Karpatorusskoho Sojuza, *Karpatskaja Rus' v Češskom Jarmi*, pp. 3 and 15. The Carpatho-Ruthenian Union of America was composed of the delegated representatives of the following organizations: *Sojedinenije* — Union of the Greek Catholic Fraternities; *Sobranije* — another Greek Catholic Fraternal organization; and, the Union of the Russian Orthodox Fraternities. The decision to send a delegation to Carpatho-Ukraine was taken at the meeting of the Council on April 12, 1937. The Delegation was to consist of Joann Popp, President; Ivan Sekerak, President of Sojedinenije; Nikolaj Pachuta, Secretary of the Union of the Russian Orthodox Fraternities; Andrij Dobosh, President of Sobranije, and Dr. Alexey Gerovskiy, Secretary of the Carpatho-Ruthenian Union. The delegates Ivan Sekerak and Andriy Dobosh did not go to Carpatho-Ukraine. Dr. A. Gerovskiy was known to the Czecho-Slovak authorities for his pro-revisionistic activities and they first were reluctant to give him an entrance visa. In Carpatho-Ukraine he supported the Russophiles. An achievement of the Delegation was the fact that it mediated between the two Councils and induced the unity of action. During its presence in Uzhhorod, the Delegation held several joint conferences with both the Ukrainian and Russian Councils.

THE PROBLEM OF CARPATHO-UKRAINIAN AUTONOMY IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

According to Article 14 of the Treaty of St. Germain the provisions of the Articles 10 - 13 of the Treaty concerning the autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine were "placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations." Since the League of Nations was not a signatory of the Treaty, the Council of the League of Nations adopted on November 29, 1920, a resolution which provided that the League of Nations took upon itself the task of seeing that no provision of the Treaty of St. Germain would be violated by the signatory states. The resolution contained also a regulation according to which the Secretary General of the League of Nations was obliged from time to time to inform the Council about all important administrative affairs of Carpatho-Ukraine.[193] On the basis of this resolution the Secretary General was authorized to get the needed information not only from the Czecho-Slovak Government but also from the Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders. On the other hand, the unsatisfied elements were free to send their petitions to the League of Nations.[194]

The first known complaint to the League of Nations against the Czecho-Slovak authorities with regard of their administrative behavior in Carpatho-Ukraine was sent by a political party of the Ruthenians of Hungary two years after the Treaty of St. Germain

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[193] The League of Nations Documents, The Woodrow Wilson Memorial Library in New York, N. Y., Document C.214.M.153. 1921.I. Hereafter cited as: League of Nations Document.

[194] For the treatment of the petitions sent against the Government there were set up several conditions which had to be observed by the petitioner. It was up to the Secretary General to decide whether the petition was satisfactory from that point of view. These conditions were as follows: a) the subject of the petition had to be within the scope of the Treaty provisions; b) the aim of the petition could not be the severing ties with the State concerned; c) the petition could not be accepted from anonymous or wrong informed persons; d) the petition was to be written in a responsible style; e) the subject of the petition could not be one on which the organs of the League of Nations already took a decision. The petitions lacking these requirements were to be returned to the petitioner without explanation. Acceptable petitions were to be sent to a special Committee which was authorized to decide whether the petition was to be forwarded to the Council of the League. The Council was to make the final decision. See *Journal Officiel de la Société des Nations* (Genève, 1923), No. 2, p. 192. It is interesting to note that these requirements were set up on the proposal of the Czecho-Slovak Government. See *Journal Officiel* (Genève, 1923), No. 7, p. 717.

was signed, i. e. on September 10, 1921.[195] The party claimed to be "the authorized representative of the Ruthenian people South of the Carpathians" and in its petition complained that the Czecho-Slovak authorities had done nothing during the two years for the realization of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy, and that after the "resignation of the American citizen" (Gregory Zhatkovych) from the position of Governor, the Ruthenians lost every hope for obtaining their autonomy from the Czechs. The other complains were that the officials on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine were appointed up to 90% from among the non-residents of the country, and the officials with the pro-Hungarian sympathies were dismissed; that elections were not held in Carpatho-Ukraine while on other territories of Czecho-Slovakia the Deputies and Senators to the National Assembly were elected in April 1920. The petition asked the League of Nations to send a representative to Carpatho-Ukraine in order to prove the validity of the complaints.

On September 16, 1921, this petition was sent to the Czecho-Slovak Ambassador in Bern, Switzerland, who on November 18, 1921, handed an answer of the Czecho-Slovak Government to the Secretary General of the League of Nations. The Czecho-Slovak Government declared its readiness to receive a representative of the League of Nations in Carpatho-Ukraine and referred to the "Mémoire concernant la Russie subcarpathique" which had been sent by the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Edvard Beneš, on June 6, 1921.[196] This note described the provisions of the Articles 10 - 13 of the Treaty of St. Germain and declared that these provisions were incorporated in the Czecho-Slovak Constitutional Charter and in other laws of the State. The elections could not be held because the treaty with Rumania concerning the Eastern half of the country was not signed until June 30, 1921, and about 90% of the Ruthenian population seemed to be dependent upon the rich Magyar land owners, who would influence their votes. The Ruthenians had to be freed from this economic dependency and trained politically for a democratic life. The note explained the steps taken by the

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[195] "Pétition du Partie Politique des Ruthènes de Hongrie au Secrétaire Général de la Société des Nations à Genève concernants les infractiones du Gouvernement de la Tschéco-Slovaquie contre les Stipulations du Traité entre les Principales Puissances alliées et associées et la Tschéco-Slovaquie, signé a Saint-Germain-en-Laye le 10 september 1919. See League of Nations Document C.491.M.354.1921.

[196] League of Nations Document C.214.M.153.1921.I.

Czecho-Slovak Government in cultural and social affairs, and declared that the party and the signatories of the petition were magyarized Ruthenians and under Hungarian influence, and their actual aim was not Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy but the revision of the Peace Treaty.

The petition and the Czecho-Slovak answer were discussed by a special Committee consisting of the President of the Council, M. Hymmans of Belgium, Marquis Imperiali of Italy and Viscount Ishii of Japan. This Committee expressed the belief that Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy would be realized in the near future and that the Czecho-Slovak Government should regularly inform the Council about all important measures taken in the territory concerned.[197] The Committee did not find it necessary to put this question on the agenda of the Council.

In October 1922, the Carpatho-Ruthenian émigrés sent another petition to the Secretary General of the League of Nations.[198] The émigrés complained that the League of Nations gave preference to the Czecho-Slovak reports in comparison with the petitions of the interested minority. Further the petition declared that the Czecho-Slovak authorities forced the Ruthenian intellectuals to leave the country in order to be able to say that there was no intellectual Ruthenian elité in the country. The petition claimed that the Government could have undertaken administrative measures in Carpatho-Ukraine even before June 1921, but it was not willing to do so. The petition was supported by the enclosed copy of the *Exposé* of the ex-Governor G. Zhatkovych.

This petition was sent on October 11, 1922, to the Czecho-Slovak Ambassador in Bern, who returned it to the League of Nations on January 23, 1923, together with the Czecho-Slovak note of January 12, 1923. The Czecho-Slovak note declared that there was no necessity for the émigrés to claim the right to represent the will of the Ruthenian population of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia because the population in the country enjoyed full freedom to do so for itself. The note summarized the Czecho-Slovak answer in the following three points: 1) the Czecho-Slovak internal policy was within the limits

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[197] League of Nations Document C.107.M.61.1922.I. Also see *Journal Officiel* (Genève), III, No. 3, p. 255.

[198] Informations relatives à l'organisation du Territoire des Ruthènes au Sud des Carpathes, présentées par les Ruthenes Émigrées au Secrétaire Général de la Société des Nations. League of Nations Document (dated January 18, 1923) No. C.74.M.30.1923.

of the Treaty of St. Germain; its aim was to prepare the population for the future elections; 2) the Ruthenian émigrés have attempted to justify the old Hungarian system, and 3) the Czecho-Slovak Government was willing to accept the control of the League of Nations in the affairs of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy.

On January 25, 1923, the Secretary General informed the members of the Council about both these documents. However, no member raised the problem in discussion, therefore the affair was considered closed.[199]

In accordance with the promise of the Czecho-Slovak Government of June 6, 1921, to send reports about all important administrative and other measures on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine, the Czecho-Slovak Government sent on November 15, 1923, through its representative at the League of Nations a report to the League concerning the situation in the country.[200] The Government declared that it would have granted full autonomy to Carpatho-Ukraine without any objections, if there would be no danger that the Ruthenians would fall victims to anti-Czecho-Slovak agitation which might lead to some international difficulties. The elections were not held because there existed a danger that the economically and culturally better situated Magyars, Jews and Germans would make full use of their democratic political rights, whereas the Ruthenians would be not able to do so. The anti-Czecho-Slovak officials, who openly declared themselves to be pro-Hungarian, were dismissed from the State service because loyalty of officials to the State must be required. The position of the Governor was not filled after the resignation of G. Zhatkovych because the Government was not able to find a suitable candidate. However, the Government promised to undertake, as soon as possible, all necessary preparations, technical, political and cultural, in order to establish the full autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine. All administrative measures which were taken until now by the Government were of a temporary character only. Besides an account of the organization of the school system and several social institutions, the Government enumerated all the most important legal measures taken for the guarantee of autonomy. Other

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[199] In this study, no evidence was found of any decision taken by the Council concerning autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine. Either the petitions were declared as not qualified to be accepted, or if accepted by the Secretary General then usually a special Committee dealt with them; and, even if they were presented to the Council, no action was taken there.

[200] League of Nations Document C.608.M.231.1923.I.

important steps toward preparation of the population for self-government were: 1) in accordance with the Act No. 663/1919 Sb. z. a n. (of December 19, 1919) the lists of voters had been prepared; 2) the communal elections were to be held on September 16, 1923, in accordance with the provisions of the existing Acts Nos. 75/19 Sb. z. a n. (of January 31, 1919) and 253/22 Sb. z. a n. (of June 6, 1922) which had only temporary validity in the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine until the autonomous Diet had established the permanent election laws; 3) a representation of the Carpatho-Ukrainian population in the National Assembly was guaranteed by the Constitutional Charter and the election laws; 4) the preparations for the elections to the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomous Diet were completed; the Ministry of Interior had already worked out a draft of the special election bill which was to be introduced in the National Assembly. However, the report concluded, it would not be possible for the Government to state the precise date on which the elections to the autonomous Diet would be held because external reasons might cause a delay.

On December 18, 1923, the Czecho-Slovak Government reported to the League of Nations the results of the communal elections held on September 16, 1923, in Carpatho-Ukraine, as well as the fact that Dr. Antin Beskid had been appointed Carpatho-Ukrainian Governor.[201] On February 23, 1924, the Government reported that the elections of 9 Deputies and 4 Senators from the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine would be held on March 16, 1924,[202] and on June 16, 1924, their results were reported to the League of Nations.[203]

The next important report was sent by the Czecho-Slovak Government to the League of Nations on December 16, 1927, regarding the Administration Reform which had been enforced in Carpatho-

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[201] League of Nations Document C.821.M.310.1923.I.

[202] League of Nations Document C.84.M.28.1924.I. Also see the Executive Ordinance No. 9/24 Sb. z. a n. R. čsl. of February 7, 1924.

[203] League of Nations Document C.331.M.107.1924.I. The general elections held on March 16, 1924, gave the Communists around 100,000 votes; the Ruthenian parties, including the Christian People's Party of Rev. A. Voloshyn, 60,000; the oppositional Autonomous Farmers Party (Kurtyak) 21,000; and the Magyar and Jewish parties together 55,000 votes. The Communists received 4 out of 9 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and 2 out of 4 seats in the Senate. The report to the League stated that the leaders of the Communist party were of Magyar nationality. The results of these elections gave reason to the Czecho-Slovak Government to delay the preparations for the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy.

Ukraine by July 1, 1928.[204] The report contained informative data concerning developments and progress in educational, social and political work and then stated that the abolishment of the three administrative Districts (*župa*) was one step toward autonomy. The Government informed the League of Nations that since November 14, 1923, a Ruthenian Governor was at the head of autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine; the officials were appointed, as far as it was possible, from among the autochthon inhabitants; Carpatho-Ukraine was represented in the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly; and, after the Administrative Reform of 1927 it constituted one administrative unit. The report further stated that the Government desired to establish the autonomous Diet. But, despite progress achieved in various fields, the results of the last elections held on December 15, 1925, showed that the Czecho-Slovak Government should proceed carefully with its preparatory work.

The Ex-President of the Western Ukrainian Republic protested against the Administrative Reform Act of 1927, as violating the autonomous rights of Carpatho-Ukraine, in a memorandum sent to the League of Nations dated May 5, 1927. The Secretary General referred this memorandum to the Czecho-Slovak Government, which refused to accept it because the signator of the petition, Dr. Yevhen Petrushevych, was not a Czecho-Slovak citizen. A special Committee of the League of Nations authorized to deal with the petitions of minorities against their governments, composed of the representatives of China, Italy and Netherland, overruled the Czecho-Slovak objection in May 1928 and in a letter to the Czecho-Slovak Government declared that after a study of the problem they came to the conclusion that "the achieved progress is not so considerable as one could hope on the basis of the declarations made by the Czecho-Slovak Government in 1923." [205] The Committee expressed their hope that the Government would speed up the preparatory work for the enforcement of autonomy in Carpatho-Ukraine and asked the Czecho-Slovak authorities to report on the progress done at the September Session of the Council.

In its report of September 28, 1928,[206] to the League of Nations, the Czecho-Slovak Government declared that the provisions of Articles 12 and 13 as well as the second sentence of Article 11

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[204] League of Nations Document C.654.M.217.1927.I.

[205] M. Karskyj, "Karpatho-Ukraine," *Nation und Staat* (Vienna, July-August 1928), I. Jahrgang, Heft 11-12, pp. 874-876.

[206] League of Nations Document C.517.M.151.1928.I.

of the Treaty of St. Germain were fulfilled.[207] Because of the existing political situation and the Communist danger, it was impossible to constitute the autonomous Diet for the time being. The Czecho-Slovak authorities claimed that the enforced Administration Reform should be considered as a partial fulfillment of autonomy, especially a step toward realization of Articles 10 and 11 of the Treaty.[208] The

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[207] Article 12 provides: "Czecho-Slovakia agrees that officials in the Ruthene territory will be chosen as far as possible from the inhabitants of this territory." The expression "as far as possible" created broad flexibility for the Czecho-Slovak authorities because of the lack of precise explanation of its meaning. As it has been indicated already (footnote No. 166, pp. 87-88) in 1927 only 12.8% of all public servants on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine were of Ruthenian nationality.

Article 13 reads: "Czecho-Slovakia guarantees to the Ruthene territory equitable representation in the legislative assembly of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, to which Assembly it will send deputies elected according to the constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. These deputies will not, however, have the right of voting in the Czecho-Slovak Diet upon legislative questions of the same kind as those assigned to the Ruthene Diet." As indicated above, p. 49, the population of Carpatho-Ukraine was not proportionally represented. Neither the special status of the Carpatho-Ukrainian representatives in the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly concerning prohibition to vote "upon legislative questions of the same kind as those assigned to the Ruthene Diet" was respected by the Czecho-Slovak Constitutional Acts Nos. 123/20 and 124/20 Sb. z. a n. concerning the composition, organization and competences of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the National Assembly.

The second sentence of Article 11 of the Treaty of St. Germain has the following wording: "This Diet shall have powers of legislation in all linguistic, scholastic and religious questions, in matters of local administration, and in other questions which the laws of the Czecho-Slovak State may assign to it." The objection to this statement of the Czecho-Slovak authorities comes out of the fact that the Diet itself was not in existence. The Land Assembly which has been called into existence by the Administration Reform Act No. 125/27 Sb. z. a n. was not an autonomous legislative organ of Carpatho-Ukraine.

[208] Article 10 among other things stated that Carpatho-Ukraine shall have "fullest degree of autonomy compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak State." Contrary to this provision, the Administration Reform Act 125/27 established a uniform administrative system in all territories of Czecho-Slovakia, and placed the real control of Carpatho-Ukraine in the hands of the Land President, making no reference to the office of the Governor. The Land President was appointed by the Czecho-Slovak authorities and was responsible only to them. Under these circumstances, there were not many elements of self-government present.

As to the reference to Article 11 of the Treaty: there was a Governor in Carpatho-Ukraine who was appointed in accordance with the provisions of § 3, Section 6, of the Czecho-Slovak Constitutional Charter. These provisions, however, deviated from the provisions of Article 11 of the Treaty of St. Germain. Besides, the Governor was left without real powers.

last official Czecho-Slovak report concerning the situation in Carpatho-Ukraine seems to be that of January 6, 1931.[209] Again it contained statistical data on the school system as well as on economic and administrative developments. The Czecho-Slovak Government declared in this report that its most important aim for the time being was to prevent the assimilation of the Ruthenians.[210] The Government expressed its satisfaction concerning the enforcement and workability of the Administration Reform Act of 1927 in Carpatho-Ukraine.

The American Ruthenians stood for the incorporation of Carpatho-Ukraine into Czecho-Slovakia. Therefore, they were interested in the realization of autonomy.[211] First they urged the Czecho-Slovak Government itself to fulfil its obligations in this respect, but in 1928 and 1932 they also sent petitions to the League of Nations.

After the resignation of the first Governor, Gr. Zhatkovych, and his return to the United States, on November 28, 1922, American Ruthenians summoned a Congress to Pittsburgh, Pa., with 1,500 delegates participating from all Carpatho-Ruthenian communities of the United States and Canada. At this Congress they set up a Rusin Council of National Defense whose sole aim was to defend the autonomous rights of Carpatho-Ukraine.[212] According to the decision of this Congress, in 1923 a detailed memorandum was sent to the Czecho-Slovak Government but this memorandum was ignored with the excuse that the autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine was an internal affair of Czecho-Slovakia and the American Ruthenians have no right to meddle in this affair.[213]

The Rusin Council of National Defense summoned another Congress of American Ruthenians held on June 21, 1925, in New York. The main problem of discussion again was Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy. In its resolutions this Congress requested the Czecho-Slovak Government to withdraw the anti-autonomous policy and to introduce full autonomy at once. Otherwise, "it must be concluded that nothing good can be expected of Czechoslovakia," therefore Car-

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[209] League of Nations Document C.21. M.12. 1931. I.

[210] Under the term "assimilation" in this case the process of Magyarization is to be understood. However, the Carpatho-Ukrainian population protested as strongly against the trends of Czechization of the country as it did formerly against Magyarization. See Mykhaylo Brashchayko, "Shcho mayemo skazaty p. min. Beneshovi?" *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), April 9, 1934.

[211] Yuhasz, *Wilson's Principles*, pp. 58-59.

[212] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[213] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

patho-Ukrainian people should feel free "to act according to their best interests." [214]

Since this memorandum remained unanswered by the Czecho-Slovak Government, the American Ruthenians decided to appeal to the international organization for the fulfillment of the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain. On September 15, 1928, the President of the Rusin Council of National Defense, Michael Yuhasz, Sr., sent a memorandum directly to the League of Nations, copies of which were forwarded at the same time to governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Germany and Belgium.[215] In the first part of its memorandum the Rusin Council demanded the union of the territories having a Ruthenian majority administered by Slovak Župans with the autonomous "Podkarpatská Rus" and the solution of the question of the boundary between Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. There was included a strong protest against Slovakization of that territory, too. In the Chapter named "The Autonomy Question" the Rusin Council protested against the Administration Reform Act No. 125/27 Sb. z. a n and demanded elections to the autonomous Diet as the legislative body. Another complaint concerned the appointment of Czech officials and the disregarding of local candidates for public service. In connection with this, the question of Czechization in Carpatho-Ukraine was brought up. The fourth group of complaints constituted "the economic grievances" including the land reform, high taxation, profit-making by the transition from old Austro-Hungarian to the Czecho-Slovak currency, etc.

In October 1928, American Ruthenians were invited by the Czecho-Slovak Consulate at Pittsburgh, Pa., to take part in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Rusin Council refused to participate and instead of calling the American Ruthenians to celebrate the jubilee, it sent out a resolution to the Ruthenian communities in the United States in which was included a strong protest against the Czecho-Slovak policy in Carpatho-Ukraine for the past ten years. One hundred and sixty Ruthenian communities in the United States adopted this resolution between October 28 and December 31, 1928.[216] On February 15, 1929, the Rusin Council sent this resolution to the Czecho-Slovak Government

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[214] *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

[215] *Ibid.*, p. 12. For text of the memorandum see Yuhasz, pp. 35-52.

[216] For full text of the resolution see Yuhasz, *Wilson's Principles*, pp. 58-60.

together with an appeal containing 22 points concerning the situation of the Carpatho-Ukrainian people under Czecho-Slovak rule.[217]

The appeal of February 15, 1929, remained unanswered, and the Rusin Council of National Defense sent on December 12, 1932, another petition to the League of Nations.[218] This memorandum dealt mainly with the problem of Czechization of the school system in Carpatho-Ukraine. The Council claimed that the Czechs and Slovaks should be considered on the territory of autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine as national minorities and fall under the protection of Articles 8 and 9 of the Treaty of St. Germain. The Rusin Council asked the Council of the League of Nations: a) to appeal to the Czecho-Slovak Government to enforce the provisions of Articles 10 - 13 of the Treaty of St. Germain in full; b) to appeal to the Czecho-Slovak Government that until the autonomous organs would be set up, a proportional part of the financial means of the Ministry of Education would be appropriated to the Ruthenian school system; these funds would be under the control of Ruthenian officials; and, c) that all linguistic affairs of Carpatho-Ukraine belonged only to the competence of the autonomous Diet and every Czecho-Slovak interference with these matters was a violation of the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain.

The Czecho-Slovak answer may be summarized as follows: The Czecho-Slovak authorities did everything possible to prepare the population for autonomous rule, but the Ruthenians were still not capable of self-government. On the other hand, the world economic crisis made it impossible to introduce autonomy in Carpatho-Ukraine. Besides these reasons, the Czecho-Slovak Government presented again statistical data on the school system as well as on public aid to fight the results of the economic crisis in Carpatho-Ukraine.

The memorandum and the Czecho-Slovak answer were examined by the Petition Committee, consisting of Sr. Castillio Najera, Mr. William Malkin and M. J. Fouques-Duprac. The Committee expressed

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[217] "An Appeal to the Czechoslovak Government by the Rusin Council of National Defense," Yuhasz, pp. 52-58.

[218] "Pétition concernant les plaintes formulées en matière d'instruction publique, par le territoire autonome des Ruthènes au sud des Carpathes. Présentée par le Conseil de défense national aux États-Unis d'Amérique, à la Société des Nations, Garantie de la Partie II du Traité conclu entre des Puissance alliées et associées et le Gouvernement de la République tschécoslovaque, à Saint Germain-en-Laye," *Journal Officiel de la Société des Nations* (Genève), XV, 3, pp.336ff.

its satisfaction with the fact that the Czecho-Slovak authorities strived to prepare autonomy through education of the population. Further, they expressed the belief that only the economic crisis prevented the Czecho-Slovak authorities from granting autonomy at that time, and that after the problems created by the crisis would be solved, the Czecho-Slovak Government would grant the internationally guaranteed autonomy to Carpatho-Ukraine.[219] The Committee did not see any necessity to present this petition to the Council of the League of Nations.

This was the last known petition regarding the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy to the League of Nations. The problem was also discussed at the Tenth European Congress of Nationalities held in Bern, Switzerland, from September 16 - 19, 1933. The realization of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy was demanded by Senator Volodymyr Zalozets'kyy, the Ukrainian delegate from Rumania, and Baron Steinheil, a Russian delegate from Poland, who spoke on behalf of the Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians usually represented in that organization of the national minorities by the late Ivan Kurtyak, leader of the Autonomous Farmers Party.[220] This Congress adopted the following resolution in support of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy:

> The Congress repeatedly demands the territorial self-government for the territories inhabited compactly by national minorities and does protest against the delay or limitation of the self-government which violate positive domestic and international obligations.[221]

Nothing positive was done in the League of Nations to put into practice the internationally guaranteed provisions for Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy. Perhaps this was the reason why the sending of petitions to the League of Nations was discontinued. The hope for a positive solution was lost.

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[219] *Journal Officiel,* XV, No. 3, p. 335. The local press repeatedly reported at that time about famine conditions among the population of Carpatho-Ukraine in the mountainous areas of the country. The Czecho-Slovak Government aided the needy but not sufficiently. See editorial "Holod," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), March 1, 1932.

[220] "Der X. Europäische Nationalitätenkongress, vom 16. bis 19. September 1933 in Bern," *Nation und Staat* (Vienna, Oktober 1933), Jahrgang VII, Heft 1, pp. 40-45. In these Congresses participated the representatives of the national minorities within the European states. According to the Czecho-Slovak official point of view, the Carpatho-Ukrainians were not considered as a minority within the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Ivan Kurtyak was a leader of an opposition party, and he had some secret ties with Hungary. Germany and Hungary strongly supported these Congresses of the Nationalities because they pursued there their revisionistic policies.

[221] *Nation und Staat* (Vienna), VII, No. 1, p. 55.

Chapter Three

CARPATHO-UKRAINE — A FEDERATED STATE

The nineteen year old struggle of Carpatho-Ukraine for the fulfillment of the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain concerning her autonomy ended successfully by the establishment of an autonomous Carpatho-Ukrainian Government in October 1938. Under the pressure of international circumstanes and the internal demands of the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians, the Czecho-Slovak Republic was transformed into a Federation of Czechs, Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians. The well known Munich Conference of September 29, 1938, considerably weakened Czecho-Slovakia internally as well as externally,[1] and this fact probably influenced decisively the future political developments of Czecho-Slovakia.

After the Munich Conference, German troops immediately started the occupation of the ceded Sudeten-German territory.[2] At the same time, on October 1, 1938, the Czecho-Slovak Government accepted Polish demands in full and ceded to Poland the long disputed Těšín region.[3] In this situation, Jan Syrový's Government of National Defense, which was created on September 22, 1938, resigned

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[1] See "Agreement Signed at Munich Between Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy on September 29, 1938," in Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945* (Washington, 1949), Series D, Vol. II, Document No. 675. Hereafter cited as: *DGFP*. For an account of the Czecho-Slovakia's crisis of September 1938 concerning the Sudeten-German question see: Joan and Jonathan Griffin, *Lost Liberty? The Ordeal of the Czechs and the Future of Freedom* (New York 1939); Dr. Hubert Ripka, *Munich: Before and After* (London, 1938); Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans: A Study of the Struggle in Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia* (London, 1938); Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Czechoslovakia Fights Back* (Washington, 1943); Vojta Beneš, *The Vanguard of the "Drang nach Osten"* (Chicago, 1942); and Jozef Lettrich, *History of Modern Slovakia* (New York, 1955).

[2] *DGFP*, D, II, maps 1 and 2 as Appendices VI and VII, pp. 1071 and 1073.

[3] *DGFP*, D, V, Document No. 56.

on October 4, 1938, and a new Government of Czecho-Slovakia, again under the premiership of General Jan Syrový, was appointed by the President of the Republic, Dr. Edvard Beneš. The deliberations which were held in Prague during the night from October 4 to October 5 resulted in a decision to reorganize the unitary Czecho-Slovak State into a Federation. To the new Syrový's Cabinet was appointed Dr. Ivan Parkanyi as the representative of Carpatho-Ukraine.[4] On October 5, 1938, Prime Minister Jan Syrový addressed the nation through the Czecho-Slovak broadcasting system and informed the people about his Government's program. Syrový declared that the foreign policy of his Government was to be based upon friendly relations with the neighboring states and that, internally, Czecho-Slovakia was to be decentralized. All "the reasonable demands of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia were to be satisfied" because "the new life of the Republic can only be based upon the life-and-death brotherhood between the Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians."[5]

On October 6, 1938, the representatives of the six influential political parties of Slovakia, the Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party, the Republican Peasant and Smallholder's Party, the Middle-Class Party, the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, the Slovak National Party, and the Slovak Fascists, met at Žilina and demanded the immediate fulfillment of their demands for autonomy of Slovakia. They issued the so-called Žilina Declaration. Part II of this Declaration reads as follows:

> The governmental and the executive power in Slovakia should at once be put into the hands of the Slovak Government. Therefore, we ask to authorize immediately the Vice-President of the Hlinka Slovak Peoples Party, Dr. Josef Tiso, as Premier-Designate, to form the first Slovak Government consisting of Premier and four Members, and to propose them for nomination with the agreement of the undersigned political parties.[6]

The next day, on October 7, 1938, Prime Minister Jan Syrový received a Slovak delegation headed by Msgr. Jozef Tiso, and in the name of the President of the Republic,[7] in accordance with the

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[4] Dr. Hubert Ripka, *Munich: Before and After* (London, 1939), pp. 236-237. Hereafter cited as: Ripka, *Munich.*

[5] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 8, 1938.

[6] Jozef Lettrich, *History of Modern Slovakia* (New York, 1955) pp. 296-297. Hereafter cited as: Lettrich, *Slovakia.*

[7] On October 5, 1938, as soon as changes of Czecho-Slovak Government and of her policy had been effected in accordance with the changing situation, Dr. E. Beneš resigned his post of President of the Republic and in a handwritten

Žilina demands, appointed the first autonomous Government of Slovakia under the premiership of Msgr. Jozef Tiso. Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Matthew Černák, Pavel Teplanský and Ján Lichner were appointed members of the Slovak Cabinet.[8] It was quite a natural thing that a similar arrangement should have been made for Carpatho-Ukraine whose autonomy had been guaranteed by the Treaty of St. Germain and by the Czecho-Slovak Constitution.

However, the Czechs were delaying even in this critical situation the implementation of the provisions concerning Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy. Apparently, they still preferred to maintain a *provisorium* through the appointment of a Minister for the Carpatho-Ukrainian Affairs in the person of Dr. Ivan Parkanyi who had virtually no following in the country. This time, however, the Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders insisted upon establishment of the Government of autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine.

FORMATION OF THE FIRST CARPATHO-UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT

On the occasion of the passing of the First Stage of Autonomy Act No. 172/37,[9] speaking in the Chamber of Deputies on November 17, 1937, the Czecho-Slovak Prime Minister, Milan Hodža, said:

> The Government hopes that this first stage (of autonomy) will be followed as soon as possible by the second stage, that of elections to a Sub-Carpathian Ruthenian Diet. As far as the Government of the Republic is concerned, the newly organized Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia will be ensured all the primary conditions to enable her to prepare for that important step as soon as possible.[10]

Therefore, neither the Czecho-Slovak Government nor the Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders linked the Carpatho-Ukrainian struggle for autonomy with the Sudeten-German crisis.[11] Actually, what the

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letter transferred all his functions to General Jan Syrový, the Premier, until the elections of a new President of the Republic by the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly. For the full text of Beneš's resignation speech on radio, see Ripka, *Munich*, pp. 237-239. Upon Nazi insistence, E. Beneš was forced to leave Czecho-Slovakia. See Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Czechoslovakia Fights Back* (Washington, 1943), p. 16. Hereafter cited as: *Czechoslovakia Fights Back*.

[8] Ripka, *Munich*, p. 242.

[9] See above, pp. 63-66.

[10] Edgar P. Young, *Czechoslovakia: Keystone of Peace and Democracy* (London, 1938), p. 278.

[11] Signed Editorial by Fedir Revay in *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), September 18, 1938.

Carpatho-Ukrainians fought for was less than they received after the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a "Czecho-Slovako-Ukrainian Federation." [12]

On May 29, 1938, the First Ruthenian-Ukrainian Central National Council in Uzhhorod passed a set of resolutions in which the Council

as representation of the Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians-Ukrainians undoubtedly declared that taking into consideration the seriousness of the international situation it firmly supported the unity of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia with the Czecho-Slovak Republic and the unchangebility of her boundaries,

and, at the same time

the First Ruthenian-Ukrainian Central National Council insisted upon the immediate fulfillment of the provisions of the § 3 of the Constitutional Charter of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, i. e. fulfillment of the obligations taken by the Czecho-Slovak State upon itself through the Treaty of St. Germain and for this reason the Council demands to prescribe and administer the elections to the Sub-Carpathian autonomous Diet as soon as possible, and to incorporate into Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia those territories of Eastern Slovakia which are inhabited by the Ruthenians-Ukrainians.[13]

Concerning the content and form of the "broadest autonomy" of Carpatho-Ukraine the Council referred to the Autonomy Bill of November 28, 1936.[14] The other important political organization, the Russian Central National Council, in its memorandum submitted to the President of the Council of Ministers of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Dr. Milan Hodža, on July 19, 1938, declared its readiness

to be satisfied with an autonomy similar to that which was enjoyed by the Croatians in Hungary before (First World) war, while admitting that this regime would fall considerably short of the "fullest degree of self-government" guaranteed by the Treaty of St. Germain.[15]

The Russian Council used a much stronger language than the Ukrainian Council[16] and linked its demands with the general Czecho-Slovak

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[12] Ripka, *Munich*, p. 241.

[13] Rezolyutsiyi ukhvaleni na zasidani Holovnoyi Upravy Pershoyi Tsentral'noyi Rus'koyi-Ukrayins'koyi Narodnoyi Rady v Uzhhorodi dnya 29. travnya 1938," *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), June 15, 1938.

[14] See above, pp. 61-63.

[15] For the text see Delegacija Karpatorusskoho Sojuza, *Karpatskaja Rus' v Češskom Jarmi*, p. 29. Hereafter cited as *Rus' v Češskom Jarmi*.

[16] For the distinction see above, pp. 60-61 and 66-68.

crisis. The Government, being engaged in "delicate negotiations with the Germans," asked not to insist "upon the realization of autonomy at an inopportune moment" and "to wait 'a little longer' in order to let the Government to come to an agreement with the Germans." [17] The representatives of this Council, Josyf Kaminskiy and V. Gomichkov, declared in their memorandum:

> We are convinced that we shall never obtain our autonomy unless we will obtain it now, at the moment when all other nationalities of the Republic will be granted rights which are not provided for either by any international treaties or by the Constitution.[18]

While the Czecho-Slovak Government tried to satisfy the demands of the national minorities i. e. Germans, Magyars and Poles living in Czecho-Slovakia by issuing the so-called Nationality Statute,[19] the Carpatho-Ukrainians were not being regarded as a minority within the Republic, since they were "free and equal partners in it with the Czechs and the Slovaks." [20] The Czecho-Slovak Government preferred to negotiate with the representatives of the governmental coalition parties from Carpatho-Ukraine than with Mr. Andriy Brodiy and his oppositional Autonomist Farmers Union. Therefore, already on July 4, 1938, Prime Minister Hodža, at a meeting in Prague, urged the Governor of Carpatho-Ukraine, Konstantyn Hrabar, to take steps necessary for the preparation of elections to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet.[21] On July 14, 1938, Prime Minister Hodža conferred with Deputy Yuliyan Revay of the Social Democratic Party concerning Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy and expressed his desire that the representatives of the governmental coalition parties in Carpatho-Ukraine would consolidate their efforts regarding autonomy and urge the oppositional parties to follow them.[22] Two weeks later, on July 28, 1938, Dr. M. Hodža received a delegation of the Carpatho-Ruthenian Parliamentary Club of the coalition parties, headed by Senator Edmund Bachynskiy, President, and Deputy Yuliyan Revay, Secretary. Milan Hodža again declared that the Government would

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[17] *Rus' v Češskom Jarmi*, p. 26.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

[19] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), July 22, 1938.

[20] Edgar P. Young, *Czechoslovakia* (London, 1938), p. 100.

[21] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), July 9, 1938. Governor K. Hrabar headed a delegation to Prague. Other members of the delegation were: Vice-Governor Jaroslav Mezník, Dr. Drbal (both Czechs), and members of the Land Assembly, Dr. A. Shtefan, M. Gulyanych and M Yatsyna.

[22] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), July 15, 1938.

have no objections to the elections of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet being held before the end of the year. He also said that the Minister of Interior, Černý, soon would present a government proposal concerning the autonomy for discussion.[23]

Soon thereafter, the Agrarian Party prepared its proposals regarding autonomy, based upon the proposal of the Central Ruthenian National Council of November 28, 1936. The Executive Committee of this party sent its proposals to all other political parties, including the oppositional parties, and tried to negotiate with them concerning a united action. It is interesting to note that this proposal included a provision of the so-called *curial* system of elections, according to which each nationality was to elect to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet a number of deputies proportional to its entire population living in Carpatho-Ukraine. The Christian People's Party under the leadership of Rev. A. Voloshyn was among the first few to accept this proposal. On the other hand, the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, to which Dr. E. Beneš belonged, declared itself against autonomy, while the leadership of the influential Social Democratic Party was divided.[24] While the proposal of the Agrarian Party was under discussion among the various political groups, the Government was forced to concentrate upon the Sudeten-German question and was able to devote very little time and efforts in order to solve the problem of autonomy. After all, the very existence of the Republic was at stake.

In order to clarify its political position in the critical situation at the beginning of September 1938, the Presidium of the First Ruthenian -Ukrainian Central National Council, headed by Rev. A. Voloshyn, as President, Yuliyan Revay, as Vice-President, and Dr. Mykola Dolynay, as Secretary General, called the General Convention of the Council for September 4, 1938, to Uzhhorod, the capital of Carpatho-Ukraine. The Convention, with 1,110 delegates participating, approved the resolutions adopted by the Executive Committee of the Council on May 29, 1938.[25] It also decided to send a delegation to Prague in order to clarify the position of the Council and to negotiate regarding autonomy. The Convention called upon

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[23] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), July 30, 1938.

[24] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), August 7, 1938.

[25] For the full text see Petro Stercho, *Karpato-Ukrayins'ka Derzhava: do istoriyi vyzvol'noyi borot'by karpats'kykh ukrayintsiv u 1919-1939 rokakh* (Toronto, 1965), pp. 47-48. Hereafter cited as: Stercho, *Karpato-Ukrayins'ka Derzhava*.

all those political parties which defend the rights of the Ruthenian-Ukrainian people in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia as well as upon the Ruthenians-Ukrainians who are members of the other parties to unite and pursue a common policy concerning the country, to formulate and to execute that policy in common.[26]

Right after the Convention, on September 7, 1938, a delegation of the First Ruthenian-Ukrainian Central National Council departed for Prague, where it conferred with several ministers of the Czecho-Slovak Government.[27] While the delegation was still in Prague, the Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Zadina, arrived in Carpatho-Ukraine. On September 14, 1938, at a dinner in Uzhhorod, to which he invited 100 prominent political and cultural leaders, he expressed on behalf of the Government his thanks to the population of Carpatho-Ukraine for its loyal fulfillment of duties, as citizens, during the days of crisis in May 1938, faithfully answering the call for mobilization. He also declared that the preparatory work for the introduction of autonomy

had already developed so far that in a short time it will be possible to prepare the election regulations for the Diet, because we (the Government) decided steadfastedly to order the elections to the Diet as soon as possible, before the end of the year, so that at the beginning of the next year the Diet could be summoned and would start to work.[28]

Dr. Zadina's address did not satisfy the representatives of the Carpatho-Ukrainian population, and Mr. Fedir Revay answered that the Czecho-Slovak Government made many promises during the last nineteen years, and "now we do not want to hear any promising words, we want deeds, therefore grant us our guaranteed rights and turn over the administration of the country into the hands of our representatives." [29] Soon thereafter, all Senators and Deputies to the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly of Ruthenian nationality, both belonging to the Ukrainian and Russophile cultural movements in Carpatho-Ukraine, except the Communists, decided to act in common. On September 21, 1938, they issued a declaration stating that

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[26] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), September 7, 1938.

[27] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), September 8, 1938. The delegation was headed by the President of the Council, Rev. A. Voloshyn, and other members included: Yuliyan Revay, Stepan Klochurak, Rev. Dmytro Popovych, Dr. Mykola Dolynay, Vasyl' Pryymak, Yuliyan Husnay, Vasyl' Sverenyak, Ivan Tchoban, and Dr. Stepan Rosokha.

[28] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), September 16, 1938.

[29] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), September 18, 1938.

the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain and those incorporated into the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic were not fulfilled by the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic until now, during the past nineteen years... Our people never resigned from their rights of self-determination and the right to govern themselves; therefore, we insist upon the realization of these rights at this fatebearing time, when not only the fate of the Czechoslovak Republic will be decided but also the fate of our Ruthenian people.[30]

In the meantime, international tension regarding the Sudeten regions of Czecho-Slovakia grew from day to day, and climaxed on September 23, 1938, when Czecho-Slovakia, with the consent of Great Britain and France, ordered general mobilization.[31] In this situation, Governor Konstantyn Hrabar issued a Manifesto to the citizens of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia in which he asked all citizens of the country, regardless of their nationality and religion, "to fulfill their everyday obligations as well as the obligations as citizens."[32]

In the first days of October 1938, a joint delegation of both the Ukrainian and the pro-Russian Councils visited the Czecho-Slovak Prime Minister, General Jan Syrový.[33] This visit resulted in the appointment of Dr. Ivan Parkanyi to the Czecho-Slovak Cabinet as Minister for Sub-Carpatho-Ruthenian affairs.[34] This was in accordance with the demands of the Ukrainian Council of May 29, 1938, as re-approved on September 4, 1938. This appointment was regarded as a provisional solution until the autonomous Government could be formed.

On Saturday, October 8, 1938, the representatives of both Councils met together with the Senators and Deputies, who signed the Declaration of September 21, 1938, in the official quarters of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Governor at Uzhhorod, and "unanimously decided to demand the same rights for Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia as have been or will be granted to Slovakia."[35] Further, the partici-

[30] *Rus' v Češskom Jarmi*, p. 17. The Declaration was signed by Senators Edmund Bachynskiy and Yuliy Feldeshiy, and Deputies Andriy Brodiy, Stepan Fencyk, Pavlo T. Kossey, Ivan Pyeshchak, Yuliyan Revay and Petro Zhydovskiy.

[31] Joan and Jonathan Griffin, *Lost Liberty?* (New York, 1939), pp. 81-83.

[32] Konstantyn Hrabar, Gubernator Pidkarpats'koyi Rusy, "Do Hromadyan Pidkarpats'koyi Rusy," *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), September 25, 1938.

[33] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 5, 1938. The Ukrainian Council represented Yuliyan Revay and Dr. Mykola Dolynay; and the pro-Russian Council — Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, Andriy Brodiy and Mykhaylo Demko.

[34] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 6, 1938.

[35] For the Slovak demands see above, p. 108. On the way from Prague, the joint delegation of the Ukrainian and pro-Russian Councils attended the Žilina Meeting of the Slovak political parties held on October 5 and 6, 1938, in the capacity as guests-observers. *Nova Svoboda*, October 9, 1938.



Yuliyan Revay

pants unanimously proposed to appoint the first Government of autonomous Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia as follows: Andriy Brodiy — Prime Minister and Minister of Education; Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, Minister of Interior; Dr. Ivan Pyeshchak, Minister of Justice; Yuliyan Revay, Minister of Communications (i.e. Railroads, Post, Telephone and Telegraph) and Public Works; Rev. Avhustyn Voloshyn, Minister of Health and Social Welfare; and Dr. Stepan Fencyk, Minister for Economic Affairs. "The decision was taken to insist upon the immediate acceptance of these demands by the Czechoslovak Government." [36] Immediately after the meeting, Dr. Ivan Parkanyi, Minister for Sub-Carpatho-Ruthenian Affairs in the Czecho-Slovak Government, who was present at the meeting as an observer, reported by phone the results of the meeting to General Jan Syrový, who in his turn invited the members of the proposed Carpatho-Ukrainian Government to Prague for negotiations. The Ministers-Designates, however, refused to go to Prague before Syrový's Government approved Andriy Brodiy as the Prime Minister of the autonomous Government.[37]

On Sunday, October 9, 1938, Prime Minister Syrový summoned a meeting of his Cabinet for 7 P.M. at which the Minister for Sub-Carpatho-Ruthenian Affairs, Dr. Ivan Parkanyi, reported about the events in Uzhhorod on the previous day. After the Cabinet meeting, at about midnight, General Syrový called by phone Governor Konstantyn Hrabar and informed him that he accepted his resignation, and asked him to notify the designated members of the autonomous Government that he would expect them in his office at Prague by 10 A. M. the next morning.[38] General Syrový also appointed immediately Dr. Ivan Parkanyi to the post of Governor of the autonomous Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.[39] This fact dissatisfied the political leaders

[36] "Protokol z narady predstavnykiv 'Tsentral'noy Russkoy Narodnoy Rady' i 'Pershoyi Rus'koyi-Ukrayins'koyi Tsentralnoyi Narodnoyi Rady', yaka vidbulysya dnya 8-ho zhovtnya 1938 r. v domi Krayevoho Uryadu," *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 11, 1938. The following representatives participated in this meeting: Senators E. Bachynskiy and Yuliy Feldeshiy; Deputies A. Brodiy, Dr. P. Kossey, Dr. I. Pyeshchak, Yuliyan Revay, P. Zhydovskiy, and Dr. S. Fencyk; on behalf of the Ukrainian Council: Rev. A. Voloshyn, St. Klochurak, and Dmytro Nimchuk; the pro-Russian Council represented Dr. Yosyf Kaminskiy, Dr. V. Gomichkov, and M. Demko. Among the observers were: Dr. Ivan Parkanyi from the Czecho-Slovak Cabinet, Prof. A. Shtefan, and Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko. For the text of "Protokol" see Stercho, *Karpato-Ukrayins'ka Derzhava*, pp. 55-56.

[37] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 11, 1938.

[38] *Rus' v češskom jarmi*, p. 18.

[39] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 11, 1938.

in Uzhhorod, even more so since there were some rumors that the representatives of some Czech circles of Carpatho-Ukraine advised Prime Minister Syrový not to accept the demands of the Uzhhorod meeting assuring him that "nothing would happen if the Government would arrest the designates on account of treason.[40] However, for the time being, the Prime Minister made no use of this advice.

The negotiations between the Prague Government and the members-designates of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government lasted for two days, on October 10 and 11, 1938. When the Ukrainian National Council in Uzhhorod learned that until the night of October 10th General Syrový had declined to appoint the autonomous Government of Carpatho-Ukraine, it sent a delegation to the Vice-Governor, Dr. Jaroslav Mezník, who conferred with Fedir Revay, Avhustyn Shtefan and Dmytro Nimchuk. Thereafter, they urged Prime Minister Syrový to appoint the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine. On the other hand, the Council sent a telegram to Rev. A. Voloshyn in Prague with the following message: "Ukrainian National Council insists upon the immediate appointment of the Sub-Carpathian Government. Otherwise, return home! Presidium awaits your answer before 2 o'clock P.M." [41] However, the negotiations proved to be successful and solved all the disputed questions. A new basis for the mutual relations between the Central Government in Prague and the autonomous Government of Carpatho-Ukraine with its seat in Uzhhorod was established. Since both Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia were now *de facto* autonomous countries with their own governments, Czecho-Slovakia changed into a Federated State. The Central Government in Prague from now on was to administer directly the lands inhabited by the Czech population, i. e. Bohemia, Moravia and a part of Silesia, and was to retain the competences in Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Finances of the Federation. All other powers were transferred to the autonomous governments of Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia in their respective territories.[42] In the question of the

[40] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 12, 1938. A Czech delegation, consisting of Josef Zajíc, Deputy of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party; M. Kekus, an influential leader of the Social-Democratic Party; and M. Rašer, a prominent member of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, visited Prague and openly took their position against self-government of Carpatho-Ukraine.

[41] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 12, 1938. The telegram was signed by Stepan Klochurak, Vice-President; and Dr. Mykola Dolynay, Secretary General.

[42] "Ústavní zákon ze dne 22. listopadu 1938, čís. 328 Sb. z. a nař. o autonomii Podkarpatské Rusi," *A-ZET*, January 1, 1939. For Ukrainian text see Stercho, *Karpato-Ukrayins'ka Derzhava*, Dodatok VII, pp. 235-242.

number of Ministers of Carpatho-Ukrainian Cabinet a threefold compromise was found, and on Tuesday, October 11, 1938, at 8:00 P. M. Prime Minister Syrový, performing the functions of the President of the Republic, appointed the first autonomous Government of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. The members of the Cabinet were: Andriy Brodiy, Prime Minister, and Yuliyan Revay and Dr. Edmund Bachynsky, Ministers; Dr. Stepan Fencyk was appointed as a Minister Plenipotentiary, and Rev. Avhustyn Voloshyn and Dr. Ivan Pyeshchak were appointed as State Secretaries.[43] Dr. Ivan Parkanyi was relieved of his functions as Governor and member of the Czecho-Slovak Government representing Sub-Carpatho-Ruthenian Affairs, and so was also Dr. Jaroslav Mezník, as the Land President and Vice-Governor. All their offices were abolished and their administrative and other functions transferred to the newly established autonomous Government.[44]

At its first formal meeting, October 15, 1938, the Council of Ministers distributed the portfolios among its own members in accordance with the decision of the representitives of both National Councils at their meeting on October 8, 1938.[45] Herewith the process of forming the first autonomous Government of Carpatho-Ukraine was formally completed.

VOLOSHYN'S CABINET

The threefold compromise of October 11, 1938, reached between the Czecho-Slovak Government in Prague and the Ukrainian and pro-Russian leaders of Carpatho-Ukraine, proved to have no solid foundation. The Czechs were interested in keeping Carpatho-Ukraine within the boundaries of the new Czecho-Slovak Federation as direct link with Rumania and the other Balkan countries. The Ukrainians, at least for the time being, wanted to stay in the union with the Czechs and the Slovaks, and opposed the Polish-Hungarian efforts to return Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary.[46] The pro-Russian group of leaders was divided regarding the future of the province. Their central political organization, the Russian Central National Council, was under the control of Prime Minister Andriy Brodiy and his followers in co-operation with Stepan Fencyk's followers. This group

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[43] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 13, 1938.

[44] *Rus' v Češskom Jarmi*, p. 19.

[45] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 18, 1938.

[46] "Inavguratsiyna promova Premyer-Ministra A. Voloshyna," *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 28, 1938.


CZECHOSLOVAKIA
and
UKRAINIAN
Ethnic Population
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
CARPATHO-UKRAINE
CARPATHO-UKRAINE

decided to work in line with the Hungarian demands that "the final decision" about the future political status of Carpatho-Ukraine "must be taken by the autochthonous inhabitants by way of a plebiscite conducted on the principle of the right of self-determination." [47] Some prominent members of the Russian Council, including Minister E. Bachynskiy, were not invited by the Vice-President of the Council, Andriy Brodiy, to the decisive meeting. Nevertheless, the representatives of the younger generation, under the leadership of M. Kovach, vigorously opposed the decision of Brodiy's group.[48] The Ukrainian National Council organized on Sunday, October 16, 1938, populous anti-Hungarian manifestations in Uzhhorod, Khust, Rakhiv, Yasinya, Volove, Velykyy Bychkiv and other towns and villages. The Presidiums of these mass meetings with the approval of the participants sent telegrams to the signatories of the Munich Agreement, i. e. Governments of France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy, declaring:

> We want to live in the Federated State of Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians. We protest against any attempt to change our boundaries which were guaranteed by twenty eight States, among them also the four Great Powers who now hold our future in their hands.[49]

Along with these two different aims, the tension between the Ukrainians and pro-Hungarian Russophiles increased, and the Ukrainian

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[47] Ödön Tarján and Dr. A. Fall, *Hungarians, Slovaks and Ruthenians in the Danube-Valley* (Budapest, 1938), p. 23. In his ciphered secret telegram of October 6, 1938, Hungarian Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya ordered the Hungarian Minister in Prague, János Wettstein, to take proper steps so that Andriy Brodiy (whose pseudonym was Bertalan) would not give up the previously agreed upon goal — the union of Carpatho-Ukraine with Hungary. Wettstein was requested to instruct Brodiy that the Hungarian Government has prepared a program for economic development of Carpatho-Ukraine and has allocated ample funds with Hungarian Consul Petrovics in Bratislava for the pro-Hungarian Ruthenian activists. In case of obstacles for achievement of the union of Carpatho-Ukraine through a pro-Hungarian plebescite, Brodiy was instructed to come to Budapest. A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történettudományi Intézete, *Magyarország és a Második Világháború*, 2nd ed. (Budapest, 1961), Doc. 48, pp. 144-145. Hereafter cited as *Hungarian Documents*. Brodiy advised the Hungarian Government that in case of need for his presence in Budapest, a coded telegram should be sent to him from Balatonkenese, Hungary, where his wife was vacationing at that time, of the following wording: "Child is sick, come immediately. Marika." See *Hungarian Documents*, Doc. 47, p. 144.

[48] *Russkiy Narodnyy Golos* (Uzhhorod), October 27, 1938. The most important supporters of the idea of plebiscite were MM. A. Brodiy, Y. Kaminskiy, V. Gomichkov, M. Demko, Tchekan, Hayovych, Vasovchyk and Rev. Ivan Melnyk.

[49] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 18, 1938.

National Council appealed to its Russophile partner "to put aside the internal differences and work in harmony, peace and equality, in united efforts for the defense of our boundaries and the consolidation of the country." [50] This appeal, however, remained unanswered.

As far as judgement could be made on the basis of the reports about the three meetings of Brodiy's Council of Ministers, the Government achieved almost no progress in the bettering the situation of the country. With the exceptions of some appointments made by Prime Minister A. Brodiy, there is no record of any constructive effort by his Ministries. He ordered the liquidation of certain Czech schools on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine and permitted the circulation of Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*.[51] Plenipotentiary Minister S. Fencyk during his talks with the representatives of the Slovak Government about the establishment of the definitive Slovak-Ukrainian border just antagonized the Slovaks, according to a statement of Msgr. Jozef Tiso, Slovak Prime Minister.[52] There is no record about the activity of the State Secretary Ivan Pyeshchak. On the other hand, the Minister of Interior, E. Bachynskiy, participated in negotiations with the Hungarian Government at Komárno, as a member of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation, regarding frontier readjustment, and visited the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, to get his support against the Hungarian-Polish claim for the common frontier.[53] The State Secretary, Msgr. A. Voloshyn, presented his plans at the Second Meeting and after discussion and approval he proceeded to execute them. Since Minister of Communications and Public Works Yuliyan Revay, besides plannnig and organizing his Ministries, was highly interested in the process of the negotiations with the Hungarians and the Slovaks, at the Third Meeting of the Brodiy's Council of Ministers held on October 22, 1938, a resolution was adopted which aimed at restricting his activities. MM. Brodiy and Fencyk wanted to clear the way to return Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary.

When the news concerning the decision of the Russian Central National Council to ask for a plebiscite leaked out, the First Central

[50] Editorial, "Otvertyy lyst do pana Premyera A. Brodiya," *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 18, 1938.

[51] For minutes of the meetings of the Council of Ministers see: The First Meeting held on October 15, 1938, *Nova Svoboda,* October 18, 1938; the Second Meeting held on October 18, 1938, see *Nova Svoboda,* October 21, 1938; and, the Third Meeting held on October 22, 1938, see *Nova Svoboda,* October 26, 1938.

[52] "Interview z o. A. Voloshynom," *Nova Svoboda* (Khust), November 11, 1938.

[53] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 72.

Ruthenian-Ukrainian National Council in Uzhhorod, at its meeting on October 25, 1938, in the presence of Rev. A. Voloshyn and Yuliyan Revay, decided: "1. Not to oppose the transfer of the Magyar ethnic territories to Hungary, but 2) to protest vigorously against any plebiscite, and 3) to make it known that the Ukrainian National Council firmly supports the present Federated State of nations." [54]

The Prime Minister of the Federated Czecho-Slovak Republic, General Jan Syrový, summoned the Council of Ministers to a meeting October 26, 1938, in Prague, with the participation in it of all members of the autonomous Governments of Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia. At this meeting Ministers Yuliyan Revay and Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, supported by a written resignation of the State Secretary Rev. A. Voloshyn, declared their unwillingness to cooperate with the Prime Minister of Carpatho-Ukraine, Andriy Brodiy. In this way A. Brodiy's Government was dissolved. General Syrový, in his capacity of Acting President of the Republic, relieved A. Brodiy from his functions and ordered an investigation of his previous activities.[55] The investigation resulted in his arrest under accusation of high treason, because

> half a million Pengö in cash, fresh from the press of the Hungarian National Bank, was found in his room, together with an official letter from the Hungarian Government promising him a Hungarian baronetsy if he succeeded in bringing Sub-Carpathian Russia under Magyar rule.[56]

Right after the dismissal of Brodiy's Cabinet, General Syrový appointed Rev. Avhustyn Voloshyn to the post of Prime Minister of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government. He reappointed Y. Revay and Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy. Since Voloshyn was not present in Prague, he was sworn in by General Syrový by telephone. This was witnessed in Uzhhorod by General Svátek and Dr. Aleksander Beskid, the Vice-Governor.[57] The functions were distributed among the members of A. Voloshyn's Government as follows: the Prime Minister, A. Voloshyn, was put also in charge of the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice. Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy retained his previous position

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[54] "Komunikat Pershoyi Tsentral'noyi Ukrayins'koyi Narodnoyi Rady v Uzhhorodi," *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 27, 1938.

[55] Dr. Stepan Rosokha, "Narodzhenya Derzhavy," in Ukrayins'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi* (Vienna, 1939), p. 15. Hereafter cited as: Rosokha in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi*.

[56] *Czechoslovakia Fights Back*, p. 172.

[57] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 28, 1938.

as Minister of the Interior, and Yuliyan Revay received the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare besides his previous position of the Minister of Communications and Public Works.[58]

In his inauguration address, delievered in Uzhhorod on October 27, 1938, Prime Minister Avhustyn Voloshyn stated among other things:

> The Government takes over the country under very difficult circumstances. First of all, it is necessary to establish our definite frontiers and to secure them. With our neighbors, the Magyars, we want to live in peace, and we are ready to transfer to them what is theirs, but we shall defend our ethnic borders and secure the national unity.[59]

The newly formed Government faced the opposition of the Brodiy-Fencyk forces domestically, and the Polish and Hungarian diplomatic efforts externally which were supported by activities of their terrorists in certain parts of Carpatho-Ukraine,[60] aiming at the re-union of the province with Hungary. At the same time, the new Government felt obliged to secure jobs and supplies for the thousands of needy.[61]

The difficulties of A. Voloshyn's Government were increased by the Vienna Award of November 2, 1938. In accordance with this Award the capital of Carpatho-Ukraine, the city of Uzhhorod, was to be transferred to the jurisdiction of Hungarian State authorities on November 10, 1938.[62] The Government ordered the evacuation of public institutions and offices and proclaimed the town of Khust to

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[58] "Podil resortiv u nashiy vladi," *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), November 3, 1938.

[59] "Inavguratsiyna Promova Premyer-Ministra A. Voloshyna," *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 28, 1938.

[60] Concerning the activities of the Hungarian irregular troops on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine see *Hungarian Documents,* pp. 104 and 139-141. Also see *Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938,* trans. by Andreas Mayor (London, 1952), pp. 175 and 178; also Malcolm Muggeridge, ed., *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers* (London, 1948), p. 235; and, *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 20, 1938. Regarding the Polish irregulars see Michael Winch, *Republic For A Day* (London, 1939), pp. 259-263; and *Nova Svoboda* (Khust), November 17, 1938, and *Hungarian Documents,* Docs. 49, 50 and 51, pp. 145-147, and Docs. 65, 66, 68 and 69, pp. 176-180.

[61] H. Ripka, *Munich,* p. 261, stated: "The task which he (A. Voloshyn) had to face would have defeated even a man of the greatest experience and firmest resolution." This statement indicates the great difficulties in Carpatho-Ukraine at that time.

[62] See Chapter VI, below.

be the temporary capital of the country and the seat of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government.[63] In order to calm the disappointed population, on November 3, 1938, Prime Minister A. Voloshyn issued a Manifesto "to the citizens of Carpathian Ukraine" in which he declared that "for the development of our country we have secured the necessary factors, the capital and the working power" therefore "our independent State shall secure bread and work for everybody." He further declared that "for all our future activities we expect the firm moral support of the population of Carpatho-Ukraine and that of the whole Ukrainian nation." [64] Before leaving its headquarters in Uzhhorod, the Ukrainian National Council issued a Manifesto on November 4, 1938. Another Manifesto was issued on November 10, 1938, in the new capital, calling all Ukrainians to support the efforts of Rev. A. Voloshyn's Government. In the first Manifesto the Council declared that "our Government was forced to accept the results" of the Vienna Arbitration[65] and in the second Manifesto the Council published a Ten Point Program of the Government to be realized in the immediate future in order to increase the standard of living of the population. This Manifesto particularly promised a land and forests reform, the development of industry for the use of domestic raw materials, increase of agricultural, dairy and fruit production, the construction of homes, roads and railroads, and the increase of the cultural standards of the population.[66]

Among the first acts of Rev. A. Voloshyn's Government in Khust was to sign an agreement with the Government of the Kingdom of Rumania concerning Rumanian supplies of food-stuffs for Carpatho-Ukraine.[67] In order to secure jobs for the population of the villages near the lost cities of Uzhhorod and Mukachiv, the Government immediately started to construct roads connecting the important highway between Perechyn-Uzhhorod-Serednye-Mukachiv-Khust which has been interrupted near the two lost cities. Since the railroad line between Perechyn-Uzhhorod-Chop-Batyovo-Khust and the other one

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[63] *Nova Svoboda* (Khust), November 8, 1938.

[64] Premyer-Minister o. Dr. A. Voloshyn, "Do Hromadyan Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny," *Natsionalist* (New York), Nov. 16, 1938.

[65] "Manifest Pershoyi Ukrayins'koyi-Rus'koyi Narodnoyi Rady v Uzhhorodi z dnya 4. lystopada 1938," *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), November 5, 1938.

[66] "Manifest Pershoyi Ukrayins'koyi Tsentral'noyi Narodnoyi Rady v Khusti z dnya 10. lystopada 1938," *Nova Svoboda* (Khust), November 17, 1938. Hereafter, if not indicated otherwise, *Nova Svoboda* was published in Khust. For the full text, see Stercho, *Karpato-Ukrayins'ka Derzhava*, pp. 231-234.

[67] "Interview o. A. Voloshyna," *Nova Svoboda*, November 11, 1938.

connecting Svalyava-Mukachiv-Batyovo-Khust were cut off by the Vienna Award and the "Hungarian frontier had never been opened, no rail communication was possible with other parts of the Republic;" [68] therefore, immediate plans were drawn for the building of the Carpatho-Ukrainian part of the highway "West-East," [69] which was to connect Carpatho-Ukraine with Slovakia and Prague.

While the reorganization of the administration of the country was in process, the militarily minded supporters of the Government during the first half of November 1938 organized a semi-military Organization for the National Defense "Carpathian Sitch" headed by the Supreme Commander, Dmytro Klempush. In accordance with the Decree of the Ministry for the Interior No. 372/1938, the members of the "Carpathian Sitch" were granted the privilege to wear uniforms and to carry weapons. The purpose of the "Carpathian Sitch" was declared to be

> the defense of the State and national interests and the support of the defensive spirit among our citizens; the fight against the hostile propaganda against us; to support our Government in general, and to defend our statehood and its security, in particular.[70]

Future developments proved that the "Carpathian Sitch" played an important role in the defense of the villages along the Polish border line against the Polish terrorism. In the final stage of the dismemberment of the Czecho-Slovak Republik, members of the "Carpathian Sitch" were the only force to defend the country against the Hungarian invasion.[71]

DETERIORATION OF CZECH-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS

For the first several weeks after the appointment of Rev. A. Voloshyn to head the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government, there was

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[68] Michael Winch, *Republic For A Day* (London, 1939), p. 97. Hereafter cited as: Winch.

[69] "Rozmova z nachal'nykom Ministerstva Publychnykh Robit, Inzh. Oleksoyu Sanatom," *Nova Svoboda,* November 22, 1938.

[70] *Nova Svoboda,* November 17, 1938. For a description of the organizational structure, development and the training of the "Carpathian Sitch" see: Inzh. Ostap Volyans'kyy, sotnyk ONOKS, "Sitch i oborona Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny" in *Ukrayina* (New York), September 27; October 4, 11, 18 and 25; and November 1, 1939.

[71] For a detailed account of the defensive activities of the "Carpathian Sitch" see a collection of articles in Ukrayins'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi* (Vienna, 1939); also Winch, pp. 36-42, 259-267, 275-280, and 283-286; and *The New York Times,* March 17, 1939.

cordial co-operation between the Czechs and the Ukrainians. "The behavior of the Ukrainians towards the Czechs was, at least in the first months after Munich, better than that of the Slovak autonomists."[72] Both the Czechs and the Ukrainians were convinced that in the face of international pressure, peaceful cooperation between them was the best solution for both parties. Not only were the Czecho-Slovak military forces standing on Carpatho-Ukrainian frontiers but also there were only relatively few changes made in the command of the internal security agencies, such as the police and the gendarmery. Military lorries were the most important means of transportation for the supplies of foodstuffs and other materials to the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine. The commanding officer of the military forces in Carpatho-Ukraine, General Svátek, showed a great deal of understanding for the country's necessities as well as his willingness to cooperate with the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government.[73] The declared principle of the "brotherhood for life and death between the Czechs, Slovaks, and Ukrainians based upon the mutual confidence and the absolute equality"[74] of General Jan Syrový was accepted by Rev. A. Voloshyn in full.[75] However, General Syrový resigned on November 30, 1938, and ever since the Ukrainian-Czech relations were cooling off and gradually worsening until a climax was reached in open street fighting between Czech troops and the "Carpathian Sitch" guards on March 14, 1939, in Khust. This fighting resulted in the deaths of 108 Ukrainians and 7 Czechs.[76]

The first important Czech-Ukrainian dissent was registered during the preparations of the Constitutional amendment in regards to the new position of Carpatho-Ukraine within the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Minister Yuliyan Revay, in his capacity as Deputy to the Czecho-Slovak Parliament, in his bill introduced in the Chamber of Deputies, used the name of his country as *Karpats'ka Ukrayina* in-

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[72] Ripka, *Munich*, p. 262.

[73] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), November 3, 1938.

[74] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 8, 1938.

[75] Ripka, *Munich*, p. 261.

[76] Augustin Stefan, *From Carpatho-Ruthenia to Carpatho-Ukraine* (New York, 1954), p. 41. See also "Do Ukrayins'koho Hromadyanstva" signed by Dr. A. Voloshyn, St. Klochurak, Dr. Yu. Brashchayko, Dr. M. Dolynay and Yuriy Perevuznyk, *Nova Svoboda*, March 15, 1939; "Komunikat Vlady do kryvavykh podiy u Khusti" in *Nova Svoboda*, March 15, 1939; Winch, pp. 270-280; and Ukrayins'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi* (Vienna, 1939), pp. 54-108.

stead of *Podkarpatská Rus* officially in use since 1919.[77] The Ukrainian National Council in Khust insisted upon the change of the name of country to *Karpats'ka Ukrayina*.[78] However, the Constitutional Committee proposed and the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly approved its contention that in this Constitutional Amendment the previously used name *Podkarpatská Rus* should be used, and "the definitive name of the autonomous country of the Ruthenians South of the Carpathians shall be established by an Act of the Diet of Podkarpaská Rus."[79] Since Prime Minister, Rev. A. Voloshyn, had used the name *Karpats'ka Ukrayina* since his appointment,[80] the refusal of the Constitutional Committee was regarded in Ukrainian circles as the remnants of the influence of the "old Rozsypal regime" anti-Ukrainianism.[81] Dr. Voloshyn's Government established temporarily the official use of the name of the country as *Karpats'ka Ukrayina* by a decree which was later approved by the Diet.

On November 30, 1938, the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly elected Dr. Emil Hácha to the office of the President of the Republic. Thereafter, all three Governments, namely the Central Government headed by General Jan Syrový, as well as Msgr. Jozef Tiso's Cabinet of Slovakia, and Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn's [82] Government of Carpatho-Ukraine resigned. On December 1, 1938, the new President of the Republic appointed a new Government of the Federation under the premiership of Rudolf Beran, formerly the President of the Agrarian Party, and currently the President of the semi-totalitarian Party of the National Union. At the same time, the President of the Republic appointed a Government of Slovakia, composed of five members as before and headed again by Msgr. Tiso, and a two-member Carpatho-Ukrainian Government, composed of Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn as the Prime Minister and Yuliyan Revay as Minister.[83] The third member of Voloshyn's second Cabinet was to

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[77] "Promova min. Yu. Revaya, vyholoshena v Prazi dnya 22. lystopada 1938," *Nova Svoboda*, November 27, 1938.

[78] "Telegrama Ukrayins'koyi Narodnoyi Rady v Khusti do p. Predsidnyka Tsentr. Vlady," *Nova Svoboda*, November 22, 1938.

[79] Ústavní zákon ze dne 22. listopadu 1938, čís. 328/38 Sb. z. a nař. o autonomii Podkarpatské Rusi, Časť druhá, Hlava I, § 1.

[80] Premyer-Minister o. Dr. Avhustyn Voloshyn, "Do Hromadyan Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny," *Natsionalist* (New York), November 16, 1938.

[81] *Nova Svoboda*, November 22, 1938.

[82] In the meantime, Rev. A. Voloshyn had been elevated to "Monsignor of His Holyness." See Yuriy Borzhava, *Vid Uhors'koyi Rusy do Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny* (Philadelphia, 1956), p. 45.

[83] Ripka, *Munich*, pp. 245-246.

be appointed some time later, upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Msgr. Voloshyn presented several candidates to the President of the Republic to fill the third vacant post of his Government, but on the advice of the Prague Cabinet they were all rejected by the President. Suddenly, on January 16, 1939, President Hácha, "without consultation and without the consent of the Prime Minister of Carpatho-Ukraine," [84] nominated a Czech, General Lev H. Prchala, a vigorous Russophile, to the position of the third Minister of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government.

The appointment of General Lev Prchala to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Cabinet was met in Khust with a storm of protests. On January 17, 1939, a mass meeting was organized by the Ukrainian National Council in cooperation with the semi-military Organization for the National Defense "Carpathian Sitch." In his protesting speech, Fedir Revay stated:

> After the evacuation (from Uzhhorod), after this terrible suffering caused to us by Prague's blind policy, we wished to live in good relations with the Czech people. However, our kindness and generosity with regard to our brothers the Czechs was considered as our weakness by the Prague Government. If the Prague gentlemen want us to deal with them in a Slovak manner, then we can do it, too.[85]

After the protesters appeared in front of the Office of the Prime Minister, Msgr. A. Voloshyn addressed them. He stated that since his youth in his political activities many injustices were done to him; however, he never experienced such a perfidy as Prchala's appointment "without consent of the Government, against the will of the people" to the Cabinet of Carpatho-Ukraine. He then publicly asked the question: "How can we accept a man as our Minister, who is not even a citizen of this country, who does not know the

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[84] Rosokha in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Boroť bi*, p. 21.

[85] *Nova Svoboda*, January 19, 1939. Referring to "a Slovak manner" the speaker had in mind the following facts: The Slovak Government released most of the Czech officials immediately after achieving the autonomy. At the same time, many Czech officials returned to Bohemia and Moravia from the ceded territories to Germany. This caused some difficulties to the Prague Government. The Government of Carpatho-Ukraine, on the other hand, retained most of the Czech officials in the country, at least temporarily. This fact was appreciated by General Jan Syrový.

Among the leaders of this protest meeting were: Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko, Ivan Roman, Ivan Kedyulych and Dr. Bandusyak.

way of life of our people, who does not know our wants, who does not know our people and their language?" [86]

Already in the morning hours of January 17, 1939, the Ukrainian National Council sent a protest telegram to the President of the Republic, Dr. Emil Hácha, to the Prague Prime Minister Beran and to General Prchala himself. In the afternoon of the same day, the protest mass meeting at Khust adopted a resolution which was also forwarded to Prague.[87] The Ukrainian National Council delegated Fedir Revay, Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko and Dmytro Nimchuk to negotiate with the responsible Federal authorities in Prague concerning the recall of General Prchala's appointment. The delegates met Prime Minister of the Central Government, Rudolf Beran, in Bratislava on January 18, 1939, during the opening of the Slovak Diet, but could not reach an agreement.[88] Therefore, on Friday, January 20, 1939, anti-Prchala demonstrations were held in a number of towns and villages all-over Carpatho-Ukraine.[89] Many of these anti-Czech mass meetings were connected with the celebrations of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Union of all Ukrainian lands in the sovereign Ukrainian National Republic, with special emphasis being placed upon the declaration of the All-Ruthenian Congress held on January 21, 1919, at Khust concerning the union of Carpatho-Ukraine with the Ukrainian State.[90]

On January 21st, General Prchala visited the Carpatho-Ukrainian Prime Minister, Msgr. A. Voloshyn, in his office at Khust, and, in the presence of the other member of the Cabinet, Yuliyan Revay,

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[86] *Nova Svoboda,* January 19, 1939. According to an informed British observer present at that time in Carpatho-Ukraine, "the Czech general, Prchala, had been sent from Prague to Khust as a military dictator, supported by Czech troops." See Vortigern (pseud.), "The End of Carpathian Ukraine," *The Nineteenth Century and After XIX-XX* (London), Vol. CXXV, pp. 542-545. Hereafter cited as Vortigern, *Carpathian Ukraine.*

[87] For the full text of the "Telegrama Ukrayins'koyi Narodnoyi Rady" signed by Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko and Fedir Revay, as well as for the "Resolutsiya prynyata na protestatsiynykh zborakh UCNR v Khusti, 17-ho sichnya 1939" see *Nova Svoboda,* January 19, 1939.

[88] *Nova Svoboda,* January 21, 1939.

[89] The available sources report about anti-Prchala mass meetings in Teresva, Vonihovo, Bushtyno, Velykyy Bychkiv, Rokosovo, Sokyrnytsya, Bronka, Dovhe, Bilky and Yasinya. In some towns, Bilky, Velykyy Bychkiv, Yasinya, etc. there were assembled around 10,000 demonstrators. See *Nova Svoboda,* January 21-24, 1939. On the other hand, *Nova Svoboda* of January 21, 1939, reported about a pro-Prchala mass meeting in the village of Iza, near Khust, held on January 20, 1939, in which also some Czechs from Khust participated.

[90] *Nova Svoboda,* January 24, 1939. Also see above, p. 24.

discussed the problem of his nomination. General Prchala declared that he was convinced that his appointment was done with the consent of Prime Minister Voloshyn and added that under the existing circumstances he could not perform his functions, therefore, he would return to Prague.[91] However, he did not resign; he returned to Prague "to represent" the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government in the Central Government of the Federation.[92] Although General Prchala returned to Prague without portfolio in the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government, this incident destroyed the harmony between Khust and Prague. The Ukrainian press returned to the pre-Munich tone, and the anti-Czech feeling among the population did not decrease.[93] However, during the pre-election campaign the speakers of the pro-Government Ukrainian National Union abstained from excessive anti-Czech propaganda, and a representative of the Czech minority in Carpatho-Ukraine, Dr. Miloš Drbal, was elected Deputy to the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine as a candidate of the Ukrainian National Union and the Nationality Groups list. There is a general belief that the Czechs of Carpatho-Ukraine supported that list.

Another reason for the Ukrainian-Czech differences was the liquidation of the Land Administration created in Uzhhorod by the Administration Reform Act of 1927. Since all functions were transferred to the various Ministries of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government, the existence of this agency which employed several hundred Czech officials, headed by the Land President, proved to be superfluous, and Msgr. Voloshyn's Government decree ordered its liquidation by January 1, 1939.[94] Many of these officials were not re-employed by the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government, and along with 820 Czech teachers of the liquidated Czech schools for the non-Czech children, were put at the disposal of the Prague Government. This created bitterness among Czech circles and deepened the Ukrainian-Czech differences.[95]

In its pursuit for industrial and agricultural development of the country, the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine prepared an investment plan and included it in the budget of Carpatho-Ukraine. The Khust Government requested that some parts of its budget be covered by the all-Federal revenue. Rudolf Beran's Government

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[91] *Völkischer Beobachter* (Vienna), January 22, 1939.

[92] Dr. Stepan Rosokha, "Narodzhenya Derzhavy" in Ukrayins'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi* (Vienna, 1939), p. 22.

[93] Winch, pp. 116-123 and 269-272.

[94] Rosokha in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi*, p. 21.

[95] *A-Zet* (Prague), January 15, 1939.

conditioned such appropriations to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government by the recognition of General Prchala as a member of Khust Government.[96] This started a new Czech-Ukrainian difficulty. The budget was not approved before the Czecho-Slovak Republic was dismembered.[97] Prime Minister A. Voloshyn felt forced to call upon all Ukrainians in the free world to support his program by their free donations.[98] In this way he tried to diminish the financial dependency of Carpatho-Ukraine on the Prague Government.

According to the provisions of the new Constitution of Czecho-Slovakia, the President of the Republic was obliged to summon the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine for its first session within a period of one month after the elections. The elections were held on February 12, 1939, and Msgr. Voloshyn's Government as well as the Ukrainian National Union asked the President to summon the Diet as soon as possible. The preparations were made for March 2, 1939, then some promises were made for March 6th, but Dr. Hácha did not issue the summoning decree before March 10, 1939, just a few days before the fall of Czecho-Slovakia.[99] This tactic was used by the Czech officials in order to force Carpatho-Ukraine to accept General Prchala as Minister and to stop certain activities of Ukrainian political circles. Of course, this tactic aggravated the elected members of the Diet to the extreme and anti-Czech agitation swept the country.[100] Finally, Dr. E. Hácha summoned the Diet for March 21, 1939, to Khust, but only for the price of the resignation of M. Fedir Revay from his position as the President of the Ukrainian National Union, the only political party in Carpatho-Ukraine, and the appointment of Yuriy Perevuznyk, a moderate man, to that post.[101] However, this did not bring back the Ukrainian-Czech friendship, nor harmonious cooperation between Khust and Prague.

On March 6, 1939, the President of the Republic, again without consultation and consent of the Carpatho-Ukrainian political circles, reconstructed Msgr. A. Voloshyn's Government. He appointed again Msgr. A. Voloshyn Prime Minister, but instead of Yuliyan

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[96] Fedir Revay, "Sprava byudzhetu Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny," *Nova Svoboda*, February 26, 1939.

[97] Winch, pp. 232-233.

[98] "Vidozva Uryadu Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny z 17. lyutoho 1939," *Nova Svoboda*, February 21, 1939. Also see Stercho, *Karpato-Ukrayins'ka Derzhava*, pp. 102-104.

[99] *Nova Svoboda*, March 12, 1939.

[100] Fedir Revay, "Chomu tse provolikanya?" in *Nova Svoboda*, March 5, 1939.

[101] *Nova Svoboda*, March 12, 1939.

Revay he nominated Stepan Klochurak, and re-appointed General Lev Prchala. This time, Dr. Hácha not only reconstructed the Cabinet but also distributed the ministerial portfolios by a decree. Prime Minister A. Voloshyn remained in charge of the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, and of the Ministry of Justice. His portfolio of the Minister of Interior was transferred to General Prchala who was also given the Ministries of Finance and Communications. The new member of the Cabinet, Stepan Klochurak, became the Minister of Health and Public Works, and Minister for Economic Affairs.[102] Czech newspapers published commentaries why Dr. Hácha had to take these drastic steps in Carpatho-Ukrainian affairs. They stated that this was done

> in view of the responsibilities taken by the President of the Republic and the Central Government upon themselves by the acceptance of the Vienna Award. The loyal relations to the neighbors, including Poland and Hungary, are a necessity without which it would be impossible to imagine a peaceful development of the State in the immediate future. Some events in Carpatho-Ukraine, particularly caused by the activities of the immigrants, undermine the pursuit towards peaceful relations with our neighbor States. Therefore, the Central Government expressed their strong will to restore order.[103]

One of the first steps which General Prchala took after he returned to Khust was to insist upon the arrest of Msgr. A. Voloshyn's own Secretary and his private secretary for the past several years, Ivan Rohach, and to disband the Organization of National Defense "Carpathian Sitch." Prime Minister A. Voloshyn rejected both demands.[104]

The attitude of the Prague authorities caused a new storm of protests in Carpatho-Ukraine. The Presidium of the Ukrainian National Union in Khust declared on March 7, 1939, the state of readiness, and summoned the Deputies of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet to an informal session on the same day. The assembled Deputies sent protest telegrams to the President of the Republic, Dr. Emil Hácha, to the Prime Minister of the Central Government, Rudolf Beran, and to the Slovak Prime Minister, Msgr. Jozef Tiso, declaring that they did not approve of the reconstruction of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government.[105] The First Central Ukrainian National Council in Khust issued a Declaration of the following contents:

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[102] *Lidové Noviny* (Prague), March 7, 1939.
[103] *Lidové Noviny* (Prague), March 7, 1939.
[104] Winch, p. 271.
[105] *Nova Svoboda*, March 8, 1939.

The First Central Ukrainian National Council with the uttmost distress condemns the violation of the Constitutional Rights and protests against the appointment of Czech General, Prchala, to our Cabinet. The Roszypal-Beneš policy arbitrarily ruled here for twenty years and now again (here follow several words which were suppressed by the press censor — P.G.S.) put the rights of the Ukrainian people under their boots.

The First Central Ukrainian National Council calls upon the entire cultured world with the most vigorous protest on behalf of the whole Ukrainian Nation and demands the immediate recall of General Prchala from his Cabinet post. A Ukrainian minister can be only a genuine Ukrainian, a son of this people who lives in this country.[106]

The Prime Minister of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government, Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn, himself, declared that he had not given his consent and he would never give his consent in the future for the appointment of a non-Ukrainian to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Cabinet.[107]

The Secretary of the Ukrainian National Union, Ivan Rohach, who was also Msgr. Voloshyn's Secretary, published on March 9, 1939, in the official paper, *Nova Svoboda,* a very aggressive anti-Czech article titled "The Czech Provocation." This representative of the younger Carpatho-Ukrainian generation, brought up in a nationalistic spirit, declared that the only way to avoid a Ukrainian-Czech bloodshed was to recall General Prchala and to stop further Czech encroachments on the rights of the Ukrainian people. He was also a member of the Supreme Command of the Carpathian Sitch and called upon all Ukrainians "to be in the state of readiness." The paper containing this article had been confiscated by order of the Public Prosecutor, but hundreds of copies were taken from the store by the members of the Carpathian Sitch and distributed throughout Khust and the country.[108] There were reports about clashes between the Ukrainian villagers and the Czech gendarmes in the towns and villages of Drahovo, Danylovo, Bilky, Rakhiv and Bychkiv during their protest meetings against General Prchala.[109]

Under these circumstances, Prague decided to make some concessions to the Carpatho-Ukrainians. On March 9, 1939, the President of the Republic additionally appointed to Msgr. Voloshyn's Cabinet

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[106] *Nova Svoboda,* March 9, 1939.

[107] *Nova Svoboda,* March 10, 1939.

[108] Winch, p. 271.

[109] Rosokha in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Boroť bi,* p. 22. The official organ of the party in power — the Ukrainian National Union — *Nova Svoboda,* on March 9, 1939, brought on the first page an empty space. An article has been suppressed entirely by the censor sent from Prague. The only words printed were: "Sela buryat'sya proty," i.e. Villages rebell against...

a Minister without portfolio in person of the well known Carpatho-Ukrainian leader, Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko. At the same time, two State Secretaries, Dr. Mykola Dolynay and Dr. Yuriy Perevuznyk, were appointed. Dr. Dolynay was put in charge of the Ministry of Health and Public Welfare, and Yuriy Perevuznyk was put at the head of the much discussed Ministry of the Interior which was taken from General Prchala's jurisdiction. However, General Prchala was not recalled and the unrest in the country did not diminish.[110] The Ukrainian National Union was not fully satisfied and insisted upon the re-appointment of Yuliyan Revay to the Cabinet. It declared that "the entire struggle is based on the Constitutional Act of Carpatho-Ukraine and is directed against the illegal acts of the Prague Central Government." [111]

The tension between Ukrainians and Czechs was connected to a certain extent with Slovak preparations to proclaim their Independence.[112] Prague attempted to keep her control over Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. However, Hitler's military force and diplomacy actually established rule over Prague. When the news about the Slovak plans, on the one hand, and the concentration of Hungarian troops along the Carpatho-Ukrainian frontier, on the other hand, reached the Carpatho-Ukrainian capital, Khust, Prime Minister A. Voloshyn, on March 13, 1939, ordered the commanding officer of the Gendarmery, Colonel Vaka, to hand over to the Carpathian Sitch all spare weapons and ammunition. After the order had been

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[110] Rosokha in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi,* p. 24.

[111] *Nova Svoboda,* March 11, 1939.

[112] For an account of these events see: Jozef Lettrich, *History of Modern Slovakia* (New York, 1955), pp. 104-109; for a Czech official interpretation see Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Czechoslovakia Fights Back* (Washington, 1943), pp. 19-21.

A member of the British Parliament who stayed incognito in Carpatho-Ukraine until the end of March, 1939, commented as follows: "By discretion and determination not to offend Berlin, Prague had set a censorship on the Republic newspapers. Thus, right up to the day of the occupation, the Czechs and Ukrainians were ignorant of the full treachery of Slovak separatism and of any imminence of German irruption... The Czechs fell into a trap. In it, before they realized their position, their military envoys, sent (with German consent) to Slovakia and to Carpatho-Ukraine, behaved with sudden brutality and political folly... The Slovaks sold themselves. The price was independence... The citizens of the little autonomous State of Carpatho-Ukraine alone were unsophisticated enough to fling themselves into fight for life and liberty, for heart and home, against the invader from whom they had been emancipated in 1918." See Vortigern, *Carpathian Ukraine.*



The Supreme Command of the "Carpathian Sitch." From left to right: Ivan Roman, Ivan Rohach, Supreme Commander Dmytro Klempush, and Stepan Rosokha.

carried out, General Prchala repeatedly demanded the disarmament of the Carpathian Sitch troops who were preparing themselves to defend the country against foreign attack. Two hours after the commanding officer of the Carpathian Sitch, Ivan Roman, rejected the last demand of General Prchala, at three o'clock in the morning of March 14, 1939, Czech Army troops attacked all units of the Carpathian Sitch in Khust, including their Hotel-Restaurant, where some representatives of foreign countries and foreign journalists were quartered.[113]

The Czech-Ukrainian shooting lasted until noon of March 14, 1939,[114] when it became known that the Slovak Diet in Bratislava proclaimed the Independence of Slovakia. At that time, German troops were ready to march into Bohemia and Moravia. General Prchala and his troops started to prepare themselves to leave the country, while Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn and his supporters made their desperate efforts to save their country from Hungarian occupation.

On March 14, 1939, the garrisons of the Carpathian Sitch in the towns and villages were mobilized. Some weapons and ammunition were taken from Czech gendarmes and Czech Army troops who were leaving the country. Armed with these weapons, they organized in fighting units and went to defend the Carpatho-Ukrainian frontiers. While some of the former Czech officials became indifferent as to what was going to develop in the country they had ruled for nineteen years, the Ukrainian political leaders were preparing themselves for events of an unknown future. The immediate task was to declare the Independence of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic. The only real force they could rely upon was the Carpathian Sitch.

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[113] Winch, p. 275; see also Inzh. Ostap Volyans'kyy, Sotnyk ONOKS, "Sitch i oborona Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny," *Ukrayina,* (New York), September 27; October 4, 11, 18 and 25; and November 1, 1939; Tchotar Levko Kris, "14. Bereznya v Holovniy Komandi," in Ukrayis'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi* (Vienna, 1939), pp. 54-63.

The above mentioned British political observer commented: "The Czech general, Prchala, had been sent from Prague to Khust as military dictator, supported by Czech troops. Instead of sinking superficial differences in the face of their two common enemies and rallying the Ukrainians to the defence of the Republic, the General disarmed Ukrainians, including the national organization Sitch, corresponding to the Czech Sokols, and seized and shot 121 prominent citizens. See Vortigern, *Carpathian Ukraine,* as above.

[114] Tchotar Levko Kris, "14. Bereznya v Holovniy Komandi" in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi,* pp. 54-63.

The attempt on the part of the Czechs to maintain their control over Carpatho-Ukraine through military dictatorship to the very downfall of the Republic, and especially the brutality of General Prchala's troops on March 14, 1939, has left deep bitterness in the hearts of the suffering Carpatho-Ukrainians. General Prchala's irrational behavior extinguished from the minds of nationally sensitive Ukrainians most of the Czech contributions to the development of Carpatho-Ukraine in the years between the two world wars. Thus, politically the Ukrainians parted with Czechs in bitterness.

When the Hungarian military units, fully equipped with artillery and airplanes, crossed the Carpatho-Ukrainian frontiers and the units of the Carpathian Sitch very poorely armed defended their country against the invaders, "the Czechs turned their machine guns on the Ukrainians from behind as they fought the advancing Hungarians in defence of the Ukrainian part of the Czechoslovak Republic. They also blew up the Carpatho-Ukrainian magazine at Khust, thus depriving the Ukrainians of access to ammunition."[115]

Prchala's behavior has been interpreted as dominated by an unlimited illwill toward the Ukrainian struggle for freedom. Apparently, he preferred to see Carpatho-Ukraine subdued by the Hungarian oppressors rather than a free country after the Czechs lost there their domination. No wonder that after the end of World War II, the Carpatho-Ukrainians once again indicated that they parted with the Czechs on March 14, 1939, once forever. Ever since that time, they regard themselves as having no political ties whatsoever with the Czechs.

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[115] Vortigern, *Carpathian Ukraine,* p. 243.

Chapter Four

THE LEGAL BASIS OF CARPATHO-UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC

In previous chapters we have discussed the circumstances under which Carpatho-Ukraine was detached from Austria-Hungary and united with the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Paris Peace Conference dealt with her as a separate unit and guaranteed to her the "fullest degree of self-government compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak Republic."[1] In Chapter II we have discussed the legal provisions for autonomy and their application in Carpatho-Ukrainian history of the years 1919-1938.

This chapter shall be limited to a brief description of three important stages in the political development of Carpatho-Ukraine after the Munich Conference: (1) The Constitutional Act regarding the autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine, (2) the general elections of the Deputies to the First Diet, and (3) the session of the Diet and the declaration of independence of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACT OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE

The transformation of the Czecho-Slovak Republic into a federal system of the State in the first half of October 1938 was caused by specific circumstances. Actually, it had no legal basis in the Constitution of the Republic. The Constitutional Charter of February 29, 1920, regarded Czecho-Slovakia as a unitary State. However, its § 3 recognized the autonomous status of Carpatho-Ukraine.[2] The

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[1] See above, Chapter I, pp. 25-38.

[2] Zákon čís. 121/20 ze dne 29 února 1920, kterým se uvozuje Ústavní listina Československé republiky, *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení Republiky československé* (Prague, 1920). For interpretation see Dr. Emil Sobota, *Národnostní právo československé* (Brno, 1927), and Dr. Ludwig Adamovich, *Grundriss des tschechoslowakischen Staatsrechtes* (Vienna, 1929). See also above, pp. 44-45.

form of self-government established in Carpatho-Ukraine in October 1938 considerably differed from the provisions of § 3 of the Czecho-Slovak Constitutional Charter of 1920. Therefore, a Constitutional Amendment proved to be a necessity if legality was to be regarded as the basis for the State life.

The Slovak political parties, at their meeting on October 5 and 6, 1938, accepted the Hlinka Slovak Peoples Party's proposal of the Constitutional Amendment regarding the Slovak self-government.[3] This proposal was presented by a Slovak delegation to the Prime Minister of Czecho-Slovakia, General Jan Syrový, on October 5, 1938, together with the demand for appointment of a Slovak Government. This proposal became a basis not only for the Constitutional Act regarding the autonomy of Slovakia, but also for such an Act regulating the self-government of Carpatho-Ukraine. A joint delegation of both Carpatho-Ruthenian Councils, the Ukrainian represented by Yuliyan Revay and Dr. Mykola Dolynay, and the pro-Russian by Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, Andriy Brodiy and Mykhaylo Demko, were present as observers at the Slovak Žilina Meeting. The delegates declared their solidarity with the Slovak demands while the Slovaks promised to support the Carpatho-Ukrainian pursuit for self-government.[4] No wonder that the Council of Ministers of Carpatho-Ukraine in its first official meeting at Uzhhorod, October 15, 1938, decided to insist upon identical rights and privileges for Carpatho-Ukraine and her Government with those granted to Slovakia and Msgr. Tiso's Government.[5] These events simplified very much the task of Yuliyan Revay, the Deputy to the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly, who on October 23, 1938, presented to the Parliament of the Czecho-Slovak Republic his Bill for the Constitutional Amendment regarding the self-government of Carpatho-Ukraine. Deputy Revay's proposal was identical with that of the Constitutional Act concerning the autonomy of Slovakia, substituting, of course, the words identifying the country, official language etc. "Slovakia," "Slovak language," "Slovak Government" by "Carpatho-Ukraine", "Ukrainian language" and "Car-

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[3] For the original text see *Slovák* (Bratislava), June 5, 1938.

[4] Dr. Stepan Rosokha, "Narodzhenya Derzhavy" in Ukrayins'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi* (Vienna, 1939), p. 10. Hereafter cited as: Rosokha in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi*. Previously, A. Brodiy's Autonomist Farmers Union cooperated with the Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party. During the elections of 1935 they were united in an election block to which also the Polish National party of Těšin belonged.

[5] "Komunikat pro zasidanya vlady," *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 18, 1938.

patho-Ukrainian Government" respectively,[6] except the addition of Chapter Two providing for the liquidation of certain autonomous Carpatho-Ukrainian organs which did previously not exist in Slovakia. However, since the Constitutional Committee regarded the new name of the country still to be a controversial one among the people of the country itself, it insisted upon the use of the previously adopted name in Czech legal terminology. This name was *Podkarpatská Rus.*[7] Otherwise the form and the content of the Bill was accepted by the Constitutional Committee of the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly and the Bill passed in the lower chamber of the National Assembly, the Parliament, on November 19, 1938, and was approved by the Senate on November 22 1938.[8] It is worthwhile to note that only the Communist members of the National Assembly voted against the Amendment.[9]

The Constitutional Act No. 328/38 Sb. z. a n. of November 22, 1938, regarding the autonomy of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia[10] not only legalized all changes made in the administration of the country but, first of all, regulated the mutual relations between the organs of the Central Government of the Federal Republic and the State Government of Carpatho-Ukraine. This fact was considered of great importance at Khust.[11]

In the Preamble to the Constitutional Act a reference was made to the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain and those of § 3 of the Constitutional Charter of February 29, 1920. The fact of voluntary

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[6] "Zakonoproyekt ministra Revaya pro avtonomiyu Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny," *Nova Svoboda* (Khust), November 22, 1938. The original document was made available to the writer by courtesy of the author of the Bill, Yuliyan Revay of New York.

[7] *Nova Svoboda,* November 22, 1938.

[8] "Promova ministra Yu. Revaya vyholoshena v Prazi cherez usi radiovysyl'ni ChSR dnya 22. lystopada 1938 o hod. 17:15," *Nova Svoboda,* November 27, 1938.

[9] Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Czechoslovakia Fights Back* (Washington, 1943), p. 16.

[10] Ústavní zákon ze dne 22. listopadu 1938, čís. 328/38 Sb. z. a nař. o autonomii Podkarpatské Rusi. See *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení Republiky česko-slovenské* (Prague, 1938). Hereafter cited in the text and foot-notes as: *Constitutional Act of Carpatho-Ukraine.*

For the full text of the Act in Ukrainian see Petro Stercho, *Karpato-Ukrayins'ka Derzhava: do istoriyi vyzvol'noyi borot'by karpats'kykh ukrayintsiv u 1919-1939 rokakh* (Toronto, 1965), Dodatok VII, pp. 235-242. Hereafter cited as: Stercho, *Karpatho-Ukrayins'ka Derzhava.*

[11] "Konstytutsiya Karpats'koyi Ukrainy," *Nova Svoboda,* November 22, 1938. If not otherwise indicated, *Nova Svoboda* published in Khust, is here cited.

union of Carpatho-Ukraine with the Czecho-Slovak Republic was also stressed.

The Act clarified the legal position of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government established on October 11, 1938, providing that it should be composed of three members who were at the same time members of the Central Government of the Republic (Chapter One, Part One, Article III, Section 4). The elections to the first Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine were to be held within five months from the day of passing the Act. The then existing Czecho-Slovak Election Act No. 330/20 Sb. z. a n. of April 14, 1920, as amended by the Act No. 126/27 Sb. z. a n. of July 14,1927, regulating the elections of the members of the Land and County Assemblies, was to regulate the elections to the first Diet. The first session of the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine was to be summoned by the President of the Republic, within one month after the elections, to a place selected by the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine. The members of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government were to be appointed by the President of the Republic upon the proposal of the Presidium of the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine (Chapter One, Part One, Article V, Sections 1, 3 and 4).

The Second Chapter of the Constitutional Act dealt also with the regulation of the provisional situation created after the establishment of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government. It provided for the liquidation of the offices of the Governor and two Vice-Governors of Carpatho-Ukraine, the dissolution of the Gubernatorial Council and of the office of the Land President. All competences of these organs were transferred to the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine (Chapter Two, Article I, Sections 1, 2 and 3).

The provisions of a permanent nature were embodied in Part Two of the Chapter One.[12] The legal position of Carpatho-Ukraine was defined as "an autonomous part of the Czecho-Slovak Republic" (Capital I, § 1, Section 1), with citizenship rights of her own. Only persons who had *domicile* rights in one of the communities on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine were citizens of Carpatho-Ukraine. They were automatically also citizens of the Czecho-Slovak Republic (Capital I, § 3). Carpatho-Ukraine was to have a Constitution of her own which was to be established by the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine within the compatibility of the Constitutional Charter of the Czecho-Slovak Republic (Capital II, § 9, Section 2).

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[12] All further references in text of this Sub-Chapter put in paranthesis refer to the Chapter One and its Part Two.

The Constitutional Act of Carpatho-Ukraine divided the legislative, executive and judicial powers between the respective organs of the Federated Republic and the autonomous organs of Carpatho-Ukraine. The legislative powers of the Federal National Assembly were enumerated (Capital II, § 4), whereas all other legislative powers within the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine were declared as belonging under the legislative competences of the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine (Capital II, § 9, Section 1). That way, the legislative powers of the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly were limited, and they included the following affairs under its jurisdiction: (1) to amend the Constitutional Charter of the Republic; (2) to regulate foreign relations of the Republic with other nations, including foreign trade; (3) to legislate in the affairs of the defense of the Republic; (4) to establish uniform rules of citizenship, immigration, emigration and traveling passports; (5) to regulate currency, standards of weights and measures, to protect patents and trade marks; (6) to levy tariffs, (7) to regulate transportation; (8) to regulate and maintain post offices, telecommunication, and the post savings and post checking exchange services; (8) to adopt the common budget for the Republic and to make appropriations for common expenditures as well as to regulate public loans for the common needs of the Federation; (10) to levy taxes, imposts and fees serving for the common expenditures of the Federation; (11)to regulate monopolies and public enterprises common for the whole Federation, excluding, however, public forests and lands, mines and iron and steel mills, and public resort enterprises located on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine; they were the property of Carpatho-Ukraine and were to be administered by Carpatho-Ukraine exclusively; and (12) the legal regulations of economic and financial affairs needed for protection of equal competitive opportunities for business enterprises. However, the Acts of the National Assembly concerning these affairs were to be valid for the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine only under the following two conditions: (1) respective laws should have an explicit clause stating that their provisions were binding also on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine, and (2) in such a case they were to be published also in the Carpatho-Ukrainian official language (Capital II, § 7, Sections 1 and 2). For a valid passage of a Constitutional Amendment by the National Assembly was required a two-third majority of all members of both chambers of the National Assembly elected on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine, voting in their respective chambers, if the Amendment would touch the legal status of Carpatho-Ukraine (Capital II,

§ 5, Section 1). Similar requirements were in regard to election of the President of the Republic (Capital III, § 10) and even for passage of laws in some of the affairs enumerated in Capital II, § 4 (Capital II, § 5, Section 2). Carpatho-Ukraine was to be represented in the Standing Legislative Committee of the National Assembly by a number of legislators elected from the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine proportionate to their representation in the National Assembly as a whole (Capital II, § 8).

The boundaries of Carpatho-Ukraine could be changed only with the approval of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet. The consent of the Diet was also required for the validity of all treaties concluded between Czecho-Slovakia and foreign countries with regard to cultural, religious and economic affairs in which the interests of Carpatho-Ukraine were directly involved (Capital II, § 9, Sections 3 and 4).

All executive powers on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine were to be vested in the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine, except the protection of the Czecho-Slovak Constitution, foreign relations and foreign trade, defense of the Republic, control over currency, measures and weights, the protection of patents and trade marks, the preparation and realization of the all-Republic budget, and the monopolies which were under the supervision and control of the all-Republic ministries (Capital III, § 15). However, the Act secured a representation of Carpatho-Ukraine in all important Federal executive organs, including international organizations in which Czecho-Slovakia was to participate (Capital III, § 14, Sections 1 and 2). Otherwise, the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine was to exercise its governing and executive powers on its territory independently from the all-Republic organs, being responsible for its acts only to the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine (Capital III, § 15, Sections 3 and 5).

The judicial powers on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine were to be vested in the courts of Carpatho-Ukraine. The highest instance of the Carpatho-Ukrainian judiciary was to be the Carpatho-Ukrainian Senate existing within the frames of the Supreme Court of the Republic (Capital IV § 17, Section 1).

Despite the changes made by the Constitutional Committee in Deputy Yuliyan Revay's Bill, the passage of the Constitutional Act of Carpatho-Ukraine was accepted in the Carpatho-Ukrainian circles with satisfaction. The Act removed *provisorium* and legalized the existing *de facto* situation, thus contrasting with the developments in Carpatho-Ukraine during the past nineteen years.[13] The following

[13] See above, Chapter II.

quotations from the official newspaper might give the reader some insight as to how this Act has been accepted at Khust. An editorial declared that

> this Act legalized our achievements in our struggle for liberation. Czecho-Slovakia now became legally and *de facto* a confederated Republic composed of the three independent States, Bohemia, Slovakia, and Carpatho-Ukraine... This Act is of great significance to us because legally we became an independent State headed by our own national Government.[14]

In his address to the Ukrainian people broadcasted through all radio stations of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, the Carpatho-Ukrainian Minister and the author of the Bill, Yuliyan Revay, after his Bill became the Constitutional Act of Carpatho-Ukraine declared that "now we shall start a new life"[15] because the rights of the people and of the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine are secured constitutionally.

It is clear enough from these few quotations that this Act gave hopes to the Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders for an harmonious development of their country in cooperation with the Czechs and the Slovaks. Msgr. A. Voloshyn in his Christmas message, on January 6, 1939, expressed his confidence in the tranquility and cooperation among the nations of the Second Republic stating that "the new constitutional system of our Republic removed the causes of suspicion existing among us in the past, diminished the reasons for tension and created an atmosphere of mutual understanding and solidarity."[16] However, less than two weeks later, he was forced to face a reality which was far from his hopes as stated in these few words.[17]

ELECTIONS TO THE DIET OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE

In accordance with the provisions of the Constitutional Act of Carpatho-Ukraine the elections of the deputies to the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine were to be held within five months after the publication of the Act. The elections were regarded as the basic step for

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[14] "Konstytutsiya Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny," *Nova Svoboda*, November 22, 1938.

[15] "Promova ministra Revaya, vyholoshena v Prazi dnya 22. lystopada 1938 o hod 17:15 cherez usi radiostatsiyi ChSR," *Nova Svoboda*, November 27, 1938.

[16] "Rizdvyana promova Premyera Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny Dra A. Voloshyna vyholoshena po radio na Svyatvechir do Ukrayins'koho Narodu," *Nova Svoboda*, January 11, 1939.

[17] See above, pp. 125.137.

removal of the *provisorium* with regard to the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine whose life was to be dependent upon the confidence of the Diet. Besides, the struggle for the elections to the Diet had lasted for past nineteen years and the Diet was always regarded as the corner-stone for Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy.

On January 12, 1939, Msgr. A. Voloshyn, in his capacity as Prime Minister and Minister for the Interior, issued a decree concerning the elections to the First Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine to be held on February 12, 1939.[18] The decree ordered in accordance with the provisions of § 20 of the Election Act of April 14, 1920, No. 330/20 Sb. z. a n. as amended by the Act of July 14, 1927, No. 126/27 Sb. z. a nař. that the lists of the candidates should be filed by the political parties before or on January 22, 1939, at 12:00 o'clock noon with the Chairman of the Election Commission at Khust. The political parties filing the lists of the candidates were ordered to file the names of their representatives delegated to the district election commissions on or before January 29, 1939. The Government of Carpatho-Ukraine appointed on January 16, 1939, Petro Kalynyuk the Chairman and Mykola Latsanych the Vice-Chairman of the Central Election Commission for Carpatho-Ukraine.[19]

According to the provisions of the Constitutional Act of Carpatho-Ukraine (Chapter One, Part One, Article V, Section 1), the elections to the First Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine were to be regulated by the existing laws of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. These laws provided that only political parties were eligible to file lists of candidates.[20] At that time none of the pre-Munich political parties was active on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine. First of all, already on October 20, 1938, the Czecho-Slovak Government dissolved the Communist Party.[21] On the territory of Carpatho Ukraine, this party was liquidated by Andriy Brodiy's Cabinet.[22] Other influential political

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[18] "Oholoshenya Ministerstva Vnutrishnikh Sprav u Khusti z dnya 12. sichnya 1939 pro rozpysanya vyboriv do pershoho sojmu Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny," *Nova Svoboda*, January 21, 1939.

[19] "Oholoshenya Pravytel'stva Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny z dnya 16. sichnya 1939 r. pro imenuvanya predsidnyka Krayevoyi Vyborchoyi Komisiyi," *Nova Svoboda*, January 21, 1939.

[20] "Vyyasnenya Krayevoyi Vyborchoyi Komisiyi dlya vyboriv do pershoho soymu Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny, z dnya 27. sichnya 1939 r.," *Nova Svoboda*, January 29, 1939.

[21] Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Czechoslovakia Fights Back* (Washington, 1943), p. 17. Hereafter cited as *Czechoslovakia Fights Back*.

[22] "Komunikat pro tretye zasidanya Rady Ministriv," *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 26, 1938.



Avhustyn Shtefan

parties, like the Agrarian party, the Social Democratic party, the Czechoslovak National Socialist party, were uniform for the whole territory of Czecho-Slovakia, including Carpatho-Ukraine.[23] All these and other unitary Czecho-Slovak parties were self-liquidated during the months of October and November 1938. Their members joined two new parties established on the territories of Bohemia and Moravia, the Party of National Unity and the National Labor Party. The first of them united the "bourgeois" elements, while the latter combined the Socialist elements of all former political parties of Czecho-Slovakia.[24] Both local autonomist parties, the Autonomous Farmers Union and the Russian National Autonomous Party, under the leadership of Messrs. Andriy Brodiy and Stepan Fencyk respectively, were also self-liquidated since their most prominent leaders remained in Uzhhorod and Mukachiv under the Hungarian occupation. However, in order to adjust to the existing reality, the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine declared on January 13, 1939, all previously active political parties in Carpatho-Ukraine as non-existing.[25] The decree left open possibilities to organize new political parties in order to participate in the coming elections.

On the same day as the "old" political parties were declared as non-existing, a new political party was organized in Khust. This party was named the Ukrainian National Union and was headed by a Presidium consisting of Fedir Revay, President; Mykhaylo Tulyk, Vice-President; Andriy Voron, Secretary General; Ivan Rohach, Secretary; Vasyl' Grendzha-Dons'kyy, the Editor-in-chief of the party organ, *Nova Svoboda*; and Dr. Volodymyr Komaryns'kyy, Campaign Manager. The Executive Committee of the party additionally was composed of Professor Avhustyn Shtefan, Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko, Madame Irena Nevyts'ka, Dr. Stepan Rosokha, Yuriy Pazukhanych, Dr. Mykola Dolynay, Stepan Klochurak, Rev. Vasyl' Lar, Mykhaylo Marushchak, Rev. Dmytro Popovych, Ivan Klempush, and Dr. M. Hupalovs'kyy. The functions of Comptrollers were performed by Mykola Babota and Dr. Mykola Bandusyak.[26] The Central Committee immediately set out to organize the county, district, and local committees of the party whose basic task now was to campaign and to win the elections.

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[23] Stepan Rosokha, *Soym Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny* (Winnipeg, 1949), pp. 16-24. Hereafter cited as: Rosokha, *Soym*.

[24] *Czechoslovakia Fights Back*, p. 17.

[25] Rosokha, *Soym*, p. 24.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.



Fedir Revay

The Ukrainian National Union (UNO), as a political party, consisted primarily of people who were at the same time active in the First Central Ukrainian National Council headed by Msgr. A. Voloshyn. This relationship between the two legally and formally separate political organizations led to some criticism that "it was not clear enough in the recent time who is responsible for what."[27] The Ukrainian National Union was organized on the basis of a preliminary agreement between the leading members of several political parties previously active on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine. This may be seen from the composition of the Central Committee of the party as well as from its list of the candidates for election to the Diet.

The list of candidates of the Ukrainian National Union and the National Minorities in Carpatho-Ukraine was prepared by the Central Committee in agreement with the representatives of the Czech, Rumanian and German national minorities. In accordance with the provisions of Article V, Section 1, of the Constitutional Act of Carpatho-Ukraine, for each 20,000 inhabitants of each nationality in Carpatho-Ukraine one Deputy was to be elected to the Diet. The representatives of the Czech National Council of Carpatho-Ukraine, of the Rumanian National Council of Carpatho-Ukraine, and those of the German Party in Carpatho-Ukraine, in order to save election expenditures connected with the filing and printing of their separate lists of candidates, asked the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian National Union to include their candidates in the common list.[28] Each of these three national minorities had the right to elect one deputy since each of these national minorities numbered less than 20,000 on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine. Some representatives of the Magyar national minority, still remaining in Carpatho-Ukraine, were inclined to follow the example of the Czechs, Rumanians and Germans. Under pressure from Budapest, they finally decided not to present their candidates and to vote against the list of the Ukrainian National Union supporting Msgr. A. Voloshyn's Government.[29] Although Prime Minister, Msgr. Voloshyn, assured the leaders of the Jewish national minority, during their formal visit with the Prime Minister, that the Jews in Carpatho-Ukraine would also have in the future equal rights and privileges with all other citizens of the country, and with regard to their religious and cultural autonomy would have an equal position with that of all other national minori-

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[27] *A-Zet* (Prague), January 26, 1939.
[28] Rosokha, *Soym*, pp. 29-30.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

ties,[30] the Jewish Community declined to present its candidates. Finally, the list of candidates of the Ukrainian National Union and National Minorities included 29 Ukrainians, one Czech, one Rumanian, and one German. Previously, the candidates belonged to the following political parties: 10 to the Ukrainian Christian People's Party, 10 to the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party (among them 2 of extreme left-wing), 7 candidates were previously members of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party's Ukrainian Wing, 2 were representatives of the Ukrainian Nationalist Youth, and one member of the German Party.[31] This was the only list of candidates presented to the electorate in the elections held on February 12, 1939.

The most prominent personalities in the pro-Russian National Council, such as Dr. Yosyf Kaminskiy, Dr. Stepan Fencyk and Mykhaylo Demko, had remained in Uzhhorod and Mukachiv under the Hungarian occupation. The leaders of those Russophiles who remained in the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine rather than follow the above-mentioned individuals, prepared their oppositional list of candidates. This list, titled "The list of Candidates of the Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians," was headed by Mykhaylo Vasylenko, a teacher and formerly member of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party. This list of candidates was presented by Mr. Hrabar, formerly the Secretary to the Governor, to the Central Election Commission. The list was rejected by the Commission on legal and financial grounds. As explained by the Chairman of the Election Commission, Petro Kalynyuk, this list had to be rejected because it was not presented by a political party as required by the provisions of §§ 20 and 21 of the Election Act No. 126/1927 Sb. z. a n., but by a group of voters and no such group was eligible to file a list of candidates for any elections. The second reason for the rejection of the list was the fact that the representatives of the group did not deposit the required sum of money for the printing of the list of candidates according to § 24, Section 6, of the cited Act. The third reason for the refusal of this list was the appearance of the name of Dr. Miloš Drbal and his alternate, Ivan Voloshchuk, who did not express their consent to be

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[30] *Nova Svoboda*, January 1, 1939.

[31] Unpublished "Protokol spysanyy na naradakh predstavnykiv karpatoukrayins'koyi emigratsiyi dnya 21. veresnya 1946 r. v Augsburzi," p. 11. Private Archives of Professor Avhustyn Shtefan of Stamford, Conn. For the full list of the candidates see Appendix No. IV.

nominated as the candidates on this list as required by § 22 of the cited Czecho-Slovak Election Act.[32]

There was an attempt to file a third list of candidates for the election of deputies to the First Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine, namely by the Ukrainian Women Organization since no woman candidate was listed by the Ukrainian National Union.[33] However, this attempt was stopped in its early stages of development by the dissatisfied women leaders themselves, and Madame Iryna Nevyts'ka, President, called upon the women to support the candidates of the Ukrainian National Union headed by Msgr. Voloshyn.[34] Thus, on Election Sunday, February 12, 1939, the single list of candidates was in the hands of the electorate.

The election campaign of the Ukrainian National Union was based first of all on the achievements of Msgr. A. Voloshyn's Government, the consolidation of the country after the October-November crisis, and a program for the future betterment of the standard of living for all social strata of the population.[35] It was also emphasized in the pre-election campaign that there was a great interest abroad with regard to the election results, especially in Hungary and Poland, which endeavored to establish their common frontier at Carpatho-Ukraine's expense. Therefore, Prime Minister Voloshyn, in his public speech on January 22, 1939, at Khust, referring to Brodiy and Fencyk's pursuit for a plebiscite hoping that way to return Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary, stated that the coming elections "will be a kind of plebiscite which will prove that our people want to be free also in the future, our people will show that they want to live an independent life, and not within Hungary."[36]

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[32] "Vyyasnenya Krayevoyi Vyborchoyi Komisiyi dlya vyboriv pershoho soymu Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny, z dnia 27. sichnya 1939," *Nova Svoboda*, January 29, 1939.

[33] Rosokha, *Soym*, pp. 30-31.

[34] Iryna Nevyts'ka, "Miy Nakaz," *Nova Svoboda*, February 5, 1939.

[35] Msgr. A. Voloshyn limited his pre-election speeches to a few. On the other hand, Minister Yuliyan Revay travelled across the country and campaigned vigorously. Other prominent campaigners were: Professor Avhustyn Shtefan, Chief of the Ministry of Education; Fedir Revay, President of the Ukrainian National Union; and the prominent candidates, like Mykhaylo and Yuliy Brashchayko, Dr. Stepan Rosokha, Stepan Klochurak, Dr. Volodymyr Komaryns'kyy, Rev. Kyrylo Fedelesh, Dr. Mykola Dolynay and others. They visited almost every town and village in the country and spoke to the people.

[36] "Promova Premyera D-ra A. Voloshyna na svyatkuvannyi 20-oyi richnytsi proholoshenya Sobornosty Ukrayiny," *Nova Svoboda*, January 24, 1939. Official organ of the Ukrainian National Union, *Nova Svoboda*, February 5, 1939,

According to the official report of the Central Election Commission in Khust, the results of the elections were as follows: out of 284,365 eligible voters 265,002 participated in elections. Their votes were cast as follows: 244,922 voted for the list of the Ukrainian National Union and the National Minorities; 2,328 votes were found void; and there were cast 17,752 empty envelopes, i. e. votes against the pro-governmental list. On the basis of these results all candidates of the Ukrainian National Union and the National Minorities in Carpatho-Ukraine were declared elected.[37]

Both members of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government, Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn and Mr. Yuliyan Revay, expressed their satisfaction with the results of the elections in special messages. They also expressed their hope that "there will be no more international bargaining"[38] regarding the future status of Carpatho-Ukraine because now "the people themselves expressed their decisive will that they want honestly and wisely develop their own State in order that future generations would have an opportunity to live in it peacefully."[39] Msgr. A. Voloshyn emphasized the fact that the Jews and a majority of the Magyar national minority in Carpatho-Ukraine voted for the pro-governmental candidates.[40]

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published an editorial titled "Narode, nekhay bude volya Tvoya" explaining that at stake were not only the candidates of the Union who could be elected by a majority or rejected if the list would get a minority of those voting. Each voter, actually, would answer the following questions: "1. Are you for the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine within a threefold alliance of the Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians? 2. Are you for the present Government of Carpatho-Ukraine? 3. Are you for the establishment of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet? and 4. Are you for the right of Ukrainian people to rule themselves in their own country?" Although these questions were not printed on the ballot, "he whose answer to the above questions is affirmative should vote *'for'* the list of candidates of the Union, and he whose answer would be negative should vote *'against' it,"* said the paper.

[37] Rosokha, *Soym*, pp. 63-64. See also Appendix No. IV. For the results in each community see *Nova Svoboda,* February 15, 1939, and Stercho, *Karpato-Ukrayins'ka Derzhava,* Dodatok VIII, pp. 242-252.

[38] Dr. Avhustyn Voloshyn, "Solodkyy Miy Narode!" *Nova Svoboda,* February 14, 1939.

[39] Yuliyan Revay, "Velyka Satysfaktsiya," *Nova Svoboda,* February 14, 1939.

[40] *Nova Svoboda,* February 18, 1939, reported that "from the other side of the Hungarian border leaflets in great quantities were brought and spread in the communities along the border; the people were urged to cast empty envelopes at the polls and in this manner express their wish to be re-united with Hungary." See also *Völkischer Beobachter* (Berlin Edition), February 14, 1939; and Michael Winch, *Republic For a Day* (London, 1939), pp. 153-154.

It was hoped in Khust that the first session of the Diet would be summoned before the end of the month of February and the Czech-Ukrainian dispute regarding the nomination of General Lev Prchala to Msgr. A. Voloshyn's Government would be solved in a peaceful and constitutional way. The expected solution was simple: after the election of the Presidium of the Diet, Msgr. A. Voloshyn's Government would resign and, in accordance with the provisions of Article V, Section 4, of the Constitutional Act of Carpatho-Ukraine, the Presidium of the Diet would propose the candidates for the new Cabinet to be appointed by the President of the Republic. However, this hope never became a reality, and the Ukrainian-Czech conflict was not solved before the dismemberment of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

SESSION OF THE DIET AND PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE

After the elections the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine started the preparations for the first session of the First Diet. The deputies-elects wanted to assert themselves as the constitutional legislators of the country as soon as possible, and the members of the Government were interested in getting rid of the *provisorium* and of stopping the accusations that they were performing their functions by "usurpation of power" or "by the grace of Czechs."[41] These were the basic reasons for the preparations in Khust for the first session to be held in Rakhiv before the end of February.[42] First, an agreement was reached between Msgr. Voloshyn and the President of the Republic, E. Hácha, to summon the Diet for March 2, 1939, and invitations were sent to foreign Governments to send their observers for the opening session of the Diet.[43] However, the summoning was conditioned. First of all, it was expected that the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government would retreat from some of its financial demands and

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[41] "Narode, nekhay bude volya Tvoya." *Nova Svoboda*, February 5, 1939.

[42] "Karpato-Ukraine nach den Wahlen," *Völkischer Beobachter* (Vienna Edition), February 14, 1939.

[43] "Pro vidkrytya nashoho Soymu," *Nova Svoboda*, February 22, 1939; also Fedir Revay, "Chomu tse provolikanya?" *Nova Svoboda*, March 5, 1939; and Michael Winch, *Republic For A Day* (London, 1939), p. 226. An official stamp was issued by the Czecho-Slovak Ministry of Post and Telecommunication picturing a typical Carpatho-Ukrainian wooden Church with the following imprints: "Cesko-Slovensko" (in Czech alphabet) and below this "Karpats'ka Ukrayina" 1. Soym — 2. III. 1939" in Ukrainian. For a photograph of the stamp see Stercho, *Karpato-Ukrayins'ka Derzhava*, p. 276.

that the budget negotiations would end successfully.[44] No agreement was achieved in this respect between Khust and Prague, and in addition to all existing differences, General Lev Prchala was sent to Khust again on March 3, 1939, thus deepening the Czech-Ukrainian differences and postponing the session of the Diet. Msgr. Voloshyn did his best, but the President of the Republic again declined to sign the summoning decree of the Diet for March 9, 1939, as expected by the official circles in Khust.[45] For that day all preparations in Khust were completed. But this was the time of greatest tension between Prague and Khust. It was the period of "the state of readiness" in Khust after the reconstruction of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government by Prague without Msgr. A. Voloshyn's consent. However, in accordance with the provisions of Article V, Section 3, of the Constitutional Act, the President of the Republic was obliged to summon the Diet within a period of one month after the elections. Therefore, with two days of the legally prescribed time left, Dr. Emil Hácha issued a decree on March 10, 1939, convoking the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine to Khust, the capital of Carpatho-Ukraine, for March 21, 1939.[46] But, even at this point, Dr. Hácha did not fulfill his obligation without conditions. Msgr. Voloshyn had to agree not only for the removal of Yuliyan Revay from his Cabinet, as he already was removed by the President on March 6th, but the Ukrainian National Union was also forced to remove Fedir Revay from the leadership of the Union.[47] He was replaced on March 10, 1939, by Dr. Yuriy Perevuznyk.

However, events changed the day of the opening of the first session of the Diet this time. The final dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia began on March 14, 1939, when Slovakia declared her independence and split the Republic in three parts. In this situation, Msgr. Voloshyn obtained Hácha's consent and summoned the Diet for March 15, 1939, at three o'clock in the afternoon.[48] The members of the Government, together with a number of deputies to the Diet and other prominent political leaders, decided in a meeting presided over by Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn to proclaim the Independence of Carpatho-Ukraine. At this March 14, 1939, meeting, which lasted

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[44] Winch, *op. cit.*, p. 226. See also Fedir Revay, "Sprava byudzetu Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny," *Nova Svoboda*, February 26, 1939.

[45] *Nova Svoboda*, February 25, 1939.

[46] *Nova Svoboda*, March 13, 1939.

[47] "Zmina v provodi UNO," *Nova Svoboda*, March 12, 1939.

[48] Augustin Stefan, *From Carpatho-Ruthenia to Carpatho-Ukraine* (New York, 1954), p. 41.

from the morning hours until the late afternoon, the Government was reorganized as follows: Prime Minister — Msgr. A. Voloshyn, who also remained in charge of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Justice; Yuliyan Revay became the Vice-Premier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs; Stepan Klochurak, Minister of Defense and of Agriculture; Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, Minister of Finance, Industry and Commerce; Dr. Yuriy Perevuznyk, Minister of Interior; and Dr. Mykola Dolynay, Minister of Health and Welfare.[49] In the face of the Hungarian attack in the early morning hours of March 14, 1939,[50] which had already resulted in the occupation of several frontier villages, like Pidhoryany, Kol'chyno, Pistryalovo, Makaryovo, Zaluzh, Barbovo near the city of Mukachiv,[51] Msgr. Voloshyn telephoned General Svátek and asked him to accept the appointment to the position of Comander of the armed forces of Carpatho-Ukraine. The General accepted this appointment but resigned a few hours later under outside pressure,[52] when Czech officers and soldiers were ordered by Prague to leave the Carpatho-Ukrainian territory and return to Bohemia and Moravia.

The declaration of independence of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic was proclaimed by the Prime Minister, Msgr. Voloshyn, on behalf of his Government and his fellow deputies to the Diet. His words, broadcasted over the Khust radio station at 6:30 P.M., were as follows:

Citizens of Carpatho-Ukraine!

By the decision of the Slovak Diet the independence of Slovakia was declared. By this fact was changed also the international status of Carpatho-Ukraine, which by the decision of our Diet will be officially declared as an independent State.

Until the final decision of the Diet, our Government herewith proclaims our independence already at present.[53]

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[49] Rosokha in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi*, p. 26.

[50] M. Tchumalivs'kyy, "Biy pid Gorondoyu" in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi*, pp. 121-122; and Tchotar N. Romanenko, "Vid Siltsya do Imstycheva." *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi*, pp. 130-133.

[51] Oleksander Sevryuk, "Ches'ko-Ukrayins'ka 'viyna' i proholoshenya samostiynosty Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny," *Dilo* (L'viv), March 31, 1939.

[52] Rosokha in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi*, p. 26. According to the provisions of § 13, Section 3, of the Constitutional Act of Carpatho-Ukraine the military garrisons on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine were to be composed of the citizens of the country itself. It was first hoped that these garrisons would be taken over in the service of the new independent State. However, this legal provision was not enforced yet by that time.

[53] *Nova Svoboda* (the last issue), March 16, 1939.

The Government of the sovereign Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic was at the same time announced as consisting of the following members: Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn, Prime Minister and Minister of Education and Religious Affairs; Yuliyan Revay, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Dr. Yuriy Perevuznyk, Minister of Interior; Stepan Klochurak, Minister of Defense and Economic Affairs; Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, Minister of Finance and Communication; and Dr. Mykola Dolynay, Minister of Health and Social Welfare.[54]

The following day, on Wednesday, March 15, 1939, at three o'clock in the afternoon, when Prague was already occupied by Hitler's military forces, twenty-two out of thirty-two elected Deputies of the Diet assembled in auditorium of the State Gymnasium at Khust.[55] At 3:20 P.M. the eldest member of the Diet, Msgr. A. Voloshyn, began his opening address with the following words:

Honorable Diet!

I feel from the depths of my soul the importance of these words with which I greet you as the first legally elected representatives of our people. I am now living through the most important moment of my life... God's Providence allowed me to open the first Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine with the words of Taras Shevchenko: "Ukraine will arise. The truth will light up the world, and eslaved people will pray in freedom."[56]

After mentioning of the President of the former Czecho-Slovak Republic, who summoned the Diet in accordance with the then existing laws, Msgr. A. Voloshyn declared according to the provisions of Article V, Section 3, of the Constitutional Act of Carpatho-Ukraine the Diet in session. After the report of the Central Election Commission on the results of the elections[57] was read by Dr. Mykhaylo Kocherhan, the oath was administered according to the provisions of § 5 of the Diet Regulations and § 22 of the Constitutional Charter. The text of the oath was read in the Ukrainian, Czech and Rumanian

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[54] *Nova Svoboda*, March 16, 1939.

[55] The following deputies were present at the session: Msgr. Dr. A. Voloshyn, Dr. M. Brashchayko, Dr. Yu. Brashchayko, Ivan Gryga, Rev. A. Dovbak, Dr. M. Dolynay, Dr. M. Drbal, A. Dutka, I. Ihnatko, V. Klempush, M. Mandzyuk, M. Marushchak, L. Romanyuk, Rev. G. Moysh, D. Nimchuk, Yu. Pazukhanych, F. Revay, Dr. S. Rosokha, V. Shobey, A. Shtefan, Rev. K. Fedelesh, and M. Tulyk. Also all members of the Government, except Yuliyan Revay, were present.

[56] Protokol pershoho Zasidanya Soymu Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny, vidbutoho v Khusti v seredu, 15. bereznya 1939. Used the original document by courtesy of Mr. Avhustyn Shtefan, President of the Diet, at present of Philadelphia, Pa.

[57] *Ibid.*; see also Appendix No. IV.



Stepan Rosokha

languages as follows: "I swear to be faithful to Carpatho-Ukraine and to uphold the laws and execute my mandate to the best of my ability and my conscience."[58] The Presidium of the Diet was elected by secret balloting and it was composed of Professor Avhustyn Shtefan, President of the Diet, Fedir Revay and Dr. Stepan Rosokha, Vice-Presidents, and Dr. Avhustyn Dutka and Leonid Romanyuk, Secretaries of the Diet. Messrs. Mykhaylo Tulyk and Dmytro Nimchuk were elected the two sergeants-at-arms.

The President of the Diet, Avhustyn Shtefan, taking the Chair, delivered his inaugural address in which he stressed "the great responsibility" of this historical session, saying that

> In the history of the Ukrainian people there was never an example of a representative body being chosen in a general national election. Laws were passed by Ukrainian princes, kings and hetmans, but the election of a legislative body according to the will of the people themselves was unknown in the past... And, we, elected by our people of Carpatho-Ukraine, without a doubt stand here where we were predestined... We want to believe that this unbreakable will of the Ukrainian people to live their independent life will be respected by all civilized peoples to whom the principle of national self-determination is a sacred testament and not merely an empty phrase. Because it is a fallacy to think that the Almighty created this world for one or two nations. Every nation has its sacred right to live its own independent life in this world... I beg the Almighty that He will permit the First Ukrainian Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine to serve the interests of the Ukrainian people.[59]

After the election of various Standing Committees of the Diet, the first meeting of the Diet was adjourned at 5:28 P.M. After ten minutes, the second meeting of the Diet was opened at which, on behalf of the Government, the Constitutional Act No. 1, declaring Carpatho-Ukraine a sovereign Republic, was introduced by Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko. This Deputy said:

> Honorable Diet!
>
> After yesterday's tragic hours when the capital of Carpatho-Ukraine became crimson with Ukrainian blood, today under the roar of cannons we are about to pass the first Constitutional Act of Carpatho-Ukraine. After a thousand years of slavery, our country becomes free and independent and declares before the whole world that it was, it is, and it always will be Ukrainian. Should fate turn against our young nation and its existence be short-lived, our country still will remain forever Ukrainian because no power in the world could destroy the soul and the strong will of our Ukrainian people. We have little time to deliberate

[58] *Ibid.*; see also Rosokha, *Soym*, pp. 60-75.

[59] *Ibid.*; also Rosokha, *Soym*, p. 63.

longer. I am certain that this honorable Diet will pass this bill because such is the will of the Ukrainian people.[60]

The Bill was amended by the Deputies Dr. Stepan Rosokha and Rev. Kyrylo Fedelesh and after the third reading in the Third Meeting of the Diet, it passed unanimously at 6:12 P.M.[61]

In the Fourth Meeting of the Diet, Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn was unanimously elected the first President of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic in accordance with § 3 of the Act No. 1 of the Diet. All twenty-two deputies present voted for the only candidate.[62] In the following Fifth and the Sixth meetings of the Diet, on the same day, the Enabling Act No. 2 was adopted,[63] and the Diet was adjourned. At the Sixth Meeting of the Diet only 21 deputies were present, all of whom voted in favor of the Enabling Act.

Before the Diet adjourned *sine die*, the President of the new Republic, Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn, with the consent of the Diet, appointed the new Government of the sovereign Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic. Mr. Yuliyan Revay, who was not present at the Session of the Diet, was appointed the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Otherwise, all members of the previous Government retained their portfolios with the exception that Msgr. A. Voloshyn as Minister of Education and Religious Affairs was replaced by Professor Avhustyn Shtefan.

However, few of the members of this Government had opportunities to perform official acts in their capacities on the territory of their country. At the time of the adjournment of the Diet, Hungarian troops, after forcing the Carpathian Sitch to retreat, were only eight miles from Khust.[64] The Government moved to Velykyy Bychkiv and from there went into exile.

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[60] Protokol iz druhoho Zasidanya Soymu Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny, vidbutoho v Khusti v seredu, 15. bereznya 1939. Used the original document by courtesy of Mr. Avhustyn Shtefan, President of the Diet, at present of Philadelphia, Pa. See also Rosokha, *Soym*, pp. 76-79.

[61] Protokol iz tretyoho Zasidanya Soymu Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny, vidbutoho v Khusti v seredu, 15. bereznya 1939. Used original by courtesy of Mr. A. Shtefan. See also Rosokha, *Soym*, pp. 79-81. See also Appendix No. V.

[62] Protokol iz chetvertoho Zasidanya Soymu Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny, vidbutoho v Khusti dnya 15. bereznya 1939. Used original document by courtesy of Mr. A. Shtefan. See also Rosokha, *Soym*, pp. 81-85.

[63] The original Minutes of the Fifth and Sixth Meetings of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet used by courtesy of Mr. A. Shtefan. See also Rosokha, *Soym*, pp. 85-88. For the text of the Enabling Act No. 2 see Appendinx No. VI.

[64] Ivan Rohach, "Pid praporom nezalezhnosty" in Ukrayins'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Boroť bi* (Vienna, 1939), pp. 109-115.



Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn has been elected President of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic by the Diet, March 15, 1939. First row from right: A. Voloshyn accepts the Presidency; Deputy Yuliy Brashchayko and Mykhaylo Kocherhan. Second row from left: Vice President of the Diet — Fedir Revay; President of the Diet — Avhustyn Shtefan; and Vice President of the Diet — Stepan Rosokha.

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Proclamation of independence of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic by the duly elected representatives of the people inhabiting southern slopes of the Carpathians completed the cycle in search for their identity. It was the climax in the long lasting process of Carpatho-Ukrainian self-determination. The Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet spoke clearly and without doubts: the people of Carpatho-Ukraine wanted to live freely in their own independent country, free from any foreign domination.

The road to the proclamation of independence of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic was slow and orderly. The historic events of 1918-1919 in Eastern Europe prevented implementation of the clearly expressed desire of the Carpatho-Ukrainian people to live in the united sovereign Ukrainian State comprising all ethnic Ukrainian territories. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 recognized the right of self-determination and respected their severance of ties with Hungary. It guaranteed autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine within Czecho-Slovakia because the Conference treated Carpatho-Ukraine as a separate entity.

In the years of 1919-1938, the political leaders of Carpatho-Ukrainian people pursued their political objectives within the legal framework of the Treaty of St. Germain and the Czecho-Slovak Constitution. Legal procedures were observed in establishing the autonomous Carpatho-Ukrainian Government as well as in electing the autonomous Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine.

The external historic events which were beyond Carpatho-Ukrainian control destined the duly elected autonomous Diet to carry out functions of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. The Diet spoke, thus spoke the Carpatho-Ukrainian people.

Although the will of the people was brutally suppressed by the Hungarian military tanks and bayonets, accompanied by the moral support of the Ukrainians-oppressing Poland, Fascist Italy and Hitler's Germany, the duly elected representatives of the Carpatho-Ukrainian people did not capitulate. They remained faithful to their people.

For being faithful to the pledge of allegience to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic, most members of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government and the Diet suffered inconveniences of the life in exile, imprisonment, and even death. However, they refused to break the oath.

Chapter Five

HUNGARY GATHERS SUPPORT FOR RECONQUEST

World War I resulted in the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Both Austria and Hungary were limited to their ethnic territories and forced to accept, as far as they were concerned, rather severe terms of the peace treaties. The Wilsonian principle of the self-determination of nationalities was to be applied in the establishment of the new order in Central Europe, and on this principle, on the territories of the former Austro-Hungary new states came into being; namely, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. A considerable part of the Monarchy was attached to Rumania and a small region was given to Italy.

While Austria lost territories predominantly located at some distance from her new national boundaries, Hungary lost provinces in the immediate neighborhood of the Magyar national lands. Bukovyna, Galicia, Silesia were relatively far from the new Austrian border lines, while Slovakia, Carpatho-Ukraine, Transylvania, Croatia, and Bachka, which were under direct Hungarian jurisdiction before World War I, and as a result of that war were included in the succession states, bordered directly with post-war Hungary. In addition, these areas had some Magyar minorities on their territories. So, while Austria seemed to be reconciled with her post-war fate, Hungary never gave up her hope to regain these lost territories.

By 1921, the Hungarian territorial losses were as follows: out of 1910 territory, Hungary lost to Austria 4,020 sq. km., to Czecho-Slovakia 61,633 sq. km., to Poland 589 sq. km., to Rumania 103,093 sq. km., to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 63,092 sq. km., and to Italy 21 sq. km.[1] Territorially, Hungary, occupying a territory of 325,411 sq. km. in 1910, was reduced by 1921 to 92,963

[1] Stephen D. Kertesz, *Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1953), p. 102. Hereafter cited as: Kertesz.

sq. km. At the same time her population was decreased to 7,481,954 inhabitants as compared with over 20,000,000 according to the 1910 census. Of course, the great majority of the population that Hungary lost was ethnically non-Magyar; however, some 3,000,000 Magyars were detached from Hungary and allotted to the succession states, namely, about 1,000,000 inhabitants of Magyar nationality were included into Czecho-Slovakia, 1,650,000 into Rumania, and 450,000 into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.[2] These Magyar minorities, especially in Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania, became the vanguard of the revisionist policy of Hungary.

These radical changes of the peace treaties regarding Hungary created some social and economic difficulties. Such important natural resources as forests, certain mines and mineral springs were located predominantly in the ethnically non-Magyar territories. Thus, for instance, 84.1% of all forests of the pre-war Hungary were transferred to the succession states, all salt and copper mines, as well as 83.7% of iron ore were lost to Hungary.[3] In addition, some 350,000 Magyars, predominantly former Hungarian officials in the non-Magyar lands, left the succession states and went to Hungary. thus increasing Hungary's economic and social difficulties.[4]

For these and probably some other reasons, the Magyars were reluctant to accept the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon. While the official governmental circles "under pressure from the great powers" [5] on November 13, 1920, ratified the Treaty of Trianon which was signed on June 4, 1920, Magyar public opinion never accepted that treaty and its provisions, depriving Hungary of some two thirds of the pre-war territories and of some 60% of the population of that predominantly non-Magyar multinational part of the Dual Monarchy in which the Magyars ruled absolutely and pursued unscrupulously the policy of total Magyarization of all non-Magyar nationalities.

HUNGARIAN REVISIONIST CAMPAIGN

The post-World War I boundaries between Hungary and the "autonomous Ruthenian territory South of Carpathians" were deter-

[2] C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences* (London, 1937), p. 4. Hereafter cited as: Macartney.

[3] Count Albert Apponyi et ali., *Justice for Hungary: Review and Criticism of the Effect of the Treaty of Trianon* (London, 1928), pp. 271 - 274. Hereafter cited as: Apponyi, *Justice for Hungary*.

[4] Kertesz, p. 20.

[5] Kertesz, p. 21.

mined by the Treaty of Trianon of June 4, 1920, in Part II, Article 27, Section 4 of the treaty. The dissolution of political ties between Hungary and Carpatho-Ukraine, on the one hand, and the union of the latter province with the newly established Czecho-Slovak Republic, on the other, were explicitly stated in the treaty. Part III, Article 48 of the Treaty of Trianon reads: "Hungary recognizes, so as the Allied and Associated Powers have done this already, the fullest sovereignty of the Czecho-Slovak State which includes the autonomous territory of Ruthenians South of Carpathians." [6]

The efforts of the Hungarians to maintain Carpatho-Ukraine within the boundaries of the new Hungarian State were discussed in Chapter I of this study.[7] Besides the "Ruthenian Ministry" which still was in existence, in 1920 there was organized in Budapest a political party named "the Ruthenian National Party" under the leadership of Mykola Kutkafalvy, who was given a seat in the Hungarian Parliament.[8] The main aim of this political party was to campaign among the Carpatho-Ukrainians as well as in international political circles for the return of Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary. The activities of the representatives of this group were maintained even after the Treaty of Trianon was signed. It should be stressed that at that time there still existed uncertainty among the common people, and the agitators spread fear by assuring, for instance, that the Magyars would re-occupy the province by September 25, 1920.[9]

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[6] The Peace Treaty of Trianon signed on June 4, 1920. See *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení Republiky československé*, čís. 102/21.

[7] See above, pp. 20-21; also Appendix No. I.

[8] *Rusyn* (Uzhhorod), November 6, 1920.

[9] *Rusyn* (Uzhhorod), September 25, 1920. As to what extent this revisionist agitation was spread in Carpatho-Ukraine and as to the degree of uncertainty it created among the people, we may judge from the fact that after the Treaty of Trianon was ratified by Hungary, the official daily of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Governor, Gregory Zhatkovych, *Rusyn*, on November 20, 1920, found it necessary to assure the Carpatho-Ukrainian population that the country would remain as an autonomous part of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. This would be so because Hungary recognized the fact that Carpatho-Ukraine no longer belonged to her legally. The editorial titled "After the Ratification of the Peace Treaty" stated among other things: "For us, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians, the ratification of the Peace Treaty means the beginning of the serious efforts to develop our autonomy within Czecho-Slovakia without further obstacles... Now, everyone may ascertain himself that we definitely did break off all ties with the Magyars, under whose yoke we have been suffering for such a long time; and this situation cannot be changed either by any enemy power or internal and

As a result of the ratification of the treaty by Hungary, those former Hungarian officials who preferred to use the approach "wait and see" rather than to declare themselves clearly one way or the other, started to make their own decisions: most of them renounced their allegiance to Hungary and took the oath of allegiance to autonomous Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and the Czecho-Slovak Republic, while others preferred not to be re-employed by the new Government.

Dr. Yosyf Kaminskiy, who was a county administrator before World War I and during Béla Kun's Communist regime was Hungarian representative of the *Rus'ka Krayina*, organized a political party under the name *Avtonomnyy Zemledil'skiy Soyuz* (the Autonomous Farmers Union). Soon he was succeeded by Ivan Kurtyak, formerly a school inspector, who also refused to pledge allegiance to the new country. Secretly, this party maintained close ties with Hungary but *pro foro externo* fought for the realization of the autonomous rights of Carpatho-Ukraine as well as against the Czechization of the province.[10] The Magyar minority in Carpatho-Ukraine organized itself into four political parties in order to protect their own interests.[11] At the time of the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon by the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly at the end of February 1921, autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine was not yet represented in the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly. However, the leaders of the Magyar minority in Slovakia were members of the Czecho-Slovak Parliament. The Magyar deputies, Ludwig Körmendy-Ékes and Dr. János Jabloniczky, in their speeches expressed themselves against the ratification of the treaty, and both Magyar and the German deputies in the Parliament voted against the ratification.[12]

After the Treaty of Trianon was ratified by both Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, the governments of both countries opened negotiations in order to normalize their mutual relations. The meeting between the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Edvard Beneš, and Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Paul Teleki, on March 14 and 15, 1921, was followed by other negotiations on June 23 and 24, 1921, in Mariánské Lázně between Beneš and the new Hungarian Foreign

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external agitation. Ratifying the Peace Treaty, the Hungarians recognized our independence from them."

[10] Josef Chmelař, ed, *Podkarpatská Rus* (Prague, 1923), p. 190; also see *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), October 15, 1932 and of January 15, 1933.

[11] See above, p. 72.

[12] *Esti Ujság* (Košice), February 1, 1921.

Minister, Count Nicholas Bánffy.[13] During both these meetings the Hungarian negotiators raised the question of revision of the then existing boundaries; however, the Czecho-Slovak Government refuted Hungarian proposals. Another attempt of the Hungarian Government to get back at least that territorial zone of the Czecho-Slovak Republic which was inhabited predominantly by Magyar-speaking people, was the presentation of a memorandum of the Hungarian Delegation headed by Field Marshal Táncos to the International Delimitation Commission in Brno, on August 9, 1921. The Hungarian representative made a proposal outlining the new boundaries on an ethnographic basis. In his proposal a demand was also included against Carpatho-Ukraine which was almost identical with the Vienna Award line between Hungary and Carpatho-Ukraine.[14] The Czecho-Slovak delegation refused to discuss this question, insisting that this would violate the Treaty of Trianon. The presiding officer of the Commission, British Colonel William Carey, accepted the Czecho-Slovak point of view and refused to accept the Hungarian proposal for discussion.[15] As a result of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian negotiations for the normalization of their mutual relations, a trade treaty was concluded in 1922, but this short-term treaty was not renewed in 1930. Thereafter, economic difficulties began to occur which affected mostly the Carpatho-Ukrainians and the Slovaks whose natural resources were exported to Hungary in exchange for agricultural products. Hungary's Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös declared in 1934 that his government would be willing to cooperate with the Little Entente countries only for the price of the revision of the Treaty of Trianon.[16] Actually, the relations between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia were never normalized to a degree which usually should exist between two friendly neighbors.

In Hungary itself, the idea of revisionism was cultivated in all spheres of the population. The domestic difficulties were ascribed mostly to the dismemberment of the pre-War Greater Hungary. One of the important leaders of the Magyar revisionism, Count Stephen

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[13] Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference: The Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon* (New York, 1942), pp. 342-344. Hereafter cited as: Deák. See also Kertesz, p. 24.

[14] See below, Chapter VI.

[15] Lajos Steier, *Ungarns Vergewaltigung: Oberungarn unter tschechischer Herrschaft* (Vienna, 1929), pp. 917-918. Hereafter cited as: Steier, *Ungarns Vergewaltigung*.

[16] Dr. Robert Nowak, *Der künstliche Staat: Ostprobleme der Tschecho-Slowakei* (Berlin, 1938), pp. 96-97. Hereafter cited as: Nowak.

Bethlen, who for several years was the Hungarian Prime Minister, formulated the reasons why the Magyars had to fight for the re-incorporation of the lost territories in the following words:

> The existence of the Magyar nation to-day depends on its ability to ensure domination over the territory which is bounded by the Carpathians and which forms the Danubian-Tisza basin. Within the present frontiers of the Hungarian State this nation perishes if timely control is not achieved.[17]

This statement shows clearly that the Hungarians in their demands did not limit themselves to the territories with a majority of Magyar-speaking inhabitants, but extended their demands for non-Magyar lands, including Carpatho-Ukraine, for economic and strategic reasons. In the publications of the Hungarian Frontier Readjustment League, writers stressed the importance of the Carpathian mountains for defense against the Russian expansion toward the West and the Balkans.[18] Thus, the policy of revisionism dominated both the domestic and the foreign policy of Hungary.

Hungarian revisionist agitation was well organized on an international scale, and was financed by the great land-owners of Hungary, whose estates were first cut through by the new frontiers and later were drastically reduced in size by the land reform measures adopted by the succession states. Abroad, and notably in Great Britain, this agitation demanded the rights of Magyar communities in the areas bordering on Hungary to be re-united with their fatherland, Hungary. This tactical approach was necessary because as

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[17] Count Stephen Bethlen, *The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace: four lectures delivered in London in November 1933* (London, 1934), p. x. Hereafter cited as: Bethlen.

[18] Sir Robert Donald, *The Treaty of Trianon: Hungary's Appeal to Humanity* (London, 1928), p. 279, states among other things as follows: "The slogan *'Nem! Nem! Soha!'* (No, no, never!) appears on stationary, on cushions, on furniture, on flags, on placards, on the hoardings (all-over in Hungary), usually accompanied with a map to impress the image of mutilated Hungary on the minds and hearts of the people." On the page 280 he proceeds: "Four impressive statues have been erected in a square in Budapest to symbolize territories torn from Hungary — East, West, North, and South. Monuments rise throughout the country to remind the people of the glories of the past, and the humiliations of the present... Dramatic art and music, songs, bands, orchestras, are other instruments in the distribution of national harmony in the apotheosis of patriotism." See also Joseph S. Roucek, ed., *Central-Eastern Europe: Crucible of World Wars* (New York, 1946), p. 334: "The children of Hungary were taught to recite: 'I believe in one God; I believe in one Fatherland; I believe in one divine hour coming; I believe in the resurection of Hungary. Amen."

former Hungarian Minister, Emil Nagy, stated, "the principle of self-determination, and the shaping of states on a national basis appeal to them (the British) more powerfully than our (Magyar) historic and constitutional pleas, even though based upon a past of a thousand years." [19] Emil Nagy made this conclusion after his series of speeches delivered in England in 1927 in various political and social circles from whom he tried to get support for the Magyar revisionist policy.

Hungarian opposition to the provisions which later were included in the Treaty of Trianon to some extent were echoed in Great Britain already in the years of 1919 and 1920. Numerous interpellations on behalf of Hungarian interests were made in the British Parliament, especially by Captain Elliot, Lord Bryce, Lord Montagu, Lord Newton, Lord Phillmore, Lord Sydenham, and Lord Weardale.[20] When the Magyar revisionists defined the way in which their aim was to be achieved by peaceful means through the application of Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,[21] the passive sympathy of some influential Britishers changed little-by-little into an active support of the Hungarian cause. Even the former British Prime Minister and the signator of the Treaty of Trianon on behalf of Great Britain, Lloyd George, evolved in his mind and declared at a meeting of the British League of Nations Union at the end of October 1927 as follows:

> The causes of danger of war are in frontier conflicts the origin of which is the fact that the Peace Treaties were made in 1919 when the Allied were filled with all the bitterness of a long war, and obtained only unsufficient and unpractical information as regards European conditions. These frontier questions in Europe can only be solved in a peaceful way, through the League of Nations, and even then only after the disarmament of the European Powers. Neither the Covenant of the League nor the text of the Peace Treaties excludes a revision of the Peace Treaties.[22]

One of the greatest enthusiasts and supporters of the Magyar revisionist efforts in Great Britain was Lord Rothermere, the owner

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[19] Apponyi, *Justice for Hungary,* p. 364.

[20] *Ibid.,* p. 112.

[21] Article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant reads: "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." For full text of the Covenant see Norman Hill, *International Organization* (New York, 1952), pp. 50 - 64.

[22] Apponyi, *Justice for Hungary,* p. 299.

of the *Daily Mail.* Besides giving generous amounts of space in his daily to the advocates of Magyar revisionism, he himself wrote and published in this same publication two famous articles, namely "Hungary's Place in the Sun—Safety for Central Europe" (*Daily Mail,* June 21, 1927) and "Europe's Powder Magazine—Gross Injustice making for war" (August 30, 1927). While in the first of these articles he proposed the restoration to Hungary of the border territories inhabited by Magyar-speaking majorities from Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, the second article was directed entirely against the weakest of the three states, Czecho-Slovakia. He stated that

> in domestic affairs the mixed elements of which it (the Czecho-Slovak State) is composed — Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Germans, Moravians, Poles, and Ruthenes — are so antagonistic to each other that the disappearance of the State by sudden disintegration from within is always a possibility.

Thus, he stated that Czecho-Slovakia constituted the "powder magazine of Europe." According to Lord Rothermere's suggestions, some two million Magyars from the three neighboring states would be returned to Hungary. With regard to Carpatho-Ukraine he suggested that the towns of Berehovo, Uzhhorod and Mukachiv should be ceded to Hungary together with the fertile Tysa River Valley South of this line. In his writings, Lord Rothermere made Great Britain, France, and Italy, as the leading powers in the League of Nations, responsible for the restoration of peace in Central Europe, and urged them to support Hungarian demands for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon. In his enthusiasm for the Hungarian cause, Lord Rothermere wrote a letter to Dr. Edvard Beneš, Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, stating that peace can be saved in Europe only after "justice has been done to Hungary."[23] Beneš politely rejected his proposals.[24]

Lord Rothermere's close co-operator, Sir Robert Donald, undertook a mission on behalf of the policy of revisionism and traveled in the summer and fall months of 1927 through Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, where he had secret meetings with the leaders of the Magyar minorities. To achieve better results from his work, Sir Robert Donald distributed various tasks among his several assistants, who belonged to English, Hungarian, German, and Slovak nationalities. At the same time,the leader of the Magyar Christian Socialist Party in Slovakia and the leader of the Hungarian Opposition in

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[23] For the full text see Steier, *Ungarns Vergewaltigung,* pp. 990 - 991.
[24] *Ibid.,* p. 991.

the Czecho-Slovak Parliament, Deputy Géza de Szüllő, went to Budapest to provide for better co-ordination of their common efforts with the Budapest revisionist leadership. Miss Lanka Wirt, daughter of Mr. Wirt of Košice, President of the Magyar Christian Socialist Party in East Slovakia, performed the function of a courier between Budapest and Sir Robert Donald who was visiting various towns and villages with Magyar minority in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine.[25] While the pro-governmental forces in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine organized popular demonstrations against Lord Rothermere's action with such distinguished speakers as Prime Minister Dr. Milan Hodža and the Foreign Minister E. Beneš, the leader of Magyar opposition in the Czecho-Slovak Chamber of Deputies, Dr. Géza de Szüllő, in a long speech in the Czecho-Slovak Parliament on October 8, 1927, welcomed his action and published his address in the Magyar language papers.[26]

In November 1933, Count Stephen Bethlen, who had been Hungarian Prime Minister for ten years, visited Great Britain and delivered a series of lectures in the influential scientific and political circles.[27] In these speeches he pretended to represent not only Hungarian interests but also the interests of the Slovaks, Ruthenians, Croats, and Transylvanians, "who to-day, cannot raise their voices before the Tribunal of Europe, or whose voices are too weak to be heard." Therefore, he proceeded,

> It is our bounden duty to raise our voice in the hearing of the whole world, even at the eleventh hour, in a demand that their rights of self-determination be recognized and granted... I do not deny that it is in our own interests also to stand up for the rights of our former minorities, but in that case

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[25] Sir Robert Donald, *The Treaty of Trianon: Hungary's Appeal to Humanity* (London, 1928), pp. 29-34. Hereafter cited as: Sir Robert Donald. Among other cities and towns, he visited: Bratislava on October 10, 1927; from here he went to Košice; on October 7, 1927, his secret meeting was discovered by police in Prešov; in Carpatho-Ukraine, Sir Robert Donald visited Uzhhorod, Mukachiv, Berehovo, Batyovo etc. Miss Lanka Wirt, who carried a message to Budapest was discovered by police and arrested on October 23, 1927.

[26] *Magyar Néplap* (Bratislava), October 9, 1927.

[27] Bethlen, p. xi. His lectures were sponsored by the League of Nations Union of Cambridge University, where he spoke on November 23, 1933; by the Near and Middle East Association in London, where he lectured on November 25, 1933; by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, lectured on November 27, 1933; and, by the Balkan Committee in London — on November 29, 1933. For the collection of these lectures Lord Newton wrote a preface.

Hungary's interests are identical with those of Europe, the peace of which is in constant danger in consequence of the mistakes that have been made.[28]

With regard to Carpatho-Ukraine, Count Bethlen made an open demand for restoration of that compactly Ukrainian inhabited province to Hungary, because, he said:

First, Czechs need Ruthenia as a link with Rumania and Yugoslavia in order to form an iron ring round Hungary's mutilated body,

Secondly, the acquisition of that territory by Czechs deprived Hungary and Poland of a common frontier. This proved useful as a means of preventing immediate intercourse between these two countries which had always been on a friendly footing, and

Thirdly, . . .Ruthenia enables to the Czechs to get nearer to Russia.[29]

Knowing the anti-Czech feelings of Carpatho-Ukrainians and especially the bitter struggle for autonomy, Count Bethlen decided to make use of these facts in his lectures, and he declared that

the creation of a Ruthenian national autonomy is of the most vital importance to them (the Ruthenians or Carpatho-Ukrainians) in order that they may be at absolute liberty to choose of their own accord the country of their adoption.[30]

He hoped, of course, that in case of a plebiscite the majority of the population of Carpatho-Ukraine would decide in favor of re-union with Hungary. In the opinon of this writer, his optimism was exaggerated in this respect, and this was proven just a few years later. It is true that some of the leaders of the Russophile movement, like Ivan Kurtyak, Andriy Brodiy, Stepan Fencyk, including Governor Antin Beskid, had secret ties with Magyar revisionists.[31] But they never dared to openly advocate the re-union of Carpatho-Ukraine with Hungary. In reality, the newly developed intelligentsia, whose majority came from the village-folk, strongly opposed the idea of revisionism.[32]

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[28] Bethlen, p. 91.

[29] Bethlen, p. 81.

[30] Bethlen, p. 83.

[31] See above: footnote No. 107, p. 71; footnote No. 153, p. 82; footnote No. 180, p. 91; and Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Czechoslovakia Fights Back* (Washington, 1943), p. 172; also Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Four Fighting Years* (London, 1943), p. 166.

[32] Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, "Ukrayintsi i Madyare," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), June 1, 1932; Anon., "Agitatsiya za reviziyu myrovykh dohovoriv," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), January 15, 1933. The impact of the revisionist activities upon the Carpatho-Ukrainians was, probably, best expressed in Editorial "Shcho bude z namy?" (What shall happen to us) in *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), April 26, 1934.

Sir Robert Gower, a member of the House of Commons, in June 1937 raised the question of the revision of the Treaty of Trianon in the British Parliament, proposing that the British Government should actively support Hungarian demands in this respect. In order to solve minority problems in Central Europe and thus to maintain peace, he proposed that His Majesty's Government pursue the following policy in the League of Nations:

> First: States having minorities within their boundaries should be effectively controlled by the League in all minority matters... Permanent committee should be established in Geneva. Its principal function would be to devise and set in operation machinery for dealing unpartially and expediously with grievances submitted by the minorities. Tact and conciliation should characterize its methods.
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> Secondly, the League should invoke Article XIX of the Covenant, which provides for the reconsideration of the treaties that, having become obsolete in the rapidly changing conditions of the modern world, are a menace to international peace. Treaty revision, it is submitted, offers the essential solution of the problem of the Hungarian minorities, whose fundamental desire is to live in peace under a moderate and humane rule.[33]

Other solutions, Sir Robert Gower believed, would be only partial and temporary. They would offer no permanent security against oppression. In this connection, it is to be remembered that at that time Adolf Hitler had already made plans for future attacks against Central and Eastern European countries.

The Hungarian revisionist movement did not limit itself to its activities in Great Britain. Hungary succeeded in securing the support for her revisionist claims first of Mussolini's Italy, and later that of Hitler's Germany, and especially agreed with Poland concerning the establishment of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier in Carpatho-Ukraine. In his campaigning lectures, Count Stephen Bethlen did not fail to stress that "it is of vital interest to Germany that this region should not come under the influence of some Great Power of the opposing camp." [34] Czecho-Slovakia, and especially Carpatho-Ukraine, was described in the revisionist publications as the breeding center of Bolshevism in Central Europe. Therefore, Germany and Italy were urged to stop Russian Bolshevik expansion toward that part of Europe. As long as the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy existed, it was stressed, Germany's rear was well protected and safe; but after the dissolution of the Monarchy, hostile states had come

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[33] Sir Robert Gower, *The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States* (London, 1937), p. 101.

[34] Bethlen, p. 170.

into being in the East. Therefore, the correction of the existing situation in the Danube Basin "is of the paramount importance to Germany."[35] By emphasizing German economic interests in the East, it was rather easy for the revisionists to please German Nazis. As a result of the loss of her pre-World War I colonies, the German economic expansion in the world market came to the end. Therefore, "it was even of more vital interest to her than to any other nation to secure the Central European market for her products."[36] Count Bethlen stressed these and similar ideas in his campaigning speeches in Germany during the spring months of 1934. In the speech which he delivered on March 8, 1934, before a selected audience in Berlin, Count Bethlen called for development of strength because "right without might is but little recognized in this world." [37] Of course, plans of Hungarians and Nazi Germans to utilize the minority questions in order to achieve their aims, co-incided.[38] The final results of the German-Hungarian co-operation which started with the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia proved, however, to be disastrous for Hungary.

Though Italy was on the winning side at the end of World War I, she was not satisfied with the results of the Paris Peace Conference. This fact led to a gradual cooling-off of her relations with France and Great Gritain. Gradually, Mussolini's regime tried to put itself in the leading position in the Danubian Basin and the Balkans. When friction arose between Italy and France, Italian policy concentrated on those countries where it was not frustrated by French influence, i. e. Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Italian opposition to French policy led to a cooling-off of her relations with Czecho-Slovakia because Czecho-Slovakia not only followed the footsteps of the French foreign policy but also promoted the idea of cooperation with the USSR. Mussolini's policy was actually directed against Russian Bolshevism until the end of his regime.

Under those circumstances, Mussolini's Italy placed herself on the side of those powers which lost World War I. In April 1927,

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[35] Bethlen, p. 170.

[36] Bethlen, p. 170.

[37] Quoted in Dr. Kamil Krofta, *The Substance of Hungarian Revisionism* (Prague, 1934), p. 9.

[38] It is interesting to note that at that time, i. e. in the years of 1933 and 1934, there were many complaints on the part of Austrians and Germans against Magyarization of the German-speaking minority in Hungary. See *Nation und Staat: Deutsche Zeitschrift für das europäische Minoritätenproblem* (Vienna), Jahrgang VII, Heft 3, p. 165; and *Ibid.*, Jahrgang VII, Heft 5, pp. 272 - 275.

the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen Bethlen, succeeded in concluding a treaty of friendship and arbitration with Italy. From that time on, Mussolini supported the Hungarian revisionist policy. He soon echoed Lord Rothermere's actions. In an interview given on March 28, 1928, among other things, Mussolini declared that

> It is incompatable with the interests of European peace to force upon such a nation as Hungary an everlasting feeling of a clear-cut injustice. History does not recall any everlasting treaties. A treaty must not be a grave. . .[39]

He openly advocated a revision of the Peace Treaties. On June 5, 1928, in his speech before the Italian Senate, Mussolini took another important step in stating that

> there are provisions in the Peace Treaties which must be revised and improved. No one can assert these treaties were perfect, especially one may question their provisions with regard to the territorial, colonial, social, and economic problems; and for that reason it would be in the interest of the Peace Treaties themselves to revise and to improve them.[40]

After this speech Mussolini was regarded in Magyar revisionist circles as a champion of the revision of the peace treaties. No wonder that in his speeches in England, Count Bethlen paid considerable tribute to Italian policy. He stated that Italy would never permit the Danube Basin to fall entirely under "Slav influence and leadership" because such a turn of affairs "would jeopardize the Italian possessions on the Eastern shores of the Adriatic as well as the closed Italian character of that sea."[41] Mussolini remained faithful to his Magyar friends and contributed a great deal toward the realization of revisionistic ideas in the fateful years of 1938-1940.

Another forum where Magyar revisionists repeatedly presented their complaints and demands were the annual Congresses of European Nationalities usually held in Bern, Switzerland. At the meetings of this institution, usually representatives of the various national minorities living in the multi-national Central and Eastern European States participated. Among the most active participants in these Congresses representing Magyar minorities and at the same time advocating indirectly the policy of revisionism were: Dr. Géza de Szüllő, on behalf of Magyar minority in Czecho-Slovakia, and Mr.

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[39] Quoted in Steier, *Ungarns Vergewaltigung*, p. 993.

[40] For the full text of the speech, see Muriel Currey, *Italian Foreign Policy, 1918-1932* (London, 1933), pp. 234-255.

[41] Bethlen, pp. 170-171.

Jakabffy and Dr. Balogh, on behalf of the Magyar minority in Rumania. Ivan Kurtyak, a Ruthenian from Carpatho-Ukraine with pro-Russian cultural and with pro-Hungarian political orientation, regularly participated in the Congresses despite the fact that the Carpatho-Ukrainians did not regard themselves nor did the Czechs consider them as a minority in Czecho-Slovakia. The German language monthly journal, *Nation und Staat*, published in Vienna and devoted entirely to the minority problems, was also used for the popularization of the revisionist ideas.

The Hungarian revisionist activity successfully prepared the ground for the acceptance of the Hungarian claims by the decision-making powers at the Munich Conference in the fall of 1938, as well as for later events in the bordering states with Hungary. Hungary received her share with the help of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, but later on she was also forced to share with them the consequences of World War II.

ANTI-REVISIONISM IN CARPATHO-UKRAINE

There is no doubt that under the new conditions of democratic freedom, Carpatho-Ukraine made noticeable progress in most spheres of human life in a relatively short time in the period between the two World Wars.

Probably, the greatest progress was achieved in the field of education. The de-Magyarization of the elementary and secondary schools in Carpatho-Ukraine was introduced by the first Governor, Gregory Zhatkovych, in 1919. This de-Magyarization was completed in 1921. In 357 elementary schools Magyar was replaced by Ukrainian as the language of instruction. At the same time, respecting the rights of minorities, in 118 schools the Magyar language remained as the language of instruction for the children of the Magyar national minority. Similar rights were respected for the German minority in 9 communities.[42] Similar steps were taken by the Governor for the de-Magyarization of the secondary schools, and new secondary and trade schools were organized. The Governor's Office in Uzhhorod did everything in its power to stimulate the increase of the educational and cultural standards of the people, especially of the village people who were so neglected in the past. Public support

[42] Viktor Klima, "Shkol'noye dilo i prosvishcheniye na Podkarpatskoy Rusy" in Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, ed., *Podkarpatskaya Rus' za hody 1919-1936* (Uzhhorod, 1936), pp. 101-105. Hereafter cited as: Bachynskiy, *Podkarpatskaya Rus'*.

was offered to talented pupils whose parents were too poor to send them to the secondary schools in which payment of tuitions was required. The Ruthenian graduates of gymnasia (secondary schools) were urged by the Governor's Office to enroll in the universities, especially to study natural sciences, economics, law etc. and scholarships were offered to the needy.[43] This policy was continued, at least to a great extent, even after Zhatkovych's resignation from his post of governorship,[44] and undoubtedly produced positive results as far as the Carpatho-Ukrainians were concerned. It helped them to develop their own young intelligentsia. Five Ruthenian gymnasia (two in Uzhhorod and one each in Mukachiv, Khust, and Berehovo) prepared candidates for university studies, and three Teachers Colleges (two in Uzhhorod and one in Mukachiv) trained the badly-needed elementary school teachers to replace the unqualified ones and to fill openings caused by deaths and retirements. The young teachers were either entirely oriented toward Ukraine or Russia, but had no sympathy for Hungary. Various tradesmen who, too, were so badly needed in the country were prepared in some 40 trade and vocational schools.[45] These efforts of the government and educational institutions advanced "the nation of peasants and priests" to a society of diversified interests on the Western European patterns.

A systematic and well organized fight against illiteracy[46] enabled the development of the Carpatho-Ukrainian press. After the outbreak of World War I, "the last Carpatho-Ruthenian newspaper on the territory of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, *Nauka,* was forbidden" [47] by Hungarian authorities. The change in this sphere of activity came only after the fall of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Immediately, in October 1918, the publisher and editor of the closed

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[43] *Rusyn* (Uzhhorod), October 9, 1920.

[44] Gov. G. Zhatkovych resigned on March 16, 1921. See *Rusyn* (Uzhhorod), March 19, 1921.

[45] For the complete statistical data on educational institutions in Carpatho-Ukraine at the end of 1930 see Statistisches Staatsamt, *Statistische Uebersicht der Čechoslovakischen Republik* (Brno, 1931), pp. 236-240. For data of 1938-1939 see Dr. E. Yu. Pelens'kyy, "Shkil'nytstvo" in Ukrayins'kyy Vydavnychyy Instytut, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina* (L'viv, 1939), pp. 122-137.

[46] Statistisches Staatasmt, *Statistische Uebersicht der Čechoslovakischen Republik* (Brno, 1931), p. 12.

[47] Dr. Yosyf Kaminskiy, "Karpatorusskaya zhurnalistyka posli 1919 hoda" in Bachynskiy, *Podkarpatskaya Rus'*, pp. 137-139. See also Yuriy Borzhava, *Vid Uhors'koyi Rusy do Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny* (Philadelphia, 1956), pp. 31-35: and Statistisches Staatsamt, *Statistische Uebersicht der Čechoslovakischen Republik* (Brno, 1931), p. 246.

paper, Rev. Avhustyn Voloshyn, resumed the publication of *Nauka.*[48] After May 1919 various political, social, educational, and scientific organizations started to publish their own organs. The presentation of their various platforms as well as criticism of the positions of opponents in these publications served as practical lessons in principles of democracy.

In the field of the betterment of the economic situation of the Carpatho-Ukrainian people, land reform should be mentioned first of all. On the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine, the Czecho-Slovak Government confiscated some 203,000 hectars of land from 104 large land-owners and distributed 61,000 ha. among some 32,000 farming families comprising about 160,000 persons.[49] The land reform was a very touchy question to both the Carpatho-Ukrainian landless villagers and to the Magyar revisionists, whose land in many cases was taken. Of course, they had diametrically opposite interests. In addition, the Government established various agricultural schools in order to increase the output per acre and man. These innovations were welcomed by the population.[50]

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[48] In 1922, *Nauka's* name was changed for *Svoboda* and was published as a weekly until June 1938 as the organ of the Peoples Christian Party. In June 1938 it was changed into a daily as *Nova Svoboda* and as such appeared until March 16, 1939.

[49] Yosyf Yirkovskiy, "Zemelnaya reforma na Podkarpatskoy Rusy" in Bachynskiy, *Podkarpatskaya Rus'*, pp. 48-50. This land has been distributed among 6,000 totally landless families and 26,000 families owning some land, in lots averaging 1.5 ha. per family, located in some 300 villages. While over 6,000 land seeking local families were deprived of opportunity to acquire at least some land, the Czecho-Slovak Government established 11 Czech colonies in the very fertile Tysa River region of Carpatho-Ukraine in which by 1935 284 families were settled, each receiving 15 ha. of land. Therefore, in reading statistics on land recepients according to their nationalities the inequality of land lots ought to be considered. Among land recepients were 86% Ukrainians, 10% Magyars, 1.5% Czechs and Slovaks, 1.4% Jews, and 1.1% belonging to other nationalities.

[50] In other fields of economic and living improvements it is worth mentioning the following: a net of consumers, credit and various agricultural co-operatives in towns and villages protected the population from usury and speculation. In 1935, there were 293 active co-operatives serving 487 communities of Carpatho-Ukraine. See Dr. Edmund S. Bachynskiy, "Kooperatsiya na Podk. Rusy" in Bachynskiy, *Podkarpatskaya Rus'*, pp. 61-65. Establishment of new hospitals with modern equipment like those in Mukachiv, Berehovo, and Sevlyush; construction of new and improvement of the old roads and school buildings all-over Carpatho-Ukraine was another visible and appreciated improvement. While until 1919 the delivery of electricity was limited to the towns of Uzhhorod, Mukachiv and Sevlyush, in the year of 1930 electric light and power was served

The democratic freedom guaranteed to all citizens was another change for the better under the new conditions. The political equality of all citizens was appreciated especially by those who in the past were barred from participation in elections because of their inadequate material possessions. Various political parties were called into existence, and the Carpatho-Ukrainians had an opportunity to choose and join whatever political party they desired. Many joined and supported the government coalition parties, while the others were free to join and work for the opposition parties. Actually, with the increase of cultural standards of the population in general, ideological and party-political differentiations also increased.

From the very beginning of the new political order, the Carpatho-Ukrainian cultural and political leaders set out to replace an inferiority complex with national pride. The editorial of the first issue of the influential newspaper, *Rusyn*, August 25, 1920, published in Uzhhorod, declared:

> The most important aim of the *Rusyn* shall be to strengthen the national consciousness of our Ruthenian people; so that everyone of them would proudly declare that he is a Ruthenian; so that every Ruthenian would know exactly what rights and privileges belong to him and would feel free to make use of them; so that he himself would actively participate in the difficult work of developing his country; so that he should remain a faithful Slav and a vigorous defender of our alliance with our breathren Czecho-Slovaks.[51]

The Carpatho-Ukrainian anti-Hungarian attitude by no means was identical with an absolute subordination to the Czechs. The popular leaders tried to follow their own policy directed toward improvement of the well-being of the people. This policy was outlined in *Rusyn*, dated September 15, 1920, in the following words:

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to 65 towns and villages of Carpatho-Ukraine with their total population of 215,000. The newly built (in 1929) Electric Power Work at Uzhhorod made it possible to supply electricity to around 29% of the total population of Carpatho-Ukraine, while during the Hungarian rule only 13% of the total population of Carpatho-Ukraine had an access to the electricity. See Inzh. Jan Merfelt, "Progres elektryfikatsiyi Podkarpatskoy Rusy" in Bachynskiy, *Podkarpatskaya Rus'*, pp. 57-60.

[51] In 1920-1921 the newspaper *Rusyn* was financed by Governor G. Zhatkovych, an American citizen, who upon his return to the United States resided in Pittsburgh, Pa., until his death on March 28, 1967. It was edited by T.A. Zhatkovych and Avhustyn Shtefan. The first of the editors was a brother of the Governor, while the second an influential Carpatho-Ukrainian educator and political leader; in 1939 A. Shtefan was elected President of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet and became Minister of Education.

There is no need here for either Czech, Magyar or any other policy... but a Ruthenian policy; and this policy means: to work for the material, spiritual, and national well-being of our Ruthenian people, and not for some other nation. The essence of this policy is: if and when such a necessity occurs, then to fight against Czechs, Magyars, Germans and all other persons who pursue a hostile policy toward our Ruthenian people, on the one hand, but, on the other hand, to co-operate and maintain friendship with anyone of those nations if this would strengthen freedom, independence and well-being of our people.

Actually, this independent policy was pursued by the Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders thereafter, and they regarded themselves the only representatives of the true desires of the people.

Under those conditions, Lord Rothermere's action and that of his emmissaries under the leadership of Sir Robert Donald[52] did not find much support among the Carpatho-Ukrainians. In July 1929, the First Congress of *Narodovets* Youth was held in Uzhhorod. In this Congress participated delegates of the Carpatho-Ukrainian youth organization from all-over the country which closely co-operated with *Prosvita*.[53] This Youth Congress issued a historical proclamation stating that "under the Carpathians between the Poprad and Tysa rivers live Ukrainian people" who are a "part of the Great Ukrainian nation behind the Carpathian mountains" and therefore "the rightful name of Pidkarpats'ka Rus' should be Zakarpats'ka Ukrayina." [54] A similar anti-Hungarian-revisionist spirit dominated also the Tenth Anniversary Congress of *Prosvita* held on June 28 and 29, 1930, in Uzhhorod.[55]

Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko and Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko, well known Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders, in the first issue of their non-partisan weekly, *Ukrayins'ke Slovo*, on February 15, 1932, declared that the weekly's aim was "to fight for cultural and national unity of the whole Ukrainian nation, and for our rights here, within the Czecho-Slovak Republic." Stressing its anti-revisionist position, the same paper in its issue of March 1, 1932, declared itself even against the introduction of autonomy in Carpatho-Ukraine

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[52] See above, pp. 168-170.

[53] See above, pp. 73-74.

[54] Mykola Vayda, *Yak pobidyv Narodovets'kyy Rukh u Staromu Krayu na b. Pidkarpas'kiy Rusy* (Bridgeport, Conn., 1950), pp. 3-4. Author of the cited publication was one of the organizers of the Congress. "Narodovets" means popular or nationally minded (in Ukrainian).

[55] Anon., "Velykoye Kulturnoye Torzhestvo u Nas vo Staromu Krayu" in o. Valentin Balogh, ed., *Kalendar Prosvity na hod 1931* (McKeesport, Pa., 1930), pp. 149-150.

should the administration of the country be given to Ivan Kurtyak and his party followers who had secret ties with Hungarian revisionists. It took a lot of courage to write against autonomy under any circumstances at that time, realizing that it was unpopular even to make some conditions under which this or the other political group would support the realization of autonomy.

During the early summer months, before the harvest, almost every year there was a shortage of food in the mountainous regions of Verkhovyna. Because of an over-average drought during the growing season in 1931, the shortage of food in Verkhovyna arrived earlier than usual in the spring of 1932. The Greek Catholic Bishop Anthony Papp, former Bishop-Ordinarius of the Mukachiv Diocese until he was replaced by the Holy See in 1924 by Bishop Petro Gebey and sent to Miskolc, Hungary, organized an aid for his former faithful. In May 1932, the Bishop sent to Carpatho-Ukraine from Hungary seven rail-road carloads of wheat and other foodstuffs to be distributed among the needy. However, the freight was addressed to Mr. Andriy Brodiy, one of the leaders of the Autonomous Farmers Union. The way in which this aid was given was criticized and suspected of being a part of the revisionist activity. Otherwise, it was interpreted, the former Carpatho-Ukrainian Greek Catholic Bishop would have sent this aid for the needy through the Greek Catholic Diocese of Mukachiv, headed at that time by Bishop Petro Gebey, or through the Red Cross. It was suspected that this aid was aimed at the strengthening power and prestige of the secretly pro-Hungarian autonomist party of Ivan Kurtyak and Andriy Brodiy.[56] This, too, was a very touchy problem because in the time of famine those suffering do not ask what political background is behind the given help. The main thing for the common people in such a situation usually was that they should get as much aid as possible and get it on time.

While until 1933 in Carpatho-Ukraine the problem of revisionism was basically limited to discussion among the leading political, educational and religious activists behind closed doors as well as to an anti-revisionist press campaign, in 1933 an organization of broad popular masses in anti-revisionism begun. The First Central Ruthenian National Council of Carpatho-Ukraine in co-operation with the Czecho-Slovak National Council organized on June 2, 1933, in Uzhhorod a popular anti-revisionist manifestation in which some

[56] *Ukraýins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), May 15, 1932. Bishop Anthony Papp was transferred from Uzhhorod to Miskolc, Hungary, by the Holy See on request of the Czecho-Slovak Government because of his pro-Hungarian sympathies.

seven thousand people participated.[57] One month later, on July 2, 1933, a regional Congress of *Prosvita* was held in Mukachiv which also was dominated by the anti-revisionist spirit, on the one hand, and the demands to stop Czechization of the province as well as stressing the ethnic and cultural unity of Carpatho-Ukrainians with "the great Slavic forty-million Ukrainian people," on the other hand. In the first point of the resolutions of this Congress adopted by the delegates of the *Prosvita* organizations from several counties we read:

> The Regional Congress asserts that the Ukrainian population of Sub-Carpathia still remembers very acutely the time of the Hungarian lordship under which we did not have any opportunity for cultural and national development and were sentenced to a national death.
>
> Therefore, the Congress protests against the efforts of some foreign countries to revise the boundaries of the Czecho-Slovak Republic; the Congress especially protests against the efforts of present-time Hungary to annex our Sub-Carpathia, and declares that it is not willing to give even a single square foot of our land to our century-long oppressors.[58]

The Fifteenth Anniversary of the declaration of Czecho-Slovak independence was celebrated all over the country in the spirit of resistance to revisionism. This occasion was especially used in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine to mobilize popular support for the Republic and her anti-revisionist policy. On October 28, 1933, the day of the anniversary, besides the usual programs in each school of the country, in many of the Carpatho-Ukrainian towns and villages manifestations were organized in which practically all youth, cul-

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[57] "Protyrevizlyni Zbory v Uzhhorodi," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), June 15, 1933. After an organized march through the main streets of Uzhhorod, the mass meeting was held at the Zhatkovych Place. On behalf of the city of Uzhhorod spoke member of the City Council, Petro P. Sova; on behalf of the First Central Ruthenian-Ukrainian National Council, Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko; on behalf of the Russian National Council, Dr. Yosyf Kaminskiy; on behalf of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, Mr. Rauscher; on behalf of the Agrarian Party, Senator Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy and Deputy Vasyl' Shcherets'kyy; on behalf of the Labor Party, Senator Illarion Tsurkanovych; on behalf of National Democratic Party, Dr. Pinta; on behalf of Social Democratic Party, Mr. Sedlak; on behalf of the Ukrainian University Students, Mr. Dolynay; on behalf of the Russophile University Students, Mr. Antalovskiy; on behalf of the Jewish Zionists, Mr. Singer; on behalf of the Orthodox Jews, Mr. Fischgrund; for the Magyar minority anti-revisionists spoke in Magyar language M. Molnar from Rakoshyn. Also Polish Consul, Swierzbyński, whose office was in Uzhhorod, was present at the meeting in the capacity as an observer.

[58] "Rezolyutsiyi Rayonovoho Prosvityans'koho Zyizdu v Mukachovi v dni 2. lypnya 1933," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), August 1, 1933.

tural and civic organizations participated.[59] The Carpatho-Ukrainian University students in Prague under the leadership of Stepan Rosokha, too, declared themselves strongly against Hungarian revisionism in a protest meeting held on October 27, 1933, connected with the celebrations of the Czecho-Slovak independence day.[60]

On the other hand, secret revisionist activities were carried on in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. These were directed from Hungary and actually succeeded by the beginning of 1934 to establish a net of underground organizations, *Levente*. As the police discovered, it was established that not only people of Magyar nationality but also some Russians and some Carpatho-Ukrainian native Russophiles were connected with this action.[61] In the meantime, the Polish political leaders openly declared their support for the realization of a common Polish-Hungarian border in Carpatho-Ukraine,[62] and Poland

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[59] *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), November 15, 1933, reported about the celebrations in the County of Sevlyush bordering with Hungary. The larger scale celebrations were held in the county seat, Sevlyush, as well as in the villages of Rokosovo, Oleshnyk, Trostnyk, Vyshniy Shard, Veryatsya, Horbky, and Novoselytsya. The initiative for these manifestations was taken by the local *Prosvita* branches. Other anti-revisionist manifestations were held in Uzhhorod, Mukachiv, Berehovo, and other county seats, as well as in larger villages like Yasinya, Korolevo n. T., Kobylets'ka Polyana etc. The special emphasis was put upon the anti-revisionism at this time because there were some press reports that over 100 members of the British Parliament supported the Hungarian revisionist policy.

[60] Stepan Rosokha was the President of the Union of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenian Students, and at the same time he headed also the Union of Greek Catholic Youth in Prague. Both these organizations sponsored this anti-revisionist meeting to which also representatives of some foreign student organizations were invited. Stepan Rosokha spoke on the topic of "The Significance of the 28th of October for Our State," Mykhaylo Antal spoke on "28th of October and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia," and Vinkentiy Shandor delivered the anti-revisionist address. See *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), November 15, 1933.

[61] In February 1934 the Czecho-Slovak police arrested under suspicion of the pro-Hungarian revisionist activity in Carpatho-Ukraine a former Russian Tsarist Captain, Vladimir Kosta, who was a community official in Hamry, Carpatho-Ukraine. His co-operators were: a policeman of the city of Mukachiv, Szakacs, of Magyar nationality, and a local lumber businessman, Symkanych. All three were arrested when they attempted to pass the border to Hungary. The investigation proved that they were connected with the Magyar revisionists. Also arrested were Yulius Sirokay of Pidhoryany and Sandor Kurucz of Uzhhorod who served as liaison men between secret revisionist groups on the territories of Carpatho-Ukraine and Eastern Slovakia, on the one hand, and Hungary, on the other hand. See *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), February 15, 1934.

[62] An interview given by Deputy Choiński-Dzieduszycki of the Polish Parliament to a correspondent of Budapest paper *Esti Kurier*, cited in *Ukrayins'ke*

restricted opportunities for contacts between Ukrainians on the both sides of the Carpathian mountains. The establishment of the Nazi regime in Germany meant the creation of additional difficulties for Czecho-Slovakia.

Throughout the year of 1934, anti-revisionism again was stressed in mass meetings all-over Carpatho-Ukraine. In order to assure the Carpatho-Ukrainians that the Czecho-Slovak forces would defend the autonomous province against Hungarian annexation, on May 3, 1934, Dr. Edvard Beneš arrived in Uzhhorod and made a trip to other Carpatho-Ukrainian towns as he had done on a similar trip through Slovak cities and towns a few months before. In his address at Uzhhorod, the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister emphasized that interests of Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, of the Ukrainian Independence Movement, and Russia crossed in Carpatho-Ukraine but Czecho-Slovakia "will never give up Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia because it is on Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia" that Czecho-Slovakia bases her policy of the Little Entente, and her entire Central European policy.[63] In Mukachiv and Khust, E. Beneš again stressed that Czecho-Slovakia is determined to defend Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine with all her means against Hungarian annexation. Several months later, on October 27, 1934, again two members of the Prague Cabinet, Dr. Ivan Dérer and Dr. Kamil Krofta, visited Carpatho-Ukraine and the latter stated in his address: "We will not give up the country which was given to us by the will of the people." [64]

Slovo (Uzhhorod), March 22, 1934. Poland was disturbed at that time by the anti-Polish activity of the underground Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO) and after 1929 the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Eastern Galicia bordering with Carpatho-Ukraine. See *Manchester Guardian*, February 1, 1932; *The Chicago Daily News*, December 14, 1932; *The New York Herald Tribune*, October 26, 1930; *Gazeta Warszawska* (Warsaw), February 4, 1932; and the Ukrainian underground publications, *Surma*, for the years of 1930-1933, and *Ukrains'kyy Natsionalist*, 1934 and after. Practically each issue of the last two publications listed on one or two full pages the names of Ukrainians arrested and sentenced by Polish authorities for the underground activities on the territories of the Polish Republic aiming at the establishment of an Independent Ukrainian State.

[63] Dr. Edvard Beneš, *Rech o Podkarpatorusskoy Probleme: Podkarpatskaya Rus' s tochki zreniya mezhdunarodnoy politiki* (Uzhhorod, 1934), p. 24. See also Dr. Edvard Beneš, "Lectures to the Slovaks on the Past and Future of our Nation" cited in Edgar P. Young, *Czechoslovakia* (London, 1938), pp. 261-263.

[64] *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), November 1, 1934. Ministers Dérer and Krofta visited various towns and villages of Carpatho-Ukraine in connection

The Fifteenth Anniversary of the declaration of the Central Ruthenian National Council in favor of the unity of Carpatho-Ukraine on an autonomous basis with Czecho-Slovakia was, too, utilized for the anti-revisionist declarations by the Carpatho-Ukrainians. Mass manifestations were organized by *Prosvita* throughout the country; however, the national festivity was held in Khust, on May 7, 1934, with the participation of delegates from various parts of the country. The main speaker, Rev. A. Voloshyn, denounced the revisionist policy as "aiming at the suppression of re-birth" of the Ukrainian population South of the Carpathian mountains.[65] A few weeks later, similar anti-revisionist manifestations were held in Uzhhorod in connection with the Fifth Congress of the Teacher Association, on May 27, 1934, and the Carpatho-Ukrainian Women's Congress held in Uzhhorod on May 28, 1934. The Carpatho-Ukrainian Teachers passed unanimously a resolution of the following wording:

> The Fifth Congress of the Ukrainian Teachers of Sub-Carpathia held on May 27, 1934, in Uzhhorod to commemorate the Fifteenth Anniversary of the union of our country with Czecho-Slovakia, solemnly declares that every member of the Teacher Association will make all possible efforts in order to paralyze and to fight against activities directed against the State and the propaganda spread by the enemies of our people and the Republic.[66]

A similar resolution was adopted by the First Women's Congress held in Uzhhorod on May 28, 1934.[67]

One of the most impressive anti-revisionist manifestations in Carpatho-Ukraine was the Second Congress of the Narodovets Youth held in Mukachiv on July 1, 1934. The Presidium and those who spoke

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with the celebration of the Czecho-Slovak Independence Day, October 28th. On this occasion, they campaigned against Hungarian revisionist policy.

[65] "Svyato pryluchenya Pidk. Rusy do ChSR v Khusti," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), May 17, 1934.

[66] "Rezolyutsiyi ukhvaleni Pyatym Kongresom Ukrayins'koho Uchytel'stva Pidkarpatya, zhurtovanoho v Uchytel's'kiy Hromadi, dnya 27. travnya 1937 v Uzhhorodi," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), May 31, 1934.

[67] "Pershyy Zhinochyy Kongres v Uzhhorodi," *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), May 31, 1934. The Congress was organized by Madame Irena Nevytska and her associates: Mme. Stankova of Khust, Mme. Tysovs'ka of Berehovo, Mme. Klempush of Yasinya, Mme. Horbachevs'ka of Mukachiv, and Mme. Kostyk of Uzhhorod. Two foremost leaders of the Ukrainian Women's Organizations of Western Ukraine, Mme. Olena Kysilevs'ka and Mme. Milena Rudnyts'ka, were guests of honor at the Congress. The Congress protested against revisionism, and, at the same time, demanded immediate establishment of the autonomous administration in Carpatho-Ukraine.

to some ten thousand young men and women from 86 communities of all corners of Carpatho-Ukraine consisted of the new generation educated in Czecho-Slovakia under the existing conditions of democratic freedom.[68] This Congress adopted a set of resolutions, one of which declared that the Carpatho-Ukrainian youth "accepts the platform of the Ukrainian Nationalism as a basis for its future activities." [69] And, this by no means could be compatible with the approval of the annexation of Carpatho- Ukraine by Hungary, because the Ukrainian Nationalists demanded the restoration of the fully sovereign Ukrainian State embracing all Ukrainian ethnic territories which were under the Russian, Polish, Rumanian, Czecho-Slovak, and even Hungarian occupation.[70] However, until the restoration of the sovereign Ukrainian State the Carpatho-Ukrainians desired to remain as a fully autonomous country in the unity with Czecho-Slovakia because from among all states occupying Ukrainian territories the Czecho-Slovak Republic provided the greatest degree of liberty.

On the other hand, the pro-revisionist leaders like Andriy Brodiy, Dr. Stepan Fencyk, and Mykhaylo Demko, were never courageous enough to declare themselves openly in favor of the annexation of

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[68] *Ukrayins'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), July 5, 1934. The initiative of this Congress was in the hands of the *Narodovets'kyy Soyuz,* headed by Stepan Rosokha, President; Yuriy Shpyl'ka, Vice-President, and Yullyan Khymynets', Secretary. Other prominent leaders and speakers at the Congress were: Dr. Mykola Bandusyak, Ivan Roman, Yelysaveta Kuz'ma, M. Bedey, and M. Kopach. Some of them were in contact with the underground Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. See Yuriy Artyushenko, *Z derzhavno-providnoyu ideyeyu slavnoho mynuloho do velykoho maybutnyoho* (Paris, 1956), pp. 3-16. The Magyar language daily, *Uj Közlöny* (Uzhhorod), July 3, 1934, reported that 86 communities were represented, among them: Rakhiv, Velykyy Bychkiv, Tereblya, Teresva, Dubove, Vonihovo, Chumalyovo, Drahovo, Khust, Zolotarevo, Volove, Izky, Nyzhniy Studenyy, Lozyans'ke, Vyshniy Studenyy, Svalyava, Lazy, Bilky, Dovhe, Dravtsi, Lysychevo, Midyanytsya, Chereyivtsi, Zarichya, Vyshni Veretsky, Velyka Kopanya, Hat', Stara Bovtrad, Loza, Perechyn, Dubrynychi, Velyke Berezne, Zarichovo, Uzhhorod, Chervenyovo, Velyki Luchky, Shkurativtsi, Berestovo, Lesovytsya, Benedykivtsi, Kal'nyk, Goronda, Strabichovo, Chynadyovo, Pidhorod, Yasinya, Mukachiv, Rosvygovo, Nove Davydkovo, Stare Davydkovo, Yovrya, Vyshni Remety, Domanytsi, Drahovo, Kuzmyno, Medvedivtsi and others.

[69] Dr. Stepan Rosokha, "Narodzhenya Derzhavy" in Ukrayins'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi* (Vienna, 1939), p. 5.

[70] For the platform of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists of that time see "Postanovy Kongresu Ukrayins'kykh Natsionalistiv" in Volodymyr Martynets', *Ukrayins'ke Pidpilya: vid UVO do OUN* (Winnipeg, 1949), pp. 335-341. At the First Congress of the Ukrainian Nationalists held in Vienna, January 28 through February 3, 1929, a special paper on Carpatho-Ukraine was presented by Riko Yaryy.

their native land by Hungary. They worked secretly for years for the Polish-Hungarian common cause but publicly presented themselves to be good Carpatho-Ruthenian patriots of the Russian cultural orientation. After they openly disclosed their aims in October 1938, many of their close co-operators in the Dukhnovych Society condemned them as traitors of their own people and declared themselves in favor of autonomous existence of Carpatho-Ukraine within the Federation with the Czechs and Slovaks as well as in support of Msgr. A. Voloshyn's Government.[71] This proves that the followers of the Dukhnovych Society could not be regarded as pro-revisionists except for a few influential persons. The rank-and-file members of that pro-Russian cultural society were not informed about the real aims of some of their leaders. They supported them first of all because they pretended to be the extreme opponents to the Czechization of the country and fervent fighters for the fulfillment of the autonomous rights guaranteed to Carpatho-Ukraine by the Treaty of St. Germain.

CO-INCIDENCE OF AIMS OF HORTHY AND HITLER

A new phase of revisionist activities was introduced on the European continent with Adolf Hitler's rise to power in Germany. It should not be overlooked that Adolf Hitler advocated the revisionist policy even before Hungary signed and ratified the Treaty of Trianon. The revisionist aims of Hitler and his followers were formulated in the Program of the National Socialist German Workers' Party at Munich as early as February 24, 1920. The fact that these aims were placed as Point One and Point Two in the twenty-five point program of the Nazi Party proves the great significance which was given to revisionism by Adolf Hitler and his party. We read in their program as follows:

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[71] Such influential Russophile leaders in Carpatho-Ukraine as Mykola Dragula, Ivan Bunganych, Dr. A. Beskid, A. Karabelesh, A. Patrus, A. Antalovskiy, Pavel and Stepan Fedor, Andriy Sochka, Mykhaylo Lugosh, Pavlo Tenyak, Anatol Sydor, P. Ihnat and Vasyl' Kohut issued declarations denouncing the pro-Hungarian actions of Dr. S. Fencyk and Andriy Brodiy and stressing that they never knew a thing about the latter's pro-revisionist activities while co-operating with them. Some of these deceived people like poets A. Patrus and A. Karabelesh who previously wrote their works in Russian switched under the impact of being deceived to the use of the Ukrainian literary language in their writings. For their individual declarations see *Nova Svoboda* (Khust) for the period between November 1938 and March 1939.

1. We demand the union of all Germans in one Great Germany by the right of self-determination of peoples. 2. We demand the equality of the German nation with all other nations and abrogation of the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.[72]

While Adolf Hitler demanded the union of all Germans in one Greater Germany referring to the Wilsonian principle of the right for self-determination of peoples, he did not hesitate to formulate his imperialistic aims, which are in principle incompatible with the right of self-determination of peoples. Point Three of his program reads:

3. We demand land and territory (colonies) for the feeding of our people and for the settlement of our surplus population.[73]

A few years later, Hitler determined the direction of the future German expansion as follows:

We (the National Socialists) stop the endless German movement to the South and the West, and turn our gaze toward the land in the East. At long last we break off the colonial and commercial policy of the pre-War period and shift to the soil policy of the future. If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states.[74]

It is true that Adolf Hitler prepared his party program when he was still an unknown man and formulated his basic future policies in *Mein Kampf* while he was in Landsberg jail, i. e. at a time when he had no responsibility for the official German policy nor was he any significant factor in German politics. However, Adolf Hitler made up his mind in this respect and did not change it after he came

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[72] Adolf Hitler, "Program of the National Socialist German Labor Party. Munich, February 24, 1920" in William E. Rappard et ali., *Source Book on European Governments* (New York, 1937), pp. IV-9—IV-13. Hereafter cited as: Rappard, *Source Book*.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. IV-9.

[74] Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. by R. Manheim, (New York, 1942), p. 654. Contrary to the general belief, German *Drang nach Osten* was not formulated for the first time by Adolf Hitler. As early as in 1881, one of the leading Pan-Germanists, Paul de Legarde, wrote about necessity of the future German expansion toward the Black Sea and colonization of large territories in the Eastern Europe by the Germans. Quoted in Percy Evans Lewin, *The German Road to the East* (London, 1917), p. 318, Another advocacy for conquering the East culturally we find in Otto Richard Tannenberg, *Grossdeutschland: die Arbeit des 20ten Jahrhunderts* (Leipzing, 1911), p. 287; and, for the German colonization plans in Ukraine and the Crimea peninsula during World War I, see N. C. Meyer, "Germans in the Ukraine, 1916," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. IX, No. 2 (April, 1950).

to power. Quite to the contrary, this program helped him to gather a considerable amount of support from the German population, and contrary to the expectations of the statesmen of the Western Democracies,[75] he started to realize his aims almost immediately. In his speech to the Reich Commissioners at Berlin, on July 6, 1933, Adolf Hitler confirmed the validity of the party program stressing that the "program has not been drawn up for the sake of fine gestures, but in order to maintain the life of the German nation." [76] His revisionist claims had been announced earlier, some seven weeks after his appointment to the post of Chancellor of Germany. In his programmatic speech to the Reichstag on March 23, 1933, in which he campaigned for the well known Enabling Act, among other things Adolf Hitler said:

> We have particularly at heart the fate of the Germans living beyond the frontiers of Germany who are allied with us in speech, culture and customs and have to make a hard fight to retain these values. The Reich Government is resolved to use all the means at its disposal to support the rights internationally guaranteed to the German minorities.[77]

After strengthening his power domestically, re-militarizing Germany, and taking the Rheinland under his control, Hitler turned his efforts toward the realization of his revisionist and imperialist program. On November 5, 1937, he held a top secret conference with his closest military cooperators. In the presence of his Foreign Minister, Baron von Neurath, a decision was made concerning the course of the future German foreign policy and the military conquest of *Lebensraum* for German people. In a long monologue — which was to be regarded in the event of his death as his last will and testament—Adolf Hitler stated:

> The aim of German policy was to make secure and to preserve the racial community (*die Volksmasse*) and to enlarge it. It was therefore a question of space.
>
> The German racial community comprised over 85 million people and, because of their number and the narrow limits of habitable space in Europe, constituted a tightly packed racial core such as was not to be met in any other

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[75] Waldemar Gurian, "The Philosophy of the Totalitarian State" in Charles Hart, *Philosophy of the State* (Washington, 1940), p. 62.

[76] "Speech of Chancellor Hitler to the Reich Commissioners in the Reich Chancery, Berlin, on July 6, 1933," in Rappard, *Source Book,* pp. IV-139—IV-141.

[77] "Speech of Adolf Hitler before the Reichstag on March 23, 1933" in Rappard, *Source Book,* pp. IV-122—IV-138.

country and such as implied the right to a greater living space than in the case of other peoples. If, territorially speaking, there existed no political result corresponding to this German racial core, that was a consequence of centuries of historical development, and in the consequence of these political conditions lay the greatest danger to the preservation of the German race at its present peak. To arrest the decline of Germanism (*Deutschtum*) in Austria and Czechoslovakia was as little possible as to maintain the present level in Germany itself. Instead of increase, sterility was setting in... Germany's future was therefore wholly conditional upon the solving the need for space... If, then, we accept the security of our food situation as the principal question, the space necessary to insure it can only be sought in Europe... It is not a matter of acquiring population but of gaining space for agricultural use. Moreover, areas producing raw materials can be more usefully sought in Europe in immediate proximity to the Reich, than overseas... For the improvement of our politico-military position our first objective... must be to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria... Even though the populations concerned, especially of Czechoslovakia, were not sparse, the annexation of Czechoslovakia and Austria would mean an acquisition of foodstuffs for 5 to 6 million people, on the assumption that the compulsory emigration of 2 million people from Czechoslovakia and 1 million people from Austria was practicable. The incorporation of these two States with Germany meant, from politico-military point of view, a substantial advantage because it would mean shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of forces for other purposes, and the possibility of creating new units up to a level of about 12 divisions...[78]

At the time of this conference, Hitler expected the outbreak of a war by summer 1938 between Italy, on the one hand, and France and Great Britain, on the other. He believed that this was the best opportunity to occupy Austria and Czecho-Slovakia. Would such a war be somehow prevented, then Germany would have to act by 1943-1945 under all circumstances. Otherwise, this long citation clearly indicates that Hitler did not intend to stop his expansion after the destruction of the Austrian and Czecho-Slovak political sovereignity. Occupation of these two countries were to be only first step in Hitler's *Drang nach Osten*.

Four months after this decision was taken, i. e. on March 13, 1938, Austria was occupied by German forces, and five weeks later,

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[78] *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945* (Washington, 1949), Series D, Volume I, Document No. 19. Hereafter cited as *DGFP*. This conference was held in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, November 5, 1937, from 4:15 to 8:30 P.M. At the conference were present: Adolf Hitler, the Führer and Chancellor; Field Marshall Werner Eduard Fritz von Blomberg, War Minister; General Baron von Fritsch, Commander in Chief, Army; Admiral Raeder, Commander in Chief, Navy; General Hermann Göring, Commander in Chief, *Luftwaffe;* Baron Constantin von Neurath, Foreign Minister; and Colonel Hossbach, Adjutant to the Führer.

on April 21, 1938, Hitler and General Keitel prepared a detailed plan of attack on Czecho-Slovakia known under the code name *Fall Grün* (Operation Green).[79] All further political and diplomatic activities were gradually directed to a crisis which was to result in war. These activities were also needed to win time for military preparations and always were timed from that point of view.

The Hungarians for years had tried to persuade the leading powers of the world about the necessity of a peaceful solution of Magyar minority problems in Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. They proposed to use Article XIX of the Covenant of the League of Nations and, as it was already stated above, basically concentrated their revisionist activities in Great Britain, United States, and Italy. However, their efforts for peaceful solution brought no success, and they found it expedient to co-operate with Hitler's Germany knowing that Hitler, too, wanted to solve the problem of Germans living beyond the frontiers of his Reich. Despite the fact that Hitler's policy was directed against Austria's sovereignty with whom Hungary was linked by the so-called Protocols of Rome,[80] Hungarian political leaders looked for help in the realization of their revisionist aims wherever they could get the needed support.

In September 1936, the Regent of Hungary, Admiral Nicholas Horthy, visited Adolf Hitler. At their meeting, on Horthy's initiative, they discussed among several other problems also the question of Czecho-Slovakia. As a result of this conversation

> The Regent found in the Führer a strong feeling of resentment against Czechoslovakia... Horthy came away with the impression that, as soon as she has finished arming, Germany proposes to show her enmity to Czechoslovakia by some concrete gesture.[81]

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[79] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 133. For further development of the plan to destroy Czecho-Slovakia by German military forces see also *DGFP*, D, II, Docs. 175, 221, 235, 282, 388, 424 and 448; and *DGFP*, D, IV, Docs. 81, 182, 188, 189, 197 and 198.

[80] On March 17, 1934, the Italian, Austrian and Hungarian Governments had signed three protocols in Rome. In the first they pledged themselves to consult on all problems of a general nature in a spirit of friendship; in the other two they undertook to develop their mutual economic relations by setting up a permanent commission of three experts. On March 26, 1936, again in Rome, three protocols were signed which consolidated the collaboration of the three countries in political, economic, and cultural fields.

[81] Malcolm Muggeridge, ed., *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers* (London, 1948),

This Hitler-Horthy meeting opened the high level German-Hungarian contacts dealing with the future fate of Czecho-Slovakia. Only a few weeks after this meeting, in a conversation between the Hungarian Prime Minister Kálmán Darányi, the Hungarian Foreign Minister Kálmán de Kánya, and the Italian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano di Cortelazzo, during the latter's visit to Budapest in the middle of November 1936, Kánya stated that

> the Czech position is a matter for concern. German pressure is increasing daily. Göring, with his blunt sincerity, has said that in less than two or three years Czechoslovakia must cease to exist. It is evident that, in these circumstances, Hungary must continue to keep in the forefront of her policy her territorial claims on the Czechs,

and for that reason, he continued,

> the drive of Magyar irredentism must be entirely directed towards Czechoslovakia which is the point of least resistance... Relations (with Czecho-Slovakia)are formally correct, but in actual fact they are extremely bad, and it is the intention of Hungarian Government to give apparent proofs of good will while avoiding for the present any relations between Budapest and Prague.[82]

In the meantime, however, the Little Entente States tried to achieve *rapprochement* with Hungary, and Hungary engaged herself in negotiations at Sinaia, Rumania, in August 1937. In order to save German confidence at the same time, Kánya first contacted the German Legation in Switzerland, on September 21, 1937, while he was attending the League of Nations Assembly sessions, and tried to explain the reasons why Hungary engaged in dealings with the Little Entente States, including Czecho-Slovakia.[83] In the second half of November 1937, Kánya, together with Prime Minister Darányi, visited Berlin and held conversations with Hitler and other Nazi German officials. At several meetings between the German and Hungarian statesmen, it was agreed upon common concentration of pressure against Czecho-Slovakia[84] as well as upon close co-operation

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pp. 36-37. Hereafter cited as: *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*. Also see Miklós Szinai és László Szücs, ed., *Horthy Miklós Titkos Iratai*, második kiadás (Budapest, 1963), Doc. 32, pp. 157-167. Hereafter cited as: *Horthy's Secret Documents*.

[82] *Ibid.*, p. 66. See also *Hungarian Documents*, Doc. 13, pp. 63-72.

[83] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 141.

[84] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 149. The conference was held at Berlin, on November 25, 1937. Participants: Adolf Hitler; Reich Foreign Minister, von Neurath; Dr. Meissner, State Secretary. Hungary was represented by Prime Minister Darányi; Foreign Minister Kánya; and the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, General Döme

between the German and Hungarian minorities in Czecho-Slovakia against that state.[85] At the same time, the Hungarians expressed their willingness to concede to Yugoslavia that Hungarian territorial claims would not be made the object of military action, provided Yugoslavia would accord cultural autonomy to the Hungarian minority. To neutralize Yugoslavia in case of a war in which Hungary would be engaged against Czecho-Slovakia,

the Führer very warmly welcomed this proposal by the Hungarian Government to Yugoslavia; since it was not possible to break up the Little Entente one had to try to weaken its internal cohesion; an agreement such as had been outlined by Kánya appeared the proper means to obtain that end. He, the Führer, declared himself willing to discuss this proposal with Stoyadinovich, who was also coming to Berlin shortly, and to support it.

The Hungarian Ministers declared that they would be only too grateful for this.[86]

Since this Hungarian plan was useful to Germany, too, Hitler presented this Hungarian wish to the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Dr. Milan

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Sztojay. The Hungarian statesmen brought with them a porcelain service to Hitler as a personal gift from Horthy. Also see *Hungarian Documents*, Doc. 16, p. 79-81. After Darányi's presentation of the Hungarian claims against the three Little Entente countries, Hitler advised the Hungarians to concentrate their efforts against Czecho-Slovakia alone rather than to split their political power into different directions. Darányi and Kánya agreed.

[85] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 148. In accordance with this decision, closer ties between the Sudeten German Party leader, Konrad Henlein, and the leader of the Hungarian minority in Czecho-Slovakia, Count János Esterházy, were established. In February 1938, Count Esterházy together with Karl Hermann Frank, in capacity as representative of Konrad Henlein, and Franz Künzel, another Sudeten German Party Deputy to the Czecho-Slovak Parliament, visited Budapest and held important conversations with Hungarian Prime Minister Darányi and Foreign Minister Kánya (on February 12, 1938) as well as with Dr. Tibor Pataky, the State Secretary for Minorities in the office of the Hungarian Prime Minister, in the presence of Dr. Flachbarth, formerly the Secretary of the Magyar Parliamentary Club in the Czecho-Slovak Parliament (on February 11, 1938). In their conversations, Dr. Pataky discussed very openly the Hungarian plans for revisionism and "made no secret of Hungary's effort to contribute to Czecho-Slovakia's disappearance from the map of Europe." Kánya stressed that he "could only see the problem of the revision of the peace treaties from the point of view of the rights of the Crown of St. Stephen" i. e. the annexation of all pre-World War I territories which Hungary lost to Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon. Thus, not only the Magyar minorities were claimed by Kánya. See *DGFP*, D, II, Docs. 58, 59 and 60.

[86] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 149.

Stoyadinovich, during the latter's visit in Berlin on January 17, 1938. On this occasion Hitler stressed the fact that "he still regarded a slow bolshevization of Europe as the greatest danger" of the time. He mentioned Czecho-Slovakia as a "danger spot" in this respect, in order to disinterest the conservatively-minded Serbian in the fate of Czecho-Slovakia. At the same time, he assured the Prime Minister that "Germany was, in her own interest, in favor of a strong Yugoslavia" and while the Germans had "certain common interests with Hungary in the direction of Czechoslovakia, but none whatsoever as far as Rumania and Yugoslavia were concerned." [87] Further, Hitler said that a suitable treatment of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia could make a way for a Yugoslav-Hungarian *rapprochement.* Should Yugoslavia be interested in coming to a clear understanding with Hungary and in developing such an understanding in the form of a treaty, "Germany would be prepared to take... the role of the guarantor" of the present Yugoslav-Hungarian border.

These assurances influenced Yugoslavia's maneuvering at the time of the Czecho-Slovak crisis. With regard to the future annexation of Austria by Germany, Stoyadinovich declared in advance that "the Austrian question was for Yugoslavia a purely domestic German question" while "as far as Hungary was concerned, the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia was today already fairly well satisfied." Stoyadinovich wanted Hitler to understand that Yugoslavia remained as a member of the Little Entente and that he tried to do his best to prevent an "extension of the Little Entente into a general mutual alliance pact, but the Hungarian question was the core of the alliance of the Little Entente" therefore the Hungarians should take this fact into consideration in their revisionist activities.[88] In other words, Yugoslavia and Rumania would be obliged to defend Czecho-Slovakia in case of a Hungarian attack, while they would have no such obligation in case of an attack on that state by some other country.

To win Hitler's grace, Hungary declared as early as the second half of the month of January 1938 that she "had no objections whatever to Austria's incorporation into the German Reich" [89] and soon

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[87] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 163.

[88] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 163.

[89] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 173. On March 16, 1938, two days after Hitler's forces occupied Austria, Hungary congratulated Hitler on this event. At the same time, Hungarian Deputy de Mecser said that the late Prime Minister Gömbös had informed him after his Berlin visit to the Führer that the

thereafter, on March 4, 1938, the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, Döme Sztojay, presented the wish of his Government to the newly appointed German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, to renew preparations for common military action against Czecho-Slovakia.[90] Inquiring about the German position with regard to military co-operation between Hungary and Germany, on April 1, 1938, Sztojay at the same time presented Hungarian claims for Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, supporting these demands by the fact that

> the Führer had told the Hungarian gentlemen (probably Messers. Darányi and Kánya during their visit in Berlin, November 21-29, 1937) that the whole of the territory at present Czechoslovak and formerly Hungarian must fall to Hungary again; he, the Führer, was not even interested in Pressburg.[91]

The German State Secretary, Ernst von Weizsäcker, gave an evasive answer to Sztojay at this time saying that these questions could be best clarified through diplomatic channels by the customary use of memoranda. Sztojay did not let the Germans wait too long for such a memorandum. On April 11, 1938, the Hungarian Minister in Berlin presented to the Reich Foreign Minister a written document in which there was stated that by a German-Hungarian simultaneous move:

Führer promised that in case of the *Anschluss* of Austria he would return to Hungary the territory in Burgenland detached from her by the Treaty of Trianon and annexed by Austria. Mecser added that "Hungary would also value such a decision as the first breach of the Trianon Treaty" and it was likewise in German interest "to annul" it after Germany had disposed of those of Versailles and St. Germain. A similar private approach was made by Hungarian Baron Malcomes to the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop* on March 14, 1938; and on March 18, 1938, the well known British supporter of Hungarian revisionism, Lord Newton, made a similar proposal in a letter to *The Times*. The publication of this letter in the Hungarian press was stopped by the German Minister in Budapest, Otto von Erdmannsdorff. The German answer was that "The Führer was not considering any such gifts at the present time." See *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 182.

[90] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 65. Hungarian Defense Minister, General Röder, and Hungarian Chief of General Staff, General Jenö Rátz, were present at the maneuvers of German armed forces in autumn 1937. It was then agreed between them and the German War Minister, Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, to commence operational General Staff talks during the winter of 1937-1938. However, Hitler disapproved this plan, and since Werner von Blomberg retired in February 1938, it was possible to give the Hungarians some evasive answer. See *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 66. Thus, on March 12, 1938, Marshal Hermann Göring told Döme Sztojay that before concentrating against Czecho-Slovakia, first the Austrian problem must be solved. See *Hungarian Documents*, Doc. 18, p. 84.

[91] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 114.

a. The whole of Czechoslovakia could be seized *at once*, making it questionable whether the Czech Army could even completely mobilize. On the other hand a shifting of forces from northern Hungary (*Sic!* The Hungarian revisionists called Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine as northern Hungary in their publications) to the western border would be prevented.

b. A landing by Russian air forces in northern Hungary (*Sic!* — probably the airports of Uzhhorod and Košice were meant here) would be made impossible from the *very* first moment,

and in view of technical and political necessities in the common preparations

the zones, objectives and missions could be outlined in advance; plans could be made accordingly, and misunderstandings could be excluded from the start. The latter would be of particular significance.[92]

Though for reasons of his own, Hitler was not inclined to let his General Staff plan the attack on Czecho-Slovakia together with the Hungarian General Staff, after

official Hungarian circles have repeatedly made references in the Reich War Ministry and in the Foreign Ministry to the German-Hungarian general staff discussions promised last fall by Field Marshal von Blomberg regarding a common attitude in the case of a war with Czechoslovakia,[93]

the Chief of the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht,* General Wilhelm Keitel, promised to the Director of the Hungarian counter-espionage service, who visited Berlin at the beginnng of April, 1938, that he would be glad to go to Budapest some time for this purpose, but he was not certain as to when, in the course of the coming summer, he would be able to do it.

While Konrad Henlein, leader of the Sudeten German Party, played his role in Czecho-Slovakia in accordance with a definite decision by Adolf Hitler and his closest co-operators in Berlin of March 29, 1938,[94] the political and military leadership of the Reich ad-

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[92] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 190.

[93] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 192.

[94] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 109. A detailed discussion on the Sudeten German question was held in the German Foreign Ministry at Berlin, on March 29, 1938, in which the following persons participated: Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop; State Secretary von Mackensen; State Secretary von Weizsäcker; German Minister in Prague, Eisenlohr; Minister Stieve; *Legationsrats* von Twardowski, Altenburg and Kordt; all from the Foreign Ministry. The *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* was represented by SS-Obergruppenführer Lorenz, and Professor Haushofer. The Sudeten German Party leaders: Konrad Henlein, Karl Hermann Frank, Dr. Künzel and Dr. Kreissl. The day before, on March

justed and re-adjusted their plan for *Fall Grün*,[95] i. e. military destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, in accordance with the current internal and external Czecho-Slovak situation. Most of the versions of the *Fall Grün* called for the concentration of German military forces in such a way that the Western parts of Czecho-Slovakia, Bohemia and Moravia, would be occupied in a sudden and unexpected action. It is interesting to note that in none of the versions of the *Fall Grün* can we find any statement with regard to what should happen with Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. No plans are discussed in those documents which would lead us to believe that German forces were to occupy these territories also. On the other hand, in the version of the *Fall Grün* of May 30, 1938, signed by Hitler, it is stated that in case of successful German operations against Czecho-Slovakia, after two or three days "the intervention of Hungary and Poland against Czechoslovakia can be expected." [96] Just a few days later, at the beginning of June 1938, Field Marshal Hermann Göring told the Hungarian Minister in Berlin Döme Sztojay, that "it would be well if Hungary were at once to take active part in any armed conflict between Germany and Czechoslovakia." [97] That way, the road for Hungarian participation in the liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia was opened. Thereafter, the Hungarian Minister in Berlin kept himself busy obtaining information from the Reich Foreign Ministry about latest developments in the Czecho-Slovak question. Of course, Hungary would "receive her share" of Czecho-Slovakia, Göring told Sztojay on a later occasion at which time the Hungarian Minister assured

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28, 1938, Konrad Henlein had a long conversation with Adolf Hitler, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and SS-Obergruppenführer Lorenz. At this meeting K. H. Frank was also present. Besides agreeing on the tactics of Konrad Henlein in his negotiations with the Czecho-Slovak Government, which was willing to accept — probably, to a great extent under British and French pressure — practically all Henlein's demands short of secession from Czecho-Slovakia, Hitler named K. Henlein his *Statthalter* (Viceroy) for Sudetenland. Hitler instructed K. Henlein that "demands should be made by the Sudeten German Party which are unacceptable to the Czech Government" and Ribbentrop stressed the point that "it must be made clear in the negotiations that the Sudeten German Party alone, not the Reich Government, was the negotiating party with the Czecho-Slovak Government." For the further collaboration, K. Henlein was advised to maintain closest possible contact with the Reich Foreign Minister, with the leader of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*, Lorenz, and the German Minister in Prague.

[95] See above, footnote No. 79, p. 190.

[96] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 221.

[97] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 248.

Germany again that "Hungary was prepared to join the struggle to the best of her ability." [98]

The months of the Czecho-Slovak crisis in the summer of 1938, which was watched by all the leading world powers in the fear of an outbreak of a world war, were very rich in German-Hungarian high level contacts. After the visit of General Keitel in Budapest on June 14, 1938, the Hungarian statesmen of the highest level, including the Regent, Nicholas Horthy, Prime Minister Dr. Béla Imrédy, and Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya, followed Hitler's invitation and visited Germany during the August 1938 maneuvers of the German Navy. While General Keitel discussed in Budapest with Regent Horthy the question of cooperation of both General Staffs, the Hungarian statesmen during their talks with Adolf Hitler and Joachim von Ribbentrop repeatedly "made it clear that Hungary intended to cooperate" [99] with Germany against Czecho-Slovakia, and "by October 1 this year (1938) their armament would be so far advanced as to enable them to take part," [100] despite the fact that Hitler stated to Imrédy that "in this particular case, he required nothing of Hungary." [101] The Hungarian readiness for military operations against her northern neighbor coincided perfectly with the German version of the *Fall Grün* of June 18, 1938, in which is stated in Hitler's words: "I am resolved, as from October 1, 1938, onward, to make full use of every favorable political opportunity for the realization of this aim" [102] as well as with the new decision of Hitler and his military

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[98] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 284.

[99] DGFP, D, II, Doc. 383. This statement was made by Horthy to Hitler on board of the ship "Patria" while watching naval maneuvers at Kiel, on August 23, 1938. For Horthy's description of his visit in Germany see Admiral Nicholas Horthy, *Memoirs* (London, 1956), pp. 159-166.

[100] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 390. On August 25, 1938, Kánya had tried to justify before Ribbentrop the Hungarian action at Bled, Slovenia, which aroused some dissatisfaction with Hitler. On August 23, 1938, at the end of discussions at Bled between representatives of the Little Entente States and Hungary, a communiqué was issued stating that the provisional agreement reached "includes the recognition by the three States of the Little Entente of Hungary's equality of rights as regards armament, as well as the mutual renunciation of any recourse to force between Hungary and the States of the Little Entente." For full text see The Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs* (London, 1942), Vol. I, p. 284.

[101] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 383. On August 23, 1938.

[102] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 282. Of course, "the favorable political opportunity" was to be created by Germans themselves. In his version of the *Fall Grün* of May 30, 1938, after the Czecho-Slovak counter-action through mobilization on May 21, 1938, Hitler formulated the following prerequisits for the intended at-

leaders taken a few days after the visit of the Hungarian statesmen, at a conference in Nürnberg, on September 9-10, 1938.[103]

After Adolf Hitler's famous speech at the *Parteitag* in Nürnberg, on September 12, 1938, in which he demanded the right of self-determination for the Sundeten Germans, and the simultaneous action of the Sudeten German Party on that "rebellious Sunday" in its demonstrations in Reichenberg and Eger (in Czech Liberec and Cheb, respectively) under the slogan *"Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer,"* the very next day, on September 13, 1938, Konrad Henlein broke off negotiations with the Czecho-Slovak Government and announced from Asch that the only solution for the Sudeten German question would be a plebiscite regarding the incorporation of Sudetenland into the German Reich.[104] Immediately thereafter, Hungary and Poland announced their claims for the equality of treatment of Magyar and Polish minorities in Czecho-Slovakia with that of the Sudeten German solution. The Hungarian Minister in Berlin, Döme Sztojay, presented this wish of his Government at the Reich Foreign Ministry on September 14, 1938, and at the same time disclosed that "this communication was also going to the Western Powers and was primarily intended for them." [105] Since "Germany had brought about

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tack: "a. A convenient apparent excuse, and with it, b. Adequate political justification, c. Action not expected by the enemy which will find him in the least possible state of readiness." See *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 221.

[103] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 448. At this conference were present: Adolf Hitler; General Walter von Brauchitsch, Commander in Chief of the German Army; General of Artillery Franz Halder; General Keitel; Hitler's Military Adjutant Major Schmundt; Captain Engel and Captain von Below.

[104] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 473. On September 7, 1938, five days before Hitler's speech, *The Times* (London) published a leading article in which the opinion was expressed that Czecho-Slovakia would become a more homogeneous State, and actually gain in strength, if certain strips of territory were lopped off and ceded to that country to which their population belonged by race. The article created a worldwide sensation and was taken as a clear warning that Great Britain had in fact abandoned the defense of Czecho-Slovakia's territorial integrity. Also Lord Runciman, who spent several months in Czecho-Slovakia to study the Sudeten German question and eventually to mediate in it, in his final report to the British Government stated: "I consider... that frontier districts should at once be transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany." Cited in Adda von Bruemmer-Bozeman, *Czecho-Slovakia: Its Rise and Fall* (Dallas, Texas, 1938), Arnold Foundation Studies in Public Affairs, Vol. VII, No. 3, p. 18. For the full text see "Lord Runciman's Letter to Mr. Neville Chamberlain" dated September 21, 1938, and published in His Majesty's Stationary Office, *British White Paper of September 28th, 1938*. (London, 1938).

[105] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 478. In reply to inquiries by the British and French

an understanding with Poland" too, Hitler was able to state to the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, who came to Berchtesgaden on September 15, 1938, to see Hitler in his efforts to save peace, that "apart from the demands of the Sudeten Germans, similar demands would, of course, be made by the Poles, Hungarians, and Ukrainians living in Czechoslovakia, which it would be impossible to ignore," though he added that "he was, of course, not their spokesman." [106] The next day, on September 16, 1938, in the forenoon hours, Field Marshal Hermann Göring expressed his dissatisfaction to the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, Döme Sztojay, that

there was complete calm prevailing in the Hungarian minority districts in Czechoslovakia in contrast to the Sudeten German ones, and... neither the Hungarian Government nor even the leader of the Hungarian minority had demanded in clear terms the detachment of the Hungarian region from Czechoslovakia.[107]

Sztojay contacted immediately Count István Csáky, then Chef de Cabinet in Kánya's Foreign Ministry, and in the course of the afternoon of the same day he received instructions from Kánya to inform Field Marshal H. Göring and the Reich Foreign Ministry that:

1. The Hungarian press and the Hungarian ethnic group in Czechoslovakia would be activated to an increased extent from now on...

Governments about the Polish attitude with respect to the Czecho-Slovak crisis, the Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck stated, in agreement with Polish Cabinet, that in the Polish opinion, a settlement could only be reached on the basis of the right of self-determination. If it should come to a plebiscite in the minority regions of Czecho-Slovakia, Poland would also expect that due consideration should be given to the Polish minority. The Polish Ambassadors in London, Paris, Rome, and Bucharest, and also the Ministers in Belgrade and Budapest had been instructed on September 16, 1938, to communicate this point of view to the Governments concerned. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Béla Imrédy, in his letter to Adolf Hitler dated September 20, 1938, expressed his fear that "the Czechoslovak question is to be settled with the utmost consideration for the interests of the Sudeten German population, but that, on the other hand, the demands of the Hungarian, Polish and other nationalities (*Sic!*) are not to be considered in any way" adding that "such a settlement would not only arouse the greatest indignation in Hungarian public opinion but would also be opposed by the Hungarian Government most energetically." Imrédy further informed Hitler that he brought this Hungarian point of view to the notice of both the British and French Governments "in no uncertain terms." See *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 541. For the text of Regent Horthy's personal letter to Adolf Hitler dated September 17, 1938, in which Horthy expressed his certain hope for Hitler's full support of Hungarian claims, see *Horthy's Secret Documents*, Doc. 35, p. 178.

[106] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 487.

[107] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 506.

2. The Hungarian Ministers in Prague and London would be instructed to inform the respective Governments that Hungary was demanding a plebiscite for the Hungarian minority districts...

3. Complete understanding had been reached between Hungary and Poland... Poland was not making any claims on Slovakia, but only to the Teschen district, and certain minor frontier rectifications in Slovak territory regarding which complete agreement had been reached down to the last detail. It would thereby be presupposed that Slovakia would receive far-reaching autonomy within the framework of the Hungarian State.[108]

Expecting a visit of Imrédy and Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Józef Lipski, with the Führer on Sept. 20, 1938, the Reich Foreign Ministry, formulating the conditions of the plebiscite in Sudetenland, at the same time prepared a preliminary plan for the German position with regard to the Polish and Hungarian demands, especially regarding Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. Since the method of plebiscite was popular at that moment, it was resolved that if a plebiscite were to be held in Slovakia, then the following questions were to be put on the ballot: "Do you wish to join Hungary? Do you wish to form an independent State? or Do you still wish to remain in a Ramp Czechoslovakia?" [109] The Germans did not believe that the Slovaks would decide in a free plebiscite in favor of Hungary. At the same time, the plan contained a statement that "there must be a special settlement regarding the Ukrainians in Czecho-Slovakia" without any specification of the nature of this settlement.[110]

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[108] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 506. It is interesting to note the absence of any mentioning of Carpatho-Ukraine in this document. It is to be assumed as self-evident that Hungary demanded Carpatho-Ukraine according to her revisionist actions. Döme Sztojay was also instructed to explain to Marshal Göring why the Hungarians were behaving carefully in Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia. They did not wish to push the Rumanians closer to the Soviet Union because in case of their military defense of Czecho-Slovakia they would occupy the Hungarian Lowlands. See *Hungarian Documents*, Doc. 36, pp. 127-128.

[109] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 536. The Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kálmán Kánya, informed the Hungarian Minister in Warsaw, András Hory, that the leader of the Slovak Hlinka's Party, Msgr. Jozef Tiso, summed up Slovak conditions for eventual joining Hungary in the following three points: "1. Central Office with the executive powers concerning administration of Slovakia and the use of Slovak as the official language; 2. Separate Slovak Parliament with legislative powers in the affairs of internal administration, religion, education, and justice; and 3. Guaranteed budget quota for Slovakia." Tiso's conditions were accepted by the Hungarian authorities. See *Hungarian Documents*, Doc. 39.

[110] Being prepared for the military "solution" of the Czecho-Slovak problem with Hungarian cooperation in it, Carpatho-Ukraine was regarded as the Hungarian "share." Therefore, only after a "peaceful" solution was in prospect, did the Germans change their position with regard to Carpatho-Ukraine. This

In order to strengthen his bargaining position at the second meeting with the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, commencing on September 22, 1938, at Bad Godesberg, Hitler presented to the Hungarian visitors, Prime Minister Béla Imrédy and his Foreign Minister Kánya, on September 20, 1938, at Berchtesgaden, two demands, namely:

1. that Hungary should make an immediate demand for a plebiscite in the territories which she claimed, and

2. that she should not guarantee any proposed new frontiers for Czechoslovakia. In certain circumstances Hungary might threaten to resign from the League of Nations and to establish a *Freikorps*.[111]

The Hungarian Prime Minister, Béla Imrédy, promised to send immediately to the Führer a document formulating the Hungarian claims[112] and affirmed that Hungary would only guarantee a new Czecho-Slovak frontier when all Hungarian demands had been satisfied. On the same day, Hitler received Polish Ambassador, Lipski, and requested him to obtain a similar document from the Polish Government which would precisely formulate the Polish demands against Czecho-Slovakia.

Immediately after his visit with Hitler, Lipski reported the results of the talks to his Government. The Polish Government on the following day, September 21, 1938, presented a note to the Czecho-Slovak Government, and another addressed to the British Government, demanding equality of treatment of the demands of Polish and Hungarian minorities with that of Sudeten Germans.[113] The Hungarian Government presented a similar note to the Prague Government on September 22, 1938, as Poland had the day before. Hungary

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is, probably, the only way to explain the fact that Hitler and Ribbentrop formulated Germany's position in that question only after the Munich Conference. See *DGFP*, D, IV, Docs. 45, 46 and 50.

[111] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 554. On October 10, 1938, over 600 irregulars were sent from Hungary into the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia to stir up disorder. Besides those killed in action, over 300 Hungarian terrorists were taken prisoners by the Czecho-Slovak defense forces on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine. On October 16, 1938, Hungarian diplomat Count István Csáky asked Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano to intervene in Prague for clemency. This was the beginning of the terrorist activity in Carpatho-Ukraine by her southern and northern neighbors. See *Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938*, trans. by Andreas Mayor, (London, 1952), pp. 175 and 178. Hereafter cited as: *Ciano's Diary 1937-1938*. Also see *Hungarian Documents*, pp. 139-142.

[112] See above, footnote No. 105, pp. 198-199.

[113] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 553.

demanded that the same settlement for the Hungarian minority as for the Sudeten Germans should be applied.[114] In both cases, the German Government was notified, and Hitler made use of these notes at the conversation with British Prime Minister Chamberlain at Bad Godesberg on September 22 and 23, 1938, making himself a spokesman for Hungarian, Polish and Slovak interests, too.[115] At these talks Hitler abandoned the idea of a plebiscite as causing some difficulties and proposed "to agree on a cession of territory by Czecho-slovakia to the Reich" and presented a memorandum outlining the process of the withdrawal of Czecho-Slovak armed forces and law-enforcing authorities from Sudetenland and the handing over to Germany by October 1, 1938. A plebiscite was to be held only in some mixed territories, before November 25, 1938.[116]

Finally, the Hungarian Government formulated its claims against Czecho-Slovakia, and on September 23, 1938, transmitted them directly to Hitler and Chamberlain at Bad Godesberg. These demands were as follows:

1. Reincorporation into Hungary of the Hungarian-inhabited territories of the present (September 1938) Czecho-Slovakia.
2. Practical guarantee of the right of self-determination for the Slovaks and Ruthenians incorporated in the present Czecho-Slovakia.[117]

While the Polish demands were accepted by the Prague Government in principle almost immediately, and in addition to it President Beneš wrote a letter on September 26, 1938, to the Polish President, Ignacy Mościcki, aiming at a *rapprochement* and economic cooperation,[118] the Hungarian claims were rejected by Prague. On September 26, 1938, the Czecho-Slovak Government refused to negotiate with the Hungarian Government on the basis of the above stated demands, and Foreign Minister, Dr. Kamil Krofta, added verbally to the Hungarian Minister in Prague, Dr. János Wettstein, that

the Czecho-Slovak Government is prepared to concede to citizens of the Czecho-Slovak State of Hungarian nationality the rights defined in the Nationalities Statute, which was drawn up during the negotiations with the German citizens of the Czecho-Slovak State.[119]

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[114] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 560.
[115] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 562.
[116] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 584.
[117] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 586.
[118] *DGFP*, D, II, Docs. 629, 639 and 652.
[119] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 630. For an account of the efforts of the Czecho-Slovak Government to satisfy the national minorities by passing the Nationalities

Thus, the Hungarian demands remained open to solution by the Munich Conference of the *Big Four* to which also Count István Csáky as a Hungarian "lobbyist" hurriedly arrived.

POLAND SUPPORTS HUNGARIAN CLAIMS

Mutual relations between Czecho-Slovakia and Poland in the years between the two world wars were rather uneasy, and it would be difficult to call them fair or good-neighbor-like. At the same time, Poland concluded with Czecho-Slovakia's friend, France, an alliance as early as on January 19, 1921.[120] With another Czecho-Slovak ally in the Little Entente, Rumania, she signed on March 3, 1921 a treaty of alliance including a provision for mutual armed assistance.[121] An effort to affect a *rapprochement* between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia was made in November 1921, when the Polish Foreign Minister, Skir- in the Little Entente, Rumania, she signed on March 3, 1921, a treaty of friendship at Prague. This agreement provided for benevolent neutrality in the event of an attack on either by a third state, permitted free passage of war materials, and prohibited propaganda against each other. Poland was to disinterest herself in the common Polish-Hungarian border, while Czecho-Slovakia did the same with respect to Eastern Galicia.[122] Had this agreement been ratified, a basis might have been laid for solid opposition to German expansion. However, Poland was still bitter over the attitude of Czecho-Slovakia toward the Polish war against the Russian Bolsheviks as well as against the Ukrainian National Republic in 1919-1920 and the Těšín question,[123] and, therefore, failed to ratify this treaty.

In his speech in the Polish Parliament of July 25, 1923, Polish Foreign Minister Seyda proposed that the Little Entente be organized into a four-power pact, mutually guaranteeing the frontiers of the four states concerned.[124] The Polish-Czech talks were opened thereafter, and although they did not lead to an alliance, on April 23, 1925,

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Statute in 1938, see Vojta Benes, *The Vanguard of the "Drang nach Osten"* (Chicago, 1942), p. 94.

[120] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. XVIII, p. 12.

[121] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. VII, p. 78.

[122] F. J. Vondraček, *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1935* (New York, 1937), p. 180.

[123] Waclaw Lypacewicz, *Polish-Czech Relations* (Warsaw, 1936), pp. 13-16 and 48.

[124] Kazimierz Smogorzewski, "Polska i Czechoslowacja," *Gazeta Polska* (Warsaw), June 8, 1938.

the two Governments concluded an agreement providing for the arbitration and conciliation of all disputes except problems arising from territorial questions.[125] Following the Locarno Agreement, which pleased Czecho-Slovakia no more than Poland, Polish Foreign Minister Skrzyński went to Prague in April 1926 and again proposed an alliance. However, at this time, Czecho-Slovakia declined on the ground that Poland might soon be involved in a war with Germany over the so-called Corridor, with Lithuania over Vilnius, and eventually with the USSR over the Ukrainian inhabited Eastern Galicia and Volynia.[126] Realizing the growing German danger, the Czecho-Slovak diplomats hinted in 1933 that it might be desirable for Poland to join the Little Entente,[127] but Poland at that time had already been engaged in the support of Hungarian revisionism,[128] and preferred Hungarian friendship over the cooperation with the Little Entente States whose alliance was primarily directed against Hungarian revisionist aspirations.

When, on the other hand, Adolf Hitler in a conversation with Polish Minister in Berlin, Wysocki, on May 2, 1933, concerning German-Polish differences hinted that he "only hoped that the political questions still pending between Germany and Poland would one day be investigated and dealt with dispassionately by the statesmen of both countries," [129] Poland immediately responded and the negotiations with regard to the improvement of economic and political relations were initiated by Marshal Pilsudski. They soon resulted in the signing of the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of January 26, 1934, for a period of ten years.[130] The conclusion of this treaty was another blow at Polish-Czech understanding. As far as Carpatho-Ukraine was concerned, at the time when German-Polish negotiations were going on, it was revealed that the Polish Consul in Uzhhorod, M. Swierżyński, had financed the publication of the daily *Karpatorusskiy Golos,* edited by Stepan Fencyk, a secret pro-revisionist promulgator. It was proven that the Consul himself wrote

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[125] League of Nations, *Treaty Series,* Vol. XLVIII, p. 383.

[126] Casimir Smogorzewski, "Poland's Foreign Relations," *Slavonic Review,* December 1937.

[127] Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1936* (London, 1925-1937), Vol. I, p. 287.

[128] See above, pp. 182-183.

[129] German Foreign Office, *Documents on the events preceding the outbreak of the War* (New York, 1940), Doc. No. 26.

[130] *Ibid.,* Doc. No. 37.

articles for that paper, and the Polish Government felt obliged to recall him to Warsaw, at the beginning of December 1933.[131]

After Czecho-Slovak efforts to improve mutual relations with Poland and in that way to decrease the number of revisionist States to Germany and Hungary proved to be without success, France decided to use her good offices in this respect. The German danger became even more evident after Hitler decided, in the summer of 1936, to raise the period of military service to two years. France immediately sent General Gamelin to Warsaw, in August 1936, in order to re-activate the still existing Franco-Polish alliance of 1921. After the five day visit of the Chief of the French General Staff in Warsaw (August 12-17, 1936), the Polish Marshal Rydz-Smigly almost immediately repaid the visit to Paris (August 30 to September 6, 1936). As a result of the conversations during these visits, a Franco-Polish protocal was signed on September 5, 1936, at Rambouillet which reaffirmed the alliance between the two countries, defined the terms of collaboration of their military staffs, and settled France's financial contribution towards the defensive organization of Poland.[132] The French Government published a communiqué, on September 7th, after the departure of Marshal Rydz-Smigly, containing a passage stating that as a result of Franco-Polish talks a *détente* in relations between Czecho-Slovakia and Poland was to be expected; in reality, however, the ties between the two countries were not brought much closer. Another unsuccessful effort in this respect was made by the French Foreign Minister, Yvon Delbos, during his visit to Poland at the beginning of December 1937. Delbos, in his talks with Polish statesmen, referred to the conciliatory proposals regarding the treatment of the Polish minority in Czecho-Slovakia recently made by the Czecho-Slovak Prime Minister, Dr. Milan Hodža, before the budget committee of the Czecho-Slovak Parliament. But "the Poles gave M. Delbos clearly to understand that no mediation by a third power, not even by their French ally, was desired for the settlement of Polish-Czech relations." [133]

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[131] *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Uzhhorod), November 1, 1933, and December 15, 1933. Two years later, in October 1935, the Czecho-Slovak Government withdrew the *exequatur* of the Polish Consul at Moravská Ostrava, charging that he, too, was intriguing with revisionist agents in Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia. See Raymond Leslie Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe*, 3rd edition (New York, 1939), p. 340.

[132] *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*, pp. 38-39.

[133] *DGFP*, D, I, Doc. 64.

On January 10, 1938, the Polish Foreign Minister, Józef Beck, delivered an address on Polish foreign relations before the Polish Parliament. While, on the one hand, he stated that the "Franco-Polish alliance is still the cornerstone of Polish foreign policy," at the same time, despite the fact that at that time a serious friction had already existed between Germany and Poland over the status of the Free City of Danzig, the Corridor, and the German minority in Poland,[134] Beck spoke of "good-neighborly relations" with Germany.[135] In the same speech, Colonel Beck stated that "as in the past" the relations with Hungary are "very friendly and heartfelt" realized in practice by the Polish "sympathy with Hungarian revisionist desires in relation to Czechoslovakia." And, despite the efforts of Czecho-Slovakia's main ally, France, and those of Dr. Milan Hodža himself, Beck declared that Polish relations with Czecho-Slovakia "remain bad." Three days later, Beck visited Hitler and his Foreign Minister, Freiherr von Neurath, and in a conversation with the latter said that Poland's relations with Czecho-Slovakia "could not be worse, and he could not imagine that they would ever change." [136]

The spirit of the Hungarian-Polish-German cooperation with regard to their revisionist aims against Czecho-Slovakia was strengthened during the visit of the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Nicholas Horthy, and his Foreign Minister, Kánya, to Poland, February 6-10, 1938. During the hunting party at Bialowieza in which the Polish President, Ignacy Mościcki; the Commander in Chief of the Army, Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly; the Foreign Minister, Józef Beck;

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[134] See *DGFP*, D, V, Docs. 1, 3, 11, 13, 14 and 23. While on November 18, 1936, Hitler declared that he saw in the German-Polish Agreement of January 26, 1934, "an important instrument of peace and, particularly in view of the increasing bolshevization of Europe and the need for a common defense, the agreement was one of the foundations of German foreign policy," he had kept his demand for permission to construct an *Autobahn* (a divided superhighway) through the Corridor between East Prussia and the other territories of the Reich alive since May 1935. The issue had been raised again in October 1937, and the Polish refusal constituted one of the reasons for the German attack on Poland on September 1, 1939. The Reich Foreign Minister, Freiherr von Neurath, said, some two months before Józef Beck made his speech, to the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Lipski, that the "restoration of German Danzig to its natural connection with the Reich" would be the only possible result of German-Polish talks on Danzig problem.

[135] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 25. For the full text of Beck's address see The Royal Institute for International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs* (London, 1942), Vol. I, pp. 306-311.

[136] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 28.

and General Sossenkowski participated, Admiral Horthy advised his Polish friends that

> in spite of the fact that the creation of the Corridor and the separation of Danzig from the German Empire in 1919 had set up a permanent cause of friction between Poland and Germany, yet Poland, with the increasingly powerful Communist Soviet Union on her borders, should more than ever try to come to an agreement with Germany.[137]

A few days after his return from the trip to Poland, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kálmán Kánya, was able to tell the leaders of the Hungarian and German minorities in Czecho-Slovakia, who came to Budapest in order to plan a coordinated action against Czecho-Slovakia,[138] that "his talks with Polish statesmen had shown that Budapest and Warsaw were of the same mind in regard to the political fate of Czechoslovakia." [139]

After the May crisis around Czecho-Slovakia seemed to have cooled-off, the Czecho-Slovak Government once more made a desperate effort to come to terms with Poland. Not only was the Czecho-Slovak Government ready to grant all cultural and economic rights to the Polish minority within Czecho-Slovakia, but it was prepared to conclude a treaty of friendship taking upon itself most of the burdens of such a treaty. Poland, however, for reasons of her own declined this offer.[140]

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[137] Nicholas Horthy, *Memoirs* (London, 1956), p. 156.

[138] See above, footnote No. 85, p. 192.

[139] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 60.

[140] In order to improve the Polish-Czech relations and at the same time to change the constellation of powers on the European continent in case of a war, the Czecho-Slovak Government handed, on June 18, 1938, to the Polish Foreign Minister an invitation to open negotations between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. The Czecho-Slovak Government proposed the following basis for the negotiations: 1. The Czecho-Slovak Government declared its willingness to deliver to the Polish Government armanents and raw materials to a maximum value of five billion Zloty. 2. The Czecho-Slovak Government was willing to relieve the Polish budget of all expenditures for State defense for a period of five years, when the Polish Government would have to start to pay for the Czecho-Slovak deliveries and would have another five years to fulfill the payments. 3. In addition, the Czecho-Slovak Government declared its willingness to grant to the Polish minority in Czecho-Slovakia all rights to independent political, cultural, and economic development. In return for this, the Polish Government would have to renounce the demand for autonomy and independence of the Polish minority in Czecho-Slovakia. 4. The Czecho-Slovak Government declared itself ready to direct all its exports through the Polish port of Gdynia. 5. The Czecho-Slovak Government proposed a speedy revision

The cultivation "of the community of ideas, ideals, and of the brotherhood in arms"[141] between Poland and Hungary continued and reached its peak with the achievement of the much desired common Polish-Hungarian border at the expence of Carpatho-Ukraine. However, this achievement, coinciding with the total liquidation of the Czecho-Slovak Republic on March 15, 1939, also meant a beginning of the end of political freedom for those who participated in the spoils. And, as a result, Hungary could do very little to help Poland when she was attacked by Hitler's military forces, save to offer some charity to the Polish military and civilian refugees.[142] The Polish-Hungarian "brotherhood in arms" proved to be exceedingly weak as compared to the German *Drang nach Osten*. Perhaps the shortsightedness[143] of those directly involved is primarily to be blamed for that situation.

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of the customs and the railway rates. 6. If the Polish Government would accept the invitation to a discussion, the Czecho-Slovak Government would submit the draft of a new trade and payment treaty which would include the most-favored-nation clause. 7. The Czecho-Slovak Government desired and proposed to the Polish Government to agree upon: a) the conclusion of a political treaty of friendship and assistance; and b) a political understanding in Central European questions with the participation of third states.

This secret proposal of the Czecho-Slovak Government leaked out to the French press as well as to the diplomatic circles in Prague, and Ribbentrop ordered his Ambassador in Warsaw, Hans Adolf von Moltke, to ask Colonel Beck about the position of Polish Government to this proposal. Ambassador H. A. von Moltke received from Beck first an evasive answer, therefore he advised Ribbentrop to give to the Poles "a binding assurance with regard to the Teschen territory, perhaps also recognition of Polish interests in Lithuania or in the Soviet Ukraine." Thereafter, on July 9, 1938, Beck assured the German Ambassador that "the Polish Government had not modified its attitude toward Czechoslovakia, nor did it intend to do so." Beck explicitly requested von Moltke to communicate this to Herr von Ribbentrop, the Reich Foreign Minister. See *DGFP*, D, II, Docs. 274, 277 and 287.

[141] *Ilustrowany Kurjer Codzienny* (Kraków), September 25, 1933.

[142] Nicholas Horthy, *Memoirs* (London, 1956), p. 177.

[143] British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, labored hard in an accord with the French statesmen to save peace, especially in the days of September 1938, when the day "X" approached and Hitler was ready to attack Czecho-Slovakia. On September 15, 1938, Chamberlain undertook a trip to Berchtesgaden, where he promised Hitler to use his good offices together with the French statesmen to move the Czechs to accept Hitler's demands. After a common decision was taken by the Governments of Great Britain and France, their Ambassadors in Prague advised the Government of Czecho-Slovakia, on September 19, 1938, for the sake of European peace to agree to hand over Sudetenland regions with 50% of German-speaking inhabitants to the Reich. Now,

Italy, too, contributed her share to the realization of the Hungarian revisionist aims. Benito Mussolini, as has been mentioned earlier in this work,[144] was the first statesman who openly declared himself in support of the Hungarian demand for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon in the sense of Hungarian desires.

Italy had no claims of her own against the succession states, except some differences with Yugoslavia concerning some regions on the Adriatic Sea. It is interesting to note that, at the same time, Italy was on the best of terms with Yugoslavia out of all three Little Entente States. Therefore, the Italian position with regard to the critical European situation in the years of 1938-1939 was primarily determined by her previous treaty commitments with Germany and

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the Czecho-Slovak Government felt isolated, and after long deliberations informed the British and French Governments that it was forced to accept their advice.

In the meantime, the German press published repeatedly articles, from September 20th on, which had shown that the aim of the Hitlerite policy was to liquidate the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia completely. Mussolini's speeches in several Italian cities were directed to the same aim. Under that tremendous pressure, Chamberlain took the pain to visit Hitler again at Bad Godesberg, on September 22 and 23. At this time, Hitler decided to use strong language, as he had told it to the Magyar and Polish diplomats on the 20th of that month. That language as well as the speed of the handing over of Sudetenland regions, disappointed the British Prime Minister. After the news about the dissatisfactory process of the Chamberlain-Hitler talks reached London, the British public opinion accepted the calm reality and the preparations for the military conflict began immediately, especially after the rejection of Hitler's Godesberg terms by the British and French Governments on September 25, 1938. Then came appeals from the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and from the King of Sweden, Gustav VI, as well as the mediation of Mussolini resulting in the Munich Conference.

What did Poland do at the time when her ally, France, and Great Britain resolved to take up arms against Hitler? Among many other things, at the same time, in the evening of September 27, 1938, when British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, addressed the British nation and spoke about the "digging trenches and trying on gasmasks," the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Lipski, in a meeting with State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker discussed the details with regard to "the demarcation line which... should be observed between Polish and German troops if it came to an advance on Czechoslovakia." Poland was resolved to war, but not on the side of her ally, France, and France's ally, Great Britain, but on the side of expansionist Germany. See *DGFP*, D, II, Docs 523, 642, 643, 644, 649, and 653; *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 248; and *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 57. Also see Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston, 1948), pp. 298-325.

[144] See above, pp. 173-174.

Hungary on the one hand, and her political differences with France and Great Britain, on the other. On December 18, 1937, the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, told the Czecho-Slovak Minister in Rome, Dr. František Chvalkovský, that Italian "relations with his country depend on those between Prague and Berlin and Prague and Budapest." Italians themselves, continued Ciano, "have nothing either for or against the Czechs." Italy was not interested in the fate of Czecho-Slovakia, "except indirectly." [145] Italy's "indirect" interest proved to be not a passive one, but rather active, and especially with regard to the Carpatho-Ukrainian question.

In her own interests as well as in those of her Hungarian friends, Italy succeeded to a great extent to make a split between Yugoslavia and the other two members of the Little Entente. As a result of the secret negotiations between Yugoslav and Italian diplomats, which lasted from December 1936 to March 1937, an Italo-Yugoslav Agreement was signed in Rome on March 26, 1937.[146] On the day of the signing of this agreement, the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Dr. Milan Stoyadinovich, in a long conversation with Count Ciano agreed to cooperate very closely with Italy. For that purpose, besides the normal diplomatic channels, the brother of Stoyadinovich was accredited with Ciano, and Ciano's personal friend, Fillippo Anfuso, with the Yugoslav Prime Minister for confidential contacts. As a result of these contacts, the Hungarian-Yugoslav relations were improving while the Yugoslav connections with Czecho-Slovakia and France were cooling-off. Although Stoyadinovich visited Paris on October 12 and 13, 1937, and re-affirmed the validity of the Franco-Yugoslav treaty of November 11, 1927, he rejected an invitation of the French Foreign Minister, Yvone Delbos, to adhere to a pact of mutual assistance between France and the three countries of the Little Entente,[147] a pact so much desired by Czecho-Slovakia.

The Yugoslav Prime Minister, Milan Stoyadinovich, visited Rome on December 6 and 7, 1937. Before he left for Rome, the Czecho-Slovak Government asked him to inquire in Rome whether there were

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[145] *Ciano's Diary: 1937-1938*, p. 43. Italy was linked with Hungary by their Pact of Friendship signed in Rome by Benito Mussolini and Count Stephen Bethlen on April 5, 1927. With Germany, on the other hand, Italy was linked by the Anti-Commintern Pact signed first between Germany and Japan, on November 26, 1936, in Berlin, to which Italy acceded on November 6, 1937, as an original signatory. The protocol was signed in Rome by Joachim von Ribbentrop for Germany, Count Galeazzo Ciano for Italy, and M. Hotta for Japan.

[146] *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*, pp. 98-105.

[147] *Ibid.*, p. 149.

some possibilities of collaboration between Italy and Czecho-Slovakia which might serve to improve the latter's international situation. Stoyadinovich made use of the request, but he expressly added that "he himself adds nothing in the way of recommendation or of pressure" though "he perfectly understood Czechoslovakia's difficult position." Benito Mussolini replied immediately that

> Italy neither can nor wishes to intervene on behalf of Prague in any way. Czechoslovakia finds she must face a most difficult situation which does not interest us directly, whereas it ranges against Czechoslovakia our German and Hungarian friends. Italy has therefore no alternative but to ignore any advance made by Prague.[148]

The Hungarian Minister of War, Gen. Vilmos Röder, who visited Rome primarily for military talks, also had conversations with the Foreign Minister on December 13, 1937, and was "very pleased about the split between Yugoslavia and the other two states of the Little Entente" when Count Ciano informed him about his conferences with Stoyadinovich one week earlier. At the same time, Ciano advised the Hungarians as to what tactics to apply at the current time: "If Hungary wants a victory, she should concentrate her efforts against Czecho-Slovakia, come to a thorough understanding with Belgrade, and find a *modus vivendi* with Bucharest." [149] Further Italian contacts with Belgrade made it possible for Mussolini to assure the Hungarian Prime Minister, Béla Imrédy, and the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kálmán Kánya, on the occasion of their visit in Rome, July 17-20, 1938, that "on the basis of Stoyadinovich's declaration, ... Hungary, by intervening in the conflict after the German attack (on Czecho-Slovakia), will run no risk of attacks on the part of the Little Entente" and therefore the Duce, at the same time, advised Hungary "to adopt towards any crisis that may arise an initial attitude of waiting, and to seize the favorable opportunity after Czechoslovakia has been broken up." [150] This position of Italy's dictator, which remained unchanged until the Munich Conference, caused some difficulties for the Hungarians who tried to satisfy Germany's dictator who urged the Magyars to speedy action.

The other member of the Little Entente, Rumania, followed also Yugoslavia's example, at least in her effort to avoid being forced to fulfill her military obligations arising from the Little Entente

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[148] *Ibid.*, pp. 151-152.

[149] *Ciano's Diary: 1937-38*, p. 43.

[150] *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*, p. 228.

alliance. And, she, too, used Italy's good offices. At the peak of the September crisis, on September 23, 1938, the Rumanian Minister in Rome, M. Zamfirescu, requested the Italian Government

> to be good enough to use its influence on Budapest in order to ensure that, on the Hungarian side, no impulsive action is taken which would render difficult Rumania's positon in relation to its Little Entente Agreement.[151]

At the same time, M. Zamfirescu informed Count Ciano that while Rumania understood and justified the return to Hungary of the purely Magyar inhabited territory of Czecho-Slovakia, she would object if Hungarian claims would be advanced to territories inhabited by other nationalities. The Rumanian Government announced its conditional consent to revise the Treaty of Trianon before Czecho-Slovakia answered the Hungarian note of the same day. Two years later, Rumania was under similar pressure, and was forced to hand over Transylvania to Hungary.

Contrary to the general opinion about the genuine friendship between Hitler and Mussolini, the Führer kept the Duce uninformed about his real aims with regard to Czecho-Slovakia. For instance, during the May 1938 crisis over Czecho-Slovakia the Italians were uninformed, and on May 28, 1938, Ciano complained to the German Ambassador in Rome, Hans Georg von Mackensen, that the Duce was unable to lay down his line of policy toward Czecho-Slovakia, because he was lacking precise information as to Hitler's real intentions.[152] Two days later, H. G. von Mackensen was instructed from Berlin to reply in Rome that the realization of the Karlsbad program [153] was "the reasonable" aim of the German policy in the Sude-

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[151] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

[152] *Ciano's Diary: 1937-38*, pp. 121-122.

[153] On April 24, 1938, Konrad Henlein made an important speech at the Sudeten German Party Congress at Karlsbad (Karlové Vary, in Czech). In this speech he stated the position of his party to the proposal of the Czecho-Slovak Government to settle the question of all minorities in Czecho-Slovakia by the Statute of Nationalities. Henlein announced in this speech his eight points as the basis for the settlement of the Sudeten German question. He demanded: "1. Restoration of complete equality of German national group with the Czech people; 2. Recognition of the Sudeten German national group as a legal entity for the safeguarding of this position of equality within the State; 3. Confirmation and recognition of the Sudeten German settlement area; 4. Building up of Sudeten German self-government in the Sudeten German settlement area in all branches of public life insofar as questions affecting the interests and affairs of the German national group are involved; 5. Introduction of legal provisions for the protection of those Sudeten German citizens living

ten German question.[154] In reality, however, on the very same day, Hitler formulated his decision in a new version of the *Fall Grün* in these words: "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.[155] Again during the September crisis, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Bernardo Attolico, had the unpleasant obligation of repeatedly inquiring about the day of the German attack on Czecho-Slovakia, and he had to be satisfied with a reply that "in any case Mussolini would be the first to be informed of any possible action." [156] Nevertheless, the Duce made himself the champion of the "total" solution of the Czecho-Slovak question, probably with the protection of the interests of his Magyar and Polish friends in mind.

Benito Mussolini decided to enter into a direct action for the support of the Hungarian and Polish claims against Czecho-Slovakia in the days of the September crisis. On the day when Neville Chamberlain was on his way to see Adolf Hitler in order to find a compromise solution for the Czech-German conflict, the Duce published, on September 15, 1938, in the organ of the Fascist Party, *Popolo d'Italia,* an open letter to Lord Runciman [157] in which he moved ahead of his friend Adolf Hitler himself, and demanded a solution of the problem of other non-Czech nationalities inhabiting Czecho-Slovakia, besides solving of the Sudeten German question,

because there is not only a Sudeten German problem, there is also a Hungarian, a Polish, and a Slovak problem; as many problems as the nationalities with which Beneš' republic was "inflated" at Versailles.

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outside the defined settlement area of their national group; 6. Removal of wrong done to Sudeten German element since the year 1918, and compensation for damage suffered through this wrong; 7. Recognition and enforcement of the principle: German public servants in the German area; and 8. Complete freedom to profess adherence to the German element and German ideology." See *DGFP,* D, II, Doc. 135.

[154] *DGFP,* D, II, Doc. 220. For other Italian inquiries and German answers see *DGFP,* D, II, Docs. 384, 401, 414, and 415.

[155] *DGFP,* D, II, Doc. 221.

[156] *DGFP,* D, II, Docs. 384 and 401.

[157] Under British pressure, the Czecho-Slovak Government consented to receive Viscount Walter Runciman in Czecho-Slovakia "as an investigator and mediator,... not in any sense an arbitrator" between the Czechs and Sudeten Germans, who should have acted "only in his personal capacity," Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons on July 26, 1938. One of the British observers accused Lord Runciman that he "himself gratuitously reinforced Hitler and Henlein by spending most of his week-ends with disloyal German aristocrats." See Joan and Jonatan Griffin, *Lost Liberty?* (New York, 1939), p. 258. Also see above, Footnote No. 104.

I believe that in your heart you have already reached this conclusion: just as there is no Czechoslovak nation, neither is there a Czechoslovak State. You, Mr. Runciman, have not come upon a family where a minimum of affection and understanding prevails as it does amongst persons of the same blood. No, the "component parts" of the Czechoslovak family are of different races and cannot tolerate one another. They are animated not by a centripetal but a centrifugal force. Constraint alone holds them together. If that constraint ceased to exist the phenomenon of Czechoslovak disruption would be inevitable and irresistible.

I believe, Mr. Runciman, ... You could do and accomplish something which would go down to history. The time for compromise is past. Karlsbad has been outstripped. Beneš, as an old parliamentarian, has lost the race. You, Mr. Runciman, ought simply to propose a plebiscite to Beneš, not only for the Sudeten Germans but for all the nationalities who ask for it. ... Courage, Mr. Runciman. Propose the plebiscite — or rather plebiscites.[158]

This letter was reprinted immediately in European press, and the Reich Foreign Minister was grateful to the Duce for the introduction of a proposal for the "general solution" of the Czecho-Slovak question on international forum, thus paving the road for the better position of the Führer in his scheduled talks with the British Prime Minister the next day. Mussolini's letter was, however, of greater value to Hungary and Poland because it prepared for them an atmosphere in which, on September 16, 1938, they could "formally announce that they intend to raise the question of their minorities" in Czecho-Slovakia.[159]

In order to stress his support for the claims of his Magyar and Polish friends as well as to create a favorable atmosphere at home for the worst eventuality, Mussolini took his special train and made a tour through Italy delivering speeches in various cities and towns.[160] In his effort to make the greatest possible impression on

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[158] For the full text see *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 488.

[159] *Ciano's Diary: 1937-38*, p. 157.

[160] From September 18 to 25, 1938, Mussolini delivered speeches in the following Italian cities: on September 18th in Trieste, on September 20th in Udine, on the 21st in Travisto, on the 24th in Padua, on the 25th in Vincenza. In accordance with Hitler's wish, transmitted to the Duce on September 17th, Mussolini emphasized in these speeches not only the "totality" of the solution but also the necessity for a speed in making it. Mussolini insisted "on the solution of the Hungarian and Polish problems" despite the fact that in the opinion of the Italian Foreign Minister "even Berlin does not seem very anxious to associate the fate of the Sudetens with that of the minorities of other countries." On the other hand, "the attitude of London and Paris towards the demands of Hungary and Poland seemed pretty discouraging," we read in *Ciano's Diary: 1937-38*, pp. 158-159, entries for September 20th and 22nd, 1938.

France and Great Britain, on the day of the fateful Chamberlain-Daladier discussions in London (on September 18, 1938), the Duce spoke at Trieste along the lines laid down in the Letter to Lord Runciman. Making hints toward the attitude of Czecho-Slovakia's supporters, Mussolini concluded his speech by saying: "Should there come into being a 'United Front,' whether it be for or against Prague, let it be known that Italy has already decided on which side she will range herself." [161] Speaking at Travisto, on September 21, 1938, the Duce stated with a considerable dose of sarcasm:

> If Czechoslovakia finds herself to-day in what might be called a "delicate situation," it is because she was — one may already say "was," and I shall tell you why directly — not just Czechoslovakia, but was "Czecho-Germano-Polono-Magyaro-Rutheno-Slovakia," and I would emphasize now that this problem is faced up to, it is essential that it should be solved in a general manner.[162]

While Mussolini was campaigning in Italy, the tension in Sudetenland was increasing from hour to hour, and the world was preparing for the military conflict. "Italy was ready down to the last detail" [163] to enter the battle field, Mussolini assured Hitler after the latter's attitude had aggrevated Chamberlain and had led to the collapse of their negotiations at Bad Godesberg on September 23, 1938.

After the failure of the Chamberlain-Hitler negotiations at Bad Godesberg, and while Sir Neville Chamberlain was still at the place of the negotiations, at 5:00 P.M., the British Minister in Prague, Basil Newton, handed to Dr. Krno, in the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Ministry, the following message from the British Government: "We are agreed with the French Government upon informing the Czecho-Slovak Government that the British and French Government can no longer take the responsibility of advising Czecho-Slovakia not to mobilize." [164] At 6:15 P.M. on the same day, the French Minister in Prague, M. de Lacroix, repeated the same message. A few hours later, at 10:30 P.M., the announcer of the Czecho-Slovak broadcasting system announced that the President of the Republic had ordered the mobilization of all classes of men up to the age of forty. He read the order of mobilization in languages of the nationalities com-

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[161] Quoted in Dr. Hubert Ripka, *Munich: Before and After* (London, 1939), p. 117.

[162] *Ibid.*, p. 117.

[163] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 577.

[164] Joan and Jonatan Griffin, *Lost Liberty!* (New York, 1939), p. 83.

posing the Republic.[165] Simultaneously, partial mobilizations were ordered in France and Great Britain, and the Soviet troops were concentrating on their western frontier.

UKRAINIANS AND SLOVAKS FOR FEDERATION

What attitude was taken by the Slovaks and the Carpatho-Ukrainians with regard to the demands of Hitler and Mussolini? In his speeches the Duce actually put their fate on the scale also. Neither the Slovaks nor the Carpatho-Ukrainans asked the Duce for any mediatory step between them and the Czechs with regard to their demands for autonomy and even less regarding their secession from the Czecho-Slovak Republic. Neither the Slovaks nor the Carpatho-Ukrainians desired to be re-annexed by Hungary.

At the peak of the September crisis, the leaders of both nationalities took their positions against Mussolini's proposals. The official organ of Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party, *Slovák*, on September 25, 1938, stated in an article titled "All for the Defense of the Nation and the State" among other things as follows:

> Let us be ready to defend our Fatherland, to defend the territory given to us by God... Our State is passing through a difficult time and we must help it; we must defend also our Slovak heritage, our right to live as Slovaks, which was granted to us by God, our Creator.

The Vice-Chairman of Hlinka's Party, Dr. Karol Sidor, on September 27, 1938, announced in his radio address that the Chairman of the Party, Msgr. Jozef Tiso, during his conversations with President Beneš in recent days, had achieved everything that the Slovak nation needed in order that it may live on its own land and in Czecho-Slovakia. Then, he appealed to the Slovaks in the following words: "Be diligently obedient to the orders of your superiors and of the national representatives. Only by such discipline shall we assure the future of Slovakia and the integrity of the Slovak land, our dear Country." [166] The Catholic leaders of the Hlinka party who fought for autonomy of Slovakia for nearly twenty years, were in harmony with the Slovak autonomist Protestants, whose leader, Dr. J. Pauliny Tóth, proclaimed that "Slovakia and the Slovaks will not allow their Republic to be torn to pieces, whether by Hungarians, by Italians, or by Poles. For us the Czecho-Slovak Republic is our only Father-

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[165] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[166] Dr. Hubert Ripka, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 142-143.

land and we shall fight for it to our last breath." [167] Future developments proved that the Slovaks did not want to be annexed by Hungary. Their actions for independence at a later time are not the subject of discussion at this time.

When, in the diplomatic circles as well as in the press the demands for the equal treatment of the Hungarian and Polish claims with those of the Sudeten Germans were raised, a speaker for the First Central Ukrainian National Council in Uzhhorod, Fedir Revay, declared on September 17, 1938:

> In no way should our Sub-Carpathian question be put on the same level with that of the Sudeten Germans, because our rights, our autonomy, were guaranteed by the Peace Treaties and the Constitutional Charter of the Republic.[168]

The mouthpiece of the First Central Ukrainian National Council, *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), on September 23, 1938, regretfully reported about the fact that Czecho-Slovakia, under the pressure of England and France, left to her own fate by her former allies, was forced to yield in the Sudeten German question "in order to save peace not only for her own citizens but for all of Europe," and turning to the Carpatho-Ukrainian situation commented:

> In these dangerous days of international tension, however, nobody followed the political events so fearfully as we, Ukrainians living within Czecho-Slovakia. Our situation, the fate of our Ukrainian people on this side of the Carpathians, was and still is in great danger.
>
> We have heard about the terrible uproar of the masses ignited by the enemies of our people from Katowice and Budapest, which carried a dangerous memento of our national subjugation. We feel that in recent days our country, our people, have become an object of bargaining between neighboring enemy States which demand justice and self-determination for theirs (minorities) and at the same time, however, were preparing and still are preparing a new yoke for us.

Thus, the destruction of the Czecho-Slovak Republic was not in the interests of the Carpatho-Ukrainians. The President of the First Central Ukrainian National Council, Rev. A. Voloshyn, rejected Mussolini's idea of a plebiscite in Carpatho-Ukraine stating that "the Ukrainian National Council is of the opinion that our Carpatho-Ukrainian people have had the opportunity in 1918-1919 to express

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[167] *Ibid.*, p. 142.

[168] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), September 17, 1938.

their wish through the National Councils here, in the country, and in America, and they so did."[169] The Russophile political leaders of Carpatho-Ukraine maintained contacts with Lord Runciman and complained about the lack of good will on the part of the Czechs to fulfill their obligations with regard to territorial autonomy, but in their two memoranda addressed to Lord Runciman on September 13, 1938, there is no mention of any plebiscite in Carpatho-Ukraine.[170] In its memorandum submitted to the Czecho-Slovak Prime Minister, Dr. Milan Hodža, on July 19, 1938, the Central Russian National Council after presenting its case for the immediate realization of autonomy, among other things expressed the loyalty of the Council's leaders stating:

> We are convinced, Mr. Prime Minister, that you sincerely wish us well and that you are doing all possible for the fulfillment of our rights. We have confidence in you... We wish you strength and health which will enable you to accomplish the great work undertaken for the good of our country and of our State.[171]

Finally, on September 21, 1938, the Carpatho-Ruthenian representatives in the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly, both of the Ukrainian and the Russian cultural orientations, namely two Senators, Dr.

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[169] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), September 27, 1938.

[170] See footnote No. 157, above. Although Lord Runciman's mission was not to deal with other than Sudeten German nationalities of Czecho-Slovakia, ever since his arrival in Prague on August 4, 1938, Lord Runciman frequently received delegations of the Magyar and Polish minorities and filed their memoranda. He had also talks with the Carpatho-Ukrainian Russophiles. They handed him two memoranda, namely: a) "Memorandum on Carpathian Russia" dated September 13, 1938, and signed by Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, Andriy Brodiy, Yuliy Feldeshiy, Dr. Pavel Kossey, Dr. Ivan Pyeshchak, Petro Zhydovskiy, and Vasyl' Shcheretskiy; b) "Memorandum of the Parliamentary Representation of the Russian People in Eastern Slovakia" dated September 13, 1938, and signed by the Deputies to the Czechoslovak National Assembly, Petro Zhydovskiy and Dr. Ivan Pyeshchak. Both memoranda concentrated on the failure of the Czechs to grant autonomy and the complaints with regard of the "Czechoslovakization" of the province. For the full texts see Delegacija Karpatorusskoho Sojuza, *Karpatskaja Rus' v Češskom Jarmi* (a report published in the United States, without place and date of publication, probably in 1938 or 1939), pp. 21-25.

[171] "Memorandum submitted to Dr. Milan Hodža, President of the Council of Ministers of the Czechoslovak Republic" in Delegacija Karpatorusskoho Sojuza, *Karpatskaja Rus' v Češskom Jarmi* (no place nor date of publication), pp. 26-29. The memorandum was signed by Yosyf Kaminskiy, Chairman, and V. Gomichkov, Secretary.

Edmund Bachynskiy and Yuliy Feldeshiy, and six Deputies, Yuliyan Revay, Andriy Brodiy, Petro Zhydovskiy, Dr. Ivan Pyeshchak, Dr. Stepan Fencyk, and Dr. Pavlo Kossey, signed a Joint Declaration demanding immediate realization of the rights guaranteed to Carpatho-Ukraine by the Treaty of St. Germain.[172] They did not mention any plebiscite, while the realization of autonomy on the basis of the Treaty of St. Germain obviously meant autonomy within the Czecho-Slovak Republic. This proves that at the time of the September crisis, there was no desire among the Carpatho-Ukrainian leaders of all orientations to recognize Benito Mussolini as their spokesman because the general tendency was to obtain the full autonomous rights and remain within the framework of Czecho-Slovakia.

HUNGARIAN AND POLISH CLAIMS AT THE MUNICH CONFERENCE

In the meantime, Hitler's demand to transfer Sudetenland to the Reich authorities by October 1, 1938, according to the conditions outlined in his memorandum handed to the British Prime Minister at Bad Godesberg[173] was delivered at Prague by the British authorities "for an early reply." The Czecho-Slovak Government agreed in principle to transfer the regions with a clear majority of the German speaking population to the Reich. There were, however, some questions concerning the property, the right of option, the method and especially the time of transfer of these regions to the German authorities, as well as the German guarantee for inviolability of the new frontiers still to be clarified. This was the purpose of the meeting with Hitler at Bad Godesberg as far as Chamberlain was concerned. On the other hand, Hitler refused to discuss these questions and insisted on the speedy transfer of Sudetenland into his hands. The violation of the Czecho-Slovak frontiers and occupation of the border towns of Eger and Asch by German troops during the presence of the British Prime Minister at Bad Godesberg did not contribute much to the creation of a peaceful atmosphere for negotiations. On the other hand, the news about the mobilization in Czecho-Slovakia reached Chamberlain and Hitler still in their conference room and this news also influenced the tone of their further talks.[174]

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[172] "Zayavleniye" in *Karpatskaja Rus' v Češskom Jarmi*, p. 17.

[173] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 584.

[174] *DGFP*, D, II, Docs. 562, 572, 573, 574 and 583.

On September 25, 1938, the three day old Czecho-Slovak Government headed by General Jan Syrový[175] rejected the German memorandum and the Czecho-Slovak Minister in London, Dr. Jan Masaryk, immediately notified the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Viscount Edward W. Halifax, for transmission to Berlin. In this situation, on September 26, 1938, the British Prime Minister sent his special Ambassador, Sir Horace Wilson, with a personal letter to Hitler. Chamberlain urged Hitler not to use force, because "a settlement by negotiation remains possible" and asked him

> to agree that representatives of Germany shall meet representatives of the Czechoslovakian Government to discuss immediately the situation by which we are confronted with a view to settling by agreement the way in which the territory is to be handed over.[176]

Further, Chamberlain expressed his belief that "these discussions can be completed in a very short time" as well as his willingness "to arrange the representation of the British Government at the discussion" if both parties desired it. Hitler immediately rejected the direct German-Czechoslovak negotiations, and told the British envoy that "he could not tolerate further delays. He therefore expected a Czechoslovak answer by 2 P.M. on Wednesday, September 28th" [177] that the conditions laid down in his memorandum of September 23, 1938, had been accepted by the Czecho-Slovak Government without any reservations or he was ready to apply "a military solution in which the new frontier would be established by the military authorities on a strategic basis" as he had told Chamberlain previously. Another British offer was presented to Hitler on the same day by the President of the British Legion, Sir Frederick Maurice. This offer was to send 10,000 British ex-servicemen to the disturbed areas of the Sudetenland to maintain order and to insure the orderly trans-

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[175] After acceptance of one demand of Konrad Henlein after another in order to solve the Sudeten German question peacefully, Dr. Milan Hodža's Cabinet facing new difficulties resigned on September 22, 1938. On the same day, President of the Republic, Edvard Beneš, appointed the Inspector General of the Czecho-Slovak military forces, General Jan Syrový, to the premiership of a Cabinet composed of the members on the merit basis rather than party representation. However, in the most critical situations the members of the former Hodža's Cabinet closely cooperated with General Jan Syrový and his Cabinet.

[176] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 619.

[177] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 607. The Reich Foreign Minister immediately informed the Ambassadors of Italy, Japan, and Poland, and the Hungarian Minister about Hitler's ultimatum to Czecho-Slovakia. German missions were notified, too.

fer of the region to the Reich as well as to maintain the undisturbed process of the proposed plebiscite in the disputed areas. It was also rejected by the Führer.[178] Hitler's demand to occupy Sudetenland by October 1, 1938, remained unchanged. His military threatening created a grave situation.

On the same day as Hitler served his ultimatum to Czecho-Slovakia, the French Government stated that "the desire for a peaceful solution remains as before" as far as France was concerned but at the same time warned that

> should German troops cross the present frontiers of Czechoslovakia *without* previous agreement with London and Paris, then at the very least general mobilization could no longer be avoided. If it really comes to a war, then the French people will stand solidly behind their Government.[179]

While military preparations were going everywhere in the countries concerned, those who had not lost faith in the possibility of a peaceful solution of the Czech-German dispute undertook as best they could to save peace in the world. The President of the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, appealed in separate letters to Adolf Hitler, Dr. Edvard Beneš, Sir Neville Chamberlain, and Édouard Daladier to agree upon a peaceful solution. In his letter to Adolf Hitler, the President of the United States wrote:

> On behalf of the 130 millions of people of the United States of America and for the sake of humanity everywhere, I most earnestly appeal to you not to break off negotiations looking to a peaceful, fair, and constructive settlement of the questions at issue.[180]

The dictator of Germany, however, was not moved and stood to his previously adopted position.[181] Sir Horace Wilson asked again for a conversation with Hitler on the 27th of September and appealed, on behalf of the British Prime Minister, to look for a peaceful solution. After Hitler replied in his firm "No," the British special envoy stated that

> if, in the fulfillment of her obligations to Czechoslovakia, France decided that her forces must become actively engaged in hostilities against Germany, then,

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[178] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 631. British Legion maintained close contacts with German ex-servicemen. At the time of the Czecho-Slovak crisis, just few days before Maurice's visit with Hitler, 800 German ex-servicemen under the leadership of the Duke of Coburg had been visiting Great Britain.

[179] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 613.

[180] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 632.

[181] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 633.

for reasons which surely be clear to the Führer and to everyone familiar with the situation, Britain would feel herself obliged to support France.[182]

Hitler's cynical reply was: "In that case it was most probable that war would break out between us within six days." Another neutral appeal to Hitler was made, some 24 hours before the expiration of the time of the Führer's ultimatum to Czecho-Slovakia, by King of Sweden, Gustav VI, who promised "to use his influence with France and Britain so that they might induce Czechoslovakia to accept (Hitler's) conditions" within ten days.[183] This royal appeal also fell on deaf ears.

Finally, four and one quarter hours before the expiration of the time of the ultimatum, F. D. Roosevelt's telegraphic letter addressed to Adolf Hitler arrived in Berlin in which the President of the United States, referring to his appeal of the 26th of September, made a concrete proposal for a multinational conference in order to solve the dispute peacefully. The letter among other things said:

> It is supremely important that negotiations should continue without interruption until a fair and constructive solution is reached...
>
> Present negotiations still stand open. They can be continued. They can be continued if you will give the word. Should the need for supplementing them become evident, nothing stands in the way of widening their scope into a conference of all nations directly interested in the present controversy. Such a meeting to be held immediately — in some neutral spot in Europe — would offer the opportunity for this and correlated questions to be solved in a spirit of justice, of fair dealing, and, in all human probability, with greated permanence.[184]

There was no clear evidence as to what attitude Hitler would take toward this proposal because shortly thereafter the Duce responded to an appeal made to him by the British Prime Minister and agreed to use his good offices with the Führer to delay military action which was to start in some four hours.

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[182] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 634. As matter of fact, Hitler in his capacity of the Supreme Commander of the *Wehrmacht* ordered the movement of the *Sturmabteilungen* from their training areas to action positions as early as at 1:00 P.M. of September 27, 1938. Some 7 divisions were ready to attack Czecho-Slovakia by September 30th. See *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 654.

[183] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 643.

[184] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 653. To ease the situation, at 11 P.M. on Sept. 27th, British Ambassador, Neville Henderson, handed to State Secretary Weizsäcker the British compromise time-table for German occupation of Sudetenland, including provisions that the regions of Eger and Asch could be occupied on October 1, 1938, and other regions gradually. See *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 655.

Four hours before the expiration of the time of ultimatum given by Hitler to the Czechs, at 10:00 A.M. on September 28th, the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, received the British Ambassador to Italy, Lord Perth, who brought an appeal from the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, to the Duce "to assume the role of mediator" in these last hours "in which something can be done to save peace and civilization." Count Ciano went immediately to Benito Mussolini who, in turn, agreed "at once on the impossibility of meeting Chamberlain's request with a flat refusal." A few moments later, Mussolini telephoned his Ambassador in Berlin, Bernardo Attolico, and ordered him as follows:

> Go to the Führer and tell him, having first said that in any eventuality I shall be at his side, that I recommend that the commencement of hostilities should be delayed for 24 hours. Meanwhile I undertake to study what can be done to solve the problem.[185]

A few minutes after Ciano informed Lord Perth about Mussolini's readiness to mediate, the British Ambassador visited Ciano again and handed him a message from Neville Chamberlain for Benito Mussolini and a copy of another one sent to Adolf Hitler containing a concrete proposal "for a Conference of Four with the task of reaching a radical solution of the Sudeten problem within seven days." The Duce decided to support Chamberlain's request and gave an order to Attolico to inform Adolf Hitler about his decision. At three o'clock in the afternoon, Attolico informed Rome that Hitler agreed in principle, "making certain reservations of secondary importance. He lays down one condition, however: the presence of Mussolini, which he regards as the sole guarantee." In the meantime a message from the President of the United States, F.D. Roosevelt, addressed to Benito Mussolini urging him to contribute his share to save peace,[186] arrived and was delivered by the United States Ambassador, William Phillips.

Immediately thereafter, Adolf Hitler invited Benito Mussolini, Neville Chamberlain, and Édouard Daladier to the Four Powers Conference which was to begin the very next morning, September 29, 1938, at Munich.[187]

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[185] *Ciano's Diary: 1937-38,* pp. 165-166. All other quotations in this particular paragraph were taken from the same source. Also see *DGFP,* D, II, Doc. 661.

[186] After Hitler consented to hold the conference, Mussolini stated to Ciano: "I am only moderately happy, because, though perhaps at a heavy price, we could have liquidated France and Great Britain for ever. Now we have overwhelming proof for this." See *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38,* p. 166.

[187] *DGFP,* D, II, Doc. 663. Besides Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler and Musso-

The Conference of the Four Powers which started shortly before one o'clock in the afternoon and lasted until midnight, actually, decided to give everything that Hitler wanted with regard to the Sudeten German regions of Czecho-Slovakia. The territory was divided in several zones which were to be gradually handed over by the Czecho-Slovak Government to the Reich authorities between October 1st and 10th.[188]

On the initiative of the dictator of Italy, Benito Mussolini,[189] the Conference discussed briefly the Hungarian and Polish claims against Czecho-Slovakia, too, and made certain decisions with regard to them which were added to the basic agreement concerning the Sudeten German regions in the form of an "Annex to the Agreement" and an "Additional Declaration," both signed separately at Munich, September 29, 1938, by Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Mussolini, and Ed. Daladier. Since for the further discussion of the future developments around Carpatho-Ukraine these two documents are of great importance, let us be acquainted with them here. The wording of the "Annex to the Agreement" is as follows:

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French proposals of September 19th, relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.

When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.[190]

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lini in the deliberations of the Conference participated: Count Galeazzo Ciano, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office — Aléxis Leger, and Special Adviser to the British Prime Minister — Sir Horace Wilson. The Czecho-Slovak Government was not admitted to defend its cause at the Conference. In the capacity of observers were present at the Conference: the Czecho-Slovak Minister in Berlin, Dr. Vojtěch Mastný, and an official of the Prague Foreign Ministry, Dr. Hubert Masařík. Hungarian envoy Count István Csáky, and Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Józef Lipski, were also in Munich but were not present at the conversations.

[188] *DGFP*, D, II, Docs. 669, 670, 674, and 675.

[189] *Ciano's Diary: 1937-38*, pp. 167-168. Ciano stated that all other participants, except Mussolini "would gladly have said nothing... about Polish and Hungarian minorities." The first draft of the "Program for the Munich Conference," prepared by the Reich Foreign Ministry, did not mention the Hungarian and Polish claims at all. Only later on, someone added: "10 a) Hungary, Poland?," see *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 669.

[190] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 675. The wording of paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French proposals of September 19, 1938, made to the Czechs and Germans reads:

And the wording of the "Additional Declaration" is:

The Heads of the Governments of the four Powers declare that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within 3 months by agreement between the respective Governments, shall form the subject of another meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the four Powers here present.[191]

The Munich Conference at last justified the almost twenty-year old Hungarian demand for the peaceful revision of the Treaty of Trianon, at least in principle. However, it limited the Hungarian claims to the Magyar minority, i. e. to those territories in which there was a majority of the inhabitants of the Magyar nationality, thus taking the ethnic principle for the basis of the solution of the dispute similarly to that in Sudetenland. The basic principle was established, and the realization was left to the Governments of the countries concerned. The Hungarians could feel satisfied with this first victory because they could be certain that within a relatively short time they would get at least a great majority of the Magyars living in Czecho-Slovakia. The Czecho-Slovak Government was obliged by the Four Powers to turn over these territories to Hungary. Only the details remained to be settled by the Governments of the two countries. However, these details caused the greatest difficulties in the solution of the Sudeten German question and almost led to a world military conflict. Neither were the details with regard to the Magyar minorities in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine solved without considerable tension.

"6) Accordingly, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be prepared, as a contribution to the pacification of Europe, to join in an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression. One of the principal conditions of such a guarantee would be the safeguarding of the independence of Czechoslovakia by the substitution of a general guarantee against unprovoked aggression in place of existing treaties which involve reciprocal obligations of a military character." See *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 523.

[191] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 675.

Chapter Six

THE VIENNA ARBITRATION

The Munich Conference of the four Great Powers imposed an obligation upon the Government of Czecho-Slovakia to settle the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities within three months by agreements between the respective Governments. Both the Polish and the Hungarian Governments decided, however, to press for an immediate settlement of the questions. Germany wholeheartedly supported their demands for a speedy solution of the problems.

Hardly had the decision of the Munich Conference been formally presented to the Czecho-Slovak Government by the four Great Powers,[1] when the Polish Government presented at midnight of September 30, 1938, an ultimatum to the Prague Government demanding the immediate cession of the Teschen district to Poland. The Polish Government stated in its note that if a satisfactory reply would not be received by noon, on October 1, 1938, Polish troops would invade the district.[2] This move of Poland surprised most of the signatories of the Munich Agreement. The British, French, and Italian Ambassadors in Warsaw appealed to the Polish Government not to use force

[1] The German Charge d'Affairs in Prague, Andor Hencke, handed the text of the Munich Agreement and an accompanying note to the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Kamil Krofta, at 6:20 A.M. on September 30, 1938. See *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 1. The Ministers of France, Great Britain and Italy — Victor Léopold de Lacroix, Basil Newton, and Francesco Fransoni, respectively, — visited together at noon of September 30th the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister. At this occasion, Dr. Kamil Krofta declared: "The President and the Government submit to the Munich Agreement which has come into being without Czechoslovakia and against her... Today it is our turn, tomorrow it will be the turn of the others." See *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 3.

[2] The Polish Minister in Prague, Kazimierz Papeé, delivered ultimatum to the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister at 11:45 P.M. on Sept. 30, 1938. For the full text see *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, 1919-1939, edited by E. L. Woodward and Rohan Buttler, (London, 1950), Third Series, Volume III, Doc. No. 83. Hereafter cited as *British Documents*.

against Czecho-Slovakia, stressing that Poland acted "wholly contrary to the spirit of the Agreement reached at Munich which provided that the settlement of the territorial problems in Czechoslovakia should be achieved by negotiations and not by force."[3] After the ultimatum was extended for one hour by the Poles, the Czecho-Slovak Government yielded[4] and the Poles crossed the Czecho-Slovak border[5] and within the next ten days occupied the rich coal and iron ore area of the Teschen district.[6] The Czechs believed that they had satisfied the Poles and hoped for an improvement of their mutual relations in the future. They were expecting a decrease of Polish pressure against them, while they still had to resist Hungarian claims. This hope of the Czechs proved to be unjustified. Even thereafter, Poland contributed her share toward the liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia.

HUNGARY GATHERS SUPPORT FOR HER DEMANDS

After the German and Polish demands seemed to have been satisfied, at least for the time being, the Czecho-Slovak Government headed by General Jan Syrový was determined to solve the problem

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[3] *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 92; also *DGFP,* D, IV, Docs. 6 and 7. British Prime Minister Chamberlain appealed to the German Government to use its influence to induce the Polish Government to defer action, but J. von Ribbentrop telephoned Ciano that he would not *démarche* in Warsaw, and on the contrary, "he is almost inciting the Poles to attack" notes the Italian Foreign Minister. See *Ciano's Diary: 1937-1938,* ed. by Andreas Mayor, (London, 1952), p.171. Hereafter cited as: *Ciano's Diary: 1937-38.*

[4] For the full set of the notes exchanged between the Polish and the Czecho-Slovak Governments see *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Docs. 82, 83 and 101.

[5] *Newsweek,* October 17, 1938, reported: "at 2 P.M. through loud-speakers on the Polish border came the voice of Poland's semi-dictator, Marshal Smigly-Rydz: 'The Majesty of the Polish Republic now crosses the Olza' and the Polish cavalry marched into the formerly Czecho-Slovak territory."

[6] In the Polish occupied counties the relation between the Czech and Polish populations according to the 1930 Czecho-Slovak census was as follows: Fryštat 52,285 to 29,790; Bohumín 35,714 to 4,755; Těšín 23,204 to 21,424, and Jablunkov 9,436 to 20,261. Thus, the total was 120,639 Czechs to 76,230 Poles, besides some 18,000 Germans. See Statistický úřad, *Statistický lexikon obcí v Republice československé* (Prague, 1935), Volume VII.

A British observer stated: "As for the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia, about ten years before the crisis, M. Grzybowski, then Polish Minister in Prague, called on Dr. Krofta to ask the Czechoslovak Government to treat its Polish minority *less* well, because envy of its good treatment was causing unrest in Poland..." See Joan and Jonatan Griffin, *Lost Liberty? The Ordeal of the Czechs and the Future of Freedom* (New York, 1939), p. 234.

of the Magyar minority as soon as possible.[7] The Hungarians were not willing to wait any longer. The day after the Munich Conference, the Hungarian special envoy, Count István Csáky, visited the State Secretary in the Reich Foreign Ministry, Ernst von Weizsäcker, and asked him "what further steps on the part of the Hungarian Government were recommended to safeguard its claims on Czechoslovakia?"[8] He was advised immediately to demand "the speedy peaceful fulfillment of the Hungarian claims" and if Prague were to make difficulties, Hungary could probably refer the matter to the Great Powers. On the next day, October 1, 1938, the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, Sztojay, informed the Reich Foreign Ministry that "apart from the reintegration of the regions inhabited by Hungarians, Hungary in fact aims only at a realization of the right of self-determination of the Slovaks and Ruthenians" and "in accordance with his wishes very far-reaching German diplomatic support has in principle been promised to him."[9] The German Legation in Prague was instructed by the Reich Foreign Ministry to maintain "the closest contact" with the Hungarian Minister there and to report on all developments by telegraph.

Almost simultaneously, on October 1, 1938, the Czecho-Slovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Kamil Krofta, addressed a note to the Hungarian Government stating that the Czecho-Slovak Government was ready to open negotiations to arrive at an amicable agreement regarding the Magyar minority in Czecho-Slovakia. He thought that the most practical procedure would be to set up a Commission of Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak experts to discuss the whole question.[10] At the same time, the Rumanian and Yugoslav Governments were informed of the steps taken by the Czecho-Slovak Government. The Yugoslav Prime Minister, Dr. Milan Stoyadinovich, in the meantime had already informed Budapest that he would be willing to mediate in Prague about the cession to Hungary of territories inhabited by the Magyar minority. He stated, at the same time, that "Yugoslavia would not agree to the cession to Hungary of the

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[7] On September 30, 1938, General Jan Syrový addressed the peoples of Czecho-Slovakia at 5:00 P.M. through the radio network. In his speech he stated: "I am living through the worst moment of my life... I am carrying out the most painful task of my life, for it would have been easier to die... We shall carry out the demands which were forced upon us..." For full text see Griffin, *Lost Liberty?*, pp. 129-133.

[8] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 8.

[9] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 9.

[10] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 108.

strictly Slovak and Ruthenian territory, as this might be dangerous for Yugoslavia."[11] While Czecho-Slovakia expressed her willingness to negotiate, in accordance with the Munich Agreement, concerning the Magyar minority, the Hungarian Minister in Prague, János Wettstein, informed on October 2, 1938, at noon, the German Charge d'Affairs on the latter's request that

> as the Munich decisions have created a new situation, my Government invites the Czechoslovak Government to enter at once into direct negotiations for the purpose of giving effect to the right of self-determination of nationalities on full terms of equality with the right of the Sudeten Germans.[12]

Thus, the differences with regard to the basis on which the negotiations were to be conducted were clear from the very beginning. The Czecho-Slovak Government expressed its willingness to negotiate within the limits set up by the decision of the Munich Conference, i. e. with regard to the Magyar minority only. The Hungarians, on the other hand, demanded as a basis for negotiations "the right of self-determination of nationalities" which would have applied not only to the Magyars living within Czecho-Slovakia but also to the other nationalities of the Republic. This basis far exceeded the provisions of the Munich Agreement in which only the Polish and Hungarian minorities were mentioned. Even the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, was disappointed and was against these Hungarian demands at this time, because "there is no point in wiping out one injustice in order to commit another." This statement was made in reply to a request made by the Hungarian Minister in Rome, F. Villani, on October 3, 1938, for Italian support of what Count Ciano called "accelerating the implementation of the Munich decision so far as Hungary is concerned."[13]

At 9:00 P.M. on October 3, 1938, the Hungarian Minister in Prague, János Wettstein, handed the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Ministry a note demanding that "in order to create a peaceful atmosphere" for the coming negotiations the Czecho-Slovak Government should at once take the following measures:

1. Hungarian political prisoners to be set free at once.
2. Soldiers of Hungarian nationality to be demobilized at once and allowed to return home.
3. A detachment to be formed under joint command for protection of life, for mediation, and for maintenance of local order.

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[11] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 9.
[12] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 13.
[13] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38*, p. 172.

4. As a gesture symbolic of cession of territory, two or three Czecho-slovak frontier towns to be handed over to Hungary and to be occupied by Hungarian troops. In the western area such towns might be Komárom or Párkánynána or Ipolyság; in the eastern area, the station at Sátoraljaujhely or Csap or Beregszász.

5. The Hungarian Government proposes that negotiations should begin in Komárom at 4 p.m. on Thursday, October 6. The Hungarian delegation will be led by Foreign Minister Kánya.[14]

When on October 4, 1938, the German Chargé d'Affairs, Andor Hencke, called on the Czecho-Slovak Deputy Foreign Minister to inform him that the Reich Government supported the wishes expressed in the Hungarian note, the Czech official replied that the Czecho-Slovak Government wished to reach direct agreement with Hungary as soon as possible, but "for technical and personal reasons, however, it was not possible to negotiate simultaneously with Germany, Poland, and Hungary."[15] The Czecho-Slovak Government, therefore, proposed to Budapest that the start of the negotiations be postponed ten days or a fortnight. To that effect, the Czecho-Slovak Government addressed a note to Hungary,[16] and on October 6th, the Hungarian Government declared its willingness, in view of the Government crisis in Czecho-Slovakia,[17] to postpone the opening of negotiations until noon of October 8, 1938.[18] This time was later postponed again until 7 p.m. on October 9, 1938,[19] when the direct negotiations actually began.

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[14] *DGFP,* D, IV, Doc. 22. On October 4, 1938, the German Legation in Prague received instructions from Berlin by telephone to support these Hungarian demands. See *DGFP,* D, IV, Doc. 28. Also see *Hungarian Documents,* Doc. 46, p. 143.

[15] *DGFP,* D, IV, Doc. 28. The Czecho-Slovak representatives were engaged in the work of the International Commission dealing with the transfer of Sudetenland to Germany. The Commission was headed by State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker (Germany), and in its work participated: the French Ambassador in Berlin, André François-Poncet; the British Ambassador Neville Henderson; Italian Ambassador Bernardo Attolico. The Czecho-Slovak Government was represented by its Minister in Berlin, Vojtěch Mastný, and General Karel Husárek of the General Staff. At the same time, Czecho-Slovakia was engaged in negotiations with regard to the transfer of the Těšín region to Poland.

[16] *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 149.

[17] On October 5, 1938, following the resignation of the President of the Republic, E. Beneš, General Jan Syrový reorganized his Cabinet. To the key position of the Minister for Foreign Affairs was appointed Dr. František Chvalkovský, hitherto Minister in Rome.

[18] *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 148.

[19] *DGFP,* D, IV, footnote 5 to the Doc. 22, p. 26.

While the Hungarian Government moved rather carefully with regard to its wish to incorporate Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine into Hungary as far as its official notes to the Czecho-Slovak Government were concerned, at the same time, however, it tried to gather the support of other nations for its claims regarding those provinces. On October 4, 1938, the Hungarian Minister, János Wettstein, stated at Prague in diplomatic circles that

> Budapest would regard voluntary union of Slovakia, including Carpatho-Ukraine, with Hungary as the most practical solution of the Slovak question. In his personal view Slovakia could be given territorial autonomy. Carpatho-Ukraine on the other hand, in view of the large Hungarian element of the population, could only be granted national autonomy,

and he assured further that

> this would also be in accordance with Poland's wishes, as Warsaw feared a strengthening of Ukrainian nationalism as a result of territorial autonomy.[20]

Even in Rome the Hungarians were moving carefully and gradually, despite the fact that in the view of the Duce himself the Hungarians were "the only people in Europe whom he finds sympathetic."[21] This caution was probably applied because Count Ciano mistrusted them, and in his opinion "Hungary's appetites are becoming more and more blatant."[22] Nevertheless, Hungarian diplomacy succeeded in strengthening its position in Rome to the extent that the Duce fixed the Italian position with respect to the Polish-Hungarian claims almost identically with these claims even before the Hungarian envoy in Rome officially formulated the Hungarian demands. On October 8, 1938, F. Villani enumerated Hungary's territorial claims as follows: to incorporate the Magyar ethnic areas of Czecho-Slovakia as well as Carpatho-Ukraine, and a plebiscite for the Slovaks.[23]

On October 5 and 6, 1938, the Chef de Cabinet of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Count István Csáky, visited Warsaw and had two

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[20] *DGFP,* D, IV, Doc. 29. For the Polish-Hungarian accord concerning their common frontier see *Hungarian Documents,* Doc. 26, p. 117.

[21] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38,* p. 173.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 173.

[23] *Ibid.,* p. 175. Mussolini decided to support these Polish-Hungarian claims on October 7, 1938. Two days before, on October 5th, Italy assured the Hungarian Government that in case of a military conflict with Czecho-Slovakia, Italy would send immediately one hundred fighters, with necessary pilots, to defend Budapest.

long conferences with the Polish Foreign Minister, Józef Beck, for the purpose of reaching an agreement for Polish-Hungarian cooperation in enforcing Hungary's territorial claims against Czecho-Slovakia. As the German Ambassador in Warsaw, Hans Adolf von Moltke, reported to the Reich Foreign Minister, during these friendly talks

it was realized that there were considerable obstacles to progress in this matter, especially since nothing was said at the Munich conference either about Hungary's claims to all of the Carpatho-Ukraine or about the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Carpatho-Ukrainian population. Since there is consequently no direct way of attaining the goal, the hope seems to be nourished that through annexation by Hungary of Hungarian-language enclaves in the Carpatho-Ukraine the territory would be blocked off from Slovakia in such a way that the desired solution would thereby be achieved indirectly.

M. Beck, I am reliably informed, again told Count Csáky that for military and political reasons Poland attached the greatest importance to a common frontier with Hungary, and he promised Hungary the moral support of Poland to the fullest extent.[24]

It has been known that in pursuing the policy of the common Polish-Hungarian frontier at the expense of Carpatho-Ukraine, Poland was doing so not for the sake of supporting Hungarian claims as having in mind her own interests. The German Ambassador in Warsaw in his analysis why "Polish political circles regard the creation of a common frontier with Hungary as one of the vital questions in Poland's foreign policy" came to the conclusion that besides some other reasons, two factors were in the foreground, namely:

The first one of these is the Ukrainian question. The Ukrainians living in Poland — about 6,500,000 in all — have been enormously strengthened in their striving for independence by the emphasis given the right of self-determination in connection with the Czech crisis. The prospect that an independent Ukrainian State might be created in the Carpatho-Ukraine or at least an autonomous structure set up within the framework of a Czechoslovakia which was no longer able to pursue a policy of oppression, has fanned these hopes even more. Polish Ukrainian circles apparently see therein a sort of "Piedmont" from which the development into a Greater Ukraine might begin, while they regard annexation by Hungary as equivalent to annihilating the Ukrainian nationality in the Carpatho-Ukraine. The revival of the idea of a Greater

[24] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 67. The Polish diplomats tried to persuade Britain and France about the usefulness of the common Polish-Hungarian frontier because that way Poland and Hungary would create a wall against the *German Drang nach Osten*. On the other hand, they were telling to the Germans that they would create a wall against Russian Bolshevism. For the British report see *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 131. Also see *Hungarian Documents*, introductory remarks, pp. 104-105.

Ukraine, which is also becoming noticeable in the Ukrainian press in spite of the most vigorous censorship by the Poles, and which has in the last few days led to bloody disorders in Lemberg (L'viv, in Ukrainian) must naturally cost the Polish Government serious anxiety and influence its attitude in the Carpatho-Ukrainian question. The Polish Government will therefore leave nothing undone to oppose the formation of the new center of crystallization sought by the Ukrainians.[25]

The second factor was connected closely with the first one. If Czecho-Slovakia would fall entirely under German influence and Carpatho-Ukraine would remain within the framework of the new Republic, "Germany might thereby be placed in a position to intervene directly in the development of the Ukrainian question" which would endanger the Polish interests in Western Ukraine.

Thus, before the beginning of the negotiations at Komárom, the Hungarians secured full support of Italy and Poland regarding the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary.

Great Britain and France co-decided with Germany and Italy at the Munich Conference that the question of the Magyar minority in Czecho-Slovakia had to be solved in principle similarly to that of the Sudeten Germans. The British Minister in Budapest, Sir Geoffrey Knox, on instructions of his Government, on October 8, 1938, handed a memorandum to the Hungarian Foreign Minister stating that "the British Government felt morally bound to guarantee Czechoslovakia and solemnly warned the Hungarian Government to keep calm and not to make such harsh demands."[26] This British *démarche* was done in the face of the Hungarian preparations for mobilization on the one hand and preparation of their irregulars to penetrate into Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia in order to stir up disorder, on the other. However, neither Great Britain nor France would do anything if Hungary would militarily attack Czecho-Slovakia in order to secure her claims.[27] Shortly before direct negotiations were to start at Komárom, the British Minister in Prague, Basil Newton, expressed his opinion to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax, to the effect that a visit of a British official to Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine would be useful at the moment. Lord Halifax, however, immediately replied in the negative since "such a visit could"

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[25] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 76. For the British observations in this question see *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 142. For the Polish presentation of the problem in Great Britain see *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 206.

[26] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 47.

[27] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 189.

he feared "effect little except to arouse suspicions and false hopes."[28] The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs also made efforts to calm Poland's position. He stated to the Polish Ambassador in London, Count Edward Raczyński, that he hoped that Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary "would succeed in reaching agreement directly between themselves" but in case of necessity, the British Government would be willing "to assist in the discovery of a reasonable solution."[29] Lord Halifax urged Count Raczyński to inform his Government that he "hoped that the Polish Government would lend their influence in the same direction." Thus, while Great Britain did not engage in this dispute to such an extent as in the Sudeten German question, in principle the British position was actually against the Hungarian claims outside of the territories inhabited by the Magyar minority. France maintained a similar position.

HITLER FORMULATES HIS POSITION FOR BARGAINING

As far as the position of Germany with regard to the Hungarian claims was concerned, it went through some evolution. From the beginning, Germany supported the Hungarian claims in principle. It seems that basically three factors influenced the formation of Hitler's position regarding the Hungarian claims against Czecho-Slovakia. The cession of the Magyar-inhabited areas to Hungary was undisputable in German foreign policy at the beginning of October, 1938. As far as Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine were concerned, however, the policy was not formulated until later.

The resignation of Dr. Edvard Beneš from the post of the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, on October 5, 1938, as well as the new policy of General Syrový's Cabinet paved the road toward a pro-German Czecho-Slovak policy. Before the new Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, Dr. František Chvalkovský, arrived from Rome,[30] two members of Syrový's new Cabinet, General Karel Husárek and M. Vavrečka, visited the Reich Foreign Ministry to present their

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[28] *Ibid.*, Docs. 183 and 172.

[29] *Ibid.*, Doc. 213.

[30] On October 5, 1938, Dr. F. Chvalkovský, then Czecho-Slovak Minister in Rome, before leaving for Prague visited Count Ciano and Benito Mussolini. In his farewell conversation, Count Ciano advised Chvalkovský as to the way to save the future of Czecho-Slovakia in these words: "Friendship with Axis — intimacy with Rome." Chvalkovský stated that his program was to settle the dispute with the three neighboring states, Germany, Hungary, and Poland, and afterwards to enter the orbit of the Axis. See *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38*, p. 174.

new policies. At their visit, on October 5th, in the afternoon, they stated:

Beneš' resignation was a matter of a few hours. The new Czechoslovak Cabinet fully realized that with her new restricted frontiers Czechoslovakia could pursue only the policy of close dependence on Germany and cooperation with her.[31]

The position of the Supreme Command of the *Wehrmacht* with regard to the future of Carpatho-Ukraine was formulated early in October and the Reich Foreign Ministry was informed that "for military reasons a common Hungarian-Polish frontier was undesirable."[32] And, finally, it is believed that Germany decided to preserve Carpatho-Ukraine as an autonomous State within the federated Czecho-Slovak Republic for her own bargaining advantages in her contacts with Hungary and Poland. Another reason which contributed toward the change in the German position regarding Hungarian claims in Czecho-Slovakia was the different viewpoint concerning Engerau (Petržalka, in Slovak), a suburb of Bratislava across the Danube river (suddenly occupied by Germany at the beginning of October, 1938), as well as the Hungarian claim for Burgenland.[33] Here German interests were directly involved, and even very carefully presented Hungarian *démarches* aggravated not only Reich diplomats but also Hitler himself.

The day after the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, Döme Sztojay, on behalf of his Government, asked Berlin "for an explanation regarding the circumstances of the occupation of Engerau," the Under State Secretary in the Reich Foreign Ministry, Dr. Ernst Woermann, on October 7, 1938, submitted a memorandum to the Führer on the Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian questions. In this document, part II was devoted to the Carpatho-Ukrainian problem which reads as follows:

An independent Carpatho-Ukrainian State without support from outside is at present hardly viable. The advantage of this solution, however, would be that nucleus for a Greater Ukraine in the future would be created here. The

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[31] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 36.

[32] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 39.

[33] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 42. For the Hungarian efforts to annex Burgenland after Germany annexed Austria in March 1938 see *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 182; also footnote No. 89 above, pp. 193-194. In both cases German officials made it clear that "a further examination of the Burgenland question from the ethnical point of view would cost Hungary still more territory" and Hungarians hurriedly declared thereafter that their *démarches* were "to be regarded as if they had not taken place."

many million Ukrainians in Poland, the Soviet Union, and Rumania would be given a motherland and thus become national minorities.

In any case autonomy for the Carpatho-Ukraine under the slogan of self-determination should be demanded, and on this there are hardly any differences of opinion. Orientation of the autonomous Ukraine to Hungary is to be definitely rejected. This solution is desired by Hungary as well as by Poland. A common Polish- Hungarian frontier would thereby be created, which would facilitate the formation of an anti-German bloc. From a military point of view the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht is also opposed to this common Polish-Hungarian frontier.

While rejecting the Hungarian solution and assuming that an independent Carpatho-Ukraine is not viable, the remaining solution would be an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine oriented to Slovakia or Czechoslovakia. This is the most natural solution for the present. It leaves other possibilities open for a later date, and can also be achieved under the slogan "self-determination." Regarding the demarcation of the Carpatho-Ukraine from Slovakia there are questions of detail which have still to be examined.[34]

In part III of the same memorandum dealing with the German-Language Enclaves in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine we read:

With the exception of Pressburg, there are no German-language enclaves in the area, immediate cession of which is claimed by Hungary. Most important groups: Proben and Kremnitz language enclave with about 50,000 Germans, Upper and Lower Zips about 40,000, less important new settlements in the Ukrainian area north of Munkatsch about 15,000 Germans. There should be no transfer of population from these language enclaves, as they are of value as a nucleus for further development in the east.

And, in the summary again we read the following proposals:

1. For Slovakia: Alternatives — independent Slovakia or Czecho-Slovak solution...

2. For Carpatho-Ukraine: Alternatives — support for an independent but scarcely viable Carpatho-Ukraine and orientation toward Slovakia or Czecho-Slovakia. For the outside world the slogan also to be "right of self-determination" with the possibility of a plebiscite when the time comes.

3. From this results a rejection of the Hungarian or Polish solution for Slovakia as well as for Carpatho-Ukraine. In rejecting the demands of both those powers we would have a good slogan in the phrase "self-determination." For the outside world no anti-Hungarian or anti-Polish slogans to be issued.

4. Steps can be taken to influence leading persons in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine in favor of our solution. Preparations for this are already on foot.[35]

On the next day, October 8th, Walter Howel, the representative of the Reich Foreign Minister with the Führer, informed the Foreign Ministry of the Führer's decisions on the formulation of the official

[34] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 45.
[35] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 45.

German position with regard to Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. Adolf Hitler decided to pursue the following line:

3. With regard to Slovakia, the Führer thinks it opportune to support the Sillein (Žilina, in Slovak) resolutions (autonomy and orientation toward Prague).

4. As far as Carpatho-Ukraine is concerned, the Führer thinks it best that Germany should interfere as little as possible in this question. What would appeal to us most would be an autonomous Ruthenian area with orientation toward Prague, which of course would only be temporary solution until the final separation. The Führer does not think that Hungary will be in position to solve the problem. Left to itself, this question will certainly develop along the right line.[36]

Hitler also approved the position of the Reich Foreign Ministry that the German settlements in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine in view of their "value as a nucleus for further development in the east" should be preserved there. Soon thereafter, on October 10, 1938, the Reich Foreign Ministry laconically instructed the German missions in various capitals:

We maintain reserve in the Carpatho-Ukrainian question. A common Hungarian-Polish frontier is not supported by us, though outwardly we do not issue anti-Hungarian or anti-Polish slogans...

6. At present we are showing no particular activity in these questions. The general watchword is "self-determination." [37]

In his conversation with Joachim von Ribbentrop at Bad Godesberg on October 12, 1938, when already some of the difficulties which developed at the Komáron negotiations were known, Hitler again stated that "incontestably Hungarian areas should pass to Hungary" while the claims for non-Magyar areas should be rejected, because "even Germany has established no strategic frontiers but only ethnic frontiers"[38] in solving the Sudeten German question. However, with regard to the intentions of Hungary to mobilize against Czecho-Slovakia,[39] Hitler stated *pro foro interno* that "should Hungary mobilize, it is not our intention to hamper the Hungarians or even advise them to use moderation."[40] This made clear the fact that Germany would

[36] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 46.

[37] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 50. The Circular letter was sent to the German envoys in London, Paris, Rome, Warsaw, Washington, Tokyo, Belgrade, Bucharest, Brussels, Bern, and Geneva.

[38] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 53.

[39] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 48.

[40] *DGFP*, IV, Doc. 53.

not oppose Hungarian aggression against Czecho-Slovakia at that time and that Germany did not attach as much significance to the problem of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine as it was generally believed. Hitler's position concerning the Hungarian threat to mobilize proved that the words "we maintain reserve in Carpatho-Ukrainian question" had precisely the interpreted meaning and were not meant only *pro foro externo.*

In order to have a clear picture of the conditions under which direct negotiations started at Komárom, it is necessary to add that Rumania and Yugoslavia (under the impact of the Munich decision) declared themselves in favor of the cession of the definitely Magyar ethnic areas of Czecho-Slovakia to Hungary; however, they strongly opposed the annexation of non-Magyar territories.

DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AT KOMAROM FAIL

Under these conditions the Czecho-Slovak delegation, headed by the Prime Minister of the newly established autonomous Government of Slovakia, Msgr. Jozef Tiso, met the Hungarian delegation, headed by the Foreign Minister, Kálmán Kánya, on October 9, 1938, at Komárom to begin direct negotiations concerning Magyar claims.[41] From the documents available we are not able to discern that a common agreement of the two delegations was achieved concerning the basis of the negotiations, but the conversations were held primarily concerning the cession of the Magyar ethnic areas and determination of their limits. At the first meeting of the two delegations, on October 9th, the Hungarians submitted their only proposal demanding essentially the following: (a) an unconditional cession of territory up to roughly the line Bratislava-Nitra-Levice-Rimavská Sobota-Rožňava-Košice-Uzhhorod-Mukachiv and including these communities,

[41] The Czecho-Slovak delegation was composed basically of the members of the newly established autonomous Governments of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. The Czecho-Slovak Foreign Ministry, however, was represented by Dr. Krno, Director of Political Department in the Ministry. The Carpatho-Ukrainian interests were represented in the delegation first by Dr. Ivan Parkanyi, the Minister for the Carpatho-Ukrainian Affairs in General Syrový's Cabinet of October 5, 1938, and after the autonomous Government of Carpatho-Ukraine was established on October 11, 1938, Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, Minister for Interior, headed the Carpatho-Ukrainian sub-delegation. Serving as an expert on the problems of the Ukrainian and Magyar populations bordering on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine was Yuliy Husnay, another member of the sub-delegation.

and (b) a plebiscite for the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians.[42] The Czecho-Slovak delegation, headed by the Slovak Prime Minister, Msgr. Jozef Tiso, and composed of Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians, immediately refused to include the problem of a plebiscite of the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians on the agenda of negotiations as a matter of no concern to the Hungarians. They agreed to talk with the Hungarians concerning the cession of the areas inhabited by Magyar majorities; and, to show their readiness to make territorial sacrifices, the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians had agreed on this first day of negotiations to symbolic cession of Šahy (Ipolyság, in Magyar) and the rail-road station of Slovenské Nové Mesto (Sátoraljaujhely, in Magyar).[43]

If the original Hungarian demands had been fulfilled, according to the Czecho-Slovak census of 1930, some 440,000 Slovaks would have been added to the 300,000 Slovaks already living in Hungary, as well as 70,000 Carpatho-Ukrainians, so that the Slovak and Ukrainian minority living in Hungary would have amounted to 810,000.[44] The Hungarians justified their demands by reference to last pre-World War I census of 1910, following the principle adopted at the Munich Conference to solve the Sudeten German problem. Besides ignoring the change occuring in the composition of the population in the areas concerned during the last thirty years, difficulties arose when it was discovered that "figures which Hungarian delegation produced were entirely different from Czech figures based on the same 1910 census."[45] The representatives of the Czechs, Slovaks, and Carpatho-Ukrainians at Komárom were aware of the fact that the Hungarian proposal, if accepted, would cut their Federation off from the Danube as well as their communications with Rumania. As far as Carpatho-Ukraine was concerned, the fulfillment of the Hungarian demands would deprive the country not only of most of her fertile land along the Tysa river, but also of the most important commercial centers. Further, the only rail-road connecting Carpatho-Ukraine with the rest of the Federation would be lost;

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[42] *British Documents*, Third Series, Vol. III, Docs. 182 and 207.

[43] *Ibid.*, Doc. 207. Also see *Hungarian Documents*, introductory remarks, p. 106.

[44] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 63.

[45] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 207. The British Minister in Prague, Basil Newton, reporting on the negotiations at Komárom to Lord Halifax commented: "Good commentary on Hungarian figures in dispute was the fact that Dr. Tiso (Msgr. Dr. Jozef Tiso), head of Czechoslovak delegation, appeared... as a Hungarian."

therefore, the province would be cut off from Slovakia and Bohemia. Taking these factors into consideration, the representatives of the Carpatho-Ukrainians in the Czecho-Slovak Parliament first tried to win the support of the Great Powers as well as that of the lesser powers for preserving the unity of their province,[46] hoping that this question could be solved by giving autonomy to the Magyar population within the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy.[47] In view of these wide differences of opinion between the two delegations, the first day of the talks ended only with the clarification of some questions.

The second day of direct negotiations did not produce any satisfactory results,[48] and on the third day of the negotiations, on October 11th, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kálmán Kánya, in his capacity as the head of the delegation addressed a note to the Czecho-Slovak delegation stating that the Hungarian delegation was disappointed with the attitude of the Czecho-Slovak delegation. Therefore, "it was impossible to continue negotiations on such a basis," since

> In the first place, Czechoslovak delegation had refused to cede certain towns of indisputable Hungarian character.
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> Secondly, Czechoslovaks had asked for about a week's delay in which their experts might study questions raised. It was surprising that Czechoslovak experts were not already on the spot. This demand showed an evident desire to spin out the negotiations which was contrary to the interests of both countries as well as the whole of Europe.
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> Thirdly, Czechoslovaks had contended that the question of free disposi-

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[46] *Ibid.*, Docs. 144 and 172.

[47] *Ibid.*, Doc. 172. This solution was in accordance with the demands of the leader of the Magyar minority in Czecho-Slovakia, Count János Esterházy, of the end of August, 1938. At that time, the Hungarian minority negotiated with the Czecho-Slovak Prime Minister, Dr. Milan Hodža, whose Cabinet was preparing the so-called Nationality Statute. In their memorandum of August 27, 1938, leaders of the Magyar minority demanded national autonomy for all Magyars living on the territories of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. Except the military, finance, communication and foreign policy, all other affairs on the Magyar autonomous territory were to be handled by an autonomous Magyar Government and a local Diet of their own. See *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), August 28, 1938.

[48] On October 10, 1938, the second day of the negotiations, the Hungarian Minister in Rome, F. Villani, told Count Ciano "in great secrecy" that "some groups inside Czechoslovakia are to be sent into action to-day." See *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38*, p. 175. Certain analogy may be traced between this Hungarian move and the creation of Henlein's *Freikorps* in Germany causing disturbances in Sudetenland during the negotiations between Hitler and Chamberlain some three weeks earlier. For British comments, see *British Documents*, Third Series III, Doc. 196.

tion of Slovaks and Ruthenes should lie outside the present negotiations. Hungarian Government could only say that Hungary possessed full right, of which she intended if necessary to make use, to refuse her own guarantee of any new situation that might arise which was not based upon previous exercise of rights of self-determination of interested populations. The Hungarians were sure of not being alone in Europe with that conception.

Finally, Hungarian Government saw no necessity for long negotiations. On the contrary very little time was required to see whether the two theses regarding territorial question were susceptible to negotiation or not.[49]

The Czecho-Slovak delegation reported immediately to its Government, and the Council of Ministers in Prague considered the newly developed situation the same day. In accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers, in which deliberations the Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian Ministers also participated,[50] the Czecho-Slovak delegation immediately submitted a new proposal, emphasizing that this proposal was not final and that the delegation wished to continue discussions on the basis of mutual concessions. The Czecho-Slovak delegation had proposed a frontier involving the cession of about 400,000 persons including 330,000 Magyars and leaving approximately the same number of Hungarians in Czecho-Slovakia as there would be Slovaks and Ruthenians in Hungary.[51] The new Czecho-Slovak proposals had been based on the ethnical results of the 1930 census "tempered where necessary by strategic, economic, and transit considerations worked out on a reciprocal basis."[52]

On October 12, 1938, in order to strengthen its bargaining position, the Hungarian Government asked Italy's dictator, Benito Mussolini, to use his power to influence the Czecho-Slovak Government to the effect of yielding to Hungarian demands. Count Ciano transmitted the wish of the Duce to Prague demanding "the immediate cession to the Magyars of the areas with a clear Hungarian majority."[53] After the following meetings of the two delegations at Komárom did not produce satisfactory results to any party, on Octo-

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[49] *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 185. Also see *Horthy's Secret Documents,* Doc. 68, pp. 183-185.

[50] The one day old Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomous Government participated in this meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Central Government of the Federation *in corpore* since all newly appointed Carpatho-Ukrainina Ministers, headed by Andriy Brodiy, still were in Prague. The Minister for the Interior, Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, went from Prague directly to Komárom to participate in the work of the Czecho-Slovak delegation.

[51] *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 207.

[52] *Ibid.,* Third Series, III, Doc. 196.

[53] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38,* p. 176.

ber 13th, the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kálmán Kánya, handed to the other negotiating party a declaration stating that since the Czecho-Slovak

counter-proposals respecting our new frontiers, which were submitted to us this morning, diverge from our views so widely that we are convinced we cannot hope that these negotiations will result in bringing over of the wide chasm which divides the points of view taken up by the two delegations,... the Royal Hungarian Government have determined to consider that the present negotiations are ended as far as they are concerned and to request the four signatory Powers of the Munich Agreement to settle our territorial claim against Czechoslovakia as soon as possible.[54]

Both delegations in their declarations claimed that they came to Komárom with the intentions to reach an agreement solving their dispute through direct negotiations. The Hungarians opened their above cited declaration with the following statement:

As we already repeatedly declared, we came to negotiations at Komárom with the best and sincerest intentions and in the certain hope that we should succeed in reaching an agreement in the shortest possible time which would establish the relations between our States on a sure foundation. Unfortunately this hope of ours has not been fulfilled.

The Czecho-Slovak Foreign Ministry in its declaration of October 14th issued after the negotiations were broken off, claimed that

Czecho-Slovak delegation had gone to Komarno (Komárom, in Magyar) with firm desire to reach lasting, fair, and rapid settlement.

They had agreed to open negotiations not later than ten days after Munich Agreement though it had contemplated a delay of three months,

and accused the Hungarians that

they have refused to put forward second proposal despite earnest request of Czecho-Slovak delegation (and) they had abruptly broken off negotiations only a few days after their opening.[55]

This was the end of the five days of direct negotiations between Hungarians, on the one hand, and the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians whose territories were involved in the dispute, on the other. At the same time, at this moment the tension between the disputing parties was at its peak. Hungarian irregulars penetrated the terri-

[54] *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 201.
[55] *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 207.

tory of Carpatho-Ukraine[56] and the regular military forces of Hungary were in the process of mobilization.[57] All parties directly involved decided to gather support for their particular interests.

GERMAN MEDIATION FAILS

As early as October 15, 1938, only two weeks after the Munich Conference, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax, in his letter to the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, dealing with the Hungarian-Polish claims admitted that "it seems that Germany is bound to have the deciding voice in future of these (Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian) territories."[58] He instructed him to follow closely the development of the German official as well as unofficial policies concerning Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. Responsible French official circles recognized this position of Germany even earlier.[59] Under those conditions, all interested parties concentrated their efforts to win German support for their aims.

After the annexation of Sudetenland by Germany, Czecho-Slovakia's defensive system in that part of the country was destroyed completely, and General Syrový's Government came to the conclusion that it was rather risky to rely on the distant allies. Dr. František Chvalkovský was purposely appointed to the post of the Minister for Foreign Affairs because his pro-Fascit attitude was known in influential Prague circles. Chvalkovský took Ciano's advice to heart, and a few days after his arrival in Prague he asked the German Legation to transmit his wish to visit Adolf Hitler. On October 13, 1938, he was received by the Reich Foreign Minister, Joachim von

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[56] The reaction of the Ukrainian population to this incident described in *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 19, 1938.

[57] While Mussolini advised the Hungarian Military Attaché in Rome, Colonel L. Szabó, that Hungary should mobilize, Count Ciano was disappointed with Hungarians and remarked that they "would like to have Slovakia, Ruthenia, everything — to create, in fact, mosaic state No. 3. They don't dare say so, because they are afraid of Germany." *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38*, p. 177. For Horthy's explanation to Hitler why he ordered mobilization in Hungary see his letter to Hitler dated October 13, 1938, in *Horthy's Secret Document*, Doc. 68, pp. 183-185.

[58] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 208.

[59] *Ibid.*, Doc. 189. The Deputy Chief of the French General Staff, General Dentz, in his conversation with the British Ambassador in Paris, Mr. Campbell, on October 12,1938, admitted that Hungary could occupy Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine only with German permission. Neither Britain nor France would act against it.

Ribbentrop, in Berlin, and the next day he visited the Führer at Munich. In his conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister, Dr. F. Chvalkovský stated that the new Czecho-Slovak "foreign policy meant of course the end of the Moscow-Prague-Paris Axis" and in her foreign policy from now on "Czechoslovakia wanted to rely on Germany, if Germany would allow this."[60] In his long talk with Adolf Hitler, Chvalkovský also

mentioned the necessity of economic cooperation with Germany and related that benevolent support from Germany was desirable for Czechoslovakia in carrying out this new policy of cooperation with Germany, a policy moreover which he had long advocated. The Reich should grant Czechoslovakia a period of probation, for, after her experience with Prague, Germany naturally could not be expected to place great value on mere assurances and promises on the part of the Czechs.[61]

After these humble words for mercy, Adolf Hitler assured the Czecho-Slovak Minister for Foreign Affairs that

If Czechoslovakia found her proper place and realized that British and French guarantees were as worthless as the treaty of alliance with France or the pact with Russia had been during the crisis and that the only really effective guarantee was that by Germany, then in the course of time satisfactory relations might develop between the two countries.[62]

In both conversations the question of the Hungarian claims was brought up by the German statesmen. Chvalkovský had to admit that he still had not enough time to acquaint himself with the details, since the negotiations were taking place in Komárom directly between the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians, on the one side, and the Hungarians on the other. He only knew that the Hungarians were making extremely far-reaching demands, including the cession of the Slovak capital, Bratislava, as well as the capital of Carpatho-Ukraine, Uzhhorod. Faced with this situation the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians had refused "in principle" to cede these two towns along with six others. The Führer pointed out that

it would be better for both parties if they solved the question in direct understanding instead of submitting it again to the four Great Powers... With regard to the Hungarian demands, the areas in which there was a definite Hungarian majority must first be singled out, and for the remaining areas

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[60] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 55.
[61] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 61.
[62] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 61.

where the proportion was in doubt plebiscites must be arranged; in these the British Legion might perhaps be used for police functions.[63]

Both these conversations did not promise much German support for the new Czecho-Slovak State. Chvalkovský had no reason for optimism since all he heard were rather strong words which might be considered as threatening rather than advisive or good-neighborly. As far as Carpatho-Ukraine was concerned, Hitler maintained full reserve during his talks with Chvalkovský and even the name of the province was not mentioned.

Immediately after direct negotiations were broken off, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Béla Imrédy, asked the German Minister in Budapest, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, to arrange that his predecessor, Kálmán Darányi, might be received at once by Hitler. The reason given for this urgent request was that the Hungarian Government "contemplated definite decisions but would do nothing without consulting the Führer."[64] While "the events of recent months caused the Hungarian Government to feel itself bound more firmly than ever to the Berlin-Rome Axis and it was prepared to affirm this on paper," reported Otto von Erdmannsdorff further on the basis of his conversation with Béla Imrédy, at the same time "the attitude of the German press toward the creation of a common frontier between Poland and Hungary in Carpatho-Ukraine had caused astonishment" in Hungary.[65] The same evening, the Hungarian Council of Ministers decided "to call up five more classes by individual orders" into the military service and to send Count István Csáky simultaneously to Rome.[66]

While Dr. František Chvalkovský was received by Adolf Hitler in the presence of Joachim von Ribbentrop only, the special Hungarian envoy, Ex-Prime Minister Darányi, had his conversations with the Führer in the presence of Ribbentrop, General Wilhelm Keitel, and the German Ambassador in Budapest, Otto von Erdmannsdorff. The talks were held immediately after the conversations with Dr. F.

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[63] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 61.

[64] *DGFP*, D, IV, footnote on page 66. The day before Darányi's conversation with Adolf Hitler, the Regent of Hungary Horthy sent a personal letter to the Führer in which he wrote: "At this occasion, I express my heartfelt thanks to you for everything you have done for my country during your historic activities and feelingly congratulate you for the great success achieved recently for the German Reich." See *Horthy's Secret Documents*, Doc. 68, pp. 183-185.

[65] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 57.

[66] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 59.

Chvalkovský who was asked by his German colleague to be on hand in case of necessity.

Darányi started his conversation with Hitler proceeding immediately to the main point. He stated that the negotiations in Komárom had been broken off because "the Czechs were prepared to give up only a fraction of the territory inhabited by Hungarians" and complained that they "intended to determine their frontiers not on an ethnic but on a strategic basis and for reasons of communications."[67] Darányi then submitted to the Führer maps and documents stating the positions of both negotiating parties and complained that "the Slovaks wanted to keep almost all Hungarian towns and railroads." Hitler asked what the Hungarians intended to do now, and Darányi answered that "Hungary had called up five classes, and general mobilization was expected tomorrow." After Darányi explicitly asked whether the Führer supported or opposed Hungary's mobilization, Hitler replied that he "expected no result from this unless the Hungarians were really resolved to fight," and he let the Hungarians know that Germany would not support them militarily at present since her military forces were in a state of demobilization, adding that "if it came to conflict (now), Hungary would be alone and the outcome would be very doubtful."

To win Hitler's support, Darányi introduced into the discussion three questions: first, whether it was desirable to issue an official statement to the effect that Hungary was adhering more closely to the Rome-Berlin Axis; secondly, whether it was desirable for Hungary to join the Anti-Commintern Pact; and, thirdly, suggested that economic negotiations between Hungary and Germany should be held envisaging a term of ten or more years and bringing economic relations of the two countries still closer. Hitler immediately agreed with the last proposal including a supply of German arms for the Hungarian military forces. As to the first question, the Führer "left this completely to the Hungarians, as they were a sovereign state"[68] but asked Darányi why Hungary still belonged to the League of Nations? Darányi answered that "resignation from the League of Nations might be suggested and probably also achieved by him." As to the joining the Anti-Commintern Pact, Hitler would approve of this, but let it be known that all these suggestions should be put into effect only after "the Hungarian-Slovak question was

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[67] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 62. All the following quotations in this paragraph below have been taken from this document.

[68] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 62.

settled as, if the quarrel came before a conference, Hungary was placing herself unnecessarily in opposition to Britain and France."[69]

Referring again to the Hungarian claims in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, Hitler expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that "the Hungarians had previously informed him that the Slovaks and Ruthenians wanted union with Hungary at all costs" while the reality was that "today this did not seem to be the case at all."[70] In view of these facts, both Hitler and Ribbentrop stated that they would not advise the Hungarians to stick to the plebiscites because the outcome of such plebiscites in both countries was "very doubtful." After Darányi said that "the atmosphere in the areas would be more favorable for Hungary as soon as there were no more Czech soldiers there" and that "if the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians became independent, Hungary could then aim at a customs union or something of the kind," Hitler answered that "a plebiscite could not be forced on the Slovaks against their will" adding that "they naturally wanted to be independent but definitely did not want union with Hungary." In further discussions, Hitler advised the Hungarians to try to reach a solution directly, because a conference of the Four Powers would be fruitless in these matters, since France and Great Britain, desiring "to save their face with the Czechs," would support Czecho-Slovakia "to the uttermost," while he and Mussolini, in order to oppose such moves, would support Hungary "to the uttermost."

At this point, Hitler suggested calling in Chvalkovský, but Darányi stated that his Government had not authorized him to hold such talks. Referring to the map marked with both the Hungarian as well as the Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian proposed lines of new borders, the Führer said that "neither the Slovak nor the Hungarian frontier delimitation was just and that fairer frontiers must be achieved through bilateral negotiations." Then he asked the Hungarians to state their minimum demands to the Reich Foreign Minister, on the one hand, and instructed Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop to talk with Chvalkovský in order to establish what minimum possibilities could be expected from the Czechs, hoping that this would lead to a satisfactory agreement.

After his talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop, Darányi contacted the Hungarian Prime Minister, Béla Imrédy, and the Hungarian Government instructed him as to what limits the Hungarians might go in

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[69] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 62.
[70] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 62.

the delimitation of the new frontier with Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. The Ex-Premier presented the position of his Government to the Reich Foreign Minister at a late afternoon meeting. A few minutes later, at 7:30 p. m. Ribbentrop received again Dr. Chvalkovský and presented to him the map with a new line drawn by him and Darányi in accordance with the instructions of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Béla Imrédy, what Ribbentrop considered to be a "fair frontier delimitation." According to this new Hungarian proposal

> the question of the future ownership of Pressburg would not be discussed for the present; that of Kaschau was left open, while Ungvar and Munkatsch would remain in Carpatho-Ukraine territory. For the rest, this line showed only a few deviations from the ethnic frontier proposed by the Hungarians and demanded for immediate cession.[71]

The Reich Foreign Minister handed this map to the Czecho-Slovak Minister for Foreign Affairs and urged him to renew negotiations with the Hungarian Government on this new and more favorable basis as soon as possible. At the same time, Ribbentrop added that these were minimum demands,and, unless they were fulfilled, there could be no question of a guarantee by the Reich Government of the new Czecho-Slovak frontier. He again emphasized that since the Hungarians had already carried out partial mobilization, speed was necessary.

On the same day, October 14th, when Chvalkovský and Darányi held their conversations with Adolf Hitler, another special envoy of the Hungarian Government, Count István Csáky, visited Rome and held conversations with the Duce and Foreign Minister Ciano. As a result of their conversations, Benito Mussolini instructed Count Ciano to send invitations to France, Germany, and Great Britain for the second conference of the Four Powers to be held as soon as possible either in Venice or Brioni to settle the problem of the Magyar minorities in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine.[72] After the negative attitude of the Führer regarding such a conference became known in Budapest, Count Csáky, acting on the instructions of his Government, informed Count Ciano late in the evening of the same day that the Hungarians "now prefer not to annoy the Germans and to aban-

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[71] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 63.

[72] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 203; also see *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 60.

don the idea of a conference and stick to direct negotiations."[73] The Duce was disappointed that his initiative had been abandoned, and after having read a disappointing report from Poland, he instructed Count Ciano to inform Berlin that Italy was "not at all keen on the common frontier between Poland and Hungary." [74] It was quite possible that one of the reasons for this change in his attitude toward the Hungarian claims was the telephone call by Joachim von Ribbentrop who asked the Italian Government to support his plan, a plan worked out with the representatives of Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia.

Count Csáky's visit to Rome actually brought to Hungary two achievements. First, he agreed with Count Ciano that "if the direct negotiations failed, the best solution would appear to be an arbitral award by the Axis Powers." [75] This Italian initiative was added as *post scriptum* to the note addressed to the German Foreign Minister re-calling the initiated Four Powers conference. Secondly, on the intervention of the Italian Minister in Prague, Francesco Fransoni, the Czecho-Slovaks granted "clemency for the forty Hungarian rebels who were taken prisoners by the Czechs in Ruthenia." [76] The declaration of the Duce concerning his disinterest in the common Polish-Hungarian frontier in Carpatho-Ukraine was to be booked on the side of losses.

After Dr. František Chvalkovský returned by train from Munich to Prague, he immediately informed the Prime Minister of the Federation, General Jan Syrový, about the results of his talks in Berlin and Munich. General Syravý summoned the Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian governmental officials to discuss the new situation. In the meantime, on October 14th, the Carpatho-Ukrainian Prime Minister, Andriy Brodiy, and a member of his Cabinet, Minister Yuliyan Revay, conferred with the Slovak Prime Minister, Msgr. Jozef Tiso, in Bratislava, concerning the next steps to be taken after the negotiations with the Hungarians at Komárom had been broken off.[77] The

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[73] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38,* pp. 177-178. On the same day, October 14th, Count Ciano sent another telegram addressed to the three powers stating in it that "Hungarian Government has now decided not to request conference of Four Munich Powers since they have ascertained that direct negotiations between themselves and the Czechoslovak Government can be resumed." See *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 204.

[74] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38,* p. 178.

[75] *DGFP,* D, IV, Doc. 64.

[76] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38,* p. 178.

[77] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 15, 1938.

following day, on October 15, 1938, the problem of the new frontier with Hungary was the most important point on the agenda of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of Carpatho-Ukraine in Uzhhorod.[78] Dr. F. Chvalkovský discussed the Darányi-Ribbentrop proposal with the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians. The Carpatho-Ukrainian Government was represented in these talks by Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy and Yuliyan Revay. They agreed that the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians themselves should present their causes to the Reich Foreign Minister since they were better acquainted with the situation and possibilities in their countries than the newly appointed Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister. In the evening hours of October 17, 1938, Dr. F. Chvalkovský asked the German Chargé d'Affairs in Prague, Andor Hencke, to inquire whether the Reich Foreign Minister or if possible even the Führer himself would receive the Slovak Prime Minister, Msgr. Jozef Tiso, the Slovak Minister for Interior, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský, and the Carpatho-Ukrainian Minister for Interior, Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy.[79] To this request the German answer was that the Reich Foreign Minister would receive the three Ministers only under the condition that the Czecho-Slovak Government was prepared to accept as a basis for negotiation the line drawn by him and Darányi.[80] Only under this pressure, the Czecho-Slovak Government accepted this line "as the starting point for the talks." [81] The green light for the trip to Munich was given.

The Reich Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, received the Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian Ministers on October 19, 1938, in the Führerbau at Munich. First he conferred with the Slovaks alone, and Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy joined the conversations later on. After the Slovaks presented their case, Joachim von Ribbentrop stated in the presence of the German Minister in Budapest, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, that he

instructed Minister Erdmannsdorff to inform the Hungarians that they should renounce their claims to Pressburg, Nitra, Kaschau, Munkatsch, and Ungvar (Slovak: Bratislava, Nitra, Košice; and Ukrainian: Mukachiv, and Uzhhorod — respectively), as these towns were vital for Slovakia. A condition for this was the occupation of the area accepted by the Hungarians within 8 days. There was no question of holding the negotiations in Vienna, nor in Prague, Pressburg, Komarno, or Pistyan. The best way would be through diplomatic

[78] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 18, 1938.
[79] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 66.
[80] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 70.
[81] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 71.



Edmund Bachynskiy

channels, and Chvalkovský should first ask the Hungarian Minister to visit him.[82]

The Slovak Ministers expressed their agreement in principle with these ideas.

The Carpatho-Ukrainian Minister, Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, was then called in and was asked to state his case since the question of Carpatho-Ukraine was different from that of Slovakia. Joachim von Ribbentrop explained to him Germany's attitude toward those problems in the same way as he had done with the Slovaks. He described the line which he had discussed with Darányi and then communicated to Chvalkovský and expressed his hope that "Carpatho-Ukraine would accede to the proposals which had already been accepted by the Slovaks." Dr. E. Bachynskiy then handed Joachim von Ribbentrop a memorandum dealing with the ethnic composition of the Carpatho-Ukrainian area under dispute stating that the districts surrounding the towns of Choma, Hetenya, Sirma, Ardiv, Chepa, and Tekovo were purely Ruthenian. The Reich Foreign Minister said that

> there was no ideal solution, but that, if these areas were so purely Ruthenian as the Minister stated, Hungary must give up her claim here, too. What was pure Ruthenian must remain Ruthenian. He would also inform the Hungarians to that effect.[83]

Bachynskiy then asked Joachim von Ribbentrop to suggest to the Hungarians that they should grant the Carpatho-Ukrainians transit rights on various railway lines, as, for example, from Chop to Sevlyush, from Chop to Uzhhorod, and from Batyovo to Mukachiv. The transit was vital for economic reasons for Carpatho-Ukraine, because the country itself would be torn apart economically. After Bachynskiy asked Joachim von Ribbentrop again "to support Ukrainian aspirations vis-á-vis the Hungarians," stressing the importance of Uzhhorod as the capital of the country, and that of Mukachiv as country's commercial center, while Sevlyush was surrounded by pure Ukrainian villages, the Reich Foreign Minister instructed Otto von Erdmannsdorff to submit these points to the Hungarian

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[82] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 72. On October 17, 1938, the Hungarian Government informed the Reich Foreign Minister that "it has no desire to enter into *direct* negotiations with the Czechoslovak Government regarding the frontier or the extension of the area to be ceded to Hungary, because this would only postpone the final decision by many days, or possibly weeks." See *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 65.

[83] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 72.

Government remarking that "after all they affected Hungary's interests also." The Carpatho-Ukrainian Minister also stated that "he himself had experienced the Magyar regime and that it meant a ruthless suppression of national individuality" of the Ruthenians in the past and that "national feeling among the youth was so strong that it was out of the question to go on living with the Hungarians." Further, he stated that his aim was "an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine under Prague." [84]

In the evening of October 19th, the Reich Foreign Minister called the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, by telephone and informed him about his conversations with Msgr. Jozef Tiso and Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, emphasizing that he "settled with them a last plan to submit to Budapest." [85] Count Ciano, "on the whole, expressed his agreement with the results" subject, however, to the Duce's approval.[86]

In accordance with Ribbentrop's instructions, the very next day after his return from Munich to Budapest, Otto von Erdmannsdorff told the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kálman Kánya, that

> the Czechoslovak Government, and also the Slovak and Ukrainian Ministers present yesterday at Munich, have accepted the frontier line proposed by the Reich Foreign Minister and have agreed to the occupation by October 26 of the area to be ceded to Hungary, with the reservation that details are to be settled in direct negotiations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary in accordance with the request to this effect made by the Czech Foreign Minister to the Hungarian Minister in Prague. Pressburg, Nyitra, Kaschau, Ungvar, and Munkatsch thus do not pass to Hungary.[87]

The German Minister to Hungary, at the same time, also transmitted to the Hungarian Government

> the special request of the Slovak and Ukrainian Ministers regarding a more favorable frontier settlement for them and the facilitation of transit traffic, as well as the Reich Foreign Minister's urgent advice given in agreement with the Italian Foreign Minister, to accept the new frontier line.

The Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kánya, replied that "there could be no question of the Hungarian Government's accepting the pro-

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[84] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 72.

[85] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38*, p. 180.

[86] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 74. Count Ciano immediately informed the Hungarian Minister in Rome, Villani, and told him: "If you accept the plan, which may be called a German plan, good — we are satisfied. If not, let us know what we can do for you." *See Ciano's Diary, 1937-38*, p. 180.

[87] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 75.

posal." Count Paul Teleki, the Minister of Education, who participated in the conversation in the capacity of an expert on nationality questions, also said that

> the Hungarian Government must insist on a plebiscite in the frontier areas with a mixed population, and, if its claim to Pressburg were abandoned, it must insist on having Kaschau, and at least Ungvár *or* Munkács.[88]

Otto von Erdmannsdorff stated to the Hungarians on instructions of his Foreign Minister that "if this proposal is not accepted, the Reich Foreign Minister sees no possibility for further mediation." And this, actually, meant the end of Germany's mediation since both the Regent, Nicholas Horthy, and the Prime Minister, Béla Imrédy, as well as Kánya "showed the greatest dismay over the proposal" of Joachim von Ribbentrop. The Regent said in his conversation with Hans Frank, Reich Minister without Portfolio, who came to Budapest to negotiate economic problems, that he "could not justify to his people the renunciation of Kaschau, Ungvár, and Munkács, or reconcile it with his honor."[89] In this situation, on October 22, 1938, the Reich Foreign Minister instructed his envoy in Budapest, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, to notify the Hungarian Government that in view of the fact that "the Hungarian Government had described the German mediation proposal approved by Darányi as unacceptable, the Reich Government regards direct mediation between the two parties as being at an end." [90]

The formal declaration about the end of Germany's mediation was a logical move to pave the way for the Italo-German arbitration which the Hungaro-Italian circles initiated in the meantime. This position of Germany was no surprise to Hungary, since both the Italian and Hungarian diplomats had inquired already earlier regarding their proposal, and concluded that it would not meet with German refusal.

UKRAINIANS EVERYWHERE SUPPORT CARPATHO-UKRAINE

The Carpatho-Ukrainian Minister for Interior, Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, on his way from Munich to the capital of his country stopped in Prague and in the presence of another member of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Cabinet, Yuliyan Revay, informed the Czecho-

[88] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 75.
[89] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 76.
[90] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 84.

Slovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. F. Chvalkovský, about the course of the conversations with the Reich Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop. Before taking further steps in contacting the Hungarians, Chvalkovský wanted to have consent of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government, and for this purpose the Prime Minister, Andriy Brodiy, summoned the Council of the Ministers of Carpatho-Ukraine for a meeting held in Uzhhorod on October 22, 1938. At this meeting, Dr. E. Bachynskiy reported about the results of his visit to Munich, and the Council of Ministers approved all steps taken by him.[91] The Council of Ministers again delegated Dr. E. Bachynskiy to represent the Carpatho-Ukrainian interests in further negotiations with the Hungarian Government.

While in towns and villages of the country populous meetings were being held to manifest the desire of the population to live freely in the Federation of the Czechs, Slovaks, and Ukrainians, the Hungarian demands caused an open split among members of the Council of Ministers. This split was contrary to the unanimous approval of Dr. E. Bachynskiy's report after his return from the Munich meeting with Joaohim von Ribbentrop. This split was kept in secrecy from the population of the country until October 26, 1938, when Andriy Brodiy was deposed from his position of Prime Minister, and Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn was appointed to head the autonomous Carpatho-Ukrainian Government. On instruction from Budapest of October 24, 1938, the followers of Andriy Brodiy met in Uzhhorod on behalf of the Russian Central National Council and decided to support the Hungarian demands for a plebiscite on the whole territory of Carpatho-Ukraine "in order to save Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia within her present frontiers as a unit, to save her from dismemberment, and to prevent the detachment of her southern territories." [92] The followers of Dr. E. Bachynskiy's Agrarian party as well as the representatives of the Russian-oriented youth were not invited to the meeting of the Council and they, in their capacity as the members of the Council, protested against this move of Andriy Brodiy.[93] Contrary to this move of A. Brodiy, the First Central Ukrainian National Council, headed by Msgr. A. Voloshyn, in its meeting held in Uzhhorod, on October 26, 1938, decided unanimously to support the policy and the line represented by Dr. E. Bachynskiy at the conference with the Reich Foreign Minister

[91] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 26, 1938.
[92] Prof. Avhustyn Shtefan to Petro Stercho, letter of July 30, 1957.
[93] *Russkiy Narodnyy Golos* (Uzhhorod), October 27, 1938.

in Munich, on October 19, 1938.[94] In that new situation, all political groups of Ukrainian orientation united on the basis of the First Central Ukrainian Council as well as a considerable portion of the Russian-oriented groups which previously were united on the basis of the Russian Council (especially the followers of the Agrarian party, headed by Dr. E. Bachynskiy, Pavlo Kossey and Vasyl' Shcheretskiy; the Carpatho-Russian National Socialist party, headed by Mykhaylo Vasylenko; and the Russian Youth League, headed by M. Kovach), strongly opposed Hungarian aspirations. Their aim was: an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine within her ethnic frontiers oriented toward Bratislava and Prague.

The Ukrainians beyond the Carpathian mountains, under Polish and Rumanian rule, wholeheartedly supported the newly established autonomous Ukrainian State in Carpatho-Ukraine. The leading dailies in L'viv and Chernivtsi already on October 11, 1938, brought the news to their readers that the autonomous Carpatho-Ukrainian Government was established in Uzhhorod and promised all the support they could offer.[95] In the evening hours of October 11, 1938, in the Metropolitan Cathedral of St. George in L'viv thanksgiving services were held after the announcement that the Carpatho-Ukrainians had obtained autonomy. After these religious services some twenty thousand Ukrainians marched through the streets of the capital of Western Ukraine, L'viv, to the Hungarian Consulate to protest against Hungary's efforts to annex Carpatho-Ukraine.[96] The undisputable leader of the Western Ukrainians, Archbishop Count Andrey Sheptyts'kyy, the Metropolitan of L'viv, Halych and Kamyanets, sent a letter of congratulations to Rev. Avhustyn Voloshyn on the occasion of his becoming the Prime Minister of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government, wishing him that he would "successfully lead his people to the fullest freedom and general well-being." [97] The enthusiasm

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[94] See above, pp. 121-122.

[95] *Novyy Chas* (L'viv), October 11, 1938; *Dilo* (L'viv), October 11, 1938. For a brief account of the support of the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomous Statehood by the Ukrainians under Polish rule, see Bohdan Kravtsiv, "Bereznevi Dni 1939 na Zakarpatyi," *Svoboda* (Jersey City, N.J.), March 21, 1957.

[96] *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), October 18, 1938. Also see *The Chicago Tribune,* October 13, 1938. The latter reported that there were serious clashes between the Ukrainian demonstrators and the Polish police. It was reported that 18 persons were killed and several hundred were reported wounded. In the city of L'viv military rule was established after two days of riots. Many of the Ukrainian leaders were reported to have been arrested and the Ukrainian newspapers attempting to publish the names of the killed were censored.

[97] For the full text see *Nova Svoboda* (Khust), November 30, 1938.

of the Ukrainians under the Polish and Rumanian rule and their willingness to help to develop and defend the Carpatho-Ukrainian Statehood could best be shown by the fact that hundreds of young men illegally crossed the frontiers dividing the Ukrainians on the both sides of the Carpathians in order to enlist into the semi-military Organization of National Defense "Carpathian Sitch." The number of the volunteers rose every day, and the number of those caught at the illegal crossing of the frontier on the Polish side and jailed by the Poles also increased every day. Therefore, as early as November 13, 1938, the Supreme Command of the "Carpathian Sitch," headed by Dmytro Klempush, found it necessary to urge publicly the young men not to take the risk.[98]

At the beginning of October, 1938, the representatives of all legally existing Ukrainian political parties in Poland issued a joint declaration against the Hungaro-Polish attempt to force Carpatho-Ukraine into the Hungarian State against the will of her population. The declaration was presented to the Polish Prime Minister, General F. Slawoj-Skladkowski, as well as sent to the Governments of France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Hungary. It said:

> Standing firmly on the principle of self-determination of all peoples, the undersigned representatives of Ukrainian political organizations raise a protest against foreign attempts to decide the fate of Carpathian Ukraine, against the expressed will of the population. The undersigned declare that only the will of the Ukrainian population of Carpathian Ukraine should determine the juridico-political status of that country and that the Ukrainian people will defend their right to self-determination as claimed by all other peoples.[99]

Thus, the representatives of religious and political life of the Ukrainians of Western Ukraine did all they could under the existing conditions to help Carpatho-Ukraine in her struggle for existence.

Besides the Ukrainians of Western Ukraine, the American Ukrainians were the most active Ukrainian community in the world supporting the struggle for freedom of Carpatho-Ukraine. Three

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[98] *Nova Svoboda* (Khust), November 13, 1938.

[99] *Natsionalist* (New York), October 16, 1938. The declaration was signed by Vasyl' Mudryy, Dmytro Paliyiv, Madame Milena Rudnyts'ka, Dr. Volodymyr Starosol's'kyy, and Dr. Matviy Stakhiv.

The Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO), headed by Vasyl' Mudryy, handed to the Polish Prime Minister a separate memorandum in defense of Carpatho-Ukraine, too. For its text see *Svoboda* (Jersey City), November 5, 1938, and a report in *The New York Times*, October 13, 1938. Both these documents were confiscated by the Polish authorities and not allowed to be published there.

days after the Munich Conference, on October 3, 1938, the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States, headed by Emil Revyuk, President, and Dmytro Halychyn, Secretary, issued a proclamation addressed "To the Ukrainian Immigrants in America" urging American Ukrainians to do everything in their power in order to secure the right "for our people in Trans-Carpathia to express freely their will regarding their future political status." [100] At the same time, this representative confederation of all major organizations of the American Ukrainians sent identical telegrams to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, stating among other things:

> We, Americans of Ukrainian descent, most strongly urge your Excellency to use your good offices to secure for Ukrainians in Czecho-Slovakia the right of self-determination...
>
> We, Americans of Ukrainian descent, also strongly oppose summary annexation or apportionment of the afore-mentioned Ukrainian territory by or to any nation.[101]

Simultaneously, the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States sent a telegram to the International Commission in Berlin, headed by Ernst von Weizsäcker, dealing with the new German-Czech frontier, in which we read:

> According to press reports, Hungary and Poland raise claims for possession of Carpathian Ruthenia. We vigorously protest against such allocation of that territory. Hungary, which for centuries oppressed all non-Hungarian minorities, and Poland which now does her utmost to exterminate seven million Ukrainians under her domination, would by such occupation only add a new chapter to martyrdom of Ukrainian people and render European situation still more unstable. We urge you to grant Ukrainian people under Czecho-Slovakia the right to express their free will directly or indirectly through their Ukrainian Central Council in Uzhhorod...[102]

These telegrams were sent before the establishment of the autonomous Government of Carpatho-Ukraine; therefore, it is to be assumed that the references to the right of self-determination were

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[100] "Do Ukrayins'koyi Imigratsiyi v Amerytsi," *Svoboda* (Jersey City, N.J.), October 5, 1938.

[101] For the full text see *Svoboda* (Jersey City), October 6, 1938. Similar telegrams were sent by the Supreme Executive of the Ukrainian National Association, representing 35,000 members; and the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine under leadership of Professor Alexander A. Granovsky.

[102] For the full text see *Svoboda* (Jersey City, N.J.), October 7, 1938.

primarily meant in the aspect of fulfillment of the Czecho-Slovak obligations taken upon themselves by the Treaty of St. Germain.

The Committee for the Defense of Carpatho-Ukraine, organized by the Americans of Carpatho-Ukrainian descent, called a public manifestation in New York City, on October 9, 1938, and some one thousand participants, under the chairmanship of Andriy Kist' and Yuriy Gaboda, adopted a fourteen point set of resolutions. Points 9, 10, and 11 protested against the Hungaro-Polish plan to establish a common frontier at the expense of Carpatho-Ukraine. These resolutions were forwarded to the President of the United States and to the Governments of the Four Munich Powers.[103]

After the negotiations at Komárom had begun and the Hungarians announced their claim for Carpatho-Ukraine, the President of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Delegation Abroad, Yuliyan Khymynets, sent a telegram from Europe to the President of the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine, Professor Alexander A. Granovsky, stating:

> I urge the American Ukrainians to request England, France, Germany, and Italy to support the right of self-determination for Trans-Carpathian Ukraine, and to protest vigorously against the common Polish-Hungarian frontier at the expense of Trans-Carpathian Ukraine and her subjugation.[104]

The text of this telegram was published in most of the Ukrainian language papers appearing in the United States and Canada. Local Ukrainian organizations in various cities and towns of both countries organized popular meetings which passed resolutions and sent telegrams to the Governments of the five above-mentioned countries protesting the Polish-Hungarian plan to annex Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary. At the same time, funds to support the Carpatho-Ukrainian cause were raised and transmitted to Europe.[105]

After the direct negotiations at Komárom were broken off and Hungary mobilized her military forces, as well as after the mediation of Germany ended without satisfactory results, the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine was again uncertain. Again, various American Ukrainian organizations sent a series of telegrams to the Four

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[103] "Rezolyutsiyi Vsenarodnoho Vicha v Oboroni Zakarpatya," *Natsionalist* (New York), October 12, 1938.

[104] *Natsionalist*, October 12, 1938.

[105] There were some 300 such meeting and fund raising collections in the United States reported by the Ukrainian dailies, *Svoboda* and *America*, and the weekly *Natsionalist*.

Munich Powers asking them to stop the Hungaro-Polish plans for annexation. On the day of the unsuccessful end of Ribbentrop's mediation, the Committee for the Defense of Carpatho-Ukraine sent identical telegrams to Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, Premier Édouard Daladier, Chancellor Adolf Hitler, and Premier Benito Mussolini. It read:

On behalf of Carpatho-Ukrainian immigrants in the United States and Canada we ask you as signator of Munich Agreement to stop Polish-Hungarian plan to annex Carpathian Ukraine against will of her people who want complete independence. We appeal to you to stress our cause for safeguarding of European peace.[106]

On the same day, another telegram was addressed to the same statesmen by the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine of the following wording:

With Hungary and Poland planning annexation of Carpathian Ukraine against principles of self-determination of Munich Agreement, the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine uniting American citizens of Ukrainian descent in 110 branches appeals to you as signator of that agreement to oppose Hungaro-Polish ambitions for sake of European peace. Carpatho-Ukrainian people will never recognize foreign occupation of their land.[107]

Out of many others, we select one more example which is interesting from the point of view of its signator. On October 23, 1938, Archbishop Yoann Teodorovych, on behalf of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church of the United States, cabled Neville Chamberlain, Adolf Hitler, Édouard Daladier, and Benito Mussolini as follows:

Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church of the United States representing 50,000 American Ukrainians urgently appeals to you as signator of the Munich Agreement to prevent Polish-Hungarian annexation of Carpathian Ukraine and urges you to force Poland to end bloody military pacification of occupied Ukrainian territories. Orthodox Church stands firmly behind Carpatho-Ukrainian demand for independence.[108]

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[106] *Natsionalist* (New York), October 26, 1938. The telegrams were signed by Rev. Omelyan Nevyts'kyy, Honorary President; Rev. Vasyl' Benyo, President; and Andriy Kist', Esq., Secretary.

[107] *Natsionalist* (New York), October 26, 1938. Signed by Prof. Alexander A. Granovs'kyy, President, and Volodymyr Riznyk, Secretary General.

[108] *Natsionalist* (New York), October 26, 1938. Besides Archbishop Yoann Teodorovych, the telegrams countersigned: Chancellor Rev. Omelyan Mytsyk of Chester, Pa., Rev. Lev Vesolovs'kyy of New York City, Rev. Dr. Volodymyr

Since Ukrainians from all regions of Ukraine regarded Carpatho-Ukraine as an integral part of the compact Ukrainian ethnic territory, it is no wonder that most of the politically active leaders organized aid for the Carpatho-Ukrainian cause to the limit of their possibilities. The vigorous activity of the American Ukrainians along these lines was logical if one considers that among leaders of most of the major organizations were not only observers but many active participants of the Ukrainian Struggle for Independence at the close of World War I, including former officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian military forces.

POLAND CAMPAIGNS AGAINST UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE

While Rumanian and Yugoslav moves in support of Czecho-Slovak interests were rather careful, Poland decided to actively participate on the side of Hungary. It is to be stressed here that both Rumania and Yugoslavia felt obliged to support Czecho-Slovak interests rather than the interests of the Carpatho-Ukrainian people as far as the Hungaro-Polish claims were concerned. If Rumania and Yugoslavia contributed something in defense of a moderate solution of the dispute, it was primarily because they expected that the next Hungarian move might be directed against their territories in which the Magyar minorities were living. Poland, on the other hand, was interested directly in the Ukrainian question, and hence in the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine.[109]

At the beginning of October 1938, influential Polish newspapers demanded the common Polish-Hungarian frontier.[110] Polish diplomats

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Klodnyts'kyy of Newark, N. J., Rev. Mykhaylo Zaparynyuk of Cleveland, Ohio, and Rev. Yosyf Zhelykhivs'kyy of Pittsburgh, Pa.

Similar telegrams were sent again by the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States, signed by Emil Revyuk and Dmytro Halychyn; by the Ukrainian National Association, signed by Supreme President Mykola Murashko, Vice-President Hryhoriy Herman, Vice-Presidentess Maria Malevych, Treasurer Roman Slobodyan, and Secretary General Dmytro Halychyn; from Canada, at the same time, telegrams were cabled by the Ukrainian National Federation of Canada, the Ukrainian Veterans Association of Canada, the Ukrainian Women Organization of Canada, and others.

[109] See above, pp. 232-233. *Slowo Narodowe*, October 13, 1938, stated: "The Ukrainian manifestations in L'viv at the present time are nothing else than counter-action against the foreign policy of the Polish Government... In other words, Polish Government aims at establishment of common frontier with the Magyars, but the Ukrainian leadership in L'viv counter-acts; it aims at separating Poland from Hungary."

[110] *Slowo* (Wilno), as early as August 11, 1938, stated: "As for Poland,

in various European capitals declared themselves in favor of Hungarian claims for the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine. As early as October 5, 1938, the British Ambassador in Warsaw, Sir H. Kennard, asked Lord Halifax for instructions "as to implications of His Majesty's Government's guarantee of new frontier of Czechoslovakia" since one could not exclude the possibility of Polish-Hungarian efforts to establish a common frontier.[111] On the same day, the British Ambassador in Bucharest, Sir M. Palairet, reported that the Rumanian Government feared "an attempt by Hungary with Polish encouragement to detach Slovakia and Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia."[112] On October 26, 1938, Sir H. Kennard reported to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax, that "M. Beck then attempted to persuade me at great length of the reasonableness of the Polish attitude regarding Ruthenia" because "it was probable to secure a *drastic* settlement of all Czechoslovak problems now than to leave any element of future discord." Colonel Beck asked the Ambassador "to assure" Lord Halifax "that it was only for this reason that he wished to secure a common frontier with Hungary." [113]

To win Rumania over to the Polish-Hungarian project, the Polish Foreign Minister, Józef Beck, visited King Carol of Rumania and offered him to annex the most eastern part of Carpatho-Ukraine including four Rumanian villages and the railroad line leading from Kolomyya to Sighet by way of Carpatho-Ukraine. At the same time, on October 19, 1938, Józef Beck tried to persuade the King of Rumania and his Foreign Minister, Nicholas Petrescu-Comnen, that

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the establishment of Trans-Carpathian Ukrainian State would be tragic... Contrary to general opinion, ... this problem is more important than the question of Polish minority beyond Olza (in Těšín district). The Carpathian Ruthenians are not a nation yet, but they may become in the future either a part of the Ukrainian or Magyar nation."

Slowo Narodowe, October 12, 1938, proposes that Poland should occupy immediately the Eastern part of Carpatho-Ukraine, especially the rail-road line Vorokhta-Yasinya-Rakhiv-Sighet. *Slowo* (Wilno), already on October 5, 1938, expressed its dissatisfaction with the fact that the Polish Foreign Minister, Józef Beck, did not yet bring up officially the question of the common Polish-Hungarian frontier with the influential capitals of the world. *Gazeta Polska* (Warsaw), October 6, 1938, — a semi-official organ — too, stressed that Carpatho-Ukraine is in the way of Polish-Hungarian plans, and *Ilustrowany Kurjer Codzienny* (Kraków), October 7, 1938, published an article titled "Common Polish-Hungarian frontier: the frontier of peace."

[111] *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 131.

[112] *Ibid.,* Footnote to Doc. 131.

[113] *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 232.

the abolition of the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomous statehood was in the interest of Rumania because the Ukrainian Nationalism was directed also against Rumania's interests in Bukovyna. Józef Beck contended that if Rumania would find it possible to adhere to the Polish-Hungarian plan, Poland would do her best to mediate between Hungary and Rumania to normalize their relations or at least to temper the Magyar claims against Rumania. He assured the King that he acted in this matter in agreement with the Hungarians. In the attempt to enforce the Polish wishes, and consequently the Hungarian as well, "M. Beck has met very strong opposition from his Rumanian ally" [114] because Rumanians mistrusted the Hungarian promises regarding moderation of their revisionist claims in Transylvania. As for the efforts of the Ukrainian Nationalists, the King declared on a later occasion that "he would have to clarify for himself what a large Ukrainian State on his eastern frontier would mean." [115]

The Polish diplomats had tried to win also the Western neighbor of Carpatho-Ukraine. On the same day when Józef Beck attempted to win the Rumanian King for his policy, his Deputy in the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs conferred with the leader of the pro-Polish faction within the Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party, Dr. Karol Sidor. The Slovak Minister, who at the same time occupied the position of Deputy Prime Minister in the Central Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, declared on October 19, 1938, in his conversation with Count Jan Szembek, Beck's Deputy, that "reasonable Slovak authorities will preserve a disinterested attitude in the matter of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia." [116]

In Rome, the doors to Count Ciano and Benito Mussolini were always open for the Polish Ambassador, Alfred Wysocki, as one may see from the notes of the Italian Foreign Minister in his Diaries. Wysocki's task was much easier than that of his collegue in Berlin, Józef Lipski. Germany tried to get most for herself out of the existing political situation and decided not to support the Polish-Hungarian plan unconditionally.

After Beck met with refusal of his proposal in Rumania, he decided to tell the Germans how strong Rumania's pro-Little-En-

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[114] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 76. For the first hand Polish report see Joseph Beck, *Dernier Rapport: Politique Polonaise 1926-1939* (Neuchâtel-Paris, 1951), pp. 172-175. Also see *The New York Times*, October 19, 1938.

[115] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 257.

[116] Joseph Beck, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 170-171. Also see Comte Jean Szembek, *Journal: 1933-1939* (Paris, 1952), pp. 359-362.

tente policy still was, and to try to win German support for a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. On his instructions, Józef Lipski visited on October 22nd Under State Secretary in the Reich Foreign Ministry, Woermann,

in order to point out once more Poland's interest in the Carpatho-Ukrainian question. To be sure, he had already repeatedly explained the Polish position to the Führer, the Foreign Minister, Field Marshal Goering, and the State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker.[117]

Since the Polish position was well known already, on this occasion Lipski only requested "that regular contacts be maintained with Poland in dealing with the Hungarian frontier question." Additionally, he only could state in support of the Polish-Hungarian position that "Carpatho-Ukraine had been the seat of Communist activities against Poland" and this endangered peace in that part of Europe. Ambassador Lipski repeated the argument that Carpatho-Ukraine was "a true Communist center" two days later during his three-hour conversation with Joachim von Ribbentrop, on October 24, 1938, at Berchtesgaden. Besides, Carpatho-Ukraine "was an island for foreign agents;" therefore, only annexation of the province by Hungary would remove all these dangers, in the opinion of Lipski. After the Polish Ambassador asked once more Germany's support "in seeing that Carpatho-Ukraine went to Hungary," Ribbentrop promised to think over "this complex of questions once more" and said that "if a general settlement was reached between Germany and Poland then surely a favorable arrangement could be found for this problem, too." [118] This statement of Ribbentrop clearly indicated that Germany, from the beginning, tried to use Carpatho-Ukraine as a barter object.

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[117] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 80.

[118] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 81. Ribbentrop decided to use this occasion to open talks "in strict confidence as between only Lipski, Beck, and himself," regarding German demands against Poland. He enumerated them as follows: "1. The Free City of Danzig would revert to the German Reich. 2. An extra-territorial *Reichsautobahn* belonging to Germany and likewise an extra-territorial, multiple-track railroad would be laid through the Corridor. 3. Similarly, Poland would receive in the Danzig area an extra-territorial road or *Autobahn*, a railroad, and a free port. 4. Poland would receive a guarantee of a market for her goods in the Danzig area. 5. The two nations would recognize their common boundaries (guarantee) or each others territories. 6. The German-Polish Treaty would be extended 10 to 25 years. 7. Poland would accede to the Anti-Commintern Pact. 8. The two countries would add a consultation clause to their treaty." These eight points are "this complex of questions" referred to above.

Despite the fact that Joachim von Ribbentrop clearly displayed his cards in the German-Polish game, Polish diplomats further concentrated their attention on the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine. Their hope that a common Polish-Hungarian frontier would put Poland in a better strategic situation proved later to be unjustified. Nevertheless, immediately after his return from Bucharest to Warsaw, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Józef Beck, invited the German Ambassador, Hans Adolf von Moltke, to a long conversation devoted entirely to the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine. In this conversation held on October 25, 1938, Beck stated that "Poland believed she was acting only in the interest of Europe in working for a solution here which would be lasting." Using his carefully chosen arguments, he proceeded that

> if after cession of the Hungarian regions the remnant of the Carpatho-Ukraine was left to Czechoslovakia, unrest and intrigue would not cease in this country. The avoidance of such a condition was the only direct interest that Poland had in this question.[119]

To make a greater impression upon other interested countries in the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine, Polish diplomats did not hesitate to use rumors to the effect that Germany had given the Poles a "free hand in the Carpatho-Ukraine." [120] This was far from the truth, if one analyzes carefully the eight points of Joachim von Ribbentrop addressed to the Poles.[121] Even after the Lipski-von Ribbentrop talks of October 24, 1938, to which the latter referred more than once, Polish diplomats still desired to play an important role in deciding the future fate of Carpatho-Ukraine.

LORD HALIFAX FORMULATES BRITISH POSITION

Finally, what was the attitude of Great Britain? Although the post-Munich Conference increase of Germany's prestige in the eyes of the smaller nations created a favorable situation for Germany to take the initiative concerning Central Europe, the British diplomats were not entirely disinterested in the future of Czecho-Slovakia. British diplomats in Prague, Budapest, Berlin, Rome, Warsaw, and Bucharest closely followed developments around the Hungarian-Czechoslovak dispute. They carefully gathered information and forwarded it to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

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[119] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 83.

[120] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 90.

[121] See above, footnote No. 118.

Lord Halifax, who in turn could form a picture of the whole situation and who also was able to formulate an official British position at any time.

As far as the British position regarding the future of Carpatho-Ukraine immediately before the German-Italian arbitration is concerned, it was formulated basically in two letters of Lord Halifax, namely, of October 26, 1938, addressed to the British Chargé d'Affairs in Berlin, Sir Ogilvie-Forbes, [122] and another one of the same date sent to the British Ambassador in Rome, Earl of Perth.[123] After studying his envoys' reports, Lord Halifax stated that

His Majesty's Government are, in principle, in favour of the return to Hungary of those districts in which the population is predominantly Hungarian, subject possibly to certain modifications that may be desirable for economic reasons, e.g. Bratislava. The holding of plebiscites in those regions where the races are so ethnographically entangled and where there is a difference of opinion regarding the figures to be taken as a basis for the voting would, however, in the view of His Majesty's Government be extremely difficult, especially at such short notice as the Hungarian Government propose (before November 30th).[124]

As far as the acceptance of the Hungarian demands regarding the Magyar minority was concerned, his position was logically the same as that which had been accepted as a basis for the solution of the Sudeten German question. His opposition to plebiscites for the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians was probably influenced by a report of his envoy to Budapest, Sir G. Knox, of October 19, 1938, in which the envoy stated:

I must confess to no liking of plebiscites in these areas. There appears little doubt that Hungarian bands are already active in Ruthenia. With plebiscites impending, and in an atmosphere super-heated with propaganda, these activities would certainly be extended and it is more than possible that Poland would join in.[125]

In the same report, Sir G. Knox expressed his opinion that despite the many difficulties involved, the best solution would be

if the four Powers could revert to the Munich decision and declare that the only issue to be settled between Hungary and Czechoslovakia is that of territory mainly inhabited by Hungarians; it should do much to ease the situation

[122] *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 226.
[123] *Ibid.,* Doc. 227.
[124] *Ibid.,* Doc. 227.
[125] *Ibid.,* Doc. 218.

particularly if we could thus eliminate the nuisance of Poland from this question.[126]

The British Government was willing to participate in a Four Powers conference to solve the dispute. The last attempt along this line was made by Lord Halifax on October 26, 1938, the evening before Joachim von Ribbentrop arrived in Rome to clarify the Berlin-Rome position before issueing a formal award a few days later concerning Hungarian claims in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, thus hoping to end the dispute. Lord Halifax instructed the Earl of Perth to talk with Count Ciano to this effect before Ribbentrop's arrival in Rome,[127] as well as to inform him about the British view in the matter. Thus, Great Britain did not willingly withdraw from participating in the settlement of the new border between Hungary, on the one hand, and Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine — as federated States within Czecho-Slovakia — on the other.

Thus, on the eve of the German-Italian arbitration, the positions of the interested countries and other political circles were clear. Germany, Great Britain, and France were at that time firmly against the common Polish-Hungarian frontier. The attitude of Italy evolved toward the point of view of the other three Great Powers, and if a Four Powers conference would have had to settle the case, probably, Italy alone would have mildly supported Hungarian-Polish aspirations. On the other hand, all these powers at that time were in favor of the annexation of undisputable Magyar ethnic territories of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary. The extent of these territories still was disputable.

While Rumania still firmly supported the Czecho-Slovak cause, Yugoslavia preferred to remain as silent as possible in this delicate situation. In Carpatho-Ukraine itself, the change in the composition

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[126] *Ibid.*, Doc., 218. When tension between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia increased due to the activities of Hungarian irregulars on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine as well as Hungarian mobilization, the British Minister at Prague, Basil Newton, suggested on October 18, 1938, that the tension could be eased if "all agreed areas could be occupied at once by Hungary and plebiscite held only in disagreed areas under aegis of Four Powers without necessity for summoning special conference," Sir G. Knox, who received copy of Newton's letter to Lord Halifax, immediately wrote to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (on October 19, 1938) that he agreed that "early occupation of agreed areas should do much to relieve tension, but discipline of Hungarian officers in such circumstances could not always be relied upon and it would be desirable to take all possible precautions to see that they did not overstep the mark." See *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Docs. 215 and 218 respectively.

[127] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 227.

of the Council of Ministers, too, created a clear situation. As far as Hungarian interests and possibilities were concerned, they evolved for the worse as compared with the beginning of October 1938.

CIANO-RIBBENTROP ARBITRATION

Immediately after the return of the Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian Ministers from their visit in Munich, the head of the Czecho-Slovak delegation for the negotiations with the Hungarians, Msgr. Jozef Tiso, offered to resume direct negotiations with Hungary "on the basis of the ethnic frontier indicated at Munich," but the Hungarian Government "did not consider that it was in a position to accept this offer." [128] The Hungarians agreed, however, to negotiate through regular diplomatic channels, and thereafter several notes were exchanged between Prague and Budapest.[129] On October 1, 1938, the Hungarian Government urged the Czecho-Slovak Government to formally submit a new proposal.[130] This was answered by the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, Dr. F. Chvalkovský, the very next day.[131] On October 24th, the Hungarian Government handed a note to the Czecho-Slovak Government demanding that

1. Undisputed areas are to be ceded within 3 days from October 27 and occupied militarily.

2. Disputed areas, including the towns of Neutra, Kaschau, Ungvár, and Munkatsch, are to be divided into 8 sectors in which plebiscites are to be suggested on the basis of the 1918 (*Sic!* — 1910) census, to be carried out under international control by November 30. For Pressburg no plebiscite but special agreement is envisaged.

3. Realization in practice of the right of self-determination under international control for all nationalities in Czechoslovakia, especially the Ruthenians. Unless this is done, Hungarian Government cannot guarantee new Czecho-slovak frontier. If Czechoslovak Government does not accept proposal for plebiscite, a decision will be reached for the whole disputed area by arbitration by Germany and Italy, with the inclusion of Poland for the eastern sector.

Hungarian Government accepts arbitral award in advance and expects the same from Czechoslovak Government.

Following the Hungarian example, an answer is expected within 48 hours.[132]

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[128] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 89.

[129] British Minister in Budapest, Sir G. Knox, telegraphed on October 13th to Lord Halifax that "the Hungarian delegation appeared to be meeting with more resistance from the Slovaks than it had expected." *British Documents*, Third Series, III, footnote to document No. 197.

[130] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 79.

[131] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 83.

[132] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 86.

The Czecho-Slovak Government answered this note immediately, handing a note of October 24, 1938, to the Hungarian Government of the following wording:

The Czechoslovak Government begs to stress again that the present negotiations can deal only with the question of the Hungarian minority. As points 1 and 2 of the supplementary Munich protocol mention only Polish and Hungarian minorities, other ethnographic problems must remain outside the scope of the present negotiations.

As far as Hungarian question is concerned, the Czechoslovak Government is inspired by the honest desire to reach a clear, rapid, and complete solution. On October 22, therefore, it made proposals which applied to the whole compact Hungarian-minority area. These proposals were made as a general basis for fresh negotiations while reserving the right to make changes later. As the Hungarian Government does not regard these proposals as satisfactory, the Czechoslovak Government agrees to submit the question of the Hungarian minority to the arbitration of Germany and Italy as signatory powers of the Munich Agreement.

The possible inclusion of other arbiters must be left to the decision of these two powers. If both powers agree to the Hungarian suggestion to include Poland, the Czechoslovak Government would propose that Rumania, too, be included.

The arbitral award should fix the procedure and the time limit for the evacuation by Czechoslovak troops and authorities of the area to be ceded. The Czechoslovak Government proposes an immediate meeting of a Hungarian-Czechoslovak commission of military experts to prepare the necessary measures and expedite their execution.[133]

The Hungarian Government accepted the position of the Czecho-Slovak Government in its note of October 27th with its "regret that the Czech Government rejects Hungarian proposal for a plebiscite in disputed areas."[134] The Czecho-Slovak Government expressed its satisfaction with the note of October 28, 1938, that "agreement had been reached on settlement by German-Italian arbitration" and also "that both parties bound themselves to accept the arbitral award in advance."[135] In this note it was further proposed that 24 hours after its delivery, the Czecho-Slovak and Hungarian Governments should officially request Germany and Italy to undertake the role of arbiters. In reply to this Czecho-Slovak note, the Hungarian Government stated that it "had already suggested to the Great Powers interested to undertake arbitration and would be grateful

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[133] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 92.

[134] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 93; also see *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 237.

[135] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 94; also see *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 238.

if Czechoslovak Government would do the same within 24 hours proposed." [136] Thereafter, the Czecho-Slovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. František Chvalkovský, officially asked the Governments of Germany and Italy to arbitrate the dispute. The wording of this request sent on October 29th was as follows:

The Czechoslovak Government requests the Government of the German Reich to undertake the role of arbiter in the matter of the Hungarian minority in the Czechoslovak Republic.

If the Royal Hungarian Government has already informed the Reich Government of its intention to include the Polish Government for the Carpatho-Ukraine question, the Czechoslovak Government asks that the Royal Rumanian Government should be included as an arbiter.[137]

An identical request was addressed to the Government of Italy. In the meantime the Foreign Ministers of the two Great Powers, Ribbentrop and Ciano, agreed to undertake the task of arbitration, and they so notified the Governments of Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary. The wording of the German notification given to Hungary on October 30, 1938, is as follows:

The German Government, in agreement with the Royal Italian Government, is prepared to accede to the request of the Royal Hungarian Government regarding the settlement of the problem of the Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, with the proviso that the Royal Hungarian Government give a binding declaration that the decisions of the arbitral award by Germany and Italy shall be accepted as the final settlement and shall be carried out without reservation or delay in accordance with the conditions to be laid down.

If the answer is in the affirmative, the German Foreign Minister and the Royal Italian Foreign Minister are prepared to meet in Vienna on November 2, to make the arbitral award in the name of their Governments.[138]

An identical notification was given to the Government of Czecho-Slovakia. The Hungarian Government accepted the conditions of the two Great Powers, and on October 30, 1938, formally notified the Governments of Germany and Italy:

The Royal Hungarian Foreign Minister declares in the name of the Royal Hungarian Government that the decisions of the arbitral award by Germany and Italy will be accepted as the final settlement and will be carried out without reservation or delay in accordance with conditions to be laid down.[139]

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[136] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 239.
[137] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 95.
[138] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 96.
[139] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 96.

A similar declaration was sent to the two Governments by the Czecho-Slovak Minister for Foreign Affairs. The way for the Vienna meeting was cleared.

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The decision reached by Germany and Italy, on the one hand, as well as Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, on the other hand, was not in accordance with the provisions of the Munich Agreement. The idea of German-Italian arbitration in the dispute under discussion was mentioned for the first time by Count Ciano in his communication to Joachim von Ribbentrop on October 14, 1938, the day after the Hungarians had broken off the direct negotiations at Komárom. This alternative was agreed upon between Count Ciano and Count Csáky who was visiting Rome at that time.[140] Adolf Hitler and Joachim von Ribbentrop were against arbitration by the Axis Powers until the latter's visit in Rome on October 27 and 28, 1938, when

> von Ribbentrop, who in the course of a preceding conversation had already revealed to Count Ciano his hesitation to accept the idea of arbitration, allowed himself to be won over by the arguments of Count Ciano and recognized that it was not only in the German interest but also offered the possibility of reconciling Hungarian and Czech differences in the name of the Axis.[141]

After direct negotiations at Komárom were broken off, Germany urged Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia to settle their dispute directly, while Italy was in favor of the solution of the problem by a group of third powers. The Hungarian Minister in Rome, Frederick Villani, informed Count Ciano, on October 15, 1938, that the Hungarian Government did not intend to enter into serious direct negotiations with the Government of Czecho-Slovakia. If Czecho-Slovakia would make an offer which would appear satisfactory to the Hungarians, "it will be accepted. If not, the Axis powers can function as arbitrators."[142] This idea was communicated to Prague by the Italian Minister, Francesco Fransoni, on the same day as the Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian Ministers held conversations with the Reich Foreign Minister who urged them to settle the dispute directly with the Hungarians. And, on October 21st, after the Hungarians secured

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[140] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 65.

[141] Malcolm Muggeridge, ed., *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers* (London, 1948), pp. 240-241. Hereafter cited as *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*.

[142] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38*, p. 179.

the Duce's consent,[143] the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, Döme Sztójay, handed to the State Secretary, Ernst von Weizsäcker, a formal inquiry "whether Germany would be willing to undertake the role of arbiter in conjunction with Italy." [144] The State Secretary replied that Germany's view "so far had been that Prague and Budapest should make one more effort to negotiate between themselves." [145]

On October 22nd, Joachim von Ribbentrop informed Count Ciano in two telephone conversations that Germany was against Axis arbitration and stated that

> should direct negotiations again fail, the Führer considers that the question should be dealt with at a Four Power Conference, in which only Foreign Ministers would take part, and which would be held in a North Italian city.[146]

At the same time, Ribbentrop expressed his wish to unofficially visit Rome in a few days in order to convey "a personal message from the Führer to the Duce." [147] Two days later, the day when he had his opening conversation with the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, regarding Danzig and the Corridor,[148] Joachim von Ribbentrop instructed his State Secretary "to maintain complete reserve" should the Hungarian Government approach him with regard to the German-Italian arbitration.[149] On the same day, the Duce has given instructions to his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, "to take up a position definitely against the (Hungarian) claim on Ruthenia, as the French press has been giving an anti-German flavour to the attempt to create a common frontier between Poland and Hungary." [150]

In the meantime, on October 21, 1938, the newly accredited Polish Ambassador in Rome, General Boleslaw Wieniawa-Dlugoszowski, inquired of Count Ciano as to the position Italy would take with regard to the participation of Poland as arbiter to settle the Car-

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[143] *Ibid.*, p. 180; also see *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 79.

[144] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 77.

[145] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 77.

[146] *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*, pp. 238-240.

[147] On October 28, 1938, Joachim von Ribbentrop visited Benito Mussolini and had a top secret conversation with him in the presence of Count Ciano. At this meeting the decision was taken to conclude a military alliance between Italy, Germany and Japan. At the end of these conversations "a decision was taken in favor of arbitration by the Axis to be given in Vienna, on Wednesday, 2nd November." See *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*, pp. 242-246.

[148] See above, footnote No. 118.

[149] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 87.

[150] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38*, p. 128.

patho-Ukrainian question.[151] While Count Ciano was personally in favor of Polish participation since for his part he "would have been very glad to see Hungary and Poland knit together," [152] he could not commit himself since he had to consult Germany on the subject. As for the German position on Poland's ambitions, it was apparently conditioned by the outcome of the planned conversations between Joachim von Ribbentrop and Józef Lipski to be held three days later. Officially, the commitments on the part of Germany regarding the arbitration in general were to be avoided.[153] Since both the Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak Governments left the decision with Germany and Italy as to the inclusion of Poland and Rumania as co-arbiters, the Axis Powers decided in the negative.

Rumania actually had no such aspirations as had Poland with regard to their participation in arbitration. As a matter of fact, Rumania supported the idea that the Four Power Conference should settle the case. On October 25, 1938, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Nicholas Petrescu-Comnen, in his conversation with the British Ambassador in Bucharest, Sir M. Palairet, urged Great Britain to insist upon the Four Power Conference. He stated:

> It was intolerable that the other two Munich Powers should be set aside; but if this was really done, Rumania must insist on taking the same share as Poland in the negotiations whether as arbitrator or as observer. Rumania's interest in the question made this essential though she sought no territorial addition. The twenty thousand Rumanians in Ruthenia wished to remain within the Ruthene State and were already appealing to the Rumanian Government not to allow them to be absorbed by Hungary.[154]

Simultaneously, the Rumanian Government urged the Government of France to do the same, and informed Poland about its position in the question. The Rumanian position was communicated to Hungary through the Government of Yugoslavia. On the next day, inquiring about Germany's position on Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian questions, the British Chargé d'Affairs in Berlin, Sir G. Oglivic-Forbes, stated to the State Secretary, Ernst von Weizsäcker, that "the omission of Great Britain and France from the Board of Arbitration proposed by Hungarian note of October 24th was not in the spirit of the Munich Agreement." [155] Thereafter, he reported to Lord

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[151] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 80.
[152] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38*, p. 178.
[153] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 83.
[154] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 221.
[155] *Ibid.*, Doc. 229.

Halifax that "both Herr von Ribbentrop and Herr von Weizsäcker have assured me that that (German-Italian arbitration) was in no way a German but a Hungarian proposal. [156] Contrary to reality, the Hungarian Minister in Rome informed Count Ciano three days before that the Hungarians were of the opinion "that France and England would be in favor of Axis Arbitration, since these countries do not intend to concern themselves any more with the disputes between Czechs and Hungarians." [157]

It seems that Germany used the Carpatho-Ukrainian problem as her bargaining trump even with regard to Italy. Hitler and Ribbentrop had chosen to discuss the problem of the triple alliance in Rome at a time when there existed a difference of opinion between Rome and Berlin regarding the solution of the Carpatho-Ukrainian question. Count Ciano had a difficult task in getting Joachim von Ribbentrop first to agree on German-Italian arbitration in principle, and secondly, to overcome his opposition to the cession of Košice, Uzhhorod, and Mukachiv to Hungary. Actually, in the final result, Count Ciano succeeded in both these tasks. After Herr von Ribbentrop agreed to the first point, Count Ciano stated in their conversation on October 28, 1938, at Rome that

> the Duce attached great importance to affecting an arbitral award in the matter by Germany and Italy, on the basis of which, of the five towns demanded by Hungary, Pozsony and Nyitra should be left to Slovakia, while the remaining three, Kaschau, Munkacs and Ungvar, were to be alloted to Hungary. The Duce had for many years espoused the cause of revision for Hungary and would now be obliged to take some action in this matter.[158]

Further Count Ciano stated that in his opinion "in exchange the Hungarians would have to renounce their claims on Slovakia and Ruthenia."[159] Since Joachim von Ribbentrop vigorously defended the interests of the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians and "contested the Hungarian claims of territory with the same zeal with which

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[156] *Ibid.*, Doc. 229.

[157] *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*, p. 239. On the basis of the communication of Lord Halifax transmitted by the Earl of Perth on October 27, 1938, to Count Ciano is seeable that Great Britain tried to induce Italy to the idea of Four Power Conference as late as immediately before Ribbentrop's conversation with Count Ciano in Rome. On his initiative, Lord Halifax informed Count Ciano that "His Majesty's Government would be ready to join in any decision." See *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 227.

[158] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 400.

[159] *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*, pp. 240-241.

the Germans made claims from Prague at Munich," [160] no final agreement was reached at these conversations except that further discussion would be held at Vienna. However, after Joachim von Ribbentrop returned home to report to the Führer on the results of his visit with the Duce, on October 30, 1938, he instructed his Ambassador in Rome, Hans G. von Mackensen, to inform Count Ciano that "he agrees upon the advisability of giving to the Magyars the three disputed towns" [161] i. e. Košice, Uzhhorod and Mukachiv.

Thus, this time the agreement was reached in accordance with Italian wishes. The Germans, however, had in their pocket Italian agreement, in principle, to sign a triple military alliance with Germany and Japan, and this was of much greater value to them than one Slovak and two Carpatho-Ukrainian towns.

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To keep Count Ciano and the Italians as much interested in their claims as possible, the Hungarians were in close contact with him during Ribbentrop's stay in Rome. On October 28, 1938, the Hungarian Minister in Rome, F. Villani, unofficially "hinted at the possibility of placing Aosta on the Hungarian throne."[162] And, the day after Ribbentrop's departure from Rome, a Hungarian delegation arrived in Rome, headed by Count Esterházy, the Magyar minority leader in Czecho-Slovakia, "to brief" Count Ciano for his discussions with Ribbentrop over the arbitration. Count Esterházy and his associates declared themselves "content if they could have Kassa, Ungvár and Munkács," [163] but Count Ciano decided still "to do something about Nitra." Thus, Count Ciano arrived at Vienna well prepared to discuss details and was to take the initiative completely in his hands.

On the evening of October 30th, State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker communicated to the British, French and Polish Gov-

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[160] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38,* p. 187.

[161] *Ibid.,* p. 187. It is interesting to note that H. G. von Mackensen in his report about the visit with Count Ciano did not mention that he communicated that Ribbentrop consented to cede Uzhhorod and Mukachiv to the Hungarians. See *DGFP,* D, IV, Doc. 97.

[162] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38,* p. 186. Duke of Aosta-Amadeo of Savoy, cousin of the King of Italy, Victor Emmanuel III. At that time he was the Viceroy of Italian East Africa since 1937, and Commander-in-Chief of Italian Military Forces during 1939-1941. Died in 1942.

[163] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38,* p. 187.

ernments officially that Germany and Italy would arbitrate on November 2, 1938. The French Counselor of the Embassy, Count de Montbas, asked for an explanation why the other two Great Powers had been excluded from participation in the solution of the question. The Polish Counselor of the Embassy, Count Stefan Lubomirski, was told that the original Hungarian suggestion to include Poland also for a certain part of the arbitration had been dropped after consultation between Italy and Hungary.[164] Neither France nor Great Britain, as signatories of the Munich Agreement, protested formally against German-Italian arbitration and allowed the increase of Axis prestige even more than after the Munich Conference.

The Foreign Ministers Joachim von Ribbentrop of Germany, Count Galeazzo Ciano of Italy, Dr. František Chvalkovský of Czecho-Slovakia, and Kálmán de Kánya of Hungary, and their staff members[165] met in Vienna in the Belvedere Palace on November 2, 1938, at 12:00 noon. In his opening address, the German Foreign Minister defined the purpose of the conference stating:

Our task today is to determine the final frontier between Hungary and Czechoslovakia on an ethnographic basis and to find a solution of the questions connected with this. The arbitral award made by us is binding and final and is recognized in advance by Hungary and Czechoslovakia as the final settlement.[166]

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[164] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 87.

[165] In the official deliberations of the conference participated the following statesmen: 1. German delegation: Herr von Ribbentrop, Under State Secretary Dr. Ernst von Woermann, Counselor of Legation Günther Altenburg, Minister Dr. Paul Otto Schmidt, and Counselor of Legation Dr. Erich Kordt who recorded the deliberations of the meeting. 2. Italian delegation: Count Galeazzo Ciano, Ambassador Bernardo Attolico, and Minister Count Massimo Magistrati. 3. Hungary was represented by Foreign Minister Kálmán de Kánya and Minister of Education Count Pál Teleki. 4. The Czecho-Slovak Republic was represented by Foreign Minister Dr. František Chvalkovský and Minister Dr. Krno. In the unofficial talks with the German and Italian arbiters participated also special delegations of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine which were invited by Germany to Vienna. The Slovak delegation was headed by Prime Minister Msgr. Dr. Jozef Tiso, and the Carpatho-Ukrainian by Prime Minister Msgr. Dr. Avhustyn Voloshyn. Other members of the Carpatho-Ukrainian delegation were: Secretaries to the Prime Minister, Messrs. Ivan Rohach and Stepan Klochurak, and members of the Presidium of First Central Ukrainian National Council in Uzhhorod, Dr. Yuliyan Brashchayko, Dr. Mykola Dolynay and Yuliy Husnay. Besides, L. E. Huzar served as interpreter to the Prime Minister. Messrs. Brashchayko, Dolynay and Husnay were appointed to the Hungarian-Czechoslovak Delimitation Commission to represent the interest of Carpatho-Ukraine. See *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), November 3, 1938.

[166] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 99. All the following quotations in this paragraph taken from this document.

This formulation of the purpose of the meeting was accepted, and thereafter Count Ciano expressed his certainty that "from the meeting in Vienna there will arise a new order and a new era in Central Europe, based on that international justice which we have always striven for and desired." On behalf of the Hungarian Government Kálmán Kánya and Count Paul Teleki presented their case, and Dr. Chvalkovský and Dr. Krno defended the interests of the Federation of Czechs, Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians. Count Teleki stated that the Hungarian proposals were based on purely ethnographic principles which were accepted at the Munich Conference. Two basic principles for the solution of the Hungarian-Czechoslovak question were laid down at that conference: first, the majority principle, and secondly, the ruling that the year 1918 was to be the basis for counting the population, i. e. the last census prior to that date. On that basis, the Hungarians claimed Uzhhorod, Mukachiv, and Sevlyush line, including these towns. Dr. Krno replied among other things that

> the Hungarian side had stated that the Munich principles must be applied uniformly, but in actual fact, conditions in Bohemia and Moravia could not be compared with those in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. In Bohemia and Moravia the ethnic frontier had been unchanged for a long time, and subsequently Germany had been able to claim that, in the areas to be ceded, an ancient German cultural area was involved. Teleki, the Hungarian Minister of Education, had stated that Hungary's demands were based on ancient and recent rights. He felt that he (Dr. Krno) must raise objections to this claim. If the year 1910 were taken as basis, there perhaps existed Hungarian majorities in many places, but if one went back only 20 to 30 years and took the census of 1880, quite different results were obtained... Thus, ... Hungary could demand these towns on the grounds of ancient and recent rights was not quite correct for, if one ignors the last 30 years, the Slovak side could demand equal justice that the 1880 figures should be taken into consideration.

Count Teleki replied to this that

> the great change in nationalities in the course of time must be recognized. It had been pointed out by the Czechoslovak side that between 1880 and 1911 these towns had been Magyarized. But if one went further back, it was seen that until 1880 there had been a Slovakization...

Foreign Minister Chvalkovský asked that the views of the Slovak Prime Minister, Msgr. Jozef Tiso, and those of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Prime Minister, Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn, on Count Teleki's statements should be heard before the two arbiters would recess for their decision. Joachim von Ribbentrop expressed himself against

this proposal because apparently "the problem itself was sufficiently familiar to both arbiters," and besides they will have "an opportunity for unofficial talks with the two arbiters in the course of lunch to which both of them had also been invited." This way, while the Hungarian cause was represented by those directly interested in the problem, the interests of the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians were represented only indirectly through the Czech delegates who were not familiar with all the necessary details of the population settlements in these two countries bordering Hungary.

Msgr. A. Voloshyn tried to do his best to save as much as was possible for his native country. He held long conversations with both arbiters, Ribbentrop and Ciano, separately, and also supplied the necessary statistical and other data to their advisers. He also was in close co-operation with Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, Dr. F. Chvalkovský, and Slovak Prime Minister, Msgr. Jozef Tiso. After his return to the new capital of Carpatho-Ukraine, he stated that during their talks with Ribbentrop the delegates of Carpatho-Ukraine

had an impression that Uzhhorod and Mukachiv were certainly secured for Carpatho-Ukraine, and that only Sevlyush was disputable. When I talked with Ribbentrop, I defended Uzhhorod and Mukachiv, and regarding Sevlyush I stated that although there is a group of Magyar inhabitants, but the Ukrainians are in majority in the town itself and the surrounding villages are entirely Ukrainian.

Ribbentrop... told me that he will act in a way to the effect that an understanding with the Magyars would be reached. They demanded the whole of Sub-Carpathia, and we have to give up their ethnic regions. I was fully satisfied with the results of the conversation with the Minister of Germany and awaited the results of the arbitration hoping that we would not lose either Uzhhorod or Mukachiv.[167]

After lunch, the German and Italian Foreign Ministers, accompanied by their advisers, went into a conclave in the Golden Chamber in order to draw the new border line between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary. Count Ciano stated the following about their work:

I took control of the discussion and, except for a few disputed points, I was able to trace the line of the new frontier with a red pencil. Ribbentrop's unpreparedness enabled me to assign to Hungary pieces of territory which might easily have given rise to much controversial discussion.[168]

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[167] "Interview z o. A. Voloshynom," *Nova Svoboda* (Khust), November 11, 1938.

[168] *Ciano's Diary*, 1937-38, p. 189.

At 7:00 P.M. the members of the four delegations met again together and after short declaration made by the arbiters, their award was read and signed by the arbiters. Herr von Ribbentrop stated that the task of the arbiters had been extremely difficult, but "on the basis of the ethnographical principle a decision had been reached, which, if correctly carried out, would bring a lasting and just solution of the questions outstanding between Hungary and Czechoslovakia." And, Count Ciano corroborated this statement on behalf of the Italian Government, adding that this "lasting and just solution of the problem" had been designed to introduce "a new era and to lay the foundations for friendly and good neighborly relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia." [169]

The seven point Arbitral Award[170] determined the new frontier between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, ordered the cession of the Magyar ethnic territory to Hungary beginning November 5th and ending November 10th, and established basic principles concerning transit traffic, option, and economic questions, the details of which were to be determined by a Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission. In case of the impossibility to reach an agreement on any of these questions, the problem was to be submitted to the German and Italian Governments for final decision.

As a result of this award, the towns of Uzhhorod and Mukachiv and the areas south of them were ceded to Hungary, while Sevlyush remained in Carpatho-Ukraine. Slovakia was obliged to cede 4,020 sq. miles of territory out of her total 18,928 sq. miles with some 895,000 inhabitants, including some 300,000 Slovaks.[171] Carpatho-Ukraine lost 610 sq. miles out of her total 4,867 sq. miles or 21% of her total territory with 180,598 out of her total 725,357 inhabitants according to the census of 1930. The inhabitants lost to Hungary belonged to the following nationalities: 33,435 Ukrainians, 83,578 Magyars, 25,397 Jews, 16,466 Czechs and Slovaks together, 4,534 Germans, 81 Poles, and 17,105 others, predominantly foreign citizens.[172] The ceded territories were the best fertile lands of Carpatho-Ukraine, and the lost cities: Uzhhorod, country's capital and administrative center; Mukachiv, the most important commercial center of the country in general, while Berehovo — the com-

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[169] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 99.

[170] For full text see *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 99; also see Appendix No. VII.

[171] Louis Novak, *Czechoslovakia: Before and After Munich* (Toronto, 1944), pp. 69-70.

[172] See above, pp. 9-11.

mercial center for the agricultural products. The existing railroad lines were broken in such a way that the remaining rail-roads in the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine had no connections with each other whatsoever and Carpatho-Ukraine was completely separated from the rail-road lines connecting her with Slovakia and Bohemia.

The results of the German-Italian arbitration were accepted with great satisfaction by the Hungarians present at the announcement of the award in Vienna. On the other hand, they were shocking not only to the Carpatho-Ukrainian delegates but for the Czechs as well. "Chvalkovský turned pale when he saw the map," and said to Count Ciano *sotto voce*: "I shall have to resign to-morrow. No government could survive such a blow." [173] Of course, he could do very little to change the decision, and even less to refuse its acceptance since he declared in the name of the Czecho-Slovak Government in advance the willingness to accept the German-Italian award unconditionally.

Even more dissatisfied were the Carpatho-Ukrainians. However, they could not openly protest the award either. On November 3, 1938, Prime Minister Msgr. A. Voloshyn issued a manifesto addressed "To the Citizens of Carpatho-Ukraine" in which he stated:

> The tearing away of our ancient cities, Uzhhorod and Mukachiv, from Carpatho-Ukraine is a wound to our Fatherland. But in this important moment we must remember this: that at the price of our wounds the independence of the Ukrainian nation has been obtained. This heavy blow, which met us, will not shake our will to accomplish that great task which history has destined to us... We have decided to begin the historical task of building up our severed but independent country... God will help us to fulfill our historical task.[174]

Although no formal protest was laid down against the German-Italian award by the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine, these words of Msgr. Voloshyn's manifesto clearly showed his disappointment.

In order to ease this disappointment among the broad masses of the people, the very next day, on November 4, 1938, the First Central Ukrainian National Council in Uzhhorod issued its manifesto in which besides expressing regret for the loss of the cities of Uzhhorod, Mukachiv and Berehovo, the Council stated that "the representatives of our Government were forced to accept the condi-

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[173] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38,* p. 189.

[174] Premyer-Minister o. Dr. Avhustyn Voloshyn, "Do Hromadyan Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny," *Natsionalist* (New York), November 16, 1938.

tions of the award." The Council appealed to the people of the country that

this bad news should not cause desperation among the patriots. Times will come when the whole nation of ours will unite in one united sovereign State.

At the same time, we let you know with a great joy that the frontiers of our Sub-Carpathian State now are guaranteed by Germany, Italy, England and France. Poland and Hungary accepted the (Vienna) award and took upon themselves an obligation not to interfere with our internal affairs.[175]

The semi-official press also published editorials in a similar tone, stressing that "after a few years we shall have new cities" which will replace Uzhhorod and Mukachiv. The most important thing was that the Carpatho-Ukrainian State has been saved because "liberty of the Ukrainian people is the greatest treasure in this earthly life." [176]

AMERICAN UKRAINIANS REJECT GERMAN-ITALIAN AWARD

On November 3, 1938, the Delegation of Carpatho-Ukraine Abroad issued a declaration of the following wording:

The Delegation of Carpatho-Ukraine Abroad received the news about the award of the Arbitration Commission of November 2, 1938, issued in Vienna regarding the frontiers of Carpatho-Ukraine with greatest disappointment.

We declare herewith that the allotment of Uzhhorod and Mukachiv with surrounding Ukrainian villages as well as that of other Ukrainian villages in other counties is not in accordance with the ethnographic principles laid down as the basis of policy which were to begun after the Munich Conference. The Delegation declares herewith that this decision is contrary to the just interests of Carpatho-Ukraine.[177]

Simultaneously, the delegate of the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States, Dr. Luka Myshuha, issued a similar declaration adding that

The award of the Arbitartion Commission is a gross injustice with regard to Carpatho-Ukraine and the whole of Ukrainian people. Therefore, the American Ukrainians do not recognize this award and protest against it.[178]

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[175] "Manifest Pershoyi Ukrayins'koyi Narodnoyi Rady do Ukrayins'koho Narodu Pidkarpatya, vydanyy v Uzhhorodi dnya 4. lystopada 1938 roku," *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), November 5, 1938.

[176] Editorial, "Postanova Arbitriv," *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), November 5, 1938.

[177] Yuliyan Khymynets', "Za Kordonom" in Ukrains'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi* (Vienna, 1939), p. 31.

[178] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

These declarations were sent to the Governments of France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy as well as distributed to the press agencies.

While most of the Ukrainian political leaders admitted that the Vienna decision could have been much worse since under Italian pressure the whole Carpatho-Ukraine might have been alloted to Hungary, the severance of Uzhhorod and Mukachiv together with the fertile valleys created resentment and aroused a storm of protests among the American Ukrainians. This might have been inspired even more by an appeal of November 3, 1938, addressed to the American Ukrainians by Prime Minister A. Voloshyn which reads:

> We, the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine, address to you, our brothers beyond the seas, a request to manifest your solidarity with us in the present decisive moment.
>
> The annexation of Uzhhorod and Mukachiv by Hungary, which is a wound to the organism of our fatherland, will not break down our firm decision to accomplish our great historical task.
>
> By rendering assistance to the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine, you will demonstrate that you understand the importance of the present situation.[179]

The United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States,[180] the largest beneficial organization, the Ukrainian National Association,[181] and the then largest and strongest political body, The Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine,[182] and many of their local

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[179] *Svoboda* (Jersey City), November 5, 1938.

[180] Their protest telegram dated November 4, 1938, and signed by Emil Revyuk, President, and Dmytro Halychyn, Secretary, read: "The United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States strongly protest against allocation of the most fertile territory of Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary. Without this territory and its capital city of Uzhhorod and the city of Mukachiv and the main railroad line, likewise ceded to Hungary, Carpatho-Ukraine is placed in a very precarious economic position. We urge Your Excellency to rectify this injustice." See *Svoboda* (Jersey City), November 5, 1938.

[181] The text of its protest telegram dated November 4, 1938, as signed by Supreme President Mykola Murashko, Vice President Hryhoriy Herman, Vice Presidentess Maria Malevych, Treasurer Roman Slobodyan, and Secretary General Dmytro Halychyn, read: "The Americans of Ukrainian descent organized in the largest Ukrainian fraternal order in the United States, known as the Ukrainian National Association, vigorously protest against the unjust allocation of the most fertile and richest part of Carpatho-Ukraine, together with its principal cities of Uzhhorod and Mukachiv and its main rail line to Hungary. Such a division not only violated the ethnographic principle but also deprived the country of its vital economic needs." See *Svoboda* (Jersey City), November 5, 1938.

[182] On November 4, 1938, this organization sent protest telegram signed

branches sent protests to the Governments of the Four Munich Conference Powers against the allotment of Uzhhorod and Mukachiv to Hungary. These telegrams, of course, were not sent in expectation that Germany and Italy would revise their award. They were meant primarily to register the dissatisfaction among Ukrainians and the claim for these towns and areas by the Ukrainian Independence Movement.[183] There is no evidence that any of the Governments to whom these protests were addressed, responded in some way to these protests.

The Carpatho-Ukrainian press adopted a rather cautious approach to the Vienna award from the very beginning. It preferred to emphasize the fact that the results might have been much worse if Germany would not have firmly supported the Carpatho-Ukrainian cause. Great emphasis was put upon the victory of the ethnic principle, the guarantee of the new frontiers by the four Munich Powers, and the fact that Hungary declared in advance that she would regard the German-Italian arbitration as final settlement of the dispute about her claims against Carpatho-Ukraine. When the Hungarian Parliament ratified the Vienna award on November 12, 1938, this was accepted with satisfaction in Khust, the new capital of Carpatho-Ukraine. The hope was that from now on the autonomous Government would be able to devote all its efforts to the necessary reorganization of the administration of the country and the general improvement of the well-being of the broad masses of the population which had been neglected by the foreign rulers in the past.

At the Vienna Conference of November 2, 1938, the ethnic principle was adopted as basis for the solution of the dispute between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia. Actually, the award denied justification for the Hungarian revisionist claims in regard to Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, while justifying their claim for the Magyar ethnic areas within Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine.

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by Dr. Alexander A. Granovsky, President, and Volodymyr Riznyk, Secretary, of the following wording: "The Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine in America most vigorously protests against violation of ethnographic principles in Vienna decision, which added to the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty by giving Hungary Ukrainian towns and territories in Carpathian Ukraine. The Ukrainian nation will never resign itself to this. The Vienna decision shook that sympathy which Germany and Italy had among 45,000,000 Ukrainians." See *Natsionalist*, (New York), November 9, 1938.

[183] Out of all available texts of the sent telegrams only that cabled by the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States contained a phrase which read: "We urge Your Excellency to rectify this injustice." See above, footnote No. 180.

Chapter Seven

TOWARD ANNEXATION OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE BY HUNGARY

In accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Award, the Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission agreed upon the gradual occupation of the ceded territory to Hungary. The Magyar ethnic territory of Carpatho-Ukraine was transferred to Hungarian military and civil authorities on November 9 and 10, 1938. On the first day, Hungarian military forces occupied the first zone which ran along the line of the following communities from West to South-East: Bovtrad', Malyy Gut, Velykyy Gut, Yanoshovo, Kvasovo, Orosiyevo, Kerestury, and Vilok, including the town of Berehovo. On November 10, 1938, Hungarian authorities took over the other communities which were to be ceded in accordance with the Vienna Award, up to the line of the following communities: Yovrya, Uzhhorod, Radvanka, Dravtsi, Velyki Geyivtsi, Kholmets', Velyka Dobroň, Barkasovo, Zhnyatyno, Klyucharky, Mukachiv, Fornosh, Nove Selo, Vyshni Remety, Shalanky, Matiyevo, Choma, and Chornyy Ardiv, including these communities, as the final settlement of the new frontier between Carpatho-Ukraine and Hungary.[1] The capital of Carpatho-Ukraine, Uzhhorod, was handed over on behalf of the military authorities by Colonel Franzl, Lieutenant Colonel Vaňa, and Police Captain Kupka to the Hungarian military representatives: Lieutenant Colonel Tándy, Major Bárdossy, and Captain Zilahy.[2] In the

[1] *Nova Svoboda,* November 11, 1938. Published in Khust if not indicated otherwise.

[2] *Nova Svoboda,* November 20, 1938. Among the ceded communities there ware 13 with absolute Ukrainian majorities, namely: Baranyntsi, Dravtsi, Yovrya, Korytnyany, Klyucharky, Rosvygovo, Nyzhniy Koropets', Pidhorod, Kvasovo, Nyzhni Remety, Vyshni Remety, Chepa, Choma; and, 6 communities with relative Ukrainian majorities, namely: Uzhhorod, Mukachiv, Radvanka, Palanok, Pavshyn, and Chornyy Ardiv. All these communities, except Kvasovo,

meantime, the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government agencies were evacuated to Khust, the new capital of the country.

While the Hungarians had had good reason to celebrate their success in the German-Italian arbitration,[3] the Czechs, Slovaks, and especially Carpatho-Ukrainians were rather depressed by its results. Nevertheless, the latter accepted loyally the award and tried to fulfill its provisions. But the Hungarians, encouraged by their first revisionist success, decided to annex the whole of Carpatho-Ukraine. Despite the fact that they signed a declaration in advance that Hungary would accept the German-Italian award as the final settlement of their claims against Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, as soon as they occupied the areas alloted to them, the Hungarians renewed their demands to annex the whole of Carpatho-Ukraine.

The Hungarian ally, the Poles, who were not bound formally to respect the Vienna award, continued their terroristic activities in the northern part of Carpatho-Ukraine even during the days of the Hungarian occupation of the ceded southern areas.[4] The Polish press

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are located in direct neighborhood with the Ukrainian communities remaining in Carpatho-Ukraine. The Ukrainian members of the Delimitation Commission tried to correct this situation, but without success. See "Chysla hovoryat'," *Nova Svoboda,* November 25, 1938. Statistical data taken from the Czecho-Slovak census of 1930.

[3] British Minister in Budapest, Sir G. Knox, reported to Lord Halifax that on the evening of November 2, 1938, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Béla Imrédy, made a speech which was broadcasted in the course of which he said that "as a result of the (Vienna) decision, hundreds of thousands of Magyars, and with them Ruthenes, Slovaks and Germans, who had for such long years shared the cares and sorrows of the thousand-year-old fatherland, were returning home." He thanked "the two friendly Great Powers" for their award. Thereafter, thousands of Hungarians assembled in the streets of Budapest and marched to the Palace of the Regent, who, too, spoke to them on the occasion. See E. L. Woodward and Rohan Buttler, ed., *Documents on British Foreign Policy,* 1919-1939 (London, 1950), Third Series, Vol. III, Doc. 254. Hereafter cited as: *British Documents.*

In the occupied territories, the greatest parade was staged in Košice. German and Italian Governments were invitted to send their representatives to that city to witness the handing over of that city, but Count Ciano and Joachim von Ribbentrop declined to accept this Hungarian invitation. See *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38,* p. 191. On the other hand, the ardent supporter of the Hungarian revisionism in Great Britain, Lord Rothermere, "hastened over from London" to witness Horthy's entering Košice on November 11, 1938. See Nicholas Horthy, *Memoirs* (London, 1956), p. 169.

[4] See report of the German Ambassador in Warsaw, Hans Georg von Moltke, of November 8, 1938, *DGFP,* D, V, Doc. 100. *Nova Svoboda* of November 15, 1938, reported that a numerous group of Polish terrorists penetrated on

and radio also continued to agitate for a common Hungarian-Polish frontier.[5] These facts were an unfavorable omen for the Carpatho-Ukrainian federated State.

It seems that the Hungarians were determined to use the German-Italian arbitration only as one of the phases of the complete annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine. Believing that the Carpatho-Ukrainians would voluntarily join Hungary after losing their only cities and their most fertile lands, the Hungarians accepted in advance the award of the German-Italian arbitration. When, however, the Carpatho-Ukrainians decided despite many difficulties to remain in federation with the Czechs and Slovaks as an autonomous State, the Hungarians and Poles renewed their efforts to annex Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary. Their common efforts succeeded with the permission of Adolf Hitler in the middle of March 1939. In the meantime, however, Carpatho-Ukraine continued to be the object of international diplomatic bargaining which then decided her fate for several years.

CO-ORDINATION OF POLISH-HUNGARIAN INVASION

As this study has indicated already, an understanding between Adolf Hitler and Nicholas Horthy concerning their common action against Czecho-Slovakia had been reached as aerly as in September 1936. This understanding was supplemented by an additional agreement between Hitler and the Hungarian Prime Minister, Kálmán Darányi, in November 1937 concerning common German and Hungarian pressure against Czecho-Slovakia from without as well as upon close co-operation between the German and Hungarian minorities in Czecho-Slovakia against that state.[6] Thus, followed a well co-ordinated action of the Sudeten Germans under the leadership of Konrad Henlein and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine headed by János Esterházy.

On February 12, 1938, Esterházy accompanied by Henlein's representatives, Karl Hermann Frank and Franz Künzel, visited

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November 4, 1938, into Carpatho-Ukrainian territory and attacked the border village of Torun. In defense of the village a Ukrainian guard, Ivan Kost' of Synyevir, was killed, and several men were wounded.

[5] *Nova Svoboda,* November 8, 1938.

[6] Malcolm Muggeridge, ed., *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers* (London, 1948), pp. 36-37. Hereafter cted as: *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers.* Also see *DGFP,* D, V, Docs. 148 and 149.

Budapest. In conferences with Prime Minister Darányi, Foreign Minister Kánya and Dr. Tibor Pataky, State Secretary for Minorities in the Office of the Hungarian Prime Minister, they worked out common strategy concerning "Hungary's effort to contribute to Czechoslovakia's disappearance from the map of Europe."[7] Following the Sudeten German example, the Hungarians in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine were to present to Prague unacceptable demands and to create an appearance of discontent and violence in the Hungarian settled regions.

Since the top Hungarian Government officials doubted that the Hungarian minority in Carpatho-Ukraine would organize the desired subversive activities and maintain them until Hungary's claims would be fully satisfied,[8] plans were prepared in spring of 1938 for the establishment of a Hungarian *Freikorps* to be smuggled into the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine for terroristic activities. The most enthusiastic promotors of this plan were Miklós Kozma, formerly Hungarian Minister of Interior; Ivan Héjjas, commander of the Székely Division of the Hungarian Army; and Béla Somogyi, personal attorney of the wife of Regent Horthy.

Miklós Kozma knew the terrain of Carpatho-Ukraine well from his experience before World War I when he lived in Turya Remety as chief officer of a military stud. Hungarian Prime Minister Béla Imrédy entrusted him in the strictest secrecy with the organization of irregular military formation in civilian clothing, called *Rongyos Gárda* or "the ragged guards."[9] Collaborating with a group of the Hungarian Army officers, Kozma organized these irregular military units from among the members of the Hungarian Fascist group of the Arrow Cross, the unemployed, and the misled and adventure-seeking young men. Many of them expected to be rewarded through appointment to governmental positions after incorporation of Carpatho-Ukraine into Hungary.

Although the *Rongyos Gárda* was trained by regular military officers and governmentally financed, *pro foro externo* the Government of Hungary pretended not to have any knowledge about its existence. However, General Sándor Homlok served as the liaison officer to the Minister of Defense.

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[7] *DGFP*, D, II, Docs. 58, 59 and 60.

[8] A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történettudományos Intézete, *Magyarország és a Második Világháború*, második kiadás (Budapest, 1961), Document 51, p. 147. Hereafter cited as: *Hungarian Documents.*

[9] Excerpts from Kozma's Diary in *Hungarian Documents*, p. 104.

The Munich Conference of September 29, 1938, made the planned military aggression against Czecho-Slovakia unnecessary for Adolf Hitler. At the same time, the Hungarian territorial claims remained unsolved, therefore the use of the Hungarian irregular military units in Carpatho-Ukraine became very adventageous in pursuit of the Hungarian objectives. On October 1, 1938, Prime Minister Béla Imrédy authorized Miklós Kozma to send units of *Rongyos Gárda* into Carpatho-Ukraine for military and political subversive activities.

In the entries in M. Kozma's diaries of October 4, 1938, we read among other things:

> Finally, the action will begin. In the last three days, the following plan of mine has been definitely approved: Simultaneously, a vigorous propaganda activity and a direct action will be initiated into Ruthenia. Volunteer battalions will gather around Nyirbátor and Vásárosnamény (in Hungary, about ten miles south of the Carpatho-Ukrainian border line — PGS.). A group of 600 men shall begin the action immediately. Our goal is as follows: to show that Ruthenia is discontent and wants to join us, but this discontent is not openly expressed because of the military occupation. This must be exposed, and a European affair must be made out of it. . .[10]

Kozma's plan was set into motion. However, it lacked success because the local population failed to support the Hungarian irregulars. Also, on October 11, 1938, one half of their company, under the command of M. Prém, was killed in the vicinity of Dercen, in Carpatho-Ukraine, and some 300 irregulars were captured and taken to the prisons.[11] The Czecho-Slovak authorities threatened to shoot the captured Hungarian irregulars if Hungary failed to stop their subversive activities in Carpahto-Ukraine.

On October 4, 1938, Miklós Kozma suggested to the Hungarian Prime Minister, Béla Imrédy, that the activities of the Hungarian irregulars in Carpatho-Ukraine should be supported by the Polish irregular military units from the North. Kozma also indicated that these actions should begin immediately and suggested that the Hungarian government should send István Csáky or himself to Warsaw immediately for establishment of full co-ordination of the Polish-Hungarian activities.[12] Count Csáky was sent to Warsaw for this purpose the very next day.

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 139.
[11] *Ibid. pp.* 141-142.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 140.

Csáky's conversations on October 5, 1938, in Warsaw concerning a co-ordinated Polish-Hungarian action against Carpatho-Ukraine was not the starting point on this problem. As early as March 2, 1938, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kálmán Kánya, instructed the Hungarian Minister in Warsaw, András Hory, to answer the previously asked question by the Polish Foreign Minister, Józef Beck, concerning the Hungarian position in the planned action against Czecho-Slovakia that "Hungary will participate in any anti-Czech action which appears to be necessary." At the same time, Kanya instructed Hory to inform Beck that in his opinion "it is desirable to begin as soon as possible negotiations about the details including those of military nature" between the Governments of Hungary and Poland.[13] Kánya added that Beck may inform the Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, about their negotiations if he deems it desirable.

Pursuing clarifications of all details concerning their common frontier at the expense of Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia, the Governments of Poland and Hungary reached an agreement through their diplomatic channels. According to the report of the Hungarian Minister in Warsaw, András Hory, of May 10, 1938, the officials of the Political Department in the Polish Foreign Ministry urgently wanted to know the Hungarian position on the following points:

1. They would like to have accurate specifications about our view regarding the new Hungarian border in case of a partition of Czecho-Slovakia. It would be desirable to have a detailed sketch of it on hand.

2. They would like to know how would we delineate the border line of the autonomous Slovak region within Hungary. If for the Ruthenian Land also an autonomy would be planned, they request to outline the borders of the autonomous Ruthenian region.

3. For purpose of better orientation, they would like to have an ethnographic map which would show nationality distribution of the Upper Land (Felvidék) in each county.[14]

The Hungarian envoy informed Foreign Minister Kánya that he very resolutely told Mr. Kobylański of the Polish Foreign Ministry that on several previous occasions it was stated to Foreign Minister Beck that "in case of the break-up of Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary would claim her historical borders,"[15] and that the Hungarian Government regards this question as settled. Since the Poles were con-

[13] *Hungarian Documents,* Doc. 17, p. 81.
[14] *Ibid.,* Doc. 26, p. 117.
[15] *Ibid.,* Doc. 26, p. 117.

cerned about two small border areas which after 1919 were incorporated into Poland but before World War I were part of Hungary, in order to avoid misunderstanding with the Poles, Kánya instructed Hory to inform the Polish Foreign Ministry that Hungary will not claim these two small areas.[16] This clarified a point of possible conflict and the Polish-Hungarian agreement about their common border at the expense of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine was achieved.

It seems that the question of autonomy of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine within Hungary was regarded by the Hungarians as their internal affair which was not to be discussed even with friends. So, at least for the time being, it remained unanswered.

While on August 25, 1938, Admiral Nicholas Horthy in his conversation with Adolf Hitler "made it clear that Hungary intended to cooperate"[17] with Germany in the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia and stated that "by October 1 this year their armament would be so far advanced as to enable them to take part"[18] in military operations against Czecho-Slovakia, at the same time the Hungarians tried to appear before the world community as if they were seeking peaceful settlement of their claims.[19] Also the Poles were determined to use their military forces against Czecho-Slovakia alongside the Nazi German troops. Nevertheless, in the middle of September, 1938, Kánya urged the Polish Government to instruct the Polish press to support plebiscite in Carpatho-Ukraine in favor of joining Hungary.[20] There is no doubt that the Hungarians would have preferred to get Carpatho-Ukraine without being forced to resort to military aggression.

After the Nazi German claims in Sudetenland were satisfied without the necessity of using military power, the planned use of regular military forces of Germany, Poland and Hungary against Czecho-Slovakia was temporarily set aside. In the new situation, Polish-Hungarian diplomatic and military co-operation was intensi-

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[16] *Ibid.*, footnote No. 17, p. 117.

[17] *DGFP*, D, II, Doc. 383.

[18] *DGFP*. D, II, Doc. 390.

[19] On May 30, 1938, Hungarian Minister Mihály Jungerth-Arnóthy reported from Moscow to Kálman Kánya with some degree of satisfaction that after his conversation with Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov of May 5, 1938, the Soviet press stopped mentioning Hungary along with Germany and Poland as an aggressor preparing for military occupation of Czecho-Slovakia. See *Hungarian Documents*, Doc. 30, pp. 121-122.

[20] *Hungarian Documents*, Docs. 34 and 35, pp. 126 and 127.

fied in pursuit of their common goal. More so, since Germany pretended to be "disinterested" in the further developments in that region. The resort to the use of Hungarian and Polish military irregulars appeared to be the best method.

Two days after Csáky's visit in Warsaw, Hungarian Minister Hory informed the Hungarian Government that the proper Polish authorities are prepared to send some Polish irregulars into the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine only after they have proof of large scale Hungarian subversive activities in Carpatho-Ukraine. Therefore, Hory urged the Hungarian Government to begin large scale operations immediately. The Poles sugggested to destroy immediately the most important railroad bridges East of Chop in order to disrupt railroad connections with Rumania which would de-activate the Rumanians.[21] Hory stressed once again that unless considerable results of the sabotage of *Rongyos Gárda* are achieved, his efforts to stimulate the Polish activities from the North will be futile.

The details of the Polish-Hungarian co-operation of their irregular military units in the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine were discussed by the Hungarian Military Attaché at Warsaw, Béla Lengyel, with the Polish General Staff. On October 10, 1938, Lengyel informed the Chief of the Honvéd General Staff that the Polish military authorities do not consider it suitable that the Polish and Hungarian units of irregulars should fight side by side. Rather, they prefer to think about the Northern part of Carpatho-Ukraine as their region of operations.

As soon as considerable activities of the Hungarian *Rongyos Gárda* are developed in the Southern part of Carpatho-Ukraine, the Polish General Staff agreed to undertake the following:

1. They will send detachments to Mukachiv and Uzhhorod consisting — according to my impressions — of active soldiers in civilian clothing under the command of an officer. These detachments will have the same manpower as we planned. 2. They will smuggle patrols, organized of volunteers, into other regions of Ruthenia with the objectives of carrying out explosions of bridges and roads as well as some terror operations.[22]

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[21] *Ibid.*, Doc. 49, p. 145. In order to de-activate the Rumanians in honoring their Little Entente obligation to defend Czecho-Slovakia against Hungarian aggression, on October 5, 1938, Count Csáky promised to the Polish Foreign Minister, Józef Beck, that Hungary was willing to let Rumania have a part of Carpatho-Ukraine. See *Hungarian Documents*, footnote No. 30, p. 213.

[22] *Hungarian Documents*, Doc. 50, p. 146.

For the proper co-ordination of these activities, the Polish General Staff requested the Hungarians to provide daily information about their subversive operations. Advising the Hungarians against the use of airlift for the Hungarian irregulars, the Poles also expressed their doubts as to the effectiveness of the operating unit of Hungarian irregulars under the command of Koren. They trusted more units composed of regularly trained military men.

In response to the Polish request, Hungarian Foreign Minister Kánya instructed the Hungarian envoy in Warsaw on October 12, 1938, to inform the Polish authorities that the Hungarians had already succeeded to smuggle about 700-800 terrorists into the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine. Failing, however, to inform Hory about the catastrophic losses of the Hungarian irregulars the day before, on October 11, 1938, in the vicinity of Dercen in Carpatho-Ukraine, Kánya complained about the virtually airtight closing of the Hungarian border by the Czecho-Slovak defense forces. This probably was an attempt on the part of Kánya to prepare the Poles for diminished Hungarian terror activities. At the same time, Kánya requested András Hory to ask the Polish authorities to send their terrorists into Carpatho-Ukraine immediately, because he feared that "if the unrest which was organized with great sacrifice and at high costs will not get nourishment from the North, the continuity of the operations will be endangered."[23] Kánya's request was honored and Polish terrorists were dispatched to Uzhhorod and Mukachiv as well as to other parts of Carpatho-Ukraine.[24]

After the Vienna Arbitration of November 2, 1938, according to which Southern areas of Carpatho-Ukraine were to be ceded to Hungary by November 10, 1938, the Hungarians tried to persuade the Poles to participate in a joint military occupation of the entire territory of Carpatho-Ukraine in the process of Hungarian troops advancements into the awarded areas.

Two days before the Hungarian occupation troops were to stop at the Vienna Award demarcation line, Hungarian Foreign Minister Kánya sent to Warsaw the following telegram:

> It is not excluded that after the occupation of Ungvár and Munkács the present Ruthenian Government will ask for the Hungarian troops to be sent into the rest of their territory to maintain peace and order. In that case, the

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[23] *Ibid.*, Doc. 51, p. 147.

[24] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 140. Also see *Nova Svoboda*, November 15, 17, 20, 25 and 27, 1938.

Hungarian Royal Government is willing to send in regular Honvéd units in order to restore order and to break any resistance. But we can carry out this action only under condition that Polish regular military units in considerable strength cross the frontier for the same purpose. For proper cooperation of these troops, an immediate agreement would be necessary.[25]

After conversation with Count Lubieński of the Polish Foreign Ministry, András Hory informed the Hungarian Government on November 9, 1938, that the Poles are not willing to accept Kánya's plan because they would have no good explanation to the outside world for taking such action. However, the Poles were willing to continue smuggling their irregulars into Carpatho-Ukraine as well as to search for an acceptable plan.

Hory informed Kánya that in his search for a suitable formula with Count Lubieński, he offered to the Poles the following alternative solutions:

...the Ruthenian inhabitants would ask simultaneously for both the Hungarian and Polish troops to maintain order. Such an action could be prepared or organized in a short time. We could also accept a solution in which the Hungarian troops after they have moved in would request the support of the Polish troops.[26]

Hory informed Kánya that Count Lubieński took to this alternative with great eagerness and promised to submit it to the Foreign Minister, Józef Beck, for approval immediately. The necessary details would have to be worked out before this plan would be set in motion.

In order to expedite the Hory-Lubieński plan, the Hungarian Military Attaché in Warsaw, Béla Lengyel, at noon of the very same day presented a request of the Hungarian General Staff to the Polish General Staff to engage four battle divisions of the regular Polish Army in the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine. The Polish military leaders were astonished by this request and answered that mobilization of these troops cannot be executed by surprise. Foreign Minister Józef Beck assured the Polish military that he will inform Budapest that in Polish opinion "Poland's military intervention would do more harm to the cause than provide military advantage." However, Beck reassured the Hungarians that the Poles "will increase activities of the Polish *Freikorps* and, if

[25] *Hungarian Documents*, Doc. 65, pp. 176-177.
[26] *Ibid.*, Doc. 65, pp. 176-177.

necessary, they will hold Rumania in check by their military forces."[27] Hory informed Kánya that this sudden request of the Hungarian General Staff created an unfavorable mood among the Polish military leaders.

On November 10, 1938, Kánya instructed Hory to inform Beck that "if the Ruthenian Government will request the Hungarian troops to maintain order, we shall grant their request in spite of the fact that the Polish Government does not regard it possible to engage regular troops in Ruthenia." Kánya expressed gratitude to the Poles in advance for the intensified activities of the Polish irregulars in case of the advancement of Hungarian troops into the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine. Kánya's special gratitude was expressed to the Poles for their assurances to keep Rumania in check from her military operations against Hungary.[28]

Public declarations of the Prime Minister of Carpatho-Ukraine, Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn, and the Manifestos of the First Ukrainian-Ruthenian Central National Council at Uzhhorod and Khust prevented the Hungarians and Poles from producing the planned "invitation" of the Carpatho-Ukrainian authorities to send their troops.[29] Therefore, even the Hungarian occupation forces were forced to stop at the Vienna Award demarcation line on November 10, 1938. Nevertheless, the terroristic activities of the Polish *Freikorps* in Carpatho-Ukrainian territory were at this time intensified.

On November 12, 1938, Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck informed the Hungarian envoy in Warsaw that strong units of Polish irregolars penetrated into Carpatho-Ukraine. They have captured seventeen Czech gendarmes in the northern part of Carpatho-Ukraine and have taken them "entirely unnecessarily unharmed" to Poland. He informed Hory that the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Ministry inquired yesterday in this matter, but Count Lubieński, the *Chef de Cabinet* in the Polish Foreign Ministry, claimed to have no in-

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[27] *Ibid.*, Doc. 66, pp. 177-178.

[28] *Ibid.*, Doc. 68, pp. 179-180. Rumania was concerned about the Hungarian claims in Transylvania which was awarded on August 31, 1940, by the Rome-Berlin Axis to Hungary.

[29] See Premyer-Minister o. Dr. A. Voloshyn, "Do Hromadyan Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny," *Natsionalist* (New York), November 16, 1938; "Manifest Pershoyi Ukrayins'koyi-Rus'koyi Tsentral'noyi Narodnoyi Rady v Uzhhorodi z dnya 4. lystopada 1938," *Nova Svoboda* (Uzhhorod), November 5, 1938; and "Manifest Pershoyi Ukrains'koyi Tsentral'noyi Narodnoyi Rady v Khusti z dnya 10. lystopada 1938," *Nova Svoboda* (Khust), November 17, 1938.

formation about it and promised to order an investigation.[30] At the same time, Hory informed Kánya that in the view of Polish officials there are valid reasons to believe that the Czechs have lost interest in Carpatho-Ukraine.[31]

In the meantime, the Hungarian officials turned to Benito Mussolini for support of their planned military occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine[32] and the Hungarian General Staff intensified military preparations for an early action. On November 17, 1938, the commander of the Hungarian irregulars, Miklós Kozma, visited Foreign Minister Kálman Kánya and demanded permission to set his military machine in motion into Carpatho-Ukraine. Kánya personally said nothing, but he sent Count István Csáky after Kozma left the office to tell him that Kánya cannot officially give permission for the military operations, especially in the presence of witnesses. After advising Kozma not to ask any more questions of Kánya, Count Csáky told Kozma that he may develop operations within the next twenty-four hours.[33]

Although the Hungarian Government claimed not to know anything about these preparations, at the request of Miklós Kozma the Debrecen division of the regular Honvéds prepared to join Kozma's irregulars in the aggression against Carpatho-Ukraine at the day-break of November 20, 1938. The irregulars of *Rongyos Gárda* planned to commence their action the night of November 19th.

On November 18, 1938, the Debrecen division of infantry, supported by artillery units, was in the state of readiness in Vásárosnamény, about ten miles away from the Carpatho-Ukfainian border. On November 20th these troops moved into Chop, a Carpatho-Ukrainian town ceded to Hungary by the Vienna Award.

In a conversation with Kozma on the morning of November 20, 1938, commandant of the Debrecen Division of regular military units Siegler stated that it was technically impossible to start operations that evening. Kozma was even more disappointed when a cer-

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[30] *Hungarian Documents,* Doc. 69, p. 180.

[31] Count Lubieński informed Hory that the Czecho-Slovak Minister in Warsaw accepted invitation of President Ignacy Mościcki to a hunt in the Teschen region for November 16, 1938. As elsewhere discussed in this study, the Czechs desperately tried at that time to achieve an accord with the Poles. However, their efforts were in vain.

[32] For the detailed first hand report, see *Hungarian Documents,* Doc. 77, pp. 193-194. Also see *Ciano's Diary,* 1937-1938, p. 197.

[33] *Hungarian Documents,* Doc. 70, pp. 181-186.

tain Szarvas brought an issue of *Felvidéki Magyar Hirlap* with the title page headline in blaring letters "*Rusin Narodna Rada* Called in the Hungarian Troops." Kozma writes in his diary: "I read it and exclaimed: This is disaster!" and continues as follows:

From this news it is apparent that there must be an agreement with the Italians in the sense that we march to-night. On the basis of this agreement, — not expecting that we will have a 24 hour rest — the news that the *Rusin Narodna Rada* called in the Hungarian troops went to press 24 hours too early; it should have been published tomorrow... Of course, our action was immediately reported to Berlin by German journalists...[34]

The end to this episode of the Hungarian attempt to occupy Carpatho-Ukraine through military aggression is described in Miklós Kozma's *Diary* in the following manner:

November 21st. In the afternoon, I went... to Chop, where I wanted to have final talk with Siegler, whom I found among soldiers awaiting the arrival of Ibrányi, the Chief of Staff. Ibrányi arrived after a few minutes and stated that after five o'clock they received a telephone order from Pest to stop all preparations for the advancement... One hour later, the Chief of the Office of Military Operations in Budapest ordered by telephone the troops to return to their quarters. Everything is over...

It was hardly any consolation to Miklós Kozma and other Hungarian expansionists that the simultaneously sent Polish *Freikorps* troops were not stopped from entering Carpatho-Ukraine.[35]

A joint German and Italian *démarche* simultaneously in Budapest and Warsaw[36] changed methods of the common Polish-Hungarian actions for establishment of a common frontier in the Carpathian Mountains. Small scale terroristic activities were carried out also in the next three months. The emphasis, however, was relocated to their diplomatic and propagandistic activities.

HUNGARO-ITALIAN ATTEMPT TO OCCUPY COUNTRY BY FORCE

Once the Hungarian military machine was put into operation, it seemed to be very difficult to stop it. Already on October 19, 1938, the British Minister in Budapest, Sir G. Knox, reported to Viscount Halifax that it would be difficult to stop the Hungarian troops at

[34] Excerpts from Kozma's Diary in *Hungarian Documents*, pp. 181-186.
[35] *Hungarian Documents*, p. 162.
[36] *DGFP*, D, IV, Docs. 128, 129, 132 and 133.

the demarcation line once they had been given an opportunity to occupy part of the claimed territory.[37] This enthusiasm was strengthened even more by the leading statesmen of Hungary.

In his address to the Hungarian people on the evening of the announcement of the Vienna award, Prime Minister Béla Imrédy appealed to the Hungarians that

> they must make a nation happier, stronger, and more united. They must endeavour to create a new Hungary penetrated with a nationalist and militarist spirit, filled with racial consciousness and observant of the principle of social justice.[38]

and the Foreign Minister, Kálmán Kánya, speaking in the Chamber of Deputies on November 12, 1938, stressed Hungary's strength stating that in order to solve the question of their claims, "the Hungarians had been prepared to employ every means to attain their object" and that they had "no reason to suppose that an armed conflict would have had serious consequences" for Hungary. Preparing the public opinion for his further actions, M. Kánya stated that "Hungary had accepted the heavy sacrifices which the Vienna Award had imposed upon her"[39] for the sake of the introduction "of a new era in Central Europe." The government controlled radio Budapest continued its propaganda directed against Msgr. A. Voloshyn's Government, and Hungarian airplanes continued to drop leaflets packages[40] over the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine.

As far as diplomatic action is concerned, the Hungarians started immediately after the Vienna arbitration. The Ex-Prime Minister of Hungary, Dr. Kálmán de Darányi, who was sent by the Hungarian Government to visit Adolf Hitler after direct negotiations at Komárom were broken off, sent a letter of thanks, on November 3, 1938, to the Reich Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and a special message to Adolf Hitler. The letter, the wording of which was first approved by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Béla Imrédy, among other things stated:

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[37] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 218.

[38] *Ibid.*, Doc. 254.

[39] *Ibid.*, Doc. 269.

[40] Anti-Ukrainian radio broadcast from Budapest was conducted by A. Bonkalo several times each day. The packages dropped from Hungarian planes contained besides the Magyar national colors a small piece of wheat bread and small piece of bacon as symbols of material well-being in Hungary.

We are fully aware that without your action we would have received none of the territory of which we were robbed at Trianon, and of which a considerable part has now been returned to us.

I am, moreover, firmly convinced that the realization of the ideas which emerged on the occasion of my visit in Munich will contribute to the establishment of still closer friendly relations between Hungary and Germany within the framework of Axis policy. The people and Government are united in this.[41]

This same letter hinted at projected changes in the Hungarian foreign policy such as "the early withdrawal of Hungary from the League of Nations, adherence to the Anti-Commintern Pact and a documentary commitment to a close union between Hungarian foreign policy and that of the Berlin-Rome Axis."[42] This was the first step calculated to win the Führer's consent to enlarge Hungary by additional lands claimed by Hungary.

On November 11, 1938, the day after all ceded territories according to the Vienna award had been occupied by Hungarian troops, the Hungarian Minister in Rome, F. Villani, gave Count Ciano a statue of Hercules "as a present from Kánya." On this occasion he also invited the Italian Foreign Minister to visit Budapest in January or February, 1939, and then "almost incidentally, he hinted at the possibility of disorders in Ruthenia, such as to necessitate its union with Hungary."[43] Count Ciano states that he

strongly advised him against this. There would be opposition from Germany, and we ourselves might possibly be compelled to recall the Hungarians to strict observance of the arbitration... I am sadly disillusioned about the Hungarians — first from a military point of view and now from that of correctness they show themselves to be anything but what we had expected.[44]

Few days later, while the preparations to attack Carpatho-Ukraine were in full progress, the Regent of Hungary, Nicholas Horthy, invited the German Minister in Budapest, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, to his palace and, after presenting the Minister with a portrait of himself, he conveyed to his guest that

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[41] Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945* (Washington, 1951), Series D, Vol. V, Doc. 244. Hereafter cited as: DGFP.

[42] Darányi handing the two letters to the German Minister in Budapest, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, clearly stated what these promises are. As a result, Hungary adhered to the Anti-Commintern Pact on January 13, 1939, and resigned from the League of Nations on April 11, 1939.

[43] *Ciano's Diary: 1937-1938,* trans. by Andreas. Mayor, (London, 1952), p. 193. Hereafter cited as *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38.*

[44] *Ibid.,* p. 193.

he was worried over the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine. The Hungarian Government was being besieged with requests to put an end to the untenable conditions there... Because of the course of the rivers the needy population of the mountainous remainder of Carpatho-Ukraine was entirely dependent on Hungary as a market. Troops with a leaning toward Bolshevism (Katljura), who had previously been driven out of the Ukraine and incorporated into the Czech Army, were terrorizing the population.[45]

In his report to the German Foreign Minister, Otto von Erdmannsdorff also stated that "there is the possibility that, in the event of an explosion in Carpatho-Ukraine, Hungarian troops would march in" and, advocating the Hungarian cause, commented that "the mountainous country of Carpatho-Ukraine, intersected by deep valleys running north to south, was moreover ill situated as a line of communication for the German activity to be expected in the future in the Ukraine." Thus, less than two weeks after Germany and Italy arbitrated the dispute on the Hungarian request, Hungarian diplomats made it clear to both arbiters that they were prepared to break previously assumed obligations.

On the day of the Vienna Arbitration, which settled the Hungarian claims against Czecho-Slovakia, Poland declared that her claims against that Republic were satisfied. On November 2, 1938, Polish papers published a joint communiqué of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments stating that certain problems which were left unsolved

by Notes exchanged on September 30 and October 1 had now been settled by a further exchange of Notes concluded at Prague on November 1. This agree-

[45] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 118. According to Kánya's statement, "the Hungarians had been prepared to employ every means to attain their object." On the other hand, there were no Ukrainian troops in the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine in existence. The only Carpatho-Ukrainian defense force that existed was the Organization for the National Defense "Carpathian Sitch" and this organization was founded on November 15, 1938. As far as Horthy's mentioning of the "troops with a leaning toward Bolshevism (Katljura)" is concerned, this was a product of bad information. First of all, Symon Petlyura (not Katljura) was the Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of the Ukrainian National Republic fighting against Bolshevism between 1917 and 1921 when the remnants of these forces were interned in Poland and partly in Czecho-Slovakia. Neither Horthy's statement that these troops were "incorporated into the Czech Army" is true since there was not one single group of such a military unit. As far as Symon Petlyura is concerned, he was living in exile, including Budapest for a short time, and continued his anti-Bolshevik activity until his death. He was killed on May 25, 1926, in Paris, France, by a Bolshevik agent.

ment "exhausted" the question of the new frontier line between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Delimitation would be concluded on November 15 in Silesia and on November 30 in Slovakia and immediately thereafter the newly established frontiers would be occupied.[46]

The communiqué also explicitly stated that the settlement of the frontier questions aimed at "constructive cooperation of the two countries." Despite this fact, however, Polish diplomats continued their activities directed against Carpatho-Ukraine which was a federated part of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. As early as November 8, 1938, the Polish Foreign Minister, Józef Beck, stated to the German Ambassador in Warsaw, Hans Georg von Moltke, that he did not consider "the rump area of the Carpatho-Ukraine, in which there were no cities and no railways, as viable." He, therefore, assumed that "the population would on its own initiative, *and in the very near future*, express a desire for a plebiscite."[47] In his report the German Ambassador stated further that

this view of the (Polish) Foreign Minister is also reflected in the entire Polish press, which maintains, as heretofore, that in spite of the Vienna decision, which can be regarded only as a partial solution, a common frontier between Hungary and Poland must be established. Although some Polish newspapers emphasize that any initiative in the question of the future form of the Carpatho-Ukraine lies with Budapest alone and that Poland is merely willing to support the Hungarian claims by every means,

in his telephone message to the Reich Foreign Minister "on acute danger in Carpatho-Ukrainian question" on November 12, 1938, the Under State Secretary in the Reich Foreign Ministry, Ernst Woerman, added that confidential reports speak "even of Polish troops movement in the region in question" and

Poland is making every effort to pave the way for the fulfillment of the Hungarian wishes. It is said that in political circles in Warsaw the opinion is generally held that the establishment of a common frontier with Hungary is at present the most important goal of Polish foreign policy. In addition, it

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[46] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 247. Also see Docs. 241, 242, 243, and 248. On October 31th, the Polish Minister in Prague handed a note to the Prague Foreign Minister demanding cession of certain regions on the Polish-Slovak frontier to Poland. The Czecho-Slovak Central Government after consulting and securing consent of the Slovak autonomous Government agreed immediately to accept the Polish demands. So, additionally, the regions of Čadca, Skalité, and Javorina were annexed by Poland.

[47] *DGFP*, D, V Doc. 100.

appears from the information available here (in Berlin) that Poland is trying in every way to realize her goal (by her money, agents, radio broadcasts, inspired resolutions, etc.). From the Carpatho-Ukraine come reports that bands are arousing the population there, blowing up bridges, and resorting to bribery; probably this is being promoted by Hungary.[48]

Ernst Woerman, also a Director of the Political Department, assumed that on the basis of these reports "it is not impossible that Poland, in complicity with Hungary, will in the near future bring about a *fait accompli*" and, therefore, he made several proposals to the Reich Foreign Minister regarding the further handling of that question. His proposals were as follows:

1. Immediate exchange of views with the Italian Government. The Italian attitude is at least uncertain, thus far.

2. If possible, a joint German-Italian *démarche* in Budapest, demanding that Hungary respect the Vienna Award in all circumstances and that she suppress any subversive activity.

3. A similar *démarche* with the Polish Government is out of the question in the present stage of developments on account of the connection with other pending questions.

4. The question of a German-Italian guarantee to Czechoslovakia should be examined in this connection; however, it will probably not be acute before the frontier is definitively fixed.

5. As a German counteraction against the Polish agitation we shall have to support the remaining Carpatho-Ukrainian territory as promptly as possible, both economically and financially. The preliminary work on this will be started by State Secretary Keppler in conjunction with the Foreign Ministry and the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. One of the first measures, moreover, will be the dispatch of a German consul general to the new provincial capital, Chust.[49]

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[48] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 100. See report of the British Ambassador in Warsaw, Sir Howard Kennard, to Viscount Halifax of November 14, 1938, in which he informed the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that "Polish Government still do not accept Vienna arbitration as final but will endeavour to bring about in the near future a common frontier with Hungary. Their real motives are fear of Ukraine agitation and German penetration toward Ukraine via Czecho-Slovakia." See *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 258.

[49] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 100. At the beginning of November 1938, Joachim von Ribbentrop instructed Oberführer Berends of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle "to take charge of the underground activities in Carpatho-Ukraine." See *DGFP*, D, IV. Doc. 109. Although on November 11th in a conversation between Field Marshal H. Göring and Slovak Minister F. Ďurčanský in the presence of Franz Karmasin and Edmund Veesenmayer of the Wilhelm Keppler's staff "some questions concerning immediate practical help for the Ukraine were discussed" (see *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 112), Professor Avhustyn Shtefan, former President of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet, Minister of Education, and closest co-operator and personal friend of late Msgr. A. Voloshyn, in a letter to the author dated

In the meantime, Polish terrorists intensified their activities in the Carpatho-Ukrainian frontier zone. A few examples of such activity are available. On November 2, 1938, a group of 24 Polish terrorists in civilian clothing crossed the frontier from Poland into Carpatho-Ukraine. On November 13th, 18 Polish soldiers under the command of an officer penetrated almost one kilometer into Carpatho-Ukrainian territory and kidnapped 6 Carpatho-Ukrainian lumber workers to Poland, where they were questioned at Osmoloda, some 20 kilometers from the frontier.

On November 15th, there was an outbreak of shooting between Polish irregulars and the Carpatho-Ukrainian Defense Service men which resulted in the death of three Polish terrorists and the wounding of several more. Leaflets in Ukrainian, Slovak and Czech languages were found with the dead Poles urging the population to demand a common Polish-Hungarian frontier.

During the night of November 18th about fifty Polish irregulars attacked villages in the region of Nyzhni Veretsky, and after they were forced to retreat they left behind them one dead and several wounded. And, in the afternoon of November 18th, other groups attacked the frontier village of Nyzhnye Studene.[50] Similar disturbances continued until March 1939. Simultaneously, Polish and Hungarian radio propaganda spread various rumors concerning events in Carpatho-Ukraine.[51]

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at Stamford, Conn., on July 30, 1957, stated as follows: "As far as I know, the German Government did not spent even one single Pfenning for the Carpatho-Ukrainian cause in time between October 1938 and March 16, 1939."

[50] For these reports see "Pol's'ki terorysty v Karpats'kiy Ukrayini," *Nova Svoboda*, November 20, 1938; *Nova Svoboda* of November 17, 1938, published an appeal to the citizens of Carpatho-Ukraine asking them to co-operate in fighting the terrorists. For other facts see *Nova Svoboda* of November 25, December 2, and December 8, 1938.

[51] For illustration we shall quote a few facts: On November 14, 1938, when Prime Minister A. Voloshyn was talking with a Belgian journalist, the Polish radio announced that Msgr. Voloshyn was very sick being in serious condition resulting from a wound he received a few days ago. To this Msgr. Voloshyn remarked that a week ago, both the Polish and Magyar radio broadcasts announced that he had been killed by a Ukrainian terrorist... Denying all this misinformation, the journalist informed his readers about the attack of the Polish terrorists on the peaceful people who assembled with their goods and animals at the weekly market held each Thursday in Nyhni Veretsky. See *Folk en Staat* (Antwerp), November 20, 1938. Another Belgian paper declared its dissatisfaction with the fact that Budapest was spreading false rumors about Carpatho-Ukraine which were communicated to the world by foreign journalists. See *Het Nieuwsblad* (Bruxelles), November 27, 1938. Even the representative of

While the representatives of the Hungarian Government officially negotiated with the members of the Czecho-Slovak Delimitation Commission representing the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine, unofficial Hungarian circles declared on November 20, 1938, through the Budapest radio that separate communities had addressed to the Hungarian Government a request for union with Hungary. They informed the representatives of foreign Governments that even the First Central Ukrainian National Council, headed by Msgr. A. Voloshyn, had "requested the Hungarian Government to incorporate Carpatho-Ukraine with Hungary." Apparently, they tried to create the impression in international diplomatic circles that all politically organized forces of Carpatho-Ukraine wished to return under the Crown of St. Stephen. Therefore, even copies of "the Council's letter" were shown to the foreign diplomats. In order to counter-act such Hungarian propaganda, on November 21, 1938, the First Central Ukrainian National Council at Khust issued the following declaration:

> Herewith we declare before the whole world and inform the representatives of all nations, all press organs as well as all honest people that Hungarian official circles employ means of deception and mystification, because neither the First Central Ukrainian National Council nor other representatives of the people of Carpatho-Ukraine ever requested or will request Hungary to take care over our country.
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> The means of deception and mystification employed by responsible Hungarian circles prove that they aim at misinforming the representatives of foreign nations and in that way attaining the change of the award of arbiters issued at Vienna on November 2, 1938, by the Great Powers.[52]

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the Italian pro-Hungarian daily, *La Stampa,* Guido Tonelli, was surprised about the great differences between the reports from Budapest and Warsaw and his eye-witnessed reality in Carpatho-Ukraine after he arrived in Khust. First of all, in his correspondence from Khust of November 19, 1938, Tonelli denied the statement of the Budapest radio that Msgr. A. Voloshyn was "hated by the local Ukrainian population to such an extent that he was forced to live far-away from his fatherland, to hide in some unknown place of Czechoslovakia." He proved that fact by his interview with the Prime Minister at Khust in the Government Building. Secondly, Tonelli, who openly admitted that he was not too friendly with the person of Msgr. A. Voloshyn or his Government, felt obliged to report that Polish and Hungarian terrorists were active in Carpatho-Ukraine and were disturbing the peaceful life of the population. See *La Stampa* (Torino), November 23, 1938.

[52] "Proholoshenya Pershoyi Tsentral'noyi Ukrayins'koyi Narodnoyi Rady v Khusti z 21. lystopada 1938," *Nova Svoboda,* November 22, 1938. The declaration was signed by Fedir Revay, Dr. Mykola Dolynay and Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko. For the initiative and development of the fabrication of the mystic "invitation" of Hungarian troops by the *Rusin Narodna Rada* see *Hungarian*

In the meantime, Polish and Hungarian military forces were concentrated on the Carpatho-Ukrainian frontiers[53] and the Hungarian Military Attaché in Rome, Colonel László Szabó, succeeded in his peculiar way to persuade the Duce, Benito Mussolini, to the effect that he ordered to send one hundred Italian airplanes together with Italian pilots in Hungarian uniforms to participate in the Hungarian attack on Carpatho-Ukraine.[54]

On November 18, 1938, the Hungarian Government informed both Rome and Berlin about its intentions in Carpatho-Ukraine. The Hungarian Minister in Rome, F. Villani, stated to Count Ciano that "the expected movement is taking place" in Carpatho-Ukraine and that "Germany appears to be indifferent to this fresh development of the situation."[55] The Italian Foreign Minister, being certain that "this is untrue," told Villani that he disapproved such kind of policy and "if Germany asks us (the Italians) to join her in addressing to Hungary an invitation to respect the terms of the arbitration, we shall march in step with Berlin." Next day, Villani informed Count Ciano about further Hungarian preparations to attack Carpatho-Ukraine, and on November 20, 1938, while he was hunting near Torino, Count Ciano was informed that 100 Italian airplanes were to depart for Hungary to be used against Carpatho-Ukraine. The departure of the planes was authorized by the Duce himself who also approved of Hungarian plans, being assured by the Hungarian Military Attaché in Rome, Colonel László Szabó, that the Germans were not against them. There was great disappointment in Rome when the German Foreign Ministry informed the Duce and Count Ciano that Germany did not consent to Hungarian occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine, and even more so because "the Duce has got himself into a serious mess. His honesty has been exploited, by the Hungarians who "are behaving badly, like a Balkanized people..."[56] Ciano felt satisfied that the threatening weather has

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Documents, Doc. 65, pp. 176-177, and excerpts from Kozma's Diary in *Hungarian Documents*, pp. 181-186.

[53] DGFP, D, V, Doc. 100, 108 and 252. Also see *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 268. Sir G. Knox reported from Budapest to Viscount Halifax on November 21, 1938, that "Hungarian agitation in favour of attachment of Ruthenia is increasing and the military speak openly of entering that country in the near future."

[54] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38*, pp. 196-197.

[55] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38*, pp. 196-197.

[56] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38*, p. 197.

prevented the airplanes from leaving the ground and reaching Hungary.

The Hungarian Minister in Berlin, Döme Sztójay, also visited the Reich Foreign Ministry on November 18, 1938, and informed Under State Secretary Ernst Woermann about the plan of the Hungarian Government with regard to Carpatho-Ukraine. He pointed out that

> the situation in Carpatho-Ukraine was beginning to be untenable and that it was difficult for the Hungarian Government to continue to exercise restraint. He added that, however the situation might develop, the Hungarian Government was anxious to confer with the German Government on the matter.[57]

Later in the day, Ernst Woermann instructed German Minister in Budapest, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, to use his next opportunity to tell the Hungarian Foreign Minister that

> German Government objects to the action apparently envisaged by the Regent in Carpatho-Ukraine. According to reports in the possession of the German Government, Czechoslovakia would just not endure such action. If Hungarian action gave rise to difficulties, Germany could not support Hungary. Hungarian action therefore, on the lines apparently contemplated appears to the German Government to be inopportune.[58]

This position of the German Government was also stated to the Hungarian Minister in Berlin who also "had been reminded of the obligation" of the Hungarian Government "to do nothing" without consulting the Germans.[59] It is interesting to note that on the next day, November 19, 1938, Woermann instructed the German Chargé d'Affairs in Prague, Andor Hencke "to exercise reserve" in the Carpatho-Ukrainian question. At the same time, Hencke was informed that "an instruction has been issued to the press to publish nothing about incidents in Carpatho-Ukraine" and that "the question of setting up a Consulate General in Chust has also been postponed."[60] It seems that Germany still was awaiting further developments in Carpatho-Ukraine and, probably, was expecting some bargaining price for which she would find it possible to give the green light for attack.

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[57] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 122.
[58] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 122.
[59] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 122.
[60] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 126.

When Otto von Erdmannsdorff appeared in the office of the Hungarian Foreign Minister on the next day, November 19, 1938, to carry out instructions of his Government, Kálmán Kánya declared that "he recognized the frontier delimitation as laid down in the Vienna Award" but in view of the new situation "he did not know whether the efforts of the Hungarian Government to prevent a solution" of the Carpatho-Ukrainian question "by force would be successful" since "this movement had the backing of very influential persons" in Hungary.[61] On this occasion Kánya informed Erdmannsdorff that when the Czecho-Slovak Minister in Budapest, Miloš Kobr, complained recently about Hungarian propaganda against Carpatho-Ukraine, the Hungarian Foreign Minister told him that "more serious possible developments might be prevented by a plebiscite under international control."[62]

Despite a previous exchange of views between Budapest and Rome, on the one hand, and Budapest and Berlin, on the other hand, the Hungarian Military Attaché in Rome, Colonel László Szabó, visited Benito Mussolini at noon on November 20, 1938, and stated to him that "the situation in Carpatho-Ukraine was becoming more and more untenable" and "the Hungarian Government would therefore occupy the Carpatho-Ukraine area within the next 24 hours."[63] He told the Duce that the Hungarian Government had previously consulted the German Government and that as far as the Hungarian Government understood "Germany did not in principle disapprove of action but was only apprehensive for Hungary." The Italian Ambassador in Berlin, Bernardo Attolico, informed Herr von Ribbentrop about these conversations. Ribbentrop immediately objected to the Hungarian misinterpretation of the German statement and declared that the Hungarian action "would be a breach of the Vienna Award." After consultation with the Führer in the course of the afternoon of the same day, Joachim von Ribbentrop asked Ambassador Attolico to transmit to Benito Mussolini the following communication:

1. The German Government was extremely surprised at the interpretation of its reply. Furthermore, the Hungarian Government had even given a written

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[61] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 127. From Kozma's Diary we see that it was the Hungarian Government itself preparing this military aggression. Kánya knowingly used misrepresentation in this conversation. See *Hungarian Documents*, pp. 181-186.

[62] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 127.

[63] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 128.

assurance that it would take no steps without informing the German Government.

2. The Führer was of the opinion that a Hungarian occupation of the Carpatho-Ukraine would discredit the Axis Powers, whose award Hungary had unconditionally accepted 3 weeks ago.

3. Hungary was playing a frivolous game if she intervened by force now and she would bear the full responsibility for all eventual consequences. The outcome of a Czechoslovak-Hungarian conflict, which would inevitably result, could not be foreseen; possibly Germany too would be forced to intervene.[64]

Thus, Hitler and Ribbentrop took a clear position against the planned Hungarian attack. It is interesting to notice that their statement that "possibly Germany too would be forced to intervene" does not say on whose side. Anyhow, the Duce felt obliged to send a communication immediately to the Führer with the following wording:

1. I deeply regret that, by means of a communication conveyed at the last moment, and entirely unsupported by the contents of the statements made from the German side to Kánya, an attempt has been made to depict to me the situation and the attitude of the German Government in a manner completely at variance with the truth.

2. I agree with the Führer that, after the Vienna Award which took account of 95 percent of the Hungarian demands, this action on the part of Budapest seriously detracts from the prestige of the Axis and places Hungary in a position which is not without danger morally, and perhaps militarily.

3. If the Führer thinks an immediate German-Italian *démarche* in Budapest is called for in order to arrest the action, in case it is still only contemplated or in a preparatory phase, and in order to clarify the situation, the Italian Government is in complete agreement.[65]

At midnight of November 20, 1938, the German Minister in Budapest reported that the Hungarian military forces were still in a state of readiness despite the fact that it was Sunday. Foreign Minister's Chef de Cabinet, Tibor Bartheldy, "admitted the possibility of a solution" of the Carpatho-Ukrainian question "by force in the course of this week." He justified this action by the fact that "the people had been overcome by a psychosis about the Carpatho-Ukraine" and that "the Army was strongly urging intervention."[66]

In this situation, Adolf Hitler directed the Reich Foreign Ministry that every detail of the "Hungarian incident" must be reported to him personally at Berchtesgaden,[67] and Herr von Ribbentrop agreed with

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[64] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 128.
[65] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 129.
[66] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 130.
[67] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 131 and footnote on the page 159.

Count Ciano regarding a joint German-Italian *démarche* in Budapest. Ribbentrop prepared the draft of a note to be delivered to the Hungarian Government which was first approved by Hitler and, after consultation with Count Ciano, the Duce also approved the main points of the note. On November 21st, the German Minister together with the Italian Minister in Budapest delivered notes of their Governments to the Hungarian Foreign Minister in order to arrest further preparations for Hungarian military action in Carpatho- Ukraine. The main points of the German note read:

1. In the award given recently at Vienna at the request of the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Governments, the frontier between Hungary and the Carpatho-Ukraine has been determined by the German and Italian Governments. By her signature in Vienna, Hungary has explicitly recognized this frontier before the whole world as the final frontier. If Hungary now advances with armed forces against the Carpatho-Ukrainian part of Czechoslovakia, the Hungarian Government may thereby be placed morally in a very difficult position.

2. Moreover, a consequence of such action would be to render valueless the Vienna Award to the discredit of the two arbitrating powers. The German Government therefore feels justified in expecting Hungary to abide by the award.[68]

Point Three of the note stressed that the Hungarian military forces attacking Carpatho-Ukraine might meet with armed resistance by the Czecho-Slovak Army and run into a difficult or even critical miiitary situation in which Germany would not render any assistance to Hungary. Point Four stressed that "Hungary would have to take the blame for any unfortunate consequences of such action." While the Italian Minister confined himself to delivering the note, the German Minister involved himself in a "very heated" discussion with M. Kálmán Kánya who "was in fact far to excited for an objective talk."[69]

At the high point of tension, the Hungarians decided to win the consent of Germany for their action against Carpatho-Ukraine by a renewed statement of their willingness to adhere to the Anti-Commintern Pact, to link their foreign policy along the Berlin- Rome Axis Powers.[70] This proposal of the Hungarian Government was

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[68] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 132.

[69] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 133. The Reich Foreign Minister instructed the German Ambassador in Warsaw to hand a copy of the note delivered to the Hungarian Government also to the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[70] *DGFP*, D, V, Enclosure to Doc. 252.

handed by the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, Döme Sztójay, to the Reich Foreign Minister on November 21, 1938. In a conversation with Under State Secretary Ernst Woermann on the same day, Sztójay informed him about these intentions of the Hungarian Government and then stated that

> the "Ruthenian" (*russinisch*) question was regarded in Hungary, irrespective of party, as a national affair. As the proposal for a plebiscite had been rejected, the only thing that remained was to take direct action.
>
> In this difficult situation the Hungarian Government asked whether, in spite of the circumstances mentioned, the negative attitude of the German Government represented its last word and whether the German Government did not consider it at all possible that it might adopt a disinterested view.[71]

After Ernst Woermann stated that the position of the German Government was clarified in its note delivered the same day in Budapest and after reading to the Hungarian Minister the main points of the note, Döme Sztójay requested an interview with the Reich Foreign Minister which then took place immediately. After Herr von Ribbentrop also referred to the content of the note delivered in Budapest and added that "Mussolini shared" German "feelings completely," the Hungarian Minister asked him whether Germany "would adopt a different point of view at some other time." Here, Ribbentrop gave an evasive answer, namely that "at present" Germany "could not take any position" on this question.[72] Ribbentrop's answer showed clearly that the Germans reserved for themselves the right to change their mind in the future regarding the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine. Adding to this answer that "a common objective" could be achieved if "the basis of a good partnership between Germany and Hungary" by an "agreement in a spirit of mutual trust on a common policy" would be established, made it clear that the Vienna Award was not a matter of principle in the German foreign policy with regard to Carpatho-Ukraine. Ribbentrop actually gave hope to the realization of the Magyar desires at some later time under circumstances favorable to the Germans.

On November 24, 1938, the Regent of Hungary, Nicholas Horthy, told the German Minister in Budapest that German-Italian intervention had occurred in time because the Hungarian military action against Carpatho-Ukraine was delayed "for a day or two as a result of necessary regrouping" of the Hungarian military forces "in

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[71] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 134.

[72] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 252.

view of Czech countermeasures." Admiral Horthy repeated on this occasion that in his view "the inviability of the remainder of Carpatho-Ukraine would become more and more evident as time went on"[73] hinting to the effect that he would not give up hope of occupying Carpatho-Ukraine in the not-too-distant future. However, he accepted the reality of the present and the Hungarian military forces which were ready to attack were ordered to stop their preparation for action.

In the meantime, the Rumanian Government also expressed its objections to the attempt of the Hungarians to take Carpatho-Ukraine by force and informed the Hungarian Government that in case force was used in order to seize Carpatho-Ukraine, "the Rumanian Government would not answer for the consequences." [74] During his conversations with the Führer and the Feich Foreign Minister at Berchtesgaden on November 24th,[75] and with Field Marshal Hermann Göring two days later,[76] the King of Rumania, Carol II, was "especially interested in the German attitude on the Carpatho-Ukrainian question" and stated that Rumania "opposed the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary." One week earlier, on the occasion of his visit in London, the King of Rumania informed the British Government in a conversation with Viscount Halifax on November 17, 1938, that "it was part of the firm policy of Rumania to maintain the Czecho-Slovak frontier against Hungary. This would also be the attitude of Yugoslavia."[77] He also stated that "Rumania was prepared to join with other Powers in a guarantee" of the frontiers between Hungary and Carpatho-Ukraine.[78] At this time, the Rumanian policy against Hungarian revisionism found support in Germany. The responsible German circles instructed leaders of the German minority in Rumania that

> the *Volksdeutsche* in Transylvania are to maintain their previous loyal attitude toward Rumania in the forthcoming communal elections and not enter into any electoral alliance with the Hungarian minority. If confronted with Hungarian wishes to that effect, they are to point to the unfavorable position of the German minority in Hungary.[79]

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[73] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 139.
[74] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 276.
[75] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 254.
[76] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 257.
[77] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 258.
[78] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 277.
[79] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 253.

Although Adolf Hitler in his conversation with King Carol II "expressly left open" the question of his future attitude in the Carpatho-Ukrainian problem,[80] he stated to the King that for years he had urged the Hungarians to be moderate in their revisionist aims against Rumania. The instructions to the German minority in Rumania made the Rumanians believe that the Germans were against further aggrandizement of Hungary. The popular Ukrainian question which was the subject of King Carol's discussion in Germany, Paris, and London, gave him another reason to believe firmly that Germany was seriously opposing annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary.

Since it was generally known that Poland was as much interested in the establishment of the common frontier with Hungary as Hungary herself, and that she was supporting Hungarian preparations to seize Carpatho-Ukraine, Germany decided to take steps in Warsaw, too. Germany still pretended to hope that the question of the Corridor and Danzig could be solved by negotiations with the Poles;[81] therefore, her step at Warsaw was much milder than that in Budapest. On November 22, 1938, the German Ambassador in Warsaw, Hans G. von Moltke, informed the Polish Foreign Minister concerning the German note sent to the Hungarian Government the day before. During a one hour conversation, Colonel Beck brought up the question "whether there was not a possibility of doing justice in a peaceful manner to the desire of the population (of Carpatho-Ukraine) to unite with Hungary?" The German Ambassador replied to this that according to German information "the desires for union were probably essentially a product of Hungarian propaganda." Colonel Beck then remarked that he "regretted a continuation of the present situation" in Carpatho-Ukraine for general political reasons. He stated that

> aside from the necessity of eliminating this source of constant unrest, he considered it desirable to satisfy the Hungarian demands for revision on this point. Then it would be easier to induce Hungary to give up her plans for revision in Transylvania and to reach the understanding with Rumania which was desired in the interest of peace and defense against Soviet Russia.[82]

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[80] *DGFP*, D. V, Doc. 254.

[81] At the climax of the Hungarian preparations to invade Carpatho-Ukraine by force, the Reich Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, had chosen to invite the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Józef Lipski, on November 19, 1938, to continue to discuss the German-Polish differences over Danzig and the Corridor. See *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 101.

[82] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 104.

When Colonel Beck further asked whether Germany had any "fundamental objections to the common Polish-Hungarian frontier," hinting at the Ukrainian question in general, H. G. von Moltke replied that it was undesirable to overthrow the Vienna Award which had just been made and added that a fundamental objection to the common frontier was not involved in the present German attitude.

In connection with these conversations it should be mentioned that on November 24, 1938, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kálmán Kánya, informed the French Minister in Budapest, on the latter Government's request, that the idea of annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine " for the moment had been put into storage" but he expressed his hope "for an eventual settlement" of the problem "in Hungary's favor by means of a bargain to be struck between Poland and Germany concerning Danzig and other matters."[83] Thus, not only Germany, but also the Hungarians at this moment thought of Carpatho-Ukraine as a bargaining object. Like the Poles who suggested that the Hungarians moderate their revisionist claims against Rumania in order to reconcile the Rumanians with the Hungarian annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine, and who tried to persuade the Germans and other interested Governments that their proposal was in the interest of European peace, so also the Hungarians now hoped that the Poles would make sacrifices in Danzig and the Corridor for the sake of winning German consent to annex the Ukrainian province. Even the Czecho-Slovak ally, France, was of the opinion that "the Germans were asking a high price"[84] in this diplomatic bargaining.

GERMAN VISITOR STIMULATES FALSE HOPES

On instruction of the Reich Foreign Minister, on November 21, 1938, the day when the Hungarian military forces intended to enter Carpatho-Ukraine, the Secretary of the German Legation in Prague, Dr. Hamilkar Hofmann, accompanied by Dr. Schubert, arrived in Khust in order to get first hand information regarding the situation there. Two days later, on November 23rd, a representative of the German Legation in Bucharest, M. Muschynsky, arrived in Carpatho-Ukraine and travelled through the northern provinces where extensive damages were done by Polish terrorists and where the population was held in permanent fear of being attacked by day

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[83] *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 278.
[84] *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 278.

or night.[85] On November 22, 1938, in Khust at the dinner given in his honor by Prime Minister Msgr. A. Voloshyn, Dr. H. Hofmann assured the Carpatho-Ukrainians that "Germany and her Führer have sympathy for Ukraine."[86] He visited also the Commander of the Czecho-Slovak military forces on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine, General Svatek, at his headquarters in Perechyn. The General informed Dr. Hofmann (on November 27th) that according to his information, Hungarian troops were withdrawing from the Carpatho-Ukrainian frontier.

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[85] For detailed report see *Nova Svoboda,* November 25 and 27, 1938. After H. Hofmann and Dr. Schubert arrived in Perechyn on November 21st, they were welcomed by representatives of various organizations there. Then they continued their trip through Khust to Yasinya where they were guests in the home of the Supreme Commander of the Carpathian Sitch, Dmytro Klempush. On November 22nd they visited Rakhiv and Velykyy Bychkiv. After a long conversation with Msgr. A. Voloshyn at Khust on November 22nd, the Germans of the Prague and Bucharest German Legations accompanied by the Prime Minister's Chef de Cabinet, Dr. Vasyl' Latsanych, and the Chef of the Department for Press and Information in the Office of the Prime Minister, Dr. Volodymyr Komaryns'kyy, visited on November 23-25, 1938, the northern provinces of the country. In the village of Vuchkove they inspected the damages of the bridge on the Rika river caused by several bomb attacks of the Polish terrorists. Here two Ukrainians, Mykhaylo Loya and M. Solyak, were killed. In the county seat of Volove visitors held conversations with the County Administrator, Mr. Roykovych, the representatives of the County Ukrainian National Council, Dr. Yosyp Dudykevych and Mr. Kurakh, as well as with a delegation of the local village farmers headed by Mykhaylo Grendzha. The expedition then visited the villages of Maydan and Vyshnye Bystre. Between these two villages, too, a bridge was destroyed by Polish terrorists. At Maydan the group joined also Lieutenant Colonel Zeman and Captain Gencer of the Czecho-Slovak army, and they proceeded to the village of Torun. During several attacks by large groups of the intruders, the building of the local Post Office, that of the local gendarmery were blown up and several others were damaged. Here the simple farmers stated that Polish terrorists forced many of them at gun's point to sign declarations of unknown content. It was assumed that these were "the petitions" to the Hungarian Government to incorporate Carpatho-Ukraine with Hungary. In the villages of Geregovyshche, Synevirs'ka Polyana and Chorna Rika the expedition inspected the spots of the fight between Polish terrorists and the Carpatho-Ukrainian Frontier Guard. Here, the expedition had an opportunity to hear testimonies of several men who were taken by the Poles to Osmoloda, some 20 kilometers inside the Polish State, and questioned in the headquarters of the irregulars. These men, too, were forced to sign some kind of declarations.

[86] *Nova Svoboda,* November 25, 1938. Also see *DGFP,* D, IV, footnote to Doc. 140, p. 170.

After his one week visit in Carpatho-Ukraine, Dr. H. Hofmann made an extensive report to the Reich Foreign Minister on his mission. This report might have been read even by Hitler since he had ordered that "every detail of the 'Hungarian incident' was to be reported" to him. In his telegraphic preliminary report,[87] Dr. H. Hofmann stated among other things:

> Complete calm in Carpatho-Ukraine with the exception of attacks by Polish terrorists on the northern frontier, which still continue. Mobilization still in force... Several large bands of Polish terrorists are said to be concentrated on the frontier...
>
> No foundation for reported existence of Carpatho-Ukrainian terrorists. Home defense organization, Sitsch, is only in elementary stage and not yet in possession of firearms...
>
> Morale among the consciously Ukrainian population is good; they see in Germany a powerful ally who will help them in solving their internal problems. Even among that part of the population which is not consciously Ukrainian a decline in sympathy toward Hungary had been noted as a result of the proposed revision of her action in the occupied area. A plebiscite for union with Hungary would now have only a small chance of success.
>
> No signs of food shortage; food supply for the population, according to data from Carpatho-Ukrainian Government and the Czech military authorities, almost completely assured for the winter...
>
> Chief economic problem lies in the cutting off by Hungary of transit traffic, which, above all, renders impossible transport into and through the territory of Czechoslovakia. Carpatho-Ukraine Government regards this as a violation of the Vienna Award.
>
> Lorries are only means of transport from Prešov; roads are already under construction, including the Uzhhorod and Munkatsch bypasses. Freight traffic is maintained by military lorries; no rise of prices is ascertainable in the different districts, in contrast to the territory ceded to Hungary.
>
> To sum up: "Carpatho-Ukraine is viable, especially if foreign help is available for reconstruction. Prerequisite for this is stability of frontier and also restoration of internal security.[88]

This report actually denied Polish and Hungarian propaganda in international diplomatic circles and the press agencies about apparent mass famine, terrorism of the "Carpathian Sitch" in the country, and the desire of the majority of the Carpatho-Ukrainian population to be united with Hungary. Herr Hofmann's official visit in Carpatho-Ukraine as well as his statements on several occasions about the "great sympathy" of the Führer for the Ukrainian people

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[87] The announced written extensive report is not available among the published documents.

[88] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 140.

and the recent German-Italian *démarche* in Budapest increased hope in responsible Carpatho-Ukrainian circles as to the permanency of the existing Vienna Award frontier. In international circles, on the other hand, German behavior gave reason to believe in German intentions to solve the Ukrainian question in general. This question was broadly discussed at that time in London, Paris, Rome, Washington, Warsaw, Bucharest, Moscow, and many other capitals.[89] In those capitals which were still interested in the destruction of Russian Bolshevism and imperialism these intentions were received with considerable sympathy. There were even some circles among the Poles that proposed revision of the Polish policy in the Ukrainian problem.[90]

It is true that only the German-Italian intervention in Budapest prevented the Hungarian attack on Carpatho-Ukraine backed by the Polish terrorist activities in the northern parts of the country. In case of an attack, the Hungarian army would have faced the resistance of the military forces of the Federation of the Czechs, Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians. At that time, Carpatho-Ukraine had no organized defense forces of her own and could do even less than she did in March 1939.

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[89] For the discussion of the Ukrainian question in British and French diplomatic circles see *British Documents,* Third Series, Vol. III, Docs. 142, 221, 226, 325, 403, 434, 526, 529 and 541; and Volume IV, Docs. 23, 24, 37, 38, 40, 62, 69, 74, 76, 83, 97, 100, 181 and 195. For the German talks with the Polish, Rumanian, and other diplomats as well as for the reports of the German diplomats from various capitals, including London, Paris, Moscow, and Warsaw, see *DGFP,* Series D, Vol. I, Doc. 627; Vol. IV, Docs. 118, 286, 367 and 493; and Vol. V, Docs. 67, 76, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 103, 104, 108, 112, 113, 119, 120, 121, 125, and 126; Volume VI, Docs. 61, 73, 99, 211, 234, 296, 300, 420, 441, 452, 729, 754, 763 and 784; and Volume VIII, Docs. 46, 57, 70, 80, 109, 122, 137, 152, 158 and 193. For the discussion between the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, and the Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, see Malcolm Maggeridge, *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers* (London, 1948), pp. 259-266. Also see press reports and articles in periodicals, especially in the period between November-December 1938 and January 1939.

[90] See *Polityka* (Warsaw), December 10, 1938. *Kurjer Polski* (Warsaw), November 26, 1938, stated: "One has to admit that the Polish-Hungarian frontier was not established and that Poland has to bear all expence of that undertaking. Poland pays for it with the worsening of the Polish-Czech relations, with the tension of her relations with Rumania and the increasingly diminished confidence of the Western European countries in Poland. At the same time, Poland won nothing." *Polska Zbrojna* (Warsaw), December 23, 1938, complained that the Polish current policy resulted in a situation that even French press criticized the Polish activity in Carpatho-Ukraine.

Neither the Hungarians nor the Poles gave up hope for the establishment of their common frontier after their first attempt to occupy Carpatho-Ukraine by force on November 21, 1938, was prevented by the common action of Germany and Italy. The German Ambassador in Warsaw, Hans G. von Moltke, on November 24th, told Sir Howard Kennard, the British Ambassador in Poland, that the Polish activity in Carpatho-Ukrainian question had diminished at the moment but added at the same time that he had an impression that "it will be revived in the future."[91] Two days later, Sir H. Kennard reported again to Viscount Halifax that the "Ruthene question is still not regarded as settled"[92] by Polish governmental circles, and the Polish press continued to demand common Polish-Hungarian frontier. Also the activity of Polish and Hungarian irregulars was reported by him in December 1938.[93] Thus, it seems that at this time Poland took the initiative in the campaign against Carpatho-Ukraine.

As early as November 22, 1938, Sir G. Knox informed Viscount Halifax that under German-Italian pressure, the Hungarians decided to demobilize their army and to give up their intentions against Carpatho-Ukraine,[94] at least for the time being. Also the Hungarian Minister in Rome, F. Villani, informed Count Ciano that "Hungary has suspended all action in Ruthenia."[95] He also informed the Italian Foreign Minister that soon Kálmán de Kánya would be replaced by Count István Csáky because it was he who was responsible for the preparation of the Carpatho-Ukrainian incident and "the anti-Magyar attitude adopted by many Germans."[96] Although the Hungarian press and radio propaganda against Carpatho-Ukraine did not stop entirely, its itensity considerably diminished.[97] Thus, there

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[91] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 276.

[92] *Ibid.*, Doc. 381.

[93] *Ibid.*, Doc. 416.

[94] *Ibid.*, Doc. 272.

[95] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38*, p. 198.

[96] *Ibid.*, pp. 197-199. Two days after the joint German-Italian *démarche* in Budapest, on November 23, 1938, after a debate in the Parliament, Hungarian Prime Minister Béla Imrédy resigned but the Regent asked him to form another Cabinet in which Count Csáky was appointed the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[97] The Head of the Carpatho-Ukrainian delegation to the Hungarian-Czechoslovak Delimitation Commission, Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, reported that between November 2 and 25, 1938, almost all Hungarian newspapers attacked Carpatho-Ukraine and did spread some false statements. He was busy translating these articles into various languages and the Czecho-Slovak Minister in

was created some basis for a hope of stabilizing the relations on the basis of the Vienna Award.

The negotiations between the Carpatho-Ukrainian and Hungarian delegations in the Delimitation Commission were proceeding very slowly. For instance, it took six weeks to reach an agreement regarding the opening of the passenger transitory traffic between Chornyy Ardiv through Khust and Kostelany to Prague,[98] which was to open on January 13, 1939. Another mutual agreement was reached concerning mutual amnesty of political prisoners[99] which was primarily in the interest of the Hungarians. The work of the Commission was interrupted several times because of frontier incidents, like those in Slanec on the Slovak-Hungarian frontier or near Mukachiv on the Ukrainian-Hungarian frontier. Despite the existing difficulties, the head of the Carpatho-Ukrainian delegation, Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, expressed his certainty at the end of January, 1939, that all questions connected with the definite establishment of the Vienna Award frontier would be done by May 1, 1939. These assurances, based on a belief in the validity of the international guarantee of the new frontier, created a basis for optimism in Carpatho-Ukraine.

The attitude of the official and semi-official German circles, active support by Rumania, British and French pledges to guarantee

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Budapest, Dr. Miloš Kobr, *démarched* almost every day in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. These attacks diminished after the visit of Count Ciano to Budapest (from December 19-22, 1938). See Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, "Pratsya Delimitatsiynoyi Komisiyi," *Nova Svoboda,* January 14, 26 and 31, 1939.

[98] The negotiations on this single problem lasted in the special sub-Committee from November 2 to December 21, 1938. Since Rumania was directly interested in this transit, she sent her representatives, too, to Budapest who negotiated on this particular problem with the Hungarians. The Carpatho-Ukrainian members of the Hungarian-Czechoslovak Delimitation Commission were: Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, Head, and Dr. Edmund Bachynskiy, Ivan Rohach and Dr. Mykola Dolynay. See Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, "Pratsya Delimitatsiynoyi Komisiyi," *Nova Svoboda,* January 14, 16 and 31, 1939.

[99] Actually, there were no Carpatho-Ukrainians who were engaged in the anti-State activity within the Kingdom of Hungary. Most of the anti-Hungarian activists left the ceded territory, except the local farmers who remained in their villages. On the other hand, several hundreds of the Hungarian terrorists who were caught in Carpatho-Ukraine were set free on the basis of an agreement reached in the Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission on December 23, 1938, and enforced in Carpatho-Ukraine by a decree of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government of January 4, 1939. See "Oholoshenya chyslo 1246 Prez. 1938 Ministerstva Vnutrishnikh Sprav u Khusti," *Nova Svoboda,* January 4, 1939.

the new frontier as well as the sympathy of the Holy See expressed through the sending of the Apostolic Delegate in the person of Most Reverend Dionysiy Nyaradiy, Bishop of Kryževci (in Yugoslavia), to Khust in less than two weeks after the Vienna Award,[100] morally supported the Carpatho-Ukrainians in their struggle for maintaining the *status quo*.

During his stay in Vienna, on the occasion of the German-Italian arbitration concerning the new frontier between Hungary and Carpatho-Ukraine, Prime Minister Msgr. A. Voloshyn was assured by the Reich Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, that Germany would support Carpatho-Ukraine not only politically but also economically.[101] And, soon after the report of Dr. H. Hofmann reached Berlin, the Reich Foreign Ministry invited the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government to send a delegation to Berlin for economic negotiations. The Minister of Public Works, Communications and Social Welfare, Yuliyan Revay, accompanied by Ministerial Counselor Vasyl' Tegze and Dr. Volodymyr Komaryns'kyy, arrived in Berlin at the beginning of December 1938. As a result of their negotiations with the German delegation headed by State Secretary Wilhelm Keppler, on December 7, 1938, an agreement was signed between Germany and Carpatho-Ukraine concerning economic co-operation, especially in the production of timber, hides, wool, and corn, the construction of railways and roads, the conservation of forests, and the building of a suitable capital city for Carpatho-Ukraine. A special agreement was signed concerning the exploitation of the mineral resources of Carpatho-Ukraine by German firms.[102]

Two German geological missions were sent to Carpatho-Ukraine to search for oil and iron ore. Their work did not develop beyond the preparatory stage. On the other hand, a three-way trade agreement was under discussion under which Rumania would increase her imports from Germany, and for the balance over her exports to Germany she would deliver food-stuffs to Carpatho-Ukraine to cover the Carpatho-Ukrainian export balance of raw materials to Germany over her imports of machinery and technical implements from Germany.[103] Great political significance was attributed to these

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[100] For the text of the nominating letter see *Nova Svoboda,* December 6, 1938. The nomination was issued on November 15th, and the Bishop arrived at Khust few days later.

[101] "Interview z o. A. Voloshynom," *Nova Svoboda,* November 11, 1938.

[102] *DGFP,* D, IV, Doc. 146.

[103] Michael Winch, *Republic For A Day* (London, 1939), pp. 160-162.



Bishop Dionysiy Nyaradiy

economic agreements and talks not only in Carpatho-Ukraine, but also in Budapest and Warsaw as well as in London and other capitals.[104] Minister Yuliyan Revay as well as those German supporters of the Ukrainian cause[105] who arranged those negotiations in Berlin confidentially admitted that the signed agreements were aiming more at political demonstrations than at their economic value.[106] Leading German papers maintained their representatives at Khust and reported extensively on the Carpatho-Ukrainian events. The presence of Dr. Peter Kleist, a member of Ribbentrop's Bureau of the NSDAP for Foreign Affairs[107] at Khust, before the establishment of the German Consulate in Carpatho-Ukraine was regarded much more than mere representation of the *Völkischer Beobachter*. Political significance was attached to it by the Ukrainians as well as by the foreign journalists in Carpatho-Ukraine.

After Rumania sent her Consul General, in the person of the Secretary of Legation, Alexander Scradianu, to the capital of Carpatho-Ukraine on December 14, 1938,[108] Germany established her Consulate at Khust on February 8, 1939, with Walter Splettstrasser

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[104] *British Documents*, Third Series, Vol. III, Doc. 416.

[105] According to Volodymyr P. Stakhiv, Director of the Ukrainian Press Service in Berlin, an agency which played the role of the mouthpiece of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, there were two factions among the influential Germans with regard to the Ukrainian problem. The most important pro-Ukrainian group was in the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht; especially Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, General Lahousen, Colonel Stolze, and Major Dering; in the Reich Foreign Ministry: von Stechow, von Altenburg, Schliep, and Mayer-Heidenhagen. In special cases also Alfred Rosenberg (NSDAP) was used to influence Adolf Hitler, who together with Joachim von Ribbentrop, Ernst von Weizsäcker and Ernst Woermann had no genuine sympathy for the Ukrainian struggle for independence. They were using, however, this problem for their own purposes. See V. P. Stakhiv, "Pochalosya v Uzhhorodi a zakinchylosya v Marmoroshskomu Syhoti," *Visti Bratstva kol. Voyakiv 1 UD UNA* (Munich, Germany), Vol. VI, No. 1-2 (51-52).

[106] V. P. Stakhiv, *Op. Cit.*, p. 8.

[107] Before Joachim von Ribbentrop became the Reich Foreign Minister in February 1938, he was Chief of the Bureau for Foreign Affairs of the National Socialist German Labor Party (NSDAP). This Nazi Party Bureau was not liquidated even after Ribbentrop became the Reich Foreign Minister. He also remained in charge of that Bureau. This gave him an opportunity to deal with the Foreign Affairs along two lines. The Reich Foreign Ministry represented the official line of the foreign policy, while the Party line was used in certain cases where the use or commitments along the official line was for some reason undesirable.

[108] *Nova Svoboda*, December 18, 1938.

in charge.[109] Since the Reich Government sent its Consul to L'viv, the capital of Western Ukraine, at the same time, this fact gave another cause for speculation about the immediacy of the Ukrainian problem in German plans. The day of the arrival of the German Consul in Khust, a German-Ukrainian Cultural Society headed by Fedir Revay was founded[110] and on February 9, 1939, the Carpatho-Ukrainian Society to Combat Communism headed by Yuriy Perevuznyk was also formed.[111] Both these groups were to cooperate with the Germans in their fields of interests hoping in that way to secure German support for the Ukrainian cause.

On the other hand, there were influential circles in Carpatho-Ukrainian politics which warned against falling into the one track policy, namely against uncritical hope for German help and friendship. An editorial of *Nastup,* the official organ of the "Carpathian Sitch," edited by Dr. Stepan Rosokha, strongly criticized those elements in Carpatho-Ukraine who became blind Germanophiles after Germany had saved Carpatho-Ukraine at the Vienna Arbitration Conference and then again in November 1938 from Hungarian occupation. The editorial expressed its dissatisfaction about the fact that some of these people saw

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[109] *Nova Svoboda,* February 10, 1939.

[110] The aim of the Society as defined in its constitution was: "To promote knowledge about each other's cultures of the two great nations; to promote, support and mediate in all cultural, economic and social affairs of the Ukrainian and German peoples." On the motion of Andriy Voron, the Secretary General of the Ukrainian National Union, Officers of the Society were elected as follows: Fedir Revay, President; Anton Ernst Oldofredi, first Vice-President; Prof. Avhustyn Shtefan, second Vice-President; Dr. Volodymyr Komaryns'kyy, Secretary General; Ivan Roman, Recording Secretary; and Herr Berger, Treasurer. Other members of the Presidium: a) Ukrainians — Dmytro Klempush, Mykola Babota and Mykhaylo Tulyk; b) Germans — Johann Thomas, Joseph Gerhardt and Hans Fieldler. The Auditors: Andriy Voron and Herr Bertnik. On the motion of A. E. Oldofredi, the Honorary Presidium was elected consisting of Msgr. A. Voloshyn, Yuliyan Revay and Franz Karmasin. See *Nova Svoboda,* February 11, 1939.

[111] The following members of the Executive Board were elected: Yuriy Perevuznyk, President; Dr. Mykola Dolynay, Vice-President; Yuliyan Khymynets', Secretary; Ivan Koperlos, Treasurer, Vasyl' Kuzmyk, Director of Information, and Ivan Hryts', member of the Executive Board. The Auditors: Madame Irena Nevyts'ka and Vasyl' Chaplya. Among some 200 participants at this founding meeting were also present: German Consul Walter Splettstrasser, Dr. Peter Kleist of the Ribbentrop's Bureau, State Secretary in the autonomous Slovak Government Franz Karmasin, and Under State Secretary Anton E. Oldofredi. They were present as guests. See *Nova Svoboda,* February 14, 1939.

in Hitler a greater Ukrainian than in themselves or in anyone other Ukrainian out of their forty-five million... They are ready to believe in Germany to such an extent that if all of us would do so and Germany would be certain about it, she would not respect us at all. Because in this world only those people are respected who clearly understand their independent interests and are aware of their value.

The editorial called for an independent policy. Turning to the problem of necessity to cooperate with the Western Democracies the editorial continued:

> We should have in mind that England is a natural enemy of Moscow and does see that the Greater Ukrainian State will be re-established in the near future. England follows the developments in Carpatho-Ukraine with great interest. In our relations with the Englishmen we must stress that the destruction of the Soviets might result in a situation contrary to English desires, if England would not have understanding for the ways of the liberation of Ukraine. We should aim at English investments here... Our concept of the foreign policy must embrace wholeness of the world situation and we must have our own view on all problems and our own political line regarding all nations and states.[112]

And, indeed, less than two weeks after the Vienna Arbitration, on November 14, 1938, question of the guarantee of the new frontier between Hungary and Carpatho-Ukraine was already raised in the House of Commons by the Conservative Member of the Parliament, Vivien Adams, and the Liberal Sir Archibald Sinclair. Honorable Vivien Adams used this opportunity to call the attention of the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, to the fact that the Vienna Award violated the ethnic principle in Carpatho-Ukraine, detaching from her Uzhhorod and Mukachiv, both with Hungarian minorities.[113] On November 28, 1938, Sir Percy Harris raised the question with the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons as to what steps were taken by the British Government against Polish plans to invade Carpatho-Ukraine, and on November 30th Robert J. Davis, as well as Commander Fletcher on December 1, 1938, asked the Prime Minister what was done by His Majesty's Government in order to stop the attacks on the peaceful Carpatho-Ukrainian population by the terrorists from abroad.[114] The British press was intensively reporting events in Carpatho-Ukraine. Well known British

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[112] "Nasha zakordonna polityka," *Nastup* (Khust), December 11, 1938.
[113] *Nova Svoboda*, November 30, 1938.
[114] *Nova Svoboda*, December 13, 1938.

scholar, C. A. Macartney, was lecturing on radio[115] and publishing articles about Carpatho-Ukraine. Professor Seton-Watson offered his aid to Prime Minister Msgr. A. Voloshyn and his Cabinet.[116] Thus, the British public was not indifferent to the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine, and neither was the Government. In January 1939, a Laborite Member of the Parliament, Colonel Wedgewood-Benn, visited Carpatho-Ukraine and held conversations with Ukrainian political circles at Khust. Colonel Wedgewood-Benn had been interested in the Ukrainian struggle for freedom for many years and was in direct contact with the Leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Colonel Yevhen Konovalets', for years.[117] He also visited Western Ukraine under Polish rule and was received by Metropolitan Count Andriy Sheptyts'kyy in L'viv. He also held informative talks with Vasyl' Mudryy, the leader of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation in the Polish Parliament. The Conservative *Daily Mail* and the Liberal *News Chronicle* maintained their permanent correspondents at Khust who observed and reported all important events.

Active support of Carpatho-Ukraine by Ukrainians under the Polish rule and their intensified demands for autonomy made Poland more interested in the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary than the Hungarians themselves. On December 3, 1938, the Deputy Speaker of the Polish Parliament, Vasyl' Mudryy, initiated discussion regarding the autonomy of the Ukrainian provinces of Halychyna and Volyň within the Polish State, and on December 9, 1938, a bill outlining the autonomous rights and privileges of the Ukrainians within the Polish State similar to those established in Carpatho-Ukraine was introduced by 15 Ukrainian deputies in the Polish Parliament.[118] The Bill was flatly rejected by the Polish majority, and the Polish anti-Ukrainian activity was intensified.

POLISH-RUSSIAN ACTION AGAINST INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE

Because of intensive discussions of the possibility of German intervention in the Ukrainian question, both Poland and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics were directly concerned, and they looked for an improvement of their mutual relations which had de-

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[115] *The Listener* (London), November 10, 1938.
[116] *Nova Svoboda*, December 3, 1938.
[117] V. P. Stakhiv, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. VI, No 5 — 6 (55-56).
[118] *The New York Times*, December 11, 1938.

terriorated rapidly during the September crisis because of their differences regarding Czecho-Slovakia. Here, Poland also took the initiative, and as a result of the negotiations between the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim M. Litvinov, and the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Grzybowski, on November 26, 1938, a Soviet-Polish communiqué reaffirmed the validity of the Polish-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression dated July 25, 1932, and extended in May 1934 for a period ending December 31, 1945. The communiqué stated that there had been created "a basis wide enough to guarantee the inviolability of peaceful relations between the two States."[119] The German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, reported at the beginning of December 1938 that

> it was doubtless primarily the fear of a steadily growing Germany which prompted the Soviet Union to improve her relations with Poland, which had become more and more hostile in the years since 1934. She believes that Poland, too, has an interest in improving relations with the Soviet Union in order to obtain backing against Germany... Czechoslovakia is viewed here as a German satellite which is to serve as the springboard for the subsequent advance of Germany in the direction of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has lost every interest in Czechoslovakia, since the latter can no longer serve as a barrier to a German attack. The Carpatho-Ukraine under German influence appears a major threat to the Soviet Union as a crystallizing point for a Ukrainian independent movement. On this issue, too, the Soviet Union believes she has the same interest as Poland.[120]

The Ukrainian political circles in Khust also interpreted the Soviet-Polish communiqué as aiming at closer Soviet-Polish cooperation against the Ukrainian Independence Movement. Special emphasis was put upon the fact that

> Poland wants to continue her terroristic activity against Carpatho-Ukraine, therefore she looks for help from Bolshevik Moscow which fears the Ukrainian struggle for freedom within her own boundaries and for that reason she aims to continue to share the oppression of Ukraine with Poland.[121]

On December 9, 1938, Sir Howard Kennard reported to Viscount Halifax about the continuation of "Polish and Hungarian activity" in

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[119] Ann Su Cardwell, *Poland and Russia: The Last Quarter Century* (New York, 1944), p. 33.

[120] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 108.

[121] *Nastup* (Khust), December 4, 1938. *The Daily Express* (London), December 8, 1938, reported that the Soviet Russian authorities arrested in the recent few days 63 officers, including three Generals of the Red Army accusing them of preparing a revolt aiming at the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State.

Carpatho-Ukraine because the country was regarded by the Poles "as a potential bridgehead for German expansion to or unsettlement of the Ukrainian provinces" of Poland and the USSR. Therefore, he informed his Government: "Polish Government still aims at common Polish-Hungarian frontier as protection against this."[122]

After a conversation with the Polish Foreign Minister on the same day, the British Ambassador communicated to the British State Secretary for Foreign Affairs that Colonel Józef Beck had informed him of the content of his note delivered recently to the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister. Poland demanded an improvement of the communications "across Czechoslovakia from Poland to the south both by land and air" and especially stressed "the necessity for controlling the activities of Ukrainian terrorists in Ruthenia and other parts of Czechoslovakia which might give rise to serious difficulties in the future."[123] Similar Polish presentation was made at Prague on December 16, 1938, repeating again that "the anti-Polish Ukrainian activity in Carpatho-Ukraine might harm the relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia."[124] This was the beginning of a series of *démarches*.

On December 14, 1938, the Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Alexandrovskiy, handed a note to the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, Dr. F. Chvalkovský, complaining about "a systematic Czech propaganda for the creation of an independent Greater Ukrainian State" declaring that this is to be qualified as "an interference of Czecho-Slovakia with the internal affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."[125] Commenting on the Polish and Soviet *démarches* in Prague, the Polish daily in L'viv, *Słowo Narodowe*, on December 20, 1938, admitted that "at present Poland and the Soviet Union are in a united front as far as the Ukrainian question was concerned." Polish-Soviet cooperation in this direction was continued, and on January 14, 1939, the Government of the USSR again protested in Prague against "the Ukrainian intrigues" in Carpatho-Ukraine and an attempt to or-

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[122] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 416.

[123] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 418.

[124] *A-Zet* (Prague), December 17, 1938.

[125] *A-Zet* (Prague), December 15, 1938. This Czech daily of December 8, 1938, published an article written by Zdeněk Hruška, entitled "Ukrajinci — národ na kříži: Boj 45 milionů za samostátnost" (The Ukrainians — a crucified nation: Struggle of 45 million people for independence). This article was translated in various languages and reprinted or quoted in many leading papers in the world.

ganize there an Ukrainian Army for subversive purposes.[126] Otherwise, the leadership in the field was left to the Poles.

GERMAN OFFER TO POLAND: UKRAINE FOR DANZIG

While Joachim von Ribbentrop at Berlin discussed with the Polish Ambassador, Józef Lipski, German claims to Danzig and the Corridor, on December 15, 1938, Herr von Moltke was ready to report to the Reich Foreign Minister about his talk with the Polish Foreign Minister on the same problem as well as on the question of common Polish-Hungarian frontier. On the 14th of December, Colonel Beck took a step ahead and, admitting that the Carpatho-Ukrainian question "had evoked a certain excitement" in Polish public opinion, he stated openly that

> the Polish public feared that Germany interested to pursue an anti-Polish policy operating from Carpatho-Ukraine, and in Germany it was suspected that Poland desires to erect a barrier against natural German expansion in the Danube region. The latter suspicion was entirely false and he hoped that the former, too, was incorrect.[127]

On this occasion Colonel Józef Beck stated that "it would be well to discuss these things sometime" and five days later he declared his desire to visit Germany soon.

Colonel Beck was received by Adolf Hitler at Berchtesgaden on January 5, 1939, and continued talks with Joachim von Ribbentrop the next day. The subject under discussion was the situation of German minority in Poland, and the Danzig and Corridor questions, but the Ukrainian question actually became the leading topic of these conversations. We read in the memorandum prepared on January 2, 1938, by State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker outlining the aims of the talks between Hitler and Beck the following: "To get Poland to commit herself in this conversation as regards other points of our eastern policy will probably prove to be premature."[128]

In his introductory remarks in the conversation with Adolf Hitler in the presence of Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Ambassador in Warsaw Hans G. von Moltke, Polish Ambassador in Berlin Józef Lipski, and Polish Legation Counsellor Lubieński, the Polish Foreign

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[126] *A-Zet* (Prague), January 15, 1939.

[127] *DGFP*, D. V, Doc. 113. German Ambassador H. G. von Moltke for the first time complained about the treatment of the German minority in the newly annexed Teschen region by the Poles. He stated that the German population "had gradually come to view the 20 years under Czech domination as a paradise in comparison with the present conditions" under the Poles.

[128] *DGFP*, D, V, footnote No. 3 on p. 152.

Minister expressed his anxiety about the declining of high level Polish-German relations established during the September crisis and his wish to make a mutual effort to eliminate the cause of these differences. One of these causes was the Danzig question in which the League of Nations was also interested, and the other was the Carpatho-Ukrainian question. Referring to Pilsudski's fear of the "Balkanization of Central Europe," Colonel Józef Beck stated that

> in the agitators, who were active in the present Carpatho-Ukrainian territory, Poland recognized old enemies and feared that the Carpatho-Ukraine might some day develop into such a seat of unrest for Poland that the Polish Government would find itself called upon to intervene, and from this further complications might then arise. This was the main reason why Poland had been striving for a common frontier with Hungary.[129]

Hitler told Beck that he was prepared to liquidate Czecho-Slovakia at the end of September 1938 but "Chamberlain's and Daladier's surprising offer to negotiate" prevented him from the "purely political solution of the Czechoslovak question" which would have consisted "in a settlement to be arranged exclusively between Poland, Hungary, and Germany as the only interested powers, that is, in the liquidation of Czechoslovakia." Under those conditions, Hitler stated further, "the only solution that he could justify before the world was the ethnographic in contrast to the political." As far as the Hungarian claims were concerned, Germany had very reluctantly acceded to the request of arbitration and had finally done so only after assurances had been received from both states involved, Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, that the award would be accepted. Then, shortly thereafter, the Hungarians "suddenly declared that they now must demand still larger parts of the Ukraine and had thereby placed the arbitral powers in a difficult position." Referring to the November attempt to occupy Carpatho-Ukraine by force, Hitler stated that "it was naturally impossible so shortly after Vienna to revise the result arrived at there." He assured, however, the Polish Foreign Minister that "it was clear that in the future, too, such solutions could never take place unilaterally; rather all countries interested in Czechoslovakia would participate therein."[130] Thus, Hitler made it clear that he did not regard the Czecho-Slovak question as settled and gave hope to the Poles and Hungarians that under certain circumstances they would be allowed to participate in the final liquida-

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[129] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 119.
[130] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 119.

tion of Czecho-Slovakia. Thus, their desire for establishment of a common frontier might eventually be fulfilled.

Herr von Ribbentrop, too, admitted the possibility of a revision of the German position with regard to Carpatho-Ukraine in his conversation with Colonel Beck the next day. Although at the present "the Vienna Award must be adhered to" but the German basic position was that "if other wishes somehow emerged here, they must be brought into accord with German interests." Switching to the Ukrainian question in general, Joachim von Ribbentrop assured Józef Beck that the Germans

> were interested in the Soviet-Russian Ukraine only to the extent that we inflicted damage on Russia everywhere we could, just as she did on us; therefore we naturally kept up constant relations with the Russian Ukraine. But we had never operated in any way with the Polish Ukrainians; this had always been strictly avoided. The Führer had explained our negative attitude regarding a Greater Ukraine. The evil seemed to me to lie in the fact that naturally anti-Russian agitation in the Ukraine always had certain effects on the Polish minority and the Ukrainians in the Carpatho-Ukraine. In my opinion, however, this could be changed only if Poland and we would work together in every respect in the Ukrainian question. I could imagine that in the course of a general, generous settlement of all problems between Poland and us we might very well be moved to regard the Ukrainian question as covered by a special Polish prerogative and to support Poland in every way in dealing with this question.[131]

The Polish Foreign Minister affirmed that Polish aspirations toward Ukraine "were doubtless still alive today" but after von Ribbentrop inquired about the possibility of Polish adherence to the Anti-Commintern Pact and a "more pronounced anti-Russian attitude on the part of Poland, since otherwise there would be no question of any mutual interest" between Poland and Germany, Colonel Beck offered to think it over, and invited Joachim von Ribbentrop to visit Warsaw to continue the conversations.[132] On the occasion of Herr von

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[131] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 120. As early as in January 1935, Adolf Hitler made his first approach to the Poles suggesting a joint attack by Germany and Poland on the USSR. At the hunting lodge at Bialowieza, where he was a guest, and in Warsaw the Reich Marshal, Hermann Göring, was "very outspoken" in his conversations. In his talks with Polish generals he outlined far-reaching plans. He gave it to be understood that Ukraine would become a Polish sphere of influence. See Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Official documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet relations, 1933-1939* (London, 1940), Doc. 16. Hereafter cited as: *The Polish White Book*.

[132] While the world press was broadly reporting on Hitler's designs regarding Ukraine, German diplomats tried to reach an agreement with the USSR

Ribbentrop's visit to Warsaw on January 26, 1939, Colonel Józef Beck "categorically rejected" the German program including Danzig and the Corridor questions[133] but re-affirmed the fact that "Poland had aspirations directed toward the Soviet Ukraine and a connection with the Black Sea." At the same time, however, he expressed his fear that "a treaty with Germany directed against the Soviet Union" would put Poland in a dangerous situation. Thus, the Ribbentrop-Beck conversation did not lead to satisfactory results for either party. When the German offers were rejected by Poland, Germany decided to keep the Carpatho-Ukrainian question still open but excluded further participation of Poland in its "settlement."

Nevertheless, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Arciszewski, stated to the British Ambassador, Sir Howard Kennard, on February 6, 1939, that "Poland still hoped to secure a common frontier" with Hungary and assured him that German interest in Carpatho-Ukraine had diminished and that "it was now felt" in Warsaw that "there was no danger of a German drive" in the direction of Ukraine in the near future.[134]

SECOND ATTEMPT OF INVASION ON ELECTION SUNDAY

The Hungarians proved to be more realistic. Count Ciano's visit in Hungary, December 19-22, 1938, helped to shape the future Hungarian foreign policy, assuring the Hungarians that Italy "will never permit Germany to act toward Hungary as she acted over Austria" but urging them that "nothing must be done which might take on an anti-German flavour."[135] The Italian Foreign Minister also urged the Regent of Hungary to adopt a more moderate policy toward Rumania after Horthy spoke to him openly "of a possible attack on Rumania." The Carpatho-Ukrainian press noted with satisfaction that after this visit the Hungarians diminished the intensity of their anti-Carpatho-Ukrainian activities.

There was, however, no reason for a long-lasting joy in Khust. Just before certain agreements between the Hungarians and Ukrain-

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on the questions "disturbing German-Soviet relations." German initiative was taken as early as October 26, 1938, in Moscow, and the following negotiations resulted in the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, and following agreements concerning the spheres of influence, etc.

[133] *The Polish White Book,* Document 52.

[134] *British Documents,* Third Series, IV, Doc. 83.

[135] *Ciano's Diary, 1937-38,* pp. 206 — 208.

ians in the Delimitation Commission were to be enforced[136] on January 6, 1939, the Hungarian irregulars provoked an incident near Mukachiv in which later on regular military forces of Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia also participated using tanks and artillery. While Hungarian, Polish, and Italian radio commentators blamed "the Ukrainian terrorists" for the incident,[137] Count Ciano noted on January 6, 1939, in his diary that the Duce was concerned "with the Czech-Hungarian frontier incidents. This time it seems they have reached more serious proportions than usual. I have direct news which the Italian Legation has not yet received."[138] After several notes between the Governments of Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary were exchanged blaming each other for the incident, Count Ciano wrote about the incident in his diary this:

> From the information we now have, it is clear that not all responsibility for the frontier clashes between the Hungarians and the Czechs is on the side of Prague. On the contrary. The Hungarian attitude is not so good. From the beginning they tried to sabotage the Vienna arbitration. This is stupid politics, since it irritates both us and Germany and certainly cannot modify the situation.[139]

While the diplomats were exchanging official notes, the very next day, on January 7, 1939, Christmas Day in Carpatho-Ukraine, new frontier clashes occurred. This time near Uzhhorod. There was an attack on the village of Dovhe in Carpatho-Ukraine. The shooting lasted from 2 to 6 a.m. on the 8th of January. Thus, the Czecho-Slovak protest note delivered to the Hungarian Government listed 18 incidents in which Hungarian irregulars and regular military forces crossed the Carpatho-Ukrainian frontier since the cession of territories alloted to Hungary by the Vienna arbitration.[140]

After these incidents, the Italian Foreign Minister urged the Hungarian Government "to stay in line and to abstain from provoking incidents" for which he would not assume responsibility

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[136] It was agreed that the slow trains would start to operate between Sevlyush and Slovakia passing the ceded territory. The first train was to pass on January 9, 1939.

[137] Yevhen Onats'kyy, "Karpats'ka Ukrayina" in Ye. Onats'kyy, ed., *Kalendar-Almanakh na 1952 rik "Vidrodzhenya"* (Buenos Aires, 1951), pp. 33-73.

[138] Hugh Gibson, ed., *The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943* (Garden City, N.Y., 1946), pp. 6-7. Hereafter cited as: *Ciano's Diaries, 1939-43*.

[139] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[140] *Nova Svoboda,* January 12, 1939. On December 21, 1938, in an attack on the village of Dovhe near Uzhhorod 4 Hungarian terrorists were killed on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine.

either for Italians or for Germans.[141] The Duce was also resentful about the Hungarian behavior. The incident was rectified by mutual agreement reached by the Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission at Budapest according to which both states forbade the appearance of armed civilians in the frontier zones on the territories of each State. However, after the elections to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet were announced, the frontier activity and the agitation of the Hungarian agents who crossed the frontiers increased immediately.

In accordance with a previous mutual agreement, prior to visiting Adolf Hitler, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count István Csáky, made a public statement that Hungary would join the Anti-Commintern Pact if invited.[142] This was done in accordance with the previous detailed discussion of the situation with Count Ciano and it paved a road for Csáky's talks with the Führer. Count Csáky in his introductory remarks to the one hour conversation with Adolf Hitler on January 16, 1939, stated that "the main purpose of his trip" to Berchtesgaden was to convey the word of Regent Horthy to the Führer that "so long as he is at the head of affairs in Hungary, Germany can rely on Hungary as on the most sincere friend."[143] Then followed a long explanation made by Hitler why he acted in the affairs of Carpatho-Ukraine as he did and not otherwise. He expressed his dissatisfaction that after "95 to 98 percent of the Hungarian demands had been met" with his Foreign Minister's help at Vienna, the Hungarians are now talking "of the great, thousand-year-old Kingdom of Stephan" and added "he would be happy if these mistaken utterances in the Hungarian press would cease." Otherwise, he would feel obliged to present his territorial demands, those of the Greater German Reich, and in that way he "might correct" these Hungarian utterances "some day."[144] While Hitler

[141] *Ciano's Diaries, 1939-43*, p. 9.

[142] The invitation to join the Anti-Commintern Pact was extended to Hungary by the Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan on January 13, 1939. The protocol for Hungary's adherence was signed in Budapest on February 24, 1939. The Government of the USSR warned Hungary against the joining of the Pact before Csáky's official announcement of intention (January 11, 1939). When the USSR broke off her diplomatic relations with Hungary, Germany refused to show her solidarity with Hungary and turned down Hungarian suggestion that Germany withdrew her Ambassador from Moscow. German-Soviet secret negotiations were at that time already in an advanced stage of development.

[143] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 272.

[144] DGFP, D, V, Doc. 272. A few days before Count Csáky's visit with Adolf Hitler, on an invitation of the Vienna circles of the Wehrmacht, arrived

emphasized again and again the validity of the ethnographic principle accepted at Munich and Vienna, he added that as far as the future was concerned "one had to strive toward a politico-territorial solution, and Poland and Hungary would have to participate" in it. He even hinted that "between October and March nothing could really be done in Europe in a military way." Both agreed to look toward common actions in the future. In his conversation with Joachim von Ribbentrop, Count Csáky referred to the recent incidents near Mukachiv and stated that "if the Czechs should again fire on Hungarian territory with artillery, Hungary would be forced to fire back and would then perhaps not be able to refrain from advancing" into Carpatho-Ukraine. In reply to this the Reich Foreign Minister asked Count Csáky "to influence the Hungarian terrorists to stop making trouble along the new border" and added that Germany would never permit a unilateral solution of the Hungarian-Ukrainian boundary problem.[145] Joachim von Ribbentrop also informed Count Csáky about recent conversations with the Polish Foreign Minister and, as in the talks with the latter, he did not state that the Vienna arbitration was to be regarded as a permanent solution. On the other hand, he mentioned in both cases the possibility of a revision of the German position in this question, and wished to secure their cooperation. Thus, Csáky could regard his trip to Germany as successful in many respects.

After the Governments of Great Britain and France were seriously looking for the most effective way to implement the provisions of the Munich Agreement regarding the guarantee of the new Czecho-

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in Vienna a group of the members of the "Carpathian Sitch" headed by Supreme Commander Dmytro Klempush. It was agreed in Vienna that the whole affair should not be publicized until after their return to Khust, since neither Hitler nor Ribbentrop were informed about it. However, on the day of Count Csáky's arrival in Berlin, *Die Börsen Zeitung* published a little notice about the presence of the "Carpathian Sitch" delegation on German soil. Under State Secretary Luther together with the Legation Counsellor von Stumm handed over a clip with this news to Ribbentrop, who in turn presented it to Hitler. It is said that Hitler became furious, since he did not want to give reason for complaint to the Hungarians and Poles. The very next day, a telegram reached Vienna of the following wording: "The Sitch delegation must immediately return to Khust; otherwise, they would be brought to Bratislava under police escort." This actually ended the visit before it started. It is believed that Luther and Stumm purposely first inserted the news in the *Börsen Zeitung* in order to prevent the fulfillment of the plans in Vienna. See V. P. Stakhiv, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. VI, No. 3-4 (53-54), pp. 8-9.

[145] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 273.

Slovak frontiers, and Dr. F. Chvalkovský's visit with Hitler and talks with Ribbentrop striving to save as much of the independence of Czecho-Slovakia as possible,[146] on January 20, 1939, the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, Döme Sztójay, on the instruction of the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Csáky, informed the Reich Foreign Ministry that "the later Germany guarantees the present Czechoslovak border, the more agreeable for Hungary" it would be.[147]

On February 7th, just five days before the elections in Carpatho-Ukraine, Sztójay again inquired about German position on the guarantee question, "since Britain had envisaged a possible guarantee only after the final determination of the frontier." In this connection, the Hungarians wanted to know German opinion on the speed of the work of the Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission. State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker replied that "these British views were of no interest" to the Germans and added that "the only frontier guarantee for Czechoslovakia that could be effective or of consequence for her was a German one."[148] As far as the work of the Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission was concerned, Weizsäcker advised the Hungarians to proceed in a businesslike manner on the basis of the Vienna Award, without either slowing it down or speeding it up.

In the meantime, Hungarian military forces again were concentrating near the Carpatho-Ukrainian frontier. Finally, during the

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[146] *DGFP*, D, IV, Docs. 158 and 159. Chvalkovský's talks with Hitler on January 21, and with Ribbentrop on January 23, 1939, did not predict anything good for Czecho-Slovakia. Both German statesmen presented to him a new list of "grievances" in Czecho-Slovakia directed against the remaining German minority in Bohemia and Moravia. As an "untolerable" fact was regarded "the revival of the spirit of the Beneš's policy" there and the maintenance of an army of some 150,000 men while it would be suitable in the new situation an army of some 10,000 to 20,000 men. Chvalkovský, in his desperate position, asked Ribbentrop just to tell him what German desires are, and, in order to preserve the rest of the Republic, he was certain that his Government would accept. However, the Germans preferred not to state their desires, since the preparations for the liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia were in full process.

[147] *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 278.

[148] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 163. For the British "Note Verbale" of February 8, 1939, presented to the German Foreign Ministry see *British Documents*, Third Series, IV, Doc. 91; also see *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 164. For the German reply see *British Documents*, Third Series, IV, Doc. 171. Simultaneously, French Government addressed a similar note and received an identical answer, namely that the question of guarantee should be postponed until an improvement of Czecho-Slovakia's relations with the surrounding States will be reached.

last few days preceding Election Sunday, February 12, 1939, the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, Döme Sztójay, tried several times to get German consent for Hungarian action in Carpatho-Ukraine in the near future. On February 9th Sztójay informed Under State Secretary Günther Altenburg that

> according to reliable information, the Hungarian Government expected serious disturbances to break out in the Carpatho-Ukraine during the elections to be held on February 12, in which case the Hungarian Government might be forced to intervene for the protection of its own nationals.[149]

He asked, in accordance with a previous agreement, what would be Germany' attitude in such an eventuality. On the same day, Sztójay approached State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker on the same question and was "pressing for fresh decisions as to the disposal" of the Carpatho-Ukrainian problem. Herr von Weizsäcker informed the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, Bernardo Attolico, that he told the Hungarian Minister that "Budapest would be informed in good time when," in German opinion, "decisions were to be taken in that matter."[150] For the time being, he advised Sztójay that the Hungarian Government should simply keep to the Vienna Award.

After Sztójay approached Ernst von Weizsäcker for the second time "very insistently" and tried to persuade him of the necessity of "direct Hungarian intervention in the Carpatho-Ukraine" because "anti-Hungarian activities were going on there and an 'explosion' must even be expected very soon," German State Secretary warned the Hungarians against arbitrary action.[151] On the day of elections itself, Weizsäcker sent a telegram to Budapest in which he added to the warning against arbitrary action the following statement: "We particularly ask Hungary not to take any action today, election Sunday in the Carpatho-Ukraine, no matter how things develop today."[152] And, finally, Ernst von Weizsäcker called upon the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count István Csáky, personally by telephone, and Csáky assured Germany that "his Government would of course abide" by German advice. The Hungarian fear of an "explosion" in Carpatho-Ukraine was ill founded as the events them-

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149 *DGFP*, D, IV, footnote No. 1 on p. 208.
150 *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 165.
151 *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 167.
152 DGFP, D, IV, footnote No. 1 to Doc. 167, p. 209.

selves proved because no incidents were reported by foreign observers during the elections.[153]

It seems that Hungary wanted to prevent the elections to the first Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine, in the first place. The process of the elections and their results had proven that the Hungarian and Polish propaganda about "Ukrainian terror" and the "desire of the majority of population to unite with Hungary" were without foundation.

Thus, Germany for reasons of her own prevented a second Hungarian attempt to take over control in Carpatho-Ukraine by force. It is true that at that time there was tension between the Ukrainians and the Czechs, but they still were united against Hungarian aspirations, and the Czecho-Slovak army was not fully demobilized yet. The Hungarians would face a bitter resistance also by the "Carpathian Sitch" numbering at that time around 10,000 men. There was little doubt that in case of a Hungarian attack the Czechs would hesitate to arm the "Carpathian Sitch." Bloodshed was prevented by a few words of the German statesmen, whose words were backed by the strongest military force in the world at that time.

INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE NOT IMPLEMENTED

As a part of the Munich Agreement, a provision was included in the document according to which the four signatory powers, namely France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy took upon themselves an obligation "to give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia" after "the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled." Both the Prague Central Government and the autonomous Government of Carpatho-Ukraine took it for granted that all four Great Powers were serious about their obligations. For that reason, the Central Government of the Federation as well as the autonomous Governments of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine were in agreement that the problem of the Polish and Hungarian minorities should be solved as soon as possible, since this was a condition for the implementation of the Munich Agreement provisions concerning guarantees of the new frontiers. Therefore, the Czecho-Slovak Government accepted all Polish claims and satisfied

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[153] Chapter Four above. Also see Michael Winch, *Republic For A Day* (London, 1939), pp. 153-154; and *Völkischer Beobachter* (Berlin Edition), February 14, 1939.

Polish territorial aspirations in the Czecho-Slovak frontier regions almost immediately after these demands were presented; and, for that reason the Central Government as well as the Governments of Slovakia and CarpathoUkraine accepted the Hungarian proposal for the arbitration of their territorial dispute.

During his conversations with the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, at Vienna on the occasion of the arbitration conference dealing with the Magyar minorities in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, Dr. František Chvalkovský touched on the problem of international guarantee of the newly established frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia. Count Ciano promised Chvalkovský to speak with the Duce on the problem after his return to Rome and he himself had seemed well disposed to the idea of bringing guarantee into force at an early date. Immediately after his return to Prague, Dr. F. Chvalkovský informed the British Minister in Prague, Basil Newton, about Ciano's attitude and expressed his anxiety to obtain as soon as possible "the guarantee of all four Munich Powers and would be grateful if steps can be taken by any of them to have it generally brought to force."[154] The British Minister informed the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Viscount Halifax, about it the very next day, on November 5, 1938. Prime Minister Msgr. A. Voloshyn was more optimistic. Since he was less experienced in diplomacy and a devout Christian, he took it for granted that after November 10, 1938, the day when all ceded territories were handed over to the Hungarian authorities, the guarantee of the four Great Powers would be applied automatically. To this effect he made a declaration on November 11, 1938, at Khust after his return from Vienna.[155] The reality proved to be far less optimistic.

To create a formal basis for the enforcement of the guarantee provisions of the Munich Agreement, the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister handed on November 22, 1938, to the envoys of France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy identical notes of the following wording:

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[154] *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 252. Referring to the very delicate nature of the new Czech-German relations, Dr. František Chvalkovský said on this occasion to Basil Newton in great secrecy that during his conversation with Adolf Hitler on October 14, 1938, the Führer threatened that he would destroy Czecho-Slovakia within 48 hours if she deviated from the pro-German policy. See *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 251.

[155] "Interview z o. A. Voloshynom," *Nova Svoboda,* November 11, 1938.

As annexes 1 and 2 of the Munich Agreement of September 29 provide for the settlement of the question of Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak Government takes the liberty of emphasizing to the signatory powers of this agreement:

1. that the notes exchanged between the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chvalkovský and the Polish Minister in Prague, Papée, on November 1, 1938, contain the following passage:

'With the present exchange of notes the Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia declare that they have finally settled the questions regarding rectification of the common frontiers."

2. that in the protocol signed at Vienna on November 2 by von Ribbentrop, Count Ciano, Kánya, and Chvalkovský, MM. Kánya and Chvalkovský have confirmed anew in the name of their Governments the declaration by these Governments of October 30, 1938, to accept the award as a final solution and to implement the same without reservation or delay.[156]

This notification of the fulfillment of all obligations imposed upon Czecho-Slovakia by the four Great Powers coincided with the first event when under normal conditions the four Great Powers would have to act, namely to stop the Hungarians from their attempt to violate the Vienna Award by forcible annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine. The question of the Four Power guarantee became problematic, since the Western Powers did not go beyond mutual consultation during these events.[157] Most probably, Great Britain and France would not have used their military strength to stop the Hungarians if the latter acted with Germany's consent. Thus, the German attitude became dominant there.

During his visit in Great Britain and France in the second half of November 1938, Rumanian King Carol II urged the Governments of these Western Democracies to apply the guarantee clause of the Munich Agreement.[158] He even raised this question in his conversations with Hitler, Hermann Göring, and Joachim von Ribbentrop, on November 24-26, 1938.[159] In these talks he maintained the position that he did not care who guaranteed the Czecho-Slovak

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[156] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 136; also *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 271.

[157] The British and French Governments were relieved from taking any further steps to help Czecho-Slovakia against "unprovoked aggression" by the fact that a representative of the Hungarian Military Staff assured Sir H. Knox on November 22, 1938, that the Hungarians have "no intentions" against Carpatho-Ukraine and ordered demobilization. See *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 272.

[158] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 325.

[159] *DGFP*, D, V, Docs. 254 and 257.

frontiers, whether the four Great Powers or Germany alone. The main thing would be that Czecho-Slovakia would be given the possibility of existence. Adolf Hitler said to the King of Rumania that after the annexation of Sudetenland

> there was now no obstacle in the way of establishing sensible, neighborly relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. If Czechoslovakia was sensible and accepted the new relations, that is, if she did not lend herself in the future to any sort of anti-German strategic plans on the part of others, it was quite possible to have a lasting peace.[160]

So far as the guarantee for the current status of Carpatho-Ukraine was concerned, the Führer stated that German attitude toward Carpatho-Ukraine would be determined by the manner in which Prague in the future developed its relations with Germany.

The question of the guarantee for the new frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia was one of the important points on the agenda of the Anglo-French conversations held at the Quai d'Orsay on November 24, 1938, in which participated British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, accompanied by his State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Viscount Halifax, and French Premier Édouard Daladier, accompanied by French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet, and their political and military assistants. In the opening discussion on this question, the French Foreign Minister stated that "this question was the more urgent in that events in Ruthenia seemed to indicate that the Vienna Agreement was not necessarily a lasting one"[161] since he had information that "Hungary, with the implicit consent of Poland, was massing troops on the Ruthenian frontier" which were ready to advance soon. The results of an extensive discussion[162] were

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[160] *DGFP,* D, V, Doc. 254.

[161] *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 325.

[162] During this discussion, the question was raised as to what nations should participate in the guarantee, especially the participation of the USSR and that of Rumania and the attitude of Poland were analyzed. Viscount Halifax stated that in the view of His Majesty's Government, if Germany refused to guarantee because the USSR, too, was a guarantor, then it would be necessary to choose Germany rather than the USSR. The French Foreign Minister, Bonnet, agreed to it. After Viscount Halifax said that the Czecho-Slovak Government should be informed that France and Great Britain were willing to give guarantee with Germany and Italy, Georges Bonnet assented to this, but asked whether Germany and Italy were prepared to give guarantees? Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain then stated that it was too dangerous so to arrange that it might happen that France and Great Britain would have to go to war because of

communicated to the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister by the British Minister in Prague, Basil Newton, on instructions from Viscount Halifax of December 8, 1938. In the letter concerned, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs stated:

> Question of guarantee of Czechoslovakia, which Czech Government are understood to be anxious to see in force, was discussed with French Ministers in Paris, who were informed that His Majesty's Government were prepared to give a guarantee of the new Czech frontier with France, Germany, and Italy. In their view this guarantee would be against unprovoked aggression and would only come into operation when three of the four Munich Powers were prepared to implement it.
>
> ...His Majesty's Government are not prepared to consider a guarantee which might oblige them, alone or with France, to come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia in circumstances in which effective help could not be rendered. This would be the case if either Germany or Italy were the aggressor and the other declined to fulfil the guarantee.[163]

After his conversation with the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister on December 10, 1938, the British Minister informed his Government that the Czecho-Slovak Government "felt themselves to be in a delicate position" and "would be thankful for any kind of guarantee."[164] Dr. F. Chvalkovský expressed his hope that the four Munich Powers would find some way to agree upon the implementation of the guarantee because the security and the very existence of his country might entirely depend on it.

The question of a Four-Power guarantee of Czecho-Slovakia's new frontiers was discussed between the Foreign Ministers of France, Georges Bonnet, and Germany's Joachim von Ribbentrop, during the latter's visit in Paris for the signing of the Franco-German Declaration on December 6, 1938.[165] To Bennet's question as to the

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action on the part of the other two guarantors. Stipulation that the guarantee would only come into force as a result of a decision by 3 of the 4 Powers would protect France and Britain against such a risk. Daladier objected that in actual fact there would never be 3 Powers against one, but always four against none, or two against two. However, this was approved as the basis for their action.

[163] *British Documents,* Third Series, III, Doc. 408.

[164] *Ibid.,* Doc. 423.

[165] The Declaration stated that: 1. Governments of Germany and France will pursue a peaceful and good neighborly relations between the two countries; 2. both Governments recognized the then existing frontier between the two countries as final; and 3. both Governments took upon themselves obligation to remain in contact with each other on all questions concerning both their countries and to enter negotiations to solve their differences. For the full text of the Declaration see *DGFP,* D, IV, Doc. 369.

German fundamental attitude toward this problem, von Ribbentrop replied that, in his opinion, a four-power guarantee would mean a certain temptation for Czecho-Slovakia to follow in the old paths of the Beneš policy. This could not be tolerated by Germany. Therefore, "the best and most effective guarantee of Czechoslovakia would, in his view, consist solely in the establishment of friendly relations between that country and Germany."[166] In a later conversation Joachim von Ribbentrop made it clear to the French Foreign Minister that Germany would regard a French guarantee of Czecho-Slovakia "as a form of interference" in the German "sphere of influence" and such a guarantee would not help their future relations. This German attitude was repeated with even more clarity by State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker two weeks later in his first conversation with the new French Ambassador in Berlin, Robert Coulondre, when the latter touched on the problem again on behalf of the French Government. Ernst von Weizsäcker told Coulondre on December 21, 1938, replying to his question concerning *garantie conjointe* that

> Czechoslovakia belonged definitely to those territories which must be regarded as German domain. The destiny of Czechoslovakia lay in the hands of Germany. Consequently, nothing other than a German guarantee had any significance for Prague.[167]

Thus, the Germans left no doubts about the fact that they now regarded Czecho-Slovakia as their domain. Even Italy was not wanted in that new "sphere of influence."

In preparation for talks with the British Prime Minister who was to visit Rome in January and with Dr. F. Chvalkovský in February, 1939, who most probably would bring up the guarantee question, the Italian Foreign Minister instructed Ambassador Attolico to find out the attitude of Germany on this issue. On December 28, 1938, the Italian Chargé d'Affairs in Berlin, Count Massimo Magistrati, approached State Secretary Weizsäcker stating that the Italian Government wished to act in concert with the German Government. Ernst von Weizsäcker in his reply purposely avoided a direct answer to the Magistrati's reference to German-Italian action "in concert," and instead he referred to his recent statement to the French Ambassador, Robert Coulondre, that "Czechoslovakia was

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[166] *DGFP*, D. IV, Doc. 370.
[167] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 373.

dependent on Germany alone" adding to this that "a guarantee by any other power was worthless" because Czecho-Slovakia "had changed since the days when there was a question of a guarantee."[168] This way the Germans made it clear to the Italians that even they should keep their hands off Czecho-Slovakia.

Before the British Prime Minister and the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs set out for their visit to Rome, the Governments of Great Britain and France agreed by an exchange of notes that they would prefer a joint guarantee of Czecho-Slovakia by the four Munich Powers.[169] Neville Chamberlain and Viscount Halifax visited Rome from January 11 to 14, 1939. During their talks on many other problems with Benito Mussolini and Count Ciano, the British Prime Minister brought up the question of the guarantee to Czecho-Slovakia and asked the Duce about his attitude to it. Benito Mussolini replied that he had no objections in principle but added that he considered

> any decision on the matter premature for the moment, particularly because of a number of practical considerations. Before speaking of a guarantee to Czecho-slovakia and of studying in what form it must be given, the country must have put itself in order internally by means of a new constitution, must have made a declaration of neutrality, and finally the new frontiers, which for the moment are marked only on the map, must also be established in reality.[170]

Thus, French Foreign Minister G. Bonnet predicted correctly that in the question of guarantee for Czecho-Slovakia there never would be a situation in which Mussolini would stand on the side of France and Great Britain against Hitler, nor where Hitler would support the two Western Democracies against Mussolini.

Despite the fact that the unwillingness of Germany and Italy to respect the provisions of the Munich Agreement concerning guarantee was now clear, the Governments of Great Britain and France still hoped to reach at least a partial success in this question. They were proceeding rather carefully in order not to worsen the situation of Czecho-Slovakia. After the visit of the British statesmen in Rome a new exchange of notes followed[171] between London and Paris concerning the question how to help Czecho-Slovakia in her delicate

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[168] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 154.

[169] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Docs. 446, 521, 525 and 528.

[170] *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*, pp. 265-266. Also see *British Documents*, Third Series, IV, Doc. 19.

[171] *British Documents*, Third Series, III, Doc. 552; and IV, Docs. 1, 6, 19, 21, 25, 43 and 86.

situation[172] and how to implement effectively the guarantee clause of the Munich Agreement. As a result of these contacts, on February 8, 1939, just a few days before the second attempt of the Hungarians to occupy Carpatho-Ukraine by force, the Governments of Great Britain and France presented their formal notes concerning the guarantee question. In the first point of the note, the British Government referred to the annex to the Munich Agreement, and in the second point of it we read:

> In the view of His Majesty's Government, the time has now come to regulate the guarantee in question in accordance with the annex referred to above and His Majesty's Government assume that with the settlement of the Polish-Hungarian minority question, the German Government are of the same opinion,

and after referring to the conditions laid down by Benito Mussolini, the fulfillment of which would result in his willingness to assume the co-guarantee, point three of the note reads further:

> His Majesty's Government would now be glad to learn the views of the German Government as to the best way of giving effect to the understanding reached at Munich in regard to the guarantee of Czechoslovakia.[173]

The French note was of similar content and the French Government also wished to know officially the German attitude on this question.[174]

While the British and French were waiting for an official reply to their notes of February 8th, the troubled Prague Government tried its best to get Hitler's mercy. On February 17, 1938, Dr. F. Chvalkovský informed Germany that if Czecho-Slovakia had prospects "of being recognized as a neutral state" the Prague Govern-

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[172] Despite the fact that on January 12, 1939, Dr. Chvalkovský communicated to the Reich Government that the Prague Government was willing to fulfill far-reaching Germany's wishes like those in the matter of armament deliveries, German military transports through the Czecho-Slovak territory, etc., when he visited Hitler and Ribbentrop on January 21-23, Hitler expressed dissatisfaction with the slow process of the "de-Benešization" policy, Jewish question, maintenance of a Czecho-Slovak army, etc. Above all, he mentioned the revival of the anti-German policy in Czecho-Slovakia which would result in "the annihilation of Czecho-Slovakia." See *DGFP*, D, IV, Docs. 156, 158 and 159.

[173] *British Documents*, Third Series, IV, Doc. 91. Also see *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 164.

[174] For the text of the French note see *British Documents*, Third Series, IV, Doc. 95.

ment would "at once be prepared to take measures accordingly and to abandon the whole treaty system pursued heretofore."[175] Hoping that this would fulfill one of Mussolini's conditions for the Italian co-guarantee of the new Czecho-Slovak frontiers, on February 22, 1939, the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Ministry submitted similar memoranda to the British, French, German and Italian Governments declaring Czecho-Slovakia's readiness to make a declaration of neutrality.[176] The question of guarantee was also raised in these memoranda. Quite contrary to the expectations, when the Czecho-Slovak Chargé d'Affairs, Ladislav Szatmáry, presented the *aide-mémoire* in Berlin to State Secretary E. von Weizsäcker, he met the latter's objection that it was "strange that in such a matter the Czechoslovak Government should approach all four Munich Powers simultaneously, without beforehand entering into an exchange of views on the subject with" Germany "alone."[177] It seemed that the Czechs did not know what else to do in order to please the Germans and still save their national honor. In this desperate situation, on February 28, 1939, the Czecho-Slovak Minister in Berlin, Vojtěch Mastný, who was in this position since 1932, came to the Reich Foreign Ministry to announce his intention to retire at the end of March 1939 and on that occasion did not hesitate to describe to State Secretary Weizsäcker "as a vicious circle the fact that Czechoslovakia could not be consolidated internally in the absence of a frontier guarantee and could not receive a frontier guarantee because she was not internally consolidated."[178] This was exactly the position that Germany maintained *pro foro externo.*

Finally, after a delay of over three weeks, Hitler drafted an identical reply to the British and French notes of the 8th of February which was delivered to the Governments of both these countries on March 2, 1939, or less than two weeks before the fateful events in Czecho-Slovakia. Adolf Hitler stated in his reply that there were still some difficulties not only in the German-Czech relations but, first of all, "between Hungary and Poland on the one hand, and Czechoslovakia on the other, differences of interpretation exist as to the accuracy of the demarcation of the frontier line now agreed upon." Since he did not want to antagonize Hungary and Poland even more, under these conditions he regarded as pre-

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[175] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 169.
[176] *British Documents*, Third Series, IV, Docs. 134 and 138.
[177] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 171.
[178] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 176.

mature the enforcement of the guarantee. Since, as a consequence of military guarantees given to the Czechs in the past by the Western Powers they had been led to believe that "they could simply pass to the order of the day over the inevitable claims of the national minorities," the Government of Germany was of the opinion that

> the undeniable danger still exists that guarantees prematurely given would lead not to a reasonable solution of the internal problems of Czechoslovakia, but rather to a stiffening of antagonisms, and might thereby contribute toward inciting fresh conflicts... The German Government is at the same time fully aware that, in the last analysis, the general development in this European zone falls first and foremost within the sphere of the most important interests of the German Reich, and moreover not only as seen from the historical viewpoint but also as conditioned by geographical and above all, by economic factors.
>
> Hence, the German Government believes it to be imperative to await first a clarification of the internal development in Czechoslovakia and the improvement resulting therefrom in the relations between this country and the surrounding states before the time can be considered ripe for a further statement of policy.[179]

The day after German notes were handed in London and Paris,[180] State Secretary von Weizsäcker informed the Czecho-Slovak Minister in Berlin, Vojtěch Mastný, about the substance of the notes exchanged between Great Britain and France, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other. Minister Mastný, referring to the German answers to London and Paris, objected that "he was not aware that there was mention at the Munich conference of a guarantee by the other neighbor states of Czecho-Slovakia." [181] Ernst von Weizsäcker

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[179] *DGFP,* D, IV, Doc. 175. At the time of the German reply, there was increased antagonism between the Czechs and Slovaks, and the Czechs and Carpatho-Ukrainians. It is generally believed that these differences were inspired by the Germans. Formally, the budgetary problems and the revival of Czech interference with the Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian internal affairs were blamed for these difficulties.

[180] German note was dated February 28th, but was not delivered until March 2, 1939.

[181] Neither the signed document nor the official minutes of the Munich Conference contain any mention of the participation of some other than the four signatory powers in the guarantee for the new Czecho-Slovak frontiers. See *DGFP,* D, Docs. 669, 670, 671, 674 and 675. On the other hand, during the visit of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Béla Imrédy, at Berchtesgaden on September 21, 1938, Adolf Hitler urged the Hungarians, and Imrédy agreed to it, that Hungary would only guarantee a new Czecho-Slovak frontier after all Hungarian demands had been satisfied. See *DGFP,* D, II, Doc. 554.

simply replied that the Czechs "would have to accept this as a fact."[182] Further explanation by Mastný that a guarantee given at the present time would not be premature, and quite contrary, it would contribute toward stabilization of the internal conditions within Czecho-Slovakia as well as provide an external security, and in that way would create a basis for closer and more constructive German-Czech cooperation, remained unheard. The special envoy, Hubert Masařík, sent to Berlin by Dr. Chvalkovský in his last effort to save the *status quo* in Czecho-Slovakia also remained unheard. The Chef de Cabinet to the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister arrived in Berlin on March 1, 1939, and despite his desperate efforts he was not received by Hitler to whom he was sent or by Joachim von Ribbentrop, or even by State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker.[183] The preparations to liquidate Czecho-Slovakia were already carried so far that Hitler refused even to talk to the Czechs.[184]

The deterioration of the relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks during the first decade of March 1939[185] as well as the movements of the German troops[186] was carefully observed by the two Western European Democracies. They felt obliged to clarify their position for the event of an open outbreak of revolt between the Czechs and Slovaks and to watch the German moves. As far as the Slovak crisis was concerned, both British and French policy was that of non-interference.[187] In view of the expected domestic pres-

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[182] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 178.

[183] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 177.

[184] The weaker partner of the Axis was kept in the dark about German plans in Czecho-Slovakia until the very last moment. During Count Ciano's visit to Poland, February 24 to March 1, 1939, the Poles approached the Italian Foreign Minister regarding his support for their plan of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. Ciano once again rejected it. And after Ciano's departure from Poland, the editor of *Il Giornale d'Italia*, Virginio Gayda, published a statement in the Polish press of March 2, 1939, in which he recalled the settlement of Hungary's present frontier at the Vienna Conference by Germany and Italy and added that the question of Carpatho-Ukraine had better be shelved for the time being. See *British Documents*, Third Series, IV, Doc. 173; also see *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*, pp. 273-275.

[185] See *DGFP*, D, IV, Docs. 168, 174, 180, 184, 185, 186, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 202, 209 and 212; also *British Documents*, Third Series, IV, Docs. 195, 212, 215, 216, 219, 222, 230, 234, 239, and 240. Also see Michael Winch, *Republic For A Day* (London, 1939), pp. 228 230; Jozef Lettrich, *History of Modern Slovakia* (New York, 1955), pp. 122-131; and Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, *Czechoslovakia Fights Back* (Washington, 1943) pp. 19-21.

[186] *British Documents*, Third Series, IV, Docs. 197, 212, 222 and 254.

[187] *British Documents*, Third Series, IV, Docs. 230 and 234.

sure to intervene on behalf of the Czechs in case of a German move against Czecho-Slovakia, the British State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Viscount Halifax, formulated his position for all eventualities on March 13, 1939. Among other things we read in his memorandum:

> The Central Government at Prague were faced with the possibility a) of disintegration of the composite state from within or b) deliberate disintegration by Germany.
>
> ...If Germany chooses to move, Herr Hitler might decide to achieve his ambition, of which he was deprived last September, of a triumphal march upon Prague...
>
> If German intervention takes place there will clearly be considerable pressure upon H.M.G. to take some action... It is clearly undesirable to make any protest which we are not prepared to implement or to make statements which would only irritate Herr Hitler without affecting his plans. If the internal situation in Germany has convinced him that some action is essential in Czecho-Slovakia, there is nothing we can do to stop him, short of war.
>
> ...it might be held that we were bound by our undertaking in the annex to the Munich Agreement to stand by our offer in the Anglo-French proposals of September 19 to join in an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czecho-Slovak state against unprovoked aggression. We could not, however, take any effective action unless the French Government also decided to take action as the German Government have hitherto refused to bring the general international guarantee into force by implementing their own Munich pledge, it seems to me most unlikely that France would wish to take any action in the matter...
>
> In all circumstances, His Majesty's Government would have no *locus standi* for taking any initiative in this matter and any attempt to check Herr Hitler by public statements or invoking Signor Mussolini's support would only seem calculated to precipitate a solution unfavorable to Czecho-Slovakia.[188]

On the same day, French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet, President of Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Senate M. Bérenger, and General Gamelin discussed the developments in Czecho-Slovakia at the British Embassy in Paris. Sir E. Phipps reported to Viscount Halifax that although the Frenchmen "feel that the situation must be watched" at the same time "both M. Bonnet and M. Bérenger feel that the less we interfere in this crisis the better" because the "renewed rift between Czechs and Slovaks only shows that we (the French and British) nearly went to war last autumn to boost up a State that was not 'viable.' "[189]

As expected, the leader of His Majesty's Opposition in the House of Commons, Clement Attlee, raised the question of a British guar-

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[188] *British Documents,* Third Series, IV, Doc. 230.

[189] *British Documents,* Third Series, IV, Doc. 234.

antee to Czecho-Slovakia in the House of Commons on March 14, 1939, before it become known that Slovakia proclaimed her independence. On Mr. Attlee's question if the Government had taken any steps to prevent "a possible breakup of Czechoslovakia, which" Great Britain "has guaranteed," Prime Minister Chamberlain replied evasively that "the proposed guarantee is one against unprovoked aggression on Czechoslovakia" adding to it that "no such aggression has yet taken place."[190] And, on March 15, 1939, after German troops invaded Bohemia and Moravia, the British Prime Minister declared in the House of Commons that

> recently His Majesty's Government have endeavoured to come to an agreement with the other Governments represented at Munich on the scope and terms of such a guarantee, but up to the present we have been unable to reach any such agreement. In our opinion the situation has radically altered since the Slovak Diet declared the independence of Slovakia. The effect of this declaration put an end by internal disruption to the State whose frontiers we had proposed to guarantee, ...and His Majesty's Government cannot accordingly hold themselves any longer bound by this obligation.[191]

Simultaneously, Lord Halifax instructed the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, a few hours after Slovakia's declaration of her independence, to take the earliest possible opportunity of conveying a message to the German Government containing a statement that "His Majesty's Government have no desire to interfere unnecessarily in matters with which other Governments may be more directly connected" than that of Great Britain. Referring to the current British-German economic negotiations and the desire "to restore confidence and a relaxation of tension in Europe" the statement continued that the British Government "would deplore any action in Central Europe which would cause a setback to the growth of this general confidence on which all improvement in the economic situation depends and to which such improvement might in its turn contribute."[192] Thus, even before German troops invaded Bohemia and Moravia, the Germans were assured that Great Britain would do nothing to stop them, and most probably the same attitude was expected to be taken by France.

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[190] German Foreign Office, *Documents on the events preceding the outbreak of the war* (New York, 1940), Document No. 257.

[191] *Ibid.*, Doc. 258.

[192] *British Documents*, Third Series, IV, Doc. 247.

Although the French Ambassador in Berlin did not receive instructions from his Government to act similarly to the Ambassador of Great Britain in Berlin, the Ambassador of the French Republic in London, M. Corbin, assured the Foreign Office on March 14, 1939, that "his Government wish to take no step without previous consultation with His Majesty's Government." Referring to the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine after Slovakia's proclamation of independence, the French Ambassador stated on this occasion to Sir Alexander Cadogan that

> it seems to him that there might be some advantage in Ruthenia being incorporated in Hungary, thereby giving the latter a frontier with Poland which would constitute a barrier of some sort against German expansion eastward.[193]

Thus, the British Government was assured that it would be not involved in any action by an impulsive move of the French Government to save Czecho-Slovakia.

When in the afternoon of March 14, 1939, the Czech Minister in Berlin, Vojtěch Mastný, tried to get some advice in the view of the new situation, adding that the officials of the Reich Foreign Ministry purposely avoided him, Sir Neville Henderson found it only possible to advise Mastný "to recommend to his Government that they should establish direct contact with German Government," adding that in his opinion the Czech Government "had nothing to lose by adopting the attitude of readiness to discuss the matter with the German Government."[194] After a consultation with Sir Henderson, the French Ambassador in Berlin, Robert Coulondre, telephoned to Paris suggesting that the French Government should also advise Prague in the above sense.

Left helplessly by their allies and guarantors, President Dr. Emil Hácha and Foreign Minister Dr. F. Chvalkovský saw no other way out except to go to Berlin and bow to Hitler's demands.[195] Thus, the guarantee clause of the Munich Agreement was disregarded by the main powers from the very beginning just like the Vienna Award was broken a short time after its issuance. The good will of Great Britain and France proved to be weaker than Hitler's crude force. If one is not resolved to back a given guarantee with all available power, such a guarantee proves to be useless.

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[193] *British Documents*, Third Series, IV, Doc. 277.
[194] *British Documents*, Third Series, IV, Doc. 238.
[195] *DGFP*, D, IV, Docs. 216, 223, 228 and 229.

The lack of implementation of the guarantees was fateful for the autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine, too. Just like the lack of an active control of the signatories of the Treaty of St. Germain over the enforcement of its provisions postponed the introduction of autonomy in Carpatho-Ukraine for nineteen years, so the lack of implementation of the Munich Agreement guarantees for the new frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia contributed toward the liquidation of her autonomy. In a world in which some militarily strong nations first sign treaties with a plan in their minds to break them some time later, existence of militarily and politically weaker nations is always at the mercy of the stronger. This un-Christian and un-Democratic approach on the part of interested surrounding powers led to the liquidation of the federated Republic of the Czechs, Slovaks, and Ukrainians, and brought an end to the hope for a free existence of Carpatho-Ukraine.

Chapter Eight

CARPATHO-UKRAINE: VICTIM OF GERMAN-HUNGARIAN AGGRESSION

Despite the fact that within a period of three months Germany twice prevented Hungarian attempts to occupy Carpatho-Ukraine, it seems that the Hitler-Imrédy agreement of September 21, 1938, according to which Hungary took upon herself an obligation not to recognize her new frontier with Czecho-Slovakia until "all Hungarian demands had been satisfied"[1] retained its validity. Just as Germany did not give up her plans to subjugate Czecho-Slovakia after the Munich Conference, so did the Hungarians never abandon their claims on Carpatho-Ukraine after the Vienna Arbitration.

Four days after the second attempt to use military force in Carpatho-Ukraine, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Béla Imrédy, who was co-responsible for both attempts, resigned. He was replaced by Count Teleki. Since the new Hungarian Prime Minister was one of the two Hungarian delegates to the Vienna Arbitration Conference,[2] it was believed in diplomatic circles that this fact "would make it peculiarly difficult for him to upset the award" with regard to Carpatho-Ukraine.[3] Also, his inauguration exposé was interpreted favorably in the official Carpatho-Ukrainian press since Teleki mentioned the improvement of Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations in it.[4] The Delimitation Commission progressed with its

[1] Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945* (Washington, 1951), Series D, Volume II, Document 554. Hereafter cited as *DGFP*.

[2] The other delegate was Kálmán Kánya who resigned after the first attempt to occupy Carpatho-Ukraine was prevented.

[3] L. E. Woodward and Rohan Buttler, ed., *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939* (London, 1950), Third Series, Volume IV, Document 126. Hereafter cited as *British Documents*.

[4] *Nova Svoboda* (published in Khust if not indicated otherwise), February 25, 1939.

work and some concrete agreements were achieved. For instance, in the second half of February 1939 an agreement was reached concerning distribution of funds paid to the governmentally regulated health insurance and pension plan institutions.[5] The business-like attitude of the Hungarian members of the Commission was appreciated by the Carpatho-Ukrainians. In the first week of March 1939, the Commission worked intensively on the question of re-opening another express transit train from Khust to Prague through the ceded territory[6] as well as on settling the remaining details of the establishment of a final frontier line between Carpatho-Ukraine and Hungary.[7] The reports of the successful developments in the work of the Delimitation Commission strengthened the optimism and hope for peaceful co-existence, and the continuation of talks on the lumber import by Hungary predicted the re-opening of trade relations between the two countries.

It seems that Hitler's decision to liquidate Czecho-Slovakia came unexpectedly not only to the Ukrainians but also to the Hungarians who, probably, lastly were willing to tolerate the existence of autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine. Even Poland was less aggressive at the beginning of March 1939 and permitted Rumania's food supplies to be transported to the Carpatho-Ukrainian railroad stations of Volovets' and Uzhok through territories under her sovereignty. The first train with Rumanian food was received at the station of Volovets', Carpatho-Ukraine, on March 2, 1939,[8] just before the beginning of the critical stage of the new Czech-German crisis.

The German surprise move against Czecho-Slovakia was not anticipated in the West either. The reports of the British and French Ambassadors in Berlin prove this explicitly. As late as March 11, 1939, the French Ambassador was of the opinion that "Reich does not as yet extend beyond the intention of keeping Czecho-Slovakia weak."[9] Sir Neville Henderson even later, in the afternoon of March 12, 1939, reported to Viscount Halifax as follows:

> Up to the present I have no evidence that the German Government intend to exploit the present unrest in Czcho-Slovakia. On the contrary both my Italian and Belgian colleagues whom I saw last night and who visited the Ministry for

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[5] *Nova Svoboda*, February 25, 1939.
[6] *Nova Svoboda*, March 7, 1939.
[7] *Nova Svoboda*, March 3, 1939.
[8] *Nova Svoboda*, March 3, 1939.
[9] *British Documents*, Third Series, IV, Doc. 212.

Foreign Affairs yesterday have gained the impression that the German Government are viewing the whole question calmly and do not for the moment contemplate forceful action.[10]

The only thing that Sir Henderson could add to this was that in the view of the Italian Ambassador, Bernardo Attolico, there seemed to be two currents of opinion in Berlin regarding the handling of the existing tension between the Czechs and the Slovaks. The current headed by Adolf Hitler proved to be stronger. In his conversation with the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Csáky, on January 16, 1939, the Führer stated that "one had to strive toward a politico-territorial solution" of the Czecho-Slovak question, and such a solution must be "planned precisely as to timing and requiring the smallest risk."[11] He skillfully put this theory into practice as far as the final dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia was concerned.

"OPERATION GREEN" IN FORCE EVEN AFTER MUNICH

While Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain believed that the Munich Conference saved peace for his generation, and even Benito Mussolini was welcomed back in Italy with genuine enthusiasm, Hitler was planning how to occupy the rest of Czecho-Slovakia. He did not cancel his last edition of *Fall Grün* (Operation "Green") of September 9-10, 1938.[12] He only shelved it for the time being to await a better opportunity to convert it into reality.

Three weeks after the Munich Conference at which all the participating powers, including Germany by Hitler's own signature, took upon themselves an obligation to protect Czecho-Slovakia against any unprovoked aggression, the Führer in cooperation with General Keitel revised the plan of attack on Czecho-Slovakia. In their new version of Operation "Green" of October 21, 1938, stress was put upon a surprise attack by German military forces stationed near the Czech frontiers.[13] The aim again was defined as a speedy occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the cutting off of these Czech provinces from Slovakia. Thus, Hitler had in mind either cooperation with the Hungarians in the sense that he would let them occupy Sloviakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, or he had some other plans regarding the fate of the two federated states of Czecho-Slovakia.

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[10] *British Documents,* Third Series, IV, Doc. 217.

[11] *DGFP,* D. V, Doc. 272.

[12] See above, pp. 188-190. Also *DGFP,* D, II, Doc. 448.

[13] *DGFP,* D, IV, Doc. 81.

Before he would strike, he decided to weaken the post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia as much as possible. For that purpose, Hitler sought to penetrate that country through his secret and open agents, to integrate her economy with that of Germany, and to link her internal and external policy with that of Germany.

For the realization of his plan, Hitler decided to use the *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans) remaining within the Rump Czecho-Slovakia, especially those in Bohemia and Moravia. For that purpose, on November 4, 1938, it was decided that one of the closest cooperators of Konrad Henlein, Deputy Ernst Kundt, was to remain in Prague and act as spokesman for the Germans still remaining in Bohemia and Moravia.[14] The Prague Government was to consult with him on all questions affecting the *Volksdeutsche*.[15] On November 17, 1938, Hitler ordered the immediate preparation of statistical data on the remaining Germans in Czecho-Slovakia and on the Czechs living in the territory ceded to Germany. According to the 1930 census, 478,589 *Volksdeutsche* still remained in Czecho-Slovakia, a sufficient number to be used for his purpose.[16] Despite the existing enthusiasm among some of these *Volksdeutsche* to depart for Germany, on the one hand, and some economic difficulties of the others, on January 13, 1939, an order was given from Berlin to the effect that "the departure of *Volksdeutsche* from Bohemia and Moravia is undesirable."[17] In order that Ernst Kundt would be able to fulfill his orders from Berlin, to keep enthusiasm among the *Volksdeutsche*, and be able to help those who needed aid since some of them lost their jobs in the new situation, Berlin provided him with necessary money.[18] Thus, the old pre-Munich methods were to be used even in the new situation. This German element did fulfill its role in the decisive days of March 1939.

Having in mind the future occupation of the whole of Bohemia and Moravia, the Führer, shaping his temporary approach toward

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[14] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 104.

[15] Similar function in Slovakia was performed by Franz Karmasin; and in Carpatho-Ukraine by Anton Ernst Oldofredi who was sent to Khust from Sudetenland.

[16] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 121.

[17] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 157.

[18] *DGFP*, D, IV, Docs. 145 and 155. On December 6, 1938, the Reich Foreign Ministry sent to Kundt a check for 1,200,000 Reichsmark (equivalent to 12 million Czech Crowns); on December 7th, 10 million Czech Crowns were dispatched to him by a special air courier; and later up to February 6, 1939, an additional sum of 8,183,334 Czech Crowns was sent.

Prague, in his conversation with Joachim von Ribbentrop on October 12, 1938, decided first of all that "no further plebiscite areas in Czechoslovakia are to be demanded by Germany."[19] This, of course, had created an easier feeling among the Czechs at the time when the Hungarians started to press for the solution of the Magyar minority question. At the same conference, the Führer decided to demand permission from the Czechs to construct a Reich *Autobahn* following the line of the Breslau-Brno-Vienna railway and to have this railway line bi-nationalized. The desire was expressed for an early finishing of the work of the International Commission in the field of the determination of the new frontiers between Germany and Czecho-Slovakia. Details were to be left to the Czech-German commission.

After brief negotiations the Central Government at Prague accepted the German proposal concerning the construction of the Breslau-Brno-Vienna *Autobahn* and a treaty was signed between the two Governments on November 19, 1938.[20] At the same time, an agreement regarding the construction of an Oder-Danube canal was reached between Germany and Czecho-Slovakia.[21] These two agreements were the first ones which proved that Germany could now have anything she wanted in the field of economics in Czecho-Slovakia. The conditions of these two treaties were to the great advantage of Germany, while Czecho-Slovakia had practically no interest in them. The *Autobahn* was to be patrolled by the Germans.

As far as the cultural development of the German minority within Czecho-Slovakia and the Czech minority numbering up to 700,000 within the German Reich[22] was concerned, it was decided in Berlin on November 7, 1938, that no minority protection treaty between Germany and Czecho-Slovakia was desirable. The rights of these minorities were not to be based on the principle of reciprocity, but rather on German dictates. While the Germans could not tolerate in the incorporated territories of Sudetenland

a Czech State Secretary for the Czech minority, an extensive Czech educational system and a Czech college, open activity by the pan-Slav-minded Sokol with flags and uniforms, uncontrolled relations abroad for Czech national organizations, cultural autonomy, nationalist organiaztion in Czech-language enclaves,[23]

[19] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 53.
[20] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc, Doc. 123 and the footnote to it No. 2 on the page 153.
[21] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 124.
[22] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 121.
[23] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 111.

these were exactly the rights that Germany demanded from the Czecho-Slovak Government for the remaining Germans within that State. One observes, therefore, a double meaning of "equality", a double meaning of the cultural, economic, social, and political rights for the two minorities. Actually, all these German demands were fulfilled by the Prague Government.

After an investigation of the situation of the remaining Germans in Bohemia and Moravia was completed by the German Legation at Prague, Chargé d'Affairs Andor Hencke in his report of December 10, 1938, stated that

> the alarming reports reaching the German authorities in the Reich on the position of the remaining Germans are not in general calculated to give a true picture of the conditions actually prevailing. These reports are often designed to persuade the Reich to take possession of additional German-inhabited areas in this country. They are, therefore, as can be proved by concrete cases, often exaggerated and sometimes even invented.[24]

But, a few days later, Hitler's *Statthalter* in Prague, Kundt, sent a list of complaints against the Czechs to the Reich Foreign Ministry.[25] Thus, preparation for the coming conflict was going on, and Kundt disposed of the necessary financial means for his subversive activity in order to create reasons for some future intervention by the Reich "to protect the German element".

During both conversations between Hitler and Chvalkovský, on October 14, 1938, and January 21, 1939, the Führer directly exercised his pressure upon the Prague Government concerning the internal order and foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia. In his political report on "the re-orientation of Czechoslovak policy on pro-German lines and the difficulties involved" of October 23, 1938, the German Chargé d'Affairs, Hencke, stated that while the mass of the Czech population still was

> embittered by the conduct of their former friends, disappointed and deceived by their leaders,.. the leading personalities in the Government, among whom, apart from General Syrový,.. the Foreign Minister, Chvalkovský, and the Minister General Husárek are ... convinced that only the closest cooperation with the Reich affords Czechoslovakia the possibility of maintaining her outward independence.[26]

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[24] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 147.
[25] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 151.
[26] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 85.

On the other hand, Hencke mentioned a passive mass resistance of the Czech population as well as that of some influential officials remaining in their offices since the time of the Beneš regime. Against these officials Hitler had spoken in strong words to Chvalkovský at the latter's second visit to Berchtesgaden.

After the Constitutional Charter of the Czecho-Slovak Republic was amended on November 19-22, 1938, reorganizing the hitherto unitary form of the Republic into a federation, and the election of the new President of the Republic, Dr. Emil Hácha, on November 30, 1938, the Prime Minister of the Central Government resigned. He was replaced by Dr. Rudolf Beran, the leader of the Party of National Unity embracing representatives of all previously existing Czech political parties, except the Marxists. After the passing of an enabling act, vesting unlimited powers in the President of the Republic, the Parliament adjourned in *sine die*.[27] Although Dr. E. Hácha never desired to become a dictator, a kind of authoritarian regime was nevertheless established in Prague to please the Germans.

Reporting on the impressions made by the results of the second Hitler-Chvalkovský conversation in Prague, Andor Hencke stated:

> Even if outwardly a certain satisfaction is displayed, the course of the Berlin conversations actually means a disappointment for the Czecho-Slovak Government. Leading circles in Prague expected Dr. Chvalkovský to return with definite basic demands from Germany for a final settlement by treaty of German-Czechoslovak relations. Indeed they were prepared for great sacrifices to be demanded of Czchoslovakia in the military and economic sphere and in foreign policy, but on the other hand, they cherished the hope that by acceding to the German demands they could buy a guarantee of their frontiers and at least formal independence as a state.[28]

He further reported that on the basis of Chvalkovský's report on his talks with Hitler to the Council of Ministers at Prague, the Council decided to take additional steps to show loyalty concerning their promises to cooperate with Germany. Some of the steps to be taken with extraordinary speed were: the Jewish question, the dismissal of the old pro-Beneš officials, the dismissal of the Chief of the Czech General Staff, General Ludvik Krejčí, to send Minister of Trade Šadek to Berlin for economic talks, and the Prague "Society of Foreign Press Representatives" was to be purged of anti-German

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[27] Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Czechoslovakia Fights Back* (Washington, 1943), pp. 16-18.

[28] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 161.

writers. Also, in the future no foreign journalists were to be admitted into this organization without the consent of the German Legation.

THE SLOVAK DESIRE TO BE FREE EXPLOITED BY HITLER

All these sacrifices of the Czechs did not satisfy Hitler. He proceeded to undermine the existence of the Republic. For a justification before the world of his breaking the Munich Agreement, the Führer decided to exploit a long desire of the Slovaks to rule themselves. Germany decided to support secretly the most radical elements in Slovakia in their struggle for the independence of Slovakia. Being aware of the difficulties awaiting the Czechs, the Slovaks decided to do everything possible to save their own country. The autonomist Hlinka's Slovak People's Party was struggling for nineteen years in order to achieve the realization of the provisions of the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement of May 30, 1918;[29] therefore, even after an autonomy was granted to Slovakia on October 6, 1938, the tension between the Czechs and Slovaks was still a reality. Thus, the Slovaks were not necessarily prepared to share the fate of the Czechs under all circumstances. After all, they regarded themselves as a separate nation and did not feel obliged to fight to the last for the Czech cause.

The reality was such that after the Munich Conference the Germans could save the national existence of the Slovaks, or subjugate them, or give a free hand to the Hungarians over Slovakia. Thus, the Slovaks were looking for the best solution for their own

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[29] For a photo-copy of the original document see Peter P. Yurchak, *The Slovaks: Their History and Traditions* (Whiting, Ind., 1947), p. 238. The Czech-Slovak Agreement was signed at Pittsburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, between the representatives of the Slovak and the Czech organizations in the United States, namely The Slovak League, on the one hand, and the Czech National Association, and the Union of the Czech Catholics, on the other, in the presence of the President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, Prof. Thomas G. Masaryk.

The first point of the Agreement declared the desire to unite the Czechs and the Slovaks in an independent state composed of the Czech Lands and Slovakia. Point Two reads: "Slovakia shall have her own administration, her own Parliament, and her own courts." Other points of the Agreement provide that the Slovak language should be the official language in Slovakia, the newly established state should be a democratic Republic, etc.

The bitterness among the Slovaks was increased by the fact that Prof. T. G. Masaryk, who was elected President-Liberator of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, was one of the signatories of the Pittsburgh Agreement, and yet the Slovaks were not granted autonomy during his Presidency.

cause under all these various possibilities. At the time when the Hungarians still were demanding Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, in the middle of October 1938, Minister Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský accompanied by the leader of the German minority in Slovakia, Franz Karmasin, held a conversation with Hermann Göring and Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart. Ďurčanský was looking for help against the Hungarian claim for Slovakia and stated that "the Slovaks never want union with Hungary. Slovaks want full independence, with very close political, economic, and military ties with Germany."[30] At the same meeting, it was declared that the Germans in Slovakia did not want union with Hungary, but wanted to stay in Slovakia. Hermann Göring expressed his opinion that the efforts of the Slovaks for independence should be "suitably supported" because the air base in Slovakia for the future operations against the East might be very useful. Some three weeks later, on November 11, 1938, Ďurčanský and Karmasin continued these talks with Hermann Göring. On this occasion, mention was also made of the future fate of Carpatho-Ukraine, namely that "the goal was an independent Slovakia and an autonomous Ukraine oriented toward this independent Slovakia."[31]

It seems that Hermann Göring was not exactly informed as to what Hitler had in mind concerning Slovakia. On Hitler's order through the Reich Foreign Ministry of November 17, 1938, the Field Marshal was to be informed that "at the moment political negotiations with the Slovaks were not opportune. The Führer had decided that at present the question of the separation of the Slovaks should not be touched upon, either in a positive or in a negative sense."[32] Thus, in accordance with Hitler's master plan, the question had to be timed with his other planned actions, especially with the most opportune moment to strike militarily.

The Slovaks made no secret of their wishes to have their own independent State. This idea was stressed in the New Year Day issue of the official organ of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, *Slovák*,[33] and on February 5, 1939, Alexander Mach declared openly at a rally of the Hlinka Guards at Rišňovce that the highest ideal

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[30] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 68. This visit took place around the time of Msgr. Jozef Tiso's visit with Joachim von Ribbentrop at Munich, which took place on October 19, 1938, with the consent of the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister.

[31] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 112.

[32] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 120.

[33] *Slovák* (Bratislava), January 1, 1939.

of the Slovak people was to have their own independent State.[34] This idea had been nursed by the Slovaks for many years. Finally, one of the foremost leaders of the Slovak independence movement, Dr. Vojtech Tuka, was received by Adolf Hitler, on February 12, 1939, in Berlin. During a long conversation, the Führer warned the Slovaks that "if Czechia would not content itself with its natural destiny, he saw dark days ahead for Slovakia, too."[35] Thus, Adolf Hitler personally opened the pressure upon the Slovaks to think about their own fate in case of a liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia.

On March 9, 1939, the negotiations on budgetary and other matters between the Slovaks and Czechs had broken down because the Slovaks were not willing to give assurance that they would refrain from proclaiming the independence of Slovakia, if they should think this necessary, nor were they prepared to give assurances that propaganda activity for Slovakia's independence in the country would be suppressed. The President of the Republic, Dr. Emil Hácha, immediately dismissed Prime Minister of Slovakia Msgr. Jozef Tiso and his Cabinet, and appointed Jozef Sivák, and two days later, Karol Sidor to the post of the Prime Minister of the autonomous Slovak Government.[36] Hácha's move was unconstitutional, since according to the amendment to the Constitutional Charter of the Republic of November 22, 1938, the President of the Republic could do this only in concurrence with the autonomous Slovak Diet. Hácha ignored this provision, and this gave reason to all interested, including the Germans, to refuse recognition of the reconstruction of the Slovak Government. There was also reason, later on, to recognize Msgr. Jozef Tiso's forcibly dismissed Cabinet as the only legal Government of Slovakia.

Hitler conceived of these events as a wonderful opportunity to utilize the long expected situation. The arrests of the leading political activists in Slovakia by the Czechs only intensified the growing tension. Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský managed to escape his arrest, and upon his arrival in Vienna came in contact with Seyss-Inquart and other Nazi Party leaders there. Since the hour of attack was approaching rapidly, Hitler pressed Slovaks to act swiftly with proclaiming their independence. Couriers were sent between Vienna and Bratislava and a group of politically influential Germans, including State Secretary Wilhelm Keppler, Seyss-Inquart,

[34] *Slovák* (Bratislava), February 6, 1939.
[35] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 168.
[36] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 186.

and Gauleiter Josef Bürckel, assisted by Franz Karmasin and Kirschbaum, arrived in Bratislava at four o'clock in the morning of March 12, 1939, to talk with Msgr. Jozef Tiso and Karol Sidor to determine the time-table for the declaration of the independence of Slovakia.[37] According to Karol Sidor's own memoirs, the Slovak leaders wanted to establish their own Slovak State, but they were not happy at all about the circumstances in which it had to be executed.

On March 13, 1939, Msgr. Jozef Tiso received an official invitation from Adolf Hitler to visit Berlin at once.[38] Msgr. Jozef Tiso asked the leaders of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party for advice and at a joint meeting of the Party leadership with the Slovak Government of the day it was decided to accept the invitation. Msgr. Tiso immediately took a plane for Berlin from Vienna, and on March 13, 1939, in the late afternoon he was received by Adolf Hitler.[39] In his long monologue, the Führer expressed his disappointment with the fact that he had sent State Secretary W. Keppler as his envoy to Bratislava, and Dr. Karol Sidor, who at that time was Slovak Prime Minister, told the latter that "he was a soldier of Prague and would oppose a withdrawal of Slovakia from the Czecho-Slovak union." Hitler proceeded that

> he had now summoned Minister Tiso in order to clear up this question *in a very short time*. Germany had no interests east of the Carpathians. It was a matter of complete indifference to him what happened there. The question was, did Slovakia want lead an independent existence or not? He wanted nothing from Slovakia... He wanted a final confirmation as to what Slovakia really wanted... He had previously said that if Slovakia wished to become independent he would support and even guarantee her efforts in that direction. He would keep his promise as long as Slovakia clearly expressed the desire for independence. If she hesitated or refused to be separated from Prague, he would leave the fate of Slovakia to events for which he was no longer responsible.[40]

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[37] Karol Sidor, "Moje poznámky k historickým dňom" (unpublished manuscript, 1939) cited in Jozef Lettrich, *History of Modern Slovakia* (New York, 1955), pp. 124-127.

[38] The invitation was first brought to Msgr. Tiso by two Germans, escorted by Ján Dafčik, the Corps Commander of the Hlinka Youth, and later confirmed by the German Consul General in Bratislava, Ernst von Drüffel.

[39] Also present at the Hitler-Tiso conversation were: Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, Minister of State Otto Meissner, General Keitel, General Brauchitsch, State Secretary Dietrich, State Secretary Keppler, and Slovak Minister Dr. Ferdinad Ďurčanský.

[40] *DGFP, D,* IV, Doc. 202. Also see Otto Meissner, *Staatssekretär unter Ebert-Hindenburg-Hitler* (Hamburg, 1950), pp. 472-475.

At this moment the Reich Foreign Minister handed to the Führer a report just received announcing Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontier. Hitler read this report, told Msgr. Tiso of its contents, and expressed the hope that Slovakia would reach a decision soon. Msgr. Josef Tiso thanked the Führer for his words and asked him to pardon him if he could make no definite statement at once. He would prefer to retire with Dr. F. Ďurčanský and "consider the whole question calmly" and thereupon he would state their decision.

After his consultation with Ďurčanský, Msgr. Jozef Tiso first of all phoned Karol Sidor asking him to summon a session of the Slovak Diet for the following morning at ten o'clock. Sidor not only agreed but also secured a letter of the President of the Republic, Dr. Emil Hácha, for summoning the session of the Diet. When Msgr. Jozef Tiso and Dr. Ďurčanský met again the Reich Foreign Minister, the latter was surprised to hear from Msgr. Tiso that nobody except the Slovak Diet was authorized to proclaim the independence. Therefore, he could not do it by himself. After Tiso informed von Ribbentrop that necessary steps were taken to invoke the Diet for the very next day, Joachim von Ribbentrop gave the Slovaks an ultimatum: should he, Ribbentrop, fail to receive a report by one o'clock in the afternoon, March 14, 1939, that the Slovak Diet voted for the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia, Germany would act accordingly.[41] Thereafter, Msgr. Jozef Tiso and Dr. F. Ďurčanský returned to Bratislava.

The session of the Slovak Diet was summoned in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, and all deputies, except Eszterházy, the leader of Magyar minority in Slovakia, were present at the session and voted by noon, on March 14, 1939, unanimously for independence of the Slovak State.[42] Thus, the majority of the Slovak people, supporting the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, were happy about their sovereignty. However, they were unaware of the circumstances under which their leaders were pressed to take that step. On the other hand, Germany could proceed with her actions in accordance with the time-table.

The proclamation of the independence of Slovakia, the middle of the three federated States, disrupted the Federation of the Czechs,

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[41] *Čas* (Bratislava), December 7, 1946; also see Otto Meissner, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 474-475; and, Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Czechoslovakia Fights Back* (Washington, 1943), pp. 20-21.

[42] *British Documents,* Third Series, IV, Doc. 239; also see *DGFP,* D, IV, Doc. 212.

Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians. The new situation altered the guarantee obligations of the four Munich Powers, and this gave a free hand to Germany for military action. This was the well planned situation of which Adolf Hitler was talking with Béla Imrédy. He himself prepared this situation. After the first revision of the plan of attack on Czecho-Slovakia made after the incorporation of Sudetenland into the Reich, on December 17, 1938, there followed the "Second Supplement to Directive of October 21, 1938."[43] The Führer ordered military forces of peaceful strength to be prepared to liquidate "the Rump Czech State". Hitler and Keitel prepared the case "on assumption that no appreciable resistance is to be expected" from the Czechs.[44] For that reason Hitler was pressing upon Chvalkovský to decrease the number of the Czecho-Slovak troops to some 10 to 20 thousand men, instead of 150,000.

HITLER FORCES HACHA TO CAPITULATE

In his master plan, Hitler envisaged one more arrangement for the easiest way to destroy Czecho-Slovakia and to deprive the world of reason to declare him an aggressor. He summoned the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Dr. Emil Hácha, and Foreign Minister Dr. František Chvalkovský to Berlin and under terror[45] forced them to sign a statement prepared in advance according to which the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic "confidently placed the fate of the Czech people and country in the hands of the Führer of the German Reich." The statement proceeded to say that "the Führer accepted this declaration and expressed his intention of taking the Czech people under the protection of the German Reich."[46] At the same time, Hácha and Chvalkovský were forced to sign a separate statement concerning the conditions under which the bloodless occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by the German troops was to be ful-

[43] A previous supplement to the October 21 directive was issued by Keitel on November 24, 1938, on the subject of preparations for the occupation of Danzig and Memel.

[44] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 152.

[45] For a description of the circumstances under which Hácha signed the statement, see the report of the French Ambassador in Berlin, R. Coulondre, to the French Foreign Minister, G. Bonnet, of March 17, 1939, in *Documents Diplomatique, 1938-1939* (Paris, 1948), Doc. 77. Also *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 228.

[46] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 229.

[47] *DGFP*, D, IV, Enclosures 1 and 2 to Doc. 229. All of these documents were prepared in advance in the Reich Foreign Ministry. However, the "Conditions for an Ultimatum" were drafted by General Wilhelm Keitel on March 11,

filled.[47] Under the threat of the complete destruction of Prague, Dr. E. Hácha called upon all branches of the Czech military forces not to resist the advance of the German troops. This appeal was continuously broadcasted by all radio stations of Bohemia and Moravia.

At six o'clock in the morning of March 15, 1939, German troops crossed the frontiers of Bohemia and Moravia and occupied these provinces without resistance. While Hácha and Chvalkovský were caught by the military traffic on their return train, Adolf Hitler entered Prague and made himself at home at Hradčany, the ancient castle of Czech kings, and the seat of the President of the Republic.

On March 16, 1939, Adolf Hitler issued a decree regarding the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.[48] Thus, the fate of two federated parts of the post-Munich Federation of the Czechs, Slovaks, and Carpatho-Ukrainians was sealed for the time being.

The succeeding events in Carpatho-Ukraine were also predetermined by the events in Slovakia and the Bohemian Lands. However, while Adolf Hitler succeeded in producing an "agreement" with Dr. Emil Hácha concerning the "protectorate" of the Czech Lands, which he had shown the world, the Hungarians had to use guns and bayonets in order to occupy the eastern and the smallest of the three federated states of Czecho-Slovakia, Carpatho-Ukraine.

AT LAST: HITLER URGES HUNGARY TO SHARE THE SPOILS

After the German warning of February 12, 1939, not to take any isolated action against Carpatho-Ukraine, Hungary decided to observe this demand. However, the Hungarians did not give up hope to achieve their goal in Carpatho-Ukraine. They continued their diplomatic actions.

In the second half of February 1939, the Italian Minister at Prague contacted the autonomous Slovak Government and tried, in Hungarian interests, to reach an agreement with the Slovaks to the effect that in return for the cession of territory around Košice,

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1939. Point one of the document stated: "No resistance by armed force or police. Troops to remain in barracks and to lay down arms;" and, point six read: "No disturbance of economic life; in particular, continued activity of banks, commerce, and industry." See *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 188.

[48] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 246. In the preamble to the document we read: "For a thousand years the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia formed part of the *Lebensraum* of the German people. They were arbitrarily torn from their ancient historic setting by force and folly..." Thus, the tone of this Proclamation and the statement signed by Hácha differ considerably.

inhabited by the Slovaks but alloted to Hungary by the Vienna Award, the Slovaks should declare themselves disinterested in the Hungarian occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine.[49] Likewise, the Polish Minister in Prague, Kazimierz Papée, had discussed a similar deal with the Slovak Ministers on February 24, 1939.[50] During the Slovak-Czech tension, when the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia was already expected, the Hungarians officially proposed to the Prague Government a purchase of Carpatho-Ukraine.[51] Otherwise, no special activity on the part of Hungary was reported.

The Poles, too, continued to make efforts for the realization of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. At the beginning of March 1939, on the occasion of the visit of the new Rumanian Foreign Minister, Grigore Gafencu, to Warsaw, the Poles succeeded in getting assurances from the latter that Rumania was not interested in preserving the *status quo* in Carpatho-Ukraine to such an extent as it was previously thought.[52]

On March 4, 1939, the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, Döme Sztójay, approached the Reich Foreign Minister with the proposal that Germany and Italy should make a statement to Hungary to the effect that "Hungary had first claim to the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine, or alternatively, that in any new settlement this area would be awarded to her." Joachim von Ribbentrop replied that Germany could not make a statement of this kind at present but urged that "Hungary must be patient" and assured Sztójay that he would inform him if any development of interest to Hungary should arise in the Czech question.[53] The last diplomatic effort short of war to get Carpatho-Ukraine was taken by the Secretary General of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, János Vörnle, at Prague in a direct conversation with Foreign Minister Chvalkovský held on March 6, 1939. Vörnle explained to Chvalkavský the great economic importance of the Carpathian forests to the economy of Hungary and offered to buy Carpatho-Ukraine from Czecho-Slovakia. Csáky's special envoy emphasized that presently Hungary is prepared to pay a price, while later the Czechs will get nothing for the territory in question. Vörnle reported to Csáky that Chvalkovský expressed his desire to settle all differences with the Hungarians and establish

[49] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 177.

[50] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 177.

[51] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 182.

[52] *British Documents*, Third Series, IV, Doc. 178. Also see *Hungarian Documents*, Doc. 89, p. 212.

[53] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 179.

good-neighborly relations. According to Vörnle, Chvalkovský accepted the Hungarian position that cession of presently held Hungarian territory as recompensation for Carpatho-Ukraine cannot be considered at all. Otherwise, Hungary is not prepared to offer her price as long as the Czechs have not accepted this offer in principle.

Chvalkovský did not reject Vörnle's offer in principle. He explained that the President of the Republic, the Government of autonomous Slovakia, and other interested parties must be consulted before a definite answer will be given through the Hungarian Minister in Prague, János Wettstein.[54] In Vörnle's opinion, Chvalkovský was not certain about Germany's position and dared not to make any decision without German consent.

The very same day, Vörnle talked about the Hungarian offer to the Czechs with the German Chargé d'Affairs, Andor von Hencke. In his report to Count Csáky, Vörnle concluded that Hencke did not like this Hungarian effort. In their conversation, Hencke emphasized that Germany adheres to the Vienna Award. However, after a detailed explanation of Hungary's needs of Carpatho-Ukrainian forests and Vörnle's emphasis that Hungary will grant transit rights to Germany in case of need to transport troops and military materials, Hencke promised to report this Hungarian proposal to Berlin immediately. The Hungarian envoy underlined that the already existing German-Hungarian brotherhood of arms will assure that the transit rights will be respected.

In his report to the Reich Foreign Ministry, Hencke stated that Vörnle in his talks with Chvalkovský emphasized that "the Government in Budapest had no objection to the Carpatho-Ukraine's being ruled by Czechs or Poles, as there was no need for fear from the careless deforestation policy which was a danger to Hungary."[55] According to Hencke, Chvalkovský replied that this position of the Hungarian Government was "an interesting new fact."

Although János Vörnle pressed in Budapest for an early and strong action in Berlin toward the realization of his mission to Prague, the historical events spared Hungary from the need of further efforts.

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[54] *Hungarian Documents,* Doc. 87, pp. 210-211. Also see *DGFP,* D, IV, Doc. 181.

[55] It is believed that this statement was made in order to strengthen the Czechs in their struggle with the Ukrainians over the appointment of Czech General, Lev Prchala, to the post of a Minister in Msgr. A. Voloshyn's Government. In other words, the Hungarians would not object if the Czechs would rule

Finally, the day came when Germany recognized Hungary's "first claim to the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine," although no public statement was made about it. The German Ambassador in Budapest, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, handed to the Hungarian Government a note dated "Budapest, March 11, 1939," with the following wording:

The German Government proceeds from the assumption that in case certain Hungarian actions in the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine become necessary, the Royal Hungarian Government will take into account the following necessities:

1. During and after any occupation of the Carpatho-Ukraine German requirements with regard to transportation shall be taken into account to a large extent.

2. The economic interests of the Reich and its citizens in the Carpatho-Ukraine will not be affected by the action. The Royal Hungarian Government will recognize treaties and agreements of an economic nature which were concluded with the Government of the Carpatho-Ukraine by German official and private institutions.

3. The Royal Hungarian Government will recognize the duly acquired rights of *Volksdeutsche* in the Carpatho-Ukraine.

4. The members of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government, former Carpatho-Ukrainian Ministers, and other leading personages in the political life of the Carpatho-Ukraine, such as, for instance, the leaders of the Defense Corps *Sitsch* shall not face criminal prosecution or be persecuted in any other way on account of their political beliefs.[56]

These conditions were accepted by the Hungarian Government unconditionally, although the date of action was not set. The conditions were again explored extensively two days later when the German envoys brought permission from Hitler to the Hungarian Regent for military action against Carpatho-Ukraine.[57]

Hitler sent the Under State Secretary in the Reich Foreign Ministry, Günther Altenburg, who was accompanied by Döme Sztójay, to Budapest. In the morning of March 13, 1939, together with the German Ambassador, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, they called on the Regent of Hungary, Nicholas Horthy, and transmitted to him Hitler's wish that Hungary could now satisfy her desire to annex Carpatho-Ukraine. Prime Minister Paul Teleki, Foreign Minister István Csáky, and the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, Gen-

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in Carpatho-Ukraine directly. At that time, the whole attention of Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders was focused on the Prchala question, overlooking other dangers for their country.

[56] *DGFP*, D, VIII, footnote to Doc. 62, p. 60.

[57] *DGFP*, D, VIII, Doc. 185.

eral Henrik Werth, also participated in this discussion. When Altenburg pressed for immediate action, General H. Werth stated that he must reckon with the Czech resistance[58] and, therefore, he would have to make certain preparations since the recruits had been with their units only since February 1st. Despite this fact, General Werth promised that "he would strike within a week at the latest." The Germans "pointed out to all these authorities that this would be too late," therefore Count Csáky left his "sickbed to press for utmost speed." The Regent "bound all participants to secrecy on their word of honor" and promised to exert appropriate influence on the Chief of General Staff.[59] Admiral Horthy immediately sent a handwritten letter in German to Adolf Hitler, dated "Budapest, March 13, 1939," of the following wording:

> Your Excellency! Heartfelt thanks! I cannot express how happy I am, for this headwater region (*Quellgebiet*) is, in fact, for Hungary — I dislike using big words — a *vital question*.
>
> Notwithstanding our recruits of but 5 weeks, we are tackling the matter with enthusiasm. The plans are already laid. On Thursday the 16th of this month a frontier incident will take place, to be followed on Saturday by the big thrust.
>
> I shall never forget this proof of friendship and Your Excellency can at all times ever rely steadfastly (*felsenhaft*) on my gratitude.
>
> HORTHY[60]

As far as Hitler's time-table was concerned, the Hungarian attack, as planned by Horthy for March 18th, would not serve Germany's purpose. Therefore, under German pressure, the Regent and his Cabinet decided to act immediately.[61] Already on March 13th the Hungarians started to concentrate their troops along the Carpatho-Ukrainian frontier, and between five and six o'clock in the morning of the 14th of March they crossed the frontier line near Mukachiv. At 10 A.M. the Hungarians were in possession of the first three Carpatho-Ukrainian villages, namely Pidhoryany, Kol'chyno, and Koropets',[62] and were advancing in the direction of Chi-

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[58] There is no evidence that Hitler's envoys disclosed Germany's plans concerning Bohemia and Moravia. Nor were the Hungarians certain about the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia at that time. Only in this way can one explain the Hungarian fear of the "Czech resistance."

[59] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 198. Also see Walter Hagen, *Die Geheime Front* (Linz, 1950), pp. 183-186.

[60] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 199.

[61] Walter Hagen, *Op. Cit.*, p.184.

[62] Dr. Stepan Rosokha, "Narodzenya Derzhavy" in Ukrayins'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Boroť bi* (Vienna, 1939), p. 24.

nadiyevo-Svalyava. The estimated strength of the Hungarians in that region was four regiments, and no resistance of the Czech troops was reported.[63] The Czech troops under the command of General Prchala simultaneously, around 6:30 of the same morning, attacked the Ukrainian semi-military units of the Carpathian Sitch at Khust. This conflict made the position of the Hungarians even better.

On March 14, 1939, at three o'clock in the afternoon, just three hours after Slovakia was proclaimed an independent state, the extraordinary envoy of Hungarian Foreign Ministry, János Vörnle, handed to Dr. Miloš Kobr, up to that time the Czecho-Slovak Minister in Budapest, an ultimatum of the following wording:

M. le Ministre,

Slovakia has to-day proclaimed her independence. The Hungarian Government is convinced that the Czechs, who obtained the admission of the Czecho-Slovak State into the ranks of independent States more than twenty years ago by appealing to the right of nations to self-determination, will in their turn have taken cognizance of the expression of the will of the Slovak, German and Hungarian population of Slovakia with its full legal and historical significance and will pay the fullest attention to it.

Nevertheless the events which have recently taken place on the territory of Ruthenia and the constantly recurring incidents, which on the one hand endanger the peace of the Hungarian population living on the frontier and on the other hand conjure up the possibility that an attack may also be made from this area on Slovakia, which is fighting for her freedom on the basis of the right of nations to self-determination, make it the duty of the Hungarian Government to demand to (*sic!* of) the Czech Government:

1. That persons of the Hungarian nationality who have been interned shall at once be liberated.

2. That the persecution of persons of the Hungarian origin shall at once cease and they shall be granted complete liberty to organize themselves.

3. That weapons shall be issued to the Hungarian defense organizations.

4. That the evacuation of the territory of Ruthenia by Czech and Moravian troops shall commence within 24 hours.

5. That the property of Hungarian subjects and of members of the Hungarian nation shall in every way be respected.

The Hungarian Government once again most earnestly draw the attention of the Czech Government to their note No. 4/b of January 9, 1939.

The Hungarian Government emphasize that, true to their well known political principles, they would not remain indifferent if an armed Czech attack against Slovakia were launched on the Ruthene-Slovak frontier.

The Royal Hungarian Government await answer to this Note within twelve

[63] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 215.

hours from the time it was handed over, failing of which they must hold the Prague Government in every way responsible for the consequences.[64]

Thus, this ultimatum was handed to the representative of the Prague Government in Budapest some nine hours after the Hungarian troops crossed the Carpatho-Ukrainian territory. The incidents of that morning near Mukachiv were described later in the day by the Head of the Hungarian Military Intelligence, Col. Rezső Andorka, to the British Minister in Budapest, Sir G. Knox, as "usual frontier 'scraps' " but at the same time he admitted that Hungary ordered partial mobilization and already occupied one Carpatho-Ukrainian village.[65] Probably, this ultimatum referred even to that morning's incident which, actually, was the beginning of the Hungarian attack.

The Czechs had no interest to defend Carpatho-Ukraine after they were cut off from their own provinces by the independent Slovak State backed by Germany and Hungary. Therefore, they complied with the demands of the ultimatum,[66] and through partial arming of the Hungarian minority in Carpatho-Ukraine they added their share to the existing difficulties of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government. The Czech troops were withdrawn from Carpatho-Ukraine through Rumania and Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and via Poland on the other. Carpatho-Ukraine was left to herself.

CARPATHO-UKRAINE'S EFFORTS TO SAVE HER EXISTENCE

Less than two weeks before the March events, on February 25, 1939, some of the Carpatho-Ukrainian leaders were informed by the Carpatho-Ukrainian Intelligence Service that the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia was to be expected soon. At the same time, it was reported that the Slovak Hlinka Guard will try to seize the railroad line Uzhok-Velyke Berezne-Perechyn-Uzhhorod on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine because Carpatho-Ukraine was to be occupied by the Hungarians with Germany's consent. If, however, Carpatho-Ukraine would proclaim her independence almost simultaneously with Slovakia, the secret source stated, it might be possible that Hitler would take Carpatho-Ukraine under his protection

[64] *British Documents,* Third Series, IV, Doc. 253. The note of the Prague Government of January 9, 1939, demanded keeping all non-military armed persons at some distance from the frontier. Hungary accepted that proposal at that time and later dissolved the "szabadcsapatok" irregulars. For the Magyar text see *Népszava* (Budapest), March 15, 1939.

[65] *British Documents,* Third Series, IV, Doc. 242.

[66] Hubert Ripka, *Munich: Before and After* (London, 1939), p. 390.



Mykhaylo Brashchayko speaks in the Diet of Carpatho Ukraine.

similarly to the promise of protection to Slovakia.[67] Under those conditions, the Carpatho-Ukrainian leaders were aware of the necessity to prepare themselves to meet the approaching events.

The political leaders of Carpatho-Ukraine were aware of the fact that only Germany was able to save Carpatho-Ukraine from Hungarian occupation. Therefore, their efforts were directed in this respect toward Berlin. At the end of February 1939, the Deputy of the Supreme Commander of the Carpathian Sitch, Ivan Roman, arrived in Berlin to contact certain circles of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht regarding the supply of weapons and ammunition for the Carpatho-Ukrainian defense organization. An agreement with high officers of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmancht with pro-Ukrainian sympathies was reached. The details of the agreement were to be discussed with the Minister for Economic Affairs, Yuliyan Revay, who was to visit Berlin in connection with the realization of the economic agreement of December 7, 1938.[68] The problem of the armament of the "Carpathian Sitch" was of a great importance, since it seemed that the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government could rely only upon this semi-military organization.

While in the country itself the tension between the Czechs and Ukrainians grew from day to day, there remained a great disproportion between the two forces. The Czechs were armed, and the Ukrainian "Carpathian Sitch" possessed almost no weapons. When at the beginning of March 1939 Minister Yuliyan Revay left Khust for Berlin, the situation was ripe for explosion in the Carpatho-Ukrainian capital. The German press reported broadly on the tension and seemed to side with the Ukrainians. This was the situation before Yuliyan Revay arrived in Berlin on March 6, 1939. That morning, however, Berlin papers reported that Prague had relieved Revay of his position in Msgr. A. Voloshyn's Cabinet. Although Revay was equipped with credentials signed by Prime Minister Voloshyn and

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[67] On February 20-24, 1939, Deputy Mykhaylo Tulyk and Yurko Biley, Chief of the Police in Khust, visited Bratislava trying to get information from the Slovak responsible circles about their political goal. However, they were able to get some information only from Franz Karmasin, who together with Dr. Vojtech Tuka visited Adolf Hitler on February 12, 1939. Karmasin's top secret information was passed on by the two gentlemen to Messrs. Avhustyn Shtefan, Fedir Revay, Andriy Voron, and Volodymyr Komaryns'kyy. Fedir Revay was to inform Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn and Yuliyan Revay.

[68] V. P. Stakhiv, "Pochalosya v Uzhhorodi a zakinchylosya v Maramorosh-s'komu Syhoti," *Visti Bratstva kol. Voyakiv 1 UD UNA* (Munich), Vol. VI, No. 7-8 (57-58), p. 15.

was authorized to conduct the necessary talks in Berlin on behalf of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government, he was received very coldly and the German officials declined to discuss the pending questions under the existing situation.[69] Thus, Yuliyan Revay left Berlin for Vienna and remained there until the fateful events of the middle of March 1939.

Revay's unsuccessful visit to Berlin proved that Karmasin's information was true. Therefore, the Ukrainians decided to make the greatest efforts to save their country by themselves. Military training of the "Carpathian Sitch" was intensified. On Sunday, March 12, 1939, armed Slovak Hlinka Guardsmen concentrated along the administrative frontier between Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine and tried to seize the railroad line Uzhok-Perechyn-Uzhhorod; and, this was a signal at Khust that the fateful events were to be expected any day. The "Carpathian Sitch" prevented the seizure,[70] and the next day, Prime Minister A. Voloshyn ordered the commanding officer of the gendarmery at Khust, Colonel Vaka, to hand over all spare weapons and ammunition to the "Carpathian Sitch" immediately.[71] With few guns thus obtained the defense of the country was actually hopeless.

What was the attitude of the Germans toward these developments? The archives in the German Foreign Ministry indicate that the official German attitude toward the "Carpathian Sitch" and the Carpatho-Ukrainian question generally had been extremely reserved. On March 7, 1939, in a conversation with Anton Ernest Oldofredi, the leader of the *Volksdeutsche* in Carpatho-Ukraine, who referred to a statement of State Secretary W. Keppler that Germany would not tolerate injustice toward Carpatho-Ukraine, the Under State Secretary in the Reich Foreign Ministry, Günther Altenburg, made it clear that "the Reich was not to be committed to active support" of Carpatho-Ukraine in her struggle against Prchala.[72] On March 8, 1939, State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker instructed German Consul at Khust, Walter Splettstrasser, "to avoid any political conver-

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[69] *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17. There were some press reports that Minister Yuliyan Revay was received by Adolf Hitler. This conflicted with the reality. After his successless visit to Berlin, Yuliyan Revay made no efforts to be received by the Führer.

[70] *Nova Svoboda,* March 14, 1939.

[71] See above, p. 134. Also see Mjr. gšt. Emil Novotný, "Zánik Karpatskej Ukrajiny" in *Slovenské vojsko* (Bratislava), Ročník I, Číslo 6, of March 15, 1940, pp. 86-88, and Ročník I, Číslo 8, of April 15, 1940, pp. 130-152.

[72] *DGFP,* D, VI, Editor's Note, p. 90.

sations with Voloshyn or other personages."[73] On March 9, 1939, the German Consul at Khust, Walter Splettstrasser, was replaced by Dr. Hamilkar Hofmann who arrived at the capital of Carpatho-Ukraine with exact instructions. While the arrival of the new German Consul in Khust was accepted in uninformed circles under the impression of his November mission in Carpatho-Ukraine with hopes for increased German support for the Carpatho-Ukrainian cause,[74] Dr. H. Hofmann made no secret in the circles of the foreign journalists of the fact that Germany was not interested in Carpatho-Ukraine. Hofmann said to a British press representative at Khust that

> Germany was not interested in Eastern Europe now. Besides she had a pact of friendship with Poland, and any development of the Great Ukraine idea would be detrimental to the interests of Poland. Germany definitely did not intend to use Carpatho-Ukraine as a jumping off place for the Great Ukraine. The place was not yet even organized itself, and was in no way ripe for such a plan.[75]

Referring to the existing tension, Hofmann added that "the task, at the present moment, was how to retain Carpatho-Ukraine itself, and not let it slip into Polish or Hungarian hands." At the same time, however, he remarked that Dr. Peter Kleist, who was active in pro-Ukrainian actions, "had been brought sternly to task by official circles."[76] Thus, at Khust deceptive statements were still made by the Germans.

Germany's behavior regarding Carpatho-Ukraine was observed with anxiety in Carpatho-Ukraine. Even friendly moves were carefully analyzed by competent circles. The official organ of the "Carpathian Sitch" did not hesitate to analyze the relations between Germany and Carpatho-Ukraine just a few days after Germany prevented the Hungarians for the second time from taking military actions in the country. In its leading article titled "German Foreign Policy" *Nastup*, February 16, 1939, wrote:

> It is true that Germany had done very much for our Statehood, but nevertheless one cannot talk to-day about an existence of a close friendship between Germany and Carpatho-Ukraine... Such a friendship does not exist. Moreover, the Ukrainian political circles realize that Germany maintains certain reserve in this respect... As for now, one should not believe in something that does not exist and to propagandize the non-existing facts among our people.

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[73] *DGFP*, D, VI, Editor's Note, p. 90.

[74] *Nova Svoboda*, March 10, 1939.

[75] Michael Winch, *Republic For A Day* (London, 1939), p. 272.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 273.

And, after the uncompleted excursion of a group of the "Carpathian Sitch" officers and guardsmen to Vienna as well as after Ivan Roman's return from Berlin without a single gun, the Carpatho-Ukrainian political and military leaders were even more convinced that they could not rely upon Germany. However, what were they to do under existing conditions? It was generally recognized that Germany had held the key position as far as the Central European problems were concerned, and the Carpatho-Ukrainians were no exception in this respect. This fact determined the direction of their efforts to save their country in the fateful hours.

While the Supreme Command of the "Carpathian Sitch" was planning how to meet the crisis and was trying to secure armaments from the Czech controlled stocks, the Government concentrated its efforts to secure Germany's support of Carpatho-Ukrainian independence. Expecting the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia, Prime Minister A. Voloshyn sent the following telegram through a delegation to the German Consul at Khust for transmission to Berlin:

> To the Foreign Minister, Berlin, Germany.
> In the name of the Government of the Carpatho-Ukraine I beg you to take cognizance of the declaration of our independence under the protection of the German Reich.
>
> Prime Minister Dr. Voloshyn, Khust.[77]

This request of Msgr. Voloshyn was handed to Dr. H. Hofmann at 1:30 a.m. of March 14, 1939, who had sent it from Khust at 3:50 a.m., and it was received at the Berlin Foreign Ministry at 6:15 a.m. on March 14th. It was received before the Slovak declaration of independence was an accomplished fact and also before Hungarian troops crossed the Carpatho-Ukrainian frontier. After the news reached Khust that the Hungarian troops occupied the village of Pidhoryany in Carpatho-Ukraine, at 9 a.m. of the same day the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine requested the German Consul in Khust to transmit its appeal to "the Reich Government to intervene in Budapest so that the advance of Hungarian troops may be stopped."[78] The transmission of this request was delayed first by Hofmann for over two hours, and then after it arrived in Berlin it remained unanswered. Instead, after the receipt of these requests from Khust, the Reich Foreign Minister issued instructions to the effect

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[77] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 210.
[78] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 215.

that "no action is to be taken" on these telegrams.[79] A further telegram from Khust which conveyed a message from Msgr. A. Voloshyn to the Reich Foreign Minister that "in view of the declaration of independence by Slovakia, it was impossible for the Ukrainian people to remain within the federative union of the Czecho-Slovak State"[80] and repeated the request for protection also remained unanswered.

After Prime Minister A. Voloshyn proclaimed the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine through the Khust radio station at seven o'clock in the evening of March 14th, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the new Government of Carpatho-Ukraine, Yuliyan Revay, "officially notified" the German Legation in Prague "of the Carpatho-Ukraine declaration of independence and asked for the protection of the Reich."[81] At two o'clock in the morning of March 15th, the German Chargé d'Affairs in Prague, Andor Hencke, also reported to Berlin that "the Carpatho-Ukraine representatives here asked for Germany's protection against the Hungarians, who have penetrated 10 kilometers inside the Carpatho-Ukraine, and against the Czechs" inside the country.[82] All these facts were reported to Berlin after considerable delay.

Finally, after the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine was left without any word from Berlin, in the morning of March 15, 1939, the German Consul in Khust, Dr. H. Hofmann, communicated through the Prague Legation the following message which was forwarded to Berlin at 2:30 p.m. of that day:

> The Carpatho-Ukraine Government asked the German Government to state whether it would accept a protectorate over the Carpatho-Ukraine. Hungarian troops were advancing along the whole southern frontier. The Carpatho-Ukraine Government asked the German Government to state as soon as possible whether or not the Carpatho-Ukraine had been promised to Hungary.[83]

Simultaneously, a courier was sent to Rumania. This courier sent, from Sighet, a telegram to Berlin which was received there at 4:00 p.m. on March 15, 1939. The wording of this telegram was:

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[79] *DGFP*, D, VI, Editor's Note to Doc. 77, p. 90.

[80] *DGFP*, D. IV, footnote No. 3 to Doc. 210, p. 251.

[81] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 230. Dr. Vikentiy Shandor presented notifications about the declaration of independence of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic on March 14, 1939, at the Prague Legations of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Poland. See Dr. Vikentiy Shandor, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina zfederovana derzhava* (New York, 1968), p. 19.

[82] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 230.

[83] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 235.

We proclaim the independence of the Carpatho-Ukraine, and we request the protection of the German Reich. At the same time we inform you that Hungarian troops crossed our frontiers near Mukačevo at 6 a.m. today. We ask for measures against the Hungarians and protection and help against the Czechs, who are resorting to force.

Prime Minister Dr. Avhustyn Voloshyn
Revay on behalf of Deputy Tulek for
the National Union of the Ukraine.[84]

All these appeals remained unanswered. Already on March 14, 1939,State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker formulated an official German justification for the Hungarian occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine. He blamed the Czechs for the appointment of General Lev Prchala to the post of a member of the autonomous Carpatho-Ukrainian Government which resulted in "severe clashes" between Czech soldiers and the "Carpathian Sitch". In his instruction to the German missions abroad, Weizsäcker continued that "as a result of these and other incidents on the frontier, units of the Hungarian Army have advanced into the Carpatho-Ukraine to protect the Hungarian population."[85] And, finally, at 5 p.m. of March 15, 1939, Weizsäcker sent a telegram to the German Consul at Khust instructing him to

inform Carpatho-Ukraine Government orally that, Hungarian troops having advanced against Carpatho-Ukraine on a broad front, the German Government advises it to offer no resistance. As matters stand, the German Government regrets that it is not in a position to assume the protectorate.[86]

Shortly after seven o'clock in the evening, Dr. H. Hofmann came to the private quarters of Prime Minister A. Voloshyn, where political leaders were assembled to deliberate as to the steps to be followed in the existing situation, and transmitted the message of the German Government.[87] This was the last contact at Khust between the two Governments.[88] The Carpatho-Ukrainian Govern-

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[84] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 236. Although the document, as it was published, is dated "Sighet, March 15, 1939," and bears a remark "Received March 15 — 4:00 p.m.", its content would rather indicate that it was written on March 14, 1939; especially the reference made in it to the crossing of the frontier near Mukachiv as well as that to resorting to force by the Czechs. Both events happened on March 14, 1939.

[85] *DGFP*, D. IV, Doc. 227.

[86] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 237.

[87] Ivan Rohach, "Pid praporom nezalezhnosty" in Ukrains'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi* (Vienna, 1939), pp. 109-115.

[88] The German Consul at Khust, Dr. H. Hofmann, declined to accept the

ment, however, did not take Germany's advice not to resist the Hungarian occupation.

After the proclamation of the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine, this fact was communicated to the Hungarian Government by Prime Minister Msgr. A. Voloshyn who asked Hungary to respect the will of the people to live in their own independent State. In return, Msgr. A. Voloshyn offered to the Hungarians "permanent friendship and close cooperation."[89] This offer was rejected by the Hungarians. Instead, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count István Csáky, sent to the Prime Minister of Carpatho-Ukraine an ultimatum expiring at 8 p.m. on March 15, 1939, demanding "the transfer to the commander of the advancing Hungarian troops of the authority hitherto exercised *de facto* by him, in order to avoid bloodshed."[90] This ultimatum was transmitted first by telephone[91] and later reaffirmed by a Hungarian parliamentarian.[92] The Hungarian officer then personally transmitted a written document to the newly elected President of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic, Msgr. A. Voloshyn. The conditions of the ultimatum remained unchanged.

While the Hungarian military officer was waiting, a short council meeting was held. It was decided to reject the Hungarian demand concerning the transfer of the newly established country's authority to the Hungarians, but it was decided to send a delegation to Budapest for negotiations with the Hungarian Government. The Carpatho-Ukrainian authorities also proposed that the hostilities on the fronts should stop during the negotiations between the two Governments. To this proposal the Hungarian Foreign Minister replied immediately that "the Hungarian Government is unable to stop the military actions for technical reasons, but is willing to negotiate with the representatives of the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine."[93] This Hun-

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invitation to be a guest at the opening session of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet. Also the representative of the German minority in the Diet, Deputy Anton Ernst Oldofredi, was absent from the session although he was in Khust at the time of the session.

[89] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 243.

[90] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 243.

[91] Prof. Avhustyn Shtefan was the recipient of the telephone message from Budapest.

[92] The Hungarian parliamentarian, baron Wimmersperg, was escorted by the members of the "Carpathian Sitch" who resisted the advance of the Hungarian troops. They reached the quarters of Msgr. A. Voloshyn after the session of the Diet, i.e. shortly before the expiration of the time of ultimatum.

[93] Ivan Rohach, *Op. Cit.*, p. 114. The efforts of Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko and Dr. Mykola Dolynay to negotiate with the Hungarian Government remained

garian message remained unanswered. It was decided to evacuate the offices of the Government immediately from Khust to Velykyy Bychkiv and to continue the defense of the country.

From the military point of view, Carpatho-Ukraine could not have had any success in her battle against the military forces of Hungary. First of all, the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine could use only the semi-military Organization for the National Defense "Carpathian Sitch", and had no jurisdiction over the federal regular military units of Czecho-Slovakia including those stationed on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine. Since the provisions of the Constitutional Charter Amendment of November 22, 1938, according to which the citizens of Carpatho-Ukraine were to serve in the military units stationed on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine,[94] were not fulfilled by the military authorities of the Federation, there were relatively few soldiers of Ukrainian nationality serving in the military units stationed in Carpatho-Ukraine. Thus, the situation was entirely different from that in Slovakia where the Slovak military units were in existence and, immediately after proclamation of the independence of Slovakia, were subordinated to the Slovak Government. They loyally accepted the change and obeyed the orders of the new Supreme Command.

The "Carpathian Sitch" was the only force defending the frontiers of Carpatho-Ukraine as far as this was possible for these very badly armed and trained units. After the proclamation of the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine by the Diet, a Minister of the Defense, Stepan Klochurak, was appointed. He immediately issued a decree creating regular military forces of the newly proclaimed Republic under the name of the "National Defense of Carpatho-Ukraine" subordinated to the Ministry of Defense. While the Supreme Command was placed in the hands of the newly elected President of the Republic, Msgr. A. Voloshyn, the operational Commander-in-Chief was appointed by Minister Klochurak by his "Order No. 1" in the person of Colonel Serhiy Yefremov. The position of the Chief of the Staff remained in the hands of Colonel Mykhaylo Huzar-Kolodzins'kyy, who up to the moment occupied the same position in the "Carpathian Sitch."[95]

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without any success. After they arrived in Budapest, the Hungarians refused to negotiate seriously.

[94] Capital III, § 13, Section 3. Ústavní zákon ze dne 22 listopadu 1938, čís. 328/38 Sb. z. a nař. o autonomii Podkarpatské Rusi.

[95] For the full text of the "Order No. 1" see Serhiy Yefremov, "Kryvavyy Berezeň Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny," *Svoboda* (Jersey City, N.J.), March 4, 1954.

This formality, however, did not change the actual situation on the front. A proclamation of mobilization was published in the last issue of *Nova Svoboda*, Khust, March 16, 1939, of the following wording:

> **Attention!**
> Former military officers, under-officers and soldiers
> to the colors!
> The Ministry of Defense in Khust established the General Staff under the leadership of Colonel Yefremov. The formation of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Army is in process. All former military officers, under-officers and soldiers report to the Supreme Command of the Army; there should be not a single trained soldier who would not offer his services to his own State. We have been serving the Kaisers, various foreign Presidents, thus let us serve our own nation.
> Soldiers, your own State calls you to the colors.

The advance of Hungarian troops along the whole front line made it impossible to mobilize the former soldiers. Even if the mobilization would have been carried out, there was a lack of armaments. The "Carpathian Sitch" guardsmen fought on the fronts only with the weapons taken from the local gendarmes and the Czech troops leaving the country.[96] On March 15, 1939, Hungarian troops occupied the town of Sevlyush at two o'clock in the afternoon. For the next twenty four hours the "Carpathian Sitch" defended the country's capital, Khust, holding a front at Velyka Kopanya-Rokosovo-Korolevo nad Tysoyu line under the command of Yakiv Holota and Ivan Chuchka.[97] After some sporadic defensive firing in the fields immediately southwest of Khust, the last "Carpathian Sitch" units left the capital and around 4:30 p.m. on March 16, 1939, the city was taken by the Hungarian military forces.[98] The remnants

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Besides Colonel Yefremov, the following officers were appointed by the Minister of Defense to the General Staff: Chief of the Staff Mykhaylo Huzar-Kolodzins'kyy, other members: Colonel V. Filonovych, Sr. Lieutenant Parchanyi, Sr. Lieutenant Gulyanych, Lieutenant Babilya, Jr. Lieutenants A. Ivashkevych, M. Puhlyk and Stepan Vayda, Lieutenants Petro Chornyy and Borys Shchuka, and the Commander of the "Carpathian Sitch" Ivan Roman. The order was dated "Khust, March 15, 1939" and signed by Stepan Klochurak, Minister of the Defense of Carpatho-Ukraine.

[96] Ostap Volyans'kyy, "V oblychi madyars'koho nastupu" in Ukrayins'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi* (Vienna, 1939), p. 116.

[97] Ivan Chuchka, "Za Sevlyush i Velyku Kopanyu"; Vasyl' Poshtak, "Biy na Khusts'komu poli"; and Yakiv Holota, "Vid Koroleva do Khustu", all in Ukrayins'ka Presova Sluzhba, *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi* (Vienna, 1939,), pp. 134-135, 136-139, and 140-141 respectively.

[98] Ivan Hutsul, "Ostannya sotnya", and Mariya Samchukova, "Orda ide", both in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi*, pp. 142-151 and 152-158 respectively.

of the "Carpathian Sitch" retreated from Khust either towards the East through Velykyy Bychkiv to Rumania[99] or dispersed in the mountains in various directions from Khust.

Simultaneously, Hungarian troops advanced from Uzhhorod into the direction of Perechyn, which was occupied by March 16th, and toward Uzhok. Other Hungarian units advanced from Mukachiv to Svalyava, which was also taken on March 16, and through Skotars'ke toward the Polish frontier. After March 16, 1939, there was actually no more regular front, and only dispersed groups of Ukrainians still attacked groups of Hungarian soldiers in the mountainous regions. There were reports about skirmishes in the vicinity of Rakhiv and Yasinya as late as March 23, 1939.[100] This, however, did not change the situation since by that time the Hungarian troops controlled the whole of the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine.

EPILOGUE

The feeling of similarity of the fate of the Carpatho-Ukrainians and that of the Czechs determined by the events of the middle of March 1939 causes one to think about their common past. Msgr. A. Voloshyn not only mentioned sympathetically the President of the dismembered Republic, Dr. Emil Hácha, in his opening address at the session of the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine, but after the ratification of the proclamation of independence of Carpatho-Ukraine by the Diet, he sent a telegram to the Prague Government in which he thanked the Czech people and their Government for the common past. The Czechs were deeply touched by that noble act of Msgr. A. Voloshyn who did it despite the bitterness created by the death of over one hundred Ukrainians in the streets of Khust just the day before from Czech guns.[101] This ended the official relations between the two Governments.

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[99] In the morning hours of March 18, 1939, the remnants of the "Carpathian Sitch" assembled around Velykyy Bychkiv passed the Tysa river to Rumania. On the same day, the Rumanian military authorities extradited some 275 guardsmen and civilian refugees to the Hungarians in Velykyy Bychkiv. See D. R., "Kriz Bychkiv ta Rakhiv" in *Karpats'ka Ukrayina v Borot'bi*, pp. 159-165.

[100] *Le Figaro* (Paris), March 23, 1939. Also see *The New York Times*, March 17, 1939; *Curentul* (Bucharest), March 22, 1939; *Slowo Narodowe* (L'viv), March 22, 1939; *Romania* (Bucharest), March 22, 1939; *Das Neue Wiener Blatt* (Vienna), March 18, 1939, and other newspapers of that time.

[101] Vincent Shandor, "Carpatho-Ukraine in the International Bargaining of 1918-1939," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* (New York), Vol. X, No. 3, Summer 1954, p. 246.

During these eventful hours, the Slovak Government was too busy defending the interests of Slovakia and maintaining order at home to be able to deal with the problem of a neighboring people with whom the Slovaks had shared their fate for the past one thousand years. Besides, even before these events, the relations between the Governments of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine were rather official.[102] Prime Minister A. Voloshyn stressed the fact that neither had the autonomous Government of Slovakia nor any Slovak political leader informed him or some other competent Carpatho-Ukrainian political leader concerning their intention to proclaim the independence of Slovakia. This fact was emphasized at the decisive meeting of the members of the Government, Deputies of the Diet, and other influential personages in the afternoon hours of March 14, 1939, at Khust, after the declaration of Slovak independence was already a historical fact.

Most of the "Carpathian Sitch" guardsmen, who decided to retreat from the regions of Svalyava-Pasika-Poroshkiv-Perechyn, as well as Serednye-Antalivtsi-Perechyn and Nevyts'ke-Perechyn-Berezne withdrew to Slovakia. Most of them crossed the frontier at Ublya where they were disarmed and escorted by the Slovak Hlinka Guard to Kamenica nad Cirokou to be interned in a camp. After a few weeks, the interned members of the "Carpathian Sitch" were set free, and the Slovak authorities provided temporary shelter for them as well as for many other Carpatho-Ukrainian refugees who were granted asylum.

The attitude of Poland was a jubilant one. The common frontier between Poland and Hungary had become a reality.[103] Poland immediately undertook to mediate between Hungary and Rumania to the effect that "Rumania would receive both the areas settled by Rumanians and the extreme eastern tip with the strategically important railway" of Carpatho-Ukraine.[104] But the Hungarian Min-

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[102] Míla Valentová, "Rozhovor státního ministra Sidora se zástupcem naš časopisu: O poměru Slovenské vlády k Rusínům," *A-Zet* (Prague), January 1, 1939.

[103] Despite the enthusiasm which overshadowed all other factors among Polish masses, some analyzing voices were raised in the Polish press. *Slowo Narodowe* (L'viv), March 22, 1939, raised the question: "What did we achieve? Yes, we established 150 kilometers of the common Polish-Hungarian frontier, but, at the same time, they (the Germans) received 750 kilometers of the common frontier with Hungary. Was it worthwhile for us to fight for it?"

[104] *DGFP*, D, VI, Doc. 4. Also see *British Documents*, Third Series, Vol. IV, Doc. 250. On March 17, 1939, the Hungarian Minister, László Bárdossy, reported from Bucharest to István Csáky that "from the conversation with the Polish

ister in Warsaw, András Hory, rejected this proposal of Colonel Józef Beck, and told the German Ambassador in Warsaw that after his conversation with Beck he had the impression that "the Polish Government would be tactful enough to leave the conquest of the Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary alone."[105]

During his visit in Poland at the beginning of March, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Grigore Gafencu, in his conversation with Colonel Beck stated that because of bad communications between Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia further opposition of Rumania to the establishment of the common Polish-Hungarian frontier was "pointless."[106] Despite this fact, the Rumanian Chargé d'Affairs in Berlin, Victor Brabetzianu, handed on March 15, 1939, in the Reich Foreign Ministry an *aide mémoire* of the following wording:

Berlin, March 14, 1939.

Aide-Memoiré

The Rumanian Government begs to inform the Reich Government as follows with regard to the events taking place in Czechoslovakia:

1. Rumania has recognized and respected the situation created by the Vienna Award. She has not taken nor will she take any action to alter this situation.

2. If circumstances render necessity, Rumania would, jointly with all other interested states, take part in the creation of a new permanent settlement in the Carpatho-Ukraine.

The Rumanian Government would therefore be particularly grateful to the Reich Government if the latter would inform it of its attitude toward the maintenance of the situation created in the Carpatho-Ukraine by the Vienna Award.[107]

After the Chargé d'Affairs even now received an evasive answer from Under State Secretary Ernst Woermann, he stated that he would take up this matter in a day or two. Simultaneously, the Rumanian Foreign Minister informed the German Minister in Bucharest, Wilhelm Fabricius, about the position of the Rumanian Government adding that:

A few Rumanian units are concentrated on the frontier facing Carpatho-Ukraine, but they are not to be given marching orders until the situation has

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Minister may be concluded that the Poles have indeed encouraged the Rumanians to present their claims and to occupy the claimed territory. On the other hand, the Rumanians would like to see the Poles to participate in the occupation" of Carpatho-Ukraine. *Hungarian Documents,* Doc. 90, p. 213.

[105] *DGFP,* D, VI, footnote No. 4 to Doc. 4, p. 6.

[106] *British Documents,* Third Series, IV, Doc. 178.

[107] *DGFP,* D, IV, Doc. 240.

been clarified. Rumania, however, will not look on idly if Rumanian villages and railway lines in the Carpatho-Ukraine are occupied by Hungary and if Hungary possibly occupies position facing the new frontier.[108]

Encouraged by the Poles, who advised the Rumanians to occupy Rumanian villages and the eastern part of Carpatho-Ukraine with the railroad leading from Kolomyya through Yasinya to Sighet,[109] the Rumanian Government had presented a Note, dated March 15, 1939, to the Hungarian Government proposing that the Hungarian troops should not move east of a line running north from Khust. Just as Poland was now advocating the Rumanian interests, so also did Rumania mutually advocate Poland's interests proposing to Hungary that Poland should have a share in the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine.[110] But, after Colonel Beck declared on March 15, 1939, that "Poland had no territorial designs on the Carpatho-Ukraine,"[111] the dispute over the distribution of the territory was confined to Hungary and Rumania. Under those conditions Rumania confined her claims to the four villages inhabited by the Rumanian minority, namely Nyzhnya Apsha, Vyshnya Apsha, Bila Cerkov and Solotvyna as well as the railroad line connecting Kolomyya and Solotvyna.

After receipt of the Hungarian note, as well as after receiving information that Rumania had mobilized five classes, the Hungarian Army received orders, on March 16th, to eject the Rumanians, should they invade Carpatho-Ukraine. After rejecting "in a friendly manner" the Polish Foreign Minister's advice to appease Rumania by means of sharing the Carpatho-Ukrainian territory, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count István Csáky, expressed his willingness to allow the Rumanians to occupy these few villages in exchange for Magyar ethnic territories under Rumanian rule elsewhere.[112] In the meanitime, on March 17th, the State Secretary in

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[108] *DGFP*, D, VI, Doc. 2.

[109] *DGFP*, D, VI, Doc. 6.

[110] *DGFP*, D, VI, footnote No. 2 to Doc. 7, and Doc. 29. Also see *Hungarian Documents*, Doc. 90., p. 213. Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck acted in the spirit of Count Csáky's promise of October 5, 1938, made at Warsaw to Beck that Hungary would agree to partial occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine by the Rumanians if they would remain neutral in case of Hungarian military attack on Czecho-Slovakia. However, Count Csáky, acting as the Hungarian Foreign Minister, broke his promise on March 22, 1939, and unconditionally rejected the Polish-Rumanian efforts. See *Hungarian Documents*, Doc. 91, p. 213.

[111] *DGFP*, D, VI, footnote No. 4 to Doc. 4.

[112] *DGFP*, D, VI, Doc. 7.

the Reich Foreign Ministry, Ernst von Weizsäcker, informed the Rumanian Foreign Ministry that the Germans considered the reserve hitherto maintained by Rumania to be prudent and are of the opinion that Rumanian interests would best be served by avoidance of violent measures.[113] In that situation, on March 18, 1939, the Rumanian Government announced that in its opinion, Hungary should declare herself in agreement with the occupation of this minimal territory "in the interests of improving Rumanian-Hungarian relations." However, "if Hungary did not do this voluntarily, Rumania would abandon her claims altogether as she desired no increase of territory."[114] Finally, to relieve the existing military tension, on March 30, 1939, Rumania renounced all her claims with regard to territory of Carpatho-Ukraine.[115] Only thereafter did both countries gradually demobilize.

It is interesting to notice that the German Minister in Bucharest, Wilhelm Fabricius, wholeheartedly supported the Rumanian claims with regard to the four Rumanian-inhabited villages in Carpatho-Ukraine. He expressed this opinion in his telegram of March 18, 1939, to the Reich Foreign Minister suggesting that "it would be to our (German) advantage if Rumania, by the occupation (of these villages) were to participate in the liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia."[116] Thus, only the Hungarian determination to fight Rumania militarily saved the unity of the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine, i. e. from being partitioned.

Despite their anti-Hungarian attitude, the Rumanians had declined Msgr. A. Voloshyn's request for protection of Carpatho-Ukraine against Hungarian invasion. After all appeals to the German Government remained unanswered, the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine addressed a similar appeal to the Rumanian Government through the Rumanian Prefect in Sighet. However, after the consultation of the Rumanian Chargé d'Affairs in Berlin, Victor Brabetzianu, with the Under State Secretary in the Reich Foreign Ministry, Ernst Woermann, on March 15, 1939,[117] the Rumanian Government answered in the negative. Although, even thereafter, Msgr. A. Voloshyn and the members of his Government were received politely in Rumania as political refugees, they were urged

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[113] *DGFP*, D, VI, Doc. 13.
[114] *DGFP*, D, VI, Doc. 29.
[115] *DGFP*, D, VI, Doc. 132.
[116] *DGFP*, D, VI, Doc. 29.
[117] *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 240.

to leave Rumanian soil as soon as possible. Therefore, they went to Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia, too, was an ally of Czecho-Slovakia for almost twenty years as one of the three members of the Little Entente. However, the Government of Yugoslavia maintained "complete restraint in the Carpatho-Ukrainian question."[118] The Hungarian-Yugoslav relations were improved at the time of the March events to such an extent that the Hungarian Government used Yugoslavia's good offices to influence Rumania's attitude.

The Government of Yugoslavia, however, received Msgr. A. Voloshyn and other Carpatho-Ukrainian political emigrées in a very friendly manner. Temporarily, the members of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government with several hundred refugees were settled in the Ukrainian settled regions of Bachka, in and around the town of Rus'kyy Kerestur. An office of the President of Carpatho-Ukraine in exile was set up in Crkvenica. The autochthone Ukrainians did provide the shelter, technical personnel, including an honor guard for Msgr. A. Voloshyn.[119] The Government of Yugoslavia also gave aid to the emigrées. The office of the Prime Minister, Dragiša Cvetkovič, immediately gave 30,000 Dinars to Msgr. A. Voloshyn for the necessities of the emigrées. The money was received by Prof. Avhustyn Shtefan, the President of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet and Minister of Education in the last Government in Khust. Yugoslavia, however, had difficulties in providing jobs for the emigrées; therefore, most of them left Yugoslavia for other countries. Some of them left for Slovakia, but the greatest number of these emigrées went either to Bohemia and Moravia, or to Germany.

While in Yugoslavia, Msgr. A. Voloshyn thought of going to Great Britain. He was, however, not willing to accept ex-President Beneš's policy of the pre-Munich conditions in Carpatho-Ukraine.[120] Dr. Edvard Beneš's followers were already active in London at that time. Under those conditions, on instructions from Reich Foreign Minister of March 29, 1939, the German Minister in Belgrad, Victor von Heeren, visited Msgr. A. Voloshyn in Crkvenica, Yugoslavia, and personally invited him in the name of the German Government to live under German sovereignty. This invitation was made, however, not from the point of view of charity or to serve Ukrain-

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[118] *DGFP*, D, VI, Doc. 7.

[119] Yevhen Matsyakh, "Ukrayintsi v Khorvatiyi" in *Organizatsiya Ukrayins'kykh Natsionalistiv: 1929-1954* (Paris, 1955), pp. 395-397.

[120] *Ibid.*, p. 397.

ian desires. The reason was stated in a telegram sent to the German Minister in Budapest, Otto von Erdmannsdorff, by Joachim von Ribbentrop personally, dated March 29, 1939, which reads:

> We possess information that Vološin is considering going to England but we have a pronounced interest in his taking up his residence in Germany as we wish to ensure that we keep in contact with him and have means of bringing influence to bear on him.[121]

Unaware of the German plan, Msgr. A. Voloshyn took up his residence in Prague rather than in some German community.[122] The President of the Diet, Prof. Avhustyn Shtefan, as well as the last Prime Minister of Carpatho-Ukraine, Yuliyan Revay, settled in Slovakia.

And, finally, what was the attitude of Russians towards the March happenings in Carpatho-Ukraine? In his long exposé to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 10, 1939, Stalin blamed the Western Democracies for the actualization of the Ukrainian struggle for independence in the "Anglo-French and North American press," adding that "it looks as if the purpose of this suspicious uproar was to engender the fury of the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without apparent reasons."[123] And, on March 19, 1939, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim M. Litvinov, in his conversation with the Counselor of the German Embassy in Moscow, Werner von Tippelskirch, "openly showed his satisfaction regarding the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary."[124]

Thus, liquidating Czecho-Slovakia, Adolf Hitler enlarged his *Lebensraum* and, at the same time, satisfied the desires of Hungary, Poland, and the USSR. The annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine by

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[121] *DGFP*, D, VI, footnote No. 19 to Doc. 300, p. 392.

[122] Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn remained in Prague where besides fulfilling his ecclesiastical obligations he worked as Professor of Psychology at the Ukrainian Free University. In May 1945, Msgr. A. Voloshyn was arrested by the Russian military police. At the same time, all other members of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government residing at that time in Prague were arrested. Thus, along with Msgr. A. Voloshyn, Dr. Mykola Dolynay, Stepan Klochurak, and Yuriy Perevuznyk were deported from Prague to Moscow, USSR, and imprisoned in the Lefortovskaya jail. Due to the unbearably torturous conditions in the prison, Msgr. A. Voloshyn died there on July 11, 1945. Other three members of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government survived Stalinist terror.

[123] *Izvestiia* (Moscow), March 12, 1939. Also cited in *DGFP*, D, VI, Doc. 1.

[124] *DGFP*, D, VI, Doc. 51.

Hungary with Germany's consent was used by German diplomats for several months thereafter to persuade the Governments of the USSR and Poland that Germany had no designs for her *Drang nach Osten*, as far as their territorial interests were concerned. At the same time, the Ukrainian question was still used by the Germans to play the USSR against Poland[125] and Poland against the USSR.[126] The red totalitarianism proved to be more willing to cooperate with the brown dictatorship than with the Western Democracies, and the March events were followed soon by the September events in Poland and the world conflict.

One country was greatly disappointed by the March events. This country was Italy. Both friendly countries, Germany and Hungary, failed to inform the Duce about their plans before the actions started in Carpatho-Ukraine.[127] And suspicious Count Ciano made the following remarks in his diary for March 14, 1939, referring to the events in Bohemia and Moravia as well as in Carpatho-Ukraine, having in mind Hitler's behavior:

> The Axis functions only in favor of one of its parts, which tends to have preponderant proportions, and it acts entirely on its own initiative, with little regard for us (Italians). I expressed my point of view to the Duce. He was cautious in his reaction and did not seem to attach great importance to the event.[128]

After "from all the capitals disturbing telegrams have arrived" in Rome, Count Ciano under the impact of his disappointment with Germany came to conclusion that "even in Hungary there is no celebration" on the occasion of the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine. "Worse things are feared,"[129] he thought, and he was right.

As far as the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine was concerned, even the former Czech political leaders did not care for it. In identical telegrams sent by ex-President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Dr. Edvard Beneš, to the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, French

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[125] For German assurances that they have no intentions to march into Ukraine see *DGFP*, D, IV, Doc. 493; and Vol. VI, Docs. 452, 582 and 729. For the secret German-Soviet division of Poland see *DGFP*, D, VIII, Docs. 46, 57, 109, 122, 137, 152, 158 and 193.

[126] For German assurances given to Poland and their proposals to Poland to play the leading role in the solution of the Ukrainian problem see *DGFP*, D, V, Doc. 126; and Vol. VI, Docs. 4, 61, 73, 99 and 234.

[127] *DGFP*, D, IV, Docs. 224, 232 and 239; and Vol. VI, Docs. 39 and 140.

[128] Hugh Gibson, ed., *The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943* (New York, 1946), p. 42.

[129] *Ibid.*, p. 45; entry for March 17, 1939.

Premier Édouard Daladier, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim M. Litvinov, and the President of the League of Nations, after the events of March 14-16, 1939, urging these Great Powers not to recognize the changes in Czecho-Slovakia, he carefully avoided mentioning Carpatho-Ukraine and the fate of the Carpatho-Ukrainians. He spoke then only on behalf of the Czechs and Slovaks, stating among other things:

> The Czech and Slovak peoples are victims of a great international crime... One of the great powers who signed the Agreement of Munich is now dividing our territory, is occupying it with its army and is establishing a "protectorate" under threat of force and military violence.
>
> Before the conscience of the whole world and before history I must proclaim that the Czechs and Slovaks will never accept this unbearable infringement of their sacred rights and will never cease their struggle until these rights are restored to their beloved country, and I entreat your Government to refuse to recognize this crime and to take the steps which today's tragic situation in the world urgently requires. Aggression and slavery have never endured for long. Nor will the present aggression and slavery last. A free Europe will again be established with free Czechs and Slovaks within it.[130]

Thus, in these days of desperation, Dr. Edvard Beneš thought only of the Czechs and Slovaks. Later on, however, the Czecho-Slovak Government in exile saw it feasable to exploit the Carpatho-Ukrainian resistance against the Hungarian invasion during the fateful March days of 1939 for its own purposes.[131] The members of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government as well as political emigrées joined the Ukrainian Independence Movement in exile as an integral part of it.[132]

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[130] For full text see Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Czechoslovakia Fights Back* (Washington, 1943), pp. 176-177.

[131] *Ibid.*, pp. 170-171. For a brief treatment of the Czech efforts to utilize thousands of the Carpatho-Ukrainian victims of the Hungarian oppression in the years of 1939-1945 who seeked refuge in the USSR see Ivan Vanat, "Zakarpats'ki ukrayintsi v chekhoslovats'komu viys'ku v SRSR" in Ivan Vanat et al. (ed.), *Shlyakh do voli*, Svidnik: Muzey ukrayins'koyi kul'tury, 1966, pp. 183-201. The Czechoslovak Government in exile tried to re-incorporate the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine into the post-World War II Czecho-Slovakia. The exile Government residing in London, Great Britain, invited Dr. Pavel Cibere to represent the policy of restoration of the pre-World War II Czecho-Slovakia, including the "autonomous Podkarpatská Rus." Gregory I. Zhatkovych supported this policy in the United States of America.

[132] For the text of an agreement signed between the Leadership of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine of July 21, 1939, see *Organizatsiya Ukrayins'kykh Natsionalistiv, 1929-1954* (Paris, 1955), p. 210. The agreement was signed in Venice, Italy, by: Colonel

Count Ciano's feeling that there was no reason for celebration even in Hungary proved to have a real basis. Hungary was able to rule Carpatho-Ukraine this time only for five years. The Czechs did not succeed in the new situation to regain that province. The present status of Carpatho-Ukraine was decided on November 26, 1945, according to which she became an integral region of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic[133] which in turn is one of the fifteen Union Republics constituting the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

Thus, after centuries of political separation, the Carpatho-Ukrainians were finally re-united with almost all the other ethnic Ukrainian provinces and territories. Although they lost the cherished democratic liberties enjoyed in 1919-1939, the revived process of Magyarization of the province was arrested, and their desire to share the destiny of the Ukrainian nation as a whole became a reality.

Presently, the Carpatho-Ukrainians as an integral part of the Ukrainian nation share all the achievements of the Ukrainian people in the spheres of culture, education, and national economy as well as in all the sorrows of the Russian Communist oppression. A strong desire for the national unity and an even stronger instinct of national self-preservation of the Carpatho-Ukrainians lessen their burden of the totalitarian subjugation.

Together with all other freedom-loving Ukrainians, the Carpatho-Ukrainians cherish the hope for liberating Ukraine and restoring all liberties in the future sovereign Ukrainian State.

Andriy Mel'nyk, Omelyan Senyk-Hrybivs'kyy, and Yaroslav Baranovs'kyy on behalf of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists; and President Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn, President of the Diet Avhustyn Shtefan, and Prime Minister Yuliyan Revay on behalf of the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine in exile.

[133] For the documents concerning the incorporation of Carpatho-Ukraine into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic see Vasyl Markus, *L'Incorporation de l'Ukraine subcarpathique à l'Ukraine soviétique, 1944-1945* (Louvain, 1956), pp. 113-133.

Chapter Nine

CONCLUSIONS

The geographical location and the physical environment of the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine made it an important strategic area in the period under investigation. The Carpathian mountains with only a few passes were regarded as natural defense barrier for the powers involved in the dispute.

Before World War I, Carpatho-Ukraine as well as Galicia on the northern side of the Carpathians were integral parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; therefore, the Carpathian passes were controlled by the Habsburg Monarchy forces. There also was a long and continuous endeavor on the part of the Russians to establish themselves in the Carpathian mountains in order to have an outlet to the Balkans. The aim of the Russian diplomacy during World War I was focused on this area and it seemed to have won favor on the part of Great Britain and France. The outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, however, changed the attitude of these western European powers.

After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine was included in the sphere where the Paris Peace Conference tried to establish a new political order. In accordance with the Wilsonian principle of the self-determination of nations, political leaders of Carpatho-Ukraine, eager to apply that principle, organized national councils to speak in the name of the Carpatho-Ukrainian population. The majority of these councils declared themselves in favor of uniting Carpatho-Ukraine with the Ukrainian State which at that time was in the process of formation. After the Ukrainian forces were suppressed by their opponents, the representatives of the Central Ruthenian National Council in Uzhhorod accepted the agreement reached between the representatives of the American Ruthenians and the Czech Liberator, Thomas Garrique Masaryk. In accordance with this agreement, which was later

guaranteed by the Treaty of St. Germain, Carpatho-Ukraine was assured of territorial autonomy within the newly established State of Czecho-Slovakia. Thus, using the principle of the self-determination of nations as a basis, the Paris Peace Conference decided to separate Carpatho-Ukraine from the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen and establish this territory as an autonomous part of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

The Paris Peace Conference regarded Carpatho-Ukraine as a separate political entity. The Government of Czecho-Slovakia took upon itself an international obligation to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain concerning the territorial autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine. These provisions, altered to the detriment of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy, were incorporated into the Constitutional Charter of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

While it was generally admitted in Carpatho-Ukraine that the situation improved under Czech sovereignty, especially in such fields as education,book and newspaper publications, and political activity, the Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders could not reconcile themselves with the Czech delay in fulfilling their internationally guaranteed obligation concerning the autonomy. This resulted in a long lasting struggle for autonomy.

The first Governor of Carpatho-Ukraine, Gregory I. Zhatkovych, after fruitless negotiations with Prague, resigned his post in order to carry the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine's autonomy to the League of Nations, hoping to effect actual autonomy. Despite several petitions to that body, success was not forthcoming. Endeavors to attain the autonomous rights continued within the Czecho-Slovak National Assembly until the autumn of 1938.

In the early post-World War I years, the Czechs tried to justify their failure to fulfill their obligations by insisting that there was a lack of qualified autochthoneous administrators; in 1930's they cited the disunity among political and cultural leaders of Carpatho-Ukraine as their primary reason. Even in 1936 when the opposing forces in Carpatho-Ukraine, those centering around the First Central Ruthenian-Ukrainian National Council and those represented by the Russian Central National Council, had found a commonly agreeable *modus vivendi* and subsequently presented their joint plan for autonomy to Prague, the Czechs again delayed the fulfillment of their international obligations.

Only the results of the Munich Conference caused the Czechs to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty of Saint Germain with regard to the autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine. Under these circum-

stances the Slovaks also received their autonomy, and the Czecho-Slovak Republic was transformed into a federation of three states. This change in the structure of the Republic was legalized by amending the Constitutional Charter of Czecho-Slovakia. Thus, Carpatho-Ukraine became an autonomous State as a result of the fulfillment of the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain.

The first autonomous Government of Carpatho-Ukraine was based on a coalition between the political forces organized in the First Central Ruthenian-Ukrainian National Council and those united in the Russian Central National Council in Uzhhorod. However, this coalition was of a rather temporary nature and had been reached for the single purpose of presenting a joint demand for the realization of autonomy. In reality, each component group of this coalition had its own political aim. Brodiy's group saw the best solution for the Carpatho-Ukrainian question in uniting with Hungary. The leaders of the First Central Ruthenian-Ukrainian National Council headed by Msgr. A. Voloshyn saw the best solution of the problem in maintaining the *status quo*, i. e. an autonomous statehood of Carpatho-Ukraine in a federation with the Slovaks and Czechs. Under those circumstances, on October 27, 1938, Msgr. A. Voloshyn replaced Andriy Brodiy as the Prime Minister of Carpatho-Ukraine and retained that position until March 15, 1939. A renewed interference by the Czechs in the Carpatho-Ukrainian internal affairs resulted in deterioration of the Ukrainian-Czech relations and made the task of the liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia somewhat easier.

The Czech attitude toward the realization of the Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy could be explained by the strategic position of that province. Through Carpatho-Ukraine Czecho-Slovakia was linked with the two other members of the Little Entente, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Thus, Carpatho-Ukraine was an important link in this predominantly anti-Hungarian system.

On the other hand, Hungary laid claims to Carpatho-Ukraine on historical as well as economic grounds. While the Hungarian Government officially accepted the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, including the cession of Carpatho-Ukraine, the Hungarian unofficial circles opposed the loss of Carpatho-Ukraine and organized revisionist activities at home and abroad. In public statements, however, the most common reason given by the Hungarian revisionists in favor of the re-union of Carpatho-Ukraine with Hungary was their claim that over 100,000 Magyar speaking inhabitants were living within the boundaries of Carpatho-Ukraine and that the Carpatho-Ukrainians themselves were dissatisfied with Czech rule.

Thus, the Hungarian revisionists demanded the realization of the right of self-determination for these peoples.

Besides some unofficial circles in Great Britain, the Hungarian revisionist policies were supported by the Governments of Italy, Poland and Nazi Germany. According to Hitler's master plan concerning his expansion toward Eastern Europe, Czecho-Slovakia was one of the first planned targets. Thus, both Germany and Hungary shared similar attitudes toward Czecho-Slovakia. Mussolini's regime supported the Hungarian claims on the basis of the existing friendship between the two countries. Both the Italian and German Governments had done their best to dissociate Yugoslavia and Rumania from Czecho-Slovakia as much as possible, promising these countries that Hungary would decrease her claims against them if they would limit their support to the Czechs. This aimed at the weakening of the Little Entente, and these efforts did not remain without results, especially as far as Yugoslavia was concerned.

Poland, too, supported the Hungarian claims against Czecho-Slovakia. While in the talks with the German diplomats the Poles pretended only to support their Hungarian friends as well as to weaken the Czechs, in their contacts with the British diplomats they claimed to be organizing an anti-German bloc around themselves and the Hungarians. For that purpose, Hungary and Poland allegedly needed a common frontier in Carpatho-Ukraine.

Thus, during the crisis of September 1938, Czecho-Slovakia was encircled by Germany, Hungary and Poland with exception of a very short Rumanian frontier in Carpatho-Ukraine. There also was a coordinated activity of the German, Hungarian and Polish minorities within the Czecho-Slovak State. On the other hand, Czecho-Slovakia's allies, France and the USSR, had no direct access to the territory of the troubled Republic.

Under these circumstances, the Czecho-Slovak Government accepted the decision of the Munich Conference of September 29, 1938. In accordance with the ethnic principle laid down for the solution of the minority questions of Czecho-Slovakia by the Conference, Germany received the predominantly German inhabited territories of Sudetenland, and Poland the Teschen district. Hungary, on the other hand, supported by Italy and Poland, presented her claim for the whole territory of Carpatho-Ukraine. This claim was immediately rejected by Prague. At this time even Germany decided to declare herself against this claim based on other than the ethnic principle.

In this situation, the Government of Great Britain offered to mediate between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia. These offered good

offices, however, remained unused. After brief direct negotiations at Komárom, the question of the Hungarian minority in Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia was submitted by the interested parties to the German-Italian arbitration. Before as well as at the Vienna Conference of November 2, 1938, Italy supported the Hungarian interests, while the Germans pretended to support the Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian interests. Also at this Conference the ethnic principle was laid down as the basis for the solution of the question of new boundary between Carpatho-Ukraine and Hungary.

Despite the fact that Hungary consented in advance to accept the results of the German-Italian arbitration as the final settlement of the question, almost immediately after the occupation of the arbitrated territories, she resumed her efforts to acquire the rest of the Carpatho-Ukrainian territory. On two occasions Hungary was prepared to annex Carpatho-Ukraine by force, but she was stopped from doing so by Germany. Poland continued to support Hungary. Italy, on the other hand, was caught in a difficult situation: while she desired to support Hungary, at the same time she did not want to differ openly with Germany. However, when, according to the German plans, the time for liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia came, Hitler urged Hungary to occupy Carpatho-Ukraine on the desired date.

While Hungary was complaining in the years between the two world wars that a portion of the Magyar speaking people was deprived of the right for self-determination, she now failed to recognize a similar right for the Carpatho-Ukrainians.

Hungary was interested primarily in enlarging her territory. Poland, on the other hand, was interested in the destruction of the autonomous Carpatho-Ukrainian statehood because a several times larger Ukrainian population within her confines also demanded the application of the right of self-determination. As far as the Ukrainian question was concerned, it was openly admitted by the Soviet Russian diplomats that there existed at that time a community of interests of both Poland and Soviet Russia. This question was a subject of discussion between the Polish and German diplomats as well as between the Polish and Rumanian statesmen.

The third immediate neighbor of Carpatho-Ukraine, Rumania, was the only nation interested in the preservation of the *status quo* in Carpatho-Ukraine. The common Polish-Hungarian frontier at the expense of Carpatho-Ukraine meant an increase of the power of Hungary as well as the beginning of the realization of the Hun-

garian revisionist policies. This revisionism was also directed against Rumanian controlled Transylvania.

Judging exclusively on the basis of the official pronouncements, the Government of the USSR adopted an approach that seemingly ignored the existence of autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine. However, it protested several times in Prague against the anti-Communist activities of the Ukrainian nationalists in Carpatho-Ukraine. Simultaneously, also the Polish Government presented similar protest in Prague. On the other hand, the Soviet authorities accused numerous high Red Army officers of Ukrainian nationality of being in contact with the Ukrainian nationalists and the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine.

Neither Great Britain nor France had any direct interest in the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine as such. They were interested in preservation of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, but found themselves in a very delicate situation. On the one hand, they wanted to help the Republic, but at the same time they were afraid that their help would actually do more harm than good to the Czechs. Fearing that they would arouse Adolf Hitler's ire, both countries approached the question of the guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czecho-Slovak Republic with great caution. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain personally discussed the question with Benito Mussolini but he was met by a flat refusal to implement the provisions of the Munich Agreement with regard to guarantees for Czecho-Slovakia.

Germany played the most important role in this situation. Her attitude toward the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine went through several stages as far as the official line was concerned. Before the solution of the problem of the Sudeten Germans at the Munich Conference, Hitler did not favor the Carpatho-Ukraine's position and was inclined to let Hungary occupy her. His aim was to liquidate Czecho-Slovakia by military operations. Hungarian participation in it was expected and urged by the Germans. After Hungary did not show too much enthusiasm for the action in September 1938, however, Adolf Hitler changed his mind and decided to use Carpatho-Ukraine as a bargaining object for his political purposes.

The lack of readiness on the part of Great Britain and France to support their efforts to implement the guarantee clause of the Munich Agreement by their military strength placed Czecho-Slovakia wholly within Germany's sphere of influence. Therefore, Germany could act not only as a mediator but also as an omnipotent arbitrator. In connection with the Carpatho-Ukrainian question, Germany uti-

lized her favorable position in her contacts with Hungary and the Soviet Union.

After many visits with the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, as well as with the Führer himself, Hungarian diplomats obtained Hitler's permission to annex Carpatho-Ukraine in the middle of March 1939. As a result, Hungary declared her willingness to withraw from the League of Nations; secondly, she adhered to the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis; thirdly, she established close economic cooperation with Germany; and, finally, the Hungarian attack on Carpatho-Ukraine was timed by Hitler himself in such a way that Hungary could share the blame for the final liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia. The consequences of these agreements also led to Hungarian participation in World War II on the side of Germany and Italy.

By giving a free hand to Hungary in Carpatho-Ukraine, Hitler was in position to utilize this circumstance in his relations with the Soviet Union. This was to serve as an indication that he was not interested in the independence of Ukraine. It is significant to note that the Soviets seemed to believe him.

The Carpatho-Ukrainians believed in the principle of self-determination and endeavored to apply it in their case. The temporary status of the autonomous Government of Carpatho-Ukraine was changed into a constitutional one by the general elections to the First Diet held on February 12, 1939. The Hungarian Government attempted to prevent these elections but failed. At the polls, the people expressed their confidence in Msgr. A. Voloshyn's Government.

After the proclamation of the independence by Slovakia on March 14, 1939, Czecho-Slovakia was divided into three parts. Under these circumstances, the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine declared the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine. The following day, this action was approved by the Diet. At the same time, Hungarian troops invaded the new state. The Carpatho-Ukrainian Government asked Germany to prevent the Hungarians from violating the Vienna Arbitration and to take Carpatho-Ukraine under German protection. After a delay of some thirty-six hours, Germany advised the Carpatho-Ukrainians not to resist the advance of the Hungarian troops and refused to take the newly proclaimed independent state under her protection.

In the meantime, the Czech troops were withdrawing from the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine, while the Hungarians advanced. The Carpatho-Ukrainian Ministry for the National Defense transformed the formerly semi-military organization "Carpathian Sitch"

into the national defense force and ordered mobilization. These forces attempted to resist the advancement of the Hungarian troops. The poorly armed and trained members of the "Carpathian Sitch" were defeated and the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine went into exile.

It is understandable that while the Czech troops failed to defend Bohemia and Moravia, they had less reason to help the Carpatho-Ukrainians to defend their fatherland. However, a sudden disinterest of the Czechs in the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine was shown also in their diplomatic actions. Ex-President Edvard Beneš protesting the liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia failed to mention the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine. He spoke only on behalf of the Czechs and Slovaks. Later on, however, in the course of World War II, he again included Carpatho-Ukraine in his policies. After the war, Czecho-Slovakia ceded that province to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The application of the Wilsonian principle of self-determination of nations which was laid down by the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 as the basis for establishing a new political order in Central Europe after World War I encountered many difficulties. First of all, the Paris Peace Conference itself deviated in some cases from this basic principle. Not only was there a failure to apply the principle to the case of the Ukrainian people, but also to the newly established states. Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, as well as Rumania were alloted territories inhabited predominantly by the Germans, Hungarians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Byelorussians. Thus, while the newly established states were granted the right for self-determination by the Paris Peace Conference, these same states denied the application of the same right to those parts of other nationalities which they dominated. This fact gave moral basis for the rise of the policy of revisionism in Hungary and Germany. Also the Ukrainian Independence Movement demanded the application of the principle of self-determination in the case of the Ukrainian people.

Both the Munich Conference of the Four Powers and the Vienna Arbitration Conference laid down as the basis for their decisions the Wilsonian principle of self-determination of nationalities. However, all three neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia which were alloted territories from Czecho-Slovakia by these two Conferences saw fit to apply this principle only as far as their own nationalities in Czecho-Slovakia were concerned, while denying the same right to those whom they dominated. Germany used this principle for the weakening and liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia. Poland was granted the right

to apply self-determination to less than a 100,000 Polish minority in Teschen region, while she herself denied a similar right to millions of inhabitants of non-Polish nationalities — Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Byelorussians, etc. — within the confines of the Polish State. Hungary, too, demanded the revision of the Treaty of Trianon on the basis of the right of self-determination for the Magyar speaking minorities in Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. However, she denied the right of self-government to Carpatho-Ukraine claiming her territory on historical and economic grounds.

Such an attitude could not and did not contribute to a lasting peace and tranquil life in Central and Eastern Europe.

DOCUMENTS

APPENDIX I

THE PEOPLE'S LAW No. X OF THE YEAR 1918 REGARDING THE AUTONOMY OF THE RUTHENIAN NATION LIVING IN HUNGARY[1]

§ 1. The Ruthenian Nation living in Hungary ought to have the full right of self determination regarding the problems of the internal administration, the administration of justice, public education, its national culture, religion and the use of language, and this should be in the field of the law-making as well as in the execution of the laws. This Law contains the valid provisions regarding these rights.

§ 2. From the territories which are inhabited by the Ruthenians of the Districts (*Komitats*) of Maramorosh, Uhocha, Bereh and Uzh hereby is being constituted an autonomous province bearing the name *Rus'ka Krayina*.

The constitutional status of the territories of the Districts of Zemplyn, Sharysh, Abauy-Torna and Spish, which are inhabited by the Ruthenians, will remain undecided until the establishment of peace in general.

Until a final decision of the international Peace Conference is made, the temporary boundaries of Rus'ka Krayina shall be established by a Mixed Commission consisting of delegates from the Hungarian People's Republic and those of Rus'ka Krayina.

§ 3. Rus'ka Krayina decides and executes her affairs through her own organs.

In those affairs which are in common with the Hungarian People's Republic deal the common organs.

Such common affairs are: the foreign policy, the military affairs, the finances, the citizenship, the private and criminal law-making, the affairs regarding the economic activities and the social policy.

§ 4. The legislative organs of Rus'ka Krayina are:

1. For the autonomous affairs the Ruthenian National Assembly.

2. For the affairs in common with the Hungarian People's Republic the common Diet for all Hungarian lands, in which the Ruthenian Nation shall have a representation proportional to its population.

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[1] See László Balogh-Beéry, *A Ruthén Autonómia* (Pécs, 1937), pp. 23-26. This Act has been published in *Országos Törvénytár* (Budapest) on December 25, 1918.

§ 5. The Executive organs of Rus'ka Krayina are:

1. The Ministry for the Affairs of Rus'ka Krayina,
2. The Directorium of Rus'ka Krayina.

§ 6. The Ministry for the Affairs of Rus'ka Krayina shall be headed by the Minister for Rus'ka Krayina, who shall have a dual responsibility, namely, to the Ruthenian National Assembly and to the common Diet of all Hungarian lands. In common affairs he shall serve as a member of the Government of Hungarian People's Republic with rights belonging to all members, but in the autonomous affairs he possesses the supreme executive powers. His representative is a State Secretary.

The seat of the Ruthenian Ministry is Budapest.

§ 7. The Directorium of Rus'ka Krayina shall be headed by the Administrator of Rus'ka Krayina.

The seat of the Directorium is Mukachiv.

The Directorium is under the supreme supervision and control of the Minister for the Affairs of Rus'ka Krayina.

§ 8. The Ruthenian National Assembly shall be elected in accordance with the People's Law I of the year 1918, by means of general, secret, equal and direct elections.

A special Law shall regulate the Ruthenian affairs within the common Diet of Hungarian lands.

§ 9. A municipal and cultural autonomy for the non-Ruthenian speaking population shall be secured in Rus'ka Krayina.

§ 10. The public lands, mines and forests in Rus'ka Krayina are placed as ownership in the hands of the legal representation of the body politic of the Ruthenian Nation.

§ 11. This Law shall be enforced by the Hungarian People's Government in cooperation with the Minister for the Affairs of Rus'ka Krayina; also in cooperation with the Minister for the Affairs of Rus'ka Krayina, the Government shall take and enforce the necessary measures for the transition to the autonomous status of Rus'ka Krayina.

All financial means needed for the enforcement of this Law shall be provided — as long as there is no State nor autonomous budget law regarding this affair — by the Finance Minister who, in cooperation with the Minister for the Affairs of Rus'ka Krayina, shall prepare an estimate of the expenditures.

§ 12. This Law shall be valid from the day of its publication.

Budapest, December 21, 1918.

APPENDIX II

RESOLUTIONS OF THE ALL-NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE HUNGARIAN RUTHENIANS HELD ON JANUARY 21, 1919 AT KHUST[2]

1. The All-National Congress of the Hungarian Ruthenians on January 21, 1919, at Khust resolved to unite the Districts of Maramorosh, Uhocha, Bereh, Uzh, Zemplyn, Sharysh, Spish and Abauy with the United Ukrainian State, insisting, however, that the new State should take in consideration the special situation of the Hungarian Ruthenians.

The All-National Congress herewith declares that the Ruthenian people in Hungary do not accept the "Law No. X regarding Rus'ka Krayina" issued in Budapest in 1918 because it was passed without consent of our people and their representatives.

2. Accordingly, the Congress resolves that the Ruthenian people will send no representatives to the Hungarian Parliament.

3. The All-National Congress requests that the Ukrainian military forces should take over all Districts inhabited by the Ruthenians and supply foodstuffs for the needy population.

4. The All-National Congress greets all liberated peoples of Austro-Hungary: the Czecho-Slovaks, the Yugo-Slavs, the Rumanians, the Poles and the Germans.

5. The Congress greets the Hungarian People's Government which, accepting the democratic principles, recognized the right of self-determination of nations and did not use any force to prevent the organization of the Ruthenian people nor against the expression of the genuine will of our people.

6. The Congress expresses its gratitude to all nations of the Entente and their allies for their defense of the democratic spirit and for the liberating the subjugated peoples, and requests them to aid the Ruthenian people in the realization of these resolutions of the All-National Congress.

7. For the conduct of the affairs of the Ruthenian people, the All-National Congress elected a Central National Council and herewith authorizes it to represent the Hungarian Ruthenians always and everywhere where there is a necessity for this, before all the nations in the world, and empowers it to do everything what is necessary to do in a given situation in the interests of the Ruthenian people.

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[2] Sydir Yaroslavyn, *Vyzvol'na Borot'ba na Zakhidno-Ukrayins'kykh Zemlyakh u 1918-1923 rr.* (Philadelphia, 1956), p. 100. Also see "Vsenarodnyy Kongress u Khusti v 1919 r.," *Karpats'kyj Holos* (Philadelphia), Vol. IX, No. 1, January-March 1957, p. 12.

APPENDIX III

MEMORANDUM ON THE JURIDICAL SITUATION OF THE RUTHENIANS SOUTH OF THE CARPATHIANS WHOSE TERRITORY FORMS PART OF THE TERRITORY OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK STATE

submitted by Dr. Edvard Beneš
to the Committee on the Czecho-Slovak Questions
at the Paris Peace Conference on May 17, 1919[3]

To give to the territory of the Ruthenians South of the Carpathians a special juridical character and to show the willingness of the Czecho-Slovak Republic to establish there a just Government, the Czecho-Slovak Republic, although it possesses a common legislation and central administration, desires to grant to the Ruthenians south of the Carpathians a generous autonomy. In order to ensure guarantees for this autonomy, the Czecho-Slovak Republic might conclude a separate Treaty with the Great Powers on this subject.

The following are the bases of this autonomy:

1. The country of the Ruthenians south of the Carpathians in its entire extent as included in the frontiers fixed by the Great Powers shall bear a special name, to be designated after an agreement on the subject between the Czecho-Slovak Republic and the Diet of the Ruthenians south of the Carpathians.

2. The country of the Ruthenians south of the Carpathians shall have a special Diet. This Diet shall enjoy legislative power in matters of language, schools, and religion, as well as in all other matters which the laws of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, according to the special needs of the country, shall assign to its competence. The laws voted by the Diet shall be ratified by the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and counter-signed by the Governor of the country of the Ruthenians responsible to the Diet.

3. For all other matters the country of the Ruthenians south of the Carpathians shall participate in the legislative system of the Legislative Assembly of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, to which it shall send deputies elected in conformity with the constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. These deputies, however, shall not have the right to vote on those legislative questions that shall be assigned to the Diet of the country of the Ruthenians.

4. At the head of the administration of the country shall be placed a Governor appointed by the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. This Governor shall represent the highest authority in linguistic, scholastic and ecclesiastical matters, on the one hand, and on the other in the affairs of the internal administration (political).

For all other affairs the Ministries of the Czecho-Slovak Republic will constitute the highest authority. In the Ministries in question shall be organized special Ruthenian sections. The courts of the territories of the Ruthenians south of the Carpathians shall form part of the judiciary organization of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. However, when the parties have to appeal to an authority situated outside the territories of the Ruthenians south of the Carpathians, the case shall be carried before a special Ruthenian court.

5. The officials shall be appointed, up to the seventh class, by the Gov-

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[3] David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris with Documents* (New York, 1924-1926), XIII, pp. 93-95.

ernor; the superior officials shall be appointed by the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic on the proposal of the Governor and the Council of Ministers of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

6. In the Council of Ministers of the Czecho-Slovak Republic the country of the Ruthenians south of the Carpathians shall be represented by a Minister without portfolio chosen by the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic from among the nationals of the country of the Ruthenians south of the Carpathians.

To show the extent of the autonomy of the territory of the Ruthenians south of the Carpathians, we take the liberty of giving the outlines of the organization that the Government proposes to establish in the other territories of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

The territory of the State will be divided into departments. At the head of the administration of the department will be placed a prefect who will represent the second authority in the matters of administration. In principle, for each department, all appeals shall be carried before the competent ministry. The body (departmental council) which will be constituted to support the prefect will enjoy only an administrative competence and a right of control. It will in no case enjoy legislative power, which will be reserved exclusively for the central legislative assembly.

APPENDIX IIIA

ANNEXE No. 1 to *MÉMOIRE No. 6*

submitted to the Paris Peace Conference*

PROCÈS VERBAL

Vingt-deux membres du Conseil National Ruthène des Carpathes à Svalava (Szolyva) conduits par leur chef, Komarnicky Michel, présentent au représentant de la République tchécoslovaque, à Budapest, les plaintes et les demandes suivantes:

Pendant toute la durée de la guerre, la population ruthène de Hongrie était la proie de la politique d'extermination du gouvernement et des armées magyars. En dehors des condamnations pour délits d'ordre militaire, les ressortissants du peuple ruthène ont été exécutés en grand nombre sans avoir opposé de résistance aux lois en vigueur. Maintenant, après la guerre, l'administration militaire et civile magyare pèse sur les Ruthènes comme s'il s'agissait d'une expédition de représailles, dirigée contre eux, sans distinction d'âge ni de sexe. Les délégués du Conseil National des Ruthènes des Carpathes déclarent que la population ruthène refuse catégoriquement n'importe quelle appartenance à l'État magyar et protesterait même dans le cas où l'autonomie lui serait accordée dans son cadre. Le peuple ruthène désire être autonome sur le territoire des comitats de Užhorod, de Bereg, de Ugoča et de Marmaroš; comme corps autonome, il demande d'être attaché soit á l'État ukrainien ou pour des raisons d'ordre économique et géographique, de préférence à la République tchécoslovaque.

La délégation formule en même temps une prière afin que le haut commandement des armées alliées ordonne l'occupation du territoire des Ruthènes de Hongrie par l'armée ukrainienne ou tchécoslovaque afin que la population puisse librement décider de son sort. Cependant, vu le manque absolu

* American Commission to Negotiate Peace. The Library.

de vivres sur le territoire ruthène de Hongrie, la délégation demande que les réquisitions n'y soient pas ordonnées et qu'on tâche au contraire dans la mesure du possible, de remédier à sa pénible situation alimentaire.

Comme preuve de l'authenticité de ces plaintes et de cette demande, ladite délégation dépose 452 signatures des mandataires auprès du représentant de la République tchécoslovaque à Budapest pour y être gardées.

Budapest, le 18 décembre 1918.

Au nom de la délégation de la Russie carpathienne:
KOMARNICKY Michel mp.

Le Conseil National de la Russie carpathienne représente les intérêts de tous les Ruthènes de Hongrie qui ont tant souffert, au cours de cette guerre, sous la domination magyare. Aujourd'hui, les Ruthènes, malgré la pression intense des autorités magyares, manifestent hautement leur désir d'échapper complètement à l'emprise magyare et n'acceptent même plus l'autonomie qui leur est offerte dans le cadre de l'État hongrois. Une délégation de 22 membres du dit Conseil, conduite par M. Kormarnicky Michel, s'est présenté au représentant de la République tchécoslovaque à Budapest, M. le Dr. Hodža, pour le saisir de ses plaintes contre les agissements des autorités hongroises et pour lui formuler ses desiderata concernant leur union avec la République tchécoslovaque. Le procès-verbal ci-joint en a été dressé et 452 signatures des mandataires ont été déposées auprès du représentant de la République tchécoslovaque comme preuve de l'authenticité des faits invoqués.

APPENDIX IIIB

ANNEXE No. 2 to MÉMOIRE No. 6

PROCÈS VERBAL*
DE L'ASSEMBLÉE DU COMITÉ DIRECTEUR DU CONSEIL NATIONAL RUTHÈNE TENU À PRESOV (EPERJES), LE 7 JANVIER 1918.

Membres du Comité présents: Ant. Beskid, président du Conseil; Dr. Nicolas Russnak, Dr. Siméon Smandraj, Nic. Burik, Jean Djulaj, Bart. Kizak, Jean Kizak, Jean Korotnokij, Jul. Lendel, etc., membres du Conseil national.

Le président expose que les Ukrainiens de la Galicie occidentale habitant jusqu'au San, ont, par l'intermédiaire de délégués plénipotentiaires, exprimé la ferme volonté de vivre unis à nous, Ruthènes de la Russie carpathienne (dans l'ancienne Hongrie), d'une façon autonome, pour assurer leur avenir, leur destinée en créant avec nous un seul État autonome.

Le Comité directeur prend note de cette communication avec satisfaction et décide d'aider de toutes ses forces ses frères ukrainiens de Galicie et à réaliser pleinement et au plus tôt leur volonté.

Le président fait part ensuite des informations qu'il a reçues d'éminentes personnalités responsables de la République tchécoslovaque. Comme la situation politique actuelle n'offre qu'une seule voie, qu'un seul moyen d'assurer à notre nation ruthène la conservation de sa nationalité et de lui garantir un avenir meilleur aussi bien intellectuellement que matériellement, le président propose que l'on se joigne á la République tchécoslovaque, à des conditions déterminées,

* American Commission to Negotiate Peace. The Library.

comme partie autonome de cette république possédant un caractère exclusivement ruthène.

Le Comité directeur adopte à l'unanimité la proposition du président sur la façon d'établir l'avenir de la nation ukrainienne et lui donne plein pouvoir pour agir avec le gouvernement de la République tchécoslovaque au nom du Conseil, etc., dans cette affaire si importante pour la nation ruthène, pour s'efforcer d'obtenir lors de la création de notre État dans le cadre donné, les conditions les plus avantageuses.

Après avoir entendu une communication du président, le Comité directeur considère comme défavorable la ligne de démarcation fixée, surtout parce que cette ligne diviserait en deux tronçons les Ruthènes qui vivent dans la Russie carpathienne (dans l'ancienne Hongrie). Comme Ruthènes, notre désir est de rester unis. Nous demandons donc que l'occupation s'étende à tout le territoire ukrainien. Nous prions en conséquence que soit occupée la seconde partie du territoire ruthène: les comitats d'Ung-Bereg, d'Ugoča et de Marmaroš; et que, dans cette seconde moitié, la frontière soit marquée par la Tisa (Theiss) à partir de la ville de Čap.

Cachet: Conseil National Ruthène.

Signé: Dr. Antonin Beskid, président; Bartol. Kizak, notaire; Dr. Nikolaj Russnak, Dr. Simeon Smandraj, O. Jan Korotnokij, Jan Kizak, Dr. Josif Vojtovic, Stefan Zacharias, Dr. Vlad. Turkyniak, Nik. Petrik, Jan Djura, Zinovej Chanat, Nicolaj T. Burik, Julij Lendel, Nik. J. Ladizinskij, Theodor Kellij, Dionys St. Zubrickij.

* * *
*

I. STATISTIQUE

Les Ruthènes, que l'on appelle aussi Russes de Hongrie, Petits-Russes, Ukrainiens, appartiennent à la branche des Petits-Russes de la Galicie orientale, qui, elle-même, est une subdivision de la race russe. Ils habitent les comitats (départements) situés dans le nord-est et l'est de l'ancienne Hongrie.

D'après la statistique de 1900, leur nombre en Hongrie, en général, était de 429.447 ce que fait 2,2% de toute la population hongroise.

D'après la statistique de 1910, leur nombre s'élevait á 464.259 c'est-à-dire à 2,5% de la population totale.

La statistique officielle dénature plus le chiffre réel en ce qui concerne les Ruthènes qu'en ce qui regarde les autres nationalités. On peut s'en rendre compte, en comparant la statistique de l'État, avec celle faite par l'Église. En prenant comme exemple le tableau de deux diocèses ruthènes, il y avait en 1900: 488.000 Ruthènes, c'est-à-dire 60.000 de plus que dans la statistique officielle. Il faut tenir compte qu'un nombre assez élevé de Ruthènes résident hors de ces deux diocèses. D'après les chiffres de toutes les paroisses de la Hongrie, il y avait en 1900, 537.962 Ruthénes, ce qui fait 108.000 de plus (25%) que la statistique publiée par l'État hongrois.

Les Ruthènes habitent en masses compactes les comitats situés au nord, au nord-est et à l'est de la Hongrie, aux confins du territoire slovaque et du territoire roumain.

Ceux du nord et du nord-est se trouvent — pour employer la terminologie de la statistique magyare — sur la rive droite de la Tisa (Theiss) et habitent les comitats qui s'appellent: les comitats de Šariš, Spiš, Zemplin, Užhorod et Bereg.

Les comitats de Marmaroš et d'Ugoča, habités aussi en grande partie par les Ruthènes, se trouvent dans l'est, ou sur la rive gauche de la Tisa (1).

(1) *Statistique officielle (de 1900) des Ruthènes dans les comitats ci-dessous désignés*:

	Nombre total des Ruthènes		Pourcentage de population ruthène par comitat
Comitats de	1900	1910	1910
Šariš	33.988		22
Spiš	14.333		7,1
Zemplin	34.831		11,4
Užhorod	55.742		38,1
Bereg	95.308		42,6
Marmoroš	143.621		44,6
Ugoča	32.721		37,5
Rive droite de la Tisa	234.803	253.062	14.8
Rive gauche de la Tisa	176.967	194.504	7,5
En tout	411.770	447.566	

II. CONDITIONS ETHNIQUES, POLITIQUES ET SOCIALES.

La frontière linguistique des comitats ruthéno-slovaques suit à peu près la direction suivante (1):

Traversant le comitat d'Užhorod, où fusionnent les idiomes magyare, slovaque et ruthène, de Kapušany, elle se dirige au nord-est vers Užhorod; de là elle continue par la vallée de la rivière Uh (Ung), jusqu'à la commune de Huta; là, elle tourne vers le nord-ouest et va en méandres, en traversant le comitat de Zemplin (Snina, Nechvál, Papin, Dlhé) à Stropkov. A la limite des comitats de Zemplin et de Šariš, au nord, près de la frontière galicienne, se trouve une île slovaque formée de 10 communes.

Ensuite elle passe dans le comitat de Šariš, où elle straverse Hanušovce en longeant la rivière Tepla et passe par Kurim et Zborov jusqu'à Regetovka-sous-Beskydes, à la frontière galicienne. A Šariš — dans la partie montagneuse du nord-est — se trouve une grande île ruthène qui se prolonge au sud jusqu'à la ville slovaque de Sabinov, dans la partie nord-ouest du Šariš, en suivant la frontière de la Galicie, réapparaît encore le territoire ruthène par Gaboltov, au sud de Jastreb, puis à l'ouest, vers Orlov jusqu'à la limite du comitat de Spiš, où le territoire slovaque touche de nouveau la frontière galicienne au nord de

Saint-Luboňa. Une presqu'île ruthène s'emboîte dans les environs de Kamjenka près de la frontière galicienne. Enfin, il y a une île ruthène aux confins des comitats de Spiš, entre le territoire allemand et le territoire slovaque. Les communes ruthènes qui se trouvent en contact avec les communes slovaques, sont fortement influencées par l'élément slovaque, et cela, d'une façon tout à fait automatique, sans que les Slovaques aient fait le moindre effort pour y coaquérir l'influence prédominanet. Ce leur était impossible pour cette raison que le mouvement national slovaque était très faible dans ces régions.

L'émigration est grande en territoire ruthène. Elle est due à la politique d'oppression des Magyars et à la négligence voulue dont le gouvernement de Budapest faisait preuve à l'égard des régions considérées comme dangereuses pour la domination magyare. Le nombre des émigrés que, de ces régions, partaient pour l'Amérique était depuis 1907, au moment où l'émigration atteignait son point culminant, de 4.753 par an.

Les Ruthènes sont, pour la plupart, des agriculteurs. Comme le pays habité par eux est très montagneux et, partout, peu fertile, et comme on les traite partout avec la défaveur et même avec haine, ils émigrent.

L'instruction y est à un niveau très bas. D'après la statistique de 1900, il y avait 85,5% d'illettrés (les Roumains de ces régions en avait en avait 79,6%). D'après celle de 1903, le nombre des illettrés (âgé de plus de 20 ans) était encore de 85% (chez les Roumains 71%).

La religion prédominante est la religion uniate: 97%. Les 3% restant sont partagés entre les Juifs (2%) et les catholiques romains (1%).

APPENDIX IV

REPORT OF THE CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION FOR THE ELECTIONS TO THE DIET OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE[4]

In accordance with § 50 of the Election Act No. 126/927, Collection of Laws and Ordinances of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, regarding the re-checking of the election results, the following results of the elections to the First Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine held on February 12, 1939, were found:

Total votes cast in the elections to the First Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine	265,002
Out of this total:	
a) for the list of candidates of the Ukrainian National Union and the National Minorities	244,922
b) invalidated	2,328
c) found empty envelopes	17,752

As result of the elections, the following candidates were elected Deputies to the First Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine:

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[4] Stepan Rosokha, *Soym Karpats'koyi Ukrayiny* (Winnipeg, 1949), pp. 63-64.

1. Dr. Avhustyn Voloshyn, Prime Minister of the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine, Khust,
2. Yuliyan Revay, Minister of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government, Khust,
3. Dr. Mykhaylo Brashchayko, notary public, Khust,
4. Dr. Yuliy Brashchayko, attorney at law, Khust,
5. Ivan Gryga, farmer, Vyshni Verets'ky,
6. Rev. Adalbert Dovbak, Izky,
7. Dr. Mykola Dolynay, physician, Khust,
8. Miloš Drbal, attorney at law, Khust.
9. Avhustyn Dutka, judge, Khust,
10. Ivan Ihnatko, farmer, Bilky,
11. Dr. Volodymyr Komaryns'kyy, attorney at law, Khust,
12. Ivan Kachala, railroad engineer, Perechyn,
13. Vasyl' Klempush, businessman, Yasinya,
14. Stepan Klochurak, Secretary to the Prime Minister, Khust
15. Vasyl' Latsanych, teacher, Velykyy Bereznyy,
16. Mykola Mandzyuk, teacher, Sevlyush,
17. Mykhaylo Marushchak, farmer, Velykyy Bychkiv,
18. Leonid Romanyuk, engineer, Khust,
19. Rev. Grigorie Moysh, protopop, Bila Tserkov,
20. Dmytro Nimchuk, President, Public Health Insurance Institution, Khust,
21. Anton Ernst Oldofredi, Under Secretary of State, Khust,
22. Yuriy Pazukhanych, school inspector, Khust,
23. Ivan Perevuznyk, farmer, Serednye,
24. Petro Popovych, farmer, Velyki Luchky,
25. Fedir Revay, Director of the State Printing House, Khust,
26. Dr. Mykola Risdorfer, physician, Svalyava,
27. Dr. Stepan Rosokha, official in the Ministry of Education, Khust,
28. Rev. Yuriy Stanynets', pastor, Vonihovo,
29. Vasyl' Shobey, farmer, Vul'khivtsi,
30. Avhustyn Shtefan, Chief of the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, Khust,
31. Rev. Kyrylo Fedelesh, Professor of Religion, Khust,
32. Mykhaylo Tulyk, journalist, Khust.

Signed by Petro Kalynyuk, Chairman
of the Central Election Commission
for Carpatho-Ukraine in Khust.

APPENDIX V

ACT No. 1
OF THE DIET OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE OF MARCH 15, 1939[5]

The Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine passed this Act:

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[5] Augustin Stefan, *From Carpatho-Ruthenia to Carpatho-Ukraine* (New York, 1954), pp. 42-43. By courtesy of the former Speaker of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet, A. Shtefan, the author is in possession of a photo-static copy of the original document.

ARTICLE 1

Carpatho-Ukraine is an independent State.

ARTICLE 2

The name of the State is Carpatho-Ukraine.

ARTICLE 3

Carpatho-Ukraine is a Republic, headed by a President elected by the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine.

ARTICLE 4

The official language in Carpatho-Ukraine is the Ukrainian language.

ARTICLE 5

The colors of the national flag of Carpatho-Ukraine are blue and yellow; the blue on the top, and the yellow on the bottom.

ARTICLE 6

The State emblem of Carpatho-Ukraine is the present national emblem: a bear on a red field on the left hand, four blue and three yellow stripes on the right hand, as well as the Trident of St. Volodymyr the Great.

This part of the Act shall be regulated by a special Act.

ARTICLE 7

The national anthem of Carpatho-Ukraine is "Shche ne vmerla Ukrayina" (Ukraine still surives .).

ARTICLE 8

This Act becomes valid immediately after its passage.

Khust, March 15, 1939.

APPENDIX VI

ACT No. 2
OF THE DIET OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE OF MARCH 15, 1939[6]

The Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine passed the following Act:

ARTICLE 1

The Government is herewith authorized by the Diet to issue ordinances with the consent of the President of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic which shall have power of law till reconvocation. This authorization does not apply to amendments of the Constitutional Acts.

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[6] Augustin Stefan, *From Carpatho-Ruthenia to Carpatho-Ukraine* (New York, 1954), p. 43. By courtesy of Prof. A. Shtefan the author is in possession of a photo-static copy of the original document.

ARTICLE 2

The ordinances issued in accordance with Article I have to be presented to the Diet at its earliest Session. Otherwise, they become null and void.

ARTICLE 3

This Act becomes valid immediately after its passage.

At Khust, March 15, 1939.

Signed by:[7]

Avhustyn Shtefan,
President of the Diet
of Carpatho-Ukraine

Dr. Avhustyn Voloshyn,
President of the Carpatho-
Ukrainian Republic

Avhustyn Dutka,
Secretary of the Diet
of Carpatho-Ukraine

Dr. Mykhaylo Kocherhan,
Executive Secretary of the Diet
of Carpatho-Ukraine

APPENDIX VII

THE VIENNA AWARD OF THE GERMAN-ITALIAN ARBITRATION COMMISSION OF NOVEMBER 2, 1938[8]

In virtue of a request from the Royal Hungarian Government and the Czechoslovak Government to the German and Royal Italian Governments to settle by award the questions pending between them relating to territories to be ceded to Hungary, as well as in virtue of notes thereupon exchanged on October 30, 1938, between the Governments concerned, the German Foreign Minister, Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop, and the Foreign Minister of His Majesty the King of Italy, Emperor of Ethiopia, Count Galeazzo Ciano, have met this day in Vienna and, after further discussion with the Royal Hungarian Foreign Minister, M. Kálmán Kánya, and the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Dr. František Chvalkovský, have promulgated the following award:

1. The areas to be ceded to Hungary by Czechoslovakia are marked on the annexed map. Demarcation of the frontier on the spot is delegated to a Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission.

2. The evacuation by Czechoslovakia of the areas to be ceded and their occupation by Hungary begins on November 5, 1938, and is to be completed by November 10, 1938. The detailed stages of the evacuation and occupation, as

[7] The Act No. 1 of the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine (see Appendix V) bears the same signatures and in the same order as this Act.

[8] Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945* (Washington, 1951), Series D, Volume IV, Document No. 99.

well as other procedure connected therewith, are to be settled at once by a Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission.

3. The Czechoslovak Government will insure that the territories to be ceded are left in an orderly condition at the time of evacuation.

4. Special questions arising out of the cession of the territory, in particular questions relating to nationality and option, are to be regulated by a Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commisssion.

5. Likewise, special measures for the protection of persons of the Magyar nationality remaining in Czechoslovak territory and of persons not of the Magyar race in the ceded territories are to be agreed upon by a Hungarian-Czechoslovak Commission. This commission will take special care that the Magyar ethnic group (*Volksgruppe*) in Pressburg be accorded the same status as other ethnic groups there.

6. Insofar as disadvantages and difficulties in the sphere of economics or (railway) traffic may be caused by the cession of territory to Hungary for the area remaining to Czechoslovakia, the Hungarian Government will, in agreement with the Czechoslovak Government, do its utmost to remove these disadvantages and difficulties.

7. In the event of difficulties or doubts arising from the implementation of this award, the Royal Hungarian and Czechoslovak Governments will settle the matter directly between themselves. Should they, however, fail to reach agreement on any question, this question will then be submitted to the German and Italian Governments for final decision.

Joachim von Ribbentrop
Galeazzo Ciano

The general course of the new frontier between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Republic of Czechoslovakia as determined in the award made by the German Foreign Minister and the Royal Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs on November 2, 1938, is as follows:

Starting from the old frontier south of Pressburg, the new frontier runs north of the Pressburg-Neuhäusl railway line, turns in a northeasterly direction to the northwest of Neuhäusl, and is continued north of Vráble direct to the Lewenz-Altsohl railway line. The towns of Neuhäusl and Lewenz revert to Hungary. To the east of Lewenz the frontier runs diagonally through the Eipel territory some 30 kilometers north of the old frontier. Its further course is directly to the north of the towns of Lutschenetz and Gross-Steffelsdorf which also revert to Hungary. The frontier then turns to the northeast, taking in the town of Jolschwa, and in the neighborhood of Rosenau extends direct to the German settlement area of the Unterzips. It then turns north, includes Kaschau in Hungarian territory, and follows a southeasterly course to a point some 30 kilometers north of the railway junction of Sátoraljaujhely on the former Hungarian frontier. It then proceeds due east to a point directly north of Ungvár, which is assigned to Hungary. The frontier then takes a sharp turn to the southeast. Its further course passes close to the north of Munkatsch. Continuing in a southeasterly direction, the new frontier links up with the old frontier northeast of the Rumanian-frontier railway station of Halmei.

Of the disputed towns, therefore, Pressburg itself, the capital of Slovakia, the old cathedral town of Neutra, and the town of Sevljusch in the Carpatho-Ukraine, with its surrounding villages, remain in the Czechoslovak Republic. The towns of Neuhäusl, Lewenz, Lutschenetz, Kaschau, Užhorod and Munkatsch were adjudged to the Kingdom of Hungary.

The new ruling returns the whole area of compact Hungarian settlement to the Kingdom of Hungary. At points where circumstances did not allow an exact determination of the frontier on ethnic lines (*volksmässige Grenzziehung*), the interests of both sides were carefully weighed.

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INDEX OF GEOGRAPHIC PLACE NAMES

Due to historical circumstances, various names have been used for the Carpatho-Ukrainian cities, towns, and villages. In this study, the place names are used as they were in the use during the period under consideration. However, after World War II, some names have been changed, and, even in the traditional names, the grammatical endings have been altered. Therefore, besides the names as transliterated in this study, their Ukrainian alphabet equivalents including the new grammatical endings are indicated in the parenthesis.

The name used in this study is put first; its Ukrainian alphabet spelling in parenthesis next; and, the new Ukrainian name and the equivalents in the other languages used in the past, thereafter. The following abbreviations are used:

Cz. — Czech or Slovak. *G.* — German. *H.* — Hungarian. *P.* — Polish. *Rum.* — Rumanian. *Rus.* — Russian. *Uk.* — Ukrainian. *Unn.* — the new Ukrainian names presently in use.

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Br. — British. *C-U* — Carpatho-Ukraine *or* Carpatho-Ukrainian. *Cz-S* — Czecho-Slovakia *or* Czecho-Slovak. *Fr.* — France *or* French. *G.* — German *or* Germany. *H.* — Hungarian *or* Hungary. *It.* — Italian *or* Italy. *P.* — Poland *or* Polish. *Rum.* — Rumanian.

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CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

January 8, 1918. President W. Wilson presented the Fourteen Point program demanding self-determination for nationalities of Austria-Hungary.

July 23, 1918. Congress of the Ruthenian National Council of America demanded full independence of Carpatho-Ukraine or her union with Halychyna and Bukovyna.

October 19, 1918. Ukrainian National Council in L'viv declared the independence of the Western Ukrainian Republic including Carpatho-Ukraine.

October 21, 1918. Avhustyn Shtefan conferred with the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation at Vienna concerning the union of Carpatho-Ukraine with the Western Ukrainian Republic.

October 25, 1918. T. S. Masaryk gained G. Zhatkovych's support for the incorporation of Carpatho-Ukraine as an autonomous Ruthenian State into Czecho-Slovakia.

November 2, 1918. Carpatho-Ukrainian leaders in Khust resolved in favor of union with Ukraine.

November 8, 1918. Union of Carpatho-Ukraine with Ukraine supported by the Ruthenian National Council in Stara Lyubovnya.

November 9, 1918. Ruthenian National Council of Uzhhorod decided to demand autonomy for Carpatho-Ukraine.

November 16, 1918. Hungary declared an independent Republic.

December 8, 1918. Ruthenian National Council of Svalyava favors union of Carpatho-Ukraine with Ukraine.

December 21, 1918. Hungarian Parliament passed a Constitutional Act granting autonomy to *Rus'ka Krayina*.

January 7, 1919. In the Czech-occupied City of Pryashiv, the Ruthenian National Council decided in favor of uniting Carpatho-Ukraine with Czecho-Slovakia as an autonomous State.

January 7-8, 1919. The Carpatho-Ukrainian population of Yasinya disarmed the Hungarian troops and established an independent governing body.

January 12, 1919. Czech and allied troops occupied Uzhhorod.

January 21, 1919. All-National Ruthenian Congress at Khust declared the union of Carpatho-Ukraine with the Ukrainian State.

January 21, 1919. The U.S. delegation at the Paris Peace Conference presented the question of uniting Carpatho-Ukraine with Czecho-Slovakia.

February 5, 1919. E. Beneš presented to the Paris Peace Conference an official proposal to include Carpatho-Ukraine into Czecho-Slovakia as an autonomous Ruthenian State.

May 7, 1919. Central Ruthenian National Council in Uzhhorod decided to support the union of Carpatho-Ukraine with Czecho-Slovakia as an autonomous Ruthenian State.

June 16, 1919. Paris Peace Conference decided to incorporate Carpatho-Ukraine as an autonomous part into Czecho-Slovakia and authorized the League of Nations to be the guardian of her autonomous rights.

August 12, 1919. The Provisional autonomous Ruthenian Directorium, headed by G. Zhatkovych, was established.

September 10, 1919. The Treaty of Saint Germain guaranteed autonomy to Carpatho-Ukraine.

October 9, 1919. Split between the two wings of the Central Ruthenian National Council and establishment of separate Ukrainian and Russian central councils.

November 18, 1919. General Statute for the provisional administration promulgated and Jan Brejcha appointed the Provisional Administrator of the country.

February 29, 1920. The Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic adopted by the Parliament without participation of the Carpatho-Ukrainian representatives.

April 29, 1920. *Prosvita* founded in Uzhhorod.

May 5, 1920. Gregory Zhatkovych appointed Governor of autonomous Pidkarpats'ka Rus'.

June 30, 1920. Rumania transferred the districts of Maramorosh and Uhocha to Czech jurisdiction and withdrew her troops.

November 13, 1920. Hungary ratified the Treaty of Trianon of June 4, 1920.

March 16, 1921. G. Zhatkovych resigned from the Governorship in protest of the Czech violation of the autonomous rights of Pidkarpats'ka Rus'.

September 16, 1923. The first communal elections in Carpatho-Ukraine.

November 14, 1923. A. Beskid appointed Governor.

March 16, 1924. The first elections in Carpatho-Ukraine to the Czecho-Slovak Parliament. Rev. A. Voloshyn elected Deputy.

July 14, 1927. The Administration Reform Act passed over the protests of Carpatho-Ukrainian defenders of autonomy

July 1, 1928. A. Rozsypal appointed as the Land President with powers superior to those of the Governor.

March 28, 1928. Benito Mussolini announced his support for Hungarian revisionism.

June 16, 1933. Governor A. Beskid died.

March 8, 1934. Count S. Bethlen delivered a revisionist address in Berlin in the presence of top Nazi leaders.

October 25, 1934. Rev. A. Voloshyn appealed to the pro-Russian segment of the Carpatho-Ukrainian political leadership to join the Ukrainians in a common struggle for autonomy.

February 25, 1935. K. Hrabar appointed Governor.

November 28, 1935. Upon the initiative of Deputy Y. Revay, the Juridical Committee for Constitutional Questions of the Czecho-Slovak Parliament urged the Government to speed up preparations for autonomy.

November 28, 1936. The united Central Ruthenian National Council presented a Constitutional Act draft for autonomy of Pidkarpats'ka Rus'.

June 26,, 1937. The First Stage of Autonomy Act passed in Prague.

November 5, 1937. Hitler decided to destroy Czecho-Slovakia.

November 25, 1937. Hungarian Prime Minister Darányi conferred with Hitler concerning a common German-Hungarian military attack on Czecho-Slovakia as agreed between Hitler and Horthy in September of 1936.

January 10, 1938. Col. Beck announced Poland's support for Hungarian annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine.

February 6-10, 1938. Regent Horthy visited Poland and advised the Poles to cooperate with Hitler's Germany.

February 12, 1938. The Hungarian and German minority leaders, János Esterházy and Karl Hermann Frank, conferred with Prime Minister Darányi in Budapest concerning co-ordinated activities against the Czecho-Slovak Republic.

April 11, 1938. Hungary offered in Berlin a plan for a sudden German-Hungarian military invasion of Czecho-Slovakia.

June 18, 1938. Hitler set October 1, 1938, as the day for the invasion.

August 25, 1938. Horthy assured Hitler that Hungary would be ready to join Germany in an attack on Czecho-Slovakia by October 1.

September 4, 1938. The First Central Ruthenian-Ukrainian National Council delegation conferred with the Prague Government concerning the immediate introduction of autonomy.

September 15, 1938. Mussolini called for dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia.

September 15, 1938. British Prime Minister Chamberlain visited Hitler to confer on prevention of the war

September 20, 1938. Béla Imrédy visited Hitler to assure Hungarian cooperation. Presented claims on Carpatho-Ukraine.

September 21, 1938. Poland demanded Těšín district.

September 21, 1938. The Carpatho-Ukrainian members of the Czecho-Slovak Parliament called for the immediate introduction of autonomy within Czecho-Slovakia.

September 22, 1938. Second Chamberlain visit to Hitler failed. Great Britain advised the Czechs to mobilize.

September 29-30, 1938. The Munich Conference. Besides incorporating Sudetenland into Germany, Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler and Mussolini agreed to guarantee new boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia after solving the problem of Hungarian and Polish minorities on the basis of ethnic principle.

October 1, 1938. Polish troops occupied Těšín region.

October 1, 1938. Hungarian Prime Minister Imrédy authorized M. Kozma to prepare *Rongyos Gárda* for subversive activities in Carpatho-Ukraine.

October 5-6, 1938. Csáky visited Warsaw to plan the co-ordination of Polish and Hungarian terror activities in Carpatho-Ukraine.

October 5, 1938. E. Beneš resigned. Gen. Jan Syrový assumed the Presidency.

October 6, 1938. Slovak political leaders formed an autonomous Government of Slovakia headed by Msgr. Jozef Tiso.

October 7, 1938. Mussolini announced his support for Hungaro-Polish subversive activities.

October 8, 1938. The Carpatho-Ukrainian political leaders formed the autonomous coalition Government headed by A. Brodiy.

October 9-11, 1938. Negotiations at Komárom failed.

October 10, 1938. *Rongyos Gárda* crossed the Carpatho-Ukrainian boundary. The Hungarians suffered disaster: 300 killed and over 300 taken as prisoners.

October 12, 1938. Polish terrorists moved into Carpatho-Ukraine from the north.

October 13, 1938. Darányi visited Hitler and offered economic, military and political cooperation in exchange for Hitler's support for the Hungarian annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine.

October 19, 1938. Minister E. Bachynskiy visited Ribbentrop to explain the Carpatho-Ukrainian position

October 19, 1938. Col. Beck visited King Carol II of Rumania to gain his support for the Polish-Hungarian common frontier.

October 19, 1938. Karol Sidor declared in Warsaw Slovakia's disinterest in the fate of Carpatho-Ukraine.

October 26, 1938. Msgr. A. Voloshyn replaced A. Brodiy as Prime Minister of Carpatho-Ukraine.

November 2, 1938. The Vienna Arbitration. Ciano and Ribbentrop decided to cede Uzhhorod and Mukachiv to Hungary.

November 3, 1938. Prime Minister A. Voloshyn designated the City of Khust as temporary capital of Carpatho-Ukraine.

November 15, 1938. The Holy See appointed Bishop Dionisiy Nyadariy as the Apostolic Delegate to Khust.

November 19-21, 1938. German intervention prevented the planned Hungarian military intervention which was to be supported by Mussolini's airforce.

November 22, 1938. Czecho-Slovak Parliament amended the Constitutional Charter of the Republic to provide for the federal system.

November 24, 1938. King Carol II of Rumania informed Hitler about his opposition to the Hungarian annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine.

December 1, 1938. The newly elected President of the federal Republic, Emil Hácha, reappointed A. Voloshyn as Prime Minister of Carpatho-Ukraine and Yuliyan Revay as Minister.

December 14, 1938. Rumanian Consul A. Scradianu arrived in Khust.

January 5, 1939. Col. Beck visited Hitler. In exchange for Danzig, Ribbentrop offered Beck a free hand in Ukraine.

January 11-14, 1939. Chamberlain and Halifax visited Rome. They discussed with Mussolini the Vienna Award border guarantees as well as the then widely discussed issue of the independence of Ukraine.

January 12, 1939. Msgr. Voloshyn proclaimed elections to the Diet.

January 14, 1939. Joint Polish-Soviet protest at Prague against the activities of the Ukrainian Independence Movement.

January 16, 1939. Hácha appointed Prchala a Minister of Carpatho-Ukraine.

January 26, 1939. Ribbentrop visited Warsaw. Beck reaffirmed Poland's interests in Ukraine.

February 8, 1939. German Consul W. Splettstrasser arrived in Khust.

February 9, 1939. Sztójay informed the Germans about Hungary's intentions to intervene in Carpatho-Ukraine on Election Sunday. Ribbentrop advised Csáky to the contrary.

February 12, 1939. Elections to the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine.

February 12, 1939. Tuka visited Hitler to talk about Slovakia's independence.

March 11, 1939. Germany formulated conditions for the Hungarian occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine.

March 13, 1939. Hitler urged Horthy to seize Carpatho-Ukraine immediately.

March 13, 1939. Hitler received Tiso and offered protection to independent Slovakia.

March 13, 1939. Msgr. Voloshyn ordered armament of the *Carpathian Sitch.*

March 14, 1939. Hungarian troops attacked Carpatho-Ukraine in the early morning hours. Gen. Prchala's Czech troops attacked the *Carpathian Sitch* within.

March 14, 1939. Slovak Diet proclaimed the independence of Slovakia.

March 14, 1939. Prime Minister Voloshyn declared the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine. The *Carpathian Sitch* defends the country.

March 15, 1939. The Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine adopted the Constitutional Act of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic and elected Msgr. Voloshyn the President of the Republic. Yuliyan Revay was appointed Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

March 15, 1939. Csáky presented an ultimatum to Voloshyn demanding capitulation. Hitler advised the Carpatho-Ukrainians to capitulate. The Government of Carpatho-Ukraine rejected these demands and decided to defend the independence of the country. The *Carpathian Sitch* was transformed into the country's regular military units and offered armed resistance to the advancing Hungarian troops.

March 16, 1939. In the evening hours, Hungarian troops occupied Khust. The Carpatho-Ukrainian Government moved to Bychkiv and later went into exile. Defense of the country continued. Scattered armed resistance until April reported.

November 26, 1944. Delegates of the People's Committees at Mukachiv decided to join the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

June 29, 1945. Treaty between the USSR and Czecho-Slovakia recognizing the union of Carpatho-Ukraine with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

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P.G.S.

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