



AN OUTLINE of THE TRAGIC Polish-Ukrainian Relations



by
DR. LUCIJAN KARACZKO



REPRINTED FROM
THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY, Vol. XXXVIII, Spring, 1982
NEW YORK, N.Y.
diasporiana.org.ua

This reprint was made possible
through the generosity of
Dr. and Mrs. Eugene Stecki
of Tonowanda, New York



AN OUTLINE of THE TRAGIC Polish-Ukrainian Relations

☆ ★ ☆

by
DR. LUCIJAN KARACZKO

☆ ★ ☆

REPRINTED FROM
THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY, Vol. XXXVIII, Spring, 1982
NEW YORK, N.Y.

NOTE ON AUTHOR

LUCIJAN KARACZKO, was born near Ternopil in Western Ukraine, then under Austro-Hungarian rule; during World War I he took part in the struggle for the independence of Ukraine. After the war he became a medical doctor and participated in the national-cultural and social life of the Ukrainian people; following World War II he was "resettled" with hundreds of thousands of other Ukrainians to the western provinces of Poland, and for a number of years he practiced medicine; he now lives in retirement in Cracow.

AN OUTLINE OF THE TRAGIC POLISH-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS

By DR. LUCIJAN KARACZKO

EDITOR'S NOTE: The following was written by Dr. Lucijan Karaczko, a Ukrainian physician in Cracow. An authentic view of Polish-Ukrainian relations, it is, in our opinion, not a diatribe nor an anti-Polish "document," inasmuch as it was submitted to every member to the *Sejm* (parliament) and the State Council of the Polish Peoples' Republic (PPR). However it succeeds or fails, it seeks, above all, objectivity.

The Ukrainian in the diaspora, as well as those in the homeland of Ukraine, deeply sympathize with the current plight of the Polish people under the totalitarian rule of the pro-Moscow Communist regime in Warsaw. But they also are aware of the unending and systematic persecution of the Ukrainian minority, numbering, by Ukrainian accounts, at least 500,000 people. They suffer constant discrimination, including the denial of their religious freedom, especially the Ukrainian Catholics; they are deprived of Ukrainian-language schools and cultural institutions, and are unendingly subjected to Polonization. Happily, prominent "Solidarity" leaders as Lech Walensa and Jacek Kuron are on record as promising to help Ukrainians in Poland to realize their national, religious and cultural rights as a distinct national minority.

Besides his personal experience, the author at the outset acknowledges his debt to the views of such Polish historians, chroniclers, observers, and writers as: E. Basinski, J. Borkowski, H. Cybulski, A. Deruga, G. Federowski, A. Filar, E. Gronczewski, O. Gorka, A. Hawryluk, T. Holuj, W. Jarnicki, P. Jasienica, J. Jedrzejewicz, J. Kirchmayer, Z. Klistko, M. Kosman, W. Kowalski, Z. Kozik, A. Kwilecki, K. Lewandowski, J. Lovell, L. Ludorowski, Z. Mankowski, J. Markiewicz, M. Moczar, G. Morcinek, J. Naumiak, F. Nieuwazny, E. Osmanczyk, L. Podchorodecki, S. Podlewski, T. Polak, B. Prus, E. Prus, A. Przygonski, J. Putrament, M. Rusinek, W. Serczyk, H. Sienkiewicz, A. Skarzynski, J. Sobiesiak, A. Szczesniak, O. Terlecki, R. Torzecki, M. Turlejska, S. Walach, M. Wankowicz, J. Wieczerska, Z. Wojciechowski, W. Wolczew, Z. Wojcik, S. Wronski, Z. Zabiello, Z. Zaks, and Z. Zaluski. In addition, the support and documents of the Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party and other published works, including *Z dziejow stosunkow polsko-radzieckich* (From the History of Polish-Soviet Relations), *Polska Ludowa*, publishers. The manuscript was received and translated several weeks before the martial law was instituted on December 13, 1981 in Poland.

The noted Polish writer and patriot Henryk Sienkiewicz concluded his novel, *With Fire and Sword* (*Ogniem i Mieczem*), as follows: "The Commonwealth became a desert, and so did Ukraine. Wolves howled in the smoldering ruins of former cities and a once flourishing land became a vast graveyard. Hatred grew in the hearts and poisoned the blood of brothers." And the greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko, a friend of the Polish revolutionaries Zygmunt Sierakowski, Bronislaw Zaleski, and others, obviously with the past tragic Polish-Ukrainian history in mind, wrote at the end of his poem, *To the Poles*:

Thus be it, Oh Pole, my friend, my brother/greedy priests and
magnates/divide and embroil us/ when we could be living in peace./
Give your hand to a Kozak/ and your pure heart!/ And again in the
name of Christ/ we will resurrect our quiet paradise of old.

The same Shevchenko, in a commentary at the end of his great poem, *The Haydamaks*, praised the Ukrainian people's uprisings against the oppressor Polish nobles, and added:

Thank God that is past, all the more so because we are children of
the same Slavic mother. The heart aches but we must say: let our
sons and grandsons know that their fathers have reconsidered and
wish again to be brothers to our enemies. Let golden fields of wheat
and rye cover for centuries a borderless Slavic land from sea to sea.

The history of these two Slavic nations is one of war. History, it is said, is a great teacher, yet one must have the wisdom to draw correct conclusions from her lessons. Alas, nations often have had leaders who for various reasons have misread her teachings and thereby have done great harm to their own society and worsened mutual relations. Misunderstandings and wrongs unthinkingly committed make it easy for mutual distrust to be fermented by opponents of friendly relations, opponents who all too often are all too ordinary people who are petty or vindictive, or both. So it has been for centuries, beginning in the Middle Ages, during the time of the Polish raids in Ukraine — adventurous in their eyes, rapacious in ours. What resulted was an unconscionable occupation of Ukraine that lasted some four centuries. And this true history has been documented from that time when — as Sienkiewicz wrote — "hatred began to grow in hearts." But if hatred grew in Ukrainian hearts, it was because it was not Ukraine that invaded Poland as an imperialistic aggressor, it fought only to defend its own ethnic Ukrainian homeland, to free itself from Polish bondage — as honest Poles have readily admitted.

Shocking is the fact — a fact which I have repeatedly pointed out

since my return to Poland as a repatriate in 1946 — that in Polish society throughout the length and breadth of Poland, regardless of region, and regardless of occupation, there is to be found an ingrained hatred of Ukrainians. One would be, at best, hypocritical to deny this. The enemies of peace and good neighborliness have deepened that hatred through scurrilous literature and the massive depredations that the mass media are capable of. By assault on the eye and ear and our sense of the printed word (our minds) they have easily falsified history and distorted the existing order to things. For example, the Polish writer Tadeusz Holuj, in his book, *Początek*, (The Beginning), was able to unite — and convince others simply because it was printed that the Ukrainians (Ukrainian Insurgent Army: UPA) were “butchers, worse than the Hitlerites.”

Collectively, individual writers and the media spread the canard that Ukrainians, organized in army units, took part in the bestial crushing of the Polish Warsaw Uprising in 1944. Edward Prus, writing in *Zycie Literackie*, for example, charged that taking part was the Ukrainian Division “SS Galizien,” which, he claimed outrageously, had also fought “at Leningrad.” Echoing the same charge in the same weekly was the “authoritative” commentator Richard Torzecki.

It is not to be disputed that the Ukrainian “SS Galizien” Division fought alongside the Germans against the Soviet Union (earning thereby for these Ukrainians the same kind of disillusionment that was suffered by the Poles when they fought in an imperialist war on the side of Napoleon). But the charge that Ukrainians took part in the putting down of the Warsaw Uprising does conflict with statements made by honest and objective Polish historians and observers. The simple truth is the culprits were not Ukrainians but “Vlasovites” under the command of a Pole, Gen. Mieczysław Kaminski (Polish father, German mother), as all reliable and objective Polish historians and memoirists readily agree. This affair has been clearly explained by Prof. Zygmunt Wojciechowski, director of the Institute Zachodny in Poznan. In the foreword to his book, *Zbrodnia niemiecka w Warszawie, w 1944 roku*, (The German Crime in Warsaw in 1944) he writes, “This special political perfidy was shown in the use of ‘Vlasovites’ — or those among the Russian prisoners-of-war who betrayed their own country by entering the German service — in the pacification of the city. In Warsaw terminology these were usually called ‘Ukrainians.’ (a piece of nonsense which was ‘trumped up’ by those who wished to sow Polish-Ukrainian dissension). “The whole responsibility for the use of these people,” Prof. Wojciechowski writes, “falls on the Germans, who in this way wished to cook two dishes. Mainly they wanted to place the blame for the mass murders in Warsaw on the Vlasovites, but they also sought to disrupt Polish-Russian relations. It is

important, however, to state that the Warsaw citizenry was aware of these intentions and this perfidy."

Everybody in Poland knows Zenon Kliszko, who, as an officer of the Armia Ludowa (the People's Army), took an important part in the Warsaw Uprising until the capitulation on September 30, 1944. In his *Wspomnienia* (Reminiscences), he writes about the "Vlasovites" but not about any Ukrainians taking part in this uprising. Moreover, in the publication of the Institut Zachodny, as well as in the book of Stanislaw Podlewski, *Przemarsz przez piekło* (Marching through Hell), all of these alleged "Ukrainians" speak only in Russian — a "faultless Russian speech." Podlewski records in his book verbatim a conversation between a so-called "Ukrainian and a partisan orderly, 'Palma' " (Helena Zubowicz). The latter says, "Z takim litsom nye paidzhosh dalshe" ("That's my daughter, she is very sick, let her alone"). The so-called Ukrainian replies, "Vse vashyye zhenshchyny i dyevochki balnyye (?) ...mnye ana nuzhna." Anyone who knows Ukrainian and Russian will testify that this alleged Ukrainian spoke in flawless Russian and that beyond doubt he was a Russian. It is clear that Podlewski, perhaps for personal reasons, peddled this slander of the Ukrainian people, ascribing to them inhuman behavior that was actually perpetrated by Russians who had betrayed their own country. One must wonder what motivated Podlewski into slandering the Ukrainian nation and thereby helping widen the chasm between the Polish and Ukrainian nations. One can certainly accuse him of consciously inciting Poles against Ukrainians. (Nonsense!) One need only note that in commenting about the Warsaw Uprising in his *Wspomnienia*, Zenon Kliszko expresses reservations regarding the credibility of such accounts of Podlewski dealing with this period.

Just as we must grieve over the tragedy that was the end result of the heroic, patriotic Warsaw Uprising in 1944 — regardless of differing political points of view concerning the purpose and aims of that uprising — we must also grieve over regrettable and tragic events in other parts of Poland during the last war. Among them is the Polish-Ukrainian strike in the Bieszczady highlands of Lemkowszczyzna (Lemkivshchyna) that was provoked by certain unthinking and heedless people on both sides.

As Zenobiusz Kozik stated, sections of the UPA issued proclamations to the soldiers of the Polish army requesting "that they not be attacked because they are Ukrainian insurgents" who ignore the reactionary Polish underground "and don't involve themselves in Polish political disputes," a position which — as Polish writers of memoirs state — even the leaders of the Polish underground accepted. Ukrainians maintain that the tragic events in Lemkowszczyzna would not have taken place had the Polish government pursued a different policy and given the

UPA people the possibility of proceeding to the West. With no outlet, however, they were forced by sheer hunger to seek sustenance from the local population. They could make for the West because the Polish government — dementedly wishing them not to leave — prevented them from doing so with the aid of the Czechoslovak government. Detained on Czechoslovak soil, UPA people were handed over to Poland, as is generally known (Jarnicki and others).

It is also a fact — as attested to by Polish historians and observers — that there were not nearly as many victims of the *nationality* strife between Poles and Ukrainians in Lemkoland as has been alleged in the exaggerations springing up from the local personal feuding. Instead, there were many victims in the fighting between the UPA people and official bodies, such as the Citizen's Militia, soldiers of the Public Security Administration ("U.B." or "Bezpieka") and the Polish Army, which was ordered to "liquidate" the UPA force.

In his book, *Gdy umilkły działa* (When the Guns Became Silent), Alfons Filar, past commander of the Citizen Militia in Rzeszow province, lists the functionaries of the Citizen Militia who perished in fighting the UPA and the reactionary Polish underground (Home Army - "AK") in the years 1944-47. This tragic list contains 470 names, together with their service ranks and dates of death. Of these, 188 are listed as having been killed by the UPA, 282 at the hands of others. Not far off are the statistics of the Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party. They show that in Rzeszow province from 1944 to 1947 in the fighting and the settling of personal accounts 865 persons, both Polish and Ukrainian, were killed, among whom were 459 functionaries of the Citizen's Militia, members of the Security Police (UB), and party *aparatchiks* and political organizers (including 165 party members).

How strange, then, is the behavior of Wladyslaw Jarnicki. In his pamphlet, *W pogoni za Burlakiem* (In Pursuit of Burlak), which recalled the joint Polish-Czech combat with the UPA in the Rzeszow province from 1944 to the spring of 1948, he claims that 8,800 persons, serving in the Polish Army, UB, the Citizen's Militia, and the government administration, perished in the war against the UPA. Because his figure wildly disagrees with the above given figures of the Party History Institute and those of Filar's book, a blatant attempt to deepen the animosity between both nations is evident.

Yet Filar's book, *Gdy umilkły działa*, has its shortcomings. For whatever reasons, he concerns himself only with the Polish fatalities in the struggle between the Poles and Ukrainians in 1944. He does not mention that the villages he names had mixed populations of Poles and Ukrainians. He says nothing about the fate of the Ukrainian *tserkievs*

(churches) in these villages. Perhaps he did not know that Poles murdered the Ukrainian priest Piotr Wolanowicz in the village of Horyniec and murdered the priest Lew Sohor in the village of Kobylnitsa Ruska, and that in the village of Oleszyce Stare the *tserkiev* was turned into a storehouse. These villages, in his book, are referred to as "Polish." Perhaps Filar did not know that in 1945 in Radruzy, Lubaczow *powiat* (county), Poles slew the Ukrainian priest Wasyl Huszka and then nailed his body to a fence and that at that time in the Rzeszow district alone more than 40 (forty) Ukrainian priests were slaughtered. *Relato refero*... and this list is enough for me. All such lists are indeed tragic and one must grieve for those who lost their lives unnecessarily, regardless of their nationality or their numbers.

And was it necessary for Polish "state reasons" to require the exiling from Lemkowszczyzna to the northern and northwestern regions of Poland some 150,000 Ukrainians (Kwilecki) or to require the destruction of a whole series of centuries-old Ukrainian *tserkievs* that pointed up the Ukrainian character of Lemkowszczyzna? Was it necessary to desecrate a number of these Ukrainian churches by turning them into pens for cattle and sheep or into storehouses? What necessity dictated the destruction of precious iconostases and ancient icons in these churches? *Relato refero* ... All of which, of course, further poisoned brotherly relations, to say nothing of the murder by Polish bands of a score of Ukrainian priests. To which, however, the Polish Government piously replies, "Not all" (were murdered). The government of the Polish People's Republic and the whole of Polish society ought to be made aware of these barbarities in order to appreciate to what degree Ukrainians can be expected to live in neighborly and peaceful relations with them.

Relative to the regrettable battles in which thousands of innocent, peace-loving victims on both sides fell in the pointless combat between Poles and Ukrainians on Ukrainian land in Volhynia and Western Ukraine, dying mostly as victims of personal encounters rather than political, Edward Gronczewski-Przepiorka, a leader of a unit of the Armia Ludowa (People's Army — AL), writes in his *Reminiscences*:

With pain I must state that in the Bug valley the reactionary underground [Polish] were unsurpassed in the maltreatment of the peaceful population. While on rare occasions small bands of less than twenty Ukrainian nationalists made quick raids on the left bank of the Bug, leaders of the reactionary underground in that region organized forays on a broad scale in which the people of Ukrainian villages were maltreated. Engaged in this reaction were hordes numbering

several hundreds, spreading in their wake terror and destruction and the spilling of innocent blood. Everything we hear among the people concerning Polish-Ukrainian relations has been confirmed by concrete facts and proofs. Units of the pro-London underground conducted the fighting, or rather the attempt to wipe out villages inhabited by Ukrainians or mixed families.

Echoing Gronczewski, the tactics of the reactionary Polish underground were similarly evaluated by certain commanders of the Peasant Battalions (Wolczew). Justifiably enough, therefore, Polish memoir writers blame the reactionary Polish underground — *Armia Krajowa* (Home Army — AK) — and the NSZ (National Armed Forces) for the massive maltreatment and slaying of Ukrainians. As is known and stated by Polish historians and chroniclers and observers, the Home Army (AK), acting on the manifesto “of the Polish Emigre Government in London and its delegates in the homeland,” and moved by the dictates of its “Burza” (Storm) program (which was condemned, however, when the Red Army, at war with Germany, reached Polish soil), aimed at the re-annexing of those Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Lithuanian lands which had belonged to Poland in 1939 with the approval of the Allies at the time a post-war peace conference would take place (Szczesniak, Zabiallo, Wolczew, etc.).

In July of 1944 a unit of the Home Army under the command of Col. “Wilk” (Alexander Krzyzanowski), acting in accord with an order of the Chief Command and in concert with Operation “Burza,” even attempted to take over the Lithuanian city of Wilno (Vilnius) before it could be occupied by the Soviet Army in order to establish a Polish administration. After a bloody encounter with the Germans and heavy losses, however, it had to withdraw. Later that same day July 7 — Wilno was occupied by the Soviet Army. A few days later, Wilk and his staff were arrested and his insurgent soldiers were sent to concentration camps (Skarzynski, Szczesniak, Putrament, etc.). The Home Army behaved in the same manner on ethnic Ukrainian land in Volhynia and Western Ukraine, where Ukrainians were attempting to create their own independent state (Szczesniak, etc.). The struggle between the Home Army and the Ukrainians did great harm to both.

In this connection, to be recalled is that in London the Polish government-in-exile — growing certain of a restoration of Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Lithuanian land to Poland — even created in 1941 an “Eastern Bureau.” Under the direction of its Interior Ministry, this bureau was concerned with political questions relating to national minorities (Szczesniak, etc.). In addition, the government-in-exile passed in 1942 a resolution calling for a general uprising against the Germans in the homeland once the German armies would be in homeward retreat on Polish territory. Likewise, an uprising east of the Bug river was planned

as a political demonstration against the approaching Soviet armies (Kirchmayer, etc.). The details of this plan were worked out by Commander-in-Chief, Wladyslaw Sikorski in London and Gen. Grot-Rowecki, commander-in-chief of the Home Army (Kirchmayer, etc.). According to the plan, the Home Army would first take over Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Lithuanian territory after the Germans forces had left with the aim of securing the territory that had belonged to Poland between 1918 and 1939. The AK commander stated that "alongside the Germans, the chief enemy, we have first of all the Ukrainians, secondly the Lithuanians. There is the possibility that we will have to engage the Ukrainians on the first day of the uprising. From the beginning we will have to fight them for Lwow" (Szczesniak, etc.).

The plan for the uprising from 1942 on showed that in Polish minds there was no doubt as to whom the eastern territory belonged. There was not even a suggestion of a political approach toward solving the problems, only a military solution, which was logical regarding the Germans and the Ukrainians, too, regarding their entertainment of other ideas (Szczesniak). Likewise, the Peasant Party, "Roch," according to Maria Turlejska, took a similar position: "The eastern borders of Poland, as delineated in the Treaty of Riga in 1921, represent our most modest demand concerning the east."

As historians and other chroniclers have revealed, AK units penetrated the territory of Volhynia and Lithuania as early as 1942 "to work for a general uprising," which as planned from the top meant a struggle with the Ukrainians for the possession of Ukrainian land. Antoni Szczesniak and Stanislaw Wronski wrote that "this program for the restoration of Western Ukraine to Poland, known to Ukrainian nationalists, was one of the reasons for the organizing of programs." The slogan, "Out with the Poles," was evoked by the menace of the return of Polish rule and land owners. "If there had not been at that time," writes Stanislaw Wronski, "the AK plan and activity aimed at once more re-establishing Polish hegemony over these lands, recalling national oppression and landowners in the period between the wars, not even the efforts of Nazi politics could have set off such a slaughter of Polish people as was conducted by a fanatical element of the nationalists." "One cannot ignore the fact that the first murders of Poles date from November of 1942, which coincided with the revelation of the plan concerning the return of the eastern lands to Poland," writes Szczesniak.

Utterly without foundation is the charge that the Ukrainians somehow provoked the Polish-Ukrainian fighting in Volhynia and Western Ukraine on lands which are now in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. That the Polish emigre government in London and its representatives in the homeland took an untenable position concerning the eastern lands of Volhynia and Western Ukraine is demonstrated by a

Polish handbill headed, "To Ukrainians," circulated in 1943, and signed by the "Polish Army Command, Region 4." It said:

To the irresponsible groups who with murder and conflagration attempt to perpetuate non-existent law in connection with the possession of (our) eastern lands, who with astounding brazenness already have spread out on the territory of central Poland, to all these we solemnly declare there will be no pardon. Every drop of Polish blood that is shed will bring forth a gallon of the murderer's blood. For every home of our destroyed, there will be ten of yours. As long as you don't come to your senses, this will poison you still. As long as you don't understand that Poles rule in Poland, not Ukrainians ... Ukraine will never be in Poland. We swear that to God. Only those will remain with us who come to their senses and take the road of penance. The rest can cross the Zbrucz (Szczesniak).

The representative of the Polish London government in Lwow (Lviv), J. Gnatowski, baldly told Ukrainians in May 1944 that they were "clinging to an empty request, for we will give up nothing" and that the Polish-Ukrainian frontier question needs to be worked out on the basis of citizenship claims in line with the Atlantic Charter. Which, however, did not at all square with the line pursued by the Polish exile government in London (Szczesniak, *Polska Ludowa*, P. 67). Authoritative and objective, the Polish chronicler, Gen. Jerzy Kirchmayer, writes in his book, *Powstanie Warszawskie* (The Warsaw Uprising), (pp. 43-44):

Those who found themselves under the command of activists representing the emigre government were not in the smallest degree prepared for the inevitable revision of the eastern borders. The propaganda, both in the country and abroad, did not even consider anything like that. The eastern pre-war boundary was tabu. The tragic happenings in the borderlands east of the Bug and San rivers could in no way influence the political outcome. The national political aspirations of the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians had to be considered. It is no longer possible in this century, though it was possible for a time, to persist in going against the tide of twentieth-century progress by continuing to rule minorities by force.

It should be pointed out that before the taking of Ukrainian lands in the 14th century no significant Polish population was to be found there. Nor even after the passage of 400 years, despite intensive Polish colonization and Polonization of the Ukrainian people up to the time of the partitions of Poland and again during the 1919-1939 period. Polish statistics of 1931 showed that only 11 per cent of the population of Volhynia was Polish and only 23 per cent in Western Ukraine. The Ukrainian population of the *województwos* (provinces) of Lwow, Stanislawow and Tarnopol comprised 75 per cent of the total rural areas.

Ukrainians, mindful of what had been handed down through the generations by historians and of documents concerning several centuries of bondage, oppression and exploitation of the Ukrainian people by the Poles, beginning in the 14th century, together with the extermination policy of the Polish "sanacja" government in the years from 1919 to 1939 and the numerous "pacifications" of the Ukrainian people, resolved to defend themselves against a renewal of Polish enslavement. Articulation of this resolve is voiced in a handbill of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) of July 1943, addressed "To the Poles:"

The Ukrainian nation, just as you, is fighting for its own state and is desirous of harmony with the Polish nation and the existence of a friendly relationship between a free Poland and a free Ukraine. At the same time we cannot allow Polish imperialists to subjugate even a part of the Ukrainian land. In particular, we shall not at the present time allow to go unpunished any acts or plans of terroristic imperialists directed against the life and property of Ukrainian citizens. If you listen to the incitements of imperialists, this will only lead to the shedding of your blood because the Ukrainian nation, with full determination, will defend its right to self-determination and its own state (Szczesniak).

In a second proclamation, "To the Poles," also issued in July 1943, the OUN expressed its resolve as follows: "The Polish press keeps writing about 'our eastern lands', referring to the western Ukrainian land up to the Dnieper River. All of that territory, in their opinion, has to be annexed to the Polish state. That way the Polish imperialists hope to suppress seven million Ukrainians by adding to the pre-1939 boundaries the entire right bank of Ukraine. This can only be understood as an annexation akin to the imperialism of Moscow or Berlin." The OUN ridiculed the Polish plans for "extinguishing" the Ukrainian nation and declared that since the Poles had not succeeded in doing so over the course of hundreds of years, they would not now succeed. "How can the Polish imperialists possibly think," we read in the above proclamation, "that we will accept a new Polish enslavement? Hope for a decent Ruthenian people' has more than once been costly to the Poles" (Szczesniak, *Polska Ludowa*, Vol. VII, p. 68). Szczesniak also writes that in 1942 the "Lwow" AK Command unit engaged in widespread activity of a political and military nature as laid down by the plan for a "General Uprising" but did not suggest any political approach for dealing with the "problem." The armed struggle had to deal not only with the Germans but also with the Ukrainians and Lithuanians "if they took a position in opposition."

From the aforementioned documents we learn that the tragic fratricidal struggle in Volhynia and Western Ukraine had already been

planned by the Poles in 1941 in the "Eastern Bureau", which functioned until June 30, 1944 and was linked to the 1942 Home Army battle plan of the "General Uprising." In compliance with this program, the Home Army chief command was acting in accord with proclamations of the Polish emigre government and its representatives in the homeland calling for continuation of the "expansion to the east" politics aimed at reuniting, even by means of armed struggle, the Ukrainian lands of Volhynia and Western Ukraine and Poland (Szczesniak). Groundless, therefore, is the charge that Ukrainians somehow started the Polish-Ukrainian war there in 1943; it had already been planned by the Poles in 1942. As observers noted, AK units in 1942 penetrated areas of Volhynia and Lithuania, alarming the Ukrainian and Lithuanian population. And if, as Szczesniak and Wronski write, that was not a planned action by the Polish emigre government in London — about which the Ukrainian population was aware, all the while observing the suspicious acts of the Poles — it undoubtedly caused rancor and unnecessarily provoked fighting with blind bitterness between brother nations, fighting instigated by enemies of understanding and harmony between them. It is now painfully clear in the face of present-day political realities — with Polish-contested Volhynia and Western Ukraine now joined to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic — that regardless of any viewpoint on this subject, the politics of the Polish emigre government in London that provoked unnecessary and tragic results, costing thousands of lives on both sides, was unwise, short-sighted irrational and a downright CRIME as regards both the Ukrainian and Polish nations.

And this is the historic truth in the view of authoritative and objective Poles. One must wonder, consequently, about certain writers and "political activists," posing as authoritative and enlightening chroniclers and journalists, who in writing about these painful events dwell on the "number" of human victims in the period of this combat. They do not write about the real dimensions of this tragic Polish-Ukrainian history. They deliberately conceal them from society and mislead by writing only — must often for the sake of meretricious sensation — about the "results" of these tragedies, "feeding" society with morbidity. They are subhuman competitors in human tragedies, outdoing each other in "reopening Polish and Ukrainian wounds." These mindless "politicals" create problems that deepen the hatred and widen the breach between the Polish and Ukrainian nations.

Antoni Szczesniak writes the following about the victims of that costly and lamentable warfare: "It is difficult today to determine, even approximately, the number of Poles who perished as victims of Ukrainian nationalists in the years 1943-1944. Those were the times when — as states the Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the

Polish United Workers Party (p. 20) — 'on one side UPA units murdered Polish people and on the other the AK underground laid waste whole Ukrainian villages'. Szczesniak writes further: "Current reports of the underground authorities list incomplete losses in certain regions — for example, in Volhynia in 1943 more than 15,000 casualties, in Eastern Malopolska (Western Ukraine) 15,000 before May 1944." And meanwhile, Szczesniak adds, "Wladyslaw Studnicki, in appealing to the German authorities in Lwow in August 1944 made reference to 200,000 Poles as having been killed by Ukrainians, to which the German police chief in Lwow replied that the number was at most 100,000." Szczesniak himself sees even less: "One can estimate that about 60,000 to 80,000 Poles were killed in Polesie, Volhynia, Chelmszczyzna (Kholm area) and throughout Western Ukraine." He does not estimate, however, how many Ukrainians were despatched by Poles.

How painful to realize that so many innocent people on both sides should have perished in these fratricidal combats instigated by the power-bent Polish emigre government in London. It is painful regardless of how many victims there actually were. Hagglng over the number of victims for purposes of morbid sensationalism is the behavior of dishonest, callous and even neurotic individuals playing games with human misfortune. To peddle fabrications in order to combine political goals with personal gain is, alas, hardly unknown. But to delight in sowing discord between *peoples* is both sick and criminal.

Tragic also was the report in the German *Krakauer Zeitung* that during the twenty years of Polish rule — meaning the occupation of Ukrainian lands from 1919 onward — "1,200,000 Ukrainians perished," which would "have been outright extermination — genocide — if it were the truth," as Tadeusz Cieslak points out in *Z dziejow stosunkow polsko-radzieckich* (On the History of Polish-Soviet Relations), Vol. V, p. 100. However, as Stanislaw Wronski, in the introduction to the book by Henryk Cybulski, *Czerwone Noce* (Red Nights), (p. 9), writes, "the Polish Sanacja government actually entertained such aims with regard to the Ukrainian and Byelorussian nations."

We do not have complete statistics concerning these deplorable events of that period and, worse still, statistics are mere numbers, with names lacking, which precludes the possibility of establishing the full truth about the events. But how shocking and awful are just the documented statistics in the above-mentioned book of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party. And speaking of brutal killing, in the village of Wierzchowina in Krasnystaw county (*powiat*), a Polish NSZ band slew in one day, June 6, 1945 (after World War II's end) 197 peaceful, unarmed, wholly innocent Ukrainians, including an 85-year-old man, two infants (3 mos. old Eugenia and Michael Kniaziuk)

and Elizabeth Mironiuk, also born in 1945. The victims also included 21 children between ages one and 14. In this book issued by the KC PZPR Institute of Party History gives the full names of all these murdered Ukrainians. The list includes 15 bearing the name, "Tywoniuk." Maria Turlejska writes that the massacre of these unfortunate people went on for three hours and that their bodies were found in the streets, in courtyards, in homes, in fields, and in cellars. After shooting those who tried to flee and completing the slaughter, the units of the National Armed Forces (NSZ) collected 70 horse-drawn wagons, filled them with stolen clothing and other loot and headed for the forest to divide their booty. In her book, *Spor o Polske* (Dispute over Poland), Turlejska writes (Jerzy Lovell and others also have written about this) that four days later (June 10) a combined force of Polish (Communist) Militia, Security Police and Polish and Soviet soldiers swooped down on this band of criminals of the NSZ, over 250 in number, killing over a score and wounding and capturing many more. Roman Jarczynski, one of the leaders, led the others in eluding encirclement.

The KC PZPR book lists also the full names of Poles killed by UPA insurgents but, with few exceptions, these were victims of sporadic encounters and who belonged to the Citizen's Militia, the Security Police (UB), ORMO, PPR or SL, or the government, or who were Polish Army soldiers whose assigned task was the liquidation of the UPA. Unconfirmed, on the other hand, in this book (published by the Ministry of National Defense, or MON, in 1970) is any account of an incident of massive and bestial massacre of a peaceful group of Poles comparable to that perpetrated by Poles in the Ukrainian village of Wierzchowina. One also cannot be silent about the concealment from the Polish public of the perfidy of one NSZ unit leader, by name Anton Dabrowski-Szacki, who in assuming the name "Bohun" borrowed the authentic name of a Ukrainian colonel who fought against the Polish nobility in the 17th century Ukrainian uprising. This NSZ leader set about killing both Ukrainians and Polish Communists, with Ukrainians being blamed for his murder of Poles because of his *nom de plume*.

Mieczyslaw (Dyomko) Moczar, a leader of units of the partisan Peoples Army (AL) and People's Guard (GL) (and later a notorious chief of the UB), writes that this same NSZ unit, under the joint leadership of "Bohun" and Leonard Zdanowicz (pseudonym "Zab"), on August 8, 1944, at Rzabice (Rzabiec) near Wloszczowa, collaborated with the Germans in the killing of 56 Polish partisans of the People's Army (AL) and Soviet Army soldiers.

Suspiciousness, animosity and hatred to the point of killing did not always characterize Polish-Ukrainian relations. There were good times in the distinct past when the nations lived in brotherly harmony. History

tells us that Swietopelk (Sviatopolk), son of the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) prince, Volodymyr the Great, was the son-in-law of King Boleslaw Chrobry. Dymitr (Dmitri) of Goray (of Ruthenian nationality) was the treasurer of Casimir the Great (Pawel Jasienica). The Ukrainian magnate Adam Kisiel, of the Orthodox faith, was the *voyevoda* (governor) of Kiev for the Polish Commonwealth and tried to unite the Polish and Ukrainian nations. Warsaw University historian Prof. Olgierd Gorka says that "the endeavors of Kisiel for the defense of the Commonwealth were of far greater value than the deeds of Jaremi Wisniowiecki" (the historical figure celebrated in Henryk Sienkiewicz's novel, *Ogniem i mieczem* (With Fire and Sword)).

Both in past and present, there have been and are many different family connections on every level of society. Egotistic and greedy magnates and nobles already in the Middle Ages were profiting greatly at the expense of the Ukrainian nation after invading and subjugating the lands, with detrimental results for both the Ukrainian and Polish peoples.

Ukraine, with its very deep fertile soil, a land "flowing with milk and honey" and rich in natural resources is, depending on one's point of view, either blessed or cursed. Certainly for centuries it has been invaded and plundered by many predators. In addition to which it was internally afflicted early on by quarrels between the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) princes. In the early Middle Ages Ukraine was devastated by the invasions of the rude nomadic tribes of Petchenegs and Polovtsi (Cumans). Later, the invasions of Mongols and Tartars laid waste to both land and people. During the scourging invasion of 1240, the Mongol Tartar horde conducted a frightful slaughter of the men, women and children of the capital, Kiev. Passing through on his way to Mongolia a few years later, the Italian Plano Carpini saw no living persons, only skeletons and the burned-out ruins of buildings. In later Tartarraids in southern Ukraine, besides extensive plundering, young people were taken into slavery, frightening so many people into fleeing north that a great expanse of territory was almost denuded of population. Indeed, this vast region became known as "the Wilderness." Even the Tartar *Khan*, in a letter to the Polish authorities, called it a "no man's land," adding, "Whoever be strong enough to take it, let him have it" (Wojcik, Podhorecki, and others). The land became a huge fallow steppe overgrown with tall grass and weeds. Yet time heals, and soon enough resettlement began at the places we know as Kamieniec-Podolski, Braclaw, Kanev, and Cherkassy, located about 300 kilometers from the Black Sea and Tartar-held Crimea.

Because of the weakening and reduction of the population, however, Lithuanians, Poles and other neighbors took advantage of the situation

and invaded the north, west and south. Gaining a signal victory over the Tartars in 1362, the Lithuanian grand duke, Olgiard, occupied Ukraine all the way down to the Black Sea. Because the Lithuanian rule was of a **benign nature**, the southern lands were steadily resettled and turned into productive farming country. The Lithuanians made no changes in the structure of the Ukrainian state. The Ukrainian aristocracy, the descendants of feudal princes and *boyars*, kept the political power in their hands, occupied high positions in the administration and sat in the council of the lords of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy.

The Ukrainians enjoyed full and complete equality with the Lithuanians, many of whom attended the Orthodox church to which all Ukrainians belonged. The Lithuanians for some time also had friendly relations with Moscow. On the other hand, the Poles began slicing off the western lands of Ukraine (nose-thumbing the Lithuanians in the process) and implanted Polish settlers as it tried to Polonize the Ukrainians, especially the Ukrainian aristocracy and nobility. King Casimir the Great, occupying in 1340 the Ukrainian Volhynian-Halich principality and the city of Lwow (established in the 13th century as a Ukrainian principality by Daniel, later king, for his son, Lev), began an intensive settling of Poles and Jews in Lwow and other cities. (He later had to withdraw from Lwow and Przemyśl [Peremyshl] after pressure exerted by the Ruthenian army of the *voyevoda* of Przemyśl.)

Where the prospect of expansion via Ukraine was of political interest to the Polish government, it was intriguing to the Polish magnates and nobles, who lusted for "new royal grants and the enlargement of their estates." It was also in the interest of the Polish Catholic hierarchy to expand into "Orthodox Ruthenia." Even the Pope at far-off Rome twice called on the Polish government for a yearly "Peter's pence" donation for the financing of Casimir the Great's action (Podhorecki). Apart from the Polish-Lithuanian and Polish-Hungarian disputes over Ukrainian land in Volhynia and Galicia, the significant Polish occupation of this Ukrainian ethnic territory began after the conclusion between Poland and Lithuania of a series of "unions": the Union of Krewo in 1385, the Union of Horodlo in 1413 and others in 1401, 1432, 1499, 1501, and, finally, the Union of Lublin in 1569, which, in permanently establishing a joint Polish-Lithuanian state, resulted in the full partitioning of Ukraine.

Jostling each other as annexers and occupiers of Ukrainian land at that time were the Poles, Lithuanians, Tartars, Turks, Moldavians, Russians, and Hungarians. Poland grabbed the most. Now a wave of Polish magnates and nobles washed over Ukraine and absorbed both the land and the people with the help of Polish settlers. Great areas containing towns and villages were swept under the control of shark-like

Polish magnates and nobles. But the Polish thrust for land and power gained another vital resource: the Ukrainian peasant, who was reduced to feudal serfdom.

The peasants were compelled to labor for the *pans* (lords) up to five days out of the week without pay so that the *pans* "welfare" could rest on this payless work of the Ukrainian peasants. On top of this, the serf had to pay taxes and tribute, both in kind and money. When there was a distillery on the place, the peasants were required to buy a designated amount of liquor, even if they did not drink. This often placed them in debt to the taverns, usually run by Jews, for whom liquor provided a far securer means of livelihood than the sale of grain (Jews did not farm). The peasants were not permitted to own property and could only rent from the *pan*. The peasant, in effect, became the property of "his lord," a magnate or nobleman, and could not leave his place of residence, on pain of death (and this without recourse of appeal to a court). Further, when the vassalage of peasants could be bought and sold, they in effect became slaves. The law of serfdom in Ukraine at that time reached heights of pitiless cruelty and, "on guard for that law," stood the army, both of the crown and of the mercenary variety.

"Ukrainian Kozakdom" was at first a conglomerate of small and diverse units, but later they jelled in Ukraine as a formidable instrument of self-defense against Turkish and Tartar invasions of the soft belly of Ukraine, its southern region. The size of Kozakdom constantly increased, largely because of the influx of rebelling peasants who preferred freedom, however unsettling, to the feudal slavery under the Polish *szlachta* (Nobility). More and more assertive protests were uttered by the peasants who stayed in place. These began to achieve the dimension of a rebellion, especially with the participation of the *Kozaks*. The rebellions, of course, were cruelly crushed with the help of the army. Captured insurgents — whom the *szlachta* labeled churls, bandits, rogues and "rebels against the Commonwealth" — were hanged without trial and impaled, and their families were terrorized if they were not killed out of hand. Whole villages were wiped out to such a degree that the nobles hotly complained to the authorities that the crown's army had wreaked such havoc that there was no one left to work the fields (Serczyk).

The chief abomination human beings can inflict on one another is oppression. For man does not solely survive; he is God-driven to improve as a species. Hence a man *must* rebel against oppression; he *must* be free. This, we submit, is as true of nations as it is of individuals. Thus Polish cruelty did not check further uprisings, including the great Kozak-peasant war against Poland under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, *hetman* of Ukraine.

This was not just a struggle between competing social classes or an upsurge of resistance to the persecution of the Orthodox church, as some have tried to present it, but a war to the death between two nations. One of them — the Polish — was the oppressor; the other — the Ukrainian — was the oppressed (Gorka, Podhorecki, Wojcik, etc.). Its actual result was that Kozakdom and all of Ukraine were completely freed of Polish rule (its fatal political complications were to develop later).

In this cruel war both Ukraine and Poland suffered grievously. Jeremi Wisniowiecki outdid other magnates in bloody atrocities. Quitting the Orthodox church at age 20, despite protests by his parents, he embraced Catholicism. Forced to flee in 1648 from beyond the Dnieper — where he had a vast holding embracing 38,000 homesteads and 230,000 serfs — because of the *Kozak*-peasant uprising, he exacted revenge as he retreated with a savage “pacification of the rebellious land.” His aim, he was reported to have said was to leave surviving “only the land and water.” Captured insurgents were hanged, impaled, decapitated, or had their hands cut off, with some more ingeniously tortured. Capturing the town of Nemeriv defended by the insurgents, Wisniowiecki shouted to his soldiers, “Kill them in such a way they will feel themselves dying.” So his soldiers committed savage acts as only the human species excels in savagery with its own kind. Not a soul survived. It was said that seven hundred insurgents were hanged, two hundred impaled and set afire. The eyes of the Orthodox priest were gouged. It was said that “there was not one tree without a hanging Kozak.” And this is what came to pass on Ukrainian land where people fought for freedom from Polish slavery (Podhorecki, Wojcik, and others).

Dismaying, then, was this fratricidal struggle. But in support of the above-mentioned facts and documents one can state (though not without sadness) that were it not for the boundless egoism of the Polish magnates and nobility in exploiting and plundering the Ukrainian nation, were it not for their haughtiness, their inhuman treatment of the Ukrainian nation, their insufferable arrogance with regard to their own species, there surely would not ensued the anti-Polish peasant-*Kozak* uprising and the frightful, bloody war that took place during 1648 and 1649. Later there would not have been the bloody uprisings of the peasants on the Dnieper’s right bank, the bloodiest of which occurred in 1768-69 under the leadership of Gonta and Zelizniak and which was provoked by the inhuman behavior of the Bar Confederacy toward the Orthodox Ukrainians, seeking by terrorism to re-convert them to Catholicism and to reassert their own lordly rights “to suppress and subjugate the Ukrainian nation.”

But for the magnates and Polish *szlachta* there would have been no hatred between the Polish and Ukrainian nations; both would have lived

in brotherly, good-neighborly accord. As historic documents show, *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky did not want that war with Poland in 1648; he had always called himself a "subject of the Commonwealth and His Royal Highness." His *kozaks* did not want that Polish-Ukrainian war, about which, as chroniclers attest, the letters of Khmelnytsky and *otaman* Krywonis to the king and magnates bear witness. But the magnates — especially Wisniowiecki and Potocki — provoked it (B. Prus. O. Gorka, L. Podhorecki, Wojcik, etc.). They who try to blame the Ukrainians for the split between the Polish and Ukrainian nations are in error. The blame should rest on the Polish magnates and nobles in ancient times and on Polish chauvinistic and imperialistic politicians in modern times. Henryk Sienkiewicz was at this Polish worst when he slandered the Ukrainian nation in his novel, *With Fire and Sword* (*Ogniem i mieczem*), reviling the insurgent peasants and *Kozaks* as "bandits, churls, riffraff and rabble." Why? Simply because they wished to be free of Polish bondage. Thus was the breach between the two nations widened. Just as it would be wrong to label as "bandits, churls and riffraff" the Polish insurgents of the time of the Partitions or in Silesia or Wielkopolska or Warsaw, all of whom were fighting on their own soil against occupiers and for the freedom of their nation and the independence who also *on their own lands* fought the Polish conquerors and oppressors for the freedom of their nation, freedom from Polish bondage and for the independence of their country. In short, one must not apply a double standard.

How self-revealing of Sienkiewicz to praise in his book the grasping magnates and Polish nobles in Ukraine and to openly applaud the frightful and hideous cruelty they exercised in the decimation of the peasants and *Kozaks*, as Prof. Gorka attests. One such perpetrator, a hero to Sienkiewicz, was the traitor to the Orthodox church, Jeremi Wisniowiecki, who said, "Can there be pity for rebels? That's a service, not a sin." And surely nothing more inhuman can be imagined than what Sienkiewicz depicted. As Janina Wieczerska writes in the *Zycie Literackie* (Nr. 44/78) in an article, "Cruel Fantasy in This Knight," "Sienkiewicz in his historical novels is insensitive to cruelty, for him it is something in which to delight," and further on, "civil virtue he does not see." Sienkiewicz identifies with Wisniowiecki, a man who, greedy for property, enlarged his estate by raids on the latifundia of Polish neighbors, a man who tried to murder senators for forcing him to take an oath in a dispute with Koniecpolski over Hadziacz (Hadiach), a man who defied the king and who, of course, together with *Hetman* Potocki, provoked the Polish-Ukrainian war that proved so tragic for both nations. In Sienkiewicz's eyes, this man is righteous and just, a man who left countless widows and orphans in his wake, who fled the city of Lwow

after collecting money and supplies for its defense during a siege in 1649, an inhuman creature of whom it was said, "he would not only have crushed the rebellion but would have drowned in blood the whole Ukrainian country." (Prus, Gorka, and others).

His adulatory portrait of Wisniowiecki cost Sienkiewicz the respect of all fair and objective Poles, such as Boleslaw Prus and Prof. Olgierd Gorka of the University of Warsaw, who made the telling point that Wisniowiecki loved the Commonwealth not at all because all his life he plotted against it and even attempted to destroy it, loving "only his estates in Ukraine and, therefore, so cruelly murdered the peasants and *Kozaks* that he had to flee to escape their revenge for the immeasurable wrongs he inflicted on them."

It is hardly surprising, then, that Sienkiewicz should have portrayed as offensively and contemptuously as he did Bohdan Khmelnytsky, whom even King Wladyslaw IV esteemed and who served the Commonwealth, under Zolkiewski, in the battle at Tsetsora in 1620. His father, Michael, was killed in that battle (against the Turks), in which Wladyslaw IV, not yet enthroned, also took part. Khmelnytsky spent two years in Turkish captivity. Sienkiewicz defamed this Khmelnytsky of whom historians said, "he had uncommon ability, a sharp mind and indefatigable energy," this Khmelnytsky who "called himself a subject of the Commonwealth and His Royal Highness" and who exhibited a "truly human, noble character" (Ludorowski). As Polish historians have recorded, King Wladyslaw IV even conducted secret negotiations with him in 1646 concerning Polish-Ukrainian military and political relations. But these good relations were disrupted by the egoistic thrusts of the Polish magnates and "kinglets," who did not wish to part with the profits and luxury provided by their unchecked and willful control over Ukraine. It is unquestionable that were it not for the rapacious and chauvinistic politics of the magnates and Polish *szlachta*, Polish-Ukrainian and indeed, all Slavic history, would have taken a wholly different course.

Dr. Edmund Osmanski puts the onus on Poland in his well-reasoned book, *Rzeczpospolita Polakow*, (The Republic of the Poles) writing, "Poland repelled Ukraine in the seventeenth century." As Polish historians and chroniclers have stated, Khmelnytsky even planned a federation of Ukraine and Poland on a basis of equality. He had to give up this goal because of the magnate obstruction, and so justified his action at the Pereyaslav Council in 1654 when the fate of a weakened Ukraine hung in the balance between those powerful neighbors, Poland, Russia and Turkey. And then when he reluctantly placed Ukraine under the protection of the tsar of Russia, he is reported to have said to the assembled *Kozakdom*, "Such slavery, such pitiless shedding of Christian

blood as we have experienced at the hands of the Polish lords, none of you need be reminded of. You yourselves know that dogs are better treated than a brother Christian."

In his prejudicial selectivity, Sienkiewicz discarded such reports, preferring to side with the overbearing Polish magnates who shamelessly placed their private interests above the common weal. Novelist Boleslaw Prus and Olgiersd Gorka consequently charged that Sienkiewicz had overlooked completely other causes which provoked the Polish-Ukrainian war, that he blithely ignored social conditions in Ukraine at the time. Fires awesomely rage and blood capiously flows in his novel but the source of his beloved pyrotechnics is of no interest to the author of *With Fire and Sword*; it is as if he zealously painted the face of a clock but understand not at all the wheels and springs that activated it. He is driven to glorify the acquisitive and overweeningly haughty magnates and *szlachta*: those who out of sheer self-conceit dug the grave of their own fatherland.

It is thus charged against Sienkiewicz the novelist that in *With Fire and Sword* one does not even glimpse the self-corroding contempt of the Poles for the Ukrainian people. One certainly does not see the plight of people deprived of fortune, wives and daughters (Boleslaw Prus, in writing about this, had in mind the infamous and rampant lawless "*ius primae noctis*" the *szlachta* established in relation to Ukrainian women). Sienkiewicz reduces all the Ukrainian people to a pack of wild dogs. He does not see — or wishes not to see — that those admirable magnates — Polish "kinglets" — at bottom worked for the deterioration and eventual overthrow of all authority and government in Poland, that his magnates were actually engaged totally "in the digging of the fatherland's grave."

It is also charged that Sienkiewicz does not explain how a military power that crushed the (German) Knights of the Cross and the (Turkish) Janissaries was completely powerless in a war with Ukrainian peasants and *Kozaks*. *With Fire and Sword*, in consequence, hardly deserves to be called an historical novel. To his credit, Sienkiewicz does admit that Khmelnytsky was not the main enemy, but rather "the internal disorder, the licentiousness of the nobles, the undermanned and insubordinate army, and the anarchy in the diet (*sejm*), with its dissension and discord, chaos and inefficiency and the insubordination of its self-serving members."

Sienkiewicz even sympathizes with the Ukrainian colonel, Bohun, and takes pity on Khmelnytsky's courier, *Otaman* Sucharuk, whom Wisnicwiecki ordered impaled (to show that he did not recognize Khmelnytsky's *hetmanship* or that he had any fear of him). The author feels for the spirit of that *otaman* and understands him: a proud *Kozak* who, while dying, experiences a wave of hatred as he gazes at the passing

Polish banners. A gaze which says, "Would to God He would punish you and your children and children's children to the tenth generation for the blood shed, for the torture; would to God He would wipe out your tribe. God grant that every such misfortune be suffered by you, and God grant that you suffer death time and time again without dying."

In spite of all that, as Boleslaw Prus and Dr. Gorka observe, the novel *With Fire and Sword* is a polemical work. Dr. Gorka bluntly proposes that it "be withdrawn from circulation and reading lists as is to some degree and future spirit of the Polish nation, whereas there is an obligation to inform young people that this is all untrue due to a painful misunderstanding on the part of the artist" (Prof. Dr. Olgierd Gorka in "*Ogniem i mieczem*" — *a rzeczywistosc historyczna* ("With Fire and Sword" and Historical Reality).

Unsurprisingly, Sienkiewicz's inhuman and unfounded affront to the Ukrainian nation evoked their indignation. Ukrainian historian Prof. Volodymyr Antonovych of the University of Kiev, in an 1885 issue of *Kievskaya Starina* (Vol. 5, pp. 44-78), asserted that *With Fire and Sword* needlessly widened the breach between the two nations. All Ukrainians naturally agree with the salutary demand of Prof. Gorka that the "Polish nation not be reared in a hatred and contempt for the Ukrainian nation." Boleslaw Prus concurred. "Demanding this in the name of peace, friendship and good neighborliness between the Polish and Ukrainian nations," Prof. Antonovych had expressed a similar criticism of the novel, not unlike the just reactions of Poles themselves against slander in the foreign press and literature. This demand, made clear by all Ukrainians, whether they lived in Volhynia, in Western Ukraine or Eastern Ukraine along the Dnieper, is now more justified than ever in the face of the recent correct and ultra-humanitarian "Declaration of Poland on the Education of Society in the Spirit of Peace," accepted by the United Nations Organization. The "education of society" ought not remain an empty phrase in the relations between these two brother nations.

We know the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations after the joining of Ukraine to Russia and after the peace of Andrusiv in 1667 between Russia and Poland, which left Poland still retaining part of the Right Bank Ukraine. Since the *szlachta* did not change their inhuman attitude toward the Ukrainian peasants there, a new and bloody uprising was provoked. That took place in the years 1768-69 under the leadership of Gonta and Zelizniak. There followed a few more years of Polish bondage of the Ukrainian nation within the Polish Commonwealth, ending only with the partitions of Poland. These began in 1772 and continued throughout the 19th century, accompanied by Polish uprisings against

the occupying powers and against the bondage which persisted until the end of World War I in 1918.

Alas, the imperialistic Polish political leaders learned nothing from the more than 100 years of their own bondage because even when the "resurrection" of the Polish state was recognized with the signing of the Versailles Treaty on January 29, 1919, the representatives of Poland, Roman Dmowski, ideologue of Polish nationalism, made a motion "for the renewal of the partition of Ukraine between Poland and Russia." This attempt to renew the subjugation of the Ukrainian nation by Poland came hard on the heels of the ending of Poland's own enslavement. The Versailles Peace Conference, however, did not accept this outrageous motion by the Polish delegate. The establishment of Poland's southeastern boundary had resulted in an armed struggle between Poles and the Ukrainians in Western Ukraine (Halychyna), who, having been since 1772 (the year of the First Partition of Poland) under comparatively benign governments of Austria which tolerated their nationalism, had proclaimed on November 1, 1918, the "Western Ukrainian National Republic" on these ethnic Ukrainian lands (lands Poland now claimed because they had "belonged" to her in the past). The Ukrainian army, however, succumbed to the overwhelming power of the Polish forces that were occupying that region (after World War II this area was annexed to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic).

The Versailles Treaty actually recognized Ukrainian claims to Western Ukraine, the right to the establishment of their own state on these lands, setting its western border with Poland along the so-called "Curzon Line," minus city of Lwow (Lviv) (about which Basinski and others have written). However, because of fear of a "Communist flood" from the east, the Supreme Allied Council meeting in Paris on December 25, 1919, decided to authorize Poland to "temporarily occupy Western Ukraine up to the Zbrucz (River)" with the aim of withstanding there the approaching Bolshevik might. After various political and military maneuvers — such as the discussions concerning federation aims between Pilsudski and the Ukrainian Directorate headed by Petlura (about which Deruga and others have written), together with the unfortunate Polish army campaign in Ukraine in 1920 (Deruga, Cybulski, Federowicz, Przygonski, and others), that "temporary" occupation of Western Ukraine and Volhynia lasted 20 years (from 1919 to 1939), ending only with World War II.

In that 20-year period the Polish *sanacja* (Pilsudskist) government patterned itself after Polish government from the 14th to the 18th centuries that were dominated by the imperialist *magnateria* and *szlachta*. In that spirit there ensued an intensive Polonization of the Ukrainian people, together with the settling of Poles on Ukrainian lands.

Polonization involved threats of firing from jobs or refusals to hire. Land parcelled out from former large estates of the magnates was divided among the Polish farmers. Ukrainians in Volhynia were pressured into accepting Catholicism. According to statistics of the bishopric of Lutsk, after 1935 about 3,400 Orthodox Ukrainians a year embraced Catholicism. The number of Roman Catholic parishes rose from 82, with 193,481 members, in 1923 to 133 parishes, with 311,133 members, in 1937. During the two months of June and July of 1938 the administrative authorities dismantled 91 *tserkievs*, chapels and houses of prayer in the province of Lublin (Wronski). According the Zbigniew Zaluski, 189 Orthodox *tserkievs* were destroyed in 1938 in the Kholm area and Volhynia. Another 149 were converted to Roman Catholic churches, leaving only 51 surviving.

Poles dominated all positions of authority and every lucrative position of employment. The homesteading program increased Polish agriculture on tracts of land ranging from 7 to 50 hectares. In Volhynia in 1939 there were 7,796 farms; of these 7,047 had been given to homesteaders during this period from 1930 to 1939 (usually amounting to more than 10 hectares in size). This settling of newcomers in Volhynia amounted to the creation of Polish "*Grossbauers*." One can imagine how inflamed national feelings became because of this kind of agrarian politics practiced by the Polish government, as Wronski writes in *Czerwone noce* (Red Nights), p. 9. As Polish observers have reported, about twenty percent of the settlers, after being assigned parcels of land but all too quickly learning of the abnormal nationality relations existing there, promptly sold out to Ukrainians and returned to Poland.

The Polish *Sanacja* government's program was continued, however, under the direction of *Instytut Gospodarstwa Ziemi Wschodnich* (the Institute of Eastern Lands Homesteading), which issued a report in 1937, called *Perspectives of Polish Farm Settlement in Eastern Poland*. The secretariat of the Committee for the Defense of the Polish Republic took advantage of this report, proposing that there be established for the length of the eastern border a compact belt of Polish settlement, removing Ukrainians from it even if it required extermination (mass extermination is genocide, according to the dictionary of foreign phrases). Other "perspectives" discussed the creation of a permanent Polish majority of about six million in the eastern borderland which would not be disturbed by any movement of population. This was a plan for both the assimilation and extermination of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian population. From 1937 onward this plan was promoted more and more by army agents (Wronski, *Czerwone noce*). In Lutsk *powiat* (county), according to A. Zalewski, an activist of the

Towarzystwo Strazy Kresowyej (Borderland Guard Society), which was in operation in Volhynia after January 1919, government officials settled from disputes under a concept of abuse involving forays of punishment, featuring the use of police, the army, and machine guns, the beatings of people, extortions of tribute, eviction of farm servants — all without the grace of a court trial (Wronski, *Gzerwone noce*, p. 12).

Compulsory Polonization was inflicted not only on adults but even on school children. According to contemporary accounts there were only eleven Ukrainian schools out of 1,732 in Volhynia province in 1936, although Ukrainians made up 75 percent of the total population and 80 percent of the rural population. On the other hand, Zbigniew Zaluski claims that "out of 2,000 primary schools only eight were Ukrainian on this ethnic Ukrainian land of Volhynia with a population of more than two million people.

The Polish government conducted similar nationalistic politics in Western Ukraine, where according to 1931 statistics Ukrainians made up about 64 percent of the population, Poles 23 percent and other nationalities 13 percent, the total population of Lwow (Lviv), Stanislawow (Stanislaviv) and Tarnopol (Ternopil) provinces amounting to about 5,400,000. Also carried out here was colonization with Polish settlers and Polonization of the Ukrainian people — chiefly in the cities — which created difficulties and obstructions in both the economic and cultural sphere. In addition to depriving Ukrainian peasants of land in the parcelization of the large rural estates, Ukrainian secondary schools (*gimnazjum*) were closed, permission to found a Ukrainian university was denied, and at Lwow state university the number of Ukrainian students was severely limited by the enforcement of the so-called *numerus clausus*.

The Ukrainian people in Volhynia and Western Ukraine began to become extremely poor, not only the peasantry but also the workers and intelligentsia were without work. Impoverishment of the peasants was aggravated by the more "open" market than existed in ethnic Poland. Both farm and other products sold at "cut prices." That which sold for *zlotys* in western Poland, sold for *groszy* by the Volhynian farmer (Wronski, Przygonski, Zaluski, etc.). These developments alone are enough to confirm that "Ukrainian nationalism had there a hotbed for action and, for its flourishing, the Polish authorities were responsible," in Wronski's words. In self-defense against impoverishment and exploitation by outside middlemen in trade, the Ukrainians began to organize their own agricultural cooperatives, a system which, thanks to the national conscience, soon blanketed the whole of Western Ukraine, thereby eliminating the outside middlemen. The Polish administration, however, managed to erect a variety of roadblocks to this endeavor. The

well-known Polish writer, Melchior Wankowicz, wrote in his book, *Przez cztery klimaty* (Through Four Climates), "The Ukrainian co-operativist, being salt in the eyes of the incompetent competitor, had to go to 'Bereza' (concentration camp)." Here is additional evidence of the persecution of Ukrainians and the illegal treatment of them during the 20-year period of Sanacja rule over the Ukrainian lands.

This provoked seething discontent among the Ukrainian people, including a sharp reaction after the Irish pattern which was cruelly suppressed by the government with army "pacifications" of the people. The greatest and most cruel was the pacification of 1930 by police and the army's *uhlans* (*ulani*), evoking an investigation on the part of the League of Nations.

For the "taming" of the Ukrainian people, the Communists, the various nationalities (about 31 percent of Poland's population comprised national minorities) and all opponents of the Sanacja (Pilsudskist) regime, the government established in 1934 a prison concentration camp at Bereza Kartuzka in Polesie. There, according to eyewitnesses, prisoners were beaten and tortured, clubbed into unconsciousness and subjected to freezing weather in wet clothing, debilitating physical labor, etc., as described in the book, *Bereza*, published in 1956 by the (Polish People's Republic) Ministry of National Defense (MON).

In September, 1939, when the Soviet Army was approaching Bereza, the police and campguards killed many inmates before fleeing westward. An ex-prisoner, Aleksander Hawryluk, writes in his published book, "... two corpses lay in the shed. One stabbed with a bayonet, the other, an elderly man, murdered with some blunt instrument, perhaps a rifle butt or hammer. His skull was broken in several places. Fellow prisoners identified them: a father and his son, workers from Bialystok. Eight more bodies were found in a potato patch behind the shed. All bayonet victims. The perpetrators wanted to avoid the sound of gunfire. It was said that more than 30 bodies lay in the fields behind the recently-erected barracks." There were about 90,000 prisoners in the camp at that time, the author writes.

Of the nationality politics concerning the Ukrainians at that time on the eastern terrain, Jozef Sobiesiak (Maks) writes in his book *Ziemia plonie* (The Land is Burning), "I knew there were deep conflicts between the Poles and Ukrainians, for which our pre-World War II government must bear the blame. These improper nationality politics toward the Ukrainians, who made up the majority of the population in the eastern territory, generated a dislike for the Poles by the people." Gustaw Morcinek, in his book, *Gorniczy zakon* (Miner's Order), cites a conversation between a druggist and several Silesian miners fleeing to Rumania in 1939 at a certain place in Western Ukraine. The druggist tells

them to be on their guard because Ukrainians hate Poles. "Why do they hate us?" asks a Silesian. "You don't know this country?" asks the druggist incredulously and then relates the grim history of "how the Polish *uhlans* pacified the Ukrainian villages because the Ukrainians demanded their own schools, how the Ukrainians defended themselves against Polonization, how they were persecuted in Pilsudski's time, how during the "pacifications" Ukrainian girls were raped, peasants were bullwhipped, this and that" ... "and that's why there's such a hatred of you Poles." "We know nothing of this," says the Silesian. "But Ukrainians don't know that you don't know these things," the druggist replies (p. 247). The Polish writer and historian, Olgierd Terlecki, records in his book *Polski drogi/Kierunek Cassino* (Polish Roads — Direction: Cassino), about a conversation that took place between two cadets, Jerzy Olesinski and Karol Mazurek, both at the time serving in the Polish Army in Italy. Mazurek says, "We'll likely be fighting in Poland, too. Lwow is in Poland. I'm a Lwowanian. There are a lot of things I understand. I also understand that we have no right to Lwow and that piece of land they *uhlanized* in pacifications. But that pains me personally. It pains me *cholera* (dammit), and there's nothing I can do about it" (Vol. I, *Kierunek Cassino* (Direction Cassino), 3rd edit., p. 135).

In the light of all the above, all just and objectively thinking persons must admit — and the Polish public ought to know about this — that the Ukrainians are not to blame for the initiation of these tragic and regrettable events in which Ukrainians only defended themselves against subjugation by the Poles, defended themselves against the occupation of their lands and fought only for their freedom and their country, just as Poles had fought for their freedom and their country during the time of the Partitions of Poland as well as in the last World War. And that is the right of every nation, the right of the Ukrainians as well as of the Pole. It is truly heartening that many distinguished and fair-minded Poles admitted in the past, as they admit today, that Poles alone bear the blame for provoking those conflicts and Polish-Ukrainian tragedies that began in the Middle Ages and that Ukrainians had the right to fight for freedom from Polish bondage. Gratifying is the welding of friendly relations between the present Polish government and Ukraine that also means recognition of present political realities. Gratifying is the development of friendly association between Polish and Ukrainian poets and writers directed toward reconciliation of the brother nations. Welcome is the fact of the welding of friendship between once mutually antagonistic Polish and Ukrainian political emigres, a friendship which, generally speaking, now does not entail rejecting the names of one nation's patriots who once opposed those of the other. Yet in the face of existing realities this group of sensible and

outgoing Poles and Ukrainians comprise, alas, but a tiny if bright beam in the great thundercloud charged with hatred that hangs over the two nations, a hatred that is fed by various enemies among both nations. Denying this reality would be *hypocrisy*, for it would be making light of the fundamental problem: the hatred between Poles and Ukrainians, between the Polish and Ukrainian nations, will continue so long as it is not made clear to the Polish public what the true reasons are for the tragedies that have befallen the two nations, tragedies brought about by egoistic and imperialistic Polish magnates in the past and intensified by annexationist politics in modern times. That hatred will not abate so long as Polish society is misled and mindlessly aroused by the perfidious calumny heaped upon the Ukrainian nation, calumny on the part of enemies of a full reconciliation between us. That hatred will not abate so long as such literary works as *With Fire and Sword* and similar tracts masquerading as great depictive novels continue to breed hatred for Ukrainians in Polish society and especially the younger Polish generation.

Continuance of a campaign of this hatred by Polish writers and journalists is diametrically opposed to the salutary and highly moral Polish "Declaration for the Education of Society in the Spirit of Peace," proclaimed at the UN forum, and which ought not, and cannot, remain an empty phrase. As Jerzy Kirchmayer wrote in his book, *Pamiętniki* (Reminiscences), Sienkiewicz's *With Fire and Sword* aroused hatred of Ukrainians even in small school children who, after reading the exonerating "praise" for the bestialities of Wieniowiecki, began to act in kind toward small Ukrainian children and to fantasize about "impaling Ukrainians" (p. 46). And one cannot be surprised, writes Kirchmayer, that "with such attitudes held by Poles towards Ukrainians, there later broke out our fighting with the Ukrainians in eastern Malapolska in the years 1918-1919, in the course of which there was much spilling of Polish and Ukrainian blood, this in turn leading to the regrettable incidents in the period of the German occupation and finally to the Polish-Ukrainian warfare along the San and Bug Rivers in the years 1945-47." And then Kirchmayer makes the fundamental point: "It is an undeniable fact that from very ancient times we have been unable to conduct our relations with the Ukrainians on a straight-forward and mutually beneficial basis. They endeavored to obtain equality and full national cultural and economic freedom. We denied them all that. A good example is (the granting of) a Ukrainian university, which we never wanted to agree to, and so it was denied. We never wanted to accept the fact that the Ukrainians constituted a nation considerably larger than ours, occupying land more advantageous and richer, all of which gave them considerably wider perspectives than ours. Instead of acknowledging

that and opening up a road to friendly coexistence with the whole Ukrainian nation, we did everything possible to convince them that they could count on us only for second- or third-class citizenship" (p. 47). Kirchmayer summarizes that: "In our relationship with the Ukrainians, we conducted through our governments several centuries of unsound and short-sighted politics," and, "Our former relations with the Ukrainians formed one of the tracks on which Polish trains ran into great historic catastrophies" (p. 47).

It is clear that taking into consideration the above documented facts and opinions of honest and just people — people authoritative on Polish-Ukrainian affairs — "the blame, from the beginning, for the growth of hatred between the Polish nation and the Ukrainian nation rests solely and entirely on Polish governments and their rapacious, imperialistic politics in relation to the Ukrainian nation," and that, consequently, in the best interests of both Poles and Ukrainians, it is necessary, above all, to put a stop to various demagogic or chauvinistic-imperialistic to prevail. As Gnatowski, representative of the delegation of the Polish emigre government in London, declared, "We do not abide by an empty declaration. It offers nothing." And these affairs need to be settled by the nations themselves, speaking out definitively on the issues, not the mouthings of a few often unwise politicians and self-centered "politicos," all too typical were those who, awaiting World War III, the song sang in Polish cafes in 1945, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, "One little atomic bomb and we return again to Lwow."

In his book *Pol wieku* (A Half Century), Jerzy Putrament writes of inhuman plans of the Polish *Sanacja* government to exterminate the Ukrainians *en masse* and of the known plans of the "Pilsudskists" in the period between the wars to "resuscitate and realize the great Jagiellonian idea." The ultimate aim seems to have been to establish a "common Polish-Japanese border along the Ural river." Which would mean not only the takeover of Ukraine but of all of the land east of its eastern Ukrainian border.

As Jan Borkowski states in his book, *Nie wykorzystane szanse II Rzeczypospolitej* (Unfulfilled Opportunities of the Second Republic), pp. 122-124, other times have come, times of reconciliation between nations once enemies, times which have seen federations of states and "international parliaments" arise. The present times demand that nations cast out their strife and hatred. It is true, of course, that there will always be territorial disputes throughout the world and that "might often prevails over principles of justice in common human understandings." But the human race has come a long way despite what seems a ruinous penchant for fratricide. May the Polish and Ukrainian nations blaze a new trial leading to peace, friendship and growing self-realization. Let us start afresh!

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Basinski, Euzebiusz — "Sprawa linii Curzona w polityce mocarstw zachodnich," *Z dziejow stosunkow polsko-radzieckich*, Vol. VI, KIW 1970
- Borkowski, Jan — *Nie wykorzystane szanse II Rzeczypospolitej*, KAW 1978
- Cieslak, Tadeusz — "Hitlerowski sojusz z nacjonalizmem ukraińskim w Polsce," *Z dziejow stosunkow polsko-radzieckich*, Vol. V, KIW 1969
- Cybulski, Henryk — *Czerwone noce*, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej (MON) 1956
- Deruga, Aleksy — "Początek rokowań o sojusz między Piłsudskim a Petlurą," *Z dziejow stosunkow polsko-radzieckich*, Vol. VI, KIW 1970
- Federowski, Grzegorz — *Lesne ognie*, MON 1965
- Filar, Alfons — *Gdy umilkły działy*, MON 1972
- Gorka, Olgierd — *Ogniem i mieczem, a rzeczywistość historyczna*, Librarian 1934
- Gronczewski, Edward — *Wspomnienia (Prezypioriki)*, Wydawnictwo Lubelskie 1964
- Hawryluk, Aleksander — *Bereza*, MON 1956
- Holuj, Tadeusz *Początek*, Iskry (ISKRY) 1960
- Jarnicki, Władysław — *W pogoni za Burlakiem*, MON 1969
- Jasienica, Paweł *Polska Piastów*, Ossolin, 1960 *Polska Jagiellonów*, PIW 1963
- Kirchmayer, Jerzy *Pamiętniki*, KIW 1957
- Kirchmayer, Jerzy — *Powstanie Warszawskie*, LKIW 1957
- Jedrzejewicz, Jerzy — *Noce ukraińskie*, Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza 1966
- Kilszko, Zenon — *Powstanie Warszawskie*, Wspomnienia, KIW 1968
- Kosman, Marcei — *Na trapach bohaterów Trylogii*, KIW 1968
- Kowalski, Włodzimierz — *Rok 1918*, Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza 1978
- Kozik, Zenobiusz — *Partie i strony, politycz. w Krakowskim*, Wydaw Literackie 1975
- Kwilecki, Andrzej — *Lemkowie*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, PWN 1974
- Lewandowski, Krzysztof — "W kregu problem. czes.-słow., ukr. i pol.," *Z dziej*, T. VI
- Lovell, Jerzy — *Polska, jakiej nie znamy*, Wydawnictwo Literackie 1970
- Ludorowski, Lech — *Sztuka opowiad. w Ogniem i mieczem*, Lubelskie Tow. Nauk. 1977
- Mankowski, Zygmunt — *Bataliony Chłopskie na Lubelszczyźnie (ruch oporu)* 1962 and
- Naumiuk, Jan — *Bataliony Chłopskie na Lubelszczyźnie*, Wydaw. Lubelskie
- Markiewicz, Jerzy — *Nie dali ziemi, skąd ich rod*, Wydawnictwo Lubelskie 1967
- Moczar, Mieczysław — *Barwy walki*, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej (MON) 1962
- Morcinek, Gustaw — *Gorniczy zakon*, Wydawnictwo SLASK 1964
- Nieuwazny, Florian — *Polsko-ukraińskie zbliżenia literackie*, Literatura na świecie, RSW 1978
- Osmanczyk, Edmund — *Rzeczpospolita Polaków*, PIW 1977
- Podhorecki, Leszek — *Zarys dziejów Ukrainy*, KIW 1976 *Siecz Zaporoska*, KIW 1970
- Podlewski, Stanisław — *Przemarsz przez piekło*, PAX 1957
- Polak, Tadeusz — *63 dni Powstania Warszawskiego*, Instytut Wydawniczy 1946
- Prus, Bolesław — "Ogniem i mieczem," critical survey, *Kraj* (weekly), Petersburg 1884
- Prus, Edward — "Ukraińskie siły zbrojne w walce z ZSRR i Polakami," *Zycie Literackie* 1975
- Przygonski, Antoni — *Z problematyki Powstania Warszawskiego*, MON 1964 (vide Federowski *Lesne ognie*)
- Putrament, Jerzy — *Pol wieku*, CZYTELNIK 1969
- Rusinek, Michał — *Krolewstwo pychy*, PIW 1958
- Serczyk, Władysław — *Hajdamacy*, Wydawnictwo Literackie 1972
- Sienkiewicz, Henryk — *Ogniem i mieczem*, many known editions 1884

- Skarzynski, Aleksander — "Cele polityczne 'Burzy'," *Najnowsze Dziele Polski*, Vol. VII 1968
- Sobieszak, Jozef — *Ziemia plonie*, MON 1961 *Przebrzeze*, MON 1957
- Szczesniak, Antoni — "Niektore problemy stosunkow polskich-ukrainskich 1939-1947," *Polska Ludowa*, Vol. VIII 1968
- Terlecki, Olgierd — *Kierunek Cassino*, (Polskie drogi), MON, 1957
- Torzecki, Ryszard — *Kwestia ukrainska w polityce III Rzeszy*, KIW 1972
- Turlejska, Maria — *Spor o Polske*, CZYTELNIK 1972
- Walach, Stanislaw — *Byl w Polsce czas*, Wydawnictwo Literackie 1971
- Wankowicz, Melchior, — *Przez cztery klimaty*, PIW 1974; PAX 1976
- Wieczerska, Janina — "Fantazja w tym rycerzu okrutna," *Zycie Literackie*, Nr. 4 1978
- Wojciechowski, Zygmunt — *Zbrodnia niemieckie w Warszawie, 1944*, Instytut Zachodny 1946
- Wolczew, Wsiewolod — *Stanowisko obozu londyńskiego wobec kwestii ukrainskich; Z dziejow stosunkow polsko-radzieckich*, V61. V
- Wojcik, Zbigniew — *Dzike pola w ogniu*, Wiedza
- Wrónski, Stanislaw — *Czerwone noce*, Foreword (see Cybulski, Henryk)
- Zabiello, Zbigniew — *O rzad i granice*, PAX 1970
- Zaks, Zofia — "ZSRR i Ukraina, wobec sprawy Galicji wschodniej," — *Z dziejow stosunkow polsko-radzieckich*, Vol. VI
- Zaklad Istorii Partii, KCPZPR — *Polegli w walce o Polskie Ludowa*, KIW 1970
- In addition: a number of literary publications, encyclopedias, films, conversations since 1946.

Abbreviations of Polish publishers:

KAW - KRAJOWA AGENCJA WYDAWNICZA

**KCPZPR - KOMITET CENTRALNY POLSKIEJ ZJEDNOCZONEJ PARTII
ROBOTNICZEJ**

KIW - KSIAZKA I WIEDZA

MON - MINISTRESTWO OBRONY NARODOWEJ

PAN - POLSKA AKADEMIA NAUKOWA

**PANKCPZPR - PUBLIKACJE INSTYTUTU HISTORII, KOMITET
CENTRALNY POLSKIEJ ZJEDNOCZONEJ PARTII ROBOTNICZEJ**

PAX - KATOLICKI INSTYTUT WYDAWNICZY

PIW - PANSTWOWY INSTYTUT WYDAWNICZY

PWN - PANSTWOWE WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE

RSW - ROBOTNICZA SPOLDZIELNIA WYDAWNICZA

