Beyond Memory
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For Thea
with love and gratitude
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# Contents

*Orthographic Note* ix

*Acknowledgments* xi

*List of Illustrations* xiii

Introduction 1

1. The Lay of the Historic Land 25
2. The Faces of Public Memory 49
3. Exile: Recalling the 1944 Deportation 79
5. The Crimean Tatar National Movement: Memories of Power and the Power of Memory 135
6. How Death Came to be Beautiful 169
7. Houses and Homelands: The Reterritorialization of Crimean Tatars 199

Sequel 231

*Notes* 249

*Bibliography* 269

*Index* 287
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Orthographic Note

I use Crimean Tatar for Crimean Tatar place names, foods, holidays, and a few key concepts. The Turkish alphabet is used for these words, which for the most part is phonetic except some of the letters, which are pronounced as follows.

cç is pronounced “ch” in English. Bahçesaray is pronounced “Bachesaray.”
c is pronounced “j” in English. Cihan is pronounced “Jihan.”
§ is pronounced “sh” in English. Özenbaşlı is pronounced “Ozenbashli.”
ö, ü, and ĭ are pronounced as back versions of English o, u, and i.

Russian: I also use transliterated Russian according to the Library of Congress system. I have retained the conventional spelling of certain well-known terms and names such as Yeltsin instead of El’tsin and Mikoyan instead of Mikoian. Similarly, glasnost, oblast, and several other words appear without the final soft sign. Both Turkish and Russian are rendered in the text by italics. All translations, unless otherwise noted, are my own.

In quoted speech, emphasis is denoted with italics, and unless otherwise noted, occurs in the original. Brackets have been used for speech inserted for clarification and I have used parentheses for the translation of foreign words, sounds, and gestures occurring in the original.
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List of Illustrations

0.1 Map .................................................. 2
3.1 Painting of deportation victims by Rustem Eminov ......... 99
4.1 Painting of Crimean Tatar woman by Rustem Eminov ... 129
4.2 Painting of rail cars by Rustem Eminov .................. 130
6.1 Painting of Musa Mahmut by Rustem Eminov ............ 190
7.1 Crimean Tatar home made from a rail car ................. 200
7.2 *Samo-zakhvat*, self-seized apartment .................. 217
7.3 *Samo-zakhvat*, self-seized apartment .................. 218
8.1 “Memory Day,” Crimean Tatar village holiday ........... 242
8.2 Crimean Tatar gathering .................................. 243
8.3 Gravestone in the shape of Crimean Peninsula, Chirchik, Uzbekistan ........................................ 246
Introduction

Exile

In the cool hours of early dawn on May 18, 1944, when the cherry blossoms had just begun to open, Asina awoke to the sound of loud knocking at the door.1 Her father and older brothers were fighting at the Soviet front, so her mother, still clad in pajamas, answered the door. Five soldiers of the People’s Commissariat for Interior Affairs or NKVD (predecessor to KGB) were standing with rifles pointed in her direction. “Get ready!” they said, “You have fifteen minutes!” “Where are we going?” her mother had asked. “That doesn’t concern us. Get ready.” In the ensuing moments, Asina’s mother managed to gather a few of their belongings and stuff them into a sack before she and her three children were loaded, half naked, into the back of a truck that took them to the train station in Bahçesaray, Crimea, in southern Ukraine. There, along with Tatars from the surrounding area, they were forced into cattle cars destined for the Ural Mountains and Central Asia, a distance of approximately four thousand miles away. Asina heard dogs barking, sheep and goats baying, and cows mooing into the twilight as they rolled away (see figure I.1).

Asina, my Crimean Tatar “mother,” told me this story as we drank Turkish coffee at a low table in her yard. She had returned to Ukraine a few years earlier and bought a house down the street from the one she grew up in. We looked out past the rustling leaves of the fig, apricot, and walnut trees to the mountains beyond. Like the casting out from Eden, Asina’s story was repeated with variation by many other Crimean Tatars interviewed between 1995 and 2001. Body to body, they traveled for several weeks. Because the trains had been used for livestock, Asina soon found herself covered with lice. The only place to relieve oneself was a hole in one corner of the train, and the lack of privacy offended everyone. The inability to wash foreclosed the Islamic practice of namaz, and violated norms of cleanliness. Asina’s mother tried to prepare food when the train stopped, but each time the train would lurch forward, and they would scramble aboard, still hungry. While Asina survived, many died, including her infant brother, whom they were forced to leave by the side of the tracks. The NKVD officers did not allow
Figure I.1  Repatriation of Crimean Tatars from Russia and Central Asia
the Crimean Tatars to bury the dead according to their Muslim traditions, but patrolled the trains for the dead and threw the corpses out.

Not only were there deaths, but women gave birth in the overcrowded cars. They did not stop, but rode on in what came to be called “crematoria on wheels.” At no point were the Tatars informed where they were going or why. Some were even told they should not ask because they were to be shot upon arrival. Asina traveled for approximately 18 days before she was unloaded, hungry and sick, in the Ural Mountains. She was given a tattered and blood-stained uniform to keep her warm and interned in a “special settlement” regime with her mother and only surviving brother. While some were given shovels and told to dig themselves dwellings, Asina and her family were given a corner of some barracks. They were forbidden from leaving a prescribed area and required to check in with a commander every month. Once in exile, at least one-third or perhaps as many as half perished as a result of dehydration, malnutrition, and disease. Tatars also allege that when they sought medical treatment in places of exile, they were used as subjects of medical experimentation and exterminated.

Stalin deported the Crimean Tatars for their ostensible collaboration with German and Romanian forces during their three-year World War II occupation of Crimea. However, it has since become clear that all ethnic groups collaborated, some of them on a greater scale than the Tatars. Further, the Soviet regime did not pause to consider who was guilty of the charges, but deported the group en masse, including the women, children, and elderly who had no connection to the German regime. Scholarship on formerly secret archival documents makes it increasingly plain that Stalin’s domestic policy with regard to the Tatars had little to do with their actual behavior. Rather, it was part of a larger and more complex foreign policy in line with his geopolitical strategy to secure the southern border and expand into Turkey. The Crimean Tatars, who had ethnic ties in Turkey, were viewed as potentially sabotaging that plan.

We can place his act in a larger context still. Nagengast observes that in the post–World War II period, state-sponsored violence toward political and ethnic groups caused more deaths, injuries, and human suffering than “all other forms of deadly conflict including international wars and colonial and civil wars” combined (1994: 126). As Rummel (1994) and Sluka (2000) have argued, totalitarian and authoritarian governments are by far the main culprits. The Soviet gulag alone is believed to have at least ten million victims (Nove 1993: 29–33). The Crimean Tatars were accused of treason and deported less than two weeks after the Soviet army cleared German forces from southern Ukraine. In a single night, approximately 191,000 had the dehumanizing experience of being taken from their homes, stripped of their possessions, and exiled from their homeland.
Physical destruction was just one of the modalities Stalin used to remove the Crimean Tatars from Crimea. After their exile, Tatar place names were changed to Soviet ones like “Happy,” (Частвивое) “Pretty,” (Красивое) and “Clean” (Чистое). Books in the Crimean Tatar language, including classics like Marx and Lenin, were destroyed. Their mosques were converted to movie theaters and warehouses, and gravestones from their cemeteries were used for building material. Mentions of them were cut from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, and their ethnonym disappeared from the Soviet census. Tatars in exile were not allowed to speak of or commemorate Crimea in any way. Given the Marxian idea that history has teleology, mentioning Crimea was taken as a code for return and vehemently suppressed. Officials took it as a form of insurrection, and labeled even the most benign utterances “bourgeois nationalist.” Those who said they were Crimean Tatars when applying for internal passports (passports to travel abroad were categorically denied) were told there was no such group, only “Tatars.” They struggled to survive in camps across Russia and the republics of Central Asia, as Russians and Ukrainians were moved in and given Tatar houses, gardens, and livestock to tend.

While they were victims of an apparent attempt at physical extermination, and were written out of official histories, the Crimean Tatars did not, as the Soviet authorities hoped, disappear or assimilate with other groups. While I use “Crimean Tatars” to refer to this ethnic group, it must be kept in mind that this is far from a homogenous group. The Crimean Tatars are linguistically, culturally, and physically heterogenous. For the sake of brevity I use Crimean Tatars and Tatars interchangeably. Nor did they forget their experience, even when the Soviet regime forbid them from mentioning Crimea. In fact, as suggested by Asina’s story, they developed a body of recollections that spans the borders of Ukraine and Uzbekistan. If we consider the recollections in light of the Soviet penal system and the attempts at repression, this is significant. Not only had a panoply of techniques been used to efface the memories, rewrite the history, and silence the Tatars, but a great deal of the literature on the Holocaust explores the silences of the witness (Wiesel 1978: 198; Langer 1991). Intersecting this literature on the Holocaust is the literature on subaltern histories that raises profound epistemological questions about our ability to even recognize, let alone understand, the silences of subaltern groups. At issue are both the production and the retrieval of subaltern speech (Spivak 1988; Prakash 1990; Coronil 1994).

Yet, in the late 1990s, the once-suppressed Crimean Tatar past seemed to be surprisingly fresh, even available. Asina’s story can therefore be understood as taking one position within wider politics of memory, and memory work (Delcore 2003).
1994), Argentina (Perelli 1994), or Germany (La Capra 1994) the tendency is for painful memories to be effaced, they become a “chosen trauma” in other societies. It has therefore been said that there are two kinds of survivors—those who cannot speak, and those who cannot stop speaking (Kurlansky 1995: 123). Readers familiar with the Palestinians (Swedenburg 1995; Parmenter 1994; Bisharat 1997; Peteet 1998) Hutus and Tutsis (Malkki 1995, 1997; Sommers 2001), Greeks from Turkey (Hirschon 1988; Voutira 1991; Loizos 1999), Greek Cypriots (Loizos 1981; Zetter 1994, 1999) or Ethiopian refugees (Kibreab 1996, 1999) will find they have much in common with the Crimean Tatars. What is intriguing about this particular case is that in electing to remember and return, the Crimean Tatars reversed the trend during the eighteenth and nineteenth century of leaving their homeland for the Ottoman Empire. Also intriguing is the shift contemporary Tatars have experienced within their lifetimes. From their position at the Soviet to post-Soviet rupture, we can explore what happens when a group whose memory has long been suppressed suddenly gains a license to remember.

To a certain extent, the Crimean Tatars share contested and sometimes hypertrophied memories of World War II with Europeans. Henry Rousso (1991) was surprised about the immediacy of the Vichy Period three decades later. This prompted him to write not the history of Vichy, but the history of the memory of Vichy. Similarly, Sarah Farmer (1999) explores the commemoration of a village that became a symbol of French suffering under the German occupation. In contrast to the Crimean Tatars, however, this commemoration received a great deal of support. David Rock and Stefan Wolff’s (2001) volume contains many insights into the experience of ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Germany, and the work of John Borneman (1997) contrasts strategies of coming to terms with the past in East and West Germany. Like Crimean Tatars, personal narratives were related, in sometimes complementary and sometimes competing ways, to state-sponsored master narratives.

In their practices of collectively remembering a lost homeland, however, the Crimean Tatars have more in common with refugees and other involuntarily displaced populations. They share both the claim to have suffered from genocidal policies, and the aspiration to repatriate. Concepts of exile and ideologies of return are therefore central in the refugee and migration literature from early studies (Cruise O’Brien 1972; Anwar 1979) to more recent work (Al Rasheed 1994; Kibreab 1999; Warner 1994; Zetter 1999). Return as a question, a dream, a slogan, an idea, and a plan reverberates through the discourses of many refugee groups. However the value of the so-called ‘myth of return’ (Cruise O’Brien 1972) as an analytic construct must be challenged (Israel 2002). Zetter refines the so-called
myth of return into a myth of home, suggesting it is home that has been mythologized: what has been lost is reconstructed in an idealized form (1999). It is hoped that, through return, home can be restored both materially and symbolically. The difficulty with this unfortunate phrase, as Zetter points out, is that what is a “myth” for social scientists and humanitarian agencies is for refugees and displaced persons a deeply held conviction. The other difficulty is that this framework has remained largely descriptive, without, until recently, any very robust theorizations of why one group romanticizes return while another does not (Barnes 2001; Israel 2002). Here the Crimean Tatar case yields insight. The research on which this book is based considered other groups that were deported from Crimea, as well as the differences between Tatars who stayed in exile and repatriated.

The centrality of return also raises the importance of the past to refugee groups. The past, as it is variously reclaimed and refigured, is both a way of constructing continuity following immense losses, and a useful bargaining chip in negotiations about the future. The “management” of memories, both one’s own and others, is therefore a significant dimension of refugee adjustment. While refugees themselves are romanticized by humanitarian organizations and the popular press (Malkki 1997), countries of asylum may have “neither time nor conceptual space” for nostalgia about the past (Loizos 1999: 259). This is an important point because how those who have been displaced manage their pasts depends not only on their own social constructions, but the political context and receptivity in the places in which they find themselves.

Crimean Tatars’ propensity to remember must therefore placed in its specific Soviet context. The waves of destalinization following Khrushchev’s Twentieth Party speech have been marked by a deeply ambivalent, and yet active struggle to come to terms with the repressive past. At the center of these efforts have been organizations like Memorial. In the early days, crowds lined up at its Moscow reception room to describe their experiences. They were motivated both by a desire to heal, and a moral imperative to bear witness. The problems associated with confronting the past are different for the Soviet Union than for either Germany or Japan. As Adler points out, neither Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan attempted to make a change toward a more open society (2002). It was only the subsequent administrations that took up the effort to come to a reconciliation with the past. In the Soviet Union by contrast, many of the same politicians were still in power when the gulag was dismantled and when political prisoners were released by administrative decree. The tension between the need to tell one’s story and the fear of what will happen if one does is therefore particularly acute.
The propensity of societies to remember and forget has received well-deserved attention (Abercrombie 1998; Boyarin 1994; Cole 1998; Malkki 1995; Rappaport 1998; Rosaldo 1980). Scholarship has amply demonstrated the extent to which cultural conceptions of history differ in their degree of symbolic elaboration, ability to influence, and capacity to capture the imagination (Rosaldo 1980: 54; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991). This work is especially welcome considering that unless we take into account the various ways of making and imagining history, we risk underestimating others’ resources (Lederman 1986). This book is an account of the Crimean Tatars’ ways of making their history and by extension remaking themselves. As such, it is about the intersections of memory and sentiment, power and agency in the production of knowledge about the past.

A significant amount of time in the field was spent recording narratives about deportation. These were stories that wracked their narrators with grief. They were especially moving because what they said bore such faint resemblance to Soviet history, suggesting a counter-memory of survival. The more I listened, the more I empathized. And so it was with even greater discomfort that I realized the Tatars’ story wasn’t the only one. Russians and Ukrainians whispered about the terrible acts committed by Crimean Tatars during the war and suggested the deportation had been humane, taking the Tatars to some of the most climatically agreeable and agriculturally fertile land in the Soviet Union, the Ferghana Valley. Clearly, there was more than one way that this history was being imagined. As Abercrombie argues, recollecting and commemorating the past takes place in contexts where power is at play. Alternative forms of social memory and construing the social are therefore always in contention (1998: 21). Whereas Tatars spoke of decorated veterans returning from war only to go, without thanks, into exile, Russians and Ukrainians saw traitors and henchmen given a life sentence in the equivalent of paradise. This book tries to build a more balanced story in the gap between these visions.

To this end, two historians at the Republican Committee for the Preservation of Historical Landmarks were consulted. They directed me to archival materials, including formerly secret intelligence documents from the Third Reich about recruiting Crimean Tatars. These documents corroborated some of what the Tatars were telling me, but were cast in very different tone. They were pitched toward incriminating the Tatars, and suggested collaboration with the Germans of a more enthusiastic nature. Gradually, however, it became clear that many Soviet history books would supply a similar message. Like oral narratives, the documentary record had to be taken as but one rendering of the past. It was just that I had become so immersed in the Tatars’ world that the documentary evidence forced me to stop and reconsider. I sought out more archival resources, and read many
issues of the newspaper *Golos Kryma* or “Voice of Crimea” to decipher the competing claims that are explored in the pages ahead.

The richness of the Tatars’ recollections, and their transmission in spite of the dangers associated with telling, suggested that by the beginning of the millennium, their recollections were no longer a “subjugated knowledge” (Foucault 1977). Rather, they had come to *dominate* the production of knowledge about the past in Crimea: if any version was in danger of subjugation in Crimea, it was probably the official Russian one. Neither were they a “hidden transcript” (Scott 1990): Crimean Tatars’ stories of deportation are interpenetrated by Soviet historiography, not in hidden, but dynamic tension. Slavic and Tatar views of the past compete for attention, suggesting that collective processes of interpretation have a significant role to play, and that the past has become a valuable commodity in the chaos of restructuring.

**Return**

Given Asina’s experience of deportation, the Tatar return would appear straightforward. However, the vast majority of returnees are not, like Asina, from Crimea, but born and raised in Soviet Central Asia. Moreover, their lives in Central Asia were relatively secure and comfortable. So the Tatars’ desire to return is complicated by two factors. First, the central referent of Tatar memories, the Crimean peninsula, lies beyond the actual memory of the majority of returnees who were born in exile. Young Tatars’ profound affection for Crimea must therefore be historicized. Second, Tatars gave up comfortable and prosperous lives in places of former exile for a life in Crimea characterized not only by a lack of infrastructure and crime, but opposition to their presence. Faced with resistance, those who returned resorted to squatting on vacant land as well as threatening and sometimes carrying out self-immolation. The question, then, is how over one-quarter million Crimean Tatars could become willing to give up everything, including their lives, in order to repatriate to their historic homeland. Indeed, how people become willing to kill or even die for national collectivities is something that is still poorly understood (Anderson 1991). This book contends that the desire to repatriate was sustained by practices of collectively remembering the homeland. The production of a body of knowledge about the past helped shape a structure of feeling about belonging that was charged enough to make the Crimean Tatars believe they were linked to one another and the land. The slippage is that they returned less because of *Asina’s* memories, than those of people like her sons.
To appreciate this point, we need to go from Asina’s home in the village, to that of her son in the capital city of Simferopol. Second-generation Tatars replay the central event in their parents’ narratives when they place themselves in a position to be evicted by the authorities. Just as their parents and grandparents were removed in 1944, Tatars returning from the late 1960s to the early 1990s were often evicted. This is not a complete isomorphism, for there are important differences. However, as scholars of the Holocaust (Bammer 1994; Bar-On and Gilad 1994; Hartman 1994) have shown, children of survivors often try to live out their parents’ interrupted lives. The Crimean Tatars have certainly picked up where their parents left off. Even more importantly, they have tried to change the outcome to success. Parental recollections shape a cultural framework that second- and third-generation Tatars bring with them when repatriating. 6

This was especially clear on my first visit to Crimea when I met Asina and then her sons. I was left in the care of her son, “Asan” and his wife “Zira” in Simferopol. Denied, despite repeated applications, the right to register and get an apartment, this couple had been involved in a standoff with the authorities. When they returned to the peninsula and were unable to find housing, they settled on land at the outskirts of town. The tension reached a peak a priori my arrival when the authorities cited them for violation of the passport regime. Asan and several of his friends formed a semi-circle around the property, doused themselves with gasoline, and held matches in their hands. Then they told the police that if they did not leave, they would all blow up together. The authorities retreated and eventually, their presence on that land was registered.

When I met them, Asan and Zira were still saving money to build a house on the parcel they had claimed. In the meantime, they had ended up squatting in an abandoned, one-room house in an older part of Simferopol. They had taken it over when the Roma or “gypsies” who previously lived there abandoned it. The family hosted a stream of friends and family who came to drink Zira’s coffee and talk. They spoke of the shortages, inflation, and a continuously changing morass of red tape prevalent throughout the former republics. What set them apart from the Russians and Ukrainians in their midst was their sense of instability. Many speculated that a “third” deportation was in order and some even slept in their clothes, fearing eviction.

Zira had helped a number of her friends reclaim old Tatar houses—a process that involved clearing away accumulated layers of trash and debris left by alcoholics, cleaning stained walls, patching the stucco, and trying to rid these dwellings of the stench that came with them. I witnessed one such reclamation, described in chapter 7. Romantic notions of Crimea derived from pictures of the Black Sea beaches, the Palace Museums, and the beautiful
dachas and sanatoria perched by the sea had to be discarded after observing this process. While living with Asan and Zira, the poetic nostalgia for Crimea that first impressed me in Asina’s village collided head on with the ugly, painful, and violent realities of property reclamation.

All of this has a bearing on the way history is being employed in the politics of the present: as they prepared to go to the Gorispolkom or City Mayor’s office and ask to be registered at the property, the family was approached by a Russian couple who claimed the home had belonged to the woman’s parents. They argued that because the woman’s predecessors built the house, it should now pass to them. Zira countered that the Tatar architecture of the building belied that, claiming her grandmother had lived on the property prior to deportation. Two competing sets of ancestors legitimized these impassioned claims, anchoring the present to the past at a moment when the “rule of law” seemed up for grabs (also see Verdery 1996).

The question remained how the profound desire for homeland came about. Why did second-generation Tatars who had never lived in Crimea feel compelled to return against all odds? Their desires to be “at home” in their historic homeland seemed to carry on a strange coexistence with the discomfort and perpetual difficulties of daily life there. One explanation is that in a sense, past events are not really past. As one person put it, “For the Soviet people, the thirties, the forties, the fifties—are history. For Crimean Tatars, they are now. . . . They live history.” His comment was borne out by my field research in which children as young as 11 produced narratives about deportation that were structurally similar to their elders. This said, the narratives were marked with different emotional inflections. Further, families had different ways of telling their children about deportation and these ways had changed over time. Asina’s narrative was a product of repeated telling. After her son learned her story, he brought others to hear it as well. He reveled in her story, probing for elements she glossed over, while leaving other dimensions untouched. The diasporic generations therefore have an instrumental role to play in the production of knowledge about the past: it is not the transmission of knowledge but its circulation that we are witnessing.

The circulation of social memories among Crimean Tatars can also be viewed in relation to recollecting among Stalin’s other deportees. After World War II, representatives of 13 different ethnic groups were deported. From Crimea alone Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans, Greeks, and Karaims were deported in addition to Tatars. As Tishkov has pointed out, “The collectively experienced trauma gave rise to special sensitivity toward the territorial issue among repressed groups, and put a special halo around the idea of a ‘homeland’ ” (1997: 170). And yet, within this special sensitivity there are important distinctions as well. Representatives of the other deported groups are in a process of questioning their post-Soviet ethnic
allegiances: who they are and where they belong are the subject of intense
debate. Further, they often embraced an idea of homeland, “in the multiple,”
which would be construed as an oxymoron for a nationally inclined Tatar
in Crimea. Finally, members of the non-Tatar groups stressed return as
nonobligatory, sometimes to the extent of rejecting the historic homeland
in favor of a contemporary one someplace else. There was none of the
moral imperative to return that figures so prominently among Tatars.8

There are thus at least three principal reasons why these groups had dif-
f erent notions of homeland. First, unlike the Crimean Tatars, they had
other, potential homelands to consider. Hence, homeland was interpreted
“in the widest sense of the word” and informants seemed to value flexibil-
ity. Crimean Tatars stress this, and attribute the ferocity with which they
defend their national homeland to the feeling that they have nowhere else
to go. Second, the Armenians and Germans had helped colonize the very
same places to which they were later exiled, meaning that they had some
positive associations. Finally, other deported groups lacked the influence of
a powerful national movement shaping their views.

Collecting Memory

Studies of memory and history are plagued by a number of terminological
problems that stem from the difficulty of pinpointing the phenomenon at
hand. Memory has become an object of analysis that literary studies, psy-
chology, medicine, sociology, history, and anthropology all claim within
their purview. As Hacking has observed this is relatively new because what
we now call “memory” would have been called “soul” in early scholarship
(Hacking 1995). In anthropology, a social constructivist view has been
employed to highlight the way in which society provides the means of
translating vague images and inchoate impressions into recollections. As
productive as this move has been, it has not always led to a very clear sense
of the specific ways in which collective memories are formed (Gedi and
Elam 1996). The ethnographic material provided here helps to fill that gap:
the ways in which children correct and fill in their parents’ memories; dis-
sidents re-educate their interrogators; and activists borrow, trade, and
appropriate one another’s lines indexes this social aspect of forming inter-
pretations.9 This is prerequisite to knowing how the colonial and the
national are positioned and produced in memory at all.10

Halbwachs paved the way to consider the historical imagination and the
making of memory.11 By considering differences among Crimean Tatars
and their implications, I will be extending Halbwachs’s idea of memory as
social in a different direction. He suggested that a particular society can persist “only if there is a sufficient unity of outlooks among the individuals and groups comprising it” [1941](1992: 82).

What must not escape attention, however, are the very different styles of remembering, recalling, and commemorating the past, even within the Crimean Tatar population. The term “collected memory” (Young 1992: 267) is apropos here because it resists the temptation to treat the way in which collectivities remember as a deep and mysterious process, or gloss over something that is fundamentally about negotiation. Crimean Tatars are far from a uniform or homogenous group: while stories of deportation are similar across new state borders, what Tatars make of these stories, and the way in which they tell them differ from one family to the next.

But what is memory? Some of scientists’ most recent conclusions actually dovetail nicely with more subjective anthropological accounts. One thing established by scientific research is that in a very real sense, memories are neither passive nor literal recordings of reality. We do not store judgment-free “snapshots” in the albums of our minds, but hold on to aspects of the meaning, sense, and emotion these experiences provided (Schacter 1996: 5). This means that we cannot separate our memories of what already happened from ongoing events. To put this in more scientific terms, the “memory” in a neural network is a unique pattern that emerges from the pooled contributions of a cue in the present and an “engram” or memory trace that has been encoded in the brain (Schacter 1996: 71). Neural networks combine the information in the present environment with patterns that have been stored in the past.

This has multiple implications for the Crimean Tatar case. For one thing, we cannot assume what they remember today is what they remembered in 1955 or 1965 or 1975. The way Tatars perceive their present situation is part of the retrieval process. In fact, the research and my presence as an interviewer created the occasion for a retrieval event. This means that what they remember, and the affect with which they remember it, are a commentary not just on 1944, but on their present place in time. We can extend this one step further by noting that very often, the subjects who “remember” were not alive at the time of the events they claim to remember. Rather, “their constitution as subjects is part of the continuous creation of the past” (Trouillot 1995: 16). Intertwined with the emergent properties of memory are sentiments.

Historicizing Sentiment

There is a remarkable amount of affect suffusing homeland for Crimean Tatars. But the expression they use to describe this, their *chuvstvo rodini* is
difficult to translate. What Tatars refer to as a “feeling” or “sense” of homeland is poorly described by “feeling” as we are accustomed to using it. The feeling or sense of homeland is really a historically specific complex of attitudes, beliefs, desires, and values that are intensely charged with affect. The idea of a structure of feeling is useful in this regard, for it refers to feeling in the sense of meanings and values that are intensely lived: the affective elements of practical consciousness (Williams 1977). It has tremendous value because it highlights the emergent aspect of social memory and encourages us to recognize that experiences such as a family’s improvisational land reclamation that are assumed to be unique or coincidental, are in fact eminently social in the sense of being embedded in social relations. Another strength of Williams’s formulation is a refusal to dichotomize thinking and feeling. He conceives of “intensely lived values” in terms of thinking-as-felt and feeling-as-thought.\(^\text{13}\) To approach Crimean Tatar practices in this way entails charting a course between formally held belief systems and less clearly articulated structures of feeling, between relations of formal assent and private dissent, between the social and the personal, the rational and the emotional.

This book is informed by Williams’s concept of structures of feeling, but I have attempted to steer clear of too literal an interpretation of the term. While Williams used the word “structure” heuristically, it still carries several assumptions that we need to clarify. For example, “structure” can suggest a hidden essence that denies the validity of what appears on the surface. A crucial component to the argument put forward here is that recollections and sentiments are socially constructed in some very public and surprisingly superficial ways. We need to keep returning to the emergent aspects that Williams highlighted because even as structures of feeling create the mood of a generation, sentiments and narratives are still in the process of development. As they become formalized, new structures of feeling are in formation.

While Crimean Tatars’ “feeling of homeland” is not exactly a feeling but an experience of interpreting the world in a particular way, the affect concerning homeland still needs to be taken into account.\(^\text{14}\) If Crimean Tatars who have never been to Crimea or have only visited state they are willing to give up their lives for their homeland, we need to know how sentiments, such as attachment to homeland, are constructed. By stressing the nation as “a deep horizontal comradeship” and (simultaneously) as a project constructed by intellectuals, Anderson’s (1991) argument requires us to take for granted the connection between a supposedly elite construct and a sentiment that is widely shared. His view demands we accept the “cultural” ground of nationalism (Skurski 1994). However, as Berlant (1991) and Verdery (1996) suggest, the process through which individuals form emotional attachments to national collectivities is poorly understood. Socialization is not as straightforward a process as we often think (Stoler
1992a). Young peoples’ representations are less a product of passive acceptance than active interpretation, modification, and rejection.

Abu-Lughod and Lutz (1990) and Appadurai (1990a) suggest a productive approach to sentiment that is discourse centered. Talk, texts, and other social practices produce experiences and help constitute realities. The production of experience is of course limited by various forms of constraint and power, but the advantage of a discursive approach is that it steers us away from overly individualistic or “mentalist” models toward treating language as a form of social action. This helps us understand that Tatar sentiment for homeland is not just deep, private, and individual, but public and learned. Otherwise, it is unlikely that second- and third-generation Crimean Tatars would harbor similar sentiments and describe them with equal or greater intensity as their parents.

If sentiment is part of political behavior, we need to take indigenous theories of sentiments into account. Tatars seem to be guided by two overarching ideas. First, sentiments are malleable. It is this kind of thinking that led one consultant to ask a cousin who had been turned down for an apartment “don’t you know when to cry?” Another advised his wife to make tears of saliva if she could not manufacture her own: they were crucial to getting a petition signed. A second and related idea is that words are powerful: one can “do things with words” (Austin 1962). By extension, one can do things with sentiments, which helps explain the highly performative practice of squatting, and in some cases self-immolation, that facilitated repatriation. The willingness to pound their fists on the table, so to speak, eventually gained them a hearing. Here the focus is the Tatars’ discursively constructed, public, and performed interpretation of their affective relationship to place.

To say that sentiment for homeland is discursively constructed or deployed pragmatically is not to suggest it is disingenuous. Sentiment and memory was strategically, consciously, and intelligently deployed in debates at the Goskornats (State Committees for Nationalities), at hearings regarding property, as well as in public spaces such as stores and museums, at the same time that these sentiments were deeply felt and intensely meaningful. Readers familiar with property restitution in the former Yugoslavia will find parallels with the Crimean Tatar experience. Emotions about home, and their discursive deployment were typically framed in terms of specific claims (Leutloff 2002: 87). For example, the Croats Carolin Leutloff interviewed imagined returning to the region to feel free and at home again, but found the places they remembered and those they returned to were very different. Like the Tatars whose sentiments for homeland evolved over time, Leutloff found that both Serbs’ and Croats’ feelings about their homes shifted. They made emotional judgments that were intricately related
(sometimes in contradictory ways) to both prewar norms and postwar political concepts (Leutloff 2002: 91).

Memory and sentiment thus converge in lived places. The built environment, in particular, collected and condensed Tatar sentiments that were marginalized by official history. This brings us to the politics of place.

Politics and Place

The plight of Crimean Tatars is often considered an “ethnic” problem. This grossly oversimplifies the dynamics involved and precludes exploring some of the most intriguing lines of inquiry. Ethnic categories are important insofar as they have structured a great deal of the scholarship on the Soviet Union, and the book takes one of those groups as its topic. However the book as a whole moves in another direction and argues that it is not the status of Crimean Tatar nationalism or their “identity” that preoccupies the majority of Crimean Tatars as much as the idea that they are connected to, and responsible for, a land where they belong. It was not so much an issue of their relations with other groups driving Tatar repatriation, as their relation to place. This is of course not to suggest we ignore ethnic categories. One of the striking accompaniments to the end of Communist rule was the growth of national sentiments, attended by increasing attention to ethnicity (Khazanov 1995; Prazauskas 1994; Suny 1993). The hydraulic model in which “suppressed ethnic hatreds” were released has been complexified in favor of far more subtle analyses (Mestrovic 1996; Verdery 1996). The case could be made that a society’s relation to place is derivative of their national ideology. Nationalist imagining produces powerful images, but I prefer to invert the relationship. What questions would be generated if we started from the premise that social relations, even those framed in “ethnic” terms arise more fundamentally out of relations to place?

This approach is more congruent with the work of theorists who seek to explain changing relationships to place, considering both the increasing mobility and displacement of populations throughout the world, and the increasing ability to imagine places from a distance (Gupta and Ferguson 1992). The literature on space and place shifts the focus from nation and culture to critically consider the very different ways in which social relations are tied to place (Casey 1993; Feld and Basso 1996; Hirsch and O’Hanlon 1995). While authors like Harvey (1989) and Sassen (1996) have placed emphasis on changing organizations of space, Appadurai (1990b, 1991, 1996), Gupta and Ferguson (1992), and Anderson (1991, 1992) have elaborated on the changing role of the imagination in social life. This has
special relevance for Tatars: the Crimea as they knew it was destroyed in 1944 but lives on in their imagination, in continual and dynamic tension with the “real” post-Soviet Crimea, in its present debilitated state. Even more provocatively, Gupta and Ferguson (1992) suggest that as actual ties to places become more tenuous, the idea of a homeland becomes increasingly important. Nowhere is this clearer than in Crimean Tatars’ passion for living in their homeland. When bulldozers flattened the squatters’ settlements, residents redoubled their efforts and rebuilt them.

The work on place enables us to see the Crimean Tatars’ attachment to homeland not as a dysfunctional manifestation of ethnonationalism, but a fully modern response to changing relations to place. Tatars are involved in processes of de- and re-territorialization. Competing interpretations of the past crop up in debates about who lived where when; in the legislative manipulation of who is a citizen and who is not; in struggles over who has the right to property and who does not; and in discussions about removing the historical monuments left over from the Soviet period. If we understand these battles over history and memory as developing out of battles over place (Yoneyama 1994), then we have a way to think about territorialized identities and place attachment without relying too heavily on tropes of nationalism.

One way to think about why second- and third-generation Tatars have taken up parents’ memories is that they have become a resource in the chaos of privatization. The price of forgetting is not just the loss of a link-age to previous generations, but a genuine stake in what is otherwise a very precarious future. The process of privatization that began in the early 1990s threatened to make the Crimean Tatars’ relationship to Crimea even more tenuous: it was primarily the Russians and Ukrainians, who had homes and were employed at collective farms, that were positioned to take advantage of the process. Crimean Tatars have tried to intervene, first by squatting on vacant land, and more recently by using political channels to solidify their claims. Knowledge of the places they and their ancestors lost lend legitimacy in this process. The conversations and narratives analyzed in this book demonstrate that the collection of memories and production of lay knowledge about the past work to create the ground or framework within which the larger debates of politics take place.

Beyond Memory

This study adds to others by considering how patriotic sentiments are constituted within the dialogic effects of everyday conversation. This is a
dialogic production of culture that, rather than relying on categories of elite and common, attempts to focus on discursive and nondiscursive practices. Conversational discourse is a particularly important site where cultural meanings are negotiated and challenged (Austin 1962; Hanks 1996; Ries 1997: 65). If we are interested in sentiments (such as attachment to homeland or patriotism) that include a public and political expression, then the appropriate site of investigation is not just the inner states of interlocutors but also the very public negotiation of responses (Appadurai 1990a).

The idea that the practice of memory and love of history led to their return is complicated by a number of inversions and reversals. As such, their return is beyond the memory they use to explain it. Not only are young adults’ “memories” complex and highly emotional interpretations of their parents’ recollections or “postmemories,” but in many families, the practice only began after the fall of the Soviet Union, when it became safe. Crimean Tatars see their attachment as “in the blood,” but in the last century, they were dying to leave the area to be free of tsarist oppression. What happened in that time span was more than the birth of ethnic nationalisms and has to do with the larger failure of Soviet cosmopolitanism and internationalism to produce localities that met peoples’ needs (Appadurai 1996). As we will see in chapter 4, memory is surprisingly thin when it comes to the generation of sentiments for homeland: they sometimes arose whether parents recalled Crimea or not. Attention to sentiments may therefore advance the concept of memory conceptually and analytically, enabling us to consider the specific structures of feeling that guide appropriations of the past. As we will see in chapter 5, knowledge of history convinced them of the rightness of return but it was the recruitment of memory and sentiment into political practice and the performance of success that animated the movement for repatriation.

**Methodology**

The consultants quoted in this book were interviewed in a variety of settings including informal family gatherings, in-depth life history interviews, and semistructured interviews between 1995 and 2001. With regard to the semistructured interviews, the responses of 53 individuals (30 in Ukraine and 23 in Uzbekistan) to a set of 50 questions were collected during the 1997–1998 fieldwork.20 The same core of questions was asked in each republic, across generations, and among different ethnic groups.21 To the core, I added questions that were specific to generation, republic/state, and
ethnic group. First generation was heuristically defined as being born prior to
1944 (whether or not one was personally deported). Second and third
generations, born in exile, were grouped together for interviewing purposes
but could be disaggregated into children and grandchildren of deported.22

Most of the interviewing was conducted in Russian, a language the
researcher is fluent in. The researcher also learned some Crimean Tatar in
the field and selected interviews were conducted in Crimean Tatar with the
aid of an interpreter. However, Russian was the primary language because
the Tatars’ experience in diaspora, and the language policies of the Soviet
regime resulted in significant linguistic Russification. So while most report
Crimean Tatar is their “native language” (rodnoi) they are more comfortable
speaking in Russian on many, but of course not all, topics.

The research began in 1995 with a preliminary trip to Russia and
Ukraine. It was followed by two other preliminary trips, one to Crimea and
one to Central Asia. Fourteen consecutive months of research in Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan began in 1997. I returned to the
field for follow-up visits in December 2001 and December 2003. These
sojourns constitute approximately two years of living in the former
republics of the Soviet Union.

How Consultants Were Selected

The nine consultants interviewed for in-depth life history interviews were
selected by snowball or network sampling. They were chosen on the basis of
their participation in the Crimean Tatar National Movement or their experi-
ences of deportation. The informants for the semistructured interviewing in
Crimea were selected randomly through cluster sampling. I obtained a map
marking the 500 parcels of land in the Marino squatters’ settlement and used
a table of random numbers to identify the parcels where residents would be
interviewed. A Crimean Tatar accompanied me on most of these interviews
to help me locate the appropriate parcels and introduce me to the people liv-
ing there. When we found nothing but a foundation on a parcel, or there was
a house but no one living in it, we proceeded to the next parcel that had been
selected. The list of parcels generated from the table helped us establish rap-
port and avoid jealousy because it enabled us to answer the question of why
we visited one home and not another (unlike snowball or network sampling).
Almost all of the people we approached were welcoming.

The settlement of Marino was unusually well suited for this method of
sampling because there was a degree of randomness in the way they were
assigned. After a construction brigade composed of future residents had
built identical foundations, the numbers of parcels were drawn from a hat to decide which parcel a family would receive. Marino therefore provided an ideal opportunity to control selection bias. Even though the Crimean sample size of 30 was small, I followed through with the cluster sampling to ensure as wide a range of views as possible. The primary objective here was not representativeness, but to exclude the possibility that my study led me only to those with the most developed national consciousness. I also wanted to make the study replicable.

In Central Asia, I had to take a different approach to obtain a sample as diverse as possible. I did this by interviewing in four cities in Uzbekistan and one in Tajikistan beginning in April 1998. I started with contacts provided by informants living in Crimea. In Uzbekistan, the consultants were located in two large urban areas and two small towns. In Tajikistan, they were located in or near the cities of Khojent and Chkalovsk, where most of the Crimean Tatars left in Tajikistan are concentrated. From a logistical and security point of view, the interviews I conducted in Tajikistan were by far the most challenging. I continued in spite of the kidnappings and shootings going on as the civil war wound down because I had been told that those in Tajikistan had established a close-knit community, were prospering as a result of “Mafia” channels, and were the only Crimean Tatars who did not intend to return to the historic homeland. Given the difficult environment, it would have been quite significant if that were in fact the case. However, interviewing suggested they were quite similar to consultants in Uzbekistan.

Upon completion of the fieldwork, I processed the material collected via the questionnaire with two different software packages. First, the data (which had been entered in hyperqual software throughout the field period) was sorted by question and coded. This enabled me to assess all the responses to a given open-ended question and consider them according to republic and generation. Then responses to the closed-ended questions were analyzed by means of a series of pivot tables. This enabled me to explore the relationships between the responses to questions that had been answered “yes,” “no,” or “undecided.” For example, I was able to look at the number of people who said they “felt at home” and see how many of them reported experiencing regrets; I was able to look at the number of people who reported experiencing discrimination and see how many of them intended to migrate. With the software, I was also able to isolate intervening variables such as age, employment, and gender, to obtain a general idea of their significance. The sample was too small to yield statistically significant results, but the process allowed me to identify patterns, and test whether the republic of residence or the generation of the respondent had a bearing on their attitude toward homeland. The interviews demonstrated
that “homeland” was more than a word referring to a geographic entity, comprising a way of approaching and comprehending the world.

Throughout the fieldwork, I was supported by a network of relationships that extended from Ukraine to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. There were many occasions when I went for a cup of coffee and was invited to stay indefinitely. Several people became involved enough to stress if I needed anything, I should turn to them, saying, “your project is our project.” Over the course of the research, close to 200 taped and many more notated interviews were amassed. The facility with which these materials were gathered is also tied to the value placed on guests: according to Islam, they come from Allah and there is an imperative to accept them. Once it was explained that they would remain anonymous, Crimean Tatars were receptive to being taped.

Organization of the Book

Chapter 1, “The Lay of the Historical Land,” offers a critical overview of Crimean Tatar history, emphasizing the issues that have become controversial topics in Crimean Tatar historiography today. Foremost among these issues is the Crimean Tatars’ ethnonym: it vividly points to the themes of civilization and barbarism that reverberate through the Tatars’ history. The chapter also places the 1944 deportation in its larger historical perspective as the culmination of a colonial policy.

Chapter 2, “The Faces of Public Memory,” considers the German occupation of Crimea that led to the Tatars’ deportation. While the real, geopolitical, reasons behind Stalin’s deportation have become increasingly transparent, the Tatars’ wartime behavior continues to generate controversy. In Crimea, Slavs continue to unearth evidence of Crimean Tatars’ collaboration with the Nazis, while Tatars take the opposite approach and de-emphasize pro-German sentiments, highlighting instead the Tatar patriots who fought at key Soviet battles and joined the partisans. These two opposing “public faces” of memory are examined through an in-depth analysis of ethnographic interviews, documentary, and mass media sources. The disagreements index the centrality of recollections and history in negotiating contemporary politics. By rendering these disputes more legible, this chapter restores the nuances to what has so often been depicted in black and white terms.

Chapter 3, “Exile,” explores Crimean Tatars’ narratives of the 1944 deportation. They transcend the boundaries of generations and republics,
even though the story lacked written and official support for over 50 years. The themes presented in oral testimony are a citation from the past and evidence of motifs that have continuing meaning in the present. This is part of contemporary mythmaking in the sense that Barthes (1957) articulated. They are not divorced from, but integral to sociopolitical activity: stories about deportation helped to foster a stance of protest.

The focus throughout is not only on what was told but how and when it was told. In chapter 4, “Family Practices,” the ways in which the narratives were circulated are therefore explored. Two mother–daughter pairs illustrate how parents’ experiences became affectively charged for their children. A mother–son pair reminds us that intrafamily dynamics alone cannot explain the Tatars’ passion. The circulation of stories and images within families is especially clear in the families of artists. In one family, the son paints his internal picture of what the mother remembers, and his paintings spark more recollections.

Chapter 5, “The Crimean Tatar National Movement,” considers how these practices of recalling, together with interpretations of history, energized the national movement. By casting a particular glance on the past, and “speaking” with the state, the activists of the movement gradually created an atmosphere in which return seemed self-evident. The Crimean Tatar National Movement is an important part of my argument about the role of recollection: the remembering the movement endorsed became a form of collective action. More specifically, the comments of activists show us how in correcting, educating, and sometimes irritating the state’s representatives, they produced a certain view of the past. Whether or not they transformed the system, they transformed themselves, becoming convinced that they were the rightful stewards and owners on the Crimean peninsula. Remembered conversations with officials show us how they saw the movement. Over time, we see a transformation of the way in which they imagined state power. It is this transformation that prefigures the willingness to give up everything they worked for in places of exile to build a new life in Crimea.

Chapter 6, “How Death Came to be Beautiful,” explores a specific event within the movement—the 1978 self-immolation of Musa Mahmut. Here I consider the dialogic construction of a notion of homeland in the gaps between recorded testimony and oral recollection. Recollections of Mahmut’s death are shown to take up diffuse values and beliefs, and forge a definitive stance toward repatriation. I make this argument by analyzing the formal particularities of a conversation with Musa Mahmut’s closest survivors, considering the ways in which cultural ideologies are internalized at the everyday level. By “collecting” a memory, speakers forge sentiments for homeland that may or may not have been Mahmut’s. Death became beautiful through remembering in successive iterations.
The Crimean Tatars found that after the fall of the Soviet Union, self-immolation still made sense. Not as an act of political protest, but as a pragmatic strategy for repatriation. Chapter 7, “Houses and Homelands,” therefore traces how Crimean Tatars returned by squatting on vacant land and threatening immolation. Parents’ narratives about their pasts were influential in shaping settlement patterns, and memory was used by Russians and Tatars alike to make statements about the legitimacy of their claims. To highlight what is distinctive about their approach today, the chapter juxtaposes the recent repatriation with their attitude to the peninsula in the last centuries when they emigrated on a massive scale. The structures of feeling guiding their actions are connected to the period and the place: rather than seeking a better life in religious or material terms, they are searching for a place where they more basically belong. Structures of feeling were connected to specific locales by means of localized and embodied remembering. The chapter therefore explores how the house provided a memory aid and narrative device.

The willingness to die displayed by Crimean Tatars helped convince local authorities that the Tatars were not going to give up: a new balance of power and property rights on the peninsula would have to be negotiated. The strategies used today present a striking contrast to those in the last century when Crimean Tatars responded to hardship by emigrating on a massive scale. The land they were ready to die for in the late 1990s is the land they were willing to give up only 100 years ago. As much as Crimean Tatars naturalize their relationship to the peninsula, it is a historically specific social product.

The Crimean Tatars have traditionally been represented as wild, blood-thirsty and barbarian, but these images are losing credence as the Crimean Tatars are drawn into transnational webs of commerce, industry, and influence. In chapter 8, the Sequel, I consider three ways in which Crimean Tatars are repositioning themselves in the twenty-first century. First, the Crimean Tatars are rejecting categorization as a “minority” in Ukraine in favor of affirming their rights as an indigenous people. Indigenous status affords them protection according to the international conventions, and may (or may not) gain them leverage in regional and state capitals. Second, the Crimean Tatars have positioned themselves both within and in relation to criminal structures in Ukraine. In addition to revenue and protection, this positioning has enabled them, paradoxically, to redefine themselves as defenders of law and order. As utopic imaginings are superimposed on dystopic realities, the Crimean Tatars have entered national and transnational networks of labor and commerce that take them away from the peninsula. Finally, some individuals are explicitly rejecting remembering as a way of life. Rather than engaging in what they call “neurosis” or “ethnic
psychosis,” they urge that the past be allowed to pass. All three dimensions have bearing on the Crimean Tatar structure of feeling and will lead to new research questions. Hopefully, the insights gleaned from their repatriation can be applied to other cases in which remembering is reconfigured and tied to specific distributions of power and authority over time.
Chapter 1

The Lay of the Historic Land

In the popular Russian film about the famous icon painter, “Andrei Rubliov,” we hear a shout and read the subtitle “The Tatars are coming! The Tatars are coming!” Soon, a band of men on horseback gallops across the steppe, barges through the gates of a small city, and proceeds to stab, shoot, and lop off the heads of the priests, monks, and passers-by it encounters. The year is 1408 and the Tatars, along with the Russian Prince who invited them, enter the cathedral without dismounting. The worshipers scatter or are killed as the Tatars set the ancient building and its priceless icons on fire. We are led to believe by their satisfied smiles that the Tatars derive pleasure from this—it’s what they do. Wild, dark-skinned, blood-thirsty, barbarian: these are some of the images that filter through the Russian imagination at the mention of Crimean Tatars. Vilified and demonized over the centuries, the Tatars are associated with the Golden Horde of Chingis Khan and charged with raiding Russia, especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The raiding culminated when they reached Moscow and set fire to the outskirts of the city. While awareness that the Crimean Tatars are bearers of an ancient, highly developed culture has grown, the old stereotypes and images continue to circulate, fueled by Soviet-era representations of Tatars as “traitors” who sold the Motherland.

Russian representations of Tatars are infused with orientalism: one could say that Crimean Tatars are to the Russian imagination what “the Orient” was in the European literary imagination. In Orientalism, Edward Said aptly demonstrated how textual modes of representing difference among people can sustain colonial power hierarchies (1978). Russians’ view of themselves as “civilized,” and belonging more to Europe than “the East,” has been maintained in relation to these “Others” who threatened to encroach from the borderlands. The dichotomy is mutually constitutive, if built on an unstable interpretation of the past. What is civilized, and the
The concept of “civilization” itself, is negatively constructed by describing its antithesis (Wolff 1994: 12–13).

The irony is that while the Tatars were “barbarians” to Slavs, the Slavs were barbarian to the Europeans. This phenomenon has been described by Milica Bakić-Hayden (1995) and Bakić-Hayden and Robert Hayden (1992) in terms of a hierarchy of “nesting” orientalisms, “in which each region has the tendency to view cultures and religions to the south and east of it as more conservative or primitive” (1992: 4). Reflecting on the problems associated with viewing an essential and unchanging distinction between “East” and “West,” in Europe, Todorova cautions that the matter is more complex, as discourse surrounding the Balkans, for example, cannot be neatly subsumed as a subspecies of orientalism. One of the essential points is that “Balkans” pertains to a geographically concrete place, unlike “the Orient.” And whereas orientalism is a discourse about an imputed opposition, balkanism deals with differences within one type (1997: 19). It is more fundamentally about ambiguity. While images and discourse surrounding the Orient provided an imaginative escape and a metaphor for the forbidden, the Balkans “with their unimaginative concreteness” inspired an attitude that eventually became pejorative (1997:14; also see Wolff 2001). While Crimea as a concrete place may never have lived up to its rich description in travelogues, it still belongs within a nested set of orientalisms as a source of positive and mysterious associations. What is remarkable here is not only the racialism and essentialism involved, but the collapse of chronology. For example, Crimean Tatars were associated with the ancient Scythians, who were particularly well known as a result of their mention in Herodotus, where they resist the mighty Persians, sacrifice prisoners of war, and drink blood (Wolff 1994: 287).

The stakes in securing spheres of influence and control within these hierarchies are particularly high. Crimea was coveted as the Pearl in the tsar’s crown. After it became an object of conquest at the end of the eighteenth century (at the time of Russian annexation), it became a site for geopolitical competition among politicians in the nineteenth century, as the staging-ground of the Crimean War. Later, conventional wisdom would suggest it was in meetings at Yalta that the postwar map of Europe was established. Throughout, the Crimean Tatars were victims and accomplices, key actors and witnesses. Ultimately, the polarization of civilization and barbarism gave the Europe–Asia division philosophical significance. Stoler observes that in this context, ideas of culture and civilization are used to do specific political work “. . . not only to mark difference, but to rationalize the hierarchies of privilege and profit . . .” (Stoler 1995: 27).

Over the last four decades, since the Crimean Tatars’ social movement for repatriation began, Tatars have been working with and against textual
modes of domination that represent them in orientalist and essentialist terms. For example, the early travelogue by Eugene Markov describes the Tatars as “born” mountain guides whose dark eyes and mustached faces seem to go naturally with riding on horseback (Markov 1995: 36). Markov also describes the fatalistic “Muslim eyes” that fail to shine with the brave spirit of enterprise. Rather, these eyes give the impression they “would not shirk before a sword, or produce a tear at the sight of blood” (1995: 37). Although essentialist, Markov’s portrait of the Crimean Tatars is lauded as a basically positive one. So too is his portrayal of Crimea itself. The beautiful lands also became a magnet of fantasy in the Russian literary imagination. Chekov set some of his short stories, such as “Lady with a Dog” on the banks of the Black Sea here, and Pushkin devoted several poems to Crimean themes including “The Fountain of Bahçesaray,” which depicts unrequited love between a maiden and a khan. Thus Crimea figures prominently in literary depictions of the Russian empire.

The racial logic of the delimitation of lands and peoples is never far from the surface. Wolff sums up the eighteenth-century rubric as invariably containing references to wilderness and frontier; civilization and barbarism; and being accompanied by, “an ingenuous note of surprise that the people were actually white” (1994: 366). He could as easily be describing twentieth-century accounts of Crimean Tatars, which often make a point of reminding readers of (some) Tatars’ European features including fair skin, blue eyes (believed to be a result of the Goth influence), and tall stature when the Crimean Tatars are diverse.2

My research suggests that there are at least five ways in which Tatars, both scholars and laypersons, have appropriated and reconfigured the discourse on barbarism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The first modality is humor. By parodying the imagery of barbaric Mongol origins, contemporary Tatars expose the absurdity of the temporal collapse. For example, one consultant used the diminutive “my little Mongol” in an affectionate and joking way with his wife. Another important modality is scholarship: works such as Murat Adzhi’s (1994) book on the history of the Turkic peoples, Połyn’ Polovetskogo Polia, explore the intricacies of Turkic origins and suggest the linking of Tatar and Mongol into one hyphenated word is a gross oversimplification of a long history that has been warped almost beyond recognition by the Russian political agenda of portraying themselves as civilized and powerful. There is also the modality of a racialist displacement: subethnic divisions enable Crimean Tatars to displace the Mongol aspect of their origins (associated with a lack of culture or development) onto the northern steppe subgroup, the Nogai. Recent Internet discussions have taken the subethnic divisions up as a pressing topic. Then there is language itself: the words describing squatting as “capture” or...
“seizure” transmute the images of Tatars as raiders, transforming and inverting some of the meanings used in describing land reclamation. A fifth approach, becoming increasingly apparent after 2001, was acceptance. As one consultant explained, they have begun to see the positive side of the Mongol heritage. “We see Mongol attacks as a part of the times they were living in. To be Tatar does not seem as terrible as before. The people who want to switch are ready to throw away their history.”

The Crimean Tatars are of course not alone in studying and recasting their history. Scholars have amply demonstrated that history is appropriated to serve contemporary needs (Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Gellner 1983; Suny 1993) and intellectual elites can play a vital role in making histories that support national ideologies (Hroch 1996: 61; Nairn 1996: 84; Smith 1983). Farmer has provided an exemplary account of how a “martyred” village displaced attention from the Vichy authorities (1999) and Rousso stresses that the misrepresentation of history has not been the monopoly of any side (1991). What is still needed, however, are more studies that focus on the microsocial operation of memory and the quotidian production of historical knowledge. The sheer variety of narrators is an indication that theories of history vastly underestimate the size, relevance, and complexity of the overlapping sites where history is produced (Trouillot 1995: 19). If not “blood-thirsty” or “barbarian,” who are the Crimean Tatars and where did they come from?

The Lay of the Historical Land

The ethnonym “Crimean Tatar” is especially confusing. Much like using the word “Indians” to refer to all the Native American peoples, this ethnonym can confuse any student of Russia or the Soviet Union. Originally a tribal name that designated one of the Mongolian clans of Chingis Khan, it was applied to all Turkified Mongols to distinguish them from Christians. The word “Tatar” was integrated into the Russian lexicon in the thirteenth century and came to be used in a bewildering variety of ways to refer to many different nomadic peoples coming to Rus from the East. Over time, the inadequacy of the term became so clear that it was necessary to specify: Astrakhan Tatars, Kazan Tatars, Barabinski Tatars, Siberian Tatars, Bashkir Tatars, and so on. This gives the erroneous impression that the Tatars were a single people living in different geographic locations. This idea is particularly flawed when it comes to Crimean and Kazan Tatars. They are often confused with one another, but are as different
from one another as Serbs and Russians. Even though there is ample scholarship clarifying the differences, many writers fail to distinguish among Tatars, or use “Tatar” and “Mongol” interchangeably (see e.g. Halperin 1987).

The confusion surrounding the ethnonym “Tatar” was convenient to the Soviet regime in manipulating their kaleidoscopic collection of ethnic and national minorities. The old associations became valuable symbolic capital when Tatars were exiled as “traitors” to the Ural Mountains and Central Asia. The image of blood-thirsty barbarians was also resuscitated when Soviet authorities told the peoples in the Urals and Central Asia to guard their children because “cannibals” would be arriving. They were literally demonized: a number of Crimean Tatars recounted having their scalp checked for horns in school. The fact that there were many kinds of Tatars also facilitated a Soviet-style sleight of hand: the erasure of Crimean Tatars from the Soviet census when the regime reduced the number of ethnic groups enumerated. Then Soviet authorities told those who wanted “Crimean Tatar” on their internal passport that there are no such people. Discerning what happened demographically after the first few years of exile is extremely difficult as Crimean Tatars were subsumed in the generic “Tatar” category until 1989.

In keeping with the play on words, the 1967 decree absolving the Crimean Tatars of the accusations of treason referred to them not as Crimean Tatars but “Tatars formerly residing in Crimea,” implying they were simply part of the much larger group of Tatars, notably the Volga Tatars who were also numerous in Central Asia (Rorlich 1986). The Crimean Tatars fought for survival of their culture and their name, but the name has always been recognized as in some ways inadequate. In July 1998, the Crimean Tatar Mejlis changed the ethnonym to Kırmıl (also spelled Qırım), but this decision remains controversial and has not been approved by the Ukrainian government. Today, most agree that more pressing problems warrant deferring the question to a later date.

Crimean Tatar historiography has aimed to reposition the Crimean past from the mental margins of history to its place among civilizations. Viewed as “blood-thirsty” and “wild” in the Soviet imagination, the Crimean Tatars are seen as exotica in the West. Only when we learn that Crimea was home to flourishing Greek city-states, Genoese and Venetian trading colonies, and the location of a proposed German Riviera are we sparked to bring what was previously blurred in peripheral vision to the center of attention. When we learn that the writers and poets of the Crimean Khanate are believed to have made a significant contribution to Islamic literature, that the peninsula was once studded with the caravansarai of the Silk Roads, that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Solhat, or the city of
“Old Crimea,” was a center of Muslim missionary activity with mosques, dervish monasteries, and medreses, it is clear that Crimea is an important part of the history of Europe and Asia. Moreover, its history raises questions about the ostensible boundaries between Europe and Asia.  

Ethnogenesis

While the Crimean Tatars are traditionally described as descendents of the Golden Horde, the formation of this Turkic-speaking, Sunni Muslim people has pre-Mongol origins in the ancient, indigenous peoples of the Crimean peninsula. They believe their history begins with the tribes living in Crimea in prehistoric and ancient times, including the Tavriis and Kimmerites, who occupied the peninsula from 2-1,000 B.C.E. (Kudusov 1995: 15). The Crimean Tatars therefore consider themselves one of the indigenous peoples, along with the Karaims and Krymchaks (two Turkic Jewish minorities).

Crimean Tatars point to their prehistoric origins in the area, but Russian sources stress that their Slavic predecessors came first, the Tatars having “arrived” only in the thirteenth century. Instrumental in promoting this view were E. V. Veimarn and S. A. Sekerinski, candidates in history who allegedly succumbed to government and party directives, and wrote about a possible Slavic presence in Crimea as early as the third and fourth century (Sevdiar 1997: 5). Tatars take issue with this view, arguing that to establish this Russian perspective, scholars had to hide the real ethnogenesis of the Crimean Tatars and create the appearance of having found Russian archeological remains (Sevdiar 1997: 2). Tatar sources such as Kudusov (1995) and Sevdiar (1997) therefore argue that the Russian influence dates only to the tenth century when pagan Russians established a principality across the straits at Kerç. They influenced the region for as much as a century, but were also affected by the various peoples living in the region, most notably in adopting Byzantine Christianity.

An appreciation for the formative influence of geography is the one thing that highly polarized views of Crimean history share. Geography is especially key to Crimean Tatar accounts that build on the philosophy of L. Gumiliev (1994) and argue that the development of an indigenous group (called korennoi narod in Russian and öz sahipleri in Crimean Tatar) is linked to a specific territory with its atmosphere and landschaft: people adapt to the landscape, adjusting their activities and industries to the goal of survival in specific natural conditions (Kudusov 1995: 15). With time, nature begins to act on the “anthropological” characteristics
(i.e., physiognomy) of the people, who become increasingly well suited to life in the given environment. A forced or voluntary change in location of such a group will result either in their assimilation or annihilation. Naturally, this scholarship supports the position that the repatriation of Crimean Tatars to their historic homeland is not only right, but necessary. But geography also plays a much more subliminal role in the imagination of anyone who happens across a map of the area. The distinct island-like configuration of the peninsula demands recognition as a separable land, hanging as it does by a narrow isthmus to the north.

The geography of the peninsula has also exerted a tangible influence on the social and economic development of the region. By offering three very different territorial–economic zones or ecosystems of the steppe, mountain, and coast, the physical geography of the region clearly shaped both the way of life of the peoples living in the various climatic zones, and the interaction between them. The northern two-thirds of the Crimean peninsula is an extension of the Eurasian steppe and nomadic groups migrating from the east such as the Scythians, Sarmatians, Huns, Khazars, Pechenegs, Kipchaks, and Mongols were attracted to the excellent pasture it offered their herds. This land is far from limitless, however, and many of these nomadic tribes were forced to seek refuge in the Crimean mountains by the stronger nomadic groups that arrived after them. There was both assimilation and adaptation as the groups pushed southward and westward in successive waves.

The coastal region, separated from the plains by the Crimean mountains experienced a similar dynamic with a different ethnic composition. Primarily European peoples arrived from the Black Sea via the Bosporus, including the Greeks, Genoese, Venetians, Armenians, and Turks. Highlighting this pattern, Kudusov suggests that by the fifth century there were already three developed territorial–economic zones of Crimea: steppe, mountain, and coast (1995: 16). He stresses that the mountains were not just a shelter from invaders of the steppe, but a unique cradle for the formation of the indigenous peoples. It was here that the “nucleus” of the Crimean Tatar people developed.

The Tatar–Mongol invasions of Crimea in the thirteenth century mark a turning point in this dynamic. For the first time in recorded history, all three geographic regions came under one rule. However, by the fifteenth century, the clans within the Horde (which united a number of different clans, including many of Turkic origin) began fighting for dominance among themselves. Eventually, they fell apart. Independent khanates established themselves in peripheral regions such as Crimea. A particularly sensitive question in Crimean Tatar historiography is the extent to which the Crimean Khanate was independent. Russian and Soviet sources tend to
emphasize dependence on the Ottomans, using the term “vassal” to describe the relationship. Crimean Tatar sources emphasize independence. They point out that even if it relied on the Ottomans, the Crimean Khanate possessed all the characteristics of a fully developed, premodern state. The Khanate had a well-established legal system incorporating Asian elements into a system modeled on the Ottomans. It functioned as a constitutional monarchy in the sense that while the khan was head of state, power was shared between the khan, mirza (lower Tatar nobility), and beys (Tatar tribal leaders). During the Khanate, the peoples of this diverse region first began referring to themselves as “Crimeans” (Poliakov 1998).

The Mongol Influence

So to say that the Crimean Tatars are the descendents of the Golden Horde of Chingis Khan is only part of the story. The Khanate that gained ascendancy in Crimea claimed decent from Chingis Khan, but these “Tatars,” as they were called, assimilated with the indigenous and European groups already living there. A Crimean version of the “Tatar” ethnic group arose that was distinct from others as a result of the Turkification and Islamicization of the descendents of the Goths, Sarmatians, and Scythians in the area. The cultural and linguistic differences between the peoples were gradually effaced during the Khanate. This is not to say that they formed a homogenous group: differences between the Tatars of different regions have persisted into the twentieth century, and are a continuing source of interest. Today, Tatars divide themselves into subgroups based on their diverse origins in the three territorial–economic zones described above. The Nogai, with Asian features, descended from Kipchak Turks in the steppe region; the Tat Tatars, known for Scandinavian features, are believed to descend from the Goths in the mountainous area; and the Yaliboyu Tats or Coastal Tats developed along the Crimean shore, having incorporated Greek and Armenian traditions. In addition to these diverse origins, Tatars use the village of origin as a source of identification and locus of differentiation.

There are a number of theories about the downfall of the Crimean Khanate. The most popular among Tatars is that the last khan, Sahin Girey, was a victim of his passion, falling prey first to Catherine’s seduction and then her superior military power. In contrast, Fisher argues that it was more benign: the Khanate flourished under the protection of the Ottoman Empire but with its decline was increasingly drawn into the orbit of the Russian Empire (1978). Lazzerini suggests we must add a degree of internal decline to the above interpretation (1988: 124). In fact, the Tatars’
inability to unify behind Sahin Girey or support his vision of a modern and centralized Khanate may have been decisive. Crimea became the protectorate of Russia in 1781, and, in 1783, Empress Catherine the Great annexed Crimea to the Russian Empire. This inaugurated a period of Russification, restructuring, and land reform in which the Crimean Tatars were rapidly disenfranchised.

Islam

Throughout this history, the Crimean Tatars’ Muslim identity plays an important role. First, it was crucial to their development as a people. Islam became the state religion under the Crimean Khanate (they are Sunni Muslim of the Hanafi School) when the peninsula was united under one rule for the first time. In fact initially, Crimean Tatar was not an ethnic category, but referred to the Turkic-speaking Muslim residents of Crimea. They felt themselves to be members of the umma, or community of Muslim believers.

At the same time, Islam was more than religion. The steppe traditions of the Mongol nomads, based on the Yasa or Yasak (“Law Code”) was replaced by Muslim laws and codes; Persian names became widespread; and Crimean Tatar language borrowed from the Arabic of the Qu’ran (Williams 2001: 13). In addition to rituals and beliefs, Islam provided social customs, cultural traditions, and psychological attitudes that guided Muslims’ way of life (Bennigsen 1979). Bennigsen stresses that Islam is embedded in every level of society, and its attitudes and practices are maintained with or without strict observance of the faith.

If Islam unified the Tatars of Crimea, it also separated them from their Christian neighbors. Russia was careful in religious matters, believing civil and religious governance best kept separate. A special Muslim clergy was appointed to supervise religious affairs and Tatar education. But Islam still fostered antimony toward the Russians. At a time when self-identification was expressed in religious terms, rule by Christians was inherently problematic. According to Islamic doctrine, any locale ruled by non-Muslims was by definition dar al-harb or the “sphere of war,” a land ruled by infidels (Ruthven 1997: 12). This thinking contributed to their eighteenth- and nineteenth-century-emigrations and may have precluded a stronger identification with the Crimean peninsula.

Their identity as Muslims is also crucial to their 1944 deportation: a fear that the Crimean Tatars would join forces with other Muslims added impetus to Stalin’s desire to remove them from the peninsula. While it is not the only reason they were deported, Stalin certainly feared the allegiances
(in Turkey and other parts of the Soviet Union) that could cross-cut the development of the new Soviet Man.

The Russian Influence

The Russian colonization of Crimea is a phase of history that is particularly susceptible to being seen from two diametrically opposed points of view. On one hand, Russian colonization brought benefits like the railroad, modern medicine, and a telegraph system. Some historians go further to argue Crimea was not subjected to colonialism at all because the land was Russian from ancient times (Nadinskii 1951: 168). From this perspective, the so-called reunification of the Crimean lands (at the time of Russian annexation in 1783) simply returns what the invading Mongols had seized. This view requires its proponents to repudiate the indigenous origins of the Crimean Tatars, group them with the “uncivilized” nomadic peoples, and date their “arrival” with that of the Mongols in 1223. Crimean Tatars, on the other hand, scorn the sanitized language regarding the “unification” of Crimea with Russia. They underline the unlawful seizure of the land by Russia, which calls into question the basis of Russian, Soviet, and now Ukrainian rule. Tatars point not to roads or Russian schools, but to the disastrous effects on their language and culture, which are only now undergoing revitalization. The Crimean Tatars’ struggle to reposition themselves in history has entailed committing some of the same errors, oversimplifying and stereotyping Russian colonizers.

However one chooses to see Russian colonization, the underlying motivations behind it are relatively clear. The Crimean peninsula offered the tsarist regime warm water ports that could enhance the economic, political, and cultural ties between Russia and Europe. Control of warm water ports (and a secured southern border) concomitantly magnified Russia’s military potential vis-à-vis its southern neighbor, Turkey. Crimea also attracted the tsarist government with its fertile soils, which were capable of growing products for export as well as feeding Russians of the interior who were living in less hospitable conditions. A third enticement, primarily psychological in nature, was Russia’s dream of becoming the “Third Rome” after Constantinople. Command of this southern region would bring Russia one step closer to the realization of a centuries-old vision. But all of this depended on controlling, removing, or eliminating the Crimean Tatar people who, as Muslim Turks, were perceived as potentially disloyal.

Colonialism had a tremendous impact on the Crimean Tatars because Catherine took control of the land as though it were empty of inhabitants,
giving away over one-tenth of the land to nobles and favorites. This and other colonial policies led Crimean Tatars to emigrate on a massive scale, abandoning the beloved “Green Isle” for what they imagined would be a better life in the Ottoman Empire. Scholars disagree about the factors contributing to these emigrations, a topic discussed in more depth in chapter 7. All agree the migrations were extensive. As many as 400,000 Crimean Tatars may have emigrated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Williams 2001: 227). The emigration is retrospectively refigured as the “first exile,” linking it symbolically to the exile they experienced later, under the Soviets.

As destructive as it was for Tatar society as a whole, the Russian colonial period did create the conditions for a new Tatar intelligentsia to develop. The situation sparked them to first formulate a nationalist project, a phenomenon that was repeated throughout the Russian Empire. In the Tatar case, Shihabeddin Merjani, a Kazan Tatar, initiated the movement for Tatar Muslim reform, believing that studying Russian and remaining faithful to Islam were not antithetical. A Crimean Tatar student of Merjani, Ismail Bey Gasprinski (or Gaspirali) expanded on these ideas, combining support for religious identity with modern nationalism. At a time when the Tatar community had suffered decimation by the wars, emigrations, and effects of the colonial regime, one of Gasprinski’s significant ideas was that Tatar culture could recover its lost traditions via cooperation with the Russians. Gaspirali called for the modernization of Russian Islam, greater equality of the sexes, and the creation of a single Turkic language for the press. He also advocated the establishment of a unified Turkic elite spanning the Russian and Ottoman empires (Fisher 1978; Lazzerini 1973, 1988). The means to attain these objectives was education: Gaspirali inaugurated a new educational approach, combining traditional Islamic subjects (in Arabic) with academic ones (in Russian and Crimean Tatar).

Initially, the Tatars developed their national aspirations in congruence with the Russian government. They participated in the Dumas and had Muslim congresses. World War I altered this. It was in the Tatar interest to remain loyal to Russia in order to continue receiving cultural rewards. The Russians, however, feared that as Muslims the Tatars would support the Turks. Thus war with the Ottomans raised Russian suspicions. Out of fear of Ottoman loyalties, Russian authorities in Crimea began suppressing Tatar cultural and national life. By the 1917 Revolution, enough enmity had been generated that Tatars were ready to help eliminate the tsarist regime and remove Russian institutions from Crimea.

The early twentieth century was a tumultuous time in which nationalist ideas took stronger hold among a new Crimean Tatar intelligentsia. In October and November 1917, Crimean Tatar nationalists held a conference
to plan strategy. At the same time, Russian and Ukrainian liberals were establishing a Constituent Crimean Assembly. Thus by the end of November 1917, there were two governments, neither of which supported the Bolsheviks (Fisher 1978: 118). In December 1917, the nationalist party, *Milli Firka*, proclaimed an independent Tatar state under the leadership of Çelebi Cihan, but it was quickly dismantled by the Bolsheviks in January 1918. Çelebi Cihan was executed and the Tatar leaders who followed him were less willing to seek rapprochement. When Bolshevik rule was established in Crimea, it abolished both the Tatar National Directory and the Crimean Provisional Assembly.

Bringing Crimea under Soviet rule was a protracted process that included state-sponsored brutality. During the third attempt to solidify Bolshevik rule in Crimea, the Soviet regime sent Bela Kun, chief of the Chekha (Bolshevik secret police) to eliminate the bourgeoisie and the anarchists. He worked with Nikolai Bystrykh, who headed a special section of the Crimean Chekha and was charged with eradicating opposition to Soviet power. Operating from the forests, Crimean Tatars organized to oppose Kun and Bystrykh. They did this so well that the Soviet regime called upon Sultan Galiev, a Volga Tatar Communist leader to investigate. Galiev’s recommendations back in Moscow were to make Crimea into an autonomous Soviet republic, and draw Crimean Tatars into party and leadership positions. This was not what the Communist government in Crimea had in mind, but central authorities nevertheless pushed for changes. Following an assembly of representatives of both the Tatar and non-Tatar communities, the *Sovnarkom* (Soviet Committee of Nationalities) announced the formation of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on October 18, 1921. Veli Ibrahimov facilitated the process, and is now viewed as the person most responsible for bringing about the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Crimean ASSR).

The “Golden Age” of the Crimean ASSR

One of the hotter topics in Tatar historiography is whether the basis for this republic was *territorial* or *national*. The Crimean Tatars cite Soviet nationalities policy about the national basis of the republic, but Russians and Ukrainians point to various decrees that suggest it was not a national, but a territorial autonomy. At stake is the legal basis for the sovereignty of Crimea today, and the role of Crimean Tatars within it. If it can be proven that it was indeed a national autonomy, then the Crimean Tatars have a
right to speak about the reestablishment of sovereignty. If, on the other hand, it is established that this was a territorial unit, then the issue is establishing a post-Soviet sovereignty for the region. A sub-issue here is whether Khrushchev acted legally when he made Crimea part of Ukraine in 1954. A small but vocal portion of the Russian-speaking population feels Khrushchev's action lacked a legal basis. They advocate Crimea should be part of Russia. The Crimean Tatar rebuttal is that Russia never secured territorial rights to Crimea through any official legal procedures.  

The Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic represented a “Golden Age” until Crimea, along with the rest of the USSR, was plunged into a period of severe repression. As in the rest of the Soviet Union, intellectuals and clergy were disappeared or sent to labor camps, and the forced collectivization of agriculture eliminated independent farmers. In the Crimea, these hardships were exacerbated when central authorities sold Crimean grain for currency, intensifying famine. The decimation of the population was accompanied by the destruction of cultural institutions. For example, from 1926 to 1927 the traditional Arabic script of Crimean Tatar was changed to Latin script and then in 1936 from Latin to Cyrillic, making it complicated for Crimean Tatars to learn their language and history, not to mention perpetuate their cultural traditions.

With cultural institutions ravished, and approximately 150,000 or 50 percent of the population eliminated, the Crimean Tatars initially viewed the Nazi invasion of World War II as a sign of hope (Fisher 1978: 145). Once the Germans established their administration, however, it became apparent that although they allowed new religious freedom, the Nazis could be as oppressive in their rule. Hitler supported the idea of German settlement feeling it to be ideal considering the Goth presence. The Germans intended to replace the Crimean Tatars and other “foreign” elements. So while some Crimean Tatars think that if the war turned out differently, they could have been drinking beer, this Goteland, as it was to be called, entailed a plan for their removal. After the Soviets reclaimed the peninsula, it was a victorious Stalin that actually carried out an act that had been contemplated first under the tsars, then by the Nazi regime.

Sürgün or “Exile” by the Soviet Regime

While Crimean Tatars soldiers were still serving at the front, Stalin ordered the NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Interior Affairs, predecessor to modern KGB) to deport all the Tatars in Crimea. So in the early morning
hours of May 18, 1944, the NKVD officers knocked on the Crimean Tatars’ doors, entered their dwellings, and told them to get ready. By popular accounts, most only had 15 minutes to gather their belongings under the barrels of the NKVD automatic rifles. They were taken by Studebakers and trucks to collection points and loaded into cattle cars bound for the Ural Mountains and Soviet Central Asia. The action had been kept so secret that not even the military that had been called in to help knew in advance what would happen.

In the Urals and Soviet Central Asia, the Tatars were interned under forced-labor conditions in what is referred to as the “special settlement system.” While Tatar and Soviet accounts disagree about the number of casualties, they concur that the losses were substantial. According to NKVD estimates, 27 percent of the population perished in the first three years (Zemskov 1995: 75). According to Bugai (1992: 144), the NKVD registered 44,887 deaths in the first years after deportation, many of them as a result of starvation and disease. This figure is aggregate, however, with no specific figure for Crimean Tatars. According to Crimean Tatar accounts, the losses are much higher: 46 percent, or “half” the population perished as a result of hunger and disease (Bekirov 1999a: 48). The Crimean Tatars calculated these losses by polling shortly after exile.

The special settlement system was dismantled in 1956 (children were released in 1954 as were veterans of military service) and many of the Crimean Tatars in the Urals relocated to Central Asia to be closer to Crimean Tatar kin. In this same year, Khrushchev delivered his famous Twentieth Party Congress address, denouncing Stalin. All the deported groups were rehabilitated at this time except for the Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, and Volga Germans. Why the Crimean Tatars were excluded from this rehabilitation remains unsubstantiated, but Crimean Tatars are convinced it had to do with the geopolitical and strategic importance of the peninsula to the Soviet regime.

A greater mystery has been the 1944 deportation. Collaboration with the Germans was publicly given as the reason, but we know that almost every other ethnic group collaborated to an equal or greater extent. Yet groups like the Ukrainians were not deported (ostensibly because there were simply too many of them) and groups in the Caucasus who did not have an opportunity to collaborate (the Chechens and the Meskhetian Turks) were also deported. The public reason is even less convincing when we consider that the Tatars who collaborated were not the ones who were punished—they departed with the German army. It was primarily the women, children, and elderly left behind who were removed from their homes. Their guilt or innocence was never investigated, let alone established. Clearly, collaboration with the Germans was a necessary, but not sufficient condition for exile.
Even when the special settlement system was abolished and they were free to move about Central Asia, the treatment they received was perplexing. They were “freed” from internment, but prevented from returning to the Crimea, advancing in their jobs, or being elected to office. They also suffered from the constant surveillance of the security apparatus. In this respect, they were caught in a state-constructed hall of mirrors that became more convoluted with every turn: they were Crimean Tatars, but they must live outside the Crimea; they were exiled for being Crimean Tatars, but there is no such people. Measures were taken to ensure the survival of the language through appeasements such as a native-language newspaper, a literary journal, and radio broadcasts. However, specialists trained in Crimean Tatar language and literature learned there was no market for their specialty. Crimean Tatar intellectuals had little opportunity for advancement beyond an ethnically determined glass ceiling. Such a situation of mixed signals from the state led to turbulent emotions, perhaps most palpable among World War II veterans and their families. They wondered why they had served and sacrificed if they were to be deprived of the homeland that they had fought so hard for.

Soviet Nationalities Policy and the Crimean Tatars

Exile, the exile of an entire national minority, contradicted everything the Crimean Tatars knew about nationality policy in the Soviet Union. According to the Soviet nationalities policy formulated by Lenin and made law by the Soviet Constitution, each national minority group had specific rights to self-determination. Crimean Tatars place special emphasis on the clause in the Soviet Constitution concerning self-determination “up to the level of separation into an independent state.”

Tatar distress stems from the tension in Soviet policy debates between ethnic and national on one hand, and proletarian and international on the other. Soviet internationalism (predicated on the Marxian theory that working people of all nations should be united) postulated that nations are entities that must disappear with time. A process of greater and greater merging of economic, cultural, and linguistic spheres was envisioned. Socialists who looked forward to proletarian internationalism viewed nationhood as “retrograde” and drew on nineteenth-century thought to reinforce their position (see Dzyuba 1968, for example). The Marxist concept of a nation as a historical entity rejected any suggestion that social identity or psychology could form the foundation of nationhood. Asserting
the stability or psychological makeup of a nation would be tantamount to treating it as an eternal category rather than a historical entity.

At the same time, Lenin realized from the beginning that in order to maintain the territorial integrity of the new Soviet Union—the territorial integrity inherited from the tsarist period—they needed the support and cooperation of the non-Russian minorities. He reasoned that by creating national autonomies, national schools, native languages, and native cadres, they would not only reach greater audiences with the “message” of socialism, but they would generate trust (Slezkine 1994). Political policy then became a kind of therapeutic intervention. Oppressed-nation nationalism was accepted as a reaction to discrimination and persecution. It could be “cured” through concessionary measures. According to this thinking, the more rights and opportunities a national minority enjoyed, the more trust it would develop. The discontent generating the nationalism would, theoretically, atrophy of its own accord (Slezkine 1994: 419).

If tolerance for ethnic particularism and support of national categories was a fundamental part of the way that the Soviet Union was organized, why were the Crimean Tatars exiled? The most plausible answer is that the actual behavior of the Soviet state did not derive wholly from Marxist–Leninist nationality theory, as some Soviet writers claimed, but from the much more basic security and state-building interests of the Soviet Union (Wixman 1986; Suny 1993). The multitude of ethnic groups can heuristically be divided into two categories: those having official recognition and those lacking it. The groups with official recognition were provided with ethnic institutions that supported them. Those with unfavorable status were forced to use those of other peoples. This changed over time with some groups being “promoted” while others were subsumed within other groups (Suny 1993). This arrangement was intended to serve the basic interests of the Soviet State, which, as Wixman sees them, were the maintenance of the political power of the Soviet Union and its territorial integrity; the transformation of Soviet society into a modern socialist one; and the spread of Soviet influence and world revolution (Wixman 1986: 467). These priorities governed all policy decisions. Hence we can think of nationality policy as derivative of state security policy, and the strategic geographic position of the Crimean peninsula placed it at the center of state security concerns.

If the spread of Soviet influence and world revolution was a factor in the domestic policies toward Tatars, the 1944 deportation makes more sense: there were hundreds of thousands of ethnic Crimean Tatars in Turkey as a result of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century migrations. The presence of these Turkic “kin” across the Black Sea made the authorities nervous because of their potential ethnic, familial, and religious allegiances. Moreover, the
1944 deportation of the Tatars roughly coincided with Molotov’s announcement to the Turkish ambassador that the USSR would not continue to observe the Turco-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality that had been signed in 1925 (Fisher 1978: 169). Molotov claimed that as a result of the war, the treaty no longer reflected the political reality. Part of what he had in mind may have been the intention on the part of the Soviet authorities to establish military and naval bases on the Turkish Straits. Molotov also mentioned an interest in the northeastern Turkish provinces, which had been ceded by Moscow to Turkey after World War I. Relations with Turkey, more than collaboration with the Germans, informed Stalin’s decision to deport the Crimean Tatars.

The rationale that it was foreign policy and not political ideology influencing Soviet behavior also helps explain the treatment the Crimean Tatar National Movement received later on. The Crimean Tatars were not rehabilitated and returned because the Soviets saw greater value in keeping them dispersed from one another and isolated from Turkish social networks. Only when the movement was strong enough that it risked damaging the image of the Soviet Union as a model for the world did authorities grant the Tatars coming to Moscow a hearing. Human rights advocates had become vocal about the Soviet Union’s lapses in this regard and their attention was a source of embarrassment. The 1967 decree is another example. By stating they were unjustly deported, it was hoped the Tatars could be pacified and Western nations would see the Soviet Union in a more favorable light. It did not, however, concretely help the Tatars, who were as unwelcome in Crimea as ever.17

The decree absolving the Tatars of treason issued in 1967 did, however, stimulate many families to try to return to Crimea. Moscow authorities stipulated that while they were free to move about, they should not be allowed to obtain a propiska (residence permit) or become employed in Crimea. Families who tried to settle in Crimea were typically re-deported. They described it as worse than the 1990s. The Soviet dissident movement became deeply involved: Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, Petr Grigorenko, and Aleksei Kosterin advocated on behalf of the Crimean Tatars and in some cases helped secure the release of imprisoned Tatars. Only in the late 1980s and early 1990s were the Crimean Tatars successful in returning to the peninsula.

Contemporary Period

Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet government formed a commission to study the Crimean Tatar issue. In 1989, the commission
decided that the Crimean Tatars should be given the right to return. Initially, a Soviet program assisted with the repatriation. After the Soviet collapse, however, Ukraine took on the financial burden of resettlement. From 1991, Ukraine has spent 300 million dollars on Crimean Tatar repatriation. International governmental and nongovernmental organizations have contributed another ten million. This was not adequate, however, and the official construction of new housing and infrastructure ended in 1996. By 1997, the State Nationality Committee (Goskomnats) was only assisting with communal housing in dormitories, rent subsidies, reimbursement of transportation costs, and emergency health subsidies to a limited number of extremely impoverished families (Bekirov 1999a: 50).

Since the allocated funds have failed to meet their needs, many Crimean Tatars see the repatriation as self-financed. The Goskomnats estimates that at least 148 million dollars are needed to complete the infrastructure for the compact settlements, but other estimates are in the billions. This is more than Ukraine can afford at a time of economic crisis. Corruption and mismanagement of funds have also complicated repatriation. There are charges that funds were embezzled before reaching their destination and that financial maneuvering in a time of galloping inflation diminished the amounts that individuals received. Today, as many as half of the repatriated Tatars lack adequate housing. This and other problems associated with infrastructure have motivated the Crimean Tatar leadership to prioritize integrating the Tatars in Crimea over resettling those remaining in Central Asia.

Crimean Tatars in Central Asia

Not all the Crimean Tatars have repatriated. In fact, it is estimated that at least 200,000 Crimean Tatars remain in places of former exile (IOM 1997: 5). The largest concentration is in newly independent Uzbekistan, where some 100,000 Crimean Tatars are believed to reside. Approximately two-thirds of Crimean Tatars in the “stans” are urban dwellers who, for the most part, lead relatively comfortable lives: they live in homes they have purchased or built themselves, own automobiles, and have time to take part in cultural life. The Central Asian stereotype of Crimean Tatars is indicative. Crimean Tatars are seen as individuals of high educational achievement and professional success, including advancement to senior positions. However, Crimean Tatars feel this well-being is threatened by policies that now seek to promote native Uzbeks. They believe prospects are especially limited for those whose Uzbek language skills are weak. Immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Crimean Tatars were urged to
“go home.” Those who held their ground observed that the attitude toward them improved once the various Central Asian peoples recognized the effects of massive out-migration of the so-called Russian-speaking population. While Crimean Tatars report close relationships with members of other groups, they also fear the kind of ethnic strife that occurred in the Ferghana valley in 1989.

The Crimean Tatars in Central Asia have various migration intentions. The vast majority of individuals wish to return, but only some are able. The IOM estimates that roughly half of the Crimean Tatars living in Uzbekistan would like to repatriate but face too many barriers (1997: 2). These are typically Crimean Tatars who hesitated when the repatriation was government subsidized and soon found themselves without the necessary financial resources. Housing is two to three times more expensive in Ukraine, and it is difficult to find buyers for homes in Central Asia. The elderly find this obstacle particularly difficult, because they lack the ability to construct low cost housing for themselves. As a consequence, the Crimean Tatar population in Uzbekistan is disproportionately female and elderly. Grounds for hesitation included unwillingness to risk unemployment and personal reasons, such as the recent death of a loved one. Crimean Tatars struggling to gather the resources necessary to repatriate live divided lives. They described themselves metaphorically as “sitting on suitcases.” A sense of being neither “here” nor “there” prevents them from living fully satisfying lives (Uehling 2002). Still, many Tatars are taking steps to repatriate. IOM statistics (which are probably overly conservative) suggest that roughly 20 percent of the population in Central Asia is actively pursuing repatriation (IOM 1997: 2). This involves purchasing or constructing housing in Crimea, waiting for a container to send belongings, and completing necessary documentation related to citizenship and residence permits.

There are those who, for a variety of reasons, plan to stay in Uzbekistan. Part of the motivation stems from an inability to cope with Crimean conditions. For example, health status may preclude them from living without running water and indoor plumbing. Or, they may not want to make the professional sacrifices that would be required. But this is to view their presence in the negative, when part of the motivation stems from ties in Uzbekistan. Tatars who plan to stay are likely to have non-Crimean Tatar spouses, children completing higher education, and homes they do not want to give up. Katya is typical of Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan. She works as a senior accountant at a cognac factory and knows she would not be hired for comparable work in Ukraine. The low-paid employment she would most likely secure would not enable her to purchase a house or support her parents. Even if they were able to sell her parents’ house where she now lives, it would not provide enough funds to purchase housing in Ukraine. Katya is
not willing to surmount these barriers, preferring to value the network of colleagues, friends, and family she has in Samarkand. This picture should not, however, suggest assimilation into Uzbek society. Crimean Tatars hate the derisive use (in Crimea) of “Uzbek Tatars,” and, regardless of migration intentions, may suffer from profound nostalgia.

Crimean Tatars in Crimea

While a few Crimean Tatars have returned to the homes they or their parents left, for the most part, they have had to build anew. Government authorities tell a story of facilitating repatriation, but Tatars point out that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they were blocked from legally purchasing housing, and refused land on which to build. They resorted to squatting on vacant land. They began with tents and dug outs that were hollowed into the Crimean hillsides. A few were lucky enough to bring building materials from Uzbekistan, but most had to improvise upon arrival. Some converted train cars while others built from sheet metal, tar paper, or other materials. Now, while many Tatars continue to live in these shelters, one can also visit completed, three-story houses of impressive craftsmanship both in the compact settlements or samostroi, and in towns and villages. While the squatters’ settlements have been legalized, they still lack basic amenities.

A problem shared by all is an appalling lack of infrastructure. In the 290 compact settlements, few roads are paved. They become impassible with ice and mud at certain times of year, making it difficult for residents to attend school and go to work. Whereas Crimean Tatars in Central Asia were accustomed to electricity, running water, and heat, according to a recent World Bank study, only 20 percent of the compact settlements had electricity, 30 percent had running water, and 4 percent had gas heat. Perhaps most striking is that none of the compact settlements have sewers (Gomart 2000: 317; Bekirov 1999a). The lack of plumbing makes cooking and washing labor-intensive, and the lack of electricity makes it difficult for children to complete their homework. In 2004, the lack of amenities remains much the same.

The prejudiced politics of resettlement have complicated Crimean Tatar integration. Crimean Tatars were denied residence permits in more prosperous urban centers like Yalta, while they were encouraged to settle in rural areas such as the steppe region. Crimean (primarily Russian) authorities’ efforts went against historic settlement patterns, which were characterized by high concentrations in the coastal region. We can also note a shift from urban to rural. Whereas two-thirds of the Crimean Tatars in Central Asia lived in urban areas, two-thirds are settled in rural areas in Crimea. Former urban
residents have experienced a dramatic change in lifestyle, learning to garden and farm for the first time in their lives. Residence in rural areas has also meant that they have been forced to accept low-paying and menial jobs that do not match their qualifications. The Crimean Tatars are highly motivated to rectify this situation. The most intense battles over property reclamation have occurred in efforts to reclaim the areas where their ancestors traditionally lived (also see Verdery 1996). The land captures have continued: in summer 2003, new holdings were taken and remained unresolved in mid-2004.

Access to some of the most coveted real estate in the former Soviet Union is only one dimension of the problem, however, for they also face employment discrimination, a lack of support for their language and religion, and political underrepresentation. Unemployment is a particularly serious problem. Called “traitors” and “Blacks” by the local population, many Crimean Tatars have been refused employment. They tell stories of applying for jobs, being told there are no openings, and then learning that a Russian or Ukrainian was offered the position. Crimean Tatar experts claim that 60 percent are unemployed (Bekirov 1999a: 37). The World Bank cites a more conservative figure of 40 percent. The unemployment rate of non-Tatar population is much lower, estimated to be 3.2 percent (Bekirov 1999a: 37). Reliable figures are difficult to calculate because as Crimean Tatars point out, official statistics fail to account for the many Crimean Tatars who do not have citizenship or residence permits. Crimean Tatars who lack citizenship are naturally denied employment in government agencies, leading to vast underrepresentation in the Ministry of the Interior, the courts, and the security services.

As this discussion suggests, the Crimean Tatars’ integration has been complicated by their legal status. Initial returnees were typically denied a propiska (residence permit), either because their housing did not meet the required specifications, or because they did not have employment. This was a vicious cycle because they could also be denied employment on the grounds that they lacked a residence permit. A lack of citizenship prevented them from voting; required they pay a higher rate for higher education; prevented them from entering faculties like law; precluded employment in government and state enterprises; and limited their participating in privatization. According to Ukrainian law, only the deported who returned prior to 1991 were automatically considered citizens. Later arrivals were required to go through a complicated and expensive process of applying for it. Following intervention on the part of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), however, provisions were made for Crimean Tatars to more easily obtain citizenship. Now the problems of political underrepresentation remain.
These aspects of marginalization contribute to poverty. Lack of cash salaries (workers are often paid in goods) and unpaid salaries mean that at certain times of the year, families are unable to make ends meet. While many Ukrainians have suffered as a result of post-Soviet political and economic change, what sets the Crimean Tatars apart is their recent repatriation. Crimean Tatars consider themselves disadvantaged compared to the Russians and Ukrainians in the area because they lack permanent housing, live in crowded or temporary structures, lack permanent employment, and have less access to infrastructure and social services. There is a high incidence of seasonal hunger: poor families are likely to run out of food in the late winter and early spring, eating animal feed, and sometimes stealing electricity or food items for survival. Every year there are deaths linked to the ingestion of *otrub*, the unprocessed bran fed to animals.

While Crimean Tatars cite infrastructure as their most pressing need, they are also working toward cultural and linguistic revitalization. The Crimean Tatar religious monuments that survived still need to be registered and protected, and Muslim holidays still need to be recognized in the state calendar of Ukraine. Crimean Tatars are debating how best to revitalize their language. The use of Crimean Tatar declined during the years in exile, and it is widely acknowledged to be a domestic language, lacking a vocabulary for professional use. There is a concern that only 6.1 percent of Crimean Tatar children have access to instruction in their native language (Bekirov 1999a: 32). On the other hand, parents fear that if their children attend Tatar classes, they will miss the classes that other children use to get ahead.

The Tatars’ existence in Crimea is by all accounts a difficult one. Until relatively recently, they lacked the vertical integration of other groups. The recent election of Mustafa Dzhemilev and Reshat Chubarov to the *Verkhovna Rada* is one sign that their political power may increase. The Crimean Tatars have traditionally compensated with highly developed social networks. However, in the current economic climate, in which visiting and reciprocity is difficult, these social ties have weakened. The Crimean Tatars will never be a majority in Crimea. In a total Crimean population of 2 million, the Crimean Tatars are only 12 percent, while Russians make up 58.3 percent, and Ukrainians are 24.3 percent. However, their hope is not to become a dominant majority or achieve political independence, but to achieve self-determination within Ukraine. Crimean Tatar elites have become increasingly effective in harnessing the resources of the international community. This has led to hints that their image as wild and blood-thirsty will ease. In the absence of tangible improvements, however, ordinary Crimean Tatars are still dissatisfied. They speak eloquently about the beauty and importance of homeland, but are increasingly likely to leave.
Conclusion

This chapter, devoted to the Crimean Tatars’ history within the territory of the former Soviet Union, has explored the most contentious aspects of their past. The Crimean Tatar ethnonym has been a source of confusion since the beginning. For a time, the Soviets tried to remove the “Crimean” adjective from the “Tatar” noun to encourage assimilation. The threat to their identity promoted ethnic self-consciousness rather than reducing it. Still, Crimean Tatars are now divided on whether or not to change their name—a question that will most certainly be revisited in the future.

While the Crimean Tatars have traditionally been portrayed as the descendents of the Golden Horde, their ethnogenesis is considerably more complicated. Mongol heritage was used to delegitimize the Tatars presence in Crimea and link them with a lack of civilization. Ironically, Crimean Tatars are now embracing this aspect of their past. Russians saw Crimea as the pearl in the tsar’s crown, and credited themselves with bringing cultural development and economic prosperity. Crimean Tatars tend to view the colonial period in a completely different light. They see it as inaugurating imperialist policies that destroyed cultural institutions and forced many Crimean Tatars to emigrate.

Following the Russian Revolution and Civil War, the Crimean Tatars enjoyed a brief Golden Age in the Crimean ASSR. Far from uncontroversial, it is now debated whether the basis of this autonomy was national or territorial. Another contested aspect of Crimean history is occupation. Stalin ostensibly removed the Tatars as a result of their collaboration with the Germans. However, subsequent scholarship has revealed that while necessary, collaboration hardly provided sufficient condition to deport the Tatars.

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, some but not all of the Crimean Tatars have repatriated. Those in Central Asia enjoy a higher standard of living, but are challenged in maintaining their cultural rights and resources. Those in Crimea have overcome the barriers to repatriation but must still integrate on the peninsula. A lack of infrastructure, poverty, and insufficient political representation mean that there is a significant distance to traverse before they can revel in being “hosts,” instead of “guests.”

It is impossible to understand how Crimean Tatars chose the difficult and dangerous path of repatriation without a fuller appraisal of historical events such as the German occupation of the Crimea. In chapter 2, we will consider competing representations of that tumultuous time, and how the Crimean Tatars came to be labeled “traitors” who sold out the Motherland.
Chapter 2

The Faces of Public Memory

While conducting fieldwork in Moscow in 1995, a Crimean Tatar friend suggested we visit the Pushkin Museum. Rustem told me he received a discount with his artists’ card, so if I would wait, he would purchase our tickets. The next thing I knew, he was pulling me along by the elbow as the woman in the ticket booth cried out, “Traitors! Traitors who sold out the Motherland!” Rustem retorted, “We didn’t sell out, but we’ll certainly buy in!” This brief exchange offers a taste of the way in which Crimean Tatars’ purported collaboration with the German regime during World War II continues to flavor relationships today. From Rustem’s vantage point, the anger and resentment that we witnessed at the museum are just the beginning.

While historians of Russian and Ukrainian ethnicity continue to unearth new evidence of Tatar collaboration with the Nazis, Crimean Tatars take the opposite approach and de-emphasize pro-German sentiments, highlighting instead the Tatar patriots who fought at the front and in key battles. Tatars are also apt to glorify Crimean Tatar leadership in the partisan movement and the underground that opposed the Germans during their occupation of Crimea. Recollections of war and conflict are therefore some of the most contentious of public memories. These opposing “public faces” of memory will be explored through an analysis of ethnographic interviews, documentary, and mass media sources.

If Slavic and Tatar recollections of the occupation share anything, it is a sense that the period was a protracted struggle for survival in which ideological concerns were often subordinated to those of life and death. “Patriotism” and “treason” appear to have been secondary to survival at the time, but have become important political currency today. Because Slavs used collaboration as grounds to exile the Crimean Tatars and preclude them from returning, the bulk of Crimean Tatars’ efforts to create their own interpretation of the past, as well as a great deal of their recollections,
revolve around these central events. This chapter therefore contributes a crucial piece to the argument that Crimean Tatars’ recollections of the past helped create a particular notion of homeland. Public memories of the German occupation are part of an endeavor on the part of Russians, Ukrainians, and Tatars to recast the period in a more tolerable light.

Constructing a Counter-Memory

Far from accepting the Soviets’ portrayal of the group as “traitors” who deserved punishment, the Crimean Tatars have produced a robust narrative that figures them as unrecognized patriots who served the Motherland. The struggle is now to solidify their view of what happened and thereby affirm their rightful place on the peninsula. They point out that the ones who were punished with deportation were the least likely to have contributed to the German effort. Those who helped the Germans were evacuated with the retreating army. They also point out that the population left in Crimea at the time was composed primarily of women, children, and the elderly. Finally, the nature of this “collaboration” needs to be reevaluated, as much of it is more aptly described as self-defense.

The struggle to construct a counter-narrative is far from past. Allegations of treason have most recently accompanied Crimean authorities’ attempts to exclude the Tatars from the process of privatization and question their right to erect historical monuments. Crimean Tatars are placed in a delicate bind: how to articulate the anti-Soviet sentiments they had without appearing pro-Nazi? How to express the Soviet patriotism they felt when there is documentary evidence of collaboration? Discussions about who was a traitor and who was a patriot have driven a formidable wedge between residents of Crimea on differing sides, and have come to serve as a medium for expressing discontent over the currently unequal distribution of rights, resources, and representation.

Rather than simply rehearsing the evidence of Crimean Tatar guilt and innocence, we need to question how (and why) terms like “patriotism” and “treason” are employed. This account shows that they are integral to how the faces of public memory are created. A substantial body of historical work on the Crimean Tatars has struggled for a more balanced and objective portrayal of the Crimean Tatars, making clear that the accusations of treason have been taken out of context (Allworth 1988, 1998; Fisher 1978; Pohl 1999; Williams 1999; Uehling 2000). Williams has further pointed out that the Tatars could hardly have affected the outcome of the war (1999: 247). And yet, the question that continues to reverberate is whether the Crimean
Tatars collaborated. Based on the research that has been done to date, we are now ready to ask fundamentally different kinds of questions. The epistemologically most relevant question is not whether the Crimean Tatars collaborated, but in what framework was “collaboration” understood at the time? Moreover, what kind of thinking made it possible to associate an entire ethnic group, rather than individuals, with treason? Answers to these questions may pave the way to the clearer understanding that is prerequisite to peaceful coexistence. If and when the opposing faces lose their accusatory edge, a different kind of self-examination will be possible.

Patriotism and Treason

The word “traitor” is part of the problem for in categorizing, it tends to deflect attention from the reasons and principles behind actions. The concept of treason is slippery because what defines it is not the inherent qualities of an endeavor, but the outcome. The word “traitor” belongs to victors as a way of labeling those who opposed them, regardless of what they may have done or stood for. Elliot made this argument when writing about a famous but overrated Nazi collaborator, General Andrei Vlasov (Elliot 1982). Vlasov was the figurehead for the Russian Liberation Army (ROA). Even though he is credited with leading 300,000 troops, he had very little real political or military power and, unlike the Germans he worked for, was not anti-Semitic. In an attempt to bring the General’s career into perspective, Elliot makes the point that to be patriots, America’s founding fathers such as Benjamin Franklin and George Washington had to be traitorous British subjects first (1982: 86).

The task of reappraising the occupation is further complicated by two factors. First, although I refer to “the Crimean Tatars,” they cannot be treated as a unified group. Their sentiments and their loyalties were divided and the purely practical issues of survival impacted enlisted and civilian, rural and urban, Bolshevik and Tatar nationalist, educated and illiterate, in asymmetrical ways. Second, the German occupation of Crimea was by no means a stable or monolithic period. For example, the ranks of the volunteers to the German army, as well as the number of partisans fighting them from the forests, rose and fell several times between September 1941, when the Germans entered the peninsula, and May 1944, when the Soviets regained control. Within the partisan organization, the size, structure and leadership changed dramatically. In addition, the terms for describing the period are highly unstable. “Collaboration” sometimes refers to taking up arms and explicitly signing-on with the German command, and sometimes includes the villagers who had been forced to guard their villages against
partisans (who often attacked villages, and came out of the forests to steal food). According to Bugai, roughly 20,000 Crimean Tatars were mobilized to fight on the Soviet front. This amounts to 10 percent of the total Crimean Tatar population at the time (Bugai 1992: 131).

Although typical Soviet accounts are adamant that the Crimean Tatars were traitors, many consultants vacillated when asked about the occupation. It was difficult to obtain an unambiguous picture of what went on because consultants contradicted themselves in the course of a single interview. Gradually, it became clear that ambiguity was part of the story of the German occupation, which was an exceedingly complex period in their lives. A single individual could change sides more than once in the three-year period or could be working on both sides, having a double identity unknown to most. This was possible because the Soviet partisans waged a clandestine, guerrilla-style battle against the German regime. Due to the enmity built into war itself, there was much secrecy. One woman told me that she found out that her husband was in the underground only later. He was afraid to tell her because one mention of his activities in the presence of the Germans, or informers to them, would jeopardize both her safety and his. She found out only at the moment of deportation when, as she put it, “our” Russians returned and asked for his documents, only to discover he was a partisan. Thus patriotism and treason were by no means easy to identify. As this example and others offered below suggest, what was assumed to be treason was in some cases patriotic and the “patriotic” were likewise fully capable of acts of disloyalty.

The issue of collaboration is further complicated by the fact that Germans posed as partisans and partisans posed as volunteers to the German army in order to conduct intelligence work. Further, the Germans encouraged their recruits to come with their Soviet weapons, or weapons without distinguishing signs, sometimes blurring the evidence of who shot whom. According to Litvin, the internal correspondence of the Third Reich indicates, “Ammunition must as far as possible be German, but without distinguishing signs” (1991: 91). The failure to adequately sort out who did what led to the Soviets’ subsequent portrayals of Crimean Tatars as uniformly treacherous. The chief drawback of Soviet representations is therefore that they offer a monochromatic view of Crimean Tatars that shapes the kinds of interpretations that are possible today. The people who lived through the experience seemed to see though this, however. A Ukrainian woman stated, “I judge a person by their behavior, not their nationality. It’s not a matter of nationality.” She had earned her living by doing laundry for the Germans. The suggestion she had committed some kind of treason by helping them never arose. Because she is of Slavic descent, a book about
this period focused on how she secretly helped two injured partisans, and depicted her as a patriot (Poliakov 1998).

First, an icon of Crimean Tatar patriotism will be described as a way to demonstrate the complexity of the period. We will then back up and look more broadly at how the stage had already been set for Tatars to sympathize with the German regime. This paves the way for a more fine-grained, ethnographic exploration of Russian and Crimean Tatar consultants’ perspectives on the war, beginning with two registers within Crimean Tatar memory. A discussion of what has been distilled from memories and recollections will follow, with a close look at what an official source, the newspapers of the time, have to say. Finally, we will consider how memories and documentary sources are refracted in politics today.

An Icon of Patriotism

A Crimean Tatar war hero who exemplifies Tatar patriotism toward the Soviet Union is Amet Khan Sultan. Crimean Tatars talk about him as a way of illustrating how the deportation was terribly unjust. Amet Khan, who twice earned the prestigious “Hero of the Soviet Union” award, was one of six Crimean Tatar Heroes of the Soviet Union—a number that is high considering the Crimean Tatars comprise a population of less than one-quarter million. So for the Crimean Tatars, Amet Khan Sultan stands as an important icon of patriotism. His patriotism was subsequently minimized by the Soviet authorities, but Crimean Tatars take his awards as proof of the legitimacy of their return.

This is far from the whole story, however, because just as the Crimean Tatars ended up on both sides of the Russian–German hostilities as a group, individual families found themselves divided across partisan lines. While Amet Khan was the recipient of numerous awards, his brother was accused of being a German collaborator.

Amet Khan enlisted early in the war after completing an accelerated training program for pilots. He became known for his extraordinary skill and fearlessness. It was after completing 500 flights and shooting down 20 enemy planes that he was admitted to the Order of Heroes (Butaev 1990: 23). Amet Khan is said to have been heavily invested in Soviet victory. A taste of this patriotism is provided by his biographer, who writes that in one battle, “with all the hatred of the enemy he had accumulated in the years of the war, the young pilot threw his fighter plane at the enemy. The wings of the planes clashed like two swords” (Butaev 1990: 32). Amet Khan parachuted to safety, surviving to complete many other offensives.
Amet Khan was granted a leave in spring 1944 after Sevastopol was freed from German forces. He went home for a visit, taking other recruits. The next morning, Amet Khan Sultan was awoken in the early hours by the sound of his mother crying. He jumped up to see two soldiers holding his mother by the arms (Butaev 1990: 143). He immediately confronted them, and he and the soldiers began to fight. An enlisted man he was traveling with intervened and told the soldiers they were fighting with a Hero of the Soviet Union. They became very embarrassed and conceded to allowing Amet Khan to go to their commander and try to secure his parents’ release. This, however, was the night that the Crimean Tatars were to be deported from Crimea. After consulting with officials in Moscow, the local Soviet headquarters permitted Amet Khan Sultan to evacuate his parents to the North Caucasus, where they were effectively exiled.

It was while Amet Khan was at the local headquarters that he learned that his brother was on a list of Crimean Tatars helping the Nazis. He was forced to face the possibility that they had been working at cross-purposes. This was the case in many other families as well. In Cain and Abel fashion, the concern was expressed that brother may have shot brother. However, in spite of this underlying anxiety about the occupation, what is recalled most about Amet Khan Sultan is his fearlessness and loyalty to the Soviet Union and the “thanks” he received in the form of exile. For Crimean Tatars, their war hero’s unflinching commitment was the backdrop against which the horrific event of deportation took place.

Toward a Better Understanding of Wartime Activity

The Crimean Tatars’ positioning on both sides of the partisan divide takes on a different cast in light of the Soviet treatment of Crimean Tatars before the war and in the first weeks and months of conflict. From the October Revolution up to the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1941, the Crimean Tatars, like many other national minorities, found themselves in a difficult position with regard to their cultural and national aspirations. While there were favorable policies of korenizatsia (nativization) or “taking root,” and periods of “flowering” of nationalities (the Crimean ASSR is one example), the ultimate goal of Soviet politics was to minimize “bourgeois nationalism” and facilitate the emergence of communism and the (non-ethnic) “New Soviet Man.”

When the Bolsheviks occupied Crimea and first tried to incorporate it into the newly formed Union, the administration they set up lacked both
support among the population, and efficacy. In fact, the Bolsheviks failed to control the sailors and soldiers stationed at Sevastopol, who are believed to have killed thousands (Fisher 1978: 121). On the third and final try to establish Bolshevik rule, they installed Bela Kun who began a reign of terror with Nikolai Bystryikh, the Commissar of a special section of the Crimean Cheka. At this time, at least 60,000 inhabitants of Crimea, labeled “bourgeoisie” and “anarchists” were shot (Kirimal 1958: 20; Fisher 1978: 132). The Crimean Tatars resisted the leadership of Bela Kun so actively that the Communist leadership sought ways to make concessions to the Crimean Tatar population.

Sultan Galiev, a Volga Tatar, was sent to evaluate the situation. In spite of local Communists’ objections, he drew up a number of recommendations in the Tatars’ favor, such as forming an autonomous Soviet republic and bringing Tatars into Party membership. The administration announced amnesty for anyone who had opposed Bolshevik victory in Crimea, and this paved the way to negotiations. Representatives of the Tatars met with non-Tatar Communists and as a result of these negotiations the Sovnarkom, or Council of Peoples Commissars, proclaimed the Crimean ASSR, or Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on October 18, 1921 (Shaw and Pryce 1990).

The practices of the earliest Communist government in Crimea had included seizing much of the arable land to form large collective farms. This was followed by a severe famine during the winter of 1921–1922. Research on the famine suggests it was created by selling the grain that could otherwise have fed the people (see e.g. Nahaylo and Swoboda 1990: 69). An estimated 100,000 people died of starvation (Kirimal 1958: 21). Inhabitants of Crimea were not alone in experiencing famine, but their situation was particularly acute because the Soviet government shipped Crimean produce to the central regions of Russia (Pipes 1957: 90; Lewytzkyj 1972: 43).

The famine was followed by a less troubled time from 1923 to 1927, when a policy of Tatarization was implemented. Under Tatarization, there came to be national schools, a national press, and a national theater. Tatars also had representation in the government of the Autonomous Republic, and Crimean Tatar was promoted as one of the languages. But this period came to a close with the resurgence of Sovietization in which the developments that had taken place were repressed as “bourgeois nationalist.” Then, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, the forced collectivization of agriculture began. Between 35,000 and 40,000 Crimean Tatars were labeled “kulaks,” became objects of enmity, and were deported to camps in Siberia and the Ural Mountains (Nekrich 1978). This contributed to a second famine that took place in Crimea and Ukraine in 1931–1933.
With the Stalin regime (1927–1953) came a period of repression for all of the Soviet Union. Churches and mosques were closed, and many clergy were shot. The Crimean Tatar intelligentsia was liquidated with 16 prominent intellectuals being shot on the night of April 17, 1938 alone. The victims included writers, scientists, journalists, artists, and members of the ruling party, both young and old. All of the men shot on that night were charged with “counter-revolutionary, bourgeois nationalist Milli Firka activity,” regardless of their political inclinations. Retrospectively, the Tatars imagine that what the executed had in common (i.e., the real reason behind their execution) was a love for their homeland.

Kirimal estimates that in 20 years of Bolshevik rule of Crimea (1921–1941) at least 160,000 Crimean Tatars starved to death, were murdered, or were deported. This amounts to half of the Crimean Tatar population at the time of the October Revolution (Kirimal 1958: 23). His research is supported by that of Fisher (1978: 145) and Nekrich (1978). I mention these figures, which may be revised with further research, because they are incorporated into the political calculus of sovereignty today: Crimean Tatar leaders point out how numerous they would have been if not for the policies of the Soviet state. Their political weight in Crimea, they assert, should take into account the losses in the Soviet period.

Lesser Evils?

Mustafa Dzhemilev, the leader of the Crimean Tatar National Movement argues, “most Crimean Tatars view the ‘Great Patriotic War’ as no more than a skirmish between two villains, neither of which promised any kindness or relief” (Cemiloglu 1995: 93). The behavior of the Soviet authorities as they lost ground to the Germans left a great deal to be desired. The NKVD resolved the problem of what to do with its prisoners by executing all of them, without trial, before they left. The bodies of women and children were among those found in the basement of the NKVD. The retreating Soviet army also attempted to sabotage the advancing Germans by destroying any industrial capacity that could not be removed (Fisher 1978). This included dynamiting water and sewage facilities, burning warehouses at collective and state farms (destroying the food reserves for winter), and tearing down telephone and electrical lines, all effectively leaving the peninsula cut off from the mainland. This made residents of Crimea unsure about just who the enemy was, an issue that comes up repeatedly in consultants’ testimony. In the final analysis, the Soviets’ actions hurt the local population more than the German army, which was able to import the equipment it needed. The German army supplies were also renewed by seizing villagers’ property.
The Germans began setting up their rule by recruiting Tatars into “self-defense” battalions (Selbschutze), and police battalions (Schutzmannschaftsbattaillonen) then initiated the formation of “volunteer” units to serve in the rear of the German army. Eventually, individuals from the self-defense battalions were required to serve in “punitive missions” against the partisans, although their primary role was to protect Tatar villages. The recruitment into the self-defense battalions was most successful in the first year of the occupation. Participation flagged after Tatars witnessed policies based on “racially inferior” types, the shooting of prisoners of war, and extermination. The Nazis were relentless, executing 91,678 people between October 1941 and April 1942 alone (Nekrich 1978: 15–16). These executions include the vast majority of Crimean Jews and Gypsies. There was an evacuation of Crimean collective and state farms, but it is not possible to know if they reached safety. The Germans were also disliked for exporting able-bodied workers to Germany to become Ostarbeiter (Eastern Workers).

It should be noted here that the history of the battalions is linked to that of the diaspora. Crimean Tatar battalions were created after Crimean Turks from Turkey intervened on behalf of the Tatars they knew to have been interned in German camps. Müstecip Fazil and Edige Kirimal approached the German leadership in Berlin, and arranged for the Tatars to be enrolled in a special support legion for the Wehrmacht. The eight battalions (an estimated 20,000 soldiers) were considered to be “volunteers” when uniforms where handed out, but the uniforms represented a chance of survival above all else.

Everyday Life, Everyday Rule

In the wake of Soviet rule, some Crimean Tatars proclaimed that “liberators” had come. Although visible, the pro-German, anti-Soviet sentiment appears to have lacked very deep roots in the administrative functioning of Crimea. For example, the Germans shared negligible authority with local Crimean Tatar representatives during the German administration of Crimea. While Russian and Ukrainian consultants argued the Crimean Tatars received preferential treatment, according to Fisher it was only the Slavic population of Crimea that maintained their posts during the occupation (1978: 158). Fisher comes to the conclusion that all of the residents of Crimea who held positions of authority during the occupation were from the Slavic population except the minister of cultural affairs.

The German administration in Crimea was composed of three parts: the military command under General Manshein, the political command
under Erich Koch, and the offices of the police and SS under Olendorf in Crimea and Rosenberg in Berlin. Manshein was most active in trying to garner Tatar sympathies by creating more liberal policies. The rationale was that they would be able to delegate more people to the war effort by maintaining peaceful relations with the occupied population and shipping laborers to Germany, thereby freeing German troops for war.

Muslim Committees

One example of a policy benefiting the Tatars was the creation of the Muslim Committees, which have been a focus of Soviet attention. Officially, the Committees were charged with providing prayer services for the Tatar self-defense battalions, giving material aid to the battalions and their families, and generating propaganda against Communism. They were responsible for repairing desecrated mosques (or mechetis) and performing the role of intermediary between the German authorities and the Tatar population. As leaders of the Committees, the mullahs, respected religious specialists, were in an influential position. Authority was ascribed to them from both the German and Crimean Tatar sides. From the Crimean Tatar side, village mullahs performed key rituals such as circumcisions, marriages, and funerals. They were valued and respected for their knowledge and interpretations of religious teachings. From the German perspective, the mullahs were literate community leaders with the ability to inform and influence a broad spectrum of individuals. Hence, they were seen as crucial for intelligence activities. They were renamed “Tatar Committees” when the Germans became concerned that the “Muslim Committees” might become a platform for pan-Islamic political organizing.

There is some evidence that the Muslim Committees provided a cover for activities of the underground nationalist organization Milli Firka (National Party) that had aspirations for sovereignty in Crimea (Nekrich 1978: 30). If this was the case, those Crimean Tatars who were most patriotic about the Crimean Tatar cause would ironically have had the greatest incentive to work with the Germans. Charges of “treason” therefore gloss over the complexity of the situation. The most pronounced and long-term effect of the Muslim Committees was to widen the rift between the Slavic and Crimean Tatar populations of Crimea. The Slavs resented the preferential treatment they felt the Crimean Tatars were receiving from the Germans, as there were no comparable institutions for the Russian and Ukrainian populations.

Initially, German order was strict. The occupational regime softened beginning in April 1942 when the German command set before itself the
task of recruiting 20,000 Tatars. Documents from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Germany indicate that the Germans had decided against offering Crimean Tatars any form of self-government (Nekrich 1978: 27). The documents of the Third Reich indicate a great deal of caution regarding the Tatars’ possible appropriation of the Committees for their own cause (Litvin 1991: 95). The German regime lasted just over three years. In April 1943 the Soviet army entered the peninsula and by May had removed the Germans. The final 250-day siege of Sevastopol was one of the tensest times during the occupation. It left the city completely devastated but the Soviets in possession of Crimea.

What should have been the end of the war and a return to normalcy was for the Crimean Tatars a continuation of confusion and disorder. Crimean Tatars referred to this as a time when citizens were summarily hung from lampposts in Simferopol. In the first two weeks of military presence, Soviet officials accepted a verbal accusation of treason on the part of two people as sufficient “evidence” for execution without trial. There was also abuse from Soviet soldiers who are reported to have raped women, plundered homes, and attacked and killed members of the population. The soldiers were predisposed to see all Tatars as collaborators, because they had been misinformed about the extent of the Tatar collaboration with the Germans.

Formative Influences on the Soviet Interpretation

The impression that the Tatars uniformly collaborated can be traced to several sources. First, the Germans had spread such rumors to lead people to believe they were powerful enough to be victorious. Consultants referred to this as “psychological warfare.” With this approach, the Germans were able to bolster their image and simultaneously defame the Tatars. Soviet leaders of the partisans (many of whom were anti-Tatar) further misrepresented collaboration in their communications with the local Communist Party. They exaggerated the nature of the Tatars’ activity by stating most of the Tatars had gone over to serve the fascists. The Communist Party in Crimea unquestioningly relayed the misinformation to the higher authorities in Moscow. Reinforcing this whole complex of misinformation was the Russian sentiment that “others” or inorodtsi are suspect, which underwent a resurgence under conditions of war (Nekrich 1978: 33).

Misinformation and rumor certainly contributed to the impression the Crimean Tatars were uniformly treacherous. However, documentary evidence seized by the Red Army in Berlin indicates the Germans planned to build their relationship with the Turkish government by using their ties among Crimean Turks.¹² The Crimean Turk nationalists who had helped
the Crimean Tatars (by suggesting the formation of the Crimean Tatar battalions and heading up Muslim Committees) cast an even darker shadow over the Crimean Tatars at this moment when the Tatars were linked not only with Germany, but with Turkey. This was particularly unfortunate at a time when Stalin was hoping to expand his territory.

The Postwar Misrepresentation of Crimean Tatars

Misunderstanding has continued into the postwar period. A primary conduit has been the use of Russian names. Many veterans say their names were Russified for the purposes of serving in the army. At first, a Russified name simply maintained a “common language” with soldiers from the most diverse regions. But as the war progressed, it became a way for the authorities to gloss over the Crimean Tatar contribution to the underground movement, and the bravery they showed as partisans. Perhaps the most famous instance is a man who led the underground and went by the name *Diadia Volodia* (Uncle Volodia) but whose real name was Dagçi.

A book commonly taken to be an authoritative text on the underground, Ivan Kozlov’s *In the Crimean Underground*, also helped distort the historiography of the occupation (1947), as did Vergasov’s (1971) account.13 Local historians now disagree about Tatar contribution to the partisans, with some charging that those who claim to have been partisans are “fantasizing.”

If the Tatar participation in the partisan army is a controversial chapter of Crimean history, the history of Tatars in the *underground* movement is even more tangled. The underground’s ethnic and racial hierarchy bears an imprint on what is remembered today. The activities of those most closely linked to the Communist Party and its command (primarily the Slavic participants) tended to be valorized while the activities of other patriotic subgroups, composed of ethnics, tended to be downplayed. Thus the war allowed the tensions already existing within socialism to proliferate. Alliances were both shifting and covert as resistance on the part of ethnic minorities flourished.

The misrepresentation of the Crimean Tatars was compounded by the fact that Soviet authorities took the “Tatar” battalions to be composed solely of Crimean Tatars, when in fact they were multiethnic. Another factor is the granting of military awards. Because the Crimean Tatars were under suspicion, military authorities hesitated to grant them their awards. This skewed public perceptions. A disproportionate number of awards were granted in 1945, after the Crimean Tatars had been deported and
demobilized. Only recently have the veterans who were formerly over-looked received attention (Asanov 1998: 4).

From Consultants’ Perspectives

Relative to official sources, consultants who survived the occupation seem to have a more tempered view, eschewing the idealism that accompanies arguments asserting or denying German collaboration. During the occupation, residents of Crimea fulfilled a variety of roles. While some were forced to give up their housing for the Germans, others did cooking, laundry, or other routine tasks. As mentioned, many were charged with guarding villages, essentially agreeing to fulfill an intelligence function while they herded sheep or goats in the pastures around their villages. A smaller number worked with one of the “Muslim Committees” or “Tatar Committees” that were involved in reestablishing national schools and the religious life of the people. So there was a range of contact with the Germans from being inconvenienced by their presence, to being directly employed by them. Attitudes toward the Germans correspondingly filled a wide spectrum ranging from fear to respect.

Two Registers: A Crimean Tatar Woman’s View

Everyone who stayed in Crimea during the occupation found his or her life altered by the transition in rule. Asanova’s family (a pseudonym) was persecuted first by the Soviets, and then by the Germans before she was finally deported by the Soviets at the age of 22. Whereas the grief brought by German rule reminds her of her loved ones’ sacrifices for the Soviet Union, the Soviets’ subsequent treatment of her people encourages her to recall the advantages of the German regime. The way she resolves the tension between these two aspects of memory is a synthetic interpretation that relies on two different registers of memory.¹⁴

Asanova was born in Crimea in the early 1920s. Due to her Turkish ancestry (and no doubt in part because of her father’s travels and political activities) the family was harassed by the Soviets until her mother renounced her Turkish links (and the family’s inheritance). Asanova says that she was “exiled” for the first time at the age of two, when the Soviets chose to make her family’s house into a police headquarters and her family was forced to leave. The remaining years of her childhood were spent “shuffling” as she puts it, from one apartment to another. When hostilities
between Germany and the Soviet Union broke out in 1941, Asanova was studying in Sevastopol, where she met her husband, a military officer. As a leader of the fifty-first Division, he was sent to the front in western Ukraine and she went with him, working as a nurse. But they soon parted in the middle of a battle when he stayed to “cover” the retreat of Soviet forces and she swam across the Dnieper to safety. She never saw him again, nor her brothers who died in the war. Pregnant with her first child, she was sent to Simferopol. She was arrested for the first time two weeks after the birth of her child. As the widow of a Soviet army lieutenant and a former telephone and telegraph operator, she was thought by the Germans to be in the underground.

As it turned out, the German command brought her to the very same house that she was born in for the interrogation. The Germans had made the Soviet police headquarters their own. She sarcastically thanked them that they had afforded her the opportunity to die in the same house in which she was born. This comment incensed the German officers, and the fact that she made the comment in German complicated her subsequent interrogation as the Gestapo suspected that she had been lying when she told them that she did not speak German. She in fact knew very little German, but like many others had picked up certain phrases.

Because she was nursing her baby, milk started to flow during the interrogation. They demanded to know where the baby was and she refused to tell them, thinking that they would kill the baby and probably hurt the neighbors who were caring for it as well. When she repeatedly refused to tell them where her baby was, they used a metal pincers to tear her nipples off. She lost consciousness and regained it fully only five days later. The doctor who treated her told her it was remarkable she survived this torture. She never saw her baby again and was told it starved to death after her arrest.

Having lost her family’s inheritance, her husband, her brothers, her baby, and her physical well-being, Asanova was herded onto the cattle trains and deported to Central Asia along with everyone else. Upon arrival in Central Asia, her mother died as a result of the strenuous journey.

Asanova’s testimony opens up two registers within Crimean Tatar memory. A struggle to situate herself against Soviet domination encouraged her to argue the Germans were preferable to the Soviets. For example, she suggests that the German regime was “better” than the Soviet regime. While both Hitler and Stalin violated humanity by destroying massive numbers of people, Stalin also destroyed those who had been loyal to him. However, she also had a compelling desire to question and de-legitimize the charges of treason that were accepted so unquestioningly by the Soviet populace. This required expressing patriotism toward the Soviet Union.
Her narratives were interlaced with references to the death of her husband, her brothers (whose graves she searched for), and her mother. Memories of each of them brought tears. For example, she described how her mother, who died in the stadium where they were being held shortly after arrival, was “thrown away” and denied a proper burial. “The most offensive thing is that mother, who sincerely believed in socialism, whose two sons died fighting for the motherland, had her corpse thrown in the stadium.” Thus in personal interviews, Asanova often stressed her service, her brothers’ sacrifices, and the patriotism her family members showed.

Moral Ambiguity: A Russian Man’s View

If Asanova’s testimony suggests multiple layers of recollection, Russian recounting often vacillated with respect to the Tatars’ role. An interview with a veteran of Russian ethnicity provides a good example of the “both-and” logic typical of consultants speaking about the issue of treason. He also provides testimony about the lack of any moral high ground in the occupied territory. “Ivanov” starts by saying the majority of Crimean Tatars were on the Soviet side, with the partisans, and then contradicts himself to say they were on the German side.

It is a painful question, a very painful question. Whose side were the Tatars on? The majority, the majority was in the partisan detachment, very many Tatars were in the underground organization, many Tatars, but the majority all the same, created volunteer detachments. Volunteers for self, self-defense. Who were they defending themselves from? Who knows! Here the question is very—the thing is that Hitler said, “The Muslim people will be the whip with which I will achieve power.” Meaning he decided to stake it on the Muslim people, who would be the whip, but a whip without a handle, dead.

Speaking in 1998, this consultant makes the important point that this is still a sensitive issue. Far from diffusing with time, the events of the occupation continue to be salient. Ivanov raises a question that probes below the level of political rhetoric to get at the painful reality of the situation, “Who were they defending themselves against?” Given the history of Crimea discussed above, the Germans were not the only threat. Crimean Tatars and other residents of Crimea felt they also had to defend themselves against a great power that was inadequate to protect them.

The metaphor of a whip without a handle reinforces that, far from orchestrating these events, the Crimean Tatars were being used by the Germans. In Ivanov’s view, rather than being treated as a living appendage to the German regime, they were seen as dead weight that could be
manipulated. This is corroborated in materials from the Third Reich that discuss the ways in which the Germans planned to preempt Crimean Tatars from gaining too much power. One of the officers of the Third Reich in Crimea wrote, “we must consider the possibility that it may soon be necessary to pay attention to the Tatar Committee, especially in Simferopol, which may wish to use the situation of a common fight for their own purposes” (Litvin 1991: 95).

The Germans solved this particular problem by heavily supervising the Crimean Tatars they worked with and fragmenting the Tatars on the German side. Like the Jews, the Mongols, and the Kirghiz, the Crimean Tatar were viewed as untermenschen or “subhuman.” Believing them to be emblematic of “Asiatic backwardness,” the Germans planned to remove them.

The profound ambivalence people felt about this time is reflected in another analogy: the Crimean Tatars “bet on the wrong horse.” Ivanov creates the impression it wasn’t that the Crimean Tatars were treacherous, evil, or duplicious, it was that they simply made a bad choice in siding with the Germans:

Maybe the Crimean Tatars interpreted the slogan that it would all be for Muslims as real. The thing is that Tatars are very obedient toward the Muslim Committee. You are a slave to your Committee. The result of which is that the Muslim Committee, as they say, bet on the wrong horse. Do you know that expression? Do you know about racetrack rules? . . .

You know, apparently they know Crimea well, they know the whole forest. They make their way through the mountains so well. You see, all their grapevines were in the mountains. If with the patriotism with which they defended the Germans, they had defended Soviet power, believe me, there wouldn’t be any question right now.17

In the first part of his statement, Ivanov seems to imply it was not even Crimean Tatars as a whole as much as the Muslim Committees who were responsible. The Crimean Tatars “bet on the wrong horse” because the Muslim Committees took the Germans’ word that their regime represented a new possibility for the Muslim populations of the Soviet Union. All this was possible because of a social hierarchy in which Muslim elders were most esteemed.

The analogy Ivanov makes between the occupied Crimea and a racetrack challenges our desire to feel that moral superiority must surely belong to one side. At first, he suggests that it was not a matter in which one side or the other could be right. It was more simply that one “horse” had to win. Still, Ivanov ends up asserting that the Crimean Tatars’ choice precluded them from becoming a heroic, patriotic nation. The racetrack analogy only
enables him to convey a part of what he wants to say. It may still be apt, however, if we consider the rigged betting, sabotage, and other foul play that may accompany horse racing.

Ivanov’s belief that the Crimean Tatars were an indispensable source of knowledge about the Crimean mountains, a view that is widespread, is part of how the Crimean Tatars’ place on the losing side was prefigured. They were seen as not only possessing, but as using the information that the Germans desperately needed to make their operation a success. Regardless of their sentiments, motivation, or actions, the Soviet authorities assumed they were a questionable element in the war effort from the very beginning. Ethnic minorities were generally felt to be less loyal to the Soviet regime and Crimean Tatars were therefore always a “marked” category from the Soviet perspective. The press was able to cultivate negative stereotypes of Crimean Tatars, and the Soviet government expected disloyalty from the Crimean Tatars, because they were seen as Muslims belonging to the “East,” and because they had good relations with the Germans during the Civil War, just over two decades earlier.

At that time, faced with the brutality of the first Bolshevik regime, the Tatars decided to persuade the Germans that Crimea lay within her sphere of influence. Tatar and other forces helped the Germans occupy the peninsula after the first Bolshevik regime had crumbled. The Tatar leadership was given permission to reconstruct the national Kurultai [Assembly] or Parliament, but the Germans stopped short of recognizing any Tatar leadership.

Already Guilty: A Crimean Tatar Man’s View

“Useinov,” a Crimean Tatar consultant, told an anecdote that supports the contention that the Crimean Tatars were “framed” for the charges of treason. His father witnessed a Soviet officer come close to shooting a group of Crimean Tatars who arrived, at great risk to their own lives, to join the ranks of the partisans. It seemed clear to his father that no matter how they actually behaved, they would have had the charges of treason brought against them. His father’s story is corroborated by the research of Yurter (1987) and Fisher (1978). The later tells us that the commander of the partisans during the first year of the war, A. V. Mokrousov refused to allow Crimean Tatars to join the partisan groups under his command and on one occasion ordered some Crimean Tatars to be shot (Fisher 1978: 159). It was only after Mokrousov’s removal by the Soviet government that Crimean Tatars freely joined the Soviet partisans. Useinov believed that documents must have come from the Central Committee instructing the leadership of
Crimea to beware of Tatars. Given the treatment Mokrousov gave potential recruits, there may have been administrative correspondence suggesting the Crimean Tatars were not to be trusted. As in the racetrack analogy in which sportsmanship may be secondary to winning, Useinov states that there were “all kinds of injustices on both sides.”

Useinov also described how readily inhabitants of Crimea took people to be traitors. All the Germans had to do was drive an individual into the forest and then bring him back. People would assume that if he was not shot, then he must have given the Germans some information—whether this was the case or not. Thus, in discussions of the occupation, it seems they were caught between two sides. The Crimean Tatars’ intimate knowledge of the Crimean landscape was both asset and liability. While they had knowledge many others lacked, it was often simply assumed they used it to the Germans’ advantage.

While Ivanov argued that the Crimean Tatars “bet on the wrong horse,” Useinov argues that the charges of treason were misleading because so many individuals were forced to join: “If someone asks you to do something at gun point, it’s not collaboration, not being a traitor,” he said. Consultants also stressed that entire battalions were composed of POWs who avoided death from starvation and disease by joining the German forces. Useinov stresses that one must also consider who, specifically, collaborated.

U: I even know a man who served in the Soviet army, gave himself in [to the Germans], came and shot the [Soviet] people that collectivized [sic] he and his father and then went back to the army, the Russian army, that is. There was fighting in a particular location, he gave himself up to the Germans’ camp, came, shot those people and then some and said, “I had my revenge!” and returned to the Russian army. And he served to the end of the war and no one knew about this. You understand, those things happened.

Useinov’s statement is key to understanding the occupation because while there were obviously strong sentiments, these very sentiments could be divided. His comment illustrates that uniforms could be deceiving, and the untold story of occupation is its equivocal character. His comment also underscores that collectivization dissuaded loyalty to the Soviet regime on the part of all ethnic groups. In the context of war, past collectivization became an incentive to transfer to the German side. It was important to pay attention to the kinds of people most likely to go over to the German side, although it was by no means simple to determine which side a particular individual was on. Asked how individuals knew whom to trust, Useinov replied:

U: . . . Misha would say to me for example, “Oh, I read today that so many vehicles went to Kerç!” You see, what do you think he was telling me for?
Probably because he knew my mother, as the wife of a former partisan, had connections with the underground and I could relay that at such and such a time so many cars went by. At the same time, if I told him something, I could tell him something and not think that he would betray me.

But trickery? There was trickery: for adults it was more complicated. My mother, somehow, apparently, felt something (pause) in her heart, in her soul perhaps, who to trust, who not to trust. 21

Useinov, like Ivanov, tends to go back and forth, at times saying that there was no treason and yet acknowledging that it was “complicated,” and there was “trickery.” He indicates the unspoken subtext of the conversation was as important as that which was explicitly stated. By using “Misha,” a Russian name, Useinov is also suggesting that whatever people make of patriotism and treason today, at the time it was far more subtle than a matter of ethnic distinctions. Useinov’s loyalties were not confined by ethnic lines.

For all the accusations of Crimean Tatars having helped the enemy, there was a great deal of physical and psychological mistreatment of Crimean Tatars by Germans. Useinov told me that just after the Germans took over the peninsula, they took over his house, forcing his family to relocate to the barn. They would say “hello,” but if they needed something, they would take it rather than ask. As a result of his father’s prominence in the partisans, Useinov’s family came under increasing scrutiny. His mother was arrested on two occasions. The second time, he was brought in with her for questioning and his mother was beaten. He remembers this because he saw the black and blue marks up and down her back. The two of them underwent several weeks of “cross-examination” in which they were separated, and each was questioned about the accuracy of the other’s statements. The hope was that one or the other of them would break down and offer useful information about his father’s whereabouts. Useinov said he was not intimidated because he knew his mother would not have said the things that the officer indicated. He withstood the experience of being asked questions at gunpoint with the knowledge that they routinely threatened to shoot as a tactic for getting prisoners to talk.

Useinov and his mother were released and told they needed to check in with the police at regular intervals. He recalled that after being released, they walked down a long, tree-lined avenue with Gestapo headquarters to their backs, knowing with each step that they could be shot at any moment. This would have been consistent with the behavior Useinov observed. He noticed that they often released or revived people only to exterminate them, managing cases so that a captive would be conscious of his or her own death.
Useinov’s firsthand account, on the details of the German occupation, reveals how close and yet how far the Germans were. His father’s involvement in the partisans, together with the Germans’ selection of his village as a strategic outpost, meant that his contact with the Germans was intimate. The Germans lived in his house and greeted him, but were also ready to kill him with the least provocation. The Germans never found his father, but he almost died anyway, of starvation in the Crimean mountains.

An Opposing Face of Public Memory

A counterpoint to consultants’ views is provided by a historian, Vladimir Gurkovich. He feels the Crimean Tatars are indisputably among the untried and unrecognized war criminals of the twentieth century. Gurkovich has gravitated toward the content of Azat Krym, “Red Crimea” that is most incongruent with the Crimean Tatars’ current position. He stresses that according to these sources, the Crimean Tatars enthusiastically served the German army, received preferential treatment, and enjoyed promotion within the ranks (Gurkovich 1995). Of course, Gurkovich is not alone in recalling the Crimean Tatars’ pro-German activities. Some residents of the Crimea were prone to speak in hushed tones when the topic of the war came up. They believed the Crimean Tatars had committed atrocities during the war. This view was also extended by a prominent series of articles in Krymskaya Pravda in the 1970s. The articles, calling the Tatars names and arguing they were guilty of scatological and violent war crimes, have a show-trial flavor that seems aimed at appealing to readers’ emotions. The articles use provocative language, name-calling, and voyeuristic descriptions to appeal to readers’ emotions. For example, one article mentions not that a girl was involved but a beautiful girl. Then, in a passage written in the style of Russian epic tales, a man testifies he saw the defendant, who was laughing, carrying two partisans’ heads by the hair. A third hung from his belt. The whole description is suspiciously reminiscent of the film about Andrei Rublyev described in chapter 1. The articles emphasize the patience and self-control the judges must have exercised in hearing the cases. Consultants believed individuals had been brought back from exile expressly for the purposes of the trial. When questioned about these articles, they speculated that at the time, there was a need to create an enemy that one could point to. The trials and the articles portraying them fulfilled this purpose. While they purport to be covering “court” proceedings, they are strangely devoid of dates and times when the events in question were to have occurred.
In 1995, Gurkovich published an article in *Svobodni Krym*，“Free Crimea” highlighting what can only be described as the most sensational snapshots of pro-German sentiment to be found on the pages of newspapers during the war. For example, a message to Hitler printed in *Azat Krym* states:

> Now there is not and cannot be any force that could divide us from the German people and from You. The Tatar people vowed and gave its word, signing as volunteers in the ranks of the German troops, to battle against the enemy arm-and-arm with your forces to the last drop of blood (…) Your victory is a victory for the whole Islamic world. We pray to God for the health of your troops and ask God to give You, great liberator of peoples, long life. (as cited in Gurkovich 1995: n.p.)

In a sense, this reinforces what Ivanov’s oral account suggested, which is that the Crimean Tatars (mistakenly) saw a benefit coming to the whole Islamic world as a result of their activities on the German side. In Gurkovich’s hands, however, the Crimean Tatars’ hope for liberation from the Soviets appears more sinister. His selection of quotes suggests the Tatars supported the German thrust toward world hegemony and prayed to Allah to give the Germans victory.

Another way in which Gurkovich casts the Crimean Tatars in a sinister light is by pointing out anti-Semitic commentary in the papers. For example, a poem published in 1942 wishes that the Jews would be buried (Gurkovich 1995). Gurkovich’s contribution is to raise important questions about the war. What he unfortunately does not question is his source, in spite of the propagandistic and tendentious nature of newspapers financed by the German regime.

The anti-Semitism in the papers is perplexing because nowhere is the contrast between various aspects of public memory greater than when it comes to the treatment of the Jews. Tatars in the Crimea today exhibit a sympathetic attitude toward the Jews. They claim to have helped them during the war and show a considerable amount of disbelief when confronted with any suggestion to the contrary. When the subject of *Azat Krym* came up at a consultant’s home, he emphasized that the Crimean Tatar elders told the Germans not to shoot the Jews or the Gypsies. He recalled cases in which Crimean Tatars were commanded to execute Jews in the forest and took them to the forest but set them free. He also recalled that some of the Jews who had been protected by Crimean Tatars later testified about their experience. In contrast, *Azat Krym* printed anti-Semitic commentary, which was selected by Gurkovich for citation. It is also worthwhile to note here that as far as the Germans were concerned, the Crimean Tatars were in a category with the Jews, and were not considered the Germans’ equals.
Turning the pages of Azat Krym, we note that plans to acquire lands in Crimea for the resettlement of the Jews are discussed. A committee referred to as “Komzet” was established to facilitate Jewish settlement in the area (Chalbash 1942: 2). The goal was to exile the Tatars in order to resettle the Jewish people and create a republic. The articles they are referring to probably pertain to 1925–1927 when Moscow planned to settle several thousand Jews from Byelorussia in the coastal region, and tens of thousands in the steppe region, according to Schwarz (1951: 271) and Rosenberg (1927). The prospect upset the inhabitants of Crimea and Veli Ibrahimov objected to it.

The proposed Jewish republic, and the rivalry for land that it stimulated, were curiously absent from Tatars’ recollections in the field. In fact, there was a profound degree of empathy for the Jews. Why, as Muslims, did they exhibit such a robust identification with Jews when they might have felt an affinity with the Palestinians? Crimean Tatars saw a parallel between their 1944 exile and the deportation and extermination of Jews during World War II. And while both nations experienced exile, the Jews were successful in establishing a national homeland. Thus their sympathy in the late 1990s had a specific latitude and longitude, oriented more toward their aspirations for a national homeland today than a religiously defined worldview in the past.26

Zivkovic (2000) examines a similar phenomenon in the former Yugoslavia where what he calls a “Jewish trope” was deployed in various narratives. For example, in Serbian narratives, a Jewish trope connected the myth of Kosovo to the Ustasa genocide against Serbs during World War II, providing a convenient way to link episodes of victimization. The Bosnian Muslims, for their part, were compared to Jews when they were subjected to a “Holocaust” perpetrated by Serbs. Zivkovic suggests this trope was one dimension in the competing narratives that played a part in Yugoslavia’s dissolution. But the centrality of the Jewish trope in Yugoslavia was derived in large measure from its salience in Europe and the United States. Novick (1999) takes us a step deeper into this symbolic landscape pointing out that the Freudian explanation, that trauma is prone to reemerge, is not enough to explain the Holocaust’s symbolic significance in American life. He suggests that the importance given the Holocaust today must be attributed to (among other factors) the decline of an “integrationist” ethos in favor of a celebration of differences (Novick 1999: 7). Plus, it is one of the few common denominators in American Jewish life, providing a much-needed symbol to anchor the community. Novick also notes a change in attitude toward victimhood. In the postwar period, American attitudes shifted from seeing victimhood as something to be eschewed to being something that is embraced. A concomitant of this process is that the “voicing” of pain and
outrage is seen as therapeutic and empowering (Novick 1999: 8). This last point has particular value for displaced and refugee populations, who derive a certain symbolic capital from their very victimization. The risk inherent in Zivkovic and Novick’s critiques is trivializing the real suffering of the various groups involved.

**Azat Krym and Golos Kryma Revisited**

Consultants who lived through the occupation avoided putting entire ethnic groups into categories marked with terms like “patriotism” and “treason.” If we revisit *Azat Krym* or *Golos Kryma* and look not for the sensational (as Gurkovich did) but the mundane, the view of the occupation that emerges is more congruent with testimony about events leading up to the war. The basic rights and freedoms that were denied by the Soviets in the period leading up to the war were also celebrated in the pages of the German-financed papers as advantages of the German regime. Consultants’ oral accounts intersect with newspaper reports on themes of religious freedom, language, “liberation,” and material incentives.

The freedom to observe one’s religion was perhaps the most important criteria by which Crimean Tatars judged the occupational regime. Their relief upon being able to renew their religious practices was shared by members of other religions in Crimea. Articles in *Golos Kryma* referred to the “godlessness” of the Bolsheviks and describe the efforts toward renewing Orthodoxy after over twenty years of “Satanly” atheism in Crimea. Crimean Tatars saw freedom of religion as helping to fulfill their desire to revitalize their national culture as a whole. Not only were churches and mechet or mosques reopened, but schools with instruction in all of the national languages were opened as well (Abdurashidov 1942: 1). This was what the Crimean Tatars had wanted from the Soviets all along.

Judging by the large amount of print devoted to the language issue, freedom from linguistic Russification also carried special significance. Articles discuss the Russification of the language, counting and listing the Russian words that had entered it. The problems that stemmed from the script being changed by decree first from Arabic to Latin and then from Latin to Cyrillic are explored, and there are literary pages. The concern with language is also reflected in the changing visual formatting. Articles in Crimean Tatar are printed in Latin, Arabic, and Cyrillic. My translators suspected this was calculated to appeal to successive generations; since the Soviets had made repeated changes, they were comfortable with different scripts.

In the papers, the military *occupation* of Crimea was represented as the *liberation* of Crimea. It becomes apparent that references to the “liberation”
brought by the Germans are possible precisely because of the Soviets’ abuse of the Crimean population. Otherwise, the theme of freedom would not have resonated beyond military slogans to infuse the topics of religion, language, and national rights. The theme of liberation fits within Crimean Tatars’ interpretations of their history as a whole. In a 1942 article, an author named “Zia-efende” points out that from 1783 to 1941, the Crimean Tatars saw little that was good. Because of collectivization and relocations, many Crimean Tatar families perished in Siberia. Using the positive symbolism of the home and hearth, Zia-efende states, “again the fire burned in the extinguished hearths” (Zia 1942: 1). When the Germans came, Crimean Tatars gained an opportunity to fight for freedom lost in 1783 with the Russian annexation of Crimea. This is congruent with Crimean Tatar interpretations of their history today: they see 1783 as the beginning of Russian domination that culminated in the 1944 deportation.

Regarding the specific politics of these freedoms, however, there is a difference in emphasis between consultants’ recollections and the papers.27 Whereas consultants of Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar ethnicity recall a state of mind in which the most important thing was to find a way to live through another day, the papers portray a very politicized freedom. The freedom they are offering is freedom from the Bolsheviks. While research indicates that the Muslim Committees were engaged in national politics, aspirations for national independence were subdued in recollections. The aspirations may be eclipsed by the effort to throw off the charges of treason, or they may have been deselected.

In addition to the cultural and religious benefits that the Germans advertised on the pages of Azat Krym and Golos Kryma, the Germans offered concrete material incentives. One of the official mandates of the Muslim Committee was to ameliorate the hunger that the Bolsheviks had left behind. Articles itemized the kilos of food offered and the benefits to volunteers and their families. For example, in a Golos Kryma article, the German command called the population to battle with the partisans, promising individuals various rewards.28 Throughout, the style of the papers suggests that the articles are not simply reporting events but rather dramatizing them for persuasive effect. While Azat Krym and Golos Kryma must be viewed as political organs of the German regime, it can also be said that they gave the dissatisfied Crimeans a long-awaited, if short-lived, opportunity to vent their frustrations about ideological oppression, the mishandling of the command economy, and the collectivization of agriculture.

Even though the content of the papers contradicts the official, politically correct line of the Crimean Tatar leadership and the national movement today, we should avoid the idea that the newspaper materials necessarily fill a mysterious silence along the lines of the “silences” of the subaltern. Tatars
openly assert that their lives were better under the Germans: this is not a secret and not a silence. While some state they disagreed with what the Germans represented, others store in their memories a German song or poem that has a positive resonance for them. This ambiguity needs to be kept in focus: it characterizes the lived reality of the occupation better than official propaganda or nationalistic accounts from the Crimean Tatar leadership.

Truth or Propaganda? Interpreters Interpret

My interpreters were profoundly uncomfortable with the material in *Azat Krym*. One interpreter said that he was ashamed of his people. Ultimately he denied that what he found reflected Tatar sensibilities. For example, he read a story of a man who came home from work, prayed, and noticed that the first grapes had ripened in his garden. He gathered the neighborhood children and told them he would give the grapes to the Germans. The rationale he offered was that he served time in Soviet camps for many years but now is “free,” thanks to the Germans (Yakub 1942: 4). My interpreter could imagine the man feeling relieved to be out of the Soviet camp but was incredulous the man would take the first grapes to the Germans. According to his view, this was a most “unTatar” way of thinking; the grapes belonged to the children. These kinds of cues led him to reject the papers as a source of “authentic” Tatar views.

The other interpreter choked on the words, saying she could not believe what she was reading. She told me that she kept thinking that she must be reading incorrectly because the content contradicted what her parents told her. Born in exile, she concluded “the Crimea I have come to is a different place in time.” Whereas she returned to Crimea in the midst of patriotic efforts of a pro-Ukrainian nature, the “place” represented in the papers was a discursive space carved out by the Germans. Thus the materials she was asked to interpret collided in a jarring way with postmemories culled from parental narratives. The only way for my first interpreter to disentangle his emotions was to separate the German sensibility from the purportedly Tatar voice. The second interpreter spatialized her recollection, similarly distancing incongruous images.

Popular Representations

Recollections of the occupation period continue to inflect discussions of politics in Crimea today, so much so that it is seemingly the ground upon
which all else has transpired. “Memories” are called up that highlight one facet of occupation at the expense of others. This fuels other controversies. In a discussion in the newspaper Respublika Krym, Gurkovich and a Crimean Tatar journalist, Lilia Budzhurova, are interlocutors (Budzhurova 1992: 4; Gurkovich 1992: 4). The topic is the sovereignty of Crimea and the politics of the Speaker of the Supreme Soviet. Budzhurova feels that the Speaker acts as though he wants to bring back the komendatski regime to which the Crimean Tatars were subjected. She asserts that the Crimean Tatars constitute the only viable political force capable of resisting old Russian-chauvinist and nomenklatura politics and guiding the Republic of Crimea to sovereignty. She writes further that it was inappropriate for the historian to dredge up that Crimean Tatar soldiers stood “shoulder-to-shoulder” with the German soldiers and participated in battles at Kerç and Feodosia in one of his recent articles. It is inappropriate because they were involuntary participants.

The Ukrainian historian agrees that the Crimean Tatars are a respectable political force but makes the point that no evil, whether it has been forgiven or not, should be forgotten because this is tantamount to allowing it an opening to return. Most Crimean Tatars would agree with him up to this point. However, Gurkovich then recapitulates his data on the numerical involvement of Crimean Tatars on each side of the war to create a miserable impression of the Crimean Tatar contribution to the partisans. He argues that only four Crimean Tatars fought with the partisans for the entire duration of the war. He fails to acknowledge that Crimean Tatars were initially barred from joining and neglects to mention their attrition due to hunger and disease. The number of Crimean Tatars who lost their lives as partisans does not seem to interest him. Gurkovich then discusses German collaboration, citing the well-established figure that 20,000 Crimean Tatars joined the German forces (Bugai 1995: 146; Fisher 1978: 155). Gurkovich admits there were historic, economic, and ideological reasons for this, but fails to make the crucial distinction between these individuals, and the Crimean Tatar civilian population. Hence “treason” is something “essential” that flows in the blood and is ascribable to an entire people. Significantly, this discussion is then subsumed in the contemporary debate concerning what to do about the squatters’ residences, which monuments to Russian culture should come down, and where in the city monuments to the Crimean Tatars’ history might be placed. For example, a tank sitting in a central square in Simferopol is reported to have had a Crimean Tatar commander. Despite the tank’s powerful presence downtown, nowhere is the Crimean Tatar’s positive contribution indicated. Clearly, the charges of treason that were brought against the Crimean Tatars continue to affect relations between Tatars and other groups. Many
Russians and Ukrainians now say that they did the right thing to deport the Crimean Tatars who are “by nature” treacherous.

Crimean Tatars now divide the non-Tatar population of the peninsula into two groups: those who lived through the occupation with them, and those who were resettled in Crimea after the Tatars’ removal to take their places. While the relations between the Crimean Tatars and Russian and Ukrainian transplants are typically marked by tension, the Crimean Tatars share rapport with the original inhabitants. This is substantiated by Crimean Tatars who returned to the peninsula surreptitiously while it was still illegal. They describe being greeted warmly and taken in by their old friends and neighbors. The warm relations between groups do not seem to have spread to the postwar generation, who see each other as potential enemies.

Among the kinds of comments heard on the street in 1995–2001 were that the Crimean Tatars had “sold out” Crimea. Some even felt references to treason were becoming increasingly prevalent. This suggests that rather than fading into the past, the events of World War II continue to be relevant. Discussions about who was a traitor and who was a patriot came to serve as a platform for discussing present activities. The Crimean Tatars’ return coincided with economic chaos leading some to make inferences about a causal relationship. The thinking was that since 1989 things have become worse and since 1989 the Crimean Tatars have been returning: therefore the Crimean Tatars caused a decline in the standard of living. The causal link is erroneous, however, because Crimean Tatars did not have the eligibility for benefits or services that would have enabled them to drain collective resources. On the contrary, funds disbursed in Kyiv for integration were used on infrastructure that helped the Slavs of the area as much.

To the extent that Crimeans are living through a phase of economic restructuring in which the outcome is still unknown, I expect the use of “treason” and “patriotism,” “collaborator” and “patriot” to rise and fall with the tides of other dissatisfactions. If this is the case, then the history of World War II and the Nazi occupation are unlikely to fade from consciousness.

Reconstructed memories limit Crimeans’ ability to make a rapprochement. War left a potent residue. It was not just the accusations of treason that were wounding. Factored in were the unforgettable losses of loved ones who gave their lives only to be discounted. With emotional bruises of this nature, the occupation is understandably fresh. A gulf has been created that has the potential to sabotage Crimea’s chances for multiethnic cooperation. If Crimeans continue to think of each other in terms of loyalty and treason, it will foreclose the kind of political relationships that could help to build a healthy, stable, and peaceful region.

Recent events provide interpretive ground for testing this idea. With the support of RUKH (Ukrainian Popular Movement in Support of
Perestroika), two Crimean Tatar leaders won seats in the Ukrainian government. This event was interpreted by non-Crimean Tatars in light of the occupation. The national movement has long taken a pro-Kyiv position, which is expressed in a strong alliance between RUKH, the western Ukrainian political organization, and the Crimean Tatar leadership. The occupation’s continuing relevance is evident in the observation:

Now we understand that the Tatars were traitors, you see. Not long ago we thought that it wasn’t so, now we believe that Stalin was right to exile them. The Tatars were traitors and they just proved it you see, when they joined with RUKH to battle against the Russians. And in RUKH in those days were activists of the Ukrainian movement, who in their day fought along with the troops of the NKVD, but at the same time served the Germans.  

This is a historical interpretation that takes stock of the past politics of RUKH and gauges the Crimean Tatars’ support accordingly. This consultant’s perception of the events going on around him dovetail with the idea that memory is the past mobilized for political purposes (Boyarin 1994: 2) and the point that the past is reused to suit present needs (Steedman 1994). In this sense, the people of Crimea are still sorting out who is on which side.

Conclusion

In the post-Soviet period, there has been a significant reappraisal of the nature and extent of Crimean Tatars’ wartime collaboration. This chapter builds on these analyses, but also asks the deeper question whether it is wise to use terms like “patriotism” or “treason” in this context. Rather than providing a moral compass, discourse on patriotism and treason has fanned ethnic and political flames. The terms fail to illuminate the contentious and shifting terrain on which Crimeans of all ethnicities struggled for survival. By rendering the ambiguity about the occupation within Tatar and Russian recollections more legible, this chapter reintroduces important gray areas to an issue that has often been depicted in black and white.

This chapter may not resolve any of the tensions surrounding Tatar wartime collaboration. It may also commit the errors associated with what Ballinger has called “ethnography of empathy” (2003: 7). She challenges the traditional anthropological approach of providing a “voice,” and asks for a better account of the seductive nature of informants’ discourse. Following critiques by Marcus (1998) and Holmes (1993), she favors an “ethnography of complicity” that recognizes being drawn into informants’ narrative strategies. While this may be an ethnography of complicity, the
fact also remains that collective ascriptions of treason, and collective punishment, without regard for guilt or innocence, is the height of essentialism. It violates norms of human rights and human dignity.

If a moral compass is to be found, it is probably in Crimean residents' recollections, which for the most part celebrate the aid they gave one another, condemn the tyranny of both the Soviet and the German regimes, and eschew categorization based on ethnicity. In particular, Dzhemilev's comment and Asanova's recollections highlight the way in which the residents of the Crimea were caught between two morally corrupt regimes. Further, if we push these recollections up against the reporting in Azat Krym and Golos Kryma, concerns about linguistic Russification, religious freedom, and material well-being are reconfirmed. However, there are also troubling differences. While Crimean Tatars today recall helping the Jews of Crimea, the papers lack evidence of this, echoing enmity instead.

Today, Slavs use the Crimean Tatars’ treacherous “nature” to deny coevalness and slow the process of reintegration. Faced with opposition to their presence, the Crimean Tatars have endeavored to create a counter-history that would legitimize repatriation. Memories of occupation are therefore built into the choreography of change in post-Soviet Crimea, and, in many ways, condition the possibilities for peace. Reconfiguring the questions we ask may lead to new answers, and less competition in this troubled region of Ukraine. At the very least, we can use terms like patriotism and treason with greater sensitivity.
Chapter 3

Exile: Recalling the 1944 Deportation

There is no greater sorrow on earth than the loss of one’s native land.
—Euripides, 431 B.C.

Just Before Dawn

Just before dawn on May 18, 1944, the Tatars living in Crimea were gathered and deported en masse to Soviet Central Asia and the Ural Mountains. While planned, the deportation had been kept so secret that even the NKVD soldiers commanded to carry out Stalin’s order did not know about it until the very last minute. In this chapter, the Crimean Tatars’ narratives of deportation are explored according to the common elements, from the knock on the door when soldiers came to get them, to the first impressions of exile. The personal testimony has been arranged in chronological order following the process of deportation itself, although consultants skipped back and forward in retelling. The strategy involves presenting not one person’s complete story but components of several. This is not to gloss over individual differences, but to capture one of the most significant qualities of the narratives: even though the population was scattered across the Ural Mountains and Central Asia, the stories of deportation retain certain key elements across republics and generations. In light of the materials the Soviets produced to contradict the Tatar story, this is significant.

As such, narratives of deportation constitute a genre or conventionalized yet highly flexible frame of reference (Bauman and Briggs 1990). In employing this genre across generations and republics, Crimean Tatars
protected a set of values and beliefs, although, as Finnegan has pointed out, new genres are continually arising as old ones are revised and reinterpreted (1992: 141). Part of the importance of deportation stories as a genre lies in repetition. They connect individuals with the social in the context of diaspora.

First and foremost, the stories about deportation are testimonies that bear witness to Crimean Tatars’ experience of deportation. In being passed down, the testimony has incorporated metaphor and allegory to make its point, telling about social truths in a symbolic way. Time and again people said that they were deported “naked.” They were not literally naked but stripped of their culture and humanity at the moment of exile. This experiential truth is wrapped in a form that uses phrases such as golod i kholod, “cold and hungry,” which rhyme in Russian, to describe the experience of exile. Similarly, the repetition of odni stariki, zhenshini, i deti, “only the elderly, women, and children” points beyond the statistical reality to make a point about the moral reality, namely, the complete immorality of deportation. When Crimean Tatars say “the elderly, women, and children,” they mean the innocent.1 Rather than sort out who was guilty and bring these persons to trial, the Soviet regime simply punished the entire people. The phrase becomes a narrative trope for the issue of guilt and innocence. Thus seemingly simple phrases encoded an entire cultural belief system that was grounded in a moral frame of reference. The genre depicting deportation drew on a standardized lexicon that enabled consultants to weave their own personal experience into cultural representations.

Discursive Possibilities

When pushed up against official documents, oral narratives provide a powerful counterpoint. According to the NKVD, 191 died during the deportation (Zemskov 1995: 73).2 This figure is almost certainly an undercount because while the NKVD reported deporting 183,155, only 176,746 arrived in the special settlements. This means that even according to NKVD, at least 6,409 Crimean Tatars or 3.5 percent must have perished en route (Bugai 1992: 144, 1995: 155). NKVD documents discussing rapid attrition early in exile suggest that as a direct result of the deportation, there was a 25 or perhaps 30 percent drop in population (Zemskov 1995: 73). Still, these figures are low compared to Crimean Tatar estimates. Indigenous historians estimate that during the deportation, about 7 or 8 percent of their population perished. But this must be added to the
deaths in the first few years of exile that reached not 25 but 46.2 percent of the population.³

It is unremarkable that oral accounts would dispute official statistics. What warrants attention is the way in which a unified interpretation developed among Tatars scattered across Siberia and Central Asia. Whether consultants were interviewed in Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or the United States, they stated that 46 percent or “half” of the Crimean Tatar population perished in the first years of exile. The figure of 46 percent came up in the narratives of individuals whether they were intellectuals or illiterate; 11 or 100 years of age. This underscores something of the contagiousness of social narratives. According to the leader of the Crimean Tatar National Movement, this figure came from an unofficial census that the Crimean Tatars carried out systematically in exile. This is a key building block in the argument that collective processes of interpreting the past have a significant role to play: the Crimean Tatars’ representation of deportation was developed, preserved, and circulated in spite of the fact that it lacks documentary support and the Soviet authorities took measures to suppress it.

This is important because creating and sustaining a story or myth about home is one of the few ways of reestablishing continuity for exiled, diasporic, and displaced persons. In this respect, the Tatar experience is consistent with other displaced groups who pass on powerful and lasting images that evoke a familiar past and perpetuate the memory of common loss (Zetter 1999: 4). Just as myth originates and functions to satisfy the psychological need for contact with the unconscious, these stories seem to maintain a connection with the past. Carl Jung suggested that telling myths is a process in which a connection between the conscious and unconscious is reestablished, allowing people to experience it.⁴ Thus myths do more than provide information about the unconscious—they provide an entrance to it (Jung 1968: 76). Similarly, the narrative testimony about deportation presented in this chapter reestablished a connection between the past and present in the context of its retelling. The stories offered the people who survived the events an opportunity to enter a world of memory and reexperience the past. They also presented the second and third generations with raw material for developing postmemories. Narratives of deportation therefore do more than tell stories about the past: they offer a source of connection and an opportunity to grieve. As Hirsch put it, memory is not just an act of recall, but an act of mourning (Hirsch 1997).

We can take this one step farther with Humphrey’s argument that myth-making is not divorced from, but an integral part of sociopolitical activity.⁵ Building on Barthes (1957) she uses myth in the sense of decontextualized or objectified images that transform history (2002: 22). Certain mythic images, like insults, graffiti, or racist posters suppress narrativity or
contribute to its closure (2002: 33). The dispossessed, however, “have another strategy, which is to draw out the prosaic narrative aspect of their accounts, thus building up a cumulative picture of who they are, in the hope that they will be recognized and that this will influence their fate” (2002: 33).6

A Composite Image

While listening to Crimean Tatars tell of their experience, I had the sense that the experience was in the past and yet not really past. It seemed to be the point from which discussions on many topics began and the point to which they returned. Many people wept as they told their stories, still fresh after 50 years. On more than one occasion, consultants made statements to the effect that, “It’s a wound that will never heal” and “I see it now as if it were today.” Telling about deportation was also difficult because it resisted completion. Consultants expressed frustration that there seemed to be no way to tell the whole story. They had the sense that to understand it, you would have to witness it. This is a complex epistemological issue because on the one hand, there is no denying that the experience of deportation entails a certain kind of knowing that is irreducible. On the other hand, something is successfully being conveyed because children know their parents’ stories well and feel passionately about them.

While each person’s story was unique in some way, it soon became clear that there were certain basic components regardless of age (the oldest interviewee was 100 and the youngest 11 years old) and location (stories were collected in Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). After my initial absorption in the complexity of each person’s story, patterns became clear. The testimony about deportation has been schematized by survivors and their offspring:

– being roused from sleep by an early morning knock at the door
– being given fifteen minutes to prepare
– being led off at gunpoint in the clothes one was wearing, “naked and barefoot”
– being among the elderly, women, and children
– not knowing where they were going, why, or for how long
– the sheep, cows, and goats who had been left behind unmilked and unfed “crying” as the people were being deported
– riding on cattle trains and becoming infested with lice
– hunger and thirst: it was virtually impossible to prepare food along the way, limited rations caused illness
– birth and death: people died and women gave birth in the crowded cars along the way
– not being allowed to bury their dead, who were tossed out to be eaten by wolves and vultures
– being met with suspicion by people who had been told that cyclops, cannibals, and people with horns were coming
– being left to fend for themselves in places of exile and many dying of malaria, typhoid, dysentery, and starvation
– discovering they had things in common with the local people: in Uzbekistan “our religion is one”
– local people sharing what they could
– living as if on reservations, forbidden from leaving a five-kilometer radius with the penalty of 25 years of hard labor if they disobeyed.

In selecting from and arranging these components, Crimean Tatars developed a genre of deportation stories that conveyed the shock and despair involved in their dislocation. The patterned nature of their testimonials suggested that the ability to recall was enhanced by the social milieu: individuals built a social milieu in the process of recalling, and milieu, in turn, guided the memories that were produced (Tonkin 1992: 105).

Postmemory

When the second and third generations took the initiative to correct and intervene in parental narratives, the social nature of memory was clear. A woman (born 1922) living outside Tashkent, Uzbekistan told me about her deportation experience, but her son, who had been reading in another part of the room, wasn’t satisfied and came to the table. He proceeded to fill in the parts he thought she left out, prefacing his intervention by saying:

Son: Excuse me, Greta, but I am going to ask a question. I am not afraid of anything. I’ve been through it all. A question about how the Russian soldiers came to get you, how your dog ran after you, how they loaded you into train cars and how you traveled in the train cars, how you died there.

Mother: I told about everything.7

Gulnara’s son then admonished me to write “the truth,” even as his intervention had called it into question. The topic of deportation usually called up expressions of support and sympathy among family members, but in
this family it exacerbated tensions. My consultant’s daughter was distraught at her brother’s interjection. Recollecting was thus embedded in the affective nexus of familial relations and sometimes strained the established hierarchies. Young Tatars’ intervention into their parents’ memories is part of the dialectical process of cultural production. How they draw out certain elements for repetition and rehearsal has done a great deal to canonize certain deportation memories. Across Ukraine and Uzbekistan, narratives about deportation displayed a rough pattern and deployed a fairly regular set of symbolic referents, even as they varied from one individual to the next.

Narrating deportation created a site for the formation of what Hirsch and others have called postmemories. Postmemory is distinguished from memory by generational distance and from history by personal connection: “Postmemory is a powerful and very particular form of memory precisely because its connection to its object or source is mediated not through recollection but through an imaginative investment and creation” (Hirsch 1997: 22). Postmemory encroaches on people who have been surrounded by parental narratives. They are shaped by traumatic events that defy simple acceptance. Thus recalling deportation provided a site for memory, what Pierre Nora so memorably called lieux de mémoire.

The Politics of Memory and History

The significance of oral testimonies is clear if we consider the “blank page” that they fill in Soviet history. Crimean Tatar descriptions of deportation were, until recently, almost nonexistent. The most notable exception is accounts by dissidents and émigrés in Allworth’s Tatars of the Crimea (1988, 1998). There have been scholarly and journalistic accounts of the Crimean Tatar problem outside the USSR, but the topic has not received nearly the depth or breadth of attention it deserves. Minority Rights Group of London and Amnesty International worked intensively on behalf of those who had been imprisoned. However, the Tatar issue failed to get the recognition that the plight of the Palestinians has, for example. Inside the USSR, official Soviet history effaced evidence of the Tatar past between 1944 and 1989. Crimean Tatars themselves did not, until very recently, write their past, even in the form of diaries or personal memoirs. The sheer challenge of physical survival in exile made attempts to create a written record next to impossible. There was also the fact that many of those who were
deported were not literate, their education having been interrupted by World War II. Crimean Tatars added that at the time, it was not characteristic for them to engage in this kind of self-reflexivity. Creating a memoir would entail risking and possibly losing one’s life.9

The extent to which Soviet authorities monopolized history and attempted to control memory has been amply demonstrated (Esbenshade 1995; Grant 1995; Wanner 1998; Watson 1994). If one searches Soviet publications for information about deportation, one finds not silence per se, but strange gaps. For example, except for the decree about Crimean Tatars published in Izvestiia in June 1946, the topic is virtually ignored in the ten-year period following the event (Conquest 1970: 55). The Confederation of Repressed Peoples of the Russian Federation observes, “In the conditions of the totalitarian regime, researching it [deportation] was impossible for many years” (Aliev 1993: 30).10 Only in the late 1980s did research become possible as an outgrowth of the fundamental shifts provided by glasnost and perestroika. Then, in the early 1990s, historians Bugai (1992, 1995, 1996) and Zemskov (1995) produced major articles empirically documenting the deportation of nationalities on the basis of archival research.

Negative Evidence

Of course, the absence of published material in itself is not evidence of anything. But one does discover a kind of “negative evidence” when examining sources that should deal with the topic but do not. Scanning major newspapers in Central Asia such as Pravda Vostoka not for some mention of deportation, which was out of the question, but for some trace of the people who arrived on such a massive scale yielded no information. There was virtually no mention of the 1.4 million people (Bitig 1997: 14) who arrived in Central Asia and Siberia between 1941 and 1944.11

Another example of this kind of “negative evidence” is the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. Prior to World War II, there was a sizable entry for the Crimean Tatar ASSR in the first edition of Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, volume 35 (Schmidt 1937). There is a remarkably detailed portrayal that includes diagrams of the Crimean Khan’s palace. But by volume 13 of the third edition (Prokhorov 1973) the Crimean Tatars are treated far more sketchily. Whereas the Crimean ASSR initially has 44 pages devoted to it, by the third edition there is just over one page on the “Crimean Oblast,” a territorial entity of much less importance, covering the period from 1944 to 1954. In the second edition, there are three brief mentions of Crimean Tatars that pertain to the period before World
War II. Stubborn resistance to Soviet power, Tatar nationalists’ capture and shooting of Bolsheviks, and Tatars’ assistance to the cruel Germans are described. The second edition (published from 1953 to 1955) contains no mention of the massive project of relocating the entire ethnic group. In the third edition, the population of Crimea is characterized as 65 percent Russian, 26 percent Ukrainian, and 2 percent Byelorussian (1973: 514–516). In this entry, there is nothing about the previously existing autonomous republic, its Crimean Tatar inhabitants, or those who returned following the 1967 decree. The only clue about the genocidal practices appears under the “Crimean Tatar language,” heading, where we learn that this is the language of the Crimean Tatars, currently residing primarily in the Uzbek SSR.

More “negative evidence” is provided by the Soviet census, which omits Crimean Tatars following World War II. Many ethnic groups were systematically omitted and Crimean Tatars ask, ironically, where all those people could have gone. More than one Crimean Tatar has related the frustration of being exiled, excluded from higher education, and barred from certain types of employment for being a Crimean Tatar and yet being told that such a nationality does not exist. Other consultants related that when they explicitly asked for a change from “Tatar” to “Crimean Tatar” in their passports, they were informed that there is no such nationality. One woman further regretted that the deportation of millions of people was not touched upon in the school curriculum concerning World War II, adding that in her atlas, “There are all kinds of small African tribes, but no Crimean Tatars! People used to say there is no such nationality as that!”

These issues are as acute today. During the first independent Ukrainian census in December 2001, Crimean Tatar fears of being officially erased rematerialized. Rumors of poorly trained census takers insisting on writing “Tatar” instead of “Crimea Tatar” multiplied across the peninsula and led to a general mood of panic. The panic was exacerbated by the practice of taking down the information in “practice notebooks,” to be recopied at the headquarters when the person being counted was not present. Census takers’ fastidiousness backfired, arousing suspicions about “cooking the books” and casting doubt over the state’s intentions to count them accurately.

Blank Pages

In discussing the genocidal policies of the Soviet state, Robert Conquest wrote that from Soviet official information and the “blank” areas to be found in it, a basic picture could be constructed about what happened to these peoples. “But important points were missing. Not only were the
destinations of the exiles not referred to, but there was little way of telling how the operations were carried out, both as a matter of police technique and from the point of view of the actual human suffering involved” (Conquest 1970: 95). The narratives related by Crimean Tatars presented in this chapter, along with newly released, formerly secret documents, address precisely these gaps in our knowledge. Many narratives began with the victory of Soviet troops.

Victory of Soviet Troops

The Tatars were deported just 13 days after the Soviet Union freed Crimea of German forces. Many consultants described how their spirits rose when they learned Soviet troops liberated Crimea from the German occupation. One woman expressed it in highly symbolic terms that suggest a belief in the supernatural:

One time, my little sister Eva went out to gather flowers to give to the military doctor with Maria. That’s what the woman living with the General was named. In the morning they got up and it was like in a fairy tale. We looked and the red flowers had grown this much (motioning) in one night! But the blue ones hadn’t changed at all. . . . “Oy! We’ll win, we’ll win, we’ll win!” they cried (laughter).14

The color red is an important symbolic element because it represents beauty and power in Soviet culture, and the Bolshevik regime. This woman’s initial euphoria about victory was destroyed in the terrible events that followed.

Rumors

While the deportation was kept secret, a few consultants with family members or close friends in the military received hints. The same woman who narrated the story above described how she and her sister were subsequently invited to celebrate with Maria, the general, and their friends. After they had been drinking, Dusia exclaimed:

“All of you will be deported from here.” And then she started to cry. “What is this family guilty of? Look at them, these are people, real people, golden . . . What are they guilty of?”15
The Russian woman asked her to come with them, suggesting my consultant could get work as a nurse. But she was then quieted by the others, who didn’t let her speak further. My consultant realized Dusia felt sorry for her, but didn’t examine the statement closely, believing it came from intoxication.

Another consultant related this foreshadowing.

When deportation was about to start, rumors spread. Grandmother told me that one time when she went out to plant garlic in the garden, a neighbor came and said, “All the same you aren’t going to taste that garlic!” She (grandmother) said, “Why not?” She replied, “You’ll find out!”

Crimean Tatars were unable to “taste the garlic” they planted, and they didn’t reap the fruits of any of their labor that year. In fact, what resources were left following collectivization and war were completely taken away. The grape vines that had been meticulously cultivated for generations receive special emphasis in many stories. The culture of grape vines was seen as integral to Crimean Tatar culture. Tatars are not alone in observing that the Russians and Ukrainians who were “transplanted” to Crimea did not know how deep to plant the roots, the intervals for trimming, or the art of irrigation. Hence, there was a drastic decline in agricultural production that threatened the Crimean economy for years to come. Reflecting on the widespread tendency to think about nations and identities in terms of roots, trees, and other arborescent metaphors, Malkki (1997: 54) points out that this kind of naturalization predisposes analysts to think of the displaced as pathological, and may also generate complications for those seeking to root themselves in a particular place.

A Knock on the Door

When soldiers knocked on the door in the early morning of May 18, many went into shock at the prospect of being taken from their homes. Considering the atrocities on the part of both the Soviet and the German military witnessed during occupation, many thought they were being taken to be shot. A man who was a young boy at the time of deportation recalled:

... soldiers came and said, “Let’s go! Get in the vehicles.” You couldn’t take anything with you. Well, only what you could take in your hands. And my father said, “I don’t need anything, shoot me here.” He had fought for this
country. But they said, “It’s alright, it’s alright, you’ll soon return.” He said, “Let me stay here, better at home. I’m not going anywhere.” The soldiers persuaded (him) saying “You’ll return later, right now you have to leave.” Well, all right, he had a small suitcase with his tools, a traveling case, and the soldier threw that case into the car and some other things, nothing else.17

Another consultant related:

My mother became flustered and said she didn’t know what to do. My mother really loved to collect photos and postcards. In her confusion, she was 15 or 16 at the time, she grabbed the album and started cutting the photographs out of it, you understand. You see, that is the kind of shock a person went through. Then she said, “Why didn’t I take the album? Why didn’t I stick it in the suitcase and bring it?”18

One woman told how she begged to be allowed to go back to her house upon seeing that others had been able to bring possessions. It was unclear how she managed to persuade the security forces to let her go back, but when she got back to her house, she found it was being looted.

We see there are two Russian women filling sacks. We look and nothing was left at home. Where those two women came from I do not know. It was so . . . It became . . . there was some grain left, some beans were left in a sack. We took those, nothing else . . . And a cup, a crystal cup. I took my crystal cup (chuckles). Nothing else was left. Where were they from? Those Russians weren’t from our village.19

Crimean Tatars report being told point blank to get ready in 15 minutes. They recall leaving with no more than the shirts, or in some cases the pajamas, on their backs. The memoirs of an NKVD officer who took part in deporting the Tatars support the Crimean Tatar side, stating that they were given 20 minutes. He adds that while the Tatars were supposed to be given two hours, a competition was announced to see who could complete the work first: “people became flustered, grabbed unnecessary things and we pushed them with our rifles toward the exit” (Vesnin 1990). The State Defense Committee, however, portrays a very different picture in order or postanovlenie GOKO No. 5859 ss. In point 2a, the State Committee of Defense states: “allow the special settler to take with them personal belongings, clothing, domestic items, dishes, and food in the amount of up to 500 kilograms per person.”20 There are also instructions that livestock and property of the deported be accounted for to facilitate future compensation in the form of loans and supplies in the places of exile. None of my
consultants mentioned such a process except for one consultant who remembered sitting at a little table under a tree before being loaded onto the trains and listening to her parents being asked about household property. According to conservative estimates, the Crimean Tatars were divested of 80,000 houses, 34,000 gardens, 500,000 heads of livestock, 360 apiaries, and 40,000 tons of agricultural produce (Aliev 1993: 42).

Crimean Tatars now exhibit symptoms similar to posttraumatic shock syndrome with regard to the knock on the door. This is a trauma that has been passed down to subsequent generations. A woman who was born in 1973 said, “We have a propiska (obligatory residence permit) but you sit and think, what if they come with semi-automatics and say, ‘Let’s go, you have 15 minutes!’” Mentally “replaying” the knock at the door is a common occurrence among Tatars of all ages. They felt that if they were to evict them now, even those who are legally registered would have to go. Many Tatars know rationally that the likelihood of another deportation is remote. Nevertheless, they often ruminate on what it would be like if such an event were to occur. The 1944 knock on the door has come to animate postmemories in such a way that the moment is mentally rehearsed today.

Loading

The Crimean Tatars were taken by car or truck to central gathering points such as the train stations at Bahçesaray, Simferopol, and Sirin. After a short time of waiting, they were loaded onto trains bound for the Urals and Central Asia. Many families were divided. This was intentional in the eyes of Tatars, a means of ethnic cleansing or genocide by separating children from their parents. The goal is to kill by any means possible: if not by physical annihilation, then from “toska,” or melancholy/loneliness. This is a point developed in a visual way by Crimean Tatar artist Rustem Eminov. His painting of a woman who has lost her child tries to convey the unspeakable despair experienced in families that were separated.

The use of genocide with regard to the Tatars is controversial because “genocide” has erroneously been interpreted as the complete extermination of a group. Since Lemkin first coined the term in 1944, however, the core of the concept is the intention to destroy (Lemkin 1944: 79). It is now legally used to mean deliberately imposing conditions calculated to bring about the partial or complete destruction of a group. The term gained wider currency following the 1946 resolution by the UN General Assembly declaring it a crime under international law. The UN Convention approved
in 1948 began a tradition of defining it broadly. Causing serious bodily or mental harm; deliberately inflicting conditions calculated to bring about life’s destruction; imposing measures intended to prevent births; and forcibly transferring children of the group to another are all included (United Nations Yearbook 1948–1949: 959). In sum, genocide is the direct or indirect attempt to intercept the biological and social reproduction of a group.

The Crimean Tatar experience is within the scope of the UN definition. But authorities in the Supreme Soviet of Crimea refer to a definition that limits genocide to complete extermination. The former speaker of the Crimean Supreme Soviet, Sergei Tsekov, was incensed that Crimean Tatars speak of “genocide” when more people have returned than were deported! From his perspective, 185,000 were deported and 250,000 returned. He argues that if the Soviet Union had wanted to annihilate the Crimean Tatars they could have. He takes the fact that they did not succeed as proof there was no such intention. Further, he does not agree with the use of “deportation” to describe what happened. Deportation should be reserved for when a group of people is forcibly moved from one state to another. He frames the act as an “internal relocation” because it took place within the boundaries of one state.

The semantic dispute reflects a deeper conflict about how best to characterize the Crimean Tatar experience. Tsekov’s technical distinction is part of his effort to deny the damage and destruction that occurred. Crimean Tatars counter with the observation that if it were not for the intervention of the Russian regime, the Crimea would have been an independent state. They point to the independent Khanate preceding annexation and the Crimean ASSR as evidence that their transport to Central Asia involved a much more fundamental violation of rights than the term “forced relocation” would suggest. The term Crimean Tatars use most widely is vysylka/vyselenie, meaning eviction or expulsion, although there is also izgnanie, which means to be driven out, banished or expelled. These are not solely matters of semantic distinction because, as the former speaker of the Supreme Soviet pointed out, the term “deportation” logically implies a need for assisted repatriation—something that would cut into scarce financial resources. Tsekov asserts that the intention of the Soviet state was assimilation, a more benign outcome. However, if Tsekov were correct, the local populations in the places of exile would not have been warned to stay away from the “cannibals” and “cyclops” that would be arriving.

The social technology in which children were separated from their mothers, and husbands were removed from the company of their wives may not have eliminated the group, but drastically reduced its numbers.
My mother, aunt, and sister were loaded into a truck. It was filled with people. It was so full of people, there was no room left for us. We started to cry and they said, “That’s enough! You’re going to the same place, don’t cry, you’ll meet there.” It was terrible what was happening, in Bahçesaray, they collected everyone there from all of Crimea, well not all over Crimea but the entire Bahçesaray region. The echelons filled, people cried.23

This consultant did, eventually, find her mother. However, many would never see their loved ones again.

The Train Journey

By all accounts, the train journey was a time out of time, liminal in the extreme. Stripped of one’s home, personal belongings, and in some cases family, Crimean Tatars were suddenly and without warning removed from the social roles and positions they formerly occupied. Malkki uses this term to point out the “structural invisibility” of refugees and displaced persons, who are no longer classified and not-yet-classified (1995: 7). The term “liminality” is borrowed from Arnold van Gennep’s formulation of transition rites, which accompany changes of social position (1960). These transitions are marked by phases of separation, margin or “limin,” and reintegration. During the liminal period, the state of an individual is ambiguous: he or she is separated from prior systems of classification and passes through a time or a space in which the attributes of his or her past and future life are notably missing. On the trains, the activities of daily life were completely suspended. There was a dramatic leveling of social status. Rich and poor, educated and illiterate, partisans and collaborators, were loaded onto the trains together. While some of the more wealthy Crimean Tatars managed to bring gold jewelry and finely crafted belt buckles or coins, more often than not these assets were rapidly traded for a hunk of bread along the way. Wounded veterans with medals who had been demobilized from the front were loaded into trains with people who had assisted the Germans. To their mutual embarrassment, men were loaded with women, making personal hygiene even more difficult. Several consultants related that a girl’s intestines exploded because she was too ashamed to relieve herself in the train.

In liminal states, an important component is an emphasis on “nature” at the expense of “culture.” As Turner put it, “man becomes the equal or fellow of non-human beings” (Turner 1974: 253). This resonates with the
prevalence of animals as a theme in narratives of deportation, ranging from
the prior occupants of the train cars they were deported in and their initial
dwellings in exile, to the way in which animals mourned their departure.
And like animals, they were rapidly infested with and tortured by lice.
“Theranthropic” figures, combining animal and human characteristics,
are numerous in liminal situations and more than one Crimean Tatar has
described being checked for horns in his or her skull by local residents upon
arrival.24 Throughout, dehumanization and demonization seem to have
characterized the experience.

The journey to exile was also a liminal experience in the sense that
deportees perceived it as time out of time. They traveled for several weeks,
but the element of not knowing where they were going or for how long,
coupled with the intense discomfort of the trains themselves, made the
journey seem interminable.

They put us in cars and brought us to Simferopol, Akmescit, it was called at
the time, to the station. They took us from there in freight trains; livestock
had been transported in them. They loaded us on and we are going and
going, there is no end in sight (kontsa i kraia netu). Going, going, going.
Then we stop somewhere, people get out. Some would fry corn or make
something, and again we would look and the train would start to move.
Those who were younger would climb back on, but others weren’t able so
they would stay on the road and part with their family. Many people were
lost like that, on the road.

The NKVD wasn’t watching? I asked.

No, the NKVD was no longer there, maybe they were there somewhere, but
not in each train car.

Who was there to check?

They didn’t check us. But when we had arrived they immediately took stock
of us. They fed us like pigs. When we arrived there was dirt, there was dust,
and it was hot. Take a step and your feet bake. Our skin became all cracked
from that heat. Everything was baked. If you placed an egg [on the ground]
you would get a fried egg, just like that, yes . . . . It was incomparable with
anything, it was so bad. (. . . ) Many people died along the way. They would
be taken and thrown out of the wagon and we would go on.25

Death and birth are ever-present concerns in the narratives of deportees
and their offspring, who observe that both took place in the crowded train
cars. Many had an experience of hovering between death and life. This gives narratives about deportation a strangely mythic quality. One consultant related the following near-death experience.

You know, it is very difficult to remember (long pause). When they came to get us, mother was preparing food. She had a cup with clarified butter in her hand. And in all the confusion she gathered us together and they took us away. She brought that cup of clarified butter with her and somehow I got a hold of it in the wagon and drank it completely. And apparently, I got diarrhea or something like that. What am I telling this for? They threw me out of the wagon, so that I would die. Mother threw herself out after me, of course.

But who threw you out?

You know, when the train cars stopped there was this brigade of escorts who came in and all the dead [were removed]. They tell me that I was only skin and bones and my eyes didn't move anymore. Mother threw herself after me and you could say this was at gunpoint, in order to get me back. Well, just then people from the train car raised a big protest. To make a long story short, she got me back. Some grandmother prayed and gave me water to drink over the Qur’an. You see my older sister, who was there just then, told me, “Just as little droplets of water started to fall into your mouth, after a few moments a living expression appeared in your eyes and the pupils,” she said, “started to move like this.” And you see I am sitting before you now.26

Recalling how the dead were tossed out of the trains was one of the most painful aspects of the train journey to recount. Even though the NKVD records assert only 191 died en route, death looms large in Crimean Tatar accounts. Corpses figure in almost every narrative because of the lack of opportunity to adequately mourn. Psychoanalysts observe that being deprived of the “dubious luxury” of mourning leads to problems later in life (Bergmann and Jucovy 1982). Like other survivors, Crimean Tatars unable to fully mourn losses reported anxiety, depression, somatic complaints, and expected further persecution rather than anticipating “decathexis.”

The accounts of suffering, illness, and death on the trains clash with Stalin’s stated plans to dispatch medical personnel. Bugai and Zemskov document these plans, which give an impression that there was a considerable effort to provide attendants to meet the needs of deportees. A gap between words and deeds is typical of genocidal systems such as the Soviet one, in which not tens of thousands, but at least ten million were exterminated (Nove 1993: 29–33).27

The official account is embraced by Russians who suggest that the Tatars were justly “relocated” and the operation was carried out in a “humane”
The testimony of Crimean Tatars, however, presents a counter-narrative that has begun to overwhelm Slavic voices. As Edensor has noted, the ability to shape meaning comes from the production of enduring forms of representation (Edensor 1998: 17). While the narratives have evolved over the last 50 years, they have also endured. This means we can consider the construction of meaning as a process in which the once forbidden is now the sanctioned, and the formerly sanctioned meanings, like so many busts of Lenin, are prone to being toppled.

In addition to conveying a liminal space, the stories fuse the material with the symbolic. One woman brought out an ornate yet deeply scarred and battered silver spoon and handed it to me, explaining that “this is what is left of my family.” They were separated during the deportation and never found one another. Multiple losses appeared in narrative testimony condensed into objects that were hard to forget. One interviewee who lost her father during deportation told how she cannot remember his face. But he once gave her a beautiful doll with a white China face and black hair. Clumsily, she dropped the doll, which fractured into several pieces. Her father reassured her he would bring another, and it is the image of the doll (not the face of her father) that she can recall. The memory and loss of her father are displaced.

Another consultant related a story about a tray. On a visit to Crimea, his identity as a Tatar was initially not accepted by the locals. Then, while eating in a small cafeteria, he noticed a copper tray that looked like one that had belonged to his family. Only when he commented on it did those around him in the cafeteria suddenly realize he had probably recognized a tray that had been confiscated at the time of deportation. The tray was used (in life and in the story) as evidence of loss and proof of identity. Another consultant recounted how she returned to Crimea to the spot where her house had stood. She was so overcome that it was as if clouds passed in front of her eyes and she was temporarily blinded. What kept coming to mind was an image of a doll she had hastily buried there before deportation, so that it would be safe from the Soviet soldiers. Thus objects played an important role in testimony as sites for remembering, and they seemed to hold meanings that were otherwise too much to bear.

The End of the Train Journey: Arrival

The Crimean Tatar arrival in the Urals and Central Asia was marked by hostility. Residents in both places had been subjected to propaganda about the Tatars that led to fear and suspicion. The violence was probably more pronounced in Central Asia, where deportees recalled having stones thrown
at them, than in the Urals, where there was a large population of peoples who had also been deported.

My mother told me a lot about how they lived in Marilsk. She told me of a moment in the village in what is now called the Marilski ASSR. They arrived and the local population, living in the forest, was quite naïve. They had let out these rumors that these terrible people were coming. They had a horn coming out of their forehead, they had knives, and they kill (consultant breaks out in laughter). You see they let out the rumor that they are bringing some half-wild people to settle with them. Many people even ran away from us.29

Consultants reported open aggression upon arrival in Uzbekistan including being stoned. The name “traitors who sold the motherland” (izmeniki rodiny) followed them into exile.30

Adding to the hardship was that the resettlement assistance called for in Stalin’s orders never materialized.

### First Days in Exile

For the special settlers, the first days in exile were a continuation of the liminal experience of time out of time:

Here in Uzbekistan we lived where animals had lived. They chased us in there. We made repairs, we lived like that, and little by little built a house. I built this house with my own hands in 1951.31

Many people spoke of their life in exile as a process in which things very gradually got better. Arriving in Siberia or Uzbekistan was not the final stop: most had to travel farther to labor camps or collective farms. What was supposed to happen according to Stalin’s telegrams when the “special settlers” arrived, and what actually transpired are completely different. Crimean Tatars reported several types of minimal shelter. Often, they were given barracks and left to curtain off a portion for their family. Others were sent to occupy a corner in someone else’s house, or, less frequently, given tools with which to build a shelter of their own. Food supplies were inadequate. Tatars relied on the generosity of the local population and gardening skills.

These accounts fly in the face of Stalin’s orders. For example, State Commission of Defense Order 5859, states:

3d. Provide the arriving special settlers with garden plots and assist in the construction of homes with local building materials; ( . . . )
4. Obligate the Selkhozbank (t. Kravtsova) to distribute to the special settlers sent to the Uzbek SSSR in the places of their resettlement loans for the construction of houses and domestic acquisition 5,000 rubles per family with installments up to seven years.

5. Obligate Harkomzag SSSR (t. Subotina) to issue special settlers under the direction of SNK of the Uzbek SSR flour, grain and vegetables for distribution to the special settlers over the course of June–August every month in equal amount in agreement with attachment No. 2.

The distribution of flour grain and vegetables is to be conducted free of charge, in exchange for the livestock and agricultural produce received from them in the places of deportation.

President of the State Committee of Defense I. V. Stalin.

Very little, if any, of the help outlined here ever materialized. If deportation was a casting out of Eden, what followed in the first years of exile was an extended descent into hell. The following narrative recounts the struggle to survive.

Then around fifty percent of our people died. There were families in which everyone perished down to the last. My aunts were also sick and their children couldn’t even get up. Forty or fifty families lived in each of the barracks. My mother told me when you go out there, bring your aunts some water to drink. Now, where there was new planting, water was standing and the clay settles and on top there is such clear water. And I was happy that I had found such clear water and I carry it to them to drink. I don’t understand, after all, that it’s harmful. And they said, “Oh such water” with such pleasure. And then [they] died. They were on the brink of death and that probably helped them die. Others also asked to drink. I hear they are calling me, “Almaz, Almaz,” and I give them water. And they drink it and then I also give them a piece of bread, whatever they had there. But then from the neighboring house they are already asking for me to come to them. I went in the door and everyone is stinking. Everyone has diarrhea, you see that dysentery all over them.

On the same day I went by to see a friend. I couldn’t drag a big vessel, I myself am weak, so thin, like this (holding up a single finger). I took a little pitcher and carried it to her, too. I went in and saw she is lying there dead. She is lying there dead and a little girl is sucking her dead mother. That, that little girl crawls, like this (motioning feebleness with bent arms), and holds on and sucks her dead mother. And then [I saw] the little boys named Rustem and Refat. The little girl was named Anife, and they had another sister who was in the hospital, a grown up girl. I said “Rustem, hasn’t any one been here?” But he’s silent (dead). I say to Refat “has anyone,” I say, “been here?” He says “Oooo ooo” (making an animal sound) like that. Well, I knew a great girl, who worked at the accounting office and sympathized with us.
She tried to defend everyone. I went and said, “She died. And little Anife is nursing.” I said, “her dead mother. The boy also died.” She threw down her pens and everything and ran to the commandant. The commandant was Karimov, a young guy. I run after them, they grabbed another worker as well, and we came and it was the ninth barracks. I remember it like it is now. We arrived and I led them because I was the one who saw. “I’ll show you, where,” I say. Zinie went in, looked, stood, and cried.

(crying) Zinie threw herself forward and grabbed the little girl. The komendant said, “let’s take the little boy who is alive, as well.” I never saw them again but Zinie said that she gave them to an orphanage. They were terribly emaciated. They couldn’t have lived. I never saw them again.32

This consultant sometimes uses the present tense, underlining that she remembers this experience “as though it were now.” But she also shifts to past tense and back again creating a vague sense of the disjunction she must have felt. The theme of “nursing death” was a prevalent one. Its imagery seemed to encapsulate the sepulchral atmosphere of the special settlement regime. Eminov devoted a painting to this very image, which was then videotaped along with other paintings from his portfolio and projected during one of the Crimean Tatar congresses. In this manner, the image of the dead mother has become an often repeated element. It is symbolic of and integral to the genocide (see figure 3.1).

While some consultants mentioned being given chestnut flour or other rations, others stressed that it was only locals who helped them. Resident Uzbeks counseled them on what to plant, and shared what food and clothing they could. In the Urals, they dug up and ate old, frozen potatoes, which led to worm infestations and other health problems. One consultant recalled a suffocation experience in which she was saved only when a family practitioner reached into her throat and pulled out what was described to her as a clump of worms.33 While some consultants mentioned being given flour rations, in none of the testimony does the assistance match that described by the State Committee. All my consultants seemed well acquainted with the ugly reality of starvation: they describe stages of swelling, bloating, and emaciation. They also talk about the seeming paradox that larger people, who appear more robust, succumbed to starvation more rapidly than individuals who were already thin:

Big women? Big men? They die. What remains is the medium or little ones (lit. small-change). They remain. It’s interesting that nature is like that, that the big man does not withstand hunger and those little ones remain. Natural selection with a minus sign (chuckles). Negative selection, that’s how it turns out.34
The living hell described by Tatars provides a striking contrast to Russian officials’ views. A member of the staff of the Russian Society in the Supreme Soviet of Crimea commented on the fact that the majority of Crimean Tatars were deported to Central Asia and those deported to the Urals later relocated to be with kin. As far as she was concerned, this was “preferential” treatment for they were not sent to Siberia. “Have you seen the Ferghana valley?” she asked. “It’s the heavenly corner of all of Central Asia!” In her view, the Crimean Tatars were “relocated” to a heavenly corner of Central Asia where they could savor the fragrant melons—not starve to death or rot in pits. By contrast, Crimean Tatars feel that the Urals were preferable because they were so susceptible to diseases like malaria, typhoid, and dysentery in Central Asia.

Those who became ill had nowhere to turn because they distrusted the Soviet medical establishment. They suspect experimentation was conducted on them in some hospitals. Some suggested that there must have been a secret order to kill as many of them as possible, because many died shortly after receiving medical treatment.

My mother became ill with malaria, then her sister died from the so-called “immunizations.” When she was washed for burial, her entire side was in bruises from injections. There are many other cases like this.\textsuperscript{35}
Hints that there was medical experimentation going on suggest that the regime was intent on interdicting the social and physical reproduction of the group, and genocide is apt to describe their experience here.

The “Special Settlement” Regime

Crimean Tatars, along with the other deported peoples, were immediately registered in the system of “special settlement,” and given the dubious honorific “special settlers,” or spetspereselentsy. Inmates of this system liken it to a reservation. It is also referred to by the Soviet appellation, spets komendatura or “special command.” This signaled that the peoples uprooted by the deportations constituted a separate category. Checking-in was imperative and it was forbidden to travel outside a small radius. Experiences in this phase of the relocation vary according to the setting, and well-being depended a great deal on the commander to which one was assigned. In the Ural Mountains, many worked in the physically demanding lumber, coal, or gas industries. In Central Asia, they worked in cotton production, or were assigned to other kinds of state and collective farms. They also worked in industry. Stalin had relocated a certain amount of the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union from the western front to Central Asia to protect it from war. In the city of Chirchik, Uzbekistan, for example, Tatars worked in chemical production and light manufacturing. A selected few with education were sometimes chosen to do secretarial work and other kinds of nonphysical labor. What they shared regardless of location were disease and the humiliation of being interned and accountable to the NKVD at all times.

A son ended up in Angren, his mother in Ferghana. It was forbidden to go beyond five kilometers . . . Someone found out through the grapevine (lit. gypsy lines) that his mother was ill. He went to the commander and asked to go see his mother, but they didn’t let him go. Then came the news that she died. Again, he went to the commander and again, he was forbidden to go. Then he said to hell with it (lit. spit on it all) and went through the Angren pass to Ferghana. He arrived in Ferghana and went to his mother.

He had an Uzbek neighbor who worked as a guard at the cotton factory, and noticed this affair. Well, he went to the kommandatura to complain and in the morning they came to get him (the Crimean Tatar). He went down on his knees, like this (demonstrating) and said, ”Let me bury my mother.” Then he said, “You can do with me what you like.” They took him and carried him away.
A year and a half later that Uzbek came home from work. At the time, gas was used: he had Primus stove with kerosene. You know such things? His wife was preparing something to eat, he came and sat down and apparently he wanted to increase the flame or something because the kerogas exploded on him. He was burned alive on the spot. You see how the Almighty reminded him of that. Those things happened. So a person could not even bury his own mother. For that they gave him fifteen years.  

This passage highlights the belief in divine intervention that many found reassuring. Almighty Allah provides a kind of retribution on behalf of the Crimean Tatar who was prevented from burying his mother, and served 15 years in prison for trying. Burying the dead is such a sacred responsibility that many adults organize their lives to be close to aging parents. Other consultants also gave testimony about divine intervention on their behalf. This reinforced the larger theme of guilt and innocence. In postulating divine intervention, the testimony has a mythic and even magical flavor: the mortals have intentions, but not necessarily the abilities to carry out their sacred obligations. The story is being made myth in the anthropological sense of a story that is concerned with the sacred, that is set in a previous time, and that is qualitatively different from the present, where “sacred” is taken to be persons or things surrounded with reverence and respect (Levinson and Ember 1996).

Reunions

Some people served time for violating the regime. Others were better connected. The consultant who gave testimony about losing her mother on the over-packed truck was selected to work as a secretary in the local government. She secured permission from the NKVD commander to personally go and get her mother, which entailed a long journey on local trains and donkey carts. In general, anecdotes were often filled with ghost-like characters and encounters with disaster. Some end tragically while others mobilize almost superhuman strength and endurance. For example, many people told of fleeing on foot through rugged terrain over almost unthinkable distances. The following consultant searches and finds her mother who has been ravaged by the deportation. Her path is darkly foreshadowed:

We’re walking along and a woman was sitting alone next to the arik (canal). Her hair was unbraided and she had sewn herself a dress from a towel. Her face was swollen and dirty. Her dress sewn from a towel, a cotton towel. She is sitting and looking at me and he (who was accompanying her) said, “Don’t
you recognize us?” She wouldn’t even recognize her own children. I see it is pointless to converse with her, she is sitting there and sitting there.

My consultant then goes on to describe how she was led to her mother. In a narrative that is choked with sobbing:

She . . . the poor creature . . . I went in . . . she tried to get up (voice beginning to shake). She was as thin as a pole (crying) and she can’t stand . . . she raised herself up a little and began shaking. I didn’t recognize her. Only her nose is sticking out . . . and black eyes. What happened to her? Where did she go? A skirt . . . a skirt was sewn from a sack. (Beginning to cry) “Well how are you” . . . we talked and kissed and I asked where [name of an acquaintance] was and she told me she went to gather wood. But there was no wood so they dug up roots from the cut corn, it turns out. “Well,” I said, “Let’s go, it’s better where I am, I work, I’m well respected at work, and we have enough bread.” I say, “We have wood and we have raisins.” I say, “And a lot of mulberry.” I say, “Everything.” I say, “Don’t worry mama, everything is going to be all right” (in Tatar the phrase mozhno yest’ dosyta), I said (crying). She said, “There is a little rice there . . .” Well I found some and prepared something without oil or anything and we choked it down.37

It was necessary to go some kilometers on foot. When they reached the local NKVD she persuaded them to release her mother by mentioning her employer. She described the torturous return carrying her emaciated mother on her back for about twenty yards, setting her down and going back to carry her aunt the same distance and finally retrieving the sack with their belongings in it. When they reached the station, she was afraid that they would not be allowed onto the train because they were obviously suffering from dysentery. She gave the conductor some raisins who let them on without objection.

A different woman was less fortunate. She related how she and her sister were sent to Uzbekistan while her mother was sent to the Urals.38 Without their mother’s care, they were transformed by hunger, lice, and typhoid. When they were finally taken to their mother in the hospital, she ran and wrapped her arms around her neck crying, “Mama, mama, mama.” Speaking not to her but to the medical personnel, her mother said, “No, it’s not my baby.” Then her mother looked into her eyes and said, “Is that you, Zarie?” She answered, “It’s me, it’s me!” But her mother did not recognize her child and said, “No, it’s not my baby, bring me my baby.” Zarie was devastated. Telling this story was so difficult that we had to close our interview. This woman’s story was not unique: experiences of this nature were recalled in family after family.
The theme of reunions is a prominent one. So much hangs in the balance. These were stories about whether or not children become orphans; whether or not spouses become widows and widowers. A young woman born in exile related:

When my grandfather came back from the war and naturally didn’t find his family, he went to Uzbekistan to search for his wife and her baby, my mother. When he came to Uzbekistan he couldn’t find them there. He passed a station—that I remember very well. It was very late, and I imagine he passed the station in the train and didn’t know where to go anymore, he had already gone around and couldn’t find them. And at that moment on that day my grandmother, who lived somewhere in a barracks, in some underground, somewhere, in some unknown location, had her bread coupons and belongings stolen. She ran in the nightshirt she was wearing to the police station. And when she ran, she was holding the little baby. He saw her from the window of the train and got off, you understand. If that had not happened he never would have found her and I would never have known my grandfather.39

This is a paradigmatic postmemory, distilled from parental narratives. We can note that the 31-year-old narrator says, “I remember very well,” when what she means is that she remembers her mother’s story, not the event itself. The reunion story stresses serendipity, which seems to have characterized the process of relatives searching for one another. Some returned to Crimea from the front unaware that deportation had taken place. Only when they arrived did they receive the shock. Others were notified at the front and were given the whereabouts of their families with varying degrees of specificity. There were thousands of chance meetings as the demobilized Tatars searched for, but did not always find, their loved ones.

The theme of reunions embed “survivor guilt.” The consultant who inadvertently poisoned her neighbors harbors profound guilt for offering contaminated water. Others have expressed guilt when describing how they survived while their siblings perished. One woman, for example, described her sister’s last day. She recalls urging her mother to pay more attention to her sister, who was in serious condition. One can only surmise what kind of responsibility she felt to recall mothering the mother in this way. When the latter went out to search for milk, she sat by her sister, who then expired before her eyes. Her mother returned, too late, with milk. A male consultant who left Crimea with seven brothers and sisters explained to me through tears of grief how each and every one died of hunger and disease. Psychologically unable to bear the inability to feed her children, his mother had then suffered a mental breakdown and abandoned him.40
Death

Representations of deportation portray the landscape of exile as a landscape of death. Just as the footpaths of Crimea seemed to hold all that was life-giving, the landscape of Central Asia represented both physical and metaphorical death. One life story consultant said that on his way to school every morning he would pass corpses of people who had died of hunger. Another life story consultant noted the prevalence of corpses and likened the piles of bodies to “haystacks.” Many consultants described the strange and unfamiliar colors that they found there: rivers of red, intensely yellow water, and gray-brown plains.

Consultants often complained that there was no one to bury the dead and that young boys were left to manage the task, a full-time job. There were absolutely no provisions for the most elementary sanitation, prolonging the dehumanization of deportation into exile.

The worst was Namanganski Oblast and Bukhara. You know, the Bukhara people told me how it was when I came to look for my relatives. It turns out that they had wolves in their cemeteries. As one told me “today we bury people, fifteen or twenty people for the night and those wolves drag everyone out and eat them.” The next day, into the hole go about the same number. “Again,” he said, “the wolves drag out the people and eat them.”

As a result of being unable to adequately deal with the dead, first during the deportation itself, and then in the days of exile, the Crimean Tatars are left with an enormous amount of mourning. As the deported generation struggles to grieve, the second generation is steeped in narratives and irrevocably altered by traumatic events. For the second and third generation, postmemories of losses weigh heavily, altering the kinds of stories they are able to tell about themselves and their lives. But rather than view this as the memoire trouée, or memory shot through with holes (Raczymow 1994), we can see the fragments they are left with as the building blocks of interpretations.

Adjustment to Exile

The Crimean Tatars were greeted with fear and distrust. But they recall being able to overcome resistance to develop positive relationships in places of exile. These narratives may be sweetened by the Soviet discourse on the “friendship of peoples.” With time, the assistance rendered led many to give
testimony about the generosity of the Uzbek people. In the Urals, most recalled feeling they shared a common lot, especially with other deported people. In fact, in the communities that sprung up, locks on doors were considered superfluous and children of all different nationalities played and studied together.

There is also, however, a pronounced “civilizing discourse” in which the Crimean Tatars portray themselves as those who brought European sensibilities to the wild East. Even Uzbeks will corroborate this “civilizing” influence, citing Crimean Tatar cuisine, cultivation techniques for fruits and vegetables, work ethic, and personal hygiene. One consultant described an initial cultural misunderstanding:

When they arrived a very perplexing thing happened to Crimean Tatars. It’s the East after all. They wanted to buy something, but didn’t know about Eastern bazaars. There were no set prices! If something costs, say, five rubles, to a Crimean Tatars one would say “fifty.” [The Tatar] would scratch his head, but it was necessary so he’d buy it. In this manner, when winter approached no one had any money left. They couldn’t understand it. That European style turned out to be ruinous. There in the collective farms the most cultured were the Crimean Tatars.44

This consultant and others went on to explain that the Uzbeks didn’t know what furniture was until Tatars arrived. When the children came in, they laughed from sheer surprise at seeing a chair for the first time.

Crimean Tatars also see themselves as literally and figuratively the foundation of the modern Uzbek state. Many told of their productive role in industry in postwar Uzbekistan. The dark side is the toll it took on the Crimean Tatar population. On my way to Tajikistan, I was shown a dam and told that thousands of Crimean Tatars laid down their lives building it. Consultants reiterated the point that “A lot of Crimean Tatars are lying under the cement” where the dam was built.45 This expression is found in the memoirs of a wide spectrum gulag survivors (Adler 2002: 213). In this view, the Crimean Tatars are part of the structure of the growing state. In other narratives, it is conveyed more metaphorically as Uzbekistan being built out of the blood and sweat of Crimean Tatars who, as “special settlers,” had many of the most difficult jobs.

Bread is a powerful trope in narratives about life in exile. While Crimean Tatars are deeply suspicious of Uzbek authorities, they have a great deal of respect for the Uzbek people. This is expressed in terms of thanks for being allowed to eat “their” bread. So the significance of bread is both material and symbolic. A key substance linking people physically and metaphysically, it was also a food stuff that, as the basic staple, occupied a privileged place.46 Consultants translated their monthly salary or pension into the
number of loaves it would buy to describe their relative impoverishment. In the mid-1980s when the Uzbeks were encouraging them to leave, they would say that Crimean Tatars had eaten their bread long enough. It’s too late to retract those statements for the Tatars in Crimea who are establishing bakeries to recreate the exact taste and texture of beloved Uzbek loaves. Bread is a trope for sharing and now indexes not hunger but a troubled nostalgia for Uzbekistan.

Conclusion

Scholars of other attempted exterminations tell us that such oppressive social conditions can effectively silence those who survive, preventing the transmission of memory. Greenspan suggests that survivors’ experiences are fundamentally untellable (1992: 13). Likewise Laub and Felman explore the destruction of the witness and the resulting silences that are created (1992). Yet, as a “chosen trauma” the deportation narratives of Crimean Tatars have neither been silenced nor destroyed. Out of attempted genocide, they have constructed a narrative about deportation that has been told and retold until the descendants of survivors know the story “like five fingers” or as some consultants put it, better than those who experienced it.

In this chapter, I have argued that the Crimean Tatars’ experience of deportation yielded a body of memories and recollections that have been passed on over the generations, in spite of the Soviet attempts to replace them with an official view of the past. Not only do the Crimean Tatars’ narratives of deportation fill what was previously believed to be a “blank page,” but they do so in a way that takes issue with the official Soviet view. This is especially important for a group living in diaspora, because the social truths told in a symbolic way provide Crimean Tatars with an emotional connection with their past. This emotional connection will be revisited in coming chapters. As I will show, it is the very basis for Tatars reclaiming the Crimean peninsula in the present.

The very existence of testimony about deportation constitutes a politics of memory by challenging the Soviet Union’s representation of Crimean Tatars as nomads, barbarians, and cannibals. But these politics are operative on more than one level: there are the macropolitical representations of the event and, at a finer magnification, we see personal efforts to hold down a vision of the past. Representations of deportation connect macro- and micropolitics of memory to form neither a preexisting representation of the past nor a projection back from the present, but a site for the creative combination of present, practical consciousness with the experiences from the past.
If the construction of historical narratives is a process of coming to know, then it is a process that should not be made hard-and-fast. The stories that are told today may or may not be the same as those told in the past, or future. Telling about deportation profoundly affected the psychological climate in Crimean Tatar families, shaping the structure of feeling about homeland. The motivations for returning to Crimea after 50 years of exile are complex, but we can already see that narratives about deportation reinforce the Tatar’s affective stance toward the peninsula by anchoring claims in the present to experiences in the past. Chapter 4 takes up how the experiences were recalled.
Chapter 4

Family Practices: The Social Circulation of Memory and Sentiments

Our history was defiled and stolen. They want us to always live as slaves and Ivans, never remembering our heritage. So that we would be ashamed of our ancestors, as though they were wild nomads, and foul Tatars, barbarians and vandals.

—(Adzhi 1994: 15–16)

Family Practices

While the Tatars’ official history may have been “stolen” by the Soviet elite, this chapter demonstrates how their recollections have been preserved. Memories of deportation like those explored in chapter 3 create a rich background, informing the Crimean Tatars’ struggle to regain their historic homeland and inspiring a special reverence for ancestors. But this process is much less uniform, and far less straightforward than we might imagine. I therefore explore the specific dynamics through which memories were shared. They reveal a great deal about how the Tatars’ attitude toward homeland developed.

Perelli’s notion of memoria de sangre is useful here, for it highlights the centrality of trauma—and emotion—to memory. So too is Hirsch’s idea of postmemory introduced in chapter 3. It highlights the way that generational remove produces a unique kind of “memories.” However, memoria de sangre and postmemory are not specific enough to help us tease apart the kind of variation found within (or across) societies. In attempting to bring greater
clarity to the way that recollections and sentiment circulate within a society, three basic “styles” of family recounting will provide a framework. This model of styles of recollecting builds on existing work that de-essentializes memory. It shows us how to probe the technologies of transmission, which are never monolithic, for the differences they contain. It can potentially be applied in other cases, particularly when state-sanctioned sentiments and national ideologies shift. What this model gives us is a way to bring a more fine-grained analysis to memory practices and link them to specific distributions of power and authority over time.

How did these memories set the tone for a generation of survivors and their children? How does past trauma organize cultural understandings? Perelli suggests that the past can function as a political commodity in the sense that a narrative of the past, with a central premise and general outline shared by all, serves as a powerful unifying force. With modification, her concept is useful for considering Crimean Tatars’ memories of homeland. She describes memoria de sangre as “the memory that arises from an experience of fear, hardship, pain and loss so extreme as to turn it into the salient fact of the past. Memoria de sangre is such a pivotal experience that it becomes the standard of evaluation against which every single situation—past, present, and future—will be judged” (Perelli 1994: 40).

To a certain extent, this does a good job of encapsulating Tatars’ preoccupation with deportation. My consultants described the deportation in terms of a total rupture, a ripping away of their childhood: “They took me away a little girl, and I was brought back an old woman” was one commonly expressed idea. An intellectual theorized that the nation itself was interrupted, aborted and what we see is a very different nation emerging from the experience in Central Asia. Now that they have returned, the words “here” and “there” have come to signify a whole constellation of positions and relationships associated with exile and return. Similarly, memoria de sangre yields a “before” and “after,” a life order that is disrupted and then somehow reconstructed.

Yet the notion of memoria de sangre also needs elaboration. Perelli states, “by its very nature, memoria de sangre seriously hinders any possibility of elaborating a common narrative of the period” (1994: 40). Argentineans’ experiences made it difficult for them to confront their history. Instead, scapegoats were found and a “culture of fear” silenced the expression of memories of destruction and suffering. In this respect, the Crimean Tatars and many other involuntarily displaced and refugee groups differ. The Crimean Tatars’ experience made them turn toward their history and study it in great detail. As the examples in this chapter show, there is internal heterogeneity. Thus memoria de sangre must be revised to encompass the way that in different historical moments, practices of recollecting will configure differently.
In foregrounding memory’s importance to cultural production, *memoria de sangre* underestimates the socially constructed aspect. Perelli states that this type of memory “is so powerful that it has become as much an essential part of ourselves as the blood that runs in our veins” (1994: 40). This is the notion of memory and sentiment that needs to be deconstructed, for it precludes seeing the ways in which emotions and memories are deployed strategically in social relationships at the same time that they are deeply felt and intensely meaningful. Hirsch’s notion of “postmemory” is more useful for capturing the changes over time. Postmemories are distinguished by generational distance: “mediated not through recollection but through an imaginative investment and creation” (Hirsch 1997: 22). This idea further underscores the importance of affect and of narrative. While Hirsch’s formulation elaborates the way in which generational removal produces interpretations of a distinctive nature, it does not go far enough to show us how or why some individuals turn to remembering while others prefer to forget.

Along with essentializing memory as something biological (as in the comparison to blood) or genetic (as some consultants insisted), we often fall back on the idea that it is a “residue” left in the mind by the ruins of time (Hartman 1994: 1). One of the most ubiquitous metaphors for resurrecting memory has been excavation. Terms like stratified, mediated, montage, and sedimentation (Hartman 1994: 3) may limit theorizing. These metaphors suggest an overly positivist notion, rooted in modernist optimism about building the past. As excerpts from interview transcripts below reinforce, “memory” and recounting are less than archeological (in the traditional sense of the term) and highly contingent.

By finding new metaphors, we can become more adept at locating memory among a constellation of other practices. Key among them is the cultivation of certain sentiments. The idea that memory is suffused with sentiment holds the promise of moving the notion of memory forward conceptually and analytically: the quality of Crimean Tatars’ recollections suggest that we may benefit from a better engagement here. This is not intended to re-essentialize memory as “deep” or “interior,” for the sentiments explored here are social ones (Lutz and Abu Lughod 1990). They can be as contested and as constructed as memory. Sentiment works to de-essentialize memory if we maintain its connections to distributions of influence, power, and prestige.

**Interjecting the Past: Tamila, Nariman, and Gulnara**

I have described how second-generation Tatars listened closely to their parents’ stories and now take an active part in eliciting narratives. In part, this is a product of the research process itself, which prompted recollection. Usually, the topic of deportation called up expressions of support and
sympathy among family members. They would admonish each other not to cry, and often cry anyway, but by the end of the interview and my departure, the mood was usually warm and buoyant. As one consultant put it when he called my Tatar hosts to say I was on my way, he felt much lighter, having said things he had been ruminating on for a long time.

The way in which the younger generation intervened could, however, also create tension. This points back to the inherent contentiousness of trying to weave a coherent view of the past. More specifically, it suggests that children sometimes disagreed with their parents’ style of recollection. They tried to modulate their parents’ emotional outpourings, turning them up and toning them down according to their own sense of the appropriate. Gulnara, described in chapter 3, told me about her deportation experience, emphasizing the loss of both parents shortly after arrival in Uzbekistan. Her son was disappointed by this story, and came to fill in the parts he thought she left out. What he most intently reiterated was the common elements of other deportation stories that had been left out. For example, he reminded her that she told him how they “died” there, presumably meaning the high mortality rate in the early years of exile. The other elements he named were ones that most typically structured deportations stories. His intervention points to one of the most important links between memory and narrative: repetition. Hayden White observed how endings are linked to beginnings, and origins are linked to a terminus in such a way that what happens in between is endowed with significance (White 1987: 52). Referencing Heidegger, he suggests that this process takes place by virtue of the human proclivity for repetition. Nariman’s intervention is an important example of the second generation’s role in this process. It is the second generation, most typically through coaching and cuing, that is choosing which elements bear repeating. It is not only those who experienced exile but their descendents who are authors.

Nariman’s interjection must also be analyzed in terms of the anger it provoked in his sister. She did not silence him, but let it be known through breath and body language that she resented his interjection. Recollections of deportation were therefore embedded in asymmetrical power relations that were not only generational, but gendered. She explained later that she thought the interruption was disrespectful. However, another possible reading is that more fully drawing out his mother’s suffering and sacrifice was Nariman’s way of respecting her. Whereas his mother’s narrative was drained of heroism, Nariman seemed to want to highlight the deported generation’s resilience and survival. His claim that the narrative I heard was hampered by fear is plausible, given the anxieties that surrounded what was called “anti-Soviet propaganda” in Soviet days. However, there are also explicit claims to authority being made. From Nariman’s perspective, only
his mother’s tearful rendition, as opposed to the dry-eyed one heard that day, was authentic.

While it is likely that his mother modified her narrative for me, it also warrants observation that Nariman’s intervention constituted an assertion of male authority. Ultimately, the emotional micropolitics of the family are part of the process of production. In this family, there was competition to carry the interpretive weight. This dimension of sibling rivalry was also evident during an interview of a village elder, “Said,” in his home. As the interview drew to a close and I shut off my equipment, his younger brother exclaimed: “but you haven’t told her the worst parts!” When I sat back down and turned on my tape recorder, the younger brother wept as he recalled traumatic moments that his older brother had left out in painting a more courageous picture.

In the literature on memory, a tension exists between retrieving content and analyzing process (Boyarin 1994; Malkki 1995; Rappaport 1990; Rosaldo 1980; Swedenburg 1995). Theorists such as Greenspan (1992) and Fentress and Wickham (1992) have pointed to the existence of family, class, and ethnic memory. However, they are most often referring to the content. The manner in which recounting takes place is equally significant. Understanding the social dimension of memory requires we do more than examine content and explore the practices of transmission. Family stories, Thompson writes, “are the grist of social description, the raw material for both history and social change; but we need to listen to them more attentively than that. They are also the symbolic coinage of exchange between generations . . .” (1993: 36). The economic metaphor is a good one, for it leaves open the possibility that sentiments and recollections move in more than one direction.

At this point it becomes useful to disaggregate the second generation, composed of individuals like Nariman and Gulnara, who were born in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, from their children, the third generation. While more work needs to be done to fully articulate the differences, the second generation was more knowledgeable about the particulars of their parents’ lives, while the third generation knew the deportation story in its canonized form. Distilling the effects of education and socioeconomic class is difficult, but it seemed that often those with the least education had the most abbreviated accounts. Within generations, there was a privileging of men over women: many women made self-effacing comments about their ability to remember and recall. Perhaps most importantly, members of a given community often knew each other’s stories and skills in recounting, and tried to steer me accordingly.

Just as archives contain hierarchies of credibility (Stoler 1992), so too do the recollections that are codified and canonized within families. 1 When
grappling with limited knowledge, differential amounts of esteem were accorded to accounts. Crimean Tatars assert that a defining feature of their culture is the respect accorded elders. They substantiate the claim with the assertion that their elders are not sent to nursing homes. However contrary to Crimean Tatar etiquette, second-generation Crimean Tatars born in diaspora did not defer to parents’ narrative recollections. Phrased in the positive, their way of respecting their elders typically entailed an intense engagement that included questioning and adding to their narratives. This is an important issue because the recollecting that is done in families not only lays bare the structures of feeling of successive generations, but helps enliven political projects, such as national movements.

One of the most important sites for the circulation of social memory is the family. It can be a crucible for forging sentiments toward homeland. And yet, if we assume it is the site, we go too far for it is clearly inadequate to explain, in a causal way, why some people become attached to the idea of their historic homeland, and others do not. It is important to avoid reifying the family as a locus of transmission or a site of circulation because the reasons people “remember” and the ways in which the idea of homeland became important, are tied to the Soviet context as a whole. In attempting to be more specific about the ways in which these historical and biographical experiences have been shared, I have identified three styles of remembering or narrative recounting which can provide a framework for discussion.

Three Styles of Remembering

By far the most widespread style among Crimean Tatars was for adults to recount their former lives in the Crimea to children as bedtime stories and mealtime conversation. Children absorbed these stories, which were eventually mastered to become their own. According to some parents, their children know their stories even better than they do, like “five fingers,” or the palm of their hand by the time they reach adulthood. This style differs markedly from that described in the literature on remembering and the Holocaust (Greenspan 1992; Laub and Felman 1992) which points to the epistemological gaps between those giving testimony and those listening. Thus Langer suggests that when a survivor leans forward and asks if he or she is understood, “that witness confirms the vast imaginative space separating what he or she has endured from our capacity to absorb it” (1991: 19). This is not to suggest there are no imaginative spaces between Tatar generations, because there are. It is also not to suggest that there are no silences in Tatar discourse about the past. There are plenty. But compared
to accounts about Holocaust survivors, and with regard to retelling the experience of deportation, the Tatar past is highly narrativized and is woven into the social imaginary.

Another common style among Crimean Tatars is for parents to talk about their experiences selectively, waiting until children reach adolescence and are considered ready to understand. Recounting in this case is often limited to remembrance of the beauty of nature in the Crimea. In these instances, adults recounted the tribulations of deportation only to one another. Telling about deportation or the special settlement regime was precipitated only when an adolescent began probing based on what he or she heard in other families or from peers. A consultant who was born in Yangiyul, Uzbekistan in 1954 said that her parents were reluctant to reveal their full history to her. So while she knew she was Crimean Tatar, she only heard about deportation at the age of 13 or 14. The rationale behind this kind of delayed transmission was described as “pedagogy”: a strategy to prevent children from becoming angry, resentful people.

In the intensive and selective styles, memories were “consumed” with meals. For example, when jam was brought out with tea, parents would tell children about the varieties of berries that dwindled after deportation. Sliced fruits at desert evoked descriptions of the exotic species of pears and apples indigenous to Crimea. In another family, a meal of boiled potatoes evoked reminiscences of the mealy and molded potatoes they ate in exile. Sensory and tactile experiences within the family were therefore triggers for recollecting experiences of Crimea prior to exile, as well as the deportation. There were extended conversations on the taste of Crimean well waters, and the strength of the Crimean sun. Some members of the second generation had a metaphysical theory that the molecules of the Crimean fruits and vegetables their parents ate became part of their bodies. Those molecules, composed of atoms, then exerted a magnetic pull. This was their metaphysical explanation for how the second and third generations of Crimean Tatars were not only figuratively, but literally drawn back to the peninsula.

Among former deportees, the style of selective recounting was employed to avoid pain as well as the negative repercussions of their “anti-Soviet” version of history. Otherwise, former deportees had to insist that the history they related stay within the family and not be repeated at school or among playmates. When Tatars had this rationale, it was typically accompanied by the idea that knowing the injustices in the past leads to political activism, and political activism leads to repression and imprisonment—in short, the unbearable loss of yet another family member. The selective style satisfied parents’ desire to pass on love for Crimea without compromising their security in Central Asia. By contrast, the intensive style is integrally
linked to a particular political stance. In telling children about the past more intensively, Tatar families effectively steered their children toward political involvement.

To a certain extent, the dangers of talking freely contained memories within the boundaries of intimate family life. However, Crimean Tatar nuclear families do not exist in isolation. The second, selective style illustrates this concretely for it was often someone beyond their immediate family circle, such as a friend, an aunt, or an uncle, that sparked a young person to probe for more familial history. Some consultants who grew up in families that had adopted the selective style attributed their intense attachment to homeland not to their family, but the insights offered by a Crimean Tatar teacher, mentor, or friend. Here then is another way that the past may be contested: the styles adopted by parents were sometimes implicitly or explicitly rejected by their children.

When deportees were asked if they told their children about their collective past, or, in the case of the second and third generations, if they had heard about deportation from their elders, the most typical response, was “of course.” But this answer glosses over the more complex reality that practices changed over time, especially in response to glasnost. One deportee in Uzbekistan told me that “of course” she told her sons of deportation. However, her sons elaborated that while they heard about the wonders of Crimea as young children, they were locked in their room when their mother held adult gatherings, lest they hear something. It was only after the Soviet Union began to disintegrate that she told them a fuller story. The nature of their mother’s recounting changed with the times. Norms of narrative recounting seem as much a product of the period as the experiences of the past.

The styles of intensive and selective recounting present a contrast to a third style of not talking about deportation at all. Among members of deported Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans, and Greeks I spoke with, it was often the preference not to talk about the pain in their past. A reluctance to remember and recount is revealed in an interview with a young Soviet–German woman (also deported from Crimea) interviewed in Uzbekistan. She said that in her family, they preferred not to touch on those themes. She added that this was very likely because it was painful to remember. Along similar lines, two German cousins, “S” and “E” had the following to say:

I: Did your mother tell you about the past?
S: No. No. All that I know from books, you see, but otherwise, mother didn’t say anything about that.
I: Why?
S: Because she couldn’t—I was too much a blabber-mouth. (laughs)
E: My mother always said—“you open your mouth somewhere, and they will put us in prison.” No. No, I became an adult, I began to ask
questions and she said “we mustn’t talk about that, and I don’t want to talk about it.”

“What,” she said, “can I tell you?” She was very stressed. [She said] “I covered all of Europe on foot, what can you say about it? I don’t want to remember it.”

This third narrative style was relatively uncommon among Crimean Tatars. In it, parents prefer not to relate the past at all. If the intensive style is oriented toward activism, the reluctant style steers clear of it, not toward apathy but, in the Soviet period at least, a sober appraisal of the disciplinary measures that could be implemented. Families that adopted the third style did so both to avoid the emotional pain emanating from the past, and to avoid the very real consequences of unsanctioned remembering. This approach is by no means limited to the Soviet sphere. Both Burchardt (in England) and Inowlocki’s research (in Eastern Europe) have noted this style of remembering. Inowlocki discusses a consultant who says that her husband had been in a concentration camp as a child, but states “Thank God, we never talk about that” (1993: 143). Concerning her daughter’s knowledge of their history, the same woman remarks, “for them it is history, just like where Napoleon died; if you heard it once, there is no more interest in details” (1993: 144).

The emotional contrasts between the reluctant and the intensive approach are clearest if we juxtapose two statements. Sitting in an outdoor café and sipping coffee, a consultant said: “For the Soviet people, the thirties, the forties, the fifties—are history. For Crimean Tatars, they are now. And in those villages where Tatars were killed they are still crying, still remembering. They live history.” This can be compared to what a Soviet–German (deported from Crimea) said when I asked if he told his children about the past: “It’s too late to cry.” At his home in Uzbekistan he said, “it’s such a bad topic: why should one cause tears?” From his perspective, what was, has passed—the opposite of what is sometimes said by Tatars—that the past is now. Even for consultants who do not tell children about deportation until later in life, it is not too late to cry. For many Tatars “the past is now” and “they are still crying,” whereas for Germans and some Crimean Tatars described below, “it’s too late to cry.” With this outline of three basic styles or approaches to the past, we can examine in more fine-grained detail some of the varieties of transmission, contagion, and circulation relevant to the construction of sentiments for homeland.

Vasfiye and Munire, Fatma and Lilya

Vasfiye adopted the intensive style of recalling with her daughter, Munire, as did Fatma with her daughter Lilya. Both mother–daughter pairs had
repatriated to Crimea. In both cases, the postmemories that developed were more affectively charged than their parents’ recollections. The following exploration of mother–daughter pairs shows how remembering made emotions social, linking individual with family and collectivity.

Vasfiye, the mother of three daughters, approached the past in terms of the first style: although she initially did not intend to return, she told her children everything. And while she and her family were very devoted to the homeland, I soon learned this had not always been the case. Vasfiye was deported to the Ural Mountains as a little girl, moved to Central Asia with her husband, and then relocated to Sukhumi, Georgia before the war there precipitated the family’s return to Crimea. Vasfiye's desire to return came about through the process of successive relocations, dislocations, and visits. In the midst of her family’s moves, there was a watershed moment when she visited Crimea. What she remembered and shared with her daughters changed their lives.

I: When did you decide to return to Crimea?
VI: At the time, I didn’t put it together to return. I didn’t imagine. When we moved to Sukhumi, you see, then I came to Crimea for the first time, in 1965.
I: 1965.
VI: Yes, the first time was in 65. After that we came every year. We came with the children every year. Every year we lived in my father’s house for a whole month. Vacation. There were old people living there and they took us in.
I: So tell me what homeland is for you.
VI: (silence)
I: If you “didn’t imagine” right away.
VI: You know, I always knew that I was from here. But when I lived there in the North, I still hadn’t imagined. But after we had already left there and came to Tashkent and [moved] here and there, it already started to play. Then I got the kids together and we all came.

Her description that at first she “didn’t imagine,” but then the idea started to “play” captures how her desire to return was not something she carried with her since deportation or in her “genes.” Rather, this desire arose gradually as the iterative product of multiple relocations and what she unexpectedly remembered when she went to Crimea for what she thought was just a visit.

VI: When we came, I couldn’t enter the house at first. It was so very difficult for me. After all, I understood that it was here that my mother lay. But when we came that year, as we had left the house, everything remained. Everything was there. Everything.
Where mother lay, the bed, my mother had been ill for a long time. In a different spot there was a couch. Everything. What was on the floor, everything was lying there completely. I entered, like that (leaning her head forward to demonstrate) into the doorway. The owner said “come on in, come on in,” and that’s when I started to cry. She said, “come on in,” but how could I go in? After all, I was seven years old in that house, I had seen everything at my parents’ house. Everything came up before my eyes and I remembered everything.

I: Your mother?
VI: Yes, all that came back to me and I couldn’t go in. Then I probably sat there for about a half an hour and sobbed. I also had a little girl, she was only two at the time. She was born in 63. So I couldn’t go in and she said, “come on in,” and that is when I started to cry and cry and cry. I probably sat there for a half an hour, I couldn’t go in. Then, only after I had calmed down, could I go in.3

Vasfiye elides my probe about her mother in order to reiterate how difficult it was to enter a house in which everything seemed exactly the same as when she left it two decades earlier.

Vasfiye was very moved when she told me the story about returning to her village for the first time. But she broke down in the story, not its retelling. In contrast, her daughter Munire burst into passionate tears and broke down repeatedly. Asking her to recall her first visit was enough to elicit her story about the same moment in the family’s history.

I: Do you remember when you came to the Crimea for the first time?
MI: To see it? The first time, I don’t even . . . Well, you see, Mama brought us. We came for vacation, and we needed to stay somewhere. So we went to her village so she could show us her Crimea. She even showed us . . . (bursts into tears)
I: mm
MI: She showed us . . . cemetery . . . my grandmother (crying). When she went into the room, the curtains were still hanging and the same furniture was there as when she lived there. She started to cry and grabbed on to that table and started to sob “Mama.” (crying)
   We were little and we grabbed on to her and also started to cry (voice shaking). Because when we were little she told us her mother died on that very couch there. When her mother died, they were getting ready to have the funeral and on the very same day they deported everyone. Everything got turned around.
I: On the same day?
KI: Yes, her mother died (crying) Cesarean. They were getting ready for the funeral and that was it.
   Mother said the furniture was sitting in the same place. It was all right there. When we were children, you see, there was no way for us to
understand the way we do now. (Voice cracking) now we understand how (sobbing) it was so hard for our mother to see how her things were sitting there and the curtains were still in the window. She grabbed on and started to just cry.

After our talk, Munire walked me to the bus stop. As we shared my umbrella in the light summer rain, she reiterated that when she was little, she remembers crying because her mother was crying, not because she understood. She said it was only later in life, after she had experienced losses of her own, that her mother’s history and events in the Tatar past began to take on a new meaning for her. Considering that Munire is the two-year-old child described by her mother above, it is difficult to say how she “remembers” this event. More likely, the story has been told and woven together with the emotions she has about return until the “story” of first return is a family one.

Munire’s perceptions concord with Carolyn Steedman’s that “children do not possess a social analysis of what is happening to them, or around them, so the landscape and the pictures it presents has to remain a background, taking on meaning later, from different circumstances” (1994: 28). Steedman’s observation is probably also relevant for adults, who make appraisals retrospectively. Munire’s story about the visit becomes emotionally charged in the context of subsequent losses. Most pressing was her concern that her family would be evicted from their squatters’ settlement. Contributing to Munire’s distress was that her family was subsisting at poverty level. She complained repeatedly that whereas they used to be “cultured” people, having a piano and many books, now the only possession the family could own was a cow that they kept for milk. But her sense of insecurity also relates to the time when a bomb fell on her house in Sukhumi and the family was forced to expedite a move they had been hoping to make gradually. A phase of her life that she truly valued came to an abrupt and violent end. Again, as actual ties to places become more tenuous, the idea of a homeland becomes increasingly important (Gupta and Ferguson 1992). Nowhere is this clearer than in second-generation Crimean Tatars’ new passion, following the upheavals associated with the breakup of the Soviet Union, for living in their homeland.

It is important that Munire offered more details about their return and was more emotional about this event than her mother. Not only did she express her own profound grief, she was more direct about a crucial part of her mother’s biography: the death of her grandmother during or following childbirth. The sentiments infusing the second interview point to a distinctive structure of feeling guiding the Crimean Tatar repatriation. In spite of the oblique way in which they have often been treated, sentiments are
more than a background providing emotional color: they are a driving force in narrative recollection.

This memory has gathered momentum between generations. Munire infuses her mother’s memory, this crucial moment in her biography, with a passion that is more subdued in her mother’s account. These recollections go beyond individual postmemories to encompass a structure of feeling because they are eminently social and grounded in Tatars’ precarious position. As the deportation narratives in chapter 3 showed, standard elements like the “15 minutes” they were given and the dogs barking as the trains pulled away, were interwoven with individual experiences.

Evidence of the generational structure of feeling guiding narrative recollection is also evident in another mother–daughter pair, Fatma and Lilya. In raising her children in Uzbekistan, Fatma adopted an intensive approach and told Lilya all about their past. Still, she was not as clear or evocative as some of the consultants cited in chapter 3. Fatma’s narrative about deportation is more disjointed, resembling a list of people and events rather than a story per se.

F: In 1944, the 18th of May, they deported us. In the course of fifteen minutes, they had us loaded into the car. We took what we could. “Don’t take a lot,” they said, “you won’t need it.” Fifteen minutes. That was all. So we didn’t have anything, the clothes we were wearing. My mother, myself, and grandfather.

I: What was that like?

F: I also had a little brother. He died. There were four of us. He got sick and died. The climate changed; maybe it was from that. He was a year and half, you see, when they drafted my father into the army and my mother was left pregnant. She gave birth, and he wasn’t around. We, my grandfather, mother, brother, and I were taken out of here. Yes, there were four of us. We took a piece of bread.

In this excerpt, she seems more absorbed in a mnemonic effort. She is more preoccupied with trying to remember the particulars, such as how many of her family members were present, than how she experienced events at the time. She therefore repeats herself, and speaks very slowly. My probe about how she experienced the event is an interruption to this process.

Whereas Fatma remained calm in the retelling, her daughter Lilya was distressed. During this interview, three generations were present: grandmother (born 1912), mother (born 1933), and daughter (born 1967). After the ritual coffee, it was the daughter, the only one who had not experienced deportation directly, who was urged to recount it. Her grandmother asked her to explain how they suffered along the way. This was one of many moments when parents seemed to want and need their children’s intervention.
to go on. Why the inversion of roles? Was it that grandmother had just woken from a long nap, and was feeling a bit unsteady? Or was it because I was of Lilya’s generation? My age may have had an impact. But above and beyond these biases, what may have enabled Lilya to speak authoritatively was her elder’s explicit deferral, and education. Her mother made a point of stressing that her education had ended with the occupation, whereas Lilya identified herself as a person with education. Education and the investment they had placed in repatriation may have made the second generation the spokespersons of repatriation.

Lilya’s construction of what “homeland” means takes us deeper into the process of claiming a homeland. When I asked Lilya to define the term *rodina* (or homeland), she had been using, she broke into impassioned tears.

L: Homeland. What are you saying?! Homeland—it’s our ancestors, first of all, its our whole life! Its our elders, our parents, our soul. Its our blood, our bread, its all we have. What are you saying? I’m saying (breaking down into tears) we lived in Uzbekistan (pause) I can’t even speak! (crying)

I: That’s alright.

L: (Crying) For us, homeland is bread, water... We came back and before they called us traitors as though we gave all this to the Germans and Tatars are traitors. When we came back, things had of course changed, although there are still those who insult us. For the sake of homeland, we are ready for anything, even for death, if only we can live in the homeland.4

From this passage, we can see that although official accounts of Crimean Tatar history “stole” an honorable past from them, this did not lead to feeling ashamed of the ancestors, as Murat Adzhi, quoted above, feared. Like most of her compatriots, Lilya challenges the view of her people as traitors unworthy of any homeland, reacting against the Soviet master narrative that remains latent, but ever present in the background. She not only speaks of a respect for elders, but in many way “lives” it, amicably sharing a two-room, corrugated sheet metal hut with her ailing grandmother, mother, brother, sister-in-law, and their children.

Although their narratives share the mention, and the metaphor, of bread, Lilya and her mother talk about the family’s past in a different way. Why is Lilya more outwardly passionate about the topic of homeland? Lilya’s sentiments pertain to the Tatar past, but she is refracting parental memories through her present place in time. It is especially at this time in Lilya’s life, right after her return, that she was most ardent toward homeland. Crimean Tatars link this phenomenon with the qualities associated with youth. Another consultant suggested that whereas she was “fearless” and able to endure multiple arrests in the 1960s, she would “have a stroke”
were such a fate to befall her today. As for Lilya, when I returned for a second interview a year later, she felt differently. She had become demoralized about their conditions and admitted that she fantasized about what it would be like to return to Uzbekistan (something she had felt was out of the question earlier). While one possibility is that gender and the “emotionality” ascribed to women are responsible, this interpretation collapses when I consider the large proportion of adult male consultants who also wept unabashedly in retelling. Gender alone is therefore insufficient to explain why the mothers broke down in the story (but not its retelling), while the daughters had such effusive narratives.

A more plausible explanation is that people remember as socially positioned individuals. Their recollections are shaped by experiences in the past and their relationships in the present. Lilya and Munire’s sentiments can be viewed as a structure of feeling that is particularly useful to young people born in diaspora as a frame of reference. Such emotions are not only appropriate, that is, not pathological, but in Riesman’s (1992) terms are one of the ways in which people identify themselves as members of a group. Their sentiments are a reflection of their connection to the land and to being Crimean Tatar, otherwise they would remain unmoved, both literally and figuratively. This idea of their sentiments as a cultural logic parallels William’s notion of structures of feeling when he describes them as not divorced from, but tied to the conceptual apparatus: feeling-as-thought and thought-as-feeling (1977). Lilya and Munire’s grief and anger are examples of how an individual participates in a community of sentiment (Appadurai 1990a: 92).

What we have seen, then, is that Munire and her mother shared a body of memories about the homeland that contributed to Munire’s attachment to the land. Similarly, Lilya had learned a great deal about the Tatar past from her elders and was (at least initially) even more emotionally involved in repatriating.

More than Memory

Family transmission by itself, however, is inadequate to explain why so many second- and third-generation Tatars have made such significant emotional and material investments in the historic homeland. Seleme’s family, who I stayed with in Uzbekistan, illustrates this concretely. They have approached the past in the third style, eschewing any recollecting in favor of living in the post-Soviet present. Seleme’s husband is a Crimean Tatar professional who prefers to remain in Uzbekistan so he can continue his career. Seleme herself is not Crimean Tatar, but Bashkir. Over tea in the
family’s kitchen, she explained that she and her husband never talked about deportation, the Crimean Tatar homeland, or even contemplated so much as a vacation in the area. They did not even raise their children to be Crimean Tatars. And yet, in the late 1980s, her son, Fuat, suddenly took an interest in studying the Crimean Tatar language. While he had previously been a mediocre student, he was soon studying the language with gusto and voraciously reading anything about the Crimean Tatar past that he could find.

When Fuat resolved that he wanted to move to Crimea, Seleme and her husband decided that he was too passionate for them to stand in his way. So upon graduating from high school, Fuat moved to Crimea. He now rents a trailer with a friend. They opened a shish-kebob business and sell to tourists by the seaside. Based on this experience, Seleme feels that there is something about homeland that is “genetic”: it runs in the “blood.” It’s “fate.” There is nothing strange, however, about her son’s sudden passion for all things Crimean, even given the lack of references to Crimea in his background. The timing of his transformation suggests we look beyond his immediate family (and beyond memory) to the sociopolitical context following the breakup of the Soviet Union. This was a time when non-Uzbeks were leaving Uzbekistan at an alarming rate for Russia, Ukraine, and other republics. It was a time when Uzbeks were telling the Crimean Tatars to “go home,” even if they had been born and raised in the republic. At a time when his future in Ferghana must have looked uncertain, it is not surprising that he began to imagine another life for himself in the historic homeland. The Crimean Tatar aspect of his background provided not memories, but a moral anchor for belonging in Ukraine. His sentiments can be viewed as a product of the politics of membership, citizenship, and nationalism in the former Soviet Union. More specifically, we can see that the Crimean Tatars’ structure of feeling for homeland had a great deal to do with relations of domination and subordination, both within the Soviet system as a disenfranchised group, and within their own community in relation to intellectuals and elites. Fuat was drawn into the ideology of homeland that proved hegemonic over time.

Fuat’s enthusiasm for Crimea proved contagious. By 2002, Seleme had moved to Crimea. She complained conditions in the Ferghana Valley had become too inhospitable and retrospectively imagined the move as something they had been planning, in spite of the very different intentions she had expressed in 1998. This pushes us beyond memories to the circulation of sentiments within families, and without them. Fuat’s family requires we accept the thinness of memory and the absence of recollection.

While the atmosphere of secrecy in the Soviet Union required whispering, the message that every nationality deserves its own homeland was so clearly
spelled out by the constitutionally enshrined concept of nationality, that it was virtually being shouted. Further, the breakup of the Soviet Union was attended by a whole spectrum of social problems such as civil war, criminalization of the economy, growing inequality, and government corruption. Ethnic affiliation became a way to broker the transition: “having” a national identity, or an ethnic identity, meant having a very important set of allegiances that were important to gaining access to goods and services (Verdery 1996). Remembering one’s ethnic affiliation is also a route to bypass the defunct ideal of the New Soviet Man. The transformation of social memories is therefore part of a larger, post-Soviet process. The upheaval made the existence of ethnic homelands even more appealing. Fuat had forged a connection to homeland not through memory but sentiments that were socially sanctioned.

Images and Artists

History Breaks Down into Images

First-generation Tatars like Fatma and Gulnara struggled to put their experience into words. This is symptomatic of genocidal state systems, in which the circulation of stories about the past is often blocked (Greenspan 1992: 13; Laub and Felman 1992). When history books, textbooks, museums, holidays, and the myriad ways of officially documenting the past are manipulated, the individual writer becomes increasingly important. As Esbenshade argued, “[h]ence the central role of the writer as keeper of the records, custodian of memory, and truth teller for the nation in the postwar period” (1995: 74). But it is of course not just writing that can provide access to subaltern histories. As Walter Benjamin has famously noted, history breaks down into images (1983–1984: 25). He called for another kind of history, one that would be less anthropocentric and bring into question the philosophy of the subject. The work of art was of course a common topos for him (Hanssen 1998: 10).

His materialist view of history incorporated a critique of the concept of progress: he sought to reveal the contingent and transient nature of history. Benjamin wanted fellow Marxists to more critically examine their faith in a messianic view of history. He wanted them to consider the power of social experience, imagery, and mood in the construction and deconstruction of political consciousness, and the willingness to act (Taussig 1987: 368). This dovetails nicely with the notion of a structure of feeling as social experience “in solution,” something “on the edge of semantic
availability” (Williams 1977: 134). It is in this spirit that the work of Crimean Tatar artists is explored. Benjamin placed more faith in the less conscious image realm and felt that it was in this image realm and the “dreamworld” of the popular imagination that it was important to work (Taussig 1987: 368). This was perhaps more important than working in the realm of facts and information. Crucial to this process of discovery were what Benjamin called “dialectical images,” or what Theodore Adorno referred to as “picture puzzles.” They shock by way of unexpected juxtapositions, and thereby set thinking in motion, “otherwise concealed or forgotten connections with the past were revealed by the juxtaposition of images, as in the technique of montage . . .” (Taussig 1987: 369).

This description of history “breaking down” resonates with postmemories of the deported generation. It was they who were forced to piece together fragments of their parents’ memories. Nariman added to what Gulnara forgot, and Said’s younger brother interjected “the worst parts.” It was also members of the second and third generations who, returning after parents were buried, experienced disjuncture and dissonance in attempting to jive parental recollections with the realities of present-day Crimea. So Benjamin’s view of history breaking down into images is apt for describing the juxtaposition of postmemories with contemporary life in Crimea.

That history “breaks down” into associations and images is further reinforced by the idea that both individual and social memories are formed of composites. Memories can be made of a range of pictorial images, scenes, and slogans (Fentress and Wickham 1992: 47). When memories and recollections find narrative expression, they are often composed out of a series of images. This observation complements Greenspan’s point about the “breaking down” of history among survivors. Instead of a plot trajectory he hears a “staccato of snapshot images” in which there is no narrative unfolding but only dissolution (1992: 149). In his view, the dissolution of narrative in survivors’ recounting signals the raconteur’s personal dissolution.

Artistic Engagement

The circulation of stories and images, both within families and without them, prompted an explosion of historically inspired and nationally inclined artistic activity beginning with the first years of repatriation. An artist who exemplifies Benjamin’s idea of the dialectical image is Ismet Sheik-Zade (b. 1965). Sheik-Zade’s art is conceptual, encompassing painting, installations, and performance while drawing on Crimean Tatar themes. It transcends any rigid national frame and is primarily concerned with breaking out of what Sheik-Zade refers to as “Soviet thinking.”
Sheik-Zade wants to do an installation commemorating deportation in the central square in Simferopol, where Lenin is currently standing. He would locate this work in Simferopol as the political capital and the physical center of the peninsula. In the very center, a black and red “X”-shaped inlay in the ground is shaded by an open, gazebo-like structure. But the gazebo melds into mausoleum, with an Islamic star. The mausoleum symbolizes the death of almost half the population as a result of the 1944 exile. The entire structure rests on rails, which are a symbol of the deportation and repatriation. Eight tracks join in a circle, and on the inside perimeter is a prayer from the Qu’ran. The prayer starts from the direction of Mecca. The names of Tatar villages that were erased by Soviet mapmakers are inscribed on the rails themselves. The entire installation is elevated on a mound of earth taken from around the graves of deceased Tatars, and the earth would be brought from all directions. Above the X a pendulum hangs, representing the “gravitational pull” or magnetism of one’s native soil, recalling the metaphysical theory of attraction. The installation presents us with a “dialectical image” or montage in its layering of political meanings, religious imagery, and Soviet history.

One can only wonder how the installation would be apprehended by contemporary Crimean residents. When he talks to people about it, they are concerned the installation would be vandalized. Sheik-Zade sees in this a need to intervene in what he calls “Soviet thinking.” In an allegory of the Crimean peninsula as the socio-geographical object of desire, he points out that when something can be touched, people leave it alone, but when something is fenced off, people try even harder to get to it. In combating this “Soviet-type thinking,” Sheik-Zade would create a piece that passersby could interact with. By resisting the temptation to see this problem as an exclusively Russian one, and including his own people among those who must be freed of the Soviet past, Sheik-Zade is using concepts and imagery to break down traditional binarisms, and “set thinking in motion.”

Dystopic and Utopic Imagery

It is at this point that we reach the limits of Benjamin’s relevance for the Crimean Tatar repatriation. While the family practices of recollecting led to a “montage” of stories from the deported generation with images from contemporary Crimea, most of the works themselves are neither dialectical nor “picture puzzles.” They work against Soviet history to reconstitute, with clarity and directness, something like a narrative of recuperation. The families of artists do, however, further illuminate the styles of transmission, confirming the importance of family practices for the construction of sentiments toward homeland, and history.
The work of Rustem Eminov (b. 1950) is produced out of the intensive style of recollecting. Rather than resurrecting the Crimea that was lost, or meditating on the beauty of the peninsula, he focuses on the protracted horror of deportation, delving into the pain. In many ways, this family is the paradigmatic example of the intensive style. Eminov paints what he imagines based on his mother’s recollections, and, once manifest on canvas, his imagination inspires her to recollect still other events. Here, memory, sentiments, and the imagination are evident in their very cyclic and very social forms.

Eminov emphasizes, “I didn’t see this—I was born here [in Uzbekistan] but I imagined it within myself, from the remembrances of my mother.” He developed an “internal picture” of the events through his mother’s stories. When Eminov began the series, it refreshed her memory so powerfully it was too painful for her to enter the studio, in a small building in the courtyard of their house. Then she got used to the images, and his paintings prompted her memory—which led to more recollections in a continuing process.

Eminov’s paintings are large, colorful, and realistic. A mother lies dead by the train tracks; head tilted back toward the sky while her baby, weak and near death himself, tries to nurse. Another picture shows a prototypical bita, or grandmother with her hair covered in the traditional manner (see figure 4.1). There is a corresponding picture of a Crimean Tatar aksakal or male elder.

Eminov has also painted on some more overtly political themes. A portrait of Musa Mahmut (the topic of chapter 6) ensconced in flames stands out for its intense eye contact and bright flames, succinctly conveying the intensity this immolation holds for Tatars. An image one could not find in a history book is the cattle cars, which seem to vividly illustrate the verbal recollections of deportation (see figure 4.2). Eminov’s collected works provide a visual analog to narrative representation.

While narratives may present “a staccato of snapshot images,” narrative and personal dissolution should not necessarily be equated. In contrast to Greenspan’s consultants, Eminov’s pictorial recounting is a way of building a personal and professional identity—crucial to achieving a robust and coherent sense of self. In this series of paintings, he is making explicit what his father, also an artist, could only hint at in Soviet times. If his father had not left this work unfinished, Eminov says, he would not have taken the thematic upon himself. Moreover, that stories and pictures even exist suggests a therapeutic step: theorists of trauma think that even for younger generations, suffering is intensified when the experience of persecution remains unmentionable (Inowlocki 1993).

The drawback of this dynamic is a fusion of identities. Burchardt identifies such a phenomenon, arguing that adult children of survivors often
find it difficult to achieve autonomy (1993: 132). This may also be true of Crimean Tatars, who often spend their lives trying to fulfill their parents’ unhived dreams. However, the point cannot be overemphasized that parents’ recounting of the past is only the first step. Children of the deported must listen, accept, reject, and form their own interpretations for “transmission” to occur. Circulation is perhaps the better word, for the second

Figure 4.1  Painting of Crimean Tatar woman by Rustem Eminov
generation drew the recollections of siblings, friends, and relatives into political and pragmatic service, when necessary. And not all children choose to remember for their parents. Eminov’s choice is a conscious one and he sometimes thinks about ending the series.8

The circulation of narratives and images between generations exerts an influence beyond his family, providing us with a way to see how the micropolitical climate within families influenced the macropolitical atmosphere. When a video of Eminov’s paintings was shown choreographed with music and sound effects (such as the sound of a train) on a television in the lobby at the Kurultai or Parliament, many were moved. Benjamin’s insight about the importance of imagery and mood in the construction of political consciousness directly pertains. As Eminov and his friends recount, even the police were riveted to the screen. There was a passionate response on the part of Tatar audiences because they felt they could see the memories that, on the one hand, they had promised themselves never to forget and yet, on the other hand, they had been precluded from writing down. Many have encouraged him to keep painting, seeing him as fulfilling a documentary purpose. Others are critical of the seriousness of the series, saying the paintings bring up too much pain. The politics of these sentiments have become the subject of debate. If the art begins in the dynamics of family transmission, it overflows these boundaries to constitute an engagement with history and the politics of return.
Imaginative Labor

While Eminov’s family practiced the intensive style, Nuri Yakubov’s family adopted the second style, telling about Crimea in a selective way. Yakubov (b. 1965) explained that his painting style and subject matter are an outgrowth of narratives, emerging from his parents’ *chuvstvo rodini* or “feeling of homeland.” He described how he experienced Crimea “like a heaven on earth” when he moved 15 years ago. The whole idea of a heaven on earth, he stresses, came *not* from Crimea but from his parents’ evening musings, “when, as children, we sat at the table with our parents, who told us practically over breakfast, lunch, and dinner, about all the beautiful places in Crimea and told us about how it was before deportation.” In adopting the second style of narrative recounting, his family concentrated on the beauty of Crimea rather than the horror of deportation. Thus, memories are, for them, essentialized as a substance transmitted physically and symbolically within the family. Food and memories are evoked as mediums of commonality and enculturation. This gives attachment to homeland a decidedly organic quality. What Yakubov confronted when he actually returned was a much less Edenic picture, for the Crimea had deteriorated ecologically since his parents’ forced exile. Rather than let it be dreamlike or remote, Yakubov performed the work of imaginative labor necessary to make it seem real.

The effects of the selective style are apparent in Yakubov’s work. He now paints romanticized scenes of Crimea. His method is to look at the scene around him, squint until he no longer sees the decay and disrepair, and then imagine the desired scene. While there is a strong imaginative vein in his work, he also incorporates Pushkin’s poetic themes, ancient legends, and historic motifs. Yakubov is attracted to this approach because, he says, it enables him to paint Tatar scenes “in a state of harmony.” His kind of painting necessitated visually subtracting the power lines and garbage that are only too common, as well as unblocking the dammed springs and restoring the crumbled wells. The results are apparent in pieces like the one entitled “Girls by the Fountain,” which exudes peace in a numinous mixing of colors. The girls are in traditional Crimean Tatar dress, wearing headpieces and using copper vessels to gather water. Yakubov uses his imagination and an upbringing infused with the selective style of family recounting to bridge the disquieting gap between past beauty and present pollution, “fantasy,” and “reality.”

Yakubov’s art also overflows the boundaries of his family’s style of remembering, for changing politics helped make the painting possible. Yakubov states that his work of imaginative labor became thinkable as a result of the Crimean Tatar National Movement. It was between 1988 and
1989, after the movement had reached its full stride, that he began to work on Crimean Tatar themes, a departure from his previous painting. He links the change to specific events such as the demonstrations in Moscow. So as far as Yakubov is concerned, his art is intricately connected to macropolitical developments such as the increased openness allowed by glasnost and perestroika. This requires us to situate sentiments for homeland in their social and political, as well as family context. The intense desire for homeland is connected to the period and its problems.

“The Time for Crying is Over”

Like Eminov, Mamut Churlu has painted his interpretation of deportation. Whereas Eminov painted scenes depicting the actual deportation, Churlu strove to give the viewer the physical sensation of upheaval associated with the events. “Deportation” and other compositions use abstract geometric forms in a discordant organization. Telephone poles lean at wild angles, and railroad tracks, houses, and trees seem jumbled, shaken loose from their moorings, all contributing to the nonverbal sense of how ghastly the world must have looked to the exile.

When we first spoke, Churlu stressed that in this phase of his painting career, he always chose materials that would facilitate quick completion of a piece. He was intent on capturing a burst of feeling. Chervonnaia and Guboglo refer to this as his “pamphlet passion” (1992: 279). His work suggests that Crimean Tatars’ nostalgic attachment to homeland was challenged on return to Crimea. When he first returned and settled on a samostroi (squatters’ settlement), the conditions were abominable. He used color sparingly, with a predominance of gray and blue. This was a time when the mud was knee-deep, there was little or no electricity, and, despite their commitment to forge ahead, the squatters’ settlements were particularly bleak. In the painting “Return” for example, he presented barren earth, barbed wire, and the temporary dugouts of the samostroi, giving a physical sense of the unsettledness. Ironically, “Return” looks surprisingly like exile.

Churlu departs from Eminov, however, by arguing that the time for crying has passed. It is therefore impossible to speak of a single approach to remembering. As he thought back on his episodes of painting about deportation and the Tatars’ political struggle to return, Churlu insisted that at first, art had to be political. Now, however, “it’s a completely different time.”10 This approach departs from the profound grief in the narratives about deportation presented in chapter 3 and points to the possibility of new approaches to the Crimean Tatar past and future, an idea that is further explored in the sequel.
Conclusion

While Murat Adzhi (1994) and others have lamented that the histories of the non-Russian people have been defiled and stolen, the Crimean Tatars’ practice of memory and love of history suggest that the “theft” is far from total. Deportation became a “chosen trauma” that inspired narrative recollection and artistic imagery. While those who did not experience the deportation firsthand will never be able to comprehend it in the way its victims do, they can relate to it emotionally as part of a cultural logic. As the artists’ work suggests, second-generation Tatars are in the process of actively imagining the past. The memories discussed here are far from a crystallized residue, having an emergent quality in intergenerational dialogue that can be surprisingly contingent. Memory, or more aptly recollecting, must therefore be viewed as an activity or practice, having to do with the continuous reworking of interpretations.

The argument for a performative, interactive model of memory that has become well established in the anthropological literature is made crisper by the introduction of styles of transmission. Crimean Tatars’ family practices, diverse and continuously evolving, show us that we have to keep refining our views. We can keep what is most useful in ideas like memoria de sangre, while we probe it more deeply for the differences it contains. It is useful to think of Tatar families falling on a spectrum from the most intensive practice, telling children all about their past, whatever the consequences; to recounting the Crimea in a selective or “pedagogical” manner; to the most restricted practice, eschewing mention of the past in favor of personal safety and political stability, at least in Soviet times. Thus whereas Lilya and Munire’s families took the intensive approach, Fuat’s adopted a more restricted one. And whereas recounting in Eminov’s family was intensive, Yakubov’s family took the more selective approach. Churlu hopes the Crimean Tatars will move past all three. What enabled young Crimean Tatars to be authoritative vis-à-vis their parents in retelling, I suspect, was their ability to embrace nostalgia without reserve, and their investment in repatriation and reparation.

Crucial to these styles of transmission is something that has been too attenuated in anthropological investigations of memory—an explicit engagement with the sentiments that infuse narrative recollecting. Sentiments for homeland were culled from parental narratives. As they coalesced with everyday hardships in Crimea, these same sentiments drove continued narrative recollection. The structure of feeling for homeland must not be divorced from differentials of power and authority within the family. Young Tatars’ interpretive clout suggests that Crimean Tatar family
structure may be changing. The micropolitical circulation of images and recollections within the family is related to macropolitics: Crimean Tatars like Fuat who experienced themselves as a minority in Uzbekistan were motivated to remember Crimea in a positive light, and when possible to move there. Thus the sentiments Crimean Tatars experienced with regard to homeland had to do with relations of subordination and domination both within the Soviet (and post-Soviet) system as a “minority,” and within their own community in relation to the nationally inclined.

The preceding discussion has concentrated on the remembering done in families. The family is not, however, the only site of circulation. Relationships with peers and mentors, as well as late Soviet propaganda, told Crimean Tatars that their future lay in the past, in the idea of the Crimean Tatar national historic homeland. In this way, the attachment to homeland that formed a structure of feeling among the Crimean Tatars is beyond memory and beyond the family, grounded in the everyday functioning of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the end, the remarkable attachment to homeland that the Crimean Tatars exhibit takes more than family, and more than recollecting, to develop. This brings us to the Crimean Tatar National Movement.
Chapter 5

The Crimean Tatar National Movement: Memories of Power and the Power of Memory

Activists harnessed the attachment to homeland that developed in narrative recollecting, and used it to energize the Crimean Tatar National Movement. In this project, the search for knowledge of the past played an inspirational role, promoting one of the largest and longest national movements on the territory of the former Soviet Union. This chapter shows how the Crimean Tatar National Movement was strengthened by memory, history, and sentiment and, in a reciprocal process, the powerful political platform and charismatic leadership of the movement gave people a reason to remember and return. By casting a particular glance on the past, and “speaking” with the state, participants in the movement gradually created an atmosphere in which return seemed self-evident, even obligatory. In many ways, the remembering the movement endorsed became a form of collective action.

Soviet power or vlast was imagined as monolithic. Since its collapse, there has been a flurry of research that has helped us to understand the systemic weaknesses that were masked (Suny 1993; Verdery 1996; Tishkov 1997). The ethnographic approach provided here contributes to these efforts. In explaining the movement, activists relied a great deal on remembered conversations with officials. While they may not truly recapitulate events, they show how Tatars saw their movement unfolding. We see a transformation of the ways in which they imagined state power, a transformation that prefigures the willingness to give up everything they worked for in places of former exile. Based on their narratives and the documents that they gave me to read or copy, the Tatars framed a very specific
ideological terrain from which to resist. Once the stage was set, powerful patriotic sentiments had an even more important place. This approach is inspired in part by Taussig’s notion of state fetishism (1984). Building on Abrams (1988) he explores the political power of fiction and is interested in the mystification that goes into creating such fictions. Abrams argues the state is “not the reality which stands behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is” (1988: 82). With this in mind, the Tatars’ attempts to speak with the state and secure their return are explored. The comments of activists show us more tangibly how in correcting, educating, and often irritating the agents of the state, they produced a view of the past that was capable of supporting a nationalist platform. In treating the Soviet state as an interlocutor, activists were able to cast the encounter as a pedagogical one in which the state (variously figured within their discourse) is enlightened about the rightness of their return. In taking this tack, they may not have transformed the system, but they certainly transformed themselves, becoming convinced that they were the rightful stewards of the Crimean peninsula.

Like my informants’ accounts, this account is partial and fragmentary. I do not pretend to present an unbiased or total picture of the movement, but an anthropological one that attends to the ways that memory and sentiment became part of political practice. There are a number of problems that complicate the task of depicting how the Tatars conceived their movement. Foremost among them is accuracy: what participants remember is a function of present needs. As Haimson has observed, the interview experience: “. . . appeared at least partially to confirm the common sense rule that especially many years after the event, the mind recalls most easily and vividly moments of victory rather than moments of defeat, times of hope rather than times of despair” (Haimson 1987: 17). These findings are not confirmed in the narrative recounting of deportation discussed in chapter 4. However, they are particularly apt when remembering is drawn into political practice. Recollecting their own political activities in a positive light was one way for activists to reconceive their relation to the regime. In addition, it entailed the performance of success.

This requires us to distinguish the memory described in the previous chapters, a kind of mass personal memory, from national memory. If mass personal memory is personal recollections that are held by enough individuals to have national significance, national memory is the organizational principle by which nationally conscious individuals use the past and understand its demands on the present. (Snyder 2000: 50). Snyder describes this kind of memory as a frame, contrasting it with the picture (2000: 39). This kind of memory found natural expression in discourse that incorporated aspects of cant and litany. Ries has used cant to describe the pious and
promotional genre that reaches its zenith in official Communist propaganda. Crimean Tatars used aspects of Communist rhetoric to “beat officials at their own game” at the same time that their place within the power structure necessitated litanies concerned with repression. Litany is especially crucial here insofar as it operates by inverting existing hierarchies of value rather than delegitimizing or discarding them (Ries 1997: 88).

Evidence and Epistemologies

The discourse legitimizing their return was grounded in an epistemology of history that relied on several different kinds of evidence. Based on my research, they have drawn on archeological evidence suggesting they are the indigenous people of the peninsula. In particular, Sevdiar’s synthesis has strengthened the argument they descend from ancient Scythians (1997). Archaeological evidence was attractive because it concretized the claim to territory and identity—nothing was more suggestive of authenticity. The language of autochthony, whether pure or, in the Tatars’ case hybrid, is developed as a kind of political currency (Ballinger 2003: 245). A second kind of evidence was the historical knowledge that they once had a sovereign state of their own, the Crimean Khanate. Its political forms, religious tolerance, and respect in the eyes of other international powers are the topic of intense interest to this day. Another aspect of this is the Crimean ASSR (1921–1944), a period in which Crimean Tatar national identity solidified. While Crimean Tatars argue that Lenin created it as a national autonomous unit to legitimize their status, Russians argue it was a multinational territorial autonomy.

A third kind of evidence in constructing the historical case for return is of course the recollections of World War II discussed in chapter 2. Veterans’ accounts are a regular feature in the Crimean Tatar newspapers, even though journalists look askance at their accuracy. This knowledge about the archeological past, Tatar history, and heroes spread in large part due to the efforts of political activists.

A fourth kind of evidence brought to bear is legal. Crimean Tatar legal experts have ample material to work with. In addition to the loss of property in 1944, they condemn the 1783 annexation, criticize the law of 1946 demoting the Crimean ASSR into an Oblast, and debate with Russian experts whether Krushchev’s “gift” ceding the peninsula to Ukraine in 1954 was within the law. In recent years, they have intensified these efforts, focusing on Ukrainian citizenship, political representation, privatization,
and suffrage. These efforts are now being linked to the concept of indigenous status, which validates their need for return.

Movement Synopsis

The Crimean Tatar National Movement developed through a number of stages that were characterized by very different modes of resistance. As their tactics and strategies developed, styles of discourse were rejected, and forms of political protest were revised. The way they gathered among themselves, and how they felt about their project changed. The first, “ideational” phase was one in which the idea of return was cultivated even as the people’s efforts were devoted to their physical survival. At this time, it was thought that a terrible mistake had been made, and would soon be corrected. To resist or protest was therefore not initially considered. This was followed by a nascent phase beginning in 1956 in which Tatars tentatively began to write letters. They believed the issue of return could be resolved if the leadership was assured of their loyalty to the Soviet state. An intellectual phase followed in the 1960s in which activists or initsiativniki (or initsiatory) were inspired by the history they rediscovered. The expansive phase began in 1967 with the exculpation (that failed to win them the right to repatriate). The letter writing campaign was rejected and the movement expanded from small circles of activists to increasing numbers of people and layers of society. In the 1960s, the first demonstrations were held and activists cultivated contact with the dissident movement of the Soviet Union. Major repressive blows were delivered by the Soviet authorities including arrests, trials, and imprisonment. The mass social movement phase begins in 1987 with the advent of glasnost and perestroika, and is characterized by the active involvement and repatriation of Crimean Tatars from all segments of society in one of the largest movements on the territory of the Soviet Union (Cemiloglu 1995: 95). A sixth phase of reframing in the Crimean homeland is still in progress. Characterized by a protracted battle for access to Crimean politics, this phase is fraught with difficulty. It has entailed questioning the leader’s role, and political infighting. Still, Crimean Tatars have begun to transform their image as the “barbarian” descendants of the Golden Horde into the preservers of law, order, and the environment in Crimea.

This movement occupies a distinguished place because the Crimean Tatars were the only nationality to develop a democratic, quasi-parliamentary system of self-government out of the wreckage of the Soviet collapse (Abdulganiyev 2002). Moreover, it inspired (and was also inspired by) the
Soviet dissident movement as a whole. The system of initiative groups it created was subsequently borrowed by other national movements as an organizing structure and the “information” (*informatsiia*) bulletins of internal communication were the first *samizdat* or “self-published” literature in the Soviet Union (Cemiloglu 1995: 95).

**Complicating the Picture**

Viewed diachronically, the modern incarnation of the Crimean Tatar National Movement was first constituted in the community of memory and the idea of the unquestionable necessity of return, which preceded the formal organization of a national movement. The importance of remembering led Chervonnaia and Guboglo to call memory the “front line” (*perednii krai*) and the “engine” of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (1992: 75, 95). The movement gained strength as a result of the interpretations of history synthesized by individuals who studied the Crimean past. If this were the whole story, it would be a relatively straightforward account of history and memory inspiring a national movement.

Complicating this picture are two, interrelated factors. First, we must consider the transformation. The movement shifted from trying to work with the Communist Party to a tack that involved an oppositional stance. While the tactics and counterstrategies are more intricate than can be described here, several will be underlined. One tactic is subverting, inverting, and generally manipulating the categories of “Soviet” and “anti-Soviet.” Another is the use of Lenin as a politically potent symbol. In this struggle to control the terms of the debate, they were creating a platform for successful political organizing. This brings us to the second point, which is the use of sentiment in this process. Through the conscious and strategic use of sentiment, the Tatars influenced their trials, their interrogators, and most importantly, one another. What began as a small, underground movement was eventually embraced by the vast majority of Crimean Tatars who became willing to lobby, petition, demonstrate, picket, and protest in order to gain the right to return. When their activities became known in the West, they disrupted the Soviet Union’s ability to maintain an image of peace and prosperity.

The point is not to make a causal argument that the activists’ political activities resulted in the Tatars’ ability to return. The factors and forces are more complex than that. Rather, the goal is to capture the kinds of dialogue that took place because these will show the Tatars’ process of fashioning their position of ideological—and ultimately emotional—resistance.
contentious conversations, they transformed their idea of themselves from inhabitants of the Crimean peninsula by default, to citizens with political subjectivities and ambitions.\(^5\)

**Within the Party and Without**

The years immediately following exile were occupied, not surprisingly, with sheer survival. We can never really know, from our present place in time, what the Crimean Tatars were thinking. However, we can surmise from the way that they kept their few belongings packed that they were in shock, if not denial. The first real opening in the political opportunity structure took place in 1956 as a result of the Twentieth Party Congress.\(^6\) Khrushchev took this opportunity, following Stalin's death in 1953, to “reach for different facts” from history and condemn Stalin's cult of personality. This marks a turning point because the mass deportation was openly criticized for the first time. Tatars thought that surely now party authorities would be receptive to correcting the injustices. However, the law of February 1957 gave legal exculpation to all the people deported by Stalin except the Tatars and the Germans. (Tatars suspect it was Stalin's designs for the peninsula that precluded them from inclusion.) This inspired exiled Crimean Tatars, first individually and then in small informal groups, to write letters to the Communist leadership in Moscow, appealing to be returned to their homeland. Most active in this letter writing were veterans of war and the partisan movement in Crimea, as well as former party and administrative workers of the Crimean ASSR. They argued according to the party rules and used the party’s Marxist–Leninist principles. To do otherwise, they believed, would jeopardize both their safety and the success of their appeal.

The scope of this effort was immense. It is estimated by the *samizdat* press that by the time it subsided, over four million individual and collectively authored letters had been sent. Nahaylo and Sheehy point out that the petition to the Twenty-Third Party Congress included more than 120,000 signatures, almost the entire adult population.\(^7\) A veteran, Communist Party member, and activist in the movement, Mustafa Khalilov, remembers this moment clearly.

Our principle was that we live in the Soviet Union, we are led by the Communist Party, and we need to reckon with it. To appeal to foreign organizations and foreign governments—we weren’t going to do that. . . . We are going to achieve this with our Party, our government, our state.\(^8\)
In the beginning at least, the state was imagined as benevolent. It was thought that it needed only to be nudged into taking action on their behalf.

At this time, it was the style to write lengthy appeals with suggested points for action at the very end. A typical appeal began with a historical account, followed by a detailed citation of Leninist nationality policy. This customarily led to mention of the Crimean ASSR and the logic that they be returned to their homeland in an organized manner. Disappointment in the results of the letter campaign led to extensive strategizing and the decision that the movement must be “internationalized,” an idea that was radical in a closed society. Disputes over appropriate organizational form then became a principal ground upon which activists parted company. By the 1960s, three factions developed that became increasingly formalized over time: the “Central Initiative Group” with Mustafa Dzhemilev at its head (the most radical and anti-regime), the “Ferghana” group led by Yuri Osmanov (the most pro-Communist), and a “Samarkand” group led by Rolan Kadiev. In the late 1980s, the three branches coalesced into two organizations. The most prominent was the Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (OKND), an outgrowth of the Central Initiative Group. The other was the National Movement of Crimean Tatars (NDKT), which lost ground following the death of its leader, Yuri Osmanov. It has since devoted the bulk of its effort to critique of the OKND. They differ in political orientation, their view of state-sponsored repatriation, and the appropriate means of reclaiming land on the peninsula.

The disenchantment with the Party, its politics, and the system as a whole was most striking when it came from previously committed Communists. For example, a one-time Communist and supporter of the NDKT worked intensively with Yuri Osmanov until his political ideology changed. He shifted his loyalties to Mustafa Dzhemilev when he realized that Marxism was a utopian project that could never work. An excerpt from his speech to the Crimean Tatar Kurultai or Parliament encapsulates the antithesis of Khalilov’s pro-communist view, and demonstrates in small measure the personal and political transformations that were involved.

Kurtbedinov stated:

Everyone has to choke on the Marxist-nationalist kasha that has been cooked up. No single ideology can embrace the richness of life. We are witnesses and victims of a system born of the utopian idea.

Although the thrust of efforts shifted to working outside party lines, a concern with Leninist nationalities policy continued. Crimean Tatar elders had taken the lead in the beginning, but efforts soon became broad-based.
Historical Inspiration

Frustrated and yet emboldened by the letter writing campaign, a core group of Crimean Tatars formed the Organization of Crimean Tatar Youth in 1961, the first mobilizing organization with a structure and a program.\textsuperscript{11} This organization reached a membership of perhaps one hundred and had a profound sense of humor about itself. My consultants recalled it like an extended lark, noting how playfully they took the organizational structure of the party as a model.\textsuperscript{12} While they were quite passionate, they never really believed they would be taken seriously—until they were arrested. At this point, the organization and its members were rapidly suppressed. However their arrests suggest that they represented a threat to the Soviet regime. In 1962, two (Seit-Amza Ymerov and Marat Ymerov) were arrested and sentenced to three and four years of hard labor, respectively. Other members of the group (such as Mustafa Dzhemilev) were fired from their jobs and expelled from educational institutions.

As a result of their work, and more broadly the work of intellectually curious Tatars as a whole, the idea that they belonged in their own sovereign republic gained credibility. Through research, Crimean Tatar young people learned with surprise that as many as five centuries ago there was a powerful Crimean Khanate and institutions of higher learning in Crimea that predated Russian institutions of a similar nature (Alexeyeva 1988). According to the current leader of the movement, this history was “oxygen” for those inundated with propaganda about how treacherous and “barbaric” the Crimean Tatar people were. Historical knowledge therefore exerted a definite magnetism and was a mobilizing factor for all ages. In personal interviews, both Mustafa Dzhemilev and Ayse Seytmuratova stressed that it was not just activists that were transformed by this approach. As Dzhemilev put it, counter-histories “give people a sense of who they are,” fostering esteem and providing a solid historical basis from which to agitate for return.\textsuperscript{13}

The life of Mustafa Dzhemilev is a well-known example of how the Crimean Tatar National Movement grew as a result of the hunger for historical knowledge. He was a baby at the time of deportation. While he has no personal recollection of the deportation, he listened to countless first-hand testimonies like the ones explored in chapter 3. The intensity of this formative experience led Dzhemilev to spend time in the Tashkent public library trying to find an explanation for the deportation. His immersion in the Tatar oral tradition inspired political activism, and led him to prison sentences, hunger strikes, and eventually leadership of the National Movement. His life story reinforces Benjamin’s view that history was the
strongest narcotic of our century (Benjamin 1983–1984: 8–9). Without it, he would not have been able to endure hunger strikes, nor would other Crimean Tatars have been able to face oncoming trains. Dzhemilev often recounts the story of researching their history in the Tashkent public library and meeting like-minded individuals. He then gave a lecture to a group of Tatars, and “. . . it was the beginning of a small movement” (Fisher 1978: 176).

Seytmuratova is another prominent activist whose career was influenced by an interest in history. The conversations with Ayse Seytmuratova related here took place for the most part in her Simferopol apartment. We had been introduced by a mutual friend. I was particularly glad to make her acquaintance because wherever I had been in Crimea and Uzbekistan, Tatars had asked if I knew her: they had listened to Seytmuratova’s voice in the darkness of the night on “Radio Freedom.” Her interpretation of their predicament had therefore shaped the stories people told about themselves and their thoughts about what was possible.

Beginning in grade school, Seytmuratova experienced a radical disjuncture between the “truth” she knew of her family’s past, and that served up in Soviet schools (Seytmuratova was deported at the age of seven). “The teachers were always saying that Tatars are traitors. Everywhere and all the time they tried to blacken us.” At the same time, she knew that her father died on the front, and that her older brother had helped Soviet intelligence efforts. This contradiction spurred her to explore the history of her people. At University, she studied the national problem, Leninist party politics, the laws of the USSR, and jurisprudence, becoming increasingly convinced that they were wrong to exile her people. As she put it, “That gave me the ability to firmly believe and insist on what I deserve: the national struggle for return and reestablishment of our sovereignty.” In spite of obstacles, she struggled to become a historian, mixing her knowledge with advocacy. Thus schoolchildren in her courses learned about Crimean Tatar partisans as well as Russian ones, and she encouraged her students of scientific communism at university to formulate their own critique. In the Crimean Tatar National Movement, her official role was identifying and locating the historical material that would support their right to return. The attraction to historical knowledge was really twofold. As Amza Ymerov, a founding member of the Organization of Crimean Tatar Youth, explained, on one level he and his compatriots felt compelled to find out why they were deported. On another level, history was necessary “to beat the Soviet regime at its own game.”

If history was “oxygen” for activists, it was also dangerous to the Soviet state. The authorities therefore did what they could to prevent people like Mustafa Dzhemilev and Seytmuratova from advancing in their studies.
Seytmuratova was initially refused admission to graduate school. In the fall of 1967, when she passed the entrance exams for the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, she was referred to a less prestigious institution in Tashkent. Several months before completing her graduate studies, she was arrested. Upon release, she was prevented from continuing her studies. Ironically, the authorities told her it was her “lack of knowledge” of Marxist–Leninist theory that was the reason. Not only had she lost a career as a historian, but constant KGB surveillance and threats on the part of security services that they would incarcerate her in a psychiatric institution led her to seek political asylum, which was granted in 1978.

“Pounding” the Authorities

Seytmuratova’s application for asylum is a good example of how dissidents began reimagining their relation with the Soviet state. In her rendering of a telephone conversation with the staff of the Central Committee, her footing shifts from assertive activist to acquiescent representative of the state. Framing it in this way helped establish her authority. This memory of power is suggestive of the power of memory.

Then I raised the question of leaving the USSR. According to the 1962 Convention, which was ratified by the Soviet Union, when a person is refused education in his country he has the right to leave the borders of the Soviet Union. . . . I started to beat, to pound Soviet authorities so they would let me out.

(...) When I called after ten days I said, “I gave you an application on such-and-such a date, my name is Ayse Seytmuratova.” “Oh, where are you? We’ve been searching for you. Please come. You will be received. They are expecting you at the Central Committee.”

This passage shows that rather than being “beaten,” Seytmuratova sees herself as “pounding” the authorities to observe her rights. Within national memory, the state that could be belligerent is imagined as polite and accommodating. As she recalls, they said “please come, they are expecting you at the Central Committee.” In the Soviet context, gentility on the part of office staff, especially of higher authorities, was by no means expected. Her performance of politeness indexes respect. It was in part by imagining a humbled Central Committee, reeducated interrogators, and chastened KGB agents that the Crimean Tatars were able to imagine their way home. This, combined with growing historical knowledge, provided the scaffolding for sentiments of a patriotic nature.
Soviet and Anti-Soviet: Playing with Polyvalence

One of the most powerful tactics was the manipulation of just what it meant to be pro- or anti-Soviet. As effective tools, the works of Marx and Lenin were brought to bear in this. For example, when I asked Seit Amza Ymerov what *rodina* or “homeland” meant, he said, “Listen! They asked me that question at my trial!” Mortified, I braced myself for comparison to KGB. But Amza smiled and, with tongue-in-cheek humor, quoted Marx. Amza recalled that he told the prosecutors that Marx had written, “Homeland is that place where the umbilical cord is cut and the first blood drops.” He described how the citation made the prosecutor livid. Clearly, the very same ideology that was supposed to be the basis of the prosecution could as easily be used against it. This comment is indicative of the linguistic performances that came to characterize the movement.

All of the activists had stories to tell about the ways in which they had, in Ymerov’s words, “tried to beat the Soviets at their own game.” Beating the Soviets at their own game typically involved reframing dissent as upholding Soviet law, and appealing to the “facts” and “reality.” In a letter to the KGB that tries to convince them to release his documents, Reshat Dzhemilev writes:

> I had no intention to spread propaganda, or slander the Soviet government. On the contrary, in my documents, in order not to make things unpleasant for myself, I always tried to base my generalizations . . . on living fact. . . .

He went on to rhetorically question whether it was he or the regime that had violated the law:

> This begs the question who, after all, in the given instance, is the violator of Soviet law? He who is pointing at these violations and asking them to be intercepted [Tatar dissidents such as himself] or they who have committed the named violations, who stubbornly refuse to investigate the given facts pertaining to violation of the law? (unpublished manuscript)

Dzhemilev’s question suggests that in challenging the regime he is *upholding*, not violating, Soviet law. His discourse is a litany of Soviet abuse that contains elements that align him with authority (the “law”) at the same time that it itemizes maltreatment at the hands of the regime. As Ries (1997) has also argued, this kind of discourse works by *inverting* existing hierarchies of value rather than discarding them. This consultant’s approach dovetails with observations of Peter Reddaway who identified “legalism” as
among the distinguishing features of the movement (Reddaway 1998: 231). Other groups such as the Baptists also tried to use Soviet law to advance their cause. Even today, the Tatars stress that they act openly, legally, and peacefully.

Taking it to Moscow: Lobbying and Demonstrations

In the 1960s, the elders began sending small delegations to lobby their cause in Moscow. Ayse Seytmuratova was among them. The new approach created a two-tier structure composed of “initiative groups” of activists willing to go to Moscow, and large numbers of supporters who participated in the movement more quietly from home by donating money, signing petitions, and supporting the families of activists who had been imprisoned. The goal, at least officially, was still to gather signatures and petition the government without leaving the frame of law.

Beginning in the summer of 1965, there was an almost uninterrupted presence of Crimean Tatar delegates in Moscow. On average, this included ten to fifteen people but at the times of major demonstrations, many more. They produced leaflets, or “information” bulletins, now referred to as samizdat literature about their activities, which were then distributed to exiled Crimean Tatars. Those in Moscow also pooled their efforts with dissidents like Petr Grigorenko, Andrei Sakharov, Elena Bonner, and Sergey Kovalyov. As a result of the permanent, rotating lobby of which Seytmuratova was a part, senior members of the Party and state leadership realized they could no longer ignore Tatar concerns and began receiving delegations. Out of the third meeting came an important shift in the position of the Soviet state: the decree of 1967, which exculpated them from the charge of mass treason during World War II. While it did absolutely nothing to concretely reintegrate them, it prompted many to attempt return.

Searches and Seizures

It was in 1964 that the Crimean Tatar elders chose Seytmuratova, then 27, to deliver signed petitions. This provoked the authorities to search her family’s apartment. Listening to stories of searches, seizures, and arrest, it
became clear that however they were experienced at the time, as viewed retrospectively these encounters with the agents of the state were not instances in which “the state” struck with inimitable power. Rather, the Crimean Tatars remember entering into dialogue with authorities and not infrequently outwitting them. For example, one friend recalled sauntering into her father’s study while the KGB were searching a different room, inserting documents into her pants, and sailing past more authorities on her way out the door, ostensibly on her way to school.

Along similar lines, Seytmuratova warned members of the State Security Committee in the midst of a search that they had better not ruin her home canning. Thus searches and arrests are at least retrospectively figured as conversations in which the Tatars are as likely to reprimand the authorities as vice versa. For Seytmuratova, an apartment search was a moment of profound transformation.

Mother opened the door and immediately seven or eight people came in. They announced they were sanctioned by the Procuracy to conduct a search. They turned everything over, even examining the canning.

I had made compote; we made compote and jam ourselves. They even wanted to open the pickles! I said, “Excuse me, but those are supplies, you’ll have to pay for them!” So they didn’t touch them!

They were looking for anti-Soviet documents. Anti-Soviet documents. I said: “I don’t have any anti-Soviet documents. I have documents of the National Movement. They are all copies of documents we submitted to the Central Committee, Supreme Soviet, and Council of Ministers. These are official documents, how can they be ‘anti-Soviet’ if we are appealing to Soviet authority?” They took everything.

Then on the fourteenth they came and said I had to go to Moscow as a “witness.” They didn’t tell me they were going to arrest me. I want to add that when they did the search captain Akchurin said to mother:

“Tell your daughter not to work on this issue!!” The Crimean Tatar National Movement, that is.

My mother answered, “We raised her in such a way that she would work on this problem. If she’s not going to work on it, I am!”

I understood then that my mother was on my side. That was a big support for me. That really strengthened me. . . . Yes. Mother was a great help to me.22

Her mother’s statement that they raised her to work on Tatar issues demonstrates the way in which parental strategies of recalling discussed in chapter 4 link up with efforts toward political mobilization. Like other mothers who were sympathetic toward the movement, Seytmuratova’s mother chose to steer her toward the struggle to return, rather than toward
self-preservation. She learned that in spite of the unpleasantness of the search, her family supported her unequivocally in fighting for her peoples’ rights.

In the passage above, Seytmuratova plays with the categories “Soviet” and “anti-Soviet” by suggesting her documents cannot by definition be anti-Soviet because they conform to the protocol of the Party and are arguing in favor of Leninist nationality policy. The Soviet authorities’ attempts to suppress activists and forestall national sovereignty are taken by the Tatars to be the truly anti-Soviet course. “Soviet” and “anti-Soviet” consequently flip positions. In this manner, she creates her own landscape in which to resist. She dramatizes the power differential between speakers, positioning and repositioning herself in an ever more influential relation to the regime until she and other Tatars were convinced that it was they who were right and it was the authorities who were mistaken. It was in this way that they inspired collective action.

Here it should be noted that the forms of activity of the Crimean Tatar National Movement lent themselves well to female participation. The “cells” or “nodes” of activity that formed operated informally among networks of acquaintances and were accessible to women. As Barbara Einhorn has noted citing research by Pippa Norris, assessments of women’s political participation have to take into account both the locus and modus operandi of women’s participation. Women are most likely to be involved at the local, rather than the national level in a wide range of neighborhood, civic, and other organizations (Einhorn 1993: 164–165). Crimean Tatar women were unequivocal that men supported them in these activities by taking on domestic duties. Several female activists claimed that their husbands fulfilled cooking and childcare responsibilities so that they could attend meetings and strategy sessions. I think socialist ideals of female workforce participation and political activism suggested (if not making manifest) a model of strong women, engaged and involved. This is not to say that the Crimean Tatars are paragons of gender equality, but that both men and women, with their different statuses, talents, and roles, were utilized for the purposes of the movement. Women made respected contributions to the National Movement, but were also used in the more conventional sense of the term when, for example, the organizers of demonstrations put the women and children in the front line of the demonstration because they were less likely to be clubbed or tear-gassed by police.

Arrest

After the authorities searched her home, they took Seytmuratova into custody, ostensibly for a brief period of questioning. But Seytmuratova
departed for Moscow knowing she would not be back in three days. Recalling these events, she shares her internal dialogue and strategizing.

When they brought me to the party headquarters of Samarkand Oblast, there was a man with a piece of clean paper lying in front of him—turned over, it turns out. He stood, turned over the paper and said: “You’re under arrest.”


“Because you are engaged in anti-Soviet this, that, and the other thing,” he replied.

I said, “I am not engaged in anti-Sovietism but the restoration of justice! Therefore even if you hold me for thirty years in prison and if you let me out alive, I’ll come out and say ‘return my homeland’ again. Do you understand?”

He replied, “You’re under arrest.”

In this linguistic performance, Seytmuratova marks the places where she smiles, where she is being sarcastic, and where shock is experienced. Thus sentiment was effective in helping to describe her experience; in conveying the meaning that was to be made; and in fostering a sense of dignity. Taking this affective stance seems to mitigate the fact that she was, after all, arrested. The moment is reframed as a pedagogical encounter in which the state is enlightened about the true nature of their activities. This is made possible by the characteristic play on words questioning the regime at its core. Seytmuratova’s “anti-Soviet this, that, and the other thing” creates levity, but not everyone spoke of the humorous side of the struggle.

The Battle of Minds

The Crimean Tatar delegations that were sent to Moscow eventually systematized their operation to deliver appeals to government bodies. While they did this within legal parameters, the increase in activity was enough to stimulate reprisals on the part of the authorities. The authorities unwittingly stimulated the movement, for each reprisal stimulated more protest.

Beginning in 1966, the first large demonstrations and new arrests were carried out. It was at this time that Timur Dğași and Ayse Seytmuratova were arrested for “inciting national discord” (razzhiganie natsional’noi rozni). Dğași refers to his interrogation as “a battle of minds” in which he did not stop strategizing, even during his interrogation. He decided from the moment he was taken into custody that he had two major goals for the
investigation. This is emblematic of the proactive stance of the Crimean Tatar *initiativniki*: rather than be made passive subjects of interrogation, they often tried to make constructive use of their predicament.

His first objective was not giving testimony that would lead to the arrest or imprisonment of anyone else. The second goal was education. Convinced that the six interrogators knew very little about Crimean Tatar history, he set out to illuminate their problems. The goal is not, however, as straightforward as it seems. For one thing, Dagçi’s knowledge of Soviet law and Marxist–Leninist theory often enabled him to manipulate his interrogators. As he describes it, the prosecutors became almost apoplectic when he quoted Marx and Lenin in answer to their questions—it was against the rules for them to enter this in the protocol. His first interrogators became so angry that they called the head of the party at the Committee for State Security to take over the interrogation. Dagçi also antagonized his interlocutors: one of his interrogator’s names was Vinogradov, from the root word “grapes.” Dagçi used the name to make a quip about wine, setting the man on edge.

Dagçi’s recollections of his conversations with the prosecutor are particularly suggestive of the way the Crimean Tatar activists had begun to imagine their relations with the state. Dagçi portrays Fomin, the head prosecutor who took over the interrogation, as positively transformed by their encounter. Dagçi alleges that Fomin (who also interrogated other Crimean Tatar activists and life story consultants) wept when Dagçi was released, saying that he had “studied” Dagçi in such depth that he knew him better than his mother. To add an ironic kick to this story, Dagçi mentioned that Fomin told him that if it were not for the circumstances, he would recommend him for membership in the Communist Party. Rhetorically at least, Dagçi’s trial is reduced to a “circumstance,” or detail marring his otherwise strong candidacy for the Party in the eyes of the prosecutor.24 There are competing interpretations and conflicting recollections about his release. For example, Mustafa Dzhemilev tells a different story that portrays Dagçi as capitulating. However as Dagçi recalls the parting, he is redeemed and rehabilitated. In fact, Fomin has been converted to his view of history.

**Speaking with the State**

Seytmuratova departed from her designated behind-the-scenes role of collecting historical materials when she found herself among a delegation that was being received by a Communist Party official. Her recollection of the conversation diverges from the memories discussed in chapter 4 when we
were exploring the contingent nature of memories within the family. By contrast, Seytmuratova’s recollection of this conversation was consistent with the way she described the event ten years previously, in writing, for inclusion in Edward Allworth’s volume, *Tatars of the Crimea* (Allworth 1988, 1998). Seytmuratova’s ability to perform the conversation from memory emerged from practiced telling that has accrued persuasive power. This conversation helped build a compelling case: the legalese not only jived with the movement’s ideology, but was well suited for wider consumption.

The official, Stroganov, challenged the delegation to concretize their claim of discrimination, saying:

> Who is insulting you? Name at least one last name! Well, you say, “at the bazaar, in the store, in line, it is written in books, in the papers,” but name one last name, who is insulting you!  
> Well, who are we going to name? We can’t name anyone.  
> Then the devil got the better of me and I said, “I’ll name one,” and then I fell silent.  
> The Tatars [in the room] said, “Well, as long as you know, go ahead and say.”  
> “Alright,” I said, but I am quiet because I don’t know what else to say!!  
> “Alright,” I said, not afraid, “take it down: the first ‘name’ of that citizen of the Soviet Union is the Defense Committee of 1944, the 11th of May!”  
> He looks at me.  
> “Record!!” I say. “The second ‘name’ of the citizen of the Soviet Union is the law of 1946 ‘Concerning the reformation of the Crimean ASSR into the Crimean Oblast,’ ” I say. “You need names of citizens that offend us? We are insulted by Soviet authority itself!”

The unfolding, through dialogue, of her position toward the Soviet state creates a sense of sudden recognition. Seytmuratova’s style delivers her point by personifying power. The state, embodied by Stroganov, is the evil one, paternalistic and threatening all at the same time. The conversation is as effective a tool for teaching the people in the narrative, her colleagues and compatriots, as it is outside the brackets, educating the audiences of Allworth’s volume.

The passage above is transcribed from our tape-recorded interview and differs from Allworth (1988, 1998) in entailing a longer conversation, a dramatization of the entire event instead of just its key components. The narrative she weaves about this encounter is really a performance of the event, involving treating “Soviet law” as a “citizen” or offending party. The brilliance of this move is that it allows her to frame the encounter with Stroganov as a pedagogical one. The way in which she opposes rather than
agreeing with this “citizen” contributes to the kinds of meanings she is able
to construct (Bakhtin 1981). Her dramatization of the authorities’ shock
and dismay fortifies her emergent authority within the dialogue. She is not
*usurping* the authority of officials through voicing, but *creating* her own
power and authority in relation to them by means of a juxtaposition of
voices, a verbal dueling. Many of her stories dramatize her point in a rich
interaction of voices and meanings.25 She continued:

The [other] Tatars started whispering ( . . . ) and his mouth was hanging open.
[I said]
“Soviet authority itself insults us and any citizen is going to insult us on the
basis of these laws. No one will judge them because there is a law charging us.”
He says, “What is your name?”
(laughter)
I say, “I’m not insulting myself, you don’t need my name.”
Why? Are you afraid?
No, I am not afraid. If I was I would not have come here, but I’m curious
why you ask my name [when] you asked who’s insulting us. Until those laws are
revoked any person, any citizen not just of the USSR but the whole world can
insult us. And not one judge will defend us. If you revoke the law that offends
us, after that if “Ivanov” or “Petrov” calls me a traitor, I can drag him into court.
Where do you work?
As a teacher.
Where?
Samarkand University.
What department?
Scientific communism.
“You shouldn’t have!!” he says.
(laughter)

Stroganov was so angered that he cut the meeting short, but Seytmuratova
had made her point. Seytmuratova had delivered a challenge to the leader
by suggesting, as a *teacher* of scientific communism, that Soviet authority
and Soviet laws are offensive and injurious.

At this point, we may compare her statement to how the same conver-
sation was rendered in Allworth’s *Tatars of the Crimea*. In writing, she recalls
that she also said: “And the third ‘name’ is the edict of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union from 1956” [on the prohibition of
Crimean Tatars from returning to their homeland in Crimea] (1988: 33).
This third “name” or piece of legislation is overlooked when she recalls the
conversation in 1998. Otherwise, both renderings drive the same point
home: the Crimean Tatars were offended by Soviet law. Until the law
changed, they saw themselves as upholding higher principles than the state.
In the oral version, the spontaneous nature of her claims is emphasized.
The others were surprised at her outburst and felt it could lead to severe punishment. Also missing from the written version is Stroganov’s shock that the “anti-Soviet” remarks came from someone who specialized in scientific communism. Following the meeting, Seytmuratova was under constant surveillance by the KGB. Far from improvisational, this kind of remembering is a form of interpretive labor, a kind of “national memory” that promotes the movement. Seytmuratova’s rendering is both cant and critique, a political performance prefiguring success.

Terror and Soviet Power: Encounters with the KGB

This is not to argue that activists proceeded unconstrained. A closer look at their interactions with the KGB tempers any representation of success. Within the KGB, special division was created to lead a countermovement and oversee their activities. The Crimean Tatars’ understanding of KGB measures is integral to their conception of themselves as political actors.

The regime’s efforts to weaken the movement were sophisticated. They began with cultivating a set of “informers” or osvedomitel. These are not KGB operatives per se, but gather information about the movement and relay it to KGB officers on a regular basis. The KGB did not trust Crimean Tatars enough to allow them to move up the ranks. The idea was to create a segment of the Crimean Tatar population that was obedient and subservient to the security services. Aside from subtle persuasion and promises of rewards, there were also cruder tactics such as blackmail. When Tatars were accused of petty stealing or infringing the rules (nearly universal in the Soviet system) they were given a choice between being fired and losing the most important document for securing future employment, the “work book” (trudovai a knizhka), or agreeing to become osvedomitel (informers), which often appeared the lesser of two evils.

However, because the individuals they wanted most tended to be activists, an individual approach was also called for. This leads Seytmuratova to refer to the agents of the KGB as “finely tuned specialists in psychological assessment.” The agents would determine what the activists’ psychological weaknesses were (i.e., thirst for power, desire to be liked, fear of criticism) and design their recruitment accordingly. They succeeded in “breaking” activists through these tactics. Surveillance, prison sentences, and arrests took a physical and psychological toll that enabled them to incapacitate others. A profound paranoia permeates my fieldnotes, which ponder its contagious nature. The activists interviewed suffered
from bleeding ulcers, diabetes, cancer, kidney disease, exhaustion, and depression.

Fear is also evident in Tatar interpretations of incidents that happened to me: a stolen address book, later retrieved and announced as “lost” on the radio was the work of the special services/secret police; being stopped by a self-professed agent for taking a photograph and detained for questioning was interpreted and presented to me as the state’s attempt to frighten me and dissuade me from pursuing my topic; and the passport check in the neighborhood was for the purpose of locating the foreigner, who was duly hidden during the proceedings. Whether or not their interpretations are realistic or not they point to a fear that is endemic, even in the post-Soviet period. The closer I became to my informants, the more I found myself thinking inside these categories, wondering, as they did, whether someone had an ulterior motive in speaking with me. Stalin’s plan to eliminate the Crimean Tatars failed, but the state succeeded in inculcating an everyday kind of fear. The Soviet state has ceased to exist as a de facto formal institution, yet individuals continue to project their fear and perform its effects through self-surveillance.

Soviet authorities also tried to deflate enthusiasm and discourage participation in the movement by presenting leaders in an unfavorable light. To this end, they arrested activists on trumped-up charges. In the case of Khairov, it was possession of a knife that they had planted at his work site, although charges like “disturbing the peace” (buliganstvo) were also quite common. Khairov was concerned about being charged with theft because it could damage the movement. And nothing seemed as demoralizing as having one’s political convictions translated into terms of petty crime.

The Crimean Tatars’ tactics evolved in response to the changing parameters, and, in a few instances, the parameters changed in response to their activism. According to Seit Amza Ymerov, the Procuracy of the Soviet Union created a new statute in 1966 to address the new forms of opposition. In Uzbekistan it was referred to as statute 191; in Russia as 190 and in Tajikistan 187. Soviet authorities also tried to wear down activists by incarcerating them with regular criminals. Reshat Dzhemilev, who served a total of eight years, asserts that the most difficult aspect of his last sentence was being deprived of people he could talk to. It was also not uncommon for the authorities to assign cellmates who were really undercover KGB agents, part of the campaign of “psychological warfare.”

The authorities’ strategy of portraying activists unfavorably worked. But it was also subject to inversion. Arrests and prison sentences became indicators of dedication to the movement. So movement activists built reputations and identities based on the statutes according to which they had been tried. Once the movement was underway, activists garnered power through
their association with opposition to the regime. And the more their opposition became known, the more real return seemed to be. As just one example, the authorities were uncomfortable with Seytmuratova’s forays into history, and her ability to influence. It had long been noted that she had talent for mobilizing. As Seytmuratova pointed out, her verdict therefore included the statement that she was “especially dangerous.” She saw this as an honor, raising her stature above those who were judged as simply “dangerous.” Dzhemilev, the current leader, mentioned this same classification to me in a separate interview. Such convictions were far from being a source of embarrassment or shame.31

The KGB was successful in undermining the Tatars’ efforts by sweeping some activists off the stage. But the most compelling reason that the KGB was the single largest obstacle to the Tatars’ repatriation effort was that it worked from within by engendering fear and paranoia. This dynamic has a great deal in common with the relationship between the state and its citizens as seen by Taussig, who viewed it as a relationship of terror. While the contagious spread is the same, a more everyday kind of fear is apt for the former Soviet Union today. People chose the moments when we sat on isolated park benches, or were walking in the woods, to mumble or whisper what was most significant. A friend explained that it is not just with me that he is careful. When he meets with a friend (and fellow activist) of many years in his hut on the outskirts of Simferopol, they write notes to each other under the fluorescent light of a single bulb. Knowing there might be cameras installed in his makeshift, sheet metal shelter, and knowing they might be listened to, they forego speech and write notes instead. One will write a note, cover it with his hand, pass it across the table. After reading the note, the other would tear up the page to remove it from the camera’s view and reply in the same manner. They repeat the process until they are through. Is there a camera? A “bug” in the wall? Are “they” listening now, or only intermittently? In the end, it doesn’t matter because they have internalized the fear.

The effectiveness of the KGB therefore lay not just in objective activities, but along the lines Bourdieu and Foucault have suggested that the most effective means of control is control of the mind. The fear authorities engender contributes to other forms violence (Green 1999). The most disastrous implications of this fear were wrought out between the activists. All of the initsiativniki (initsiatory) who acted as major consultants for this study had specific examples of activities that had been undertaken to alienate them from one another. Even the activists who seemed to work well together would express suspicion about one another privately. This is not unique to the Crimean Tatar movement, but a measure of KGB success.32
KGB Imaginings

Given the fear, it is remarkable that this was not the end of the movement. As has been argued for other socialist settings, states’ capacity to affect events, produce meanings, and work themselves into the bodies of their subjects depends on how they are imagined as entities (Mueggler 2001: 4). We know something about how Crimean Tatar activists imagined the KGB (now SBU) by their recollections of its activities, and their conversations with its agents.

Some of my consultants recalled the KGB playfully, portraying its agents as fumbling. For example, Dagçi recalls: “It was always so easy to know when we were being followed. For example, the plane lands and you see two men standing in the rain. No one else is around and when you walk by them, they turn around and follow.” He quipped that he once asked them, “If I can avoid you, how do you catch spies?”

Others recalled a well-socialized KGB. Mustafa Khalilov described the experience of having specific agents politely follow him for years on end. Once, one of them showed up at his front door to talk, hoping to capitalize on Tatar hospitality and be invited in for coffee. Khalilov apologized for violating the rules of Tatar hospitality and they held the conversation outside. Khalilov’s recollection portrays a gracious and benevolent man. Other activists proceeded with more design. For example, when agents arrived to search his family’s apartment, Khairov used the very same hospitality to subvert the effort, inviting them for coffee, and laying the table. He felt that the best and perhaps only way to find out what the KGB had in store was through conversation. These comments should not be taken as a measure of the KGB’s power, influence, or control but as windows on how they hoped to surmount obstacles to the movement.

Seytmuratova’s recollections of her imprisonment and trial take us a step deeper into how their encounter with the KGB was imagined. Her recollections imply that however frightening the experience may have been, there is still an ability to recast the characters. Following her first arrest, Seytmuratova was interrogated in Lifortovo prison for nine months. She recalls that she was then tried on May 19 and 20, 1967 according to statute 74 of the criminal codex of the RSFSR. Many of her dramatizations of events have a movement from darkness to light, utmost seriousness to hilarity. There was often a transformation taking place within her narrative as her interlocutors realize with shock or surprise what she was saying. In the process, her identity could vacillate from wise woman to clown in such a way as to produce a new, third perspective on a given situation. This is her way of forging an interpretation that could potentially motivate action.
Nowhere are the contrasts more starkly drawn than with respect to her encounters with the penal system and the KGB.

AS: Big gates opened, the car entered, and it turns out to be Lifortovo prison—the isolation chamber (izoliator) of the KGB of the USSR. When they moved me in, they brought me, opened a cell, took my things away from me and gave me a big, blue dress. I put it on and it was so big for me that it was falling off and the collar was down to here (motioning) and I had to hold it like this so it wouldn’t fall off! They gave me a mattress and blanket there, but how to carry them? The attendant said, “I’ll help. You hold the dress.”

So I hold the dress and they opened it [my cell] it was on the second floor. I went in and there were two women in the cell. They had rollers! The attendant put the mattress down, walked out, locked us inside. ( . . . )

Well, I didn’t let on. I look at those women and they are so funny in handmade rollers of paper!

GU: rollers so that their hair . . . ?

AS: would be curly. (laughter) Rollers made of paper. They were so funny! I looked at them and laughed. “Hello,” I said, “What are your names?”

One says “Elena,” the other says “Tanya.” “My name is Ayse,” I said.

“Now let’s get some sleep.” I made my bed too, and fell right to sleep.34

In Seytmuratova’s description of her arrival at the prison in Moscow in 1967, darkness is placed in contrast to light and the comic is pushed up against the calamitous. We can imagine her traveling from the airport in the cavernous backseat of an automobile, arriving in the dark of night, and seeing the huge gates of Lifortovo prison open as if by an omniscient Big Brother. For generations of Soviets, this prison of the KGB was imagined as a hell on earth. Through the use of juxtaposition, her dramatization invites a listener to see another side: there are extreme and even absurd associations. The positioning of opposites creates humor by linking categories of experience that are ordinarily understood as separate: we see a risqué prison uniform and rollers in the same frame as incarceration. This view can be contrasted with other views of imprisonment that more fully draw out its nature. R. Dzhemilev recounts his experiences in Norilsk where inmates were not only starved in unheated cells, but were bitten by rats and were forced to swallow electrodes and metal objects as part of an “experiment” in disciplinary techniques.35

When it came to the interrogation, Seytmuratova recalls being every bit as assertive as in previous encounters. She describes being led into a room where she was asked to sit at a tiny table. At a larger table sat a man in black, who she later found out was Vasilli Fedorovich Fomin, who headed major dissident cases. The man in black she describes points to the sinister aspect of the KGB and the diminutive size of the table demonstrates how
even the furniture in the room was designed to make the defendant feel small. Based on statements like “Listen to me,” however, Seytmuratova refused to feel insignificant. After being scolded by Fomin, the prosecutor, Seytmuratova reports to have said:

“Are you finished?” I asked. And then I said, “Then listen to me! How many labels are you going to hang on us? Traitors? Anti-Soviet? Treason? You returned from the front but my father died defending you and Soviet power! But you robbed him of seven children, throwing them out barefoot and hungry, left them for dead. If you’re going to talk to me like that, I won’t come in here again. I’ll sit here for thirty years but I won’t come in for questioning. Take me out!” I said. “Right now, take me out! You won’t see me here again! I’m going to speak with you in Tatar. I have the right. That’s it. From this day on, hire a translator!” And they took me out.\textsuperscript{36}

Seytmuratova then laughed, saying that she spent a whole month in the cell while they tried to sort out her demands. The punch line of the story is that she “marinated them” for two months while they searched for an interpreter. Seytmuratova’s statement that she “marinated” them is akin to leaving someone to “stew in their own juices.” Like “pounding” the authorities to allow her to emigrate, the metaphors and aphorisms she chooses are loaded with power. Seytmuratova is not alone in communicating in this style: describing conversations through reported speech is a widespread characteristic of speech in Russian (Ries 1997). Countering our received notions about what is entailed in interrogation, Seytmuratova describes how she used what she knew to be her rights under the Soviet Constitution (the right to an interpreter) to maintain a sense of control.

Seytmuratova speaks back to the state that has condemned her people, and “educates” the prosecutors about her rights. The evil prosecutor is in black but the imprisoned are in curlers. The prosecutor loses control of the situation while she, the interrogated, takes charge. The Soviet authorities are the personification of evil, and she a paragon of Leninism.

The KGB agents that pursued the Tatars were experts in psychological evaluation. A testament to the Tatars’ skills, apart from their own claims to both victimization and success, is that the KGB is known to have had not just selected agents, but an entire division devoted to subverting the movement.

Seytmuratova’s shifts in footing portray the authorities as weak and ineffectual. This helped create a vision of the movements’ prospects and possibilities that held wide appeal. In part as a result of the concerted efforts of Crimean Tatars protesting at demonstrations on her behalf, she was released straight from the courtroom with a sentence of three years \textit{uslovno} (conditional), meaning freedom on condition of good behavior.
Her stance helped shape the structure of feeling for homeland. First, she was a presence in the early years when they were solidifying the historical legitimacy of their claims. Then, after her emigration in 1978, she became instrumental in psychological, “micro” mobilization: her voice was heard on BBC and Freedom and she was listened to by thousands of Crimean Tatars. Many recalled waking to listen to her in the middle of the night, and gaining tremendous reassurance from her statements. In this way, she became a leader whose thinking shaped that of countless others. After emigration, she began working with international news agencies and political bodies like the United Nations.

One of the ideas that Seytmuratova helped to perpetuate in the movement was the value of homeland. In spite of her comfort in New York, Seytmuratova argues that her true and only home is really the historic one in Crimea. She made this point in public speeches that were then quoted in the local newspapers. This resonated with Crimean Tatars I knew because just as she chooses life in Crimea over the comfort of America, they had given up favorable conditions in Uzbekistan. She stresses that her relative material comfort in New York was not enough to compensate for the longing she had to return. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it became possible for her to divide her time between Crimea and New York.

Soviet authorities inculcated fear through the use of propaganda, arrests, incarceration, and interrogation. They co-opted some activists and placed informers in the midst of others. Crimean Tatar activists’ reaction, however, is not what Taussig (1987, 1992, 1997), and more recently Skidmore (2003), would envisage for a situation in which terror had become routine. Skidmore suggests that there are two main conditioned responses to terror, the first of which is an absolute lack of expectation. Her Burmese consultants “learned to get rid of expectation as a response to events.” The second conditioned response was “emotional flatness, a calm that emerges from the panic occasioned by terror of the military coming to arrest you. . . .” (Skidmore 2003: 18). By contrast, Tatars developed a heightened sense of expectation through imagining their success. They describe an “action and reaction” scenario in which their efforts were met with attempts to dominate, which were met with increased resistance. New leaders took over when former ones were silenced or imprisoned. Neither does the second condition, of emotional flatness, obtain. Crimean Tatars’ righteous indignation suggests a very different economy of affect. The historical knowledge contributed to righteous indignation and impassioned statements that Homeland is “everything.” Far from “flat,” individuals produced impassioned slogans like Homeland or Death.
The ability to figure the state as an interlocutor is particularly significant given the frustration that many felt about the unseen, unheard, faceless power of the state. One consultant speculated that he would work with the security services if only to have an opportunity to tell them what he thinks, face-to-face. Another, whose home had been repeatedly searched described how her neighbor knew it was not ordinary visitors who entered her apartment while she was at work. When visitors come, they always leave their shoes at the door and bring their coats inside. The shoes are then turned around by the hosts or their children so that they are facing the right direction when it is time to leave. When the KGB went to search her apartment, they left three massive pairs of shoes outside the door, as well as their coats, which alerted her neighbor that something was wrong. Her neighbor could not identify them because they exited *with their backs to her* at all times, sliding away in their massive shoes without ever turning their faces toward the peephole.

**Lenin as Symbol, Lenin as Subversion**

In addition to inverting pro- and anti-Soviet behavior, Crimean Tatars promoted Leninism as a subversive tactic. The latter undermined the Soviet authorities’ ability to make a convincing argument *against* granting them freedom and rights. Protest in the form of admiration for Lenin and Leninist nationality policy created a clash of symbols that was difficult to mute. Soviet officials tried, but never completely silenced it, considering the centrality of Lenin to the ideological infrastructure of the Soviet state.

As the movement gained mass appeal, the number of meetings and demonstrations increased. In the late 1970s, Tatars decided to lay a ceremonial wreath at the foot of a Lenin monument to commemorate his nationalities policy and the founding of the Crimean ASSR. They secured permission, but the authorities then tried to persuade the organizers to call off the commemoration. Khalilov told me that under pressure, they agreed to lay the wreath in silence. Before Lenin’s next birthday, a fence was erected around the monument so they tried to place flowers around the fence instead. When the birthday grew close the next year, the Crimean Tatars discovered that the authorities had *removed* the Lenin monument and it was missing on his birthday! Crimean Tatars tell this story as an *anecdote* or joke: it was ironic that the laying of wreaths to a principal architect of socialism could be prohibited in a socialist state. The popular *anecdote* shows that the clash of symbols did not just affect activists and intellectuals, but a wide spectrum of individuals. The Chirchik riot, Mubarek, and the TASS announcement further elaborate this point.
Chirchik

In addition to pressuring authorities in Moscow, Crimean Tatars held a major demonstration in Chirchik, Uzbekistan, a few minutes from the capital city of Tashkent in 1968. They gathered from surrounding areas to hear speeches calling for a return to Lenin’s nationality policy and the reestablishment of the Crimean ASSR. The consultant I lived with in Chirchik recalled this event as a violent one. When they refused to disperse, police and military forces used water hoses and irritating gas against them, as well as wrestled them into the backs of trucks. Scores were arrested, although in the end a much smaller number, perhaps a dozen, were charged with disturbing the peace. From the demonstrator’s perspective, this was a galvanizing moment: it became patently clear that politics of the Soviet state did not match its rhetoric. They redoubled their efforts, sending even more representatives to Moscow to present their complaint.

Mubarek

Activists were successful in creating grounds for resistance through the promotion of history, the manipulation of key symbols, and the mobilization of sentiments. That this process made a difference is evident in Tatars’ reaction to political and policy shifts. Similar to the creation of Birobidzhan as a republic for Jews within the Soviet Union, the authorities invited the Crimean Tatars to settle the Mubarek and Baharistan raions in Kashka Darya Oblast of Uzbekistan in the 1980s. These areas, south of Tashkent and Bukhara, were sparsely populated at the time. They were promised housing, jobs, and cultural institutions of their own.

The KGB succeeded in recruiting a few prominent Tatars to advocate the people settle this area. But they failed to gain anything resembling broad-based support. Even though the prospect of sovereignty was held out, it lacked referents in Crimean Tatar memory and history, holding little appeal. Those graduating from the department of Tatar language and literature were given assignments to that region, but they protested vociferously, staging a sit-in at the University and categorically refusing to accept their assignments. Activists point to their wholesale rejection of Mubarek as “natural,” considering the lack of historical ties. But it is also a measure of the movement’s success in inculcating patriotism toward the historic homeland. Few were taken in by the allure of a territorial unit to call their own—it had to be the Crimean homeland. The stance against Mubarek continues to shape relations among Tatars today: those who moved to the region or advocated on behalf of it are now viewed with suspicion and resentment.
Another measure of the movement’s success is the widespread disdain for another official policy, orgnabor. In order to quiet the Tatars and keep them in Central Asia, the authorities also crafted an ersatz plan of repatriation, claiming they would resettle all in “organized” fashion. This process is commonly referred to as orgnabor, or organized selection, whereby families (believed to be obedient to the authorities) were resettled in Crimea, primarily the northern steppe region. While some families took advantage of this program, activists were opposed to it, taking this as yet another way in which the Soviet Union tried to forestall complete repatriation: officials could tell families that if they would only wait peacefully in Uzbekistan, they, too, would be returned. At the rate the officials undertook this, repatriation would be very slow indeed.

A related practice, verbovka, resulted in the relocation of perhaps one hundred and fifty families or one thousand people to Crimea. One consultant who was subject to this verbovka said they offered his family and his parents apartments in Simferopol. As he saw it, they were trying to “buy” him after the attempts to put him away in prison failed. He imagines that sooner or later they would have spread rumors that he was working for them. Like other activists being released from prison in the late 1980s, he was told that if he ceased his political activities and stopped issuing “propaganda” about repatriation, he would be relocated. This would have been a Faustian bargain. Rather than give up the fight for the Crimean Tatar peoples’ repatriation, he elected to remain active in politics, and live in Central Asia. After all, the goal was for all Crimean Tatars to return to the historic homeland.

The TASS Announcement and the 1987 Gromyko Commission

With the advent of glasnost and perestroika, the Crimean Tatar National Movement underwent a fundamental shift. Liberalization made it possible to engage in new forms of organization, and expand their protest. On July 23 and 24, 1987, several hundred Crimean Tatars gathered for an unprecedented demonstration in Red Square. Consultants recall the euphoria of the time, when they captured international attention: their protest registered in international news and sparked numerous letters from dissidents and human rights groups across the world. Soviet authorities responded by rapidly sweeping the Crimean Tatars out of Red Square and then publishing a TASS (Soviet News Agency) announcement.
The announcement, now referred to as “the TASS announcement,” proclaimed the formation of the Gromyko Commission to discuss solutions to the Crimean Tatars’ problems. The announcement included a public admission that the forced deportation of the entire Crimean Tatar people had been unjust. But the TASS announcement also contained statements that the Crimean Tatars had burned people in ovens during World War II and described the Tatars’ activities during World War II as “anti-Soviet.” This was a picture that simply could not be reconciled with the view that the Crimean Tatars had developed about their past.

Rather than be intimidated, the Crimean Tatars argued that the accusations were just plain wrong. The Germans destroyed their victims by two means: execution by firing squad and gas in sealed trucks. They ask if there had in fact been ovens, why didn’t the Soviets call attention to them in 1944, when they most needed proof? Tatars acknowledge only that they had to shovel dirt over bodies in ditches under the Germans. The inclusion of the deeply insulting allegations incensed Tatars and convinced them to look not to the regime, but to the National Movement. The Crimean Tatars were skeptical that the commission led by Gromyko would reach a solution. After all, Soviet leaders had repeatedly promised to take measures and then let the Tatars down. They were no longer willing to wait.

The TASS charges also destabilized their relationship with other groups, making the appeal of an ethnically defined homeland even stronger. One consultant recalled an Uzbek coworker who arrived at work the next day and stated it was a good thing that he had divorced his Crimean Tatar wife some months previously because as it turns out, the Tatars are a “traitorous” people. Others recalled stories of interethnic marriages breaking up and harassment at work. Reactions to the TASS announcement reveal in small measure how linking ethnicity to territory breeds enmity.

Agitation?

The nationalist sentiments stirred by the movement failed to encompass all: for some, righteous anger about the TASS announcement fueled a desire to return, but others simply didn’t want to be left behind. This is a sensitive topic. There were rumors, particularly widespread among Russians and Uzbeks I spoke with, that nationally inclined individuals had “agitated” for return, using the techniques of Soviet politics in which they were well schooled. There seems to be some truth to this claim for the small slice of the Crimean Tatar population, primarily from among the working class, that now feels betrayed that Crimean Tatar leaders put out a call to
repatriate without having adequately thought through the provision of jobs, housing, infrastructure, and cultural institutions.

A Political Turnaround: 1989

The Gromyko Commission antagonized the Crimean Tatars and pushed them farther into the arms of the National Movement. But the next Commission, headed by Yanaev was more sympathetic. In May and June of 1989, the Congress of Peoples Deputies of the USSR met and was markedly more receptive to Crimean Tatar concerns. A Soviet of Nationalities was elected that created a special commission under the leadership of Yanaev. The Yanaev Commission recommended the full political rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars, the cancellation of any acts in effect that were of a repressive or discriminatory nature, and advocated Crimean Tatars’ right to return to Crimea. The commission proposed to reestablish the Crimean ASSR and to develop programs of a historical and cultural nature. However, it was soon made obsolete by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Moreover, while the Yanaev Commission removed resistance at the highest political level, Crimean officials still took measures to dissuade the Crimean Tatars from repatriating.

Following the Yanaev Commission, simply trucking the Crimean Tatars off the peninsula was no longer acceptable. Local authorities were left with the strategy of refusing residence permits or propiska to prospective repatriates. The propiska is important because it is tied to other documents in a circular way. One needs a propiska to get a job and a job to get a propiska. The authorities also pursued a strategy used elsewhere in the Soviet Union of inciting the non-Tatar population into conflict with the Tatars. The local Slavic population was pressured to take land for dacha construction in order to make it unavailable for Tatars. The opposition to their presence led the OKND to begin encouraging the Crimean Tatars to occupy empty plots and build housing without official permission. The squatting strategy was taken up to reclaim the land that local Crimean authorities refused to sell to them. According to the Migration Department of the Council of Ministers, 250,000 returned by 1991.

A Parallel Government?

The advent of glasnost and perestroika, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, paved the way for the ascendance of Crimean Tatar political organizations
of a more formalized nature. In 1991, the Crimean Tatars convened a Kurultai or Parliament in Simferopol. Actually, it is referred to as the second Kurultai of the Crimean Tatar people, in honor of the first Kurultai that took place in 1917. Delegates to the Kurultai were chosen by means of elections in the Crimean Tatar settlements across the region. When this body met, it elected 33 people by secret ballot to serve in the Mejlis, conceived as the highest representative body of the Crimean people. The Mejlis is really a multilayered organization. At the national level is the 33-member Milli Mejlis. Below it are regional and village levels. This type of organization has proven to be a flexible and effective means for disseminating information from the “top” and receiving it from the “bottom,” offering the Crimean Tatars a viable political structure.

As of 2003, the status of the national or Milli Mejlis is still somewhat controversial. Some, such as members of the defunct NDKT object that it constitutes a government within a government, or a parallel structure that interferes with the functioning of existing bodies. The Crimean Tatar political elite insists it is intended as an advisory body. President Kuchma’s recent creation of a Presidential Council incorporating all the members of the Milli Mejlis confirms this view. Rather than take up the issues of legitimacy, it is worthwhile to consider how different this problem is from the ones that faced the Crimean Tatars at the beginning of their movement. In effect, they have become experts in organizing, forming a structure that reflects their values and can begin to meet their needs.

One of the most positive outcomes of extensive strategizing is that Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov were elected to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. As one of the members of the Council of Europe put it in April 2000:

The Crimean Tatar people have managed to gain the respect of many fellow citizens of different ethnic origins. The fact that two leaders represent the Crimean Tatars in the Ukrainian Parliament is good evidence of that. It is particularly important that one of them, Mr. Refat Chubarov, was elected in an electoral district where the Crimean Tatars do not constitute the majority of voters.42

Chubarov enjoys respect as a politician and a leader among a variety of ethnic constituencies at the same time that he suffers derision in circles that see him as former KGB. This attests to the way in which politics cannot be neatly reduced to ethnic terms. A concomitant of this process is that the Crimean Tatars are no longer viewed solely as barbarians and heathens. Rather, they are also seen as defenders of human rights: Mustafa Dzhemilev won the Nansen Medal in 2000, and the Crimean Tatar dissidents’ struggle
has become more well known. Commentators in the Crimea now cite the Tatars as the only viable force capable of resisting the proliferation of Mafias in post-Soviet Ukraine, as will be described in more detail in the sequel. After the Mejlis intervened in a Mafia-related skirmish, the traditional positions were overturned. Rather than being seen as the bandits or barbarians, the leaders were cast as defenders of law and order.

Conclusion

Recollecting the proximate past in a positive light was one way for activists to reconfigure their relation to the regime. This entailed recruiting memory into politics and, more importantly, the performance of success. Recollecting is notorious inaccurate. This chapter does not treat national memory as veridical history, but as one way to map the transformation of Crimean Tatars’ ideas about themselves. Through a multiplicity of moments, they came to see and to represent themselves in new ways.

The movement was informed by a growing body of knowledge about the past: Scholars and lay historians found evidence that the Crimean Tatars had been wronged and deserved to be restored to the peninsula. The epistemology of history inspiring these efforts drew not just on recollection, but archeology, history, and law. The latter is particularly important because it was central to the Crimean Tatars’ strategy. It led to the use of Lenin as a symbol and their inversion of what had been labeled “Soviet” and “anti-Soviet.” In working with their compatriots, activists were able to yoke yearnings for homeland to a political project. By 1987 and the TASS announcement, Crimean Tatars were no longer content to wait, having become convinced that their rightful place was on the peninsula. It was they who were right and the authorities who were mistaken. Activists had forged an interpretation that would motivate action.

Seytmuratova was among those who recruited memory and sentiment into political practice. Her sentiments for homeland were embedded in recalled conversations with activists and authorities. This points us to the creative aspect of language. More than a reflection of some past reality, the voices they embodied set an affective tone of indignation. They laid out the discursive tools that were picked up by Crimean Tatars who joined the National Movement. Activists remembered moments of power, and this enhanced the power of their memories for compatriots who drew on the movement to repatriate, reintegrate, or regain self-respect.

The Crimean Tatars did not just struggle with the Soviet administration or judicial system; they struggled with the whole set of meanings that
defined them as traitors, deviants, and “anti-Soviet.” This is significant because the overall strategy of state terrorism is to gain control of a whole social body by sanctioning a set of meanings and inculcating a type of rationality (Agger and Jensen 1996). In such a system, acts like imprisoning dissenters become normalized. For democratization and healing to occur, the set of meanings inculcated by state terrorism has to be exposed, overturned, and replaced. At the broadest level, then, the Crimean Tatar National Movement was not just concerned with repatriation, but with overturning the meanings that had been used to limit Crimean Tatar self-representation and self-actualization.

Although the KGB agents were experts in psychological evaluation, the Tatars had linguistic resources that enabled them to call into question the regime. Rather than fixate on the question of “reality” versus “imagining,” we can take this as an opportunity to consider the reality of the imagining: these conversations can tell us about how the Tatars wanted to see their relations with the Soviet Union, and the Ukrainian state. By the 1990s, the Crimean Tatars had established a Kurultai and saw themselves fulfilling the functions of the state. It was this transformation that made it possible for Crimean Tatars to build a democratically inspired and quasi-parliamentary system that may begin to meet their needs. The sentiments for homeland engendered in the context of the movement are nowhere more clearly encapsulated than in the story of Mahmut, described next.
In the summer of 1978, a 47-year-old Crimean Tatar man named Musa Mahmut walked out of his home in the village of Besh Terek, Crimea toward a policeman waiting for him at his front gate. He was to be taken to the station for questioning, and quite possibly arrested for violation of the passport regime. But Musa Mahmut had already drenched himself with gasoline and, lighting a match, was engulfed in flames. He ran toward the policeman, who ran the other way. Mahmut died in the Simferopol city hospital six days later, never having expressed regret.

His son, Unus, who witnessed the event, explained that his mother was picking flowers at the collective farm that morning. He was with his father and a cousin when an officer from the police station, Lieutenant Sopriken, arrived. Unus sensed his father was upset when he went out to greet the police officer:

After a little while we heard some kind of commotion from the direction of the street and, parting the curtains, saw how Papa had come out of the house wet, and was walking toward the policeman. In his hand were matches. My cousin and I ran toward him. He smelled of gasoline. I threw myself at Papa and wanted to grab the matches from his hand, but he pushed us to the side and ran a match along the box. The match did not ignite. We started to call for help from Aider-aga and Redvan-aga who were standing in the direction of the policeman. The policeman continued to stand there, supporting himself on his motorcycle, but Aider-aga and Redvan-aga ran toward Papa. Papa ran deeper into the yard and again struck a match. The match ignited and
Papa blew up in flames. Redvan-aga and Aider-aga tried to put him out with their hands, but it didn't work. Then Redvan-aga ran into the house and, grabbing the bedspread, ran out again to put Papa out. At this time Papa, engulfed in flames, ran toward the policeman. The policeman took off running. Someone tripped Papa and he fell. Redvan-aga ran up and put him out with the bedspread. Papa began to let out terrible cries. I was scared and ran deep into the yard but my cousin Delover continued to stand there. They put father out and then drew back the bedspread. My cousin called out to me “Unus, come! Papa is alive! Unus, don't be afraid!” I came up to Papa, crying. Papa was still alive. Seeing me, he whispered something and shook his head. His face was completely burned, a rivulet of blood ran along his nose.

After they had put father out, the policeman Sopriken also came up. Father said something to the policeman but we couldn't hear. People came running. They took off father’s smoldering pants, socks and almost completely tore off his burned shirt. . . . People helped put father in Redvan’s car and took him to the hospital.

This testimony has been read by me and is written correctly.

Unus Mahmut [signature]

August 2, 1978, village of Besh-Terek

I have an addition to testimony: I remember that when the policeman Sopriken came up to father after they put him out, father said “So, did you get me?” (Dzhemilev 1986: 68–70).1

In this chapter, I ask why Musa Mahmut immolated himself on that June morning and what his death came to mean for his people. After his death, Mahmut became a martyr and a model—another instance of the affinity of nationalist imagining with death and immortality so famously observed by Anderson (1991: 10). The overarching idea within a number of religious traditions is that a martyr chooses death rather than relinquishing his or her faith, values, beliefs, or principles. Combined, interpretations of Mahmut’s death condense abstract cultural meanings, leading me to suggest that these interpretations are a site for the social production of homeland. As such, Mahmut’s life helps constitute the very meaning of homeland for Crimean Tatars.

This argument is based on materials that offer insight into how the idea of homeland is constructed on a microsocial rather than political level, which becomes especially apparent in an interview with his closest survivors. Through detailed attention to the formal particularities, content, and social–spatial organization of a conversation with Musa Mahmut’s wife, son, friend, and a local chronicler, emergent cultural meanings are identified.2 The conversation is considered in relation to a collection of documents, Human Torch, including verbatim testimony collected from
the same individuals immediately after the immolation by dissidents Ayse Seytmuratova and Reshat Dzhemilev (Dzhemilev 1986). Dzhemilev and I traveled to visit Mahmut’s widow so that he could give her copies of the book he edited, and I could interview her. Another main source is Torch Over Crimea, a poem written in 1978 and circulated as samizdat literature until it was published by a private press (Aleksandrov 1991). I also draw on notes from fieldwork, when people often recalled Mahmut to convey both the extremes to which they felt they were being driven and the lengths to which they were willing to go. During this time, other immolations took place.

Examining the 1998 interview in relation to verbatim testimony of 1978 creates an opportunity to study remembering in practice. The interview with Mahmut’s family and friends was a challenging one because the four of them interrupted and corrected each other repeatedly. Initially, it seemed the many breakdowns in the story meant I would be left with fragments. In transcribing and translating the interview later, however, I realized that the breaks and interruptions revealed the seams in the process of weaving an interpretation. Speakers forgot, confused, disputed, and traded lines, but ended by agreeing on shared meanings.

Because the speech in this conversation was both individual and collective, the concept of dialogism is particularly useful for understanding the interview (Bakhtin 1981). The basic insight is that when actors speak, their words are not merely their own but reflect their engagement in the ideological and verbal worlds of which they are a part (Hanks 1996: 202). Giving attention to dialogism exposes the constant interaction between meanings, all of which have the potential to condition others. While all speech is dialogic and draws its value from the “ideological horizons” of a society, what warrants attention are the specific kinds of borrowing, paraphrasing, and rephrasing in evidence. They can provide clues to the production of meaning—in this case, the meaning of being Crimean Tatar and the meaning of vatan or homeland.

Musa Mahmut’s Background

Musa Mahmut was born in Crimea in 1931 and was 13 years old when he was deported to Central Asia. He was taken to Tashkent Oblast, where he watched two of his four brothers and both his sisters die of starvation. In 1967, the decree stating the charges of treason were wrongfully leveled against the whole population inspired some families to return to Crimea.
While they were technically allowed to reside anywhere in the Soviet Union, Moscow party officials had stipulated that Crimean authorities should not allow Tatars to obtain a *propiska* or registration, become employed, or purchase property in Crimea. So when Mahmut returned with his family to Crimea in 1975, it was only to be denied the required *propiska* at the address of the house he bought, and without this registration he was refused work. In 1976, criminal charges were brought against Mahmut and his wife, and they were convicted of violating the passport regime according to statute 196 of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Mahmut served over two years, while his wife was convicted “provisionally,” enabling her to stay home with their children. When Mahmut returned from prison in 1978, the authorities continued to harass him and threatened that he must leave Crimea or face additional charges. Mahmut refused, stating that he would prefer dying to giving up his homeland.

Musa Mahmut chose a public and dramatic expression of protest. With time, his death became an important event to recall, something Mahmut anticipated. On the way to the hospital where he died, some of Mahmut’s last words were, “What I have done will not pass without effect” (Dzhemilev 1986: 73). These words turned out to be prophetic: there are many “effects” or traces of his act in subsequent events associated with repatriation. Six of these traces or “iterations” of his death are explored in order to show how his death became constitutive of the meaning of homeland for Crimean Tatars.

**First Iteration: “I’m Going to Die Here”**

Mahmut’s friend Redvan began to tell me about Mahmut’s 1978 death by self-immolation. But before he could do so, he told me his own story of potential immolation that took place in 1989, near the city of Alushta, Crimea 11 years later. When prompted to talk about Musa Mahmut, he replied that he hadn’t “gotten there yet,” even though he was telling his and Mahmut’s story in reverse chronological order. The embedding of one story in the others here reveals how discourse is filled with references, allusions, paraphrases, and outright quotations of prior discourse.

The facility with which Redvan and other interviewees insert their story into Musa Mahmut’s relates to the movement as a whole because at the same time that the juxtaposition is made to seem natural, this kind of alignment constitutes an act of cultural framing. Various forms of quotation, as Hanks has observed, are just one instance of a much more widespread linguistic phenomenon whereby speakers indicate that a portion of
their utterance is anchored elsewhere (Hanks 1996: 212). While the spatial referents are obvious, an often neglected aspect of this “elsewhere” is its \textit{temporal} dimension. The quoting and paraphrasing of Mahmut suggests that speech in the present is produced out of utterances in the past, and may contain directives for the future. The various configurations of co-presence and absence of speakers, the lamination of the present and the past, as well as the individual and his or her context, encourage us to consider the discursive grounds of community in conversation.

Even though Redvan’s veteran status enabled him to register and receive a pension, he was deeply involved in helping the rest of his people repatriate. This led him to try to prevent the police from leveling a nearby squatters’ settlement.

I told my guys, “Move away, I will stay here, I’m going to die here,” see. I’m staying. . . . My brother stayed and another young guy stayed. I said “Umir, blow the oxygen tank,” the oxygen tank, it’s equal to a five hundred kilogram bomb. We would also die. They were coming straight at us with automatics, that mass of six hundred men.

But that young man couldn’t blow it up. You had to open it just a teeny bit, but he opened it all the way and vooosh. Oil poured, oil went flying, the tank didn’t blow up. The police started to run back, they got scared and then when the tank didn’t blow up and all the air went out, they come at us with their automatics, their shields. We had poles. My little brother grabbed a pole and hit five or six. They twisted him up, beat him to a pulp, broke his head open, blood was flowing.

Redvan described how he flew to his brother’s defense and was clubbed to unconsciousness. When he regained consciousness some moments later, he was in the grip of six policemen who rubbed his face in the dirt:

Then, without leaving the tobacco field, they dumped me onto the ground, the dirt. At the time it was snowing and raining. “Ah traitors, treasonous Crimean Tatars! You need Crimean soil? Eat up!” My hair was long like that and [they rubbed] my face in the dirt, cutting open my head here and here. They went out on the road and a Russian woman was walking by. They said, “Woman, here’s a club. Beat this traitor, this treasonous-scum-of-a-Crimean Tatar.”

She beat [me] five or six times on the head with that club. When she beat . . . [me my head was] just spinning. But my head was already like wood—I didn’t feel the pain anymore. They beat me such that when they hit my head would go to one side, you know. They brought us and put us in a car and took us to the Alushta police. The guys who had run away were also caught. Then we were all sitting there and there was a row of policemen here and a row of policemen there. My face is all dirty and covered with blood.
I looked at them and said, “You think you beat us,” I said, “No. You showed your backwardness insulting national integrity.” I said, “We’ll show you, we won't back down.”

Redvan’s story provides a way for him to articulate his opposition to the regime. Redvan takes up the words of the policemen who are insulting Crimean Tatars, giving listeners an idea of how they were abused by law enforcement officials. At the same time, he provides himself with a new, discursive opportunity to offer a rebuttal, as he does with his statement that, despite the blood on his face, the police have not “won,” but have only revealed how base they are. The way in which Redvan embeds voices in recounting the dialogue at the police station emphasizes his moral victory.

A number of significant linguistic features, which can be grouped into the categories of dialogic and dialogue, aid us in understanding this discourse. The dialogic calls our attention to the rich “heterophony” of voices within his discourse. Redvan animates the event by embedding over 22 voices, lending his speech an incredible dynamism absent from his recorded testimony. The figures he voices are dissenting ones, and include the policemen at the 1989 demonstration, various “authorities,” Russian and Ukrainian neighbors, a “smart Pole,” several different KGB officers, a prison warden, Tatar neighbors, the doctors at the hospital where Mahmut is admitted, Mahmut’s wife, a local bureaucrat, a Tatar elder, a kolkhoz president, and a party official. These figures disagree about Mahmut and the repatriation. Redvan also includes a telegram calling him to a meeting, refers to the Qu’ran, and uses traditional sayings, such as comparing himself to a “lamb of sacrifice.” The voices relate events, and, at the same time, establish a moral evaluation, suggesting the production and active internalization of cultural values. While Redvan’s discourse is heterogeneous, the voices ultimately collude to construct a unitary argument in favor of self-sacrifice. In Bakhtin’s terminology, the voices exert a “centripetal” force that homogenizes meaning (1981: 425). Centripetal forces facilitate verbal and ideological unification and centralization.

Dialogue in the sense of an interaction that takes place among speakers also warrants examination here, particularly in light of Goffman’s idea that the role of a single speaker can be analytically subdivided (1981: 144). His idea of “footing” dovetails with Bakhtin’s concept of dialogism and highlights the relation between speakers and utterances. Goffman’s insight was that a speaker producing quoted speech is a speaker in a very different sense than one who produces direct discourse. The traditional view of conversation as something that takes place in a dyad also needs to be more finely shaded to allow for the roles of a single speaker and multiparty talk. In *Forms of Talk*, Goffman identified the roles of animator, author, principal,
and figure. While the true author of the key phrases is believed to be Mahmut, there is often confusion over who said what. Hence in this conversation, the author and animator roles only overlap some of the time. Most at issue, however, is the principal, the person whose position is established by the words that are spoken. Speakers would like to establish themselves as principal in this dialogue because it is Mahmut’s sentiments that are believed to be encoded. They seem to jostle to establish themselves in this role that, despite their efforts, shifts considerably.

Redvan’s sense of victory over the police, which emerged from his dialogic rendering of the event, was clear. Why, however, was he willing to die when as a legally registered resident, he could have chosen to stay home?

RC: We had decided, we kissed the Qu’ran, we were to die there. Do you know what the Qu’ran is?
I: Yes. You were ready for that?
RC: We were ready; we were to die there. We weren’t afraid of anything.
I: But suicide is forbidden by the Qu’ran?
RC: No, we vowed. We are going to fight to the death here and therefore we kissed the Qu’ran in case we should die here. It’s not a sin, we [did it] for the people. We aren’t going to give in.

Crimean Tatars recognize a tension between the prohibition against suicide in the Qu’ran and Musa Mahmut’s act. But the vast majority resolve it by placing his act within a broad interpretation of Shari’ā, or “Islamic law.” This made Redvan’s proclamation that “we are going to die here” acceptable to those, including the mullah, who read prayers and then stood back. In Arabic, “Islam” means self-surrender to God as revealed through the message and life of the Prophet. A Muslim, then, is someone who surrenders him or herself. From this point of view, Redvan was offering to give up his life for the ummah or Muslim community.

The religious concept of martyrdom is instructive here. The term martyr derives from the Greek and refers to the act of witnessing. Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary defines a martyr as “a person who chooses to suffer or die rather than give up his faith or his principles; a person who is tortured or killed because of his beliefs; a person who suffers great pain or misery for a long time.” Mamut’s act fits comfortably within this category. What makes the act heroic is that the martyr chooses to defend truth unto death but does not choose death itself. The martyr simply sees no other way to defend truth. Here lies the distinction from suicide. Whereas suicide is perceived as selfish, representing a failure to go on in spite of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, martyrdom is selfless. The martyr’s death both serves and is effected by a compelling cause (Harlan 2002: 121).
Martyrdom has positive valuation in the religious traditions that have developed over the past two millenia, particularly in Christianity and Islam, but also in Judaism and some would say the practice of sati immolation in India. While Islam uses the terminology derived from Christianity (Lewinstein 2002: 78), the emphasis in Islam is less on suffering than the Prophet’s call for active struggle against injustice and idolatry. Islamic scholars today stress that Muslims have a duty to struggle against evil both within themselves and in the world around them. As Ahmed puts it, faith does not permit Muslims to accept injustice (2002: iii). So it is the spirit of martyrdom and struggle, rather than the prohibition against suicide that is invoked in Redvan’s and other’s admittedly tense accomodation of Mahmut’s act as within the law. Framed in these terms, the suggestion that he, his brother, and his friend would sacrifice themselves for the ummah was taken as a noble sacrifice, fully within the spirit if not the letter of the law. The focus for those seeking to defend Islam (and the Soviet regime was experienced as oppressive of Islam) is action more than belief, practice rather than doctrine. Redvan’s and other’s dramatic and life-threatening protests are probably best viewed not in relation to Durkheimian categories of suicide or Eurocentric conceptualizations of psychopathology, but in relation to religious and cultural traditions, and forms of political protest. Given that the Crimean Tatars’ efforts to negotiate with the authorities have typically failed, it makes sense that methods of protest have developed along the lines of ever more decisive actions.

Redvan stated that he was motivated to do something “for the people,” a statement that is picked up by Reshat and ascribed to Mahmut. Through successive iterations, “for the people” becomes a core theme and part of the abiding ethos of the movement. In formulating nationalism as a cultural construct, Anderson (1991), Hroch (1996), Gellner (1983), and others have emphasized the role of intellectual elites. For them, the idea of the nation is built on an abstract and decontextualized foundation, which gives it a modular character and explains part of its attraction to disparate people. Anderson argued that regardless of actual conditions of inequality and exploitation, the nation is conceived as a horizontal comradeship and it is precisely this comradeship that makes people willing to die for nationalist imaginings (1991: 7). Subsequent studies (Gullestad 1992) have attempted to locate the connections between these various levels of belonging such as family, home, community, and nation to understand how the elite construct is instantiated on the so-called everyday level.

But how to trace the interconnections that make national allegiance possible is still a complicated question. Many studies turn to a “trickle-down” approach. Smith, for example, argues that while “the masses” are important, it is intellectual elites who spread nationalism (1983: 83). This
formulation raises the question of how elites’ interests become emotional attachments and why loyalty to a region on the part of the “common people” might turn into identification with a nation (Hroch 1996: 66). But the categories “elite” and “common” are inherently troublesome. By shifting the focus away from different groups of people to different kinds of social practice, we can avoid the difficulties that this hierarchical model of nationalism suggests. A more useful assumption from which to proceed is that the difference between elites and common people is not that one group formulates ideology and the other does not, but that ideologies of common people are generally taken into account differently than those of elites (Gullestad 1992). The conversation with Mahmut’s survivors makes the internalization of national ideology more visible.

Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* (1991) and Hobsbawm and Ranger’s *The Invention of Tradition* (1983) created an opening for cultural studies to examine the many ways that the nation is produced through processes of imaginative labor. Lauren Berlant forged ahead by considering what she called the harnessing of affect to political life through the production of “national fantasy” (Berlant 1991: 20 as cited in Eley and Suny 1996: 30). She was particularly interested in the ways in which national culture becomes local through images, narratives, and sites in both individual and collective consciousness. But a close analysis of the dialogue and *dialogic* effects in the interview with Musa Mahmut’s family and friends suggest that what is equally important is how the local is made national. To grasp the importance of these dynamics entails turning Berlant’s formulation upside down and looking at the micropractices of mobilization.11

The Self-Immolation of Musa Mahmut

Having told me about his own potential immolation, Redvan was ready to tell me how he happened to witness the self-immolation of Mahmut. When he was driving down the street one day in 1978, he passed by Mahmut’s house and noticed that a policeman was standing by the gate.

RC: I stopped, it was about eleven o’clock. I stopped and came up and I say, “Why did you stop here?”
“Yeah, well, I came for Musa,” he replied. I said, “Where to?”
“To the sel’sovet,” he said.
I said, “You should be ashamed of yourself” I said. “Fifty years and you think he won’t find the way [himself] or something? Why do you humiliate us innocent small people, Crimean Tatars? Go away!”

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“Well no, they sent me, I can’t.”
I said, “I told you leave, don’t humiliate our people. What? Are we criminals or something?” I came in here. It was like the kitchen was here, a couch was there and Musa was putting on his pants.¹²

Redvan stood up to walk around the room and demonstrate where particular things were said and done. He related the short conversation they had to the effect that Mahmut should just keep his “cool” and everything would be all right. Redvan left, promising to stop by on his way home to see how things went. Redvan had only made it to the gate, and was still talking to the policeman when Mahmut came out of the house looking wet. Redvan noticed that he had something in his hands, and thought it was probably a rock so he admonished Mahmut not to throw it. That would surely lead to another prison term. Only then did Redvan realize that what he was holding was a box of matches.

He ran under the plum tree and immediately—flames! He shouted, and started to run and I embraced him. I started to burn here and here and here. I gave that up and ran in here and here on the couch was an old bedspread. I took that bedspread, ran out to the street and there a truck driver had stuck out his foot and he [Musa] fell in the ditch. (Ibid.)

Redvan described how he ran out and covered him with the bedspread. This put him out, but his undershirt was burned to his flesh.

Memory’s Intersection with Testimony

Redvan’s 1998 narration is surprisingly faithful to his 1978 testimony. What Redvan leaves out of the 1998 account is that before he lit the match, Mahmut called to the policeman “Go away!” and then waited. When the policeman continued to sit on his motorcycle, Mahmut proceeded toward them and lit the match. Was this pause an attempt on Mahmut’s part to forestall what he had undertaken? We cannot know whether Mahmut was seeking a last-minute reconciliation. Just as prayer or pilgrimage does not earn one afterlife benefits automatically, those who qualify as martyrs are those with the right intention. This said, we lack access to the intentions of others.¹³ We can only wonder if he was more ambivalent than he is portrayed to have been when we hear his words, now voiced by Redvan telling the policeman, “Go away!”

The other omission is that protagonists are left out of Redvan’s 1998 recitation. For example, only midway through the 1998 telling does Redvan suddenly remember and say, “Oh yeah, I forgot to say that Aider-aga
was along.” Although Redvan remembers that Aider was present, he fails to include him in strategic moments the way he did in 1978. In Redvan’s 1978 telling, Aider is very important, helping Redvan try to catch Mahmut, putting out Mahmut’s flames with his coat when he is tripped, and sitting in the back of the car holding Mahmut’s hand on the way to the hospital. So his 1998 account does not conform to his 1978 testimony about how the flames were extinguished. In the 1998 interview, Redvan seems more intent on building a particular image of himself, perhaps as a result of the opportunity to be heard outside his immediate circle. The 1998 account reinforces Redvan’s image as a fighter for the national cause: an identity that is being forged through language incrementally.

After extinguishing the flames and pulling off pieces of burnt clothing, Redvan and the others eased Mahmut into the back of his car and drove him to the city hospital, about 20 kilometers away. Then Redvan went home, where he found agents of the KGB waiting for him. They brought him to their offices and accused him of “organizing” Mahmut’s death. What is ironic is that Redvan did not organize this immolation but his own, 11 years later. His reply when the KGB officers pressed these charges against him was: “You created the mess, now lie in it! You are guilty for all of it!” The officers were reportedly shocked. Again Redvan takes a discursive opportunity for retaliation and uses the words of official figures to bolster his authority.

**Second Iteration: “For the People”**

Reshat, the Crimean Tatar who compiled “Human Torch,” appreciated Redvan’s recounting of the event but interjected:

RD: You forgot that I gave my life for my people, so that it would live in the homeland, I gave my life.

RC: That’s understood as it is.

RD: As is, no. He said it to you in words, you retold it to me then.

RC: Oh, yes.14

This moment in the conversation vividly demonstrates the way memory is jointly produced. Reshat corrects Redvan (and later Unus) because his age and his role as chronicler after the event gave him the authority to do so. Here again, the circulation of memories was contested between generations. Reshat had the advantage of having the testimony in writing. The trouble is that according to the testimony that Reshat himself took down,
Mahmut never said “for the people” back in 1978. And yet all the participants in the conversation agree with the correction! A great deal is at stake here because the shift demonstrates the way in which memory is a process of negotiation and meaning a collective concern.

Notice that Reshat does not say, “You forgot that Musa said,” but in more streamlined fashion offers the statement, “You forgot that I gave my life for my people.” This instance of “double voicing” is illuminating because in place of direct quotation, we can hear Musa’s voice reverberating within Reshat’s. Reshat thereby aligns himself with the hero even though the author of the words is unclear. This alignment constitutes a shift in footing suggesting a projected self. The shift shows that language does more than describe or refer. These speakers are reaching beyond themselves to create meanings and identities that were not there before. Through contestation, Reshat and Redvan attempt to ally themselves with Mahmut’s devotion to homeland, or, perhaps, more accurately, what they imagine Mahmut’s devotion to homeland to have been. Regardless of the true author of the statement, which is never resolved, they agree that doing something “for the people” was the crux of Mahmut’s motivation.

While the author of “for the people” is ambiguous, a movement toward consensus occurs when speakers reiterate one another. Redvan shifts from talking about Mahmut to his own experience to explain why he bothered to engage in the movement. Not surprisingly, it is “for the people.”

What would I do here without the people? It’s my people. He (Reshat) can also say “It’s my people.” We Crimean Tatars, we are one, you know, united. I can’t say I’m only going to fight for myself. We are united. I am for all and they are also for me, you see, we were that close.

The route that the phrase “for the people” travels in this conversation is a remarkable one because it first appears voiced by Redvan in reference not to Mahmut, but to himself. Here he is both author of the statement and the figure who voices it. It is next voiced by Reshat but ascribed to Musa Mahmut. It is implied that while Redvan might be the figure of the statement, we must not forget that Mahmut is the author. It appears many more times in the words of Reshat before a voicing by Unus as the reason for his father’s act and a final voicing by Redvan as the reason he prepared to immolate himself. In Bakhtinian fashion, Redvan voices the words that had been ascribed to Mahmut. Through these successive iterations, “for the people” come to be words that are firmly believed and highly regarded.

This interview with Musa Mahmut’s survivors demonstrates the way in which people create moods and meanings by drawing on voices of others as useful frames of reference. These are not just abstract or symbolic formulations
such as “the nation,” but rather thoughts and emotions linked with social situations and goals that give them moral force and direction (Irvine 1990: 130). If nations are imagined communities, and if homeland is socially constructed, then we have to look more closely at what takes place below, beyond, and outside of elite constructs (cf. Nairn 1996; Smith 1983). There may be an elite construct fashioned by intellectuals, but if we take our analysis to another level of magnification, we see there is also a dialogic construction of reality, both within an individual’s utterance and among the individuals who engage in conversation. The “centripetal” force of national rubric has a homogenizing effect on conflict-ridden and tension-filled utterances.

Third Iteration: “Beautiful Death”

In spite of their consensus and apparent alignment with the hero, the disunity inherent in the Crimean Tatar nation-building project is also revealed in the conversation. Redvan supports the credo “all for one, one for all,” but there are still divisive issues. He and Reshat suggest that the official leader, Mustafa Dzhemilev, is neither a leader nor a hero. The movement may have a singular goal, but there are multiple and very robust factions within it.

From this conversation, we learn that apparently self-sacrificial acts can also be unauthentic performances of egoistic leaders. Reshat alleged that M. Dzhemilev (no relation) expressed the desire to die a “beautiful death” on more than one occasion. The first time was on August 11, 1982 when they were traveling from Tashkent to Yangiyul, Uzbekistan and R. Dzhemilev had to restrain M. Dzhemilev from jumping from the Volga they were traveling in.15 Reshat linked his behavior to knowledge that he would soon be confined under house arrest. Then, based on his admiration of Musa Mahmut, M. Dzhemilev crafted what he called a “beautiful death” for himself, saying:

“I want to die beautifully,” he said. “Musa Mahmut outdid me, he incinerated himself and a repeat would not have the same resonance,” he said. “Therefore, when they arrest me I am going to announce a hunger strike. I am going to keep a hunger fast until the end. Until they either free me, or I die there.”

I said, “Mustafa, don’t do it, we know that our death is the happiness of our enemies, you shouldn’t do that. We must fight. We must dedicate ourselves to the fight, not to our enemy’s happiness. If we die today, our enemies will be happy.”

“No,” he says, “No matter how you try to dissuade me, you won’t persuade me. I have my own. I could have not told you,” he said, “but I did so that you wouldn’t say later that you didn’t know. I’m letting you know.”16
Reshat Dzhemilev reported that this particular conversation took place in September 1983, when the two visited. The point of having the conversation was to provide R. Dzhemilev with evidence against any explanation that the prison administration might officially fabricate about his death in Omsk, where the hunger strike was to be carried out. R. Dzhemilev offers Mustafa’s statement that, “You and I should go down in history” as further evidence that the hunger strikes, arrests, and prison sentences were calculated to draw the world’s attention on himself as a person who sacrificed “for his people.” Mustafa Dzhemilev’s contribution to the repatriation of Crimean Tatars is indisputable. But Tatars also express ambivalence about his role. Increasingly, Dzhemilev’s efforts are viewed not as a sincere desire to help, but to advance his career.

Thus in my 1998 interview, the speakers juxtapose three deaths: Mahmut’s “authentic” death, Redvan’s foiled death, and Mustafa Dzhemilev’s “unauthentic” death. It is through these “deaths” that the normative standards of participation in the movement are articulated. What may underlie these statements is a desire for a sense of contribution, and inclusion in the pantheon of heroes. In this interview, Musa Mahmut is created as a national hero who facilitated return migration by sacrificing his life. But this construction is only partially derivative of nationalist ideologies. Equally important are the personal associations. In this case, it is their admiration for one another, and their desire to align themselves with a martyr that inspire the construction of new, national selves among Tatars who are neither politicians nor intellectuals. Nationalism has taught us that intellectuals and elites are instrumental in political transformations. However, there are also less recognized, interpersonal sites for the production and internalization of national sentiments.

Speakers’ personal aspirations are manifest in their interjections and in their alignment of the hero’s life with their own. They can’t be “bracketed out” and still remain faithful to the conversation. There is no way to extract Mahmut’s story because it would miss what is most significant: there is no stable story, other than the one that is emergent in the conversation. The conversation revealed the production of patriotic sentiments in the process of memory.

Mahmut as Torch, or How Death Came to be Beautiful

There are still many unanswered questions about Musa Mahmut’s immolation, such as where he acquired the idea. We have already looked at the idea of martyrdom. However, it is important to place this in perspective for while martyrdom is a part of the Islamic tradition, it is most developed in
the Shi‘ite, rather than Sunni schools.18 Even more importantly, the Crimean Tatars who were most vocal in their support for Mahmut were not the religious specialists. In fact, it was two mullahs I spoke with who voiced opposition to what he did, citing the prohibition against suicide in the Qur’an. So while interpretations of Mahmut’s death often use religious terms to frame his act, we must also consider his immolation in terms of political protest. Bruce Kapferer captures the overlap between religion and politics in the statement that “nationalism has become the dominant religion of modern nation-states” (1988: 136). What some have described as secularization may better be interpreted as transformation, the “sacralization of the political” (Kapferer 1988: 136). Once the nation has become an object of devotion, it is a short step to the “religion” of nationalism, in which the political is reframed or “shrouded” as a higher purpose (Kapferer 1988: 1).

But to say his act was cultural, religious, and political does not answer the question of why immolation, specifically, was the modality he chose. If this immolation is not the first, by what path did the idea come to Musa Mahmut? Could it have been the spate of immolations by Buddhist monks in protest of the Vietnam war (Joiner 1964)? Or was the inspiration closer to home? Consultants told me that before Mahmut, a Crimean Tatar man by the name of Pashidov Abdurim threatened to immolate himself in a telegram he sent to Moscow. He was then granted the right to legally reside in Crimea and obtain a propiska. Unfortunately, no one recalled what year this took place or where in Crimea he lived. In addition to three immolations that took place while the research was underway, there is a samizdat bulletin that refers the immolation of Shevkat Yarulin in December 1990. According to the bulletin, over 300 were present at a memorial service in his honor.19

When I asked those assembled where Mahmut’s idea came from, Reshat suggested that Mahmut learned it from “Danko,” a literary character created by Gorky. Danko rips out his heart and holds it up as a “torch” for his people. Gorky is widely read, but Mahmut had a technical education and worked as a tractor driver and mechanic. More to the point, his years of primary school were interrupted by war and deportation. It is difficult to be sure he had contact with this literature. Another suggestion about the origin of Mahmut’s idea was Uzbek women who immolated themselves in Central Asia where Mahmut lived in exile. But journalism about these instances was limited, and the report generated by the State Commission appointed to investigate was declared top secret and sequestered.20

A better possibility for the genesis of his idea is Jan Palach, who immolated himself at the time of the Prague spring. He is believed to have emulated the Czech hero, Jan Hus, a heretic that was burned at the stake in
This immolation was widely condemned by Warsaw Pact countries, including the Soviet Union. Palach's suicide note stated, “It was my honor to draw lot number one and thus I acquired the privilege of writing the first letter and starting as the first torch.” Torch is a key word, for it was picked up and repeated by a man who immolated himself one month after Palach. The next immolation, that of Jan Zajic, explicitly aligned himself with the heroism of Ian Palach by closing his farewell note, “To Jan Palach, living torch number one from living torch number two” (Treptow 1993: 44). If the *Times* index is an accurate indication, the wave of immolations in Czechoslovakia immediately following Palach’s death reached seven (Biggs 2002: 11).

But in considering the various paths that the idea followed, it may be necessary to cast a wider geographic net. If repertoires of contention are modular, as social movement theory suggests, we need to look more broadly. Michael Biggs suggests the “lineage” of self-immolations begins in Vietnam with Thich Quang Duc’s widely publicized immolation in June 1963. This Buddhist monk immolated himself in front of Western news cameras at a major intersection in Saigon to protest the Diem government’s policies that fostered religious inequality (Joiner 1964: 918). Thich Quang Duc’s act was unprecedented in Vietnam, but drew on already existing cultural elements: the ordination ceremony for monks and nuns who practiced Mahayana Buddhism in Vietnam involved burning part of the forehead. Auto cremation was also practiced, though it remained doctrinally suspect (Thich Thien-An 1975: 172–173). Thus religious symbolism, carrying positive associations with purity, was adopted and adapted for politics. Four monks and a nun were inspired to immolate themselves before Diem’s weakened regime was toppled by a coup. More immolations followed in 1966 to protest the American-backed military regime and the war (Biggs 2002: 9).

Self-immolation became part of a repertoire of protest that was global in nature. In addition to cases in Malaysia and Japan, there were cases in the United States. For example, Alice Herz, a Quaker, burned herself in the United States as a protest against American foreign policy. She explicitly told police, “I wanted to burn myself like the monks in Vietnam” (Biggs 2002: 10). In close succession, Norman Morrison and Roger LaPorte set fire to themselves, all in response to American foreign policy and the war in Vietnam. Ian Palach’s act represents something of a departure, for it protested not American, but Soviet foreign policy. Immolations in Hungary and Great Britain followed Jan Palach.

With respect to iterations forward through time, we may consider Mahmut as a possibility. Of the two books that have been written about Musa Mahmut one is called *Human Torch* (Dzhemilev 1986) and the other
Torch Over Crimea (Aleksandrov 1991). I make the linkage between the Tatar and Czech immolations because the news coverage of the Czech deaths contains some of the exact same words as those that have come to posthumously describe Mahmut, and also because the two deaths in Czechoslovakia were not only public performances but explicitly “for the nation.” As Jan Zajíc’s suicide note, dated January 1969, states: “For the nation, for the country. In the name of your life I burn . . .” (T reptow 1993: 44). If not through the news media, the idea of a human being as a living “torch” could have traveled by way of the dissident movement. By 1978 when Mahmut immolated himself, Crimean Tatar activists had established close ties with Czech dissidents. Mahmut’s statement that what he did would not pass without effect suggests that he may have been trying to duplicate the attention that Jan Palach’s self-immolation generated.

Mahmut succeeded in drawing attention to the Tatar cause. However, he never suggested that others should follow by immolating themselves, only that they should keep up the struggle for repatriation. Even so, subsequent immolations became part of the process of reclaiming land in Crimea.

Reason and Rage

Interpretations of Mahmut’s death are part of a larger constellation of guilt and blame in Crimea. Tatars wage a battle for rights and property but are systematically pathologized as “insane” and “unbalanced,” or demonized as “primitive” and “uncivilized” by authorities. Mahmut’s wife Zikiye is among those who conceive the act outside a Western psychological framework. She thinks that what Mahmut did made perfect sense. “He conceived it. He planned it, planned to take precisely that difficult step. I don’t know how else to explain it. When we went to the raiispolkom (the regional governing structure) to a meeting, he also spoke of it then.” Zikiye is unequivocal that the authorities should be held responsible for her husband’s death. It is they who are “criminals,” even though it was she and her husband who were convicted of violating a statute. In a letter to the Prokuror (Procuracy) of the Soviet Union, Zikiye suggests a criminal case be opened to investigate, try, and punish the “criminals” responsible for Mahmut’s death.

In addition to making this moral evaluation, Zikiye helps set the emotional tone of subsequent interpretations of Mahmut’s death. Her approach reverberates in the heightened emotional pitch of subsequent protest. In her letter to the Prokuror of the Soviet Union she writes:

It was an enraged act of protest against the anti-national discrimination of the Crimean Tatar people. The local policeman Sopriken cold-bloodedly
looked on, not trying to extinguish the burning, and calmly sat on his motorcycle and left. This, apparently, corresponded with the plans of the criminals, the base actions of whom led to the horror of this tragedy. The local authorities of Crimea and the specific organs of the Prokuror and police are directly guilty for the death of my husband Musa Mahmut 1931 y.o.b., father of three children (Dzemilev 1986: 87).23

Her expression that it was “an enraged act of protest” became a narrative trope for describing the immolation. The expression was repeated even in casual conversations among consultants. Anger and rage encompass normative evaluations of the situation, but gnev or rage carries with it the added weight of accumulated layers of resentment. Her discourse on emotion sets the tone: others seemed to find it so compelling that the words she used were taken up and became a way of talking about Mahmut. The affective stance would be carried forward all the way to Tatars’ claims to the land that they lost in the late 1980s and early 1990s.24 This mood also enters poetry about the event: the imagery of burning and rage runs through Torch Over Crimea.

Whereas the authorities attribute the immolation to Mahmut’s individual psychopathology, the Tatars see the act as deriving from much broader, social origins. They argue that Mahmut’s death is a social structural “effect” of the oppressive Soviet conditions. The act was a reasoned one, motivated by a desire to shake up the oppressive context and find a way out of the unacceptable situation that he was in. This is a fairly stark contrast to the traditional view that such acts “in the main are committed by psychologically damaged personalities. . . .” (Farber 1968: 11).

The welding of reason and rage goes against our tendency to see emotion and reason as antithetical. Interpretations of Mahmut’s death as a reasonable, and yet enraged act of protest reveal an important aspect of Tatars’ approach to protest. Although we may be tempted to see emotion as arising from a fundamentally biological substrate, the decidedly social origins of Mahmut’s rage redirects our attention to the interpersonal dimension. As Lutz has argued, once it is de-essentialized, emotion is a cultural and interpersonal process of naming, justifying, and persuading. Emotional meanings, thus construed, are then an emergent product of social life (Lutz 1988: 5).25

“He Was a Completely Normal Person”

One question that remains is why Mahmut chose what was probably the most excruciating means available to him. His son Unus was helpful in deciphering this. He stressed that his father was “a completely normal
person.” For Unus, completely normal meant believing in Allah, and being of “sound mind.” Unus remembered that a year or two before Mahmut died, they went to visit friends and the problems associated with repatriation, such as obtaining a *propiska* came up. Unus recalls his father making a startling statement:

He said, “I will burn myself,” you know. All this I produce from a child’s memory, from the memory of a ten-year-old child and therefore it is hard to say something concrete.

(laughing) We couldn’t get firearms at that time, you know. But he acted precisely as a hero of the Crimean Tatar people. He proved himself like that. Before the Russians he showed his heroism, his courage, [and] that he was devoted to the people.

But even at that moment, even a year previous when he said, “I will burn myself.” Even at that time he wanted to burn not only himself but take him with some of the authorities, you know, who were guilty of his problem. He wanted to take out one of the authorities by means of fire. But by means of a rope? Well, I don’t know about a second person in a noose. You can’t fit two people in one noose, it seems to me. He wanted to burn the duty officer, it just didn’t turn out that way.26

From Unus’s perspective, Mahmut chose a painful end because his choices were technically limited (he lacked access to a gun) and because he wanted to “take someone with him.” Unus’s presentation of his father’s intentions shifts the issue from people who die without killing to those who die to kill. He is the only one who highlights this aspect of his father’s death. Unus’s account of his father also departs from the others by including very sardonic humor. This humor is at the macabre end of the spectrum (“I don’t know about a second person in a noose”), but provides a backdoor entry to the anguish that had so far been submerged under Redvan’s carnivalesque performance, populated as it was by so many protagonists. In these two respects, Unus’s emphases differ from the others.

Memory’s Intersection with Testimony, Revisited

Memory intersects with testimony in some illuminating ways if we consider Unus’s 1978 recitation in relation to his 1998 statements. In 1978, Unus initially couldn’t hear (or remember?), but then suddenly recalled his father’s last words: “So, did you get me?” (Dzhemilev 1986: 70). This is arguably the punch line of the entire event because it condenses the years of defiance and indignation that Mahmut experienced into one victorious sentence. They
did not “get” him alive because he martyred himself first. The statement underscores Mahmut’s determination not to be subject to the will of the authorities: he is finally rid of the controls they imposed on his life.

Unus forgets about his father’s comment again in the 1998 conversation and recalls it only with the prompting of Reshat, who compiled the testimony. In this case, Reshat’s seniority influenced the footing of the conversation and shaped recall. The interpersonal mechanisms for constructing a shared memory are therefore crucial. Whereas R. Dzhemilev and Seytmuratova provide an untarnished image of heroic sacrifice, Unus adds that he was also trying to kill. This second-generation interpretation is the one that seems to have spread and circulated in the late 1980s and early 1990s when it was the phrase “we will all blow up together” that reverberated at squatters’ settlements. The second generations’ interpretations have gained the widest currency, but it is important to keep the dissenting voices in view. When the topic of Musa Mahmut came up in more casual conversations, two suggested what he did was against the Qu’ran. These views were immediately suppressed, however, as the prevailing interpretation in support of the movement and its repertoires of contention were defended.

Unlike the others, Unus is somewhat inhibited in recounting the event. It took the others’ coaxing to encourage him to speak. Unus rejects the authority to interpret his father’s death. His candor highlights the vulnerability of memory and the problem of accurately remembering things from childhood. Unus was nevertheless capable of offering important insights about his father.

A different rendition may have emerged with a different socio-spatial configuration of roles. While part of the purpose of our visit was to deliver Dzhemilev’s books to Mahmut’s family, the speakers had also gathered on my behalf to recount what happened to Musa Mahmut. In this context, they were trying to understand me at the same time I was trying to understand them. This undoubtedly shaped their discourse: a great deal of discussion was directed toward the family’s unmet needs. It would be naïve to take this orientation as coincidental. As an American, I was associated with resources and at least the potentiality of aid. I prefaced interviews with an explanation that participation in the study would not result in humanitarian relief, but this did not preclude an extended exegesis on need. The dynamics of the conversation would have been changed by subtracting any of the individuals, including myself.

Fourth Iteration: “Homeland or Death”

Driving past the turn-off to his village, Crimean Tatars inevitably point out where Mahmut lived. From my first trip to Crimea in 1995 forward, it was
a recommended visit. In both Ukraine and Uzbekistan, the topic of his immolation came up repeatedly as shorthand for their plight. I interacted with hundreds of Crimean Tatars in the process of research and cannot count the number of people who described Mahmut as a way of conveying their situation. Rare was the individual who felt his action was excessive. Musa Mahmut’s act of protest has also become a theme in Crimean Tatar artwork. Among others, Crimean Tatar artist Eminov devoted one of his paintings to the topic. Mahmut’s face is ensconced in bright orange flames as he stares probingly at the viewer (see figure 6.1). Poems about Mahmut’s act are periodically circulated on the Internet.

Many consultants reminisce about his funeral, partially because it was so difficult to get there and partially because it was a spiritually galvanizing moment in the history of the movement. Musa Mahmut’s funeral therefore marks a significant place in Crimean Tatar memory both physically and metaphorically. Fearing a massive demonstration, the authorities closed all the roads. Undaunted, many Tatars tell stories of flocking to the funeral on foot over rugged terrain. The authorities were justifiably concerned because his funeral did turn into a demonstration with banners such as “Shame on Soviet Power!” and “Shame on the Soviet Police!” The police did what they could to contain the ritual, but their very presence seems to have exacerbated the tension. Practically all the Tatars living in Crimea at the time tried to attend because word of his death spread rapidly. Martyrs thus have an ability to galvanize communities. As Peteet has observed in the Palestinian context, posters and funerals of fallen heroes evoke sentiments of affinity among Palestinians. Death for the sake of the community carries significance that is felt to transcend the family and inspire both militancy and patriotism (1991: 106).

One reason the funeral proved to be a formative event was that an elder ended his speech with a call that they make an oath. He suggested they pledge not to forget Musa Mahmut or ever give up the struggle to return home. As one consultant recalled:

> Then he said, “At the end, comrades and compatriots, we will swear by the grave of Musa Mahmut.” And we all cried out, “We swear, we swear, we swear!”

This vowing or swearing is akin to Austin’s notion of illocutionary force (1962) in which the saying of certain words in a certain way is the doing of certain kinds of acts. The elder’s statement not only defined the situation, but when the people joined in his call “we swear, we swear, we swear,” it entailed making a spiritual and moral commitment. A monument commemorating Mahmut’s heroism has since been erected, and is something of a pilgrimage site.
The idea that his immolation was not an individual act but largely structured by the constraints of society has been carried into the present. In a 1996 interview with a consultant, the issues that Mahmut’s death raised are taken up and related to contemporary developments such as the slogan “Homeland or Death” and the the land claims. Like Unus, this consultant points out the double meaning of immolations, which is simultaneously directed inward and out.

Figure 6.1 Painting of Musa Mahmut by Rustem Eminov
What do you think of the slogan “Homeland or Death?”

It's completely normal. ( . . . ) You see that decisiveness is one kind of feeling transformed to another [and] came to fruition at the time when they lived in those tent cities, made demands, and were refused. When a person's heart progressively fills with rage. For every person there is a moment when, from his peaceful condition, there can be a transformation into a condition of aggression, ah, or into a condition in which he is ready to do something to himself as a form of protest. ( . . . )

From an absolute benevolent state, a peaceful state, to a state of extreme irritation and aggressiveness apparently this process, this capturing, [and] the readiness to do something with yourself or with someone else caught these people from the outside, from the outside and influenced their spiritual condition. The slogan “Homeland or Death” at a certain moment was not just thrown out as a slogan but concrete actions could follow it! Perhaps not from a huge number of people, but a completely concrete group of people.30

From their perspective, the willingness to “do something with oneself” is a completely normal response to the situation that the authorities created. In the tension between psychology and sociology, reasonableness and pathology, we can see that the way this death is defined is grist for the mill of debates of a political nature and, more broadly, the power to define what is “normal,” “healthy,” and “sane.”

Fifth Iteration: “Torch Over Crimea”

A 35-page poem about Musa Mahmut entitled “Torch Over Crimea” elaborates the Crimean Tatar interpretation of this death (Aleksandrov 1991). The poem constitutes another iteration of Mahmut’s death in the sense that it captured attention and worked its way into the overall social context. It was read by dissidents and non-dissidents alike. The poem even brought his death to the attention of people who had not previously heard of the Crimean Tatars. Because it was devoted to a forbidden topic, copies of the poem figured prominently in stories about apartment searches and arrests. One consultant made the poem part of a “conversion” story. After witnessed the police searching for a copy of the samizdat poem in her dormitory, she was sensitized to the discrimination against national minorities. Empathy led her to join the Crimean Tatar National Movement. In the process, she met her future husband. She and her family now reside at one of the squatters’ settlements and Aleksandrov’s poem is part of her story.
about how she came to live there. Here we see the poem providing a basis for a stance toward homeland that ultimately transcends ethnic categories: when the land captures began, she realized hers was an all or nothing type of involvement.

Tatars repeatedly gave me copies of the poem, first in samizdat form as a typewritten manuscript, circulated without any indication of author. Then, while in Central Asia, the author gave me a copy of the published poem. Aleksandrov is a Russian who empathizes with Crimean Tatar concerns, and was incarcerated in a psychiatric hospital for “anti-Soviet” sympathies. Tatars repeatedly gave me copies of the poem, first in samizdat form as a typewritten manuscript, circulated without any indication of author. Then, while in Central Asia, the author gave me a copy of the published poem. Aleksandrov is a Russian who empathizes with Crimean Tatar concerns, and was incarcerated in a psychiatric hospital for “anti-Soviet” sympathies.31

**Torch Over Crimea**

Whether the poem evolved in response to ambient interpretations, or interpretations were created based on the poem circulating in the samizdat press is difficult to ascertain. What can be said is that the work expresses a common interpretation of Mahmut’s death, presenting themes that have wide currency in Crimean Tatar culture. The first stanza of the poem demonstrates this point concretely in likening the people to a phoenix who does not die, but springs to life from ashes to live, love, and suffer all over again. The Crimean Tatars feel an affinity with the mythic phoenix that reaches the point of near extinction before rising again.

The secret meaning of the saying is that he who burns himself with his own hand in the name of truth, purity, and the sacred lives eternally in the memory of the people

Because Mahmut’s pain is depicted as a smaller version of the pain of his entire people, it becomes increasingly clear that Mahmut’s death is part of the social construction of homeland. The poem explores the process whereby the views of people who go through intense trauma are radicalized. Life is subordinated to other causes: dedication to homeland supersedes dedication to life itself. The idea of suffering leading to larger benefits is one that both Christian and Muslim traditions of martyrdom share.

Aleksandrov describes how Mahmut comes home from prison and is reunited with his family. His wife cries tears of joy to see him. When he sees his now-empty yard, Zikiye is forced tell of the abuses they suffered while he was away, such as having their garden destroyed. Mahmut and Zikiye discuss what to do and Mahmut, clenching his fists, rejects his wife’s idea to move back to Uzbekistan (1991: 6–10). When Zikiye suggests going
back for the sake of the children, Mahmut tells her she should go without him. He does not want to hold her back:

If you go, I won’t remain alone
There will be two of us: myself and Crimea
And with Crimea I am not alone ( . . . )
I won’t leave Crimea alive
It will become for me you and beloved mother. (1991: 10)

In this passage, Crimea doubles as lover and mother. Mahmut pronounces his love for his family and his wife, but homeland is even dearer. In fact, it comes to stand above all else: “Crimea is dearer than family” (1991: 10). Hearing his words, Zikiye apologizes for the suggestion they return to Uzbekistan, saying she is not afraid, she will die if she must. Mahmut’s “marriage” to homeland reinforces the Christ-like quality he embodies in the poem and reinforces the importance of the overlap between religions in the meaning of martyrdom.

In the section of the poem called “Third Path,” Mahmut mentally explores his options. One of them is to return to exile, the other is to go to prison. If he leaves, the authorities will have had an easy victory. How would he look his loved ones in the eyes? he asks. If he gives up, others will too and their people will be scattered across the world. If he goes to prison, on the other hand, how will his family survive this time? His children will always be judged for having a father in prison. Even if he served his term, they could find him guilty and sentence him again. He decides that neither going to prison nor going back to exile is an option for him. There is a third path, which is to give his life for the people and the homeland. The time has come to say “enough!” What they need are deeds “so that the heart would boil with rage, calling the people into a brave battle” (1991: 14). He realizes that by burning himself, he will experience hell while he is still alive but the people will be able to follow him; not to death, but to the homeland (1991: 12–15).

One of the most significant views in the poem is that Mahmut has earned immortality. This view is articulated in a secular way without mentioning Allah or a deity. This is striking because it effectively places devotion to homeland in the realm of religiosity. Memory replaces them as a vehicle of immortality: those who remember are saved. Also, by replacing religious words with elements of nature, the poem seems to bridge the authors’ Russian background and the Tatars’ Muslim faith, potentially encompassing the secularized, Soviet views of many in “semantics” of exile that resonate widely (Malkki 1995). First the “stars” tell Mamut he is a great hero, then the point of view shifts and as if reassuring the people, the
stars say:

into the fathomless sky we have taken him
he will gain peace with us
the sparks of a burning heart have fallen
lighting a torch on earth
we have raised him to our side
so that he would burn always and everywhere
the torch of Titan, inextinguishable
extraordinary fame, remembered for centuries
heart quenched the thirst of the people
blood reborn, inextinguishable fire
earned eternal life. (1991: 35)

In the end, Aleksandrov’s poem takes the idea of Mahmut as a “torch” and magnifies it to suggest Mahmut illuminates the whole world with inextinguishable light, “always” and “everywhere.” Mahmut is now on the level of the phoenix mentioned at the beginning of the poem, raised to a mythic level.

Aleksandrov leaves us with a memorable allegory. He describes how an ant tries to escape up a tree during a forest fire, but walks right into the tree sap and dies. Others follow and expire in the thick sap. In so doing, their bodies form a bridge. Then thousands of ants are able to climb up the tree, reaching its very heights, away from the raging fire. This is just one of the allegories used to describe what Mahmut did. Like the conversation with Mahmut’s survivors, Torch Over Crimea condenses cultural meanings that can be difficult to articulate. In being carbon-copied, circulated, hidden, and retrieved it became a reference for Crimean Tatars. The poem expanded the cultural iconography of homeland to include immolation as constitutive of love for homeland.

Conclusion: A Sixth Iteration?

On a November morning in 1997 while I was living in Simferopol, a 34-year-old man named Lenur Ametov immolated himself on the steps of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea. This was followed by rumors of two other immolations taking place in rural areas. A Kyiv-based newspaper, Krymskoe Vremia, reported that, “In the estimation of law enforcement officials, the act has no political subtext” (Bushev 1997: 1). The paper also reported a suicide note in which Ametov asked that no one be blamed for his death
Given that he chose the steps of the Supreme Soviet, however, it is difficult to accept that the act was devoid of political meaning and the newspaper commentary seems to have been calculated for palliative effect.

At the very least, past immolations framed ideas about what actions are possible, permissible, and desirable. Thus we see yet another trace of Mahmut’s act in the present. As Tilly has pointed out, people take with them from the past not only a history of their claims and a sense of identity, but also the particular forms of claim making they have at their disposal (1994: 247). Interpretations of Ametov’s immolation also suggest changes in the Crimean setting. Whereas Tatars took to the streets for Mahmut’s funeral, after Ametov’s death they mostly just went home. What followed was almost complete silence on the topic. Consultants I probed explained that Ametov was not alone: everyone is in such a state right now that it seems a completely normal thing to do. As one put it, “Many people are on the absolute brink of such despair themselves.” These replies point to a radically different historical context than the one in which Musa Mahmut immolated himself, and suggest a need to link the linguistic analysis to material conditions, a goal in chapter 7.

One significant change is that Crimean Tatars no longer feel that they alone suffer. Political and economic disorganization trouble everyone. Further, the social cleavages are no longer primarily along ethnic lines. Crimean Tatars now hold some positions of authority and therefore just whom to bring claims against is less clear. The subdued response also suggests a fundamental shift in the political consciousness of Crimean Tatars. The recent immolation did not become a basis for protest because Crimean Tatars claim to have become “apolitical.” Crimean Tatars stress that their foremost concern is now putting bread on the table and a roof over their heads. Today it seems survival issues upstage politics in the struggle to return.

Side by side, the immolations taking place in Crimea first in 1978 and then in 1997 speak clearly about the significance of time and place. The moment in which Ametov immolated himself is a politically disenchanted one. Also, the impact of his action is depreciated in the violent, criminalized environment of 1997 Crimea. Ametov immolated himself in a time when suicides and political murders seem everyday and individuals hear about (or worse, witness) Mafia-linked shootings when they do the daily marketing. Mahmut’s immolation, in contrast, occurred during enforced quiescence. While the times have changed, Ametov’s 1997 actions cannot be disassociated from the past. His actions bear its imprint if not its import.

Musa Mahmut’s act is best seen within a wider system of values. Seeing it in this light gives a greater sense of its meaning as a spiritual act parsed.
in the language of nationalism. However, a crack in this interpretation is that Mahmut’s dying wish, that his family be taken care of, has not been fulfilled. Is this a reflection on the dire economic circumstances in Crimea? Or is it a hint that the Crimean Tatars are not as loyal, patriotic, or self-sacrificing as they would like to believe? The answer is probably both. Mahmut’s widow describes how she applied for financial aid and was sent from one person to the next until she was finally refused on the grounds that no funds were available. After Ayse Seytmuratova intervened on her behalf, an account in her family’s name was opened with a balance of roughly one hundred dollars. She spent the money on repairing the heating system in her tiny village home, even though what she needs is a new furnace.

While his widow has largely been forgotten, Mahmut has not been. The net effect of his protest has been to consolidate the meaning of homeland and the mood of protest. Reshat and Redvan are good examples of this process because they ally themselves with Mahmut’s devotion to homeland, or at least what they imagine Mahmut’s devotion to have been. While parsed in the language of nationalism, immolation is not something that necessarily has its most profound meaning at the macropolitical level. We also have to consider the level of Tatars’ everyday relationship with their land. In the end it comes down not to “the nation” but to the meaning invested in living, and for Tatars like Redvan and Reshat, this meaning has been derived from a specific relationship to place.

Death became beautiful in the moments of emotional excess that characterized involvement in the national movement. It was not just the “narcotic” of history that motivated them, but, on a deeper level, the valorization of suffering and sacrifice for one’s people. Thus “for the people” indexes a whole constellation of feelings and beliefs about living a meaningful life in a context that tended to drain significance.

Crimean Tatar attitudes are shifting. A recent visit suggested that if Crimean Tatars preferred death to leaving the peninsula in the late 1990s, they were entertaining other possibilities by 2001. Faced with rampant corruption, unemployment, and a depressed economy in Ukraine, many Crimean Tatars were investigating the possibility of working for dollars or Euros elsewhere. Parents were taking an increasingly dim view of their children’s future, a future that once seemed bright in Crimea. While their love for their homeland was not diminished, they were becoming increasingly doubtful about their practical ability to withstand its hardships.

Chapter 7 explores the political ramifications of immolation by considering in more detail the strategies whereby Tatars made claims to land they had lost in 1944. It aims to ground the present conversational analysis in the concrete material conditions facing Tatars. While Crimean Tatars don’t
seem to draw an explicit connection between Mahmut’s famed death and their repertoires of contention, they share the same lineage of protest. The willingness to die explored in this chapter helped convince authorities in Crimea that the Tatars were not going to give up. A new balance would have to be negotiated.
Chapter 7

Houses and Homelands: The Reterritorialization of Crimean Tatars*

Crimean Tatars found that after the fall of the Soviet Union, self-immolation made sense not as an act of political protest, but as a pragmatic strategy for repatriation. It was largely through the practice of seizing land (samo-zakhvat), and threatening self-immolation when the authorities tried to evict them that Crimean Tatars repatriated. However, the Crimean Tatars have not always been willing to make sacrifices to live on the peninsula. After annexation by Russia in 1783, and the Crimean Wars in the 1800s, the peninsula was hardly construed as a “homeland.” They left it on a scale unprecedented in Europe at the time. This chapter therefore focuses on their attachment to homeland and the way it manifest in the process of repatriation. Juxtaposing two radically different moments in Crimean Tatar history, the centrifugal moment of emigration to the Ottoman Empire and the centripetal moment of repatriation to Crimea, will clarify the structure of feeling that guided repatriation.

The Crimean Tatars are part of the trend toward territorially, as opposed to religiously based identities that began in the eighteenth century.¹ Throughout the world, citizens have come to see national identity, like gender, as an inseparable part of identity (Berlant 1991; Stephens 1995: 15; Eley and Suny 1996: 26). What distinguishes the Crimean Tatars is the degree of shift that took place in their attachment. Whereas two centuries ago they looked to the Ottoman Empire as the center of a Muslim world, Crimean Tatars today are conditioned by secularized, Soviet views that sometimes made death preferable to life outside the Crimean peninsula.
Throughout, the repatriation has been informed by the affective elements of historical consciousness. It is a practical, not just ideological, approach that led Tatars to adopt the slogan “Homeland or Death,” and be willing to carry it out. We can recall that Williams used “structure of feeling” as distinct from more formal concepts of worldview and ideology. This is not to discount formally held belief systems such as Islam, which play an important role in shaping meanings and values as lived. What is most urgent for understanding squatting, however, is identifying emerging values that are more protean and difficult to define. Urban and rural squatting are an evolving set of practices, the meaning, effects, and affective content of which are changing. The land parcels that Crimean Tatars seized were eventually legalized and many of them have since been privatized. But the practice of squatting will resist being described in the past tense for as long as Tatars are living in basements, train cars, and half-finished houses (see figure 7.1).

An exploration of the centrifugal moment of emigration to the Ottoman lands is followed by a detailed examination of the repatriation process. The structure of feeling that infuses returning Tatars with a sense of purpose is by no means limited to the peninsula. In Uzbekistan, structures of feeling that were “at the edge of semantic availability” for political reasons still found expression (Williams 1977: 134). They were connected to specific locales by means of localized and embodied remembering. This

Figure 7.1  Crimean Tatar home made from a rail car
chapter therefore ends with a discussion of the ways that, from Ukraine to Uzbekistan, the house provides an aide de memoire and a narrative structuring device for speaking of homeland.

Centrifugal Forces: Crimean Tatar Emigrations

Following Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 1783, and well into the nineteenth century, there were successive waves of migration to Anatolia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. The first migration took place in connection with the 1783 annexation of Crimea to Russia; the migration continued during the first half of the nineteenth century; and the last and largest migration occurred in the aftermath of the Crimean War in the 1860s.2

All agree the migrations were extensive. According to Lazzerini, the first migration in the early period of Russian rule reached 100,000 at a time when the Crimean Tatar population was believed to have been approximately 300,000 (1988: 126). Later, the exodus following the Crimean War resulted in the departure of two-thirds of the Tatar population, or 181,000 (Lazzerini 1988: 127). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries combined, a total of as many as 400,000 may have emigrated (Williams 2001: 277).3 The reasons for these migrations to Ottoman lands are more disputed. Authors such as Özenbashli (1992) and Livitskii (1992) emphasize the abuses of the colonial regime while de-emphasizing the importance of religious or cultural ties in Ottoman lands. Others, such as Kirmili (1990), Fisher (1978), and Williams (2001) find the religious and moral dimension of the migrations more compelling.

The latter view, that Islam played a key role in the Tatars’ exodus, was also taken by colonial administrators who suggested that the Tatars were leaving on a massive scale because of “fanaticism” and “indolence” (Williams 1999: 186). In a rather blatant instance of wishful thinking, one administrator argued that Crimea was better off without the Tatars. He was in favor of relocating Slavs to the area and ridding Crimea of a people whose hearts and thoughts were directed to the place where “brothers in blood and faith” were located (Sherban 1992: 37). Similarly, Markevich ascribes this migration to religious “fanaticism” and the “low cultural level” of Crimean Tatars, although he admits that the prospect of military service under the (Christian) Russians may also have been a factor (1928: 377).

From a certain point of view, they had reason to look to religion to explain emigration. After all, a Crimean Tatar at this time was simply a
Turkic-speaking Muslim resident of Crimea. Self-identification was expressed primarily in terms of faith, and other types of identification were more subdued. In the years after annexation, Islam was an important diacritic of the Tatars’ history, identity, and culture. The everyday and seasonal rituals of Islam were part of what distinguished the Crimean Muslims from the primarily Russian and Ukrainian Christians.

Those ascribing to the view that it was at core a religiously motivated migration also point to an Islamic perspective on tsarist rule. According to Islamic doctrine, any locale ruled by non-Muslims was by definition *dar al-barb* or the “sphere of war,” a land ruled by infidels (Ruthven 1997: 12). That the Ottoman Empire was conceived as *dar al-islam*, the “sphere of Islam” must surely have bred an affinity, even though it was a land most of the Crimean Tatar emigrants had never seen. Seeing Ottoman Turkey as the seat of the Caliph (successor to the Prophet) may also have made them receptive to the Islamic concept of *hijra*, emigration for the sake of God. Karpat argues the Crimean Tatars saw themselves as moving from the periphery to the center of an Islam-centered universe by leaving the Crimean peninsula (1986).

But this approach seems also to fetishize religion as an ethnic marker, divorcing it from politics and a host of vitally important factors that also influenced the Crimean Tatars’ departure from Crimea. As Bennigsen has argued, Islam does not just pertain to the religious. It is a complex “aggregate” of traditions, attitudes, and customs that are social and psychological as well (Bennigsen 1979). Attempts on the part of *mullahs* (religious specialists) to suggest emigration would have failed if the Crimean Tatars were not already receptive to the idea. It seems important, considering the Crimean Tatars were religious but not fanatics, to think about the more subtle effects of Islam that transcended the confines of faith to encompass aspects of Crimean Tatars’ legal, political, and economic life, and led to a cultural clash with the Russian colonizers.

The changes wrought by the colonial regime are more numerous, and more complex than can be fully described here. However, it is possible to discuss three principal dimensions of change that were key to the Tatars’ emigration: different concepts of land and property rights; a lack of support for their culture and religion; and depredations during the Crimean Wars.

### Concepts of Land and Property Rights

From the outset, the Russian colonizers and the inhabitants of Crimea had a troubled relationship because the new administration failed to appreciate the significance of the Crimean land system based on *shari’a* and laws
referred to in the Kitab al-haraj. Under the traditional system, a great deal of the land was considered state (miri) property. Common resources were appropriated first by the tsarist administration, then by pomeshchiks, and eventually by the mirzas (lower nobility). Some scholars suggest that Russian colonial policies failed to respect Tatar ways because they did not understand their concept of communal ownership and Islamic property relations (Fisher 1978; Kirimli 1990). Others are more adamant that the Russians did not want to learn them (Özenbashli 1992).

The Russians considered that they had a legitimate right to appropriate land in the colonized area. The land that formerly belonged to the Girey dynasty, plus the land of the Tatars who had fled or had been expelled by the Russians, was appropriated and made property of the state. This property was initially distributed through a procedure referred to as “bestowalment of property for the purpose of settlement and economy” by means of “charters” signed by Empress Catherine, Prince Grigorii Potemkin, or Count Platon Zubov (Kirimli 1990: 6). In the beginning, a significant amount of the land in Crimea was distributed by means of these endowments. There was also the sale of land to dignitaries and others at reduced prices. Whether or not the actual amount of land bestowed upon the nobles and high military officers is considered significant, the fact remains that the endowments were part of a general approach to land that destroyed the established relationships between land and persons. Russian landholders further alienated Tatars by diverting water flows and requiring payment for access to the much-needed and formerly common supply (Levitskii 1992: 124, 134).

These changes brought disaster because daily life depended on access to woods, pastures, streams, and fountains. Previously, shari’a (Islamic law) had determined the relationship between a peasant and his landlord, and gave the peasants a great degree of protection. As long as the peasant fulfilled his specific obligations, the title to usage could not be taken from him or his family. The Kitab al-haraj had dictated that a cultivator without property title (rakaba) still had title to usage (tasarruf) of the land he worked (Karpat 1986: 27). Not even the khan had “owned” the land in the sense Russians were accustomed to. A significant portion of the Crimean Tatar nobility did not have de jure ownership of the land, but the right to its usufructuary benefit because the land was essentially believed to belong to the community as a whole (Karpat 1986: 277). In other words, rights to use the land were not to the land per se as much as the tithe, which mediated the relationship.

The imposition of Russian political and social norms precluded Crimean residents from defending themselves. For example, the tsarist administration initially required “satisfactory and reliable documentation”
in order to prevent the confiscation of peasant lands (Kirimli 1990: 7). The problem was that the system of land tenure under the Khanate had been based on custom, not written documentation. The documents that did exist were often destroyed in the unstable years of war and upheaval.

Commissions were established to protect the Tatars’ rights, but the measures were insufficient. For example, the law of 1833 stated that they were exempt from the need to provide documentation, but Tatars soon discovered that land could be taken away from them in spite of the law and their hereditary rights (Levitskii 1992: 123–124). A related development was that when land tenure came under contractual arrangements, the Kitab al-haraj ceased to protect the peasants. They became tenants of lords who raised taxes and work obligations in an effort to boost incomes. Crimean peasants were subject to much of the same treatment as serfs but ironically, because they were not serfs, did not benefit from emancipation in 1861 (Karpat 1986: 277). Tatar peasants were legally free, but found their access to the land circumscribed: nobles had bought land at reduced prices, seized it when ownership could not be proven, and raised the amount of corvée labor (barschina) required above the traditional three days per week (Lazzerini 1988: 129).

Religion and Culture

The second factor influencing the Tatars’ exodus was a lack of respect for their religion and culture. While annexation brought positive changes such as extension of the railroad and telegraph service, there was a tragic destruction of Islamic architecture, particularly in Simferopol, which never regained its previous style. As serious from the Tatar point of view was the destruction of gravestones that were carted off for building material. Crimean Tatars also suffered personal attacks: Russian soldiers reportedly amused themselves by firing muskets at mullahs who had ascended the minaret to proclaim the hour of noon (Clarke 1816 in Williams 1999: 175).

There were also important changes within Tatar society. As part of her efforts to colonize Crimea, Catherine tried to incorporate the Tatar classes into the Russian social structure by making the mirzas equivalent to Russian dvorianstvo. This was difficult because Tatar mirzas lacked evidence of predecessors’ service and distinction, as well as proof of landholdings. After overcoming their discomfort at being made part of the new tsarist nobility, many of the mirzas became tools of the government. Mirzas who had been given nobility persuaded peasants to indicate that forests proximate to villages belonged to them, and to believe that unless they did so,
the land would have to be given to Russian landowners or the state, having been declared “empty.” Thus Crimean Tatars became vulnerable not only to colonial authorities, but highly ranked Tatars as well.

The Crimean War

A third factor influencing the Tatars’ exodus was the Crimean War of 1853–1856. Russian authorities were sensitive to the Crimean Muslims’ identification with the Ottomans and considered them to be potentially disloyal during the time of war. The Russian administration therefore took preventive measures by removing Tatars from villages close to the southern shore. Not entirely unlike the 1941–1943 occupation, the Russian military authorities suspected the Crimean Tatars of collaboration with the Allied armies and subjected the Tatar population to repression. In fact, suspecting secret collaboration with the Turks, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Prince Menshikov, ordered the mass deportation of all the Crimean Tatars on the peninsula, the entire Black Sea littoral, and interior of Russia. The only reason the order was not carried out was that the war made it logistically impossible.

In addition to these relocations, the Tatars endured the raids of Cossack sotinas or squadrons that were sent to patrol villages during the siege of Sevastopol. In part because they were Muslim, Cossack patrolmen saw the Tatars as enemies. They arrested and deported Tatars who left their village to collect water under the pretext that the Tatars intended to go over to the other side. Many Tatars had their grain storage areas raided, and their cattle driven away. Crimean Tatars were also robbed, raped, and flogged. As a result of these wartime traumas, thousands of Tatars fled their homes and many sought asylum with departing allies. This departure was then taken as a sign of betrayal by military authorities.

Not all the factors leading to the Crimean Tatars’ departure were malignant. The unfortunate consequences of modernization also contributed to displacement. For example, the mixed economy of the Crimean Tatars that had been oriented toward subsistence was edged out when, as part of changes taking place throughout the Russian Empire, gentry who had acquired land began to cultivate a single, income-generating crop, such as wheat. This pattern was especially disruptive to the Nogais living in the steppe region, who left the Crimean peninsula on the largest scale.

In sum, the expropriation of formerly Tatar lands associated with annexation, the insensitivity to cultural traditions under Russian rule, and wartime depredations in connection with the Crimean War led to a collapse of the Tatars’ traditional way of life. In light of these changes and the
desire to avoid service in the tsars’ Christian army, it is neither surprising
nor mysterious that the Crimean Tatars left the peninsula in such large
numbers. Whereas Russian colonial administrators and some Russian his-
torians were inclined to see it as somehow “religious” that the Crimean
Tatars should desire to leave Orthodox Russia, there is clear evidence that
this is an oversimplification. Therefore, while this migration has
been framed in religious terms, “Islam” must not be used monolithically or
ahistorically to account for a dynamic encompassing the devastation of a
way of life.

Alternative Imaginings of
Homeland

From Tatars’ perspective in the present, these emigrations seem shameful,
even unpatriotic. Since their 1944 deportation to Siberia and Soviet
Central Asia, Crimean Tatars have been fighting to return to Crimea in
spite of opposition to their presence, poverty, a lack of civil rights, and
inadequate infrastructure. When not provoking embarrassed silence, the
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century emigrations were retrospectively
recounted as forced migrations. When asked to recount Sürgün or exile
(referring to their 1944 deportation), many Tatars sought clarification
about which exile. The linguistic convention used to refer to the nineteenth-
century emigrations is ilk Sürgün or “first exile.” Hence, what has been
called “emigration” from a social scientific perspective is, from a more expe-
riential positioning, another exile.

Still, the fact remains that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
Tatars experiencing difficulty were leaving the peninsula on a massive scale.
Unlike their descendants today, Tatars in this period did not think it
was imperative they live on the peninsula, regardless of the quality of their
lives. The contrast with the present is striking: protracted and contentious
battles for land reclamation have taken place over the same south shore area
of the peninsula that Crimean Tatars were so anxious to leave just over a
century ago.

This contrast can be elaborated. Observers who traveled extensively in
Crimea at the end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the
nineteenth century suggested that Crimean Tatars were not attached to
their lands. For example, Markevich mentions a “detachment” of Crimean
Tatars from the land (1928: 385). Tatars allegedly considered they were liv-
ing in the wrong time and place. Kirimli builds on this, suggesting that
they had a feeling of “temporary residence”:

. . . within Crimea self-identification with the land hardly evolved during the nineteenth century, when existence in Crimea was apparently considered as living at the “wrong time and in the wrong place” due to extra-territorial allegiances of religion and culture which were still defined not in ideological but in vague traditional terms. (Kirimli 1990: 10)

Kirimli also observed about this time that:

At times when the threat seemed insurmountable, even the age-old homeland could be jettisoned, since it no longer formed part of the Abode of Islam. From the believer’s point of view, that was what all these mass emigrations were about. (1990: 50)

Although the Crimean Tatars in previous centuries had a different kind of attachment than do Tatars today, it seems superficial to speak of “jettisoning” the homeland. Crimean Tatar songs and laments suggest that they left with sadness. The following lines from a destan collected in the nineteenth century express a sense of despair: “They say the Crimea has one ruler / The consequence is the destruction of the Crimea / All the Mirzas are the people’s enemy / From the Lord I expect help and I cry for the Crimea” (cited in Williams 1999: 201). Although the tenets of Islam dictated that the peninsula was to be abandoned by the pious, we would be mistaken to assume that it was a smooth or easy process.

By the twentieth century, the Crimean Tatars developed a national movement that saw the Crimean “abode of war” in a completely different light. It was seen as a milli vatan, or national homeland. The reimagining of Crimea as a national homeland is due in part to the efforts of early nationalists like Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1851–1914). He was the first to define the community based primarily on culture and language. Gaspirali devoted his career to revitalizing and modernizing Muslim traditions (Lazzerini 1973; 1988). A principal means for developing the common religious and ethno-national consciousness he envisioned was Tercüman, or “Translator,” the first Crimean Tatar news paper, which Gaspirali founded in the mid-1800s. Gaspirali certainly challenged the thinking of Crimean Tatar elites, but we may go too far to see him as nationalist. From his perspective, the nation included millions of Turkic-Muslims, not just the relatively small group of Turkic Muslims on the Crimean peninsula (Williams 2001: 303). While his approach was eventually abandoned as too supportive of Russia, he influenced successive groups.
Of course, the notion of a national homeland further solidified when Lenin sanctioned the Crimean ASSR in 1921. This republic supported the development of native cadres, Crimean Tatar cultural institutions, and national identity, representing a Crimean Tatar Golden Age. This is a key phase in the shift from religiously oriented approach to one organized around national categories.

**Centripetal Forces: The Crimean Tatar Repatriation to the Crimean Peninsula**

The Crimean Tatars were drawn back to the peninsula following their 1944 deportation with considerable centripetal force. In contrast to the previous century when Crimean Tatars sought better material conditions and a context that would be more conducive to their faith, Crimean Tatars returning to the peninsula after Stalin’s deportations saw themselves righting a historic wrong. While the quality of *real estate* was a factor in their decisions, the quality of *life* there was far from central to their deliberations. Conspicuously absent from their rationale was anything approximating a better life, in either material or religious terms. Those who returned to the peninsula in the 1960s and 1970s were re-deported or detained, and those who returned in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in the wake of the Soviet collapse, faced unemployment, discrimination, and opposition to their presence. Tatars refer to their desire to return as “in the genes,” but we can see that during the Khanate and the period of Russian colonization, their relationship to homeland was very different. They had learned to see a territorially based national identity as necessary and, paradoxically, sacred.

Some Tatars began returning shortly after the decree in September 1967 “Concerning the citizens of Tatar nationality formerly living in Crimea.” But only a few families were able to hold their ground. The vast majority was re-deported outside the Crimean peninsula. The leader of the Crimean Tatar National Movement estimates that in 1968 alone, some six thousand may have been removed from the peninsula. By the mid-1980s, a growing number of Crimean Tatars were clustered in the Ukrainian Oblasts that lay just outside Crimea such as Kherson and *Krasnodarski Krai*, in the Caucasus region. Some of them settled there after being prevented from settling in Crimea, while others moved there deliberately, positioning themselves to repatriate at the first opportunity.
Seizing Land

In 1989, activists of the national movement made the decision that it was time to return to the historic homeland. As the leader put it:

The situation here was such that when Crimean Tatars began returning, the authorities were of course not thrilled. They did not want return. But it was already 1989 and perestroika was already in full swing. If in 1968 all returning Tatars were forcibly removed from here, now they couldn’t do that. But they created other barriers: they did not process documents; they said that you don’t have enough living space. Well, they found various bureaucratic reasons.10

The Crimean authorities also waged a last-minute campaign that there was insufficient land to accommodate returnees.11 While a pretext, it was propagandized as a legitimate reason to delay. The regions Crimean Tatars were leaving in Uzbekistan had a population density two to four times higher than Crimea, revealing the questionable basis of these claims.12 To make matters worse, Tatars who requested property were sometimes refused based on an ukaz or order of 1956, which stipulated that the end of the special settlement system did not entail restitution of property (Chervonnaia and Guboglo 1992: 187).

Crimean authorities refused the Tatars’ requests to be granted land on which to build, even though it was clearly preferable to having Russian and Ukrainian homes seized by returnees (as occurred when Chechens returned from their exile). The Crimean Tatars characterize their own approach as moderate compared to the Chechens’ tactics. Crimean Tatars claim that returning Chechens simply said, “vacate these premises or we will slit your throats” in order to reclaim their houses. Crimean Tatars who could not purchase housing most often elected to build for themselves. However, Crimean authorities refused to grant Tatars land for this purpose, claiming that it was kolkhoz land, or that there were already plans for construction. At the same time, land was rapidly being given to the Slavic population for gardens and dachas, if nothing else. Dzhemilev continued:

It even came down to being distributed to Russians in a forced way. At the “Foton” factory they did not give vacations until you wrote an application for receiving a plot of land. It was the official politics: agitators even went around to Russian families in the villages. They said, “Hurry up and take land, invite your relatives and friends from Russia. We’ll help you receive land, you will build, otherwise Crimea will become Tatar.” And so in the course of 1989–1990, 150 plots of land were given to Russians.13
Thus Soviet racial and ethnic politics conditioned the official response to repatriating Tatars. The Crimean setting can be compared with the former Yugoslavia, where repatriation and property reclamation were supported (in admittedly uneven ways) by national legislation, UN resolutions, and cadres of administrators and specialists who were tasked with sorting out property claims. In the wartorn regions, international organizations promoted policies that would reverse the process of ethnic cleansing by facilitating the return of members of non-majority ethnic groups (Sharp 1998). In Croatia, for example, residents who had claimed houses during or shortly after the war received letters that they would have to give up their house when the state found new property for them (Leutloff 2002). The success of efforts toward property restitution and integration has been mixed, and the approach has therefore been criticized (Sharp 1998). However, an international hand in repatriation was unavailable for the Crimean Tatars until comparatively late. Ukraine did not attempt any form of property restitution: for the most part, Ukrainian law distributes rights to those currently occupying the property or working the land.

In Crimea the urgency of their situation coupled with the recalcitrance of authorities made attempts to work out a favorable solution particularly tense. Tension escalated and ultimately overflowed into violence. A full-scale attack on a land reclamation took place at Krasnyi Rai or “Red Paradise,” where the authorities bulldozed dwellings and took the injured Crimean Tatars who tried to stop them into custody. This prompted Tatars to demonstrate in front of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea, then march to the Council of Ministers or “Pentagon” as it was euphemistically called, and surround it. The demonstration alarmed the authorities and drove representatives of non-Tatar ethnic groups to characterize the Tatars as “warlike.” In this respect, the seizures of land put the Tatars at odds with other groups, who referred to them as “heathen” and “uncivilized.” As disastrous as it was for ethnic accord, many Tatars feel that they would not have been able to relocate if they had simply cooperated with the authorities.

Soon the economic situation in Uzbekistan and Ukraine made repatriation even more difficult. For example, a flooded real estate market in Uzbekistan and inflation in Ukraine meant the purchase of housing was increasingly unrealistic. Then the new states began instituting economic reforms. Those who had relocated to Ukraine early had been able to buy building materials relatively inexpensively or bring building materials with them. But newly independent Ukraine experienced inflation and a construction rush, which drove the prices of building materials higher. The demand on shipping containers made the cost of relocating construction
materials prohibitive. Economic reform in Uzbekistan instituted the non-convertible sum and then currency reform or indexation devalued savings. The net result was that those migrating after 1991 were significantly impoverished.

Tale of Two Repatriations

To hear Crimean Tatars tell the story, they began seizing land when authorities refused to grant it. What this story eclipses is the Soviet program that attempted to assist with the repatriation of as many as 50,000 per year between 1989 and 1991 (Gomart 2000; Bekirov 1999a: 50). After the Soviet collapse, Ukraine took on this program in 1991, spending some 300 million. However, Ukrainian funding fell short of Crimean needs and the official construction of new housing and infrastructure was largely abandoned by 1996. By 1997, the State Committee of Nationalities (Goskomnats) was only assisting with some communal housing in decaying dormitories such as Zviozdochka (Starlet) in Yalta, as well as reimbursing the cost of a third-class, one-way train ticket from Uzbekistan. Emergency monies were available to the most impoverished families, but many complained of being turned away.

Another reason Crimean Tatars de-emphasize the assistance is that only a portion of the funds reached their destination. Dzhemilev gave the example that in 1992–1993, each family that was building housing was given 65,000 korbontsev, approximately 1,500 dollars. However, the money went through many months of “turn around” in banks coinciding with a period of galloping inflation. In the end, the value was approximately 200 dollars. As Dzhemilev put it, each family was basically robbed of 1,300 dollars. Of the funds that were disbursed, some were inevitably mishandled, and there are widespread charges of nepotism against the Goskomnats, Crimea Fund, and other organizations tasked with resettlement efforts. Since the allocated funds failed to meet their needs, many Crimean Tatars see the repatriation as self-financed. Some are unaware and others are unwilling to acknowledge state support on their behalf. The Goskomnats estimates that at least 148 million dollars are needed to complete the infrastructure at the compact settlements.

Those who repatriated at the expense of the state were settled primarily on kolkhozes in the Crimean steppe. Far from their parents’ lands and dissatisfied with their lot, they soon relocated in order to purchase land and houses around Simferopol, Bahçesaray, and Belogorsk areas with traditionally higher concentrations of Tatars. These Tatars, better situated than those who came later, helped resettle successive waves.
“Compact Settlements”

Today, there are approximately 290 squatters’ settlements, or “compact settlements.” Many of the houses on these settlements are not finished, meaning roughly half the Crimean Tatars lack adequate housing. In the 290 settlements, 25 percent are without electricity, 70 percent are without running water, 90 percent are without paved roads, and 96 percent are without gas heat, relying on stoves or small heaters. A small number of Tatars have been able to privatize homes, but they are still subject to the lack of amenities. The settlements that were formalized after 1991, and those that remain unofficial have the least infrastructure. City officials blame the Tatar leadership for not taking into account the costs of establishing utilities when they began claiming land.

The quality of the land that they acquired is also a growing concern. As it turns out, there are reasons that much of it was previously vacant: some of it is not tillable. Other land, such as the Zaleskoie settlement, is the site of previous chemical dumping, making ground water highly suspect. Another settlement, Ismailovski, is built on a flood plain and it is difficult to be optimistic about the fate of the houses.

The following examples of squatting demonstrate how the Crimean Tatars’ attitude toward land developed in contestations with the authorities. Tatars adopted “confrontational politics” when their desire to peacefully settle unoccupied land met with resistance. In capturing land, fearlessness and a willingness to sacrifice oneself became standard. This was evident in the case of Musa Mahmud: the protracted legal battle for a propiska or residence permit ended in his death by immolation, becoming an issue of importance for the entire nation. But it is also evident in the strategies adapted later by Tatars from Marino to Simferopol and Yalta. The frequent statement that they came back to Crimea “ready for anything, even death” is therefore neither a peculiarity of the Crimean Tatar people, nor an essential passion lodged deep in their “nature,” but an outgrowth of a situation in which mass actions and extreme measures got results, where talks and negotiations failed.

Marino: A Case Study of Suburban Squatting

Consultants differ about the place where the first seizure of land took place, but most indicate the beginning of this phase in 1989 (Khalilova 1998).
On the margin of a subdivision called “Marino,” a sunflower field was taken over by a group of Crimean Tatars. Before the Tatars began squatting, the land belonged to the Raiispolkom (Raionyi Ispolnitelnyi Komitet), a regional governing structure.

Two of the residents, Gulnara and Nariman, were in their mid-thirties when interviewed. Unlike his ancestors in the nineteenth century, they are unequivocal that they are living in the right place at the right time. However, much of their life is gerry-rigged, entailing one adaptation after another. To begin with, they live in a train car that has been converted into a home. The car, which is deeply rusted, is set on a rise of the Marino settlement, and surrounded by a garden. On the day I visited, Gulnara was outside working among the zinnias. Because the car is elevated, it is difficult to get into the front room, but once inside, it feels more like a trailer home than a rail car. Immediately inside is the “kitchen” with the table where we sat and talked. Later, Nariman and Gulnara showed me the “bedrooms,” which had been fashioned from some of the car’s old compartments.

Nariman was appointed to head the seizure just after the land had been taken over. He told me that the initial group consisted of about 75 people, but dwindled to 26 the very same day when people became frightened of police raids. The group had chosen this land after considering its “strategically comfortable location.” The experience of taking over other land showed they needed at least two entrances to the settlement. Some of the other squatters’ settlements had been blockaded by the police, and it became impossible to bring in groceries or construction material. After they set up camp, others joined them as each day without a police raid passed.

The people who came to the Marino settlement were those who had run out of other options. As Nariman put it:

They simply had no other way out. At the time, prices of houses had risen and become astronomical. And some were just fighters. Because of that we decided it would be the most expedient to take land. If they are not going to give us land, we are going to take land: it’s our land. We came to our homeland and if they are going to officially refuse us, we are going to take it. We started to put down stakes and build.19

Nariman clarified that when they were refused land on which to build, they established a tent village right on the central square in Simferopol (the capital) that functioned as a headquarters where they could conduct meetings and exchange information. When journalists arrived to report on the situation, the tent villages embarrassed authorities and prompted them to take a more conciliatory position.
Nariman elaborated that the captures were organized in advantageous relation to one another. He placed one hand at the center of the table and the other hand touched down around it at various satellite positions closer to the edge as he explained:

We had headquarters there [in the center], and captures here and here and here. If we specifically had come here by ourselves, they would have leveled us with a bulldozer and that would have been it. For that we thought of a ring. You know, at each exit from the city we have captures: here’s Marino, here’s Lozovoe, here’s Kamenka, and so Simferopol is surrounded! (laughter). But you know everything was decided in the tent village. If somewhere someone had been demolished we [would] all gather and hash it out at the square. There was a president, a komendant, a komendant of the camp. Everything was organized in that sense.20

The camp was also strategic in the sense that it was located on a rise in elevation. The majority of the houses command wide vistas, and approaching cars and pedestrians are visible at considerable distance.

When the authorities realized that they were not going to succeed by threatening the Crimean Tatars, they indicated they were ready to make a compromise. They asked the Tatars to remove the embarrassing tent village in the center of Simferopol (which Russian journalists had called attention to), and then they would “evaluate the situation.” Based on previously broken promises, Marino residents were skeptical this would be to their advantage. According to Nariman they said:

Give us a [positive] decision on general legalization, plus a place for our headquarters, plus a dormitory. If we arrive at this, then we will take down the tents and sit at the negotiating table, and decide these questions to legalize normally in an orderly fashion.21

Putting Down Stakes

The way in which they “started to put down stakes and build” was aimed to eliminate jealousy, competition, and rancor within the community. Infighting, they had learned, is not out of the ordinary and is a favorite device used by government authorities to gain leverage. First, they surveyed and divided the sunflower field into 500 parcels of land. Then, as a group, they built identical foundations on each one. During this time, they lived in tents on the land and cooked and ate communal meals. Only when the foundations were built did they pull numbers from a hat to determine who
would receive each parcel. From then on, families were responsible for their own housing construction, which continues today. The group showed their vision by marking out a street plan, naming the streets after dissidents and heroes, and setting aside ample land for a school, medical clinic, bakery, and mechet or mosque.

This was a time of high emotion. One resident of this settlement referred to it as “the most romantic time in his life.” Another commented that they are “sleeping” now compared to the level of activity that was in evidence at the time. Nariman and Gulnara’s story is itself an expression of the euphoria of the times. They met at the pickets in downtown Simferopol and had their “honeymoon” on the newly captured land.

The phase of reclaiming land and property is now romanticized, but this glosses over the explicit tensions that erupted. There were instances when land that had been seized by small groups was then appropriated by elites seeking to make their own claims (Ymerov 1996). Part of the Marino settlement was seized by a subgroup led by a prominent dissident. These lands are thus doubly disputed and tensions linger. There were also incidents when apartments that had been granted to Tatars through legal channels were seized by individuals who had failed to secure similar benefits. For example, a Crimean Tatar construction brigade seized an apartment building that had been officially allocated to the families of people who had died for the national movement. Lacking sufficiently organized and established procedures whereby they could obtain land for domestic construction, the Tatars perfected the practice of claiming land when refused an opportunity to rent or buy it.

Squatting became so institutionalized that they began to describe it as performance. While Geertz (1973) suggested that performance articulates meta-social commentary that reproduces social norms, the post-Soviet meta-social commentary of land seizure swept social norms to the side and radically changed the demographic and power balance in Crimea. This dynamic is more along the lines of Edensor’s description that social performances sometimes bypass norms and rules, leading to a sort of bricolage of meanings and actions (Edensor 1998: 64). Squatting was held in high esteem at the same time that it was condemned; taken as a carry over from the seventeenth century at the same time that it was seen as an innovation.

When Crimean Tatars said the captures became “performance,” they were framing the behavior as repetition, raising the specter of inauthenticity. This reframing entailed jockeying between Crimean Tatars and Slavic authorities; and among Tatars themselves. Imir Mejit, a Crimean Tatar official in Yalta, said that his clients often became irate and even threatened to kill themselves if he could not disburse an apartment or land parcel to them. Like his Slavic colleagues, he was caught up in a web of threats and accusations.
In effect, a hierarchy of captures came into being. Crimean Tatars vied for power by capturing the land and dwellings of less influential, connected, or powerful compatriots, demonstrating that structures of feeling at later stages become “formalized, classified, and in many cases built into institutions and formations” (Williams 1977: 132). Once the practice and logic of capturing was endemic, it made sense as a strategy even as it victimized other repatriating Crimean Tatars.

Downtown Simferopol: A Case Study of Urban Squatting

While Nariman and Gulnara talk about the organized manner in which the squatters’ settlements were achieved, there were also less organized, individually orchestrated operations that carried greater risk. While conducting preliminary research in Simferopol in 1995, a family I lived with took over (zakhvatili) property in downtown Simferopol. They lived in the oldest part of the capital city, where the traditional Tatar architecture predominates. “Zira,” who took the lead in this operation, had noticed that a house across the street where some alcoholics had been living was abandoned. So when a friend arrived and burst into tears about her untenable situation, Zira thought of the abandoned dwelling. She had us wait for a day when the whole family could be home in the early morning, including two of her extended male relatives. Then we crossed the street and broke through the outer gate. We discovered a courtyard filled with litter and debris and stepped inside the house, which was unlocked (see figures 7.2 and 7.3). The floors were littered with kerosene-drenched clothing, and the walls were fire-scarred. My companions discussed renovation of the two, single-family dwellings that were joined in an “L” shape. I helped them to begin to clear away the debris, until they sent me to the library to continue where I had left off the day before. No sooner had I begun to read when Zira came into the reading room. She had clearly been running, and asked me to return with her.

As we hurried back, she explained that after less than half an hour, two racketeers had appeared and told them that they had plans for the property. They said that if they did not leave, their “boys” would take care of them. This was when she sought me out, thinking it would not come to blows if a foreigner were present. By the time we got back the racketeers were gone, and the others explained that they had insisted that they too, have their “boys” and were not going to leave. After a discussion, they had agreed to divide the property. The dwelling to the south would belong to the racketeers.
Rackets and “Mafias” were forces to contend with and claiming domestic space was no exception.

After several days the family was confronted again, this time by a city official who came by and said he would have the building condemned. Zira interpreted this comment as political code that it would be an appropriate time to offer him money not to condemn the building. The man was from the Zhek Department, which is roughly the equivalent of municipal building inspection. In the economic restructuring, he was in a position to exert his influence. Having accomplished over 20 captures similar to this one,
Zira told him to come back in a couple of days in order to give the family some time to go to the Gorispolkom or City Mayor’s office. They planned to go to the Crimean Tatar branch of the Gorispolkom with their passports and ask to be registered at the property.

But before she could do so, the family was approached for a third time, this time by a Russian couple who said that the home was built by the woman’s parents, and should rightly pass to them. Zira alleged that according to her mother’s stories, her grandmother had lived there prior to deportation. At this point, there were two competing sets of ancestors legitimizing the claims (also see Verdery 1996). The Russian woman became upset by this challenge and exclaimed that Crimean Tatars had “sold out the motherland” and “invaded” her property. Even though the Russian woman began screaming and crying, Zira and her family remained calm, warning me that the show of emotion was a “performance” to add credence to their claim. A portion of the home they were arguing about had been badly burned and vandalized two weeks before. Through questioning, Zira realized that the first night the couple reported coming to Simferopol concerning the dwelling was the same night that the fire occurred. She suspected that the couple had committed arson to devalue the home and justify acquiring a dwelling in a newer neighborhood of Simferopol.

When Zira and her friends did not agree with the couple about whom the property belonged to, or whose ancestors had lived there before the war,
the couple called the building commissioner. The commissioner arrived almost immediately with the police and dogs to straighten the matter out. As we stood on the street, the commissioner looked at the map of the lot and told them that the matter would have to be decided in court. Before they left, Zira’s suspicion about the couple was supported when the woman offered her the home and settlement out of court, provided that the officials arrange for her and her husband to receive a more “appropriate,” that is, large and modern, dwelling. Taking possession of property doesn’t require the commodification of memory for its execution. But claims clearly take on more weight when backed up by real or putative recollections. The politics of memory in post-Soviet Crimea are pervasive, touching many aspects of life and cutting across ethnic lines. In this context, the Russians were as likely to produce emotionally charged recollections of what belonged to them as the Crimean Tatars. The preoccupation with the prewar past helps energize the processes of privatization, economic restructuring, and repatriation taking place.

Zira and the family went through the bureaucratic process of trying to secure registration for the people living there, but the home is still slated to be condemned. They complain that it requires a bribe of about 300 dollars to obtain such a registration. This notwithstanding, Zira’s friends did significant work to clean and repair both interior and exterior. There are now two Crimean Tatar families who are living at this address and call it home. When we first entered there was knee-deep trash, charred walls, broken windows, and feral piles of clothes and shoes. Now, the dwelling is clean and tidy, and is as comfortable as any. The home is technically owned by Zhkek, but when last consulted in 2001, they had been left in peace for over five years.

Greater Yalta: An Exception That Proves the Rule

Parents’ narratives about their past in Crimea were particularly influential in shaping settlement patterns. Crimean Tatars felt compelled to resettle as close to their family’s historic land as possible. In the Yalta area, this presented tremendous logistical problems. Initially, their request were repeatedly denied by authorities who wanted to preserve the tourist potential of the area. Because it was the tourist attraction of Crimea, the authorities were loath to part with any of the greater Yalta area, even though they knew the south shore traditionally had a high concentration of Crimean Tatars. As a result of unflagging persistence on the part of some former inhabitants,
however, land some ten kilometers outside Yalta was granted for domestic construction. The subsequent unfolding of events in this area and Yalta proper show that it was more advantageous to take vacant land or abandoned urban property *without* the authorities’ permission.

The land outside Yalta had remained undeveloped because of its propensity for landslides. Desperate, Crimean Tatars built anyway only to have parts of the hillside cave in, ripping foundations and tearing houses in half. Now the victims of these landslides are even more impoverished. What savings they may have brought from Central Asia were spent on the construction of housing that was destroyed. These individuals are now forced to join the long lists of applicants for land parcels and apartments—at the bottom. Thus legal solutions to the problem of property meet their needs far less than the illegal seizure of land. They also present more dangerous living conditions for inhabitants.

Greater Yalta is also the setting for the dormitory called *Zviozdochka* (Starlet) in the center of Yalta. I spent several days in winter 1998 talking with the residents, who describe their existence in terms of purgatory.23 One consultant said that her family is “three hundred-and-something” in line for an apartment in a building that has yet to be constructed. Their prospects for moving out at the moment are nonexistent. In the meantime, the ceilings leak, the walls exude dampness, and whole families struggle to live in rooms that were meant for a single individual.24

The dormitory used to be a hotel for summer vacationers owned by the city of Yalta. The vacationers came for a week or two and used enough electricity to shave or curl their hair, but most of their time was spent at the beach. When the flow of Tatars and displaced persons into the area began increasing, the Goskomnats (State Committee for Nationalities) began renting the building from the Gorispolkom (comparable to City Mayor’s Office) to house them. So when Tajik and Crimean Tatar refugees began living there, it was owned and maintained by the Gorispolkom as part of the city budget. In 1994, however, it was shifted to the State Committee for Nationalities’ (Goskomnats) budget, which was drained of resources.25 This body is not able to pay for maintenance on the building, and the city refuses to put the building back on its budget. My consultant said that no one really knows what will happen next, using the expression that it is as if they are “hanging” in the air.

When she said this, the superintendent, whom the residents call “Commandeer” told me that they live in bad conditions but no matter how bad it gets, he is not going to leave because a person only has one homeland, and this is it. Hence, the ideology surrounding “Homeland or Death” is not hubris, but implemented by Tatars whether they are activists or not. Commandeer told me that 90 percent of the people living in the dorm were
either born here in Yalta, or are the children of people born in Yalta. In other words, the affective dimension of historical consciousness had informed their choice to endure this environment rather than take a path with less resistance. This choice was fraught with consequences. One consultant told me that her family used to be in the line for a parcel of land, but switched to the line for an apartment when the government of Ukraine “froze” their savings in the bank. Having frozen savings meant that even if they were given a parcel of land, they would not have money to build. In exchange for their frozen deposits, they received “certificates” (each worth approximately ten dollars). Today, the need for housing in Yalta continues to exceed supply. In summer 2003, new captures took place along the southern shore. Interviewing them in late October of the same year, it was clear they had no intention to relinquish their claims. As of July 2004 the claims in Semeiz were still the object of dispute.

Squatting and Immolation

The squatting strategy described here was backed up by threats of immolation. It became so successful that gasoline did not have to be present. The KGB, special forces, and local police knew the Tatars were serious. A female consultant recalled how she was home alone plastering when police came to evict her:

. . . at the time I didn’t have running water, so there were twenty-liter containers sitting there with water in them. Two containers. I said, “if you are going to evict me,” I said “there is gasoline and I’m going to start you on fire and myself on fire. I don’t have a home in Uzbekistan anymore. I don’t have a house here,” I said, “I’m just going to live here. You will die with me—we will blow up together!” He [a correspondent] shot [a picture] and then they ran! The correspondent photographed me and then the missionary newspaper . . . didn’t print an article about what I said to them, how they were evicting us, how I said, “I’ll blow you up,” but wrote, “Away on holiday!” There was just clean water in the containers! They could have seen for themselves, but got scared and didn’t notice that it was water.27

This consultant’s story illustrates the extraordinary success of a squatting strategy that was backed up by threats of self-immolation. The threats became part of a performance signifying the Crimean Tatars’ unwillingness to back down. The photograph in the paper elided the nature of her protest, encapsulating the moment in a more habituated and prosaic narrative of tourism and relaxation in Crimea. While this provided a moment of comic relief for this consultant and her friends, a disturbing undercurrent
is the routinization of violence and self-sacrifice. The phrase “we will blow up together” was also repeated in men’s narratives, demonstrating the rhetoric of bravery and bravado figured in both men’s and women’s statements about property reclamation. This is not to say narratives of reclamation lacked a gender dimension. This consultant was also articulate about the despair she saw in her situation, lamenting that her belongings had become rat-eaten and molded in storage. As she gardened and laid brick, her husband, depressed, sank into alcoholism. He was inclined to fault the ubiquitous corruption, and Crimean authorities. Consultants therefore “gendered” repatriation by observing women were inclined to shoulder the burden while men were inclined to passivity. The circumstances surrounding the land captures nevertheless necessitated a partial inversion of what Ries has called the traditional “division of discursive labor” allocating lamenting to women and joking to men (Ries 1997: 90).28 Women’s discourse did not privilege humor or pain, but intermixed them.

Another female informant faced down soldiers with lethal weapons. Fatma recalled trying to secure a propiska, or residence permit, and being turned down. Even though she squatted in her grandfather’s abandoned house, the previous occupants demanded payment, precluding her from getting the legal registration at the residence. I asked about the registration process:

I: Well, how do they treat you?
FI: At first, the OMON (special military forces) came, they were armed with semi-automatics. At the time, my mother wasn’t there, so she did not see. It’s a good thing, she would have been upset. They came and yelled at us, and my children cried. They scared us and said, “why have you entered?” I said “it was vacated, it was my grandfather’s house.” I explained everything, saying they [the people who used to live there] are living in nice apartments. They said, “Leave” and I said, “No, I’m not going to.”

(laughter)

I: Was it frightening?
FI: It was frightening. But our people, you see, are behind me. So thanks to that. Of course, they said that they would help with everything. For one thing, you’re already in. What’s more, its your grandfather’s house. I did it for my mother. She could die today or tomorrow. Your homeland is your homeland, that’s what she says (...) I would give my soul for my mother. If they had opened fire that day, I would have said “Go ahead and shoot.” And the children were crying. (...) I yelled Shoot! See my children? Go ahead and shoot, but we aren’t’ leaving this place. That’s the way that we stood there.29

It is difficult to say whether “go ahead and shoot” is what she said, or what she wanted to say. Whether there is a slippage or not, postmemories and
parental injunctions carried enough weight for her to face possible OMON fire. Fatma reclaimed the dwelling for her formerly deported mother. Knowing “her people” were behind her was also a significant factor in her willingness to take this stance. This was not easy: she described the difficult adjustment she went through in renovating her grandfather’s apartment, hinting through descriptions of the tears that she had been depressed. Taking mud and straw into her own hands required making a radical change in her life. This was the kind of change that many Crimean Tatars from upper- and middle-class, urban, and suburban backgrounds had to make.

Houses and Homelands

By the time the Crimean Tatars returned to their historic homeland, the abode-of-war was construed as a national homeland. However, national categories are made personally meaningful not at the abstract, political level, but as a lived, local reality. Houses were particularly important in this process. In addition to being a source of reverence, many return migrants see the house as the ultimate destination of their journey and figure the house in the denouement of their stories. On many returnees’ first visit back, a primary goal was to locate the house where they or their parents had lived. When town and street names had changed, they relied on kinesthetic memories. They often described “knowing” where to turn and pacing across the ground, feeling for signs of an old foundation. Often, villagers would recognize a family resemblance and guess whose son or daughter they were. Neighbors confirmed who lived where, and explained which structures had been torn down or added in their absence.

Thus a good deal of Crimean Tatars’ sense of homeland is tied to their embodied experiences of the peninsula. Early visits were watershed moments in composing a life plan, and the memories that accosted them upon return gave a visceral edge to the politics of repatriation. One consultant, Jamila, knew about Crimea primarily from the stories of her older brother. When the two of them went back for the first time, they sought out their parents’ home. Although he could not have explained in words how to get there, her brother remembered the way. The current occupants let them inside, and they were able to walk through the rooms. When he came to the fireplace, her brother crouched and his fingertips located an indentation, barely visible, where a coal had fallen from the fire. It was as if his body had remembered the spot. Jamila hadn’t heard about the coal, or the story that went with it, until the physical experience of walking
through the rooms disbursed it. The embodied link to place is a crucial one. As Bachelard put it, “over and beyond our memories, the house we were born in is . . . a group of organic habits” (Bachelard 1994: 14). Bachelard goes on to say that the word “habit” is perhaps inadequate to describe the “passionate liaison” of bodies that do not forget, with beloved places (1994: 15).

Houses became an important cultural category in part through the exigencies of memory. While Soviet authorities were unsuccessful in controlling Tatar recollecting, the oppressive atmosphere shaped practices: historiography was limited, albums were lost or destroyed, and diaries and memoirs were too dangerous to compose. But visiting houses triggered an unexpected flood of sensory-type memories in an environment that had been drained of other references. There is something about enclosed spaces that encourages recollection, leading some theorists to conclude that there is a special relationship between rooms and memory (Swiderski 1995: 96). This is especially pertinent to groups that have experienced genocide or forms of repression: rooms may house memories and feelings that have no other expressive outlets. As we explored in chapter 4, consultants like Vasfiye were overwhelmed by the memories that suddenly came back to them when they entered rooms they left decades before.

The importance of houses is also conditioned by language. In Crimean Tatar, the verb construction for “to marry” is “to acquire a house.” True to the Whorfian axiom, grammar is clearly playing a role in structuring cognitive categories. These “background practices” should not be underestimated. In the case of the verb construction for “to marry,” native linguists (bilingual in Russian and Tatar) remark about the expression, noting how unconscious and yet unavoidable it is. The difficulty, according to Hill and Mannheim, is identifying the specific linkages between patterning in language and nonlinguistic “cultural” or cognitive practice (1992: 394). Some of that patterning is accessible in the use of houses, which ground memory and political activism.

In her study of the ways that a Jewish-Muslim household in Setif (French colonial Algeria) was remembered, Bahloul described how the house could be compared to a small-scale cosmology that, symbolically at least, restores a shattered geography (1996: 29). For the Crimean Tatars, the “geography” that was shattered was their historic linkages to specific houses, mountains, streams, and villages. Bahloul argues that domestic space and objects are more important for their symbolic than their practical function. This has to do with the ways in which past use inscribes them in social exchanges and the cultural order (1996: 129). This resonates with Crimean Tatars who often describe their return to home places through, for example, a long lost tray, a battered spoon, a copper carafe, or other domestic objects. For
Crimean Tatars, like Bahloul’s consultants, “remembering the house is in fact recalling the social and cultural milieu in which one grew up” (1996: 129). Hirschon (1988) and Ballinger (2003: 172) document similar emotional geographies in which houses and domestic objects accrue significance.

Crimean Tatars explicitly “read” houses for what they could tell them about the past. Reentering the houses they left behind, they felt for cracks, and noted changes. However, the reading of houses was not limited to Crimea. One of the most striking instances took place in Uzbekistan. When I went to interview consultants I will call Servir and Bekir in Uzbekistan one day, Bekir told me they had a “surprise” for me. They didn't want to sit and talk as we had planned, but take me to the home of Bekir’s recently deceased uncle. As we were going through the house, one of our companions took the tape recorder out of my hands and turned it on. What he recorded was a “reading,” in true Bachelardian fashion, of the way in which the house, not just text, is a locus of Tatar memory and helps organize thinking about repatriation. The house tour suggests that rather than treating the Tatars as effectively silenced, and restricting our analysis to “mute subject positions,” we can locate their voices within the “cracks” of the dominant history by attending to the specific rubrics employed (Coronil 1994).

Servir and Bekir told me that three weeks before he died, the uncle had hired a team of carpenters to come and complete a number of repairs. Then, suddenly, he canceled the repair. Bekir suggests that he was “saying”:

No—I haven’t forgotten the homeland and am not going to finish my house so that no one can have the pleasure of saying that we have “taken root” in Uzbekistan—I won’t allow them that pleasure.

Whether or not this was the uncle’s thinking, their rationale tells us about their structure of feeling.

In this case, floorboards were embedded in a narrative about patriotism, and domestic objects came to anchor identity. They intensify the imperative to return, and compound its emotional significance. Servir was explicitly conscious of this:

You start thinking where does the feeling of homeland come from? Take a look at this tray. You will not see trays like this anywhere, it is made from pure copper. You could sell this for one thousand dollars! Why did he keep it here? You know, we only asked that question after he died. As I look at all this now, I find an answer to my own question: what made me what I am now? They made me this way. If they weren’t that way, I wouldn’t have been that way, either. I would have walked around and thought about all sorts of things, about marvelous power and riches, but no.
Through reflection on the contents of the rooms, this informant found a way to express and explain his involvement in the movement. He framed his participation in moral terms, seeing a parallel between his involvement and the deceased uncle’s. Rather than profit from the sale of the artifact, the uncle who lived in poverty chose to keep the vessel for the value it held for him personally. Copper vessels were made and used by Tatars in pre-deportation Crimea, and have come to signify the old ways. The old man’s rooms and possessions told the story of his life, which provided a key for unlocking clues about their own identities: as he put it, “what made me what I am now.” The feeling of homeland or *chuvtso rodini* is condensed in the copper tray, a box of books, the old newspapers, and warped floorboards. I suspect my consultants chose a house tour over an interview in part for fluidity and ease: the content of each of the rooms could be verbally “unpacked” in any order. It was also a comfortable device for pointing out their suffering and sacrifice. The rooms were iconic of frugality, something my consultants valorized at the same time that they questioned the wisdom of their involvement in the Crimean Tatar National Movement.

In Uzbekistan, people told me about suspending repairs and home improvement. They seemed to be saying that their presence was temporary and return was on the horizon. One of my life history consultants refrained from fixing the perpetually flowing water in the bathtub or the pipes that were leaking above the living room ceiling because she was waiting for her husband to call and tell her to come to Crimea, where he was building. While individuals throughout the former republics might postpone such repairs for a whole host of reasons, Tatars interpreted and framed their postponement and procrastination in terms of their feelings about houses and homeland.

In Ukraine, the situation was somewhat different. Early in my fieldwork, residents of the Marino settlement could always be seen busily working to complete their houses. Construction, it seemed, was everywhere. As the economy slowed, consultants began to describe how they had discontinued building and conveyed apprehension that the situation was unstable. I therefore suggest talk about fixing the floorboards or leaking pipes is less about floorboards and pipes than Crimean Tatars’ overall relationship to their surroundings. Since repatriation involves reclaiming old houses and taking over parcels of land for new construction, the cultural idiom of the house provides a vital discursive space.

In the abstract, the existence of a nation is predicated on a solid and continuous link between a particular space and a history (Swedenburg 1995: 8). But more concretely, the sense of belonging to a particular place at a particular time is constructed through what is closest at hand: it is only walking through his uncle’s house that Bekir says, “What I see is continuity.”
One way to comprehend Tatar discourse about the past is to honor the operative epistemology by looking through, not past the cultural framework that the idiom, metaphor, and narrative structure of the house provide, as a distinctive kind of knowledge. Historicizing a territory may be one of the most crucial components of establishing a nation (Swedenburg 1995). We can be even more specific, however, that historicizing territory and territorializing memory is accomplished not only through laying claim to the land within republican borders, but also through specific places of dwelling, as the metaphor of the “house” illustrates. As Bachelard has noted, “our house is our corner of the world” (1994: 4).

Citizenship and Ownership

Crimean Tatars’ relationship to land and homes, and their psychological attachment to the peninsula, must be situated in the nexus of citizenship and ownership in the Newly Independent States. Citizenship and ownership are closely tied because only people with Ukrainian citizenship are eligible for certificates and able to participate in the process of privatization of former state enterprises. Others are not only excluded from this process, but unable to intervene because they lack the right to vote. It has only been since 1998, when UNHCR and the OSCE intervened, that over 100,000 Crimean Tatars were able to overcome the barriers to Ukrainian citizenship that had arisen in the wake of the Soviet collapse. (Uehling 2004.)

Since the period of privatization was time-limited, those in diaspora had little hope of being included. Similarly, those in Crimea who lacked Ukrainian citizenship could not privatize their land. Missing out on the phase of privatization meant that one would have to pay the market price for each square meter. The Crimean Tatar Mejlis tried to address this by requesting that the Ukraine suspend the process of privatization in Crimea until the rest of the people could return. This would mean that far more would benefit. Crimean Tatars are especially vulnerable to being left behind because of their exclusion from productive roles. For example, when a kolkhoz is being privatized, only those who currently work there have the right to participate. Even if the repatriate was exiled from the area, he or she could not participate.

It should be underscored that unlike repatriating Chechens, Tatars are not asking for a reinstatement of the property they owned before deportation, although the inhabitants of Crimea initially feared this would be the case. Dzhemilev advocates stopping the process whereby relatively recent
settlers are given former Crimean Tatar land and homes as privatized property. Like many residents in the former Yugoslavia, they feel the government could decide these “new” problems without giving out their former property. In Crimea, working groups are trying to develop solutions to achieve a more reasonable solution.

The similarities and differences between Crimea and former Yugoslavia are instructive here. In both places, the issue of housing and property reclamation is highly charged, and in both cases the emotions aroused by houses are channeled and framed by politics (Denich 1994). Where Carolin Leutloff worked in Croatia, for example, claims for property and housing rights were in part motivated by postwar sentiments of loss and despair (Leutloff 2002). At the same time, Leutloff is careful to point out that the emotional judgments that were made in accordance with national politics often coexisted with more tolerant prewar norms and experiences. In the postwar reconstruction period, pressure from international organizations, and changes in the political leadership in 2000 softened the overtly national orientation of property claims (Leutloff 1996: 90).

While this chapter cannot begin to describe the complexity of the many wartorn regions within the former Yugoslavia, some of the contrasts with Croatia serve to highlight important dimensions of the Crimean context. For example, in Knin, Croatia, there were conflicts between those who occupied houses that were allocated to them during or shortly after the war, and the owners who subsequently returned (Leutloff 2002). By contrast, Tatars avoided direct conflicts with those who lived in their homes. This is due to a range of factors, including the amount of time that had elapsed, and the realization that, as a small minority, they wanted to live as neighbors with Russians and Ukrainians. Crimean Tatars also invoked the philosophy of nonviolence promoted by the National Movement. In any event, the conflict the Crimean Tatars experienced was for the most part with the Crimean authorities who opposed their presence, not the Russian and Ukrainian homeowners who feared their return. Crimean Tatar claims came at a time when the legal framework governing private property was in rapid flux. This did not impede the legalization of the compact settlements, but disadvantaged Crimean Tatars in the process of privatization. By contrast, although the return program gave Serbs the legal right to repossess their property, they were in practice not always able to do so (Leutloff 2002: 85). Another contrast is that whereas Serbs were overwhelmed by feelings of powerlessness and despair, Crimean Tatars’ emotional reaction is better characterized as a powerful, if enraged, self-defense.

Crimean Tatars are also in a very different position than Baltic peoples, where the state adopted a policy of restoring property to titular nationalities.
Here, the state questioned whether non-titular nationalities such as Russians should be able to own property at all (Smith et al. 1998: 100). In contrast, Ukrainian law does not attempt to restore the property regime that existed before World War II. In most cases, it simply distributes rights to those currently occupying the property or working the land. In the various contemporary settings in which homes, housing, and property claims become charged, emotional judgments are tied to past individual and collective experiences (Svašek 2000) and have to be historicized in relation to power.

In spite of a fundamental lack of rights and abominable living conditions, Crimean Tatars are adamant about their national homeland. As one put it, “Even if you gave me a house filled with gold and a car with a chauffeur somewhere else, I wouldn’t take it.”40 The late twentieth century was a time in which Tatars channeled their attachments and identifications to a specific territory. Otherwise, the banner “Homeland or Death” would not have been accepted and raised at squatters’ settlements.

Conclusion

The Crimean Tatars secured a place on the peninsula through samo zakhvat, a process of seizing unoccupied land and property. Their approach was reinforced by threats of self-immolation when authorities tried to evict them. The slogan “Homeland or Death” reflects the structure of feeling that emerged from struggles for physical as well as emotional survival in the post-Soviet period. In contrast to previous centuries when they sought better material conditions and a context that would be more conducive to their faith, these Crimean Tatars saw themselves making a historically sanctioned claim. The quality of real estate was a consideration, but the quality of life there was less important. As one consultant put it, “Give me a rotting homeland, but a homeland all the same.”41 This is what distinguishes the Crimean Tatar structure of feeling in time and place: rather than seeking a better life in either religious or material terms, they are looking for a place where they more basically belong.42

This approach to homeland is iterative: it developed in the experience of displacement and exile, first as part of the Russian Empire, next during collectivization, and finally as a national minority in the Soviet Union. Given the appropriation of Tatar lands that took place under the tsars and the elaborate methods designed by the Soviet regime to forestall their return, the Crimean Tatars’ homecoming was fraught with difficulty. The practice of squatting on vacant land arose in answer. Whether in suburban, urban,
or rural settings, the strategies whereby Tatars reclaimed land were often taken to be unique, idiosyncratic, and isolated events in the overall scheme of restructuring. As the experiences described here show, Crimean Tatars’ repatriation took place in a systematic, if unofficial way.

Relationships to the built and natural environments are best understood when situated in their political and economic times. The practice of capturing land was backed up by threats of self-immolation, but Tatars do not explicitly connect it with Musa Mahmut. Only later were the squatters’ settlements formalized. And yet, as soon as they had been claimed, they became vulnerable within a new Crimean Tatar hierarchy. Land captures were recaptured and squatters’ settlements were usurped, raising old questions about legitimacy and the nature of resistance (Abu-Lughod 1990; Gupta and Ferguson 1997).

The national homeland was made meaningful at the level of lived and local reality. Houses were uniquely positioned in Tatar memory to provide not only some of the most intense, embodied memories of the past, but a way to talk about displacement. Houses therefore became a vital link between the abstract and the concrete. Above and beyond memory, houses were part of habits. This attachment to place stands out due to the contrast between then and now. Still, their experience has relevance for many others who must also struggle for spiritual, physical, and cultural survival in the Newly Independent States. In the Sequel, we consider the forms this struggle is taking.
For over half a century, the Crimean Tatars have been crafting a view of history that produces a very different account than what official Soviet versions provided. At the core of this view are recollections of prewar Crimea, deportation, and exile that are circulated between and within the first, second, and third generations. These recollections make up a fund of background knowledge, but are far from residual, having an emergent quality in intergenerational dialogue. The social constructivist approach to memory and history still needs to provide a more accurate picture of the specific ways in which interpretations come to be shared. This book contributes by considering how children correct and intervene in parental narratives, and how speakers borrow and trade lines. Throughout, memories and recollections were drawn into political practice, and helped make repatriation seem self-evident. Attention to styles of recollecting and their contribution to structures of feeling further sharpens the performative, interactive approach to memory.

Studying the relationship between memory, sentiment, and place opens up an immense ethnographic project that cannot be completed in a single book. Rather than tie up loose ends, this sequel reveals some of the ambivalence involved in recalling. As such, it is less about endings than beginnings, raising new questions and pointing to new starting points.

The Crimean Tatars’ practice of memory and love of history added impetus to their return. While they locate the reasons for repatriation in the chuvstvo rodini that emerged from historical memory, there are several ways that repatriation is beyond memory. Among the second and third generations, “memories” are complex and emotional interpretations of their parents’ recollections or “postmemories.” In many families, the practice began after the fall of the Soviet Union, burgeoning with the “avalanche of remembering” occurring in the Gorbachev period (Remnick 1993: 7). While styles of recollecting shaped the attitudes toward homeland that developed, they were by no means entirely responsible for the devotion that developed. Repatriates became passionate about returning with and without parental recollections. And sometimes, “memories” and recollections flowed from the second and third generations to the first. The thinness of
memory requires we look also to politics, economics, and ideologies of homeland in former Soviet areas. If the idea of a homeland becomes increasingly important as actual ties to places become more tenuous (Gupta and Ferguson 1992), the reverse may also be true: the narratives of the dispossessed may end when they are no longer oppressed (Humphrey 2002: 33). Perhaps the idea of homeland will lose its special halo when their position there becomes more secure. Repatriation is also beyond memory in the sense that, among some at least, “it’s a new moment.”

In this chapter, we consider key ways in which the Crimean Tatars are repositioning themselves in the twenty-first century. The adjustments being made now will have a profound influence on the structures of experience and the practices of recalling that evolve. Specifically, Crimean Tatars are drawing on their status as an indigenous people to frame themselves with greater rights and resources; they have become part of the proliferation of post-Soviet Mafias, using this to define themselves as defenders of law and order; and they have turned to forms of labor migration that signal a backing down from utopic imaginings into the realities of repatriation.

Indigenous People

One way that the Tatars are altering the terms in which they are defined is by rejecting the status of a minority within Ukraine. They may be a minority, comprising 12 percent of the Crimean population, but this does not mean they necessarily belong in the juridical category of “minority” as defined by the law of Ukraine. According to legal expert Nadir Bekirov, the problem is that for minorities, the titular state is outside Ukraine, whereas for Crimean Tatars the historic homeland is fully within Ukraine. Referring to Crimean Tatars as a “minority” fails to distinguish them from Armenians, Bulgarians, Germans, and so on, who have ethnic homelands elsewhere. By contrast, indigenous status reaffirms their cultural difference where the state would prefer to create a homogenous “minority” space. Having already recognized its obligation to protect the rights of formerly deported peoples, the state is explicitly recognizing the distinction. For example, Ukraine’s legislative system contains international agreements, such as the “Bishkek” agreement of 1992, which includes the renewal of rights of deported persons, national minorities, and peoples, delineating and de facto acknowledging the categories.

If minority status has become a contentious issue, so too has the definition of indigenous. Those who are unsympathetic claim the Crimean Tatars are not the indigenous people.¹ It is unlikely agreement will be reached at
the local level because there are two operative definitions of “indigenous” in Crimea. Whereas Crimean Tatars ascribe to the common definition—a people that has developed as an ethnic group on a particular territory—local officials insist that an indigenous people lives according to its “traditional economic means of livelihood.” Ironically, as far as these individuals are concerned, the Crimean Tatars’ traditional means of livelihood was raiding, pillaging, and slave trading, occupations they would hardly wish them to take up again. By denying them the status of indigenous people, the local officials are repudiating the Crimean Tatars’ ethno genesis on the territory of Ukraine. These disputes may amplify already existing disagreements about the peninsula’s history.

Fortunately, there is more agreement at the international level. Crimean Tatar human rights specialists agree with the notion of indigenous as defined by the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 and the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, under consideration by the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. According to the Working Group, indigenous peoples are “ethnic communities, the historic homeland of which is the territory where they formed as an ethnic group.” They must have been “situated fully or partially within the territory of Ukraine on the date of the signing of the Act on the State Independence of Ukraine” (Bekirov 1999b: 30; Belitser 2000: 5). Another characteristic is that they have an identity that associates itself (in terms of language, culture, and politics) with a particular territory. Indigenous peoples fully or partially preserve and develop the traditional social, legal, and political institutions that ensure their ethnic integrity. An important component is that their existence has been threatened and their normal development restricted because of colonial policy, repression, and limitations based on ethnicity (Bekirov 1999b: 30).

The nature and degree of this threat is the crux of disagreement regarding mechanisms of implementation. In fact, Crimean Tatars’ assertion of their rights raises concern about a new hegemony. This places Tatar advocates in a delicate bind: at the same time that Tatars’ claims gain legitimacy as “indigenous,” they are accused of ethnic exceptionalism and extremism. What the Crimean Tatars see as conditions for real as opposed to fictive equality before the law, the Slavic population views as undue advantage. In the abstract, scholars, government officials, and indigenous rights advocates agree that the problems of the indigenous peoples could be resolved by increased democratization. But in practice, there is little agreement about what this means. The heuristic definition of democracy as one person, one vote is too simplistic, leading one consultant to tell me this idea was a “bomb in slow motion.” Refat Chubarov stressed that the principle of the majority rule only works in the presence of equality.
Some form of consociationalism may be appropriate, for what the Crimean Tatars are lobbying for is the ability to take part in the decisions that affect them through guaranteed representation at all levels of government, including the Parliament of Ukraine. This requires representation to an extent sufficient for the protection of their lawful interests (Bekirov 1999b: 32). A number of proposals are on the table that would reform Crimean Election Laws and secure some form of proportional representation. What they envision is ultimately being entitled to political and territorial autonomy within the boundaries of Ukraine. This would mean an ability to create and fund self-governing institutions such as the Mejlis. They also feel they should have the right to participate in international affairs. So rather than threatening the borders of the Ukrainian state, the reaffirmation of “indigenous” status could be understood as a counterweight to excessive state control.

The definition of “indigenous” and the use of the term “minority” are far from matters of semantic distinction because they affect the international community’s perception and treatment of Crimean Tatars. These terms have become an important part of the lexicon of international affairs. In November 1995, Ukraine was admitted to the Council of Europe on the condition that the government bring its legislation and policy into compliance with the Council’s norms. Once the Foundation of Research and Support for Indigenous Peoples of Crimea (led by Bekirov) made the Council aware of the Ukraine’s continuing discrimination against Tatars, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe began pressing Ukraine to come into compliance, especially with regard to including Tatars in elections.4

The Ukrainian government complied with the requirement that they submit a report on the national minorities but they did so without speaking with the Crimean Tatars. Asked how this could transpire, they explained that they did not consult the Tatars about their own conditions because the Tatars object to being addressed as a minority. When the Council sent Lord Ponsonby to investigate the Crimean Tatar situation, he admitted he was confounded by the definitional problem (Ponsonby 1999: 3). Making matters worse, he did not meet with the Crimean Tatar leadership, and spent the bulk of his time with authorities in Kyiv. Although his report on the Crimean Tatars is sympathetic, Crimean Tatars criticized him for failing to consult with the Mejlis on his visit, and committing errors in his report.5

From the Crimean Tatar perspective, it is not enough to proclaim “rights.” Concrete mechanisms have to be developed to deliver them. The indigenous peoples’ right to citizenship is a starting point. For example, the OSCE intervened and facilitated negotiations between Ukraine and

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4 This section is based on various sources, including interviews with Crimean Tatars and experts on the issue.

5 These critiques highlight the importance of direct consultation and engagement with indigenous communities to ensure their rights are respected and protected.
Uzbekistan that simplified the procedures for withdrawing from Uzbek citizenship and applying for Ukrainian citizenship in 1998. Even though international norms are designed to protect indigenous minorities, the confusion surrounding the terms combined with a lack of clear measures for implementation suggest indigenous status is not enough to facilitate integration.

The notion of “indigenous” folds back on the love of history and practices of remembering that are at the core of this book. The idea that they developed as an ethnic group on the territory of Crimea and thereby enjoy an “organic” connection to the peninsula promotes the search for historical linkages to the territory by means of toponyms (new books on this topic are forthcoming), fascination with the Girey dynasty, education in the native language, and the erection of historical monuments. The notion of indigenousness has also affected the structure of feeling concerning homeland: many Tatar families relocated because they felt that as the indigenous people or korennoi narod they belonged in Crimea and would have their rights respected. Hence indigenous status connects the subjective experience of homeland with the juridical rights and resources that could make it a tangible reality.

A growing body of anthropological literature addresses indigenousness in greater depth. Slavs in the Crimea are not alone in their frustration with the concept, which in some ways is ill-suited to multiethnic Crimea. For example, what are we to make of the fact that the Greek presence predates the Crimean Tatar one? Béteille observes that in migrating around the world, the term has bred confusion, and in some cases provided ideological encouragement to those who would reorder the world according to claims of blood and soil (1998: 191). Absolute indigenism, Clifford has pointed out, is a frightening Utopia (2001: 482). But glossing all indigenous rights as basically essentialist must also be avoided. Crimean Tatars are not claiming ownership or that they become the sole inhabitants of Crimea: like other indigenous groups, they are arguing for specific rights to an environment and for an environment (Muehlebach 2002: 2). The concept amplifies already existing concern that the environment was ignored, at great peril to the population, on the Soviet watch. Still, indigenousness is a slippery concept that has so far failed to provide a buffer from the vicissitudes of daily life in post-Soviet regions. This is where post-Soviet Mafias come in.

Post-Soviet Crimean Mafias

Crimea has been characterized as even more densely controlled by post-Soviet Mafias than Moscow. Crimean Tatar positioning within, and in
relation to these structures is a crucial part of their integration on the peninsula. Most of my informants had direct contact with rackets, and knew people whose lives had been affected by Mafia violence. This phenomenon has a bearing on their affective stance toward homeland: Mafia violence contributes to a sense of vulnerability and accentuates the need to stake a serious claim to the peninsula. Several consultants, traumatized by the Mafia-linked murder of loved ones in Crimea, had sought refuge in Uzbekistan. Others talked about buying guns and stayed. The idea of needing a “roof” or krysha played into and ultimately overlapped with Crimean Tatar sensibilities regarding spheres of influence and control.

Through their negotiation of a series of conflicts, we can begin to see how the Crimean Tatars have used the post-Soviet rackets and “Mafia” to reclaim a privileged place. One conflict erupted over Mafia-controlled prices when racketeers asked a Crimean Tatar selling cigarettes to raise his prices. Otherwise, invoking Stalin’s 1944 deportation, they would “chase all the Tatars from Crimea.” Having been schooled in the idea it was “Homeland or Death,” Odju refused. The next day, four cars filled with racketeers arrived at his house accompanied by a police sergeant (Korneva and Izumova 1995: 6). They beat Odju and threw his body in the garbage, believing him to be dead. But Odju survived and in retaliation, Tatars raided a tochka or trading area near the train station controlled by the Mafia group they believed was responsible. They then went to the bazaar at Moskolt’so, where a fight ensued with racketeers. When the police arrived, rather than arrest the racketeers, they took the Crimean Tatars into custody.

This led the Tatars to hold a demonstration in downtown Simferopol requesting the authorities stop the spread of organized crime. They appealed to officials but did not receive any commitments. Tatars then gathered for a meeting and produced a statement that they would no longer rely on the authorities for protection, but take independent measures. Mustafa Dzhemilev, the leader of the movement, commented:

We are not at all happy that we have to resist bandits. It’s the work of the police and law enforcement agencies. But if they aren’t going to fulfill their duties, we will have to defend ourselves. In the future, Crimean Tatars will not pay the racket. If we find out that a Crimean Tatar is paying tribute, he will be considered a traitor . . . . (Korneva and Izumova 1995: 6)

Here, the leader evokes the metacultural discourse on patriotism and treason to artfully position the Mejlis on the “patriotic” side. At the same time, the key semantic opposition between Crimean Tatars and everyone else seems to be dissolving. The statement suggests that at least as far as the governing elite were concerned, ethnicity is beside the point. This is a
significant gesture in a place where ethnic categories are a recurring trope and the Mafia is so active that schoolchildren know the names of the major clans. The semantic possibility that Crimean Tatars oppose the Mafia is undermined by the concomitant use of terms like “bandit,” which are also employed to describe Crimean Tatars.

The fact is that Crimean Tatars do pay tribute—and collect it. In late June of the same year, a Russian woman selling cherries in Sudak was approached for protection money. When two Crimean Tatars, Robert Gabitov and Evbekir Veisov, observed what was transpiring, they confronted the racketeers and were beaten to death in front of everyone in the market. One consultant explained the event in terms indigenousness: it was offensive for anyone to collect protection money from produce grown on the land of the korennoi narod. Mustafa Dzhemilev added a human rights perspective, asserting that the Tatars intervened on moral and philosophical grounds. Given the criminalized setting in Crimea, a more mundane explanation, that the Crimean Tatars were defending the interests of their own racket, is perhaps more plausible. Avdet, a major Crimean Tatar newspaper, reported:

The reality is such that Crimean Tatar entrepreneurs pay tribute to their own, Crimean Tatar, racket. As distinct from the well known rackets, which everyone hates and fears, they try to present their Crimean “colleagues” in the manner of Robinhood, who does not touch the poor but helps them, whose percent of “taxation” is a great deal lower than that of ruling groups. Moreover, the Crimean Tatar Mafiosi claim the role of defenders of their fellow tribesmen from everyday hooligans and come to the aid where the police are powerless or do not want to become involved. But criminals are criminals. It is difficult to say whether or not a connection exists between this group and the Mejlis . . . . (Poliakov 1996: 4)

This view was echoed by Crimean Tatars caught up in dense webs of tribute and taxation. At the end of the day, they were more concerned about securing the “roof” that they needed, than occupying any moral high ground. The leader of the Mejlis has come under intense scrutiny for purported financial mismanagement in the millions. In 1998, a group of 16 from within his Milli Mejlis tried to depose him. They did not succeed but added currents of distrust and apprehension to already turbulent Crimean political conditions.

The representatives of the Mejlis in Uzbekistan portrayed the Crimean Tatar involvement in organized crime in a more practical way. He said that even if all return, they will still only be 20 percent of the population, and there is resistance to them at all levels, from the everyday level of the bazaar to high politics. Therefore, they need to find a “niche” in order to survive. But they do this in an environment that is criminalized at all levels. So they
have to think about how to integrate under these conditions. An antiracket is created, which spawns an “anti-antiracket,” and so on. The representative did not see any way to defend the Crimean Tatars’ interests without intimate involvement in criminal structures.\(^\text{10}\)

That the movement for self-determination and organized protection rackets find themselves on common, if ill-defined ground in post-Soviet Ukraine is not surprising if we consider the transitions in state structure. If states fulfill political, economic, and security-related functions, then during a loss of state capacity, one logical recourse is to other forms of political organization, as many have pointed out. Tatars’ efforts to craft a politically powerful Mejlis stem from a desire to regain historical losses and provide the political, economic, and security functions they need to repatriate. There are other areas of overlap as well. As Humphrey has observed, patrons in the legitimate power structure and racketeers are referred to by the same term, krysha (2002: 78–79). Traders pay both legitimate site fees to the town council and payments to racketeers who divide up the turf and protect traders from incursions.

Crimean Tatar involvement with Mafia structures has the potential to reposition them in relation to other groups on the peninsula. After the pominki (wake or funeral) of Robert Gabitov and Evbekir Veisov, the two individuals slain by racketeers, a group formed a motorcade. They stopped and raided businesses they knew to be linked to the local Mafia. The motorcade also stopped in Feodosia, where Tatars surrounded the police station and demanded release of the men who had been taken into custody for the first incident, following the beating of the cigarette vendor. The motorcade then continued its path of destruction, stopping only when Refat Chubarov and Mustafa Dzhemilev, president and vice president of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, caught up and persuaded them that the “bandits” would be brought to justice. Unfortunately, the OMON (Special Forces) were already moving in and began shooting, killing two and wounding six (Korobovaya 1995: 11).

At first, representations of the rampage appeared to repeat the old dynamics in which Crimea was identified as a “hot spot” and a culturalist logic was used to explain ethnic dissent. As Mustafa Dzhemilev described in his annual report:

... [E]vents took place in Crimea that attracted the attention of the mass media and politicians of many countries of the world, for it was expected that in Crimea, too, a massive inter-ethnic conflict is beginning. (1996: 8–9)

This time, however, the Crimean Tatars were also complemented on the courage with which they engaged the Mafia. The population was frightened,
but there were suggestions that law enforcement had been chastened. Following the rampage, a member of the Feodosia police reported to the Literaturnaya Gazeta journalist:

> It was strange to supposedly be the preservers of law and order, and find a crowd of us chased into the local station like a bunch of chickens. We’re morally beaten. Here, the Tatar victory is complete. (Korobovaya 1995: 11)

In this event, traditional positions were at least temporarily inverted and the Crimean Tatars were hailed as *defenders* of law and order.11

This presents an intriguing twist on representations of Crimean Tatars as “wild” and “barbarian.” It is unlikely that the old stereotype of Crimean Tatars as bandits and traitors will ever completely die. However, involvement with Mafia structures threw into bold relief the extent to which the Crimean Tatars are seen as the Robinhoods of post-Soviet Crimea. The riot was followed by mutual affirmations: Chubarov asserted that defending the interests of the Crimean Tatars is defending the interests of the Ukrainian government. President Leonid Kuchma reiterated this and on a visit to the area expressed his gratitude to the Mejlis for “stabilizing” the situation (Korobovaya 1995: 11). Articles in the more liberal Russian papers Literaturnaya Gazeta and Izvestiia, as well as the more radical paper Express Khronika describe Tatars as a source of stability. This presents a striking contrast to the typical fare of Crimean Tatars as traitors and untrustworthy lawbreakers. Thus Crimean Tatar involvement in rackets, and willingness to condemn the Mafia work both with and against Soviet representational practices. Overturned are antimonies between Crimean Tatars and “the law”; Crimean Tatars and Slavs. This discussion can only scratch the surface of Crimean Tatar positioning on the side of law and order. The topic is a rich one if we consider that in former Soviet areas, the “Mafia” is simply the government’s shadow side.

The kind of inversions and reversals discussed here are not occurring for the first time. Additional layers of meaning are discernable if the history of these Mafias is considered. In revolutionary times, the state was not considered coextensive with the people (Humphrey 2002: 103). Moreover, there was a tendency among the Bolsheviks to reject the idea of law. The goal of generally applicable rules and regulations was seen as bourgeois, something anachronistic in a socialist society where protecting property rights was unnecessary. At the same time that the new Soviet rulers were questioning the value of law, criminals were taking up the idiom of “law” to systematize their rules. The bandits’ law came to be one that was hostile to the state, but had an internal consistency, widespread legitimacy, and appeal (Humphrey 2002: 104). The deep histories of Mafias in
Russia require the functional argument (that the Mejlis was providing services that the society as a whole lacked) be made more complex. The Robinhood mentality also points to a distinctive ethical stance. What Crimean Tatars’ involvement in these quasi-legal “niches” ultimately entails is a fairly sophisticated stab at securing their place on the peninsula, while reorganizing the terms and categories that came to define them.

**Labor Migration**

That Crimean Tatars would be intricately tied to post-Soviet rackets is inevitable considering their roles selling produce and other goods in the bazaar. When I returned to Crimea in December 2001 and again in 2003, consultants were increasingly impoverished and demoralized. Their attitude toward homeland had shifted and they were increasingly willing to consider leaving. The stigma associated with going abroad, so strong in 1998, was now a thing of the past, and many individuals were willing to consider any option that would provide them with an acceptable standard of living and relief from Crimean pressures. While their affection for their homeland was still profound, they said they felt little hope for a normal life there.

The growing acceptance of labor migration points to another way in which Crimean Tatar positioning has changed, leading to a very different structure of feeling about the peninsula. An increasing number of Crimean Tatars traveled to Turkey and parts of Russia to buy products that they could sell in the bazaars. There are also more tales of women traveling irregularly to Moscow and Italy to take jobs as housekeepers and waitresses. What changed was not so much the activity, but the response to it. The normalization of labor migration represented a significant change from 1995 when the idea of working in Europe or Turkey would have been taken as unpatriotic. Today, these same activities have become mundane and predictable, given the difficulty of making a living in Ukraine. In this respect, Crimean Tatars’ utopic imaginings are accommodating Crimean realities.

More importantly, while post-Soviet Mafias tend to reinforce the territorial principle, forms of trade and labor migration cut across it. Traders earn by profiting on regional differences in prices and availability that other people are compelled to observe, rather than laboring in a single locale (Humphrey 2002: 84). In failing to observe the linkage between people and place, territory and identity, this activity provides a basis for reformulating ties to the peninsula.
The structure of feeling that brought the Crimean Tatars back to the peninsula is therefore in a state of flux. Many see the affective stance that propelled return in an increasingly negative light. For example, a Crimean Tatar intellectual denaturalized Crimean Tatar affection for homeland, arguing that it’s cultivated, unnatural:

There is a cultivation that creates a neurosis, which should be eradicated, overcome. Suffering is cultivated in the family, in the community, and in the conventional wisdom that everyone should remember from morning until night what the people lived through.12

He feared the “neurosis” would be kept alive by the difficult living conditions in Crimea, but hoped that the past could eventually be, “taken as the past, and turned into myth, so that people can move on to the reality of dealing with everyday problems.”

Another consultant, the late Vildan Shemi-Zade, issued a similar caution about Crimean Tatars’ feeling for homeland.13 He too saw the practices of recollecting as in need of change. As he put it, post-Soviet ethnic groups suffer from “ethnic schizophrenia.” Under the totalitarian regime, they were subject to anti-Tatar propaganda, arrested, and put in prison. Fear was so successfully inculcated that it engendered a virtual epidemic of paranoia:

Then, with the disintegration of Soviet power, there is a euphoria accompanied by an insufficient grip on reality. This loss of a grip, in connection with “ethnic psychosis” is something you could almost expect from a formerly repressed people: the emotional moment is very deep, at the same time that there is an economic side.14

This statement reveals the sentimental scaffolding of transition from socialism, but also pathologizes it, setting the minorities up as in need of some kind of therapeutic intervention. He added that the physical return of the Crimean Tatars to the historic homeland is not enough. The task of cultural revival, bringing about a return of the vibrant cultural institutions that once nourished them, is still ahead. This is something to which the Crimean Tatar Mejlis has yet to devote significant attention.

Can we celebrate a sense of closure with these comments? Perhaps, but the danger is falling back into a totalitarian system adapted for repression. Closure could mean denying the history of that repression for the purposes
of self-mollification. We must therefore be cautious of any imposed amne-
sias, whether from outside the community or within. Individual survivors
and their descendents should retain the right to their own moods and man-
ners of recollecting. This is prerequisite to arriving at a nontotalitarian
future. Kurchi and Shemi-Zade would have stories harden into a generic
narrative, and the sentiments for homeland ebb away, but the inherent risk
is imposing closure prematurely. Crimean Tatars’ unsanctioned recollect-
ing and reinterpretations marked a disengagement from hegemonic master
narratives of Soviet history. Enforced closure would run against this grain,
implicating them in the very dynamics they sought to dismantle. Crimean
Tatars have been holding “memory days” in the villages from which they
were deported, explicitly to reconnect (see figures 8.1 and 8.2).

This suggests we need to take the structure of feeling fostered by recol-
lection and relate it back to the hegemonic. In Williams’s rendering, the
hegemonic goes beyond culture and ideology to relate “the whole social
process” to specific distributions of power and influence (1977: 108). This
raises new questions related to the nature of post-Soviet society and extent
to which the Crimean Tatars’ passionate attachment to the homeland was
linked to continuity versus change. It also raises questions about the reper-
cussions associated with having the “wrong” kind of attachment to the
peninsula. What kinds of excommunication will the people who are

Figure 8.1 “Memory Day,” Crimean Tatar village holiday
deemed to lack the right kind of attachment to the peninsula experience? Did the scaffolding of sentiments require that loyalty and patriotism be performed? What are we to make of the willingness to capture land and apartments that had been captured by other Crimean Tatars?

Whether the shifts and discontinuities discussed here signal closure or continuity, they unravel the image of the Crimean Tatars as a long-suffering people. As Raymond Williams observed, the emergent, connecting, and
dominant characteristics of structures of feeling, and their specific hierar-
chies become more recognizable at a later stage, when they have been for-
malized, classified, and incorporated into institutions and formations
(1977: 32). By this time, “the case is different; a new structure of feeling
will usually already have began to form, in the true social present” (1977:
132). Another way to view this, without over confining it in a temporal
framework, is to view the “new moment” as confirmation that structures of
feeling were being tested and revised throughout, like all the other discurs-
ptive codes comprising culture.

If not for its compulsory, pedagogical thrust, the impulse to stop
remembering and grieving could represent a willingness to break from the
kind of litanies that pervaded Crimean Tatars’ life. As Churlu put it in the
positive:

Right now we need to find the energy in ourselves to build our culture. We
don’t need to yell or cry any more. We have already arrived and have a roof
over our head. We have our place here in society and are not waiting for any
help from anyone. We must find our own internal resources.17

This statement on the appropriateness of particular sentiments involves a
critique of the affective stance in which “they are still crying, still remem-
bering.” The (proposed) departure from customary modes of discourse has
a bearing on the transformation of post-Soviet society. As Lewin (1995)
and Ries (1997) have observed, litanies about life’s difficulties can
strengthen the kind of cynicism that discourages political participation in
the wake of the Soviet collapse. Litanies of Soviet and post-Soviet mal-
treatment reinforce a sense of powerlessness and demoralization. This con-
sultant is not so much advocating forgetting the past, as incorporating it in
a different way. His work still entails an intense involvement with the
Crimean past: his son is one of the few Tatars to be married in traditional
dress, and he is working to bring back the ancient ways of weaving using
plant dies and traditional patterns. In his view, Crimean Tatar artists can
help foster a new structure of feeling. His comments suggest a willingness
to entertain new possibilities:

We need to bring people energy, we need to bring people joy, hope. ( . . . )
You need to search for it inside, you need to search for it in culture, in
some roots. You need to search. It’s a new moment because it will depend on
us, . . . .18

Will the “new moment” entail new ways of recollecting? His comment
suggests that what and how Crimean Tatars remember may indeed be rad-
cially different in the twenty-first century. If the experiences touched on in
this chapter are an indication, they will regale one another with tales of victories over “petty hooligans and thieves.” And with Chubarov and Dzhemilev in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, future narratives may recount more political victories and less political imprisonment. Labor migration and cooperation with the international humanitarian and human rights communities may also figure in potentially reshaping their view of homeland along more expansive lines. The danger is that their memories and reflections will come under new modes of domination that may exclude the full range of possibility.

Closing Words

This book has explored how over one-quarter million Crimean Tatars became willing to give up their lives in Russia and Central Asia in order to repatriate to their historic homeland in Crimea. At one level, the book is organized chronologically, mirroring the Crimean Tatars’ experience of having their lands occupied by the Germans, being exiled to the Urals and Central Asia, and subsequently repatriating. We therefore moved from competing representations of the 1941 occupation, to the deportation for alleged collaboration with the Nazis, and the movement for repatriation. A structure of feeling webbed through styles of recollecting, eventually advocating “Homeland or Death.” The structure of feeling was made manifest in the strategies whereby Tatars reclaimed land in Crimea. This attachment to the peninsula at the end of the twentieth century provides a sharp contrast to their attitude during the colonial period. Utopic imaginings and dystopic realities now coexist in a troubled relationship.

At another level, the book experiments with ways of knowing and communicating about the past. Taking this approach involved incorporating a number of analytic and interpretive strategies. Documentary and oral sources as well as oral recollection and recorded testimony were set side by side to discover how they articulate in competing and complementary ways. Attending to the dialogic aspect of memory within families and among artists revealed the importance of family styles and the workings of power in recollection. The rubrics and rhetorical strategies of consultants were mined for what they could tell us about the practice of memory. In this, my consultants were the guides. It was their epistemology of history, however complicated by the regime’s attempts to silence and to erase, that inform this study.

As a result of this book, we have a clearer idea of the real reasons for the Crimean Tatars’ deportation, as well as a way to think about the German
occupation outside rigid frames of patriotism and treason. This book also represents the first ethnographic account of deportation, a topic previously explored primarily in humanitarian and journalistic forms. The analysis may sharpen our understanding of the dialectical nature of memories circulated in the family, as well as the importance of sentiments to narrative

Figure 8.3  Gravestone in the shape of Crimean Peninsula, Chirchik, Uzbekistan
recollection. While the project of depicting the Crimean Tatar National Movement is left to other scholars, the recollections of political activity explored here show how national memories contributed to the performance and prefiguring of success. Finally, this ethnography is the first to present an argument about the centrality of self-immolation to repatriation—a topic that has not received the amount or kind of attention it deserves.

The Crimean Tatar experience shows that the Soviet Union was not as successful as scholars once thought in controlling representations of the past. Even though the place names were changed, their kinesthetic memories lead them back to natal villages, even though it was forbidden to mention Crimea, Tatars created narratives and had their love for that land inscribed on gravestones (figure 8.3). We do not have to move beyond the studies of memory that have been done to date, but rather engage the use of memory in the present in a still more critical way. One way to do this is to look at the social experiences still in solution, the cultural hypotheses and experiences of the present that compose vague and yet powerful structures of experience.

As the structure of feeling that guided repatriation becomes formalized and institutionalized, it is replaced by new structures of feeling with ties to the present problems of existence. The Crimean Tatars are now players in international politics, a part of post-Soviet Mafias, and potential migrants. What new cultural hypotheses will take shape has yet to be determined, but these latest changes make a performative, interactive model of memory even more important. Hopefully, the insights gleaned from their repatriation can be applied to other cases in which remembering is reconfigured.
Notes

Introduction

Notes to Pages 1–11

1. All names, except those of officials, artists, and authorities, have been changed.
2. Stalin wanted to annex Turkish provinces on the northeastern border with the USSR that had previously been part of Russia, but were lost during World War I.
3. This of course only scratches the surface of a highly developed and informative literature on genocide and state terror. Useful overviews are provided by Adler (2002), Horowitz (1982), and Fein (1993) as well as work by Nordstrom (1997) and Green (1999).
4. Memory “work” creates representations of the past that inform the ongoing process of social remembering and forgetting through which people define who and what they are in the modern world (Abercrombie 1998).
5. Memorial began as a small initiative group in 1987 and grew into a scientific research center with an archive, museum, reception room, and library.
6. The memories of Crimean Tatar children parallel those of Palestinian refugees, who typically mention the name of their village in Palestine when they are asked where they are from.
7. As Akhil Gupta has argued, “Why nations come to be such potent forms of imagining community can only be understood by contrasting them with other forms of imagined community, both supranational and subnational” (Gupta 1992: 67).
8. For a discussion of moral imperatives among another displaced people, the Hutu, see Liisa Malkki. Camp refugees saw their exile as a locale on a moral trajectory that would empower them to reclaim a homeland in Burundi (1995: 3).
9. Watson (1994) and others have argued that in socialist societies, attempts were made to “privatize” memory and in so doing obliterate collectively held, social memories. History writing was within the purview of a single party state, and it was small acts of private, unsanctioned remembrance that were felt to kept alternative memories and histories alive (Watson 1994: 4). However, there was little chance of developing these memories into alternative histories (Jones 1994; Watson 1994). Until relatively recently, discussions of reinventing the past, alternative histories, and counter-memories were limited to places outside the socialist bloc. Now that the countries that supported such “technologies of amnesia” (Schwarcz 1994) such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have collapsed, we have an opportunity to consider their ramifications.
10. As Stoler and Strassler have pointed out, what is urgently needed in ethnographic histories “from the bottom up” and elite histories viewed upside down is a more explicit engagement with the nature of memory (2000: 4).

11. Halbwachs was of course progressive in recognizing long before *The Invention of Tradition* (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), that collective memory is continually revised to suit present purposes.

12. Social memory differs from personal memory because it does not rely on a direct experience of the past. Social memories are cultural understandings that develop over time. One way they are concretized and made explicit is through localization in place. Crimean Tatars walk the garden paths their grandparents walked, touch the cracked stucco walls their parents plastered, and reclaim abandoned dwellings as a part of “remembering” what they lost.

13. Rosaldo argues “just as thought does not exist in isolation from affective life, so affect is culturally ordered and does not exist apart from thought” (Rosaldo 1984: 137). Also see de Sousa (1987).

14. While it has long been assumed that emotion, unlike other cultural realities, has an inner, independent existence, anthropologists are increasingly interested in how sentiments are tied to the community and its concepts. In this book, it is the public manifestation of sentiments, such as that of patriotism, that are of primary concern. There is an epistemological problem of deciphering the discrepancies between observable states and subjective experience. Solomon suggests that if there is no inaccessible, private reference, then the problem of understanding others’ sentiments is similar to translating any other cultural phenomenon (Solomon 1984: 251). I prefer a more conservatively approach for it is presumptuous to make too many assumptions about others’ inner experience. Here the focus is on the Tatars’ discursively constructed, public, and performed interpretation of their affective relationship to place.

15. This is to take “discourse” as a kind of social practice. The production of experience is of course limited by various forms of constraint, and power.

16. As Lutz’s study (1988) has shown, indigenous theories of emotion inform a whole range of practices, and are accessible to anthropologists in metacommentary.

17. Their approach to homeland suggests they are metaphysically connected to the peninsula, they are only able to thrive in that land; they deserve to live there by virtue of their ancestors; they have a moral obligation to return at all costs; and return is imperfect and incomplete until all the people return.


19. Yoneyama used this phrase for the relation between contested space and history (Yoneyama 1994: 99–137). I have modified the concept to take place into consideration.

20. When consultants who had already returned to Crimea were asked to discuss the reasons why they relocated, the majority of the respondents mentioned a desire to return to their *rodina* or homeland, and often they mentioned this reason first. They frequently said they experienced a calling or pull to the homeland which they referred to as *zov rodiny*. The second most common answer was family. Some said they moved to be with their parents or siblings and others said they moved because their children were urging them.
Consultants mentioned their group as a whole almost as often as family, stating, for example, “Well, if all the people are already here, how could I stay there? What would I do there by myself?” Only about one-third of the consultants mentioned political or macrosocial reasons such as Gorbachev’s promises about ethnic homelands, the civil war in Tajikistan, or the slaughter of the Meskhetian Turks in 1989. Most importantly, improving one’s life was conspicuously absent as a reason for relocating.

If we consider the intention to emigrate from Uzbekistan, two findings stand out. First, the first and subsequent generations are equally likely to intend to relocate with 75 and 74% indicating the desire respectively. In a similar study, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) considered place of birth, and determined that those born in Uzbekistan were no more or less likely to intend to relocate than those born in Crimea (IOM 1997: 13). They too found no appreciable difference with respect to intention to migrate. If people born in the historic homeland and people born in diaspora are equally likely to plan on “returning” to the historic homeland, the desire to return must be constituted culturally among subsequent generations.


22. In the Crimean Tatar population, 26 were born before the 1944 deportation and 27 were born after. Of the 26 individuals born before 1944, 19 had direct experience of deportation. There were 29 females and 24 males in the sample. With regard to employment, 16 informants were employed, 5 were unemployed, 8 were out of the workforce, and 24 were collecting pensions. With respect to education, 32% had higher education, 40% had technical education, and 28% had incomplete primary education or were still in school.

23. The instrument and responses can be found in Uehling (2000).

1 The Lay of the Historic Land

1. They also besieged Tula and other cities, an abducted many individuals. After Ivan IV annexed Kazan, the Crimean khan launched an attack on Moscow, presumably fearing Crimeans would be next. It took place in the context of competition between Muscovy and the Crimean khans for the former lands of the by-now disintegrated Golden Horde. An immense amount of territory was at stake (Fisher 1978: 40–41).

2. Recent dissertations (Williams 1999) and Crimean Tatar historiography (see Kudusov 1995 or Crimean Tatar Web page, for example) are among the sources that stress this distinction.


5. The Kazan Tatars are struggling for greater sovereignty in Tatarstan, currently part of the Russian Federation. Crimean Tatars acknowledge solidarity with the Kazan Tatars, but their struggles are not linked.

6. The situation is not unlike the Arabs of Spain or the Muslims of Bosnia.
7. The Karaims are a non-Muslim minority who speak a Turkic language and have Turkic traditions. Originally concentrated in Chufut Kale near the city of Bahçesaray, this group was entitled to certain privileges under the Khanate, such as exemption from some taxes. According to a Karaim consultant, the Karaims now number approximately 800, and are struggling to maintain their cultural traditions.

8. Nadinskii (1951) was a vocal proponent of this view, and Russian politicians in the Crimean Supreme Soviet continue this line of thinking today.

9. The presence of Islam was first noted in Crimea in the ninth century, although Islamicization did not gain momentum until the tenth through the twelfth centuries.

10. The Mongols and the clans that were united in the Golden Horde were shamanistic until Khan Uzbek (1313–1341) lead conversion to Islam.

11. Lenin realized that if he was to win the loyalty of minority groups, concessions would be necessary. He instituted a Soviet nationalities policy that, on paper at least, allowed for the right of secession of national autonomies.


13. The Germans were attracted by the idyllic climatic conditions of the south coast and postulated kinship with the early Gothic inhabitants of Crimea.

14. The comment about beer is one that many find deeply offensive, racist, and misinformed.

15. Predating the modern KGB or Committee of State Security is the Cheka or Special Commission for the Struggle against Counter-Revolution and Sabotage, which was led by Dzerzhinsky. The Cheka, which operated from 1917 to 1922, was replaced by the GPU or State Political Administration and renamed OGPU in 1923. In 1934, the OGPU was abolished and its functions absorbed by the NKVD or Peoples’ Commissariat for Internal Affairs. Stalin made the NKVD independent in 1943. The NKVD was replaced by the MVD or Ministry of Internal Affairs (Shaw and Pryce 1990: 184–185).

16. Some or the idiosyncrasies of nationalism in the Soviet Union stem from the Russian imperial period. Russia ruled in what Suny characterizes as “a mixed, contradictory system” that involved indirect rule in some places, direct military government through in others, and various forms of constitutionalism (Suny 1993: 23).

17. There were other factors as well. After the war, Tatars had come to fill crucial niches of the economy in Central Asia. Tatars suggest the Uzbek republic was therefore disinclined to let them go. At the same time, Crimean authorities feared the Tatars’ return would lead to a conflict with the Russians and Ukrainians (Kudusov 1995: 14).


19. According to legal experts, the right to ask for restitution is provided for by the Constitution of Ukraine, the Civil Code of Ukraine, the Civil Judicial Code, the Household Code, and The Law of Ukraine on Property, but the government of Ukraine has failed to draft and adopt legislation that would provide for implementation (Bekirov 1999a: 38).
20. The Crimea Foundation suggests that as many as 450,000 may reside there.
21. Whereas 20% of Crimean Tatars in Crimea are elderly, as high as 28.5% of Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan are 60 or older (IOM 1997: 12).
22. First independent Ukrainian census.
23. To this end, Crimean Tatars have increasingly emphasized their status as an indigenous people and underlining that the Geneva Convention, the Helsinki Accords, and United Nations resolutions should protect them.

2 The Faces of Public Memory

1. Not only were their numbers too small to have made a decisive impact, their participation on each side appears to have been approximately equal.
2. The nature of this collaboration will be scrutinized: many of the soldiers who were recruited into the German army came after being interned in German POW camps where they faced starvation and disease.
5. The Crimean ASSR was later demoted to an oblast in 1946, and remained subsumed in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) until Khrushchev ceded it to Ukraine in 1954.
6. The evidence is abundant. One example is that an offer to help on the part of the Italian Red Cross was turned down; another is that grain sent to Crimea from Turkey was shipped out for sale.
7. In the long succession of purges, one of the first to be executed was Çelibi Cihan in 1918. Ten years later, the Crimean Tatar communist Veli Ibrahimov was executed. In 1930, the poet Amdi Giraibai was executed followed by the scientist Choban Zade in 1937.
Dean of Simferopol State Pedagogical and Industrial Institute, Fevzi Yakubov March 3, 1998. The Institute is gathering information for the production of new textbooks, and books on Crimean historiography.
8. In 1939, prior to the war, there were 65,452 Jews in Crimea or 5.8% of the total population (Altshuler 1993: 9). By the next Soviet census, there were 26,815 in Crimea (Central Statistics Department 1963. Results of the All Union Census of 1959. Moscow: Gosstatizdat). According to Nekrich, German documents indicate 91,678 individuals were destroyed between October 1941 and April 1942, most of them Jews and representatives of national minorities (1978: 25–26). According to Schwarz (1951: 220) at least 300,000 perished in Russia, of which Crimea was a part. According to the 2001 census, there are 30,200 Jews in the Crimea today, comprising 4.5% of the population. According to Schwarz (1951: 224) accounts that effective measures had been taken to evacuate the Jewish population from the Nazi regime were exaggerated, as this evacuation was voluntary, and conducted in a haphazard way.
9. According to Fikret Yurter of the National Center for Crimean Tatars, as many as 15,000 Crimean Tatars were taken to Germany and Austria for compulsory labor.
10. According to the International Renaissance Foundation, over thirty-nine mosques were destroyed during the occupation (1997: 9).

11. Crimeans speculate that the Tatars were receptive to the Germans at the advent of World War II because of the positive associations left from 1918. The Muslim Committees were represented as the direct descendents of the Mohammedan Committees active during the time of the Civil War and the German occupation of 1918.


13. There is an abundant literature on the partisan movement. One consultant’s father was a protagonist in Four Seasons a Year (Genov 1969). Genov told him he had been required to cut certain material and write “around” key Tatar figures. Genov was, however, allowed to use the old Crimean Tatar place names in contrast to much of the other scholarship of this era. Asanova (pseudonym) told her story to me over the course of a number of meetings in Uzbekistan in June, July, and August 1998. The August 23, 1998 meeting was taped.

14. Registers (Swedenburg 1995) is a preferable term to “contradictory,” an unnecessarily incriminating term.


17. Ibid.

18. The soldiers and sailors who were under the control of the first Bolshevik regime killed both the Slavic and Tatar populations indiscriminately. When the Germans arrived in spring 1918, they found mass graves near Simferopol. Efforts in self-defense were subsequently glossed as “counterrevolutionary” and condemned (Fisher 1978: 120–121). In explaining the nature of the mass killings, Fisher suggests that the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, signed several months earlier had undercut Soviet authority in Crimea, intensifying the sense of chaos. Tatars hoped to persuade the Germans to see the Crimea as part of their sphere of influence. Germany did decide to bring Crimea under the Ukrainian and South Russian areas of control.

A Muslim Corps under Seidahmet and Sulikiewicz (of the Russian army) was then key in removing Bolshevik troops. The Tatars were given permission to reinstate their Kurultai. Seidahmet offended the Germans when he stated, “We are now free to belong to the Turko-Tatar world” and “Crimea for the Crimeans” (1978: 122). Tatar nationalist desires were too extreme for the Germans to accommodate.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Both newspapers give rich information. Changes in the valid currency, rules for marketing, curfews, laws on carrying weapons, crime, the observance of holidays, and the times and places of food distribution were all regular features. As the organ of the Muslim Committee, Azat Krym contains a multitude of articles about the needs and interests of the Tatar people, in Crimean Tatar. The
paper was German-financed, but had Crimean Tatar editors. *Golos Kryma* has fewer articles on specifically Crimean Tatar themes except for the reports on Crimean Tatar theater performances. It includes many articles about the positive aspects of the German regime for all the peoples of Crimea, in Russian.


24. Gurkovitch (1995) is referring to *Azat Krym* of April 10, 1942 (n.p.).


26. This said, Crimean Tatars also empathize with Palestinians.

27. The papers contain sharp criticism of the Soviets. There are critiques of Marx and Lenin pointing out the Bolshevik failure to bring the promised utopia into being. Stalin is a dictator for whom victory is more important than the welfare of the people. Critique also concerns the economy.

28. For city dwellers, a money award in the amount of 1,000 rubles was granted. For rural residents an increase in amount of their land was promised (*Golos Kryma* 1942, no. 27 (33), April 2, p. 3, *list* 52 (no auth.).


30. Unfortunately, there are also examples of (mutual) desecration of monuments and memorials in Crimea.

31. Numerous examples could be drawn upon. For example, an MP in the Ukrainian Parliament recently *questioned* whether the deportation was a mistake. Pavlo Baulin, speaking during April 5, 2000 parliamentary hearing, quoted in “Research Update of the Independent Center for Political Research,” vol. 6, no. 168.

32. Ibid.

3 Exile: Recalling the 1944 Deportation

1. While the act of deportation was unquestionably immoral, the elderly, women, and children are of course not by definition innocent.


4. Jung writes: “The protean mythologem and the shimmering symbol express the processes of the psyche far more trenchantly and, in the end, far more clearly than the clearest concept; for the symbol not only conveys a visualization of the process but—and this is perhaps just as important—it also brings a re-experiencing of it …” (Segal 1998: 89–90). Jung goes further to suggest also that myth, especially religious myth, has a part in making people feel at home in the world (Jung 1968) [1964]: 76.

5. As Humphrey points out citing Herzfeld (1987: 44) and Baumann and Briggs (1990: 59–61), the Levi-Straussian categorization of societies on the basis of the presence or absence of “myth,” defined in a universalistic way, is antiquated.
6. In Humphrey’s rendering, the dispossessed are refugees, economic migrants, demobilized soldiers, abandoned pensioners, invalids, and single-parent families, the homeless and people living in various illegal ways. In short, the people who have been dispossessed by the Soviet system, or are interstitial in some way (2002: 21).


9. Today, there is a great deal of scholarship underway: a bibliography on the Crimean Tatars lists 175 books (80 of which are in Russian), 60 theses, and 250 journal articles (Altug 2000). In 1997, a detailed and comprehensive series on deportation called Spets-Kontingent was published in a Crimean Tatar newspaper (Khayali 1997). The specific gap that this chapter fills is an ethno-graphic one.

10. Nekrich was forced to rely on unpublished dissertations that had been suppressed.

11. This figure includes Volga Germans, Karachay, Kalmyk, Chechens, Ingush, Balkar, Crimean Tatars, and Meskhetian Turks. See “Punished Peoples: The Mass Deportations of the 1940s” in Bitig (1997: 14) (no auth.). Other minority groups were also deported such as Poles, Koreans, Finns, other North Caucasus groups, other Soviet Germans, Black Sea Greeks, etc.


13. 2001 fieldwork on the first independent Ukrainian census was made possible by the Watson Institute at Brown University and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.


15. Ibid.


17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.


21. Anonymous female consultant (born 1924) Samarkand, September 19, 1998. Many live without a valid propiska as it is difficult and time consuming to obtain. The system is being replaced by a slightly different, but equally restrictive one.

22. Sergei Tsekov, October 22, 1997. This is also a point made by Chervonnaia and Guboglo (1992: 76).


24. This was expressed on several occasions, including a consultant on January 3, 1998.

27. Russian figures tend to be higher. Aleksandr Yakovlev, an architect of pere-
stroika and Head of Gorbachev’s Rehabilitation Commission estimates that approximately 15 million fell victim (Adler 2002: 17).
30. Tashkent was a central unloading point. Crimean Tatars were sent to towns such as Chirchik, Yangiyul, Gulistan, Samarkand, Alma Alik, Namengan, Margilan, Ferghana, and Andijan.
41. Simferopol, Ukraine, August 9, 1997.
44. Anonymous male consultant (born 1937).
46. For further discussion on bread as a cultural category, see Ries (1997: 136–137).

4 Family Practices: The Social Circulation of Memory and Sentiments

1. See Stoler (1992) for a description of hierarchies of credibility, which refer to the ways in which fragmented social realities are reflected in the esteem accorded to certain sources, as well as the process of resisting the limitations of knowledge.
2. Greenspan writes, “[a]long with the traumatized silence of memory and the extended silence of absent listeners, there is also the silence of enactment: a silence derived from survivors having been driven to live rather than speak their retelling” (Greenspan 1992: 163).


4. “An image is that in which the past and the present moment flash into a constellation. In other words: image is dialectic at a standstill. For while the relation of the present to the past is a purely temporal, continuous one, that of the past to the moment is dialectical: not of a temporal, but of an imagistic nature” (Benjamin 1983–1984: 8). For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Hanssen (1998).


7. Two of the women who told their stories in chapter 3 lost their mothers. One when her mother ceased to recognize her. The other was eventually able to locate her emaciated, barely recognizable mother.

8. At his father’s only personal exhibition in 1972, a speaker made a comment in the opening remarks that, “Allah willing, such exhibits will be arranged in Crimea as well.” This was threatening enough for the authorities to close the exhibit, even though the paintings had no explicit political content.


10. Ibid.

5 The Crimean Tatar National Movement: Memories of Power and the Power of Memory

1. As Cole has argued, few people have a single narrative of the past that is always accessible. What people remember and recall shifts and transforms, depending in part on the occasion in which it is cued (Cole 1998). Theorists differ on the extent to which the state should be treated as a subjective versus structural phenomenon. Of course, it is neither wholly subjective nor wholly objective. Between these two approaches, the Crimean Tatars’ movement for repatriation offers a way to consider not just how the aspirations of a minority were constrained by institutions i.e., the structural dimensions of social change, but also how the Tatars imagined their relationships with state institutions and actors.

2. Framing is metacommunication that indicates what kind of interaction (playful, serious, etc.) will follow (Lemon 2000).

3. The task of writing a history of the movement is left to other scholars. See Fisher (1978), Andrews (1998), Abdulganiyev (2003), and Williams (2001).

4. National movements soon swept the former Soviet Union. There were disputes over Nagorno- Karabakh, Abkhazia, Chechnya, and the Baltics.
5. Here, I am building on a long line of research that begins with Austin (1962) and includes Ries (1997) and Mueggler (2001). Linguistic anthropologists vary in the amount of importance they place on distinguishing “performativity” (the effectiveness of speech acts) from “performance” (speech and behavior that is displayed or framed). Performatives are those speech acts that, given proper institutional support, enact themselves by their utterance, e.g., “I now pronounce you man and wife” (Austin 1962; Lemon 2000: 24). Mueggler demonstrates particularly clearly that discourse does not just reflect the world of social action, but helps create it. Ries argues conversation is a primary way of honing political ideologies and cultural stances: “. . . the extraordinary changes in Russian society have been negotiated, in large part, through the continual exchange of stories about those changes . . .” (1997: 4).

6. The political opportunity structure refers to the constraints confronting a movement, or the degree to which groups can gain access to the political system and influence it.


9. Whereas the OKND was anti-Communist, the NDKT held fast to Communist ideals. And while the NDKT accepted an official plan for incremental repatriation, the OKND rejected it. The OKND also helped spearhead the strategy of samo-zakhvat, or self-claimed land, while the NDKT rejected this tactic for its illegality.


11. For the most part, Crimean Tatar mobilizing organizations survived by maintaining a fluid leadership that made it difficult to identify and prosecute them. Mobilizing organizations refer to agreed upon ways of engaging in collective action. This occurs on both macro and micro levels (McCarthy 1996: 142). Less obviously, a mobilizing structure can also entail friendship networks, the family, work networks, and voluntary associations.


14. Simferopol, October 12, 1997. The expression “blacken” refers to the view of the non-Slavic minorities as “blacks” and the frequent comparison of them to American “negry.”

15. Ibid.


17. Footing refers to the attitude or position that a participant in an interaction takes vis-à-vis the others. As Lemon points out, shifts in footing are evaluated in light of variable access to linguistic resources (Lemon 2000: 26).

18. However other Crimean Tatars used a racist logic to imply the authorities released Seytmuratova (who has “Asian” features) to communicate in code that the group is “Asian” and hence not worthy of assistance.

19. The so-called initiative groups were conceived more precisely as “initiative groups for assistance to the government and the party in the resolution of the national question of the Crimean Tatar people.”
20. According to historians and activists, the decree of 1967 emerged from the meetings that took place as a result of the lobbying effort (Fisher 1978; Williams 2001; Wilson 1998). Their “speaking” with the state had at least one concrete effect.

21. The Procuracy was established in Russia by Peter the Great in 1722 for ensuring administrative legality. Since that time, it has undergone many changes. Within the Procuracy, there are departments for supervising criminal and civil proceedings in the courts, supervising prisons of various types, investigating and supervising preliminary inquiries into wrongdoing, and handling complaints by citizens against government bodies.


24. Membership in the party was difficult to secure.

25. Or “heteroglossia,” Bakhtin’s idea that stress the role of context in the creation of meanings (Bakhtin 1981: 428).

26. Remarks are made, e.g., about “certain forces” that are out there “behind” certain people. There are many references to individuals who are working behind the scenes, and the “third,” unnamed force. The mask is a therefore a good metaphor for the state because everyone thinks there is something behind the mask, supporting the whole system.


29. It can be argued that criminals, especially “mafia,” were the original dissenters against the system.


31. At the same time, the precise circumstances of an arrest often remained unclear. The defendant offered one version, court records another, and rivals within the movement yet another. Also see Ymerov (1996).

32. This intrigue continues. In August 2002, I received correspondence from activists alleging that Mustafa Dzhemilev and Seytmuratova are embezzling international funds and Dzhemilev is associated with criminal networks.


34. October 11, 1997.


38. Crimean Tatars took the Soviet nationality policy developed on the basis of Marxism–Leninism at face value. First, they agreed with it; and second, it could be used to advocate for national goals. Two small examples reinforce the point. When the Tatar delegation was received by Demichiev (first vice president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR) in 1987, an activist named Reshat Godjenov observed that the Leninist resolution to their problem should be the re-establishment of the Crimean ASSR (samizdat). When asked by the leader about their desires for sovereignty, another activist, Rolan Kadiev, answered using Marxist theory. Over and over again, dissidents who underwent interrogations used Marxist–Leninist nationality theory to reply to their interrogators.
41. The decision to risk demonstrating in Red Square had been made in the aftermath of an All-Union Conference of initiative groups in April 1987. They had drafted an appeal to Gorbachev, but failed to get the desired response. They convened another All-Union conference in June 1987, and decided to send a delegation to Moscow to press their demands. This was their bravest attempt yet to attract attention to their cause.
42. On April 5, 2000 the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) held a debate on the report of Lord Ponsonby called “Resettlement and Integration of the Tatars of Crimea” A verbatim report was distributed on Crimea-L, April 7, 2000.

6 How Death Came to be Beautiful


1. While there are both Russian and English editions of this compilation, I use the Russian and the translations here are my own.
2. Interview with Zikiye Abdullayeva, Unus Mahmut, Redvan Charukov, and Reshat Dzhemilev on January 2, 1998, Besh Terek, Crimea. UM is Unus Mahmut, RC is Redvan Charukhov, RD is Reshat Dzhemilev, ZM is Zikiye Mahmut.
4. Voloshinov (1986), Bakhtin (1984), and Hill (1995: 109) have developed the idea of a system of voices.
5. The forces that serve to unify and centralize the verbal and ideological world operate alongside the processes of decentralization. The utterance is a conflict-ridden, tension-filled unity (Bakhtin 1981: 270–271).
6. Principal is what Goffman described as “someone whose position is established by the words that are spoken, someone whose beliefs have been told, someone who is committed to what the words say.” The animator, in contrast, is the one who brings the words of a song, play, or quotation to life by verbalizing them, the “talking machine,” a largely functional role. The author is at the heart of the system as the composer or person who “has selected the sentiments that are being expressed and the words in which they are encoded” (Goffman 1981: 144).
7. Ibid.
8. A Muslim is also an individual born to a Muslim father who takes on his or her parents’ confessional identity without necessarily subscribing to the beliefs and practices of the faith (Ruthven 1997: 3). In this context, there is no contradiction
between being Muslim and being secularized. This ambiguity is inherent in Crimean Tatars’ self-identification as Muslims.

9. For a discussion of this issue, see Harlan (2002).

10. Martyrdom is not the monopoly of any culture or tradition, highlighting important commonalities in ethos and ideas. Lewinstein however emphasizes that “where the early Christians mourned, the Muslims strove” (2002: 80). The ideal in Islam was less to die for the faith than to struggle. This is an important difference. While the element of struggle is present in Christianity, it is Jesus’s death, rather than his fighting that carries the most religious significance for Christians, whereas the opposite is true for Muslims (2002: 80).


13. The Muslim understanding of martyrdom is of course not static. It evolved first in relation to the activist model of the Prophet Muhammed, and subsequently by the quietism of scholars (Lewinstein 2002: 86). Those who died of plague, were eaten by lions, or fell off the tops of mountains were included in martyrdom in an attempt to make it more accessible. The Prophet reportedly said that if only those killed in war were properly considered martyrs, then martyrs would be few (Lewinstein 2002: 82). The idea is that one must actively struggle for justice and principles. The will to die “in the way of God” is sufficient. Islam shares with other religious traditions a view that martyrdom revolves around certain central conditions. Droge and Tabor (1992: 75) identify five: they reflect situations of oppression or persecution; the choice is viewed as necessary, noble, and heroic; the individuals are often eager to die, and may kill themselves; there is often the idea of vicarious benefit resulting from the suffering and death; and the expectation of vindication and reward beyond death is a prime motivation for the choice (Droge and Tabor 1992: 75 cited in Cormack 2002: xii).


15. R. Dzhemilev told this story during an interview on September 25, 1997, and recorded it in writing in a 2001 samizdat letter. R. Dzhemilev was later accused of trying to push M. Dzhemilev from the Volga.


17. It is difficult to assess how much of Dzhemilev’s critique is inspired by rivalry between the one-time friends, but R. Dzhemilev alleges M. Dzhemilev sought prison sentences as a way to win the Nobel Peace Prize.

18. Modern Shi’ite ideologues have created a sophisticated ideology of social and political activism and revolution. See Brown (2002) and Lewinstein (2002) for a more detailed discussion of this idea within Sunni and Shi’ite e Islam.


20. The Uzbek women were believed to be immolating themselves to bear witness to, and protest, oppressive conditions in their marital families. Comparisons could also be drawn with the practice of sati. Harlan points out that to associate sati with martyrdom, a word with positive valuation in Christianity and Islam, is to invite outrage on the part of the many people engaged in moral discourse around and opposition to sati immolation and worship (2002: 118).
While it may be difficult to agree, those who see *satis* as venerable and exemplary basically regard them as sacred and divine. This is to open a debate that cannot be adequately explored here, except to point readers to the large body of literature on the topic (Weinberger-Thomas 1999; Mani 1998; Datta 1988; *Venkatesan 1983*; Harlan 2002).


23. This is an excerpt from a letter written by Zikiye to Rudenko, the Prokuror of the Soviet Union dated August 15, 1978 and reprinted Dzhemilev 1986.

24. I use affective stance as similar to a disposition (Bourdieu 1977: 214) or emotional posture that communicates values, perspectives, and desires.

25. Kapferer makes similar observations about the passion of nationalism as manifesting reason. This is not to argue that ethnic prejudice is “sane” or that destruction is justified. Both are “madness” filled with reasoning, products of the ideas and practices in an otherwise routine and compassionate world (Kapferer 2002: 20).


27. See Ries (1997) for a discussion of this type of discourse as a culturally specific style of communication.


31. The poem is in Russian and the translation provided here is my own.

32. For example, a female journalist said this at the Cultural Center in Simferopol, Ukraine, December 5, 1997.

7 Houses and Homelands:
The Reterritorialization of Crimean Tatars


1. “Land” is used instead of “property” because many of the places they claimed had an ambiguous or transitional status.

2. Bekirova’s division into three waves is used here (Bekirova n.d.).

3. On the basis of estimated rates of population increase, Crimean Tatars speculate five or six million descendants in Turkey today. In keeping with Turkey’s assimilationist approach, however, only a subset of this population identifies as descendants of Crimean Tatars.

5. Taking “communal holdings,” “private holdings,” and “ownership” as transparent terms may obscure the actual relationship to land. Crimean Tatars had at least ten kinds of land tenure (Kirimli 1990).

6. Approximately 288,000 desiatins of land had been bestowed by 1796 when the whole area of Crimea was 2,316,833 desiatins, and one desiatin was the equivalent of 2.7 acres (Kirimli 1990: 7). This amounts to approximately 12% of the area of Crimea.

7. Endowment charters are a clear example of manipulation. They stipulated the width of the land to be bestowed, but the precise land to be bestowed was left to the person holding the charter and local officials (Kirmili 1990). Virtually any land desired by someone in possession of an endowment could be acquired by having it declared state property. For example in 1787, Potomkin gave a Sablinkia dacha and land to a Captain Pleshevy. That there were three villages with a population of over 300 on this land did not affect the transaction (Vozgrin 1992: 276).

8. Prince Menshikov proposed expelling the entire Tatar population to the mainland and a precautionary measure. Logistical difficulties prevented them from carrying out the idea.


10. Mustafa Dzhemilev, president, Milli Mejlis, Simferopol, Crimea, August 8, 1996.

11. Visitors are often struck by the extent of uncut forest, untilled fields, and open shoreline in Crimea. Crimea is actually one of the least densely populated areas of the Ukraine.

12. Letter from Mustafa Dzhemilev to the Congressional Committee of the United States for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (n.d.).

13. Mustafa Dzhemilev, president, Milli Mejlis, Simferopol, Crimea, August 8, 1996.

14. According to Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research Update, vol. 6, no. 168, April 10, 2000. This figure varies. Bekirov (1999a) writes that Ukraine spent 14 million between 1991 and 1996 when funding was curtailed. Today, the amounts are even higher.

15. Dzhemilev asserts that from 1992 to 1997, the Ukrainian government assigned 430 million of the state budget for the resettlement of the Crimean Tatars, a figure higher than some accounts. Dzhemilev, Mustafa “Presentation of the President of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People,” Golos Kryma, no. 51–52, December 26, 1997.

16. Some funds are becoming available from the international community, and Turkey has promised to finance a program to build 1,000 apartments.

17. The estimates in a recent World Bank study are more conservative. Gomart suggested that only 25,000 families are affected (Gomart 2003).


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. The seizure of property took place on August 9, 1995.


24. Of the 370 people living in the dormitory, approximately 60 are on pensions and 120 are children under the age of 14, meaning that almost half the residents are not in the workforce.
Consultants suggested corruption (embezzlement by highly placed Crimean Tatars) and highly placed officials said funds were held up in Kyiv.

According to Ruslan Nikolaevich Smirnov of the Yalta Gorisplkom or Mayor’s Office, there were 404 heads of household in line for apartments in 1998 and the number was growing daily, Yalta, January 13, 1998. The waiting list for parcels of land is separate, and showed 2,000 heads of household at the time according to Imir Mejit, of the Goskomnats.

Crimea, August 12, 1995.

Ries further describes that while both men and women produce litanies, the details that embellish them tend to come from distinctive “male” and “female” domains (1997: 97). In the compact settlements, the brazen language used by Crimean Tatar women departs from “female” discourse centered on shortages, children, and husbands.


Numerous studies argue that the textual model of memory is a poor one because one part of a text is physically separable from the next whereas remembering most often calls up a whole chain of recollections (Fentress and Wickham 1992: 5). These authors also argue that semantic-based memory is not the norm, but the exception (1992: 30).


As Bloch (1998: 24), as well as Strauss and Quinn (1997: 53, 57, 82) have argued, a great deal of our knowledge about the world is not arranged like an orderly succession of sentences, but is organized into networks.


Citizenship became an issue when the republics of the former Soviet Union declared independence. Not only had the categories of persons changed, but the rules and the procedures for making a transition from one category to another were altered. Tatars experienced this particularly sharply because according to Ukrainian law, only the deported who returned prior to November 13, 1991 were automatically considered citizens. Those arriving later were required to go through the process of applying for it. This was time-consuming (until 1999, a five-year waiting period was required), bureaucratically complicated (requiring documentation many Tatars lacked), and costly. This legislation led to the absurd situation in which virtually anyone in the former Soviet Union who moved to Ukraine by the end of 1991 could claim citizenship while a person who was born in Ukraine and forcibly removed in 1944 could not.

Individuals living in Uzbekistan at the time it declared independence were in an equally frustrating position. Having been made a citizen of the Uzbek state against their will, they were then required to go through the costly, frustrating, and time-consuming process of withdrawing from this newly acquired status. In Uzbekistan, this was done only by obtaining a presidential
decree—a process that could take years and cost over 100 dollars. If the date an individual withdrew from a former place of residence preceded the signing of the law on citizenship (which in Uzbekistan was July 28, 1992) the situation was not much better, because he or she was considered a person who lacked citizenship altogether and was therefore stateless.

Significant negotiations have taken place between the states of Ukraine and Uzbekistan to simplify the process of withdrawing from the citizenship of one state and becoming a citizen of another. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) under the leadership of Max van der Stoel facilitated the negotiation process. In September 1999, Ukraine and Uzbekistan reached agreement, vastly simplifying the procedure.

Still, Tatars hesitated to take advantage of the recently revised procedure. Some suspected the procedure would be controlled by local bureaucrats, who would demand fees and bribes. Others hesitated believing they might need to move back to Uzbekistan and did not want to renounce their citizenship there. Still others, especially the elderly, were unaware of the changes in the law, although an information campaign was undertaken. In Crimea, the transition to independence created three categories of persons: citizens of Ukraine, citizens of another state, and persons who lacked citizenship altogether. In 1997, 47.4% of the Crimean Tatars questioned were citizens of Ukraine, 30.6% were citizens of another state, and 22% were without citizenship altogether (Pribitkova 1997: 10).

They cite the 1990 Geneva Convention (Ukraine and Uzbekistan are signatories) as supporting this position. Every person has a right to citizenship, and signatory governments are required to consider previously deported peoples’ special needs.

Discrimination with respect to citizenship, voting rights, and political representation.

See e.g., Bekirov (2000).

7. A racket, according to Humphrey, is “the extortion of regularly paid dues from enterprises in return for “protection,” controlled by a person or group known in Russian slang as the usually “roof” (2002: 99). In the post-Soviet period, it transcends the boundaries of criminal groups and encompasses a proliferation of kinds of “roofs” found among the police, politicians, and private security firms. At its broadest level, rackets manifest cultural attitudes about the state (2002: 97). Insofar as the phenomenon figures prominently in cultural imaginings, Verdery suggests we distinguish the “conceptual Mafia” from the “real thing” (1996: 219).

8. Mustafa Dzhemilev, Central Mejlis, August 8, 1996.

9. The faction within the Mejlis published “Address to the Delegates of the III Kurultai of the Crimean Tatar People” Avdet, 22 (185) December 8, 1997. The address was also circulated in photocopied form. Mustafa Dzhemilev issued replies that were published in subsequent editions of Avdet, as well as his report to the Kurultai, December 19–21, 1997.


11. Dzhemilev pointed out in his annual report that up until the police opened fire, the damage had solely concerned property, and not a single individual had been wounded (Dzhemilev 1996: 8).


14. Ibid.

15. The Soviet regime is renowned for its disregard and devaluing of individual persons (Adler 2002).

16. It should be noted that both were speaking from Moscow, they did not have to live the collision between utopic imaginings and dystopic realities.


18. Ibid.

Abdurashidov, Jemil. 1942. “Bizim tesbekurimiz” [We are Thankful], Azat Krym, no. 4, p. 1, list 3.


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Bibliography


Index

Abrams, Philip, 136
Adorno, Theodore, 126
Adzhi, Murat, 27, 109, 122, 133
Aleksandrov, Grigorii Matveevich, 171, 185, 191–192, 194
Allworth, Edward, 50, 84, 151–152
Amnesty International, 84
Anderson, Benedict, 13, 15, 28, 170, 176–177
assimilation, 4, 31–32, 44, 47, 92
asylum, 6, 144, 205
Austin, John Langshaw, 14, 17, 189
Bachelard, Gaston, 224–225, 227
Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich, 152, 171, 174, 180
Bakic-Hayden, Milica, 26
Barthes, Roland, 21, 81
Bekirov, Nadir, 38, 42, 44–46, 211, 232–234
Benjamin, Walter, 51, 125–127, 130, 142–143
Bennigsen, Alexandre, 33, 202
birth, 3, 17, 62, 81, 83, 91, 94, 120–121, 160
Bolsheviks, 36, 51, 54–56, 65, 71–72, 86–87, 239
Bonner, Yelena, 41, 146
Borneman, John, 5
Bourdieu, Pierre, 155
Bugai, Nikolai Fedorovich, 38, 52, 74, 80, 85, 95
Burchardt, Natasha, 117, 128
Bystrykh, Nikolai, 36, 55
Catherine the Great, 32–34, 203–204
Cemiloglu, Mustafa
see Dzhemilev, Mustafa
Chervonnaia, Svetlana Mikailovna, 132, 139, 209
Chingis Khan, 25, 28, 32
Chirchik (city), 100, 160–161
Chubarov, Reshat, 46, 165, 233, 238–239, 245
Churlu, Mamut, 132–133, 244
Cihan, Çelebi, 36
citizenship, 227–229
civilization, 20, 25–27, 29, 34, 47, 185, 210
collaboration, 3, 7, 38, 41, 47, 49–53, 59, 61, 66, 74–77, 93, 105, 205, 245
collectivization, 37, 55, 66, 72–73, 88
Communist Party, 59–60, 139–141, 150
Twentieth Party Congress, 38, 140
Conquest, Robert, 85, 87
counter-memory, 7, 50
counter-narrative, 50, 95
“Golden Age” of, 36–37
Crimean Tatars
in Central Asia, 42–44
in Crimea, 44–46
emigration, 201–206
ethnogenesis, 30–32, 47, 233
exile (Sürgün), 37–39
history, 28–30
as indigenous people, 14, 22, 30–32, 34, 80, 115, 137–138, 232–235, 237
and Islam, 33–34
Mongol influences, 32–33
postwar misrepresentation of, 60–61
repatriation, 208–212
Russian influences, 34–36
and Soviet Nationalities Policy, 39–41
subgroups, 32
viewed as barbarians, 22, 25–26, 28–29, 107, 109, 138, 165–166, 239
synopsis, 138–139
Crimean Tatar leadership, 42, 49, 73, 76, 234
Crimean War, 26, 199, 201–202, 205–206
Dagçi, Timur, 60, 149–150, 156
becoming “beautiful,” 21, 196
demonstrations, 146
deposition (1944), 20, 33, 38, 40–41, 72, 79, 206, 208, 236
arrival, 96
disparities in accounts of, 80–82
“a knock on the door,” 89–90
loading, 90–92
narratives of, 79, 81, 93
and postmemory, 83–84
representations of deportation, 104, 107
rumors of, 88
train journey, 92–95
Diadia Volodia, 60
dialogism, 171, 174
discrimination, 19, 40, 45, 151, 185, 191, 208, 234
displacement, 15, 27, 205, 229–230
see also exile
dissidents, 11, 41, 84, 138–139, 144–146, 157, 162, 165, 170, 185, 191, 215
domination, 8, 27, 62, 72, 124, 134, 245
Dzhemilev, Mustafa, 56, 77, 141–143, 150, 154–155, 157, 165, 170–172, 184, 186–188, 209, 211, 228, 236–238, 245
Dzhemilev, Reshat, 46, 145, 154, 171, 176, 179–183, 188, 196
economic reform, 210–211
Einhorn, Barbara, 148
Elliot, Mark, 51
Eminov, Rustem, 91, 98, 128, 130–133, 189–190
employment, 19, 43, 45–46, 86, 153, 196, 208
Esbenshade, Richard, 85, 125
essentialism, 26
exile, 37–39, 79–81, 83, 85–87, 90, 92–93, 96–97, 100, 103–107, 131–132
adjustment to, 105–106
and death, 104
first days in exile, 96–100
reunions, 101–104
see also special settlements
exodus, 201, 204–205
extermination, 3, 57, 68, 70, 91, 95, 106
family stories, 113
famine, 37, 55
Farmer, Sarah, 5, 28
Fisher, Alan, 32, 35–37, 41, 50, 55–57, 66, 74, 143, 201, 203
Foucault, Michel, 8, 155
Free Crimea (Azat Krym), 68–73, 77
freedom of religion, 71
Galiev, Sultan, 36, 55
Gaspirali, (Ismail Bey Gasprinski), 35, 207
Geertz, Clifford, 215
genocide, 90–91, 98, 100, 106, 224
Ustasa genocide, 70
geography, 19, 26, 28, 30–31, 40, 127, 184, 224
Germany, 4–6, 54, 57–60, 62
German occupation of Crimean Peninsula
consultants’ perspectives of, 61–68
popular representations of, 74–76
“Girls by the Fountain” (Yabukov), 131
glasnost, 85, 116, 132, 138, 162, 164
Goffman, Erving, 174
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 41, 231
Goskomnats (State Committee of Nationalities), 14, 42, 211, 220
Great Patriotic War, 56
Greenspan, Henry, 106, 113–114, 125–126, 128
Grigorenko, Andrei, 41, 146
Gromyko Commission, 162–166
Guboglo, Mikhail, 132, 139, 209
Gumiliëv, Lev, 30
Gurkovich, Vladimir, 68–71, 74
Hayden, Robert, 26, 112
hierarchy, 25–26, 60, 64, 113, 137, 146, 177, 216, 230
history, 4–5, 7, 10–11, 15–18, 20–21, 27–31, 137–140, 142–144, 150, 155, 161, 166
history, Crimean accounts of victory of Soviet troops, 87
history, politics of, 84–87
blank pages, 87
monopolized history, 85
negative evidence, 85–86
official history, 15, 87, 109
oral accounts of, 69–71, 81
alternative imaginations of, 206–208
milli vatan, 207
Homeland or Death, 159, 188, 190–191, 200, 220, 229, 236, 245
Human Torch, 170, 179, 184
humor, 27, 142, 145, 149, 157, 187, 222
Humphrey, Caroline, 81, 232, 238–240
hunger, 38, 46, 72, 74, 83, 99, 102, 104, 106, 142–143, 181–182
Ibrahimov, Veli, 36, 70
imagery, 11, 15, 21–22, 25–26, 28, 74, 81–82, 125–128, 130, 134, 177
breaking history into images, 125–126
dialectical imagery, 126–127
distopic and utopic imagery, 127–130
mythic imagery, 82
imaginative labor, 131–132, 177
immortality, 170, 193
inflation, 9, 42, 210–211
initiativniki, 138, 150, 155
inorodtsi (“others”), 59
International Labor Organization (ILO), 233
interrogation, 11, 62, 139, 144, 149–150, 156–159
International Organization for Migration (IOM), 42–43
see also Muslim Committees
Jews, 30, 57, 64, 69–71, 77, 161, 224
Jung, Karl, 81
Kadiev, Rolan, 141
Khalilov, Mustafa, 140–141, 156, 160, 212
Khan Sultan, Amet, 53–54
Khruzhchev, Nikita, 6, 37–38, 140
Kirmili, Sirri Hakan, 201
Kitab al-haraj, 203–204
Koch, Erich, 58
korenizatsiia (nativization), 54
Kosterin, Aleksei, 41
Kovalyov, Sergey, 146
Kozlov, Ivan, 60
Kudusov, Eric, 30–31
Kun, Bela, 36, 55
Kurultai (Parliament), 65, 130, 141, 165, 167
labor migration, 232, 240, 245
land and property rights, concepts of, 202–204
see also ownership
Langer, Lawrence, 114
Lazzerini, Edward, 32, 35, 201, 204, 207
Lemkin, Raphael, 91
Lenin, Vladimir, 39–40, 127, 137, 139, 145, 150, 160, 166, 208, 249
Leninism, as subversion, 160–162
Chirchik, 161
Mubarek, 161
orgnabor (organized selection), 162
Leutloff, Carolin, 14, 210, 228
liberation, 51, 69, 71–72, 87, 91, 208
Lifortovo prison, 156–157
Livitskii, G., 201
Mahmut, Musa, 21, 128, 167, 169–197, 212, 230
background, 171–172
as martyr, 170–171, 175–176, 178, 182, 188–189, 192–193
self-immolation, 172, 177, 184–185
Mahmut, Musa, accounts of death
first iteration, 172–179
second iteration, 179–181
third iteration, 181–188
fourth iteration, 188–191
fifth iteration, 191–194
Malkki, Liisa, 5–7, 88, 92, 113, 193
marginalization, 15, 46
Marino (city), 18, 212–215, 226
Markevich A.I., 201, 206
Markov, Evgenii, 27
memoria de sangre, 109–111, 133
memory, 4, 8–9, 13, 17, 20–21, 49–50, 109–125, 126, 133–134, 136–137, 142, 150–151, 156, 219, 224, 231, 245–247
beyond memory, 16–17, 124, 134, 230–232
circulation of, 10, 21, 109, 114, 124–126, 130, 134, 179
control of, 85
passed between generations, 10, 16–18, 20, 72, 79–81, 83, 90, 106–107, 113–116, 121, 126, 128, 130, 157, 188, 231
politics of, 4, 84–87, 107, 219
postmemory, 17, 73, 81, 83–84, 90, 103–104, 109, 119, 118, 121, 126, 222, 231
private remembrances, 87
public memory, 20, 49–50, 68–73
selective recounting, 115–116
styles of remembering, 114–117
see also counter-memory
Merjani, Shihabeddin, 35
Milli Firka, 36, 56, 58
mirzas, 203–204, 207
Mokrousov, A.V., 66
mullahs, 58, 183, 202, 204
Muslim Committees, 58–59, 60–61, 64, 72
myth of return, 5
mythmaking, 21
Nahaylo, Bohdan, 140
national identity, 125, 137, 199, 208
nationalist sentiment, 163
nationalities policy, 39, 141, 160
negative evidence, 85–86
Nekrich, Alexander, 55–59
NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Interior Affairs), 37–38, 56, 76, 79–80, 89, 93–94, 100–102
see also KGB
Nogai (Tatars), 27, 32, 205
Norris, Pippa, 148
Novick, Peter, 70–71
oblasy, 86, 104, 137, 149, 151, 161, 171, 208
OKND (Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement), 141, 164
OMON (Special Forces), 222–223, 238
oral narratives, 7, 80
orientalism, 25–26
OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), 45, 227, 234
Osmanov, Yuri, 141
ownership, 227–229
communal ownership, 203
Özenbaşlı, Ahmet, 201
Palestinians, 5, 70, 85, 189
parental narrative, 74, 83–84, 103, 133, 231
Perelli, Carina, 109–111
petitions, 14, 26, 77, 80, 84, 90, 112–113, 139–140, 146, 214–215
Poliakov, Vladimir, 53, 237
Ponsonby (Lord), 234
post-Soviet Crimean mafia, 19, 166, 195, 217, 232, 235–240, 247
postwar, 14, 26, 60, 71, 75, 105, 125, 228
Potemkin, Grigorii, 203
poverty, 46–47, 120, 206, 226
Pravda, 68, 85
privatization, 16, 50, 137, 200, 212, 219, 227–228
propaganda, 58, 73–74, 96, 112, 134, 142, 145, 159, 241
property
  property reclamation, 10, 45, 210, 222
  property restitution, 14, 210
  property rights, 22, 202, 239
  seizure of, 199, 209, 211
propiska, 41, 45, 164, 172, 183, 187, 212, 222
racialism, 26
recollection
  see memory
reform, 33, 35, 151, 210–211, 234, 240
refugee, 5–6, 45, 71, 92, 110, 220
putting down stakes, 214–216
seizing land, 209–211
squatting, 212–214
resistance, 60, 86, 105, 138–139, 145, 159, 161, 164, 212, 221, 230, 237
reunification, 34
reunions, 101–103
Rosenberg, James, 58, 70
Rousseau, Henry, 5, 28
RUKH (Ukrainian Popular Movement in Support of Perestroika), 76
Russian Empire, 32–33, 35, 205, 229
Russian influence, 30
Russian Revolution, 47
Said, Edward, 25, 113, 126
Sakharov, Andrei, 41, 146
samizdat (self-published literature), 139–140, 146, 171, 183, 191–192
Scharz, Solomon, 70
Scythians, 26, 31–32, 137
searches and seizures, 146–149
Sekerinski, S.A., 30
self-defense battalions, 57–58, 60, 66
self-immolation, 8, 14, 21–22, 172, 177, 184–185, 199, 221, 229–230, 247
sentimental scaffolding, 144, 241–245
settlement patterns, 44, 219
Sevdiar, Memet, 30, 137
Seytmuratova, Ayse, 142–144, 146–153, 155–159, 166, 171, 188, 196
sharia, 83, 106, 122, 175, 202–203
Sheik-Zade, Ismet, 126–127
Shemi-Zade, Vildan, 241–242
Simferopol (city), 8–9, 59, 62, 64, 75, 90, 93, 127, 143, 155, 162, 165, 169, 194, 204, 211–216, 218, 236
Skidmore, Monique, 159
Slavs, 20, 26, 49, 58, 75, 77, 201, 235, 239
social norms, 203, 215
social status, leveling of, 92
sotinas, 205
Sovietization, 55
Sovnarkom (Soviet Committee on Nationalities), 36, 55
“special settlements,” 38–39, 80, 98, 100–101, 115, 209
spetspereselentsy, 100
squatting, 8–9, 14, 16, 22, 27, 44, 164, 200, 212–214, 215, 216–219, 221, 229
compact settlements, 42, 44, 211, 212, 228
urban squatting, 212, 216
Stalin, Joseph, 3–4, 10, 20, 33, 37–38, 41, 47, 56, 60, 63, 76, 79, 95–97, 100, 140, 154, 208, 236
Steedman, Carolyn, 120
stereotypes, 25, 42, 65, 239
Stoler, Ann Laura, 26, 113
sürgün
see exile
TASS announcement, 160, 162–163, 166
Tatarization, 55
repression by Soviets as “bourgeois nationalist,” 4, 55–56
Tatars of the Crimea (Allworth), 84, 151–152
Taussig, Michael, 125–126, 136, 155, 159
terror, 55, 153–155, 159, 167
Thompson, Paul, 113
tolerance, 40, 137
Torch Over Crimea, 171, 185–186, 191–192, 194
see also Mahmut, Musa
train journey, 92, 94, 96
traitors, 7, 25, 29, 45, 47, 49–50, 52, 66, 76, 96, 122, 143, 158, 167, 173, 239
trauma, 5, 10, 70, 84, 90, 104, 106, 109–110, 113, 128, 133, 192, 205, 236
truth, 73, 80, 84, 106, 125, 143, 163, 175, 192
Tsekov, Sergei, 91–92
Turco-Soviet Treaty, 41
Turkey, 3, 5, 34, 40–41, 57, 60, 202, 240
Turner, Victor, 93
UN (United Nations), 91, 210
UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 233
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), 45, 227
USSR, 37, 41, 84–85, 143–144, 152, 157, 164
exile of Crimean Tatars, 37–39
Soviet account, 38, 52
Soviet census, 29, 86
Soviet collapse, 42, 138, 208, 211, 227, 244
soviet influence, 40
soviet interpretation, formative influences on, 59–60
USSR—continued
  Soviet power, 36, 64, 86, 135, 153–155, 158, 241
  Soviet thinking, 126–127
van Gennup, Arnold, 92
Veimarn, E.V., 30
verbovka, 162
Verkhovna Rada, 46, 165, 245
Vichy Period, 5, 28
Voice of Crimea (Golos Kryma), 7, 71–73, 77
Wolff, Larry, 26–27
World Bank, 44–45
World War II, 3, 5, 10, 37, 39, 49, 70, 75, 85–86, 137, 146, 163, 229
Yakubov, Nuri, 131–133
Yalta (city), 26, 44, 211–212, 215, 219–221
and squatting, 221–223
Ymerov, Amza, 142–143, 145, 154, 215
Zaleskoie settlement, 212
Zemskov, N., 38, 80, 85, 95
Zetter, Roger, 5–6, 81
Zhek Department (housing), 217, 219
Zivkovic, Marko, 70–71