
Soviet Repression of the Ukrainian Catholic Church

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During the nearly seven decades that have elapsed since the Bolsheviks seized power, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has sought to eliminate religion or, failing that, utilize it for the purposes of the state. In this deliberate attack on religion, no institution has suffered more than the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Claiming the devotion of millions in western Ukraine, the church—leaders and laity alike—has been systematically repressed by Soviet rule. Official Soviet historiography even goes as far as to claim that the church “liquidated itself” in 1946, that its followers “voluntarily joined” the Russian Orthodox Church.¹

But the Ukrainian Catholic Church lives on, in the catacombs, as witness numerous *samizdat* documents and repeated discussions in Soviet publications of the need to repress it. This paper sets forth an account of that repression.

Church and State in the Soviet Union: 1917-46

Situated primarily in western Ukraine, which the Soviets forcibly annexed from Poland in 1939, the Ukrainian Catholic Church traces its modern lineage to the 1596 Union of Brest, through which it affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church while preserving its Byzantine form of worship and spirituality. Thus, unlike the Russian Orthodox Church or

the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church that arose after the revolution in eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian Catholic Church has looked to the West, recognizing the authority of the Pope from its inception.

Western Ukraine poses a particular problem for the Soviet regime, since, according to Soviet sources, nearly half of the officially permitted religious congregations in the Soviet Union are located there.² In addition, there are many unofficial groups which include Ukrainian Catholics. Furthermore, the Ukrainian Catholic Church has served as a focus for the development of a distinct Ukrainian national and cultural identity in western Ukraine. Not surprisingly, these characteristics have marked the church in Soviet eyes.

In its first years the Soviet regime attacked all religious institutions, accusing them of political opposition to the regime and collusion with its internal and external enemies. All religious groups suffered from discriminatory Soviet legislation, beginning with the Soviet Decree of February 5, 1918, on the Separation of Church From State and School From Church. The new laws transferred all church property, including all houses of worship, to the state. Clergy and their families were stripped of their civil rights. Organized religious instruction of minors was made a criminal offense, and all theological schools were closed, as eventually were all monasteries and convents. The regime sponsored abusive antireligious campaigns which were accompanied by the harassment of believers and their

exclusion from all positions of importance.

During the 1920s, however, the regime shifted its tactics in the direction of “sovietization” of individual churches and sects. “Disloyal” religious leaders were replaced by others who were willing to accept a platform of loyalty to the Soviet state and were prepared to submit to far-reaching controls over the external and internal activities of their groups. By 1927 these conditions were accepted by the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church in return for a limited and uncertain tolerance; but the price was the alienation of many Orthodox bishops, clergy, and believers who considered such a compromise with the atheist state to be incompatible with the integrity and spiritual mission of their church.

These early won concessions did not last long, however. By 1929 Stalin’s regime had embarked on a violent, widespread antireligious campaign. More and more churches and prayer houses of all faiths were closed down by the authorities, often on the basis of fabricated “demands of workers.” Growing numbers of bishops and clergy were banished, imprisoned, or executed. This situation worsened during the late 1930s, culminating by the end of the decade in the near total suppression of institutional religion throughout the Soviet Union. Soviet authorities destroyed what remained of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church during this period, killing most of its bishops and many thousands of its followers.³ They also drew up plans for the liquida-

tion of the Ukrainian Catholic Church; these became reality with the Soviet acquisition in 1939 of western Ukraine and western Belorussia, which had large congregations of Catholics. With Soviet occupation, there immediately followed the abolition or state takeover of longstanding church institutions—including schools, seminaries, monasteries, and publishing houses—and the confiscation of all church properties and lands. Finally, as the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet secret police rounded up a large number of Ukrainian Catholic priests who were either murdered or deported to the east.

Following the Nazi attack on the U.S.S.R., Stalin altered substantially his tactics toward religious communities. Fearing for the very survival of the Soviet regime, he reduced antireligious propaganda and offered significant concessions to the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as other denominations, in the hope of harnessing all the potential of the Soviet Union in its struggle against Nazi Germany. But with the Soviet reoccupation of Ukraine in 1944, repression of Ukrainian Catholics, already suffering under Nazi occupation, was resumed once again, culminating in the official "liquidation" of the church in 1946.

Liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, 1946

From the very beginning of the Soviet reoccupation of western Ukraine, measures aimed at liquidating the Ukrainian Catholic Church were undertaken. In the winter of 1944–45, Soviet authorities summoned Catholic clergy to "reeducation" sessions conducted by the secret police, the NKVD. On April 5, 1945, the Soviet media began an anti-Catholic campaign. Then on April 11, 1945, the NKVD began arresting the entire Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy of western Ukraine, including the secular and monastic clergy—a program that would last for the next 5 years. Along with Metropolitan Yosyf Slipyj, the NKVD arrested Bishop Nykyta Jodka, the Vicar General of the Metropolitan; Gregory Khomyshyn, the Bishop of Stanislav, and his Auxiliary Bishop, John Liatyshevsky; Paul Goydych, the Bishop of Priashiv, and his Auxiliary Bishop, Basil Hopko; Bishop Nicholas Charnetsky, Apostolic Visitor of Volyn; Monsignor Peter Verhun, Apostolic Visitor for Ukrainian emigrants in Germany; and Josaphat Kotsylovsky, the Bishop of Peremyshl, and his Auxiliary Bishop, Gregory Lakota. (All but one of these either died

in prison or died shortly thereafter, their health ruined by the abuse they had suffered; only Metropolitan Slipyj, through the efforts of Pope John XXIII, was finally released from prison in 1963 and allowed to leave for Rome.) According to eyewitnesses, in Lvov alone there were about 800 priests imprisoned at that time; and in Chortkov about 150 priests from the district of Ternopol were deported to Siberia.⁴

Meanwhile, in late May 1945, as these mass arrests of Catholic clergy were being carried out, Soviet authorities sponsored the so-called Initiating Committee for the Reunification of the Greek Catholic Church With the Russian Orthodox Church. This was a preparatory committee, which subsequently convened a pseudosynod—the authorities proclaimed it a "Sobor"—in Lvov on March 8–10, 1946. In that "Sobor" an end was proclaimed to the 1596 Union of Brest, and the Ukrainian Catholic Church was declared "reunified" with the Russian Orthodox Church.

This entire exercise was planned and guided by Soviet authorities. Knowledge of the "Sobor" was withheld from the public; no advance election of delegates was held, and only 216 clerics and 19 laymen—allegedly representing the

Ukrainian Catholic Church—brought about "reunification." Not surprisingly, the NKVD was entrusted with the task of coercing the remaining Catholic clergy to join the Russian Orthodox Church.

Both the Vatican and the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the West have refused to recognize this forced reunification, considering it to be uncanonical and illegal: according to Catholic and traditional Russian Orthodox canon law, to be valid, a synod must be called by the Pope or by a patriarch and must be attended by bishops. Yet Soviet authorities consider this "Sobor" and its decisions binding on all Ukrainian Catholics in the U.S.S.R. to this day.⁵ The protests of almost 300 Ukrainian clerics and the 1946 and 1952 encyclicals of Pope Pius XII in defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church have gone unheeded. Moreover, the same fate met the Catholic Church in Transcarpathia, a part of Czechoslovakia incorporated into the Ukrainian S.S.R. at the end of World War II, where the Mukachiv eparchy was liquidated and subordinated to the Russian Orthodox Church in 1947. Its bishop, Theodor Romza, was killed.⁶

The following table, comparing the situation of the Ukrainian Catholic

Situation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church

Number in 1939	Losses Suffered by 1950
Dioceses 4	All dioceses liquidated.
Territory of Apostolic Visitor 1	Liquidated.
Bishops 8	All imprisoned, condemned, died in prison, killed, or exiled.
Parishes 2,772	Taken over by the Russian Orthodox Church; some liquidated.
Churches and chapels 4,119	Taken over by the Russian Orthodox Church or closed.
Monasteries and convents 142	Confiscated and closed by the authorities; a few transferred to the Russian Orthodox Church.
Other church institutions	All liquidated.
Secular priests 2,638	Fewer than half forced into Russian Orthodox Church; others imprisoned or in hiding.
Monastic clergy 164	Dispersed, imprisoned together with three Provincial Superiors.
Brothers 193	Dispersed or imprisoned.
Seminarians 229	Dispersed or refugees.
Nuns 580	Dispersed.
Faithful 4,048,515	Many imprisoned or deported for their faith; majority resisting passively.

Church prior to World War II with the situation in 1950, offers a graphic picture of the losses suffered by the church from its forced reunion.⁷

The Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Catacombs

Forty years after the official abolition of their church, Ukrainian Catholic communities continue to exist in the Soviet Union, as even Soviet sources attest. The most telling evidence of the survival of the Catholic Church is to be found in Soviet propaganda, which wages a vigorous campaign against the church through books, pamphlets, periodicals, television programs, movies, lectures, and exhibits, all designed to falsify the historical record, defame Catholic leaders and clergy, and intimidate church members. To this day, the great Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, who led his church for four and one-half decades (1900-44), saving the lives of thousands of Jews during World War II, is maligned by Soviet officials.

At the outset, the priests of the Catacomb Church were those who did not rejoin Russian orthodoxy during the 1945-49 period but remained Catholics, giving up any public exercise of their clerical duties. After 1946, a significant portion of Catholic laymen continued to depend on the services of these "illegal" priests and monks, whose numbers increased after the mid-1940s with the return of what the Soviets called "recalcitrant" clergymen—those who had completed their sentences or had benefited from the post-Stalin amnesties.

The hope that de-Stalinization would lead to the restoration of the Ukrainian Catholic Church produced a marked intensification of covert Catholic activities. By the late 1950s, however, as more and more "converts" to the church began to repudiate orthodoxy, communist authorities dispelled any hope for a change in official policy toward the church by arresting even more priests and unleashing a new wave of anti-Catholic propaganda. Notwithstanding this widespread antireligious campaign, the number of priests increased in western Ukraine in the 1950s and thereafter, due in part to secret ordinations in exile. In addition, the existence of secret theological "seminaries" in Ternopol and Kolomyia was reported in the Soviet press in the 1960s in connection with the arrests of their organizers.

Today, the underground Catholic Church is said to embrace hundreds of priests, headed by a number of secret bishops working under the authority of

their primate in Rome. Religious women in orders working throughout Ukraine number more than 1,000. Many former Catholic and non-Orthodox priests have retained a spiritual allegiance to the Pope as well, while others have taken up civilian professions and continue to celebrate the sacraments in private. A certain number of Ukrainian Catholic priests live in exile outside western Ukraine or as free settlers in Siberia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, and eastern Ukraine, often serving their faithful from afar. Members of religious communities and monastic orders have maintained close contact with each other, and most have remained faithful to their vows. In 1974, a clandestine Catholic convent was uncovered by police in Lvov.

Almost invariably, these clergymen and monastics hold full-time secular jobs or have retired from such employment. The identities of the older clergy seem to be known to the Soviet police, who frequently subject them to searches, interrogations, and fines but stop short of arrests unless they have extended their activities beyond a narrow circle of friends in private homes. It appears, however, that Soviet authorities are much more ruthless in dealing with new, secretly ordained priests.

In 1968, apparently in connection with the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, the harassment of "recalcitrant" clergy escalated into a large-scale campaign against "illegal" Ukrainian Catholic clergy. Many of these clergymen were subjected to searches, interrogations, fines, and beatings. In January 1969, the KGB arrested an underground Catholic bishop named Vasyly Velychkovskiy and two Catholic priests, sentencing them to 3-years imprisonment for alleged violations of the "law on cults."

Religious activities that are "illegal" when performed by Catholic priests or members include holding religious services; educating children in the Catholic faith; performing baptisms, wedding rites, and funerals; hearing confessions; anointing the ill; copying religious materials; and possessing prayer books, icons, church calendars, religious books, and other sacred objects. Soviet sources reveal numerous examples of arrests for such activities. One is the case of Reverend Ivan Kryvy, who was arrested in 1973 for organizing the printing of a Ukrainian Catholic prayer book (actually a reprint of a prayer book published in Canada in 1954) in three consecutive editions (1969, 1971, and 1972) totaling 3,500 copies. The work was done by two employees of the Lvov state printing shop who also were arrested in 1973

together with another person involved in the distribution of these materials. In the same manner, the clandestine printers also produced 150 copies of a "Carol and Church Songs" book and 150 copies of the "Missal."

The most active lay people and clergy of the "illegal" church have tried to use legal means to defend their church. By 1956-57, there were cases in which believers had tried to legalize their Ukrainian Catholic communities according to Soviet law by petitioning the proper authorities to permit their parish congregations to operate openly. A number of such petitions were sent in the late 1960s and early 1970s, including an appeal from the Ukrainian Catholics of the city of Stryi, which reached the West in 1972. All of these petitions were refused. In 1976 a Ukrainian Catholic priest named Reverend Volodymyr Prokopiv was arrested for accompanying a delegation of Ukrainians to Moscow with such a petition, signed by a large number of Catholics from the Lvov region. The Soviet response to these petitions has been to sharpen repressive measures against the activist clergy, monastics, and lay people and to intensify their propaganda.

In recent years, the cause of persecuted Ukrainian Catholics has been taken up by the dissident movement in Ukraine. Since 1970, the movement's organ, the *Ukrainian Herald*, has carried accounts of the harassment, searches, arrests, and trials of Catholics and has editorially condemned "wanton liquidation" of the church as "illegal and unconstitutional." A leading Ukrainian dissident, historian Valentyn Moroz, devoted part of his *Chronicle of Resistance* to the nation-building role of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in western Ukraine; he equated the regime's anti-Catholic struggle with an attack upon "the spiritual structure of the nation."

Lithuanian Catholic dissidents also have raised their voices in recent years. In their petitions to Soviet authorities and in their underground *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*, they have joined Ukrainian dissidents in calling for the lifting of the illegal ban on the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Likewise, in September 1974, a leading Russian Orthodox dissident named Anatoly Levitin-Krasnov appealed to Sakharov's human rights committee in Moscow to raise its voice in defense of Ukrainian Catholics and other persecuted religious groups. "The Union in Western Ukraine," wrote Levitin-Krasnov, "is a massive popular movement. Its persecution means not only

religious oppression, but also restriction of the national rights of Western Ukraine."⁸

Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine

At the beginning of 1984, a group of Ukrainian Catholics began to publish and disseminate a *samizdat* publication, the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church*. To date, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* in Munich has received and broadcast nine numbered issues of the *Chronicle* plus one special issue. The 10th edition of the *Chronicle* was published in June 1986 and had a significant change in title: *Chronicle of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Catacombs*. The *Chronicle* is published by members of the "Initiative Group for the Defense of the Right of Believers and the Church in Ukraine," which was established in 1982 and spearheads the campaign of Ukrainian Catholics for the legalization of their church.⁹

It was the years of abortive demands by believers that authorities legalize the activities of the Catholic Church in western Ukraine that brought about the emergence of an organized human rights movement among believers. In early 1982 the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics was formed, and Yosyf Terelya was elected its chairman. In a statement about the formation of the Initiative Group, addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Terelya wrote:

This was the response of Ukrainian Catholics to increasing repression against the Ukrainian Catholic Church. From now on, all information about the Ukrainian Catholic Church will be passed on for scrutiny by the world public. The Catholics of the world should know and be reminded in what conditions we exist.¹⁰

The first three issues of the *Chronicle* are varied, although they deal largely with the lives of believers—Catholics, Orthodox, Baptists, Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Seventh-Day Adventists—giving accounts of repressive measures taken against them and naming the camps and psychiatric hospitals in which they are confined. The journals also devote considerable attention to the sociopolitical situation in Ukraine and discuss such diverse subjects as the Raoul Wallenberg case, Russification, and the Polish workers' movement. Most of the information contained in the *Chronicle*, however, relates to the lives of members of the banned Ukrainian Catholic Church, especially to violations of their human rights. These journals underscore the needs of the peo-

ple to worship freely in their own rite, to have their own churches with free access to them, and to have their own priests and their own language.¹¹

The founder of the Initiative Group and moving force behind the *Chronicle*, Yosyf Terelya, was arrested on February 8, 1985, and sentenced on August 20, 1985, to 7 years imprisonment and 5 years exile for his religious activities. He had already spent years in various camps, prisons, and psychiatric institutions. He is currently serving his sentence in Camp #36 near Kuchino, the so-called death camp where, since May 1984, four prominent Ukrainian prisoners have died—Ukrainian Helsinki Monitors Vasyli' Stus, Oleska Tykhy, Yuriy Lytvyn, and journalist Valeriy Marchenko.

Terelya's successor as chairman of the Initiative Group, Vasyli' Kobryn, also was sentenced in March 1985 to 3 years imprisonment for "anti-Soviet slander." The plight of Terelya and Kobryn is just one example of the persecution of countless numbers of Ukrainian Catholics who have suffered harassment, illegal searches, beatings, and arrests solely because of their attempts to practice their religious beliefs.

Grounds for Repression

Clearly, the Ukrainian Catholic faithful who were driven underground following the forced 1946 "reunion" have posed an especially complicated problem for Soviet authorities. Enjoying massive support from believers in the western Ukraine, as well as from the strong Ukrainian Catholic diaspora in the West, the faithful have survived despite repeated repressive measures. They have survived both within the formal Orthodox Church—so-called secret Catholics—and as an "illegal" church with a succession of its own bishops and a network of secular and monastic clergy, performing clandestine religious rites in private homes, at cemeteries, and even in officially "closed" churches. Among young people, in particular, there has been a growing acceptance of religious traditions and symbols as important links with the past and as integral elements of national culture.

The reaction of the regime has been to renew its emphasis on mass antireligious propaganda, especially in western Ukraine. Conferences have been organized on the subject of perfecting the methodology to combat Ukrainian Catholicism in western Ukraine.¹² Numerous publications have appeared that attempt to discredit the union of the

congregations in Ukraine and what is now Belorussia with Rome in 1596; these go to great pains to prove the allegations that the Catholic Church conducted activities that were directed against the population of Ukraine during the first half of the 20th century.

The growth of interest in Ukrainian Catholicism has to be understood in relation to the general rise of interest in religion, spiritual values, and ethics among the younger generation in Ukraine. Complaints by Soviet officials and their publications attest to this revival. A letter by an avowed atheist published as part of an article on religious belief and atheist propaganda in a 1984 issue of *Nauka i Religiya (Science and Religion)* states:

If you could only imagine how difficult it is for us atheists in Ukraine. For many years now, I have been involved in the thankless propagandizing task of Soviet ritualism. I have ploughed through mountains of literature, observed, pondered, and spent many hours in the churches where religious rites are practiced. I have come to the conclusion that Soviet official statistics are very far from reality.¹³

The problem of religious practices in western Ukraine also was raised by the first secretary of the Lvov Komsomol, Olesiy Babychuk:

... in this oblast, particularly in the rural areas, a large number of the population adheres to religious practices, among them a large proportion of youth. In the last few years, the activity of the Uniates [Ukrainian Catholics] has grown, that of representatives of the Uniates as well as former Uniate priests; there are even reverberations to renew the overt activity of this Church.¹⁴

Another important factor in the steady growth of interest in Catholicism in Ukraine has been the proximity of the Solidarity movement and the election of a Slavic Pope. It is worth noting that for some years now the Polish dissident movement—particularly members of Solidarity—has supported Ukraine's quest for self-determination in its official statements and publications and, conversely, members of the dissident movement in the Ukraine, like Vasyli' Stus and Yosyf Terelya, have praised Solidarity in their activities. In an open letter, published in 1981 in the journal of Catholic opposition in Poland, *Spotkanie*, Ukrainian Catholics registered their joy on the occasion of the election of Cardinal Wojtyla as Pope.¹⁵

At the same time, Soviet authorities have launched a related propaganda campaign in Ukraine, disseminating publications that criticize the Vatican's support for believers in Soviet-bloc countries. The mass media also has stepped up its attacks on Pope John Paul II,

especially his support of Ukrainian Catholics.¹⁶ The antireligious journal *Liudyna i Svit* (*Man and the World*), published in Kiev, stated the following:

Proof that the Church is persistently striving to strengthen its political influence in socialist countries is witnessed by the fact that Pope John Paul II gives his support to the emigre hierarchy of the so-called Ukrainian Catholic Church. . . . The current tactic of Pope John Paul II and the Roman Curia lies in the attempts to strengthen the position of the Church in all socialist countries as they have done in Poland, where the Vatican tried to raise the status of the Catholic Church to a state within a state. In the last few years, the Vatican has paid particular attention to the question of Catholicism of the Slavonic nations. This is poignantly underscored by the Pope when he states that he is not only a Pope of Polish origin, but the first Slavic Pope, and he will pay particular attention to the Christianization of all Slavic nations.¹⁷

These same themes were stressed at a 1981 symposium in Bratislava for specialists in antireligious propaganda in the Warsaw Pact countries. One of the papers dealing with Ukrainian Catholicism stated the following:

Pope John Paul II has approved certain additional measures, directed in support of the Uniates. . . . [The] Head of the Vatican underscored his "dedication" to the Uniates by approving the claims of Cardinal Slipyj to represent and speak on behalf of all the faithful of the Western province of the Ukrainian S.S.R.¹⁸

However, Ukrainian Catholicism, seen as the strongest and most representative exponent of cultural and spiritual ties with the West, remains an obstacle to the Soviet goal of creating a single Soviet people. The Soviet regime has officially liquidated the church and also has attempted to erase it from historic memory. To enable Moscow to achieve its goals, all signs of the religion's ongoing revival are continuously repressed.

¹⁶See note 4.

¹⁷*Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma*, publication no. 24, Moscow, 1979, p. 46. *Stanovleniya i rozrytok masovoho ateizmu v zakhidnykh oblastakh Ukrainskoi RSR*, (Kiev, 1981), p. 51.

¹⁸Soviet repression and liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in eastern Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s was a portent of its later repression and liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in western Ukraine. Shortly after the revolution, a number of Ukrainian Orthodox bishops separated themselves from the Russian Patriarchal Church, creating in 1920 an

independent Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church. By 1924, the church embraced 30 bishops, 1,500 priests and deacons, and 1,100 parishes in the Ukrainian S.S.R. From 1922, however, Soviet authorities began imposing restrictions on the Autocephalous Church, attempting to split it from within by supporting a splinter faction. In 1926 they arrested its Metropolitan, Basil Lypkivsky, along with a number of other leaders and ordered the dissolution of its central body, the All-Ukrainian Church Council. Then in 1929, massive repressive measures were taken against the bishops, clergy, and faithful, culminating in the dissolution of the church in 1930. The remnant of the church was allowed to reconstitute itself at the end of 1930 but was progressively decimated until the last parish was suppressed in 1936. According to Ukrainian Orthodox sources, two metropolitans of the church, 26 archbishops and bishops, some 1,150 priests, 54 deacons, and approximately 20,000 lay members of the church councils as well as an undetermined number of the faithful were all killed. See *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, Vol. II. University of Toronto Press, pp. 170-71.

¹⁹Analecta O.S.B.M., *First Victims of Communism White Book on the Religious Persecution in Ukraine* (Rome, 1953) pp. 42-44. This book was composed by Ukrainian Catholic priests resident in Rome; it was translated from Italian with Ecclesiastical Approbation.

²⁰See, for example, K. Kharchev, Chairman of the Council of Religious Affairs attached to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, in an interview for the Warsaw weekly, *Pravo i zycie*, February 8, 1986, p. 13. The current stand of the Russian Orthodox Church regarding the Lvov "Sobor" is presented in detail in "The Moscow Patriarchate and the Liquidation of the Eastern Rite Catholic Church in Ukraine," *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. 13, No. 2, Summer 1985, pp. 182-188. Compare the article of Metropolitan Nikodimus of Lvov and Ternopol, published in *Visti z Ukrainy*, No. 5, January 1986, with the article in *Muskovskyye novosti*, No. 22, June 1986, and the article of K. Dmytruk in *Radiinska Ukraina*, May 31, 1986.

²¹Analecta, *First Victims*, pp. 30-59.

²²*Soviet Persecution of Religion in Ukraine*, Human Rights Commission World Congress of Free Ukrainians, Toronto, 1976, p. 28.

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

²⁴Because of the potential for intentionally planted disinformation, it is impossible to be certain that all items in the *Chronicle* were written by or reflect the opinions of Ukrainian Catholics in Ukraine today. However, enough of the facts have been substantiated by other sources to make the *Chronicle* on the whole a credible source of information about the true status of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

²⁵Yosyf Terelya, "Declaration to the CC CPU on the formation of the Initiative Group

of the Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine," *Arkhiv Samizdata* (AS) 4897, *Radio Liberty*, Munich, 1983.

²⁶On the *Chronicle*, see *Radio Liberty* 3/85, "Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine," January 7, 1985; Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Church Rumbling Beneath the Kremlin," *The Times*, January 12, 1985; Maxine Pollack, "KGB Crackdown in the Ukraine," *The Sunday Times*, January 27, 1985; Bohdan Nahaylo, "Persecuted Ukrainian Catholics Speak Out," *The Wall Street Journal* (European edition), February 18, 1985; Ivan Mhul, "La resistance tenace des catholiques clandestines d'Ukraine," *Le Monde*, March 1, 1985; George Zarycky, "Soviet Journal on Religious Dissent May Embarrass Kremlin," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 6, 1985; *Radio Liberty* 71/85, "Moscow Still Putting Pressure on Ukrainian Catholics to Break with Rome," March 8, 1985; and *Radio Liberty* 101/85, "First Issue of New *Samizdat* Journal Put Out by Ukrainian Catholics (Uniates)," March 26, 1985.

²⁷In November 1982 a conference was held in Kiev on the topic "The Anti-Communist Essence of Uniato-Nationalistic Falsification of the History of the Ukrainian Nation," (*Liudyna i Svit*, No. 2, February 1983, p. 21). Toward the end of 1983, in the city of Kalush, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, a conference was held dealing with "Uniatism and Ukrainian Bourgeois-Nationalism," (*Liudyna i Svit*, No. 1, January 1984, p. 33). In April 1985 a conference was held in Lvov on "Critique of the Catholic Uniato Ideology in Atheist Propaganda," (*Nauka i Religiya*, No. 11, November 1985, p. 34).

²⁸*Nauka i Religiya*, Moscow, No. 10, October 1984, p. 11.

²⁹*Ibid.*, No. 1, January 1985, p. 10.

³⁰Ivan Hvat, "The Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Vatican and the Soviet Union During the Pontificate of Pope John Paul II," *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. 11, No. 3, (Winter 1983), pp. 264-280.

³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 277-278; See also L.F. Shevtsov, *Sotsializm i Katolitsizm*, (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), p. 39.

³²I. Tykhonov, "Catholic Church: New Trends, Old Goals," (in Ukrainian) *Liudyna i Svit*, No. 10, October 1982, pp. 53-54.

³³B. Lobovik, I. Myhovic, "Zlopocestne tiene minulosti," *Ateizmus*, No. 4, Bratislava, 1981, pp. 361-469. ■

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