MAKING NEWS AND TELLING STORIES: CANADA'S HUNT FOR NAZI WAR CRIMINALS

by

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THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

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THESIS ABSTRACT

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This study is an exploration in the realm of critical media analysis. It examines an instance of media representation; specifically, the portrayal of a Canadian ethnic minority in the news coverage of the mainstream English-language media. The case study selected is the representation of the Ukrainian Canadian community in the news coverage of the proceedings of the Deschenes Commission, the Royal Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals.

The Ukrainian Canadian community voiced strong objections to its perceived portrayal in the coverage of the Deschenes proceedings. This claim of misrepresentation is the starting point of the inquiry at hand. Eschewing debate of whether the claim was 'right' or 'wrong', it proceeds from the acknowledgement that members of the community did perceive misrepresentation in the Deschenes news coverage. Moreover, to the extent that the misrepresentation was perceived as real, it also must have been real in its consequences. As such the claim warrants further social scientific inquiry.

The questions this study explores are how and why the Ukrainian Canadian community produced this particular reading of the Deschenes news coverage. Using the tools of interpretive analysis, the claim of misrepresentation is examined as the trace of a reading experience, tangible evidence of a negotiation of meaning stemming from an encounter between a specific audience group and a determinate set of images produced and conveyed by the Canadian news media. A critical account of this experience is

constructed by analyzing a representative sampling of the news coverage in question as a text. The Deschenes story as told in the news text is actively juxtaposed with elements of the unique framework of perception which to varying degrees guided the Ukrainian Canadian community's reading experience, thereby reconstituting or appropriating the negotiation of meaning evidenced by the claim of misrepresentation. The study's findings and concluding questions hope to contribute to a critical understanding of this and similar negotiations of meaning in the context of the socio-political reality that is contemporary Canada.

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INTRODUCTION:

On 7 February 1985 the federal government of Canada announced the formation of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals. Headed by the Honorable Mr. Justice Jules Deschenes of the Superior Court of Quebec, the Commission was charged with the responsibility of investigating claims that Nazi war criminals who had escaped prosecution following World War II were now residing in Canada. In the event such allegations could be substantiated the Commission was also to determine how these individuals had gained entry to Canada and clarify the legal provisions extant for their prosecution.[1]

The Deschenes Commission, as it came to be known, required almost two years to fulfill its mandate. In that time, its work was the subject of intense scrutiny by Canadian media outlets, who transformed the Deschenes proceedings into a major ongoing news story. In the process, a host of troubling questions was raised, many of them pertaining to the news coverage itself.

The most frequently voiced concerns centered on media portrayals of the various social and political groupings who emerged as pivotal players in the Deschenes proceedings. Several ethnic communities of East European origin were taken aback at their representation in the news coverage of the Deschenes Commission. Most outspoken among them were Ukrainian Canadians, who condemned the media for portraying them as a community

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[1] "Minutes of Order No. 1985-348 of the Privy Council for Canada", cited in the Honorable Jules Deschenes, <u>Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals Report Part I: Public</u> (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1986), pp. 17-19.

of active Nazi sympathizers, if not collaborators.[2] Fears were also expressed regarding the possible consequences of such public portrayals for the community's collective identity, for its place in the socio-political fabric of the Canadian mosaic.

The Ukrainian Canadian community's claim of misrepresentation was considered serious enough to warrant inclusion in the ongoing news coverage of the Deschenes proceedings.[3] It was also addressed as part of a public opinion poll commissioned by the federal government in late 1986 in an attempt to assess the ramifications of its policy options on the war criminals issue. The results of the survey, according to some, demonstrate there was no general tarring of the Ukrainian Canadian community's image by the news coverage of the Deschenes proceedings.[4] By extension then, there would appear to be little of substance to the claim of misrepresentation.

The following study challenges the closure inherent in the preceding formulation. It starts from the acknowledgement that members of the Ukrainian Canadian community did perceive themselves as being misrepresented in the Deschenes news coverage. Moreover, to the extent that this situation was perceived as real, it also must have been real in its

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[2] Roman Serbyn, "Alleged War Criminals, the Canadian Media, and the Ukrainian Canadian Community", Ukraine During World War II: History and its Aftermath, ed. Yury Boshyk (Edmonton: The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), p.121.

[3] cf. "Ukrainian Community Incensed over War-Criminal Allegations", The Globe and Mail, 14 February 1985; "Ukrainian Community Leaders Fear Effects of Nazi Reports", The Globe and Mail, 15 February 1985; "Ukrainians raise $2 million to fight war crimes' image", The Toronto Star, 14 November 1985; "Ukrainians say media unfair about war crimes", The Montreal Gazette, 2 December 1985. The charge was also addressed in a panel discussion at the Centre for Investigative Journalism's 1986 conference in Vancouver. cf. "Canada's war crimes probe: hot topic at journalists' parley", The Ukrainian Weekly, 10 August 1986.

[4] Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld, Old Wounds: Jews, Ukrainians and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada (Markham, Ontario: Viking, 1988), pp. 313-314.

consequences.[5] As such, the claim of misrepresentation begs further social scientific inquiry.

This project proposes an interpretive exploration of the phenomenon in question. Within this framework the Ukrainian Canadian community's claim of misrepresentation will be analyzed as a reading experience, a negotiation of meaning stemming from an encounter between a specific audience group and a determinate set of images produced and conveyed by the mass media.[6] The task at hand is to construct a critical account of this negotiation. By addressing the questions of how and why the Ukrainian Canadian community produced this particular reading of the Deschenes news coverage, this inquiry hopes to contribute to a critical understanding of the claim of misrepresentation. Its concluding questions should be regarded as a base from which to pursue further studies into the significance and potential ramifications of such perceptions for the social and political fabric of a multicultural Canada.

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[5] The fundamental premise of the so-called 'Thomas theorem', cited in Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 348. Schutz attributes the term 'Thomas theorem' to Robert K. Merton, who in turn derived it from the work of William Isaac Thomas. Ibid., fn. 71, p. 348.

[6] The term 'mass media', in this context, refers to mainstream Canadian media outlets - daily newspapers, television, radio, and news magazines - which provided regular news coverage of the Deschenes Commission proceedings.

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CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

I.1 The Interpretive Method

As a localized phenomenon confined largely to a specific audience group, the Ukrainian Canadian community's perception of misrepresentation in the news coverage of the Deschenes Commission proceedings poses an analytic challenge similar to that described by Clifford Geertz in his elaboration of how the ethnographer comes to grasp 'the native's point of view'.[7] Success in such an endeavor is predicated on understanding the distinction between what Geertz terms 'experience-near' and 'experience-distant' concepts. The former are descriptions the ethnographer's informants might themselves use to define their perceptions, beliefs and experiences; the latter are broader theoretical formulations employed by ethnographers in their inquiries. The ethnographer's task, according to Geertz, is to devise a strategy that deploys experience-near and experience-distant concepts simultaneously so as to produce insights which are critically revealing yet sensitive to local experiences and detail.

Geertz calls this strategy 'the understanding of understanding', or cultural hermeneutics. His ethnographic inquiries endeavor to clarify socio-cultural phenomena by situating them in local frames of awareness.[8] What they produce is a systematic unpacking of a conceptual world that translates the logic of a group's perceptions into a broader, more accessible discourse.[9]

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[7] Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge. Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 55-70.

[8] Ibid., p. 6.

[9] Ibid., pp. 22, 10. As Geertz suggests, it is a "...catching of 'their' views in 'our' vocabularies."

Geertz's methodology is situated within the critical paradigm James Carey calls the cultural science of communication.[10] Practitioners like Geertz are diagnosticians of meaning who seek to understand human behavior by interpreting its significance. Their goal, ultimately, is "to grasp hold of the meanings people build into their words and behavior and to make these meanings, these claims about life and experience, explicit and articulate."[11] This end is achieved by way of an appropriation of meaning: taking that which was initially 'alien' and making it "one's own".[12]

The appropriation of meaning through interpretation is accomplished by way of dialectical inquiry. In Geertz's ethnographies, the dialectic is manifested in his integration of the study of fixed meanings with the study of the social processes that fix them.[13] His investigations entail

> ...continuous dialectical tacking between the most
> local of local detail and the most global of global
> structure in such a way so as to bring them into
> simultaneous view. Hopping back and forth
> between the whole conceived through the parts
> that actualize it and the parts conceived through
> the whole that motivates them, we seek to turn
> them, by a sort of intellectual perpetual motion,
> into explications of one another.[14]

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[10] James Carey, "Mass Communication Research and Cultural Studies: An American View", Mass Communication and Society, eds. James Curran, Michael Gurevitch and Janet Woollacott, (London: Sage Publications, 1977), pp. 418-425.

[11] Ibid., p. 421.

[12] Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation, trans. and ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 185.

[13] Geertz, Local Knowledge, pp. 31-32.

[14] Ibid., p. 69.

By embracing the dialectic in this fashion, Geertz's inquiries strive for a deeper, more critical level of insight.

Critics of the interpretive approach frequently contend that it contributes to what Louis Sass dubs 'the Cartesian anxiety' - a vicious relativism in which all assertions are equally valid.[15] While acknowledging the danger, the interpretive method proceeds from the assumption that where questions of culture, society, human nature, and history are concerned, "there are always legitimate grounds for differences of opinion as to *what* they are, *how* they should be spoken about, and the *kinds* of knowledge we can have of them."[16]

Interpretation is informed by what Berger and Luckmann call relational epistemology, which implies " a recognition the knowledge must always be knowledge from a certain position."[17] Instead of a foundation of absolute, incontrovertible knowledge, relational epistemology posits a provisional knowledge - knowledge that is "the best available to us at the time,.... that is relative to our times, our learning, and, of course, our talent."[18] Even the most statistically rigorous 'facts' generated by traditional empiricist researches in the human and natural sciences are thus grounded.

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[15] Louis A. Sass, "Anthropology's Native Problems: Revisionism in the Field", Harper's, May 1986, p. 52. Carey also acknowledges this dilemma in his discussion of how the cultural science of communication confronts 'Mannheim's Paradox'. cf. Carey, op. cit., pp. 415-419.

[16] Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p.1.

[17] Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966), p. 9.

[18] Mario J. Valdes. Phenomenological Hermeneutics and the Study of Literature (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 3.

Interpretation also recognizes that no matter what form an analysis takes, a degree of subjectivity or pre-judgement is unavoidable. Rather than negating the possibility of critical insight, this subjectivity is put to the service of interpretive inquiry. It constitutes a study's 'fore-understanding', a pre-condition of any interpretive enterprise. As Allan Megill suggests, interpretive analysis begins by making explicit all pre-judgements regarding the object of study.[19] The parameters of inquiry thus acknowledged, the interpreter proceeds to make the object of his interpretation intelligible to himself and to the audience for who he intends that interpretation.

> He accomplishes this task by looking at the object in light of his own knowledge and concerns. In doing so, he quite legitimately gives new meanings to the object - meanings that may go far beyond anything that the original textual authors or historical actors could have conceived of.[20]

Thus the role of the interpreter is similar to that of Roland Barthes' critic: the construction of an intelligibility for a given time, place, and context.[21] Critically conceived and executed, such constructions contribute to the existing stock of provisional knowledge.

I.2 Meaning and Social World-Making

The fore-knowledge underlying this interpretive inquiry proceeds from an acknowledgement of the provisional knowledge on which it is based. This exploration takes place within the critical paradigm previously identified

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[19] Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p.xi.

[20] Ibid., p. 23.

[21] Roland Barthes, "What is Criticism?", in Critical Essays, trans. Richard Howard (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 257-260.

as the cultural science of communication. Here it is principally informed by a specific configuration of literature anchored in Geertz's cultural anthropology, Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutics, Alfred Schutz's phenomenology, and the critical media analysis and cultural criticism of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham and the Centre for Mass Communication Research at the University of Leicester. This critical framework is tempered by the interpreter's 'experience-near' knowledge of both the Canadian news media and the Ukrainian Canadian community. The resulting frame of understanding simultaneously constrains and empowers the inquiry. On the one hand it influences the selection of questions for investigation; on the other, it provides the critical conception which drives the ensuing analysis.

Within this critical conception the Ukrainian Canadian community's perception of misrepresentation in the news coverage of the Deschenes Commission proceedings is understood to be a socio-cultural phenomenon. It is evidence of an interaction between a particular configuration of individuals and a specific set of images produced and conveyed by the mass media. In this interaction the aforementioned audience group encountered the media materials in question and responded by investing them with meanings.[22] The analytic challenge posed by this phenomenon is to offer a critical account for the investiture or negotiation of meaning manifested in the Ukrainian Canadian community's claim of misrepresentation.

To refer to a negotiation of meaning is to acknowledge that meanings are created; they are the tangible consequences of the ongoing intersubjective

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[22] Martin Laba, "Making Sense: Expressiveness, Stylization and the Popular Cultural Process", Journal of Popular Culture, 19, 1986, p. 107.

act of making the world mean. The outcome of these negotiations is the social reality that frames the consciousness of every individual. Negotiations of meaning might therefore be understood as instances of world-making.

The process of world-making is characterized by four essential features. As social reality is rooted in the inherent human capacity to establish meaningful relationships with other human beings as well as with all kinds of objects, world-making is foremost a social process. Its inherent intersubjectivity and resulting correspondences of meaning are experienced by way of symbols: "tangible formulations of notions, abstractions from experience fixed in perceptible forms, concrete embodiments of ideas, attitudes, judgements, longings or beliefs."[23] These symbols encompass all humanly-inspired objects, actions, events, qualities, and relations that transcend their mere actuality to give meaning to social reality.[24] World-making, then, entails the process of human action and interaction whereby social reality, its symbols and meanings, are shaped as collective and constructed phenomena.

In addition to being an intersubjective and symbolic world, social reality is also an historical world. As such, the process of world-making is not entirely a matter of free will and unrestrained human agency. Marx makes the point most forcefully, arguing that history is made "under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past."[25] World-making is therefore understood to be influenced by historically and culturally

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[23] Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 91.

[24] Ibid., pp. 92-94.

[25] Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" (1852), The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1972), p. 436.

developed codes of organization, including language, social values, ideologies, economic structure, and other factors. All human activity is framed by this context and simultaneously contributes to its ongoing reproduction and development; interaction within given meanings produces adumbrations of the latter as well as new meanings.

The final characteristic of the world-making process concerns the level of consciousness at which it occurs: the activity of world-making is largely taken for granted.[26] Social reality is perceived as a given, as being 'naturally' there. Any doubts about its facticity are suspended as we proceed through the routines of everyday life. But as Schutz goes on to note:

> Of course, at any time that which seemed hitherto
> unquestionable might be put in question.
> Common-sense thinking simply takes for granted,
> until counterevidence appears, not only the world
> of physical objects but also the sociocultural world
> into which we are born and in which we grow up.
> This world of everyday life is indeed the
> unquestioned but always questionable matrix
> within which all our inquiries start and end.[27]

Drawing on Schutz, then, the following study proposes that its object can be understood as an instance of world-making. The Ukrainian Canadian community's perception of misrepresentation in the news coverage of the Deschenes Commission proceedings is a determinate codification of a specific social, historical and cultural experience by a particular audience group. Symbolically experienced and expressed, this negotiating meaning is situated in a field of similar instances of world-making that variously shape, constrain and otherwise motivate it. What emerges from this dialectical tension is one

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[26] As defined by Schutz, the term 'taken for granted' means "...to accept until further notice our knowledge of certain states of affairs as unquestionably plausible." Schutz, op.cit., p. 326.

[27] Schutz, op.cit., pp. 326-327.

dimension of the social reality in which this audience group exists. The
unpacking of this reality - overcoming its relative taken-for-grantedness
through a critical appropriation of its meanings - constitutes the focus of the
ensuing analysis.

I.3 Social World and Text

The process of appropriation begins with the most tangible element of
the problematic: the media materials on which the Ukrainian Canadian
community's perception of misrepresentation was based. Within the
interpretive paradigm the news coverage of the Deschenes proceedings can be
construed as a text - an inscribed work of discourse containing traces of
meanings. The claim of misrepresentation is one such trace: concrete
evidence of an interaction between one audience group and the Deschenes
news text. The meanings invested in the text by this group in the course of
the encounter can be more fully understood by unpacking this trace. Doing so
involves focusing on a specific set of questions namely:

> how the inscription of action is brought about, what
> its vehicles are and how they work, and on what
> the fixation of meaning from the flow of events -
> history from what happened, thought from
> thinking, culture from behavior - implies for
> sociological interpretation.[28]

All texts are distinguished by three identifying features. In the first
place they are instances of discourse. To refer to texts as instances of discourse
is to acknowledge that they are specific realizations of language- or speech-
events.[29] As speech-events or language in use, they differ from language

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[28] Geertz, Local Knowledge, p. 31.

[29] Ricoeur, op.cit., p. 198.

systems or linguistic codes on several counts: discourses are realized temporally and in the present as opposed to being virtual and outside of time; they feature active participants - subjects/speakers as well as audiences; finally, they refer to something which they claim to describe.[30] It is through discourse that the unfamiliar is transformed into the familiar and the social structuration of meaning is achieved.

The possibility of elucidating the transformation from the unfamiliar to the familiar rests on the recognition that discourses embrace two coincidental yet distinct social processes: the practices of production and consumption. Both categories figure prominently in textual analysis, for in any consideration of a text's meanings, it is essential to examine both the actual text and the action involved in responding to it. Consequently, the critical appropriation of a text's meanings becomes predicated on an elaboration of "the social, political and historical conditions of its production and consumption, because these 'determinants' will shape what it says, the way it develops, the status it enjoys, the people who use it, the uses to which it is put and so on."[31]

The coincidental processes of production and consumption embodied in texts can be elaborated through the remaining features of the textual metaphor. While they are instances of discourse, texts are also specific works of discourse. To refer to a text as a work is to acknowledge that it is the result of a particular practice, a determinate objectification of specific human

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[30] Ibid., pp. 133-134.

[31] John Hartley, Understanding News (London and New York: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1982), p.6. The importance of both processes is underscored by the work of Todd Gitlin, who argues that the study of popular culture must encompass the production and consumption of cultural goods. Todd Gitlin, "Television's Screens: Hegemony in Transition", Cultural and Economic Reproduction in Education, ed. Mike Apple (London: Routledge, 1982), p. 204..

activity.[32] This product has a particular composition; it is a structured and organized whole that transcends the sum of its parts. The previously-cited conditions of production determine the work's genre, while its uniqueness is ultimately predicated on its style , or the manner by which its ends are achieved. The production of discourse as work is thereby manifested in the reciprocal movement between the textual categories of composition, genre and style.

The third and final characteristic of texts addresses the question of how works of discourse are consumed. Texts are inscribed works of discourse. What is inscribed or fixed in place from the ongoing flow of discourse is not a speech-event itself but rather, a representation or depiction of the speech-event. The latter is several steps removed from the speech-event, a distancing that carries several implications for the meanings of a text.[33]

By virtue of inscription, works of discourse are removed from their immediate contexts. In the process, the intentions of speaking subjects and the meanings of inscribed expressions can cease to coincide. Depending on their new contexts, works of discourse can assume different referential dimensions. Inscribed works of discourse are no longer addressed to designated audiences; they are open to all who can access the inscriptions. Consequently, texts become analytically accessible across time and space. They assume an historical dimension, tying in to a universe of other texts. Perhaps

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[32] As elaborated by Althusser, practice transforms " 'a determinate raw material into a determinate product, a transformation effected by a determinate human labor using determinate means (of"production").'" Louis Althusser, For Marx (London: Allen Lane, 1969), p. 166, cited in Stuart Hall, "The Rediscovery of 'Ideology': Return of the Repressed in Media Studies", Culture, Society and the Media, eds. Michael Gurevitch, Tony Bennett, James Curran, and Janet Woollacott (London and New York: Methuen, 1982), p. 77.

[33] Ricoeur, op.cit., pp. 200-202.

most significantly, inscription suggests a text can have no single, fixed meaning.[34] Freed from the intentionality of its author(s) and the limits of its ostensive reference, a text's meanings are revealed in the specific reading experience of the text, the way in which it is consumed, or encountered and interpreted by a given audience.

1.4 The Deschenes News Text

Extending the textual metaphor to the exploration at hand facilitates an analysis of the news coverage of the Deschenes proceedings as an inscribed work of discourse. As a concrete instance of discourse the Deschenes proceedings were realized between Friday, 8 February 1985, when the formation of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals was announced, and Friday, 13 March 1987, when the inquiry's findings were made public. Participants in this speech-event included all those with official standing or called to testify before the Deschenes inquiry, members and staff of the Royal Commission, the Canadian news media covering the proceedings, and, to the extent that this news coverage was consumed, the general public. The discursive interaction between these parties revolved around the Deschenes Commission's fulfillment of its mandate: diagnosing the degree of threat posed by the presence of Nazi war criminals in Canada, isolating the cause of the problem, and prescribing treatment.

To achieve this end, the inquiry investigated a total of 883 cases of alleged Nazi war criminals in Canada, compiling evidence from both

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[34] In his critique of the historicist tendency to reduce a text to a single, preferred interpretation, Valdes writes: "...the reduction of a text to the author's intended meaning is just as inappropriate as the reduction of historical events to the intentions of the main participants." Valdes, op.cit., p.25.

Canadian and foreign sources. Sixty-six days of public and in-camera hearings were conducted in eight Canadian centres. During these sessions the Deschenes Commission heard from 85 witnesses and accepted 23 submissions from interested groups or individuals. The inquiry also commissioned nine separate studies on various aspects of its mandate. Its findings were published in Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals Report Part I: Public, a 966-page document released on 12 March 1987, and Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals Report Part II: The Confidential Report, a version of which appeared in extensively edited form in August 1987.

The news media's coverage of this discourse, or the Deschenes news text, was something other than a reflection of the skeletal structure described above. In their location, gathering, interpretation, and dissemination of information pertaining to the Deschenes inquiry, journalists were engaged creating a work of discourse. Their labor entailed the practice of representation: "the active work of selecting and presenting, of structuring and shaping: not merely the transmitting of an already-existing meaning but the more active labor of making things mean."[35] Informed by a prescribed code of professional ethics and values, and realized through the implementation of a host of well-defined craft skills, this newswork resulted in a text distinguishable by its composition, genre and style.

Where the composition is concerned, the Deschenes news text was a component part of a commodity that is produced and consumed according to the economic logic of profits and markets. Like other products of the Canadian news industry, this work of discourse belongs to a genre of texts called news:

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[35] Hall, op.cit., p. 64.

information which is transmitted from sources to
audiences, with journalists - who are both
employees of bureaucratic commercial
organizations and members of a profession -
summarizing, refining, and altering what becomes
available to them from sources in order to make
the information suitable for their audiences.[36]

News, then, invests occurrences with their public character, transforming
them into publicly discussable events. In the case at hand, the Deschenes
news coverage opened the proceedings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry
on War Criminals to a general audience who, by consuming the text, became
indirect witnesses to a discourse of which few had first-hand knowledge or
experience.

The unique style of this work of discourse is evidenced in the manner
by which it transformed the unfamiliar into the familiar. It did so by way of a
cohesive narrative or story. To refer to the Deschenes news text as a story is to
acknowledge that it was the product of cultural resources and active
negotiations. It was created by journalists out of the conventions, procedures,
ethos, and devices of their craft.[37] The story they told was a complex web of
interconnected sub-plots. This narrative imposed a semblance of order on the
flow of occurrences comprising the Deschenes discourse by investing the
latter with a dramatic unity integrating plot, characters, scene, methods and
purposes.[38] The end result was a partial and particular rendering of the
Deschenes proceedings, a highly-selective abstraction designed to appear all-

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[36] Herbert J. Gans, Deciding What's News. A Study of CBS Evening New, NBC Nightly News,
Newsweek, and Time (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 80.

[37] James Carey, "The Dark Continent of American Journalism", Reading the News, eds. Robert
Karl Manoff and Michael Schudson (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), p. 159.

[38] Ibid., p. 148.

inclusive and coherent.[39] Moreover, by virtue of the status and legitimacy accorded this textual genre in Canadian society, the Deschenes news text was presented and could be taken-for-granted as an impartial and 'objective' record of the proceedings.[40]

Herein lies the significance of the news genre. News is one of the primary discursive vehicles via which social reality is perpetually constituted and reconstituted. Adapting to the text's codes and conventions, audiences become 'news literate':

> not only able to follow the news and recognize its
> familiar cast of characters and events, but also
> spontaneously able to interpret the world at large in
> terms of the codes we have learnt from the news.
> Individually, we perceive and interpret the world
> in terms partly derived from classifications made
> familiar in the news; collectively, we make up
> reality as we go along, perceiving it as meaningful
> to the extent that it can be made to resemble the
> expectations we bring to it from the ordered
> language-system of news.[41]

Consequently, the Deschenes news text can be understood as one of the many inscribed works of discourse contributing to "'the climate of opinion', to the horizons of possibility, and to the process of marking the limits of acceptable thought and action"[42] in Canadian society.

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[39] As Tuchman notes, audiences fill in missing details as they consume the news. Gaye Tuchman, Making News:A Study in the Construction of Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978), pp. 189-190. For a detailed treatment of this process, see Doris A. Graber, Processing the News. How People Tame the Information Tide (New York: Longman Inc., 1984).

[40] Tony Bennett, "Media, 'Reality', Signification", Culture, Soceity and the Media, p. 303.

[41] Hartley, op.cit., p. 5.

[42] Ibid. p. 56.

As the practice of representation makes clear, what is inscribed in the Deschenes news text is the journalistic interpretation of a speech-event as opposed to the event itself. In order for the meanings inherent in this inscription to be realized, the text had to be removed from the control of its producers and transferred into the domain of public readership. In the process, not only did the coincidence between the intentions journalists invested in their inscribing and the meanings their inscriptions bore dissipate; the text was also opened up to an unlimited series of readings by diverse audience groups. Each of them brought its own unique referential context to the textual encounter. And while there were significant points of correspondence among these contexts, they were sufficiently exceptional to be able to speak of group-specific reading experiences.

I.5 A Reading Experience of the Deschenes News Text

The audience group on whose reading experience this inquiry focuses is the Ukrainian Canadian community. In general demographic terms, the latter is a relatively small and compact collectivity comprised of almost one million people living primarily in Central Canada and the Prairies.[43] Its extensive community infrastructure and cultural vitality attest to its being more than a statistical category; it is an ethnocultural minority - a social grouping whose members to varying degrees share "...a common cultural tradition and a sense of identity as a traditionally distinct subgroup within a larger society."[44] Within Canadian society this community acts as a *'nomos-*

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[43] Roman Petryshyn, "Introduction", Changing Realities: Social Trends Among Ukrainian Canadians, ed W.R. Petryshyn (Edmonton: The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), pp. x, xi.

[44] Allan B. Anderson and James S. Frederes, Ethnicity in Canada: Theoretical Perspectives (Toronto: Butterworth and Co., Ltd., 1981), p. 48.

building instrumentality', a distinctive social arrangement creating a variety

of order through which individuals can experience their lives as making

sense.[45]

What facilitates the Ukrainian Canadian community's sense of *nomos*

is its unique stock of social knowledge - the idiomatic social information

system which to some extent frames the individual consciousness of every

group member.[46] Abstracted from a common language, social experiences,

history, attitudes, beliefs, and values, it is one of many shared texts through

which this community imagines itself.[47] Among other things, this text

provides the schema which guide information processing by group

members.[48] These heuristic structures

> constitute serviceable although imperfect devices
> for coping with complexity. They direct attention to
> relevant information, guide its interpretation and
> evaluation, provide inferences when information
> is missing or ambiguous, and facilitate its
> retention.[49]

The text of social knowledge is also a constituent element of the Ukrainian

Canadian community's framework of perception - the codes and

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[45] Peter L. Berger, Facing up to Reality. Excursions in Society, Politics, and Religion (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977), p. 5.

[46] Berger and Luckmann, op.cit., pp. 39-43.

[47] cf. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso Editions, 1983). Anderson defines an imagined community as one whose members "...will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion." Ibid., p. 15.

[48] Graber, op.cit., p. 23.

[49] Susan T. Fiske and Donald R. Kinder, "Involvement, Expertise, and Schema Use: Evidence from Political Cognition", Personality, Cognition, and Social Interaction, eds. Nancy Kantor and John F. Kihlstrom (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1981), p. 173.

predispositions group members consciously and subconsciously deploy in their textual encounters and reading experiences. This framework allows group members to make sense of their own experiences of social reality as well as the multidimensional representations of that reality created by the media.[50] In the case at hand, the framework contributed to shaping the Ukrainian Canadian community's perception of misrepresentation in the Deschenes news text.

While it produced a highly localized negotiation of meaning, the Ukrainian Canadian community's reading experience did not take place in a vacuum. Like any other facet of human activity, it was contextually situated in a shared social environment. Within this environment there was constant interaction between the Ukrainian Canadian community's perception of misrepresentation and other groups' encounters with the Deschenes news text - Jewish Canadian, other associations based on ethnicity, the network of newsworkers responsible for the text's production, government agencies whose actions created the text's ostensive referent, and various other socio-political and cultural configurations. This interaction and its resulting exchanges of meanings constituted a broader discourse. Intertwined with other, similar discourses, it comprises the experiential field of social relations in which Canadian society is activated and realized.

The historical context of this particular configuration of social relations is understood to be a hegemonic one, where the interests and values of certain groups are privileged at the expense of others. A dynamic and continually shifting situation, its existence is predicated on a broad, moral and intellectual social consensus which is diffused throughout the whole of

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[50] John Westergaard, "Power, Class and the Media", Mass Communication and Society, p. 111.

Canadian society and informs our daily lives.[51] News texts play a key role in shaping and defining that consensus. Signifying the 'real' in a determinate way, these texts help set and control the public agenda - our order of priorities regarding our problems and objectives.[52] The production of these texts sees the selection of certain issues for discussion and decision, thereby conferring and confirming their status and legitimacy. Others are ignored, treated as non-existent, or framed in a privileged definition.[53] The resulting consensus may be understood as a determinate world view - a preferred way of seeing Canadian society's socio-political arena and the events occurring within it.[54]

As an element in this discursive field, the Deschenes news text is inscribed with such a world view. Its many layers of meaning remain obscured because of the text's relative taken-for-grantedness. But with the claim of misrepresentation the unquestioned becomes questionable. The tension between the Ukrainian Canadian community's perception of itself and its experience of its representation in the Deschenes news text implies a struggle over meaning. Stuart Hall explains the struggle over meaning as

> the difference between those accredited witnesses
> and spokesmen who had a privileged access, as a
> right, to the world of public discourse and whose
> statements carried the representativeness and
> authority which permitted them to establish the
> primary framework or terms of an argument; as
> contrasted with those who had to struggle to gain
> access to the world of public discourse at all; whose

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[51] Tom Burns, "The Organization of Public Opinion", Mass Communication and Society, p. 62.

[52] Denis McQuail, "The Influence and Effects of Mass Media", Mass Communication and Society, p. 84.

[53] Hall, op.cit., p. 81.

[54] Jay G. Blumler and Michael Gurevitch, "The Political Effects of Mass Communication", Culture, Society and the Media, p. 263.

'definitions' were always more partial, fragmentary
and delegitimated; and who, when they did gain
access, had to perform within the established terms
of the problematic in play.[55]

Understanding the Ukrainian Canadian community's claim of misrepresentation, therefore, entails analyzing it as an example of an ongoing hegemonic struggle to produce and impose definitions of the world on the world.[56]

Thus the fore-knowledge underpinning this inquiry comes full circle. The Ukrainian Canadian community's claim of misrepresentation in the news coverage of the Deschenes Commission is the inscribed trace of a reading experience. It is a tangible consequence of the dynamic interaction between a group whose collective identity and existence are ultimately predicated on its unique framework of perception and a text whose coding of that identity conflicted with the aforementioned framework. This inquiry proposes that by dialectically juxtaposing the framework with the story told in the Deschenes news text, by clarifying the processes whereby this discourse was produced and consumed, it is possible to construct a critical account of the negotiation of meaning evidenced by the claim of misrepresentation. The resulting appropriation of meaning will overcome not only the taken-for-grantedness of this localized phenomenon, but offer critical insight into the broader social reality contextualizing this instance of world-making.

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[55] Hall, op.cit., p. 81.

[56] Dick Hebdige, Subculture. The Meaning of Style (New York and London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1979), p. 14.

I.6 The Interpretive Case Study

Insofar as the Deschenes news text is a key element of the reading experience under investigation, it is essential to clarify the particulars of this inscribed work of discourse. The Deschenes news text may be said to consist of all printed, visual and aural representations of the proceedings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals produced by the Canadian news industry between 8 February 1985 an 13 March 1987. A definitive exploration of so vast a text clearly falls beyond the scope of this undertaking. Consequently, analysis will be limited to a representative sample of the Deschenes news text comprising five newspapers: *The Globe and Mail, The Montreal Gazette, The Ottawa Citizen, The Toronto Star,* and *The Winnipeg Free Press.* Inquiry will be further restricted to wire and by-lined news stories, background features, opinion pieces, editorials, photographs, and other visuals appearing in these publications during the 28-month period between 1 January 1985 and 30 April 1987.

Drawing on the aforementioned media materials, the ensuing study will proceed in three phases. Chapter II explores the genesis of the Deschenes news text and its resonance in the Ukrainian Canadian community. Chapter III examines how the Ukrainian Canadian community experienced its portrayal in one of the many sub-plots of the Deschenes story and why the rendering was perceived as misrepresentation by this group. Chapter IV situates this reading experience in the broader hegemonic discourse of Canadian society, where it will be analyzed as a struggle over meaning. The study concludes with questions raised by the interpretive approach to the socio-cultural phenomenon of the Ukrainian Canadian community's claim of misrepresentation.

CHAPTER II: THE GENESIS OF THE DESCHENES STORY

As a concrete instance of discourse the Deschenes news text made its first appearance on Friday, 8 February 1985 when each of the five publications under consideration carried reports on the formation of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals.[57] The prominent, front-page coverage afforded the story was the most tangible manifestation of its status as a significant news event, an occurrence warranting special attention from the Canadian news media. In order to qualify for such legitimacy, the story had to meet certain standards of newsworthiness.

For an occurrence to become an event in news discourse it must either occur within the spectrum of subjects anchoring the institutional news net - the day-to-day activities of governments, for example - or be so inherently identifiable - unusual, unexpected, sensational or significant - as to engage and sustain the interest and imagination of the journalistic profession and news consumers alike.[58] The issue of Nazi war criminals qualifies on both counts. They are readily-identifiable symbols of an historical experience that is etched deeply in Western consciousness: World War II and the trauma of the Holocaust. This theme resonates in a number of contemporary public discourses, including pulp fiction, Hollywood film, television melodrama, popular fashion, and political ideologies. Its representation in these textual genres is diverse, ranging from the ridiculous caricatures of the television series 'Hogan's Heroes' to the critical reflections of Hannah Arendt on the banality of evil; from its oppositional appropriation by the bricoleurs of punk

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[57] "Ottawa sets up...", *The Toronto Star*, 8 February 1985, p. A1; "Deschenes heads probe...", *The Montreal Gazette*, 8 February 1985, p. A1; "Ottawa sets up commission...", *The Globe and Mail*, 8 February 1985, p. 1; "Inquiry to seek out...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 8 February 1985, p. 1; and, "Inquiry to hunt...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 8 February 1985, p. A1.

[58] cf. Tuchman, op.cit., pp. 15-39, 44-45.

to the tactics of the American neo-Nazi movement.[59] As they appear in the discourse of news, Nazi war criminals are at once horrifying yet fascinating. On the one hand they are clearly coded symbols of deviance; their behavior has been labelled a transgression of both legally codified rules and normatively enshrined codes of social behavior.[60] On the other hand, they are subjects of a morbid curiosity and public titillation such as that evidenced by the media spectacle based on the trial of John Demjanjuk (alleged to be the brutal concentration camp guard known as Ivan the Terrible) in Jerusalem.

The emergence of the Nazi war criminals issue as a domestic concern can be attributed to what Stanley Cohen calls an 'amplification spiral', whereby the scope and significance of an initial 'problem' is subjected to increased magnification through the mutually-reinforcing reality-defining practices of various social agencies and institutions.[61] A cursory observation reveals that Nazi war crimes were firmly established as a theme in Canadian news discourse in late 1984 and early 1985. At this time media outlets were devoting considerable time and attention to the trial of Ernst Zundel, the Toronto publisher accused of disseminating hate literature that claimed the Holocaust was a hoax. News accounts of the case focused on the nature of the atrocities under dispute, recreating the latter in graphic detail for public consumption. Stories headlined "No scientific proof Jews gassed, trial told", "Documents prove millions of Jews exterminated, trial told", "Saw Jews gassed, Auschwitz inmate tells Zundel trial", and other sensitized Canadian

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[59] A more detailed consideration of this phenomenon undoubtedly would prove revealing but falls beyond the scope of this study.

[60] W. Lance Bennett, News. The Politics of Illusion (New York: Longman Inc., 1983), p. 296.

[61] Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1972). Cited in Bennett, op.cit., pp. 299-300.

news consumers to crimes committed forty years earlier and their continued significance.[62]

In the broader context of what might be called the chronicle of public remembrance, the Western news media were engaged at this time in the commemoration of events associated with the end of World War II. Among the first to be so remembered was the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, perhaps the most notorious of all Nazi concentration camps. To mark the occasion the World Jewish Congress had sponsored a mock trial of Josef Mengele, whose heinous medical experiments on camp inmates at Auschwitz had earned him the name 'Angel of Death' and contributed to his infamy as the last major Nazi war criminal still unaccounted for. Conducted in Jerusalem, this international media event featured testimony by survivors of Auschwitz, whose recollections infused the issue with a new sense of urgency.[63] Through the resurrected symbol of Mengele the news media reminded the world yet again that crimes dating back almost half a century continued to go unpunished and that the prospect for justice dimmed with every passing year.

It was the question of Mengele's whereabouts that ultimately nudged the issue of Nazi war criminals into the forefront of Canadian news coverage. In late December 1984, the Canadian representative of the Los Angeles-based Simon Wiesenthal Centre for Holocaust Studies, Sol Littman, wrote a letter to the federal government claiming to have evidence that Mengele had

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[62] "No scientific...", *The Toronto Star*, 18 January 1985, p. A2; "Documents prove...", *The Toronto Star*, 19 January 1985, p. A3; and, "Saw Jews...", *The Globe and Mail*, 23 January 1985, p. M1.

[63] cf. "Twins return...", *The Toronto Star*, 26 January 1985, p. A3, and "Survivors re-encounter...", *The Globe and Mail*, 28 January 1985, p. 3.

applied for admission to Canada as a landed immigrant in 1962.[64] Receiving no response, Littman took his case to the news media - *The Toronto Star* and *The New York Times*. Both newspapers were supplied with apparent summaries of U.S. government documents obtained under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act which formed the basis for stories that ran on 23 January 1985.[65]

As it appeared on page A4 of *The New York Times* the Mengele story downplayed the Canadian connection, focusing instead on the allegation that Mengele may have been arrested and released in the American occupation zone of Vienna after World War II. *The Toronto Star*, on the other hand, capitalized on the local angle and featured the report on its front page. In addition to a synopsis of the circumstances surrounding Mengele's attempt to come to Canada, *The Toronto Star* enhanced its coverage by integrating quotes from an interview with Littman. According to the latter,

> "We don't know what happened because the
> Canadian government refuses to confirm the
> application was rejected. These factors make it
> impossible to rule out the possibility - incredible as
> it may seem - that Mengele was knowingly
> admitted to Canada. Only a complete investigation
> at the highest level can clear up the matter."

The story ended with an assertion attributed to the Wiesenthal Centre that as many as 3000 Nazi war criminals and collaborators were hiding in Canada and that successive Canadian governments had done little to bring them to justice.

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[64] The following version of events was confirmed by the Royal Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals. cf. Deschenes, op.cit., pp. 67-68.

[65] "Notorious Nazi Mengele...", *The Toronto Star*, 23 January 1985, p. AQ; and, "Papers Indicate Mengele...", *The New York Times*, 23 January 1985, p. A4. The qualifier "apparent" is appropriate owing to the somewhat dubious nature of the evidence. cf. Deschenes, op.cit., pp. 77-82.

The impact of *The Toronto Star* report was immediate. The story was picked up instantly by other Canadian media outlets. Questions about Mengele were raised in the House of Commons the same day. Prime Minister Mulroney responded by ordering Solicitor General Elmer Mackay and Justice Minister John Crosbie to investigate whether Mengele had come to Canada.

The news media, meanwhile, launched their own inquiries with more immediate results. On Friday, 25 January 1985 *The Toronto Star* carried a front-page story accusing the federal government of providing sanctuary in Canada for a number of suspected Nazi war criminals after World War II.[66] According to anonymous "high-placed sources", a secret RCMP report prepared a year earlier contained details of a deal worked out between the governments of Canada, Britain and the United States in which Nazis were provided safe haven in Canada in exchange for intelligence information. Moreover, *The Toronto Star* reported, the Mulroney government now refused to make that report public. Once again, other Canadian media outlets picked up the story. Its significance was summed up in an editorial the following day:

> Something stinks in Ottawa. It's the whiff of an
> RCMP report which concludes that the Canadian
> government provided a haven for suspected Nazi
> war criminals. And the stench will only become
> fouler until Solicitor-General Elmer Mackay makes
> the report public...
>
> The Nazis planned, carried out and tried to make
> excuses for the greatest crime against humanity the
> world has seen. They sent millions to the ovens.

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[66] "Ottawa reported...", *The Toronto Star*, 25 January 1985, p. A1.

There can be no hiding place for Nazi war criminals
as long as the last of them breathes and as long as
the law endures. No immoral deal made by some
past Canadian government can take precedence
over the silent claim of the victims of Nazism -
including those Canadians who gave their lives
fighting it - for elementary justice.[67]

The Canadian news media's pursuit of the war criminals story

followed several different directions during the next two weeks. Much of the

coverage was devoted to the Mulroney government's attempts at controlling

the political fall-out resulting from its publicly implied lack of ethical

integrity. But no sooner had government officials proclaimed their

commitment to seeing that justice was done than new accusations were

levelled by the Wiesenthal Centre. Not only had known Nazi war criminals

been allowed into Canada but the government of Louis St. Laurent had

passed cabinet orders legalizing their presence.[68] Paraphrasing Sol Littman,

the Canadian Press story reported that "the Canadian government has

protected their identities since that time and has blunted the efforts of foreign

countries to extradite war criminals and bring them to trial."

The sensational nature of the war criminals story was such that it also

influenced the news coverage of other events. Nowhere was this more

evident than in the reports regarding a working paper released by the Law

Reform Commission of Canada. The 210-page document made 67

recommendations aimed at improving Canadian laws applying to

extraterritorial jurisdiction. Potentially a rather dull story, the report was

saved from obscurity by virtue of its counsel that the federal government take

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[67] "Is Ottawa protecting...", *The Toronto Star*, 26 January 1985, p. B2.

[68] "War Criminals...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 30 January 1985, p. 1; "St. Laurent...", *The Globe and Mail*, 30 January 1985, p. 5; "St. Laurent...", *The Montreal Gazette*, 30 January 1985, p. A1.

steps to amend the Criminal Code to permit the trial of suspected Nazi war criminals in Canada. The currency of the issue in the news discourse of the day transformed this single recommendation into a lead for stories headlined "Amend law to allow trial of Nazis, Ottawa urged", "Govt. urged to try suspected Nazis in Canada", and "Review of war crimes laws suggested".[69] The reports elaborated the Law Reform Commission's position on Nazi war criminals and how they should be brought to justice, setting it in the context of their own coverage during the preceding two weeks. Of the remaining recommendations only a handful received any mention whatsoever.

Insofar as news reports contribute to the shaping of government agendas, the Mulroney government found itself faced with an issue demanding some kind of response. After less than six months in power the Progressive Conservatives' honeymoon with the Canadian news media showed definite signs of being over. Stories about the Tories' handling of the question of social program universality and allegations of government pork-barrelling resonated with the suspicion that the Prime Minister's election pledge of a fresh start was nothing more than an empty promise; instead of a clean break with the cynicism, secrecy and blatant patronage associated with previous Liberal administrations, speculation abounded that Canadians were in store for more of the same.

On the surface the war criminals issue presented the Mulroney government with an ideal opportunity to polish its increasingly tarnished image by putting some distance between itself and its predecessors. It was a chance to be seen assuming the morally higher ground and taking the

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[69] "Amend law...", *The Toronto Star*, 7 February 1985, p. A1; "Review of war-crime...", *The Globe and Mail*, 7 February 1985, p. M1; and, "Govt. urged to...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 7 February 1985, p. A2.

initiative where others had faltered. To achieve that end, however, something more than internal departmental inquiries and RCMP investigations of the Mengele affair would be required. Hence the Prime Minister's choice of a Royal Commission of Inquiry - a gesture of government concern without obligation to future action.[70] The Commission would investigate all the allegations made to date, offer its recommendations, and the government could then choose the most prudent and politically-expedient course of action.

As an instance of political discourse - an example of a federal government making use of a specific policy instrument to deal with an issue of public concern - the Deschenes inquiry fell into the recognized province of routine news coverage. Within this framework Royal Commissions are something of a paradox for newsworkers. On the one hand, they are cynically perceived as an expensive standing joke, a tactic used by governments to shirk their responsibilities and throw money at a problem in hopes that it will disappear.[71] On the other hand, Royal Commissions are concrete events of the type to which the pacing of news work is geared; the combination of public hearings, studies, and final reports over a set period of time provides the gist for a continuing news story which not only fills news space but creates contexts for airing issues, reporting on the government policy-making process, and solving mysteries.

Consequently, the creation of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals was greeted universally by the Canadian news media.

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[70] Available evidence would appear to indicate that the decision to convene the Deschenes inquiry was Prime Minister Mulroney's alone. cf. Troper and Weinfeld, op.cit., pp. 145-149.

[71] "Has most of the $53 million...", *The Toronto Star*, 1 February 1985, p. A1.

Editorials praised the move and elaborated the context in which it was to be understood. According to *The Montreal Gazette*, "the news last month that the notorious concentration camp doctor Josef Mengele may have been among (Nazi war criminals in Canada) has jolted many Canadians into the realization that this country did fail in its moral duty four decades ago, and has been failing ever since." "For forty years," *The Ottawa Citizen* opined, "Canadian governments have dithered and equivocated about tracking down Nazi war criminals who may have found haven in this country. Finally the Tory government is going to do something about it. It's about time." *The Winnipeg Free Press* assumed the voice of prevailing public sentiment, stating that

> Canadians do not wish their country to be a haven
> for butchers, assassins and torturers. They do not
> wish Canadian law to be an obstacle to the
> punishment of people whose crimes, on the
> proven facts, are heinous and horrendous and cry
> out for punishment.

By appointing the Deschenes Commission, wrote *The Toronto Star*,

> the Mulroney government is sending a welcome
> signal that it's serious about hunting down war
> criminals whatever their numbers may be. Even if
> there's only one, we have a moral duty to bring that
> one to justice. No one who contributed to such
> crimes against humanity should be able to escape
> Canadian law.[72]

The hunt for Nazi war criminals was on. With the belated pursuit of justice established as its ostensive referent, the representation of the Deschenes discourse in the news now had a potent dramatic pretext. Nazi war criminals

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[72] "Canada's Nazi...", *The Gazette*, 11 February 1985, p. B2; "The Third Reich's...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 11 February 1985, p. A8; "The facts on...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 12 February 1985, p. 6; and, "No haven for...", *The Toronto Star*, 10 February 1985, p. H2.

were a symbolic threat to the moral integrity of Canadian society. The Deschenes inquiry was an attempt to counter that threat. More significantly, the Canadian news media would have an active part to play in that process.

Among the first tasks undertaken by journalists was probing the nature of the Nazi war criminal threat, thereby reinforcing its identifiability. One of the elements to be so defined was the threshold or size of the threat. How many Nazi war criminals were there in Canada? Already a part of the Royal Commission's mandate, the question was raised time and time again in the Deschenes news text. Lacking conclusive evidence journalists could only engage in speculation, headlining various claims made throughout the course of the proceedings. In *The Toronto Star* alone the following stories appeared: "Nazi hunter Wiesenthal says Ottawa ignored his 28 suspects" (10 February 1985); "269 probed here, war crimes lawyer says" (10 May 1985); "Canada has failed to use list of 40,000 Nazis, probe told" (23 May 1985); "11 suspected Nazis were citizens of Canada in '56, paper reveals" (11 November 1985); "Nazi inquiry probes up to 800 Canadians" (2 May 1986); "List names 26 war criminals believed in Canada" (28 October 1986); and, "29 Canadian citizens reported questioned as suspected Nazis" (9 January 1987). For all that these claims were part of the Deschenes proceedings, the prominence accorded the question of numbers in the news text belied the previously-cited editorial observation that where Nazi war criminals were concerned, one was too many.

Whatever their numbers anonymous Nazi war criminals were still a somewhat amorphous presence. Who were they? As the inquiry had forbidden the publication of the names of any suspects being investigated by the Commission, the Deschenes news text relied on another standard

objectification - ethnic identity. The text's linkage of the identifying terms "Ukrainian" and "Nazi war criminals" offers a case in point.

The first juxtaposition occurred in the introduction of the Deschenes news text. The front page story in *The Winnipeg Free Press* announcing the formation of the Deschenes Commission appeared immediately below a story with a copyrighted byline and a bold headline declaring "Alleged war criminals believed in Winnipeg".[73] It opened with the assertion that "federal authorities have information on at least nine suspected war criminals and Nazi collaborators who are living or have lived in Winnipeg." The names of those individuals and their alleged crimes had been provided to *The Winnipeg Free Press* by the Vienna-based Simon Wiesenthal Centre and the Soviet embassy in Ottawa. Perhaps realizing the legal risk inherent in publishing the identities of the accused, the newspaper opted for a broad description reinforced with details of the crimes.

> One man is reported to have participated in the
> execution of civilians while a member of a Gestapo
> branch in Ukraine. Another is alleged to have
> taken part in the shooting of 100 people, while a
> third is said to have shot three prisoners of war.

A fourth suspect was revealed to have died five years earlier in a local nursing home. Nevertheless, according to documentation prepared by renowned Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal,

> he was chief of police in the Ukrainian town of
> Trembowla during the Second World War.
> Wiesenthal said the man led murder squads which
> killed hundreds of Jews in Janiv and other towns
> and took part in arranging for other Jews to be sent
> to death camps.

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[73] "Alleged war criminals...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 8 February 1985, p. A1.

The Soviet embassy identified a fifth suspect as a retired Canadian National Railways mechanic living in a Winnipeg suburb who was born in Ukraine and emigrated to Canada in 1949. He was accused of participating "in the war-time torture and killing of five people in the Ukrainian village of Pryvitne." The man was located and interviewed by *The Winnipeg Free Press*. Confronted by the charge the unnamed suspect was reported claiming to be either a victim of mistaken identity or a target of Soviet recrimination for some unspecified reason. His adamant denial was edited down to three sentences: "I'd just throw that thing (the list of Soviet names and allegations) in the fire and don't bother about it. Don't even look for anybody else. I hate the Communists, to tell you the truth."

To this point *The Winnipeg Free Press* story had used the identifying label "Ukrainian" to establish where the atrocities had occurred. Only later in the report was it linked directly to the alleged perpetrators. Asked to elaborate the Canadian government's lack of response to extradition requests from the Soviet Union and other countries, Sol Littman was cited as saying that some of the 2000 estimated Nazi collaborators in Canada were "Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Rumanian, Hungarian, French, Dutch and Belgian."

A similar format was adopted for *The Winnipeg Free Press* follow-up story on Saturday, 9 February 1985. In this case the report named two of the suspects accused by the Soviet Union. One was reported to be living in Winnipeg and was described as

> a native of the Chernigov region of Ukraine, (who)
> served as the headman of his village
> administration during the Nazi occupation.
>
> They say he ordered 20 villagers and their families
> to be killed, personally shot a pregnant woman,

commanded the burning of a farmstead and
committed a host of other crimes.

While *The Winnipeg Free Press* could find no trace of the man in Winnipeg,
the integrity of the Soviet claim was vouched for by Sol Littman.

On the same day the Associated Press in Jerusalem reported on an
Israeli radio interview with Simon Wiesenthal. As it was adapted for the
Deschenes news text starting Sunday, 10 February 1985, the story focused on
Wiesenthal's claim that the federal government was refusing to co-operate
with efforts aimed at bringing to justice some of the more than 200 Nazi war
criminals he believed were in Canada. The charge was based on the absence
of any official response to the list of 28 suspects he had passed on to Solicitor
General Elmer Mackay two months earlier. The suspects were identified only
as part of a group of "218 former Ukrainian officers of Hitler's SS (elite guard),
which ran death camps in Eastern Europe," that had emigrated to Canada
after the war. All those names had been turned over to former Solicitor
General Robert Kaplan in November 1984.

The Wiesenthal allegations qualified as news not only because they
related to the proceedings of the Deschenes inquiry. Wiesenthal was also a
legitimate news source, his status as such predicated on the esteem in which
he was held by the news media. According to *The Ottawa Citizen*, here was a
man who was

> hard as gunmetal. A concentration camp survivor
> who wouldn't quit after his postwar stint with U.S.
> intelligence, the man who tracked down Adolf
> Eichmann. His targets know how dangerous he is -
> he works in a rundown office with fortified security
> and a permanent police guard. His home was
> bombed three years ago.

He is a Jewish hero with credentials, a Nobel
nominee who works beneath a huge map of
European concentration camps.[74]

For all that the representation may have captured the essence of Wiesenthal,

it also lent immediate credibility to what he had to say. What he was reported

as claiming was that eight thousand SS members were left alive at the end of

World War II. At least half of them were in Canada. Moreover, he had

names "culled from SS regiments formed in the Ukraine and the east

European lands - the Baltics, for instance - that rolled out the carpet for Hitler

in their hatred for Communism."[75] Included among those names was "a list

of Ukrainian SS men in Canada, 218 of them, all lieutenants and above, so

there will be no talk of persecuting ignorant foot soldiers. History has

recorded that the Ukrainian SS were amongst the most bloodthirsty of the

Nazi collaborators."[76]

The example cited above is an instance of what Tuchman calls the

mutual embeddedness of fact and source, the news practice of reinforcing facts

with their sources and vice-versa.[77] The practice also applied in the case of

Sol Littman, the source of the initial Mengele story.[78] Called upon to

corroborate Wiesenthal's allegations regarding the Ukrainian SS, *The Globe*

and Mail reported Littman as saying that

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[74] "Promises but little action...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 14 May 1985, p. A1. The image was
reinforced with a picture of Wiesenthal gesturing before the map.

[75] Ibid., p. A1.

[76] Ibid., p. A10.

[77] Tuchman, op.cit., pp. 82-103.

[78] Littman's legitimacy as a news source stemmed from his connection with the Wiesenthal
Centre as well as his professional association with various Canadian media outlets. To what
extent either Littman or Wiesenthal spoke for the Jewish Canadian community is the subject of
some controversy. cf. Troper and Weinfeld, op.cit., pp. 139-143.

records, probably originating from the U.S. military
archives in West Berlin, prove the 218 suspects in
Canada belonged to Ukrainian SS units. They came
to Canada soon after the war, passing themselves
off as displaced people, he said. Most of them are
now members of 13 chapters of a veterans' group
scattered throughout Canada, Mr. Littman said.
The group, which campaigns for the "emancipation
of 'captive nations,'" also has chapters in the
United States, Australia and Latin America, he
said.[79]

The Ottawa Citizen elaborated in even greater detail, including a direct quote

from Littman:

"These people are still meeting, still holding
annual celebrations (of national holidays)," he said.
"They have invited federal officials to attend their
functions. They play the role of nationalists now
wanting the freedom of their countries. But these
are the people who greeted the Nazis when they
marched in.[80]

The Deschenes news text's incorporation of the Wiesenthal and

Littman allegations as factual statements did more than flesh out an answer

to the question of who the Nazi war criminals in Canada were. The charges,

repeated time and again in the form of boilerplate paragraphs about the

Ukrainian SS, introduced a new angle newsworkers could pursue to keep the

story alive, to sustain public interest through the interregnum before the

Deschenes proceedings got underway.[81] Journalistic integrity also demanded

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[79] "Ottawa assailed...", *The Globe and Mail*, 11 February 1985, p. 1.

[80] "Canada ignored...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 12 February 1985, p. A2.

[81] As Carey notes, the boilerplate paragraph, a standard journalistic device, is "...the
explanatory paragraph, the motive paragraph, the paragraph that sets the story in context.
The trouble is that it is a gross, oversimple, and unchanging explanation for complex and
changing events." James Carey, "The Dark Continent of American Journalism", op.cit., p. 185.

both sides of the story, prompting newsworkers to seek a response from representatives of the community the accused were said to be part of.

By this time, however, breaking developments had taken the Deschenes news story in a new direction. On Monday, 11 February 1985 the League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith Canada staged a news conference to unveil a report examining the legal options available to the federal government for dealing with suspected Nazi war criminals. The coverage focused on League chairman David Matas' criticism of government inaction on the war criminals issue and his suggestion that anti-Semitism on the part of former Canadian prime ministers may be partially to blame.[82] This angle, coupled with reports of the federal government's response to the Wiesenthal/Littman allegations, relegated the reaction story from the Ukrainian Canadian community to a less newsworthy status. *The Montreal Gazette* included a two-sentence footnote at the conclusion of its 12 February 1985 Deschenes coverage which stated that two Ukrainian-Canadian academics had "demanded that Nazi-hunter Sol Littman prove his weekend allegation that Alberta is a haven for Ukrainian war criminals. The allegation is historically doubtful and a slur on all Ukrainian-Canadians, they said."[83]

The remaining newspapers followed up two days later. In *The Ottawa Citizen*, a three-sentence Canadian Press story with an Edmonton dateline buried on page F14 reported an apparent spokesman for the accused

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[82] "Report attacks..."*The Globe and Mail*, 12 February 1985, p. 1; "Hunting of Nazis...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 12 February 1985, p. A4; "B'nai B'rith urges...", *The Toronto Star*, 12 February 1985, p. A14; "Ottawa's 'laxity'...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 12 February 1985, p.8; "Anti-semitic PMs...", *The Montreal Gazette*, 12 February 1985, p. B1.

[83] "Anti-Semitic PMs...", *The Gazette*, 12 February 1985, p. B4.

Ukrainian veterans' group saying there was no evidence linking the group to war crimes and that Ukrainians were as anxious as anyone else to see war criminals brought to justice. *The Globe and Mail* pegged its reaction story to its coverage of a news conference staged in Toronto by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee to respond to the Wiesenthal/Littman allegations. A sixteen sentence piece reported that Ukrainian Canadians were 'angry' about the charges. The latter, according to Committee president John Nowosad, "'are not historically accurate' and reflect badly on Ukrainians and people of Ukrainian descent in Canada." The SS division in question, it was explained, was formed among Ukrainians in 1943 and spent the rest of the war fighting Soviet troops on the eastern front. Former members who had come to Canada were screened several times: by Canada, the Soviet Union, and twice by Britain. More than half of the story was devoted to restating the offending accusation and a reaction to the reaction of the Ukrainian Canadian community from Sol Littman, who was reported to be 'disappointed' in the response.

The Toronto Star provided more in-depth coverage of the news conference, pegging it to new allegations by Wiesenthal that at least six former members of 'the notorious Romanian Iron Guard' were still living in Canada.[84] The press conference had been called, explained *The Star* "to protest the way the 'entire Ukrainian community' has been 'demeaned' by recent media reports and statements concerning the Ukrainian SS, made by both Wiesenthal and his Canadian representative, Sol Littman." A Committee representative was cited as saying that

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[84] "Iron Guard...", *The Toronto Star*, 15 February 1985, p. A7.

the Ukrainian community is concerned that a
"witch-hunt" of Ukrainians will tarnish the whole
community in Canada. He challenged those who
are making the accusations to come up with names
and hard proof.

"Either put up or shut up," he said.

After quickly reviewing the circumstances under which the accused had come

to Canada the story concluded with another quote from the Committee

official:

"One would have thought that having been vetted
not once, but twice, that the matter would have
been put to bed long ago," he said. "And yet it
seems to be a very handy kind of firecracker to
throw into the discussion."

The words proved prophetic, particularly where the Deschenes news

text was concerned. Journalists had stumbled into the discourse of dyadic

social interaction between the Jewish and Ukrainian Canadian communities.

Initiated on another continent and rooted in a hotly-disputed history dating

back more than three centuries, the exchange between these two

ethnocultural minorities is characterized by ignorance, friction, mutual

suspicion, and occasionally, outright hostility. The parallels in their historical

experiences are obscured by fundamental differences - socio-economic,

demographic, political, linguistic, and religious - and an

inability/unwillingness to accept and accommodate these differences.[85]

Recent attempts at initiating a dialogue of understanding between the two fell

victim to the passions incited by the war criminals issue. Through the

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[85] A detailed treatment of the question of Ukrainian-Jewish relations can be found in
Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective, eds. Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard
Aster, (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988); Jewish-Ukrainian Relations:
Two Solitudes, eds. Howard Aster and Peter Potichnyj (Oakville: 1983); and, Troper and
Weinfeld, op.cit.

mediation of the news coverage, the Royal Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals was transformed into a symbolic vehicle through which another chapter in this discourse could be played out.

More importantly, by locating the 'butchers, assassins and torturers' within a recognizable socio-cultural entity - the Ukrainian Canadian community - journalists had scripted the missing character for the unfolding Deschenes plot. The news genre's stylistic imperative of personalization had introduced a cast of unscrupulous governments engaged in political and bureaucratic subterfuge tinged with anti-Semitism, readily-identifiable Jewish victims, and now, Ukrainian SS victimizers. Mr. Justice Deschenes' eventual decision to grant both the Ukrainian and Jewish Canadian communities official standing before the Commission with the right to cross-examine witnesses was but another loop in the amplification spiral. Now, as Troper and Weinfeld observe,

> the war-crimes issue was not only an important
> story, it was also sexy journalism. Revelations
> about the seedy underbelly of Canada's
> immigration past, the intrusion of cold-war politics
> into the hearings and, not to be overlooked, finding
> two of Canada's senior ethnic communities
> represented by high-profile lawyers locking horns
> in public was the stuff that sold newspapers.[86]

As the Deschenes news story unfolded, the profiles of its characters would be brought out in starker relief. Discursive interactions between them would constitute the story's assorted sub-plots. The following chapter explores the Deschenes news text's portrayal of the Ukrainian Canadian community as a character in one of these sub-plots, and the experience of this representation by members of the aforementioned group.

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[86] Troper and Weinfeld, op.cit., p. 217.

CHAPTER III: UKRAINIAN CANADIAN COMMUNITY'S
READING EXPERIENCE

Beneath the exterior facade of the Ukrainian Canadian community as it was introduced in the preamble of the Deschenes news text lay an infinitely more complex reality. Had newsworkers probed beyond their formulaic assumptions about their subjects they would have discovered that the Deschenes proceedings were a concern only for the so-called "organized" element of the Ukrainian Canadian community. This grouping of between 10 and 15 percent of the total Ukrainian Canadian population was comprised predominantly of individuals who were either "professional ethnics" or "ethnics whose consciousness has been raised".[87] The official voice of this element was an organization known as the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, or the UCC.

The UCC was created in 1940 at the behest of the Canadian government as an ad hoc umbrella group uniting non-communist Ukrainian Canadians behind the Allied war effort. Its activities during the war years included

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[87] A useful distinction used by Charles Keely. According to Keely, a "professional ethnic" is an individual

> ...who makes his or her living because of ethnic identity, and I do not mean that in a perjorative way. I refer to the religious professions, teachers of language, academics who study a particular group and heads of organizations who get status and prestige, if not actually some power and perhaps economic gain, by heading an ethnic organization.

An "ethnic whose consciousness has been raised", on the other hand, is an individual who will

> ...respond to a call by an ethnic group to build a cultural hall or convince people to put down "Ukrainian" on a census. This might be the kind of individual concerned with problems in the homeland. It might be somebody who takes an active part in cultural performances and supports youngsters who do that sort of thing. This is the individual who has his ethnic identity very near the surface and who can be called upon fairly quickly.

Far from being static, Keeling's categories are fluid, with individuals moving between identities. Charles Keely, "Comments on the Conference", in Petryshyn, op.cit., p. 243.

encouraging military enlistment in the Canadian armed forces, participating in government sponsored victory loan campaigns, and establishing the Ukrainian Canadian Relief Fund, which provided aid to Ukrainian refugees.[88] It was retained after the war as a permanent co-ordinating superstructure for all non-communist Ukrainian Canadian organizations, which numbered approximately 30.

The groups comprising the UCC represented a diverse range of political, social and religious interests. Nevertheless, they shared a number of resonant texts encompassing history, language, culture, and ideologies of Ukrainian nationalism and anti-communism. Together they accorded the UCC with the legitimacy to act as the community's public advocate on issues affecting Ukrainians in Canada. It was in this capacity that the UCC was instrumental in sustaining political pressure on the federal government, a tactic which in October 1971 resulted in the introduction of a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.[89]

The UCC's interest in the Deschenes proceedings was vested in several levels. Most immediately, the veterans' group implicated in the original Wiesenthal/Littman allegations was the Brotherhood of Veterans of the First Division of the Ukrainian National Army, a member organization of the UCC. Most of the group's 600 members emigrated to Canada in 1950/51 after strong lobbying on their behalf by the UCC.

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[88] _____, "Canada", Encyclopedia of Ukraine Volume I, ed. V. Kubijovic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), p. 352.

[89] Ukrainian Community Development Committee - Prairie Region, Building the Future: Ukrainian Canadians in the 21st Century, (Edmonton: The Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 1986), p. 10.

The Brotherhood was more than a client whose character the UCC was obliged to defend. To the "organized" Ukrainian Canadian community it was a symbolic embodiment of an historical experience of Europe during World War II which differed radically from what was enshrined in numerous mainstream representational forms, including the Canadian news media. In the case of the latter, the subject was dominated by an image of

> countries overrun by Nazi armies, populations
> terrorized by the Gestapo, summary executions, and
> concentration camps. The behaviour of the
> occupied peoples is also depicted in standard
> fashion: the "good" people invariably resisted the
> Nazis while the "bad" collaborated. The essence of
> this version of the war is that the Nazis were the
> universal and exclusive enemy and that the only
> acceptable behaviour during World War II was to
> fight against them.[90]

This predictable, if substantially correct, backdrop to the Deschenes news text stood in stark contrast to a community collective memory predicated on three fundamental beliefs:

> First, because Western Ukrainians had to deal with
> not one but two alien totalitarian invaders during
> World War II, they were forced to make choices
> that other peoples did not have to confront.
> Second, based on very recent and painful
> experiences - the Soviet crushing of attempts to
> establish Ukrainian independence in 1917-20, the
> famine of 1933, the purges of the 1930s, and
> especially the occupation of 1939-41 - the
> Ukrainians had good reason to view the Soviets as
> their primary enemy and, after the German defeat
> at Stalingrad in 1943, as the greatest threat they
> would face in the future. Third, when many
> Western Ukrainians chose to side with the
> Germans to fight against the Soviets, they acted in

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[90] Orest Subtelny, "The Soviet Occupation of Western Ukraine, 1939-41: An Overview", in Boshyk, op.cit., p. 5.

what they perceived to be their best interests, as
have other nations in similar circumstances.[91]

Within this shared text Jews were a problematic element. They were
perceived to be the most faithful supporters of the ruling Soviet regime who
were opposed to Ukrainian political aspirations. Exploitation of similar
perceptions had resulted in violent mass outbursts against Jews in the period
immediately following the collapse of the German/Soviet alliance.
Consequently, there may have been Ukrainians responsible for atrocities
against Jews, but they acted as individuals; no Ukrainian organizations
cultivated anti-Semitic programs or policies.[92] Like the Jews, Ukrainians with
first hand experience of World War II in a Soviet and Eastern European
context were victims. More than two million had been deported to Germany
as forced laborers. Thousands had been victims of terror perpetrated by the
Gestapo and the Soviet secret police. Hundreds of thousands more were sent
to concentration camps in Eastern Europe and the Gulag. In all, the casualties
of World War II numbered more than six million Ukrainians.

Within this frame of reference members of the Brotherhood were
heroic survivors of another tragic chapter in a national history of victimhood
dating back more than 700 years. Not surprisingly, having this revered
symbolic element in its midst publicly accused of the most brutal
victimization imaginable came as a shock to the Ukrainian Canadian
community. Its reaction was compounded by the Deschenes news text's
preamble to the formal inquiry, the story angles of which included
speculation on the number of Nazis in Canada and profiles of alleged

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[91] Ibid., pp. 12-13.

[92] For a detailed discussion of this question, cf. T. Hunczak, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations
during the Soviet and Nazi Occupations", in Boshyk, op.cit., pp. 39-57.

Ukrainian war criminals to the virtual exclusion of all others. It would be impossible for this many of "the most bloodthirsty of the Nazi collaborators" to have lived secretly in the Ukrainian Canadian community for more than 30 years. Within this community's reading of the Deschenes news text, then, it had been grossly misrepresented as a host body for the Nazi virus in Canada, a group which knowingly and willingly harbored these "butchers, assassins, and torturers" in its midst.

The Deschenes news text had cast the Ukrainian Canadian community as a character in a classic moral disorder story, which Herbert Gans defines as news dealing with an instance of legal and moral transgression.[93] Having been identified as the transgressor, the community was forced into a defensive posture, attempting to negotiate the fine line between defending a critical component of its collective identity while simultaneously reaffirming the moral values in question. The difficulties inherent in publicly maintaining such a position were compounded by and discernable in the Deschenes news text. Nowhere were they more readily apparent than in one of the text's major sub-plots - the debate over the use of Soviet supplied evidence.

The sub-plot of Soviet evidence was anchored in the Deschenes news text at two distinct levels. Most immediately, it was rooted in one of the anticipated outcomes of the commission proceedings. As stipulated by the third element in its mandate, the Deschenes inquiry was expected to recommend legal means for bringing alleged Nazi war criminals in Canada to justice. Options for prosecution included extraditing the accused to face trial in countries where the war crimes had been committed; alternately, those

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[93] Gans, op.cit., pp. 52, 57.

countries could be called upon to provide evidence or witnesses whose testimony could be used in Canadian prosecutions. As many of the countries in question had before, during or since World War II fallen within the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, the Deschenes Commission was forced to grapple with the controversies surrounding the use of Soviet evidence and the latter's hotly disputed credibility. The inquiry's deliberations of these questions became another story angle to be pursued and explored within the Deschenes news text.

More significant, however, was the dramatic nature of the evidence provided by Soviet sources. As demonstrated earlier, the Canadian news media had already used information supplied by the Soviet Union to locate the Nazi threat in the Ukrainian Canadian community. The Wiesenthal/Littman allegations about the Ukrainian SS were also based on Soviet claims.[94] In each case the information was intended to be taken-for-granted as factual; it was used to reinforce the horrific nature of the crimes in question and the identities of those alleged to have committed them.

Herein lay the concern of the Ukrainian Canadian community. It had recently concluded its commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Ukrainian artificial famine, during which it had publicly jousted with the Soviet Union over the facts of that Stalinist act of genocide. In a more immediate context, Ukrainian Canadians had been previously accused by the Soviets of Nazi atrocities. Both were seen to be part of a sophisticated Soviet disinformation campaign aimed in part at discrediting Soviet and Eastern European emigres in the diaspora and driving a wedge between them and

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[94] cf. L.Y. Luciuk, "Ukraine's wartime unit never linked to war crime", *The Globe and Mail*, 26 March 1985, p. 7.

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their Jewish neighbours. Viewed from this perspective, the Deschenes news text was another chapter in this campaign.

An illustrative case in point occurred on the first day of the Royal Commission's public hearings. Setting the scene for the proceedings, *The Globe and Mail* and *The Montreal Gazette* profiled a Ukrainian Canadian accused by the Soviet Union of committing war crimes.[95] The stories described Dmitry Kupiak as a 66-year-old "burly Ukrainian native" who lived in a "secluded rural home, guarded by three German Shepherd dogs". After listing the Soviet charges, drawn from unnamed Soviet documents and graphic in their detail, the stories went to complete Kupiak's public portrait by describing him as "one of the many Ukrainians who embraced the Nazis when they rolled into Ukraine in June, 1941." During the war he had been "an important cog in the local activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The group modelled itself after Italian fascists and had well-developed links with German intelligence during the 1930's." Underscoring the banality of evil he represented, the stories concluded on an interview with Kupiak "over coffee, cookies and cognac in his comfortable home." He denied the allegations, explaining that he had been the subject of such charges by the Soviet Union since the early 1970s. During the war, he claimed, his only loyalty was "to the cause of an independent Ukraine, despite a photograph showing him welcoming Nazi troops." To reinforce the point, *The Globe and Mail* published the offending picture, a grainy photo of two indistinct figures standing before a banner emblazoned with a swastika, one

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[95] "Immigrant braced for war crimes hearing", *The Globe and Mail*, 10 April 1985, p. 1; "War actions might make man target for deportation", *The Montreal Gazette*, 11 April 1985, p. A7.

of them holding a flag. The visual was captioned: "Dmitry Kupiak, left, holds flag at 1941 Nazi rally in Ukraine."

Two days after the Kupiak story appeared, *The Globe and Mail* published a correction. In its regular column of retractions and clarifications titled "Our mistake", the newspaper made the following statement:

> A story and photo caption on Wednesday
> incorrectly said that a photograph featuring Dmitry
> Kupiak was taken at a ceremony welcoming
> German troops to the Ukraine in 1941. In fact, the
> event was a Ukrainian harvest festival and the
> German flag had to be flown to obtain a permit for a
> public gathering. The same story said Mr. Kupiak
> was a member of the auxiliary police of the
> Ukrainian government. In fact, Mr. Kupiak
> worked in the propaganda section.[96]

The Globe and Mail's admission of error did little to mitigate the stereotypical caricatures and historical misrepresentations of the original story. The Deschenes news text still left no doubt as to the type of characters the Royal Commission was looking for. Within the perception of the Ukrainian Canadian community, *The Globe and Mail*'s correction only lent credence and further legitimacy to its grave concern with the dangers inherent in relying on Soviet evidence.

It was from this and other perceptions that the Ukrainian Canadian community's public position on the Deschenes inquiry's use of Soviet evidence evolved. While supporting the proposition that Nazi war criminals must be brought to justice, the community was fundamentally opposed to the use in any Canadian legal proceeding of evidence which had been under the exclusive control of the Soviet Union for more than 40 years, and so-called

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[96] "Our mistake", *The Globe and Mail,* 12 April 1985, p. A2.

witnesses who had been subjects of terror and repression over that same period.[97] Any such evidence would be the product of a legal system that was a widely acknowledged arm of state policy. To use it would be morally and legally unacceptable, tantamount to distorting Canadian law " for the purpose of avenging wrongs, filling historical gaps of information, or achieving political goals at the expense of individual liberties."[98]

This was the case the Ukrainian Canadian community attempted to state before the Deschenes inquiry, the federal government, and the Canadian public. As borne out by the Deschenes news text, its efforts met with mixed results.

Lacking an experienced organizational infrastructure to respond to the perceived challenge posed by the Deschenes inquiry, the UCC endorsed the creation of a working group which came to be known as the Civil Liberties Commission, or CLC. Its goals were:

1. To take a public stand against slanderous allegations which have resulted in the defamation of all Canadians of Ukrainian descent.

2. To represent the Ukrainian community at the [Deschenes] Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals.

3. To show that membership in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the First Division, Ukrainian National Army and the Ukrainian Nationalists is not proof of participation in war crimes as these organizations (sic) purpose and operations

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[97] S. Paul Zumbakis, Soviet Evidence in North American Courts (Toronto: Canadians for Justice, 1986), p. 164.

[98] Ibid., p. 137.

were to advance the cause of Ukrainian freedom.

4. To prevent the use of Soviet evidence in Canadian Courts against Canadians.

5. To require that any Canadian accused of war crimes be tried not in a civil court but in a criminal court of law where stricter proof of guilt is required.

6. To extend the terms of reference of the Deschenes Commission to include all criminals against humanity, past and present.[99]

To achieve these goals the CLC spearheaded the largest campaign of political action ever undertaken by the Ukrainian Canadian community. Specific tactics included securing official status before the Deschenes inquiry, fierce government lobbying, media relations, and community outreach and fundraising.[100] The way in which these activities were represented in the Deschenes news text would prove particularly problematic.

The sub-plot of Soviet evidence began to crystallize in the Deschenes news text in late June 1985. During the preceding months of public testimony, the case against the use of such information had been presented on numerous occasions before the inquiry and in the news media.[101] Its representation in the Deschenes news text, however, was strongly influenced

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[99] Cited in Troper and Weinfeld op.cit., pp. 165-166.

[100] The campaign is recreated in detail in Troper and Weinfeld op.cit., pp. 166-169.

[101] cf. "Canadian trials urged...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 7 May 1985, p. 12; "Group to give...", *The Globe and Mail*, 7 May 1985, p. 5; "War criminals...", *The Montreal Gazette*, 7 May 1985, p. 18; "Survivors differ...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 23 May 1985, p. 1; "Extradite to...", *The Globe and Mail*, 23 May 1985, p. 5; "Commission may use...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 5 June 1985, p. A1; "Groups scorn...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 6 June 1985, p. A16; "Royal commission must...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 8 June, 1985, p. A8; "Emigre says...", *The Globe and Mail*, 11 June 1985, p. 4; "Nazi probe warned...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 11 June 1985, p. 20; "Refugees warn...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 11 June 1985, p. A13.

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by the stylistic dictates of the genre. Arguments against Soviet evidence were routinely juxtaposed with those in favor, particularly when the latter were made by representatives of the Jewish Canadian community. Exploiting the dramatic tension inherent in the Jewish/Ukrainian discourse, the question was framed as a conflict between the two communities. Their common desire to see that justice was done did not figure prominently in the Deschenes news text.

On 26 June 1985 the Royal Commission issued a written statement updating its progress to date. As presented in the Deschenes news text, the Commission possessed a master list of 660 Canadians suspected of being Nazi war criminals.[102] It was now faced with the task of deciding which accusations warranted further investigation. What would help the Commission in this undertaking was access to "an immense quantity of documents that have been accumulating in public and private archives, both in Canada and abroad, for the last 40 years." Given that so many charges had been made against Canadians from Eastern European lands occupied by the Nazis during World War II, the stories stated, the Commission might have to travel to the Soviet bloc to collect documentary evidence and testimony. Opposition to such a trip was located in "Baltic and Ukrainian federations in Canada"; their position was attributed to the oversimplified belief that "the Soviets forge documents and lie in order to discredit them".

The issue surfaced again two weeks later with the unearthing of the so-called Low Report. The latter was a secret 19-page document prepared in 1980 by Martin Low, a senior Justice Department official who had chaired an

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[102] "660 Canadian accused...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 27 June 1985, p. A1; "Commission has list...", *The Globe and Mail*, 27 June 1985, p. 3. "Winnipeg lawyer to sift...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 27 June 1985, p. 14; "War criminals probe...", *The Montreal Gazette*, 27 June 1985, p. B1.

intergovernmental committee established by the previous Liberal government to examine options for prosecuting alleged Nazi war criminals in Canada. Called to appear before the Deschenes inquiry, Low would not reveal his committee's actual recommendations. He did, however, elaborate on why existing legislation or lack thereof made legal action difficult.

Low's testimony was featured prominently in the Deschenes news text.[103] In addition to exposing previously secret government information, the story was deemed newsworthy because it shed some light on one of the unanswered questions in the Deschenes discourse: how had the accused managed to evade detection and prosecution for so many years? The news media explored the question by framing it in terms of reference already familiar in the Deschenes news text. For example, in the emerging sub-plot of Soviet evidence, Low's testimony could be summarized as follows: estimates to date regarding the number of Nazi war criminals in Canada were wildly inaccurate. Low's committee placed the number at somewhere between 50 and 100. Most, if not all of the accused, were from Eastern European countries now within the Soviet sphere of influence. They were named in lists submitted to the committee by the Soviet embassy in Ottawa. According to Low, "some of the allegations are utterly bald and unsubstantiated." Soviet evidence is suspect, concluded his report, "because the Soviets have branded as war criminals not just those who may have collaborated with the Nazis, but also those who resisted Soviet occupation after the Nazis."

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[103] "Study says law bars...", *The Globe and Mail*, 11 July 1985, p. 4; "Alleged war criminals...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 11 July 1985, p. A9; "Alleged war criminals...", *The Montreal Gazette*, 11 July 1985, p. B6; "No more than 50 to 100...", *The Toronto Star*, 11 July 1985, p. 1' "Secret report estimates...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 11 July 1985, p. 19.

Further details of Low's testimony were contextualized in other sub-plots: the threshold of the Nazi threat in Canada, four decades of government hypocrisy, cover-up and inaction on the war crimes issue for reasons of blatant political expediency, the simmering conflict between the Jewish and Ukrainian Canadian communities, options for justice, and more. By combining and recombining these elements the Deschenes news text recreated Low's testimony before the inquiry and infused the speech event with meaning by explaining its significance.

On the issue of Soviet evidence, the Deschenes news text's representation of the Low report and testimony appeared to lend credence to concerns voiced by the Ukrainian Canadian community. One story went so far as to suggest the community should "find solace" in the Low report. The text, however, had not exonerated the Ukrainian Canadian community; if anything, it had reinforced its character as the locus of the Nazi threat in Canada. In terms of the plot's pacing it had merely been granted a reprieve; less than two weeks later the Ukrainian Canadian community was on the defensive again.

On 20 July the UCC sponsored a protest march on Parliament Hill. This media event was intended to focus public attention on the news media's misrepresentation of Ukrainian and Baltic Canadian communities in the coverage of the Deschenes proceedings and these communities' shared concern with the prospect of the Deschenes inquiry making use of Soviet evidence. More than 500 placard carrying demonstrators descended on Parliament Hill, where they listened to academics, politicians, representatives of student groups, and others speak out on these issues.

The event succeeded in attracting the attention of the news media. As it appeared in the Deschenes news text, however, the issues underlying the

demonstration were secondary. The concern with Soviet evidence was written off as anti-communist ideology, while claims of media misrepresentation were portrayed as critiques of and opposition to the Deschenes Commission itself. What was of far greater interest was the revelation that the demonstration was part of the previously unnoticed political action campaign mounted by the CLC on behalf of Ukrainian Canadians. The details of the campaign were laid out for public scrutiny:

> They have raised more than $250,000 in the past
> three months to fight the legal and public relations
> battle. The rally on Parliament Hill is just the start.
> They have printed up more than 40,000 protest
> postcards, and mail has begun arriving at the offices
> of MPs and members of provincial legislatures
> calling for an end to the use of Soviet supplied
> evidence.[104]

By focusing on the specifics of the campaign as opposed to the concerns it represented, the Deschenes news text gave short shrift to the intentionality of the Ukrainian Canadian community; in its place it substituted its own representation of intentionality. According to an editorial in *The Globe and Mail*, the campaign against the use of Soviet evidence appeared "to indicate a mistrust not merely of Soviet intentions but of Canadian justice".[105] The Deschenes Commission, it concluded, should be permitted to complete its work "free of misplaced political pressure".

Not only had the Ukrainian Canadian community been chastized; a new story angle had presented itself: the shady backroom wheeling and dealing of political lobbying. In this context the matter could be rendered even more dramatically. Looking to maximize the story's mileage, the news

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[104] "Soviet evidence rejected...", *The Globe and Mail*, 22 July 1985, p. 5.

[105] "Admissible evidence", *The Globe and Mail*, 25 July 1985, p. 6.

media incorporated a reaction to the campaign activities by Sol Littman.[106] According to this acknowledged source, "influential members of Canada's Ukrainian community are trying to thwart the federal commission on war criminals by raising a $1 million propaganda fund." To flesh out the charges Littman was quoted as claiming that Ukrainian and Baltic Canadians were

> building a "war chest" to launch "propaganda smokescreens" against the pursuit of suspected Nazi war criminals living here.

> "A loose coalition of nationalist Ukrainian, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian organizations have launched a $1 million information campaign designed to thwart the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals in Canada and weaken Parliament's will to bring Nazi war criminals to justice," Littman said.

In conclusion he stated:

> "We certainly do not want to make this into a shouting match between the Jewish community and the Ukrainian community...But this is a wedge which is not being driven by the Jewish community," Mr. Littman said.

On the last point at least Littman was correct. If there was a wedge being driven it was by the Deschenes news text. In their quest for the dramatic, the news media were again exploiting the tensions inherent in the Jewish/Ukrainian discourse. And while representatives of the Ukrainian Canadian community were given an opportunity to counter the Littman accusations, the Deschenes news text left little doubt as to whose story was more credible.

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[106] "Growing war crimes inquiry...", *The Toronto Star*, 26 July 1985, p. A10; "Influential Ukrainians...", *The Globe and Mail*, 26 July 1985, p. 18; "Ukrainians sidetrack...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 26 July 1985, p. A5; "Nazi hunter alleges...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 26 July 1985, p. 5.

The sub-plot of Soviet evidence unwound rapidly through the late summer and fall of 1985. With its mandate expiring at the end of the year, the Deschenes Commission had to decide whether or not it would travel to the Soviet bloc to collect documentary evidence and testimony. Legal counsel representing the Ukrainian and Jewish Canadian communities were invited to summarize their arguments for and against Soviet evidence before the inquiry. As packaged in the Deschenes news text, the events were represented as a confrontation pitting two of the plot's principal characters against each other. The text became a play by play description of their battle before the inquiry and behind the scenes.

Witness the events of late September. Lobbying efforts by the Ukrainian Canadian community had succeeded in bringing together a group of Progressive Conservative backbenchers willing to speak out publicly against the inquiry's use of Soviet evidence. Its first public utterance was a motion made in the House of Commons by MP Andrew Witer on 24 September 1985 condemning the prospect of the Deschenes Commission travelling to the Soviet Union.

The news media responded to this plot twist by situating this new character within a familiar framework: the Ukrainian Canadian community's "propaganda smokescreen" aimed at thwarting justice. The contents of the motion became secondary to the action itself. According to *The Globe and Mail*,

> Backbench Conservative MPs have mounted a
> campaign with the help of the Ukrainian Canadian
> Committee to convince Judge Jules Deschenes not
> to travel to the Soviet Union to obtain evidence
> against Nazi war criminals living in Canada. More
> than half a dozen MPs, mainly from Toronto area
> ridings with large Eastern European ethnic

> communities, have joined ranks to persuade fellow
> caucus members, Justice Minister John Crosbie and
> Prime Minister Brian Mulroney that Judge
> Deschenes should not go to the Soviet Union.[107]

The treatment of the event in the Deschenes news text filled in an important detail. Not only was the Ukrainian Canadian community pressuring government to exert influence on an ostensibly independent Royal Commission of Inquiry; it was threatening a political backlash come the next election in the event of failure to comply with its demands.

Given its lack of numbers and organizational infrastructure, it is doubtful the Ukrainian Canadian community would have been able to deliver on such a threat, even if it had been expressly articulated. Within the framework of the Deschenes news text, however, the threat was entirely credible. Moreover, it was a useful point of departure for a consensus of editorial opinion that had begun to emerge. First off the mark was *The Ottawa Citizen*, with an editorial that claimed "the Soviet Union has a good record of providing sound evidence on Nazi war criminals to courts in the United States and West Germany. Whatever Moscow's reliability on other matters, on this issue it seems sturdy."[108] An analysis piece in *The Toronto Star* suggested that Jewish and Ukrainian Canadians alike should take solace in the fact that Soviet evidence has been used by West Germany and the United States, and not once has there been disclosed a single example of a forged document or a perjured witness."[109] The factual inaccuracy of these

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[107] "Ukrainians, MPs lobby...", *The Globe and Mail*, 25 September 1985, p. 19. cf. also "Shun Soviets, MPs...", *The Toronto Star*, 25 September 1985, p. A8; "PC MPs oppose...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 25 September 1985, p. A10; "Tories protest evidence...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 25 September 1985, p. 22.

[108] "Get the truth - wherever it is", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 25 September 1985, p. A8.

[109] "Separating fact from fiction", *The Toronto Star*, 28 September 1985, p. A19.

claims notwithstanding, the Deschenes news text went on to pass editorial judgement on the actions of the MPs and, by extension, the Ukrainian Canadian community. An editorial in *The Globe and Mail* accused the MPs of "blatant interference in the administration of justice."[110] Pressured by their constituents, they had lobbied the Justice ministry "to declare the Soviet Union off-limits to the commission." By doing so they were asking investigators "to turn a blind eye to certain sources of evidence." In the final analysis, intoned the editorial, "(s)uch a politically motivated obstruction of justice would do honor to the Soviet system."

From there the sub-plot of Soviet evidence moved swiftly to its anticipated climax. As the deadline for the Royal Commission's decision on travel to Soviet bloc countries loomed, the Deschenes news text recapped the issues at stake by revisiting relevant story lines. For example, an information meeting of the MPs previously accused of politically motivated obstruction of justice, a group which had since expanded its membership and formalized in a bipartisan body known as the Parliamentary Study Group on the Nazi War Criminal Inquiry, was framed once again in the context of the Ukrainian Canadian community's "propaganda smokescreen".[111] The Jewish/Ukrainian conflict had been escalated to the level of racial tension. According to one story, the "ethnic rift has been particularly magnified by a growing war of lobbyists in which influential Jewish groups are pitted against a $2 million campaign by the Canadian Ukrainian Committee (sic)." After

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[110] "Unfetter the evidence", *The Globe and Mail*, 30 September 1985, p. 6.

[111] "Parliamentarians against...", *The Globe and Mail*, 5 November 1985, p. 18; "Conservative MPs question...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 13 November 1985, p. A7; "Ukrainians raise $2 million...", *The Toronto Star*, 14 November 1985, p. A10; "War crime prober...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 15 November 1985, p. B14.

again laying out the Ukrainian Canadian community's tactics for public scrutiny, the news media approached Sol Littman for a pithy reaction to the campaign. He didn't disappoint:

> "They (The Ukrainian committee) are using every
> device to persuade MPs they will be punished for
> going ahead with this...They see that even if the
> Deschenes Commission recommends punishing
> war criminals, it will be up to Parliament to act on
> it, so they're really going to throw a scare into every
> MP they can get their hands on."[112]

It its dramatization of this and other sub-plots, the Deschenes news text heightened the sense of anticipation surrounding the Royal Commission's decision. The day of judgement was at hand.

On Monday, 18 November 1985, Justice Deschenes issued the inquiry's decision. To fulfill its mandate, the Deschenes Commission "ought to inquire fully and, in doing so, to look for, bring forward or go to and listen to all available evidence. This includes evidence which may exist in Eastern Europe."[113] Consequently, in order to gather evidence against eight Canadians suspected of serious war crimes, the inquiry would appoint commissioners to visit the Soviet Union, Poland, Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. Where the Soviet Union and Poland were concerned, strict safeguards would have to be in place to ensure the reliability of the evidence. The inquiry requested access to original German documents in Soviet archives, freedom to examine witnesses under Canadian rules of evidence, confidentiality of identities to protect reputations, independent

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[112] "Conservative MPs question...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 13 November 1985, p. A7.

[113] "Deschenes wants to get...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 21 November 1985, p. A9.

interpreters, access to witnesses' previous statements, and videotaped examinations.

The news media's packaging of the Deschenes decision included reactions solicited from the apparent winners and losers.[114] The Jewish Canadian community hailed the ruling, calling it "an excellent judgement, well-founded in law." A representative of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa concurred, adding "we see no problem with any of those conditions." On the other side, meanwhile, the Parliamentary Study Group on the Nazi War Criminal Inquiry continued to have "serious reservations" about the Deschenes decision. As for the Ukrainian Canadian community, its reaction was one of disappointment and dismay. In summarizing the significance of the decision, an editorial consensus in the Deschenes news text signalled its approval: justice had prevailed; the safeguards proposed by the Commission should be sufficient to silence all doubters.[115]

In the aftermath of the decision, the Deschenes news text entered a period of reflection. Background stories and opinion and analysis pieces speculated on the implications of the decision and the next steps the inquiry would take to bring Nazi war criminals to justice. They did so by again revisiting the sub-plot's familiar themes, particularly the Jewish/Ukrainian conflict. In the case of the latter, some stories offered a balanced, even-handed treatment of the differences between the two communities, suggesting

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[114] "Nazi inquiry sets...", *The Globe and Mail*, 19 November 1985, p. 1; "Soviets clear way...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 19 November 1985, p. A3; "Nazi probe will visit...", *The Montreal Gazette*, November 1985, p. 1; "Nazi war-crime inquiry...", *The Toronto Star*, 19 November 1985, p. A3; "Safeguards set...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 19 November 1985, p. 10.

[115] "Where evidence leads", *The Globe and Mail*, 20 November 1985, p. 6; "Seeking the evidence...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 20 November 1985, p. A6; "In search of justice...", *The Toronto Star*, 20 November 1985, p. A10; "Find the evidence", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 24 November 1985, p. 6.

rapprochement was possible and desirable.[116] Others did nothing more than heighten tensions.

The most overt example of the latter effect in the Deschenes news text was an opinion column written by Keith Spicer of *The Ottawa Citizen*.[117] On the pretext of smoothing the way for entente between the Jewish and Ukrainian Canadian communities, Spicer's column drove the wedge between the two even deeper. After summarizing the last 150 years of Ukrainian history in seven sentences, *The Ottawa Citizen* editor wrote:

> None of this aims to prove that Jews and Ukrainians have suffered "equally". History has seen Ukrainians hurting Jews. Never the opposite. But tracing the parallels behind today's Jewish and Ukrainian insecurities might help moderate Ukrainian-Canadian leaders rethink the misguided and self-defeating $2 million anti-Deschenes campaign. And it might help moderate Jewish leaders reassure their Ukrainian-Canadian compatriots about their intention not unduly to exploit East Bloc evidence.

> For realizing mutual suffering might lead to more mutual respect. And respect, plus common sense among some Ukrainian-Canadian leaders, is what has been lacking. How did they lack common sense? By appearing to fight tooth and nail to stop Deschenes, militant Ukrainian Canadians have succeeded only in drawing suspicion to their community. They have managed, appallingly and unfairly, to make millions of Canadians imagine that all of our 530,000 loyal and talented Ukrainian Canadians (about 90 percent Canadian-born) have something to hide.

> Other "accused" nationalities, notably the Baltic communities, have kept their tongues, only

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[116] cf. "War criminals hunt a sore point...", *The Globe and Mail*, 20 November 1985, p. 7.

[117] "Jews and Ukrainians: time for entente", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 20 November 1985, p. A7.

> warning, rightly that Moscow might well fabricate
> evidence. They have even promised reasonable co-
> operation in ferreting out rotten apples.
>
> By leading a cavalry charge against Deschenes, the
> folk behind the campaign are inadvertently
> defaming Ukrainian Canadians far beyond
> anything Deschenes, the Jews or anyone could
> have.

For all that is comprised but a small element of the Deschenes news text, the Spicer column was significant in that it epitomized the Ukrainian Canadian community's concerns with its representation in the news coverage of the inquiry's proceedings. Its own historical experience discounted, the community found itself caricatured as a victimizer which had drawn attention to and defamed itself by way of its inappropriate activities. Factual inaccuracies aside, the Spicer column offered a concise summary of the Deschenes news text's treatment of the Ukrainian Canadian community's claim of media misrepresentation. A response to the text was translated as a criticism of the Deschenes Commission itself. Adding insult to injury, the text clearly implied that if the community had been misrepresented, it had been through the "misguided and self-defeating" actions of its leaders. In short, the concern had no legitimacy in the Deschenes news text and consequently had little currency in the Deschenes discourse.

With formal proceedings on hold until inquiry commissioners embarked on their travels, the sub-plot of Soviet evidence moved out of the spotlight. It was supplanted by new angles and plot twists: the revelation that Sol Littman had no proof of his allegations about Josef Mengele, public speculation about Mr. Justice Deschenes' credibility in light of his reported skepticism of the kind of justice meted out during the Nuremburg war trials, and others. The story of Soviet evidence was kept alive through lower profile

explorations of questions either raised or left unanswered by the Commission's travel decision. Was it the right decision? Despite the earlier editorial consensus, the Deschenes news text continued to offer reassurances.[118] Did the Mulroney government have the political will to back the inquiry's plans? According to the text, it was still too early to tell as the government was sending mixed signals. On the one hand, it had agreed to extend the inquiry's mandate by six months in order to facilitate a trip to the Soviet Union;[119] on the other, it would not step in and negotiate the international agreements necessary to expedite the process.[120] How would the decision affect Jewish/Ukrainian relations? Here a clearer consensus emerged: it was guaranteed to increase tensions.[121] And finally: would the Soviet Union agree to abide by the safeguards set in place by the inquiry? In their treatment of this question the news media brought the sub-plot of Soviet evidence to the forefront of the Deschenes news text one final time.

Upon announcing its decision to travel the Deschenes Commission had immediately initiated correspondence with each of the five countries on its proposed itinerary in order to get the necessary agreements for its visit. In late April the Deschenes news text revealed that none of the countries had

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[118] cf. "War time criminals...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 22 December 1985, p. 7; "No need to fear...", *The Montreal Gazette*, 23 January 1986, p. B2.

[119] "Deschenes war crimes...", *The Globe and Mail*, 14 December 1985, p. 5; "Deschenes gets...", *The Montreal Gazette*, 14 December 1985, p. A8; "Nazi war crimes...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 14 December 1985, p. A10; "War Criminal probe...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 14 December 1985, p. 8.

[120] "War crimes probe...", *The Globe and Mail*, 22 November 1985, p. 3.

[121] cf., "Court requested...", *The Globe and Mail*, 22 January 1986, p. 8; "Group wants role...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 22 January 1986, p. A13; "War crimes suspects...", *the Winnipeg Free Press*, 22 January 1986, p. 15; "War crimes probe raises...", *The Globe and Mail*, 1 March 1986, p. 7; "A flaw in Canada's search...", *The Globe and Mail*, 1 March 1986, p. 7.

responded, prompting speculation that the inquiry's travel plans were evaporating.[122] One story broke with the previously established framework to establish the link between the Soviet Union's silence and the safeguards insisted on by the Deschenes inquiry.

> This silence should now be read as a sign that it has
> found the conditions unacceptable. But if there is a
> positive reply, it will probably come close to the end
> of the commission's mandate, in June. By that
> time, the commission will not have time for a trip
> to the Soviet Union, and the promise of co-
> operation will never have to be put to the test.[123]

The story proved remarkably prophetic. Less than a week later the Deschenes news text revealed that the Soviets had finally replied to the inquiry's request for co-operation.[124] The Deschenes Commission's representatives would be welcome to visit the Soviet Union after 10 June 1986. No mention was made of the safeguards demanded by the inquiry. Quoting an official from the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, the text indicated that the Soviet Union would offer the testimony of 34 witnesses against two Ukrainian Canadians it claimed were being investigated by the Deschenes Commission. He then identified both by name. Only *The Ottawa Citizen* published the names, thereby violating the Commission's paramount requirement of confidentiality.[125]

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[122] "Travel plans evaporating...", *The Globe and Mail*, 26 April 1986, p. 4; "Nazi-hunters unlikely...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 26 April 1986, p. 8; "Nazi inquiry probes...", *The Toronto Star*, 2 May 1986, p. A3; "Soviet silence...", *The Toronto Star*, 2 May 1986, p. A19.

[123] "Soviet silence...", *The Toronto Star*, 2 May 1986, p. A19.

[124] "Deschenes dealt two...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, , 8 May 1986, p. A19; "Metro area man...", *The Toronto Star*, 8 May 1986, p. A1.

[125] "Deschenes dealt two...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 8 May 1986, p. A19.

The tempo of events picked up noticeably. Dissatisfied with the first

Soviet response, the inquiry repeated its request to the Soviet Union. In the

meantime, the Deschenes news text's editorial consensus began to shift.

According to *The Globe and Mail*, "(i)f the Soviet Union is as dedicated to the

prosecution of Nazi war criminals as it claims, it should deal with the

commission in a constructive, co-operative manner."[126] And in an apparent

concession to the Ukrainian Canadian community, an analysis piece in *The

Ottawa Citizen* concluded that "(the Soviets') final response and their conduct

since the request was submitted, makes more believable the Ukrainian

charges that the Soviets are more interested in crucifying Ukrainian

nationalists abroad."[127] The observation begs the immediate question of why

the Ukrainian Canadian community's charges were not believable in the first

place. The answer lay in two boilerplate paragraphs inserted earlier in the

story to summarize events to date.

> Most experts say that most war criminals living in
> Canada are Ukrainian or Baltic in origin -
> Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian -
> simply because Canada's post-war immigration
> policies heavily favored applicants from those
> Nazi-occupied areas.
>
> Those communities, particularly the Ukrainians,
> have taken the commission as an ethnic attack, and
> have not hesitated to use their considerable
> political clout to stifle Deschenes.[128]

In other words, the concern with Soviet evidence was not believable because

of the role into which the Ukrainian Canadian community had been scripted

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[126] "War criminals...", *The Globe and Mail*, 9 May 1986, p. 6.

[127] "Soviets don't want...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 10 May 1986, p. A7.

[128] "Soviets don't want...", *The Ottawa Citizen*, 10 May 1986, p. A7.

in the Deschenes news text. As an identified Nazi victimizer, its concern with Soviet evidence, like the claim of media misrepresentation, was not legitimate.

Still optimistic the Soviets would agree to its conditions, the Deschenes Commission sought another extension of its mandate near the end of May. The Deschenes news text reported that the Mulroney government, sensitive to the potential political fall-out, was reluctant to grant the extension. Then, on 29 May 1986, the Canadian embassy in Moscow received a telegram ostensibly accepting the Deschenes Commission's conditions.[129] Approached by the news media to confirm the story, a representative of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa indicated that "(h)is government is eager to co-operate fully with the Canadians, and visas could be arranged "without delay"." By all appearances, Canada's hunt for Nazi war criminals would go behind the Iron Curtain after all.

The bubble burst two days later when inquiry co-counsel Michael Meighen revealed that the Soviet invitation was not all the representative of the Soviet embassy (or the Deschenes news text) had made it out to be. The Soviet Union still refused to acknowledge the principal safeguards sought by the inquiry. Consequently, there would be no trip to the Soviet Union.[130]

Less than a week later, the federal government granted the Deschenes Commission a 90-day extension. In mid-June, the Soviets finally offered their

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[129]"Soviets say rules...", *The Globe and Mail*, 29 May 1986, p. 1; "Soviets clear the way...", *The Toronto Star*, 29 May 1986, p. A1; "Soviets aid in Nazi...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 29 May 1986, p. 15.

[130] "War crimes probe rejects...", *The Globe and Mail*, 31 May 1986, p. 3; "Nazi probe rejects...", *The Montreal Gazette*, 31 May 1986, p. A6; "Probe into war crimes...", *The Toronto Star*, 31 May 1986, p. A11.

total co-operation but to no avail; the Commission refused to reconsider its decision. It would complete its work without a consideration of Soviet evidence.

From that point until the Deschenes Commission's final report was tabled in the House of Commons eight months later, the issue of Soviet evidence virtually disappeared from the Deschenes news text. It only re-emerged briefly as a context for another of the story's many plot twists. On 12 December 1986 - two weeks before the inquiry's final report was to be handed over to the federal government - *The Globe and Mail* published a front-page story which claimed to reveal a number of the report's recommendations.[131] Most controversial among them, according to the Deschenes news text, was a proposal recommending the establishment of a permanent Canadian Nazi hunting unit similar to the Office of Special Investigations, or OSI, in the United States.

The OSI was an agency of the U.S. Justice Department set up in 1979 to bring Nazi war criminals in the U.S. to justice. Its work to that point had resulted in the U.S. revoking the citizenship of and deporting more than 50 people alleged to have hidden their Nazi involvement when they emigrated to the U.S. in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The OSI, acknowledged the Deschenes news text, "had stirred considerable criticism from eastern European groups in the United States."

The story offered no explanation of the criticism on the assumption that its basis was clear. Until that point the OSI had been a relatively minor character in the Deschenes story. Most of its previous appearances were in

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[131] "U-S style...", *The Globe and Mail*, 12 December 1986, p. 1. cf. also "Deschenes backs...", *The Montreal Gazette*, 12 December 1986, p. B15; "Deschenes to recommend...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 12 December 1986, p. 5.

support of the editorial consensus that the Royal Commission should follow

the example of the United States in making use of Soviet evidence to

prosecute Nazi war criminals. Opposition to such evidence had already been

explained and located in the Ukrainian, Baltic, and other East European

communities.

The nature of the opposition was of course infinitely more complex

than implied by the Deschenes news text. In the case of the OSI, the latter was

making use of Soviet evidence supplied on the basis of a 1980 agreement

between Washington and Moscow, the terms of which had never been

revealed. The way in which the OSI obtai .ed its evidence in the Soviet

Union was also a source of concern. OSI opponents held a frame cf reference

which recognized that

> all OSI depositions are conducted in the Soviet
> court system under the auspices of the Central
> Committee of the Communist Party and the
> Committee for State Security (KGB), and all
> witnesses are questioned under Soviet criminal
> law. In all cases, a Soviet prosecutor presides over
> the taking of testimony, conducts the proceedings,
> and determines the extent of cross-examination.
> The translator is always provided by Intourist, an
> agency under the Second Chief Directorate of the
> KGB.
>
> The overwhelming presence of Soviet authorities
> at the depositions, the restrictions on all documents
> concerning war crimes, and access to "only those
> witnesses attained and controlled by the Soviet
> government" have led one U.S. judge to conclude
> that such circumstances do not "easily square with
> accepted concepts of due process of law" and deny
> the "opportunity to conduct even a primitive
> preparation of a defence."[132]

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[132] "Soviet silence keeps...", *The Toronto Star*, 2 May 1986, p. A19.

Most of these concerns had been addressed by the Deschenes Commission's proposed safeguards regarding the use of Soviet evidence. But the proposal that the OSI should be the model for Canadian action - particularly in light of the OSI's role in what the Ukrainian Canadian community perceived as the persecution of John Demjanjuk, a tale being played out simultaneously on the same pages as the Deschenes story - was guaranteed to generate controversy.

The Globe and Mail never revealed the source of its story. The suggestion that Canada should have an OSI-styled body had appeared earlier in the Deschenes news text but had never achieved much currency. Perhaps the news media were attempting to test the Mulroney government's political courage by speculating on the decisions it would face when confronted with the Deschenes inquiry's recommendations. Perhaps the story had been leaked deliberately as a trial balloon to test public opinion of a policy option. Whatever the case, reaction was swift. Falling back on the angle of the Jewish/Ukrainian conflict, the Deschenes news text pinpointed the recommendation as a future sore point in relations between the two communities. Mr. Justice Deschenes, meanwhile, refused comment, saying of the story only "(t)here are things which are correct and others which are not."[133]

When the Deschenes Commission's final report was tabled in the House of Commons in mid-March 1987, its recommendations did not include the establishment of a permanent Nazi hunting unit. Instead, the RCMP, working with the Justice Department, would be provided with additional resources to track down and investigate Nazi war criminals in Canada. The

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[133] "Deschenes mum on....", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 13 December 1986, p. 31.

Deschenes news text reported the Ukrainian Canadian community to be "elated" with the recommendation, while Jewish Canadian were "disappointed."

The release of the Royal Commission's final report was the climax of the Deschenes story, in which the majority of sub-plots in the Deschenes news text were brought to varying degrees of closure. Summarizing the inquiry's 900-page plus public report, the text highlighted eight of its findings and recommendations. In addition to the proposal for additional RCMP resources, they included:

> Action should be taken against 20 suspected Nazi war criminals living in Canada.

> Cases against an additional 218 suspects require further investigation; accusations against 698 were dismissed.

> The Criminal Code should be amended to allow for Canadian trials of all war criminals, including Nazis.

> Procedures for the revocation of Canadian citizenship and deportation of suspected Nazi war criminals should be streamlined.

> Canada should consider extraditing suspected Nazi war criminals to countries with which it has extradition treaties.

> Suggestions that Dr. Josef Mengele, the notorious Angel of Death from the Auschwitz concentration camp, came to Canada or applied to come in 1962 are false.

> The Galicia Division, a Ukrainian division organized as part of the German Waffen SS, should

not be indicted as a group because there is no proof
its members committed war crimes.[134]

Additional sidebar stories wrapped up other angles while reaction pieces
summarized response to the report from the various characters in the
Deschenes news text.

The text's ostensive referent was revived again in the editorial
response to the Deschenes report. According to *The Winnipeg Free Press*:

> The generally positive reactions from Canada's
> Jewish, Baltic and Ukrainian communities to the
> report of the commission of inquiry into whether
> Nazi war criminals live in this country is a
> welcome sign that Mr. Justice Jules Deschenes
> produced what is perceived to be a balanced
> document.[135]

In the assessment of *The Montreal Gazette*, "(t)he Mulroney government's
positive response to the Deschenes report, though cautious to a fault, shows
the right determination to bring Nazi war criminals to justice."[136] At last,
wrote *The Toronto Star*, "as a result of the long-awaited report of Mr. Justice
Jules Deschenes, Canada will seek Nazi war criminals living among us and
bring them to justice. It's a step that is about 40 years late, but one that will
right an historical wrong."[137] And in the opinion of *The Globe and Mail*:

> Not many people who are guilty of war crimes or
> crimes against humanity live in Canada, but those
> who do should be held to account to the end of
> their days. They should be held to account whether

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[134] "Highlights of the...", *The Globe and Mail*, 13 March 1987, p. 1. cf. also "Deschene (sic)
report highlights", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 12 March 1987, p.1; "Alleged Nazis will...", *The
Toronto Star*, 13 March 1987, p. 1.

[135] "War Criminals in Canada", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 14 March 1987, p. 6.

[136] "Let there be no refuge", *The Montreal Gazette*, 13 March 1987, p. B2.

[137] "Deschenes report rights old wrong", *The Toronto Star*, 13 March 1987, p. A16.

they be aging Nazis or zealots from any place and
time who have acted monstrously, or who may yet
perpetrate atrocities elsewhere. This is the central
conclusion of the Commission of Inquiry on War
Criminals, and it is just.[138]

The consensus, then, was that justice would triumph, albeit belatedly. Yet

many questions remained unanswered. For example, had the public been

told everything there was to know about the Nazi threat in Canada? What

about the controversy surrounding the editing of the Deschenes report and

allegations that it had been watered down prior to its tabling in the House of

Commons?[139] What about the second, secret part of the Deschenes report?[140]

And perhaps most importantly, would the federal government have the

political courage to implement the Deschenes Commission's

recommendations?

As for the issue of Soviet evidence, it surfaced almost as a footnote in

the Deschenes news text's coverage of the final report. The Deschenes

document recommended only that the federal government would have to

decide on a case by case basis, whether to gather evidence in Soviet and East

European countries, and any evidence gathered there must be subject to strict

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[138] "The Deschenes files", *The Globe and Mail*, 13 March 1987, p. 6.

[139] cf. "Deschenes told to alter...", *The Globe and Mail*, 31 January 1987, p. 8; "Deschenes report needs editing...", *The Montreal Gazette*, 3 February 1987, p. B1; "War crimes report...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 3 February 1987, p. 13; "Deschenes report revised...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 10 February 1987, p. 16; "Ottawa revises Deschenes...", *The Montreal Gazette*, 10 February 1987, p. B1; "Requested change...", *The Globe and Mail*, 10 February 1987, p. 3; "Jewish official fears...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 16 February 1987, p. 8.

[140] cf. "Nazi story buried...", *The Globe and Mail*, 17 March 1987, p. 5; "Kaplan wants secret...", *The Toronto Star*, 17 March 1987, p. C16; "Hnatyshyn silent...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 17 March 1987, p. 14; "Unwrap secret Deschenes...", *The Montreal Gazette*, 17 March 1987, p. B1; "Hnatyshyn says he'll...", *The Globe and Mail*, 18 March 1987, p. 4; "Ottawa pushed to release...", *The Montreal Gazette*, 18 March 1987, p. A8; "Publish the Rodal study", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 18 March 1987, p. 6.

safeguards. No reaction was offered to this recommendation, although on the eve of the report's publication the Deschenes news text had speculated that this option, along with the idea of a Canadian OSI, would be included. A reaction solicited from a UCC representative at that time indicated that the Ukrainian Canadian community had "raised sufficient funds to launch a nationwide public campaign" if the government chose to pursue either option.[141] Thus, in the denouement of the Deschenes story, the Ukrainian "propaganda smokescreen" was again invoked to set the stage for another battle on another day.

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[141] "Ukrainians brace for...", *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 12 March 1987, p. 1.

CHAPTER IV: THE STRUGGLE OVER MEANING

This inquiry began from the premise that critical insight into the Ukrainian Canadian community's claim of misrepresentation in the news coverage of the Deschenes discourse could be gained by exploring it as the inscribed trace of a reading experience. As it has been unpacked in the preceding chapters, the text on which this negotiation of meaning was based stands revealed as a dramatic rendering of the Deschenes proceedings. The representational practices and resources of newsworkers, infused with journalistic intentionalities such as objectivity, factuality, realistic coverage, and accuracy were deployed to produce a complex web of angles, plot twists, revelations, confrontations and climaxes. Together they comprised a moral disorder story whose ostensive referent was the belated pursuit of justice. In this story the Ukrainian Canadian community was variously discussed, covered, and apprehended as the locus of the Nazi threat in Canada, a moral stain on the fabric of Canadian society. A dynamic, *nomos*-building instrumentality was reduced to a crude, essentialized caricature - a community of assorted Nazi victimizers, collaborators, sympathizers, apologists and obstructionists engaged in an all-out effort to thwart justice.

Not only was this representation decidedly ethnocentric; in the "organized" Ukrainian Canadian community's reading of the Deschenes news text, the latter's account of this audience group's place in the Deschenes discourse was more often than not predicated on pure misinformation, Soviet disinformation, repetition of unsubstantiated but emotionally charged accusations, and the absence of a genuine 'experience-near' perspective. Moreover, the text's ostensive referent was substituted with one from the community's own collective framework of perception: the news media's witch-hunt for Ukrainian Nazis. This reading experience, among other

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things, motivated the claim of media misrepresentation as well as the controversial political action campaign mounted by the community to counter its perceived public image and seek legitimacy for its concerns. The ensuing conflict between the community's representation of itself and its representation in the Deschenes news text is the most tangible manifestation of the struggle over meaning inscribed in the "organized" Ukrainian Canadian community's reading experience. The full significance of this struggle emerges when it is situated in its broader social and political context.

Inasmuch as it was news, the Deschenes news text was a commodity whose production entailed the provision and selective construction of social knowledge, or the social imagery through which news consumers "perceive the 'worlds', the 'lived realities' of others, and imaginarily reconstruct their lives and ours into some intelligible 'whole of the whole', some 'lived totality'."[142] In short, it was one of the myriad of shared texts through which Canadian society to greater or lesser extents imagines itself. The Deschenes news text was realized in a universe of associated discourses. They included those that had preceded it and those being realized simultaneously - the international hunt for Josef Mengele, the case of John Demjanjuk (Ivan the Terrible), the Zundel and Keegstra trials, the controversy surrounding President Reagan's proposed visit to the Bittburg cemetary, the Kurt Waldheim affair, and others. Together these texts offered a correlation of representations based on the common theme of Nazi war crimes and their ongoing significance in contemporary society. Not only did they legitimize the issue for discussion and decision; they contextualized newsworkers'

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[142] Stuart Hall, "Culture, the Media, and the 'Ideological Effect'", in Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott, op.cit., pp. 341-342.

interpretation of the Deschenes discourse as well as the Ukrainian Canadian community's reading of the Deschenes news text.

The text's equation of the identifying terms 'Ukrainian' and 'Nazi' served to create a powerful label.[143] At one level, this label offered a perfunctory differentiation, a superficial glimpse of what the Ukrainian Canadian community was, as opposed to all other characters in the Deschenes story as well as other social groupings in Canadian society at large. At a second, more complex level of meaning, the label provided the schema via which the Ukrainian Canadian community could be judged. By invoking a range of taken for granted assumptions capable of evoking emotional responses, the label neatly captured the moral values at stake in the Deschenes news text. It clearly coded the Ukrainian Canadian community's public identity as that of a social deviant set in a confrontational relationship with the mores and values of Canadian society. Here the Deschenes text's representation of the community ties in with another universe of texts, a universe dominated by Sikh terrorists, Islamic fundamentalists, Chinese street gangs, Vietnamese refugees, Hong Kong money, and ethnic unrest and violence in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. At this level of understanding, communal identities predicated on ethnicity as difference come into conflict with taken for granted representations of ethnicity as deviance. The struggle over meaning thus becomes the struggle to define the terms of the discourse of ethnicity in Canadian society.

As an element in this discourse, the Deschenes news text shaped and reshaped itself to a consensus which defined ethnicity as marginality, as

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[143] Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), pp. 8-9.

'other', 'foreign', or 'not us'. To be a member of the Ukrainian Canadian

community in the Deschenes news text was to be relegated to the 'wrong' side

in the Deschenes discourse, a position of exclusion. The text's portrayal of the

community's claim of media misrepresentation is but one example of the

hegemonic nature of this marginality. It appears again in the text's framing

of the discourse as an inter-ethnic conflict, a source of temporary titillation

but hardly worth sustained public attention and action.[144]

The consensus equating ethnicity with marginality resonates in

numerous other public discourses. For example, it reinforces and is

reinforced by an official policy of multiculturalism that is based on an image

of Canadian society as existing somehow independently of ethnic groups and

toward whose development ethnic groups are encouraged to make their

designated contributions.[145] Quite apart from the fact that it denies an

alternative image of Canadian society as being constituted by the interaction

between various ethnic groups, including multi-ethnic English and French

speakers, this policy reduces ethnic groups to cultural compartments. From

here, individual ethnics can graduate into mainstream society through a

combination of acquiring the proper attributes and disposing of cultural

baggage deemed irrelevant or inappropriate. In the case of the Deschenes

news text, the cultural baggage in question was the Ukrainian experience of

the events of World War II. By denying the legitimacy of that experience and

the community's claim as to its meaning, the Deschenes news text is not only

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[144] This observation would appear to be borne out by the previously cited public opinion poll commissioned by the federal government. cf. Troper and Weinfeld, op.cit., pp. 314-315.

[145] This critique of multiculturalism is drawn from the work of Karl Peter in "The Myth of Multiculturalism and Other Political Fables", Ethnicity, Power and Politics in Canada, eds. Jorgen Dahlie and Tissa Fernando (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1981), pp. 57-66.

an example of, but actively contributed to, a practice of containment which constrains ethnic groups and denies them a political and economic reality in Canadian society. Relegated to a separate universe of discourses, they have no voice in other significant socio-political discourses.[146] At this level of understanding, the struggle over meaning comes to encompass the struggle between competing histories, the struggle for a place in Canadian society.

Clearly, then, the Deschenes news text is more than an impartial and 'objective' record of the events associated with the proceedings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals. As the preceding analysis of the "organized" Ukrainian Canadian community's reading experience has shown, the text and its creators were active participants in the Deschenes discourse, as much responsible for its tone, direction, and outcome as were other participants and events. This study has offered a partial account of this instance of world-making. Further insights into the nature of this phenomenon might be had by exploring the following questions:

1. How did the text represent other characters in the Deschenes story? For example, what was the nature of the role of victim ascribed to the Jewish Canadian community within the sub-plot of Soviet evidence? Cursory observation suggests that this angle was motivated by what Christopher Lasch calls the politics of resentment.[147] In the Deschenes news text the Jewish Canadian community could be perceived as claiming a privileged moral position as a victim of injustice by virtue of which it was entitled to long overdue reparations that might involve condoning the very

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[146] Witness, for example, the way in which Canada's current constitutional debate has been framed and taken for granted as a debate between French and English Canada.

[147] Christopher Lasch, "Fraternalist Manifesto", Harper's, April 1987, pp. 17-20.

methods (e.g., the use of Soviet evidence) the community condemns when its opponents deploy them.

2. How was the broader range of interaction between these characters represented in other sub-plots of the Deschenes news text? What struggles over meaning and hegemonic relations might be revealed by unpacking the case of the missing immigration files, the public discreditation of Sol Littman, the Deschenes/Nuremburg war crimes trial controversy, and the Mengele affair, to name but a few? What texture do they add to the Deschenes story?

3. What sub-plots were conspicuously absent in the Deschenes news text? For example, where was the story of the Western world's own ignominious contribution to the Holocaust, be it through the appeasement of Nazi Germany in the 1930s or Canada's turning a blind eye to the plight of Jewish refugees seeking to escape genocide? What does this absence reveal about the nature of the text's ostensive referent?

4. How did other audience groups encounter the Deschenes news text? For example, insofar as it can be construed as an audience group, what was the federal government's reading experience? Did the text's packaging of the Royal Commission's final report as a ticking political timebomb contribute to the Mulroney government's obvious and ongoing reluctance to act on the recommendations in the report? What would this reveal about how the news media variously enable and constrain the public policy process?

5. What were the residual effects of these reading experiences on the various audience groups? For example, in the case of the "organized" Ukrainian Canadian community, the effects were profound. On the level of organizational structure the CLC has become a permanent fixture of the UCC; as well, the latter now maintains a full-time information bureau on

Parliament Hill through which it also channels its political lobbying efforts. A more significant impact can be discerned at the level of collective identity. Throughout the Deschenes proceedings the Ukrainian Canadian community sought recognition similar to that which it perceived being accorded to its Jewish Canadian counterpart - the status of victim. This definition of the collective self as victim has emerged as a cultivated component of the community's public face, as witnessed by the resources and efforts the community has poured into seeking redress for the internment of Ukrainian Canadians during World War I. By devoting its energies to what amounts to winning public acknowledgement of its powerlessness, is the community deterred from pursuing a more empowering collective identity? Is it in fact recreating and reinforcing the conditions of its powerlessness?

6. What insights might be gained by unpacking a Deschenes news text comprised of either a different or broader cross-section of news media? For example, how did Canadian television news tell the Deschenes story? What medium-specific representational techniques were used to create the story's characters, sub-plots, and dramatic pretext?

7. Finally, what critical understandings could be appropriated by adapting and applying this model of inquiry across a wider range of discourses? For example, what fresh insights might it offer into the free trade debate, the national unity crisis, the Oka dispute, and other symbolic discourses through which we create and experience ourselves as Canadians? What would it reveal about the nature of the Canadian news media's place in these discourses?

Each of the avenues of inquiry outlined above could be elaborated by expanding the underlying relational epistemology. Indeed, the preceding exploration would have evolved differently had the provisional knowledge on which it is based been configured differently. For all its limitations, this study nevertheless invests the phenomenon under consideration with a critical intelligibility. By doing so it offers an alternative prespective and understanding of the issues it addresses.

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