


Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine

The legacy of Andrei Sheptytsky

Andrii Krawchuk



In the first half of the twentieth century, Christianity in Europe faced an unprecedented range of social, economic and political issues that challenged the very essence of the faith. In response to the rise of socialism, the struggle for political self-determination and the competing totalitarianisms of Soviet communism and German fascism, some of Europe's finest theological minds sought to interpret the social message of the gospel in order to promote a specifically Christian understanding of ideals such as justice, liberty and democratization.

Andrei Sheptytsky (1865 – 1944), who headed the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Galicia for almost half a century, was not only an outstanding ecclesiastical, cultural and civic leader, but also a thinker and writer of distinction. Grappling with the social and political problems that beset his religious community, Sheptytsky applied key principles of Christian social ethics to such issues as patriotism, inter-ethnic and church-state relations, the ideal of church unity, Soviet communism, nationalism, religious liberty, ideological atheism, and Nazism.

Whether in pastoral letters that probed the Christian life through ethical reflection on social and political reality or in personal representations to such figures as Emperor Franz Joseph, Pope Pius X, Khrushchev, Hitler and Stalin, Sheptytsky promoted a vision of human life that was grounded in the practical wisdom of both Eastern and Western Christendom.

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Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press,
Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky Institute
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For my mother, Irena Chyzhevs'ka



...to do one's duty in the face of adversity, to bear the heat of the day, the scorching rays of the sun, the ill will of people, the hatred of enemies, the absence of trust from among one's own, the want of assistance from one's closest friends—and, in the midst of such work, to fulfill one's task to the very end, without expecting any laurels for the triumph or any reward for the service.... In our hands is only one moment of the existence of our nation. And if in that moment we do not link up our work with those who came before us, and if those who come after us do not link up their work in their time with our work and with the work of those who came before us, then what can our nation achieve, even after centuries?

—Andrei Sheptytsky, *A Word to Ukrainian Youth* (1932)

Умирають майстри, залишаючи спогад, як рану.
В барельєфах печалі уже їм спинилася мить.
А підмайстри іще не зробились майстрами.
А робота не жде. Її треба робить.

—Ліна Костенко

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The quotation from a poem by Lina Kostenko is reprinted by kind permission of the poet and of Dnipro Publishers, Kyiv, from Lina Kostenko, *Vybrane* (Kyiv: Dnipro Publishers, 1989), p. 107.

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Finally, I thank my parents for spiritual and moral support along the way. Дякую.

Introduction

Background and Context

The industrial revolution brought dramatic social and economic changes to nineteenth-century Europe, and its impact was also felt in the intellectual life of the Catholic Church. By the end of the century, a new concern had emerged within the official ethical discourse of the church: the social encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII addressed a broad range of social, political and economic issues of the day. In the progressive shifts from feudalism to capitalism, from clericalism to secularization and socialism, and, by the early twentieth century, from absolutism to democracy, the church found itself faced with unprecedented questions about the nature of its role in society and its relationship with the state. Since those processes of change were occurring at varying rates in different European countries, papal social teaching would, from its very beginnings, require an ever-increasing degree of practical interpretation and implementation by local episcopates. Inasmuch as Catholic social teaching by its very nature addressed economic, social and political conditions in Christian communities, in order to be incarnated, it would have to be attuned to the contextual social reality, following Leo XIII's call "to look upon the world as it truly is." Hence the emergence of papal social teaching was accompanied by a corresponding new prominence of individual episcopal conferences as a point of mediation between the official teaching of the Vatican and the particular social context.

A unique case of the contextual application of Catholic social doctrine was that of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the Austrian province of Galicia. Situated at the crossroads of two Christian cultures—Orthodox, tsarist Russia to the east and Latin-rite Catholic Poland to the west—the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church attempted to bridge the divide between the Christian East and West. Historically, under the terms of its reunion with Rome in 1596, the church had become Catholic, but retained its Byzantine Slavic heritage. Its Eastern roots were evident in a distinctive liturgical and ascetical tradition, which refused to compartmentalize or separate moral theology from the total Christian life of prayer, and which took the community of worship and faith as the point of departure in its ethical reflection on society. Unity with Rome brought contacts with the West and provided access to schools, all of which raised the level of theological training among the Greek Catholic clergy. In addition, Western theological tracts were translated into Ukrainian and Ukrainian Catholic

theologians drew heavily on Western sources. By the late nineteenth century, the social teachings of Leo XIII were on the local agenda in Austrian Galicia.¹

Catholic Austria had conferred upon this church not only the title “Greek Catholic,” but also equal status with the Roman Catholic Church in the empire, along with an array of attendant social, economic and political privileges. For their part, the priests of the Greek Catholic Church, and later their children, were in the vanguard of the emerging Ukrainian movement for social, political and economic change: along with his pastoral and family responsibilities, the Greek Catholic pastor was to be found organizing the first farm and credit cooperatives, raising the national consciousness of the peasants, and participating in political

1. For example, the treatise on the social question by the Austrian Jesuit Joseph Biederlack (Innsbruck, 1895) was translated into Ukrainian: Iosyf Biderliak, *Suspil'ne pytanie: Prychynok do zrozuminia ieho suty i ieho rozviazania* [Trans. Rev. Amvrozii Redkevych] (L'viv, 1910).

The only manuals of moral theology available to pastors of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia at the turn of the century were: Iosyf Mil'nytskii, *Rozmyshleniia o Pravednosty Khristiian'skii* (L'viv, 1881), and Aleksander Bachyn'skii and Iosyf Mil'nytskii, *Korotkii vyklad katolytskoho Bohosloviia Moral'noho (Etyky katolytskoi)*, 2 vols. (L'viv, 1899). The former drew, among other German sources and German translations, on the moral manuals of Ernst Müller (Vienna, 1879) and of Karl Martin, Bishop of Paderborn (5th ed., Mainz, 1865). The latter used as basic references the Latin compendia of moral theology of Joannes Petro Gury (Regensburg, 1874), Joseph Scheicher (Vienna, 1890) and M. M. Marathan (Paris, 1894), as well as the two German texts cited above and the moral treatise of Thomas M. I. Gousset (Schaffhausen, 1851). Metropolitan Sheptytsky expressed the following opinion of the two Ukrainian manuals: “Both of those books were published in the last century. Despite the great contributions of both those theologians to the field of ecclesiastical literature, these two works may be considered the weakest of their writings. At the time when they were published, they may perhaps have been adequate to the average needs of priests; today they are found only in a few libraries. Most priests do not have them and, of those who do, few ever open them.” Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro liberal'nu sovist” (1942), in *Pys'ma-Poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho, ChSVV. z chasiv nimets'koï okupatsii* (Yorkton, 1969) (hereafter 03–69), p. 315.

It is not known how widely *Rerum Novarum* or other encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII were distributed in Galicia. However, five of Leo's social encyclicals, including *Rerum Novarum*, were included in Ukrainian translation in the appendix volume of the acts and decrees of the 1891 Sobor of Lviv. See *Dodatok do Chynnostei i rishen' ruskoho provintsiial'noho Sobora v Halychyni otbuvshoho sia vo L'vovi v r. 1891* (L'viv, 1897), pp. 97–199. Later, during the interwar period of Polish rule, a collection of papal encyclicals (“Biblioteka Paps'kykh Entsyklik”) was published in Lviv. See “Dekrety i Pravyla AEparkhiial'noho Soboru 1940 roku: Paps'ki pys'ma,” in 03–69, p. 65. As for the Metropolitan, he of course was familiar with the Leonine corpus and quoted from it regularly. He would certainly have received all official documents from the Vatican, and it is likely that official Polish translations were also readily available in Galicia.

action intended to improve the socio-economic conditions of Ukrainian life. And, in the absence of an extensive Ukrainian political representation, it was often the bishops who, as *ex officio* members of the upper house (Herrenhaus) in the Viennese parliament, brought forth the needs of their people in the political forum.²

Such was the context into which in 1865 the aristocratic family of Jan Szeptycki and Zofia z Fredrów welcomed the birth of a son, Roman Aleksander Maria. The personal journey whereby the Polish Roman Catholic Count Roman was to become Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky³ of the Greek Catholic Archeparchy of Lviv has been, and no doubt will continue to be the subject of research, discussion and speculation. Yet, although in its particular socio-cultural environment this transition might well have raised some eyebrows, it is less surprising when one bears in mind that, among his many illustrious ancestors, Roman Aleksander could count, in the eighteenth century, no less than four bishops of the Greek Catholic Church, two of them Metropolitans of Kyiv.⁴

The future metropolitan's higher education began with the study of law in Cracow. Having fulfilled his father's wish with a degree in that field, in 1888 Roman took the momentous step of joining the Galician Eastern-rite order of Basilian monks, which had only recently undergone a major reform carried out

2. As Metropolitan Sheptytsky himself would later explain, "In Galicia, the Ruthenians had neither governors nor workers nor people who were rich and influential. Their bishops were almost the only representatives of the nation. And, according to a law that might be called a 'law of substitution' (*loi de substitution*), our bishops are sometimes called upon to perform certain functions and to wield a level of influence that elsewhere only secular heads of state would possess." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Report to Giovanni Gennoch, 12.II.1923," "Beatificationis et Canonizationis Servi Dei Andreae Szeptyckij Archiepiscopi Leopoliensis Ucrainorum Metropolitae Haliciensis," vol. 1, "Epistolae et Relationes ad Sanctam Sedem Lingua Gallica Exaratae" (Rome, 1965), p. 24. This unpublished twenty-volume compilation will be abbreviated henceforth as *ERSS-LGE*.

3. The varieties of spelling of the Metropolitan's family name range from the Polish "Szeptycki" to the transliterated Ukrainian "Sheptyts'kyi" and to the somewhat simpler English form "Sheptytsky," with countless variations in other languages, as will be noted in the bibliographic references at the end of this study. It is the third form that we have chosen to use in the present work when referring to the Metropolitan after he joined the Greek Catholic Church.

4. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky's familial predecessors in the Greek Catholic episcopate were: Bishop Varlaam Sheptytsky of Lviv (1700–15), Bishop Atanazii Sheptytsky of Peremyshl (Przemyśl) (1762–79), Metropolitan Atanazii Sheptytsky of Kyiv (1729–46), and Metropolitan Lev Sheptytsky of Kyiv (1778–79). On this and other genealogical matters, the basic sources are Ivan Shpytkovs'kyi, *Rid i herb Sheptyts'kykh* (Lviv, 1936), and Andrzej A. Zięba, "Szeptycki/Sheptyts'kyi Genealogy," in *Life and Times*, pp. 437–39.

by the Society of Jesus. It was thus as a Basilian novice that he received his theological training and monastic formation. As a highly educated priest (ordained in 1892), as a celibate in a church in which the vast majority of priests were married, and as a monk who showed both initiative and skill in performing a wide variety of tasks ranging from novice master to preacher to co-founder and contributor to the religious periodical *Misionar*, Sheptytsky was eminently *episcopabile*. And so it was that, in 1899, at the age of thirty-four, he was appointed bishop of Stanyslaviv. A year later, after the death of Metropolitan Iulian Kuilovsky, Bishop Andrei was nominated to the Metropolitan See of Lviv.

As the Eastern-rite Catholic Metropolitan Archbishop of Lviv, Galicia, in a time of turbulent social and political change (1899–1944), Andrei Sheptytsky played a key role in the social history of that western region of Ukraine. During his tenure in office, Galicia would change political hands so many times that the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the first half of the twentieth century provides a unique case study of church-state relations. At the same time, Ukrainian society was also undergoing profound changes, particularly in connection with the emergence of a Ukrainian national movement that was beginning to wage a struggle for political self-determination. Metropolitan Sheptytsky faced issues that emerged as a result of both those social and political processes.

Status Quaestionis and Statement of the Problem

The social role of the Greek Catholic Church was shaped by factors that reached back to the ninth-century Cyrillo-Methodian roots of Slavic Christianity. In contrast to the Western missionary model, according to which unity with the universal Church meant cultural adaptation to Latin forms, the mission to the Slavs had resulted in the translation of the gospel and liturgical books into the vernacular. This, in Jaroslav Pelikan's estimation, paved the way for a uniquely Eastern identification of *cultus* and culture, one in which the development of Christian culture was to take on a decidedly contextual, autochthonous character, and in which the life of the church would come to be characterized by a powerful "bond with the total life of the people."⁵

The question that such a linkage raises is whether the Ukrainian church's proximity to the culture extended as well to the political order or, in other words, whether the local church ever became a state church. In the case of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the first half of the twentieth century, there was little

5. Jaroslav Pelikan, "Eastern Christianity in Modern Culture: Genius and Dilemma," in *The Ukrainian Religious Experience: Tradition and the Canadian Cultural Context*, ed. David Goa (Edmonton, 1989), pp. 235–36.

scope for such an alliance with nation-states because, with only brief exceptions, the predominantly Ukrainian population of Galicia was to remain within non-Ukrainian political entities. Even in the last two decades of the relatively favourable context of multinational, imperial Austria, whose monarchic values the Greek Catholic Church endorsed and cultivated, the road from Lviv to Vienna was seen as an avenue of appeal for justice in Galicia rather than as a path between two political homes. Another factor preventing a total fusion of the Ukrainian Catholic Church with any of the states within which it would find itself was that, in the task of interpreting the social message of the gospel to its nationally conscious people, the Greek Catholic Church had recourse to yet another supranational authority—Rome.

Despite its benefits, communion with Rome also had its price on the international scene, for it put the Greek Catholic Church on the Western side of the Catholic-Orthodox boundary in Europe. This would prove to be the deciding factor in the Russian Orthodox critiques of Greek Catholicism. In entering the twentieth century, therefore, the Greek Catholic Church was still very much an exception to the operative conceptual frameworks of the time, and found itself situated squarely between Russian Orthodoxy, which viewed it as little more than an heir to a centuries-old “schism” at Brest, and Roman Catholicism, which in practice still had lingering doubts about the fullness of communion with Ukrainian Catholics as equal partners in its universality. This ecclesiastical predicament also had its parallel in the broader socio-political environment. Here too, Ukrainian Catholics and their church strove to establish their legitimate place in the world community in a prolonged struggle for self-determination.

Closely related to the question about the nature of the Ukrainian Catholic Church’s relationships with a range of political administrations in Galicia in the first half of this century is a question about the ethical reflection and decision-making of its leader, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, in the area of social and political issues, especially in regard to the Ukrainian national movement. In the literature that deals with Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s life and activity—whether in scholarly, hagiographic, polemical or popular fashion—two fundamentally opposed schools of thought have emerged. On the one hand, writers in the former Soviet Union alleged that the Greek Catholic Church under Sheptytsky betrayed its bond with the Ukrainian people by endorsing militant Ukrainian nationalism and Hitler’s plans for Eastern Europe. On the other hand, many students of Sheptytsky in the West have extolled the unity of the church and Ukrainian society, some even rallying around that unqualified principle as a sort of *sine qua non* for the definition of the local church.⁶ Basic factual inaccuracy

6. *Patriiarkhat* (New York and Philadelphia, 1967–), the monthly organ of the lay Ukrainian Catholic movement for the recognition of the Ukrainian Catholic Archbishop

in the former position obliges one to question the scholarly responsibility of those who advance it while, in the latter case, ambiguity at the level of principle lends itself to the transformation of the church into a political tool that has forfeited its critical perspective and instead is committed only to one intransigent assertion, “My people, right or wrong.”⁷

It is not our purpose to enter into the polemical fray. Instead of producing any substantive and documented clarification, the ideological debate has only begged the question of the nature of Sheptytsky’s ethical thought. We shall attempt to come to grips with and understand the process of Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s ethical reflection and activity in its context by making a thorough study of a resource that has been all too often neglected on both sides of the ideological divide—the actual writings of the Metropolitan on social and political issues.

Prior to the present study, scholarly work on Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky occurred in what may be characterized as three more or less distinct phases: in the first phase, monographs and articles attempted to reconstruct the biographical framework of the Metropolitan’s activity; in the second, studies began to survey his ecumenical thought; more recently, a number of his theological writings have been analyzed individually.⁸ Sheptytsky’s ethical thought had never been studied in a systematic way.⁹

Major as Patriarch, proclaims on its masthead the slogan “For the Unity of Church and People” (“Za iednist' Tserkvy i Narodu”).

7. With regard to the Ukrainian underground’s interwar acts of terror against the Polish state, one author has incorrectly claimed that Metropolitan Sheptytsky “kept silent and never spoke about those matters until the fall of Poland in 1939,” and has speculated that such silence implied consent: “The Metropolitan understood that the Lord gave every living being, every person and every nation, the right to a free life and, following from that, the right to defend one’s own life against unlawful aggression and oppression...” S. Shevchuk, “Vidnoshennia Mytropolitya do okupantiv Ukraïny v rokakh 1914–1945,” in *Pro Velykoho Mytropolitya Andreia* (Yorkton, Sask., 1961), p. 89. As is demonstrated in the present study, the suggestion that the Metropolitan remained silent on this issue is as unfounded and contrary to the facts as the inference of his tacit support for terrorism.

8. The most notable biographical accounts have been: Baran (1947), Bodnaruk (1949), Prokoptschuk (1955, 1967), Schuver (1959), Kravcheniuk (1963), Korolevskij (1964), and Sheptyts'ka (1965), which are listed in the bibliography appended to the present work. Sheptytsky’s ecumenism has been studied in such monographs as: Hryn'okh (1961), Husar (1972), and Dacko (1974). Monographic studies of specific aspects of the Metropolitan’s theological thought are: Kostiuk (1980) and Sianchuk (1981).

9. The careful reader will not be misled by an unfortunate pattern of imprecision in recently published titles, from which it may appear that Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s ethical thought has been studied for quite some time. The posthumously compiled works published as 04–78 and 05–83 both mention “moral” or “morality” in their titles, but the Metropolitan’s writings reprinted there actually cover a broad range of subjects over and

A study of Sheptytsky's ethical thought also seemed necessary as a contribution to our knowledge of how the official social teachings of the Catholic Church were contextualized by local churches in eastern Europe. In the transition from Leo XIII's universalist, generic pronouncements to the contextual, pastoral praxis of Western Ukraine, the creative interaction between theology and socio-political reality was an important instance of official Catholic social ethics and policy in practice.

The hypothesis advanced here calls into question Metropolitan Sheptytsky's presumed identification of the Ukrainian Catholic Church with Ukrainian nationalism and the related suggestion that his ethical reflection on social and political issues was guided by a nationalist political ideology. To the contrary, it is proposed that the key to an accurate understanding of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's ethical reflection on social issues, and indeed the basis of his ethical decisions in the socio-political sphere, is to be sought not in any a priori commitment to some political ideology, but in his painstaking efforts to assess the central social and political problems of Galicia and then to address them by implementing the social message of the gospel and Catholic social teaching. Although the Metropolitan did support Ukrainian national (in contradistinction to nationalist) ideals and aspirations from the standpoint of what he called Christian patriotism, it is our contention that no interpretation of his social thought can be complete without an account of his critique of chauvinism and nationalist extremism, which he applied to Ukrainian society in exactly the same way as he did to other groups. While the Metropolitan's vehement criticism of Russian communism in the 1930s and his initial welcome to the Germans in 1941 seem to invite the charge of sympathy with fascism, the evidence does not bear out such ideological simplification. Instead, such considerations as his ideal of a unified Ukraine and his consistent record of initial accommodation of any new political authority were the operative, though fallible, principles on the basis of which he strove as a Christian pastor to come to grips with the political reality that arose between the two dictatorships.

above morality. Similarly, it should be noted that although the volume of collected essays referred to here as *Life and Times* bears the subtitle "Morality and Reality," in fact only one contribution to that volume analyzes the Metropolitan's ethical thought.

There is no monographic study of the Metropolitan's social writings. Those Soviet and, more recently, Polish studies that purport to "expose" Sheptytsky's political thought and activity typically exclude any mention of such key social statements as "O kwestii sotsiial'nii" (1904), "Slovo do ukraïns'koï molodi" (1932), "Idealom nashoho natsional'noho zhyttia..." (1941), "Pro myloserdia" (1942), and "Pro iednist" (1943).

The Data: Collection and Organization

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky's writings on social and political issues are the main focus of this study. Since there was no comprehensive, chronological bibliography of these writings, our first task was to assemble one. Materials were collected primarily from repositories in North America, Italy, and Poland. Former Soviet archival holdings of the relevant Ukrainian Catholic materials, which were opened in the summer of 1988, were also consulted extensively. Thus it proved possible to assemble a bibliography comprising more than four hundred primary source entries, many of them forgotten or completely unknown in the secondary literature, which probably represent almost all of Sheptytsky's published work.

The first attempt to organize the materials for this study involved the search for a "social corpus," that is, documents pertaining to social and political issues. However, it soon became clear that only a few documents were specifically and exclusively social or political in content: many others, whether dealing with spirituality, the Christian life, or the sacraments, also touched on the social and political dimension of Christian ethics. Thus, it was necessary to sift through the known writings in quest of materials that would permit a reconstruction of Sheptytsky's ethical reflection on social and political issues. Indeed, that socio-political focus was the operative principle of selection: there was no attempt to exclude materials that could shed light on debatable or questionable points in the Metropolitan's social or political thought.

Most of the material used in this study is taken from pastoral letters and other official statements; some supporting material has also been drawn from the Metropolitan's unpublished correspondence.

The question of authenticity is not a major problem in the case of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's writings. In the first place, most of the published material appeared either in the official organs of the Ukrainian Catholic Church or in the contemporary press and bore the Metropolitan's name, both in the opening salutation and in the final blessing. Secondly, at least until the outbreak of war in September 1939, the Metropolitan himself never challenged the authenticity of any official published document bearing his name. Thirdly, even if the Metropolitan's other writings during the last five years of his life may merit closer scrutiny in the future from the point of view of authenticity, his social and political statements appear to reflect a sufficient degree of stylistic and substantive continuity with his earlier thought for us to accept them as authentic. Finally, even in the case of some controversial documents from the period 1939–44, disputes have centred more on interpretation than on authorship. As for unpublished material, such as the selected items from the Metropolitan's correspondence, most of it consists of notarized items collected by the Postulator for the Cause of the Beatification and Canonization. Here too, neither style nor

content suggest any significant departure from well established patterns in the Metropolitan's ethical reflection and argumentation.

Periodization

The matter of periodization might have been controversial if our purpose had been to propose the scheme employed here for broader use. But that is not the case. As if the social issues with which Metropolitan Sheptytsky would deal during his forty-four years in office were not sufficiently complex in themselves, between 1900 and 1944 the territory of the Greek Catholic Archeparchy of Lviv (Eastern Galicia) changed political hands numerous times. In fact, so closely was Sheptytsky's own life bound up with the social history of Galicia in those years that it is perhaps most useful to suggest a periodization of his social thought and activity that centres on four pivotal moments in Galician politics: September 1914, when tsarist Russian forces occupied Galicia and exiled the Metropolitan to Russia; March 1923, when the Council of Ambassadors in Paris decided to allow the incorporation of Eastern Galicia into the new Polish republic; September 1939, when the Soviets invaded Galicia; and July 1941, when Germany took Galicia and held it for three full years, withdrawing in July 1944, only three months before the Metropolitan's death at the age of 79.

Within each of the five periods that those four moments define, Metropolitan Sheptytsky faced an array of social and political challenges that demanded his ethical reflection and response as a Catholic bishop. Accordingly, it has been a key task of the present study to discover the nature of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's theoretical and practical approaches to perceived ethical problems in each of those periods. As the work progressed, it appeared that Sheptytsky's social writings had to be studied in the context of these respective periods before a comparison of themes and patterns across periods could be attempted.

Analysis

In each period, the analysis follows a three-step progression: first, a reconstruction of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's empirical and theological reading of a situation or problem that, in his judgment, called for ethical reflection; second, the rules and principles to which Sheptytsky referred in developing an ethical response to the problem; and, third, the specific courses of action that the Metropolitan took, or official positions that he adopted, in implementing his ethical decisions. By employing this analytical progression as a heuristic device, we do not suggest that the Metropolitan followed such a three-step method of ethical reasoning. Nevertheless, it is useful to highlight these three discernible, often concurrent, dimensions of his ethical reflection.

Our inquiry applies a number of categories outlined by Glen H. Stassen in his essay, "Critical Variables in Christian Social Ethics."¹⁰ Stassen describes dimensions of ethical reasoning according to which moral arguments and types of moral reasoning may be classified, and this generic typology proved to be a source of useful heuristic devices that facilitated the analysis of Sheptytsky's social and political writings. A particularly valuable feature of Stassen's typology is that it poses foundational questions about an ethical line of thought, allowing the texts to speak for themselves, that is, without imposing anachronistic conceptual frameworks from outside.

The first set of questions that we have brought to the Metropolitan's writings in each period is drawn from what Stassen calls the "perception of the situation." This dimension of ethical reasoning contains two variables particularly important to the present study: the question of the nature of authority in society and an appreciation of the perceived threat. In the unstable, constantly changing political and social environment in which he found himself, Metropolitan Sheptytsky repeatedly had to reflect on the nature, locus and limits of the prevailing civil authority at a given moment and on how it affected or challenged the authority of the church. Related to this question, yet extending also beyond church-state relations, was the matter of determining the main threat posed to the church and to society at any given moment. In the case of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, so extensive is the linkage of empirical and theological considerations within this variable that we have found it useful to include his theological interpretations as an integral part of his reading of social and political situations.

A second set of questions that have guided this inquiry is concerned with what Stassen calls the "mode of moral discourse." This refers to four broad types of possible approach to ethical decision-making: situationism, which relies on non-binding rules of thumb; legalism, which employs specific rules and directives; principlism, which is guided by the principles that underlie rules; and contextualism, which situates moral problems within the context of one's basic beliefs about the nature of God, His actions, and human responsibility. The question that we have posed at this second level of analysis has therefore been: what are the operative ethical categories to which Metropolitan Sheptytsky appealed, and how did they shape his moral reasoning?

The final step in our analysis, an examination of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's practical implementation of his ethical decisions in the socio-political sphere, has been carried out with a view to further clarifying his preferred means of achieving social change in a particular situation. This level of our analysis sheds light on the Metropolitan's attentiveness and adaptability to the changing needs

10. Glen H. Stassen, "Critical Variables in Christian Social Ethics," in *Issues in Christian Ethics*, ed. Paul D. Simmons (Nashville, 1980), pp. 57–76.

of a social environment in flux, as well as his capacity for self-criticism and self-correction.

The areas of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social reflection studied here fall into two broad categories: the church's external relations with a variety of states and political orders and its internal reflection on its life as a community of faith. Within the succession of the five proposed periods, different issues emerged both externally and internally, and this in turn resulted in different types of substantive analysis and response by the Metropolitan. Those variations notwithstanding, we have tried to maintain throughout a focus on the same three analytical steps, namely, empirical and theological assessments of ethical situations and problems, moral reasoning and its grounding, and the practical implementation of ethical decisions.

Terminology

The official name of the Ukrainian Catholic Church under Austria was "Greek Catholic," as distinct from the (Polish) Roman Catholic Church. As the ethnic designation of the people, "Ruthenian" (from the German *Ruthenen*) came gradually to be replaced in general usage by "Ukrainian." Between 1914 and 1918, the Greek Catholic Church began to refer to itself and its people as "Ukrainian." However, in Polish-ruled Galicia between 1919 and 1939, the ethnic designation was prohibited; instead, the denominational "Greek Catholic" was retained for official purposes.

Following the accepted scholarly convention in modern Ukrainian historiography,¹¹ we use only the term "Ukrainians" to refer to the Ukrainian people of Galicia. As a general rule, the term "Ruthenian" appears only in direct quotations. The official denominational "Greek Catholic" and the unofficial ethnic "Ukrainian Catholic" are used here alternately, and sometimes together, since they refer here to one and the same church.

11. There is an informative discussion of the need to balance strict historicism ("Ruthenian") and anachronism ("Ukrainian") in John-Paul Himka, *Socialism in Galicia: The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism (1860–1890)* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), pp. 7–8. Himka's use of "Ruthenian" makes sense in a work devoted exclusively to nineteenth-century Austrian Galicia, but studies that extend into the twentieth century, especially those that go beyond 1918, have commonly opted for consistency with the term that finally prevailed, using the anachronism "Ukrainians" rather than "Galician Ruthenians." See, for example, Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule," in *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia*, ed. Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 23–67; Paul R. Magocsi, *Galicia: A Historical Survey and Bibliographic Guide* (Toronto, 1983); and Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 2d ed. (Toronto, 1994).

Recent scholarly literature has introduced the term “Greco-Catholic,” which is much more accurate, both ethnically and denominationally. It may well replace “Greek Catholic” in the future.

In quotations from Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s writings and other ecclesiastical documents of the period, the word “Church” is capitalized, reflecting the usage in publications of the Greek Catholic Church. Elsewhere, the capitalization of “church” follows the usage recommended in the *Chicago Manual of Style*, 14th ed. (Chicago, 1993), 7.83.

Transliteration

In the text, the modified form of the Library of Congress system of transliteration has been adopted. In the bibliography and bibliographic references in the notes, the strict Library of Congress system of transliteration (without ligatures) is followed, according to the practice set forth in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč and Danylo Husar Struk (Toronto, 1984–93), 1: xi–xiii. On the transliteration of the Metropolitan’s name, see n. 3 above.

CHAPTER 1

The Social Question in the Austrian Context (1899–1914)

In this chapter, we survey four areas of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social reflection in the pre-World War I period of his episcopate: his teaching on the social action of the church, the political involvement of priests, church-state relations, and Polish-Ukrainian relations.

The Metropolitan's reflection on Christian social action was an attempt to apply Catholic social teaching to the principal socio-economic concerns in Galicia. As elsewhere in Europe, the church in Austrian Galicia interpreted the rise of socialism as both an economic and an ideological challenge. In the spirit of Pope Leo XIII's teachings, Metropolitan Sheptytsky sought ways of reaffirming his church's commitment to the advancement of the social and economic welfare of Ukrainian Catholics without yielding to secularization. His second concern was with political activism among priests. In the Austrian context, political participation by the clergy and hierarchy had a long history. But the proliferation of political parties in the latter part of the nineteenth century engendered an unprecedented form of divisiveness and, in the absence of clear limits on acceptable clerical involvement in political life, that divisiveness extended into the internal life of the church. The Metropolitan therefore set out to delineate the nature and limits of acceptable political involvement by priests. The third issue was church-state relations. From the church's perspective, secular tendencies in the Vienna and local Galician parliaments at the turn of the century were undermining the traditional harmony between church and state. In response, Metropolitan Sheptytsky adopted a more assertive stance in order to defend the Christian social values that he felt were threatened. Finally, a social issue specific to the Galician context was the question of Polish-Ukrainian relations. This question, too, had a long history, and in the first sixteen years of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's episcopate it continued to arouse social tensions. As one who had been raised a Polish Roman Catholic but later chose to return to his Eastern Christian and Ukrainian roots, Metropolitan Sheptytsky brought a unique perspective and original ethical proposals to the issue of conflicting patriotisms in Austrian Galicia.

The Social Question and Socialism

Whereas what came to be known as the social question in western Europe had sprung from industrialization and the attendant processes of social and economic change, the situation in Austrian Galicia was significantly different. Austrian policy had not favoured industrial development in the province, but instead perpetuated a quasi-colonial agricultural economy that was subservient to the interests and priorities of the empire.¹ In western Europe, according to Pope Leo XIII, the condition of the working classes was “the pressing question of the hour,” but the social question facing the Greek Catholic Church in pre-industrial Galicia was that of the endemic peasant poverty that had led to economic unrest and to a massive wave of emigration at the turn of the century.

In order to address the social question in Galicia, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky first gave a contextual diagnosis in his pastoral letter *On the Social Question* (1904), the first serious attempt by a Greek Catholic hierarch in Austrian Galicia to grapple with the socioeconomic problems of the region.²

1. See Andrii Zhuk, *Suspil'no-ekonomichni vidnosyny v Halychyni i kul'turno-ekonomichna pratsia halyts'kykh ukraïntsyv* (L'viv, 1911); and Illia Vytanovych, “Sotsiial'no-ekonomichni ideï v zmahanniakh halyts'kykh ukraïntsyv na perelomi XIX-XX vv.,” *Naukovi zapysky Ukraïns'koho tekhnichno-hospodars'koho instytutu* 21 (1970): 3–70.

2. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, *O kvestii sotsiial'nii* (Zhovkva, 1904). All references are to this edition, cited hereafter as *OSQ*, with page numbers followed by paragraph numbers.

OSQ stands out as perhaps the single most studied and cited work of Metropolitan Sheptytsky. See Iosyf Botsian, “Pastyrs'ki lysty Mytropolity Andreia,” *Bohosloviia* 4, nos. 1–4 (L'viv, 1926): 117–18; Anatol' M. Bazylevych, “Pysannia na suspil'ni temy,” in his “Vvedennia” to [Andrei Sheptytsky], *Tvory Sluhy Bozhoho Mytropolity Andreia Sheptyts'koho: Pastyrs'ki Lysty*, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1965), pp. B/191–B/231 (hereafter 02–65); Iurii Rybak, “*Rerum Novarum* ta Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi,” *Dzvony* 3–4 (114–115) (1980): 75–84; Iurii Rybak, “Kyr Andrei u hromads'ko-ekonomichnomu dovkilli (ohliad plianiv i diial'nosty),” *Al'manakh “Provydinnia”* (Philadelphia, 1984), pp. 219–236; and Andrii Krawchuk, “Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky and the Ethics of Christian Social Action,” in *Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, ed. Paul R. Magocsi with the assistance of Andrii Krawchuk (Edmonton, 1989), pp. 247–68.

The best-known critique, made from a socialist standpoint, is Ivan Franko, “Sotsiial'na aktsiia, sotsiial'ne pytannia i sotsiializm,” *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* 28, no. 10 (1904): 1–23; reprinted in full in Bohdan Kravtsiv, ed., *Ivan Franko pro sotsiializm i marksyzm (retsenzii i statii, 1897–1906)* (New York, 1966). Soviet researchers' studies considered this critique definitive, although Franko's article was never published in its entirety in the former USSR. See Vasyl' L. Mykytas', *Ivan Franko—doslidnyk ukraïns'koi polemichnoi literatury* (Kyiv, 1983), p. 218; and Mykola Virnyi, “Kinets' odniiei mistyfikatsii,” *Vidhomin mynuloho* 32, no. 7 (Kyiv, 1954): 139–40.

Inspired by Leo XIII's social teachings, and particularly by those enunciated in the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891), Sheptytsky applied them to the specific needs of the situation in Galicia. He was aware that the changes European society had undergone were traceable to the industrial revolution; that in the new social order, capital was taking precedence over labour; that capital and power were concentrated in the hands of a few; and that the result was hatred between social classes.³ In Galicia, this problem was further complicated by other factors. As the Metropolitan observed: "The situation in our region is becoming even more difficult: this is because of the insupportable economic situation of the entire land, endless political struggles, excessive taxes, and a level of education among the peasants that is lower than anywhere else."⁴ Sheptytsky felt that the search for an effective solution to this socio-economic crisis required concerted practical reflection; facile solutions would only exacerbate the lot of the poor.⁵ The social question was real, not metaphysical; its solution would likewise have to be tangible and concrete.

The pressing socio-economic issues in Galicia were closely tied to external challenges that faced the church. A secularizing tendency had arisen in the form of a politically effective Ukrainian intelligentsia. The emergence of socialism had introduced a compelling program for social change and more equitable economic relationships, yet it was perceived by the church as a threat to its hitherto exclusive moral hold on the popular mind.⁶ Indeed, by the turn of the century, the movement had made significant advances in promoting and representing the main social stratum among Galician Ukrainians—the peasantry—and thereby loosened the clergy's grip on the population. This gave rise to fears of apostasy on a massive scale. The church therefore made efforts to forestall any such movement, and it did so with particular vehemence in the press. Religious periodicals published polemical tracts directed against the "enemies of the church," seeking to expose their methods and alleged goals to the public.⁷ During the fifteen years immediately preceding World War I, there was a sense of urgency in the Greek Catholic Church about dealing with socialism. In a prophetic tone, the Ukrainian bishops warned in 1906 that a spiritual polarization

3. *OSQ* 7: 14–15.

4. *OSQ* 7: 16.

5. *OSQ* 8: 19.

6. See John-Paul Himka, *Socialism in Galicia: The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism (1860–1890)* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).

7. The semi-monthly catechetical journal *Misionar* (Zhovkva, 1897–1944) published a lengthy series of articles in 1899 under the title, "Pro vorohiv tserkvy i narodu." Although these articles were unsigned, it is quite possible that their author was one of the founding editors of the periodical, the Reverend Andrei Sheptytsky, OSBM.

of society was taking place: “We are approaching the moment when there will be only two camps in the world: that of Christ and that of his opponents.”⁸

Metropolitan Sheptytsky readily acknowledged that a powerful process of democratization was under way and, evaluating that development positively in light of the gospel, welcomed the new efforts to improve the lot of the poor and oppressed. Indeed, he felt strongly enough about this to open his major social pastoral letter with the words:

The democratic movement, which throughout Europe is rallying all people of good will to the defence of the poor and the oppressed, is not foreign to the Church but, on the contrary, is favoured by priests of all countries, for the spirit of Christ’s Gospel is also democratic through and through.⁹

Even if there was a Christian basis for welcoming democratization, Metropolitan Sheptytsky also saw problems connected with the new social consciousness. The hierarchical, monarchic structures of both church and state were being shaken by a sustained critique and bold new alternatives, and this collision of tradition and innovation resulted in a crisis of authority. As a hierarch of the church, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was concerned that matters could get out of hand:

8. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., “Rik mynaie...” (Zhovkva, 1906), p. 10.

In 1899, Sheptytsky spoke of those two competing ideological trends and linked the sense of urgency with the pressing economic concerns in Galicia:

From the very beginnings of the Holy Church, the work of priests was always very important, not only because salvation exceeds human capabilities, but also because our work and striving is a struggle with evil in every form. In our time, this work is becoming more difficult than ever before, for the power of evil is growing, it seems, in step with the progress of the cause of Christ. All the forces that are hostile to Christ are joining together and consolidating their power with a frenzied effort. When we also consider that the struggle for daily bread is becoming ever more difficult and arduous, the result is that people are weakening in their faith, materialism is growing, and the seed of the Word of God is falling more and more often on barren soil.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, *Nasha Prohrama* (“Vzhe vid samoho pochatku...”), in 02–65, p. 20.

The Catholic Church in eastern Europe was not alone in the economic struggle with socialism; the Russian Orthodox Church took an active interest in the social question as well, sending an official from its Procurator General’s office, Vladimir Karlovich Sabler, to western Europe in order to study the Catholic workers’ movement. Sabler later wrote a book entitled *O mirnoi bor’be s sotsializmom*, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1907–8), that outlined the Christian cooperative alternatives to socialism in Italy, Germany, France and Holland.

9. *OSQ* 3: 1.

A spirit of disobedience to authority—which in our time is spreading throughout Europe, which is gaining momentum through the diffusion of a theory of exaggerated freedom and absolute equality, and whose flame is fuelled by every abuse by the organs of power, by every illegality and injustice—is but one facet of a revolutionary spirit that has won adherents among our own people, that could possibly plunge our people into an abyss of misfortune.¹⁰

The “theory of exaggerated freedom and absolute equality” referred to socialism.¹¹ The Metropolitan believed that, in the struggle for social and economic justice in Galicia, the fundamental differences between Christianity and socialism were being ignored. Consequently, socially concerned Christians were sometimes prone unwittingly to embrace socialist principles.¹² In subtle ways, philosophical ignorance of what was really at stake made the Galician public highly susceptible to socialist agitation.¹³ For their part, the socialists were all too ready to exploit that ignorance. Well aware that “the banner of improving the lot of the poor” was also being raised by the church,¹⁴ the socialists were “so adept at winning people over that they became leaders [of the people] without many of them even realizing it.”¹⁵ By virtue of its secular, anti-clerical, and “anti-Christian”¹⁶ nature, socialism, in the Metropolitan’s view, posed a threat to the Christian foundations of Ukrainian society.¹⁷ In seeking solutions to the

10. *OSQ* 68–69: 227.

11. Sheptytsky drew an explicit link between absolute egalitarianism and the socialist program in numerous passages of the pastoral: “The socialists aim to achieve the *absolute economic and social equality* of all people through the abolition of private property” (*OSQ* 18: 52); and, with specific reference to the socialist program, “The *absolute equality* of all people is being proclaimed in theory...” (*OSQ* 22: 67). Emphasis mine.

12. “Among those in our land who more or less admit to being socialists there are many Christians who are not sufficiently aware of the principles of the Church and of the principles of socialism. They adopt the latter because they see in them the fulfillment of their desires for social reform” (*OSQ* 15: 43).

13. Sheptytsky assumed that the widespread perception among Galician Ukrainians of socialism as harmless was partly due to the rather muted variant of socialism that existed in Galicia. Galician socialists, he noted, were not as outspoken as their counterparts in western Europe, and there had not yet been any clear-cut “struggle for faith and morality,” as had occurred in other countries (*OSQ* 13: 40).

14. *OSQ* 12: 36.

15. *OSQ* 13: 38.

16. *Ibid.*

17. “...the Ruthenian people is a thoroughly Christian people...” (*OSQ* 13: 39). See also Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Do ukraïns'koï inteligentsii” (“U pastyrs'komu lysti...”), in 02–65, p. 212: “The Ukrainian people is a Christian society. Comprised entirely of Christians (*zlozhenyi iz samykh khrystyian*), it considers the faith to be its collective and highest good, its highest collective law.”

social question “without any regard for ethical or religious principles,”¹⁸ socialists were undermining those foundations and thus propagating an ideology “harmful to the faith and to society.”¹⁹

Socialism threatened not only the faithful. The social action of the Greek Catholic clergy was also at a crossroads: Sheptytsky felt that the difference between “democratic, Christian (social) action” and the work of socialists was not adequately understood by the Galician clergy.²⁰ Concerned that socialist tendencies in the social action of priests threatened to turn that constructive work from its proper ultimate purpose, the salvation of souls, toward the spiritual ruin of the entire people, the Metropolitan urged: “We must in the first place safeguard those ethical principles of divine revelation without which our entire socio-economic work would lead our people into perdition.”²¹ Unless the lines between Christianity and socialism were clearly drawn for all to see, the Metropolitan feared that the Christian social action of certain priests would become completely syncretized with socialism. The intrinsic danger of the social and economic reform movement was that it could easily be diverted from its worthy ideals by a spirit of revolutionary upheaval, a phenomenon that Sheptytsky observed in other countries. He was concerned that any such fusion of democratic and revolutionary tendencies could only bring negative social consequences, “an abyss of misfortune.” Rather than reinforcing the Christian faith and social values among the faithful, it would secularize the people and drive them into the socialist camp.

In applying Christian social teaching to socio-economic concerns in Galicia, Sheptytsky drew key distinctions and proposed guidelines that he felt would steer the social action of his clergy onto an unequivocally Christian course. In particular, he distinguished between the law of Christ and the law of the church, as well as between Christian and socialist remedies to the social question in two main areas—the right to property and the ideal of equality.

In acknowledging the historical fact of democratization, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was prepared to accept that broader participation in public life would also eventually lead the laity to take a more active role in the life of the church. Considering this perfectly natural, he indicated that the church would in no way set aside the immutable law, the foundation that Christ himself had laid, but,

18. *OSQ* 12: 34–36.

19. *OSQ* 13: 39.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *OSQ* 12: 33.

“beyond that, both the law and the practice of the Church can be changed and modified in very many areas.”²²

As for the church and socialism, the first difference between them concerned the use of private property to achieve a just distribution of wealth in society. Whereas socialism stood for the abolition of private property, the church considered it a natural and inalienable right, a first principle of its social action.²³ In elaborating the retentionist argument, Sheptytsky drew on many of the natural-law premises that had also been employed by Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical *Rerum Novarum*:²⁴ private property was a natural right²⁵ that was historically confirmed by human customs and laws²⁶ as well as by divine law;²⁷ the right to the permanent possession of things, as opposed to their temporary use, was derived from human rationality and the capacity to reflect on needs for future welfare;²⁸ a worker who cultivated land had a right not only to the fruits that were harvested, but also to the land itself;²⁹ the right to own property was also linked to a father’s natural-law obligation to provide for the needs of his family;³⁰ and remuneration was not the only incentive to work, for a worker was also entitled to the liberty of choosing how to spend his wages, a liberty that would be lost through the abolition of private property.³¹ Moreover, the church took the view that the abolition of private property would necessarily lead to harmful social consequences and economic stagnation.³²

22. “...i zakon i praktyka tserkvy mozhe buty v mnohykh i mnohykh richakh zminena i zmodifikovana.” Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, handwritten draft of a pastoral letter to the clergy (“V poslidnim moim pys'mi...”), Lavriv, 17 March 1910, TsDIA, f. 408, op. 1, spr. 6, ark. 4.

23. On the abolitionist stance of the socialists, see *OSQ* 17: 49, 18: 52; the retentionist stance of the church is declared in *OSQ* 29: 93, “The first principle of Christian social action is the inalienability (*netykal'nist'*) of private property.”

24. [Leo XIII], “Rights and Duties of Capital and Labor, Encyclical Letter *Rerum Novarum*, May 15, 1891,” in *The Church Speaks to the Modern World: The Social Teachings of Leo XIII*, ed. Etienne Gilson (Garden City, N.Y., 1958), pp. 205–44. All citations are from this edition, cited hereafter as *RN*.

25. *OSQ* 22: 68; *RN* 208: 6, 209: 9.

26. *OSQ* 24: 76; *RN* 210: 11.

27. *OSQ* 26: 81; *RN* 210: 11.

28. *OSQ* 22–24: 69–74; *RN* 208–9: 6–7.

29. *OSQ* 24: 74; *RN* 209–10: 7–10.

30. *OSQ* 27: 85; *RN* 211: 13.

31. *OSQ* 20: 60–61; *RN* 207: 5.

32. The list of evils that Sheptytsky expected to follow the collectivization of property was formidable: economic stagnation (*OSQ* 18: 53), harm to workers (21: 61) and to the poor (28: 92), and the loss of motivation and incentives for workers to apply their skills

The other fundamental difference concerned the ideal of human equality. Socialism was said to advocate absolute equality,³³ which the church criticized as a false ideal with no basis in human nature³⁴ and impossible to achieve.³⁵ In fact, the argument went, human life was full of natural inequalities over which people had no control, and it was deceptive and ultimately harmful to society to stir up hope for complete equality. Here, too, Sheptytsky drew on the notion of “natural human inequalities” mentioned in *Rerum Novarum*: inequalities of capacity, skill, health, strength, and fortune,³⁶ and also cited differences in degrees of diligence that allowed people to take charge of their own progress, and in the (moral or amoral) perspective from which one “either corrected or spoiled what nature has bestowed.”³⁷ Such inequalities were, he declared, a fact of life.³⁸

In addition to the foundational distinctions on property and equality, Christian social action differed from the socialist program in its guiding principles and aims, which may be summarized in five points. First, the church based its social action on an alternative ethical interpretation of social and economic value. The

with diligence (18–19: 53–55, 28: 90); moreover, the family would be undermined (28: 88), the state would acquire an authority that did not belong to it (28: 90, 92), and the floodgates of jealousy, dissatisfaction and discord would be opened (28: 90), thereby threatening social peace and security (28: 92).

33. *OSQ* 18: 52, 22: 67.

34. *OSQ* 18–19: 54, 20: 59, 61: 204.

35. *OSQ* 18: 53.

36. *OSQ* 29–30: 96–97; *RN* 213–14: 17.

37. *OSQ* 30: 97.

38. *OSQ* 30: 98; cf. Leo XIII’s exhortation concerning such human inequalities “to look upon the world as it really is,” *RN* 214: 18.

OSQ is much more detailed in its critique of absolute egalitarianism than *RN*, which, except for the mention of natural inequalities (214: 17–18), does not discuss socialist doctrine at all. Not finding sufficient material in *RN* in support of his argument against socialist egalitarianism, Sheptytsky quoted from another of Leo XIII’s encyclicals, *Quod Apostolici Muneris* (1878); see *OSQ* 14: 42.

The argument of natural inequalities appears to have been more a rhetorical device to further highlight the differences between Christianity and socialism than a substantive Christian statement on the human condition. For all its opposition to socialism, the Christian perspective was also shaped by a fundamental principle and ideal of human equality. As Metropolitan Sheptytsky indicated, Jesus himself gave a new meaning to justice by “proclaiming the rights of man qua man and by placing all people as equals according to laws [that are] universal and independent of any social and political customs” (*OSQ* 41: 134). But absolute equality was an illusion that had urgently to be dispelled, since many naive people were unwittingly being drawn to socialism because of it (*OSQ* 15: 43).

distinctiveness of this interpretation lay in its focus on eternal life as the main point of reference: “This brief life is followed by an eternal life—only then is it a real life. Whether one possesses wealth or not is a matter that in its very essence is irrelevant. Only one thing has any bearing on true, eternal happiness, namely, how one makes use of the gifts he has received.”³⁹ In light of eternal life, temporal goods did not have any intrinsic moral value, but were ethically assessed according to whether they served as effective means of achieving the ultimate, spiritual purpose of human life.⁴⁰ Similarly, contrary to popular opinion, the church did not consider poverty demeaning, since “human worth is not decided by possessions or by public opinion,” but by virtue and merit.⁴¹ Nor was human suffering merely a material phenomenon that could easily be undone; it was a consequence of original sin⁴² and could not be removed from temporal life: “Nothing doing, it is necessary to see things as they are; to suffer is human.”⁴³ Yet, in view of the afterlife, this was not a form of fatalism; rather, human suffering acquired new meaning as part of a pilgrim’s journey: “Man is a traveller in this world; his homeland is heaven.”⁴⁴ Thus, in contrast to the socialist perspective, Christian social action framed the social question within the larger context of humanity’s eternal destiny. While its commitment to socio-economic progress was authentic, the church considered the ultimate goal of human progress to reside beyond this world.

Second, in proclaiming this teaching on the ultimate goal of human life, the church was guided in its social action by a special commitment to (or preferential option for) the poor. Avoiding any endorsement of struggle between social classes, Sheptytsky stressed that through its priests the church, “...in upholding social morality, must decisively take a stand in defence of those who are unable to defend themselves effectively, and must set itself to work on all their grievances, even at the risk of its own welfare.”⁴⁵ The church recognized that rich and poor alike had legitimate claims on its assistance,⁴⁶ but the poor were entitled to “special care and assistance” by virtue of “their more difficult and

39. *OSQ* 33: 104.

40. *OSQ* 34: 108.

41. *OSQ* 48–49: 157, 159–60.

42. *OSQ* 33–34: 107.

43. *OSQ* 34: 107. See *RN* 214: 18: “To suffer and to endure, therefore, is the lot of humanity.”

44. *OSQ* 34: 108. See also Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pershe Slovo Pastyria” (“Isus Khrystos...”), in 02–65, p. 10: “[God] gives us suffering and hardships that we may know and remember that we are in exile here, and that only there, in heaven, is our true homeland.”

45. *OSQ* 9: 23; see also *OSQ* 53: 168.

46. *OSQ* 9: 25.

greater need.”⁴⁷ Accordingly, in this regard, the rich were also enjoined to show true charity toward the poor, above and beyond perfunctory almsgiving.⁴⁸ Unlike the socialist movement, which incited the poor to rise up in class struggle against the rich and portrayed the two sides as natural enemies, the church favoured a path of reconciliation.⁴⁹

Third, the church defended the legitimate rights of workers, prohibiting employers from exploiting their workers or treating them as slaves,⁵⁰ reminding them of their duty to pay a just wage, and warning them that withholding a salary was a sin “that cries to the avenging anger of heaven.”⁵¹ In particular, the church opposed the liberal view of labour as a commodity whose value was to be judged solely on the basis of supply and demand in the open market.⁵² On the contrary, the church considered labour intrinsic to the worker’s life, a part of his mortal existence;⁵³ furthermore, a worker had legitimate material and religious needs.⁵⁴ All of these were factors that the church considered important in the calculation of a just wage, that is, one commensurate with the work performed, as required by natural law.⁵⁵

Fourth, while the popular notion of justice was limited to external duty in the public forum, and human laws were limited in their capacity to bring about complete justice in the social order,⁵⁶ the church could appeal to an internal principle—the human conscience. Civil authority, Metropolitan Sheptytsky declared, “...ends where the internal conscience of people begins. To influence that conscience is a matter for the divine law and for the Church that protects it

47. *OSQ* 9: 24–25, 32: 103.

48. *OSQ* 53: 168–70.

49. *OSQ* 17: 49, 9: 24. “The two classes, the rich and the poor, are not naturally hostile to each another. It is an error to think that nature itself locks them in relentless, eternal struggle. On the contrary, in accordance with nature, those two classes should mutually fulfill each other” (*OSQ* 34–35: 109). The argument is identical to that given in *RN* 214: 19.

50. *OSQ* 35–36: 114.

51. *OSQ* 36: 114. Cf. *RN* 215–16: 20.

52. *OSQ* 36: 115.

53. *OSQ* 36: 114, 37: 118.

54. *OSQ* 37–39: 119–25.

55. *OSQ* 37: 118.

56. *OSQ* 41–43: 135–39. “Reviewing our [civil] codices and statutes, we often recognize that in many cases the measure of what we call ‘justice’ in legal terms is not in fact just” (*OSQ* 42: 137). Restricted as they were to external reality (*OSQ* 43: 140–41), civil laws could not penetrate the internal dimension of human conduct, and thus, according to the teaching of the church, it was quite possible to commit an evil act—for example, a sin of the mind or heart—without breaking any civil law (*OSQ* 45: 145).

and that leads people to its fulfillment.”⁵⁷ Metropolitan Sheptytsky considered this Christian understanding of justice, informed by personal as well as public considerations, to be “the principle essential to all attempts to unravel the social question.”⁵⁸ And it was essential precisely because religion and ethics, as the church saw them, were not just private but also public matters, hence conscience, too, was seen as an objective, social matter. Its personal character could not be reduced to individual preferences, for “‘Duty in conscience’ has meaning only where there is a universal ethic (*zahal'na etyka*)—independent of the human will, immutable, grounded in nature and the law of God, the Lawgiver and Judge of human conscience—[that is,] where ethics is recognized as a social fact.”⁵⁹

The fifth and final point was that Christian social action proceeded from an understanding of justice informed by the law of love.⁶⁰ Without love, any system of justice was vulnerable to the natural human inclination toward egoism, the desire to retain a biased, subjective perspective and to see rights and duties from the viewpoint of one's own best interests.⁶¹ The Christian teaching on love of neighbour effectively drew the moral subject out of a self-enclosed stance and put him into his neighbour's shoes: “By placing himself in the position of his neighbour, and seeing the other's right at least somewhat as his own, he will not overstep the bounds of justice so easily, [but will] measure his rights and duties with one measure and one heart.”⁶²

The social significance of Christian love was that it animated an otherwise “barren, restricted, stingy and stubborn” form of justice and transformed it into a “generous, abundant, benevolent and prudential justice (*‘uperedzhaiucha spravedlyvist’*).”⁶³ The very same crucial difference obtained between the man who was “merely just” and one who had an “internal sense of justice”: the former followed the letter of the law, while the latter strove to be benevolent and loving toward his neighbour.⁶⁴ This practical understanding of love informed the social action of the church and, in particular, its work for the material and moral advancement of the poor and the defence of their rights.⁶⁵

Proceeding from the Christian view of human life as a path toward an eternal goal, Metropolitan Sheptytsky set a course for Christian social action by the

57. *OSQ* 43: 140.

58. *OSQ* 44: 144.

59. *Ibid.*

60. *OSQ* 45: 146.

61. *OSQ* 45–46: 148–50.

62. *OSQ* 46: 150.

63. *OSQ* 47: 151.

64. *OSQ* 47: 152, 48: 154.

65. *OSQ* 53: 168–69.

Greek Catholic Church in a way that brought into relief its differences with the socialist movement. Certainly there were substantial similarities between them in the special option for the poor and the commitment to workers' rights, but the spiritual rationale and the law of love underlying the church's social analysis gave its social action a distinctive Christian aspect. Although it was indeed an aim of Christian social action to promote socio-economic advancement, that was only a proximate goal, a means to a higher end. In Sheptytsky's elaboration, the primary agents of the social action of the Greek Catholic Church were priests,⁶⁶ whose first responsibility was saving souls,⁶⁷ and whose social action was therefore directed toward that higher purpose:

...in our time more than ever that method of economic work among the people is the indicated means of leading people to God. That is what the economic work of the clergy must be, for in general all temporal goods are but means of achieving eternal benefits.⁶⁸

Metropolitan Sheptytsky hoped that, out of fidelity to their spiritual charge, Greek Catholic priests would not limit the focus of their economic work to worldly goods alone, but that through it they would seek the Truth and the Kingdom.⁶⁹ It was therefore the proper purpose of Christian social action to lead people to God, rather than away from Him;⁷⁰ to defend the divinely revealed ethical principles without which the church's "socio-economic work will lead our people to perdition."⁷¹ In so doing, Christian social action would uphold that universally human sense of justice and natural order that socialists

66. Unlike some other pastorals that the Metropolitan wrote for the clergy and the faithful, *OSQ* was addressed exclusively to the clergy.

67. *OSQ* 10: 27, 70: 233.

68. *OSQ* 70: 231–32. A basic guiding principle for the social action of the church was a priest's constant commitment to his spiritual duty. As Metropolitan Sheptytsky explained to his priests: "Fervor with regard to saving souls is the foundation of our unity and solidarity. We shall engage in social and economic matters, but only for the love of our faithful, and that love demands first of all that we care for their souls" (*OSQ* 57: 186–87).

Sheptytsky's view of Christian social action as promoting the Church's spiritual mission through economic progress is abundantly evident in *OSQ*: in a time of increasing materialism, the Metropolitan was convinced that socio-economic issues were "the means of our influence on the people" (62: 206), an instrument for the salvation of souls (64: 211) and for leading people to God (70: 231); through temporal goods, the church would lead people to faith and morality (66: 220, 70: 232); and it was a priest's duty to see to it that this ultimate aim of his social work was clear in the minds of the faithful (70: 233).

69. *OSQ* 11: 32.

70. *OSQ* 10: 28, 12: 33.

71. *OSQ* 12: 33.

were all too ready to discard,⁷² and it would transform the existing social order into one that stood firmly on Christian foundations.⁷³

Socialists were committed to the people's material advancement, but disregarded their need for spiritual progress. For its part, the church recognized its responsibility to participate in the struggle for social justice, yet it would not allow that work to separate it from its primary *raison d'être*, the salvation of souls. That fundamental difference of approach to the social question in Galicia was evident in the guiding principles that Sheptytsky proposed for the social action of his priests—the ethical assessment of socio-economic values in light of eternal ones, the preference for class harmony (through a special option for the poor and the defence of workers' rights) over class struggle, and the reliance on conscience and love as dynamic principles of social change toward true justice.

The implementation of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's guidelines took the form of a fraternal correction of the existing social action of the Greek Catholic Church. One immediate application of the guidelines to the situation in Galicia concerned respect for workers' rights. Given their privileged role as agents of Christian social action and advocates of justice, Greek Catholic priests could be called upon to serve as mediators in disputes between employers and employees. Yet, at the same time, those priests themselves employed their parishioners, sometimes in ways that bordered on exploitation. The main source of income for the predominantly rural clergy was the land that came with a parish appointment and that local peasants would till and harvest, often without pay. Given the social commitment of the church, Metropolitan Sheptytsky felt that the onus was on the clergy more than on anyone else to apply the highest possible degree of justice in their working relationships with the faithful.⁷⁴ He considered the age-old custom of voluntary work on church land by the faithful to be essentially a matter of the good will of the people. In his view, it was important to point out that the faithful were under no obligation to do such work, and that priests had no right to demand it.⁷⁵

There were two related practices that the Metropolitan enjoined his priests to abolish immediately—requiring farm work in conjunction with prenuptial catechism or in exchange for a priest's normal pastoral functions.⁷⁶ Such

72. *OSQ* 18: 51.

73. *OSQ* 8: 22.

74. *OSQ* 39: 129.

75. *OSQ* 40: 130–31.

76. *OSQ* 40: 131–33. In December 1905, in the wake of a government decision to discontinue salaries for religious educators, the Metropolitan addressed his clergy with a strong affirmation of the duty to catechize, even without pay. Metropolitan Andrei

practices were dangerous, inappropriate, and harked back to the days of serfdom, declared the Metropolitan. Catechesis, the imparting of religious instruction in the fundamental truths of the faith, was a priest's duty regardless of any compensation, while the exchange of religious services for farm work, which in the absence of a standard wage scale was arbitrary and unfairly weighted in the priest's favour, lent itself easily to the exploitation of peasants.⁷⁷ Reflecting on the principles of social action, the Metropolitan proposed an ethical reassessment of what had long been an accepted practice in the church, for:

The poor find themselves in such a difficult situation and are so lacking in foresight that in the springtime they would rather promise three days of work during the harvest than pay a crown in cash. But such a condition, even though it might appear to be voluntary on the part of the worker, would in fact amount to extortion and the withholding of a worker's just wage.⁷⁸

There may have been nothing illegal about the traditional employer-employee relationship that existed between Greek Catholic priests and their parishioners, but Sheptytsky's point was that the abuse of this relationship could only undermine the church's credibility and social role. It therefore had to be stopped.

Another dimension of the church's social action that needed correction, in Sheptytsky's view, concerned the relationship between rich and poor in Galicia. The Metropolitan noted that some of his socially active priests were fomenting class antagonism through an inordinately close association with the poor.⁷⁹ As we have seen, in contrast to the advocates of revolution, the Metropolitan believed that the church's preferential option for the poor had nothing to do with class struggle. But at the other extreme, some priests actually avoided social action because of their own option for the rich. Sheptytsky rejected both extremes as contrary to Christian fraternal love:

As it is abusive and excessive to become intimate with the rich and to clutch the doorknobs of the nobility, but not to admit a peasant into one's kitchen, so too it is the same kind of excess, although to the opposite extreme, to kiss every peasant on both cheeks but to put on airs before anyone who may own some property.⁸⁰

The official position of the church was to reject no one on the basis of class; the class harmony that it sought to achieve required everyone's participation. Addressing wealthy Greek Catholics of Stanyslaviv in 1899, the Metropolitan

Sheptytsky, "Za laskoiu Vsevyshn'oho..." in *Rishenie l'vivs'koho eparkhiial'noho sobora vidbutoho 28 i 29 hrudnia 1905* (Zhovkva, 1906), pp. 8–12.

77. OSQ 40: 132–33.

78. OSQ 40–41: 133.

79. OSQ 67–68: 221–24.

80. OSQ 67: 223.

challenged their narrow view of charity as simply giving alms and directed their attention to the more profound, social dimension of Christian charity:

When you set out to help your poorer brother, remember—he needs not only your money. Even more than that he often needs your active assistance; that is, your advice and comforting reassurance. Do not help the poor one only superficially but, insofar as you are able, in such a way as to enable him to raise himself out of his misfortune and to stand on his own two feet. Give the poor the opportunity to earn a fair wage—teach them, show them how to improve their lot.⁸¹

Sheptytsky did not believe that poverty and economic disparities could ever be entirely overcome, but he did feel that the condition of the poor could be significantly improved through their advancement toward economic self-sufficiency.

A third area into which Sheptytsky introduced adjustments was the social content of preaching. Excessive zeal had led some priests to preach their own social message in church. While Metropolitan Sheptytsky encouraged his priests to prepare for social action through intensive study of the social question and to acquaint themselves with the existing theoretical and practical literature on the subject,⁸² he also emphasized that they were not permitted to theorize or expostulate on socio-economic matters from the pulpit.⁸³ A sermon was to remain the word of God, dealing only with the truths of the faith and morality.⁸⁴ Not even the social activity of a priest, which was recognized as a necessary part of his pastoral ministry, could be the subject of a sermon if it did not deal directly with faith and morality. The only items relating to social action that could be incorporated into sermons were the church's principles, which the Metropolitan summarized in five theses: 1) that religion and morality are not private matters, but have social significance; 2) that in accordance with divine and natural law, a man may acquire and hold private property; 3) that all people are equal in their nature and in the ultimate purpose of their life, but not in status, particular rights, or authority, and that striving for equality in everything is utopian; 4) that family bonds are sacred according to nature and divine law, and whoever undermines those bonds shakes the foundations of human happiness; and 5) that socialism, which rejects these truths, is hostile to God, the church, the faith and the good of the people.⁸⁵ This restriction of the content of

81. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pershe Slovo Pastyria" ("Isus Khrystos, daiuchy...") (1900), in 02–65, p. 10.

82. *OSQ* 58–60: 193–202.

83. *OSQ* 60: 203.

84. *OSQ* 61: 206.

85. *OSQ* 61: 204.

sermons was intended to prevent any confusion between Christianity and socialism or between a priest's pastoral and social roles.

The corrective limits on social action were not the only practical significance of the guidelines. The Metropolitan did, after all, strongly support his church's involvement in social action. He had indicated his perception of the universal social mission of the Church in 1900, as bishop of Stanyslaviv:

Even today, [the Church] still has the same power [as before], which comforts the dying prisoner and the African Negro and enlightens the aboriginal American Indians; which stands up throughout the whole world in defence of the poor and the weak and ceaselessly protests against any injury or exploitation of them; which does not hesitate, when necessary, boldly to level an accusation of lawlessness and injustice at even the greatest lords and princes of the world...⁸⁶

Identifying himself with that global social commitment, the Metropolitan considered the Galician church to be bound by the same responsibility. He commended the Greek Catholic clergy for its selfless dedication to the development of the Ukrainian people:

To go to the people (*ity v narod*) in order to raise them up, defend them, enlighten them, save them, die for them—that is our ideal. This is the task of the clergy, this is the history of our renaissance...

Our entire national renaissance has the character of a gradual awakening of the social masses. But the very history of nineteenth-century [Galicia] would not have that character if our patriotism had not had this aim, this meaning, this direction—to the people, to our people.

The Ruthenian patriotism of Galicians has few historical traditions and little political thought, but instead [there is] across the board the pre-eminent, characteristic and elementary [imperative]: “to the people.” We all have this sense that our strength is our people, that our work for them is our duty, that their welfare is our future.⁸⁷

86. “O Viri,” in 02–65, p. 66. It is not our purpose to assess the accuracy of this appraisal of the contemporary church's global social commitment, but only to indicate the kind of Christian social mission with which Sheptytsky was explicitly prepared to identify himself.

87. [Andrei Sheptytsky], “Promova Vysokopreos'viashchenoho Mytropolyta Ie. E. gr. Andreia Sheptyts'koho vyholoshena v stolitni rokovyny urodyn Markiiana Shashkevycha 5.X.1911 nad mohyloi poeta” (“Ridko komu dane...”), *Nyva* 8, no. 22 (15 November 1911): 691. The Metropolitan composed a prayer for the Ukrainian people that further confirmed his concern for their progress: “Bestow your blessing also upon the temporal welfare of our people, allowing them to develop the natural strengths that you have given them, grant them true and unspoiled enlightenment, bless their work in all the fields of science and welfare...” [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky,] “Molytva za ruskyi narid,” in *Bozha Siiba* (Zhovkva, 1913), p. 131.

When he considered the practical side of social action in his 1904 pastoral, the Metropolitan pointed to an array of social and economic institutions that had been established by the church to improve the condition of the working class and the poor.⁸⁸ Such were the farm and commercial cooperatives and the credit unions, which, the Metropolitan observed, were to be found in almost every village in eastern Galicia by the turn of the century.⁸⁹ In addition, an association of priests was formed to focus special attention on socio-economic issues,⁹⁰ and Greek Catholic priests became involved in the agrarian strike of 1902 and in other efforts to improve the wages of farm workers.⁹¹ While the Metropolitan supported such initiatives, his practical involvement in the socio-economic life of his people was considerably more visible, for example, in his concern for the welfare of émigrés from Galicia.⁹²

88. OSQ 29: 94.

89. OSQ 69: 231. The first cooperatives in western Ukraine had been organized in the 1870s by priests who were inspired by the German cooperative movement and wanted to alleviate the economic depression of the Galician countryside through community cooperation. The cooperative philosophy represented a significant departure from the profit-oriented capitalism that characterized prevailing economic relations in Galicia. Credit unions granted credit on the basis of a borrower's character rather than his capital holdings; they consciously tried to assist borrowers to achieve economic independence; profits were shared among members; and the credit unions had a democratic organizational structure, allocating one vote to each member at annual meetings. When the first farm cooperatives began to appear in 1904 (dairy cooperatives in the Stryi region), priests again played a prominent role in their organization. On the links between the cooperative movement and the Ukrainian national movement, see Petro Stavenko, "Pro kooperatsiiu za kordonom i na Ukraïni," in *Rozvaha: Kalendar polonenykh ukraïntsiu na roky 1916 i 1917* (Freistadt, [1916]), pp. 221–22.

90. The association, known as the Theological Socio-Economic Group (*Bohoslovs'kyi suspil'no-ekonomichnyi kruzhok*) and headed by Rev. Amvrozii Redkevych, published the Ukrainian translation of a major German treatise on the social question: Iosyf Biderliak [Joseph Biederlack, SJ], *Suspil'ne pytanie: Prychynok do rozuminia ieho suty i ieho rozviazania* (L'viv, 1910); National Archives of Canada, Andrii Zhuk Collection, MG 30 C 167, vol. 92, file 21.

91. For instance, the Greek Catholic priest Ivan Iavorsky (1856–1930), a member of the Galician provincial diet, was an organizer of the agrarian strike. Other clerics noted for their involvement in the promotion of workers' rights were Rev. Stefan Onyshkevych, also a member of the diet, and the Basilian hegumen Soter Ortynsky, who later became bishop of the Greek Catholic Church in the United States. Cf. Hryhor Luzhnyts'kyi, *Ukraïns'ka Tserkva mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom: Narys istorii ukraïns'koï Tserkvy* (Philadelphia, 1954), p. 679, n. 353.

92. Sheptytsky showed an ongoing concern for the welfare of seasonal workers and émigrés from Galicia, maintaining links with them through pastoral letters and brochures and seeing that their financial and social needs were served while they were abroad. See Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, *Rusynam osilym u Kanadi* ([Zhovkva], 1901); his "V

Realizing that while some of his priests were actively involved in social action, others remained hesitant, the Metropolitan unequivocally endorsed such work; his stated purpose in writing *On the Social Question* was to caution the former about “potentially dangerous errors” and at the same time strongly urge the latter to become involved.⁹³ Reinforcing that call to involvement, Metropolitan Sheptytsky addressed a stern warning to any priests who still harboured reservations about becoming involved in socio-economic work:

The tendency to neglect the socio-economic side of things is altogether false and harmful. The Church does not neglect those temporal and material things, for through them it leads to faith and morality. A priest who ignores the desires of parishioners to set up a reading society, a general store or a community granary and who opposes all such establishments is not fulfilling his office.⁹⁴

Although he left the conduct of social action to the clergy, the Metropolitan set an example of personal commitment to the material development of Ukrainian society, in particular through philanthropic activity.⁹⁵ Through that activity and in his teaching, Sheptytsky saw the problem of poverty in Galicia as a problem of social development; the search for solutions was therefore not limited to the

spravi opiky nad emigrantamy,” in *L'vivs'ki Arkhiieparkhiial'ni Vidomosti* (hereafter *LAeV*) 23, no. 7 (6 June 1911): 80–84; and his *Pamiatka dlia ruskykh robitnykiv v Nimechchyni, Frantsii, Spoluchenykh Derzhavakh, Kanadi, Brazyl'ii i Argentyni* (Zhovkva, 1912). This particular aspect of Sheptytsky's social and pastoral activity has been studied by Bohdan Kazymyra in “Pastyrs'ki lysty ta inshi pys'ma Mytropolyta Andreia do kanads'kykh ukraïntsiiv,” *Lohos* 9, no. 3 (1958): 217–24 and in his “Starannia pro sezonovykh robitnykiv u frankomovnykh kraïnakh,” *Lohos* 32, no. 3 (1981): 202–14.

93. *OSQ* 71: 234.

94. *OSQ* 66–67: 220. It should be noted that the Metropolitan was equally concerned about the other extreme of pastoral work, the neglect of its spiritual side, which he called a “caricature of pastoral ministry” (*OSQ* 67: 221). We discuss this more fully in the section of this chapter on priests and politics.

95. Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social and economic philanthropy has been studied extensively, especially in Iuliian Dzerovych, “Mytropolyt—Metsenat,” *Bohosloviia* 4, nos. 1–2 (1926): 66–77; and Ann Slusarczyk Sirka, “Sheptyts'kyi in Education and as a Social Philanthropist,” in *Life and Times*, pp. 269–87.

A few examples will suffice to illustrate this aspect of the Metropolitan's multifaceted activity. In 1911, Sheptytsky donated land (some 15 acres) and buildings in Korshiv to the agricultural association “Sil's'kyi Hospodar.” Cf. *Nyva* 8, no. 22 (15 November 1911): 732–33. The decision by the Austrian government to allot a monthly pension for priests' widows and orphans has been linked to political initiatives undertaken by the Metropolitan. See Stepan Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi: Zhyttia i diial'nist'* (Munich, 1947), 38–39. The Metropolitan also provided funds that were used to establish banks (for example, the Land Bank and the Agricultural Mortgage Bank), which provided good terms on mortgages, enabling peasants to buy land. Cf. Dzerovych, “Mytropolyt—Metsenat,” p. 75.

achievement of economic self-sufficiency by some individuals, but would have to encompass all of society: "Let [our] future generations take hold of industry and trade. For any nation that does not have its own industry and whose trade is run by foreigners is always a poor nation."⁹⁶

Grounded in natural law theory and inspired by the teaching of Leo XIII, Sheptytsky's thinking on the social question had a strong contextual thrust. In focusing special attention on the Greek Catholic clergy, many of whom were in the vanguard of Ukrainian social activism, the Metropolitan was mainly concerned with ensuring that the church's legitimate social action not also serve as a bridge to socialism for priests and, through them, the faithful. Convinced that the essence of the problem lay in ignorance about the fundamental incompatibility of Christianity and socialism, he elaborated the key ideological principles whereby these two approaches to the social question could be sharply and clearly distinguished, and proposed corrective measures to ensure that the church's social action would indeed promote, and not undermine, Christian social values in Galicia. In 1905, addressing the eparchial sobor in Lviv, the Metropolitan drove the point home with the words:

We need to tie people to the Church through our care for the material, temporal side of human life... The foundations of the future society will emerge from the solidarity of the Church with the democratic masses of peoples. We Ruthenian priests, to whom God has entrusted the salvation of that poor, hard-working and therefore most democratic of peoples—we understand the spirit of our times, we understand the needs of society and the path upon which the Church has entered. We understand how we must work in order to win people—not for ourselves but for the Church—how to care for the people's welfare, and how through temporal goods to lead them to eternal ones.⁹⁷

Like the sacraments that a priest administered in the church, his social action in the world employed material means to achieve the same spiritual purpose. And just as a priest cared for individual parishioners, so the church was committed to the welfare of the entire people, regardless of any class or other differences.

Priests and Politics

For the Greek Catholic Church at the turn of the century, the political side of the social question centred on the involvement of priests in party politics. The gradual democratization of Austrian society resulted in a proliferation of political

96. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pershe Slovo Pastyria" ("Isus Khrystos, daiuchy..."), in 02–65, p. 13.

97. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Besida Mytropolyta pry zakincheniu sobora eparkhiial'noho" ("Bohu blahodarenie..."), in *Rishenie L'vivs'koho eparkhiial'noho sobora vidbutoho 28 i 29 hrudnia 1905* (Zhovkva, 1906), p. 68.

parties and platforms. In the new climate of political pluralism, the political participation of Greek Catholic priests only exacerbated their long-standing disunity; a debate that had previously revolved around differences in theological orientation toward either the Orthodox East or the Latin West became politicized in the public forum. As political fervor grew among clergymen, Metropolitan Sheptytsky tried to alert them to the delicate balance between their social and pastoral roles.

Yet even as it addressed those internal matters, the church could not afford to neglect external factors on the political scene. With the emergence of a secular intelligentsia in Galicia in the latter part of the nineteenth century, Ukrainian socialists were vying for elected office in the Viennese and local parliaments. At the same time, some socially oriented Greek Catholic priests were openly supportive of publications that promoted such candidates and their political programs.⁹⁸ Others brought their social concern into the public forum by way of participation in a Christian Social Party, which had been established in Galicia in 1896.⁹⁹

Metropolitan Sheptytsky considered this period one of political divisiveness, a time of “social antagonisms [and] political hatred.”¹⁰⁰ The problem was compounded as the political convictions of individual priests began to affect their pastoral work. The Metropolitan was convinced that “the spirit of political partisanship [had] worked its way into our ranks”¹⁰¹ and felt it necessary to check politically charged sermons in the churches.¹⁰² He was no less concerned that some priests were taking their political agitation to the point of interfering in parishes other than those to which they had been assigned and attacking other priests who did not share their political views.¹⁰³ Not only did this amount to

98. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnimy...” (Zhovkva, 1907), p. 5.

99. Formed by a moderate wing of Galician populists, the party was originally known as the Catholic Ruthenian People’s Union. Renamed the Christian Social Party in 1911, it advocated a program of social and economic reform inspired by the social teachings of Pope Leo XIII. Its official organ was the Lviv daily *Ruslan* (1897–1914).

100. Andrei Sheptytsky, “Besida” (1906), p. 68; see also *ibid.*, p. 65, “times of general disunity and partisan disputes.”

101. Andrei Sheptytsky, *OSQ*, 55–56: 179. See also the official Polish translation: Andrzej Szeptycki, *O kwestji socyalnej* (Żółkiew, 1905).

102. *OSQ* 62: 207–8: “A priest may not act as a politician in church, nor may he mix politics into his sermon.... He may not abuse the pulpit or the confessional for a political purpose.”

103. Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnimy...” (1907), pp. 3–4.

“undermining another priest’s authority among the people,”¹⁰⁴ but it also detracted from the social image of priests and of the church. Indeed, “A hundred atheists inciting people against their parish priests would not do as much damage as one of us who, forgetting his office, would say to the people, ‘Do not obey your pastor.’”¹⁰⁵

Politically motivated intolerance led some priests to “drag the private matters of other [priests] out into public scrutiny, thereby providing the faithful with the spectacle of one priest attacking another in the press.”¹⁰⁶ Anonymous articles whose authors admitted to being priests appeared in the press and attacked the clergy, church institutions and ecclesiastical authority. Similarly, public appeals attributed to priests criticized attempts to organize the clergy as “clericalism,” labelled Christian schools “medieval institutions,” and equated them with the Spanish Inquisition.¹⁰⁷

Nor were the adverse effects of political agitation by priests restricted to the clerical ranks. Some priests were not above causing difficulties for those among the faithful whose political convictions differed from their own, from unnecessary delays in the arrangement of marriage ceremonies to the withholding of certificates of baptism and certificates of poverty (which were required for establishing eligibility for social benefits). In addition, Sheptytsky lamented that priests were “...demanding to be paid for the fulfillment of their most essential duties and, in various ways that are incompatible with the priestly vocation, they are oppressing [the faithful].”¹⁰⁸ All these factors indicated to the Metropolitan a lack of clerical solidarity.¹⁰⁹

104. *OSQ* 55: 176.

105. Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnimy...” (1907), p. 11. The Metropolitan restated his belief that internal divisions among the clergy were more harmful to the church than socialism in his pastoral “Zblyzhaiut' sia vybory...” *LAeV* 23, no. 5 (16 May 1911): 68.

106. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., *O solidarnosty* (“V chasakh tiazhkykh...”) (Zhovkva, 1905), p. 7.

107. Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnimy...” (1907), pp. 4–5. Apparently Sheptytsky did not consider the possibility that the anonymous articles could, at least in some instances, have been anti-clerical provocations by people who were not priests at all. What is certain is that the Greek Catholic bishops worried about more than just the articles. In particular, they noted that almost no one among the clergy protested against these onslaughts and that there were priests who subscribed to, and thus supported, the anti-clerical and socialist press.

108. Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnimy...” (1907), p. 8. On Sheptytsky’s criticism of the exacting of fees by priests, see n. 78.

109. Sheptytsky et al., *O solidarnosty* (1905), p. 26; Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnimy...” (1907), p. 29.

The same problem extended to the relationship between priests and bishops. When criticisms of the bishops appeared in the press, the Greek Catholic hierarchy responded collectively with the following admonition: “When our enemies attack us publicly, there are those among you who are pleased to see it. But how many would stand up in our defence?”¹¹⁰ Metropolitan Sheptytsky noted that because of clerical disunity the church was losing its social authority:

Nemesis saw to it that the clergy, by disobeying their superiors, lost the obedience of their subordinates. And if it is with a heavy heart that we see today that the influence of the clergy has diminished, that the people look less and less to the priest’s opinion in social and political matters, then we must admit with regret that no one has undermined respect for the clergy to the extent that priests themselves [have].¹¹¹

In Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s interpretation, the politicization of Ukrainian society had diminished the social influence of the church. In many areas of social life, priests were yielding place to the lay intelligentsia; as the Metropolitan put it, “the times when only priests constituted the Ukrainian intelligentsia are gone forever.”¹¹² The effects of secularization were being felt as people broke away from the leadership of the church and as anti-clerical attacks continued to appear in the press. Sheptytsky recalled a time when the clergy exercised unquestioned leadership in society. That clergy was significantly different from the clergy of the present; it was “internally united—it truly constituted a single body, in accordance with the principle, ‘all for one.’ But now times have changed.”¹¹³ Focusing primarily on the differences between the church of the past and that of the present, rather than on the social changes occurring outside it, Sheptytsky was primarily concerned with finding ways of overcoming the internal disunity of the church.

Sheptytsky’s theological assessment of the crisis of clerical unity in the face of political challenges to the church contained two elements: a discernment of the theological considerations underlying the situation and an appraisal of the threat to society that followed from it. In theological terms, Sheptytsky felt that some priests were falling into grave error by mistaking their “bitter hatred and partisan quarrels” for divine fervor, and their worldly wisdom for divine

110. Sheptytsky et al., *O solidarnosty* (1905), p. 17.

111. Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnimy...” (1907), p. 4. See also the Metropolitan’s call for priests to leave destructive work to the enemies of the church in his pastoral “Zblyzhaiut’ sia vybory...” (1911), p. 68.

112. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Nasha Prohrama” (“Vzhe vid samoho pochatku...”), in 02–65, p. 22.

113. Ibid.

wisdom.¹¹⁴ From a Christian standpoint, political antagonisms, libellous statements and a spirit of vengeance were all instances of hatred and contravened Christ's law of love.¹¹⁵

In Sheptytsky's reading of the situation, the very notion of clerical solidarity was being subverted and in its place a "false solidarity with evil" was creating tensions between priests and bishops.¹¹⁶ He concluded that the political concerns of priests had gone out of control to the extent of displacing spiritual concerns: "...among [our] priests there are many servants and adherents of all sorts of political ideas, but servants of Christ are only rare exceptions among them; this clergy is placing partisan considerations above the good of the Church and the faith."¹¹⁷

By their very nature, the various instances of clerical disunity were bound to scandalize the faithful¹¹⁸ and injure the church as a whole.¹¹⁹ Whether it was cloaked in political or other considerations, the betrayal of Christ was nothing less than treason, and any priests who engaged in or tolerated it were on the way to perdition.¹²⁰ No less important, however, were the more immediate implications of clerical disunity in the socio-political context. For the times had indeed changed and the political agenda now included matters that the church considered to be within its jurisdiction:

Whereas in the past many social or diplomatic principles (having nothing to do with faith and morality) entered into political and public affairs, today public and political life touches more and more on fundamental moral problems.¹²¹

114. *OSQ* 65: 215.

115. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., *O vyborakh do parlamentu* ("V nezvychno vazhnu...") (Zhovkva, 1907), p. 8.

116. Sheptytsky et al., *O solidarnosty* (1905), p. 14.

117. Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), p. 5.

118. Sheptytsky et al., *O solidarnosty* (1905), p. 8.

119. Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), p. 13; and Sheptytsky et al., *O vyborakh do parlamentu* (1907), p. 8.

120. Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), p. 12. "Priests who tolerate such things in their midst are not only doomed to perdition, but, by virtue of dragging the people into their own perdition, they will leave this world with the mark of Cain" (ibid.).

The bishops also felt that many of the public personal attacks amounted to grave sin: "There are transgressions that must truly be regarded as grave sin and a public scandal. For, without sufficient evidence, casting public suspicion on another in a serious matter is a grave sin. Even to suspect without foundation is a grave sin." Sheptytsky et al., *O solidarnosty* (1905), pp. 14–15.

121. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., "Rik mynaie..." (Zhovkva, 1906), p. 10. Similarly, the bishops emphasized the importance of a Christian basis for ethical decision-making in the public sphere: "...more and more often now in public life we are encountering issues in which some principle of Christian teaching is decisive" (ibid., p.

Two issues with which Sheptytsky was especially concerned at this time were the deconfessionalization of schools and proposed legislation on civil divorce and marriage. Both these secularizing tendencies, although not yet law, were seen as threats to the Christian foundations of Ukrainian society in Austrian Galicia. In his view, deconfessionalization would deprive schoolchildren of religious education and a good grounding in Christian social values; civil marriage and divorce laws would likewise erode the Christian moral values that the church tried to inculcate in the basic social unit, the family.

Since the main advocates of such legal reforms were socialists, Metropolitan Sheptytsky feared that the election of sufficient numbers of anti-clerically inclined representatives to the respective parliaments could bring about the persecution of religion and mark the end of the church's social role in matters of faith and morality:

I think that we are approaching times of real persecution. The enemies of the Church could easily come to power, or at least acquire greater influence on the government. Then, without a doubt, a series of anti-Church laws would begin [to appear] with the aim of removing all the Church's influence on public and school policy and, in the long term, to wear away the Christian character of social life as much as possible.¹²²

As in the socio-economic sphere, so too in the political arena Metropolitan Sheptytsky felt that the lines were being drawn between two incompatible camps, Christianity and socialism. The church was committed to the entrenchment of Christian values in public life, yet that responsibility was proving ever more onerous as socialists entered the mainstream of Galician politics and as disunity among the clergy undermined the influence of the church.

On the basis of his empirical and theological perception of the problem, the Metropolitan proposed two guidelines for the political activity of the clergy: one, a delineation of the limits of acceptable political involvement by priests and the other, a principle of clerical solidarity. Underlying these guidelines was the premise that Ukrainian society was fundamentally a Christian society that valued its church and religion as its highest social goods.¹²³ In upholding religious

12). They also indicated the gravity of the threat to faith and morality in society by linking it with the potential loss of eternal salvation (*ibid.*, p. 10).

122. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Za laskoiu Vsevyshn'oho..." (Zhovkva, 1906), p. 8. The Metropolitan's concern about a "potential persecution" of religion was not unique to this document. He had mentioned it in 1904 (*OSQ* 69: 229) and would return to it again in 1908; see Sheptytsky et al., *O tsisarskim iuvyleiu* ("Dnia 2 hrudnia...") (Zhovkva, 1908), p. 5.

123. Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), p. 17; Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., *O reformi vybornoho prava* ("Nastaly vazhni chasy...") ([Zhovkva],

values in society, therefore, Sheptytsky saw the teaching church not at all as a voice in the wilderness but as a legitimate representative of the concerns and needs of the Ukrainian people. In its role as advocate of the religious concerns of Christian society, the church was viewed as a defender of the faith and morality in the public sphere.¹²⁴

The first guideline distinguished between acceptable and unacceptable political activity by priests. As with social and economic action, Sheptytsky began by affirming the legitimacy and need for priests to be involved in the political life of their people. There were two main justifications for such participation: the duty of every citizen to participate in the political life of the state and the duty of priests to speak out for the church and on behalf of Christians whenever the public debate touched on questions of faith and morality. The solution to the problems associated with priests in politics was certainly not to be sought in a ban on political participation. On the contrary, even priests were bound by civic duties;¹²⁵ they were entitled to their own political convictions;¹²⁶ and they were expected to make full use of their constitutionally guaranteed civil rights as Christians and to transmit that same attitude to their people.¹²⁷ Political participation was further seen as an essential part of the Ukrainian church's duty to the Ukrainian people, "whose rights we must defend always and everywhere."¹²⁸

Faith and morality were issues over which the church always felt obliged to become involved in public debate. When, because of them, a priest's participation in public affairs was "necessary for God's cause or for the common good," it was more than a right; it was a duty.¹²⁹ Furthermore, it was the duty of priests to "defend the people from political injury and injustice," and "to work in the name of Christ toward the expulsion of every form of injustice and hatred, toward the introduction of the principles of justice and love into public life."¹³⁰

1913), pp. 5–6; Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Do ukraïns'koï inteligentsii," ("V lysti pastyrs'kim..."), in 02–65, p. 212; "Ordynariiat poruchaie..." (Zhovkva, 1906), p. 5; Sheptytsky et al., *O solidarnosty* (1905), p. 26.

124. Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), p. 17.

125. *OSQ* 66: 219. One such duty was that of exercising the franchise. Sheptytsky, "Zblyzhaiut' sia vybory..." (1911), p. 68.

126. Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), p. 9. See also Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, *O misiakh i dukhovnykh vpravakh* ("Kozhdyi sviashchenyk...") (Zhovkva, 1902), p. 19.

127. Sheptytsky, "Zblyzhaiut' sia vybory..." (1911), p. 68.

128. Ibid.

129. Sheptytsky et al., "Rik mynaie..." (1906), p. 2.

130. Ibid., p. 13.

In affirming the church's right to take a stand on public issues relating to faith and morality, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was consciously opposing the view, widespread in Ukrainian society, that political matters were to be strictly separated from Christian faith and morality.¹³¹ In the same way, the church was committed to seeing that political leaders were attuned to the needs of the people and "in no way violated [the rights of] the Church and the faith."¹³² Sheptytsky believed that, in this protective role, the church was legitimately using its right to represent the religious interests of the faithful in civil society, for "...by virtue of the right that has been given to us, we do not now cease to hold—and will not in the future cease to demand—leadership in the most important social issues, [that is,] in matters of faith and morality."¹³³

The Metropolitan affirmed that divorcing morality from politics was incompatible with Christian teaching. In the Christian perspective, the principles of faith and morality informed public and political life, and the law of Christ allowed people to defend their rights.¹³⁴ In the Austrian context, the duty to voice Christian political concerns was linked specifically to religious matters on the political agenda, such as religious education, civil marriage and divorce laws, and other matters of direct concern to the church.¹³⁵ We discuss these matters in detail in the next section on church-state relations.

Committed to advancing the Christian values of the Ukrainian people in the political arena, the church would therefore monitor the legislative process. There was no question of stamping out the political activity of priests or of confining parish priests to their sacristies.¹³⁶ On the contrary, given the needs of the situation, the image of a politically passive priesthood was firmly rejected:

Reverend Fathers, we must undertake to remedy our circumstances across the board. We must finally achieve that freedom to speak our minds openly and to

131. "Many people who are blinded or confused are repeating the atheist doctrine that there are no sins in politics, that everything is permissible in public life, and that public political life can do without God and Christ the Saviour." Sheptytsky et al., *O vyborakh do parlamentu* (1907), pp. 2–3.

132. Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), p. 17.

133. Sheptytsky, "Nasha Prohrama" (1899), in 02–65, p. 22.

134. Sheptytsky et al., *O vyborakh do parlamentu* (1907), p. 9.

135. "In parliament, not only matters that pertain to physical life are discussed, but there are also many issues that pertain to morality, faith and religion. The church, the school and marriage are discussed there, as are other matters that are certainly not irrelevant to the good of the Church and of the Christian people." Sheptytsky et al., *O vyborakh do parlamentu* (1907), p. 10.

136. "We are not of the opinion that priests should not step outside the sacristy. On the contrary, priests should participate in social life..." Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), p. 8.

give up that demeaning position we have held up to now. We listened, bit our tongues and remained silent. We assented, carried out [orders] and we paid. The Areopagus may be there, but we too have completed university studies. We are citizens with the right to speak our minds freely. And our mind is first of all the teaching that we proclaim. We proclaim that teaching not only to the common folk, not only behind closed doors, but publicly and to all. [For the words] “you will stand before governors and kings for my sake” (Mark 13: 9) were also intended for us. And with St. Paul we say again, “I am not ashamed of the gospel” (Romans 1: 16).¹³⁷

Having clarified the ways in which political participation was an imperative, Metropolitan Sheptytsky went on to explain what constituted unacceptable political activity. Basically, the political activity of priests could be unacceptable either qualitatively, in its form and content, or quantitatively, in degree. Political activism was unacceptable whenever a priest crossed the line between politics and ministry. For example, a parish church was not the appropriate place for furthering political ends; it was always wrong for a priest to deliver political messages within the walls of a church. Political sermons, Sheptytsky warned, could only be regarded as “a betrayal of Christ and a profanation of the Word of God.”¹³⁸ It was one thing for a priest to hold private political views, but he was never to be “a politician either in church or in the confessional or in any facet of [his work as] a pastor in relation to his faithful.”¹³⁹ Any confusion of politics with the pastoral duties of a priest was a serious error that the church would not tolerate.¹⁴⁰ Whether in the performance of his liturgical ministry inside the parish church or in his pastoral work outside it, a priest had the duty to remain “only a priest, for there he takes the place of Christ. For there his one job, his one mission and goal of his holy, priestly office is the salvation of souls that have been redeemed by the Blood of Christ.”¹⁴¹ It was only outside the church and outside his pastoral work that a priest could participate in politics, providing that such participation did not bring him into conflict with the teachings of Christ, and that his priestly duties were not neglected.¹⁴²

137. Ibid., pp. 27–28. The passage referred to the secular press, which had published items that were critical of and even hostile to the church. The bishops recognized that the newspapers enjoyed considerable popular authority, hence the reference to the Areopagus.

138. Sheptytsky, *O misiakh i dukhovnykh vpravakh* (1902), p. 19.

139. Ibid. The same view was expressed in *OSQ* 62: 207: “a priest can neither be a politician in church nor mix politics into his sermons...”

140. *OSQ* 63: 210. Similarly, on mixing politics and pastoral work: “that kind of mixing of the human with the divine, of the sacred with the profane, would be an abuse of holy things for temporal, human goals.” Sheptytsky et al., “Rik mynaie...” (1906), p. 2.

141. Ibid., p. 3.

142. *OSQ* 63: 211; Sheptytsky et al., “Rik mynaie...” (1906), p. 3.

The acceptable degree of clerical involvement in political activism was also determined by the requirement of fidelity to the priestly office.¹⁴³ That requirement was the first priority of every priest's work and could never be reduced to accommodate political fervor. The Metropolitan explained that if a priest were to place his political activity above catechization, he would be neglecting his duty and doing more harm than good.¹⁴⁴ Thus the issue at hand was not the mere occurrence of political activity by priests, which Sheptytsky recognized as both necessary and legitimate. Rather, the problem was one of modulating the degree of political involvement so that it did not interfere with a priest's fundamental pastoral duty:

It is an excess that is perhaps even more dangerous and worse [than neglecting such matters] to become involved in material concerns to such a degree as to set aside or neglect the spiritual side of the Church's work. It is definitely a caricature of pastoral work, as the very word suggests.

An even more dangerous excess would be to neglect [both] spiritual work and concern for the material welfare of the people, and to see the entire object and aim of one's action in the awakening of a political spirit.¹⁴⁵

The importance of keeping a clear sense of priorities was most evident in the priest's relations with the faithful. Not only was it unacceptable for a priest to talk politics within the walls of the church, but he also had to take care outside the church not to allow his political opinions and activity to come between him and his faithful. Metropolitan Sheptytsky explained the danger: such actions could lead to a perception of the priest as a political opponent of parishioners who did not happen to share his views. In fact, even when he was not performing pastoral duties, a priest was obliged to remember his priesthood and the universal character of his ministry: "He must always remain only a pastor to all those who have been entrusted to his care, for he is always responsible for every soul and must lead every soul to salvation, even were he to disagree with all of their political views."¹⁴⁶

The basic rule was thus that, no matter how important or necessary a given political action might be, a priest participating in it remained a priest first and foremost.¹⁴⁷ Whenever political convictions threatened to pit one priest against

143. In 1906, the Ukrainian bishops wrote the following directive to the clergy: "We require not only that you not diverge a single hair from either the Law of God or from the principles of the faith, but that those principles be, for you and the people, the leading thought in civic activity." Sheptytsky et al., "Rik mynaie..." (1906), p. 8.

144. *OSQ* 64: 211.

145. *OSQ* 67: 221–22.

146. Sheptytsky, *O misiakh i dukhovnykh vpravakh* (1902), p. 19.

147. *OSQ* 66: 219.

another, the priority of “duties toward God and the people” overruled personal opinions and preferences. Accordingly, the correct political path for priests required discernment of “the good of the people in Christian terms.”¹⁴⁸

In 1907, the Greek Catholic bishops of Galicia summarized their position on clerical involvement in politics as follows:

We do not hold the view that priests must not come out of the sacristy. On the contrary, priests should participate in social life. They should go out among the people, but as priests, not as politicians, agitators or agents of some party. They should go out among the people, but with work, not slogans; setting a good example, not causing scandal; with love, not passion; with charity, not obstinacy; with sacrifice, not greed. Priests should go out among the people in order to unite them with Christ, not with some political party.

A priest may have his own political convictions as long as they are not contrary to the Catholic faith and Christian morals; and as long as they in no way prevent him from fulfilling his priestly, pastoral duties; and, finally, on condition (and this is no less essential) that [his] politics never place him at odds with the people or with his pastoral care for those entrusted to him.¹⁴⁹

As for actual political activity by priests, there were two conditions of acceptability: first, that such work should never occupy the primary place in a priest’s life so as to impede the fulfillment of his pastoral duties; and second, that such activity should never be directed against other priests in a way that could undermine their reputations or their work.¹⁵⁰

In sum, the criterion for determining the acceptability of clerical participation in politics was its subordination to the requirements of the Christian faith and divine law. With that criterion in mind, therefore, a priest was to exercise prudence in his political activity: if he saw that his political enthusiasm was occupying more of his attention than was his pastoral work,¹⁵¹ or if it was leading him into public confrontation with other priests, then he could be sure that it was excessive. For, in carrying out his Christian and civic duty to participate in the political life of society, every priest was bound by a primary loyalty to the principles of the faith that always overrode any political considerations.

The second principle that Metropolitan Sheptytsky elaborated in order to counter political divisions among the clergy was professional solidarity.¹⁵² It

148. Sheptytsky et al., “Rik mynaie...” (1906), p. 8.

149. Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnimy...” (1907), pp. 8–9.

150. Ibid., p. 25.

151. Metropolitan Sheptytsky drew attention to the grave error of transforming pastoral duties into an exclusively political exercise in *OSQ* 67: 222.

152. The limit of acceptable clerical involvement in politics was stated in the following

was intended to promote unity at two levels: first, as a clerical esprit de corps shared by all priests and second, as the foundation of fraternal trust between the clergy and the bishops. It was in his 1899 pastoral letter to the clergy of the Stanyslaviv eparchy that Sheptytsky first drew attention to the need for clerical solidarity. “We need,” he said, “to care all the more for solidarity among ourselves. We must focus all our forces in one direction: we need to be of one spirit.”¹⁵³

In that early statement, the principle of solidarity was still a rather general, undifferentiated ideal of unity. Sheptytsky was more concerned with allaying suspicions about his episcopal appointment and uncertainties about his plans for the Ukrainian church than he was with the problem of politically based disunity among the clergy.¹⁵⁴ In the following years, however, as the need for clerical unity became more urgent, the Metropolitan elaborated and broadened the notion of solidarity.

One of the results of the ongoing reflection on the place and role of the clergy was a detailed examination of their corporate identity. The basis of clerical solidarity was a “clerical spirit” that was the sine qua non of every Catholic priest. Without that spirit, a man was nothing but a “base charlatan pretending to be a priest.”¹⁵⁵ Clericalism, in Sheptytsky’s understanding, was a special requirement that was imposed only on priests: “it is our internal [principle of] organization, the principles that serve us in our work, but which are not a subject of sermons.”¹⁵⁶

The clerical spirit or fervor was not a type of fanaticism, but a clear view of the priestly mission and its priority over other purposes in a priest’s life. It identified the raison d’être and the professional unity of the clergy: “Our solidarity in action will consist first of all in holding high the banner of the faith and in Christ’s work for the salvation of souls. Fervor for saving souls is the foundation of our unity and solidarity.”¹⁵⁷

way: “In no way can we regard as a good priest one who is more in solidarity with any political or social organization or party than he is with the Church, with the clergy, and with us [i.e., the bishops].” Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnyny...” (1907), p. 16.

153. Sheptytsky, “Nasha Prohrama” (1899), in 02–65, p. 27.

154. Sheptytsky stressed that he had accepted his episcopal appointment with some reluctance and only as an act of obedience, not because of ambition or a faltering monastic vocation; similarly, he identified himself ethnically as a Ruthenian, stressing that he was neither a “foreigner” nor a “cynical infiltrator.” Sheptytsky, “Nasha Prohrama,” p. 21.

155. *OSQ* 56: 182.

156. *OSQ* 56: 183.

157. *OSQ* 57: 185–86.

The concept of clerical solidarity followed from an understanding of the true nature of the priest's work as "animated by the spirit of Christ."¹⁵⁸ All were driven by that same spirit;¹⁵⁹ their first and most important duty was to proclaim the word of God.¹⁶⁰ The animating spirit that priests shared would make of them an "organized body," a "clerical organism."¹⁶¹ Given the necessary solidarity, the clergy could become "one body animated by one spirit."¹⁶² The call to clerical solidarity proceeded from the bishops' conviction that this "spirit of Christ" was to permeate not only a priest's pastoral work, but his political and social work as well.

Clerical solidarity, grounded in the basic, conscientious fulfillment of the law of neighbourly love, proceeds from a commonality of spirit (*spil'nosty dukha*) and manifests itself in a uniformity of procedure, in a similarity of judgments and desires, in collective undertakings, mutual assistance, and in all aspects of the life and activity of priests.¹⁶³

The ideal of clerical unity was thus seen as a form of likemindedness and as a sense of corporate identity. It encouraged a cohesiveness among priests that necessarily took precedence over political loyalties, for: "In no way can we regard as a good priest one who is more in solidarity with any political or social organization or party than he is with the Church, with the clergy, and with us [bishops]."¹⁶⁴

In Metropolitan Sheptytsky's view, the clergy indeed constituted a "spiritual body," a "clerical society,"¹⁶⁵ and he therefore hoped that the solidarity of his priests would manifest itself as an *esprit de corps* combining loyalty with collective identity. If it did, then before entering into political battles with a neighbouring pastor, a priest would be inclined to remember that he was first of all a member of "that corps whose greatest good is solidarity."¹⁶⁶ In its practical application, then, solidarity was aimed at preventing any activity that could undermine another priest's reputation among the people.¹⁶⁷ Thus, solidarity operated not so much through commands or disciplinary measures within a hierarchical scheme of authority as through the implementation of

158. Sheptytsky et al., *O solidarnosty* (1905), p. 29.

159. Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), p. 16.

160. Sheptytsky et al., *O solidarnosty* (1905), p. 29.

161. Ibid., pp. 7, 8.

162. Ibid., p. 31.

163. Ibid., p. 8.

164. Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), p. 16.

165. *OSQ* 55: 176.

166. Sheptytsky, *O misiakh i dukhovnykh vpravakh* (1902), p. 20.

167. *OSQ* 55: 176.

internally held Christian principles, namely, “objectivity, justice, toleration and one love for all.”¹⁶⁸

The second level on which solidarity was intended to function was the relationship between the clergy and their bishop. Conscious that he could not single-handedly deal with the crisis of anti-clericalism and secularization, Metropolitan Sheptytsky counted on the assistance of his priests; together, he hoped, they would be able to form an effective front for “the victory of good over evil.”¹⁶⁹ In that sense, solidarity may have been simply a means of affirming the hierarchical structure of authority and obedience. However, it is clear that the Metropolitan saw this dimension of solidarity in fraternal rather than paternal terms. He spoke of his duties toward his priests as “not those of an Archbishop, but of a brother and a friend.”¹⁷⁰ He felt linked in solidarity with his priests “more strongly than with anyone else,” including his own family.¹⁷¹ The operative notion of authority here hinged not on submission but on mutual trust:

I hope in God that I will be able to fulfill the duties of a friend to every one of you and all your families. I ask you, Reverend Fathers, to turn to me with sincerity even in matters where only a friend could be asked for a favour.

We all need the greatest [possible] unity and an ongoing rapprochement between myself and you in order to fulfill the obligations of the priesthood, which are so difficult in our time.

In caring for solidarity in work between the entire clergy and myself, I ask you to consult with me not only in pastoral matters, but on all issues, even social and national matters.¹⁷²

In his own relations with the clergy, therefore, Sheptytsky saw solidarity as a mutuality or reciprocity of trust; as bishop, he resolved to be guided by that principle; and he expected the same of his priests.¹⁷³ The obedience that his episcopal authority required was situated within a context of fraternal reciprocity, trust and mutual assistance.¹⁷⁴ It was in that same fraternal perspective that the

168. Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnimy...” (1907), pp. 15–16.

169. Sheptytsky, “Nasha Prohrama” (1899), in 02–65, p. 20. In this same pastoral, Sheptytsky greeted the priests as his “brothers and assistants” (ibid., p. 21). And again: “I will try, Reverend Fathers, to be both a brother and a friend to you” (ibid., p. 27).

170. Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro dostoiinstvo i oboviazky sviashchenykyv” (“Po trydtsiat’okh...”), in 02–65, p. 188.

171. Sheptytsky, “Nasha Prohrama” (1899), p. 22.

172. Sheptytsky, “Pro dostoiinstvo,” in 02–65, p. 188.

173. Sheptytsky, “Nasha Prohrama” (1899), p. 22.

174. “In my dealings with you, [as I apply] sincerity and trust and lend a fraternal hand to our common task, I also hope, Reverend Fathers, that I will always find sincerity, trust, assistance and obedience among you, regardless of how difficult the situation [might be].”

Metropolitan reminded his priests of the need for “a spirit of discipline and obedience.”¹⁷⁵ In light of the ideal of solidarity, the Metropolitan understood the authority-obedience relationship, and his own role as leader, as a fraternal exchange of trust.

Thus, the ultimate aim of solidarity was not to create an exclusive society or caste, but to lead priests toward universal love and a spirit of toleration. Accordingly, priests were encouraged to practise love and toleration in their social and political work:

Every [priest] may have his convictions, but along with them he must also have a broad tolerance, a broad heart for all those who hold different views; it is only on that condition that his participation in social and political work will not be harmful. Any political action by a priest [that is carried out] with passion in any form but without tolerance and love will be harmful to the Church and, subsequently, to the people.¹⁷⁶

The call to solidarity was not an invitation to yet another political platform, but to toleration and universal love for all, and to broad-mindedness that would encompass the faithful.¹⁷⁷ Clerical solidarity was the basis of Sheptytsky’s hope that it would still be possible to win back the support of the laity and the intelligentsia in matters of faith and morality.¹⁷⁸ And, since it was also the premise of the social unity that was expected in a Christian society, the solidarity of priests was a duty.

The practical response to the problem of priests in politics involved the implementation of the guidelines on political participation and solidarity.

An absence of clerical solidarity was signalled with particular force in 1905, when the three Greek Catholic bishops of Galicia devoted their first joint pastoral to the subject. Echoing Sheptytsky’s earlier sentiment that clerical disunity was largely the result of partisan politics,¹⁷⁹ the bishops lamented, “There is no solidarity among us...because there is too little tolerance and too little of our clerical, priestly spirit.”¹⁸⁰ They went on to condemn press attacks against them as provocations that were sinful and detrimental both to the priestly office and to the church. They observed that an aberrant form of solidarity had emerged—that of priests united against their bishops. Faced with this challenge,

Sheptytsky, “Nasha Prohrama” (1899), p. 28.

175. Ibid.

176. Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnymi...” (1907), p. 10.

177. Ibid., pp. 23, 24.

178. Sheptytsky, “Nasha Prohrama” (1899), p. 22.

179. *OSQ* 55–56: 179.

180. Sheptytsky et al., *O solidarnosty* (1905), p. 26.

the bishops called for the replacement of such false unity with genuine unity, which they felt could be achieved through “the correction of those who are falling or who have already fallen.”¹⁸¹

Slander and calumny among priests undermined both their pastoral work and their solidarity, and no appeal to civic duties could ever justify them.¹⁸² Where priests were in error, the constructive way to clerical solidarity was through fraternal correction.¹⁸³

The practical import of clerical solidarity was directly linked to those public affairs in which the church was obliged to intervene:

The issue of clerical solidarity, of the collective action of priests in public life, is one of those issues that touch the Church and the faith....

Every one of you, brothers in Christ, sees that the divisions among our clergy are causing real harm to the Church and the people. Anyone who is not blind sees the danger that threatens our Church in this way and, by the same token, recognizes the authority of the bishop to decide in those matters and the duty of the priest to obey in conscience in those matters.¹⁸⁴

The implementation of clerical solidarity was aimed first and foremost at putting an end to the erosion of episcopal authority in the Greek Catholic Church. Sheptytsky appears to have understood the prevailing problem of authority as one that had political roots; seeing that it stemmed from political fervor rather than ecclesiastical insubordination, he preferred persuasion over canonical sanctions as a way of restoring unity.

Two actions that he took in 1905 suggest that his thinking had already advanced along this line. In February of that year, he issued the first of six pastorals on clerical solidarity. Although we have already noted calls for solidarity in the earlier writings, here the notion was elaborated more fully and explicitly linked to the socio-political context. Moreover, all six pastorals on solidarity were issued and signed collectively by all three Greek Catholic hierarchs, who in that first document of 1905 indicated that they were doing so expressly to offer an example of unity to the priests; indeed, they saw a practical, pedagogical value in their collective effort, which, “proceeding from solidarity,

181. *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16.

182. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

183. *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16; see also pp. 13–14. In responding to the problem of excessive political fervor among priests, Sheptytsky had also suggested fraternal correction. *OSQ* 64–65: 214.

184. Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnimy...” (1907), pp. 12–14.

calls to solidarity.”¹⁸⁵ They were consciously trying to set an example for their priests to follow.

Then, in December 1905, the Metropolitan convoked a sobor that brought together the priests of the Lviv eparchy. The assembly, the first of its kind in Lviv since the provincial sobor of 1891, proclaimed guidelines on a variety of administrative and pastoral issues, including the school question and the subdivision of the eparchy. No less important than the actual decisions of the sobor was the idea underlying the convocation of such an assembly in the first place. In his pastoral introducing the published documents of the sobor, Metropolitan Sheptytsky explained that motivation as follows:

The decisions of an eparchial sobor, more than any other directives of the chancery office and the consistory, can be a real, living [form of] legislation, answering to all the needs of society, and perhaps one of the most essential conditions of the usefulness of a law. The law [of the Church] must answer to the customs, the needs and all the conditions of time and space in such a way as not to be a burden on society, but rather a help in that natural and universally felt need of order...

The law of the Church...and our ecclesiastical practice of discussing important matters at meetings of the consistory give episcopal decrees all the more importance the less they depend on the judgment of the bishop alone. The participation of at least some representatives of the clergy in the formulation of decrees gives those decrees, as it were, greater weight, not legally, but socially.¹⁸⁶

It was thus a decentralized, participatory model of church authority that Metropolitan Sheptytsky had in mind when he conceived of the sobor. Given the deep divisions of the Galician clergy at that time, it was “not without fear” of potential failure that the Metropolitan had taken to organizing the assembly; in a sense, it was a test of solidarity that ultimately proved successful. Reflecting on the proceedings in his closing address, Sheptytsky observed:

Everyone had an opportunity to state his opinion sincerely and candidly on the matters that were submitted for the decision of the sobor. All the decisions came out in favour of the like-minded and unanimous agreement of all; thus, in those decisions there is not a single paragraph that was not unanimously supported, and there is no one among us [now] who would not agree with those sobor resolutions and each of their parts. In this way, we have confirmed the solidarity among

185. Sheptytsky et al., *O solidarnosty* (1905), p. 4. The other five collective pastorals were: Sheptytsky et al., “Rik mynaie vid khvyli...” (1906), Sheptytsky et al., *O vyborakh do parlamentu* (1907), Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnymi...” (1907), Sheptytsky et al., “Zblyzhaiut' sia vybory...” (1911), and Sheptytsky et al., *O reformi vybornoho prava* (1913).

186. Sheptytsky, “Za laskoiu Vsevyshn'oho...” (1906), pp. 5–6.

ourselves, and through the actual decisions we have confirmed our solidarity with the people.¹⁸⁷

Metropolitan Sheptytsky believed that, through the sobor, the seeds of consensus had been planted among the clergy and that this represented an important step toward the achievement of clerical solidarity—of the clergy with the bishop, of the priests among themselves, and of the bishop and clergy with the people—“the foundation of our future and the program of our work.”¹⁸⁸

The principle of solidarity acquired a political meaning at a time when suffrage was being extended to peasants in the rural regions, and as socialist candidates campaigned on a secular platform. In an attempt to instill political solidarity among the clergy during the elections of 1907, Sheptytsky and the other bishops suggested that local assemblies of priests seek ways of achieving unanimity of support and endorsement for a given candidate in their electoral districts. Priests were advised to discuss and arrive at a consensus with other priests in the same electoral constituency and to form a bloc of support for a single candidate of their choice.¹⁸⁹ That plan failed, however, for although such assemblies did meet, they were unable to prevent some priests from breaking ranks and, as Sheptytsky put it, “reneging on their pledge of solidarity on orders from highly placed lay people.”¹⁹⁰

After it became clear that such breaches of clerical solidarity were continuing well into the post-election period and were even spreading into the social and economic activity of priests, Sheptytsky imposed sweeping canonical sanctions: all clerical interference in other parishes was prohibited, even if it involved organizational work that was purely cultural or economic. Moreover, the full severity of canon law would be applied to those who continued such activities.¹⁹¹

Yet, despite that setback, the Metropolitan considered the outcome of elections in Galicia so vital to the region’s future that he extended the teaching on political participation and solidarity, originally directed only to the priests, to

187. Sheptytsky, “Besida” (1906), p. 65.

188. Ibid., p. 66.

189. Poruchenia 1–2. Sheptytsky et al., “Zblyzhaiut' sia vybory...” (1911), p. 68. This attempt to instill clerical solidarity during the elections of 1907 did not succeed. See Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnimy...” (1907), p. 4.

190. Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnimy...” (1907), p. 4.

191. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Poklykuiuchys’...,” administrative notice dated 27 July 1908, reprinted in “Ad maiorem Poloniae gloriam,” *Dilo* 29, no. 182 (14 August 1908), p. 1. The controversial prohibition, which applied to the establishment of reading societies, brotherhoods and associations, as well as to organizing assemblies, conferences and meetings outside the limits of one’s jurisdiction, was roundly criticized in the *Dilo* article.

the faithful as well. This was only to be expected, since every vote could make a difference and now, with the extension of voting rights, priests and peasants were on an equal footing. Drawing attention to rampant corruption and bribery in the electoral process,¹⁹² the Metropolitan and his fellow bishops urged the faithful to make honest use of their voting right, consulting their Christian conscience rather than their pockets: “Make honest and Christian use of the civil right that you now have. Do not allow yourselves to be cheated or bribed, be it with money or with drink. Remember: it is dishonest to sell one’s convictions.”¹⁹³

Electoral solidarity was all the more crucial in view of Austria’s indirect system of voting, where the electorate was actually two-tiered, with citizens voting only for delegates who would then cast their decisive ballots for members of parliament.¹⁹⁴ The faithful were therefore also instructed to “stay close to their priests” during elections, that is, to vote as a bloc and give massive support to the “approved” candidate.¹⁹⁵ The preferred candidates, as far as the church was concerned, were simply those who were known to be “good Christians,”¹⁹⁶ who could be counted on not to “betray the cause of the church,”¹⁹⁷ who would defend Christian schools¹⁹⁸ and represent “our Christian and Catholic people.”¹⁹⁹ These, according to the Metropolitan, were the Christian interests of the voting Ukrainian public, and it was therefore only natural “that just as the Ruthenian people vote for their own Ruthenian [candidates to serve] as members, so, too, a Christian people should elect only Christians as their representatives.”²⁰⁰

The expectation was that those Christians who were elected to parliament would act according to the principles of their faith. Sheptytsky encouraged Greek Catholic voters to use their critical judgment and to give their support to candidates who were not Christians only nominally but who could be expected

192. Sheptytsky, *O misiiah i dukhovnykh vpravakh* (1902), p. 18. Sheptytsky et al., “Zblyzhaiut' sia vybory...” (1911), p. 68.

193. Sheptytsky et al., *O reformi vybornoho prava* (1913), p. 6. See also Sheptytsky et al., “Zblyzhaiut' sia vybory...” (1911), pp. 68–69.

194. Sheptytsky et al., *O reformi vybornoho prava* (1913), p. 6.

195. “...during the elections, keep close to your spiritual fathers, proceed together with them.” Sheptytsky et al., *O vyborakh do parlamentu* (1907), p. 13. See also Sheptytsky et al., *O reformi vybornoho prava* (1913), p. 6.

196. Sheptytsky, *O misiiah i dukhovnykh vpravakh* (1902), p. 21. Sheptytsky et al., *O reformi vybornoho prava* (1913), p. 6.

197. “Ordynariiat poruchaie...” (1906), p. 3.

198. Sheptytsky et al., *O vyborakh do parlamentu* (1907), p. 11.

199. Sheptytsky et al., “Zblyzhaiut' sia vybory...” (1911), p. 68.

200. Sheptytsky et al., *O vyborakh do parlamentu* (1907), p. 9.

to be guided by their Christian beliefs in performing their duty in elected office.²⁰¹ Christian solidarity in the electoral campaign was thus a vitally important democratic means of defending the foundations of a Christian society and the rights of the church against its opponents. From a Christian standpoint, Ukrainians were told, voting involved a grave moral responsibility:

...by voting for, and even more so by supporting a given candidate, the voter accepts responsibility for his behaviour. He becomes coresponsible (*spivvynnym*) when the elected member acts to harm the Church or the people. It is without doubt a grave sin to vote for a man if there is reason to believe that, if elected, he might do harm to the Catholic Church and people.²⁰²

Sheptytsky thus shifted the focus of solidarity from the clergy to the people. Accordingly, the teaching on political participation and solidarity, which was originally intended as a strategy for overcoming clerical disunity, was extended to the electoral participation of all Christian voters, with the aim of defending the Christian values of society. Reflecting this new political consciousness on the eve of the election of 1911, the Greek Catholic hierarchs concluded a pastoral letter with a prayer for wisdom in the political sphere, so that Christian voters might elect “representatives who would fulfill their duties as elected members and represent all the needs of the people wisely and as Christians; and who would in a given instance be able to defend the holy Catholic and Christian faith and the rights of our holy Church...”²⁰³

The political activity of priests, which had brought to light the urgent need for clerical solidarity, was thus by no means the only sphere in which fundamental Christian unity could have political significance. While it was certainly useful to affirm this ideal in reminding priests of their primary duty of fidelity to their vocation and of their corollary duty of professional, corporate unity, Metropolitan Sheptytsky also saw that, in a time of democratization, it was no less important for solidarity to encompass the entire Christian community, including the laity.

The Church and the Austrian State

In the Austrian socio-political environment throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, the state conferred a variety of privileges upon the Greek Catholic Church: state salaries for priests; tracts of arable land; equal status with the Roman Catholic clergy; legal exemptions for the hierarchy, which was nominated by the emperor; *ex officio* membership in the Austrian House of Lords. For its part, the church reciprocated with loyalty to the imperial throne

201. Sheptytsky et al., “Zblyzhaiut' sia vybory...” (1911), p. 69.

202. Ibid., p. 68.

203. Ibid., p. 69.

and the Austrian state. This loyalty was outwardly expressed, and reinforced among the faithful, in numerous ways. At the turn of the century, Greek Catholic prayer books contained an imperial hymn; gathered in their parish churches, the faithful prayed for Emperor Franz Josef I, who, strengthened by his faith, would continue to “rule wisely.”²⁰⁴ Schoolchildren were expected to attend liturgies that were celebrated on imperial holidays.²⁰⁵ And in November 1908, on the sixtieth anniversary of the emperor’s coronation, the Greek Catholic bishops directed all their parishes to mark the festivities by ringing church bells, celebrating festal liturgies with special prayers for the emperor, and singing the imperial hymn and the traditional *vivat* (*Mnohaia lita*) for the emperor.²⁰⁶ In September 1917, Metropolitan Sheptytsky affirmed in a letter to the emperor: “...Your Excellency’s slightest wish is for me a command in which I see the will of God.”²⁰⁷

It was within this setting that, in 1904, Metropolitan Sheptytsky first addressed the question of church-state relations in his pastoral letter *On the Social Question*. While acknowledging the church’s right to defend itself and the faithful against abuses of political power, he nevertheless affirmed a need for “obedience to the just dictates of the civil authority”²⁰⁸ and concluded that “we cannot start up a struggle [with the civil authority].”²⁰⁹

In Sheptytsky’s view, it was best for the church to maintain a *modus vivendi* with the state, “for without perspicacity we could expose the Church and the people to harm.”²¹⁰ Consistent with this approach, the Metropolitan considered the possibility that “imprudent action” might have negative consequences: if the church were to oppose the Austrian state, it would surely run the risk of persecution by the civil authorities.²¹¹ Looking at the situation from a long-term perspective, Sheptytsky was willing to tolerate some state intervention in some church affairs in order to preserve harmonious relations. There were, after all,

204. “Hymn narodnyi,” in *Druh Dushi: Molytvoslov dlia mirian* (L’viv, [1893]), pp. 371–73; in *Korm Dushi: Molytvoslov dlia mirian* (L’viv, 1907), pp. 675–77; and in *Molytvenyk* (L’viv, 1909), pp. 186–88. The hymn was also referred to as the “imperial hymn.” See Sheptytsky et al., *O tsisarskim iuvyleiu* (1908), p. 8.

205. *Rishenie L’vivskoho Eparkhiial’noho Sobora vidbutoho 28 i 29 hrudnia 1905* (Zhovkva, 1906), p. 52 (no. 153) and p. 44 (no. 127zh).

206. Sheptytsky et al., *O tsisarskim iuvyleiu* (1908), pp. 7–8.

207. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, signed copy of letter to Emperor Franz Josef [September 1917], TsDIA, f. 358, op. 1, spr. 404, ark. 188.

208. *OSQ* 68: 226.

209. *OSQ* 68: 225, 69: 230.

210. *OSQ* 69: 230.

211. *OSQ* 69: 229.

tangible benefits to an accommodationist stance. Despite certain legislative shortcomings, the Greek Catholic Church still enjoyed a position of prestige and privilege bestowed by the Austrian state, an arrangement that it was unwilling to jeopardize.

There were at least three important considerations behind Sheptytsky's conservative position on church-state relations. First, he drew upon the Christian concept of authority, which commanded obedience to the just dictates of the civil authorities.²¹² The church considered those dictates of the state that did not contravene divine law to be justified. Second, whereas the socialist movement's "theory of exaggerated freedom and absolute equality" was thought to contain the seeds of revolution,²¹³ the church took pride in its record of commitment to peaceful reformism within the limits of the law. And third, the benefits accruing from a *modus vivendi* with, after all, Catholic Austria seemed preferable to the costs and injury the church could surely suffer as a result of "needless outbursts."²¹⁴

Thus, even while going so far as to admit that Austria's May Laws of 1868 had gone "contrary to divine law" in that they allowed the state to "meddle in church life," the Metropolitan still felt that this did not warrant direct opposition or confrontation,²¹⁵ nor did Sheptytsky's reservations about the May Laws lead him to condemn the state. Instead, the biblical principle, according to which there is no authority but from God (Rom. 13: 1), remained for him the operative guideline. Although the May Laws were unfavourable to the church, this in itself did not warrant disloyalty to the Austrian state; the Pauline teaching took precedence.²¹⁶ While this might appear to have been an unduly submissive posture, there was more to Metropolitan Sheptytsky's position vis-à-vis the state than benign passivity. A fuller understanding of this position requires an inquiry into his views on the limits of civic loyalty and the duty of obedience, as well as a consideration of his stands on some of the issues in which he felt that Austria-Hungary was being unjust to Christian citizens and the church.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's Christian reflection on church-state relations was grounded in two principles: first, that human laws were subordinate to divine law

212. *OSQ* 68: 225–26. The texts cited were Romans 13:1 and Titus 3:1.

213. *OSQ* 69: 227.

214. *OSQ* 69: 228–30.

215. *OSQ* 69: 229. The May Laws had placed schools and marriages under civil jurisdiction.

216. *OSQ* 68: 225. On at least one occasion after the fall of Austria, Sheptytsky criticized the "Josephine interference of the Austrian government," which he felt had lowered the status of the Basilian order in Galicia prior to 1882. André Szeptycky, "La restauration du monachisme slave," *Bulletin des Missions (Bénédictines Belges)* 6 (1923): 491–99.

and human conscience, and second, that political leaders should protect the rights of Christians in society. In practical terms, the affirmation of the precedence of divine law meant that, in spite of the duty to obey the just dictates of the civil authorities and notwithstanding the notion of divine right as applied to the Austrian monarch, Christian citizens were not called to blind obedience. Christian civic loyalty proceeded from the notion of “just dictates,” which referred to those laws and directives of the state that did not transgress divine law; the latter always took precedence. Likewise, the rights of the earthly church had to be respected by civil legislation. As the Metropolitan pointed out, “We [priests] need to protect ourselves and the people against potential abuses; we must demand our rights, for [it is said] *vigilantibus iura*.”²¹⁷

In the years that followed *On the Social Question*, the Metropolitan became considerably more assertive of the church’s rights. When in 1907 he published the collective pastoral letter *On the Elections*, the usual reminder about Christ’s directive to obey earthly masters (Col. 3: 22) was followed by an important qualification: “it is inappropriate to obey civil authority if it were to issue orders contrary to justice and divine law.”²¹⁸ In itself, this addition was hardly innovative, for the conditionality of obedience to the state was already well established in traditional Christian teaching. Yet it was significant in its political context. By 1907, Metropolitan Sheptytsky and the other Greek Catholic bishops in Galicia had become convinced that the gravest threat the church faced from the state was the election of socialists to parliament, which increased the likelihood of new legislation hostile to a Christian social order. The Greek Catholic Church was entering a new phase in its relations with the Austrian state, and the Metropolitan would have to decide how far he was prepared to allow the line between civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions to be moved. Two legislative reforms that were emerging at this time were the introduction of civil marriage laws and the deconfessionalization of schools.

That Sheptytsky did not place implicit trust in civil law is clear from his repeated statements on that subject: “After examining our codes and statutes, we often have to admit that the measure of what we refer to in legal terms as justice is not in fact just.”²¹⁹ Even the best of legal systems was not without the risk of conflicts and injustice, and even within the limits of the law, it was possible to perpetrate injustice.²²⁰ That risk of injustice existed because of “the extreme difficulty in determining and delineating what, according to justice, is a person’s

217. *OSQ* 68: 225.

218. Sheptytsky et al., *O vyborakh do parlamentu* (1907), p. 6.

219. *OSQ* 42: 136.

220. *OSQ* 43–44: 142–43.

due.”²²¹ Another inherent limitation of civil law was that it always remained vulnerable to manipulation. According to Sheptytsky, “When those in authority and power act in bad faith, it is possible for them to circumvent even the most equitable of statutes in such a way that, proceeding quite legally, they nevertheless perpetrate a very real offence.”²²²

In Sheptytsky’s view, the ideal of justice to which humanity aspired transcended temporal formulations; human laws could approximate but never achieve the ideal. It was precisely in cases that went beyond the reach of civil law that the church made its appeal to an internal criterion, the conscience. Defining it simply as the “internal awareness of duty” (*vnutrenna svidomist' obov'iazku*),²²³ Sheptytsky illustrated how it transcends legalism and serves as a guide to moral conduct. Those who follow conscience “do not violate another’s rights, nor do they add any rights to their own; not even given a case that could be won in a court of law.”²²⁴ In its social application, the Christian conscience came into play when civil laws fell short of their purpose or whenever narrow legalism threatened to compromise true justice. An instance of this occurred in 1906, when the Metropolitan’s chancery office convoked a special conference of priests in order to work out a common position for the upcoming elections;²²⁵ in that same year, Metropolitan Sheptytsky addressed the faithful with an appeal to protest against a proposed divorce law.²²⁶

In cases of conflict between the state and the Christian conscience, Sheptytsky assigned the greater weight to conscience. As the discourse on conscience in *On the Social Question* clearly indicated, he was indeed able to “step outside” the historical particularities that favoured loyalty to the Austrian state and to adopt a critical posture by appealing to a higher authority.²²⁷ Thus, the Christian conscience, in both its individual and collective manifestations, not only had a definite role to play in society and in the political process; in Sheptytsky’s

221. *OSQ* 43: 139.

222. *OSQ* 5–6: 10. Sheptytsky’s views on the law were no doubt informed both by his training as a civil lawyer and by his subsequent theological formation.

223. *OSQ* 45: 145.

224. *OSQ* 43: 141.

225. The document convoking the meeting of priests was attached to the pastoral, Sheptytsky et al., “Rik mynaie...” (1906). On the efforts to mobilize clerical solidarity in view of the elections, see also the pastoral to the faithful, Sheptytsky et al., *O vyborakh do parlamentu* (1907); the pastoral to the clergy, Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnymi...” (1907), and the pastoral to the clergy, Sheptytsky et al., “Zblyzhaiut' sia vybory...” (1911), pp. 67–69.

226. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Donoshu Vam...” ([Zhovkva], 1906).

227. *OSQ* 43–45: 140–45.

understanding, it was grounded in religious faith and operated independently of civil law, as expressed by the saying, *De internis non iudicat praetor*.²²⁸

In the evolving church-state relationship, Sheptytsky diligently watched for legislation that could harm social morality, and he reviewed the church's understanding of the duties of the state and of its elected representatives. In the first place, elected members of parliament had to represent Ukrainian voters' Christian values and needs.²²⁹ Sheptytsky identified a good political representative as one who understood and was prepared to stand up for those needs and concerns: "A member [elected by Ukrainians] who must defend Christian schools has to understand clearly what the faith and the Church mean to us... Our faith and our Church are our greatest and most valuable social goods (*narodni dobra*)."²³⁰ In addition, the Metropolitan observed that only a Christian could truly represent a Christian people in public office.²³¹ The implication was that Ukrainian society was viewed, fundamentally and traditionally, as Christian.

For its part, the church expected politicians to be sensitive to the religious values of the people, and to provide a form of leadership "that would not harm the people and, taking account of all their needs and convictions, would not bring harm in any way to either the Church or the faith."²³² Similarly, political leaders should allow the church to go about its work unimpeded by the state:

...let them not draw the people away from the Christian faith and the Catholic Church; let them show tolerance to us; let them allow us to work for the salvation of souls; let them not slander us whenever they have the opportunity; let them not obstruct us or spoil our work; let them recognize our civil rights and allow us to make use of those rights according to our conscience and our convictions. Every citizen has the right to require that from the leaders of the people, and so does every priest.²³³

Implicit in this assertion was the hope that, in an increasingly secular political environment, the church might be allowed to maintain the legal foundations of

228. *OSQ* 45: 145. While Sheptytsky's earlier legal training no doubt served him well in his approach to church-state issues in this and subsequent periods, as a Catholic bishop he could not but affirm the primacy of the Christian conscience over and above human laws.

229. Sheptytsky et al., *O vyborakh do parlamentu* (1907), p. 9: "Our member of parliament in Vienna must know and be attuned to all the needs of our people, for how could he defend the interests of the people if the good of the people and everything that concerns the people were not close to his heart?"

230. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

231. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

232. Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), p. 17.

233. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

its coexistence with the state. Yet there was also a realization that fundamental changes affecting that relationship were imminent, and so, in addition to reviewing the duties of civil authorities toward the church and Christian citizens, the Greek Catholic bishops saw fit to urge their priests to make full use of all their constitutionally guaranteed civil rights and to teach their people to do likewise.²³⁴

Faced with reforms, some of which the church viewed as hostile to its own social vision, the most promising countermeasure was therefore to be sought in an increased level of participation by Christians in the democratic process. As we have mentioned, Metropolitan Sheptytsky understood obedience to the state's just dictates as hinging on the state's respect for the divine law and the rights of the church. The specific meaning that Sheptytsky attached to "divine law" and the "rights of the church" in his discourse on church-state relations became evident in his approach to two pressing issues in the Austrian period: civil marriage and divorce laws and the deconfessionalization of schools. Then, in 1914, the outbreak of war provided a new occasion for the church to rethink its stance with regard to the state.

The church's official position on the school question was spelled out clearly in 1906, when Sheptytsky affirmed: "Certainly the Church has the God-given right to run schools, and the school belongs more to the [domain of] the Church than to the government."²³⁵ In the same document, he expressed dissatisfaction with a new law that "with great injury to the Church and the clergy removed the Church's influence over the schools."²³⁶ In accordance with the new legislation, priests would no longer receive state salaries for teaching religion in schools. Consequently, some of them withdrew from the schools altogether, and the Metropolitan saw this as an excessive instance of the separation of church and school.²³⁷ In an attempt to counteract this trend, he pointed out that although the educational reform was restrictive, it did not prohibit the teaching of religion in schools; the situation was not yet comparable to that of other European countries such as France, where religious education had been completely removed from the schools.²³⁸ Moreover, he argued, a pastor's duty to teach catechism overrode any question of remuneration; that duty was to be fulfilled

234. Sheptytsky et al., "Zblyzhaiut' sia vybory..." (1911), p. 68.

235. Sheptytsky, "Za laskoiu Vsevyshn'oho..." (1906), p. 7.

236. Ibid.

237. "They considered themselves freed from [the duty to] oversee the school, and they came to see the school, [now] emancipated from ecclesiastical authority, as alien and of no concern to the Church." Sheptytsky, "Za laskoiu Vsevyshn'oho..." (1906), p. 7.

238. Ibid. Comparisons with the situation in France were also made in Sheptytsky et al., *O vyborakh do parlamentu* (1907) p. 10.

with a view to the spiritual needs of schoolchildren and of Christian society, not to any material benefit.²³⁹ Accordingly, the sobor that Sheptytsky had convened in 1905 reaffirmed earlier pronouncements of the Greek Catholic Church requiring priests to teach religion on a voluntary, non-remunerative basis.²⁴⁰ For the moment, he did not consider the school question critical, but he anticipated danger in the observable trend:

I think that we are approaching times of real persecution. The enemies of the Church could easily come to power, or at least acquire greater influence on the government. Then, without a doubt, a series of anti-Church laws would begin [to appear] with the aim of removing all the Church's influence on public and school policy and, in the long term, to wear away the Christian character of social life as much as possible.²⁴¹

The perceived threat was thus not only to the church and its influence on public policy in matters of faith and morality but, beyond that, it extended to the very future of Ukrainian society as an identifiably Christian society. According to Sheptytsky, the duty to impart a religious and moral education was such an important pastoral obligation precisely because it involved the spiritual formation of the future generation of society.²⁴² Indeed, the level of the church's commitment to its work in the schools would be the decisive factor determining "whether or not our people will [continue to] be Christian in the future."²⁴³

Although there appeared to be little that the church could actually do to change the direction of school reform, the matter was becoming more and more urgent. By early 1907, the Greek Catholic bishops were warning their faithful that the deconfessionalizing "free schools" movement had already made its way into Austria. The Austrian branch of the movement, they said, was actively lobbying parliament for educational reforms "along atheistic lines."²⁴⁴

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's response to the issue consisted of two elements: a firm official statement of the church's opposition to deconfessionalization (which, he hoped, would also be taken up by the priests and the faithful in the public forum), and a heightened commitment to catechization. The state could

239. Sheptytsky, "Za laskoiu Vsevyshn'oho..." (1906), p. 9.

240. Ibid. *Rishenie L'vivs'koho Eparkhiial'noho Sobora vidbutoho 28 i 29 hrudnia 1905* (Zhovkva, 1906), pp. 140–60, par. 49–54.

241. Sheptytsky, "Za laskoiu Vsevyshn'oho..." (1906), p. 8.

242. *Rishenie L'vivs'koho Eparkhiial'noho Sobora vidbutoho 28 i 29 hrudnia 1905* (Zhovkva, 1906), pp. 140–41, par. 49.

243. Sheptytsky, "Za laskoiu Vsevyshn'oho..." (1906), p. 8.

244. Sheptytsky et al., *O vyborakh do parlamentu* (1907), pp. 10–11. As deconfessionalization continued into 1908, the bishops lamented that Catholic schools were being opened to all faiths. Sheptytsky et al., *O tsisarskim iuvyleiu* (1908), p. 5.

well withdraw its support for religious education, but the church was still duty-bound to continue to teach the faith.

The second focal point of church-state tension at this time was the institution of marriage. Here, too, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was well aware of contemporary developments in Western European countries, where civil marriage and divorce laws had already been passed. His position on this issue was categorical: such laws were a usurpation of the church's exclusive authority in the matter. As far as Sheptytsky was concerned, civil marriage was "no marriage in the eyes of God" but "concubinage" (*zhytie na viru*); those who entered into it were excluded from the sacraments, and the consequences were bound to affect their children as well.²⁴⁵ Similarly, civil divorces of Christian marriages were invalid in the eyes of the church; moreover, any subsequent remarriage was concubinage and the children of the first, Christian marriage were "lost to God, to the people and to themselves."²⁴⁶ Both civil marriage and divorce laws were "atheistic and contrary to the revealed truth of the holy faith."²⁴⁷ According to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, what placed marriage under the exclusive jurisdiction of the church was its sacramental nature. As he explained:

Outside the Church there is no authority in the world that could decide anything in this matter. If any authority—be it parliament, or some minister, or any other civil authority—interferes in this divine act that is the Sacrament of matrimony, then *any law that results from [such interference] is invalid*, just as any state decisions or resolutions about other Sacraments or the Divine Liturgy [would be].

In this matter, the civil authority must accept divine and ecclesiastical law. It is up to the Church to judge those civil matters that pertain to marriage.²⁴⁸

In January 1906, after a civil divorce law had been tabled in the Vienna parliament, Sheptytsky referred to it as "the first strike" of the enemies of the church against divine law and the rights of the church.²⁴⁹ Two months later, he took steps to mobilize his faithful to protest against the proposed law.²⁵⁰

These tensions over religious rights in the law were abruptly set aside on 28 July 1914, when Austria declared war on Serbia. In the early days of the conflict,

245. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, *O supruzhestvi i rodyni* ("Nastav chas...") (Zhovkva, 1902), p. 9.

246. Ibid.

247. Ibid.

248. Ibid., p. 10 (emphasis added). Metropolitan Sheptytsky drew a further distinction between the jurisdictions of the two authorities: the discharging of estates was a civil matter, but decisions about the permissibility or validity of marriages belonged to the church alone (ibid.).

249. Sheptytsky, "Za laskoiu Vsevyshn'oho..." (1906), p. 8.

250. "Donoshu Vam..." (Zhovkva, 1906).

Metropolitan Sheptytsky addressed three aspects of church-state relations: he defined the fundamental attitude of the Greek Catholic Church toward the Austrian state in light of the new situation; he enacted wartime measures that modified the life of the church; and, as the war moved on to the Russian front, he levelled a critique at the Russian model of church-state relations, as compared with the Austrian model. Each of these positions that Metropolitan Sheptytsky adopted sheds further light on his approach to church-state relations.

In the emerging crisis, as domestic policy was subordinated to the war effort, the church's position regarding political developments was no longer a matter of nuance and negotiation but a categorical option: it was either with Austria-at-war or against it. In this situation, Metropolitan Sheptytsky returned to the traditional symbols of the church's fundamental loyalty to the empire. On 29 July he issued a pastoral urging Greek Catholics "to defend the fatherland;"²⁵¹ their support for the war effort was a collective duty grounded in loyalty to Austria:

The time has come for us to prove our loyalty to the blessed person [of the emperor], to the dynasty and to the throne. We are certain that our entire people will fulfill its duty conscientiously and piously.

No one among us will forget [his debt of] gratitude to this Austrian Habsburg state in which we have found religious and ethnic freedom and the development of our national culture. We are certain that no one among our people will forget that we are linked with the Habsburg state and dynasty by age-old and sacred bonds. Our fortune or misfortune is one [i.e., with the Habsburg state]; our future is one.²⁵²

Those words harked back to categories that had been etched into the popular consciousness through the old imperial hymn: the sentimental attachment to the emperor, the fatherland (the social heritage) and the faith. In addition, the traditional linkage of loyalty to the throne and to the faith no doubt lent a religious meaning to the war. As Sheptytsky proclaimed, "Fulfill your duties with courage! Victory is certain and the cause is sacred... We shall fight for the freedom of our people, for the sacred cause of the faith. God is with us."²⁵³

However, the certainty of victory began to fade as Russian forces continued their advance into Galicia and, on 22 August, occupied Lviv. The occupation brought with it a propaganda campaign aimed at winning Galician public support for the Russian side. When it became known that Russian Orthodox clerics were using religious arguments to persuade Galicians to repudiate their oath of loyalty

251. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Naimylostyviishyi nash monarkh...", issued 29 August 1914 and published in *LAeV* on 30 August. Cited here from the full text as reprinted in Iuliian Dzerovych, "Materiialy do istoriï martyrol'ogii nashoi Tserkvy v chasi vsesvitnoi viiny," *Nyva* 12 (1916): 96–97.

252. Sheptytsky, "Naimylostyviishyi nash monarkh..." (1914), p. 96.

253. *Ibid.*, pp. 96–97.

to Austria, Metropolitan Sheptytsky reacted forcefully: "...a heretic who pretends to be a monk has the audacity to absolve our people, in the name of God, from loyalty to our Emperor. What gives him the right? What a shameless lie and sacrilege it is to usurp divine rights!"²⁵⁴ And, as the occupation threatened to erode the sense of loyalty among Galicians, he reaffirmed that duty all the more forcefully. Still employing the traditional symbols of loyalty to Austria, he now reinforced them further by adding a religious critique of treason:

The oath of loyalty is a sacred duty to the will of God and the law of God. In the name of God, as your Metropolitan and Spiritual Pastor, I exhort you not to accept the advice of Judas: do not obey those who want to put you in irons; do not heed the voice of the deceiving atheists who dare to urge you to betray the Emperor—the Fatherland—the Faith.

Any assistance given to the enemy or to traitors is treason, and treason is a crime that incurs terrible punishment, both divine and human.²⁵⁵

The appeal to the oath of loyalty as a sacred trust and the implicit justification of punishment for treason placed the ultimate seal of approval on commitment to Austria. For indeed, the war had provided a powerful rallying point—in effect, a confluence of political, social and religious loyalties under one banner. As the Metropolitan put it, "Be loyal to the Emperor unto bloodshed. Be faithful children of our famous people. Be faithful to our holy ancestral Church."²⁵⁶

Thus, although in peacetime the social concerns of the Greek Catholic Church had been on a collision course with the direction of Austrian legislation, in the war with Orthodox Russia there was little question but that Metropolitan

254. Sheptytsky, "Prevazhna—dorohi—khvyliia...", 21 August 1914, in Dzerovych, "Materiialy do istoriï martyrol'ogii," *Nyva* 12 (1916): 99. The reference was of course to Archbishop Evlogii of Volhynia.

It appears that Sheptytsky's theologically founded objection to the "usurpation of God's right" may indeed have been motivated by more than just a desire to defend Catholics from spiritual interference by Orthodox prelates. For, in a related statement, Metropolitan Sheptytsky suggested that in light of the Christian faith he was prepared to respect the binding force of loyalty oaths on both sides of the conflict. In his sermon on 6 September 1914, he said, "I ask you to pray for all of them, even those who are fighting on this or on the other side. For, my Beloved, through Christ we are all brothers and need God's mercy." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Ziishlysia my..." in Dzerovych, "Materiialy do istoriï martyrol'ogii," p. 231.

255. Sheptytsky, "Prevazhna—dorohi—khvyliia..." (1914), p. 99.

256. *Ibid.*, p. 100. Elsewhere, the Metropolitan urged unswerving loyalty to the faith unto death: "You, who in battle are threatened with death every day, be ever ready to stand before the throne of God and to give an account of your whole life" ("Naimylostyviishyi nash monarkh..." [1914], p. 96); and "Keep to [the Church] even if you should have to offer much for her, including your own lives" (Sheptytsky, "Ziishlysia my..." [1914], p. 232).

Sheptytsky would opt for loyalty to Austria over treason. And in expressing that loyalty in appeals to the faithful, he employed the powerful, familiar symbol of combined loyalties that had been cultivated for generations in the Austrian subject's mind.

Along with his endorsement of total loyalty in the war, Metropolitan Sheptytsky enacted emergency measures to regulate the internal life of the church. These measures of course had a religious and social thrust,²⁵⁷ but, no less importantly, they also reflected Sheptytsky's attitude toward the church's relations with the state in wartime. In his view, the crisis required the church directly to assist the state in mobilizing support for the war effort. Accordingly, in his pastoral letter of 29 July Sheptytsky instructed that, for the duration of the war, Sunday and feast-day liturgies were to be followed by special prayers for the emperor, the army, victory and peace. Priests were to assist the families of soldiers by seeing to it that they were informed about how to apply for wartime subsidies from the state. As well, the church would take it upon itself to cultivate a spirit of hope, patriotism, courage, and peace among the faithful, according to the Metropolitan's own words: "Those looking forward to certain and glorious victory have nothing to fear."²⁵⁸ But, beyond taking on such additional supporting tasks in response to the war, the Metropolitan implemented measures that subordinated some religious obligations to the war effort:

...during the war, as long as [agricultural] work in the fields requires it, the law of the Church—which prohibits hard work on Sundays and feast-days—is suspended. Likewise, as the need arises, priests are given the authority to grant absolution from fasts to those who request it.²⁵⁹

In Metropolitan Sheptytsky's view, therefore, the war had placed the church on a new footing in its relation to the state. The external threat was seen as

257. The religious and social measures included an order that, until the end of the war, Sunday and feast-day liturgies be followed by a special prayer service (*Vo vremia brany*) for victory and that they be concluded with supplications before the exposed Blessed Sacrament. In addition, access to churches would be increased by keeping them open in the evenings, and the faithful were to be encouraged to receive communion as often as possible. Finally, priests were directed to encourage the faithful to make donations through the archbishop's chancery to the Red Cross for the war wounded and to care for the families of those who went to war. Sheptytsky, "Naimylostyviishyi nash monarch..." (1914), p. 97.

258. Ibid.

259. Ibid. The church's voluntary subordination of some of its rights to the interests of the state was evident in another area as well: a priest's duty of residence was affirmed as a general rule, but was also subject to change, depending on the will of the civil authorities.

directed equally against the emperor, the state and the church—the very complex of loyalties that had shaped the church’s political consciousness in the Austrian context. The urgency of the situation required accommodation from the church, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky showed himself ready, in view of the crisis, to demonstrate solidarity with the state.

In the days that followed the outbreak of war, Ukrainian political attention was turned toward the Russian front. Sharing as he did the widely held view that an Austrian victory would result in the annexation of ethnically Ukrainian Russian-ruled lands,²⁶⁰ Metropolitan Sheptytsky wrote a memorandum to the Austrian government with proposals for an administration of the annexed territory that would ensure Ukrainian autonomy through a complete break with Russia.²⁶¹ Of the three areas of administration that he singled out—military, juridical, and ecclesiastical—it was the last that pertained to the Metropolitan’s views on church-state relations.

In essence, Sheptytsky proposed that the Orthodox Church in Ukraine be separated from the Russian Holy Synod in St. Petersburg. This would be achieved through a variety of measures, including the exemption of the Ukrainian church from the authority of St. Petersburg; the replacement of prayers for the Russian tsar with prayers for the Austrian emperor; the elimination of Russian saints from the liturgical calendar; and the replacement of bishops who refused to accept the new arrangement with others who would avow “Ukrainian and Austrian convictions.”²⁶²

On the surface, these changes may have appeared to amount to little more than a substitution of Austrian symbols for Russian ones. Certainly Metropolitan

260. Sheptytsky’s view of the potential geopolitical consequences of an Austrian victory was no doubt informed by the Ukrainian political opinion prevailing at the time in Galicia. Two weeks earlier, on 1 August 1914, a Supreme Ukrainian Council (Holovna Ukrainska Rada) was formed by members of the major Ukrainian political parties in Galicia. In a manifesto issued to the Ukrainian people on 3 August, the Council had declared: “The victory of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy will be our victory. The more severe the blow to Russia, the sooner the hour of Ukrainian liberation will arrive.... Let [Ukrainians] devote all their material and moral strength to destroying the historic enemy of Ukraine.” Cited in Kost' Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky halyts'kykh ukraïntsiiv, 1848–1914* (Lviv, 1926), p. 722.

261. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro memoria” (“Sobald eine siegreiche österreichische Armee...”) (Lviv, 15 August 1914), 5 pp. in MS. Vienna, Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Politische Abteilung 523, Liasse XLVII/11. We refer here to the English translation of this document, “Memorandum of Count Andrew Szeptycki, Uniate Metropolitan of Lviv,” in Osyp Kravcheniuk, *Veleten' zo Sviatoiurs'koï Hory* (Yorkton, 1963), pp. 121–24.

262. Sheptytsky, “Memorandum” (1914), p. 123.

Sheptytsky would have been motivated by his own pro-Ukrainian, pro-Austrian and pro-Catholic convictions. Yet he also objected to the Russian structure of ecclesiastical authority from another important perspective, namely, his perception of the type of church-state arrangement that existed in tsarist Russia. There, he felt, religious toleration was lacking; the clergy was involved in policing and political activities and had endured much at the hands of the Synod and the consistory.²⁶³ He therefore proposed that all those aspects of church-state relations be altered to conform with the Austrian model: religious toleration of all creeds would be entrenched within the legal system; the clergy would engage in activities of a purely ecclesiastical and Christian nature and would be freed from the “heavy yoke” of the Holy Synod.²⁶⁴

Moreover, Sheptytsky stipulated that all the reforms of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine should be carried out through ordinances issued by the church, not by the (Austrian) state. This would further promote the shift away from the Russian model of church-state relations, in which the church was completely subordinated to the state.²⁶⁵ That distinction was a crucial one, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky elaborated on it again in September 1914:

...they [Orthodox Christians in Russian Ukraine] call themselves “orthodox” and we [too] are “orthodox.” Our orthodoxy is ecclesiastical, while theirs is a state faith (*kaz'onne*). That is, they base their orthodoxy on the power of the state, while we derive strength from our unity with the holy Catholic Church, through which God's grace is mediated and in which the true source of salvation is found.²⁶⁶

Thus, despite accommodations by the Greek Catholic Church that Sheptytsky accepted as necessary and legitimate in view of the war effort, the sovereignty of the church's jurisdiction over matters of the faith and salvation remained for him the cornerstone of church-state relations in Austria. By that same criterion, Sheptytsky judged the church-state arrangement in Russia completely unacceptable.

263. Ibid., pp. 122–23. Rallying his people in his pastoral of 24 August, Sheptytsky again referred to the issue of religious liberty as a crucial point of contention in the conflict: “The war is being fought over us, because the tsar in Moscow could not stand that we in the Austrian state have religious and national freedom; he wants to tear it from us and put us in irons.” Sheptytsky, “Prevazhna—dorohi—khvyliia...” (1914), p. 99.

264. Sheptytsky, “Memorandum” (1914), pp. 122–23.

265. “All these decrees must proceed from the spiritual rather than the civil or military authorities, so that in this way a complete breach might be made with the Russian system. The establishment of a system corresponding to that of St. Petersburg would clearly be inappropriate.” Sheptytsky, “Memorandum” (1914), p. 123.

266. Sheptytsky, “Ziishlysia my...” (1914), pp. 231–32.

The Ukrainian Catholic Church in Austrian Galicia had entered the twentieth century with a strong tradition of loyalty to the empire. However, as socialists began to vie for, and attain, elected office in Vienna, the traditional loyalty symbol of a Christian emperor was displaced by the pluralistic reality of non-Christian and anticlerical legislators. In this situation, while still remaining loyal to the *person* of the emperor, Metropolitan Sheptytsky found it necessary to restate his church's understanding of the separation of powers between the church and the Austrian state, and to list the rights to which the church felt entitled within the political order, as well as the duties it felt called to perform in the socio-political sphere. This reflection, carried out against the backdrop of social and political change during the pre-war period, took Sheptytsky from an accommodationist stance, submissive and preferring a *modus vivendi* with the state, to a more critical, self-affirming posture, intent on defending Christian social values and opposing the usurpation of the church's authority by the state.²⁶⁷ In Sheptytsky's view, the whole configuration of church-state relations was undergoing a radical change that reflected the secular and anticlerical trends in society. However, far from diminishing the Metropolitan's perception of the church's social role as a guardian of morality, its new aloofness from the state only reinforced his resolve to pursue that worldly mission with renewed vigor:

Long ago, the Church of Christ, in order to lead people to salvation, would turn to the worldly powers for support and assistance. Those times are gone forever. The powers of this world, governments and states, have turned away from the Church and are making alliances with its enemies. Deprived of the single element of order in the world (that is, of morality), they are hurling themselves headlong into abysses where they will perish, unless the Church—which, when persecuted, conquers and, as it conquers, raises up its opponent—extends a helping hand and saves society from annihilation.²⁶⁸

As in the case of its struggle against socialism, the church's dispute with the secular state centred on the question of whether religion was to be recognized as a public matter or restricted to private life. A key concern here was with religious freedom—that the church be allowed freely to fulfill its function in public life as teacher of the faith. This, in effect, was a *sine qua non* for maintaining church-state harmony. In 1913, on the 1600th anniversary of

267. Another issue that Metropolitan Sheptytsky cited as an instance of invalid state interference in the jurisdiction of the church was that of transfer of rite. In a 1904 pastoral to Polish-speaking Greek Catholics, Sheptytsky reminded them: "A change of rite that is registered with the civil authority cannot be recognized by the authority of the Church. It is unlawful and illegal (*nieprawna i nielegalna*)." Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki, *Do Polaków obrządku grecko-katolickiego* (Zhovkva, 1904), p. 15.

268. Sheptytsky, "Besida" (1906), p. 67.

Constantine's Edict of Toleration, the Metropolitan and his fellow bishops interpreted that act as follows:

The gospel was victorious. And through its victory in the souls of the converts, having changed their customs and transformed their private lives, it immediately acquired a powerful influence over public matters. Under the influence of the Church, the state's legislation changed in a few short years. In a series of edicts and decrees, the Emperor Constantine himself gave the sanction of state law to various customs and laws of the Church. Thus what had seemed impossible came to pass: the influence of the Church transformed the social order of the state.²⁶⁹

Metropolitan Sheptytsky acknowledged, though perhaps not without a touch of historical nostalgia, that the days of near-perfect harmony between church and state along the lines of the Constantinian model were indeed gone forever. But his fundamental conviction that the Christian life was a public matter, and not just a private one, remained unaltered. The issue of religious freedom, which was coming to the fore with increasing frequency in Austrian Galicia, was, he felt, as much of a social ideal for the Greek Catholic Church in the first decade of the twentieth century as it had been for Christians in the Roman Empire sixteen centuries earlier.

As a result of the war, the church's central concern in its relations with the state shifted from the protection of religious rights to the fundamental attitude toward the war effort. In view of deep-seated religious, ethnic and imperial attachments, it was scarcely surprising that Metropolitan Sheptytsky should have sided with Austria. Yet, above and beyond those attachments, his option for Austria was also informed by his reflection on the difference between the Austrian and the Russian models of church-state relations. Comparing the two on their own merits, and finding the Russian model wanting, the Metropolitan revealed his main concern in church-state relations—that a state should guarantee the church freedom to exercise its authority in religious matters without interference from civil authorities.

Following his sermon on 6 September 1914, in which he criticized the Russian model of church-state relations (and, by implication, the attempts to transplant that tradition to Galicia), Metropolitan Sheptytsky was arrested by the occupying Russian forces. On 18 September, he was sent into exile in Russia, where he would remain until his release in 1917.

269. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., *O luvyleiu svobody Tserkvy* ("I prystupl' Isus...") (Zhovkva, 1913), p. 11.

The Church and Patriotism

One of the most complex social issues that Metropolitan Sheptytsky faced in the pre-World War I period was the conflict between the patriotisms of the two dominant ethnic groups in Galicia, the Poles and the Ukrainians. At the turn of the century, Austrian Galicia, the territory in which the Ukrainian (Greek Catholic) Archeparchy of Lviv was situated, was inhabited by some 7 million people, 46% of whom identified themselves as Poles and 42% as Ukrainians.²⁷⁰ The eastern part of Galicia (east of the Sian River), the location of the Greek Catholic Archeparchy of Lviv, was predominantly Ukrainian: 65% Ukrainian to 25% Polish.²⁷¹ By the end of the nineteenth century, tensions between the two ethnic groups mounted, as Ukrainian political consciousness began to assert itself and come into increasing conflict with established Polish interests.²⁷² In the religious sphere, Sheptytsky considered that throughout the history of his church's union with Rome the Ukrainian people had acquired a hatred for any attempt, whether from the Polish or the Ukrainian side, to use that ecclesiastical unity as a basis for achieving the political unity of the two peoples.²⁷³

270. Andrii Zhuk, *Suspil'no-ekonomichni vidnosyny v Halychyni i kul'turno-ekonomichna pratsia halyts'kykh ukraïntsiiv* (Lviv, 1911), pp. 4–5. The proportions reflect figures from the census of 1900 for religious self-identification: i.e., Polish Roman Catholics to Ukrainian Greek Catholics. Although denominational affiliation was not always the same as ethnic affiliation (i.e., some Poles were Greek Catholic, while some Ukrainians were Roman Catholic), another indicator of ethnic self-identification in the same census, native language, yielded a similar proportion of Poles to Ukrainians in Galicia; in that category, 54% of Galicians considered Polish their mother tongue, while 42% named Ukrainian.

271. Zhuk, *Suspil'no-ekonomichni vidnosyny*, pp. 4–5. The proportional ethnic composition of eastern Galicia given here is also based on religious self-identification figures from the census of 1900. The figures are corroborated by I. Sukhodol's'kyi, "Uriadova statystyka Skhidnoi Halychyny," *Narodnii Kalendar Tov. "Prosvita" za zvyych. rik 1921* (Lviv, 1921), p. 196.

272. Despite the awakening of Ukrainian nationalism and the bare majority of Poles in Galicia, Austria favoured the Poles to such an extent that an eminent historian has referred to the province as a "Polish monopoly." See A. J. P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809–1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary* (London, 1967), p. 218. For example, in 1871, the Poles had established effective administrative control of the province through a special Minister for Galician Affairs. And in 1899, a declaration of German aims (the Whitsuntide program) had included a proposal to recognize the province's Polish "historic nationality" with its own official language. Moreover, the electoral law in Galicia was structured in a way that guaranteed Polish political control in the region.

273. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Rapport au Père Gennochi" ("J'accepte avec grande reconnaissance..."), *ERSS-LGE*, pp. 20–22 (1: 76–78).

Realizing that the Greek Catholic Church was a key institution in Galician society, Ukrainian political circles looked to it for moral support and were prepared to criticize it harshly whenever they judged that such support was too slow in coming. Metropolitan Sheptytsky was sensitive to their concerns and gave clear indications of his favourable attitude to Ukrainian patriotism from the very outset of his episcopate. In 1899, he assessed favourably the patriotism of Ukrainian Catholic priests; in his opinion, they showed their love for the people by their work and self-sacrifice.²⁷⁴ Two years later, in a pastoral letter to the Ukrainian intelligentsia, he praised the patriotism of Ukrainian youth: "Our guarantee of success is the youthful and strong patriotism that is manifesting itself to a greater extent among our people than among those who have already, as it were, worn it out with the work and struggles of ages."²⁷⁵

Sheptytsky was aware that some doubted the sincerity of the Greek Catholic Church's commitment to Ukrainian patriotism. In his reading, they were "the enemies of the teachings of Christ" (i.e., socialists), who mistakenly believed that the church, "...by rubbing out the differences between peoples, is striving toward internationalism; that it is indifferent to a person's fulfillment of patriotic duties; and that good Christians make poor patriots."²⁷⁶ For indeed, in the church's struggle with socialism, the issue of national pride was a veritable bone of contention. Noting that the socialists were quite adept at "adorning their theories with patriotism,"²⁷⁷ the Metropolitan objected to what he felt were abuses of the notion of patriotism. He noted such instances in the press:

In our times, when in the daily press people sin so often against love of neighbour, the general moral opinions on that matter are so erroneous that, under the guise of patriotism and civic duties, the ugly habit of speaking ill of others is concealed.²⁷⁸

From a theological perspective, such abuses of the virtue of patriotism were a matter of concern to the Metropolitan inasmuch as they fomented hatred and contravened the law of love. In 1906, the Greek Catholic bishops of Galicia condemned the "lack of love..., the injustice and hatred" that they were seeing.²⁷⁹ Nor were Polish-Ukrainian tensions the only instance of the problem; disagreements over patriotism were also an internal problem that could set

274. Bishop Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pershe Slovo Pastyria" ("Isus Khrystos, vruchaiuchy..."), in 02-65, p. 17.

275. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Do ukraïns'koï inteligentsii" ("V lysti pastyrs'kim..."), in 02-65, p. 213.

276. Sheptytsky, "Pershe Slovo Pastyria," in 02-65, p. 17.

277. Sheptytsky et al., "Rik mynaie vid khvyli..." (1906), p. 12.

278. Sheptytsky et al., *O solidarnosty* (1905), p. 15.

279. Sheptytsky et al., "Rik mynaie vid khvyli..." (1906), p. 12.

Ukrainian against Ukrainian (as we have seen in the section on priests and politics). In 1907, Metropolitan Andrei, together with the other Ukrainian Catholic bishops, observed: “The greatest misfortune of our people and our clergy is that there is such a polarity of opinions about the concept of nationality that some consider others to be their enemies.”²⁸⁰

Sheptytsky therefore perceived the issue of patriotism as both a social and a religious problem. From a social point of view, it was a source of antagonism that pitted Ukrainians against Poles in a struggle for social and political justice. As for its religious aspect, distorted views of patriotism were threatening to draw Christians away from the fundamental law of their faith and were being used to support anti-clerical charges that Christianity was incompatible with patriotism.

In developing an official response to the issue of Ukrainian patriotism, Metropolitan Sheptytsky looked first of all to gospel teaching. In the figures of Christ and St. Paul, he saw examples that merited attention:

Christ, who said of himself that he came ‘only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel’ (Mt. 15:24); Christ, who wept because he foresaw the destruction of Jerusalem; and, after him, Paul the Apostle, who was ready to give up his life for his brothers in blood—they truly loved their people. And not only did they not forbid patriotism; they cultivated it.²⁸¹

But evangelical patriotism was not an exclusive form of love, directed only to one’s own and withheld from others. Sheptytsky noted that, whereas the pagan patriotism of the Greeks and Romans saw foreigners not as brothers but as barbarians, and the Jews of the Old Testament taught that enemies were to be hated, the Christian was obliged to love everyone, including his enemies.²⁸² Nor did this universal application of the Christian law of love contradict or dilute patriotism in any way. The alleged incompatibility of Christianity and patriotism was in fact a misrepresentation; from a Christian standpoint, there was nothing wrong with love of one’s country. On the contrary, as the Metropolitan observed, “The Christian can and should be a patriot.”²⁸³

280. Sheptytsky et al., “Khotiai pered poslidnimy...” (1907), p. 15.

281. Sheptytsky, “Pershe Slovo Pastyria,” in 02–65, p. 17.

282. Ibid. The cited scriptural passage was Mt. 5:44.

283. Ibid. This did not, however, exclude a priority of loves. The Metropolitan thus spoke of the love of one’s country as prior to other forms of community-oriented love: “A Christian must love all people. But this in no way prevents him from loving his family and his country with his first love (*naipershoiu liubov’iu liubyty*)” (ibid.). The same synthesis of universal and particular concerns was restated in the Metropolitan’s prayer for the Ukrainian people: “We the children of the Ruthenian people, in obedience to Your holy will, love all the peoples whom You redeemed with Your Blood on the Cross, and we love our own Ruthenian people first and foremost.” Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky,

When in 1904 the Polish member of parliament Kozłowski launched a campaign to “save a million Poles who were threatened by Ruthenianization,” that is, Ukrainization within the Greek Catholic Church, Metropolitan Sheptytsky wrote a unique pastoral letter to the Polish Greek Catholics of his Archdiocese.²⁸⁴ In it, he gave a further clarification of his understanding of Christian patriotism in a multi-ethnic environment:

...I want you to know that I respect your convictions and that I am far from imposing Ruthenian patriotism upon you. It is perhaps those who do not understand what the priesthood and the episcopal office are who suspect me of that. Indeed, I care for only one thing: that your life be Christian, that you be Christ's own (*Chrystusowymi*) in the full meaning of the word...

Language, convictions, ethnic identity: those are goods and rights that no one may ever take away. To respect them is a plain duty according to justice...

I can only encourage you in your patriotic convictions, insofar as that patriotism is a Christian love of the homeland and proceeds from a love of God and neighbour.²⁸⁵

Such an understanding of Christian patriotism was not reducible to narrow nationalism; one's particular choice of ethnic identity simply did not enter into the ethical discussion. Christian patriotism was framed within a supranational perspective that provided no basis for objecting, for example, to the Polish ethnic affiliation that some members of the Greek Catholic community had chosen to accept.

Sheptytsky was in a position to bring a unique sensitivity to the issue, for he himself, now a Greek Catholic archbishop of the Ukrainians, had been raised as a Polish Roman Catholic. But by the time he began to write pastoral letters on the subject, his thinking had progressed from the personal level of his own transition and had allowed him to adopt a fundamental ethical stance regarding patriotism and ethnic identity in general. In his moral assessment of particular instances of patriotism, the Metropolitan was more concerned with its compatibility with Christian love than with making value judgments about the ethnic self-identification of individuals. Since he considered ethnic identity a fundamental, inalienable right, from a Christian point of view the only legitimate question that could be asked about a person's patriotism was whether it proceeded from Christian love.

Another important element of discernment in Sheptytsky's approach to the question of patriotism was the *via negativa* path to Christian love, namely, the

“Molytva za ruskyi narid,” in his *Bozha Siiba* (Zhovkva, 1913), p. 130.

284. Andrzej Zięba, “Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki,” *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 92 (1986): 892.

285. Szeptycki, *Do Polaków* (1904), pp. 6–7.

avoidance of hatred. As love (specifically, that which was linked with love of God and neighbour) was a Christian requirement or test for the authenticity of patriotism, so too hatred was a sign of false patriotism. The Metropolitan often employed this motif in exhortations to his Ukrainian and Polish faithful alike. In 1899, he instructed the faithful of the Stanyslaviv eparchy to “...love what is yours, keep to it and care for it. But beware of hatred, for it is an unchristian sentiment”; also, “[A Christian’s] patriotism cannot be hatred. Nor can it place duties upon him that are opposed to the faith. Whatever appears to be patriotism but in fact is hatred or runs counter to the faith is not true patriotism.”²⁸⁶ And he reiterated the prohibition of hatred in his pastoral letter to the Polish Greek Catholics: “All hatred is wrong because it is contrary to God’s and Christ’s commandment and human nature”; and: “A Christian is obliged to love his native land and to care for the good of his people. Only one thing is forbidden: he is not allowed to hate, even under the guise of patriotism...”²⁸⁷

The Christian patriot, then, remained first and foremost a Christian, bound by the law of love; he avoided hatred inasmuch it was an “unchristian sentiment.” Implicit in that message was the operative distinction between true patriotism, which adhered to the law of love, and false patriotism, which did not. The love/hatred variable was, in effect, a criterion of discernment whereby instances of patriotism could be ethically identified and assessed by Christians: “Whether [it is] class hatred or national hatred, whether it is masked by appearances of fervor and patriotism, or motivated by either real or apparent injuries, every hatred is always unchristian.”²⁸⁸

Since patriotism was not merely an individual matter, but a collective one as well, it became necessary for the church to articulate its own position concerning it. Metropolitan Sheptytsky approached the question by speaking of two characteristic features of the Catholic Church—cosmopolitanism (or universality) and particularity. The church was cosmopolitan, or international, in that its aim was the salvation of all people, the good of all the nations of the world and at all times. The church stood for a truth and culture that were universal and to which no nation had the right to lay exclusive claim. By virtue of those universal principles and absolute truth, the church stood above historical and cultural

286. Sheptytsky, “Pershe Slovo Pastyria,” in 02–65, pp. 18 and 17, respectively. The same message was echoed in another context in 1907: “Christians are permitted to join together and organize for the defence of their rights in order to improve their temporal destiny, but they would sin if jealousy or hatred were to be the motive of their conduct, their unity, their organization.” Sheptytsky et al., *O vyborakh* (1907), p. 9.

287. Szeptycki, *Do Polaków* (1904), p. 7.

288. *OSQ* 10: 28.

differences.²⁸⁹ In answer to charges that the Greek Catholic Church was unable to serve the Ukrainian people because of its submission to foreign (i.e., Vatican) influences, Sheptytsky responded that it was the way of all culture to “accept all human achievements that promote the progress of truth and the good.” Moreover, by virtue of its divine nature and origin, the church could not be subordinated or reduced to the level of a national organization, for:

When it is understood as a purely national institution that embraces only one people and separates that people from all others, the Church becomes an instrument that supports schism; it incites nationalistic passions and collaborates in the oppression of other nations. [Such a Church] promotes conflict, not peace; division, not unification, and thus is not the Church of Christ.²⁹⁰

The church could adapt some of its external features in order to answer to the needs of time and space; for example, by modifying its hierarchical structure or in applying its teaching to actual human relations, but its essence—the revealed truth, universal love, the sacraments, and the divine nature of the church—was immutable and indeed had not changed in nineteen centuries. Sheptytsky clearly considered this stable inner nature a reliable criterion for discerning the true church. As a function of its divine nature, the church had the power to promote the social good in particular contexts and times. That power was evident when the church induced the Roman emperors to bow to Christ and give up their pagan morality, when it abolished slavery and servitude in almost all states, and when it “enlightened the dark, barbarian hordes and preserved knowledge from destruction.”²⁹¹ Sheptytsky also saw that same power present within the work of the church in his own time, exerting its “ennobling influence” on all humanity. In its unchangeable essence, then, the church’s work had a social thrust.

The other side of the church was its particularity, the human side of its activity, in which it adapted itself locally to the needs of individual peoples. This it did by promoting the social and cultural development that was part of nation-building. In the cultural sphere, the Ukrainian Catholic Church promoted the use of the vernacular through translations of the Bible, the Divine Liturgy, and the works of the Church Fathers; its advancement of education served to develop literature and, through it, a national culture; its promotion of ecclesiastical art and music served to develop all the fine arts; its cultivation of a national (i.e., patriotic) spirit and its commitment to the Eastern rite reinforced the sense of a Ukrainian identity among the people.²⁹² In the social sphere, Sheptytsky was

289. Bishop Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pravdyva Vira” (“U travni, ts’oho roku...”) (1900), in 02–65, p. 65.

290. Ibid., p. 66.

291. Ibid.

292. Ibid., pp. 66–67. In his pastoral letter to Polish Greek Catholics, Sheptytsky again

committed to implementing within the Ukrainian Catholic Church the same principles of justice and love that characterized the universal Church: “By removing and overcoming all that is opposed to natural law and harmful to humanity, [the Church] contributes to the moral health of every nation and, indirectly, to the development of all national energies.”²⁹³

In Galicia, the Metropolitan argued, the Greek Catholic Church had been actively involved in Ukrainian social advancement. It had introduced education “to even the most neglected” Ruthenian village; it promoted sobriety, concord and love; it drew people away from lawsuits and supported every good initiative—whether educational or economic—in every village.²⁹⁴ The church’s work in the cultural and social spheres left no doubt in the Metropolitan’s mind that, while remaining unchanged in its universal essence, the institution was truly on the side of the Ukrainian people. Thus, the Christian synthesis of cosmopolitanism and national particularity was expressed succinctly: “love all but keep to what is yours.”²⁹⁵

It was from this understanding of Christian patriotism that Metropolitan Sheptytsky responded to Polish-Ukrainian tensions in pre-war Austrian Galicia. Three occasions that called for its practical implementation were the assassination of the Polish viceroy Potocki, the electoral reform issue, and a public debate on the paths to peaceful Polish-Ukrainian coexistence.

On 12 April 1908, almost two months after violence had erupted in the course of provincial elections, the Ukrainian student Myroslav Sichynsky shot to death the Polish viceroy for Galicia, Andrzej Potocki. Twelve days later, Metropolitan Sheptytsky condemned the act in his Good Friday sermon at St. George’s Cathedral:

That public crime must be publicly condemned. It must evoke a decisive and vehement protest from Christians, a protest of indignation and disgust at such an affront to the light of divine law. And we have a particular duty to condemn the crime that has been committed, since its perpetrator thought in his blindness that he would thereby serve the national cause. For God’s sake, that is not so! One does not serve a people with crimes; a crime committed in the name of patriotism is a crime not only before God but also against one’s own community and one’s

singled out language, convictions and ethnic identity (*narodowość*) as inalienable rights and assured them that he would respect those rights. Szeptycki, *Do Polaków* (1904), p. 6. 293. Sheptytsky, “Pravdyva Vira” (1900), p. 67.

294. Ibid., p. 68.

295. Sheptytsky et al., *O reformi vybornoho prava* (1913), p. 6. The cited Ukrainian precept (“Maite do vsikh liubov, ale svoho derzhit’ sia”) closely resembled a popular couplet from the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko: “Study other [heritages], but do not forsake your own.”

fatherland.²⁹⁶

The Metropolitan recognized that, beyond the strictly moral question of homicide, the event had also had an immediate impact on Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian press and political leaders generally saw the assassination in direct relation to social and political injustices suffered by Galician Ukrainians, and many portrayed it as a heroic and virtuous act of patriotism.²⁹⁷ In turn, the Ukrainian church was being accused of a lack of patriotism. Aware that under the circumstances any criticism was likely to be branded as unpatriotic, Sheptytsky chose not limit himself to a condemnation of only the assassination. The issue could not be effectively addressed by referring only to the intrinsic ethical evil of homicide; the social dimension of the crime had to be challenged as well. Thus, both in his sermon and in a subsequent collective pastoral letter of the Greek Catholic hierarchy, he levelled a full-fledged critique at popular Ukrainian perceptions of the assassination. While condemning it as a grave social sin that was closely allied with atheism and amorality in politics (*polityka bez Boha; dumaty, shcho v politytsi vse vil'no*),²⁹⁸ the statement was phrased in a way that would avow a patriotic commitment of its own. In particular, the bishops took explicit account of social injustices that had been visited upon Ukrainians:

We are aware that in public life today not everything is proceeding according to the requirements of strict justice and the intent of the divine law of love of neighbour. We are aware of the collective and individual disregard of our people [that occurs] often and in many ways.

Together with you, we feel all the pain and suffering of our people; together with you we want to work and are working as much as we can toward improving our people's destiny.²⁹⁹

The message was clear: the bishops' objections to the assassination did not amount to a renunciation of the Ukrainian cause or siding with the Poles, but proceeded from both Christian and patriotic convictions. The bishops addressed

296. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, Good Friday sermon 1908, quoted in Mykhailo Demkovych-Dobrians'kyi, "Potots'kyi i Bobzhyns'kyi—tsisars'ki namisnyky Halychyny, 1903–1913," part 2, *Bohosloviia* 46 (1982): 115.

297. According to Ukrainian Radical Party member of parliament Kyrylo Tryliovsky, the Ukrainian public was quite receptive to such an image: "All the Ruthenians I spoke to—peasants, workers, officials and even gentry—were almost inspired by Sichynsky's act... Most Ukrainians consider Sichynsky a national hero." [Kyrylo Tryl'ovs'kyi], *Potots'kyi, Sichyns'kyi, Sheptyts'kyi: Promova posla dr. Tryl'ovs'koho...* (Kolomyia, 1908), pp. 47–48.

298. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., "My vzhe neraz..." (Zhovkva, 1908), pp. 4–5. The non-Christian press was directly blamed for this (*ibid.*, p. 10).

299. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

two issues in their critique: in their capacity as citizens and patriots, they condemned injustices against Ukrainians, but as pastors responsible for souls, they felt obliged to “object even more to whatever is a moral evil or a moral danger to the task of your salvation, which has been entrusted to us.”³⁰⁰ The assassination was just such an evil—a “heinous crime,” a “trampling on the divine law in public,” and a scandal to the faithful. Accordingly, the bishops protested against it both as Christians and as Ukrainians:

If as Christians and bishops we raise a voice of disgust at the sight of the crime that has been committed and the divine law that has been trampled on, then even more vehemently as Ruthenians [i.e., Ukrainians] we must loudly and decisively protest against the notion that it is possible to serve one’s native land with crimes, insults to God, scorn of Christ and the trampling of divine law.

No, a hundred times: no. Service to one’s people and country is a sacred service, and is also offered up to God; in order to undertake it, one must have clean, not bloodied, hands.

After God, a man’s country is [his] most sacred thing; and, after the love of God, love of country is the noblest, highest and best sentiment. The desire to serve one’s country through lawlessness is like staining white garments with blood and mud...³⁰¹

Condemning both the crime and its association with patriotism, the statement was a defence of authentic Christian patriotism. From a social point of view, the popularization of the crime had “debased the virtue of patriotism and undermined the moral foundations of work for [the good of] society;” it represented the transformation of noble, patriotic sentiments into something the church could never condone, “an abominable feeling of hatred and anger,”³⁰² an “ill-conceived and material patriotism.”³⁰³ Moreover, the popularization of the crime had potentially far-reaching social implications, and the bishops pointed out its inherent fundamental error: “Praising the sins of others, approving of sin, defending sin, or abetting sin will always be a sin in politics.”³⁰⁴ In the particular context, the error represented a subversion of moral categories and of the Christian fabric of society and was evident in:

...the false and dangerous teaching that in politics everything is permissible and that politics should not be guided by divine law. From this, it follows that they are always ready to praise and defend every crime and every injustice. They are even ready to portray the crime as heroic, virtuous and sacred. No confusion of

300. Ibid., p. 6.

301. Ibid., p. 7.

302. Ibid., p. 8.

303. Ibid., p. 10.

304. Ibid., p. 5.

concepts could possibly be more harmful...³⁰⁵

There were three key points. First, the assassination had to be criticized on both Christian and patriotic grounds. Second, a Christian perspective was not incompatible with patriotism; on the contrary, the crucial distinction was between true patriotism (which, being grounded in Christian faith and morality, did not allow hatred) and the false patriotism of those who rejected any superior moral authority in social and political affairs. And third, homicide either committed or extolled in the name of patriotism was still homicide; it was as much a perversion of the noble virtue of true patriotism and a threat to the good of society as it was a violation of divine law.

The Metropolitan believed that at the root of much of the conflict of patriotisms were the inveterate injustices in the Galician electoral system.³⁰⁶ In a 1913 pastoral on electoral reform, he declared with his fellow bishops that social justice was the most important guiding principle for such a reform. Consequently, in order to restore the Christian foundations of social life in Galicia, all forms of deceit, bribery and other illegalities that had become common would have to be eliminated:

As long as that principle [of justice] is not strictly implemented, there can be no order in the land. The least injustice in the social order by its very nature causes dissatisfaction and becomes an occasion for electoral abuses, which only corrupt people and feed the flames of fratricidal hatred, that veritable plague of the Christian life.³⁰⁷

This was a defence of the right to convictions of another sort—political convictions. To sell or impose them, whether with or without violence, was not only an indication of a lack of character, but also a grave sin.³⁰⁸ In seeking harmony between Poles and Ukrainians, the bishops expressed the hope that the parliamentary representatives of the Poles “would find a way to keep their word without exposing to danger the Catholic faith and Church among the Polish

305. Ibid., pp. 10–11.

306. Among the sources of Ukrainian dissatisfaction were: the electoral law of 1906, which they felt reduced their rights in provincial elections by limiting their number of mandates (to 28 of 106); the existence of “two-mandate” ridings, whose purpose even Polish sources admitted was to prevent Ukrainian representatives from outnumbering Poles in the rural areas; and the rigging of elections by the Polish authorities, which in the 1908 elections resulted in the election of eight Russophiles. Demkovych-Dobrians'kyi, “Potots'kyi i Bobzhyns'kyi,” p. 91; Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia politychnoi dunky*, pp. 468–69.

307. Sheptytsky et al., *O reformi vybornoho prava* (1913), p. 2.

308. Ibid., p. 3.

people.”³⁰⁹ Recognizing the importance of political factors in resolving the Polish-Ukrainian problem, they felt that the precondition for a meaningful agreement would be visible progress by Ukrainian and Polish politicians in electoral reform. For “the quarrels between us have already lasted too long” and the task of fraternal peace was “sacred.”³¹⁰

When in January 1914 a Polish-Ukrainian agreement for electoral reform ran into new difficulties and a deadlock seemed imminent, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was invited to address an ad hoc meeting of elected representatives from all parties. The Metropolitan’s proposal for a new compromise agreement consisted of three points,³¹¹ yet far more telling was the shift of perspective to which he called the politicians of both ethnic groups. Convinced that, in order for an agreement to be reached, ethnic divisions would have to be transcended, he tried to set an example and approach the issue by stepping outside his own ethnic identity:

Permit me to forget, as it were, that I am a Ruthenian Metropolitan and to take the common position in the province so as to help incline, with God’s help, both sides to shake hands and become reconciled in this matter. Then, God willing, we will walk together peacefully in many other matters.³¹²

In fact, the Metropolitan believed strongly enough in the need for such a preliminary, personal distancing that he urged the assembled politicians also to adopt the new perspective:

Gentlemen, in order to accomplish the blessed task, raise yourselves above the impressions of the current moment, which are so unpleasant to you. Let [even] justified personal grudges not obscure your view of the historical significance of an agreement between the two peoples in a matter of such importance to our province. We have lived for ages in this land, where we are bound by the link of common issues, shared needs and misfortunes. Let us set aside that struggle and, together and today, lay the cornerstone of the development of both peoples and of a better future for the whole land.³¹³

309. Ibid., p. 4.

310. Ibid.

311. The proposals were: first, that the Ukrainian parties agree to a proportion of 2:8 as the structure of the provincial government (*sklad kraievoho vydilu*), while provincial commissions and institutions would reflect the same proportion of ethnic representatives as were elected to parliament; second, that the Polish parties agree to a reduction of two-seat electoral ridings (*dvomandatovi okruhy*) from 16 to 12; and third, that Polish parties agree to reopen talks on the question of establishing a Ukrainian university. Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky*, pp. 42–43.

312. Ibid., p. 42.

313. Ibid., p. 43.

The Metropolitan proposed this new perspective in the interest of achieving long-term harmony between the Poles and Ukrainians who lived in the same land. He saw the value of a settlement on electoral reform as going far beyond the immediate issue at hand. Indeed, if agreement were achieved according to his proposal, the Metropolitan was convinced that it could be the first step toward a new understanding between Poles and Ukrainians and a basis for further cooperation and normalization of relations.³¹⁴ Such an outcome became a real possibility on 28 January, when representatives of Polish and Ukrainian parties to the provincial diet signed an agreement based on the Metropolitan's proposal. Unfortunately, the plan was shelved later in the year because of the outbreak of war.

In April 1914, the Cracow-based Polish Catholic periodical *Przegląd Powszechny* announced a survey requesting reader response to the question: "Beyond the controversial Polish-Ukrainian question, what matters are common to both peoples and by what means could mutual cooperation be realized in such matters?" Metropolitan Sheptytsky responded to the survey with a short letter that shed further light on his understanding of Christian patriotism. He began by pointing out a common error, that of regarding patriotism "as an absolute virtue, as something intrinsically good and noble."³¹⁵ Since many things went under the popular heading of "patriotism," the Metropolitan felt that it was vital to distinguish between abuses of the term (i.e., "pagan patriotism" or "national egoism...which are currently spreading like a disease") and authentic, Christian patriotism. He believed that, although the Christian idea of love of neighbour had more or less penetrated human consciousness at the individual level, international relations were still governed by a "cannibalistic," dog-eat-dog morality, according to which "it is all right for me to devour my neighbour, but not all right for him to devour me."³¹⁶ In fact, such so-called "patriotism" was not patriotism at all, but egoism, and was but one instance of a corruption to which, ultimately, every form of love was susceptible. As the Metropolitan explained:

Every feeling, desire, disposition, every love of the human heart lies on a line (to put it geometrically), one end of which reaches down into the abyss of passion and lawlessness, while the other rises into the limitless expanses of the Kingdom of God...

As with one's love of oneself, so too with love of family or country: [each of these] is in every heart a point on that line and is closer to either one or the other

314. Ibid.

315. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Bez wątpienia..." in "Z ankiety polsko-ruskiej 'Przeglądu Powszechnego,'" *Przegląd Powszechny* 129, no. 385 (January 1916), p. 100. Although written in 1914, the letter was not published until 1916 because of the war.

316. Ibid., p. 101.

end.³¹⁷

For Metropolitan Andrei, the bane of every form of love was egoism, and it could take on very subtle forms that made it difficult to distinguish from authentic love. Distorting the individual moral life, egoism was hidden more deeply and was therefore even more dangerous in its social form, where it became a distortion of the social virtue of patriotism.³¹⁸ In the Metropolitan's estimation, therefore, the way toward the improvement of Polish-Ukrainian relations lay not so much in the search for agreement on one or another issue, but rather in a conversion of social attitudes—the replacement of what he considered an essentially pagan social morality of national egoism with a Christian patriotism rooted in an authentic Christian love for all peoples.

What emerges very clearly from these three instances of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's practical reflection on patriotism in the Polish-Ukrainian context is his commitment to an enduring settlement. The condemnation of the Potocki assassination, for which he was severely criticized by many Ukrainians,³¹⁹ indicated that his view of Christian patriotism was rooted in an authentically Christian ethic rather than in narrow nationalism. Nor did the critique proceed from a legalistic moralism that would judge only individual acts while ignoring their social context and implications: Metropolitan Sheptytsky was convinced that it was as dangerous for a society to praise homicide as it was for an individual to commit it. As the subsequent polarization of the two national groups confirmed, the path of violence was ultimately self-defeating. Sheptytsky's alternative proposal of a Christian basis for patriotism meant working toward lasting peace and justice along a path of love. His contribution to the electoral reform debate also showed his concern for placing individual disagreements within a broader perspective, that of the search for a long-term solution to

317. Ibid., p. 100.

318. Ibid.

319. In addition to numerous press attacks, Ukrainian politicians levelled criticism at Sheptytsky in the Austrian parliament. See [Tryl'ovs'kyi], *Potots'kyi, Sichyns'kyi*; and Mykhailo Lozyns'kyi, "Mitteilungen aus der österreichischen Ukraina," in "Interpellation des Abgeordneten Stefanyk und Genossen an Seine Exzellenz den Herrn Justizminister...," *Anhang zu den stenographischen Protokollen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des österreichischen Reichsrates im Jahre 1908*, 96 Sitzung der XVIII Session am 26 Juni 1908 (Vienna, 1908), pp. 10898–10904. An intriguingly original perspective is Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, "Krov," in *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* 42, no. 5 (1908): 380–85, which not only condemned homicide in all its forms, but also lamented the rash of suicides among Ukrainian youth in the early months of 1908, which the author attributed to political causes.

Polish-Ukrainian relations. As he saw it, the driving force behind negotiations on particular issues had to be a shared desire for the ultimate goal of justice. And that could only be achieved in a spirit of Christian patriotism, since it provided the courage to step outside the national bias that one brought to the debate. Finally, the letter to *Przegląd Powszechny* drove home an important point: the solution to the Polish-Ukrainian question was not to be sought only in the examination and weighing of the respective interests and claims of each side. The real problem, to Sheptytsky's mind, was a crisis of patriotism. He therefore believed that the essential requirement for achieving stable and lasting social harmony was a transformation of consciousness: the replacement of national egoisms with genuine Christian patriotism.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social thought and teaching during the period 1899–1914 was essentially focused within four areas: the social action of the church, in which he affirmed spiritual values in contradistinction to the materialistic approach of socialism; the political participation of priests, where he emphasized the primacy of the priestly ministry; church-state relations, in which he tried to balance fundamental loyalty with the competing concern for the protection of Christian values and the rights of the church in society; and the Christian understanding of patriotism, where he rejected "pagan" patriotism regardless of ethnic distinctions. In each of those areas, the Metropolitan was concerned with defending the Christian foundations of society against secularizing trends that regarded religion as strictly a private matter.

In elaborating his understanding of the church's social mission, Sheptytsky addressed not only the perceived external threats (such as socialism, anti-clerical attacks on the church and secular legislation), but the internal situation of the church as well. To a large extent, this corrective thrust of his social teaching was directed to the priests, seen initially as the primary agents of the church's social mission. However, in response to developments particularly in the area of Polish-Ukrainian relations, this social message was extended to include the faithful as well.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social reflection at this time showed some variability, primarily in the form of shifts of emphasis in response to emerging developments and his changing perceptions of the needs of the situation. For example, he adapted his notion of solidarity from a predominantly clerical to an all-Christian ideal, which included the faithful much more emphatically within the church's social agenda. An equally important adjustment occurred in the area of church-state relations. Before the war, the Metropolitan drew a fine line between traditional Greek Catholic loyalty to the empire and a critical assertiveness with a view to safeguarding the rights of the church. The war transformed the entire debate: given the simple choice between Austria and Russia, the Metropolitan sided unequivocally with Austria. It should be noted,

however, that he arrived at that decision for essentially the same reason as that which had led him to criticize Austria in peacetime, namely, his strong reservations about state intervention in ecclesiastical matters.³²⁰

Integral to Metropolitan Sheptytsky's ethical reflection on social issues was the Christian law of love. By applying it as a criterion of ethical discernment, he systematically identified and rejected all the forms of hatred that he saw in the four areas we have examined: in social action, the socialist doctrine of class struggle; in political action, partisan infighting among priests; in church-state relations, the goal of revolutionary upheaval; and in inter-ethnic relations, chauvinism. Throughout his reflection on the social issues of the day, Metropolitan Sheptytsky turned to the law of love as a reliable constant. Grounding his own ethical discernment in it, he was convinced that its broader implementation by all Christians, priests and faithful alike, would enable them to distinguish for themselves authentically Christian courses of action from amoral, atheistic ones. This perspective situated the socio-political debate in Galicia in an entirely new context: the central question was not whether the church could endorse social action, political participation and patriotism (it did), but how to determine the authentically Christian path, which led to salvation, as opposed to the path of perdition. Sheptytsky consistently found the most reliable answer to that question in the application of the law of love to even the thorniest of social issues.

320. Two precursors of Sheptytsky whose thought had a powerful influence on the mind of the Catholic Church in the latter part of the nineteenth century were Pope Leo XIII (1810–1903) and Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer of Djakovo (1815–1905). Their deep commitment to Catholic-Orthodox unity has been established in the literature as the formative context of Sheptytsky's promotion of church unity.

At the same time, the articulation of official positions on church-state relations was also part of this same formative context. After all, the question of church unity was itself situated within a variety of international political considerations. Among them, during Leo XIII's papacy (which began in 1878), were the Vatican's rapprochement with Russia and a corresponding aloofness toward Austria-Hungary. Within this setting, the church saw itself as a guardian of human dignity and religious values in social life. Thus, while Leo's encyclicals affirmed the divine origin of authority, generally promoted church-state harmony, and encouraged participation in political life, he also unequivocally rejected a liberalism that would introduce religious indifference into the socio-political sphere. And Bishop Strossmayer, as a member of the Croatian Diet, strongly opposed absolutism in the policies of Vienna and Budapest. Not until 1931 would Pope Pius XI take this reflection to its logical conclusion by introducing the principle of subsidiarity as a counterbalance to unrestrained state intervention in public affairs, but it is clear that a critical Catholic posture toward the respective roles of church and the state in social life was already firmly in place in Sheptytsky's time.

CHAPTER 2

New Challenges during and after World War I (1914–1923)

The second period of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's activity covers three more or less distinct phases: his exile in Russia (1914–17), followed by a three-year period in Lviv, and finally a long voyage through western Europe and North and South America (1920–23). Despite a wide variety of difficulties and obstacles, the Metropolitan managed to remain active at this time, promoting the cause of church unity while in Russian exile and, after his return to Lviv, supporting independence, then again assessing the needs of Ukrainian Catholic communities abroad and seeking international economic and political assistance for Ukrainians in war-torn Galicia.

Compared with the other four major periods of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's life and activity treated in this study, the period 1914–23 yields few primary source materials. This is understandable in light of the Metropolitan's absence from Lviv for two three-year periods and the disruptions of the World War, which in Galicia were compounded by a Polish-Ukrainian conflict that prolonged the state of war until mid-1919.¹

In light of these factors and of the rapid change that was going on in eastern Europe, this second period, presented in a rather episodic fashion, is probably better regarded as a transitional phase than as a distinct stage in the development of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's ethical reflection on social and political reality.

1. Along with the relative paucity of documentary material, a further consideration in grappling with this period of the Metropolitan's social thought and activity is that, of the key documents available, two are pastoral letters that were collectively written and signed by all three Greek Catholic bishops. A legitimate question might be raised about the degree to which authorship of the collective pastoral letters may be attributed to Metropolitan Sheptytsky. Rather than pursuing at length the question of authorship, we treat these documents as joint statements, recognizing that behind them was a process of collective reflection in which the Metropolitan was directly and personally involved.

A recently published document has shed some light on the redaction process behind these collective pastoral letters and identifies the authors of some original drafts. See Andrii Krawchuk, "Konferentsiï Arkhyiereïv Ukraïns'koï Hreko-Katolyts'koï Tserkvy, 1902–1937," *Logos* 35, nos. 1–4 (1994): 429–518.

Exile in Russia

On 15 September 1914, the Russian forces occupying Galicia placed Metropolitan Sheptytsky under house arrest. Three days later, he was sent into exile in Russia. Until his release in March 1917 by the Provisional Government of Aleksandr Kerensky, Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social activity was limited to written representations to the Russian government, primarily on the matter of wartime Galician deportees in Russia.

One of the earliest such communications is a purported letter that was mentioned in the polemical Russian literature of the day. Prior to the revolution, Metropolitan Sheptytsky allegedly wrote to Tsar Nicholas I and "greeted the victorious Russian army, expressed happiness that Ukraine was finally united with Russia, and gave his assurances of loyalty to Russian ideals."²

Later, the Metropolitan wrote to the Russian Minister of Internal Affairs requesting a transfer to Tomsk or Minusinsk in Siberia, where other Ukrainians had been deported from Galicia; the transfer was denied.³

In March 1917, after the fall of the Romanov dynasty, the Russian Provisional Government declared an amnesty for political and religious prisoners, and Sheptytsky was freed. By that time, a Ukrainian governing body in Kyiv, the Central Rada (Council), had adopted the principle of national self-determination.

As the Russian occupation of Galicia wore on, military units rounded up Greek Catholic priests and members of the lay intelligentsia, then deported them to Russia and Siberia. Deported children were registered as Orthodox and educated in the Orthodox faith. Learning of this, Sheptytsky protested to Oberprocurator Vladimir N. Lvov, an official of the Holy Synod, against the forcible conversion of children and called for an investigation of those Russian Orthodox priests who, with Russian military assistance, had occupied Greek Catholic churches in Galicia and sent the local parish priests into exile in Russia and Siberia. However, this intervention yielded no result.⁴ Sheptytsky also made personal representations to ministries of the Provisional Government in Petrograd on behalf of tens of thousands of Galician deportees in Russia, among whom

2. Iu. D. Romanovskii, *Ukrainskii separatizm i Germaniia* (Tokyo, 1920), p. 8. For further discussion, see Appendix 1.

3. *Tsars'kyi Viazen', 1914–1917* (L'viv, 1918), p. 32.

4. *Tsars'kyi Viazen'*, pp. 31–32, 48. According to Korolevskij, Galician orphans were taken to a government school in Taganrog on the Black Sea. If they responded negatively to the question whether they were Polish, they were enrolled as Orthodox pupils and educated in the Orthodox faith. However, when the Metropolitan's objections came to the attention of the school's director, the matter was apparently resolved satisfactorily. Korolevskij, *Métropolitte André Szeptyckyj*, p. 142.

there were some eighty priests.⁵ But it was on the religious front that more dramatic changes began to occur.

Shortly after his release, Metropolitan Sheptytsky had a unique opportunity to address the issues of religious life and church-state relations in Russia. At the end of May, he convoked a sobor in Petrograd with the aim of organizing the Eastern-rite Catholic Church in Russia. The Metropolitan himself presided over the proceedings of the sobor, which was comprised of Russian Catholic priests, including the Exarch of Russia, Leonid Fedorov.⁶ Among other things, the sobor resolved to seek the legalization of the Greek Catholic Church in Russia. When the Russian government appeared unreceptive to that proposal, Metropolitan Sheptytsky intervened personally to argue the case. After the sobor, he met with members of the government. He reasoned that Russia had nothing to lose and everything to gain from contacts with the West and a rapprochement with the Western church. In addition, he reminded the Russian authorities that the Greek Catholic Church already existed within Russian boundaries, namely, in occupied Galicia. Finally, he referred to some of the guiding principles of the revolution:

In your slogans you called for freedom of religious beliefs; supposedly, therefore, you will not restrict or abrogate it, but will allow the Church that you took over to develop.... If in your thinking every people may develop freely in the faith of its choice, then what danger do you perceive in the fact that many 'Russians' want to be in unity with the Roman Church?⁷

The intervention was successful; the Russian Provisional Government granted the Greek Catholic Church equal status with the Roman Catholic Church.⁸ Its priests began to appear publicly at religious gatherings and Exarch Leonid Fedorov was invited by the government to attend deliberations on religious affairs of its committee on church-state relations.⁹ By the end of the year, the Provisional Government promulgated a Regulation for the Catholic Church in Russia.¹⁰

The resolutions of the sobor affirmed unity with Rome on fundamental issues (papal primacy, the truths of the faith, and saints canonized in the West were formally accepted), but at the same time they recognized the distinctiveness of the Eastern tradition in such areas as liturgy (no Latin forms would be accepted),

5. *Tsars'kyi Viazen'*, p. 48.

6. Iosyf Slipyi, "Petrohrads'kyi Synod 1917 r.," *Bohosloviia* 9 (1931): 289–92.

7. *Tsars'kyi Viazen'*, p. 54.

8. *Ibid.*

9. Slipyi, "Petrohrads'kyi Synod 1917 r.," p. 290; Korolevskij, *Métropolitte André Szeptyckyj*, p. 141.

10. Korolevskij, *Métropolitte André Szeptyckyj*, p. 141.

canon law (canonical innovations in the Western church since the seventh Ecumenical Council were not binding unless they explicitly referred to the Eastern church), and sacramental ministry (where Eastern practices such as the communion of infants were affirmed). Church-state relations were covered in resolutions 25 and 26: the sobor considered the church's independence from the state essential, but also recognized the need for legalization.¹¹ And, in a socially significant departure from the feudal practice of *ius patronatus*, which was still in place in Galicia, the synod recognized no lay patronage rights over churches: according to Article 35 of the sobor's decisions, "a lay person who gives something to the Church relinquishes all claims on what has been given."¹²

In the months that followed his release, Metropolitan Sheptytsky also made public statements expressing his views on the developments in Russia and Ukraine. Departing from Petrograd for Kyiv on 24 April 1917, he wrote a message to the Ukrainian Central Rada representatives in Petrograd, in which he referred to the "historic moment" that had occurred:

In accordance with divine Providence, the shackles that once bound our Ukrainian people have fallen off; no longer are our people gagged. Along with the renewal of life in all of Russia, our people, too, are revived.... I am grateful to be able to witness this moment and, with a sincere, silent prayer, I have bowed my head before the inscrutable paths of divine Providence.¹³

Viewing the developments in Russia favourably, Sheptytsky understood them as having great significance for Ukrainians in Galicia. Indeed, he saw the national strivings of Ukrainians in Galicia and in Ukrainian lands under Russian rule as united and identical. It was in that light that he understood his warm reception in Petrograd:

I know that the ovations were directed not so much toward me personally as toward the entire Ukrainian people in Galicia; in that way, you have publicly demonstrated our indivisible national unity, the closest of bonds and fraternal regard [that exist between us], and [our] identical strivings for self-determination (*samooznachennia*), development and the raising up of our national culture...not even boundaries can tear apart our national unity and the soul of our good

11. On resolutions 25 and 26, see Slipyi, "Petrohrads'kyi Synod 1917 r.," p. 291, and "Postanovleniia eparkhiial'nogo sobora Greko-kafolicheskoi Tserkvi, sostoiavshegosia v Petrograde ot 29–31 maia 1917 g. pod predsedatel'stvom Vysokopreosviashchenneishago Andreia Mitropolita Galitskogo" (Petrograd, 1917), reprinted in *Bohosloviia* 9 (L'viv, 1931): 294.

12. "Postanovleniia eparkhiial'nogo sobora Greko-kafolicheskoi Tserkvi," N°35, p. 295.

13. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Velykoiu radostiu...", letter of 24 April 1917 to the National Rada in Petrograd, reprinted in full in Oleksander Lotots'kyi, *Storinky mynuloho*, vol. 4 (Warsaw, 1934), pp. 379–80.

Ukrainian people. Our national unity is the surest guarantee of a magnificent future to which we can look forward boldly, and toward which all of us Ukrainians will walk together in our cultural work.¹⁴

On his way back to Lviv through neutral Sweden and Switzerland, the Metropolitan again had occasion to express his favourable view of the fall of tsarism and the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state in Kyiv; in essence, it had brought an end to the oppression of the Eastern-rite Catholic (Uniate) Church in Russia:

Tsarism persecuted us and officially suppressed our Church at the end of the eighteenth century in Ukraine and in 1838 in Belorussia and Volhynia. Today we have eight eparchies: 3 in Galicia, 3 in Hungary, and 2 in America. However, the memory of the Uniate Church has remained deep and very much alive in the regions that it once occupied, and today it enjoys the favour accorded to all formerly oppressed forces. That is why the present Russian revolution, without actually being sympathetic to us, is not particularly hostile to us either.¹⁵

In late August 1917, Sheptytsky addressed Ukrainians in Vienna with much the same optimism about the anticipated end of the war:

The moment is approaching when the bitter punishment will come to an end; the path that leads to a better future is opening up before us. The developments in Ukraine, which is now free, are the guarantee of a glorious future for the Ukrainian people.¹⁶

He urged Ukrainians to give thanks to God “for those magnificent hopes for the future, for those beautiful beginnings of national development,” and to ask for all that they needed “both in Dnipro Ukraine and here for the free and full development of all their God-given attributes and energies.”¹⁷ Those hopes for political freedom were closely interwoven with the expectation that a new era was at hand for Eastern-rite Catholicism, for:

There, beyond the border, a free Ukraine has been resurrected. The people are reawakening to a new life and, with youthful strength and vigor, they are working toward the establishment of their own state. Hope for the Holy Unia is also being revived, and the blood of our martyrs is beginning to bear the fruit of the Christian

14. Ibid., p. 380.

15. [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], “Une interview de Mgr. Szeptycky. L’Archevêque uniate travaille au rapprochement de l’Eglise d’Occident et de l’Eglise d’Orient,” p. 439.

16. [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], “My vsi perenesly...,” 26 August 1917, in *Tsars'kyi Viazen'*, p. 91.

17. [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], “Velii iesy, Hospody...,” 10 September 1917, in *Tsars'kyi Viazen'*, p. 173.

spiritual rebirth of our people.¹⁸

In September 1917, Sheptytsky finally addressed his people in Lviv for the first time in three years. Again, the fundamental changes in Russia were foremost in his mind:

Our faith and hope have overcome. The pagan tsarist authority has turned into dust, like a demonic idol before the tabernacle of God. The power that for centuries oppressed our faith and our nationality has disappeared from the face of the earth: it is no longer there! Those who wanted by every available means to shackle the Ukrainian people with a yoke, those who tried with all manner of violence to destroy the very memory of the Holy Unia have been struck down, as if by a thunderbolt, by the hand of the Almighty; lowered and humbled, they have become an example of how God, ever merciful though He is, nevertheless sometimes punishes injustice and humbles the proud even in this world.¹⁹

That national optimism, however, did not lead the Metropolitan to set aside his loyalty to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. His vision of a free, united Ukraine was still framed within the bounds of Austrian monarchism:

We have a young monarch who sincerely loves his peoples. Among the members of the imperial family who are closest to him we have advisors who are wise and well disposed to us. The leadership has become convinced that our people are always faithful to God, that even in the most terrible misery they remained faithful to their monarch, that we gladly sacrificed our property and our blood, and that we only want to live in freedom in our own land.²⁰

Sheptytsky's internment in Russia, which took him from Kyiv to Nizhnii Novgorod and Kursk, then to the Spaso-Efimiev monastery prison in Suzdal and finally to Yaroslavl, effectively isolated him from the Greek Catholic Church in Russian-occupied Galicia and prevented him from carrying out any pastoral activity. Nevertheless, he raised humanitarian issues with the tsarist government that had ordered his arrest. And in the six months between his release and his return to Lviv, the Metropolitan was able to lay the groundwork for a Greek Catholic Church in Russia with the consent of the Provisional Government in Petrograd. In meetings with Ukrainian political circles, he also took the

18. Ibid., pp. 171–72.

19. Ibid., p. 171.

20. Ibid., pp. 173–74. In the following year, Sheptytsky pointed out that whereas in Russia Ukrainians were denied the right to exist as a people, in Austria they had had the opportunity to “preserve our national and religious life.” Now that the war was over, Ukrainians expected that Austria would “allow us to develop all our national strengths under the aegis of the Habsburg dynasty.” In particular, he expected that Austria would soon provide for two vital Ukrainian needs—their own schools and regional self-government. [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], “Es ist die Frage...” (1918), p. 812.

opportunity of expressing his views on the radical change in Russia and its implications for Ukraine. Essentially, he welcomed the fall of tsarism and saw it as opening up new possibilities for the religious and political future of Ukraine. With regard to religion, it appeared to him that the era of the Russian persecution of the Uniate Church was finally over; the promising direction of the Provisional Government's policy on religion and religious freedom fanned hopes for a Catholic missionary drive to the East. In the political sphere, Sheptytsky welcomed the beginnings of a Ukrainian political administration in Kyiv as a significant step toward the political unification and self-determination of a united Ukrainian people. So sweeping and unexpected were the shifts in political reality and political ideas that Sheptytsky felt he could only attribute them to "the inscrutable paths of divine Providence." At the same time, he knew that those changes offered Ukrainians unique and historic opportunities to which they themselves would have to respond. Because of the enduring impact of the developments in Russia, it is not surprising that the Metropolitan's ethical reflection on social and political realities should have continued to be strongly oriented eastward after his return to Lviv in September 1917. It is to this period that we now turn.

Restoration and Challenges in Galicia

Upon returning to Lviv, Metropolitan Sheptytsky set about reconstructing the life of his church, whose internal and external affairs had been profoundly shaken up by the war. The main focus of attention in rebuilding the internal life of the Ukrainian Catholic Church was on the development of a highly qualified clergy that would be attuned to the new socio-political environment and equal to the challenge of a Catholic mission in the East.

On 21 February 1918, in their first joint pastoral letter since the beginning of the war, the Ukrainian Catholic bishops headed by Metropolitan Sheptytsky drew attention to the extreme suffering that the war had brought upon the Ukrainian people: "The war inflicted deep and serious material and spiritual wounds upon us. It is not yet possible to describe all the suffering to which our poor people were exposed. Nor can the sacrifices that we made be counted yet."²¹ Beyond the material losses of life and property,²² there had also been spiritual losses. The Russian Orthodox attack on Greek Catholicism in Galicia, spearheaded by Archbishop Evlogii, had had its impact. The pastoral letter went on to cite the "sad apostasy of some unfortunates who, either through fear or for some benefit,

21. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki..." (Lviv, 1918), pp. 3–4.

22. The pastoral letter referred to thousands of Ukrainian children who had been orphaned by the war. Ibid., p. 12.

renounced their faith.”²³ Considering the situation in which their church found itself, the Greek Catholic bishops concluded that one of the most urgent tasks before them was the restoration of popular religious education (mainly through catechism and preaching), which they considered to have fallen into neglect.²⁴ Thus, they concluded, many years of dedicated pastoral work would be needed in order to heal the wounds of this war.²⁵

At the same time, the document echoed the optimism of Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s statements of the previous year: the end of the war had opened “a new era in the history of the Ukrainian people and their Church.”²⁶ Politically, that new era was marked by “the awakening of Ukraine to statehood”; in ecclesiastical terms, there was now a new “glorious hope for a new flowering of our ecclesiastical Unia.”²⁷ Moreover, in Galicia, there were signs that the divisiveness that had plagued the Greek Catholic clergy might finally be overcome. In particular, the Russophilism of some Greek Catholic priests, “who considered our people to be one with the Russians,”²⁸ was no longer tenable because of the objective historical changes that had taken place: the fall of the Russian Empire, the recognition by the civilized world of the right of nations to self-determination, and “the world-wide recognition of the Ukrainian people as an independent people, distinct from the Great Russian people.”²⁹ Indeed, the bishops argued, the war had revealed that the Muscophile or “Old Ruthenian” orientation among the Ukrainian Catholic clergy was in fact harmful to the people; during the Russian occupation of Galicia, that tendency had been at the root of “the apostasy of many confused Christians and some priests who were either inadequate or extremely weak of faith.”³⁰ Now that this serious obstacle

23. Ibid., p. 5.

24. Ibid., pp. 7–8. Along with the focus on catechization and preaching, the attempt to restore Ukrainian Catholic life would also include greater attention to the distinction between “good” and “bad” books, and the promotion of a cult of St. Josaphat, the seventeenth-century Ukrainian Catholic martyr whose relics the bishops expected to be transferred from Vienna to Galicia after the war (ibid., pp. 8–9).

25. Ibid., p. 5.

26. Ibid., p. 4.

27. Ibid., p. 5.

28. Ibid., pp. 5–6.

29. Ibid., p. 6.

30. Ibid. The Old Ruthenian (*starorusyny*) movement of the Greek Catholic clergy in Galicia during the 1850s and 60s initially represented a conservative, clericalist line of thinking that sided with the Austrian monarchy against Polish rule. In the 1860s, many of its adherents joined the ascendant Russophiles (*moskvofily*), having been attracted by their Easternizing orientation. However, the Russophiles also promoted political unification with Russia, which placed them at odds with Austria-Hungary. Although a full

to unity had been removed, the Greek Catholic Church would be free to address the pressing needs of the time. And it was precisely the purpose of the pastoral “to draw attention to the needs and dangers of the moment.”³¹

Foremost among those needs, both in the political and the ecclesiastical spheres, was the need for able civil and ecclesiastical leaders. In all walks of Ukrainian social and religious life, the fields were ripe, but the harvesters few. In this situation, truly exceptional individuals were needed to take up the “great tasks” that lay ahead: “Times are coming when our people, in the Ukrainian state and in our land [i.e., Eastern Galicia], must produce an abundance of individuals to occupy the leading positions and to whom the common good in all areas of social and economic life will be entrusted.”³²

account of their fate in Austria-Hungary during World War I is not yet available, it is known that thousands of these citizens were incarcerated in concentration camps at Thalerhof, Theresienstadt and elsewhere, and that thousands were executed. S. Ripetsky and O. Sereda, “Russophiles,” in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, ed. Danylo Husar Struk, vol. 4 (Toronto, 1993), p. 475.

On 8 August 1914, reacting to the frequent arrests of Greek Catholic priests, Metropolitan Sheptytsky apparently wrote to the Viceroy’s chancery to request an intervention on their behalf. According to Sheptytsky, many of those arrested had been falsely accused of being Russophiles. He personally vouched for the pastor of Vynnyky, “who is not a Muscophile, though his wife is Russian.” The Metropolitan readily admitted that “a priest who disseminates or supports the Russophile—or, worse, the pan-Russian—social or political idea among the people deserves to lose the trust of the authorities and, in wartime, can and should be removed from any [position of] influence over the people...,” but at the same time he feared that innocent priests were becoming victims of the personal settling of accounts. He suspected as well that in some cases these might be reprisals against clerics who had opposed an erstwhile Polish chauvinist party known for its support of Russophilism. [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], Draft copy of a letter to the Viceroy’s office, “V. Prezydii Namist.,” 8 August 1914, TsDIA, f. 358, op. 1, spr. 404, ark. 28–28a.

Judging from later discussion of the religious situation in wartime Galicia, the number of Catholic priests who apostasized was probably minimal. See Dzerovych, “Materiialy do istoriï martyrol'ogii,” *Nyva* 12 (1916), no. 2: 92–100; no. 3: 166–68; no. 4: 226–43; no. 5: 279–86; no. 6: 336–45; nos. 7–8: 384–400; nos. 9–10: 437–47; nos. 11–12: 513–26. While any case of apostasy was certainly a matter of legitimate concern to church leaders, the absence of any mention of incarceration or execution of Russophiles raises the question of precisely how much the bishops knew at the time the pastoral letter was submitted for publication. Nor should the fact that this issue was picked up by ideologically driven Soviet analyses detract from the need for its clarification, insofar as currently available archival sources allow. See I. F. Oksiuk, “Iednist' Tserkvy i Tserkovni Unii,” *L'vivs'kyi Tserkovnyi Sobor: Dokumenty i materiialy, 1946–1981* (Kyiv, 1984), p. 31.

31. Sheptytsky et al., “Hlyboki i tiazhki...” (1918), p. 4.

32. Ibid., pp. 9–10.

In the socio-political sphere, the primary concern of nation-building was situated within a Christian world-view. Christian scholars and poets were urgently needed to “raise the level of Christian culture” among Ukrainians; politicians to develop the national life and to usher in a new era of prosperity and welfare for the people.³³ From the standpoint of the church, there was a need for “great and holy servants of God who by word and example would be wise leaders in all areas of social, national and political life.”³⁴

In the religious sphere, then, the primary concern of the bishops was with the sanctification of the Ukrainian people, so that they might become “a holy people, and fulfill their divine mission to convert the whole East to the light of the faith, and to contribute to the common good of the human race.”³⁵ This meant that in the nascent Ukrainian polity the source of religious unity was to be found within the Catholic Church. Here, too, the task was long and arduous, and would require special individuals—holy activists, apostles and teachers who would not only strengthen Catholic life in Galicia, but would also “carry the banner of the Holy Unia to the whole Ukrainian state.”³⁶ And if one great saint could be found among the people, then he would surely take upon his shoulders “the burdens that entire generations could not bear.”³⁷

In its approach to the task of reconstruction, the church would place special emphasis upon the cohesiveness of the Greek Catholic clergy, both among themselves and with the people. Just as they had done in the series of pastoral letters on solidarity in the Austrian period, the bishops again stressed the importance of a collective approach by the church to the social and religious challenges facing Ukrainians. Again, they chose a collective statement as the means of conveying a living example of their own unity to the clergy and the faithful. The views expressed in the document were not those of one author but of the entire Ukrainian episcopate, thus being more fully “the voice of the church,” and carrying greater weight.³⁸ The statement called upon priests to show unity with the episcopate, as well as unity among themselves and with the people.³⁹ And, following their example, the entire Ukrainian Catholic community was exhorted to do away with all divisions and disunity,⁴⁰ for in

33. Ibid., p. 11.

34. Ibid., p. 13.

35. Ibid., pp. 13–14.

36. Ibid., p. 10.

37. Ibid., p. 11.

38. Ibid., p. 4.

39. Ibid., pp. 5, 6.

40. Ibid., p. 5.

their work “for the Kingdom of God among our people,” all would have to show the solidarity, unity in love, and community of work that “issue from Christian fraternal love.”⁴¹

Beyond those exhortations, the recent course of history was also seen as promising; the new situation appeared conducive to a unity that had scarcely been conceivable before the war. The waning of Galician Russophilism and the emergence of a Ukrainian national consciousness were now indisputable facts, and the church had no alternative but to accept them as such. According to the Ukrainian bishops, this was a moral obligation: “Priests whose national sentiments differ from those of the Ukrainian people are obliged in conscience to adapt themselves to those others in their work [outside the Church]. They must set aside their personal convictions and adapt in everything to the people whose pastors they are.”⁴² In addition, priests were encouraged to promote, and at all costs to avoid obstructing, the development of Ukrainian culture: “We will require that, regardless of any personal national convictions, no one obstruct the full development of the national life and the culture of the Ukrainian people, but rather serve them and adopt a favourable attitude to all their affairs.”⁴³

Special attention would be given to seeing that this position was understood and put into practice by those priests who had formerly been associated with the Muscophile tendency. This was no different, the bishops explained, from what was expected of any non-Ukrainian priest who was entrusted with pastoral work among Ukrainians; in accordance with the Pauline example of being “all things to all men” (1 Cor. 9: 22), the official position of the Ukrainian Catholic Church was stated clearly: “...a foreigner who works as a spiritual pastor among the Ukrainian people must renounce his own personal patriotism for their sake, take up the Cross of Jesus Christ and, for the love of Christ and of his spiritual flock, become all things to his flock: a Ukrainian for Ukrainians, in order to save them.”⁴⁴

In the new historical situation, the needs of Ukrainian society were such that the bishops felt they simply could not allow any “political or national agitation that was contrary to the national sentiments of the Ukrainian people.”⁴⁵ But this was not a simple call to political activity by priests, for the pastoral letter affirmed the primacy of the spiritual function of a priest.⁴⁶ Recalling Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s pre-World War I endorsement of some socio-economic

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 6.

43. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

44. Ibid., p. 7.

45. Ibid., p. 6.

46. Ibid., p. 7.

and political involvement by priests, the bishops now reaffirmed that pastoral synthesis, attending to both the material and the spiritual needs of the people:

Any work [by a priest] that would address the material welfare of the people, or that would take account of other needs besides their religious needs, must have the divine character of a spiritual ministry, that is, it must always be aimed toward the Christian goal of the salvation of the soul, and must always be founded on the principles of divine law and the Catholic faith. A priest's work for the community outside the Church should tie people to their Church and strengthen their Christian convictions; but, in order to reach their hearts, that community work outside the Church must be characterized by a love for the people.⁴⁷

In October 1918, Metropolitan Sheptytsky responded further to the needs associated with a Catholic Ukraine. By that time, he had become convinced that the historical moment imposed a new moral duty on the Ukrainian clergy, "to respond to our mission to our brothers" (i.e., in Eastern Ukraine).⁴⁸ Moreover, he came to believe that the only realistic way for the Ukrainian Catholic Church to fulfill that mission was by extending its ecclesiastical "army" to include a "light cavalry," namely, celibate priests.⁴⁹ Considering also that the mission to the East was not a job for married priests, Sheptytsky issued a decree whereby one-half of the Seminary in Lviv would be reserved for candidates to the celibate priesthood for a period of twelve years.⁵⁰

47. Ibid.

48. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "O vykhovanniu pytomtsiv i ievanhel's'kykh radakh" ("Kandydaty dukhovnoho stanu...") *LAeV* 31, no. 5 (15 September 1918), reprinted in Pliaton Martyniuk, *Nepodil'ne sertse sviashchenyka v sluzhbi Boha i Tserkvy* (Zhovkva, 1935), p. 206.

49. Sheptytsky, "O vykhovanniu pytomtsiv..." (1918), p. 207.

50. Ibid., p. 209. This attempt to introduce celibacy became a cause célèbre in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic and even the secular press in Galicia during the 1920s, as Bishops Khomyshyn and Kotsylovsky banned candidates to the married priesthood from the seminaries in Stanyslaviv and Peremyshl. Sheptytsky, however, perhaps more attentive to the will of the people, favoured a gradualist approach to the introduction of celibacy and allowed for the free, personal decision of seminarians in the matter. Also, unlike his episcopal colleagues, Sheptytsky continued to ordain married men. He would later explain that "in this matter more than in any other, excessive rigour always seemed dangerous to me." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Rapport au Père Gennochi," in *ERSS-LGE*, p. 14a (1: 70).

Overall, despite considerable popular dissension, the combination of hard-line and soft-line approaches to the promotion of clerical celibacy did have its effect on the clerical composition of the Greek Catholic Archeparchy of Lviv. Whereas at the turn of the century celibate priests had represented only some 4% of the entire Ukrainian Catholic clergy, by 1939 that number had increased to 25%.

No less important, however, was the task of assuring a constant flow of solid candidates to fill the clerical cadres on the home front in Galicia. With considerable candour, Sheptytsky confessed that before the war he had erred in allowing himself to be guided by the opinions of others as to the acceptability of candidates for the priesthood. For this reason, he feared that some people were ordained who should not have been. "Today," he admitted, "I recognize that as a grave offence and I am determined to correct myself."⁵¹ He proposed to do so by devoting special attention to what he considered valid criteria for determining the worthiness of candidates to the priesthood: a spirit of holiness and prayer, a readiness to work hard (instead of an inclination toward sloth), and a spirit of sacrifice (as opposed to desire for personal gain).⁵² The quality of the decision about the acceptability of sacerdotal candidates was vital to the common good, Sheptytsky believed; so vital, indeed, that he considered it better to err in that decision on the side of the common good (that is, with excessive caution in screening candidates) rather than to its detriment. As the Metropolitan explained: "...it is preferable not to accept for ordination a candidate who could become a good priest than to admit an unworthy one. For the harm that an unworthy [priest] does to the Church is so great that it is probably difficult to be excessively cautious."⁵³

51. Sheptytsky, "O vykhovanni pytomtsiv..." (1918), p. 205.

52. Ibid., pp. 205–6. In later years, Sheptytsky elaborated further on the "materialism" of some candidates to the priesthood in Galicia: "...vu que notre jeunesse est généralement pauvre et que les cas sont rares où les parents peuvent entretenir leurs fils au Séminaire, nous appréhendons toujours que des matérialistes sans vocation se présentent et que par une certaine hypocrisie se passent pour de bons séminaristes." Sheptytsky, "Rapport au Père Gennoch," in *ERSS-LGE*, p. 14 (1: 69).

Sheptytsky also considered the desire to serve the common good especially necessary for priests who wanted to serve in Russia. After the Bolshevik Revolution, he felt, missionaries to Russia would have to be prepared to sacrifice material benefits. As the Metropolitan explained, whereas the tsarist state had given some financial support to priests, the revolution abolished those "material inducements." [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], *Address of Archbishop Andrew Szeptycki about the Catholic Missionary Work in What Once Formed the Russian Empire* (New York, 1922), p. 6. By the same token, Sheptytsky felt that the new order in Russia made conditions difficult for materialists among the Russian Orthodox clergy: "Those who were employees [of the state] must now become pastors.... The position of the priest, which was so good for the materialist under the Old Regime, is now [imperilled] under the Bolsheviks. Now nobody will want to be a [Russian Orthodox] priest." [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], Talk at St. Augustine's Seminary in Toronto, 26 August 1922 ("I will first speak..."), in "Archbishop Andrew Szeptycky in Canada (1922)," *Analecta O.S.B.M.*, Series 2, Sectio 2, vol. 3 (Rome, 1958), p. 105.

53. Sheptytsky, "O vykhovanni pytomtsiv..." (1918), p. 205.

In their first collective pastoral letter after the war, the Greek Catholic bishops returned to a theme they had jointly addressed on a number of occasions prior to 1914—the vital importance of clerical solidarity to the church’s work in society. Mindful, however, of the fundamental changes that the war had brought, the bishops did not simply reiterate their earlier position of unabashed clericalism. Instead, they acknowledged that, in the work of nation-building, both religious and secular leaders were needed. Moreover, the notion of clerical unity was broadened; in view of the perceived needs of the times, priests were henceforth expected to show unity with the national consciousness of the Ukrainian people. As for Metropolitan Sheptytsky, he approached the issue of religious leadership with a renewed commitment to ensuring that future priests of the Greek Catholic Church would be truly dedicated, willing to make sacrifices, and prepared to serve the common good of all Ukrainians as they anticipated the unification of western and eastern Ukrainian lands.

The war also gave rise to a range of problems in external affairs, among which was the delicate question of Ukraine’s status on the international scene. On 9 February 1918, a treaty was signed at Brest-Litovsk between the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey). By virtue of that agreement, the Central Powers would recognize Ukraine as a political entity and in return would receive economic assistance, primarily in the form of foodstuffs. Far more controversial, however, was a provision for the annexation by Ukraine of two regions: Kholm and Podlachia. That aspect of the treaty became a new bone of contention between Ukrainians and Poles. The former saw the decision as just, for it reflected the will and ethnic character of the regions; the latter branded it “the fourth Partition of Poland.” The dispute came to a head three weeks after the signing of the treaty, when two speeches were delivered in the Austrian House of Lords. Bishop Józef Pelczar, Latin-rite ordinary of Peremyshl, spoke for the Polish side, while the Ukrainian side was represented by Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky.⁵⁴ Sheptytsky argued that a fundamental shift had occurred in the international community’s thinking about the basis for setting territorial boundaries:

The old principle of diplomatically constituted territorial boundaries...is being opposed in modern times by a new principle, which...imposes new groupings that are more appropriate to the consciousness of peoples. Obviously, a principle that answers to the life and needs of peoples will prevail. It is no longer a matter of what was decided at some peace congress or other, but of what ethnographically distinct peoples want. It is a matter of ethnographic boundaries, and of the right of self-determination (*Selbstbestimmungsrecht*).⁵⁵

54. “Za kholms’ku zemliu,” *Nyva* 14, no. 3 (March 1918): 65.

55. [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], “Es ist die Frage...” (1918), p. 810. Although

In Sheptytsky's view, ethnic (in the terminology of the time, "ethnographic") boundaries and the underlying principle of self-determination served the interests of world peace, for this principle did not allow "the dominion of one national group over another."⁵⁶ The Metropolitan was convinced that the end of the war signalled the dawn of a new historical era in which the peaceful coexistence of nations would replace the dominion and hegemony of some over others: "Obviously, the principle of ethnographic divisions will not please those who have become accustomed to hegemony over others. That kind of hegemony can no longer be sustained; it belongs to the obsolete, abnormal conditions of the past historical period."⁵⁷

From the context of the debate around the contested regions, it is clear that "hegemony" referred obliquely to Poland.⁵⁸ In Sheptytsky's perception, the new world order had replaced political domination with the duty of every national state to serve humanity, for "The duty of nations and states is to rise up above every narrowly conceived and self-serving egoism and to work and make sacrifices for the good of all humanity."⁵⁹

In addition to ethnic considerations and democratic principles, the issue of religious identity had also been a pivotal factor in the history of the Kholm region:

formally the Brest treaty made no mention of the right of self-determination, Sheptytsky observed that the guiding idea of the treaty was "a desire to create ethnographic boundaries" (ibid.). He considered that this had been stated with sufficient clarity in the official commentary to the treaty.

56. Ibid., p. 811.

57. Ibid.

58. The public debate around the annexation issue was considerably less oblique. A case in point was an editorial in the socially oriented Ukrainian Catholic periodical *Nyva*, which affirmed: "Throughout the world, democratic ideas are now coming to the fore. And the one [positive] consequence of the present World War will be the complete democratization of all public life in Europe. Everyone sees and understands this. Only the Poles, "aristocrats" that they are, though perhaps they too understand what is happening, are instinctively resisting this powerful, democratic idea. And naturally so: as the saying goes, *beati possidentes*. That new idea requires them to make some painful sacrifices." "Za kholms'ku zemliu" (1918), p. 67. The editorial went on to observe, quite perceptively, that the application of the democratic principle of ethnic boundaries (i.e., majority rule) in the Kholm and Podlachia regions was bound to be seen by most Poles as a "dangerous precedent" at a time when the political fate of Eastern Galicia had yet to be resolved.

Looking back at this period five years later, Sheptytsky would remark that, for a variety of reasons "it became more and more difficult [for the Poles] to dominate the Ruthenians." Sheptytsky, "Rapport au Père Gennochi," in *ERSS-LGE*, p. 26 (1: 82).

59. [Sheptytsky], "Es ist die Frage..." (1918), p. 811.

The bloody persecutions of our people in the Kholm region and the Russian invasion of Galicia seemed to herald the last days in the history of the Unia. We thought that we were witnessing the complete destruction of our Church and of the last representatives of this idea [of church unity]. The miraculous reversal [of that process], through the will of the Almighty, revives hopes for a greater future. And for us, in Galicia, the successful end to the war brings new hopes on that front.⁶⁰

The Catholicism that Poles wanted for the region was Latin and Polish; Ukrainian Catholics considered this a betrayal of the sixteenth-century Union of Brest, signed in that very region, whereby their Orthodox forefathers had joined with Rome but not with the Latin rite. Metropolitan Sheptytsky made it clear that, in his view, the region was not only ethnically Ukrainian, but also historically Ukrainian Catholic.⁶¹

The dissolution of the Habsburg Empire and the end of the world war in October 1918 left open the question of the control of Eastern Galicia. From November 1918 to July 1919 the Ukrainian Galician army struggled against Polish forces for possession of the area in a local war that compounded the devastation of the world war. In the end, Poland took Eastern Galicia. In August 1919, the Ukrainian Catholic bishops addressed the new situation of Eastern Galicia under Polish rule. The destruction caused by this new war outweighed that of the previous conflict, they pointed out.⁶² Thousands of civilians had become prisoners of war; five priests had been killed, and hundreds of others imprisoned; churches and monasteries had been looted.⁶³

From a theological perspective, the bishops attributed the destruction and suffering to the will of God. “It pleased the Almighty One,” they remarked, “to

60. Ibid., pp. 811–12.

61. The Metropolitan’s position on the religious significance of the Kholm region was, needless to say, shared by the vast majority of Ukrainian Catholics. In the following month, on 27 March 1918, at a meeting in Lviv of the St. Paul Association of Ukrainian Catholic Priests, some 200 priests declared that they welcomed the establishment of a Ukrainian national state in Kyiv and its annexation of Kholm and Podlachia, and protested against continuing efforts by Poland to Latinize and Polonize the local Ukrainian population. “Zaiava ukraïns'koho katolyts'koho dukhovenstva v spravi kholms'kii,” *Nyva* 14, no. 4 (April 1918): 132–33.

For the Poles, as Bishop Pelczar argued, the martyrs of Kholm had died for the Catholic faith and now, through the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, their children were being given up to “the same Cossacks who had tortured their parents and grandparents.” “Za kholms'ku zemliu” (1918), p. 65.

62. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., “Podobalosia Vsevyshn'omu...” (Peremyshl', 1919), p. 3.

63. Ibid., p. 4.

inflict these new and harsh sufferings upon us.”⁶⁴ And, in the conviction that nothing happens outside divine providence, they resolved to accept “these blows from the hands of God.”⁶⁵ Yet this theological interpretation was not limited to a fatalistic acceptance of suffering, for, the bishops emphasized, God was a good Father, and even when He punished His children, He did so for their good and in view of a sacred purpose.⁶⁶ It was therefore up to Christians to determine, in light of their faith, the meaning of that punishment. That process of discernment involved an introspective examination of conscience. The bishops instructed their faithful: “Let us enter into ourselves and ask whether we have not offended God in any way; let us seek higher, further reasons for our sufferings. Let us look upon them from the point of view of our faith. Let us try to answer the question: why, for what reasons and to what end did God let us suffer in this way?”⁶⁷

The bishops identified two groups that might have incurred divine punishment: those “who wanted to undertake the work for the future of the nation not only without God, but with an outright struggle against His divine law,” and those “who were unable to sacrifice personal gain for the sake of the common good and out of fraternal love.”⁶⁸ From a Christian perspective, therefore, the fundamental problem was that some Ukrainian initiatives of nation-building had diverged from the Christian faith and social values. Consequently, the solution lay in restoring the theological foundations of Ukrainian social and political ideals:

Only one thing is needed: for our entire people to understand that it is essential to return to the Lord God; for everyone to focus his life’s goal first and foremost on the Kingdom of God, on divine righteousness, on truth and justice; for people to understand that the foundation of life is [found in] the divine truths that ensure the morality (*zapevniaiut’ obychainist’*) of individuals and nations. By no other path will anyone achieve noble and enduring success.⁶⁹

That fundamental reorientation toward Christian values required a corresponding shift of focus from self-serving private interests to a collectively

64. Ibid., p. 3.

65. Ibid., p. 4.

66. Ibid. The bishops had expressed quite the same view in their pastoral letter the year before. Placing their hope in God’s mercy, they quoted the Biblical passage, “if our living Lord is angry for a little while, to rebuke and discipline us, he will again be reconciled with his own servants” (2 Macc. 7: 33). Sheptytsky et al., “Hlyboki i tiazhki...” (1918), p. 4.

67. Sheptytsky et al., “Podobalosia Vsevyshn'omu...” (1919), p. 4.

68. Ibid., p. 5.

69. Ibid., p. 6.

shared concern for the common good. The bishops therefore urged Ukrainians, “let us try to earn God’s divine grace not only for ourselves, but for everyone.”⁷⁰

This Christian theological approach to the conflict had already been manifested in a very specific show of concern for humanitarian values, which overrode any ethnic bias or favouritism. In December 1918, Metropolitan Sheptytsky and the Polish Archbishop Józef Bilczewski drafted a letter to the commanders of both warring armies. The letter raised the issue of civilian families with children who had been taken as prisoners of war, and called both sides to free such people by way of an exchange.⁷¹ And when it was charged that some members of the Ukrainian forces had been involved in drunken shooting sprees, Sheptytsky promptly responded with a letter to one of the Ukrainian commanders, requesting that he issue a new order for the humane treatment of the civilian population along with a renewed prohibition of gratuitous violence. He took the occasion to point out that even the smallest abuse of the principles of civilized warfare (*prypysiv kul'turnoho provadzhennia viiny*) would be exploited to the fullest in order to compromise the Ukrainian cause in international negotiations.⁷² Similarly, in February 1919, he wrote to the Ukrainian government and asked for the unilateral release of some thirty Roman Catholic priests held by the Ukrainian forces.⁷³ And in a letter to the Polish Archbishop, Sheptytsky thanked him for obtaining the release of two Greek Catholic priests and, in the interest of “a just rather than a one-sided reading of the situation,” he also listed Ukrainian grievances under the Polish military occupation. He concluded by urging Archbishop Bilczewski that they both continue to intervene, each on his own side, with the military authorities and thereby show “Christian charity and unity at least between ourselves.”⁷⁴

70. Ibid.

71. The Polish and Ukrainian texts of the letter were drafted separately. The Ukrainian text is: Andrei Sheptytsky and Józef Bilczewski, “Do komand obokh voiuuichykh armii” (“V tsily zlahodzennia...”), L'viv 14 December 1918, TsDIA, f. 408, op. 1t, spr. 53, ark. 15. The Polish text is: Andrzej Szeptycki and Józef Bilczewski, “Do komend obu walczących wojsk” (“W celu zlagodzenia...”), L'viv, 14 December 1918, TsDIA, f. 408, op. 1t, spr. 53, ark. 11.

72. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, [letter to an unnamed “Ataman”], L'viv, 7 November 1918 (“Distaiu vid Arkhiepyskopa Bilchevs'koho...”), TsDIA, f. 358, op. 1, spr. 404, ark. 49–50.

73. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter “Do Prezydenta Ministriv” (“Diishlo do moiei vidomosti...”), L'viv, 27 February 1919, TsDIA, f. 408, op. 1t, spr. 53, ark. 6.

74. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Archbishop Józef Bilczewski (“Jak tylko doszło...”) [L'viv, after February 1919], handwritten version, TsDIA, f. 408, op. 1t, spr. 53, ark. 9–10; typed copy: TsDIA, f. 408, op. 1t, spr. 53, ark. 7–8.

In October 1918, anticipating the imminent dissolution of Austria-Hungary, Ukrainian deputies of both the Vienna parliament and the local diets of Galicia and Bukovyna called a meeting in Lviv to discuss the future of the Ukrainian territories of Austria—Eastern Galicia, northwestern Bukovyna, and Ukrainian Transcarpathia. On 19 October, this Constituent Assembly proclaimed an independent Ukrainian state in those territories. Later that day, this act was endorsed at a meeting of some 300 delegates from all three regions. Present at both events were the Ukrainian Catholic bishops Kotsylovsky and Khomyshyn, as well as Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky. Although the Metropolitan addressed neither of those two assemblies, two weeks later, on 1 November, he officially welcomed the news that Ukrainians had seized power in Lviv with a bloodless coup.⁷⁵

In a matter of days, however, Polish forces took control of Lviv and placed Metropolitan Sheptytsky under house arrest in his residence on 3 November; he was neither permitted to receive visitors nor to enter the adjacent cathedral.⁷⁶ That forced confinement apparently lasted until the end of March 1920.⁷⁷

In January 1919, after Polish forces had conducted searches of the St. George's Cathedral complex in Lviv and seized correspondence of the Archeparchy, the Polish division commander, General Tadeusz Rozwadowski, wrote to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, charging that the Ukrainian Catholic clergy were doing nothing to prevent Ukrainians from committing alleged acts of barbarism. Rozwadowski added that an official statement by the Metropolitan could go a long way toward ending the "artificial hatred of Ukrainians for Poles."⁷⁸ Metropolitan Sheptytsky responded with an open letter of his own in which he refused to comply with the general's proposal. In the first place, he doubted whether "regrettable acts of violence" had been committed by only one side. Second, as he did not have access to complete and accurate information, the Metropolitan suggested that an international commission be set up to give an impartial hearing to both sides. Third, he emphasized that any official statement he might make and that was known to have been either "inspired by the

75. Stepan Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, pp. 89–90.

76. Ibid., p. 90; [Vladimir Temnitzky], *Polish Atrocities in Ukrainian Galicia: A Telegraphic Note to M. Georges Clémenceau from Vladimir Temnitzky and Joseph Burachinsky* (New York, 1919), p. 16, cited in Kravcheniuk, *Veleten' zo Sviatoiurs'koï Hory*, p. 67. See also Korolevskij, *Métropolitane André Szeptyckyj*, p. 174.

77. "Memoriial ukraïns'koho Posol'stva do papy Benedykta XV," 30 March 1920, in Ivan Khoma, "Ukraïns'ke Posol'stvo pry Apostol's'komu Prestoli, 1919–1921," *Bohosloviia* 45 (1981), document N°7, p. 47.

78. Letter of General Rozwadowski to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, 1 or 2 January 1919, French translation in Korolevskij, *Métropolitane André Szeptyckyj*, p. 407.

commander of the Polish army or written under his threat” would certainly fail to persuade the Ukrainian public.⁷⁹

Despite his reluctance to accede to the general’s request, Sheptytsky did not set aside pressing humanitarian concerns. When the Polish army interned thousands of Ukrainians, among them some 600 priests, he intervened with the authorities. A good number of them were released, only to be confined to quarters by the military authorities.⁸⁰ The Metropolitan also intervened with Ukrainian military authorities on behalf of Poles. While Ukrainian forces controlled Eastern Galicia, some Polish priests were interned. The Metropolitan sent a memorandum to the President of the State Secretariat (Rada Derzhavnykh Sekretariv) asking for their release, and on 9 March 1919, the Latin-rite priests were freed.⁸¹

Another hotly contested issue at this time was education for Ukrainians. As Polish administrative control of Galicia extended to education, Ukrainian university students and professors staunchly refused to swear allegiance to Poland. Their punishment was exclusion from the university; all attempts to seek alternatives (such as studying abroad or organizing underground courses) were similarly quashed. Police harassment of Ukrainian educators and students was common. After almost two years of such tensions, on 30 June 1920, twenty-three prominent Ukrainians representing cultural and academic institutions signed an open letter of protest against the Polish suppression of Ukrainian education in Galicia.⁸² Listing abuse after abuse, the document charged, “the aim that Poland

79. Letter of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky to General Rozwadowski, 4 January 1919, French translation (“J’ai reçu hier...”) in Korolevskij, *Métropolitaine André Szeptyckyj*, pp. 408–10.

80. “Memoriial ukrains’koho posol’sstva do Papy Benedykta XV,” 30 March 1920, in Khoma, “Ukrains’ke Posol’sstvo,” p. 47.

81. Ibid. See also Korolevskij, *Métropolitaine André Szeptyckyj*, p. 167.

82. “Aux Académies des Sciences, Universités et autres Sociétés Scientifiques du monde entier,” open letter of Ukrainian cultural and academic leaders, L’viv, 30 June 1920, in the Ivan Petrushevykh Collection, National Archives of Canada, MG 30–C51, Reel M-5227, File “Petrushevykh II: Ukraine, Galicia and Polish Terror.” The following are some of the grievances included in the letter.

With only two exceptions, all Ukrainian university professors had refused to swear an oath of allegiance to Poland. As a result, they lost their positions and were prohibited from teaching in Ukrainian (in a region where an estimated 70% of the population was Ukrainian).

Ukrainian students were not admitted to university unless they had first sworn allegiance to Poland and served in the Polish army. Those who tried to study abroad were either refused an exit visa or arrested. In June 1919, the Polish militia was brought in to disperse Ukrainian students at the university. At the end of 1918, the Polish government closed the doors of Lviv University and of the Lviv Polytechnical Institute to Ukrainian

is pursuing in Galicia is nothing but the systematic destruction of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.” Signing for the Ukrainian National Museum in Lviv were its director, Ivan Svientsitsky, and its founder, Andrei, Count Sheptytsky.

In his interventions after the Polish takeover of Lviv, therefore, Metropolitan Sheptytsky concentrated mainly on the defence of the fundamental rights of Ukrainians. Yet, at the same time, the humanitarian dimension of his activity continued to include a concern for the welfare of Ukrainians and Poles alike.

The Metropolitan's Mission Abroad

The final portion of this transitional, second period of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's activity was a three-year journey, from November 1920 to October 1923, through western Europe, Canada, the United States, Brazil and Argentina, and then back again to Europe via North America. The main purpose of the Metropolitan's voyage was to seek economic assistance and political support for Ukrainians in Galicia. Economically, the country was in crisis, having been devastated by a succession of wars and military occupations; relief was desperately needed. Politically, Galician Ukrainians were actively seeking international support for their aspirations to national self-determination; Sheptytsky endorsed those aspirations and tried to advocate them before the international political community.⁸³ What we have reconstructed here are at best the main lines of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's activity in a period that will no doubt prove a fertile field for future research, particularly valuable because of its international setting.

A key reason why Metropolitan Sheptytsky set out on his journey was to seek economic relief for victims of the wars in Galicia. By his account, since 1914, the territory of Galicia had been crossed four times by warring armies. In many

students and professors.

When the Ukrainian Shevchenko Scientific Society organized its own alternative faculties, the Polish government abrogated them on 27 September 1919. Similarly, on 9 March 1920, police and army units were sent in to disperse organizers and participants in university courses that had been organized by the Stauropegion Institute in Lviv.

The protest letter may have served to inform the international community, but it failed to change the situation. For example, when the Greek Catholic seminary in Lviv was reopened at the end of 1920, after having been closed for some two years, more than half of the building was unavailable for use because it was reserved for Polish soldiers. “Pekucha sprava,” *Nyva* 15, nos. 5–6 (November–December 1920): 113.

83. To date, the only detailed study of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's three-year mission abroad is M. H. Marunchak, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi na Zakhodi, 1920–1923* (Winnipeg and Edmonton, 1981), which gives a good introductory survey of the Metropolitan's itinerary, his economic and diplomatic representations, and coverage of his visits by local newspapers. The first monographic treatment of this period is currently being researched by the American historian Maria Klachko.

areas, the trenches were so dense that the cultivation of fields was virtually impossible; homeless Ukrainian families, which in the Metropolitan's estimate numbered thirty thousand, often had no other recourse but to live in the abandoned trenches. Unsanitary conditions led to the spread of black typhus and an infant mortality rate that hovered around 50 per cent. Homeless orphans were in the tens of thousands. Compounding this human tragedy was a devaluation of currency in Galicia so drastic that lifetime savings were wiped out in a matter of months. As for the Polish government, whose forces now occupied the region, it seemed unable to alleviate the grave economic situation.⁸⁴

As he travelled through North America (from August 1921 to April 1922), the Metropolitan spoke about those socio-economic hardships in Galicia, emphasizing in particular the plight of the homeless orphans.⁸⁵ In a letter to the New York-based Joint Distribution Committee of the American Funds for Jewish War Sufferers, Sheptytsky explained that his mission was "to help the poorest of the poor, viz., the helpless, abandoned orphans of all denominations in a country ravaged by war and pernicious Bolshevik mismanagement, economic and spiritual."⁸⁶ Although the available information about the success of the fund-

84. [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], *Address of Archbishop Andrew Szeptycki about the Catholic Missionary Work* (1922), p. 15. Particularly distressing was the lot of orphans, whose care posed a special problem: "We have organized twenty orphan asylums, but it is difficult enough to give the children even the barest necessities of life. The children taken into the asylums are often so depressed by the tragedy of their young lives that the Sisters, who are as mothers to them, must give them many months of loving care before they can draw a smile from the little ones. The Sisters teach games and cheerful songs, but the children repeat them with a seriousness and sorrow which would befit a man of seventy years. The young lives of little boys and girls of three to twelve years are filled with more sorrow than the lifetimes of many old men.

Those children who still have their fathers and mothers have a life not much better than the orphans. A poor mother told me once in tears, 'I am glad that three of my children are dead, because I can give a little more to eat to the other three who are alive'" (ibid.). See also Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, *Address at St. Augustine's Seminary in Toronto*, 26 August 1922 ("I will first speak..."), p. 109.

85. Emilien Tremblay, *Le père Delaere et l'Eglise Ukrainienne du Canada* (Berthierville, 1960), p. 252; "Primate of Galicia Welcomed to City," *Philadelphia Inquirer* (18 November 1921), p. 2; "Velyke torzhestvo v Shamokin, Pa.," *Misionar* 6, no. 2 (February 1922): 45; Marunchak, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi na Zakhodi*, p. 9.

86. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, Letter to Felix M. Warburg, Joint Distribution Committee of the American Funds for Jewish War Sufferers, New York City, 5 April 1922, in Joint (Distribution Committee) Archives, file N°468, "Ukrainian Provinces Diocesan Relief Fund, 1922," p. 1. In his letter to Mr. Warburg, the Metropolitan stressed the non-denominational nature of his relief effort and asked Warburg to assist him in seeking prominent Jews to join the Diocesan Relief Committee. He pointed out that the material support of American Jews "would have a great influence upon the mentality of

raising campaign is scanty,⁸⁷ it is known that what was collected enabled the Metropolitan to establish other orphanages in Galicia.⁸⁸

The second aspect of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's activity abroad was diplomatic and involved the advocacy of Ukrainian self-determination in anticipation of the decision of the Council of Ambassadors in Paris. As a member of the Ukrainian National Rada (Council), headed by its president-in-exile, Ievhen Petrushevysh, Sheptytsky remained in close touch with Ukrainian political and diplomatic missions during his travels. And in meetings with foreign dignitaries, the Metropolitan tried to convey the concerns of Ukrainians about the political future of Galicia. For example, in November 1921, he submitted a memorandum on the subject to U.S. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes.⁸⁹ And it was in the United States that the Metropolitan explained his sense of obligation in this matter as follows: "As long as I have the strength, I consider it my duty to assist our people and our Church. If the Council of Ambassadors were to turn Galicia over to Poland, I would consider myself at fault if, while in the European capitals and in Washington, I had not done everything that was possible to represent and defend our cause."⁹⁰

Metropolitan Sheptytsky was in Paris on the eve of the momentous decision of the Council of Ambassadors concerning the political future of Galicia. On 14

the population and upon the attitude of Christian toward Jew" and would help to "dissipate the animosity which unfortunately still exists" (ibid.).

Felix Warburg was impressed by the sincerity with which the Metropolitan conveyed his humanitarian concerns, and was initially inclined to lend assistance. However, after a meeting with Kenneth Reid, a representative of New York Archbishop Patrick J. Hayes, Warburg was of the opinion that as "a prelate of the Roman [*sic*] Catholic Church," the Metropolitan was probably "in a position of antagonism to the Orthodox Russian Church"; that he was "at odds with the priesthood of his own Church"; and that he was "apparently not persona grata to the Polish authorities." Felix M. Warburg, draft letter to Dr. Boris D. Bogen (marked: "not sent"), 5 May 1922, in Joint (Distribution Committee) Archives, file N°468: "Ukrainian Provinces Diocesan Relief Fund, 1922," p. 1. This raised doubts in Warburg's mind, and Sheptytsky apparently never heard from him.

87. Pope Benedict XV gave 100,000 lire for the relief of Ukrainians in Galicia. Marunchak, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi na Zakhodi*, pp. 12, 29. In Canada, Bishop Budka donated \$2,000.00 on behalf of Ukrainian Canadians, while a separate collection in Edmonton yielded another \$2,000.00. Marunchak, *ibid.*, pp. 21, 23.

88. Ann Slusarczyk Sirka, "Sheptyts'kyi in Education and Philanthropy," *Life and Times*, p. 286, n. 38.

89. Marunchak, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi na Zakhodi*, p. 28.

90. "Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi v Amerytsi. Iz spohadiv pro Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho," *Tserkovnyi Kalendar-Almanakh na 1979 r.* (Chicago, 1979), p. 79, cited in Marunchak, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi na Zakhodi*, p. 28.

March 1923, he met with French President Raymond Poincaré, to whom he explained that Ukrainians “would never accept Polish domination and that [Polish sovereignty in Eastern Galicia] would be the beginning of eternal disquiet, of a state of war.”⁹¹ The Metropolitan was also to have met Jules Cambon, the President of the Council of Ambassadors, in an attempt to express Ukrainian concerns. Having thus done what he could, the Metropolitan looked forward to the council’s decision with a prayer: “God grant that our cause may be decided according to His will (*po Bozhomu*)—so that our people may at least have the freedom to develop in a natural way.”⁹²

On 15 March, the Council of Ambassadors gave Eastern Galicia to Poland. The Metropolitan’s commitment to the Ukrainian cause and his efforts in Paris had failed to achieve the desired result. But the three-year absence had not diminished his keen grasp of socio-political conditions in Galicia: in the following two decades, his prediction of Ukrainian unrest would prove all too accurate.

This second period of Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s social thought and activity (1914–23) may be characterized with reference to the main focus in each of its three phases: church unity, the restoration of clerical cadres, and the economic and political future of Galicia. Each of those issues had its ethical underpinnings, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky showed both an awareness of them and a readiness to address them.

Under his guidance, the sobor in Petrograd showed sensitivity to the concerns of Orthodox believers who wished to become Catholic: while affirming papal primacy, the newly constituted Eastern-rite Catholic Church in Russia would require no special oath of loyalty to the pope by its faithful, and the sobor left aside completely the question of papal infallibility.⁹³ No less important in this respect was the sobor’s endorsement of Eastern liturgical and canonical traditions. Following through on other resolutions of the sobor, Metropolitan Sheptytsky tried to establish a framework for the church’s *modus vivendi* with the post-tsarist Russian state, one that would balance coexistence with jurisdictional independence. For it was the state that had to grant the church its legal right to exist, and the Metropolitan’s successful appeal in the matter centred on the revolution’s affirmation of religious liberty. At the same time, the sobor

91. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to the Rev. Lazar Berezovsky, O.S.B.M., Paris, 13–14 March 1923 (“*Ia pryikhav shchaslyvo...*”), in Irynei Nazarko, “Aktsiia Mytropolita Andreia Sheptyts'koho na peredodni rishennia Rady Ambasadoriv 1923 r.,” *Analecta O.S.B.M.*, Series 2, Sectio 2, vol. 3, fasc. 3–4 (Rome, 1960), p. 453.

92. Sheptytsky, letter to Berezovsky (1923), p. 453.

93. Ivan Muzyczka, “Sheptyts'kyi in the Russian Empire,” in *Life and Times*, pp. 322–23.

took a strong stand in favour of the separation (understood as the jurisdictional distinctiveness) of church and state. In so doing, the sobor also abolished the archaic institution of parish patronage rights that still existed in Galicia.

On the home front, the years between late 1917 and late 1920 were a chaotic time of continuing war, occupation, and idealistic attempts to restore social order. The Greek Catholic bishops addressed themselves to the pressing need for leaders in Ukrainian society by calling for a new breed and calibre of Ukrainian Catholic priest: patriotic, dedicated to the common good (understood here primarily in relation to the task of nation-building) and, if possible, celibate. In external relations, Metropolitan Sheptytsky advocated the internationally accepted principle of self-determination as the strongest foundation for Ukrainian aspirations to nationhood.⁹⁴

Throughout this period, the unfolding of human history was interpreted in light of divine providence. Thus, the fall of tsarism was welcomed as a blessing and source of hope, and was likened to the fall of demonic idols, while the takeover of Galicia by Polish forces in 1919 was cast as an apocalyptic drama having both natural and supernatural dimensions.

From the point of view of social ethics, the final segment of this period, the Metropolitan's three-year mission abroad, may be said to have been pure praxis. For action was desperately needed, rather than reflection, in order to secure economic and political assistance for Galicia. Such was the many-faceted and troubled transition through which Metropolitan Sheptytsky, both in Galicia and abroad, accompanied his people into the interwar years.

94. Sheptytsky would later explain this commitment in direct relation to his commitment to the Christian foundations of Ukrainian society: "Naturellement que dans toutes les questions où toute la nation était solidaire dans la poursuite d'un bien qui lui était justement dû, je ne pouvais m'opposer à son désir ni même rester indifférent sans nuire à la cause catholique dans le coeur de mes fidèles." Sheptytsky, "Rapport au Père Gennochi," in *ERSS-LGE*, p. 26 (1: 82).

CHAPTER 3

The Struggle for Justice within Poland (1923–1939)

The third major period of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's archepiscopal activity began with his return to Lviv after the fateful decision of the Council of Ambassadors in Paris in March 1923. That decision signalled international consensus that the matter of Western Ukraine was closed and put an end to Ukrainian diplomatic representations. Thenceforth, moderate Ukrainians in Poland would struggle for minority rights and regional autonomy within the limits of Polish law and parliamentary procedure; others, rejecting Polish rule in Eastern Galicia, joined the nationalist underground, which aimed to overthrow what it saw as foreign rule. In this chapter, we examine Metropolitan Sheptytsky's responses to social issues that emerged in interwar Poland. Three major areas stand out in the Metropolitan's social writings and activity at this time—the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church's struggle against communism, its position vis-à-vis the Polish state, and the response to Ukrainian nationalism in view of the future of the Ukrainian people.

Communism

The social question and the various forms of conflict between the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and socialism, upon which Metropolitan Sheptytsky had focused attention during the Austrian period, continued to be a matter of urgent concern during the interwar Polish period. In particular, the Metropolitan felt that the October Revolution in Russia, which had effectively installed a communist regime on Galicia's eastern border, increased the threat to the church and the faith. Looking back at this interwar period in 1939, he wrote that the social question, which had originated at the time of Pope Leo XIII,

...became a great threat to the Church and humanity during the pontificate of Pius XI in the form of communism, which has captured a great world power and which uses and abuses every [available] means and international politics in order to shatter nations and states and to carry out a worldwide revolution.¹

1. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "V dva dni...", pastoral letter to the clergy and the faithful on the feast day of the Three Hierarchs, *LAeV* 52, no. 2 (February 1939), reprinted in Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, *Tvory (moral'no-pastoral'ni)* (Rome, 1983) (hereafter 05–83), p. 87.

In historical terms, he was convinced that in this period he and his people had seen a “false idea” (Marxism) expand internationally to such an extent that it had become “a force that threatens the whole world with global revolution.”² The Soviet Union represented to him a consolidation of anticlerical and atheistic forces and, as such, a threat to Christian societies everywhere. His prediction during the Austrian period of the emergence of “two mutually hostile camps” appeared now to have been fulfilled. The establishment of a communist and officially atheistic state, he felt, had given a tremendous boost to atheism on the world scene; until the revolution, atheists may have appeared to be exceptions in many societies, but now, with the regime’s support, atheism was “spreading like a terrible disease throughout the whole world.”³ The Metropolitan sensed an urgency in the situation; the “frenzied advance of the kingdom of Satan” was under way⁴ and it was only a matter of time before communism would assert itself in Galicia, as it already had done in other European countries. When it did, Ukrainian Catholics would be subjected to the supreme test of their faith: “...ruthless persecution may place us face to face with the need to defend our faith even unto death, even, if necessary, unto readiness to shed our blood for the cause of the holy faith.”⁵

But the Metropolitan did not perceive communism only as an external threat. In addition to the upheaval in Russia, with all its international consequences, communism was present in Galicia as well, primarily centred around the Communist Party of Western Ukraine.⁶ Throughout the 1920s and early 30s, that party had had a relatively isolated existence because of its hostility to virtually every other political grouping in Western Ukraine. But in 1934 it began to approach the socialist parties with proposals to form a united front that would bring together previously disparate leftist formations under a common banner of

2. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Slovo Mytropolyta-Iuvyliata vyholoshene u L'vovi dnia 18/VI 1939 u 40-littia Svoho epyskopstva,” (“Dozvol'te meni...”), in *Nyva* 34, nos. 7–8 (July-August 1939): 278.

3. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “I stalosia...,” pastoral letter to the clergy and the faithful, *LAeV* 45, no. 5 (15 May 1932): 2; reprinted in *05–83*, p. 4.

4. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., “Z voli i ustanovy...,” collective pastoral letter to the clergy and the faithful on the feast day of St. Andrew, *LAeV* 49, no. 12 (December 1936), reprinted in *05–83*, p. 472.

5. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro iednist' Tserkvy,” *LAeV* 51, no. 1 (January 1938), reprinted in *05–83*, p. 348.

6. Two excellent studies of the party are Roman Solchanyk, “The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919–1938,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973; and Janusz Radziejowski, *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919–1929*, trans. Alan Rutkowski (Edmonton, 1983).

“anti-fascism.”⁷ And on 16–17 May 1936, an “Anti-Fascist Congress of Cultural Workers” took place in Lviv; organized by the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, the congress represented one of the greatest successes of the party’s united-front tactics.⁸

As if those new initiatives by communists toward broadening their base of public support were not a sufficient cause for concern, Metropolitan Sheptytsky noted that the communists of Western Ukraine were aiming an aggressive recruitment campaign at the Christian community as well. Thus, when he addressed the Ukrainian Catholic clergy and faithful in 1936 with a pastoral letter that pointed to communism as the main “danger of the present moment,” Sheptytsky sounded the alarm on the propaganda campaign to which Ukrainian Catholics were being subjected. The wolf had taken on sheep’s clothing: the communists, he declared, had undertaken a campaign of deception; they were “pretending to be believers and were sacrilegiously receiving the Holy Sacraments.”⁹ Indeed, Ukrainian parish priests were reporting a significant increase in sacramental devotions, particularly among people who had not been practicing Christians or who had been widely known or suspected of being communists. Seeing this as a deliberately deceptive cover for the communists’ true aim (to win Christians over to their cause), Sheptytsky described the scenario of infiltration in the following way:

From Moscow there came a directive to all communists of the world: the supreme authority in Moscow commands all communists who are of Christian descent, that is, those who are baptized, to pretend to be the most pious and sincere of Christians. They are to confess their sins, receive Communion, and join all the brotherhoods and associations where Christians are working. Everywhere they are to pretend to be pious Christians so as to fool and deceive true, believing Christians all the more successfully.... In that way, their leaders tell them, “you will be better able to incite the people against the priest and the Church.”¹⁰

Metropolitan Sheptytsky was further concerned that this danger was compounded by the general vulnerability of Ukrainian Catholics to such tactics. Many, he noted, “believe the Bolsheviks and think that it is possible to help them

7. Solchanyk, “The Communist Party of Western Ukraine,” pp. 305–7.

8. Ibid., p. 307. Among other forms of united-front activity, there was a joint action protesting the Polish government’s increasing authoritarianism, as well as the organization of committees in defence of political prisoners, and demonstrations in support of the international brigades fighting in Spain. On the Congress in Lviv, see also *Proty fashyzmu ta viiny: Antyfashysts'kyi Kongres diiachiv kul'tury u L'vovi u 1936 r. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kyiv, 1984).

9. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Nebezpeka teperishn'oï khvylyny...,” *LAeV* 49, nos. 7–9 (July–September 1936), reprinted in 05–83, pp. 274–89.

10. Ibid., p. 277.

without grave sin.” Aware of the Stalinist suppression of the church,¹¹ the Metropolitan warned his people that the conciliatory overtures were but a recruitment tactic, and that the Bolsheviks’ hostility toward Christianity was historically unprecedented; in fact, one of the main aims of the communists was to destroy the church altogether. In their efforts to achieve that goal, they were committed to “a revolutionary struggle as part of which they manage to burn churches, murder priests and faithful, and destroy the faith in people’s hearts.”¹² The Metropolitan pointed to such consequences of Bolshevism in Russia, Soviet Ukraine, Mexico and Spain. This led him to conclude that “wherever the Bolshevik Communists appear, there churches begin immediately to burn and innocent blood flows in swelling streams.”¹³ Considering the anti-religious and destructive character of Bolshevism, the Metropolitan was convinced that any Christian complicity with it amounted to an act of religious treason. “Is it not obvious,” he asked in 1936, “that to help such enemies of Christ is to betray Christ and His Holy Church?”¹⁴ And, as he had argued earlier, the gravity of religious treason exceeded by far even the betrayal of one’s own country.¹⁵

In Sheptytsky’s assessment, therefore, Bolshevism represented a form of militant atheism that was making its way into the European political order and posed a formidable threat to the Catholic Church and Christian social principles. Although the communists had not yet acquired political power in Polish Galicia, the Metropolitan noted that aggressive communist agitation was present within the church and that the consolidation of the political left in an anti-fascist united

11. The pastoral letter on communism revealed Sheptytsky’s detailed grasp of the religious situation in Soviet Ukraine. Although he would certainly have relied on many private sources of information, the Stalinist suppression of the Ukrainian and Russian churches and of the Jewish faith had been amply covered in the Ukrainian Catholic press in Poland since the early 1920s. See, for example, “Rosiiia,” *Nyva* 17, no. 10 (October 1922): 377, on the confiscation of church property; “Rosiiia,” *Nyva* 20, no. 1 (January 1925): 38, on the liquidation of monasteries, the burning of icons, and antireligious propaganda; “Ukraïna,” *Nyva* 20, no. 1 (January 1925): 39–40, on the desecration of a church by a detachment of the Communist Youth League, and on arrests of priests and rabbis. Such reports continued through the 1930s; see “Dal’shyi plian borot’by z religiieiu v bol’shevii,” *Nyva* 27, no. 10 (October 1932): 382–83, on a proposed five-year plan (for the years 1932–37) in the Soviet struggle against religion. Other periodicals in Western Europe, notably *La Documentation Catholique* (Paris), also reported regularly on the persecution of religion in the USSR.

12. Sheptytsky, “Nebezpeka...” (1936), in 05–83, p. 275.

13. Ibid., p. 276.

14. Ibid., p. 277.

15. “The betrayal of Christ and of His Church is a worse and more terrible offence than a soldier’s treason, worse than the betrayal of one’s country.” Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Poslannia do dukhovenstva na Velykyi Pist” (1935), in 05–83, p. 227.

front was ultimately directed against the church, since it served to reinforce militant atheism. The communist threat to the Greek Catholic Church in Poland was therefore a matter of urgent concern.

In order to counter this occasion for apostasy and prevent any further successes of communist recruitment among Christians, Metropolitan Sheptytsky in his 1936 pastoral proclaimed three theses against collaboration with the communists. They were: “whoever helps the communists, even in purely political work, betrays the Church”; “whoever helps the communists in carrying out their plans for a united, so-called ‘popular’ or ‘people’s front’ with the socialists and the radicals betrays his people”; and “whoever helps the communists in any of their activities, and especially in the organization of the so-called ‘popular’ or ‘people’s front,’ betrays the cause of the poor, the suffering and the oppressed in the whole world.”¹⁶

Behind those three theses on collaboration as treason was the fundamental premise that the proponents of the united front were operating on direct instructions from one source. As far as the Metropolitan was concerned, the united front’s tactical decision to reduce its hostility to the Christian faith and the sacraments, as well as toward other political formations, had originated in Moscow.¹⁷ In support of such a linkage, he pointed to the pattern of religious persecution, social enslavement and common-front tactics in Mexico, Spain, France, Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine: “everywhere one goal and one tactic reveals one leader...in all those instances we will find one hand that betrays one leadership.”¹⁸

The Metropolitan saw little difference between the situation in the Soviet Union and the priorities and work of Bolsheviks elsewhere: “Wherever they manage to stir up confusion and revolution, there immediately emerges that

16. Sheptytsky, “Nebezpeka...” (1936), p. 275.

17. Ibid., pp. 275, 277–78, 280, 281.

Roman Solchanyk points out that “beginning in 1928–1929 the Comintern began to exercise a much greater degree of influence within individual communist parties, steadily reducing their role to the mechanical execution of directives formulated in Moscow” (“The Communist Party of Western Ukraine,” p. 303). This would appear to support the Metropolitan’s assessment. However, not all united-front tactics were coming into Poland from the east. For example, after the outbreak of the war in Spain, the French government of Léon Blum made representations in Poland in an attempt to persuade it to join an anti-fascist alliance. See Bohdan Budurowycz, “Sheptyts'kyi and the Ukrainian National Movement after 1914,” in *Morality and Reality*, p. 57.

18. Sheptytsky, “Nebezpeka...” (1936), p. 281.

whole Muscovite program that has been practised in Moscow for a long time. So it was and is in Mexico, so it was and is in Spain.”¹⁹

This linkage of the popular front with the designs of Moscow was at the centre of the Metropolitan’s argument that collaboration with the popular front constituted a threefold betrayal of the church, of the Ukrainian people, and of the cause of the poor and oppressed of the world: support for the popular front amounted to support for the religious, social and economic conditions prevailing in Soviet Ukraine. We shall now consider each of the three essential arguments against collaboration with the communists more closely.

Cooperation with the communists amounted to a betrayal of the church, according to Sheptytsky, because one of the main goals of Bolshevism was the destruction of the church.²⁰ He saw evidence for this in the Soviet Union, where many village churches had been closed, burned down or transformed into granaries or movie theaters, and where priests were being murdered and driven into destitution.²¹ In his estimation, the bloody suppression of Christianity in the USSR had cost “tens and possibly hundreds of thousands of Christian lives,” including those of many Orthodox priests and bishops. He noted that communists often boasted that “within a few years there would not remain a single Church in all of Soviet Russia or Soviet-occupied Ukraine.”²²

At its root, this systematic repression of Christianity was grounded in lies, in Sheptytsky’s view. The Soviets could well point to constitutional guarantees that protected freedom of conscience and religious toleration, or to a single church in an area that was allowed to remain open as “proof” of that toleration, but Sheptytsky was convinced that their militant atheism knew no compromise and that in their attitude toward Christianity “the Bolsheviks are honest only when

19. Ibid., p. 276.

20. Ibid., p. 275. The Metropolitan further explained that in the Soviet Union, “Churches are being closed with the aim of destroying religion. Sometimes the farce of ‘the expressed will of the people’ is invoked, but more often churches are turned into theatres even without that pretext. Wherever the people are sufficiently inclined to favour the retention of a church and its pastor, such heavy taxes are levied on those churches that it becomes impossible to maintain them. Priests are prohibited from teaching catechism to children, and young people are submitted to a truly diabolical system of depravation, of the demoralization of children from their youngest years” (ibid., p. 276).

21. Ibid., p. 286. In his 1937 preface to a pastoral letter of the Spanish episcopate, Sheptytsky again signalled the same pattern of religious oppression in Spain, where churches were being destroyed and priests murdered. [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], “Pastyrs'ke poslannia espans'kykh epyskopiv: vstupne slovo Vysokopreosv. Mytropolyta” (“Espaniia bula...”) (December 1937), in 05–83, pp. 474–75.

22. Sheptytsky, “Nebezpeka...” (1936), p. 276.

they express their hatred of God and of the revealed religion.”²³ The anti-religious character of Bolshevism was evident not only in the persecution of Christians, but also in the cultivation of atheism, whether in the form of the “pagan” deification of Lenin or in the propagation of atheistic ideas among young people.²⁴

Of course, the elimination of religious values necessarily had grave social consequences. In the USSR, Sheptytsky observed, the institution of marriage had been transformed into a contract that could be unilaterally broken before a commissar. The consequences included single mothers abandoned by “men without conscience” and an abortion rate so high that even the government had become alarmed and was beginning to search for ways to stem it, even as thousands of homeless children roamed the land.²⁵ The Metropolitan was convinced that precisely because it had stamped out Christian family values (conscience, chastity, fidelity to vows and obligations), the “machine of social life” in the USSR had fallen into disrepair.²⁶ Taking account of the socially destructive record of Soviet Bolshevism, and of its method of supplanting Christian social values with a “materialistic and pagan religion” and filling young minds with “thoughts that God does not exist and that religion is a poison,” Metropolitan Sheptytsky became convinced that any assistance extended to such “enemies of Christ” amounted to a betrayal of Christ and of the church.²⁷

On 26 August 1936, several weeks after his pastoral on communism, the Metropolitan returned to the subject of Christian apostates to communism, describing in greater detail the nature and gravity of their religious betrayal:

They are always ready to stab even their father’s back; on orders from their leaders, they are ready to burn down their own home and to kill their own brother. Such are those who have dedicated themselves forever to the service of Bolsheviks or communists and have believed them to such an extent that they have completely discarded their faith in Jesus Christ, their love for the Blessed Virgin Mary, and no longer pay any heed to the reproaches of their own conscience.²⁸

What Metropolitan Sheptytsky feared most about communism, therefore, was not only the physical destruction of the church, the demolition of individual

23. Ibid. See also: “Communists are atheists; in their program there is no point on which they are more sincere than they are on this one—the struggle against God” (ibid., p. 275).

24. Ibid., pp. 275–76, 285–86.

25. Ibid., pp. 286–87.

26. Ibid., p. 287.

27. Ibid., p. 275–77.

28. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prychashchalsia” (“Po zakinchenomu chasi...”), *LAeV* 49, nos. 10–11 (October–November 1936), reprinted in 05–83, pp. 290–91.

parish churches, and the murder of priests. No less than these, he feared the social demoralization that would necessarily follow when the Christian foundations of social life were uprooted.

The Metropolitan's second argument against the Soviet system and its agents abroad focused on its economic policies. He summarized it in the statement: "Whoever helps the communists organize the 'Popular Front' betrays the cause of the poor, the suffering and the oppressed."²⁹ Sheptytsky charged that, contrary to their claim of having done away with capitalism, the Bolsheviks had actually permitted capitalism to evolve into its "most extreme and unjust form," that of state monopoly.³⁰ This had spelled disaster for the Soviet republics, "which are seemingly free on paper but in reality are groaning under the yoke of blood-stained Moscow."³¹ Through its monopoly on the means of production, through heavy hidden taxes and the use of unpaid labour, through its takeovers of small, private enterprises, the state was, in the Metropolitan's words, "sucking the blood of the people."³² The state's monopoly also extended to the land; the introduction of collective farms had involved the seizure of family farms and created a situation in which peasants were forced "to work on their land for the benefit of the government."³³ Thus deprived of their chief means of subsistence, many were driven to desperation.

Nor was there any recourse for those who might want to oppose such measures: arbitrary arrests and convictions without trial ensured a steady flow of manpower to the hard-labour camps on the Solovets Islands and in Siberia, where the Metropolitan estimated that several hundred thousand people had already been sent.³⁴ As for any opposition to the collectivization of farmland,

29. Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), pp. 275, 282. Metropolitan Sheptytsky's economic argument on communism was actually his third objection. Since it sheds considerable light on both the substantive and the emotional content of the second, political objection, we discuss them here in reverse order.

30. Ibid., pp. 283, 284. In this instance, as in his earlier economic pastoral letter, *O kvestii sotsiial'nii* (1904), Metropolitan Sheptytsky had no qualms about criticizing capitalism in what concerned social justice: "No one doubts and everyone admits that capitalism has its negative side and that it is the cause of many injustices and wrongs against the poor and the oppressed" (ibid., p. 283). The Metropolitan believed that the Christian social values of justice and love of neighbour could neutralize or lessen the harmfulness of "such evil systems as capitalism." In his words, "Justice and love of neighbour keep people from exploiting their economic superiority as much or even at all..." (ibid., p. 287).

31. Ibid., p. 284.

32. Ibid., pp. 282–85.

33. Ibid., pp. 284–85.

34. Ibid., pp. 284, 286, 288. The Solovets Islands on the White Sea (northeast of

the solution was quite simple: “the Cheka surrounds the village and sets it afire, allowing no one to escape from the burning houses.”³⁵

In effect, the Bolsheviks had declared economic war on the peasants. Nowhere was this more evident than in the famine that had struck Soviet Ukraine three years earlier. In July 1933, after news of the famine had reached the Archeparchy of Lviv, Metropolitan Sheptytsky and the entire Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy responded with a statement of protest, condemning Soviet communism as a “cannibalistic system of state capitalism”:

Today we see the consequences of the Bolsheviks’ ways; the situation worsens daily. The enemies of God and of humanity have rejected religion, the foundation of the social order; they have deprived people of freedom, the greatest human good; they have turned peasant citizens into slaves; and they lack the wisdom to nourish them in return for their slavish work and the sweat of their brow.³⁶

On 17 October, the Ukrainian bishops again protested against “the crimes of the Bolshevik authorities” and called on the faithful to offer prayers, penitence

Leningrad) were the site of three monasteries in which rebellious Russian priests had been interned during the Middle Ages. After the Russian Revolution, the monasteries were transformed into the Solovets Special Purpose (i.e., forced-labour) camp.

35. Ibid., p. 286. Cheka was the acronym for the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-revolution and Sabotage.

36. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Ukraïna v peredsmertnykh sudorohakh,” *Nyva* 28, no. 8 (August 1933): 281–82. The cited text is from the English translation in Andrii Krawchuk, “Protesting against the Famine: The Statement of the Ukrainian Catholic Bishops in 1933,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 8, no. 2 (Winter 1983): 61.

Nor was Metropolitan Sheptytsky alone in blaming the Bolsheviks for the famine in Soviet Ukraine. Among the voices of protest in Western Ukraine at that time, there was a joint appeal of three Ukrainian socialist parties—the Social Democratic Workers’ Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Radical Party. Addressed to all socialist organizations of the world, the statement condemned Soviet economic policy: “We declare that the single and the obvious cause of the famine in Soviet Ukraine is the unscrupulous economic exploitation of the Ukrainian people by the Bolshevik dictatorship, which considers Ukraine its colony.... The communist authorities are covering up the fact of the famine in Ukraine...in order to continue their exploitation of the country that has been starved and destroyed by experiments in collectivization.” *Tryzub* 9, nos. 30–31 (27 August 1933): 41.

The Metropolitan knew that the effects of the famine in Ukraine had been exacerbated by the global economic crisis: “The general crisis has obviously had an impact on us. Perhaps it has been worse elsewhere, but it really seems that nowhere can it be worse than in Great Ukraine, where apparently millions of people have already starved to death, and where death by famine awaits millions more.” Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Khoto vynen?” (“Koly v ostannikh...”), *LAeV* 47, no. 3 (March 1934), reprinted in *OS*–83, p. 123.

and alms to assist the work of the Ukrainian Relief Committee.³⁷ And three years later, Sheptytsky again placed the blame for what he estimated to be “more than three million deaths by famine” in Soviet Ukraine squarely upon the Bolsheviks.³⁸ The Metropolitan therefore concluded that cooperation with the communists meant supporting and extending an economic system that exploited and oppressed the peasants. It amounted to a betrayal of the interests of the poor through collaboration with the builders of an illusory paradise.³⁹

Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s final objection to collaboration with communists was that it also entailed the betrayal of one’s people. In light of the famine in Ukraine during 1932–33, he believed that, along with the destruction of the church, one of the purposes of the “popular front” was to find unwitting accomplices for the fulfillment of a diabolical project: “to destroy the Ukrainian people and to erase them as completely as possible from the face of the earth.”⁴⁰ In support of this accusation of a specifically anti-Ukrainian, genocidal intent on the part of the Stalin regime, Sheptytsky cited the enslavement of nations that had been carried out by the Soviet Union since the revolution. The Russian communists, he argued, had dispensed with democratic institutions and had managed to “create a state in which a small minority holds the vast majority in harsh bondage.”⁴¹ The experience of the nineteen years since the Revolution had unmasked the deception of the Bolsheviks: their talk of “freedom” was nothing more than slavery, the Metropolitan argued; their councils and soviets really referred to “a system in which no one is allowed to speak his mind.”⁴² All this indicated to the Metropolitan that one of the essential aims of the Soviet regime was to enslave peoples, impose its will and shackle them with its yoke.⁴³

Essentially anti-Ukrainian, the “popular front” initiative was, according to the Metropolitan, more accurately designated as an “anti-popular” front. He expected that even Western Ukrainian leftists would hesitate before joining the communist

37. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., “Protestuiuchy nedavno...” *Dilo* 54, no. 284 (28 October 1933), p. 1.

38. Sheptytsky’s estimate of more than three million victims of the famine in Ukraine was given in his pastoral letter “Nebezpeka...” (1936), p. 288. As late as March 1934, he was still referring, in the present tense, to “those [Ukrainians] far away who are suffering and dying a terrible death by famine.” Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Do neduzhykh,” *LAeV* 47, no. 3 (March 1934), reprinted in 05–83, p. 160.

39. Sheptytsky, “Nebezpeka...” (1936), 286.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 275.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 280.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 276.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 278, 280.

platform. First of all, Sheptytsky believed that Ukrainian Social Democrats and Radical Socialists were still “imbued with the democratic ideas that had prevailed in pre-war Europe.” Moreover, even though these parties were committed to overthrowing the existing system, they acted on that commitment “by legal means, through the parliamentary process, by legislative reform, and through a gradual evolution from a capitalist to a socialist society.”⁴⁴ In contrast, the Soviet Bolshevik tendency to suppress national entities was also felt in the political sphere: democratic pluralism and debate were suppressed through terror, intolerance and aggression.⁴⁵ The second reason why Metropolitan Sheptytsky believed that Western Ukrainian leftists would hesitate before allying themselves with the pro-Soviet communists was that they still felt national ties to the Ukrainian people and their Ukrainian forebears. The Metropolitan expressed this metaphorically: “They dread [the thought of] joining with people whose hands are stained with the still warm blood of millions of our compatriots in Eastern Ukraine.”⁴⁶ In fact, Sheptytsky’s positive description of Western Ukrainian communists was also a subtle appeal to their democratism and sense of Ukrainian identity, which, he felt, could prevent them from joining the popular front.

In Sheptytsky’s political argument, alliances with Bolshevik communism were alliances with political terror and stood for the subordination of national values to the rule of might. Accordingly, he warned those who might want to join the popular front that, by doing so, they would in fact expose not only themselves but also the Ukrainian people to great harm. The crux of the argument was thus that, by cooperating with the communists, Ukrainians in Poland would only be buying into the system of religious, social and economic oppression that was already in force in Soviet Ukraine.

Having outlined the official position of the Greek Catholic Church regarding the religious, political and economic conditions in the USSR and the ethical implications of collaboration with communism, Metropolitan Sheptytsky set out

44. Ibid., p. 279.

45. Ibid. Sheptytsky further felt that the democratism of Western Ukrainian socialists also led them to differ from the Russian communists in their view of revolution: “No matter how one looks at it, revolution was also something of an ideal for the socialists. The very word seemed so attractive, so pleasant. But the revolution would have to be kept democratic. For whoever was not a democrat was ‘retrograde,’ ‘aristocratic,’ ‘clericalistic.’ In a word, outside democracy, there was no truly human program” (ibid.). The Metropolitan also observed that even the leaders of the Western Ukrainian left were wary of the popular front and were warning their people about it (ibid., p. 287).

46. Ibid., p. 280. It is quite possible that the Metropolitan was aware of the condemnation by leftists in Western Ukraine of the famine in Soviet Ukraine. See n. 36 above.

to translate these considerations into practical action. At the center of the “popular front” initiative was its strong propaganda campaign, and so the primary practical aim of the Metropolitan’s pastoral letter on communism had been to undercut the potential impact of that effort. But in the ideologically driven conflict between the church and Marxism, he felt it imperative to resolve the problem of credibility and the question of how the truth could be discerned. Although the basic facts that he had recounted were supported by the reports of “hundreds” of people who had travelled to Soviet Ukraine and had been widely covered in the European and American press,⁴⁷ the Metropolitan was also aware that a propaganda of denial was being implemented in order to answer all charges against the Soviet Union.

Propaganda was being disseminated in leaflets and in the press.⁴⁸ Books and letters from Ukraine were also used to support the Bolshevik line.⁴⁹ The Metropolitan noted that popular publications were a particularly effective form of propaganda. Referring to Bolshevik propaganda literature, he therefore warned that the very reading of such “filthy and abominable” books could irreparably poison and contaminate a pure soul.⁵⁰ The Metropolitan urged people not to read Bolshevik publications and asked parents to see that their children did not read them. As for Galicians who travelled to Soviet Ukraine during or after the famine and wrote favourably about life there, he felt that no one really believed those reports; the operative principle in the Soviet Union was brutal terror, which was applied to everyone equally:

For, to be honest, whenever the poor and the common folk, as well as the greatest leaders, chiefs, generals and ministers are well off, that only lasts so long as they can tear the shirt off another’s back. But eventually and without exception, everyone’s time comes to walk the plank. Even the chief must do so.⁵¹

The propaganda campaign posed a special problem of distinguishing truth from lies; the Metropolitan was quite aware that the facts he had presented would be rejected by supporters of the Soviet system. Nor did he underestimate the effectiveness of the Soviet propaganda campaign; indeed, his argument showed some signs of exasperation.⁵² But, as far as he was concerned, the lines were

47. Ibid., p. 288.

48. Ibid., p. 286.

49. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Zaklyk do pokaiannia u Velykyi Pist” (“Sv. Apostol Pavlo...”), *LAeV* 51, nos. 2–3 (February–March 1938), reprinted in 05–83, p. 361.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. At one point, the Metropolitan remarked, “If you refuse to believe me, I think you are doing me wrong.” Sheptytsky, “Nebezpeka...” (1936), p. 288. He further tried to ground his argument by referring to his age, his many years of experience and his

sharply drawn between the Christian and Bolshevik interpretations of Soviet reality. To those Ukrainians who wanted to remain loyal to the church, to their people and to the cause of the poor, he therefore suggested two preventive remedies—critical perspicacity and a Christian perspective. Sheptytsky called for cautious scepticism toward anyone who praised Bolshevism: one had to learn “to distinguish between their words and the truth.”⁵³ One path to a more critical attitude was a better grasp of the big picture. Sheptytsky realized that Western Ukrainians might be susceptible to Bolshevik propaganda because it was difficult for someone in a Ukrainian village to discern Moscow’s hand in popular-front activity in other countries, such as France and Spain, or to understand such global phenomena as the Third International, the Comintern, or communism.⁵⁴ Yet it was only from a broad comparative perspective that one could see things as they truly were. The Metropolitan tried to show how discernment required seeing the connections between events:

It is necessary to look at the thing in its entirety and to capture everything with one look in order to understand that whether in Verchany or in Nahuievychi or in Lviv, one goal and one tactic point to one leader. And when we compare these events in our land with what is happening in France, Spain, Mexico, Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine, we also see in all those events just one hand, which betrays just one leadership.⁵⁵

The supporters of the Soviet system were not to be believed, according to the Metropolitan, because they had no commitment to the truth; they were professional agents, agitators trained in special schools and paid, or sometimes coerced, into praising the Bolshevik system.⁵⁶ They were the only ones who

paternal benevolence, contrasting this with the naiveté of young people who, in his estimation, were much more susceptible to manipulation (*ibid.*, pp. 281, 288).

However, the Metropolitan was also prepared to admit that, for obvious reasons, information from Ukraine was incomplete: “We do not yet fully know everything that the Bolsheviks did in order to destroy the Ukrainian village and drive it into misery, but what has reached us [makes it] perfectly clear... [the Bolsheviks] are against the people, they are destroying them and want to continue doing so until they have driven the peasants to ruin.” Sheptytsky, “Zaklyk do pokaiannia” (1938), p. 360.

53. Sheptytsky, “Nebezpeka...” (1936), pp. 281–82, 288.

54. *Ibid.*, pp. 281, 288.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 281.

56. *Ibid.*, pp. 287–88. Sheptytsky also mentioned coercion by the Soviets in his “Zaklyk do pokaiannia” (1938), p. 361: “The Bolsheviks coerce people to write such letters and, perhaps, they sometimes also pay for such treason. Then, against his own convictions and in the face of the truth that is as clear as day, the poor peasant writes with praise for the Bolshevik regime and with descriptions of the wealth that, supposedly, everyone there possesses.”

denied reports coming out of Ukraine, for they had sold themselves and were betraying church and country for money.⁵⁷ They were accomplices of a system that was thoroughly grounded in “fundamental, all-around and incessant lying.”⁵⁸

For Metropolitan Sheptytsky, the decisive role of the ethical discernment of truth in this case was illustrated in the Spanish conflict and in case of the Ukrainian famine. In Spain, it was largely through “ignorance and a lack of perception (*nesposterezhennia*)” that people of good will had been misled into rallying round a flag that was hostile to the church and Christianity.⁵⁹ In Soviet Ukraine, however, where the imposition of collective farms had destroyed village life, peasants were not so easily deceived by Bolshevik propaganda. Because of their hard work on the land, they were attached to it and not inclined to give it up easily.⁶⁰ The Metropolitan therefore urged people in Western Ukraine, when they encountered Soviet propaganda, to remember the famine: “When you meet such a person, look first of all at his hands to see whether they are not stained with the blood of the poor and the suffering; with the blood of the Fatherland, which they have betrayed in exchange for money from bloody Moscow.”⁶¹ The practical thrust of the instruction was not lost within the metaphor: if people recognized what Bolshevism and communism had truly meant in Eastern Ukraine, they would not be easily deceived.⁶²

Along with remembering the famine, Metropolitan Sheptytsky called Ukrainians to react to Bolshevik propaganda “as Christians.” This referred, first of all, to steadfastness in Christian duties: love of neighbour, the fatherland, the church and God. In turn, this translated into obedience to the church and its official position on both communism and the popular front. Sheptytsky suggested

57. Sheptytsky, “Nebezpeka...” (1936), p. 288.

58. Ibid., pp. 275, 278. Sheptytsky illustrated the deception as follows: “...when the Bolsheviks spoke about freedom they meant slavery; when they mentioned welfare they meant famine; *radas* and *soviets* referred to a system in which no one was allowed to speak his mind; peasant rule meant a system in which a peasant was forced to do unpaid labour...and their talk of the rule of the proletariat referred to a proletarian caste that sucks the blood of the people” (ibid., p. 276).

59. Sheptytsky, “Zaklyk do pokaiannia” (1938), p. 360.

60. “Ukrainian peasants understood from the first moment that by its very nature communism must be hostile to every farmer and every producer, and thus to every peasant...” Ibid., p. 360.

61. Sheptytsky, “Nebezpeka...” (1936), p. 287.

62. Ibid., p. 288.

that people seek the counsel of a priest and, if he so requested, withdraw from an association or refrain from reading a particular book or newspaper.⁶³

As for any confusion that may have resulted from communist agitation within the Christian community, the guideline was the complete incompatibility of Christianity and communism. With regard to the problem of communists who pretended to be practicing Christians, the Metropolitan advised his community that the discernment of truth would be served by attention to deeds, not words:

...one must look not only at who is going to confession and who is receiving communion, but also at how one lives and what one says. Let this be a rule: whoever admits to being a communist and defends communism is no Christian, but only pretends to be. A communist and a Christian are like fire and water, which cannot be in the same place together.⁶⁴

In meeting the challenge as Christians, the faithful were also to seek God's assistance; they were to pray for wisdom and "the spirit of discerning truth from falsehood."⁶⁵ In the spirit of this theological approach, Sheptytsky added a prayer of his own. It was addressed to the prophet Elijah, who, the Metropolitan noted, found himself in a situation "similar to our own" when the Jewish people were heeding the false prophets of Baal:

The holy Prophet Elijah exposed the false prophets of Baal before all the people and persuaded them that the true God is the God of Abraham and Israel. May the holy Prophet therefore obtain for you by prayer that heavenly light by which you may recognize the false prophets who come to you with promises of paradise, promises that are nothing but lies and hellish words. May he permit you to understand where the truth lies, where the good of the people is, who is to be heeded in life, and which paths in life will lead to a better future.⁶⁶

According to the Metropolitan, the fundamental choice that Ukrainians were facing over the issue of the popular front was essentially the same as that which had been faced by the people of ancient Israel—the choice between Jehovah and Baal. As their spiritual pastor, Sheptytsky believed that if they approached that decision as true Christians, they would be certain not to embark on the path of betrayal and perdition.⁶⁷

63. Ibid., p. 282.

64. Ibid., p. 277. The guideline was intended for the Christian community at large; the Metropolitan expected his priests to understand that they were not permitted knowingly to administer the sacraments to communists (ibid., p. 288). Communists, he declared, could not receive absolution for sins that they confessed unless they publicly renounced Bolshevism and redressed the wrongs they had committed (ibid., p. 277).

65. Ibid., pp. 288–89.

66. Ibid., p. 289.

67. Ibid., p. 288.

Church-State Relations

The polarization of Ukrainian and Polish political interests, heightened as a result of the Ukrainian liberation struggle and short-lived independence in 1918, then exacerbated by the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–19 and by the reprisals that ensued, was sealed definitively in March 1923, when the Council of Ambassadors in Paris recognized Eastern Galicia as part of the Second Polish Republic. Hardened by defeats in the war and on the diplomatic front, Ukrainian nationalism would grow to such an extent in the next sixteen interwar years under Polish rule that Poland's largest minority, its "involuntary" Ukrainian citizens, constituted one of the most pressing internal problems of the republic until the outbreak of World War II.

The Greek Catholic Church was not indifferent to these developments. Already in the preceding period, Metropolitan Sheptytsky had voiced his support for Ukrainian political aspirations. But while militant Ukrainian nationalists would resist Polish rule and would struggle, even by violent means, for the independence of Western Ukraine, the Ukrainian Catholic bishops accepted the decision of the Council of Ambassadors. That acceptance, though it certainly was not to be confused with unequivocal allegiance to the Polish state or political interests, became an important premise of the relations between the Greek Catholic Church and the Polish Republic. Metropolitan Sheptytsky favoured the option of those Ukrainian political circles that worked for change within the Polish parliamentary system, and he availed himself of the channels of communication with the Warsaw government that such an approach left open. Sheptytsky's attitude toward the Polish Republic was worked out largely in response to two key events, the decision of the Council of Ambassadors and the Concordat of 1925. Both events set out the practical framework within which church-state relations were played out in interwar Poland.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky did not delay in conveying assurances of his acceptance of the decision of the Council of Ambassadors to the Polish government. Following the decision in Paris, Metropolitan Sheptytsky travelled to Rome, where he met with the Polish diplomat Władysław Skrzyński at the Polish Embassy to discuss the new situation. According to Skrzyński's report about this meeting to the Polish Foreign Ministry, Sheptytsky signed a declaration recognizing the boundary settlement and promising that he would do all that he could to keep his priests out of politics and to reduce any tensions that might have arisen among the Ukrainian people.⁶⁸ Whether Skrzyński's report

68. "Raport Władysława Skrzyńskiego do Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych," Rome, 26 April 1923, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw, Kolekcja Ministerstwa Wyznań

was received in Warsaw or not, as Metropolitan Sheptytsky was returning to Lviv he was detained at the Polish border, then interned in Poland for three weeks before obtaining permission to re-enter Lviv.⁶⁹

After the decision of the Council of Ambassadors, the Polish government dealt with the Ukrainian minority with an iron fist, unleashing a campaign of anti-Ukrainian harassment. One of the most hotly contested issues was that of education, in which the government showed itself committed to a policy of Polonization and de-Ukrainization. The Polish Ministry of Education imposed politically based hiring and firing criteria for positions in Ukrainian schools, as well as Polish language testing for Ukrainian students who had completed high school, and banned the use of Ukrainian in school administration.⁷⁰ By 1920, 682 Ukrainian primary schools in Eastern Galicia had been closed. As a result, there were 7,211 Polish-language classes as compared with 2,645 Ukrainian-

Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego, 423 (hereafter Skrzyński Report). I am grateful to Andrzej Zięba of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow for bringing this important document to my attention. The apparent lack of public discussion around, or even references to, Sheptytsky's declaration during the 1920s and 30s suggests that both the meeting in Rome and the Skrzyński Report remained the privileged internal information of the Polish government and were unknown to the Ukrainian public at large.

69. Sheptytsky was detained from 22 August to 14 October 1923. Among the reasons cited for his internment in Poznań and refusal of permission to return to Lviv were allegations that the Metropolitan had made anti-Polish statements while abroad; there were also suspicions about his loyalty to Poland and fears that he would use his popularity among Ukrainians to cause unrest in Eastern Galicia. Kravcheniuk, *Veleten' zo Sviatoiurs'koï Hory*, pp. 81–82.

Polish sources on this incident have tended to portray it as a legitimate and understandable measure. In 1930, a Cracow newspaper wrote that Metropolitan Sheptytsky had “received permission to enter Poland” on condition of “absolute loyalty to the [Polish] nation.” “Administrative Authorities: Metropolitan Sheptytsky Knocks at the Door,” from *Ilustrowany Kuryer Codzienny* (3 October 1930), translated in *Polish Atrocities in Ukraine*, ed. Emil Revyuk (New York, 1931), p. 183. More recently, a Polish church historian has declared, “Sheptytsky was detained in Poznań by Polish authorities, who rightly demanded that he submit an oath of loyalty to the Polish state.” See Hieronim E. Wyczawski, “Kościół w odrodzonym państwie polskim (1918–1939): Cerkiew Greckokatolicka,” in *Historia Kościoła w Polsce*, ed. Bolesław Kumor and Zdzisław Obertyński, vol. 2, part 2: 1918–1945 (Poznań and Warsaw, 1979), p. 78. A considerably more nuanced statement is given by Tadeusz Śliwa: Sheptytsky was “arrested and detained by order of the Polish government at the border, apparently owing to suspicions about his attitude toward the Polish government and his refusal to recognize the eastern border of Poland prior to the decision of the Council of Ambassadors.” See Tadeusz Śliwa, “Kościół Greckokatolicki w Polsce w latach 1918–1939,” in *Kościół w II Rzeczypospolitej*, ed. Zygmunt Zieliński and Stanisław Wilk (Lublin, 1980), p. 161. Emphasis mine. None of these sources mentions the Skrzyński Report.

70. Korolevskij, *Métropolitaine André Szeptyckij*, pp. 181–82.

language classes in a region with a majority Ukrainian population. Teachers' colleges fared no better; by 1924, twenty were Polish, while only six were Ukrainian.⁷¹ The official designation of schools as either Polish or "utraquist" (i.e., partly Polish and partly Ukrainian) also proceeded in a way that favoured the ever-increasing use of Polish in Ukrainian areas. For example, by 1938 the Stanyslaviv eparchy, whose Greek Catholic population of 1,044,000 (82.5%) compared with 222,000 (17.5%) Roman Catholics, had the following proportional distribution of schools according to language of teaching: 99 (14.9%) Ukrainian, 162 (24.4%) Polish, and 402 (60.6%) utraquist.⁷²

Anti-Ukrainian measures also extended beyond the school system. The Prosvita Society for public education saw its centres closed by Polish authorities on the shallowest of pretexts. When in 1923 a ministerial decree exempted cultural associations from postage fees, the government of Lviv refused to apply this exemption to Prosvita, designating it an economic organization. Ticket-office receipts of Ukrainian community theatres were confiscated; Ukrainian symbols, such as the lion of Galicia and the very word "Ukrainian," were also suppressed.⁷³ And when a crowd of Ukrainians gathered before St. George's Cathedral in 1923 to protest against the persecution, Polish troops dispersed them with rifles and swords.⁷⁴ In 1925, Polish authorities ordered the dissolution of the St. Paul Association of Greek Catholic Priests because of the alleged involvement of its members in the struggle for Ukrainian rights.⁷⁵

Yet another source of tensions that had a direct impact on the Ukrainian church was the issue of language. The civil authorities classified parish administration as a civil function and tried to impose the use of Polish in the administrative work of Greek Catholic parishes. Contravening that ruling on at least two occasions, the Metropolitan's chancery office encouraged Greek Catholic priests to use Ukrainian.⁷⁶ For their part, the authorities showed themselves prepared to punish such disodience. By 1926, they were applying the official language law against Ukrainian Catholic priests, subjecting them to fines and arrests for filling out government statistical surveys in Ukrainian. The Ukrainian Catholic press responded by publishing a form that individual priests could fill out to file appeals to challenge the legal proceedings brought against them. Central to the legal argument that the form contained was a reference to

71. Ibid., p. 181.

72. Śliwa, "Kościół Greckokatolicki," p. 162.

73. Korolevskij, *Métropolitte André Szeptyckyj*, pp. 180–81.

74. Avro Manhattan, *The Catholic Church against the Twentieth Century* (London, 1950), p. 301.

75. Śliwa, "Kościół Greckokatolicki," p. 158.

76. Ibid., p. 162.

an “authoritative interpretation of the language law” by the former Minister of Religious Affairs and Public Education, Stanisław Grabski. The form went on to cite a letter of 9 April 1926 from Grabski to Metropolitan Sheptytsky in which the minister had affirmed that ecclesiastical authorities and offices were considered juridical persons within the meaning of the language law and were therefore entitled to use their native language for that official purpose.⁷⁷ By making available this letter from Minister Grabski, the Metropolitan gave considerable force to appeals filed by Greek Catholic priests.

The Polish church historian Tadeusz Śliwa has described the relationship between the Polish state and the Greek Catholic Church as “proper, but marked by mutual distrust.”⁷⁸ That appraisal appears to be well-founded. On the government’s side, that distrust was manifested in a variety of ways, beginning with the internment of and temporary refusal of re-entry to Metropolitan Sheptytsky and extending to the censorship of the Ukrainian religious press.⁷⁹

77. “Vidklyk: Do l'vivs'koho voievodstva u L'vovi,” *Nyva* 21, no. 10 (October 1926): 361.

78. Śliwa, “Kościół Greckokatolicki,” p. 161.

79. The following is an illustrative list of items that were censored: L. Kunyts'kyi, “Bil'shovyts'kyi Kongres,” *Nyva* 16, no. 11 (November 1921) at pp. 336–343; “Bez poludy na ochakh,” *Dilo* 43–45 (1925) on the Concordat; “Z dniv nedoli nashoho dukhovenstva,” *Nyva* 21, no. 3 (March 1926), one passage at p. 82; Sheptytsky et al., “Khrystova Tserkva...,” *Nyva* 25, no. 10 (October 1930): 365–67, three paragraphs deleted; also in *Nyva* 25, no. 10 (October 1930): 363–64, pages blank and marked “censored pastoral letter of our bishops”; “Rozмова z Vysokopreosviashchenym Mytropolytom Andreiem,” *Dilo* 51, no. 222 (7 October 1930), p. 1, several passages censored; Kh., “Mynulyi rik u zhyttiu nashoi Tserkvy,” *Nyva* 26, no. 1 (January 1931): 4, on the pacification; speech by Mykhailo Halushchynsky at the Session of the Sejm Administrative Committee, delivered on 20 January 1931 during a debate on the pacification and published by *Dilo* and *Novyi chas* in Lviv shortly after 20 January (two lengthy passages deleted); and Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s entire pastoral letter of 20 July 1938 protesting against the destruction of Orthodox churches.

When entire issues of periodicals were confiscated, Ukrainian Catholic publishers often tried to print them a second time. For example, the following issues of *Nyva* went to press a second time and bear the note “second edition, following the confiscation [of the first]”: 21, no. 3 (March 1926); 25, no. 10 (October 1930); 26, no. 1 (January 1931); and 29, no. 5 (May 1934).

The official policy of censorship in Poland in the 1920s and 30s, particularly in regard to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, is a subject that will require further in-depth study of the relevant materials in the archives of the Polish Ministries of Internal Affairs and Religious Denominations. What appears clear at this stage is that the censorship policy was carried on throughout the interwar period and that it targeted the Ukrainian church and Metropolitan Sheptytsky in particular. However, a more detailed and conclusive assessment, weighing the consequences of, on the one hand, the Polish

On the church's side, Metropolitan Sheptytsky tried to balance the necessary respect for the prevailing political authority with a certain political aloofness. Thus, although he did accept the authority of the Polish government, he expressed it in a tellingly indirect way: there could be "no question of his not accepting" that authority.⁸⁰

A similar aloofness was carried over into the Greek Catholic Church's relations with the Polish Roman Catholic Church. The Greek Catholic episcopate was part of the Conference of Bishops of Poland—they attended the latter's conferences and plenary sessions, but for the most part they kept their distance.⁸¹ Certainly there was a basic Catholic solidarity among the bishops, regardless of ethnicity. For example, in 1931, after Poland's legislative committee had prepared a draft divorce law, the Polish episcopate, headed by its primate, Cardinal Hlond, issued a statement attacking the proposed law. Describing it as contrary to the Catholic principle of the indissolubility of marriage, reaffirmed only a year earlier in Pope Pius XI's encyclical "*Casti Connubii*," the Polish bishops expressed the hope that the government would reject the proposed law. In a show of support for that fundamentally Catholic viewpoint, all three Ukrainian Catholic ordinaries co-signed the pastoral.⁸² Another issue on which the bishops of Poland were united was the threat of communism.⁸³ Nevertheless, despite such convergence on certain issues, the

government's concern for suppressing criticism of its policy and, on the other, the silencing of even moderate Ukrainian voices, must be left to future research.

80. Skrzyński Report.

81. Śliwa, "Kościół Greckokatolicki," p. 155. A similar opinion about the reserved attitude of the Greek Catholic hierarchy is given in Wyczawski, "Kościół w odrodzonym państwie polskim," p. 81. But on various occasions the Ukrainian Greek Catholic episcopate did participate in meetings of the Roman Catholic bishops of Poland, for example: the synod of Bishops in Warsaw, 29 May 1925; the National Polish Eucharistic Congress in Poznań, 26–29 June 1930; and the special meeting of the Polish episcopate in Jasna Góra to discuss the position of the Catholic Church with regard to the developments in Spain, 25 August 1936 (Kravcheniuk, *Veleten' zo Sviatoiurs'koï Hory*, pp. 82, 89, 93–94).

82. "Lettre collective de l'épiscopat polonais (10.11.31)," *La Documentation Catholique* 26, no. 596 (23 January 1932): 206–9.

83. In December 1927, the Polish Roman Catholic bishops issued a pastoral letter on communism. They wrote: "En Pologne, comme dans tous les pays, deux systèmes s'affrontent: l'un défendant les droits du Christ, l'autre hostile à tous les principes religieux. Le peuple polonais commence à se diviser en deux camps; ceux-ci rangées sous la bannière du Christ...; ceux-là voudraient insuffler à la République l'esprit de l'Antéchrist." "La question religieuse et les partis. Lettre collective de l'épiscopat," in *La Documentation Catholique* 29, no. 431 (9 June 1928): 1450–51. Although it appears that the Ukrainian bishops were not co-signatories of this particular document, a number of

pastoral commitments of the two episcopates often led them to diverge along ethnic lines,⁸⁴ and this, together with the perceived best interests of their respective peoples, who at that time were at loggerheads, precluded the normalization of relations between the Polish and Ukrainian hierarchies.

The second development that had a profound effect in shaping relations between the Greek Catholic Church and the Polish Republic was the Vatican's Concordat with Poland, signed on 10 February 1925. For the Greek Catholic Church, the Concordat was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it restored that church's status to what it had been in Austria prior to the war, placing it on an equal footing with the Roman Catholic Church and granting it virtual autonomy within its own area of jurisdiction.⁸⁵ On the other hand, the Concordat also turned certain ecclesiastical matters over to the government. Above and beyond the requisite liturgical prayers for the Republic and its President on Sundays and national holidays (Article 7), the state would play a direct and decisive role in the appointment of archbishops and bishops (which, according to Article 11, required presidential approval).⁸⁶ Other provisions of the Concordat were no less ominous for the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The state would henceforth take a hand in the conferral of benefices on parish priests. The Ministry of Religious Affairs reserved the right to screen candidates for parish assignments in order to ensure that their activity did not "threaten the security of the state" (Article 19).⁸⁷ Finally, the formula of the oath of allegiance to the state, which all bishops had to take, was phrased in unconditional terms, with no mention whatever of a Catholic bishop's duty of primary loyalty to divine law (Article 12).⁸⁸

themes in the Polish bishops' document recalled statements on socialism that Metropolitan Sheptytsky had made during the Austrian period, and which he would develop further in his own pastoral letter on communism.

84. The inveterate issue popularly referred to as that of "stolen souls" (*dusze kradzone*) was a case in point. As the land of Eastern Galicia was contested, so too were its people: Polish Roman Catholics claimed that Greek Catholic priests were illicitly baptizing Poles into the Greek Catholic rite, while Ukrainians complained of the opposite. At the source of this problem was the sensitive canonical issue of ritual transfer resulting from inter-ethnic marriages.

85. Wyczawski, "Kościół w odrodzonym państwie polskim," p. 78.

86. This article was never actually applied in the years 1923–39, since none of the three Ukrainian eparchies would require the appointment of a successor.

87. Śliwa, "Kościół Greckokatolicki," p. 162, points out that in fact there were instances in which the Polish authorities either refused to confirm the appointment or demanded the resignation of Ukrainian pastors who advocated a Ukrainian national identity.

88. The episcopal oath of loyalty, contained in Article 12 of the Concordat, read: "Before God and on the Holy Gospel I swear and promise, as befits a bishop, obedience

The Concordat also marked the beginning of a unique experiment in the history of Catholic missions called the “neo-Unia.” Essentially a strategy for bringing Orthodox Christians in Poland into union with Rome, the neo-Unia was directed primarily toward the provinces of Wilno, Nowogródek, Podlachia and Volhynia. The Concordat effectively replaced Greek Catholic episcopal jurisdiction over a number of individual parishes in these areas with Roman Catholic jurisdiction,⁸⁹ and prepared the way for more sweeping anti-Orthodox measures in the 1930s.⁹⁰

to the Polish Republic. I swear and promise that I will respect the constitutionally created government with complete loyalty, and I will see to it that my clergy respect it too. In addition, I swear and promise that I will not participate in any agreement and will not attend any conference that might harm the Polish state or the political order. I will not allow my clergy to participate in such activities. Caring for the good and the interests of the state, I will try to preserve it from any dangers that I may know to be threatening it.”

89. Edmund Przekop, “Die griechisch-katholische (unierte) Ritus im polnischen Konkordat vom Jahre 1925,” *Ostkirchliche Studien* 28 (1979): 145–67. In essence, the Concordat limited Greek Catholic jurisdiction to the original boundaries of the church’s three eparchies of the Austrian period.

With regard to the four provinces targeted for the neo-Unia, Przekop indicates the Orthodox predominance on the basis of figures taken from the 1921 census:

<i>Province</i>	<i>Orthodox</i>	<i>Roman Catholics</i>	<i>Jewish</i>	<i>Other</i>
Wilno	48.5%	42.2%	5.9%	3.4%
Nowogródek	51.6%	39.0%	9.1%	.3%
Podlachia	79.3%	7.3%	13.0%	.4%
Volhynia	74.6%	11.5%	11.3%	2.6%

Ibid., p. 148.

90. The neo-Unia was intended to be a vehicle for the conversion of Orthodox Christians to Catholicism, allowing them to retain the Eastern rite. Unlike the Union of Brest of 1596, which had brought most Western Ukrainians into union with Rome, the neo-Unia made no provision for an Eastern-rite episcopate for the new Catholics. Instead, they were to be subordinated to the Latin-rite ordinary, while their priests would be incorporated into Latin-rite deaneries. Entrusted to the Society of Jesus, this effort at ecumenism employed a principle of biritualism; in effect, Polish Roman Catholic priests could be accepted into the Eastern rite and serve Catholics of both rites. Pope Pius XI, who had once served as Apostolic Visitor to Warsaw, had become convinced that biritualism was a practicable way to proceed with the Orthodox in Poland and was a strong supporter of the neo-Unia.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky considered the question of reunion from a very different viewpoint. Reviving a notion that had been put before the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith some four decades earlier by Cardinal Howard and the Russian Jesuit Martinov, the Metropolitan took the position that the most effective path to the reunion of the Eastern Churches would be to have all the Western congregations and religious orders form Eastern branches that would work for reunion: “Le pont par lequel les Orientaux passeront à l’unité catholique doit être bâti sur ces deux fondements:

Aside from matters pertaining to the Eastern rite, the Concordat regulated other affairs and exchanges of services to which both the Roman and the Greek Catholic churches were equally subject. For example, Greek Catholic priests received some financial support from the Polish government.⁹¹ And a selected number of Ukrainian Catholic priests who met the established requirements were assigned for service as Eastern-rite military chaplains for Ukrainians in the Polish army.⁹²

Committed to an apolitical approach to the sensitive question of the Ukrainian minority in interwar Poland, and mindful as well of Polish censorship, Metropolitan Sheptytsky nevertheless gave clear indications of the principles

Congrégations occidentales organisant dans leur sein des branches orientales; Ordres orientaux se recrutant aussi entre les Occidentaux; organisation occidentale transplantée en Orient; monachisme oriental s'organisant et se renforçant par des éléments occidentaux." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "La mission du monachisme dans la cause de l'Union des Eglises," *Bulletin des Missions (Bénédictines Belges)* 6 (1921–23): 187–88. Another important step in Sheptytsky's program for reunion was the renewal of ancient Eastern monasticism, which, he felt, was well equipped for the task, because it shared many common elements with its Western counterpart: "...l'oeuvre de l'Union des Eglises sera en grande partie l'oeuvre du monachisme.... Ni pour la cause de l'Union des églises dissidentes, ni pour le bien des peuples orientaux, l'Eglise Catholique ne peut faire oeuvre plus importante que de restaurer et de renouveler le monachisme de l'Eglise Orientale, si florissant jusqu'au X-me siècle, et demeuré si proche du monachisme occidental par les principes communs sur lesquels l'un et l'autre se basent." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "La restauration du monachisme slave," *Bulletin des Missions (Bénédictines Belges)* 6 (1921–23): 494.

To date, the most exhaustive treatment of Sheptytsky's ecumenical thought and activity is Lubomyr Husar, "Andrej Sheptycky, Metropolitan of Halych, 1901–1944: A Pioneer of Ecumenism," Ph.D. dissertation, Pontificia Universitas Urbaniana, 1972. A revised Ukrainian translation is being prepared for publication in Ukraine.

91. Metropolitan Sheptytsky mentioned a government donation to the church; see his pastoral letter, "Pro poboriuvannia vorozhoï Tserkvi propagandy" (1927), pp. 4, 9. Apparently some of the government funding was directed toward the operation of the Ukrainian seminary in Lviv. Stanislas Srokowski, "The Ukrainian Problem in Poland," *Slavonic Review* (March 1931): 595.

92. In accordance with a decree of 27 February 1926 by the Apostolic Nuncio to Poland ratifying the agreement on military chaplains, every ordinary was to assign such chaplains from his eparchy for a period of two years. Among the Greek Catholics serving in this capacity in 1930 were: in Warsaw, Rev. Dr. Nykolai Nahoriansky, who also served as an advisor to the military Bishop General in liturgical matters of the Eastern rite; in Poznań and Toruń, Rev. Podolynsky; in Łódź, Rev. Nykolai Ilkiv; in Cracow, Rev. Vasyl Kuzma; in Peremyshl, Rev. Omelian Vavryk; in Lviv, Rev. Nykolai Stetkevych; and in Stanyslaviv, Rev. Lev Kharkavy. A brief notice to this effect is given in *LAeV* 43, no. 4 (1 October 1930): 8–9.

behind his thinking on church-state relations. He often did so indirectly by referring to situations that were either historically or geographically removed from the immediate context of Galicia. One such reference was to the Byzantine model of church-state relations, caesaro-papism. The Emperor Constantine had laid the foundations of caesaro-papism in Byzantium, yet, the Metropolitan remarked, seven hundred years later “they vomited themselves out in the final disastrous eruption of the religious schism between East and West.”⁹³ The problem, according to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, was that Byzantine caesaro-papism was contrary to the spirit of the Catholic Church.⁹⁴ Whenever civil states asserted their authority over the church, as Sheptytsky felt they had done in the Byzantine and Russian empires, the church inevitably found itself in a subservient position: “By demanding ever more complete and absolute submission to the will of the monarch in return for the dubious assistance that they lend to the Church, maintaining it in superficial unity...[secular states] exact a high price in freedom.”⁹⁵ Moreover, Sheptytsky observed that when empires fell, the churches that had existed under their aegis and were now deprived of a civil protectorate showed little stability of their own:

When the secular state that previously supported the Church is shaken up or falls, soon the Church within it breaks up into countless independent churches. The history of the separated Eastern Church shows clearly how its unity is simply a fiction, for among those state or “autocephalous” churches, as they are called, there is only as much cohesiveness as individual states will tolerate. There is [only] the unity that proceeds from political unity or from agreements between states.⁹⁶

A fundamental distinction was to be drawn between ecclesiastical and political sources of unity, in the Metropolitan’s view, because the church relied on its own internal life, not the state’s, for its unity. After all, he explained, the unity that Christ wanted for his church was a strong and lasting unity that did not compromise the church’s freedom or subordinate it to the will of the state. Whereas other churches were subordinated to the administration of states and were achieving autocephaly either legitimately or illegitimately (that is, by breaking canonical ties with their superiors),

93. Archbishop Andrew Szeptycky, “Catholic and Orthodox Mentality,” *The Commonweal* 12, no. 23 (8 October 1930): 574.

94. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro obriadovi spravy” (“Dvi prevazhni podii...”), *Dilo* (21 April 1931), reprinted in 05–83, p. 103.

95. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro iednist' Tserkvy” (“Kozhnoi maizhe dnyny...”), *LAeV* 51, no. 1 (January 1938), reprinted in 05–83, p. 352.

96. *Ibid.*

...only the Catholic Church—in its struggle or endless contradictions with many, if not all, states and secular authorities—can preserve the unity of teaching and authority in a way that is by far stronger, more lasting and more internal (*sposobom bil'she vnutrishnim*) than the superficial unity that states give to individual groups of the separated Church.⁹⁷

The unity of the church, Sheptytsky declared, was based on a fundamental and absolute affirmation of the free will of its members, while that of civil states employed coercion or punitive sanctions, at least to some extent.⁹⁸ Only the Catholic Church, in his view, was able to preserve intact its internal unity of teaching and authority without relying on coercive secular support, to which it was opposed in principle.⁹⁹ As for instances in which the church had employed coercive measures, Sheptytsky declared that they were breaches of the fundamental principle of religious liberty:

Without a doubt, there were times when secular states employed coercion in the interest, as it were, of the Church. For example, in Spain Jews were forcibly baptized, and secular courts sentenced those whom ecclesiastical courts pronounced to be heretics. There may even have been clerics (*liudy Tserkvy*) who approved of such ecclesiastical methods and influence, or who practiced it themselves. Those were abuses that do not change the principle according to which the Church's unity relies exclusively on the free will of people.¹⁰⁰

In addition to grounding its unity in the free will, rather than in force, the church differed from states in that its ultimate aim and *raison d'être* was spiritual. In the preferred model of church-state relations, the state would respect that fundamental difference in the church's perspective, for:

...the Christian clergy, Christian bishops and a Christian people need a liberation of religious ideals from the yoke of secular authority, which would prefer to divert Christian action to its own non-spiritual aims.

For such is the nature of secular statesmen: they naturally place their aim of the civil administration of a country or a state higher than the Christian aim of the salvation of souls, yet at the same time they readily make use of the work of priests and of the Church as a means toward achieving their goals.¹⁰¹

The “diversion” or secularization of the life of the church and the exploitation of its social work for secular purposes was always possible when a state was reluctant to concede more than nominal religious liberty. To Sheptytsky, that was contrary to the principle of freedom to which the church was committed; in the

97. Ibid., p. 353.

98. Ibid., p. 345.

99. Ibid., p. 353.

100. Ibid., p. 345.

101. Sheptytsky, “V dva dni...” (1939), in 05–83, p. 89.

preferred model, the church needed to be completely free from any interference in its affairs by the state.¹⁰²

The fundamental differences between ecclesiastical and civil authorities did not close the door on church-state relations, however. Having explained the differences between them, Metropolitan Sheptytsky elaborated the principles upon which the church grounded its coexistence with the state, and which he felt should guide his church in its relations with the Polish Republic. The first feature of proper church-state relations, in his view, was the mutual recognition of jurisdictions. Accordingly, the church stood above politics and “may not without cause become involved in purely political, temporal matters.”¹⁰³ And whereas the “advocates of excessive state power” subordinated the church to the state and turned matters of faith and morality over to the final discretion of the state,¹⁰⁴ Metropolitan Sheptytsky felt that the church was entitled to an independent jurisdiction over spiritual matters, free from state control. The state was not to “meddle in matters that are proper to the mission of the Church.”¹⁰⁵ Rather, it had to recognize that the church was responsible for safeguarding the substance of the Christian faith:

In disciplinary matters [the Church] can adapt to various conditions of time and space, though she is obviously not free to alter the immutable principles of the faith or the unchanging truths of revelation. For it is her charge, her mission, to

102. In connection with his reflection on the sovereignty of the church’s jurisdiction, the Metropolitan had a positive view of the Lateran Accord of 1929, which, in his words, “joined a great and powerful state to the Church, a powerful state that was practically built on a principle of hostility to the Church and that by its nature could have gone over to the ranks of the enemies of the Church, if indeed it was not already among them.” Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “V dva dni...” (1939), p. 88. Although others would disagree with the Metropolitan and criticize the Lateran Pact, the Metropolitan’s actual position was less telling than his reasons for adopting it; in his view, the pact was a step toward securing ecclesiastical independence, allowing the church to “release itself more and more from the influence of secular states” (*ibid.*, p. 89).

103. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro Tserkvu,” *LAeV* 49, no. 1 (1936): 1–10, reprinted in 05–83, p. 258.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 259. The Metropolitan listed some of the theses of the statistes that had been condemned by Pope Pius IX in his “Syllabus of Errors” (1864). The statistes had maintained that the state is the only source of law; the authority of the state being higher than that of the church, civil law prevailed in cases of conflict between the two; the state could annul concordats unilaterally; the state could involve itself in matters of religion, customs and the spiritual leadership of society; it could pass judgment on pastoral teachings; and it could set out the necessary conditions for administering and receiving the sacraments (*ibid.*).

105. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

keep intact the treasure of revealed truths that were conferred upon her by the Lord Jesus Christ Himself.¹⁰⁶

Issuing from that missionary responsibility, the church's independent authority encompassed all matters of faith and morality, the administration of the sacraments and, in particular, "all conjugal matters."¹⁰⁷ Above and beyond the areas of faith, morality and the sacraments, Metropolitan Sheptytsky pointed out that the church also required a guarantee of certain fundamental liberties from the state: freedom from persecution and from interference in matters relating to almsgiving and the customary abstinence from labour on Sundays and religious holidays.¹⁰⁸

When the church found itself in conflict or disagreement with the state, it was guided by its primary adherence to divine law; if necessary, it could "judge and declare that unjust laws are null and void."¹⁰⁹ Christian citizens too were expected to follow a similar line: although in normal circumstances they were obliged to obey the directives and laws of the state, when those laws conflicted with or transgressed the law of the church, the latter took precedence. This followed from the Christian perspective, according to which human laws were transitory and ultimately subordinate to divine law.¹¹⁰

At that time, perhaps no other event in Europe was as dramatically revealing of church-state tensions as the Spanish Civil War. Sheptytsky referred to the national uprising that had led to the war as "that holy revolution in defence of God and country," and spoke favourably of the Spanish bishops' decision to bless and join the uprising.¹¹¹ An important aspect of the conflict for Sheptytsky was that the church had not precipitated it. Rather, the process began when the "enemies of the Church" began to acquire influence in Spain, and when the government organized militia units that "began to burn and destroy

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid., p. 257.

108. Ibid., p. 258. The church's independence also extended partially into the temporal sphere: "The jurisdiction of the Church extends also to the rulers and princes of this world and to all peoples. It extends to public life, to family life and to the education of children in Christian schools" (ibid., p. 258). In the temporal sphere as well, the church claimed the "God-given" right to hold property (ibid., pp. 253, 258).

109. Ibid., p. 258.

110. Metropolitan Sheptytsky drew attention to the confusion between the factual reality, or letter, of civil law and the "true concept of law," or its spirit (ibid.). This recalled the difference he had pointed out 32 years earlier between justice as defined by civil law and "what in fact is just." Sheptytsky, *OSQ* (1904), 42: 136.

111. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pastyrs'ke poslannia spans'kykh iepyskopiv. Vstupne slovo Vysokopreosviashchenishoho Mytropolyta" ("Espaniia bula...") (December 1937), in *OS-83*, p. 475.

monasteries and churches and to murder priests and monks.”¹¹² For several years (1931–36) the Spanish church endured persecution and humiliation and “had to adapt to the unjust laws and directives of the government.” In effect, the church was a passive participant in the conflict; it “endured everything and encouraged the faithful to be patient and obey those whom Spain still considered to be the legitimate authority.” It was only five months after the elections of February 1936, when the people of Spain “took up arms in the defence of God and Church, [that] the bishops blessed the popular uprising and aligned themselves with it.”¹¹³ In Sheptytsky’s opinion, the Spanish church had been properly slow in mounting opposition to the state and, when it finally did so, it did not initiate subversion, but merely joined itself with the democratic will of the people. The Metropolitan therefore appears to have been more interested in the Spanish church’s prolonged endurance of persecution than in its ultimate confrontation with the state. He put this quite directly in his preface to the Ukrainian translation of the Spanish bishops’ pastoral letter of 1936:

You will be all the more pleased to hear [what the Spanish bishops have to say] since they are to some degree surrounded by the aureole of martyrdom. For if not they themselves, then their friends, brothers and sons—the bishops, priests, monks and lay people in their eparchies who were killed by the Bolsheviks—gave up their lives for their faith and their homeland.¹¹⁴

By virtue of its divine nature and mission, the church was independent of the state. Immutable and God-given, its institutional side constituted “a perfect association, independent of human considerations, which needs neither any sanction nor any completion by any human authority whatsoever.”¹¹⁵ Consequently, it also had the right to fulfill its divine teaching mission “without regard for the permission or the prohibition of the secular authority”¹¹⁶ and the liberty to remind those who held civil power that theirs was a sacred trust:

Members of the community council, bailiffs and village magistrates have a small portion of authority and, with it, the sacred duty to use that authority for the good of the community or communities. More than any other citizens, they must always act justly and not seek their own benefit but, as the Apostle [Paul] says, the good of their neighbours.¹¹⁷

Metropolitan Sheptytsky described political authority as a “great and important duty” for which leaders would one day be held accountable before

112. *Ibid.*, p. 474.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 475.

114. *Ibid.*, p. 476.

115. Sheptytsky, “Pro Tserkvu” (1936), p. 253.

116. *Ibid.*, p. 257.

117. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Zaklyk do pokaiannia” (1938), p. 369.

God. Above and beyond providing actual leadership, they were to set a good example to other citizens, both in their private lives and in their public respect for “the Church, religion and good social customs.” In the fulfillment of their duties, they were to bear in mind that, “if authority indeed comes from God, then those who hold it must take care to use it according to God, His will and His laws.”¹¹⁸

On the other side of the church-state balance there was the Christian duty of obedience to the state. For, just as the church expected the state to recognize the legitimacy of its jurisdiction, so too the church was bound to “render unto Caesar” in living up to its tolerant submission to temporal authority. In spite of the difficulties that he might well have expected in trying to convince Ukrainians to obey Polish authority (which many considered to be an occupation), Metropolitan Sheptytsky did call them to precisely that kind of obedience. He pointed out that the Pauline teaching on submission to the state extended to the church’s recognition of the state’s authority, “even when that authority is in the hands of sinners.”¹¹⁹

An important symbol of voluntary Christian submission to the state was the practice of prayer for the civil authority, and the Metropolitan reminded Ukrainians of the Christian civic duty to pray for those in positions of authority. Indicating that this obligation remained in force even if the state were hostile to Christians, he explained that St. Paul had called the early Christians to pray even for the Roman emperor, “who at that time was Nero, a cruel oppressor of Christianity.”¹²⁰ The duty of prayer for the civil authority was thus seen as absolute and independent of a particular state’s policy toward Christians and the church. The very same duty was contained in the ecclesiastical law that required priests to pray for “the highest representatives of authority in every state,” and the Metropolitan pointed out that Greek Catholic priests fulfilled that obligation in their Sunday and feast day liturgies. For any Ukrainian priest who may have harboured doubts on that score, the Metropolitan’s declaration would serve as a reminder.

The obligation of prayer for the secular authority extended as well to the general Christian community; accordingly, the Metropolitan emphasized that the apostle’s command “applies to every lay person individually.” Nor was the duty to be taken lightly: any failure to pray for political leaders was a very serious matter that had to be confessed to a priest during Lent.¹²¹ The collective act of Christian prayer for the state was thus a fundamental Christian moral imperative.

118. Ibid.

119. Sheptytsky, “Pro Tserkvu” (1936), p. 258.

120. Sheptytsky, “Zaklyk do pokaiannia” (1938), p. 370.

121. Ibid.

By calling Ukrainians to fulfill this Christian duty, Metropolitan Sheptytsky made a compelling reference to Christian tradition: true believers had always been up to the challenge to pray for their oppressors.

In Sheptytsky's elaboration, then, church-state relations had to be grounded first of all in respect for the distinctiveness of each authority and its corresponding jurisdiction: the church was to leave civil matters to the state, and the state was to allow the church to fulfill its spiritual role. Balancing these two concerns, the Metropolitan expressed the ideal church-state relationship as a harmonious interaction rather than as a separation:

The Church should not be separated from the state. The ideal of both of these authorities is harmonious coexistence and cooperation. For even secular authority is in a sense from God, and so the Church recognizes the state and its rights. [For its part], the state needs the Church, and a just and good administration of the state without regard for the Church is unthinkable.¹²²

In effect, neither the fundamental differences in perspective nor the jurisdictional independence of the church meant that the preferred church-state relationship ought to involve a complete separation of the two authorities. While Metropolitan Sheptytsky held fast to his conviction that, in principle, the state's authority in certain public policy areas (such as civil marriage and divorce legislation and religious education) was invalid, at the same time he recognized that it was necessary for the church to seek the legislative reforms that it favoured by working within the existing political process.

Anti-government feeling among nationally oppressed Ukrainians in Poland peaked in the latter part of 1930, as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) stepped up its campaign of sabotage against the Republic. Primarily, it took the form of arson that targeted agricultural property,¹²³ but political assassinations also occurred. Responding to that terrorism, the Polish government cracked down on 16 September with retaliatory measures against the Ukrainian community at large. Military and police detachments were sent into the villages in order to "pacify" the Ukrainian population. Along with searches, there was considerable destruction of property and ruthless treatment of Ukrainians. Ultimately, rather than restoring order, the "pacification" only exacerbated the conflict.¹²⁴ When it became clear that the "pacification" had got out of hand, that innocent people were being victimized, and that the campaign was premised on the collective responsibility of all Ukrainians for the crimes of a few,

122. Sheptytsky, "Pro Tserkvu" (1936), p. 258.

123. Teofil Piotrkiewicz, *Kwestia ukraińska w Polsce w koncepcjach Piłsudczyzny, 1926–1930* (Warsaw, 1981), p. 66.

124. Śliwa, "Kościół Greckokatolicki," p. 162.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky took steps to defend the Ukrainian community. In the first week of October 1930, he travelled to Warsaw and discussed the situation with senior government officials, including the Minister of Internal Affairs, Felicjan Sławoj-Składkowski, Vice-Premier Józef Beck, and the Minister of Justice, Stanisław Car. Those meetings confirmed that it was indeed the official position of the Polish government to hold the entire Ukrainian community responsible for the violence. The Greek Catholic clergy, “who did not decisively oppose the arson and sabotage,” were also being held accountable.¹²⁵

In response, Metropolitan Sheptytsky argued three basic points in Warsaw. First of all, he rejected the attribution of collective guilt: the Ukrainian community could not legitimately be held responsible for the actions of “unknown conspiratorial elements of provocation.” As he would later explain, “I endeavoured to draw the attention of the authorities to the fact that the whole peaceful population cannot collectively bear responsibility for individual cases of incendiarism that are accomplished without their knowledge.”¹²⁶ Second, Sheptytsky objected to the application of collective guilt to the clergy. As Christians, Ukrainian priests could not be accused collectively of complicity in the crimes, for, in principle, “they were and are opposed to arson and sabotage.” And third, responding to criticisms, the Metropolitan explained that the Ukrainian bishops had not officially condemned the arson, for, “by doing so, they would have confirmed that the Ukrainian public was perpetrating it, yet that is not true.”¹²⁷ The Metropolitan also raised concerns that were common to both the

125. “Rozmowa z Wysokopreosviashchenym Mytropolytom Andreiem,” *Dilo* 51, no. 222 (7 October 1930), p. 1.

126. “The Report of Mr. John Elliot, of the New York Herald Tribune,” in *Polish Atrocities in Ukraine* (New York, 1931), p. 9.

127. “Rozmowa z Wysokopreosviashchenym Mytropolytom Andreiem,” p. 1. A passage that apparently referred to the government’s response to Sheptytsky’s argument was confiscated from the article by the censor, and is not available.

The attribution of collective guilt to the Ukrainian church was also furthered by the Polish press. On 3 October, the Cracow daily *Ilustrowany Kuryer Codzienny* charged: “The Greek Catholic metropolitan has tolerated wildest violence and crimes of his spiritual followers, carried out under the slogan of Ukrainian nationalism. He never moved a finger to stop those crimes or at least to condemn them. The Greek Catholic Consistory at Lviv, whose prominent representative is, for instance, that prelate Kunitsky [Rev. Leontii Kunytsky was arrested by the Polish authorities. A.K.], took an active part in the criminal activities, the fruits of which are arsons and murders. In the Church of St. George rebel knives were consecrated and requiem masses were sung for criminals, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky—kept silent.” Cited in *Polish Atrocities in Ukraine*, p. 183.

According to another writer, “all efforts made by the Polish authorities to induce the Ruthenian Uniate [i.e., Ukrainian Greek Catholic] clergy to condemn such acts came to nothing. This clergy, up to and including Archbishop Andrew Szeptycki, its highest

Greek Catholic Church and the Polish government, warning that the violence unleashed against Ukrainians might push them toward communism.¹²⁸

The discussions in Warsaw appeared to have achieved a measure of understanding, for the Metropolitan was given assurances that the abuses would be stopped. However, as the repressions continued unabated, Metropolitan Sheptytsky and his fellow Greek Catholic bishops officially condemned the violence, both of the terrorists and of the Polish security forces, on 13 October. Disregarding an order by the Lviv municipal authorities to delete certain passages from the text of their pastoral letter, the bishops ordered its publication in full.¹²⁹ This led to an open conflict, with an initial Polish censorship of passages that “could cause unrest among the population” and, on 17 October, the confiscation of all published copies of the pastoral letter and the suppression of any further attempts to publish it.¹³⁰

authority, kept silent, looking with indifference upon what was going on, or, as was shown by judicial inquiries, even taking an active part in this action” (Srokowski, “The Ukrainian Problem,” p. 595). This view has been quite common among Polish writers, and Polish historian Teofil Piotrkiewicz found it “noteworthy” that the Ukrainian terrorists were not condemned clearly and decisively by Metropolitan Sheptytsky (Piotrkiewicz, *Kwestia ukraińska*, p. 66).

For its part, the Ukrainian press did publish articles that condemned the arson, and a joint appeal to that effect was also issued by the three Ukrainian parties (the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance, the Radicals, and the Socialists). Moreover, political representations in the matter, denying complicity in the crimes, were made by Ukrainians before the voivodes (regional officials) of Lviv and Ternopil as well as in the Warsaw parliament. See the “Speech of Deputy Michael Halushchynsky at the Session of the Sejm Administrative Committee Delivered on January 20, 1931, during a Debate on the ‘Pacification,’” in *Polish Atrocities*, pp. 368–69.

128. “Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi u Ministra Skladkovs'koho,” *Dilo* 51, no. 220 (4 October 1930), p. 4. The same point was raised in Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., “Khrystova Tserkva...” (13 October 1930), *Nyva* 25, no. 10 (October 1930): 366.

129. Sheptytsky et al., “Khrystova Tserkva...,” pp. 365–67.

130. “Pislia konfiskaty pastyrs'koho lysta,” *Dilo* 51, no. 234 (21 October 1930), p. 4. The pastoral letter was suppressed so effectively that, although a few of the censored versions were distributed, no known uncensored version ever appeared in print in Polish Galicia. The Catholic press outside Poland carried the full text of the pastoral. According to the full text as given in *Katholische Kirchenzeitung* 48 (Salzburg 1930), p. 420, the three censored paragraphs, which apparently have never been published in Ukrainian, read as follows:

(Paragraph 2):

“Therefore we have kept silent until today, and if we speak out today, then we do so in order to face an [even] greater misfortune. Those who are in power openly declare and suspect that, through our silence, we are in solidarity with the underground activity of arson and so-called sabotage. They blame us for everything that has happened in the country and they are punishing our people en masse for the offences of individuals who

The pastoral letter responded to charges that were being levelled against the Greek Catholic Church and raised a protest against abusive repression by the state authorities.¹³¹ Recalling Sheptytsky's statement to government officials in Warsaw, the document began with a defence against charges that the Ukrainian bishops were guilty of remaining silent in the face of violence by Ukrainians. In the first place, it was in the very nature of the church, standing as it did for divine law, to oppose transgressions of that law as morally evil. Because of the fundamental Christian principles to which they adhered, neither the church authorities nor the Christian faithful could ever support moral evil. It was therefore unnecessary, the argument went, to make any pronouncements, for they would only "demean the divine dignity of the Church."¹³² From the

as yet have not been found out by the authorities."

(Paragraph 4):

"However, it is with great pain and sorrow that we are witnessing events with which, from the standpoint of justice, we cannot agree. The entire [Ukrainian] people, the clergy, the intelligentsia and the farmers are being blamed for the [acts of the] as yet uninvestigated culprits. The entire population is being severely punished with harassment, imposed contributions and confiscations without investigation. Punitive expeditions were sent from village to village where no acts of sabotage had occurred and where there had been no resistance at all against the state authority; where, on the contrary, the population had remained completely peaceful and loyal. It is with great concern for the future that we have observed many incidents in which, to the greatest pain of all, physical violence was used unlawfully to annihilate (*zur Vernichtung*) the cultural and economic possessions of the people or to mistreat the defenceless and the innocent; in many cases, even the clergy were beaten mercilessly and humiliated in public; their spiritual dignity and authority were trampled underfoot."

(Paragraph 5):

"We have gone to the governors and to the ministers, we explained everything and asked for redress, and we hope that the civil authority will put a stop to and punish the lawlessness and the encroachment. We hope that the state will turn away from the path of massive reprisals. However, on the occasion of this pastoral letter, we cannot but remind those to whom it applies by quoting from the word of the Holy Scripture (on the promise of truth and peace) that where justice rules, there peace and unity shall prevail."

The scriptural reference appears to have been to Isaiah 32:17: "The effect of righteousness will be peace, and the result of righteousness quietness and trust forever."

With regard to the beatings of priests (paragraph 4), at least one of the priests who were flogged by Polish soldiers, Rev. Evhen Mandzii of Bohatkivtsi, actually died as a result of the injuries he received. "The Report of Mr. John Elliot," in *Polish Atrocities*, p. 10.

131. The pastoral letter was by no means limited to the description of and protest against police and military violence. The second part of the document was addressed to the Ukrainian people and called them to be true to their Christian principles. We discuss it in the next section of this chapter.

132. Sheptytsky et al., "Khrystova Tserkva..." (13 October 1930), p. 365.

Christian perspective as well, the bishops categorically rejected the attribution of guilt to the church for the crimes that had been committed:

All of us who think as Christians and want to live as Christians recognize that, as in the cases of other crimes, so too here the hand of justice should reach the guilty. However, we cannot accept responsibility for revolutionary groups or individuals. Arsonists and all sorts of would-be assassins are people who heed not the voice of the Church of Christ but the secret orders of some secret authority. We cannot answer...for their actions; we bear no guilt for them, nor should we be punished for them.¹³³

Such a pronouncement would have overstepped the bounds of the church's jurisdiction, for, as the bishops argued, "the Church may not speak out when the investigation and punishment of the guilty are being handled by the police and the judicial authorities."¹³⁴ And a statement by the church could also have raised unfounded suspicions about innocent people and exposed them to punishment that they did not deserve.¹³⁵

Because of the gravity of the situation, the Ukrainian bishops followed up with a memorandum to Rome, outlining the situation in detail and asking the Vatican to intervene with the Polish government in the matter.¹³⁶

At the end of November, the pacification was halted. After nearly eleven weeks of brutal repression, during which between 1,000 and 2,000 Ukrainians had been arrested and imprisoned (among them sixteen Ukrainian members of the Polish parliament), hundreds more injured, and some 800 villages pillaged,¹³⁷ only fifty-eight individuals were actually charged with sabotage.¹³⁸ Reportedly, some arsonists and terrorists had been turned over to the authorities by the Ukrainian public.¹³⁹

133. Ibid., p. 366.

134. Ibid., p. 365.

135. In fact, even without such an intervention by the bishops, the civil authorities had proceeded to lay the blame for crimes on the Ukrainian public at large.

136. Stepan Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, p. 97.

137. "Testimony of Mr. Negley Farson of the Chicago Daily News," in *Polish Atrocities*, p. 63; and "The Report of Mr. John Elliot," *ibid.*, p. 10. The estimate of more than 1,000 arrests was attributed to Metropolitan Sheptytsky.

Compared with the estimates given in the above sources, Avro Manhattan's suggestion that "in 1930 there were over 200,000 Ukrainians in jail" appears to be an exaggeration. See his *The Catholic Church against the Twentieth Century*, p. 303.

138. Piotrkiewicz, *Kwestia ukraińska*, p. 67.

139. "Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi u Ministra Skladkovs'koho," *Dilo* 51, no. 220 (4 October 1930), p. 2. The emerging split between the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and militant nationalism is treated in the final section of this chapter.

In further response to the eruption of Polish-Ukrainian violence in 1930, and in anticipation of continued threats to Christian social values in the future, Metropolitan Sheptytsky called on Ukrainian Catholics on 22 October to organize a Catholic Union (Katolyts'kyi Soiuz): “Difficult times and the approach of even darker clouds require us to gather together more solidly than we have done so far and, with strong internal unity and supported by the truth, to defend what is most dear and sacred to us all.”¹⁴⁰

With the stated aim of protecting the faith and morality in public life, and the common good of Ukrainians understood in Christian terms, this political but nonpartisan Catholic formation was to be guided by its foundational principles, which Sheptytsky outlined as follows: (1) to defend the Catholic faith and morality, even in political life, (2) to obey the church in matters of faith and morality, (3) to defend the rights of the Christian family, standing up for the indissolubility of marriage and for the Christian education of children in their own schools, (4) to uphold social justice and the development of social services for peasants, workers, and the victims of social injustice, (5) to struggle by legal means for ever higher levels of education, culture, welfare and rights for the Ukrainian people (“The complete good of the Ukrainian people, in the Christian meaning of that expression, is the aim toward which we aspire in political life”), and (6) to allow members freedom of activity in all political matters in which the Catholic faith and morality and the above-mentioned social and national foundations were not violated.¹⁴¹

As the principles indicated, Sheptytsky’s Catholic Union initiative was essentially an attempt to create a non-partisan political coalition or common front that could effectively represent Ukrainian Catholic interests within the Polish political context. On the Ukrainian side, the church stood for social justice and the “unrestricted good of the Ukrainian people in Christian terms.” On the Catholic side, the organization was to respect the directives of the church and uphold Christian faith and morality. In practical terms, this meant opposition to divorce legislation and support for religious instruction in the schools. At the same time, however, the organization would limit its political activity to what was legal and, in Christian terms, ethical. By proposing a Ukrainian Catholic Union in that particular form, Sheptytsky showed that he supported the struggle for Ukrainian rights, but only within the framework of Polish law and Christian morality. For the proposal was not an attempt, contrary to his promises of 1923 and 1925, to activate the Ukrainian Catholic Church politically. Rather, it was

140. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pid odyn prapor! Zaklyk Vysokopreosviashchenoho Mytropolyta” (“Vazhki chasy...”), in *Nyva* 25, no. 10 (October 1930): 361.

141. *Ibid.*, pp. 361–62.

aimed at rallying “under one banner” and under one slogan (“Christ is our strength”) the various Ukrainian initiatives for social justice, some of which had lost their Christian bearings. The principles of the Catholic Union essentially reiterated Sheptytsky’s basic tenets of church-state relations: the inseparability of Christian faith and morality from public policy, as well as obedient submission to legitimate dictates of the state. Yet, at the same time, the rights of social justice and national self-determination were emphatically placed on an equal footing with these dictates as vital elements of the social and political agenda. Those social and national principles were authoritative and, as the Metropolitan observed, they were generally accepted by all Catholics.¹⁴²

Five days after the original announcement, the Metropolitan held a press conference at which he elaborated further on his notion of a nonpartisan Catholic Union. Asked whether it was intended to be a new political party, he replied:

If by “political party” you are referring to what is usually called by that name, that is, a party as opposed to all other currently existing parties and a political program in contradistinction to all other programs, then the Catholic Union cannot and should not be such a party.

But if you call a “party” a group of people who want to have an influence on politics, who want to act in unison on a range of political issues, and who have their common, strictly defined program only on those issues, then the Catholic Union should be such a party.¹⁴³

Moreover, the Metropolitan explained, Catholic Union members could belong to any existing parties or create new ones as long as in so doing they did not violate the fundamental principles that established its non-partisan character.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky recognized that respect for religious and national minorities was a pressing issue within the Polish school system. In education, he considered that the rights and duties of parents were primary, taking precedence over both church and state. It was a requirement of truth and justice, he felt, that parents be allowed to decide on the religion and nationality of the schools and of the teachers entrusted with the education of their children. While that was the ideal arrangement toward which people could legitimately aspire, Sheptytsky was also well aware that “civil laws do not always take sufficient account of the rights of parents and the rights of the Church [regarding education].”¹⁴⁴ Turning to the situation of Ukrainians in the Polish Republic, he argued that Ukrainian children should have access to education in Ukrainian; their teachers

142. [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], “Interviu Vysokopreosviashchenoho Mytropolyta,” in *Nyva* 25, no. 10 (October 1930): 375.

143. *Ibid.*

144. Sheptytsky, “Zaklyk do pokaiannia” (1938), p. 369.

should be Ukrainian and of the Greek Catholic rite; schools should be both confessional and “of our rite for children of our rite.” Religious and ethnic rights were equally important within the school system, he explained:

In our children’s schools there can never be a teaching that is opposed to either the teaching of Jesus Christ or of the Holy Church. There cannot and should not be anything in school that would denationalize or assimilate children. A school should educate children according to the wishes of the parents, forming them as their parents want to see them.¹⁴⁵

And the way to achieve this, in the Metropolitan’s view, was for Ukrainians to make their demands “with solidarity and persistence.”

Underlying the Metropolitan’s position on education was the fundamental conviction that, to a Christian, civic obedience was always subordinate to duty toward God and the dictates of Christian conscience. In case of conflict between those two levels of duty, a Christian was obliged to disobey the state:

If someone in power orders something that is contrary to conscience and divine law, a Christian may not obey such a command; obedience to God precedes obedience to the people. So it was that the Apostles did not obey the [order of the] high priests not to preach about Christ. They spoke out boldly to the entire assembled tribunal of high priests: “Whether it is right to listen to you rather than to God, decide for yourselves. For we cannot but speak of what we have seen and heard” (Acts 4:20).¹⁴⁶

In June 1938, an agreement was concluded between Poland and the Vatican to regulate the issue of several regions that had large Orthodox populations: Volhynia, Kholm, Podlachia, and Polisia. According to the agreement, those Orthodox church properties that had been Uniate until 1875 were to be turned over to the Polish Roman Catholic Church. Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox deputies to the Polish parliament had voted against the deal. The Orthodox found it objectionable not only because they were being deprived of their churches and landholdings, but also because they were being converted under duress to Catholicism by the Polish military authorities.¹⁴⁷ Ukrainian Catholics objected

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid., p. 370.

147. In Volhynia, for example, Orthodox faithful were being forcibly converted to Roman Catholicism. As government forces moved in with threats to expel the peasants from their land, entire villages “converted” to Roman Catholicism. The case of one such village, Hrynychky in the Kremianets district, evoked considerable indignation and was even raised before the parliament in Warsaw. In a letter of 2 April 1938 to Cyrille Korolevskij, Metropolitan Sheptytsky mentioned such occurrences and made it clear that he saw through the facade of the purportedly “voluntary” conversion. Korolevskij, *Métropolitte André Szeptyckyj*, pp. 184–85.

to the agreement because the regions in question, formerly part of the Russian Empire, had been predominantly Eastern-rite Catholic until the tsarist suppression of Catholicism there in 1875; thus, the Polish *cuius regio* claims were considered a contradiction of the area's historical Eastern-rite tradition.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky treated the matter as a case of religious persecution. The situation was critical and, on 20 July, he issued a pastoral letter "in defence of our persecuted brothers."¹⁴⁸ For the record, he stated that in June and July, some 100 churches had been taken over and ruined, mostly by fire; ancient monuments and sacred objects had also been destroyed; many churches were closed and religious services prohibited in them; people were coerced into conversion to Roman Catholicism; those who refused to yield were violently beaten and run out of their homes; priests were pursued, severely taxed or imprisoned; catechism and sermons in the native language of the people were forbidden.¹⁴⁹ In his view, a major blow had been dealt to the Orthodox Church, whose faithful had suffered the heaviest losses. A blow had also been dealt, he argued, to the very idea of church unity. The destruction of the Orthodox Church and the harsh treatment of the faithful created a serious obstacle to the reunion of churches. The Metropolitan explained:

The events in the province of Kholm destroy in the souls of our separated Orthodox brothers even the thought of any possibility of reunion. They represent the Universal Church as a dangerous enemy of the Orthodox people. In the eyes of a population numbering several million within Poland, the Holy See is being presented as coresponsible for this destruction. A new divide has opened up between the Eastern Church and the Universal Church.¹⁵⁰

The Metropolitan did not directly blame the Polish Republic. Instead, he asked, "Who had the audacity to oppose the interests of the country?" But while he referred vaguely to "the hidden enemies of the universal Church and of Christianity" and even singled out Masons, he was clearly also disturbed by the collaboration of Catholics. If the enemies of the church had struck against the Orthodox (and, indirectly, the Catholic) Church, they appeared to have done so with at least the tacit approval of many Catholics. Indeed, Metropolitan Sheptytsky had quite deliberately not appealed to the Polish Roman Catholics for help, reasoning that "they could have refused us help and considered us disloyal citizens."¹⁵¹

148. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Poslannia v spravi Kholmshchyny" ("Potriasaiuchi podii...") (2 August 1938), in Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, pp. 108–10.

149. Ibid., p. 109.

150. Ibid.

151. Ibid.

Sheptytsky was clearly disturbed by the audacity of this anti-religious violence, which, after all, had occurred “in a Catholic country, in plain view of many Catholic bishops and of the nuncio.” He was convinced that there were many “unconscious Catholics” who had been manipulated into committing anti-Christian actions. Ultimately, he believed, “what has happened is and will remain a terrible memory for Catholic Poland.”¹⁵²

Nor did Sheptytsky blame the Vatican for the events in the Kholm region. On the contrary, he criticized those who were trying to blame the Holy See for what had occurred. The Vatican-Polish accord concerning the province of Kholm that had preceded the persecution there was, in Sheptytsky’s thinking, only a “chronological coincidence”; the actual organizers and initiators of the persecution were anxious to connect the Vatican to the violence as a way of diverting attention from themselves.

To Sheptytsky, the issues at hand were religious persecution and ethnocide. For what had occurred was nothing less than the destruction of “a part of the Universal Church and of a people that belongs to that Church.” The perpetrators of that destruction had tried to justify their actions with the “specious explanation that they were detroying the enemies of their country, “uprooting historical injustices” and “annihilating the vestiges of slavery.”¹⁵³ In the face of such flagrant excesses, the Metropolitan protested:

With great pain we sympathize with all the sufferings of our brothers and we must condemn the anti-Christian acts. We must regard the destruction of churches, which the people need, the prohibition on celebrating the Divine Liturgy, and the punishment that is meted out for prayer as acts of religious persecution.... We must protest against the attempt to create a shadow of suspicion that the Holy See approves of the struggle against the Orthodox Church. We must also protest against the attempt to justify the occurrences in Kholm and the political struggle against the Ukrainian people with allusions to the interests of the Catholic Church.¹⁵⁴

Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s fundamental ethical objection to the destruction of Orthodoxy in the Kholm region was that it was anti-Christian. In his reasoning, the perpetrators could only be enemies of the Catholic Church and of Christianity. Their rude blows against the innocent Orthodox population and their patriotic slogans with which they deceived “uncritical Catholics” into performing anti-Christian acts had ultimately betrayed their evil aims and identity. Without putting it directly, Sheptytsky had in fact condemned those in the Polish government and those in the Polish Roman Catholic Church who, misguided in

152. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

153. *Ibid.*, pp. 109–10.

154. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

their patriotism, had either condoned or advocated the destruction of Orthodox churches. Seeing this pastoral letter as a threat, the authorities had it promptly confiscated.

The Future of Ukrainian Society

Commenting on the complex of problems that Ukrainians faced in interwar Galicia, Metropolitan Sheptytsky noted that foremost among them was the national question:

What difficulties there are, what suffering, pain and misery there is among our people. In the first place, there are those nation-wide misfortunes that weigh so heavily on all of our hearts: the difficulties of our overall national situation, from which there appears to be no way out; wounds that over many long years have not yet healed; and a pain that is more intense than [that caused by] all other national divisions; fratricidal struggle, the division along party lines, mutual animosity, perpetual misunderstanding, and the one thing [that is] worse than anything else: what relates to the feeling of the most noble love of one's country.¹⁵⁵

It was hardly incidental that the Metropolitan chose to single out patriotic feeling as a central social problem of Ukrainian society. Simmering Polish-Ukrainian hostility was a key factor that determined the lot of Ukrainians in the interwar period: the world war and the Polish-Ukrainian conflict might have been over on paper, but injustices and animosities continued to divide the two peoples.¹⁵⁶ Sheptytsky observed that the Polish Republic's discrimination along ethnic lines had effectively blocked access to employment for Ukrainian university graduates. And although the consequences of the economic crisis were global, he pointed out that high rates of unemployment among Ukrainian youth in Poland had already existed years before its onset.¹⁵⁷ Political factors had aggravated the economic difficulty and the Metropolitan considered the situation of young people to be desperate. The dire predicament of the Ukrainian minority in Poland radicalized not only the unemployed young intelligentsia, but also the Ukrainian population at large:

Unfortunately, even the most serious people and those who keep farthest away from politics are often pushed out of their [apolitical] stance perhaps for no reason

155. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "V khvylyni, koly..." (15 June 1932), in 05–83, p. 10.

156. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "I stalosia..." (15 May 1932), in 05–83, p. 4.

157. "Rozmowa z J.E. Metropolita Szeptyckim" (2 April 1933), *Bunt Młodych* 39 (1933), reprinted in *Zeszyty Historyczne* 71 (1985): 120. "...the problem of what to do with scholars who are leaving centres of higher learning with diplomas but without any prospect of finding employment is a matter of concern throughout the world. But please consider that among Ukrainian youth that crisis has existed for years. That is why we are seeing unfortunate consequences" (ibid.).

other than that they are Ukrainians. Those kinds of instances [i.e., of discrimination] create a feeling of hopelessness and facilitate the work of the emotional, senseless and irrational elements that in normal circumstances would play a markedly lesser role. Obviously the issue of employment opportunities is only one detail of the whole system. Purely emotional matters also have a great impact.¹⁵⁸

The social picture of Galicia in the 1930s was dominated by the emergence of a particularly militant form of Ukrainian nationalism. While it had formerly encompassed a broad spectrum of political ideologies and parties, Ukrainian nationalism now shifted to the right. It combined two principles that were shared by most Ukrainians in Poland after the war and the disappointment of 1923—anti-Bolshevism and vehement opposition to Polish rule. At the same time, national extremism among youth drove the militant wing of the Ukrainian nationalist movement to take the momentous step of legitimizing terrorism and violence as valid means of forcing the political changes it desired.¹⁵⁹ This move effectively separated the militants not only from more moderate nationalist circles, but also, in a very decisive way, from the Greek Catholic Church. Metropolitan Sheptytsky's principled stand on the issue further deepened the split between nationalist extremism and Christian patriotism among Ukrainians; in

158. Ibid., p. 120. The Metropolitan also acknowledged that the Polish Republic's refusal to permit the establishment of a Ukrainian university had heightened national feeling among Ukrainians. Ukrainian students were, he said, meeting with "chicanery at every step" and were being "deprived of any opportunity of leading a normal life" (ibid., pp. 120–21).

159. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) published a statement of principles in the summer of 1929. Consisting of ten "commandments of the Ukrainian Nationalist," the so-called "decatalogue" represented a clear departure from any semblance of Christian morality. In view of the nationalists' primary aim of attaining independent Ukrainian statehood, it urged them to "avenge the deaths of the Great Knights," "to carry out the most dangerous deeds, should this be demanded by the good of the Cause," "to regard the enemies of [their] Nation with hate and perfidy," and to "aspire to expand the strength, riches and size of the Ukrainian state even by means of enslaving foreigners." "The Ten Commandments of the Ukrainian Nationalist (Decatalogue). June 1929," trans. Taras F. Pidzamecky, in *Ukraine during World War II: History and its Aftermath*, ed. Yury Boshyk with the assistance of Roman Waschuk and Andriy Wynnyckyj (Edmonton, 1986), pp. 173–74.

Originally published in the underground, the "decatalogue" by its very nature was probably not widely known until later; one of the "commandments" in fact amounted to a vow of secrecy. Although Metropolitan Sheptytsky never mentioned the nationalist decatalogue specifically, and perhaps did not have direct knowledge of it, this did not prevent him from condemning the morality of "ends justifying means," which he clearly saw behind the terrorism of the OUN, as "unethical and extreme." "Rozmowa z J.E. Metropolita Szeptyckim" (1933), p. 120.

May 1933, when the Christian jubilee year was being celebrated in Lviv with a peaceful 100,000-strong rally under the slogan "Ukrainian Youth for Christ," the event was boycotted by the more nationalistically inclined Ukrainian university youth.¹⁶⁰

Although it was known that the majority of the militant Ukrainian nationalists were young people, for the Metropolitan, the fundamental difference in ethical perspective was far more significant than the generational difference:

Almost all the tendencies among youth also have their counterparts in the older generation. [But] if it is a matter of serious Catholic circles, then they have repeatedly condemned all methods of struggle that are incompatible with Christian morality. It is unnecessary to add that both sides [i.e., both Poles and Ukrainians] are using such methods, much like cog-wheels that drive each other and whose end cannot be seen...¹⁶¹

While Sheptytsky did not condone the ethics of ends justifying means, he understood the reason for its heightened popularity as a consequence of the aggravated situation.¹⁶² Of course, from a Christian perspective, he criticized it, but the central ethical problem that he saw as "relating to the love of country" was the question of what was to be the future of Ukrainian society. In his view, Ukrainian society faced a choice: it could either adhere to the social principles of Christianity or replace them with barbarism, as a segment of the population had already done. As a Catholic bishop, Metropolitan Sheptytsky felt it his duty to warn Ukrainian Catholics that only the former path was viable and that the latter would most certainly lead to perdition.

As he had approached the issue of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the Austrian period, the Metropolitan again set out to correct the path of false patriotism on which he felt Ukrainians had embarked. In the 1930 pastoral letter protesting against the pacification, he devoted special attention to idealistic Ukrainian youth:

...You are young and hot-tempered. You have a strong sense of love for your native land, which demands action and which calls you to action. Persevere in that service and spare no sacrifice, but [by that we mean] sacrifices that the national cause requires at the present moment and that are in accordance with the teaching of Christ and the good of the people.¹⁶³

160. "Poza naukova diial'nist' Bohoslovs'koï Akademii," in *Svityl'nyk Istyny. Dzherela do istorii Ukraïns'koï Katolyts'koï Bohoslovs'koï Akademii u L'vovi, 1928/1929–1944*, ed. Pavlo Senytsia, vol. 1 (Toronto and Chicago, 1973), pp. 546–48.

161. "Rozmowa z J.E. Metropolita Szeptyckim," p. 120.

162. Ibid.

163. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., "Khrystova Tserkva..." (1930), p. 366.

Although critical of the patriotism that had led to violence, Sheptytsky acknowledged that, from the church's perspective, the national cause was legitimate. What he proposed as an alternative to violent struggle was work for the common good—constructive, patient, and adhering to divine law:

We are weakened to an extreme degree; in order to be revived and to recover our health and energies, our people need daily, silent, ant-like, constructive and productive work in all areas of life; they need agricultural and scientific work; they need Catholic organizations. How much of this has been neglected! Persevere in that work, prepare for it and undertake it, all of you who are young. Our current conditions are truly and exceptionally unfavourable, but [by the same token] that work is all the more essential for us, even more than life itself. Do not allow anyone among you to be led into work for the underground. Whoever leads you away from positive work and inclines you toward conspiracy commits a crime against you and against our native land. Work openly for our people and subordinate that work always to the divine law.¹⁶⁴

The Metropolitan thus showed his support for the national cause, but in his view such support always had to retain a self-critical posture and stay strictly within the limits of Christian teaching. As opposed to an amoral autonomy that was essentially pagan, Christian patriotism was a synthesis of religious and social values: "A pagan considers himself dependent on no one, a master of his own life and behaviour. A Christian considers his whole life as a service to God and country."¹⁶⁵ In the practical application of that distinction, the Metropolitan favoured a self-critical outlook on the national question, for he considered it more of a service to the people to correct their errors than to teach them "to grow haughty and to delight in the glory or greatness of past generations."¹⁶⁶

In May 1932, Metropolitan Sheptytsky again discussed militant Ukrainian nationalism in an article addressed to Ukrainian youth. Clearly concerned that their understanding of patriotism had all but lost its Christian foundations, the Metropolitan levelled a critique at what he felt were misguided, hot-headed forms of patriotism. Insofar as it was rooted in love and readiness to make sacrifices, patriotism was not in itself contrary to Christian morality and the Christian life. Those features were essentially Christian, too. But whereas Christianity excluded hatred, some forms of patriotism did not. From a Christian moral standpoint, therefore, it was vitally important to distinguish between authentic patriotism and

164. Ibid. In addition to calling Ukrainian youth to remain faithful Christians in their patriotism, the bishops directed their priests to add to every liturgy special intentions taken from the service for "times of nation-wide suffering" (*vo vremia vsenarodnyia skorby*). Ibid., p. 367.

165. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Khrystos zachynav..." *LAeV* 47, no. 1 (15 January 1934), reprinted in *OS-83*, p. 110.

166. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Khto vynen?" (15 March 1934), in *OS-83*, p. 123.

its distorted forms, which were corrupted by hatred: "...love cannot go together with hatred, for the narrower hatred becomes, the more it turns love into egoism. It is acceptable to defend and demand one's rights, but not by means of hatred for others."¹⁶⁷

An important distinction between Christian and pagan patriotism centred on the understanding of sacrifice. Whereas Ukrainian youths were wont to sacrifice not only their own good but also that of others and, by extension, the good of the Ukrainian people, the Metropolitan countered that, on the contrary, "another's good and welfare should be sacred not only to a Christian but to every human person," and that, after all, "the best ends do not justify evil means."¹⁶⁸ The problem with the patriotism of many young Ukrainians was its rash and imprudent character. They had not properly understood the true meaning of sacrifice: "You rush too quickly into politics and work for society. It appears to you that the soldier on the field of battle cannot stop to think, to reflect. You think that a sacrifice is all the more successful the more it is offered with bravado and the less with prudence."¹⁶⁹

As a result, many well-intentioned sacrifices of the nationalists were futile and even harmful. In spiritual terms, this situation harked back to the warnings about ideological atheism, for "a spirit of deception stalks the world, drawing uncritical followers off the right path and ruining them. And Satan assumes the form of a magnificent Angel."¹⁷⁰ Thus, an uncritically patriotic person was easy prey to the manipulation of hidden, anonymous political players. His patriotic idealism could then be exploited to further an unknown agenda, potentially even turning the patriot against the best interests of his native land. In order to redirect patriotism onto its proper course, Sheptytsky suggested that sound ethical discernment was needed as a way of getting behind external appearances:

It is necessary in life to scrutinize the spirit; to reflect on whether the spirit that is driving one in a particular direction is a good spirit that comes from God; to be able to doubt and not trust the judgment of a first impression about what is beautiful or good.¹⁷¹

Unless one took the time to look closely at "the essence and the depth of things," one would easily be deceived by attractive slogans and drawn into rash actions. Although patriotism was a virtue, it was fraught with hidden, subtle

167. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Slovo do ukrains'koï molodi," *Meta* 19 (22 May 1932), reprinted in 05-83, pp. 104-5.

168. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

169. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

170. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

171. *Ibid.*

dangers. In order to avoid them, one had to be able to situate love of country within a long-term, historical vision of the life of a nation. From that point of view, the differences between true and false patriotism began to emerge more clearly:

...the sacrifice of a single instant cannot replace many years of ant-like work. It is not by momentary outbursts, but through tireless effort and sacrifice unto bloodshed and death on the part of many generations that a people raise themselves up. It is sometimes easier to spill blood in a single moment of enthusiasm than to do one's duty in the face of adversity, to bear the heat of the day, the scorching rays of the sun, the ill will of people, the hatred of enemies, the absence of trust from among one's own, the want of assistance from one's closest friends—and, in the midst of such work, to fulfill one's task to the very end, without expecting any laurels for the triumph or any reward for the service.¹⁷²

Carefully distinguishing the notion of sacrifice as patient endurance and offering from suicidal fervor and idealism, the Metropolitan tried to steer young people toward thinking about how they could contribute constructively to nation-building, which he saw as far more of a challenge than sabotage and terror. In 1938, anticipating conflict over threats to the territorial autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine, Sheptytsky urged young Ukrainians to guard against allowing themselves to be provoked into committing acts of violence. It was not important how trying the circumstances were, he argued, for “the more staggering and painful they are, the more they require us not to lose our spiritual equilibrium and well-advised peace.”¹⁷³ If young Ukrainians could overcome their counter-productive extremism, they would no longer squander their energies and harm themselves, the Ukrainian people and their future. Sheptytsky therefore appealed

172. Ibid. In 1939, responding to developments in Carpatho-Ukraine, the Metropolitan again felt obliged to refer to the same distinction between the long-term Christian understanding of sacrifice and the immediate satisfaction of passing desires: “As for the army that is fighting the enemy for a sacred cause, for which [the soldiers] are sacrificing their lives, the fervent love with which they offer their sacrifice is a greater source of hope for the future of the sacred cause than any momentary victory that they might enjoy.” Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Chas Velykoho Postu...,” *Nyva* 34, no. 4 (April 1939): 152.

173. [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], “Poklyk Mytropolyta” (“Podii, shcho my ikh teper...”), in *Dilo* 59, no. 246 (5 November 1938), p. 1. When Carpatho-Ukraine lost some of its territory, including its capital, Uzhhorod, by arbitration in Vienna on 2 November 1938, the province's autonomy became tenuous. Sensing the potential for unrest, Metropolitan Sheptytsky issued a terse statement urging Poland's Ukrainians to exercise prudence and “spiritual equilibrium.” And again in 1939, following Hungary's takeover of Carpatho-Ukraine, he pointed out that inner equanimity was needed: “Let us apply ourselves to the work at hand, let us maintain our spiritual equilibrium and the peace of Christ.” Sheptytsky, “Chas Velykoho Postu...,” p. 153.

to their strong sense of patriotism, urging them to adopt a more critical attentiveness to the consequences of their activity: "It is precisely because you love your unfortunate Ukrainian people that you are not permitted to overlook this."¹⁷⁴

It was basically intolerance that had led young Ukrainians to try to impose their views on others, even through the use of violence. The Metropolitan did not blame Ukrainians directly for this phenomenon, for he believed that it was part of a world-wide current created by fascism and Bolshevism. Nevertheless, it was an erroneous path that disregarded fundamental liberty and ignored the principle that "sacrifices that are not freely made are worthless"; that "outside the individual free will there is no good or happiness or future for the people"; and that "it is a sign of weakness when a man cannot persuade another except by force."¹⁷⁵

A second corrective that the Metropolitan tried to develop was a sense of solidarity with the past. He noted that a certain arrogance was leading young Ukrainians to disregard the views and experience of their elders. Consequently, they often erred in their judgments. Sheptytsky tried to correct this by reminding them that, "as in the Church and in Christianity, so too in national life, tradition is the foundation of the future."¹⁷⁶ Nation-building was not, in Sheptytsky's view, a matter of one instant; it involved the arduous process of transmitting tradition from generation to generation. That very process of transmission, which kept a people in touch with their past, was at the same time the door to their future:

A nation whose every generation would break with the past and begin anew the work for their native land would necessarily remain a weak child among other nations. For nations do not arrive at adulthood through the work of one generation. That requires the long, laborious effort of many generations; it requires the linkage of those generations not only in the most proximate ideals, but in all the means by which they want to achieve those ideals. You see, my dear ones, a human person is a very tiny and frail being; and far from the truth is he who thinks of himself as great and mighty. In our hands is only one moment of the existence of our nation. And if in that moment we do not link up our work with those who came before us, and if again those who come after us do not link up their work in their time with our work and with the work of those who came before us, then what can our nation achieve, even after centuries?¹⁷⁷

174. Sheptytsky, "Slovo do ukraïns'koï molodi" (1932), p. 108.

175. Ibid., p. 105.

176. Ibid., p. 106.

177. Ibid.

The rejection of the past and of the knowledge of older people was basically a rejection of authority, the Metropolitan observed. Its implicit danger was that it led to the rejection of all forms of authority—parental, national, ecclesiastical and divine: in a word, it led to anarchy.¹⁷⁸ Sheptytsky, however, viewed the national cause as the collective project of the entire people, and believed that it spanned many generations through history. He therefore reminded young people that they had much to gain from the experience of their elders: “...let their experience and social responsibility always supplement and inspire your youthful and exuberant idealism.”¹⁷⁹

This advice proceeded from a strong paternal instinct, for the Metropolitan saw his role as that of a loving, caring father. His benevolent paternalism was situated within a broader view of the Christian community as a family of believers supporting one another and, when necessary, correcting one another fraternally. As he put it,

You should know and understand that you have a Father in Lviv who loves you deeply, who remembers you and prays for you; and that in Rome there is also the Father of all Catholic peoples in the whole world. Your father who resides in Lviv is happy when he hears...that you are becoming good Catholic Christians, good sons of the Church and good and loyal sons of your fatherland.¹⁸⁰

Concerned that some forms of Ukrainian nationalism had veered away from Christian social values, Sheptytsky resolved to try to restore a proper understanding of the notion of sacrifice, as well as a sense of family unity under the banner of Christian patriotism. These, to his mind, were the key principles that would have to inform a practical Christian alternative to militant nationalism.

In an effort to counteract the displacement of Christian morality by the nationalists, Metropolitan Sheptytsky encouraged the establishment of Catholic Action, a lay apostolate under an episcopal mandate. Tracing their origin to Pius XI's encyclical *Ubi Arcano Dei* (1922), the organization's first Greek Catholic chapters began to appear in Galicia in 1931.¹⁸¹ Sheptytsky explained that the

178. “Whoever rejects these authorities is left with either his own authority, or the authority of his party, or that of some nearby clique. Does this not lead to complete anarchy?” Ibid.

179. Sheptytsky et al., “Khrystova Tserkva...” (1930), p. 366.

180. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Do ukraïns'koï molodi zorhanizovanoi v K.A.U.M.-i” (“V den' moïkh imenyn...”) (18 December 1934), in 05–83, p. 49.

181. Concentrated mainly in the cities, the Ukrainian version of Catholic Action had an autonomous structure; centred in Lviv, it was independent of the all-Polish Catholic Action, whose headquarters were in Poznań. The organization's constitution was affirmed by the three Greek Catholic hierarchs at their meeting in Lviv in January 1931. Metropolitan Sheptytsky et al., “Z voli i ustanovy...,” *LAeV* 49, no. 12 (December 1936),

aim of Catholic Action was “to organize and encourage lay Christians [to participate in] pastoral work, that is, to assist the pastors in their work.”¹⁸² He was particularly interested in developing cadres of catechists to assist in religious education in the villages.¹⁸³ In order to develop a lay apostolate, the organization would also offer lectures and courses, and would publish materials for study and information. The Metropolitan saw the Catholic Action initiative as a way of revitalizing the church and winning lapsed believers back into the Christian fold; he therefore called on the members of Catholic Action in 1935 to convert “those unfortunate ones who have completely removed themselves from the Church.”¹⁸⁴ In December 1936, the three Greek Catholic hierarchs devoted a special pastoral letter to Catholic Action. Citing growing communist hostility to Christianity, they addressed the need to extend the church’s apostolic teaching mission to the laity. In this, they found the situation in Spain and Mexico instructive:

The whole Catholic world bows its head to the immortal heroes of recent days in Mexico and Spain, who are struggling and giving their lives for the rights [and cause] of God and their homeland with the cry: “Long live Christ the King!” The young heroes of the Alcázar are an example to youth of all nations; they are all living examples of Catholic Action. In the frenzied advance of the kingdom of Satan against God and His Kingdom of love in this world, the mobilization of the

reprinted in 05–83, p. 470. In 1934, a separate constitution was also adopted (“Konstytutsiinyi Statut Katolyts'koï Aktsii v Halyts'kii Provintsii”). Wyczawski, “Kościół w odrodzonym państwie polskim,” p. 81. The bishops met again in December 1935 to ratify the by-laws for local chapters of Catholic Action. Sheptytsky et al., “Z voli i ustanovy...” (1936), p. 470. The organization enjoyed a certain prestige in the Ukrainian church, and in 1938 the President of the General Institute of Catholic Action in Lviv, Dr. Markiiian Dzerovych, was entrusted with organizing the celebration of the 950th anniversary of Christianity in Ukraine. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Iuvilei 950–littia Khreshchennia” (“Preosviashchennyi Epyskopat...”), *LAeV* 51, nos. 2–3 (February–March 1938), reprinted in 05–83, p. 78.

182. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Zaklyk do pokaiannia” (1938), p. 367. On the aim of pastoral collaboration of the laity with priests, see also Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “V dva dni...” (1939), p. 87.

183. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Shukaiemo pomichnykiv” (“Ne v spromozh...”), *LAeV* 47, no. 3 (15 March 1934), reprinted in 05–83, p. 25. The call to Catholic Action members to assist in catechization was repeated in the Metropolitan’s pastoral “Pro znannia katekhyzmu” (“Po nashykh selakh...”), *LAeV* 50, no. 4 (April 1937), reprinted in 05–83, p. 313.

184. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne spovidalysia...” (“Rik tomu...”), *LAeV* 48, no. 10 (15 October 1935), reprinted in 05–83, p. 251. The Metropolitan expressed the same view on the aims of Catholic Action two years later in the pastoral letter “Pro tykh i do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prystupyly do sv. Prychastiia i ne spovidalysia,” *LAeV* 50 (November 1937), reprinted in 05–83, p. 339.

entire Christian world against this enemy is essential, and, thank God, in accordance with the call of the Head of the Church, this is happening.

More than any other nation in the world, Ukraine is suffering at the hands of this enemy, and so we must all arm ourselves with the weapons of truth and love, for we need as many heroes and apostles as possible [to defend] the rights [and cause] of God and country.¹⁸⁵

Unlike the Catholic Union, which was explicitly conceived as a political instrument that would lobby for legislative reform, Catholic Action was strictly apolitical. However, the bishops made a special point of declaring that Catholic Action would not stand in the way of Ukrainian patriotism. On the contrary, “true love, sacrifice and dedication to one’s people can only proceed from a properly understood love of God and neighbour. The believing Catholic is always and everywhere a good patriot.”¹⁸⁶

A second instance in which the church confronted militant nationalism concerned terrorist violence. The campaign of terror that had been waged by revolutionary Ukrainian nationalists since the early 1920s had targeted primarily Polish victims. But on 25 July 1934, just over a month after the assassination of the Minister of the Interior, Bronisław Pieracki, OUN terrorism claimed a Ukrainian victim, Ivan Babii. A leading member of Catholic Action in Lviv and director of the oldest Ukrainian gymnasium in Galicia, Babii was known to have staunchly opposed and obstructed the recruitment of Ukrainian high-school students for the terrorist underground. Metropolitan Sheptytsky condemned both the crime and the criminal, reiterating the fundamental principle that “a crime is always a crime, and it is not possible to serve a sacred cause with bloody hands.”¹⁸⁷ But the real focus of his criticism was the Ukrainian nationalist leadership, which had its headquarters outside Poland (in Germany and Czechoslovakia). In Sheptytsky’s view, they were the ones who directed the Ukrainian underground movement in Poland, ordered assassinations, and recruited Ukrainian high-school students for terrorism. This was reprehensible, for “whoever demoralized youth was a criminal and an enemy of the people.”¹⁸⁸

Bypassing any theological consideration of the divine law that had been transgressed, the Metropolitan instead went straight to the broader social

185. Sheptytsky et al., “Z voli i ustanovy...” (1936), pp. 472–73.

186. Ibid., pp. 471–72.

187. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Z nahody vbyvstva bl. p. dyr[ektora] I. Babiia” (“Dyrektor Babii upav zhertvoiu...”), *LAeV* 47, no. 8 (15 August 1934): 171.

188. Ibid. According to Professor Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, Babii’s assassination was probably ordered by the territorial leadership of the OUN, and not by its leaders abroad. Interview with Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, February 1989.

dimension of the crime. Babii's assassin was a high-school student, one of the recruits of the terrorist underground. In Sheptytsky's opinion, that recruitment was itself a grave crime, for students were being drawn away from their schoolwork and into crime, homicide and, ultimately, injury to their own people. By following such a line, the hidden promoters of terrorism had completely divorced themselves from the best interests of Ukrainian society; their methods were not solutions, but had become part of the problem:

...no reasonable Ukrainian would fail to oppose that criminal activity. No educator would fail to affirm that whoever draws young people away from their work and into the underground commits a grave crime against youth. No father or mother would fail to curse those who are leading our youth astray and into the dead end of crime.

If you want to kill treacherously those who oppose your work, you will have to kill all the teachers and professors who are working for Ukrainian youth, all the mothers and fathers of Ukrainian children, all the heads and directors of Ukrainian educational institutions, all the politicians and community activists. And, above all, you will have to remove by assassination the obstacles posed to your criminal and stupid work by the clergy and the Bishops.¹⁸⁹

This was as clear and fundamental a personal break with revolutionary Ukrainian terrorism as the Metropolitan could possibly have made. Yet, as a pastor, he also felt obligated to lead others to the same ethical conclusion. In order to ensure that Ukrainian Catholics would not be led astray, it was necessary to isolate the terrorists definitively from the mainstream of Ukrainian society. Sheptytsky therefore called those who had known Ivan Babii to give public testimony to his character and achievements, so that all could "see clearly onto which paths [Babii] had wanted to guide our youth, and which path his murderers took."¹⁹⁰

In spite of being ethically isolated from the Catholic mainstream, the militant wing of Ukrainian nationalism nevertheless tried to curry favour and maintain a base of support within the church. In July 1934, Metropolitan Sheptytsky learned that some church services requested by lay people were being turned into political rallies during which leaflets were distributed and secular songs were sung. Since local parish priests often found it awkward to oppose such wishes of their parishioners, he issued a statement that clarified the official position of the church.¹⁹¹ The statement explained unequivocally that such abuses were a

189. Sheptytsky, "Z nahody vbyvstva bl. p. dyr[ektora] I. Babiia" (1934), pp. 170–71.

190. Ibid., p. 171.

191. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Bohosluzhennia dlia svits'kykh tsilei" ("Buvaie, shcho liudy..."), *LAeV* 42, no. 8 (15 August 1934): 169–70.

profanation and a sacrilege contrary to divine law. Moreover, parish priests were strictly prohibited from conducting services for secular rather than religious purposes.

Later that year, in preparing for the celebration of the anniversary of Ukrainian independence (1 November), Metropolitan Sheptytsky explained the proper religious commemoration of the day. Ukrainian Catholics would mark the occasion with prayer and thanksgiving. In addition to asking God to have mercy on those who were suffering and those who had died in the fight for independence, Ukrainians would also ask for “those heavenly gifts that are needed for the complete and successful development of national energies and talents, as well as for the blessed development of the material and spiritual life of the people.”¹⁹² Since the annual celebration was commonly attended by people who were known to have fallen away from Christianity, Sheptytsky declared that the church would continue to welcome them as it had done in the past, in the hope that their superficial attendance (i.e., without the same spirit of faith, hope and prayer in which Christians gathered) would perhaps someday lead them into the internal, spiritual community of believers.¹⁹³ Anyone who wanted to manipulate such religious gatherings for political purposes was not to be allowed to participate:

Unfortunately, there are people who have lost their Christian faith and become so alienated from Christian thinking that, in the festive moment of nation-wide prayer, they enter our churches to trample on our sacred objects with their sacrilegious behavior. They turn a place of worship and prayer into an arena of clamorous and unwise political demonstrations with which they insult the Almighty and offend the Christian sentiments of their own people. In the face of such abuses by unreasonable and blind people, for whom the Liturgy is only an external form and for whom patriotism consists only of words and slogans, we must close the doors of our churches.¹⁹⁴

The Metropolitan’s overriding concern was with keeping the church free from political manipulation. Church doors would be opened to atheists and agnostics who approached with an open mind, but not to those who sought to abuse holy places and objects for political purposes. As for any priests who may have been drawn into the political fervor of the times, Sheptytsky urged them not to overstep the bounds of acceptable political involvement. As he had done very forcefully in the Austrian period, the Metropolitan spoke out in the 1930s against

192. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Natsional'na richnytsia” (“Kozhna vazhnisha podiia...”), *LAeV* 47, no. 11 (November 1934), reprinted in 05–83, p. 46.

193. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

194. *Ibid.*

the mixing of pulpits and politics; even sound politics, if voiced from a pulpit and in liturgical vestments, were nothing but “lies and falsehood”:

That same abuse of the teaching of Christ occurs when [a priest] stands on the platform of patriotism and speaks as a patriot rather than as a messenger of Christ. Even a messenger of Christ may speak about patriotism, but he must always do so from the point of view of Christ and of the age-old heavenly truth.¹⁹⁵

On numerous occasions during the interwar period, the Metropolitan explained his personal reluctance to become entangled in politics. Having granted an interview to a Polish periodical, the Metropolitan declined to comment on political issues and referred the reporter instead to lay people who, he said, were more competent in such matters.¹⁹⁶ When in December 1934 Rev. Vasyl Mastsiukh was appointed Apostolic Administrator of the Lemko region, the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO) strongly opposed this as a step toward the denationalization of the Ukrainians in the region. Mastsiukh wrote to Sheptytsky and expressed his concern over the conflict. The Metropolitan replied by explaining his own method of avoiding political tensions with the population:

I try carefully to avoid all politics, and that keeps me from any conflict with my faithful. No national group complains as long as no one steps on their toes, that is, when no one interferes in their political affairs with a political program or action that is contrary to their own. Purely Catholic, apolitical action can only help a people, and no people is ever offended by [such] help.... It is important that no one be able to accuse us of any political action that might be contrary to those national goods, aims and desires that are not opposed to the faith and morality.¹⁹⁷

195. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Kheto vynen?” (1934), p. 151.

196. “Rozmowa z Metropolita Szeptyckim” (1933), p. 121.

197. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Duzhe serdechno diakuiu...,” letter to Rev. Vasyl Mastsiukh of 28 December 1935; cited in Hryhor Luzhnyts'kyi, “Nevidomyi lyst Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho do apostol'skoho administratora Lemkivshchyny Vasylia Mastsiukha,” *Holos Lemkivshchyny* 11 (November 1985): 3. Nor was Sheptytsky's evident preference for the moderate line of UNDO a political endorsement. In this connection it is significant to note that, unlike other parties, UNDO had in its program explicitly accepted Christian morality as espoused by the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia. In 1926, the party's central committee had adopted the following resolution: “In accepting the principles of Christian morality as fundamental to the development of a Ukrainian nation, the party supports the teaching and laws of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia and of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in other Ukrainian territories.” *Nyva* 21, no. 10 (October 1926): 368.

Also, he explained that Catholic Action was a “completely apolitical organization of societies.”¹⁹⁸ Even the Catholic Union, which was unequivocally political, was explicitly non-partisan.

Such were some of the ways in which Metropolitan Sheptytsky tried to steer his church clear of attempts to politicize it. All the while, despite his best efforts to keep his distance from the political sphere, he remained cognizant of their limitations in the eyes of the public: “Sad experience has taught me that the harder you try to stay out of politics, the more likely it is that you will often be accused of meddling in political affairs.”¹⁹⁹

Another area of particular social concern that was tied to the future of the Ukrainian people in the Metropolitan’s thinking had to do with sexual ethics. A variety of reproductive interventions, ranging from contraception to abortion, were being practised in Poland and, although the problem was perhaps not yet as widespread as in France and other Western European countries, the Metropolitan was alarmed at “seeing almost daily how families that should be Christian shamelessly adopt a system of neo-Malthusianism to such an extent that this filth has become an eyesore.”²⁰⁰

While he was aware of Pius XI’s encyclical “*Casti Connubii*,” and while he objected to contraception on the grounds that it was an intrinsic evil that transformed the sacrament of marriage into pagan concubinage,²⁰¹ Sheptytsky also voiced deep concern about the social consequences of “the system of two children or none at all.” Contraception was contrary to nature, because it “threatens the physical existence of humanity and condemns a nation or a human society to death and destruction.”²⁰² The widespread practice of birth control would have a devastating effect on a country’s population growth; that effect was apparent in some countries where there were already “more coffins than cradles.”²⁰³ By reducing the size of families, entire peoples were destroying

198. [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], “Interviu Vysokopreosviashchenoho Mytropolyta,” *Nyva* 25, no. 10 (October 1930): 375.

199. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Einleitung,” in *Die Kirche und das Östliche Christentum: Ukraine und die kirchliche Union* (Berlin, 1930), p. 9.

200. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Khto vynen?” (1934), p. 122.

201. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Poslannia do dukhovenstva na Velykyi Pist 1935 r.” (“Zblyzhaiet’sia nedilia Mytaria...”), *LAeV* 48, no. 2 (February 1935), reprinted in 05–83, p. 223.

202. *Ibid.*, p. 225.

203. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Uvahy dlia spovidnykiv” (“U dopovnenni poslannia...”), *LAeV* 47, no. 2 (15 February 1934), reprinted in 05–83, p. 116; Sheptytsky, “Poslannia do dukhovenstva na Velykyi Pist 1935 r.,” p. 226; Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prychashchalsia” (“Po zakinchenomu

themselves, and the same fate awaited Ukrainians if they followed that path.²⁰⁴ For, the Metropolitan affirmed, birth control was a plague that avenged itself on an entire people and was far worse than enslavement by an enemy.²⁰⁵ Children were a nation's guarantee of the future, its potential political leaders, scholars, artists and writers,²⁰⁶ and the loss to society of every individual life was incalculable, for no one could ever know the potential contribution to the common good that was thereby erased.²⁰⁷ No less importantly, the incalculable spiritual worth of every individual human being was closely associated with the human soul, which was "more valuable than the greatest earthly treasures":

From a Christian perspective, we have to say that every human soul is an almost limitless treasure for the parents, for society, for the Church, and a limitless good for God Himself. The human soul is such a great good that Jesus Christ gives up His life for souls or, one could say, for 'the soul'....

From a Christian perspective, we have to say that the Christian soul, that is, a soul blessed by divine grace, participates in what Christ presents as the most essential feature of the Kingdom and which is a hidden treasure. The comparison will be clear when we remember two pronouncements of Jesus: that the Kingdom is like a hidden treasure (Mt. 13: 44) and that the Kingdom is within you (Lk. 17: 21). Obviously, the gospel reference to the Kingdom of God refers to the Church, and to heaven, and to the Gospel, and to the coming of the Messiah, and, finally, to God's sanctifying grace. The Kingdom has the character of a hidden treasure in every one of the scriptural connotations of that word. But perhaps the most natural hidden treasure is the Kingdom of God that is within our souls, that is, that very human soul that has been sanctified by divine grace.²⁰⁸

chasi..."), *LAeV* 49, nos. 10–11 (October–November 1936), reprinted in 05–83, p. 293; Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro tykh i do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prystupyly do sv. Prychastia" ("L'vivs'kyi Provintsional'nyi Synod..."), *LAeV* 50, no. 11 (November 1937), reprinted in 05–83, p. 335.

204. Sheptytsky argued that those who practised birth control were destroying "our entire people through the ruin of their family." Sheptytsky, "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prychashchalysia" (1936), p. 294.

205. *Ibid.*, pp. 292, 294.

206. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Poslannia na Pist do sviashchenykyv i narodu" ("V serpni..."), *LAeV* 52, no. 2 (February 1939), reprinted in 05–83, pp. 396–97.

207. "A child so barbarously deprived of life or not brought into life by its parents was perhaps appointed by God to render some service to its family, to its people, or even to all of humanity that no one else will ever give, or to deliver some heavenly benefits that no one else will deliver." Sheptytsky, "Poslannia na Pist" (1939), p. 398. Applying a similar kind of moral reasoning from uncertainty, the Metropolitan concluded that abortion "deprives a people of perhaps its most precious individuals" (*ibid.*, p. 397).

208. *Ibid.*, pp. 397–98.

Another important consideration in appreciating the social impact of limiting the size of families was its effect on the ability of a society to recover from massive losses of life, whether through wars or epidemics. With this in mind, Metropolitan Sheptytsky contrasted “healthy” nations, which were comprised of large family units, with weak nations, which artificially restricted the size of families:

In healthy nations, where every family always has six, seven, nine, and more children, the worst pogroms and the bloodiest wars are wounds that heal very quickly. But a people that has adopted the system of two children is such a sick people that every single wound [is one that] will not heal.²⁰⁹

Although the Metropolitan did not look upon patriotism as the main argument that was to be used against birth control, he acknowledged that “even those do well who avoid that sin and struggle to overcome it in society only because of those temporal considerations.”²¹⁰ For they, too, required the moral strength on which the future of the motherland depended. Thus, he called upon Ukrainians:

...preserve your innocence also because of your love of our motherland. Young people who are not vigilant of sins against chastity are weak in will and character; they are poor soldiers not only of Christ but of their motherland as well. In order to be whole, healthy and strong, in order to know how to live and win a better future for oneself, one’s own and one’s people in the battle of life, it is necessary

209. Sheptytsky, “Poslannia do dukhovenstva na Velykyi Pist” (1935), p. 226. Metropolitan Sheptytsky believed that the system of limiting births cost a society far more than “the bloodiest of wars that last a decade” (ibid.).

See also his “Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prychashchalsia” (1936), pp. 292–93: “...if that sin were to spread among our people, they would lose more souls...than through a bloody war that might flare up every two or three years...the plagues on the healthy organism of a Christian people that are caused by the bloodiest war heal quickly, but the plagues that are caused by the pagan cohabitation (*pohans’ke spivzhytia*) of Christian couples are such as have no cure. A bleeding wound never heals. If a family has only two children and if by pagan cohabitation even that number is reduced, that nation will never be able to recoup the losses that it suffers through the death of childless, unmarried women and unmarried men. Every epidemic, war, and almost every death is [then] an irreparable loss, a plague that will always be wet with blood. Thus, pagan cohabitation leads to the annihilation of an entire people.”

See also his “Pro tykh i do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prystupyly do sv. Prychastia” (1937), p. 335: “When such a system [i.e., of birth control] becomes rooted within a nation, that nation must perish, for that system annually costs as much in lost human lives as a bloody war. In other words, every year that nation receives from its own children wounds that are worse than any inflicted by enemies in a bloody war. The only difference between those kinds of loss [of life] is that the wounds of a bloody war can heal, but the wounds caused by that system cannot...”

210. Sheptytsky, “Pro tykh i do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prystupyly do sv. Prychastia” (1937), p. 336.

to be not only physically but also morally healthy and pure, and to keep one's distance from that softness, worthlessness and feebleness to which the abuse of sensual pleasures leads.²¹¹

And Sheptytsky invoked divine wisdom with a prayer for the gift of ethical discernment: "to understand how precious and good numerous offspring are, and what a terrible crime against the family, the nation and humanity it is to restrict the number of offspring."²¹²

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's political argument against birth control suggests that he may have expected it to have a special resonance among Ukrainians in addition to the traditional natural-law argument. Just as he had shown a subtle attentiveness to Ukrainian sensibilities by elaborating his critique of excessively militant nationalism from within a strong affirmation of Christian patriotism, so too on the issue of birth control Sheptytsky found that he could effectively appeal to the form of patriotism that the church was able to endorse.

Thus, in the interwar Polish period, the Metropolitan continued as before to chart a course for Christian patriotism. Attuned to the Ukrainian political thought of the time, he proceeded beyond the question of peaceful inter-ethnic coexistence, which had been prominent in the prewar Austrian period, to reflect upon the constructive elements and attitudes that were necessary for the process of nation-building. From a Christian perspective, that process could only be successful if it was based firmly on Christian values. Since that Christian spirit was perhaps nowhere more needed than among Ukrainian youth, Sheptytsky prayed:

May Christ protect our youth from every evil influence; let Him create conditions in which they can develop all their God-given talents. May every generation of our youth produce many people of conscientious and profound work: great scholars, genuine artists, excellent writers, lawyers, physicians, architects, great industrialists and merchants. Let every one of them grow up to be a citizen whose work will bring benefit and glory to our people.²¹³

211. Sheptytsky, "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prychashchalysia" (1936), p. 303. On another occasion, the Metropolitan expressed the same contrast as follows: "Young people are only healthy, strong and mentally well developed and capable of high and noble ideas when they are pure. Young people who are given to the vices of impurity are weak-minded, lacking in strength, character and will; they are a herd that is easily dispersed by one man with a whip." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Poslannia na Velykyi Pist" ("Zatrubit' u truby..."), *LAeV* 49, no. 2 (February 1936), reprinted in 05–83, p. 265.

212. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Propovid' na Novyi Rik 1939" ("I koly spovnylosia..."), *Meta* 9, no. 3 (22 January 1939): 1.

213. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "V khvylyni, koly..." (1932), p. 14.

The future of Ukrainian society would also depend on wise individuals, inspired by the Holy Spirit, whose “tireless scholarly effort would enlighten and for centuries indicate the path of work to future generations.” In Sheptytsky’s thinking, wise political and social leaders were needed, who

...would seek the common good, not their own; who would provide leadership and not yield to every change in public opinion; who would boldly and loudly confess the principles of the Christian faith...who in the legislatures would defend those who have been wronged, who would courageously and wisely demand national rights, and who would always set themselves to work for the rights of our holy Catholic Church.²¹⁴

The main threats to Christian social values that Sheptytsky perceived during the interwar period were both external to the church (atheistic communism in the USSR and anti-Ukrainian sentiment in the Polish state) and internal (militant nationalism and a secularized ethic). In responding to those threats, the Metropolitan focused attention on standing fast in the faith as the fundamental ethical challenge for the Ukrainian Catholic Church and Ukrainian society. And, as was his habit, he expressed this fundamental problem in a prayer:

Many have not recognized you; many have fallen away from you, having scorned your commandments.... Lord, be a King not only to the faithful who have not fallen away from you but also to the prodigal sons who have rejected you; grant that they may soon return to the family hearth and do not let them die in misery and hunger. Be a King for those who have been misled either by false teachings or by disagreements and bring them back to the source of the truth and unity of the faith so that they may soon become one flock and one pastor.²¹⁵

Keenly aware of the power of patriotic ideals in the popular consciousness of Ukrainians during the interwar period, Metropolitan Sheptytsky articulated the official position of the Greek Catholic Church on key social issues, with special attention to Ukrainian patriotic sentiment. Thus, an important element in his critique of communist collaboration was the patriotic argument that it constituted a betrayal of the Ukrainian people. Similarly, patriotic concerns were a crucial part of Sheptytsky’s dealings with the Polish Republic, for he actively opposed the attribution of collective guilt to the Ukrainian community and made representations in defence of its linguistic and religious rights. Finally, reflecting

214. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

215. [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], “Molytva Posviaty Ukraïns'koho Narodu Presviatomu Isusovomu Sertsu” (“Vsemohuchyi Bozhe...”) (November-December 1938), reprinted in 05–83, p. 207. Although it was substantially the same as the earlier prayer for the Ukrainian people (1913), a few new passages were added, including the one cited here.

on the future of Ukrainian society, the Metropolitan firmly endorsed the Christian understanding of patriotism and, from that perspective, proceeded to criticize attempts to shift the Ukrainian social and political agenda from its traditional Christian foundation to a secular, even atheistic, base. By incorporating the element of Ukrainian patriotic self-awareness into Greek Catholic reflection on social ethics, Sheptytsky took an innovative step toward applying Catholic social teaching to the Ukrainian context.

CHAPTER 4

Defending the Faith against Soviet Atheism (1939–1941)

On 17 September 1939, shortly after the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov non-aggression pact between the USSR and Nazi Germany, Soviet forces invaded Poland and began an occupation of Western Ukraine that would last twenty-one months. The Greek Catholic Church was faced with a *fait accompli* that radically altered its relations with the civil authority—the occupying forces brought in a social order grounded in an official doctrine of atheism that severely restricted the social role of the church. Metropolitan Sheptytsky applied his social thought and activity in response to this new socio-political climate; both as an institution and as a community of faithful, the church saw its very existence challenged. Sheptytsky therefore tried to identify and address the urgent social problems that resulted from the war and the occupation. In this chapter, we consider the tenuous situation of the church in relation to the occupying Soviet state and examine the implications of that relationship for three aspects of Sheptytsky's social thought: his reading of the new reality, his proposed guidelines for Christian social action, and his implementation of those guidelines in practice.

Assessments of the Situation

Although Western scholars generally agree that this first Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine was not accompanied by anti-church policies as harsh as might have been anticipated,¹ such assessments are historically informed by events that

1. There was no interference in local church organizations and no large-scale anti-religious terror took place, such as that which accompanied the second Soviet occupation. See Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Orthodox Church in Ukraine since 1917," *UCE* 2 (1971): 174; and Volodymyr Kubijovyč, "Western Ukraine to the Outbreak of the German-Soviet War," *UCE* 1 (1963): 872.

There have been various suggestions as to why the Soviets stopped short of totally destroying the Greek Catholic Church at this time. One important factor was clearly caution owing to the as yet incomplete consolidation of political power in the area; on this, see *Soviet Persecution of Religion in Ukraine* (Toronto, 1976), p. 21. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw has discussed three related considerations: the uncertainty of the international situation, Sheptytsky's popularity, and the cohesiveness and strength of the Greek Catholic Church; see his paper, "Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi and the Greek Catholic Church under the Soviet Occupation of 1939–1941," in *Life and Times*, pp. 101–23. Such an

were to follow. However, operating within the context as it developed, Metropolitan Sheptytsky perceived the occupation as a genuine and immediate threat, both to the population at large and to his church. In the first place, the occupation dealt a devastating blow to Western Ukrainian society, as was evident from the cost in human lives. The attempt at transition to a communist order, although short-lived, involved the deportation of some 400,000 people to eastern lands,² while the military withdrawal in June 1941 was accompanied by massacres such as that in Lviv, where 6,000 people perished.³

Secondly, the Soviet occupation introduced policies and legislation that raised doubts about the future of Greek Catholicism in Galicia: nationalization, secularization and anti-clericalism.

Nationalization proceeded almost immediately after the entry of Soviet forces into the land. Monasteries and convents were suppressed, while monks were dispersed and landholdings confiscated. The internal communications and administration of the church were hamstrung by the nationalization of its printing presses. The Greek Catholic Church had depended on its many newspapers and periodicals to disseminate information and pastoral guidance, and now most of them ceased publication.⁴ To make matters worse, the church was deprived of

assessment is borne out by other studies, e.g., Bohdan Cywiński, *Ogniem próbowane: Z dziejów najnowszych Kościoła katolickiego w Europie środkowo-wschodniej*, vol. 1, *Korzenie tożsamości* (Rome, 1982), p. 126, as well as by Sheptytsky's own conclusion that the Soviet authorities reckoned with the overwhelming public support enjoyed by the church: "Il est bien certain que sous les bolcheviks nous étions tous quasi condamnés à mort; on ne dissimulait pas le désir de ruiner et de supprimer jusqu'aux dernières traces du christianisme. On n'avancait que lentement pour ne pas exciter une trop grande opposition de toute la population. On ne se croyait pas tout-à-fait 'chez-soi'; c'est peut-être une des raisons pour lesquelles on nous a ménagés peut-être plus que nous ne l'espérions." Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Budapest Nuncio Angelo Rotta, 30 August 1941, in *Actes et Documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la seconde Guerre Mondiale*, ed. Pierre Blet et al., 3 vols. (Vatican City, 1967) (hereafter *ADSS*, followed by vol. no.), 1: 437.

2. Sheptytsky estimated that half of the 400,000 deportees were Greek Catholics. See his letter of 7 November 1941 to Nuncio Rotta, in *ADSS-I*, p. 491.

3. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Nuncio Rotta, 31 August 1941, in *ADSS-I*, p. 439.

4. Some of these were: *Bohosloviia* (Lviv, 1923–39), *Dobryi Pastyr* (Stanyslaviv and Peremyshl', 1931–39), *Katolyts'ka Aktsiia* (Lviv, 1934–39), *Meta* (Lviv, 1931–39), *Nyva* (Lviv, 1904–39), *Peremys'ki Eparkhiial'ni Vidomosti* (Peremyshl', 1889–1939), *Vistnyk Stanyslavivs'koï Eparkhii* (Stanyslaviv, 1886–1939).

The official organ of the Archeparchy of Lviv, *L'vivs'ki Arkhieparkhiial'ni Vidomosti* (cited in the present work as *LAeV*), continued to appear for a time in limited cyclostyle (stencil) runs of 200 issues; later, even the cyclostyle was confiscated and *LAeV* was distributed only in hand-written form, not appearing in print again until after the Soviet

postal service. Metropolitan Sheptytsky related the resulting difficulties of internal communications to his go-between with the Pope, Nuncio Monsignor Rotta in Budapest: "...the lack of postal and communications links or, rather, the unavailability of such services to the Church was the reason why I could not keep all the clergy of my diocese on the alert..."⁵

A process of planned secularization was put into place in order to "sovietize" the society of newly occupied Galicia, that is, to bring it more into conformity with the Soviet model. Organized religion was thus deemed to be a purely private matter, and systematic efforts were made to remove it from public life. The school system was not only secularized through the dismissal and forcible exclusion of catechists⁶ and the elimination of courses in religion, but was turned into a platform for the promotion of atheist doctrine.⁷ Also, in a variety of ways, the state attempted to subvert the institutional structure of the church.⁸

Priests were specifically targeted by anti-clerical measures. Socially, they were stigmatized by means of specially designated passports and by official

withdrawal.

5. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Nuncio Rotta, 7 November 1941, in *ADSS-1*, p. 493.

6. Catechists were not only fired from teaching positions, but also forbidden by the state authorities to return to the schools. See the following three documents: "Naivazhnisha sprava...", M.O. N°4 (November 1939); "Podaiu do vidoma...", M.O. N°12 (January 1940); and "Do Oo. Katykhytiv..." ("Khoch ia vzhe poperedn'o..."), M.O. N°28 (February 1940), all in Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, *Pys'ma-Poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia z chasiv bol'shevyts'koï okupatsii* (Yorkton, 1961) (hereafter *01-61*), pp. 3, 11, and 16 respectively.

7. "Dès le premier moment toutes les écoles ont été déclarées écoles d'Etat. Défense d'enseigner la religion, et tendance systématique de corrompre la jeunesse, de l'attirer avant tout par des danses, musiques, jeux et puis par une propagande d'athéisme fanatique." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 26 December 1939, in *ADSS-1*, p. 169. The secularization of schools was carried out very quickly and largely completed within two months. Cywiński, *Ogniem próbowane*, pp. 124–25.

8. Soviet efforts to undermine the Greek Catholic Church came from within and without. The activities of the Greek Catholic bishops were closely monitored by spies, and there were attempts to sow discord between Bishop Khomyshyn and Metropolitan Sheptytsky. External interference took the form of an abortive initiative to set up a "Ukrainian National Greek Catholic Church" that would sever ties with the existing local church and with the Vatican. Mykhailo Khomiak, "Borot'ba Ukraïns'koï Katolyts'koï Tserkvy proty komunizmu," *Logos* 1, no. 4 (October-December 1950): 285–86.

More recent studies have identified steps that the Soviets took as early as the spring of 1941 in preparation for the liquidation of the Unia in Eastern Galicia through the forcible incorporation of the Greek Catholic Church into the Russian Orthodox Church. See Cywiński, *Ogniem próbowane*, p. 126, and Bociurkiw, "The Orthodox Church," p. 174.

references to their homes and to church buildings as “unproductive institutions.”⁹ No less significant were economic sanctions; whereas priests had formerly received state salaries, they now lost such benefits and instead were subjected to a heavy religious tax (*kul'tzbir*) and, in some cases, were deprived of landholdings.¹⁰ Moreover, Sheptytsky noted that the ranks of the Greek Catholic clergy were being depleted at an unprecedented rate of attrition. A number of interrelated factors, in addition to those already mentioned, were behind this phenomenon: when the occupying forces began arresting, sentencing to hard labour and summarily deporting priests, many others fled the Soviet-occupied zone into Nazi-held areas.¹¹ In this way, the Greek Catholic Church lost about 200 priests during the Soviet occupation. Although this represented less than 10% of the total lay clergy in the archeparchy, the loss was a matter of urgent concern for another reason: all three seminaries (located in Lviv, Stanyslaviv and Peremyshl) had also been forcibly dissolved, and there were very few new ordinations. Thus, the only potential replacements for the parishes were now the monastic priests whom the state had expelled from the cloistered life.¹²

In responding to all these developments, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was primarily concerned with ensuring the survival of the church. In order to survive, the church would have to be allowed to fulfill its duty of religious education. His fundamental social concern during this period was with the defence of religious freedom. He therefore focused his social reflection and ethical decision-making on two questions that emerged directly from the historical context: how to define the appropriate posture of the church toward the authority of the occupying state and how to indicate the acceptable means by which the church might meet the social demands that were being placed on it in the new situation. Before turning

9. Kubijovyč, “Western Ukraine to the Outbreak,” p. 872.

10. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Naivazhnisha sprava...,” M.O. N°4 (November 1939), in *01–61*, p. 4.

11. Sheptytsky estimated that by the end of the Soviet occupation, some fifty priests had been arrested, while in the last days six had been killed and five others were presumed dead. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Nuncio Rotta, 30 August 1941, in *ADSS-I*, p. 439. Of the fifty who had been arrested, thirty-three were deported. Sheptytsky's letter to Rotta, 7 November 1941, *ADSS-I*, p. 492. In an unpublished letter to Cardinal Tisserant (17 August 1941, p. 4), Sheptytsky reported that almost 100 priests had emigrated during this period. On the arrests, hard labour and the religious tax (*kul'tzbir*), see Khomiak, “Borot'ba Ukraïns'koï Katolyts'koï Tserkvy,” p. 285.

12. More than half of the estimated vacancies in the parishes would have been filled by Basilian monastic priests, who in 1939 numbered 133. In addition, the order comprised 91 scholastics and 149 brothers, who would likely have been considered for clandestine catechetical duties. The figures are given in *Catalogus Ordinis Basiliani Sti Josaphat Ineunte Anno Sancto MCML* (Rome, 1950), p. 52.

to these issues, we shall briefly examine Sheptytsky's theological assessment of the situation.

Along with the external threat to the life of the church as an institution, Sheptytsky saw that the suppression of religious life in Galicia also posed a deeper, spiritual threat to society. The state's systematic promotion of atheism had an observable effect on the Greek Catholic community. In the first place, atheist doctrine showed signs of taking root among the traditionally Christian people. In a letter to Cardinal Tisserant, the Metropolitan observed: "...alas, despite the best intentions of parents and children, the imprint of official atheism of the teachers already began to show itself and would have grown even more if that system had continued."¹³

"In light of the Christian faith," Sheptytsky observed, "the greatest threat is loss of faith,"¹⁴ and under Soviet rule he saw plenty of occasions where Greek Catholics were being exposed to that very danger. Particularly vulnerable were the young, who were subjected to atheist indoctrination¹⁵ and pressure in the schools, while enrolling in the Pioneer youth organization,¹⁶ and in the course of military service.¹⁷ Adults, he noted, were subjected to the same kind of pressures whenever they collaborated with the government or its agencies and, especially, when they carried out official decisions to expropriate church property.¹⁸ All these factors undermined the life of faith and prayer of the Greek Catholic community and, to Sheptytsky, this was ineluctably bound up with the sufferings of the people:

The changed circumstances are an opportunity [that has been provided by] Divine Providence, an opportunity that we neither earned nor asked for, an opportunity to perceive the error in which we have lived until now. We are witnessing historical events that for all times will clearly demonstrate the significance of prayer for humanity. We are seeing what consequences ensue when [our] prayer falls silent. A land where the words "give us this day our daily bread" are omitted from the "Our Father" is condemned to famine by the

13. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 17 August 1941, p. 7.

14. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Podaiu do vidoma...", M.O. N°90 (31 October 1940), in *01-61*, p. 72.

15. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pryminiuiuchy do poodynokykh...", M.O. N°95 (9 December 1940), in *01-61*, p. 76.

16. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Deiaki vypadky nasyl'stva...", M.O. N°68 (March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 44.

17. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Podaiu do vidoma...", M.O. N°90 (31 October 1940), in *01-61*, p. 72.

18. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pytaie sviashchenyk...", M.O. N°65 (20 March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 41.

historical Nemesis. The same fate may well await a land or a people whose voice is not constantly raised to heaven with the words, “hallowed be Thy name, Thy Kingdom come.” For, if so terrible are the consequences of omitting the words that are, as it were, closest to the land, what then might be the results of leaving out the other words?¹⁹

For those whose faith was strong, the occupation was perhaps less an insurmountable adversity than an opportunity for renewal.²⁰ But Sheptytsky feared that for many others it was a time of profound corruption, whether they submitted to the influence of the regime or freely chose to reconcile themselves with communism. Sheptytsky was convinced that he was seeing an unprecedented dissolution of society and social values:

All the worst passions of human nature were unleashed and this system of permanent and continual revolution raised the lowest and vilest elements to the surface of the social life; it also shook the authority of the family, of the schoolmaster, and of all other moral authority, and stirred up a real hatred of the so-called Soviet authorities.²¹

The devastating implications of the widespread loss of faith were therefore to be seen in the moral degeneration of society. Sheptytsky focused on three areas in which he saw the symptoms of that degeneration: declining morality in marital and sexual relations, alcohol abuse, and apathy with regard to work.

The moral fabric of society was being eroded, Sheptytsky felt, because the Christian family itself was “threatened in its very foundations.”²² This referred in part to the state policy on civil marriage, yet another vehicle through which Sheptytsky felt that the state was undermining the role of the church and propagating atheism.²³ But it also referred to actual issues of sexual ethics in Ukrainian society, to which Sheptytsky referred during this period, such as

19. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Ubohyi cholovik...,” Speech at the end of a session of the Sobor of 1940 (12 September 1940), in *OI-6I*, p. 77.

20. “Somme toute ces 21 mois passés sous le regime bolchévique a été pour un grand nombre l’occasion d’une conversion et de comprendre mieux que jamais que tous les biens terrestres ne sont que vanité. Nous avons vécu avec la persuasion de gens condamnés à mort, qui seront exécutés tôt ou tard...” *Ibid.*, p. 10.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11. As in the case of the Ukrainian underground, anti-Soviet sentiments ran high among the Greek Catholic clergy. See n. 54 below.

22. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Do spovidnykiv” (“Zvertaiu uvahu...”), M.O. N°52 (February-March 1940), in *OI-6I*, p. 29.

23. “Une des occasions de propager l’athéisme pour les bolchéviques étaient les mariages séparés, car on exigeait les employés qui ne vivaient pas bien avec leurs femmes de se marier, naturellement par un mariage civil, et le nombre des employés était très grand...” Sheptytsky to Cardinal Tisserant, 17 August 1941, p. 9.

contraception (“the sacrilegious abuse of matrimony”) and abortion.²⁴ In the Metropolitan’s view, Ukrainian society was no longer threatened merely from outside by the actions of the state, but was also eroding internally as a result of sin.

Another social problem that became widespread after the Soviet takeover was alcohol abuse. On that subject, Metropolitan Sheptytsky wrote a special statement to the faithful. The issue was complex, and he pointed out that it had several causes:

Whenever people have many reasons to worry and fear for the future, there is inevitably a great temptation to seek pleasure or strength in intoxicants. Such is human nature. And the enemy of our salvation exploits our weakness so as to increase and to constantly foist that temptation upon us.²⁵

In its specific historical context, the problem arose out of two factors—the human weakness of “people of weaker character and faith” and the difficulties of that historical moment “when a person is in the greatest need of God’s grace.”²⁶ Indeed, the expression “the enemy of our salvation” was a subtle double-entendre covering both the spiritual source of temptation on the one hand

24. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Obermulasia kartka...,” in *01–61*, p. 1; and Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Oskil’ky vy...,” M.O. N°17 (31 January 1940), in *01–61*, p. 12. On abortion as a sin for which absolution was withheld in the Archeparchy of Lviv, as well as on the respective exceptions to this rule, see Regulation 72 of the Sobor of 1940, in *03–69*, pp. 23–24.

Although to some extent these issues were a carry-over from the interwar period, the Metropolitan was quite concerned about the apparently rising incidence of sexual promiscuity, and regularly included it, along with drunkenness, in lists of pastoral issues. In one of his first statements after the outbreak of the war and prior to the Soviet invasion, he urged parish brotherhoods to remind married couples that “the sin of abusing the conjugal bond is the worst of all sins of impurity; it is a sacrilege, a sin against nature, a sin that cries to heaven for vengeance, and the death of a people.” Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Chas voiennyi utrudniaie...,” pastoral letter to the clergy, L’viv, 1 September 1939, signed and typed draft, TsDIA, f. 358, op. 1, spr. 165, ark. 44. See also Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro nebezpeku zanedbannia potribnoi pratsi” (Khoch shchoino...), M.O. N°48 (February–March 1940), in *01–61*, p. 28; “Pytaiut’sia sviashchenyky...,” M.O. N°80 (15 April 1940), in *01–61*, p. 57; and Regulation N°23 to the Decree “Dogmatychni osnovy morali” of the Sobor of 1941, in *03–69*, p. 108. In light of these issues, as well as that of onanism (which the Sobor of 1940 felt it necessary to single out, also in Regulation 72), one author’s suggestion that the Greek Catholic Church at the time had succeeded in “saving the Ukrainian family from perdition” probably needs to be taken with a grain of salt. See Khomiak, “Borot’ba Ukraïns’koï Katolyts’koï Tserkvy,” p. 281.

25. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Zvertaiusia do vas...,” M.O. N°25 (February 1940), in *01–61*, p. 14.

26. Ibid.

and, on the other, the specific conditions that prevailed in Galicia in the years 1939–41: “...from some quarters I am informed that there are people without conscience, atheists, who are not ashamed to induce and encourage people to drink.”²⁷ Not only were the causes of alcohol abuse both psychological and social, in Sheptytsky’s estimation, but its consequences were equally serious in both a material and a spiritual sense. For, in addition to the loss of the faculty of reason and conscience, drunkenness also entailed the loss of divine grace and exclusion from the Kingdom.

Another threat to a healthy society that Sheptytsky detected at this time was apathy with regard to productive labour. Wartime conditions had created uncertainty about the future and about the security of property, with the result that some people gave in to despair and simply abandoned all work as futile. The Metropolitan recognized that the pressure of the times was indeed overwhelming:

It appears to you that this work, although essential, will bring neither any benefit nor any good. Perhaps that is truly so; the times of war in which we are living are times when no one is sure of either his life or his possessions. At any moment, the sad circumstances in which we find ourselves can place any one of us before God’s judgment, tearing us away from the present life and taking away an entire life’s earnings and all the possessions that a good father may have wanted to leave for his children. In such circumstances, not only does one not desire to work, but everything seems to indicate that it is not worth the effort.²⁸

Sheptytsky appreciated that the state of emergency had caused some of his faithful to lose hope, and felt that it was inappropriate to tell people how they should conduct their personal affairs. Instead, he merely reviewed the biblical teachings on the meaning and importance of human work.²⁹ According to those teachings, human work is necessary, though not in itself the aim of life; it is meant to lead people to God. In work are balanced both social duties (to assist the needy in a spirit of brotherly love) and religious duties (to do what is

27. Ibid.

28. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro nebezpeku zanedbannia potribnoï pratsi,” M.O. N°48 (February–March 1940), in *01–61*, pp. 25–28. See also the passage from Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s letter to Cardinal Tisserant (17 August 1941, p. 10): “Nous avons vécu avec la persuasion de gens condamnés à mort, qui seront exécutés tôt ou tard...”

29. It is interesting that in his 1940 statement Sheptytsky cited none of the biblical references that were employed in such key papal social teachings as *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931). Even later Vatican social documents, for example, *Octogesima Adveniens* (1971) and *Laborem Exercens* (1981), cite biblical references that are different from Sheptytsky’s, while *Mater et Magistra* and *Gaudium et Spes* make passing reference to only two passages that were cited by Sheptytsky (1 Cor. 10: 31 and Col. 3: 17).

pleasing to God), so that, whenever it is fulfilled in the Christian spirit, it never goes to waste.³⁰ In Sheptytsky's reading, the biblical teachings showed that there was a "danger of neglecting that work which perhaps will turn out to be indispensable and without which very unpleasant and hard times may yet come upon you."³¹ Productive labour was to be continued, inasmuch as it could never really be futile, even though it may have appeared so: by neglecting it, one inevitably risked great personal and national losses.

The complex interplay of material and spiritual considerations underlying the question of labour under wartime conditions thus did not prevent the Metropolitan from taking a strong stand on the issue. While acknowledging that the war had made it difficult for people to choose between work and idleness and for him to advocate one specific course of action over another, he was nonetheless convinced that scriptural teaching consistently favoured work over idleness, regardless of historical vicissitudes. In relation to God, in other words, the value and dignity of human labour remained constant and did not depend on contextual considerations.

No less urgent from a theological perspective was the danger of grave sin, which also carried both spiritual and socio-historical consequences. Sheptytsky felt that along with the direct, external threat brought on by the Soviet regime, the internal life of the church was now also fraught with danger. By severely restricting the activity of the church, the new conditions had effectively increased the occasions for grave sin. This danger was perhaps most pronounced in the sacramental ministry. Time and again, Sheptytsky warned his priests and the faithful against the sacrilege of knowingly administering or receiving the Eucharist in a state of mortal sin.³² Nor did he underestimate the detrimental impact of such a sin on the entire community of believers, for, "With one sacrilegious Eucharist a miserable sinner does more harm to the entire Christian community than all the atheists put together."³³ Whenever a priest thus

30. Sheptytsky, "Pro nebezpeku zanedbannia potribnoi pratsi," M.O. N°48 (February-March 1940), in *01-61*, pp. 27-28.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

32. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Hornetesia...", M.O. N°9 (December 1939), in *01-61*, p. 7; and his "U vazhnu khvyliu...", address at the opening of the Sobor of 1940 (19 April 1940), in *01-61*, p. 65. This concern was already strongly evident in the Metropolitan's writings during the 1930s, particularly in his Lenten pastoral letters.

33. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Do spovidnykiv," M.O. N°52 (February-March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 29. Earlier, the Metropolitan had warned parish brotherhoods and lay Catholic organizations about the divine punishment that they could bring upon themselves and upon the entire Ukrainian people through a sacrilegious communion: "This repetition of the sin of Judas Iscariot is such a grievous insult to God that one sinner could bring

reenacted the treason of Judas,³⁴ the Metropolitan warned that, both from a spiritual and a historical standpoint, he was courting disaster:

For, if a sacrilege committed by a common Christian who does not know his catechism is a terrible misfortune for the entire community and people, then with what a weight does the burden of the treason of Judas bear down upon an entire people when it has been committed by a priest?

This crime is a thousand times more terrifying than the other; it is such a misfortune for an entire people that its consequences are more difficult to overcome than the consequences of a bloody war.³⁵

Likewise, priests were reminded that, in carrying out their clandestine ministry, they were exposed not only to personal risk; whenever they carried the presanctified gifts on their person and failed to take the appropriate precautions to avoid discovery, they exposed Jesus Christ to a dishonour “even worse than the insults of atheists.”³⁶

Metropolitan Sheptytsky recognized that, in addition to the Soviet occupation, the chief source of social turmoil at this time was the state of war. But in analyzing the situation with all its attendant human suffering and in attempting to understand its true cause, he went beyond the observable facts and sought out its deeper, spiritual origins. In theological terms, the Metropolitan saw the war as an evil that was intimately connected with human sinfulness and human responsibility. Writing to monastic superiors in March 1940, he suggested that the suffering of the innocent caused by the war required a special kind of ethical introspection by Christians: “...all of us, together and individually, are obliged to ask ourselves in a humble spirit whether we did not become the reason for that deep suffering of our entire people.”³⁷ The Metropolitan recalled his 1934 pastoral letter, titled “Who Is To Blame?”, in which he had explored this very problem: “I was troubled by the thought that...the sufferings of our people, sufferings that already then were plentiful...were to a great extent caused by sins committed by us, priests. And like a nightmare, a bad dream, this thought returns

down countless and limitless misfortunes upon everyone.” See his “Chas voiennyi utrudniaie...” (1939), TsDIA, f. 358, op. 1, spr. 165, ark. 44.

34. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “V Svitlyi Chetver...,” M.O. N°59–1 (March 1940), in *01–61*, p. 38; and his “U vazhnu khvyliu...” (19 April 1940), in *01–61*, p. 65.

35. Sheptytsky, “U vazhnu khvyliu...,” in *01–61*, p. 65.

36. “Mytropolychyi Ordynariat podaie...,” M.O. N°57 (February–March 1940), in *01–61*, p. 32.

37. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “V Svitlyi Chetver...,” M.O. N°59–1 (March 1940), in *01–61*, pp. 37–38.

to me now, as the sufferings of the innocent grow greater by the day.”³⁸ Thus, Sheptytsky had come to the disturbing conclusion that there was a linkage between the historical sufferings of Ukrainian society and the rupture with God that was caused by a grave sin:

...if the sins of men incur divine punishment of an entire people and if the penalties for those sins can become such a heavy burden that extreme suffering of the innocent along with bitter tears and relentless acts of penitence (*zhorstoki dila pokaiannia*) by sinners become essential, then it would appear that the sufferings brought onto our entire people by this war are at least in part a punishment for sins whose measure has tipped the scales.³⁹

In the troubling equation that related the sufferings of war with human sinfulness, Sheptytsky also addressed the question of the locus of human responsibility: who bears this burden? He approached the question from its specific historical context: since the war had been brought to Galicia from beyond its borders, the real question for the Greek Catholic Church was not that of moral responsibility for waging a war. Rather, the sufferings of the Greek Catholics, who had had no hand in the outbreak of the war or in precipitating the aggressive invasion of their land, and whom the Metropolitan therefore saw as truly innocent in that respect, raised for him the age-old problem of evil: why were the innocent being exposed to such suffering?

Sheptytsky's reflection on the problem led him to conclude that the cause of the suffering in this case was spiritual rather than temporal: the continuation of war-related hardships was a divine punishment for grave sins. As for the questions of precisely what those grave sins were and who had incurred the wrath of God by committing them, Sheptytsky reasoned that only a grave sin or sacrilege could have been at the root of such widespread human suffering. He was most concerned that this might have taken the form of a defilement of the Eucharist by priests knowingly administering the sacrament to people in a state of mortal sin (for example, those who had usurped the church's landholdings on behalf of the state).⁴⁰ Such was the gravity of that sin, to Sheptytsky's mind, that it could incur the punishment of an entire people. In his view, therefore, there was an urgent need for repentance, atonement and personal conversion among the clergy; in fact, he considered these to be the central aims of the Sobor of 1940:

Being an act of atonement for the sins of the people and of the clergy, our Sobor must reflect on the means of correction and seek out ways to raise the level of

38. Sheptytsky, “U vazhnu khvyliu...” (19 April 1940), in *01–61*, p. 65.

39. Ibid., p. 64.

40. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pytaie sviashchenyk...,” M.O. N°65 (20 March 1940), in *01–61*, pp. 40–41.

Christian righteousness among the people and Christian authority among the priests to such a degree that the commission of a grave sin by a priest would be an extraordinarily rare occurrence and a sacrilegious communion would be impossible.⁴¹

Moreover, Sheptytsky called on the fathers of the Sobor to repent for sins and errors “for which so often we deserved God’s disfavour and wrath.”⁴² Clearly convinced that the problem was truly far-reaching, he looked upon the Sobor as nothing less than “an examination of conscience not only of the clergy, but also of the Eparchial authority.”⁴³ And in a similar way, the Metropolitan tried to raise awareness of this threat among the faithful, imploring young people in particular to take care not to “expose the entire Ukrainian people to danger and to painful grief.”⁴⁴

Metropolitan Sheptytsky therefore saw the temporal sufferings of his people as linked to the spiritual reality of grave sin. Although actual grave sins may have been committed by only a few individuals, the punishment was severe and entailed the collective suffering of great masses of innocent people. Before his eyes, the traditionally Christian society of Western Ukraine was on the verge of being transformed into an atheistic society. Since such a prospect would have far-reaching spiritual and historical implications, the Metropolitan considered it the most urgent matter of the moment. He recognized that the threat was actually twofold: on the one hand, it was an external threat posed by state policies that promoted and supported atheist indoctrination; on the other hand, it also proceeded from the fallible nature of man, who, ever vulnerable to sin and tested now by exceptionally harsh circumstances, could well jeopardize not only his own spiritual and historical welfare, but that of the entire people. Metropolitan Sheptytsky saw this as the essential challenge: the church was called to fulfill its social mission with a view to countering the threat to the Christian soul on both fronts.

Guidelines for Social Ethics

Having assessed the plight of his church under Soviet rule, Metropolitan Sheptytsky proceeded to address the two perhaps most fundamental questions: what would be the church’s position vis-à-vis the occupying regime, and how

41. Sheptytsky, “U vazhnu khvyliu...” (19 April 1940), in *01–61*, p. 66.

42. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Blyz’ko dva misiatsi...,” M.O. N°88 (May-June 1940), in *01–61*, p. 68.

43. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “V Svitlyi Chetver...,” M.O. N°59–1 (March 1940), in *01–61*, p. 37.

44. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Podaiu do vidoma...,” M.O. N°90 (31 October 1940), in *01–61*, p. 72.

would it go about fulfilling its social mission? The anti-religious stance of the new political administration posed the main external threat to the Greek Catholic Church and its faithful. The question of an appropriate *modus vivendi* under these circumstances was complicated by conflicting theoretical and practical considerations that favoured either accommodation with the state or resistance. In support of accommodation, there was the fundamental Christian duty to obey the just dictates of civil authority, to “render unto Caesar.” This duty was reinforced by a very tangible concern—the avoidance of persecution. Although it is clear that Metropolitan Sheptytsky was personally willing to accept persecution as a cross,⁴⁵ he cautiously avoided any ill-considered positions or statements that might have exposed his priests or the faithful to suffering. In fact, his overall record of relations with the successive administrations of Austria (1899–1914) and Poland (1923–39) may ultimately be characterized as one of compliance, for as long as divine law was not challenged, Sheptytsky unequivocally preferred negotiation with the state to confrontation. On the other hand, the specific question in 1939 was that of dealing with a political administration that officially espoused atheism and made no secret of its intent to enact policies that were hostile to the church. When that state began to persecute citizens on the basis of their religious beliefs, did the basic Christian teaching on civic obedience continue to apply? Was the church not permitted in such situations to defy civil authority and to call the faithful to resistance?

Sheptytsky had stated emphatically his opposition to communism in 1936, when he issued the pastoral letter on “The Danger of the Present Moment.”⁴⁶ But in 1939 the situation was very different: it was one thing to condemn communism as an ideology from a distance, and quite another to do so now that this ideology was embodied in the occupying state: the very survival of the Christian community was at stake. Taking full account of the mortal danger in his first pastoral letter at the very beginning of the occupation, Sheptytsky declared his fundamental stance as follows:

Our agenda is the following: we will comply with the civil authority; we will obey the laws insofar as they do not contravene the law of God; we will not meddle in politics and secular affairs, nor will we cease to work tirelessly for the Christian cause among our people.⁴⁷

45. In a letter to Cardinal Tisserant on 26 December 1939, Metropolitan Sheptytsky wrote: “...j’avais demandé, et je redemande, que Sa Sainteté daigne par sa bénédiction apostolique et paternelle me désigner, députer et déléguer à la mort pour la foi et l’Unité de l’Eglise” (in *ADSS-I*, p. 172).

46. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Nebezpeka teperishn'oi khvyli...,” *LAeV* 49, nos. 7–9 (July–September 1936): 81–98.

47. “Obernulasia kartka...,” M.O. N°1 (September–October 1939), in *OI–6I*, p. 1.

The pastoral letter was a strong affirmation of the spiritual task of the church, which remained unaltered by prevailing conditions. In it, Sheptytsky called his priests to preach catechetical sermons, to lead their congregations in collective prayer, and to encourage frequent confession and the teaching of catechism in the home. This intensification of the Christian life did not detract from the basic attitude toward the state: insofar as its laws were not contrary to Christian teaching, they would be obeyed. Quite clearly, the church was at the mercy of the new regime and was in no position to engage in open hostilities or in any activities that might incite further reprisals against its members. But even such obligatory loyalty to the state was subordinated to the priority of divine law.

Having expressed this principle promptly in the first weeks of the occupation, Sheptytsky would adhere to it consistently throughout this period: while keeping aloof from political matters, Sheptytsky affirmed his commitment to the spiritual welfare of his Christian flock. Situated between the poles of accommodation and resistance, this concept of a “nip-and-tuck” struggle against superior brute force informed his social thought and served as a guideline for the social action of the Greek Catholic Church throughout the crisis.

In distancing itself from political affairs, the church would steer clear of purely secular matters that were proper to the state's jurisdiction. Accordingly, in February 1940, Sheptytsky forbade his priests to hang state or national banners in the churches and to name secular persons in the prayers of the liturgy.⁴⁸ The Sobor of 1940 reaffirmed the reasoning behind this when it decreed: “Even the appearance of political involvement by the clergy is to be avoided. Our task is to preach the Gospel and to lead all people to salvation. Out of complete love for our people and all our neighbours we do not meddle in any political matters.”⁴⁹ On the eve of the election of 15 December 1940, Sheptytsky put the principle into practice: although priests were allowed to vote, he asked them “scrupulously to refrain from any influence on the people in this regard.”⁵⁰ Sheptytsky was concerned that priests who adopted partisan stands could undermine both their pastoral work and their authority by involving themselves in conflict with the faithful, who might not share their political views. The Metropolitan further

48. M.O. №26, February 1940, in *01–61*, pp. 15–16. At that time, some priests omitted from the liturgy prayers for God to bless the state. Iaroslav Nahurs'kyi [Jarosław Nagórski], “Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi u litakh 1939–1940,” *Zhyttia i slovo* 1 (1948): 25.

49. Sheptytsky, “Do dukhovenstva i virnykh” (“Podaiu do vidoma...shcho sv. Otets'...”), M.O. №90 (31 October 1940), in *01–61*, p. 73. This important regulation also found its way, anachronistically, into a collection of documents purportedly dealing with the subsequent Nazi occupation of Western Ukraine. See Regulation №56, Sobor of 1940, in *03–69*, p. 21.

50. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pryminiuiuchy do poodynokh...,” M.O. №95 (9 December 1940), in *01–61*, pp. 75–76.

reminded preachers to ensure that their sermons remained evangelical, and did not become secular speeches: "Under the threat of a grave sin, a preacher is not permitted to add to the Gospel any purely human affirmations, nor to propagate any sort of political, national or state-related thesis, nor any personal matters, needs or aspirations."⁵¹ Through a conscious effort, even the merest symbolic support for the state would be avoided in the interest of safeguarding an inner purity. The path of political aloofness also served to check potentially dangerous political idealism among the clergy. The Greek Catholic clergy generally supported the anti-Soviet Ukrainian underground, but many, particularly younger priests, were capable of hot-headed vehemence in voicing their allegiance in public.⁵² Sheptytsky therefore took pains to discourage any ill-conceived declarations that might have rendered the situation more volatile than it already was.

Thus, in order to avoid reprisals by the state, Metropolitan Sheptytsky proposed an approach that balanced political neutrality with social commitment. This approach was dictated by the prevailing dynamics of power: the church could not afford to risk retaliation from a hostile military and administrative apparatus, but, at the same time, it enjoyed widespread public support, and Sheptytsky could count on that support to back up his appeals for religious liberty. He also proposed a very similar approach for the internal life of the church, and we shall now examine his guidelines on that subject.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky believed that the church's social role, far from being limited to exhortations, also included an ethical critique. In its capacity as a teacher of morality and of the faith, the church was fully integrated with society and actively concerned with social relations. Thus, among the Metropolitan's key

51. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Rozsylauchy apostoliv...", M.O. N°66 (March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 41.

52. Interview with Professor Bohdan Bociurkiw, 7 August 1987. See also the purported communiqué of Stepan Bandera to the members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists: "...from the moment of the arrival of the (Soviet) armies, the Greek Catholic clergy not only has not in any way manifested its support for the Soviets, but, on the contrary, priests are sowing distrust toward them among the population and are stirring hopes of rapid changes in the situation, which is undesirable to the church." TsDIA, f. 201, op. 4b, spr. 2626, ark. 59. Cited in Edward Prus, *Władyka Świętojurski: Rzecz o arcybiskupie Andrzeju Szeptyckim (1865–1944)* (Warsaw, 1985), p. 207. Prus is justifiably considered a notoriously unreliable source, drawing on Soviet polemical writings and proffering fictitious references to collections at the Central State Historical Archives in Lviv, in which he has never conducted research. We therefore cite him very sparingly. The present item is certainly plausible and simply sheds additional light upon the problem of excessive anti-communist fervor among the clergy, which is amply substantiated in the Sheptytsky corpus.

reasons for convoking the Sobor of 1940 was to enable the church “not only to live and act, but also to set the norms for relations among people.”⁵³

The church was to carry out its critical role in social ethics by balancing sensitivity and commitment to the needs of the people on the one hand, and, on the other, a critical discernment of the characteristic traits and shortcomings of the people. This message was addressed in the first instance to the Greek Catholic priests, whose work was at the centre of the church’s social program. Sensitivity to the needs of the people meant that they had to be attentive to their historical context. While the Metropolitan felt that sermons should be free from political content, it was vital that they apply gospel teachings to the context and needs of the times. It was the mark of an effective pastor that he quickly grasped the needs of the people and was able to apply his teachings to those needs, for “Whoever would ignore the changed times and would preach today as he did ten or twenty years ago would probably be lacking in that trait.”⁵⁴ Sheptytsky recognized that, since human nature remained constant, a good sermon on the gospel would have universal applicability, but still he stressed the importance of attending to the needs of the people “in their specific time and in their specific parish.”⁵⁵ Rather than a watering down of the gospel teaching, this meant that those teachings had to be selected which would address the needs of a particular context:

In order for a sermon to be applicable to the needs of the times and of the people, it should raise those truths that people need more at that given moment... It is necessary to explain those truths that are useful for successfully overcoming the flaws of the present moment.⁵⁶

Similarly, Sheptytsky tried to inspire the Sobor of 1940 with a sensitivity to the particular, pressing needs of the Ukrainian people:

The decrees of the Eparchial Sobor must be well suited to the needs of place, time and the nature of the people and the clergy, for it is impossible to find anywhere a scheme of laws that could be transplanted verbatim into our eparchy. Some resolutions that might be very beneficial and necessary in German or Italian eparchies would be unnecessary and perhaps even detrimental in our circumstances.⁵⁷

53. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Vid lit bazhav ia...,” M.O. [N°59] (13 March 1940), in *01–61*, p. 34.

54. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Rozsylaiuchy apostoliv...,” M.O. N°66 (March 1940), in *01–61*, p. 42.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Sheptytsky, “Vid lit bazhav ia...,” M.O. [N°59] (13 March 1940), in *01–61*, p. 34.

Secondly, sensitivity to the needs of the people required actual contact with them. Pastors were therefore instructed to consult with and confide in a select group of their parishioners: "It is inconceivable for a pastor not to speak with pious parishioners about his sorrows and about this terrible task that he must fulfill, and not to seek their assistance!"⁵⁸ In the Metropolitan's view, a pastor truly needed that contact with the people, inasmuch as the effectiveness of his pastoral work depended on it.⁵⁹

Thirdly, social sensitivity demanded tact and respect for the hardships of the faithful. Thus, in addressing the problem of wartime apathy with regard to work, Sheptytsky refrained from moralizing, because he recognized that truly extreme difficulties had driven many to the brink of despair.⁶⁰ Similarly, tact was to be observed in delivering sermons; at all costs, priests were to avoid reproaching the faithful or, for that matter, making personal remarks of any sort.⁶¹ The best sources for grounding this social sensitivity were the scriptures and tradition. Thus, if priests were not to chastise, it was because the word of God, the divine truths themselves "chastise like thunder"; and if they were not to rely too heavily on their own perceptions of social needs, it was because the teachings of the church contained all the necessary guidelines for enlightening a social ministry. Little was to be gained through mere moralizing, Sheptytsky maintained, even when the faith itself was threatened.⁶² What people needed was the light of the faith, and this meant that a priest had to focus attention on the gospel teachings and deepen his life of prayer with the daily office, in which

...he will find the response to all his needs, to the pains and needs of the family, as well as the source of its sorrows and afflictions; he will find the needs of the entire people in all its affairs and aspirations; its hopes, its future, its power and glory; he will find all the instruments of pastoral work and of influence upon the people; he will find the obedience and respect of the parishioners, their needs and

58. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pytaiut'sia sviashchenyky...", M.O. N°80 (15 April 1940), in *01-61*, p. 57.

59. Ibid., p. 58.

60. Sheptytsky, "Pro nebezpeku zanedbannia potribnoï pratsi," M.O. N°48 (February-March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 27.

61. "A sinner to whom a particular teaching is directed should apply the teaching to himself. When the preacher does this, he can harm the sinner or discourage him. There is no such danger when the sinner applies the teaching to himself." Sheptytsky, "Rozsylaiuchy apostoliv...", M.O. N°66 (March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 42. A decree of the Sobor of 1940 resolved that priests should avoid actions that might deter people from an evangelical life, such as censuring sinners from the pulpit or, worse, naming them. The chancery office reserved for itself the power to decide when such exceptional conditions had arisen as might justify measures of this kind. "Dekrety i pravyla Arkhyeparkhiial'noho Soboru 1940 roku. Ch. 8: Propovidy," in *03-69*, p. 71.

62. Sheptytsky, "Rozsylaiuchy apostoliv...", M.O. N°66 (March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 42.

the way to respond to them, and sometimes he will even find a word that will provide themes for his best sermons.⁶³

The needs of society, finally, also included matters that called for social philanthropy. Of course, the church had already been involved in this sphere of activity before the war, but at a time of general shortages and rationing, those in need of social assistance (widows, orphans, the elderly, the ill and the various organizations and institutions that provided assistance to them) were in even greater difficulty.⁶⁴

Balanced with this sense of the needs of the people was a social critique that revolved around the identification of ethical shortcomings in society and an attempt to suggest ways to correct them. In setting the agenda for the Sobor of 1940, the Metropolitan reminded his priests that their sobors had an important corrective function: "The point of every sobor is to correct faults and to raise the level of virtue and the religious life. No one can know better than you, Reverend Fathers, what are the deficiencies and faults among our people and by what means those flaws might be removed."⁶⁵ And indeed, once the Sobor was in session, this social concern was prominent in its proceedings. For example, it was resolved that the Sobor should be an occasion for "...working toward the correction and perfection of our life and our pastoral work; working on repentance for our [sins] and [those of] the people; correcting the errors of our work and the errors or even vices in society."⁶⁶

Yet when it came to the problem of apostates and collaborators with the regime, Sheptytsky refrained from harsh criticism, recognizing that their decisions and acts might well have been carried out under duress. Thus, when referring to "the rare exceptions who betrayed the Church and their people" by voting to close the monasteries, the Metropolitan also made an effort to see them in their context:

In reality, the matter was decided under circumstances in which, fearing for their lives, the delegates [to the People's Assembly] did not realize that they had become the blind instruments of our enemies and that through their decision, which was perhaps not very conscious and not very free, they dealt a heavy blow

63. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Ubohyi cholovik..." (12 September 1940), in *01-61*, p. 78.

64. M.O. N°3 (November 1939), in *01-61*, p. 3; Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro mylostyniu" ("Polozhennia mnohykh..."), M.O. N°53 (February-March 1940), in *01-61*, pp. 30-31; and Sheptytsky, "Pytaiut'sia sviashchenyky...", M.O. N°80 (15 April 1940), in *01-61*, p. 57.

65. Sheptytsky, "Vid lit bazhav ia...", M.O. [N°59] (13 March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 34.

66. "Dekrety i pravyla Arkhyeparkhiial'noho Soboru 1940 roku. Ch. 1: Vyznannia Vselens'koi Viry," in *03-69*, p. 64.

to our Church and our people.⁶⁷

Appreciating the moral predicament of Christian deputies who had adapted to communist rule, Metropolitan Sheptytsky did not condemn apostates and collaborators with the Soviet occupiers. Rather than condemning what under almost any other conditions would have been considered a blow to the church, he left open the door to reconciliation with those who had injured the church.

The elements of the church's social mission examined here—an attentiveness to the needs of the people and the needs of the times—reflected the tenuous situation of the church under the Soviet occupation. Attentiveness to needs required priests to find ways of communicating the gospel message so that it would reach the people regardless of obstacles. To that end, the Metropolitan tried to cultivate an effective preaching and social ministry that would combine Christian teaching with a high degree of social sensitivity.

Practice: Patterns of Accommodation and Resistance

The Soviet occupation posed a structural threat to the church: institutionalized atheism was poised to replace the institutional church. As a community of faith, the Greek Catholic Church faced the threat of internal erosion through apostasy. Metropolitan Sheptytsky therefore sought ways to defend religious liberty against the state's atheist and anti-church policy and, at the same time, to counter some of its effects by intensifying the Christian life of his spiritual flock. The means available to him were limited, since virtually all executive power was concentrated in the hands of the civil authorities. Sheptytsky's responses to the

67. Sheptytsky, "V Svitlyi Chetver...", M.O. N°59-1 (March 1940), in *01-61*, pp. 36-37. Sheptytsky, however, disapproved of the confiscation of church lands. He warned any lapsed Christians among the members of the People's Assembly who might have profited by such means: Christians were obliged before God and before their own conscience to ensure the livelihood of those who ministered to their spiritual needs. Whoever presumed to claim parish or monastic property for his own would incur "heavy penalties" from the church, that is, excommunication until the injustice had been redressed. See Sheptytsky, "Naivazhnisha sprava...", M.O. N°4 (November 1939), in *01-61*, p. 4; and Khomiak, "Borot'ba Ukraïns'koï Katolyts'koï Tserkvy," p. 283. Moreover, any priests who gave absolution to such "usurpers" were considered to have contravened Canon 2346 and were also subject to excommunication. See M.O. N°11 (January 1940), in *01-61*, p. 10.

However, if restitution were made, church tradition allowed for absolution, and Sheptytsky even took this a step further, with special provisions for anyone who was unable to make restitution for fear of reprisal by the Soviets. Such people could retain custody of church property as hired workers and pay the church a designated portion of the income from the holdings. See Sheptytsky, "Pytaie sviashchenyk...", M.O. N°65 (20 March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 41. In the end, therefore, the punitive thrust of Sheptytsky's response was outweighed by an appreciation of the difficult circumstances that effectively drove a wedge between moral duty and the freedom to fulfill it.

new situation included lawful measures and other measures which, in the eyes of the authorities, were illegal. This twofold approach reflects the opposite poles of accommodation and resistance between which the church articulated its position toward the state. In the present section, we examine these two patterns of response with a view to shedding further light on the way in which the Metropolitan addressed the issues of church-state relations under Soviet rule.

Sheptytsky's accommodating responses to the occupation occurred at two levels: in external relations with the state and in the internal life of the church. Accommodation with the state was evident in Sheptytsky's attempts to secure religious liberty while remaining strictly within the framework of Soviet legality. A similar accommodating pattern of response was integrated into the internal life of the church, where traditional structures and practices were modified to respond more effectively to the needs of the moment.

At the forefront of church-state relations at this time was the issue of religious freedom. In numerous appeals for religious liberty, Metropolitan Sheptytsky found some support in the Soviet constitution of 1936. Article 123 stated: "In order to safeguard the freedom of conscience of citizens, the church is separated from the state and schools are separated from the church." Sheptytsky saw the reference to freedom of conscience as crucial to the interests of the church, which wanted to intensify Christian community life and to take a firm stand in defence of religious freedom before the civil authorities. In February 1940, he cited this constitutional provision as a guarantee of freedom of worship, understanding it to permit the establishment of religious brotherhoods and other church organizations.⁶⁸ The Metropolitan also declared his intention to request permission from the occupation authorities to establish a pastoral ministry for those who had been resettled in lands to the east of Galicia.⁶⁹ Evidently, he supposed that the state might consider such a request permissible under the constitution. Similarly, in December 1940, Sheptytsky reminded Greek Catholic priests that in countering atheist propaganda they should make use of all the religious rights granted by the Soviet constitution.⁷⁰ And in a letter to the

68. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Khoch ia vzhe...", M.O. N°28 (February 1940), in *01-61*, p. 17. Two months later, he reiterated in a pastoral letter to the clergy: "We certainly must avail ourselves of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of conscience and of worship, and organize our parishes in the best possible way, beginning with the organization of brotherhoods." Sheptytsky, "Pytaiut'sia sviashchenyky...", M.O. N°80 (15 April 1940), in *01-61*, pp. 56-57.

69. Sheptytsky, "Podaiu do vidoma...shcho bazhaiuchy...", M.O. N°83 (17 April 1940), in *01-61*, p. 61.

70. Sheptytsky, "Pryminiuiuchy do poodynokykh...", M.O. N°95 (9 December 1940), in

educational official Zharchenko, protesting against atheist propaganda in the schools, Sheptytsky repeatedly referred to the provisions and guarantees of Stalin's constitution.⁷¹

It would certainly be incorrect to infer from such references that Sheptytsky had a favourable opinion of the Soviet constitution of 1936. In order to keep this in proper perspective, it is worth remembering that after the withdrawal of Soviet forces in the summer of 1941, the Metropolitan gave a more candid appraisal of the true situation than had been possible during the occupation: "They even gave religious denominations a measure of the 'freedom of religion' that Stalin's constitution guaranteed, but the very notion of that liberty was so narrowly conceived that it went hand in hand with an altogether formal persecution of the mere name 'Christian.'"⁷² Also, in a situation report to Cardinal Tisserant of the Congregation for the Eastern Church, Sheptytsky referred to the "quasi-constitution of Stalin" and pointed out that it was being contravened in practice by anti-religious propaganda.⁷³ He then affirmed:

Clearly, we did not recognize the Soviet regime as a legitimate authority (*pouvoir légal*), since their methods, which were hostile in the extreme to the entire population, contained nothing of what constitutes the minimal conditions of a legal power. Accordingly, we never mentioned the [civil] authority in our liturgical services. That did not prevent me from declaring publicly that we submitted to the just dictates of this quasi-power—[that is, those dictates that were] not contrary to divine law.⁷⁴

The Metropolitan therefore had no illusions about the legitimacy of the Soviet constitution as a legal instrument, any more than he did about the legitimacy of the Soviet occupation.⁷⁵ However, the church's critical capacity in social affairs

01-61, p. 76.

71. Sheptytsky, "Protest proty nasyl'stva nad sovistiu ditei" ("Deiaki vypadky nasyl'stva..."), M.O. N°68 (March 1940), in 01-61, pp. 44-46. We examine this letter in greater detail later in this chapter.

72. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Budapest Nuncio Angelo Rotta, 30 August 1941, in ADSS-1, p. 437.

73. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 17 August 1941, p. 6.

74. Ibid., p. 5.

75. In this connection, Sheptytsky's view of the constitutions of parish brotherhoods, which he expressed at this time, is also telling: he felt that a brotherhood becomes the heart of a parish "not by force of [its] statutes, but by virtue of the wise leadership of its pastor." See Sheptytsky, "Pytaiut'sia sviashchenyky...", M.O. N°80 (15 April 1940), in 01-61, pp. 58-59. This attentiveness to the wisdom of leaders over and above constitutions further supports our point that Sheptytsky's superficial adherence to the Soviet constitution was only a formal, procedural posture dictated by circumstances. Inasmuch as the Stalinist "leaders" were anything but "wise" in their treatment of the

was framed within the larger question of the survival of the Christian community, and this remained the first priority. In light of that fundamental concern, the resort to strict Soviet legality was in effect nothing more than an attempt to establish a solid footing from which appeals and protests against the suppression of religion could be launched.⁷⁶ Given the repressive conditions of the occupation, Sheptytsky regarded the Soviet constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience as a useful instrument through which the church could voice its concern for religious liberty and mount its opposition to anti-religious propaganda; supported by provisions of the constitution, the argument for religious liberty was at least formally immune to charges of disloyalty to the state. The Metropolitan's constitutionally based argument responsibly avoided inciting further actions against the church and the faithful. Unfortunately, it did not bring about any changes in state policy, and Sheptytsky therefore undertook more forceful representations in the cause of religious liberty.

One important area in which he did so was education, where atheist indoctrination was becoming a serious problem for the Christian community. In accordance with Soviet educational policy, schools in occupied Western Ukraine were subjected to reforms that replaced religious instruction with atheist doctrine, and catechists (mostly priests and nuns) with non-Christian teachers and administrators.⁷⁷ This policy was therefore not merely a question of secularization and deconfessionalization of the educational system, but it was also accompanied by an active promotion of anti-religious attitudes. In addition to the schools, various youth organizations (such as the Young Communist League) cultivated attitudes hostile to a religious world-view.⁷⁸ Troubled by such a state of affairs, Sheptytsky wrote a letter of protest to the head of the District Department of Public Education in Lviv, Zharchenko. Invoking the constitutional

church, the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms remained a fiction.

76. Sheptytsky at one point even referred to the eparchial sobors as "a legal fiction, as it were, to replace the monthly publication of the *L'vivs'ki Arkhieparkhiial'ni Vidomosti*." See Sheptytsky, "U vazhnu khvyliu..." (19 April 1940), in *01-61*, p. 63. Also, by requesting permission to conduct pastoral work in the Eastern lands, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was probing the regime by every means available to him in an attempt to win some basic concessions. See M.O. N°83 (17 April 1940), in *01-61*, p. 61.

77. "The very fact that the educational authorities appoint as teachers and principals non-Christians who are at times full of hatred for Christianity places the school at odds with the very strong Christian tradition of the Ukrainian people." [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], "Protest proty nasyt'stva nad sovistiu ditei" ("Deiaki vypadky nasyt'stva..."), M.O. N°68 (March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 45.

78. Ibid., p. 44.

guarantee of freedom of conscience and worship, the document defended the right of religious freedom.

In the first place, Sheptytsky argued that the constitutional guarantee applied to children as much as to adults. From this, it followed that schools were likewise bound by the duty to respect the freedom of citizens to fulfill their religious obligations. Similarly, parents had the right to transmit their faith to their children and the right to demand that the school carry out those wishes or, at least, not interfere with them by attacking a child's religion.⁷⁹ However, the Metropolitan observed that the practical implementation of the freedom of conscience in occupied Western Ukraine left much to be desired:

Although freedom of conscience is guaranteed by the constitution, it is interpreted in the schools of Western Ukraine in such a way that the school restricts the freedom of children and punishes those who wish to pray. This appears to indicate that certain individuals in the school system are attempting to deviate from the direction set forth by the Constitution, and this necessarily undermines respect for the authority of the Constitution among parents and Western Ukrainian society at large.⁸⁰

The appointment of non-Christians as teachers and principals was another unwelcome change, because it placed the educational authorities at odds with the Christian tradition of the Ukrainian people. Sheptytsky felt that the public outcry over this matter would inevitably be harmful to the "prestige of the Soviet regime."

Sheptytsky was arguing for consistency between the provisions of the constitution and the state of religious education in Western Ukraine. While pointing out the contradiction between theory and practice, his argument avoided polemics and ideologically based rhetoric, focusing instead on the interest of the state in consolidating its power. Knowing that this was the top priority of the Soviet authorities, the Metropolitan argued that the popular support they sought would only emerge when people saw the practical implementation of the constitutional guarantees:

It is evident that our society will respect the Constitution and will grow stronger in its respect for and trust in the Soviet government when that government ceases to tolerate blatantly anti-constitutional initiatives in every sector of its administration of this land, including education.⁸¹

In order to promote fidelity to the constitution by the educational authorities, Sheptytsky proposed a democratization of the educational system; parents, he

79. Ibid., p. 45. Sheptytsky also criticized the reported use of atheist propaganda during the enrolment of children into the Pioneers as a violation of the freedom of conscience.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

felt, deserved a greater measure of decision-making power in the running of schools, and this would prevent any further sidestepping of the constitution in the matter of religious freedom. The Metropolitan's letter to Zharchenko epitomized the stand of the Greek Catholic Church toward the Soviet occupation. It situated the religious question squarely within the political agenda by showing its direct relevance to the Soviets' desire to win the hearts and minds of the population. Sheptytsky's point was very simple: in order to earn the loyalty of its Christian citizens, the state and all its organs would first have to respect their religious rights.

Another instance of a more assertive stand in defence of religious rights was the Metropolitan's protest against the suppression of monasteries. On 27 October 1939, the members of a newly convened People's Assembly (Narodni Zbory, which had voted to reunite Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian SSR) passed a resolution to liquidate monasteries and seize their landholdings.⁸² There were also indications that the same sanction would be applied to individual parish lands. Sheptytsky protested in very strong terms, arguing that this abused the rights of the church. In his view, the move was a grave injury and an affront to the church, a "flagrantly illegal" decision coming from "an assembly that considered itself to be [comprised of] representatives of the entire population."⁸³ In a decree of the Sobor of 1940, he went even further, pronouncing the decision of the People's Assembly invalid: "This decision, inasmuch as it is contrary to divine law and the rights of the Church, *has no legal force*; it entails spiritual penalties for those who participated in it and those who stand to gain by it; and it requires restitution for the damage done."⁸⁴

The confiscation of church property disregarded the basic and legitimate needs of the priests and the faithful. The state had already withdrawn other means of subsistence from the clergy (i.e., salaries) and now, Sheptytsky argued, it was proceeding to do the same with an indispensable source of their income. Nor were the consequences of such a policy limited to the priests: because of the social aspect of parish ministry, the sequestration of parish lands also injured the entire Christian community, which needed its spiritual ministers and which had

82. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 26 December 1939, in *ADSS-I*, p. 169, and Khomiak, "Borot'ba Ukraïns'koï Katolyts'koï Tserkvy," p. 283.

83. Sheptytsky, "V Svitlyi Chetver...," M.O. N°59-1 (March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 37.

84. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Dekret i pravyla Arkhieparkhiial'noho Soboru z 1940 r. Pro tykh, shcho zhyiut' po ievanhel's'kym radam," in *03-69*, pp. 378-79; and in *Diiannia i Postanovy L'vivs'kykh Arkhyieparkhiial'nykh Soboriv 1940-41-42-43, pid provodom Sluhy Bozhoho Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho* (Winnipeg, 1984) (hereafter 06-84), p. 247. Emphasis mine.

toiled to build and maintain their places of worship.⁸⁵ Sheptytsky's argument, although it was an outright challenge to the legality of the decision of the People's Assembly, still was formulated within the framework of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the church.

In pressing for religious liberty on the basis of constitutional provisions, Metropolitan Sheptytsky argued at least on one occasion for a more lenient interpretation of the Criminal Code of the USSR. Article 114 of the Code, which prohibited the performance of religious ceremonies inside state and community establishments, was routinely applied to hospitals and clinics. The Metropolitan wrote to Nikita S. Khrushchev, the head of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, asking him to introduce an instruction or regulation that would ensure that the sick and dying in hospitals would no longer be deprived of basic pastoral care. There were three essential points to his argument: first, that by virtue of their function hospitals and clinics were not state institutions in the strict, juridical sense of the term; second, that ministering to the sick and dying did not constitute a public performance of religious ritual but was, instead, "a private conversation by a priest without vestments, without any singing, and without incense"; and third, that the strict interpretation of the article deprived the sick of their constitutionally guaranteed religious freedom.⁸⁶

In a second letter to Khrushchev, Sheptytsky protested against the arrests and imprisonment of priests without trial. Arguing that this was yet again a violation of the constitution, he boldly put forth his interpretation of the constitution's provision on freedom of worship and basically challenged the authorities to contradict it:

As the Metropolitan in charge of the eparchy and ecclesiastical province to which all of Galicia belongs, I constantly remind my priests in every way I can that a priest who avails himself of the freedom of worship, which is protected by Stalin's constitution, cannot thereby be exposed to any punishment, and that the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of worship consists of the free fulfillment of all the duties that the Church imposes upon us. I constantly repeat to one and all that preaching is an essential part of worship and that freedom of worship includes the freedom to preach and to administer all the sacraments. I am positively certain that many priests did not depart in the least from the loyalty to the Soviet authority to which I called them, but still they are being punished severely. Meanwhile, no official has ever asked me how I interpret freedom of worship, and

85. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Naivazhnisha sprava...", M.O. N°4 (November 1939), in *01-61*, p. 4.

86. This particular letter to Khrushchev has not been found, but Metropolitan Sheptytsky mentions it in his follow-up letter of 11 November 1940 to lawyer and Academy of Sciences member Andrei Ianuar'evich Vyshinskii, whom he asked for support on the same issue. A typed copy is preserved in TsDIA, f. 201t, op. 1, spr. 104, ark. 38, 38a.

no one has ever objected to any of my instructions to the clergy.⁸⁷

These representations to the state were the legitimate means that Metropolitan Sheptytsky employed in his attempt to restore religious freedom. His appeals ranged in their intensity from the straightforward request that the state respect its own fundamental law to the protest against the promotion of atheism in the schools and, ultimately, to the outright charge of illegality in the case of the suppression of monasteries and of the arrests of priests. In his official and public pronouncements, Metropolitan Sheptytsky adopted a generally accommodating posture. In order for his appeals for religious liberty to be heard, he knew that he would need—at least temporarily and *pro forma*—to refrain from questioning the legitimacy of the Soviet administration in Western Ukraine and to stay strictly within the framework of the Soviet constitution and Soviet law.

A similar pattern of accommodation to the new socio-political conditions was evident in the internal life of the church. The Soviet suppression of the Greek Catholic Church's activity forced Metropolitan Sheptytsky to make certain adaptations in the internal life of the church, in much the same way as he had followed a pattern of accommodation in relation to the state. We shall examine two instances of adaptation within the church, structural reorientation and ritual accommodation, and then draw out some of the operative principles that guided Sheptytsky's ethical reasoning in this area.

The restraints imposed on the church by the Soviet occupation led Metropolitan Sheptytsky to introduce an unexpected measure of flexibility into the structure of the Greek Catholic Church. In particular, this structural flexibility was applied in two areas: a loosening of some rules regarding the clergy and the allocation of new tasks. The relaxation of rules respecting the clergy was a necessary adaptation in direct response to the difficult situation. The Soviet invasion had eroded the ranks of the Greek Catholic clergy; fearing for their lives, many had fled their parishes. By the end of the occupation, the numbers of those who fled would reach almost 100.⁸⁸ The Metropolitan tried initially to stem this exodus with a hard-line approach; in January 1940, his chancery office issued two directives censuring those priests who had departed without official leave and promising to publish their names in the forthcoming issue of the eparchial organ, *Lvivs'ki Arkhieparkhiial'ni Vidomosti*.⁸⁹ But as the Soviets

87. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, Letter to Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, [L'viv], 5 March 1941, manuscript copy, TsDIA, f. 201, op. 1t, spr. 104, ark. 39, 39a.

88. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 17 August 1941, p. 2.

89. M.O. N°13, 14 (January 1940), in *01-61*, p. 11. At the end of May 1940, the

consolidated their authority in the occupied territory and the plight of the church worsened, it became clear that a more understanding approach was needed. In a report to the Vatican after the Soviet withdrawal, Sheptytsky described the gravity of the situation and the psychological dimension of the problem, which, in his view, overrode canonical obedience and required instead that the church exercise tolerance:

...first of all, a word in defence of those who, by fleeing the Bolsheviks, abandoned their parish ministry. We lost almost one hundred priests in this way; among them, few had a chance to ask my permission to leave. I did not refuse [permission] to anyone [who asked for it], for my experience from the very beginning [of the occupation] showed me that even without great fault a very good priest could do some very foolish things out of fear. I saw some very good priests who completely lost their balance and who practically no longer knew what they were doing. It was therefore preferable in every respect to let them go.⁹⁰

In a similar way, Sheptytsky instructed monastic superiors to exercise leniency in dealing with those monks and nuns who were forced to leave their monasteries:

As long as it remains possible to do so, monasteries or cloisters will continue to support orphanages, kindergartens, schools and other institutions. As this becomes impossible because of external circumstances, superiors shall permit monks and nuns either to leave the monastery with a full dispensation from all the duties of monastic life or to live [as monks and nuns] outside the monastery and in civilian attire.⁹¹

Structural adaptation involved the introduction of new measures to assist the church in addressing the spiritual needs of the faithful, needs that were aggravated by the shortage of priests and by the severing of communications links. In responding to the growing need for new priests, Sheptytsky instituted new courses in theology to be given by local priests, and supplemented them with lessons circulated in the organ of the Archeparchy⁹² and with lectures in the archbishop's residence.⁹³ Also, a more immediate solution was available to make up for deceased or departed parish priests: the vacancies were filled by

chancery issued another terse reminder that any priests who had vacated their parishes without leave were automatically suspended. See M.O. N°87 (30 May 1940), in *01-61*, p. 67.

90. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 17 August 1941, pp. 2-3.

91. Sheptytsky, "Rozsivaiuchy Vas...", M.O. N°3 (November 1939), in *01-61*, p. 3. See also Nahurs'kyi [Nagórski], "Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi u litakh 1939-1940," p. 25.

92. M.O. N°20 (February 1940), in *01-61*, p. 13.

93. M.O. N°32 (20 February 1940), in *01-61*, pp. 17-18.

monastic priests (including Basilians, Redemptorists and Studites) and by catechists who had lost their employment in the schools.⁹⁴ In further support of work at the parish level, Sheptytsky also promoted lay participation through parish organizations and lay brotherhoods.⁹⁵

Other structural adaptations were aimed at overcoming problems with internal communications. Metropolitan Sheptytsky instituted regular weekly meetings of the clergy in the archepiscopal residence.⁹⁶ In May 1940, these meetings were transformed into diocesan synods (*soborhyky*)⁹⁷ that dealt with a variety of theological and pastoral questions and issued decrees and regulations. Another means of maintaining communication was an underground network of couriers by which messages were transmitted to and from the Archbishop's chancery.⁹⁸ And in order to extend financial assistance more promptly to the needy, the Metropolitan authorized pastors to disburse funds directly from parish treasuries to that end.⁹⁹

The war and the occupation gave rise to new ethical problems in the area of ritual worship. Metropolitan Sheptytsky found himself facing an array of special situations that, under the exceptional circumstances, forced him to rethink many

94. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 17 August 1941, p. 4.

95. Sheptytsky, "Pytaiut'sia sviashchenyky...", M.O. N°80 (15 April 1940), in *01-61*, pp. 56-59.

96. "Pour donner à mon clergé un support moral j'ai invité tous les prêtres de prendre part à des sessions de ce qu'on appelait autrefois le consistoire—chaque jeudi à 10 ou 11 heures tous les prêtres présents à Léopol se rassemblaient chez moi. Les actes de l'autorité ecclésiastique étaient lus, puis copiés et propagés par les prêtres. De cette manière j'ai pu écrire beaucoup de lettres pastorales,—presque chaque semaine j'en promulguais une..." Sheptytsky, letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 17 August 1941, pp. 4-5. The Metropolitan estimated that, on average, the meetings were attended by 60-80 priests.

97. Sheptytsky, letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 17 August 1941, p. 5. During the course of the war, four such sobors were held: in 1940, 1941, 1942, and 1943. Sheptytsky's letter to Tisserant of 6 September 1942 discusses the first three synods, while the acts of all four sobors are contained in *06-84*. For further discussion, see the unpublished doctoral dissertation by Volodymyr Mudri, "Cinque Sinodi Arcieparchiali di Leopoli, 1905-1943" (Pontifical Institute of Oriental Studies, 1983). The first synod in this study is one that took place in 1905.

98. Sheptytsky's writings indicate that the network was primarily intended for the distribution of longhand copies of the Archeparchial organ, though it is not far-fetched to suppose that the same routes were also used as a mail service by the church. See the following references in Sheptytsky's writings: M.O. N°24 (February 1940), in *01-61*, p. 14; M.O. N°84 (17 April 1940), in *01-61*, p. 62; and Sheptytsky, "U vazhnu khvyliu...", (19 April 1940), in *01-61*, p. 63.

99. Sheptytsky, "Pro mylostyniu" ("Polozhennia mnohykh..."), M.O. N°53 (February-March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 30.

traditional practices and to allow for considerable adaptation in this area as well. For one thing, access to confession by a priest had become difficult. Sheptytsky recognized that the usual requirement of a priest was often impossible to fulfill, thus forcing some accommodation:

It is becoming common for Christians to find themselves in a situation where they may die without a final confession. Whether in the army, or on the battlefield, or far away from priests or in a hospital [i.e., from which priests were barred, A.K.], any one of you may find yourself dying without the opportunity of receiving absolution from a priest. In such a case, the most important thing is to know how to awaken in the soul a perfect act of contrition and thereby return to divine grace even without a confession.¹⁰⁰

Other accommodations in the area of ritual worship waived restrictions that governed the celebration of the Divine Liturgy. With a view to ensuring the subsistence of priests, Sheptytsky allowed pastors to dedicate Sunday and feast day liturgies to individuals who made offerings (i.e., rather than to the parish, as was the customary practice).¹⁰¹ And in cases where a reasonably large number of parishioners were unable to attend the morning liturgy because of work on Sundays and religious holidays, permission was given to celebrate a second liturgy in the afternoon, as long as that liturgy was joined with a vesper service and the pastor observed a proper fast, as required by the Eastern tradition.¹⁰²

100. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Mnozhat'sia vypadky, de khrystyiany...", M.O. N°92 (6 November 1940), in *01-61*, p. 73. The pastoral letter explained the essence of an act of contrition and provided examples of prayers that might accompany it.

101. Sheptytsky, "Pryminiuiuchy do poodynokykh...", M.O. N°95 (9 December 1940), in *01-61*, p. 76. Almost a year earlier, a similar directive had been issued allowing a second liturgy on the same day. See M.O. N°15 (January 1940), in *01-61*, p. 11.

102. M.O. N°98 (2 January 1941), in *01-61*, pp. 76-77. According to one source, there was considerable flexibility in the timing of liturgical services. "It was then that liturgies were celebrated at four or five in the morning and then also in the evening—an innovation that raised eyebrows in Rome. It was also against the standard practice of the Eastern Byzantine Churches which prescribe that the Liturgy may not begin after the noon hour." Letter of Rev. Lubomyr Husar to the author, 26 December 1987. Although this accommodation went against both the Eastern and the Western liturgical traditions, it would have permitted Ukrainian Catholic workers to attend services on Sundays and feast days during the Soviet occupation. In principle, this was consistent with the reasoning behind dispensing with ablutions, which often became chaotic in concelebrated liturgies. Sheptytsky explained that decision as follows: "Every liturgical prescription, if it does not relate to the liturgical essence of the service, ceases to oblige and must not be followed when that would cause a scandal to the faithful, as is always the case with every confusion of ritual." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Povtoriuiuchy davni...", M.O. N°67 (March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 44.

A variety of special dispensations were issued. During Lent, those who lived in student residences (*bursy*) or other institutions (i.e., those who ate in a collective setting) were exempted from fasting and, since dairy products were in short supply, it was permitted to substitute lard for butter. Furthermore, parish priests were authorized to confer other dispensations on an individual basis, as the need arose.¹⁰³ And, as noted above, in response to the forcible expulsion of monks into the world, Sheptytsky permitted those who wished to remain faithful to their vows in the world to wear civilian clothing.¹⁰⁴

When the impossibility of resupplying wine and candle-wax threatened to cut short liturgical services, the Metropolitan urged that both be used sparingly; adjusting the prescribed practice, only two candles would be lit after the Liturgy of the Word and they would be extinguished immediately after the Eucharist.¹⁰⁵ Later, when wax became altogether scarce, the chancery issued special provisions that allowed for substitutes such as vegetable oil or butter.¹⁰⁶ With regard to wine shortages, some priests inquired whether it was permissible to administer the Eucharist under only one species (i.e., contrary to Eastern liturgical tradition); Sheptytsky replied that it was preferable to do so rather than to deprive a parish of liturgies for what risked turning out to be a long time. However, he also emphasized the importance of explaining to the faithful that such changes did not represent a permanent transformation of the rite, but were merely a temporary measure dictated by prevailing circumstances.¹⁰⁷

Ritual accommodation also extended beyond the Greek Catholic community and included the question of administering sacraments to Orthodox believers. Soldiers from the occupying Red Army occasionally attended Greek Catholic liturgies and wished to receive communion.¹⁰⁸ Sheptytsky urged his priests to administer the sacrament even when the man before them was in uniform (i.e.,

103. M.O. N°51 (February-March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 29.

104. Sheptytsky, "Rozsivaiuchy Vas...", M.O. N°3 (November 1939), in *01-61*, p. 3.

105. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Usyl'no poruchaiemo...", M.O. N°3 (January 1940), in *01-61*, pp. 9-10.

106. M.O. N°76 (3 April 1940), in *01-61*, p. 55.

107. M.O. N°33 (17 February 1940), in *01-61*, p. 18.

108. Orthodox communities in the Lviv region were also affected by shortages of priests and liturgical services during the occupation. As a result, Greek Catholic priests would occasionally be faced by Orthodox mothers who had brought their infants up to receive communion along with them. Sheptytsky encouraged his priests to administer the sacrament to Orthodox infants, reasoning that "to discourage [the mother] would be harmful to her and the child." See Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Prychastia neziedynenykh ditei" ("Buvaie, shcho..."), M.O. N°37 (23 February 1940), in *01-61*, pp. 19-20; and Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Ishche pro prychastia pravoslavnykh ditei" ("Mozhna by..."), M.O. N°41 (February-March 1940), in *01-61*, pp. 23-24.

likely to be an Orthodox); he reasoned that such persons could also be Catholic and should have the benefit of the doubt. Of course, it was quite another matter when an Orthodox Christian identified himself as such to the priest before the liturgy and requested communion. In such a case, the priest first had to hear the person's confession and to ask whether he had permission from his own ecclesiastical authorities to receive the sacraments in a Catholic church. The purpose of such precautions, the Metropolitan explained, was "so that the Eucharist, administered without any reservation and contrary to the prescriptions of ecclesiastical rules, would not confirm an Orthodox person in denominational indifference."¹⁰⁹ On the one hand, withholding sacraments could well alienate an Orthodox believer from the Catholic fold for the rest of his life, while, on the other hand, a more caring approach would both "help his soul and draw him into the Catholic Church." In that case, Sheptytsky thought it necessary to overrule the prohibiting canon by invoking the principle that when the reason of a law ceases, then its binding force ceases also (*Cessante ratione legis, cessat lex ipsa*).¹¹⁰

This decision was part of a longer discussion of the applicability of the Roman Catholic prohibition on administering the sacrament of penance to the Orthodox.¹¹¹ Sheptytsky admitted that, inasmuch as the canon had nothing to do with the ritual aspect of sacraments (i.e., it did not touch on the particularities that distinguish Eastern and Western practices), it was also applicable in the East. However, he also noted that in some cases a rigid adherence to that prescription could do more harm than good, both to the individual and to the church:

In a certain sense, there is here as in other cases a conflict between two laws: the law of the Church and the Law of God, that is, love of neighbour. According to Aristotle, *epikeia* is like a correction of the law, which, because of its universality, may err in some particular case. Roman law contrasts what is *aequum* with what is required by *ius strictum*. And for that reason people regard *aequitatem*—or, as we would call it, "benevolent equilibrium" (*zychlyvu rivnomirnist'*)—as a virtue and situate it between justice and love. Another well-known saying is: *Summum ius, summa iniuria*. That saying has a complete and full application whenever the positive law is contradicted by natural law... The wise use of that quasi-custom of the natural law is the virtue that ancient theologians used to call *gnome*. That virtue enlightens the use of graciousness and benevolence (*laskavosty i zychlyvosty*) in matters of justice.¹¹²

109. M.O. N°40 (February-March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 23.

110. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro sovist' neziedynenykh" ("Pytaiut': koly..."), M.O. N°39 (February-March 1940), in *01-61*, p. 22.

111. The discussion of Canon 731 of the Code of Canon Law is in *ibid.*, pp. 21–23.

112. *Ibid.*, p. 22. In the same document, Metropolitan Sheptytsky understood *epikeia* to be "a benevolent, people-oriented interpretation (*laskava, zychlyva dlia liudei*) not so

The Christian duty of fraternal love had been expressed in various historical instances: by Aristotle, Roman law, ancient theology and popular wisdom. All of these represented a line of ethical reflection on *epikeia-aequitas* according to which human positive law was never the final word but needed to be tempered with love. Thus, in Sheptytsky's view, Christian ethical reflection involved the correction of laws whenever blind adherence to them would contravene the divine law of fraternal love.

In exercising structural and ritual adaptability, Metropolitan Sheptytsky showed himself well able to transcend strict legality and to exercise equity in responding to issues and problems that faced the church as a result of the Soviet occupation. The structural modifications he introduced indicated that, regardless of the damages sustained by the church, no effort would be spared to ensure that its work was continued. The emphasis was therefore not on what was formal and disciplinary (e.g., chastising priests who had left), but on practical reality (such as the need to find replacements for absent priests). In addition, as a social organism, the church would expand its activity by encouraging a greater measure of lay participation. Modifications of the liturgical tradition were not taken lightly in 1939–41, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky showed considerable sensitivity in accommodating to the practical needs of the situation, over and above the requirements of ritual practice. An even more flexible ethical approach was evident in the Metropolitan's accommodation in matters of ritual. His aim was to seek out that which could unite people with the church rather than alienate them from it, without encouraging denominational indifference through excessive liberalism toward the Orthodox. Secondly, in cases of conflict, as natural law always took precedence over positive law, so too did gospel teachings overrule canons of church law. Finally, *epikeia*, or "benevolent proportionality," served as a corrective device that came into play whenever the strict application of the law threatened to divorce justice from love. The purpose of these structural and ritual changes was to sustain the faith of the Christian community despite the prevailing difficulties. In this way, by maintaining its ministry to the people even during a hostile occupation, the church was able to address both their spiritual

much of the law as of the intent of the lawgiver." Thus, the church as a lawgiver could suspend the obligation of a canon whenever its strict application was either detrimental or was an excessive burden upon the people.

and social aspirations.¹¹³ For, in a time of crisis, the ultimate end of liturgical ritual was permitted to modify its traditionally prescribed means.

One of the principal ways in which Metropolitan Sheptytsky sought to counter the secularizing effect of sovietization on the Greek Catholic community was by reinforcing the church's commitment to its specifically spiritual task. Faced with the regime's attempts to reduce the church's role in society, he undertook to maintain its pastoral and sacramental ministry above and beyond the limits of the state's narrowly conceived notion of private religion. Metropolitan Sheptytsky's resistance to the Soviet state cannot be understood in isolation; rather, as we have seen, because it was developed out of a concern for the survival of the church, it was qualified by a degree of accommodation. We now turn to the pattern of resistance as it emerged both in the church's encounters with the state and in the internal life of the Christian community.

In Sheptytsky's application, resistance to the state proceeded from a principled political aloofness that, far from simply refuting communism, was characterized by subtle reasoning and sensitivity to potential consequences. His forceful protest against the suppression of monasteries, although staying formally within the limits of the law, was at the same time a defiant rejection of the usurpation of the church's authority by the state. Nor did the Metropolitan overlook the importance and value of ritual symbolism as a vehicle for conveying defiance and forging solidarity among the faithful, hence the omission from the liturgy of prayers for the state or its representatives.¹¹⁴ Also, priests were instructed to refuse to comply with requests to hang state banners in their churches.¹¹⁵ Liturgically attentive churchgoers would not have missed the implicit but powerful message that the church thus communicated about its opposition to the Soviet state.

Another pastoral area in which the directives of the state were to be challenged was the ministry to the dying in hospitals. Under Soviet occupation, priests were prohibited to enter hospitals to hear confessions or administer the Eucharist and last rites. The state treated the administering of sacraments in

113. As one patriotic observer noted, "...the Ukrainian Catholic Church, with its solemn liturgies and thanksgiving services dedicated to the Ukrainian people on such solemn occasions as 22 January or 1 November, requiem services for fallen heroes and deceased national activists tortured and murdered by the enemies of Ukraine, with processions past graves in the cemeteries, deepened the faith in a better tomorrow, in the victory of Good over Darkness, in the complete national and social liberation of Ukraine." Khomiak, "Borot'ba Ukraïns'koï Katolyts'koï Tserkvy," p. 281.

114. Nahurs'kyi [Nagórski], "Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi u litakh 1939–1940," p. 25.

115. M.O. N°26 (February 1940), in *01–61*, pp. 15–16.

hospitals as a crime punishable by six months in prison. Against this restriction, the Metropolitan protested to the government in Kyiv, charging that the dying in Soviet hospitals were being treated worse than prisoners on death row throughout Europe—the latter could rest assured that their last wishes would be respected, while the former had no such assurance. In addition, the Metropolitan felt that the hospital ministry was an essential duty of the church. Seeing that his protest had fallen on deaf ears, Sheptytsky decided to defy the ban and promote that ministry.¹¹⁶ Thus, Greek Catholic priests carried out a clandestine hospital ministry in civilian dress, were assisted by religious nurses,¹¹⁷ and were supported by the Metropolitan, who even gave instructions regarding precautions to be taken in order to avoid discovery by the occupying authorities.¹¹⁸

Nor did Metropolitan Sheptytsky limit his critique of Soviet legality to the legislative sphere. Equally dissatisfied with the judiciary, he invoked the Code of Justinian (Byzantine law) and authorized ecclesiastical tribunals to undertake and settle civil matters in the Archeparchy such as disputes and contracts.¹¹⁹ The Metropolitan felt that such tribunals should be conducted with all due circumspection, “so that the Soviet government will have no grounds on which to cite us for impeding the work of the courts that it has established or to consider our ecclesiastical court illegal.” As it turned out, in the prevailing chaos the church tribunals were unable actually to exercise their functions, but the official statement by Sheptytsky nevertheless revealed his readiness at the time to follow Byzantine precedent and extend the church’s administration into areas where the civil administration had been found wanting.¹²⁰

116. The Metropolitan’s chancery issued a number of statements to that effect. See M.O. N°30 (February 1940) in *01–61*, p. 17; and M.O. N°58 (March 1940) in *01–61*, p. 32. See also Nahurs'kyi [Nagórski], “Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi u litakh 1939–1940,” pp. 162–63.

117. The illegal hospital ministry depended a great deal on the assistance of religious nurses, and it was through their cooperation that priests were able to enter hospitals. Nahurs'kyi [Nagórski], “Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi u litakh 1939–1940,” p. 163.

118. “I am calling upon all pastors who live near hospitals to visit them as often as possible... in civilian clothes, of course, in order to enable the sick to have their confessions heard. I am also permitting the taking of the Holy Eucharist to the sick and the administration of the sacrament in such a way that even the patient in the next bed will not notice it” (*ibid.*).

119. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Z ohliadu na voienne...,” (March 1940), M.O. N°63 in *01–61*, p. 39.

120. Concerning the decision to set up ecclesiastical tribunals, Sheptytsky later wrote to Cardinal Tisserant, “Cette déclaration n’a été qu’une théorie, car les rapports sociaux et civils ont été...par les bolchéviques bouleversés d’une manière si incroyable que personne ne pensait à faire des contrats ou à faire valoir des droits quelconques.” Sheptytsky, letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 17 August 1941, p. 6.

In responding to the Soviet measures against organized religion, Metropolitan Sheptytsky also directed his social teaching and praxis to the internal dimension of the Christian life. In coping with and seeking ways of surviving the external threat, the church underwent a process of internalization, both at the level of its life as a community of faith and in its institutional aspect.¹²¹ Sheptytsky's renewed emphasis on the spiritual dimension of the Christian life drew attention to the internal focus of Christian piety and prayer. In December 1939, he addressed Ukrainian student youth on the subject of the Eucharist and reminded them that a good preparation for the sacrament consists of "approaching Jesus Christ not in order to be observed by others, nor out of habit, nor even because others are doing so, but only in order to obtain His holy grace."¹²² And in discussing the question of administering the Eucharist to infants, Sheptytsky reasoned that not only was the practice part of the Eastern tradition, but that it was truer to the spiritual meaning of the Eucharist itself than were other practices that tended to focus on external effects:

In my opinion, a few or even several communions administered to a child before school age, when children usually receive communion, are much more valuable than the external festivities of the so-called 'First Communion.' Those festivities are played up in France to such a degree largely because most of the children will never again return for a second communion. So the priests want to leave them with at least that souvenir for the rest of their lives and surround that First Communion with a festive aura, white dresses, candles with flowers, etc.... Parents who worry about their eight- or nine-year-old's First Communion are often more concerned about showing off their child and her dress before the whole community, and less with the communion. And the priests adapt themselves accordingly.¹²³

Indeed, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was convinced that even priests needed an occasional reminder about the deeper dimension of authentic Christian living. In an exhortation to the clergy, he chided those who recited the divine office perfunctorily: "...the divine office, when it is performed without enthusiasm, without warmth and love, without the concentration [*skuplennia*] that is necessary in prayer, and without any depth of mystical thought—what does it give? But

121. Sheptytsky's emphasis on internal, spiritual values over external appearances had been present in his writings ever since his accession to the episcopacy, and merely acquired a new urgency and emphasis under the Soviet occupation. A useful survey of Sheptytsky's ascetical works is Anatol M. Bazylevych, "Bohoslovs'ko-dushpastyrs'ki i asketychni tvory," in his *Vvedennia u tvory Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho*, in 02–65, pp. B/22–B/54.

122. Sheptytsky, "Hornetesia...", M.O. N°9 (December 1939), in 01–61, p. 7.

123. Sheptytsky, "Prychastia neziedynenykh ditei" ("Buvaie, shcho..."), M.O. N°37 (23 February 1940), in 01–61, p. 20.

when it is said conscientiously, attentively, it brings countless benefits...”¹²⁴ Such reminders were of course valid in any context as guidelines for the Christian life, but during the Soviet occupation this inward turning toward authentic Christianity also had the function of protecting the life of the community of faith. Thus, when the state prohibited public prayers in the schools, the Metropolitan urged schoolchildren to dispense with the “external [i.e., visible, A.K.] practices that normally accompany prayer” and to pray silently on their way to school.¹²⁵

The priority of the internal spiritual dimension was also an essential feature of monastic life, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky strove to ensure that, despite the Soviet occupation, it would retain its primacy in consecrated religious life. When monks and nuns in Soviet-occupied Galicia were forced to leave their monasteries, far from considering this an *ipso facto* termination of their religious life, the Metropolitan reasoned that “it is not monastic attire that makes a person a monk or a nun, but a spirit of humility, of prayer, of selfless love and work for one’s neighbour.”¹²⁶ He later developed this point in an address to those religious who chose to continue to live according to their vocation in the changed circumstances:

Let them remember that a monk or a nun is not constituted by monastic clothing, nor by the monastery in which they live, nor by the community of brothers and sisters, nor even by the way of life, which has more to do with the *external adherence* to one or another daily schedule or custom. A person who is living according to the gospel teachings, that is, a monk or a nun, a brother or a sister, is moved by the *internal disposition* of the soul and by the will to compete in an endless struggle with the passions, in order to become more perfect and more like Christ the Saviour every day.¹²⁷

In a theological discourse at the closing of the Sobor of 1940, Sheptytsky made a point of contrasting the “internal practicality of divine love” with the “external practicality of pastoral prudence,” placing the former above the latter in order of precedence. Apparently a number of priests had criticized some of the decisions of the Sobor as overly theoretical and lacking in practical value. To this, the Metropolitan replied:

124. “Ubohyi cholovik...” (1940), in *01–61*, p. 78.

125. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Zvertaiut’ meni uvahu...,” *M.O.* №56 (1940), in *01–61*, p. 32.

126. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Do monakhiv i monakhyn’ ta vsikh, shcho spil’no zhyvut’ po ievanhel’s’kym radam” (“Rozsivaiuchy...”), *M.O.* №3 (November 1939), in *01–61*, p. 3.

127. “Pro tykh shcho zhyiut’ po ievanhel’s’kym radam” (“AEp. Sobor protestuie...”), in *03–69*, p. 379; and *06–84*, pp. 247–48. Emphasis mine.

The regulations of the Sobor are not so theoretical as not to be of great practical importance for pastoral work and of even greater importance for the priestly life and priestly virtues. It is possible and, I think, necessary to distinguish here between external practicality, that is, the practicality of [our] external work, and internal practicality, which is the practicality of virtues and the spiritual life.¹²⁸

By placing renewed emphasis upon the internal dimension of the Christian life in his writings during the Soviet occupation, Sheptytsky was not merely repeating a theme that was already present within his catechetical and spiritual writings. Rather, he was attempting to articulate its continued relevance even during times of extreme social and ecclesiastical tribulation. Although some Greek Catholic priests might have preferred that the church adopt a more prophetic, confrontational posture toward the prevailing conditions and the state, Metropolitan Sheptytsky clearly opted for fidelity to authentic Christian witness: the church would indeed carry on its social and sacramental ministry, but it would ground its internal life in prayer and virtue. Thus, even as the church was obliged by external circumstances to turn inward structurally and to take perhaps the first steps toward becoming an underground church, it also tried to derive the maximum benefit of this inward shift for the spiritual life of the faithful.¹²⁹

The process of internalization centred on the linkage between the Christian spiritual life and Christian duty in the world, a linkage very clearly expressed by the Sobor of 1941. In its 12 regulations devoted to spirituality and Christian piety, the Sobor drew a crucial distinction between *true piety* (“which leads to the happy fulfillment of even the least pleasant of duties”) and *false devotion* (“which neglects the most important duties and merely seeks pleasure in religion”).¹³⁰ The distinction, centred on the criterion of duty, showed how the understanding of the Christian life in the Greek Catholic Church integrated spirituality with duty in the world. Thus, the process of internalization and the emphasis on spirituality did not entail a withdrawal from the world, but was

128. Speech at the closing of the Sobor of 1940 (“Sered nezvychaino tiazhkykh...”), in *01–61*, pp. 69, 71.

129. Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s social ethics during the first Soviet occupation of Galicia have special relevance for current efforts at reconstructing the postwar history of the Ukrainian Catholic underground. Although this occupation lasted only twenty-two months, many priests who would later serve in the underground had the benefit of first-hand experience of Sheptytsky’s leadership and, in particular, of his nuanced attitudes toward Soviet rule. Pending more thorough research into the postwar period, it appears that Sheptytsky’s adjustments of church life in response to the introduction of state-supported atheism during the period 1939–41 may well have laid the groundwork for the underground church of the second Soviet occupation, which began in 1944.

130. *03–69*, pp. 96–97, 109–10.

rather an intensification of the Christian commitment to social duty in the struggle for justice.

Under the harsh conditions of Soviet occupation, Metropolitan Sheptytsky articulated Christian social ethics primarily through a discourse on virtue. This enabled him to spell out the duties of Christians in a language that balanced the needs of the specific context with the unchanging requirements of the Christian life of faith. We now turn to specific duties about which Sheptytsky reminded his clergy and faithful.

Concerned with the possibility of massive apostasy from the church that could have resulted from the concerted promotion of atheism by the Soviets, Metropolitan Sheptytsky set out to consolidate the available human resources within the church and to reinforce commitment to specific Christian duties. He focused special attention on his priests, calling them to be steadfast in spite of the threat of persecution. Secondly, he sought support from the faithful and the secularized religious, who could often carry out tasks that had become difficult or impossible for priests.

If there is a single duty that stands out above all others that Sheptytsky stressed to his priests at this time, it is the duty to preach and teach catechism. We have already seen that Sheptytsky felt very strongly about political aloofness at the pulpit. Now he addressed a very different problem: that of priests who, for fear of punishment by the state, were neglecting their duty to preach. In response, the Metropolitan adopted a hard line, warning that such priests would face ecclesiastical sanctions to the full force of canon law:

I consider the omission of four sermons in a month to be a grave transgression that will incur canonical sanctions and the loss of a parish. In accordance with canonical obedience, I require tireless effort on the part of pastors in order [to ensure] that all children shall be taught catechism. I consider any priest who does not devote at least four hours of every week to that end a careless and unworthy priest.¹³¹

When in the following month reports reached the Metropolitan that some priests were still neglecting to preach, he reiterated his position and promised to publicize any such complaints from the faithful. Moreover, any priest who failed within a specified period to justify his inactivity would be canonically censured.¹³²

131. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pryhaduiu tiazhkyi oboviazok...", M.O. N°1 (January 1940) in *01-61*, p. 9. The Sobor of 1940 fully endorsed this position with the statement, "Let us work tirelessly and with perseverance even unto death, so that our preaching might be worthy of the Gospel." "Dekrety i pravyla Arkhyeparkhiial'noho Soboru 1940 roku. Ch. 8: Propovidi" ("Mohutnim, perekonlyvym..."), in *03-69*, p. 70.

132. "Mnozhat'sia vypadky, v iakykh virni...", M.O. N°22 (February 1940), in *01-61*, pp.

However, the severity of the punishment was not absolute; the Regulations of the Sobor of 1940 listed canonically acceptable exemptions, such as illness, a legitimate dispensation from the chancery office, an extended leave of absence from the eparchy or, most significantly, "circumstances that make even a short sermon impossible."¹³³ This was an explicit recognition of the harsh situation, of the many obstacles faced by priests, and of the need in such cases to permit an exception. However, as far as the basic duty of every priest to preach and teach the faith was concerned, Sheptytsky was adamant in insisting that this fundamental task be taken very seriously.

The increased emphasis on the fulfillment of this priestly duty begs the question of whether there were many who neglected their preaching ministry. From the recorded complaints of parishioners,¹³⁴ we know that some priests fled their parishes when the Soviets invaded. But most stayed, and Sheptytsky's sense of urgency was more likely due to the actual threat of atheism and its anticipated social consequences. Other instances appear to bear this out. For example, the Metropolitan also stressed the importance of fulfilling other priestly duties, such as ministering to the sick and dying in hospitals¹³⁵ and pastoral ministry to Greek Catholics who had been deported to eastern territories.¹³⁶ Neither of these admonitions was due to a lack of resolve among the clergy; rather, they were attempts by the Metropolitan to intensify the pastoral ministry in response to Soviet rule.

Prior to the Soviet occupation there had been no such interference in the internal affairs of the church, and priests were allowed to perform their fundamental duties. But now that some sacerdotal functions were deemed criminal offences punishable by law, the social role of the church was put to the test as never before. Sheptytsky stood up for the right of the church to exercise that role and vigorously upheld the place of priests in that undertaking. In his view, the priestly duty remained constant even in the face of adversity.

In fact, Sheptytsky was modulating his discourse on the duties of priests: as the new conditions required proportionally greater courage and commitment to duty, so too did the Metropolitan strive to evoke that commitment with correspondingly greater fervor. Furthermore, he consciously applied the notion

13-14.

133. See regulation N°12 of the Sobor of 1940, in *03-69*, p. 15. Similar exemptions were applied to the teaching of catechism; see regulation N° 27, Sobor of 1940, in *03-69*, p. 18.

134. "Mnozhat'sia vypadky, v iakykh virni...," M.O. N°22 (February 1940) in *01-61*, p. 13.

135. M.O. N°30 (January-February 1940) and M.O. N°57 (February-March 1940), in *01-61*, pp. 17, 32, respectively.

136. M.O. N°83 (17 April 1940), in *01-61*, p. 61.

of proportionally incremented duty to himself, hoping that this would set an example and inspire his priests to do likewise:

According to a principle that seemed to me to be well-founded, though also paradoxical, whenever the circumstances became less favourable I tried to intensify [our] activity all the more and to draw the clergy, who quite often were demoralized and terrified, into such work.¹³⁷

The same notion of proportionally incremented duty also appeared in Sheptytsky's pastoral letter to the faithful in November 1939:

In some areas the Bolshevik authority does not permit us [i.e., priests] into the schools, and we are unable to reach many people and properly instruct them in the divine teachings. *Therefore the duty of parents*—to ensure that their children are well raised and instructed from infancy in the truths of the faith—*increases*. As your spiritual pastor, I remind you of this grave duty toward children, *a duty which with every passing day becomes greater*.¹³⁸

The duty to preach and teach was proportionally greater during the Soviet occupation because of the “greater needs of the present moment” and the greater difficulty in fulfilling the task. For, the Metropolitan pointed out, schoolchildren needed religious education all the more now that, in its place, they were subjected to “harmful and dangerous” guardians.¹³⁹ The task of priests was considerably more difficult, too; barred from the schools, they could no longer teach children in groups, but could only try to reach them individually. In light of such difficulties, the Sobor of 1940 permitted and even encouraged priests to give over some of their catechetical work to parents.¹⁴⁰ As early as October 1939, in his first pastoral letter after the Soviet invasion, Sheptytsky had singled out the catechization of children as the main duty of priests. Because of its importance, that duty would encompass the entire Christian community:

We will employ the more exemplary Christians, older boys and girls, for the teaching of catechism in the homes. I impart to everyone the mission to teach

137. Letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 6 September 1942, p. 2. See also Sheptytsky's address at the opening of the Sobor of 1940: “As the external circumstances, brought on by the war, became an ever greater obstacle to our work, we needed to exert more intensity in our work” (01–61, p. 62). Indeed, despite formidable obstacles during the Soviet occupation, the Metropolitan continued to issue pastoral letters and instructions to the clergy and the faithful.

138. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Naivazhnisha sprava...,” M.O. N°4 (November 1939), in 01–61, p. 3. Emphasis mine.

139. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Khoch ia vzhe...,” M.O. N°28 (February 1940), in 01–61, p. 16.

140. Regulations N°29, 30, Sobor of 1940, in 03–69, p. 18.

religion. Every pastor shall instruct several heads of families how to baptize children, so that, in the absence of a priest, they would be able to baptize a newborn infant properly with water.¹⁴¹

In Sheptytsky's thought, the Greek Catholic community was an organic social unit characterized by shared, collective duties. Normally, these duties were distributed first of all among the priests and then among the faithful. When the Soviet occupation interfered with the efforts of priests to fulfill their task, that task remained unchanged. The solution therefore lay in the proportional reallocation of tasks to the faithful. Obviously, this did not include all the duties of priests, but it nevertheless covered a relatively broad range of activity: from catechism in the homes to baptism, from the work of religious nurses in the hospitals to that of clandestine couriers in the streets, Sheptytsky attempted to maintain as much as possible the day-to-day tasks of a socially minded church. The hope that such activity could be successful rested on the premise that the Christian community was an organic unit, so that when political circumstances prevented the clergy from safely performing their tasks, the faithful could be counted on to pick up the slack.

The special focus on the shared duties of the entire Christian community was also rooted in a theological concern for salvation and overcoming the consequences of sin. Those aims could only be achieved through a dynamic cooperation and sharing of duties between the clergy and the faithful. Thus, Sheptytsky affirmed that one of the aims of the Sobor of 1940 was

...to consider of the means of correction, that is, of how we priests can fulfill our *pastoral duties* toward you [the faithful] more correctly and more perfectly, and how through our work we can help you to correct the sins that either complicate or preclude your salvation. We also want to help you to raise yourselves out of all those sins into which you are falling and to give you the assistance [that will enable you] better to serve the Lord in the future by fulfilling all the *duties of the Christian life*.¹⁴²

These patterns of resistance in the church's posture toward the state and in its internal spiritual life further demonstrate attentiveness to socio-political reality in Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social ethics. Both in civil disobedience and through the intensification of the church's teaching ministry, Sheptytsky asserted the Christian identity and adopted as hard a line as was possible under the circumstances.

141. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Obernulasia kartka...", M.O. N°1 (September-October 1939), in *01-61*, p. 1. On the need to train catechists, see also Sheptytsky, "Pryhaduiu tiazhkyi...", M.O. N°1 (January 1940), in *01-61*, p. 9.

142. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Blyz'ko dva misiatsi...", Pastoral letter to the clergy and the faithful, M.O. N°88 (May-June 1940), in *01-61*, p. 68. Emphasis mine.

In Metropolitan Sheptytsky's analysis of the situation, the fundamental social struggle during the Soviet occupation of Galicia was between the occupation authorities, who tried to establish an atheistic social order, and the church, which was committed to maintaining its spiritual ministry in Ukrainian society. The Metropolitan's concern with maintaining the Christian foundations of the social order even under communist occupation required a more nuanced approach than that which he had expressed when denouncing collaboration with communists only three years before. The situation had changed dramatically: it was no longer a matter of a few agitators seeking a consolidation of the Left and recruiting Christians, but of war and a military occupation with the power to fundamentally alter the conditions of the church's existence.

In responding to this situation, Metropolitan Sheptytsky followed a differentiated approach, combining what we have referred to as patterns of accommodation and of resistance, both externally, in dealing with the civil power, and internally, in trying to maintain the work of the church in society.

Accepting that the Soviet takeover of Galicia was a *fait accompli*, Sheptytsky avoided open confrontation or symbolic protest against the occupation authorities. The priority lay elsewhere—in response to the social crisis, it was to maintain and intensify the spiritual work of the church. Thus, if the Metropolitan appealed for religious freedom and protested against the abuse of that freedom, he did so within the strict legality of the Soviet constitution and without questioning the legitimacy of Soviet rule, with an eye to preventing further sanctions. At the same time, when Soviet measures and prohibitions violated the church's understanding of its duty to minister to the people, the Metropolitan quietly ignored those prohibitions.

A similar non-confrontational commitment to fundamental duty was developed for the internal life of the church. Although vital administrative and communications links within the church had been severed, the Metropolitan firmly resolved that the work of the church for souls should go on. He exhorted his priests to continue preaching and ministering, and he invited lay people to assist them in their catechetical work. They were to do so with due caution, above all avoiding any semblance of political provocation. In expanding the work of the church to compensate for the prevailing obstacles, changes aimed at providing a pastoral and sacramental ministry to the faithful were put into place. Seeing the Christian basis of Ukrainian society threatened to its core, the Metropolitan demonstrated that, in the name of spiritual duty and mission to the world, the church was ready and able to adapt structurally and ritually in ways that were unthinkable in peacetime.

CHAPTER 5

The Sanctity of Life: Resistance to Nazi Rule (1941–1944)

The transition from the Soviet to the Nazi occupation in Western Ukraine was swift: in Lviv, Soviet forces withdrew on 29 June 1941 and were replaced by German forces on the following day. That change brought with it new social issues to which Metropolitan Sheptytsky tried to develop Christian ethical responses. In order to understand those responses, it is necessary first to consider Sheptytsky's empirical and theological interpretations of the period.

Assessments of the Situation

A number of factors determined Metropolitan Sheptytsky's interpretation of the new situation. First, as at the beginning of the Soviet occupation, he considered the attitude of the state toward the Greek Catholic Church and society in Western Ukraine. Second, inasmuch as the expulsion of the Soviets was far from definitive, the possibility of their return was perceived as a continuing threat. And third, the unprecedented scale and frequency of acts of violence, perpetrated both by the occupying forces and by the local population, was also a harsh fact of life that demanded the Metropolitan's attention in this period. We shall examine more closely these three empirical considerations, which entered into Metropolitan Sheptytsky's appraisal of the situation under the German occupation, and then look at his theological assessment.

The policy of the Nazi occupation authorities toward the Ukrainian Catholic Church comprised a series of seemingly contradictory permissions and restrictions. On 18 July 1941, the municipal authorities of Lviv decided to return to the Archeparchy landholdings that had been confiscated by the Soviet authorities.¹ At the same time, rural lands confiscated by the Soviets were still deemed to be the property of the German state. Since the Ukrainian Catholic

1. "Postanova upravy m. L'vova pro povernennia mytropolytovi A. Sheptyts'komu zemel' v raioni Kaizerval'da," 18 July 1941, in *Pravda pro Uniiu: Dokumenty i materialy*, ed. V. Iu. Malanchuk et al., 2d rev. ed. (Lviv, 1968) (hereafter *PPU*), Document no. 196, p. 304, which cites the archival reference, TsDIA, f. 201, op. 46, spr. 2665, ark. 133. See also Edward Prus, "Cerkiew greckokatolicka w okresie wojny i okupacji hitlerowskiej," *Śląskie Studia Historyczne* 1 (1975): 69, n. 37.

clergy depended in large part on the land for their subsistence, the Metropolitan complained that, because the state withheld such properties, “the endowment of the clergy is practically reduced to what the poor can spare.”² The state also paid a voluntary subsidy to the Ukrainian clergy (50 Reichsmarks per month), but Sheptytsky remarked that this was really an empty gesture (“une démonstration politique”) rather than real assistance; indeed, a 25% tax was to be imposed on that subsidy.³

Beyond financial matters, Metropolitan Sheptytsky looked closely at other aspects of German policy toward the church. Aware of the Reich’s anti-Catholic legislation in Germany, he noted in August 1942 that such measures had not yet been imposed in Galicia. In fact, some changes even seemed to represent a real improvement on conditions under Soviet rule. Thus,

Priests are allowed to teach catechism to children in the schools. There is not yet very much meddling in sermons and parish administration. There is a desire to regulate marriages, but not in a way that is contrary to canon law... Seminaries are allowed to be reopened... I am permitted to print the official organ of the diocese every month... I was able to convoke a diocesan synod, which, with long intervals, has been going on almost a whole year... The monasteries are being reorganized little by little.⁴

2. Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s letter to Pope Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in *ADSS-2*, p. 627.

3. Ibid. Initially, a lump-sum payment of 900,000 złoty was made by the German civil authorities to the Ukrainian church. Not until April 1943 did the Ukrainian Catholic bishops begin to receive monthly payments from the treasury of the Generalgouvernement. See Prus, “Cerkiew greckokatolicka,” p. 72, nn. 50–51.

In Prus’s argument, this is presented as an instance of the Greek Catholic Church’s collaboration with the Nazis. However, a number of factors need to be considered. In the first place, it appears that such funding was purely gratuitous, with no evidence to suggest that it was tied to any specific reciprocation by the church. Second, in view of the grave impoverishment of the clergy at this time, the need was urgent and, apparently, a matter of preserving life. Third, there is no indication that these funds in any way altered Sheptytsky’s rapidly declining opinion of the German regime. On the contrary, by April 1943, when the government payments were to have begun, the Metropolitan was already on record as opposing the Nazi regime and shortly thereafter became convinced that even a Soviet return would be preferable to further Nazi occupation.

Nor did the Ukrainian Catholic Church rely exclusively on the German government for financial support during the Nazi occupation; Catholic groups in Germany also offered assistance. Thus, for example, the Roman Catholic episcopate in Germany transmitted to the Ukrainian Catholic Church a payment of 15,000,000 złoty, which was designated “for the struggle against Bolshevik propaganda.” See Prus, “Cerkiew grecko-katolicka,” p. 72, nn. 47–48. A similar initiative was undertaken by a Catholic association that served Germans living outside the Reich. See Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in *ADSS-2*, p. 627.

4. Ibid. A year earlier, the Metropolitan had also pointed out that the German advance

At the same time, the new situation was not all positive; as the Metropolitan put it, “all this is far from sufficient to outweigh the silent demoralization to which the poor and the weak are exposed.”⁵ Embedded within the very same text (quite likely as a precaution to avoid censorship), Sheptytsky included a more critical appraisal:

There are attempts to harass the clergy, like all citizens, through the requirement of passports, permits and all manner of regulations restricting civil liberties that one could possibly imagine... the threat of a real persecution is with us constantly, like a sword of Damocles above our heads... [pastoral letters and instructions] are confiscated for the most futile reasons in the world.⁶

Far from seeing the situation as stable, Metropolitan Sheptytsky took account of various other forms of harassment. In addition to searches and arrests of the clergy,⁷ he noted that Ukrainian Catholic priests were prohibited access to hospitalized Soviet prisoners of war in Eastern Ukraine in order to administer sacraments.⁸ Priests were also prohibited from baptizing Jews.⁹ And, despite the

into eastern Ukraine was accompanied by the rebuilding of churches and some renewal of religious life. He had felt then that there was a greater measure of religious liberty under the Germans than under the Soviets, and was also optimistic that such pressing concerns as the restoration of Soviet-confiscated church lands and a subsistence allowance for the clergy would be favourably resolved. See Sheptytsky to Pope Pius XII, 29 October 1941, in *ERSS-LGE*, p. 2.

5. Ibid.

6. Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in *ADSS-2*, p. 627.

7. Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 28 December 1942, p. 1. A search of all the buildings on St. George's Hill, including the Metropolitan's living quarters and his chapel, was carried out in 1943. See M. Sopuliak, “Pamiati Velykoho Mytropolyta (zhmut spohadiv),” [1947] in *Svityl'nyk Istyny*, vol. 3 (Toronto and Chicago, 1983), p. 445. In Peremyshl, the Greek Catholic bishop Iosafat Kotsylovsky was twice interrogated by the Gestapo and threatened with incarceration in a concentration camp. Andrew Turchyn, “The Ukrainian Catholic Church during WWII,” *Ukrainian Quarterly* 41, nos. 1–2 (Spring-Summer 1985): 65.

According to one source, twenty-five priests were arrested and another two were killed by the Nazis. “Ukraïns'ka Katolyts'ka Tserkva pid chas bil'shovyts'koï okupatsiï,” in *Martyrolohiia Ukraïns'kykh Tserkov*, ed. Osyp Zinkevych and Taras R. Lonchyna, vol. 2, *Ukraïns'ka Katolyts'ka Tserkva* (Toronto and Baltimore, 1985), p. 208.

8. Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, p. 628. The prohibition of a ministry for Soviet prisoners of war is also confirmed by a written order from Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA), to the Einsatzgruppen (special task forces) of those formations. The religious ministry to prisoners was only permitted where a priest was already present; bringing in new priests from the Reich or the Generalgouvernement for that purpose was prohibited. See Ryszard Torzecki, “Stavlennia Hitlerivs'koï Sluzhby Bezpeky ta politsiï do tserkov na skhodi,” *Kalendar-Al'manakh Novoho Shliakhu na 1986 rik* (Toronto, 1985), p. 45. The Heydrich document sheds

renewed publication of the official organ of the archdiocese and the opportunity to write full-length pastoral letters (which under the Soviet occupation had been reduced to seldom more than a page or two in length), random confiscations continued and a system of censorship was put into place by the German authorities. Thus, as had been the case under the Soviet occupation, Metropolitan Sheptytsky continued to regard his diocesan synods as the single most reliable vehicle for internal communication with his priests.¹⁰

External communication, though less restricted than in the preceding period, was nevertheless an area in which Sheptytsky exercised caution; some of his letters to the pope were now addressed directly to the Vatican rather than to a go-between, but the Metropolitan still took precautions against abusing this restored privilege.¹¹ On one occasion, he chose not to publish a letter from the

further light on the German suppression of religious activity in occupied Galicia. German forces were instructed categorically to block all attempts by the Catholic Church to extend its activity into the formerly Soviet occupied territories. Moreover, the order continued, "In areas where a Catholic or Uniate priest is still active, it is necessary to ensure an extensive restriction of his activity. All those Catholic and Uniate clerics who, disregarding the ban on their travel to Soviet areas, have appeared there must be deported back to their country of origin" (ibid., pp. 43–44). Directed equally against the Orthodox and evangelical churches, the clearly stated aim of this policy guideline was to limit religious activity and prevent the emergence of denominational solidarity: "...it is desirable that the church be broken up into many small groups. In this regard, there are to be no obstacles in the way of the multiplication of sects on this territory..." (ibid., p. 44). See also n. 12 below.

9. Prus, *Władyka Świętojurski*, pp. 224–25.

10. The German authorities would occasionally retain original correspondence and transmit only copies to the Metropolitan; see Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Budapest Nuncio Rotta, 30 August 1941, in *ADSS-I*, Document N°297, p. 437.

Confiscation and censorship were also applied to the Metropolitan's pastoral letters, for example, "Idealom..." of December 1941; see Ivan Hryn'okh, *Sluha Bozhyi Andrei—Blahovisnyk iednosty* (Munich, 1961), p. 35. When the German authorities confiscated his pastoral letters, the Metropolitan countered by reading the texts to the priests assembled for the synod; see his letter to Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, p. 627. In November 1942, Sheptytsky's pastoral letter "Ne ubyi" was seized and several passages excised from the text; see Andrei Sheptytsky, "Ne ubyi," *LAeV* 55, no. 11 (November 1942): 179, and Hansjakob Stehle, "Der Lemberger Metropolit Šeptyćkyj und die nationalsozialistische Politik in der Ukraine," in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 34, no. 3 (1986): 416. Eventually, the censorship of church publications became a routine matter; in a February 1943 letter to the Greek Catholic Apostolic Administrator for Germany, Rev. Petro Verhun (Werhun), Sheptytsky remarked matter-of-factly that the latest issue of the official organ of the Archeparchy had been sent to the censor the day before. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Rev. Petro Verhun, 17 February 1943, in *PPU*, Document no. 231, p. 346.

11. Two weeks later, Sheptytsky explained that he had not published a papal

pope, because he felt that it would be confiscated and noted as well that, under the guise of religious toleration, the German state was actually promoting the fragmentation of churches.¹²

Nor was the church alone in being subjected to restrictions; the population at large also fell victim to Nazi repression. In the first place, much of the fallout of the Soviet occupation was carried over into the new situation. The democratic process remained in abeyance as long as political parties, many of which had been dissolved during the Soviet occupation, continued to be prohibited under the Nazis.¹³ Properties confiscated by the Soviets were retained by the German occupation authorities, notwithstanding their pronouncements to the contrary. In many instances, the families of those who had been arrested or deported by the Soviets had no word from their loved ones as late as a year after the Soviet withdrawal.¹⁴ Observing all this, Sheptytsky lamented that the Nazis, far from

communication for fear that it would be confiscated: see his letter to Pope Pius XII, 14 September 1942, in *ADSS-2*, p. 633. As the situation worsened later in the same year, the Metropolitan found it increasingly difficult to communicate with the Vatican: "J'écris à votre Eminence à toutes les occasions qui se présentent mais elles deviennent rares et il est de plus en plus difficile d'en trouver." Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 28 December 1942, in *ERSS-LGE*, p. 2. And in a letter to Rome (possibly to Bishop Ivan Buczko) on 27 March 1942, Metropolitan Sheptytsky remarked: "I will say no more about our situation, though there is plenty to write about and plenty to w[EEP OVER] (*i ie nad chym p[lakaty]*)." TsDIA, f. 2021, op. 1, spr. 104, ark. 8a. As had been the case under Soviet rule, so too under the German occupation some of the church's missives abroad were carried by clandestine couriers; on several occasions, Archimandrite Johannes Peters travelled incognito to Berlin on the Metropolitan's behalf. Stehle, "Der Lemberger Metropolit," p. 415.

12. Sheptytsky's letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 22 January 1943, p. 5. A case in point was that of the two Ukrainian Orthodox churches on formerly Polish territory, about which Sheptytsky wrote: "Les Allemands, passés maîtres dans l'art de diviser, soutiennent les antagonismes des deux côtés; reconnaissent les deux églises et admettent la possibilité de deux évêques et même de deux curés dans le même endroit..."

Les Allemands cherchent à organiser des évêchés indépendants des deux branches. Un certain évêque Photius (Tymochtchouk) s'est séparé de l'église de Policarpe, et s'est déclaré chef hiérarchique de toute l'Eglise Autocéphale de Volhynie, indépendant de tous les métropolites, et confirmé seulement par les autorités allemands" (*ibid.*). Sheptytsky's assessment has been amply corroborated by German wartime documents that have subsequently come to light. John Armstrong referred to the German policy of preventing the churches from acquiring too much internal cohesiveness; see his *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2d ed. (New York, 1963), pp. 199–203. See also Torzecki, "Stavlennia Hitlerivs'koï," pp. 43–46.

13. Stepan M. Horak, "Ukraïntsi i druha svitova viina: Dosvid u spivpratsi z Nimechchynoiu, 1941–1942," *Ukraïns'kyi istoryk* 16, nos. 1–4 [61–64] (1979): p. 27.

14. Sheptytsky, "Pro myloserdia," in *03–69*, July–August 1942, p. 166.

bringing about any of the anticipated changes, "are perpetuating, extending and entrenching the Bolshevik system."¹⁵

Apart from maintaining much of the Soviet status quo, the Nazi occupation also brought measures of its own, which were a matter of great concern to the Metropolitan. In the first days of the occupation, leading Ukrainian political activists were arrested and incarcerated.¹⁶ German policy was especially harsh in the Galician countryside, where, Sheptytsky noted, "...a regime of slavery has been imposed upon the rural population; practically all their young people are rounded up and forced to go to Germany to work in factories or on farms. Whatever the peasants produce is taken away and they are required to double their production. The penalty for buying or selling directly with the producers is death."¹⁷ Above and beyond the deportations and pressure to produce impossible quantities of food for the war effort, peasants were subjected to such unprecedented violence and abuse by the police and other organs of the state that Metropolitan Sheptytsky could "scarcely believe that such [personality] types as one encounters are possible. And yet they are real."¹⁸ The continuing priority of the war effort entailed food shortages and an inflated cost of living for the local population; the ranks of the poor in Western Ukraine swelled and many starved. Even those who had formerly been reasonably well off, the Metropolitan noticed, found themselves exposed to poverty and hunger.¹⁹

Another social factor that shaped Sheptytsky's ethical decision-making was the public perception of the situation. After the termination of the twenty-two-month period of Soviet rule, with all of its deleterious consequences for Ukrainian society as a whole and the church in particular, there was a concern with consolidating this "post-Soviet" order. And even though the Nazis had moved in with their own priorities and plans, the support that they enjoyed among the Ukrainians of Galicia may safely be said to have stemmed less from outright support for national socialism than from the continuing fear of a Soviet return. Mindful of this, in a pastoral letter of 10 August 1943, Sheptytsky

15. Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in *ADSS-2*, p. 626.

16. Kost' Pan'kivs'kyi, *Roky nimets'koï okupatsii* (New York and Toronto, 1965), pp. 74–75. Pankivsky explains that during the German occupation even anonymous allegations of anti-Nazi activities (e.g., Soviet collaboration or membership in the Banderite wing of the OUN) were considered sufficient cause for arrest and political imprisonment.

17. Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Pope Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in *ADSS-2*, p. 626. It has been estimated that by August 1942, as many as 250,000 Ukrainians had been deported to Germany for labour; see Stehle, "Der Lemberger Metropolit," p. 416.

18. Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in *ADSS-2*, p. 626.

19. Sheptytsky, "Pro myloserdia," July-August 1942, in *03-69*, p. 166.

exhorted Ukrainian youth to “remember that every disorder in our land benefits the communists and can be exploited for their councils or for the provocations of their agents.”²⁰

Throughout the Nazi period, Sheptytsky remained attuned to this atmosphere of fear that had penetrated the fabric of Ukrainian society. Those fears were heightened in February 1943, when, after the German defeat at Stalingrad, the Soviets launched their westward counteroffensive. As the Soviet advance continued, Sheptytsky’s reports to the Vatican reflected concern for the safety of the civilian population as well as of the clergy.²¹

The initial sense of freedom that resulted from the Soviet withdrawal was short-lived, and soon a system was in place in which violence was the order of the day. In a letter to the pope, Sheptytsky reported:

Today the entire country agrees that the German regime is, perhaps even more than the Bolshevik regime, evil and almost diabolical. For at least a year now, scarcely a day has passed without the most horrible crimes, assassinations, robberies, pillage, confiscations and upheavals.²²

Sheptytsky was appalled by the violence that occurred almost daily: massacres of Jews, with a death toll that he estimated at 200,000 in the first year;²³

20. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Slovo Mytropolyta” (“U vazhkii khvylyni...”), *Krakivs'ki visti* 4, no. 179 [917] (17 August 1943), p. 2.

21. In a letter of 8 May 1943 to Cardinal Tisserant, Metropolitan Sheptytsky expressed concern that incarcerated priests might not be released in time to escape death in the “upheaval that is approaching.” See *ADSS-2*, p. 791. The Metropolitan again voiced similar apprehension a year later, when the fear of the Soviet advance was further fuelled by reports of actual reprisals against those who had cooperated with the German regime. “L’armée bolchévique approche [*sic*] de Léopol. Il devient presque sûr qu’ils occuperont la ville peut-être même dans 8 ou 10 jours. Cette nouvelle remplit nos fidèles de peur. Tous les intellectuels qui, pendant ces deux dernières années ont coopéré avec les allemands, même de la manière la moins volontaire, pensent qu’ils sont exposés à une mort certaine et quittent la ville ou le pays pour se rendre dans quelque endroit de l’ancienne Pologne, moins exposé que la Galicie. Des villages occupés par les bolchéviques les émigrés ou évacués racontent que dès le premier moment les bolchéviques tuent tous ceux qui sont accusés ou dénoncés, même faussement, de quelque crime contre le communisme.” Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 23 March 1944, photographic copy in *UHVR*, p. 2. The fear of the Soviets was also cited by Rev. Iosyf Slipyi, who nevertheless felt by March 1943 that it had subsided to a certain degree among the population. Letter of Archbishop Iosyf Slipyi to Dr. M. Dzerovych, 1 March 1943, *PPU*, Document no. 232, p. 347.

22. Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in *ADSS-2*, p. 625.

23. “Jews are the first victims. The number of Jews killed in our little land has certainly surpassed 200,000. As the [German] army advanced eastward, the number of victims

indiscriminate arrests and shootings, some of which, the Metropolitan believed, were aimed at the extermination of Ukrainians and Poles;²⁴ and the killing of priests.²⁵ Describing the public beatings and murders that had become commonplace by August 1942, Sheptytsky lamented, "It is very simply as though

grew. In Kyiv, in a matter of days up to 130,000 men, women and children were executed. All the towns in Ukraine bore witness to similar massacres and this has gone on for a year. At first, the authorities were ashamed of these inhuman acts of injustice and tried to procure documents that would prove that the local population or militia units were behind these murders. But in time, they began to kill Jews in the streets in plain view of the public and without any shame." Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in *ADSS-2*, p. 625.

Nor did the terror against Jews subside in the months that followed: in a letter to Cardinal Tisserant, Sheptytsky reported that in the previous two months more than 40,000 Jews had been killed in the city of Lviv alone. See Sheptytsky's letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 28 December 1942, in *ERSS-LGE*, p. 1.

The Jewish population of Western Ukraine, numbering more than a half million in 1931, had increased dramatically during the Soviet occupation, before being largely exterminated by the Nazis. Sheptytsky estimated that about 200,000 Jews had fled from German-occupied Poland into Soviet-occupied Eastern Galicia (i.e., between September 1939 and June 1941). With the Nazi invasion, the Jewish community of Western Ukraine was almost completely destroyed, and by 1945 barely a few thousand Jews remained in the area.

24. "Naturally, many Christians, and not only baptized Jews but so-called 'Aryans,' were also victims of unjustified murder." Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in *ADSS-2*, pp. 625–26. The Metropolitan expected that, having become accustomed to killing innocent Jews by the thousands, the executioners would soon turn upon Ukrainians and Poles (*ibid.*, p. 628). Later developments convinced him that his fears were well founded: "From day to day, it is becoming clearer that the aim is to exterminate the entire Ukrainian and Polish intelligentsia." See Sheptytsky's letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 28 December 1942, in *ERSS-LGE*, p. 1.

25. According to statistics provided in the official *L'vivs'ki Arkhiieparkhiial'ni Vidomosti* for the first quarter of 1944, four priests were listed as murdered, while two others were missing and unaccounted for. Cited in Hryhor Luzhnyts'kyi, *Ukraïns'ka Tserkva mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom* (Philadelphia, 1954), pp. 688–89, n. 384. Of those priests, two were apparently killed by the Nazis (*Martyrolohiia*, p. 208). Another five priests were killed in 1943 in the Lemko region and the Peremyshl area, allegedly by the Polish communist partisan "Bataliony chłopskie," which are thought to have continued killing Ukrainian priests into 1945 (*ibid.*, pp. 67–68). The five priests were: Mykhailo Velychko (1889–1943), Mykola Liskevych (1904–43), Hryhorii Tyktor (1910–43), Stepan Shalash (1890–1943), and Iaroslav Shchybra (1902–43) (*ibid.*, pp. 113, 132–33, 148, 153, 154). For Sheptytsky's discussion of violence against priests at this time, see Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro vbyvannia sviashchenykyv" ("V imeni Khrystovoï Tserkvy...") [1943] in *03-69*, pp. 431–32.

a band of madmen or of raging wolves had swept down upon this poor people.”²⁶

As the violence began to spread beyond the German military and police forces, it became difficult to identify its perpetrators; underground resistance groups of various ethnic and ideological affiliations emerged and, as a result, it was seldom possible to ascribe responsibility for individual instances of violence with any degree of certainty.²⁷ Nevertheless, what became shockingly clear to the Metropolitan in the course of time was that, between the pressures exerted on Ukrainian society by the German occupation forces and the enduring fear of a Soviet return, there were Ukrainians who took part in acts of violence. As a pastor, Sheptytsky felt obliged to address the problem, for there seemed to be no end to the escalation of violence and repression. In the last days of 1942, he wrote to Cardinal Tisserant:

...the terror is growing. In the past two months, more than 40,000 Jews have been summarily executed in Lviv alone. Searches were carried out at the cathedral, at my residence, at the chapter and the monastery.... Two monastic priests were imprisoned and there will probably be an attempt to trump up a *cause célèbre* based on lies. Arrests continue. It is a regime of raving lunatics.²⁸

Reviewing the massive scale of human suffering in the land, Metropolitan Sheptytsky also gave a theological assessment of what was happening. In doing so, he focused special attention on the suffering caused by violence. Behind the harsh material suffering of his people, Sheptytsky saw “even worse suffering of the soul.”²⁹ He expressed alarm at the demoralization of society, which he saw in such things as the breakdown of the family, uncertainty of life and the imminence of death, general despair, weariness of life, and the dissolution of hope in a better future. But if this description of the spiritual degeneration of society seemed to hark back to his analysis of the situation under Soviet rule, it differed from the earlier experience in at least one important respect. According to Sheptytsky, the breakdown of the family, with all its attendant grief and

26. Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in *ADSS-2*, p. 626.

27. “Toute la Volhynie et en partie la Galicie sont pleines de bandes, qui ont un certain caractère politique. Il y a des bandes, constituées de Polonais, d’autres d’Ukrainiens, des autres, enfin, de communistes. Il y a outre cela des vrais bandits, parmi lesquels il y a des gens de toutes les nationalités, Allemands, Juifs, Ukrainiens, Polonais et Russes.” Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 8 May 1943, in *ADSS-2*, p. 790.

28. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter, probably to Cardinal Tisserant (my inference), Lviv, 28 December 1942, signed copy, TsDIA, f. 358, op. 3t, spr. 179, ark. 59.

29. Sheptytsky, “Pro myloserdia,” in *03–69*, p. 167, par. 7.

worries, was not merely the result of external factors, as had been the case with Soviet arrests and deportations of husbands and fathers. Under the German occupation, Sheptytsky felt that an internal factor had also come into play—the ingratitude of children and the shame of parents for their children’s behaviour. And by “shameful behaviour” Sheptytsky was referring specifically to acts of homicide:

With what heartache must parents look upon their children, once the pride and joy of their family, but who have now become a heavy cross and a painful source of shame! What a pain [it must be] for a father to see his own son stained with innocent blood and to see neighbours and friends turn away from him with abhorrence.³⁰

Thus, for Metropolitan Sheptytsky, the violence that came with the German occupation and that had already infected his own people was more than a matter of individual guilt for individual acts; at the spiritual level, blood guilt jeopardized the entire Christian community and was felt in the very heart of the Christian social order—the family.

Although the institutional life of the church may have been less threatened now than it had been under the Soviets, the fabric of society and, in particular, the Christian foundations of society were undermined. Sheptytsky considered one of the worst instances of this social degeneration to be the luring of local youth into German auxiliary police units, since “the German authorities made use of such militia units to achieve their perverse goals.”³¹

In the face of overwhelming historical forces, the predominant feeling was that, on its own, the local church was powerless to stem the tide of violence. The

30. Ibid., p. 167, par. 9. Sheptytsky described the spiritual pain of blood-guilt in very concrete terms: “Not even streams of water can cleanse those stained hands, that soul which is stained with another’s blood! Not even the fragrances of all Arabia could overcome that cadaverous stench of the soul that rots in the sin of homicide.” Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Dekret pro dukhove cholovikovbyvstvo sebto soblazn’,” (Decree on spiritual homicide or incitement), issued December 1942, *LAeV* 56, nos. 1–2 (January–February 1943): 8.

31. Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 3 September 1942. Cited in Eugène Tisserant, *L’Eglise militante* (Paris, 1950), p. 14. Later that same year, Sheptytsky wrote again to Cardinal Tisserant, “Notre pauvre peuple souffre plus que jamais, et les torrents de démoralisation inondent tout le pays.” In exasperation, he added: “Elegi abjectus esse in domo Dei magis quam habitare in tabernaculis peccatorum.” (I would rather be an outcast from the house of God than dwell in the midst of sinners.) Letter dated 28 December 1942, p. 2. TsDIA, f. 358, op. 3t, spr. 179, ark. 59. This passage bears a striking resemblance to the Old Testament account of the suicide of Razis (2 Macc. 14:42), who preferred to die courageously than to fall into the hands of criminals.

After the Soviet withdrawal, German authorities dissolved the OUN militia units and recruited Ukrainians for German-commanded auxiliary police units.

Metropolitan felt that, in these times, hope and support were to be sought in the higher authority of divine providence:

Considering that everything is already permitted to the Germans, their rage will not be abated, and there will be no power by which even the least amount of discipline could be imposed upon them. We therefore expect that this whole land will again be deluged by waves of innocent blood, unless some extraordinary occurrence should stop the flow of events.

The only possible consolation in these terrible times is [knowing] that nothing happens to us unless our Heavenly Father wills it.³²

Similarly, in coming to grips with the slaughter of masses of people, particularly Jews, and in trying somehow to understand its spiritual implications, Sheptytsky concluded that the souls of non-Christians and Christians alike could ultimately be entrusted to providence:

I think that among the many massacred Jews many souls converted to God, for in centuries they have never faced as they now do the likelihood of a violent death; often entire months [pass] before their death is carried out. The fate of Christians, of whom hundreds of thousands are either dead or dying without the sacraments, is also in the hands of God.³³

The Metropolitan also sought spiritual support from the Vatican, and, writing to Pope Pius XII, he requested an apostolic blessing for Ukrainian Catholics, who, as he put it, “are suffering so much and who are exposed to great dangers and even greater scandals.”³⁴

The violence and killing demonstrated to Sheptytsky the moral degeneration of society. In addition to homicide, other vices began to appear. Thus, the Metropolitan noted that the common folk and the weak, driven to desperation, “are actually learning to steal and to commit murder; they are losing their sense of justice and humanity.”³⁵ And although he did press repeatedly for a stop to the violence, the Metropolitan felt that his interventions were “nothing compared to the rising tides of moral impurity that are flooding the whole land.”³⁶ For Sheptytsky, this demoralization had a fundamental ethical significance: it carried with it the curse of Cain, by which human nature was fundamentally altered, degenerated, spoiled and abased; in this manner, human nature was brought lower than that of a wild animal.³⁷ As before, the Metropolitan focused not only on the evil of individual acts of murder, but also on their social implications.

32. Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in *ADSS-2*, p. 628.

33. *Ibid.*

34. Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 14 September 1942, in *ADSS-2*, p. 633.

35. Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in *ADSS-2*, p. 627.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 628.

37. Sheptytsky, “Dekret pro dukhove cholovikovbyvstvo” (January-February 1943), p. 8.

Convinced that repeated acts of murder could poison an entire society in whose midst murderers remained, Sheptytsky was deeply troubled by the prospects for the future of the Ukrainian people.³⁸ As he saw it, the crimes of a few risked causing the suffering of many.³⁹

In the end, Sheptytsky believed, there would be a reckoning; whoever committed a homicide exposed himself to the vengeance of the “historical Nemesis,”⁴⁰ and would be held accountable at “the hour of justice and punishment.”⁴¹ For murder was “a terrible crime that draws damnation from the heavens upon the soul and leaves upon the body the stain of innocent blood;”⁴² it “calls to the heavens for vengeance.”⁴³ In broader, socio-historical terms, that vengeance could affect the chances of an early end to the war. Indeed, the

38. “With a very painful heart, and with fear for the future of our people I see how in many communities there are people whose souls and hands are stained with the innocent blood of their neighbours.” Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro myloserdia” (June 1942), in *03–69*, p. 181, par. 53.

39. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Slovo Mytropolyta” (“U vazhkii khvylyni...”), 10 August 1943, *Krakivs'ki visti* 4, no. 179 [917] (17 August 1943), pp. 1–2. In this pastoral letter, Sheptytsky repeatedly drove home the point that violence had far-reaching social consequences: “By taking it upon themselves to decide on matters of concern to the general public—without sufficient experience and without any desire to consult with their elders—young people are exposing us all to grave danger. Among them are older people, who lead them...and who in fact are inciting them to illegal acts and rash steps that later bring vengeance upon the whole community” (ibid., p. 1, par. 3); “...take care that your sons not commit crimes by which they could incur terrible misfortune upon the village” (ibid., p. 1, par. 4); and “It is in the interest of our enemies to persuade our people to [act] recklessly; [for] that could and, indeed, necessarily would cause great harm to our people” (ibid., p. 2, par. 7). In this last instance, the Metropolitan was clearly referring to reprisals by civil authorities, though at other times he may also have been returning to the theme of divine punishment.

40. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro vbyvannia sviashchenykyv” (“V imeni Khrystovoï Tserkvy...”) in *03–69*, n.d. [1943?], p. 431.

41. Sheptytsky, “Dekret pro dukhove cholovikovbyvstvo,” (January–February 1943), p. 8.

42. Sheptytsky, “Slovo Mytropolyta,” 10 August 1943, par. 3. In a similar vein, the Metropolitan exhorted Ukrainian mothers, “Standing on guard for the divine order in the community...do not allow [your sons] to stain their souls with innocent blood...” (ibid., par. 8).

43. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro myloserdia,” in *03–69*, p. 180. Sheptytsky may have drawn on scripture here; his expression appears to hark back to the Old Testament passage: “And the Lord said, ‘What have you done? The voice of your brother’s blood is crying to me from the ground. And now you are cursed from the ground, which has opened its mouth to receive your brother’s blood from your hand’” (Gen. 4: 10–11).

Metropolitan could foresee no resolution of the armed conflict until the crisis of morality had been addressed:

Whoever observes the incredible audacity of those who every day continue to violate the divine law and, in particular, the fifth commandment with incredible scandal for the common folk, easily becomes persuaded to expect the gravest penalties. To a certain extent, everyone almost daily thinks he foresees the end of the war, but has no basis for thinking so other than the ardent desire that the scandals should cease.⁴⁴

The implications of rampant homicide were also carried over into the sphere of Christian unity. Thus, when new violence broke out against priests, Metropolitan Sheptytsky condemned it not only as an attack upon the institutional church, but also as an offence against Christian unity. As he saw it, the murder of priests could not but stir latent inter-denominational tensions, exacerbate age-old divisions and undermine the chances of reunion.⁴⁵ Anti-clerical violence was capable of undermining fraternal relations between Greek and Roman Catholics: “Whoever divides and disunites two Catholic denominations that differ only in rite and thereby imposes grief, offence, and [incites] hatred of the faithful of another rite, deals a heavy blow to the Church’s most essential attribute: all-encompassing fraternal love.”⁴⁶

For Sheptytsky, the principal ethical challenge Christians were facing was that of remaining faithful to the commandments and to Christian righteousness. Such fidelity was the only real guarantee that human relations, from the family to society and international relations, could be maintained in a spirit of harmony and order. In the absence of these essentials, the moral foundation of human social relations was undermined, and the inevitable consequence would be prolonged chaos and violence:

Let no one among us follow the modern political or social slogans that, supposedly in the name of the national good, dare to set aside God’s commandments as inapplicable or detrimental to our life. How many times in history have we seen, and continue to see, what becomes of people who, out of pride and malice, break the tablets of God’s commandments and replace them with their own arbitrary will! How often we have seen, and continue to see, what happens when the notion of justice—which is the basis of all Christian righteousness—is removed from interpersonal and international relations. All of human culture, all the achievements of the human mind and heart accumulated over the ages will be brought down and ruined. There will be chaos and

44. Letter of Metropolitan Sheptytsky to Cardinal Maglione, 12 June 1943, in *ADSS*-2, p. 811.

45. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro vbyvannia sviashchenykyv” [1943?], in *03–69*, p. 431.

46. *Ibid.*

barbarism. There will be neither any moral order nor law. The law will be anarchy (*samovolnia*) and the rule of the strong over the weak.⁴⁷

Principles of Social Ethics

In responding to the continuing social crisis brought on by the war and the Nazi occupation, Metropolitan Sheptytsky focused on the church's external relations with the regime and secular Ukrainian society, and on its internal life as a Christian community. In this section, we shall therefore first look at the church's external relations, in particular, at the ethical reflection behind Metropolitan Sheptytsky's evolving approach to the occupation, and then consider his guidelines for Ukrainian national life. Second, we will examine the foundations of his teaching and activity as the leader of the Ukrainian Catholic community of faith.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's attitude toward the German regime during its occupation of Galicia progressed through distinct stages. On the basis of available documentary sources, we may identify three successive perceptions that Sheptytsky had of the Nazi occupation and three corresponding postures that he adopted toward the state. In what was perhaps the most dramatic political about-face of his entire career, the Metropolitan started out with an initially positive perception of the German takeover as a liberation from Soviet oppression, then became more critical of certain aspects of German policy, and finally voiced and acted on a fundamental opposition to the Nazi regime. In order to better understand this shift, we shall examine the three phases individually and indicate the religious and socio-political factors behind each of them.

At first, Sheptytsky welcomed the arrival of the Germans in Galicia. In the days that followed the takeover, the Metropolitan issued two key documents: on 1 July 1941, a pastoral letter in which he welcomed the proclamation of the independent Ukrainian state and greeted the Germans as "liberators";⁴⁸ and four days later, on 5 July, a second pastoral that greeted the "victorious German army," expressed "gratitude for the liberation from the enemy," and called priests to lead their parishes in a song of salutation (*mnoholitstviia*) for the "victorious German army" at the end of liturgies.⁴⁹ From a religious standpoint, the change

47. Andrei Sheptytsky, "Rozdumuiuchy nad kalendarem...", *Kalendar "Studion"* (L'viv, 1944), pp. 31–2.

48. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Do ukraïns'koho narodu" ("Z voli vsemohuchoho...zachalasia..."), 1 July 1941, in Kost' Pan'kivs'kyi, *Vid Derzhavy do Komitetu* (New York and Toronto, 1957), p. 116.

49. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Slovo Mytropolyta" ("Z voli

from the Soviet to the German occupation meant first of all that the Greek Catholic Church in Western Ukraine was rid of official atheism, and Sheptytsky fully expected that, under the Germans, Ukrainian Catholics would enjoy a greater measure of religious liberty. And, to a degree, those expectations were fulfilled, as the Germans allowed the Greek Catholic Church to renew some activity that the Soviets had suppressed. Second, as he had done in the first days of the Soviet occupation, so too now under German rule Sheptytsky reiterated the principle of “rendering unto Caesar” and called his people to “submit obediently to the just dictates of the state.”⁵⁰ Third, as the German forces continued their advance into eastern Ukraine, Sheptytsky saw this as opening up new and promising opportunities for church unity by way of an eastward expansion of Catholicism.⁵¹ In addition to this concern for religious freedom and ecclesiastical unification, the overall sense of liberation from Soviet rule was tied closely to the political aspirations of Ukrainians, who expected Germany to heed their requests for political autonomy.⁵² Metropolitan Sheptytsky shared those

Vsemohuchoho...pochynaiet'sia...”), 5 July 1941, in Pan'kivs'kyi, *Vid Derzhavy*, p. 120.

50. Sheptytsky, “Z voli vsemohuchoho...zachalasia...,” 1 July 1941, p. 116.

51. In a letter to Pope Pius XII on 29 October 1941, Metropolitan Sheptytsky referred to “cette tâche de pénétration de l’unité ecclésiastique dans ce pays,” in *ERSS-LGE*, p. 4. And in a letter of 7 November, Sheptytsky wrote, “Les possibilités de voir nos frères dissidents de la Grande Ukraine revenir à l’unité de l’Eglise éveillent en nous de grandes espérances.” Metropolitan Sheptytsky to Budapest Nuncio Angelo Rotta, 7 November 1941, in *ADSS-I*, p. 493.

52. Among the plausible reasons why Ukrainians were inclined to trust that German political strategy could be compatible with their autonomist goals, perhaps the most often cited one is the memory of Soviet rule. Cardinal Tisserant, to whom Sheptytsky reported regularly on the situation, pointed out that by the end of the nearly two years of Soviet occupation, the Soviet regime was “universally detested” in Galicia: “Il ne faut donc pas s’étonner si les habitants saluèrent l’arrivée de l’armée allemande comme une libération. Mais l’enthousiasme tomba vite en raison des procédés brutaux des fonctionnaires nazis.” Eugène Tisserant, *L’église militante* (Paris, 1950), p. 14. This opinion was shared by the prominent American political scientist John A. Armstrong, who suggested that the period of Soviet rule in Eastern Galicia “created a state of mind in which the Ukrainians of the area would at least initially welcome any force which opposed the Soviet Union.” John Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism 1939–1945*, 2d ed. (New York, 1963), p. 27. Similarly, Sheptytsky biographer Cyrille Korolevskij observed: “Une chose est certaine, c’est que les Russes en ont tant fait en Galicie, surtout au moment de l’évacuation à la fin de la première occupation, qu’ils étaient universellement haïs.” See his *Métropolitaine André Szeptyckyj*, p. 381. Israeli historian Shimon Redlich has pointed out that, along with anti-Soviet sentiment, Ukrainian political hopes were also in play: “...Hitler’s policies toward the Slavs were not yet apparent in 1941, and numerous Ukrainians, Sheptyts'kyi among them, assumed that the mutual Ukrainian-German hatred of Soviet Russia would suffice to cement an anti-Bolshevik alliance and also ensure Germany’s support for Ukrainian

hopes and would participate in various representations to the German government in that matter. In view of both religious and political considerations, then, Metropolitan Sheptytsky initially perceived the new situation as basically a liberation, and greeted the German entry into Western Ukraine accordingly.

Along with the religious and political considerations that entered into the accommodating stance, there was an ethical foundation. Thus, the Metropolitan spelled out two key preconditions on which Christian obedience to civil authority would depend. The first was that the state must not contravene any divine laws: "The sacrifices that are absolutely necessary in order to achieve our goal [i.e., independent statehood] will, first of all, consist of obedient submission to the just dictates of [the civil] authority that are not contrary to divine law."⁵³

The second condition was an egalitarian principle that served as a criterion for discerning the wisdom and justice of civil leadership and civil dictates: "From the government that has been called into being [by Iaroslav Stetsko] we expect wise and just leadership, and dictates that would take into consideration the needs and the welfare of all the citizens inhabiting our land, regardless of the religious, ethnic or social group to which they may belong."⁵⁴

Respect for divine law and equality before the law were therefore, in Sheptytsky's thought, two constitutive elements of the "just dictates" and "wise leadership" that Christians were required to obey. The implicit message was that, when these conditions were not met, the Christian citizen ceased to be bound by civil obedience. And although the document, addressed to the Ukrainian people on the occasion of the declaration of Ukrainian statehood, did not refer specifically to the German regime, the two conditions were clearly intended to apply to all political orders, including the wartime German occupation.

These qualifications on loyalty to the state came into play mere months after the German takeover, as the Metropolitan became better informed of the true intentions of the Nazis, but their pronouncement in the very first days of the German occupation, and the Metropolitan's subsequent change of heart regarding the Germans, suggest that his initial welcome to the "liberators" was only a

national objectives." See his "Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews during World War II," in *Life and Times*, pp. 145–62. In addition, the apparent compatibility of Ukrainian and German political objectives had received expression in the thought of Alfred Rosenberg, Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, who at one time advanced the idea of Ukrainian autonomy.

53. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Z voli vsemohuchoho...zachalasia...", 1 July 1941, p. 112. See also a spurious version of the text, which calls for "obedience to divine laws that do not contravene the dictates of the [civil] authority" (Pan'kivs'kyi, *Vid Derzhavy*, p. 116).

54. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

tentative and conditional accommodation to the new situation rather than wholehearted support for Nazi Germany, its ideology and policies.⁵⁵

As German policy began to reveal Hitler's intentions, Sheptytsky's qualified support changed to a critical attitude. When Ukrainian hopes for autonomy were dashed by the annexation of Western Ukraine to the Generalgouvernement (on 1 August 1941) and by the arrests of Ukrainian political activists, Metropolitan Sheptytsky joined the voices of protest.⁵⁶ Similarly, despite official obstruction, he took pains to send Greek Catholic priests into eastern Ukraine.⁵⁷ In this transitional period, during which he became critical of the German occupation and even drew some parallels between it and the period of Soviet rule,

55. Metropolitan Sheptytsky later regretted his initial reading of the situation and explained that he had been misled. Ivan Kedryn spoke with the Metropolitan on this matter in August 1941 and later gave this account: "The Metropolitan disclosed that he was 'troubled by his conscience' about whether he had done well to give his blessing to the Ukrainian government. From many sources he had heard criticisms of the method by which that government was formed, and of how people found themselves faced with the *fait accompli* of the return of Ukrainian statehood in Galicia. 'But what was I to do...when they came to me and said: 'Bless the Ukrainian state!' Could I have refused to give my blessing?'" Ivan Kedryn, *V mezhakh zatsikavlennia* (New York, 1986), p. 408.

Hansjakob Stehle has pointed out that crucial information was withheld from the Metropolitan in the days that followed the German takeover. See his "Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi and the German Regime," in *Life and Times*, pp. 125–44.

56. Sheptytsky tried to prevent the Generalgouvernement's annexation of Western Ukraine before it occurred by appealing in a telegram to Hitler, Heinrich Himmler and Joachim Ribbentrop on 22 July 1941. In it, the Metropolitan argued that Ukrainian support for Germany would depend on the latter's acceptance of Ukrainian political ideals. "The Ukrainian nation," he wrote, "has since 1918 waged a bloody struggle against the Polish and the Soviet states for the sake of its ideal, a united and free Ukraine, which is physically necessary [*naturnotwendig*] and self-evident. The annulment of their ideal of statehood would shake their sincere sympathy and trust in the German government and would affect very detrimentally the vital interests of the Ukrainian people and especially the just new order in Eastern Europe." The text of the telegram is given in [Jarosław Nagórski], "Die Tragödie der ukrainisch-katholischen Kirche," *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, 1, no. 2 (April-June 1952): 9–10. Similar messages were sent to various levels of the German government by the Ukrainian National Council and the Council of Seniors. See Roman Ilnytskyj, *Deutschland und die Ukraine, 1939–1945*, 2 vols. (Munich, 1958), 2: 214, and [Nagórski], "Die Tragödie," p. 10.

57. Writing to the pope, Sheptytsky mentioned that "The first attempt [to send priests into German-occupied Eastern Ukraine] did not succeed because of a formal prohibition by the German authorities in Berlin against admitting or tolerating any kind of work by Catholic priests in the occupied regions." Sheptytsky to Pope Pius XII, in *ERSS-LGE*, 29 October [1941], p. 3. The prohibition is confirmed in an internal German policy memorandum, the Heydrich order, cited in n. 8 above.

Sheptytsky still stopped short of a complete break with Germany. This may be attributed to two considerations: first, a reluctance to jeopardize the limited religious freedom under German occupation, which, at the very least, was an improvement on the condition of the church under Soviet rule; and, second, the fear of a Soviet return, which was still prevalent in Galicia at the time and continued to orient much of Western Ukrainian political sentiment toward Germany.

Yet Sheptytsky also began to move toward a critical stance. In 1942, he issued two key documents that spelled out his ethical views on the situation under German rule. The main ethical problem, as he saw it, centred on the Christian commitment to protect human life. In his pastoral letter *On Christian Mercy*, Sheptytsky declared that when human life was imperilled, as it was under the Nazi occupation, even the principle of private property was subordinated to the Christian duty to save life.⁵⁸ Indeed, following the example of Christ, that duty went so far as to include placing one's own life at risk for the sake of another.⁵⁹ The sanctity of human life was given even more forceful expression in the pastoral letter *Thou Shalt Not Kill*; in it, the Metropolitan condemned various forms of homicide, including state-sanctioned summary executions.⁶⁰

Of course, these statements simply reviewed the Christian moral norm governing respect for human life, but their timing in Nazi-occupied Galicia contained a deeper, contextual meaning. Despite the religious and political concerns that had seemed to favour German-Ukrainian harmony, there could be no compromising them for the sake of harmony with the civil authorities. The pastoral statements also indicated Sheptytsky's readiness to challenge the legitimacy of German policy as soon as that policy contravened divine laws. And although this critical stance toward the German authorities was embedded within texts that were addressed to Ukrainian Catholics, it marked the humble

58. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro myloserdia" ("Tsile dilo..."), June 1942, *LAeV* 55, nos. 7–8 (July–August 1942), reprinted in 03–69, par. 29–30, pp. 173–74. All citations given here are from 03–69.

59. Sheptytsky, "Pro myloserdia," par. 47, p. 179.

60. Sheptytsky recognized the right of the state to execute criminals convicted of grave offences, as long as four conditions were met: 1) criminal responsibility had to be duly established (i.e., before a court of law); 2) the death sentence had to be required by the existing law; 3) the accused had to have been given the opportunity to defend himself before the courts; and 4) the defendant had to have the right to appeal a guilty verdict to a higher court. Metropolitan Sheptytsky, "Ne ubyi" ("Khrystova Tserkva..."), *LAeV* 55, no. 11 (November 1942): 179. What is perhaps most significant about this statement is that, despite its being written and published during the war, it made no mention of waiving due process of law in favour of summary justice under wartime conditions.

beginnings of a process that would culminate in the Ukrainian Catholic Church's defiance of German laws.

Thus, in a third phase, Sheptytsky became convinced that the German state was inherently evil ("almost diabolical") and worse even than the Soviet regime. It is likely that he arrived at this opinion some time before his letter of 29–31 August 1942 to Pope Pius XII, when he is first known to have dared to go on record with an explicit and direct condemnation of the occupation.⁶¹ As the policy of systematic violence and extermination became evident, Sheptytsky unequivocally condemned it as contrary to the Christian law of love:

This system of lies, of deceit, of injustice, of pillage, a caricature of every idea of civilization and order; this system of egoism exaggerated to an absurd degree, of totally crazed national chauvinism, of hatred of all that is beautiful and good, this system constitutes something so phenomenal that one's first reaction at the sight of this monster is dumbfounded amazement. Where will this system lead the unfortunate German people? This can be nothing but a degeneration of the [human] race such as has never before been witnessed in history.⁶²

This position was consolidated and hardened by subsequent events. Indeed, after the outbreak of new violence in 1943, Sheptytsky actually looked forward to the return of the Soviets, who, he hoped, would restore some semblance of peace and order. In a letter to the Vatican in March 1944, he wrote, "the arrival of the Bolsheviki will perhaps be beneficial in the sense that it will put an end to the anarchy that now prevails throughout the land."⁶³

61. Metropolitan Sheptytsky wrote to Cardinal Tisserant: "Je me proposais de présenter à Votre Eminence un exposé de toute la position religieuse dans tout le terrain conquis par l'armée allemande. J'avais même écrit des lettres, que je n'envoie pas, comprenant leur insuffisance. La position change et évolue continuellement et nous attendons des événements, qu'on peut prévoir, mais qu'il est difficile de prédire. J'attends donc une meilleure opportunité." Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Cardinal Tisserant, in *ERSS-LGE*, 23 February 1942, pp. 3–4. Apart from this terse and oblique reference to the early part of the German occupation, there is little information on the Metropolitan's changing attitudes between February and August 1942.

62. Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in *ADSS-2*, pp. 628–29.

63. Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Cardinal Tisserant, "L'approche des bolchéviques," 23 March 1944, photographic copy in *UHVR*, p. 2.

In this connection, an eminent Polish historian has observed that, as early as 1943, Sheptytsky expected a German defeat and was ready to cooperate with the USSR as long as his church was given the assurance that it would be able to carry out missions east of Galicia. Ryszard Torzecki, "Kontakty polsko-ukraińskie na tle problemu ukraińskiego w polityce polskiego rządu emigracyjnego i podziemia (1939–1944)," *Dzieje Najnowsze* 1/2 (1981), cited in Andrzej Zięba, "Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 92 (1986): 897.

Such, then, were the three stages through which Sheptytsky progressed in his dealings with the occupying German regime. Although religious and political considerations affected his progress from one stage to the next, they were ultimately overridden by ethical principles. The initial accommodation to and acceptance of the occupation had been conditioned by the immediate effect of the German invasion: the expulsion of the Soviets. This was greeted as the beginning of a new era of political autonomy for Western Ukraine. At the same time, however, the promise of conditional civic obedience hinged on “just dictates,” requiring that the state respect divine laws and the equality of all citizens. In the next stage, which was characterized by a critique of certain German policies through direct representations to the authorities, the Metropolitan took issue with the German disregard for Ukrainian political aspirations and Ukrainian Catholic efforts to achieve church unity. More importantly, his critical posture applied Christian conditions for civic loyalty to the actual situation at hand; the result was a condemnation of state-sanctioned violence and an affirmation of the Christian duty to defend the sanctity of human life. The final stage—resistance in the form of non-violent civil disobedience, notably through the organization of illegal sanctuary and escape operations for Jews—had neither political nor religious underpinnings. It served neither the purpose of Ukrainian independence nor the eastward expansion of Catholicism, but was simply the result of putting Christian ethics into practice. By opposing the official policy of deportation and extermination of Jews in both word and deed, Sheptytsky led the way for those Ukrainian Catholics who were prepared to risk their lives in order to hide, shelter or smuggle the fugitives to safety.

As in the preceding Soviet period, Metropolitan Sheptytsky initially adopted a position of qualified submission and obedience to the German occupation authorities. However, whereas we have noted concurrent patterns of accommodation and resistance in the church’s activity during the Soviet occupation, in the period of the Nazi occupation Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s attitude to the state and his social action underwent a definitive shift from qualified accommodation to outright resistance. Although political and ecclesiastical considerations did enter into that evolution, the decisive factor was Christian ethical reasoning.

Another dimension of Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s social teaching at this time had to do with what was known as the national struggle. The fall of Poland in 1939 and, two years later, the withdrawal of Soviet forces had given rise to new hopes for Ukrainian autonomy and culminated in the declaration of an independent Ukrainian state. With the war, the Ukrainian struggle for self-determination entered a new phase. The Ukrainian Catholic Church identified itself with and endorsed that historical process, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky felt

that the situation called for reflection on the Christian ethical principles that ought to guide nation-building.

In his view, the Ukrainian national ideal was the creation of a viable native national homeland (*ridna vsenatsional'na Khata-Bat'kivshchyna*).⁶⁴ The crucial element here was viability, and although as a human construct the nation-state was certainly not to be confused with natural organisms, in its ideal form it was supposed to reflect very closely the organic life that was observable in nature.⁶⁵ The prime focus of nation-building was the consolidation of inner energies, solidarity and social unity. External obstacles to nation-building could only be left up to God, in whose hands was the destiny of nations.⁶⁶ From a Christian standpoint, the effective way toward nationhood was through internal regeneration. Accordingly, the church would define the social ethics and cultivate the social climate that was necessary to sustain a viable national entity:

The task of the Ukrainian people will consist of creating such Christian social conditions as would guarantee real and lasting happiness to citizens and would have sufficient internal strength to overcome the centrifugal tendencies of internal disintegration and successfully defend the borders from enemies outside. The motherland can be just such a powerful guarantor of happiness to all its citizens only when it is no longer a whole that is comprised artificially of many and various parts, but an organism similar to a monolith; that is, a body animated by one spirit that develops from its own inner vitality; that compensates for its own deficiencies; that is naturally healthy, strong, and aware of its aims; and that is not only a material but [also] a moral body.⁶⁷

At the time he was writing the pastoral letter *The Ideal of Our National Life*, it appeared to Metropolitan Sheptytsky that “divine providence will give the Ukrainian people [a chance] to fulfill their natural right—to choose and establish a system of government for their homeland.”⁶⁸ It was therefore necessary to see to it that the Ukrainian people would exercise that right “wisely and as Christians.”⁶⁹ In order to do so, they would have to understand and live by the Christian principles of sovereign authority, which Sheptytsky summarized in five points:

64. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Idealom nashoho natsional'noho zhyttia...,” Decree of the Sobor of 1942 to the clergy (L'viv, [1941]), par. 1, p. 1. Offprint. National Archives of Canada (Ottawa). Andrii Zhuk Collection, vol. 129, file 4.

65. Ibid., par. 4–5, p. 1.

66. Ibid., par. 2, p. 1.

67. Ibid., par. 3, p. 1.

68. Ibid., par. 9, p. 2.

69. Ibid.

1. (Political) authority comes from God, because it is the natural consequence of the (God-given) social nature of humanity;
2. Authority resides within the nature of an entire people, not within any individual person;
3. A people may choose its own system of government (monarchy, oligarchy, democracy) and reserves the right to participate in the political process through elections, plebiscites or referenda;
4. The aim of civil authority is to serve the public welfare and uphold the freedoms of its citizens, and it therefore enacts laws that are just (i.e., conforming to divine law and the common good) and establishes an impartial and independent judiciary that applies the general laws to specific cases and delineates the mutual rights and duties of citizens; and
5. The state authority is bound by Christian duties: in particular, it must exercise civil toleration of all faiths and cults, ensuring that its citizens enjoy freedom from coercion and freedom to fulfill their respective religious obligations.⁷⁰

Such, then, were the universal, “fundamental laws on which every social order is based.” Sheptytsky understood these general principles and conditions as ethical prerequisites for social and political harmony. As long as they were upheld, one could expect social peace, happiness and prosperity; and just as every social order depended on these conditions, so too did the success of nation-building. However, if these conditions were disregarded or replaced by “the false slogans of revolution or socialism,” the inevitable result would be anarchy, enslavement and ruin.⁷¹

Authority was based on reciprocal rights and duties of the state and its citizens. Once the state had fulfilled its duty, it was incumbent upon every citizen to submit obediently to its authority.⁷² Sheptytsky felt that such authority was indispensable and indicated that a given people had attained the political maturity required to govern themselves:

The Ukrainian people must show at this historic moment that they have the vital energy and a sufficient sense of authority to merit a position among the peoples of Europe in which they could develop all their God-given powers.

With discipline, solidarity and the conscientious fulfillment of duties, demonstrate that you are mature enough for statehood.⁷³

We have seen in the previous section that this did not entail an a priori, passive submission to state authority, for, in the Christian perspective, civil

70. Ibid., par. 10–11, pp. 2–3.

71. Ibid., par. 13, p. 3.

72. Sheptytsky, “Z voli vsemohuchoho...zachalasia...,” 1 July 1941, p. 112; and Sheptytsky, “Z voli Vsemohuchoho...pochynaiet'sia...,” 5 July 1941, p. 120.

73. Sheptytsky, “Z voli vsemohuchoho...zachalasia...,” p. 112.

obedience was based on a vigilant scrutiny of the state's fulfillment of its duties. Metropolitan Sheptytsky therefore focused special attention on the duties of the state. Foremost among those duties was ensuring the welfare of all its citizens. According to Christian teaching, authority carries with it the obligation to serve and thus also the duty to care for the good of those who are served. In practical terms, an abuse of authority occurred wherever the common good was subordinated to personal interests.⁷⁴ On that score, Sheptytsky criticized the Soviet regime, identifying it as an example of a state that had failed in its duty of service:

The aim of a state is to guarantee the happiness and welfare of families and individual citizens. [Ensuring] the security of life, property and every civic right—such are the basic duties of the state; without them, there is no state. What is called the Bolshevik state is so far removed from that aim that in no way can one detect any trace of the basic, primary functions of the state in the Bolshevik government. Its rulers do not even dream about the prosperity and happiness of the people. It is the source of an exploitation of human energy, health and life about which no one elsewhere has any inkling.... It is an atmosphere in which no organism can long survive. It is an atmosphere that follows from Marxism, which may be considered a system that turns a person into a machine and takes no account of his natural rights or needs.⁷⁵

Metropolitan Sheptytsky felt that the guarantee of religious liberty was a key characteristic of any civilized state. For it was also a fundamental duty of the state to show “civil toleration toward all creeds and cults,” “not interfere in the internal content of those faiths” and “guarantee in practice civil liberties to its citizens.”⁷⁶ Inasmuch as the Soviet system had failed in its duty to safeguard that right, Sheptytsky regarded its official policy of atheism as “completely contrary to human nature and the laws of organic life, the laws of society and of the family.”⁷⁷ Moreover, there could be no talk of religious freedom in the Soviet Union as long as

...the sick in hospitals are treated worse than death row prisoners in civilized states. For in all prisons of civilized states there is the age-old and universally respected custom of fulfilling, whenever possible, the last wish of those who are sentenced to death... But in Soviet hospitals, all of which are state institutions, the sick, and even the dying, no matter how much they may request religious consolation, can never receive it, because of the atheistic principle implanted in

74. Sheptytsky, “Idealom” (1942), par. 21, p. 5.

75. [Metropolitan Sheptytsky], “Slovo Mytropolyta Andreia pro bol'shevyzm” [6 October 1941], in *Zakhidnia Ukraïna pid bol'shevykamy, IX.1939–VI.1941*, ed. Milena Rudnyts'ka (New York, 1958), pp. 9–10.

76. Sheptytsky, “Idealom” (1942), par. 11, p. 3.

77. [Sheptytsky], “Slovo Mytropolyta Andreia pro bol'shevyzm,” p. 10.

Marxist communism.⁷⁸

It was thus Metropolitan Sheptytsky's reflection on the state's duty to safeguard religious freedom that led him to conclude that in the interest of maintaining a harmonious relationship with the church, the state's policies would have to show respect for divine law and equality without discrimination.

A third duty of the state was to provide "wise leadership." It was understood as tied closely to safeguarding the common good and religious liberty,⁷⁹ but beyond that, the Metropolitan also realized that wise leadership was essential to the process of nation-building. The problem was that even the best intentions of nation-building stood to be undermined by the accession to positions of power and leadership of people who, "instead of caring for the common good, seek only the satisfaction of their personal egoism and place their own interests above the common good."⁸⁰ In Sheptytsky's view, such political opportunism was indicative of the lack of a solid Christian foundation in social life. However, a society that was built on Christian principles would manifest four features: the general acceptance of gospel principles; adherence to the Christian life and virtues by the majority of citizens; a social life and prayer deserving of divine blessing; and freedom for the church to fulfill its God-given mission (to preach the gospel, sanctify its people and pray for them).⁸¹ Whenever these conditions were met, the difficulties associated with supreme authority could be resolved peacefully and in a way that promoted the common good. Conversely, "when these conditions are absent, there is no divine blessing, and individuals who are inept at leadership push their way to the top of the life of a society, thereby doing harm rather than good."⁸²

Although Sheptytsky's principles of statehood were primarily intended to address Ukrainian aspirations to independence, their scope was not limited to the Ukrainian situation. Even after the Nazis had dashed Ukrainian hopes of achieving independent nationhood, the Metropolitan's continuing reflection on ethics within the political sphere led him to level a critique at both the Soviet Union's shortcomings as a state and, more subtly, at the Nazi occupation of Galicia. Although the church did not possess the freedom openly to criticize the

78. Ibid., pp. 10–11.

79. Sheptytsky, "Idealom" (1942), par. 32, p. 9: Wise leadership "fulfills the aim of general welfare and happiness." In his pastoral letter of 1 July 1941, Metropolitan Sheptytsky also linked the notion of wise leadership with respect for religious liberty. Sheptytsky, "Z voli vsemohuchoho...zachalasia...", 1 July 1941, p. 113.

80. Sheptytsky, "Idealom" (1942), par. 32, p. 8.

81. Ibid. On the duty of the state to respect the divine mission of the Christian Church to preach the revealed Word, see also *ibid.*, par. 11, p. 3.

82. Ibid.

occupation,⁸³ the German authorities viewed the pastoral letters *The Ideal of Our National Life* and *Thou Shalt Not Kill* with enough suspicion to confiscate and delay publication of the former and to censor the latter. As we shall see in the discussion of the social action of the Ukrainian Catholic Church later in this chapter, regardless of the risks involved, Metropolitan Sheptytsky would apply Christian principles to the political scene, even to the point of overt criticism of the Nazi occupation regime.

In addition to addressing the church's external relations with the state, Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social reflection and teaching during the German occupation was directed toward the internal life of the Ukrainian community. Here, the Metropolitan considered two principles to be of paramount importance—social solidarity and respect for human life. Social solidarity was urgently needed in both the religious and the political spheres of Ukrainian life at a time when national aspirations were at a peak, while the call to respect human life was in direct response to the Nazi policy of extermination in Western Ukraine.

In his pastoral letter *The Ideal of Our National Life*, Sheptytsky addressed a powerful ideal among Ukrainians—the desire to have their own homeland. In his vision, a unified Ukraine would comprise both the Catholic segment formerly under Austrian rule and, to the east, the predominantly Orthodox Ukrainian lands that had passed from tsarist to Soviet rule. Within this, a key presupposition was that nation-building had to be preceded by the attainment of social and political unity. Accordingly, when speaking of Ukrainian aspirations to nationhood, it was essential to distinguish between what promoted and what impeded social unity. Setting aside “external obstacles” to unity (e.g., the successive foreign occupations of Ukrainian lands), over which there was little control, Sheptytsky attempted to direct attention instead to the internal obstacles to social unity or, as he called them, the “centrifugal forces” that were present among his people. Such internal causes of disunity were basically of two types: political and religious.

One of the main internal obstacles to unity among Ukrainians was “hot-headed patriotism,” or intolerance of political views other than one's own. Sheptytsky considered this a worrisome trait that undermined Ukrainian efforts at nation-building:

83. Ivan Hryn'okh's observation that during the Nazi occupation Sheptytsky's rejection of authoritarian and one-party political systems (*providnyts'ki chy monopartiini systemy*) was stated implicitly in order to avoid Nazi censorship appears well-founded. Hryn'okh, *Sluha Bozhyi Andrei*, p. 49.

...there is in the Ukrainian soul a deep and powerful will to have their own state, yet along with that will there is an equally powerful and deeply felt desire that the state should necessarily be exactly of the form that the party, the clique, the group or even the individual wants. For how else can we explain that fatal divisiveness, those arguments, schisms, quarrels—that partisanism that destroys every national cause? How [else] can we explain the mind of so many hot-headed patriots whose work has such a distinctly ruinous character?⁸⁴

All of this engendered a kind of “Bolshevik intolerance,” with the result that the social unity of Ukrainians was constantly undermined by internal discord. Their national consciousness was readily aroused, but at the same time it was extremely vulnerable to “hostile forces” that could only weaken the social fabric.⁸⁵

According to Sheptytsky, some of these forces of political disunity had their origin in the historical experience of Ukraine, which had endured many occupations by foreign states.⁸⁶ Being of foreign origin, such antagonisms only had to be seen as remote from Ukrainian concerns, and they could then be set aside. But what had to be confronted directly were the problems of internal disunity and divisions among Ukrainians, for: “It is as clear as day that there will be no homeland, no Ukrainian monolith, until Ukrainian irredentists, in spite of all the differences by which they are divided, achieve the greatest possible degree of unity among themselves.”⁸⁷

As Sheptytsky saw it, therefore, the problem lay not in the multiplicity of political parties but in doctrinaire positions that generated intolerance. When he spoke of a “monolithic” society, Sheptytsky was not ruling out political pluralism, but rather calling for a climate of mutual respect in which debate over social and political issues could take place. An overriding internal harmony was crucial to success in nation-building:

...[our] greatest danger is internal schism, the struggle against one another and the anarchy (*otamanshchyna*) that results from schism and that already, during the first attempt at nation-building in 1917–20, dashed all our hopes.

Whoever leads us into a civil war, even though he may [otherwise] have made great contributions, harms the national cause. All who survived the Bolshevik onslaught know that partisan divisions are a national crime that we cannot permit.⁸⁸

84. Sheptytsky, “Idealom” (1942), par. 40, p. 10.

85. Ibid., par. 38, p. 10.

86. Ibid., par. 47, p. 12.

87. Ibid., par. 48, p. 12.

88. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Vid khvyli...,” pastoral letter of 10 July 1941, in

Obstacles to social unity were present also in the religious sphere. Although Ukrainians belonged to many Christian denominations, the main source of religious antagonism was enmity between Greek Catholics and the Orthodox, hence Sheptytsky turned to this specific problem. His proposal, which he called a “program of religious reconciliation,” was a preliminary framework for reunion that placed emphasis on compromise in the interdenominational debate.⁸⁹ In order to establish common ground between the two Ukrainian churches, both sides would have to be ready to make all possible compromises that did not contravene the dictates of conscience. In this matter, Sheptytsky contended that denominational allegiance made no difference, since Catholics and Orthodox alike were equally obliged to act according to conscience. The only limit to this rule, which both traditions accepted, was that matters of faith (having to do with revelation, the gospel, divine law, etc.) could never be subordinated to reason and subjected to compromise.⁹⁰ Furthermore, the procedure for arriving at compromise had to be grounded in decisions that were freely made, independent of any external pressure or coercion. Finally, it was seen as far removed from the divisions that had been imposed by others in the distant past, and it would be attentive to indigenous Ukrainian concerns. Sheptytsky believed that in the work toward unity, real progress could only be achieved if this method of conscientious compromise were accepted by both sides.

The Metropolitan reasoned that the primary cause of religious disunity among Ukrainians was a kind of “egoism and imperialism” that gave rise to hostilities: “If the various Christian Churches in Ukraine are to fulfill the task of conferring unity upon the Ukrainian people, they must divest themselves of that spirit of hatred and schism that sets Ukrainian against Ukrainian.”⁹¹ For Sheptytsky, the notion of a “spirit of hatred” was a key criterion of ethical discernment for understanding religious unification and division throughout history. Thus, in his analysis, after the creation of the Moscow Patriarchate, the theory of the “Third Rome” revealed its hidden “egoism and imperialism.”⁹² Conversely, the antithesis of this tendency was obedient submission, and Sheptytsky asked: were not the Kyivan bishops justified in reuniting with Rome in “the spirit of

Mykhailo Khomiak, “Diial'nist' Mytropolita Kyr Andreia pid nimets'koïu okupatsiieiu,” *Lohos* 6, no. 2 (October-December 1955): 294–95.

89. Sheptytsky, “Idealom” (1942), par. 50, p. 13.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid., par. 69, p. 18.

92. Ibid., par. 56–57, p. 14.

submission and [sic] authority?"⁹³ He answered his own question with reference to the same ethical criterion:

In breaking [canonical] ties with Constantinople, they did so not in the name of the complete sovereignty of each Metropolitan (for the Christian Church never accepted such a principle as correct), nor in the name of egoism, nor in a spirit of rebellion, but in the name of obedience and submission.⁹⁴

However,

...for a bishop to break [canonical] ties with his superior, when that is done in the name of egoism and of some unknown principle of the independence of every bishop, is a thing condemned by the entire tradition of the Church.⁹⁵

In summing up, Sheptytsky declared himself ready to make conscientious concessions (*ustupky*) that would lead to religious unity. But the Orthodox would first have to establish "that in the sixteenth century we broke canonical ties with Constantinople *in a spirit of egoism and schism*" and also "that the Roman pontiffs separated from Constantinople *in a spirit of schism and egoism*." At the same time, it would have to be recognized that the defamation of Uniates (Greek Catholics) by the Russian synodal church had incited hatred toward their brethren and that since the fall of tsarist Russia the Orthodox Church there was plagued by "the disintegrating disease of ruin and schism."⁹⁶

Thus, social and religious unity was not only a goal but also itself a criterion by which progress toward the ideal of unity could be discerned and evaluated ethically. Where it could be shown that decisions or actions had been undertaken "in a spirit of schism and egoism," of "imperialism" and rebellion against authority, rather than in a spirit of obedient submission, Sheptytsky was convinced that the drive to division had replaced the sincere quest for unity and, contrary to Christian teaching, love had given way to hatred.

A closer analysis of the pastoral letter reveals a sort of "duae viae" motif in Sheptytsky's proposals for religious unification. In developing his argument, he repeatedly referred to the opposition between egoism-rebellion-schism and obedience-submission to authority-love.⁹⁷ The model of two contrary paths

93. Ibid., par. 57, p. 14.

94. Ibid., par. 59, p. 15.

95. Ibid., par. 60, p. 15.

96. Ibid., par. 71–72, p. 19.

97. Metropolitan Sheptytsky saw the opposition of categories as follows: "egoism and imperialism" vs. "submission and authority" (ibid., par. 57, p. 14); "egoism and rebellion" vs. "obedience and submission" (ibid., par. 59, p. 15); "hatred and schism" and "egoism and imperialism" vs. "love, Christian submission and Church authority" (ibid., par. 69, p. 18). The former path was further characterized as one of "schism and egoism" (ibid., par. 71, p. 19); and of "hatred" (ibid., par. 72, p. 19).

revealed the contradiction between the Christian ethical imperative of love and its ideal of unity on the one hand and, on the other, the reality of ecclesiastical disunity. Through such reasoning, the Metropolitan concluded that the quest for church unity was an urgent ethical imperative, since religious disunity contradicted the law of love.

In the quest for social and religious unity, Christian ethical discernment centred on the distinction between what promoted unity and what aggravated discord and schism. Closely related to the dialectics of love and hate, these categories shed new light on the history of ecclesiastical disunity and could potentially point to solutions for the present. By applying the fundamental law of love to the contextual problem of social and religious disunity, Sheptytsky reasoned that, just as a Christian was always obliged to reject hatred as morally wrong, so it was necessary to reject instances of hatred in ecclesiastical history (egoism, schismatic rebellion and imperialism). Similarly, if the Christian was bound to be directed in his ethical choices by love, then that also required a fervent commitment to unity and obedient submission to authority.⁹⁸

Sheptytsky's program for religious reconciliation thus comprised an interpretive, critical account of the causes of religious divisions in Ukrainian history and an attempt to overcome those divisions by learning from the mistakes of the past. Since the Catholic-Orthodox dispute over which side was in error had only led to a standoff, Sheptytsky's proposal was to establish a common ground on which the debate might proceed toward a resolution. This common ground consisted of two elements—first of all, a readiness in principle to make conscientious compromises and, secondly, an objective ethical criterion (love-unity-obedient submission) that would serve as a Christian ethical standard for interpreting history and for distinguishing between ethically acceptable and unacceptable courses of action. The resulting interpretation of church disunity and its true causes could also assist ethical decision-making in one's own time. For Sheptytsky believed that, once the debate was situated within a climate of shared ethical convictions, a climate in which the commitment of both sides to strive for full unity was well established, the ultimate goal would be in sight.

98. Metropolitan Sheptytsky's emphasis on obedience in this case should not be mistaken for an advocacy of total submission. As we have seen, he viewed Christian submission to the civil authority as conditional rather than absolute. And, although the Metropolitan was perhaps less inclined to be critical of ecclesiastical than of civil authority, the reference here was to the continued situation of ecclesiastical schism, which, to him, indicated a spirit of rebellion and egoism rather than a commitment to unity within the church. A "spirit of obedience," then, was seen as an essential element in the restoration of unity.

A second, practical application of Christian love on which Metropolitan Sheptytsky reflected at this time concerned the protection of human life. In June 1942, the Metropolitan wrote the pastoral letter *On Christian Mercy*, which discussed the various forms of the Christian duty of brotherly love and its practical implications. Observing the gravity of the prevailing social situation, Sheptytsky noted: "Every day such human sufferings pass before our eyes that it seems impossible for the human heart not to feel them very deeply."⁹⁹ In this situation, Christian almsgiving had a special function, and the Metropolitan indicated how it differed from non-Christian practices. Whereas in material terms the Christian and the non-Christian both saw alms as contributing to the satisfaction of material needs, they had different motives for almsgiving: proceeding from the love of God, "...the Christian act of mercy has a higher spiritual meaning; it is commanded by a higher, supernatural motive; it is illuminated by the light of Christian faith and divine grace."¹⁰⁰

On this basis, Metropolitan Sheptytsky criticized the economic liberalism of his time. It had failed to deliver on its promise of serving the common good, and instead had only confirmed a little-understood pattern: "As production grows, so do the ranks of the poor." Instead of promoting economic justice, the existing system, blindly driven by "growth" and "hyperproduction," seemed doomed to collapse. What was missing was even a minimal awareness of "...the principles in which the social order could be grounded."¹⁰¹ Sheptytsky saw no basis for hope that the prevailing economic systems in Europe could overcome the disparities between rich and poor. On the contrary, he fully expected that the plight of the poor would only worsen. In such circumstances, he felt that the church ought to use every means available "to remind the faithful of their duty to give alms and to organize the practical implementation [of Christian charity]."¹⁰²

Without naming German National Socialism, a full year into the Nazi occupation Metropolitan Sheptytsky nevertheless drew special attention to the distinction between Christian and socialist approaches to economic justice. In his view, the key source of conflict centred on the notion of private property. The socialists regarded it as "the fruit of human injustice,"¹⁰³ while in the Christian tradition it was seen as "a legitimate, natural and, therefore, essential

99. Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro myloserdia" ("Tsile dilo..."), June 1942, *LAeV* 55, nos. 7–8 (July–August 1942), reprinted in 03–69, par. 4, pp. 165–66. All quotations given here are from the text in 03–69.

100. Ibid., par. 23, p. 171.

101. Ibid., par. 24, p. 172.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid., par. 26, p. 172.

institution”¹⁰⁴ that informed Christian charity and almsgiving (i.e., they were always carried out with respect for private property). On this point, both civil and divine law were in accord:

...the temporal, earthly goods that Divine Providence gives can be and are the property of those who have acquired them legitimately and who are their owners before the law... Private property, [whether it is] acquired through inheritance or through thrift and hard work, is a right protected by divine law.¹⁰⁵

From these divergent views of private property, different concepts of duty necessarily followed. Whereas socialists believed that the rich were bound by justice to perform acts of restitution (i.e., dividing up their possessions and restoring to the poor what was considered rightfully theirs),¹⁰⁶ the Christian position was firmly grounded in the inviolability of private property. Accordingly, the rich were entitled to their property; at the same time, however, they had a duty toward the poor by virtue of the Christian requirement of fraternal love. The Christian option promoted class harmony rather than class struggle and based the duty of working toward economic equality not on justice alone, as the socialists did, but on the requirements of *both* justice and love:

It is natural for people mutually to exchange services of Christian love and reciprocal kindness. In this way, justice and love, joined together under the just and light burden of Christ’s law, support very well the bonds of human society and lead its every member to work for his own private good and for the common good.¹⁰⁷

Finally, in this approach, which strove to promote harmonious class relations rather than class conflict, almsgiving was not “contrary to natural human dignity,” as the socialists would have it.¹⁰⁸ When it was practised in an evangelical spirit, not only was there nothing demeaning about it, but “Christian almsgiving can only facilitate the mutual relations between rich and poor, and strengthen the bonds of mutual service.”¹⁰⁹

Because of their materialist bias, socialists saw only the needs of the poor and the debts of the rich. In the Christian view, however, which considered the spiritual as well as the material dimension, human needs and obligations were more evenly distributed between the haves and the have-nots; thus, the rich were not without their legitimate needs, nor the poor without their own obligations:

104. Ibid., par. 24, p. 171.

105. Ibid., par. 25–26, p. 172, par. 25–26.

106. Ibid., par. 26, p. 172.

107. Ibid., par. 28, p. 173.

108. Ibid., par. 27, p. 173.

109. Ibid., par. 28, p. 173.

“There is no one so rich as to need no assistance from others, nor anyone so poor as to be unable to give necessary and beneficial service to his neighbour.”¹¹⁰

Sheptytsky was calling for Christian charity at a time when widespread poverty and starvation made it difficult for people to give alms.¹¹¹ Citing the example of the widow’s mite (Mk. 12: 11), he argued that almsgiving acquired a profound new meaning precisely in such hard times. It mattered little that in material terms such gifts might not be very substantial; what was crucial from the Christian standpoint was the disposition of the heart, for:

Such gifts, although they may be insignificant in human terms and though they may pass unnoticed, penetrate the heavens...God looks upon the heart. Whoever cannot give more than a good word or a prayer or render a small service can, with the grace of God, receive a word such as the one that Christ pronounced to the Canaanite woman: “For this saying... [you may go your way; the demon has left your daughter”] (Mk. 7: 29). It is not easy to replace deeds with words, for “Not everyone who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord’ shall enter the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of my Father, who is in heaven.” [Mt. 7: 21] However, it sometimes happens that before God a word acquires the value of an act.¹¹²

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., par. 25, p. 172: “The poor will always be with us, but in our time their numbers have grown in an extraordinary way. For [now] the poor are not only those who are unable to subsist in the unforeseen circumstances of illness and old age; among them there are also many young people who cannot support themselves and their families with [the income from] their work, either because they cannot find work or because the pay is such that, even with the best intentions and the most earnest work, they cannot support themselves and their families.” And again: “In our times and in the circumstances of the present moment there is the difficulty that few have plenty of anything, but many are in dire straits, hungry and even starving to death” (ibid., par. 34, p. 175).

112. Ibid., par. 35, p. 175. The biblical reference is to a singular encounter between Jesus and a Canaanite woman (Mt. 15:21–28, and Mk. 7:27–30, where she is called a Syro-Phoenician). At first, Jesus declines the woman’s request to help her daughter, who is possessed, saying, “I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.” This prompts an exchange between the woman and Jesus: “And he said to her, ‘Let the children first be fed, for it is not right to take the children’s bread and throw it to the dogs.’ But she answered him, ‘Yes, Lord; yet even the dogs under the table eat the children’s crumbs.’ And he said to her, ‘For this saying you may go your way; the demon has left your daughter.’ And she went home and found the child lying in bed, and the demon gone.” (Mk. 7:27–30). The story is believed to have been a response to problems of admission of Gentiles into the church. In the Old Testament, the Canaanites became the sinful, godless race that was to be exterminated. According to the story, Jesus was prepared to accept genuine faith not only among the “children” and the “sheep” of the house of Israel, but even among the Canaanite “dogs.” The episode’s uniqueness, to which Sheptytsky drew attention, is that its climax is the woman’s saying, rather than the miracle or saying of Jesus. By virtue of its relation to the miracle, the woman’s word could indeed be said

In exceptional times, especially, the Christian duty to give alms was *proportionally related* to the needs in a particular situation, for “the duty to give alms increases as the needs of one’s neighbour increase.”¹¹³ In fact, in cases of urgent need, such as when a life was in danger, the right to life overrode claims on private property: “Whoever finds himself in dire misery has the right to seek refuge even in another’s property, even without the owner’s consent.”¹¹⁴

Here, then, was the underlying message of a seemingly anachronistic discussion of economic theory: whether a victim had been driven to the brink of destitution by Nazi aggression or hounded by the perpetrators of genocide, the door to a Christian home always had to remain open. Certainly, heroism was not a moral obligation and there was no Christian duty that required one to place one’s own life in grave danger,¹¹⁵ but when human life was at stake there could be no comfortable retreat to private property claims.

Sheptytsky’s reflection on private property in the pastoral letter *On Christian Mercy* thus had two principal aspects. In the first place, it reaffirmed the right to private property and distinguished it sharply from the socialist alternative. Secondly, it focused on specific problems caused by the war and the Nazi occupation of Galicia, in which the fundamental right to private property was being violated in a way that Christians could not ignore. The matter was urgent: since human lives were at stake, the primary Christian moral imperative was to save those lives (for example, by providing sanctuary to those in danger). Sheptytsky affirmed the superior duty to save life over and above the duty to defend private property. The resulting social mission of the church, informed by Christian charity and compassion, would focus on assisting the poor and saving lives:

The Church—whose task it is to preach the Gospel of love and to accomplish acts of mercy, and which, in the name of the Good Samaritan, must come to the rescue of and heal those who have fallen into the hands of thieves—must also remind the faithful of that difficult duty of Christian love and in every possible way encourage people to fulfill it.¹¹⁶

Those who had ears to hear were being told to keep their doors open for the fleeing victims of the thieves.

to have had the power of an act.

113. Ibid., par. 29, p. 173.

114. Ibid., par. 29, p. 174.

115. Ibid., par. 30, p. 174.

116. Ibid., par. 3, p. 165.

Practice: From Accommodation to Resistance

In the first days of the Nazi occupation, Metropolitan Sheptytsky had issued two key statements expressing approval of the new situation. The first document was a pastoral letter of 1 July that recognized the independent Ukrainian government formed by Iaroslav Stetsko. Sheptytsky interpreted this particular moment of Ukrainian political history in both theological and historical terms. Theologically speaking, a new age had begun “through the will of the almighty and all-merciful Triune God”; it was the fulfillment of prayers; it was an act that had been undertaken “in God’s name and with divine grace.” Sheptytsky was confident that, with God’s continued blessing and with leaders who were inspired by divine wisdom, political independence would be consolidated or, in his words, it “would come to a successful conclusion.”¹¹⁷

The Metropolitan also referred to the sequence of events that had been the backdrop for the declaration of Ukrainian independence, namely, the Soviet withdrawal, followed by the Nazi occupation of Western Ukraine. Thus, as he expressed support for the Stetsko government, he drew the connection with the larger picture with the words: “We greet the victorious German army.” The remainder of the document, calling for obedience to the civil authorities, referred explicitly to the Ukrainian government rather than to the German occupation authorities.¹¹⁸

Metropolitan Sheptytsky expected the new state to observe two minimum requirements that were preconditions for the church’s submission to the state. As indicated earlier, the church would promote obedience and submission to the civil authority only insofar as the latter’s commands were just, that is, only if civil laws did not contravene divine law. Secondly, the church grounded its loyalty to the state in the expectation that those who held political power would exercise it *wisely*, that is, by issuing “...directives that would take into account the needs and the welfare of all the citizens living in our land, regardless of the religious denomination, ethnic group or social class to which they may belong.”¹¹⁹ Thus,

117. Sheptytsky, “Z voli vsemohuchoho...zachalasia...,” 1 July 1941, pp. 112–13.

118. There is another version of the same pastoral letter, the text of which does not include the controversial passage. See Pan'kivs'kyi, *Vid Derzhavy*, p. 116. It is somewhat unusual that neither version should have been included in the Soviet collection, *PPU*.

119. Sheptytsky, “Z voli Vsemohuchoho...pochynaet'sia...,” 5 July 1941, p. 120. The importance of this condition of non-discrimination lies in the foresight that it showed. Almost a full year before the final goal of Nazi policy (especially toward the Jews) became evident to all in Galicia, the Germans enacted a variety of measures designed to isolate and segregate Jews from the rest of the population. As was the case in other Nazi-occupied countries, this was but a preliminary step toward mass deportation and extermination. Since this linkage was not completely apparent in Galicia until the second half of 1942, it is all the more remarkable that as early as July 1941, Metropolitan

the civic obedience of Christians was conditional; it would be given only if the state respected Christian ethics and avoided any form of discrimination.

The second document, dated 5 July 1941, was also a brief pastoral letter to the clergy and the faithful of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. It too addressed the new political situation and was similar in style and tone to its predecessor, issued four days earlier. But while the theological content was essentially the same (i.e., affirming that a new epoch had begun through the will of God, for which gratitude was due, along with prayers for continued blessings), now the political referents were quite different. Here, only oblique reference was made to the Ukrainian government, while the greeting to the Germans took on a more expanded, elaborate form: "It is with happiness and gratitude for liberation from the enemy that we greet the victorious army, which has occupied almost the entire land..."¹²⁰ In addition, the Metropolitan called on his priests to serve a liturgy of thanksgiving, after which they were to lead their congregations in a *vivat* "for the victorious German army and for the Ukrainian people."

This document's political frame of reference was no longer that of Western Ukraine and the Stetsko government. Sheptytsky focused his attention no longer on the Ukraine that already existed, but on the one that was yet to come, "Soborna Ukraina," uniting Eastern and Western Ukrainian lands. There can be little doubt that this broader notion of Ukraine was intimately bound up with the eastward advance of the German armed forces, but it is also clear from the text that Sheptytsky was pinning his hopes exclusively on the future of Ukraine, not on Nazi Germany or the ideology of national socialism. Specifically, the German army was greeted for having routed the Soviet forces, which, Sheptytsky claimed, had "destroyed our economic, educational and cultural life." Beyond that greeting, the discourse centred on an independent Ukraine. With that goal in mind, Metropolitan Sheptytsky called for an end to partisan political schisms and exhorted his people to show the unity, concord and social solidarity that were considered necessary for the reconstruction of the homeland into a "living, organic state." The focus was to be on earnest effort and dedicated work by Ukrainians rather than on empty words and concepts. Thus, the main thrust of the appeal concerned the future and the welfare of a free Ukrainian state; there could be no confusing this with an ideological statement embracing Nazism. In both the cited documents, Metropolitan Sheptytsky laid out the minimal standards of political ethics (just dictates and wise leadership) on which the loyalty of Christian citizens would be predicated. Mindful of Ukrainian political goals, he

Sheptytsky should have singled out and stressed equality without discrimination as a precondition for the church's loyalty to the state.

120. Ibid.

saw submission to the occupation regime and the restoration of order as necessary for consolidation and the realization of those goals.

Given the availability of a wide range of other writings by Metropolitan Sheptytsky during the German period, it is not possible to treat these two documents in isolation and to infer from them a supposedly unchanging position of the Ukrainian Catholic Church throughout that entire three-year period. Sheptytsky's political attitude early in the German period was largely shaped by his favourable view of the end of the Soviet occupation; initially, he saw it as a shift from an illegitimate authority to legitimate rule. Convinced of the need for resistance to Soviet rule, which had curtailed religious freedom, the Metropolitan did not immediately see the need to resist German rule. On the contrary, owing in large part to an overwhelming sense of liberation from the Soviet yoke, he felt that the new situation called for a conciliatory relationship with the new regime. In another statement, dated 10 July 1941, the Metropolitan wrote:

The time that we spent in Bolshevik enslavement may well have developed in many people a revolutionary spirit that was understandable under illegal rule, yet [it becomes] detrimental when there is no longer any need for revolution but only for ordering and consolidating what we can and what we recognize as necessary and beneficial to our future... Let [young people] not forget that behaviour that was justified under the Bolshevik onslaught can be sinful in times when that justification is no longer present.¹²¹

Primarily concerned with overcoming divisions in the Ukrainian community, the Metropolitan called for the restoration and stabilization of order in the new situation, so as to take full advantage of the liberation that had occurred. However, as the euphoria of the liberation was dissipated by new horrors, Metropolitan Sheptytsky revised this accommodationist position, and his subsequent social writings and activity became more critical of German rule.

In order to understand the progression from this initial position to a condemnation of Nazi rule and the conviction that the prospect of a prolonged German occupation was worse even than a potential Soviet return, it is essential to bear in mind that Sheptytsky's initial accommodation was not an embrace of fascism or Nazism, but an open-ended, conditional statement of general Christian civic loyalty that was applicable under any regime. It was open-ended in that it could be modified, or indeed withdrawn, in response to the emerging policy of the regime, and it was conditional in that the Christian duty of civil obedience and loyalty to the state ceased to apply as soon as the dictates of the state were no longer "just" and "wise," that is, when they contravened divine law or

121. Andrei Sheptytsky, "Vid khvyli..." in Mykhailo Khomiak, "Diial'nist' Mytropolyta Kyr Andreia," pp. 294–95.

Christian conscience, or when they discriminated against people because of their religion, race or social class. Although it did not yet constitute a critique of the regime, this conditional component in Sheptytsky's understanding of loyalty to the state nevertheless indicated that, despite the general euphoria of liberation from the Soviets, the Metropolitan still maintained a critical vigilance toward the Germans. Indeed, as the occupation wore on, Sheptytsky's interventions with the civil authorities and statements to the Ukrainian Catholic community showed an ethical assessment of emerging events on their own merit, and a discernment that was unclouded by those first impressions.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's interventions with the German authorities had their basis in his pronouncements of July 1941. Having expressed his conditions for loyalty to the state, he followed up by appealing for the modification of certain policies that seemed to contradict the regime's commitment to uphold Ukrainian political aspirations.¹²²

The Metropolitan's first interventions pertained to the proposed annexation of Eastern Galicia to the Generalgouvernement. When news of this plan reached Ukrainian political circles, Sheptytsky added his name to a statement by the Ukrainian National Council urging the German government to reconsider the decision.¹²³ In the same matter, the Metropolitan wrote to Hitler, Himmler and Ribbentrop: "Our people, who remain completely loyal to the German army and government, would be struck with deep disappointment [by such a move].... The annulment of the [Ukrainian] ideal of statehood would shake their sincere sympathy and trust in the German government..."¹²⁴ Tolerance of German policy by Ukrainians would not go so far as to compromise Ukrainian aspirations to nationhood. After the annexation, which took place on 1 August 1941, the Ukrainian National Council (headed by Sheptytsky) sent a second telegram to the German government, stating that "the annexation of the Galician land to the Cracow Generalgouvernement, that is, to Poland, has generated a feeling of deep

122. Mykhailo Khomiak cites three actions by the German authorities that quickly eroded the hopes Ukrainians had invested in Germany: the arrest of Iaroslav Stetsko (on 8 July), the annexation of Galicia to the Generalgouvernement (on 1 August), and the harsh policy toward Ukrainians in Volhynia. See his "Diial'nist' Mytropolyta Kyr Andreia," pp. 221–22.

123. Telegram from the Ukrainian National Council to Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories Alfred Rosenberg and Foreign Affairs Minister Joachim Ribbentrop [July 1941], in Ilnytzkyj, *Deutschland*, 2: 214. A hand-written Ukrainian version of the text, signed by Metropolitan Sheptytsky, is preserved in TsDIA, f. 408, op. 1t, spr. 53, ark. 53.

124. [Jarosław Nagórski], "Die Tragödie," pp. 9–10.

disappointment and oppression among the entire Ukrainian people.”¹²⁵ The same opposition to the annexation of Galicia was stated again in a January 1942 letter from the Ukrainian National Council to Adolf Hitler, which cited widespread Ukrainian dissatisfaction with German occupation policies in Eastern Ukraine.¹²⁶

125. Memorandum of the Ukrainian National Council to the German government, 14 August 1941, in *PPU*, Document no. 200, p. 312.

126. According to the statement, the annexation of Galicia to the Generalgouvernement undermined “Ukrainian hopes for the eventual unification of this territory with the Ukrainian mainland (z ukrains'kym materykom).” “Brief an Hitler,” in Ilnytzkyj, *Deutschland*, 2: 277. A Ukrainian translation of the document is “Lyst Ukraïns'koï Natsional'noi Rady do Adol'fa Hitlera,” in *Ukraïns'ka suspil'no-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti*, ed. Taras Hunczak and Roman Solchanyk, vol. 3 ([New York and Munich], 1983), pp. 44–47. Ilnytzkyj suggests February 1942 as the date of the letter, but Hunczak and Solchanyk cite an archival reference (Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, Microcopy no. T-454, Roll no. 92, Doc. EAP 99/434) and give the precise date, 14 January 1942. Yet another source erroneously postdates what is apparently the same document to 1943. See the reference to “Epistola ad Adolphum Hitler in nomine Praesidii Consilii Nationalis Ucrainorum cum protestatione contra atrocitates nazistarum germanicorum in Galicia et aliis partibus Ucrainae” in the section “Index Scriptorum” in *Beatificationis et Canonizationis Servi Dei Andreae Szeptyckij Archiepiscopi Leopoltan. Ucrainorum, O. Basilian. (1865–1944). Positio super Scriptis* (Rome, 1980), p. 10.

The letter went on to criticize German policy in Eastern Ukraine: “The Ukrainian public was gripped by great anxiety when, in regions that were liberated from the Bolsheviks, there occurred events that we are witnessing today.... Ukrainians have been deprived of any possibility of cultural and national development, there is interference in the patriotic press, the activities of traditional cultural and educational associations are being prohibited, schools are being shut down, academic institutions are not allowed to do [research], and the professorial ranks, the intellect of the nation, are left without any means of subsistence, much less any chance to carry on their work. Such a state of affairs evokes great disquiet in Ukrainian society regarding the future of the national culture.

The hated Bolshevik system has been pushed out of Ukraine but, on the other hand, the right to private property had not yet been renewed [although] the Ukrainian people struggled for it with persistence and at the cost of great sacrifices. Collective farms, those Bolshevik tools of the subjugation of the Ukrainian peasantry, have been maintained. Such a situation evokes public feelings that do nothing at all to promote either productivity or the organization of work.” “Brief an Hitler,” Ilnytzkyj, *Deutschland*, 2: 276–77.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky allegedly wrote a separate letter to Hitler on the occasion of the fall of Kyiv to the Germans in August 1941. For an English translation, see “Congratulations to the Führer” in *Alliance for Murder: The Ukrainian-Nazi Nationalist Partnership in Genocide*, ed. B. F. Sabrin et al. (New York: Sarpedon, 1991), p. 50. Aside from the expression of support for the struggle against Bolshevism, which the Metropolitan would have supported at that time, the document’s authenticity remains open to question for several reasons. First, there is no mention of Ukrainian concerns over the annexation of Eastern Galicia to the Generalgouvernement, which took place on 1 August

No less significant was the Metropolitan's personal intervention with the German authorities, in particular, his protest of February 1942 to Heinrich Himmler against the use of Ukrainian auxiliary police units to round up Jews for extermination. That letter, which may have been a response to an anti-Jewish pogrom that had occurred shortly before in Rohatyn,¹²⁷ dealt with the killing of Jews and in particular with the use of Ukrainian auxiliary police units as part of those actions. Kost Pankivsky, a member of the Ukrainian National *Rada*, had an opportunity to read the letter, and described its contents as follows:

...the Metropolitan wrote that, not daring to interfere in matters that are being handled by the German civil authorities, as a priest he could not but be concerned about the oppression and shootings of people without trial and about the conduct of the German armed forces and the German police toward the local population, especially the Jews. Therefore he was permitting himself to call attention to this, for he did not know whether these things were actually known in Berlin. As head of the [Ukrainian Catholic] Church and the spiritual leader of his people, he considered it his duty to request that the Ukrainian police, which without exception was formed of his faithful, should not be used in actions against the Jews.¹²⁸

1941, and which was the main reason for appeals to the German authorities signed by the Metropolitan both before and after the event. Secondly, an ambiguous phraseology (in particular, a reference to the "progress of the German nations"), as well as the lack of any mention of Ukrainian statehood and Ukrainian society, or of the key categories of just dictates and wise leadership, is entirely out of character with the Metropolitan's well-established patterns of thinking and expression. Third, any statement of congratulation from the Metropolitan on this occasion would have referred not to an occupation but to a liberation. And finally, the purported document is undated. The cited book is dedicated, among others, to Soviet soldiers "massacred by Ukrainian Nationalists," and an excerpt from Klym Dmytruk's propaganda tract, *Swastika on Soutanes*, on "the role of the Catholic and Orthodox clergy during the Occupation," is translated and cited as a "historical record." The reference given for the purported letter by Sheptytsky is: The Archives of the History of the Communist Party of Ukraine (now renamed Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromads'kykh Ob'iednan' Ukrainy), fond 57, opys 4, spr. 338, ark. 131-32. Although the originals of many other documents are given as photocopies or photographs in the appendices, this one is strangely absent. One can only express dismay whenever the noble enterprise of documenting one of the greatest tragedies of human history is marred by a confusion of sound documentary evidence and Soviet anti-Ukrainian hate propaganda.

127. Rabbi Herzog, cited in Gregor Prokoptschuk, *Der Metropolit: Leben und Wirken des grossen Förderers der Kirchenunion Graf Andreas Scheptytzkyj* (Munich, 1955), p. 230.

128. Kost' Pan'kivs'kyi, *Roky nimets'koï okupatsii*, p. 30. The letter was forwarded from Himmler's office to the Chief of Police (SD) in Lviv, Alfred Kolf, who showed the letter to Pankivsky. Kurt Lewin, a Jewish survivor of the Holocaust who was sheltered in the St. George's Cathedral complex and worked in the Metropolitan's archives in 1943-44, also saw a copy of Sheptytsky's letter to Himmler. Kurt I. Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas

Himmler's office responded to the Metropolitan's letter with a "rude rebuff."¹²⁹ Indeed, such a direct intervention with the German government was unique in its boldness: Sheptytsky later recalled that the answer he received was "insulting, and the German officer who brought me Himmler's reply intimated that, but for my age, I would have been shot for daring to intercede on behalf of the Jews."¹³⁰ Shortly thereafter, apparently as another consequence of Sheptytsky's letter, the Ukrainian National Council was forced to suspend its activities.¹³¹ It is unlikely that the Metropolitan was surprised by such measures, but this incident, which marked a distinct departure from his earlier caution in dealing with the Germans, showed that he was prepared to pay the price of taking a principled stand.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky continued his interventions with the German authorities even after his relations with them had begun to deteriorate (in August 1942). Such ongoing communication proved valuable. For one thing, it enabled the Metropolitan to raise humanitarian issues. When in April 1943 the Capitular Vicar of the Armenian Archdiocese of Lviv, Msgr. Dionizy Kajetanowicz, was imprisoned by the Nazis for issuing false baptismal certificates to Jews, Sheptytsky successfully intervened with the chief of the Gestapo and obtained his release. Aware that the tide of the war was turning after the German defeat at Stalingrad, Sheptytsky interpreted the release as "a sign that the German authorities want a rapprochement with the Church, probably a sign of their weakness and of their apprehension."¹³² As the Soviets continued their

Sheptytsky and the Jewish Community in Galicia during the Second World War," *Unitas* 12, no. 2 (Summer 1960): 138, n. 6. Archimandrite Johannes Peters, a German priest who joined the Ukrainian Catholic Church, claimed that he had drafted the letter for Metropolitan Sheptytsky and personally delivered it to Berlin. Stehle, "Der Lemberger Metropolit," p. 415, n. 39. In spite of these independent accounts, there is no record of the full text of the letter or of its whereabouts.

Another source corroborates Sheptytsky's complaints about the way in which the Ukrainian police was being used. According to Rabbi Kahana, the Metropolitan said: "These young Ukrainians volunteered to fight Communists, but instead of deploying them at the front, the Nazis are forcing them to participate in massacres of helpless Jews." Leo Heiman, "The Rabbi Who May Make a Saint: The Forgotten Epic of Count Sheptytsky," *Jewish Digest* (January 1963): 9.

129. Rabbi Dr. David Kahana, cited in Philip Friedman, *Their Brothers' Keepers* (New York, 1957), p. 135. Kurt Lewin also saw the reply, which apparently advised the Metropolitan "not to meddle in affairs which did not concern him." Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas," p. 138, n. 6.

130. Sheptytsky, quoted by Rabbi Dr. David Kahana, in Leo Heiman, "They Saved Jews: Ukrainian Patriots Defied Nazis," *Ukrainian Quarterly* 17, no. 4 (1961): 327.

131. Pan'kivs'kyi, *Roky*, p. 30.

132. Metropolitan Sheptytsky to Cardinal Tisserant, 8 May 1943, in *ADSS-2*, p. 791. See

westward advance, another humanitarian concern was that of securing the release of Ukrainian Catholic priests who were being held in German prisons; the Metropolitan feared that “the revolution that is coming will probably not be a liberation, but certain death for prisoners.” In May 1943, he therefore undertook efforts to have those prisoners freed.¹³³

Other communications between the church and the occupying authorities were initiated by the Germans themselves: at the beginning of their occupation of Galicia, the Germans sought to consolidate their power in a variety of ways. Knowing that Metropolitan Sheptytsky was a respected figure in Ukrainian society, they solicited his endorsement of their administrative directives to the public. Sheptytsky’s response was either to decline such support or to give only nominal endorsement, stating clearly that he was being ordered to do so. On 19 July 1941, the German Agricultural Commission wrote to the Metropolitan requesting that he give his backing to a call for dedicated work by Ukrainian peasants.¹³⁴ When he did so on 25 July, it was in the form of a separate introduction to the official statement; in his introduction, Sheptytsky twice indicated that the statement was that of the German Agricultural Commission (i.e., not his).¹³⁵ Thus, even in the early days of the occupation, when the Metropolitan still saw the German presence as primarily a liberation from Soviet rule,¹³⁶ he was reluctant to give even a minimum of unqualified support to the regime. It was by keeping such a critical distance that he could protest against Nazi executions to SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Ludwig Losacker and to Galician district Governor Karl Lasch when they paid him an official visit in late 1941.¹³⁷

Sheptytsky displayed the same critical caution in the latter part of the Nazi occupation. In 1943, he was approached by the Lviv Sicherheitsdienst’s man

also M. Sopuliak, “Pamiati Velykoho Mytropolyta (zhmut spohadiv),” *Svityl'nyk Istyny*, vol. 3 (Toronto and Chicago, 1983), p. 448.

133. Metropolitan Sheptytsky to Cardinal Tisserant, 8 May 1943, in *ADSS-2*, p. 791.

134. Letter of 19 July 1941 from the German Agricultural Commission to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, TsDIA, f. 201, op. 4–b, spr. 2665, ark. 28–29. Reprinted in *PPU*, Document no. 147, pp. 304–5.

135. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky (Introductory statement to an appeal of the German Agricultural Commission) (“Komanda nimets'koï armii...”), in *PPU*, Document no. 199, p. 310. See also Sopuliak, “Pamiati,” p. 445.

136. In the above-mentioned introduction to the appeal of the German Agricultural Commission, Metropolitan Sheptytsky wrote: “We must obviously help the German army as much as possible, for it is to it that we owe our liberation from the Bolshevik yoke. For our own good, and for the good of our state, we must submit to the just requirements and dictates of the German military authority.” *PPU*, p. 310.

137. Stehle, “Der Lemberger Metropolit,” p. 416.

responsible for religious affairs, Hauptsturmführer Herbert Knorr. Knorr wanted to write to the Apostolic Visitor for Ukrainian Catholics in Germany, Petro Verhun, concerning the organization of a pastoral ministry for Ukrainian workers there. He asked Sheptytsky for a letter of introduction and Sheptytsky provided it, but indicated that he was writing in response to “the local German government” and at the request of Knorr.¹³⁸ Thus, the Metropolitan took special pains to steer clear of even the appearance of a tacit endorsement of German policy.

A second aspect of Sheptytsky’s emerging critique consisted of exhortations to the Ukrainian Catholic community. The Metropolitan himself listed these interventions; they included protests and pastoral letters condemning occurrences of violence, a declaration that homicide was an offence punishable by excommunication, and a warning to young Ukrainians not to enroll in the militia, “in which they could be scandalized.”¹³⁹

The recruitment of Ukrainians to militia units was a serious problem from the very beginning of the occupation. Sheptytsky addressed it promptly on 10 July 1941 with a warning about those who might try to incite actions contrary to conscience and to divine law.¹⁴⁰ Shortly thereafter, in his first letter to Hitler on 22 July 1941, Sheptytsky isolated the militant wing of the Ukrainian nationalist movement by affirming that the Ukrainian public “condemned the spontaneous behaviour of one faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.”¹⁴¹ And, appealing to the Ukrainian people in his June 1942 pastoral letter *On Christian Mercy*, the Metropolitan directly condemned those who had participated in the killing of innocent people:

138. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky’s letter to Msgr. Petro Verhun, 17 February 1943 (“Tuteshnyi nimets'kyi uriad...”), in *PPU*, Document no. 231, p. 346.

139. Metropolitan Sheptytsky to Pope Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in *ADSS-2*, pp. 627–28. The excommunication measure was mentioned in “Pro myloserdia,” in *03-69*, p. 180, par. 50. In a letter of 3 September 1942 to Cardinal Tisserant, Metropolitan Sheptytsky repeated that he had tried to dissuade Ukrainian youth from joining German police and militia units. See Eugène Tisserant, *L’Eglise militante* (Paris, 1950), p. 14. It appears that the reference may have been to the pastoral letter “Pro orhanizatsiiu parokhiï i hromady” of 10 July 1941. See the full references to this document in n. 140.

140. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro orhanizatsiiu parokhiï i hromady” (“Vid khvyli...”), pastoral letter of 10 July 1941, separate fragments of which are reprinted in Khomiak, “Diial'nist' Mytropolyta Kyr Andreia,” pp. 294–95; in *PPU*, Document no. 195, pp. 302–4; and in S. T. Danylenko, *Dorohoiu han'by i zrady (istorychna khronika)* (Kyiv, 1970), pp. 218–19.

141. [Nagórski], “Die Tragödie,” pp. 9–10.

With a heavy heart and with fear for the future of our people I see that in many communities there are people whose souls and hands are stained with the innocent blood of their neighbours.... It is only by a long and difficult path that people who are stained by mortal sin and who have lost the innocence of baptism can return into [a state of] divine grace. Even when they have converted and have purified their souls with bitter tears of penitence and with the sacrament of penance, for a long time they will still probably have [to continue] to return to divine grace through a life of Christian righteousness and sincere, persistent Christian prayer...¹⁴²

The turning point, from critique to resistance, seems to have come some time after the letter of February 1942 to Himmler. When it became clear that the letter had had no impact other than to bring on the forcible suspension of the National Council's work,¹⁴³ and when Sheptytsky's repeated requests that the authorities restore order in (i.e., return) the small farms of the rural rectories that the Soviets had confiscated proved to be of no avail,¹⁴⁴ the Metropolitan began to mobilize a Christian opposition.

142. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro myloserdia," in 03-69, p. 181, par. 53. A somewhat similar statement, attributed to Sheptytsky by Rabbi David Kahana, apparently included the following passage: "...unfortunately, some Ukrainian communities contain a number of sinful people whose hands are covered with innocent Jewish blood. These people are not representative of the Ukrainian nation. They are criminals without any nation. They are doomed to suffer in hell for eternity." Heiman, "They Saved Jews," p. 327. Such a document, however, is neither known nor discussed in the literature to date and, but for the specific date that Kahana attached to it (19 August 1942), it seems that Kahana may have been paraphrasing the pastoral of June 1942 on the basis of his personal recollection. Kahana knew, moreover, that under the Nazi occupation such statements could only be made without any specific mention of the Jews; despite that, "the people understood the message in its entirety." Heiman, *ibid.*

143. That the regime had no intention of changing its policy was evident from the "rude rebuff" that the Metropolitan reportedly received in reply to his protests. Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas," p. 138, n. 6.; Pan'kivs'kyi, *Roky*, p. 30; and Stehle, "Der Lemberger Metropolit," p. 416.

Nor were militia recruits sought exclusively among Ukrainians. According to one contemporary observer, a Jewish militia unit was also formed to assist in the roundup of people for labour: "The Jewish Council (Judenrat) was given powers that in reality were a destructive burden. Immediately in August [1941], when [the Generalgouvernement] disbanded the Ukrainian militia, it formed a militia of the Jewish Council and gave it the most disagreeable task, which had previously been forced upon the Ukrainian militia—namely, to fulfill the requirements of all sorts of German military, police and civilian stations. First and foremost, it was a matter of [providing] labour. The militiaman was required to deliver a quota of workers and, in order to do so, he would go from house to house and drag people out by force." Pan'kivs'kyi, *Roky*, p. 64.

144. Metropolitan Sheptytsky to Pope Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in ADSS-2, p. 627.

With due regard to the possible consequences, the Metropolitan's decisive break with the occupying regime was expressed in a private letter to Pope Pius XII. In August 1942, Sheptytsky wrote his first situation report to the Vatican on the German occupation of Galicia and said:

Having been liberated from the Bolshevik yoke by the German army, we felt a certain relief, which nevertheless did not last longer than a month or two. Little by little, the government instituted a truly incredible reign of terror and corruption that becomes heavier and less tolerable every day. Today the whole country agrees that the German regime is, perhaps even more than the Bolshevik regime, evil and almost diabolical....¹⁴⁵

A few days later, on 3 September, he reaffirmed this stand in a letter to Cardinal Tisserant, in which he stated that the policies of the Soviet and German occupations were similar in their brutality.¹⁴⁶

The impact of Sheptytsky's critical stand toward the German regime is difficult to assess. Public disaffection with the Nazis grew over time. The earliest Ukrainian resistance to Nazism was likely that of ideologically motivated Ukrainian communists, but as the German occupation wore on, the resistance became more broadly based. Ukrainian Catholic priests reported to their bishops about difficulties encountered in collecting state-imposed quotas (*kontyngenty*) and revealed that many young people were defying the Nazi deportation order for work in Germany and instead were joining the anti-Nazi underground.¹⁴⁷ Ukrainian nationalists, some of whom had been persecuted by the Nazis, also formed their own resistance movements. While it is quite possible that many of these people were Ukrainian Catholics motivated to some degree by the Metropolitan's pronouncements, a much more thoroughgoing historical reconstruction of this period is required before the social impact of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's critique can be gauged with any accuracy. What is clear, however, is that Sheptytsky's teaching and activity began to have a more readily discernible social impact after he had shifted toward resistance, and it is to that final phase that we now turn.

The Nazi takeover of Western Ukraine (30 June 1941) opened the grimmest chapter in the history of Galician Jewry. In the capital city of Lviv alone, German military units killed an estimated 4,000 Jews during the first week of the occupation, and another 2,000 in the last days of July.¹⁴⁸ Incited by the

145. Ibid., pp. 628–29.

146. Metropolitan Sheptytsky to Cardinal Tisserant, 3 September 1942, quoted in Tisserant, *L'Eglise militante*, p. 14.

147. Edward Prus, "Cerkiew Greckokatolicka w okresie wojny," p. 82, n. 100.

148. Shimon Redlich, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews during World War II," in *Life and*

Germans, anti-Jewish riots erupted, with local people rampaging in mobs and killing Jews.¹⁴⁹ In the ensuing months, Jews were systematically rounded up, segregated in ghettos and sent to labour camps.¹⁵⁰ At the same time, sheltering Jews was proclaimed a criminal offence punishable by death.¹⁵¹ In March 1942, deportations of Jews to Belzec and other death camps began;¹⁵² the deportation action was carried on for a full year, reaching a climax in August 1942, when an estimated 50,000 Jews were moved out within a four-day period.¹⁵³ The very process of rounding up and deporting Jews also involved their indiscriminate killing. August 1942 was a turning point: although the final “Judenrein” action, during which the ghettos and labour camps were destroyed, would only occur in the summer of 1943,¹⁵⁴ by late 1942 it had become “clear that it was no longer a question of sporadic killings, but of sheer genocide of the Jewish people.”¹⁵⁵ By the time the Germans finally withdrew, the population statistics bore out those fears: of an estimated 870,000 Jews who had lived in Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia and Volhynia) in July 1941, only 17,000 (about 2%) remained after the Nazi withdrawal in 1944.¹⁵⁶

Metropolitan Sheptytsky took action to save Jews, responding to developments as they were brought to his attention. In his pastoral letter of 1 July 1941, on the day after the Nazi takeover, the Metropolitan had urged the newly established Ukrainian government to ensure the safety and well-being of all, “regardless of religion, nationality and social status.”¹⁵⁷ When anti-Jewish

Times, p. 153.

149. Lewin, “Archbishop Andreas,” pp. 136–37; Aharon Weiss, “Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Western Ukraine during the Holocaust,” *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton, 1988), p. 412; Heiman, “They Saved Jews,” p. 326.

150. Weiss, “Jewish-Ukrainian Relations,” p. 415; see also Heiman, “They Saved Jews,” p. 326.

151. Lewin, “Archbishop Andreas,” p. 139.

152. Weiss, “Jewish-Ukrainian Relations,” p. 415.

153. Redlich, “Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews,” p. 154.

154. Redlich, “Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews,” pp. 153, 156; Weiss, “Jewish-Ukrainian Relations,” p. 415.

155. Weiss, “Jewish-Ukrainian relations,” p. 415. See also Lewin, “Archbishop Andreas,” p. 139.

156. The estimates are given in Weiss, “Jewish-Ukrainian Relations,” p. 409. See also n. 23 above.

157. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Z voli vsemohuchoho...zachalasia...,” 1 July 1941, p. 112.

One Jewish source that links this early statement to Sheptytsky's subsequent activity of saving Jewish lives is “Holocaust: Churches outside Germany,” *Encyclopedia Judaica*, ed. Cecil Roth and Geoffrey Wigoder (Jerusalem, 1972), 8: 875.

violence broke out in the days that followed, Rabbi Dr. Ezechiel Lewin asked Sheptytsky to intervene with the rioting mob. The Metropolitan offered sanctuary to Dr. Lewin and, shortly afterwards, issued a pastoral letter in which he called on his priests to remind young people that

...no human considerations and no statements that may be issued can justify a sin against a divine commandment.... There may come a time when you young people will be advised to behave in a way that is contrary to your conscience and contrary to the law of God. At such times, always act as Christians, faithful and obedient to the law of God.¹⁵⁸

It may have been partly as a result of this statement that a number of Ukrainian Catholic priests did in fact intervene with the rioting mobs and thereby prevented some massacres of Jews.¹⁵⁹ Similarly, Sheptytsky's well-known protest in February 1942 against the use of Ukrainian auxiliary police units in carrying out massacres was sent to SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler shortly after a massacre had occurred in Rohatyn, and, as noted earlier, may well have been a reaction to it.¹⁶⁰

This shift in Sheptytsky's activity and attitude from critique and protest to resistance began to occur in the summer of 1942, as the Nazi operation to deport Jews was moving toward its peak (20–23 August). Since the true intentions of Nazi policy toward the Jews were already becoming evident before August, Sheptytsky made a clear commitment to save Jews and to exhort his clergy and faithful to do the same. In his pastoral letter *On Christian Mercy* (June 1942), he linked the Christian duty of fraternal love with the sanctity of human life, which in the context meant providing, even at grave personal risk, sanctuary for those whose lives were in danger. Then, in the last days of August 1942, he wrote a detailed situation report to the Vatican, detailing the wholesale massacre of Jews that was taking place.¹⁶¹ What had occurred specifically between 20 and 23 August was a massive deportation of Jews from the Lviv ghetto into death camps, involving an estimated 50,000 people.¹⁶² Within the week, Sheptytsky responded with a condemnation of the Nazi system and the German occupation of Galicia: "Today the whole country agrees that the German regime is, perhaps even more than the Bolshevik regime, evil and almost diabolical."¹⁶³ And in a letter to Cardinal Tisserant, Sheptytsky wrote, "the

158. Andrei Sheptytsky, "Vid khvyli...", pastoral dated 10 July 1941, in Khomiak, "Diial'nist' Mytropolyta Kyr Andreia," p. 295.

159. Weiss, "Jewish-Ukrainian Relations," p. 414.

160. Friedman, *Their Brothers' Keepers*, p. 134.

161. Metropolitan Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in ADSS-2, pp. 625–29.

162. Redlich, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews," p. 154.

163. Metropolitan Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29–31 August 1942, in ADSS-2, p. 625.

terror is growing. In the last two months, more than 70,000 Jews have been executed in Lviv without trial.”¹⁶⁴

Despite the risks involved in openly opposing the regime and in calling upon Ukrainians to defy the law against protecting Jews, Sheptytsky's interventions were not limited merely to statements. In the late summer of 1942 he put into place a coordinated campaign to save Jews.¹⁶⁵ The operation provided a safe passage for Jews, primarily those who had managed to escape from the Lviv ghetto and from the Ianiv concentration camp in Lviv.¹⁶⁶ It also responded to specific requests coming to the Metropolitan from the Jewish community. Thus, for example, after Rabbi Dr. David Kahana had met with Sheptytsky on 14 August 1942 to discuss the situation and needs of the Jews, 200 Jewish children were “smuggled to one or another monastery, concealed in the crypt, given false certificates of baptism, Ukrainian-sounding names, and were dispersed throughout the convent schools and orphanages in and around Lviv. All of them survived the Nazi occupation and the war.”¹⁶⁷

In November 1942, Sheptytsky issued what is perhaps his best-known pastoral letter of the entire period, *Thou Shalt Not Kill*. In it, he condemned the various forms of murder that had swept through the land, including political assassination, fratricide and suicide. The pastoral letter made no explicit mention of the extermination of Jews, but the timing of this forceful statement on the sanctity of human life left no room for doubt that it condemned the policy of genocide, as well as the other forms of homicide. Grounding the protection of human life in its biblical sources, both the Decalogue and the law of love, Sheptytsky addressed the problem of homicide at the level of universal values of the human community; and the most sacred of those values was that of human life.¹⁶⁸ The scope of the biblical prohibition of homicide and the teaching on

164. Metropolitan Sheptytsky to Cardinal Tisserant, 28 December 1942, p. 1.

165. According to Itzhak (Kurt) Lewin, cited in Friedman, *Their Brothers' Keepers*, p. 135, this followed a visit by his father, Rabbi Ezechiel Lewin, to Sheptytsky. According to Kurt Lewin, “the Metropolitan now embarked on a positive campaign to save and shelter individual Jews; those whom he knew, and total strangers, adults and children, in fact any Jew whom he could help.” Lewin, “Archbishop Andreas,” pp. 138–39.

166. Redlich, “Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews,” p. 156. One such case was Rabbi Kahana, who escaped from the Ianiv camp in the winter of 1942–43 and was hidden in the Metropolitan's residence. On this, see Kahana's account in Heiman, “They Saved Jews,” p. 330.

167. Rabbi Kahana, cited in Heiman, “They Saved Jews,” p. 328. Fifteen children and several Jewish adults were hidden at Sheptytsky's residence. On these and other Jews who were saved, see Luzhnyts'kyi, *Ukrains'ka Tserkva mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom*, p. 688, n. 384; and Friedman, *Their Brothers' Keepers*, p. 134.

168. “Ne ubyi,” in 03–69, p. 224. This discussion of the fifth commandment of the

love went beyond the bounds of the Christian community for, as Sheptytsky reminded his readers, “real love includes all one’s neighbours,” and the manifestation of fraternal love in opposition to homicide was a duty that extended “to every person by virtue of their human nature.”¹⁶⁹ Metropolitan Sheptytsky again chose an indirect way of making his point, yet the document’s underlying message was readily understood by Jewish and Ukrainian readers alike.¹⁷⁰

In order to keep abreast of the plight of the Jewish people, Sheptytsky relied on a steady and reliable flow of information from the ghettos. He appointed Rev. Ivan Kotiv to maintain contact with the Jewish community and to report back to him on daily life in the ghettos: the amount of rations allotted, the condition of

biblical decalogue proceeded from the deliberations of the wartime sobors of the Lviv Archeparchy, which set out to analyze the contextual significance of each of the commandments, and did so in chronological order.

169. Ibid., pp. 224–25.

170. The acceptance by Jewish scholars and Holocaust survivors that “Ne ubyi” implicitly referred to the massacres of Jews is significant: it lends strong support to the view that this was how the document was understood in 1942, when it first appeared. Kurt Lewin describes the pastoral letter as self-evidently referring to the situation of the Jews and as exhorting Ukrainians to avoid even an indirect role in the exterminations (“Archbishop Andreas,” p. 137). Aharon Weiss agrees, saying it was clear that the document referred to the crimes being perpetrated against the Jews (“Jewish-Ukrainian Relations,” p. 417). Shimon Redlich points out that, although the document contains no explicit mention of the Jews, “it is quite clear that [Sheptytsky] intended to warn Ukrainians not to participate in Nazi anti-Jewish activity” (“Sheptytsky and the Jews,” *Jerusalem Post Magazine*, 13 December 1985). Redlich has also observed, “The fact that Sheptytsky gave a copy of this letter to Rabbi Kahana in 1943, when the latter was hiding in the Metropolitan’s quarters, indicates that Sheptytsky himself considered it also as a Jewish-related appeal.” See his “Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews during World War II,” in *Life and Times*, p. 155.

Other inferences have been made on the basis of the timing of the letter. Since in 1942 Ukrainian-Polish fratricidal acts had not yet attained the large scale that they did in 1943, and since the mass murder of Jews was already taking place in 1942, the pastoral “Ne ubyi” could only have referred to this earlier phenomenon, without, however, naming it specifically, since the threats of confiscation, censorship and reprisals were very real. Ryszard Torzecki, cited in Redlich, “Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews,” p. 161, n. 52.

Nor was the pastoral letter’s critical import overlooked by the Germans. The Gestapo held the document for months before allowing it to be printed; later, it was again seized and censored. See Stehle, “Der Lemberger Metropolit,” p. 420, n. 55.

Ukrainian perceptions are more difficult to determine. Some survivor recollections appear to suggest that the document was considered exceptionally significant, if not the single most significant document that Sheptytsky ever penned, and that it referred specifically to the extermination of the Jews. However, it is not yet possible to reconstruct a reliable picture of contemporary Ukrainian assessments of this document.

children and of the sick, and so on.¹⁷¹ Another contact person between the Jewish ghetto and the Ukrainian Catholic Church at this time was the wife of Rabbi Dr. David Kahana. Using forged documents, she was able to pose as a Ukrainian and move about freely in Lviv, avoiding capture for two years.¹⁷²

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's efforts to save Jews extended beyond the walls of St. George's Cathedral and the Archbishop's residence. After having been informed of the situation of the Jews, he organized a network of trusted individuals who were involved in clandestine rescue and sanctuary operations.¹⁷³ Primarily, these were clerics: individual parish priests took part in these operations, as did monastic communities, such as the Studite monks, led by their hegumen, Metropolitan Andrei's brother Klymentii.¹⁷⁴ A special network was set up within the existing structure of the church to protect, shelter and ensure safe passage for Jews across the border. Escape routes were established to smuggle Jews out into Hungarian Carpatho-Ukraine.¹⁷⁵ The crucial role of this monastic initiative, as well as the courage it required, has been noted by Holocaust survivor Kurt Lewin:

This labour of saving Jews was possible only because of the cooperation of a small army of monks and nuns together with some secular priests. They gathered the Jews into their monasteries and convents, orphanages and hospitals, shared their bread with the fugitives, and acted as escorts with total disregard for the danger of Jewish company.¹⁷⁶

One of the key participants in this undertaking was the Studite superior, Father Marko Stek, who oversaw the issuing of Ukrainian identity documents to Jews and coordinated the escort of fugitives into monasteries.¹⁷⁷

171. Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas," p. 138.

172. Rabbi Kahana, cited in Heiman, "They Saved Jews," p. 328.

173. On the network, see Redlich, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews," p. 156; Yehuda Bauer, *A History of the Holocaust* (New York, 1982), p. 286. According to Bauer, Sheptytsky "ordered his clergy to save Jews."

174. Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas," p. 139.

175. "Groups of Jews, mostly men who could not hide in Ukrainian convents, were guided by Ukrainian monks from monastery to monastery. They then crossed the mountains by a secret path winding its way among unguarded ridges, and contacted representatives of Jewish underground movements." Rabbi Kahana, quoted in Heiman, "They Saved Jews," p. 329. According to Kahana, prior to the summer of 1944, there were no massacres of Jews in Hungary, and so that country was considered a haven in 1942 and 1943. An alternative escape route was into Romania.

176. Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas," p. 140.

177. Ibid. The rescue operation is also mentioned in Redlich, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews," p. 156. Lewin also singled out the work of three other Studites, the Reverends Nykanor, Tyt and Herman. Nykanor, the superior of the Studite monastery of St. Josaphat in Lviv,

Complementing the work of the monks, other sectors of the church also became instrumental in saving Jews. Ukrainian Catholic women's religious orders cared for Jewish girls and women,¹⁷⁸ while significant numbers of secular priests also participated in the efforts to save Jews. When the Nazis began to round up, segregate and deport Jews to labour and death camps, Ukrainian Catholic priests did what they could to save them. Contravening the Nazi ban on the baptism of Jews, many issued fake baptismal certificates and falsified parish records to show Ukrainian Catholic ancestry.¹⁷⁹ With such documents, these ethnically "naturalized" Ukrainians could then apply to the civil registry office for Ukrainian identification cards, ration tickets, domicile permits and other necessary documents.¹⁸⁰ A good indication of the scope of involvement by the lay clergy in this work was given by Rabbi Kahana, who drew up a list of more than 240 Ukrainian Catholic priests who risked their lives either in this way or by hiding Jews, adding that the list was not exhaustive.¹⁸¹

a man who had spent a year and a half in a German prison, took in two Jews in the autumn of 1943, Rabbi Dr. David Kahana and Kurt Lewin. Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas," p. 141.

178. In this activity, leading roles were played by the Studite Superior Iosefa and the Basilian Superior Monika. Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas," p. 141.

179. Rev. Omelian Kovch, pastor in Peremyshliany, was convicted of that offence. He was incarcerated for almost a year in the Łacki Gestapo prison in Lviv, and then was transferred to Auschwitz, whence he never returned. "Testimony by Dr. Volodymyr Bemko," in *Ukrainians and Jews: A Symposium* (New York, 1966), p. 124. Rev. Kovch's activity and fate did not pass unnoticed in pro-Soviet circles. On this, see the text of a leaflet, c. April 1944, of the partisan group Vyzvolennia Vitchyzny, in *PPU*, Document no. 244, p. 362: "We do not affirm that all priests are like those we have mentioned. There are also those, though they are far less numerous, who did not commit such indecencies. The priest of Peremyshl[iany], Omelian Kovch, may be mentioned as an example.... Rev. Kovch was imprisoned and later sent to a death camp, where he has been close to death for over a year, for having tried to help save [Jewish] people by baptizing them."

180. Heiman, "They Saved Jews," p. 328; idem, "The Rabbi Who May Make a Saint," p. 10.

181. Heiman, "They Saved Jews," p. 331; idem, "The Rabbi Who May Make a Saint," p. 12; and Turchyn, "The Ukrainian Catholic Church," p. 66. Individual priests who saved Jews are occasionally named in the literature: Rev. Pobereiko, pastor at Briukhovychi, who sheltered Jewish children (Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas," p. 141); Rev. Shevchuk (Luzhnyts'kyi, *Ukrains'ka Tserkva mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom*, p. 688, n. 354); Rev. Marko (Heiman, "They Saved Jews," p. 331); Rev. Stepan Bachynsky, pastor at Berezhany, who issued baptism certificates to Jewish children ("Testimony by Dr. Volodymyr Bemko," in *Ukrainians and Jews: A Symposium*, p. 124). Similarly, "In the basement of a shoe shop in Lviv run by the Studites, Brother Theodosii took care of 16 Jews whom the Metropolitan was hiding" (Turchyn, "The Ukrainian Catholic Church,"

In addition to calling for the participation of priests and monks in these activities, Metropolitan Sheptytsky directed lay brotherhoods (parish-level organizations) to take up the task of saving lives.¹⁸² The Ukrainian population at large also provided instances of heroism,¹⁸³ and it is quite possible that many were inspired by Metropolitan Sheptytsky's example.

Following the destruction of the Lviv ghetto in the summer of 1943, Sheptytsky remained in touch with fugitive Jews,¹⁸⁴ and, after the Soviet reoccupation in July 1944, he saw to it that all the Jewish children who had been hidden by the Ukrainian Catholic Church were returned to the Jewish Committee in Lviv,¹⁸⁵ and that the same committee was provided with all the necessary supplies (food and clothing) to help the survivors begin to rebuild their lives.¹⁸⁶ The illegal Ukrainian Catholic operation to save Jews thus spanned a full two years, from the summer of 1942 to the end of the Nazi occupation in July 1944.¹⁸⁷

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's written interventions, both protests to the government and appeals to the people, were instances of political praxis. They were not merely theoretical pronouncements of a teaching whose implementation would be left up to the individual conscience, but urgent exhortations and reminders of the difficult duties that the Christian faith imposed upon ordinary people in those extraordinary times. Indeed, they were integral to the rescue operations to which the church had committed itself. As public pronouncements subject to censorship and confiscation by the Nazi authorities, they entailed considerable risk, since they were intended to mobilize the Christian community

p. 66). The pastor of Rivne in Volhynia, Rev. Havryliuk, who was hanged in 1943 by the Gestapo for having aided Jews, is mentioned in "Testimony by Dr. Volodymyr Bemko," p. 126. See also references to Rev. Kovch in n. 178 above.

182. "U vazhkii khvylyni...", 10 August 1943, par. 9.

183. Ivan Solovei, a Ukrainian farmer, hid an entire Jewish family in his barn. Heiman, "They Saved Jews," p. 332; other Ukrainians in charge of the city's sewer-pipe network hid four Jewish families in the sewers, supplying them with food stolen from the market (ibid.); Omelian Masliak, director of the Lviv municipal library, hid eight Jews in the library and later in his home (ibid., p. 331); and in the Peremyshliany area, forest rangers cooperated with the monks of a nearby monastery to hide a reported 1,700 Jews. Weiss, "Jewish-Ukrainian Relations," p. 417. In Lviv, Vasyl Diakiv, a notary, was shot for issuing a [false identity] certificate to a Jew, and the Ukrainian Committee (Ukraïns'kyi Kraïevyi Komitet) also issued Ukrainian-identity documents to Jews. Pan'kivs'kyi, *Roky*, p. 73.

184. Rabbi Kahana's wife continued as a contact between the Jewish community and the church for another year. Heiman, "They Saved Jews," p. 328.

185. Luzhnyts'kyi, *Ukraïns'ka Tserkva mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom*, p. 688, n. 384.

186. Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas," p. 142.

187. Ibid., p. 140.

to disobey the law. The timing of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's interventions and initiatives on behalf of Jews further indicates that they were concrete ethical responses to specific events in their historical context. And it is significant that all of the Metropolitan's interventions cited here were made long before the final destruction of the Jewish ghetto of Lviv in June 1943.¹⁸⁸

Estimates of the numbers of Jews who were saved as a result of these efforts range from hundreds to thousands.¹⁸⁹ In his capacity as leader of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, the Metropolitan took up the struggle in the name of the Christian faith and urged his people to do likewise, even at the risk of their lives. Even though sheltering Jews was an offence punishable by death, Metropolitan Sheptytsky actively disobeyed that regulation in the name of Christian duty and called upon his people to commit the "crime" of resisting the Nazi regime's policy of extermination.

Central to Sheptytsky's articulation of a contextual ethic during the Nazi occupation was the changing relationship between the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the civil authorities. The two primary ethical principles governing church-state relations—just dictates (adherence to divine law) and wise leadership (equal treatment of all without discrimination)—remained operative in the Metropolitan's teaching and praxis throughout the three-year period of Nazi occupation. As the German occupation authorities began to violate both those principles, Metropolitan Sheptytsky stepped up his opposition to the extent of launching clandestine resistance in the form of rescue operations and reminding the Ukrainian Catholic faithful of the duties entailed by the Christian teachings on charity and the sanctity of human life.

Inasmuch as the fundamental principles were intended to be universally applicable, they did not spell out an a priori stand on relations between the church and the civil order. Rather, they were conditional and open-ended, leaving the church with a variety of possible positions to adopt and allowing it to interpret the unfolding events ethically on the basis of those principles. During

188. Redlich, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews during World War II," pp. 153, 156.

189. Petro Mirchuk suggested that thousands were saved (cited in Redlich, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews," p. 147, n. 10); an estimate of several hundred is given in Walter Dushnyck, "Soviet Attack on Judaism," in *Ukrainians and Jews: A Symposium*, p. 158, and in Luzhnyts'kyi, *Ukrains'ka Tserkva mizh Skhodom i Zakhodom*, p. 688, n. 384. Statistics on clerical deaths during the Nazi period are scant, and we do not have indications as to how many of those who helped to save Jews were caught. According to Kurt Lewin, all the Jews who were sheltered by Metropolitan Sheptytsky survived the war. Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas," p. 141. More detailed research into the history of the Holocaust in Galicia is required before definitive answers to these important questions can be given.

the Nazi occupation, that process of ethical discernment took Metropolitan Sheptytsky from a position of qualified accommodation to outright opposition. The crucial role of the open-ended principles permits an understanding of what was perhaps most surprising about Sheptytsky's shift of attitude, namely, that it also involved the gradual erosion and eventual collapse of Sheptytsky's critique of the Soviet regime, which was centred on the church's demand for religious liberty. It was only a matter of time before Sheptytsky's relief relating to the Soviet withdrawal wore off and, as one author has noted, the Metropolitan began to speak of the German occupation "in the same terms" as he had used to describe the Soviet occupation.¹⁹⁰ Eventually, the violence became so rampant as to convince Sheptytsky that even a Soviet return was preferable. Thus the Germans, initially greeted as liberators from an atheistic system that had curtailed religious liberty, came to pose an even greater ethical problem for the church than had the Soviet occupation. Their wanton destruction of human life precluded all possibility of continuing the conciliatory line, which had proceeded from gratitude for the liberation. Having broken decisively with the system that stood for the extermination of human life, Sheptytsky made what was certainly one of the most difficult ethical choices of his life: to view the restriction of religious liberties that was certain to follow a Soviet return as the lesser evil.

Two key values to which Sheptytsky referred at this time—human life and private property—informed his critical stance toward both the German regime and Ukrainian society. In the face of Nazi policy, the Metropolitan repeatedly affirmed the Christian principle of respect for human life and called for the restoration of properties confiscated by the Soviets. Similarly, he warned Ukrainians against participating in Nazi-coordinated roundups and killings, urging instead the heroic rescue of the persecuted Jews. In such drastic circumstances, it was clear to him that, as an ethical principle, the protection of human life overrode even the church's differences with the socialists over private property and with the Soviets over religious liberty.

Nor was the primacy of Christian charity in Sheptytsky's ethical thought evident only in the social teaching and praxis that he developed in response to the German occupation. In view of the Ukrainian goal of independent statehood, the Metropolitan appealed for social and religious solidarity, and in doing so he introduced a criterion of ethical discernment based on the Christian law of love. For, whether in the socio-political or the religious-ecclesiastical sphere, the historical quest for unification was either promoted by centripetal forces (love-unity-obedient submission) or impeded by centrifugal forces (hatred-egoism-rebellion). The Christian ethical option was necessarily grounded in love, and therefore it always favoured unification. For Metropolitan Sheptytsky, it provided

190. [Pierre Blet et al.], "Introduction," in *ADSS-I*, p. 26.

a moral standard by which the meaning of historical events could be discerned and according to which progress toward unity could be ethically assessed.

Conclusions

In his ethical responses to issues in the socio-political sphere, Metropolitan Sheptytsky developed two parallel lines of thought, the first focusing on relations between the Church, both as institution and as Christian community, and society, and the second centred on the political realm, in particular, church-state relations.

The Social Mission of the Church

In defining the social mission of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the two central issues that Metropolitan Sheptytsky faced were Ukrainian nationalism and socialism/communism. His responses involved the articulation of creative alternatives to the atheistic variants of both trends, alternatives grounded in the fundamental Christian principle of love. This insight permits a critical reassessment of the Metropolitan's allegedly militant nationalism and anti-communism.

Ukrainian-Polish relations in Austrian Galicia were the first training ground for the Metropolitan's ethical reflection on the issue of patriotism. At the end of the nineteenth century, Ukrainian national sentiments were present not only on the political scene but within the church as well, where Russophile and Ukrainophile factionalism divided the clergy. Individual outbreaks of ethnic violence were widely understood as symptoms of social, economic and political unrest. In condemning the assassination of Viceroy Potocki in 1908, Metropolitan Sheptytsky revealed his grasp of and concern about the social dimension of that event: it was not only the crime itself that he found morally abhorrent, but also the debasing redefinition of the word "patriotism" by those who condoned it.

In the wake of the Russian revolution and the proclamation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Metropolitan adopted a very favourable attitude toward Ukrainian patriotism and national sentiment. In 1917–18, he emphasized the importance of a nationally conscious clergy and, invoking the principles of national self-determination and ethnic boundaries, supported the legitimacy of Ukrainian claims to self-rule in Galicia.

However, that convergence of the church with Ukrainian national sentiment did not extend to militant nationalism. In the interwar Polish period, the Metropolitan's views would diverge in many important ways from those of the nationalists. The beginnings of that process may be traced back to 1923, when Sheptytsky accepted something that was anathema to the militant nationalists—the decision of the Council of Ambassadors to turn Eastern Galicia over to Poland. In the years that followed, Metropolitan Sheptytsky would stand

up for Ukrainian rights, but would not question the legitimacy of Polish rule. He would argue vehemently against the violent methods of the Polish “pacification,” but no less vehemently would he condemn those who trained Ukrainian youths to perform acts of violence and to believe that terrorism was morally justified.

During World War II, when the Soviet withdrawal from Galicia fanned hopes for Ukrainian statehood, Sheptytsky issued key statements emphasizing respect for life as a fundamental principle of Christianity, and religious and social unity as central to the ideal of a Ukrainian state. So essential were these principles that in his final break with Germany the Metropolitan would actually look forward to a Soviet reoccupation, with all its inevitable restrictions on religious liberty, as long as basic respect for human life could be restored.

Although he criticized the violent side of Ukrainian nationalism, Sheptytsky also recognized the potential benefits of Ukrainian patriotic ideals and appreciated their powerful hold on the Ukrainian collective consciousness. Dedicated to the achievement of full communion between those ideals and the Christian faith, he integrated patriotic considerations into a number of moral arguments: his criticism of the Soviet regime, his defence of Ukrainian cultural rights in Poland, and even his critique of contraception. His most significant appeal to Ukrainian patriotic sentiment opposed its Christian variant to its secular, “pagan” form, rejecting the latter as crude cannibalism that had no place within a civilized Christian society.

Proceeding from the law of love, the Christian alternative to secular nationalism unified people along national lines without dividing them from other peoples. Just as the New Testament law of love excluded hatred, so Christian patriotism excluded chauvinism. Sheptytsky explained this difference: “Pagan patriotism is love of one’s own together with hatred of all others. But Christian love of one’s native land, by embracing all peoples, unites Christians with their opponents and enemies and gives their patriotism the foundation that is needed; it teaches unity.”¹

Ultimately, then, any patriotism that had lost its Christian bearings was pagan, and the Metropolitan would have no part of it. On the other hand, Christian patriotism was rooted in the law of love and was unswerving in its commitment to the fundamental unity of humanity. The threat to society that Metropolitan Sheptytsky saw in nationalism was that it could degenerate into a socially destructive force. Whether by setting priest against priest (as in the Austrian period), or brother against brother, or ethnic group against ethnic group (as in the interwar Polish period), unrestrained nationalist fervor, along with its popularization, threatened to subvert the Christian foundations of Ukrainian

1. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro iednist” (1943), in *06–84*, p. 270.

society. It was precisely to counter this “moral hemophilia,” as he called it,² that the Metropolitan indicated the alternative path of Christian patriotism within which the Ukrainian national ideal was expressed as the epitome of Christian and social unity.

In the Metropolitan’s view, the atheistic variants of socialism, and later communism, posed similar threats to the Christian foundations of society. Before World War I, the main challenge that socialism posed to the Greek Catholic Church centred on its socio-economic action; by advancing the cause of social justice, it was drawing people away from the church. The alternative that Metropolitan Sheptytsky proposed to his priests was a social action that would address the pressing material problems of Ukrainian society. He stressed that work for socio-economic advancement was integral to the church’s spiritual work for the salvation of souls. Whereas the socialists addressed only the material side, Metropolitan Sheptytsky instructed his priests to maintain a Christian course in their social action. In the political sphere as well, the church struggled against socialist proposals for secularizing legislation, especially in the areas of education and marriage law.

After the Bolshevik revolution, Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s perceptions of communism were shaped largely by reports about the repressive religious and social policies in Soviet Ukraine. Accordingly, when in the mid-1930s attempts were made to consolidate the Left in Galicia, the Metropolitan responded with a powerful condemnation of that undertaking and warned Christians against cooperating with it.

Yet, while criticizing both the socialist and the communist options, Sheptytsky avoided the pitfall of ideological narrow-mindedness. This enabled him to acknowledge points of compatibility between the Christian gospel and the democratic movement, as well as between the communist principle of collective ownership and the monastic way of life, and to recognize the sincere dedication of many Ukrainian socialists and, later, the patriotism of many Ukrainian communists. Such broad-mindedness would hardly have been possible had the Metropolitan failed to take his stand above the ideological divisions of political parties. Sheptytsky’s impartiality may be traced to his reflection on the foundational Christian principle of love. Indeed, it was in light of that principle that Sheptytsky drew a sharp distinction between “false” socialist doctrines and socialists themselves, whom Christians were duty-bound to love. And that distinction in turn enabled the Metropolitan to say in 1940, at the height of the first Soviet occupation:

2. Sheptytsky, “Pro iednist” (1943), in *06–84*, p. 266.

...I have never and do not now call communism our enemy or an enemy of the Church. For there is also an evangelical communism, consisting of evangelical poverty and a communal way of life, that I myself avow and to which I have belonged for more than fifty years.... The enemy of the Church and of religion is the false principle of atheism (*bezbozhnytstva*). In that sense atheists, as representatives of the enemy, are themselves [our] enemies too. But even as we struggle against the false idea, we do not stop loving the people and considering them our poor, blinded and ailing brothers. That is why I often call you to prayers for the good of atheists, for their conversion and salvation.³

The fundamental norm that informed Metropolitan Sheptytsky's ethical reflection on Ukrainian society, especially with regard to the poles of nationalism and socialism/communism, was the Christian concept of love. Not only was this the central principle behind Christian patriotism, but it also was integral to Sheptytsky's critique of militant nationalism and tempered his statements about the Left. In Sheptytsky's understanding, Christian love was an ethical imperative that permitted no exclusion: whether in matters of ethnic (Polish-Ukrainian) differences or of ideological differences among Ukrainians, Christian love was all-encompassing. This radical social thrust of the gospel message repeatedly set the Metropolitan's ethical perspective apart from the exclusivist tendencies within Ukrainian nationalism.

Underlying the Metropolitan's understanding of the contextual significance of the gospel message was his overriding pastoral concern that Ukrainian society should not be allowed to leap headlong into an abyss of spiritual perdition. His repeated recourse to a pedagogical *duae viae* motif—which contrasted the path of salvation with that of perdition, a society grounded in faith in God with an atheistic one, Jehovah with Baal, unity with schism, humble obedience with pride—was grounded in his understanding of the social implications of the Christian ideal of love and in an awareness of the potentially devastating spiritual and social implications of disregarding it.

It was therefore perfectly natural for Sheptytsky to explain his own sense of Ukrainian patriotism and social commitment by relating it to that basic law of love:

True patriotism being in its essence nothing other than true love of one's neighbour, in that way I became a Ruthenian patriot, and all my work that proceeded from that love was always aimed at the good that I wanted for my people. That good was first of all material, considering the abject poverty of our Church and our people: I did everything I could to remedy the situation. Secondly, it was a moral good: it was a matter of raising the level of Christian knowledge

3. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro bezbozhnykiv i ziedynennia tserkov" ("Shchoby unyknyty vsiakoho neporozuminnia..."), M.O. N°82, 17 April 1940, in *01–61*, pp. 59–60.

among the people about supernatural life, about the Christian life of the family, and so on. I tried to embrace all the needs of our people and to help everyone at least to some degree.”⁴

Integral to Sheptytsky’s understanding of Christian patriotism was his view that the church stood with the people, but above nationalism. Its duty was to promote the social and cultural development through which Ukrainians could realize their full potential and contribute to the good of humanity, while at the same time restraining the drive toward ethnic hostility, disunity and conflict.⁵

The Church and Politics

Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s approach to politics focused on the political activity of priests and the institutional relationships between the Greek Catholic Church and the various political administrations of Galicia. In addressing the questions that emerged in those two areas, the Metropolitan consistently grounded his

4. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Rapport au Père Gennochi” (“J’accepte avec grande reconnaissance...”), 12 February 1923, p. 24.

5. The view of Sheptytsky as an anti-Polish Ukrainian nationalist has been advanced by prominent Polish scholars who, for lack of substantive supporting evidence, cite a passage from Bishop Hryhorii Khomyshyn of Stanyslaviv in which he spoke of the Greek Catholic Church as the representative of only one of the many rites in the Universal Church; this, they allege, was very different from Sheptytsky’s desire that the Greek Catholic Church be a national church. See Mirosława Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska w drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, 1922–1926* (Cracow, 1979), pp. 94–96; and Andrzej Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki narodowościowej rządów polskich w latach 1921–1939* (Wrocław, 1979), p. 188. Surprisingly, this tendentious nationalist interpretation has found its way into Ukrainian appraisals as well. See *Life and Times*, p. 54, n. 41.

Those interpretations fail to take account of the Metropolitan’s strongly stated reservations about the idea of a national church and his equally firm commitment to the principle of the universality of the Catholic Church (discussed in Chapter 1). He reiterated those views on a number of occasions: “The Church is an institution that collects and organizes completely unrelated peoples from all the nations of the world into one great, divine family.” Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Do ukraïns'koï molodi zorhanizovanoi v K.A.U.M.-i” (“V den' moïkh imenyn...”) (15 December 1934), in 05–83, p. 49; “[the Church] encompasses all peoples of the world.... National churches that are independent of the Pope cannot be recognized as the Church that was established by Christ.” Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro Tserkvu” (“V den' u iakomu...”) (January 1936), in 05–83, pp. 254, 258; and “Is there any need to explain that the Catholic Church stands above rites? Neither the Latin, the Greek, the Slavic, the Armenian, the Coptic, nor the Syrian rite belongs to its essence. The Church employs them all, permits them all, without tying itself to any one of those rites with any permanent bonds.” Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Poslannia pro iednist' Tserkvy” (“Kozhnoi maizhe dnyny...”) (January 1938), in 05–83, p. 344.

reasoning in a conceptual framework of justice (rights and duties). This explanation puts into question his alleged “anti-Russian Germanophilism.”

In delineating the delicate question of the acceptable limits of political involvement by priests, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was primarily concerned with ensuring that the spiritual duty of priests be respected. Fidelity to that duty, he believed, would allow priests to steer clear of partisan politics, which could only divide them among themselves and cause scandal among the faithful. Their dedication to the spiritual welfare of the people was also at the core of what he referred to variously as a “clerical spirit,” “fervor,” and “priestly solidarity.”

Yet an exclusive emphasis on the spiritual duty of a pastor would have amounted to an outright prohibition of all clerical involvement in politics. From the very beginning, Metropolitan Sheptytsky made it clear that this was not his position. Balanced against a priest’s spiritual duty was his civic responsibility, derived first of all from the fundamental right of every priest as a private citizen to have a political opinion, to vote and to participate in the political process. Sheptytsky’s emphasis was on non-partisan political activity, which took a variety of forms, for example, under Austria, the mobilization of electoral support for candidates who were prepared to advocate Christian values and, under Poland, the organization of non-partisan or supra-partisan coalitions of citizens to give voice to Christian social and political concerns.

Secondly, civic responsibility was derived from the social concern that was expected of a priest; in particular, from his obligation to promote the material welfare of his people. In affirming those elements of a priest’s social responsibility, Metropolitan Sheptytsky encouraged political participation by priests, even referring to it as a duty, as long as its fulfillment did not lead them to neglect or secularize their primary duty and did not undermine their professional unity. There were also instances of political activity that were directly related to a priest’s spiritual duty (for example, opposing divorce and civil marriage legislation, and the deconfessionalization of schools).

Third, the rationale for clerical involvement in politics also had to do with the Metropolitan’s firm conviction that Christian moral values were the lifeblood of the social order. In this perspective, the church was seen as politically and socially active in fulfilling the historical role of Christianity—the spiritual revitalization of the world.⁶

6. A succinct expression of this notion of a socially and politically involved church, from an Eastern perspective, was given by the nineteenth-century Russian philosopher Vladimir Soloviev: “...le dogme et le culte, ce n’est pas le christianisme tout entier: il reste encore l’action sociale et politique de la vraie religion, l’organisation des forces collectives de la chrétienté pour régénérer le monde—il reste encore l’Eglise militante.... Jésus-Christ a vaincu le monde dans son principe et dans son centre, et... l’Eglise

Fourth, given the absence of significant Ukrainian political representation, Sheptytsky recognized that the historical role of the Greek Catholic clergy in the political field had extended to include the advocacy of Ukrainian socio-cultural, economic and political interests. Thus, beyond purely religious concerns, Metropolitan Sheptytsky felt that priests should be allowed to raise issues of social justice in the political forum. He did so himself on numerous occasions (to support the idea of a Ukrainian university, to promote a Polish-Ukrainian accord, to back the principle of self-determination in the Kholm region, and to protest against the Polish “pacification” and the destruction of Orthodox churches).

Metropolitan Sheptytsky thus believed that appropriate political activity by priests was a balance between two levels of duty—spiritual duty for the sake of the salvation of souls, which was primary, and socio-political duty, which was secondary and always at the service of the spiritual obligation.

In church-state relations too, Metropolitan Sheptytsky strove to achieve an ethical equilibrium of reciprocal rights and duties. He sought a *modus vivendi* with the state and, in doing so, he appealed to the Pauline doctrine on submission to civil authority. Whether in war or peace, whether he was dealing with a Catholic empire or a totalitarian regime, Metropolitan Sheptytsky appeared simply to accept passively each new change in the political situation and to submit to the civil authority of the day. Although that appearance has informed many an interpretation of the Metropolitan’s attitude to the political order, we have seen that in fact this simplifies and overlooks a considerably more complex approach to the political question that was at work.

In the first place, although Sheptytsky treated the “duty to Caesar” as an a priori obligation (a priori in the sense that it typically informed his immediate responses to sudden changes in political rule), it is equally clear that this obligation was never stated in absolute terms, but that instead it hinged on a specific set of conditions. Those conditions, which expressed the Metropolitan’s understanding of the fundamental duties of any state whose authority in civil matters he was prepared to recognize, may be summarized in two points. First, the state and its representatives, as part of their obligation to the common good, were required to respect the church’s jurisdiction in spiritual matters, that is, in matters of faith and morality, the administration of sacraments, religious education, ecclesiastical administration, and seeing to the religious obligations of the faithful. For example, although during the Austrian period the Metropolitan

militante doit affirmer et appliquer cette victoire absolue dans toutes les sphères relatives de l’existence humaine.” Vladimir Soloviev, “Saint Vladimir et l’Etat Chrétien” (1888), in his *Una sancta: Schriften zur Vereinigung der Kirchen und zur Grundlegung der universalen Theokratie*, vol. 1 (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1957), p. 104.

felt that there was no need for struggle with the state, he was quite categorical in rejecting any civil authority in matters of religious education or legislation concerning marriage. Second, the state was only considered a legitimate authority insofar as it issued just dictates and showed wise leadership. In other words, the state was expected to operate within the limits of divine law, and the Metropolitan specifically understood this to include respect for human life and religious liberty, as well as non-discrimination (whether on religious or ethnic grounds). He also expected any occupying state to honour the age-old Christian tradition of the Ukrainian people. Christian citizens, in turn, were reminded of the fallibility of human laws and human justice, and of the duty to heed the dictates of their conscience. Such socio-religious priorities indicated that the Metropolitan looked upon religion as a public, and not just a private, matter.

These qualifications are crucial to an understanding of Sheptytsky's attitude toward civil authority. They show that the Metropolitan did not treat the Pauline directive as an absolute principle (as has often been assumed), but as a rule of thumb that was overridden by the superior authority of divine law as soon as there was conflict between the two. The qualifications also indicate that the framework from which the Metropolitan approached church-state relations was sensitive to changes and developments, and thus it allowed for self-correction and adjustment as the evolving political situation required. Accommodationism was therefore hardly the final word on the Metropolitan's approach to the various civil administrations under which his church found itself.

Secondly, Sheptytsky's approach to the various states and occupying regimes derived from a fundamental conviction that the spiritual mission of the church in society was a sacred duty and, as such, absolute. Included as part of that mission, Sheptytsky felt, were the duties of preaching and teaching the faith, administering the sacraments and upholding the Christian life and Christian values in society. Thus, when Austria withdrew state salaries for religious educators, Sheptytsky reminded his priests that it was still their fundamental obligation to teach catechism, with or without pay. And during the Soviet occupation, when religious education was suppressed altogether, the Metropolitan censured those priests who neglected their preaching and catechetical ministries. Reflecting on his own hard-line approach, Sheptytsky admitted that he found it "paradoxical," for as obstacles mounted he only stressed the importance of fulfilling that pastoral duty all the more. But that was only to be expected, since he considered attentiveness to the spiritual needs of the faithful an absolute duty of the clergy, regardless of the prevailing political situation or obstacles. Related to that hard line, we have also noted that the Metropolitan exercised leniency (*epikeia-aequitas*) in ritual and structural matters in order to facilitate the work of the church in a hostile environment.

Thirdly, Metropolitan Sheptytsky sometimes resorted to what may be called legal formalism, appealing to the strict letter of civil law in an attempt to win

concessions from civil powers whose interests and priorities diverged from those of the Greek Catholic Church. Thus, in 1917, in arguing before the Russian government for the establishment of an Eastern-rite Catholic Church in Russia, he referred to that government's avowed principle of religious liberty. In 1930, he personally met with Polish government representatives in Warsaw and presented his views on how best to achieve what they at least formally supported—an end to the crisis of ethnic violence. And in 1940, he appealed to the provisions of the Stalinist constitution regarding freedom of conscience and worship in raising a protest against the abuse of those freedoms by the Soviet occupation authorities. In none of those cases was the method indicative of any transfer of loyalty by the Metropolitan; rather, he employed such legalistic tactics in order to arrive at a basic common ground or a point of leverage at which civil authorities could be effectively urged to live up to their own promises and stated priorities.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky thus regarded church-state relations through a prism of concomitant rights and duties, the most basic of which were the absolute duty of the church to fulfill its spiritual task and the corresponding duty of the state to recognize the church's right to do so.⁷

Thus, Metropolitan Sheptytsky approached the political question primarily through a discourse on justice. The category of duty was central to his elaboration of the church's work in the political sphere. The acceptable level of a priest's involvement in politics was determined with reference to both his spiritual and his temporal duties. Similarly, church-state relations were framed within a reciprocal exchange of rights and duties between the two authorities. This allowed the Greek Catholic Church to adapt to changes in the political and/or military situation and respond to the actions of the civil authorities without compromising its obligation to divine law and to its spiritual mission. The notion of justice delineated the autonomous jurisdictions of church and state, and was the central point of reference in the Metropolitan's official positions toward the various political and military administrations.

As opposed to what others have suggested was basically an ethnocentric or chauvinistic predisposition toward political structures,⁸ the Metropolitan's

7. Although the final three months of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's life do not provide sufficient documentary material to permit useful comparisons with his social thought in the preceding periods, the Central State Historical Archive in Lviv preserves three drafts of a letter to Stalin, one of which may well have been sent to the dictator in October 1944. These drafts bear out our observations about Sheptytsky's attitudes toward occupying powers.

8. The image of Sheptytsky as an anti-Russian Germanophile, which we mentioned briefly in Chapter 2, has its roots in Russian propaganda during World War I. An early

reflection and stated views on the subject appear, on the contrary, to have been drawn from his practical assessments of actual church-state relations as they existed at particular times. His critique of tsarist Russia and, later, of the Soviet Union was centred not on personal, ethnically based animosity, but rather on his reading of church-state relations in pre- and post-revolutionary Russia, relations that he felt had gone out of kilter, in both cases subordinating the church to the absolute authority of the state.⁹

Similarly, the suggestion that Sheptytsky's relations with Austria and Germany were shaped by a Germanophile predisposition must be set against the fact of his critique of Austria over the issue of civil incursions into church affairs, as well as his ultimate break with Germany over its breach of fundamental justice. Nor is there any evidence for attributing to national or ideological considerations the Metropolitan's habitual pattern of initial accommodation to new political rule. Rather, he appears to have followed a course of Pauline submission as a rule of thumb, applying it consistently at the beginning of every new regime—Polish, Soviet or German—and later adjusting or even discarding it as the evolving situation and the superior dictates of divine law required.

In this study of Catholic social ethics in Ukraine, we have reconstructed the method whereby Metropolitan Sheptytsky interpreted social reality. We have shown his Christian understanding of specific (church-society and church-state) problems and outlined his solutions, as well as his means of arriving at those solutions. Although this reconstruction centres on but one sphere of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's thought and activity, it is by no means limited to a one-dimensional presentation of the evolution of his thought. By its very nature as a contextual application of Catholic social teaching, the legacy of his thought is an integral part both of the twentieth-century story of the Church in Ukraine and of modern Ukrainian social history.

Throughout his forty-five-year episcopate, Sheptytsky's reflection about the church and society was grounded in the unifying notion of Christian love. Applied in practice, it set up the dichotomies that placed the real ethical stakes in high relief: authentic solidarity within the faith community as opposed to

representative of this school of thought is Iu. D. Romanovskii, *Ukrainskii separatizm i Germaniia* (Tokyo, 1920). More recent exponents of this view are S. T. Danylenko, *Dorohoiu han'by i zrady (istorychna khronika)* (Kyiv, 1970), and Klym Dmytruk, *Svastyka na sutanakh* (Kyiv, 1973).

9. Sheptytsky's critique of tsarist Russian caesaro-papism bears some similarity to the views of Vladimir Soloviev, who also criticized national exclusivism and chauvinism, and whose ideal notion of temporal government was that of a supranational Christian theocracy.

political divisiveness, whether at the pulpit or in the street; patriotism as an extension of a universal love of humanity, not a cover for ethnic conflict; social concern within a framework of eternal spiritual values in contrast to intolerant materialism; and religious faith as a social fact and social mission rather than a privatization of the life of the spirit and the conscience. The critical edge of this practical doctrine of love, and indeed its implications, have been missed by some who preferred to see it only as a passive blessing of any initiatives that were declared national or patriotic.

The Metropolitan's approach to church-state relations also had a critical edge. On the surface, it may have appeared that the church's relations with the state were ultimately reducible to mere submission. But as we have seen, whether in peacetime or during armed conflicts and occupations, Sheptytsky's guiding notion of justice was informed by the application of specific criteria of discernment to political reality. Just dictates, wise leadership, non-discrimination, religious toleration—each of these was a gauge with which to assess the legitimacy of state authority or its usurpation and abuse of power. Without an appreciation of this essential element in the Metropolitan's justice-oriented approach to church-state relations, it is neither possible to give a full account of his thought and activity directed toward the various political orders and wartime occupations nor to understand his ability to see good even in some representatives of the Left. This fundamental shortcoming has arguably been the main basis for attributing ideologically intolerant reasoning in this area to the Metropolitan.

As a result of our findings, a number of earlier interpretations—whether their theses were driven ideologically or by an equally dangerous filiopietism—may be set aside as unsubstantiated. At the same time, despite a separation now of more than half a century, the method of discernment, social diagnosis, and Christian ethical insights analyzed here remain relevant in our time. Not only have they shaped the character of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, but they have also made a significant contribution to Christian ethics on the international scene. Indeed, just as Metropolitan Sheptytsky gained much by following Pope Leo XIII's maxim "to look upon the world as it truly is," there is also much of lasting value in his own social ethics. Proceeding from a particular historical experience, it resonates with the experience of all Christian communities whose faith has, at one time or another, been threatened from without and within.

Those who hoped to transform this living legacy into an archeological fossil and those who tried to use it as an instrument for their own ends have failed. It is now possible to begin to appreciate it for what it truly was and is.

APPENDIX A

Polemics concerning Sheptytsky's Views during World War I

Anti-Sheptytsky polemics in Russia, which began to appear shortly after his exile, were probably intended as propaganda to mobilize support for Russian policy toward the Greek Catholic Church. As international efforts were made to secure Sheptytsky's release, the Russian polemicists stepped up their attacks.

While Sheptytsky's letter to Tsar Nicholas was apparently accessible only to Russian polemicists such as Romanovskii, who used it as cannon fodder in their propaganda campaign, there appears to be no basis for doubting the existence of such a document. Indeed, the position that Sheptytsky is alleged to have expressed in it is virtually identical to his reactions to the military takeovers of Galicia during World War II: an explicit acceptance of the military-political situation, an implicit recognition that the church could do little to change it in the foreseeable future, and a readiness and commitment to carry on the Christian mission of the church, no matter how hostile the conditions.

Iurii Romanovskii claimed to have been given the opportunity to peruse the Metropolitan's confiscated archives between 1914 and 1917, while they were in Russian custody. In his view, the Metropolitan was nothing but "a politician in a monastic soutane, a despiser of Russia and a loyal servant of Germany and Rome, who played a leading role in the organization of a Ukrainian separatist movement."¹

Polemical attacks against Sheptytsky followed the Russian takeover of Galicia. Among other things, the Metropolitan was accused of having personally funded cadres of Ukrainian riflemen to fight the invading Russians and of having a hand in the arrests of Russian activists by Austrian authorities.²

In the summer of 1917, the Russian General Staff published intelligence information on the Metropolitan's activity, linking it with Ukrainian "separatist" collaboration with the Germans.³ Behind the polemics were Russian charges that Austria had rounded up, arrested and hanged suspected Russophiles in Galicia and Bukovyna, all of which, in Romanovskii's assessment, "was carried out with

1. Iu. D. Romanovskii, *Ukrainskii separatizm i Germaniia* (Tokyo, 1920), p. 10.

2. Kost' Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia vyzvol'nykh zmahan' halyts'kykh ukraïntsyv z chasu svitovoi viiny, 1914–1918*, vol. 1 (L'viv, 1928), pp. 59–60.

3. Romanovskii, *Ukrainskii separatizm*, p. 13.

Sheptytsky's blessing."⁴ It remains to be determined whether the Metropolitan ever spoke out in defence of arrested Russophiles, some of whom were priests.

After the Metropolitan's release from Russian custody, personal attacks alleging that he was either anti-Polish or anti-Russian followed him on his journey back to Lviv. While in Switzerland, Sheptytsky clarified his position: "I have come to Switzerland...via neither Berlin nor Austria, where I had no business, since I do not involve myself in politics. It is true that such aims have been attributed to me, but that was a mistake, for politics is not my business and I am not given to chauvinism. Despite being of Polish Ruthenian descent, I returned to the rite and the nationality of my ancestors, and that is certainly no proof of chauvinism. Those who claim that I am an enemy of Russia are confusing the [present] country with the Bobrinskii-Evlogii regime, which was disavowed by the Duma and by the Russian revolution, and they forget that a good number of my faithful and several priests in Russia who are with me are Russian."⁵

Responding to criticism of his involvement in the political sphere, Sheptytsky would later argue that it was both necessary and legitimate for him as a Ukrainian bishop to express the interests of Ukrainians. Addressing the Austrian House of Lords in February 1918, he stated: "Unfortunately, Ukrainians are represented in this esteemed House by only three members, and so a bishop must often take the floor on purely political matters. Obviously, I do not need to justify myself. For the view that a bishop must not become involved in purely political matters is a fundamentally false opinion and one that is insulting to us. Like all citizens, we have the right and often the duty to address purely political questions ('rein politische Fragen')."⁶ At the same time, the Metropolitan saw real limits to what church leaders could actually do to effect political change. He cited the example of Pope Benedict XV, who had tried to intervene with the Entente and the Central Powers in order to seek an end to the hostilities, but to no avail.⁷

4. Ibid., p. 8.

5. [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], "Une interview de Mgr. Szeptycky. L'Archevêque uniate travaille au rapprochement de l'Eglise d'Occident et de l'Eglise d'Orient," interview in Fribourg, 13 August 1917, for *Journal de Genève*, reprinted in *Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914–1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe*, ed. Theophil Hornykiewicz, vol. 2 (Philadelphia, 1967), Document no. 445, p. 438.

6. [Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky], "Es ist die Frage...," *Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Herrenhauses des Reichsrates*, 28 Sitzung der XXII Session am 28 Februar 1918 (Vienna, 1918), p. 809.

7. Ibid., p. 811; see also the letter of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky to General Tadeusz Rozwadowski, 4 January 1919, French translation ("J'ai reçu hier...") in Cyrille Korolevskij, *Métropolitaine André Szeptycky, 1865–1944* (Rome, 1964), p. 410.

In a later statement, the Metropolitan indicated one of the fundamental distinctions that he drew between acceptable and unacceptable political activity. He considered it important to support the legitimate aspirations of Ukrainians as long as this did not involve unfairness to the Poles. The Metropolitan explained, “Mon abstention de toute politique fut interprétée par les Polonais, et l’est jusqu’à présent, dans le sens d’une politique antipolonaise, ce qu’elle n’a jamais été...je n’ai jamais dit une seule parole qui ait été contre les Polonais; je n’ai même jamais parlé des souffrances que la politique polonaise nous infligeait, et je n’ai jamais tâché de gagner les sympathies de ma nation par une fronde contre le système polonais qui nous opprimait.” Similarly, he recalled his support for Ukrainian demands under Austrian rule: “...comme membre du Sénat autrichien, j’ai dû à plusieurs reprises être l’interprète de ce qui me semblait leurs justes postulats. Mais même en ces circonstances, je n’ai pas parlé contre les Polonais, ni même fait d’allusion à leur politique.”⁸

8. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Rapport au Père Gennochi” (“J’accepte avec grande reconnaissance...”), in *ERSS-LGE*, pp. 22, 27 (1: 78, 83).

APPENDIX B

Sheptytsky's Attitude to the Formation of the Division Galizien

It is not within the scope of our study to take a position regarding the formation of the Waffen SS-Division Galizien. However, inasmuch as the question of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's attitude toward this unit inevitably comes to the fore when discussing the events of World War II, it may be useful to review some facts concerning the issue and briefly consider some of the pitfalls of interpretation.

German and Ukrainian motivations behind the formation of the Division appear to have been formed primarily in response to the turning tide of the war, particularly after the German defeat at Stalingrad. April 1943, when the Division's formation was announced, was not a time for recruiting and indoctrinating true-blue Nazis, but a time for limiting, or at least slowing down, the advance of the Soviets.

Nevertheless, this strategic consideration did not remove what has appeared to some a moral issue, imputing guilt by association. After all, the newly formed Waffen-SS was part of the SS, which by that time had claimed the central role in the Nazi campaign of mass extermination: Heinrich Himmler was the overseer of the "final solution," and it was the SS that ran the Einsatzgruppen and the death camps. Although the Ukrainian population was hardly unanimous about the advisability of the new formation—for example, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists actually had some success in encouraging desertion from it¹—dissent under what was still the German occupation was limited to the partisan underground, and any public controversy, particularly that which touched on German military policy, would still have been summarily settled through the barrel of a gun. Valuable light may be shed on the issue in the future through the study of the methods and patterns of recruitment.

Another issue has centred on direct allegations that members of the Division committed war crimes. As investigations continue around the world, it is worthwhile to bear in mind that in Canada, the Division's record concerning such allegations was exhaustively scrutinized by the federal Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals headed by Justice Jules Deschênes. The Commission's final

1. Kost' Pan'kivs'kyi, *Roky nimets'koï okupatsii*, p. 247.

report (30 December 1986) declared the following in its findings regarding the Division:

“56- The Galicia Division (14. Waffengrenadierdivision der SS [gal. Nr. 1]) should not be indicted as a group....

58- Charges of war crimes against members of the Galicia Division have never been substantiated, either in 1950 when they were first proffered, or in 1984 when they were renewed, or before this Commission.

59- Further, in the absence of evidence of participation in or knowledge of specific war crimes, mere membership in the Galicia Division is insufficient to justify prosecution.”²

This is significant for the question of guilt by association.

As for Metropolitan Sheptytsky, it is difficult to establish definitively what he thought of the Division. Perhaps the single most important reason for this is that there is no indication that he ever issued an official statement unequivocally supporting the formation of the unit. On the contrary, Holocaust survivor Kurt Lewin affirms that the Metropolitan refused to issue such a proclamation, which German military officers had demanded.³ Indeed, if such a document had been issued, there is no reason for it not to have survived along with so many others from this period. The burden of proof rests upon the accusers.

In the absence of conclusive documentary evidence of a “blessing,” scholarly opinion has taken note of the undocumented accusations of extremists, little more than for the record, but has generally preferred to limit its judgment to what appears plausible on the basis of currently available facts and testimony.

Extremist allegations, typically without substantiation, have been levelled by Polish, Russian and Ukrainian communist polemicists. Iaroslav Halan considered Sheptytsky to have been a “co-organizer” of the Division.⁴ To N. Iarmolovich, writing in *Izvestiia* in 1985, the Metropolitan was “a fierce enemy of the Polish, Ukrainian and Russian peoples, and a loyal servant of Hitler.” Ignacy Krasiński, in *Trybuna Ludu*, accused Sheptytsky of complicity in anti-Jewish pogroms in Galicia.⁵ However, neither Waschuk nor Redlich, in citing these writings, treats them as anything more than ideologically inspired posturing. At the same time, some East Bloc polemics managed to filter into the West. For example, drawing

2. *Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals. Report. Part 1: Public.* Hon. Jules Deschênes, Commissioner (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1986), p. 261.

3. Kurt Lewin, “Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi During the Years 1942–1944: Recollections of an Eyewitness,” in *Life and Times*, p. 452.

4. Noted by Roman Waschuk, “The Symbol of Sheptyts'kyi in Soviet Ideology,” in *Life and Times*, p. 412.

5. Iarmolovich and Krasiński cited by Shimon Redlich, “Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews during World War II,” in *Life and Times*, p. 158, n. 8.

on the notoriously unreliable Edward Prus, Hansjakob Stehle contrived the loaded question: "What was it that had moved the Metropolitan, despite his deep abhorrence of Nazi rule, once again to give his blessing to collaboration with the German regime, even under the SS symbol?"⁶ But this is only an *obiter dictum*: we return to Stehle's main argument below.

In search of plausible explanations, several authors have ventured some useful information and tentative opinions on the subject.

Bohdan Budurowycz links a liturgy, purportedly celebrated at St. George's Cathedral by Bishop Iosyf Slipy on the occasion of the Division's formation, with the Metropolitan's attitude. He also considers the appointment of Rev. Vasyl Laba, a close associate of the Metropolitan, to the post of the Division's chief chaplain as another significant connection in this regard. And he cites an order of the day issued on 10 November 1944 by the Division's commander, Major General Fritz Freitag, in which the senior officer declared that the late Metropolitan had been one of the Division's "sincerest friends and oldest supporters." Budurowycz concludes: "there can be no doubt that the Metropolitan did give the Division Galizien his wholehearted endorsement and moral support."⁷ In our opinion, "wholehearted endorsement and moral support" is an overstatement, disproportionate to the established facts.

Ryszard Torzecki doubts the likelihood of the Metropolitan's "ostensible approval" of the formation of the Division. However, he does feel that the appointment of chaplains for the unit, as well as the participation of high-ranking priests in various Ukrainian-German celebrations (Torzecki does not name Slipy), requires more study in the future. In light of other unanswered questions about Sheptytsky's attitudes toward the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the author concludes: "Future access to documents may help clarify many problems, but for the time being it is certain that Sheptytsky was against the participation of Ukrainians in groups used for criminal purposes."⁸ Based on extant documents, such an assessment appears perfectly legitimate.

Hansjakob Stehle restates the central question much more effectively a second time: "The illusion of some Ukrainian nationalists that they could save their own future by fighting everyone —Russians, Poles, and Germans—was as far from Sheptytsky's views as any hope in Hitler or Stalin. Hence the question remains about what motivated him, just one year before the total collapse, to support the formation of a Ukrainian SS division."⁹

6. Hansjakob Stehle, "Sheptyts'kyi and the German Regime," in *Life and Times*, p. 137.

7. Bohdan Budurowycz, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Ukrainian National Movement before 1914," in *Life and Times*, p. 64.

8. Ryszard Torzecki, "Sheptyts'kyi and Polish Society," in *Life and Times*, p. 95.

9. Stehle, "Sheptyts'kyi and the German Regime," p. 137.

One explanation, borrowed from Torzecki, is that (aside from trying to hold the Eastern front) the Division was also intended "to bring under control the anti-Russian and anti-Polish partisan and terrorist activities of the Ukrainian national underground and to channel them into 'legitimate' German activities."¹⁰ There are at least two reasons why Sheptytsky would have supported such an initiative. First, as we have established in the present study, he was opposed in principle to terrorist violence as a legitimate means for achieving any ends. Second, it is Budurowycz's very astute observation that, as a former soldier and a person used to discipline and order, "Sheptytsky could hardly be expected to identify or sympathize with an irregular military force [i.e., partisan groups, A.K.] whose activities could, in his opinion, easily lead to abuse and crime, thus further aggravating the general state of chaos and anarchy."¹¹ At the very least as an alternative to partisan chaos and violence, then, the proposal of a Division may indeed have appealed to the Metropolitan.

The second explanation suggested by Stehle is closely related to the first. According to the report of a "Dr. Frédéric" (possibly the Frenchman René Martel), who spoke with the Metropolitan later that year, in September, Sheptytsky believed that Soviet victory was inevitable. But in the wake of German defeats and prior to the arrival of the Soviets in Galicia, he also anticipated an intervening period of anarchy and chaos that a Ukrainian military presence could prevent.¹²

Such an explanation appears to overlook the anti-Soviet premise central to the Division's establishment, and of which the Metropolitan could not have been unaware. Thus, if the words cited in the Frédéric report were indeed the Metropolitan's, the necessary conclusion would appear to be that he viewed the Division as essentially an ill-conceived, and ultimately doomed, stop-gap measure whose short-lived merit, and indeed whose men, would survive only until the arrival of the Soviets.

Kurt Lewin's reading of the situation echoes this: "While refusing to issue a proclamation in support of this experiment, the Metropolitan did delegate a number of priests to act as chaplains to young people whose tragic destiny he clearly foresaw."¹³ The blessing, if indeed there was one, and the assignment of pastoral ministers was a prayer for the souls of those about to die. In July 1944, the Division's ranks were reduced from 11,000 to 3,000 on the front line at Brody.

10. Stehle, *ibid.*

11. Budurowycz, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Ukrainian National Movement before 1914," p. 64.

12. Stehle, p. 138.

13. Lewin, "Sheptyts'kyi During the Years 1942–1944," p. 452.

Bibliography

The core of this bibliography is a chronological list of primary sources: the published writings of Metropolitan Sheptytsky from 1899 to 1944 and a select list of correspondence. To date, only two attempts have been made to provide a comprehensive list of Sheptytsky's writings. An early study, which outlined sixty of the Metropolitan's pastoral letters from 1899 to 1918, was Bishop Iosyf Botsian, "Pastyrs'ki lysty Mytropolyta Andreia (Literaturnyi ohliad)," *Bohosloviia* 4, nos. 1–4 (1926): 95–149. Four decades later, another excellent bibliographic source on Sheptytsky's writings was published: Anatol' Maria Bazylevych, "Vvedennia u Tvory Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho," in 02–65, pp. B/9–B/237.

The most extensive bibliographic work on the non-Ukrainian secondary source literature pertaining to Metropolitan Sheptytsky has been done by Osyp Kravcheniuk (Krawcheniuk). In 1961, he surveyed the English-language writings on the Metropolitan in "Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi v anhlomovnykh publikatsiiakh," *Lohos* 13, no. 3 (July-September 1961): 161–84; in 1966, he published a further list, consisting of thirty-three entries, under the title "Neue Literatur über Metropoliten Andreas Scheptytzkyj," *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* 34 (1966): 20–21; and his biography of the Metropolitan, *Veleten' zo Sviatoiurs'koï Hory* (Yorkton, 1963), was based on an extensive bibliography of non-Ukrainian secondary source literature.

This bibliography takes those earlier works and reference tools a step further by providing a comprehensive, chronological listing of information on all the known published works of Metropolitan Sheptytsky (numbering more than 400 items), with more than 1,000 annotations, including references to reprints, translations, and literature discussing the individual documents. Locations of rare brochures and books are also given.

Although some of the primary sources listed here exceed the scope of the present study of Sheptytsky's ethical reflection on social issues, the list as a whole gives a good overview of the Metropolitan's written work: the personal intellectual journey, as it were, within which the Metropolitan worked out his social thought. A comprehensive list may indeed be more appropriate than a specialized one, since many of Sheptytsky's responses to social issues were ad hoc pronouncements embedded within larger texts. Considering also that the Metropolitan typically took a holistic, Eastern approach to Christian ethics (as opposed to a more systematic, compartmentalized approach characteristic of the Western tradition of moral thought), the question of isolating a "sub-corpus" of Sheptytsky's social writings is problematical.

As the first comprehensive listing of its kind, the primary source list also has its limitations: until the key Ukrainian Catholic periodicals *Nyva*, *Meta*, and especially *L'vivs'ki Arkhiieparkhiial'ni Vidomosti* have been scanned in their entirety (either in Poland or in Ukraine), and until the holdings of the Central State Historical Archives in L'viv have been thoroughly consulted, no such bibliography can pretend to be exhaustive. Nevertheless, it is the most complete bibliography on the subject to date and, as such, it will add much that had been either forgotten or thought lost from the Sheptytsky corpus. In that way, it can serve as a basic tool for future research in the area.

How to use the primary source list

The primary source list contains particularities that require some explanation.

For orientation within the forty-six-year period (1899-1944), the year of entries appearing on a given page is indicated in the header. The information for every year begins with an abbreviated listing, which may be consulted for quick reference. Within each year, the chronology is marked by an alphabetical designation of each document. For those years in which the number of published works exceeds twenty-six, we have used the progression “za, zb, zc...” to indicate documents numbered 27, 28, 29, etc.

In addition to marking the precise chronological position of each entry within the list, the alphabetical designation is used to identify documents, e.g., in cross-references. Thus, for example, “1908-f” refers to the sixth entry for 1908, while “1942-za” is the twenty-seventh item for 1942.

Since abbreviations are used extensively throughout the primary source list, the initial list of abbreviations must be consulted in order to make full use of the information.

Library and archival locations are positioned to the left of the manuscript, book or edition to which they refer.

A few clarifications about titles, chronology and calendar dates are also in order.

Titles

Many documents in the Sheptytsky corpus were originally designated only by a generic title (e.g., “Pastoral letter to the clergy”). Since such information is not helpful in distinguishing one particular document from another, it is used here only as secondary information specifying the nature of the document. In cases where no title besides the generic one is given, the *first words* of the document are given here as the title. Even where a distinctive title is available, the first words are also added following the title to assist in identifying the document. (In a number of instances, different pastoral letters were issued at different times under identical titles). New titles, which were sometimes given to documents that

were translated or reprinted, appear in parentheses after the reference to the translation or reprint.

Chronology

Since timing is a crucial, and indeed sometimes vital, factor entering into the interpretation of Sheptytsky's responses to social issues, special attention has been given to reconstructing the original chronology of the writings as accurately as possible. Documents published in a given year are listed chronologically according to date of issue/writing, where that information is available. In the absence of such information, the date of publication (for example, in a serial) has been used to determine the chronological position of an entry.

Some items were published a considerable time after they had been written or issued. Where both dates are available, a document's chronological place has been set according to the date of issue (or writing), rather than the date of publication.

In order to give the reader an overview of items published in a given year, a brief listing (title, description and date, if available) is provided at the head of the entries for each year.

Calendar dates

Complicating the task of chronologically organizing this corpus is the fact that one is often dealing with two liturgical calendar systems, the Julian and the Gregorian. For the sake of simplicity, and with a view to facilitating comparisons with contemporary secular sources, events and dates, only Gregorian calendar dates are used here. Accordingly, whereas a document's date of issue may have been given according to both the Julian and the Gregorian dates, only the latter is used in this bibliography. When a date of issue was given as a feast day in the Julian calendar, the corresponding Gregorian date has been calculated as follows: for immovable feasts, 13 days are added to the Julian date; for dates of movable feasts or Sundays of the Paschal cycle, the calculation is made with reference to the chart of Julian calendar Easter dates given in Isydor Dol'nyts'kyi's *Typik* (L'viv, 1899), p. 573. Thus, while all feast days refer to the traditional, Eastern liturgical calendar, the actual dates of such feasts are expressed here in the conventional Gregorian calendar dates. For example, in the Eastern liturgical year 1901, the Archeparchy of L'viv celebrated Easter on 13 April 1901 and Christmas on 7 January 1902.

Finally, all books or pamphlets are in 8°, unless otherwise indicated.

The secondary source list is selective. Popular studies with little or no scholarly value, of which—alas—there is no shortage, are not included here.

This bibliography is organized as follows:

1. Abbreviations
 - A. Libraries, archives and collections
 - B. Documentary sources
 1. The collected works of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky
 2. Other documentary and reference sources
 - C. Other abbreviations
2. Primary Sources: A Chronological Listing
 - A. The published works of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, 1899–1944
 - B. Selected correspondence and other private writings
3. Secondary Sources
 - A. General works covering more than one period
 1. Surveys
 2. Studies focusing on Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky
 - a. Monographs
 - b. Essay collections
 - c. Articles and brochures
 - B. Studies focusing on specific periods
 1. 1899–1914
 2. 1914–1923
 3. 1923–1939
 4. 1939–1941
 5. 1941–1944

1. ABBREVIATIONS

A. Libraries, archives and collections

BJ	Biblioteka Jagiellońska (Cracow)
BSB	Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (Munich)
C-Urbana	Library of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Slavic and East European Division
IOR	Library of the Istituto Orientale (Rome)
JKS	Private collection of the late Jan Kazimierz Szeptycki (Warsaw)
KUL	Library of the Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski (Lublin)
LNB	Stefanyk Library, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (L'viv)
LODA	L'viv Oblast State Archives (L'viv)
LUL	L'viv University Library
NAC-BAZ	Anatol' M. Bazylewycz Collection, MG31 D149, National Archives of Canada (Ottawa)
NAC-HKO	Rev. Michael Horoshko Collection, MG31 F15, National Archives of Canada (Ottawa)
NAC-ZHUK	Andrii Zhuk Collection, MG30 C167, National Archives of Canada (Ottawa)
ONB	Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (Vienna)
OSBM-M	Library of the Ukrainian Basilian Fathers (Mundare, Alberta)
OSBM-R	Library of the Ukrainian Basilian Fathers (Rome)
Robarts	Robarts Library, University of Toronto
Stamford	Library of St. Basil's Ukrainian Catholic College, Stamford, Connecticut
TsDIA	Central State Historical Archives, L'viv (N.B.: Fond 201 contains documents and materials pertaining to the history of the Ukrainian Catholic Archeparchy of L'viv up to 1944).
UCS-O	Library of the Ukrainian Catholic Seminary, Ottawa
UCU	Library of St. Clement's Ukrainian Catholic University (Rome)
UHVR	The Mykola Lebed' Collection, Archive of the General Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Ukraïns'ka Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada (Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council), Yonkers, New York
UVAN	Archives of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (New York)
ZNIO	Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich (Wrocław)

B. Documentary sources

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- Pan'kivs'kyi (1957) Pan'kivs'kyi, Kost'. *Vid Derzhavy do Komitetu*. Seriiia "Zhyttia i Mysli," Book 4. New York and Toronto: Vydavnytstvo "Kliuchi," 1957.
- Pan'kivs'kyi (1965) Pan'kivs'kyi, Kost'. *Roky nimets'koï okupatsii, 1941–1944*. Seriiia "Zhyttia i Mysli," Book 7. New York and Toronto: Vydavnytstvo "Kliuchi," 1965.
- PPU* *Pravda pro Uniiu: Dokumenty i materialy*. 2d rev. ed. Ed. V. Iu. Malanchuk et al. L'viv: Kameniar, 1968.
- Prokoptschuk (1955) Prokoptschuk, Gregor. *Der Metropolit: Leben und Wirken des grossen Förderers der Kirchenunion Graf Andreas Scheptytzkyj*. Munich: Verlag "Ukraine," 1955.
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<i>Svityl'nyk Istyny</i>	<i>Svityl'nyk Istyny. Dzherela do istorii Ukraïns'koï Katolyts'koï Bohoslovs'koï Akademii u L'vovi, 1928/29–1944.</i> Pavlo Senytsia, comp. 3 vols. Toronto and Chicago: Nakladom Absol'ventiv Ukr. Kat. Bohosl. Akademii, 1973–83. Abbreviation includes volume and year of reference.
<i>Tsars'kyi Viazen'</i>	<i>Tsars'kyi Viazen', 1914–1917.</i> L'viv: Nakladom Komitetu “Zhyvoho Pamiatnyka,” 1918.
<i>UCE</i>	<i>Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia.</i> Ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč. 2 vols. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963–71.

C. Other abbreviations

D	discussion (including polemical responses to specific documents)
ed.	editor or edition
<i>LAeV</i>	<i>L'vivs'ki Arkhieparkhiial'ni Vidomosti</i> (L'viv, 1888–1944). The official organ of the Ukrainian (Greek Catholic) Archeparchy of L'viv.
M.O.	Mytropolychyi Ordynariiat. Designates documents issued from the Archeparchial chancery office, usually followed by a number indicating their chronological order.
n.d.	no date
n.p.	no place of publication, or no name of publisher given
OSBM	Basilian Fathers (Eastern-rite). Also used to abbreviate “Drukarnia (i Pechatnia) Ottsiv Vasyliianiv,” the publishing house of the Ukrainian Basilian Fathers.
PL	Pastoral letter; if collectively issued by several bishops, marked “Collective” and followed by a number in parentheses indicating number of signatories.
publ.	year of publication (i.e., when different from year of writing)
R	reprint
Ref	reference; source of information
Tr	translation; followed by language of translation in parentheses
Z	Zhovkva

2. PRIMARY SOURCES: A CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING

A. The published works of Andrei Sheptytsky, 1899–1944

1899

- a. *Khrystiian'ska robota* ("Isus Khrystos, vruchaiuchy..."). PL to faithful of Stanyslaviv, 2 August.
 - b. *Nasha prohrama* ("Vzhe vid samoho pochatku..."). PL to clergy of Stanyslaviv, 2 August.
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a. *Khrystiian'ska robota* ("Isus Khrystos, vruchaiuchy...").
PL to the faithful of Stanyslaviv on the Feast of the Prophet Elijah, 2 August 1899.
OSBM-R, LUL Kolomyia: Cherenkamy i nakladom M. Bilousa, 1899. 29 pp. in 16°.
OSBM-R, IOR Z: OSBM, 1900. 31 pp.
LUL Parokhiial'na Biblioteka, ch. 26 (Dodatok do *Prapora*), 32 pp.
ZNIO, KUL, JKS Tr (Polish): "Jezus Chrystus, poruczajac..." Cracow: Drukarnia *Czasu*, 1899. 9 pp. in 4°.
R: PDV-35, Document no. 1.
R: 02–65, pp. 1–19. (Title: "Pershe Slovo Pastyria").
A programmatic statement to all social groups in the eparchy of Stanyslaviv on various issues (e.g., material goods, patriotism, etc.).
D: Botsian, pp. 97–98.

b. *Nasha prohrama* ("Vzhe vid samoho pochatku...").
PL to the clergy of Stanyslaviv, 2 August 1899.
KUL, ZNIO Tr (Polish): "Od samego poczatku..." Cracow: JKS Drukarnia "Czasu," 1899. 4 pp. in 4°.
R: PDV-35, Document no. 2.
R: 02–65, pp. 20–28.
On the duties of the Greek Catholic clergy in response to political radicalism.
D: Botsian, pp. 99–100.

1900

- a. *Khrystiian'ska rodyna* ("Ne davno tomu..."). PL to clergy and faithful of Stanyslaviv, 2 March.
- b. *Pravyla Sv. Ottsia N[ashoho] Vasyliia V[elykoho] dlia mirskykh liudei*.
- c. *O viri* ("V maiu seho roku..."). PL to Ruthenians of Bukovyna [20 November].
- d. *Napimnenia i nauky (vsim vozliublenym moim hutsulam)* ("Pereïkhavshy vashi krasni hory..."). PL to faithful of Kosiv deanery [21 November].
- e. "Deviatnaitsiate stolittia mynaie..." PL to clergy and faithful of Stanyslaviv [1 December].

- a. *Khrystiian'ska rodyna* ("Ne davno tomu...").
 PL to the clergy and the faithful of Stanyslaviv, 2 March 1900.
 IOR Z: OSBM, 1900. 32 pp.
 KUL [Z: OSBM,] 1900. 9 pp. in 4°.
 JKS Tr (Polish): "Nie dawno temu..." Cracow: Drukarnia
 "Czasu," 1900. 10 pp. in 4°. Issued "w dzień
 Ofierowania N.M.P." [4 December 1900].
 R: PDV-35, Document no. 3.
 R: 02-65, pp. 29-49.
 On the Christian principles pertaining to marriage and the family.
 D: Botsian, p. 100.

- b. *Pravyla Sv. Ottsia N[ashoho] Vasyliia V[elykoho] dlia mirskykh liudei* (Ulozhyv Preosv. o. Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, Ch.S.V.V., iepyskop v Stanyslavovi).
 LUL Z: OSBM, 1900. 24 pp.
 (Ref: 61761)

- c. *O viri* ("V maiu seho roku...").
 PL to the Ruthenians of Bukovyna on the eve of the Feast of St. Michael the Archangel [20 November] 1900.
 KUL Z: OSBM, 1900. 12 pp. in 4°.
 OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1901. 42 pp.
 KUL, UCS-O
 R: PDV-35, Document no. 4.
 R: 02-65, pp. 50-77. (Title: "Pravdyva Vira").

R (excerpt): "Pamiatky i slidy pershykh khrystiian v Rymi.
(Spomyn zi sviatoho roku 1900)," *Holos Khrysta*
Cholovikoliubtsia (Louvain) 28, no. 6 (1974): 35–36.

On the Catholic faith and the Catholic Church.

D: Botsian, p. 101.

d. *Napimnenia i nauky (vsim vozliublenym moim hutsulam)* ("Pereïkhavshy vashi krasni hory...").

PL to the faithful of the Kosiv deanery on the Feast of St. Michael the Archangel [21 November] 1900.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1901. 44 pp.

KUL, ZNIO, UCS-O

R: PDV-35, Document no. 5.

R: 02–65, pp 78–107. (Title: "Do moïkh liubykh hutsuliv").

On a variety of issues, including adultery, alcoholism, hygiene, etc.

D: Botsian, p. 101.

D: Volodymyr Hnatiuk, "Lyst pastyrs'kyi," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* (L'viv) 14, no. 4 (1901): 13.

e. "Deviatnaitsiate stolittia mynaie..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful of Stanyslaviv on the Feast of the Prophet Nahum [1 December] 1900.

KUL Z: OSBM, 1900. 6 pp. in 4°.

R: PDV-35, Document no. 6.

R: 02–65, pp. 108–21. (Title: "Na hrani dvokh vikiv").

Remarks on the occasion of the Christian jubilee year.

D: Botsian, pp. 101–2.

1901

a. *O liubvi* ("Taka bula poslidna molytva..."). PL to faithful of Stanyslaviv, 17 January.

b. *O tserkvi* ("Vozliubleni! Koly vzhe z voli..."). PL to faithful of the Archeparchy of L'viv, 27 January.

c. *O dostoinstvi i oboviazhkakh sviashchenykyv* ("Po tryitsiaty litakh..."). PL to clergy of Archeparchy of L'viv, 9 February.

d. *Do ruskoï inteligentsii (O provodi Khrystovim)* ("V lysti pastyrskim..."). PL to Ruthenian intelligentsia, 9 February.

e. *O pokaianiu* ("Koly ia, misiats' tomu..."). PL to faithful, 3 March.

f. *O iuvyleiu* ("Vzhe vid pershoho maia..."). PL to archeparchy, 21 June.

- g. *Rusynam osilym u Kanadi* ("Vzhe vid dvokh lit..."). PL to Ruthenians in Canada, 7 September.
- h. *Pamiatka posviashchennia tserkvy (poiasnennia obriadiu)* ("V selakh, de luchaiesia...").
- i. *Vsechestniishomu nastoiatelstvu i vozliublenym pytomtsiam dukhovnoho semynaria u L'vovi* ("Obniavshy prestol Mytropolychii..."). PL to L'viv Seminary [14 September].
- j. "Zibrani na zahal'ni zbory..." PL to clergy, 14 September.
- k. "Kheto lyshen' zvertaie uvahu..." Appeal to clergy, 14 September.
- l. "Dlia skorshoho obsadzhuvannia..." Administrative directive, 14 September.

a. *O liubvi* ("Taka bula poslidna molytva...").

PL to the faithful of Stanyslaviv, 17 January 1901.

KUL Z: OSBM, 1901. 14 pp. in 4°.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1901. 49 pp.

KUL

R: PDV-35, Document no. 7.

R: 02-65, pp. 122-156. (Title: "Naibil'sha Zapovid").

On the Christian understanding and practice of the virtue of love.

D: Botsian, pp. 102-3.

b. *O tserkvi* ("Vozliubleni! Koly vzhe z voli...").

PL to the faithful of the Archeparchy of L'viv, 27 January 1901.

KUL Z: OSBM, 1901. 10 pp. in 4°.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1901. 35 pp.

KUL, UCS-O

R: 02-65, pp. 157-73, 267-68.

On the notion of "Church" (Sheptytsky's first pastoral letter as Metropolitan of the L'viv Archeparchy).

D: Botsian, p. 103.

c. *O dostoinstvi i oboviazkakh sviashchenykyv* ("Po tryitsiaty litakh...").

PL to the clergy of the Archeparchy of L'viv, 9 February 1901.

KUL Z: OSBM, 1901. 9 pp. in 4°.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1901. 29 pp.

KUL

KUL, JKS Tr (Polish): "Po trzydziestu latach..." Z: OSBM, 1901. 10 pp. in 4°. ("Pisano w Krechowie").

KUL 2d ed. Z: Nakładem Hr. Szeptyckich, 1901. 27 pp.

R: 02-65, pp. 174-89.

On the duties of priests, and the personal qualities required of them.

D: Botsian, pp. 103–4.

d. *Do ruskoï inteligentsii (O provodi Khrystovim)* (“V lysti pastyrskim...”).

PL to the Ruthenian intelligentsia, 9 February 1901.

KUL Z: OSBM, 1901. 14 pp. in 4°.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1901. 48 pp.

KUL, Robarts

R: 02–65, pp. 190–214. (Title: “Do ukrains'koï inteligentsii”).

On the four elements of the general notion of leadership: authority, law, doctrine, personal influence and the Christian understanding of leadership.

D: Botsian, pp. 104–6.

e. *O pokaianiu* (“Koly ia, misiats' tomu...”).

PL to the faithful, 3 March 1901.

IOR, KUL Z: OSBM, 1901. 50 pp.

R: 02–65, pp. 215–41.

Pastoral letter at the beginning of Lent on sin, repentance and the sacrament of penance.

D: Botsian, p. 106.

f. *O iuvyleiu* (“Vzhe vid pershoho maia...”).

PL [to the entire archeparchy], 21 June 1901.

KUL Z: OSBM, 1901. 10 pp. in 4°.

IOR, KUL Z: OSBM, 1901. 35 pp.

R: 02–65, pp. 242–58.

On the grace bestowed during the jubilee year of Christianity and on the ways of becoming worthy of it.

D: Botsian, pp. 106–7.

g. *Rusynam osilym u Kanadi* (“Vzhe vid dvokh lit...”).

PL to the Ruthenians in Canada, 7 September 1901.

OSBM-M (Ref: 02–65, p. 259n).

R: 02–65, pp. 259–66;

R: *Iuvileina Knyha Parokhii sv. o. Nykolaia u Vinnipeg*.
Winnipeg: Nakladom Parokhii sv. o. Nykolaia, 1955.
pp. 123–26.

A call to steadfastness in the faith, given a shortage of Greek Catholic priests in Canada.

D: Botsian, p. 107.

D: Bohdan Kazymyra, “Rusynam osilym u Kanadi,” *Lohos*
(Yorkton, Sask.) 32, no. 2 (April-June 1981): 93–101.

h. *Pamiatka posviashchennia tserkvy (poiasnennia obriativ)* (“V selakh, de luchaiesia...”).

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM [1901]. 42 pp.

KUL, UCS-O

Booklet explaining the rite of consecration of a church.

D: Botsian, pp. 107–8.

i. *Vsechestniishomu nastoiatelstvu i vozliublenym pytomtsiam dukhovnoho semynaria u L'vovi* (“Obniavshy prestol Mytropolychii...”).

PL to the L'viv Seminary, “v nachalo Indykta roku Bozhoho 1901” [14 September].

KUL Z: OSBM, 1901. 11 pp. in 4°.

OSBM-R, KUL,

ZNIO, JKS

Tr (Polish): *Do przełożenstwa i klerików Seminarium duchownego we Lwowie*. (“Objąwszy Stolicę Metropolitalną...”), Z: OSBM, 1902. 30 pp.

On the aim of the seminary and suggested reforms subsequent to the Metropolitan's visits to the seminary in March and April 1901.

D: Botsian, pp. 109–10.

j. “Zibrani na zahal'ni zbory...”

PL to the clergy, 14 September 1901.

KUL Z: OSBM, 1901. 4 pp. in 4°.

On the need for generosity with regard to the fund for widows and orphans. The document is followed by two administrative directives (1901–k and 1901–l, below), bearing Metropolitan Sheptytsky's signature, on the need to preserve items of religious art and on benefices.

D: Botsian, p. 108.

k. “Kheto lyshen' zvertaie uvahu...”

Appeal to the clergy, 14 September 1901.

KUL, L'viv, 1901, M.O. N°298, 2 pp.

NAC-BAZ, vol. 2, f. 6

On the importance of preserving items of religious art.

l. “Dlia skorshoho obsadzhuvannia...”

Administrative directive, 14 September 1901.

KUL L'viv, 1901, M.O. N°299, 1 p.

On benefices: an attempt to standardize the transfer of priests from one parish to another.

1902

a. *Nasha vira* (“Kheto lyshen' khoche...”). Pamphlet, on the eve of the Epiphany.

b. *O supruzhestvi i rodyni* (“Nastav chas Velykoho Postu...”). PL to faithful of L'viv and Kam'ianets' eparchy, 1 March.

- c. "Poruchaietsia vsechestnym dushpastyriam..." Administrative notice to clergy, 28 July.
- d. *O misiakh i dukhovnykh vpravakh* ("Kozhdyi sviashchenyk..."). PL to clergy, 28 July.
- e. *O kanonichnii vizytatsii* ("Kanonichna vizytatsiia..."). PL to clergy, 8 August.
- f. "V poslidnykh chasakh..." PL to clergy, 20 August.
- g. *Pravdy viry* ("Na usyl'ni vashi pros'by..."). PL to Canadian Ruthenians [29 August].
- h. *Vidozva* ("Epyskopat ruskii nashoi provintsiia..."). Statement, 30 August.
- i. *O papskim iuvyleiu* ("Dnia 20 liutoho 1878 r..."). PL to clergy and faithful, 15 September.

a. *Nasha vira* ("Kheto lyshen' khoche...").

Pamphlet, on the eve of the Epiphany, 1902.

OSBM-R, IOR Z: OSBM, 1902. 21 pp.

KUL, UCS-O

A catechism outlining the fundamental principles of Catholic doctrine.

b. *O supruzhestvi i rodyni* ("Nastav chas Velykoho Postu...").

PL to the faithful of the L'viv and Kam'ianets' eparchy, 1 March 1902.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1902. 53 pp.

KUL

On Christian marriage and the family.

D: Botsian, pp. 110–11.

c. "Poruchaietsia vsechestnym dushpastyriam..."

Administrative notice to the clergy, 28 July 1902.

R: PPU, Document no. 75, p. 120.

An exhortation that the agrarian strike be conducted without violence.

d. *O misiakh i dukhovnykh vpravakh* ("Kozhdyi sviashchenyk...").

PL to the clergy, 28 July 1902.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1902. 41 pp. ("Pysano v Prylbychakh").

KUL, ZNIO

On home missions and spiritual retreats.

D: Botsian, pp. 112–13.

e. *O kanonichnii vizytatsii* ("Kanonichna vizytatsiia...").

PL to the clergy, 8 August 1902.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1902. 37 pp.

KUL

Pastoral remarks after a canonical visitation to various deaneries.

D: Botsian, pp. 111–12.

f. “V poslidnikh chasakh...”

PL to the clergy, 20 August 1902.

KUL Z: OSBM, 1902. 6 pp. in 4°.

R: “Pro vidnosyny mizh Rymom a Rusynamy.” *Dilo* (L'viv) 23 (186) (21 August 1902), pp. 1–2; 187 (22 August), pp. 1–2.

On relations between the Ruthenian Catholic Church and Rome.

D: *Uniiia v Amerytsi. Prychynok do vidnosyn Ruskoï Tserkvy.*

Vidpovid' Andreievy hr. Sheptytskomu, mytropolytovy l'vivskomu hr. kat. obriadu na ieho poslaniie z 20 avhusta 1902, “Vydavnytstvo T[ovarystva] R[uskoï] Ts[erkvy v]

A[merytsi],” no. 1. New York: Nakladom Fondu

Narodnoho, 1902. 73 pp. A critique of the PL by American Ruthenians, who felt that Metropolitan Sheptytsky did not understand their situation and was not really committed to establishing a Ruthenian episcopate there.

D: Botsian, pp. 113–14.

g. *Pravdy viry* (“Na usyl'ni vashi pros'by...”).

PL to Canadian Ruthenians, issued on the day after the Feast of the Dormition of the Holy Theotokos [29 August] 1902.

IOR Z: OSBM, 1902. 117 pp. (“Pysano v Unevi, 29.VIII 1902”).

IOR, OSBM-R, Z: OSBM, 1902. 2d ed. 105 pp. (“Shcho roku...”).

UCS-O

An outline of the Catholic catechism for the use of Ukrainians in Canada.

Another edition, also published in 1902 but 112 pages in length, is mentioned in

Roman Lukan', OSBM, “Spys knyzhok vydavnytstva ChSVV v Zhovkvi,” in *Analecta OSBM* (Rome), Series 2, Sectio 2: Articuli, vol. 5 (1967): 394.

D: Botsian, p. 114.

h. *Vidozva* (“Epyskopat ruskii nashoï provintsii...”).

30 August 1902.

KUL Z: OSBM, 1902. 4 pp. in 4°.

Univ: Nakladom Mytr[opolychoho] Ordynariiata, 1902.

Announcement of a pilgrimage to Rome in October 1902, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the papacy of Leo XIII.

i. *O papskim iuvyleiu* (“Dnia 20 liutoho 1878 r...”).

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 15 September 1902.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1902. 30 pp.

KUL

In anticipation of the 25th anniversary of the pontificate of Leo XIII, a brief review of his teachings and activity, with special attention to the secular and socialist movements of the time.

D: Botsian, pp. 114–15.

1903

- a. "Shchoby nashi trudy..." Notice to clergy and faithful, 18 March.
 - b. Letter to Jewish community, 3 July.
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- a. "Shchoby nashi trudy..."

Notice to the clergy and the faithful, 18 March 1903.

LAeV (24 March 1903), M.O. N°37 pp. 19–20.

On the appointment of Rev. Andrei Bilets'kyi as Vicar General.

- b. Letter to the Jewish community, 3 July 1903.

R: Kravcheniuk, p. 111. A photo of the hand-written original.

R: *Encyclopedia of the Jewish Diaspora*. Ed. N. M. Gelber. Vol. 4, part 1. Poland Series. Lwów Volume. Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, 1956. Col. 669–70.

Tr (Ukrainian): "Moi braty, shcho virno...", in Kravcheniuk, pp. 110–11.

A letter responding to the Jewish community's request for assistance.

1904

- a. *O postavleniu o. dr-a. Hryhoriia Khomyshyna iepyskopom* ("Koly ia pered troma..."). PL to faithful, 8 May.
- b. *O preneporochnim zachatiu Bohorodytsi* ("Piadesiat lit mynaie..."). PL to clergy and faithful, 16 May.
- c. *Do Polaków obrządku Grecko-Katolickiego* ("Między wiernymi..."). PL to Polish Greek Catholics, 16 May.
- d. *O kwestii sotsiial'nii* ("Demokratychnyi rukh..."). PL to clergy, 21 May.
- e. *Protest mitropolita Andreia Sheptitskago do dostokhval'nogo obshchestva "Galitsko-Russkaia Matitsa" v Lvovi* ("Ponezhe dosi Obshchestva Narodni..."). Letter, 16 November.

a. *O postavlenu o. dr-a. Hryhoriia Khomyshyna iepyskopom* ("Koly ia pered troma...").

PL to the faithful, 8 May 1904.

IOR, KUL Z: OSBM, 1904. 20 pp.

R: PDV-35, Document no. 8.

On the occasion of the appointment of the Rev. Khomyshyn as bishop of the Eparchy of Stanyslaviv, a statement on the episcopacy.

D: Botsian, pp. 118–19.

b. *O preneporochnim zachatiu Bohorodytsi* ("Piadesiat lit mynaie...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 16 May 1904.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1904. 52 pp.

KUL

OSBM-R, KUL, Tr (Polish): *O Niepokalanem Poczęciu Najświętszej Panny Bogorodzicy*. Z: OSBM, 1904. 40 pp.

ZNIO

Tr (English): in John Sianchuk, "The Writings of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptycky on the Immaculate Conception," M.A. dissertation, Istituto Orientale, 1981. Appendix.

An explanation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception on the fiftieth anniversary of its promulgation.

D: Botsian, pp. 115–16; Sianchuk, *ibid.*

c. *Do Polaków obrządku Grecko-Katolickiego* ("Między wiernymi...").

PL to Polish Greek Catholics, 16 May 1904.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1904. 30 pp.

KUL

R (excerpt, to p. 9 of original): *Komunikaty Towarzystwa Romana Dmowskiego* (London) 2, no. 1 (1979–80): 202–9.

Basic Christian teachings and remarks on the importance of preserving the Eastern rite, as well as on keeping pastoral and political work separate.

D: Botsian, pp. 116–17.

d. *O kwestii sotsiial'nii* ("Demokratychnyi rukh...").

PL to the clergy, 21 May 1904.

IOR, KUL Z: OSBM, 1904. 71 pp.

OSBM-R, ZNIO Tr (Polish): *O kwestyi socyalnej*. ("Demokratyczny ruch..."),

Z: OSBM, 1905. 56 pp.

KUL Warsaw: Nakład "Przeglądu Katolickiego," 1905. 57 pp.

Catholic social teaching applied to the situation in Galicia.

D: Ivan Franko, "Sotsiial'na aktsiia, sotsiial'ne pyttannia i sotsiializm," in *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* (L'viv) 10

(1904): 1–23; reprinted in *Ivan Franko pro sotsiializm i marksyzm: Retsenzii i staty, 1897–1906*, ed. Bohdan Kravtsiv, Suspil'no-politychna Biblioteka, no. 17 (New York: Vydavnytstvo "Proloh," 1966), pp. 152–90.

D: Botsian, pp. 117–18.

D: Iurii Rybak, "Kyr Andrei u hromads'ko-ekonomichnomu dovkilli (ohliad plianiv i diial'nosty)," in *Al'manakh Provydinnia* (Philadelphia, 1984), pp. 219–36.

D: Andrii Krawchuk, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Ethics of Christian Social Action," in *Life and Times*, pp. 247–68.

e. *Protest mitropolita Andreia Sheptytskago do dostokhval'nogo obshchestva "Galitsko-Russkaia Matitsa" v Lvovi* ("Ponezhe dosi Obshchestva Narodni...").

Letter, 16 November 1904.

IOR in *Mitropolit Galitskii Andrei Sheptytskii i "Galitsko-Russkaia Matitsa."* Ottisk iz "Nauchno-literaturnago sbornika" (L'viv: Iz tipografii Stavropigiiskago Instytuta, 1905), pp. 3–4.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter of protest to the literary society "Galitso-russkaia Matitsa," in which he objects to its constitutional amendment of 24 May 1900, whereby the Metropolitan of L'viv would no longer be an *ex officio* patron of the society.

1905

a. "Vzhe kil'ka raziv..." PL to clergy, 19 February.

b. *O solidarnosty* ("V chasakh tiazhkykh..."). Collective (3) PL to clergy, 13 February.

c. *O tserkovnim bratstvi* ("Chas velykoho posta iest'..."). PL to faithful [19 February].

d. *O tserkovnim bratstvi* ("Iduchy za davnym zvychaiem..."). PL to clergy [4 March].

a. "Vzhe kil'ka raziv..."

PL to the clergy, 19 February 1905.

IOR [Z: OSBM, 1905.] 16 pp.

A reminder to priests that their pastoral duties include the teaching of catechism to children.

D: Botsian, p. 119.

b. *O solidarnosty* ("V chasakh tiazhkykh...").

Collective (3) PL to the clergy, 13 February 1905.

IOR, KUL

Z: OSBM, 1905. 32 pp.

A call to solidarity among priests as a check on politically partisan divisions within the church.

D: Botsian, p. 120.

c. *O tserkovnim bratstvi* ("Chas velykoho posta iest'...").

PL to the faithful, Sunday of the Publican and the Pharisee [19 February] 1905.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1905. 44 pp.

KUL

On the need for close cooperation of the laity with their parish priest in his pastoral work.

See related PL to the clergy, bearing the same title, 1905–d.

D: Botsian, p. 121.

d. *O tserkovnim bratstvi* ("Iduchy za davnym zvychaiem...").

PL to the clergy, Meat-Fare Saturday [4 March] 1905.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1905. 30 pp.

KUL

On parish-based lay brotherhoods, with advice on how to strike a practicable balance between excessive autonomy of such organizations and unnecessary interference on the part of priests. See related PL to the faithful, bearing the same title, 1905–c.

D: Botsian, pp. 121–22.

1906

a. "Rik mynaie vid khvyli..." Collective (3) PL to faithful, 11 January.

b-f: *Rishenie L'vivskoho eparkhiial'noho sobora vidbutoho 28 i 29 hrudnia 1905*. Documents from the sobor of December 1905. 14 January.

g. "Die nächste politische Zukunft..." Speech before House of Representatives, 1 and 7 February.

h. "Die Punkte 1, 2 und 4..." Speech before House of Representatives, 8 February.

i. "Donoshu vam..." PL to faithful, 6 March.

j. *Velykoposna nauka virnym* ("Iak shcho roku..."). PL to faithful [17 March].

k. *Sestram Sluzhebnytsiam Prechystoi Divy* ("Khotiai desiat' lit..."). PL to Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate, 3 April.

l. "Mynuvshoho roku v serpny..." PL to clergy and faithful [22 April].

m. *Pro pochytannia Presviatoho Sertsia*. ("Vdiachnist' zhliadom Isusa Khrysta..."). PL to clergy [13 May].

n. "Ordynariiat poruchaie..." Directive, 23 April and 12 November.

a. "Rik mynaie vid khvyli..."

Collective (3) PL to the faithful, 11 January 1906.

OSBM-R, IOR Z: OSBM, 1906. 18 pp.

KUL Peremyshl': n.p., 1905/6. 18 pp.

On the participation of priests in civil affairs, developing the topic of *O solidarnosty* (1905–b).

D: Botsian, p. 122.

b-f: *Rishenie L'vivskoho eparkhiial'noho sobora vidbutoho 28 i 29 hrudnia 1905.*

Documents from the sobor of December 1905. 14 January 1906.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1906. 75 pp.

Robarts

b. PL to the clergy ("Za laskoiu Vsevyshn'oho..."), pp. 3–13.

c. Decisions of the sobor, pp. 14–64.

d. "Besida Mytropolyta pry zakincheniu Sobora eparkhiial'noho" ("Bohu blahodarenie..."), pp. 64–70.

e. Proclamation of the sobor dedicating the eparchy to the Immaculate Conception, pp. 70–74.

f. Ratification and approbation of the sobor decisions, pp. 74–75.

g. "Die nächste politische Zukunft..."

Speech before the House of Representatives, 1 and 7 February 1906.

BSB *Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten österreichischen Reichsrates.* Vienna, 1906. 1 February: 372 Sitzung der XVII Session, pp. 33702–4; 7 February: 375 Sitzung, p. 33919.

On the pension law.

h. "Die Punkte 1, 2 und 4..."

Speech before the House of Representatives, 8 February 1906.

ONB *Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten österreichischen Reichsrates.* Vienna, 8 February 1906. 376 Sitzung der XVII Session, pp. 33984–5.

Concerning the law on hops (*Hopfenprovenienzgesetz*).

i. "Donoshu vam..."

PL to the faithful, 6 March 1906.

IOR [Z: OSBM] 1906. 10 pp.

A call to protest against a proposed divorce law.

D: Botsian, p. 123.

j. *Velykoposna nauka virnym* ("Tak shcho roku...").

PL to the faithful on the third Sunday of Lent [17 March] 1906.

IOR, KUL

Z: OSBM, 1906. 24 pp.

D: Botsian, pp. 123–24.

k. *Sestram Sluzhebnytsiam Prechystoi Divy* ("Khotiai desiat' lit...").

PL to the Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate, 3 April 1906.

IOR

Z: OSBM, 1906. 15 pp.

D: Botsian, pp. 124–25.

l. "Mynuvshoho roku v serpny..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful on the Sunday of St. Thomas [22 April] 1906.

OSBM-R, IOR

Z: OSBM, 1906. 16 pp.

About Jerusalem, which Sheptytsky had visited in August 1905.

D: Botsian, pp. 125–26.

m. *Pro pochytannia Presviatoho Sertsia*. ("Vdiachnist' zhliadom Isusa Khrysta...").

PL to the clergy on the Feast of St. James the Apostle [13 May] 1906.

OSBM-R, IOR,

Z: OSBM, 1906. 36 pp.

KUL, Stamford

On the cult of the Sacred Heart.

D: Botsian, pp. 126–27.

n. "Ordynariiat poruchaie..."

Directive, 23 April and 12 November 1906.

OSBM-R, IOR

Z: OSBM, 1906. 6 pp. ["Vid Ordynariiatu z spil'nykh narod halytskoho ruskoho Iepyskopatu"].

Attached to pastoral letter "Rik mynaie vid khvyli..." (1906–a). Directive from the Metropolitan's Chancery office convoking local conferences of priests to work out specific forms of solidarity in view of the upcoming elections.

1907

a. *O vyborakh do parlamentu* ("V nezvychaino vazhnu..."). Collective (3) PL to faithful, January.

b. *Ustav Sestram Sluzhebnytsiam* ("Mynuvshoho roku my zapovily..."). Regulations for Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate, 2 February.

c. "Zistavshy epyskopom..." PL to faithful [10 March].

d. "Zblyzhaiut' sia chasy..." PL to clergy, 26 November.

e. "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." Collective (3) PL to clergy, December.

a. *O vyborakh do parlamentu* ("V nezvychaino vazhnu...").

Collective (3) PL to the faithful, January, 1907.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1907. 18 pp.

KUL, NAC-ZHUK,

UCS-O

On the upcoming parliamentary elections, the Christian duties of citizens, patriotism, etc.

D: Botsian, pp. 128–29.

b. *Ustav Sestram Sluzhebnytsiam* ("Mynuvshoho roku my zapovily...").

Regulations for the Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate, 2 February 1907.

IOR Z: OSBM, 1906. 3, 96, 108 pp.

Convocation of a chapter of the Congregation, draft regulations and the promulgation of new regulations.

c. "Zistavshy epyskopom..."

PL to the faithful, Meat-Fare Sunday [10 March] 1907.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1907. 38 pp.

KUL

On the bishop as preacher of the Word of God.

D: Botsian, pp. 127–28.

d. "Zblyzhaiut' sia chasy..."

PL to the clergy, 26 November 1907.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1908. 20 pp.

KUL, Stamford

On ecumenism and the unification of the Eastern Churches.

D: Botsian, pp. 129–30.

e. "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..."

Collective (3) PL to the clergy, December 1907.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1907. 30 pp.

KUL

On the need for clerical solidarity and Christian values in public life.

D: Botsian, pp. 130–31.

1908

a. "Ves'ma chasto sluchaetsia..." PL to clergy in Russia, March.

b. Sermon, Good Friday (24 April).

c. "My vzhe neraz..." Collective (3) PL to faithful, 1 May.

- d. "Poklykuiuchys' na torzhestvennu..." Administrative notice,
8 August.
- e. "V tim rotsi..." Collective (3) PL to clergy and faithful,
28 September.
- f. *O tsisarskim iuvyleiu* ("Dnia 2 hrudnia obkhodyt'..."). Collective (3)
PL to clergy and faithful, 2 November.

a. "Ves'ma chasto sluchaetsia..."

PL to the Greek Catholic clergy in Russia, March 1908.

08–95, Document no. 11, pp. 51–55.

On the paths to church unity.

b. Sermon, Good Friday (24 April 1908).

Nyva (L'viv) 5, no. 5 (1 May 1908): 285–87.

Dilo (L'viv) 29, no. 92 (1908), pp. 3–4.

Ruslan (L'viv) 22, no. 85 (1908): 1–2.

Halychany (L'viv) 28, no. 85 (1908): 1.

Tr (Polish): *Przegląd* (L'viv) 97 (26 April 1908).

A condemnation of the murder of Viceroy Andrzej Potocki.

D: Mykhailo Demkovych Dobrians'kyi, "Potots'kyi i Bobzhyns'kyi, tsisars'ki namisnyky Halychyny, 1903–1913," Part 1, *Bohosloviia* (Rome) 45, nos. 1–4 (1981): 115–16.

D: Ryszard Torzecki, "Sheptyts'kyi and Polish Society," *Life and Times*, p. 79.

c. "My vzhe neraz..."

Collective (3) PL to the faithful, 1 May 1908.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1908. 3, 13 pp.

KUL

R (excerpt): Mykhailo Demkovych Dobrians'kyi, "Potots'kyi i Bobzhyns'kyi, tsisars'ki namisnyky Halychyny, 1903–1913," Part 1, *Bohosloviia* (Rome) 45, nos. 1–4 (1981): 116–17.

Political sins, the dangers of engaging in politics "without God." More specifically, in reference to the assassination of Viceroy Andrzej Potocki by the student Myroslav Sichyns'kyi.

D: Botsian, pp. 131–32.

D: Dobrians'kyi, "Potots'kyi i Bobzhyns'kyi" (see 1908–b).

d. "Poklykuiuchys' na torzhestvennu..."

Administrative notice, 8 August 1908.

LAeV (L'viv) 20, no. 8 (8 August 1908).

R: in "Ad maiorem Poloniae gloriam," *Dilo* (L'viv) 29, no. 182 (14 August 1908), pp. 1-2.

A prohibition against clerical interference in the internal affairs of parishes other than their own.

D: "Ad maiorem Poloniae gloriam." A critique of Sheptytsky's alleged attempts to denationalize the Greek Catholic clergy.

D: Kost' Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky halyts'kykh ukraïntsiiv, 1848–1914* (L'viv: Nakladom vlasnym, 1926), pp. 494–95.

D: Baran, p. 33.

D: Volodymyr Doroshenko, "Mytropolyt A. Sheptyts'kyi na tli doby," *Lohos* (Yorkton, Sask.) 7, no. 4 (October-December 1956): 278–81.

e. "V tim rotsi..."

Collective (3) PL to the clergy and the faithful, 28 September 1908.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1908. 10 pp.

KUL

The fiftieth anniversary of the priesthood of Pius X.

D: Botsian, p. 132.

f. *O tsisarskim iuvyleiu* ("Dnia 2 hrudnia obkhodyt'...").

Collective (3) PL to the clergy and the faithful, 2 November 1908.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1908. 8 pp.

KUL

On the sixtieth anniversary of the coronation of Emperor Franz Joseph I.

D: Botsian, pp. 132–33.

1909

a. "De proximo conventu Velehradensi." ("Ex decreto...").

b. "Oratio Excellentissimi Praesidis." ("Electionem, qua me...").

c. *O viddaniu sia liubvi i myloserdiu Khrystovomu* ("Dnia 11 chervnia..."). PL to clergy, 19 April.

d. *O chastim sv[iatim] prychastiu* ("Vid davna vzhe ia..."). Collective (3) PL to faithful, 1 May.

e. *O chastim sv[iatim] prychastiu* ("Vid davna na tsilii..."). Collective (3) PL to clergy, 2 May.

f. *O viddaniu sia Khrystovii liubovy* ("V khvyli, koly..."). Collective (3) PL to faithful, 11 June.

g. [Slovo] na posviacheniu bursy ruskoho Tov[arystva] pedagogichnoho ("Stoimo na pochatku..."). Speech, 20 June.

h-i: Nacherk konstytutsii zhens'kykh monastyriv Ch.S.V.V. Halytskoï provintsii. Draft constitution, July.

j-k: *Vytiah z pravyl...Vasylia Velykoho ulozhenyi...Iosyfom V. Rutsnym Mytropolytom vseï Rusy. Konstytutsii zhens'kykh monastyriv Ch.S.V.V. Halytskoi provintsii.*

a. "De proximo conventu Velehradensi." ("Ex decreto...").

IOR *Slavorum litterae theologicae* (Prague) 5, no. 1 (1909): 64.
Tr (Russian): ("Soglasno postanovlenie..."), *ibid.*

A general invitation to the second congress at Velehrad. Co-signed by Aurelius Palmieri, OSA.

b. "Oratio Excellentissimi Praesidis." ("Electionem, qua me...").

IOR *Slavorum litterae theologicae* (Prague) 5, no. 3 (1909), pp. 186–89.

A salutation to the assembly of the second Velehrad Congress.

c. *O viddaniu sia liubvi i myloserdiu Khrystovomu* ("Dnia 11 chervnia...").

PL to the clergy, 19 April 1909.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1909. 11, 2 pp.

KUL

D: Botsian, p. 135.

d. *O chastim sv[iatim] prychastiu* ("Vid davna vzhe ia...").

Collective (3) PL to the faithful, 1 May 1909.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1909. 28 pp.

KUL, UCS-O

On the sacrament of the Eucharist.

See separate PL on the same subject to the clergy, 1909–e, below.

D: Botsian, p. 134.

e. *O chastim sv[iatim] prychastiu* ("Vid davna na tsilii...").

Collective (3) PL to the clergy, 2 May 1909.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1909. 19 pp.

KUL

On the sacrament of the Eucharist.

See separate PL on the same subject to the faithful, 1909–d, above.

D: Botsian, pp. 133–34.

f. *O viddaniu sia Khrystovii liubovy* ("V khvyli, koly...").

Collective (3) PL to the faithful, 11 June 1909.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1909. 18 pp.

KUL

On the Eucharist, Christ and salvation.

D: Botsian, p. 136.

g. [Slovo] na posviacheniu bursy ruskoho Tov[arystva] pedagogichnoho ("Stoimo na pochatku...").

Speech, 20 June 1909.

LUL *Nyva* (L'viv) 6 "feriial'ne chyslo" (July 1909): 654.

h-i: Nacherk konstytutsii zhens'kykh monastyriv Ch[yna] S[viatoho] V[asyliia] V[elykoho] Halytskoï provintsii.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1909. 22 pp.

KUL

h. "Koly v formi zariadu..." pp. 1–6.

PL introducing the new constitution.

i. Draft constitution in six sections: Rada (zahal'na i monastyr'ska), Ihumenia, Doradnytsi, Namistnytsia, Magistra novychok, Novitsiat, pp. 7–22.

The outline of a new constitution for the Basilian Sisters, issued 23 July 1909.

j-k: *Vytiah z pravyl Sv. Ottsia Nashoho Vasyliia Velykoho ulozhenyi dlia inokyn' Iosyfom Veliamynom Ruskym Mytropolytom vseï Rusy. Konstytutsii zhens'kykh monastyriv Ch.S.V.V. Halytskoï provintsii* [ed. Metropolitan Sheptytsky].

OSBM-R, IOR Z: OSBM, 1909. 108 pp.

j. *Prepodobnym v Khrysti Inokyniam Ch.S.V.V.* ("Rozvii Vashoho Chyna...").

PL to the Basilian nuns, 21 October 1909, pp. 3–13.

An introduction to the monastic regulations contained in the book.

k. "Besida Sv[iatoho] Ottsia Nashoho Vasyliia Velykoho o askezi" (pp. 15–19),

"Vytiah z pravyl Sv[iatoho] Ottsia Nashoho Vasyliia Velykoho" (pp. 21–73),

"Konstytutsii zhens'kykh monastyriv Chyna Sviatoho Vasyliia Velykoho Halytskoï provintsii" (pp. 75–95), "Monashi konstytutsii" (pp. 97–103), and "Shistdesiat dukhovnykh sententsii monashykh potribnykh i znamennykh" (pp. 105–8).

A collection of regulations and other constitutional materials for the Basilian nuns.

1910

a. *Z pravyl sv. o. nashoho Vasyliia Velykoho.*

b. *Piat' besid asketychnykh sv. o. nashoho Vasyliia Velykoho.*

c. *O Molytvi i tserkovnim pravylu* ("Zhytie khrystiian'ske iest'...").

PL to clergy, 20 March.

d. "Bud'te hotovi..." PL to faithful, 21 March.

e. "Skhyzmatytska agitatsiia..." Collective PL to clergy, 31 March.

f. "Z dushpastyrskoho oboviazku..." PL to faithful, 31 March.

g-h: *Typikon Studytskoi Lavry Sv. Antoniiia Pecherskoho v Sknylovi pid L'vovom*, 5 June.

i. "Hohes Haus! Wenn ich in der Budgetdebatte..." Speech to Austrian House of Lords, 28 June.

a. *Z pravyl sv[iatoho] ottsia nashoho Vasyliia Velykoho*.

OSBM-R, IOR Z: OSBM, 1910. 76 pp.

Excerpts from the Rule of St. Basil the Great, translated by Metropolitan Sheptytsky. On the aims of the monastic life: poverty, chastity and obedience, community life, councils, the hegumen, the novitiate and the rejection of the world.

b. *Piat' besid asketychnykh sv[iatoho] ottsia nashoho Vasyliia Velykoho*.

OSBM-R, IOR Z: OSBM, 1910. 48 pp.

Five ascetic tracts by Basil the Great, translated by Metropolitan Sheptytsky, with his critical opinion, dated 24 March 1910, on the question of the authenticity of the last two documents, pp. 46–48.

c. *O Molytvi i tserkovnim pravylu* ("Zhytie khrystiiian'ske iest'...").

PL to the clergy, 20 March 1910.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1910. 42 pp.

KUL

On prayer and grace in the Christian life.

D: Botsian, pp. 136–37.

d. "Bud'te hotovi..."

PL to the faithful, 21 March 1910.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1910. 26 pp.

KUL, Stamford,

UCS-O

On sin, death and sanctifying grace.

D: Botsian, p. 137.

e. "Skhyzmatytska agitatsiia..."

Collective PL to the clergy, 31 March 1910.

OSBM-R Z: OSBM, 1910. 22 pp.

On the opponents of the Catholic faith and the church.

D: Botsian, pp. 137–38.

f. "Z dushpastyrskoho oboviazku..."

PL to the faithful, 31 March 1910.

OSBM-R, KUL, Z: OSBM, 1910. 21 pp.

UCS-O

A teaching on peace and unity.

D: Botsian, p. 138.

g-h: *Typikon Studytskoi Lavry Sviatoho Antoniiia Pecherskoho v Sknylovi pid L'vovom*. [ed. Metropolitan Sheptytsky].

OSBM-R, IOR Z: OSBM, 1910. 47 pp.

g. "Monashe zhyttie, Brattia..."

PL to the Studites (signed "Mnolehryshnyi Bozhyi rab monakh Andrei, ihumen sknylivskoi Lavry"), pp. 1–33.

h. The Studite Monastic Constitution, issued 5 June 1906, with sections on: monastic poverty, angelic chastity, fasting, monastic obedience, clothing, daily schedule, prayer, silence, humility, work, etc. (pp. 35–47).

Typikon and constitution for the Studite monastery at Sknyliv, near L'viv.

i. "Hohes Haus! Wenn ich in der Budgetdebatte..."

Speech to the Austrian House of Lords.

*Stenographische Protokolle des Herrenhauses des
Österreichisches Reichsrates*. Vienna, 28 June 1910. 11
Sitzung der XX Session, pp. 286–88.

R: Kravcheniuk, pp. 112–17. (Title: "Die Notwendigkeit
einer ruthenischen Universität in Lemberg").

Tr (Ukrainian): "Koly zabyraiu holos..." in Kravcheniuk, pp.
117–21. (Title: "Potreba ukraïns'koho universytetu u
L'vovi").

On the importance of and the need for a Ukrainian university in L'viv.

1911

a. *Kanadiiskym rusynam* ("Ia obitsiav..."). Booklet for Ruthenians in
Canada, February.

b. *O molytvi* ("Iak shcho roku v chasi..."). PL to clergy and faithful,
12 February.

c. *Pravyla dlia monakhiv Sviatoho Ottsia Nashoho Vasyliia Velykoho*.

d. *Address on the Ruthenian Question to their Lordships the
Archbishops and Bishops of Canada* ("The Canadian
episcopate decided..."). Memorandum to Canadian
episcopate, 18 March.

e. "Zblyzhaiut' sia vybory..." Collective (3) PL to clergy, 10 May.

f. *V spravi opiky nad emigrantamy* ("Nynishna emigratsia..."), June 6.

g. *Promova... vyholoshena v stolitni rokovyny urodyn Markiiana*

Shashkevycha 5.XI.1911 nad mohyloiu poeta ("Ridko komu..."), November.

a. *Kanadiiskym rusynam* ("Ia obitsiav...").

Booklet for Ruthenians in Canada, February 1911.

KUL, IOR, UVAN, Z: OSBM, 1910. 93, 2 pp.

OSBM-R, Stamford,

UCS-O

R (excerpts): O. Sushko, *Za shcho halytskyi Mytropolyt muchytsia v moskovs'kii nevoli?* Winnipeg: Kanadiisko-ukraïnska Vydavnycha Spilka, 1914. pp. 24–31.

Catholic teachings for Ukrainians in Canada.

D: Botsian, p. 140.

b. *O molytvi* ("Iak shcho roku v chasi...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 12 February 1911.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1911. 32 pp.

KUL, UCS-O

On prayer.

D: Botsian, pp. 140–41.

c. *Pravyla dlia monakhiv Sviatoho Ottsia Nashoho Vasyliia Velykoho.*

OSBM-R, KUL Z: OSBM, 1911. 155 pp.

Regulations for the Basilian monks, translated and with a preface by Metropolitan Sheptytsky, pp. 3–26.

D: P. Filias, in *Analecta O.S.B.M.* (L'viv, 1928–30).

d. *Address on the Ruthenian Question to their Lordships the Archbishops and Bishops of Canada* ("The Canadian episcopate decided...").

Memorandum to the Canadian episcopate, 18 March 1911.

L'viv: n.p., 1910. 20 pp.

R: in *Two Documents of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, 1911–1976*, ed. M. H. Marunchak (Winnipeg: National Council of Ukrainian Organizations for the Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, 1977), pp. 5–25.

R: Bohdan Kazymyra, "Memoriial Mytr. Andreia z 18 bereznia 1911," *Lohos* (Yorkton) 10, no. 3 (1959–60): 230–31; no. 4: 303–6; 11, no. 1: 64–66; no. 2: 140–45.

Tr (Ukrainian): Bohdan Kazymyra, "Mytropolyt Andrii Sheptyts'kyi ta kanadiis'ki ukraïntsi," *Propamiatna Knyha Ottsiv Vasyliian u Kanadi* (Toronto: oo. Vasyliiany, 1953), pp. 125–49; and in Kazymyra, "Memoriial," *Lohos* (Yorkton) 10, no. 3 (1959–60): 227–30; 10, no. 4: 298–303; 11, no. 1: 60–64; 11, no. 2: 131–40.

Memorandum on the need for a Ukrainian Catholic bishop in Canada.

Copies of the official French-language version of the document are held at the Provincial Archives of the Oblate Fathers in Edmonton and at the Roman Catholic Archbishop's Chancery in St. Boniface. Ref: Kazymyra, "Memoriial," p. 147, n. 13.

D: Kazymyra, "Memoriial," pp. 143–47.

D: Vasyl' Markus', "Introduction" in *Two Documents*, pp. iii-x.

e. "Zblyzhaiut' sia vybory..."

Collective (3) PL to the clergy, 10 May 1911.

LAeV (L'viv) 23, no. 5 (16 May 1911): 67–69.

A reminder to observe Christian solidarity in view of the upcoming elections.

f. *V spravi opiky nad emigrantamy* ("Nynishna emigratsiia...").

LAeV (L'viv) 23, no. 7 (6 June 1911), M.O. N°37, pp. 80–84.

A plan to address various threats faced by Galician émigrés (e.g., slavery, prostitution, sectarian proselytizing).

g. *Promova... vyholoshena v stolitni rokovyny urodyn Markiiiana Shashkevycha 5.XI.1911 nad mohyloi poeta* ("Ridko komu...").

Nyva (L'viv) 8, no. 22 (November 1911): 689–92.

1912

a. *Pravyla sv. o. n. Vasylyia V[elykoho] Dlia liudy mirskykh.*

b. *Pamiatka dlia ruskykh robitnykiv v Nimechchyni, Frantsii, Spoluchenykh derzhavakh, Kanadi, Brazylії i Argentyni* ("İdete v neznanyi dlia sebe krai...").
November 1911 and March 1912.

a. *Pravyla sv[iatoho] ottsia n[ashoho] Vasylyia V[elykoho] Dlia liudy mirskykh.*

OSBM-R 2d ed. Z: OSBM, 1912. 32 pp. ("Arranged by the Rev. Andrei Sheptytsky, O.S.B.M., hegumen of the L'viv monastery of St. Onufrii.")

Rules and regulations for lay brotherhoods of St. Basil. (Such groups were usually mixed and composed of not less than ten members per chapter). An oath of obedience to the Catholic Church is also included.

b. *Pamiatka dlia ruskykh robitnykiv v Nimechchyni, Frantsii, Spoluchenykh derzhavakh, Kanadi, Brazylії i Argentyni* ("İdete v neznanyi dlia sebe krai...").

Booklet for émigré workers leaving Galicia, November 1911 and March 1912.
OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1912. 97 pp.

KUL

D: Botsian, pp. 141–142.

See 1914–a, below. 2d revised ed.

1913

- a. *Bozha siiba* (“Vyishov sivach siiaty...”).
 - b. “La mesure que vient de prendre...” Letter to Latin-rite bishops in Belgium, France and Switzerland, 23 March.
 - c. *O Iuvyleiu svobody tserkvy* (“I prystupl' Isus...”). Collective (3) PL to clergy and faithful, 12 May.
 - d. *Nasha vira i nashi obychai*. Brochure for the faithful, 26 May.
 - e. *O reformi vybornoho prava* (“Nastaly vazhni chasy...”). Collective (3) PL, 29 May.
 - f. *Z istorii i problem nashoi shtuky* (“Pamiatnyky shtuky i kul'tury...”). Speech, 13 December.
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- a. *Bozha siiba* (“Vyishov sivach siiaty...”).

IOR, OSBM-R, Z: OSBM, 1913. 135 pp.

KUL

A handbook for Christians containing teachings on a variety of topics.

Includes “Molytva za ruskyi narid” (pp. 129–31).

- b. “La mesure que vient de prendre...”

Letter to Latin-rite bishops in Belgium, France and Switzerland, 23 March 1913.

R: in Bohdan Kazymyra, “Starannia pro sezonovykh robitnykiv u frankomovnykh kraïnakh,” *Lohos* (Yorkton) 32, no. 3 (July-September 1981): 207–10.

Tr (Ukrainian): Kazymyra, “Starannia,” pp. 211–14.
 (“Napevno diishla...”).

A brief introduction to the religious tradition of Eastern-rite Catholic émigré workers, prepared for the information of Roman Catholic bishops.

- c. *O Iuvyleiu svobody tserkvy* (“I prystupl' Isus...”).

Collective (3) PL to the clergy and the faithful, 12 May 1913.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1913. 21 pp.

KUL

On the occasion of the 1600th anniversary of Constantine's Edict of Toleration, followed by a Ukrainian translation of a statement of 8 March 1913 by Pius XII on the same subject (“Spomynaiemo velyku shchaslyvu podiiu...”).

D: Botsian, p. 142.

d. *Nasha vira i nashi obychai*.

Brochure for the faithful, 26 May 1913.

IOR, OSBM-R Z: OSBM, 31 pp.

A short catechism, presented in point form.

e. *O reformi vybornoho prava* ("Nastaly vazhni chasy...").

Collective (3) PL, 29 May 1913.

IOR, OSBM-R [Z: OSBM] 1913. 7 pp.

On the desired changes to the electoral law.

D: Botsian, pp. 142–43.

f. *Z istorii i problem nashoi shtuky* ("Pamiatnyky shtuky i kul'tury...").

Dilo (L'viv) 24 (December 1913), no. 279 (15 December), pp. 1–2; no. 280 (16 December), pp. 1–2; no. 281 (17 December), pp. 1–2.

R: *Ameryka* (Philadelphia, December 1963): no. 238 (14 December), p. 2; no. 239 (17 December), p. 2; no. 240 (18 December), p. 2. ("Pamiatnyky mystetstva...").

Speech delivered at the opening of the National Museum in L'viv, 13 December 1913.

1914

a. *Pamiatky dlia ruskykh robitnykiv v Anhlії, Argentyni, Brazylії,*

Danії, Kanadi, Nimechchyni, Ziedynenykh derzhavakh Ameryky, Frantsії, Shvaitsariї i Shvetsії ("Їдете в неznanyi...").

b. "My chuly zaiavy..." Speech to Galician Diet, 26 January.

c. "Z ankiety polsko-ruskiej *Przeglądu Powszechnego*." ("Bez wątpienia..."). Letter to editor, May.

d. "Naimylostyviishyi nash Monarkh..." PL to faithful, 29 July.

e. "Pro memoria." ("Sobald eine siegreiche österreichische Armee...").

Memorandum to Austrian Government (Consul Urbas), 15 August.

f. "Prevazhna—dorohi—khvyliia..." PL to faithful, 21 August.

g. "Ziishlysia my, moi Vozliublenni..." Sermon, Sunday, 6 September.

a. *Pamiatky dlia ruskykh robitnykiv v Anhlії, Argentyni, Brazylії, Danії, Kanadi, Nimechchyni, Ziedynenykh derzhavakh Ameryky, Frantsії, Shvaitsariї i Shvetsії* ("Їдете в неznanyi...").

2d revised ed. L'viv: Nakladom T[ovaryst]va Sv. Rafaïla, 1914. 71 pp.

A revision of the 1912 book (see 1912–b).

D: Botsian, p. 143

b. “My chuly zaiavy...”

Speech to the Galician Diet. L'viv, 26 January 1914.

R: Kost' Levyts'kyi, “Z natsional'noï diial'nosti Mytropolyta Andreia hrafa Sheptyts'koho,” *Bohosloviia* (L'viv) 4, nos. 1–4 (1926): 42–43.

Speech to Polish and Ukrainian party representatives from the Galician Diet with proposals for a mutual agreement on electoral reform and an independent Ukrainian university.

c. “Z ankiety polsko-ruskiej *Przeglądu Powszechnego*.” (“Bez wątpienia...”).

Letter of May 1914 to the editor of *Przegląd Powszechny*.

NAC-BAZ vol. 1, *Przegląd Powszechny* (Cracow) 129, no. 385 (January file 35 1916), pp. 98–99. Includes Ukrainian version (“Bez sumnivu...”), pp. 99–101.

R: *Nyva* (L'viv) 12, no. 2 (February, 1916): 124–26.

Sheptytsky's reply to the survey question: “Beyond the disputed Polish-Ruthenian question, what matters are common to both ethnic groups?” Christian patriotism as the solution to the Polish-Ruthenian question.

d. “Naimylostyviishyi nash Monarkh...”

PL to the faithful, 29 July 1914.

LAeV (L'viv) 26, no. 9 (30 July 1914).

R: Dzerovych, pp. 96–97.

The war as an opportunity for Ukrainians to prove their loyalty to the Austrian emperor.

e. “Pro memoria.” (“Sobald eine siegreiche österreichische Armee...”).

Memorandum to the Austrian Government (Consul Urbas), 15 August 1914. 5 pp. MS.

R: *Ereignisse* 1, Document no. 4, pp. 8–11.

R: Petro Isaïv, “Memorandum Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho do Uriadiv tsentral'nykh Derzhav 3–15 serpnia 1914,” in *Bohosloviia* (Rome) 32, nos. 1–4 (1968): 36–38.

Tr (English): Kravcheniuk, pp. 121–24.

Tr (Ukrainian): Kravcheniuk, pp. 124–26.

Tr (Ukrainian): Isaïv (1968), pp. 39–41.

Tr (Ukrainian): *PPU*, Document no. 87, pp. 138–40.

Memorandum with proposals for the military, judicial and ecclesiastical reorganization of eastern Ukrainian lands after their anticipated takeover by Austria.

Kravcheniuk, p. 40, mentions that a copy of the memorandum, along with other archival materials, was confiscated by invading Russian forces in 1914. On

Sheptytsky's release from Russian exile in 1917, V. L. Burtsev, editor of the paper *Obshchee delo*, published the document in support of his argument that the ovations Sheptytsky had enjoyed in St. Petersburg were unwarranted. This would have been the first publication of the document.

The original document is located in the Austrian State Archives in Vienna under the reference Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Politische Abteilung 523, Liasse XLVII/11.

D: Isaiv (1968), pp. 30–76.

f. "Prevazhna—dorohi—khvyliia..."

PL to the faithful, 21 August 1914.

R: Dzerovych, pp. 99–100.

R: *PPU*, Document no. 85, pp. 135–36.

Tr (German): "Wir befinden uns..." *Ereignisse* 2, pp. 424–26.

As Russian forces advanced into Galicia, this appeal to the people urged them not to yield to pressure to betray the emperor and the church.

D: Botsian, pp. 143–44.

g. "Ziishlysia my, moi Vozliublenni..."

Sermon, Sunday, 6 September 1914.

R: Dzerovych, pp. 231–32.

R: *Tsars'kyi Viazen'* (1918), pp. 7–8.

R: "Propovid' o. mytropolyta Andreia hrafa Sheptyts'koho vyholoshena v Uspens'kii tserkvi u L'vovi," in Kost' Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia vyzvol'nykh zmahan' halyts'kykh Ukraïntsiiv z chasu svitovoï viiny, 1914–1918* (L'viv: Nakladom vlasnym, 1928), pp. 56–58.

R: Baran, p. 63.

R: *Svityl'nyk Istyny* 2 (1976), pp. 133–34.

Tr (Polish): "Kazanie ks. Metropolity Szeptyckiego," ("Zeszliśmy się..."), *Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiński* (Warsaw) 4, no. 30 (1935): 334.

Tr (German): ("Wir haben uns hier versammelt..."), in Prokoptschuk (1955), pp. 109–11; and Prokoptschuk (1967), pp. 138–39.

Tr (Russian): ("My sobralis' zdes'..."), in D. Vasilii, pp. 288–89.

The Metropolitan's sermon at the Church of the Dormition in L'viv, in which he distinguished between Ukrainian (ecclesiastical) and Russian (civil) Orthodoxy.

D: D. Doroshenko, "Spomyny pro perebuvannia mytr. Andriia Sheptyts'koho v Rosii za chasiv viiny," *Bohosloviia* (L'viv) 4 (1926): 59.

1917

- a. Statement to the revolutionary government in Russia. Petrograd.
- b. "Postanovleniia eparkhial'nogo sobora Greko-Kafolicheskoi Tserkvi, sostoiavshegosia v Petrograde ot 29–31 maia 1917 g. pod predsdatel'stvom Vysokopreosviashchenneishago Andreia Mitropolita Galitskogo." Petrograd, 31 May.
- c. Interview for *Journal de Genève* ("J'attribue ma libération..."). 13 August.
- d. Statement to Ukrainians in Vienna (1) ("My vsi perenesly..."). 26 August.
- e. Statement to Ukrainians in Vienna (2) ("Vy nacherknuly..."). 30 August.
- f. Statement to Ukrainians in Gmünd, Austria. ("Ne biitiesia, ditochky...").
- g. Speech to Ukrainians in L'viv. ("Velii iesy Hospody..."). 10 September.
- h. Homily in St. George's Cathedral. ("Koly ia tomu try roky..."). 10 September.

- a. Statement to the revolutionary government in Russia. Petrograd, 1917.
Tr (Ukrainian): "Vid Petra Velykoho..." in *Tsars'kyi Viazen'*, p. 54.

A proposal for the legalization of the Greek Catholic Church in post-tsarist Russia.

- b. "Postanovleniia eparkhial'nogo sobora Greko-Kafolicheskoi Tserkvi, sostoiavshegosia v Petrograde ot 29–31 maia 1917 g. pod predsdatel'stvom Vysokopreosviashchenneishago Andreia Mitropolita Galitskogo." Petrograd, 31 May 1917.

R: *Bohosloviia* (L'viv) 9 (1931): 292–97.

R: D. Vasilii, pp. 323–28.

R: *Tvory Kyr Iosyfa Verkhovnoho Arkhyiepyskopa i Kardynala*, comp. Ivan Khoma and Iurii Fedoriv, vols. 3–4 (Rome: Ukraïns'kyi Katolyts'kyi Universytet im. Sv. Klymenta Papy, 1970), pp. 75–83.

The document was signed by Metropolitan Andrei and by Exarch Leonid Fedorov.

D: Iosyf Slipyi, "Petrohrads'kyi Synod 1917 r.," *Bohosloviia* (L'viv) 9 (1931): 289–92.

D: Ivan Muzychka, "Ekumenichna diial'nist' Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho v Rosii v 1914–1917 rokakh," *Bohosloviia* (Rome) 47 (1983): 29–33.

c. Interview for *Journal de Genève* ("J'attribue ma libération..."). Fribourg, 13 August 1917.

R: *Ereignisse* 2, Document no. 445, pp. 437–39.

d. Statement to Ukrainians in Vienna (1) ("My vsi perenesly..."). Vienna, 26 August 1917.

R (excerpts): *Tsars'kyi Viazen'*, p. 91.

e. Statement to Ukrainians in Vienna (2) ("Vy nacherknuly..."). Vienna, 30 August 1917.

R (excerpts): *Tsars'kyi Viazen'*, pp. 106–7.

f. Statement to Ukrainians in Gmünd, Austria. ("Ne biitiesia, ditochky...").

R (excerpts): *Tsars'kyi Viazen'*, p. 114.

g. Speech to Ukrainians in L'viv. ("Velii iesy Hospody..."). L'viv, 10 September 1917.

R: *Tsars'kyi Viazen'*, pp. 171–74.

h. Homily in St. George's Cathedral. ("Koly ia tomu try roky..."). L'viv, 10 September 1917.

R: Kost' Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia vyzvol'nykh zmahan' halyts'kykh Ukraïntsiiv z chasu svitovoi viiny, 1914–1918*, vol. 2: 1917–1918 (L'viv: Drukarnia oo. Vasyliian u Zhovkvi, 1928), pp. 595–96.

R: *Tsars'kyi Viazen'*, p. 76.

1918

a. "Hlyboki i tiazhki..." Collective (3) PL to clergy and faithful, 21 February.

b. Speech before Austrian House of Lords (Herrenhaus) ("Es ist die Frage aufgeworfen..."). Vienna, 28 February.

c. *O vykhovaniu pytomtsiv i ievanhel's'kykh radakh* ("Kandydaty dukhovnoho stanu..."). Statement, 31 October.

a. "Hlyboki i tiazhki..."

Collective (3) PL to the clergy and the faithful, 21 February 1918.

OSBM-R, IOR, L'viv: Dilo, 1918. 14 pp.

KUL

On the effects of the war.

b. Speech before the Austrian House of Lords (Herrenhaus) ("Es ist die Frage aufgeworfen..."). Vienna, 28 February 1918.

Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Herrenhauses des österreichischen Reichsrates. Vienna, 28 February 1918. 28 Sitzung der XXII Session, pp. 809–12.

R: Kravcheniuk, pp. 127–32.

R: "Brest-Litowsker Friede," *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Munich) 30 (1965): 20–25.

Tr (Ukrainian): in Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia vyzvol'nykh zmahan' halyts'kykh Ukraïntsiiv*, pp. 760–64.

Tr (Ukrainian): "Bulo vydvyhnuto pytannia..." in Kravcheniuk, pp. 133–38.

Baran, pp. 80–82, gives a synopsis, paraphrasing the salient points.

c. *O vykhovaniu pytomtsiv i ievanhel's'kykh radakh* ("Kandydaty dukhovnoho stanu...").

LAeV (L'viv) 30, no. 5 (31 October 1918).

R: Pliaton Martyniuk, OSBM, *Nepodil'ne sertse Sviashchenyka v sluzhbi Boha i Tserkvy* (Zhovkva: Drukarnia oo. Vasyliian, 1935), pp. 204–9.

The Metropolitan's decision to reserve, for a period of twelve years, one-half of the places in the L'viv Seminary for candidates to the celibate priesthood.

D: Martyniuk, *Nepodil'ne sertse*, pp. 209–19.

1919

a. "Tekst protestu vyslanoho do myrovoi konferentsii" ("L'épiscopat ukrainien...") Letter, 27 July.

b. "Podobalo sia Vsevyshn'omu..." Collective (3) PL to clergy and faithful, 26 August.

c. Do Nuntsiia v Varshavi ("Nos Ruthenorum..."). Letter, 28 August.

d. "Violentiis de quibus..." Letter, 23 October.

e. "Auctoritates militares..." Letter, 23 October.

a. "Tekst protestu vyslanoho do myrovoi konferentsii" ("L'épiscopat ukrainien...")
LNB Manuscript.

Manuscript Division
no. O/N-1069

07-94, pp. 481-82.

Tr (Ukrainian): ("Ukrains'kyi iepyskopat..."), in 07-94, p. 481n.

Letter dated 27 July 1919 to the Peace Conference in Paris. A protest against acts of violence by Polish military forces.

b. "Podobalo sia Vsevyshn'omu..."

Collective (3) PL to the clergy and the faithful, 26 August 1919.

OSBM-R, IOR, Peremyshl': Drukarnia Hr.-Kat. Kapituly, 1919. 7 pp.

KUL

On the post-war occupation of Eastern Galicia.

c. Do Nuntsiia v Varshavi ("Nos Ruthenorum...")

LNB Manuscript.

Manuscript Division

no. O/N-1069

07-94, pp. 483-84

Tr (Ukrainian): ("Kozhen iz nas...") in 07-94, p. 483n.

Letter dated 28 August 1919 to the Nuncio in Warsaw. On the social crisis in Galicia.

d. "Violentiis de quibus..."

LNB Manuscript.

Manuscript Division

no. O/N-1069

07-94, p. 486.

Tr (Ukrainian): ("Do tykh nasyl'stv...") in 07-94, p. 486n.

Letter dated 23 October 1919 to the Nuncio in Warsaw. On violence against Ukrainians by Polish military authorities.

e. "Auctoritates militares..."

LNB Manuscript.

Manuscript Division

no. O/N-1069

07-94, p. 487.

Tr (Ukrainian): ("Pol's'ki viis'kovi vlasti...") in 07-94, p. 487n.

Second letter dated 23 October 1919 to the Nuncio in Warsaw. On the appointment of Roman Catholic hospital chaplains for ministry to Greek Catholics.

1921

- a. "Pys'mo Sviatishoho Ottsia do Ukraïns'koho narodu." ("Vid 1914 r. ia ne buv v Rymi..."). Introduction and comments, 28 February.
- b. "Prashchal'ne pys'mo Arkhipastyria." ("Vyïzdzhaiuchy do Ameryky..."). Message, 5 July.
- c. "La Mission du monachisme dans la cause de l'union des Eglises." Statement, 18 December.

- a. "Pys'mo Sviatishoho Ottsia do Ukraïns'koho narodu." ("Vid 1914 r. ia ne buv v Rymi...").
Rome, 28 February 1921. 4 pp.
LAeV (L'viv) 34, no. 2 (20 April 1921): 1–2, 5–6.
Nyva (L'viv) 16, no. 4 (April 1921): 101–4.

Introduction and follow-up comments to a letter of Pope Benedict XV to Metropolitan Sheptytsky for the Ukrainian people, "Il dolore che Noi provammo...," *LAeV* (L'viv) 34, no. 2 (20 April 1921): 2–5.

- b. "Prashchal'ne pys'mo Arkhipastyria." ("Vyïzdzhaiuchy do Ameryky...").
Antwerp, 5 July 1921. 1 p.

TsDIA, f. 408, Flyer, printed by *Dilo* in L'viv.
op. 1, spr. 7, ark. 1

A word of guidance and farewell to the clergy and faithful of the L'viv Archeparchy prior to embarking on his voyage to the Americas.

- c. "La Mission du monachisme dans la cause de l'union des Eglises."
Rome, 18 December 1921.
Bulletin des Missions (Bénédictines Belges) (Abbaye de St-André par Lophen, Bruges) 6 (1921): 181–89.
R: *Stoudion—Bulletin des Eglises de Rite Byzantin* (Rome) 1, no. 1 (1923): 10–12; no. 2: 33–40.

1922

- a. "Vzhe druhyi rik..." Letter to the Ukrainian people, 21 March.
- b. *Address of Archbishop Andrew Szeptycki about the Catholic Missionary Work in What Once Formed the Russian Empire* ("With the fall of the Tsar...").

- c. Address at St. Augustine's Seminary, Toronto. ("I will first speak..."). 26 August.

- a. "Vzhe druhyi rik..." Letter to the Ukrainian people, 21 March 1922.

LAeV (L'viv) 35, no. 3 (25 May 1925): 1–3.

(Written in transit from New York City to Brazil).

b-c:

- b. *Address of Archbishop Andrew Szeptycki about the Catholic Missionary Work in What Once Formed the Russian Empire* ("With the fall of the Tsar...").

New York: n.p., 1922. 16 pp.

A revised version of the talk given at St. Augustine's Seminary in Toronto (1922–c).

- c. Address at St. Augustine's Seminary, Toronto. ("I will first speak...").

Toronto, 26 August 1922.

R: "Archbishop Andrew Szeptyckyj in Canada (1922),"

Analecta O.S.B.M. (Rome), Series 2, Sectio 2, vol. 3 (1958): 104–10.

1923

- a. "Le rôle des occidentaux dans l'oeuvre de l'union des églises." ("Parmi tous les chrétiens..."). Lecture, 18 February.
- b. "La restauration du Monachisme Slave." ("Depuis la Révolution russe...").
- c. "Shche zaky vernu do L'vova..." PL to clergy and faithful [29 June] 1923.
- d. "Pro 300–litnii Iuvilei muchenyts'koï smerty Sv. Iosafata Arkhiiepyskopa Polots'koho." ("Laskavyi i myloserdnyi Boh..."). Collective (6) PL to clergy and faithful [14 October] 1923.
- e. "Iuvylei sv. svm. Iosafata..." Instruction to clergy, 15 October.

- a. "Le rôle des occidentaux dans l'oeuvre de l'union des églises." ("Parmi tous les chrétiens...").

Rome, 18 February 1923.

Stoudion—Bulletin des Eglises de Rite Byzantin (Rome) 3, no. 6 (December 1926): 153–69; 4, no. 1 (February 1927): 3–18; 4, no. 2 (April 1927): 49–60.

Tr (Dutch): "De Rol van de Westerlingen in het Apostolaat van de Hereniging" ("Onder alle niet-katholieke Christenen..."), trans. J. F. Th. Perridon (Nijmegen: Instituut voor Byzantijnse Studien, 1959), pp. 5ff.

Tr (Ukrainian) Ref: Bazylevych, p. B/139, n. 21.

Lecture delivered in Rome on 18 February 1923.

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- b. "La restauration du Monachisme Slave." ("Depuis la Révolution russe...").
Bulletin des Missions (Bénédictines Belges) (Abbaye de St-André par Lophen, Bruges) 6 (1923): 491–99.
 (Offprint): Mgr. André Szeptycky, *La restauration du monachisme slave*, Les questions missionnaires, fasc. 2 (Abbaye de St-André, Lophen lez-Bruges: Imprimerie du "Bulletin des Missions," [1923]), pp. 5–13.
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- c. "Shche zaky vernu do L'vova..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful on the Feast of SS. Peter and Paul [29 June] 1923.

LAeV (L'viv) 36, no. 3 (5 September 1923): 1–5.

R (excerpt): *Dilo* (L'viv) 41, no. 134 (16 September 1923).

Tr (French): "Lettre pastorale de Mgr. André Szeptycki, Archevêque de Léopol," ("Avant de rentrer à Léopol..."), (Abbaye de St. Paul hors les murs [Rome]: n.p., 1923), 9 pp. In *BetC*, vol. 17: "Scripta Unionistica et Alia Opera" (Rome, 1965), pp. 62–69.

- d. "Pro 300-litnii Iuvilei muchenyts'koï smerty Sv. Iosafata Arkhiiepyskopa Polots'koho." ("Laskavyi i myloserdnyi Boh...").

Collective (6) PL to the clergy and the faithful on the Feast of the Most Holy Theotokos the Protectress [14 October] 1923.

OSBM-R, IOR, Z: OSBM, 1923. 19 pp.

KUL, BJ

- e. "Iuvylei sv[iato]ho sv[iashchen]m[uchenyka] Iosafata..."

Instruction to the clergy, 15 October 1923.

LAeV (L'viv) 36, no. 4 (25 October 1923): 1–7.

On the organization and planning of celebrations for the jubilee year of St. Josaphat.

1924

- a. "Vidozva v spravi ukr. kat. Tserkvy u Kyïvi" ("U khvyliakh naibil'shoho peresliduvannia..."). Collective (3) appeal, 1 December.
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a. "Vidozva v spravi ukr[aïns'koï] kat[olyts'koï] Tserkvy u Kyïvi" ("U khvyliakh naibil'shoho peresliduvannia...")

Collective (3) appeal, 1 December 1924.

LAeV (L'viv) 38, no. 1 (1 February 1925): 3.

An appeal for financial assistance for the Church of the Sacred Heart of Christ in Kyiv.

1925

a. "Zakon o poperedzhaiuchii tsenzuri knyh." ("Ponezhe oboviazuiuchi..."). Collective (4) directive, 9 April.

b. "La psychologie de l'Union." ("Parmi toutes les questions..."). Article, 23 October.

c. "Discours de Clôture." ("Après l'exposé lumineux..."). Article, 6 November.

a. "Zakon o poperedzhaiuchii tsenzuri knyh." ("Ponezhe oboviazuiuchi...").

Collective (4) directive, 9 April 1925.

LAeV (L'viv) 38, no. 2 (15 April 1925).

R: "Tsenzura," *Nyva* (L'viv) 20, no. 5 (May 1925): 147–50.

b. "La psychologie de l'Union." ("Parmi toutes les questions...").

La Revue Catholique des Idées et des Faits (Brussels) 5, no. 31 (23 October 1925): 5–10.

c. "Discours de Clôture." ("Après l'exposé lumineux...").

La Revue Catholique des Idées et des Faits (Brussels) 5, no. 33 (6 November 1925): 7–9.

1926

a. "Deux mentalités; Orthodoxe et Catholique." ("Plus on rencontre..."). Statement [19 May].

b. "Promova nad domovynoiu bl. p. iep. Iosyfa [Botsiana]." ("Spomynaiuchy pomershykh pravednykiv..."). Eulogy, November.

a. "Deux mentalités; Orthodoxe et Catholique." ("Plus on rencontre...").

- L'viv, on the Feast of the Prophet Job “ò polyathlos” [19 May] 1926.
- Irénikon* (Prieuré d'Amay s/Meuse, Belgium) 1, no. 5 (August 1926): 229–38; 1, no. 6 (September 1926): 261–66.
- Tr (English): “Catholic and Orthodox Mentality” (“Now that the return...”), *Commonweal* (New York) 12, no. 23 (8 October 1930): 570–74.
- Tr (English): “Eastern and Western Mentality,” *Pax* (Caldey Abbey, Gloucester) 22, no. 135 (January 1933): 227–32; 23, no. 138 (April 1933): 2–6.
- Tr (English): *Eastern Churches Quarterly* (London) 9, no. 8 (1952): 392–401.
- Tr (Italian): “Mentalità orientale e mentalità occidentale” (“Il ritorno individuale...”), *L'Oriente cristiano e l'Unità della Chiesa* (Rome) 19, no. 4 (1941): 86–89; 19, no. 5: 101–4.
- Tr (German): “Die östliche und die westliche Mentalität” (“Heute, da die individuelle...”), *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Munich) 3 (1954): 21–28.
- Tr (Dutch): “Twee Mentaliteiten: de Psychologie van de Hereniging,” (“Dikwijls en duidelijk heeft...”), *Periodieke Uitgave van het Geert Groote Genootschap* (Mariënborg and 's Hertogenbosch) 708 (1958): 8–36.
- D: Michael Williams and Julia Kernan, *The Catholic Church in Action* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), pp. 266–67.
- D: Mykhailo Hrynchyshyn, “Za pohlyblennia ekkleziolohii Ukraïns'koï Katolyts'koï Tserkvy,” *Lohos* (Yorkton) 26, no. 4 (October-December 1975): 254–55.

b. “Promova nad domovynoiu bl. p. iep. Iosyfa [Botsiana].” (“Spomynaiuchy pomershykh pravednykiv...”).

LUL *Nyva* (L'viv) 21, nos. 11–12 (November-December 1926): 372–76.

Eulogy for the late Bishop Botsian, with a discussion of the situation of the Church in Volhynia, Podlachia, and the Kholm region, and on the Christian understanding of suffering.

1927

- a. "Russkii katolicheskii ekzarkhat v Rossii." ("Mnogochislennye puti..."). Article.
- b. "Pro poboriuvannia vorozhoï Tserkvi propagandy." ("Chas Velykodnoï Spovidy..."). PL to clergy, May 1927.
- c. "Spravedlyvyi dopust..." Collective (4) PL to clergy and faithful [1 July 1927].
- d. "Per tres dies..." Closing remarks at fifth unionistic congress.

- a. "Russkii katolicheskii ekzarkhat v Rossii." ("Mnogochislennye puti...").
in *Ex Oriente: Religiöse und philosophische Probleme des Ostens und des Westens*, ed. Ludwig Berg (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald-Verlag, 1927), pp. 66–77.
Tr (German): "Das russische katholische Exarchat"
("Mannigfaltig sind..."), *Ex Oriente* (1927): 78–89.

- b. "Pro poboriuvannia vorozhoï Tserkvi propagandy." ("Chas Velykodnoï Spovidy...").
PL to the clergy, May 1927.
LAeV (L'viv) 40, no. 5 (25 May 1927), M.O. N°17, pp. 1–5.
R (excerpts): *PPU*, Document no. 112, pp. 179–81.

- c. "Spravedlyvyi dopust..."
Collective (4) PL to the clergy and the faithful [1 July 1927].
KUL N.p., n.d., 26 pp.
A discussion of the spiritual dangers of apostasy and loss of faith in the midst of sectarian proselytizing among Ukrainians.

- d. "Per tres dies..."
in *Acta V Conventus Velehradensis Anno MCMXXVII, post S. Cyrillum Natum MC.* (Olomouc: Sumptibus Academiae Velehradensis, 1927), pp. 63–66.
Closing remarks to the fifth unionistic congress at Velehrad.

1929

- a. Inaugural document for the establishment of the L'viv Theological Academy. ("Nebesnyi nash Spasytel'...").
22 February.

- b. "Koly tomu dva roky..." PL to clergy and faithful on the Feast of St. Oleksii [30 March].
- c. *Codificazione Orientale. Voto di Monsignor Szeptyckyj, Metropolita Ruteno, sul modo di procedere*. ("On peut concevoir..."). Proposals for codification of canon law, 1 June.
- d. "Promova na sviatochnim vidkryttiu Hreko-katolyts'koï Bohoslovs'koï Akademii" (Oratio occasione inaugurationis Gr-cath. Academiae Theologicae habita). ("Kolyby my buly obkhodyly...") Speech, 6 October.
- e. "Einleitung." ("Das alte russische Kaiserreich..."). Introductory article, October.
- f. "Post novem dierum..." Speech, 29 October.
- g. "Vvedennia." ("Shchoby zrozumity velyku vahu..."). In *Asketychni Tvory Sv. Ottsia Nashoho Vasyliia Velykoho* (Opera Ascetica S. Basilii Magni). Introduction to translation.

a. Inaugural document for the establishment of the L'viv Theological Academy. ("Nebesnyi nash Spasytel'...").
 L'viv, 22 February 1929. M.O. N°14.
 R: in Vasyli' Lentsyk, "Bohoslovs'ka Akademiia u L'vovi," *Lohos* (Yorkton) 9, no. 1 (January-March 1958): 11–12.

b. "Koly tomu dva roky..."
 PL to the clergy and the faithful on the Feast of St. Oleksii [30 March] 1929.
LAeV (L'viv) 42, no. 4 (April 1929).

On almsgiving.

c. *Codificazione Orientale. Voto di Monsignor Szeptyckyj, Metropolita Ruteno, sul modo di procedere*. ("On peut concevoir...").
 L'viv, 1 June 1929.
 N.p., S. Cong. "Pro Ecclesia Orientali," n.d. 18 pp.
 in *BetC*, vol. 17, "Scripta Unionistica et Alia Opera" (Rome, 1965), pp. 86–103.

The Metropolitan's proposals for the codification of Eastern canon law, especially with regard to marriage.

d. "Promova na sviatochnim vidkryttiu Hreko-katolyts'koï Bohoslovs'koï Akademii" (Oratio occasione inaugurationis Gr-cath. Academiae Theologicae habita). ("Kolyby my buly obkhodyly...")

L'viv, 6 October 1929.

Bohosloviia (L'viv) 8, no. 1 (1930): 1–4.

Speech at the opening of the Greek Catholic Theological Academy in L'viv.

e. "Einleitung." ("Das alte russische Kaiserreich...").

L'viv, October 1929.

in *Die Kirche und das östliche Christentum: Ukraine und die kirchliche Union* (Berlin: Die katholische Emigrantenfürsorge, 1930), pp. 8–10.

f. "Post novem dierum..."

Rome, 29 October 1929.

R: Petro Khomyn, "Konferentsiia ukraïns'koho hr.-kat. Epyskopatu v Rymi," *Nyva* (L'viv) 24, no. 11 (November, 1929): 434–39.

Speech at a papal audience in Rome following the conclusion of the Ukrainian Catholic Episcopal conference (21–29 October 1929).

g. "Vvedennia." ("Shchoby zrozumity velyku vahu...").

in *Asketychni Tvory Sv. Ottsia Nashoho Vasyliia Velykoho* (Opera Ascetica S. Basilii Magni), trans. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, Pratsi Bohoslovs'koho Naukovoho Tovarystva i Hr.-Kat. Bohoslovs'koï Akademii u L'vovi, vols. 4–5 (Zhovkva: Drukarnia oo. Vasyliian, 1929), pp. iii–xiv.

The Metropolitan's introduction to his translation of the "Opera Ascetica" of St. Basil the Great. A study of the significance of St. Basil's ascetic works in his own time and their impact on later Christian thought.

Unsigned; authorship is attributed to Metropolitan Sheptytsky by Basilius Wawryk, "De S. Scripturae apud S. Basilium Studio Auctoritate et Usu," *Analecta O.S.B.M.* (Rome), Series 2, Sectio 2, vol. 10 (16), fasc. 1–4 (1979): p. 7, n. 45.

1930

a. "Diliusia z Vamy..." PL to clergy and faithful, February.

b. "Zariadzhennia torzhestvennoho Bohosluzhennia nadolozhennia za znevahy Boha i sviatotatstva bol'shevyzmu..." ("Sviatotats'ka borot'ba na Radianshchyni..."). Directive, February.

c. "Moï spohady pro predmet Muzeinykh Zbirok." ("V znamenytti povisti pro Leonarda da Vinchi..."). Article.

d. "Rozmova z Mytr. Andreiem." Interview, October.

- e. "Khrystova Tserkva, shcho stoit' na storozhi..." Collective (7) PL to clergy and faithful, 13 October.
- f. "Pid odyń prapor." ("Vazhki chasy i nablyzhaiuchisia..."). Appeal, 22 October.
- g. "Interviu Vpreosv. Mytropolyta." Interview, October.

a. "Diliusia z Vamy..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, February 1930.

LAeV (L'viv) 43, no. 2 (25 February 1930), M.O. N°1, pp. 13–14.

On the appointment of Ivan Buchko as auxiliary bishop.

b. "Zariadzhennia torzhestvennoho Bohosluzhennia nadolozhennia za znevahy Boha i sviatotatstva bol'shevyzmu ta vsi zhertvy peresliduvannia khrystiians'koï viry v Radians'kii Ukraïni, Bilorusy i Rosii v tsily uproshennia zakinchennia tykh peresliduvan'." ("Sviatotats'ka borot'ba na Radianshchyni...").

LAeV (L'viv) 43, no. 2 (25 February 1930), M.O. N°12, pp. 14–16.

c. "Moï spohady pro predmet Muzeinykh Zbirok." ("V znamenyti povisti pro Leonarda da Vinchi...").

in *V 25–littia Natsional'noho Muzeiu u L'vovi, 1905–1930*, ed. Ilarion Svientsits'kyi (L'viv, 1931), pp. 1–3.

R: *L'viv: Literaturno-mystets'kyi zbirnyk* (Philadelphia: "Kyïv," 1954), pp. 116–20.

Tr (German): "Metropolit Andreas Scheptytzkyj über die Ikonen-Malerei," in Prokoptschuk (1955), pp. 265–70; and in *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Munich) 4, nos. 2–3 (1955): 73–78.

d. "Rozmova z Vysokopreosviashchenym Mytropolytom Andreiem."

Dilo (L'viv) 51, no. 222 (7 October 1930), p. 1.

Tr (English): "An Interview with the Right Rev. Metropolitan Andrew," in *Polish Atrocities in Ukraine*, comp. and ed. by Emil Revyuk (New York: United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States, 1931), pp. 186–88.

Interview with the Metropolitan after his meetings with Polish government officials in Warsaw about the pacification campaign.

D: "Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi u Ministra Skladkovs'koho," *Dilo* (L'viv) 51, no. 220 (4 October 1930), p. 4.

e. "Khrystova Tserkva, shcho stoit' na storozhi..."

Collective (7) PL to the clergy and the faithful, 13 October 1930.

Nyva (L'viv) 25, no. 10 (October 1930): 365–67. Censored text, reprinted from *Dilo*. See also *Nyva* (L'viv) 25, no. 10.

Nova Zoria (L'viv) 4 (26 October 1930). Censored text.

R: *Ukrains'ka suspil'no-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti*, comp. T. Hunczak and R. Solchanyk (n.p.: Suchasnist', 1983), 2: 337–39.

Tr (German): “Die Kirche Christi...,” *Katholische Kirchenzeitung* (Salzburg) 48 (1930), p. 420. Full text.

Tr (French): “Eglise du Christ...,” *Le Monde Slave* (Paris) 8, no. 3 (March 1931): 425–27. Full text.

A protest against the pacification campaign.

D: “Skonfiskovane pastyrs'ke poslaniie nashykh vladyk,” *Nyva* (L'viv) 25, no. 9 (September 1930): 363–65.

f. “Pid odyn prapor.” (“Vazhki chasy i nablyzhaiuchisia...”).

L'viv, 22 October 1930.

Nyva (L'viv) 25, no. 10 (October 1930): 361–62.

A call to organize Catholic Union associations. (This issue of *Nyva* marked “after confiscation, second printing”).

See 1930–d above.

g. “Interviu Vysokopreosviashchenoho Mytropolyta.”

Nyva (L'viv) 25, no. 10 (October 1930): 375–76.

Clarifications about the nature and purpose of Catholic Union.

1931

a. “Virnist' Tradytsii.” (“U preharno vidnovlenim khrami...”). Speech, March.

b. “Pro Obriadovi Spravy.” (“Dvi prevazhni podii...”). PL to clergy, 13 April.

a. “Virnist' Tradytsii.” (“U preharno vidnovlenim khrami...”).

Nyva (L'viv) 26, no. 3 (March 1931): 81–85.

R: 05–83, pp. 93–97.

Speech on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the consecration of the Church of the Dormition of the Blessed Virgin in L'viv.

b. “Pro Obriadovi Spravy.” (“Dvi prevazhni podii...”).

PL to the clergy, 13 April 1931.

Meta (L'viv) 1, no. 6 (19 April 1931): 1–2.

Dilo (L'viv) 52, no. 85 (21 April 1931).

R: 05–83, pp. 97–104.

On the appointment of Mykola Charnets'kyi as Apostolic Visitor for the Eastern Catholic rite in Poland; Rome on the Eastern rite outside Galicia.

D: *Dilo* (L'viv) 52, no. 84 (19 April 1931), p. 1.

D: "Pastyrs'kyi lyst Vysokopreosv. Mytropolyta Andreia," *Nyva* (L'viv) 26, no. 4 (April 1931): 154–56.

1932

- a. "Slovo Mytropolyta do Ukraïns'koï Molodi." ("Moi oboviazky suproty Vas..."). Statement, May.
 - b. "I stalosia odnoho dnia..." PL to clergy and faithful, May.
 - c. "V khvyli, koly..." PL to faithful, June.
 - d. "Symvoly Isusa Khrysta: Zhertvennyk." ("Zahal'no vidomo, shcho Tserkva..."). Statement, June.
 - e. "Bozha Mudrist'." ("Vsi ukraïntsi vysoko tsiniat'..."). Statement.
 - f. "Z vykladiv pro asketyku." ("Zmahannia pratsi ta borot'by..."). Statement, December.
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- a. "Slovo Mytropolyta do Ukraïns'koï Molodi." ("Moi oboviazky suproty Vas...").
L'viv: Nakladom Vydavnychoï Kooperatyvy "Meta," 1932.
8 pp.
R: *Dilo* (L'viv) 53, no. 111 (22 May 1932), p. 1.
Tr (Polish): "Słowo do młodzieży ukraińskiej," ("Obowiązki moje..."), *Sprawy Narodowościowe* (Warsaw) 6, nos. 4–5 (July–September 1932): 467–70.
R: 05–83, pp. 104–8.
-

- b. "I stalosia odnoho dnia..."
PL to the clergy and the faithful, May 1932.
LAeV (L'viv) 45, no. 5 (15 May 1932): 1–3.
R: 05–83, pp. 3–5.
-

- c. "V khvyli, koly..."
PL to the faithful, June 1932.
LAeV (L'viv) 45, no. 6 (15 June 1932): 1–9.
R: 05–83, pp. 9–16.
-

- d. "Symvoly Isusa Khrysta: Zhertvennyk." ("Zahal'no vidomo, shcho Tserkva...").
Nyva (L'viv) 27, no. 6 (June 1932): 201–3.
On liturgical symbols.

See also 1933–b.

e. "Bozha Mudrist'." ("Vsi ukraïntsi vysoko tsiniat'...").

LAeV (L'viv) 45, no. 10 (1932): 1–12; no. 11: 1–41; no. 12: 1–33; 46, no. 1 (1933): 1–26; no. 2: 37–40.

R: 03–78, pp. 3–126.

On divine wisdom.

D: Petro Kostiuk, "Die göttliche Weisheit in den Schriften 'Bosha Mudrist' und 'Chrystianska Pravednist' des Metropoliten Andrej Scheptyckyj," Ph.D. dissertation, Pontificia Università Urbaniana (Rome), in progress.

f. "Z vykladiv pro asketyku." ("Zmahannia pratsi ta borot'by...").

Nyva (L'viv) 27, no. 12 (December 1932): 425–28; 28, no. 1 (1933): 3–7; no. 3: 89–92; no. 4: 129–32.

On the nature and sources of ascetical theology, with reference to the New Testament epistles of SS. Paul and James.

1933

a. "Rozmowa z J.E. Metropolita Szeptyckim." Interview, 2 April.

b. "Liturgichni symvoly Khrysta: Nerukotvorena Ikona Khrysta." ("Do liturgichnykh symvoliv Isusa..."). Statement, May.

c. "Vytaite u L'vovi!..." Speech, May.

d. "Hramotoiu z dnia 6 travnia ts[eho] r[oku]..." PL to clergy and faithful, 14 July.

e. "Ukraïna v peredsmertnykh sudorohakh..." Collective (7) PL, Feast of St. Olha (24 July).

f. "Trylitnyi katekhytychnyi kurs." ("Konferentsiia vsikh nashykh..."). Statement, August.

g. "Protestuiuchy nedavno..." Collective (6) PL to clergy and faithful, 17 October.

h. "Dukhovna Semynariia tse symvol Tserkvy (Slovo v den' 150–litnoho iuvyleiu Dukhovnoï Seminarii.)" ("V torzhestvennyi den'..."). Speech, November.

a. "Rozmowa z J.E. Metropolita Szeptyckim."

Bunt Młodych (Warsaw) 39 (2 April 1933).

R: *Zeszyty Historyczne* (Paris) 71 (1985): 119–21.

b. "Liturgichni symvoly Khrysta: Nerukotvorena Ikona Khrysta." ("Do liturgichnykh symvoliv Isusa...").

Nyva (L'viv) 28, no. 5 (May 1933): 172–75.

c. "Vytaite u L'vovi!..."

Speech, 1933.

LUL

Nyva (L'viv) 28, no. 5 (May 1933): 187–88.

Speech to the Ukrainian Catholic Youth festival Ukraïns'ka Molod' Khrystovi.

d. "Hramotoiu z dnia 6 travnia ts[eho] r[oku]..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 14 July 1933.

LAeV (L'viv) 46, no. 7 (15 July 1933): 102–3.

Nomination of members of the Council of Catholic Action of Ukrainian Youth: the president, Andrii Mel'nyk; eight members; and a chaplain, Rev. Roman Chaikovs'kyi. See also 1934–h.

e. "Ukraïna v peredsmertnykh sudorohakh..."

Collective (7) PL, Feast of St. Olha (24 July) 1933.

LAeV (L'viv) 46, no. 7 (15 July 1933): 101–2.

R: *Dilo* (L'viv) 194 (27 July 1933).

R: *Nyva* (L'viv) 28, no. 8 (August 1933): 281–82.

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R: in *Riatunkova Aktsiia dlia Velykoï Ukraïny*, comp. Andrii Zhuk (L'viv: Nakladom Ukraïns'koho Hromads'koho Komitetu Riatunku Ukraïny u L'vovi, 1933), Document no. 5, pp. 50–51.

Tr (French): "L'Ukraine à l'agonie: lettre de l'épiscopat grec-catholique d'Ukraine polonaise (24.7.33)," *La Documentation Catholique* (Paris) 30, no. 670 (9 October 1933): 323–24.

Tr (Polish): "Z halickiej prowincji kościelnej: o ratunek dla głodnych na Ukrainie" ("Ukraina znajduje się w konwulsjach przedśmiertnych..."), *Oriens* (Cracow) 1, no. 4 (15 August 1933): 115.

Tr (English): *Pax* (Caldey Abbey, Gloucester) 32, no. 144 (October 1933): 165–66.

Tr (English): "Ukraine is in agony..." in *First Victims of Communism: White Book on the Religious Persecution in Ukraine* (Rome: Analecta O.S.B.M., 1953), pp. 14–16, n. 10.

Tr (English): "Ukraine is suffering..." Andrii Krawchuk, "Protesting against the Famine: The Statement of the Ukrainian Catholic Bishops in 1933," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* (Toronto) 8, no. 2 (Winter 1983): 59–62.

Tr (Italian): "L'Ucraina in agonia..." in *Primi incatenati... Libro bianco sulla persecuzione religiosa in Ucraina* (Rome: [Analecta O.S.B.M.], 1953), pp. 14–15, n. 10.

D: *Nyva* (L'viv) 28, no. 8 (August 1933): 282–84;

D: *Riatunkova Aktsiia dlia Velykoï Ukraïny*, comp. A. Zhuk (1933).

See also the related document, 1933–g, below.

f. "Trylitnyi katekhytychnyi kurs." ("Konferentsiia vsikh nashykh...").

LAeV (L'viv) 46, no. 8 (15 August 1933): 126–27.

R: 05–83, pp. 17–18.

g. "Protestuiuchy nedavno..."

Collective (6) PL to the clergy and the faithful, 17 October 1933.

LAeV (L'viv) 46, no. 10 (15 October 1933): 1–4.

Dilo (L'viv) 54, no. 284 (28 October 1933), p. 1.

R: *Riatunkova Aktsiia dlia Velykoï Ukraïny*, comp. A. Zhuk (1933), Document no. 15, pp. 76–79.

See also 1933–e.

h. "Dukhovna Semynariia tse symvol Tserkvy (Slovo v den' 150–litnoho iuvyleiu Dukhovnoï Seminarii.)" ("V torzhestvennyi den'...").

LUL *Nyva* (L'viv) 28, no. 11 (November 1933): 402–6.

Speech on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the L'viv Theological Seminary.

1934

a. *Ze wspomnień o Bracie Albercie*. Memoirs.

b. "Richnytsia vyboru i koronatsii Sv. Ottsia Papy Piia XI." ("Dnia 12 liutoho..."). Statement, 18 January.

c. "Khrystos zachynav..." PL to faithful, 1 January.

d. "Osnuvannia General'noho Instytutu Katolyts'koï Aktsii." ("Dlia uspishnoho provedennia..."). Statement, January.

e. "Evkharystiinyi tyzhden'..." ("V chasi tsiloho Iuvileinoho Roku..."). Message, February.

f. "Uvahy dlia Spovidnykiv." ("U dopovnenni poslannia..."). Statement, February.

g. "Do neduzhykh." ("Ne maiuchy spromohy stanuty..."). PL to the sick, 1 March.

h. "Hramotoiu z dnia 6 travnia 1933 roku..." PL to clergy and faithful, 1 March.

- i. "Shukaïemo pomichnykiv." ("Ne v spromozì..."). PL to faithful, March.
- j. "Khto vynen?" ("Koly v ostannikh misiatsiakh..."). PL to clergy, March-July.
- k. "Bratstvo Sv. Tain i Khrystiians'koï Nauky." ("Kozhnomu dushpastyrevi..."). PL to clergy, Sunday of the Cross.
- l. "Promova Ėkh Eks. Vpreosv. Mytr. Kyr Andreia na zasidanniu M. Konsystorii." ("Podaiu do vidoma Vsechesnykh Ottsiv..."). Speech at meeting of Metropolitan Consistory, 5 July.
- m. "Bohosluzhennia dlia svits'kykh tsilei." ("Buvaie, shcho liudy..."). Administrative directive, 25 July.
- n. "Z nahody vbyvstva bl. p. dyr. I. Babiia." ("Dyrektor Babii upav zhertvoiu..."). Statement, 2 August.
- o. "Nauka katekhyzmu." ("Ne mozhna sobi dostatochno z'iasuvaty..."). Statement, August.
- p. "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne spovidalysia i Sv. Prychastia ne pryinialy." ("Ne znaiu, iak vas..."). Statement, 10 August.
- q. Nauka na Preobrazhennia ("Nynishnie Ievanheliie...") Homily, 19 August.
- r. "Pomozhim bezrobitnim." ("Distaiuchy neraz pys'ma..."). PL to clergy on the eve of the Feast of the Dormition of the Theotokos.
- s. "Sviatyi Otets' otvoryv dveri..." PL to clergy and faithful, 17 September.
- t. "Uriad Spovidnyka." ("Iak do propovidannia Bozhoho slova..."). Statement, October.
- u. "Donoshu Vam radisnu vistku..." PL to clergy and faithful, 21 October.
- v. "Natsional'na richnytsia." ("Kozhna vazhnisha podiia..."). PL to clergy and faithful, November.
- w. "Pro Praznyk Tsaria-Khrysta." ("Ostannia nedilia zhovtnia..."). PL to clergy and faithful on the Feast of St. Lonhyn (29 October).
- x. "Poslannia pro liturhichne zhyttia." ("Tse maizhe ochevydne..."). PL to clergy, December.
- y. "Podiaka za zhelannia v den' sv. Andreia." ("Vy buly dobri..."). Statement to clergy, 18 December.

- z. "Do ukraïns'koï molodi zorhanizovanoï v K.A.U.M-i." ("V den' moïkh imenyn..."). Statement, 18 December.
- za. "Promova ïkh Eks. Vpreosv. Mytr. Kyr Andreia." ("Tishusia takym chysel'nym..."). Speech, 26 December.

a. *Ze wspomnień o Bracie Albercie.*

ZNIO, JKS

Cracow: Wyd-ctwo Księży Jezuitów, 1934. 14 p.

b. "Richnytsia vyboru i koronatsii Sv. Ottsia Papy Piia XI." ("Dnia 12 liutoho...").

L'viv, 18 January 1934.

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 1 (15 January 1934): 1–2.

R: 05–83, pp. 19–20.

c. "Khrystos zachynav..."

PL to the faithful, 1 January 1934.

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 1 (15 January 1934): 2–10.

R: 05–83, pp. 108–15.

On three "particularly dangerous" sins: suicide, concubinage and the loss of faith.

d. "Osnuvannia General'noho Instytutu Katolyts'koï Aktsii." ("Dlia uspishnoho provedennia...").

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 1 (January 1934), M.O. N°7, p. 11.

e. "Evkharystiinyi tyzhden'..." ("V chasi tsiloho Iuvileinoho Roku...").

L'viv, Cheese-Fare Sunday, 1934.

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 2 (15 February 1934): 23–26.

R: 05–83, pp. 20–23.

f. "Uvahy dlia Spovidnykiv." ("U dopovnenni poslannia...").

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 2 (15 February 1934): 26–33.

R: 05–83, pp. 116–22.

g. "Do neduzhykh." ("Ne maiuchy spromohy stanuty...").

PL to the sick, 1 March 1934.

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 3 (15 March 1934): 52–62.

R: 05–83, pp. 155–63.

On the Christian understanding of suffering.

h. "Hramotoiu z dnia 6 travnia 1933 roku..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 1 March 1934.

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 3 (15 March 1934): 62–63.

Nomination of a president (Ksenia Ianovych), 7 members, and a chaplain (Rev. Osyp Ostashevsky) to the Women's Council of the Catholic Action of Ukrainian Youth. See

also 1933–d.

i. “Shukaïemo pomichnykiv.” (“Ne v spromozh...”).

PL to the faithful, March 1934.

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 3 (15 March 1934): 50–52.

R: 05–83, pp. 23–25.

j. “Kheto vynen?” (“Koly v ostannikh misiatsiakh...”).

PL to the clergy, March–July 1934.

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 3 (1934): 45–50; no. 5: 108–15; no. 6: 131–47; no. 7: 157–65.

R: 05–83, pp. 122–55.

Cf. also: I. Ia., “My vynni. Iak zaradyty?” *Nyva* (L'viv) 29, no. 2 (February 1934): 56–60; in reply to an earlier piece: “My sami trokhy vynni, shcho vono tak ie.”

k. “Bratstvo Sv. Tain i Khrystiians'koï Nauky.” (“Kozhnomu dushpastyrevi...”).

PL to the clergy, Sunday of the Cross, 1934.

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 4 (15 April 1934): 88–96.

R: 05–83, pp. 163–70.

l. “Promova ĭkh Ekstselentsiï Vysokopreosviashchenoho Mytropolyta Kyr Andreia na zasidanniu M[ytropolychoï] Konsystorii.” (“Podaiu do vidoma Vsechesnykh Ottsiv...”). Speech at a meeting of the Metropolitan Consistory, L'viv, 5 July 1934.

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 7 (15 July 1934): 154–56.

LUL R: *Nyva* (L'viv) 29, no. 8 (August 1934): 250–52.

R: 05–83, pp. 26–28.

On titles of ordination and the social benefits of priests and their families.

D: “Vazhna postanova,” *Nyva* (L'viv) 29, no. 8 (August 1934): 249–50, 253.

m. “Bohosluzhennia dlia svits'kykh tsilei.” (“Buvaie, shcho liudy...”).

Administrative directive, 25 July 1934.

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 8 (15 August 1934): 169–70.

R: 05–83, p. 29.

Tr (Polish): “Zdarza się że ludzie...” *Sprawy Narodowościowe* (Warsaw) 8, no. 4 (July–September 1934): 437.

D: *Sprawy Narodowościowe* (Warsaw) 8, no. 4 (July–September 1934): 438.

n. “Z nahody vbyvstva bl. p. dyr. I. Babiia.” (“Dyrektor Babii upav zhertvoiu...”).

Pidliuty, on the Feast of the Prophet Elijah (2 August), 1934.

Dilo (L'viv) 55, no. 205 (5 August 1934), p. 3.

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 8 (15 August 1934): 170–71.

R: 05–83, pp. 30–31.

Tr (Polish): "Dyr. Babii upadł..." *Sprawy Narodowościowe*
(Warsaw) 8, no. 4 (July-September 1934): 435.

o. "Nauka katekhyzmu." ("Ne mozhna sobi dostatochno z'iasuvaty...").
LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 8 (15 August 1934): 172-76.
R: 05-83, pp. 171-75.

See also 1937-b.

p. "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne spovidalysia i Sv. Prychastia ne pryinialy." ("Ne znaiu, iak vas...").

L'viv, 10 August 1934.
LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 8 (15 July 1934): 177-79.
R: 05-83, pp. 31-33.

q. Nauka na Preobrazhennia ("Nynishnie Ievanheliie...") Homily, 19 August 1934.
LUL *Propovidy—Dodatok do Nyvy* (L'viv) 29, no. 10 (October 1934): 133-38.

Delivered at the parish church in Pidliuty.

r. "Pomozhim bezrobitnim." ("Distaiuchy neraz pys'ma...").
PL to the clergy on the eve of the Feast of the Dormition of the Theotokos, 1934.
LAeV (L'viv) 47, 9 (15 October 1934): 183-87.
R: 05-83, pp. 33-37.

s. "Sviatyi Otets' otvoryv dveri..."
PL to the clergy and the faithful, 17 September 1934.
LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 10 (15 October 1934): 199-200.
R: 05-83, p. 38.

t. "Uriad Spovidnyka." ("Iak do propovidannia Bozhoho slova...").
LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 8 (15 October 1934): 206-13; 48, no. 1 (15 January 1935): 5-7.
R: 05-83, pp. 175-92.

u. "Donoshu Vam radisnu vistku..."
PL to the clergy and the faithful, 21 October 1934.
LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 11 (15 November 1934): 219-20.
R: 05-83, p. 45.

Announcement of an apostolic visit by the Rev. Ivan Hudechko.

v. "Natsional'na richnytsia." ("Kozhna vazhnisha podiia...").
PL to the clergy and the faithful, November 1934.
LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 11 (15 November 1934): 220-21.
R: 05-83, pp. 46-47.

w. "Pro Praznyk Tsaria-Khrysta." ("Ostannia nedilia zhovtnia...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful on the Feast of St. Lonhyn, hieromartyr (29 October) 1934.

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 11 (15 November 1934): 221–35.

R: 05–83, pp. 193–205.

x. "Poslannia pro liturhichne zhyttia." ("Tse maizhe ochevydne...").

PL to the clergy, December 1934.

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 12 (15 December 1934): 247–54.

R: 05–83, pp. 208–14.

On the essence of the liturgy.

y. "Podiaka za zhelannia v den' sv. Andreia." ("Vy buly dobri...").

Statement to the clergy, 18 December 1934.

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 12 (15 December 1934): 254–56.

R: 05–83, p. 48.

z. "Do ukraïns'koï molodi zorhanizovanoï v K.A.U.M-i." ("V den' moïkh imenyn...").

L'viv, 18 December 1934.

LAeV (L'viv) 47, no. 12 (15 December 1934).

R: 05–83, pp. 48–49.

za. "Promova ïkh Ekstselsentsiï Vysokopreosviashchenoho Mytropolyta Kyr Andreia." ("Tishusia takym chysel'nym..."). Speech, 26 December 1934.

NAC-BAZ in *Metodyka pratsi v mariis'kykh organizatsiiakh* (L'viv:

vol. 2, file 8, no. 10 Nakladom Mariis'koho Tovarystva Molodi, 1935), pp. 13–14.

1935

a. Interview for *Tygodnik Ilustrowany*.

b. "J.E. Ks. Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki o *Biuletynie Polsko-Ukraïnskim*." Statement.

c. "V den', u iakomu nasha Tserkva obkhodyt' pamiatku..." PL to clergy, 27 January.

d. "Poslannia do dukhovenstva na Velykyi Pist 1935 r."

("Zblyzhaiet'sia nedilia Mytaria..."). PL to clergy [29 January].

e. "Podaiuchy do vidoma..." Statement to clergy [22 March].

f. Obituary for Exarch Leonid Fedorov. ("Dnia 7 bereznia..."). 22 March.

- g. "Do vidoma kandydatam dukhovnoho stanu." ("Z ohliadu na te, shcho v Seminarii..."). Statement, 10 June.
- h. *Khrystians'ka Pravednist'*. ("Dushpastyr maie pratsiuvaty..."). Theological treatise.
- i. "Instruktsiia dlia dushpastyriv pro postupuvannia z sektantamy..." ("U vidpovid' na chasi..."). Directive, 20 May.
- j. "Z filosofii kul'tury." ("Zhadauiuchy vid mene..."). Statement, July.
- k. "Podiaka za pobazhannia." ("Na 29 lypnia..."). Statement [2 August].
- l. Introduction. 18 August.
- m. "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne spovidalysia." ("Rik tomu, ia duzhe zaproshuvav..."). PL to those who did not confess their sins before Easter. October.
- n. "Na spil'nii nashii konferentsii..." Collective (7) PL to faithful, 23 December.

a. Interview for *Tygodnik Ilustrowany*.

D (summary of points): "Wywiad 'Tygodnika Ilustrowanego' z ks. Metropolita A. Szeptyckim," *Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiński* (Warsaw) 4, no. 30 (1935): 330.

b. "J.E. Ks. Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki o *Biuletynie Polsko-Ukraińskim*." *Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiński* (Warsaw) 4, no. 30 (1935): 330.

c. "V den', u iakomu nasha Tserkva obkhodyt' pamiatku..."
PL to the clergy, 27 January 1935.

LAeV (L'viv) 48, no. 1 (15 January 1935): 1–5.

R: 05–83, pp. 49–53.

On the thirteenth anniversary of the coronation of Pius XI. N.B.: not be confused with 1936–b, a PL to the clergy and the faithful, with similar opening words.

d. "Poslannia do dukhovenstva na Velykyi Pist 1935 r." ("Zblyzhaiet'sia nedilia Mytaria...").

PL to the clergy on the eve of the Feast of the Three Hierarchs [29 January] 1935.

LAeV (L'viv) 48, no. 2 (15 February 1935): 25–46.

R: 05–83, pp. 214–34.

e. "Podaiuchy do vidoma..."

Statement to the clergy on the Feast of the Forty Martyrs [22 March] 1935.

LAeV (L'viv) 48, no. 3 (15 March 1935): 59–60.

R: 05–83, pp. 57–58.

Comments on Pius XI's *motu proprio* of 21 December 1935 on the Commission "Pro Russia."

f. Obituary for Exarch Leonid Fedorov. ("Dnia 7 bereznia...").

L'viv, 22 March 1935.

LAeV (L'viv) 48, no. 3 (15 March 1935): 61.

R: 05-83, pp. 59-60.

g. "Do vidoma kandydatam dukhovnoho stanu." ("Z ohliadu na te, shcho v Seminarii...").

L'viv, 10 June 1935.

LAeV (L'viv) 48, no. 7 (15 July 1935), M.O. N°56, pp. 223-26.

R: 05-83, pp. 62-64.

h. *Khrystiians'ka Pravednist'*. ("Dushpastyr maie pratsiuvaty...").

LAeV (L'viv) 48, no. 3-12 (March-December 1935).

R: 04-78, pp. 129-413; and 05-83, pp. 234-36.

A theological treatise on Christian righteousness. Ten sections: 1) original sin; 2) justification; 3) faith; 4) fear of God; 5) hope; 6) the sacrament of repentance; 7) the charism of reason and the charism of knowledge; 8) love; 9) the moral virtues; and 10) the virtue of wisdom-in-life ("zhyttieva mudrist").

D: Petro Kostiuk, "Die göttliche Weisheit in den Schriften 'Bosha Mudrist' und 'Chrystianska Pravednist' des Metropoliten Andrej Scheptyckyj," Ph.D. dissertation, Pontificia Università Urbaniana (Rome), in progress.

i. "Instruktsiia dlia dushpastyriv pro postupuvannia z sektantamy, shcho khochut' navernutysia do katolyts'koï viry i Tserkvy." ("U vidpovid' na chasi...").

L'viv, 20 May 1935.

LAeV (L'viv) 48, no. 5 (15 May 1935): 151-54.

R: 05-83, pp. 237-39.

j. "Z filosofii kul'tury." ("Zhadaiuchy vid mene...").

Nasha kul'tura (Warsaw) 4 (July 1935): 201-7.

R: *Nasha meta* (Toronto) 44, 45, 46 (31 October, 7 November, 14 November 1964).

R (excerpts): 02-65, pp. B/177-B/178.

k. "Podiaka za pobazhannia." ("Na 29 lypnia...").

Pidliuty, on the Feast of the Prophet Elijah [2 August] 1935.

LAeV (L'viv) 48, no. 8 (15 August 1935): 229-33.

R: 05-83, pp. 239-43.

l. Introduction.

Pidliuty, 18 August 1935.

in Hryhorii Dvorianyn, *Nauka Sektantiv i Katolyts'ka*

Tserkva (L'viv: "Rusalka," 1935), 4 pp., unpaginated.

An introduction to the book, discussing Protestantism with a view to preventing Greek Catholic apostasy in Galicia.

m. "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne spovidalysia." ("Rik tomu, ia duzhe zaproshuvav...").

PL to those who did not confess their sins before Easter,

LAeV (L'viv) 48, no. 10 (15 October 1935): 277–81.

R: 05–83, pp. 247–52.

n. "Na spil'nii nashii konferentsii..."

Collective (7) PL to the faithful, L'viv, 23 December 1935.

TsDIA f. 408, *Meta* (L'viv), no. 1 (December 1935 or January 1936): 2.

op. 1, spr. 654,

ark. 51a

On the renewal of the Christian foundations of the Ukrainian people through Catholic Action.

1936

a. Christmas message. To Ukrainians of Dnipro region [6 January].

b. "Pro Tserkvu. (Z nahody richnytsi koronuvannia Sv. O. Papy Piia XI)." ("V den' u iakomu nasha Tserkva..."). PL to clergy and faithful, 29 January.

c. "Podiaka Sviashchenykam i Virnym." ("Khoch ia na bahatolystiv..."). Statement [30 January].

d. "Poslannia na Velykyi Pist." ("Zatrubit' u truby, storozhi!..."). PL to clergy and faithful [February].

e. "Chasto v rotsi prykhodyt'sia Vam..." PL to faithful, Saturday of Sunday of the Cross [8 March].

f. "Propovid' korotka..." Easter homily, 13 April.

g. "Molytvoslov i Sv. Pys'mo." ("Dosvid konkursovykh ispytiv..."). PL to clergy, May.

h. "Ekonomichni Rady." ("Ratsional'na hospodarka..."). Statement, May.

i. "Congressus [*sic*] Velehradenses iam habent..." Opening remarks at Velehrad congress, 14 July.

- j. *Ostoroha pered zahrozoiu komunizmu*. (“Nebezpeka teperishn'oï khvyli...”). PL to clergy and faithful [3 August].
- k. “Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prychashchalysia.” (“Po zakinchenomu chasi...”). Statement [8 September].
- l. “Z voli i ustanovy...” Collective (3) PL to clergy and faithful, on the feast day of St. Andrew (13 December).
- m. “Obkhodymo 300–litnii iuvilei smerty Mytropolyta Ruts'koho...” Address, 23 December.

a. Christmas message.

To Ukrainians of the Dnipro region. [L'viv, 6 January 1936].

R (excerpt): in Bodnaruk, pp. 99–100.

A radio message broadcast to Eastern Ukraine.

See 1937–a.

b. “Pro Tserkvu. (Z nahody richnytsi koronuvannia Sviatishoho Ottsia Papy Piia XI).” (“V den' u iakomu nasha Tserkva obkhodyt' praznyk...”).

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 29 January 1936.

LAeV (L'viv) 49, no. 1 (January 1936): 1–10.

R: 05–83, pp. 252–60.

N.B.: not be confused with 1935–c, a shorter PL to the clergy, with similar opening words.

c. “Podiaka Sviashchenykam i Virnym.” (“Khoch ia na bahato lystiv...”).

L'viv, on the Feast of St. Anthony [30 January] 1936.

LAeV (L'viv) 49, no. 1 (January 1936): 10–14.

R: 05–83, pp. 244–47.

d. “Poslannia na Velykyi Pist.” (“Zatrubit' u truby, storozhi!...”).

PL to the clergy and the faithful, Saturday preceding Cheese-Fare Sunday, 1936.

LAeV (L'viv) 49, no. 2 (February 1936): 17–26.

R: 05–83, pp. 260–69.

e. “Chasto v rotsi prykhodyt'sia Vam...”

PL to the faithful, Saturday of Sunday of the Cross [8 March] 1936.

LAeV (L'viv) 49, no. 3–4 (March–April 1936): 33–39.

R: 05–83, pp. 269–74.

f. “Propovid' korotka...”

Easter homily, 13 April 1936.

LUL *Nyva* (L'viv) 31, no. 4 (April 1936): 155–56.

Homily delivered on Bright Monday, 1936, during the Divine Liturgy at the Dormition

Church in L'viv, and broadcast live by L'viv Radio.

g. "Molytvoslov i Sv. Pys'mo." ("Dosvid konkursovykh ispytiv...").

PL to the clergy, May 1936.

LAeV (L'viv) 49, no. 5 (May 1936): 50–53.

R: 05–83, pp. 65–68.

h. "Ekonomichni Rady." ("Ratsional'na hospodarka...").

LAeV (L'viv) 49, no. 5 (May 1936): 54–56.

i. "Congressus [*sic*] Velehradenses iam habent..."

L'viv, 14 July 1936.

in *Acta VII Conventus Velehradensis* (Olomouc: Sumptibus Archiepiscopi Velehradensis, 1937), pp. 300–302.

Opening remarks for the seventh Congress at Velehrad (in Metropolitan Sheptytsky's absence, they were read by Rev. Iosyf Slipyi).

j. *Ostorooha pered zahrozoiu komunizmu*. ("Nebezpeka teperishn'oï khvyli...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful on the day after the Feast of the Prophet Elijah [3 August] 1936.

Stamford

Univ: Naklad i druk Sv. Usp. Lavry Studyts'koho Ustavu v Unevi, 1936. 12 pp.

R: *LAeV* (L'viv) 49, nos. 7–9 (July–September 1936): 81–98.

R: *Nyva* (L'viv) 31, nos. 7–8 (July–August 1936): 243–57.

R (excerpt): *Dilo* (L'viv) 56, no. 177 (8 August 1936), pp. 3–4.

R (fragment): *PPU*, Document no. 175, pp. 272–73.

R: 05–83, pp. 274–89.

Tr (German): *Pressedienst* (Essen) 65 (27 August 1936).

Tr (German): "Der Kommunismus" ("Die Gefahr des jetzigen Augenblicks..."), *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Munich), Sonderheft (1951): 1–16.

Tr (French, excerpts): "Lettre de S. Exc. Mgr. Szeptycki, archevêque ruthène de Lwow (août, 1936)," *La Documentation Catholique* (Paris) 36, no. 816 (14 November 1936), pp. 870–73.

D: "Dzvin na trivohu," *Nyva* (L'viv) 31, nos. 7–8 (July–August 1936): 241–43;

D: "Lyst Vysokopreosv[iashchennoho] Mytropolyta Sheptyts'koho," *Nyva* (L'viv) 31, no. 9 (September 1936): 336–37. (An Orthodox opinion expressed in the Luts'k-based *Ukrains'ka Nyva*).

k. "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prychashchalysia." ("Po zakinchenomu chasi...").

Pidliuty, on the feast of SS. Adrian and Natalie [8 September] 1936.

LAeV (L'viv) 49, nos. 10–11 (October–November 1936):
105–24.

R: 05–83, pp. 290–306.

l. “Z voli i ustanovy...”

Collective (3) PL to the clergy and the faithful, on the feast day of St. Andrew
(13 December) 1936.

LAeV (L'viv) 49, no. 12 (December 1936): 137–43.

R: 05–83, pp. 467–73.

On Catholic Action.

m. “Obkhodymo 300–litnii iuvilei smerty Mytropolyta Ruts'koho...”

L'viv, 23 December 1936.

IOR in *Uniinyi Zizd u L'vovi*, ed. Volodymyr Kuchabs'kyi, Pratsi
Bohoslovs'koho Naukovoho Tovarystva u L'vovi, vols.
11–12 (L'viv: “Bibl'os,” 1938), pp. 15–22.

Keynote address at the unionistic congress in L'viv (22–25 December 1936).

1937

a. Christmas message. To Ukrainians of the Dnipro region [6 January].

b. “Richnytsia koronatsii Sviatoho Ottsia Piia XI.” (“V praznyk Tr'okh
Sviatyteliv, sebto...”). Statement [6 March].

c. “Slovo Mytr. Andreia v den' koronatsii Sviatishoho Ottsia.”
 (“Praznyk Tr'okh Sviatyteliv mozna...”). Statement,
January.

d. “Iuvilei Mytropolyta Ruts'koho.” (“Dnia 7 liutoho...”). Statement,
January.

e. “Na Pist pro pokaiannia.” (“Zblyzhaiet'sia Velykyi Pist...”). PL to
clergy and faithful, February.

f. “Molytvy pro dobrykh Nastoiateliv (do tykh, shcho zhyvut' po
ievanhel's'kykh radakh, ta do vsikh virnykh).” (“Na
pershyi tyzhden'...”). Statement, March.

g. “Pro znannia katekhyzmu.” (“Po nashykh selakh buvaie...”). PL to
faithful, April.

h. *Dar P'iatdesiatnytsi*. (“Z soshestviem Sviatoho Dukha...”).
Theological tract.

i. “Promova na Mariis'kii Akademii 10 chervnia 1937.” (“Mynulo 300
lit...”). Speech, 10 June.

- j. "Nadzvychaini proiavy v khrystiians'komu zhytti." ("Use khrystiians'ke zhyttia tse nenache..."). Statement [2 August].
- k. "Pro tykh i do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prystupyly do sv. Prychastia i ne spovidalysia." ("L'vivs'kyi Provintsional'nyi Synod z 1891 r..."). PL to clergy and faithful [3 September].
- l. "Pastyrs'ke Poslannia Espans'kykh Epyskopiv. Vstupne Slovo Vysokopreosv. Mytropolyta." ("Espaniia bula..."). Introduction to PL, December.
- m. "Pro Obriadovi spravy" ("V sv[iatii] katolyts'kii Tserkvi..."). PL, 23 December.

a. Christmas message.

To Ukrainians of the Dnipro region. [L'viv, 6 January 1937].

R (excerpt): in Bodnaruk, p. 99.

A radio message broadcast to Eastern Ukraine.

See also 1936–a.

b. "Richnytsia koronatsii Sviatoho Ottsia Pii XI." ("V praznyk Tr'okh Sviatyteliv, sebto...").

L'viv, on the Feast of St. Timothy [6 March] 1937.

LAeV (L'viv) 50, no. 1 (January 1937): 1.

R: 05–83, pp. 69–70.

c. "Slovo Mytr. Andreia v den' koronatsii Sviatishoho Ottsia." ("Praznyk Tr'okh Sviatyteliv mozna...").

LAeV (L'viv) 50, no. 1 (January 1937): 2–4.

R: 05–83, pp. 70–72.

d. "Iuvilei Mytropolyta Ruts'koho." ("Dnia 7 liutoho...").

LAeV (L'viv) 50, no. 1 (January 1937): 4–5.

R: 05–83, pp. 72–73.

e. "Na Pist pro pokaiannia." ("Zblyzhaiet'sia Velykyi Pist...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, after (*sic*) the Sunday of the Publican and the Pharisee, 1935.

LAeV (L'viv) 50, no. 2 (February 1937): 17–22.

R: 05–83, pp. 307–11.

f. "Molytvy pro dobrykh Nastoiateliv (do tykh, shcho zhyvut' po ievanhel's'kykh radakh, ta do vsikh virnykh)." ("Na pershyi tyzhden'...").

LAeV (L'viv) 50, no. 3 (March 1937): 25–27.

R: 05–83, pp. 74–76.

g. “Pro znannia katekhyzmu.” (“Po nashykh selakh buvaie...”).

PL to the faithful on the Thursday before Palm Sunday, 1937.

LAeV (L'viv) 50, no. 4 (April 1937).

R: 05–83, pp. 312–16.

See also 1934–m.

h. *Dar P'iatdesiatnytsi*. (“Z soshestviiem Sviatoho Dukha...”).

LAeV (L'viv) 50, nos. 5–10 (May–October 1937).

R: 04–78, pp. 417–56.

A theological reflection on the significance of Pentecost for the Christian life, in 14 sections: 1) the school of the Church; 2) the school of Christ; 3) the school of the Holy Spirit; 4) why a school of the Church? 5) the gift of infallibility; 6) the need of inspiration by the Holy Spirit; 7) theology and the laws of human understanding; 8) kerygmatic, or prophetic (“vishcha”) theology; 9) kerygmatic Christianity; 10) creative theology; 11) charisms; 12) theology of the Christian life; 13) theology of love; 14) creative and prophetic theology of the Holy Spirit.

D: Petro Kostiuk, “Dono della Pentecoste: analisi dell'opera del Metropolita A. Szeptyckyj,” M.A. dissertation, Pontificia Università Urbaniana, 1980.

i. “Promova na Mariis'kii Akademii 10 chervnia 1937.” (“Mynulo 300 lit...”).

L'viv, 10 June 1937.

NAC-BAZ, *Visnyk Mariis'kykh Tovarystv* (L'viv) 3, no. 5 (July–August 1937), vol. 2, file 6, p. 8.

A speech to the Marian association in L'viv.

j. “Nadzvychni proiavy v khrystiians'komu zhytti.” (“Use khrystiians'ke zhyttia tse nenache...”).

L'viv, on the Feast of the Prophet Elijah [2 August] 1937.

LAeV (L'viv) 50, no. 8 (August 1937): 119–25.

R: 04–78, pp. 459–64.

Tr (English): “Extraordinary Phenomena in Christian Life,” in Andriy Freishyn-Chirovsky, “True and False Mysticism in the Writings of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky,” M.A. thesis, University of St. Michael's College, Toronto School of Theology, 1981, pp. 81–96.

The official position of the church on mystical experiences (visions, ecstasies, stigmatization).

On this subject, see also 1942–t and 1942–w.

k. “Pro tykh i do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prystupyly do sv. Prychastia i ne spovidalysia.”

(“L'vivs'kyi Provintsional'nyi Synod z 1891 r...”).

PL to the clergy and the faithful, on the Feast of Our Venerable Father Ilarion [3 September] 1937.

LAeV (L'viv) 50, no. 11 (November 1937): 161–87.

R: 05–83, 317–39.

Includes the following sections: “Do virnykh, shcho zhyvut' u Bozhii blahodati”; “Do tykh, shcho spovidalysia na Paskhu, ale cherez tiazhkyi hrih stratyly Bozhu blahodat”; and “Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne spovidalysia.”

1. “Pastyrs'ke Poslannia Espans'kykh Epyskopiv. Vstupne Slovo Vysokopreosv. Mytropolyta.”

(“Espaniia bula...”).

LAeV (L'viv) 50, no. 12 (December 1937): 193–96.

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vol. 2, file 2

R: *Pastyrs'ke Poslannia Espans'kykh Epyskopiv pro podii v Espanii* (L'viv: Nakladom General'noho Instytutu Katolyts'koï Aktsii, 1938), pp. 3–6.

The Metropolitan's introduction to the Ukrainian translation of a pastoral letter of the Spanish Bishops' Conference on the war in Spain.

m. “Pro Obriadovi spravy” (“V sv[iatii] katolyts'kii Tserkvi...”).

PL, 23 December 1937

08–95, Document no. 99, pp. 252–57.

On the value and merits of the Eastern rite, as opposed to transfers to another rite. N.B.: The original manuscript is located in TsDIA, f. 358, op. 1, spr. 165, ark. 43—50.

1938

a. “Bozhe Provydinnia, shcho vede...” Statement.

b. “Poslannia pro Iednist' Tserkvy.” (“Kozhnoi maizhe dnyny...”). PL to clergy and faithful [15 January].

c. “Zaklyk do pokaiannia u Velykyi Pist.” (“Sv. Apostol Pavlo...”). Statement [22 March].

d. “Krystyians'ka shkola dla ukrains'koï molodi.” (“Nablyzhaiet'sia khvylyna...”). Statement, on Palm Sunday.

e. “Khrystos Voskres! Zblyzhaiut'sia velykodni...” Easter greeting.

f. Radio message to Ukrainians of the Dnipro region, 13 June.

g. [950–littia Khreshchennia Rusy-Ukraïny]. (“Vsevyshnii Boh; Sotvorytel' vselennoi...”). Collective (7) PL to faithful [29 June].

h. “Potriasaiuchi podii...” Statement [2 August].

i. “Poklyk Mytropolyta.” (“Podii, shcho my...”). Appeal, 3 November.

j. "Podiaka za pobazhannia." ("Vsim, shcho pro mene..."). Statement, 29 December.

a. "Bozhe Provydinnia, shcho vede..."

L'viv, 1938.

Statement, probably for Easter, bearing Metropolitan Sheptytsky's signature.

Ref: unidentified (possibly *Meta* or *Nedilia*) newspaper clipping, NAC-HKO, File: "Newspaper clippings, 1938–1942."

b. "Poslannia pro Iednist' Tserkvy." ("Kozhnoi maizhe dny...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful on the Feast of St. Sylvester [15 January] 1938.

LAeV (L'viv) 51, no. 1 (January 1938): 2–16.

R: 05–83, pp. 340–53.

c. "Zaklyk do pokaiannia u Velykyi Pist." ("Sv. Apostol Pavlo...").

L'viv, on the Feast of the Forty Martyrs [22 March] 1938.

LAeV (L'viv) 51, nos. 2–3 (February–March 1938): 17–43.

R: 05–83, pp. 354–76.

d. "Krystyians'ka shkola dlia ukrains'koï molodi." ("Nablyzhaiet'sia khvylyna...").

L'viv, Palm Sunday, 1938.

LAeV (L'viv) 51, nos. 4–5 (April–May 1938): 76–80.

R: 05–83, pp. 78–82.

e. "Khrystos Voskres! Zblyzhaiut'sia velykodni..." Easter greeting.

LUL

Pysanka dlia chleniv Apostol'stva Khvorykh. L'viv:

Ref: 161345

Stavropyhiis'kyi Instytut [1938], pp. 3–5.

f. Radio message on the day after the Feast of Pentecost.

To Ukrainians of the Dnipro region, 13 June 1938.

R (excerpt): Bodnaruk, p. 99.

g. [950–littia Khreshchennia Rusy-Ukraïny]. ("Vsevyshnii Boh, Sotvorytel' vselennoi...").

Collective (7) PL to the faithful on the Feast of Saints Peter and Paul [29 June] 1938.

LAeV (L'viv) 51, nos. 6–7 (June–July 1938): 81–86.

Nyva (L'viv) 33, no. 9 (September 1938): 306–10.

R: 05–83, pp. 497–501.

On the need for social unity, and the commemoration of the 950th anniversary of Christianity in Ukraine.

h. "Potriasaiuchi podii..."

L'viv, on the Feast of the Prophet Elijah [2 August] 1938.

R: Baran, pp. 108–10.

- R: Ostroverkha, pp. 32–35.
 R: *Svityl'nyk Istyny* 2 (1976), pp. 139–41.
 Tr (French): “Les événements pénibles...,” *La Vie intellectuelle* (Paris) 59, no. 3 (10 November 1938): 373–76.
- IOR Tr (French): Bureau Ukrainien, London (n.d.), 2 pp.
 Tr (French): Korolevskij, Document no. 4, pp. 412–14.
 Tr (Russian): D. Vasilii, pp. 796–98.
- TsDIA Tr (Polish): “Wstrząsające wypadki...” typescript, 2 pp.
- f. 201, op. 4b,
 spr. 2517, ark. 3,3a
- On the persecution of Orthodoxy in the Kholm region.
 D: “Vylens'ke ‘Slovo’ pro lyst Mytropolyta Sheptyts'koho,” *Dilo* (L'viv) 59, no. 188 (27 August 1938), p. 7.
 D: “Vidhomin pastyrs'koho lysta Mytropolyta Sheptyts'koho,” *Dilo* (L'viv) 59, no. 187 (26 August 1938), pp. 3–4.
 D: *Svityl'nyk Istyny* 2 (1976), p. 141.
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- i. “Poklyk Mytropolyta.” (“Podii, shcho my...”).
 L'viv, 3 November 1938.
Dilo (L'viv) 59, no. 246 (5 November 1938), p. 1.
- A call to peace and order.
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- j. “Podiaka za pobazhannia.” (“Vsim, shcho pro mene...”).
 L'viv, 29 December 1938.
LAeV (L'viv) 52, no. 1 (January 1939): 5–9.
 R: 05–83, pp. 380–84.

1939

- a. “Khrystos Razhdaiet'sia!” (“U sam Praznyk Rizdva...”). PL to faithful, 7 January.
- b. “Propovid' na Novyi Rik 1939 vyholoshena do radiia dnia 14 sichnia 1939.” (“I koly spovnylosia...”). Homily, 14 January.
- c. “U den' koronatsii Sv. Ottsia.” (“V den' 12 liutnia za n. st...”). Statement, 30 January.
- d. “Slovo Mytropolyta Andreia v praznyk Tr'okh Sviatyteliv.” (“Praznyk Tr'okh Sviatyteliv tse symvol...”). Statement, January.
- e. “Poslannia na Pist.” (“V serpni mynuloho 1938 roku...”). Statement (5 February).

- f. "Pro chaste Prychastia." ("Praktyka chastishoho..."). Statement (5 February).
- g. "V dva dni pered khvylynoi..." PL to clergy and faithful (12 February).
- h. "U chasi sv. Chotyrodesiatnytsi..." PL to faithful, March.
- i. "Khrystos Voskres!" ("Voskresennia Rozpiatoho..."). Easter message.
- j. "Slovo Mytropolyta-Iuvyliata...u 40-littia Svoho epyskopstva." ("Dozvol'te meni zrobyty probu..."). Homily, 18 June.
- k. "Spil'ne Pastyrs'ke Poslannia...z nahody 500-litn'oho iuvyleiu fl'orentiis'koho ziedynennia." ("V tu 500-litniu richnytsiu..."). Collective (7) PL to clergy and faithful, 16 July.
- l. "Einführung" ("Zweck dieser Zeilen ist..."). Introduction.
- m. "Povtoriuiuchy slova..." PL to clergy and faithful, March.
- n. "Chas Velykoho Postu..." Statement.
- o. "Velykodnie Slovo" ("Tsym paskhal'nym pryvitom..."). Easter greeting.
- p. Statement to the Ukrainian people. September 1939.
- q. *Zaklyk do Pokaiannia. Poslannia na Velykyi Pist.* L'viv, 1939.
Expanded version of Lenten PLs.
- r. "Vstupne slovo." Sv. Ioan Zolotoustyi, *Pro Chernetstvo*, trans. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky.
- s. "Obernulasia kartka istorii..." PL to clergy [9 October].
- t. *Do Ukraïns'koï molodi* ("Hornetesia do vsiakoho rodu..."). PL to Ukrainian youth, September-October.
- u. *Do monakhiv i monakhyn' ta vsikh, shcho zhyvut' po ievanhel's'kym radam* ("Rozsivaiuchy vas po sviti...").
- v. "Naivazhnisha sprava dlia Tserkvy..." PL to faithful, November.

a. "Khrystos Razhdaiet'sia!" ("U sam Praznyk Rizdva...").

PL to the faithful, 7 January 1939.

Meta (L'viv) 9, no. 1 (7 January 1939): 1–2.

A Christmas message.

b. "Propovid' na Novyi Rik 1939 vyholoshena do radiia dnia 14 sichnia 1939." ("I koly spovnylosia...").

L'viv, 14 January 1939.

Meta (L'viv) 9, no. 3 (22 January 1939): 1.

New Year's homily, broadcast on radio.

c. "U den' koronatsii Sv. Ottsia." ("V den' 12 liutnia za n. st....").

L'viv, 30 January 1939.

LAeV (L'viv) 52, no. 1 (January 1939): 1.

R: 05–83, p. 83.

d. "Slovo Mytropolyta Andreia v praznyk Tr'okh Sviatyteliv." ("Praznyk Tr'okh Sviatyteliv tse symvol...").

LAeV (L'viv) 52, no. 1 (January 1939): 2–5.

R: 05–83, pp. 377–80.

e. "Poslannia na Pist." ("V serpni mynuloho 1938 roku...").

L'viv, on the Sunday of the Prodigal Son (5 February) 1939.

LAeV (L'viv) 52, no. 2 [L'viv, February 1939]: 25–102.

R: 05–83, pp. 384–455.

f. "Pro chaste Prychastia." ("Praktyka chastishoho...").

L'viv, Sunday of the Prodigal Son (5 February) 1939.

LAeV (L'viv) 52, no. 2 (February 1939): 102–7.

R: 04–78, pp. 464–69.

g. "V dva dni pered khvylynoi..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful on the Feast of the Three Hierarchs (12 February) 1939.

LAeV (L'viv) 52, no. 2 (February 1939): 19–25.

R: 05–83, pp. 85–90.

On the late Pius XI.

h. "U chasi sv. Chotyrodesiatnytsi..."

PL to the faithful, March 1939.

R (excerpt): "Potishaty kozhnoho z Vas—tse mii oboviazok..." *Dilo* (L'viv) 60, no. 68 (25 March 1939), p. 4.

i. "Khrystos Voskres!" ("Voskresennia Rozpiatoho...").

Meta (L'viv) 9, no. 14 (9 April 1939): 1–2.

Easter message.

j. "Slovo Mytropolyta-Iuvyliata vyholoshene u L'vovi dnia 18.VI.1939 u 40-littia Svoho epyskopstva." ("Dozvol'te meni zrobyty probu...").

Homily, L'viv, 18 June 1939.

Meta (L'viv) 9, no. 24 (25 June 1939): 2–3.

Nyva (L'viv) 34, nos. 7–8 (July–August 1939): 277–82.

R: *Svityl'nyk Istyny* 2 (1976), pp. 174–79.

k. “Spil'ne Pastyrs'ke Poslannia Epyskopatu Halyts'koï Provintsii z nahody 500–litn'oho iuvyleiu fl'orentiis'koho ziedynennia.” (“V tu 500–litniu richnytsiu...”).

Collective (7) PL to the clergy and the faithful, 16 July 1939.

Meta (L'viv) 9, no. 27 (16 July 1939): 1.

l. “Einführung” (“Zweck dieser Zeilen ist...”).

in *Der Christliche Osten: Geist und Gestalt* (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1939), pp. 11–16.

R: Prokoptschuk (1955), pp. 148–52.

R: Prokoptschuk (1967), pp. 180–84.

Tr (Ukrainian): “Piznaty skhidni tserkvy...”, in “Za odnist' Tserkvy,” *Lohos* (Waterford and Yorkton) 3, no. 3 (July–September 1952): 164–67.

m. “Povtoriuiuchy slova...”

PL to the clergy and the faithful, March 1939.

LAeV (L'viv) 52, no. 3 (March 1939): 115–17.

Habemus papam. The announcement of the election of a new pope.

n. “Chas Velykoho Postu...”

R (excerpts): *Dilo* (L'viv) 60, no. 68 (25 March 1939), p. 4.

R (excerpts): *Nyva* (L'viv) 34, no. 4 (April 1939): 148–53.

R: *Meta* (L'viv) 9, no. 13 (13 April 1939): 1–2. Full text.

o. “Velykodnie Slovo” (“Tsym paskhal'nym pryvitom...”).

L'viv, Easter, 1939.

Audio recording by Alexander Pezhans'kyi of a fragment of the Metropolitan's Easter greeting. Record: “Zhyve Slovo Sluhy Bozhoho Mytropolyta Andreia,” SWS Records, Stereo 242K-15, Chicago, 1978.

p. Statement to the Ukrainian people.

L'viv, September 1939.

Tr (German): “In diesen Tagen...” in “Metropolit Andrej Septyckyj und Vasyl Mudryj an die Ukrainische Bevölkerung im September 1939: Gegen die provokatorischen Gerichte! [sic]” In *Illytzyk*, 1: 343.

In the wake of Galician manifestations of opposition to the Hungarian takeover of Carpatho-Ukraine, a joint statement by the Metropolitan and the President of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation, Vasyl' Mudryi, discounting rumours of anti-Polish activities by Ukrainians and exhorting Ukrainians to keep the peace.

q. *Zaklyk do Pokaiannia. Poslannia na Velykyi Pist.*

LNB

L'viv: Nakladom Hr.-Katol. Mytropolychoho Ordynariiatu, 1939. 87 pp.

R: L'viv: Svichado, 1995.

An expanded version of the Metropolitan's Lenten pastoral letters of the 1930s.

D: Andrii Krawchuk, "Nevidomi tvory Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho," *Logos* (Ottawa) 35, nos. 1–4 (1994): 42–51.

r. "Vstupne slovo."

Sv. Ioan Zolotoustyi, *Pro Chernetstvo*, trans. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Asketychna Biblioteka," vol 1. (L'viv: Nakladom vlasnym, 1939), pp. 4–7.

The Metropolitan's introduction to his own translation of Chrysostom's *Comparatio regis et monachi* (PG 47, 387–92) and *Adversus oppugnatores vitae monasticae* (PG 47, 319–86). The only two known copies of this book are in the private collections of Joseph Andrijisyn and Andrii Krawchuk.

D: Andrii Krawchuk, "Nevidomi tvory Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho," *Logos* 35, nos. 1–4 (1994): 51–53.

s. "Obernulasia kartka istorii..."

PL to the clergy on the Feast of St. John the Theologian [9 October] 1939.

LAeV (L'viv) 52, nos. 9–10 (September-October 1939), M.O. N°1, p. 1.

R: 01–61, pp. 1–2.

A program of action for the church under Soviet occupation: respect for civil authority, catechism for the faithful.

t. *Do Ukraïns'koï molodi* ("Hornetesia do vsiakoho rodu...").

PL to Ukrainian youth.

LAeV (L'viv) 52, nos. 9–10 (September-October 1939): 7–8.

UCU

R: *Malyi shkoliar. Odnodnivka Ukraïns'koï Narodnoï Shkoly im. Mytr. A. Sheptyts'koho v Regenzburzi* (Regensburg: n.p., 14 February 1948), pp. 3–4.

R: 01–61, pp. 6–8.

On prayer, the sacraments and adherence to the church.

u. *Do monakhiv i monakhyn' ta vsikh, shcho zhyvut' po ievanhel's'kym radam* ("Rozsivaiuchy vas po sviti...").

LAeV (L'viv) 52, nos. 9–10 (September-October 1939), M.O. N°3.

R: 01–61, pp. 2–3.

Under the Soviet occupation, Sheptytsky allows monks and nuns with permanent vows to live outside the monasteries (now closed) and to wear civilian clothes. ("It is not robes that make a monk, but a spirit of humility, prayer, self-giving love...").

v. "Naivazhnisha sprava dlia Tserkvy..."

PL to the faithful.

LAeV (L'viv) 52, no. 11 (November 1939), M.O. N°4.

R: 01-61, pp. 3-5.

On the importance of catechism for children.

1940

- a. *Pro nebezpeku zanedbannia potribnoi pratsi* ("Khoch shchoino nedavno..."). PL to faithful, Meat-Fare Sunday.
- b. "Zvertaiusia do vas, Dorohi Brattia..." PL to faithful on the Feast of the Presentation of Christ at the Temple [2 February].
- c. Do Oo. Katykhytiv ("Khoch ia vzhe..."). Statement, February.
- d. *Prychastia neziedynenykh ditei* ("Buvaie, shcho maty prynosyt'..."). PL [to clergy], February.
- e. *Pro sovist' neziedynenykh* ("Pytaiut': koly pravoslavni prystupaiut'..."). Statement, February.
- f. *Do spovidnykiv* ("Zvertaiu uvahu vsikh oo. spovidnykiv..."). PL to Fathers confessors, February.
- g. *Pro mylostyniu* ("Polozhennia mnohykh vdovyts'..."). PL to clergy and faithful, Tuesday of Cheese-Fare Week.
- h. "Vid lit bazhav ia..." PL to faithful, 13 March.
- i. *Do vs. i vpr. O. verkhovnykh nastoiateliv monashykh Chyniv...* ("V svitlyi chetver..."). PL to superiors of the male monastic communities on first Saturday of Lent.
- j. *Do Sester inokyn' i zakonnyts' usikh monashykh i tserkovnykh zhromadzhen' Ch. S. V. V.—Stud[yts'koho] ustavu—Sester Sluzhebnyts' i usikh inshykh kongregatsii...* ("Aktom iaskravoi nespravedlyvosty..."). PL to female monastic communities on Tuesday of second week of Lent.
- k. "Rozsylaiuchy apostoliv..." PL to faithful on Tuesday of third week of Lent.
- l. *Protest proty nasyt'stva nad sovistiu ditei* ("Deiaki vypadky nasyt'stva..."). Letter to Comrade Zharchenko, March.

- m. *Pro pochyttannia sv[iatoho] khresta* ("Nedavno zaokhochuvav ia vas..."). PL to faithful on Tuesday of third week of Lent (Sunday of the Veneration of the Holy Cross).
- n. *Pro bezbozhnytstvo* ("Pravdyve zaperechennia isnuvannia..."). PL to faithful, 1 April.
- o. "Pytaiut'sia sviashchenyky..." PL to clergy, 15 April.
- p. *Pro bezbozhnykiv i ziedynennia tserkov* ("Shchoby unyknyty vsiakoho neporozuminnia..."). PL to clergy, 17 April.
- q. "U vazhnu khvyliu zhyttia..." Keynote address at sobor in L'viv, 2 May.
- r. Decree of Sobor of 1940: "Kul't Khrystovoï Liubovy" ("Vprodovzh maizhe 20 stolit'...").
- s. Decree of Sobor of 1940: "Pro tykh, shcho zhyiut' po ievanhel's'kym Radam" ("AEp. Sobor protestuie rishucho...").
- t. Appendix to decree of Sobor of 1940, "Pro tykh, shcho zhyiut' po ievanhel's'kym radam:" "Obov'iazky spovidnykiv zakonnyts" ("Sviashchenyk kotromu porucheno...").
- u. "Blyz'ko dva misiatsi..." PL to clergy and faithful, May-June.
- v. "Ubohyi cholovik..." Speech after session at Sobor, 12 September.
- w. "Sered nezvychaino vazhkykh..." Speech at end of Sobor.
- x. *Do dekaniv* ("Pratsi A[rkhieparchiial'noho] Soboru postupaiut'..."). To Reverend Deans, 31 October.
- y. "Podaiu do vidoma..." PL to clergy and faithful, 31 October.
- z. "Mnozhat'sia wypadky..." PL to clergy and faithful, 6 November.
- za. "Pryminiuiuchy do poodynokykh..." PL to clergy, 9 December.

a. *Pro nebezpeku zanedbannia potribnoi pratsi* ("Khoch shchoino nedavno..."). PL to the faithful, Meat-Fare Sunday, 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53, no. 2 (February 1940), M.O. N°48, pp. 6–8.

R: 01–61, pp. 25–28.

The importance and dignity of work, even in the uncertainties of war.

b. "Zvertaiusia do vas, Dorohi Brattia..."

PL to the faithful on the Feast of the Presentation of Christ at the Temple [2 February] 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53, no. 2 (February 1940), M.O. N°25.

R: 01–61, pp. 14–15.

On the abuse of alcohol.

c. *Do Oo. Katykhytiv* ("Khoch ia vzhe...")

LAeV (L'viv) 53, no. 2 (February 1940), M.O. N°28

R: 01–61, pp. 16–17.

On guarantees of religious freedom and religious education.

d. *Prychastia neziedynenykh ditei* (“Buvaie, shcho maty prynosyt'...”).

PL [to the clergy].

LAeV (L'viv) 53, no. 2 (February 1940), M.O. N°37.

R: 01–61, pp. 19–20.

On administering the Eucharist to Orthodox infants.

e. *Pro sovist' neziedynenykh* (“Pytaiut': koly pravoslavni prystupaiut'...”).

LAeV (L'viv) 53, no. 2 (February 1940), M.O. N°39.

R: 01–61, pp. 21–23.

On the need for confession of Orthodox Christians by Greek Catholic priests in certain exceptional circumstances.

f. *Do spovidnykiv* (“Zvertaiu uvahu vsikh oo. spovidnykiv...”).

PL to the Fathers confessors.

LAeV (L'viv) 53, no. 2 (February 1940), M.O. N°52.

R: 01–61, p. 29.

On prayer and confession as ways of counteracting atheist indoctrination.

g. *Pro mylostyniu* (“Polozhennia mnohykh vdovyts'...”).

PL to the clergy and the faithful, Tuesday of Cheese-Fare Week, 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53, no. 2 (February 1940), M.O. N°53.

R: 01–61, pp. 30–31.

On alms for those in need.

h. “Vid lit bazhav ia...”

PL to the faithful, 13 March 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53, no. 3 (March 1940), M.O. N°59.

R: 01–61, pp. 33–36.

R: 06–84, pp. 2–5.

Notice of preparations for an archeparchial sobor, its purpose and procedures.

i. *Do vs[echesnishykh] i vpr. O[ttsiv] verkhovnykh nastoiateliv monashykh Chyniv: ierom[onakha] Vitaliia, Protoihumena ch[yna] S[viatoho] V[asyliia] V[elykoho], Ierom[onakha] Iosyfa, Namisnyka protosa ch[yna] S[viatoho] izbavytelia i Ieromonakha Klymentiia, Ihumena Uspen[s'koi] Lavry Studiis'koho ustava v Unevi* (“V svitlyi chetver...”).

PL to the superiors of the male monastic communities on the first Saturday of Lent, 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53, no. 3 (March 1940), M.O. N°59–1.

R: 01–61, pp. 36–38.

R: 06–84, pp. 5–7.

Invitation to superiors of three Eastern-rite monastic communities to participate in the upcoming sobor. Also, a protest against the forcible closures of monasteries and the expropriation of monastic lands by the occupying Soviet forces.

j. *Do Sester inokyn' i zakonnyts' usikh monashykh i tserkovnykh zhromadzen' Chyna Sv[iatoho] V[asyliia] V[elykoho]—Stud[ytys'koho] ustavu—Sester Sluzhebnyts' i usikh inshykh kongregatsii iakykh pravyla dosi ne ie definityvno odobreni eparkhiial'noiu vladoiu* (“Aktom iaskravoi nespravedlyvosty...”).

PL to the female monastic communities on Tuesday of the second week of Lent, 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53, no. 3 (March 1940), M.O. N°64.

R: 01–61, pp. 39–40.

A protest against the closures of convents, words of encouragement, and a reminder of the importance of prayer.

k. “Rozsylaiuchy apostoliv...”

PL to the faithful on Tuesday of the third week of Lent, 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53 (1940), M.O. N°66.

R: 01–61, pp. 41–44.

On effective preaching.

l. *Protest proty nasyl'stva nad sovistiu ditei* (“Deiaki vypadky nasyl'stva...”).

Letter to Comrade Zharchenko, head of the district department of public education.

R: *LAeV* (L'viv) 53, no. 3 (March 1940), M.O. N°68.

R: Mykhailo Khomiak, “Borot'ba Ukraïns'koï Katolyts'koï Tserkvy proty komunizmu,” *Lohos* (Yorkton) 1, no. 4 (October–December 1950), pp. 282–83.

R: 01–61, pp. 44–46.

A protest against atheist propaganda in the schools.

m. *Pro pochyttannia sv[iatoho] khresta* (“Nedavno zaokhochuvav ia vas...”).

PL to the faithful on Tuesday of the third week of Lent (Sunday of the Veneration of the Holy Cross), 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53 (1940), M.O. N°71.

R: 01–61, pp. 49–52.

R: 06–84, pp. 9–13.

n. *Pro bezbozhnytstvo* (“Pravdyve zaperechennia isnuvannia...”).

PL to the faithful, 1 April 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53 (1940), M.O. N°72.

R: 01–61, pp. 53–54.

On atheism.

D: Iaroslav Nahurs'kyi, “Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi u litakh 1939–41,” *Zhyttia i slovo* (Waterford, Ontario) 2 (Fall 1948): 163–64.

o. "Pytaiut'sia sviashchenyky..."

PL to the clergy, 15 April 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53 (1940), M.O. N°80.

R: 01-61, pp. 56-59.

R: 06-84, pp. 14-17.

On reforming old parish brotherhoods and establishing new ones.

p. *Pro bezbozhnykiv i ziedynennia tserkov* ("Shchoby unyknyty vsiakoho neporozuminnia...").

PL to the clergy, 17 April 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53 (1940), M.O. N°82.

R: 01-61, pp. 59-61.

On atheism and the unity of the churches, partly in response to the article "Hlava uniativ" in *Bezbozhnyk*, no. 11 (11 April 1940).

q. "U vazhnu khvyliu zhyttia..." Keynote address at the sobor in L'viv, 2 May 1940.

R: 01-61, pp. 62-66. Title: "Slovo ĭkh

Vysokopreosv[iashchenstva] o[ttsia] Mytropolyta na
otvorennia L'vivs'koho Arkhiieparkhiial'noho soboru."

R: 06-84, pp. 17-21.

r. Decree of the Sobor of 1940: "Kul't Khrystovoï Liubovy" ("Vprodovzh maizhe 20 stolit'...").

R: 03-69, pp. 130-48.

R: 06-84, pp. 104-22.

s-t:

s. Decree of the Sobor of 1940: "Pro tykh, shcho zhyiut' po ievanhel's'kym Radam" ("AEp. Sobor protestuie rishucho...").

R: 03-69, pp. 378-88.

R: 06-84, pp. 247-57.

See the four regulations, dated 31 October 1940 and relating to this decree, *ibid.*, pp. 388-89, and in 06-84, pp. 257-58. Another set of ten regulations, including the above four, is given in 06-84, pp. 38-40.

For other regulations of the Sobor of 1940, see "Pravyla," from the unpublished manuscript "Akty, dekrety ta pravyla L'vivs'koho AEparkhiial'noho Soboru 1940 r.," in 06-84, pp. 33-42. The 72 regulations are grouped as follows: (1-14) "Pro katolyts'ku viru"; (15-17) "Pro oboronu i poshyrennia viry"; (18-23) "Pratsia nad ziedynenniam tserkov"; (24-31) "Pratsia v dochernykh tserkvakh"; (32-35) "Umovyny uspishnoho prosvichuvannia svitlom viry v parokhii"; (36-38) "Oboviazky suproty Vsevysn'oho"; (39-41) pertaining to the decree "Kul't Bozhoï mudrosty"; (42-44) "Kul't sviatoho dukha"; (45-46) "Utrymannia dukhovenstva"; (47-56) "Pro tykh, shcho zhyvut' za ievanhel's'kymy radamy"; (57-62) "Molytvy khrystiians'koï rodyny"; (63-69) "Kul't Khrystovoï liubovy"; (70-71) "Kul't Khrysta v ioho symvolakh"; and (72) "Soborovi rezervaty."

A further fourteen decrees and thirty-five regulations of the Sobor of 1940 are to be found in "Dekrety i pravyla AEparkhiial'noho soboru 1940 roku," in 06–84, pp. 65–88. The decrees are: 1) "Vyznannia viry slovamy i dilamy"; 2) "Pysannia Ottsiv Tserkvy"; 3) "Paps'ki pys'ma"; 4) "Nauka bohoslovii"; 5) "Nauka sv. Pys'ma"; 6) "Chytannia Psaltyri"; 7) "Poshyrennia znannia sv. Pys'ma"; 8) "Propovidi"; 9) "Oborona i poshyrennia viry v parokhii"; 10) "Pratsia nad ziedynenniam Tserkov"; 11) "Nauka viry v selakh, de nemaie sviashchenyka"; 12) "Katykhyzatsiia"; 13) "Vykhovannia katykhystiv"; 14) "Umovyny uspishnoho prosvichuvannia svitlom viry parokhii."

For an explanation of the differences between these two sets of documents, see 1942–f.

t. Appendix to the decree of the Sobor of 1940, "Pro tykh, shcho zhyiut' po ievanhel'skym radam:" "Obov'iazky spovidnykiv zakonnyts" ("Sviashchenyk kotromu porucheno...").

R: 03–69, pp. 389–91.

R: 06–84, pp. 258–60.

u. "Blyz'ko dva misiatsi..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, May-June 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53 (1940), M.O. N°88.

R: 01–61, pp. 67–68.

R: 06–84, pp. 22–23.

On the aims of the Sobor.

v. "Ubohyi cholovik..."

Speech after a session at the Sobor in L'viv, 12 September 1940.

R: 01–61, pp. 77–80. Title: "Slovo ĭkh

Vysokopreosv[iashchenstva] o[ttsia] Mytropolyta pislia soborovoi sesii."

R: 06–84, pp. 26–29.

w. "Sered nezvychaino vazhkykh..."

Speech at the end of the Sobor in L'viv in 1940.

R: 01–61, pp. 68–71. Title: "Promova ĭkh

Vysokopreosv[iashchenstva] o[ttsia] Mytropolyta na zakinchennia Soboru z 1940 r."

R: 06–84, pp. 23–26.

x. *Do dekaniv* ("Pratsi A[rkhieparkhiial'noho] Soboru postupaiut'...").

To the Reverend Deans, 31 October 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53 (1940), M.O. N°89.

R: 01–61, pp. 71–72.

R: 06–84, p. 26.

On local sobors in the deaneries.

y. "Podaiu do vidoma..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 31 October 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53 (1940), M.O. N°90.

R: 01-61, pp. 72-73.

A warning about the threat of atheism faced by those who were on military duty.

z. "Mnozhat'sia vypadky..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 6 November 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53 (1940), M.O. N°92.

R: 01-61, pp. 73-74.

The form of an act of contrition in case of imminent death in the absence of a priest.

za. "Pryminiuiuchy do poodynokykh..."

PL to the clergy, 9 December 1940.

LAeV (L'viv) 53 (1940), M.O. N°95.

R: 01-61, pp. 75-76.

On the upcoming elections (15 December) and a renewed call to priests to abstain from partisan involvement.

See also the reminder to priests to refrain from engaging in political activities in the regulation of the Sobor of 1940, "A[rkhieparkhiial'nyi] sobor poruchaie usyl'no...", in 01-61, p. 73.

1941

a. "Pro obriady." ("Zi samoho poniattia obriadovoho prava..."). PL, 19 May.

b. "Do ukraïns'koho narodu." ("Z voli vsemohuchoho i vsemylostyvoho Boha v Troitsi..."). Statement, 1 July.

c. "Slovo Mytropolyta." ("Z voli Vsemohuchoho i Vsemylostyvoho Boha pochynaiet'sia..."). PL to clergy and faithful, 5 July.

d. "Pro orhanizatsiiu parokhiï i hromady." ("Vid khvyli..."). PL to clergy, 10 July.

e. Introductory statement to an appeal of the German Agricultural Commission to the Ukrainian people. ("Komanda nimets'koï armii..."). 27 July.

f. "Slovo Mytropolyta Andreia pro Bol'shevyzm." ("Metoiu derzhavy ie zapevnyty..."). Introduction, 6 October.

- g. Obituary notice for Kost' Levyts'kyi. ("Diliusia z ukraïns'kym hromadianstvom..."). 12 November.
- h. Decree of Sobor of 1941: "Pochytannia Sviatykh." ("Do predmetu tr'okh...").
- i. Decree of Sobor of 1942. ("Idealom nashoho natsional'noho zhyttia..."). December.
- j. "Mii lyst do vsikh Vysokopreosviashchenykh Arkhiereïv v Ukraïni i na Ukraïns'kykh Zemliakh." ("Do osiahnennia nashykh natsional'nykh idealiv..."). Statement, 30 December.

a. "Pro obriady." ("Zi samoho poniattia obriadovoho prava...").

PL, 19 May 1941.

LAeV (L'viv) 55, no. 6 (June 1942), M.O. N°6, pp. 119–28.

R: 03–69, pp. 149–61.

R: 06–84, pp. 123–35.

Read on 21 May at a session of the Sobor of 1942.

b. "Do ukraïns'koho narodu." ("Z voli vsemohuchoho i vsemylostyvoho Boha v Troitsi...").

L'viv, 1 July 1941.

R (excerpt): *Ukraïns'ka diisnist'* (Berlin) 2, no. 12 (1 August 1941), p. 3.

R: *Nash klych* (London) 2, no. 8 (30 June 1946).

R: Mykhailo Khomiak, "Diial'nist' Mytropolyta Andreia pid nimets'koiu okupatsiieiu," *Lohos* (Meadowvale and Yorkton) 6, no. 3 (July–September 1955): 220–21.

R: *Pan'kivs'kyi* (1957), pp. 112–13.

R: *O.U.N. v svitli postanov Velykykh zboriv, konferentsii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borot'by 1929–1955 r.*, Biblioteka ukraïns'koho pidpil'nyka, no. 1 (n.p., 1955), pp. 58–59.

R (with photo reproduction): Danylenko, pp. 210–11.

R (excerpts): Dmytruk, pp. 84–85.

Tr (English, excerpts): John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939–1945*, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 79–80.

Tr (German): Prokoptschuk (1955), pp. 221–22.

Tr (German): Ilnytzyj, 2: 273–74.

First statement after the German takeover of Galicia.

N.B.: not to be confused with the statement of 5 July 1941 (1941–c).

D: *Pan'kivs'kyi* (1957), pp. 114–18, discusses the two main versions of the statement: one with a greeting to the Germans, the other without.

D: *Illytzyj*, 2: 173–78.

c. “Slovo Mytropolyta.” (“Z voli Vsemohuchoho i Vsemylostyvoho Boha pochynaet'sia...”).

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 5 July 1941.

LAeV (L'viv) 54, no. 7 (July 1941), M.O. №63.

R: *Ukrains'ki shchodenni visti* (L'viv) 1 (5 July 1941).

R: *Krakivs'ki visti* (Cracow) 157 (10 July 1941).

R: Khomiak, “Diial'nist' Mytropolyta” (1955), pp. 293–94.

R: *Pan'kivs'kyi* (1957), p. 120.

R: *PPU*, Document no. 193, pp. 300–301.

R (including photo reproduction): Danylenko, pp. 211–13.

R (including photo reproduction): Dmytruk, pp. 86–88.

d. “Pro orhanizatsiiu parokhii i hromady.” (“Vid khvyli...”).

PL to the clergy, 10 July 1941.

LAeV (L'viv) 54, no. 7 (July 1941).

R: *Krakivs'ki visti* (Cracow) 2, no. 172 (7 August 1941).

R (excerpt): Khomiak, “Diial'nist' Mytropolyta” (1955), pp. 294–95.

R (excerpt): *Pan'kivs'kyi* (1957), p. 42.

R (excerpt): *PPU*, Document no. 195, pp. 302–4.

R (excerpts): Danylenko, pp. 217–19.

On the organization of parish life under the German occupation.

e. Introductory statement to an appeal of the German Agricultural Commission to the Ukrainian people. (“Komanda nimets'koï armii...”).

Ukrains'ki shchodenni visti (L'viv, 27 July 1941).

R: *PPU*, Document no. 199, p. 310.

f. “Slovo Mytropolyta Andreia pro Bol'shevyzm.” (“Metoiu derzhavy ie zapevnyty...”).

L'viv, 6 October 1941.

in *Zakhidnia Ukraïna pid bol'shevykamy IX. 1939 — VI.*

1941, ed. Milena Rudnyts'ka (New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1958), pp. 9–11.

An introduction to Rudnyts'ka's book, with comments on the previous occupation by the Soviets.

g. Obituary notice for Kost' Levyts'kyi. (“Diliusia z ukrains'kym hromadianstvom...”).

L'viv, 12 November 1941.

R: *Pan'kivs'kyi* (1957), p. 28.

The Metropolitan signed this notice as President of the Ukrainian National Council (Rada).

h. Decree of the Sobor of 1941: “Pochytannia Sviatykh.” (“Do predmetu tr'okh...”).

R: 03–69, pp. 182–201.

R: 06–84, pp. 153–72.

On the veneration of saints: 1) the saints in general; 2) the Blessed Virgin; 3) the angels; 4) St. Joseph; 5) the apostles; 6) the martyrs; 7) the hierarchs; 8) Ukrainian saints; 9) the cult of the righteous.

For the regulations of the Sobor of 1941, see also “Pravyla Arkhiieparkhiial'noho Soboru 1941 roku,” 03–69, pp. 106–17, and 06–84, pp. 93–104. The 116 regulations are grouped according to the decrees of the 1941 sobor to which they correspond: (1–10) to the decree “Pro Kul't Neporochnoho Zachattia Presv. Bohorodytsi”; (11–14) to the decree “Pro zakon”; (15–29) to the decree “Dohmatychni osnovy morali”; (30–35) to the decree “Pro dekaloh”; (36–47) to the decree “Pro try pershi Bozhi zapovidi”; (48–63) to the decree “Pro pochytannia Sviatykh”; (64–74) to the decree “Ikonohrafiia”; (75–87) to the decree “Chetverta zapovid' Bozha”; (88–104) to the decree “Pro poslukh dlia Tserkvy;” (105–116) to the decree “Poza vselen. Tserkvoiu nema spasinnia.” The texts of most of these decrees are unavailable.

i. Decree of the Sobor of 1942. (“Idealom nashoho natsional'noho zhyttia...”).

NAC-ZHUK, L'viv, December 1941.

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R: “Za iednist' sv. Viry, Tserkvy i Natsiï,” *Lohos* (Yorkton) 1, no. 4 (1950): 241–48; 2, no. 2 (1951): 81–87; 2, no. 3: 161–67; 2, no. 4: 241–46.

D: Vasyl' Markus', “Velykyi Mytropolyt-derzhavnyk (v desiatsu richnytsiu smerty Hrafa Andreia Sheptyts'koho, Mytropolyta Halyts'koho i Arkhyiepyskopa L'vivs'koho,)” *Ukrains'kyi samostiinyk* (Munich) 5, no. 45 (7 November 1954): 3.

D: Hryn'okh, pp. 35–56.

j. “Mii lyst do vsikh Vysokopreosviashchenykh Arkhiiereiv v Ukraïni i na Ukraïns'kykh Zemliakh.”

(“Do osiahnennia nashykh natsional'nykh idealiv...”).

L'viv, 30 December 1941.

See 1942–j.

1942

a. “Poslannia do Dukhovenstva tr'okh kanonichno ziedyne'nykh eparkhii: L'vivs'koï, Halyts'koï ta Kamianets'koï.” (“Z Bozhoiu blahodattiu vidbulu...”). PL to clergy [16 January].

b. “Tyzhden' Ziedynennia Tserkov” (“16 sichnia st. st...”). Statement, 17 January.

- c. "V spravi opiky nad polonenymy Ukraïntsiamy" ("V taborakh polonenykh..."). PL to clergy, January.
- d. "Richnytsia Koronatsii Sv. Ottsia Piia XII" ("Dnia 12 bereznia prypadaie..."). PL to clergy and faithful [23 January].
- e. "Poslannia na Pist. (Zaklyk do pokaïannia)." ("Chotyrydesiatnytsia—to chas..."). PL to faithful [25 January].
- f. "Do Regulaminu Soboru" (Rizhnytsia, iaka zaisnuvala...). Statement, 20 February. M.O. N°105.
- g. Decree of the sobor of 1942: "Pro Sviatkuvannia Nedili" ("Bozhyi zakon, shcho prypysuvav..."). 7 February.
- h. - l. "U spravi porozuminnia" (A collection of documents).
- m. "Poslannia do Virnykh (Arkhypastyr's'ki pobazhannia)" ("Pyshu tse v Strasnu Seredu..."). PL to faithful, 1 April.
- n. Decree of Sobor of 1942: "Pro Liberal'nu Sovist" ("Do nezhidnykh z tserkovnym zakonom liberalizmiv..."). 9 April.
- o. "Mariia—Maty" ("Koly sered naitrudnishykh..."). PL, 14–15 April.
- p. "Epyskops'kyi Iuvilei Papy" ("Dnia 13 travnia ts. r. prypadaie..."). PL, 17 April.
- q. "Proholoshennia rishen' eparkhiial'nykh synodiv" ("Ne maiuchy zmohy..."). Statement, 20–24 April.
- r. "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne spovidalysia" ("Zaky zachnu, po prypysam..."). Statement, May.
- s. "Vydannia novoho Sluzhebnyka" ("Koly pered rokom pysav ia..."). Statement, 25 May.
- t. "Pro Psevdoprorokiv" ("Dyvni proiavy..."). Statement, June.
- u. "Pro myloserdia" ("Tsile dilo Khrysta-Spasytelia..."). PL to clergy and faithful, June.
- v. "Zariadzhennia i opovistky: v spravi pil'nykh robit u nedili i sviata ta viddachi kontyngentu" ("Na vypadok, koly..."). Statement, 1 August.
- w. "Do Sester Sluzhebnyts'" ("Obkhodyte ts'oho roku..."). PL to Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate in L'viv [August].
- x. "Shche pro mistychni chy spirytystychni proiavy" ("Rizni dyvni proiavy..."). Statement, September.
- y. "Pro vidpravliuvannia sluzhby Bozhoi" ("Nemaie sviatishoho..."). PL to clergy.
- z. "Khrystos skazav: 'Nikhto, khto...'" PL to clergy.

- za. "V spravi vdovycho-syrotyns'koho fondu" ("Shchob u takykh prykykh..."). Directive to Reverend Deans, 15 September.
- zb. Decree of Sobor of 1942: "Pro vykhovannia [molodi]" ("Arkhiieparkhiial'nyi Sobor zvertaiet'sia..."). 24 October.
- zc. "Ne ubyi" ("Khrystova Tserkva ne perestaie..."). PL to clergy and faithful, 21 November.
- zd. Decree of the sobor of 1942: "Pro dukhove cholovikovbyvstvo sebto soblazn'" ("Khrystos skazav: 'khto soblaznyt'...'"). 3 December.
- ze. "Propaganda Vidstupstva" ("Shchob osiahnuty natsional'nu iednist'..."). Statement, 8 December.
- zf. "Promova na zakinchennia AEp. Soboru, 1942 r." ("Za laskoiu Vsev. Boha..."). Address, 14 December.
- zg. "Naimohutnishyi Orudnyk Dushpastyrs'koï Pratsi" ("V poslanniakh sv. A. Pavla..."). PL, 22 December.
- zh. "Do tykh, shcho vyïzhdzhaiut' na Roboty do Raikhu" ("Vyïzhdzhaiete v dalekyi..."). PL to faithful, 22 December.

a. "Poslannia do Dukhovenstva tr'okh kanonichno ziedynenykh eparkhii: L'vivs'koï, Halyts'koï ta Kamianets'koï." ("Z Bozhoiu blahodattiu vidbuly...").

PL to the clergy on the Feast of the Prophet Malachi [16 January] 1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 2-5.

R: 06-84, pp. 30-33.

b. "Tyzhden' Ziedynennia Tserkov" ("16 sichnia st. st....").

L'viv, 17 January 1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 12-13.

c. "V spravi opiky nad polonenymy Ukraïntsiamy" ("V taborakh polonenykh...").

PL to the clergy on the eve of the Feast of the Epiphany, 1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 27-28.

d. "Richnytsia Koronatsiï Sv. Ottsia Piia XII" ("Dnia 12 bereznia prypadaie...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful on the Feast of St. Gregory of Nyssa [23 January] 1942.

LAeV (L'viv) 55, no. 2 (February 1942).

R: 03-69, pp. 30-33.

e. "Poslannia na Pist. (Zaklyk do pokaiannia)" ("Chotyrydesiatnytsia—to chas...").
PL to the faithful, Sunday of the Publican and the Pharisee [25 January] 1942.

R: 03–69, pp. 34–38.

f. "Do Reguliaminu Soboru" (Rizhnytsia, iaka zaisnuvala...").

L'viv, 20 February 1942. M.O. N°105.

R: 03–69, pp. 87–88.

R: 06–84, pp. 88–90.

An explanation concerning corrections to the text of the regulations of the Sobor of 1940.

g. Decree of the sobor of 1942: "Pro Sviatkuvannia Nedili" ("Bozhyi zakon, shcho prypysuvav...").

[L'viv], 7 February 1942.

R: 03–69, pp. 43–55.

R: 06–84, pp. 45–56.

See also the regulations, dated 9 February 1942 and corresponding to this decree, in 03–69, pp. 55–56; and 06–84, pp. 56–57.

h. - l. "U spravi porozuminnia" (A collection of documents).

h. "Vstupne slovo" ("Na moï vidkryti pys'ma...").

[L'viv], n.d. (not before March 1942).

R: 03–69, pp. 333–39.

i. "Ioho Vysokopreosviashchenstvu Kyr Ilarionovi, Arkhiiepyskopovi Kholms'komu" ("V den' Sv. Ilariona Velykoho...").

L'viv, on the Feast of St. Ilarion the Great (3 November)
1941.

R: Baran, pp. 123–24.

R: *Svityl'nyk Istyny* 2 (1976), pp. 142–43.

j. "Mii lyst do vsikh Vysokopreosviashchenykh Arkhiiereiv v Ukraïni i na Ukraïns'kykh Zemliakh" ("Do osiahnennia nashykh natsional'nykh idealiv...").

L'viv, 30 December 1941.

R: 03–69, pp. 339–40.

R: Baran, pp. 127–28.

R: *Svityl'nyk Istyny* 2 (1976), pp. 143–44.

Tr (French): "Pour atteindre notre idéal national...," in *BetC*,
vol. 2: "Variae epistolae et relationes" (Rome, 1965),
pp. 193–94.

See also the Metropolitan's letter of 28 January 1942 to M. Rybachuk.

k. "Mii lyst do ukraïns'koï viruiuchoï Pravoslavnoï Inteligentsii" ("Svoioho lysta do pravoslavnykh...").

L'viv, 3 March 1942.

R: 03–69, pp. 340–42.

R: Baran, pp. 130–31.

R: *Svityl'nyk Istyny* 2 (1976), pp. 144–46.

l. "Moï vidpovidi" ("Na Vashoho vidkrytoho lysta...").

[L'viv], n.d.

R (excerpts): 03-69, pp. 349-59; 401-8.

m. "Poslannia do Virnykh (Arkhypastyr'ski pobazhannia)" ("Pyshu tse v Strasnu Seredu...").

PL to the faithful, 1 April 1942.

LAeV (L'viv) 55, nos. 3-4 (March-April 1942).

R: 03-69, pp. 40-41.

n. Decree of the Sobor of 1942: "Pro Liberal'nu Sovist" ("Do nezhidnykh z tserkovnym zakonom liberalizmiv...").

L'viv, 9 April 1942.

LAeV (L'viv) 56, nos. 1-2 (January-February 1943): 10-22.

R: 03-69, pp. 310-26.

R: 06-84, pp. 226-42.

Read at the Sobor on 30 April 1942.

See also the regulations, dated 11 June and 8 October 1943, corresponding to this decree, in 03-69, pp. 414-16, and 06-84, 271-73.

o. "Mariia—Maty" ("Koly sered naitrudnishykh...").

PL, 14-15 April 1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 92-100.

p. "Epyskops'kyi Iuvilei Papy" ("Dnia 13 travnia ts. r. prypadaie...").

PL, 17 April 1942.

LAeV (L'viv) 55, no. 5 (May 1942).

R: 03-69, pp. 90-92.

q. "Proholoshennia rishen' eparkhiial'nykh synodiv" ("Ne maiuchy zmohy...").

L'viv, 20-24 April 1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 41-43; 103-5.

R: 06-84, pp. 43-45; 90-92.

r. "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne spovidalysia" ("Zaky zachnu, po prypysam...").

LAeV (L'viv) 55, no. 5 (May 1942): 79-82.

s. "Vydannia novoho Sluzhebnyka" ("Koly pered rokom pysav ia...").

L'viv, 25 May 1942.

LAeV (L'viv) 55, no. 6 (June 1942): 100-105.

R: 03-69, pp. 122-30.

t. "Pro Psevdoprorokiv" ("Dyvni proiavy...").

LAeV (L'viv) 55, no. 6 (June 1942), M.O. N°107/42, pp. 128-29.

R: 03-69, pp. 161-63.

Tr (English): "On False Prophets," in Freishyn-Chirovsky, "True and False Mysticism in the Writings of Sheptytsky" (1981), pp. 97-102.

On this subject, see also 1937-j and 1942-w.

u. "Pro myloserdia" ("Tsile dilo Khrysta-Spasytelia...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, June 1942.

LAeV (L'viv) 55, nos. 7-8 (July-August 1942).

R: 03-69, pp. 165-82.

R: 06-84, pp. 136-52.

v. "Zariadzhennia i opovistky: v spravi pil'nykh robit u nedili i sviata ta viddachi kontyngentu" ("Na vypadok, koly...").

L'viv, 1 August 1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 210-11.

w. "Do Sester Sluzhebnyts' (na ruky S. Heneral'noi, nastoiatel'ky u L'vovi" ("Obkhodyte ts'oho roku...").

PL to the Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate in L'viv, on the eve of the Feast of the Transfiguration, 1942.

LAeV (L'viv) 55, nos. 9-10 (September-October 1942), M.O. N°721/42.

R: 03-69, pp. 214-17.

x. "Shche pro mistychni chy spirytystychni proiavy" ("Rizni dyvni proiavy...").

L'viv, September 1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 270-83.

Tr (English): "More on Mystical and Spiritualist Phenomena," in Freishyn-Chirovsky, "True and False Mysticism in the Writings of Sheptytsky" (1981), pp. 103-41.

On mystical and spiritual manifestations.

On this subject, see also 1937-j and 1942-t.

y. "Pro vidpravliuvannia sluzhby Bozhoi" ("Nemaie sviatishoho...").

PL to the clergy, 1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 206-10.

z. "Khrystos skazav: 'Nikhto, khto...'"

PL to the clergy, 1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 217-18.

za. "V spravi vdovycho-syrotyns'koho fondu" ("Shchob u takykh prykykh...").

Directive to the Reverend Deans, 15 September 1942.

R: 03-69, p. 221.

zb. Decree of the Sobor of 1942: "Pro vykhovannia [molodi]" ("Arkhiieparkhiial'nyi Sobor zvertaiet'sia...").

L'viv, 24 October 1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 231-55.

R: 06-84, pp. 187-210.

See also the regulations, dated 10 December 1942 and corresponding to this decree, in 03-69, pp. 255-57, and in 06-84, pp. 210-13.

zc. "Ne ubyi" ("Khrystova Tserkva ne perestaie...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 21 November 1942.

LAeV (L'viv) 55, no. 11 (November 1942).

R: 03-69, pp. 222-31.

R: 06-84, pp. 178-87.

Tr (Russian, excerpts): *Dialohy* (Jerusalem) 11-12 (1986): 80-83.

On homicide: political assassination, infanticide, suicide and fratricide.

The same subject was discussed at the sobor of 1942, and a decree was issued.

Although that decree is not available, the regulations appended to it are to be found in "Pravyla do dekretu 'pro p'iatu zapovid'," 03-69, pp. 257-58, and 06-84, pp. 213-14.

zd. Decree of the sobor of 1942: "Pro dukhove cholovikovbyvstvo sebto soblazn'" ("Khrystos skazav: 'khto soblaznyt'...").

L'viv, 3 December 1942

LAeV (L'viv) 56, nos. 1-2 (January-February 1943): 6-10.

R: 03-69, pp. 303-10.

R: 06-84, pp. 219-25.

ze. "Propaganda Vidstupstva" ("Shchob osiahnuty natsional'nu iednist'...").

L'viv, 8 December 1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 283-87.

zf. "Promova na zakinchennia AEp. Soboru, 1942 r." ("Za laskoiu Vsev. Boha...").

L'viv, 14 December 1942.

LAeV (L'viv) 55, no. 12 (December 1942).

R: 03-69, pp. 260-65.

R: 06-84, pp. 214-19.

zg. "Naimohutnishyi Orudnyk Dushpastyrs'koï Pratsi" ("V poslanniakh sv. A. Pavla...").

PL on the Feast of the Immaculate Conception (22 December) 1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 287-94.

zh. "Do tykh, shcho vyïzhdzhaiut' na Roboty do Raikhu" ("Vyïzhdzhaiete v dalekyi...").

PL to the faithful, 22 December 1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 265-70.

1943

- a. "Poklyk do pokaiannia" ("Sv. Ievanheliie opovidaie..."). PL to clergy and faithful for the Week of the Publican.
 - b. "Dosvid tr'okh lit pokazav..." PL to clergy, 26 February.
 - c. Easter greetings to *Krakivs'ki visti* ("Redaktsiia *Krakivs'kykh vistei* prosyla..."). 2 April.
 - d. "Pobazhannia do robitnykiv u Praznyk Khrystovoho Voskresennia" ("Do Vas moie slovo..."). Message to émigré workers, Easter [21 April].
 - e. Easter greetings to *L'vivs'ki visti* ("Prosyte mene pro stattiu..."). 21 April.
 - f. "Poslannia pro pochyttannia i posviatu sebe Prechystii Bohorodytsi" ("U nashomu obriadi viddaie..."). Statement, 2-3 May.
 - g. "Promova Vysokopreosv. Ottsia Mytropolyta Kyr Andreia pry otvorenni AEp. Soboru 1943 r." ("Z Bozhoiu laskoiu zachynaiemo..."). Address, before 10 June.
 - h. "Poslannia do tykh, shcho na Velykodni Sviata ne prychashchalysia" ("Kozhnyi khrystiiannyn znaie..."). PL to those who did not receive communion at Easter [5 June].
 - i. Decree of the sobor of 1943: "Pro iednist" ("Iak metu Khrystovoï smerty..."). 10 June.
 - j. "U vazhkii khvylyni zvertaiusia do Vas..." PL to clergy and faithful, 10 August.
 - k. "U spravi vidpravliuvannia dvokh Sluzhb Bozhykh u odnomu dni" ("Potreba narodu..."). PL to clergy, 24 August.
 - l. "U vazhkomu lykholitti..." Collective (10) PL to clergy and faithful, November.
 - m. "Promova ikh V. Preosviashchenstva Mytropolyta Kyr Andreia na zakinchennia IV AEp. Soboru, dnia 11.XI.1943" ("Vsev. Bohovi khvala..."). Address, 11 November.
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a. "Poklyk do pokaiannia" ("Sv. Ievanheliie opovidaie...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful for the Week of the Publican, 1943.

LAeV (L'viv) 56, nos. 1–2 (January-February 1943): 1–5.

R: 03–69, pp. 297–303.

b. "Dosvid tr'okh lit pokazav..."

PL to the clergy, 26 February 1943.

LAeV (L'viv) 56, nos. 3–4 (March-April 1943).

R: 03–69, pp. 329–33.

R: 06–84, pp. 242–47.

c. Easter greetings to *Krakivs'ki visti* ("Redaktsiia *Krakivs'kykh vistei* prosyla...").

L'viv, 2 April 1943.

Krakivs'ki visti (Cracow) 17 (April 1943).

R: 03–69, pp. 372–76.

d. "Pobazhannia do robitnykiv u Praznyk Khrystovoho Voskresennia" ("Do Vas moie slovo...").

Message to émigré workers, Easter [21 April] 1943. (Radio).

R: 03–69, pp. 368–72.

R (excerpt): *PPU*, Document no. 233, pp. 347–48.

e. Easter greetings to *L'vivs'ki visti* ("Prosyte mene pro stattiu...").

L'viv, 21 April 1943.

L'vivs'ki visti (L'viv) 91 (April 1943).

R: 03–69, pp. 376–78.

Includes a greeting to the readers of *Ridna zemlia*.

f. "Poslannia pro pochyttannia i posviatu sebe Prechystii Bohorodytsi" ("U nashomu obriadi viddaie...").

L'viv, 2–3 May 1943.

LAeV (L'viv) 56, 5 (May 1943).

g. "Promova Vysokopreosv. Ottsia Mytropolyta Kyr Andreia pry otvorenni AEp. Soboru 1943 r." ("Z Bozhoiu laskoiu zachynaiemo...").

L'viv, 1943.

LAeV (L'viv) 56, nos. 6–7 (June-July 1943).

R: 03–69, pp. 393–97.

R: 06–84, pp. 261–64.

This keynote address was likely delivered some time before 10 June, the date of the decree "Pro iednist" (1943–i).

h. "Poslannia do tykh, shcho na Velykodni Sviata ne prychashchalysia" ("Kozhnyi khrystiiianyn znaie...").

PL to those who did not receive communion at Easter, issued on the Saturday after the Ascension [5 June] 1943.

R: 03–69, pp. 397–401.

i. Decree of the sobor of 1943: “Pro iednist” (“Iak metu Khrystovoï smerty...”).

L'viv, 10 June 1943.

R: 03–69, pp. 408–13.

R: 06–84, pp. 265–70.

R: *Holos Khrysta Cholovikoliubtsia* (Louvain) 27, no. 6 (1974): 21–27.

j. “U vazhkii khvylyni zvertaiusia do Vas...”

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 10 August 1943.

TsDIA f.201, Signed carbon copy of typed text, 5 pp.

op. 1t, spr. 4,

ark. 1–5

R: “Slovo Mytropolyta,” *Krakivs'ki visti* (Cracow) 4, no. 179 (17 August 1943): 1–2. The pastoral letter was apparently printed a second time in the 22 August (4, no. 34) issue of this newspaper, according to a photo reproduction in *Koło Lwowian: Biuletyn* (London) 22, no. 43 (June 1982): 10.

R (excerpts): *Ukraïns'ka diisnist'* (Berlin) 4, no. 25 (1 September 1943): 1–2.

R: *Holos Khrysta Cholovikoliubtsia* (Louvain) 16, no. 5 (May 1962): 98–101.

R: Pan'kivs'kyi (1965), pp. 282–83.

R (excerpts): *PPU*, Document no. 241, pp. 355–56.

JKS

Tr (Polish): *Prawda*, pismo Frontu Odrodzenia Polski (n.p., August–September 1943): 22–24.

Tr (Polish): *Koło Lwowian: Biuletyn* (London) 22, no. 43 (June 1982): 11–14.

Tr (Polish): Maurycy Prozor, “Stare i nowe w polskiej legendzie o Metropolicie A. Szeptyckim,” *Arka* (Cracow) 16 (1986): 112–15.

k. “U spravi vidpravliuvannia dvokh Sluzhb Bozhykh u odnomu dni” (“Potreba narodu...”).

PL to the clergy, 24 August 1943.

R: 03–69, pp. 448–49.

l. “U vazhkomu lykholitti...”

Collective (10) PL to the clergy and the faithful, November 1943.

R: 03–69, pp. 417–25.

m. "Promova ikh V. Preosviashchenstva Mytropolyta Kyr Andreia na zakinchennia IV AEp. Soboru, dnia 11.XI.1943" ("Vsev. Bohovi khvala...").

L'viv, 11 November 1943.

LAeV (L'viv) 57, nos. 1–3 (January–February 1944): 16–17.

R: *PPU*, Document no. 243, pp. 358–59.

R: 03–69, pp. 440–43.

R: 06–84, pp. 278–81.

1944

a. "Rozdumuiuchy nad kalendarem" ("Na shchyti odnoho...").

b. "Pro vbyvannia sviashchenykyv" ("V imeni Khrystovoï Tserkvy...").

PL to clergy and faithful, n.d.

c. "Pam'iaty o. Dymytriiia Dyoniziiia Tkachuka, Protoarkhimadryta oo. Vasyliian." ("Dnia 24.I. pomer v Rymi...").

Statement, February.

d. "Na ostannii sviatochnii sesii..." PL to all participants in archeparchial sobors, on the Wednesday of the first week of Great Lent [8 March].

e. Statement to clergy. L'viv, 14 October.

a. "Rozdumuiuchy nad kalendarem" ("Na shchyti odnoho...").

C-Urbana in *Kalendar "Studion" na rik Bozhyi 1944* (L'viv: Nakladom tovarystva "Studion" [1944]), pp. 29–32.

b. "Pro vbyvannia sviashchenykyv" ("V imeni Khrystovoï Tserkvy...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, n.d.

R: 03–69, pp. 431–32.

c. "Pam'iaty o. Dymytriiia Dyoniziiia Tkachuka, Protoarkhimadryta oo. Vasyliian." ("Dnia 24.I. pomer v Rymi...").

L'viv, February 1944.

R: 03–69, pp. 444–48.

d. "Na ostannii sviatochnii sesii..."

PL to all participants in the archeparchial sobors, on the Wednesday of the first week of Great Lent [8 March] 1944.

LAeV (L'viv) 57, nos. 1–3 (January–March 1944).

R: 03–69, pp. 426–30.

R: 06–84, pp. 273–78.

Convocation of the sobor of 1944.

e. Statement to the clergy.

L'viv, 14 October 1944.

Tr (Polish, excerpt): "Jednym z głównych obowiązków...",
in Edward Prus, "'Ukraińskie siły zbrojne' w walce z
ZSRR i Polakami. List metropolity hr. Szeptyckiego do
Stalina," *Życie Literackie* (Warsaw) 1069 (23 July
1972), p. 13, n. 35. Cites archival ref.: TsDIA, f. 201,
op. 4–b, spr. 2742, ark. 6.

Tr (Polish, excerpt): Prus, p. 295.

A call to every parish to collect funds for the Red Cross to care for the sick and
wounded of the Red Army.

B. Selected correspondence and other private writings

1888

23 May: prayer ("Pered Tvoïm khrestom...").

R: Iosyf Slipyi, "Pro molodechyi vik nashoho Mytropolyta,"
Bohosloviia (L'viv) 4, nos. 1–4 (1926): 24–25.

R: Sofiia Sheptyts'ka, *Molodist' i poklykannia o. Romana
Sheptyts'koho*, trans. Damian Horniatkevych (Winnipeg
and Toronto: Dmytro Mykytiuk, 1965), p. 123.

Tr (German): "Vor Deinem Kreuz..." in Prokoptschuk
(1955), p. 66; and Prokoptschuk (1967), pp. 94–95.

1907

27 June: to the Rev. Aleksei Zerchaninov ("Vsledstvie...").

R: D. Vasilii, pp. 83–85.

1 July: to Bishop Antonii of Zhytomyr ("Prostitute, Vashe...").

R: D. Vasilii, pp. 768–69.

1 July: to Bishop Petr of Smolensk ("Gospod' nash...").

R: D. Vasilii, pp. 769–70.

1 July: to Bishop Innokentii of the Old Believers ("Do moego svedeniia...").

R: D. Vasilii, pp. 770–71.

1909

8 November: to Arsenii Morozov ("Tot komu Vy...").

R: D. Vasiliï, pp. 773–75.

after 15 November: to V. E. Makarov ("Vy sami ne mozhetе...").

R: D. Vasiliï, pp. 772–73.

The text of Makarov's letter, to which this was a reply, is given in D. Vasiliï, p. 772, n. 5.

1913

22 December: to Cardinal Merry del Val.

Tr (Russian): D. Vasiliï, pp. 217–35. ("Ia ochen' priznatelen...").

1914

31 August: to the Austrian High Command ("Ich erlaube mir...").

Documents ruthéno-ukrainiens (Paris, May 1919), p. 9A.

(Photo of the original letter, handwritten in German).

Tr (French): ("Je me permets..."), in *Documents ruthéno-ukrainiens* (Paris, May 1919), p. 9.

Tr (Ukrainian): ("Dozvoliu sobi..."), in *PPU*, Document no. 86, p. 137. Cites archival ref: LODA, f. 1, op. 52, spr. 10, ark. 48.

A covering letter introducing a study titled "The Russophilism of Galician Poles," written by Ukrainian publicists and examining anti-Austrian attitudes among Poles.

N.B.: *PPU* neglects to mention the title of this article and, quoting selectively, presents it instead as "a notice of Galician bourgeois-nationalist activists' support for the Austro-Hungarian government in its war with Russia."

18 September: to Rev. Bilets'kyi ("O. ofitsiialovy Bilets'komu...").

R: Dzerovych, p. 234.

R: *Tsars'kyi Viazen'*, p. 19.

A hastily written note of farewell before being exiled to Russia.

1917

- 24 April: to Ukrainians (National Council) in Petrograd (“Velykoïu radostiū perepovnena...”).
 R: Bodnaruk, p. 89.
 R: Oleksander Lotots'kyi, “Povorot mytr. Andreia Sheptyts'koho z zaslannia,” in his *Storinky mynuloho*, Pratsi Ukraïns'koho Naukovoho Instytutu, vol. 21, Seriia memuariv, vol. 4 (Warsaw: n.p., 1934), pp. 379–80.
 R: Doroshenko, pp. 40–41.
- c. 15 July (Stockholm): to Kaiser Karl of Austria (“Von Schwedens...”).
Ereignisse 2, Document no. 449, p. 442.
- 21 August: to Count Ottokar Czernin, Austrian Minister of External Affairs (“Trotzdem ich mit aller Sorgfalt...”).
Ereignisse 2, Document no. 452, p. 445.

1918

- 2 April: to Count Ottokar Czernin, Austrian Minister of External Affairs (“Angesichts der Religionsfreiheit...”).
 R: “Offizielle Bekanntgabe an das k.u.k. Ministerium des Äussern über die Restituierung der Cholmer gr.-kath. Diözese,” in *Ereignisse* 2, Document no. 381, pp. 354–55.
- 13 June: to Archduke Wilhelm Habsburg.
 Tr (French): “J’apprends qu’une partie...,” in *Documents ruthéno-ukrainiens* (Paris, Bureau Polonais des publications politiques, May 1919), p. 12.
 Tr (Ukrainian): *Nova hromada* (Prague, January 1924).
 Tr (Ukrainian): Lonhyn Tsehel's'kyi, *Vid lehend do pravdy: Spomyny pro podii v Ukraïni zv’iazani z pershym lystopadom 1918 r.* (New York: Bulava, 1960), pp. 194–95n.
 Tr (Ukrainian): “Ia diznavsia...,” *PPU*, Document no. 94, pp. 147–48.
 D: Tsehel's'kyi, *Vid lehend do pravdy* (1960), pp. 192–95;
 D: Lonhyn Tsehel's'kyi, “Ukraïns'kyi patriiarkhat u plianakh Volodymyra Vynnychenka,” *Kalendar Svitla 1986* (Toronto, 1985), pp. 63–66.

See also the letter of 18 March 1918 from Wilhelm Habsburg to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, *PPU*, Document no. 92, pp. 145–46.

18 July: to Count Ottokar Czernin, Austrian Minister of External Affairs (“Wiederholt kommen zu mir...”).

Ereignisse 2, Document no. 397, pp. 382–83.

8 August: to Bishop Iosafat Kotsylovs'kyi of Peremyshl' (“Na tsinnyi dopys...”).

R: *PPU*, Document no. 96, p. 150. Cites archival ref:

TsDIA, f. 201, op. 4–b, spr. 1815, ark. 11.

1919

4 January: to General Tadeusz Rozwadowski.

Tr (Polish, marked “Translated from the original”):

“Wczoraj oddano mi list...” (in ZNIO, Papiery Bolesława i Marii Wysłouchów, Sygn. 7195 II).

Tr (French): “J’ai reçu hier...,” in “Correspondance entre le général Rozwadowski et le Métropolitte André au sujet de la participation du clergé ruthène à la guerre civile polono-ukrainienne” in Korolevskij, Document no. II, pp. 408–11.

23 December: to Senator Antin Horbachevs'kyi (“Proshu pryniaty vyrazy...”).

R (photo reproduction): 02–65, between pp. B/237 and 1.

1921

19 November (Toronto): to Rev. Achille Delaere, C.Ss.R. (“Je partirai pour les Etats-Unis...”).

Emilien Tremblay, *Le père Delaere et l'Eglise Ukrainienne du Canada* (Berthierville: Imprimerie Bernard, 1960), pp. 268–69.

1922

5 April (New York): unpublished, to Felix Warburg, Joint Distribution Committee of the American Funds for Jewish War Sufferers (“I would feel very grateful...”).

New York, Joint (Distribution Committee) Archives, file no. 468, “Ukrainian Provinces Diocesan Relief Fund, 1922.”

1923

12 February: unpublished, to Giovanni Gennoch, Apostolic Visitor to Galicia.

“Rapport au père Gennoch” (“J’accepte avec grande reconnaissance...”).

ERSS-LGE, 1: 56–90.

13 March (Paris): to Rev. Lazar Berezovs'kyi, O.S.B.M. (“Ia pryikhav shchaslyvo...”).

R: Irynei Nazarko, “Aktsiia Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho na peredodni rishennia Rady ambasadoriv 1923 r.,” *Analecta O.S.B.M.* (Rome), Series 2, Sectio 2, vol. 3, fasc. 3–4 (1960): 452–53.

R: Jan Leo Szeptycki, “Moï spomyny pro Mytropolyta kyr Andreia Sheptyts'koho,” *Shliakh peremohy* (Munich) 47 (22 November 1970).

1924

27 July: to Leopold Prečan, Archbishop of Olomouc (“Unionistici congressus velehradensis habent...”).

in *Acta IV conventus velehradensis* (Olomouc: Sumptibus Archiepiscopi Olomucensis, 1925), pp. 188–90;

R (excerpt): Jos. Drozd, “Memento mortuorum: Andreas Šeptyckyj, Metropolita Leopoliensis, Praeses Academiae Velehradensis, 1910–1939,” in *Acta academiae velehradensis* 18 (Olomouc, 1947), p. 99.

1929

28 September: unpublished, to Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi ("Peredovsim diakuiu Vam za dovirie...").

BetC, vol. 2: "Variae epistolae et relationes" (Rome, 1965), 222–23.

1932

31 May: to the President of the Apostolate of SS. Cyril and Methodius ("Accipio humanissimam invitationem...").

in "Ad Praesidem Apostolatus Ss. Cyrilli et Methodii." *Acta Academiae Velehradensis* 12, nos. 1–2 (Olomouc, 1932), p. 90.

1933

29 March: to Vasyl' Mudryi, editor of *Dilo* (L'viv) ("Oderzhuiu...").

R: "B. het'man P. Skoropads'kyi ne ie masonom," *Dilo* (L'viv) 54, no. 85 (5 April 1933), p. 2.

1935

28 December: to Vasyl Mastsiukh, Apostolic Administrator of the Lemkian region ("Duzhe serdechno diakuiu...").

R: *Przemyskie Zapiski Historyczne* (Przemyśl) 3 (1985): 201–5.

R: *Svoboda* (Jersey City) 92, no. 235 (1985).

R: *Holos Lemkivshchyny* (Yonkers) 2 [264] (November 1985).

1939

26 December: to Cardinal Eugène Tisserant (“Agréez mes remerciements...”).

R: *ADSS-I*, pp. 168–73.

1941

7 July: to Andrii Mel'nyk, Leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (“Tsile ukrains'ke hromadianstvo...”).

R: *PPU*, Document no. 194, pp. 301–2. Cites archival ref.:
TsDIA, f. 358, op. 1, spr. 11, st. 2.

13 July: to Vasyl' Hlibovyts'kyi (“Distav dva lysty...”).

R: *Pan'kivs'kyi* (1957), pp. 51, 131.

22 July: (protest) to Adolf Hitler (“Auf die Gerüchte...”).

R: [Nahurs'kyi/Nagórski], “Die Tragödie” (1952), pp. 9–10.

R (excerpts): Prokoptschuk (1955), pp. 223–24;
Prokoptschuk (1967), p. 269.

See also the protest telegram of the Ukrainian National Council to Rosenberg and Ribbentrop, “Der Ukrainische Nationalrat zu Lemberg...,” in *Illytzyj*, 2: 214. The telegram was signed by all the members of the council.

See also the message of the Ukrainian Council of Seniors to the German government, “Der Ukrainische Seniorenrat in Lemberg...,” [Nahurs'kyi], “Die Tragödie” (1952), p. 10. The message was signed by 17 members of the Council of Seniors.

17 August: to Cardinal Tisserant (“Pendant les 22 mois...”).

A report on the state of the eparchy after the Soviet occupation.

ERSS-LGE, 415–26.

30 August: to Monsignor Angelo Rotta, Nuncio in Budapest (“Les autorités allemandes...”).

R: *ADSS-I*, pp. 437–42.

29 October: to Pope Pius XII (“Je désirerais présenter...”)

ERSS-LGE, 427–31. A situation report.

7 November: to Monsignor Angelo Rotta (“Je reçois la lettre dans laquelle...”).

R: *ADSS-I*, pp. 491–93.

29 November: to Cardinal Tisserant (“Quinze prêtres orthodoxes...”).

ERSS-LGE, 432–33.

1942

28 January: to Col. M. Rybachuk, head of the Church Council in Kyiv ("Pozvoliu sobi pereslaty...").

Tr (Polish): "Pozwalam sobie..." in Prus, p. 325, n. 106.

R: *PPU*, Document no. 207, pp. 319–20. Gives archival ref.:
TsDIA, f. 201, op. 4–b, spr. 2694, st. 133.

24 March: to Cardinal Tisserant ("Permettez-moi, Eminence...").

R: *ADSS-2*, pp. 552–56.

29–31 August: to Pope Pius XII ("Je n'ai pas écrit...").

R: *ADSS-2*, pp. 625–29.

R: *Bohosloviia* (Rome) 51 (1987): 102–6.

Tr (Polish, excerpts): Maurycy Prozor, "Stare i nowe w polskiej legendzie o Metropolicie A. Szeptyckim," ("Nie pisałem..."), in *Arka* (Cracow) 16 (1986): 110–12.

Tr (Polish): *Znak* (Cracow) 400 (September 1988).

Tr (Ukrainian): "Ia ne pysav..." in *Bohosloviia* (Rome) 51 (1987): 97–101.

Tr (Ukrainian): *Viche* (L'viv) 9 (1989): 6–7.

3 September: to Cardinal Eugène Tisserant.

R (excerpt): Eugène Tisserant, *L'Eglise militante* (Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1950), p. 14.

6 September: to Cardinal Tisserant ("Depuis que je suis évêque...")

ERSS-LGE, 453–60.

14 September: to Pope Pius XII ("Je reçois la lettre si pleine...").

R: *ADSS-2*, pp. 632–33.

15 October: to Oleksander Ohloblyn ("Vash lyst z 29.IX...").

R: Oleksander Ohloblyn, "Velykii i svitlii pamiati Mytropolity Andreia Sheptyts'koho," in *02–61*, p. 65.
(N.B.: The same article reprints two other short notes from the Metropolitan to Ohloblyn, dated 27 December 1943 and 11 March 1944. *Ibid.*, pp. 67–69).

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R: *PPU*, Document no. 231, pp. 346. Gives archival ref.:
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Andrii Krawchuk offers the first comprehensive scholarly study of this complex sphere of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's thought and activity. This pioneering analysis of how Christian moral teaching was applied within an Eastern European context breaks new ground in our understanding of the churches that survived Soviet persecution.

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