

# The Ukrainian Quarterly

A JOURNAL OF UKRAINIAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Volume LXIV, Numbers 1-2

Spring-Summer 2008

This issue is a commemorative publication on the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Stalin-induced famine in Ukraine in the years 1932-1933, known in Ukrainian as the *Holodomor*. The articles in this issue explore and analyze this tragedy from the perspective of several disciplines: history, historiography, sociology, psychology and literature.

*In memory of the "murdered millions and ... the graves unknown."*

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A JOURNAL OF UKRAINIAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Since 1944

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*To our Readers:*

*The present issue of **The Ukrainian Quarterly** is dedicated to the Stalin-induced famine in Ukraine in the years 1932-1933. It is a commemorative publication on the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of this tragedy, which is known in Ukrainian as the **Holodomor**. The word was coined in the Ukrainian diaspora in the past century; it is a compound made up of the noun **holod** (hunger) and the transitive verb **moryty** (to starve to death). The Holodomor is one of the greatest genocides ever perpetrated on a nation; it occurred before the term was coined ten years later in 1943. Despite intensive studies and research, the number of its victims cannot be definitively established. Conservative estimates range anywhere from six to ten million people. They were starved to death in a country that was at that time known as the "bread basket of Europe." The enormity of this tragedy is perhaps best expressed in Roman Tatchyn's translation of Mykola Rudenko's poem "The Cross" (featured in this issue) in the following lines:*

*"And countless are the murdered millions.  
And countless still the graves unknown."*

*Indeed, despite the efforts of the present Ukrainian government, the Ukrainians living in the diaspora and scholars from all parts of the world, the true number of the victims will never be known. The memory of the event, however, will never fade.*

*This issue of our **Ukrainian Quarterly** explores and analyzes this man-made calamity from the perspective of several disciplines: history, historiography, sociology, psychology and literature. Despite the emotionally charged topic, the authors, for the most part, do so sine ira et studio. It is hoped that this modest collection of materials will contribute toward a deeper understanding of the tragic catastrophe that occurred 75 years ago and help keep alive the memory of its victims in the consciousness and conscience of our readers and decent people everywhere.*

*The Editors*

LEONID RUDNYTZKY

## A Note on the *Holodomor* in Imaginative Literature<sup>1</sup>

In chapter four, entitled “Soviet Historical Fiction on the Famine,” of the *Report to Congress* published by the staff of the Commission on the Ukrainian Famine, headed by the late James Mace, we are offered the following pertinent information on our topic:

“Like the once-taboo subject of the Gulag, the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33 has surfaced from time to time in post-Stalinist Soviet fiction and literary criticism in both Ukraine and Russia. Four writers who deal with the Famine at some length are Ivan Stadniuk in his novel *Liudi ne angely* (People Are Not Angels), first published in the Leningrad journal *Neva* in December 1962, subsequently issued in book form in Russian, Ukrainian and English and also as a play in 1967; Petro Lanovenko in *Nevmyruchy khlib* (Undying Bread, 1981); Mikhail Alekseev in *Drachuny* (Fighters), first serialized in the journal *Nash sovremennik* (Our Contemporary) in 1981 and soon thereafter as a book; and Vladimir Tendriakov in the novel *Konchyna* (The Demise, 1974).”<sup>2</sup>

The Report does not mention the first major work of fiction on the Famine, published in Lviv in 1934: the novel *Mariya* by Ulas Samchuk (1905-1988), one of Ukraine’s premier 20<sup>th</sup> century prose writers. Strictly speaking, this cannot be considered an error of omission on the part of the Commission, because Lviv (and indeed the whole of Western Ukraine)

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<sup>1</sup> An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the *Holodomor* Conference organized by the Embassy of Ukraine and the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Washington, D.C., on April 5, 2008. Ukrainian-language extracts and summaries have appeared in various newspapers both in the United States and Ukraine.

<sup>2</sup> “Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine 1932-33, Report to Congress, Commission on the Ukraine Famine, adopted by the Commission 19 April 1988,” submitted to Congress April 22, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 97.

was at that time not under Soviet occupation.<sup>3</sup> *Mariya* is a chronicle of the life of a simple woman who, like millions of other peasants, becomes a victim of the *Holodomor*. The author dedicated the novel to all the mothers who, like Mariya and her daughter Nadiya, together with her infant, suffered death through starvation in Ukraine during what became later known as the cursed years of Stalin's terror.

While the Commission's Report covers the major prose works on the Famine, it does not include poetry. It does not mention the great Soviet-Ukrainian symbolist Pavlo Tychyna (1891-1967), who uses the Famine as a background for the final part of his magnificent poem *Skovoroda*. This poem is a *sui generis* rhapsodic elegy, in which the author pays homage to the victims of this man-made catastrophe and Soviet terror in general, including the writer-essayist Mykola Khvylovy (1893-1933), who committed suicide in protest against the inhumanities of Stalin's regime.<sup>4</sup> In addition, there are several other literary works, written at that time, the authors of which try to come to terms with a genocide that has no precedent in history. Most of these literary reactions to the tragedy are in poetic form, which is rather typical of the Ukrainian people. Literature, and especially poetry, has in the past served — and continues in the present (although to lesser degree) — to serve as a form of psychoanalysis for the Ukrainian people, who often, in trying to cope with the vicissitudes of life, perceive reality through the prism of poetry and through song, as well as other art forms. This, of course, could not happen, truly and authentically, in Soviet-occupied Ukraine, as indicated by the Report to Congress, in the next paragraph of the cited Chapter:

"The lifting of the once-absolute taboo on the Famine does not imply a full portrayal. Rather, it has only meant the creation of a new set of limitations on how far the author can go. Fiction, of course, does not necessarily demand verisimilitude. In the West, fiction writers, including those who write on historical themes, are under no special obligation to interpret reality and history in any way other than the way they choose. In non-totalitarian societies, historical fiction, like all fiction, is a literary ge-

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<sup>3</sup> Samchuk's novel was republished in the city of Rivne in 1941; the third edition appeared in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1952.

<sup>4</sup> See Yuriy Lavrinenko's memoirs, *Chorna purha ta inshi spomyny* (New York, Munich: Suchasnist, 1985), p. 125.



nre where style is at least as important as content in being the measure of a novel's aesthetic merit."<sup>5</sup>

Suffice it to say, that most of the literary prose works mentioned in the Report, and a few others, are of no significant esthetic merit and have not attained great popularity. None of them reach the level of, for example, Franz Werfel's magnificent 1933 novel *Die vierzig Tage des Musa Dag* (*Forty Days of Musa Dag*), which is a compelling story of the Armenian genocide of 1915-1921 perpetrated by the Turks. With this novel, the Austrian writer set a lasting monument to this historic event, the consequences of which still reverberate today in international politics. Werfel's work appears to have no equivalent, either in Ukrainian or Russian literature, with the exception of Vasyl Barka's *Zhovtyi knyaz* (*The Yellow Prince*), which is discussed by Jean-Pierre Cap elsewhere in this issue. For better or for worse, the Ukrainian literary reaction to the tragedy, which was swift and immediate, is for the most part in poetry, probably for the reason mentioned earlier — i.e., for the Ukrainian people, poetry is a cathartic, psychoanalytical process.

It is interesting to note that in the West, immediately after WWII, there were voices questioning the writing of poetry altogether. "To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric," said the German philosopher and social critic Theodor Adorno (1903-1969). This type of view could never be seriously considered in the Ukrainian realm, where the primacy of the poet and his sacred activity is never questioned, no matter what calamities befall the people. Conscious of the fact that poetry is a gift of God, the Ukrainians would rather accept Goethe's dictum concerning the mystic origin of poetry and of the poet's divine ability to express and assuage even the greatest of sorrows and sufferings: "Und wenn der Mensch in seiner Qual verstummt,/Gab mir ein Gott, zu sagen, was ich leide." ("And when the human being falls silent in his pain/ A god gave me [the power] to say what I suffer."),<sup>6</sup> wrote Goethe while attempting to come to terms with evil in this world through poetry.

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<sup>5</sup> "Report to Congress," p. 97. See also Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986): the introduction to this pioneering study refers to several fictional accounts of the Famine published in the Soviet Union.

<sup>6</sup> There are two versions of this statement: "... **what** I suffer," and "... **how** I suffer." See Goethe's poem *Trilogie der Leidenschaft* and his drama *Tasso* (Act V, Scene 5).

For the Ukrainians “song is existence,” to quote a line from Rainer Maria Rilke (1875-1926), and the task of the poet is to transform the banality of everyday life into song. The poet, the “One appointed to praising,”<sup>7</sup> unites the living with the dead through his unconditional praise of existence, because as Rilke puts it:

“Not understood are the sufferings.  
Neither has love been learned,  
And what removes us in death  
Is not unveiled.  
Only song over the land  
hallows and celebrates.”<sup>8</sup>

The poet has the divine right to spiritualize existence, to endow it with order, grace and beauty. Thus poetry not only mitigates suffering; it overcomes it. Rilke offers a metaphysical rationale for this belief in the following short poem consisting of questions and answers:

“Tell us, o poet, what it is you do, — I praise.  
But the deadly and monstrous things,  
How can you bear them, how can you accept them? — I praise  
But the nameless, the anonymous,  
How can you, poet, call upon them? — I praise,  
What right have you, in every disguise,  
In every mask to be true? — I praise.  
And how is it that the calm and monstrous things,  
Like star and storm know you? — Because I praise.”<sup>9</sup>

Perhaps this kind of lyrical, mystic inwardness, this existential *amor fati*, which fuses transcendence and immanence, is the main reason for Rilke’s enormous popularity in Ukraine. It, at least partially, explains the spiritual affinity of the numerous Ukrainian poets who have either translated Rilke or were influenced by him in their writings. Thus writing poetry about the *Holodomor* (and for that matter about all tragedies) is not a question of simply converting stark despair into blissful hope, but rather a coming to terms with a horror, the consequences of which can only be

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<sup>7</sup> Rainer Maria Rilke, *Sonnets to Orpheus*, part I, no. 7 (translated by M. D. Herter Norton) (W.W. Norton, New York, 1970).

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, part I, no. 19

<sup>9</sup> Rilke, “Tell us ...,” in *The Penguin Book of German Verse* (Toronto, 1957).

overcome through an intractable faith. This type of poetry therefore has a religious nature. It is, in the final analysis, the reaffirmation of man's existential purpose based on an intuitive certainty of an all-loving God. For the Ukrainians, its essence is acquiescence.

One of the earliest poems on the Famine, "In a Ukrainian Cemetery," was written in 1933 by Oleksa Hai-Holovko (1910-2006), an eyewitness to the tragedy. He wrote it in Ukraine and, for reasons of personal safety, memorized the poem, burned the original text and later reproduced it from memory in Canada. The following is an excerpt in a rather inadequate prose translation:

"A red blizzard ... wailing and weeping  
Pierce the bloody thick mornings.  
I am in my sorrowful Ukraine,  
Crucified by Moscow on an honest cross.

Around me – graves, graves, graves,  
In the graves lies my wretched country.  
O holy fate, give me strength,  
That I may say the hereto unsaid.

The fiery word that seizes the heart,  
We languish and perish in cruel prison.  
There is no salvation, none, none, none,  
Alone, we cannot get escape from hell ..."

This utter despair of the poet is poignantly expressed in the repetition of individual words — "graves" and "none" — for the immensity of the happening is so overwhelming, it renders the poet almost speechless. There appears to be an intrinsic, tragic frustration inherent in the process of communicating events of such magnitude. In some cases, their poetic articulation must, by the very nature of the medium, remain in *chiffres* to be interpreted by the reader. Thus, this *Holodomor* genre of literature can be classified in two categories: some of these works are but poetic gut-reactions, so to speak, to the ineffable horror; while others describe the historic events in more concrete terms while attempting simultaneously to offer a metaphysical explanation for the evil. A profound consciousness of God is the lifeblood of these poems in which mysticism and eschatological motifs abound. Both these categories, however, leave the poet with the feeling of tragic inadequacy, a sense of failure to communicate the demonic enormity of the calamity. The first category displays a strong inclination to the inscrutable, the mythogenic, while the other bespeaks the stark-

ness of the author's identification with human suffering. A good example of the first is Mykola Rudenko's poem "Khrest" ("The Cross"), which is accorded separate treatment in this issue, while Hai-Holovko and others comprise the second category.

Another early poem of the second category is "Hell on Earth" by Andriy Lehit (1916-), in which the author sets forth concrete details on the progression of the Famine. Here are several stanzas:

"The sycamores at the roadways rustle no more  
Only the bare stumps burn like lanterns  
Soundlessness reigns over the bare fields,  
And the plundered Ukrainian land sleeps.

But here comes nineteen thirty three,  
The year the people called the accursed,  
When every barn, bin and corner of granary  
Was swept clean by the red broom.

They took the horses and bulls to the collective,  
They took the wagons, plows, and harrows, too,  
They took some people to the distant north,  
While others died of hunger and starvation.

.....  
The famine chased the elders away  
Into Turkestan, Siberia, the forest of Ural,  
Pens, sheds and fences were burned in the ovens,  
Livestock and grain were taken by the soldiers."

In enumerating faithfully the tragic historical events, the author stresses the unprecedented nature of the horror. Later in the poem, we read that if Taras Shevchenko were to rise from his grave, he would weep, for the hell reigning in Ukraine under Stalin is incomparably worse than the reign of Tsar Nicholas in his lifetime:

"In Kyrylivka, where he grew up  
In a ragged and unheated hut,  
A woman stoops, as if taken down from the cross,  
A mother over her prostrated children.

.....  
"Bread," cried little Olia,  
"Sleep, child, you'll dream of it,"

And the red broom emptied  
The barn, the shed, and the cellar.

"Milk," cried the younger Ivas,  
"Sleep, my beloved Ivasyk, without milk:  
Herod Stalin is raging at us,  
He has taken our cow to the slaughterhouse."

...She put out the lamp, and laid herself down...  
But without closing their eyes for a minute that night,  
As already had half of the village,  
The three of them fell asleep for eternity."<sup>10</sup>

There are many works of this genre, written in the 1930s, which were, for obvious reasons, published years later in the Diaspora. Among the leading proponents of this genre are: the writer and journalist Anatol Halan (pseudonym of A. Kalynovsky, 1903-1987), known primarily for his humorous-satirical poetry; the poet-translator Oleksa Veretenchenko (1918-1993); and the prolific Canadian-Ukrainian writer Yar Slavutych (pseudonym of Hryhoriy Zhuchenko, 1918- ).

While some references to the Famine may be found in the poetry of dissidents in the Brezhnev era, there is no question that the most powerful poetic work written at that time is Mykola Rudenko's "Khrest" (1976). In contrast to the other works, "The Cross" is available (albeit in a very limited edition) in an excellent English translation by Roman Tatchyn.<sup>11</sup>

The poem combines subjective, autobiographical motifs, i.e., the conversion of the author from Marxism to Christianity, with fictionalized historical elements and mystical, religious imagery. It is a riveting dra-

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<sup>10</sup> For texts and commentaries on these and other poems see Dmytro Chub, *Vidlunannya velykoho holodu v spohadakh otchevydtsiv i v ukrayynskiy literature* (1984), and an article by the same author entitled *Echoes of the Great Famine in the Memoirs of Eyewitnesses and in Ukrainian Literature* (Toronto, Canada: Ukrainian Orthodox Brotherhood of St. Volodymyr, 1988). Among the earliest essays on the subject was Oleh Kandyba, "Holod i suchasna ukrayynska literatura" ("The Famine and Contemporary Ukrainian Literature"), *Samostiynna Dumka*, book 2 (Chernivtsi, February 1933), pp. 124-131. It was reprinted several times in various Ukrainian publications, including the selected edition of Kandyba's works published in 2007.

<sup>11</sup> See Mykola Rudenko, *The Cross* (Philadelphia: St. Sophia Religious Association of Ukrainian Catholics, 1987). All quotations are taken from this edition, which has been reprinted in this issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*.

matic account of Commissar Myron, who returns to his native village in the year 1933 to find all its inhabitants, including his mother, no longer among the living.

The Introduction, which precedes the eight cantos comprising the poem, begins with the conversion of the author:

“No, I don’t rue my having been a Marxist –  
In life, I searched for new religions.  
For without faith, what are we? ...  
Beasts conditioned  
With underdeveloped brains confined to darkness.”

This *confession de foi*, which reveals the searching nature of the author and his Faustian quest, is followed by his realization of the suffering that awaits him and thus introduces a theological dimension to the work. Admitting that he once was an adherent of a false religion, he now perceives himself as a man in search of the Truth within him, because this Truth, he believes, is “the First and Last foundation” of all things.

“Falsely was I led by ‘prophets’ risen,  
Through straights and passes  
Most perilous and stormy....  
Now, withal, my new poems lie before me,  
For which I’m to be adorned with prison.”

And he continues addressing with the defiant words of a neophyte his future jailers:

“But you won’t break me or my struggle lessen,  
Nor with your lies the Sacred Tablets shatter,  
It wouldn’t hurt for you to learn the lesson,  
That Eternity –  
Is God!...  
And *that’s* what matters.”

What follows is a moving account of the plight of Myron, “a Bolshevik like steel,” a communist who fervently believes the propaganda fed to him by Moscow and rejects any notion of a man-made famine:

“... he declines this truth to grasp:  
He’d seen how Moscow’s tribes  
Lived short on food, in rations cast –  
Yet each man-jack alive.”

Against the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the Commissar argues with himself in the following inner monologue:

“And wherefore then, beneath these skies,  
Could Famine raze these plains?  
It’s kurkuls — spreading monstrous lies!  
Sheer fantasies insane!

Ha! Let them play! Their day will come.  
They’ll tear their throats from fright.  
Once Communism and Stalin’s Sun,  
Suffuse these plains with light.”

Yet the impact of the revelation of the nightmare’s reality is so powerful that he faints; upon awakening the next morning his hair has turned white. He realizes that “From forty farms —/ no one survived,”<sup>12</sup> and begins searching for his mother’s grave. Through compelling poetic imagery and a tragic all-embracing pathos, the poet achieves a spiritual synthesis of the personal, the national and the religious. The ineffable is thus poetically made palpable. The work also contains a profoundly ironic scene — shades of Potemkin villages: A movie is being made in the Commissar’s native village with the use of foreign actors (the Ukrainians being all dead); a motif of cannibalism is introduced by the ravings of the madwoman Christine, who has eaten her children; and a dialogue between the protagonist and Christ dealing with the age-old problem of evil culminate the dramatic section of the work. All these personal-psychological and philosophical-religious elements are subordinated to the human tragedy of the Famine which is most starkly expressed in the lines that, unfortunately, will forever ring true:

“For Hell’s Hyena – Hell’s Dominion –  
Turns tongues – and fearlessness – to stone.  
And countless are the murdered millions.  
And countless still the graves unknown.”

The works of Rudenko (1920-2004), a religious poet, a writer of science fiction, a dramatist, a trenchant social thinker and human rights activist, deserve to be known better. Incredibly rich in its philosophic range, his *oeuvre* is truly a part of what Goethe called *Weltliteratur*. Spi-

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<sup>12</sup> Rudenko’s original work cited 100 farms, which Tatchyn changed to 40 farms, probably for stylistic reasons.

noza, Pascal, Kant and Hegel, to name but a few, helped shape his worldview, which is steeped in the millennial Christian tradition of Ukraine.<sup>13</sup>

This rather sketchy and superficial survey would be even less complete if we were to omit the dramatic genre. Its most prominent representative is a play, entitled *Holod* (1933) (Hunger, 1933), written by Bohdan Boychuk (1927-), a member of the New York Group of Poets, in the early 1960s and published in 1968. The play is a powerful drama, composed under the influence of Samuel Beckett. Its *dramatis personae* have no names. They are simply "Man," "Woman," "A Voice from the Crucifixion," "the Poet" and "He who is dying," which underscores the symbolic nature of the work. Boychuk, who currently resides in Kyiv, has also published two poems devoted to the Famine: "Protsesiya" (The Procession) and "1933."

Without doubt, the most powerful prose work on the Famine is Barka's *The Yellow Prince*. This novel, once it is published in western languages, will do much to establish the *Holodomor* in the consciousness of the world. An English-language translation has already been made, and it is hoped that it will appear in print this year. A German translation, prepared by the Vienna-based free-lance translator, Maria Ostheim-Dzerowycz, is currently in print. And finally, a most readable French translation was published by Gallimard of Paris in 1981. However, immediately upon publication, the Soviet authorities bought up almost the entire edition, and there was no second printing.

Today it is virtually impossible to render an account for everything that is being published on the *Holodomor*. Recently, an extensive bibliography of materials on the Famine, including imaginative literature, appeared in Ukraine. (See the Shtohryn review in this issue). There is indeed a veritable flood of works — memoirs, historical tractates, collections of articles, bibliographies and poetry. The latter is especially prodigious. Almost every issue of the *Literaturna Ukrayina*, the official organ of the Union of Writers of Ukraine, features works on the Famine. There is also a number of short books and pamphlets, some not without literary merit. A good example of the latter is *Holodomor. Poema* (2007) by Nina Vynohradska. Its text is illustrated by historical photographs, sundry documents and incisive commentaries. Together with an accompanying disc, this poetic documentary constitutes a new literary genre which may well be called a "docupoem."<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> See Leonid Rudnytsky, Introduction to the "The Cross," pp. 7-10.

<sup>14</sup> Nina Vynohradska, *Holodomor* (Kharkiv, 2007), 30 pages.



In closing, let us pose several questions:

- Is literature, both in the form of poetry and imaginative prose, really necessary for a better understanding of the tragedy of 1933?
- Is it not more efficacious for the Ukrainian cause to produce well-documented scholarly works, especially in English and other European languages?
- And, inasmuch as we live in what might be called an audio-visual age, are not films, that is motion pictures and videos, most important in spreading the message?

I believe we have already supplied implicit answers to these questions. Notwithstanding the importance of film and video (especially such a documentary as "Harvest of Despair"<sup>15</sup>) poetry is essential for keeping alive the memory of the tragedy in the collective consciousness of the Ukrainian people. Imaginative prose works, on the other hand, disseminated throughout the civilized world in esthetically agreeable translations, will ensure a clearer understanding and a more sensitive and compassionate reception of the Ukrainian tragedy by the community of free nations. As manifested by the example of Franz Werfel's novel, imaginative literature can sometimes achieve more than well-documented scholarship, in the realm of the human mind. The poet is often capable of seeing connections of historic events which remain hidden to the researcher. He (or she) can appreciate more intimately the *Zeitgeist* of a given era and thus supplement the findings of the scholar-historian. In our spiritless, techno-centric times, poets are needed to humanize the world. For better or for worse, Ukraine has and, we are certain, will always have, an abundance of poets. Their task is to preserve the collective memory of a calamity that almost destroyed a nation, to help find, again and again, in face of an ever-present evil, a reaffirmation of man's existential purpose, and to strengthen his faith in the ultimate redemption of mankind.

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<sup>15</sup> A documentary directed by Slavko Novytski and produced by him and Yuriy Luhovy under the sponsorship of *The Ukrainian Famine Research Committee of Canada* in 1984. It was aired for the first time in the United States on PBS, September 24, 1986, during a special edition of William F. Buckley's *Firing Line*. Since that time, several films dealing with the tragedy have been produced.

## **“The Cross” — Editorial Introduction**

The following English-language version of Mykola Rudenko's poem “The Cross” by Roman Orest Tatchyn (and dedicated to P. Grigorenko) belongs to the rare category of translated works that in some respect excels the original. A classic example is Edward Fitzgerald's translation of *The Rubáiyát* of Omar Khayyam, which is considered by many critics to be superior to the Persian classic.

Tatchyn has admirably captured the spirit and ethos of the Ukrainian original. It is, at times, as if the souls of the translator and the author had coalesced and found expression with one voice in two tongues. Rudenko himself admired Tatchyn's interpretation of his work, and, once it was explained to him (for Rudenko knew no English), marveled at the skill of his interpreter.

Tatchyn's powerful command of the English language is demonstrated throughout the work. To be sure, his work, some might remark, is more of an adaptation than a translation. Tatchyn often changes the imagery, takes liberties with metaphors and even adds his own poetic devices to Rudenko's original work. However, it is clear that he does this only to remain faithful to the author's original design and intent.

A scholarly comparison of the Ukrainian poem with the English version would be most fruitful, as both works are masterful representations of the poetic genre. Both express the primal emotions evoked by an ineffable horror, as well as an unwavering conviction in the indestructibility of the human spirit.

MYKOLA RUDENKO

## The Cross<sup>1</sup>

### Introduction

No, I don't rue my having been a Marxist -  
 In life, I searched for new religions.  
 For, without faith, what are we? ...  
 Beasts conditioned.  
 With undeveloped brains confined to darkness.  
     Hear the jeers:  
     "Yeah? Where's your promised kingdom?  
     Those fabled gifts your Mage was always 'seeing'?"  
     We've won His Kingdom, for we've grasped the wisdom:  
     Of Eternity there is no healing  
 Hide your heart and eyes, renounce your being,  
 Still it will rise, incarnate and undying.  
 Cleanse out your soul with its immortal fires,  
 And bestow on you the gift of seeing ...  
     It's no star ungrasped, no withered sinew,  
     Not some dark abyss of depredation.  
     It is Truth —  
     The First and Last Foundation.  
     Bare yourself to it,  
     Find it within you!  
 Falsely was I led by 'prophets' risen,  
 Through straights and passes  
 Most perilous and stormy ...  
 Now, withal, my new poems lie before me,  
 For which I'm to be adorned with prison.

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<sup>1</sup> Originally published as a pamphlet: Mykola Rudenko, *The Cross*, translated by Roman Tatchyn (Philadelphia, PA and St. Catharines, ONT: St. Sophia Religious Association of Ukrainian Catholics, 1987), 29 pages.

Still, I'm prepared to pour this poison into me —  
They say that minds change for all time in prison:  
Jail being — salvation from Eternity,  
From poetry,  
And optimism.

But you won't break me or my struggles lessen,  
Nor with your lies the Sacred Tablets shatter.  
It wouldn't hurt for you to learn the lesson,  
That Eternity —  
Is God! ...  
And that's what matters.

# I

In morning dew's a frozen star.  
A raven's wrangling reel.  
The train's disgorged a Commissar —  
A Bolshevik — like steel.  
    He lunged from off the tracks and marched  
    Along the steppeland leas.  
    Across his cheek — a saber scar.  
    A crimson star — his sleeve.

Who hasn't cursed or sworn you grief,  
You, crimsoned stalwarts bold,  
Whose stars had scrawled across your sleeves,  
The Astrologues of old?

    You'll say to me: "It's not the one,  
    For all we've brought stands new."  
    You knew it not that God's own Son  
    Adorned that star for you.

You knew it not, advancing bold,  
From gloomy, Mongol plains:  
From Masons' fanes your Marxists stole  
That crimson-spattered bane.

    No, I will not renounce your name,  
    Old warrior of the line.  
    We both will share men's praise and blame.  
    Until the end of time.

Yes, I myself that star displayed  
In wars and battles far.

And that is why today I'll claim:

"We're brothers. By that star ..."

So, on the Commissar strode proud,  
The old roads seemed the same;  
On high, the rooks and crows cried loud,  
Remembering his name ...

His war-front wound's been torn again —

Perhaps it's home — for good ...

Dry breezes race across the plains,

Dispersing dust and soot.

He knows these parts, each farm and well —

Each family, each lea ...

It was the year of death, of Hell —

The year of □thirty-three.

But he declines this truth to grasp:

He'd seen how Moscow's tribes

Lived short on food, in rations cast —

Yet each man-jack alive.

And wherefore then, beneath these skies.

Could Famines raze these plains?

It's kurkuls — spreading monstrous lies!

Sheer fantasies insane!

Ha! Let them play! Their day will come.

They'll tear their throats from fright.

Once Communism and Stalin's Sun,

Suffuse these plains with light.

## II

But beyond far fences,

Lifeless homes and farms;

Just a distant windmill,

Lifting lonesome arms.

Arms like iron prostheses,

From the post-war years,

Like a cripple praying,

On upholstered knees.

Not a wisp is curling

From the roofs this dawn;

Thickset weeds and grasses,

Choke the listless lawns.

Here's the home I've grown in,  
"Mother! Mom, I'm home!"  
Graftling twigs lie withered,  
On the orchard's loam.

Crumbling paths and posterns  
Black with dust have grown.  
Broken hives lie scattered —  
All the swarms have flown.

Darkened walls and doorsteps  
Glint with weeds and grass.  
Has the end of mankind  
Truly come to pass?

Maybe, it's some nightmare,  
Some mad demon's fun?  
"Mother! Hear me, Mother!  
Myron's home! Your son!"

There — the yellowed photo ...  
Schorsiv's sundered war ...  
Where I battled, wounded,  
Where my face was torn.

There's where, wielding sabers,  
With the foes I strove ...  
Darkened rooms lie empty,  
Damply reeks the stove.

On the wall — not Lenin? —  
Something strange astride;  
In his place of honor —  
Jesus Christ presides.

Ah, perhaps poor mother  
Trundled Illyich down? ...  
A Commissar's mother?

"Mom! How could You? How?"

Then, like struck by lightning,  
Myron gasped, appalled:  
"Fool! Are there no feelings  
Left in you at all?

Here, within this wasteland,  
Ranged with crows and daws,  
Will you lurk here babbling,  
Dialectic laws? ...

Here grim Hell's been reaping —  
 Not some dreamer's dream! ..."  
 And Commissar Myron  
 Dropped face down and screamed.

With his head he bludgeoned,  
 Bit his lips and sliced,  
 And, in time, raised up his  
 Battered eyes on Christ.

### III

Softly the wheat fields deepen, —  
 Palely his face has faded:  
 For of those starved till the reaping,  
 Only a few had made it.

Nighttimes ... like Hells they linger!  
 He doesn't sleep till morning.  
 Women's razor-clawed fingers  
 Weals in his throat keep goading.

Then comes his mother before him.  
 And with pain in her eyes starts chiding:  
 "Time to get up. Myron darling.  
 Outdoors the sun is shining.

It hurts to languish in darkness.  
 Death is harsh and confining:  
 Who'll take care of the harvest,  
 Out in the fields, sweet Myron?"

Little children squeal, sobbing,  
 Redheads, starved unto dying:  
 "A little bread, mommy, mommy,  
 Some bread! ..."  
 And the shrieks grow silent.

Out by the com-storehouse entrance,  
 Storming outdoors in the morning,  
 Christine, the widow demented,  
 Saltates with cannibal glory.

### Christine:

"Ho, I killed and carved my children,  
 In the harvest moon I boiled them,

Made an aspic, came the dawn,  
For my tractor driver, John.  
    Eat up Johnny! Drink up, Johnny!  
    Fill your love as sweet as honey!  
    You said: 'If you'd lived alone ...'  
    Look! The children now are gone!

Eat up, lover, eat, don't linger,  
Spit back out Orysia's finger.  
From my daughters, sons and babes,  
Just a pile of bones remains.  
    All their souls are safe forever.  
    Their remains I'll slice and sever.  
    And I'll busy them with care.  
    Soon we all will end up there!

But till then keep gorging, swilling.  
Those that fall keep right on killing.  
Young or old, shy or brave —  
Soon we all will lie in graves!"

#### IV

Myron's dark locks turned white by morning:  
From forty farms —  
No one survived ...  
Just distant megaphones kept roaring  
About "new roads" and "Party pride."  
    And, wild with words, like lashes raining,  
    A well-known poet,  
    In killing fits,  
    Into one ditch cursed all Ukrainians:  
    "Stick and kill! Kill and stick!"

Myron plods on, with horror stricken,  
His conscience crucified inside.  
Far up ahead, he hears dogs barking —  
Thus, someone's left ... perhaps alive!  
    A yard appears — a dray, raked flooring,  
    A white-washed doorway, ricks of hay. —  
    And, through the door, plump girls alluring —  
    Tote buttered dumplings stacked on trays!  
A table packed with food stands sagging —  
Good whiskey, pickles, pork in brine.



A peasant, shod in clogs of twine,  
Stands turning straw inside a wagon.  
    Hauling out a samovar before him,  
    His cap he cocks and starts inside:  
    “Hey! Take that kettle back. It’s foreign:  
    It’s Kurskan — not the Ukrainian style!”  
Who screamed those words so strange, commanding  
This Hellish travesty of sin?  
Then Myron gasped with understanding.  
Why, it’s a movie set — being filmed!  
    And all cleared up, each clue he’d noted:  
    Some tribe from Kursk was hired en masse,  
    And — robed in bright Ukrainian clothing —  
    Railed down to film this staged “repast.”  
As though to say, let kurkul liars  
Desist with their distortions bold,  
“that half Ukraine is starved and dying” —  
There’s been no famine here, —  
Behold! ...  
    And now the “kingpins” enter, strolling  
    Like lords to gorge on wines and spuds.  
    The squares are packed. Standing room only.  
    And each man’s foreign. Alien blood.

**Chorus:**

“Play, good minstrel, play,  
Paradise — not hay!  
Let the whiskey flow like water,  
Through these lands today.  
Sunlight —  
Kremlin-sent,  
Dumplings —  
Hearts content.  
Look, good people, what a wedding,  
What a grand event!”

No shoes of bast adorn the peasant,  
But burnished boots of Russian leather,  
A white embroidered shirt. A vest.  
Only the language ...

Perhaps, for the language,  
These wonders too were meant?

**The Peasant Groom:**

“Don’t be ankry, comrade. For all t’is —  
Ve’re not to blame — t’ey drove us □ere;  
They said t’at Sout’, beyond the forests,  
T’ere would be □eaps of land and beer.

I’m not t’at t’rilled vit’ t’ese arrangements.  
T’ey planned t’is vedding — curse my luck.”

**The Bride:**

“Groan gently, comrade! Knov t’e saying:  
‘Guests □oo smash tablevare — brink luck’.”

Here it’s been smashed for countless seasons ...  
Even the farm-boss, undisturbed,  
Kept blethering the following words,  
As if the fool had lost his reason.

**The Collective’s Farm-Boss:**

“We’ll march victorious against them —  
Like thunderclouds — all brave!  
If we can’t still re-educate them,  
We’ll lay them in their graves.

And all their deaths, we’ll say it straightly,  
Won’t bother us one bit.  
Into one ditch all scum-Ukrainians,  
Stick and kill! Kill and stick!”

Like hounds, dour sentries-caballeros  
Patrol the poles on circling steeds;  
Just mad Christine, insane with terror,  
Wails throatfully her lone motif.

**Christine:**

“Swill the sewer! Gorge the garbage!  
Kill them all, complete the carnage.  
From my daughters, sons and babes,  
Just a pile of bones remains.”

## V

The day expires. The steppe's horizon,  
 With stars — like living jewels — grow rife —  
 Eternal heads of rage-defiance,  
 That burn, keep burning, gorged with life!  
     And grieving Cosmos, with compassion,  
     Cradles Ukraine soft upon her breast,  
     And God Himself, with rapt attention,  
     Slows time to scan the famined steppes.  
 Myron sensed all of this, so clearly ...  
 Time merged into a timeless maze ...  
 And he recalled his childhood fleeting —  
 The moonlit steppes ... The steeds he grazed ...  
     Then, too, he used to sense God's presence ...  
     He groans — remembering ... his loss.  
     His mother's nameday ... for a present,  
     He's sitting ... fashioning her a cross ...  
 "Oh, mother, mama ... hands I cherished!  
 How can I live beneath these skies?  
 The ones who buried you — have perished;  
 Unknown, beneath the ground they lie."  
     A village oldster strolled with Myron.  
     To chart his mother's new-made grave,  
     But all they found were scattered headstones,  
     And not one stone that marked her place.  
 The poplar trees knew — they only —  
 For free men's blood imbued their veins ...  
 Myron picked up a cross — and slowly  
 Turned back toward the sparkling plains.  
     And though the moonlit dew were shining,  
     His grieving soul would not imbound  
     The listless flames that shimmered, lining,  
     The straw-thatched roofs of his dead town.  
 "You hear me, mother? Send an omen ...  
 Your son seeks Judgement ... For your tears ..."  
 And all at once, deep down below him,  
 He heard her voice ring out:  
     —"I'm here!"

He stopped, stood, listened long — then, turning,  
Passed to the church beyond the town.  
And once again he heard soft groaning:  
— “I’m here.” — sobbed low beneath the ground.

All night he roamed And ere the dayglow,  
As still in dews the grasslands dreamt,  
Atop an ancient Scythian barrow,  
Myron collapsed, with anguish spent.

Prostrate, he cursed — lips weakly moving —  
All leaders: living, dead, unborn ...  
Dropped flat before a carven woman,  
His oaken cross the ground adorned.

“Oh, where to search, to seek you, mama?  
Through what untold travails and tears? ...”  
And in response the barrow-mother  
Called out, cried out to him:

— “I’m here! ...

I’m everywhere, where people perish.  
Their pain am I — their dying groans ...”  
He kissed her stony breasts encreviced,  
He grasped her fingertips of stone.

As if that stone held healing powers  
That soared to Earth from alien skies,  
And his dead mother was the all-world,  
That raged in trembling stars on high.

Then, all at once, beyond the skyline,  
A silvered string transpierced the air.  
Some living hand had plucked a lyre —  
Spreading soft tremblings everywhere.

Myron had never heard such playing  
In all his life.

Who was this bard?

It seemed the Earth’s own skies were flaming —  
With Nature’s songs, — the steppes, — the stars.

It seemed — its single voice all-golden  
Called forth the starved from their dark graves,  
Striving to staunch their pangs unspoken —  
And — all the universe obeyed!

Myron rose up and glanced before him.  
Oh wonder! ...

Down the dew-flamed steppes,  
 With lyre in hand, there strode toward him,  
 Nor someone else,  
 But Christ Himself.

He who downed death, the world no nurture,  
 As His fore-ravaged, helpless babe, —  
 He looked like Him, whom Myron's mother  
 Had nailed back up in Lenin place.

The One, to whom his mother, daily,  
 Prayed. For  
 All dead — and living — souls.  
 And just his lyre seemed old and failing —  
 As borne from Sietch-campaigns of old.

## VI

It seemed that Myron should have dropped, suppliant,  
 Down on his knees. But no —  
 He stood. Head high.

No qualms or fears perturbed his soul undying —  
 But reckless rage at what he'd seen transpire.

It wasn't quite the time, not quite the moment,  
 To fret about his claims to Heaven's Doors.

### Myron:

"Though You be God, and I — a helpless human,  
 Still, for the Truth I spilled my blood in war.  
 And what transpires? Not Truth, but Hellish tortures —  
 Unending tortures, with no end in store.  
 People throughout raise their worn hands toward You,  
 And You, in turn, roll up Your eyes at God.  
 Tell me, what certitude, what grace or freedom  
 Have You bequeathed or ever given Ukraine?  
 We search for Good throughout — like hay for needles,  
 Yet all we glean is grief for all our pains."

### Christ:

"I proffer that which men keep spurning lamely.  
 I breathed life-animation into lifeless stone,  
 So it could rise as human flesh — and bravely  
 Reach for the star worlds, where the Cosmos glows.

Without the Word it's just a lump of matter —  
Gelid rigidity, not living life."

**Myron:**

Words, empty words! Like scales of chaff they scatter —  
Awhirl, without cohesion, without plight.  
You preach to us the timeless joys of Heaven,  
And we believe You on Your golden throne.  
Meanwhile the mother skins and rends her children —  
And, powerless, our hearts turn back to stone."

**Christ:**

"Speak, explicate. I too am God's creation,  
Being the Son. Yet I've unveiled my Sire."

**Myron:**

"You're loathe, perhaps, to hear these harsh delations,  
Forced forth with malice from these lips of mine ..."

**Christ:**

"Oh no! The man of malice mouths Hosannahs,  
His liege to praise, extols the five-year plan.  
And meanwhile, to secure his next advancement,  
Murders his mother with his own two hands.  
If you must know — therein, sublimely buried,  
Lies mans perdition ...

There's what Satan is!

Man's ancient shield against the Holy Spirit.  
This — lust for power,  
Pride's subverting bliss!  
And all you've seen transpire — it's His creation:  
Today His Force has silenced Good on Earth."

**Myron:**

"You're God. Yet — where's Your sacred obligation  
To all just souls, — to all good deeds of worth?  
Death reigns today within Ukraine's green borders,  
How have her sons displeased or angered You?"

**Christ:**

“The actions of your nation are immortal,  
For it — is I ...”

**Myron:**

“Explain, I beg of You.”

**Christ:**

“Its whole — is God.  
Its people — cells, comprising  
A higher countenance of life, which you  
Weren't meant to see. A soul that's guileless, childlike,  
As is its brain, which, with its views and hues,  
Forces new forms upon the world's infinity,  
So it can breathe it ...

Such a nation brave  
Will never place another in captivity.  
Won't murder fathers, orphans won't enslave.  
Think back: when have Ukrainians ever prisoned  
Their neighbor-nations? On which neighbor's grounds  
Have they wreaked havoc? ...

Faith in friendship's vision  
They've always borne upon their prescient brows.  
Pick up your cross. I'm crucified upon it —  
Your noble nation's glorious fate-to-be.  
And he who spurns us —

he, accursed, dishonored,  
Shall Chaos reap — for all Eternity.  
Pick up your cross. And though its weight impales you  
With wicked agony, you bear it — breath by breath.  
Within its depths rage starving children's wailings,  
And women's ululations, facing death.  
And faith sustains it — faith! The Word's first vantage,  
Man's flag of glory and God's battle-creed.  
And in it rings the true Ukrainian language,  
Whose every comma — plants a sacred seed.”

**Myron:**

“But I'm a communist ...”

**Christ:**

“Is it still from you hidden,  
That only God —  
Is the ONE Communist? ...  
And men — mere children,  
mind, unfeeling children,  
Who hail new words not for the truths within,  
But solely for their fleeting sounds external.  
Know, Satan steals from men such bootless words,  
And diabolically he twists and turns them,  
So deftly, that all truths are made absurd ...  
Pick up your cross. And bear it, as I, Myron.  
Bear this old lyre —

The Dnieper Cossacks’ gift ...”

... And changed the bard:

No more the Christ in triumph —

But a gray minstrel, sitting blind and stiff.  
And the old minstrel’s silver-blossomed features  
Merged into Sunlight on the Heaven’s girth.  
Master of Sagas and the Word’s first Teacher,  
He sat revealed as Lord of Lords on Earth.

**VII**

The grassland’s moist, prolific bosom,  
Spouts morning mists across the vales,  
While sated ravens, bravely cruising,  
Scout skulls above the lifeless trails.

The minstrel strides, and, close beside him,  
Hot tears concealed in anguished eyes,  
Myron moves on, arms hard behind him,  
An oaken cross against his spine.

And no one stares at them or wonders,  
With black despair all eyes are glazed:  
Throughout Ukraine, enslaved and plundered.  
Stretch crosses, burial mounds, and graves ...  
They pause beside a wellspring shaded,  
Their thirsts to slake with water pure;  
And, by and by, old men and maidens  
Stir forth like ghosts from darkened doors.



The sightless minstrel strums his lyre,  
 But only mumbles — doesn't sing.  
 And everyone stands mutely crying;  
 And none to speak themselves can bring.  
     The ravaged soul no longer bothers  
     To search for Grace in human sound:  
     Now only One carves words for others —  
     The One in barbs and wires wound.

For Hell's Hyena — Hell's Dominion —  
 Turns tongues — and fearlessness — to stone.  
 AND COUNTLESS ARE THE MURDERED MILLIONS.  
 AND COUNTLESS STILL THE GRAVES UNKNOWN.

    "Nothing to buy or sell ... or plunder."  
     As spoke serenely John the Wise.  
     No sunlight breaks the clouds asunder;  
     Three sixes-skulls, like Roman numbers,  
     Spout Hellish smoke against the skies.

(On what Hell-spawned news is this:  
     Strides the world a Hellish guest  
     — 6 6 6 ...)

But still the old ones soothe their youngsters,  
 And grandma soothes her daughter's child:  
 "As long as tones this lyre can muster,  
 So long our souls shall stay alive.  
     New crops will cleanse from us our sorrows,  
     These doleful days — with time — shall wane.  
     As fades the seed, that blooms tomorrow,  
     In sun-drenched fields of golden grain.

And resurrection starts with dying,  
 And new-born life by death survives.  
 And all that's best in man, and highest.  
 Shall in our midst someday revive ..."

    Ukraine. Ukraine, my black-browed mother,  
     My opal-golden world of tears!  
     Like to a cow that's bred for slaughter,  
     You've, Mother, stood — three hundred years.

By nature so benign, complacent,  
 That each next dolt can milk you dry,  
 Then from your stalls, that self-same wastrel,  
 Will steal your last, remaining child.

But still your faith remains unchanging,  
You still believe, with sacred sight,  
That once, just such an emptied manger,  
Became the cradling-place of Christ ...

So, on throughout Ukraine they ramble,  
Famished, exhausted — yet alive.  
The evening sun drives forth their shadows  
Across the tablelands for miles ...

But, worth to note, that gone for ages  
Are Ukraine's ancient "outlands-steppes,"  
That now — throughout — reign Party Stations,  
Whose roving minions never rest.

And thus a red-faced Chekist mastiff  
For questioning arrests the pair  
— "Ho! Where you from, you vagrant bastards?  
Who gave this star to you? And where?" —

"Aha! They've killed some Party agent!"  
— No pleas. No alibis. No bail —  
Thusly begins incarceration —  
Sits Myron languishing in jail.

The turnkey, sways, with laughter roaring,  
His drunken face — a crimson pall.  
And only Myron sees before him:  
The oakwood cross against the wall.

Damp feels the prison floor, and stony,  
Red droplets splash against his feet.  
And once again he hears soft groaning:  
— "I'm here.

I'm — a'zek.

I'm — number three."

Torn hands clasp rowels of rusted iron,  
A crown of thorns enwreathes His brow.  
But in His eyes ... no fear of dying,  
Just boundless anguish ... boundless woe.

Soon, soon shall death these thorns be clasping,  
These blood-soaked lips, bereaved and sliced.  
And, somewhere near, for Earth stands grasping,  
The Hellish antipode of Christ.

And no one waits for promised wonders,  
And no one now for kindness pleads;

Mute Judas seals the final folder,  
and on it scrawls:

“NKVD ...”

Like bricks they snap — the prisons biscuits.  
For exercise when they’re released,  
Old mottled Marxists stare and whisper:  
— “Look! Look who’s here. —

The Bible Beast ...”

## VIII

And he whose heart has spurned all ruth and feeling,  
From his tribunal thunders to the skies:

“Why rub this salt into old wounds congealing?

IT NEVER HAPPENED. NO ONE STARVED. IT’S LIES.

Today we work to raise our souls and spirits ...

We stack our bread-bins — as our plans allow!”

— “Your souls? Oh, really?” —

I must counter, clearly, —

“And whose bread, ‘planner,’ are you hustling now?”

Where are all those your ‘plans’ exterminated,

Who dropped gut-swollen on their fathers’ farms?

Perhaps they too rose up and emigrated,

There —

To the West Atlantic’s boreal dawns?

They soared in agony, their hearts exhausted,

Foul winds of death suffused the tortured plains.

While far below, across the opal Bosphor,

Great steamships plowed the seas toward Ukraine ...

Bearing bread from Canada — from kinsmen grieving.

But thundered Moscow from her Northern gloom:

“Return back home, while you’re still living-breathing.

What ‘forced starvation!’ —

Whence these tales of doom!”

Mutely, invisibly they kept on flying.

Beneath them — seas,

Above — the boundless rifts.

Their souls soared onward, laborers undying,

To lands of bread ...

And God ...

Where kinsmen lived ...

To where dwelt wisdom. And to where shone freedom.  
To where good-natured hearts still lived and toiled;  
Where not some mob, but the lone farmer-breeder,  
Sovereign — like God — still tilled the sacred soil.

And he, their kinsman, clasped those souls undying —  
Of children, fathers old, and mothers gray.  
And now they all, as one, in rain or dryness,  
Still ship back bread to you across the waves.

Don't race so fast to thresh those "purchased" harvests,  
For you're in debt, and payments still remain.  
Consider well the words that, unembellished,  
God breathes with love into each golden grain:

"Hear My words, people, people!  
This road I close to you forever.  
Wait or don't wait for rain —  
I'll stop you from leaving again.

With bread from across the ocean  
You can't heal a wounded nation  
There, where the earth expires.  
Think, people! ...  
It is time."

IVAN Z. HOLOWINSKY

## **A Psychodynamic Interpretation of the *Holodomor* in Mykola Rudenko's Poem "The Cross"**

It is a well-known historical fact that the *Holodomor* genocide in Ukraine (1932-1933) was organized and directed by Moscow with the main purpose of destroying the Ukrainian agrarian class, the so-called "hospodari" (land owners).<sup>1</sup> It was a national catastrophe of unprecedented proportion. According to objective estimates, anywhere between six and 12 million Ukrainians perished in this artificially induced famine. In his dramatic poem "The Cross," Mykola Rudenko describes the psychological trauma of a party functionary, Commissar Myron, who becomes disillusioned with Marxism-Leninism when he is confronted with the starvation of his native village and the death of his mother from hunger.

In the poem, which symbolizes resurrection and victory over death, Rudenko analyses the struggle between Christian philosophy and Marxist-Leninist ideology.

### **Historical Background**

Before interpreting the poem itself, we should briefly review the Soviet totalitarian system that ultimately was responsible for the *Holodomor*-genocide in Ukraine. It should be emphasized that it is difficult for a person, who did not grow up in a closed totalitarian system, to understand the extent to which the Communist Party in the former Soviet Union controlled every aspect of life. As existential psychologists suggest, there is a difference between knowing about terror and experiencing it at a personal-ontological level. Millions of Ukrainians not only knew about terror — they experienced it firsthand.

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<sup>1</sup> For a comprehensive analysis of the *Holodomor*, see Robert Conquest's authoritative study *The Harvest of Sorrow* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

The Marxist-Leninist ideology of dialectical materialism promoted class struggle, brutal force and terror as a means of realizing the "perfect" Communist society. To achieve those goals, an extreme method of "paradoxical humanism" was advocated by Felix Dzerzhinsky (1877-1926) and Antin Makarenko (1888-1939). Their argument was that terror promotes humanism because it can force an individual to change his/her behavior for the common good.

Marxist ideology began to assert itself in Europe long before the October Revolution in Russia. Already toward the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the famous Ukrainian writer Ivan Franko (1856-1916) criticized Marxism as a "religion" based on a dogma of hatred and class struggle. In the introduction to his collection of poetry *Miy Izmarahd*, Franko writes: "I like to acknowledge that I never was a member of such a religion [Marxism], but had the courage in spite of ridicule, to carry my own banner of old, sincerely humane socialism, based upon the progress of general education, human and national freedom, and not on party dogmatism and the despotism of leaders."<sup>2</sup>

Following the October Revolution, totalitarian Marxist despotism and dogmatism were established. This became known as "partiynost," or party control of all aspects of life. The clear explanation of the meaning of party loyalty was provided by Ernest Kolman, the Party boss in charge of mathematics and natural science, who declared: "Now it is clear to everyone that the basic lesson of philosophical discussion is this: philosophy and every other science as well, cannot exist in the condition of proletarian dictatorship separate from party leadership. Now it is clear to everyone that all efforts to think of any theory, of any scholarly discipline as autonomous, as an independent discipline, objectively signify opposition to the Party's general line, opposition to the dictatorship of the proletariat."<sup>3</sup>

From the late 1920s through the 1980s, Soviet psychology and psychiatry were rigidly guided by the materialistic philosophy of Marxism-Leninism and political "partiynost," or the primacy of the Communist party. One example of party control over psychology may be illustrated by the fact that the Soviet Research Institute of Psychology was located administratively within the Department of Philosophy and Law of the Acad-

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<sup>2</sup> Ivan Franko, *Miy Izmarahd* (New York: Knyhospilka, 1958), vol. XVI, pp. 29-30. This part of the introduction was deliberately omitted in Soviet editions of Franko's works.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in David Joravsky, *Russian Psychology: A Critical History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 312.

emy of Sciences of the USSR. Locating the Institute within the Department of Philosophy and Law was characteristic of Soviet reality, in which every aspect of life was controlled by the "high priests" of Marxism-Leninism.<sup>4</sup>

The sinister application of party control was exercised through the profession of psychiatry. This mental health profession was put under the strict control of the KGB. Party psychiatrists even created a diagnostic category of "insidious schizophrenia," which they applied to dissidents in order to confine them to psychiatric hospitals. KGB psychiatrists justified their actions through a convoluted rationalization. They maintained that since the Soviet-Marxist society is the most rational in history, anyone who questions it or attempts to change such society must be irrational. Numerous dissidents spent some time in psychiatric hospitals. Rudenko himself was committed in 1976 to a psychoneurological hospital in Kyiv.

### Ethnopsychology

In "The Cross," Rudenko uses numerous symbolic personalities in the context of Ukrainian cultural archetypes. The interpretation of archetypes is a main task of ethnopsychology; thus it would be appropriate for our discussion to focus upon ethnopsychology.

One of the leading Ukrainian ethnopsychologists of the past century was Volodymyr Yaniv (1908-1991).<sup>5</sup> His theoretical foundations are based upon Jungian analytical psychology, Ukrainian cultural mores, as well as the works of leading Ukrainian poets and writers. Yaniv acknowledged that the specificity of a national mentality is at the core of ethnopsychology. It is obvious that any discussion of transcendental permanent national psychological characteristics has to involve a discussion of the inheritance of collective traits, as a collective unconscious. This notion was well formulated by Jung in his discussion of cultural archetypes. Jung also referred to these as "images," "root images" or "behavior patterns." According to him, such collective memories are universal in nature. Freud called such concepts the "racial unconscious."

In the context of our discussion, it should be mentioned that four of Jung's predecessors were important as philosophers of the unconscious:

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<sup>4</sup> Ivan Z. Holowinsky, "Soviet Research Institute of Psychology," *American Psychologist*, vol. 30, no. 4 (1975), p. 521.

<sup>5</sup> Volodymyr Yaniv, *Introduction to the History of Ukrainian Ethnopsychology* (published in Ukrainian) (Munich: Ukrainian Free University, 1993).

Gottfried Leibniz, who postulated the concept of irrational unconscious; Carl Gustav Carus, who distinguished three levels of the unconscious; Arthur Schopenhauer, who emphasized the irrational forces, primarily blind sexual forces that are often repressed; and Eduard von Hartmann, who described three levels of unconscious functioning, including an absolute or universal source of images.

Yaniv was convinced that the agricultural background of Ukrainians engendered a strong archetype of "Mother-Earth." In this context, the destruction of Ukraine's agricultural class through collectivization and artificial famine was a crime beyond comprehension. In addition to the archetype of Mother-Earth, other common archetypes in Ukrainian culture are: *kobza*, *kobzar* and *kamyana baba* (stone *baba*, stone statue).

*The kobza* was an ancient stringed instrument of eastern origin. It was known in Ukraine as early as the 11<sup>th</sup> century and became popular by the 16<sup>th</sup> century. *Kobzars* were wandering folk singers who performed epic historical, religious and folk songs while playing the *kobza* or *bandura*. *Kobzars* first emerged in Kyivan-Rus and were popular by the 15<sup>th</sup> century. They were persecuted by the tsarist régimes in Russia for propagating Ukrainophile sentiments and preserving historical memory. *Kobzars* are immortalized in the poetry and drawings of Taras Shevchenko, who titled his poetic works *The Kobzar*.

Stone *babas* are found in the steppes in Europe and Asia from the Dnister River in the west to Mongolia in the east. Commonly used as a grave marker the *baba* was connected with the cults of the dead among nomadic people. Those erected in Ukraine date back to the 7<sup>th</sup> century B.C.

Since the declaration of Ukraine's independence in 1991, after decades of one ideology and one-party rule, within newly found freedom in scholarship, we notice new interest in ethnopsychology.<sup>6</sup>

### **"The Cross"**

The main topic of Rudenko's poem is the struggle between Christian philosophy, grounded in love and tolerance, and dialectical material-

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<sup>6</sup> Examples of such studies include: O. Nelha, "Ukrainian as an Ethnopsychological Phenomenon," *Ukrainian Diaspora*, vol. 3, (1993), pp. 5-20 (in Ukrainian); V. N. Pavlenko, "Designing Ethnopsychological Investigator Methodological Consideration," *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology*, vol. 3, no. 31 (1993), pp. 72-89; Holowinsky and Pavlenko, "Ukrainian Psychology in Search of Identity and the New Dimensions in Ethnopsychology," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, no. 1 (1999), pp. 5-21.



ism, built upon the foundations of class struggle, hatred and terror. Rudenko begins his poem with a profound philosophical assertion that faith is the ultimate characteristic of humans. Without faith we are simply animals — which is true from a physiological and physical perspective. However, it was unfortunate that Marxist materialistic ideology attempted to replace Christian faith with utopian paradoxical humanism. The need for humans to have non-materialistic faith and to believe in an absolute being was supported by such giants of science as Jean Piaget and Sigmund Freud.<sup>7</sup>

In his *Biology and Knowledge*, Piaget asserts: “All philosophers in search of an Absolute have recourse to some transcendental subject, something on a higher plane than man and much higher than nature, so that truth for them is to be found way beyond any spatio-temporal and physical contingencies and nature becomes intelligible in its temporal and external perspective.”<sup>8</sup>

Rudenko’s poem begins as Commissar Myron, a decorated party functionary who believes in the “new religion” of Marxism-Leninism, visits his native village. Myron sees the utter destruction and experiences deep remorse — thinking about his own mother, who perished in the *Holodomor*. He realizes that what he observes is not a dream but reality. These profound feelings trigger in him an emotional catharsis. Catharsis usually occurs when an individual experiences deep remorse and sorrow for his/her past behavior. In psychodynamic psychotherapy, catharsis is a stage that precedes recovery.

Myron experiences remorse and sorrow when he realizes that his Marxist-Leninist ideology has betrayed him. In this crucial moment, Myron experiences a psycho-mentor equivalent reaction. He falls on a bench, hits his head and bites his lip. In the moment of profound catharsis, he experiences emotional epiphany and “turns his eyes toward Christ,” i.e., literally looks at the crucifix hanging on the wall of his late mother’s house. This moment symbolizes the victory of Christian faith over Marxist-Leninist ideology.

One of the most tragic and horrifying results of the artificial famine was psychiatric breakdowns, resulting in cannibalism. Rudenko describes a young insane cannibalistic widow by the name of Christine. In a

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<sup>7</sup> See Jean Piaget’s *Biology and Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), and Sigmund Freud, *Moses and Monotheism*, standard edition, vol. 23 (London: Hogarth Press, 1964), originally published in 1939.

<sup>8</sup> Piaget, p. 362.

psychotic rage, she kills her children and uses their flesh to prepare *kholodetz* (a Ukrainian jellied meat dish) for her boyfriend tractor driver.<sup>9</sup> Rudenko describes the bizarre behavior of the demented widow:

"Ho, I killed and carved my children,  
In the harvest moon I boiled them,  
Made an aspic, came the dawn,  
For my tractor driver, John."<sup>10</sup>

The next day, Myron, who overnight becomes gray and emaciated from sorrow, notices an unusual contrast against the background of the hell-like reality in his Ukrainian village. In this part of the poem Rudenko describes the life of Russian colonists, who were sent from the Kursk region to Ukraine.

"As though to say, let kurkul liars  
Desist with their distortions bold,  
"that half Ukraine is starved and dying" —  
There's been no famine here, —  
Behold! . . .

\* \* \*

No shoes of bast adorn the peasant,  
But burnished boots of Russian leather,  
A white embroidered shirt. A vest.  
Only the language . . .  
Perhaps, for the language,  
These wonders too were meant?"

In search of his mother's grave, Commissar Myron experiences a vision of Christ approaching him with a *kobza* in his hands. It should be noticed that Rudenko uses the Ukrainian traditional archetype *kobza* and identifies it with Christ. The powerful symbolism is in the fact that, as Christ suffered on the cross, so Ukraine is suffering an artificial famine, the *Holodomor*.

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<sup>9</sup> It should be mentioned that at the time of industrialization and forced collectivization, drivers of harvesting machines as well as tractor drivers were a new privileged class among peasants.

<sup>10</sup> All references to and quotations from Rudenko's "The Cross" are from Roman Tatchyn's translation, which is reprinted in this volume and was originally published by the St. Sophia Religious Association of Ukrainian Catholics, Washington-Philadelphia-Toronto, 1987.

Seeing a vision with the kobza, Myron realizes:

“Oh wonder!...

Down the dew-flamed steppes,  
With lyre in hand, there strode toward him,  
Not someone else,  
But Christ Himself.

\* \* \*

He looked like Him, whom Myron's mother  
Had nailed back up in Lenin's place.

\* \* \*

And just his lyre seemed old and failing —  
As borne from Sietch-campaigns of old.”

Toward the end of the poem, Rudenko describes a dialogue between Myron and Christ. Initially Myron expresses doubt about the Christian faith. Christ responds by providing a clear explanation of the idealism which is a crucial foundation of faith.

“I proffer that which men keep spurning lamely.  
I breathed life-animation into lifeless stone,  
So it could rise as human flesh — and bravely  
Reach for the star worlds, where the Cosmos glows.  
Without the Word it's just a lump of matter —  
Gelid rigidity, not living life.”

In the above passage, a clear distinction is made between idealistic and materialistic ideology. It should be pointed out that, in the ancient Greek language, the word “Logos” — which means “the Word” — had a double meaning as a linguistically coded symbol and as Wisdom. As beautifully stated by the Evangelist John, “In the beginning was the Word (Wisdom).” The present day anti-materialistic position can be stated as “In the beginning was the intelligent design.”

In the Myron's dialogue with Christ, Rudenko criticizes the dialectical misuse of words that do not reflect the essence of truth. He writes:

“And men – mere children,  
Blind, unfeeling children,  
Who hail new words not for the truths within,  
But solely for their fleeting sounds external.  
Know, Satan steals from men such bootless words,  
And diabolically he twists them and turns them,

So deftly, that all truths are made absurd ...  
Pick up your cross. And bear it, as I, Myron,  
Bear this old lyre —  
The Dnieper Cossack's gift ..."

In this part of the poem the phrase: diabolically twisting and turning the words "So deftly, that all truths are made absurd," is a strong criticism of the misuse of dialectics for political purposes. In contrast to dialectical discourse, Rudenko uses the symbolism of the Ukrainian archetypes of *kobza* and *kobzar* to emphasize the truth.

In the context of this discussion, it might be worthwhile mentioning the neo-Marxist interpretation of words as concepts. This trend was promoted in the past century by two French philosophers Jean Paul Sartre (1903-1980) and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) and is known as deconstructivism. Derrida proposed in his writings a notion that reality is only a metaphysical illusion that does not exist apart from the concepts that describe it. Deconstructivism maintains that everything in life is relative. Deconstructivism is the opposite of structuralism, which teaches that life has positive goals and structures. Strong pessimistic visions of reality were expressed by Sartre in his major work *Being and Nothingness*. Both Derrida and Sartre were promoters of pessimistic views of life in contrast to the philosophy of hope espoused by Christianity.

Rudenko's poem vividly describes the stark reality in colonial Ukraine. The broken promises of Marxism-Leninism evoke psychological trauma and catharsis in Commissar Myron. This catharsis leads to an epiphany grounded in Christian faith and Ukrainian national tradition in the context of cultural archetypes. Rudenko's poem is a powerful testament of how faith — grounded in Christian philosophy and supported by cultural archetypes — enabled *Holodomor* victims to overcome psychological trauma.

JURIJ DOBCZANSKY

## **Subject Analysis in Accessing *Holodomor* Resources<sup>1</sup>**

With all the recent discussion surrounding the recognition of the *Holodomor* as genocide, legislative resolutions and commemorations, you may have missed some noteworthy milestones in a less conspicuous area: information storage and retrieval of publications on the *Holodomor*. On the surface, it may seem not as significant as the highly visible socio-political achievements. Nevertheless, accurate and in-depth information pertaining to the Great Famine of 1932-1933 is vital to a fuller understanding of the events 75 years ago.

In addition to the events of the past, we need to document the way the events of 1932-1933 still affect the lives of Ukrainians today. We need to document the ways in which these events are perceived and how they continue to influence current affairs. We need to document the ways they are reflected in art, literature and folklore. There is also the need to document and preserve manifestations of the “*Holodomor* denial” phenomenon — but the documentation of denial literature, of course, should not be seen as tacit agreement or support.

The focus of my report is not limited to any particular aspect of the *Holodomor*, be it historical or literary. It does not attempt to prove or disprove its genocidal nature. I will provide a historical overview of the way *Holodomor* materials have been cataloged during the last 25 years. With the opening of formerly inaccessible Ukrainian archives to scholars after 1991, new and original interdisciplinary works on the *Holodomor* have seen the light of day. Cataloging and systematic acquisition of these works is an ongoing process. I want to illustrate the importance of appropriate subject analysis. Using traditional approaches in the digital age, li-

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<sup>1</sup> Originally presented at a conference on “The Famine of 1932-1933 and the Ukrainians: History and Literature” held at the Embassy of Ukraine in Washington, D.C., on April 5, 2008.

brarians facilitate research by providing useful and timely access points to the rapidly expanding literature on the *Holodomor*.

### Value of Traditional Library Research

I am grateful to Thomas Mann, a senior reference specialist at the Library of Congress, for articulating the vital role of traditional library research and cataloging techniques. Mann draws on his vast experience assisting general readers and serious researchers alike. In a series of thoughtful articles, Mann seeks to preserve time-tested and established library procedures while others seek to simplify the process. His essay on the future of reference, cataloging and scholarship in research libraries<sup>2</sup> advocates the “principles and practices of reference service and cataloging operations in the promotion of scholarly research.” He draws an important distinction “between scholarship and quick information seeking.”

Bowing to budgetary pressures, administrators of many major research libraries are increasingly more often turning to a seemingly easy solution: substitute full text digitization for so-called “expensive and outdated cataloging.” In the interest of speedy information retrieval, catalogers are being asked to forego vocabulary-controlled subject headings, cross-reference linkages and classification numbers. Most conscientious professionals would agree that these devices — developed for over more than a century — have served the scholarly community well and deserve to be continued.

As a professional librarian/cataloger, let me illustrate some of the thinking and background operations that take place before adding a published resource to a library collection. Mann is very much to the point when he says: “the Internet does not show all relevant parts, does not distinguish the important from the tangential, and does not show interconnections or relationships.” We both agree on the “inadequacy of the open Internet alone for scholarly research.”

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<sup>2</sup> Thomas Mann, “The Peloponnesian War and the future of reference, cataloging and scholarship in research libraries” (June 13, 2007), accessed April 4, 2008 at <http://www.guild2910.org/Pelopponesian%20War%20June%2013%202007.pdf>. For Mann’s more recent assessment, see “‘On the record’ but off the track: a review of the Report of the Library of Congress working group on the future of bibliographic control, with a further examination of Library of Congress cataloging tendencies” (March 14, 2008) at <http://www.guild2910.org/WorkingGrpResponse2008.pdf>

### Internet Searching: Key Words

A simple statistical comparison may clarify this point. When today's college students begin their initial search of the literature, they will typically turn to *Google*. Take, for example, the terms "famine" and "Ukraine." A search in *Google* yields over 329,000 hits! A more refined search using *Google Scholar* provides 8,810 items. A *Google Book Search* yields 1,114 hits. Clearly, these figures are overwhelming. Who can spare the time to winnow through these vast numbers, let alone view each and every one of these citations? We are told they are arranged by relevance, but do we know what criteria are applied to the relevance order? Instead of aiding the scholar in finding a few specific sources, the keyword approach buries the useful information with granular bits of useless data. Enormously high yields produced by search engines (and these will only increase) are further evidence that serious scholarship continues to depend on traditional library research techniques and cataloging.

Keyword searching in an online public access catalog is a more useful and promising approach. Select subject headings appearing in bibliographic records combined with keywords in the text produce significantly higher levels of relevancy. Here is a comparison of sample searches:

TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF SAMPLE SEARCHES

	Library of Congress Catalog	<i>FirstSearch</i>	<i>Google</i>
Holodomor	18	105	182,000
Famine & Ukraine	173	470	85,300
Famine, Ukraine, 1932	57	342	121,000
Famines & Ukraine	145	483	555,000
dekulakization*	4	13	7,720

\* Not an approved subject heading.

Searching by keyword is a legitimate research method if one is looking solely for English-language materials. Consider the fact that a high percentage of the Library of Congress collection is written in foreign languages. Without uniform English-language subject headings, there would be no indication that these works are related in any way to the Famine of 1932-1933. For example, the title of the publication *La morte della terra: la grande "carestia" in Ucraina nel 1932-33*<sup>3</sup> does not have any keywords

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<sup>3</sup> Gabriele De Rosa e Francesca Lomastro, *La morte della terra: la grande "carestia" in Ucraina nel 1932-33: atti del convegno, Vicenza, 16-19 ottobre 2003* (Roma: Viella, 2004).

useful to an English-only search. Neither do the titles of the Ukrainian novels *Kaminnya pid kosoyu*<sup>4</sup> or *Kara bez vyny*.<sup>5</sup>

Controlled vocabulary and hierarchically arranged subject headings are superior tools because they retrieve bibliographic records that are marked by “relationships, interconnections, contexts and integration” not merely “isolated facts or snippets.” The precision of Library of Congress subject headings (LCSH), guided by well-developed rules of application, is unsurpassed. An illustration of this quality is the difference between the terms “Famine” and “Hunger.” The LCSH “Hunger” is classified under physiology and nutrition and is related to the terms “Appetite,” “Fasting,” and “Starvation.” Some records in the OCLC *FirstSearch WorldCat* database incorrectly use “Hunger” when they should be using “Famines.” Subject headings originally developed by the Library of Congress have set the pattern for the work of other libraries. In recent years, cooperative cataloging has increased the pool of contributors of subject headings. Contributors are trained and guided by principles devised by the Library of Congress. Of course, application of the rules and quality of bibliographic records can never be fully guaranteed.

It has become customary practice to enhance bibliographic records with informal notes and complete tables of contents. This has greatly increased accessibility, especially when searching by keyword. However, subject headings are still more useful because they summarize the content of a work as a whole. They are not index terms. They can be assigned singly or in combination with other headings to best describe a unique item. Assignment of subject headings is subjective by its very nature. It is not the place of catalogers to make value judgments about the item being cataloged. It is important to note that assignment of the heading “Genocide” to every work on the *Holodomor* is not useful. The term is assigned only in cases where genocide is substantially discussed or where the *Holodomor* is compared to other cases of genocide.

### Famines in Ukraine

In cataloging works about famines in 20<sup>th</sup> century Ukraine, a distinction must be made with regard to the three major famines (1921, 1932 or 1946). If a book covers all three, the appropriate treatment calls for one subject: “Famines—Ukraine.” The *Holodomor* is a unique event, however,

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<sup>4</sup> Olha Mak, *Kaminnya pid kosoyu* (Toronto: Homin Ukrayiny, 1973).

<sup>5</sup> Andriy Hudyma, *Kara bez vyny: roman* (Kyiv: Urozhay, 1993).



and requires a specific heading denoting when it occurred. Such a heading was established in 2003 when the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum submitted a proposal to the Library of Congress. It took the form "Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933." Illustration 1 shows the official subject authority record listing the heading, cross-references and sources.

#### ILLUSTRATION 1

LCCN sh2003010182  
 HEADING: Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933  
 Used For/See From:  
 Great Famine, Ukraine, 1932-1933  
 Holodomor, Ukraine, 1932-1933  
 Man-Made Famine, Ukraine, 1932-1933  
 Ukrainian Famine, Ukraine, 1932-1933  
 Search Also Under:  
 Famines—Ukraine  
 Found In: Work cat.: Ukrainskyi Holokost 1932-1933, 2003.  
     • Investigation of the Ukrainian famine, 1932-1933, 1988.  
 Holodomor v Ukraini 1932-1933 rr.: bibliohrafichnyi pokazhchyk, 2001.  
     • WWW.shevchenko.org/famine/default.htm/, Dec. 30, 2004 (The Ukrainian Famine (Holodomor) of 1932-1933, and aspects of Stalinism: an annotated bibliography-in-progress in the English language; Holodomor (Terror-Famine) of 1932-1933)  
     • Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv iak velychezna trahediia ukrainskoho narodu, 2003.  
     • The agony of a nation: the great man-made famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933, 1983.  
     • World Book, 1995 (Ukraine: in 1932 and 1933 the Soviets seized grain and food, causing a major famine; between 5 and 7 1/2 million Ukrainians died of starvation)  
     • Brockhaus die Enzyklopadie, c1996 (Ukraine: between 4 and 6 million people died of hunger 1932-1933)

The heading "Famines" has not been replaced by the heading "Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933," since the latter cannot be further subdivided by place. It might be useful to compare it with the heading "Holocaust, Jewish (1939-1945)." Unquestionably, both are unique events. By its very nature, the Holocaust was transnational. It took place in many places and, therefore, may be subdivided by place. The Famine of 1932-1933, on the other hand, is rooted in one country, Ukraine. For that reason it is not further subdivided by place. Much of the specialized recent litera-

ture on the subject pertains to a specific place. It is possible to provide adequate cataloging by subdividing "Famines" by the specific locations listed in Illustration 2.

### ILLUSTRATION 2

Famines—Ukraine—Anniversaries, etc.
Famines—Ukraine—Bibliography
Famines—Ukraine—Bila Tserkva Region—History—Congresses
Famines—Ukraine—Cherkaska oblast—History—Sources
Famines—Ukraine—Chernihivska oblast—History
Famines—Ukraine—Congresses
Famines—Ukraine—Exhibitions
Famines—Ukraine—Fiction
Famines—Ukraine—Folklore
Famines—Ukraine—Historiography
Famines—Ukraine—History
Famines—Ukraine—History—Congresses
Famines—Ukraine—History—Sources
Famines—Ukraine—History—Sources—Bibliography
Famines—Ukraine—Hladkivka—History
Famines—Ukraine—Kharkiv Region—History
Famines—Ukraine—Khersonska oblast—History
Famines—Ukraine—Pictorial works
Famines—Ukraine—Podillia—History
Famines—Ukraine—Poltavska oblast—History
Famines—Ukraine—Press coverage
Famines—Ukraine—Study and teaching

Following approval of the LCSH "Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933" by the Cataloging Policy Office, I added several "See references" to the authority record for those terms which, although legitimate, are not approved for use. These terms may be used for keyword searches, but are not in the controlled vocabulary for subject headings: "Great Famine, Ukraine, 1932-1933," "Holodomor, Ukraine, 1932-1933", "Man-Made Famine, Ukraine, 1932-1933" and "Ukrainian Famine, Ukraine, 1932-1933." Once the *Holodomor* became a "named event," Library of Congress cataloging rules allow for various subdivisions to be applied. Illustration 3 lists what currently exists in the Library of Congress online catalog.

## ILLUSTRATION 3

Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933
Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933—Anniversaries, etc
Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933—Anniversaries, etc.—Bibliography
Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933—Bibliography
Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933—Catalogs
Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933—Congresses
Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933—Drama
Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933—Exhibitions
Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933—Fiction
Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933—Historiography
Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933—Personal narratives
Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933—Press coverage
Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933—Social aspects—Congresses
Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933—Sources
Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933—Sources—Bibliography—Catalogs
Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-1933—Study and teaching

**Starting in 1983 ...**

Twenty-five years ago, there were relatively few printed resources on the *Holodomor*. Since 1983, a steadily increasing number of publications appeared as a result of the Ukrainian diaspora's efforts to record for posterity what was known of the *Holodomor*. At a time when access to Soviet archives was severely limited, the only sources were eyewitness testimonies and survivor accounts. Books on the 1932-1933 famine had been assigned rather vague subject headings, such as "Ukraine—Famines" or "Ukraine—Politics and government," and were classified in the economics or history schedules. The term "Famines" was applied as a free-floating subdivision to names of regions or countries. At one time, cataloging rules allowed for a date to be added in the following manner: "Ukraine—Famine, 1932-1933." It is interesting to note that a proposal to establish "Ukraine—Famine, 1932-1933" submitted from within the Library of Congress was not approved by the Cataloging Policy Office. For a brief period, until the subdivision was changed to a topical heading, books such as *The Man-made famine in Ukraine*<sup>6</sup> were given the heading "Ukraine—Famines."

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<sup>6</sup> Robert Conquest et al., *The Man-Made Famine in Ukraine* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984).

One of the early books of this period was Miron Dolot's *Execution by Hunger*.<sup>7</sup> It was an eyewitness account, a personal narrative. Under the existing cataloging rules, the free-floating subdivision "Personal narratives" could not be used. Only named events — such as "World War, 1938-1945" — could be followed by "Personal narratives." The crucial questions arose: how best to summarize the content of Dolot's book? If the free-floater "Biography" was to be applied, to what class of persons did the author belong? Would "Farmers—Ukraine—Biography" be sufficient? The answer came in 1986 on the basis of Dolot's book. A new heading was proposed and approved: "Victims of famine" (see Illustration 4). This term was to be applied to works by survivors or for registers of the dead. It could be used for biographies, autobiographical accounts as well as interviews.

#### ILLUSTRATION 4

Victims of famine—Ukraine—Biography
Victims of famine—Ukraine—Biography—Congresses
Victims of famine—Ukraine—Cherkaska oblast
Victims of famine—Ukraine—Chernihivska oblast
Victims of famine—Ukraine—Chornukhynskiy raion—Registers
Victims of famine—Ukraine—Congresses
Victims of famine—Ukraine—Correspondence
Victims of famine—Ukraine—Hladkivka—Biography
Victims of famine—Ukraine—Interviews
Victims of famine—Ukraine—Kharkiv—Pictorial works
Victims of famine—Ukraine—Kharkiv Region—Registers
Victims of famine—Ukraine—Monuments
Victims of famine—Ukraine—Periaslav-Khmelnitskyi raion—Biography
Victims of famine—Ukraine—Podillia—Biography
Victims of famine—Ukraine—Poltavska oblast—Biography
Victims of famine—Ukraine—Valkivskiy raion—Registers

#### Headings Related to the *Holodomor*

There is a host of subject headings that have been assigned to works that are not directly about the *Holodomor* but contain valuable information pertaining to related aspects. While there is no term for "dekulakization" or "spetspereselentsy," the subject headings assigned to works

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<sup>7</sup> Miron Dolot, *Execution by Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985).

on these topics are: "Farmers—Relocation" and "Forced migration." Until 1985, the term "Collectivization" was not used as a subject heading. "Collective farms" and "State farms" were the only terms available. I proposed the subject heading "Collectivization of agriculture," it was approved and I began to apply it in tandem with "Famines" and "Victims of famine." Shortly thereafter a drive to gain bibliographic access to the unprocessed backlogs of the Library of Congress brought to light periodicals from the early 1920s and 1930s. Among these were several Ukrainian periodicals on the theoretical and practical aspects of collectivization. One of them was *Kolektyvist Ukrayiny*<sup>8</sup> for the years 1932-1933. This photo appeared on the cover of the June 1932 issue.



It is a group of "prize winning collective farm brigadiers assembled in Kharkiv." How the authorities allowed such a photo to be published is a mystery.

Generally, in the literature on famines, there are additional terms assigned such as "Food relief." It is notably absent in records for works on the *Holodomor*. Five out of the six books on famines in Ukraine list "Food relief." They cover the famine of 1921-1922.

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<sup>8</sup> *Kolektyvist Ukrayiny: masovyï zhurnal kolhospnoho budivnytstva* (Kharkiv: Radianske selo, 1932-1933).

Unique among *Holodomor* publications is Mykola Bondarenko's *Ukraina 1933: kulinarna knyha* = *Ukraine 1933: a cookbook*.<sup>9</sup> As a collection of works of art, it depicts recipes for surviving on the wild foods available to a starving rural population. While it is classified in the fine arts schedule, it has been assigned an unusual array of subject headings in addition to "Ukraine—History—Famine, 1932-33": Famines in art; Survival in art; Wild plants, Edible; and Cookery (Wild foods).

A significant number of books are accounts of commemorations, monuments to victims of the famine, both in Ukraine and Ukrainian communities abroad. Notably, the brief booklet and accompanying CD *Unveiling of the monument to the famine/genocide in Ukraine, 1932-1933*<sup>10</sup> that was published on the occasion of its dedication, generated the subject heading "Holodomor Monument (Windsor, Ont.)" Prior to 1991, who would have predicted that parliamentary hearings would be held in memory of the victims of the *Holodomor*? *Parlaments'ki slukhannia shchodo vshanuvannia pam'iaty zhertv holodomoru 1932-1933 rokiv*<sup>11</sup> contains not only the proceedings of the commemorative hearings but is supplemented by unique source materials, photographs and a bibliographical guide to publications and websites on the *Holodomor*.

A publication with an unusual story is the three-part memoir of Dmitrii Goichenko, an immigrant from Ukraine, who lived and died in California. His manuscripts, composed in the 1940s and 1950s, were found by chance in a church library and sent to be published in Moscow by the All-Russian Library of Memoirs founded by Alexander Solzhenitsyn. His book *Skvoz' raskulachivanie i golodomor : svidetel'stvo ochevidtstva*<sup>12</sup> depicts life during the *Holodomor* in Odesa, Kyiv and the Kyiv oblast.

Another unusual publication is Mykola Klymenko's *Holodomor — rekviem na vidstani chasu*,<sup>13</sup> a collection of his paintings depicting the

<sup>9</sup> Mykola Bondarenko, *Ukraina 1933: kulinarna knyha* = *Ukraine 1933: a cookbook* (South Bound Brook, NJ: Historical and Educational Complex of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA, 2003).

<sup>10</sup> "Unveiling of the monument to the famine/genocide in Ukraine, 1932-1933" (Windsor, Ontario: Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Windsor Branch, 2005).

<sup>11</sup> "Parlaments'ki slukhannia shchodo vshanuvannia pam'iaty zhertv holodomoru 1932-1933 rokiv: 12 liutoho 2003 roku" (Kyiv: Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, 2003).

<sup>12</sup> D. D. Goichenko, *Skvoz' raskulachivanie i golodomor: svidetel'stvo ochevidtstva* (Moskva: Russkii put, 2006).

<sup>13</sup> Mykola Klymenko, *Holodomor: rekviem na vidstani chasu* (Dnipropetrovsk: VAT Dniproknynha, 2007).

famine. Novels, dramas and other works of fiction pertaining to the *Holodomor* are classified under the literary numbers established for their authors. The book *Sviatynia i Holodomor*<sup>14</sup> is particularly interesting. It is a compilation of memoirs from the Kaniv region. It covers the events of the early 1930s during the construction of the Taras Shevchenko Museum. While the state was building a museum near the grave of Ukraine's poet laureate, people in the surrounding villages were dying as a result of the famine.

Although the bulk of "famine books" are classified in the special topic area, a number of books have been classified in distinct areas with books of similar content. This principle of collocation, especially in libraries with open stacks, is beneficial to research that depends on serendipity and chance discovery. I have illustrated the variety of resources available in order to broaden the scope of famine studies. By assigning subject headings and subdivisions such as "Journalistic ethics," "Press coverage" and a host of others triggered by the resources themselves, I have sought to integrate the topic of the *Holodomor* with other topical areas. As researchers use the heading "Victims of famine" they will find an array of geographical subdivisions, among them "Ukraine." Likewise, they will find the subjects "Famines in art," "Forced migration" and "Political atrocities."

Famine studies, if you will, have advanced beyond the infancy stage. What can we expect in the near future? First, more work needs to be done in terms of publishing. Conference proceedings, bibliographic guides and "pathfinders" to websites and archival collections must be compiled. Novels, dramas and other works of fiction on the theme of the *Holodomor* are now assigned the subdivision "—Fiction" or "—Drama." Future works analyzing the depiction of the *Holodomor* in literature will necessitate the use of "Famines in literature." As museums and archives of the *Holodomor* are established, guides to these collections will necessitate the subdivision "—Archival resources." My list of future projects goes on. In conclusion, I can say with confidence: the initial phase in building the necessary vocabulary for *Holodomor* research is now completed.

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<sup>14</sup> O. V. Bilokin and Z. P. Tarakhan-Bereza, *Sviatynia i holodomor: dokumenty i materialy z naukovoho arkhivu Shevchenkivs'koho natsional'noho zapovidnyka* (Kaniv: PP Soroka T. B., 2003).

IWAN S. KOROPECKYJ

## George Kennan and Ukraine

### Introduction

There are people in public life who disregard the proposition that all nations or countries are equal, notwithstanding the level of their cultural and economic development. Guided primarily by emotions, they take a sympathetic or hostile attitude toward some country.

As with any other nation, Ukraine has had its share of friends in the world, as well as its share of those who do not acknowledge its place among nations and its political and cultural aspirations. Among those with a certain antipathy toward Ukraine was the prominent American diplomat and historian George F. Kennan (1904-2005). For the sake of completeness, Ukraine's history requires that we not only remember and honor the memory of its friends, but also not forget those whose participation in the political and scholarly life of the United States influenced to the detriment, to a certain degree, the views of policy makers with regard to Ukraine. As proof of the importance of Kennan's opinions is the publication of a number of books and articles about him in recent years.<sup>1</sup> As we will argue at the end of this article, some of his ideas may be of relevance even today.

Before we embark on a discussion of his views on selected episodes in Ukrainian history, it is necessary to highlight the parts of his life that influenced his scholarly work and opinions. He was born in Wisconsin to a middle-class Scottish-English family. Following his graduation from Princeton University, he joined the diplomatic corps, a position that al-

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<sup>1</sup> See David Mayers, *George Kennan and the Dilemma of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA, 1988); Walter H. Hixson, *George F. Kennan; Cold War Iconoclast* (New York, 1989); Anders Stephanson, *Kennan and the Arts of Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA, 1989); Wilson D. I. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950* (Princeton, 1992); Bruce Kuklick, *Blind Oracles: Intellectuals from Kennan to Kissinger* (Princeton, 1992); John Lukacs, *George Kennan; A Study of Character* (New Haven, 2007).



lowed him to continue his studies in Berlin. Starting in 1927, he occupied various posts in Hamburg, Berlin, Tallinn, Riga and, following a short stay in Washington, in Moscow. Kennan returned to Washington in 1947 and in 1952 was appointed Ambassador to the USSR. After a short stay at this post, the Kremlin expelled him. Upon returning to Washington, he was invited to accept a position at the prominent Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, where he stayed until 1974. During that time, he also served as Ambassador to Yugoslavia for two years. He took an active and important part in formulating the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, organizing the Central Intelligence Agency, and, notably, popularizing the containment policy against the USSR, which he formulated.

From the very beginning of his diplomatic service, Kennan specialized in Central-Eastern Europe, mostly the Soviet Union. He was a hard worker and authored a large number of books, articles and official documents. As his friend and biographer once said, when studying the life and work of some prominent people, authors usually bemoan the lack of material. In Kennan's case, the opposite is true — the question is how to handle the vast volume of his writings.<sup>2</sup> However, he did not write much about Ukraine, and the volume of relevant material is not extensive.

During the course of his professional life, Kennan did not change his attitude toward Ukraine in any substantial way. We will attempt to demonstrate this by analyzing his statements — and in some cases their omission — regarding a number of episodes in Ukrainian history in chronological order. In order to facilitate our presentation, we will try to limit the analysis of the conditions surrounding these episodes and our remarks about them to what is absolutely necessary. It has to be stressed that Kennan should be considered equally responsible for what he wrote as for what he omitted to write, but what would have been included by any reasonable person.

### Maybe a Joke

The first episode in Ukrainian history, to which Kennan turned his attention, was the peace negotiations between the Central Powers and the

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<sup>2</sup> Lukacs, pp. 4-5. According to Laurel F. Franklin, *George F. Kennan: An Annotated Bibliography* (Westport, CN, 1997), he authored approximately 600 publications, including many which were reprinted and translated into other languages; this does not include various archival materials.

Russian Bolsheviks in Brest-Litovsk in the winter of 1917-1918.<sup>3</sup> Ukraine was also invited to participate. A ceasefire was essential to all sides. It would have allowed Germany to concentrate its armed forces on the Western Front and, together with its ally, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, would gain access to Ukraine's economic resources. The Bolsheviks sought to consolidate their power in Russia and to export their revolution to other countries more easily. Their price was the loss of Poland, the Baltic countries and Finland, which became independent states. Ukraine's objective was to obtain from the participants recognition of its sovereignty and the possibility to include in the newly created Ukrainian National Republic all Ukrainian lands, including those which had been a part of the former Tsarist Empire and the bulk of the ethnic Ukrainian territories under the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

According to Kennan, the loss of the Russian Empire's western borderlands was not a big surprise to the Bolsheviks. However, they were not prepared to lose Ukraine. The alliance between Ukraine and Germany was really painful to the Bolsheviks. "The inability to seize Ukraine by force of arms, which is what they would have done in the absence of German interference, and the abandonment of this area to economic exploitation by the Germans: this was the real price the Bolsheviks paid for a separate peace."<sup>4</sup> The Germans, naturally, took advantage of the opportunity to exploit Ukrainian resources, albeit only for about a year and half. Ukraine initially benefited from the treaty also: Germany assisted it in stopping the military intervention of the Russian Bolsheviks and in partially suppressing the insurrection of Ukrainian communists.

Kennan's description of these events is accurate. Nevertheless, some of his comments require our attention. His bias against Ukraine is apparent in his presentation of Ukraine's attempts to establish diplomatic relations with the Allies, in particular with France, in the fall of 1917. At that time, France had already anticipated that the Bolshevik regime would seek a ceasefire with Germany and, in general, the Allies were not in favor of the communist régime. But they did not want to use their own forces to remove that régime. Instead, they preferred to provide financial support to the anti-Bolshevik centers, in particular in the south of the former empire. One of these beneficiaries was the *Tsentrlna Rada* (Central Council) in

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<sup>3</sup> George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston, 1961), pp. 37-48. The book was based on his lectures at Oxford at the end of the 1950s.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41

Kyiv — in his words, “a weak autonomous regime, consisting mostly of a few romantic intellectuals in Kiev ‘the Ukrainian Rada’.”<sup>5</sup> Instead of calling the leadership of the *Rada* in Kyiv a government or a central authority, he chooses to use the term “separatists.” Furthermore, he writes: “After pocketing some fifty million rubles of French money [the Ukrainian government] tricked the French in the most heartless manner, went over to the Germans, rubles and all, and concluded with the Germans the separate treaty that placed the Ukraine at German disposal.”<sup>6</sup>

After having reviewed some of the newest research on Ukrainian history<sup>7</sup> and memoirs of the participants in these events, including the then-Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I did not find any confirmation that the *Rada* in fact received this amount of money from the French. Even Dmytro Doroshenko, an active participant of the negotiations and a reliable historian by profession, who described the negotiations between the French representative, General Taboui, and the *Tsentralna Rada* government, does not mention any such assistance.<sup>8</sup> A recent historian comes closest to Kennan’s description of this episode when he writes that such assistance was offered to Ukraine, but he does not mention whether Ukraine actually received the funds.<sup>9</sup>

Kennan made other comments that deserve our mention. Let us start with the term “separatists,” persistently used by him. This expression suggests that Ukraine naturally belonged to Russia, and that Ukraine’s attempts to change the existing international order were not acceptable — not only to the then-allies of the Empire, but also to him. Even if it was true that the Kyiv government consisted of “romantic intellectuals,” this would not be surprising, considering the long-term subjugation of Ukraine under Russia and the lack of necessary conditions to develop its own cadre of diplomats and other political and social leaders. This situation is not unique in world history. According to a popular thesis by historian Miro-

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., pp. 45-46

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 46

<sup>7</sup> See Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine, A History* (Toronto, 1988) and Paul Robert Magosci, *A History of Ukraine* (Seattle, 1996)

<sup>8</sup> Dmytro Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrayiny, 1917-1923*, vol. 1 (New York, 1954), pp. 231-239.

<sup>9</sup> Arkady Zhukovsky, “Politychna i hromadyanska diyalnist Oleksandra Shulhyna,” in Volodymyr Yaniv (ed.), *Zbirnyk na poshanu Oleksandra Shulhyna (1989-1960)* (Paris, 1969), p. 23.

slav Hroch, it was “the romantic intellectuals” in Central-Eastern Europe who became the catalysts of political revival in various nations.<sup>10</sup>

Also, the accusation that Ukrainian leaders betrayed their French negotiators in favor of the Central Powers and that they received the aforementioned amount from the French does not take into account the political realities of the day. Let us leave the problem of money aside, because of the uncertainty as to its existence, and instead consider the Ukrainians’ alleged betrayal of the Allies in favor of the Germans. Kennan, who thought of himself as a pragmatist, should have understood that the Ukrainian government had difficulties in negotiating with the Allies, who *a priori* did not want to recognize Ukraine as an independent state and were only interested in restoring the Russian Empire to the pre-war borders (without the former colonies mentioned earlier) and in continuing the Russian war with Germany from the east, objectives that they ultimately did not achieve. The Germans, at least initially, provided some assistance to the Kyiv government.

While still legally part of the Russian Empire — before the declaration of its independence on January 22, 1918 — Ukraine took part in the elections of deputies to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Moscow. The election took place peacefully, with 7.6 million Ukrainian voters participating. All regions of Ukraine submitted the results of the elections, with the exception of Podillya and Kherson, which submitted incomplete reports. Of the 120 elected deputies, 61 percent represented parties favoring independence for Ukraine, 9 percent were communists and 30 percent represented various other parties that consisted mostly of ethnic Russians.<sup>11</sup> These results show that Ukraine’s leaders enjoyed the support of the majority of population, and Kennan’s claim of unrealistic Ukrainian leadership does not reflect the political realities.

### Why Mention It?

In the second half of 1933, Kennan was one of the first American diplomats who traveled to Moscow, following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the USSR, in order to prepare conditions for the United States embassy’s work. The ambassador

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<sup>10</sup> Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge, 1985).

<sup>11</sup> Volodymyr Kubijovyc (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1984), pp. 51-52; Oliver H. Radkey, *The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly* (Cambridge, MA, 1950).

was to arrive the following year. Subsequently, his responsibilities included providing Washington with reports, which obviously were expected to include an evaluation of the internal situation in the Soviet Union. The artificially created famine, the *Holodomor* of 1932-1933 in the USSR, mostly in Ukraine, which claimed millions of lives, was slowly coming to an end at the time of Kennan's arrival. The Soviet leadership was trying to keep the famine hidden from the international community, and any mention of the famine was forbidden in the USSR. The terrorized population was scared to discuss these events, even with family members. Clearly, it was very difficult for foreign correspondents and members of diplomatic corps to obtain any information about the origins and consequences of the famine and to write about it while still residing in Moscow.

Nevertheless, there were some journalists who were inquisitive and courageous. They learned about the famine and wrote about it for their newspapers. Deserving of special mention are Malcolm Muggeridge and Gareth Jones for their dispatches on the real state of affairs. Others, like W. H. Chamberlain and E. Lyons, described the horrible events in their books after their return home. In contrast, other journalists and public figures — such as American journalist Walter Duranty,<sup>12</sup> French politician Eduard Herriot and British scholars Sydney and Beatrice Webb — denied the existence of this catastrophe in their writings.<sup>13</sup>

In 1961, after teaching at Oxford University, Kennan published a book based on his lectures there. In this book he briefly described the famine on the Soviet territory in 1921-1922.<sup>14</sup> However, he devotes only one sentence to the much larger famine of 1932-1933: "By 1932 there was again, as in 1922, a full-fledged famine in many parts of the countryside — this time, entirely man-made."<sup>15</sup> He also provides a very brief description of the collectivization (dekulakization) of private farms; this effort by the central government to eliminate wealthier peasants and destroy private farming was one of the main reasons for the famine, for which Stalin was personally responsible.

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<sup>12</sup> Malcolm Muggeridge, a well-known British journalist working at that time in Moscow, described Walter Duranty as "the greatest liar of any journalist I have met in my fifty years of journalism." See Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (New York, 1986), p. 320.

<sup>13</sup> Conquest, chapter 17.

<sup>14</sup> Kennan (1961), p. 280

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

In this sentence, Kennan neglects to mention that Ukraine suffered more from such a policy than any other USSR region. The human losses from the *Holodomor* were enormous. Despite several demographic studies, a complete count of the victims is not available even today. Even Nikita Khrushchev, one of the leaders at that time, did not know it. Several years later he wrote: "I can't give an exact figure because no one was keeping count. All we knew was that people were dying in enormous numbers."<sup>16</sup> According to various estimates, 7 million people fell victim to the famine, of which 5 million died in Ukraine, 1 million in the Ukrainian settlements in Northern Caucasus, and 1 million in other regions. Nearly one fifth of the Ukrainian population, a quarter of the Ukrainian rural population, died during the famine. In addition to deaths from hunger, the Kremlin's collectivization drive included loss of property, deportation and imprisonment for 6.5 million peasants at the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s.<sup>17</sup> A particularly large share of the victims was Ukrainian.

When Kennan arrived in Moscow at the end of 1934, he spent evenings in the company of the aforementioned Duranty and, through him, met various other Western journalists and diplomats assigned to the Soviet Union.<sup>18</sup> The 1932-1933 famine must have been undoubtedly discussed among these professionals, considering that at least one of the frequenters of such gatherings, W. H. Chamberlain, subsequently wrote a book about this genocidal policy by Moscow. Kennan, a diligent and able diplomat, historian and prolific author, was most likely interested in these events; this was, after all, his professional responsibility. In addition, although he could not have received any information about the famine directly from official sources, he certainly had access to the Western media.

The question arises: why did he limit himself to only one sentence in his book? It is very possible that he wrote about these events in greater detail in his secret reports to Washington. He may not have wanted — or, considering his position at the time, he may not have been able — to speak publicly about the extent of the *Holodomor*. Despite its obvious significance in understanding the Soviet régime, the public awareness of the famine in the West might have jeopardized the newly established diplomatic relations between the United States and the USSR. However, Kennan's book was published in 1961 and, as a private person residing in the West, he could have openly spoken about this crime. This information would

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<sup>16</sup> Conquest, p. 306.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston, 1967), p. 60.

then have become more accessible to a wider circle of readers than the official reports to Washington, which were to remain secret for many years.<sup>19</sup>

### Why Ignore It?

The existence and activity of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is another example of a historical event, which was important not only for an understanding of the conditions within the USSR, but also for possible implications for postwar Europe — but one that Kennan failed to mention, even though he was most likely familiar with it. UPA was created in 1942-1943 in order to protect the Ukrainian population from exploitation and mistreatment by German Nazis, Bolshevik guerillas and subsequently the Red Army and Soviet authorities.<sup>20</sup> Its ultimate purpose was to create an independent Ukrainian state. The UPA's struggle continued into the mid-1950s. While Ukrainian sources number UPA membership at about 40,000, Soviet sources claim that in 1944-1946 about 56,000 partisans were killed in battle, 108,000 were taken prisoners, and 48,000 turned themselves in to Soviet authorities voluntarily.<sup>21</sup>

Kennan was on the staff of the United States Embassy in Moscow in 1944-1947, when this struggle — particularly in Western Ukraine — was most intense. He could have learned about the existence and activities of the UPA even in the official press, which wrote about the operations of Soviet forces against the "German-Ukrainian nationalistic formations," the alleged losses of the latter, and published calls to the "guerillas" to turn themselves in to the supposedly merciful state.<sup>22</sup> Also, he certainly had access to Western, mostly American and German, press and radio, which occasionally reported on the activities of the UPA. In particular, a large number of press dispatches appeared in the West, when UPA insurgents mortally wounded Soviet General Nikolai Vatutin in February 1944 and assassinated Polish General and Minister Karol Swierczewski in May 1947. The coverage increased when the UPA dispatched its units to West

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<sup>19</sup> As a result of the war, Ukraine suffered another famine in 1946-1947. However, in this instance there probably were no human victims. See Kubijovyc, vol. 1, p. 855. Kennan also does not mention this event.

<sup>20</sup> See Mykola Lebed, *Ukrayinska povstanska armiya*, 2nd edition (1987); Petro Sodol, *They Fought Hitler and Stalin* (New York, 1987).

<sup>21</sup> Kubyjovic, vol. 5, p. 394

<sup>22</sup> The collection of press clippings about these events can be found in Peter J. Potichnyj, "The Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Ukraine," in *Archives of Litopys UPA* (University of Toronto).

Germany from Ukraine, starting in September 1947. Also, the Polish and Czech press provided a lot of coverage during the infamous "Action Wisla" in 1947, when Polish authorities, with the help of the USSR and Communist Czechoslovakia, crushed units of the UPA operating in the Ukraine's most western region, Lemkivshchyna. The region's Ukrainian population was subsequently deported to Northern and Western Poland.<sup>23</sup>

Despite all this readily available information, Kennan completely ignored the activities of the UPA.

### Yearning for Austro-Hungary

Because of his official duties and his lifelong interest in the history of Central Europe, Kennan became interested in the events in Carpathian Ukraine in 1938-1939. In the summer of 1938, following his return from Germany and a short stay in Washington, he was appointed secretary to the American embassy in Czechoslovakia. He arrived in Prague in August, exactly a day after the signing of the Munich agreement, and remained at this post until the beginning of WWII. Then, as well as during his stay in Berlin, where he supervised all American property in the former CSR, he had many opportunities to visit Carpathian Ukraine. He calls it "Ruthenia" and its inhabitants "Ruthenians." This nomenclature was widely used in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and by the Vatican, which held close religious ties to the majority of population. Occasionally, when he used the term Ukraine and Ukrainian, he sometime put them in quotation marks.<sup>24</sup>

In reality, during the interwar period, in what was then Czechoslovakia, the official name of the region was "Subcarpathian Rus." The government of the short-lived autonomous and, later, independent, entity in 1938-1939 used the name "Transcarpathian Ukraine." In 1945, already under the USSR, its name was changed to the "Transcarpathian oblast."<sup>25</sup> Also, in neighboring Galicia, persons with archaic or outdated views were sometimes derisively referred to as "Ruthenians."

For some reason, Kennan preferred to use this term also. It seems that he either could not get rid himself of his affection for the former Austro-Hungarian Empire or just wanted to put down those who preferred to call themselves Ukrainians, instead of the obsolete "Ruthenians."

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<sup>23</sup> Sodol, Appendix B.

<sup>24</sup> See, for example, Kennan, *From Prague after Munich; Diplomatic Papers, 1938-1940* (Princeton, 1968), pp. 60, 62.

<sup>25</sup> Paul Robert Magosci, *The Shaping of a National Identity Subcarpathian Rus, 1848-1948* (Cambridge, MA, 1978), Appendix 1.



In a report to the American government at the end of March 1939,<sup>26</sup> Kennan's attitude toward the residents of Carpathian Ukraine, as well as their government, can be clearly understood from the following citations: "These peasants are not Russians or Ukrainians, they are neither ... peasants are too primitive to provide good fodder for totalitarians ... they raised little opposition to the establishment of a totalitarian regime. Founded on the strata of educated or semi-educated Ruthenians and on a large number of educated Ukrainians [i.e., Ukrainians from other parts of Ukraine]... small class of educated Ruthenians, afflicted with the sense of strangeness and inferiority in the face of the more highly developed cultures." With respect to the government, he wrote that the Prague government denied demands for more autonomy "on the grounds – by no means unfounded – that the Ruthenians were not yet capable of running their own affairs ... The entire regime in Ruthenia now rests on two main factors: German political interest and Czech financial support ... sums, which have been granted to the Ruthenian regional government by Prague for purposes of urgent road constructions have been used almost exclusively for purposes of propaganda ... The two Ukrainian ministers ... are largely figure-heads. Their actions are inspired – if not entirely controlled – by German agents ... Neither Voloshin nor Revay<sup>27</sup> appears to have any great understanding of – interest in – economic matters ... Chust reeks with intrigue." And finally, as a conclusion: "It is this development - the attempt by Germany to create out of Ruthenia the Piedmont of a future Greater Ukraine – which makes it necessary to give serious attention to certain matters which might otherwise be, at best, a subject of humorous treatment."

Kennan believed that the election of the local parliament, which took place on February 12, 1939 was "not secret, and was from a single list of candidates, so that its political significance is minimal."<sup>28</sup> In reality, the Ukrainian National Union (UNU), which prepared the joint ballot, was, in this existentialist moment for the region, the union of all local Ukrainian parties. Another list, prepared by a group favoring Hungarians, was rejected because of legal violations.<sup>29</sup> These elections complied with true democratic standards: they were secret, equal, direct and without interme-

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<sup>26</sup> Kennan (1968), pp. 58-87. All following quotations are from this monograph.

<sup>27</sup> Reverend Avhustyn Voloshyn and Yulian Revay were political leaders of this region and previously democratic deputies to the Prague Parliament.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., pp. 67-68

<sup>29</sup> Petro Stercho, *Karpato-Ukrayinska Derzhava* (Toronto, 1965), p. 123.

diaries and, in fact, were a plebiscite. The question was asked: does the population of the Carpathian Ukraine desire independence or not? The result was a resounding “yes.” Of the 284,000 eligible voters, 93 percent took part in the elections and 92 percent voted for UNU — for the independence of the Carpathian Ukraine. About 130 young men sacrificed their lives for these elections, when their miniscule and hastily assembled army defended their land from the invading Hungarian army.<sup>30</sup>

There is also a different view on this election. According to a historian of the region, some people, while voting for independence, were actually expressing their preference for the former Czechoslovakia over Hungary, with its revisionist plans.<sup>31</sup> But who knows what was deep in the hearts of the voters?

Kennan often called the Ukrainian government in Uzhhorod, and later in Chust, a “fascist regime,” because for a certain time it enjoyed the support of Nazi Germany. He was correct in claiming that Carpathian Ukraine was a toy in the hands of the Germans, a temporary card in their political game. However, as a historian and diplomat, he should have tried to understand the position of this Ukrainian region at the time and, for that matter, of all Ukrainians.

In the interwar period, Ukraine was not an independent country, but was divided between four occupation régimes, under which Ukrainians were robbed, to various degrees, of many national and cultural rights. Like any other people in similar situations, they aspired to political independence. Not a single state in the whole world at that time supported their aspirations. Most likely, many Western leaders would have even been hard-pressed to find the small territory of Carpathian Ukraine on the map.

In the 1930s, Germany entered the international arena with the intention of revising the Versailles Treaty. That was exactly what Ukrainians wanted at that time. Having no other allies, some Ukrainian politicians, including the leaders of Carpathian Ukraine, tied their hopes to fascist Germany, which was hostile to Ukraine’s both main occupiers, the USSR and Poland. This did not mean that Ukrainians approved of all or any of Nazi Germany’s domestic and international policies, nor did it mean they would have liked to imitate these policies at home.

Following Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, Winston Churchill (Kennan’s favorite authority) supposedly stated that even if the devil himself were Hitler’s enemy, he would find something nice to say

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., pp. 252-255.

<sup>31</sup> Magosci (1978), p. 245.

about him in Parliament. Franklin Delano Roosevelt happily cooperated with good old "Uncle Joe." His successors, in the name of anticommunism, tolerated such corrupt totalitarian heads of state as Somoza, Trujillo, Batista and Marcos. Paragons of democracy are allowed to be pragmatic in politics and forget moral principles; however, "Ruthenians" were not free to do so.

The facts and moral judgment in no way support Kennan's racist, contemptuous conviction that the citizens of Carpathian Ukraine were some primitive, underdeveloped tribe, ignoring the fact — if one were to believe him — that such an unsatisfactory state of affairs was the result of the centuries-long enslavement of this Ukrainian region by Hungarians. Moreover, Kennan favored pushing them back under the same yoke, as evidenced by his statement: "Ruthenia will find its way back to the economic and political unit, to which it most naturally belongs, which is Hungary."<sup>32</sup>

Despite the singularity of the region's development, he showed no desire to analyze the political situation of the day from the point of view of Ukrainian interests. He denied these people (as well as those of other parts of Ukraine) the right to fight not only for their political independence, cultural and economic development, but also for their human dignity.

It is also important to stress that the United States did not have a strategic interest in Carpathian Ukraine at that time. Thus, in expressing his views, Kennan was showing his and, indirectly, the preference of the United States for a pre-World War I configuration of Central Europe — in which there was no room for an independent Carpathian Ukraine or, for that matter, an independent Ukraine.

It was not his concern that the aspirations of Ukrainians in this region would be crushed by a return to Hungarian occupation. His approval of the annexation of this newly created political unit by its former oppressors would have sentenced Carpathian Ukrainians to a policy of complete assimilation, which would include closing all Ukrainian-language schools,<sup>33</sup> "Hungarianization" of the Ukrainian (Greek) Catholic Church

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<sup>32</sup> Kennan (1968), p. 74

<sup>33</sup> The following data illustrate how quickly the "Hungarianization" of education was taking place: in 1874, there were 479 Ruthenian and 225 Ruthenian-Hungarian grammar schools, while shortly before World War I, there were no Ruthenian and only 34 Ruthenian-Hungarian schools left. (In these statistics Ukrainians or Ruthenians are referred to as "Rusyny," another archaic term for Ukrainians). See Magosci (1978), p. 65.

and bans on Ukrainian-language publications and civic organizations. In other words, Carpathian Ukrainians would be sentenced to a national death. One must ask if these are the views of a moral person.

### **Against the Warsaw Pact, but for Peace with the Soviet Union**

Following his return from Moscow to Washington in 1946, Kennan was appointed director of the newly created Policy Planning Staff at the State Department and served as a liaison with the National War College, where he also taught. The following year he published an article under the cryptonym "X," which brought him fame as a diplomat and historian.<sup>34</sup> It is fair to say that the views expressed in that article, known as the "containment policy," became the foundation of the Truman Doctrine, and later the Marshall Plan, and continued, to some extent, to influence United States policy toward the Soviet Union for the period after WWII, until the demise of the Soviet Union. The postulates of that article are so well known that I will limit myself to focusing only on its relevance to the subject of our discussion.

Prior to publication of this article, Kennan emphasized that United States policy toward the USSR was determined by such factors as geographical location, historical development, including ideological considerations, and international relations. In this article, which was most likely written to curry the favor of the then-influential Navy Secretary James Forrestal, who was particularly interested in United States-Soviet relations, Kennan focuses on Soviet ideology, as developed by Lenin.<sup>35</sup> Lenin proposed the theory of the uneven development of capitalist states and the introduction of socialism to the country with the most favorable conditions at his time — Tsarist Russia. The establishment and strengthening of the Soviet state benefits, first of all, its élite, the Kremlin leaders, but also enables them to spread this ideology to other countries. This external goal remains unchanged for the Soviet leaders. Considering the permanent antagonism between the communist state and global capitalism, compromises between them are just temporary maneuvering. When Moscow encounters resistance in some aspect of its diplomatic efforts with other countries, it is ready to relent on some positions, but the main goal always remained unchanged. Occasional victories of the capitalist state cannot defeat or undermine the determination of the Soviet leaders. The population of the USSR, which is under the complete control of the Communist

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<sup>34</sup> X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* (July 1947).

<sup>35</sup> See Kuklick, pp. 39-40

Party and its security organs, as well as Communists abroad are required to believe in the judgment of the Kremlin leaders and in strengthening the Soviet régime to achieve its goals.

Because of its long-term goals, Soviet foreign policy is characterized by elasticity and a lack of urgency. Therefore, American policy should be “long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies... [has] nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward ‘toughness’.”<sup>36</sup> Democracies should accept the fact that the USSR exists and will continue to exist with a régime unfavorable to the West. The Kremlin will continue to try to dominate other states, exploiting the West’s weaknesses. Western powers should resist these efforts, according to Kennan, but by peaceful means, and not with threats that may lead to war with its eschatological consequences — a war which, by the way, neither side could win. As a means of maintaining political balance, the West should not interfere in the internal affairs of the USSR and should abstain from any effort to change it. It is also unnecessary to belittle the Soviet régime because no country likes that.

Considering the possible influence of communist propaganda on other nations, the United States should counteract it by creating “among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of the world power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time.”<sup>37</sup> This good example will make other countries in the world immune to Soviet propaganda and will, in some small way, influence the people of the USSR

The Bolshevik régime can be expected to change only from the inside. Emphasis on the development of the military and heavy industry while, at the same time, keeping consumer goods production primitive and insufficient resulted in a passive and tired population. As elsewhere, the post-war generation in the USSR has different views of civic life than the generation that survived the war. These factors, along with the uncertainty that arises in all non-democratic states during leadership changes, could, in the long run, lead to drastic changes in the régime.

Undoubtedly, the article was convincing. It provided substantial analysis of the circumstances of that time with regard to Western policy

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<sup>36</sup> Kennan (1947), p. 575.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 581

toward the USSR. Nevertheless, according to the well-known scholar, James Burnham,<sup>38</sup> the analysis proposed by Kennan was based on an internal contradiction. On the one hand, he believed that peaceful coexistence between capitalism and communism is necessary and possible, and on the other, that the Kremlin élite was quite open about its determination to spread its system throughout the world. Furthermore, the call to peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union, which did not deny its ultimate goal, constrained United States policy to defensive measures. But it is common knowledge that no one has ever won a competition by relying on defensive tactics alone. In addition, Kennan's recommendations lacked a clear distinction between diplomatic and military means.<sup>39</sup>

The question of appropriate United States policy toward the Soviet Union led to a debate in official American circles between those who believed, like Kennan, that it should be based on ideological, nonmilitary premises, and those who believed that military might has always been the decisive factor in this as in any international policy. When George Marshall was Secretary of State during the Truman Administration, adherents of the former approach prevailed. When Marshall was succeeded by Dean Acheson, the latter approach was preferred and became more or less dominant during the entire period of the Cold War.<sup>40</sup>

Kennan's star began to fade with this change in American policy. Yet Kennan continued to object to the emphasis on building up the weapons arsenal, because he did not believe that the Soviet Union was preparing for war. Although he was never to be as influential as he had been, American policy makers continued to consider his views with respect to the USSR up to the time of its collapse.

Another weakness of the article by X, which relates more directly to our topic, was the absence of any discussion about Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. The author himself recognized this omission after the appearance of the article. Possibly to make up for the omission, he devoted considerable attention to this issue in a subsequent important article.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> See James Burnham, *Containment or Liberation? An Inquiry into the Aims of United States Foreign Policy* (New York, 1953), p. 42. Even Kennan himself considered this book well written and convincing. See Kennan, *Memoirs, 1950-1963* (Boston, 1972), p. 100.

<sup>39</sup> Lukacs, p. 89.

<sup>40</sup> Kuklick, p. 41.

<sup>41</sup> Kennan, "America and the Russian Future," *Foreign Affairs* (April 1951).

Kennan's containment policy, which advocated noninterference in the internal affairs of the USSR and of the occupied satellite countries, was equivalent to tacit approval of the existence of the Iron Curtain, behind which communist régimes had the opportunity to consolidate their strength. Moreover, by avoiding some "unrealistic" — in Kennan's opinion — agreements with the USSR, such as the subsequent Helsinki Accords,<sup>42</sup> American policy implicitly separated itself from the internal struggle for human rights in the Warsaw Pact countries and from the aspirations for political liberation of non-Russian nations within the USSR. Their enslavement was the price that the Kremlin, with Kennan's approval, demanded from the West for the illusory *status quo*.

However, even this peaceful struggle against the Soviet régime would require great patience and material resources. Burnham argues that, in the long run, Kennan's utilitarian approach and the lack of attention to either the need for a moral basis for such a tactic or any political action doomed it to failure, because "spirit must direct matter toward the goal, and a firm resolution must sustain an unyielding effort through periods of failure, loss and sorrow."<sup>43</sup>

In this second article, Kennan divided East European countries into two groups: the ones that were occupied during and following WWII and those that were occupied in various times prior to the war. He included in the first group the three Baltic States: Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. According to Kennan, they deserved to regain their independent status.<sup>44</sup> He did not explicitly discuss what should happen to the second group of countries — the ones that were not independent prior to WWII. One can assume that he considered them as either unworthy of independence or unwilling to obtain it. Thus, they should remain within the USSR/Russia. In some aspects, Ukraine was an exception, as discussed later.

He believed that the Soviet Union would ultimately fall because of internal problems, as mentioned earlier, as well difficulties resulting from

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<sup>42</sup> Later, in the second half of the 1970s, Kennan spoke out against them, in particular those on human rights, because he believed that these agreements did not cover the creation of the mechanism that would monitor their implementation and enforcement, and that the implementation of some of them was impossible without a change of régime. See Kennan, *At Century's Ending: Reflections, 1982-1985* (New York, 1996), pp. 271-272.

<sup>43</sup> Burnham, p. 41.

<sup>44</sup> Kennan does not mention Romania and Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia was then already outside the Soviet Bloc.

the absorption of satellite countries. Should the political situation change, Kennan hoped, "a new Russia ... will refrain from pinning an oppressive yoke on other peoples who have the instinct and the capacity for national self-assertion."<sup>45</sup> Following WWII, the satellite countries became closely tied to Russia both politically and economically. Yet, the final choice of whether or not to remain dependent on Russia or to choose political independence should belong to them. Economic benefits should determine this choice. In any case, in order to preserve peace, the newly independent states should overcome their hatred toward Russia, demonstrate a willingness and ability to establish political borders among themselves, and solve possible political conflicts between ethnic groups in the region.

On the question of whether the United States should interfere in this process or not, Kennan remained to a certain extent an isolationist. It is true that "at the end of the First World War we had, to be sure, incurred a certain responsibility by the part we took in setting up an independent Polish state and in sanctioning the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; but both of these things had been done in deference to the abstract and poorly thought through principle of self-determination, without regard to specific realities of power."<sup>46</sup> As a result, the newly created states, located between Germany and Russia, were not very stable. And "[The] Wilsonian internationalist idea of Making the World Safe for Democracy [is] illusory and dangerous, as well as the corrupting belief in American omnipotence, with its temptation of American involvement in any or every corner of the world."<sup>47</sup> However, even in this case, Kennan continued to worry about the Russians. He was concerned that some Russians may react to the loss of their empire by seeking revenge. However, Russians themselves did not bother to consider the feelings of the populations of the nations they occupied and on which they imposed their rule.

It appears that while working on this article, Kennan developed — or allowed to surface — a new, intellectual interest in the Eastern and Central European states. This interest spread into the policy's practical side as well.<sup>48</sup> Now his goal became to encourage the governments of these countries to follow Yugoslavia's policy in the course taken by Joseph Tito, which included political independence from the Kremlin, but, at the same time, the preservation of the Soviet-like internal economic and political

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<sup>45</sup> Kennan (1951), p. 359.

<sup>46</sup> Kennan (1967), p. 132.

<sup>47</sup> Lukacs, p. 23, note.

<sup>48</sup> See Miscamble, chapter 6.



arrangements. For this purpose, Kennan promoted the founding of Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe and the National Committee for Free Europe, which were to be involved in practical policy toward the satellite countries.

Among the countries of the second group, which were part of the Empire for a longer period of time, Kennan paid special attention to Ukraine, of which he wrote: "The Ukraine ... deserves full recognition for the peculiar genius and abilities of its people and for the requirements and possibilities of its developments as a linguistic and cultural entity; but the Ukraine is economically as much a part of Russia as Pennsylvania is a part of the United States. Who can say what the final status of the Ukraine should be unless he knows the character of the Russia to which the adjustment will have to be made?"<sup>49</sup>

These views cannot be accepted uncritically. First of all, economists and political scientists have long expressed their doubts as to the economic benefits to the subjugated nations in colonial empires. As the respected political scientist Karl Deutsch expressed concisely: "The loss of cultural or national-political values, which is naturally connected to the acceptance of the foreign colonial power, generally does not bring the economic compensation."<sup>50</sup> Regarding Ukraine, in particular, there exists considerable literature devoted to the analysis of its gains and losses from being an integrated part of Russia/USSR. It seems that there is consensus among objective scholars that Ukraine was exploited by Moscow in a variety of ways.<sup>51</sup> One needs just mention the famines, centralization of decision-making in Moscow, the unrequited export of Ukrainian resources to Russia, structural decisions of production designed to benefit the center, forced participation in imperialistic wars, and the drive to destroy the Ukrainian language, culture and social institutions. It is obvious that a common monetary system and legislation facilitate trade and a division of labor between the parts of an integrated state. But such benefits could also be achieved through external trade between independent states, when the appropriate institutions are in place and where good will between the participants exists.

Second, according to Kennan's logical progression, since economic ties between Russia and the satellite countries grew closer during

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<sup>49</sup> Kennan (1961), p. 360.

<sup>50</sup> Karl W. Deutsch, "The Price of Integration," in P. E. Jacobs and J. V. Toscano (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia, 1964).

<sup>51</sup> See Iwan Koropecyk, *Development in the Shadow; Studies in Ukrainian Economics* (Edmonton, 1990), part 1, and the literature cited there.

the half-century after the war, one would expect that economic ties between Ukraine and Russia would grow even closer as a result of over three centuries of integration. Such ties are usually estimated on the basis of data on external trade. The data on trade between Ukraine and Russia are not always available and are not always comparable. One is often limited to comparing export data only. For example, during the pre-revolution years, 1909-1911, exports from Ukraine to the entire Tsarist Empire comprised 54 percent of all exports from Ukraine.<sup>52</sup> In 1972, this grew to 79 percent. In both periods of time, approximately 90 percent of all Ukrainian exports went to the Russian SFSR. The increase in this relationship between the two benchmark years was obviously the result of the autarkic character of the centralized Soviet economy, where certain relevant decisions were based not on economic, but on political and strategic considerations.

Considering the importance of oil and gas imports from Russia to Ukraine, especially in recent times, the use of data on external trade volume (the sum of imports and exports) is preferable for our analysis. In 2005, 26 percent of Ukraine's trade volume was with Russia.<sup>53</sup> By comparison, in the same year, this indicator of the external trade volume between, say, Germany and Russia was 22 percent, not much lower than that of Ukraine.<sup>54</sup> However, nobody would claim, based on these data, that Germany should belong to Russia. Even if our data are not completely comparable, they nonetheless demonstrate that Ukraine's political status does influence its economic dependence on Russia and, ultimately, the well-being of its population.

In the end, economic ties between Ukraine and Russian Federation proved not to be so strong, because the transition from the all-union economy to the independent economy of Ukraine at the beginning of the 1990s was not very difficult. The exception has been the oil and gas problem, which, considering the geographic location of this industry and the changes in the production structure, would have manifested itself sooner or later in the Soviet system as well.

Third, in his analysis, Kennan did not even mention other nations subjugated by Moscow. But republics other than the Russian Federation and Ukraine comprised approximately 30 percent of the population of the Soviet Union in 1990. If we add to this share the 7.5 percent of the population of non-Russian autonomous republics of the Russian Federation, we

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<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>53</sup> Ukraine Statistics Committee.

<sup>54</sup> Deutsche Bundesbank.

obtain a total amounting to more than one-third of the total population of the USSR.<sup>55</sup> Kennan ignored them.<sup>56</sup>

Fourth, Kennan did not even mention the consequences of political subjugation on the psyches of the populations of these countries. These would include feeling like second-class citizens, humiliation and the loss of their own cultures and languages — in other words, being sentenced to oblivion as a nation.

Fifth, it is unclear what criteria Kennan used to classify various nations — as to whether some have the right to independence, while others do not. Is this not reminiscent of Nazi Germany, which divided people into *Übermensch* and *Untermensch* status? Furthermore, why does Russia alone have the right to decide the fate of other nations “to which the adjustment will have to be made”? The opposing view expressed by former President Dwight D. Eisenhower sounds much more appealing: “I said frequently that the United States would never believe and never accept that a true peace had been established in the world until every single nation had the right to express its own views about its own destiny, and said the United States would always use whatever peaceful methods were available to it to bring about this opportunity.”<sup>57</sup>

### The Trouble-Making Ukrainian Lobby

The émigré communities of Central-Eastern Europe, including Ukrainians, in the United States did not like the containment policy proposed by Kennan. The main argument against this policy was that the hopes for real or even moral support from the United States for internal opposition in this region would practically vanish. As a result, those desiring freedom would encounter more obstacles from the Soviet authorities and the possibility of achieving political independence in these countries would become more remote. It was also obvious that, without serious opposition from the United States, the Soviet Union would become more self-assured and successful in the world, in particular among developing countries.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1990 g.* (Moscow, 1991), pp. 67-68.

<sup>56</sup> Obviously, one has to consider different shares of Russian population in these non-Russian autonomous republics.

<sup>57</sup> Quoted in Lev E. Dobriansky, “The Captive Nations Week Resolution,” *The Ukrainian Quarterly* (September 1959), pp. 216-217.

<sup>58</sup> See, for example, Editorial, “Five Years of Our Containment Policy,” *The Ukrainian Quarterly* (Autumn 1951).

Kennan's views evoked an especially strong reaction from the Ukrainian émigré community. Due to the hard work of Lev E. Dobriansky, a Georgetown University professor, and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, the central organization of Ukrainian-Americans which he headed, the United States Congress passed the "Captive Nations Resolution" in 1958, and President Eisenhower issued the corresponding declaration.

The resolution and presidential proclamation assert that the USSR is an empire, which includes not only the countries that fell into the sphere of Soviet domination after WWII, but also the nations that Russia occupied previously. The complaint by the USSR that such concern about captive nations in the West was equivalent to interference in its internal affairs is spurious. The occupation of one nation by another has international implications and may threaten world peace. Furthermore, remaining passive in the face of aggression may be understood as tacit approval of such Soviet policies and an invitation to further expansion. These considerations should be the subject of concern for other nations.

However, it is not sufficient for adherents of more active policy to simply keep reminding the world of such a political situation. It is necessary to conduct policy known as political warfare,<sup>59</sup> which would include reminding the world community of the strategic, political and military significance of all captive nations in current policies, especially when international complications arise. Heightened awareness by the world community of the potential importance of captive nations would make the Kremlin leaders less self-confident and less adventurous in their international politics and, at the same time, would psychologically support captive nations in their resistance to the occupiers. The fact that, after WWII, Moscow did not attack Western Europe might be indicative of proof that the Soviet leaders, facing persistent problems with the captive nations inside the USSR, as well as in satellite countries, did not feel very secure.<sup>60</sup>

This critique of some aspects of Kennan's containment policy and some of its variants, which were implemented by the United States, and the overt, sometimes brutal, personal attacks on him were not pleasant to him<sup>61</sup> and provoked his reaction.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Burnham, p. 194 and further.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 123.

<sup>61</sup> For example, V. Vasylyv's book review of Kennan's, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950* (Chicago, 1951) in *The Ukrainian Quarterly* (Autumn, 1951);

Before we move on to a discussion of his single and very important argument, the issue of war, one more comment is in order. Kennan states that the driving force behind the adoption of the "Captive Nations Resolution" was Ukrainian-Americans, mostly Galicians and Ruthenians, who accepted the name of Ukrainians based on a weak linguistic connection with Ukrainians in Central and Eastern Ukraine under Russia. Only a person without any knowledge of the history of Slavs — which Kennan was not — or a devoted Russian chauvinist could say such a thing. He acknowledged that these people, many of whom were victims of horrible Soviet persecution, moved their political activity to the United States because they had no other means of fighting Russia. One senses a certain irritation on his part, as if Ukrainian-Americans were the only ethnic group in United States history who tried to influence government policy and the views of its society. He failed to remember that lobbying for the interests of the countries of their origin in the United States Congress is an accepted and widespread practice in the United States. One need only mention the often successful influence of such ethnic groups as Jews, Cubans and Armenians.

In order to allow an exchange of the two opposing views, in 1953 Dobriansky organized on Georgetown University radio and television a discussion of the above-mentioned book by Burnham, in which the author, Kennan and Dobriansky were to participate. However, Kennan declined, citing his busy schedule. In 1962, Dobriansky again invited Kennan to a televised discussion, but Kennan ignored the invitation.<sup>63</sup> Interestingly, such a prolific publicist did not take advantage of an opportunity to publicly defend his views. Kennan, moreover advised newly elected President Kennedy not to issue the annual "Captive Nations Proclamation" in 1961, as required by the Congressional resolution.<sup>64</sup> Nevertheless, President Kennedy did issue the proclamation, in which he stated: "This country must never recognize the situation behind the Iron Curtain as a permanent one, but must, by all peaceful means, keep alive the hopes of freedom of the peoples of the captive nations."<sup>65</sup> By doing so, President Kennedy ex-

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also Michael Feighan, "The Kennan Fables," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* (March 1958).

<sup>62</sup> Kennan, *Memoirs*, vol. II, p. 97 and further.

<sup>63</sup> I am deeply indebted to the late Professor Dobriansky for this and other information on Kennan's views on the "Captive Nations Resolution."

<sup>64</sup> Kennan (1972), pp. 292-293.

<sup>65</sup> Press commentary, *The Heritage Foundation* (May 22, 2007).

pressed sympathy toward the captive nations, an attitude shared by both the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States.

When Kennan was appointed Ambassador to Yugoslavia that year, he claimed that this resolution would make his job in Belgrade more difficult, despite the fact that this country was not even on the list of the 22 captive nations<sup>66</sup> and was not mentioned in the resolution. Particular antipathy toward all the captive nations (or possibly only toward particular ones, such as Ukraine) seems to be evident.<sup>67</sup>

Kennan discussed at length the possibility that a policy espousing the liberation policy could lead to war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Researching materials related to this policy, I have not found any evidence of any lobbying by its adherents to deploy the United States military for the liberation of captive nations. The horrors of war are very familiar to the émigré community, because many of them had recently experienced them. Their representatives favorably accepted the clause of the Resolution, which states that “the desire for liberty and independence by the overwhelming majority of the people of these submerged nations constitutes a powerful deterrent to war and one of the best hopes of a just and lasting peace.”<sup>68</sup> Subsequently, Dobriansky went a little further, arguing that the support of captive nations is also the best way to peacefully win the Cold War.<sup>69</sup> It is very doubtful that anybody at that time could have naïvely hoped for military action on the part of Western powers in view of the postwar events: no action was undertaken by Western countries to help the workers’ uprising in June 1953 in Berlin, in June 1956 in Poland or in October-November 1956 in Hungary.

### Somehow We Have to Co-Exist

If the previous aspects of Kennan’s attitude toward Ukraine can be characterized as negative, his attitude after the collapse of the Soviet Un-

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<sup>66</sup> Public Law 86-90, July 17, 1959.

<sup>67</sup> Erroneously, Lukacs, p. 142, believes that this was the reason behind Kennan’s resignation from his post in Belgrade in 1962. In reality, Kennan accepted this job in 1961, two years after the “Captive Nations Resolution” in 1958 and his resignation was caused by Congress’ refusal to extend the status of a favored trade nation to Yugoslavia in 1962 — see Kennan (1972), pp. 292, 306 — not because of disagreeing with Washington’s policy toward captive nations. It seems that Kennan was not as principled as suggested by Lukacs.

<sup>68</sup> Dobriansky (1959), p. 207.

<sup>69</sup> Dobriansky, *Ukrainian Weekly* (July 30, 1960).

ion can be interpreted as rather neutral. He writes: "As revealed in the practices of the United Nations, no one could deny to the Ukrainians (nor did in 1991, the leaders of the Russian Republic) the status of the independent state."<sup>70</sup> It is as if Ukraine could not decide its own destiny without Russia's agreement.

Looking into the future, he predicted some difficulties between free Ukraine and the former empire. He believed that since several regions, mainly the Crimean peninsula, which are now part of Ukraine's territory, never before belonged to Ukraine and their population is non-Ukrainian by character and tradition, their adjustment to the new conditions would be difficult. He ignored the fact that the Crimea was already a part of Ukraine's administrative structure for over half a century prior to independence and that, in the future, the ethnic distribution might shift to include more Ukrainians and Tatars, because the proportion of Russians, presently about 70 percent, increased in the past primarily because of the transfer of Russians from large Russian cities to the hospitable climate of the peninsula. For example, a certain St. Petersburg enterprise purchased properties for vacation homes for its employees on the peninsula, as well as properties for its retirees, who remained there permanently. Under the new conditions, such population movements would be less likely.

While considering this issue, Kennan did not mention a similar situation with the historically ethnic Ukrainian regions, such as parts of the Kursk and Voronizh oblasts, Northern Caucasus, which the Kremlin included in the administrative territory of Russia following WWI. Russia's leaders have dealt with this situation in a very Russian manner. By banning Ukrainian schools, the Ukrainian language press and civic organizations, they have been Russifying the native Ukrainian population.

Kennan was pleased that the satellite countries were liberated from Russian domination due to the political changes at the end of the last century. However, he accepted the independence of the Baltic States, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and, implicitly, several other former Soviet republics only reluctantly. He did not say openly that Russia was ready to relinquish its influence over these countries. On the contrary, the acts of organizing various counterparts of the European Community — the Commonwealth of Independent States, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Eurasian Economic Organization — dominated by Moscow and strenuous objections against the expansion of NATO into post-Soviet space were, if nothing else, proof of panicked efforts to maintain Russia's influence in the

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<sup>70</sup> Kennan (1996), p. 327.

region. Always ready to support the Kremlin's policies, Kennan wrote: "this thoughtless expansion of a 'North Atlantic' alliance might be the most disastrous mistake of American foreign policy in recent decades."<sup>71</sup>

He justified Moscow's need for continued influence as a concern for the safety of its western and southern borders: that is to say, in order to protect Russia from possible attack by the West, it was necessary to control Ukraine and Poland, and then Germany and finally France. The shores of the Atlantic Ocean, and possibly the Pyrenees, would then become Russia's safe borders.

However difficult it may be to believe, Kennan considered the expansion of Russia's influence to be a legitimate precaution to insure its security, because, as he stated, the Russian people were never enthusiastic about the imperialist policies of their government. He explained that the imperialism of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries was due to dynastic considerations,<sup>72</sup> while the Red Army's pursuit of Hitler's retreating army explained the expansion into Central Europe.<sup>73</sup> Thus, he postulated, there was no need to fear Russian imperialism after democracy came to Russia, because the people would not allow imperialistic tendencies to resurface.

For some reason, in the past, the Russian people did not object very much to such policies. On the other hand, because of their painful experience, the former satellite states and the Baltic States gladly joined NATO, and approximately half of Ukraine's population is waiting for the time when it can follow in their footsteps.

### Reasons for Kennan's Attitude and Its Importance for the Future

Why was Kennan's attitude toward Ukraine negative? Three factors come to mind: his profession as a diplomat, his character and external influences, particularly when he was young and his worldview was being formed. As a diplomat, he believed that the primary function of any country's government is to ensure its military security, its survival and the well-

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<sup>71</sup> Lukacs, p. 183; originally from the *New York Times*.

<sup>72</sup> This is not the place to engage with Kennan in a discussion about such absurd statements. It is sufficient to note that between 1478 and 1940, the area dominated by Russia /USSR increased from a small Muscovite Duchy to one-seventh of the earth area, and in achieving this it started 43 aggressive wars against its neighbors. See Historicus, "George Kennan and Russian Aggressive Wars," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* (Autumn, 1951), pp. 362-364.

<sup>73</sup> Kennan (1996) p. 270.



being of its population.<sup>74</sup> This responsibility is not based on any moral foundation, but on the basic fact of the existence of the state. Concepts such as good and evil, moral and immoral are not important. One of the ways to achieve these goals is through foreign policy, and the only purpose of foreign policy should be to determine whether a decision is beneficial to the country or not.

Kennan, as an American and in his capacity as a public figure, might have had a negative attitude toward Ukraine because it was on the side of the enemies of the United States during the two world wars. Ukraine, *volens nolens*, was on the side of the powers that were looking to change Europe during both periods. During WWI, the Central Powers attempted to create an international environment favorable for them, and Hitler's Germany had the goal of subjugating all of Europe. It helps to keep in mind that Ukraine, although in the orbit of the Central Powers and, later, Nazi Germany, was not hostile toward the Western Allies. On the contrary, the Ukrainian government in 1917-1920, as we saw, tried to establish friendly relations with the Allies, and the UPA fought against both Stalin and Hitler during WWII. Other Ukrainians who served in the First Ukrainian Division swore their allegiance to Hitler only as to the leader in the war against Bolshevism, which was considered at that time by some Ukrainians to be a greater evil than Nazi Germany. Implicitly, this allegiance meant that the Division would not be used in the war against the Western Allies — and it was not.

Kennan rejected the need for changes in the international system during both wars, since they were motivated by other than purely pragmatic reasons. This stance can be explained most likely by his character. As one recent researcher aptly noted, Kennan was “an organic conservative, who believed that applying universal and legal concepts to resolution of international conflicts would be an artificial intervention in world problems.”<sup>75</sup> Such concepts as the equality of nations, justice in the broad meaning of this word, and feelings of national pride were for Kennan “unreal” ideas. They “were odious, almost perverse. His ‘realism’ lay in understanding the inherent limits of things, the futility, indeed, blasphemy, of extending beyond the existing, the real.”<sup>76</sup> The demise of the Tsarist and the Austro-Hungarian Empires were, for him, the results of the implementation of such “unreal” ideas.

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p. 322.

<sup>75</sup> See Kuklick, p. 41

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

He was an adherent of the *status quo*. In this he was not alone. In the United States, the notion of changing the *status quo*, and the related notion of “separatism” have negative connotation. It is as if the existing world borders were ordained on Mount Sinai, and it is not for people to change them. And separatists, at best, are trouble-makers in international politics. For Kennan, the captive nations who fought to restore their independence were fighting against the natural order of things. But in fact, Ukrainian aspirations were not important enough to influence events in the international arena during both world wars, especially those relating to the United States. Nevertheless, most likely in Kennan’s perception, Ukraine remained, if not an enemy of the United States — although, as a matter of fact, Ukraine as a country did not even exist at that time — then, at the least, a country whose sympathies were on the side of the enemies.

While Kennan’s character and public position, in view of the information available at that time, might have been responsible for his anti-Ukrainian attitude to a certain extent, his bias seems to be a stronger factor by commission and omission. He, as well as all Russian chauvinists and foreign Russophiles, have been convinced that independence for Ukraine and for all non-Russian nations of the Empire was tantamount to the weakening of Russia.

It seems that this attitude was based on his almost unnatural love for all things Russian. He acquired this love during his early studies.<sup>77</sup> In his memoirs, he emotionally recalls learning Russian from his instructor, who was, incidentally, Ukrainian, and how important this language became in his life. “This great Russian language – rich, pithy, musical, sometimes tender, sometimes earthy and brutal, sometimes classically severe – that was not only never to leave me, but was to constitute in some curious way an unfailing source for strength and reassurance in the drearier and trying reaches of later life.”<sup>78</sup> In Riga — still a living copy of old St. Petersburg — where he continued his Russian studies, with “vodka, champagne, gypsies, sleighs or drozhki with hugely bundled coachmen,” made him nostalgic for the old Russia.<sup>79</sup> And the majority of people in the Soviet Union (obviously, he meant the Russian people) “are not by nature cruel. They have no greater fondness for cruelty than people anywhere else in the

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<sup>77</sup> Although Kennan denies it, it is possible that he instinctively wanted to follow in the footsteps of his grandfather’s cousin, George Kennan, who during the 19<sup>th</sup> century in the United States was an authority on Russian studies.

<sup>78</sup> Kennan (1967), p. 28.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., p. 29

world. They hold, on the contrary, extraordinary reserves of the capacity for kindness, for tenderness, and, at their best, for saintliness, which, as reflected in their own literature, has entered into, and changed the consciousness of great portions of mankind.”<sup>80</sup> Kennan’s dream was to retire among those people and work on Chekhov’s biography.

A no less important stage in Kennan’s life was his enrolment in the Oriental Seminar at Berlin University, taught by professors Otto Hötsche and Karl Stöhlín, for two years in the early 1920s. There he solidified his Russophile views and, by extension, his antipathy toward the non-Russian peoples of the Empire — since they wanted to destroy it. The political flavor of the seminar can be surmised from the textbook he used, which was written by V. Kluchevsky, known for his “imperial” theory of Russia’s development and a denial of the existence of non-Russian nations. Further, Kennan’s private tutors were Russian émigrés, and he lived for a while with a Russian émigré family. It is not surprising that in such an environment he failed to acquire much objective information about ethnic affairs within Russia. Russian émigrés also taught many of the Russian and Eastern European history and literature courses in American universities during the interwar period. They imparted to the students their views on the indivisibility of the Empire and thus indoctrinated an entire generation of scholars of this region. These scholars, in turn, influenced United States policy, which for a long time ignored the existence and needs of the captive nations.

Kennan’s prediction of the eventual demise of the Soviet Union came true — possibly, even sooner than he expected. However, one can argue that the decisive factors responsible for the breakup were different from the ones he foresaw. He believed that the low standard of living (in comparison to the West), a new generation of leaders and the struggle for succession to supreme power would give the impetus for a change of régime. As it turned out, there were three other reasons that caused if not the complete collapse of the Soviet régime, then at least the disintegration of the USSR. One was the pathological centralization of the economic and social system in Moscow, which resulted in relatively low efficiency in all spheres of economic and social life. The second was the arms race between the USSR and the United States, which the Kremlin could not maintain because of its lagging technological progress and lesser economic strength. And the third reason of the breakup of the Soviet state was —

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<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 262.

perhaps unexpectedly for Kennan and people with views like his — the yearning for political independence of the non-Russian republics.

Also, his prophesy that a democratic system may arise in Russia, in place of the Soviet régime, albeit one that would be peculiar to Russia, is becoming less likely. Throughout the history of Muscovy/Russia/USSR/Russia there were only two periods during which the power in Moscow could be considered democratic. The first was the very short period of time in 1917 when A. Kerensky was the head of government. The second one, although not completely, was 1991-2000, during which Boris Yeltsin was in power. But since his successor, Vladimir Putin, has been in power, one can observe a slow but steady turn toward totalitarianism. This refers not only to internal affairs, but also to foreign policy, particularly United States-Russian relations. This is not the place to discuss all the factors that have strained this relationship. We will limit ourselves just to listing the most important ones: the Kremlin's attempts to preserve control in the area of the former USSR; the membership of Georgia, Ukraine and possibly other former Soviet republics in NATO; the use of oil and gas trade for Moscow's political purposes; the construction of an American anti-missile defense system in Poland, the Czech Republic or Azerbaijan; the development of nuclear technology in Iran; the war against world terrorism; the appropriation of land near the North Pole; the war in Chechnya; the war in Iraq; Russia's threats to leave the treaty on limits of conventional military forces in Europe; Sino-Russian military maneuvers; and, finally, Kosovo's independence.

Differences in the views of antagonistic powers can escalate. One can only hope that they will not lead to crises threatening all of humanity. However, one can be certain that these two military — or, better said, nuclear powers — will continue to negotiate. Negotiations most likely will not end in a complete victory for one side or the other. Both in the Kremlin and in the White House, diplomats and generals are working on various compromise plans, which, to a certain extent, will satisfy the preferences of both sides. It is also possible that there will be people working on these matters in Washington who will remind the government and the public of Kennan's dominant idea: tolerance of the Soviet Union and opposition to the Warsaw Pact. Such a policy seemed to have been successful during the Cold War because it prevented outright war. Maybe this idea or some variant of it will guide policy decisions now as well.

Tolerance meant not intervening in the internal affairs of the former Soviet Union and ignoring the resistance of non-Russian people, mostly Ukrainians, against persistent Russian suppression of their quest for

independence. In view of the fact that some leaders of the newly established states did not show much enthusiasm for democracy and the ability to govern themselves, it is possible that Washington may one day acquiesce to the intensification of Moscow's influence over post-Soviet space, including economic and political centralization in Moscow and the slow but steady Russification of non-Russians. Without even moral support from the West, Ukraine will have a much harder time defending itself from pressure from Moscow.

*(Translated by Serhiy Zhykharev)*

DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS

ASKOLD S. LOZYNSKYJ<sup>1</sup>

## **The Case for Seven to Ten Million**

### **Introduction**

On November 7, 2003, 25 member countries issued a “Statement” to the 58<sup>th</sup> Session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, which was transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations by the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN. Subsequently, 14 more member countries signed directly or sent letters of support.<sup>2</sup> The “Statement” read in part:

“In the former Soviet Union millions of men, women and children fell victims to the cruel actions and policies of the totalitarian regime. The Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine, which took from 7 million to 10 million innocent lives and became a national tragedy for the Ukrainian people. In this regard we note activities in observance of the seventieth anniversary of this Famine, in particular organized by the Government of Ukraine.”

On November 10, 2003, the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC) issued a “Statement in Support of Remembering the Victims of the Great Famine 1932-33 in Ukraine.” Distributed in the UN, it read: “This year

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<sup>1</sup> Askold Lozynskyj is the President of Ukrainian World Congress.

<sup>2</sup> The following 25 countries are named in the heading of the *Statement*: Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Egypt, Georgia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Nauru, Pakistan, Qatar, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates and the United States of America. Additional signatories include: Argentina, Iran, Kuwait, Kirghizstan, Nepal, Peru, South Africa, South Korea, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Delegations from Italy (on behalf of the European Union), Australia, Israel, Serbia and Montenegro sent separate letters of support.

marks the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the enforced famine of 1932-33, engineered by the Soviet régime, in which 7-10 million Ukrainians perished.”

On January 29, 2008, the UN Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, holding its 2008 Regular Session on January 21-30, 2008, considered the UWC's 2003-2006 quadrennial report and submitted the following questions for further clarification:

1. What is the position of your organization on the joint statement about the “Holodomor” made during the 58<sup>th</sup> Session of the United Nations General Assembly?
2. What are the sources of the numbers of the deaths from the “Great Famine” in your statement?

The UWC responded on January 30, 2008:

“Thank you for your consideration of our quadrennial report and, particularly, your interest in the Great Famine.

“The position of the UWC on the joint statement about the ‘*Holodomor*’ made during the 58<sup>th</sup> Session of the United Nations General Assembly is that it is an important acknowledgment by almost forty countries in the world community of the existence of this great tragedy. Furthermore, we feel that it was an important initial step in recognizing this event as Genocide within the meaning of the Genocide Convention of 1948. The UWC assisted Ukraine's Permanent Mission to the UN with the Statement by offering suggestions. The final text, naturally, was authored by the Mission.

“The seven to ten million assessment stated in our Statement of November 10, 2003 comes from various sources such as: Robert Conquest's book *Harvest of Sorrow*, the Final Congressional Report of the U. S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine and the findings of an International Commission of eminent international jurists convened by the Ukrainian World Congress which rendered its final report in 1990. The number seven to ten million ascribes seven million to the territory of the former Ukrainian SSR and three million to other areas of the USSR including Kuban, the North Caucases in Russia and Kazakhstan. The regions outside the Ukrainian SSR where the famine was most severe in many instances were populated heavily by Ukrainians. The International Commission report includes statistics from two censuses taken in the USSR along ethnic lines pre and post the famine of 1932-22 which support the aforesaid number.

“Should you require any further clarification, substantiated by documentation, we would be willing to supply same upon request. We appreciate your interest.”

On February 5, 2008, the UWC received notification from the UN Non-Governmental Organizations Section, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, that it had “decided to defer the consideration of the quadrennial report of your organization, ‘Ukrainian World Congress’, on its activities for the period 2003-2006.” The notification concluded: “The committee will continue its review of the report during its 2008 Resumed session scheduled for 29 May - 6 June 2008 and an invitation from our office will follow.”

## The Case

The number of victims has been the subject of much debate and some estimation. There are at least two significant declarations against interest.

In his memoirs, published in 1959, Winston Churchill refers to a conversation with Joseph Stalin in August 1942 about the stresses of the war as compared with carrying through the policy of the collective farms. In the course of the conversation, according to Churchill, Stalin talks about the collectivization effort and holds up two hands with the words “Ten millions, it was fearful.”<sup>3</sup>

William Strang, a diplomat at the British Embassy in Moscow, described a conversation in September 1933 with the notorious Soviet apologist and Great Famine denier, Walter Duranty, who was at that time *The New York Times* reporter in the USSR, and had recently returned from Ukraine and the North Caucasus. Strang writes: “Mr. Duranty thinks it quite possible that as many as 10 million people may have died directly or indirectly from lack of food in the Soviet Union during the past year.”<sup>4</sup>

Dr. W. Horsley Gantt, chief of the medical division of the American Relief Administration, Leningrad Unit (1922-1923), a collaborator in Pavlov’s laboratories (1925-1929) and a member of the school of medicine

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<sup>3</sup> Winston S. Churchill in *The Second World War*, vol. 1 (New York: Time Incorporated, 1959), pp. 271-272.

<sup>4</sup> Letter from William Strang to Sir John Simon, “Tour by Mr. W. Duranty in North Caucasus and the Ukraine” (September 26, 1933) in Marco Carynnyk, Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Bohdan S. Kordan, *The Foreign Office and the Famine, British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932-1933* (The Limestone Press, 1988), p. 313.



at John Hopkins University, returned to the USSR in 1933 to continue his work with Pavlov. In 1936 he published "A Medical Review of Soviet Russia: Results of the First Five Year Plan" in the *British Medical Journal*. In a March 6, 1964 letter to Dana G. Dalrymple of the U.S. Agriculture Department, noting that the Soviet government forbade news correspondents to travel from Moscow or Leningrad to the outlying areas of the country, he wrote:

"However, I as a scientist, was allowed in areas outside of the cities, and I could talk with doctors who gave me first hand reports of both the famine and the epidemics. These latter were a complicating picture of the famine. Your highest estimate of the famine deaths is put at ten million, while I got the maximal figure of fifteen million, received privately from Soviet authorities in Russia. Since starvation was complicated by the epidemics, it is not possible to separate which of these two causes was primary in casualties."<sup>5</sup>

Noted British historian Robert Conquest in his book *The Harvest of Sorrow* estimates the total number of victims from the 1932-1933 famine at seven million, with six million Ukrainians. Additionally, he estimates four million deaths within the USSR in 1930-1937 as a result of dekulakization. Ukrainians were considered the main opponents to dekulakization. Some 80% of that four million were Ukrainians, which would mean that in 1930-1937 more than nine million Ukrainians lost their lives from famine and de-kulakization.<sup>6</sup> The distinction between death from famine and death from de-kulakization is, in our view, difficult to define.

In its report to the Congress of the United States, adopted and submitted in 1988, the Congressional Commission on the Ukraine Famine sets the number of Ukrainian victims as widely ranged — but with a high end of over eight million.<sup>7</sup>

James Mace, the Executive Director of the Congressional Commission, had written earlier of a 7.5 million number: "Actually, the figure

<sup>5</sup> Cheryl Madden, "The Holodomor;" *Canadian American Slavic Studies* (Fall 2003), p. 26.

<sup>6</sup> Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow* (Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 299-307.

<sup>7</sup> "Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine 1932-33, Report to Congress, Commission on the Ukraine Famine, adopted by the Commission 19 April 1988," submitted to Congress April 22, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1988), p. i.

might well be higher. The figure of ten million total victims of the famine seems to have circulated with the Soviet élite.”<sup>8</sup> Mace later added: “The extraordinary frequency with which the ten million figure appears obliges us to take seriously the possibility that it did in fact originate in Soviet official circles, even if we cannot claim to know with certainty.”<sup>9</sup>

The International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-1933 Famine in Ukraine concluded in its 1990 report that the number of victims in Ukraine was at least 4.5 million, with approximately three million outside Ukraine — thus at least 7.5 million.<sup>10</sup> The Summary of the International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-1933 Famine in Ukraine refers to two censuses in the USSR: one in 1926 and the other in 1939.<sup>11</sup> It is important to note there had been a thorough and complete census conducted in 1937 that evidenced such an egregious loss of life attendant to the Famine, that Stalin had the results suppressed and the responsible officials promptly arrested and executed.<sup>12</sup>

In any event, the 1926 census — about which there is no dispute — reveals that in 1926 the total population of the USSR was 147 million, with 31 million Ukrainians and 116 million non-Ukrainians. The 1939 census, which was sanctioned officially as accurate, shows the total popu-

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<sup>8</sup> James E. Mace, “The Man-Made Famine of 1933 in Soviet Ukraine” in Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko (eds.), *Famine in Ukraine: 1932-33* (University of Toronto Press, 1986), p. 11.

<sup>9</sup> Mace, “The Famine of 1933: A Survey of the Sources” in Serbyn and Krawchenko, p. 52.

<sup>10</sup> The International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-1933 Famine in Ukraine was a tribunal, set up by the UWC (then the World Congress of Free Ukrainians), of jurists and legal scholars from all over the world. The Commission was constituted on February 14, 1988 with the following seven prominent international jurists as member-commissioners: Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper, formerly British prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials; John P. Humphrey, Canada, formerly Director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights; George Levasseur, France, formerly member of the Commission for the Revision of the French Penal Code; Ricardo Levene, Argentina, formerly President of the Court of Appeals; Covey T. Oliver, U.S.A., former Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador; Jacob W. F. Sundberg, Sweden, appointed President of the Commission of Inquiry; and Joe Verhoeven, Belgium, appointed Vice President.

<sup>11</sup> “International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-33 Famine in Ukraine, The Final Report” (World Congress of Free Ukrainians, 1990) p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> Catherine Merridale, “The 1937 Census and the Limits of Stalinist Rule,” *The Historical Journal*, vol. 39, no. 1 (March 1996), p. 225.

lation of the USSR at 170.5 million, with 28 million Ukrainians and 142.5 million non-Ukrainians. This indicates that the Ukrainian population actually declined by some three million during that period, while the population of non-Ukrainians grew by 26.5 million, or 23% — which, if applied to Ukrainians, would have meant that in 1939 there should have been 38 million Ukrainians. Thus, it would appear that the Ukrainian population declined by 10 million.

Arguably, Stalin's purges, commenced in late 1937, resulted in the deaths of a disproportionate number of Ukrainians, particularly from labor camps. Thus the statistics in the 1937 census (conducted in January 1937) are very important. The demise of the USSR and the opening of archives have shed light on the results of the suppressed 1937 census. According to that census, the number of Ukrainians within the USSR in 1937 was 26.4 million — almost 5 million less than in 1926.<sup>13</sup> That, in and of itself, is staggering. When combined with what was the normal growth rate of non-Ukrainians in the USSR from 1926 to 1937 — 17% — Ukrainians should have numbered 36.5 million in 1937. The conclusion is that, between 1926 and 1937, the Ukrainian population within the entire USSR declined by 10.1 million. However, in assessing the number of actual victims, allowance should be made for children never born to those victims.

## Conclusion

Certitude as to the number of victims in any crime against humanity or genocide is impossible — due primarily to the perpetrator's attempts to cover up, dislocations, etc. This is particularly true in the case of the former USSR, where purges of records and record keepers were the norm. The passing of 75 years makes this endeavor more problematic. Nevertheless, a seven-to-ten million estimate appears to present an accurate picture of the number of deaths suffered by the Ukrainian nation from the Great Famine (*Holodomor*) of 1932-1933.

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<sup>13</sup> Yuri Shapoval, "Significance of Newly Discovered Archival Documents for Understanding the Causes and Consequences of the Famine-Genocide of 1932-1933 in Ukraine" in Taras Hunczak and Roman Serbyn, *Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933: Genocide by Other Means* (New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 2007), p. 80.

OREST POPOVYCH<sup>1</sup>

## **The *Holodomor*: Ukraine's Genocide, Ethnocide and Linguicide<sup>2</sup>**

Recently in Ukraine, two documentary works on the *Holodomor* have been published on the basis of archival materials: *Rozsekrechena Pamyat: Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukrayini v dokumentakh GPU-NKVD* [Unclassified Memory: The *Holodomor* in Ukraine 1932-1933 in the documents of the GPU-NKVD] — an edition of the Security Service of Ukraine — and *Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukrayini: Dokumenty i Materialy* [The *Holodomor* of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Documents and Materials] compiled by Ruslan Pyrih.

The documentation of the *Holodomor* with the aid of newly discovered archival materials, the commemoration of the anniversaries of the *Holodomor* everywhere where there is a substantial Ukrainian community, honoring the millions of its victims with monuments, museum exhibits, popular and scholarly lectures, publications, memorial processions and lit candles — all are necessary measures. They are necessary in order to honor the memory of those millions of innocent victims of the *Holodomor*, in order to reveal to the world the criminality of the Kremlin clique and its lackeys in Ukraine, to declare that such evil must never happen again.

This, however, is only the first step, because the *Holodomor* not only claimed the lives of millions of Ukrainian villagers or expelled them from Ukraine, but also changed those who managed to survive in Ukraine. The *Holodomor* has destroyed the Ukrainian rural class, which was the main fountainhead of Ukrainian national traditions, Ukrainian culture and language as well as Christian ethics and morality. A terrorized, starving

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<sup>2</sup> This document is an excerpt from the keynote address at the Commemoration of the 17<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Independence of Ukraine, on August 23, 2008, at the Ukrainian Educational and Cultural Center in Jenkintown, PA.

person is not going to be interested in morals, culture or language — his one and only imperative is survival at any cost.

Therefore, the *Holodomor* has altered the psyche of the Ukrainian people and their mutual relationships. In order to survive, many Ukrainians have registered as Russians. Add to this those Russian-speaking people who were transplanted into Ukraine in place of the indigenous population which was starved to death or deported, and we see the reason why today there exists such a considerable Russian-speaking population in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Consequently, the *Holodomor* represented not only genocide against the Ukrainians, but ethnocide as well.

In 1933, while the Ukrainian rural population fell victim to genocide by famine, all Ukrainians were simultaneously subjected to a process of linguicide. This was manifested most drastically in the Kuban region, which belonged to the Russian Federation, but at that time had an ethnic Ukrainian majority. In that region, Stalin simply banned the Ukrainian language from the media, administration and schools (December 1932). In Ukraine proper, where its outright prohibition was impossible, the Ukrainian language was subjected to a pogrom!

The year 1933 saw first of all the proscription of the 1928 Kharkiv orthography, which represented a consensus orthography agreed upon by Ukrainian linguists from all regions of Ukraine, and which has been preserved to this day by Ukrainian-American scholarly institutions, as well as the main print media. It was replaced by a Russified orthography, which is still being used in independent Ukraine, with only minor cosmetic modifications.

Furthermore, the linguistic pogrom of 1933 was directed not only at the orthography, but at the entire Ukrainian scientific terminology. At that time there existed scores of Ukrainian scientific and technical dictionaries, which were immediately banned; the terminology contained in them was removed from usage and replaced by Russian calques or international terms. Not only did the scientific terminology experience the pogrom — a major portion of every day Ukrainian vocabulary fell victim to forced Russification as well. One can read about this linguistic tragedy in detail in the book *Ukrayinska Mova u XX Storichchi: Istoriya Linhvotsydu, Dokumenty i Materiialy* (The Ukrainian Language in the XX Century: A History of Linguicide, Documents and Materials) edited by Larysa Masenko. The

book, sponsored by the Shevchenko Scientific Society, USA, was published in Kyiv in 2005.<sup>3</sup>

Having banned Ukrainian terminological and orthographic dictionaries, the Bolsheviks also liquidated the linguists and scientists who compiled them, as they liquidated the majority of patriotic Ukrainian intelligentsia at that time.

Thus, the tragic consequences of the *Holodomor* extend far beyond the human losses alone — no matter how staggering those might be. These consequences have been psychological, sociological, demographic, cultural and linguistic as well. To sum up, what the *Holodomor* brought to the Ukrainian people was genocide, ethnocide and linguicide.

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<sup>3</sup> See the review in *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, LXIII, no. 1 (Spring 2007), pp. 100-102.

ANDRÉ ARMAND CARDINAL VINGT-TROIS<sup>1</sup>

## **“A Light for the Future”<sup>2</sup>**

Through the ages, the 20<sup>th</sup> century will doubtless have the sad privilege to be the one which will have seen the cruelest massacres. This sad privilege is all the more significant and scandalous as it is accompanied by an unimaginable development of the power of human intelligence, mobilized to change the future of mankind. Better than during any other epoch in the history of humanity have men been able to care, to heal, to cultivate and even to travel in the immensity of space. Better than at any other moment in time, it has been possible to produce exceptional fruits of human intelligence and use them in the management of the world. It is during the same time and within the same cultural space, rather than in some other world — but in this world of progress and culture — that we have seen in a mysterious way the murderous brutality of human fury. Not only, as we all know, in the two world wars, but in wars of lesser importance, which nonetheless were undertaken to exterminate entire peoples, be they Armenian, Ukrainian or Jewish. This human holocaust unleashed by the will of men, is a kind of blemish, which is recorded as a warning about our ability to develop the power of human intelligence and its mastery over the world.

Was it necessary, at the same time as men invested themselves without measure in the development of medicine in order to save human lives and to fight hunger throughout the world by the development of agricultural programs, to fight other miseries that weigh on humanity, that they should also unleash even more terrible ones?

The Great Famine, which we are commemorating today, struck Ukraine in 1932 and 1933. It was not the consequence of a natural catastrophe, such as occurs periodically around the world. It was neither the weather, nor the infertility of the soil, nor the inability of the farmer that caused the famine. It was a political decision, which was designed to subjugate and then to exterminate a substantial part of the Ukrainian people in

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<sup>1</sup> André Armand Cardinal Vingt-Trois is the Archbishop of Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Originally delivered in French on November 19, 2006 in Notre-Dame Cathedral in Paris during a Divine Liturgy of the Byzantine rite celebrated in commemoration of the great Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933.

order for Soviet imperialism to better enslave this nation. Thus, it was a human decision with the attending ambiguity and anonymity surrounding a governmental decision taken on such a scale. It was a human decision, which programmed the killing of a people. Shortly before the advent of Nazism in Germany, Soviet communism established in the former empire of the czars wanted to continue to extend its domination over neighboring peoples and nations. It continued not only to fight against regional cultural and religious particularities that it was fighting from its very beginning, but it also attempted to subjugate entire nations in order to absorb them in the immense Soviet Union.

How could they imagine that peoples, who had a thousand-year-old history, would accept without resistance that their traditions, their faith and their history be trampled? How could they imagine that they would accept without resistance that their culture and their language be assimilated? How could they accept without resistance civil death in exchange for the status of subjugated citizens? In order to obtain that which politics were unable to convince and produce, it was necessary to crush not only the ideas, the programs, but the people themselves. In order to silence the national soul, it was necessary to kill the bodies. The decision of the Soviet government to take away Ukrainian citizens' right of owning the produce of their land, the seizure of all the products of a prosperous agriculture, depriving the Ukrainian people of the means of existence gradually reduced them not only to hardship, but to famine and, unfortunately in the case of many, to death. Not only the possession of wheat, the pride of Ukraine, but that of vegetables and potatoes was forbidden. All was confiscated. Consequently, little by little entire families in Ukrainian villages died in the most horrible conditions. Millions of people, starving, ill or malnourished, died in the oppressive silence of the world. Worse still, Soviet authorities prevented, by all sorts of means, international aid from reaching Ukrainians.

Today, together with you, I think about all the villages and all the cities of Ukraine where flags are at half-staff as their inhabitants are mourning their ancestors.

Today, I pray with you as I think about all the Ukrainian families, who remember how their grandparents, and in some cases their entire family, were decimated.

Today, as I pray with you, I do not want millions of innocent children, women old people who lost their lives in this famine and in the silence of the world to be forgotten.

We must not forget them — for this crime was a grave sin against the Creator and against mankind.



It is good, it is useful and it is necessary that we commemorate these events, which are so close to us.

It is good, it is useful and it is necessary that we implore God for those who have been thus annihilated.

It is good, it is useful and it is necessary that we pray that the commemoration of these events enlighten the present and the future.

First, the present — in order that we become conscious that today in the world, millions of women, children and old people are subjected to famine and death. Not as in the case of the Ukrainians, who were doomed by a political decision to be exterminated, but by the consequences of the irresponsibility of the international system. Television, radio, newspapers could present each day at our family dinner table the faces and the emaciated bodies or millions of human beings in Africa, in Asia and probably also South America. The memory of the abomination committed in Ukraine which we are evoking must help us assess the silence of the world, which we have a tendency to accuse from a distance. It can recur today at home if we are not able to shout that there is a famine on behalf of those who are hungry and call for help, on behalf of those who no longer have a voice. Pope Benedict XVI was urging us to do so again recently as he was explaining how the fight against hunger can no longer be deemed sufficient when it is merely a marginal aid, but must question the equilibrium of the world system.

What happened in Ukraine is a light for the future, for it can happen elsewhere, as history, alas, has demonstrated. The desire for absolute power, the dream of building a new world upon the ruins of that which exists, the hope of seizing the wealth of the world for the benefit of a few can still become the ingredients of an infernal machine. Dictatorship establishes itself deceitfully and not openly: Lenin did not have a majority, but he seized power; the Nazis did not have a majority, but they attained it through intimidation. We must be aware that our responsibility in the world of today and in the world of tomorrow requires that men and women be lucid regarding the stakes of the political decisions to which they give their support.

Today, as we recall with sadness the memory of the victims of the Great Famine, we carry in our hearts and in our prayers the unknown multitude of the men and women whose lives were destroyed by the ineptness, the negligence, the irresponsibility and the silence of those who could have said and done something.

Today we pray to God that He develop our lucidity and that He give each of us the courage to speak when it is necessary to do so.

*(Translated by Jean-Pierre Cap)*

JEAN-MARIE CARDINAL LUSTIGER<sup>1</sup>

## **“Cry for Justice to Heaven”<sup>2</sup>**

May the Holy Spirit in your hearts help you face that which memory compels us to remember today, a source of suffering and of ignominy.

In the Gospel, which we have heard (Luke 10, 25-37), it seems to me most significant that Our Lord Jesus gives the commandment of love — love of God and love of one’s neighbor — which is intimately connected to the mystery of redemption. At first glance [the commandment], “Thou shall love the Lord thy God with all your heart, and your neighbor like yourself,” could suggest a totally irenic and serene attitude, which would make the discourse on love ethereal.

To explain this notion, Jesus employs the parable of a man wounded by robbers whom every one abandons. The sign of the reality of love is given by the Samaritan, who approaches the wounded man, takes him, carries him, cares for him, consoles him. The Christian tradition has seen in him the figure of Christ himself. To observe the commandment of love of one’s neighbor is possible only at the price of redemption.

As to the man fallen into the hands of the robbers and abandoned by all, it is not out of place to recognize in him the Ukrainian people in the years 1930, 1931, 1932, and especially 1933, when, as a result of the cynical decision of the Soviet authorities and Stalin, following the persecution of the land-owning peasants for the sake of agrarian reforms, an entire people were condemned to death by famine.

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<sup>1</sup> Jean-Marie Cardinal Lustiger was the Archbishop of Paris until his resignation in 2005. He died in Paris on August 5, 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Originally delivered in French on November 23, 2003 in Notre-Dame Cathedral in Paris during a Divine Liturgy of the Byzantine rite celebrated by Bishop Michael Hrynchyshyn, Apostolic Exarch for the Ukrainians, in commemoration of the 70<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Great Famine in Ukraine of 1932-1933.

Historians oscillate regarding the number of victims, which runs into millions. This is an unimaginable shedding of blood. I shall not provide details here of these events; others are more competent than I to do so.

I shall propose three lessons. The first is to ask ourselves: how is such a thing possible?

How can people be capable of committing such murders? The answer (which I will formulate in very simple terms and which certainly merits more ample commentaries) is: When man puts himself in the place of God and does so by his own will, he turns his own will into the divine will. The error, the sin of this ideology which was capable of such murders, is that in desiring to destroy the idea of God, it seized the idea of omnipotence not for the good of mankind, but for ends which men propose for their own benefit, ends devoid of mercy, devoid of respect, devoid of humanity.

This Promethean desire of man always begets idols, tyrants who enslave man. We, the believers, know that we must always fight to take down these idols and to recognize only the One Creator and Redeemer. Here is the first lesson which we must not forget.

The second is that murderous idolatry cannot exist without lies. Lies are essential for it.

It was necessary to conceal these murders, to conceal this crime. The only weapon of the poor, of the victims, of those who “cry for justice to heaven” (Luke 18, 7) is the truth. This immense cover-up conducted by the Soviet régime found collaborators in the countries of the West. I shall return to this in a moment. Let us recall that the lie is always a companion to murder, to the desire [to inflict] death — and the desire [to inflict] death needs the lie. The lie leads inexorably to death, to the murder of one’s neighbor or to one’s own death, to suicide, to sin.

To love God with all one’s strength, to recognize only Him and not to fall into idolatry, to be truthful and to live in truth — this is what is asked of us by remembering this terrible event in our century.

Finally, the third lesson is that of cowardice. How can one explain that well-informed men of good faith failed to speak up? How can one explain that a very great power would be silent to the point of recognizing a government that had committed such crimes? How can one explain that faced with murderous idolatry, faced with the triumph of the lie, those who should have defended the truth preferred their own short term interests; is this not so?

In these three points of the event unleashed 70 years ago, which brings us together today, we recognize that which Jesus Christ endures in His passion. I make this comparison with the passion of Christ so that we comprehend the meaning of the expression which John the Baptist used by referring to Christ: "The lamb who takes away the sins of the world" (John 1, 29), quoting in his manner the prophet Isaiah: "The Servant of God laden with our suffering" (Isaiah 53, 4-7).

We believe that these innumerable, inconceivable sufferings were born by the Christ and that the Ukrainian peasants, who were subjected to them, will find consolation in the Savior and will receive with us the fullness of life in the resurrection.

We also believe that forgiveness and redemption apply to every person. This is why, fellow Christians, we have the duty in Christ, through the Holy Spirit, to pray for the idolaters, for the liars, for the cowards, for the torturers, because forgiveness is part of love such as God manifests it towards us. He has pardoned us and loved us "while we were yet sinners" (Romans 5, 8).

The remembrance of this massacre, which bloodied the Ukrainian people and then during long years wounded their dignity, has given rise to resentment and the desire for vengeance. May the memory of these victims become rather a hidden force which God gives from above to those who recognize in Christ the embodiment of all human suffering, the lamb of God who carries it on his shoulder — to those who desire to work with the lamb of God for the forgiveness of sins, "so that they might have life, and might have it abundantly" (John 10,10), and that they taste the joy which God wants for His children.

May the acknowledgement of this crime by the nations help them to understand the path of love, of truth and of courage.

*(Translated by Irene Rudnytzky)*

## REVIEW ARTICLES

CHRISTOPHER FORD

### **Holubnychy and the *Holodomor***

Vsevolod Holubnychy's "The Causes of the Famine of 1932-33"<sup>1</sup> has been described as "an outstanding attempt to come to grips with basic issues necessary for an understanding of the Famine and must be considered seriously."<sup>2</sup> Written in 1958, Holubnychy's analysis of the *Holodomor* sadly remains one of the lesser known works of this respected Ukrainian scholar and was, surprisingly, not included in *Soviet Regional Economics*, his selected works published in 1982.<sup>3</sup>

Holubnychy was born on June 5, 1928 in Bohodukhiv near Kharkiv. His mother, an ethnic Russian, was a childcare worker, while his father was an agronomist who had served with Budenny's elite cavalry unit of the Red Army during the revolution — he was arrested twice during Stalin's terror. During World War Two, Holubnychy was deported by the retreating Germans and worked as an *Ostarbeiter* in Germany until 1945.<sup>4</sup> Despite two American efforts to deport him to the USSR, he managed to immigrate to the U.S. in 1951, where he studied at Columbia University and lectured in economics at Hunter College in 1962-1976. During the 32 years from the end of the war until his untimely death on April 10, 1977,

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<sup>1</sup> First published as Всеволод Голуб, "Причини голоду 1932-33 року" [Vsevolod Holub, "Prychyny holodu 1932-33 roku"], *Vpered*, no.10 (Munich, October 1958). A subsequent English version was published in *Meta*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Toronto, 1978). The complete text follows this article.

<sup>2</sup> Investigation of the Ukraine Famine, *Report to Congress, Commission on the Ukrainian Famine*, United States Government Printing Office (Washington, 1988), p.21.

<sup>3</sup> Vsevolod Holubnychy, *Soviet Regional Economics: Selected Works of Vsevolod Holubnychy* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1984).

<sup>4</sup> "Inside the Soviet Union, Interview with Two Ukrainian Refugees," *Fourth International* (New York, September-October 1951).

Holubnychy was a prolific writer, producing a range of scholarly works on a breadth of subjects, most notably political economy, history and philosophy. His writings on Marx's labor theory of value anticipated many contemporary debates, while his works on the Soviet economy were among the first to take into consideration the importance of the republics as necessary to understanding the USSR as a whole. Holubnychy's writings on Ukrainian politics, economics and history are ranked among the best in the field of Ukrainian studies. In his post-war writings on the future development of the USSR, he presented a prognosis which, though largely overlooked by Sovietologists, was startlingly accurate.<sup>5</sup>

While Holubnychy wrote a number of works on the agrarian question in Ukraine, such as *The 1917 Agrarian Revolution in Ukraine*, and on aspects of Soviet planning and collectivization, his analysis of the famine did not appear in the journals of Sovietology: still largely Russophile at the time, next to nothing was published on the subject for nearly a decade. It was written in a period of Holubnychy's life which — though one of his most interesting — has been all but forgotten, i.e., his post-war years as a leader of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (URDP).<sup>6</sup>

Holubnychy joined the URDP as a refugee in Germany after World War Two. Founded in 1947 in Regensburg, the URDP was dedicated to the building of an independent and democratic Ukrainian state.<sup>7</sup> Led by Ivan Bahriany, it was the largest party of émigrés from the pre-war Ukrainian SSR.<sup>8</sup> Soon after its foundation, a split emerged in the URDP in

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<sup>5</sup> As early as 1951, in response to the debates in American ruling circles on returning the USSR to private-capitalism, Holubnychy outlined a prognosis which provides a key to understanding the "great puzzle" of the post-Communist transition — the continuity of rule of the nouveau *Nomenklatura*: "When it sees the current system about to collapse, the ruling bureaucracy would be quite willing to maintain its social and political privileges in that way. The restoration of private property would as a matter of fact be greeted with great joy by the bureaucracy, provided that this form of private property assures its continued rule." See "The Future of the Soviet Union," *Fourth International*, no. 3 (1951).

<sup>6</sup> For a history of the URDP, see Chris Ford, "Socialism, Stalinism and National Liberation: Coming to Terms with a Changed World, The Ideas of the URDP (*Vpered* Group) in the Post-War Era," *Debatte*, vol. 14, no. 2 (August 2006), pp. 119-143.

<sup>7</sup> In 1990, the right-URDP changed its name to the Ukrainian Democratic Republican Party.

<sup>8</sup> It is estimated it had 100-120 active members, thus slightly smaller than the Melnyk OUN; other estimates put it at the same size, with 1,200-1,500 mem-

1947 between a left and a right wing; the left, led by its first president Hryhoriy Kostiuk, included Maistrenko, Holubnychy, Levytsky, Paladiychuk and others. The new left criticized other émigrés who sought the “restoration of the old pre-revolutionary order,” considering such a slogan “after thirty years” did not relate to the changed situation, in which they opposed the policy of restoring private property in the economy.<sup>9</sup>

In April 1949, they launched the paper *Vpered, A Ukrainian Review for Workers*, which, under Holubnychy’s editorship, represented the most left-wing current in the post-war Ukrainian emigration for ten years.<sup>10</sup> While the Ukrainian émigré community developed a rather insular character, the URDP made every effort to reach outwards. URDP members, especially Holubnychy and Maistrenko were published widely in the late 1940s and 1950s, reaching a remarkably wide audience, including those often ignored by other émigré bodies.

Within the diaspora, *Vpered* presented democratic socialist positions on the key questions facing Ukraine and produced a wealth of political, economic and literary writings. They engaged in continuous critical analysis and examination of Ukrainian history, as well as Ukraine’s development through the 1940s and 1950s.

A significant event in this period was the rise of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which *Vpered* supported enthusiastically, publicizing its struggle and engaging in dialogue with UPA theoreticians Osyp-Diakiv Hornovy and Petro Poltava, both members of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council.<sup>11</sup> The URDP considered the movement vindicated their ideas of the “third camp,” a view encapsulated in the slogan

bers. See John-Paul Himka, *First Escape: Dealing with the Totalitarian Legacy in the Early Post-war Emigration* (Edmonton: unpublished, 2005).

<sup>9</sup> It should be noted this was a view they also took towards associates on the left, such as Roman Rosdolsky former leader of the Communist Party of West Ukraine, whom they accused of seeing things in terms of the 1920s and being unable to adjust to the post-war environment.

<sup>10</sup> A. Babenko (Ivan Maistrenko), “Ukrayinska Revolyutsiyno-Demokratychna Partiya, Istoriya, Taktyka, Otnoshenye k Dryhym Ukrayinskym Partiyam, K Mezhdunaronomu, Rabochemu Dvyzhenyu” (Unpublished, March 5, 1951).

<sup>11</sup> Babenko, “Zavvahy do lysta P. Poltavy” [“Comments on the letter of P. Poltava”] *Vpered*, no. 4 (13) (1950); W. Wilny (Holubnychy), “The Future of the Soviet Union,” *Fourth International* (New York, May-June 1951).

“Neither Washington nor Moscow but International Socialism.”<sup>12</sup> Holubnychy said: “Under the German occupation, the prevailing ‘mood’ acquired the form of a ‘third force’ idea — against both Hitler and Stalin.”<sup>13</sup> The UPA, wrote Holubnychy, fought for a “new just order in Ukraine without any landlords, capitalists or Soviet commissars.”<sup>14</sup>

This was a particularly difficult period in which to espouse such ideas; even beyond the ranks of the western communist parties, there existed widespread sympathy for the USSR, based to a large degree on war-time feelings over its role in the defeat of Nazi Germany. While this began to wane after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, this was still a strong body of opinion in the world of labor. Holubnychy was undaunted in articulating a critique of “actually existing socialism” in the Eastern Bloc, publishing a range of articles in numerous languages, which examined the economy, the social classes and the ideology of the Soviet régime.<sup>15</sup> It was within this overall body of work that Holubnychy wrote his pioneering and unique analysis of the cause of the 1932-1933 famine in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

To understand the importance of this article, we must first understand the context in which it was written. The word “famine” tends to imply an event caused by natural forces, but the *Holodomor* was not the result of drought or crop failure. The nearest historical comparator is the Irish famine, but this was a crop failure turned into famine by the policy of the colony’s British rulers. The Ukrainian *Holodomor* was a tragedy that was entirely man made. In contrast to the less extensive famine following the war in 1921-1922, when the Soviet government allowed Western food agencies to provide aid, Moscow denied the very existence of the famine a decade later, as millions perished in the Ukrainian SSR. It was the start of *Holodomor* revisionism.

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<sup>12</sup> This slogan was raised by the American paper *Labor Action* which *Vpered* worked closely with during the post-war era, considering it “the only one which clearly understand the problems of the struggle against Stalinist-Russian imperialism and the true will of the Ukrainian people to be free; see Letter of S. Horoshchenko, “Ukrainians and Labor Action” (New York, April 7-14, 1952).

<sup>13</sup> “Inside the Soviet Union, Interviews with Two Ukrainian Refugees.”

<sup>14</sup> Cited in Vs. F. (Holubnychy), “The Russian Ukrainian Underground,” in *The Position of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement* (Munich: Prolog, 1948).

<sup>15</sup> Holubnychy wrote extensively on this subject in an array of publications under various names: Vs. Felix, S. Horoshchenko, Vsevolod Holub.



This denial was strengthened by the parrot-like apologists of the Stalinized Communist Parties outside the USSR and Stalinist sympathizers in the wider labor movement and beyond. When the *Manchester Guardian* reported the horrors witnessed by their journalist Gareth Jones, the Kremlin banned journalists from traveling to Soviet Ukraine.<sup>16</sup> Reports of the famine were challenged by a string of journalists, who actively denied in public, what they often confirmed in private. The press cover-up was complemented by the antics of the tourist agency *Voks*, who constructed Potemkin villages, fueling the fables of willing and gullible "tourists" such as George Bernard Shaw.

Stalin's heir Khrushchev records in his memoirs that "perhaps we'll never know how many people perished" in the famine, but neither during his "de-Stalinization" nor under his successors was there honest accounting of the events of 1932-33 or did the perpetrators of this crime ever face justice. For decades the Soviet authorities suppressed this event from "official" history. Those who sought to commemorate, analyze or protest the famine risked imprisonment or worse.

Under the weight of mounting evidence, *Holodomor* revisionism shifted from outright denial to questioning the scale and reasons for the famine. This style of revisionism can be found in the *New York Times* as early as March 1933, where Walter Duranty wrote: "There is no actual starvation or deaths from starvation, but there is widespread mortality from disease due to malnutrition."<sup>17</sup> This set the pattern for later works such as *Fraud, Famine and Fascism* by Douglas Tottle, whose pseudo-history *par-excellence* became a key text of *Holodomor* revisionism. Tottle concluded: "Drought (a complicating factor), widespread sabotage, amateurish Soviet planning, Stalinist excesses and mistakes caused the famine of 1932-33."<sup>18</sup> This opinion can be found in contemporary Ukraine, not only among the neo-Stalinists of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Progressive Socialist Party but also within the milieu of the Party of Regions.

Holubnychy's analysis poses a strong challenge to *Holodomor* revisionism; it cannot be shrugged off as the work of a "Ukrainian national-

<sup>16</sup> The report was insensitively entitled "Famine in Russia, Englishman's Story: What He Saw on a Walking Tour," *Manchester Guardian* (March 30, 1933).

<sup>17</sup> Walter Duranty, "Russians Hungry but not Starving," *The New York Times* (March 31, 1933).

<sup>18</sup> Douglas Tottle, *Fraud, Famine and Fascism, The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard* (Toronto, Canada: Progress Books, 1987).

ist." This term, so often used pejoratively in certain circles, cannot be applied to Holubnychy, who — while a staunch advocate of Ukrainian national liberation — was a lifelong Marxist and respected economist. In addition, while some studies of the famine can be criticized for being overly impressionistic or marred by political bias, this is not the case with Holubnychy. With his meticulous use of original sources, his study seeks to go beyond such approaches in his attempt to outline the famine's political and economic context.

Holubnychy locates the *Holodomor* within the context of the formation of "Stalinism as a new social order," a component of which was the liquidation of those remaining achievements of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1921. The revolution had revealed an unresolved contradiction between internal and external elements. The tendency of the internal forces was apparent in the struggle of the Central Rada for self-government, in the proclamation of the independent Ukrainian People's Republic and in the vernacular radical left, which strove to create an independent Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. In contrast, the tendency of the external forces was to subordinate Ukraine to Russia and retard development of these internal forces.<sup>19</sup>

While the efforts of these internal elements were repeatedly negated, the revolution had swept away the old order and replaced "Southern Russia" with the Ukrainian SSR, a "clearly defined national, economic and cultural organism."<sup>20</sup> It became the arena of a struggle between these two trends in Ukraine, the centralist Russophile element and diverse internal elements, now dominated by the Ukrainian communists. The internal elements had succeeded in securing a policy of "Ukrainization," a program of "positive action" with regard to language, culture and promotion of non-Russians in the Soviet, party, trade unions and co-operative apparatus.

The policy of Ukrainization heralded an unprecedented national renaissance; it was energetically carried forward and viewed as a "weapon of cultural revolution in Ukraine."<sup>21</sup> In the eyes of some, it was an engine of efforts to assert autonomy and liquidate the vestiges of colonialism. To others, it was a manifestation of opposition to ascendant Stalinism. The

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<sup>19</sup> Richtysky, "Memorandum Ukrayinskoi Kumunistichnoyi Partiyi," p. 54.

<sup>20</sup> Hryhory Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule in Ukraine* (New York, 1960), p. 39.

<sup>21</sup> This is how Yevhen Hirschak, a comrade of Skrypnyk, described Ukrainization; see Basil Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine, 1918-1953: A Study of Russian Bolshevik Nationality Policy* (New York, 1956), p. 71.

experience of Ukrainization provides us with the paradoxical legacy of the revolution. However, this national-cultural autonomy was not accompanied by the revival of the organs of democracy of the revolutionary years; this subjective element fell into abeyance, as the locus of real political power shifted to the higher organs during the "Bolshevist Thermidor." Within the one-party régime, the political landscape was increasingly shaped by the Russian Communist Party, the participatory channels for the Ukrainian peasantry, working class and persecuted intelligentsia being closed down.

The economic and cultural spheres were not separated by impenetrable barriers; there was an intimate relationship between the agrarian and national questions arising from the state, capital, labor relations and ethnic composition of the social classes. Ukrainians constituted 27% of the urban population, with the vast majority in the rural districts, mostly classed as "peasants" — considered synonymous with "Ukrainian." Inevitably, the tendencies of the Stalinist socio-economic and Ukrainian national-cultural policies came into conflict; the Stalinist reforms sought to resolve this contradiction in the most negative manner imaginable. The agrarian policies and resultant famine occurred correspondingly with the intensification of the campaign against the Ukrainian movement.

Holubnychy considered the First Five Year Plan of 1928-1932 as the key historic conjuncture in the formation of "Stalinism as a new social order," which with this process had assumed stable forms, the "bureaucracy has become a new social class."<sup>22</sup> This new order, he argued, was a form of state capitalism; however, "this state-capitalism calls itself 'socialism' and is different from that analyzed by the Marxist teachers in its unprecedented political despotism."<sup>23</sup>

In his writings on Stalinism, Holubnychy outlined the inequities of the USSR, both in the class and national spheres. In his analysis of membership data, he revealed that the Communist Party was not only less popular in Ukraine than Russia, but that "the most important jobs were held by Russian bureaucrats."<sup>24</sup> The Supreme Soviet "Stalin's Parliament

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<sup>22</sup> Vs. Felix (Holubnychy), "Stalinism as a New Social Order," *Labor Action* (July 30, 1951), translated from *Vpered*; also published in *Funken: Aussprachehefte für internationale sozialistische Politik*, no.1 (April 1951).

<sup>23</sup> Felix, "New Elements in Stalinist Theory, A Study of Recent Changes in Official Russian Theory on Marx's 'Obsolete Ideas'," *Labor Action* (November 27, 1950).

<sup>24</sup> Felix, "Zyizd bolshevykiv Ukrayiny," *Vpered*, nos. 6-7 (1952).

is the class parliament which represents the interests of the upper class of Russian society, while the Second chamber of the Soviet of Nationalities saw the main positions occupied disproportionately by Russians — comparable, argued Holubnychy, to the French Parliament in colonial Morocco and British South Africa.<sup>25</sup>

It is important to highlight these views of Holubnychy in light of some criticism that he dealt with the famine separately from the Soviet nationality policy.<sup>26</sup> Not only do his writings of the period contradict this, but also in his *The Causes of the Famine of 1932-33*, which is an analysis from the standpoint of political economy, Holubnychy emphasizes: "That Ukraine was being exploited directly at this time can be seen from the fact that, while the total grain harvest in Ukraine amounted to only 27% of the all-Union harvest in 1930, the consignment of grain in Ukraine accounted for 38% of the grain consigned in the entire Soviet Union in 1930."<sup>27</sup>

His appreciation of the national question is also apparent in his highlighting of the conflict with the Russian Communist leadership over the agrarian question at the All-Ukrainian Conference of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine in 1932, with the communist leader Skrypnyk openly branding these policies as the cause of the famine (*holod*). Holubnychy records that CP(b)U membership fell by 50,000 between June 1932 and October 1933. This conflict within the CP(b)U is important not only in light of the subsequent eradication of the famine from official Soviet history, but also as a challenge to contemporary revisionism.

The failure of this rearguard battle by Ukrainian communist oppositionists occurred at a time purges were already fully underway across the Ukrainian SSR. Following their defeat, the policy of Ukrainization was abolished in its entirety in January 1933. The dynamics of Stalinist centralism set about eradicating the last vestiges of equality between the republics. The reign of terror, which lasted for a decade, brought about the virtual destruction of the generation of the Ukrainian Revolution.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Felix, "In the Mirror of Stalin's Parliament, An Analysis of the Composition of Moscow's Supreme Council: The Bureaucracy Rules," *Labor Action* (October 9, 1950).

<sup>26</sup> This point is made in *Report to Congress, Commission on the Ukrainian Famine*, p. 23

<sup>27</sup> Holubnychy, "The Causes of the Famine 1932-33," pp. 22-25.

<sup>28</sup> According to Khrushchev, the only reason the Ukrainians did not suffer the fate of smaller nationalities who were deported en-masse was that "there was too many of them and there was no place to deport them."

Holubnychy's effort to come to grips with the cause of the famine is an important contribution to answering the question still being discussed today — why? Holubnychy does not locate the cause in collectivization as such, pointing out that 75% of peasants were already in collective farms before the famine. He considers that the “famine was more likely a result, rather than the cause, of collectivization,” if the enormous harvest losses can be attributed to the “peasants’ unwillingness and inability to work collectively.”<sup>29</sup> Nor, claims Holubnychy, is there “evidence to show that Stalin specially planned the famine.”<sup>30</sup> Holubnychy's explanation for the cause of the famine should be located in the wider debate of the nature of the Stalinists' social system itself, for he contends the famine “was rather a consequence of external and internal economic factors and the situation in which the USSR found itself.”

In this regard, contemporary discussion of the *Holodomor* can learn a great deal from Holubnychy's analysis. In contrast to many current analyses, Holubnychy does not de-contextualize the famine from the wider environment of the USSR and the world economy, nor uncouple it from the USSR's drive as a developing economy to “catch up” with its international competitors. Of crucial importance, this “catching up” was launched concurrently with the onset of the Great Depression, which adversely affected the price the USSR's agricultural produce could command on the world market. The price of wheat, which was exported to reinvest the returns in machinery, fell from 8.63 rubles per hundredweight in 1929 to 2.57 rubles in 1933; simultaneously, the cost of machinery for import more than doubled. The response to this situation was to increase requisitioning to accumulate the capital necessary to underpin this ruthless industrialization drive — and, in the process, callously starving millions to death in the “breadbasket of Europe.”

In placing the famine within this global and historical context, Holubnychy does not lose sight of the specificity of the *Holodomor* but seeks to view it in its social and economic totality. Nor does he absolve Stalin from responsibility, but levels the charge that he could have taken the necessary steps to reduce requisitioning and the tempo of industrialization but he did not — therefore, “the famine was quite obviously an artificially created one.” That it was artificial and could have been avoided he contends is “supported by a whole series of facts which came to light only later.”<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Holubnychy, “The Causes of the Famine 1932-33,” p. 24.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

Anticipating our contemporary revisionists' contention the famine was caused by drought, Holubnychy points out that a drought occurred in 1934, but there was no famine because Moscow took actions to avoid one, a fact which stands in stark contrast to the refusal to act in 1932.

Holubnychy was later criticized, rather unfairly, for his "exceedingly conservative estimate of 3,000,000 victims."<sup>32</sup> In fact, as Holubnychy points out, this is according to official Soviet government statistics, which reveal "over 3 million people missing from the population figures!" Holubnychy goes on to present unofficial estimates, based on the extrapolation of data between the censuses, which reveals 5-7 million missing from the populace; he also cites, as further evidence of the effect of the famine on the population, the reduction of peasant households.<sup>33</sup> As such, Holubnychy is clearly careful not to give a fixed opinion on the total number of victims of the famine. This is perfectly understandable in terms of the availability of the necessary information to reach such a conclusion — but even based on questionable official statistics, he seeks to show that a demographic catastrophe had occurred.

Holubnychy does not consider the famine was an act of genocide against the Ukrainians, along with other minorities of the rural populace. It was not that he considered Stalinism incapable of genocide — he did. Nevertheless, the famine was still in his opinion an artificially created one. This, and other brutalities of Russian imperialism, had led him to the conclusions he articulated in an earlier interview in 1951:

"The non-Russian republics of the USSR should be separated from Russia once and forever and become independent nations — that is the main reaction to Stalin's Russian nationalism. Confidence in Russian 'brotherhood' does not exist anymore after the policy of genocide and colonial exploitation that has taken place."<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> *Report to Congress, Commission on the Ukrainian Famine*, Washington 1988, p. 21

<sup>33</sup> Holubnychy, "The Causes of the Famine 1932-33," p. 24

<sup>34</sup> "Inside the Soviet Union, Interviews with Two Ukrainian Refugees."

VSEVELOD HOLUBNYCHY

## **The Causes of the Famine of 1932-33**

A study of available official primary sources, such as government resolutions, economic statistics and Moscow and Kyiv periodicals of the time, allows us to reconstruct the following picture of the causes of and the circumstances surrounding the famine in the Ukrainian SSR of 25 years ago.

The first Five Year Plan for industrializing the USSR was, in every respect, an improvisation. The planners were still inexperienced and the Stalinist majority in the VKP(b)<sup>1</sup> obstinate and over-enthusiastic. The economy of the USSR was not guided by rational planning, but moved in fits and starts, goaded along by “storming campaigns” and “shock brigades.” As a result, the goals for 1930-32 set by the Five Year Plan were considerably overfulfilled, while the yearly plans drawn up by the Stalinists independently of the Five Year Plan were all underfulfilled, both in Ukraine and in the Soviet Union as a whole.

In 1930 an acute shortage of capital suddenly made itself felt because too large a number of industrial projects had been embarked upon simultaneously, and there was nothing to finish the building with. At the same time the capitalist crisis of unprecedented proportions which was unforeseen by the Bolsheviks had a significant effect on the tempo of Soviet industrialization. As a result of the crisis, the prices and demand for agricultural materials, the main Soviet export, fell to much less than the price of machinery being imported by the USSR. For example, a hundred-weight of Soviet grain sold on the world market in 1929 for 8.63 rubles; in 1933 it sold for only 2.57 rubles. This was not a case of dumping by the Soviet Union, as some voices in the Western press, for their own competitive reasons, maintained. For, after all, American and Canadian prices for grain were even lower than the Soviet.

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<sup>1</sup> All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

On the other hand, the prices of tractors, for example, which the USSR imported, were by 1934 55% higher than they had been in 1929. Furthermore, the USSR was also bound by long-term contracts such as the three-year deal with H. Ford (1929-1932) for the purchase of tractors. The prices, according to this agreement, remained at the 1929 level regardless of what transpired on the world market in the meantime. In order to fulfill its obligations to Western businessmen, whose confidence it valued, and in order not to slow its industrialization plan, the fulfillment of which was very much dependent on the importation of machinery, the USSR had to export more and more agricultural products at falling prices in order to find the currency with which to pay for imports. The export of grain from the USSR in these years reads as follows (in millions of hundredweight):

1929	2.6 million	1932	18.1 million
1930	48.4 million	1933	17.6 million
1931	51.8 million	1934	8.4 million

The USSR was never again able to achieve as high an export figure as in 1930 and 1931 although, naturally it would have liked to. Owing to a lack of exportable products, the importation of machinery to the USSR fell significantly from 1932, and the USSR's foreign trade was brought to a minimum.

Following instructions from Moscow, the XI Congress of the CP(b)U<sup>2</sup> of June 5-15, 1930 passed a resolution about the immediate need to raise the quantity of agricultural products assigned for export from Ukraine. The plan for the consignment of grain for export from Ukraine from the harvest of 1930 was raised by Moscow to 2.3 times what it had been in 1926, for example. In 1926 the Ukrainian SSR gave 3.3 million tons of grain to the state, which at the time was 21 % of the harvest. In 1930 7.7 million tons were taken from Ukraine: 33% of the harvest. That Ukraine was being exploited directly at this time can be seen from the fact that, while the total grain harvest in Ukraine amounted to only 27% of the all-Union harvest in 1930, the consignment of grain in Ukraine accounted for 38% of the grain consigned in the entire Soviet Union in 1930.

Never again in its history, neither before, nor after was Ukraine to achieve such a high figure for grain consignment as in 1930. Having trundled 7.7 million tons of grain out of Ukraine, the Bolsheviks lost their

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<sup>2</sup> The Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, a constituent section of the VKP(b).



heads from success. Stalin hurried to announce that the grain problem had been solved. A statistical survey of collective farms and Machine-Tractor Stations showed that the harvest in the collective farms had been considerably better than in individual homesteads. As a result, the Bolsheviks' optimistic hopes in the collective farms were inflated to utopian proportions. *Bilshovyk Ukrayiny* (no. 2, 1931), for instance, wrote that a collectivized Ukraine would overtake Europe and America in agricultural productivity within ten years! Some growth in productivity in the collective farms was in reality probably due to the fact that in 1930 it was largely the voluntary collective farms that continued to exist: compulsory collectivization had been halted in March 1930 when 71.5% of the land in Ukraine had been collectivized all at once; after this Stalin allowed the peasants to leave the collective farms, and at the beginning of July 1930, the level of collectivization in the Ukrainian SSR fell to 36.4%. This is the percentage at which it remained without change until December 1930, when forced collectivization was begun once again. But the forced collectivization, as will be seen, did not lead to the expected productivity.

The success of grain requisitioning in 1930 can be explained firstly by the fact that the harvest of that year was considerably above average: it netted 23.1 million tons of harvested grain. On top of this the requisitioners in 1930 sometimes took the seed and all of the stored grain from previous years. The sowing campaign of 1931 could only find 95% of the required seed.

Giddy from the success of 1930 and from exaggerated hopes in the growth of productivity that would be registered by the collective farms which were again being forcibly introduced from December 1930, the Bolsheviks planned for a harvest in 1931 of 23.0 million tons and placed the same levy of grain for consignment as had been extracted in the previous year — 7.7 million tons. All of this, however, turned out to be a mistake. By harvest time in 1931, collectivization in Ukraine had indeed reached 71% as had been foreseen, but the abused peasantry neither wanted to nor yet knew how to work collectively. The harvest of 1931 was only 18.3 million and of this (according to official figures) almost 30% was lost during grain collection.

It became imperative that the level of grain requisitioning in Ukraine be lowered. This, however, meant that Stalin's industrialization would slow down, that the plan for exporting grain and for importing machinery would be underfulfilled. This is why the order came from Moscow that the planned amount of grain to be requisitioned had to be fulfilled at any cost.

The campaign of grain collection of 1931-1932 took place in Ukraine under enormous, unprecedented pressure. Even so, by the spring of 1932 only 7.0 million tons of grain had been collected, about 91% of the plan. There was simply nothing left to, take, As Mykola Skrypnyk said at the time, echoing the words of peasants, "the broom swept away everything." Statistics revealed that a peasant in Ukraine was left for consumption an average of only 112 kilograms of grain. For the peasants, whose main staple had for centuries been bread, this was a catastrophe.

In the spring of 1932, the famine began in Ukraine. The local press of 1932 bears witness to this fact quite graphically. Take, for example, the report of Y. Zaslavsky in the Kharkiv journal *Kolhospnytsya Ukrayiny* (no. 16, 1932). The author writes that the women in the collective farms demanded of the head of the collective farm: "Give us something to eat! Give us bread! I am hungry and my children have already begun to swell with hunger. We cannot bear it anymore, the devil take you!" The head of the collective farm "found an anonymous note on his desk in the office: 'We'll finish you off you son of a bitch if you don't find us some bread'." The head replied: "It is true that we are having problems with provisions; this fact is undeniable. But for those that work, there is bread." Then the collective farmers "went in a group to the store-shed and broke in. They tried to take out the grain by force." All this took place in the village of Novo-Oleksiyivtsi in Kherson province.

The first results of the famine were serious. In the autumn of 1931, instead of the planned 14 million hectares, only 6.5 million were ploughed for spring sowing. In the spring of 1932, only 55% of the necessary amount of grain was available for sowing, and Moscow had to loan Ukraine 135 thousand tons. According to the plan, 19.1 million hectares should have been sown in the spring of 1932. This plan, however, was underfulfilled by 2 million hectares: there was a shortage of animals to draw the ploughs and of people to do the work.

The Ukrainian Bolsheviks — Skrypnyk, Chubar, Petrovsky, Kosior, Strohanov. Terekhov, Mayorov and others — more than once addressed themselves to the Central Committee of the VKP(b) and to Stalin personally with demands to ease the pressure on Ukraine. They pointed to what was clearly a critical situation in the agricultural economy of Ukraine. Under this pressure, Stalin issued a resolution in Kharkiv on 6 May 1932, lowering the quantity of grain to be requisitioned from the harvest of 1932 in Ukraine to 6.6 million tons. Nevertheless, this concession was much too small, and the Ukrainian Bolsheviks continued to protest. In order to demonstrate the solidarity of the entire CP(b)U in the face of this

pressure from Moscow and to show that opposition to the high levels of grain requisitioning was not the work merely of the leadership of the CP(b)U, the Third All-Ukrainian Conference of the CP(b)U took place in Kharkiv on 6-9 July 1932 with only one item on the agenda: the situation in the countryside.

Before this conference, the leaders of the CP(b)U had toured the starving villages and collected a huge amount of factual information with which to back up its opposition. Stalin, in turn, sent Molotov, who was then the head of the government of the USSR, and Kaganovich, then the Second Secretary and head of the Agricultural Department of the VKP(b), to the conference as his personal representatives. A tremendous fight took place at the conference. The Ukrainian Bolsheviks argued that the targets set for "grain collection were too high, that the Ukrainian peasants were starving, that the agricultural crisis was 'objective'." Molotov and Kaganovich, however, declared that it was the leadership of the CP(b)U which was responsible for the crisis, that Moscow would not make any more concessions, and that the figure of 6.6 million tons of grain called for by the plan had to be fulfilled by 1 January 1933, unconditionally.

The struggle between the Party and the Ukrainian peasantry for possession of the grain harvest in 1932 was a matter of life and death. As part of the struggle, 112,000 members were sent into the villages, compared to 44,000 in 1931. Statistics below show that far from every Party member went against his own people. The total membership of the CP(b)U fell — from 520,000 on 1 June 1932, to 470,000 on 1 October 1933. Membership in the Communist Youth League of Ukraine (LKSMU) fell from 1.3 million in 1932 to 0.45 million in 1934. During the month of February 1933 alone, 23% of the membership of the CP(b)U and 27% of the Communist Youth League of Ukraine were thrown out for opposing Party discipline. Those ejected were, of course, immediately arrested.

The harvest of 1932, according to official estimates, amounted to somewhere between 13.4 and 14.6 million tons. Losses during harvesting accounted once more for up to 40% of the crop. In order to extract the required 6.6 million tons from what remained, every method was used to terrorize the population. The notorious law of August 7, 1932 established the death penalty for the "theft of socialist property," which included even the gathering of ears of grain in the field by hungry children after the harvest. At the beginning of August, a resolution was sent down from the Central Committee of the VKP(b) which abolished various norms for grain requisitioning in the collective farms. Instead, it demanded that the requisitioners themselves define differentiated norms at each collective farm,

which in effect meant "take as much as you can." The government of the Ukrainian SSR had resolved on September 1, 1932 to give collective farmers advances on days worked in order to encourage them to work and prevent them from starving, but by November 20, 1932, in accordance with Moscow's demands, a new resolution ended the distribution of grain for workdays, demanded the return of grain already handed out wherever possible, and ordered that all other collective tons of grain be counted in with the amount of requisitioned grain. This included seed grain. On December 17, 1932, the government of the Ukrainian SSR ordered that villages which do not fulfill the planned grain consignment would have consumer goods cut off and no trading would be allowed with them. In actual fact, almost all the villages failed to fulfill the plan.

The last available count, made on December 26, 1932, showed that 71.8% of the planned volume of grain, i.e., 4.7 million tons, had been collected from Ukraine. The plan had failed. Because of a lack of draft animals and working hands, the sugar beet harvest of 1932 also failed. Instead of the foreseen 16.8 million tons, only 4.3 million tons were collected, and the rest rotted in the fields.

The hunger began to take on new, massive proportions. According to official statistics, the distribution of grain for workdays in 1932 took place in only 12% of the collective farms in the Odesa oblast, in 5% of the farms in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast and 18% of the farms in the Kharkiv oblast. In an absolute majority of collective farms, there was no payment for work done at all, simply because there was nothing with which to pay. A calculation will establish that, on the average, in 1933 there remained for consumption only 83 kilograms of grain per person of the village population throughout Ukraine.

However, in contrast to 1932, in 1933 the press was forbidden to speak openly of hunger. This is why in the periodicals one can find almost nothing referring to the existence of a famine. There were only indirect comments, as in *Bilshovyk Ukrayiny*<sup>3</sup> (nos. 9-10, 1933), which mentioned that people were complaining that the "food was bad," and so on. At the XIII Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on December 5, 1933, M. M. Popov said that in Ukraine there existed "production problems." A. Slipansky, a former Borotbist was denounced for "sabotaging the grain economy" and for trying to drive Ukraine "to famine." Slipansky

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<sup>3</sup> Official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine

was shot, although the accusations brought against him were clearly fabricated.<sup>4</sup>

The consequences of the famine are clearly evident, nevertheless, from various other indicators. The First Five Year Plan of the Ukrainian SSR, for example, anticipated a growth in the population of Ukraine under normal conditions from 30.2 million people on January 1, 1929 to 33 million on January 1, 1933. In actual fact, the official population statistics of Ukraine turned out to be the following:

January 1, 1931	31.4 million
January 1, 1932	31.8 million
November, 1 1932	32.1 million
January 1, 1933	31.9 million
November 1933	31.6 million

At the VII Congress of Soviets in Moscow, P. P. Lyubchenko referred to the population of Ukraine in 1934 as being only 30.0 million people. According to official Soviet government statistics, then, over 3 million people were missing in 1933 from the population figures! Unofficial estimates, based on the extrapolation of data between the two censuses of 1926 and 1939, show the loss to be somewhere between 5 and 7 million people. This figure, however, includes not only those who died in the famine but also the unborn, those deported during the dekulakization, etc.

The devastation of the Ukrainian countryside is evident also from these figures of the number of peasant households in Ukraine:

DATE	ALL PEASANT HOUSEHOLDS	OF THAT NUMBER IN COLLECTIVE FARMS
1.7.1929	5,214,600	292,000
1.7.1931	4,990,000	3,510,000
1.1.1932	4,748,000	3,314,000
1.7.1932	4,656,000	3,212,900
1.1.1933	4,584,000	3,149,500
1.1.1934	4,043,700	3,238,800

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<sup>4</sup> Borotbisty — Ukrainian Communist Party of former left SRs which fused with the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine in 1920; leaders of the opposition to the Stalin-Kaganovich-Skrypnyk faction of the Ukrainization program in the twenties.

Of course, the reduction of households in this table reflects not only the famine, but also the dekulakization going on at that time. The following official data on the number of cattle (in millions of head) in Ukraine illustrates the catastrophe very clearly:

	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Cows	3.9	3.5	3.4	2.7	2.4	2.5	2.6
Horses	5.6	5.3	4.8	3.6	2.6	2.5	2.5

It might be said, in conclusion, that the famine of 1932-1933 was not organized in order to drive the peasants into the collective farms, as some people mistakenly imagine. At the time when the famine broke out, 75% of the Ukrainian peasants were already collective farmers, and the private sector accounted for only 18% of the entire sowing area in 1932. The famine was more likely a result, rather than the cause, of collectivization, if the enormous harvest losses can be attributed to the peasants' unwillingness and inability to work collectively. Furthermore, there is no evidence to show that Stalin specially planned the famine. It was rather a consequence of external and internal economic factors and the situation in which the USSR found itself. Nevertheless, insofar as Stalin could have — but refused to — diminish its consequences by lowering the amount of grain requisitioned and by sacrificing the tempo of industrialization, the famine was quite obviously an artificially created one.

This statement — that the famine was artificial, i.e., that it could have been avoided — is supported by a whole series of facts which came to light only later. Already in the spring of 1933, a significant number of tractors were dispatched to Ukraine, and the newly formed political Machine-Tractor Stations were able to fulfill, for sowing grain, 2.1 million hectares more than were sown in the spring of 1932. In the spring of 1933, Moscow extended a new loan to Ukraine of 340,000 tons of seed. The harvest of 1933 came to an above-average 22.3 million tons, and the losses during harvesting due to mechanization were reduced to 3.3 million tons. But the most important factor was that this time Moscow reduced the quantity of grain to be collected to 5.0 million tons! In this way, the plan was fulfilled, and the famine ended.

Even more important changes came about in 1934. In this year, because of the drought, the harvest in Ukraine was only 12.3 million tons, i.e., even lower than that of 1932. But there was no famine! Moscow had drastically reduced the quantity of grain to be requisitioned and even released 770,000 tons of grain for consumption by the population and for

seeding. Obviously, something similar could have been done in 1932, but at that time Stalin was against this. Insofar as this was in his power, he is to blame for the famine.

One sometimes hears the statement that Postyshev was the organizer of the famine in Ukraine. A study of source materials does not support such a simplified assertion. P. P Postyshev arrived in Ukraine on January 24, 1933, after 72% of the grain called for by the plan had been collected from the harvest of 1932, and the famine already existed. It is well known that Postyshev tried to collect grain in 1933, but there are no facts to show that he continued to requisition grain. This might have been the case if there had been anything left to take. But it seems likely, however, that there was nothing left to take, and so Postyshev was irrelevant; Postyshev, to be sure, created the impression that he was responsible for the famine by publicly defending the terror being used against the starving peasants, by stating that the planned grain-requisitioning could have been fulfilled and that the "kulaks" had sabotaged it, and also by the fact that at the height of the famine, which coincided with the beginning of his rule, he did nothing to help the peasantry. In this he was deeply to blame, but this fact does not make him the organizer of the famine.

JEAN-PIERRE CAP

## **The *Holodomor* in Historical and Literary Context: *The Yellow Prince* by Vasyl Barka**

Although the *Holodomor* took place in Ukraine in 1932-1933, 75 years later it remains shockingly little known or misunderstood.<sup>1</sup> At least several aspects of this horrendous crime against humanity need to be understood:

- the historical context and why it happened;
- the way it was carried out and by whom;
- the victims' identities and their number should be determined to the extent possible, for this fact is essential to measure the magnitude of the catastrophe.

In order for this crime against humanity to be better understood, its philosophical significance needs to be determined. One murder is a threat against society. The murder of millions is a threat against humanity.

### **Historical Perspective**

Although the Bolsheviks claimed to have started with a clean slate, in certain important areas, such as imperialism, they essentially adopted czarist policies and methods. Ironically, the adoption of imperialism was a departure from Marxist orthodoxy, which contributed, perhaps more than any other error, to the ultimate demise of communist ideology in the Soviet Union and the world.

Like the régime they had overturned, the Bolsheviks considered Ukraine to be an essential part of the Russian Empire, and they were just

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<sup>1</sup> The word *Holodomor* translates as "genocide by hunger" and applies specifically to the Ukrainian Famine-Genocide of 1932-1933. The number of countries that have already recognized the *Holodomor* as genocide is considerable and still growing.



as determined to keep it under Russian domination at all cost — in fact, they exceeded the brutality of their predecessors.

Since the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Russia's goal had been to integrate its colonies within a centralized system by using all the means at its disposal: military, administrative, economic and even religious. The Russian Orthodox Church gave this secular goal its full support under all the régimes it served, thus making an ideological error similar to that of the communists. The expectation of czarist and later communist imperialists was that in time, the Slavic colonies — especially Ukraine — would become culturally assimilated, that their people would forget their history, their culture, even their language in favor of the allegedly superior Russian civilization.

Under the czars, Russian efforts toward achieving this cultural genocide culminated in Alexander's II incredibly brutal 1876 *ukaz* or decree. It ordered the absolute prohibition of all publications and distribution of any and all texts in the Ukrainian language, as well as performances of Ukrainian plays and even music. Already embarrassed by their current barbaric practices, such as flogging and deportations to Siberia, senior Russian officials, no doubt ashamed of seeing their country's latest slide into the dark ages, obeyed the *ukaz* — but kept it secret from the general public. The enforcement of this order — for it could not be called a law — involved intimidation, imprisonment and exile of artists and intellectuals for their use of the Ukrainian language or their treatment of Ukrainian history and culture in any way except as subsumed in a Russian context.

These brutally repressive measures did cause a considerable setback in education, because Ukrainian children had to learn from textbooks written in a language that was not theirs, and there was a negative effect on the intellectual development of the Ukrainian population as a whole. However, it did not kill the Ukrainian national spirit.

Some liberalization resulted from the 1905 Revolution. However, the Ukrainian language was not in a situation where it could blossom until Ukraine became independent in 1918. Then, for a decade of relative freedom in the areas of culture and education, the Ukrainian language was taught to about 80% of the children, and Ukrainian cultural life in general made great strides — so much so that, by the early 1930s, Stalin and his fellow Russian chauvinists began to fear that the centuries-old Russian goal of assimilating Ukraine might be in jeopardy. Virtually all subsequent repressive measures visited upon Ukraine were motivated at least in part by Moscow's fear of Ukrainian separatism.

Thus, the 1932-1933 collectivization campaign in Ukraine was not only about agriculture. It was focused on Ukraine and territories populated

mostly by Ukrainians, rather than on agriculture throughout the Soviet Union. It was a war against the Ukrainian peasantry and, since approximately 80% of Ukrainians were peasants, it amounted to a war against the Ukrainian people — not only because they had resisted earlier collectivization efforts, but because they constituted the irreducible bastion of Ukrainian culture. By “liquidating” as many Ukrainian peasants as possible, Stalin thought he would simultaneously advance communism and reopen the way for Russification.

Having no respect whatsoever for human life, Stalin might have been concerned by the loss of labor if Soviet industry had not begun to produce tractors in large numbers. It is well known that he and his planners expected to replace a very large part of the agricultural work force by machines. The death of millions of recalcitrant Ukrainian peasants could thus be envisaged in cold blood as the removal of an obstacle to a communist and Russian imperialistic objective.

The Famine-Genocide of 1932-1933 was neither an accident nor unavoidable collateral damage resulting from collectivization — as it was claimed to have been by simplistic defenders of communism whose crude rejoinder was “there is no omelet without breaking eggs.” In fact, collectivization could have been carried out in Ukraine, as it was elsewhere, with some violence, but without the enormous loss of human life. Requisition of all grain and other food predictably would cause starvation and indeed, from the beginning, numerous Ukrainian officials did warn Stalin of the horrible consequences of his order. Some have explained that Stalin wanted to increase grain exports to finance the purchase of Western machinery — as if this could be a justification for the death of millions of people in atrocious conditions. In any case, much of the requisitioned grain was wasted.

Furthermore, it was not indispensable or even useful to forbid peasants from leaving their villages in search of work and food. It was absolutely not useful in any way to refuse free aid in food from abroad, not only from governments, but from NGOs and even private individuals. Significantly, such foreign aid, coming mainly from the United States, was permitted during the famine of 1921-1922 in territories primarily populated by Russians. The relief effort was so efficient that millions were saved.

None of the measures and restrictions applied specifically to collectivization in Ukraine contributed to making the collectivization process more efficient. Instead, they created the conditions in which the genocide could occur. A fact seldom mentioned by historians — but found in survi-

vors' testimonies — is that, once the campaign had begun, there was no possibility for peasants to save themselves by agreeing to join the collective farms. In fact, even numerous Ukrainian peasants who had supported communism and collectivization were trapped and died in the Famine. Once the vast regions populated by Ukrainians were blockaded, they became a closed hell on earth for all their inhabitants — men, women, children, old and young. Yet, by any reasonable measure of justice, none had committed crimes punishable by such a cruel death.

Like millions of Jews who were killed in the Holocaust by the Nazis less than a decade later — as a people, because they were Jews — millions of Ukrainians were starved to death, their physical suffering increased by the agony of seeing their loved ones, especially their children, die — because they were Ukrainians. They had never wanted to oppress the Russians; they had merely wanted to cultivate their land, speak their native language and worship the God of their fathers. However, these modest and peaceful aspirations constituted an obstacle to the centuries-old Russian imperialistic goal. The Russians wanted to assimilate the Ukrainian people so that Russia might become stronger on the world stage.

Thus, the Famine-Genocide of 1932-1933 in Ukraine was the culmination of several centuries of barbaric brutality inflicted by the Russian people on their Ukrainian neighbors who never even attempted to cause them any harm. It must be emphasized that the Famine was part of a political process in Russian history. It was planned in Moscow by Russians such as Molotov, or thoroughly russified individuals such as Stalin<sup>2</sup> — a Georgian — and Lazar Kaganovich, a Jew from Ukraine, and carried out by the infamous “activists” and chekists who were predominantly Russian or russified individuals. This is consistently reported in the testimonies of survivors. By contrast, many Ukrainian officials opposed the orders that caused the Famine, and many perished because of their stand.

The plan was to “liquidate” — to use the Bolsheviks' sacrilegious and inappropriate term — as many Ukrainians as possible, “in order to teach the rest a lesson”: to terrorize the survivors into acceptance of communism and russification. Stalin realized that shooting millions of men, women and children might be too gruesome a task even for his “activists.” Even within the Soviet Union of that time, it might have created a scandal. It was also impractical because the cause of death would be readily established even long after the massacres. Even a comparatively small massacre

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<sup>2</sup> Stalin almost always spoke of Russia, seldom of the Soviet Union.

by shooting, such as at Katyn, was to cause embarrassment, as was Srebrenica.

On the other hand, Stalin remembered that Lenin, who had a visceral hate for peasants, was quite jocular reminiscing about the famine he had witnessed as a young man in 1891-1892. Even at that time, Lenin saw famine as a political tool. He refused to participate in relief efforts, lest they diminish the propaganda value of the famine for the revolutionaries. In 1921, he most reluctantly authorized the future American President Herbert Hoover and his American volunteers to pour hundreds of boatloads of grain, other food and supplies into the starving Volga region because he was concerned that his refusal of aid would tarnish the image of communism in the world.<sup>3</sup>

Subsequently, the political usefulness of famine as a weapon against insufficiently submissive masses was seriously debated by Bolsheviks in various circumstances, especially within the Komintern. Its meetings were attended by international communists, many of whom had terrorist records — or wished they had. Lenin, a titled aristocrat turned revolutionary "*en pantoufles*" was not capable of physical violence any more than the average leftist college professor. But he admired Stalin when he was still called Koba — not for his intellect, but for his reputation as a terrorist, his legendary robberies on trains and banks. (More recently, Ernesto Che Guevara, a thug with style, had similar admirers.)

The Bolsheviks and their disciples had no respect for human life, no pity for human suffering, and recognized no moral laws in their struggle to impose communism. That is why they considered famine as a practical weapon to crush opposition — not only in Ukraine, but subsequently in China, Cambodia and Ethiopia.

In Ukraine and in neighboring territories in the Kuban, in Kazakhstan and in the northern Caucasus, inhabited mostly by ethnic Ukrainians, the Famine-Genocide of 1932-1933 caused the death of between seven and ten million Ukrainian peasants. During the entire communist period, discussion or even mention of the *Holodomor* was strictly forbidden and harshly punished — Soviet-style — by a stint in the Gulag. The denial and lying about the *Holodomor* lasted so long — over half a century — that even many Ukrainians have learned to deny it even happened.

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<sup>3</sup> This great humanitarian success is well documented and narrated in Bertrand Patenaude, *The Big Show in Bogoland: The American Relief Expedition to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2002.)

Since it tarnishes Russian history forever, as the Holocaust tarnished German history, the Russians, instead of owning up to it as the Germans did, continue to claim that the famine was everywhere and to minimize the number of victims, reducing the number to one or two million — as if even such numbers were trivial. At a minimum, the Russian government should open all pertinent archives to scholars so that historians — especially Ukrainian historians — can help establish an incontestable number of victims.

Due to the inaccessibility of Russian sources, the estimated number of victims of the *Holodomor* has varied. The earliest unofficial estimates circulated among Soviet authorities in the Kremlin and in Ukraine even exceed 10 million. On several occasions, Stalin himself is reported to have said that 10 million Ukrainians perished during the Famine of 1932-1933: to Walter Duranty, correspondent of *The New York Times* who shared the information with acquaintances at the British Embassy in Moscow, while negating the Famine in his paper; to Winston Churchill at the Yalta Conference in February 1945<sup>4</sup>; and to the Yugoslav leader Milovan Djilas.<sup>5</sup> Stalin's figure cannot be disregarded out of hand, since there was no advantage for him to inflate it.

Since then, historians have had to rely on two principal bases of information to estimate the number of victims: demographic calculations<sup>6</sup> using Soviet census figures, as did the Anglo-American historian Robert Conquest<sup>7</sup>; and on the extensive gathering of reports provided by refugees. Such reports have proved to be more accurate on numerous other subjects than the credit given to them by Soviet sympathizers among Western government officials and the press.

All these studies, as well as the data collected and analyzed by various agencies and used in the excellent report prepared for the U.S. Congress under the direction of the American historian James E. Mace,

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<sup>4</sup> Winston S. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, vol. 4 of *War Memoirs* (Boston, 1950), p. 498.

<sup>5</sup> Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, 1961.

<sup>6</sup> According to the Soviet census of 1926, Ukraine had a population of 31,195,000. By the 1939 census, Ukraine's population had declined to 28,111,000 — i.e., by 10% — whereas in Russia the population had increased by 28% and by 15% in the Soviet Union as a whole. The population of Ukraine should have increased by at least 4.8 million, whereas it declined by over 3 million. Its total population loss amounted to at least 7.8 million.

<sup>7</sup> Robert Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow. Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*. (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

estimate the number of *Holodomor* victims to have been between seven and ten million.<sup>8</sup>

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, for a brief period under Yeltsin, certain archives were opened, and many documents were examined by Western scholars. Unfortunately, the archives have been closed since then, and many had never been opened. The Russians are more interested in image than in truth. Since Ukraine became independent in 1991, Ukrainian historians have had access to certain Ukrainian archives. But much work remains to be done. The study of local and regional archives is proving to be very useful in drawing up the lists of victims. Unofficially, as of 2005, over two million victims had been identified by name. The process continues, although it will remain incomplete because many archives disappeared during the war, which destroyed over 3,000 towns and villages. Again, Russian cooperation would be very useful, because it is known that during the Famine, the Kremlin demanded — and no doubt received — regular and thorough reports from the field. Seventy-five years have passed. It is time to know the whole truth about the number of victims of the *Holodomor*.

Unfortunately, today, perhaps a majority of the Russian people tends to minimize the harm done by communism to all the peoples of the Soviet Union. It is almost two decades since the collapse of communism, and the time for lies and denials is past. The Germans and the Japanese have owned up to the wrong they have done, apologized to their victims and tried to compensate materially for the harm they have done. They have thereby regained much respect. By contrast, Vladimir Putin, the former President and current Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, has been bemoaning the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead of letting the people they harmed so much for so long heal their wounds, instead of helping them, as other former imperialistic nations such as France and the United Kingdom have done, the unrepentant Russians continue to undermine the countries they formerly oppressed. And so the world can observe the shocking spectacle of the Russian behemoth destroying Chechnya because it aspired to be free and bullying tiny neighbors having populations one-fiftieth to one-hundredth of that of Russia, such as Estonia, Latvia, and Georgia.

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<sup>8</sup> James E. Mace and Leonid Hertz, *The Oral History Project of the Commission on the Ukrainian Famine*, 3 vols. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990). The work remains an excellent source of information on many aspects of the Famine-Genocide in Ukraine in 1932-1933.

Free Ukraine remains a most unbearable phenomenon, not only to extremists in the Russian leadership, but apparently to the majority of the population. The fact that over 93% of the population of Ukraine actually voted to live as an independent country has not persuaded the Russian to leave them alone. They continuously meddle in Ukrainian elections and corrupt the political process, protect Ukrainian traitors, and sabotage Ukrainian economic and diplomatic initiatives under the presumptuous assumption that they have the right, by virtue of their power, to restrict the freedom of their neighbors, which they now define to extend even beyond contiguous countries. Thus, Poland and the Czech Republic may not provide for their defense without the approval of Russia!

Other countries have had experiences and disappointments similar to theirs, but have accepted them with more wisdom. France, whose policy it has been since the 16<sup>th</sup> century to own everything up to the Rhine (*la rive gauche du Rhin*), especially Belgium, finally in 1830 accepted the existence of a completely independent Belgium, in whose affairs the French never meddled. After World War I, caused in great part by France's passionate determination to retake Germanic Alsace and Lorraine, at the cost of 1,300,000 lives, many Frenchmen have had regrets, and certainly today very few would consider worthwhile even a cold war over territorial issues, such as the Russians are waging upon their former colonies.

### Literary Perspective

Nearly a century has passed since the slaughter of World War I and over half a century since World War II. Yet, no truly great poets have emerged to immortalize these tragic catastrophes — because they incomparably surpass the human scale. When combatants are in the millions, no single human mind can capture even their collective actions, nor fathom their fears and suffering. The metamorphosis of reality into art will not take place before reality is diffused by time.

The *Holodomor* and the Holocaust are enormous catastrophes, and infinitely more inhuman because they were carried out deliberately. Fatality did not play a role. They were infinitely more unjust because the victims were unarmed; infinitely more ignoble because the strong tortured and killed the weak with impunity. This is why the perpetrators of these horrible crimes tried to keep them hidden from the eye of history. This is why it is so difficult to write about these tragic catastrophes, these extremely difficult subjects.

Few memoirs or other literary works were written about the Famine in Ukraine prior to its independence. This was not the case beyond its borders. Even during the Famine, a considerable number of letters made their way abroad, as well as reports by a few diplomats, especially Italian and German, journalists and travelers who managed to inform the world about the Famine. A number of articles appeared in France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Poland and North America, where the Ukrainian community even organized protest marches. Unfortunately, there was no outrage in the general public. Governments, for the most part, chose to believe Moscow's denials, echoed by communists and fellow travelers. Soon the public became preoccupied by the world Depression and other momentous events of the remainder of the 1930s and 1940s. It was not until survivors of the Famine, and other refugees from Eastern Europe, began to arrive in North America in the late 1940s and 1950s, that the world could be informed about the *Holodomor*. They had to overcome incredulity and deference to Soviet denials relayed by their collaborators around the world in the media, government and academe.

The Ukrainian writer Vasyl Barka,<sup>9</sup> himself a survivor of the *Holodomor*, had the great talent to fulfill what he felt was his duty: to bear witness for the victims of the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 and immortalize them. He has succeeded in his masterpiece *Zhovtyi Knyaz* (*The Yellow Prince*), published in 1968 in Ukrainian. It is the tragic story of a typical Ukrainian peasant family's ordeal during the Famine. All aspects of the Famine are treated with realism, but without the slightest hyperbole or attempt at rhetorical effect by a very talented and sophisticated writer. Barka earned a doctorate in medieval studies from Moscow State University. He was a polyglot with an especially keen appreciation for Italian and French literatures. He had begun to write as a student, especially poetry and al-

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<sup>9</sup> Vasyl Kostyantynovych Ocheret, who used the pseudonyms Ivan Ver-shyna and Vasyl Barka, was born July 16, 1908 in the village of Solonytsia, in the Poltava region of central Ukraine. He began to write while still in Ukraine. He earned a doctorate from Moscow University in medieval studies with a dissertation on Dante. In 1943, he was wounded at the front and taken to Germany as a prisoner of war. He remained there until 1949, when he emigrated to the United States. For many years he was a language editor in the Ukrainian section of "Radio Liberty" and at "Voice of America." He spent the last 32 years of his life at the Verkhovyna estate of the Ukrainian Fraternal Association, Glen Spey, New York State, where he died on April 11, 2003. Barka's life and works have been studied by Mykola Virnyi-Francuzhenko in a book titled *A Portrait* (Rivne: Diva, 1998).



ways remained a poet, even in his prose. By the time he was writing *The Yellow Prince*, he was a highly experienced writer. Within the linear structure imposed by his subject, the events are handled in a remarkably interesting fashion. The story is heart wrenching and poignant. The tone throughout is marked by simplicity and great respect. Poetic finds, worthy of a great poet, abound. The following passages exemplify Barka's poetic style and evocative powers.

"One of the most barbaric actions committed by the 'activists' was to actually shoot at desperate starving men who would come to grain storage depots begging for some of the grain that had been taken from them.

"Like dishonest reapers who hastily cut the ears in a field that does not belong to them, the machine gunners cut down rows of peasants. The white ground became littered with sheaves cut too early during a forbidden harvest. The snow, soaked with blood, melted, and a long moan — the ultimate pain — broke the silence of the plain and filled the dawn. [A wounded man] raised his hand holding a bag as if he wanted to explain to the guards 'I want to take some flour for those who are back there in the village, who are dying; I did not do anything [wrong], yet I am willing to die ... but I absolutely must take some flour, in this bag, for them!' Suddenly, another round resounded and the peasant collapsed. [...] The last to arrive continued to move forward before finally realizing that unarmed men were being massacred" (pp. 169-170).

These were for the most part fathers who could no longer bear the sight of their dying children.

Although wounded, Myron Katrannyk, the principal character of the story, later that evening saw villagers bury their neighbors who had been killed by "activists." His perception of the scene is extraordinary poetry:

"... four silhouettes ... [and] small candle flames and an incense burner. It looked like a fallen constellation, vacillating on the snow. A voice resounded; it was that of an old man who said with solemnity some phrases in a raspy, broken voice. Three others responded and accompanied him in a sadder song than all the sobs of the earth: they were celebrating a service for the repose of all [the dead]; they implored forgiveness for the sinners. The flames swung from one side to the other, apparently in a precise direction, as if to connect the stars among them and to draw a figure. They crossed the darkness and pulled behind them sadness imbedded in a song addressed to heaven, high and invisible, scintillating above all like a mountain of light. A song of eternal witness, thanks to the presence of the Father of men and angels. Katrannyk listened and was unable to leave. It

seemed to him he had before him a book opened on the white vastness, a book revealing the secret meaning of all things and that his soul was unable to read and comprehend its sparkling letters. But the meaning was in this book, the ultimate good, which the Yellow Prince would not be able to take away by taking their lives" (pp. 173-174).

Having gone to the city in search of food for his family, Myron was caught in a routine roundup of the dead or starving peasants and taken far away by train to a ravine into which they were thrown. At the bottom, a huge fire, prefiguring the crematory ovens, consumed the dead and the dying.

Many peasants were consumed in this immense abyss, transformed into an inferno, from which rose columns of smoke as from a factory. The train was bringing many dying men. Thrown by the guards, these men would yet be injured in their fall before becoming the prey of the fire, which was fed by boards and railroad ties sprinkled with tar. Logs were also brought by the trains and thrown into the ravine, alternating with people (pp. 253-254).

Barka also describes in the most heart-wrenching words the grief caused to the survivors — in a scene where Myron's wife Daria contemplates her dead husband:

"The dearest human being she had known had become an incomprehensible stranger, as if invisible walls had separated them forever. [...] She felt so implacably and definitively abandoned to her profound unhappiness that she began to cry. Infinite despair overwhelmed her soul like a storm would a bush. She cried silently without complaint, without a murmur, but with tears and sobs, which shook her chest: like a scream that her heart could contain no longer. She knelt again, hitting her forehead against the bench, near the deceased's elbow; she whispered with despair: 'We never argued and got along well, as the children could attest. But, it was written that we would not remain here ... I feel I will follow you soon, for I have no more strength ... I will remain with the little ones as long as I can! Forgive me if I ever hurt you; you have never been guilty of anything towards me ... We shall meet again where God will call us'" (pp. 293-294)

Having lost his brother, his sister and his parents, Andriy, who is about twelve years old, is one of the few survivors of his family and in the village. As he is leaving at dawn, he passes by the garden where he had seen, "under the vacillating stars," his father help bury the precious chalice in order to save it from the non-believers. The boy verified that, covered by thick grass, the hiding place had not been violated. Henceforth he would be the only heir to the secret for which his father had been willing

to die. When he looked back from the road, he saw, rising above the garden where the precious object had been buried, a flamboyant column casting rays of light like flashes of lightning, which scattered under the sky before taking the shape of the chalice the peasants had hidden in the black earth, revealing to no one their secret, suffering and dying one after the other like prisoners of an infernal circle. The chalice seemed to rise above them, with an invisible and immortal power, to bring them eternal salvation (p. 364).

Andriy moved on, carrying with him the hope of revival on Ukrainian land.

The excellent literary quality of *The Yellow Prince* was noticed in France, where it was published in 1981 by Gallimard, arguably the most distinguished publishing house of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in France. Unfortunately, it seems that nearly the entire *tirage* was purchased by a KGB agent for destruction. Thus, until now, only Ukrainians and a very small number of francophones have had the opportunity to read this beautiful and moving work on one of the most difficult subjects: the destruction of a people by hunger.

Upon the completion of his masterpiece, Barka did not think his duty to the victims of the *Holodomor* fulfilled. Until his death in 2003, he often returned to the terrible subject. A continuation of *The Yellow Prince* was found among his papers. It seems almost ready for publication. Hopefully the complete work will soon be published, not only in Ukrainian, but also in English, French and other languages.

Numerous other literary works of considerable merit, including excellent poems, memoirs and plays were also inspired by the *Holodomor*, but no work is more iconic of the Genocide-Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukrainian than *Zhovtyi Knyaz* and, as of this date, no one has better memorialized the victims.

## Conclusions

After 1983, thanks to works by such scholars as Robert Conquest and James E. Mace, as well as many others, no one could reasonably deny the *Holodomor* any longer. Nonetheless, the publication in 1997 of *Le Livre noir du communisme. Crimes, terreur, répressions* [*The Black Book of Communism. Crimes, Terror, Repressions*] gave the *coup de grâce* to

communist denial of the *Holodomor*.<sup>10</sup> However, Nicolas Werth, who treated the *Holodomor* in this volume, estimates the number of victims at approximately four million, which is less than one half the number advanced by the vast majority of specialists. Since then he has increased his estimate to between five and six million. He admits that "The great famine marked a formidable regression [...and ...] a huge backslide into barbarism," but inexplicably he does not consider it to have been a genocide.

One had to await the late 1980s to publicly "mention the national and mass genocide of the Ukrainian peasantry," as did Stéphane Courtois in his *Du passé faisons table rase! Histoire et mémoire du communisme en Europe*. It is a complementary volume to *The Black Book*.<sup>11</sup> Commenting on the work of two Ukrainian historians, Lydia Kovalenko and Volodymyr Maniak, who published a book-memorial of the Famine in the late 1980s and subsequently died mysterious deaths, Courtois writes that "they paint an apocalyptic picture of a war of extermination against the most dynamic and independent segment of the peasantry, they justify the expression 'class genocide' that I used [in an introductory essay] in *The Black Book of Communism*, but several earlier and later studies insist on the national dimension of this genocide." Quoting another scholar, he adds "Laurence Weissard has underscored the fact that 'the intention to exterminate the peasants by famine could not simply mean to destroy 'a social class' as one would a national or ethnic Ukrainian group: [because] in Ukraine, peasants constituted the national group as such, 80% of Ukrainians being peasants." Weissard and Françoise Thom further pointed out that "the famine was accompanied by a process of denationalization of Ukraine — including its Communist Party — and that by means of famine Stalin wanted to deal the Ukrainian nation a final blow." Courtois concluded: "Of course, the communists did all they could to deny and disguise this genocidal practice [...] Soviet propaganda was disseminated by Western personalities, and they smothered all information on the Ukrainian famine and even passed it for an anticommunist canard."<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Stéphane Courtois et al., *Le Livre noir du communisme: Crimes, terreur, repression* (Paris: Laffont, 1997); *The Black Book of Communism*, translated by Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1999).

<sup>11</sup> Courtois, *Du passé faisons table rase! Histoire et mémoire du communisme en Europe* [*Let us Wipe the Past off the Slate! History and Memory of Communism in Europe*] (Paris: Laffont, 2002).

<sup>12</sup> For more information about Lydia Kovalenko, Volodymyr Maniak, Françoise Thom and Laurence Weissard, see *L'Intranquille*, nos. 2-3 (1994).

Edouard Herriot, one of the most prominent politicians of his generation,<sup>13</sup> participated, perhaps unwittingly, in this cover-up. In 1933, after having been treated to a tour of Ukraine à la Potemkin, the prominent French politician claimed he had seen no famine, that he “had seen nothing.” He was thoroughly ridiculed for his naiveté. However, some have suggested that he participated in the Soviets’ deception in order to enhance the position of France in ongoing negotiations with the USSR.

An evolution in the characterization of the 1932-1933 Famine in Ukraine has taken place. Increasingly, historians are seeing it for what it was: not as collateral damage in the process of implementing the communist policy of collectivization, but as a deliberate attempt at exterminating as many Ukrainian peasants as possible in order to weaken the core of the Ukrainian people, so that it could be forced to accept communism more easily, and be russified and absorbed by Russia. Clearly, Moscow’s intent was to commit genocide, and by killing seven to ten million Ukrainians out of 40 million, it nearly attained its barbaric goal.

Undoubtedly, the 1932-1933 famine in Ukraine, as documented by a vast corpus of archival documents, by survivors’ accounts, and by literary works such as Barka’s *The Yellow Prince*, has all the aspects of a genocide as defined by the United Nations on December 9, 1948, and as entered in the statutes of the International Court of Justice in 2002.

In spite of universal condemnation, the danger of ideologies run amok remains. Imperialism has been recognized as one of the components of National Socialist ideology. While Germany has been purged of imperialism, post-Soviet Russia has not — as reflected in its attitude and behavior toward its neighbors. It is all the more important for it to recognize and fully disclose the harm it has done to its neighbors under the name of communism and, to the extent possible, engage in reparation. Given the present mentality of Russian leaders and the majority of Russians, it is regrettably too much to hope for.

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<sup>13</sup> As President of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies, Edouard Herriot signed a non-aggression pact between France and the Soviet Union in November 1932.

YAROSLAV BILINSKY

## **The *Holodomor*-Genocide of 1932-1933 and Ukrainian Independence**

Taras Hunczak and Roman Serbyn (editors), *Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933: Genocide by Other Means*, New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 2007, 154 pages.

Altogether, this is a splendid book in that, concisely, it proves that Stalin did commit genocide against the Ukrainians. Its subtitle, *Genocide by Other Means*, is felicitous, and its hardcover pleasing to behold — but it is not so successful in establishing a figure on the number of victims of the *Holodomor*. The documents, which constitute 37 out of 154 pages, or one quarter of the book, have been selected well. The book is a giant step toward helping to safeguard Ukrainian independence, which rests upon understanding the essence of the *Holodomor*-Genocide.

The book includes a very thoughtful introduction by Henry R. Huttenbach, the founder and editor of the *Journal of Genocide Research*; two lectures delivered at the Dag Hammarskjöld Library Auditorium of the United Nations on November 21, 2006 by Taras Hunczak and Mark von Hagen on the occasion of the 74<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the *Holodomor*-Genocide; a trenchant critique of Walter Duranty by Hunczak, who calls him a “Liar for a Cause”; and three scholarly articles by Roman Serbyn, Yuri Shapoval and Oleh Wolowyna. Serbyn and Shapoval are historians, while Wolowyna, a demographer, is president of the consulting firm Informed Decisions, Inc. While Serbyn has been identified as a Professor of History at the University of Quebec in Montreal, it should also be mentioned that he has done archival research in Ukraine on the famines in Ukraine and has been asked to finish the article on the *Holodomor*, in the Macmillan Encyclopedia of History, that had been started by the prematurely-deceased James Mace. Shapoval is a well-known Professor at the Institute of Political and Ethno-national Research, of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv), who, together with V. Vasilev, edited

*Commanders of the Great Famine: Travels of V. Molotov and L. Kaganovich to Ukraine and Northern Caucasus* (2001). That book, in turn, is a major piece of evidence for the argument that Stalin did, indeed, kill Ukrainians because they were Ukrainians.

In his brief but enlightening lecture at the UN, Hunczak raises a key point. The 20<sup>th</sup> century saw several mass killings equal to genocide, namely the Armenian massacre of 1915 and the almost simultaneous artificially created famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine and the Holocaust against the Jews and the Gypsies during World War II (p. 13).

Mark von Hagen's lecture at the UN — "The Terror-Famine and the State of Ukrainian Studies," which has been printed verbatim, as delivered — is outstanding and alone worth the price of the book. Von Hagen is Chairman of the History Department at Columbia University and has freely discussed some of the most sensitive issues: the failure of an organized effort to have Duranty's Pulitzer Prize revoked; his cooperation with Ukrainian archivists, as contrasted with the attitude of Russian archivists; and his difficulty in persuading Russian historians.

In reading both Hunczak and von Hagen, we find that it was not possible to succeed in the anti-Duranty campaign. In general, a posthumous revocation of an award is rather awkward to handle and might lead to unanticipated consequences. In Duranty's case, not only did he have the ear of Franklin D. Roosevelt (p. 32), but he was also friends with Herbert Pulitzer, the son of Joseph Pulitzer, in whose name the award was established (p. 31). Duranty also expressed the spirit of the times, more broadly defined by von Hagen as "the Duranty syndrome." Von Hagen wrote: "This was not the era of sympathy for the underdog in history, but of great men, and, most often, cruel and tyrannical great men" (p. 27).

Important is von Hagen's poignant reference to a close personal friend, the late Russian historian Viktor Danilov, who almost to his death resisted any suggestion that the Great Famine in Ukraine had any anti-national aspects (pp. 23-24). Interesting is also the contrast between the Russian and Ukrainian archivists with whom von Hagen had to deal. He failed to get archives from World War II in Moscow, whereas two former National Archivists in Ukraine, Ruslan Pyrih and Hennady Boriak (p. 23) gave him documents on very sensitive topics, "including the fates of *Ostarbeiter* from Ukraine in the Third Reich, collaboration by important Ukrainian intellectuals with German occupying authorities, and the NKVD's ruthless filtration of returning or returned Ukrainian citizens from forced labor or prison in the Reich" (p. 29). This struck a personal chord in the reviewer, of which later.

But truly superb and eloquently expressed is von Hagen's insight into how "genuine collective memory and the officially promoted commemorative memory of the war" have impeded the study of the *Holodomor-Genocide*. In his words: "Before leaving the topic of Soviet taboos and myths, I'd like to consider one considerably more *intangible* matter that shaped and helped to silence the collective memory and the officially promoted commemorative memory of the war. *Both sets of memories have served to occlude the experience of famine in 1932-33.* The horrors of Nazi Germany's occupation, including the Holocaust, but also the deportation of Ostarbeiter and the postwar experience of repatriation to Stalin's Soviet Union, reshaped the remembered experience of the famine itself for those who survived. This remembering was further compromised by the Soviet state's policy of resettling *millions of Russian and Ukrainian farmers* from non-famine regions of the USSR to the worst affected provinces. For many of the resettler population, the memory of those whose graves they trod regularly in their everyday lives was largely absent. This perpetrated and reinforced the imposed silence that reigned in Ukraine and elsewhere for so many subsequent decades"<sup>1</sup> (p. 25). This insight also bears on the question of the number of victims.

Serbyn's contribution — "The Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 and the United Nations Convention on Genocide" — is a revised version of his brilliant article in the Summer 2006 issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, which was also published in the *Action Ukraine Report* (AUR # 774, October 14, 2006). In the book, he freely admits that while the fact that the famine occurred is no longer questioned, "[w]hat is still disputed is the number of victims, the reason [for] the catastrophe, and its nature." He brings in contrary interpretations, citing R. W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft — the authors of the 2004 book *The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933* — to whom the famine was "unexpected and undesirable" (p. 34). Serbyn also grants and documents that "[t]he Ukrainian famine has not yet been recognized as genocide by the United Nations" (p. 35). Not only this, but Ukrainian historians are not unanimous in interpreting the Famine. In particular, Serbyn criticizes the well-known Stanislav Kulchytsky, of the Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, who not only has changed his position on the Famine rather frequently over time, but who has taken a diametrically opposite stand on the Famine as genocide in the very same publication (see p. 36

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<sup>1</sup> Emphasis added by author.



for details). Kulchytsky has not been asked to contribute to this book — in my opinion, rightly so.

Serbyn's contribution is clarity on three points: "(1) The Ukrainian famine was genocide. (2) Documents show that deliberate starvation was directed against Ukrainians. (3) The evidence meets the criteria set by the 1948 United Nations Convention on Genocide" (p. 38). He is convincing by bringing in the life mission of the true father of the UN Genocide Convention, Raphael Lemkin, "[a] Polish Jew, born in what today is Lithuania, ... [who] studied law at the University of Lviv, where he became interested in crimes against groups and, in particular, the Armenian massacres during the First World War" (p. 38). He references Stalin's public 1925 statement that "the farmers constitute the main army of the national movement," as found by Vasyl Hryshko, Robert Conquest, and others (pp. 50-51). Above all, by analyzing the documents discovered by Shapoval and his associates, Serbyn concludes: "By the end of 1932, the 'war against the farmers' in Ukraine and in the Ukrainian regions of the RSFSR had become *an outright assault on the Ukrainian nation*"<sup>2</sup> (p. 74).

The crux of Serbyn's argument is that the fate of the ethnic Ukrainians in Northern Caucasus and elsewhere in the RSFSR was even worse. In his words: "They were submitted to a real national pogrom. The Poltava stanytsia [in the Kuban region] was deported (2,158 families with 9,187 members) by 27 December [1932] and resettled on 28 January 1933 with 1,826 demobilized soldiers. Other Cossack stanytsias fared likewise. *All Ukrainization was discontinued and replaced with Russification*. The Ukrainian language was banned from all office work in local administration, cooperative societies, and schools. The printing of newspapers and magazines in the Ukrainized raions of the Northern Caucasus was to be switch[ed] immediately from Ukrainian to Russian, which, the document claimed, was a language 'more understandable to the Kuban residents'. Preparation was to begin immediately for the transfer in the autumn of all Ukrainian schools into Russian. ... On 15 December 1932, Molotov and Stalin signed another ban on Ukrainization, this time for the other regions of the USSR that had previously been subject to Ukrainization. Previous demands from 'Ukrainian comrades'<sup>3</sup> for mandatory Ukrainization of a whole series of regions of the USSR (for example in the Far Eastern Territory, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Central Black-Earth Oblast, etc.)' are con-

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<sup>2</sup> Emphasis added by author.

<sup>3</sup> In other words, party members.

demned. ... *It should be noted that the attack on Ukrainization does not even have an economic pretense*"<sup>4</sup> (pp. 75-76).

This emphasis on the physical removal of Ukrainians from the Northern Caucasus and the forcible Russification of all ethnic Ukrainians outside the Ukrainian SSR does strengthen Serbyn's thesis that Stalin committed genocide against Ukrainians as such — but this is what really happened in history.

Shapoval's article — "Significance of newly discovered archival documents for understanding the causes and consequences of the famine-genocide of 1932-1933 in Ukraine" (pp. 84-97) — is most welcome because of Shapoval's role in discovering and publicizing those documents. At the same time, an interested American reader will find that the alphabet soup of abbreviations is difficult to follow. (This criticism also applies to most of the documents. Perhaps a glossary at the end would have helped?) In Shapoval's contribution, there is an oversight which is not so obvious: "...were organized [sic] by the 'enemies of the Soviets, *esers*,"<sup>5</sup> and Polish agents with the purpose of agitating 'through the farmers' in the northern regions of the USSR against the collective farms and against the Soviet regime in general" (p. 92). The reference here is to the SRs, or Socialist Revolutionaries, a party opposed to the Bolsheviks.

I was uncomfortable with Wolowyna's article on "Demographic Dimensions of the 1932-1933 Famine in Ukraine" (pp. 98-114). He is very good in bringing out the shockingly low life expectancy at birth: "A male born in 1933 was expected to live, on the average, only 11 years, and the respective figure for females was 15 years. The impact of the Famine in terms of life expectancy at birth in 1933 was worse than the impact in World War II in 1942, the worst year in terms of human losses" (p. 112). In 1942, the life expectancy for males was 18 (see p. 111). He also cautions us that the official documents at the local level have provided fragmentary evidence of high levels of underreporting of deaths. According to Ukrainian demographer E. Libanova and others, in 1933 alone the true number of deaths was "3.55 million, or close to twice the 1.85 million officially registered number of deaths in 1933" (p. 108).

What makes me uncomfortable about Wolowyna's article is his statement that, despite all the details showing underreporting of deaths, he flatly states that "estimates of losses like 10 million or more are unrealistic, and that a more accurate estimate is probably in the 4-6 million range"

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<sup>4</sup> Emphasis added by author.

<sup>5</sup> Emphasis added by author.

(p. 106). Wolowyna also dismisses, without any discussion, the figures presented for the 1926 census of the total population from the *Holodomor 1932-33* section of Ukraine's Presidency website (p. 100), preferring data offered by the deeply conflicted Kulchytsky (pp. 102-103). Wolowyna's approach is scholarly, however; he does cite his sources.

A few words on the section of documents would be appropriate. It does have the key document "Directive of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government Prohibiting the Departure of Starving Farmers from Ukraine and the Kuban, January 22, 1933," which amounts to Stalin's declaration of war on the Ukrainians as a nation, both in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus (pp. 127-128). Moreover, this key document is beautifully presented, with all the necessary editorial notes.

The section also includes another key document, Italian Consul Gradenigo's Dispatch of May 31, 1933, "RE: The Famine and the Ukrainian Question" (pp. 131-136). This telegram is particularly important for its blunt conclusion that the Famine was equivalent to genocide. "... The current disaster will bring about a preponderantly Russian colonization of Ukraine. It will transform its ethnographic character. In a future time, perhaps very soon, one will no longer be able to speak of a Ukraine, or a Ukrainian people, and thus not even of a Ukrainian problem, because Ukraine will become a *de facto* Russian region" (p. 136).

Because the document is so important, let me offer a double counsel of perfection, to be implemented in the second edition of the book. First, the conclusion itself should have been also printed in the original Italian. Second, there is a mention of Khvylovy and Hirniak on p. 136, which should have been explained to the reader. Mykola Khvylovy was a Ukrainian writer, who wanted to put a liberating distance between Ukraine and Russia — and who shot himself in protest against Stalin's policy on May 13, 1933. Yosyp Hirnyak [Hirniak] was a close associate of the famous modernist Ukrainian theater director Les Kurbas. Hirnyak was arrested in 1933, but he survived and later immigrated to the United States. Kurbas was executed in 1937.

To cite the wise observation of Huttenbach: "...[T]he experience of violence in Ukraine pointed to more than implementing state goals by all means available. The mega killings and mass deportations as well as the murder of political elites and willful destruction of cultural monuments had an *existential dimension amounting to genocide*. As the documents unambiguously reveal, underlying the Great Famine was the official intention to threaten the very existence of Ukrainianism. Thus, within the war to

reshape the Soviet Union lurked another war, the USSR versus Ukraine”<sup>6</sup> (p.12).

A few additional observations are in order on political usage in Ukraine, parallels between the policies of Stalin and those of Hitler, and the importance of capturing individual memories of Holodomor and *Lebensraum* evacuation survivors. While scholars like Hunczak, Serbyn, Shapoval and Wolowyna may go from international conference to international conference in their quest to establish a consensus of objective scholars’ opinions on the genocidal nature and demographic consequences of the *Holodomor*-Genocide, the anniversaries of the event call for political action by Ukrainian statesmen and their political allies in the West.

Even prior to the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Holodomor in 1993, Leonid M. Kravchuk, the first popularly elected President of Ukraine, wrote in a major interview in *Der Spiegel* that the Ukrainian people had been subjected to *Voelkermord*, roughly translated as genocide, with five to seven million victims.<sup>7</sup> Almost explicit in that interview was the idea that Soviet genocide of the Ukrainian people was the best argument for Ukraine becoming independent in 1991 and staying independent. Leonid D. Kuchma, Kravchuk’s somewhat authoritarian successor, did not address himself to that issue, but he did not bar the Ukrainian Parliament from passing a law in 2003 declaring that the *Holodomor* was an act of genocide.

The more democratic President Viktor Yushchenko, whose father had survived the Auschwitz Concentration Camp, has been in the forefront of commemorating the important 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the *Holodomor*-Genocide with greater political effect in Ukraine. More energetically than Kuchma, Yushchenko has also been trying to obtain international validation for the Ukrainian government position that the *Holodomor* had been genocide against the Ukrainian nation. But because of political opposition — and also to gain political advantages against his rivals in his own “Orange” camp — Yushchenko has allowed a Communist, Olha Ginzburg, a Holodomor denier, to head the extremely important National Archives. Furthermore, Yushchenko has also been inconsistent in using the figures of victims. For instance, in appealing to the participants of the International Conference at the United Nations on November 27, 2007, on the

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<sup>6</sup> Emphasis added by author.

<sup>7</sup> L. M. Krawtschuk, “‘Habt keine Angst vor uns’: Der ukrainische Præsident Leonid Makarowitsch Krawtschuk ueber seinen neuen Staat” [“‘You need not fear us’: The Ukrainian President Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk about his new state”], *Der Spiegel*, vol. 46, no. 6 (February 3, 1992), p. 155f.

occasion of the 75<sup>th</sup> Anniversary, Yushchenko said that the Holodomor in Ukraine had cost the lives of “almost ten million of our compatriots,”<sup>8</sup> which — given all the underreporting of deaths, settlement of ethnic Russians in Ukraine and, above all, the heavy physical or forcible assimilation losses among ethnic Ukrainians in the RSFSR — is a reasonable estimate, in my view. At the same time, on November 24, 2007, at 4:16 p.m., in his Presidential address at the Mykhailivsky Square in Kyiv, Yushchenko — whether using rhetorical or poetic license — referred to “three, five, seven or ten million innocent victims.”<sup>9</sup> In his formal proposal of November 2, 2006 to the Parliament to pass the law “On Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine,” Yushchenko used the figures “seven to ten million.”<sup>10</sup> As in the 1980s and 1990s, political action by the Ukrainian-American and Ukrainian-Canadian communities is indispensable, because the statesmen and politicians in Ukraine feel they have to make concessions to their opponents, who, as a rule, want to bury the evidence of the *Holodomor*-Genocide.

To facilitate political and diplomatic action, we must remember two facts. First, Stalin, *qua* Russian nationalist and imperial restorationist, hated all Ukrainians. Second, Hitler had also shortlisted the Ukrainians for “resettlement” — in reality, genocide — to free up *Lebensraum*. That the Ukrainians survived the two totalitarian dictators and established a democratic government is a near miracle. Our leaders and spokesmen should cease apologizing for our existence and start “calling a spade a spade.”

The evidence that Stalin hated all Ukrainians comes from a matter-of-fact statement in Andrei Sakharov’s 1968 book.<sup>11</sup> It is also well known that Stalin wanted to restore the Russian Empire under the Communist Party, giving the non-Russian peoples only provincial autonomy, and that he resented Mykola Skrypnyk, who had persuaded Lenin to form a Soviet Federation. Skrypnyk shot himself on July 7, 1933, after Stalin reversed the Ukrainization in the Northern Caucasus and other regions of the RSFSR that Skrypnyk’s associates had implemented.

As to the Nazis, Heinrich Himmler “conceived the plan to resettle the Ukrainians in Asia near and beyond the Caspian Sea and to settle Ger-

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<sup>8</sup> See the *Holodomor 1932-1933* section of the President’s website.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Andrei Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom* (Norton), p. 54.

mans in Ukraine after the war.”<sup>12</sup> Alexander Dallin’s massive 1957 book<sup>13</sup> documents the brutality of the German occupation. Relevant are also the works by the late Ihor Kamenetsky and the multi-talented Hunczak. Some Ukrainians collaborated with Hitler, as mentioned in von Hagen’s article; other more independent-minded Ukrainians were shot, such as the poet Olena Teliha, who was executed February 21, 1942, in the notorious Babi Yar.

It would appear that, with the exception of the 11 years under Khrushchev, who was part brutal dictator and part Communist reformer, Ukrainians could never succeed. Those who wanted to defend Ukrainian cultural and political rights such as General Petro Hryhorenko [Grigorenko], Mykola Rudenko, Nadiya Svitlychna and Dr. Nina Strokata Karavanska, all of whom I had the great honor and privilege to meet, were put in either insane asylums or labor camps. On the other hand, ambitious Ukrainian leaders who wanted to make a career in Moscow and who took to speaking Russian, such as Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, were rebuffed by the ethnic Russian clique in the Kremlin under Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev. As I see it, the Russians will never recognize that they committed an injustice by supporting Stalin’s *Holodomor-Genocide* — they are still waiting 75 years later for Ukrainians to disappear as an independent nation.

Implicit in the book as a whole, and especially clear in von Hagen’s chapter, is the challenge to all of us to add to the “collective memory” of the *Holodomor-Genocide* and of the Nazi brutalities during World War II. On my mother’s side, her younger sister Nastya Balabaj was taken as an *Ostarbeiter* to East Prussia. When my mother and I visited her in her camp, she told us that her older sister had managed to send the news about the *Holodomor* abroad. The news encompassed the very nadir of Ukraine’s history, namely, instances of cannibalism. Try as my father did, he could not have my aunt released. She disappeared when Soviet troops occupied the region.

My wife, Wira Rusanivskyj, survived the *Holodomor-Genocide* in the Poltava region. She pointed out to me that in a neighboring village all the peasants would leave their houses and hide overnight. They feared that the entire village would be moved out, which usually was done in the darkness of night. Serbyn documents how an entire Cossack settlement or

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<sup>12</sup> *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, II, p. 153.

<sup>13</sup> Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study in Occupation Policy*.

*stanytsia* was deported from the Kuban (p. 75). Could entire villages have been moved out of Ukraine itself without this being recorded in the literature? Finally, there is the poignant story of my wife's older brother Petro (Peter). He survived the *Holodomor* and, with the help of friends who gave him secret shelter, he even lived after he publicly refused to join the Kom-somol. When he was rounded up for work in Germany, he took his books with him to study. He said that the Germans were not as bad as the Communists. A somewhat rebellious *Ostarbeiter*, he was killed in a German concentration camp.

In summary, the book, with its arguments and documents, is splendid. It also raises some questions. The most important of those may be: How different was Stalin's *Holodomor*-Genocide from Hitler's only partly realized efforts to create *Lebensraum*?

## Book Reviews

Ruslan Pyrih (editor), *Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukrayini: Dokumenty i materialy* [The Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Documents and Materials], Kyiv: Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2007, 1,128 pages.

Valentyna Borysenko, Vasyl Danylenko, Serhiy Kokin, Olesia Stasiuk and Yuriy Shapoval (editors), *Rozsekrechena Pamyat: Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukrayini v dokumentakh GPU – NKVD* [Uncovered Memories: The Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine in the Documents of the GPU-NKVD], Kyiv: Stylos, 2007, 604 pages.

The volume *Rozsekrechena Pamyat* starts with three short introductions and is followed by five analytical chapters, which provide the reader with information as to the origin, planning and the execution of the *Holodomor*-Genocide in Ukraine and in Kuban. The first chapter, authored by Vasyl Danylenko, discusses the archives of the secret police, the GPU and NKVD, as a source of research of the tragic years of 1932-1933. The author's position is extended and reinforced by Serhiy Kokin's chapter on the role of secret police in the execution of *Holodomor*. The significance of the newly discovered documents, some of which became accessible to researchers only in 2006 (p. 45) is analyzed by Yuriy Shapoval. At last, according to Shapoval, the directives, orders and information of Cheka about the real situation in the village as well as statistics, eye-witness accounts, memoirs of concrete individuals — even pictures of that time — became accessible.

A very sensitive chapter about the people who witnessed and lived through the tragedy was written by Valentyna Borysenko. The tragedy described by these survivors, as conveyed by the author, is beyond imagination. This mass destruction of the population, writes Olesia Stasiuk in her chapter, brought about ruin and deformation of the Ukrainian traditional culture, affecting negatively its historical continuity. "Holodomor," wrote the author, "broke the human being as an individual who experienced irrevocable psychological changes — his emotional sphere was being deformed [and] traditional moral values were ruined" (p. 111). The ultimate



level of moral degradation was reflected in numerous cases of cannibalism, many cases of which are well recorded in the archives of the GPU.

The details of the methods used by the GPU — the State Political Administration (secret police) — and the results of their work can be found in *Rozsekrechena Pamyat*. Over 160 documents illustrate the genocidal decisions of the Communist Party and the methods by which the GPU implemented those decisions toward the farmers of Ukraine. The results are best illustrated by a letter from Z. Katsnelson, the Chairman of the GPU of Kharkiv, to V. Balytsky, the Head of the GPU of Ukraine, in which Katsnelson reports the increase of homeless, people of various ages dying in the streets of Kharkiv, and the increasing number of cases of cannibalism and corpse consumption throughout the oblast of Kharkiv. From March to June 1, 1933, the number of cases increased from nine to 221 (pp. 532-537).

The volume *Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukrayini* contains documents from all state archives in Kyiv and from various regional archives. Ruslan Pyrih, the editor of the volume, was also able to obtain documents from several state archives of Russia. It is an impressive collection of 681 documents, although some are abbreviated. It should be noted that almost all documents bore a special stamp of secrecy.

The documents, which are organized in chronological order, begin with the problems of grain delivery, then progress to various decisions by the polit-bureaus in the Kremlin and in Ukraine to try to force the farmers to deliver the quotas imposed upon them by the government. The process of confiscation of property and various forms of pressure reached its apogee on May 20, 1932: a letter to Stanislav Kosior, Secretary General of the Ukrainian Communist Party speaks "about mass famine, death and cannibalism in the Uman county of the Vinnytsia region" (no. 100, pp.166-168). The documents in the volume relate the process of rapid deterioration of life in the villages. The communist government took extreme steps, as is illustrated by the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on August 7, 1932, to prevent farmers from finding food even on the already harvested fields of collective farms (no. 210, pp. 282-283).

The pressure gained new political dimensions beginning August 11, 1932, when Stalin in his letter to L. Kaganovich, his right-hand man, expresses his concern about the developments in Ukraine. He stated: "If we do not attempt now to correct the situation in Ukraine, we may lose Ukraine" (no. 212, pp. 285-286). In addition to all the documents about various measures to obtain the planned grain deliveries, we find an increasing number of documents which call for "liquidation of counterrevo-

lutionary nests” (no. 294) and “measures to conduct operative pressure against kurkul-petlyurite and counterrevolutionary elements” (nos. 310, 333, 335, 357 and others). In many documents we find such expressions as “agenturno-represyivni zakhody GPU” or, for example, “Operational order to DPU USRR ‘concerning the next tasks in secret-operational work of the organs of DPU USRR’.” In that lengthy document of February 13, 1933, the agencies of the Secret Police are instructed to deliver a decisive blow against all “kulak-petlyurite elements,” whose objective is to organize an armed uprising in the Spring of 1933 “in order to overthrow the Soviet authority and to establish a capitalist state, so-called Ukrainian independent republic”(no. 476, pp. 672-684).

Another tragic subject documented in the volume is the question of mass exodus of farmers in search of food, since everything edible was taken away from them (no. 442). On the same date, January 22, 1933, Stalin issued a decree forbidding the farmers from Kuban and Ukraine to go to Russian provinces and to Belarus in search of food. Stalin’s Decree (no. 440) was reinforced by the Communist Party of Ukraine on the next day (no. 443). As a result of these directives, farmers who tried to leave the villages in search of food were either arrested or sent back to their villages.

To make their rule of terror more effective, the communists decided to deport entire villages to the north (no. 374). On December 29, for example, Stalin was informed that the deportation of farmers from regions of Kuban was completed (nos. 386 and 419). They were replaced by victims from other regions (no. 625).

The documents presented in the two volumes illustrate the drama and the tragedy of the Ukrainian people in 1932-1933. Both volumes are carefully researched and provide the reader with the image of a society thrust into an artificial famine, with all exits for survival closed by the authorities. The famine, as illustrated in the documents, has all the characteristics of a man-made tragedy — whose ultimate objective was genocide against the Ukrainian people.

The publishers and the editors of the two volumes did an excellent job in presenting hitherto inaccessible documents to scholars, as well as to general readers.

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L. M. Buryan and I. E. Rikun (editors), *Holodomor v Ukrayini 1932-1933 rr. : bibliohrafichnyi pokazhchyk* [The Famine in Ukraine of 1932-1933: A Bibliographical Guide] (English title page: *The Genocide by Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933. A Bibliography*), Odesa, Lviv: M. R. Kots, 2001, 654 pages.

This book is the result of several years of work by professional bibliographers, compiled with the cooperation of such prestigious institutions as the M. Gorky Odesa State Scientific Library, The Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and The Ukrainian Studies Foundation in Australia. The bibliographical descriptions, which consist of 6,384 main entries, also include many reviews and second, and/or later, editions. The bibliographical entries are preceded by three forewords and one analytical article, which were written in Ukrainian and translated into English by W. Motyka, the President of The Ukrainian Studies Foundation in Australia. The initial offering is a foreword titled, "Note for the compilers," that gives an interesting overview of library resources and the individuals who were most helpful in compiling the work.

The main part of the book was done in the scientific libraries in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa, as well as some university libraries in the United States, notably at the Library of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The list of persons who contributed to this project includes: W. Motyka (University of Newcastle), L. Pendzey (University of Toronto), P. Rikun (Harvard University), D. Shtohryn (University of Illinois) and B. Yasinsky (Library of Congress).

L. H. Lukianenko, Head of the Association of Researchers of the Genocidal Famines in Ukraine, in his foreword "Our Nation's Tragedy," indicates that the main reason for attempting to destroy the substance of the Ukrainian nation was its striving for independence. This was evident, particularly when Ukraine was occupied by Russia in all of its various colors and régimes. In order to prove his assertions, Lukianenko stated:

"Had we not risen up in the years of 1917-1920s and not shaken the empire, it would not have organized the execution of the people of Kyiv for wearing folk-custom shirts, and would not have created in 1921-1923 a genocidal famine in the south-eastern regions of Ukraine. Had there not been a movement of mass uprising during the 1920s, Moscow would not have organized in 1932-1933 the destruction of 10 million farmers and people of the land, and a further 500,000 nationally conscious and active Ukrainian intelligentsia in the years 1934 to 1941. Had not Ukraine risen up with even greater tenacity during the Second World War, then Moscow

would not have organized the famine of 1946-1947 in the *Naddnipro-anshchyna* region, would not have forcefully transported 2 million Ukrainian people of the land of the western regions of Ukraine to Siberia, and would not have resorted to inhuman methods of suppressing the Ukrainian desire for independence" (p. 16).

The core of the research and compilation of the bibliography was done at the M. Gorky Odesa State Scientific Library by its bibliographers mentioned above. However, it should be noted that, according to its Director, O. F. Botushanska: "deserving of high recognition and appreciation for the dedicated work over many years is the entire team of professionals from our library" — including L. O. Zhyrnova and E. S. Zhymolostnova, and editors M. L. Denysenko and I. S. Shelestovych (p. 23). As hostess and coordinator of the project, Botushanska expressed her appreciation to a long list of people who were involved in the undertaking. She stated: "To this end we present, in the memory of those seven million who were killed in Ukraine in 1932-1933, the efforts of the professional personnel of the Library for the consideration of the reader" (p. 24).

"The darkest page in the history of Ukraine" is the title of the article by S. V. Kulchytskyi, Director of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Its text is divided into six parts which methodologically present a condensed, but lucid, historiographical outline not only of the Famine itself, but also of historical events in the Soviet political system. The text reveals Moscow's plan for the physical destruction of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, as well as the core of the nation — its village-farmers. The subject of the 1932-1933 Famine was familiar to the author, since, as he mentioned, it "has been revisited in my research work. In the latter part of the 1980s it forced me to reject stereotypical models, implanted in my brain still in my childhood" (p. 46). He was involved in the study of this topic by virtue of his membership in a special Commission, which was established by the Central Committee of the CPU in 1987. This Commission was formed after it became evident that the work of the U.S. Congress Commission "for the study of the reasons of the famine in Ukraine 1932-33, inspired by the Soviet government," under the directorship of James Mace, was almost completed. The Commission created by the Central Committee of the CPU "expected fundamental studies along the lines of exposing the falsification of bourgeois nationalists" (p. 61).

The article shows that Kulchytskyi is knowledgeable, not only with the archival materials of the subject, but also with almost all source publications published in Ukraine and abroad, especially Malcolm Mug-

geridge's article in *The Manchester Guardian* (March 1933) and Walter Duranty's "Russians are hungry, but are not dying of hunger" in *The New York Times* (March 31, 1933), which was an attempt to counter the views put forth in *The Manchester Guardian*. There are also cited articles on the 1932-1933 Famine by B. Kravchenko, R. Serbyn, Mace and the work by Robert Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow* (1986). In his analysis, the author emphasized their scholarly importance, as well as their political impact not only on Soviet Ukraine, but also on the Soviet Union as a whole.

In his description of foreign publications on the 1930's Famine, the scholar was very exacting. He did not ignore the voices of Moscow, such as that of S. A. Kovalov, the Head of the Committee of the Duma of the Russian Federation, and M. O. Ivnytskyi, one of the leading specialists of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who opposed "the thesis that the character of the famine was anti-Ukrainian" (p. 65). He also discusses the 1995 polemic between Conquest and Sh. Merle, a German specialist on the agricultural history of the USSR in "Otiechestvennaia istoriia."

In Kulchytskyi's opinion, "the main role in activating research into the famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine was played by the Association of Research of the Genocidal Famine in Ukraine, founded by V. A. Manyak and his wife L. B. Kovalenko," and presently headed by Lukianenko (p. 63). It should be stressed that Kulchytskyi's article presented an analytic outline of historical events and political maneuvers, the description of which is helpful in understanding the great artificial Famine of 1932-1933.

The bibliography itself is divided into several chapters:

1. Publications of official documents and archival materials, containing 2,700 entries, from the years between 1933 and 2000.
2. "Famine 1932-1933," which includes 2,864 bibliographical descriptions, with an attempt to cover the years 1931 to 2000.
3. "Commemoration of the Famine victims" — 707 descriptions that were published during the years from 1948 to 2000.
4. Publications on the Famine in the various oblasts (regions), which contains 1,730 entries that present sundry publications, connected with the famine, in 17 eastern and central oblasts of Ukraine from 1989 to 2000.
5. "National tragedy in literature and art," which includes literary works; works of unknown authors; literary and literary-musical scenarios, compositions; literary competitions; musical works, concerts; radio; television programs; motion pic-

tures; paintings; memorials and sculpture. All are presented in 1,730 entries that were published from 1989 to 2000.

6. "Exhibits," which includes 22 bibliographical entries, covering the years from 1983 to 1998.
7. Bibliographical materials — 22 entries of publications that were published in the 31 years from 1968 to 1999.

The book also includes several indexes: a subject index, an index of reference sources, an index of names, an index of geographical names, an index of periodical publications and an index of abbreviations of the names of organizations and institutions (pp. 566-651). There also is a map of the territories of Ukraine under Soviet occupation, identifying the oblasts that suffered from the Famine. These auxiliary features are most helpful in navigating and understanding the materials presented.

*Holodomor v Ukrayini 1932-1933 rr.: bibliohrafichnyi pokazhchyk* should be recognized as the most comprehensive bibliography on the subject published to date. It provides bibliographical descriptions of books, articles and other works about the 1932-1933 Famine mainly in Western Ukraine and abroad during the years from 1932 to 1989 and in Independent Ukraine until 2000. Its introductory articles deserve praise as a serious attempt to present an outline of historical events connected with that national tragedy.

However, this first attempt at compiling a comprehensive bibliography on this topic has some marginal drawbacks which should be taken into consideration for the second edition. They are apparent especially in the bibliographical descriptions of articles and reviews in periodicals, the index of which includes 327 titles of journals and 764 titles of newspapers published in Ukrainian, Russian, English and other Western languages, and issued in Ukraine and Western countries. Each title of those periodicals is accompanied with the place of their publication. It is expected that all those periodical publications listed in the index mentioned above were thoroughly examined in order to find in them the needed articles or reviews connected with the 1932-1933 Famine in Ukraine. Following the reviewed bibliography, one may have difficulty in overcoming some discrepancies. For example, the *Vistnyk* edited by D. Dontsov and published in Lviv in 1933-1939, has been listed in the index as it was examined by the compilers of the bibliography. Here one may find that Yuriy Klen's poem "Proklyati roky," published in the *Vistnyk* (1937, kn. 3) and E. Malaniuk's "Voloshkovi ochi" (about the organized famine in Ukraine, 1931-1934) were not listed in the bibliography in their original publication, but

rather referenced to later published sources. O. Burghardt's articles "Cherha" (*Vistnyk*, 1937, kn. 9) and "Bolshevytska spadshchyna" (*Vistnyk*, 1939, kn. 2) are not described in the bibliography.

Among the enormous number of newspapers (764 titles), there are the dailies *America* (Philadelphia), *Svoboda* (Jersey City), *Dilo* (Lviv) and *Novyi chas* (Lviv). The articles in Ukrainian (especially those issued in Western Ukraine and abroad) and foreign newspapers started to be published in 1933. For the years 1932 and 1933, the compilers describe only five titles of *Novyi chas*, nine of *Dilo*, none of *America* and 77 of *Svoboda*. The significant historical event — M. Lemyk's assassination of a representative of the Soviet consulate in Lviv (in protest against the organized famine in Soviet Ukraine) in 1933, which had been widely described in Western Ukrainian and foreign newspapers, was mentioned only once in the monthly *Misionar* (1933, no. 9).

One may find additional shortcoming, but those examples of failures in description of publications for a two-year period should be corrected in following editions. In the next edition, it would be advisable to take into consideration the following bibliographical publications which were not considered in this work:

- Illia Chaykovskiy, *Ukrayinski periodychni vydannya v Druhiy svitoviy viyni, 1939-1945*; edited and supplemented by M. Kravchuk (Philadelphia: Kyiv Publishing House, 1976)
- Mykola Martynyuk, *Ukrayinski periodychni vydannya Zakhidnoyi Ukrayiny, krayin Tsentralnoyi ta Zakhidnoyi Yevropy (1914-1939 rr.): materialy do bibliohrafiyi* (Lviv: Lvivska naukova biblioteka im. V. Stefanyka)
- Volodymyr Maruniak, "Periodyka 1945-1951 v Nimechchyni ta Avstriyi" in his *Ukrayinska emigratsiya v Nimechchyni i Avstriyi po Druhiy svitoviy viyni* (Munich: Akademichne vydavnytstvo Petra Beleya, 1985), pp. 411-419.

*Holodomor v Ukrayini 1932-1933 rr.: bibliohrafichnyi pokazhchyk* is not only a most valuable resource for researchers but a peerless reference publication on one of the darkest chapters of Ukrainian history. It is most certainly useful to students and scholars — but particularly revealing and instructive for those who study genocide.

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Leonid Rudnytzky, *Ivan Franko i nimetska literatura* [Ivan Franko and German Literature], Lviv, Ukraine: Naukove Товариство imeni Shevchenka, Ukrayinoznavcha Biblioteka NTSh, Number 10, 202, 238 pages, includes index, photographs and illustrations.

Literary translations form an integral part of Ivan Franko's work. Throughout his entire life, the author was very much concerned with the fate of his native Galicia, as well as with that of Ukraine, and he attempted to integrate more intimately Ukrainian culture into the West European realm. This he was able to do with a considerable degree of success because of his knowledge of foreign languages, which enabled him to translate masterpieces of world literature into Ukrainian. His views concerning the importance of translations are well known: he saw literary translations as bridges between nations. According to Franko, they constitute a dialogue of cultures which enhances mutual understanding and enriches national cultures.

The fact that translations from German literature occupy a principal position in Franko's *oeuvre* is quite understandable, in light of the fact that Galicia, i.e., Western Ukraine, at that time belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and German was the dominant language in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, as Franko himself once noted, "the German people have played a most significant role in the history of the modern world, even more significant than the ancients, including the Greeks and the Romans ... The German people throughout their almost 2000 year-old history present us with a picture of such wide and diverse development that has no equal among other contemporary nations" (pp. 45-46). It is primarily for this reason that Franko devoted so much attention and effort to German literature.

It is quite difficult to offer a cogent analysis of Franko's achievements as a translator from the German. The scholar undertaking such a challenging project must be intimately familiar with both the German and the Ukrainian language; he (or she) must have a profound understanding of various periods of literary history, an appreciation for poetic devices as well as for the aesthetics of the various epochs involved. In addition, the critic must also be familiar with the social and political contexts of the times and be able to assess and evaluate the selection criteria applied by the Ukrainian sage as he translated the works in question. It appears, therefore, that any scholar who dares to undertake such a task would have to be almost as erudite as the Ukrainian genius himself.



In our opinion, the work under review and its author are able to do justice to the subject matter. Leonid Rudnytzky, having been born in Lviv at the time when the city was still alive with the spirit of Franko, having mastered the German language at an early age and acquired a thorough knowledge of German literature and culture, is ideally suited to undertake such a study. His scholarly endeavors on Franko and the Germans can well be considered a life-time work. It began with his doctoral dissertation entitled *Franko's Translation from German Literature* (1965), which he later expanded and published under the title "*Ivan Franko and German Literature*" (1974) and finally culminated in the present edition. All of these works were written in Ukrainian. The 1974 publication received numerous positive reviews, but it was banned in Ukraine, which was at that time a part of the Soviet Union. Thus, it is only fitting that another expanded edition of the study should appear in today's independent Ukraine as a publication of the Shevchenko Scientific Society.

There is no question that Rudnytzky has initiated a new chapter in the studies of Franko, which is a separate discipline in Ukrainian scholarship known as *frankoznavstvo*. This latest edition of his work is very useful to both Ukrainian and German scholars. It discovers, *ab ovo*, so to speak, the causes and contexts of Franko's uses of the German language in his own imaginative works and thus makes a definite contribution to a deeper understanding of Franko, the man and the artist. According to Rudnytzky, the German language is for Franko the principal means of communication with Europe and the channel of information on the happenings and events in Ukraine. Rudnytzky's analysis of Franko's German correspondence, in the chapter entitled "Ivan Franko and the German-speaking World: the Importance of the Milieu on Poetry" (pp. 13- 30), offers highly revealing glimpses of Franko's knowledge and feelings for the German languages and his ability to express in it his most intimate thoughts and emotions. In this connection, Rudnytzky's work touches on two very important aspects of Franko studies which deserve additional exploration: the influence of the Ukrainian scholar-poet on his German contemporaries, and the possibility that there are still numerous letters in various European archives written by Franko to sundry eminent Europeans of his time, which have not been as yet discovered by scholars.

A comprehensive analysis of the importance of the German languages for Franko's literary activities is continued in the chapter "German Language and Literature in the Work of Ivan Franko" (pp. 31- 60), which reflects the poet's constant preoccupation with and the presence of German in his consciousness. Rudnytzky diligently analyses the use of German

proverbs, sayings and quotations from various German poets and thinkers in Franko's works and assesses the importance — for Franko — of individual German poets, such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Heinrich Heine, Friedrich Schiller and others.

In the next chapters, Rudnytzky examines and evaluates Franko's translations. He offers detailed comparisons of lexical and stylistic devices present in both the originals and the translations. This line of scholarly activity is especially impressive, inasmuch as it reveals a depth of philological knowledge on the part of the author and his ability to follow the flight of fancy of both the original German authors and their Ukrainian translator, i.e., make incisive analyses of the differences between the originals and the translations. Thus Rudnytzky analyses Franko's translations from a thousand years of German literature, including such medieval masterpieces as the epic poems *Hildebrandslied* and *Nibelungenlied*, great literary works of the 18<sup>th</sup> century (the works of Lessing, Goethe, Schiller and Heinrich von Kleist), as well as authors from the 19<sup>th</sup> century, including Heinrich Heine, the Swiss novelists G. Keller and C.F. Mayer and others.

The author analyses critically the metric, lexical, stylistic, syntactic and aesthetic features of Franko's translations, compares and contrasts the images of the German originals with those found in the translations, examines in great detail the rendering of German idioms and toponyms in Ukrainian, which Franko accomplished with the help of archaisms and words from Ukrainian dialects in attempting to make the German texts more accessible to Ukrainian readers. Special attention is paid to the evolution of Franko's *Weltanschauung* and the resulting changes in his criteria for the selection of works to be translated.

It should be stressed that the book has a certain monumental quality. In addition to the some 200 pages of text by the author, the edition also boasts a thoughtful "Foreword" by Ivan Denysiuk; an "Afterword" by Albert Kipa; Ukrainian, German and English language summaries; an index of names and titles of works, as well as an extensive (not to say exhaustive) bibliography (pp. 215-227) on the subject. What makes the book eminently readable and attractive are the translations of German quotations into Ukrainian and the carefully selected illustrations, all features that the 1974 edition did not have. Much praise for these and other salient characteristics of the book should be accorded to the President of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Ukraine, Oleh Kupchynsky, whose editorial expertise left an indelible imprint on the work.

*Ivan Franko and German Literature* can be recommended to all and sundry who seek a more profound knowledge of the life and works of Franko. It offers new horizons and new interpretations, thus shedding more light on Franko from heretofore unknown perspectives. Pertinent and fresh information is also made available on the works of the German writers translated by Franko. As Rudnytzky frequently points out, "every translation is *ipso facto* an interpretation, thus the translator is often, *nolens volens* a critic and always an interpreter." The work will also be of immense value to theoreticians of translation and well as to translators themselves, because the author does point out several interesting features of Franko's translating techniques. And finally, for the Ukrainian linguists, especially those who are interested in Franko's language, the study offers a revealing insight into the coexistence of western and eastern Ukrainian lexical and morphological elements in Franko's work. Rudnytzky's work is definitely a classic of contemporary Ukrainian Franko scholarship.

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Maria Grazia Bartolini and Giovanna Brogi Bercoff (editors), *Kiev e Leopoli. Il testo culturale* [Kyiv and Lviv. *The cultural text*], Florence, Italy: Firenze University Press, 2007, 244 pages.

Ukraine's dynamic and diverse cultural identity in the 20<sup>th</sup> century largely reflects its historical positioning between two very different worlds: Communist Russia and the Nazi-Fascist regimes in Europe. *Kiev e Leopoli. Il testo culturale* offers expert and novice readers alike a rare purview into the Ukrainian experience of this nation's historical struggle to establish its own identity, and even the validity of its own language, against a backdrop of pervasive and often conflicting external political and social influences.

The book, which testifies to the nation's struggle to create a single, unifying cultural identity since gaining its independence in 1991, contains a series of articles, the majority of which are written in Italian, that were presented at the Italian Association of Ukrainian Studies Convention in Milan, Italy in 2007. This collection of heterogeneous essays utilizes interdisciplinary approaches to the subject matter; the unifying element is their

focus on two Ukrainian cities that are considered to be the most representative of Ukraine as a whole. At once diverse and complimentary, Kyiv is home to multiple ethnicities and religions, while Lviv, is a city characterized by more complex cultural features, but less social integration. It is within this finite geographic context that the book works to illustrate both the Ukrainian people's capacity to adapt elements of other cultures to fit their own needs and beliefs, as well as the limitations of the ability to do so and the difficulties it has created in defining their own national identity.

The book starts with an article which explains the influence of Horace's poetics on the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in an attempt to understand and learn about the classical legacy, and to appreciate Renaissance humanism through the practice of the *imitatio antiquorum*. In the only work written in French, Daniel Tollet contemplates the contemporary Polish clergy's attitude toward the Jews.

Particularly interesting is Ksenya Konstantynenko's "Artistic Life in Lviv in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century: the Icons," in which the author illustrates the main characteristics of the Ukrainian icon painting art by describing the Slavo-Byzantine and Polish legacies on which it relies, and by pointing out the main differences between the two traditions.

In another essay, Maria Grazia Bartolini illustrates the close mutual relationship between the philosopher Skovoroda and the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, his *alma mater*, which provided him with the knowledge and vehicles for his theories and, therefore, profoundly influenced his own identity as a philosopher.

On a different note, Aldo Ferrari contemplates how, while Kyiv was the city in which the Armenians settled their first colony after the *diaspora*, around 1550, their colony in Lviv had actually become the most important cultural center in Ukraine. The author also notes that Lviv was the city in which the union between Ukrainians, Armenians and the Roman Church took place, an event that facilitated the full integration of the two populations by the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

In "Lwów is everywhere: Considerations about two Cities by Adam Zagajewsky," Luca Bernardini points out some of the paradoxical characteristics of the two mythological cities, Lviv and Vilnius, idealized through memories and nostalgia in the Polish imaginary. Similarly, in "The Poles' Sentimental Journey to Lwów," Bozena Myciek describes the magical image of Lwów filtered by the Poles' nostalgia for the city they were forced to abandon as a direct consequence of the Yalta agreement. Their profound sorrow and resentment, stemming from the loss of the city, prompted them to write poems, short stories and anecdotes in order to ex-

press these sentiments — writings which today bear witness to their perceptions of the city.

In his article, written in English, Oleksij Toločko considers the reality of the Ukrainian national identity as opposed to the Russian perception of it. The author recounts an instance in the 18<sup>th</sup> century when a group of Russians found it impossible to visit Italy because of the Napoleonic wars, and opted instead to pay homage to their own country by visiting Kyiv, which they had been made to believe was the “cradle” of their nation. To their surprise, they found clear signs of a foreign culture which, instead, presented indications of a recent Cossack history. Similarly, in “The Epics of Kyiv in the Russian Émigrés’ Memoirs (1918-1920),” Giuliana Lami uses historical writings to illustrate the perceptions that Russians and Ukrainians had of one another, particularly in the period of time after the October Revolution.

Architecture is also an important cultural expression, and in “Neo-Byzantinism in Kyiv and Lviv: Saint Vladimir’s Cathedral and the Church of Transfiguration,” Ewa Anna Rybalt describes the two cities’ attempts to re-establish ancient traditions through architecture, an undertaking which ultimately produced buildings that were unique accomplishments, rather than pure revivals of past traditions. Recognizing the historical role of religion within the Ukrainian culture, Simona Merlo discusses how the annexing of Ukraine in the Soviet system had a dramatic impact on Kyiv, by erasing its image as the “Holy City” for the Orthodox Church, a symbol restored only after the downfall of the Soviet régime.

In the last group of articles, the authors focus on a selection of literary and cultural works from the 20<sup>th</sup> century and discuss their influence on the recent processes of recovery, and then on Ukrainian civilization and national identity. Particularly in “Kyiv’s Romance: the Desacralization of the City’s Utopian Myth,” Tamara Hundorova demonstrates how the sacred apocalyptic myth of Kyiv changed into a perception of profane romance. Thanks to Eleonora Solovey’s essay, the reader also learns about the achievement of the Kyiv School of Poets in assuring the continuity of Ukrainian traditions, despite the fact that they were rejecting the contemporary literary institutions.

Oksana Pachlovska defines the main differences between Ukrainian (European-oriented) and Russian (anti-western imperialism) Orthodoxies during the “Orange Revolution.” By underlining the evident differences between Ukrainian and Russian historiography, the author urges a review of the cultural history of the eastern Slavs in an effort to broaden the quest for European identity. Finally, Olene Ponomareva discusses how and to

what extent the peculiar historical, ethnic and cultural aspects of the different regions in Ukrainian territory may have determined and justified political divergences (democratic and totalitarian) within the country.

*Kiev e Leopoli. Il testo culturale* is an informative and unique work of scholarship, and offers Italian readers one of their first introductions to contemporary Ukraine. Set within the context of the nation's most representative cities: Kyiv and Lviv, the book contains a diverse collection of articles, which together provide a window into the complex and fascinating culture of the Ukraine — a culture defined by external forces, yet uniquely its own.

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Vladislav Bevc (editor), *Smiling Slovenia: Political Dissent Papers*, New York: Peter Lang, 2008, 332 pages.

Slovenia is a 17-year-old nation — though an ancient culture — located on the geopolitical fault line between Western Europe and the Balkans. It is slightly smaller than New Jersey in area and, at two million souls, has only one forth of New Jersey's population. But despite its size, it houses an over-abundance of grievances and concerns.

What is one to make of this particular compilation of Slovenian complaints? Is this anthology essentially picking fleas off a mouse? Or do these admittedly partisan investigations offer more general interest?

A few of the articles are, in fact, flea-pickers. One that comes to mind describes how the President of the Republic of Slovenia came to be awarded an honorary doctorate by Cleveland State University. But most of the treatises deal with matters of broader interest — though, of course, from a Slovenian perspective.

One section, for example contains articles examining how power was retained, or quickly regained, by former communist party bigwigs even though their blood-soaked socialist experiment collapsed in abject failure. This same pattern was replicated throughout much of the former Communist Block, and the Slovenian experience is worthy of serious attention. This book offers worthwhile resources in this regard.

Of similar broad interest are accounts of Communist crimes, including the mass murder of the Communists' political foes, both during and after World War II. What with the U.S. sucking up to Marshall Tito when it suited our Cold War interests, this chapter of Balkan history is easily overlooked by Americans. This anthology offers a remedy.

One of the collection's weaknesses, however, is that some of the authors are so impressed by the evils of communism and the left that they fail to appreciate the perils of unalloyed capitalism and the right. Borut Prah, for example, asserts that property rights are "the cornerstone of our civilization." Tell that to those Americans whose enslavement was based on the assertion that they were property.

Similarly, the editor, Vladislav Bevc, asserts in the "Introduction" that there have been times in American history where "... it looks uncannily as if some kind of divine Providence held a protecting hand over America: as if some unknown Power felt that this best and perhaps last hope of humanity deserved divine protection."

What event excites this admitted agnostic to such religious and patriotic fervor? Would you believe the 2000 election of George W. Bush?! Had the other candidate won, Bevc opines, "we would probably be facing Mecca five times a day, our rears risen high, to the braying from the minarets — if were still alive, that is." One hopes Bevc's understanding of Slovenian events is more profound than his appreciation of recent American history.

One must also note that this collection offers the annoyance of numerous minor typographical errors. Words sometimes are misused, missing or out of place. At other times they are mysteriously doubled. Here are some examples:

- "Although censorship officially did not exist, more than thirty court injunctions against distributing printed materials in Slovenia have [been?] issued" (p. 43).
- "... and on the disastrous Communist political methods under the morals o[f] Marxist-Leninism which allowed murder and lies in the service of communism" (p. 68).
- "But an honorary [sic] makes no difference as it [is?] useless in the academia" (p. 133).
- "He was [a?] rarity among political policemen ..." (p. 149).

These and similar errors are a distraction and sufficiently common to detract from the overall effort.

In all, the entire book contains 62 articles and essays in 12 categories: "Dissent," "History," "Émigrés," "Communists," "American Views," "Nomenclatura Thrives," "Foreign Intrigue," "Human Rights," "Property Restitution," "The Judiciary," "Economy" and "Media Bliss." It is recommended for specialists or graduate students in Balkan affairs, as well as those with special interests in the now-defunct Yugoslavia and/or the recent history of the former Communist bloc.

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## **Guidelines for Submissions**

*The Ukrainian Quarterly* (UQ) is a scholarly journal open to contributions of articles and commentaries focusing on Ukrainian history, literature, politics, sociology, etc. and international affairs related to Ukraine, as well as reviews of books, journals and literary collections related to the aforementioned areas of interest.

Only articles that have not appeared elsewhere and are not being submitted for publication to another journal will be considered. Work that will soon be published in essentially the same form as part of a book or that is already available on the Internet should not be submitted.

The language of publication is English. Submission of any contributions originally created in another language and subsequently translated into English must be accompanied by the original version. Citations, quotations, references or other material included with the submission in a language other than English must also be translated. Special characters and accents must print clearly and unambiguously.

Submissions can be made electronically (preferred) or via typed manuscript. The preferred electronic format is Microsoft *Word for Windows*, submitted as an email attachment (see email address below). Typed manuscripts should be in Times Roman font, 12-point type, double-spaced for ease of review, paginated consecutively from start to finish. Illustrations should be legible photocopies, not originals; if an article is accepted, the author must supply high-quality black-and-white glossy photographs and permission to reproduce them. Regardless of the form of submission, tables and figures should include all required legends and pertinent values for data points.

Notes and any required bibliographic information should be formatted as footnotes, not endnotes. The UQ uses a modified MLA standard for all references and footnotes. The author is responsible for the accuracy and completeness of all citations and references. When in doubt, the author should err on the side of providing more rather than less information.

**Review Policies.** The UQ follows a policy of review of all submissions by members of the UQ Editorial Advisory Board. Upon receipt of the article, the editor will enlist selected members of the Advisory Board as a review panel. A decision on publication will be rendered within three months of receipt of the article.

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**Submission Instructions.** Article submissions and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the UQ Editor:

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