

The Millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine

The Ukrainian Orthodox Question in the USSR

Frank E. Sysyn



Harvard University Ukrainian Studies Fund

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***The Ukrainian Orthodox Question
in the USSR***

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The Ukrainian Studies Fund, Inc. was established in 1957. Its purpose is to raise funds for the establishment and support of Ukrainian scholarly centers at American universities. The organization has endowed three chairs in Ukrainian studies (history, literature, and linguistics) at Harvard University, and is in the process of completing the endowment of Harvard's Ukrainian Research Institute.

The Friends of HURI was established by a group of young professionals concerned about the cultural development of Ukraine and committed to the advancement of Ukrainian scholarship. The founding principle of this organization was two-fold: to seek financial support for HURI in the Ukrainian community and to draw the community into the academic and social life of Harvard University.

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FOREWORD

The Ukrainian Studies Fund prepares for the Millennium

In 1988 Ukrainians throughout the world will celebrate the Millennium of the Christianization of Rus'-Ukraine. An important part of these observances will be the promotion of scholarly inquiry about the process of Christianization and the thousand-year Christian Ukrainian spiritual and cultural tradition. The Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University proposes to undertake a number of projects, including sponsorship of an international scholarly conference, a multi-volume source series and a comprehensive history of the Ukrainian church, and the establishment of a chair devoted to the religious history of Ukraine at the Harvard Divinity School. In addition to providing financial assistance to the Institute for the realization of these plans, the Ukrainian Studies Fund has funded a position at Keston College, Kent, the United Kingdom, for a Ukrainian researcher, whose task is to examine the present status of religion in Ukraine. In cooperation with the Friends of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, the Fund has also initiated the Millennium Series of seminal studies on topics of Ukrainian religious and ecclesiastical history. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church traces its origins to the Christianization of Kievan Rus' in 988. Yet, in the twentieth century, Ukrainian Orthodox believers have twice had to reestablish their Church only to see it destroyed by the Soviet regime. While denied the right to function in Soviet Ukraine, Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the West continue to fulfill their traditional role as leading spiritual and cultural institutions in the Ukrainian community.

In the article and reviews reprinted in this booklet, Dr. Frank E. Sysyn provides a multifaceted view of the recent history and the present situation of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Frank E. Sysyn is Associate Director of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute.

Ukrainian Studies Fund
Harvard University

The Ukrainian Orthodox Question in the USSR

In 1977 Father Vasyl' Romaniuk, a prisoner in the Soviet Gulag because of his struggle for religious rights, addressed a letter to Metropolitan Mstyslav, leader of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the West:

Your Grace! First of all, I assure you of my devotion and humility. I declare that I consider and have always considered myself a member of the U(krainian) A(utocephalous) O(rthodox) C(hurch) in spite of the fact that I formally belonged to a different hierarchy, for it is well known that the Ukrainian Church, Orthodox as well as Catholic, is outlawed in Ukraine. Such are the barbaric ethics of the Bolsheviks.¹

The appeal was a remarkable testimony that almost fifty years after the destruction of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church formed in the 1920s and over thirty years after the eradication of the Church restored during the Second World War, loyalty to Ukrainian Orthodoxy still remains alive among Ukrainian believers. It also demonstrates how shared persecution has brought new ecumenical understanding between Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholics.

To discuss the position of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the Soviet Union is a difficult task, for since the destruction of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, tens of its bishops, hundreds of its priests, and thousands of its lay activists in the early 1930s (and the liquidation of its successor restored during the Second World War), it exists more as a preference and a tradition than as an active movement. But it is clear that a substantial number of Orthodox believers and Ukraine see themselves as Ukrainian Orthodox and numerous believers would be attracted to a movement to establish a Ukrainian Orthodox Church were it to be feasible to do so.

In any examination of the Ukrainian Orthodox issue among contemporary Soviet believers, political, cultural and ecclesiastical factors far predating Soviet rule must be taken into account, above all the relation of Russian Orthodoxy and Russian nationalism to Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the inter-relations of Ukrainian Catholics and Ukrainian Orthodox. This short sketch permits mentioning only the major points, even at the risk of over-simplifying complex issues.

First it is important to remember that the migration of the metropolitans of Kiev to Russian territory at the end of the thirteenth century left the Ukrainian lands without a resident ecclesiastical leader.² Several attempts by the rulers of Galicia-Volhynia, Poland, and Lithuania to convince the metropolitans of Kiev to return to Ukrainian or Belorussian territories or to create a separate metropolitan see for these lands did not meet with lasting success. Only in the mid-fifteenth century, with the Russian Church's declaration of autocephaly from the patriarchs of

Constantinople and the change of the metropolitan's title from "Kiev" to "Moscow," did an enduring division of ecclesiastical leadership occur between the Russian Church and the Ukrainian-Belorussian Church. From that time the Church once again became a major factor in preserving and developing Ukrainian culture and identity.

Always in close contact with Latin Christendom, the Ukrainian Orthodox were influenced by the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation. In the late sixteenth century, Ukrainian believers responded to the Western Christian challenge by forming religious brotherhoods, in which the laity took an active part. The brotherhoods organized printing presses and schools. In 1596, at the Union of Brėst, a segment of hierarchs and laity united with Rome, forming the ecclesiastical body from which present-day Ukrainian Catholics descend. Opposition to the attempts of the Polish government to enforce the Union resulted in restoration of an Orthodox hierarchy in 1620 and pressured the government to recognize the Church's legality in 1632. The election of Peter Mohyla as metropolitan initiated a period of religious and cultural reform. In 1632, Mohyla adapted Western models to form the famed collegium, later academy, that was the first modern Orthodox higher educational institution. He also outlined the dogmas of the faith in a statement approved by the Orthodox patriarchates. This whole period of religious ferment accompanied a Ukrainian cultural revival and it is viewed by modern Ukrainians as essential in defining their spiritual culture.

The great Cossack revolt of 1648 and the establishment of the Hetmanate gave protection both to Orthodoxy and the cultural revival. Nevertheless, Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's recognition of the suzerainty of the Muscovite tsar in 1654 set the stage for the growing influence of the patriarchate of Moscow (erected in 1589) in Ukraine. Metropolitan Syl'vester Kosov and other Ukrainian hierarchs struggled against any change in the Ukrainian Church's status, but the increase of the Russian government's political power in the Ukraine sealed the fate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In 1685-86, as the result of governmental pressure and bribes, the metropolitan see of Kiev was transferred from the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople to the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Moscow. In the seventeenth century, learned Kievan clergymen poured into Muscovy where the reforms of Patriarch Nikon resulted in an Old Believer schism that undermined native Russian religious traditions. A new Imperial Russian Orthodoxy was formed in which the Ukrainian input was great. But with the political and cultural integration of the Ukrainian elite into the Russian elite came an undermining of Ukrainian religious traditions from architecture to book printing and their replacement by the new official Russian Orthodox norms. As Orthodoxy became subordinate to the Russian state, the Church became an instrument of imperial ideology and Russification. This process was hastened by the change of the Russian Church's

structure under Peter the First, who in the early eighteenth century abolished the patriarchate and created the Synodal Church as a bureaucratic arm of the state.

It was therefore inevitable that the rise of modern Ukrainian culture and national sentiment in the nineteenth century would challenge the Russian Orthodox control of Ukrainian believers. By the early twentieth century, both in Russia and in Ukraine, a church reform movement sought to revitalize religious life and remove the dead bureaucracy that governed the Imperial Church. But what in Russia remained a controversy between reformers and conservatives took on a national coloration in Ukraine. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, movements in Ukraine to improve the spiritual, cultural and material life of the masses usually assumed a Ukrainian patriotic stance and opposed the Russificatory policies of the Tsars. In the early twentieth century, most of the hierarchs and monks of the official Church in Ukraine defended the old regime and its policies. The reformers, who sought liturgical, constitutional and attitudinal changes in the Church, came largely from the married clergy and the laity. In Ukraine, a segment of the reformers sought use of the Ukrainian language in sermons, religious texts and the liturgy and a reorganization of the Church's government. They were opposed by those bishops and clergymen who had sought to strengthen the Russian Orthodox Church's position by allying it with the Russian nationalist and "Black Hundreds" movements. These activists, who had begun transforming the Imperial Russian Church into an instrument of Russian mass national politics, were profoundly Ukrainophobe, and they used their influence in the Church to persecute Ukrainian culture and patriots.

The collapse of the tsarist regime offered great opportunities for the Ukrainian national movement. The rapid spread of Ukrainian national consciousness and patriotism was soon manifested in Orthodox Church affairs. After 1917 the Ukrainian Church movement demanded Ukrainization of the Church, a greater role for the married clergy and laity in its governance, and autocephaly.³ Persecuted by the conservative and Russian chauvinist bishops who even opposed using the Ukrainian language in the liturgy, the Ukrainian Church movement became more and more radical. The Russian leadership sought to use the Church for Russian political purposes, particularly support of the monarchists, and the fall of the Ukrainian National Republic, which had adopted a decree declaring the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church in January 1919, undermined the Ukrainian Church movement's position. Still, the Bolshevik triumph over the Russian Whites also weakened the Russian Orthodox Church. A deadlock ensued in which the Ukrainian Orthodox activists, unlike the Georgian Orthodox who reestablished their Church after the collapse of tsarist rule, found it impossible to win existing bishops over to establish a Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Determined not to capitulate to the Russian hierarchs, a council held in St. Sophia's

Cathedral in 1921 resorted to the "Alexandrine" precedent, the consecration of a bishop through the laying-on of hands by the clerical and lay members of the sobor.⁴ It declared the 1686 submission of the Kievan metropolitan see to Moscow as forcible and illegal, and saw Ukrainian Orthodoxy as always having existed, but having lacked its own hierarchy.

In the 1920s, the Bolshevik regime favored competition between Orthodox religious groups. It also embarked on a Ukrainization program to win the support of the Ukrainian populace. Therefore, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was allowed to develop; it gathered Ukrainian patriots around itself, and by its competition even induced the Russian jurisdictions in Ukraine to make concessions to Ukrainian sentiment. By 1927 Soviet policies began to change, and the revered Metropolitan Vasyl' Lypkivs'kyi was forced to resign. In 1929 the Church was accused of involvement in purported underground activities of the "League for the Liberation of Ukraine" and condemned as a "Petliurite" institution. It was forced to declare its self-liquidation in 1930 and its clergymen and activists were annihilated in the arrests and purges of the early 1930s. While all Orthodox groups were persecuted, only the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox were selected for total destruction, thus indicating the increasing Russificatory tendencies of Stalinism.⁵

The annexation of Volhynia and Polissia by Poland after World War I had put about two and one-half million Orthodox Ukrainians into the Polish state. In 1924 the patriarchate of Constantinople established a Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, explaining its right to determine the fate of former territories of the Russian Orthodox Church as deriving from the powers of the Constantinople ecumenical patriarchate, the canons of the Church, and the uncanonical means by which the Kiev metropolitan see was transferred from the jurisdiction of Constantinople to that of Moscow in 1686. In the interwar period the increasing national consciousness of the Ukrainian population was manifested in a movement to Ukrainize the Church and to challenge the Russian nationalists' control of the hierarchy and the institutions. The Ukrainian Church movement had achieved considerable successes by the outbreak of World War II, including the appointment of a Ukrainian bishop in Volhynia.

It was from the Polish Orthodox Church, with its hierarchy consecrated in the traditional manner, that a new hierarchy was consecrated for a restored Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1942. With the question of the apostolic succession of the hierarchy resolved, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church began setting up a church structure in the former Soviet Ukraine, although harassment from the Nazi occupation authorities and competition from an "Autonomous" Orthodox Church that wished to remain loyal to the Russian Orthodox Church hindered its activities. Meanwhile, Stalin had come to an accommodation with the Russian Orthodox Church in 1943, largely to obtain support for his war effort. A new patriarch was elected in that year and

as the Soviet army swept westward all Orthodox believers in Ukraine were incorporated into the Patriarchal Russian Orthodox Church. In 1946 after a period of persecution and intimidation, the Soviet authorities staged the spurious "Synod of Lviv" incorporating the Ukrainian Catholics into the Russian Orthodox Church. Similar measures were taken in Transcarpathia in 1949. Since World War II, only the Russian Orthodox Church is allowed to serve Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic (Uniate) believers.

The twentieth-century experience of Orthodox believers in Ukraine has been a struggle over whether the Church should represent the interests of Russian nationalism or should represent the interests of the Ukrainian national movement. Political goals, ecclesiastical laws and religious dogmas have intertwined in deciding believers' choices, but the Russian trend has usually had the advantage of representing the status quo. Nevertheless, Ukrainian Orthodox believers have twice established Autocephalous Churches that have attracted large constituencies. However, since World War II the Russian trend has been backed by all the power of the Soviet state.

In discussing the present fate of Ukrainian Orthodox believers, one must see them as sharing the difficulties of all members of the Russian Orthodox Church—discrimination in education and employment, pressure on clergy, difficulty of retaining houses of worship and constant demands for demonstrations of Soviet patriotism. Within the structure of Russian Orthodoxy, Ukraine and Ukrainians occupy a position far greater than their proportion in the general population, due to the greater strength of religious activity in Ukraine than in Russia, particularly because of the reopening of churches during the Second World War and because of the desire to convert Ukrainian Catholics to Orthodoxy. It has been estimated that over fifty percent of the functioning Orthodox churches in the USSR are in Ukraine (with over twenty-five percent of the all-Soviet total in the western and by tradition predominantly Ukrainian Catholic regions, which have a mere 7-8 million inhabitants).⁶ In addition, Ukrainians provide a very large percentage of vocations. In short, the post-war period has repeated the processes of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when Ukrainians played an important role in the Russian Church. But unlike that period, when Ukrainian learning and ecclesiastical practices supplanted Muscovite ones, no such tendencies are apparent yet in the USSR. The church in eastern Ukraine remains a bastion of Russification, using Russian pronunciation of Church Slavonic and Russian as a language of preaching and administration. Only in western Ukraine, prompted by fear of widespread Ukrainian Catholic sympathies among Orthodox believers, does the Church use Ukrainian Church Slavonic and Ukrainian in preaching, and allow the retention of local liturgical practices, including markedly Uniate ones.

How does the Ukrainian Orthodox problem affect the position of believers in Ukraine and what significance does it hold for the future?

First, the Ukrainian question remains one of the major unresolved issues for the Orthodox world. The decree of the patriarchate of Constantinople of 1924 questioning the 1686 transfer of the Kievan metropolitanate casts doubt on the canonicity of the Russian Church's position in Ukraine.⁷ But on a more basic level, the Ukrainians face the problem of being the second most numerous national body of Orthodox believers, but having no Church of their own in Ukraine. However fictitious their republic's autonomy may be, they cannot help contrasting the position of their fifty million-strong homeland with the tiny Georgian republic of the USSR, which has its own patriarchate.

The problem is far more than one of national pride. As long as Russian Orthodoxy, whether official or dissident, remains the instrument of Russian nationalism, it inevitably evokes resentment from Ukrainian believers. It is but one more sign that the formally atheistic internationalist Soviet regime uses one measure for Russians and their culture and another for non-Russians. In addition, the Russian nationalist trends among Orthodox dissenters, including Solzhenitsyn, can only trouble Ukrainian believers.

At a time when the Russian Orthodox Church is becoming more Ukrainian in its constituency, pressures are inevitable. So far the official Church has made a few concessions: the active role permitted Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev, Exarch of all Ukraine, in international forums, the publication of a Ukrainian-language journal of the Patriarchate, *Pravoslavnyi visnyk* (Orthodox Herald), a limited edition of a Ukrainian prayer book and the retention of Ukrainian Church Slavonic in Uniate areas. Many of these gestures, like pamphlets issued by the Society for Contacts with Ukrainians Abroad entitled "Eastern Orthodoxy in Ukraine" (not "Russian Orthodoxy..."), may be seen as intended for the Ukrainian diaspora, but they inevitably strengthen the position of Ukrainians in the Church.⁸

What is harder to judge is the effect of the increasing number of Ukrainian clergy, above all from the patriotic western Ukraine, including traditionally Orthodox (Volhynia, Bukovina) and Catholic (Galicia, Transcarpathia) regions. As they, as well as western believers, have fanned out throughout Ukraine, they have undoubtedly disseminated their patriotism and their non-Russian liturgical practices. (Anyone who has attended church in Kiev and Lviv knows how substantial the differences still remain.)

We have information from Orthodox testimony from the eastern Ukraine that the KGB is concerned about the increase of western Ukrainian clergy and is trying to stop the practice of candidates from the vocation-rich western dioceses going east to be ordained. In 1977, the bishop of Poltava, Feodosii, a native of the former western Ukrainian Volhynian stronghold of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, addressed a lengthy letter to Brezhnev on the position of the Church in his diocese. In it he recounts the following confrontation with the authorities:

I. Ia. Nechytailo says that I am “enticing clergy to Poltava from the western regions of Ukraine.” At present two priests from western Ukraine serve in the Poltava area—neither of whom I knew previously and therefore could not “entice” them. It seems to me that one should not be surprised that two priests from the western regions of Ukraine serve in the Poltava region, but rather one should be surprised why they should not serve here? Why does the regional representative (Nechytailo) divide Ukraine into two, when we have one? And why should one part be set against the other? What crime did the regional representative see in that people of some region, let us say western, go to live in other regions, eastern, or the reverse?⁹

If Bishop Feodosii seems concerned to treat all believers equally as his faithful, other bishops remain closer to the official Church's and the regime's traditions of Russian chauvinism. In spring 1974, the editors of the underground journal, *Ukrains'kyi visnyk* (*The Ukrainian Herald*), challenged Metropolitan Filaret:

And maybe the Exarch will tell us what he did with Father Sava of St. Volodymyr's Cathedral in Kiev, after he began delivering his sermons in Ukrainian? Maybe he can also tell us why in 1972 only four students from the Lviv region were accepted into the Odessa Theological Seminary? Why an atmosphere of (Russian) chauvinism pervades the seminary? Why services in the churches of Ukraine are conducted in Russian, with the exception of the western regions, and even there not in all areas? In Volhynia, for example, only Russian is used in almost all the churches. Why is there no religious literature published in the Ukrainian language? No, the Exarch will not answer these questions. We will do this for him. It is because there is no official Ukrainian Church in Ukraine. Moscow usurped the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church in eastern Ukraine in the thirties and the Greek-Catholic Church in western Ukraine in the forties. Moscow's Orthodox Church is an instrument of Russification. Key administrative positions in the Church are held by obedient lackeys who care only about their earthly comforts and who receive a dole from the satanical regime for their black hypocritical deeds.¹⁰

Essential to the question of Ukrainian Orthodoxy is the Ukrainian Catholic issue. It is clear that the regime has allowed that the Orthodox Church a Ukrainian face in western Ukraine, in order to win over the suppressed Ukrainian Catholics. For every active member of the catacomb Ukrainian Catholic Church, there are many priests and believers in the official Orthodox Church who would return to the Ukrainian Catholic Church immediately, if the Church became legal. For the present this element as well as the real converts to Orthodoxy form a strong lobby which views the proper role of the Orthodox Church as similar to that of the traditionally patriotic and activist Ukrainian Catholic Church. They press for the pursuit of this role at least at the parish level. The tremendous increase in activity of the catacomb Ukrainian Catholic Church in the last few years will obviously strengthen this party's hand.

Although in recent years there have been a number of noble protests by Orthodox Russian believers in defence of Ukrainian Catholics, it is still safe to say that most Russian Orthodox (like Russian atheists) find the Uniates alien and incomprehensible.¹¹ In contrast, throughout the twentieth century, common patriotism and common suffering have drawn Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholics together. In the 1930s, the Ukrainian Catholic metropolitan, Andrei Sheptytsky, defended Orthodox believers against Polish religious persecution. To this day the Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy in the West condemns the forcible conversion of the Ukrainian Catholics in 1946. Father Romaniuk's statement is, I believe, indicative of a widespread sentiment, particularly among intellectuals. Even the most ardent Orthodox cannot but have respect for the tenacious struggle of his fellow-Christian Ukrainian Catholics. Whether Russian Orthodox believers can fully understand this ecumenical drift among Ukrainian Orthodox is a major question.


In recent years, it is clear that young Russians have turned more and more to the Church for spiritual and national values. Here, as always, Ukrainian youth are in a difficult position, particularly in eastern Ukraine where the Church is so Russian. It is indicative that when Valentyn Moroz, a son of Orthodox Volhynia, defended the spiritual legacy of Ukrainians as represented by the church of the Hutsul mountaineers in Kosmach, he asserted:

In 1773 it was reconsecrated as Uniate Church but by this time this had lost its former significance. Galicia had become a province of Austria. Polish rule had come to an end. The Uniate movement had become integrated into Ukraine's spiritual life. The struggle against it and defence of Orthodoxy ceased to be a national problem. On the contrary, Russia soon began to use Orthodoxy as a means of Russification in the lands taken from Poland. The most important task was the preservation of the Church.¹²

His statement reflects the contrast of how a Ukrainian and a Russian patriot must view the role of the Orthodox Church in the past—the Russian can see it as a national Church that defended his people's cultural legacy, but the Ukrainian has two national Churches and cannot forget the official Orthodox Church's alien nature and negative role in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There has yet to be a study of the spiritual and cultural values of Ukrainian intellectuals and dissenters.¹³ Some, such as Lev Lukianenko, have demanded the restoration of a Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In general, it seems clear that the Ukrainian intelligentsia's search for spiritual values leads more to the past (Mohylan Orthodoxy, the brotherhoods, Ukrainian Baroque) and the rich Christian folklore of the people (Christmas Holy Eve supper, carols, pysanky or Easter eggs, the vertep or holiday puppet theatre, etc.), than to official

Russian Orthodoxy. Anyone who had viewed "Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors" and the other Ukrainian ethnographic films of the 1960s and early 70s cannot but feel this strongly.

The Ukrainian intelligentsia has also turned to its spiritual roots in the broad cultural sense in its attempts to preserve its legacy. Here it is at a great disadvantage compared with the Russian intelligentsia, since historical, literary and art history works that would be permitted and even encouraged in Russia are forbidden as "nationalist" in Ukraine. The pogrom of intellectuals in the early 1970s brought research in fields such as pre-1917 Ukrainian history to a halt, and destroyed almost all historical journals: *Seredni viky na Ukraini* (Middle Ages in Ukraine), *Istorychni dzherela ta ikh vykorystannia* (Historical Sources and their Utilization), *Kyivs'ka starovyna* (Kievan Antiquities), etc.¹⁴ While scores of art books appear in Leningrad and Moscow, it was only the appearance of a book on Ukrainian icons in the USA that forced the Soviet authorities into allowing one in Kiev. The vast icon collections assembled by Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi remain stored precariously in church basements in Lviv. While destruction of churches and other cultural monuments is an all-Soviet phenomenon, the KGB works with particular zeal in Ukraine, accusing opponents of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism."



Built under the patronage of Hetman Ivan Mazepa in 1690-1696, the Collegiate Church of St. Nicholas was the site of the first Ukrainian-language liturgy in Kiev (May 22, 1919).

Those interested in Ukrainian spiritual and artistic culture inevitably turn to the "Second Jerusalem," Kiev. Here the situation is catastrophic, since Communist plans to build a new Soviet capital led to virtual cultural genocide in the city of the Golden Domes in 1934-35. St. Michael's Monastery, the Church of St. Basil, the Brotherhood Monastery of the Epiphany, the Collegiate Church of St. Nicholas, the Church of Sts. Borys and Hlib and many others were all destroyed and in the end nothing was built in their place.¹⁵ Interestingly enough, while Ukrainian medieval and Baroque churches were removed from the face of the earth, the nineteenth-century Synodal period St. Volodymyr's (Vladimir's) Cathedral was left standing and now serves as the metropolitan's cathedral.

In the last few years there had been a spate of publishing activity involved with the rather arbitrarily proclaimed 1500th anniversary of Kiev in 1982.¹⁶ New books on Kiev and its art have been published and for the first time modern Ukrainian translations of the chronicles have appeared: *The Primary*, the *Kievan* and the *Galician-Volhynian*. While the authorities intend the anniversary to affirm "East Slavic" (read All-Russian) unity throughout the ages, the Ukrainian intelligentsia have used it to provide at least a little access to Ukraine's spiritual and cultural legacy. The 1500th anniversary of the city must also be seen in connection with the impending light of the looming Millennium of Kievan Christianity in 1988. It is, of course, painful for Ukrainian Orthodox to remember that the city of Metropolitans Hilarion, Peter Mohyla and Vasyly' Lypkivsky, now contains a mere exarch of the Moscow patriarchate. Pope John Paul II's call to Ukrainians to prepare for the celebration of the Millennium of their Christianity has resonance not only for Ukrainian Catholics, but also for Ukrainian Orthodox. The Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches in the West will be joining together for conferences and scholarly publications intending to reaffirm their spiritual legacy and bring their Churches' plight to the world's attention.¹⁷ It is clear that this will sustain their believers in Ukraine. It will be interesting to see how far the Soviet authorities will go in allowing the Moscow patriarch to celebrate the Millennium of "Russia's" Christianity in order to combat Ukrainian activities.

As with all Soviet policies on religion, foreign affairs play a major role in calculations. Patriarch Pimen and Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev have important parts to play in "ecumenical contacts," and "peace offensives." Obviously the existence of large and active Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the West is extremely troublesome to them. The Ukrainian Catholics, with their support from Pope John Paul II and their access to the Vatican Radio, are the greater problem. Still, the existence of 300,000 to 400,000 Ukrainian Orthodox believers in the West poses a major problem for the Soviet authorities.¹⁸ The Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, based primarily in the United States and Canada (where the

Ukrainian Church is the largest Orthodox Church), challenge the Russian Church's legitimacy in Ukraine.

At his election in 1971, the new patriarch of Moscow, Pimen, announced the "reunion" of Ukrainian Orthodox abroad with his Church as a major goal. Indeed, Moscow's recognition of the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Metropolia as the Orthodox Church in America in 1970, with the program of gathering all Orthodox believers in the US and Canada, cannot be seen as divorced from the Soviet government's and Moscow patriarchate's plans to undermine Ukrainian Orthodoxy abroad.¹⁹ During a visit to the USA in the 1970s, Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev, facing thousands of demonstrators for the rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholic Churches, mendaciously asserted that all Ukrainians wish to belong to the Russian Orthodox Church.²⁰ The resolution of the US Congress calling for religious freedom for the Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholic Churches obviously causes discomfort to Filaret and to his superior, Patriarch Pimen.²¹ Regrettably, until now many of the western broadcasting companies who send information on religion and religious services to the USSR have seen Orthodoxy as only Russian in culture and language, thus depriving Orthodox Ukrainian believers and Ukrainian Orthodoxy of support. Consequently the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada has begun its own transmissions.

All too often Ukrainian Orthodoxy and Ukrainian believers are forgotten in discussions of religious problems in the USSR. The Ukrainian Orthodox issue takes on complexity because it is not merely an issue of Soviet denial of religious freedom. Russian Orthodox émigré leaders, who are otherwise critical of Soviet religious policies and the accommodations of the Moscow patriarchate with the regime, approve of any measures against "Ukrainian nationalism." Few Russian Orthodox leaders have concurred with the recently deceased Alexander Schmemmann in declaring the annexation of the Ukrainian Church by the Russian Church in the seventeenth century uncanonical and in condemning the Russian hierarchy's opposition to the restoration of an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the twentieth century.²² A more typical response has been the virulent attack by Ludmilla Sergeeva, editor of the journal *Posev*, on Michael Bourdeaux of Keston College, for having even discussed the Ukrainian Orthodox issue in an interview for Radio Liberty.²³

While the discussions in émigré and Orthodox circles in the West will influence the Ukrainian Orthodox issue in the Soviet Union, they will not be decisive. At present the firm alliance between the Soviet state and the Russian Orthodox Church on the Ukrainian Orthodox issue appears likely to continue, and indeed strengthen as the Millennium celebrations near. However, the existence of a disproportionately large Ukrainian constituency in the Russian Orthodox Church, the continued

discontent of Ukrainian patriots with the Soviet regime's Russificatory policies, the contacts with Ukrainian Orthodox abroad, and the very identification of the Millennium with Kiev will likely engender opposition to the current situation. One can agree with the evaluation of the major student of twentieth-century Ukrainian Orthodoxy, Bohdan Bociurkiw.

When the Second World War brought a dramatic reversal in Stalin's religious policy and gave a new lease of life to the Russian Orthodox Church, the latter was unabashedly put to use as an instrument for the sovietization and russification of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholics. As in the secular sphere, so too, in ecclesiastical life the very concept of "Ukrainization," let alone independence, has assumed a "nationalist" and "subversive" connotation. But behind the facade of the "monolithic unity" of the regime and the Russian Church, Ukrainization remains a very much alive, if suppressed, idea and an unfulfilled popular aspiration.²⁴

Frank E. Sysyn



The Church of the Epiphany of the Bratskyi Monastery.

NOTES

1. Vasyl' Romaniuk, *A Voice in the Wilderness: Letters, Appeals, Essays* translated and edited by Jurij Dobczansky (Wheaton, Illinois, 1980), p. 45
2. The standard history of the church is Ivan Vlasovs'kyi, *Narys istorii Ukrains'koi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy*, 4 vols. (New York, 1955-66). Volumes one and two appeared in English in 1956/1979: Ivan Wlasowsky, *Outline History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church* and the other volumes are scheduled to appear before the celebration of the Millennium of Ukrainian Christianity in 1988.
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4. For the Church's justification of this practice, see Ivan Teodorovych, *Blahodatnists' Ierarkhii UAPT's* (Regensburg, 1947). On the issue of autocephaly see Aleksander Lotots'kyi, *Avtokefaliia*, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1935-38).
5. On the history of the Church in this period, see Vasyl' Lypkivs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrains'koi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy*, Rozdil 7: *Vidrodzhennia Ukrains'koi Tserkvy* (Winnipeg, 1961); Friedrich Heier, *Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1945* (Köln-Braunsfeld, 1953); and the articles of Bohdan Bociurkiw: "The Issues of Ukrainisation and Independence of the Orthodox Church in Russian-Ukrainian Relations," Conference Paper delivered at McMasters University on "Russia and Ukraine: Past and Present" forthcoming under the editorship of Peter Potichynyj; "The Church and the Ukrainian Revolution: The Central Rada Period," in Taras Hunczak, ed. *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), pp. 220-46; "The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 1920-1930: A Case Study in Religious Modernization," in Dennis J. Dunn, ed. *Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union* (Boulder, Colo., 1977), pp. 310-47.
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7. A Ukrainian translation of the Tomos, 13 November 1924 is published in Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Istorychni pidvalyny UAPT's*, pp. 113-16.
8. On the policies and situation of the Church, see Vasyl' Markus, "Violation of Religious Rights in Ukraine," in *Ukraine and the Helsinki Accords. Soviet Violations of Human Rights*, ed. Marco Carynnyk (Toronto-New York: Human Rights Commission, World Congress of Free Ukrainians, 1980), pp. 94-127, and the bibliography *Soviet Persecution of Religion in Ukraine* (Toronto: World Congress of Free Ukrainians, 1976). See the booklet, *The Eastern Orthodox Church in the Ukraine* (Kiev, 1980), by Archbishop Makariy, and my review in *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. XIV, no. 1 (1986).
9. "Zvernennia Iepyskopa Feodosiia do Brezhnieva, *Suchasnist'* XXI (July-August 1981), nos. 7-8, p. 172.

10. *The Ukrainian Herald*: Issue 7-8, *Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R.*, Spring 1974, comp. Maksym Sahaydak (Baltimore-Paris-Toronto, 1976), p. 157.
11. See the letter of Ielena Sannikova to Pope John Paul II published in the Documents section in *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. XI, no. 3 (1983), pp. 293-294.
12. Valentyn Moroz, *Report from the Beria Reserve* (Toronto, 1974), pp. 58-59.
13. For a bibliography of Ukrainian religious dissent, see George Liber and Anna Mostovych, *Nonconformity and Dissent in the Ukrainian SSR, 1955-1975: An Annotated Bibliography* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978).
14. I discuss these problems in a review of V. P. Kolosova and V. I. Krekoten, compliers, *Ukrains'ka poeziia in Kritika*, vol. XVI, no. 1 (Winter, 1980), pp. 24-40.
15. See the catalogue of the Ukrainian Museum in New York: Titus D. Hewryk, *The Lost Architecture of Kiev* (New York, 1982).
16. Roman Solchanyk, "Literature, History and Nationalities Policy in the Ukraine," *Radio Liberty Report* 318/82 (9 August 1982).
17. For the announcement of the joint plans of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches to celebrate the Millennium, issued on 27 June 1981, see *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, vol. XXXVIII, no. 3 (Autumn 1981), p. 325.
18. On the problems of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the West see my article, "The Ukrainian Orthodox Churches and the Ukrainian Diaspora" (pp. 16-25) and that of Petrusia Markowsky, "The Rise of Ukrainian National Consciousness and the Formation of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada" in *Vitrazh* (Great Britain) no. 11 (June 1980). Also see Paul Yuzyk, *The Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada, 1918-1951* (Ottawa, 1981), and Odarka S. Trosky, *The Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church in Canada* (Winnipeg, 1968).
19. I discuss this problem in "The Ukrainian Orthodox Churches," *op. cit.*, pp. 22-24.
20. On Filaret's statements and the demonstrations against him, see "Chronicles of Current Events," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, vol. XXXI, no. 1 (Spring 1975) pp. 103-107.
21. For the full texts of Senate Congressional Record 18 (27 April 1981) and House Congressional Record 123 (1 May 1981), see Lev E. Dobriansky, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, vol. XXXVIII, no. 4 (Winter 1982), pp. 353-70.
22. Aleksandr Shmeman, "Ukrains'ko-rosiis'kyi dialoh: Relihiinyi aspekt," *Vidnova*, no. 2 (Winter 1984-Spring 1985), p. 52.
23. See "An Interview with the Reverend Michael Bourdeaux" by Bohdan Nahaylo, Radio Liberty Research, 297/84 (2 August 1984) and the primitive attack on Bourdeaux by Sergeeva, "Komu eto na pol'zu?", *Posev*, no. 10 (1984). Even the Orthodox Church of America continues to publish tendentiously anti-Ukrainian materials such as Dimitry Pospelovsky, *The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime 1917-1982*, 2 vols. (Crestwood, New York, 1984). See my review in *Russian Review*, vol. XLV, no. 1 (1986).
24. Bohdan Bociurkiw, "Ukrainization Movements within the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* III-IV (1979-80), p. 111.

II

Reviews

1.

The Eastern Orthodox Church in the Ukraine, by The Most Reverend Archbishop Makariy. Kiev: Ukraina Society, 1980. 75pp. 30 kopecks.

Archbishop Makariy of Uman undertook to write this pamphlet at the request of the Association for Cultural Relations with Ukrainians Abroad (the Ukraina Society). In a preface, Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev, Patriarchal Exarch to Ukraine, explains that this work is necessary because of the interest of Ukrainians in the USA, Canada and Western Europe in the religious life of Soviet Ukraine as a result of their growing contacts with their ancestral land. Metropolitan Filaret sees this booklet as satisfying the needs of “our Ukrainian compatriots, as well as many other Christians and people of different religious affiliations” who wish to know “the truth about the status of religion in the Soviet Union, about the activities of the Eastern Orthodox Church under new social conditions”. It is therefore particularly interesting to note how this booklet presents the history and the contemporary situation of religious life in Ukraine to over three million Ukrainians abroad.

The desire to appease Ukrainian sentiments can even be seen in the title, *The Eastern Orthodox Church in the Ukraine* which would be more accurately rendered as “The Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukraine”. There is indeed an attempt to placate Ukrainian patriotism in various ways — by using Ukrainian geographical names, for instance. Nevertheless, traditional conventions and ways of thinking are too strong to allow either author or translator to carry out this policy consistently. In any case, the real purpose of the booklet, as stated in the preface and the conclusion, is to view “the Ukrainian Exarchate as an inseparable component of the Russian Orthodox Church”.

Most of the booklet is devoted to the history of the church in Ukraine and it is here that the Makariy is most selective in his presentation of events. The Christian culture of Kievan Rus' is extolled, in particular for its services to the “fatherland”. Here Makariy enters the area of the traditional conflict of perspective between Russian and Ukrainian views

on ecclesiastical affairs. Archbishop Makariy is solidly in support of the Russian viewpoint. He concludes the section on this period with the Union of Florence of 1439, the election of Metropolitan Iona in Moscow without Constantinople's consent in 1448, the appointment of a separate Metropolitan of Kiev by Constantinople for Ukraine and Belorussia in 1458, and the change of title by the Metropolitan in Moscow from "Kiev" to "Moscow" in 1461.

Makariy next proceeds to discuss the fate of the Kiev Metropolitan See under Polish and Lithuanian rule. He insists that:

What made the Orthodox living in the Kiev Metropolitan See feel inseparable from the Church in Rus' was their common creed, baptism, ethnic origin and the entire course of historical and cultural progress since the time of Vladimir I. The Russian Church constantly helped Orthodox Ukrainians by sending them words of sincere encouragement and generous donations, and proving their reliable supporter.

These statements follow closely the official line of Soviet historians on the "eternal friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples" and the Ukrainians' desire for "reunification". Makariy in his popular brochure does not have to go to the trouble of presenting evidence. Thus he can make such a bald statement about a period when in fact cultural and religious differences between Russians and Ukrainians were rapidly widening and the metropolitanates of Moscow and Kiev displayed relatively little interest in each other as they faced totally different problems under different cultural-political systems. It might be argued that Moldavia and Constantinople and even possibly the Balkans loomed larger than Moscow for Kievan Christianity during this period.

Makariy criticises the Polish king's appointment of church hierarchs and the oppression of the Orthodox minority, but he ignores the considerable cultural achievements of the Orthodox community which came from stimulation by the Latin West and the degree of toleration and tolerance in the Commonwealth at least until the end of the 16th century. Considerable attention is devoted to the Union of Brest of 1596, the agreement of a part of the Orthodox hierarchy, clergy and laity to unite with the Church of Rome while retaining their eastern traditions. For Makariy this is a clear struggle between good and evil in which the "treacherous" Uniates are even excluded from the Ukrainian people, since, he declares, the enemy of the Union was "the entire Ukrainian people, all the social strata." While it might be expected that Makariy would show little understanding of the Union as an attempt to reform the eastern church, it is surprising how little interest he shows in the renaissance of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, except as a force struggling against the Union. The uninformed reader is unlikely to realise that the spread of

printing, the formation of schools and the establishment of brotherhoods all predated the Union, and while they may be seen as a response to Western Christian pressure, this Catholic and Protestant pressure was less overt persecution than an intellectual and organisational challenge. After 1596 these innovations, which made Orthodoxy in Ukraine so different from Orthodoxy in Russia, were put to the service of the Orthodox Church. Archbishop Makariy almost entirely avoids mentioning the pinnacle of educational, printing and theological activity reached under Metropolitan Peter Mohyla (1633-1647), after the Polish government recognised the legality of the Orthodox Church. This reluctance is probably due to Metropolitan Mohyla's anti-Muscovite and pro-Polish political views, his western-orientated reforms, and his formulation of a distinct Ukrainian Orthodox tradition.

It is with the great Cossack revolt of 1648, the formation of the Hetmanate and the acceptance of the protection of the Muscovite tsar in 1654 that Makariy's account switches from a highly opinionated history to an elliptic list of events and episodes, as interesting for what is left out as for what is included. No mention is made of the fact that Metropolitan Sylvester Kosov opposed Khmel'nyts'kyi's agreement with the Tsar because he feared his church's incorporation into the Muscovite Patriarchate. The transfer of the metropolitanate of Kiev to Moscow's jurisdiction in 1686 is described as "a natural completion of the process of state reunification of the Ukraine with Russia" and as having been carried out "with the consent and blessings of the Patriarch of Constantinople" with no mention that the procedure was carried on in a highly questionable way with simoniacal practices. The absorption of the Kievan Metropolitanate into the Russian Church is discussed without making clear that in the end not only did the metropolitan lose authority over dioceses that remained under Polish control, but also over Orthodox dioceses under Russian control, ultimately leaving him with the mere title "Metropolitan of Kiev and Halych". The saints and scholars that the church in Ukraine produced in the late 17th and 18th centuries are listed, but no explanation is made of the Imperial Government's policies that rooted out the local traditions of the church in Ukraine, banned the printing of books in Ukrainian editions and turned the once flourishing Kiev Academy into a provincial seminary.

For the 19th century Archbishop Makariy provides only three disparate pieces of information: the Eastern-Rite Catholics "disappeared" in all Ukrainian lands "reunited" with Russia, culminating in the "return" of the Uniates of the Kholm region in 1875; the Russian Orthodox Church marked the 900th anniversary of the Christianisation of Old Rus' in Kiev in 1888; and the Holy Synod permitted a Ukrainian version of the Gospels in 1911. He does not tell us that the Uniates "disappeared" only after fierce persecution or that the Russian Orthodox Church had

banned Ukrainian ecclesiastical printing during the reign of Peter I, had prevented publication of Ukrainian translations of the Bible throughout the 19th century and had supported Tsarist Russia's infamous ban against Ukrainian printing in 1876. Archbishop Makariy apparently sees no reason to criticise such policies of the old regime and church.

In describing the period after the 1917 revolution, Archbishop Makariy shows a similar selectivity. Considerable comment is made about the proclamation of autonomy for the church in Ukraine in 1918, but no explanation is given as to what remains of this "autonomy". In contrast, the Ukrainian Church movement, the formation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and the competition between the Patriarchal and Autocephalous Churches in the 1920s (that is, the reason that the Patriarchal Church grudgingly granted "autonomy") are not even mentioned. Makariy steps gingerly in describing relations between church and state in the 1920s and 1930s and instead concentrates on the services of the church to the Soviet war effort, in particular in condemning Ukrainian partisan groups who sought to establish an independent Ukraine.

While Makariy avoids even mentioning the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, destroyed by Stalin in the 1930s, he devotes a whole chapter to the Ukrainian Catholic Church — a catacomb church that has been persecuted by the Soviet government since 1946. He asserts that the Eastern-rite Catholic Church had no roots among the Western Ukrainian populace, that their hierarchy served the Nazi occupiers, and that the "Synod" of L'viv of 8-10 March, 1946 which nullified the Union of Brest of 1596 was canonical. All are extremely questionable assertions, to say the least. Interestingly Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi (1900-1944), who is revered by Ukrainian Catholics and vilified by the Soviet regime and the Patriarchal Church, is not mentioned. Archbishop Makariy also gives no explanation for the continued activity and constant persecution of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

Archbishop Makariy follows with a description of the Ukrainian Exarchate (in which no mention is made of "autonomy") and of the church's role in the inter-Orthodox, ecumenical, and peace activity. Much of the text consists of quotes of foreign visitors, a pastiche intended to convince the reader that there is no religious persecution in the USSR.

What impact Archbishop Makariy's and the Ukraina Society's work will have on Ukrainian believers abroad or on foreign opinion on the religious question in Ukraine is difficult to estimate. That such a contrived and convoluted brochure was produced reveals the Russian Patriarchal Church's sensitivity to the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic criticism of its activity in Ukraine and the Soviet government's annoyance that there is increasing knowledge of its religious policies.

FRANK SYSYN

Pospelovsky, Dimitry. *The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime, 1917-1982*. 2 vols. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1984. 535 pp. \$18.90.

Dimitry Pospelovsky's two-volume work provides a much-needed synthesis on the history of the Russian Orthodox Church's relationship with the Soviet regime. Although it is far from the "attempt at objective synthesis" that John Meyendorff labels it in the preface, it does constitute an informed account by a committed Russian Orthodox scholar.

Volume 1 takes the history of the Russian Orthodox Church from the eve of the Revolution to the end of World War II. It shows how existing divisions within the Church widened after the Revolution. While the Revolution permitted the restoration of the office of patriarch, the controversies among right, centrist, and left wings of the Church were soon exploited by the anti-religious Soviet regime. To the right were the monarchists of the émigré Karlovci Synod and those underground Orthodox who refused to accept the Metropolitan Sergei's oath of allegiance to the Soviet state in 1927. To the left were the critics of the bureaucratized and reactionary nature of the old Tsarist Church who sought to carry on reform under the new regime. These groups formed the Renovatianist Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Pospelovsky shows how the regime in turn manipulated and persecuted the various religious factions. All had their institutional structures decimated, reaching a high point in what he calls the "Holocaust of the 1930s." He also demonstrates the continued hold of Orthodoxy on large segments of the population, a force that prompted an accommodation of Stalin with the Church during World War II as a means of securing popular loyalty to the Soviet state. This accommodation allowed for the election of a new patriarch and the regime's recognition that the Russian Orthodox Church under the patriarch was to be the sole legal form of Orthodoxy everywhere in the USSR except the Georgian republic.

Volume 2 begins with a discussion of the intricacies of émigré Russian Church politics, but it is primarily devoted to the history of the Church in the USSR since World War II. Pospelovsky recounts how, during the first post-war decade, the regime elevated the prestige of the Church within the Soviet bloc and engineered for it the forcible "conversion" of the Uniates. He demonstrates that Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign ended this relatively favorable period for the Church, stimulating new Orthodox dissent within and without the official Church. Finally he examines the complex relationship of

Church and state since 1965, during which an uneasy truce has been worked out. Each side attempts to use the other for its own goals, but the state has the upper hand.

For all the interesting material and incisive commentary, *The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime* is far from a standard reference work based on a full examination of the literature and sources. To point out two glaring omissions, Bohdan Bociurkiw's dissertation, the most comprehensive work on Orthodoxy in the Ukraine, 1919-1939, is missing from the bibliography (which lists only three of his articles), as is the multi-volume history of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church by Ivan Vlasov's'kyi. One may admire the amount of material that Pospelovsky has assembled but still recognize that the work is far from comprehensive, and that the limited coverage of numerous aspects of the Church's life leaves fundamental problems untouched. For example, no attempt is made to provide statistics on the geographic distribution of parishes. Yet if one accepts Bociurkiw's estimate that over 50% of parishes are in the Ukraine and over 25% in the predominantly Uniate Western Ukraine, one gains an understanding of relations between the Russian state and the Russian Church that is missing from Pospelovsky's analysis. One can see that the Russian Church is dependent on the state to ensure that true religious freedom not be permitted in the USSR, since a return of the Uniate parishes to Catholicism would severely diminish the parishes and vocations of the Russian Church.

If the lack of comprehensive coverage may be explained by difficulties of access to sources and the demands of time and space, the partisan nature of the work must be explained by Pospelovsky's views on religious, cultural, and political issues. His assessments and selection of material are related to his positions on a number of controversies about Soviet religious affairs in the 1980s. I believe that four controversies have shaped Pospelovsky's presentation and that his views on them emerge implicitly from the text.

At present the Synodal Russian Orthodox Church, the descendant of the Karlovci Synod, declares itself the only true successor to the pre-1917 Russian Orthodox Church and condemns the Moscow Patriarchate as a puppet of the KGB. It also censures the Orthodox Church of America, the former Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church, for having negotiated with the Patriarchate and for having accepted a grant of autocephaly from it in 1970. Pospelovsky's affirmation of the legitimacy of the official Church in the USSR and of the actions of the Orthodox Church in America is apparent in the considerable attention he devotes to Russian émigré Church politics. He criticizes sharply the Synod's canonical position and portrays its activities, particularly during World War II, negatively. (See Appendix 5, pp. 491-492.)

Pospelovsky's work is also directed to Western churchmen and peace movements who have recently muted criticism of Soviet religious policies in their desire to gain access to Soviet believers and to cooperate with the Moscow Patriarchate. The increasing influence of the Patriarchate on the National Council of Churches (of which the Orthodox Church of America is a member) and the World Council of Churches has disturbed specialists on Soviet religious groups, who see the Western churchmen's naiveté as damaging the situation of believers in the USSR and turning Western Church organizations into pawns of Soviet foreign policy. Pospelovsky's last chapter and conclusion are addressed

to these Western churchmen in an attempt to demonstrate the continued persecution of religion by the regime, the bondage of the Patriarchate to the state, and Soviet manipulation of Church affairs for foreign policy goals.

An additional controversy influencing Pospelovsky's work is whether the Russian Orthodox Church has distorted its religious mission by serving as an instrument of Russification of Ukrainians and Belorussians. In the twentieth century, the canonicity of the Russian Church's control of Belorussia and the Ukraine has been questioned. The Ukrainian and Belorussian Autocephalous Orthodox Churches in the West condemn what they see as the alliance of the Moscow Patriarchate, Russian nationalism, and the Soviet state. Although Pospelovsky states in his introduction that he leaves aside the question of Ukrainian and Belorussian frictions with the Russians in the Orthodox Church and "separatist church attempts in the Ukraine," in practice he devotes considerable attention to portraying Ukrainian and Belorussian aspirations in religious affairs negatively.

Finally, Pospelovsky describes the forcible incorporation of the Uniate believers of the Western Ukraine into the Russian Orthodox Church in 1946 in a tone so apologetic for the Moscow Patriarchate, indeed almost for the Soviet regime, and so minimizes the role of force and uncanonical practices (pp. 306-309), that he loses all claims to objectivity.

Once we understand Pospelovsky's viewpoints, we can find much that is enlightening and informative in the book. Only recently have scholars interested in politics in the Soviet bloc come to understand the continued importance of religion and the complexity of religious issues. Pospelovsky's book, if read critically, can enhance understanding of the position of Russian Orthodoxy in the Soviet state and the politics of Russian nationalism in religious affairs.

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3.

Lytsar pratsi i obov'yazku. Zbirnyk prysvyachenyy pam'yati prof. Oleksandra Lotots'koho-Bilousenka, edited by Bohdan Hoshovs'ky. Toronto-New York: Yevshan-zillya, 1983. 190 pp., \$10.00

Alexander Lotocki (1870-1939) contributed greatly to Ukrainian political, cultural and ecclesiastical life. The son of a priestly family, he studied at seminaries in Kam'yanets'-Podil's'ky, Tbilisi and Kiev, specialising in the history of the Church and Canon Law. Prevented from following a teaching career in the Russian Orthodox Church's seminaries because of his Ukrainian cultural activities, he entered the Tsarist bureaucracy in the Ministry of State for the Control of Finances. He assisted in organising the Ukrainian Club in the First Duma and in obtaining the revocation of the Ems Ukaz (1876) banning Ukrainian printing. After the Revolution, Lotocki served as Chancellor of State in the Ukrainian autonomous government, State Controller in the Ukrainian National Republic, and Minister of Religions in the Hetmanate government and the Directory government. From 1919-20 he went abroad as Minister Plenipotentiary in Istanbul. Taking part in the last attempt to maintain the Ukrainian government's rule in Ukraine, he joined the exodus of the Ukrainian National Republic into emigration. From 1922-28 he was professor of Canon Law at the Ukrainian Free University in Prague and from 1928 to his death in 1939 he held the chair of history of Orthodox Churches at the University of Warsaw, serving as well after 1930 as the Director of the Ukrainian Scholarly Institute which he founded.

The list of Lotocki's positions only suggests the breadth of his activities and publications. This memorial volume goes far in describing them by publishing and republishing discussions of the many facets of Lotocki's career by prominent Ukrainian scholars, political leaders, and churchmen (Marco Antonovych, Dmytro Doroshenko, Archbishop Anatoly (Dublyans'ky), Bohdan Hoshovs'ky, Ivan Kedryn-Rudnyts'ky, Ivan Korovyts'ky, Borys Lotocki, Metropolitan Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), Tymish Oleksiyuk, Zenon Pelens'ky, Omeljan Pritsak, Vyacheslav Prokopovych, Ivan Tokarzhevs'ky-Karshevych, Oleksander Shul'hyn, Ivan Vlasovs'ky and Pavlo Zaitsev). Over seventy pages of the book consist of bibliographies of Lotocki's works, of reviews and comments about Lotocki, and of works published and prepared by the Ukrainian Scholarly Institute in Warsaw.

Although only the articles by Ivan Vlasovs'ky (on Lotocki as a religious activist) and Archbishop Anatoly (on Lotocki's role in the declaration of the Autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on 1 January 1919) deal exclusively with church affairs, almost all the articles treat some aspect of Lotocki's impact on Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Lotocki's clerical upbringing and his studies occurred during the early phase of Ukrainian

religious rebirth and its struggle with the Russian Orthodox Church. His activities in 1918-20 centred on the movement to form the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and to obtain recognition for it from the civil and religious authorities, above all from the Patriarchate of Constantinople. From 1922 to 1939 Lotocki's publications on Canon Law, on the principles of autocephaly, and on church history provided intellectual support for Ukrainian Orthodoxy, while his translations of Scripture and liturgical services served as the bases for the ukrainisation programme. With the destruction of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Soviet Ukraine, his preparation of the seminarians and laymen who led the Ukrainian church revival in the Polish Orthodox Church took on great import. In carrying on this work Lotocki laid the basis for the restoration of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine in 1942 and its continuation in the West. The volume under review provides a good introduction to Lotocki and his tremendous role in Ukrainian religious affairs.

FRANK E. SYSYN

Lysty 1933-1937: Letters 1933-1937

by Mytropolyt Vasyl' Lypkivs'ky. USA: Ukrayins'ke pravoslavne bratstvo im. Mytr. Vasylya Lypkivs'koho, 1980. Distributed by the Consistory of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the USA, South Bound Brook, NJ. xi + 55 + 50 + 44 pp., \$15

In the 1980s, a number of events in the Ukrainian emigration paid tribute to Vasyl' Lypkivs'ky, first metropolitan of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) (1921-27). The rather small Conciliar (*Sobornopravna*) Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which views itself as the loyal upholder of the canons proclaimed by the UAOC of 1921, canonised Lypkiv'sky, who had disappeared into Stalin's Gulag in 1938. The larger Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the USA, together with its sister jurisdictions in Canada and in Europe, South America and Australia, supported by Ukrainian emigres of all faiths, erected an imposing statue-monument to the Metropolitan at the Church centre in South Bound Brook, New Jersey. Finally, a volume of Lypkivs'ky's letters to Father Petro Mayevsky was published, dated 1980, but delayed by Father Mayevsky's sickness and death.

While all these events ensured that, even though the Metropolitan's work in his native land was so ruthlessly destroyed, he would not be forgotten, it is the collection of nineteen letters, written between 1933 and 1937, that allows us to enter the churchman's thought at the very time he witnessed the extermination of the last vestiges of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in Ukraine. Its importance is all the greater because so many of his writings are known to have been destroyed. His manual for the self-education of the Ukrainian clergy, his history of the Ukrainian Church (except chapter VII), his discussions on the history of the Universal Church, his church canon and his translations and commentaries on sacred texts all remained in manuscript until World War II and perished during a bombing raid with his follower who attempted to take them out to the West. It

is due to Father Mayevsky's urgings that Lypkivs'ky's sermons were preserved. Laboriously hand-copied by the Metropolitan, they were sent in fragments through the Soviet mail to his loyal spiritual son in Winnipeg, and they were published in 1969. At the same time, the Metropolitan, whose forcible resignation in 1927 probably saved him from the first wave of arrests and trials of the UAOC hierarchy in 1929-30, wrote to his friend about his own situation and the state of religion in Ukraine. For the volume under review, Father Mayevsky prepared photocopies, transcriptions of the Ukrainian texts and English translations (paginated separately).

This reader, for one, is surprised at how much one could say through Stalin's mail. Many of the letters reflect the abject poverty of the Metropolitan who was sent from Kiev to a neighbouring village during that time. Father Mayevsky appears to have kept the Metropolitan alive by his cash remittances, revealing another, for me, unexpected aspect of Soviet life in the 1930s, the time of the deliberately-orchestrated Ukrainian famine. The Metropolitan's need of support, his embarrassment about his financial dependence, and his careful accounting of pennies for religious books sent to the faithful in Canada (since they could not be used for the faithful in Ukraine) provide a particularly human insight into the decade of famine and terror.

Much of the reading is profoundly depressing as it chronicles the victory of the oppressor over the faithful. The increasingly isolated Metropolitan frequently mentions the closing of Ukrainian Orthodox churches in Kiev and the entire country, and the imprisonment and exile of some of his fellow clergymen and the apostasy of others, until in 1936 he admits that he does not know if there is even one parish left "since an attempt is being made to create in Ukraine, ruthlessly, in the Communist manner, a social order without religion" (p. 42). But with this despair comes his message of hope to his compatriots abroad: "So we should do more religious work in places where there is freedom and possibility for such activities".

Metropolitan Lypkivs'ky's concern that Ukrainian Orthodoxy should be preserved abroad prompted him to give advice on issues as diverse as altar boys' vestments and the uses of radio and electricity in church services. His primary care was that the principles of the UAOC of 1921 be maintained and his major fear was that more conservative elements in the Church abroad would bring about a reversion to traditional Orthodox canons, undermining the conciliar government and democratic procedures of the Church. In particular, he feared that Archbishop Ivan Teodorovych would give in to those who called his consecration as bishop invalid and would accept reconsecration by bishops who had traditional episcopal orders. While the general reader may find the discussions of squabbles of the Ukrainian Orthodox Abroad arcane and even petty, he

will observe in Lypkivs'ky's comments a pervasive Christian love and charity. The letters serve to demonstrate Lypkivs'ky's dedication to the spirit of the Ukrainian church movement — a desire for renewal by returning to Apostolic Christianity, flexibility in interpreting church canons, a dedication to democracy and lay participation in the Church, a distrust of government (be it Tsarist or Soviet) interference in church affairs, and a conviction that every people should have a right to its own church life and that the Ukrainians should restore and develop their native Christian traditions. He also showed an ecumenism rare for his period, stemming from his striving toward Apostolic Christianity. At a time when Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholics were conducting vituperative religious wars in Canada and the USA, Lypkivs'ky wrote in a letter of 25 July 1934 (p. 23):

Regarding the matter of the differences between Catholics, the Uniates, etc., of course one could say something about them. But in my opinion, it is high time for us, Christians of the different Churches, to pay attention not to the differences but to the matters that are in common between us and keep us united: not to the things that were and are not praiseworthy in the other Churches but to the precious things which they possess. It is high time for all of us to cherish brotherly love and respect through Christ, regardless of the differences that were created by life conditions. Thus even the existent differences would be less painful.

He even advised Ukrainian Orthodox to de-russify the Church by looking to the practices of their brother Ukrainian Catholics.

In the nineteen letters there is much for one who wishes to understand the modern Ukrainian church movement, the UAOC, and Vasyl' Lypkivs'ky. Even those who disagree with Lypkivs'ky's interpretation of Orthodoxy will admit that he was a man of inspiring faith.

FRANK SYSYN

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