



SECRET

**NAZI
PLANS
for
EASTERN
EUROPE**

By
IHOR KAMENETSKY

A Study of
Lebensraum Policies

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BOOKMAN ASSOCIATES :: New York

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 61-9850

**MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY
UNITED PRINTING SERVICES, INC.
NEW HAVEN, CONN.**

TO MY PARENTS

Preface

The dawn of the twentieth century witnessed the climax of imperialistic competition in Europe among the Great Powers. Entrenched in two opposing camps, they glared at each other over mountainous stockpiles of weapons gathered in feverish armament races. In the one camp was situated the Triple Entente, in the other the Triple Alliance of the Central Powers under Germany's leadership. The final and tragic result of this rivalry was World War I, during which Germany attempted to realize her imperialistic conception of *Mitteleuropa* with the Berlin-Baghdad-Basra railway project to the Near East.

Thus there would have been established a transcontinental highway for German industrial and commercial expansion through the Persian Gulf to the Asian market. The security of this highway required that the pressure of Russian imperialism on the Middle East be eliminated by the fragmentation of the Russian colonial empire into its ethnic components. Germany planned the formation of a belt of buffer states (associated with the Central Powers and Turkey) from Finland, Beloruthenia (Belorussia), Lithuania, Poland to Ukraine, the Caucasus, and even to Turkestan.

The outbreak and nature of the Russian Revolution in 1917 offered an opportunity for Imperial Germany to realize this plan. The emergence of the buffer states on ethnically non-Russian territories was becoming a reality. They were partly legalized by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which was inspired by the Central Powers. But the Imperial German Government was either unable or unwilling to grasp and utilize the issues and motives of the Revolution. Germany's new order in Eastern Europe completely lacked a social message, and her principle of national self-determination was confused and inconsistent. Consequently, following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Germany's position in Eastern Europe was based mainly on her military strength, since her political and moral contributions were either

negligible or nonexistent. When German armies left Eastern Europe after the defeat in the West, their plans for a new international system in Eastern Europe represented no more than a vacuum.

There was still hope that the victorious Allies would succeed where Germany had failed. Wilson's Fourteen Points contained a potential promise, not only as an ideological challenge to Bolshevik slogans, but also as a basis for political, social, and national reconstruction in Eastern Europe, according to the Western pattern. Unfortunately, the Allies never treated Wilson's Fourteen Points very seriously, and the forces which they supported in the fight against Bolshevism had not very much to offer toward the solution of problems brought to the surface by the Revolution within the Tsarist Empire. The victory of Lenin, who proved to be more skillful in riding the waves of the Revolution, was a severe blow to the hope for democratization of Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, the effect of the Bolshevik seizure of power extended beyond the boundaries of Russia proper and later of the Soviet Union.

Aggressive Soviet Russian imperialism under the banner of world revolution inaugurated the era of dictatorships in Europe which partly justified their existence by posing as a defense against this new international menace: Mussolini's Fascism and Hitler's Nazism were also imitated in Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Persia and China.

How, we can ask, could this terrible anti-Christian ideology of Nazism arise in Germany among the "Volk der Dichter und Denker"? There are deep roots for this *Weltanschauung* in Fichte, Hegel and Treitschke, in Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and Wagner. The traditions of militarism under Frederick II, the "blood and iron" *Realpolitik* of Bismarck, and the fear of Russia's Pan-Slavism were also important factors.

But one must also take into consideration the Frenchman Gobineau, who proclaimed the Teutons a superior race among all men; the Englishman Houston Stewart Chamberlain, a forerunner of racism in Germany; the geopolitics of the Swede Kjellen; and the influences of the anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic

Russian Dostoevsky, who strongly influenced the Russian-educated Rosenberg. Also to be considered here are Hitler's Vienna background; Lueger's anti-Semitism; and the contempt and hate of von Schoenerer's Pan-Germanism for all Slavs with the traditions of the First Pan-Slav Congress in Prague in 1848, for all the Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, Slovenes, Croats, Slovaks and Serbs who endangered German supremacy in Austria-Hungary. All these factors also contributed to Hitler's emotional attitudes.

Another fact which should not be overlooked is that soon after World War I the Germans felt they had been deprived by the West of the promised right to self-determination during the disintegration of the Hapsburg Empire. It should also be understood that the treatment of the Republic with its Socialist government, especially in economic matters, was not always wise. To complete the background, the League of Nations, as a protector of European minorities and as the new authority for peace, soon lost any power it might have had. On the rising wave of German national resentment of alleged discrimination, Hitler came to power.

The inability of the Western democracies to grant German democracy equality and to organize the cooperation of democratic powers against Russian Communism and Italian Fascism became the springboard for Hitler's demagoguery. Let me say frankly, as one who had the opportunity as an accredited minister and envoy of his country to observe Germany in the early postwar years, that if the Western democracies had granted Ebert's Germany the same concessions they were forced to give Nazi Germany, then, in my opinion, Hitler never would have risen to power.

The Hitler movement, in the decade preceding its full ascension to power in 1933, had time to elaborate fully its ideology encouraged by the new aggressive imperialism of Soviet Russia (against the non-Russian peoples within her domain), of Italy (in Ethiopia), and Japan (in Manchukuo). Influenced by the previous great designs of World War I, the Nazi ideology now claimed a German *Lebensraum* in Eastern Europe up to the Urals. In this plan, the Jews would be liquidated, and the

Slavic nations numerically reduced, partially resettled to the East, and partially converted to an ethnographic mass representing a manpower reservoir. The Third Reich had to rise on those territories in order to realize Hitler's conception of the new German nation into which would be integrated all the Teutonic nations: the Dutch, the Flemings, the Danes, Swedes, Norwegians, and the Swiss Germans. The realization of the Berlin-Baghdad-Basra plan would then be only a minor detail for the Third Reich—which as a world power, based on a totalitarian imperialism, would abolish all the traditional values of Christian European culture and civilization.

The crux of Hitler's reasoning was contained in one simple observation. Since the Western democracies had for so long tolerated the abolition of all values of Christian European culture and civilization by Stalin in the Soviet Union, they would also tolerate Germany's attempt to do the same. After all, Hitler reasoned further, Stalin was the master of terror and genocide with his "resettlements" and concentration camps, therefore a German genocide policy of "resettlements," terror and concentration camps for Jews and Slavs would be viewed with the same tolerant Western eye.

Hitler's conceptions challenged not only any balance of power in Europe but would also have upset it in the whole world. Thus, World War II was the consequence, and the Western democracies were forced to fight.

The work of Dr. Ihor Kamenetsky on the German *Lebensraum* policy in Eastern Europe during World War II is a great contribution to the history of that struggle, in which Hitler, through his conceptions, made an attempt on the very life of Germany's Slavic neighbors, in fact on all Slavdom. He thus gave Stalin the opportunity to start the Russian Communist neo-Pan-Slavism in defense of Slavdom during World War II.

German-Slavic relations were and are of the utmost importance for European politics. Therefore the Slavic Institute of Marquette University intended to include this well-documented study, based on primary sources, in its "Marquette

Slavic Studies Series." Lack of funds made this impossible, and we cordially welcome its publication by Bookman Associates.

ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI

Slavic Institute
Marquette University
February, 1960

Acknowledgments

In preparation of this work the writer received invaluable support and help from Dr. Royden Dangerfield, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of Government of Public Affairs at the University of Illinois. For this friendly and efficient assistance the writer feels deeply obliged.

The writer is also very grateful to the University of Illinois, Stanford University, the Hoover Institute and Library on War and Revolution, the Mid-West Inter-University Library, the United States Army's Departmental Records Center in Alexandria, Virginia, the National Archives in Washington, D. C., the Library of Congress, the publishing company "Prolog" Professor Lev Shankovski in Philadelphia for supplying him with the research materials without which this work could not have been accomplished.

The author thanks the following publishers and authors for giving permission to quote from their publications:

Ballantine Books, Inc.: *The Road to Stalingrad*, by Benno Zieser, translated by Alec Brown (1956).

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Introduction

No ideology which aims at the explanation of all historical events of the past and at mapping out the course of all events of the future can bear the unpredictability which springs from the fact that men are creative, that they can bring forward something so new nobody ever foresaw it. (H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, p. 432.)

The idea of creating a stable and perfect society on a philosophical basis or according to some immutable laws and on the basis of a predetermined plan has a long historical background. Such plans are to be found in the Spartan State, in Thomas More's *Utopia*, Rousseau's *Citizen-State*, and in many less known blueprints and models. In most cases they remained paper plans because the planners lacked sufficient power to bring them to fruition.

But such historic models differed in many important respects from modern totalitarian empires. First, they evolved from a mythological, religious, or traditional origin. Second, they were designed for relatively limited geographical areas. Third, they were developed in a period in which the media of mass communication, the machinery of mass destruction, and a system of close supervision over a vast number of people were unknown.

The two totalitarian states, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, which arose following World War I possessed many qualities which earlier plans of ideal states did not possess. One shaking difference was the totalitarian ideology. [Unlike preceding models they took most of their principles and goals not from mythology, religion, or clearly defined tradition, but from "scientific laws." Racism, materialism, geopolitics, Darwinism, and twisted interpretations of history became models for building the new society.]

Old social criteria, religion, ethics, the dignity of the individual, were sacrificed, for all of them included elements of unpredictability which sooner or later would conflict with the

all-embracing totalitarian control. [Unlike earlier models, the totalitarian states were of a dynamic character, and territorial expansion was essential to their development.] In the case of the Soviet Union, the transitional stages from Socialism to Communism could be reached only after the extension of the Soviet order on a global scale. In the case of Nazi Germany, the society was supposed to progress from an "unhealthy urban society," contaminated by the racially foreign admixtures, to a racially pure, biologically strong, and predominantly rural society. The ultimate objective of the Nazi state could be achieved only with considerable territorial expansion. This was necessary if Germany was to become predominantly an agricultural state and a great power at the same time.

The methods and achievements of science could be used by the Nazis for the purpose of bringing about the transformation. This fact distinguished the Hitlerite movement from all earlier theories and attempts to build a model state. Many of the same characteristics are to be found in the Soviet plans for an ideal state.

Technological developments made the creation of the monolithic totalitarian empires a possibility. Advances made in the means of communication and in the mass dissemination of ideas overcame geographical limitations which earlier planners and rulers had to face in the past. Conformity and obedience could now be enforced more effectively. [It became especially true when the totalitarian governments gained control over such vital nerves of modern society as the means of information, production, education, and communication. By isolating a society from outside influences, by weeding out nonconformist and intractable elements, by developing efficient methods of control both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany attempted to create new societies based upon predetermined plans and possessing certain qualities, including that of ultimate stability.]

Nazi Germany sought stability in a predominantly agricultural society, sufficient agricultural *Lebensraum*, and the racial purity of her citizens.

Eastern Europe was earmarked as the area for the future German *Lebensraum*. During the course of World War II the

essential part of it came under Nazi control. The prerequisites for an Eastern Nazi Empire were thus achieved. Yet the new racial society which the Nazis planned could not be built in Eastern Europe since the Eastern peoples were regarded by the Nazis as biologically and culturally inferior. Those groups that could not be integrated into Germandom because of some racial or cultural "defect" had to disappear from the *Lebensraum* area in one way or another. The same applied to non-Germanic manifestations of culture in the form of buildings, monuments, etc. They had to be removed so that the new society would be undisturbed by any foreign heritage or traditional environment which might conflict with Nazi ideology.

Freed from traditional moral restrictions and contemptuously rejecting the Christian humanitarian and ethical values, Nazi Germany plunged into the task of clearing the *Lebensraum*.

The only limiting factor in carrying out the *Lebensraum* policy on a full scale was the existence of war, a war which had to be fought and won. But even this handicap did not prevent Hitler and Himmler from carrying out the preparatory work for the *Lebensraum*, both theoretically and practically.

The present study is concerned with the origin of Nazi totalitarianism, its aims and principles, and the methods applied. Altogether they form certain patterns of totalitarianism and certain symptoms which unfortunately were not limited to the Nazi State and which consequently did not disappear after the Nazi defeat. Communist totalitarianism not only survived World War II but it actually spread both territorially and numerically.

On the other hand we can see that the events and developments since World War I, and more particularly since World War II, have resulted in rapid and unprecedented growth in all governments. Such growth may be the inevitable consequence of technological progress and industrial development. The growth of government into a modern behemoth has serious implications.

Certainly, the modern totalitarian states have utilized the increased power of government to more effectively enslave people, and modern technology has been utilized by the masters to more effectively impose their will upon the enslaved.

For democracies, too, big government has serious implica-

tions. Certainly, it is true that the individual citizen and voter is now called upon to make decisions on highly complex issues. Democratic government is currently required to use to the fullest the most highly developed technology for the solution of public problems and for the administration of public programs.

Totalitarian governments, possessing control of technology, can and will use it to remain in power and to liquidate the opposition. Modern developments make revolution much more difficult and less likely to succeed.

If democracies can continue to meet the problems of the people, and if the citizens can continue to exercise wisdom and good judgment, democratic governments will flourish. If democracies fail to measure up, they will become vulnerable to the would-be dictator, who, seizing the big government machinery, may get control over the people to a degree unknown to any despot in the past. Should this occur, then the fantastic novels of Orwell or Huxley may become a reality in the same way that the fiction of Jules Verne came true within one century in the field of technological inventions.

The Nazi blueprints and achievements reveal how closely certain totalitarian objectives came to their fulfillment, even though the Nazi State never reached its ultimate goal.

Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe

CHAPTER ONE

Ideological and Political Background of Nazi *Lebensraum* Policy

Every people has to be educated up from smaller to larger space conceptions, and the process has to be repeated again and again to prevent the people from falling back into the old small-space conceptions. In every state decay is the result of decline in its space conceptions. (F. Ratzel, *Der Lebensraum*, 1901, quoted in *Polish Fortnightly Review*, London, August 15, 1943.)

The right to soil and territory can become a duty if a decline seems to loom for a great nation unless it extends its territory. . . . Germany either will be a world power or will not be at all. (Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, pp. 741-742.)

We must realize, that the whole sense of this war rests in a natural enlargement of *Lebensraum* for our people. (Governor Hans Frank, August 1, 1942, Nuremberg Trial Doc. 2233-PS.)

The Influence of German Tradition and the Science of Geopolitics

It is both difficult and risky to trace a current or recent ideology to the dim past of a nation. To compare the German theory of *Lebensraum* with the behavior of savage Germanic tribes or with policy of a feudal empire is much like comparing a modern motor car with a primitive cart. German historians, such as Gerhard Ritter or Theodor Heuss, are right in rejecting wartime theories explaining the rise and character of National Socialism as the inevitable product of Teutonic heritage and the sweep of a historical process.¹ It cannot be forgotten

that Nazism was a denial rather than an outcome of the concept of humanity as it was created by Lessing or Goethe, and that militaristic and aggressive attributes were assigned during different stages of Western Civilization to such countries as Spain, Sweden, or France, rather than to Germany. It is also significant that the Austrians and Swiss Germans, though culturally and historically connected with Germany, did not fatalistically follow in its modern totalitarian experience.

The limitation of historic parallels and experience as guides to the recent past do not necessarily mean that a historic background is meaningless in evaluating contemporary conditions and processes. Socialism and the mass production of the twentieth century would certainly be incomprehensible without the background of the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century. Similarly, the formulation of the Nazi theory of expansion and methods for building a gigantic Nazi empire in the East would be hard to grasp if we ignored the way in which German nationalism grew and the circumstances under which German national unity was achieved.

Because of a strong political particularism, German historians, writers, and statesmen in the nineteenth century worked toward German national unity based on the common racial solidarity of all Germans.² This conception was useful in overriding the pride and self-possession of numerous German ruling houses. But because of this racial tendency, German nationalism lacked already at its initial stage the liberal qualities which other national movements displayed.]

The ethnical uniqueness of Germans was stressed as early as the liberal German Convention for Unity which met at Frankfurt am Main in 1848. There, the admission of Austria to the German Union was seriously resisted because of the multinational composition of the Austrian Monarchy, and a proposal was submitted that only the ethnically German portion of Austria be allowed to join the Union of German states. This particular brand of German nationalism made acceptance of Nazi pseudo-scientific racial laws much easier and contributed more toward the egocentricity of Germandom than was the case with the other nations. French nationalism during the French Revolution

could combine French ambitions with the slogan "Brotherhood of Nations." The racism of Stewart Chamberlain and the imperialism of Cecil Rhodes could be neutralized in Great Britain by Gladstonian national broadmindedness. There were no such important moderating forces to influence German nationalism at the time that it crystallized and when Germany achieved its national unity. German nationalism saw its dreams fulfilled not by a liberal crusader but by a man who held that empires are built by "blood and iron" and whose *Realpolitik* was void of any liberal considerations in relation to other peoples.

It was also a strange coincidence that German nationalism took shape and materialized at a time when the traditional Christian humanitarian ideas were undermined in Germany by the attacks of Marx and Nietzsche and by the application to human society of Darwin's principle of the survival of the fittest. A rapid decay of the established moral values and growing reliance upon power left its distinct mark on German nationalism. By the time of Germany's unification we find a strong egocentric German nationalism which tried to set itself above the traditional moral standards of Western society, especially in dealing with other nationalities. It found its expression in relation to Poles, who formed a considerable minority within the Second German Empire. Unlike the Poles in neighboring Austria, their compatriots under the rule of the "Iron Chancellor" were subject to severe and merciless persecutions because of their nationality. The justification for this kind of policy is reflected in the following passage from Bismarck's speech, delivered to the Prussian *Landtag* in 1885:

A struggle for existence is going on between the Germans and Poles. Heaven and earth will unite before the Germans and Poles unite. Beat the Poles until all their desire to live is gone. I have a great sympathy for their situation, but if we are to exist we must destroy them. The wolf is not to blame that God made him what he is.³

Bismarck's ideas were not the ideas of one man alone. Similar conceptions of a higher national morality permeated German nationalism. Thus, about ten years later, long after Bismarck's

retirement, an important and long established German paper, *Grenzboten*, wrote:

We argue that if the good of our Fatherland demands the conquest, enslavement, elimination or destruction of other nations we should not be restrained from doing this by any Christian or humanitarian scruples.⁴

And at approximately the same time the German Minister, Baron von Rheinbaben, echoed this idea in his speech to the German *Reichsrat*, saying:

{ If something is being done which is indispensable to our national necessities, there is no reason to concern ourselves with whether the so-called moral feeling will or will not be taken into account outside Germany's frontiers.⁵

These claims of national superiority and expressions of an aggressive spirit were initially spontaneous and unsophisticated; they, like any other claims in human history, required a philosophical justification to provide the aura of authority. The Divine Law and Divine Will fell into disrepute long ago; the claims of legitimacy were becoming obsolete in the second half of the nineteenth century. Even the Concert of Powers, which moderated the behavior of the States, was rapidly disintegrating by the end of the nineteenth century. This disintegration resulted in the absence of a powerful authority which could influence the international relations among the European states. It is no wonder, therefore, that in Germany, where expansionist nationalism was very much alive, there would be attempts to rationalize its imperialistic ambitions in a more concrete form.

One of the attempts to set a new standard for the behavior of States was that made by the German professor of political geography, Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904). He was the first to advance geographic determinism as a factor in the interrelation of states. Professor Ratzel became interested in the political significance of great spaces during his journey through the United States and his studies there during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Impressed by the riches and the potentialities which the vast American spaces seemed to offer, Ratzel

wrote his first book, *The United States of Northern America* (1876–1880), in which he exalted the importance of space and predicted a great future for the United States when it succeeded in fully exploiting the areas it possessed. In his succeeding works: *Anthropogeography* (1882–1891), *Political Geography* (1897), and in an essay, “Living Space” (1901), Ratzel laid down the basic ideas for the German Geopolitical School and for the Nazi conception of *Lebensraum*. Three of Ratzel’s ideas became important for the later Nazi ideology: (1) The view that space represents the most vital requirement of the State; that diminution of territory means decline and disintegration of the State and that expansion and growth in territory is to be viewed as a prerequisite of state power and prosperity; (2) that struggle for space is a natural law and that the most fit will gain space at the expense of their weaker neighbors; (3) that only racially pure peoples, strongly rooted in the soil (not only in the agricultural sense), are most likely to be victors in conquering and keeping living space.

Ratzel’s theories were not widespread in his time, and neither the politics of the Second German Empire nor the causes of World War I can be traced to them. But his ideas survived his death in 1904 and found some remarkable successors. One of his most outstanding successors was Rudolph Kjellen, a Swedish professor of political science. In his main work, *The State as a Living Form*, Kjellen exalted the importance of the organic growth of space mentioned by Ratzel. He went so far as to compare a state to a human being of superior character, with organic lusts, morals, and above all, growth. According to him, a state had a natural tendency to grow as a human being does. It grows by acquiring new territory in the same way a human being grows in size or weight. (Therefore, territorial aggrandizement is, morally, neither good nor bad because it is merely a natural phenomenon.)

By this particular elaboration of Ratzel’s theory of space growth, Kjellen strengthened the future Nazi *Lebensraum* conception that acquisition of new territory cannot be restricted by any moral considerations because such expansion is inevitable for a healthy state.

Another famous successor of Ratzel was the British professor of geography, Sir Halford MacKinder. Sir MacKinder's theories of geopolitics are significant in so far as he stressed the importance of great continental powers as opposed to sea powers. MacKinder revealed the danger for the Western Allies of a possible transcontinental combination between Germany and Russia. He thought that the power which controls Eastern Europe possesses the potential key for actual domination of the world. In his book, *Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction*, published in 1919, Sir MacKinder warned the victorious allies of this danger and admonished them to draw such political arrangements in Europe which would prevent creation of a powerful German-Russian bloc.

It is uncertain to what degree MacKinder's geopolitical views were taken into consideration during the writing of the Treaty of Versailles. The relative unpopularity of MacKinder's continental theories in Great Britain may indicate that the influence of his ideas was slight. The belt of independent states created between Germany and the Soviet Union more likely had its origin in the principle of self-determination and in the desire of France to get some allies on the other side of Germany. Nevertheless, it is significant to notice that these Eastern "buffer states" were the first target of attack of German geopolitician Karl Haushofer. Karl Haushofer's personality is important in so far as he put the finishing touches to German geopolitics and institutionalized it. He, unlike his great predecessors, had a direct influence on the Nazi movement. Because of his extensive authority as a German general and university professor, and through his widely circulated *Journal of Geopolitics*, founded in 1924, and his Institute of Geopolitics, he was able to promote his geopolitical ideas on a greater scale than other less influential geopoliticians. Haushofer was not an originator of strikingly new ideas in geopolitics. Accepting basically the findings of Professor Ratzel and Professor Kjellen, who dealt with living space in more general geographical terms, and those of Sir Halford MacKinder, who was concerned with specific geographic areas, Haushofer tried to create a synthesis of his own. He succeeded only in defining the direction in which German

expansion should proceed, and he narrowed Ratzel's thesis of the necessity for a nation to be "embedded in soil" to one which stressed agricultural cultivation.

In deciding upon the area of German spacial expansion, Haushofer saw great chances for Germany in MacKinder's theories of continental blocs. Thus, he not only embraced enthusiastically the fear expressed by MacKinder of the possibility of a German-Russian continental combination but extended it into an idea of a transcontinental bloc in which Germany, Russia, and Japan should be united in a very close alliance. He believed that such a territorial combination would result in complete economic self-sufficiency and strategic impregnability for the nations concerned.

In evaluating the quality of space, Haushofer considered the fertility of its soil as well as its strategic importance. He thought that in agricultural cultivation a nation finds the proper mode of life as opposed to unhealthy urbanization. This emphasis of space in terms of soil, which brought Haushofer's geopolitical interpretations closest to the Nazi concept of *Lebensraum*, appears at a very early stage of his geopolitical work. In the first number of the *Journal of Geopolitics* we read:

Only those state organisms that are firmly embedded in their mother-soil will be able to offer resistance to the onslaught, from their expanding neighbors in their pursuit of inborn power lusts. Where the roots are feeble, the conquerors will force their victims to give way and migrate elsewhere along the path of least resistance.⁶

In his introduction to Gattineau's *Urbanization*, Haushofer writes:

No form of life can be maintained unless it is rooted in its soil. Urbanization and the rule of the worker-class of the urban masses endangers by the negation of this fact the vital laws of life on earth.⁷

The similarity of Haushofer's geopolitical ideas and the objectives of Nazi foreign policy could be explained by the fact that by a strange coincidence the Geopolitical School and the Nazi movement had their origin in the same city, Munich, at ap-

proximately the same time, after the end of World War I. Much more important, it can be traced to the personal contacts between Haushofer and the leading Nazi personalities. It is known that Rudolf Hess, Hitler's Deputy within the Nazi Party, was one of the closest pupils of Haushofer and the man to whom Haushofer dedicated his book, *Weltpolitik von Heute* (*World Politics of Today*), 1934.⁸ It was also said that Haushofer visited Hitler in jail after the latter's unsuccessful *Putsch* and that Chapter XIV of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, dealing with future German foreign policy, was written under the strong influence of Haushofer.

A close relation between Haushofer and the Nazi movement seemed also to be confirmed by the mutual courtesies exchanged after the Nazis took over the German government. In 1933, Haushofer published a pamphlet in which he paid tribute to National Socialism, and he received favors in the form of government funds for the Institute of Geopolitics and a personal favor in terms of the honorary aryanization of his two sons—an extraction of his half-Jewish wife.⁹

Yet in spite of the obvious similarities of ideas and the close personal contacts, the Nazi *Lebensraum* concept did not coincide completely with Haushofer's geopolitical principles. The Nazi concept of blood and soil was too strongly saturated with Germanic myth and racism to fit completely within the frame of Haushofer's Geopolitics. The methods by which Hitler and Haushofer wanted to achieve *Lebensraum* differed considerably. It is true that Haushofer tied his idea of *Lebensraum* to the idea of racial purity. He wrote: " 'Master races' must remain pure; race mixture has brought about the decay of many a great empire."¹⁰

The Geopolitical School held basically the same views about the racial quality of the new and spacious German Reich. It is obvious if we compare it with the following statements of the Nazi leaders: "Common blood should belong to a common Reich."¹¹ And:

Today we must choose between Crusade politics and space politics; between world imperialism and the racial will of the state; between Barabarossa and Henry the Lion;

between the Stresemann-League of Nations and the racial National Socialist Germanic state.¹²

When, however, the geopolitical considerations were clearly in conflict with racial considerations, Haushofer and his associates would take the side of the former and reject "racial and ideological extremism."¹³ Such conflict between geopolitical and racial considerations emerged on the point of relations with the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Haushofer viewed the Soviet Union as an ally because it was a great continental power which, from his geopolitical standpoint, had the same interests as Germany, in opposition to the geopolitically hostile bloc of sea powers. Haushofer rejected, from a geopolitical standpoint, the idea of military conquest of the Russian space, arguing about the terrific risk involved in an attack on the states of "broad spaces" which might use their space as a weapon in their defense.¹⁴ On the other side, Haushofer speculated that if Germany promoted Russian expansion in the Far East and supplied Russia with the technical know-how and machinery, Russia would be grateful enough to grant Germany some part of its western provinces, or at least close her eyes to German absorption of the Eastern buffer states, the existence of which Haushofer from the very beginning regarded as unnatural.

On the other hand, the Nazi ideologists would not agree to regard Russia as a full-fledged and permanent ally because of racial prejudices and the Germanic myth. Nazi foreign policy was permeated to a great degree by the conception of so-called "organic allies and organic enemies."¹⁵ According to this theory, a friendly or hostile attitude of the Third Reich to the other states was bound to their relation to the "German Urproblem" (German original problem).¹⁶ [The "German Urproblem" in the Nazi vocabulary meant mainly two things: (1) to become free from the disintegrating influence of the Jews; (2) to recover the "traditional Germanic *Lebensraum*" in the East. According to these criteria and the predominant racial principles of Nazi ideology, there existed no possibility of a permanent alliance with the Soviet Union¹⁷ because the latter possessed part of the traditional Germanic *Lebensraum* and because of its racial composi-

tion (Jewish ruling class and inferior Slavic masses), which made such a partnership impossible.¹⁸ Also, the buffer states between Germany and the former Gothic realm could avoid a conflict with the Third Reich only if they were willing to abandon their national independence. They could count on the mercy of the German "master race" only in so far as they, from the Nazi racial standpoint, were qualified to become Germans or were needed by the Germans as slaves.¹⁹

On the same basis Great Britain, whose colonial empire was outside of the Nazi *Lebensraum* area and which, according to Nazi racists, was akin to the German race, represented an "organic ally" in spite of temporary misunderstandings—which materialized in war.

Transcontinental geopolitical considerations never seemed to be of a great interest to Nazi leaders. Limits of the German Eastern *Lebensraum* were provisionally decided along the so-called A-A line²⁰ or along the Ural Mountains.²¹ What happened behind this line concerned Germans only in so far as it prevented a new military build-up of Soviet Russia capable of reconquering the German *Lebensraum*.²²

Regardless of the deviations in scope and methods between the Nazi *Lebensraum* ideology and Haushofer's Geopolitical School, one thing is clear: their objectives could hardly be achieved without causing a world war. Both conceptions so vastly exceeded the peaceful adjustment possibilities (like treaty revision, spheres of influence, legal rights, or even irredenta claims) that in the long run they left the state concerned with only two possibilities: that of complete surrender or war. It is obvious that even if Haushofer's objectives of a peaceful German-Soviet transcontinental combination could have been realized, it was bound to happen only by eliminating the Eastern buffer states like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Hitler added to this array of states an attack on the Soviet Union, doubting a permanent, peaceful arrangement with her. It was highly improbable that France and Great Britain would allow an outright incorporation of these states into Germany without a war. They had to interfere, if not because of their

legal commitments, then from the necessity to maintain the balance of power.

When Hitler came to power in 1933 the hope for peace in Europe could be based only on two assumptions: (1) that either Hitler would change his mind with respect to *Lebensraum* or (2) that Germany would remain so weak and the state concerned so strong as to make any attempt in this direction hopeless. Hitler's scale of rearmament soon proved the second assumption illusory. But Hitler's pleas for self-determination, revision of the Versailles Treaty, and his attacks against Communism proved to be misleading as to his real intentions till shortly before the outbreak of World War II. It was believed that Hitler, because of the self-determination tirades in his speeches, would limit his territorial claims to German irredenta and that his crusade against the Soviet Union would not exceed securing the spheres of influence in Eastern Europe.²³

Thus, the extent of German armaments, which was passively regarded by the Western Powers, was no clear indication of Hitler's intentions. What the states concerned failed to see, and what would probably have shaken them from their lethargy, was the creation, with the coming of the Nazis to power, of agencies which clearly indicated what Hitler meant by *Lebensraum* and how serious he was about it.

The Tools by which Lebensraum Was Forged

At the time when the world paid attention to the most obvious and the most spectacular deeds of Hitler, such as renunciation of the clauses of the Versailles Treaty, remilitarization of the Rhine provinces, and the march into the Saar, the quiet but systematic and elaborate machinery prepared for the future *Lebensraum* went almost unnoticed. Yet the most important and the most powerful Nazi organization for realizing Hitler's *Lebensraum* in Eastern Europe during World War II was the SS (*Schutzstaffel*), which was given an independent status and a broad field for activity on July 13, 1934.²⁴

From its beginning, the SS did not limit itself to the

role of a select, protective guard of National Socialism and its leaders, but embarked on various programs which were supposed to put Nazi ideology into practice. The concept of German *Lebensraum*, with its notions about blood and soil, seemed to be most essential to the SS leader Heinrich Himmler. As early as September 3, 1935, Himmler indicated the key role which the SS was supposed to play in the realization of Hitler's *Lebensraum* plans by saying:

The new creation of the German peasant and non-peasant settlements belongs to the Weltanschauung and to the political duties of the SS and will be enduringly promoted by this Organization. The realization of all necessary measures, connected with this issue, is exclusively a business of the Race and Settlement Office.²⁵

Besides making the Race and Settlement Office one of the most important offices of the SS organization, Himmler created or held the key position in other organizations connected with the *Lebensraum* problem. Among others he became president of the Ahnenerbe Society and Foundation (Ancestral Heritage) whose functions included:

. . . investigation of the space, spirit, accomplishments and heritage of the Indo-Germanic peoples of the Nordic Race, the verification of the results of their research, and their transmission to the people.²⁶

This organization, which in 1942 was incorporated into the SS organization, extended its activity to such fields as biological and medical experimentation, research in folklore and ethnology, and later on it concerned itself also with the archives and cultural treasures in the countries occupied by Germany.²⁷

Also significant was the organization which Himmler created in 1935 under the name *Lebensborn* (Well of Life). This private SS organization had as its purpose the education and upbringing of the illegitimate offspring of the SS men.²⁸ It provided free hospitalization and gave the so-called "racially valuable" children either to childless SS families for adoption or provided for their upbringing in the Nazi spirit in especially es-

established institutions. The idea behind it was to promote as many good racial births as possible, in addition to the births issuing from the regular marriages, which as yet could not be completely controlled.

To promote such illegitimate births of "good blood" the so-called system of *Belegung* (mating) was used. Hitler indicates in his Table Talks that this practice was applied in Germany in Berchtesgaden by stationing the Elite SS troops in this area, and he suggested that such experiments could be repeated in the Occupied Eastern Area.²⁹

The *Lebensborn* extended its activity during the war outside of the Reich boundaries and tried not only to fish out the racially "good" offspring left behind by the German soldiers in occupied countries but also to bring up as reliable Germans children of alien origin who were kidnapped by the Nazi authorities because of their "perfect racial" qualities.³⁰ Thus the *Lebensborn* organization was created and grew into an institution where an ideal Nazi specimen could be physically and spiritually conditioned at the earliest stage of individual development.

The SS organization itself provided a rigid program of conditioning even though it dealt with more adult people. The objective and means of this SS "education" were described by an SS leader as follows:

We, who must mould these young people into leaders, are aiming at a modern state which finds its inspiration in the city of the ancient Greeks. It is to these democracies led by an aristocracy and resting on the economic foundation of a large class of helots that antiquity owes the finest masterpieces of its civilization. . . . The choice of the new class of leaders will be made by the SS. It will be made, in the positive sense, in the Napolas [National-Politische Anstalt] at the preparatory stage, then in the Castles of the Order which will be the centres of Higher Education of the future National-Socialist aristocracy, and finally in a period of practical experience which will follow immediately with the stress on active politics. It will also be made by eradicating all inferior elements from the racial and biological point of view, by eliminating such of our political opponents as are incapable of conversion or refuse on principle to re-

cognise our "Weltanschauung," which is the basis of the National-Socialist State, and the vital institutions of that State.³¹

The candidates of the Elite SS organization had to abandon their church affiliations;³² they were trained in blind obedience³³ and inculcated with an intense hate for Jews;³⁴ but above all they were indoctrinated with the idea of *Lebensraum*. They were harangued constantly about the magic Eldorado in Eastern Europe, half-deserted and half-inhabited by a primitive and animal-like people. The type and scope of such indoctrination may be seen from a sample of a text destined for the SS men and issued by the SS Main Office:

Without end, the steppes of Russian area extend—Eastern Europe. Abrupt and sudden is the difference of the cultural levels of Central Europe and the gigantic districts.

And yet, on both sides of the frontier there is the same soil, but not the same people. Only man alone is able to impress his stamp upon the country. Therefore, on the one side the well-ordered fertility, planned harmony of fields, and carefully designed villages of Germany, and on the other side the zones of an impenetrable jungle, of the steppes, of never ending primeval forests, where silting rivers painfully cut their ways.

Badly exploited, fertile soil of black earth that could be a paradise, a California of Europe, and in reality abandoned, dreadfully neglected, branded with the stamp of a crime against culture beyond imagination even today, is a perpetual accusation against the sub-human and his rule.

and further:

The sub-human, this apparently fully equal creation of nature, when seen from the biological viewpoint, with hands, feet and a sort of brain, with eyes and a mouth, nevertheless is quite a different, a dreadful creature, is only an imitation of man with man-resembling features, but inferior to any animal as regards intellect and soul. In its interior, this being is a cruel chaos of wild, unrestricted passions,

with a nameless will to destruction, with a most primitive lust, and of unmasked depravity.

For not everything is alike that has a human face.³⁵

Reading these passages one may be surprised at how crude, naive and unrealistic this indoctrination was, especially when one considers that those ideas were directed to an "elite" of a great people. [It seems strange unless one realizes that a new Nazi elite was supposed to have neither critical sense nor its own ideas. Once an idea or an order came from above, its quality could be neither challenged nor investigated.] The flavor of this principle is reflected, in a way, in the following speech of Himmler to the Officer Corps of a Grenadier Division:

There are two estates in every people and in every realm which because of the State-reason are given especial rights. . . . It is the estate of the teachers and the estate of the officers. The State-reason demands that the subordinate in the both cases should exercise no criticism, and that they, the little pupils and the soldiers, are given no possibility for expression of their opinions, therefore the teachers . . . and the officers are becoming so often godlike, or at least let us say, semi-godlike. . . .³⁶

Ideology in the Nazi political system, and especially in the case of an elite organization, had to be accepted blindly and uniformly. It was the trend which Hitler anticipated at an early stage of his movement, and we may see it in the following passage of Heiden, who writes:

Hitler saw as early as 1929 the "great thing" of the movement in the fact that sixty thousand men have outwardly become almost a unit, that actually these members are uniform not only in ideas, but that even the facial expression is almost the same. Look at these laughing eyes, this fanatical enthusiasm, and you will discover how a hundred thousand men in a movement become a single type. . . .³⁷

Those who did not fit within this frame of uniformity or who had their own interpretation of National Socialism were eliminated as soon as Hitler established his power. It happened

in the case of the Storm Troops (SA) leader Roehm and other dissident elements during the famous "Blood Purge" in 1934. The SA organization, which was strongly permeated with such dissident elements, came out from the Purge greatly weakened; it never recovered its previous importance. It was actually replaced in its former role by the SS organization. Himmler, as a chief of the SS had this excellent—from the Nazi standpoint—trait, that he lacked his own ideological conceptions, was to the utmost faithful to the principles of Hitler's ideology, and showed great versatility in applying this ideology in practice.³⁸ Similar to the SS leaders, the rank and file of the SS organization never developed any fanatical ideological convictions of their own but were permeated by ideas from above which, like orders, were self-evident and unchallengeable. Freed from the traditional human inhibitions of ethics and morals, they were not supposed to make decisions about good and bad and true and false, for ultimately this was the responsibility of the *Führer*; their only duty was to believe that the orders were right and to carry them out. Acting according to these criteria, most of the SS men could commit the worst inhumanities feeling neither particular personal hostility to their victims nor suffering any conscience twinge for their deeds.

This spirit of "moral neutralism" behind SS activities is best reflected in the speech of the leader of the German Labor Front, Dr. Ley, on the occasion that the first Ordensburg (Castle of the Order) was opened. He said:

We have the will to dominate, we feel joy in commanding not for the pleasure of playing the despot or paying homage to sadism or tyranny but because we have the firm, rock-like belief that in all spheres only one man is capable of being the leader and that only one man is capable of bearing the responsibility.³⁹

In the same way Hannah Arendt explains the character of SS killers. She says:

The same average German, who, despite years of mad Nazi propaganda, could not take it upon himself to kill a Jew . . . will set the death-machine in motion without a word of protest. By contrast with the early SS and Gestapo

formations, Himmler's organization does not rely on the support of fanatics or sadists who find a voluptuous pleasure in murder: it relies quite simply on "normal" men, of the same species as Heinrich Himmler.⁴⁰

This impact of dehumanization, which was set as a standard for conditioning SS men, is reflected in the reminiscences of an ex-member of the SS division "Leibstandart Adolf Hitler" who later joined the Ukrainian Underground and was killed by Germans. He wrote in a clandestine paper in 1943 as follows:

It would be difficult to find in this atmosphere (of SS upbringing and life) any trace of human soul. All achievements of the several millenniums old human culture, and all embodiments of a human being perish in its surroundings. Before your eyes arises a horrible, thoughtless, soulless, gluttonous monster, which from all the achievements of human civilization exploited only its mechanical side in order to turn it into a dreadful tool of destruction of everything which it encountered on its way. I have never noticed any noble feelings among them or any manifestations of independent thought. On command their minds respond mechanically.⁴¹

This disciplined, efficient, and ready-for-action SS organization, deprived of all traditional moral values and lacking its own reason for existence, was an excellent tool for Hitler's far-reaching plans. With the help of this highly reliable and militant organization, Hitler wanted to remove the "rotten" Christian humanitarian vestiges of western European civilization, which Spengler condemned to a natural death; further, he wanted to remove the "sub-human" elements from Eastern Europe and to build a completely new Nazi society on the basis of the old Germanic heritage and a "pure" racial community.

Realizing the great possibilities which the reliable and militant SS organization could offer in fulfilling his ideological plans, Hitler assisted its growth and saw to it that gradually the most vital organs of the State came under the control of the SS organization. Thus, by 1936 he made Heinrich Himmler, the supreme leader of the SS, chief of German police. In its effect the action meant that the highly elaborated Nazi police system,

the Regular Police or *Ordnungspolizei* (ORPO), and the Security Police or *Sicherheitspolizei* (SIPO)—with its two well-known branches: Secret State Police (*Gestapo*) and Criminal Police (*Kripo*)—and the deeply penetrating Party spying machinery, Security Service (SD), combined forces with the steadily increasing SS circle. This appointment of Himmler to the position of police chief meant more than just a personal union of two equally independent systems. As soon as Himmler got the intricate German police system under his control, he took care to see that all key positions were held by SS men.⁴²

A new addition to the power of the SS organization took place on October 7, 1939. A few weeks after the German conquest of Poland, Hitler became obsessed with the idea of putting into effect his Eastern *Lebensraum* plan immediately. With this purpose in mind he appointed Himmler to head the *Reichskommissariat* for the Strengthening of Germandom. The newly created Commission had the following main objectives:

1. Bring back those German citizens and racial Germans abroad who are eligible for permanent return to the Reich.
2. Eliminate the harmful influence of such alien parts of the population as constitute a danger to the Reich and the Germany community.
3. Create new German colonies by resettlement of German citizens and racial Germans coming back from abroad.⁴³

In more specific terms it meant the repatriation to Germany of ethnic German groups which were endangered in their existence as Germans abroad and their settlement, if possible, in areas newly incorporated into the Reich. It implied also a mass deportation from and partial physical annihilation of non-German populations in areas earmarked for immediate German colonization.

Himmler did not conduct the activities of the Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom personally, but he was the final authority on all its doings. He appointed the SS Brigade Leader Greifelt as his deputy and established his SS men in the most important positions of the new Commission.⁴⁴

The Commission was much more complex and all-embracing than its name suggested. It gave rise to an array of auxiliary

agencies involved in the policy of *Lebensraum*. Though concerned with different specialized activities, all of these organizations were subordinated to Greifelt and were thus under strong SS influence. Thus there was created the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* (office for dealing with those of the German race) which worked at finding ethnic Germans, verifying their German heritage, and registering them on a so-called *Volksliste*. Then they took care of them by supplying them with quarters and food in transitory camps, by educating and indoctrinating them in National Socialist ideas, and by keeping them under supervision till they were permanently settled.⁴⁵

Of great importance was the *Deutsche Einwandererzentrale* (EWZ) (Central Immigration Office), where decisions were made concerning aptitude for naturalization and settlement in the East or in the Old Reich.⁴⁶ Among other organizations that must be mentioned were: the German Resettlement Trustee Corporation (DUT), which handled the compensation in money for the property the German evacuees left behind and issued temporary credits to the new German colonists; the Main Trust Office East (HTO), which was entrusted with the management of the confiscated urban property belonging formerly to the Polish state or to the deported Polish citizens;⁴⁷ and the Land Estate Company (*Grundstückgesellschaft*), which similarly administered the confiscated Polish lands.⁴⁸ In the Polish provinces, newly incorporated into the Reich, there operated an *Ansiedlungsstab* (settlement staff) with its subdivisions, *Kreis-Arbeitsstäbe* (district staffs), which were actually entrusted with the very technical problems of settlement and deportations.⁴⁹

In 1940 the SS organization experienced another boost of power by the creation of the SS combat forces on a large scale.* Watching the complicated and extensive machinery used during

* Himmler's SS (*Schutzstaffel*), which increased its membership from 280 in 1929 to 210,000 in 1937, already possessed at the last mentioned date three armored regiments (the "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler," "Deutschland," and "Germania") as well as two to three divisions of their own. (See Paul Seabury, *The Wilhelmstrasse: A Study of German Diplomats under the Nazi Regime* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954), p. 44.

the settlement of a few Polish provinces, Hitler probably realized what terrific apparatus and force would be required to set his *Lebensraum* plan on a full-scale basis and to extend it to the rest of Poland, the Czech Protectorate, and above all to the most important space in the European part of the Soviet Union—the Ukraine. He probably anticipated that these millions and tens of millions would not be willingly shifted behind the Urals, and he had some good reason to assume that a mass exodus of the German colonists to the East would require something more than skillful propaganda and the inducement of an ideal rural society.⁵⁰ It was only a logical step for him to increase his reliable force both in numbers and in authority. Hitler did so within the first year of war, and he stated his reasons for doing so in his speech on August 6, 1940, which went as follows:

The Greater Reich, in its definite form, will not only comprise within its frontiers ethnic groups which have always, on principle, shown good will towards the Reich. It is, therefore, essential to provide, outside the old provinces of the Reich, a military State police, which will be in a position, in all circumstances, to represent and impose the authority of the Reich within our frontiers.

This task can only be carried out by a military State police which only includes in its ranks men of the best German blood and which, without any restriction, embraces completely the “Weltanschauung” on which the Greater German Reich is founded.

. . . It is further necessary that this State police should prove itself on the field of battle, as part of regular units, and should sacrifice its blood in the same way as any unit of our armed forces.

Once they have tested and have returned from the front-line, the units of the Waffen-SS will have the necessary authority to carry out all their duties as State police. This use of the Waffen-SS in the interior will be of advantage even to the Regular Army.

In the future it will no longer be tolerated that the Regular Army, recruited by compulsory military service, should at critical moments be employed against its own fellow-citizens.⁵¹

The SS organization extended its influence in the occupied territories of the East by setting up its own police system which was almost independent of the authorities of the civilian German administration. As the occupation proceeded there was created side by side with the regular German juridical system a system of SS courts. Such courts already existed in Germany, but they had authority only over SS men. In the occupied areas of the East the SS courts had at their mercy all non-German populations. The persons who committed hostile acts against the German Reich or who were potentially dangerous because of their political views, background, their former position, or race, could be arrested and condemned by such courts to incarceration in a concentration camp or to death, with no chance of an appeal and with no interference of other legal agencies.⁵³ This SS jurisdiction sometimes took the shape of *ad hoc* martial courts,⁵⁴ and sometimes it abandoned all juristic appearances in its pursuit of the *Lebensraum* policy. Quite typical creations in this connection were the SD *Einsatzgruppen*. They were created in the pre-Munich period in anticipation of a planned invasion of Czechoslovakia. They came into action for the first time during the Polish campaign of 1939, acting as security forces in the hinterland of the front.⁵⁵ From this period date the first reports about the excesses committed by such groups, especially the mass shooting of Jews.⁵⁶ Particular significance was acquired by these *Einsatzgruppen* during the Soviet-German war. An agreement between the German Army and the SD of March 26, 1941 provided for sending some SD special task groups, advancing close behind the German troops, which were supposed to eliminate hostile activities in the hinterland, closely cooperating with the *Abwehr*⁵⁷ to inform the German Army about the political situation there.⁵⁸ Besides this formal definition of their task, the *Einsatzgruppen* had secret orders from their own superiors which provided for elimination of all "undesirable elements" which, from the standpoint of the future German *Lebensraum* policy, could be dangerous.⁵⁹

The SS organization had powerful and very elaborate tools for realizing Hitler's plans in Eastern Europe. Their predominant position, however, did not prevent some other Reich agen-

cies from working on the German *Lebensraum* policy program on their own. To such agencies belonged the *Reichsstelle für Raumordnung* (Office for Space Planning). It was transformed from the Reich Office for the Regulation of the Land Claims on June 28, 1935. Its scope of authority was much wider than that of the previous agency. It involved not only the planning and rational arranging of space available within the German Reich, but it was also to study the concept of space in general in connection with Nazi ideology and to work out the blueprints for setting into practice the idea of blood and soil.

Working in very close cooperation with this agency was the monthly *Raumordnung und Raumforschung*, edited by Hans Boehm, in which the ideas and findings of the *Reichsstelle* were popularized.⁶⁰

During the war, *Reichsminister* Kerl was put in charge of the Office for Space Planning. At this time it was concerned with the following specific problems: (1) the biological strengthening of the people's capacity by a wise distribution of men in the available space; (2) the best possible use of the soil and its resources; (3) the suitable matching of people and landscape;⁶¹ (4) the strengthening of the strategic defense of German space, that is, the proper distribution of industry, the strengthening of the hinterland, a healthy traffic and transportation policy, preventing desertion from the land, and prevention or diminution of the bad effects which might result from giving some land free for defense purposes.⁶²

The *Reichsstelle* was supposed to give theoretical advice concerning the manner of settlement by Germans in the newly incorporated Polish provinces (in 1939). Being subordinated directly to Hitler, it had the right of vetoing any colonization action which did not correspond with the principles which it had set but, as it is indicated by German administrator Du Prel, it made use of this right only in extreme cases.⁶³

Similar to the *Reichsstelle* for Planning of Space there arose with the passage of time Nazi institutes and research centers for studying the peoples, cultures, political circumstances, and history of the newly acquired German *Lebensraum*. This research and study had two main objectives: (1) to investigate

the biological strength and weakness of the subjugated Eastern peoples and their adaption to work, their social structure, political antagonism, and other peculiarities which when established would contribute towards their better domination, enslavement, or biological reduction; (2) to produce historical and scientific facts which would prove the complete superiority of the German master race and its historical rights to the Eastern *Lebensraum*.⁶⁴

Among such research centers, which based their studies on Nazi ideology and a vast collection of confiscated foreign libraries, archives, museums, etc., were the following:

1. *Institut für Deutsche Ostarbeit* (The Institute for German Activities in the East). This institute was founded by the Governor of the *General-Gouvernement* Hans Frank, and it developed an extensive publishing program, including publishing the quarterly *Die Burg* (Castle), the monthly *Das Generalgouvernement*, and later on a periodical, *Deutsche Forschung im Osten* (German Research in the East).

2. The Research Institute of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA). This institute was supposed to possess the greatest amount of confiscated cultural objects, including 2,000,000 books. These collections were used mainly by two departments of the RSHA: one dealing with espionage and the counterintelligence office and another concerned with the "intellectual supervision of political and religious deviations."⁶⁵

Among the most significant publications which RSHA edited in this connection was an illustrated book, *The Subhuman*, which was supposed to give a pictorial account of the unworthiness of human races within the area destined for German *Lebensraum*.⁶⁶

3. *Einsatzstab Reichsführer Rosenberg* (Rosenberg's Task-Staff) was authorized by Hitler to secure for the German State cultural objects throughout occupied Europe and was particularly concerned to establish proof of old Germanic influences in conquered Eastern Europe.

The gigantic Nazi machinery of *Lebensraum* had little relation to the war effort. It had, however, a direct relation to the aims of the war, and its character demonstrates the degree to

which the Nazi war was an ideological war and how far Hitler's concept of *Lebensraum* exceeded the importance of his anti-Communist crusade.

Hitler's rearmament program by itself was not a clear indication of his future plans, and the seriousness of his statements could be doubted in view of his often changing slogans. Yet the actual building of *Lebensraum* machinery after 1935 removed all doubts. Had their creation, their program, and their purpose been taken at face value, the riddle of Hitler's ambitions might have been revealed much earlier and at less expense to humanity.

CHAPTER TWO

Nazi Colonization Designs and Practices

Do not consider the Reich as secured so long as it does not provide a piece of land for centuries ahead for every offspring of our Nation. Do not forget that the most holy right on this earth is the right for land which one may cultivate himself and that it is the holiest sacrifice to shed blood for the land. (Hilter's Political Testament, *Mein Kampf*, pp. 754-755.)

Now that this war has created a new *Lebensraum*, thanks to the heroic effort of our *Wehrmacht*, we know that our work during the last ten years accomplished the saving and strengthening of the peasant class and will be the basis for an agricultural Germanization of the Eastern Space.

... The ultimate objective will be reached only then when after years of a constructive peace the space in the East will become not only a granary but also a motherland. It will be the place where generations of peasants, surrounded by the settled country people, procreating according to the holy laws of God, will create reserves of new blood and will form by their bodies a defensive, living Eastern Wall. (Hartwig von Rheden, "10 Jahre National-Sozialistische Agrarpolitik," *National-Sozialistische Monatshefte*, Jan. 1943, p. 43.)

Nazi colonization activities in Eastern Europe during World War II represented only a fraction of a grand design scheduled for the postwar period. The objective to make Eastern Europe German in the racial sense could not be carried out because of several reasons: (1) most of the prospective German candidates for colonization were inducted into the German armed forces; (2) the German war economy could not afford a far-reaching dislocation of manpower and reorganization of enterprises, which were bound to occur as a result of such action. There-

fore, the Nazi colonization efforts were, on the whole, of an experimental character. They aimed at solution of the most urgent problems of resettlement, and they were designed to test some theoretical rules of colonization and to develop new rules on the basis of experience.

Due to the territorial limitations of German *Lebensraum* at the different stages of the war, the size of the conquered territories, their geographical position in relation to Germany proper, and finally, due to the "racial" peculiarities of the population living in these areas, German colonization designs differed in methods, scope, and timing. These deviations were never so important as to change the original and ultimate German concept of Eastern *Lebensraum*, and the adjustments which were made during the period of Nazi occupation were never so important as to challenge its main idea.

The First Stage of Nazi Colonization, 1939-1941

After the conquest of Poland in 1939 the boundaries of the German Eastern *Lebensraum* became temporarily stabilized on a Soviet-German frontier—approximately along the so-called Curzon Line, which roughly follows the Polish-Ukrainian ethnographic boundary. The peaceful cooperation with the Soviet Union and the warfare in the West forced Hitler to shelve temporarily the plans for the gigantic German Empire and to make the best of the newly acquired provinces of Poland and the Czech Protectorate. Czechs were spared for the time being from large-scale German colonization because their highly efficient economic system and the vital war industries (Skoda Works) would be difficult to replace and because the racial status of the Czech population was as yet not decided by the Nazi authorities.¹ Poland, on the other hand, experienced the fury of German colonization practices in its Western Provinces which, shortly after the September Campaign (1939), were incorporated into the Reich.² This colonization consisted of three different phases: (1) deportation of Polish and Jewish populations from the Western Provinces to the remaining Polish prov-

inces organized in the *General-Gouvernement*; (2) bringing to Germany the German ethnical groups from abroad; (3) induction of German citizens from the "Old Reich" to settle in the newly incorporated areas.]

Deportation of Polish and Jewish populations was decreed by Hitler and the *Reichskommissar* for the Strengthening of Germandom, Himmler, on October 7, 1939.³ It was supplemented by a decree of Field Marshall Göring who, as the head of the German four-year plan, ordered confiscation of the property of all Poles deported or liquidated for hostility towards Germany. Simultaneously he transferred the confiscated property to the *Reichskommissariat* for the Strengthening of Germandom for disposal.⁴

The population destined for deportation was classified according to their occupational and social status and their attitude toward the Germans. Altogether there were five different classes into which the non-German population of the Incorporated Western Provinces was subdivided:

Class-A: The Poles who settled in newly incorporated provinces after October 1, 1918, coming either from Poland proper or from the Reich.

Class-B: Polish intelligentsia—first of all Polish clergy, teachers, physicians, dentists, veterinarians, officers, high-ranking officials, big businessmen, owners of large land estates, writers, editors, and also all those with higher and secondary education. (Exempt were those intermarried with Germans and those friendly to the Germans.)

Class-C: The Poles who worked for the Polish cause.

Class-D: Neutrally inclined Poles—small handcraftsmen, part of the peasantry, low-ranking employees and clerks.

Class-E: Polish agricultural workers.⁵

Of these classes the first three were earmarked for deportation to the *General-Gouvernement*. Class D was regarded as feasible for Germanization and Class E was supposed to be left during the war to assist German farmers but with the definite intention of deporting these "inferior" elements beyond the Reich boundary as soon as German agricultural workers became available.⁶

There were some other criteria used in determining who should be deported immediately or at all. Regional particularities or regional economic importance was considered. This latter was the case if its relation to the war industry was direct and essential. The so-called "Wasserpolen" inhabiting the border district of Upper Silesia were spared from deportation. Due to their close "racial" connection with Germans, their bilingual abilities, and their skills in coal mining and in the iron pits of highly industrial Upper Silesia, this ethnical group of around 1.2 million was accepted en masse into the Germanic family.⁷ Also about 300,000 Masurians and Kashubes were not affected by deportation. Masurians were granted German citizenship en masse because of their "ethnological closeness" to Germandom.⁸ Kashubes and very small Ukrainian colonies in the Western Provinces, mostly *émigrés* of the World War I period, were encouraged to cultivate their tradition and culture in accordance with Himmler's plan "to split up the Eastern people from within." The disappearance of these little islands in the German territories was indicated in orders even though no final solution was mentioned.⁹

Sometimes the priority of deportation was determined by geographic or strategic criteria. In large cities, like Lodz or Poznan, deportations took place streetwise rather than according to classification or occupational considerations.¹⁰ Poles were deported completely from such seashore towns as Gdynia and Orlowo and from the frontier zone between the newly incorporated Western Provinces and the rest of Poland.¹¹ The idea was to grip the alien population in the colonization area in a vise which ultimately would close completely when the area became solidly German.¹² The frontier belt was planned to be 100-150 miles wide and to be settled by soldier-peasants (*Wehrbauern*). But as the frontier of the projected *Lebensraum* moved eastward during the following years of war the question of where such a defense belt should be erected remained open.

The way in which the deportation of the non-German population was carried out by Nazi authorities corresponded completely to their "sub-human theory." The population could not count on a human consideration at the point of deportation, nor

were they given any prospect for the future. Without proper notice, the earmarked families were crowded into trains and either dumped in the *General-Gouvernement* or sent to Germany as slave labor. The first transports of deportees in the *General-Gouvernement* were directed to the barrack camps in Radom and Kielce, but later on this practice was discontinued and the Polish evacuees were simply dumped at small railway stations or even on open fields and left to their own devices.¹³ Their compensation, shelter, and means of livelihood never bothered the Germans.

Deportations were carried out by SS detachments with only formal supervision by the German civilian administration. The people to be deported received a notice which allowed them between twenty minutes to a few hours preparation.¹⁴ They were allowed to take only hand luggage weighing from 50 to 100 pounds. No valuables were allowed, and sometimes even gold frames of spectacles and wedding rings were confiscated. Only a restricted amount of money was allowed to be taken, 20 *zloty* (\$3.80) or in exceptional cases 100 (\$19.00) or 200 (\$38.00) *zloty*. The deportees were also compelled to set their own houses in order for the coming German colonists.¹⁵ Any resistance or sabotage of resettlement orders was punished by death.¹⁶

On the whole, the mass deportation of the non-German population from the Western Provinces, which started as early as October 12, 1939, did not encounter much resistance from the Poles. The reason for this may be found in the fact that the Polish population still suffered under the shock of the recent catastrophic defeat. There are other circumstances which must be considered. We must realize that the Polish Underground was only in its early organizational stage and that a coordinated German blow to the Polish upper classes in the settlement area served its purpose at least to a degree.¹⁷ How quick and efficient was the German effort to get the Polish element out of the picture in the newly annexed territories may be seen from the following report of a Polish Underground courier visiting Poznan at the end of 1939:

I reached Poznan without any difficulties. It was a city I had known rather well in pre-war days. Poznan is about

200 miles west of Warsaw. It is one of the oldest cities in Poland and regarded by many as the cradle of the Polish nation, especially when, many centuries ago, Poland was emerging as one of the most powerful monarchies in Europe. The population of the entire province is as purely Polish as in any other district in Poland. . . .

I thought about this as I walked through the streets of Poznan. The city with the finest historical tradition in all Poland was now, to all appearances, a typical German community. Every sign on stores and banks and institutions was in German. The street names were in German. German newspapers were being hawked on the corners. All I could hear spoken was German, often, true enough, German with an accent, or German spoken grudgingly and sometimes with a deliberate twist and inflection through which the Polish character of the speaker could be discerned, but I do not remember hearing a single word spoken publicly in any other language.¹⁸

The fate of the Poles who were allowed to stay as such in the area was not less miserable than that of their expelled compatriots. The same source comments on this topic as follows:

All the intelligentsia and every Pole who owned property had been expelled from the city. The same operation took place in every part of the district that the Germans had incorporated into the Reich. The only Poles who had been allowed to remain were those whom the Germans allowed to survive as outcasts. The humiliation of this latter group exceeded all limits. A Pole who had refused to register as a German had to doff his hat before anyone whose uniform or insignia indicated that he was a German. If a German passed by, a Pole had to step off the sidewalk. A Pole could not travel by automobile or trolley and was even forbidden to own a bicycle. He had been placed completely outside the protection of the law and all his property, movable or immovable, was at the disposal of the German authorities.¹⁹

Mostly because of economic reasons, there were a considerable number of such "outcasts" left behind in the Western Provinces after the basic resettlement action was completed by the end of 1939. The population of the Western Provinces totalled

10,740,000 at the outbreak of World War II. Of these 1,500,000 were deported to the *General-Gouvernement*; 200,000 were deported as slave laborers to the Reich;²⁰ 600,000 were ethnic Germans;²¹ 1,000,000 were earmarked for possible Germanization;²² 1,600,000 were Wasserpolen, Masurians, and Kashubes in process of absorption into the German nation;²³ approximately 1,000,000 were killed or left as war refugees during the September Campaign. There were about 5,000,000 "undigestable" Poles who remained, forming about 50 percent of the population.

Eastern Germans Move Westward

With considerable energy and admirable success, the Nazi authorities carried out the second phase of their colonization scheme—bringing to Germany the ethnic Germans living abroad. The main reason behind this move was to save small scattered German communities from denationalization or even physical annihilation, and to settle them systematically in the newly incorporated territories.²⁴ Such resettlement took place simultaneously with the deportation of Poles from October 1939 to the end of 1940. The areas from which German authorities first tried to get ethnic Germans were those which had been annexed by the Soviet Union during 1939–1940 or those within her sphere of influence (Western Ukraine and Belorussia, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Baltic States). There was also repatriation from some German satellites like Rumania and Bulgaria, where the German colonies were too scattered or where the economic conditions for them were not good, as for example, Dobruja.²⁵ Finally there were cases where the Germans from the territories under immediate Nazi control were taken from the midst of alien populations for settlement in a compact mass in the prepared colonization area. Thus, 30,000 ethnic Germans from the Lublin District (within the boundaries of *General-Gouvernement*) were settled in Warthegau (one of the new provinces within the annexed Western Territories).²⁶

Altogether 500,000 persons of German origin were moved to Germany from the East in the period between the autumn of 1939 and March of 1941.²⁷

The repatriation of the ethnic Germans from abroad was voluntary and quite successful, especially in the case of the territories under Soviet control. Persons who could prove their German heritage besieged German repatriation missions, not because they were particularly friends of Nazism but because it seemed to be the only avenue of escape from the Soviet paradise. This escape was even more tempting because of the promise of property compensation by the Nazi authorities. In view of the nationalization legislation which the Soviet authorities introduced shortly after the annexation of new territories, such a promise was a direct gain.²⁸

After the repatriation of the Germans from the East was negotiated successfully on the diplomatic level between the German Reich and the government concerned, it was the job of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* to arrange the details for repatriation. When such arrangements were agreed upon, the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* sent abroad so-called *Umsiedlungskommandos* (Resettlement Teams) which, together with the representatives of the state concerned, actually brought the repatriation machinery into action. They received the candidates for repatriation, checked their claims, estimated the property they left behind, and took care that the amount of movable goods and money which a resettler could take accorded to treaty stipulation. The *Umsiedlungskommandos* also took care of securing transportation for the German resettlers from their country of origin to their place of destination.²⁹

The care and facilities which the German resettlers enjoyed under the auspices of the Nazi government contrasted strikingly with those enjoyed by the Polish resettlers who were moved to make room for them. While the Polish resettlers were moved only with minutes' or hours' notice, could barely take what they could carry with them, and had no chance for property compensation, German evacuees got every facility possible to make their departure from their old homes as painless as possible. They usually were allowed a week or two for settling their personal and economic affairs before leaving for their new fatherland. Having the choice of going either by train, truck, or by their own cart, they could take a substantial amount of movable

property with them. Those who were transported by train or by truck could take, besides their hand luggage, 110 pounds per head of family and 55 pounds per individual. Those who travelled on their own cart could fill their vehicle to the limit with their movable goods and could take with them two horses or two oxen, one pig, one cow, five sheep or goats, and ten fowl.³⁰

The limitation on taking away money amounted to \$2,850 per person. Silver in excess of 500 grams and other precious metals and stones, as well as interest-bearing bonds, could not be taken at all.³¹ The last-mentioned items did not represent a substantial part of the movable goods of most of the German evacuees, who were of a peasant stock.

While the endless train-loads, truck- and cart-caravans, and even ship-transports with human and animal cargo were streaming westward, there were feverish preparations on the German side for their temporary shelter, screening, and settlement.

Along routes where the transports passed all possible facilities for accommodation for the increased number of people, such as converted schools, factories, etc., were secured and prepared for them.³² The German Red Cross found them worthy of humanitarian aid and gave them food and medical care at the specially scheduled stops.³³

The German evacuees were never left too long in the occupied territories. They were transferred as soon as possible to the more permanent camps in the Old Reich. There a new "purgatory" started, conducted with diligence and in a systematic way. The process of investigation going on at this stage had important implications for both the German evacuees and the Nazi regime. The classification, made on the basis of a careful investigation of their racial and political background and their occupational skills, determined to a great degree the future social status of a resettler within Nazi society. For the Nazi authorities these uprooted and wholly dependent evacuee masses represented a convenient colonization capital which could be moulded according to the whims of the Nazi ideology.

The organization which carried on the most detailed investigation of German evacuees—the Central Immigration Office (EWZ)—examined most carefully the racial, political, national,

and occupational background of the incoming ethnic Germans. On the basis of this investigation naturalization was granted or refused by the Ministry of Interior, and the person concerned was either chosen for settlement in the East or rejected and destined to make his living in the Old Reich. According to Hitler's directives only the representatives of the best German blood were to be settled in the East, and the qualities which counted were: "Physical fitness, origin, ethnic-political attitude, and vocational training."³⁴

⌈ In a way, the new *Lebensraum* in the East was to become more important for Hitler than the Reich itself, for here he could build a perfect society on pure National-Socialistic principles, pure in a racial, social, and political sense. ⌋

The Second Stage of Nazi Colonization 1941-1944

Between the spring and autumn of 1941 there was a lull in the colonization activities of Himmler. This was partially due to the preparations for the Eastern campaign, which required all of the transportation facilities and many services of different Nazi organizations which usually were involved in colonization activity, and partially because the new *Drang nach Osten* was expected to extend considerably the present *Lebensraum* and put the colonization activity on a new and much broader basis.

As soon as the German troops in their push eastward achieved their first territorial successes the Nazi colonization expansion started with new impetus. Three weeks after the outbreak of the Nazi-Soviet War, Hitler expressed his intention of colonizing with Germans the former Austrian Galicia and the Crimean Peninsula.³⁵ The Governor-General of Poland, Hans Frank, revealed expansive colonization designs to his associates in September 1941. He indicated that the entire *General-Gouvernement* would be settled with Germans within the near future and would become a *Vandalengau*, and that the same was to apply to the area to the east of it, which would become a *Gothengau*.³⁶

In the years 1941-1944 the German colonization scheme in the East emerged in its far-reaching and more definite form. To

all appearances, the system of colonizing belts, and also gradual strangulation (*Einkapselung*) of Eastern peoples after splitting them up both nationally and politically, was to be established in the newly conquered areas of the Soviet Union. Because the newly acquired *Lebensraum* was too spacious in relation to the colonizing resources which Germany possessed during the war, there arose the problem of how to lay a basis for the future solid colonization of this area with the scant means available. A device had to be invented which would create an efficient and coordinated colonization net, at least at its rudimentary form, with the greatest economy of the colonizing manpower. From these problems and deficiencies there developed the idea that colonization of the Eastern territories should start along the most vital lines of communication.

The idea took definite shape in the so-called *Kegelbahn* (bowling alley) or pearl-string plan.³⁷ It was supplemented by a scheme according to which the important communication knots in the East should be surrounded by solid German settlements.³⁸

During a conference which took place in Hitler's headquarters and in the *Ostministerium* in Berlin (August 17, 1942)³⁹ the above colonizing device was finally accepted. The colonization was to proceed along the two main communication lines traversing the Eastern *Lebensraum* from north to south and from west to east. In this connection two new super-highways and railways were to be built: one on the Cracow-Lviv-Zhytomyr-Kiev line and another on the Leningrad-Mogilev-Kiev-Zhytomyr-Odessa line.⁴⁰

Direct communication lines, protected from both sides by a belt of German settlements, were planned to connect the future solid Germanic outpost areas in the East: Crimea, and Estonia, with the larger part of Latvia included.⁴¹

In addition to 500,000 ethnic Germans brought to Germany from Eastern and Southeastern Europe between the end of 1939 and beginning of 1941, there were 100,000 ethnic Germans who came to the Old Reich from abroad in the years 1941-1943.⁴² Only an insignificant part of the latter group was settled in the incorporated Western areas—a number which by no means could

drastically change its character during the second stage of German colonization activity. [Thus, even in the territory closest to the Old Reich, there existed no possibility of creating a racially pure colony during the war. Millions of Poles were left behind in this settlement area, either because they were skilled workers in vital industries or agricultural workers. Even at the time of the most intensive colonization there were as many Poles as Germans in the Western Provinces.⁴³

The only achievement of German colonization in terms of Nazi ideology and Nazi policy was the separation of the incorporated provinces by a solid belt of German settlements from the remaining part of Poland and by the separation of German and Polish settlements within this area. The influx of Germans from the Old Reich to the newly incorporated provinces was not more significant in numbers than those of the ethnic Germans. Their importance in colonization was, from the standpoint of Nazi ideology, even less significant. Nazi authorities wanted to see hundreds of thousands of volunteers from the Old Reich, either from peasant stock or from those willing to embrace wholeheartedly the ideology of "blood and soil," become pioneer-peasants in this newly conquered *Lebensraum*. However, only about 400,000 Old Reich Germans were either transferred there officially for administrative purposes or were merchants and artisans who came mostly for speculative purposes, trying to make quick and easy money in deserted Polish enterprises.⁴⁴

An attempt to induce German peasants to move from some overcrowded portions of the Old Reich and resettle in the eastern *Lebensraum* met such obstinate resistance that it had to be postponed until after the war.⁴⁵ The uncertainty of the outcome of the war was certainly a strong deterrent in many cases, but a general indifference of the German masses to the idea of becoming pioneer-peasants in the East may indicate that the *Lebensraum* concept, as Hitler conceived it, had not such a magic appeal to the German people as was reflected in Nazi official literature.

Of greater ideological importance was the fact that the Western Provinces became an area where the German youth

were practically indoctrinated in the idea of *Lebensraum*. In 1940 there were volunteers from *Deutscher Mädchenbund* (German Girls League) for work in the East. This number increased in 1941 to 9,973, and in 1942 to 19,000.⁴⁶ In 1942 there were also 30,000 of the *Hitler-Jugend* (Hitler Youth) working during the summer on the farms in the Western Polish Provinces.⁴⁷

[On the whole, the colonizing activity in the Western Provinces had during the years 1941–1944 a more stabilizing character and was bound not so much to further expansion as to cementing previous achievements.]

German colonization in the Czech Protectorate came after the outbreak of the Soviet-German war and was very limited in comparison with that carried out in the Soviet Union or in Poland. German colonists were allowed to settle there only in exceptional cases and in a limited number.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the colonization activity during the second stage of colonization was somewhat more extensive than before. In 1942 the German Resettlement Company took over 975 farms for the purpose of resettling German farmers, and it had 43,800 acres at its disposal.⁴⁹ It is significant also that Himmler settled 1,000 Dobruja and Sudeten Germans in the Protectorate during 1942.⁵⁰ The settlers were usually settled in the properties confiscated from Jews and Czechs who, because of their race or their political offenses, had been deported or had escaped abroad.⁵¹ Occasionally, the Nazi authorities responsible for colonization in the Protectorate would buy some suitable objects or enterprises.⁵² In 1942 a special branch of the German Settlement Staff was created in Prague, which together with the Bohemian-Moravian Land Company, concerned itself with finding colonization possibilities within the Protectorate and with determining where settlement projects could take place inconspicuously and without great disruption of the economic order.

Agricultural settlements were carried out in the Protectorate in the Koschatek district,⁵³ though there is no indication that it was a large-scale project which would affect a large number of the Czech population.

In cases where Czech farmers were replaced by German

farmers, the economic results were not encouraging. The German farmers seemed to be less efficient and less productive.⁵⁴ Thus, colonization on a larger scale in the Protectorate threatened not only to decrease agricultural production during the war but it might contradict the ideology of German superiority over the Slavs.

The caution which Germans showed in regard to the Protectorate economy during the war by no means meant that they had abandoned the idea of making the Protectorate a solid Germanic area after the war.⁵⁵ The settlements which were established during the war were arranged in such a way that they encircled the important Czech centers and tended to separate the two important Czech ethnic regions, Bohemia and Moravia.⁵⁶ The general pattern of colonization, biological reduction,⁵⁷ and partial Germanization, was intended ultimately for Czechs as well as for the other peoples in the Eastern *Lebensraum*, even though German policy did not emphasize resettlement in the Protectorate strongly, for the time being, as it did in the other occupied areas of the East.

Another area where German colonization proceeded rather cautiously, but on a larger scale than in the Czech Protectorate, was Lithuania.

Lithuania belonged to the bloc of Baltic nations which the Nazi authorities planned to absorb into the German nation and which they treated therefore with some consideration. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia had a greater degree of self-government than Poland, Ukraine, or Belorussia, and no policy of biological reduction or social "moronization" was applied there. On the other hand, Lithuania was regarded as being the least adapted of the Baltic nations for Germanization because of a high admixture of Slavic blood.⁵⁸

German colonization in Lithuania had two objectives: to strengthen the Germanic element in this little country; and to create a German settlement string across Lithuania which would link the "solid Germanic blocs" in the East—Estonia and Latvia—directly with East Prussia.⁵⁹

With this purpose in mind, the ethnic Germans of Lithuania, who were evacuated to Germany in the years 1939–1940,

were allowed to return to Lithuania. This permission applied only to those resettlers who were classified as O-cases—Germans who were found fit for colonization in the East.⁶⁰

The Nazi Resettlement Staff started the colonization of Lithuania in 1942 with 26,931 O-cases from Western Lithuania and 3,069 O-cases from Eastern Lithuania.⁶¹ By July 11, 1943 there were 4,700 German families (18,000–20,000 persons) settled in Lithuania.⁶² The settlements were supposed to form a “pearl-string” across Lithuania, and they affected such Lithuanian provinces as Kaunas, Mariampol, Wilkovishki, Shaki, Rasieni, Tauroggen, and parts of Seini and Olita.⁶³

Because the Germans did not want to lose the confidence of the Lithuanian people, the great part of whom they had earmarked as future German citizens, they tried to alleviate the plight of evicted Lithuanian peasants as much as possible. There were no sudden evictions similar to those practiced in Poland, and in many cases the Lithuanian family was allowed to stay with the German colonists on the farm for a certain length of time.⁶⁴ Lithuanian farmers were also promised compensation, and in many cases they were given property taken away from Jews, Poles, or Belorussians, or other minorities living in Lithuania who in their turn were either liquidated or deported to Poland or Belorussia.⁶⁵ This gesture did not reconcile the Lithuanian peasants completely, and the foreign colonization was taken at its face value. Incendiary acts and assaults against the German colonists were common occurrences and had not only a spontaneous character but were also backed by the Lithuanian Underground.⁶⁶

Much harsher were the colonization measures in the Zamosc area (Lublin District in the *General-Gouvernement*). The initiative for this particular German resettlement action was given by SS General Globocnik who was a representative of the Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom. In June 1941 he suddenly “discovered” in the Zamosc area about 6,000 “Polonized Germans,” and it gave him the idea to build a cell of German Eastern colonization in the *General-Gouvernement*.⁶⁷ His idea coincided perfectly with Heinrich Himmler’s project to take the Polish nation into an iron grip by establishing a belt of

German settlements in the Lublin and Cracow districts.⁶⁸ Thus Globocnik got Himmler's full support, and in the autumn of 1942 about 10,000 Poles from the Zamosc area were uprooted by German colonization activities. The resettlement procedure was particularly harsh, even in comparison with the resettlement methods used in the Western Polish Provinces. The Polish evacuees had only 10 minutes to 2 hours' time to pack their luggage before leaving.⁶⁹ They were not merely deported from the colonization area and left free, as was the case during the previous resettlements, but underwent a strict classification which separated families even of the closest kin, and sent them to different places. The SS resettlement squads classified the Polish evacuees into four different groups. Class I (Nordic) and Class II (Falic) were brought to the Lodz ethnic German camp for Germanization or for a closer racial examination. Class III (Mixed Races) was destined to work in Germany when in good physical condition and within the age limit from 14-60 years. People racially classified in Group III, who did not fulfill requirements for work, were shifted to the so-called *Rentendörfer* (rent villages), which usually meant half-ruined and desolated Jewish ghettos, and left to their fate. The members of the Class IV (Asocial and Racially Inferior) between age 14-60 were to be sent directly to the Auschwitz Concentration Camp. It was planned to send a certain number of the resettled Poles to the Ukrainian territory, but this plan did not work because of partisan warfare there.⁷⁰

The settlement in the Zamosc area and the planned extension of it in the Lublin District were supposed to mark the beginning of another belt of German settlements running along the Curzon line which would separate the Polish ethnographic territory from the Ukrainian, and it would also isolate the remaining Polish population within the *General-Gouvernement* territory between two solid German walls in the East and in the West. A similar belt was planned in the eastern part of the Galicia District (the outermost eastern district of the *General-Gouvernement*). A mass evacuation of the Ukrainian population from the eastern boundary of the *General-Gouvernement* and a colonization of this area with German settlers would sep-

arate the predominantly Ukrainian Galicia District from the *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine, and it would isolate the remaining Ukrainian population there between the eastern belt on the Galicia eastern boundary and the Cracow-Lublin belt in the West.

From all the above-mentioned colonization projects within the *General-Gouvernement*, only this one in the area of Zamosc was completely realized. The other colonization projects were abandoned because partisan activities made their realization impossible.⁷¹

Even the Zamosc settlement, which was successfully established during 1942, suffered under increasing pressure and insecurity. About one-half of the Polish population in the Zamosc area managed to escape German deportation by taking refuge in the forests. There, many of them were organized into partisan detachments by the Polish Underground, which was at this time well organized and had considerable manpower and arms at its disposal.⁷² Supplemented by the professional Underground groups, the Poles carried out numerous raids on the German colonies.

The resistance activities forced Himmler to abandon further colonization activities in the *General-Gouvernement* until after the end of the war. The remaining German settlements in the Zamosc area continued to be the object of pitched battles between German security forces and the Polish guerrillas, which by 1944 made the life of German colonists there unbearable. Early in 1944 the governor of the Lublin Districts, Zoerner, found the pressure on the German settlement in Kreis of Zamosc so strong that he, in a direct letter to Himmler, asked the latter to consider the possibility of complete liquidation of this German colony in view of the dangers.⁷³

By this time the German settlement area in the district of Zamosc had 25,000 Germans surrounded by a population of 170,000 Poles and 26,000 Ukrainians.⁷⁴

The problem of disbanding this settlement was finally solved by the advance of the Red Army, which occupied the area in July 1944.

The area of the Soviet Union proper which came under

Nazi occupation was too vast to permit extensive settlement by the ethnic Germans who still remained in the Vo Mi transitory camps. [The colonization action in this new huge space was limited during the war mainly to two activities: creating isolated landed estates for SS men; and concentrating the ethnic Germans living in these areas around the important strategic and communication points.⁷⁵

[The first strongholds of the German future colonization in this area were created in the form of large SS estates. These estates were managed by veteran SS men who because of injuries were unfit for active military duty. Even by 1942 such estates cultivated nearly 1,500,000 acres and employed 700 SS men.⁷⁶ In the Ukraine alone there were 50 such SS estates.⁷⁷ This number was to be rapidly supplemented by new volunteers who were to be initiated in the ways of farming in the East at 1,000 specially selected agricultural training farms in Germany.⁷⁸

In the Ukraine, as in the other Eastern areas of German occupation, the representatives of the Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom were given complete freedom of movement (both in the areas under German military occupation as well as under civilian administration) in their search for those of German heritage.⁷⁹ Their effort was quite successful in the Ukraine where they succeeded in registering 319,943 ethnic Germans by March 1943.⁸⁰

Though the regulation of the previously established *Volksliste* applied formally also to the ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union proper, it had little practical value. Because there were no ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union who either belonged to the illegal Nazi Party or to the German cultural organizations (unless they were merely the Soviet agencies), there were none who would qualify for the Class I and II of the *Volksliste*. A distinction could barely be made between those who actually participated in the Soviet government and those who did not. Thus there could be persons eligible for Class III who preserved their ethnical peculiarities and abstained from mixing with the alien elements and the Class IV (Renegades), those who became "unfaithful" to their German heritage. Both categories under the specification of the *Volksliste* would be repatriated to

the Old Reich in order to become full-pledged Germans again. German administration in the extensive area of the Ukraine was too weak to handle such a job efficiently, and besides, it needed (in view of its uncompromising policy towards the native population) and element on which it could rely. Therefore, the main policy towards the ethnic Germans within the Soviet Union was to consolidate their strength within the area rather than to deport them immediately to the "Old Reich." There were, therefore, several legislative acts passed which clarified and strengthened the position of ethnic Germans in the *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine. [On September 9, 1942 a law was passed which provided for the reception of all ethnic Germans within the *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine to the German community. This provision did not mean the legal grant of German citizenship to the ethnic Germans in the Ukraine, but it put them under protection of German law and thus elevated them over the masses of the subjugated Slavs.⁸¹

Another law passed on September 9, 1942 provided that the Germans of Classes I, II, and III on the *Volksliste* were entitled to compensation for the property which they had lost during the Soviet nationalization policy in the Ukraine.⁸² They were to have their lands restored, or an equivalent of their property, and could cultivate or run it privately.⁸³ It was again a privileged deviation from the general agrarian order in the Ukraine where the kolkhozlike system was rigidly maintained by the German administration.⁸⁴

With this legal strengthening of the Germanic element in the Ukraine, there were practical steps taken towards separating the ethnic Germans from the alien surroundings and in preparation for larger German settlements in the Ukraine where the scattered Germanic element could be consolidated. Such larger German settlements were to be created around the strategically important cities and vital knots of communication in the Ukraine.⁸⁵ Some positive plans were made to build completely new German cities in the East, with approximately 15,000–20,000 population, at important railway and highway junctions. Such cities were to be surrounded by a 5-10 mile broad belt of German villages.⁸⁶ As a concrete example of such settlement

several cities in the Ukraine were mentioned. In the northwestern part of *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine, the towns of Zhytomyr, Vinnycia, and Rovno were selected as primary points of German settlement.⁸⁷ About 20,000 ethnic Germans were to be concentrated around an undesignated junction point in the vicinity of Nykolayev. Also, the towns of Dnepropetrovsk, Kryvyi Rih, and Zaporozhe were to be surrounded by German settlements.⁸⁸

These preparations were made in accordance with the wishes of Hitler, who wanted to have whole parts of the Ukraine settled solidly with Germans within the next twenty years.⁸⁹

One such part of the East which was supposed to be settled solidly with Germans was the Crimea. Though remaining under military administration until the end of the German occupation, the Crimea experienced quite extraordinary activity on the part of the Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom. The strategic and consolidating settlements were worked out in much greater detail than in the rest of the Ukraine. This can be seen clearly from the official German report on the progress of colonization in the Crimea. First of all it specifies the following places of settlement:

1. The municipal district of Eupatoria together with the rural district of Otar-Moinak (railway connection Eupatoria-Simferopol).
2. The area of the town of Simferopol.
3. The territory along the railway line from Simferopol to Dshankoi between Spat and Kurman, with the rural districts of Spat, Kambary, Menglertschik, Eki-Basch, Kyabak, and Alabash.⁹⁰

The report proceeds and indicates that:

In September 1943 all the mentioned rural districts had been made German villages. In the urban districts of Simferopol and Eupatoria the ethnic Germans were, as far as possible, concentrated in their own quarters. These exclusively German villages and parts of towns were, as far as possible, given their own municipal administration. German burgomasters took care of their community.

The military Government of Crimea made available a fixed key amount from the total of incoming taxes for the German communities which was, however, administered centrally by the *Bereitskommando 44* in cooperation with burgomasters.⁹¹

While in the *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine only one consolidated German colony came into existence, the settlement near Zhytomyr,⁹² the German colonization blueprints for the Crimea found realization to a far greater degree. All places of settlement which had been planned actually became German villages. In towns like Simferopol and Eupatoria the Germans did not succeed in expelling all the foreigners, but they consolidated the German minority in separate districts and put them under their own municipal authority.

The colonizing of the Crimea with ethnic Germans was combined with a strong Nazi indoctrination to which those newly won for Germanism were subjected. Especial care was taken by the Nazi authorities to win over the children of the ethnic Germans to the German way of life and to the Nazi ideology. For this purpose kindergartens were built, beautifully equipped and staffed with German Red Cross nurses, where the youngest candidates for Germanism could be conditioned in a proper spirit from childhood. Large educational camps were erected where the foreign-born German youth could reach the "German level" of culture and civilization and where they could shake off any foreign influences. By the spring of 1944 three such boarding schools were built where German children over ten years of age were subject to the process of "re-education."⁹³

In anticipation of further German colonization in the Crimea the zones of settlement were prepared by the special German agency *Volksdeutsche Leitstelle* (Guidance Center for ethnic Germans). Its job was to pick out the zones suitable for the settlement of ethnic Germans. The zones which were best adapted for colonization and where "all industries and all types of agriculture were possible" received the name of "General Settlement Zones." They were supposed to absorb the greatest number of German settlers, and detailed plans were made to determine how such areas should be settled. The architect, Profes-

sor Regler, was invited to design, in detail, the pattern of Nazi architecture and interior decorations for the new German settlements in the Crimea.⁹⁴

It is interesting to note with what tenacity and endurance the Nazis held to their colonization designs in the East. Even in face of continuous retreat from the East after the summer of 1943, the Nazis made no attempt to liquidate their German settlements, unless absolutely necessary. Such colonization areas as the Crimea and the incorporated Western Polish Provinces were often overrun by Russians before the Nazi authorities could evacuate the greater part of their colonists.⁹⁵

The only revision of the Nazi colonization design was made by Himmler in the summer of 1944, after the Allied troops successfully made their invasion in France and the Russian troops were approaching the German Reich boundary. At the same time, when the overwhelming part of German *Lebensraum* was actually lost, Himmler consented to settle in the East not only those of Germanic descent but also those alien elements who served in the Eastern Legions and fought on the German side. They were to be settled separately from the Germans on the exterior boundary of the German Empire in the Ural Mountains as military colonies fulfilling the function of a securing wall against the Soviet Empire, which Himmler thought would still exist beyond the Urals.⁹⁶ This revision was not supposed to affect the German colonization in the remaining areas of the East.⁹⁷

What is significant and worthwhile to note is the fact that the Nazi colonization activities were not entrusted to the regular German administration and occupation authorities in the East but to the special agencies under the authority of SS leader Heinrich Himmler. During the time when Nazi governors and commissars, including the Minister for the East, Alfred Rosenberg, were theoretically responsible for all measures taken in territories under their authority, they had virtually no control over colonization and resettlement activities sponsored by Himmler in his role as Commissioner for the Strengthening of German-dom. In possession of an unlimited authority for preparing the East for German settlement and exercising the actual executive

power in the East—the German police—Himmler could conveniently ignore the German civilian authorities if their help was not essential or if their policy did not coincide with his. The main difficulty in cooperation emerged not only from the fact that they both had, in a way, supreme control over the same territory and the same people, but because they put different stress on the objectives of the Nazi Eastern Policy.]

German civilian authorities in the East emphasized the policy of the *present* with Germany's war effort in mind.⁹⁸ They were concerned with political stability, economic exploitation, and securing the cooperation of their foreign subjects for this end by different means, including ruthless force. Himmler, on the other hand, was more concerned with the *future* Nazi objectives in the East. Therefore, he was more inclined to regard foreign subjects there as a burden rather than an asset. He was less willing to see their value as an economic factor in the war effort, but rather he viewed the war circumstances as a very convenient time for their reduction or their removal from the German settlement area.

The colonization activities created tension between the German Civil Administration in the East and the SS organization and its subsidiary agencies. Matters of prestige as well as the bad effects which such colonization activities apparently had on economic planning and public security seemed to be matters of the greatest concern to the Civil Administration. Governor Hans Frank sent Hitler a long memorandum⁹⁹ complaining that SS detachments carried on resettlement in his territory without consultation with him or with his local subordinates. He complained that such settlement had a deterrent influence on agricultural production, even in the areas which were not directly affected by the resettlement action.¹⁰⁰

Ostminister Alfred Rosenberg complained in a direct letter to Himmler that resettlement action in the Ukraine was started without his knowledge, though there had been a previous agreement with him that colonization activity would be carried out with mutual understanding and through joint settlement staffs.¹⁰¹

There was only one Nazi administrator in the East who was not annoyed by Himmler's *Lebensraum* activities in his ter-

ritory—*Reichskommissar* of the Ukraine, Erich Koch. Himmler's activities not only perfectly coincided with Koch's idea of the immediate, most drastic measures in the East but it also gave him a chance to make the SS organization his most powerful ally and in this way to be practically independent of Rosenberg, who was his superior. Therefore, Koch not only cooperated with Himmler wholeheartedly,¹⁰² but he actually took personal credit for some of Himmler's "achievements" in the Ukraine.¹⁰³

On the Way to the Garden of Eden

The German colonization design and action are not completely comprehensible without the Nazi *mystique* of "blood and soil." National-Socialist ideology put a heavy stress on the "natural relation" of man to the soil which, according to their beliefs, not only determined the biological stamina of an individual but also had an influence on his "Weltanschauung." The cultivation of soil and living in the country were regarded not only as a kind of economic necessity but as a virtue on which the future well-being of the nation was based. Therefore, land-colonization was of a primary interest to the Nazi authorities, and it came into being and progressed under the strict supervision of the competent Nazi organizations. There was very little opportunity for independent development of the new German village communities in the East; any deviation from the set pattern of the rural society was brought to an abrupt end.

Though the Nazis often proudly referred to the German colonists as the "pioneers of the East," struggling heroically against the foreign environment, leading a rugged life in a primitive and almost wild country, this did not correspond with the truth; nor could the experience be compared with the conditions or ways in which the American pioneers moved westward and settled the land. The German colonist had no choice about where he settled, what farm he received or what he could do with it. This was decided by some superhuman agency of Space Planning, which prescribed how many people could be settled in a certain area in order to strengthen and consolidate the German element.¹⁰⁴ There was, further, the Immigration Agency

(EWZ) which, on the basis of race, political reliability, and occupational skill, determined irrevocably who may and who may not become an "Eastern Pioneer."¹⁰⁵

Even when the right individual was sent to a proper area he did not find an open space where he could build his own farm or his own enterprise and feature his own life in the way he wanted. First of all, the area in the East was not virgin land and primeval forests. It had been cultivated for as long (if not longer) than the soil in Germany. Even in more recent times, months or years before his arrival, the soil in the colonization areas and the expropriated foreign farms and enterprises was under the current care and management of different Nazi agencies. The NSV (National Socialist Welfare Organization) took care that the farm, which a German colonist was to get, be supplied with all of the necessary implements.¹⁰⁶ The *Ostdeutsche Landwirtschaftsgesellschaft* (East German Agricultural Association) and *Deutsche Wohn- und Siedungsgesellschaft* (German Housing and Settlement Company), which managed the confiscated foreign property in the Incorporated Provinces, improved and readjusted the individual holdings, and supplied them with sufficient livestock and equipment to make their farms suitable to the requirements of an average German colonist family.¹⁰⁷

The *Ansiedlungsstab* (Settlement Staff), which was under SS management and consisted half of Nazi Party members and half of experienced farmers, assigned to the colonist the farm or enterprise which was regarded as best for the size of his family and his background.¹⁰⁸

There were no primitive people to be fought by the German colonist because the potentially dangerous natives were whisked away in advance of the coming of the colonists. Those who remained were of a complacent type, and they were reduced to the status of slaves and servants.¹⁰⁹

The German "pioneer" in the East entered into a new and artificially created society, and there were as yet many gaps and many uncertainties about the final shape and character of the Nazi colonization scheme.

For example, the criteria for the amount of land to be dis-

tributed was not yet precisely determined at the very early stage of colonization. Usually, it was assumed that a German resettler should get a farm which would correspond in value and size to that which he had to leave behind. In view of the abundance of the foreign property and the relative scarcity of the settlers, many generous provisions were made which granted to the settlers Polish farms or consolidate tracts of land in excess of what they had abandoned at home.

Such arrangements often created practical as well as ideological problems. Some farmers coming from moderately-sized farms in the East had neither the necessary will nor actual know-how to run large-sized farms. This kind of problem could be seen from the following Nazi press interview with one of the resettled farmers:

"Well, Kamerad, how are you getting on?" asked the local peasant leader. The peasant greeted us and said that things were improving but that he had too much land. "Too much land," he added and looked helplessly into the distance. "What? Sixty acres are too much for you? But you have enough horses, and grown-up sons and a wife to help you." In the stables the peasant leader, to his surprise, saw only two horses and instead of eight cows, only two. When he got to the pigsty he found only two sows, and four sucklings. "What have you done with the rest of your livestock?" he inquired. "Those," the peasant replied sullenly. "Well I got rid of them. There back in the East we never had more, neither my father, nor my grandfather, but we had enough to feed the family."¹¹⁰

Another problem was created by the fact that by the drafting of the majority of young Germans into the Army the German colonists had to rely on the help of Polish manpower. Because of the highly elevated position of the Germans in the incorporated Western Polish Provinces and the inferior status of the remaining Poles, there arose the question of whether the German colonists should perform the physical work at all, or whether they should hold the position of managers with the subordinate Poles doing the necessary work. This peculiar inter-

pretation of the Nazi-race principle in the shape of a modern squirearchy was promptly rejected by the Nazi Party for the obvious reasons: (1) Nazi ideologists could not build their new social order based on racially pure communities by making a racially foreign element a permanent component of it. (2) The *mystique* of blood and soil could only have meaning when a German peasant had direct contact with the soil and exercised his muscles—not merely through brain work.

Therefore, the authoritative sources were quoted broadly by the Nazi press rejecting such an erroneous conception. With this intention the *National-Sozialistische Landpost* of August 1940 quoted the founder of the master-race concept, Walter Darré, saying: “The soil will be mastered by those who till it, and not by those who merely give the orders to till it.”

The Under-Secretary of State in the *Reichsministerium* of Food wrote in *Das Reich*, August 4, 1940:

Conquests are really valuable only where the conquered land can be colonized by German peasants and tilled, with limited exceptions, exclusively by Germans. Wherever Germans conquered a land but failed to settle their own peasantry—as, for example in the Baltic states, where the German barons used alien labor—German rule did not last and the conquered land was lost again. Our past teaches us that the plow must follow the sword.

Alfred Rosenberg was quoted in *Das Neue Bauerntum* in August, 1940 as follows:

Any kind of labor done on the German soil is worthy of respect. . . . Our goal can never be a *Herrenvolk* in the English sense. We do not wish a Reich built on clay foundations, but a strong and sound Reich of German blood and soil.

Under the stimulus of this challenge and discussion, there arose a necessity to define and outline the future agricultural society in greater detail and on certain fixed principles. Thus on November 26, 1940 the Commission for the Strengthening of

Germandom issued a detailed blueprint which was to specify how the soil should be distributed among settlers; what organizational structure should the future *Lebensraum* eventually acquire; and what objectives there are behind the different individual measures.

According to these new regulations the basic economic unit in the colonization area should be a 50-100 acre farm, large enough to support a family of 10-14 (including grandparents and agricultural trainees). In case the soil should be of such poor quality that the indicated amount would be insufficient, some greater estates, called *Grosshufen* or *Gutsbetriebe*, will be created.¹¹¹

Some larger estates would also be formed, as in the case of so called *Erbhöfe* (hereditary farms), which often included as many as 300 acres. In general, the farms of between 50-300 acres should make up two-thirds of all lands and three-fourths of the soil employed in cultivation.¹¹² Generally, it was planned that for every six or seven average farms there should be one larger estate.¹¹³ About one-third of all lands and about one-fourth of cultivated land was withheld from the general land distribution, and the blueprint does not state clearly in which way it should be used. But some remarks in the decree and the practical measures taken in the later years of occupation indicate that some parts of this remaining land should be forested (especially in the case of poor soils), a part was to be either rented¹¹⁴ or donated¹¹⁵ to the outstanding leaders of the nation, and the rest was to be kept as reserve land for the future farmers.

This arrangement had as its purpose to draw more people into agricultural pursuits, and it also was supposed to provide the possibility of a social rise or distinction within the hierarchy of Nazi society. An average settler in the East would have to start his career from the very bottom. First he would become a common farm hand on one of the average-sized farms. Then after a few years of training he would marry and move to one of the larger farms (*Erbhof*—hereditary farm) and work as an agricultural laborer there. Only after the successful conclusion of his training would a young candidate be granted some land and thus be enabled to become a farmer on his own.¹¹⁶

Land was also to be granted to the Nazi elite in the form of large estates. Such a grant served not only as a reward but it also bound the German leaders personally to something which the Nazis regarded as of mystical and vital importance—the soil.

To such an elite belonged distinguished great soldiers, Knights Cross bearers,¹¹⁷ and dignitaries from the SS organization. The estates were given to them either on the basis of a nominal rent or as a direct gift from the Reich. Among others, German Panzer-General Guderian and SS-*Oberstgruppenführer* and *Generaloberst* of Police, Kurt Dalwege, were granted such estates for perpetual use.¹¹⁸

(Increasing difficulties during the war and the crisis resulting from the Stalingrad defeat brought on total war measures which did not allow the Nazi government to expand its colonization schemes to a greater degree.) There were, nevertheless, still more daring projects in store in comparison with which the actual colonization action in the East was only an insignificant and rudimentary beginning. The same blueprint mentions the future creation of special villages and village complexes. Such an ideal future village was supposed to cover from 2,500-3,500 acres and to secure a livelihood for 300-400 people. The most striking provision in the creation of the new villages required their almost complete isolation from city life. The groups of villages were not to be centered around a town, as might naturally be expected, but around one large village called *Hauptdorf* (Main Village). Such a *Hauptdorf* was to be the unifying core of the surrounding villages. It was supposed to provide facilities for sport activities, celebrations of Nazi Party festivities, and cultural events in which the inhabitants of the neighboring villages could participate. Therefore, the *Hauptdorf* had to be located at such a distance from the other villages that it could be reached conveniently by foot. Apart from the facilities offered by the *Hauptdorf* for more important community events, every single village should have public buildings: a Party-house, an inn with an auditorium and stage facilities, a gymnasium, a school, and common economic buildings.¹¹⁹

In order to diminish relations with cities or towns, the Nazi

authorities planned to go so far as to build special electric power stations in the countryside in order to make the villages free from reliance on urban centers.¹²⁰

The future villages were going to be constructed by special Nazi architects in a style which would reflect individuality and yet harmonize with the surrounding landscape. This yearning for a rustic way of life by no means indicated a withdrawal from civilization in a technological sense. On the contrary, the farmers were supposed to get the most modern agricultural equipment and machinery to stimulate agricultural production.¹²¹ All that the villages had to banish were the effeminate influences of the big city.

No industrial activities as such were to be suffered in the colonization areas of the East. It could be judged from the letter of the SS Economic and Management Headquarters dated August 24, 1942 as follows:

(There in East) we cannot think of Industry in a capitalistic sense. I believe there would be no possibilities for this with our farm economy, which does not admit urbanization, estrangement of the soil, or an exploitation system. Instead, there will probably be created large-scale artisan-enterprises which would manufacture the incoming goods procured by the settlers' communities.¹²²

The cities were still accepted in the East as necessary evils, but some reforms were planned in their size and appearance. They were not only to be built in the Germanic style or to be completely rearranged (like Lublin—see Himmler's File, 266 No. 55/6), but they were to be reduced in size to small towns, (15,000-20,000) which would display no symptoms of decay.

In this way the healthy, strong, agricultural German East was supposed to counterbalance biologically and "culturally" the Old Reich and preserve it from the decline which, according to Oswald Spengler, threatened effeminate, easygoing Western Europe.

In the evaluation of their actual colonization achievements the Nazi authorities refused to be satisfied or compromised by half-measures or piecemeal solutions. They had a clear picture

of what they had done, and they had a precise plan of what they wanted ultimately to do in the future. The colonization of the East had to be total, and this endeavor was stated clearly and firmly in the official SS organ *Das Schwarze Korps* (August 20, 1943):

The Reich brought hundreds of thousands of German peasants home, out of endangered and scattered settlements. Our Reich organized and settled them in the East in a well-planned fashion. Their number exceeded the size of some peoples during the time of the Peoples' Migration. Still, their number is only a little drop on a hot stone. They are only a seed, not a fulfillment. And when, after the homecoming of our soldiers, we finally get new hundreds of thousands and millions willing to build their farms in the East, it will still be only a beginning. Only through them, their wives, their children and their children's children will we be able to secure our victories on the battle-fields forever.

(It would be a misconception to see only economic reasons in this scheme of a gigantic agricultural colonization.) The Nazi objective to reach a point where the Nation will be predominantly employed in agriculture, while applying at the same time the most modern and labor-saving agricultural machinery, was obviously contradictory. It is known that in the United States, because of agricultural mechanization, the agricultural class dropped to below 8 percent of the whole population. Yet this drastically reduced manpower employed in agriculture is able not only amply to supply a nation of 180 millions with food but also to render tremendous food surpluses for export and storage.

It is clear that Germans with their efficiency and with their technical know-how could get similar results with an equally reduced amount of farmers. There is, therefore, no rational explanation either for building up a predominant peasant class or for extending agricultural colonization on such a large scale.

The German colonization scheme in the East is fully understandable only within the whole pattern of Nazi policy with its strong ideological attachment.

Very revealing in this connection is the statement of SS-

Gruppenführer Greifelt who, as the chief of the Main Office of the Commission for the Strengthening of Germanism, was responsible for the great majority of actual resettlement and colonization actions. Outlining the German *Lebensraum* policy in the East, he said:

The planned New Order is something completely new. It will express the National-Socialistic philosophy of life. Therefore, it will influence all aspects of life. It will bring not only excellent social and economic results, but also cultural results, and creation of a new spiritual attitude.¹²³

His words indicate the peculiar feature of the totalitarian "order" where a problem (like self-sufficiency of food) would be solved not within the limits of the problem itself but in consideration and in agreement with the whole intricate "philosophy of life" which a given totalitarian regime holds.

There is ample evidence at present indicating that the above-mentioned ideas were shared by Hitler. The events of World War II seemed only to strengthen Hitler's determination to realize his ideological conception of *Mein Kampf* in relation to the Eastern *Lebensraum*. That Hitler did not think about the conquest of Eastern territories in terms of ordinary war spoils, but that he attributed to them a fundamental importance within the framework of a new Nazi society, is reflected in the following remarks:

I would regard it as a crime to have sacrificed the lives of German soldiers simply for conquest and natural riches to be exploited in capitalistic style.

~~According to the laws of nature, the soil belongs to him who conquers it.~~ The fact of having children who want to live, the fact that our people is bursting out of its cramped frontiers, these justify all our claims of the Eastern spaces. Jan. 28, 29, 1942).¹²⁴

~~Our gains in the west may add a measure of charm to our possessions and constitute a contribution to our general security, but our Eastern conquests are infinitely more precious, for they are the foundation of our very existence.~~ (Sept. 6, 1942.)¹²⁵

The impact of the *Lebensraum* idea on Hitler is also indicated in his last message to the chief of the German general staff, Keitel. On April 29, 1945, when Russian troops already fought in the streets of Berlin, and shortly before Hitler committed suicide, he insisted that "the aim must still be to win territory in the East for the German people."¹²⁶

CHAPTER THREE

The Policy of Germanization

Germanization can be applied only to the soil, never to the people. What was generally understood by this word was a forced, outward acceptance of the German language. But it is an almost inconceivable error to believe that, let us say, a Negro or a Chinese becomes a Teuton because he learns German and is willing to speak the German language in the future, and perhaps to give his vote to a German political party. . . . The frequently demanded policy of Germanizing the Polish East unfortunately almost always rested on the same fallacy. Here, too, they believed the Polish element could be Germanized by a purely linguistic process of Teutonization. Here, too, the result would have been disastrous. . . . Historically, the thing usefully Germanized has been the soil that our forefathers conquered with the sword and settled with German peasants. (Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, New York, 1939, p. 378.)

It is not our task to Germanize the East in the old sense, that is, to teach the people there the German language and the German law, but to see to it that only people of purely Germanic blood live in the East. (Heinrich Himmler, in July 1942, *I.M.T. Doc. NO-3001.*)

The conquerors in the past tried either to assimilate the vanquished nations, to convert them to their religion or their way of life, to enslave them, to exploit them economically, or to keep them under control for strategic reasons. The objective of the totalitarian imperialism of our time is much deeper, more all-embracing and predetermined. In its permanent conquests it wants to build a new society from the very roots, according to specific rules. In pursuit of its new creation it can use only certain elements from the old society. The remaining "undigestable" parts of the old culture are regarded as superfluous and

are treated accordingly. In the Soviet Union the percentage of such organically unassimilable elements (hostile classes) was relatively small.¹ It consisted of such categories as nobility, high-ranking officials, police, judges, rich peasants (kulaks), merchants, clergy, industrialists, military officers, and large landowners. Unless they fled before the Red Terror during the Civil War, they were either physically annihilated or enslaved and removed to uninhabitable parts of the Soviet Union. In 1936, when introducing the new Soviet constitution, Stalin officially announced that hostile classes had ceased to exist in the Soviet Union. A similar process of classification and elimination of "hostile classes" was applied by the Soviet authorities in the newly incorporated territories annexed after the outbreak of World War II.

(In building the new Nazi society, racial criteria were chosen instead of the criterion of social origin. The common unit considered for this purpose was, in the Nazi case, the nation as a whole rather than a class.)

Racially the German people are a mixture, 60 percent Nordic, including such "inferior" blood as that of the Eastern Race.² Despite the mixed blood, no Germans were subjected to racial discrimination by the Nazis unless they had Jewish blood. In the territory of the German *Lebensraum*, racial criteria were applied to national ethnic groups. Peoples living in the occupied territories were categorized as follows:

- (1) Racially akin to the Germans—the Estonians.³
- (2) Partially Germanic—the Czechs, Latvians, and Lithuanians.⁴
- (3) Racially alien—the Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Gypsies.⁵

Since the colonies to be established in the *Lebensraum* were to be purely *Germanic* the peoples indigenous to the territories must be treated with that objective in mind. The treatment applied to all members of a particular nation. Only those who were individually picked as having Germanic traits were eligible for Germanization, and only they could escape the harshness of the German *Lebensraum* policy.

Since the German Reich must be built from the Germanic element, with Nordic traits predominating, Hitler could not consider the "alien" Eastern peoples as proper components of the new society nor as reliable allies. He was not interested in their conversion to National Socialism.⁶ Only Germanic nations such as the Norwegians or Dutch were regarded as worthwhile objects for National Socialist conversion.⁷

The Reich and the Ethnic Germans

Just as there was irreconcilable contempt for the idea of "opportunistic bastardization" of the German Nation, there was also an eagerness to discover, register, and restore to German-dom persons of German ancestry popularly called *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans).

Following the creation of the Commission for the Strengthening of Germanism and setting in motion the elaborate machinery of *Lebensraum*, it was necessary to develop a blueprint according to which the process of registration and acceptance into German nationality would be regulated. Such a blueprint was created in the form of a *Volksliste* (Record of Racial Descent), which divided the ethnic Germans into four main classes. Class I included those ethnic Germans who before the outbreak of war belonged to the illegal Nazi organization abroad. This class of Germans was immediately granted German citizenship and regular membership in the Nazi Party.⁸

Germans who were not Party members but who actively participated in German cultural or fraternal organizations and associations abroad were put into Class II. They were eligible for immediate and unrestricted German citizenship, but they were not allowed, for the time being, to join the National Socialist Party. They were eligible for membership in the auxiliary Nazi organizations like the NSV (National Socialistic Welfare Organization) or DAF (German Labor Front). The members of Classes I and II within the German colonization area were allowed to remain in their places of residence and to retain their property intact.⁹

Class III included those ethnic Germans who did not asso-

ciate formally with Germandom by participation in any kind of German organizations abroad but who cultivated their Germandom within their own family by retaining language, customs, and cultural patterns. Mixed families, in which the German part predominated, were also registered in the Class III.¹⁰

Class III ethnic Germans were granted German citizenship for ten years only. After their loyalty to Germandom had been proved satisfactorily they could secure permanent citizenship. Otherwise the citizenship could be annulled.¹¹

This category of Germans suffered from another kind of limitation. They were allowed to join the auxiliary Nazi organizations, but they were not eligible to become officials and were barred from any honorary positions until such time as they secured permanent citizenship. Limitations were placed on their marriage. They could intermarry within their Class and were allowed to marry average German citizens, but they could not marry persons from Class IV; and marriage to foreigners was also out of the question. This limitation on Class III Germans also applied to German citizens of an elevated rank within the German bureaucracy, Army, and Nazi Party. The prohibition was not an absolute one in the latter case, and some exceptions could be made with permission of a Gauleiter¹² or a Commanding General.¹³

The German resettlers from abroad who were classified in this category could be settled only within the boundary of the Old Reich so they might become acclimatized to the German surroundings and thus accelerate the process of their Germanization. The Germans of Class III, in the German colonization areas of the East, were supposed to abandon their property and their old place of residence and to move to the Old Reich for permanent residence.¹⁴ They were to receive compensation for their property, which they could not take with them, and funds so received were to be used to help establish themselves in the Old Reich.¹⁵

Class IV was reserved for "German Renegades"—the people of German heritage who actively associated themselves with the life of an "alien people" and participated wholeheartedly in foreign political or cultural life. There was a period of hesita-

tion on the part of the Nazi authorities about what to do with this category of people. Obviously, here was a conflict between political and racial criteria in the evaluating of candidates for Germandom. In the long run, racial solidarity prevailed, and the "German Renegades" received basically the same treatment as the members of Class III. The only difference was in the form of citizenship. While the members of Class III received citizenship for a ten-year period, Class IV members were eligible only for provisional citizenship, which could be revoked at any time.¹⁶

Class IV was earmarked for permanent residence in the Old Reich. Their property in the German colonization areas in the East legally was subject to confiscation.¹⁷ The Nazis actually started resettlement action in which members of Classes III and IV were resettled from the Eastern areas under German control to the Old Reich.¹⁸ This action then stopped suddenly, and the persons so resettled were in many cases returned to the East for the time being, though not to their original places of residence. The order to leave the Class III and Class IV Germans temporarily at peace was motivated by the necessity of "better Germanizing" them.¹⁹ It is possible that either this category of Germans were so estranged from Germandom that their immediate transfer to the Old Reich did not promote their amalgamation into German society and created some mutual tensions or the necessity for strengthening the German element in the East was of great importance since the Nazi authorities desperately attempted to establish at least a 1:1 ratio between foreigners and Germans in the colonization area.²⁰

In their efforts to retain good German stock, the Nazi authorities were willing to exempt from deportation Germans with some Jewish blood in their veins. This applied to those ethnic Germans in the Incorporated Provinces who were of mixed blood of the first degree Jewish descendancy and who were married to Germans or who were disposed to be friendly to Germandom. Those of second degree Jewish descendancy were allowed to remain provided their political reliability was proven.²¹ There was no specific provision made as to the class to which they should be assigned. The problem of the so-called

Mischlinge (mongrel) was most difficult for the Nazi authorities to solve.²² On October 27, 1942 it was decided that 70,000 Germans of mixed blood of the first degree should be sterilized or compelled to divorce.²³ Otherwise, it seems, they were left in peace.

At the beginning of the Nazi *Lebensraum* policy, acceptance of an individual of German origin was based not only on his German heritage but on his political and national convictions, and above all upon his willingness to embrace German nationality.²⁴ In the later stage of Nazi occupation, after 1941, the principle of heritage greatly outranked all other considerations. Persons of German origin within an incorporated area were no longer asked if they felt like Germans or if they were willing to learn the German language and pursue the German way of life. They were made to face a very difficult decision: either embrace German nationality and save their property, the unity of their family, and their personal security or risk a forceful removal from the ranks of an "alien" nation, to a concentration camp, separation from and Germanization of their children, and eventual annihilation.²⁵ The reason behind this drastic Germanization move was to increase by all means the strength of the Germanic element²⁶ and to provide security for the future. The Nazis believed that the Germanic element within an alien people provided the leadership, and this leadership might stir the otherwise passive and amorphous Slavic masses to resistance against German *Lebensraum* measures. It was pointed out that many leading personalities in the Polish State were of German origin and that they were the ones who fought ferociously against their own blood.²⁷ Concrete examples were found in the Polish-German Campaign (1939) where the commanding officers of the Polish last-ditch defenders (in case of Warsaw and the Hela Peninsula) bore German names.

The Nazi authorities made sure that at least the Poles who occupied an elevated political, social, or economic position, either at present or in the past, and who had some German blood in their veins would be separated from the alien race in one or another way. Heinrich Himmler took a personal interest in the process of Germanizing such leading Poles. He was

prompt in acting according to his principles when an attempt at Germanization failed. This can be seen from his two following orders:

CASE MARIA LAMBUCKI

Maria Lambucki from Tomasz-Lub is 100% German according to her descent and yet totally Polish-minded. I order her immediate transfer to Concentration Camp Ravensbrück. The two sons 8 and 13 years of age, who are racially very good are to be brought, by the Chief of SS-Race and Settlement Office and by the help of Security Police, to Germany and put separately in two especially well-managed boarding schools.²⁸

CASE STANISLAUS KOCH

Stanislaus Koch from land-estate Sitno is 75% of German origin. He refuses, however, to admit any connections with Germandom. He is therefore to be brought to a Concentration Camp with an arms industry; also his wife and daughter are to be put separately in two different concentration camps.²⁹

German heritage could be of great advantage to people who by inclination or for opportunistic reasons wanted to become Germans. Their decision could elevate them quickly from a slavlike status to the status of the privileged master race. It could become disastrous to individuals who attempted to live according to their principles and who did not want to trade away their national allegiance.

It is only a matter of interpretation whether these people were better or worse off than those who because of their race had no freedom of choice and who could not count on a minimum existence within the Nazi Empire—if they could count on an existence at all.

The Search for Germanic Blood

The second objective of the Germanization policy was to secure for the German nation those parts of the Eastern European masses which Nazi authorities regarded as racially "val-

uable." Action in this direction was conducted under different slogans, such as "bringing the related peoples back into the Germanic family," or "retrieving scattered people of Germanic blood," or to "secure for Germandom some individuals or groups with Nordic qualities." Measures were taken for the purpose of securing within a short time an additional number of 30 million Germans who would help to realize the idea of making the spacious *Lebensraum* solidly German.³⁰ Such slogans were used to rationalize an apparent deviation from the strictly ethnic definition of German nationality.

The earliest attempt to Germanize whole ethnic groups in the East was that attempted in Poland where the Wasserpolen, Masurians, and Kashubes were split off from the Polish nation. Such mass Germanization was less painful than the individual Germanization and more superficial. There were no humiliating interrogations, investigations, checkups, and other usual procedures. Whole villages and townships were simply declared German and the inhabitants had often only to give their names to the local *Ortsgruppenleiter*³¹ for registration.

It meant, of course, the suppression of Polish schools, literature, and press, but similar measures were also applied to the remaining Polish communities.³²

Such mass "Germanization" of whole areas did not give to an individual the social stigma of a "traitor." Even the Polish Underground, which usually persecuted individual turncoats, acquiesced in such mass "Germanization," taking into account its forced and superficial character.³³

Another mass Germanization project was planned in the case of the Baltic nations. The original idea went back to Rosenberg's blueprints on the eve of the German Eastern Campaign. He planned the ultimate Germanization of the Baltic States and intended to group them together for this purpose under one administrative unit—*Ostland*.³⁴

After Rosenberg's general policy for the East was rejected, some of his detailed provisions, like the assimilation of Balts, were disregarded in Nazi planning. Thus the Racial-Political Office of the Nazi Party planned to push the Estonian nation further east because the Estonians were regarded as of Finno-Ugric

stock and thus racially utterly foreign.³⁵ The SS organization seemed at times to be completely disinclined to consider a Germanization of the Lithuanians because of their strong Slavic "admixture."³⁶

Later on, on the basis of the Political Investigation Staff's (part of *Ostministerium*) racial "findings," the Estonians were declared Nordic enough in race to be incorporated into the German nation en masse.³⁷ A plausible theory was developed seeking to prove that the original Finno-Ugric population in Estonia was actually conquered and permeated by Germans and that only for some strange and unexplainable reason the conquerors accepted the language of the vanquished nation.³⁸

On the basis of further racial evaluation, the Latvians were recognized as fit for Germanization too, and Lithuanians were found to be only in part adaptable for this purpose.³⁹

Excluded were the Baltic minorities: Lettgallen and Letukese, both of which were found to be strongly permeated by the "Eastern Race" element.⁴⁰

Hitler seemed to be favorably inclined to the idea of making the Baltic nations an organic part of his Empire and he planned to include the Baltic States within the German Reich in the form of regular German provinces (*Gauen*) or in the form of a protectorate.⁴¹

The incorporation plans naturally excluded any prospect of independent statehood for the Balts. They were to be won over, however, to an idea of a "Great Germanic Nordic Community," which would arise as the result of Hitler's "New Order" policy. Such a community would unite closely the racially best peoples of Europe in one powerful bloc.⁴² Such an idea was supposed to be more acceptable to the nations concerned than a project for outright annexation and Germanization.

The Germanization process itself was not of such an immediate character in the Baltic area as it was in the Polish Incorporated Provinces. On the contrary, the native schools (including the universities) were allowed to continue; the native press (under Nazi control) continued to publish; the local authorities in many cases were left in power; and local

self-government was granted to the level of German *Gebietskommissar*.⁴³

A gradual process of Germanization was planned. First, the German language, culture, and laws should be introduced in public life and in the schools on an equal basis and side by side with the native; then, after some time, the German element should slowly but surely take over and achieve the leading position. In the meanwhile, the main stress was to be put on the Germanization of Baltic youth. This was to be achieved particularly by drafting Baltic young people into the German Army and into the Reichs Labor Service (RAD), where they should be subjected to strong indoctrination.⁴⁴

The Nazis believed that by such gradual Germanization the national distinction of the Balts would lose its political significance, without a more painful operation, and that it would be reduced after some time to mere regional difference. Though suppressing ruthlessly manifestations or reminiscences of the national spirit of independence among the Balts,⁴⁵ the Germans were more lenient regarding their purely cultural and ethnical activities.⁴⁶ ✱

The Czechs were another people within the German *Lebensraum* which was described by most Nazi authorities on this subject as related to the German nation, or as a nation strongly permeated with German elements.⁴⁷ However, as in the case of the Lithuanians, the Czechs were found to be only partially suitable for Germanization. The exact method for the Germanization of Czechs was not definitely settled during the war, but it was considered seriously enough to spare the Czechs from the more ruthless methods of physical reduction, or social "moronization," applied generally to the alien peoples of the East.

A concrete step toward the investigation of the racial qualities of the Czech people was undertaken during 1942 in the form of a nationwide check of Czech school children on their racial merits, and some general conclusions were drawn from this investigation regarding the whole Czech population. During a conference of high SS leaders of the Race and Settlement Office in Prague on June 29, 1942, one of them commented that

the investigations indicated that the Czechs possess considerable "inferior" racial elements, either from the Eastern races or even from the Mongoloid race.⁴⁸ Yet he was still impressed by the Czech racial qualities to the degree that he suggested that the racially "valuable" part of the Czech people be separated from the "inferior" part.⁴⁹ Behind this proposal there lurked two objectives: first, to weaken the Czech nationality by splitting it internally and promoting antagonism between the privileged and nonprivileged groups; and secondly, to keep the inferior elements at hand for ultimate deportation to the East.

From the social standpoint the Nazis indicated that better educated Czech classes showed the closest racial relation to the German people, while the Czech workers and peasants showed more markedly the "Eastern types."⁵⁰ It was stated, also, that the "better" people are most reluctant to become Germans and those who show a willingness to become Germans were from the "worst" elements.⁵¹

As in the Baltic area, the Germanization process in the Czech Protectorate was of a gradual character. The Nazi authorities planned to apply to the Czech nation the so-called *Kap-aunen* system in order to mold them according to an elaborate plan.⁵² This system aimed at directing the interest of a nation exclusively toward economic gains. The Nazi policymakers believed that by stimulating the growth of extreme commercial and philistine qualities in the Czech people (*die Verspiessung*) they would be able to destroy their national consciousness and political ambitions.⁵³ They expected that after achieving such status and by binding the Czech economic prosperity to the Reich they would have little difficulty in bringing about the Germanization of the valuable Czech classes at will.

Practical measures for the preparation for Germanization in the Czech Protectorate could be seen in the closing of the Czech universities and in the introduction of the German language parallel to the Czech language in public life.

There is no account of mass Germanization in the Protectorate, such as took place in the Polish Incorporated Provinces in the case of the Masurians or the Wasserpolen. The prepara-

tory measures for Germanization in the Protectorate were on an individual basis and apparently voluntary. To the preparatory measures belong Hitler's orders regulating the acceptance of Czech applicants to the German higher schools (universities, schools of technology, etc.). Only those deemed eligible, racially and otherwise, to become Germans in the future, were to be admitted.⁵⁴ Such applications, of course, were forced by circumstances (the closing of Czech universities), but they still required private initiative on the part of an applicant. When admission was granted it did not involve a denial of Czech nationality by the applicant nor did it mean a grant of provisional German citizenship, as in the case of actual Germanization procedure. The idea behind this measure was to prepare the individual for Germanization before an actual offer was made.

The individual Germanization cases in the Protectorate were of a voluntary nature and required a strict racial examination. There is an account which indicates both the strictness of Nazi rules in selection and the superficiality of the racial criteria. A Nazi official from the nearby Sudetenland area was supposed to participate in one such racial investigation of Czech candidates for Germanization. Being unknown to the personnel conducting the investigation and bearing a Czech name he was forced by mistake, with the other candidates, to undergo an investigation and before he was able to explain he was declared racially unfit.⁵⁵

The similar strictness of rules for Germanization is reflected in the case of a marriage between German Captain von Schlipenbach and a Czech girl, Ilanka Ludkova. Before a permit for marriage was granted his future wife was to undergo a rigorous racial investigation. After permission for marriage was granted and the wedding took place the young wife was not allowed to live with her Czech parents, but was given the choice of moving to live in some German community in the Protectorate or being transferred to the Old Reich. Her husband in the Army was informed that because of her close association with Czechs she could hardly be allowed to raise their children, in case he should be killed during the war.⁵⁶

In spite of repeated emphasis on the close relation of the Czech people with the German race, the Germanization process was meant to be much more intense than some of the general statements indicated. Even though the procedure and the preparations for Germanization could be extended for a length of time, the result was to be total allegiance to Germandom.

*Individual Germanization in Poland
and the Ukraine*

More systematic Germanization of aliens started after the occupation of Poland and after the creation of the Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom and its auxiliary and coordinating organizations, such as *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* and EWZ.

The first provisions for the Germanization of aliens who could not prove their German heritage were included in the original rudimentary regulations of the *Volksliste*.⁵⁷ To the qualifications required for the ethnic Germans of Class III was added a paragraph which provided for the Germanization of those aliens whose nationality was not clear and "who used a Slavic language in their household" but who on account of their blood and cultural ties gravitated toward Germandom.⁵⁸

In a later order dated September 12, 1940, such regulations became more specific. Himmler ruled that such nationalities as Ukrainians, Great Russians, Belorussians, Czechs, and Lithuanians should be considered for Germanization on the basis of individual investigation.⁵⁹ If they should be found fit for Germanization they should be put into Class IV of the *Volksliste* and granted provisional citizenship, which might be cancelled at any time.⁶⁰

These provisions, which applied to the people of definitely alien origin, were valid only within the Incorporated Polish Provinces, where such nationalities formed insignificant minorities and therefore could be easily handled and controlled by the Nazi apparatus.

The Polish masses, left behind in the Incorporated Polish Provinces, were skimmed of their upper classes. They were left

behind in anticipation of a temporary German need for manpower and in the expectation that some portion of this Polish population would become adaptable for Germanization. Regardless of these two different objectives, all Poles were treated in the same way. They were denied en masse all Polish cultural and educational facilities and they were barred from German social and cultural life as well.⁶¹ The only concession granted to them was that their children could attend the first four classes of a German elementary school. Their jobs were those of the lowest rank and they could not pick their own jobs.

The main criterion for determining which elements were fit for Germanization was based on efficiency in work, particularly ability in technical skills.⁶² Only those individuals who succeeded in rising above the general level of the remaining Poles were to be considered racially and politically suitable for Germanization. If found satisfactory for this purpose they were to be transferred to the Old Reich and settled amidst the German population.⁶³

The Nazi authorities tried to stratify the Polish population which remained in the Western Incorporated Provinces into three basic classes: *Class A* was deemed to be racially good and fit for assimilation; *Class S* was marked as racially average and destined to be used as seasonal workers; and *Class V* was evaluated as racially inferior and politically unreliable.⁶⁴

The latter category was to be placed under the care of the Security Police.

The Germanization of Poles in the Western Incorporated Provinces was relatively limited. From among over 6,000,000 Poles remaining there⁶⁵ only 3 percent were found qualified for Germanization up to June 1942.⁶⁶ This limited percentage may be explained partially by the restrictive Nazi qualifications and partially by the reluctance of Poles to become Germans.⁶⁷

Another individual selection of Poles for Germanization took place during the German colonization period in the Zamosc District (*General-Gouvernement*). Twenty-seven thousand Poles, who were eventually affected by this colonization, were divided into four groups. Class I and Class II, termed Nordic and Falcic races, respectively, were selected for possible Germanization

and were transferred to a transition camp in Lodz for further investigation.⁶⁸ After close examination by EWZ, those found eligible for Germanization were transported to the Reich and settled usually on the large German farms as agricultural workers.⁶⁹ Only those farms were selected for this purpose whose owners were known as reliable supporters of the Nazi regime.

According to a report of the EWZ of February 28, 1943, of all Poles marked for Germanization during the "Zamosc-area colonization" one-third of those selected for racial investigation were found to be "desirable" and one-half were classified as merely "tolerable" (*tragbar*) for this purpose.

The individual applications for German nationality made by aliens under the German occupation were accepted. The primary investigation which usually accompanied such registration was superficial and German linguistic proficiency or physical appearance were the most important criteria. Often registration was encouraged by such incentives as special and better rations for "Volksdeutsche." The final acceptance on the basis of the *Volksliste* was connected with a grant of German citizenship and was much more difficult to get.

The rigidity of German regulations for Germanization may be illustrated again by the strange case of Wladislaus Matuczak.

Matuczak, a Pole, worked before the outbreak of war in two capacities: as a minor Polish customs official and as a leading German Intelligence Service Man (V-Man). Shortly before the war his perfidy was discovered by the Poles and he was condemned to death and kept for execution in a Polish jail in Brest-Litowsk. During the German Blitz-Campaign against Poland he was liberated by German troops and in due time established contact with his former German employers. In view of the general bad treatment of Poles by the Germans and his particular relation towards the Polish nation, he was especially eager to secure German citizenship. He asked his German superiors for backing in his endeavors and was given the highest recommendation on his political reliability and his outstanding achievements for the German cause. He was refused, however, by EWZ for two reasons: first, it was established that racially he was a pure Pole, and secondly, he was found not good enough in

character. It was revealed that he worked for German Intelligence for financial reasons and not because of his idealism for Nazi Germany.⁷⁰

Of the other Eastern Nationalities, Nazi sources mention the Ukrainians as those involved in the process of individual Germanization. A specific provision for the Germanization of Ukrainians goes back to 1940 when an agreement was reached between the SS Race and Resettlement Office and the chief of DAF, Dr. Ley. The agreement stipulated that the SS should supply some Ukrainian individuals capable of becoming Germans to be trained as skilled metalworkers.⁷¹

Such selection was started first from among the Ukrainian prisoners of war⁷² but apparently came to include the Ukrainian civilian workers from the *General-Gouvernement* as well.⁷³ During the occupation of the Ukraine by Nazi forces this selection was limited to the Transit Camp of German Labor Office (*Arbeitsamt*) in Lviv and thus dealt exclusively with the Western Ukrainians inhabiting the former Austrian Galicia, which Hitler planned to Germanize completely.⁷⁴

The plan to extend a screening for the Germanic element in the whole Ukrainian population was cancelled after the first attempts.⁷⁵ Such action was found to be impractical during the war because of the lack of an extensive German apparatus. Thus, large-scale action in this direction was to be postponed till after the war and Germanization practices were to be limited to those Ukrainians living in the Reich, where the proper agencies for screening and supervision were available.⁷⁶

Direct Germanization was limited in the Ukraine during the war and applied on a larger scale only to the ethnic Germans—319,943 of whom were registered in the Ukraine by April 1943.⁷⁷

Germanization of Special Social Groups and Other Categories of Aliens

Nazi authorities were also interested in particular groups within the mass of Eastern “sub-humans,” whose Germanization they regarded as important either from political considerations or as a matter of convenience.

1 (For political and security reasons Himmler was specially concerned with the Germanization of the foreign upper classes. In one of his circulars he gave directives as to why and how the Polish leader-types should be gained for Germanization. He pointed out that most of the captured leaders of the Polish Underground were of the Nordic-Dinaric race, and he explained that the winning of such elements ahead of a careful investigation and selection would help considerably in preventing an effective Polish resistance.⁷⁸ Therefore, he ordered that Germanization of such elements should not be refused on the basis of ignorance of the German language or their political past. When they were found racially good,⁷⁹ they and their families were supposed to be transported to the Old Reich for Germanization.

Himmler pointed out that there were no risks involved because such individuals would be under a steady police supervision and German citizenship would be granted to them only on a provisional basis.⁸⁰

There is no evidence to show that the circular, and German efforts in this direction, had any great effect on defection of the Polish upper classes. The few Polish celebrities of film, theater, music or sport life who joined the German cause are not a convincing argument for it.⁸¹

On the other hand, the numerous orders issued and the measures taken against the Polish upper classes indicate that the Nazis regarded detention and elimination of them as a much safer and a more practical device than their Germanization.

1 (The other category, which from the biological standpoint was most valuable and which from psychological considerations was most convenient for Germanization, was that of young alien children.) In the spring of 1940, Himmler worked out a plan (which was fully approved by Hitler) according to which the children of the alien peoples of the East should be examined for racially valuable elements.⁸²

There was to be an annual sifting in schools for children from ages 6-10 in order to select those racially most valuable for Germanization. The children so picked were to be deported to the Old Reich so they could be brought up as Germans. To

the parents it was to be explained that the removal of their children to the Reich was necessitated by the condition of their health. If the parents were willing to follow their children and to become loyal German citizens, they were to be given such a chance. Otherwise the children were to be completely separated from them.⁸³

There is no evidence that such a plan was actually carried out on a large scale in any of the *Lebensraum* areas. Such a large-scale action would have required considerable personnel, which the Germans could not spare during the war. It would also have aroused resistance among the native population; therefore, the Nazis were careful not to antagonize them too much.⁸⁴

That such measures for early adoption were considered can be seen from the nationwide screening of Czech school children where racial evaluation was carried out under the disguise of "X-ray" examinations.⁸⁵

There is evidence also that the children in Polish orphanages or children who lost their parents during the war or during resettlement of Poles from the Western Incorporated Provinces were examined and when found racially good were removed to Germany to be brought up as Germans.⁸⁶

Immediate removal of children from their parents occurred in the case of illegitimate children of Eastern slave laborers in Germany, especially if the father was of German descent. Racially "valuable" children of this kind were brought up in special SS organization children's homes or boarding schools.⁸⁷

Otherwise, the kidnapping of children from the alien peoples seems to have been rare and exceptional during the war, even though it was considered as correct policy for the future.

Another more extensive program was that of the Germanization of alien girls and young women. According to this project selected girls and women from the East were to be deported to Germany for work in German households. It was assumed that women thus selected, by living and taking care of a German family, would quickly learn the German language, acquire German customs and manners and eventually fortify their allegiance to Germandom by marrying Germans.

The first indication of such a plan is to be found in a letter

of the Director of the Commission for the Strengthening of Germanism, SS-Brigade-Führer Greifelt, dated July 31, 1940.⁸⁸

On July 7, 1941 there was issued a special order which applied to the alien girls, ages 16-20, providing for a racial screening of them in the Incorporated Western Provinces, *General-Gouvernement*, and Occupied Eastern Provinces (taken from the Soviet Union). All girls thus selected were marked for housework in the Reich, with a special provision for their eventual Germanization.⁸⁹

This project for the Germanization of alien women was crowned by a personal order of Hitler dated October 9, 1942, providing for deportation of 400,000-500,000 specially selected Ukrainian girls and women between 15 and 35 for household duties in Germany and eventual Germanization. Hitler's ideological defense of such measures is interesting. He explains that this step merely intended to retrieve those of German blood who were lost by Germanism after the ancient Gothic realm in the Ukraine was conquered by the Huns in the fifth century A.D.⁹⁰

The racial selection of the Slavic women for planned Germanization seems to have been more superficial in character. It was conducted by the regular German Labor Office agencies, and there is nowhere evidence that the EWZ or the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle* participated in their selection. They were not granted German citizenship, even on a provisional basis, and there is a strong hint in the orders that the real decision for their Germanization would be made during their work in Germany.

The last and the oddest category for Germanization was that of Himmler's concentration camp inmates. At the first view such an attempt seems to be completely absurd. It is hard to believe that an alien, after going through all the hell of a Nazi concentration camp, and after being elevated from the sub-human "lower depths" to the semigodlike status of a German, would become a loyal and worthwhile Nazi citizen. But there are parallels which indicate that such totalitarian practice works in spite of all logical rules to the contrary. It is known that many

tortured and mistreated Soviet dignitaries, who were brought out from the Soviet concentration camps shortly before and during the war, proved to be the loyal supporters of the Red Regime. Among those who might be mentioned were the Soviet Marshall Rokossovski and the recently deceased top Soviet-Ukrainian humorist, Ostap Wyshnia.

The explanation of this strange phenomena must be left to the more competent judgment of modern psychology. We may only state the fact that such cases existed.

The measures for sifting out racially valuable elements are mentioned in three different instances. First, it applied to the Polish inmates in general; secondly, it applied to those Polish offenders who had some unauthorized relations with German girls or women. If offenders were not punished by death, as was often the case, their racial qualities were to be investigated before being sent to a concentration camp.⁹¹ If the racial evaluation was good, such a culprit was sent to a concentration camp where survival was more likely and was employed there as a skilled worker; if the racial findings were negative he was sent as a regular inmate to a concentration camp where he would probably be worked to death. Thus the race factor rather than the magnitude of the offense very often determined the fate of such an individual.⁹²

Similar procedures were applied to the families—from the partisan-infested areas in the Soviet Union—who were to be transported for security reasons and for work to the German concentration camps. They were to be held separate from the other inmates and divided into two main groups: adolescents, and children. From those two groups the racially valuable were to be selected.⁹³

The selection of a concentration camp inmate for Germanization meant neither his release, nor his actual Germanization, nor the grant of any kind of German citizenship. It meant, however, escape from at least the most obvious annihilatory practices in German concentration camps, such as the gas chamber, killing by work or being chosen for “scientific” experimentation. Those chosen for Germanization were put on a separate list,

and their death had to be explained and individually reported.⁹⁴ No individual death reports were made in the case of ordinary eastern aliens who were inmates of concentration camps.⁹⁵

Racial considerations, though often of very superficial character, were the cornerstones of the policy of Germanization. The whole Germanization action was designed for the absorption of a very limited percentage of the Eastern European masses within the German *Lebensraum*.⁹⁶ It was neither an answer nor a solution per se to the problem of what to do with all those foreign races in the East which could be neither absorbed nor allowed to coexist within the German "~~Reich.~~"

CHAPTER FOUR

The Policy of Enslavement

It is our destiny to belong to a race of high standing. If we National-Socialists are convinced that mankind is divided up into races of high and low standing, we are also convinced that the conditions underlying the existence of each race are various. A race of lower standing needs less room, less clothing, less food and less culture than a race of higher standing. (Dr. Ley, "Angriff," January 30, 1940.)

Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only insofar as we need them as slaves for our Kultur, otherwise it is of no interest to me. (Himmler's speech, October 1943, *I.M.T. Doc. NO-5001*.)

The Slavs are to work for us. In so far as we do not need them, they may die. (Martin Bormann, August 1942, in instructions to Alfred Rosenberg on the policy in Eastern Territories, *I.M.T. Doc. NO-5001*.)

Although the theory of a "master race" and "sub-human races" was well advanced in the Third Reich several years before World War II, it was only the outbreak of the war which caused the Nazis to adopt it on a large scale. The discriminatory Nazi measures against the Jews before the war could not be regarded as such mainly for two reasons: first, the limitations and mistreatment of Jews in the Reich were supposed to create the mass Jewish exodus to other countries rather than to keep an underprivileged and subservient group in Germany; second, even from the Nazi ideological standpoint the Jews were not ideal material for slaves. Unlike the Slavs, whom the Nazis believed to be passive and obedient, the Jews were described as those who try to dominate other nations and who, because of their disintegrating qualities, were more akin to "bad geniuses"

than to the "sub-humans." The Czech Protectorate, in spite of its Slavic character, did not offer a good field for spectacular enslavement either. It passed under control of the Reich peacefully and on condition of internal autonomy, which the Germans found expedient to observe at the early stage. Further, the Czechs, because of their high living standards, economic stability, technical efficiency and a "strong admixture of the German blood," were not an ideal people with which to start such a policy.

The first real attempt at enslavement of the "sub-human" Eastern races started after the fall of Poland in 1939. The crushing Polish defeat, the complete Polish economic disorganization and collapse which followed the war, and the relatively low living standards in Poland made realization of the principles of "sub-humanity" highly desirable to the Nazi authorities. With the Nazi occupation of Poland there were developed the first systematic blueprints for degrading the Eastern races to the status of primitive, decadent, and blindly obedient masses. There were several objectives behind this planned degradation. From the psychological standpoint, it was highly important that the Nazi creed of a master race and the slavlike character of the Eastern races should be factually confirmed. In view of practical considerations, this plan was important, too. First, it was viewed as a security precaution. Nazi planners anticipated that the German *Lebensraum* policy, with its gradual pushing of the foreign races to the East, would lead to tensions which might result in resistance by the peoples concerned. Therefore, their reduction to the slave status would make resistance less likely or at least not dangerous. Further, a slave society would supply a source of cheap and convenient labor which would be useful in building the model Eastern Empire for the Third Reich. The gigantic highways, railroads, and an array of model villages and towns which the Nazis planned would require a large labor force, and that need gave to "sub-humans" a temporary significance.

The Nazi device for enslavement could be divided roughly into three parts: spiritual, economic, and physical enslavement. It is worthwhile to consider these separately.

Spiritual Enslavement

It was clear to the Nazi leaders that in order to secure an effective control over the Eastern European masses it would be necessary to condition them in such a way as to make their obedience most natural. [Working on a premise that the more educated a person is the more conscious he becomes about his rights and the more eager he is to defend them, the Nazis decided to make the Eastern races of Europe as ignorant as possible.]

The first specific blueprint, which was applied initially to Poles but later extended to other peoples in the East, contained restrictive stipulations relating to their education.

In the first restrictive order of this kind, dated November 25, 1939, the Polish children were limited in their education to the first four classes of elementary school. In the newly Incorporated Western Provinces, all Polish schools were indiscriminately closed¹ and Polish children were allowed to attend the first four classes of German elementary school.² In the rest of Poland (*General-Gouvernement*), Polish four-year elementary schools were allowed to remain open but were to be subject to some strict regulations. Such subjects as history, geography, and history of literature were not to be included in the curriculum. Similarly, physical training was regarded as superfluous for Polish children.³ It was feared that the first group of subjects would stimulate Polish historical traditions and national self-consciousness and might serve to stimulate a rebellious spirit against foreign domination and against slavery. Physical training was to be prohibited because the Nazis thought that sport makes a nation *wehrkräftig* (conditioned for defense) and this, from the Nazi standpoint, was obviously a dangerous asset to the enslaved masses.

Stress was to be put on training in the mechanical, agricultural, and artisan fields, and this education was to be rounded off by basic training in arithmetic, reading, and writing.⁴

Special attention was given to the choice of teachers. No "chauvinistic" Polish teachers were to be employed in the schools, and particular precaution was sounded against the hir-

ing of Polish female teachers, who were supposed to be even more chauvinistic than men.⁵ In the long run, it was planned that positions in Polish schools should be filled with retired Polish policemen, whose loyalty to the German regime could be proven by their service record.⁶

Other matters concerning Polish education were included in a secret Nazi memorandum by an "expert" on the *General-Gouvernement*, dated January 1940. He again stressed the incompatibility of Polish education with the aims of Nazi policy: "A popular education will not weaken ethnically the Poles; quite the contrary, it will give them a better weapon in their struggle against us."⁷

He stated that it was definitely not in the German interest to give the Poles schools of quality and that the gates of secondary and higher schools should be closed to them. Only those Polish children who possessed qualities for Germanization should be admitted to such schools and then only on an exceptional basis.⁸

These two initial blueprints touching on educational problems in Poland were elaborated in the spring of 1940 by Himmler in his memorandum on general Nazi policy towards the alien races in Eastern Europe.⁹ In his blueprint, which Hitler approved in May 1940 and which was sent to all top Nazi administrators in Eastern Europe, Himmler explains Nazi education policy in the following words:

{ The sole goal of this school should be: simple arithmetic up to 500 at the most; writing of one's name; a doctrine that it is a divine law to obey the Germans and to be honest, industrious and good. I don't think that reading should be required.

{ Apart from this school there are to be no schools at all in the East.¹⁰

How strongly this idea of spiritual sterilization was approved by Hitler is apparent from his own statements and orders. During his residence in the Ukraine in the summer of 1942, Hitler often discussed the problem of education in the East in connection with his far-reaching colonization projects

there. Among others, he advanced the idea that the future isolated reservationlike Slavic settlements should be given only the crudest kind of education necessary for communication between them and their German masters. For this, Hitler thought, the recognition of the traffic signs and understanding of the German language sufficiently to take orders via loudspeakers would satisfy the educational requirements of these people.¹¹

Whatever deviation there was in the different plans of education for the "eastern sub-humans," and regardless of how literally the words of Himmler and Hitler were meant, all agreed on one point: that only the most primitive education should be allowed to the alien races in the East.

This method, pursued with the aim of enslavement and domination, seems at the first sight to be completely opposite to the Soviet method of control and its relation to education. It is known that the Soviets not only do not limit the educational facilities of the occupied countries but actually extend and strengthen them. It may lead then to an assumption that the Soviets use the positive policy of indoctrination through the channels of education and the Nazis use a negative policy of suppression of education, for one and the same purpose—enslavement. When we investigate closer, however, the differences in method appear less contradictory. We note that the Soviet laws and practices limit education of the members of the "hostile classes" or the national groups which for this or another reason are regarded as unfit to be absorbed into the Soviet Russian society.¹² On the other hand, there are many accounts which indicate that the Nazis were quite eager to promote indoctrination of Eastern nationals who, on account of their heritage or racial peculiarities, were found fit to become Germans.¹³

In reality the Nazi-prescribed educational program for "sub-humans" had no time to take root in any part of the Eastern *Lebensraum*. Only the negative part of it, the school suppression, was more or less enforced. The most successful was the policy of school suppression in Poland. The Nazis succeeded in a complete elimination of the Polish schools in the Western Polish Provinces, and they saw to it that only elementary schools and lower vocational schools were allowed within the Polish part of

the *General-Gouvernement*.¹⁴ The District Galicia (predominantly a Ukrainian province), which was attached to the *General-Gouvernement* in August 1941, enjoyed in this connection a preferential standing. Ten Ukrainian secondary schools (*gymnasiums* and teachers' seminars) were opened by Germans in the autumn of 1941 in this province, and a year later the medical courses were opened at the University of Lviv.¹⁵

This preferential treatment granted to the small segment of Western Ukrainians in the field of education had different reasons behind it. First of all, it was politically expedient to promote antagonism between Poles and Ukrainians in the *General-Gouvernement* by giving an advantage to one group and withholding it from another. On the other hand, the few schools which were opened seemingly as an exception to the general rule were not quite contrary to the objectives of Hitler's *Lebensraum*. It was understood that those numerically insufficient schools¹⁶ would educate only the "ablest" children—an elite.¹⁷ It was also known that Himmler issued special orders for the *General-Gouvernement* to secure such an "elite" for Germanism if possible. The secondary schools could serve for this selective purpose. Most of their graduates would be subject to strict Nazi scrutiny when they sought admission to German universities—there were no universities in the *General-Gouvernement*. At this stage the Nazi authorities could definitely decide who should get a higher education, and the criteria for such permission was one's fitness for Germanization.¹⁸ That such exceptional "concessions" to the Ukrainians were motivated by the desire to "strengthen Germanism" rather than with the intention of cultivating Ukrainian culture or nationalism may be indicated by the selecting experiment in the case of SS Division "Galicia." For this Division only those Ukrainians were selected who passed certain rigid physical standards set by the SS regulations. The Division was advertised among the Western Ukrainian population as an Ukrainian Legion; but among the leading Nazi circles it was regarded as a skimming off of those Germanic elements with which Galicia was permeated during almost 150 years of Austrian domination.¹⁹

The traditional pro-German sympathy of the Galician

Ukrainians was a strong point in favor of such an experiment, and the limited number of Ukrainians in the *General-Gouvernement*²⁰ was a guarantee that not much was at stake should the experiment fail.

In the *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine the ban on schools above the level of the fourth grade was an official Nazi policy. The action for limitation of education in this area came late, due to the fact that the civil German administration took over the authority there from the Army only gradually and did not possess an adequate German administrative staff to supervise and enforce its policy immediately. The German Army, which was supposed to crush the Soviet Union in a few months, was not entrusted with the implementation of all the refinements of Nazi *Lebensraum* policy. The Military Administration, which preceded that of Erich Koch, did not interfere with the educational endeavors of the Ukrainian population.²¹ Thus, when Koch and his staff took over the *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine from the German Military Government, it found a number of Ukrainian secondary schools and several schools at the university level operating on a full scale. Koch's administration was faced with the necessity not only of prohibiting the opening of other schools but of suppressing or undermining the schools already in existence. It took time to suppress such schools, partly because Koch seemed eager to avoid bad political repercussions which such a policy would cause and partly because of the direct intervention of Koch's formal boss, A. Rosenberg, who wanted to save some higher schools capable of producing technical experts for the German East-administrators which Germany could not spare from the Reich.²² Koch's action to limit the education of the Ukrainian "sub-humans" was on the whole successful, and in his controversy with Rosenberg on this point he gained strong support from the *Führer* himself.²³

A number of higher schools survived in one form or another during the period of German occupation. Among these institutions were the University of Dnepropetrovsk, medical institutes in Kiev, Kherson, Stalino, Vinnitsa; the agricultural school in Kiev; and the University of Kharkiv.²⁴ These institutions were

barely tolerated by the Nazis and were obliged to operate under restrictions. The University of Dnepropetrovsk, in the summer of 1942, was placed under the control of a German curator, who very early removed the Ukrainian President of the University and substituted a German puppet. Under German control the university was transformed into an economic institution.²⁵

The Higher Agricultural School in Kiev lost all of its lower classes in the school year 1942-1943. The Nazi order assigned the physically stronger students to slave work in Germany and the weaker ones to collective farms in the Ukraine.²⁶

The University of Kharkiv, under German military administration, was allowed to conduct its research activities, but this permission was extended only to its faculty. No student enrollment was allowed.²⁷

The secondary schools were allowed to survive only where it was possible to gain the favor of local German officials, sometimes by bribes,²⁸ or where such schools managed to exist under the disguise of "vocational schools."²⁹ The latter were opened in order to fill the gaps caused by the annihilation of Jews in the Ukraine who had formerly constituted the overwhelming bulk of artisans there.³⁰

The four-year elementary schools were formally allowed to exist, but even in their case there were many technical difficulties resulting from Nazi restrictions which limited their activities. The refusal of Nazi authorities to supply schools with fuel and paper, an undue delay in printing the new textbooks which were supposed to replace the Soviet texts, and very often seizure of the school buildings for other purposes, made even elementary education very inefficient and problematic. [With only a basic curriculum in the elementary school system and with the gradual closing of the last schools of higher education, the Ukraine was not very far from the level prescribed by the "master race."]

Belorussia experienced basically the same treatment in the field of education as the *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine. During the first year of occupation only the four-year elementary schools were allowed to exist.³¹ Other schools were not only closed but their equipment and libraries were either de-

stroyed or shipped to Germany.³² When in the autumn of 1942 a delegation composed of representatives of Belorussian National Relief (BNS), teachers, and parents, approached the German General Kommissariat for Belorussia with a request to open the secondary schools, they were told bluntly that the Belorussians would become, in Hitler's New Order, a nation of farmers and cattle raisers and that education above the elementary school level would be superfluous.³³

The attitude of the Germans towards Belorussian aspirations changed with the weakened grip of Germans in Belorussia. The large-scale Red Partisan activity in Belorussia, which extended beyond the limit of German control, forced the Germans to seek an alliance with the Belorussian population. Some concessions were granted in the field of self-government. On June 21, 1942, the Germans created in Belorussia a native advisory council called "Men of Confidence."³⁴ BNS was put in charge of organizing the Belorussian defense against the Red Partisans.³⁵ To strengthen such cooperation the Germans were forced to yield to some Belorussian demands and to grant some concessions in the field of education. In the winter of 1942 Germans allowed the reopening of the secondary schools and the middle professional schools in district cities. In one of the main cities of Belorussia, Mahilev, a medical institute was established.³⁶

Such concessions were, indeed, not a great sacrifice on behalf of German Eastern *Lebensraum*. Belorussia, because of its poor soil and extensive forests and swamps, was ill-adapted for German colonization. It was often referred to in top Nazi talks as an area where the racially alien peoples of the East should be dumped; or it was regarded as a future exercise ground of the German army and an ideal place for German ballistic experiments.³⁷

[The Germans regarded the Belorussian masses as lacking national consciousness, so passive and lacking completely any competent leadership, that they felt sure a few secondary schools during the war would not change the situation drastically.]³⁸

In the Czech Protectorate and in the Baltic States, where the racial rating was higher, the educational limitations were less apparent. But even in these "privileged" *Lebensraum* coun-

tries the racial rating and their attitude toward Germandom determined the degree of education which they were allowed to pursue. Czechoslovakia, which started its existence as a German Protectorate in March 1939 with full educational facilities, suffered a continuous limitation as the years of German occupation advanced.

The first blow to Czech education came in the autumn of 1939, when the Nazis, taking as an excuse the demonstration of the Czech students on the Czech National Day of Independence, closed all Czech higher schools.³⁹ The Czech students were given the choice of seeking entrance to German universities in the Reich or of abandoning hope of further studies.⁴⁰

Secondary education in the Protectorate was not discontinued but it was drastically reduced. During 1939 the number of those attending the Czech secondary schools was cut to 50 percent; in 1940 this number fell to 40 percent; and in 1941 to 35 percent.⁴¹

In the Baltic States where the Nazis planned to absorb some peoples (as the Estonians or Latvians) almost completely and where the fear of Bolshevism exceeded the fear of Nazism, German educational policy was more generous. The schools of all levels in the once independent Baltic republics were allowed to continue. There is an indication that these educational facilities were left open, not with the intention of stimulating independent research into the culture of the Baltic nations but with the purpose of using these educational facilities as a means for Germanization. This aim is reflected in a political report of the German Security Police (SD) from Lithuania on September 26, 1941:

When we consider the necessity of closing the Lithuanian universities we should give a thought to the way in which our aims should be achieved; it seems that our purpose will be reached better if such liquidation would happen in a more inconspicuous way by ~~gradual Germanization of them~~. Above all we share the opinion that the direct closing of the universities will have at the present time a very unfavorable effect in our relations to the Lithuanian population; on the other hand there would be hardly an

opposition when the lectures will be held in the German language, first in the two or three departments and later on in all of them. This process will be followed by permeating of these universities with the German professors.⁴²

This report coincided with German plans to create in Balticum only one German university (in Tartu) at the expense of all the existing Baltic universities which should be closed.⁴³

Into the general pattern of German educational and cultural policy in the Baltic states falls the revealing incident reported by Professor Oras in which the Germans prohibited the translation of Goethe's works into the Estonian language.⁴⁴ The reason for the prohibition was not to deny to the Estonians German culture but rather to deny the Estonian language an equal status with German. The Estonian language could be tolerated for the time being as a vernacular dialect of a remote German province, but it was not to be given prominence as a language of literature. Ultimately, the language would have to fade away, as must the Estonian national self-consciousness, according to the Nazi scheme.

[The Baltic nationals could be elevated spiritually to the heights reserved for a "master race" but only as the members of the Germanic community, not as Estonians, Latvians, or Lithuanians.]

Again, it must be emphasized that "privilege" in the field of education did not apply to these Baltic minorities whom the Nazis regarded as racially inferior. Belorussians, Poles, Letgalls, or Letukese living in the Baltic states got their strictly separate school system which did not include more than the four-year elementary school.

The spiritual enslavement of the foreign races in the East was not limited to restrictions on formal education. It included limitations on all cultural activities. Nazi authorities wanted to uproot not only activities of the Eastern nationals which contributed to their national self-consciousness, but they sought also to prevent them from building up their moral and esthetic values. The first blueprint dealing with the treatment of the Poles specified that Polish cultural or entertainment activities should

be deprived of any true form of art and all elevating motives. Classical music, operas, dramas, should not be accessible to the Polish public.

The German Propaganda Office in the *General-Gouvernement* was supposed to organize or sponsor Polish burlesque shows and publish cheap literature, strongly erotic in nature.⁴⁵ The purpose of this policy was to keep the masses on a low level and to divert their interest from political aspirations. These projects for degeneration and moral debasement were actually realized in the larger Polish cities of the *General-Gouvernement* by the efforts of the German Ministry of Propaganda. German success in this effort was significant enough to become a target of the Polish Underground. The latter used to dispatch some special "punishing squads" which overran some of the ill-famed Variety Theaters and took disciplinary measures against the Polish collaborators in the programs.⁴⁶

In the *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine the German administration was too loosely organized and lasted too short a time to succeed in similar "positive projects" of German *Lebensraum* policy; but it was efficient enough to carry out the negative part of it. Ukrainian drama theaters and operas, which were re-established under the initially lenient German Army Administration, were suppressed and the opera programs were reserved for the German public only.⁴⁷

Exceptions were made when musical or cabaret shows were on the stage. In these cases the native population was admitted to the theater.⁴⁸ The Nazi authorities dealt harshly with professional choirs which were very popular in the Ukraine. Their members were not issued ration cards for food and they were not exempt from forced labor. In some cases such discrimination went even further. They were lured to Germany for an "artistic tour" and then put into slave labor camps.⁴⁹

The Czech Protectorate and the Baltic States were allowed theatrical activities which were less restricted, although the national element was strictly omitted by the German censor who selected the plays. Thus Smetana's opera *Libuse* was not allowed to be performed in the Czech Protectorate because it includes a prophecy that the Czech nation will never perish.⁵⁰

There was a numerical decrease of Czech theaters under the German occupation in favor of German theaters, which again indicates a strong desire of the Nazis to Germanize this area. Belorussia alone seemed to enjoy a greater degree of autonomy in its cultural development, following the German concessions which were caused by the German desire to gain the support of the Belorussian population for the fight against the formidable Red Partisan movement. But because Belorussia was, in the German *Lebensraum* policy, of secondary importance, Germany could display a greater degree of understanding and tolerance to Belorussian aspirations and even to play the game of recognizing some political rights of the Belorussians. These concessions were given to promote the enlistment of Belorussians for different combat detachments on the German side.⁵¹

In the case of the native press, the Nazi authorities took care that the newspapers which appeared should be restricted not only in their content but also in their national character. The newspapers appearing under the German occupation were to be strictly regional in character and void of any national or cultural flavor in content.⁵² Most of the independent Ukrainian papers were suppressed under the Koch administration, and their editors were either jailed or executed.⁵³ This seems to have been the case in Poland and the Czech Protectorate, where the Nazi-controlled native press was in most cases limited to publishing German military communiques and German official announcements. Not only any sign of political aspiration but also the nonpolitical cultural activities of the newspapers were subdued, either by direct charges of extreme chauvinism or by cutting the paper supply to such a minimum that only the essential news and official announcements could appear in them.⁵⁴ On the whole, the native press within the area of German *Lebensraum* was more strictly controlled by the Nazi authorities than any other cultural activity.⁵⁵ An exception could be seen again in the territories which were under permanent German Military Administration. In a specific case, the Kharkov paper *Nova Ukraina* (The New Ukraine) was prohibited in the *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine.⁵⁶

Other measures for cultural enslavement were those involv-

ing destruction or removal of the cultural material in the East, such as national monuments, museums, libraries, and cultural objects which had no relation to Teutonic culture.] They had to disappear because they contradicted the Nazi assertions that only Germanic peoples were able to create something worthwhile and durable and that the inferior and passive Slavic masses were utterly incapable of any creative effort. They had to be removed, also, because they represented a potential danger against the policy of enslavement. They could be reminders to the Eastern "sub-humans" of their cultural achievements in the past and could inspire them to rebel against their slave status or their national subjugation.

The native population, which was to be left temporarily within the German colonization area, was supposed to be separated from the German colonists, and destined to live in declining villages and towns. Their war-damaged cities were to be left unrepaired and should bear no indications which might suggest something better and loftier than the basic needs of a slave.⁵⁷

Pieces of art had no value for the Nazis unless they were of "Teutonic" origin. Therefore an order to the troops issued by Nazi Field Marshall Reichenau at the beginning of the Eastern Campaign stated clearly:

The disappearance of the symbols of the former Bolshevik rule, also in form of buildings, are included in our fight of annihilation. Therefore, neither historical nor fine arts objects deserve any consideration here in the East.⁵⁸

The Nazis were also eager to remove or destroy the remaining cultural treasures during their administration. About two months after the German conquest of Kiev an ancient Ukrainian religious and national shrine—the Monastery of Petcherska Lavra—was blown up, destroyed according to the German reports by the "Red Partisans." The former Mayor of Kiev under German occupation, Professor Forostivskyj, reported in his memoirs that he had found "a Red Partisan leaflet" announcing the destruction of Petcherska Lavra two weeks before the explosion and had brought this leaflet to the attention of German authorities;

yet there was no effort on their side to prevent this impending danger.⁵⁹ In two weeks, as announced in the leaflet, the monastery was turned into a heap of ruins.

Though the Soviets were responsible for much destruction in Kiev by leaving some time-bombs and mines behind, this isolated case is too strange to be associated with the Red Partisan activity. First, why would the Red Partisans blow up a monastery where no Germans were stationed and which had neither military nor economic importance? Why would the "Red Partisans" announce two weeks in advance a plan of action on a specific target, thus creating a possibility of German intervention? But even if they had been so unwise as to set a trap for themselves, the lack of German action must still remain a mystery.

On other occasions Germans were not afraid to demolish openly certain ancient towns or certain sections of towns in different parts of the Ukraine. A Ukrainian Underground publication issued in Vinnitsa in 1943 describes German activities in the following passage:

When somebody visits the town Kamenets-Podilskyi at the present time, he will be moved deep in his soul: the so-called Old City is completely dead. You can hardly see any people on the streets. The pavements are covered by grass. Strolling through the town you will only find one single enterprise which is active. This is a German company for house wrecking. The purpose of this German activity is to destroy the cultural and historical monuments in which the ancient city of Kamenets is particularly rich.

Street by street the town is systematically being leveled to the ground with typical German precision, and the famous historical buildings disappear. Similar demolition of the Ukrainian castles and ancient churches take place also in smaller towns of Podolia province.⁶⁰

Similarly ruthless was the Nazi policy toward museums and libraries in the Ukraine. Though most of them were brought into order after the Soviet retreat by the local municipal authorities, it was a general Nazi rule to keep them closed. They were closely investigated by Nazi experts and some of the more val-

uable museum pieces and books were shipped to Germany in order "to save them from Bolshevik destruction."⁶¹

Among others, the whole municipal library of Kiev was transported to Germany and the Library of the University of Kharkov was partially plundered. In other instances a lot of indiscriminate destruction resulted wherever the Germans took the museums, schools, and library buildings as their quarters. On one such occasion the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev was barbarously destroyed.⁶² Its library was used as fuel and many valuable items and equipment were simply thrown through the windows by the Nazi "supermen" residents. A similar fate was suffered by the famous Cossack museum of Yavornytsky in Dnepropetrovsk, which was requisitioned by the German City-Commissar.⁶³

It would be a mistake to assume that only the greatest centers of culture were targets of Nazi "missionary" fury. On the contrary, in most cases the humble secondary schools and small town museums and libraries became objects of plunder or destruction.⁶⁴

In Poland the fury of Nazi warfare against foreign culture affected first the Western Polish Provinces incorporated into the Reich. In all-out Germanization efforts the Nazi authorities started a systematic program of elimination against the slightest vestiges of Polish culture.

The Germans are removing from the archives all the documents in order to destroy them and they purloin from public and private collections priceless manuscripts, libraries and works of art, which they systematically transfer to the Reich. National monuments are being exploded with dynamite . . . they exploded . . . the statues of Poland's national heroes such as Kosciuszko in Poznan, and King Boleslaw the Great in Gniezno.

The public ceremony of destroying the Kosciuszko monument in Lodz arranged on the day of Polish independence on November 11th was intended as a proof that this land should never be Polish again.⁶⁵

The warfare against Polish culture was carried out to a somewhat limited extent in the rest of Poland. No Polish

museums or libraries were allowed to be opened, and the famous, ancient Polish church altar from Marijacki Church in Cracow was carried away to Germany as "German Art."

In the Czech Protectorate the German cultural policy was somewhat milder but no less obvious in its endeavors. It was aimed first of all at the cultural exponents of Czech national independence. The statues of President Masaryk⁶⁶ in Prague and Brno were either demolished or badly damaged.⁶⁷ The Prague memorial to Ernest Denis, the French historian who stood for the Czech national cause, was removed.⁶⁸

In many cases Czech national monuments were surrounded by high fences so as to cover them from the eyes of passers-by and to prevent their being decorated by flowers on national memorial days.⁶⁹

Similarly, the documents and mementoes from the military exploits of the Czech legionnaires during World War I, which were contained in the Czech revolution memorial on the Vitkov Hill near Prague, were removed by the Gestapo.⁷⁰

There are no reports of drastic German cultural warfare in the Baltic states.⁷¹ This may be partially due to the fact that most of the architecture in this area was of Teutonic character, and most national monuments commemorated fights for freedom from the Russians rather than a struggle against Germans (unlike those in the Czech Protectorate). On the other hand the cautious German policy on the territory of those nations whom they regarded as "racially related" may account for the fact that the Baltic cultural treasures found more consideration by the Germans.

On the whole, the spiritual enslavement, which the Nazis applied in the East, was of a negative nature. It meant destruction of certain values, reduction to primitivism, moral debasement, and the transformation of certain nations either into tribes or into provincials. The positive policy of enslavement through indoctrination was relatively weak, fragmentary, and belated.

The negative character of the German enslavement policy was due mainly to two reasons: (1) Nazi ideology offered almost nothing toward the indoctrination of the racially foreign

peoples. (2) "Sub-humans" were not considered a permanent economic factor within the German *Lebensraum*. Their labor was required only for the initial transitory period of Germanic colonization. The explanations concerning their future were vague, and the orders regulating their pattern of behavior were harsh, merciless, and void of any idea of progress. Physical control and all its ramifications were considered to be sufficient for keeping them in line as long as they were needed, and indoctrination seemed to be superfluous and not worth serious efforts.⁷²

Therefore, in spite of Himmler's outline of the methods of indoctrination for the Eastern "sub-humans" as early as 1940,⁷³ the specific projects in this direction did not materialize till 1942. They were ~~gaining in significance and in pace~~ as German prospects for a quick victory in the East declined and as the first colonization projects indicated that the making of the East into a solid Germanic country would take not years but decades.⁷⁴

After 1942 some Nazi attempts of positive indoctrination in "submission" and training for the menial jobs of the "sub-humans" can be noted. There is evidence that in connection with the planned transfer of population from the northern regions of the Ukraine (infested by the partisans) to German concentration camps, a special project was provided for the children of these deportees. It was planned that they would be held in separate concentration camps; Himmler sketched their re-education as follows:

The children must be brought up to be obedient, industrious, with a sense of unconditional subordination and respect towards their German master. They must learn to count to 100, learn to recognize traffic signs and be trained for their work as agricultural laborers, locksmiths, stonemasons, carpenters, etc. Girls are to be taught to be agricultural laborers, weavers, spinners, knitters and such like.⁷⁵

Another project realized by *Reichskommissar* Koch in the Ukraine in 1942 was the so-called "Work Service Organization" for Ukrainian youth. The education in this particular organiza-

tion was supposed to follow the method of a "wooden hammer." Its slogan was to be "daywork for victory" and its purpose "to increase the working efficiency of the Ukrainian people."⁷⁶

This work project, to which the German Army and the native population referred as a "slave force," bore many similarities to German concentration camps. The members of this "working organization" lived in strictly guarded camps, were referred to by numbers rather than by names, could not secure home leaves or make contact with the outside population, and were subject to a severe labor discipline.⁷⁷

Every Sunday morning they had instead of a Church mass an indoctrination program which consisted of community singing which should glorify the benefits of German "liberation"; as a climax to the program the Nazi group-leader would give a speech via a translator in which he would stress the theme that "the Ukraine must be grateful to the Germans for everything."⁷⁸

More advanced but also more fantastic was the project of Himmler to use religion as a means of indoctrination and to promote submission and pacifism. Himmler decided that a policy of support of the Greek Orthodox Church was false because it fostered native nationalism and that support of the Catholic Church would be equally wrong.⁷⁹ Therefore he turned his attention to a German sect called *Bibelforscher* (the Explorers of the Bible), members of which were held in German concentration camps for their strong pacifistic convictions and their refusal to serve in the German armed forces. With their strong anti-Semitism and anti-Catholicism on one side and their preachings of nonviolence, industry, and reward in the world beyond, Himmler thought of them as the ideal missionaries for the indoctrination of the Eastern "sub-humans." In his letter to Kaltenbrunner in the summer of 1944, Himmler⁸⁰ indicated that he planned to release the *Bibelforscher* sectarians from the concentration camps and to train them for this "missionary" work. This "touching project" of Himmler which shows his concern for the welfare of the "sub-humans" in the world beyond developed rather late. In the summer of 1944, the Germans had already lost the essential part of the Eastern Empire, and the

front line approached the Reich boundary near Eastern Prussia. Yet the proposal indicates the utmost limit of Nazi methods in positive enslavement. It indicates also that in spite of the catastrophic reverses on all fronts, the top Nazi leaders were still entranced by the visionary plans of a huge Eastern Empire.

Economic Enslavement

The Nazi economic policy in their *Lebensraum* area differed according to the way in which their control was established there, their political-racial objectives, the previous economic structure of the occupied country, and the necessities of the war.

In the Czech Protectorate, which came under the Nazi occupation before the outbreak of war, the economic system remained basically unchanged. The treaty between the Czech and Nazi governments, which preceded occupation, secured for the Czechs certain autonomy which extended also to the economic field.⁸¹ The Czech autonomous government maintained its own Ministries of Economics, Labor, Forestry, Finance, and Agriculture which, though being subordinated to Germans and often duplicated by German agencies, were still able to exercise some moderating influence.

The German control of Czech industry and commerce was exercised by the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions (which also controlled the production of consumer's goods) by way of the armament inspectorates. Another agency of control was the Reich Ministry of State which controlled, through its delegates, such vital industries in the Protectorate as coal, petroleum, motor vehicles, and machinery products.⁸²

With the outbreak of war, the transport, post, and telegraph systems were placed under German control.⁸³

Czech enterprises which remained under native management were entangled with the general German economic system where the vital key positions were controlled by Germans. In this way the Czech glass and shoe industries were controlled by the German supercartel system, and the remaining Czech enterprises were forced to form compulsory corporative organi-

zations which were headed by Germans domiciled in the Czech Protectorate.⁸⁴

The internal domination of the individual Czech enterprises was often achieved by compelling the transfer of shares to German companies and by similar devices.⁸⁵

Independent Czech foreign trade was gradually eliminated. In the autumn of 1940, Czech representations abroad were liquidated and became departments within the foreign agencies of the German Chamber of Trade.⁸⁶

Internal retail trade, artisan enterprises, and agriculture suffered no unusual limitations and contributed to the relative prosperity of the Czech Protectorate during the years of war and occupation.⁸⁷

On the whole, the immediate German economic objectives coincided basically with the ideological Nazi Program in this part of the *Lebensraum*. The Czechs belonged to those nations whose social structure was not to be radically changed by the Nazis. Through the "Kapaunen system" they had to be disintegrated as a nation. The Nazis hoped to gain during this process certain racially valuable parts for Germandom. Economic stimulation, under strict Nazi control, was a desired way to this goal.

In the case of Poland the degree and objectives of the economic enslavement were different, and they came under different circumstances. Poland came under German control after a short but devastating war. Its government fled into exile, and no other Polish government was formed by the Germans. The Polish economy was not only disorganized by the events of war, but it had neither capacity nor efficiency equal to that of the Czechs. Therefore, it was less important for the German war effort and could be reorganized at will.

The Polish people were not to be absorbed into the German nation to the degree planned for the Czechs. The Polish social structure was to be drastically changed, and its level was not to be raised above that of small farmers, technicians or artisans. The German objectives, regarding the Polish people, gave considerable freedom to the German administrators in handling the economic affairs of Poland. In the Western Polish Provinces,

where all Polish and Jewish enterprises were expropriated and the owners either deported to the *General-Gouvernement* or liquidated, the plans were more completely carried out.

In the rest of Poland, Germans lacked enough of their own officials to take the economy under a more detailed control; but there were efforts made to bring the Polish economy as close as possible to the status prescribed by the *Lebensraum* policy.

During the first phase of the Occupation of Poland (1939-1940) the Polish economy was barely supposed to provide the subsistence level for the population. In this connection Hermann Göring⁸⁸ issued a decree for the dismantling and transfer to Germany of all Polish enterprises which were not regarded as indispensable for the needs of the Polish population.⁸⁹

The Reich made no claims on the agricultural production of the *General-Gouvernement*, but this "generous" attitude did not alleviate the food shortage in this area, which was catastrophic.⁹⁰ Being cut off from the Western Polish Provinces and the Western Ukraine, which became a part of the Soviet Union, the *General-Gouvernement* was not nearly self-sufficient in food. Before the war, the District of Cracow alone had to import annually nearly 155,000 tons of grain, mostly from the Western Polish Provinces.⁹¹ Without food imports and with an additional 1,500,000 million deportees from the Polish Western Provinces, the food situation in this part of Poland was desperate.⁹² Yet this situation was foreseen by the Nazi experts and was in agreement with the *Lebensraum* policy for the biological weakening of the Polish people and for the reduction of its birth rate.⁹³

During the economic year 1940-1941, the Nazi economic policy in the *General-Gouvernement* was somewhat altered. German authorities took a keener interest in the increase of agricultural production by supplying fertilizers, machinery, and breeding cattle. They also carried on some reconstruction work, especially in transportation.⁹⁴ This work was undertaken not with the welfare of the Polish people in mind but in preparation for "Action Barbarossa." In the *General-Gouvernement* the main German forces gathered in preparation for the "Action

Barbarossa," and their food supply as well as the transportation across the *General-Gouvernement* had to be cared for.⁹⁵

In the third stage of German economic policy in this area (1942-43), the original plan for the pastoralization of Poland was completely abandoned because of the necessities of war. A considerable part of the German war industry had to be moved to the *General-Gouvernement* as a result of the Allied air attacks.⁹⁶

The degree of control which the Germans exercised in the *General-Gouvernement* was much greater than in the Czech Protectorate. There was no autonomous Polish government parallel to that of Czechoslovakia, and there were no treaty stipulations which to some degree could moderate German actions. Self-government in Poland did not reach higher than the level of a city mayor or village elder, and its influence in economic matters was not important. Germans automatically took over property owned by the Polish government. They also passed a law under which they could seize any landed estate or any private enterprise they chose. This German decree specified four different types of property which could be expropriated:

1. State enterprises.
2. Deserted enterprises.
3. Enterprises of those hostile to the Germans.
4. Inefficient or indebted enterprises.⁹⁷

The same criteria for expropriation applied also to the landed estates.⁹⁸ The enterprises expropriated on any of the above premises did not go directly under government management but were placed under a private management (*Treuhand*). A person who was entrusted with the management of such an expropriated enterprise (usually Germans, though in some cases also Ukrainians) was supposed to increase the efficiency of the enterprise, free it from debt, and account for his activity and financial operations to a specific agency (*Haupt-Treuhandelsstelle Ost* [the Main Trust Office East]) within the German administration in the *General-Gouvernement*. The former owner could be compensated from the current income of the enter-

prise, but it was left to the discretion of the trustee, and no compulsion was imposed in this case.⁹⁹

The expropriated land-estates were put under the management of the state agency called [*Liegenschaftshauptverwaltung*] (LHV). This agency managed two-thirds of all estates in the *General-Gouvernement*, whose area exceeded 120 acres.¹⁰⁰

The most significant feature of the expropriation of private property was that it was not to be returned to the old owners after the war was over, but that it was to be reserved for German ex-soldiers who were supposed to settle in the East. The purpose of the trustee system was to take care that these properties or enterprises would be protected for future German colonists.¹⁰¹

By the spring of 1943 there were 4,000 different *Treuhand* enterprises in the *General-Gouvernement*.¹⁰² They by no means included all the private enterprises in this area, though there was a way open to transfer "legally" under the trustee system any private enterprise which the Germans saw fit to take.

The only native enterprises in the *General-Gouvernement* which retained control of their property and continued their activity in more or less traditional fashion were the cooperative associations. They were mainly involved in the acquisition and distribution of agricultural products. They also possessed some industrial enterprises (especially in the food industry), and they maintained a chain of food stores in villages and towns.

In the Western Polish Provinces, where the Polish cooperative movement was most developed, it was suppressed. In the *General-Gouvernement* there was a certain period of hesitation and speculation on the part of German authorities whether to leave the cooperative enterprises intact under German control or to replace them with a purely German institution. Only the lack of a reliable German business element willing to come to the *General-Gouvernement* and take the whole intricate cooperative system in its hands forced the German authorities to decide on the first alternative.¹⁰³

The Polish and the Ukrainian cooperative associations were allowed to operate under provisions of the Polish prewar law,¹⁰⁴ but they were put under the supervision of German commissars, *Staatlicher Genossenschaftsrat* (State Council on Cooperatives).

The last-mentioned agency extended its supervision down to the county subdivision of the cooperatives.¹⁰⁵

To take precautions against the gaining of too strong an influence by these native enterprises, the *General-Gouvernement* authorities insisted on a considerable investment of the cooperatives' income in buildings, grain stores, etc.¹⁰⁶

There are many indications that the concessions granted to the native economy were made because of the temporary advantages of such arrangements. It was not a step in the permanent German economic policy.

The cooperatives were not recognized in German law but were allowed to continue under Polish law. This fact was indicative of the temporary character of the arrangement. Moreover, the German authorities showed no interest in protecting the legal rights of the cooperatives or in plans for their future development.¹⁰⁷ Of the 161 industrial enterprises in Poland owned by the Ukrainian cooperatives prior to World War II only 24 were restored to the cooperatives during the German occupation.¹⁰⁸ The remainder were placed under German control because they could be conveniently managed by available German personnel and because there was no advantage to be gained by leaving them under the cooperatives.

On the other hand, the cooperatives, as intermediaries between peasants delivering food supplies and the German economic agencies responsible for securing the food, were supported wholeheartedly. Here the cooperative organizations performed a task which Germans could hardly handle efficiently, due to the lack of sufficient personnel and ignorance of the local circumstances. In this particular field the Germans went so far as to let the cooperatives use former Jewish property, such as buildings, storage facilities, and any objects which were required in performing their task of securing food supplies. The status of the property acquired in such a way was never clarified. The Germans did not require the cooperatives to pay rent for it and failed to recognize formally any legal right for acquisition of the property.

On the whole, all relations of German authorities with the native Polish economic organizations were of an *ad hoc* basis.

The local organizations remained in such a position as not to interfere with the objectives of future German policy and so as to be replaced without any complications when the time was ripe for it. The enterprises remaining under more direct German control were generally earmarked as the property of the future German colonists.

[The degree of economic enslavement in the huge territory occupied in the Soviet Union was even more drastic and free of any restrictions. It was due again to a series of different factors. First of all, the wide open fertile space in the Soviet Union, especially the Ukraine, was to be a nucleus of German *Lebensraum* and the main source of food and raw materials for the German Empire. Second, the Germans operated on an assumption that the population had been "conditioned" to extreme hardships and submission by the Soviet regime and that their passive character was adapted to take any hardships meekly. Third, the nationalized economy in the Soviet Union allowed the Nazi authorities to step conveniently into the shoes of the Soviet government and to claim all the property for the German state.] Further, the economic exploitation of the Soviet Union was planned months ahead of the real occupation. In the spring of 1941, Göring was entrusted by Hitler with the task of securing the economic goods in this vast area, and before the invasion took place, a rough blueprint for economic exploitation was worked out under the code name of "Oldenburg."¹⁰⁹ Some specific agencies for exploitation were created.¹¹⁰ [Göring's economic objective was put on the basis of a pure colonial exploitation in the East and it contradicted Rosenberg's concept of the "people's imperialism" which violently opposed the traditional colonial imperialism of the "rotten" Western powers. The latter's plan necessitated extension of the *Volkstum* (nationality) to the East, not merely German capital or military bases.¹¹¹] There is some indication that Rosenberg tried to modify Göring's economic policy in the East before the beginning of the Eastern Campaign but without success.¹¹² [During the decisive conference about the German Eastern policy which took place on July 16, 1941, Hitler seemed to implement the policy of exploitation as well as the policy of colonization, which in their ulti-

mate ends were clearly contradictory.¹¹³ Hitler, therefore, did not restrain Göring's determination to follow his policy of economic exploitation, and during a conference on November 8, 1941, the latter repeated his views and reaffirmed them by the will of the *Führer*.¹¹⁴ On the other hand Himmler's *Einsatzgruppen* felt free to implement practically Rosenberg's idea of "people's imperialism" by clearing out the Eastern *Lebensraum* for future German colonization. The conflicting tendencies of these two simultaneously pursued policies are reflected in the following report of the Göring economic agency in the Ukraine, *Wi-Rü-Amt* (Military, Economic and Armament Office) which stated:

If we shoot the Jews, liquidate the war prisoners, starve the major part of the big cities' population, and in the coming year reduce also a part of the peasants through famine there will arise a question: Who is going to produce the economic goods?¹¹⁵

In view of Hitler's extensive projects for colonization of the European part of the Soviet Union in general and for the Ukraine particularly, it was clear that the economic exploitation of the Eastern peoples would have to be sacrificed. Himmler actually started the preparatory measures for clearing the *Lebensraum*. His methods of artificial famine and mass executions directly contradicted a pure colonial policy by the physical annihilation of the objects of exploitation. Yet for the time being, the colonial policy did not completely lose its significance. The prolongation of war and the shortage of manpower made the exploitation of labor in the East too important a factor. It also urged the Nazi authorities to keep the economic activities of the natives in an iron grip.

The original economic control in the occupied areas of the Soviet Union was exercised by the so-called *Wirtschaftsstab OST* (Economic Staff East). It was composed of military personnel who formally headed it and of representatives of the Four-Year-Plan who advised and actually determined the economic policy. The Departments of Industry and Agriculture of the Four-Year Plan maintained their agents even in the local branches of the

German Military Government and in this way attempted to control the economy in the East even to the smallest details.¹¹⁶

The agents of the Industrial Department were interested in securing for Germany the industrial resources of the conquered area. They installed the German *Treuhander* (trustees) in such enterprises in the East which could be reactivated within the general economic policy.

On the other hand, the Agricultural Department installed in the newly conquered areas so-called "Agricultural Leaders" (*Landwirtschaftliche Führer*). Such "Agricultural Leaders" represented the lowest level of supervision over native agriculture. Usually the Nazi "Agricultural Leader" supervised 3-4 collective farms in the East. When the German Military Administration gave way to the German Civil Administration the Military top of the Economic Staff East was removed, and the remaining part of it, including the representatives of the Four-Year Plan, were absorbed into the Economic Department of the relevant *Reichskommissariat*.¹¹⁷ Germans also exercised control over the industrial enterprises which were reactivated and which remained under control of different German companies which acted as "trustees." The extent of German industrial and commercial domination in the East could be seen by the number and activity of German monopoly companies, some of which were created for the economic exploitation of the Soviet Union before the beginning of the Eastern Campaign:

1. Continental Öl, organized in March 1941—a monopoly company for exploitation of the Soviet oil resources.
2. Chemie Ost—had the monopoly in chemical resources.
3. Osfaser G.m.b.H. was set to exploit the textile products.
4. Ostland Berg and Hüttengesellschaft (BHC)—organized in August 1941, specialized in the exploitation of the Soviet coal and iron industry and mining operations. Specifically, it was involved in the exploitation of manganese ore mines at Nikopol, the iron works in Krivoi Rog, and ore mines in the Donets Basin.

5. The Mining and Steel Company East (BSO)—a branch of the above-mentioned company employed in the same field.

6. The Osterfassungsgesellschaft, for securing hides and furs.

7. Die Deutsche Rauchwaren—G.m.b.H., Leipzig (German Tobacco Co.).

8. Central Trading Company East (Zentrale Handelsgesellschaft Ost für Landwirtschaftlichen Absatz und Bedarf)—specialized in the acquisition and distribution of agricultural goods.¹¹⁸

The Nazi opposition to the native economic organizations in the *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine indicates that the Germans tried to prevent the Ukrainians from having any influence on the economic affairs of their country. Most enlightening in this connection is the fate of the Ukrainian Cooperative Association (*Vukospilka*). It was the only cooperative organization (with its roots still in the prerevolutionary period) which preserved a semblance of autonomy within the Soviet economy.¹¹⁹ Due to its distinct organizational structure and its popularity among the population,¹²⁰ it was revived spontaneously under the mild German Military Administration only three weeks after the Germans captured Kiev.¹²¹ Physically it showed an amazing extension, claiming within one year 522 *rayon* food societies and 7,788 cooperative village organizations in the *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine, Crimea, and in the Ukrainian territory under the German Military Administration.¹²² Yet in January 1942 the *Vukospilka* was placed under control of a special German commissar and in the autumn of 1942 there was a positive effort of the *Reichskommissar* Koch to replace this Ukrainian cooperative system with a German economic organization. Only the danger of loosening the efficient economic net,¹²³ and the intervention of Rosenberg who feared the political repercussions, prevented temporarily a complete liquidation of this organization. A new arrangement was achieved, however, which provided that the *Vukospilka* self-government could exist on the village and *rayon* level only. The structure on the province and

country level was to be put in the hands of a German agency. Finally, the whole concern with its German and Ukrainian component had to be subordinated to the Central Trading Company East (ZHO).¹²⁴

This reorganization was accompanied by mass arrests of the leading members of *Vukospilka*, including the head of *Vukospilka*, Perevertun, who, with his whole family was executed for his "hostile activity against Germans."¹²⁵

The reason for the liquidation of the native commercial activities as well as postponement of the restoration of private trade in the Ukraine is apparent from the following authoritative statement of the *Wirtschaftsdienst* (*Zeitschrift für Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik*), October 2, 1942:

The final restoration of private trade in the Ukraine—there are now only 4,000 merchants with 40,000-50,000 native officials employed—will follow only when the German merchant, who now fights in the East, comes home. These same motives predominate here as in the new Eastern provinces of the Reich which serve as a settlement ground for the German peasant.

The same reason seemed to be a predetermining factor for preservation of collective farms, 90 percent of which were left intact by Germans in the Ukraine.¹²⁶

The "New Agrarian Reform" from February 15, 1942, sponsored by Rosenberg, meant in practice only a change of name from *Kolkhoz* to *Gemeinwirtschaft* (community enterprise) and the doubling of garden allotments,¹²⁷ but it preserved on the whole the collective cultivation of the soil. A new reform announced by Rosenberg on June 3, 1943, which was to restore private ownership of soil under the name of a *Landbaugenossenschaft* (agricultural association), and which could be regarded as one of his means of "psychological warfare" in the adverse Eastern situation, remained on paper because of the resistance of Koch and Bormann and because of the accelerated retreat of the German armies.¹²⁸

Into the general pattern of German economic policy in the Ukraine falls also the regulation of the artisan workshops. By a

decree of Koch, from March 7, 1942 they could work only within the framework of an Artisan Association (*artels*) which had to be subordinated to the German artisans.¹²⁹ Because at this period of war there were hardly any German artisans willing to settle in the Ukraine, the whole provision remained on paper. Yet its tendency is nevertheless revealing, and there is no doubt that the plan would have been realized after the war.

The Baltic States, though being technically an integral part of the Soviet Union during the time of invasion, experienced a preferential treatment in the economic sense also, because of Hitler's intention to win them for Germandom. Although Germans formally claimed all the nationalized property even in the Baltic area as their inherited domain, for practical purposes they restored most of the nationalized land and small enterprises to their private owners. The provision was left, however, that the German state still remains the legal proprietor of the restored property and that a fixed rent should be paid to it by the former owner.¹³⁰

Direct German influence on the Baltic economy was established by the transfer of deserted lands and enterprises, and also properties expropriated from Jews, Communists, and elements hostile to Germany to a German trustee organization called *Landbewirtschaftungsgesellschaft Ostland*.¹³¹

Unlike in the Ukraine, there followed an early restoration of private artisan enterprises and trade on October 17, 1941, still with the attachment of the financial strings in cases where these enterprises were nationalized previously.¹³² Similar restoration of the industrial enterprises was decreed by the *Reichskommissariat Ostland* on November 29, 1941.¹³³ In both cases the condition for reopening or forming a new enterprise was bound by two provisions: (a) that there is a public need for such enterprise; and (b) that the owner is personally and professionally qualified for its management.¹³⁴ These stipulations were used, however, in such a way as to deny in most cases the restoration of the enterprises to the former owners.¹³⁵ Even those economic activities which were allowed to the Balts were strongly linked with German trade and industry with the obvious intention of preventing the re-establishment of an independent national

economy in the former Baltic states. There is an indication that at least in Latvia the true purpose of the Germans was recognized and the German promise for a greater degree of self-government was accepted with scepticism and reserve. The usually well-informed and objective situational report of SD (German Security Service) from April 24, 1942 states as follows:

The Latvian economic circles spread the rumor that the new Self-Government will have nothing to govern because the entire Latvian economy, especially in industry and trade, is integrated with the big German companies which will remain outside of the control of the Latvian Self-Government.¹³⁶

In June 1942 the *Ostministerium* pushed through a general restoration of private property law in the former Baltic states.¹³⁷ This restoration process in the Baltic States did not radically conflict with the role which the Baltic States had to play within German *Lebensraum*. The nationalized status of Baltic economy and the initially unclarified racial status of the Balts made the reservation of all property by the German state desirable, at least from the Nazi standpoint. When Germanization of the majority of the Balts was definitely decided, there could be no weighty opposition to treating the Baltic economy at least in the same way as the Czech, with the bulk of its enterprises in private hands.

Similar to the economic policy in the Czech Protectorate, it was the integration of the Baltic economy with that of the German which essentially mattered, not the change of the social structure of the Baltic peoples, and in this respect the German economic policy differed in the Baltic States from the policy in Poland or the Ukraine.

Physical Enslavement

The idea of physical enslavement within the German *Lebensraum* applied first of all to the Eastern peoples which, according to the Nazi experts, could not be absorbed racially within the German Racial Empire. The ideas for such physical

enslavement are included in the first three blueprints dealing with the treatment of the alien population in Poland and the alien Eastern peoples generally, which appeared between November 1939 and May 1940.¹³⁸

In the light of these three blueprints there could be distinguished the three main objectives of the slave labor policy during the initial stage of occupation:

(1) The Germans intended to keep a certain amount of Poles (about 50 percent of the Polish population in the Incorporated Polish Provinces) in subordinate and dependent positions in order to maintain an efficient economy in these areas and with the aim of helping the steady flow of new German colonists establish themselves. Denied freedom of movement, deprived of the right to the slightest cultural activities, and segregated like outcasts away from the German dwellings which they could enter only during work, they were reduced to the status of modern helots, and their condition could be compared only to the plight of the Polish Jews suffering similar restrictions (with the exception of cultural activities which were not denied the Jews) in the secluded ghettos in the *General-Gouvernement*.

Even in this form the presence of the Polish "sub-humans" amid the German society was regarded as a temporary measure. They were to be replaced by Germans after the war, and pushed further east to the "sub-human reservations of labor."¹³⁹

(2) The second objective of the Nazi slave labor program was to keep the Polish youth in isolation so as to interfere with the Polish reproductive process. It was to be achieved by the deportation of a certain number of Polish youth as slave labor to Germany, by maintaining indefinitely the Polish PW's and by creating long-term labor battalions of Polish youth. In this way the practice of slave labor would contribute to the German *Lebensraum* policy by decreasing the birth rate, thus resulting in biologically weakening the alien people within the German living space.¹⁴⁰

(3) The third objective was to have a cheap and obedient labor force which could fulfill the hardest and least gratifying physical work in construction projects in the Eastern Empire.

They were to live in special reservations, under primitive economic and cultural conditions.¹⁴¹ The *General-Gouvernement* was the first area earmarked as such a prospective reservation for "sub-humans," but when the German *Lebensraum* expanded after the invasion of the Soviet Union and the *General-Gouvernement* itself was earmarked as the German settlement area, it was Belorussia which was considered as a dumping area for racially unacceptable peoples.¹⁴²

[During the Soviet Campaign, which lasted longer than expected, and with the entrance of the United States into the war—which also excluded hope for an early end of the war—the German economy had to switch from the Blitzkrieg economy to an economy of depth. This posed the problem of using the Eastern nationals in Germany to an extent which was never before anticipated. Bringing millions of foreign workers to Germany¹⁴³ was an unusual, harsh, yet in view of total war, understandable measure.] What, however, exceeded economic necessity or military consideration was the way in which most of the Eastern nationals from the *Lebensraum* area were treated.

While the hardships of the foreign workers from Western Europe and the Balkans could to some degree be explained by the circumstances of war, the treatment of Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians could only be explained by the Nazi ideology and its attitude toward "racially inferior" peoples from the German *Lebensraum*. [The theory that Germans had to fear that they might spread Communist propaganda could serve neither as a justification nor as an explanation of Nazi motives; There is no evidence that Ukrainian or Polish workers were more inclined or qualified to preach communism in Germany than French or Czech workers; yet the latter were not subject to that hard treatment and limitation of individual freedom which was applied to Polish and so-called "Eastern Workers" ("Ostarbeiter"). Also, one's national sentiments and traditions did not matter in the quality of treatment; again the national enemies of Germans, the Frenchmen, experienced far better treatment than the Ukrainians who were known to be traditionally pro-German.]

Göring and Bormann insisted on treating the Eastern and the Polish workers no differently from the Soviet PW's. This attitude revealed that the civilian workers from the East were thought to be as dangerous as Red Army PW's. Secondly, it implied that the decimating policy applied to the Soviet's PW's would in principle also be used on them.¹⁴⁴ The humiliating order to feed both Soviet PW's and Eastern and Polish workers on horse- and cat-meat was issued to attach to them a common tag of inferiority. The above-mentioned measure should also remind the German people that the Eastern and Polish workers were to be regarded as sub-humans and enemies, regardless of all other considerations and circumstances.

□ Taking into consideration the increasing difficulty with T which labor from the East could be obtained and the constant demands of German industry and agriculture for an additional supply of labor, it is also difficult to understand on a rational basis the Nazi treatment of Eastern workers—the deliberate killing by famine and exhaustion of thousands of badly needed foreign workers—□ The uneconomic considerations in the treat- 1 ment of the Eastern workers are reflected best in a report of the German witness Dr. Wilhelm, who had been employed by the Krupp Industry since October 1942, which says: "The diet prescribed for the eastern workers was altogether insufficient. They were given 1,000 calories a day less than the minimum prescribed for any German. . . ."¹⁴⁵

It seems strange that the Germans, who were known to be practically inclined, exact, and interested in efficient work, would deliberately create circumstances where efficient and systematic work was impossible because of the high death rate and rapid physical exhaustion of the workers.

The contribution of the eastern workers and Poles was reduced by the Nazis by killing any incentive in the idea of work¹⁴⁶ and by abolition for these nationalities of the insurance arrangement which usually accompanies the employment contract of an average German worker.¹⁴⁷

Such useless waste of the physical and moral capacities of the eastern workers is still justified by the higher goals of

Nazi ideology, which again is basically bound on the "German East" and German *Lebensraum* program. This can be seen from the following speech of Himmler from October 4, 1943 when he said:

⚡ Whether 10,000 Russian females fall down from exhaustion when digging an anti-tank ditch, interests me only insofar as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished. We shall never be rough and heartless where it is not necessary, that is clear. . . . But it is a crime against our own blood to worry about them and give them ideals, thus causing our sons and grandsons to have a more difficult time with them.¹⁴⁸

CHAPTER FIVE

The Policy of Extermination

If the Jews do not want to work they must be shot. . . . They must be treated like tubercle bacilli with which a healthy body may be infected. No, this is not cruel if one remembers that innocent creatures of nature such as hares or deer have to be killed to prevent harm being caused by them. . . . Nations which failed to rid themselves of the Jews have perished. . . . (Hitler's dialogue in his discussion with Horthy, *I.M.T.* Vol. X, p. 135, *Doc.* D-736.)

The Führer had to emphasize once more that for the Poles there can be just one ruler—the German. There cannot be two Lords side by side; therefore all representatives of the Polish intelligentsia are to be liquidated. It sounds hard but it is the law of life. . . . (Martin Bormann's Instructions, *I.M.T.* *Doc.* 172-USSR.)

Heathcliff, in *Wuthering Heights*, would kill everybody on earth in order to gain Cathie, but he would never think of saying that murder is reasonable or theoretically defensible. He would commit it; there his theory comes to halt. . . . But as soon as a man, through lack of character, takes refuge in a doctrine, as soon as he makes a crime reasonable, it multiplies like Reason herself and assumes all the figures of the syllogism. It was unique like a cry; now it is universal like science. Yesterday, it was put on trial; today it is law. (Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, p. 11.)

The Reason for Killing

Though Nazi ideology did not specifically include a positive program of genocide, it had tendencies which when followed consistently made such a program inevitable. This ideology resulted in the destruction of moral inhibitions and a perversion of the general concept of humanity. There was a

denial of humanity to the Jews and to the Slavs in Eastern Europe.¹ Further, there was a belief in the survival of the fittest as applied to the nations and the races of the world. The survival of the strongest could be guaranteed only by destroying the weak in this or another way.²

The third determining factor was the conception of the *Lebensraum*. The new living space in Eastern Europe had to be Germanic in its racial composition. The new Germanic model society established in the East had to be "racially best." It was not to be just a dominating Germanic elite ruling a foreign population. It was to become a solid and stratified German society built in the East within which there would be no permanent room for a "racially inferior" native population. [The economic significance of the native population was not so great as to justify their existence over the long term.] Their extremely primitive standard of life, which had to be enforced for ideological reasons, would hardly make them an important economic asset in terms of trade; and even their value as a labor force was of a limited and temporary character.³ The new Nazi society was not to indulge in the luxury of slave-holding but was supposed to gain its robust, healthy physical stamina by its own physical exertion.⁴

As the German settlements increased, the native population was supposed to diminish proportionately within the *Lebensraum*.

The unwanted population could then either be gathered on some reservation within the *Lebensraum* and remain as a source of ready and cheap labor for German state projects, or could be deported to areas outside the German *Lebensraum*.⁵ But neither solution seemed satisfactory to the Nazis. The sheer numbers of the Slavs and their high birth rate were annoying to the Nazi authorities for two reasons: first, the facts contradicted the idea of Nazi superiority and indicated that the "inferior Slavic peoples" are "biologically stronger" in procreation; secondly, their rapid increase could lead to a condition where they would greatly outnumber their German "masters," and thus they might be in a position either to undermine or challenge German rule.

The implementation of Nazi plans required special precautions so as to guarantee clearance of foreign elements from their *Lebensraum*. Removal could be accomplished by humane means, but the "sub-humans" were denied human qualities, and they were rated by the Nazis even below the level of animals.⁶

When one endeavors to be rid of rats, fleas, flies, or other "coexistors," which are of no use and which cause some damage or discomfort by their presence, the action taken against them is usually one of extermination. A method for forcing them to flee would not be used because there is always a possibility that they will return. There are no ethical or moral restrictions which prevent one from taking the most drastic actions against them. We might resort to the use of poison gas or some other device for extermination; we might carefully remove all remnants of food and use other "Malthusian means" to prevent their procreation. We would never rest until completely rid of the pests.

When certain peoples or races are denied human dignity, when they are placed on the level of animals—or even worse, when they are labelled "harmful elements" or "deadly bacilli"—why should they be treated differently from any other noxious "biological specimen"? Why spare them if they interfere with the fixed pattern of life of the "supermen"? It is only natural that, starting from the premise of the survival of the fittest, void of conventional moral values, and applying "scientific" methods and laws to human society, we will not fail to put genocide on the same level as insecticide. The "sub-humans" and the Jews were regarded as much more dangerous and complicated objects to deal with than mosquitoes or rats, and therefore the methods for their elimination had to be more elaborate.

Birth Control and Diseases in the Fight Against the Sub-human

In implementing the program of eliminating inferior races, one of the first steps was to arrest the natural increase of undesirable peoples. Nazi leaders believed that healthy biological behavior, sanitary conditions, sufficient food, etc., were essential in building national strength.⁷ By denying such conditions

to the inferior peoples the Nazis endeavored to prevent their increase in numbers. As early as November 25, 1939, the Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom issued a circular outlining such a program:

Our medical care should be limited only to preventing the spread of diseases over to the Reich territory. The degree to which medical care is taken of the population by Polish physicians or Jewish medics is not our business; we are also not interested in the further growth of this profession.⁸

and further:

All measures which tend to limit births are to be tolerated or to be supported. Abortion in the remaining area (of Poland) must be declared free from punishment. The means for abortion and contraceptive means may be offered publicly without any police restrictions. Homosexuality is always to be declared legal. The institutions and persons involved professionally in abortion practices are not to be interfered with by police. Racial-hygienic measures are not to be promoted.⁹

This particular policy of elimination was actually implemented by German police in the Eastern Occupied areas, which for all practical purposes were subordinated to Himmler and therefore linked directly with the policy of the Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom. Its policy did not always coincide completely with the policy of the German Civil Administration in the Eastern areas which, besides the promotion of Nazi ideological policy, was in certain instances keenly aware of the need for the preservation of economic productivity and tranquillity among the foreign population during the war.¹⁰

Sometimes, because of the extreme secrecy in which the more drastic blueprints of *Lebensraum* were veiled, their content was fully known only to the high-ranking SS leaders, but not necessarily to all high-ranking German civil administrators. Nor did the German civil administrators think it feasible to fulfill all the drastic ideological measures during the war.

From conflicts which occasionally arose between the SS organization under Himmler and the NSDAP¹¹ headquarters under Bormann on the one side and the German administrators in the East, Hans Frank and Alfred Rosenberg, on the other, it is possible sometimes to find out the degree to which the objectives of the *Lebensraum* policy were actually carried out. It seems that the negative policy in the medical-sanitary field was pushed in Poland. This is reflected in a report from Governor Frank to Hitler dated May 25, 1943. Frank complained that:

The health condition of the population is getting worse and their working capacity decreases quite obviously; also the tendency to disease is growing rapidly, especially tuberculosis.¹²

On the other hand, the policy of promoting abortion did not seem to be grasped quickly enough by German eastern administrators. This can be seen from the complaints of Hitler and the SS men closest to his ideology. In his table talk of July 22, 1942, Hitler mentioned with indignation an article which presented the point of view that abortions and contraceptive means should be prohibited in the occupied eastern areas. Hitler commented in rage: "Should an idiot try to set this prohibition actually into reality I shall shoot him personally."¹³ We have the record of an occasion where Himmler, as the chief implementor for the *Lebensraum* policy in the East, complained in the spring of 1942 that the policy of legalization of abortions was hampered in the *General-Gouvernement*. The German courts there punished the Poles harshly for such practices, which were supposed to be in the interest of the German nation to encourage. Himmler asked his subordinate, the chief of German police in *General-Gouvernement*—SS General Kruger—to intervene personally and to correct this unwholesome interference by the Governor-General.¹⁴ Similar difficulties seem to have occurred in Belorussia where, as SS General Berger remarked, the German administrators handling the abortion cases "have no idea what the German Eastern policy really means."¹⁵

(Such occasional deviations in the pattern of Nazi *Lebens-*

raum policy are to be explained by overlapping and lack of coordination between the maze of different Nazi authorities in the East rather than in a principal revision of agreed methods.] This is revealed in the specific orders from Hitler to Rosenberg, which are of the same kind as the circular of the Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom, issued after the outbreak of war. Bormann, who transmitted these orders of Hitler to Rosenberg, sums up the main ideas of biological reduction in the three following points:

1. If girls and women in the Eastern Territory have abortions performed on themselves that is all right with us; under no circumstances should German legal authorities oppose this.

In the Führer's opinion one should even admit a lively trade in contraceptives in the occupied Eastern Territories as we have no interest whatsoever in the non-German population increasing.

2. There is a great danger that the non-German population in the Occupied Eastern Territories will increase more than hitherto, as living conditions as a whole will naturally become much better and more assured for the non-German population. Just for this reason we must take the necessary precautionary steps against an increase of the non-German population.

3. Therefore, German health organizations should on no account exert themselves on behalf of the non-German population in the Occupied Eastern Territories. For instance, the inoculation of the non-German population and similar precautionary health measures are definitely out of the question.¹⁶

The measures for reducing the birth rate were not applied to the Latvians and Estonians, who were to be absorbed into the German nation. To them was extended the German law for the legal protection of motherhood.¹⁷

With the steadily growing influence of the SS organization and its leader Heinrich Himmler, who enjoyed the complete confidence and backing of Hitler and the NSDAP, the extreme and immediate policy of the *Lebensraum* seemed to prevail.

The SS men acquired authority over the birth control program which was applied not only to the occupied Eastern Territories but also to the vast slave labor camps in Germany.¹⁸

The pursuit of the objectives and the rigidity of the policy are best revealed in one order issued by an SS officer as late as January 18, 1945. At this time, four months before German capitulation, when the German front suffered its greatest catastrophies and when the Russian mammoth offensive irresistibly rolled toward Berlin and the Nazis were struggling for bare survival, the SS Office for Race was still deeply involved in the problem of how to handle the pregnancy cases of foreign females who served as volunteers in the German army. The issue of *Lebensraum* and race seemed still to be very important and it was decided that the females from the East and the Balkans should have abortions under the pretext that it was required for the sake of their service efficiency. The volunteers from the "Nordic" countries and the Balts should be subject to all provisions of the German motherhood law.¹⁹

Through the encouragement of birth control and by permitting the spread of diseases among the native civilian population to go unchecked, the Nazis created a unique pattern by means of which the totalitarian regime intended to create a racial *Lebensraum*.

Starvation of the Large Cities and the Countryside

In creating the conditions of an artificial famine, the Nazis found another effective means for reducing the unwanted population in the occupied Eastern Territories. In following this method of reduction, the Nazis showed little originality, being preceded in such practices by the Soviet regime which indulged in staging an artificial famine during the years of collectivization for the purpose of eliminating hostile classes or opposition.

The most impressive conditions of famine were created by the Nazis in the Ukraine during the first months of German occupation. This famine was brought about by the interception of food deliveries to the large cities of the Ukraine or to those

regions of the country which, because of war damages or natural disasters or traditional insufficiency in food, were dependent on imports of foods for survival.)

The famine measures for the Ukraine were apparently decided during a conference of eastern administrators with Hitler in East Prussia on November 11, 1941.²¹ The policy adopted was reflected in the official report of the German Economic Armament Staff of December 2, 1941:

The skimming of the agricultural surpluses from the Ukraine for distribution in the Reich is possible only when Ukrainian inland traffic is reduced to a minimum. This objective is to be achieved by the following means:

1. By the elimination of the superfluous eaters (Jews, and the population of the Ukrainian cities such as Kiev, which get no food rations at all).
2. Through the drastic reduction of rations in the other Ukrainian cities.
3. By the reduction of consumption of the peasant population. It is natural that the population of the towns try to escape starvation, to which it is condemned, by the exchange of different utensils for food, which they try to get from the farmers.²²

The people were denied the use of the railroads. The German authorities erected road blocks and prevented the bringing of foodstuffs to the cities by highway. The Security Police not only stopped private efforts at securing food, even through the inevitable black market operations, but they also conducted an organized drive against all efforts of the local Ukrainian governments to provide relief for the population.²³

Although the Nazis later organized a system for supplying food for the larger cities, the supply was always insufficient to meet the minimum needs of the populace.

According to the former Mayor of Kiev, Professor Leontij Forostivskyj, under Nazi occupation the food rations in that city at the end of 1943 amounted only to 30 percent of the minimum.²⁴ Food prices on the black market in Kiev were beyond the means of the average inhabitant. With 477 *karbovantsi*²⁵

per month, which was the average salary for those who were fortunate enough to find employment, it was hardly possible to buy very much on the black market where the food prices were listed by the end of 1942 as follows:²⁶

<i>1 kg. (2.2 lbs.)</i>	<i>Karbovantsi</i>
Butter	600
Bacon	600
Beef	130
Rye flour	81
Barley	68
Potatoes	13

The official food rations for normal consumers in Kiev in April 1942 were fixed at 400 gr. of bread per person for one week. Those who worked received one additional loaf of bread for one week or fourteen days at their working place. In addition, the rations included small amounts of flour, barley, groats, and from time to time, meat.²⁷

It is a small wonder that in the circumstances there occurred cases of cannibalism in the very heart of the Ukraine. The high mortality within the city resulted in a population loss of 17.6 per thousand.²⁸

Similar circumstances seemed to prevail in other Ukrainian cities and industrial centers. The German situational report for April 1942 described the food situation in Kharkov as catastrophic, and stated that the workers in Gorlovka, the industrial city in the Donets Basin, received only 100 gr. of bread daily.²⁹ Another situational report for March 1942 reported from Stalino (an industrial city located in the Donets Basin) that one potato there cost one ruble and a turnip from 3 to 5 rubles. It is stated that the monthly wage of the workers was from 400 to 600 rubles.³⁰

The artificiality of the famine is apparent from the SD Situational Report of February 1942, which revealed that there were some surplus foods in the General-Bezirk (district) of Kiev—grain, leguminous foods, and cattle—"but they could not be brought to Kiev neither immediately nor in the near future

because of transportation difficulties, fuel shortages, and the condition of the road."³¹ The traffic problems apparently did not exist for the transportation of Ukrainian foods and other products to the German³² cities. The volume of these exports indicated the inadequacy and flimsiness of the technical excuses given by the Germans. In a letter to Hitler, Erich Koch gave the following summary of exports from the Ukraine up to the end of June 1943:³³

<i>Product</i>	<i>Procured or Produced</i>	<i>Deliveries to the Army and to the Reich</i>
Cereals	6,300,000 tons	3,600,000 tons
Legumes	350,000 "	100,000 "
Butter	57,000 "	50,000 "
Potatoes	1,380,000 "	500,000 "
Honey and Jam	26,000 "	25,000 "
Sugar	245,000 "	155,000 "
Cotton	5,000 "	5,000 "
Wool	7,000 "	7,000 "
Hemp and Flax	5,500 "	5,500 "
Drugs (medical herbs)	1,500 "	1,500 "
Pigs	500,000 lbs.	420,000 lbs.
Sheep	410,000 "	360,000 "
Eggs	680,000,000 "	570,000,000 "

The ruthless German policy of exploitation is clearly revealed by Koch's statistics. It was the policy of the Nazis to starve not only the inhabitants of large cities but also the residents of the countryside, which was not self-sufficient in food and which from the economic standpoint could not be considered as a great asset. Such regions included the swampy, sandy lands and the virgin forest province of Polissia. The inhabitants of this province depended to a great degree for their livelihood upon seasonal work. They were accustomed to work as agricultural laborers during the summer in the neighboring wealthy provinces of Volhynia and Podolia. The grain supply which they earned during this time was an important food item for the long winter.

This source of income was largely cut off for them in the summer of 1941 by the German invasion which started around the harvest time. As the winter approached, the only alternative for the inhabitants of Polissia was to try to exchange their meager resources in cattle, sheep, wool, and homemade textiles for some grain in the neighboring southern provinces. It is not surprising therefore that in the fall of 1941 long lines of carriages, loaded with the exchange goods and people, moved slowly on the few sandy roads of Polissia southward in a desperate effort to acquire some grain for the winter.

When the Germans discovered this particular migration of people and learned its true purpose they stopped the movement abruptly and turned the unfortunate inhabitants of Polissia back to their native forests to face the inevitable famine.³⁴

Similar movements and almost the identical German reaction took place in Eastern Galicia, which had become a new District of the *General-Gouvernement* in August 1941. The regions threatened by famine were the Carpathian Mountains region and the Sub-Carpathian region in the vicinity of the Upper Dnister River. The Carpathian Mountains region was never self-sufficient in food, and the people depended on seasonal work in the timber industry, tourist trade, carpets and souvenir production, and on the imports of grain. The Sub-Carpathian region, although usually self-sufficient in food, was affected in the summer of 1941 by heavy floods which destroyed a considerable part of the harvest. Since the Germans failed to provide these regions with grain and other necessary food, mass movements of populations to find food in the neighboring provinces began. This migration met with reckless German food confiscation on trains, in railway stations and highroads where all the food was taken away on charges of black-market operations and speculation. Within the *General-Gouvernement* the Germans allowed some sort of self-help for the native population. The Ukrainian Central Aid Committee organized "the people's kitchen" and kindergartens in the famine-affected regions, and in this way tried to rescue at least a part of the starving population.³⁵ The extent of the famine disaster was too great to be mastered by this type of sporadic action on the

part of a committee limited in resources and competence. The Nazi authorities could record some success in their biological warfare in Galicia as well as in the Polissia area.

*Liquidation by Famine and Labor
behind Barbed Wire*

The effects of Nazi starvation methods as applied to the large cities and in certain Eastern regions could be to a great degree moderated by the ingenuity of the population and because of the physical inability of the meager German police force available to enforce the policy. But the Soviet prisoners of war, the inmates of the German concentration and labor camps, and the Jewish inhabitants of the ghettos had much less chance to avoid the effects of these indirect methods of extermination.

The thousands of Soviet prisoners of war behind barbed wire seem to have been the first target for the application of the policy. In the case of the Soviet prisoners the Nazis had the chance to eliminate the most reproductive element of the "sub-humans" and to get rid of the category of people who because of their military training and because of their age could offer the most effective resistance to future German colonization of the East. Probably the Great Russians were regarded initially as the main targets of the annihilation policy because they were looked upon as the natural enemies of German plans for the East. Non-Russian nationals among the Red prisoners of war were treated with some consideration, and many of them were released from the German camps. This policy was applied at the beginning of the Eastern Campaign to the Ukrainians, the Balts, and the Finns, on whose friendship Rosenberg counted. He believed that the German *Lebensraum* penetration of the East should be gradual, and he was willing to create an independent Ukraine for the time being in order to protect and facilitate the absorption into the Reich of countries bordering more closely on the German frontier. Included were Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.³⁶ As the Ukrainians and Finns were to become German allies and the Balts were to be absorbed into the German

nation, there was no valid reason for their elimination. In this light, the initial liberal Army policy of freeing such nationalities from German stalags can be understood. When Hitler's decision on July 16, 1941 changed Rosenberg's plans for the East and the Ukraine had to become a German *Lebensraum* immediately,³⁷ and when the Ukrainians were classified as a people unfit to be absorbed en masse into the German nation, their biological reduction became imminent. In the autumn of 1941 a circular signed by Martin Bormann decreed that the Ukrainians should not thereafter be released from the German prisoner-of-war camps.³⁸ The nationals of the Baltic States, whose absorption into the German nation was still being seriously considered, would be accorded preferential treatment.³⁹

[The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war was largely determined by Hitler's inclination to consider the Eastern Campaign not as a conventional war but as a war of annihilation. Hitler's orders which regulated the conduct of German troops in the East gave them wide latitude in the treatment of the Soviet prisoners of war.⁴⁰ An order for the liquidation of political commissars and unreliable elements, coupled with almost unlimited discretion in taking "security measures," made the massacres and executions of the Soviet citizens not only a matter of convenience, but a duty as well.] The moral and the legal restrictions in the treatment of the Soviet prisoners of war were further rescinded because of the fact that the Soviet Union was not a signatory of the Geneva Convention, safeguarding the rights of prisoners of war. The prisoners also suffered because of the continuing disinterest of the Red Regime in the fate of the Soviet prisoners of war.⁴¹

Because of an effort of the German Military Command to preserve discipline within the German Army, no arbitrary actions were allowed to the German soldiers. There are only a few accounts of mass executions on a large scale of Soviet prisoners of war, although their rough treatment was recommended and enforced.

There is also evidence which shows that, relying on the Code of Honor of the German Army, German military leadership avoided the Nazi orders to execute the political commissars or

the Jews. But this resistance to the direct annihilation measures against defenseless persons seemed to be dictated by the rigid German Army rules and traditions rather than by humanitarian considerations. As soon as arrangements could be made to preserve Army rules and traditions, the German Military Command was willing to cooperate in support of the German *Lebensraum* policy. The political commissars, the "unreliable elements," and the Jews were spared by the German Army but they were handed over to the Security Police "special squads" for execution or for transfer to concentration camps for extermination by overwork.⁴² The Soviet prisoners of war, in general, were not massacred but they were forced to live under such conditions that there was only a slight chance for survival. There the diseases, exposure to severe weather, and above all, insufficient food, decimated the main bulk of the prisoners without the direct interference of the German Army.⁴³ In this way a perfect compromise was found between the Army's point of "honor" and the Party's program of *Lebensraum*.

Referring to this program, Göring remarked to the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, on one occasion:

In the camp for Russian prisoners they have begun to eat each other. This year between twenty and thirty million persons will die of hunger in Russia. Perhaps it is well that it should be so, for certain nations must be decimated.⁴⁴

And the decimation of the Soviet prisoners started under the most abhorrent conditions. Their condition is described by the German Armament Agency in the Ukraine as follows:

The PW's are in a majority of cases completely apathetic. It is noticed again and again that they collapse during the work or during the march, and are carried by their friends.⁴⁵

In his memoirs a former German infantryman describes a team of the Soviet PW's assigned to work in a supply distribution center under his guard in the following words:

Our prisoners swayed like drunken men. Many even didn't have overcoats. Their uniforms were in tatters hang-

ing loosely over their bones. . . . The Russkies were completely debilitated. They could hardly keep on their feet, let alone perform the physical effort required of them. A team of four could scarcely lift a crate, a job that was child's play to Franzel and me. But they certainly did their utmost. Every one of them was out to curry favors. They vied with one another, they egged each other on. Then they'd peer over to see if we had noticed their zeal. That way, they hoped to earn better treatment, and perhaps a hunk of bread. . . .

These were human beings in whom there was no longer a trace of anything human; these were men who really had turned into animals. We found it nauseating, utterly repulsive.⁴⁶

The deliberate design for the starvation of the prisoners is reflected in a report of *Ostminister* Alfred Rosenberg to the Supreme Command of the German Army:

According to the available evidence the population within the Soviet Union was quite willing to help out the prisoners of war with food.

In most cases the commanders of the camps forbade the civilian population to supply prisoners with food and preferred to expose them to starvation.

Also during the marches to the camps the civilian population was not allowed to hand any food to prisoners.

In many cases when prisoners could not continue marching either because of starvation or because of exhaustion, they were shot and their corpses were left behind in the sight of the dismayed population.⁴⁷

It is possible to argue that the hardships and mistreatments in the German Army stalags is nothing new under the sun. Similar accounts of inhuman treatment of prisoners of war could be found in the course of the American Civil War, during World War I in the stalags of the different nationalities, and during and after World War II in the case of French treatment of German prisoners. True as this may be, however, an important difference in the extent of mistreatment, in the rate of mortality, and in the definite purpose behind German treatment of prisoners.

[The special policy applied to the Soviet prisoners of war contrasts sharply in comparison to the Nazi treatment of prisoners of war of other nationalities. Neither French, nor Serb, nor American prisoners were subject to the living conditions and the work programs in German stalags, which bordered on ~~a wholesale annihilation.~~]

The mortality rate of the Soviet prisoners in German stalags is revealed in the various German statistics. A report of the German Office for Armament in the Ukraine indicates that the daily death rate among Soviet prisoners by the end of 1941 reached 3,000.⁴⁸

The quarterly reports from the German stockades for the Soviet PW's state that in the last months of 1941 and in the early months of 1942 the total number of prisoners which perished from cold, disease, or starvation averaged 12 percent and in some particularly bad cases rose to 20 percent of the prisoners taken.⁴⁹

The number of the Soviet PW's taken by the Germans in 1941 totalled 3,806,000.⁵⁰ There were only 911,000 of them in October 1944 when custody over the prisoners was transferred from the Army to the SS leader Himmler.⁵¹ Even if we take into consideration the numerical changes due to different causes than death—such as release of a certain number of Soviet prisoners at the beginning of the Eastern Campaign, and the enlistment of some of them in Eastern Legions (numbers which were certainly balanced by the new intake of the Soviet prisoners during years 1942–1944) the losses caused by the deadly milieu of the German stalags must still be counted in several millions.

The extent of this annihilation represents a record never before reached in military history. The ironic touch of this mass killing is that in most cases it was accomplished by “peaceful and ~~non-violent means.~~”

The policy of famine and working to death was applied even with a greater efficiency to the specially selected groups of Eastern nationals who were brought for this purpose to Nazi concentration camps. Such special categories were selected first of all from among the Soviet prisoners of war who, because of

political unreliability, racial background, or disciplinary violations, were transferred by the Germany Army to the German Security Police. A special secret order, issued on November 15, 1941, provided for the transfer of selected Soviet prisoners to German concentration camps for extermination, but the commanders of such camps had authority to postpone executions so long as there was a possibility of using the remnants of the prisoners' physical strength for work in the stone quarries.⁵²

The fate of this special brand of concentration camp inmates is described by a former German prisoners in Concentration Camp Sachsenhausen as follows:

On September 1, 1941, immediately after the beginning of the war against Russia, 18,000 prisoners arrived at our camp. . . . Since none of these prisoners of war had received food since their capture they arrived at our camp already half starved. Quickly a new killing device was constructed. It was a room in which the prisoners were shot in the back of the neck by Gestapo personnel hidden behind a screen. Through this method and starvation the SS was actually able to do away with 18,000 prisoners of war over a period of seven days. It is understood half of them died of starvation while the balance were shot.

During the time that the 18,000 prisoners were being done away with another shipment of 8,000 arrived. Since no facilities were available for these men, not to mention food or other provisions, they were simply caged in the open, the machine gun towers were erected, and the prisoners were held in this enclosure without food or water till they starved.⁵³

A similar account of the disposal of the Soviet prisoners in the German concentration camps is given by a former German statistician in the Concentration Camp Mauthausen. He states that because of "special treatment" of this category of inmates only five out of 2,000 Soviet prisoners of war were left alive by the time of liberation.⁵⁴

A similar method of "special treatment" was applied to the Western Jews who arrived in German concentration camps

before the installation of gas chambers and whom the Nazis preferred to annihilate by other means than mass execution.

The same source describes the method of annihilation of the Dutch Jews in Camp Mauthausen in the following words:

In Fall 1941 and early Summer 1942 we received transports each about 1,000 Dutch Jews who worked in the quarries. Obviously these people were destined to die, from the very beginning. They received even less food than the remaining camp inmates and were murdered by beatings, under-nourishment, by being driven to the electric cable, and by being thrown over the cliffs and by other means so that at the end of 1942 not one of these people remained alive. We knew from very beginning in our office that these people had been destined to die as we had been told by Obersturmführer Schütz not to issue any index cards for these Jews and not to enter them into the register.⁵⁶

When the tempo of the *Lebensraum* policy in the East was increased and took a still more definite shape, the mass transport of civilian Eastern nationals to the German concentration camps increased. Those so transported were a particular selection from the burdensome *Lebensraum* peoples who were classified as "undisciplined" or "politically undesirable elements."⁵⁶

With the arrival of the mass-transports to the concentration camps, the case of individual guilt of persons involved became irrelevant.⁵⁷ They all were subsumed into a category of "prisoners under protective custody" from the East and dealt with accordingly.⁵⁸

On September 18, 1942 the *Reichsminister* of Justice, Thierack, issued an order by which he condemned so-called asocial elements from the East to outright annihilation. This order reveals the decision concerning "a special treatment" of the "asocial elements," which should include in principle all Jews, Gypsies, Russians, Ukrainians, charged or condemned by the German criminal courts. The Poles condemned by a criminal court for a term of over three years and who were unfit for

Germanization were subject to a "special treatment." All of them were to be transferred from prisons to Himmler's custody for annihilation through work.⁵⁹

In explaining the reasons behind these orders the document reads as follows:

There is an agreement that because our State decided the settlement of the Eastern Problem and because of the goals which we are going to pursue there, the Jews, Poles, Gypsies, Russians, and the Ukrainians will no longer be tried by the regular courts in the future but should be dealt with by the Reichsführer-SS.⁶⁰

As a criminal act could include any action which would endanger either German interests as such or those of a German national's security, the term "asocial" had considerable latitude.

Himmler's regulations concerning the status of such Eastern nationalities indicate clearly that he was not interested in their continued existence. This may be seen from the following regulations:

1. The Eastern nationals who will arrive from Eastern Occupied territories in collective transports should not be formally treated as the others to whom the Reich directives apply.
2. It is to be noted especially that the usual individual reports on them are not required.
3. The registration of these prisoners follows only for the internal use of the given concentration camp.
4. The reports about transfer, death, or other changes on behalf of these prisoners are not requested.⁶¹

These orders are very close to those regulating treatment of Jews brought to concentration camps to be exterminated. As their death was expected en masse, any permanent registrations or individual account was regarded as superfluous.

Yet the extermination of the Eastern nationals did not include mass execution in gas chambers. They were to be killed by work, which during the year 1942 was becoming an important commodity.

In the intricate system of concentration camps developed by the Nazis, the main concentration camps radiated around them like satellites some smaller concentration camps built for special purposes. Some of them served as transitional camps to confine those destined for the gas chamber; others were designed for the killing of the prisoners by starvation and over-work. One of the most obnoxious "special camps" was the concentration camp "Dora" which specialized in the killing of its inmates by working them to death in the stone quarries. The character of this camp is reflected in a description by Dr. Kahr, a German camp physician, who for disciplinary reasons was transferred to "Dora" camp in 1943. He recollects:

I was sent to Dachau concentration camp as camp physician in the middle of 1943. From there I was transferred for disciplinary reasons to "Dora" concentration camp at Christmas 1943. I was horrified by the conditions in camp "Dora." The prisoners here lived under the worst conditions of all existing camps. The work of the miners who worked at the mine construction underground was exceedingly hard, and the food was inadequate. There were no living quarters whatsoever for the prisoners. ~~They not only had to work in the galleries inside the mountain, but they also had to sleep and eat there.~~⁶²

"Dora" was then a camp where the people destined for a short span of life were sent from the other German concentration camps with the definite purpose of annihilation.

There is a statistical table of the transfers transported from Camp "Buchenwald" to "Dora." The most interesting feature of this table is the fact that the people transferred are classified not according to the gravity of their crimes but according to nationality and race. Jews, Gypsies, and the *Lebensraum* nationalities represent 90 percent of these transfers.⁶³

<i>Date</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Type of Prisoners</i>
1943		
Sept. 22	300	Mostly Russians
„ „	210	149 Russians and others
Oct. 14	650	373 Frenchmen; 144 Russians and others
„ 17	849	Mostly Russians
„ 19	311	Mostly Russians and Poles
„ „	300	Mostly Russians and Poles
„ „	506	Mostly Yugoslavs
„ 23	1,539	Mostly Poles
„ 30	1,025	Mostly Yugoslavs and Russians
Nov. 20	375	Mostly French and Poles
„ 21	417	Mostly French and Russians
Dec. 12	200	Russians and Poles
1944		
Jan. 25	400	Germans and Russians
Mar. 3	421	Mostly Czechs
„ 11	413	Mostly Poles
Apr. 2	202	Czechs
„ 7	883	Gypsies
May 28	350	Mostly Poles and Russians
June 24	2,000	Mostly Poles and Russians
July 29	200	Russians and Poles
Aug. 3	510	Gypsies
„ „	400	Russians and Poles
„ 16	1,350	Jews of various nations
Sept. 27	1,085	Jews of various nations
Oct. 1	1,500	Poles and Russians

[The influx of the Eastern nationals to the German concentration camps continued during the period of German retreat from the East, which proves again the unusual tenacity and determination to carry out the Nazi *Lebensraum* policy.] German statistics indicate that hundreds of Ukrainians were deported to Germany on the eve of German retreat, officially as workers for German industry. Actually, as persons under German “protective custody,” they were brought to German concentration camps.⁶⁴

The following table shows the extent of these deportations from the Ukraine within a span of seven months:⁶⁵

<i>Date</i>	<i>Origin</i>	<i>Number</i>
1943		
Aug. 26	Dnepropetrovsk	998
„ 29	„	781
Sept. 9	„	1,362
Oct. 5	Nikolayev	604
„ 10	Kirovograd	529
„ 31	Kiev	233
Nov. 1	Kirovograd	318
„ 28	Nikolayev	192
Mar. 24	„	377
		<i>Total</i> 5,394

Concerned with the ultimate elimination of these potentially dangerous or burdensome groups, the Nazis thought to get rid of them in a useful and inconspicuous way.

In their “working projects” within the concentration camps the Germans could utilize the labor of the victims to their very end. Further, they could avoid the bad political repercussions resulting from a direct annihilation of people who apparently had not committed any violation of law.⁶⁶ Himmler went to great pains to make the deportation of some selected groups of Eastern nationals appear as recruitment for regular work in Germany. His specific orders provide that even the correspondence of this kind of prisoners should be channeled in such a way as to give an assurance to friends and relatives that they were working in a regular labor camp.⁶⁷

The Scope and Methods of Executions

The outright annihilation by executions was originally limited by the Nazis to specially selected groups, the existence of which was incompatible with the policy of German eastern *Lebensraum*. The first target of direct annihilatory action was the Polish intelligentsia. This group had to perish for security

as well as for ideological reasons. "The conspiring Polish nation" could not be allowed to develop potential leaders of resistance, nor could it be allowed to challenge or contradict the Nazi concept of the "master race" by its very presence.

This objective was not only stated by *Reichsleiter* Martin Bormann in his instructions,⁶⁸ but it really started to materialize under Himmler's supervision. The first occasion for executions came during the mass resettlement of Poles from the Western Polish Provinces in the *General-Gouvernement*. Himmler stated bluntly that during this large *Lebensraum* action the SS was tough enough to shoot thousands of the leading Poles.⁶⁹ Polish sources estimate that approximately 25,000 of the Polish intelligentsia, nobility, and those of other classes who showed some leadership qualities, were shot during the resettlement.⁷⁰

A direct measure for the destruction of one of the centers of Polish intelligentsia was taken by the SS against the ancient Polish University of Cracow. Polish professors, assistants, and instructors were invited by Nazi authorities to attend a lecture at the University on the topic: "The Attitude of the National-Socialist Movement Toward Science and Learning." When the University auditorium was filled it was suddenly surrounded by the SS troopers, and all persons present, one hundred sixty-seven, were taken to Cracow Prison. The reason given for this measure was "the traditional anti-German spirit of the University."⁷¹

All of the professors were sent to the Sachsenhausen-Oranienburg concentration camp. Only a few of them survived this experience.⁷²

Another object of the annihilation actions was those regions or vicinities which were accidentally involved in the activity of the Polish resistance movement or in acts of violence against the Germans. The principle of retaliation in such cases is stated best in the following hints of Himmler to the German police:

If you stamp out every little fire that shows itself you will never have a big conflagration. Thus if you tackle the matter and shoot the first 20, others will not wish to follow them. I will always protect those commanders who act fiercely and decisively.⁷³

Thus a principle of collective responsibility was widely applied in German executions resulting from any sign of resistance or violence. These collective retaliatory measures are reflected in a report of the German Army Headquarters East, stationed in Poland, on an accident which took place in a little suburban district near Cracow:

On December 29, 1939 two master-sergeants from Construction-Battalion 538 were killed in an attempt to arrest two professional criminals. They were accompanied by only one Polish policeman and failed to take sufficient forces, for their support. Being notified of the murder the Administration sent over the 6th Battalion of the Police. They first hung the owner of the tavern where the killing occurred and then they shot 114 Poles from the locality of Anin, who were in no way connected with the crime.⁷⁴

This pattern of a ruthless and indiscriminate annihilation of the potential or probable culprits were precautionary measures, and continued with undiminished zeal during the years of the Nazi occupation in Poland.⁷⁵ In 1943 when the German mass retaliations only stimulated but could not suppress Polish resistance; when the situation on the German fronts was very critical; when German industries sought Poland as a haven of protection and peace—Governor Frank found the tranquillity and cooperation of the Polish people, for the time being, of immeasurable value. In one of his reports, dated May 25, 1943, he complained bitterly to Hitler about Himmler's police methods in his province, which obviously contradicted his temporary objectives of security and stability in Poland. Among other things he mentioned the fixed Nazi pattern of executions which was safe in 1939 but hazardous in 1943:

Today, unfortunately, Polish public opinion compares the Katyn affair to the mass-annihilation in the German concentration camps and shootings of men, women, as well as children and old people during our collective responsibility retaliations in the areas infested by bands. It goes even without mentioning that in most cases these actions were not directed against those who are guilty. . . .⁷⁶

To carry out the executions and combat resistance in the East, there were created SD *Einsatzgruppen* (Special Task Forces of the Security Police), led by and composed of SS men. They made their first public appearance during the Polish Campaign and were the first to indulge in massacres of the Jews behind the German lines.⁷⁷

At the early stage of the occupation of Poland there came an extension of these *Einsatzgruppen* in order to combat Polish unrest and to promote Nazi ideological objectives. Governor Frank records in his diary that the building up of these forces was followed by the combining of the members of the ordinary German police with the SS men into so-called *Jagdkommandos* (hunt commandos). They were equipped with modern arms and motorized.⁷⁸

Heinrich Himmler refers to building up such forces in Poland in his speech of September 7, 1940. He points out the necessity for ideologically convinced and determined detachments which, even after the end of the military operations, would continue an unrelenting struggle against Poland.⁷⁹

The *Einsatzgruppen* gained even more importance during the German preparation for the Eastern Campaign. Hitler was very keen about the security measures in the new Eastern territories which he planned to conquer. He wanted to take precautions against the recurrence of Communism. Therefore, he ordered the creation of some special security units which would be used to eradicate the Communist influence. For this purpose some new *Einsatzgruppen* were organized on a much larger scale. Their training started as early as the spring of 1941 in the Frontier Police School barracks at Pretzsch, Saxony. There they were indoctrinated in their future tasks by such high-ranking SS men as Brigadier General Streckenbach, who was a Chief of Personnel of RSHA,⁸⁰ and Heydrich himself, who was the chief of RSHA.⁸¹

With the opening of an assault against the Soviet Union, the *Einsatzgruppen* were sent to follow closely behind the advancing German troops and to take not only security measures in the newly conquered territory but to prepare it for

the German *Lebensraum*. Thus besides the hunting of the remnants of the Red bureaucracy which failed to escape, or fighting the Communist partisans and diversionists, the *Einsatzgruppen* extended their machinery of destruction to the people who were in German custody or to those whose political background was of no importance. In the first case they dealt with the Soviet prisoners, from which they separated the political commissars, Jews, politically unreliable elements, as well as the members of the Soviet intelligentsia, especially such professions as artists, journalists, editors, and writers.⁸² People of this kind were either executed on the spot or moved to the concentration camps for extermination by overwork.⁸³ On the other hand, the *Einsatzgruppen* started the mass executions of the Jewish populations on former Soviet territory on a purely racial basis.⁸⁴ When any selections were made during this process of annihilation, it occurred on the basis of their utility and skills needed by Germans rather than on their political convictions or their political past.⁸⁵ Even this limited selection did not mean a compromise with the Nazi plan of "Final Solution of the Jewish Problem." It merely meant that individuals so selected would have the privilege to die last.⁸⁶

As the German occupation of the Eastern areas continued and the *Lebensraum* policy took still more definite shape, the scope of the victims on the list of the *Einsatzgruppen* widened considerably. A report of the SD from Kiev, dated October 12, 1941, indicates the categories which were subject to execution by the Special Task Forces:

Former political officials, those involved in pillage or sabotage, active Communists and the bearers of political ideas, Jews who got out from PW Camps by fraudulent means, agents and informers of NKVD, persons who participated in deportations of the ethnic Germans, undesirable elements, asocial elements, partisans, political commissars, bearers and promoters of plagues and diseases, members of the Russian bands, fighters for freedom, those who supplied Russian bands with food, rebels and agitators, destitute young people, and the Jews in general.⁸⁷

In practice it meant not only "the elimination of Communists and their twin brothers the Jews" as explained during the *Einsatzgruppen* indoctrination, but all the elements which were useless or dangerous in the program of building German eastern *Lebensraum*. [The Ukrainian nationalists, although showing strong anti-Communist and anti-Russian tendencies were nevertheless dangerous to the German idea of *Lebensraum* because they claimed the right of the Ukraine to be independent at the time when the Germans wanted to make it the center of German colonization. Therefore, they were shot too.⁸⁸] The members of the intelligentsia were apprehended and executed under different pretexts as potential leaders;⁸⁹ patients with contagious diseases were executed because they could endanger German administration or German troops and because it did not pay to treat medically the native population, which had to be reduced anyway. All patients suffering from syphilis were killed by SD Special Task Squads in one of the hospitals in Mariupol (Ukraine).⁹⁰ There are instances where local municipalities applied for German medical help to combat diseases and received SD execution squads.⁹¹ There were some other people who were killed because of their socially destitute background or because they appeared to Germans to be so racially inferior as to be useless for the Nazi "build-up" in the East.⁹² ★ 1

Another pretext for mass killing in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union was that they were retaliatory actions against the population for the acts committed by the partisans. Such incidents resemble the German actions in Poland although the scale on which this policy was applied further East was much wider and less restricted. It gained in impetus because of Hitler's attitude, as expressed during the policymaking conference which took place on July 16, 1941. During this conference—which included such Nazi dignitaries as Göring, Keitel, Rosenberg, Lammers—Hitler brought out the point that the Soviet partisan warfare behind the German lines should be regarded as a chance to eliminate all anti-German elements there.⁹³

The policy of mass retaliation was strengthened further

by the fact that the German Army also was ordered to apply the collective responsibility principle in a liberal fashion. This is apparent in the following order of Wilhelm Keitel to the German Army in the East:

T [In view of the political and economic conditions which created a tense situation in the occupied areas, we must expect a reaction from the nationalistic and other circles there. They are likely to utilize the current circumstances to prepare some difficulties for the German Occupation Authorities, taking advantage of the present Communist subversive activities to cover their work.]

Any action against the German Occupation Authorities must be traced by us to a Communist source, regardless of circumstances.]

For the killing of a single German soldier we should retaliate by the execution of 50-100 persons.

The punishment should be explained as an action against the Communists.⁹⁴

The extent to which such mass retaliations were applied to the civilian population in the East is best reflected in a report of the leader of the SS force charged with fighting partisans. The report refers to the antipartisan actions which took place in the Ukraine, South Russia and the Province of Bialystock, and it covers a three-month period, from September 1 to December 1, 1942:⁹⁵

Partisans:	dead: 1,337
„	taken alive: 737
„	taken alive and executed after interrogation: 7,828
Suspects:	arrested: 16,553
„	executed: 14,257
Jews executed:	363,211
Investigated:	1,716 villages
Burned down:	159 villages and 1,978 single farms.

Countless similar reports on actions against "partisans" indicate in almost all instances that the losses of the civilian population far exceeded the losses of the partisans. There are

never any plausible explanations of why these executions had to take place and no attempt to justify such actions. Apparently, they all were accepted by their superiors without comment or objection. Occasionally, isolated reports from the Germans themselves questioned the wisdom of this senseless and indiscriminate annihilation and destruction in the Eastern territories.

Moral objections to these actions were not made. The actions were challenged in terms of propaganda setbacks, political repercussions, or economic losses.⁹⁶

The German pattern of retaliatory mass executions became so constant and so rigid that the Soviet partisans used it as an unfailing tool for their own purposes. If they wanted to punish an uncooperative village they would kill one or two German soldiers and post them on a road nearby a given village. A wholesale massacre would follow almost inevitably. The Red partisans could enjoy revenge at little expense and they could count on new volunteers joining their ranks from the survivors and refugees.⁹⁷

The Annihilation of Jews

The activity of the special Task Forces of the German SD in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union was also the signal for a large-scale systematic execution of the Jews. The first major massacre of Jews took place in Kiev, September 29-30, 1941, where 33,771 of them were summoned for "evacuation" (ostensibly as an aftermath of the fires and explosions set in the preceding days by the Soviet partisans) and then shot in a forest near Kiev.⁹⁸

Similar executions occurred in other cities of the Ukraine and in the other occupied parts of the Soviet Union such as the Baltic area and Belorussia.⁹⁹ By the end of 1941 it was estimated by German sources that the number of Jews executed in the *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine totalled around 200,000.¹⁰⁰

The evolution of the Jewish problem in the Eastern areas following the outbreak of war went through several stages. In

the first stage the Jews lost all immovable property.¹⁰¹ In the second stage, they were concentrated in larger towns and put into secluded ghettos.¹⁰² In the third stage, all Jews of working age were subject to forced labor.¹⁰³ Then came the fourth stage, which pressed them into the Nazi system of mass extermination from which neither their economic value as cheap labor,¹⁰⁴ nor their skills,¹⁰⁵ nor their wealth,¹⁰⁶ nor their submission,¹⁰⁷ nor desperate resistance,¹⁰⁸ could save them.

When the first executions started in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union there were some efforts made by the Nazi authorities to attribute them to some particular causes. The execution of Jews was explained as a purge of Communist or pro-Communist elements.¹⁰⁹ The Jewish population was chosen as the first scapegoat for the partisan actions, sabotage acts, Anti-Nazi propaganda, etc.¹¹⁰ They were often executed as the "bearers of contagious diseases and plagues."¹¹¹ Finally all explanations were given up and the "removal" of Jews in general was admitted even though these actions, until the very end, officially carried (even for internal use) the innocent term, "resettlement of Jews further east."¹¹²

The chain reaction of mass executions, which started in the territories conquered from the Soviet Union, spread gradually toward the West. The next wave of Jewish victims came from the territories under direct German control in Western and Central Europe and Poland.¹¹³ The last group of victims came from the Nazi satellites of Slovakia and Hungary, from which the latter was forced to yield as many as 400,000 for the death mills of Auschwitz.¹¹⁴

The further east the Jewish communities were located the shorter was their path to the place of annihilation. Within the Soviet Union where the Jewish communities were hardly organized effectively within a ghetto, the Jewish population was usually summoned by the SS men and executed near the town where they were concentrated. In Poland where the ghettos and Jewish self-government had existed for several years, the Germans took precautions not to annoy the Jews by the executions in the vicinity of the towns but disposed of them in secret and distant extermination camps. In this way the Germans

could secure initially the cooperation of the Jewish Councils which readily supplied the requested quotas¹¹⁵ "for resettlement and work in the East" from the overpopulated, starved, and disease-ridden ghettos.¹¹⁶

The Nazis went to greater pains to preserve the appearance of "enlistment for work" in other countries under their occupation and especially in their satellites. In some cases there were regular contracts offered to the semi-independent governments which provided for the delivery of Jews for the "work in the German East" and these even included a clause for eventual return if the governments concerned wanted them back.¹¹⁷ The "enlisted" Jews were then transported eastward, sometimes as far as Riga and Minsk,¹¹⁸ but usually to the closer extermination camps in Poland. Sometimes to show off Germany as a "cultured nation," the Nazis transported the Western Jews in luxurious pullman trains¹¹⁹ and supplied them with fancy camping equipment (like tents and field-kitchens) which, of course, were taken away at the place of destination.¹²⁰

The "Final Solution of the Jewish Problem" by mass executions was only partially related to the problem of German Eastern *Lebensraum*. It is clear that the Germans regarded the considerable Jewish minority in the East burdensome just as they regarded the Slavs. German documents reveal specific instructions according to which the Jews should be removed not only from the German community but also from German *Lebensraum*.¹²¹ But the Jewish problem was considered by Germans in much broader scope than was the problem of the Slavs. The drastic Nazi measures against the Slavs applied only to those nationalities which inhabited territories destined to be German settlement areas and which could not or would not be assimilated. The Slavs, outside of the German *Lebensraum* area, were not only left in peace but in many cases they were turned into German allies (Slovaks, Bulgarians, Croats). On the other hand the Nazi annihilatory action against the Jews was not restricted to the Jews inhabiting the German *Lebensraum*. They applied the same policy to all Jews they could manage to get into their hands. The Nazi slogan of the "World Jewry" and their all-embracing "World Conspiracy" was trans-

formed into a combat action which extended as far as German influence reached.

While the eastern "sub-human" Slavs were viewed by the Nazis as a primitive and passive mass with only an artificially created or non-Slavic upper class, Jews of all classes were regarded as destructive elements—the active bearers of all moral and physical evils.

Therefore, even the initial Jewish emigration from Germany and Austria was regarded only as a partial success. Alfred Rosenberg expressed the idea of Jewish deportation very early and quite clearly. In a radio broadcast in the summer of 1939 he commented as follows:

It is necessary to gather all the Jews of the entire globe and its continents, old and young, those who believe in the cruel Jehovah and those who indulge in godlessness; those who squat on sacks of gold, as well as those who fill our cities with beggars and chisellers; the international revolutionaries and disturbers of world order; the high intellectuals and the petty pants-makers. All of them, with their Rothschilds and Mandels [Minister of France], the Zadics [pious Hassidic leaders] and rabbis of Belz, the Albert Einsteins with Hore-Belishas [British Ministers] and the Kaganoviches [Soviet Commissars] all of them together should be gathered and settled somewhere on a wild island with a deadly climate, such as Madagascar or Guiana. Isolated like lepers from the outside world, let them moisten the pits with their sweat and blood, and the more cruel the climate, the more inhuman the work, the better it will be for the Christian world, for Christian civilization as we have known it; the obnoxious Jewish race will find itself isolated in a reservation from where there is no return, from where there is but one exit—death.¹²²

This passage is significant insofar as it suggests that whatever means for settlement of the Jewish problem would be applied, only their death will bring its ultimate solution. In the light of this idea we may assume that the concrete German plans for transfer of the European Jews to Madagascar and keeping them under German administration¹²³ was only an-

other alternative for settlement of the Jewish problem by liquidation.

It may be argued, of course, that in view of war pressure and the German feeling of insecurity in extensive areas under their occupation, the Nazis had to take drastic action against their imaginary internal enemies—the Jews. It may be argued that they really did not intend to kill them, that it happened because it became the only practical solution of the problem, since transporting them overseas was impossible either for financial or technical reasons.¹²⁴ These arguments are not valid because there is evidence that the Germans actually prevented Jewish emigration where neither their own finances, their war effort, nor security were involved. Thus in July 1941, the Nazis prohibited the emigration of the Jews from Southern France to Spain, although Spain was a neutral country with strong pro-German leanings.¹²⁵ At the beginning of 1943, the Nazi authorities prevented the Rumanian government from allowing the emigration of 70,000 Jewish children up to eight years of age to Palestine. The Nazis refused this project in spite of the fact that it was supposed to be handled at the expense of the International Red Cross and Sweden, who were ready to employ their own ships for transportation.¹²⁶ Because of the tender age of these Jewish children there could be no argument about the strengthening of the enemy's war potential, nor was it possible to claim that they would be able to incriminate the Germans or betray their military secrets. Why, then, did the Nazis prefer to kill them rather than to get rid of them? We shall be short of a reasonable explanation if we underestimate the ideological factor. When a totalitarian ideology evolves to a stage where a part of its scheduled "permanent solution" can be technically realized, then all half-measures, compromises, humane considerations, economic values, go overboard. How is it possible to build something "lasting"—a structure of a permanent New Order—if you compromise in any way with the old problems of absolute evil, disease, rottenness, and sub-humanity? By not uprooting it completely at once you would leave the seeds for undermining your own structure. Why should one worry about the human values, the rights of the

individual, or even the welfare of contemporary society, if the structure being planned is for the "coming generations" and will serve as an ultimate panacea for all time? This is the way in which the Nazi executioners looked at their drastic and inconvenient measures. It is also the philosophical basis on which the SS General Otto Ohlendorf, Commander of *Einsatzgruppe* D, lawyer in civilian life and agent of 91,678 deaths during the war, explained the killing of children before the court. He stated:

I believe that it is very simple to explain if one starts from the fact that this order of Hitler did not try to achieve security temporarily but also permanent security, because the children would grow up, and surely being the children of parents who had been killed, they would constitute a danger no smaller than of the parents.¹²⁷

This all-embracing program envisaged by the Nazi New Order was closing its ring in one stage of its plans—"the permanent solution of the Jewish problem in Europe." In doing so it set in operation a mammoth machine of mass executions. This machinery, and its processes, is worthy of attention not only because it reveals the tremendous new weapons of a behemoth state, but it shows the potentialities of power of a totalitarian dictator. In our modern scientifically-minded world, a perpetrator of an ideology may "solve" the "social problems" with amazing efficiency and rapidity, and he does so as soon as he attains unlimited power at home and an independent international position. In the summer of 1941 Hitler was in the ideal position where he could undertake the "final solution of the Jewish problem" without fearing domestic opposition and without concern regarding international repercussions. As the moves for peace with Great Britain failed long ago, there was no need to appease that country. The United States was so strongly committed to the cause of the Allies that Hitler regarded it as practically at war against him. Italy and Japan would not object to his action. Vichy France was subdued and the Soviet Union was in the mortal grip of the German Army.

Mass extermination of Jews could begin without external complications.

The first executions by specially trained and indoctrinated *Einsatzgruppen* were carried out within the occupied Soviet Union. The victims, stripped of their valuables and clothes, were lined up kneeling on the brink of a broad ditchlike grave and shot from behind.¹²⁸

The descriptions of the executions are in agreement that they were smooth and precise procedures.¹²⁹ There was no resistance in most cases and no pleading for mercy. There was a strange passive mood on the part of the victims and hardly any passionate brutality on the part of the killers. The executions were conducted either by individual SS men or by firing squads to "avoid feeling personal responsibility."¹³⁰ The mercy killing, however, and the executions of infants always required an individual executioner. The latter were killed by crushing their skulls with rifle-butts before being thrown into the mass-pits. Later, to "humanize" the executions, Himmler ordered gas vans from Germany for killing women and children by carbon monoxide during transportation.¹³¹ It is not clear whether this measure was taken because of humane considerations for the victims or in order to prevent nervous breakdowns among killers. That such stress existed is apparent from a Himmler speech where he directly refers to and praises the work of the executioners as glorious deeds of anonymous heroes. There were some reports of nervous breakdowns among the heroes so employed, cases of insanity and even suicide.¹³² In one respect the killers resembled their victims—there were no cases of disobedience or rebellion.

In Poland and in other countries where the Germans tried to solve the Jewish problem in the same way, the summoning of Jews for extermination took place six months or even years after the first executions in the East began.¹³³

During the next stage of mass extermination the technique of killing and the tactics of the whole procedure were greatly advanced. The Jews were not executed by shootings near their towns but were removed to camouflaged extermination camps.

Most of the extermination camps were located in Poland but there were some in other places.¹³⁴ In Poland, five were built as separate and independent camps (Chelmno, Belzek, Wilczek, Sobibor, and Treblinka) and three existed as subsidiaries of the gigantic Auschwitz Concentration Camp—Brzeninka (Birkenau), Majdanek, and Stutrow (Stutthof).¹³⁵

The camps differed in size and in technical devices for killing. Treblinka Camp had two gas chambers which were arranged in the form of a "Red Cross Lazarets" where the arriving Jews were supposed to undress and wait for the "physical examination." Under the floors of these "waiting rooms" there were gas pipes which were connected with the engines producing carbon monoxide gas located in the adjoining rooms. After the engines started to work the gas valves were opened and the Jews, peacefully awaiting "medical treatment," were liquidated. In this way it is estimated that nearly 731,000 persons were killed in Treblinka Camp.¹³⁶

The Extermination Camp Chelmno specialized in killing Jews, Soviet prisoners of war, and Poles. It used gas vans where the prisoners were killed by monoxide during the ride. The execution took only four or five minutes. The estimated number of executions in Chelmno Camp reached 340,000.¹³⁷

In Belzec Camp the Jews were herded tightly into a freight train the floors of which were covered by quicklime. The passengers of such "death trains" burned to death, the lime conveniently providing a disinfectant.¹³⁸ *

Far more important as an execution center was Auschwitz Camp, together with its auxiliary "death camps." Nearly two and a half million people were executed there by gassing.¹³⁹ Here, an ideal of Nazi efficiency and impersonality of killings seems to have been achieved. Rudolf Hoess, the former Commandant of the Camp, said during the trial that in his camp he built modern, spacious gas chambers which could hold as many as 2,000 people. The duty of the Nazi guards was limited to supervision only. The Jews were driven in mostly by their own compatriots enlisted in "special squads." The SS guards would only watch naked crowds of Jews being pushed into chambers resembling shower rooms and observe the heavy

door slam behind them. Then one SS man would lift a little window in the wall, throw in a can of poison gas¹⁴⁰ and close the window carefully again.¹⁴¹ It took only three to fifteen minutes to kill thousands of people.

After a Nazi "superman" had completed his simple and highly impersonal "mission," the processing of the deceased would be left to the Jewish "special squads." There was still a lot to be done. Scientific and methodical "saving devices" required further labor. The Jews, who were "harmful" when alive, had some value when dead. Their clothes were carefully sorted and packed; their gold teeth were extracted; women's hair was cut for industrial purposes,¹⁴² and it is said that the ashes of the cremated bodies were used by Germans as fertilizer.

After the chambers were cleared and the dead bodies were brought to crematories, a new batch of victims was brought in. Auschwitz had a capacity for cremating 10,000 corpses per day.¹⁴³

The Nazi "settlement of the Jewish problem" reduced the number of Jews in Europe to one-fourth their number in 1939.¹⁴⁴ In all its significance and horrifying qualities the extermination of Jews was only one fragment within the extensive "New Order" program, not a goal in itself. It "had" to be "settled" as a precautionary measure for the sake of the "New Order," which the Jews endangered by the quality of their race. Here is the striking parallel with the "Slav Problem" within the *Lebensraum*. Because Slavs interfered with the "New Order" and represented a challenge to it by virtue of their very existence and their reproduction, they were an obstacle to the "New Order" and must therefore disappear; if not all of them then at least most of them. It was impossible to settle the Slavic problem in the East during the war in a manner as effective as that applied in the Jewish case. The number and economic importance of the Slavs were too great to be disposed of in the circumstances of a prolonged war. But partial measures for their reduction were well under way. Many measures were strikingly similar to those applied to the Jews at an earlier stage. Starvation in the ghettos and in the large Ukrainian cities

was almost identical. The transportation of Slavic "undesirables" to the concentration camps for elimination by work resembled the shipping of the first quota of Dutch Jews for liquidation at Camp Mauthausen. The expression "deportation to the East" which was used for the solution of the Jewish problem was kept in store for the *Lebensraum* Slavs in Nazi blueprints destined for use after the war.¹⁴⁵ It is difficult to estimate what the postwar period might have brought, but the policy was implemented far enough to lead one to expect the worst.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion

A living man can be enslaved and reduced to the historic condition of an object. But if he dies in refusing to be enslaved he reaffirms the existence of another kind of human nature which refuses to be classified as an object. (Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, p. 208.)

In summarizing the Nazi *Lebensraum* concept in its ideology, organization, and action we come to the following conclusion:

1. The whole concept of *Lebensraum* as laid down in Nazi ideology included in it the assumption that war was inevitable. Because the Nazi program was based on a large-scale territorial expansion, involving countries which Germany could claim neither on the ground of irredenta nor on the basis of her historical rights, no possibility of a peaceful adjustment would be possible in the long run. The only question, after the Nazis seized power was how seriously they embraced the concept of *Lebensraum* and whether they would develop sufficient power to enforce it. The building of particular organizations specializing in the acquisition and preparation of living space indicated from the beginning of Nazi rule that they were serious about their ideological design; but this fact was overlooked by the states concerned. The occupation of Czechoslovakia brought foreign states to the realization that Hitler's territorial claims meant something more than mere adjustments of boundaries or the correction of the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles. But by then it was already too late, and there was no power able to stop his expansion.

2. The Nazi *Lebensraum* policy reveals clearly a pattern of a new totalitarian imperialism, which the leading Nazi

ideologist Alfred Rosenberg preferred to call *Völkischer Imperialismus* (folk-imperialism). As Rosenberg defined it, it aimed neither at economic exploitation of certain peoples nor at the establishment of some strategic bases in the territories destined for German expansion, but at a complete settlement of the earmarked areas with peoples of the Germanic race. In Rosenberg's interpretation it was the union of people and soil which was essential in the Nazi brand of imperialism, not the domination of the foreign peoples. The latter must ultimately disappear from the German settlement area to make room for the colonists. What Rosenberg and Hitler do not specify, but what may be added on the basis of the Nazi blueprints, is the fact that the Eastern *Lebensraum* was not to be an area of spontaneous Germanic colonization but a place where an ideal Nazi society was to be planned and created, where only the racially best could live. There, by an artificially created semi-rural way of life and extensive Nazi indoctrination, a certain homogeneous type of people would be created. They would be the healthiest, biologically the most vigorous and reproductive, and politically the most reliable people; and they would form a nucleus of the New German Empire.

3. The Nazi totalitarian imperialism reveals a new concept of relations toward other peoples. This concept is expressed in terms of organic allies and organic enemies of the German people. Whether a people is an organic ally or an organic enemy depends on its geopolitical position and its historical relationship to the German *Urproblem* (original problem). In Nazi terminology the German *Urproblem* consisted of two elements: (1) ~~to get~~ rid of the Jews whom the Nazis credited with parasitic and disintegrating influences in Europe for a period of several centuries; (2) to recover the Germanic Eastern *Lebensraum* which was lost to them with the destruction of the Gothic Empire. The Czechs, Jews, Poles, Russians, and finally the Ukrainians were organic enemies of the Third Reich regardless of whether or not they harbored any hostile intention against it. The Germans could not make friends with these people because from the standpoint of the German *Urproblem*, conflict with them was inevitable. On the other hand,

Great Britain was an organic ally of Germany in spite of her declaration of war. From the standpoint of the German *Ur-problem* there was no basis for conflict with Great Britain.

This concept is the key to understanding the Nazi policy of annihilation and enslavement in Eastern Europe. While annihilation and the Nazi pattern of enslavement makes no sense from the military, economic, or juristic point of view, from the theories of pseudoscientific Nazi ideology, it makes perfect sense. If a political and social order is built on a premise that a space in terms of soil is a must and that a chosen soil may be settled only by a racially pure population; if tens of millions of the subhuman residents must therefore be removed; and if one regards them not only as organic enemies but also as beastlike creatures, then ultimate action taken against them cannot be very different from that which the Nazis pursued. It is not possible to dump fifty million Slavs behind the Urals and let them increase at their own fast rate, because they might strike at the Germans at some later time. One must either put them under absolute control or reduce them beyond the point of danger—the latter way is much the safer way.

The application of these deterministic, pseudoscientific rules by the totalitarian states of the twentieth century brought about mass killing by the organs of the state to an extent completely unknown in history. History records many massacres. People have been killed in the rush of a battle or during pillage following battle—such is a part of war. People have been killed for their nonconformity, for acts committed by them, and for thoughts they have held; they were killed in the Roman Circus to please the crowds. In all of these cases murder still had a shade of human emotion in it. Totalitarian killing was different. It was a matter of absolute indifference to a Nazi executioner if a Jew committed a hostile act or not, or if a Slav showed a willingness to become a Nazi; or if either professed some different creed. Certain people were destined to die by a “scientific” law or a historic necessity. They could be killed without emotion in the same way as cattle are killed in the stockyards or as the trees are cut in the forest. In the same way the Communists could destroy hostile classes in the Soviet

Union regardless of whether they possessed the means to threaten the state or whether they conspired against the state. They were destroyed because they, too, were organic enemies. The Soviets never tried to convert to Communism such class enemies as capitalists, kulaks, clergy, and other hostile elements. According to the Communist doctrine such conversion is impossible. The killing of a capitalist, a kulak, a clergyman, had no personal touch because the man is not killed as an individual but as a member of a class. He is killed not for some act but in fulfillment of a natural law.

Despite the tendency of modern totalitarianism to degrade the individual to a cog within a class or ethnic group and to deprive him of his human attributes, no model society has so far resulted from it.

As long as the other-directed type of men foreshadowed by Riesman¹ remains a myth, as long as men preserve even a deeply concealed notion of their own value and belief in human dignity, totalitarian schemes will fail in their ultimate aim to create stable antlike or beelike societies, into which all Utopias seem finally to degenerate.

Appendices

Appendix I

Das Politische Reich. An article in a secret Nazi Party Manual explaining the new meaning of the Nazi Empire.

**Deutschland
ordnet Europa neu**

**Dieser Krieg ist ein
weltanschaulicher Krieg**

**Sinn und Wesen
nationalsozialistischer
Feiargestaltung**

**Schulungsgrundlagen für die Reichsthemen der NSDAP.
für das Jahr 1941/42**

Nur für den Dienstgebrauch

**Herausgeber:
Der Beauftragte des Führers für die Überwachung der gesamten geistigen
und weltanschaulichen Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP.**

DAS POLITISCHE REICH

Von Dienstleiter Professor Bäumler

Die deutsche Geschichte ist die Geschichte der deutschen Volkwerdung. Die deutsche Geschichte ist die Geschichte des Reichs.

Das bedeutet: die deutsche Geschichte ist nicht die Geschichte des deutschen Staates. Der für Ausländer und selbst für manche unserer Volksgenossen so schwer verständliche Verlauf dieser Geschichte beginnt nicht mit einer Staatengründung, sondern mit der Begründung eines germanischen Reichs außerhalb des Imperium Romanum. Das Reich der sächsischen, fränkischen und staufischen Könige ist trotz der römischen Kaiserkrone nicht ein Staat nach römischem Muster, sondern eine Schöpfung nordischer Stammesführer auf der Grundlage der germanischen Gefolgschaftsordnung. An staatlichen Prinzipien gemessen, ist dieses Reich höchst unvollkommen: es hat weder feste Grenzen noch einen tragenden Beamtenstand, weder eine Hauptstadt noch eine juristisch klar faßbare Einheit. Das Reich ist ein lebendiges Gebilde, das aus seiner einheitlichen rassischen Substanz und aus der Einheit seiner Führung lebt. Es ist nicht zwischen Grenzen gepreßt wie zwischen Mauern, sondern es atmet wie ein Organismus; seine Grenzen reichen so weit wie der jeweilige Führerwille reicht, der seine Kraft aus der geschichtlichen Aufgabe schöpft, die dem Reiche des Nordens aus der germanischen Substanz heraus und aus ihrem Verhältnis zu der Kultur der Mittelmeerwelt gestellt ist. Das Erbe der römischen Weltherrschaft konnte nicht einfach liegenbleiben. Wenn es ein Imperium des Nordens geben sollte, dann mußte dieses Imperium sich mit der Hinterlassenschaft der antiken Kultur auseinandersetzen. Es stand nicht im Belieben der deutschen Könige und Kaiser, diese Auseinandersetzung aufzunehmen oder nicht. Sie war vom Schicksal dem neuen Reiche auferlegt, und gerade die entschlossene Übernahme dieses Schicksals bewies die politische und geistige Spannweite, die seit Otto dem Großen das Gesetz der neuen kühnen Gründung ist.

Die tragische Geschichte des Ersten Reiches geht aus der Größe dieser Zielsetzung mit Notwendigkeit hervor. Ein wer-

dendes Volk, das unter dem Drucke einer ungeheueren Aufgabe steht, vertraut sich ganz der Führung einzelner heldenhafter Männer an. Die Führung allein ist entscheidend: das Schicksal des Reichs ist abhängig von dem Manne, der durch Geburt und Erbfolge an seine Spitze gestellt wird. Mit einem kindhaften Vertrauen, für das die Weltgeschichte kein zweites Beispiel bietet, überliefert unser Volk sein Schicksal den Zufällen der Geburt und der Erbfolge. Alles ist auf die Persönlichkeit des jeweiligen Führers abgestellt: ist er groß und hat er eine lange Lebensdauer, so wächst das Reich. Greift er fehl oder stirbt er früh dahin, so gerät das Reich in Gefahr.

Der große Lehrmeister, den wir haben, die deutsche Geschichte, zeigt uns, was der Staat für uns ist: Tatsache und Erbe, Schicksal und Aufgabe, aber viemals letztes Ziel und höchster Wert. Der Deutsche kann wahrhaft nur aus dem Reiche leben, und das heißt: aus seinem Volke, wenn es unter großer Führung steht. Zweimal hat uns die Geschichte der letzten Jahrhunderte gezeigt, wie gefährlich es für uns wird, wenn wir uns bloß dem Staate anvertrauen. Als Friedrich der Große starb, erlosch in dem künstlichen Gebilde, das er hinterließ, das Leben, denn es war noch kein Volk da, das seinen Willen bewahren konnte. Und als der große Kanzler starb, da war es möglich, daß die Parteien das Erbe des Titanen übernahmen, weil das Volk noch immer nicht erwacht war. Schließlich konnten sich Juden und Marxisten des Staatsapparates bemächtigen und das Volk an den Rand des Verderbens führen. Das war möglich geworden, weil dieses Volk nur als politischer Organismus groß und lebendig zu existieren vermag. Unser Volk gehorcht, wenn es sein muß, und tut aufs pünktlichste seine Pflicht. Schöpferisch und wahrhaft gestaltend aber wird es nur, wenn es ganz aus sich heraus, angerufen in der Tiefe seiner Kraft und seines Vertrauens, aus der Fülle des Reiches handeln kann.

Es ist wunderbar zu sehen, wie mitten im Zusammenbruch des friderizianischen Staates das deutsche Volksgefühl seiner selbst zum ersten Male bewußt wird, das Wort vom Reiche aufnimmt und ihm einen neuen tiefen Sinn verleiht. Warum verewigte sich das Tatenleben Friedrichs des Einzigen nicht?—so fragt Jahn in seinem „Deutschen Volkstum“, diesem erstaunlichen Werke, das zu Unrecht über Fichtes Reden an die Deutsche Nation vergessen wurde. Friedrichs Fehler liegt nach Jahn darin, daß er die Hehrheit eines Volkstums nicht ahnte. „Trefflich verstand er einen Staat zu bauen, aber stiftete kein

Volk in ihm . . . Nichts ist ein Staat ohne Volk, ein seelenloses Kunstwerk; nichts ist ein Volk ohne Staat, ein leibloser, luftiger Schemen, wie die weltflüchtigen Zigeuner und Juden. Staat und Volk in eins geben erst ein Reich, und dessen Erhaltungsgewalt bleibt das Volkstum.“

Was Jahn hier ausspricht, ist das vorweggenommene Ergebnis der deutschen Geschichte: die Ausbildung des deutschen Volkstums konnte nicht ohne die Hilfe der Staatenbildung geschehen. Das deutsche Volkstum setzt den Staat voraus. *D u r c h Staatenbildung zur Volkwerdung*—das ist der Gang unserer Geschichte. Der Staat darf aber nicht verabschiedet werden, wenn das Volk als Einheit erschienen ist. Er kann nicht nach Hause geschickt werden wie ein Knecht am Abend. Ein lebendiges, machtvollcs Volkstum vermag ohne Staat nicht zu bestehen. Darum sagt Jahn: „Volkstum ist der wahre Völkermesser der Größe, die richtige Völkerwaage des Wertes. Es setzt den Staat voraus, aber nicht umgekehrt jeder Staat das Volkstum.“

Jahn hat als erster ausgesprochen, daß das Reich der durch die Kraft des Volkstums geschaffene und getragene Staat ist. Aus dieser Definition spricht ebenso sehr echter geschichtlicher Sinn wie echter politischer Instinkt. Denn hier wird nicht das „Reich“ gegen den „Staat“ ausgespielt, sondern es werden Volk, Staat und Reich in ihrem richtigen Verhältnis zueinander bestimmt. Die Tiefe dieses Gedankens wird uns erst deutlich, wenn wir begreifen, daß aus der Geschichte unseres Volkes sich *zwei Gefahren entgegengesetzter Art* für das deutsche politische Denken ergeben. Unser Denken kann beim Staate stehenbleiben in der nicht ganz abzuweisenden Erwägung, daß das, was wir mit soviel Anstrengung erworben haben, nicht wieder preisgegeben werden dürfe. Der Staat bleibt immer der Staat, und ein Staat ohne Reich ist besser als nichts. Es kann nicht ohne tiefere Folgen bleiben, daß die Wirklichkeit des deutschen Lebens solange der Staat ohne Reich gewesen ist. Darum denken heute noch viele unter uns etatistisch, ohne es manchmal selber zu wissen.

Auf der anderen Seite aber besteht die Gefahr, das *R e i c h* zu denken ohne den Staat. Weil wir erfahren haben, welche Verdorrung der Herzen, welche Enge der Planung und welche Lähmung des Willens das bloß staatliche Dasein hervorruft, ist es möglich, daß auch solche bei uns Gehör finden,

die vom Reiche reden, um den Staat zu schmähen. Die Melodie vom unpolitischen Reich ist noch vor kurzem sehr verführerisch gesungen worden, und die schönsten Kirchentönen und der feierlichste Hymnenstil mußten erhalten, um den Deutschen von heute zu sagen, daß nicht der Staat ihre Bestimmung sei, sondern das Reich. „Das Reich ist die große und tragische Bestimmung der Deutschen. Denn es verbietet ihnen, sich auf einen Staat zu beschränken. . .“ Eine derartige Entgegensetzung von Reich und Staat entspringt der Abneigung, die deutsche Geschichte als Einheit zu sehen. Die deutsche Staatwerdung durch Friedrich und Bismarck, die mit dem protestantischen Prinzip eng verbunden ist, wird hier als eine Folge der sogenannten Glaubenspaltung angesehen. Man will es nicht wahrhaben, daß ein neues Reich der Deutschen nur bestehen kann auf der Grundlage einer vorbehaltlosen Bejahung der staatlichen Entwicklung der letzten Jahrhunderte, daß das Reich nur dann nicht wieder zum bloßen Traum werden kann, wenn es immer zugleich einen „handfesten Staat“ im deutschen Raume gibt.

In der Tendenz: Staat ohne Reich finden wir die Gefahr der politischen Verhärtung und Verengung; in der Tendenz: Reich ohne Staat die der politischen Verweichlichung und Auflösung. Zur ersteren halten die Positivisten, zu dieser die Schwärmer (und jene „Realpolitiker“, die sich der Schwärmer zu bedienen wissen). Durch die Staatspositivisten wird das Volk als lebendige Größe mit seiner Weltanschauung und seinen Lebensordnungen aus dem politischen Leben ausgeschaltet, die Phantasie wird erstickt, die Gestaltungsfreude getötet, das Dasein wird zu einem schwunglosen Dienst und der pünktliche Beamte wird zum Vorbild der politischen Erziehung. Durch den Schwärmer werden die staatlichen Notwendigkeiten und der Alltag des Dienstes der Verachtung des Gefühls preisgegeben, wird das Gesetz entwertet und der Anarchie das Tor geöffnet.

Der Staatspositivist hält das Vaterland für gerettet, wenn ein System wohldurchdachter Paragraphen vorhanden ist und pünktlich befolgt wird, was er sich ohne eine weitgehende Mitwirkung geeigneter Aufsichtsorgane nicht vorzustellen vermag. Der Schwärmer wiederum, der im Staate nur den „armen Amtsdieners des Reiches“ sehen möchte, ist manchmal nahe daran, aus der bloßen Unpünktlichkeit schon eine Religion zu

machen. Dort ertrinkt das Leben in Pedanterie und Starre, hier löst sich jede Ordnung in Subjektivismus und Sentimentalität auf.

So stehen sich der verabsolutierte „Staat“ und das vom Staatlichen losgelöste „Reich“ wie zwei menschliche Haltungen gegenüber, die wir im Leben des Alltags überall wiederfinden. Es hat daher eine unmittelbare pädagogische Bedeutung, wenn wir vom politischen Reiche reden. Wir bezeichnen damit nicht nur das Reich Adolf Hitlers als eine Wirklichkeit der deutschen Geschichte, sondern zugleich die Haltung des Menschen, durch den dieses Reich gestaltet wird und die gleich weit entfernt ist von Schwarmgeisterei wie von bloßer abstrakter Pflichterfüllung. Es ist die Haltung des Menschen der aus einer lebendigen Mitte fühlt, denkt und handelt. Wir nennen diese Mitte, die mit Klarheit und Sicherheit empfunden, aber niemals bloß intellektuell verstanden werden kann. Volk, Gemeinschaft, Weltanschauung, Reich. Und wir prüfen diejenigen, die „Reich“ sagen, daran, ob sie es in seinen positiven Beziehungen zu der Nüchternheit des Staates sehen oder nicht. Es ist höchste Vorsicht geboten gegenüber denen, die vom Reiche reden, ohne zuvor dem Staate gegeben zu haben, was ihm gebührt, und die vorgeben, aus der Haltung des Reiches zu handeln, ohne die Forderungen zu erfüllen, die der Staat an sie stellt. Das Reich ist mehr als der Staat, aber es steht nicht im Gegensatz zum Staate, sondern ist die Erfüllung dessen, was der Staat seinem Sinne nach meint. Darum nennen wir es das politische Reich.

Grundlegende politische Begriffe sind immer zugleich grundlegende pädagogische Begriffe. Die Pädagogik der Vergangenheit ist über die Entgegensetzung von Staatserziehung und Persönlichkeitsbildung nicht hinausgekommen. „Politisch“ war für sie soviel wie staatlich, dem Staate aber wurde der „Geist“, die „Kultur“ gegenübergestellt. Wenn wir Reich sagen, so meinen wir nicht ein vom Politischen getrenntes geistiges Reich, sondern wir meinen jene Gemeinschaft, aus der die politische sowohl wie die geistige Einheit hervorgeht. Das Wort Reich weist auf ein Prinzip einheitlicher Gestaltung hin. Nicht um ein Reich aus Traum und Sehnsucht handelt es sich, sondern um eine Gestalt in geschichtlicher Wirklichkeit.

Appendix II

An article about "sub-humans" edited by SS Main Office and destined primarily for indoctrination of SS men.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NO-1805 OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

"As long as there are human beings on the earth, the struggle between humans and sub-humans will be a historical rule, and so will the fight, urged by the Jew against the nations as far as we can look back, be part of the natural schedule of life on our planet. We will have to submit calmly to the conviction that this fight for life and death is a natural law just as the war of the pest-bacillus against the healthy body."

Reichs Führer SS Heinrich Himmler 1935.

Just as the night arises against the day, as light and shadow are eternal enemies, just so man himself is the greatest enemy of man who rules the earth.

The sub-human, this apparently fully equal creation of nature, when seen from a biological view-point, with hands, feet and a sort of a brain, with eyes and a mouth, nevertheless is quite a different, a dreadful creature, is only an imitation of man with man-resembling features, but inferior to any animal as regards intellect and soul. In its interior, this being is a cruel chaos of wild, unrestricted passions, with a nameless will to destruction, with a most primitive lust, and of unmasked depravity.

Sub-human—and nothing else.

For not everything is alike that has a human face.

Woe to him who ever forgets this.

Whatever this world possesses in great works, ideas, and art, it was planned, created and perfected by man; it was he who thought and invented, he had only one aim, namely to raise himself to the higher life, to give shape to the shapeless, to replace the inadequate with better things. Thus civilization grew. Thus through the tools, the house came into being. Thus

man became social; and family, nation, the state came into being. Thus man became good and great, and thus he rose far above all living things.

Thus he became next to God.

But the sub-human, too, was living. He hated the work of the other. He raged against it, in the darkness a thief, in the open as a slanderer, a murderer. He associated with his ilk.

Beast called beast.

The sub-human never kept peace, never gave rest. For he needed the twilight, the chaos.

He shied the light of cultural progress.

For his self-preservation he need the swamp, hell, but not the sun.

And this underworld of sub-humans found its leader: the eternal Jew.

It was he who understood them, who knew what they wanted, he fanned their basest lust and desires, he spread horror over mankind. It began in historical times with the extermination of the Persians, with the feast of Purim, the first glorification of organized mass-murder. 73,000 Aryan Persians fell victims to Jewish hatred. Even today the Jewry believe this deed of horror to be their greatest "religious feast."

Eternal is the hatred of the sub-human against the light shapes, these bearers of light. Eternally the occident is threatened with destruction from the deserts. Without end the powers of destruction are gathering, Attila and Ghengis Khan are collecting their hordes of Huns and sweep over Europe, a living apocalypse, leaving behind them fire and death, rape, murder and terror, in order to cast back into the primeval abyss the world of light, of thousandfold knowledge, of progress and human greatness.

The desire of the sub-human is eternal:

To turn again into a desert the land where the light of lofty perception still shone upon the dark creatively, then his ultimate aim, namely chaos, would be attained.

This struggle between these two poles has been going on under dreadful, unfathomable laws for thousands of years, and there will be always an Attila, a Ghengis Khan to tear down the gates of Europe, knowing only one desire; namely the complete annihilation of all that is beautiful.

Today the embodiment of this will to destruction is: bolshevism. But this bolshevism is now an ephemeral phenomenon. It is not a product of our days. It is not a novelty within the history of mankind, but is as old as the Jew himself. The pioneers of its path are called: Lenin and Stalin.

First the hands of a people are cruelly cut down, and then the people will be led into political, economical, cultural, intellectual, spiritual and physical slavery. The remainder of the people, once deprived of their proper values and characteristics due to innumerable blood-mixtures—well, after a few centuries, which is a short time in the history of man, there will be perhaps still some vague knowledge of such a people having existed.

Reichs Führer SS Heinrich
Himmler 1935

Editor: The Reichs Führer SS, SS Main Office.

(Page 2 of original)

Without end, the steppes of the Russian area extend—eastern Europe. Abrupt and sudden is the difference of the cultural levels of central Europe and the gigantic districts.

And yet, on both sides of the frontier, there is the same soil, but not the same people. Only man alone is able to impress his stamp upon the country. Therefore, on the one side the well-ordered fertility, planned harmony of fields and carefully designed villages of Germany, and on the other side the zones of an impenetrable jungle, of the steppes, of never ending primeval forests, where silting rivers painfully cut their ways.

Badly exploited, fertile soil of black earth that could be a paradise, a California of Europe, and in reality abandoned, dreadfully neglected, branded with the stamp of a crime against culture beyond imagination even today, is a perpetual accusation against the sub-human and his rule.

Sorrowful fate of the black earth.

Unending, fertile, neglected eastern Europe, but blessed with all the advantages, whose absence from the rest of the continent is inconceivable, is brutally separated therefrom by an arbitrary chasm.

Eastern Europe never progressed beyond a certain primitive-

ness. It has never known anything but chaos, because it lacked mankind, the valuable bearer of culture, the genius who systematically planned peaceful reconstruction, who ordered the well-designed exploitation of the immense treasures and the fertility of the soil. This country has only known the powers of unrestricted despoiling and brutal armament for war.

Certainly, highly civilized nations of central and western Europe set out with this country as their goal too. Once there were the Goths and the Waraoger who founded empires here and brought civilization with them. The Hanseatic League, Swedes, Flemish, Dutch, Swabian and Saxonian settlers from Lower Saxony attempted to bring light into the darkness. A voice crying for help was heard thence in all centuries. Peter the Great, Catherine II, and all the others, whatever their names may be, called the German farmer and officer, the European scientist, physician and engineer.

But again and again, the powers of darkness prevailed, and the genius called to assistance was slaughtered in a frenzy of wild and bestial madness.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

11 August 1947

I, Paul E. Gropp, Civ. No. B-397 975, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NO-1805.

Paul E. Gropp
Civ. No. B-397 975

Appendix III

(Himmler's) Reflections on the Treatment of Peoples of Alien races in the East. (A blueprint which became a basis for SS policy in Eastern Europe.)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NO-1880
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(handwritten)

Dr. GROSS (of the Department
of Racial Politics) has been informed
28 November 40

For the files

Top Secret

WOLFF

*Reflections on the Treatment of Peoples of Alien
Races in the East.*

Concerning the treatment of peoples of alien races in the East we have to see to it that we acknowledge and cultivate as many individual ethnic groups as possible, i.e., outside of the Poles and the Jews, also the Ukrainians, the White Russians, the Gorals (Goralen), the Lemcos (Lemken) and the Cashubes (Kaschuben). If other small and isolated national groups can be found in other places, they should be treated the same way.

What I want to say is, that we are not only most interested in not unifying the population of the East, but, on the contrary, in splitting them up into as many parts and fragments as possible.

But even within the ethnical groups themselves we have no interest in leading those to unity and greatness, or perhaps arouse in them gradually a national consciousness and national culture, but we want to dissolve them into innumerable small fragments and particles.

We naturally want to use the members of all these ethnical groups, especially of the small ones, in positions of police officials and mayors. Only the mayors and local police authorities will be allowed to head these ethnical groups; as far as the

Gorals are concerned (page 2 of original) the individual chieftains and elders of the tribes, who live in continuous feud with each other anyhow, should fill these positions. There must be no centralization towards the top, because only by dissolving this whole conglomeration of peoples of the Generalgouvernement amounting to fifteen millions, and of the eight millions of the Eastern provinces, will it be possible for us to carry out the racial sifting which must be the basis for our considerations: namely selecting out of this conglomeration the racially valuable and bringing them to Germany and assimilating them there.

Within a very few years—I should think about four to five years, the name of the Cashubes, f.i. must be unknown, because at that time there won't be a Cashubian people any more (this also goes especially for the West Prussians). I hope that the concept of Jews will be completely extinguished through the possibility of a large emigration of all Jews to Africa or some other colony. Within a somewhat longer period, it should also be possible to make the ethnic concepts of Ukrainians, Gorals and Lemkon disappear in our area. What has been said for these fragments of peoples is also meant on a correspondingly larger scale for the Poles. (page 3)

A basic issue in the solution of all these problems is the question of schooling and thus the question of sifting and selecting the young. For the non-German population of the East there must be no higher school than the four-grade elementary school. The sole goal of this school is to be:

Simple arithmetics up to 500 at the most; writing of one's name; the doctrine that it is a divine law to obey the Germans and to be honest, industrious and good. I don't think that reading should be required.

Apart from this school there are to be no schools at all in the East. Parents, who from the beginning want to give their children better schooling in the elementary school as well as later on in a higher school must take an application to the Higher SS and the police leaders. The first consideration in dealing with this application will be whether the child is racially perfect and conforming to our conditions. If we acknowledge such a child to be as of our blood, the parents will be notified, that the child will be sent to a school in Germany and that it will permanently remain in Germany.

Cruel and tragic as every individual case may be, this method (page 4) is still the mildest and best one, if, out of inner conviction, one rejects as un-German and impossible the bolshevist method of physical extermination of a people.

The parents of such children of good blood will be given the choice to either give away their child; they will then probably produce no more children so that the danger of this sub-human people of the East obtaining a class of leaders which, since it would be equal to us, would also be dangerous for us, will disappear—or else the parents pledge themselves to go to Germany and to become loyal citizens there. The love towards their child, whose future and education depends on the loyalty of the parents will be a strong weapon in dealing with them.

Apart from examining the applications made by parents for better schooling of their children, there will be an annual sifting of all children of the General Government between the ages of six and ten in order to separate the racially valuable and non-valuable ones. The ones considered racially valuable will be treated in the same way as the children who are admitted on the basis of the approved application of their parents.

I consider it as a matter of course from an emotional as well as from a rational viewpoint that, the moment children and parents come to Germany, they are not treated like lepers in the schools and in everyday life, but, after having changed their names, they should, in full confidence, be incorporated into the German life, although attention and vigilance must be exercised with regard to them. It must not happen that the children be made to feel as outcasts, because, after all we believe in this, our own blood, which, through the errors of German history has flown into an alien nationality and we are convinced that our Weltanschauung and our ideals will strike a chord of resonance in the racially equal soul of these children. Here teachers and HJ-leaders especially must do an out-and-out job and the mistake that has been made in the past with the people from Elsass Lorraine must never be repeated; namely that, on one side, one wants to win the people as Germans and, on the other side, one constantly hurts and repudiates their human value, their pride and honor through distrust and insults. Insults like "Polack" and "Ukrainian" or something like that must be made impossible..

The children will have to be educated in an elementary

school and after these four grades it can be decided whether the children should continue to go to the German grammar school or should be transferred to a national political institution of education. (page 6)

The population of the General Gouvernement during the next ten years, by necessity and after a consistent carrying out of these measures, will be composed of the remaining inferior population supplemented by the population of the Eastern provinces deported there, and at all those parts of the German Reich which have the same racial and human qualities f.i. parts of the Serbs (Serben) and Wends (Wenden).

This population will, as a people of laborers without leaders, be at our disposal and will furnish Germany annually with migrant workers and with workers for special tasks (roads, quarries, buildings): they themselves will have more to eat and more to live on than under the Polish regime, and, though they have no culture of their own, they will, under the strict, consistent and just leadership of the German people, be called upon to help work on its everlasting cultural tasks and its buildings and perhaps, as far as the amount of heavy work is concerned, will be the ones who make the realization of these tasks possible.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

14 July 1947

I, Hanna Marie BIEBER, 3 397 989, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the original document NO. NO-1880.

HANNA MARIE BIEBER

Appendix IV

Hitler's instructions for Alfred Rosenberg, transmitted via Martin Bormann. (This document implies a definite inclusion of the Ukraine within the scope of Nazi *Lebensraum*.)

Abschrift!

Reichsleiter Martin B o r m a n n

Führerhauptquartier,
den 23. Juli 1942.
Bo/ a.

Geheime Reichssache!

Herrn

Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg *Persönlich!*

B e r l i n 35

Rauchstraße 17/18.

Sehr verehrter Parteigenosse Rosenberg!

Der Führer wünscht, wie ich Ihnen im Auftrage mitteile, daß Sie für Beachtung und Durchsetzung folgender Grundsätze in den besetzten Ostgebieten sorgen:

1. Wenn Mädchen und Frauen der besetzten Ostgebiete ihre Kinder abtreiben, dann kann uns das nur recht sein; keinesfalls sollen also deutsche Juristen sich dagegen wenden. Man müßte nach Auffassung des Führers sogar einen schwungvollen Handel mit Verhütungsmitteln in den besetzten Ostegebieten zulassen; denn wir können keinerlei Interesse daran haben, daß sich die nichtdeutsche Bevölkerung vermehrt.
2. Die Gefahr, daß sich die nichtdeutsche Bevölkerung in den besetzten Ostgebieten stärker als bisher vermehrt, ist sehr groß, denn die gesamten Lebensumstände werden für die nichtdeutsche Bevölkerung selbstverständlich viel besser und gesicherter. Gerade deshalb müssen wir die notwendigen Vorkehrungsmaßnahmen gegen eine Vermehrung der nichtdeutschen Bevölkerung treffen.

3. Deshalb soll auch keinesfalls eine deutsche Gesundheitsfürsorge für die nichtdeutsche Bevölkerung in den besetzten Ostgebieten einsetzen. Ein Impfen z.B. der nichtdeutschen Bevölkerung und ähnliche vorbeugende Gesundheitsmaßnahmen sollen keinesfalls in Frage kommen.
4. Keinesfalls darf der nichtdeutschen Bevölkerung eine höhere Bildung beigebracht werden. Würden wir in diesen Fehler verfallen, würden wir selbst einen kommenden Widerstand geradezu züchten. Es muß also nach Auffassung des Führers durchaus genügen, wenn die nichtdeutsche Bevölkerung— auch die sogenannten Ukrainer—lesen und schreiben lernen.
5. Keinesfalls dürfen wir bei der nichtdeutschen Bevölkerung durch irgendwelche Maßnahmen ein Herrenbewußtsein züchten! Das Gegenteil ist notwendig!
6. Anstelle der jetzigen Schriftzeichen soll künftig in den Schulen die Normalschrift gelehrt werden.
7. Die Deutschen müssen auf jeden Fall aus den ukrainischen Städten abgesetzt werden; sogar die Unterbringung in Baracken außerhalb der Städte ist besser als die Unterbringung innerhalb der Städte! Keinesfalls sollen die russischen (ukrainischen) Städte irgendwie hergerichtet oder gar verschönert werden, denn die Bevölkerung soll kein besseres Niveau bekommen und die Deutschen sollen in später neu zu erbauenden Städten und Dörfern wohnen, die von der russisch (ukrainischen) Bevölkerung streng abgesetzt sind. Deshalb sollen auch die für Deutsche zu erbauenden Häuser keinesfalls den russischen (ukrainischen) gleichen (kein Lehmverputz, kein Strohdach usw.).
8. Im Altreich seien, betonte der Führer, viel zu viele Dinge reglementiert und vorgeschrieben; in diesen Fehler dürfen wir keinesfalls in den besetzten Ostgebieten verfallen. Keinesfalls solle also für die nichtdeutsche Bevölkerung zuviel reglementiert werden: hier müsse man sich unbedingt auf das Notwendigste beschränken. Die deutsche Verwaltung müsse deshalb auch auf jeden Fall klein gehalten werden, der Gebietskommissar müsse mit den einheimischen Ortsvorstehern arbeiten; eine einheitliche ukrainische Verwaltung etwa bis zum Generalkommissar oder etwar gar bis zum Reichskommissar dürfe es aber keinesfalls geben.

Durchschlag dieses Schreibens habe ich dem Herrn Reichsmi-
nister und Chef der Reichskanzlei übermittelt.

Herrn Reichsminister und Chef der

Heil Hitler!

Reichskanzlei Dr. L a m m e r s

Ihr

Berlin mit der Bitte um Kenntnisnahme,

gez. M. Bormann

gez. M. Bormann.

Appendix V

Blueprints for German colonization in Eastern Europe (Decided at a Conference at the Führer's Headquarters and at the Reich Ministry for the East.)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NO-2703 OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIME

The Reichsführer SS Berlin, W 35, 17 August 1942
Chief of the SS Main Office Luetzowstr. 48/49
Cd SS HA/De/Vo. VS Journal No. 3097/42 secret

	(stamp:)
	Personal Staff of the
	Reichsführer SS
(stamp:)	Central Archives
SECRET	File No. G 57

Subject: Conference at the Führer Headquarters
 and at the Reich Ministry for the East.

Reference: _____

Enclosures: 2 memoranda for the files.

(handwritten:)	(handwritten:)
	file
Settlement in the East.	(initials)

Enclosed we forward memoranda to the files regarding the conference at the Führer Headquarters and at the Reich Ministry for the East with request to take note.

by order:
(signature:) BLESSAU
SS Obersturmführer
and first adjutant.

Distribution:
Reichsführer SS, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. Brandt,
SS Oberst-Gruppenführer DALUEGE,
SS Gruppenführer STRECKEN ACH Reich Main Security Office
SS Obergruppenführer LORENZ,
SS Gruppenführer GREIFELT!

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NO-2703
CONTINUED

(stamp:)
Personal Staff of the
Reichsführer SS
Central Archives
File No. G 57

M e m o r a n d a to the files

Conference at the Führer Headquarters.

Present:

Reichsführer SS, Obergruppenführer WOLFF, Obergruppenführer LORENZ, Obergruppenführer PRUETZMANN, Gruppenführer BERGER, Gruppenführer GREIFELT, Gruppenführer Under Secretary Dr. STUCKARDT, Oberführer/MEYER!
Professor

a) General:

1.) Situation of ethnic Germans:

There are 45,000 ethnic Germans in approximately 486 villages in the Ukraine, as far as it is not a theatre of operations. They had been registered and taken in charge by the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (Liaison Office for Ethnic Germans). Since the General Commissar took charge of them nothing further was done. Nobody bothered about them. The ethnic Germans starved, a double tax was imposed on them. The schools already opened were closed. All national life has died, in contrast to Transnistria (enclosure) where new life has blossomed under foreign authority, the births figures have considerably increased during 1942, and the economic upwards trend is also unmistakable so that these ethnic Germans have come to be the backbone of the whole country. This is also made apparent by the fact that two training centers for teachers have been opened and five hospitals have been established through the agency of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (Liaison Office for Ethnic Germans).

The ethnic Germans in the communication zone have equally been taken charge of in every way, the collaboration with all offices of the Army is excellent. In Transnistria as well as in

communication zone a troop of ethnic Germans has been formed which has taken charge of the safeguarding of communities and protects itself against bands of all sorts. In the Ukraine, within the territory administered by the Reich Ministry for the East, these things have been omitted up to date.

In order to prevent further disaster the Reichsführer SS proposes the establishment of Ethnic German Directorates (Volks-deutsche Leitstellen) within the staffs of the Higher SS and Police Leaders, which will be attached to the Reich Kommissars and, as far as there are any ethnic Germans, also to the General Kommissars as the responsible agencies dealing with the matter, and which will take charge of welfare and consolidation of settlements. (page 2 of original)

(stamp:)

b) As a group of ethnic Germans which is spread out over 486 villages cannot be taken care of, and national life can never develop in this way, the Reichsführer SS has ordered a consolidation of settlements. Insofar as they are not settled in the Hegewald district (see point c), they should be concentrated, after the harvest has been brought in, in about 100 villages and these villages must be situated that one can also reach them in winter, until the final resettlement in strong-points can be put in operation.

The resettlement of the Russians should be carried out in such a decent manner that no formation of new bands will result from it.

It is self-evident that no ethnic Germans will be allowed to enter the Reich as workers., as long as the resettlement has not been completed.

c) 1. In the district round Shitomir approximately 10,000 ethnic Germans will be settled after the harvest has been brought in. In accordance with the order of the Führer to the effect that it is preferable for German offices to operate in huts outside the town and for all officials and employees to live there, and not in the town itself, this settlement will be concentrated around field headquarters Hegewald as far as ground conditions permit.

As at present trucks are being made available by the battalions at the immediate disposal of the Reichsführer for anti-partisan warfare, the task will be made much easier.

SS-Gruppenführer GREIFELT together with the Volksdeutsche Mittelsetelle (Liaison Office of Ethnic Germans) have been put in charge, the responsible local leader will be Obersturmbannführer of the Reserve JUNGKUNZ, SS-Oberführer of the general SS, born 23 July 1892, SS serial No. 21 765, up to now leader of the administrative sub-district VIII.

The plans for the distribution of land should be drawn up immediately, the necessary workmen required for the settlement should be selected. A query in this connection addressed to the Commissar General at Shitomir brought to light that neither plans of ground conditions nor any records relating to professions, economic situation, and family status of the ethnic Germans are available there. Furthermore the settlement should be organized in such a way that sufficient land is left for an extension if the number of children increases.

2. Territory: Planning of consolidation and settlements in the East, in the Ukraine.

Pursuant to the Führer decree, parts of the Ukraine will be completely colonized by German settlers in the course of the next 20 years. At the beginning the settlement will be laid out in accordance with the main east-west and north-south communication roads, with the planned meter roads and the direct railroads newly to be constructed, such as Cracow-Shitomir-Kiev, Leningrad-Magilow-Kiev, Shitomir-Vinitza-Odessa.

The districts within the whole eastern territory which are to be colonized in the first instance are:

Reichskommissariat Ostland,
taking into consideration the Estonians' suitability for Germanization.

In Latvia and in Lithuania it will be more difficult, as the Lettgalls will have to be evacuated from Latvia under all circumstances, and the Lithuanians can also not be considered for Germanization as they are mentally slow and their strain of Slav blood is very pronounced.

Ingermanland.

White Ruthenia.

With regard to the latter country the matter is easier in as far as the White Ruthenian population has no intellectual class and no political ambition.

Crimea.

3. The strong-point-like settlement is planned in such a way that towns of 15-20,000 inhabitants will grow up at the intersection points, and that around these towns a completely German agricultural population will be resettled.

4. SS-Gruppenführer GREIFELT will be instructed to plan the resettlement of the ethnic Germans from Transnistria.

5. General:

It must be kept in mind that just that part of a nation which is valuable from a racial point of view cannot be won over if they have been previously systematically robbed, as for instance in Esthonia where so-called German business managers, receiving a monthly salary of 1500 RM and more, have been appointed who are completely incapable, don't want to work at all and leave it to the previous Esthonian owner, receiving a salary of 300 RM, to look after the business.

(stamp:)

(page 4 of original)

If such slogans are being coined as "stealing is called mania with the little people, kleptomania with the distinguished people, and Germanic with the Germans," then the result later on may be disastrous.

Furthermore, it is more difficult in every way to rule a country if the officials to be sent from the old Reich are selected from a negative point of view, if suddenly the money craze gets hold of everybody and secretaries earn 750 RM (salary of a lieutenant colonel with 3 children); if, furthermore, offices in general are closed from 16 December to 16 January, and if now, during the reconstruction stage, the fixed office hours are from 8:00 to 11:00 and from 16:30 to 19:00.

(signature:) G. BERGER

SS-Gruppenführer.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

31.7.1947

I, George H. GRANT; A 442 694, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document No. NO-2703.

George H. GRANT
A 442 694

Appendix VI

Outline for consolidation of the Racial German settlements in the Ukraine.

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES
APO 696-A U. S. Army

STAFF EVIDENCE By: Hedy WACHENHEIMER
ANALYSIS Date: 12 February, 1947

Dec. No. : NO-2278

Title and/or general : Certified copy of a memo, signed
nature by HIMMLER re: Racial Ger-
mans in the Government Gen-
eral (Generalgouvernement)
Ukraine.

Date: : 21 July, 1942

Source (Location of : 7771 Document Center Berlin
original, etc.) Folder N 314
SS-2282

PERSONS, FIRMS OR : HIMMLER
ORGANIZATIONS SS-Ostuf. Rudolf BRANDT
IMPLICATED SS-Ogruf. H. PRUETZMANN,
Plenipotenitary-General
in Croatia
SS-Ogruf. Karl WOLFF, Chief
of Personal Staff RFSS
SS-Ogruf. LORENZ, Chief of
VOMI
SS-Gruf. G. BERGER, Chief
of SS-HA
SS-Gruf. KRORLAUCH, Chief
of Training of SS
SS-Gruf. U. GREIFELT, Com-
missioner for Consolidation
of German Folkdom
SS-Obf. HOFFMEYER

TO BE FILED
UNDER THESE
REFERENCE
HEADINGS:

: NO-As above
NG-Ministry for Eastern Affairs
NC-Concentration Camps Lub-
lin

NO-Deportation
NG-Regional (Gau) Party Ad-
ministration
NG-Ministry of Occupied East-
ern Territories

SUMMARY (Indicate page nos:
of original or translation)

This three-page document is a certified copy of a memo, signed by HIMMLER. This memo outlines in 12 paragraphs what has been discussed at a meeting on racial Germans in the Government General (General-gouvernement) Ukraine.

In paragraph five it is stated that in agreement with the Ministry for Eastern Affairs the centralized settlement of racial Germans will have to be put into effect within the next three months.

Paragraph 6. Racial Germans from Kommissariat General Shitomir, about 45,000 people, are to be settled around Rowne, Shitomir and Winniza.

Paragraph 7. Racial Germans from Nikolajow, about 20,000 people, are to be concentrated near Nikolajow.

Paragraph 8. Racial Germans from Kriwoi Rog and vicinity and Germans are to be collectively settled.

Paragraph 9. Germans from Stalino are to be gathered together for the time being.

Paragraph 10. The ultimate aim is to settle the agrarian population on farms, the size of 10-25 hectars. The Germans from Kiew with their tradesmen are to be split up.

Paragraph 11. These areas settled by Germans and racial Germans serve the purpose to secure the vital German arteries on roads and railways.

Paragraph 12. The supply for clothes and household goods for the settlers is to be provided by the camps in Lublin.

Appendix VII

Himmler's instruction on kidnapping Polish children for Germanization.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NO-3188 OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

The Reichsführer SS
Journal No. AR/38/8
RF/V

(stamp)

Berlin, 18 June 1941

Personal Staff of the
Reichsführer SS
Central Archives
File No. AR/32/14

- 1.) Reichsstatthalter
SS-Gruppenführer GREISER,
Posen
Schlossfreiheit 13

Dear Party-comrade GREISER,

May I repeat in writing the suggestion I recently submitted orally.

- 1.) I would consider it right if *small children*, of *Polish families*, who show especially *good racial characteristics*, were apprehended and educated by us in special children's institutions and children's homes which must not be too large. The apprehension of the children would have to be explained with endangered health.
- 2.) Children who prove unfit are to be returned to their parents.
- 3.) I suggest that, in order to collect experience, at first a start should be made with only two or three such institutes.
- 4.) After half a year the genealogical tree and documents of descent of those children who prove to be acceptable should be procured. After altogether one year it should be considered

to give such children as foster children to childless families of good race.

5.) Only the best and racially indoctrinated male and female workers may be appointed chiefs of such institutes.

Heil Hitler!

Signed HIMMLER

Notes

NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE

1. Gerhard Ritter, "The Historical Foundations of the Rise of National Socialism," in the symposium *The Third Reich* (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1955); see also Theodore Heuss, "German Character and History," *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1957, pp. 103-109.

2. Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 103.

3. *Polish Fortnightly Review*, February 1, 1943, p. 2.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.* It is interesting to notice the continuity of these convictions in German nationalism as they were expressed by A. E. Frankenfield, a German administrator in the Ukraine in 1944 in his report concerning the administration of the Occupied Eastern Territories. He states: "Among champions for a 'sensible' eastern policy there is nobody who would hesitate to approve even the most serious and ruthless actions if they were required in the interest of the German people. It seems justifiable and can be justified even in the fact of history in the case of the dire necessity to let thousands and hundreds of thousands of foreigners die if it is necessary for the future and victory of German people." Documents of the International Military Tribunal (henceforth referred to as *I.M.T. Doc.*), NO-5394, p. 4.

6. F. Hesse, *The Law of the Growing Spaces*, quoted in Hans W. Weigert, *Generals and Geographers; The Twilight of Geopolitics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 108.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

8. Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

9. Frederick Sondern, Jr., "Hitler's Scientist," *Current History*, June 1941. See also A. Whitney Griswold, "Paving the Way for Hitler," *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1941.

10. Karl Haushofer, *Weltpolitik von Heute*, p. 151. See also Alois Fischer, "Neue Untersuchungen über Rasse und Volkstum," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, 1926, No. 11, p. 869a., No. 12, p. 939.

11. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Munich: Verlag F. Eher Nachfolger, 1930), p. 1.
12. Alfred Rosenberg, 1927, quoted in Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
13. H. W. Weigert, *German Geopolitics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), pp. 9-10.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 18
15. F. T. Hart, *Alfred Rosenberg der Mann und sein Werk*, 5th ed. (Berlin: J. F. Lehman Verlag, 1942), pp. 60-61.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Alfred Rosenberg, *Völkischer Beobachter*, Berlin, April 18, 1926.
18. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, *op. cit.*, pp. 742-743.
19. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-5001.*
20. Otto Bräutigam, *Überblick über die besetzten Ostgebiete während des 2. Weltkrieges* (Tübingen: Institut für Besatzungsfragen, 1954), p. 2. (A-A line refers to Astrakhan-Arkhangelsk advance-line set for the German troops.)
21. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
22. International Military Tribunal, *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, Nuremberg, Secretariat of the Tribunal (1946), XXXV, 444-445, henceforth referred to as *I.M.T. Trial*.
23. *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945* (U.S. Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1953), Series D, IV, 367a, 366. Also see Lord Halifax's speech two months before the outbreak of World War II, in Hans W. Weigert, *Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 221.
24. Fritz Maier Hartmann, *Dokumente des Dritten Reiches* (Munich, 1939), II, 159-160.
25. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-4114.*
26. *Ibid.*, NO-303.
27. Joseph Tenenbaum, *Race and Reich, the Story of an Epoch* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1956), p. 31.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
29. Henry Picker, *Hitler's Tischgespräche: im Führerhauptquartier, 1941-1942* (Bonn: Athenaenum Verlag, 1951), p. 149.
30. *I.M.T. Trial*, V, 102-108; see also IV, 989-1016.
31. Eugen Kogon, *Der SS-Staat, Das System der deutschen Konzentrationslager* (Frankfur/Main: Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte, 1946), pp. 1-2. Quoted from Karl O. Paetel, "The Reign

of the Black Order," *The Third Reich* (symposium ed. by UNESCO, 1955), p. 657.

32. Karl O. Paetel, *ibid.*, p. 659.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 656-657.

34. *I.M.T. Doc.*, NO-1805.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Rede des Reichsführers-SS vor dem Offizierskorps einer Grenadier Division auf dem Truppenübungsplatz Bitsch am 26. Juli, 1944.* (An isolated document located in Hoover Library, Stanford, Vault, Ts Germany, H 658.)

37. K. Heiden, *Der Führer: Hitler's Rise to Power* (Boston: 1944), p. 311.

38. D. Alfieri, *Dictators Face to Face* (New York: New York University Press, 1955), p. 259. See also Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 642.

39. Paetel, *op. cit.*, p. 656.

40. Hannah Arendt, "Organisierte Schuld," *Die Wandlung* I, 4, (Heidelberg: 1945-46), 333-334.

41. "From Behind the Scenes," *Ideya i Chyn* (*Idea and Action*), Organ of the Ukrainian Nationalists (Bandera Faction), No. 13, 1943, pp. 24-26.

42. Gabriel A. Almond, *The Struggle for Democracy in Germany* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1949), p. 41.

43. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-3075; *I.M.T. Trials*, vol. 13, p. 141; vol. 4, pp. 631-632, quoted from Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

44. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-5365.

45. Peter Carstens, "Aus der Praxis der volksdeutschen Umsiedlung," *Neues Bauerntum*, April 1941, p. 156. See also Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 32

46. W. Gradmann, "Die Erfassung der Umsiedler," *Zeitschrift für Politik*, May 1942, pp. 350-351.

47. Polish Ministry of Information, *The German New Order in Poland* (London, 1941), pp. 204, 254.

48. "Der Ostraum," *Siedlung und Wirtschaft*, Dec. 1939.

49. "Der Deutsche Osten nach einem Jahr," *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, Sept. 1, 1940.

50. J. B. Schechtman, *European Population Transfers, 1939-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 342.

51. Paetel, *op. cit.*, p. 646. The Waffen-SS were the German elite combat forces, usually organized in division units. They

were selected, trained, indoctrinated, and led by SS leaders, though for operational purposes at the front they remained under the command of the German Army.

52. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11. Also *I.M.T. Trials*, XI, 533.

53. Guenther Moritz, *Gerichtsbarkeit in den von Deutschland besetzten Gebieten 1939-1945* (Tübingen: Institut für Besatzungsfragen, 1955), pp. 36-38. See also Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

54. Moritz, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

55. Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 347.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 348.

57. *Abwehr*—German Military Counter-Intelligence Service.

58. R. Herzog, *Grundzüge der deutschen Besatzungsverwaltung in den ost- und süd-Osteuropäischen Ländern während des zweiten Weltkrieges* (Tübingen: Institut für Besatzungsfragen, 1955), p. 122.

59. *I.M.T. Doc.* OKW-701a, 703, 703a, see also *I.M.T. Trials*, XLII, S-253.

60. Himmler's File, Folder 257.

61. Maximilian Freiherr du Prel, *Das General-Gouvernement*, (Würzburg: Konrad Triltsch, 1942), pp. 206-207. It meant that, for example, resettlers from mountains would be settled in rather mountainous areas.

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Ibid.*, p. 207.

64. Du Prel, *op. cit.*, pp. 30, 141, 185.

65. Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

66. A photocopy of this publication is located in Hoover Library (Himmler's File), Stanford, California.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO

1. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-4122, NO-5351; *I.M.T. Doc.* USSR- Exhibit 60.

2. The Incorporated Polish Western Provinces covered an area of 36,117 sq. miles with a population of some 10,740,000 and represented 23.7 percent of the Polish State of 1939; 30.4 percent of its population. Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

3. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-4059.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Departmental Records Branch, TAGO, Alexandria, Va. Doc. RDV/57, *Die Frage der Behandlung der Bevölkerung der ehemaligen polnischen Gebiete nach rassenpolitischen Gesichtspunkten* (Nov. 25, 1939), p. 22. Henceforth referred to as: TAGO Doc.
6. *Ibid.*
7. TAGO Doc. RDV/57, pp. 24-25.
8. *Ibid.*
9. I.M.T. NO-1880 and NO-1881.
10. Polish Ministry of Information, *The German New Order in Poland*, pp. 160, 175.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
12. Henry Picker, *op. cit.*
13. *Documents Relating to the Administration of Occupied Countries in Eastern Europe*, New York: Polish Information Center, 1941, p. 11.
14. Polish Ministry of Information, *The German New Order in Poland*, pp. 160, 175.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Documents Relating to the Administration of Occupied Countries in Eastern Europe*, p. 9, *op. cit.*
18. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
19. Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Polish White Book*, p. 22.
20. *Polish Fortnightly Review*, Feb. 1, 1942 (Review of Four-Year Plan by Governor-General Frank in April, 1941).
21. *Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland*, Sept. 1939-June 1941, pp. 14-15.
22. TAGO Doc. RDV/57, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
23. *Ibid.*
24. "Umsiedlung im General Gouvernement," *Nation und Staat*, October 1942, pp. 1, 35-36.
25. Schectman, *op. cit.*, pp. 228. See also R. Bahr, *Deutsches Schicksal im Suedosten* (Hamburg: 1936), pp. 224-225.
26. *Kölnische Zeitung*, Sept. 22, 1940. See also *Polish Fortnightly Review*, Nov. 1, 1940, p. 6.
27. Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 255. (This number included ethnic Germans from the following regions: Estonia, Latvia, Wolhynia, Galicia, the Narew area, Bessarabia, Northern and

Southern Bukovina, Northern Dobruja, Lithuania, and the Lublin and Chelm districts of the *General-Gouvernement*).

28. T. Zoeckler, "Was wir alles zurückliessen" *Der Volksdeutsche*, Jan. 1940; see also Schechtman, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-153.

29. Schechtman, *op. cit.*, pp. 150, 217, 229.

30. Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

31. A. Thoss, *Heimkehr der Volksdeutschen* (Berlin, 1942), pp. 16-17. See also Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

32. *New York Times*, January 13, 1940.

33. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, February 11, 1940.

34. Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

35. *I.M.T. Doc.* 221-L.

36. *I.M.T. Trials*, vol. XXIV, 501. Speech of Governor-General Frank in Cracow, Dec. 16, 1941.

37. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-2703; see also Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

38. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-2278, p. 2.

39. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-2703.

40. *Ibid.*

41. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

42. Schechtman gives the number of resettlers from the East in the time between Oct. 1939 and spring 1941 as 500,000 (see *op. cit.*, p. 255); Himmler's Deputy for the Commission for the Strengthening of Germanism Greifelt reports that on July 1, 1942 the number of resettlers from the East reached the amount of 600,569 (see *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-3222, Table 3a). Schechtman further indicates (*op. cit.*, pp. 348-353) that after spring 1942 the number of settlers in the Western Provinces of Poland became pretty stable until 1944 when the retreating German armies from the East in 1944 brought a new influx of ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union.

43. The objective of the Commission for the Strengthening of Germanism was to create in resettlement areas the proportion of 50:50 between Germanic and non-Germanic elements during the war. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-2418.

44. Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 342.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 342.

46. *Krakauer Zeitung*, August 28, 1942.

47. *Polish Feature and News Service*, No. 51, Sept. 1942.

48. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-5245; see also Schechtman, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-204.

49. Gerhard Jacoby, *Racial State* (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1944), p. 224.
50. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-3182.
51. Jacoby, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-222.
52. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-3182.
53. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-5245.
54. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-5398.
55. *I.M.T. Doc.* USSR Exhibit 60, p. 5.
56. Jacoby, *op. cit.*, pp. 222-223.
57. *Ibid.* See also *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-402, NO-4122, NO-5351.
58. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-3359, No. 190, p. 20; and NO-2703, p. 4.
59. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
60. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-5295.
61. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-5033.
62. E. J. Harrison, *Lithuanians Fight for Freedom* (New York: The Lithuanian American Information Center, 1948), pp. 32-33.
63. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-5053.
64. Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
65. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-5033.
66. Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
67. Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 221.
68. Henry Picker, *op. cit.*
69. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-2202, Gov. H. Frank's Report to Hitler on the bad effects of resettlement, May 25, 1943.
70. *Himmler's File*, 266, the letter of the Governor of the District of Lublin to Himmler, May 3, 1944.
71. *Himmler's File*, 266, a letter from Himmler to Gov. H. Frank, No. 55/6.
72. *Polskie Sily Zbrojne w Drugiej Wojnie Swiatowej*, Vol. 3, Armija Krajowa (Polish Armed Forces During World War II, Vol. 3, Home Army) (London: Instytut im. Gen Sikorskiego, 1950), p. 524.
73. *Himmler's File*, No. 266, Zoerner's letter from May 3, 1944.
74. *Ibid.*
75. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-4107, NO-4108, and NO-2278.
76. *Ibid.*, NO-4108.
77. *Ibid.*, NO-4107.
78. *Ibid.*, NO-4108.
79. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.

80. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-5081.
81. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
83. *Ibid.*
84. *Ibid.*
85. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-2703.
86. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-2278.
87. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-2703 and NO-2778.
88. *Ibid.*, NO-2278.
89. *Ibid.*, NO-2703.
90. *Ibid.*, NO-4009, p. 9. (Report about the working results of commandos attached by RVD to SS and Police Leader of Crimea.)
91. *Ibid.*
92. *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, October 23, 1941.
93. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-4009, p. 17. (The schools were erected in the period between 1942–1944 and were located in Alupka, Eupatoria, and Quelldorf, near Kakhovka.)
94. *Ibid.*, *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-4009, p. 18.
95. *Ibid.*; see also Schechtman, *op. cit.*, pp. 361–363.
96. *Himmler's File*, Folder 26, Drawer 2 (Himmler's letter to Kaltenbrunner on July 21, 1944).
97. *Ibid.*
98. J. A. Lukacs, *The Great Powers and Eastern Europe* (New York: American Book Co., 1953), p. 570. (Speech of Governor-General Hans Frank, Jan. 14, 1944.)
99. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-2202.
100. *Ibid.* NO-2418 and NO-2207.
101. *Himmler's File*, 401, Folder 57.
102. *Ibid.*
103. Führer's conference with Field Marshall Keitel and General Zeitzler on Berghof, June 8, 1943, *Development of State* (journal) (Cleveland: Summer, 1954), No. 2 (13).
104. Du Prel, *op. cit.*, pp. 206–207.
105. Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 275.
106. *Ibid.*, 278.
107. Polish Ministry of Information, *The German New Order in Poland* (London: 1941), p. 204a, 254.
108. "Der deutsche Osten nach einem Jahr," in *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, Sept. 1940.
109. *TAGO Doc.* RDV/108 and RDV/57, pp. 14, 23. It ap-

plied only to the Incorporated Western Polish Provinces where the German colonization was more systematic and included extensive areas. In the thinly scattered settlements of the *General-Gouvernement*, Lithuania, and the Ukraine, German colonists were subject to the assaults from outside, being surrounded in a sea of alien population.

110. Schechtman, *op. cit.*, pp. 299-300.
111. TAGO Doc. RDV/10, p. 2.
112. Konrad Meyer, "Neue Landvolk-Verwirklichung im neuen Osten," in *Neues Bauerntum*, March 1941, pp. 93-98.
113. *Ibid.*
114. TAGO Doc. RVD/33.
115. *Ibid.*, RVD/35.
116. *Ibid.*, RVD/10, p. 2.
117. Hoover Library Vault, Ts Document, Germany, H658, p. 11.
118. TAGO Doc. RDV/33 and RDV/35.
119. TAGO Doc. RDV/10, p. 2.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
121. *Ibid.*
122. I.M.T. Doc. NO-2033.
123. TAGO Doc. RDV/83, p. 19.
124. H. R. Trevor-Roper, *Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941-1944* (Farrar, Straus and Young, New York, 1953), p. 214.
125. *Ibid.*, p. 566.
126. H. R. Trevor-Roper, *The Last Days of Hitler*, 2nd ed., (London: Macmillan, 1930). See also Alan Bullock, *Hitler, A Study in Tyranny* (Harper & Bros., N. Y. 1952), p. 729.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE

1. The greatest number of victims included those of the "right social origin or profession" who were condemned for nonconformity or for other real or imaginary crimes.
2. Alois Fischer, "Neue Untersuchungen über Rasse und Volkstum," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, No. 11 (1926).
3. I.M.T. Doc. NO-3182.
4. *Ibid.*, NO-5181.
5. *Ibid.*, *Trials*, Vol. XXVI, p. 201.
6. Henry Picker, *op. cit.*

7. *Ibid.*, p. 45; also *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-1783, p. 3 and NO-2088.
8. *Himmler's File*, Folder 57, Drawer 401, p. 2.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
12. Gauleiter—governor of the largest administrative unit within the Third Reich—a Gau (or district). He was usually a high-ranking member within the Nazi Party.
13. *Himmler's File*, Folder 57, Drawer 401, p. 5.
14. *TAGO Doc.* RDV/13, p. 7.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *TAGO Doc.* RDV/12, p. 3 and RDV/106.
17. *TAGO Doc.* RDV/12, p. 3.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-2418, p. 5a. (On Dec. 9, 1940 there were still in the Incorporated Provinces 8,530,000 Poles, 610,000 Jews and 180,000 others in comparison to 8,100,000 Germans. See RDV/106.)
21. *TAGO Doc.* RDV/57, p. 24. "First degree" refers to persons whose father or mother was of Jewish origin. "Second degree" refers to the Jewish origin of one of the grandparents.
22. Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 257.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-4122, p. 2. (According to the regulations of the German Ministry of the Interior only those who confess their Germandom by themselves should be considered for further investigation for German origin and political reliability.
25. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-3091.
26. *Ibid.*, *Trials*, Vol. XXXVII, p. 523.
27. *Ibid.*, *Doc.* NO-5143.
28. *Ibid.*, *Doc.* NO-1669, p. 9.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *I.M.T. Trials*, Vol. XXXVII, p. 523.
31. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-5112 pp. 4-5. Affidavit of a VDA advisor. *Ortsgruppenleiter*—the lowest rank of a Nazi official in charge of a community.
32. *TAGO Doc.* RVD/57, pp. 10-14.
33. Stefan Korbonski, *W Imieniu Rzeczypospolitej* (In the

name of the Polish Republic), Paris: Institut Littracki, 1954, pp. 136-137.

34. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-3457.*

35. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

36. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-2703*, p. 4; see also NO-1101-PS.

37. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 80. See also *I.M.T. Doc. NO-3182.*

38. *Ibid.*

39. *Ibid.*; see also *I.M.T. Doc. NO-5181.*

40. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-5181.*

41. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-3457.*

42. *Ibid.*; see also *I.M.T. Doc. NO-2088* and NO-1659.

43. *TAGO Doc. RVD/108. Gebietskommissar* was a minor German administrator in the East, managing a *Kreis* (district). This office was paralleled by a native Baltic government on this level but the Nazi administrator had the last word.

44. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-3301.* See also *Doc. NO-3457.*

45. The celebration of Baltic national holidays like Independence Day was not allowed and an encouragement of national feelings by Estonian émigrés from Finland by radio and press was strongly protested by German government officials and led to a temporary stoppage of post traffic between Finland and Estonia. (See *I.M.T. Doc. NO-3394*, Part IV, pp. 21-22; also *Doc. NO-4784*, p. 8, and *Doc. 3943-PS*, No. 9, p. 155.)

46. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-65, and pp. 70-73.

47. Dr. A. Walz, *Staatsvolk und Urvolk* (Munich, 1941), cited in *Polish Fortnightly Review*, No. 31, Nov. 1, 1941, p. 4. Also, *I.M.T. Doc. NO-4122.*

48. *I.M.T. Doc. U.S.S.R. Ex. 60*, pp. 4-5.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

50. *Czechoslovakia Fights Back! A document of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, American Council on Public Affairs, Washington, D. C., pp. 50-51. Cited in the Prague radio broadcast by Prof. Mueller, November 20, 1942.

51. *I.M.T. Doc. U.S.S.R. Exhibit 60*, p. 5.

52. *Ibid.*, *Doc. 661-PS.*

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Ibid.*, *Doc. NO-4021.* Even if permission were granted to a Czech student to study at a German University, on the basis of his adaptability for Germanization, his choice of subject was to be limited to technical fields. No history, law, or philosophy was allowed. (*Czechoslovakia Fights*, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.)

55. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-5112.*
56. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-5103.*
57. *Himmler's File*, 401, Folder 57, p. 2.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *TAGO Doc. RVD/106.*
60. *Ibid.*
61. *TAGO Doc. RVD/57*, pp. 10-14.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
63. *Ibid.*
64. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-4325.*
65. *TAGO Doc. RVD/106.*
66. *I.M.T. Doc. U.S.S.R. Exhibit 60*, p. 4.
67. *Himmler's File (Orange)*, Folder 304, Drawer 8, p. 6.
68. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-2477*, pp. 1-2.
69. *Ibid.*, *Doc. NO-5112*, pp. 4-5 (Affidavit of Karl Schoepke, Volksdeutsche Aussenstelle Advisor).
70. *TAGO Doc. RVD/39* (Wladislaus Matuczak Case).
71. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-1600*, p. 13.
72. ~~There~~ **There** were many thousands of Western Ukrainians who fell into German hands as soldiers of the Polish Army during the September Campaign.
73. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-1600*, p. 13.
74. ~~*Ibid.*, *Doc. 221-L.*~~
75. *Ibid.*, *Doc. NO-1600*, p. 2.
76. *Ibid.*
77. *Ibid.*, *Doc. NO-5081.*
78. *TAGO Doc. RVD/13.*
79. *Ibid.* As one of the criteria for picking out such leaders Himmler suggested height. The individual so selected was supposed to stand out physically from among the other members of his class.
80. *Ibid.*
81. Stefan Korbonski, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-146.
82. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-1880* and *NO-1881.*
83. *Ibid.*, see also *I.M.T. Doc. NO-3188.*
84. *Ibid.*, *Doc. NO-2477*, p. 2.
85. *Ibid.*, *U.S.S.R. Exhibit 60*, pp. 4-5.
86. *Ibid.*, *Doc. NO-1600*, p. 10; also see *TAGO Doc. RVD/57*, p. 19.
87. *Himmler's File*, Folder 140, Drawer 4.
88. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-2792.*

89. *Ibid.*, Doc. NO-2401 and NO-3938.
90. *I.M.T.* Vol. XXXV, p. 83.
91. *Compiled directives dealing with administration of concentration camps.* No. 164a 16/7, p. 28 (in Departmental Records Branch, TAGO, Alexandria, Va.).
92. *Ibid.*
93. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-2031.
94. *Compiled directives, op. cit.*, p. 91.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
96. *TAGO Doc.* RDV/57, p. 18.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR

1. *TAGO Doc.* RDV/57, pp. 13-14.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. *I.M.T. Doc.* 661-PS.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*, Doc. NO-1880a, NO-1881.
10. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-1880.
11. Henry Picker, *op. cit.*
12. This policy of exemption of the "hostile elements" from higher education finds its parallel also under the present totalitarian government of Eastern Germany. "Collegians in Red Berlin," Associated Press, *The News-Gazette*, Champaign-Urbana, May 5, 1951, p. 1.
13. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-4009, pp. 9-11.
14. *Encyclopedeya Ukrainoznavstya* (Encyclopedia of Ukraine). New York and Munich: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1949, p. 952.
15. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-2202.
16. Ten *Gymnasiums* under Nazi occupation was only an insignificant fraction of 138 *Gymnasiums* existing in Galicia under the Polish rule in the school year 1937-1938. [See *Encyclopedia of Ukraine, op. cit.*, p. 944.]
17. Author's own experience.

18. I.M.T. Doc. NO-4021.
19. *Himmler's File* 266, No. 47/61/43 (located in the Hoover Library). See also: *Nachrichten und Pressedienst* (News and Press Service—agency of the German Foreign Ministry), May 31, 1943.
20. There were 4,029,000 Ukrainians in the *General-Gouvernement* in 1942. See Heinz von Streng, *Die Landwirtschaft im Generalgouvernement* (Tübingen: Institut für Besatzungsfragen, 1955), p. 2.
21. I.M.T. Doc. NO-5394, pp. 9-10.
22. *Ibid.*, Doc. NO-1198-PS.
23. *Ibid.*, Doc. NO-1878.
24. Atanas Milanytsh, *Ukraine during the years of German Occupation, 1941-1944* (Manuscript for Encyclopedia of Ukraine), p. 31. See also John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 221-223.
25. Milanytsh, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
28. H. Sova, *Do Istoryi Bolshevytskoyi Diysnosty: 25 rokiv zyttya ukrayinskoho hromadyanyna v SSSR* (To the History of Bolshevik Reality: 25 Years of Life) (Munich: Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, 1955), p. 65.
29. Interview No. 1; see also Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 221.
30. Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 221.
31. Nicholas P. Vakar, *Byelorussia, The Making of a Nation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 186.
32. *Ibid.*
33. Select Committee on Communist Aggression: *Communist Takeover and Occupation of Byelorussia*, House Report No. 2684.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
37. Henry Picker, *op. cit.*
38. I.M.T. Doc. 1058-PS, p. 5.
39. Eugene V. Erdely, *Germany's First European Protectorate* (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1942), p. 201.
40. I.M.T. Doc. NO-4021; see also *Czechoslovakia Fights Back*, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

41. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-5399*, p. 5; see also *Czechoslovakia Fights Back*, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
42. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-3447*, No. 95.
43. Ants Oras, *Baltic Eclipse* (London: Victor Gallanz Ltd., 1948), p. 239.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 239-240.
45. *TAGO Doc. RVD/57*, pp. 34-35; see also the *Documents Relating to the Administration of Occupied Countries in Eastern Europe*, Nos. 8 and 9, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
46. Stefan Korbonski, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-146.
47. Milanytsh, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
48. *Ibid.*
49. Milanytsh, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
50. Erdely, *op. cit.*, p. 210.
51. Vakar, *op. cit.*, p. 201; see also, House Report No. 2684, p. 26.
52. *I.M.T. Doc. 661-PS*; pp. 225-226; see also Armstrong, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-33.
53. Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 229; see also Milanytsh, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
54. Armstrong, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-232.
55. *Ibid.*; see also *Czechoslovakia Fights Back*, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-95.
56. Milanytsh, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
57. Henry Picker, *op. cit.*
58. *I.M.T. Trials*, Vol. I, 84.
59. Leontij Forostivskyj, *Kyiv pid Vorozhymy Okupatsiyamy* (Kiev Under Enemy Occupation) (Buenos Aires: Mykola Denysiuk, 1952), p. 38.
60. J. Koroliv, *Shlah Natsiyi* (The Way of the Nation) (Vinnytsa, 1943) p. 39.
61. Milanytsh, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
62. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 1015.
63. Milanytsh, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
64. Author's own experience; see also reports from Belorussia, Vakar, *op. cit.*, p. 186.
65. *Polish Fortnightly Review*, Sept. 1, 1940 (Polish Ministry of Information, London), pp. 17-18.
66. President T. Masaryk—founder of the modern Czechoslovak State after World War I.
67. Erdely, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

68. *Ibid.*

69. *Ibid.*

70. *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

71. An exception to this was the closing of Lithuanian universities and higher schools and the arrest of 89 Lithuanian intellectuals as punishment for Lithuanian resistance to Nazi mobilization measures in Lithuania. See *Himmler's File H 264* and E. J. Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

72. Henry Picker, *op. cit.* Also see *I.M.T. Doc. 0-89-USSR*, se. 8.

73. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-1880.*

74. *Nation und Staat*, Oct. 1942, Vol. 1, p. 35.

75. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-2031.*

76. *Himmler's File*, Folder 323 (in Hoover Library)—Report of SS General Berger on the Labor Organization of Youth in occupied Ukraine.

77. *Ibid.*

78. *Ibid.*

79. The Nazis attempted to dominate the resurging Greek Orthodox Church in the Ukraine and Belorussia by playing up different factions within it and by trying to subordinate the bishops to the local German administrators. See Armstrong, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-202; and Milanytsch, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

80. *Himmler's File*, Folder 26, Drawer 2, Himmler's letter to Kaltenbrunner, July 21, 1944.

81. Decree of March 16, 1939, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, Part I, p. 485.

82. Arnold Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946*, Vol. 4, *Hitler's Europe* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 186.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 555.

85. Erdely, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

86. *Deutsche Wirtschafts Zeitung*, June 24, 1941, p. 51. See also Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

87. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-5398.*

88. Hermann Göring, besides his many other different functions, was also director of the German Four-Year Plan, and the virtual dictator of Nazi economy in Germany and in many occupied countries.

89. Heinz von Streng, *Die Landwirtschaft im General-*

gouvernement (Tübingen: Institut für Besatzungsfragen, 1955), p. 5, Doc. Ec. 410, from October 19, 1939.

90. *Ibid.*

91. Maximilian Freiherr Du Prel, *Das deutsche Generalgouvernement* (Cracow: 1940), p. 83.

92. From Sept. 1, 1940 to Sept. 1, 1943, the average caloric intake amounted to 814 in Polish cities. See Streng, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

93. *I.M.T. Doc.* 661-PS.

94. Streng, *op. cit.*, p. 6. 2,600 km. of highways were repaired, 400 km. were built new and railway capacity was raised 40 percent.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

96. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

97. "Treuhand-Verwaltung im Generalgouvernement," *Deutsche Wirtschafts-Zeitung*, March 5, 1943.

98. Streng, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

99. "Treuhand-Verwaltung," *op. cit.*

100. Streng, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

101. "Treuhand-Verwaltung," *op. cit.*

102. *Ibid.*

103. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

104. Interview No. 2.

105. Streng, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

106. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

107. Interview No. 2.

108. *Ibid.*; see also Andriy Katchor, *35 Lit na Sluzhbi Narodu* (35 Years at the Service of the People) (Winnipeg, Cooperative Association, 1950), p. 24.

109. Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-29.

110. *Ibid.*, p. 129.

111. F. T. Hart, *Alfred Rosenberg der Mann und sein Werk* (Berlin: J. F. Lehmann Verlag, 1942), 5th ed., pp. 59-61.

112. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

113. *I.M.T. Doc.* 221-L.

114. *I.M.T. Doc.* NI-440, cit. from R. Herzog, *Grundzüge der deutschen Besatzungsverwaltung in den ost- und süd-osteuropäischen Ländern während des zweiten Weltkrieges* (Tübingen: Institut für Besatzungsfragen, 1955), 185-186.

115. *I.M.T. Trials*, Vol. XXII, pp. 72-75.

116. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

117. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

118. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 48. See also Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-130.

119. Armstrong, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-220.

120. It was the only economic organization in the Soviet Ukraine which paid farmers for their food supplies partially in different agricultural equipment to a great degree produced by their own artisan workshops (like forks, spades, carriages, etc.). See Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

121. Milanytsh, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

122. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

123. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

124. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

125. *Ibid.* See also Milanytsh, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

126. Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

127. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

128. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

129. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

130. Alfred Bilmanis, *A History of Latvia* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 404.

131. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

132. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

133. *Ibid.*

134. *Ibid.*

135. *Ibid.*

136. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-3277.*

137. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

138. (a) TAGO Doc. RDV/57, Die Frage der Behandlung der Bevölkerung der ehemaligen polnischen Gebiete nach rassenpolitischen Gesichtspunkten. (b) *I.M.T. Doc. 661-PS*, Secret Expert Opinion: Legal Construction and Demographic Aspects of German Policy in respect of Poland. (c) *I.M.T. Doc. NO-1880*, Reflections on the treatment of Peoples of Alien Races in the East.

139. *Ibid.*, TAGO Doc. RDV/57, p. 23.

140. *I.M.T. Doc. 661-PS.*

141. TAGO Doc. RDV/57, pp. 32-35.

142. *I.M.T. Doc. 1058-PS.*

143. The number of foreign workers in Germany amounted to 6,450,000 by January 1944, and it included about 2,000,000 Soviet citizens, 1,400,000 Poles and 1,100,000 Frenchmen. See

W. Görlitz, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1939–1945* (Stuttgart: Steingruben Verlag, 1951), Vol. I, p. 344.

144. See Bullock, *op. cit.*, p. 606.

145. *I.M.T.* Vol. XXXV, p. 58.

146. The wages of the Eastern workers were subject to such discriminatory taxes that only 25 percent did go on their account and was spent almost entirely on their food and their “rent” in the working camps. See Bräutigam: *op. cit.*, p. 90.

147. Göring’s decree regarding the treatment of Eastern workers of June 30, 1942, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1942, Part I, p. 419.

148. *I.M.T.* Doc. 1919-PS.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE

1. *I.M.T.* Doc. NO-1805.

2. *Hitler at Kulmbach*, Feb. 5, 1928, edited by Gordon W. Prange (American Council on Public Affairs, Washington, 1944), from the *Völkischer Beobachter*, Apr. 7, 1928, pp. 8-9.

3. *I.M.T.* Doc. 1919-PS, Vol. XXIX, p. 112.

4. Speech of the Gauleiter of the Warthegau, Greiser, *Ostdeutscher Beobachter*, May 7, 1941.

5. It was planned to “deport” as many as 50 million “sub-humans” from German Eastern *Lebensraum* after the war.

6. *I.M.T.* Doc. NO-1805.

7. These were the factors which Nazi Germany tried to foster in Germanic society to bring about its intensive growth.

8. *TAGO Doc.* RDV/57, p. 34.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *I.M.T.* Doc. 912-PS. Also see Doc. 358-PS.

11. NSDAP—*National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei* (National-Socialistic German Workers Party), the official name of the Nazi Party.

12. *I.M.T.* Doc. NO-2202. By this time Poland was covered with many evacuated from West German war industry plants and the conflict between the efficiency of Polish working power and the objectives of Nazi *Lebensraum* policy was obvious.

13. Henry Picker, *op. cit.*

14. *Himmler’s File* #1302, Folder H, 11.

15. *I.M.T.* Doc. NO-3134.

16. *I.M.T.* Doc. NO-1878.

17. See letter from Himmler to Kaltenbrunner, *I.M.T. Doc.* 1101-PS.

18. *Himmler's File*, Folder 140, Drawer 4. See also *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-5357.

19. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-1803.

20. Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics*, 5th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1955), p. 265.

21. Milanytsh, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

22. *I.M.T. Doc.* NI-441.

23. *Ibid.*, *Doc.* NO-4784, S.D. Situational Report from USSR, No. 100, p. 2.

24. Leontij Forostivskyj, *Kyiv pid Vorozhymy Okupatsiyamy* (Kiev under Enemy Occupations), Buenos Aires, M. Denysiuk, 1952, p. 42.

25. *Karbovantsi*—the Ukrainian currency equivalent to rubles, introduced by Germans.

26. Forostivskyj, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

27. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-3256, p. 30. The rations were even lower than those which the Soviet population received in besieged Leningrad at the same time. See *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-3256, p. 10.

28. Forostivskyj, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

29. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-3256, p. 31.

30. *Ibid.*, *Doc.* NO-3237, p. 8.

31. *Ibid.*, *Doc.* NO-3256, p. 24.

32. Letter of Koch to Rosenberg from June 2, 1942. Two hundred thousand Ukrainian workers were recruited for work in Germany till June 1942.

33. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-1786.

34. "Ekonomichni prychyny povstannya U.P.A." (The Economic reasons behind the creation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), *Do Zbroyi* (To Arms), September, 1947.

35. Author's own experience.

36. *I.M.T. Doc.* 1058-PS.

37. *Ibid.*, *Doc.* 221-L.

38. *Ibid.*, *Doc.* NO-1879.

39. *Ibid.*

40. *Ibid.*, *Doc.* 389-PS. See also *Doc.* 221-L, and Roman Ilnytskyj, *Deutschland und die Ukraine, 1934-1945: Tatsachen Europäischer Ostpolitik Ein Vorbericht* (Munich: Osteuropa-Institut, 1956), Vol. II, p. 73.

41. The Soviet Government refused also during the war to join the Covenant on the protection of rights of prisoners of war, arguing that only "traitors" would surrender to Germans. A further logic behind this stand was that the more inhumanly the Soviet PW's were treated by Germans, the less willing others would be to surrender.

42. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-5481. See also NO-5359.

43. *TAGO Doc.* OKW/1970.

44. A. Bullock, *Hitler—a Study in Tyranny* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 606.

45. *I.M.T. Doc.* NI-441.

46. Benno Zieser, *The Road to Stalingrad* (translated from the German by Alec Brown), New York: Ballantine Books, 1956, pp. 30-31.

47. *TAGO Doc.* OKW/1970, p. 2.

48. *I.M.T. Doc.* NI-441.

49. *Ibid.*, *Doc.* NOKW-2170.

50. War Department, *The World at War, 1939-1944* (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1945), p. 80. (A. Rosenberg in his letter to The German Supreme Command gives a somewhat reduced number of 3.6 million—see *Doc.* OKW/1970.)

51. *TAGO Doc.* OKW/1970, p. 3.

52. Central Commission for Investigation of German Crimes in Poland, *German Crimes in Poland* (Warsaw: 1946), Vol. I, p. 54.

53. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-1911.

54. *Ibid.*, *Doc.* NO-3104.

55. *Ibid.*

56. *I.M.T.* The Numerical Expansion of the Concentration Camp Buchenwald during the years 1937-1945. Translation of *Doc.* E-168; Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel. Report B. 2833, p. 8.

57. *Ibid.*

58. *TAGO Doc. Compile Directives dealing with the administration of Concentration Camps*, 164a, 16/7, p. 28.

59. *I.M.T. Doc.* 654-Ps.

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Tago Doc. Compiled Directive Dealing with the Administration of Concentration Camps*, 164a, 16/7, p. 28.

62. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-1948.

63. *I.M.T. Doc.* E-168, Table 9.

64. *Ibid.* See also *Compiled Directives Dealing with the Administration of Concentration Camps*, 164a, 16/7, p. 201.

65. *I.M.T. Doc. E-168.*

66. *TAGO Doc. Compiled Directives dealing with the Administration of Concentration Camps*, 164a, 16/7, p. 201.

67. *Ibid.*

68. *I.M.T. Doc. 172-USSR.*

69. *I.M.T. Doc. 1918-PS.*

70. *Documents Relating to the Administration of Occupied Countries in Eastern Europe, op. cit.*, p. 9.

71. T. Bor-Komorowski, *The Secret Army* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), pp. 18-19.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 19. Instructions about the execution of Polish leading intellectuals were also issued to the various *Sicherheitsdienst* units on the eve of the Nazi Invasion of the Soviet Union. They applied to the areas annexed by the Soviet Union in September 1939, formerly known as Eastern Poland. As a result of these premeditated plans 38 Polish professors were murdered by the Nazis in July 1941, shortly after the occupation of Lviv. See *I.M.T. Doc.*, Vol. III, pp. 243-245.

73. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-2032.*

74. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-3011.*

75. Bor-Komorowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 114, 155.

76. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-2202*, p. 5.

77. *I.M.T. Vol. XIV*, p. 539.

78. *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIX, p. 446.

79. *Ibid.*, *Doc. 1918-PS.*

80. RSHA (Reichssicherheits-Hauptabteilung)—Reich's Security Main Office—a center which embraced all the branches of German police.

81. *I.M.T. Vol. IV*, 317.

82. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-3416.*

83. *Ibid.*, *Doc. NO-5481 and NO-5359.*

84. *Ibid.*, *Doc. NO-3160.*

85. *Ibid.*, *Doc. NO-2403.*

86. *Ibid.*, *Doc. NO-3146.*

87. *Ibid.*, *Doc. NO-3155.*

88. *I.M.T. Doc. 3876-PS.*

89. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-3416; OKW 701a, 703, 703a.*

90. Bräutigam, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

91. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-2833 and NO-3143.*

92. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-3153.
93. *I.M.T. Doc.* 221-L.
94. *Ibid.*, Doc. 389-Ps. Keitel's top-secret directive.
95. *Ibid.*, Doc. NO-3392.
96. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-3028. See also *Doc.* NO-5394, p. 5.
97. Menski: "Narodnaya Pravda" (Peoples Truth), nos. 7-8 (150) and Dallin Files, No. 126, cit. from: Nicholas P. Vakar, *Belorussia: The Making of a Nation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 196. See also Ivan Krypyakevych, *Istoriya Ukrainskoho Viyska* (The History of the Ukrainian Armed Forces), ed. by Myron Levytsky, 2nd rev., ed., (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Book Club, Ltd., 1953).
98. Operational Situation Report USSR, No. 106. *I.M.T. Vol. IV*, pp. 146-150.
99. Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, pp. 356-361.
100. *I.M.T. Trials. Vol. XXII*, pp. 72-75.
101. Lemkin Rafal, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe—Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division for International Law), p. 131.
102. *Official Gazette of General Government*, No. 94, p. 665, Nov. 1, 1942 (*I.M.T. Vol. III*, p. 524).
103. Arnold Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946*, Vol. 4, Hitler's Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 245.
104. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-3146, p. 17. See also NO-1611.
105. *Ibid.*
106. "Akcje" i "Wysiedlenia" ("Actions" and "Resettlements"), Documents and Materials to the events of German Occupation in Poland, Vol. II, Part I. Ed. by Dr. Jozef Kermorz, Warsaw-Lodz-Cracow, 1946, p. 306.
107. "Alle Juden Raus," Die Liquidation des Warschauer Ghettos miterlebt und nachempfunden von einem Christen. (Pamphlet, Hoover Library, Stanford, No. Ts Poland T318, p. 5.)
108. *I.M.T. Trials*, Vol. XXVI, pp. 628-698, *Doc.* 1061-PS.
109. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-3149, p. 15. Yet the SS leaders were aware that in reality the Jewish problem could not be identified with the Communist problem. As early as September 17, 1941 a Special Task Group leader reported: "Even if an immediate hundred per cent exclusion of the Jewry were possible, this would not remove the political sense of danger. The Bolshevistic

work depends on Jews, Russians, Georgians, Armenians, Poles, Ukrainians; the Bolshevistic machine is by no means identical with the Jewish population." (*I.M.T. Doc. NO-3151*).

110. *Ibid.*, NO-3149. Also L-180.

111. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-2833* and NO-3143.

112. *Ibid.*, NO-2403.

113. Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, pp. 333-339.

114. *Ibid.*, pp. 318-332.

115. Jacob Apenszlak and Moshe Polakiewicz, *Armed Resistance of Jews in Poland* (New York: American Federation for Polish Jews, 1944), p. 28. This source asserts that at some periods the daily quotas of evacuation from Warsaw ghetto amounted from 6,000-10,000 a day. This account coincides with the figures of Tenenbaum (*op. cit.*, p. 337), who states that between July 22 and Sept. 21, 1942, approximately 300,000 Jews were evacuated from Warsaw.

116. "*Alle Juden Raus*," *op. cit.*, p. 5; Apenszlak, *op. cit.*, p. 14, gives mortality rate in Warsaw ghetto as high as 500 daily.

117. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-2586; Trials*, Vol. XIII, pp. 243-249; see also Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-272.

118. Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

119. *German Crimes in Poland*, *op. cit.*, p. 42 a. 110.

120. Interview No. 9.

121. *I.M.T. Doc. NG-2586-G; Trials*, vol. XIII, pp. 210-217.

122. Rosenberg's radio address in the summer of 1939, cited from Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

123. *Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Council Law, No. 10*, Vols. 1 to 14 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), Vol. XIII, p. 244. Henceforth referred to as *M.T. Trials*.

124. Madagascar was occupied at the end of 1942 by the British troops.

125. *Doc. RF-1201*; "La Persecution des Juifs en France et dans les autres Pays de l'Ouest," 1947, p. 83.

126. *I.M.T. Trials*, Vol. XIV, pp. 512-517.

127. *I.M.T. Trials*, Vol. IV, p. 382.

128. *I.M.T. Doc. NO-3824*.

129. *I.M.T. Doc.*, 3279-PS; *I.M.T. Trials*, Vol. IV, p. 491. See also *Doc. 2992-PS*.

130. *Ibid.*, *Doc. NO-3824*.

131. Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 360.
132. *I.M.T. Doc.* 1919-PS. See also "Autobiography of Rudolf Hoess," in *Biuletyn Glownej Komisiji Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce* (Bulletin of the Chief Commission for the Investigation of the Nazi Crimes in Poland), Vol. VII, 1951, p. 187.
133. Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 383. See also Bor-Komorowski, p. 97.
134. *Ibid.*, pp. 460-461.
135. Central Commission for Investigation of German Crimes in Poland, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, p. 15. See also, *I.M.T. Doc.* 3868-PS.
136. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
137. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
138. Jan Karski, *Story of a Secret State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1944), pp. 349-350.
139. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-3868-PS.
140. In Auschwitz Cyclon B, a crystallized prussic acid, was used.
141. *I.M.T. Doc.* NO-3868-PS.
142. *Ibid.* See also "Autobiography of Rudolf Hoess," *op. cit.* p. 236.
143. Tenenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 388.
144. *Ibid.*, p. 339.
145. According to the blueprint of *Reichsführer SS*, 50 millions of *Lebensraum* Slavs were to be "resettled" in Western Siberia: 85 percent of Poles, 75 percent of Belorussians, 65 percent of Ukrainians, and 50 percent Czechs. See *I.M.T. Doc.* NG-2325.

NOTE FOR CHAPTER SIX

1. David Riesman and others, *The Lonely Crowd* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1953).

Bibliography

Although Nazi Germany left behind an impressive collection of documents and literature for the study of the totalitarian state and totalitarian imperialism, these sources are widely scattered on two continents, and a researcher on a particular problem or aspect in this field is faced with the necessity of travel in order to piece together different fragments into a workable source.

This study on the Nazi *Lebensraum* policy was begun with the basic sources included in the two sets of Nuremberg Trials which were found at the University of Illinois Library and which are now available in almost any large library. The two sets total almost sixty volumes. The volumes include the proceedings of the Trials as well as many Nazi documents and affidavits of the defendants and witnesses. Many of the documents shed some light on Nazi *Lebensraum* designs and practices. But they have their shortcomings. Most of the evidence is related specifically to the charges of the prosecution, and the included documents are often incomplete or fragmentary.

The University of Illinois Library possesses other valuable sources for the study of Nazi *Lebensraum*. Among them are some secret Nazi ideological manuals drafted for use by the Nazi Party and the German Army during the war. The Library also has in its collection accounts of German administrators in the East (Bräutigam and Du Prel) and periodicals relevant to the Nazi movement and Nazi policy. Among those included in an almost complete collection of *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, *Nation und Staat*, *Wirtschaftsdienst*, and *Wirtschaftszeitung*.

Other important sources are the German documents and affidavits prepared for various Nuremberg Trials but not actually included in the published Trial volumes. They are mostly the photostats of complete German documents totalling 30,000–40,000, and they are located at Columbia University, the Library of Congress (Law Department), and the Mid-West Inter-University Library. They are mostly uncatalogued and identified only by the general code markings of the Nuremberg Documents. These markings are as follows: NO for documents relating to the activities of Nazi organizations; NG for Nazi

administration in the East; NOKW for the High Command of the German Army; NI for the German industry; and P.S. for the documents used specifically by the Nuremberg prosecution.

Another source is the Hoover Institute and Library for War and Revolution at Stanford, California. Here is available a part of the Himmler's Archive (Himmler's File). This file is very enlightening, especially in matters dealing with Nazi resettlement policy in Poland and Lithuania. Another part of Himmler's Archive, which the author consulted, is located in the Document Department of the Library of Congress. This portion of the Archive gives some supplementary evidence of Himmler's *Lebensraum* practices in Poland and Lithuania and includes his designs and practices for the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.

In the vicinity of Washington, D. C. are other source centers. Among them the author consulted the Departmental Records Center in Alexandria, Virginia and the National Archives in Washington, D. C.

The first center is managed by the Army and includes many original Nazi documents, of which a considerable part is still under security classification. From the unclassified documents those most valuable for study of Nazi *Lebensraum* are following: *RDV/Doc.* referring to activities of the German Commission for Strengthening of Germanism; *OKH/Doc.* of the High Command of German Army; and *EAP/Doc.* dealing with Himmler's Administration of Concentration Camps.

In the National Archives the author viewed several motion pictures taken in different Nazi concentration camps shortly after arrival of the allied troops.

In New York, the author studied some clandestine press literature and leaflets of the Ukrainian Underground in possession of the "Prolog" Publishing Company. More of the Ukrainian clandestine press and literature under the Nazi occupation, as well as the copied situation reports and instructions from the Ukrainian Underground Archives, was made available to the author by Professor L. Shankovsky of Philadelphia.

The above-mentioned sources were supplemented by interviews with various former concentration camp internees, underground members, administrators, and other eyewitnesses of Nazi policy.

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