

HISTORY
of the
UKRAINE



PROF. D. DOROSHENKO

*З бібліотеки
Анни Фігус-Ралько,
Вінніпег, Канада.*

History of the Ukraine

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З бібліотеки
АННИ ФІГУС-ФАЛЬ
Вінніпег, Канада.

INTRODUCTION

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There is no national group among the Slavic peoples so little known to the English-speaking world as the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian people at the present time are being moved by that powerful spirit of nationalism which has so continuously transformed political society, particularly since the middle of the Nineteenth century. It is therefore a special satisfaction to be able to introduce to the English world a History of the Ukraine written by one of the foremost Ukrainian historians.

Demeter Doroshenko was born in 1882. His ancestors belonged to the old Cossack-nobility of the province of Chernigov and played a distinguished part in Ukrainian history. Having in mind an academic career the author studied history and philology in the Universities of Warsaw, St. Petersburg (Leningrad), and Kiev. Because of the anti-Ukrainian attitude of the Czarist government Dr. Doroshenko was refused appointment to the faculty of the University of Kiev. He, therefore, devoted himself to literary and newspaper work. In 1903 he became an active member of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, and later identified himself with the Radical Democratic Party.

At the beginning of the War in 1914 Dr. Doroshenko was appointed a representative on the Board of the All-Russian Union of Cities and was given the task of administering the Relief Department of that part of Galicia and Bukovina which was occupied by the Russian army and was suffering from the devastation of war. At this time he was in close contact with the leaders of the opposition in the Russian Duma, notably with Kerensky and Miliukov. The Revolution of 1917 brought him at once into the forefront of the Ukrainian national movement which resulted first in autonomy for the Ukraine and then in independence. In rapid succession he was appointed Vice-Governor of Kiev province, Governor-General of the occupied area of Galicia and Bukovina, and Governor

of the Province of Chernigov. In agreement with the provisional Government of Russia he undertook to organize the first administration of the Autonomous Ukraine in 1917. In 1918 he became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Government of the Independent Ukraine under Hetman P. Skoropadsky.

With the political downfall of the Independent Ukraine the author engaged himself in academic work. He became Professor of History in the Ukrainian University of Kamenets-Podolsky. In 1922 he migrated to Czechoslovakia and was appointed a member of the faculty in the Ukrainian University which had been established in Prague. In 1926 he was attached to the Czech University of Karl IV. From 1926 to 1931 he was director of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin. In 1936 he became Professor of Church (Greek-Orthodox) History in the Joseph Pilsudsky University of Warsaw.

Dr. Doroshenko has written extensively for European publications, German, French, English, Swedish, Czech, Polish, Serbian, and others. His most important books include the following: Index of Ukrainian Literature (in Russian) St. Petersburg, 1904; The Slavic World (in Ukrainian) 3 vol. Berlin, 1922; Outline of Ukrainian Historiography (in Ukrainian) Prague, 1923; The Ukraine in Western European Literature in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (in German) Berlin, 1927; A History of the Ukraine, 1917-1923 (in Ukrainian) 2 vol.; Uzhorod, 1930-32; and A History of the Ukraine (in Ukrainian) 2 vol., Warsaw, 1932-34. The last-named is the work now presented in abridged form in this book.

It can readily be seen from this brief outline of Dr. Doroshenko's career how admirably equipped he is to interpret Ukrainian history from the standpoint of Ukrainian nationalism since his long academic training has been enriched through personal experience in the practical field of politics during a most critical period. The author is interested not only in the political aspect of history but he also writes movingly concerning social conditions.

The History here presented is an abridgement of two volumes. In condensing the work Madame Keller has faithfully maintained the general narrative but has omitted those sections dealing chiefly with historiography, which though of great interest to the historian and specialist have little appeal to the average student. It is assumed that the ordinary reader wishes to know where the Ukraine is, what is the origin of the people and of the name, and what is the historical state tradition which has come down to the present, to blossom forth in the contemporary national movement.

Russian historians have always presented Ukrainian history as merely a regional history subsidiary to their own. Polish writers have treated Ukrainian history as simply particularist frontier developments in connection with their own state evolution. Both Russian and Polish publicists have tended to portray modern Ukrainian nationalism as an artificial movement promoted by ambitious Ukrainian intellectuals and supported by outside intriguing powers. They deny to this movement deep roots of tradition which feed the present nationalist manifestations with the vital sap of historical consciousness. This Russian and Polish attitude of exclusiveness can no longer successfully be maintained in the light of recent historiography. The continuity of the Ukrainian state tradition is the theme ably supported by Dr. Doroshenko. In the nature of things some of the material must be controversial but the fairness and moderation of the author is a fine tribute to his objectivity. His history is a survey of the process of the political, social, economic and cultural development of the Ukrainian people from their beginnings to the present day.

One of the remarkable facts concerning the Ukrainians is that, broadly speaking, they occupy essentially the same territory now that they did when they first appear in history. At present the territory inhabited by the Ukrainians is divided politically among four states, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), Poland, Rumania and Hungary. This vast territory extending

from the western slopes of the Carpathian Mountains to the foot of the northern Caucasus, from the marshes of Pinsk in the basin of the river Pripet in the north to the shores of the Black Sea in the south, is enclosed between 20.5° and 45° longitude east and 44° and 53° latitude north, and comprises about 800,000 square kilometres. The rich black soil of this vast territory renders it one of the most fertile lands in Europe. As such it was viewed with envious eyes by neighboring states and even by peoples more remote. The absence, for the most part, of easily defended geographical boundaries accentuated the problem of defence.

Politically by far the most important part of Ukrainian territory is within the so-called Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic which belongs to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Ukrainian territories in Poland are Eastern Galicia, Volynia, and the southern parts of Kholm and Polissia. In Rumania Ukrainians inhabit the northern territory of Bukovina and Bessarabia while in Hungary they occupy the north-east corner which was formerly known as Ruthenia, Pidkarpatska Rus or Carpathian Ukraine.

According to the statistical data of 1931 the population of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was 26,796,000, with some seven million Ukrainians living elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. In Poland there are 6,257,000 Ukrainians; in Rumania, 1,100,000; in Hungary (in 1931 CzechoSlovakia) 570,000. The total number of Ukrainians in Europe amount to thirty-six million. Ukrainian colonization began in Siberia and in the basin of the Amur and Assuri rivers about the middle of the Nineteenth century. At the end of the century large numbers began to emigrate to the United States, Canada, Brazil, and the Argentine. It is estimated that 1,254,000 Ukrainians live in Asia; about 700,000 in the United States; around 300,000 in Canada; 130,000 in South America; and 240,000 in other countries. The number of Ukrainians in the world was therefore about thirty-nine million in 1931. Allowing for the increase since then one may

reckon without exaggeration the present number as being over forty million.

The terms "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian" are those now accepted to apply to the area inhabited by Ukrainian-speaking people. Other names, official and popular, have been used in past times. The decision to accept "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian" has been made by the people themselves, who alone have the right to make it. In applying the terms "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian" to past periods the same practice is followed as in any other history where the modern national designation is used roughly to apply to territories in times when actually other administrative or official designations were employed in whole or in part. A brief account of the historic designations may serve to dissipate some confusion.

The oldest historic name for Ukrainian territory was "Rus". It is more than probable that it originated with the Scandinavian vikings, possibly as the name of one of the tribes of Northmen who assisted in the formation of the Kievan State. At first it was applied exclusively to the region about Kiev, the nucleus of the subsequent large Kievan State. By the middle of the Eleventh century the name had been extended to include the whole of Eastern Europe. By the Thirteenth century the designation "Rus" had acquired a political significance, meaning "belonging to the state," and had spread to the north-east where a new Slavic group—the present Russian, Great Russian, or Muscovite group—was in the process of formation. Instead of taking a new name this emerging group adopted the general name "Rus".

The Ukrainians retained the historic name "Rus" when they became part of the Lithuanian and Polish States. Although the Muscovite princes, who united under their sway all "Great Russian" territory had some right to call their state "Rus" since they were descended from Rurik, the Scandinavian prince who founded the Kievan State, their neighbors, the Ukrainians, Poles and Lithuanians, as well as western Europeans, usually called the country Muscovy and the inhabitants Muscovites. In the Seven-

teenth century the compound name "Rus-Ukraine" was used to denote the present Ukraine.

The name "Ukraine" is of considerable age. It is first used in the Kievan Chronicle of 1187. The name derives from the word "krai" or "kraina" meaning region, country and also border. It was probably employed to denote a region dividing the Christian or civilized world from the barbarian and pagan, and later, the Moham-medan world. At least this is the explanation of the name given by a Polish historian of the Seventeenth century who wished to emphasize the borderland character of the Ukraine which at that time was part of Poland. The name "Ukraine" was first popularly employed in the Sev-enteenth century at which time it was freely employed in Cossack epics, such as the "Dumy" and in popular songs. Soon it was adopted by the educated classes often joined with "Rus" as "Ukraina-Rus" or "Rus-Ukraina". It then appeared in historical documents, diplomatic des-patches, literature, and history. Finally it appears on contemporary maps. It was then adopted by Poles, Mus-covites and western Europeans.

After the union of the Ukraine with Muscovy in 1654 a new political designation was introduced for the Uk-rainian territory and people. This was "Little Russia" (Malaia Rossia or Malorossia). The Muscovite Czars having become over-lords of the Ukraine adopted the high-sounding title "Czar of the Great and Little Russias," though in fact it should have been "New and Old Russia" or "Muscovy and the Ukraine." In introducing the name of "Little Russia" for the Ukraine the Muscovite states-men revived the practice of the Patriarch of Constantino-ple who in the Fourteenth century began to apply the name "micra Rosia", or in Latin "Rossia Minor", to the old Rus territory about Kiev. This territory had been thus differentiated from that of the Great Russians to which was applied the term "Rossia Magna". This distinction was similar to that in ancient history when the term "Magna Graecia" was applied to the Greek colony of South Italy which developed its own political life dis-

tinct from the older Greek land in the Balkans called Graecia Minor.

The Russian Government having adopted the name of Little Russia (Malaja Rossia) as the official designation for the Ukraine went so far as to prohibit in the Nineteenth century the use of the names "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian". At times when even the name Little Russia seemed to have rather a separatist suggestion the geographical designations of "Yougo-Russia" and "Yougo-Russian" (Yougo means south) were used to denote the former Cossack Ukraine, while Volynia, Podolia, Kholm and Polissia were known under the official names of "Yougo - Zapadnyi - krai" or "Zapadno - Russki - krai" (South-west or West Russian region). These artificial names came into use among Russians but were never accepted by the Ukrainians, who continued to term the land "Ukraine" and themselves "Ukrainians", when not forbidden by the censorship. The national revival of the Nineteenth century definitely fixed the name "Ukraine" to all the territories populated by Ukrainians in Russia and Austria, and termed the population "Ukrainians". They took this name with them as emigrants to Asia and America. In Galicia and Carpathian Rus which were never under Russian rule the historic names of "Rus" and "Ruski" continued to be used much longer. But even these regions in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries adopted the terms "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian" to express the feeling of national unity and community of aspiration.

Prior to the War of 1914 the official name for Ukrainians in Austria was "Ruthenian". This term was derived from mediaeval Latin. It was applied to the Kievan Princedom and was also used by the Galician and Volynian kings. The term differed from the designation "Rossia" which was derived from the Greek of the Patriarchs of Constantinople. Hence "Russia" and "Russian" designated modern Russia after the foundation of the Empire by Peter 1, while "Ruthenia" and "Ruthenian" continued as a Latin name in the area acquired by Austria through the partition of Poland.

Thus the Russians appropriated the old historic name of "Rus" abandoned by its original bearers who adopted the term "Ukrainian" to express their distinctive nationality.

The dawn of Ukrainian history is marked by the existence of East Slavic tribes situated between the Carpathian mountains and the Don river north of the Black Sea, with the Dnieper river constituting the central geographical artery. The presence of these tribes is noted by various classical writers. In the Ninth century under the dynamic leadership of Viking or Scandinavian adventurers the Slavic tribes were organized into a state with its capital Kiev. This state was brought into contact with the Eastern Roman Empire, particularly its capital, Constantinople. From here this Slavic state received the elements of a more advanced culture, including Christianity. The Kiev state under its ruling Scandinavian dynasty, which was soon absorbed in the Slavic sea, enjoyed several centuries of flourishing civilization, though always it had to fight to maintain itself against the inroads of nomadic tribes. This was the first Ukrainian state.

In this period the ruling house became divided into several branches and the country itself was broken up into principalities. A number of principalities emerged in the north in the region of the Upper Volga. Among these was the principality of Moscow. The city was established in 1147 about three hundred years after the founding of Kiev. The principality of Moscow was later to swallow the surrounding principalities and finally to emerge as the nucleus of the Russian Empire of modern times. In Russian history the Kiev area which was incorporated into the Russian Empire less than three hundred years ago was regarded simply as a fragment of the first "Russian" state which was recovered by the patriotic zeal of Russian czars. The fact is, as Professor Doroshenko indicates, the historic tradition centering in Kiev diverges from that centering in Moscow. Differences in geographical conditions, in ethnic mixture, and in political circumstances produced distinctive developments.

The historic roads diverge rapidly after the invasion of the Mongols in the Thirteenth century. The Ukrainian tradition is developed further in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth centuries in the so-called Galician-Volynian Kingdom in the west with its centre in Halich on the Dniester river. The Kiev area and other Ukrainian principalities passed under the Lithuanian state where they continued to maintain their essential institutions. The rapid growth of the Lithuanian state was due to vigorous rulers who sought to withstand the conquests undertaken by German knights who had gained a foothold in the East Baltic in the Thirteenth century. While this large state in East Europe in the Thirteenth to the Fifteenth century had a Lithuanian dynasty at its head, nine-tenths of the population were Slavic and a wide latitude was given to the exercise of local rights and customs. This long period still further differentiated the Ukrainian and Great Russian tradition.

The necessity of further resistance to the Germans in the East Baltic region tended to draw Lithuania and Poland together. Dynastic ambitions also played a part. In 1386 the ruling houses of these two countries were united. A loose political union in which each state had its own administration culminated in an organic union in 1569 which brought all Ukrainian lands within Poland. For Poland it was a time of comparative economic prosperity. There was a growing demand in Western Europe for the agricultural products of Poland. This brought about an extension of settlement in the rich steppe lands of the Ukraine. It also brought about an accentuation of the tendency toward the rise of a landed gentry and the reduction of the peasantry to serfdom.

On the land south of Kiev the area of occupation of the steppes was pushed forward by Ukrainian groups who were typical frontiersmen. They were fighters and raiders, their traditional enemy, the Tatars, being still in possession of the Crimea and constituting a menace to the entire surrounding area. These frontiersmen lived partly by hunting and fishing. At times they engaged in

farming. Thus developed the famous Cossack Ukrainians. The Polish Government attempted to organize and control them as border guards but they were not easily controlled by a distant authority. Their numbers were constantly recruited by peasants and adventurers fleeing from the increasingly harsh social conditions on the estates of Poland. Behind the protective outpost of Cossacks the Ukrainian peasants cultivated the rich black soil which blossomed forth under their care. Kiev again flourished and became a lively cultural centre.

At the same time an attempt was being made to bring the Greek-Orthodox Church under the jurisdiction of Rome. A Uniate Greek-Catholic Church had been established in 1596. It met with considerable success in the Ukrainian areas of Galicia and Volynia and was tolerated by the Polish king. In distant Kiev however the Orthodox followers resented the attempt to suppress or transform their Church and looked upon the movement as essentially a movement toward Polonization. The Orthodox Church in the Ukraine began to look to the Cossacks as the defenders of their organization and faith.

The dissatisfaction of the Cossacks with the treatment accorded them by the Polish Government, the resentment of the Ukrainian peasants against Polish landlords, and the religious suspicion directed against Roman Catholic Poland combined to produce a number of uprisings against Polish authorities in the beginning of the Seventeenth century. These culminated in a fierce and widespread revolt in 1648 under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky. Beginning with a Cossack revolt it rapidly assumed the proportions of a national movement in which the common people saw in the efforts of Bohdan Khmelnitsky an attempt to re-establish the old Ukrainian Kingdom of Kiev. The setting up of local forms of government proceeded swiftly.

Professor Doroshenko follows the varying fortunes of this revolt and notes many cross-currents which served to confuse the issues. He rightly emphasizes the tremendous significance of the decision to call upon the aid of

Moscow in the struggle against Poland. The Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654 gave Moscow certain ambiguous rights over the Ukraine. This Treaty continued the long struggle between Poland and Russia, the possession of Ukrainian lands being now a definite issue. The struggle ended in 1795 in complete Polish disintegration and an almost complete victory for Moscow as far as Ukrainian territory was concerned.

The Ukrainian movement for independence was at its height in the Seventeenth century, particularly between the years 1648 and 1676. Its successes did not last. In spite of political defeat, however, the struggle left enduring popular memories which served to perpetuate the state tradition and feed the revived national consciousness in the Nineteenth century.

Even when the Ukraine passed under the overlordship of Russia it required more than a century of consistent effort on the part of the latter to eliminate all forms of self-government and local rights which had been established in the Cossack period and previously. In the early Eighteenth century Peter the Great narrowly escaped disaster at the hands of the Ukrainian Hetman, Mazepa, who was allied with the powerful Swedish king, Charles XII. Not until 1785 in the reign of Catherine II were the political institutions of the Ukraine entirely assimilated to those of Imperial Russia. In the meantime a social transformation had taken place. The Ukrainian peasantry were steadily reduced to serfdom, and finally in 1783 they were deprived of the last vestige of their freedom, the right to move from one estate to another. A new aristocracy, Russian and Russian-Ukrainian, constituted the only privileged class.

Imperialist Russia, based on a system of political absolutism, dominated East Europe and played an increasingly important part in the international life of Europe generally. At the very time, however, when absolutism and aristocracy appeared nearly everywhere in Europe in the ascendancy the new radical ideas of modern nationalism and democracy were germinating. The French Revolu-

tion beginning in 1789 ushered in the new age of politics. While the French Revolution was followed by Napoleonic despotism and the reaction of 1815, the new ideas continued to eat with acid persistence into the old political structures.

Hardly had the last remnants of freedom in the Ukraine been swept away when the first beginnings of a national renaissance appeared. Poets and writers heralded the new dawn. Dr. Doroshenko traces the rise of the new nationalism in the Ukraine. When it was suppressed in Russia the movement was carried on in Galicia, that part of the Ukraine which the Hapsburgs of Austria had taken in the first partition of Poland in 1772. After the Russian Revolution of 1905 the Ukrainian national movement began to develop more actively and openly in the Ukraine under Russia. Before the forces could be fully organized and co-ordinated there came the War of 1914.

The War was particularly tragic for the Ukrainian people who found themselves divided in opposing Imperialistic camps and compelled to fight for causes not their own. Suddenly and dramatically the situation was changed. The collapse of Russia in 1917 resulted in the formation of an independent Ukrainian Republic there, while the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 was followed by the establishment of a West Ukrainian Republic. Fighting desperately to maintain themselves these two Republics united in January, 1919. They were compelled to fight against Bolshevists, pro-Czarist forces (White Russian Armies), Poles, Rumanians, and they were even further handicapped by typhus and the effect of Allied intervention. It is little wonder that they fought a losing battle. The Bolshevists were finally victorious in the East Ukraine where a Socialist Soviet Republic was set up and united with the other Soviet Republics. In the west Poland over-ran East Galicia. It had been the intention of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to give this latter area the right of self-determination, setting up an autonomous state. Poland, however,

wished to include this area in her kingdom, and having occupied it she continued to hold it. In 1923 the Council of Ambassadors, the successor to the Paris Peace Conference, ratified Poland's occupation on the understanding that autonomy would be granted to the territory. Ruthenia, separated from Hungary, was incorporated in the newly-established CzechoSlovak state. Here also autonomy was promised, a promise not realized till the September crisis of 1938. After a few short months of hopeful activity as a self-governing unit the region, which had changed its name to Carpatho-Ukraine, was over-run in March, 1939, by the Hungarian army and once more united with the Hungarian state. Late in 1918 the Rumanian army occupied the Ukrainian part of Bukovina which previously had proclaimed its union with the West Ukrainian Republic.

Thus Ukrainian nationalist hopes have been frustrated in every direction. National movements, however, are not lightly dissipated when they are rooted in historical tradition, and when the people concerned are subjected to continuous humiliation and persecution. It may be comforting to dismiss troublesome questions from one's mind and rationalize them into non-existence, but problems of nationalism have a way of appearing spectre-like at all international crises. As a contribution to the understanding of the present Ukrainian question this History is particularly welcome. It is, however, more than a contribution to contemporary politics; it is an interesting human record.

G. W. SIMPSON,
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CHAPTER I

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(1) Geography of the Ukraine. (2) The Prehistoric Period. (3) Greek Colonies on the Shores of Black Sea. (4) The Nomads. (5) Settlement of Slavic Tribes in Eastern Europe. (6) Origin of the Ukrainian State. (7) Scandinavians and Their Part in the Building Up of the Ukrainian State.

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1. Geography of the Ukraine.

The influence of geography on the origins and development of group life is now regarded by historians as a proper starting point in the investigation of the history of any national group. The characteristics of the territory on which the ancestors of the Ukrainians originally settled, and on which the Ukrainians continued to live, are distinctive. Geographical factors, therefore, exerted a continuing influence on their history.

The Ukrainians are autochthonous, that is to say, they still inhabit the same territory on which their ancestors settled when first they appeared in Eastern Europe. Very little of the territory originally inhabited has been yielded to strangers and the new territories have all been acquired by colonizing uninhabited areas from which it was not necessary to drive anyone away. Thus the Ukrainian people were not aggressors but peaceful colonizers. At present the Ukrainian ethnographical limits almost coincide with geographical frontiers. In the west it includes part of the Carpathian mountains; in the north it follows more or less the course of the rivers Pripet, Desna and Seim; in the south-west it follows the river Pruth down to the mouth of the Danube; on the south it is bounded by the Black Sea; in the south-east it reaches the Caucasus in the basin of the river Kuban; but in the east it loses itself among the mixed population of the Don and Voronezh provinces.

It could be said in general that the whole geographical position of the Ukraine is determined by the Black Sea

which serves as a geographical, political and economic basis to the Ukrainian territory. All the Ukrainian rivers flow into the Black Sea; only one small part of the Ukrainian territory in the north-west belongs through the rivers San and Western Bug to the northern Baltic slope.

The system of rivers on the Ukrainian territory has had an enormous influence on the life of the population, on the formation of the Ukrainian groups and on the emergence of the Ukrainian State. The Dnieper is the chief artery of the Ukraine. Its waters are collected from wide areas and through its tributaries it communicates with the basins of the Western Dvina, Western Bug, Nieman, Oka and Donets. The middle region of the Dnieper was, as we shall see, the original home of the Ukrainian people. The river Dniester was also very important, being the direct route from the South-west Ukrainian lands to the Black Sea. It was along the rivers which formed the principal highways of trade that the population concentrated. It was on the rivers that the first trading centres or towns grew up. Those who settled far from the rivers lived by growing grain and exploiting the forests, but they still gravitated to the rivers where they found a market for their products. By determining the economic life of the population the river region also constituted a natural unit for political organization. The political divisions of the territory followed closely the basins of the principal rivers, as the earliest Chronicles clearly show, by indicating the rivers along which each of the tribes had settled. The inland position of the Black Sea, however, and dependence on the political power that controlled the straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, had unfavorable consequences for the ultimate development of the Ukrainian people by making their trade dependent first on the Byzantine rulers and later on the Turks.

Still more unfavorable was the close vicinity in the south-east of the open steppe that from time immemorial served as a direct route for the Asiatic hordes in their invasion to the West.

In connection with its geological structure, which will not be elaborated here, the territory of the Ukraine is divided, according to the nature of its soil, into two principal zones, the forest in the north and the steppe in the south. The one gradually merges into the other. The soil of the forest zone is not fertile and is less adapted to agriculture though very advantageous to all forms of forestry. The steppe, on the contrary, has rich black soil, the best in Europe; but, open to invasion from the East, it had not the peaceful conditions necessary to the development of agriculture. Almost the whole of Ukrainian history consists of the struggles for possession of the steppe. Shut out in the west by the Carpathian mountains and the neighborhood of organized nations, the expansion of the Ukrainian people was directed towards the east and south-east. But their colonizing here was hindered by the movements of nomadic hordes coming from Asia, and very often the Ukrainians had to abandon for long periods the cultivated territory in the steppe and seek refuge in more protected areas in the forest zone. It was only at the end of the Eighteenth century that these struggles for the steppe came to an end and the Ukrainian plough was able to begin a peaceful cultivation of the rich and fertile lands north of the Black Sea.

This fight of the Ukrainian plough and Ukrainian sword with nomadic Asiatic weapons for possession of the steppe in order to introduce agriculture, lasted for centuries. It passed through all stages of retreat and advance. The Ukrainian historians see in this continuous struggle to maintain agricultural society against Asiatic nomadism one of the leading features of Ukrainian history. It constituted a service rendered by the Ukrainian people to European civilization.

2. The Prehistoric Period.

The ancestors of the present Ukrainians settled on a territory that already possessed a long history. Traces of human civilization have been found here dating from early prehistoric times, that is, from the Palaeolithic or

Old Stone Age. Sites of settlements of later Palaeolithic men with implements made of flint chips and mammoths' tusks and bones, often very artistically ornamented, have been found in several places. The sites which have been most thoroughly investigated are those of Kiev, of Mizen on the Desna near Novgorod Sieversk, of Hontsi on the Sula, in the province of Poltava, of Krivy Rih on the Dnieper. Men of the Neolithic, or New Stone age left many traces found everywhere in the Ukraine. Especially important finds were made about Kiev and along the banks of the Dnieper, and to the west as far as the Carpathian mountains and the lower Danube. This period is especially distinguished by painted pottery consisting of vessels variously shaped. Sometimes they were elaborate in design and richly decorated with the spiral and the meander pattern. This pottery is known in archaeology as Ukrainian or Tripilla type from the place Tripilla on the middle Dnieper where it was mostly found.

Traces of burials of this period show that the cult of the dead was very much developed. On the steppe, from Bessarabia to the Kuban, skeletons are found which have been buried in a crouched position, often colored with red ochre. In south Volynia and in Podolia burials took place on the surface and a barrow was raised over the dead. In Galicia stone sarcophagi were used. Beside the skeleton stone implements, weapons and pottery were found in the tombs. Later and possibly also, to some extent, at the same time, there was the custom of burning the dead. Urns with ashes were found in burial places on the Pripet in Polissia and Volynia and in the basin of the Donets.

The Neolithic age was succeeded by the period of metal implements and weapons. Copper axes and other objects in copper were found in tombs. But most of the finds are from the Bronze age. Later, silver and iron appeared. From the oldest times we find on the Ukrainian territory cross currents of different cultural influences. The Danube civilization left samples of poly-

chromic pottery while the Caucasian influence is shown in metal objects, weapons, and personal adornments.

The first known group of people on the territory now called the Ukraine occupied it at the beginning of the first millennium B.C. These were the Cimmerian people, probably of Thracian origin. Traces of them are found in the Ukraine in geographical names such as the Cimmerian Bosphorus, a name used by Greek historians for the straits of Kerch, and also in several important archaeological finds. About the Seventh century B.C. they were driven out by the Scythians, probably a people of Iranian origin. These uncouth nomadic Scythians soon assimilated the civilization of Greek origin they found on the shores of the Black Sea while adding to it Iranian and Caucasian elements. Herodotus, a Greek historian of the Fifth century B.C., left us considerable information about the Scyths. Tombs of Scythian kings along the banks of the Dnieper and on the shores of the Black Sea have yielded unique treasures in wealth of silver vases, and gold personal ornaments decorated with scenes of the daily life of the Scythians representing the best Greek workmanship.

3. Greek Colonies on the Shores of the Black Sea.

In the Eight and Seventh centuries B.C. there had begun the Greek colonization of the shores of the Black Sea. It was Miletus, a rich Ionian colony in Asia Minor, that was first to send colonists. Athens followed the lead. Previous to colonization Greek sea-farers visited the Black Sea and carried on a lively trade with the northern shores, chiefly in dried fish, though also in metals, gold and iron. Ancient legends of the Argonauts, as well as parts of the Odyssey, witness to these early adventurous journeys. Numerous trading expeditions of the Greeks before the permanent colonies were founded presuppose the existence of a local population with whom they traded and among whom the Greek colonists settled. The chief Greek colonies on the north coast of the Black Sea were:

Tyras, at the mouth of the Dniester; Olbia at the mouth of Dnieper and Boh; Chersonesus and Theodosia in the Crimea; Panticapaeum on the straits of the Cimmerian Bosphorus, the present-day Kerch. This Greek colony became subsequently the capital of the rich and powerful States of mixed Greek and barbarian population. Further to the east were colonies such as Tanais at the mouth of the Don, Phanagoria, and others less important. The chief objects of Greek export were: slaves, cattle and hides, furs, honey, bees' wax, and salted and dried fish. They imported: woven material, wine, oil, jewelry, artistic pottery, and other objects of cultured life. The Greek colonists not only traded with the local population but founded important industries, cultivated the soil, and introduced the grape vine and different cereals. Life in these colonies in the vicinity of warlike nomads was anything but peaceful. At the end of the Second century B.C. begins the slow downfall of the Greek colonies pressed by the swarms of new-comers, nomadic tribes pouring from Asia. It is from the Greeks that we possess the earliest information about the land and the population of the South Ukraine.

4. The Nomads.

About the Fourth century B.C. the Scythians were superseded by the Sarmatians, a nomadic and warlike people, undoubtedly also of Iranian origin. They left about 600 topographical names in the South Ukraine as was proved by Professor Vasmer of Berlin. The Sarmatians were in their turn succeeded by the Alans, nomads, and also of Iranian origin. Like other nomadic tribes they did not build houses or till the land, but lived in wagons and possessed herds of cattle and many horses. They were probably not the only inhabitants of the country. There is reason to suppose that there was an older population from whom they took tribute.

Generally speaking during the first two centuries A.D. there lived in different places on the present Ukrainian

territory a number of people and tribes known to us only by the names recorded by Greek and Roman authors, and which according to different historians are supposed to be either Thracians, or Celts or Germans. It is, however, certain that Goths, a German tribe, came down in the Third century A.D. from their northern homes and settled between the Carpathians and the Black Sea. Being a warlike people they attacked the Roman provinces on the Danube. The Roman emperor Decius was killed in a battle against them in 251. Twenty years later the Romans were obliged to abandon to them Dacia, their province on the lower Danube (part of present-day Rumania). About the middle of the Fourth century the Goths were christianized. But in the same Fourth century began the advance from the East of the Huns, people of Turco-Finno-Mongolian origin. About 370 the Huns, after having destroyed the Alans, attacked the Ostgoths and forced them beyond the Danube. A small section of the Goths was separated and remained for many centuries in the hills of Crimea and in the Taman peninsula.

The Huns did not stay long in the Ukrainian steppes. In the Fifth century under their famous chief Attila, named the "scourge of God", they advanced on Western Europe. After many invasions and battles that led them as far to the West as present France, the Huns were defeated and disappeared as a group.

The Huns were succeeded in the Ukrainian steppes by new nomadic hordes of Turco-Finnish origin, the Bulgarians, and after them by the Avars. The Bulgarians appeared in Europe about the Fifth century. Part of them settled on the Volga and the other part went in the Sixth century westwards and settled on the Danube in the former Roman province of Moesia. The Avars traversed in their turn the Ukrainian steppes and invaded the plains of the middle Danube (present-day Hungary), from where they continued for a long time to attack Byzantium and other neighboring states.

5. Settlement of Slavic tribes in Eastern Europe.

From behind this cloudy kaleidoscope of different peoples that move across the steppes, there begins to emerge about the Sixth century the group of Slavic people, who are the direct ancestors of the Ukrainians.

From this short survey of the pre-Slavic population of the Ukraine, it is evident that this territory on which the Slavic tribes settled in the Sixth century, was a region of cross-currents of political and cultural influences between the East and the West, the North and the South; and that it was also the site of many strata of successive civilizations. This territory had all the possibilities of producing a rich civilization which ultimately could produce an amalgam of two different influences, Eastern and Western, developed on a Slavic basis. Owing, however, to the lack of natural geographical frontiers and the vicinity of constantly moving nomadic Asiatic peoples, the Ukrainians were not allowed to reach the climax of their development, their forces being absorbed in the struggle for sheer existence with the unsettled nomadic steppe.

Still it is a fact that the Ukrainian Kievan State, according to Rostovtsev, the well-known historian of the Eastern Roman Empire, inherited from its predecessors all the features characteristic of the states which grew up before them on this territory in the Classical Age and during the "Great Migration of the Peoples." The people of this state were noted for warlike and commercial character, their desire for the possession of the Black Sea, and their orientation towards the South and the East and not towards the North and the West. Like the civilization of the Cimmerians, of the Scyths, the Sarmatians and the Goths, the civilization of Kiev was a southern civilization penetrated by Eastern elements, an offspring of classical culture in that Greco-Oriental aspect which was characteristic of Byzantium.

The term "East" refers chiefly to Arabic and Persian influences. Concerning Byzantium we must keep in mind that it was at that time the most civilized country of

Europe and Western Asia. For a long time it was thought that the Byzantine civilization was only the rich and fossilized remains of a long dead civilization, a mere outward form without any inner life. But closer acquaintance with Byzantine history leads the historian such as Charles Diehl in his "*Histoire de l'empire byzantin*", to the conclusion that the time about 867-1081, when the Kievan State was subject to Byzantine influence, was not only the period of the greatest political power of Byzantium under the Macedonian dynasty, but also a Renaissance period of intellectual and artistic life.

It was at this period that the Ukrainian State in Kiev was mostly subject to the Byzantine influence. It was from this rich spring of civilization, at the height of its religious, literary and artistic revival, that the newly founded state imbibed and easily assimilated the elements of its culture, transforming and adapting them to its own conditions. Thus in the Eleventh century Kiev because of its high level of culture may be considered as one of the most centralized centres of contemporary Europe. This must be kept in mind as we begin to examine the origin of the Ukrainian state.

6. Origin of the Ukrainian State.

When did the Slavic people first appear in Europe? Where was their original home and when did the tribal division take place? These are the questions to which scholars do not give a uniform answer. However, the opinion prevails that the cradle of the Slavic race in Europe is to be sought on the upper and middle Dnieper, that is, in the country now occupied by the White Russians, which are thus the most autochthonous group of all the Slavs. From here the Slavic tribes dispersed in different directions: to the west, those who formed afterwards the group of Western Slavs, Czechs, Poles and others; to the south, the Southern Slavs, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes; and to the south-east and east the Eastern Slavic tribes which ultimately became the Ukrainians, the Great Russians and the White Russians.

Slavs, under the name of Veneds (name of one of the western tribes) are mentioned by the Greek historian Ptolemy in the First century A.D. They are also mentioned by the Roman writers Tacitus and Pliny.

The oldest Chronicle of Kiev gives us the following positions of the settlements of the Eastern Slavs in Eastern Europe in the Eleventh century; in the north on the lake Ilmen the Slovens; to the south from them, down to the upper Volga and Dnieper were the Krivichi; on the upper Dvina dwelt the Polochane; in the basin of the upper Oka settled the Vyatichi; to the south-west of them, on the middle Dnieper and its tributary the Sozh, lived the Radimichi; to the west of them and to the north of the river Pripet lived the Dregovichi. All these tribes formed later two great Slavonic peoples: the Great Russians and the White Russians. The tribes which settled to the south of these formed later the Ukrainian people. These included the Drevlyane, settled in the triangle between the Pripet and the river Teteriv; and to the south of them, in the present province of Kiev, the Polyane. On the left bank of the Dnieper in the basin of the river Desna and other eastern tributaries of the Dnieper were settled also the Sieveryane. Between the Boh and the Dniester lived the Ulichy, and between the Dniester and the Pruth the Tivertsi; on the Western Bug were the Dulibi or Volynyane.

Archaeological finds confirm this information from the Chronicle concerning the early settlement of the East Slavic tribes and furnish sufficient material to enable the historians to distinguish even at that early time the three principal groups that became ultimately three different branches, the Great Russians, the White Russians and Ukrainians.

The ancestors of the Ukrainians occupied the lands on the Dnieper and the Dniester immediately after they had been abandoned by the Goths, who moved to the south-west. They took over from the Goths several geographical names which the Goths in their turn had taken from the Iranian population, the Sarmatians. It is possible that

the Slavs found also remnants of the Gothic population. These, however, did not constitute an important strain in the formation of the Ukrainian group.

In the east the new settlers came into contact with a powerful people of Turkish origin, the Khazars, who founded their state in the Sixth and Seventh centuries on the lower Volga and Don, and attained in the Eleventh century a high degree of political and economic development and culture. It was through the Khazars that the Eastern Slavs carried on trade with the civilized East, the Arabs and the Persians. But the chief importance of the Khazars for the contemporary Ukrainians lay in the circumstance that during several centuries the Khazars formed the protective barrier against the pressure of the nomadic swarms from Asia. Protected thus by the Khazars, the Eastern Slavs had time to develop and to organize themselves into a state. In order to have direct access to the rich sources of the trade in the East, they overpowered and destroyed the Khazars. But in doing so they reopened to nomadic tribes the way to the Ukrainian steppe, and that, as we shall see, had fatal consequences to all Eastern Slavs. The South of the Ukraine was invaded in the Tenth century by the Pechenegs, a Mongolian nomadic tribe who in the Eleventh century were followed by the Polovtsi, a still more powerful Mongolian tribe. Under their pressure the Slavs on the Don and the lower Dnieper were thrown back to the north.

The presence of the warlike nomadic tribes rendered difficult, if not impossible, the trade with Byzantium and her colonies on the northern shores of the Black Sea, which remained there from the extensive Greek colonization of ancient times.

In the north and north-east the Eastern Slavs were in contact with numerous Finnish tribes, but the settlers in the south and south-east, that is, the ancestors of the Ukrainians, had no direct relations with them. On the other hand, Finnish tribes played a very important part in the formation of the future Great Russian people and its history.

In the north-west the Eastern Slavs met the Lithuanian tribes. The White Russians were their immediate neighbors.

In the west the Ukrainian tribes were adjacent to the Polish, or as they were called the Lekh tribes. The ethnographical frontier was almost the same then as it is now, though there are proofs that this line was slightly pushed back during historical times to the east, to the disadvantage of the Ukrainians. The same, more or less, must be said about the Ukrainian-Slovakian border in the Carpathians. Here, beyond the Carpathians, the nomadic hordes of the Magyars, people of Finno-Turkish origin, who arrived there from Asia at the end of the Tenth century to join on the plains of the middle Danube the remnants of the Huns and the Avars, found there already Slavic settlements. The political relations with the Magyars began to have importance only in the Eleventh century when their state was organized.

In the south-west the Ukrainians were neighbors to the Rumanians. Here the ethnographical Ukrainian territory suffered important losses. During almost ten centuries of Ukrainian-Rumanian relations the ethnographical line was wavering to the east or to the west, according to the political circumstances. In the Tenth and Eleventh centuries almost the whole of Bessarabia was inhabited by the Ukrainians and belonged to the Kievan political system from which it passed in the Twelfth and Thirteenth centuries to the successors of the Kievan State, the Galician-Volynian principedom.

The Eastern Slavs at that time had still other neighbors, though their home originally was across the water. They settled in small groups on the endless spaces of the East European plain, and played an important part in its history. These were the Norsemen, or, as they were called by the Slavs, the Variags or the Varangians, who came from Scandinavia. They were the cement that consolidated the Eastern Slavic tribes into one political system. It was also they that gave to this state, founded by them in the Eleventh century, their own tribal name

"Russ". This name was applied for a long time to the Kievan State and the people, ancestors of the present Ukrainians, who lived there. Gradually it was extended to other Eastern Slavic groups, Great Russians and White Russians, at the time when they all belonged to the Kievan State.

7. Scandinavians and Their Part in the Building Up of the Ukrainian State.

The oldest Ukrainian Chronicle of Kiev and the Chronicle of Novgorod (Great Russian) noted under the year 859: "There came Variags (Norsemen) from beyond the sea and took tribute from the Slavonic and Finnish tribes." Under the year 862 they wrote: "Variags were driven beyond the sea and the Slavonic tribes began to govern themselves, but there was no order among them: kin rose against kin carrying warfare. Then they took counsel: let us look for a prince who would rule over us and govern us according to the law. Then they sent beyond the sea to the Norsemen, to the Rus—those Norsemen were called Rus, as others are called Swedes, others are called Angles, others again Goths. Thus they told to these Rus: our land is rich and plentiful, but there is no order in it: come and rule over us and govern us." "There came three brothers," continues the Chronicler, "Rurik, Sineus, and Truvar with their kindred and took with them the whole Rus. They founded at first three principedoms, in Ladoga, in Belosero, and in Izborsk". "And from those Variags (Norsemen)" finishes the Chronicle, "the Rus Land received its name".

As we see it is a typical dynastic legend concocted undoubtedly at the court of the descendants of the conquerors in order to legitimize the origin of the foreign dynasty and to show that they arrived at their power not through conquest, but by election.

But who were these Norsemen, or as the Chronicle calls them "Variags"? The Greeks gave them the same name. There is no doubt whatever that these were foreign folk whose home was in Sweden. The name "Rus" by

which the Chronicle calls the whole tribe who followed their leaders, is preserved to this day in the Finnish name for Sweden, "Ruotsi". Besides quite a number of contemporary Arabian, Byzantine and West European Chronicles and historians give the name "Rus", "Rusios" to a Scandinavian tribe of Vikings and military adventurers.

According to the Swedish historian Arne, trade relations between the Swedes and the Khazars began already in the Eighth century. There have been discovered in Sweden abundant archaeological finds of contemporary Eastern coins which prove that an active trade was carried on by the adventurous Scandinavians across the East European plain. Volga was their highway to the Khazars, to Persia and the Arabs. Trading with Byzantium was carried by way of Dnieper and the Black Sea. According to the Kievan Chronicle "Dnieper was the way from Variags unto the Greeks".

At first the Norsemen settled in small colonies in towns that were trading centres. Later on they came as conquerors and organizers of the Eastern Slavic tribes. It is quite probable that some, even most of these tribes had been already organized into small political communities with local dynasties at their head. Traces of these local dynasties remained in some places as late as the Twelfth century. Probably they were not strong enough, because they did not, for instance, resist the Khazars. Northmen appearing among them had no difficulty in reducing the local dynasties to dependence, conquering one tribe after another, and organizing them into one large state with the Scandinavian dynasty of Rurik at their head. Thus should be interpreted the record of the Kievan Chronicle about the formation of the great Slavic State in Eastern Europe. Such interpretation would not contradict the legend created in Kiev two centuries later in order, as we said, to legitimize the dynasty of Rurik reigning at that time in Kiev. We know of several similar instances at the same time in history, of Scandinavians founding states by the conquest of the local population in Normandy, in Sicily, and a little later in England. There

also the conquerors, establishing their dynasties, were assimilated by the conquered population. Moreover, they gave to Normandy their name. This is exactly what also happened in Eastern Europe on the territory of the South-Eastern Slavic tribes, the ancestors of the Ukrainians.

These Scandinavian conquerors, most probably called by the name Rus, were also very soon assimilated by the Slavic population. They were not numerous and probably very little more, if at all, civilized than the Slavic tribes they overpowered. Their superiority consisted in their warlike and adventurous spirit, their initiative, the desire for conquest and domination. It was probably these precise characteristics which Slavic tribes lacked, for they were landtillers, hunters, fishers and peaceful traders. Attracted by the closer vicinity of Byzantium, the rich soil and the milder climate of Ukrainian territory, the conquerors very soon left the northern countries and reduced to dependence the southern Slavic territories. Kiev, the chief town of the Slavic tribe Polyane and already an important trading centre, became the capital of the Scandinavian conquerors. Their tribal name Rus was now applied to their capital, the territory and the whole group of South-Eastern Slavic tribes. Later on the same name Rus spread to all Eastern Slavic tribes. It is true that the Northern Slavs, such as Princedoms of Rostov, Suzdal and others, continued for a long time in their Chronicles to designate by the name "Rus" the present Ukraine, in the first place the Princedom of Kiev, but foreigners gave the name of Rus to all territories that were under the supremacy of the Kievan princes, attaching to this name not national but political and territorial meaning.

After the conquest was accomplished, new Scandinavians continued to come into this land now called "Rus". They came as soldiers of fortune to seek service at the court of the Kievan princes. The body guard of the princes of Kiev was chiefly composed of Northmen. They came also as merchants and settled peacefully. Archaeological excavations on the sites inhabited in the Tenth

century indicate important settlements of Scandinavians. Quite recently there were found and opened about 80 tombs near Chernigov (Chernihiv) the skeletons in armour and other objects showing the presence there of the Scandinavian type like those scattered everywhere on the shores of the Baltic.

The process of assimilation of the Northmen was very rapid. At the end of the Eleventh century only Scandinavian names such as Oleg, Olga, Igor, Svineld, Rognid, Asmund and others remained in use in the families of the ruling dynasty, and in a few aristocratic houses. It is the records of the Chronicles that tell us about their foreign origin which by that time had become quite legendary. Such was the origin of the Ukrainian state.

CHAPTER II

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(8) First Kievan Princes. (9) Christianity in Ukraine.
 (10) Vladimir (Volodimir) the Great. (11) Yaroslav
 the Wise. (12) International Position of the Kievan
 State.

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8. First Kievan Princes.

The coming of the Northmen and the formation of the Kievan principedom wrought great changes in the life of the local population. Cities on the Dnieper and the Desna became centres of political life. Tribal interests retreated into the background and gave place to state interests. The process of the formation of the Kievan Principedom was a rapid one, the necessary elements being already at hand in local organizations.

Quite naturally Kiev became the centre of the new state. The first steps taken by the new rulers led them to the south: a succession of campaigns against Constantinople. One of the first princes, Oleg (879-914)* appears in the Chronicles as a successful leader of these wars. We possess the text of his treaty with the Greeks in 911 by which he obtained a war contribution from them and the privilege of trading without the usual customs. The treaty lays down the basis of relations between the Greek and Ukrainian traders. Ukrainian merchants arriving in Constantinople had the right to stay there six months and received the necessary food supplies for the return voyage. Quarters outside the city in the precincts of the convent of Saint Mama were assigned to them. They were allowed to enter the city only in small groups of about fifty men, without their arms and accompanied by Greek officials. The treaty provided also a code for law suits between the Greek and Ukrainian merchants and special regulations about cases of shipwreck, about rights of succession to the belongings of an Ukrainian merchant

* It is of incidental interest to note that Oleg is the contemporary of the English king Alfred the Great.

who died on Greek territory, about permission for Ukrainians to enlist in the imperial guards and such like. This treaty being the first legal document preserved has great importance for the history of old Ukrainian law, and a considerable number of investigators have written scholarly books concerning it.

Oleg's successor, the Prince Igor (914-945), continued the policy of uniting Ukrainian tribes under the central power of Kiev. In his turn he started a campaign against Byzantium (941) but was not as successful as Oleg. Also he made a treaty with Byzantium (944) the text of which has been preserved. It provides regulations for the diplomatic and commercial relations of the two countries. Ukrainians were bound not to interfere with Greek colonies in Crimea, they bound themselves to protect the imperial territory from the invasions of nomadic Bulgarians, and they were allowed to fish in the mouth of the Dnieper. The treaty had to be ratified in Kiev.

Under Prince Igor the supremacy of the Kievan State over the territory was almost complete. About twenty local princes acknowledged him as their overlord. His son Sviatoslav was his lieutenant in Novgorod.

The Byzantine Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus (913-959) left us in his writings a description of how Kievan princes governed their lands. In November, he tells us, a Kievan prince with his followers started on a round of visits to the tribes who recognized his supremacy: Drevlyane, Dregovichi, Krivichi, Sieveryane and others. During the whole winter he travelled thus, taking the tribute in products of their lands and dispensing justice. In April he returned by water to Kiev, sailing down the Desna or Pripet or Dnieper. A trading fleet was then got under sail from Kiev to Constantinople in order to sell there the collected products.

9. Christianity in Ukraine.

Intercourse with Byzantium was not of course limited to war or trade only. The influence of Byzantine culture very soon found its way into Ukrainian towns. Igor's wife

Olga was one of the first to be converted to Christianity. She was a very active and clever princess and ruled the principality after Igor's death for several years (945-957). Resolved to accept Christianity, she began negotiation with the German Emperor, Otto the Great, in order to have a bishop sent to her from the West. Soon, however, she made up her mind to go to Constantinople herself to be baptized there. Constantine Porphyrogenitus left a very detailed record of this visit. Princess Olga was a prototype of later Ukrainian women of the Cossack period who as wives of Hetmans and Colonels, in the absence of their husbands at war, ruled the country, edited Universals (manifestos) and took, on the whole, an active part in politics.

Sviatoslav (957-972), son of Olga and Igor, was a typical Scandinavian viking. Fond of wars and military adventures he spent his life in the field carrying on warfare, conquering new lands, and finding out new trading routes and new markets. He succeeded in establishing the supremacy of Kiev over all the East Slavic tribes, and extended his authority to several Finnish tribes that lived between the upper Volga and the Oka. He defeated the Bulgarians on the Volga and destroyed their capital Bolgar (near Kazan). Then he turned against the Khazars, conquered them and destroyed their strongholds, Sarkel on the Don, and Itil at the mouth of the Volga. Now the way to the East was open to direct trade relations without any intermediaries as the power of the Khazars was broken. But the downfall of the Khazars, who during three centuries had protected the Kievan State from the pressure of nomadic hordes from the East, had fatal consequences for the Slavs: already during Sviatoslav's lifetime the hordes of Pechenegs invaded the Ukrainian steppe. They came as far as Kiev and held for a certain time the city in a close blockade. Having defeated the Khazars, Sviatoslav made war against the Caucasian tribes for the possession of the Greek colony Tamatarka, named in the Ukrainian Chronicles Tmutorokan, on the

Taman peninsula, and established his rule in the basin of the Kuban.

In the meantime Byzantine diplomacy dragged him into their Bulgarian policy. The usual tactics of Byzantium was to set one barbarian people against another. In 968 Sviatoslav defeated the Bulgarians on the Danube and occupied East Bulgaria. He wished to remain there permanently and chose Pereyaslavets (near the mouth of the Danube) as his residence. We read in the Kievan Chronicle that when asked to return to Kiev he answered: "I wish to live on the Danube. Here is the centre of my land, all goods are brought here: silks, gold, wine and fruit from the Greeks; silver and horses from the Czechs and the Hungarians; from the Rus come furs, honey, wax and slaves". But he was not allowed to remain in Bulgaria since his successes against the Bulgarians alarmed the Greeks. The emperor John Tzimisce, himself took the field against Sviatoslav. The same Chronicle has preserved for us Sviatoslav's admonition to his warriors in this battle: "Let us stand firm, let us not cover our land with shame. It is better to be slain in battle than taken prisoner, because the dead do not feel shame". In spite of his bravery, Sviatoslav was forced to abandon Bulgaria and return to Kiev. On the way there he was attacked by the Pechenegs near the rapids of the Dnieper, and slain in 972.

10. Vladimir (Volodimir) the Great.

After a short strife among Sviatoslav's sons, Vladimir (Volodimir), surnamed the Great (980-1015), took the upper hand, having destroyed his brothers Yaropolk and Oleg. He inherited the warlike nature of his father and continued his policy in uniting about Kiev all the Eastern Slavic tribes and consolidating his power. He took back from Poland the towns of Przemysl (Peremishl), Cherven and others, uniting thus the ethnographical territory of the Ukraine.

But the chief event of Vladimir's reign was his conversion to Christianity. The Chronicle dates it in the year

988. The introduction of Christianity and the organization of the Church was a step of great importance in the cultural development of the Eastern Slavs. Everything leads us to the conclusion that this change was gradually prepared by long preceding relations with the Christian Byzantium and that the official act of the prince in accepting Christianity for himself and his people was made without any opposition or relapses into heathenism, as was often the case in Western Europe. The Eastern Slavs on the whole had not an established form of cult nor a developed religious system. They had, of course, a mythology and worshipped such gods as: Dazhboh or Khors, personification of the sun; Perun, of thunder; Striboh, of the winds; Svaroh, of the moon; and many others. But these gods had no clearly defined personality nor sharply delimited functions. There is no record of temples, or organized priesthood whose place seems to have been occupied by wizards and sorcerers. Vague and undefined beliefs easily gave way to the highly organized Byzantine Christian Church.

There are historical records according to which Christian propaganda among the Eastern Slavs came not only from Byzantium, but also from Rome. We also know of the existence of a Christian cult at a very early age in the Crimea and in the present Taman. During the Eleventh century Christianity spread steadily in Kiev. Thus during Igor's reign there was a Christian church in Kiev consecrated to the prophet Elijah, and among Igor's followers were many Christians, probably Scandinavians. It is supposed that Olga and her eldest grandson Yaropolk (son of Sviatoslav) tried to initiate direct relations with Rome. Vladimir, however, decided for the Greek Church. Ukrainian Chronicles, later on influenced by the clergy, were silent concerning these relationships with the Western Church. About Vladimir's conversion there is a legend preserved in the Chronicle. It is told that Vladimir, dissatisfied with the heathen religion, was for a long time uncertain which faith he should accept instead, whether the Mohammedan from the Bulgarians who

lived beyond the Volga, or the Jewish from the Khazars, or the Roman from the Germans, or the Greek from Byzantium. He sent delegates into different lands to report to him which faith was the best. His choice then fell on Byzantium. Not wishing, however, to be indebted to Byzantium he started a war against them by laying siege to Chersonesus, a Byzantine colony in Crimea (near Sebastopol). Having taken Chersonesus he made it a condition of peace that the Greek princess Ann, sister of the Emperors Basileus and Constantine, should be given him to wife. Vladimir's conversion was a consequence of this alliance. This legend is based on some facts, though Chersonesus was not the place where Vladimir's baptism took place. It is more probable that it was in Kiev or Vassilkiv, near Kiev.

The newly founded Ukrainian Church was dependent on Constantinople. To the metropolitan see founded in Kiev was appointed a Greek metropolitan. For several years afterward Greeks and only Greeks were appointed to this important post which, as we shall see later, led to protests from the Ukrainian clergy. Several bishoprics were founded: in Kiev, Chernigov, Pereyaslav, Turiv, Bilhorod, Volodimir and Tmutorokan. Later on bishoprics in the Great Russian lands of the Kievan state were founded in Novgorod and in Rostov.

Christian church service books had been already translated from the Greek into a Slavonic language (that adopted by the Bulgarians on the Danube) which was understood by the Eastern Slavs. These books were brought to Kiev. Herewith began the division or the duality of languages in Ukraine, the language used by the Church and the learned, though understood by the population was distinct from the language they spoke. It is probable that Bulgarian clergy from Okhrida took a certain part in organizing the Ukrainian Church.

The introduction of Christianity into the Kievan principedom opened wide the way to Byzantine influence in all branches of political, social and religious life. Conceptions of state, of law and of social relation were sub-

jected to Byzantine influence. Churches built by Byzantine architects were followed by the introduction of Greek secular architecture. Kiev soon was adorned with churches and monasteries as well as with palaces built in the Byzantine style; streets and public places were decorated by bronze statues from Chersonesus. Byzantine architecture, arts and crafts took a firm hold in Kiev and other towns. At the end of Vladimir's reign Kiev was a rich and civilized city greatly admired by foreign travelers. Thietmar bishop of Merseburg (Northern Germany) who visited Kiev in 1018, wrote in his travels concerning the four hundred churches he saw in Kiev, the eight market places and the "countless masses of population".

After the death of Vladimir the Great (1015) his sons, by different mothers, fought among themselves for the possession of Kiev. The real meaning of this struggle for supremacy is obliterated for us by the Chronicle and the clerical tradition which glorified as martyrs the two youngest sons of Vladimir, Boris and Gleb, slain by their eldest brother Sviatopolk. He also destroyed his third brother Sviatoslav and seized Kiev. His intention, evidently, was to keep united the East Slavic lands under the supremacy of Kiev and not to let them be divided among the brothers. He was, however, defeated by another brother, Yaroslav, who was his father's representative in Novgorod.

11. Yaroslav the Wise.

Yaroslav, who received in history the surname of Wise (1019-1054), disputed Kiev with his brother Sviatopolk. In this struggle he was supported by his ally the German Emperor, Henry II. He had also a strong army which he had collected in Scandinavia. Sviatopolk in his turn, had the support of the Polish king Boleslav, whose daughter he married. He also allied himself to the Pechenegs. At first Yaroslav occupied Kiev, but Sviatopolk with the Polish help took it from him (1018) and the city was plundered by the Polish army. Boleslav returned

with a rich spoil carrying among the prisoners also a sister of Yaroslav, the princess Predslava. He also took back the northern Galician towns with Peremishl (Przemysl).

Sviatopolk was, however, not long victorious. With the help of the Northmen Sviatoslav defeated him in a cruel battle on the river Alta (1019) and took Kiev. Sviatopolk was obliged to fly "among the Lekhs and the Czechs, where he ended his wicked life," as we are told by the Kievan Chronicle, who did not approve of him and gave him the surname of "Cain".

Yaroslav had, however, to fight for the supremacy with his last brother Mstislav, who during his father's life ruled the far Tmutorokan. Yaroslav was defeated by Mstislav in the battle of Listven (near Chernigov), 1024. This battle is especially dwelt upon in the Chronicle. There were probably long preserved traditions about it, and even folk songs. The brothers settled their strife amicably by dividing the Ukraine along the Dnieper. Yaroslav took the right bank with Kiev, Mstislav the left with Chernigov. They reigned henceforth in peaceful understanding. After the death in 1034 of Mstislav, who was childless, the inheritance of Vladimir the Great was once again united under the sway of Yaroslav.

12. International Position of the Kievan State.

This peaceful arrangement enabled the Kievan State to recover the losses caused during the period of unsettlement. Thus Yaroslav profiting by disorders in Poland after the death of Boleslav (1025), recovered the Galician towns. He even made alliance with the new king Casimir by giving him his sister in marriage and marrying his son Iziaslav to Casimir's sister.

He also rounded out his frontiers in the north-west by annexing the Finnish tribes in the present Esthonia, where he founded the town Yuriev (present Dorpat, or Tartu). Yaroslav's son Vladimir, whom he appointed to rule Novgorod in his name, carried on warfare with northern and north-eastern Finnish tribes in the present North Russia.

In the direction of the south and south-east only, was Yaroslav obliged to stand on the defensive. He dealt to the Pechenegs a decisive blow in a battle near Kiev, after which Ukraine had peace, for a certain time at least, on this frontier, until new nomadic hordes appeared in the steppe, those of the Polovtsi. The danger of these nomads was so real that in order to ward off the attacks Kiev was surrounded with fortifications, traces of which are seen to this time in the form of earthen mounds along the rivers Stuhna and Ros.

Yaroslav's campaign against Byzantium (1043), the last made by the Ukrainians against their church metropolis, was very unsuccessful. A fleet against Constantinople was sent under the prince Vladimir Yaroslavich (Yaroslav's son), and a land army under the general Vishata went along the western shores of the Black Sea. Both forces were utterly routed by the Greeks. Part of the Ukrainian fleet was burned down in the Bosphorus by the famous Greek fire; the rest turned back followed by the Byzantine fleet which perished in its turn in the mouth of the Dnieper. The land army was defeated near Varna and the prisoners, among whom was Vishata, were all blinded in Constantinople. At last, though not before 1052, peace with Byzantium was concluded, and fortified by the marriage of Yaroslav's son Vsevolod with a Byzantine princess.

But this Byzantine war was only an episode in Yaroslav's, on the whole, very successful reign. His principedom reached now from the Baltic to the Caucasus, from the middle Volga to the Carpathians right up to Cracow. In addition to all the East Slavic tribes, quite a number of Finnish tribes in the north and north-east belonged to the Kievan State, as well as some Turkish nomadic people who, after having settled and recognized Kievan supremacy, were intrusted with the defense of those borderlands against other nomads.

Building up and maintaining order in a State of this magnitude was possible not only as the result of successful wars, but also of capable diplomacy. From this point of

view the dynastic alliances of Yaroslav are very interesting. The net of these alliances spread over the whole of Europe.

Yaroslav's first wife was Ingigerd, daughter of the Swedish king Olaf. After her death he married Anna, daughter of the Byzantine Emperor. One of his daughters, Elizabeth, was married to the Norwegian king Harold Haardraada, who claimed the English throne as son of Cnut. He invaded England but was slain in the battle of Stamford Bridge (Yorkshire), 1066, by the English king Harold. Another of Yaroslav's daughters, Anna, was married to Henry I, king of France, and after his death and during the minority of her son, Philipp I, she ruled the kingdom. There were plans for the German Emperor, Henry III, to marry another daughter of Yaroslav. Though this alliance was not carried out, a son of Yaroslav married a German princess. German Chronicles tell us of a marriage of a daughter of the Landgraf of Saxony to a "rex russorum" and of another "rex russorum" taking the daughter of the Count of Stade to wife. The marriage of the prince Vsevolod with a Greek princess of the house of Monomach has already been mentioned as well as the matrimonial alliances with Casimir of Poland.

All these alliances led certainly to the consolidation of Yaroslav's international relations, and increased his importance in Europe. His court in Kiev became a place of refuge to members of European dynasties in adverse circumstances. The Norwegian king, Olaf the Saint, for instance, driven from the kingship by Cnut, the Danish king, fled with his son Magnus to Kiev. Later on Magnus recovered his throne with the help of Yaroslav. The Hungarian princes Andrew and Leventa also took refuge in Kiev and stayed until the Hungarian magnates called them back. This prince Andrew took with him as his wife Yaroslav's daughter, Anastasia.

When Cnut conquered England in 1016, grandsons of the defeated king Aethelred the Unready, and Eadward the Aetheling found refuge in Kiev, from where Eadward returned to England.

Yaroslav's State, however, was not as firmly consolidated inside as it seemed on the surface. Tendencies to particularism of certain East Slavic tribes, fostered by their geographical and ethnographical conditions, developed gradually into practical independence. The system of government which consisted in the prince-father placing his sons as rulers in his name in different parts of his principedom, contributed of course greatly to it. The desire of certain members of the ruling dynasty to throw off the supremacy of the Kievan prince was favorable to the growing decentralization of the State. After Yaroslav's death in 1054, his principedom was practically divided among his seven sons, who at once started the struggle for the possession of Kiev, which would give the victor supremacy over all others.

CHAPTER III

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(13) Beginning of the Breaking Up of the Kievan Princedom. (14) Invasion of the Polovtsi. (15) Strife of the Princes. (16) Formation of the Great Russian People.

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13. Beginning of the Breaking Up of the Kievan Princedom.

Yaroslav divided his princedom among his sons: to the eldest, Iziaslav, he gave Kiev and with it the supremacy over other parts of his realm; to his second son, Sviatoslav, he assigned Chernigov, only second in importance to Kiev; to Vsevolod he gave Pereyaslav; to Igor went Volynia; to Viacheslav was assigned Smolensk; and to his grandson Rostislav was allotted Galicia. From this moment the dismemberment of the Kievan State proceeded apace. Tendencies to particularism and independence of the central power were very strong, and led to decentralization. On the other hand, the descendants of Yaroslav soon became very numerous and their general inclination was to throw off the supremacy of Kiev and the Kievan prince.

There was as yet no settled rule of succession to the Kievan crown. It is only seldom that we see a son succeeding his father directly, especially if the heir were too young to be an efficient ruler. Generally the prince of Kiev was succeeded by his nearest brother, so that the head of the house occupied the throne. But this was not an invariable rule. Sometimes princes were elected by an assembly consisting of nobles, military followers, high ecclesiastics and ministers of State. Their choice always fell on a member of the princely dynasty of Rurik. The absence of any settled and fixed rule of succession led to strife and quarrels among the members of the dynasty, and this ultimately contributed to the ruin of the Kievan Princedom. The princes, being disunited and divided

amongst themselves, were not able to resist the pressure of Nomadic hordes that succeeded each other in the South Ukrainian steppe.

In the meantime the descendants of Yaroslav quarrelled among themselves for the crown of Kiev or for richer and better minor princedoms. Very soon the stronger among them started the precedent of seizing their possessions from the weaker for the benefit of themselves or their sons.

The situation soon became very complicated, when shortly after Yaroslav's death a new Nomadic horde, the Torks, came from the East and invaded the Southern Ukraine. The princes, united this time by the common danger, defeated the Torks (1060). They partly exterminated them, and partly taking them prisoner, settled them on the borders as a defence against new invaders.

14. Invasion of the Polovtsi.

Very soon the Torks were followed by much stronger swarms of newcomers, the Polovtsi or Cumans, who were for more than a hundred and fifty years the terror of the population. The history of the Ukraine until the invasion of the Tatars in the first half of the Thirteenth century is almost exclusively a history of wars against the Polovtsi. The worst of it was that the princes used the hordes of Polovtsi in their internal quarrels. This gave to the nomads an excuse for interfering. They overran the southern territories, plundering, slaughtering and enslaving the peaceful population.

In 1068 Polovtsi defeated the three elder Yaroslavichi (sons of Yaroslav) on the river Alta and devastated the princedom of Pereyaslav. In consequence of this defeat the population of Kiev drove out Prince Iziaslav and he fled to Poland. Soon, however, he recovered Kiev with the help of Boleslav the Brave, King of Poland, who, as reward for his help, took the Galician town Peremishl. Five years later Isiaslav, who was an incompetent ruler, was again driven out of Kiev by his brothers Sviatoslav of Chernigov, and Vsevolod of Pereyaslav, and Sviatoslav

Yaroslavich, an energetic and enlightened prince, took possession of Kiev, where he reigned from 1075-1076. Iziaslav again sought refuge in Poland, but this time Boleslav could not help him, being menaced by the Czechs, though Iziaslav had at first won him over with large sums of money. Iziaslav then went to Mainz, bringing rich gifts to the Emperor, Henry IV, but received no help there. He also sent one of his sons to Rome to Pope Gregory VII, asking him to intervene on his behalf. In the meantime Sviatoslav died, and the throne of Kiev being vacant, Iziaslav, accompanied by the Polish army, recovered it, but only for a short time, as he died the following year. After his death the throne of Kiev was occupied by Vsevolod, the third son of Yaroslav (1078-1093). His reign was filled with the wars with his nephews the Sviatoslavichi (sons of Sviatoslav) who constantly attacked and intrigued against him. Vsevolod, who died amidst these quarrels, was one of the most learned men of his time. Among his accomplishments was proficiency in five languages. His dynastic alliances were very wide. He himself was married to a Byzantine princess of the house of Monomach, his son Vladimir, who received the surname of Monomach because of his mother's family, married a daughter of the ill-fated English king Harold. Vsevolod's daughter Praxedes was married to the Emperor Henry IV. This marriage was unhappy, and Praxedes returned to Kiev and entered a nunnery there. Vladimir Monomach's son was married to the Swedish princess Christine.

Vsevolod himself was inactive and delicate in health, but his son Vladimir Monomach had all the gifts necessary to a monarch. He was energetic and active, having high ideals of monarch's duties. He successfully defended the Ukraine from the Polovtsi and acquired general regard and admiration. He inherited his father's literary gifts. We have from him his autobiography and a very interesting "Instruction" to his children.

After his father's death, to avoid quarrels, he surrendered the crown of Kiev to Sviatopolk Iziaslavich, son of

his uncle, and himself took the principedom of Chernigov. However, the quarrels of the princes continued and embraced all the Ukrainian territories. The southern parts, Kiev and Pereyaslav, were especially exposed to the attacks of the Polovtsi. Hardly a year passed that they did not invade whole districts, carrying ruin and desolation. Sometimes their hordes came as far as Kiev, burned and devastated the suburbs and plundered the famous monastery Pecherski (from the Ukrainian pechera—catacomb) where the Chronicles were being written.

The Chroniclers, some of whom wrote almost amidst these invasions, have left us very dramatic descriptions of these scenes and events, such, for instance, as the disastrous battle on the river Stuhna (1094) where the young prince Rostislav, Vladimir Monomach's brother, was drowned, the capture by the Polovtsi of the town Torchesk in Volynia, of the plunder by the Khan Bonyak of the Pecherski monastery and others, evidently written by eye-witnesses. The Chroniclers depicted the dramatic scenes of how prisoners were captured by the Polovtsi and dragged into slavery, and how they lamented and wailed in their misfortune. These pages of the old Chronicles anticipate the "Laments of the Prisoners" of later times during the centuries of the wars of the Ukrainians with the Turks and the Tatars.

Prince Sviatoslav Yaroslavich tried in vain to propitiate the Polovtsi with rich presents. He even took to wife a daughter of Khan Tugar. But it was of no avail, chiefly because the Ukrainain princes themselves let these hordes interfere in their family quarrels over lost or stolen inheritances. Life in the Ukraine became unbearable. Then the princes decided to solve their complications and satisfy the grievances of the disinherited in an amicable way. Upon the initiative of Vladimir Monomach an assembly of princes took place in 1097 near Kiev by the lake Lubcha. Here it was decided that every prince was to hold the seat of his father, and henceforth the succession should be from father to son. Thus the dismemberment of Yaroslav's State was sanctioned and smaller

princedom were confirmed in the possession of the descendants of the sons of Yaroslav as allotted to them by their father. The assembled princes also decided to live in peace and harmony, and took oath to this effect by kissing the cross. But the members of the Convention had hardly had time to reach their respective homes when the oath was broken in a most brutal way by Prince David of Volynia, who kidnapped the young Prince Vassilko of Terebovla in Galicia, and had him blinded. This crime provoked a new war among the princes and a new repartition of princedom.

It is only in the first part of the Twelfth century when the throne of Kiev was occupied by Vladimir Monomach (1099-1125) that there was again peace and order in the Ukraine. Owing to his energetic dealings with the Polovtsi the safety of the southern frontiers was assured for about fifty years. Vladimir Monomach reunited under his supremacy the greater part of Yaroslav's princedom. His dynastic alliances throughout Europe in Byzantium, England and Scandinavia are reminiscent of Yaroslav's time. Vladimir Monomach's reign is also important for the revision of the laws and customs which were set down in writing by Yaroslav in a Codex known as "Ruska Pravda".

Vladimir Monomach gained such authority, love and respect that after his death his son Mstislav (1125-1132) succeeded to the throne of Kiev without any contention. His short reign was a continuation of his father's policy. He was universally respected and beloved and carried on with success his father's reign, giving dignity to the house of Monomach. Mstislav also continued his father's policy of international dynastic alliances, and among his sons-in-law were kings of Sweden, Denmark and members of the Imperial house of Byzantium. The lesser princes felt his strong hand, and those who rebelled against his authority were severely punished and brought to obedience. But after Mstislav's death it was clearly evident once more that decentralizing forces and aspirations were stronger than the bonds with which Vladimir Monomach and his

son had succeeded for some time in keeping together all Yaroslav's lands under the Kievan supremacy.

15. Strife of the Princes.

The quarrels, to begin with, started among the numerous representatives of the house of Monomach in which the Chernigov house, descendants of Sviatoslav Yaroslavich, soon joined claiming in their turn the crown of Kiev. These wars lasted from 1132 to 1146, and several European rulers became involved. Kiev changed hands several times, but at last the grandson of Vladimir Monomach, Iziaslav II of the Mstislavich family, won the crown from his uncle, Monomach's youngest son Yuri (George), surnamed the Longhanded, who held the Great Russian princedoms Rostov and Suzdal from his father. When, after only a short reign, Iziaslav II died in 1154, "the whole city and the princedom of Kiev wept bitterly", wrote the Chronicler, "and bewailed their prince more than a father, because he was a noble and a just prince, a good Christian and a warrior covered with fame". It was as if the citizens of Kiev were bewailing and burying with him their own might and fame. After Iziaslav's death, new wars sprang up among the pretenders to the throne of Kiev, and during this strife the growing hostility between the Ukrainians and the Great Russians became evident. When Prince Andrew, son of Yuri the Longhanded, who hated the Ukrainians for their independent character and love of freedom, and in his youth refused to live in Ukraine, now came with his Russian army and took Kiev in 1169. He let his Great Russians plunder Kiev during several days; in order to humble the ancient capital he left his lieutenant there and carried away everything portable of the city's wealth to his residence newly founded in Vladimir in Suzdal. He also tried, but unsuccessfully, to transfer to Vladimir the seat of the Metropolitan in order to completely deprive Kiev of its importance. Soon, however, Andrew, who was hated among his own followers for his autocratic and cruel character, fell a victim to conspirators and was killed in 1175.

Kiev never recovered from the plunder and ruin of 1169. It still continued for some time to be the object of wars of different pretenders. The importance of the city as a commercial centre was lost, owing to its insecurity against invaders, its wealth was ruined and its brilliant civilization lost for ever. It still continued to be important as the seat of the Metropolitan and the centre of religious life but, at the opening of the Twelfth century, it ceased altogether to be a political centre and the capital of the Rus. The old State Rus of the Kievan princes ceased to exist and fell into several princedoms with many political centres.

The process of the formation of separate princedoms out of the great State united by Yaroslav, began to be quite obvious even at the end of the Eleventh century, Galicia was the first to be independent. It was the hereditary seat of the descendants of Prince Rostislav, Yaroslav's grandson. These princes succeeded in defending their land from the neighboring Poland and Hungary, and colonized free areas down the rivers not only with Ukrainians, but also with pacified nomadic tribes, Pechenegs, Torks, Berendeis and others, who had to protect the border from the Polovtsi. Of Rotislav's three sons, Volodar, Vassilko and Rurik, the eldest, Volodar, founded a dynasty that for a century occupied the throne of Galicia. Volodar's son, Volodimirko, made the town Halich on the Dniester his capital. Galicia being the most western of Ukrainian lands was out of the reach of nomadic invasions and very soon became a densely populated and prosperous State.

The second princedom to throw off the supremacy of Kiev was the Chernigov or Sieveryane. It was already practically an independent State during the lifetime of its prince Mstislav the Brave (1024-1036), and later on under Sviatoslav Yaroslavich it became even more so. This was a very vast territory covering the whole basin of the Desna and Seim, the upper Sula and Psiol, and the region of the upper Oka. Along with the city of Chernigov, Novgorod Sieversk was an important centre of this

princedom. The descendants of prince Sviatoslav multiplied and formed a vast family, members of which strictly observed the order of succession according to age. The eldest of the family resided in Chernigov and was head of the whole princedom, the second in age had Novgorod Sieversk, and so on, the importance of the princedom being regulated in accordance with the age of the prince. Active and enterprising, the princes of Chernigov expanded greatly. Besides, they often seized and held the thrones of Kiev, Pereyaslav, Volodimir in Volynia, and even Galicia. Whereas the south of the princedom of Chernigov suffered greatly from the invasions of the Polovtsi and in the last half of the Twelfth century was almost ruined and devastated, the northern parts, protected by their great forests, to the north of the river Desna and Seim, were very well populated, rich and prosperous; here the lands of the princes and of the aristocracy were situated.

The city of Chernigov became, in the first half of the Twelfth century, an important political and commercial centre, second only to Kiev. Great architectural monuments of the period are still to be found in Chernigov, whose churches were not destroyed like those of Kiev and are the oldest extant examples of the Ukrainian architecture of the time. Recent excavations brought to light remarkable finds of the goldsmith's craft, showing local, independent treatment of Greek, West European and Roman models.

Almost simultaneously with the princedom of Chernigov, the princedom of Pereyaslav grew independent of Kievan supremacy. The town of Pereyaslav, on the left bank of the Dnieper, already in the Tenth century ranked after Kiev and Chernigov in importance. At the end of the Tenth century, under the pressure of the Pechenegs, the population of this princedom was obliged to retire almost to the town of Pereyaslav, behind the line of fortifications on the river Trubizh. When, in the battle of 1034, the strength of the Pechenegs was broken, the frontier of the princedom of Pereyaslav advanced consid-

erably to the south and south-east, only to be withdrawn again under the onslaught of the Polovtsi. They devastated the land and kept the town of Pereyaslav in constant blockade. The struggle went on for generations. The princes of Pereyaslav made a practice of settling subdued and civilized nomads, such as Pechenegs, Torks and others, on the border lands. This brought about an important mixture of these races in the population of the northern and western parts of the present province of Poltava. This has been scientifically confirmed by anthropological investigations.

The town of Pereyaslav was protected by a whole system of fortifications against the steppes, remnants and traces of which in the form of earthen mounds and walls are to be seen even now. The capital already in the Tenth century was an important and ancient settlement. The bishop of Pereyaslav had at one period the dignity of metropolitans. At the end of the Eleventh century the town was surrounded with walls, towers and several gates, and adorned with beautiful churches and secular buildings among which was a public bath, built according to Byzantine fashion. There are reasons to suppose that Chronicles were written in Pereyaslav recording historical events concerning this principedom. At any rate, other Chronicles have preserved quite a number of heroic legends and poetic fragments concerning Pereyaslav and its historic task of first meeting and repulsing the onset of the nomadic hordes. That, of course, accounts for the growth of the chivalrous and warlike spirit that contributed to the development of chivalrous poetry and heroic traditions about this principedom.

The principedom of Volynia, a rich territory well protected by the great forests and rivers and on the north side by great marshes, was for a long time strictly dependent on the princes of Kiev, who considered it as their own to dispose of. Only in the middle of the Twelfth century a strictly speaking Volynian dynasty was founded by the sons of Prince Iziaslav II of the Mstislavich family. In the first quarter of the Thirteenth century the

crown of Volynia was in the possession of a very able prince Roman who succeeded in uniting Volynia with Galicia. Under his son Daniel the two princedoms formed one powerful Volyno-Galician State. The capital of Volynia was situated in the town of Volodimir which was well fortified and populated. Here were settled many foreign merchants and especially Germans. Volodimir, built at the beginning of the Twelfth century, was famous even throughout foreign lands, and when the Hungarian Prince Andrew came in 1232 with his army, it is recorded he said that he had not seen a more beautiful city even in Germany.

Contemporary with the separation of Volynia was also that of the princedom of Turov and Pinsk, the former territory of the Dregovichi, which, besides the Ukrainian population, included the White Russians. Though poor, this land was well protected by its great forests and marshes. The capital of the princedom was the town of Turiv and the bishopric of the same name, founded in the beginning of the Twelfth century.

In the former chapters we related how Ukrainian colonization extended, in the beginning of the Eleventh century, to the south-east as far as the southern shores of the Azov Sea to the peninsula Taman. The name of this territory is recorded in the Chronicles as Tmutorokan. At the same time the records about this Tmutorokan are so vague that historians do not agree as to where exactly this land was situated. Most of them think that Tmutorokan was on the site of the former Greek colony Phanagoria or Tamatarcha, on the Taman peninsula. During the Eleventh century Tmutorokan kept up a lively contact with Kiev and Chernigov. There was in that region a monastery that seems to have been dependent on the Kievan Pechersky Lavra. This outpost of the Kievan State played an important part in the commercial and cultural relations of the Eastern Slavs with Transcaucasus, Persia and the Hellenized Asia Minor. The flourishing time of the Tmutorokan was however short; already the presence in our steppe of the Pechenegs (Patzinaks) was

a warning sign. The invasion of the Polovtsi put an end to this eastern expansion of the Kievan State. From the end of the Eleventh century we have no records about it whatever in the Chronicles. There is vague information about Tmutorokan again at the end of the Twelfth century, but it leads to the conclusion that at that time the Tmutorokan was politically dependent on Byzantium and thus lost to Ukraine.

Lost also were the territories situated in the nearest south and south-east, such as now form the southern Poltava province. In the middle of the Twelfth century the southern boundary was the river Vorskla, and the town Poltava existed already at that time under the name of Ltava. But very soon, under the pressure of the Polovtsi, the line of Ukrainian settlements receded as far as Pereyaslav, and when, in the year 1187, the three Sieveran princes set out on their well known campaign against the Polovtsi which is the subject of the remaining oldest Ukrainian epic "Slovo o polku Igoreve" (Tale of the Expedition of Igor), they had only to cross the river Seim to find themselves in the "unknown steppe of the Polovtsi". Where did the population of the present Poltava, Kharkov and Kursk provinces vanish?

16. Formation of the Great Russian People.

We have already related how it receded to the north and north-west into more naturally protected wooded territories of the northern Chernigov and Volynia. A certain number of these refugees did not stop there, but having traversed the great forests of Bryansk, went further north, across the territory of Vyatichi and settled on the spaces between the upper Volga and Oka that were already to a certain extent colonized by the Northern Slavic tribes from Novgorod. These spaces had previously been sparsely occupied by Finnish tribes. These Finns were, in course of time, assimilated by the Slavs. Out of the blending of the Finnish people with Eastern Slavs from two different tribes, Northern and Southern, the Great Russians were gradually formed.

Up to recent times, historians attributed to the Southern Ukrainian settlers a preponderant part in the formation of the Great Russian race, though not denying the colonization of the basin of the upper Volga and the Oka by North Eastern Slavs of Novgorod. But recent investigations, both archaeological and anthropological, have convinced them of the limited part played by the Ukrainian settlers. Thus, for instance, Spitsin, a well known Russian archaeologist, decidedly denies a mass colonization of North Russia by the refugees from the Ukraine. Firstly, he does not consider the danger of the Polovtsi invasion sufficiently strong, and insists on the readiness of the Ukrainians to fight and oppose the raids of the nomads. In his opinion, the Ukrainian population never lost their courage in the struggle to such an extent as to flee and abandon their land altogether. On the contrary, he sees in the Chronicles the tendency to look down upon the "infidel", and the readiness to take revenge on them at every opportune moment. Besides, Spitsin considers as improbable, nay impossible, a mass emigration from the South to the North: "abandon the fertile black earth", he says, "for the sands and marshes, the steppe for the forest, a warm climate for a cold, assured harvests for scanty ones, the oxen for horses, the cottage for the blockhouse, large villages for isolated settlements, an easy life for hard work: hardly would one do so, moved only by slight cause".

Formerly, the fact that names of Ukrainian towns were given to new settlements in Russia from the Twelfth century: Pereyaslav, Peremishl, Zvenihorod, Halich, Volodimir, Yuriev and others, was insisted on as proof of colonization. Spitsin accounts for these names as having been given officially by the princes, who were from the Ukrainian south. Further, these duplicate names belong to towns and princely residences, but not to villages, thus they are official and not popular names.

In this way it is proved that the chief Slav elements that settled in the basin of the upper Volga and Oka came

from Novgorod and other North Slavic tribes, and that the Ukrainians made only an unimportant contribution.

There were, too, aboriginal elements that entered as a constituent part in the formation of the Great Russians. "We are obliged to admit", says Kliuchevsky, "a certain part played by the Finnish tribes in the formation of our anthropological type. Our Great Russian physiognomy does not exactly express the general Slavic type. Other Slavs noticing common features, observe, however, certain anthropological particularities of the Great Russian type, such as the high cheek bones, sallow skin, dark hair, and especially the peculiar Great Russian nose with its broad base. All these must be attributed to Finnish influence". Kliuchevsky insists also on the Finnish influences which modified the Russian language.

Platonov also notices the part played by the Finns in the formation of the Russian type that brought about the changes of anthropological and linguistic character in the Slavic colonists settled among Finns. Some of the modern Russian historians such as Presniakov, Liubavski, and Pokrovski, for instance, do not consider the process of colonization as a peaceful one. They speak of a conquest and of the submission of the aboriginal population already skilled in agriculture, and as civilized as the colonists themselves. Pokrovski writes: "Great Russia is built on the bones of the Finns and in the veins of the modern Great Russian flows at least 80 % of Finnish blood". He calls also the Muscovian State that united and consolidated the Great Russian nation, "a prison of peoples", as the Empire of the Romanovs was also later called.

It is not only the mixture of Finnish blood that played a decisive part in the formation of the Great Russian type. Geographic as well as climatic influences were equally important. There was the struggle with forest and marshes to gain even a small patch of the poor ground that yielded but a scanty harvest and there was the northern climate that demanded from the population an enormous effort in exchange for small results. The colonists settled among the poor and thinly scattered Finnish popu-

lation. There were no towns and life was excessively primitive. The political power of princes was also very patriarchal, being based on the support of the landed aristocracy. These peculiar conditions put their stamp on the formation of the national type of the Russian, very different from the Ukrainian. In opposition to Ukrainian individualism, Russians show a strongly developed solidarity, a tendency to support common interests, a readiness to sacrifice the individual to the welfare of the community, and give preponderance to common interests over the individual. The struggle with implacable nature, incessant toil in hard conditions of life, was favorable to the development of hardiness, caution and perseverance, also resistance and energy. Thus a nation was formed, strong and healthy, hardy and active, that showed a remarkably well developed instinct for state building and an innate tendency to imperialistic expansion. At the same time the Ukrainians and the White Russians were unable to maintain their own State and their national independence, and already in the Fourteenth century fell under foreign domination. The Russians, who as a scattered conglomeration of small princedoms, fell under the yoke of the Tatars in the Thirteenth century, but during the next two centuries they united, threw off Tatar domination and emerged, at the end of the Fourteenth century, a united and mighty Muscovian autocratic State.

Although Russians and Ukrainians are seen to be clearly differentiated as early as the first half of the Twelfth century, by their strongly marked features of different ethnical type, and by their national character and political ideals, and although there existed a growing antagonism between Kiev and Suzdal, the Russian political centre of the time, particularly on the part of Kiev because of the plunder of the city in 1169 by the army of Prince Andrew (Andrei) of Suzdal, nevertheless Ukraine and Russia belonged to the same political system, were ruled by the same dynasty, and shared as Head of the Church the Metropolitan of Kiev, and thus to a certain extent, had a common life. However, this can be said

only of the upper classes, especially the clergy. A complete breach and separation was brought about by the invasion of the Tatars in 1237-1240, and the ruin and devastation following them. Subsequently the two peoples, Russians known under the name of Muscovians, and Ukrainians, went each their own way. The differences in their political, cultural and social life grew deeper and deeper until two different types were created: Russians then called Muscovians; and Ukrainians; with White Russians taking the middle way, though nearer to the Ukrainians.

CHAPTER IV

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(17) Political, (18) Social and (19) Economic Conditions in the Kievan State.

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17. Political Conditions in the Kievan State.

The political organization of the State was based on two principles: the power of the prince and the opinion of the population represented in the viche, a popular assembly akin to the Anglo Saxon "Folk moot". All the princes belonged to the Scandinavian dynasty of Rurik, local tribal dynasties previous to the Northmen having, at least in Ukraine, disappeared very early. Though the princes considered all East Slavic lands as lands of the "Rus" belonging to their clan or family, still they had to reckon with an old institution like the viche. Undoubtedly the viche as an organ of the sovereign people embodied a principle much older than the monarchic power, but at the period of the organization of the State by the Scandinavians the monarchic power took the uppermost place because of the armed force the princes had at their disposal, their military followers being called druzhina, corresponding to the Anglo Saxon Gesith. Under Vladimir the Great and Yaroslav the Wise, the Kievan State was comparatively centralized, and the viche was left in the background, having only local importance and the functions of local self-government. But with the weakening of centralization after Yaroslav's death, meetings of the viche again became customary. This is most apparent in the question of the succession. There was in existence a practice rather than actual law of succession to the throne, especially that of Kiev, up to the end of the Eleventh century, showing that the clan principle was at least partly observed by the sons and descendants of Yaroslav. The deceased prince was followed by his brother next in age, or in default of a brother, by the eldest son, who in his turn was followed not by his son but by his brother.

This practice was, however, as often broken as observed. At the same time there was growing in importance the principle of succession in a direct line, the eldest son succeeding his father and disregarding his uncles. It was this principle that the viche or local representatives of the people supported, when they were given or had seized dominant power. Certainly, the expulsion by the viche of an unpopular prince and invitation of another is to be considered as abnormal proceedings and rather of exceptional or revolutionary character. We know, however, of several such occurrences, as for instance, the expulsion in 1068 of the Prince Iziaslav Yaroslavich by the viche of Kiev, when in his stead they set up Vseslav, a prince of the local dynasty of Polotsk. Or for instance, when the Kievan viche in 1113 elected Vladimir Monomach, and later on gave constant support to his house. Princes invited by the viche had to accept certain conditions on oath. The communities inviting the prince and negotiating with him were indifferent as to whether he were entitled to occupy that throne or not, according to the rule of succession. Having elected a prince the community did not, however, interfere with his foreign or home policy of which he was complete master. Generally speaking, the viche in the Ukraine never had the importance which it acquired, for instance, in Novgorod, or Pskov, and other northern towns which strictly speaking were republics. According to the Chronicles, the most important viche on Ukrainian territory was the viche of Kiev, but even its functions were of an extraordinary character: such as the expulsion of a prince or election of another, a disastrous war, an imminent danger, express necessity of reforms, financial difficulties, and such like exceptional events.

At the end of the Eleventh century and during the whole of the Twelfth century when the Kievan State was practically broken up into several princedoms with their own dynasties at the head, the old clan practice of succession was upheld in Chernigov longer than elsewhere, though also not exclusively. The supremacy of the Kievan

crown lost, of course, its significance with the breaking up of its central power, and the title of the Great Prince of Kiev carried with it only an honorary meaning. Still "the golden throne of Kiev", as it is phrased in the Chronicle, had a historical tradition and continued to attract princes, though its political importance had long ago disappeared.

The princes of the Scandinavian dynasty were immediately surrounded by a class of men that ranked above the population. These were their military followers, called "druzhina". At first they lived in the palace, and, sharing with the prince "fire and bread" belonged thus to his household. At that time they were almost exclusively Scandinavians, as is seen from the names that have come down to us. From the last half of the Eleventh century the followers (druzhina) were mostly of local origin. The eldest or more important among them besides being warriors, also held offices in the State, and if assembled, constituted the political Council of the prince. The composition of this Council was not regulated by any law, but seems to have depended purely on local usages and customs. Sometimes besides these councillors, or as they began to be called "boyars", municipal and local representatives sat in the prince's council. Vladimir Monomach in his "Instruction to his children" advises them "to sit down and take counsel with the 'druzhina'."

The court of a prince, besides being the monarch's household, had also the functions of State, as was usually the case in primitive forms of State organization everywhere in Central and Western Europe. We have records about the officials of a court of the prince from the Twelfth century. At their head was the "dvorski" which corresponded to "palatinus" or "comes palatii" and "maire du palais" (Steward). There was also a Keeper of the Seal or Chancellor, Gentlemen of the Bedchamber and others. The property of the prince and the necessities of his household were administered by his keykeepers and "tiuns" who, although often of obscure origin, as for example

liberated slaves, carried out administrative and judicial functions as his lieutenants.

All the power, administrative, military, and juridical, was concentrated in the hands of the prince, and theoretically he was expected to carry out personally all the functions, and only in his absence, confer them on others. Vladimir Monomach advised the prince not to rely on the officials, and as far as possible do everything himself. With the growth and development of the State, this became, of course, impossible, and the prince was forced to rely on appointed officials, military and administrative, and on judges. The druzhina of the prince alone were of course insufficient for the defence of the land and for wars and campaigns. For that purpose military forces furnished by the population were put at his disposal. This popular army was divided into "hundreds" and "thousands" with corresponding leaders at their head, who although elected at first, became appointed by the prince and were then his officials.

18. Social Conditions in the Kievan State.

The druzhina of the prince and his officials constituted a small class of "prince's men". With the exception of this class and a small class of "church men", men who stood under the protection of the church, the rest of the free population were either country people or town people according to their way of living. There was an upper class consisting of great landowners and rich merchants who were closely connected with the prince's boyars. They were known under the name of "best men" or "town elders", or simply boyars. They were the land and town aristocracy whose position depended on their wealth, consisting of land, possessions or trade. Between this upper class and the rest of the free population there was no unsurmountable barrier, that is to say, these classes were in no case castes: every free man according to his personal merit or good fortune, was entitled to become follower of the prince, and the lower classes of the free population according to their changed circumstances

could rise to the boyar group. All free men enjoyed political rights and had a voice in the "viche". This equality of rights did not prevent economic differences, which were very striking. Rich boyars oppressed and exploited the poorer classes of small traders and artisans, and we know of grave discontents and violent disorders such as the uprisings of 1068 and 1113 in Kiev.

The peasants at this period were small freeholders occupying and cultivating their own land. There was also a class of land tillers who though free, had no land of their own and worked for other landowners for a share of the harvest. They were often liable to become slaves through debts.

Quite by itself was the class of "serfs" or "slaves". The chief source of slavery was war, but in addition to prisoners of war who became slaves, debt and bankruptcy carried with them a loss of personal freedom. A slave had no rights whatever; he could not, for example, bear witness in court. If someone killed a slave he had to make good the loss to his owner for any material damage, but he remained otherwise unpunished. Christianity contributed to the amelioration of the situation of serfs and slaves.

The organization of the Church brought with it the formation of a special small class known as "men of the Church" which consisted not only of the clergy, priests and monks and servants of the Church, but also of serfs and slaves bequeathed or given to the Church as well as beggars, cripples, orphans and homeless old people who sought the protection and charity of the Church. This was not a distinct, well defined class: it comprised people of different social classes and their belonging to this group was often accidental.

The introduction of Christianity and intercourse with Byzantium also influenced legislation and jurisdiction. Byzantine influence was especially felt in the ecclesiastical legislation, in the so-called Church Statutes of Vladimir the Great and Yaroslav.

In the domain of the secular law, however, old Ukrainian law remained practically independent. We possess the first attempts to set down the old custom in writing in the first half of the Eleventh century. This is the so-called "Ruska Pravda". The text of this code was discovered in 1738 and first published in 1767. Later on a great number of different copies of this interesting document were found. There exist four different versions of the "Ruska Pravda". The first and the shortest is drawn up under 17 heads, and is attributed to Yaroslav the Wise. The second version, much more elaborate and far-reaching, dates from the time of the Kievan prince Izyaslav Yaroslavich. The third, the most elaborate with its 135 paragraphs is also the best known, more than 40 copies having been found. It belongs to the reign of Vladimir Monomach. Finally, the fourth version is a short compilation of the last two. "Ruska Pravda" was not, as it would seem, the official code of law in use, but was set down probably by some clerical persons. This fact, however, does not diminish the historical value of the document, which is very important for the study of old Ukrainian law. It contains the code of Civil and Penal law. Fines for different crimes and offences against the law are therein set forth. The fines in money were paid by the offender and the amount was divided between the prince, as representing the offended law, and the victim. In a case of murder, for instance, part of the money paid by the murderer, the so-called "vira" went to the prince, the rest to the kinsmen of the slain man. The same procedure was known among the Anglo-Saxon as "wer-gild". In case of lesser offences part of the fine was given to the injured party as his damages. The chief source of the "Ruska Pravda" was the practice in the courts. Along with the practice of fines "Ruska Pravda" recognizes the older custom: the right of the kinsmen to avenge the murder. Corporal punishment was given only to serfs and slaves. Very high fines are set for offences against private honor, which is significant as showing the high conception of honor. In the portions on the Civil law

there are sections about rights of property, its succession, sales, and acquisition, about money-lending and the like.

19. Economic Conditions in the Kievan State.

Economic affairs in the Ukraine of the Tenth to the Thirteenth centuries were based on the primitive natural economy of production and distribution, with preponderance of extraction of raw material for export and exchange, over manufacturing, or generally speaking, of extensive economy over intensive. Finally, hunting, fishing and primitive bee-keeping gradually gave place to cattle-breeding and agriculture. In the Tenth century, however, agriculture was already highly developed. We have records of wheat, rye, barley, oats, flax, peas, poppy (for seed) being cultivated. In the Eleventh and Twelfth centuries we know of landed property being sold, given, or inherited, as well as confiscated. From the "Ruska Pravda" we know of heavy fines being inflicted for encroachment of the bounds of landed property. The origin of property in land was by the occupation of free areas and the introduction of culture on them. Stretches once cultivated could be sold or otherwise disposed of, as they had now a market value. Land property where serf or slave labor was provided was the most valuable. Some economists think that the conception of land as private property grew out of slavery, land being plentiful and labor scarce. "This is **my** land because **my** serfs till it".

Examining the conditions of landed property in Ukraine in the Tenth to the Thirteenth centuries we find a complete analogy with the social structure in Central and Western Europe: feudalism was the system that prevailed throughout the Ukraine. Especially it was developed in the Galician-Volynian principedom.

As in Western Europe land property constituted in the Ukraine the economic basis of national wealth as well as the basis of the political and social structure of the State. The whole was based upon the feudal principle of rendering military service and obedience by lesser vassals in the feudal heirarchy to their tenants-in-chief

for the possession of land. The difference between the feudal system in the Ukraine and that in Western Europe was only in the historical process of feudalisation. In Western and Central Europe great barons came immediately after the king in the feudal scale, whereas in the Ukraine the numerous lesser princes were tenants-in-chief and vassals to the Great Prince of Kiev, and their own immediate vassals were their military followers, or the boyars, who in their turn had their vassals and followers who held land from them.

Another important feature lay in the fact that the great mass of Ukrainian peasants were at that time not serfs but small freeholders engaged in agriculture in peace time and bound to military service in wartime, something like the English yeomen.

Besides the feudal social structure of rural Ukraine, the towns and the town population played a very important part in the historical development. Ukrainian historians in studying the early mediaeval culture of our country are unanimous in attributing the creative and organizing part to the town aristocracy whose wealth was derived from foreign trade. Indeed, it was through the trade with foreign lands that the principal Ukrainian towns such as Kiev, Chernigov, Pereyaslav and others came into existence, and grew, and prospered. From time immemorial these towns were central and convenient points where foreign merchants brought their goods to be bartered for local products. Local merchants were supported and protected by the Northmen, military adventurers, who also were traders. It was through the Scandinavians that Slavic and strictly speaking Ukrainian merchants were introduced into the wider international trade which the Scandinavians organized with the daring and adventurous spirit wholly lacking in the Slavs. The principal achievement of the Scandinavian dynasty was that of organization and the regular protection of international trade by military power.

The foreign trade of the Ukraine was, as we have

said, carried on with Byzantium and the East, and the Balkans, and with Poland, Hungary, Bohemia and Germany in the West. The most important trade routes were of course, the rivers. The Dnieper, which used to be the main trade route of the country, was even called in the Kievan Chronicle "the route from the Scandinavians (Variags) to the Greek". The river Desna on the left and the Pripet on the right were important inner trade channels as well as other lesser tributaries of the Dnieper river system in which Kiev occupied a most convenient and central place. The Dniester served also as a trade route. It was navigable then from the town Halich down to the Black Sea. As well as water routes, there were also routes across the land. We read in the Chronicle about three of the most important roads. The Greek road led from Kiev down to the south and ended in the Crimea, where important Greek (Byzantine) colonies lay. The Zalozny road led from Kiev eastwards to the river Don and down to the Azov Sea. The Salt road led to the salt lakes in Northern Crimea. There were, of course, also other roads and Kiev lay at their junctions. In order to pass over from one river system to another there were portages. For example, going up the river Samara, the southernmost left tributary of the Dnieper, the boats were portaged to the river Kalmius that flows into the Azov Sea. More striking still, the boats going up the Dnieper were carried overland to the river Lovat, that flows into the lake Ilmen and thence down to the Baltic. Rivers at that time used to be deeper and carried far more water. In our day, at the bottom of small rivers, remnants of boats have been found, so large that we can hardly believe they were used on these streams.

The chief exports to Byzantium were slaves, bees wax, honey, hides and cattle, furs, dried fish and corn. Imported from Byzantium were woven materials, wines, and other luxuries. From the East, the Ukraine imported fine woven materials, spices and perfumes, precious stones and jewelry, such as, plate, rings, bracelets, earrings, pins, and buckles, all being artistically wrought

objects that are now abundantly found in the archaeological excavations in the Ukraine.

Commercial relations with Byzantium were regulated, as we have seen, by special commercial and peace treaties very elaborately drawn up.

In addition to trade with Poland and Hungary, the nearest neighbors, Western European trade was carried on with Prague, Regensburg on the Danube, Vienna and other cities. Regensburg, for example, had in Kiev, in the Twelfth century, its own commercial court of representatives. The west European traders exported from the Ukraine hides, furs, corn, cattle, horses, Byzantine and Oriental goods. They imported weapons, wrought metal and objects of wood, woven materials and so on. An important part in the trade was played by German Jews. In Kiev, numerous foreigners were settled, such as, Poles, Greeks, Jews, Armenians, not only merchants, but artisans and small traders.

The inland trade was also very fully developed. Northern provinces brought to Kiev, principally furs, and took from Kiev, grain and foreign goods. From Kolomya in Galicia, salt was brought into the Ukraine. Polovtsi sold horses and cattle to the Ukrainians and bought grain from them.

The trade was carried on by caravans because of the insecurity of roads due to the robbers. Trading required commercial capital and credit which was very expensive, as interest rates were excessive. It was constantly regulated by the princes; for instance, Vladimir Monomach limited it to 40% per year. "Ruska Pravda" gives an important place to commercial relations and sometimes it was called, not without reason, "the code of commercial capital".

From abundant archaeological numismatical finds we have exact knowledge of the old Ukrainian coinage. There are also many references to it in the "Ruska Pravda" and occasionally in the Chronicles. Owing to flourishing foreign trade, foreign money was also current. In the archaeological excavations from the Seventh to the

Ninth centuries Arabic, Byzantine and Scandinavian coins are found in great quantities. The first local monetary system was in valuable furs, a marten skin or "kuna" being used as the unit. It was replaced by a silver unit called "hrivna". Its weight was $\frac{1}{3}$ pound in silver and it had the form of a silver bar. It was also cut into smaller weights. In the reign of Vladimir the Great, stamped gold and silver coins appear, of a weight of about 6 grams, respectively. The coins were stamped with the likeness of the prince and his coat of arms, a trident.

Commercial relations with the East were soon interrupted by the invasion of the nomads which obstructed the road leading to the Caspian and the Caucasus. Relations with Byzantium were also rendered difficult. Nevertheless, the Eleventh and Twelfth centuries are considered to be the flourishing period of Kievan trade.

Economic development produced a rich material and spiritual culture, the centre of which was Kiev. In order to present a true picture of the Kievan State in the Tenth to the Twelfth centuries, some of the more important of these features must be considered.

Thietmar of Merseburg, in Germany, who visited Kiev in 1018, left a description in which he relates that there were in Kiev, 400 churches, 8 market places and "countless numbers of people". Adam of Bremen speaks of Kiev in 1072 as a rival to Constantinople and "a jewel of Greece". The records of the travellers are corroborated by the remains in Kiev of the monuments of that time. If we take into consideration only a few, the beautiful Saint Sophia built by Yaroslav the Wise, finished in 1037; the convents Pecherski, Saint Michel and Saint Cyril; the remnants of other buildings with their sculptures, frescoes and mosaics; and consider the objects excavated, especially jewelry and the well known Kievan enamel; we will not think the information left to us by contemporary travellers is exaggerated. Architectural monuments of the same time are also to be found in

Chernigov. The cathedral of Chernigov was begun in 1024 and is thus contemporary with Saint Sophia in Kiev. In Kaniv, Pereyaslav, Volodomir in Volynia, Ovruch, Bilhorodka, Halich and other towns on the wide plains of the middle Dnieper, are found similar remains.

Contemporary Ukrainian literature also shows a brilliant development of original local growth. There is also evident, foreign literary influences, chiefly Byzantine. Thirty original Ukrainian literary relics of the Eleventh century, incorporated in manuscripts of later time, have come down to us, and sixty-five of the Twelfth century. Among these there are works of great historic and literary value, such as Sermons of the Metropolitan Hilarion, Epistles of Cyril, Bishop of Turiv, of Clement Smolyatic, the Chronicle of Kiev; and finally a precious fragment of the more extensive epics of the Twelfth century, the "Tale of the Expedition of Igor" (*Slovo o polku Igoreve*) which relates the historic campaign led by the princes of Siveran territories in 1187 against the Polovtsi. Together with fragments of tales of military exploits of the princes' *druzhina* that have come down to our time inserted in the Kievan and Galician and Volynian Chronicles, this epic poem is the greatest literary monument of the old Ukrainian Golden Age. So much for the original works of the old Ukrainian literature which, with the exception of this heroic epic and the Chronicles, took the form, here as elsewhere, of works of religious and moral edification.

Translations, mostly from the Greek, constituted, also, an important part of the literary relics of the Kievan period. Religious works prevail here also. Besides the translation of the Gospel and Bible, liturgical and other church books, lives of Saints and works of the Fathers of the Church, we have, also, contemporary fiction, such as, tales of Barlaam and Josaphat, the Destruction of Troy, the Tale of Alexander, a rich literature of Apocrypha, and a series of translations and compilations of popular works on geography, and astronomy, complete the literary inheritance of the Kievan period.

Prof. Platonov says that Kiev, at this time, was the trading post, not only between the south and the north, Scandinavia and Byzantium, but also, between the East and the West, between Europe and Asia. In the city were Polish, Jewish, German, Greek and Armenian quarters. Quiet agricultural pursuits mingled here with the noise and activity of commercial traffic. Life here was many-sided. Through trading, the population came into touch with different nations and this contributed to the accumulation of wealth and knowledge. Conditions were favorable here for the growth and development of culture, which soon flourished to a high degree. Enlightenment brought about by the introduction of Christianity was sheltered and flourished in numerous convents, acquiring many friends and protectors. We know that the new Christian moral teaching was most successful in overcoming the pagan coarseness and barbarity. We meet here princes who read and collect books, who order translations of foreign works. We see here the development of schools and teaching under the protection of the Church. We admire works of art, frescoes and mosaics made by local artists after the Greek fashion and read works of enlightened Ukrainian theologians.

Kiev, the capital of the Kievan State, was then the oldest and most important centre of culture in the whole of Eastern Europe. Its influence was decisive for the growing towns in Great Russia, such as Novgorod, Suzdal, Vladimir on the Kliazma, Rostov and later Moscow. Churches and palaces and public buildings were built and adorned after the Kievan fashion. In all these new centres literary works were indebted to Kievan authors, whose works were copied and imitated. The influence of Kiev was also felt in the West, in Poland and Bohemia and Ukrainian works of arts and crafts were known and admired in France and in Germany. When the prince of Kiev, Iziaslav Yaroslavich, banished from the Ukraine, fled to Germany and appeared at the court of the German Emperor Henry IV, in Mainz, the wealth and magnificence of his clothes, his weapons, and the treasures he brought

with him from Kiev were greatly admired and commented on by German Chroniclers.

The standard of culture in the Ukraine of the Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth centuries was by no means below that of the other new nations in Western Europe. As for their nearest neighbors, Poles, Hungarians and others, historians investigating their early relations with the Ukraine recognize without hesitation the superiority of the latter.

CHAPTER V

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(20) The Princedom of Galicia and Volynia. (21) Vladimirko. (22) Yaroslav Osmomisl. (23) Roman. (24) King Daniel and His House. (25) Invasion of the Tatars. (26) The Decline of the Galician-Volynian Princedom. (27) Trade and Cultural Influences.

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20. The Princedom of Galicia and Volynia.

When in the first half of the Thirteenth century the Tatars made their initial appearance in the Ukrainian steppes, the Princedom of Yaroslav the Wise, such as we knew it under him and his sons, existed no longer, it having been divided into separate independent princedoms, among which Kiev was no longer the political centre. The leading part among Ukrainian princedoms fell to the princes of Galicia, and thus the political centre was removed westward.

21. Vladimirko.

Galicia was ruled at that time by the house founded by Prince Rostislav, a grandson of Yaroslav the Wise. Among the members of this house were many gifted and able princes. In the middle of the Twelfth century we find here one of the most successful, Prince Vladimirko (1141-1153), an energetic and able ruler, who transferred his capital from Peremishl to Halich on the Dniester, overcame and handled successfully the rebellious boyars, put aside a dangerous pretender to his crown and sat firmly in his new capital, in spite of the hostilities of the prince of Kiev and the proximity of Poland and Hungary, both of whom were extremely desirous of seizing and annexing Galicia. Against the Hungarians, Vladimirko had sought alliance with the Byzantine Emperor Emanuel Comnenus. Indeed, Vladimirko's sister was married to his son. Against the great prince Iziaslav II of Kiev, Vladimirko had an ally in the person of Prince Yuri (George) the Longhanded, of Suzdal, confirmed by the marriage of Vladimirko's son, Yaroslav, to Yuri's daughter.

Though Vladimirko succeeded in strengthening Galicia and extending his power to the Podolia, Bukovina and Bessarabia, his heir, Yaroslav, began his reign under very difficult circumstances.

22. Yaroslav Osmomisl.

Yaroslav, surnamed Osmomisl (1153-1187) was an even more capable ruler than his father. The Chronicle speaks of him as of a "prince wise and well-spoken, pious and honored in foreign lands, and famous by reason of his armies". Yaroslav was of a fiery and powerful character, often uncontrollable in his impulses, but he had keen political insight and was a careful manager of the State's finances. During his reign the position of Galicia was very much strengthened and he became one of the most powerful Slavic princes of his time. The unknown author of the epic "Slovo o polku Igoreve" addresses him with an apostrophe: "O Yaroslav Osmomisl of Galicia! you sit high on your golden throne, propping with your armies the Hungarian (Carpathian) mountains, shutting out the way to the king, closing the gate of the Danube, dispensing justice as far as the river Danube. Your wrath flows on your lands!"

Yaroslav kept up wide diplomatic relations with the Byzantine Emperor, and the German Emperor, Friedrich Barbarossa. In the East he always counted on his father-in-law, Prince Yuri the Longhanded, of Suzdal. Galicia under his reign extended to the Black Sea. Galician boats went fishing and trading unhindered down the Dniester. The flourishing trade enriched the population and gave to the prince resources for keeping a strong army and carrying on his active foreign policy. His capital, Halich, became an important centre of trade and culture that inherited the chief features of Kiev, being the meeting place of Eastern, Western and Byzantine influences. The ruins of churches, especially those of St. Panteleymon in Halich, are a characteristic monument of the time showing in the architecture, both Roman and Byzantine influences and features. The town of Halich

was strongly fortified and a bishopric was founded there by Yaroslav.

Home affairs in Yaroslav's principedom, however, did not correspond with the outward power of his realm. The landed aristocracy of Galician boyars had already in Vladimirko's time, acquired great influence in State affairs. These boyars, as elsewhere in Eastern Slavic lands, originated in the former military followers or *druzhina* of the prince. They demanded voice in important questions, denied to the prince the right of decision without the consent of the *Boyarska Rada*, or Council, and seized and disposed of high State offices. Yaroslav managed, somehow, to keep them more or less in check, but after his death in 1187, they seized the power, expelled his sons, and offered the Galician crown to Prince Roman Mstislavich of Volynia, a member of the house of the Monomach, and grandson of Iziaslav II of Kiev.

At first this only led to a great strife, Yaroslav's son Vladimir, fled to Hungary for help. The Hungarian king, Bela III, came indeed, with an army, expelled Roman, and occupied Halich, but not with the intention of returning it to Vladimir. He left in Halich his own son, Andrew, with a strong Hungarian garrison. The Galician boyars were at first well pleased, as in fact, they ruled the country. But the population, and especially the clergy, much resented the foreign occupation, and the metropolitan of Kiev appealed to all Ukrainian princes to deliver Galicia from foreigners. In the meantime, Prince Vladimir of Galicia fled from Hungary, where he had been kept as hostage, to Emperor Frederic Barbarossa, in order to help against the Hungarians. Barbarossa occupied at that time in preparations for his famous Crusade, had little time to put Galician affairs in order, but commissioned the Polish king, Casimir the Just, his vassal, to give help to Vladimir. When the latter appeared in Galicia with a Polish army this time, he was welcomed as a deliverer from the Hungarians. This first Hungarian occupation lasted for about a year, and Vladimir reigned

undisturbed over Galicia till 1199, when, by his death, the dynasty of the house of Rostislav came to an end.

23. Roman.

Galicia then again returned to the suzerainty of Prince Roman of Volynia (1199-1205) who was one of the most remarkable Ukrainian princes at the end of the Twelfth century. In a short time, he succeeded in uniting under him, Galicia and Volynia, and creating a new powerful State that included all the Ukrainian territory between the Carpathians and the Dneiper.

Fearless and determined, Roman was merciless to his enemies, especially the rebellious boyars, but he achieved a lasting and grateful recognition in the memory of the people, in their popular songs and in the Chronicles. They speak of him as of a prince: "wise and God-fearing, who was watchful as a lynx, attacked his enemies like a lion, brought destruction on them like a crocodile, swept their countries like an eagle; whose courage was equal to that of a bison and who, like his grandfather, Monomach, was the terror of the heathen Polovtsi".

Son of a Polish princess, daughter of Boleslav, the Wry-mouthed, Roman spent his youth in Poland and Germany, which helped him later on to understand the political situation in Central Europe. His father Mstislav, was for a time Great Prince of Kiev, and had set him up as his lieutenant in Novgorod. After his father's death, Roman returned to the Ukraine and occupied the throne of Volynia. As we have seen, he tried in 1188 to set foot in Galicia, but unsuccessfully. After Vladimir's death, he made another attempt, and this time held the Galician principedom firmly in his hands. He became now, the most important political power in the Ukraine, subdued the rebellious boyars at home, expelled his father-in-law, Prince Rurik of Kiev, and set up his lieutenant in that town, thus making Kiev dependent on the Galician-Volynian prince.

Roman kept up friendly relations with Byzantium, with Hungary, and with Pope Innocent III. There is a

legend about Pope Innocent having offered him the title of King if he would accept the Roman Catholic rite, but Roman remained true to the Greek Orthodox religion. Modern historians, however, consider this to be a legend without any foundation. Toward the end of his life, Roman was involved in the strife between the Guelfs and Ghibellines, taking the side of the latter, that is of the German Emperor of the house of Hohenstaufen. He made war against the Polish king Leshko, who sided with the Guelfs, with the intention of bringing help to the Swabian king Philip and was slain in a battle in the summer of 1205.

24. King Daniel and His House.

Owing to his untimely death, Roman had not time to strengthen his throne and his young sons were put aside by the boyars, who seized the power, in order to invite a prince of the house of Chernigov. The eldest of Roman's sons, Daniel, was brought up at the court of the Hungarian king Andrew, and it was only after forty years of very adventurous life, full of hardships and danger, that he recovered the inheritance of his father, the throne of Galicia. To the land itself, these forty years brought no peace, and the name of "great revolt" by which this period is designated in the Chronicle seems to be justified by the events. Several times the land was occupied either by the Hungarians or the Poles; several princes of distant Chernigov and even of the more distant Novgorod, sat one after the other on the Galician throne or divided the principedom among themselves. Daniel, however, succeeded in the end in overcoming all the pretenders and all the hindrances put in his way by the rebellious boyars. In the year 1240 he finally took possession of Galicia, and very soon united all the Ukrainian lands this side of the Dnieper and put his lieutenant in Kiev.

It is about this time that the great invasion of the Tatars took place. Like all former nomads, the Tatars came from the East. Their advance into the Ukrainian

steppes was only a ripple in the mighty upheaval made in Central Asia by the Great Khan of Mongolia, Temuchin, at the beginning of the Thirteenth century.

25. Invasion of the Tatars.

The home of the Mongols was the steppe of Gobi, beyond lake Baikal, in the south-eastern basin of the river Amur. The Mongols led a nomadic life in these steppes, plundering the neighbors, hiring themselves out for military service, as they did, for example, to the Chinese. Each of these hordes had its own dynasty at its head, who chose a Khan from among themselves. One of these Khans, the Chingiz Khan (Great Khan) Temuchin, elected in 1206, set out on a series of successful campaigns which led him to the conquest of Turkestan, Bokhara, Khiva and Northern Persia. Advancing always westwards the Tatars plundered and devastated till their countless hordes arrived at the Caspian Sea and attacked in 1222, the Polovtsi. The alarm spread over the whole Ukraine and in consequence an assembly of almost all the Ukrainian Princes was held in Kiev, where it was decided to meet the enemy in the field. The Polovtsi were invited to take part in the campaign.

The Tatars spent the winter 1222-23 in the Ukrainian steppes making a diversion in the Crimea where they ruined and plundered several towns. In the spring of 1223 a united Ukrainian army set out against the Tatars. The foot regiments went down the Dnieper in boats, and the horse followed along the river. The Galician army came in boats down the Dniester into the Black Sea and then up the Dnieper. The armies rallied just below the rapids of the Dnieper and started eastward in the steppe. The Chronicles which preserve all these details, tell us that there was an embassy from the Tatars asking for peaceful relations, but the Ukrainian princes would not hear of entering into parleys. The Galician prince, Daniel, advanced in the vanguard and was the first to meet the advance posts of Tatars. The Ukrainian army came as far east as the Azov Sea when they met the

principal force of the Tatars. The battle fought on 31st May, 1223, on the river Kalka (now Kalmiyus) was fatal to the Ukrainians. There was no unity of command in the Ukrainian army nor a common plan of campaign. The Polovtsi who were in the front, did not resist the onslaught of the Mongols, and fled, infecting the Ukrainian armies with such panic, that it was impossible to rally them. Though they fought with great courage, the advantage of the battle and the superior numbers being on the side of the enemy, the Ukrainians were utterly routed. The Kievans, with their Prince Mstislav, resisted three days, defending themselves in a hurriedly fortified camp, but were defeated. A number of princes were taken prisoner and slain by the Tatars. The Galician Prince Daniel saved his life, though severely wounded. The united Ukrainian forces, according to the Chronicles, had numbered about a hundred thousand. The remnants fled to the Dnieper. Many perished in flight, especially in crossing the river. The defeat of the Ukrainian army made a tremendous impression in the Ukraine, according to the Chronicles. The Tatars, however, did not this time pursue their success. They returned to the East and disappeared for some fourteen years. The Chronicler could only note down, at that time, that "the unknown enemy came, nobody knows whence, and vanished, no one knows whither".

The Ukrainian princes probably soon recovered from the defeat on the Kalka, as it made apparently no change in their internal relations. Their quarrels continued, especially that between Daniel and his adversaries for the possession of Galicia which finally ended by Daniel's temporary recovery of Halich in 1237. In the same year, the Tatars returned. The catastrophe on the river Kalka, appears to have been only a prelude to the great ruin and devastation they brought into Eastern Europe for centuries to come. This time they came even in greater numbers, under the Khan Batu and directed their attack against the Great Russian princedoms which fell one after the other into their hands and were plundered and

ruined. In the spring of 1239, the Tatars attacked Ukrainian territory; they took and laid in ruins Pereyaslav and Chernigov, crossed the Dnieper and laid siege to Kiev. The city was defended by Daniel's lieutenant, Dimitri, but after a heroic resistance was taken and then pillaged and devastated. The Tatars continued their way westwards, traversed Volynia, Galicia, Poland and Hungary carrying with them ruin and devastation. It was only in Silesia, near Liegnitz, in 1242, that their advance was checked by the united forces of the Czechs and the Germans. Furthermore, some event in Mongolia, in connection with the death of the Great Khan and the elections of a new ruler compelled the Khan Batu to return. He then began his retreat, retraversed the whole of the ruined Ukrainian territory, and stopped on the Volga. Here he founded his residence, and sent embassies to all the princes of the ruined territories demanding tribute and submission. Thus began the period known in the history of the Ukraine and Great Russia as the "yoke of the Tatars".

For Great Russia, this period lasted until 1480. In the Ukraine it was very much shorter and had a different character altogether. Here, the domination of the Mongols never produced the influences it had in Russia on the social and political structure of the State and the life, culture, usages and customs of the population. There was a difference of geographical position. Russia was in close vicinity to the Volga where the Tatars remained encamped, and the facility of access by that river rendered possible to the conquerors, frequent interventions into the home affairs of Great Russian principedoms and exactions of tribute. Every prince had to be confirmed in his rights to his throne by the Khan, had to appear personally in his camp. to pay homage to him, performing humiliating ceremonies and bringing rich gifts. The Russian population had to pay heavy head-taxes collected by the Tatar officials. The Great Russian principedoms, and especially that of Suzdal, the most important among them, were completely cut off by the Tatars from the

rest of the world. The Republic of Novgorod alone, among the North-Eastern Slavic States was not conquered by the Mongols and continued to stand in close relations with the Hanseatic League of commercial towns of the Baltic. The Great Russians were in complete submission to the Asiatic conqueror during centuries, and it was only slowly that they freed themselves from their control and domination. This long period of Asiatic domination left a very strong stamp on the subsequent national and historical development of Russians. It is to this long and close intercourse with the Tatars and centuries of submission to their control that the Russians owe the autocratic despotic form of their own government in Moscow, and at later period in St. Petersburg, as well as all the Asiatic or Eastern features of their character and conception of life, features that were entirely foreign to the Eastern Slavs and that distinguish the Russians from the Ukrainians and from other Slavs.

The situation in the Ukraine during the Tatar conquest was different. First of all, in the sense that this conquest was never accepted; on the contrary, it provoked resistance. In the beginning, it is true, the Tatars laid their hands also, on the Ukrainian Princes. Prince Daniel himself, was forced to pay homage to the Khan and acknowledged his supremacy, but it was only temporarily. We see from the Ukrainian Chronicles how deeply this humiliation was felt, and how they were never reconciled to it. Also, several acts of resistance, such as the refusal by Prince Michel of Chernigov to pay homage to the Khan, for which he was tortured to death, show another spirit in the Ukraine. The geographical position of the Ukraine and the distance from the Tatar camp was also more favorable, as well as the uninterrupted connection with Central and Western Europe.

Recovered from the first blow of the Tatar invasion, Prince Daniel directed his policy towards closer alliance with his western neighbors. He sought from them and from the rest of Europe help against the Mongols. Daniel made peace with the king of Hungary and married his son

Lev to his daughter. His further step was to obtain from the Pope, Innocent IV, a call to a crusade against the Tatars.

Even before Prince Daniel began his negotiations with the Pope, the Metropolitan of Kiev, Peter Akerovich, dispossessed by the Tatars of his see, went to Rome and not finding the Pope there, followed him to Lyons where, in 1245, Pope Innocent IV, presided over the Ecclesiastical Council. The Kievan Metropolitan told the assembly about the horrors of the Tatar invasion, and warned Western Europe of the danger from the East. We know about his presence in Lyons from two contemporary English Chronicles. From these also, is derived our knowledge about his mission to the Pope, and about his activity in Lyons, where he accepted the Union with the Roman Catholic Church.

It is probably under the influence of Peter Akerovich that the Pope sent his Legate, Plano Carpini, to the Tatars to reconnoitre. On his way to the Horde, Plano Carpini saw Daniel's brother Prince Vassilko, and tried to persuade him to acknowledge the Union with the Roman Catholic Church. Later in the year, he met Prince Daniel on the river Don, as Daniel was on his way from the Khan, and heard from him that his ambassador was already on his way to the Pope. Returning from his journey to the Tatars, Plano Carpini took with him another ambassador from the Galician prince to Rome. In this way an active correspondence was started between the Pope and Prince Daniel. The Pope sent him one Bull after another, took the Galician prince under "the protection of St. Peter" and promised help. However, he was not able to carry out Daniel's most desired wish—to organize a crusade against the Tatars. Thus Prince Daniel soon abandoned his plan of Union with the Roman Catholic Church.

Besides his negotiations with the Pope with a view to a crusade, Prince Daniel worked out another plan that was meant to bring him certain support in the West. When after the death of the last Duke of Austria of the House of Babenbergs, his inheritance was seized by the Czech

king Ottokar II, the Pope advised Daniel to marry his son, Roman, to Gertrud, the daughter of the late Duke of Austria who was heiress to the Austrian throne. Roman, however, though duly married to Gertrud, was overcome by the Czechs and fled back to his father. Thus Daniel's Austrian plan led to nothing. Daniel's relationships with the Poles were, on the whole, good.

In the meantime, there grew up in the North of the Galician-Volynian Princedom a new political power that began to threaten Ukrainian territories. This was Lithuania. Already, Prince Roman Mstislavich carried on successful wars against them when they made attacks on Volynia, and his allies were Poles and the Teutonic Order. Bearing always in mind a crusade against his chief enemy, the Tatars, Daniel made peace with the Lithuanians, but when the Lithuanian Prince Mendog united all the tribes and grew to be a dangerous neighbor, Daniel formed a strong coalition against him together with the Poles and the Knights of the Teutonic Order, following thus his father's policy. Now Daniel's frontiers and the spheres of his influence spread to the North in the basins of the rivers Nieman and Narew.

It was in the midst of these campaigns that the Pope sent his Legate to Prince Daniel with the royal crown and Daniel was crowned King of Galicia (1253) with high hopes of soon being enabled to begin an active struggle with the Tatars. However, his expectations of a crusade against the Tatars and of an effective help from Central and Western Europe for a war against them came to nought. Daniel's disappointment was very great and probably shortened his life.

With his death in 1264 there disappeared one of the ablest Ukrainian princes. As such he is unanimously considered by all Ukrainian historians. Even in the contemporary Galician-Volynian Chronicle we find a short but expressive characteristic of this prince: "the King Daniel", we are told, "was a good, a brave and a wise prince who built many towns and churches and beautified them with different adornments; he shone in brotherly

love to his brother Prince Vassilko. This king Daniel was second only to Solomon".

The Ukrainian historian Kostomarov of the last century gives us a happy characterization of King Daniel: "the destiny of this prince", he says, "was a tragic one: he achieved more than any other Ukrainian prince, making an effort that perhaps no other could emulate. The whole of the Ukraine was at one time united under his power. But his inheritance did not last because he did not strengthen it sufficiently for the future. He was not allowed to bring about a complete victory over the Tatars and with regard to his western neighbors his policy was not cunning enough to be completely successful. Courageous and fearless, Daniel was too frank and great-minded to be a successful politician. In all his dealings we do not find a trace of craftiness, even of that most innocent artfulness used by men if they do not wish to be deceived by others. This Ukrainian prince was a complete contrast to prudent and crafty Russian princes who, though differing in their respective natures and temperament, all had in common the policy of craftiness and violence and were not accustomed to choose their means. . . . The person of King Daniel remains a noble and the most attractive personality in Mediaeval Ukrainian history".

Modern Ukrainian historians, such as M. Hrushevsky and Stephan Tomashivsky, find King Daniel to be one of the most idealistic personalities in Ukrainian history. His failures do not diminish his political abilities because the circumstances in which he had to reign and display his activity were unusually difficult.

Daniel's son Lev (1264-1301) did not enter into any conflict with the Tatars, though his lands were several times devastated during their wars with Poland and Hungary. King Lev exploited adroitly the internal difficulties of Poland and the weakness of Hungary, ruined by the Tatar invasions. Allied to the Czech King Wenceslas II, he annexed the Polish territory of Lublin and recovered from Hungary the Ukrainian territory of Munkach, now called Carpathian Ukraine, which in 1919 was joined

to Czechoslovakia. He also used to his own ends the temporary weakness of Lithuania after the death of Mendog, and pushed his frontier northwards beyond the river Narev. The reign of King Lev and that of his son Yuri, was the last period of the greatness and power of the Galician-Volynian principedom as a Ukrainian independent State. The political situation in the beginning of the Fourteenth century turned to their disadvantage.

Poland, reconstructed under Casimir the Great, started an aggressive policy against the Ukraine. The Hungarians, on their side, recovered strength under the new dynasty of Anjou and took back Ukrainian Munkach. Though the Tatars for some time left the Ukrainian territories in peace, the Lithuanians under Gedimin became very dangerous. Against all these powerful neighbors, who coveted the rich and fertile Ukrainian lands, the Galician dynasty could not muster sufficient resistance, especially, when after the sudden death of two sons of King Yuri, Lev II and Prince Andrew (1324), the dynasty came to an untimely end. Their nephew, King Yuri II (1324-1340) was the last king of Galicia-Volynia; he was poisoned by the boyars, and the kingdom became the prey of Poland, Lithuania and Hungary. For some time the boyars, supported by the Tatars, resisted Poland, whereas Volynia was seized by the Lithuanian prince Lubart. In the year 1349, Casimir the Great of Poland, made a pact with the Tatars and annexed Galicia. For some time, however, the Hungarian king Louis, took Galicia from Poland, but in 1387 it was finally incorporated into Poland.

26. The Decline of the Galician-Volynian Principedom.

Thus, the Galician-Volynian principedom, the second in importance among Ukrainian States that had united almost all the lands with a Ukrainian population, ceased to exist as an independent State at the end of the Fourteenth century. The princes of the Galician-Volynian house, having held out for two centuries against the Poles and the Magyars, and promoted the development of Uk-

rainian culture, preserved Western Ukrainian lands from being completely absorbed by their Western neighbors. On the other hand, by breaking dynastic and ecclesiastical connections with the principedom of Suzdal, they protected the Ukrainian population in the East from being assimilated by the Great Russians. By opening Ukrainian territories to West European influences they neutralized, to a certain extent, the exclusive Byzantine influence on Ukrainian culture.

The political and social structure inherited from the Kievan State was thus exposed to the influence of contemporary mediaeval conditions in Central Europe. The struggle of Galician-Volynian princes with the Ukrainian aristocracy, the boyars, developed in the same way as the conflicts of Western European rulers with their great vassals, the barons. The boyar class in Galicia acquired a great importance. Prince Roman, though often victorious over them, was not able to break down entirely their political importance and their economic power. Political troubles in the first half of the Thirteenth century were very propitious to the pretensions of the boyars and they asserted themselves so vigorously, that even King Daniel, at the height of his power, was often obliged to consider the claims of the boyar oligarchy. The Chronicle noted this in observing: "the Galician boyars call Daniel their prince, but in fact they held the land in their hands." The ranks of the Galician aristocracy had been strengthened by a number of improvised princely houses or disinherited princes, who entered into the service of the reigning house. The boyars, at times, seized even the right to distribute grants of land and State monopolies, and the Princes, as for instance, Daniel and Vassilko, had to assert their princely right of granting monopolies, as was the case in the conflict about the salt monopoly of the mines in Kolomya. The economic power of the boyars rested, as it was said, on their ownership of great stretches of land. As the soil here is very fertile, farming was very advantageous and brought great incomes. The labor on great land estates was chiefly performed by

slaves and serfs; the latter were personally free but attached to the land. Free peasants, "smerdy", gradually became also bound either to pay tribute in kind to the prince or landowner, a boyar, or to work on his estate. The transfer of Galicia and Volynia to the Polish sovereign brought with it great changes in the social structure of the country. Of these more will be said in subsequent chapters.

27. Trade and Cultural Influences.

Besides agriculture, trade was an important source of the wealth of the country. As a result of growing trade with Central and Western Europe, we see already in the Thirteenth century, the rise of Galician and Volynian towns. Even at the time of the supremacy of the Kievan Princedom, a lively trade with Western Europe was carried on chiefly through these Western Ukrainian provinces. With the downfall of Kiev, the role of intermediary in the trade between the East and the West fell to Galicia. Here came the merchants from Poland, Germany, Hungary, Greece, and the Balkans bringing their merchandise and taking with them local products and goods imported from the East. The navigation on the Dniester played then also a very important part. Galician towns, such as Halich, Lvov, Lutsk and Kholm, became important centres and had considerable foreign colonies within their walls. After the Tatar invasion, the princes undertook the repopulation of devastated areas and invited foreigners to settle, especially artisans and traders. Thus many Germans came and settled in towns, receiving from the princes certain privileges, such as self government, according to the custom of the German towns from which they came. Thus German city self-government was at this date introduced into Ukrainian towns and played an important part in later times. Undoubtedly, in promoting the growth and development of the towns, Galician princes counted on their support in the struggle against the landed aristocracy, the boyars, as it indeed was often the case.

Prince Daniel was especially a great town builder. Among his chief foundations was Lvov, named after his son and successor, the Prince Lev, and also the town of Kholm, which soon became very important. The Chronicle gives us a vivid picture of how King Daniel had built this town, how he called in architects and masons, Ukrainian, as well as German and Polish. Daniel's brother Vassilko, Prince of Volynia, was also an active builder: the Chronicle names quite a number of churches, castles, and towers built by him and especially by his son Vladimir Vasilkovich who, in his turn, was a generous patron in building and adornment of churches not only in his own land, Volynia, but even in far away Chernigov. In the Chronicle we read a panegyric to this prince for his building activity: he built the towns of Brest-Litovsk and of Kamenets-Litovsk and many others.

Very little remains of all this building activity of the Galician princes except ruins. But even from those ruins and occasional archaeological discoveries, we can judge of the high standard of artistic development and trace influences, Byzantine, Roman and Gothic in the architecture and sculptural adornment. The Chronicle has preserved for us the name of one of these Ukrainian sculptors, Avdiy (Obadiah), whom King Daniel employed in the adornment of one of the churches built by him in Kholm.

Frequent political contact with Central and Western Europe brought to Galicia and Volynia West European cultural influences and created a community of interests. The Ukrainian Chronicle gives us a number of facts and details about conditions of life in Western Europe and notes down historical and political events from which we see how well informed these Chroniclers were about what was going on in Western and Central Europe. We also notice what is astonishing to us in the light of later history, the existence of religious tolerance; there was almost no difference made between the Christians of the Greek and Roman rites. But, though the Pope was held in great esteem, the Chronicle shows us that Ukrainians remained

faithfully attached to the Greek form of worship, accepted by their ancestors. At the same time, the Chronicle shows a conscious national feeling. Chroniclers note down with pride and delight everything in their country that could be admired by foreign visitors whether it was the wealth and prosperity of Galician and Volynian towns, or the strength and beauty of King Daniel's armies, or his greatness and his power.

The Galician-Volynian princely house stood in dynastic relations with different reigning houses in Europe. It was at this time that Latin came into general use, first as the means of diplomatic relations and then as the official language of the State. Seals of princes came into use with Latin, instead of the old Ukrainian inscriptions, and the charters of the last Galician kings were written in Latin.

CHAPTER VI

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(28) Conditions in the Ukraine After the Tatar Invasion. (29) Lithuania. (30) Ukraine Under the Lithuanian Princes. (31) Union of Lithuania and Poland.

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28. Conditions in the Ukraine After the Tatar Invasion.

During the time when a new political centre of national life was forming in Galicia, around which capable rulers successfully endeavored to unite the western Ukrainian territories, a further disintegration of the old political and social forces was taking place in the territory of the former Kievan Princedom, the basin of the Dnieper and its tributaries. New forms came slowly into existence, replacing the old, and early showing the germs of subsequent political organizations.

The Tatar invasion, as has been shown, greatly changed the political aspect of eastern Europe, and particularly the Great Russian territories grouped round the Princedoms of Suzdal. Its influence was, as we have said, very deeply impressed on all manifestations of national life, on political forms, on social and cultural conditions, even on the character and psychology of the Great Russian population. Less deep, but yet very definite, was the influence of the Tatar invasion on the Ukrainian territory. Firstly, it confirmed the political disintegration of the Kievan State. The centre of national life was, as we have seen, transferred westward into Galicia. All the dynastic, political, economic and cultural connections of the Ukrainian territories with the Great Russian Princedoms were entirely broken. The national development of the Ukrainians and the Great Russians, or rather Muscovians, continues from this time along different lines.

In speaking of the direct influence of the Tatar invasion on the Ukraine, the first question which arises is the extent to which the invasion led to actual extermina-

tion and disappearance of the population in the Ukraine, and to the subsequent repopulation of the deserted land by the new-comers. Russian historians long maintained that the territory in the Dnieper basin was completely depopulated in consequence of the Tatar invasion, and this gave rise to the hypothesis formulated by Pogodin that these vacant spaces formerly occupied by Russians, were re-populated by Ukrainians coming from Galicia. This view was based on imperfect knowledge of contemporary historical sources and evidences, and influenced by the fact that the *Kievan Chronicle*, chief source of our direct knowledge of Kiev, closes at the end of the Twelfth century. Chronicles, both of Suzdal and of Galicia-Volynia give us but scanty and fragmentary information about events on Kievan territories, and this fact contributed to the belief in the complete depopulation of the Dnieper basin.

Polish historians of the Nineteenth century supported this view chiefly with the object of giving the merit of the repopulation of the Ukrainian "desert" to Polish influence and efforts.

Later historical research and study of western European contemporary sources of information chiefly by Ukrainian historians (M. Maksimovich, V. Antonovich, M. Hrushevsky, M. Vladimirski-Budanov) led to an entire change of view on this question. Our chief source of positive knowledge of this period is the account of the journey of Plano Carpini, the Legate whom the Pope sent on a mission to the Tatars. Plano Carpini states in his diary that in 1246 he came to Kiev together with several merchants and found there a number of other merchants from Poland, Austria, Greece, Venice, Genoa, Pisa and France, showing that foreign trade with Kiev had not been entirely interrupted. The city of Kiev was, according to him, very much damaged, and the population had diminished, but it is incredible that a complete devastation and entire desertion of the population had taken place. A great number of the magnificent buildings were ruined, among

them many churches, but St. Sophia and the Monastery of Pecherski were standing.

According to the testimony of Plano Carpini, supported by other contemporary sources of information, the system of the Tatars was to destroy the political organizations and attack the leading upper classes of the population in order to terrorize the masses and force them to pay tribute under the supervision of Tatar officials. Thus it was not to the interest of the Tatars to slaughter the population. They aimed at converting it into a docile mass deprived of national leadership.

It is in this light that we must interpret the Chronicles also. Though, on the whole, they give very little information about this invasion of the Ukraine by Batu, they do not speak of an entire devastation. Many were killed, especially those who opposed the invaders, but the mass of the population fled and took shelter in the forests, avoiding the first danger, and later returned. Thus, the towns and villages, ruined by the Tatars, were gradually and slowly rebuilt by their inhabitants. We must here take into consideration the fact that during former nomadic invasions, the Ukrainian population had been accustomed to an existence which required adaptation and mobility. Having constantly to be on the alert, they were ever ready to flee and hide in the forests and swamps and other natural shelters when invasions occurred. Thus a constant ebb and flow of population had become a characteristic feature of their history. In Galicia, the population sometimes fled into the hills. According to the Galician Chronicle, Prince Daniel, returning from the battlefield after the initial panic was over, met masses of his people coming down from the Carpathians on the way back to their abandoned homes.

We can, with confidence, now say that the mass of the Ukrainian population remained, though they, of course, suffered very much from invasion and the general insecurity of life. Kiev was without importance as a political centre. The Great Russian Princedoms were cut off from the Ukrainian territories, and too much held

in check by the Tatars. Galicia was too far away to be of real help. When, therefore, a strong new political power grew up in the North-west, namely that of the Lithuanian Princes, the Ukrainian territories in the basin of the Dnieper and its tributaries, were easily attached to this political centre. We know for certain, that about the year 1360 Kiev, as well as most of the Ukrainian territories not belonging to the Galician-Volynian Kingdom, was in the possession of the Lithuanian Prince Olgerd. The Chernigov-Sieversk territory maintained its independence rather longer, but divided into a number of small Princedoms, it was too weak to resist, finally, the two powerful growing States in the north, Lithuania and Moscow.

When speaking of the Galician-Volynian Princedom in the Thirteenth century, there was mentioned the new political power which now came into existence on the north-western frontier of the Ukrainian territories, Lithuania. Compared with the East Slavic Princedoms in the Twelfth century, the Lithuanians were weak and unimportant neighbors. In the Thirteenth century, however, they were united into one State, which grew rapidly in importance. At the beginning of the Fourteenth century, the Lithuanian Princes took upon themselves the task of uniting under their sway the territories of the White Russians and the Ukrainians broken up by the Tatar invasion. From this moment, Lithuania began to play an important part in the life of the two peoples, the connection with White Russia being maintained to this day. On this account, we must here consider the formation of the Lithuanian State. It was not a conquest in the ordinary sense of the word, but rather an example of the peaceful co-existence in one political organism of three different peoples—the Lithuanians, the White Russians, and the Ukrainians.

29. Lithuania.

According to the latest scientific opinions, the Lithuanians are an independent branch of the Aryan group of

peoples. Their language preserves to this day very archaic forms, and of all living European languages it is the nearest to Sanskrit. History found them, at the beginning of the Christian era, settled on the Western Dvina. Owing to their seclusion in the forests and swamps, they remained for a considerable time little known even by their immediate neighbors. When, in the Eleventh and Twelfth centuries, German and East-Slavic Chronicles began to mention them, the Lithuanians were divided into seven important tribes: the **Pruss** on the lower Vistula; the **Zmud** on the river Nieman; the **Lithuanians** proper on the River Viliya; the **Zemgal** on the left bank of the western Dvina; the **Kuron** at the mouth of the western Dvina; the **Letgals** on the right bank of that river and the **Yatviags** on the upper Nieman and Western Bug. Within the limits of each tribe they were organized into separate clans, disunited and practically independent. Together with hunting and fishing, they knew primitive agriculture. Their religion was very much like the pagan religion of the Slavic peoples. The chief deity, Perkunas, the god of thunder, was akin to the Ukrainian Perun. But differing from the Eastern Slavs, the Lithuanians possessed an influential body of Priests, who were held in great respect and exercised considerable power. This accounts for the fact that the Lithuanians retained their pagan religion as late as the end of the Fourteenth century.

The Ukrainian Chronicles of the Twelfth century relates numerous inroads of Lithuanians on the neighboring Polish and Ukrainian territories. They mention different "reges" and "duces" who led them, but without doubt, these were only local chieftains who did not unite the whole of Lithuainia. In the beginning of the Thirteenth century different events were taking place which hastened the formation by the Lithuanians of a stronger organization than that of mere clans and tribes for the purpose of self-defence. There appeared in the west an enemy more aggressive than had ever been the Polish and Ukrainian Princes. This enemy was the German Knights

of the Livonian Order. They obtained from Pope Innocent III a Bull for the crusade against the pagan Lithuanian tribe of Letgal (ancestors of the present-day Letts). In 1230, the Teutonic Order of Knights came into existence for the same purpose of proceeding against the Lithuanian tribe of Pruss on the lower Vistula, and secured the protection of Pope Gregory IX. The Knights of the Livonian Order, who undertook the conversion of the pagan Letgals by fire and sword, had soon subdued them and separated them from the rest of the Lithuanian tribes. The Knights of the Teutonic Order had equal success with the Prussians (a Lithuanian tribe which later gave its name to the German province) and in a short time were in possession of their land. This danger brought about the organization of the rest of the Lithuanians into a strong state. This was accomplished by the Lithuanian Prince Mendovg in the first half of the Thirteenth century. He also took possession of several small White Russian Princedoms on the Nieman with a view to expansion towards the South-east, but his plans were interrupted by his death in 1263.

30. Ukraine Under the Lithuanian Princes.

A further strengthening of Lithuania took place under Prince Gedimin (1316-1341) who founded a dynasty. He united the remaining Lithuanian tribes and annexed, partly by conquest, partly by means of dynastic alliances, further White Russian and Ukrainian territories. Thus, he married his eldest son Olgerd to a Princess of Vitebsk, and his second son Lubart to a Volynian Princess, creating a claim to the inheritance of those lands. His five daughters he gave in marriage to neighboring Polish and Ukrainian Princes, thus procuring for himself important alliances. Prince Gedimin transferred his capital to his newly founded town of Vilna on the River Viliya. Here, along with the pagan Lithuanian temples, he tolerated Christian Churches, both of the Greek-Orthodox and Roman Catholic Rites. On his death he left to his son

Olgerd a strong State inspired by a powerful spirit of expansion.

This expansion could not be opposed either by White Russia or the Ukraine, the former being divided into small Princedoms, and the Ukraine weakened by the Tatar invasion. The Galician-Volynian Kingdom was also too weak at that time, and nearing its end.

The Lithuanian conquest was not, however, dangerous to White Russia and the Ukraine. On the contrary, it provided protection against the Tatars. There was another very important circumstance which made this conquest extremely welcome to Slavic territories at that time. Already under Gedimin the Lithuanian element in the State was completely submerged by the Slavic, and the State was actually a Union of Lithuanians, White Russians and Ukrainians under the dynasty of Gedimin. The Lithuanians remained pagan, and the Lithuanian Princes, though married to Slavic Princesses had not yet openly accepted Christianity. During Gedimin's reign, the pressure of the German Knights of the Livonian and Teutonic Orders was very strong. This struggle became more intense under his son Olgerd. In order to be able to continue peaceful expansion towards the east, Olgerd (1341-1377) left the defence of his western frontiers against the Germans to his brother, the war-like Prince Keistut, who thus held the western provinces, whereas Olgerd, safely seated in Vilna, had a free hand for the building up of the State. He gradually and peacefully incorporated the Chernigov-Sieversk territory, putting his sons and daughters in the most important towns or even leaving Ukrainian Princes of the Rurik dynasty where they seemed to him to be useful. Kiev was occupied, as we have said, about 1360. At the same time the Princedom of Pereyaslav was annexed, and Olgerd's son Vladimir was set up as Prince of Kiev.

This advance of Olgerd provoked a conflict with the Tatars who considered themselves over-lords of the Ukrainian territories. Olgerd took the field against them and defeated a Tatar army in the battle on the river Sini

Vodi (Blue Waters) on the frontier of Volynia and Podolia in 1370. By this victory he secured not only the whole territory of Kiev but also Podolia.

For possession of Volynia Olgerd and his brother Lubart had to carry on a fierce struggle against the Polish King Casimir in which the Ukrainians sided with the Lithuanians, thus deciding the issue.

Thus Olgerd united in his hands all the White Russian and most of the Ukrainian lands. The chief cause of the Lithuanian success was, of course, their policy of not interfering with the existing order of things. The Lithuanian Princes not only left unaltered the system of dividing the lands among the members of the ruling house, but adopted it, and Olgerd divided his state among his sons giving portions to his brothers and nephews also. The laws of succession were even less settled here than in Ukraine. For instance, Olgerd designated as Great Prince of Lithuania, his youngest son, Yagailo. In order to maintain his rights Yagailo made war on his brothers, and on his uncle Keistut, whom he had slain, and continued the struggle with Keistut's son Vitovt, who fled to the Germans to seek help.

As has already been related, the incorporation of the White Russian and Ukrainian territories was of a peaceful character. In most cases, the two sides made a treaty, the Prince of Lithuania promising "protection" to the Ukrainian Prince or community, who promised their "allegiance" in return. When in place of a Ukrainian Prince a member of the Lithuanian ruling house was put up, the relationship remained the same. The maintenance of the "old order" was a matter of principle. The Lithuanians had no fully developed machinery of state to impose on an annexed land, at the utmost they could provide a Prince, thus all the former administrative officials retained their offices. White Russian and Ukrainian boyars entered the service of the Lithuanian Prince, and the White Russian and Ukrainian military forces strengthened his armies. The Lithuanians had no central organization to administer the annexed lands whose number

increased rapidly. Very intricate local questions were dealt with by the Prince personally. He was therefore himself the link of union. In other matters the annexed lands enjoyed self-government and practical independence in local affairs. The superior culture of the White Russians and Ukrainians asserted itself, and had an unhindered influence on the Lithuanians. They took over everything from them, military, administrative and financial organizations as well as their judicial system. Now, even on Lithuanian territory, we meet Ukrainian offices of state and officials. The Ukrainian language became the court language of the Lithuanian Princes, and the Greek-Orthodox religion made headway at the court through marriage with Slavic Princesses. Olgerd himself, before his death, accepted Christianity according to the Orthodox Rite. Vilno in the Fourteenth century was not exclusively a Lithuanian town but the capital of the Lithuanian-White Russian and Ukrainian State. Ethnically, Lithuanians formed only one-tenth part of its population.

The historic process of the development of the Ukrainians and White Russians found a new centre after the fall of Kiev. It might have been expected that the Lithuanian dynasty would play the same part as did the Scandinavian in the Tenth and Eleventh centuries, uniting and strengthening the Slavic element and becoming assimilated by it. The course of history, however, was quite different. At the end of the Fourteenth century an event took place which led the destiny of the Lithuanian, White Russian and Ukrainian State in quite another direction: this was the political Union of Lithuania with Poland.

31. Union of Lithuania and Poland.

This Union did not come unexpectedly; there were deep reasons for it in Poland as well as in Lithuania. Firstly, the two States were united by the common danger of the Germans. The struggle with the Knights of the Livonian and Teutonic Orders grew ever fiercer and com-

pelled united action, both Poland and Lithuania being threatened, the former having been cut off from the Baltic by the Germans. Dynastic troubles in Poland provided a convenient motive for the nearer approach of the two States. After the death of the Polish King Louis, his only daughter, Jadwiga, heiress to the Polish Crown, was solicited in marriage by several candidates, among whom the Polish Nobles chose Yagailo (Jagello) as the candidate most likely to be advantageous with regard to the interests of Poland. On his side Yagailo was in need of support outside his own land against the lesser Lithuanian Princes, his brothers and relatives, who showed separatist tendencies: some wanted to be quite independent, others were drawn towards Moscow, others again, like his most powerful cousin Vitovt, were allies of the Germans.

Poland's advantages in this Union were of a political and economic character. Pressed by the Germans from the west Poland was reduced to seeking for expansion in the east, that is in Lithuania, and especially in the fertile territories of Ukraine.

The preliminary negotiations of Yagailo with the Polish nobles brought about in 1385 the so-called Union of Krevo, according to which Yagailo was to accept Christianity according to the Roman Catholic Rite, to be elected King of Poland and to be married to Jadwiga. Further, he was to promise to baptise all his pagan subjects, help to recover from the Germans territories lost by both Poland and Lithuania, and to surrender to the Polish Crown all his Lithuanian, White Russian and Ukrainian lands.

Only the first three points of the Treaty of Krevo were at first carried out. In 1386 Yagailo was elected King of Poland, was baptised and married to Jadwiga. He also subsequently introduced the Roman Catholic religion as the official religion in Lithuania, but great difficulties appeared to stand in the way of the projected Union of the two States. Chief among them was the dissatisfaction and unwillingness of the Lithuanians as well as of the

Ukrainians and White Russians. This difficulty was very cleverly used by Vitovt. He forced Yagailo, now King of Poland, to recognize him as Great Prince of Lithuania, so that not until after Vitovt's death could Yagailo again be Prince of Lithuania. Thus the Union of Krevo remained a personal Union only, and the whole of Lithuanian policy during the next forty years revolved round the person of Prince Vitovt (1386-1430).

Vitovt was an able politician and a very good soldier. His skillful and successful policy assured him European prestige. He continued his uncle Olgerd's task of uniting under the Lithuanian Crown all White Russia and almost all the Ukrainian lands with the single exception of Galicia. His State reached in the south to the shores of the Black Sea. Profiting by disorders in the Tatar horde, he extorted from the Khan Tokhtamish a formal retraction of his rights on Ukrainian territories. He had built a fortress of St. John (Ivanhorod) at the mouth of the Dnieper. Another fortress on the Black Sea was built in Bilhorod (present Akerman), and in Khadjibey (present Odessa) a port was built from whence Ukrainian grain was shipped to Byzantium.

Vitovt's expansion to the south was, however, checked by the defeat of his army by the Tatars in 1399 on the River Vorskla (near Poltava). Here perished the flower of the Lithuanian and Ukrainian knights. This moment was taken advantage of by the Poles, who again pressed the Union on Vitovt. The Lithuanian Princes and boyars were compelled to promise to take no other Prince but Yagailo in case of Vitovt's death, the Poles having also promised that in the case of Yagailo's death, Vitovt should be their King. An alliance of mutual aid was also concluded.

This renewed alliance of Lithuanian and Polish military forces enabled them to deal a great blow to the Germans. In the well-known Battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg) in 1410 the united armies of Yagailo and Vitovt composed of Ukrainian and White Russian forces defeated the Knights of the Teutonic Order and broke their power

for ever. Vitovt, however, kept up his friendly relations with the Germans, wishing to have a check on Polish aspirations. He continued his independent policy in Lithuania with the object of proclaiming himself King of Lithuania. The Poles renewed their efforts to give more substance to the Union and brought about a new meeting in Horodla in 1413, where some new points were added to the existing treaty, the chief being that Lithuanian nobles of the Roman Catholic faith should receive the same rights and privileges in Poland as Polish nobles.

Vitovt was one of the most powerful princes of his time in Europe. His only daughter, Sophia, was married to the Great Prince Vasili of Moscow. His nephew, Sigismund, occupied the throne of Bohemia. Shortly before his death he decided to carry out his plan of declaring himself King of Lithuania. The coronation was fixed for the year 1429 in Lutsk in Volynia, where a brilliant assembly was invited, including Emperor Sigismund, the King of Denmark, Yagailo, Prince Vasili of Moscow, Ambassadors of the Byzantine Emperor and others. The crown alone did not arrive in time, being intercepted by the Poles. The coronation was put off till the next year in Vilna, but Vitovt died in 1430 before it could take place.

Vitovt's death freed the hands of the Polish politicians, but the idea of Lithuanian independence was by now so deeply rooted that it was impossible to overlook the forty years of Vitovt's rule. He fortified the State, and made the power of the Prince almost absolute. Former half-independent lesser princes were reduced to obedience and considered themselves as official servants of the State. Those of them that were more ambitious and independent were replaced by Vitovt's lieutenants. To the separate lands, however, Vitovt left their privileges of autonomy. He even sanctioned them by numerous charters, confirming the rights of the Orthodox Church and of the Clergy, and securing local jurisdiction generally. The tendency of his rule was to preserve the old traditions in the annexed lands in order to attach them to the Lithuanian crown. Local government was con-

centrated in the hands of the local nobility. Law was administered by the voevods and starosts against whose decisions the population could appeal to the Prince himself. Personal freedom was guaranteed, imprisonment without trial was illegal.

In spite of this, antagonism existed within the Lithuanian State between the Lithuanian and Slavic (White Russian and Ukrainian) nobles, which was kept up by the Poles to serve their own interests. The chief cause of this hostility was religious differences. The Lithuanians were forced by the Union of Krevo to accept the Roman Catholic Faith and on this difference Polish policy played, as for instance in the question of privileges given to Roman Catholics by the Union of Horodlo in 1413. Vitovt, in his endeavor to secure the independence of Lithuania over-looked and under-estimated this religious antagonism. He would have found in his Orthodox White Russian and Ukrainian nobles more support for his policy of independence than in his Lithuanian subjects, who, having the same Roman Catholic Faith as the Poles were more easily and indeed very soon assimilated by the Poles.

After Vitovt's death, the Lithuanians refused to have Yagailo as their Prince as agreed in the treaty with Poland and preferred his younger brother, Svidrigailo, as their Prince. Yagailo was compelled to recognize him. Svidrigailo was not a good politician and rather an unlucky general. The Lithuanian nobles were soon dissatisfied with him and put forward Vitovt's youngest brother, Sigismund. Unluckily, Svidrigailo sought support from the Ukrainian and White Russian nobles, where Sigismund attached himself to the Lithuanians and was also supported by Yagailo and the Poles. It came to open civil war in which Svidrigailo lost a decisive battle near Vilkomir in 1435, where forty-two Ukrainian princes were taken prisoner and the army utterly routed. The Poles were triumphant at this success, but the civil war continued, and both princes lost their lives. Svidrigailo in 1439 and Sigismund in 1440, and for the actual union they had to wait another thirty years.

After Yagailo's death the Polish crown was given to his eldest son, Vladislav, but the Lithuanians elected another prince to the Lithuanian throne. Casimir, Vladislav's youngest brother. Thus the Polish and Lithuanian thrones were occupied by different rulers, though brothers. Practically, the Union did not exist.

Casimir was a clever politician. He set himself to temporize with the Ukrainians, and put Prince Olelko, Olgerd's grandson in Kiev, and the young Svidrigailo in Volynia. When, after his brother Vladislav's death in the battle against the Turks in Varna, Casimir was also elected to the Polish throne, he confirmed certain rights and privileges of the Ukrainian princes and nobles.

Once Casimir felt secure on his two thrones, he ceased to consider his Ukrainian and White-Russian subjects. After the death of Prince Simeon of Kiev, the Ukrainian Princedom of Kiev was abolished and a Lithuanian who was also a Roman Catholic was established in Kiev as Casimir's lieutenant. Ukrainian opposition reared its head. Ukrainian princes began clandestine negotiations with Moscow, promising Moscow lands in White Russia in return for help against the Lithuanians and Poles. This conspiracy was discovered, and its leader, Prince Mikhailo Olokovich, great-grandson of Olgerd, was beheaded. This, however, did not stop the conspirators, but merely showed them the way to Moscow.

In the meantime, when Gedimin and Olgerd were uniting round Vilna the Ukrainian and White-Russian lands broken by the Tatar invasion, there grew up in the north-east a centre amidst the mass of small Great-Russian princedoms, round which the Great-Russian lands were soon united. This was the Princedom of Moscow. By means of marriages, diplomacy, guile and often of crime, the Princes of Moscow annexed a number of lesser Princedoms about Moscow. After having incorporated a few of the more important, such as Tver, Rostov, Riazan, and the Republic of Novgorod, the Moscovian Princes directed their attention to the south, and were

about to annex Great-Russian Princedoms lying on the frontier of the Ukrainian territories of Sieversk. It was here that they met with the Lithuanians.

After having annexed almost all the Great-Russian territories, Ivan III called "The Great", Prince of Moscow, advanced his claims to White Russian and Ukrainian territories as being hereditary appanages of the House of Rurik. He began to use, instead of his title of Prince of Moscow, the title of "Lord of all Russia". Strictly speaking, from a dynastic point of view, as opposed to that of the Lithuanian Princes, his claims were not devoid of right, the Moscovian branch being a descendent of the Ukrainian dynasty of Yaroslav the Wise, but equally so were quite a number of lesser princes whose smaller princedoms Moscovian Princes had annexed by the above mentioned means. As regards the dynastic rights of the Lithuanian Prince, the Prince of Moscow was a formidable rival.

During the rule of Vitovt, lesser Great-Russian princes sought help in Lithuania against the aggression of Moscow. Now, on the contrary, lesser Ukrainian Princes from Chernigov-Sieversk began to prefer the overlordship of Moscow, and during the last two decades of the Fifteenth century quite a number of them applied to Moscow for protection against Lithuania. This was, of course, on account of the danger of the Roman Catholic Church of Poland, and the pressure of Poland for union with Lithuania. The Orthodox religion was no longer safe in Lithuania, whereas Moscow was of the same Faith. A conflict of the two growing powers, Lithuania and Moscow, was now ripe, especially as new measures against the Orthodox Ukrainians and White Russians were started in Lithuania, which more and more fell under Polish influence. Notwithstanding the marriage of the Lithuanian Great Prince Alexander with the Princess Helena, daughter of Ivan III of Moscow, war broke out in 1501. The Lithuanians were beaten and Moscow occupied the territory of Sieversk and a part of White Russia. In the meantime, a revolt broke out

in Lithuania with a Ukrainian Prince Mikhailo Hlinski at its head. The revolt was put down and Hlinski found refuge in Moscow. The war lasted with intervals until 1514 when Moscow took Smolensk.

The victory of Moscow over Lithuania gave strength to the party which advocated a complete Union of Lithuania and Poland. A new danger in south Ukraine also contributed greatly to bring about the union of the two States.

The Golden Horde of the Tatars broke up in the first half of the Fifteenth century, and part of it settled in the Crimea with the war-like dynasty of Menhli-Hirey at its head. The Crimean Horde accepted the overlordship of Lithuania and even protected the Ukrainian territories against the eastern Tatars. Everything, however, was changed with the coming of the Turks to Europe. The Turkish fleet made its appearance in 1475 near the shores of the Crimea, and the Crimean Khan Menhli-Hirey became a vassal of the Turks. This had fatal consequences for Ukraine. The weak Lithuanian Government did not understand how to keep an ally. Menhli-Hirey accepted overtures from the Moscovian princes and became their ally. In the interests of Ivan III Menhli-Hirey invaded Ukraine in 1484. Kiev was taken and plundered as terribly as at the time of the Khan Batu. The gold chalices of St. Sophia in Kiev were sent by Menhli-Hirey to his ally Ivan III of Moscow. The territory of Kiev was devastated and masses of the population were dragged to Crimea as prisoners.

This invasion was only a prelude to numerous others which occurred regularly nearly every summer. The Lithuanian Government, weak and harassed by the war with Moscow, was powerless to defend Ukrainian territory. The defence of the country was taken by the population itself into their own hands. These efforts at self-defence gradually created out of the midst of the peaceful population a special military class known in Ukrainian history under the name of Cossaks, who undertook for centuries the defence of the Ukraine against the

Tatars and the Turks. The Turks settled on the Bosphorus and became overlords of the Tatars and used them according to the words of the Lithuanian chronicler of the Sixteenth century, "as the hunter uses a pack of hounds, letting them loose on the unhappy land to ruin it and to drag the people into slavery".

The Lithuanian Government was unable to deal with the Crimean Horde and was powerless to organize the defence of the State, and therefore sought help in the close union with Poland. The long reign of Sigismund I (1506-1548) who was both King of Poland and Prince of Lithuania strengthened the idea of the Union, though the Lithuanian, Ukrainian and White-Russian aristocracy continued jealously to guard their independence. On the other hand, the lesser nobles who began to take a more active part in the government, looked forward to a complete union in the hope of having organized state protection from Poland against the Tatars, and also with the object of gaining more political influence in the government through privileges possessed by the Polish lesser nobles where the aristocracy was not so powerful as in Lithuania. It was practically the lesser Lithuanian nobles that carried through the Union.

During the reign of Sigismund II (1548-1572) a new war against Moscow broke out for the possession of Livonia (Latvia). The whole burden of this war fell on Lithuania, especially on the White Russian territories. The lesser nobles of this territory made petition after petition to the King-Prince pressing for Union. They were supported by the Ukrainian nobles of Volynia, who were harassed by the Tatars. The King was childless and after his death new elections would have to be undertaken to fill both the Lithuanian and the Polish thrones, and there was no certainty that one and the same person would be elected. The king himself was very much in favor of the Union, and convoked the Polish and Lithuanian Seim (Parliament) in Lublin in 1569. The Polish representatives introduced their plan for the complete incorporation of Lithuania by Poland, in face of which

even those of the Lithuanian aristocracy who were in principle not adverse to Union had to be on their defence. The sittings of the Seim lasted through several months, and some of them were very boisterous and dramatic. The King, in order to pacify the Ukrainian nobles, who were all of the Orthodox religion, issued a series of privileges for them, securing their rights in Volynia, Kiév and Podolia. Against those who still resisted the Union, repressive measures were taken. At last the King and the Polish nobles succeeded in over-ruling the opponents of the Union and the Treaty of Lublin was concluded in 1569.

This document, of the greatest importance in the history of the four peoples, Poles, Lithuanians, White-Russians and Ukrainians, was drawn up on the following lines: 1. The Polish Kingdom and the Lithuanian Principdom were to form one State. 2. The King of Poland and the Great Prince of Lithuania was to be one and the same person elected by the united Polish and Lithuanian Seim and Senate. 3. On coronation the King was to take an oath to both States. 4. There was to be a united Seim and a Senate for both States. 5. A common foreign policy was to be pursued. 6. A common mint and coinage was to be established. 7. Rights for Polish nobles to acquire lands in Lithuania were laid down and similar rights for Lithuanian nobles in Polish territory. There remained separate: 1. State coat of arms and the seal. 2. Ministers of State. 3. Army. 4. Finance. 5. Legislation. 6. Administration.

The special rights of the newly united Ukrainian provinces were guaranteed by separate charters. The Ukrainian nobles of Kiév, Volynia and Podolia were united in rights with those of Poland without any difference on account of religion. Local administration and functioning of the courts in the Ukrainian language, preserved under Lithuanian rule by the codex called "The Lithuanian Statute", were to remain untouched. Posts of state officials, both clerical and secular, in the Ukraine were to be occupied only by natives of the territory.

The Union of the Ukrainian territories, formerly under Lithuania, with Poland gave to this latter a considerable preponderance in this strange mixture of unions, federations and special privileges, a sort of compromise of various national and state interests. Poland thus became the greatest State in the east of Europe with the exception of Moscow, which, still increasing in power, now practically stood outside the sphere of European life. The rich Ukrainian territories were thinly populated, especially those beyond the Dnieper and gave wide scope for expansion and colonization. The international importance of Poland was now considerably increased by new forces and means acquired from the Union. On the other hand, the annexation of the Ukrainian territories brought with it new and considerable difficulties to Poland. The relations with Lithuania were also anything but smooth, especially at the beginning.

The artificial and unwieldy state organization created by the Union was very soon to be felt. First of all, it proved to be almost impossible to transform the united Polish-Lithuanian Seim into any sort of manageable and working body. It was impossible for the Polish Seim to absorb the Lithuanian which had its own traditions, and the Lithuanian wing at once formed an unmanageable opposition making endless protestations and misusing the "veto". Especially difficult were the periods of interregnum when the Lithuanian Seim practically ruled the country. This united Seim was more a Congress than a real Parliament.

From the moment of the Union of Lublin the history of Lithuania no longer claims our special attention, as only small districts of Ukrainian territory remained under Lithuanian rule, that of Brest and of Pinsk. The bulk of the Ukraine now formed part of the Polish Realm.

CHAPTER VII

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(32) Ukrainian Lands Under the Lithuanian Princes from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Century. (33) Power of the Prince and Organs of State and Local Administration. (34) Council of the Lords (Rada Paniv). (35) Social Classes. (36) Lithuanian Statute.

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32. Ukrainian Lands Under the Lithuanian Princes from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Century.

It has already been stated that the chief element in the growth and development of the Lithuanian Principedom was the Ukrainian and White-Russian population. These two branches of the eastern Slavs had put all their gifts, all their creative power and all their material means into the building up of the Lithuanian State. The Lithuanian people merely supplied at first the organizing cement which united the Ukrainian and White-Russian worlds broken up by the disintegration of the Kievan State and ruin of the Tatar invasion. The Lithuanians provided the dynasty, which at first was very gifted and energetic. The occupation of the White Russian and Ukrainian lands by the Lithuanians in the Fourteenth century had not, as we have said, the character of a conquest or invasion. It was a peaceful "gathering" of the lands analogous to the uniting of the Kievan princes in the Tenth and Eleventh centuries. The Lithuanian princes looked upon themselves as heirs to the old Kievan State. The population also looked upon them as their lawful monarchs and on the Lithuanian Principedom as their own State.

All the circumstances led, as it would seem, to the Lithuanian Principedom becoming a united Ukrainian-White-Russia, thus securing to these two peoples a free national and political development. However, at the end of the Fourteenth century the Ukrainian and White-Russian population in Lithuania was threatened by a powerful rival in Poland, which possessed the strongest weapon of the time in the Roman Catholic Church organization that stood under the protection of the Popes and

shared their international life and purposes. At the beginning of the Fifteenth century the Polish Roman Catholic element in Lithuania entered into conflict with the Ukrainian Orthodox population. At first Ukrainian opposition was passive only, but when, after the Union of Lublin in 1569, Ukrainian territories were directly connected with the Polish Crown a conflict became inevitable. The first step leading to the conflict was the fact that the Polish Government tried to introduce into the Ukrainian lands a social structure quite different from their own which had grown up under the protection of the Lithuanian princes out of local conditions in these lands. The conflict broke out at the end of the Sixteenth century shortly after the Union of Lublin.

33. Power of the Prince and Organs of State and Local Administration.

Like the state organization of the Lithuanian Princedom, its social structure had developed naturally out of the social forms known to us in the old Kievan State. The constitution of the Lithuanian State, as well as the principles of law on which the judicial system was based grew up out of the old Ukrainian law as practised in the Kievan State. Of course, this law showed certain changes, but they had evolved naturally from the new circumstances to which Ukrainian life was now subject, and down to the second half of the Fifteenth century these changes were only manifestations of the normal internal organic process of development. It is not until the end of the Fifteenth century that foreign influences, such as Polish and German, were felt in the Ukrainian territory belonging to the Lithuanian Princedom. These influences gave a new and different direction to the development of the old Ukrainian social structure.

At the end of the Fifteenth century, the Lithuanian Princedom was a completely unified State, having a centralized monarchical power, while the various districts, especially the former minor princedoms, preserved a wide local autonomy. The monarchical power belonged

to the house of Gedimin in the same way as in the old Ukraine it belonged to the house of Rurik. There was a difference, however, in the practice of succession to the crown; it was not the eldest who succeeded to the central power but the ablest, or his father's favorite. It is difficult to speak of any settled law of succession in the house of Yagailo which held in its hands the sovereign power, for instead of growing in number, his descendants diminished and became extinct in the second half of the Sixteenth century, with the death of Sigismund II. In the same way as in the Ukraine the central sovereign power was connected with the crown of Kiev, in Lithuania it was connected with the crown of Vilna, the ethnic Capital of Lithuania. The Great Prince was the sovereign head of the whole State, he was arbiter in the quarrels among the lesser Princes, he nominated them to vacant thrones, led the united armies, conducted foreign policy and represented the State abroad. The lesser principedoms were the appanages of the members of the house of Gedimin, who either succeeded their father, or were nominated by the Great Prince. In some lands the wish of the population had a certain influence on the choice of the Prince. In many lands the population became very much attached to their nominated Lithuanian princes. An example of this is in Kiev where three generations of the house of Gedimin, Vladimir Olgerovich, Olelko, and Simeon, contributed much to the prosperity of the population. During the whole of the Fifteenth century, as we have seen, the great princes of Lithuania struggled with the independence and insubordination of the lesser princes and were victorious in this struggle, assuring the preponderance of the central power.

34. Council of the Lords (Rada Paniv).

It was in the second half of the Fifteenth century that the vestiges of the old order of appanages disappeared. At the head of the State was the Great Prince with practically unlimited power. Constitutionally, there was as yet no legal limitation to his power, but in practice

he was compelled to share his power with the Council of Lords (Rada Paniv). At the beginning, about the end of the Fifteenth century, this Council (Rada) was not a legal institution but simply an assembly of clerical and secular officials standing nearest to the Prince, similar to the court of the Ukrainian Princes of Kiev and elsewhere called the Knyaza Rada or Boyarska Duma. In the first half of the Sixteenth century the constant attendance of the Council of Lords (Rada Paniv) became fixed and from the private Council around the Prince it grew into a State organ that sat in council even in the absence of the prince. The privileges and rights of the Council of Lords were now fixed by special charters, the Prince was compelled to consult it in case of important decisions affecting foreign and home policy, and had no right to enact laws without having consulted the Council of the Lords. The sphere of competence and activity of the Prince was still very wide. He held in his hands all the threads of the state administration, he was not only the sovereign but the richest landlord in the country, the income from his estates being the chief source of the State revenue. He was also the court of final appeal in the Princedom, and his Chancery was crowded with endless law-suits that could not be settled in the local courts.

35. Social Classes.

An important task for the historian of this period is to throw light on the social structure of the Lithuanian Princedom. To all appearances this structure corresponded with that of other contemporary European States, it had all the principal features of feudalism. The chief task of the sovereign was to organize the defence of the country, and in order to do this he had the right to claim military service from every member of the community according to his means. In return for military service, the Prince granted lands. Being the real owner of all the land he could distribute it among his tenants-in-chief, the great nobles, who, in their turn, had tenants, and so on, all being bound by military service in case of war.

Here, as elsewhere, it was only gradually that the idea of conditional land tenure gave way to the principle of private property in land.

The Council of the Lords limited the absolute power of the Prince to the advantage of the great nobles. The influence of this Institution diminished as the Seim, where the lesser nobles were represented, grew in importance. The Statute of 1566 secured the predominance of the Seim, but even then the high administration and the preparation of the laws for submission to the Seim remained in the hands of the Council of the Lords.

The Seim originated in occasional assemblies of the knights for special important purposes. Such, for instance, was the meeting of 1401 called for the purpose of considering the proposed Union with Poland. From the second half of the Sixteenth century the sittings of the Seim became more frequent, but still the initiative in calling it lay with the Council of Lords, and its powers were very limited. By the Sixteenth century however, these had become very much wider. The principle of representative government was gradually growing. Thus, the Statute of 1566 fixed the Seim as a permanent institution and prescribed the order of representation, namely two knights from each district. The Seim was divided into two chambers, the Council of Lords which sat **in corpore** and that of the knights or lesser nobles. The most important Seims were those of 1554-1566. They accepted the new draft of the Statute of 1566, and carried through the reform of the judiciary, by which all lands were divided into thirty districts with judges elected from among the local nobles. These Seims also carried out a new administrative division of the Principedom into thirteen provinces which in their turn were divided into districts. Voevods or governors were nominated by the Prince and given restricted power. Heads of districts, or starosts, were elected by the nobles and the election confirmed by the Prince.

The knights (lesser nobles) of every district formed a special military detachment which together with other

similar detachments from the districts constituted more important military units under the governors. The Commander-in-chief of the army was the great Hetman.

The administrative districts corresponded with the judicial districts. In every district town there were three different courts in which justice was administered: the land court for judgments in private suits about landed property; the second was the land title's court which settled disputes about the boundaries of landed estates; and the third was the criminal court or court of the manor, presided over by the starost of the district.

From all these reforms laid down by the Statute of 1566 we conclude that the Lithuanian Prince was a Constitutional Monarch whose power was limited by the Council of Lords and by the Seim. The former was also gradually limited in power, the dominant class of the population being the lesser gentry represented in the Seim by two knights from every district. The great lords, however, still practically held the power in their hands because of their wealth, connections, and political influence.

In the old Kievan Princedom there were roughly three classes into which the population was divided: boyars, townsmen and peasants. Along with free-men there existed half-free peasants or serfs and slaves. Further evolution produced the great nobles or aristocracy, a class above the boyars composed partly of former reigning princes who had lost their appanages and the more powerful boyars. They surrounded the Prince and helped him with the state administration. Besides the landed nobility the class of military nobles arose, who were still connected with the land. This class, under the influence of Poland, where a similar class known as the Szlachta, played an important part, became also in the Lithuanian Princedom the privileged class which played a most important part in the government, and enjoyed great political influence. With the development of this class of gentry the former balance of the classes disappeared, the classes below the gentry, formerly free peasants, gradually losing their rights and becoming serfs. Citizens

within the towns who had rights and privileges formed a class between the gentry and the serfs. The clergy, however, were above and outside the classes. Such was the evolution of the social structure of the Ukraine under the Lithuanian Princes.

Let us examine each of these classes separately. The Nobility as a class was not numerous. It consisted of about twenty princely families and about fifty boyar families. In the old Ukraine the Boyars were not yet an exclusive class. Through personal merit, wealth, and family connection access to this class was not closed to "the grand-sons of the Clergy or of yeomen (free peasants)". This class now was closed with very few exceptions to new-comers from below. Former lesser royal princes having lost their appanages, became officials of the ruling Prince and formed merely the titled section of this class without any special privileges. Their wealth lay in great landed estates, and their chief privilege was to have their own military detachments and the right to display their own colors in war. All the high posts of the administration of the State were concentrated in the hands of the great Nobles, such as Hetman, Chancellor, Marshall, Voevod. All these posts were hereditary and limited to a few families only. Even the minor posts, such as heads of districts (starosts) were in their hands to bestow. Thus in the hands of this class was the Council of Lords, being the Senate and the Cabinet of Ministers. Their privileges exempted them from local jurisdiction, they being subject only to that of the Prince or the Council of Lords. In war they fought under their own colors at the head of their own detachments. The Lithuanians composed only a small part of this class, most of them being old Ukrainian and White-Russian families of princes and boyars. The conspiracy of the Fifteenth century under Prince Hlinski led to the emigration of this and other Ukrainian princely families to Moscow. Some of the princely houses became extinct. Under the Polish crown, after the Union of Lublin, they soon became Roman Catholic and polonized. Thus, in

the Seventeenth century this class was completely lost to Ukraine.

The middle class, between the aristocracy and the peasants, was now formed by the gentry. They took the Polish word "Szlachta". The origin of this class chiefly lay in military service. The defence of the State required a standing army. The State, however, could not afford a paid army, and the princes had recourse to the middle class of the population, who were obliged to furnish men and horses according to their income, and the importance of their estates. These were lesser nobles not included in the upper class, lesser tenants of the great lords, burgesses, yeomen, even rich peasants who were freed from other duties for the purpose of serving in the army. Till the end of the Fourteenth century this class was in process of formation. Consolidation did not begin until the end of the Sixteenth century. In the struggle against the lesser princes with their independent and separatist tendencies, the Great Princes of Lithuania had to find support somewhere, and gave charters of all sorts of privileges chiefly to the middle class of gentry, mostly of Ukrainian and White Russian origin. One of the most important of these privileges was the right of jurisdiction over their dependents. The struggle for Union with Poland to which the great nobles were opposed brought a new distribution of privileges to the Szlachta, conceded by special charters and granted to separate provinces, such as Volynia, Kiev and Podolia. These rights and privileges were confirmed by the Lithuanian Statute of 1566.

Military service was the only duty exacted from this class. Every tenant of an estate had to join the detachment of his district bringing with him the appointed number of men and horses. In case of illness a substitute had to be found. Non-appearance and unpunctuality were severely punished even by loss of the estate.

Along with the consolidation of the class of Szlachta or gentry went the process of differentiation and consolidation of the town population. In old Ukraine the class of burgesses as such was unknown. Though the

towns were very highly developed and were centres of economic and political life, the citizens were in no way distinct from the country population. At the end of the Twelfth century we notice the decline of the towns and the growth in importance of landed property, especially in Galicia. Under the Lithuanian princes, this process was further accelerated, all importance and influence being transferred to the lords and gentry connected with the landed property. The Galician and Volynian Princes, however, fully understood the importance of towns for trade and industry, and they even undertook the repopulation of deserted towns of foreigners, especially Germans. These colonists were granted self-government according to German law and customs, thus the German form of municipal self-government was introduced into Ukraine under the name of German or Magdeburg law. The chief privileges under this law included the exemption of the town population from the direct detailed jurisdiction of the central government and introduced the right of self-government based on a system of election and guilds. The burgesses of each town formed a community with their own municipal administration and court of justice, granted and sanctioned by a special charter to the town. At the head of the administration stood elected mayors, or reeves, assisted by aldermen. Burgesses alone came under municipal jurisdiction. Those in the towns who lived on the lands attached to the castle, or which belonged to the prince, or on the lands of the bishop, were outside the municipal jurisdiction.

The oldest charter granting municipal self-government which has been preserved is dated 1339, but we have every reason to believe that municipal self-government according to the German model or Magdeburg Law was introduced in the towns of Galicia and Volynia as early as the end of the Thirteenth century. Lithuanian princes began to grant their towns charters of municipal self-government about the end of the Fourteenth century.

Together with self-government, towns were entrusted with keeping the fortifications in order, and with main-

taining the watch. This was of particular importance in border towns, especially in the south and south-east of the Ukraine for defence against the Tatars.

Self-government however, improved but little the economic status of the town population. The landed gentry were exempt by special privileges from paying duties on products they imported directly from abroad. Great nobles and many of the lesser gentry employed their own artisans on their estates. The town population was not allowed to own land and had to buy the products from the country. They were locked within the walls of their towns with practically no liberty outside them. The burgesses were not represented in the Seim. The town population of the Orthodox confession was very soon excluded from sharing in the government at all, their places being occupied by foreign elements, such as Germans and Poles. In commerce there shortly appeared aggressive rivals, namely the Jews.

The great mass of the population in the Ukraine were peasants. The history and development of this class is intimately connected with that of the landed gentry. The country population in old Ukraine was subdivided into the free peasants, who were small land-holders; the half-free peasants or serfs bound by certain duties to the estates of their landlord; and finally the slaves. Development tended towards the levelling of the differences between the sub-divisions, the position of slaves being very much improved in the course of centuries while on the other hand, the free peasants had their freedom gradually very much curtailed.

In the beginning of the Sixteenth century slavery still existed in the Ukraine under the Lithuanian princes. The slaves were mostly employed in agriculture. Some of the slaves were attached to the Manor, others had their own homesteads on the estate. In the Statute of 1529 we find that the origin of slavery was the same as in the Kievan State, the class being recruited from prisoners of war, descendents of slave parents, marriage with an enslaved man or woman, or through sentence of death

commuted to slavery. The same Statute also provides some possibility for the slaves to buy their freedom. By the Statute of 1566 the commutation of the death sentence to slavery was abolished, and the Statute of 1588 abolished slavery altogether, former slaves being put on the same footing with serfs.

The freedom of former free peasants was, as we have said, very much curtailed. They were sub-divided into different groups chiefly according to the sort of labor they had to provide and the duties they had to perform. Most of them were attached to the land. They had to pay to the landlord some tribute mostly in kind, and their work on his land constituted the chief source of labor on the estates. Their duties were constantly growing, also the amount of personal service they were bound to give. In some rare cases they paid their duties in money, but mostly in products of their trade if they had any, such as hunting, fishing, beekeeping and so on.

Considerable masses of peasant-serfs were bound not to private landlords but to the State. These peasants were employed on the borders, in the castles and fortresses; often they were artisans such as smiths, carpenters, wheelwrights, coopers, wagoners, carters, whose chief duties were transport during the military campaigns. The peasants of this category were especially numerous in the south and south-east of Ukraine, in the provinces of Kiev, Sieversk and Podolia.

The most common type of peasant settlements was a farm or a group of two or three farms occupied by the members of the same family or close relatives. The quantity of arable land that such a settlement cultivated varied much according to local conditions. This type of peasant settlement was also considered as a unit for taxation and the imposition of other duties. About the middle of the Sixteenth century an important land reform was carried out in order to render taxation more uniform. According to this new arrangement, by the law of 1557 a certain definite measure of arable land became the unit for taxation purposes. This was the "voloka", equivalent to

about fifty-five acres. Every peasant group in possession of a "voloka" of land was bound to pay a certain tax in money and produce as well as in labor service, the latter being two days in the week. The peasants were not yet definitely deprived of liberty of movement and bound to the soil. This law was applied only in certain parts of the Ukraine, mostly in the north, whereas in the south of the Ukraine old customs were in force until after the Union of Lublin and the attachment of Ukrainian territories directly to the Polish crown.

36. Lithuanian Statute.

The conception of law in the Lithuanian State in the Sixteenth century, especially from the point of view of the szlachta, found its expression in the historical document known under the name of the Lithuanian Statute. This code of laws lasted much longer than the Lithuanian Princedom and was in force in the Ukraine as late as the middle of the Nineteenth century, under the Russian government.

The first scientific studies of this document immediately connected it with the old Ukrainian code of Yaroslav, "Ruska Pravda". Indeed, all historians are unanimous in saying that it is in the Ukraine and not in Moscow that the old forms of law as fixed by the code of Yaroslav found their natural development. Not only the chief laws of the Lithuanian Statute but even the sub-divisions are made under the same headings as in the Code of Yaroslav, thus proving the complete dependence of the later code on the legal conceptions of the Kievan State.

Before the publication of the first Lithuanian Statute in 1529 there was no written, generally accepted, Code of Laws, the Lithuanian Princedom being governed according to local customs, precedents, charters and privileges. The initiative for codification came from the szlachta who petitioned the Prince in the Seim of 1514 to give a written law. The draft of the Statute was prepared by the lawyers of the Great Prince's Chancery,

examined and discussed in successive Seims, and finally published in 1529.

This first Lithuanian Statute had only thirteen paragraphs, subdivided into articles. Under the first heading we find the definition of the sovereign power and its relation to the population; the second is about the organization of the defence of the State and military service; the third treats of the privileges of the gentry; and the fourth is on jurisdiction and courts of justice and judges. It contains also the codes of civil and penal law, and the order of legal procedure. The final form of the Statute was undoubtedly the result of certain struggles between the great nobles and the lesser gentry. We distinctly see in it how the privileges of the latter are insisted upon. A member of the gentry class could not be imprisoned without a public trial. He could not be deprived of his estate unless there was sufficient ground for punishment. His dependents were exempted from state taxation. If a person belonged to the gentry class, the principle of prescription was taken as a criterion; those who had belonged to this class for several generations and enjoyed the rights and privileges of the gentry were considered as such. In some cases it was necessary to bring a certain number of witnesses to swear that the person was "a gentleman by birth". New nobility was acquired only through grants by the sovereign.

The growth of the gentry necessitated a new settlement of these rights and privileges, and they saw to it themselves that a new edition of the Statute should be made to include all the additions. Thus, the second Lithuanian Statute was edited in 1566, augmented and revised, but the same in principle as the first.

Hardly had this second edition come into use when the Union of Lublin considerably changed the situation in the Lithuanian State, especially in the Ukrainian provinces. The Seim of Lublin appointed a Commission to adapt the Lithuanian Statute to the new circumstances, that is to the Polish Code, so as to make it workable under the Union. The Commission, however, composed of Lithu-

anians only, did not care to give much consideration to Polish legislation and practically left it out of account. In the new Lithuanian Statute the Union of Lublin was not even mentioned. The Third Lithuanian Statute of 1588 confirmed by King Sigismund III without having consulted a Seim, was adopted not only in Lithuania proper but also in the Ukrainian territories. In addition to legislation concerning the privileged gentry, this code contains laws concerning all classes of the population.

As an important feature of this part of the Code the Communal courts of Justice (Kopny Sud) should be mentioned. Besides the regular legal system administered in courts by appointed judges there existed in the Ukraine under the Lithuanian and Polish crowns irregular communal courts based entirely on custom or established by precedent, a practice that acquired the force of law. It was based on the principle of self-government or self-defence of a community against the criminal elements in it. Any member of a community aware of some crime that had been committed had the right to call together a sufficient number of qualified persons to denounce the crime, and make the accusation before them. They then proceeded to investigate and sit in judgment on the matter. The powers of these Communal courts were very wide, and appeal from them could be made to the regular court of the district, the minor court. The origin of these communal courts is to be sought in the practice in use from the Eleventh to the Thirteenth centuries when justice was administered in public meetings, or "Viche". As far as we can judge from the records preserved, the communal courts flourished in Ukraine mostly about the Sixteenth century, but the practice lasted until the end of the Eighteenth century.

Generally speaking, certain social changes appeared during the Lithuanian period, which for centuries played a very important part in the life of the Ukrainian people.

CHAPTER VIII

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(37) West Ukrainian Territories Under Polish Rule.
 (38) Political and Economic Evolution. (39) Consequences of the Lublin Union to the East Ukrainian Lands and Their New Colonization.

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37. West Ukrainian Territories Under Polish Rule.

For the Ukrainians, one of the most important consequences of the Union of Lublin was that all the Ukrainian territories were re-united under one State. Kiev, Sieversk, (beyond the Dnieper) Volynia and Podolia, formerly under Lithuanian rule, were united with Galicia and Kholm, which since the middle of the Fourteenth century, had been under the Polish crown. Notwithstanding certain differences of a political and social character they drew more closely together and exercised a mutual influence. Weakened and impoverished under more than two centuries of Polish administration, the Ukrainians of Galicia nevertheless preserved their national traditions. Supported materially and morally by the eastern Ukrainians, they very quickly succeeded in developing an active movement which soon led to a general renaissance of the Ukrainian people.

In order to understand the exact part played in Ukrainian history by Galicia and Kholm we must survey the conditions within these territories from the time of their annexion to Poland. As we have previously seen, Ukrainian-Polish rivalry with respect to these territories dates from the earliest dawn of Ukrainian history under Vladimir the Great. The relations of the Ukraine with Poland were sometimes peaceful, strengthened by dynastic connections and treaties, and sometimes hostile, expressing itself in wars and campaigns. Pressed from the north and west and cut off from the Baltic by the Germans, Poland sought an outlet in the east and south. In this direction it was able to take advantage of the weakening of the Ukraine by the Tatar invasion. Owing

to the growth of the Lithuanian Princedom in the east, Poland's only hope of expansion was towards the south-east in Galicia, and we have seen that about the middle of the Fourteenth century Galicia became a Polish province. It was, therefore, towards these territories that the Poles directed their first efforts at expansion, their colonization and their political and religious penetration.

38. Political and Economic Evolution.

From the political point of view, Galicia in the Fourteenth century, though not behind Poland in cultural development, was certainly weaker in the matter of national resistance. The country, weakened by the strife of the boyars, suffered from the lack of a strongly concentrated power, and the masses of the population had become unaccustomed to taking an active part in political life. Galicia fell into the hands of a State that was politically consolidated, whose King knew what he wanted and whose aggressive policy certainly found an approving echo among the Polish population. When Silesian merchants now asked the Polish king's permission to continue to trade with the Ukraine, he declared, "I have got Rus with the help of my own people and the road to them belongs to no other than my own people".

In spite of the internal weakness of Galicia, the Polish government did not introduce any important changes for almost a century, and the land was administered according to the old laws and customs. The changes came gradually, as a consequence of the intensive colonization of Galicia by the Polish gentry, who at that time already played a very important political part in Poland, and enjoyed all sorts of privileges. According to the chief of these privileges, granted by the King in 1374, the Polish gentry were exempt from all taxation and duties, the land was assured to them as their private property, and the peasants on their estates were put under the jurisdiction of their landlords. It was natural that the Galician nobles should demand the same rights and privileges

as were enjoyed by the Polish szlachta. In 1430, King Yagailo granted similar privileges to the Galician nobles, and these were confirmed by the next King Wladislaus.

Before these measures came into effect, certain changes took place in Galicia in consequence of the peculiar circumstances in which this kingdom came under the Polish crown. Immediately after the annexion, an extensive wave of colonization spread from Poland. Kings were very generous in granting land in Galicia, and the Polish gentry eagerly seized upon these rich and fertile lands, abandoning their meagre, barren, and sandy soil in Poland.

The Galician aristocracy, especially those amongst them who were against the union with Poland, lost their estates, which were confiscated by the Polish crown and given to the Poles. Those of the Galician boyars who still remained, were in the minority and soon absorbed by the Polish colonists. Families whose lands were confiscated either emigrated to Volynia and other Ukrainian territories or sank into the mass of the common population.

Official posts in the administration were systematically given to Poles, who deliberately or inadvertently introduced Polish ways and customs. The towns already populated by German colonists had their rights under "Magdeburg Law" confirmed by the Polish Kings, and new German settlers, mostly artisans, were invited and came from Germany in large numbers especially in the first two decades after the annexation.

Thus the ground was gradually prepared for the official union and the introduction of Polish laws and customs. This took place in 1443 when the administration and jurisprudence of the Ukrainian provinces of Galicia and Kholm were brought into line with the rest of Poland. The Ukrainian territory was divided into three provinces (Voevodstvo): Rus, comprising the territory of Lvov, Halich, Peremyshl, (Przemysl), Sianik and Kholm; Western Podolia; and Belz, comprising Rava, Sokal, Zovkva, Kamianka Strumilova, Belz and Brody. The gentry in

each voevodstvo obtained self-government according to the Polish model. The rights and privileges of the newly annexed gentry consisted in their rights being exempt from all taxation and duties, including foreign service, with the sole exception of military service for the defence of the frontiers. The gentry obtained special courts of law and the rights of representation in the Seim. Small local Seims were instituted for the discussion of questions to be considered in the chief Seim of the State.

In consequence of these measures, the Galician nobles were very soon absorbed into the mass of the Polish gentry, and only in remote corners of the land did they retain for a few centuries longer their religious and national distinctiveness.

At the same time as the Galician nobles profited from the annexation of Galicia, and so obtained a fully privileged position, the rights of the town population of Galicia were in contrast very much curtailed, Polish town life being very retrograde compared with contemporary European towns in Germany and France. In contradistinction to the privileged position of the landed gentry in Poland, the towns were weak and deprived of every right to participate in political life. The Polish gentry took full advantage of their privileges of free imports and exports, thus much injuring the commerce and industry of Polish towns. Burgesses were deprived of the right to own and cultivate land. They were not represented in the Seim and took no part whatever in political life. Though Polish kings retained the German model of the municipal self-government of towns introduced by the Ukrainian rulers of Galicia, it only led to the complete isolation of the town population within the walls of each separate town and entirely divided it from the surrounding country population. Ukrainian burgesses were also excluded from the advantages of self-government because, according to the Magdeburg Law only Roman Catholics were admitted to municipal functions. Thus the new German and Polish settlers in Ukrainian towns gradually seized the control of municipal institutions

to their advantage and to the exclusion of the old Ukrainian population, which began to suffer under these restrictions.

The bulk of the population in Galicia, as elsewhere in the Ukraine, were free peasants who owned their land, and were economically an independent class. Besides, there existed different categories of half-free peasants who, having no land of their own, were bound to work as agricultural laborers for the landowner on whose land they lived. In consequence, they were limited in their freedom. There also existed a not numerous class of slaves. As we have already seen, the tendency was for the free peasants gradually to lose their freedom and be bound to the land by the gentry who appropriated the peasant's land as well as claiming their personal service, thus transforming them into serfs. The position of slaves on the contrary was improved, in the sense that they were put on the level with the former free peasants, their bondage thus becoming lighter. The old Ukrainian law admitting peasant landownership conflicted with the Polish principle of leaving all the land in the hands of the privileged class of nobles with the king as first landowner in the State. To begin with, some compromise was made with the Ukrainian law, but in the end the Polish law was introduced and the peasants bound to the land. The Seim of 1505 confirmed the new order depriving the peasants of the land and enacting that they might not leave one landlord to go to another. Along with this, the peasants were removed from the general jurisdiction and put under the jurisdiction of their landlords. From records and documents of the Fifteenth and following centuries we can see that the peasants had to pay one tribute in kind to their landowner, and to work for a certain number of days on his land. At the beginning of the Sixteenth century the general custom was established of working two days in the week for the landlord. In the course of the Sixteenth century these duties increased. From contemporary records and documents we see that abuses and oppressions were frequent, and that the Polish government

was powerless to bring any improvement into the position of the serfs.

The Union of Lublin in 1569, as we have seen, brought together most of the Ukrainian territories under the Polish crown: to Galicia, Kholm and Pidliasha were now added Podolia, Volynia, Kiev and the southern districts of Sieversk (present south Chernigov and Poltava provinces). Now, only the districts of Brest and Pinsk remained under the Lithuanian administration. The northern part of the Sieversk territory was annexed by Moscow, and the Carpathian Ukraine, after a short period under the rule of the Galician Kings, remained with Hungary. Thus, the chief Ukrainian territories with their historic centres were united under one rule, with the exception, however, of Chernigov which was surrendered to Poland by Moscow at the beginning of the Sixteenth century.

As we said, all the Ukrainian lands were divided into provinces (voevodstvo). These were Belz, Rus, Podolia, Braslav, Kiev and Volynia. The nobles of each voevodstvo had local Seim and sent representatives to the Seim in Warsaw. The voevodstvo of Braslav, Volynia and Kiev were left under the Lithuanian Statute, and retained the Ukrainian language in the civil administration and in the courts, but in spite of these concessions to old Ukrainian tradition, the way was open to Polish influence in all spheres of political and national life, and this led to the evergrowing polonization of the Ukrainian nobles.

39. Consequences of the Lublin Union to the East Ukrainian Lands and Their New Colonization.

One of the most important consequences of the Lublin Union to the Ukraine was the now comparative safety of the southern and south-eastern borders against the Tatars. The Ukrainian population of these territories, driven back during the new invasions of the Crimean Horde at the end of the Fifteenth century, was now able to recover the vast tracts of the steppe to the south and south-east of Kiev, especially beyond the Dnieper. These territories, partly abandoned at the time of the first great

invasion of Batu in the middle of the Thirteenth century were partly recovered under Lithuanian protection, only to be again abandoned in consequence of these renewed invasions of the Crimean Tatars.

The most densely populated Ukrainian territory at the end of the Sixteenth century was Volynia. In 1629 it had a population of over 600,000 and was more densely populated than contemporary Prussia, Scotland or Denmark. The bulk of the population consisted of peasants living on the land and working for about 250 noble families. About thirteen of these families owned more than one half of Volynia. These were the oldest and most powerful of the Ukrainian Nobles, being mostly descended from local sovereign princely houses, such as the Princes of Ostrozhsky, Lubomir, Korets, Vishnevets, Zbaraz and others. They were completely polonized in the course of centuries and lost to the Ukraine.

Comparatively densely populated was the northern part of the province of Kiev. Kiev itself was well fortified thus rendering trade and industry possible, in spite of the dangerous proximity of the Tatars. To the south, on the right bank of the Dnieper were also a few fortified towns, such as Kaniv and Cherkassy which soon became centres of Cossak organization.

Territories beyond the Dnieper, the former principedom of Pereyaslav, and the southern part of the principedom of Chernigov were now for purposes of administration included in the voevodstvo of Kiev, especially its districts of Kaniv and Cherkassy. Recovered by the Lithuanian princes and even formally surrendered by the Great Tatar Horde to Vitovt, these territories had been practically re-populated. Under the Lithuanian dynasty of the Olelkovich in Kiev, during the Fifteenth century, the left bank of the Dnieper was populated and cultivated as far as the river Oskol, a tributary of the Desna, in the east, and the river Samara, a tributary of the Dnieper, in the south. After the successive invasions of the Crimean Khan Mengli Gerei at the end of the Fifteenth century, this territory was again almost deserted by the population.

These vast tracts of land beyond the Dnieper, now known under the name of the "Wild Steppe" though unsafe for habitation, were extremely fertile and abounded in game, fish and every kind of natural wealth attractive to the adventurous population of the borderland, especially of Kaniv, Cherkassy and Kiev, who sometimes ventured very far from the fortified towns for hunting, fishing and primitive beekeeping. We shall see that Cossak military organizations were started in connection with this kind of enterprise from which certain monasteries profited as well as the administrative authorities. There is also evidence of a permanent population remaining in some parts of the former Pereyaslav Princedom accustomed to a precarious and insecure existence, always ready take cover at the approach of the enemy, reappearing when the danger was over for the time being.

The north-eastern part of the Ukrainian territories, the former princedom of Sieversk and Chernigov, being too distant to be in constant danger from the inroads of the Crimean Tatars during the Lithuanian period, was more densely populated, especially to the north of the rivers Desna and the Szym; the southern zone bounded only by the Pereyaslav territory was more or less deserted and served the population beyond the Desna as a land of adventure in the same way as the Poltava and Pereyaslav territories served the population of Kaniv and Cherkassy districts. At the beginning of the Sixteenth century most of the former Chernigov princedom was surrendered by the Lithuanian princes to Moscow, only a narrow strip of land along the left bank of the Dnieper and the region of the lower Desna remaining under Lithuanian rule.

These thinly populated territories beyond the Dnieper, the southern part of the Kiev province and eastern Podolia have the richest soil in Europe as well as a mild climate and are extremely well suited to agriculture. From the dawn of Ukrainian history, countless generations have fought for centuries with Asiatic nomads for the possession of these vast territories. Their definite recovery

by the Ukrainian population took place under peculiar and unfavorable conditions.

According to the Lublin Union all Polish subjects obtained the right to the possession of lands in the former Lithuanian provinces, thus not only the Ukrainian and Lithuanian nobles but also the Polish szlachta purchased or received from the King grants of sometimes very extensive estates. After the death of the last Polish King of the house of Jagailo, the new Polish King, Stephen Bathory, of Hungarian origin and his successor, Sigismund III of the Vasa family, freely distributed Ukrainian lands to their adherents who helped them to obtain the Polish crown. By the decision of 1590 the Polish Seim gave to the King an unlimited right to dispose of these free Ukrainian lands and the new owners were expected themselves to provide for the defence of their possession against the Tatars which they did by militarizing and organizing the local population and the new settlers.

The sparse local population of these areas, as well as those peasants who returned there, now found themselves in the power of the new landowners; and according to the form of social order which had been generally introduced, became bound to them as serfs. The bondage however, on these lands was at first very light. Indeed, in order to attract a new population and retain the existing one, landowners and the government at first gave all sorts of liberties and privileges to them, especially as it was they who were to constitute the military defence of their own homes and fields against the inroads of the Tatars. Most of the new settlers came from the bordering zones of Kiev, Podolia and Chernigov territories, people who were already familiar with the conditions and the constant danger from the nomads. There are historical evidences also of colonists coming from Volynia, Galicia, Kholm and Sieversk, the names given to new settlements often being those of their old homes. These new settlers undoubtedly belonged to more adventurous and intrepid elements of the community, who preferred freedom and a life full of danger and hardship to the settled and

regular conditions of the serfs. Together with the local population, accustomed to a free though precarious existence, they formed that independent, daring and freedom-loving Ukrainian population which refused to accept at that time the social dependence which the nobles tried to introduce but were unable to enforce in face of the danger from the nomads.

Economic conditions in Europe about the second half of the Sixteenth century were extremely favorable to the extension of agricultural enterprise in these hitherto unused vast areas of fertile land. Owing to economic changes in Europe and, in particular, to the failure about that time of agriculture in Spain, the demand of certain lands, such as France, Italy, and even Spain, for agricultural products turned the attention of buyers to Eastern Europe and to Poland, in the same way as in the Fifteenth century the destruction of forests in Western and Central Europe led to a demand for timber from Poland and Lithuania. Like timber, agricultural products were brought down the rivers to the ports of the Baltic, chiefly that of Danzig, and shipped mostly on Dutch ships. The prices for grain and other agricultural products rose rapidly, thus rendering agriculture extremely profitable and encouraging intensive cultivation in the already existing estates in Ukraine, especially the exploitation of these vast newly-recovered areas of the south-east.

In the course of a few decades following the Union of Lublin, the re-population of these territories that only recently were called the "Wild Steppe" was almost accomplished. A continuous stream of Ukrainian peasants advanced far east and south, in comparative safety only; but feeling themselves free, they displayed great energy and initiative in dominating the uncultivated spaces, and adapting them to agriculture. The land was now in the possession of some twenty families of Polish and Ukrainian magnates, who built towns, castles, and fortresses which were designed to hold the Tatars in check. The new settlers, besides laboring on the land, were called to defend it. They were often mobilized and organized in

military units, and being accustomed to carry arms they developed a military spirit of discipline. The defence of the land was the chief aim of the authorities and the land-owners, but it was also the chief aim and duty of every new individual settler-peasant. It was these peculiar circumstances which developed the class of population in the Ukraine that was destined to play such an important part in the political and national development of the Ukraine. These were the Ukrainian Cossacks.

CHAPTER IX

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(40) The Cossacks and Their Importance in Ukrainian History. (41) The Circumstances and Conditions Under Which This Class Developed. (42) Polish Government and Ukrainian Cossacks in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century.

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40. The Cossacks and Their Importance in Ukrainian History.

The new forms of social and political life that shaped themselves and began to take root on Ukrainian territories after the Lublin Union encountered steady opposition from the Ukrainian population as early as the end of the Sixteenth century. This opposition very soon took the form of open conflicts, complicated by religious differences. The Cossacks, the new social class, played the leading part in these conflicts. This class of warrior-farmers was engendered by the special circumstances of life of the Ukrainian population in the steppe in the close vicinity of nomadic Asiatic hordes who constituted a permanent danger to the agricultural population. The Ukrainian Cossacks were the outcome of the century-long warfare between the settled agricultural population and the nomadic invaders who appeared in the Tenth century as the Pechenegs, later as Polovtsi, and finally, as Tatars, and who systematically ruined the products of civilization. It was in self-defence that this class of half-military half-agricultural settlers developed and now took, under the name of "Cossack" a leading part in Ukrainian history. The Cossacks formed the new aristocracy of the population of the Ukrainian State, and became what is generally considered to be a unique phenomenon in history. The Cossacks existed not only in the Ukraine; analogous conditions such as constant danger from the Tatars settled in the Crimea and Astrakhan, created in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries in Russia a similar class of Cossacks of the Don and Ural.

Social oppression introduced in the Ukraine after the Lublin Union furnished the Cossacks with recruits from among the peasants who fled from the bondage of serfdom; and the enormous taxes and duties which the Moscow princes imposed on their subjects made the Russian Cossacks the shelter and refuge of the discontented. Accordingly, many Russian historians consider the Russian Cossacks to be a rebel element. Though they rendered great service to the Moscow State in conquering and colonizing vast tracts in the Urals and Siberia, the Russian Cossacks were always in opposition to the government that employed them, and conflicts existed as late as the end of the Eighteenth century. The Russian government definitely conquered their Cossacks and transformed them into submissive, though irregular troops.

The Ukrainian Cossacks were of a different character. They also were constantly in opposition to the Polish government, but the Ukraine was governed by foreigners, and the opposition was not only of a social but of a political, national and religious character. This is why the part played by the Cossacks in the Ukraine was quite different.

The Cossack period is not only the most brilliant and striking of all periods of Ukrainian history, it was also the time of the highest intensity of the national energies of the Ukrainian people, and the culmination of their political, social and national creative powers. It was at this period that the most characteristic features, positive as well as negative, of the Ukrainian national genius were revealed, and found their most complete expression. The Ukrainian Cossacks were recruited from among the best and most active elements in the Ukrainian population. They were a true aristocracy in the real meaning of the word and played the leading part among the Ukrainian people in place of the old aristocracy which had become polonized and lost to the Ukraine. The Ukrainian Cossacks re-organized the Ukrainian population in the Seventeenth century and renewed the Ukrainian

State in the form of the Ukrainian Cossack State under the Ukrainian Hetmans. It is true, this State did not long retain its complete political independence, but it preserved the Ukrainians from being assimilated first by the Poles then by the Russians. It preserved Ukrainian culture and the spirit of Ukrainian independence. The name of "Cossack nation" was thus quite natural and appropriate. This term, created in the Seventeenth century, remained in use for a considerable time.

The Cossacks became the ideal of the Ukrainian nation as expressed in popular songs and in literature. A Cossack in the popular Ukrainian songs, is an idealistic, freedom-loving, gallant and independent man who fights for the well-being of Ukraine, and is ready to sacrifice his life for his country, his religion and his freedom. In the popular songs of the Ukrainian women the word "Cossack" is an epithet applied to an ideal young man, brave and daring, who embodies the best characteristics of masculine nature. In the romantic period of Ukrainian literature, especially in the poetry of the beginning and middle of the Nineteenth century, we see the same glorification of the Cossacks, whose real apotheosis is to be found in the poems of Shevchenko, the Ukrainian national poet. The whole of Ukrainian literature of the Nineteenth century shows a poetic and idealistic treatment of the Cossacks, and this view long influenced Ukrainian historical writers also. Modern scientific Ukrainian investigators, however, have taken a stand against this idealistic romanticism and sentimentality, and have given an impartial history of the origin of the Cossacks, their historical development and the part they played in Ukrainian history.

41. The Circumstances and Conditions Under Which This Class Developed.

As we stated above, the Cossacks originated and developed as an organic outcome of the peculiar conditions of life in the Ukraine, especially during the Fifteenth and

Sixteenth centuries on the border of the steppes in close vicinity to the nomads and Tatars then settled in the Crimea.

The origin and the process of formation was very slow. Its separate stages were inconspicuous and escaped general notice, the more so as the life led by the Cossacks took them to remote places in the steppes far from civilized centres. This led to the fact that when the Cossacks at last appeared on the stage of history as a fully organized military class, no one could give adequate and definite answer to the question: "whence did they come?" "How, and when did they come into existence?"

Already at the beginning of the Sixteenth century, if not earlier, there are evidences of the interest which the Cossacks aroused. Polish, German and other foreign writers faced with the fact of the existence of a peculiar social class unknown in other lands, tried to explain it each in his own way. Some sought for analogies in antiquity, others in early Mediaeval European history. Three German dissertations written in the Seventeenth century are devoted to the investigation into the origin of the Cossacks. Chr. Engel, a German author of the Eighteenth century, compared the Cossacks to the ancient Spartans. Ukrainian chroniclers of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries were not less enterprising than foreign writers in investing the most fantastic theories about the origin of the Cossacks, tracing their descent sometimes from the Sarmations or from the Khazars and so on. The Russian, Polish and Ukrainian historians of the early Nineteenth century put forward some of these far-fetched theories and parallels. It was not until recent times that the question of the origin of the Cossacks can be considered to be fairly settled by historical science. The Cossacks, as we have said, formed part of the local Ukrainian population and were an outcome of those specific historic and geographical conditions to which the attention of the reader has been sufficiently directed in this and preceding chapters.

After the Tatar invasion of the Thirteenth century

the population on both sides of the Middle Dnieper became very sparse and almost disappeared. We know of settlements along the Middle Dnieper only as far south as Cherkassy. Further south and east on both sides of the river stretched the "Wild Steppe". During the Lithuanian period this borderland was to some extent fortified at different points with defence works which, though they bore the proud title of castles, were only earthen mounds surrounded by a ditch. But they were sufficient to keep back the enemy who had neither guns nor equipment for laying siege. This enemy from the end of the Fifteenth century, was the Crimean Tatar. After the terrible invasion of 1475 and succeeding years which devastated even Kiev and all the Ukrainian territories as far as the forest zone of Chernigov, there was hardly a summer that the Tatars did not show themselves in more or less numerous hordes, carrying away the most valuable spoil, and taking both sexes prisoner. These regular inroads of the Tatars did not, of course, contribute to the increase of the population of the "Wild Steppe". On the contrary, those who were left had to take refuge in the forests and swamps or retreat to the protection of the fortified towns of Volynia and western Podolia. The Lithuanian princes provided no other means of protection than those "castles", built here and there, and their defence was thrust upon the local population, poor and scanty as it was. The organization of defence practically lay in the hands of the local border administration, the Ukrainian starosts (heads of the districts) chiefly that of Kaniv and Cherkassy in the Kiev vоеvodstvo and Bar in that of Podolia. These starosts received far-reaching powers from the princes but very little means. They had to look out for themselves on the spot for such defence as was possible. Indeed, they had not to go far. The local population was accustomed to self-defence, and left as it was to itself, did not lack initiative or discipline. They were excellent material from which to recruit the defence force of the border.

Notwithstanding the danger of living in those con-

ditions, the population did not diminish; on the contrary, it began to increase. The territory was too rich in natural wealth not to attract adventurous men, in spite of the constant danger. The Dnieper and its numerous tributaries were full of excellent fish, the country abounded in game, and valuable fur-bearing animals, such as beaver, marten, fox, bear and others. The fertile soil required a minimum of effort in order to return a hundred fold. According to a Polish author, who wrote about 1590: "Ukraine is the richest land known. Its steppes are to be compared with Elysian fields. They are boundless, broken only from time to time by gentle hills, valleys and groves. Their aspect is fertile and lively. There is such wealth of cattle, game and birds that you might think it were the home of Diana and Ceres. Such quantities of honey are taken from the countless hives that you could forget the Sicilian Hela and the Attic Hymettus. Grapes grow there in plenty, and the vine can be easily cultivated. Walnuts are in such plentiful abundance that the Ukraine might once have been an Italian land. It would be impossible to enumerate all the fish-ponds, lakes and rivers. But why should I vainly scatter magnificent descriptions when I might say in a word that Ukraine is the Promised Land that our Lord spoke of to the Jews, the land that flows with milk and honey. Once to have been in the Ukraine is never to leave it, it draws everyone as a magnet draws steel, on account of its many advantages. The sky above the Ukraine is smiling, its climate is healthy, its soil fertile. . . ."

There is no wonder that such a rich country attracted a daring and active population who would settle in Kaniv or Cherkassy and go out from there in summer hunting and fishing in the steppes. They did not, of course, go singly but in small armed bands. It was always possible when hunting or fishing in the steppe to meet Tatars and be obliged to fight. The lower Dnieper offered the most attractions. The Dnieper in its middle course passes through the fertile plain of Chernigov and Kiev, and then across the steppe to Ekaterinoslav. About 45 miles south

of this town it has to force its way through the granite offshoot of the Carpathian mountains which interrupts the course of the Dniester and the Boh also, and for a distance of 25 miles rapid succeeds rapid (Ukr. porih). The drop of the river in that distance is 155 feet. The rapids form a serious obstacle to navigation, and it is only for a few weeks when the river is in flood that they are passable, and even then the venture is not without risk and can only be undertaken with the assistance of special pilots. On that part of the river beyond the rapids where the Dnieper divides into countless arms and armlets, small rivers and lakes forming many islands and grassy plains, the hunters and fishermen found their richest harvest spoil. This was the "Great Meadow" which the Cossacks later called their "Foster-father". Bands of hunters and fishermen usually gathered early in spring in Kaniv, Cherkassy and other populous centres on the Dnieper beyond the rapids, remaining there till late autumn. They returned with rich spoil that was mostly sold in Kiev. The governors of Kiev received the tenth part of the profit.

Defending themselves against the Tatars, these men adopted all the methods of the steppe guerilla war and often did not merely remain on the defensive but attacked such of the Tatar herdsmen as advanced too far with their cattle and sheep or waylaid caravans of Turkish, Tatar or other foreign merchants. Life amidst constant danger, under the menace of a daily encounter with the foe hardened and tempered them into daring, resourceful, and persistent people. Coming home for the winter with rich spoil earned by their hands or taken from the enemy, these men brought with them the free spirit of the steppe, a spirit of independence and revolt against every restraint, the spirit of "unsubmissiveness and rebellion" as it was expressed at that time. In the eyes of the peaceful inhabitants of an inner province, these men were more like wild adventurers than ordinary hunters and fishermen. They were feared and admired. At the end of the Fifteenth century they were so numerous that they al-

ready constituted a separate social class of the population and had their own name; they were called Cossacks.

The name "Cossack" is of Turkish origin. We find it for the first time in a vocabulary of the speech of Polovtsi compiled by an Italian traveller in 1303 called the Codex Cumanicus preserved in the library of St. Mark at Venice. There, the word "Cossack" has the meaning of "sentry", "watch". In the Turkish dictionary of Radlov the word Cossack means a free independent man, a vagrant. We find this name, however, not only in dictionaries. Some old documents have preserved for us the different uses of the name "Cossack". Thus in a Fifteenth century document about 1449, we find a series of notices about Tatar Cossacks who were a body of light horsemen used for sentry duty in Kaffa and other Genoese colonies in the Crimea and showed an independent behaviour. In the year 1492 we find Ukrainian Cossacks mentioned. The Khan of Crimea complained to the Lithuanian Prince that men from Cherkassy had wrecked and plundered a Turkish vessel at the mouth of the Dnieper and in response to this complaint, the Prince promised to call these "Cossacks" to account. When, in 1493, Prince Bohdan Hlinski, then starost of Cherkassy, stormed Ochakov, a Turkish fortress at the mouth of the Dnieper, the Khan called his men "Cossacks". From all this we may conclude that in adopting the methods of Tatar warriors, the Cossacks also adopted their name. Nothing is known later about the Tatar Cossacks, whereas the renown of the Ukrainian Cossacks has grown steadily ever since.

The Cossacks provided very good recruiting material for border warfare, and we see that they were used by local voevods and starosts for military purposes. Quite a number of them, as early as the end of the Fifteenth century, had Cossacks as permanent troops or engaged them for certain campaigns. Among the first organizers and leaders of the Cossacks was Ostap (Eustace) Dashkevich, who was starost of Cherkassy from 1514 to 1535. He was considered in Lithuania as the first authority on

the Tatar question. His campaign sometimes led him as far as the Crimea. At other times he had Tatars for allies in the Lithuanian wars against Moscow. The Khan of Crimea, roused by his attacks himself laid siege to the town of Cherkassy in 1532 but did not succeed in taking it.

Besides Ostap Dashkevich, history has preserved for us the names of Predslav Lanskoronski, starost of Khmelnik, known for his campaign against Bilhorod (Akerman) in 1516; Bernat Pretvich, starost of Bar; Semen Polosovich, starost of Cherkassy; Prince Bohdan Rusinski; Prince Bohdan Hlinski and others. Legends about these first Cossack leaders were introduced into the Cossack Chronicles, where they are called the first Cossack Hetmans. Hetman, in Lithuania and Poland, meant the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The Cossacks adopted this name for their first leader. Since the time of Bohdan Khmelnitsky, Hetman in Ukrainian means not only the military leader of the Cossacks, but also the Head of the Ukrainian State. The fame of the Cossack exploits against the Tatars spread in Lithuania and Poland and attracted many adventurous men from among the nobles to take part in these campaigns. "Try chivalrous life and fortune" was a contemporary expression. Indeed, among the members and leaders of the Cossacks in these guerilla wars against the Tatars and Turks, we find the names of very powerful noble families of Ukrainian magnates such as the Princes of Vishnevets, the Princes Zaslavsky, Zbarazsky, Koretsky and others.

The most famous among them was Prince Dimtri Vishnevetsky, surnamed "Baida", who was a remarkable leader, although somewhat of an adventurer. He started in 1550 organizing a Cossack army against the Tatars. Displeased with the Lithuanian Prince Sigismund August II, Vishnevetsky was ready to go over to the Turks, but was appointed by the Lithuanian Prince to fortify the island of Khortitza on the Dnieper beyond the rapids which he did so thoroughly that the Khan could not take it. In 1556, Vishnevetsky took part in the campaign of Moscow against the Tatars and entered into the service of Moscow.

At the head of his Cossacks and Muscovian troops he went in 1558 as far as Perekop. He submitted to the Lithuanian Prince in 1561, and took over the fortifications on the Khortitza. Two years later, Vishnevetsky was involved in Moldavian affairs, perhaps hoping to obtain the throne of Moldavia, but was defeated by the Turks, taken prisoner and tortured to death in Constantinople in 1563. The personality of Baida Vishnevetsky, his exploits and death must have had a deep impression on his contemporaries in Ukraine because popular songs about him and his career sprang up throughout Ukraine, which have been preserved and are sung even to this day.

Vishnevetsky's fortifications on the island Khortitsa, the so-called "sich" (hewn wood fort) served as prototype and model for later Cossack military fortified camps, called "Sich" which were built like those on Khortitsa, beyond the rapids of the Dnieper in the wilderness, face to face with the Tatars and far from the control and intervention of the authorities.

The fortified camp beyond the rapids, or "Zaporogian Sich" was entirely a military camp. Zaporogian in Ukrainian means "Beyond the rapids". The Cossacks of Ukraine were called Zaporogian Cossacks. There were no other inhabitants of the camp besides the Cossacks, and women were not allowed to enter it at all. The Zaporogian Cossacks were organized as a half-monastic half-military community and formed an Order or Brotherhood of bachelor-warriors with their own code of rules and customs gradually confirmed by tradition and perfectly adapted to the severe conditions of permanent warfare. About 1580 there already existed beyond the rapids a fully established "Sich" where those of the Cossacks who found life in the towns of Kaniv or Cherkassy too confined and restricted under the eye of the administration, found shelter and freedom. Here, beyond the rapids, the Cossacks only obeyed their own authorities elected from among themselves. They lived in very severe Spartan conditions, in plain wooden huts and were used to cold, hunger, and lack of the necessities of life.

Constant danger and a life full of privation developed among them peculiar ascetic views on life, and a contempt for pleasures and luxuries. Though often enriched by rich spoils after a successful campaign, there remained the question of what use to the Cossack Brotherhood beyond the rapids could such treasures and riches be? Only horses and valuable arms taken from the slain foe could give pleasure to a stern Zaporogian Cossack. "But it was this wilderness beyond the rapids", said the Ukrainian historian Kulish, "which was the home of the freedom that gave to the Cossacks their permanent epithet of free Cossacks. Here they now came for hunting and fishing not only from the neighboring provinces, but from the whole of Ukraine and even from other lands. The Cossacks brotherhood had no hierarchy. All were equal, even the leader who held dictatorial powers lived amidst them and dressed like the rest. Putting on fine rich garments was not considered to be bad form and bad taste if these fine clothes had been taken with their own hands from the slain Tatar or Turk. This brotherhood, poor by choice, founded the famous Zaporogian Sich or fortified camp beyond the rapids, where they stored war munitions, where young men came to be instructed in chivalry and military arts, and where no woman could be admitted. The Zaporogian Sich was the refuge and in a way the home of all the Cossacks in Ukraine, and every Ukrainian Cossack unit wherever it was, took the name of "Zaporogian". Thither complaints were later sent from all parts of the Ukraine about the oppression of the Polish nobles and their agents, and it was from thence that punishments were dealt to the oppressors. The Zaporogian Sich was, so to speak, the Cossack Order, and what was decided there, was accepted by the whole Cossack population.

42. Polish Government and Ukrainian Cossacks in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century.

At first, the Lithuanian, and later the Polish governments tried to keep the Cossacks under the control of the

local administration. Later attempts were made to organize special units from among the Cossacks and take them into regular service on pay. These units were put under the control of local administrators. In this way it was thought an effective control could be exercised over the Cossacks.

The early history of the Cossacks was long shrouded in a mist of legend and fantasy, which very soon found a place in the pages of Seventeenth and Eighteenth century authors, and later on, was canonized by Ukrainian historians at the beginning of the national revival in the early Nineteenth century. Only slowly and after long and persevering labor did scientific historical investigation succeed in clearing up the circumstances of the origin and early history of the Cossacks, selecting facts and rejecting fables. One of these legends only quite recently rejected was the so-called "Reform of Bathory". All the Cossack Chronicles unanimously state that King Stephen Bathory in 1576 chose six thousand men from among the Cossacks, divided them into six regiments, nominated a Hetman, six colonels, officers and judges, gave them their insignia, the seal with the coat of arms and guns and ordered them to defend the border against the Tatars. Besides the town of Chihirin, he also gave them, we are told, another town, Traktemiriv on the Dnieper, for their winter quarters, and as a hospital for their wounded and sick.

Historic criticism has proved that there never was such a thing as the "Reform of Bathory" and that the historical facts were much simpler. Endeavors to organize the Cossacks into separate units and take them into service on pay were certainly made as early as the beginning of the Sixteenth century and in this the border administration took the initiative. For instance, the above-mentioned Ostap Dashkevich, starost of Cherkassy, proposed in the Seim of 1533 to keep two thousand to defend the frontier against the Tatars, but this suggestion was left unconsidered as were also later many similar ones, coming from the border administration. The Government had no money and no understanding of the need.

Indeed, the Government began to look with suspicion and fear on the Cossacks, especially after they began to mix in Moldavian affairs, because it led to complications with the Turks. Thus in 1577 one of the Cossack pretenders to the Moldavian throne, Ivan Pidkova, at the head of the Cossacks, occupied Moldavia, but the Polish government arrested and beheaded him in Lvov in 1578. The experiment of transforming the Cossacks into a paid army though in a modest form, was made as early as 1572 by King Sigismund August. This experiment was only of short duration, but the fact of organizing the Cossacks by order of the King and exempting them from the jurisdiction of the local authorities had an important influence on the development of the Cossacks as a distinct military class and their immunity from ordinary administration.

King Stephen Bathory regarded the Cossacks as an independent, unruly element whose activities led him into diplomatic difficulties with the Turks. But he was a soldier, and in the interests of border defence and in order to keep the Cossacks more under his control, he recruited a unit of about five hundred men on special conditions with a treaty and a written grant to them and put this military unit under the leadership of Prince Michael Vishnevetsky, starost of Cherkassy. The Cossack Hetman was to be under his orders and he was expressly forbidden to begin any campaign without his knowledge. This treaty was to last during the war with Moscow that began at that time, and the Cossacks received the town of Traktemiriv on the Dnieper between Kiev and Kaniv for their headquarters. After the war with Moscow was over there is no mention of the renewal of this treaty.

The roll of the Cossacks adhering to this Treaty has been preserved. Ukrainians form 83%, besides which are Poles, Russians, Rumanians, Germans, a Serb and two Caucasians. Among different professions mentioned, we find a medical man and one graduate of a University, a Bachelor of Arts.

During the last two decades of the Sixteenth century

several other recruitments of the Cossacks were made. Though their contingents were small—500, 600, and 1000 men—the mere fact of treating the Cossacks as a distinct military class was important and furnished a precedent. These numbers included only a very small part of the Cossacks who were at the time already numerous and had their own centre practically independent of the Polish authorities.

The Zaporogian Sich lay, about the year 1530, on the river Basavluk, a small tributary of the Dnieper on the right bank beyond the rapids. This camp was visited in 1594 by Erik Lassota, an envoy from the Emperor Rudolph II, who left a description of this visit in his well-known diary. He arrived at the Sich on June 6th, 1594. The Cossacks met him with salvos of guns. Their Hetman, Bodhan Mikoshinsky, was absent on a campaign with 1500 men, thus Lassota had to wait for his return, living in an ordinary Cossack hut. The guard of the camp was composed, according to him, of 400 men. In camp there were about 6000 Cossacks altogether. When the Hetman returned, a meeting of all the Cossacks was held, on which occasion Lassota was officially received by the whole Brotherhood, and explained his mission. The negotiations lasted for several days, and when the proposals of the Emperor were accepted, he was again greeted with a salute of ten guns, fanfares of trumpets and beating of drums; there were fireworks at night. On leaving the Cossacks, Lassota was presented with a fur coat of marten from the treasury of the Sich, and a fur bonnet of black fox. He was conducted on a galley—spoil from the Turks—with more salvos of guns, trumpets and music. He speaks of a numerous fleet of galleys and smaller rowing vessels called by the Cossacks "Sea-gulls", which carried fifty men. He also mentions a considerable number of horses bred by the Cossacks, which he saw grazing in the meadows. From his descriptions we conclude that there was a completely organized military camp with considerable stores, war supplies and other necessities.

Ten years earlier, another foreigner, an Italian named

Gamberini, took down a detailed description of the Zaporogian Cossack organization from a former Cossack who was taken prisoner by the Turks and escaped to Italy. "Some of the Cossacks", Gamberini relates, "are in the service of the Polish King and follow an appointed Hetman. Their number is about fifteen hundred men under arms appointed to defend the frontier against the Tatars. Other Cossacks, and these are more numerous, numbering about fifteen thousand men, do not recognize any authority but their own elected Hetman. They live on spoil and are ready to face every danger. They are armed with muskets and swords and are unfailing shots. They excel in warfare both on foot and horseback. They live in wooden huts and are very frugal, subsisting on fish and game of their own killing. They do not eat bread and only drink fresh water.

"Most of them are men from neighboring provinces, but there are also among them Poles, Germans, French, Spaniards, Italians and all sorts of refugees. Here they find refuge and no hand can reach them. They live on a small island. When more join them, they move to a bigger island. There is much wood there, and they are skilful in building forts that even if the Dnieper is frozen they are not afraid of the foe, they cut the ice around their camp and build walls with ice blocks. In summer, it is impossible to reach them. It is even difficult to find the way to their camp if one does not know its exact whereabouts. Cossacks are also very good at sea. They have a fleet of all sorts of vessels, and set out plundering the Turkish towns on the shores of the Black Sea".

This is quoted at length because it is very typical. Since the end of the Sixteenth century we have in Polish, German, French, Dutch, English, and other European languages similar descriptions of the life of the Ukrainian Zaporogian Cossacks including numerous writings verging on fictions because in addition to the facts they contain much that is exaggerated and incorrect. For instance some speak of the international character of the Cossacks;

we can say with certainty that the majority were Ukrainians, the others being exceptions.

As a powerful military organization of this sort making use of their own considerable war munitions and military equipment, the Zaporogian Cossacks not only made war on the Tatars and Turks on their own initiative, but very soon began to conduct their own international policy. This was one of the reasons for a considerable number of the conflicts with the Polish Governments.

CHAPTER X

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(43) Fate of the Orthodox Church Under Lithuanian and Polish Rule. (44) Inner Organization of the Ukrainian Church. (45) Decline of the Orthodox Church at the End of the Sixteenth Century. (46) Its Revival and the Part Played by the Tatars. (47) Religious Brotherhoods.

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43. Fate of the Orthodox Church Under Lithuanian and Polish Rule.

At the time when the Cossack class was roaming and developing in the Dnieper steppes, a strong national movement began in the western Ukrainian provinces of Galicia and Volynia which was intimately bound up with religious revival. In order to understand the forms and meanings of this revival we must look back and retrace the fate of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine since the loss of political independence.

Under the old Ukrainian Kievan princes, the head of the Orthodox Church was the Metropolitan of Kiev, who bore the additional title of "All Russ" that is of White Russians and Great Russians as well. He was dependent on the Patriarch of Constantinople, who nominated mostly Greeks to this Office, without even asking the consent of the Kievan Princes. This procedure often provoked discontent in Kiev, and, as early as the time of Yaroslav the Wise, protests were made, but nevertheless the Patriarch of Constantinople retained in his hands the right of nominating the Metropolitan of Kiev. As the city of Kiev declined as a political centre, the Metropolitan of Kiev gradually lost his importance and prestige. Prince Andrew Bogolubski of Suzdal, after having ruined Kiev (1169), planned to transfer the Metropolitan See to his territory, but did not succeed in converting the Patriarch of Constantinople to his scheme. The Tatar invasion, however, made life in Kiev unsafe, and in 1299 we see Maxim the Greek, the Metropolitan of Kiev, taking up his residence in Suzdal. In conse-

quence, the Galician Prince, George I, succeeded in obtaining the consent of both the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Byzantine Emperor for a separate Galician Metropolitan See in Lvov (1303). The loss of the political independence of Galicia, and the intrigues of the Muscovian princes now at the head of the Great-Russian territories, made it difficult for the Galician Metropolitan See to maintain its existence, and it was only later, in consequence of the efforts of the Lithuanian Princes, that the Metropolitan See of Kiev was revived through the nomination by the Patriarch of Constantinople (1458) of Gregory the Greek to this Office. All Ukrainian territories, including Galicia, and all White Russia were subject to the Metropolitan of Kiev, who in his turn was dependent on Constantinople in the matter of nomination. The Lithuanian Princes, baptized according to the Orthodox Rite now protected the Ukrainian Metropolitan, and he resided as often in Vilno as in Kiev. The Orthodox Church however, lost its dominant position when Yagailo accepted the Roman Catholic Rite in order to become King of Poland.

At first however, there were no limitations to the rights and privileges of the Orthodox Church under Lithuanian and Polish rule, but gradually, as the Princes and great nobles went over to the Roman Catholic Faith, the importance of the Orthodox Church diminished. It became the religion of the lower classes of the population. Orthodox clergy in the Polish state were gradually losing the political influence and social importance they held under the rule of the Ukrainian and later of Lithuanian princes. Still, as long as some of the great Ukrainian boyars remained true to it the position of the Orthodox Church was not so unfavorable. It retained great wealth and high offices, such as that of the Metropolitan; and Bishops and Abbots of more important monasteries were members of Ukrainian noble families. A series of circumstances, external as well as interal, led to the decline of the Orthodox Church, especially after the Union of Lublin in 1569.

44. Inner Organization of the Ukrainian Church.

First of all, the power and authority of the Metropolitan, which was so high in the Kievan period, greatly diminished under the Lithuanian princes. The Metropolitan lost his right of nominating Bishops, who were now nominated by the Princes or the Council of Lords (Rada Paniv). These Bishops were practically independent of the Metropolitan, and since the nomination lay in the hands of the secular authorities, Bishoprics became the ambition of men who had neither formal nor moral right to them. The Lithuanian Princes gave Bishoprics, together with considerable material wealth to secular men as a reward for military or other services. Such a candidate would hastily discard his secular clothes in order to be consecrated Bishop without even going through the lower offices in the clerical hierarchy. On becoming bishops in most cases they took no interest in clerical affairs, did not even change their way of life, and continued to spend their time making war on their neighbors, hunting, carousing and sometimes leading very debauched lives. Often nomination to a bishopric was given even before the See was vacant, and to several candidates at once. These then started a fight amongst themselves, laying siege to the residence of the bishop with armies and guns. Such conduct of course, only served to discredit the Orthodox Church in the eyes of its friends, and gave ample grounds to its enemies for their attacks.

Besides the nominations to high offices, there was a custom of patronage of monasteries and churches by secular persons that had the same evil consequence in the case of lesser Abbots and of Priests. Patronage was not regulated by law, it developed as a custom through tradition and through precedent. Some authors derive it from the Byzantine custom of the founders and builders of monasteries and churches having the right to look after their material well-being. This right of supervision took such forms in the Ukraine under Lithuanian and Polish rule that the patrons, the local nobles, began to con-

sider the Orthodox Churches and Monasteries on their land as their own property. They nominated Abbots and Priests without even consulting the Bishop, controlled the property of Churches and Convents, and appropriated the income. The same was done by the local administrative authorities. The voevods and starosts seized the right of patronage of the convents and churches within their districts, and disposed of clerical offices and property in the same way as private patrons. This practice led, of course, to great abuses. Some patrons seized the church property, others even closed churches and convents under their patronage for the same purpose. The right of patronage became hereditary and was often bequeathed by will. Especially difficult was the position of those Orthodox churches and monasteries whose patrons became Roman Catholic or Protestant. In those cases, patronage took the form of persecution of the Orthodox clergy and parishioners found themselves in the power of a patron professing another creed. During the Sixteenth century this state of things became more and more frequent. The position of the Orthodox clergy and especially of the country Priests became very hard. This led to the lowering of the standard of those seeking admission to the priesthood, no decent person being attracted by the calling. Contemporaries bitterly complained that only "human refuse, vagabonds, and ignoramuses filled the Parish Churches, and that the Parson was more often to be found in a public house than in his Church".

45. Decline of the Orthodox Church at the End of the Sixteenth Century.

Having fallen into this state of disorganization and degradation, the Orthodox Church was naturally unable properly to fulfil another important duty that fell to its lot after the loss of Ukrainian political independence, namely the duty of maintaining Ukrainian cultural national tradition, Ukrainian learning and literature. The Orthodox creed became identified with the Ukrainian

nation as distinct from the Roman Catholic Polish nation. The Orthodox Church, though disorganized as it still was, had to be the rallying point of the popular masses of Ukraine.

At the same time, in the Sixteenth century, Poland went through an epoch when the level of spiritual life rose considerably. The humanistic and early Protestant movements of Central and Western Europe found a lively echo in Poland. Compared with the Polish, the Ukrainian population was conservative, and these modern movements had for a long time less influence in the Ukraine than in Poland, though the early Protestant doctrines of John Hus had a deeper influence in the Ukraine of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries. In the first half of the Sixteenth century Polish culture was to a considerable extent under Italian influence, due to the Italian Queen, Bona, who was of the Sforza family, and her court. The ideas of the Italian Renaissance freely penetrated the wider masses of the population, especially on account of the frequent journeys, and studies abroad, at Italian Universities of the young nobles, Polish, Ukrainian and Lithuanian. Italian humanistic ideas were followed in Poland by German humanistic influences which brought the German Protestant movement in their train. The chief stronghold of German Protestantism was Prussia, now a vassal of Poland after the secularization of the Teutonic Order in 1525. Therafter, Protestantism made such progress in Poland that about the middle of the Sixteenth century it seemed at one time that the Roman Catholic Church might even disappear there. The first appearance of Protestantism in Poland under the Lutheran form was about 1520-1530, especially among the town population, but it was met with very severe repression. It took however, a very firm hold in Prussia, and at the same time that Protestants were being burnt in Cracow, a Protestant University was founded in Koenigsberg (1544) which had a great influence on the western and north-western territories of Poland. About the middle of the Sixteenth century Protestantism had made great

progress also among the nobles. We know, for instance, of a considerable number of students in Wittenberg, the centre of Lutheran propaganda. Among these were "Poloni and Rutheni or ex-Russia", that is Poles, Ukrainians and White Russians. (The Great Russians were at that time called Muscovians). The Roman Catholic Church in Poland found it more difficult to deal with Protestant nobles, especially as the King Sigismund August II, a son of the Italian Princess Bona Sforza, was very tolerant of Protestant movements. Many great families such as the Radziwills for instance, were converted to Lutheranism or Calvinism and they were powerful protectors of reform. There were now Protestant professors at the University of Cracow. Another wave of Protestantism came in 1548 with the so-called "Moravian Brothers", a Hussite Protestant sect expelled from Bohemia and Austria.

On Ukrainian territories in particular the ground for Protestant doctrines was prepared by the "Hebrewists", a rationalistic sect, also known in Moscow as early as the middle of the Fifteenth century, but soon exterminated there. In Ukraine, this sect left considerable documentary proof of its wide-spread influence. Among Protestant doctrines, Arianism or Anti-trinitarianism was especially wide-spread in the Ukraine under the name of Socianism, from its founder Socin. The followers of Socianism, especially in Volynia, were mostly from among the Ukrainian country gentry, though some of the great families also adhered to it. An Arian Academy existed for some time in Kisselin in western Volynia. As already stated, the Protestant movement in the Ukraine only touched the upper classes of the population, the bulk remained conservative and clung to the Orthodox Church, such as it was, seeing in it the expression of their Ukrainian national tradition. Besides, many were repelled by the lack of unity and organization in the Protestant movement, its chaotic appearance, and its sharp criticism of the abuses of the Roman Catholic church, which did not apply to the conditions of the Orthodox Church. One innovation

brought about by the Protestant movement, namely the translation of the Bible into living languages, was very soon imitated. The Bible was translated from Old Bulgarian into popular living idioms, Ukrainian and White Russian, which were printed as early as 1517-1519 by a White Russian of the name of Franz Skorina in Prague.

46. Its Revival and the Part Played by the Towns.

It was, however, the Protestant movement which brought about the Ukrainian religious revival, though again, this affected only the lower classes of the population; the Ukrainian aristocracy, as already mentioned, had fallen under the influence of the Polish or rather, west-European, culture introduced through Polish channels. They were converted to the Roman Catholic creed, adopted Polish speech, and took an active part in the different religious and other movements which agitated Polish society in the Sixteenth century. Compared with these modern and brilliant manifestations, the old forms of Ukrainian life, conservative and even archaic, which had been preserved in the forests of Volynia or in the steppes of Podolia and the Dnieper country, appeared somewhat old-fashioned to the Ukrainian aristocracy. Associating with Poles in the Seim and at court, or meeting them on occasions when transacting administrative or judicial business together, the Ukrainian nobles acutely felt their "provincialism" and took pains to imitate the more brilliant Polish aristocracy. Thus, imperceptibly, they were polonized in speech, manners and customs. It is true, there still existed a number of powerful Ukrainian aristocrats who actually supported Ukrainian national traditions and the interests of the Orthodox Church. They were the patrons of Ukrainian literature and protectors of the first Ukrainian printers. These however, were only exceptions among the mass of polonized Ukrainian nobles. Especially important among them were Hetman Gregory Khodkevich who gave shelter to the persecuted printers, Ivan Fedorovich and Peter Mstislavez, and installed their printing press at his

country seat of Zabludov in 1568; Prince George of Slutsk founded in his residence in Slutsk the famous Ukrainian school and a printing office (1560); Prince Michael Vishnevetsky in Ovruch and a few others. The best known among them was Prince Konstantine Ostrozhsky (1526-1608). He founded schools in Turov and Vladimir and an Academy in his residence in Ostrog in 1580, where he invited Greek and Ukrainian teachers who taught Greek, Latin and Slavonic, besides the subjects usual in scholastic academies, the so-called Liberal Arts, trivium (grammar, rhetoric and dialectics). He also founded a printing office in his residence in Ostrog where the famous Slavonic Bible, the so-called "Ostrog Bible" was printed in 1580. But as already mentioned, the efforts of the Prince of Ostrog and a few others in supporting the Orthodox creed and the national Ukrainian traditions remained exceptional and only served to show up the inertness and indifference of the rest of the Ukrainian nobles.

As long as the Roman Catholic Church, weakened by the Protestant movement, remained in a state of disorganization, the Orthodox population was in no great danger. But in consequence of the general Catholic counter-reformation, the Roman Catholic Church in Poland began to regain lost ground about 1560. About that time, the Jesuits came to Poland and succeeded in arresting the Protestant movement in Lithuania and Poland. They soon directed an aggressive campaign, attacking not only Protestants, but also members of the Orthodox Church. The Jesuits were introduced into Poland by Cardinal Hosius, a member of the Council of Trent. They founded in 1569 a Jesuit College in Vilno, and soon afterwards one Jesuit school after another, many of them being in the Ukraine. The King, Stephen Bathory, was their protector and soon transformed their college at Vilno into an Academy. The teaching in the Jesuit schools was also scholastic, but they laid great stress in training their pupils in public speaking and in debate. The Jesuits were very good teachers, and their excellent schools became fashionable and soon attracted great

numbers of pupils not only children of Roman Catholics but also of Protestant and Orthodox aristocratic families. In a short time the Jesuits succeeded in bringing up a new generation in blind obedience to the Roman Catholic Church. Among others, children of great magnates, zealous Protestants or Orthodox, such as Khodkevich, Radziwill, Princes of Slutsk and Ostrog, became pious Roman Catholics and gave enormous donations to the Jesuits for setting up new schools.

Another powerful weapon in the hands of the Jesuits, besides education, was preaching. The Jesuits had first-class preachers, who conducted effective propaganda by means of sermons, public debates and polemics, not only by word but also in print. They accused the Orthodox Church of errors in Christian dogma, found fault with their way of using the Slavonic language in church instead of Latin, with the marriage of Orthodox priests, and with the interference of the laity in Church affairs.

This attack by the Latin Church which began about 1570 found the Orthodox Church quite unprepared. At first their tactics consisted in leaving these attacks unanswered and in avoiding polemics and discussions. But the Roman Catholics gained ground in Ukraine, as well as in White Russia, and became more and more aggressive. Thus it became impossible to ignore them, and we see the Orthodox taking to polemics which, however, were far from being on the same level as the brilliant and learned works of the Jesuits. Besides, the disorganization and weakness within the Orthodox Church, described above, were so evident that it was impossible to disguise them. A complete re-organization and regeneration of the whole system was necessary. This was keenly felt by zealous Orthodox individuals and communities, and several Ukrainian aristocrats endeavored to come to the rescue. However, their efforts were isolated and proved to be insufficient, remaining without response among the bulk of the Ukrainian nobles. This ancient leading Ukrainian class no longer answered to the urgent needs of the time, and was unable to carry out the

historic task laid on the shoulders of the leaders of a nation.

47. Religious Brotherhoods.

It was at this time, that a new class of the Ukrainian population came forward, which, hitherto obscure, had up till now played but a modest part in Ukrainian history. This was the town population or the burgesses. It was they who took into their hands the regeneration and re-organization of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, as well as the revival of religious life in general. The same was done by the White Russian town population in Vilna and other towns. The Ukrainian burgesses succeeded with the help of isolated members of the Ukrainian aristocracy, such as the Princes of Ostrog and Slutsk, in checking the advance of the Latin Faith, just at the moment when the Jesuits were ready to triumph on Ukrainian territories. Their methods of succesful opposition to the Jesuit propaganda was the formation of powerful organizations, the so-called Brotherhoods, founded spontaneously at first around certain important churches, thence spreading widely throughout the Ukraine. It was through these Brotherhoods that the Ukrainian town population successfully countered the growing Roman Catholic and Polish influence of the Jesuits, and displayed in this struggle an extraordinary energy in defending their Orthodox Faith and their Ukrainian national traditions.

The Ukrainian Brotherhoods were half religious, half charitable organizations whose origin is hidden in pagan antiquity. The principle of the family or clan lay at their origin, uniting the descendants of one family by community of interest for the purpose of defence against a common enemy, and for mutual aid and the common cult of a deity who was considered to be the protector of the family. As family and clan ties were loosened these Brotherhoods took different forms, such as territorial or professional organizations, which continued the functions of the former clan and family unions. When Christianity replaced paganism it gradually took over the ways and

forms of the ancient pagan cults: local heathen feasts and ceremonies were often adopted by the Christian clergy, remaining for centuries essentially pagan. The Christian Churches in this way became religious centres round which gathered the village or parish community still conserving heathen vestiges. Commemorations of anniversaries of the patron saints of the church continued to be accompanied by meals taken in common, during which the heathen ritual plays and entertainments were performed as of old. The old name of Brotherhood, a survival of the original family and clan character of the organizations, was retained by these parish organizations. Members of a Brotherhood had a common treasury replenished by subscriptions, out of which the parish church was kept in due repair, poor members of the Brotherhood received help, and the expenses of feasts on patron's festivals were paid. Later on, the Sixteenth century Church Brotherhoods adopted many of the features of the Guilds of Artisans which were much developed in the Ukraine, undoubtedly under German influence, and lasted under this form until late into the Nineteenth century.

The most important Brotherhoods were those of Lvov. The oldest is known from documents to have existed since 1463, and that of Lutsk since 1483. Ukrainian burgesses of Lvov, though disadvantageously placed between Germans and Poles, still acquired great wealth, especially from the cattle trade with Rumania and Turkey. Excluded from political activity because of religious restrictions, they gathered closely round their churches, forming "Brotherhoods", of which that of the Church of the Assumption (Uspenski) was the most important. At first the activity of the Brotherhood was limited to the care of the Church, providing it with candles, books, and ikons to embellish the services. Every year on the Feast of the Assumption a great banquet was held at which members as well as guests took part. Later, as the organization developed, their treasury became more and more important, and they were able to build a very

beautiful church in Lvov, one of the best examples of the Renaissance period which has been preserved in the Ukraine.

Members of a Brotherhood had their own court of justice and judges, and avoided the Polish courts. They helped their poorer "brothers" and their families, and held solemn burials for them out of the common treasury. Generally speaking they cultivated a spirit of solidarity and mutual aid.

The Assumption Brotherhood in Lvov founded in 1574 a printing office, and in 1586, a school called gymnasium where Greek and Latin in addition to other subjects were taught by well-known teachers.

The Patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremy, came to Lvov in 1586 and confirmed the new statutes of the Assumption Brotherhood which later served as a model for other Brotherhoods. The Assumption Brotherhood received the honorary title of "Stavropighia", and important privileges, according to which, all new Brotherhoods were obliged to copy the statutes of the Stavropighia, and were placed under their control. They also were supposed to watch over the lower clergy and their conduct and were exempt from the authority of the local bishop. The object of all these privileges was to raise the moral and spiritual level of the Orthodox clergy and of the communities. Naturally there was a danger of these extensive rights being abused, and as we shall see later, it proved so, and that very soon, in Lvov.

At the end of the Sixteenth and beginning of the Seventeenth centuries Brotherhoods spread widely throughout the Ukraine. It became fashionable even among the Orthodox gentry to be members of Brotherhoods, and women had full rights as "Sisters". The Brotherhoods were fully conscious of their high mission to stand up for the defense of the Orthodox Church and watch over its interests.

Soon the so-called "Calendar Conflict" arose. In 1582 Pope Gregory XIII ordered the old Julian Calendar (introduced by Julius Caesar) to be corrected according

to modern astronomic calculations. The reform in itself was conservative, because a similar plan for the correction of the calendar had been approved by the Council of Nicea. However, the brutal ways of the Roman Catholic Bishops in carrying out the reform and enforcing it on the Orthodox population, by driving people out of the churches, closing and sealing them, led to great indignation among the Orthodox populations led by the Brotherhoods. The King and the Seim were appealed to, and the Orthodox Brotherhoods and clergy won the "Calendar campaign". Victory raised their spirits. The controversy having been started lasted for about a century, and left behind an enormous quantity of pamphlets and tracts, forming a very voluminous literature.

CHAPTER XI

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(48) Attempts at Union of the Churches During Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries. (49) Orthodox Bishops, Promoters of Union. (50) The Council of Brest (Berestia) and Its Immediate Consequences. (51) Religious Polemic. (52) First Cossack Rebellion Against Poland.

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The history of the Union of the Churches in the Ukraine at the end of the Sixteenth century, as well as its influence on contemporary Ukrainian life has been studied by Ukrainian, Polish and Russian historians and forms a bulky mass of material. Yet, it is impossible to say that historians have come to any consistent view or conclusions on this subject. Besides purely ecclesiastical affairs, the question presents important political and national considerations. It created a turmoil in contemporary Ukrainian life, and upset it for a long time to come. For three centuries, the question of the Union of Churches did not cease to agitate minds, especially in west Ukrainian territories and disturb the course of their history. Even to-day the question is surrounded with smouldering fires of religious, political and national passions. Neither side is disinterested, and it is not to be wondered at that only seldom do we find among the historians of the Union of the Churches an impartial view, independent of religious, political or national differences and controversies. As Professor M. Hrushevsky has said, the history of the Union of the Churches is still too much treated "cum ira et studio" and the factual knowledge of the masses of accumulated material is far more advanced than the true understanding and impartial explanation of it.

48. Attempts at Union of the Churches During Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Centuries.

Attempts at the Union of Churches in Ukraine began as early as the Thirteenth century, and at the time when the Union was realized at least partially at the end of the Sixteenth century, it could already boast of a long history.

Indeed, Ukrainians having accepted Christianity under the Byzantine form stood at the same time at the meeting place of two different cultural influences. The Latin influence was certainly very important. About the time of Vladimir the Great and his sons we meet Latin missionaries in Kiev, and contemporary Orthodox controversialists, mostly Greeks, found it necessary to mention the Romans and their errors, (thus proving that Latin propaganda was an actual fact). Later, we also find in the Ukraine members of Roman Catholic Monastic Orders and Missionaries, and the dynastic ties of the Ukrainian princes with the reigning houses of Central and Western Europe very often led to intercourse with the Roman Catholic world. It is difficult to say how far the plans for the Union of Churches of the Galician Princes since the Twelfth century were disinterested, that is how far they were endeavors to reunite the two sundered parts of the formerly one Christian Church in the interests of Christian Universalism. Political considerations, such as the desire by submission to the Pope to obtain his influence in enlisting the help of western Europe against the dangers from the Tatars in the east, certainly played an important part. The same situation again arose in Byzantium in the Fifteenth century owing to the Turkish invasion, and its repercussions also affected the Ukraine. However, these attempts did not achieve very definite results. The most important of all the efforts was the Union of Florence in 1439. For Greeks as well as for Ukrainians, the Orthodox Rite was intimately bound up with their national culture, and the Roman Catholic Rite was in their eyes, especially in the case of the Ukrainians, a form of religion which would inevitably bring with it national and political influences of their neighbors, the Poles. Thus all attempts to conclude a Union of Churches with Rome, even assuming the purest motives of good faith on the part of their promoters, encountered in the Ukraine a decisive resistance from the leading classes of the population. But it is difficult to deny that exactly at the end of the Sixteenth century, owing to the livelier intercourse of Ukrainians

with western Europe, there were more grounds than ever for the Union of the Churches, though at the same time there was also more bitter opposition.

49. Orthodox Bishops, Promoters of Union.

This time the initiative for Union with Rome came from the Bishop of Lvov, Gedeon Balaban, who was embittered against the Patriarch of Constantinople on account of the latter's conduct in the conflict which Gedeon Balaban had with the Brotherhood of Lvov. During his visit (1588-89) to the Ukraine the Patriarch Jeremy undertook to put the Ukrainian ecclesiastical affairs in order. Not being acquainted with local circumstances, he showed a lack of tact and consideration towards the Ukrainian Bishops, and in particular, hurt the feelings of Gedeon Balaban, Bishop of Lvov, by giving special privileges to the Assumption Brotherhood. His conduct provoked general discontent among the Ukrainian Bishops, which was further aggravated by his replacing the Metropolitan of Kiev, Onisiphorus by Michael Rogoza without calling the usual Council of Bishops. The Bishop of Lvov took the initiative at a private meeting of several Bishops, including both Ukrainians and White Russians in Belz in 1590, where he brought up the question of Union with Rome as a means of strengthening the position of the Ukrainian Church in Poland, and of recovering the authority of the Bishops endangered by the Patriarch of Constantinople.

The idea of Union, as we have seen, was not a new one, even on the part of the Orthodox Ukrainian Bishops. It is sufficient to recall the part played by Gregory Zamblak in the Council of Constance in 1418, and the attempts at Union made in Florence in 1439, not to mention the negotiations for Union, vague and little known it is true, of the Ukrainian Metropolitans during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries. The leading spirits this time were Cyril Terlecki, Bishop of Lutsk and Hypathius Poti, Bishop of Vladimir. The Metropolitan Michel Rogoza, head of the Ukrainian Church was also later initiated into the

question of the Union, but being a timorous and vacillating man, he could not play an active part. The four Bishops who had held the clandestine meeting in Belz in 1590 now addressed a petition to the King, in which they declared their wish to have the Pope of Rome as their head instead of the Patriarch of Constantinople, but to retain the Orthodox Rite and the existing inner organization of the Ukrainian Church.

King Sigismund III accepted the declaration, promised to put the Uniates on the same footing as the Roman Catholics and wished to have all the plans for Union made public. Until now all negotiations had been kept secret. Though the Jesuits were at the same time carrying on active propaganda for the Union, the Ukrainian Bishops were afraid to bring their intentions to the knowledge of the public. For a few years longer everything was kept secret. At last, at the end of 1594, an Act of Union was definitely drawn up and handed to the king and to the Papal Nuncio in Cracow. The draft of the Florentine Union of 1439 was taken as the point of departure in questions of Christian dogma. The Uniate Church was to be subject to the Pope in matters of dogma and the Uniate clergy were to accept the Gregorian calendar. All the religious rites and ceremonies of the Orthodox Church were to remain, but the form of communion was left to the Pope. The Uniate priests were not to be bound by the vow of celibacy, Uniate Bishops were to sit in the Polish Senate and be exempt from all taxation. All Uniates were to have equal rights with Roman Catholics as regards the holding of State Offices.

The Metropolitan, Michael Rogoza, could not make up his mind for a long time, but at last was persuaded by the energetic Poti, Bishop of Vladimir to sign the Act of Union, which now received the approval of the King and the Nuncio. In spite of all the secrecy, rumors of what was afoot reached the ears of the Orthodox population, who were greatly alarmed. The first to be apprehensive was old Prince Konstantine of Ostrog. He addressed a circular appeal to all Orthodox communities in which

he revealed the action of the Bishops, calling them traitors, and invited resistance to the Union by all available means. The Prince of Ostrog was by no means opposed to Union, but he objected to the matter being privately decided by the Bishops, and called for an ecclesiastical Council. His appeal was printed and widely circulated, It made a great impression. Ukrainian Orthodox nobles called meetings of protest and tried to enter into relations with the Protestants who were holding their Synod in Thorn with a view to common action for the protection of religious interests. The promoters of the Union accelerated their proceedings. Poti, Bishop of Vladimir, and Terlecki, Bishop of Lutsk, went to Rome at the end of 1595 and made an official declaration before Pope Clement VIII in favor of the Union of the Orthodox Church in Poland with the Roman Catholic. The Pope accepted their declaration and the Union was officially proclaimed. A commemorative medal was struck with the inscription "rutenis receptis". Poti and Terlecki returned home from their mission in March 1596. It now remained to reconcile the Ukrainian and White Russian population to the Union.

50. The Council of Brest (Berestia) and Its Immediate Consequences.

This proved to be a matter of some difficulty. Neither the masses of the Ukrainian clergy nor the Ukrainian nobles and burgesses would even hear of the Union, considering it to be nothing less than an attack on the Faith of their fathers and their nationality. The idealistic motives for the Union of Churches, and for gathering all Christendom into one Fold under One Shepherd retreated in their eyes into the background when confronted with latinization and the polonization of Ukrainian culture. An energetic agitation against the Union was at once started. Under its influence and the passions it let loose, the first promoters of the Union, Gedeon Balaban, Bishop of Lvov and Michael Kopistensky, Bishop of Przemysl, repudiated the Union by a solemn act officially inserted in

the Municipal Books. The protests of Ukrainian gentry at local Seims were made public at the Seim of Warsaw in 1596. The situation became very critical. It was decided to solve the difficulties at a Council which the King ordered to be called in Brest Litovsk at the end of 1596. Both sides prepared for a decisive battle. The Patriarch of Constantinople sent his representative, Nicephorus, Professor at the University of Padua; the Patriarch of Alexandria also sent a representative, and many of the Orthodox clergy, Greek, Balkan and Muscovian, were present. Never has there been such a brilliant and solemn assembly in the Ukraine. Delegates of Ukrainian and White Russian gentry came from all the provinces, as well as delegates representing Ukrainian and White Russian burgesses from all the important towns, and thousands of Ukrainian clergy, both high and low. The Orthodox Council assembled in the house of the Prince of Ostrog who played a most important part on the side of orthodoxy. The Orthodox refused to sit together with the adherents of the Union on whose side were the representatives of the King and the Government, the Ukrainian Bishops, who were promoters of the Union, and several Roman Catholic Bishops.

51. Religious Polemic.

From the start, both sides took up irreconcilable positions towards one another, and formed two separate Councils which were practically two hostile camps. The town was actually surrounded with military forces and guns. It did not, however, come to an armed conflict, but neither did the opponents arrive at any understanding whatever. Finally, both sides excommunicated and anathematized each other. Thus it came to an open and definite breach, and a fierce and relentless struggle ensued which lasted for centuries. Literary evidence is considerable of the written and verbal controversy which took place between the promoters and opponents of the Union. Among the defenders of the Orthodox Church, a Ukrainian noble, Martin Bronevsky, became conspicu-

ous in literature. He was the author of an important work "Apocrisis" printed in Ukrainian and Polish. Then a burgess of Lvov, George Rohatynets, wrote a book "The Warning", full of deep patriotic feeling and showing a remarkable understanding of the cultural needs of his land and people. Most important in Ukrainian literature are the works of a monk from Mount Athos, a Ukrainian, John of Vishnia, who is author of the famous "Epistles" in which he charges the Ukrainian Bishops with apostasy from the Orthodox Faith and castigates the low standard of morals of the Ukrainian clergy. His "Epistles", excellent in their form and penetrated by real feeling and pathos, with their expressive and plastic language, belong to the best works of contemporary Ukrainian literature. They may well be compared with the best contemporary literary works elsewhere in Europe.

Parallel with the literary warfare an actual struggle was going on. The most important fact was that the Polish Government now recognized only the Uniate Ukrainian Church as legal. The King began the persecution of the Orthodox by arresting the representative of the Patriarch of Constantinople at the Council of Brest, and the Exarch Nicephorus under the pretext that he was a Turkish spy. Notwithstanding protests on all sides, Nicephorus was imprisoned in the fortress of Marienburg in Prussia, where he died. On the other hand, the Patriarch of Constantinople, head of the Orthodox Church, confirmed all the decisions of the Orthodox side of the Council of Brest, thus from the Orthodox point of view they were canonically sanctioned.

After the death of the Ukrainian Metropolitan, Michael Rogoza, the energetic Poti became Metropolitan and started an active campaign to introduce the Uniate principles. He opened a persecution against the Orthodox bishops, abbots and lower clergy, confiscated Orthodox monasteries, printing offices and schools, and founded Uniate institutions in their place. His successor, Velyamin Rutsky was as energetic as Poti had been. The Orthodox Church in Ukraine gradually lost her bishops until

there was only one left, the Bishop of Lvov; they were not replaced, and the Church fell into a state of disorganization which was adroitly exploited by the Uniates. The Ukrainian gentry defended the interests of the Orthodox Church as best they could. For this purpose they concluded a Confederation, or Political League with the Polish Protestants.

A meeting of the Confederation was held in 1599 in Vilna in the presence of the old Prince of Ostrog, where the representatives of the Orthodox clergy and laity, especially nobles, met with the representatives of different sections of Protestants, Lutherans, Calvinists, Hussites, etc., and decided to "maintain peace and not permit religious differences to lead to bloodshed, or that anyone should be persecuted for his religious opinions with confiscation, restrictions of rights, imprisonment or banishment". The Confederation acquired certain influence over the Seim. Thus in 1601 the Seim in Warsaw decided to abolish law-suits in religious matters and decreed that Orthodox Church benefices should only be given to Orthodox Clergy. The King, however, refused his sanction to these decisions of the Seim. In the Seim of 1603 the Confederation obtained the surrender to the Orthodox of certain monasteries seized by the Uniates, but the King would not agree to any general ruling. Though on accession to the throne he had taken a solemn oath to maintain religious toleration, now under the influence of the Jesuits he openly and repeatedly broke his oath. Only after a long struggle and under the threat of rebellion did the Protestant and Orthodox nobles obtain from the Seim of 1667 a concession that the Orthodox Church might maintain all its former rights and privileges, and that Orthodox clergy who opposed the Union were not to be persecuted. All these decisions, however, had not much influence. In Poland there was already a custom that everything depended not on law but on the actual balance of power within the State, and this balance was not to the advantage of the Orthodox. In spite of great tension between the two sides, and great opposition to the Union

in the Orthodox camp, the idea of the Union of Churches continually found adherents, mostly from among the Orthodox Ukrainian clergy, and not only those who became converted for personal and material advantage, but also from idealistic motives. As time went on there were even fanatics and martyrs for the idea of Union. Still more important was that mass desertion of Ukrainian nobles already mentioned who went over directly into the Roman Catholic camp. Education in Jesuits schools led to the repudiation by Ukrainian nobles of the religion of their fore-fathers and not religion only but also their language, habits and customs. After the death of Prince Konstantine of Ostrog, the "Pillar of Orthodox Religion", in 1608 his children became Roman Catholics. In place of the famous Orthodox Academy in his residence in Ostrog, there was opened a Jesuit College. Almost all the aristocratic Ukrainian houses showed the same change. The old Ukrainian aristocracy almost completely abandoned the ranks of the Orthodox.

The measure of pain and despair which seized all those faithful to the Orthodox creed can be seen in the famous "Trenos" or Lament of the Orthodox Church written by Meletii Smotritsky. In this Lament the Orthodox Church addresses her apostate sons. "Oh Bishops, Bishops", she appeals "are you not satisfied with the losses I have sustained through your carelessness, such losses of gold and silver, pearls and precious stones, in which I used to glory like a brilliant queen. Where is now the priceless stone ruby which shone like a light in my crown among other precious stones, like the sun among the stars? Where is the princely house of Ostrog which shone above all others with the light of devotion to the old Faith? Where are the other precious stones of my crown, the glorious houses of the Ukrainian princes, the priceless diamonds and sapphires? Where are the children of the Princes of Slutsk, of Zaslav, of Zbaraz, of Vishnevets, Sangushko, Chartorysky, Pronsky, Massalsky, Lukomsky, Ruzinsky and countless others impossible to enumerate? Where are my other jewels? I mean the

old Ukrainian noble houses?" Here the author enumerates scores of old Ukrainian families where the fathers were Ukrainian and Orthodox and their children had become Poles and Roman Catholic. This desertion seemed to be catastrophic for the Ukrainian nation, its universality illustrated by the fact that even the author of this Lament, Meleti Smotrisky, a Ukrainian Orthodox Bishop, was himself later converted to the Union and died a Uniate.

The Orthodox Church in the Ukraine had now to rely on the lesser gentry and the burgesses. This fact gives a more popular and democratic character to the later struggle of the Orthodox Church. At the beginning of the Seventeenth century, the Cossacks, as representing the Ukrainian nation in the eyes of the people, came to the rescue of the Orthodox Church. Along with the political and social claims which the Cossacks made on the Polish State, the claims of the Orthodox Church were now added. Thus the Cossacks became the leading class of the Ukrainian population.

52. First Cossack Rebellion Against Poland.

We have already seen that as early as the end of the Sixteenth century the Cossack class was rapidly growing in importance. The Zaporogian Sich, the centre of the free Cossack organization, was independent of the central and local authorities. The Zaporogian Cossack Brotherhood took up the attitude of an independent State. Nominally, they acknowledged the sovereignty of the Polish-Lithuanian State, sometimes taking the name of the "Royal Army", but in practice they acted quite independently, made war, interfered in the affairs of neighboring States, carried on diplomatic relations with foreign powers, and accepted subsidies from foreign rulers. To a certain extent Moldavian affairs served the Cossacks as a school of international politics. After a period of political independence and a certain political importance, Moldavia, about the middle of the Sixteenth century, fell into the hands of two strong neighbors, Turkey and

Poland, changing hands from one to the other. The crown of Moldavia became a prey to different adventurers who secured it with the support, sometimes, of Poland and sometimes, of Turkey. Usually the Turks surrendered the Moldavian throne to any pretender who promised more tribute and knew how to win over the Sultan's courtiers with rich gifts. We have already seen how Prince Dmitri of Vishnevetz, surnamed Bayda, an early Cossack leader, intervened with tragic consequences to himself, in the war of two Moldavian pretenders (1563). A score of years later, the Cossacks, under the leadership of Sverchovsky, set up another pretender on the Moldavian throne, a certain Ivonya. The Turks made a speedy end of Ivonya, but very soon a successor turned up in the person of Ivan Pidkova, a Ukrainian who gave himself out to be Ivonya's brother. He was supported by the Cossacks, and seized the town of Yassy, capital of Moldavia. As we have seen, Pidkova perished tragically in 1578 but the Cossacks took so much interest in Moldavian adventures, that the same year, when Pidkova was beheaded in Lvov, they brought to Yassy Pidkova's "brother" Alexander, and the next year Alexander's "son" Peter. Evidently Moldavian campaigns were very advantageous to the Cossacks, bringing in rich spoil as well as military fame.

Simultaneously with Moldavian wars, the Cossacks made almost annual inroads on Turkish and Tatar possessions, avenging the Tatar invasions on the Ukrainian border. This made them very popular among all classes of the Ukrainian population.

At the end of the Sixteenth century, the Cossack forces were considerably augmented by the refugees from the territories which after the Lublin Union in 1569 were united to Poland. The population there became very discontented with the newly introduced regulations coming from landowners, Poles or polonized Ukrainian nobles. It is important to examine the social composition of the Cossacks at this time, because therein lies one of the principal causes of the conflicts which began to occur

at the end of the Sixteenth century between the Cossacks and Polish government. Undoubtedly, the mainstay of the Cossack organization was the free town and country population of the Ukrainian territories forming part of the Great Princedom of Lithuania which, after the Union of Lublin, became part of Poland. These were town burgesses and lesser country gentry. The upper classes of the Ukrainian nobles and even members of the highest aristocracy furnished leaders or Hetmans of the Cossacks. Such was the situation until the Lublin Union and the mass colonization of the Ukrainian steppes which followed. Great masses of country people were removed closer to the centres of Cossack organizations and among these discontent with the new social order introduced into the Ukraine by the Polish Government soon grew and made itself manifest. These disaffected elements formed endless new detachments which began to swell the ranks of the Cossacks. If in the first half of the Sixteenth century the Cossacks were numbered by thousands, at the end of the same century they were increased tenfold. The new Cossacks coming as they did from the peasant class brought with them a new spirit of opposition to the new social order. The mass of the peasants, who could not, of course, leave their homesteads, fields and families, began to look upon the Cossacks not only as avengers of the Tatars, but also as protectors against the Poles. Between the Cossack and the peasants unseen bonds of mutual understanding and sympathy were developed, and to some extent there was community of interest.

This connection between the Cossacks and peasants soon became very evident and found expression during the first conflicts between the Cossacks and the Polish government. Ukrainian historical tradition attributed to these first conflicts features characteristic of later times when the struggle between the Cossacks and the Poles certainly assumed the character of a national and religious struggle. According to this tradition which long persisted in Ukrainian history, the leaders of the first Cossack revolts received a heroic halo as defenders

of the Orthodox religion and Ukrainian national culture. Many legends were created to this effect only to be destroyed later in the light of modern scientific criticism.

In speaking of the beginnings of the Cossack movement it must not be forgotten that within the Cossack class itself a certain differentiation is to be observed which became more evident about the last decade of the Sixteenth century. On one side there were the well-to-do Cossacks who possessed rich homesteads sometimes far distant from the steppe, as for instance, in the forest part of the Province of Kiev. It was among these that the contingents of the Cossack army of Stephen Bathory were recruited. They were more conservative, more loyal to the authorities and were not easily tempted to an adventure. They were known as the "Town Cossacks" (*horodovi Kozaki*) as opposed to "down the river Cossacks" (*nizhovi Kozaki*) or Zaporogians (beyond the Rapids). These "down river" Cossacks constituted the other element among the Cossacks, more active, more opposed to the Polish government because they were continually incorporating the elements dissatisfied with the new social order introduced into the Ukraine under Polish influence. Thus the active conflicts of the "down river" Cossacks clearly showed their character from the first, and it was these who were supported by the bulk of the peasants.

The first revolt of the Cossacks is connected with Christopher Kossinsky, a noble from Pidliasha, about whom little is known. Whether he was a Pole, or a Ukrainian, a Roman Catholic or Orthodox has not been ascertained. In 1590, together with other nobles from the Cossack leaders he received as a grant from the King lands in the province of Kiev, but was prevented from taking possession of them by Yan, Prince of Ostrog, who was starost of Bila Tserkva. Kossinsky then at the head of a Cossack unit attacked in 1591 the lands of the Princes of Ostrog. The Government nominated a Commission to investigate and punish the disturbers of the peace. The Commission collected armed forces and set out against the Cossacks who shut themselves in the fortified town

of Tripillia on the Dnieper. The Commission had not the courage to attack them and was satisfied with the promise of the Cossacks that they would choose another leader instead of Kossinsky and keep quiet. In the meantime the revolt of the Kossinsky reacted among the peasants in the Dnieper region, in Volynia and Podolia. The promise given by the Cossacks to the Commission was not fulfilled as Kossinsky remained their leader. The Nobles, alarmed, set themselves to deal with the Cossacks. The gentry of Volynia were mobilized. At the head of the armed forces stood old Prince Constantine of Ostrog and in 1593 near Zhitomir a pitched battle was fought in which the Cossacks were defeated, leaving on the battlefield 2000 killed, 26 guns and several banners. However, the victors did not feel strong enough and Kossinsky retired with the rest of the Cossacks beyond the rapids giving another vague promise to keep quiet. The revolt of Kossinsky was only a prelude to a series of Cossack revolts which likewise had the character of opposition to the new social order introduced into Ukraine after the Lublin Union, and moreover were complicated by the fact that the Cossacks began to play an active role in the international politics of the time.

A European coalition against the Turks was planned in central Europe between 1592 and 1593. The chief incentive to this coalition was given by Pope Clement VIII on the one side and Emperor Rudolf II on the other. These plans found an echo in Ukraine. The Bishop of Kiev, Joseph Vereschinsky became a warm supporter of the coalition to which he wished to attract the Ukrainian Cossacks. Prince Jan of Ostrog, who had recently defeated the Cossacks at Zhitomir, also became a member of the coalition, perhaps because he wished to direct their surplus energies against the Turks in order to distract their attention from Ukrainian home affairs. At any rate, the idea of the Cossacks as most desirable members of the anti-Turkish coalition at once gained ground in Rome and Prague. In 1593 the Pope sent a special ambassador, a Catholic Priest of the name of Komulovich, to the Cos-

sacks bringing them the sum of 12,000 ducats towards the expenses of a campaign against the Turks. The Pope's ambassador did not go far, as he met in Podolia two of the well-known Cossack leaders (one of them, Nalivayko, later became famous for a revolt against the Poles) and gave them the money for the Cossacks. The ambassador of the Emperor, Erich Lassota, whose mission we have already mentioned, left the imperial residence in Prague and in the summer of 1594 visited the Zaporogian Sich, the central camp of the Cossacks beyond the rapids of the Dnieper. He remained several weeks negotiating with the Cossacks about the conditions of their joining the coalition. He brought gifts from the Emperor, silver trumpets, drums, banners and 8000 ducats. Lassota's mission did not lead to any concrete result. The Cossacks only succeeded in making several diversions against the Turks, and on this occasion it did not come to serious war. Ukrainian history was, however, enriched by a foreigner's account of the camp of the Cossacks, their habits and customs. This is found in Lassota's Diary in which he noted down in detail his journey from Prague through Lvov and Kiev to the Zaporogian Sich and back. This Diary is thus a valuable historical document of the early history of the Cossacks.

At this time as may be noticed the Cossacks did not as usual desire to fight the Tatars and Turks, so that it was necessary to encourage them with presents to do what they had formerly thought to be their sacred duty. This is explained by the fact that they were now imbued with the wish to attempt other exploits in another direction, namely that indicated by Christopher Kossinsky, the plundering of the manors and castles of the nobles. This change in the direction of the Cossack activities can only be explained by the change which had taken place in their composition. Their ranks were now swelled by those discontented with the new social order, and the introduction of serfdom, and great was their desire to avenge the loss of freedom and the oppression of the new lords. This element among the Cossacks, full of burning

hatred against the Polish government and their oppressors carried with them the old more or less loyal Cossacks, who also began to feel, not the chains of serfdom, for they remained free, but vexation against the Polish administration which tried more and more to control them and limit their independence.

As leader of a new Cossack rebellion we find Severin Nalivayko, a burgess from the small town, Satanov in Podolia. He was for a time among the military followers of Prince Constantine of Ostrog and was forced by him to fight Kossinsky and the Cossacks. This, many historians, think made him break with the Prince of Ostrog. He left him, and in 1594 we find him at the head of a Cossack detachment which he led against the Turks in south Bessarabia. Having under him 2,500 men, he defeated the Turkish garrisons on the lower Dniester and, having seized from the Tatars great quantities of horses, he offered alliance with the Zaporogian Cossacks. Several thousand Cossacks joined him with their Hetman Loboda.

In 1594, with united forces consisting of about twelve thousand men, they crossed the Dniester and attacked the Moldavian prince, and having defeated him, forced him to renounce the overlordship of the Turkish Sultan and recognize the Emperor as his suzerain. In the following year, (1595) together with the Moldavian prince, they took several fortified towns from the Turks, among them Bilhorod (present Akkerman), Tiahinia (now Bender) and Kilia, an important fortress at the mouth of the Danube.

The Polish government was far from being delighted with the independent military exploits of the Cossack victories. The Polish candidate, Jeremy Mohyla, was put on the Moldavian throne, having recognized the protectorate of Poland. Mohyla, a skilful diplomat, obtained the recognition of Turkey by taking advantage of the Cossack victories. The Cossacks were ordered by the Polish Government not to interfere further in Moldavian affairs, and to return to their quarters. They pleaded

lack of food supplies, and remained in Podolia and Volynia for the winter. They took up their quarters on the land belonging to the nobles, exacted supplies, and took them if they were not voluntarily given. When the exasperated nobles offered armed resistance, the Cossacks of Nalivayko and Loboda began what was practically a military campaign, plundering and levying contributions on the landed gentry.

The rebellion of Nalivayko was warmly supported by the peasants who had practically never accepted the newly introduced serfdom. Emboldened by the Cossacks, they refused obedience, and in many places took to arms and open revolt. The Polish government was at last forced to take active measures. Up till then they had merely sent messages and orders to the Cossacks to stop their unruliness. Stanislas Zolkievski was charged with the mission of reducing the Cossacks of Loboda and Nalivayko to obedience. He was instructed to deal with them as open rebels. Zolkievski was one of the best generals of his time. He set out in the spring of 1596 with a small but efficient army and strong artillery. He was joined by several Ukrainian nobles, who brought their own armed forces with them. Up till lately, many of them had been on friendly relations with the Cossacks, some having indeed, been their leaders, as for example, Prince Kirik Ruginski and others. Now they were alienated from them by class feeling, and thought only of revenge for the exactions and plundering. Zolkievski's plan was not to allow the Cossacks to unite their forces, but to surprise single detachments and defeat them separately. Zolkievski's expedition had the character of a real military action, both sides fighting according to the rules of strategy. The Cossack leaders, Loboda and Nalivayko succeeded in uniting their forces, defeated the vanguard of the Polish army and crossed the Dnieper with the intention of retiring into the steppes of the province of Poltava, not expecting Zolkievski to follow them. He did follow them, however, and surprised and surrounded their main force on the river Solonitsa near the town of

Luben, and besieged their fortified camp. The Cossacks fought desperately, and the siege proved to be long and was marked by hard fighting. However, it was the middle of the hot summer of 1596, and lack of food and water in the Cossack camp and ensuing illness broke their spirit. They accepted Zolkiewski's terms; but that did not save them. Enraged by their resistance the Polish soldiers slaughtered several thousand of the disarmed Cossacks. Only 1500 escaped and fled to the Sich beyond the rapids. Zolkiewski brought his prisoners to Lvov where the King was expecting him. Several Cossack leaders were executed in Warsaw in the spring of 1597, among them being Nalivayko. According to a legend, since proved to be untrue by modern historians, he was roasted alive in a hollow copper bull.

The immediate impression made by the Cossack defeat on the Solonitsa was very great. The Polish government, thoroughly alarmed by the danger of the Cossacks declared them to be outlaws and "hostes patriae", and undertook severe measures against them, among which was the destruction of their camp, the Sich beyond the rapids. This turned out to be practically an impossibility. Zolkiewski's army was too much exhausted to be able to carry out this decision, and the ranks of the Cossacks continued to be swelled by increasing numbers of discontented Ukrainian peasants and those involved in the recent rebellion who had escaped punishment.

In the ranks of the Cossacks themselves, however, the distinction previously noticed grew ever wider. On the one side the Cossacks of the towns who, being more or less loyal, wished to reconcile the Polish government by renewed campaigns against the Tatars and thus obtain amnesty and be able to return to their homes and families; on the other, the more radical elements, who having nothing to lose, were burning for revenge. Soon however, the Polish government, having started two wars, was in need of Cossacks and recalled the decisions of the Seim and gave up trying to annihilate them. In the Moldavian

war about 4000 Cossacks were engaged on the Polish side, and also in the following year (1601) in the war with Sweden. Thus the Cossacks were rehabilitated and once more on a legal footing.

REV. P. WYCEZKA

CHAPTER XII

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(53) Cossacks at the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century. (54) Peter Konashevich Sahaidachny. (55) Cossack Defenders of the Orthodox Church. (56) Revival of the Orthodox Hierarchy.

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53. Cossacks at the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century.

Precisely at the beginning of the Seventeenth century Poland was engaged in a series of wars; Moldavian, Swedish and Muscovian. Therefore the circumstances were such that the Polish government was obliged to put up with the Cossacks and meet them half-way, since they possessed a very considerable military force of trained and well-equipped soldiers. In consequence, the laws passed against them were formally repealed by the Seim of 1601, and their position again legalized. The Cossacks took an active part in the Moldavian and Swedish wars. Their internal differences and strife were therefore much eased. After 1600, at the head of the once more united Cossacks, we meet a remarkable man, the Hetman Samuel Kishka. His personality is very popular because of the contemporary folksong (duma), which is well preserved and gives in detail an episode of the Cossack wars against Turkey. This duma relates how Hetman Samuel Kishka, having been taken prisoner by the Turks and condemned to a Turkish galley, succeeded in raising a revolt among the other prisoners. Having seized the vessel, and put to death all the Turks on board, they returned to Ukraine. Episodes such as that described in the folksong were frequent, and based on authentic information, but it is not borne out by historical evidence that Samuel Kishka himself was the hero of such an escape. The historical facts about him are few. All we know is that he proved himself to be a very successful diplomat, and that it is mostly to him that the Cossacks owe the abolition of the restrictions which had threatened them since the rebellion

of Nalivayko and Loboda. When in 1600 the Moldavian Hospodar (Prince) Jeremy Mohyla, who was under Polish protection, was attacked by the Wallachian Hospodar, a vassal of the Sultan, it was necessary to send Mohyla help. The Polish government had no one to turn to but the Cossacks, in spite of their having been declared outlaws. Kishka then made their help conditional on the sentence of banishment being withdrawn, the rights and privileges given by Stephen Bathory being restored, pay being promised, and the banners seized in the battle on the Solonitsa being returned. The King promised to support the wishes of the Cossacks in the next Seim and 4000 Cossacks started out to settle the Moldavian difficulties. The Wallachian campaign was most successful. The Turkish vassal was defeated and the Polish government put Semen Mohyla, a brother of Jeremy on the Wallachian throne. This was the Jeremy whom they had previously put on the throne of Moldavia.

In the meantime the war with Sweden had started, and the Polish government was again in need of the Cossacks' help. After the death of his brother John in 1592, the Polish King Sigismund III of the house of Vasa inherited the Swedish crown, and for a time was king of both Poland and Sweden, being represented in Sweden by his uncle Charles, Duke of Sodermanland, as regent. Sigismund being a fanatical Roman Catholic, was never popular in Protestant Sweden, and in 1598 his uncle proclaimed himself King, occupied Esthonia, and in 1600 threatened Livonia (Lettland) part of which belonged to Poland. When the war began, the Cossacks were appealed to, and the Hetman, Samuel Kishka again put forward their claims to withdraw the sentence of banishment and restore their rights and privileges. The Cossacks sent delegates to the Seim of 1601 in Warsaw and obtained, though not all they claimed, most of their more important wishes.

The Livonian campaign was very hard. Samuel Kishka was killed in the battle of Fellin and the Cossacks suffered other severe losses. The fact that Poland had no

fleet, and Sweden a very good one, decided the war. The Swedes blockaded the coast, and held all the fortified sea-side towns. The war was lost for Poland and soon came to an end.

The Cossacks returned home, repaired their losses and in 1601 turned all their energy to the south. With the intention of helping the Moldavian Hospodar, the Cossacks, having a good fleet of several galleys and a great number of small vessels called "Chaika" (sea-gulls) attacked and destroyed in 1601 the Turkish fleet off Kilia at the mouth of the Danube. During the next ten years the Cossack Brotherhood increased greatly in number, and they gained more and more influence in the Ukraine, so much that the king and nobles began to be alarmed, and much regretted having withdrawn the restrictions. At this time, Polish intervention in Muscovian affairs began. This lasted for several years, and the Cossacks had a wide field for their activities. We refer to the Muscovian revolution and interregnum.

As is known, the Muscovian revolution was prepared by the political and social events which had shaken the Muscovian State during the reign of Czar Ivan IV, the Terrible. It began formally by the appearance of a pretender to the throne of the Czar, a mysterious personality who declared himself to be Tsarevich Dmitri, son of Ivan the Czar. Historians have long thought him to have been a puppet of the Jesuits put forward by them with the object of gaining influence in Orthodox Muscovy. But modern historians consider him rather to have been originally a creature of the Muscovian boyars, and used by them against the unpopular Boris Godunov, a parvenu among the Muscovian aristocracy who had seized the Muscovian throne after the death of the last prince of the dynasty of Rurik, the Czar Feodor, whose brother-in-law he was. This mysterious pretender appeared in Poland as a servant of the princes of Vishnevets and declared his intention of winning the throne of Moscow. With the tacit consent and assistance of the Polish government he assembled an army of followers mostly composed of

Polish and Ukrainian nobles and about twelve thousand Zaporogian Cossacks. In 1605 the pretender Dimitri seized Moscow, but this was only a prelude to a long political and social revolution which spread over the whole Muscovian State, and was followed by Polish and Swedish intervention. Only at the cost of terrible effort and after a great patriotic rising, did the Great Russians succeed in 1613 in recovering the independence of the Muscovian State and expelling the foreigners. The Ukrainian Cossacks intervened actively on the side of Poland. In King Sigismund's army alone, which captured the White Russian town of Smolensk from Moscow in 1609, there were thirty thousand Zaporogian Cossacks, and almost as many were engaged in the campaign for detaching the Ukrainian province of Siversk from Moscow. At the same time, the Ukrainian Cossacks were not inactive on their southern front against their chief enemy the Tatars and Turks. In 1606 the Cossack fleet took the fortified town of Varna on the Black Sea from the Turks; in 1608 they took Perekop from the Tatars, and in 1609 they were again engaged at the mouth of the Danube, taking and burning the fortified Turkish towns of Ismail, Kilia and Bilhorod (Akerman). These were only temporary victories, for the Cossacks had not the power to hold these towns for long.

In consequence of the evacuation of Moscow by Polish armies and the conclusion in 1613 of a temporary armistice, the Cossacks were forced to turn all their activities against the Tatars and the Turks in the south. The Polish government had to tolerate these proceedings, even seeing in it an excellent way of employing the surplus energies of the Cossacks, in spite of the fact that these hostilities might provoke a terrible revenge by the Turks. The years 1614-1620 were in truth a heroic period in the history of the Cossacks. Their gallant and daring maritime campaigns were only comparable to the naval exploits of their ancestors of the early Kievan period. The object of the campaigns was the same, namely Constantinople and northern shores of Asia Minor and the Crimea.

Besides mere plundering they also had the further aim of avenging themselves on the Tatars and their suzerain the Sultan for their inroads on Ukrainian territory, with the ruin and devastation which for centuries had followed in their train; of releasing the Ukrainian prisoners of whom there were great numbers in captivity in Crimea and Constantinople; and of destroying the nest of vultures which for centuries had endangered the very existence of the Ukrainian population by carrying away into slavery the flower of its young men and women. There was also the religious motive of fighting the infidel, the enemy of Christianity. Thus not only in the eyes of Ukrainians but of the whole contemporary Christian world did the Cossack successes meet with recognition and applause. The population of the Mediterranean countries, especially Italy and the Balkans, could appreciate the triumph of the Cossack arms, having themselves been engaged in a similar constant struggle with the Mohammedan world.

We have descriptions important to the history of the Cossacks, of contemporary Turkish authors and chroniclers who were eye-witnesses of the Cossack attacks on the Turkish towns on the southern shores of the Black Sea. The campaign of 1614, for instance, is thus described: "The Cossacks came down and attacked the fortress of Sinope on the Anatolian shores, which on account of its beautiful surroundings, is called the city of lovers. Having captured the ancient castle, the Cossacks cut down its garrison, plundered and ruined Moslem houses, and finally destroyed and burnt the town, turning this beautiful and charming spot into a melancholy desert. They also destroyed the arsenal, and burnt galleys and other vessels. The damages are assessed at forty million gold pieces. Before armed men could be mustered in defence, the Cossacks loaded their spoil on to small vessels called "sea-gulls" and returned home. The Sultan, having heard the news, fell into such a state of wrath and sorrow that he ordered the Great Vizier to be hanged, and only the great lamentation of his wife, daughter and other

women-folk prevailed to save his life. The Sultan, however, gave him a thorough beating with his own hands, and the news of this soon spread throughout the whole town. The Vizier stated in self-defence, that he had already sent a fleet and army to pursue the Cossacks." We know from other sources that Pasha Ahmet sent orders to pursue the Cossacks and to bring from Akerman the Turkish fleet to join that of Ochakov. Some vessels had also been sent from Constantinople under Ali Pasha and stationed at the mouth of the Dnieper to await the return of the Cossacks. The latter got wind of this ambush in time, and divided their fleet into two parts, one being sent to land to the east of the Dnieper mouth and portage the boats higher up the river. They were attacked by the Tatars and suffered some losses. The other part of the Cossack fleet succeeded in evading the watchfulness of the Turkish fleet, entered the Dnieper and sailed up the river unobserved, only having to throw overboard much of their spoil in order to lighten the boats. The twenty men taken prisoners by the Tatars were brought to the Sultan and he delivered them to the population of Sinope to dispose of as they pleased.

Next year (1615) the Cossacks again made a descent on the shores of the Bosphorus, so close to Constantinople that from his palace the Sultan could see the smoke of the fires. The Turkish fleet, sent after them, reached them at the mouth of the Danube. The Cossacks were very skilful in boarding the enemy vessels and thus defeated the Turks, even taking a Turkish admiral prisoner. They carried away some of the vessels and burnt them within sight of the Turkish garrison of Ochakov in order to spite the Turks. They always loved a joke and had a keen sense of humor. Entering the mouth of the Danube undisturbed, they returned to their camp, the Sich.

In the year 1616 the Cossacks undertook naval operations against the Turks on an even larger scale. They completely destroyed an important Turkish fleet, seized several galleys and hundreds of smaller vessels. At the head of the Cossack forces stood the Hetman Peter Kona-

shevich Sahaidachny, in whom the Cossacks acquired not only a daring leader but an able statesman who understood how to direct the Cossack energies and forces not only in the acquisition of military fame and rich loot, but also in the interests of the whole Ukrainian nation.

54. Peter Konashevich Sahaidachny.

Undoubtedly Peter Konashevich Sahaidachny was the most remarkable leader the Cossacks had until Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and a notable Ukrainian. His personality and activities were highly appreciated even by his contemporaries, and came down to later generations surrounded with a halo of glory. From contemporary documents we know that he came from the landed gentry near Sambor in Galicia, that he was a student in the Academy of Ostrog founded by Prince Constantine, and that he joined the Cossacks. The exact dates of his birth and residence in the Academy are not known, but it is certain that before becoming a leader he must have been several years among the Cossacks. At any rate he must have begun his career in the Sich previous to becoming leader of the whole Cossack forces. He was not only a military leader, but a political leader also. Sahaidachny was at the head of the Cossacks at the moment when the Polish Government was again alarmed by their growth in numbers and power, and began to look for some means of restraining them. In fact, after the beginning of the Seventeenth century no session of the Seim passed without the Cossack question being under discussion, or a special commission being elected for the same purpose. The Seim of 1607 decided that the Town Cossacks were to obey the local administration authorities, and also they were forbidden to have relations with the Zaporogian Cossacks from the Sich. A commission was elected in 1609 to see that this was being carried out, and in 1611 it reported that the Town Cossacks continued to obey only their own authorities, which were the same as those of the Zaporogian Sich. A new commission was called in Zhitomir composed of the most powerful magnates. The Cossack re-

representatives were invited to hear the decisions of the Commission. The Town Cossacks were ordered to obey the voevods or starosts or other administrative authority and were deprived of the rights of special jurisdiction they had enjoyed until then. Their leader was to be nominated by the King and not elected as heretofore. The Zaporogian Cossacks were to remain beyond the rapids and not show themselves elsewhere. They were allowed to retain their judicial system and their elected leader. Moreover, the Town Cossacks were not to take any part in the campaigns of the Zaporogian Cossacks without having asked the king's permission, their duty being to protect the border of Ukraine against the invasions of the Tatars. They were to receive a salary from the State Treasury. Like many other decisions, those of the commission of 1614 were not carried out. The Cossacks making a pretext that their salary was never properly paid, continued to disregard the decisions of the commission.

In the spring of 1616, Sahaidachny, at the head of the Cossack fleet, defeated the Turkish fleet at the mouth of the Dnieper and seized several galleys and a number of smaller vessels. Then, pursuing his course around the Crimean peninsula, he attacked Kaffa (now Theodosia) where the Tatars held the world-famed slave-market, chiefly of Ukrainian prisoners. The Cossacks burned Kaffa, and set many of the prisoners free. In the autumn of the same year the Cossack fleet crossed the Black Sea and took Trebizond. They were in their turn attacked by the Turkish fleet led by Admiral Chikala Pasha, a Genoese by origin, but the Cossacks defeated him and having sunk part of his fleet, took and plundered several places on the Bosphorus. Another Turkish fleet under Ibrahim Pasha was sent after them to Ochakov in order to intercept their fleet at the entrance to the Dnieper, but instead of going up the Dnieper, the Cossacks turned into the Sea of Azov, and leaving the large vessels behind, took the smaller ones up the rivers, and portaging them, arrived at the Sich. In the meantime Ibrahim

Pasha went up the Dnieper as far as the Cossack camp, the Sich. The small Cossack garrison which had been left behind escaped, and the Turks satisfied themselves with ruining the empty nest. The Cossack main force returned with rich spoil after Ibrahim Pasha left.

These Cossack naval campaigns, especially in the years between 1614 and 1617 were carried out on a grand scale, and almost led to declaration of war on Poland by the Sultan. Only with great effort, did the Polish government succeed in maintaining peaceful relations as it had promised the Sultan to reduce the Cossacks to obedience and not allow them to make raids on Turkish possessions.

In order to impress the Cossacks and force them to accept the conditions and restrictions, the Polish government sent out to the Ukraine the old General Zolkiewski, the former victor of Nalivayko, at the head of an army, and mobilized all the nobles of the Province of Kiev. Sahaidachny, prudent and careful as he was, besides always having been loyal to the King, thought it better not to enter into conflict. He very well understood that all these restrictions coming from the government were only temporary, and that as soon as the Cossacks were required for urgent military purposes, the restrictions would be withdrawn. He thus succeeded in persuading the Cossacks to give way, and obtained their formal acceptance which led to a partial demobilization of their forces. According to a historic document which has been preserved of the written ultimatum of the Polish government to the Cossacks, they were ordered to exclude from among their numbers: "all artisans, traders, innkeepers, butchers, tailors, that had slipped into the ranks of the Cossacks, having no business to be there at all."

The Cossacks also promised not to attack neighboring States and to occupy themselves solely in defending the Ukrainian border. But they maintained their right to elect their leader, which was to receive confirmation only by the Polish King. The question of the numbers of the Cossacks remained unsettled, but the Cossacks promised to exclude all who were not professional warriors from

among those who had joined them during the last two years. The final settlement was postponed until the Seim of 1618. In accepting the conditions of the Polish government for reduction, Hetman Sahaidachny foresaw that these were but temporary measures, and that the government would again need Cossack help.

Indeed, he was right, for the need for the Cossacks arose in the same year (1618) when Crown-prince Wladislaus, having set out with insufficient forces to attempt once more the conquest of the Muscovian throne now in the possession of the young Michael Romanov, found himself in a difficult position in the neighborhood of Moscow. Only immediate help could save him. None of the Polish troops could be mobilized at such short notice, and regular troops were insufficient. Thus appeal was made to the Cossacks, and Sahaidachny set out at the head of his twenty-thousand, traversed Moscovia, having defeated all the Muscovian forces on his way and taken several fortified towns. The Cossacks were in time to relieve Prince Wladislaus and the united forces besieged Moscow. Advantageous peace conditions having been offered by Moscow, the Peace Treaty of Deulino was concluded in 1618, according to which Poland took the provinces of Smolensk, with its White-Russian population, and Sieversk, with its Ukrainians.

After this successful campaign, however, the Polish government insisted on the reduction in the number of the Cossacks, and Hetman Sahaidachny found it advisable to accept and sign once again the terms of 1619, according to which the number of registered town Cossacks was reduced to 3,000, and their leader was to be nominated by the king. Of course, it was much easier to sign these terms than to carry them out, as they concerned only the Town Cossacks, whereas the Zaporogian Cossacks remained as before, inaccessible to the Polish authorities. Accordingly, a restricted number of three thousand Town Cossacks duly registered remained in the towns and villages along the Dnieper, with a nominated leader at their head, whereas the mass of the Cossacks excluded from

the legal lists took up their abode in the Zaporogian Sich beyond the Rapids, forming a reserve force on which it was always possible for the Cossacks to draw when necessary.

Certainly the bulk of the Cossacks were far from being satisfied with their leader for having signed the conditions, and as was usual with the Cossacks, they divided themselves into two parties, the elder or more settled, better-to-do Cossacks especially those included in the polls supporting Sahaidachny. In opposition to him were notably all the young men and socially lower elements, the poor and desperate who owned nothing and had nothing to lose. Sahaidachny, however, succeeded in maintaining his influence and authority and remained the leader, owing to his firm will, powerful personality and the iron discipline he had introduced among the Cossacks and which he knew so well how to maintain. Further, he knew how to divert the energies and power of the Cossacks to the support of the Orthodox Church, which was at that moment of great national importance.

55. Cossack Defenders of the Orthodox Church.

At the time when the former leading class of the Ukrainian population, the nobles, gradually vanished from the historic scene owing to their mass desertion to the Roman Catholic camp, and the burgesses or town population were powerless to carry on alone the burden of supporting and fighting for the Orthodox Church and Ukrainian national culture, the Cossacks took upon themselves the task of being the main support of both the Orthodox Church and Ukrainian nationality.

Of course, the Cossacks did not all at once comprehend and become conscious of their task. Their first rebellions, as for instance those of Kossinsky and Nalivayko, had no religious motives. After the Union of the Churches in Brest, when the struggle became acute, however, it found supporters amongst the Cossacks, many of whom were members of noble Ukrainian families and

burgesses who already had been active in the religious struggle.

As early as the end of the first decade of the Seventeenth century the Cossacks began to take part in this struggle, at first using legal methods. Like the nobles, the Cossacks petitioned the king, making protests against the Uniate's pretensions to the possessions of the Orthodox Church. When the emissaries of the Uniate Metropolitan came to Kiev and attempted to seize the rich monasteries, the Cossacks took up arms to prevent them, and one of the more active of the emissaries lost his life. The Orthodox clergy then began to realize that protected by the Cossacks they could develop religious and cultural activities more freely in Kiev than in Lvov, or generally in Galicia or Volynia. Thus at the beginning of the second decade of the Seventeenth century the centre of Ukrainian national and religious life was once more removed to Kiev. A few learned theologians were the first to transfer their abode from Lvov and Ostrog to Kiev. Here they immediately founded the religious Brotherhood to which Halshka Lozkina Hulevich, the wife of a Volynian noble, gave a generous donation for the foundation of a school. This school of the Kievan Brotherhood was soon transformed into a College and later into an Academy, its first Rector being Job Boretsky. Hetman Sahaidachny himself "together with the whole Brotherhood of Zaporogian Cossacks" became members of the Kievan Brotherhood, thus officially undertaking the protection of the religious and national Ukrainian centre in Kiev. The Archimandrite of the Pecherski monastery founded in 1617 the famous printing office which in a short time developed extraordinary activity. Prayer books, liturgical books, school books, dictionaries, controversial writings, theological and other scientific and literary works were printed in great quantities, so that Kiev soon became the centre for printing and publishing for the whole of Ukraine.

56. Revival of the Orthodox Hierarchy.

Lastly, as the crowning effort of the Ukrainian Orthodox believers of that time, came the revival of the Orthodox hierarchy in the Ukraine which was achieved under the protection of the Cossack Hetman. After almost all the Ukrainian Bishops had adopted the Union of the Churches, and those who remained faithful had died, the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine was threatened with complete disorganization, there being no ecclesiastical authority to ordain the Priests. Sahaidachny took advantage of the presence in Ukraine of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Theophan, who was on his way from Moscow. At that moment Sahaidachny was not acting as Hetman. It has been related above how he lost his popularity with the majority of the Cossacks on account of having accepted the conditions for the reduction of the Cossacks proposed by the Polish government. The discontented chose the moment when Sahaidachny was absent on a campaign with part of the Cossacks in 1628 against the Tatar town of Perekop in the Crimea, to depose him and elect another Hetman, Borodavka. However, Sahaidachny remained in authority as Colonel, and together with the religious Brotherhood in Kiev undertook the renewal of the Hierarchy in Ukraine. As soon as the Patriarch of Jerusalem arrived in Kiev, a meeting was held by the representatives of all parts of the Ukraine and White Russia, at which candidates for the Metropolitan See as well as for the Bishoprics were designated. Sahaidachny took part in the meeting, which had the character of a National Convention.

After the death of the Metropolitan, Michael Rogoza, the Polish King nominated to the Metropolitan See the Uniate Hipathius Poti, and after his death, Velyamin Rutski. All the Ukrainian Bishoprics with the exception of that of Lvov where there was an Orthodox Bishop, were in the hands of the Uniates. The burgesses and Cossacks of Kiev prevented the Uniate clergy from seizing the Metropolitan See, but the situation of the Orthodox

Church in the Ukraine became critical. The Cossacks and the nobles, members of the meeting at Kiev, promised protection to the newly-ordained Bishops. The Patriarch consented to consecrate as Metropolitan the Rector of the Kievan Brotherhood College, Job Boretsky, and two Bishops for Przemyśl (Peremyshl) and Polotsk. The ceremony took place in the greatest secrecy at night with tightly closed doors and windows, in the presence of a few persons only. Sahaidachny and his regiment of Cossacks accompanied the Patriarch when he left Kiev. On his way south he ordained three more Bishops, for Lutsk, Kholm and Pinsk, and was conducted safely to the Moldavian frontier by the Cossacks.

After the Patriarch left Kiev the Metropolitan being protected in Kiev was able to take up his functions. The newly ordained Bishops on the other hand, were not able to go to their Sees. They could not expect the King to confirm their consecration, but on the contrary were declared by the Polish government to be usurpers and repressive measures were taken against them. The Metropolitan, Job Boretsky, together with the newly consecrated Bishops then published their well-known protest on 28th April, 1621, the full text of which was discovered and republished as late as 1910. In this declaration the Ukrainian clergy protested against the Polish government having accused the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Theophan, of being a Turkish spy. They told the story of the consecration which was conducted according to all canonical rules, and protested against the persecution of the Orthodox by the Uniate clergy in White Russia and the western provinces of Ukraine, Galicia, Volynia, and others. They also warned that persecution and violence would be followed by revolts, for which the Uniates would be responsible. Most interesting to the historian in this protest is the part allocated to the Cossacks. "We all know about Cossacks," says the declaration, "that these chivalrous men are our blood, our kith and kin and true Orthodox Christians. Indeed, they are the descendants of the glorious Rus, of the seed of Japheth who fought

Byzantium at sea and on land. They are of the same tribe that went under Prince Oleg, Monarch of the Rus, to Byzantium by sea in their small boats; and on the dry land, providing those same boats with wheels, they attacked Constantinople. Under Saint Vladimir, Prince of the Rus, they fought Greece, Macedonia, and Illyria. Their ancestors were baptized under Vladimir, having been converted to the Christian faith by the Church of Constantinople, and even to this day they live in this faith, are born in it, and baptized in it. They do not live like heathens, but like Christians. They have their presbyters, they learn to read and write, to know God and His Law Setting out to sea they pray, declaring that they go to fight the infidel for the Christian faith Their second purpose is to set the prisoner free It is truly said that no one in the whole world does so much for the benefit of the persecuted and oppressed Christians as the Greeks with their heavy levies, the King of Spain with his strong fleet, and the Zaporogian Cossacks with their daring and their victories. What other peoples achieve by words and discourses the Cossacks achieve by their actions."

These lines which we have quoted show how at the beginning of the Seventeenth century in the Ukraine educated men were conscious of the continuity of historical development, and tradition since the days of the Kievan Princedom. They also show that the Union of the Ukrainian educated classes with the Cossacks was an accomplished fact. The Ukrainian clergy could use such independent language only if they could rely on their national armed power, the Cossacks. Following the publication of this protest, the Metropolitan convoked a Council in Kiev composed of clergy and laity to decide what was to be done. Those of the Ukrainian nobles of Kiev Province who still remained faithful to the Orthodox Church gathered and held a meeting in Zhitomir where the Metropolitan conferred with them. Finally he went to the Zaporogian Cossacks in their camp and addressed them in the presence of Sahaidachny, inviting them to

stand up in defence of their faith. "All the Cossacks," we are told by an eye-witness, "took an oath to defend their faith even to the death".

About the same time, negotiations were being carried on between the Polish Government and the Cossacks concerning a fresh engagement of the Cossacks. The Polish Government, being menaced by the Turks at that time, stood greatly in need of the Cossack's help. A Turkish army under Iskander-Pasha set out in the summer of 1620 against Poland, and on the way occupied Moldavia. The old Polish general, Zolkievski, with only a small detachment, set out to intercept them. He crossed the Dniester, but on the fields of Zezora, near Jassy, was surrounded by overwhelming forces of the enemy; his army was annihilated and he himself was slain. His second general, Konecpolski, was taken prisoner. On the same battlefield Michael Khmelnitsky, Starost of Chihirin, lost his life, and his son, Bohdan, was taken prisoner. This Bohdan was later the most famous Hetman of the Ukraine. The Turks did not take advantage of their victory, nor did they cross the Dniester. The victory of Iskander-Pasha was only intended to be a preliminary to a great campaign against Poland, and Sultan Osman II was himself to lead the army.

At the moment when the Metropolitan, Job Boretsky, was holding council with the Ukrainian nobles and the Cossacks, the Sultan was mustering his forces in Adrianople in order to conquer "Lekhistan" (Poland). To meet this menacing danger, the Seim of Warsaw decided to engage no fewer than 20,000 Cossacks with an annual payment of 100,000 ducats, and the king gave his consent. He even asked the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Theophan, when he was on Ukrainian territory, to use his influence with the Cossacks in favor of the war with the Turks. The member representing Volynia in the Warsaw Seim, Lawrence Drevinsky, made a speech in which he said that in the coming war, Poland would be protected by the hands of the Orthodox whose just demands in religious matters the Polish Government would not satisfy. He drew a

vivid picture of all the injustices, abuses and persecutions endured by Orthodox Ukrainians and White-Russians, and warned the Polish Government against the grave consequences of refusing justice to the Orthodox. Drevinsky was supported by other members from Kiev, Volynia and Brest. Their speeches, however, were met with laughter and merriment, and the King said he would sooner abdicate than see an Orthodox Metropolitan installed in Kiev. The burning question was disposed of by a few formal insignificant decisions which could not satisfy the Orthodox.

In the meantime, the Cossacks, encouraged by former appeals and promises of the Government, started energetic preparations for the war, though recent events had somewhat cooled their enthusiasm. However, the visit of the newly consecrated Metropolitan had its effect. The Cossacks continued to negotiate with the King's emissary about their taking part in the war and promised to take the oath together with their present Hetman, Borodavka, for the period of the war. They also sent a special deputation to the King, including Sahaidachny, the Prince-Bishop Kurtsevich and two others, in order to demand his confirmation of the newly consecrated Metropolitan and the two Bishops. In the meantime, the Cossack fleet sailed into the Black Sea and appeared before Constantinople, attacking the suburbs. The Turkish fleet which protected the capital was not able to prevent them plundering, and a special fleet under Kapudan Pasha was sent in pursuit. A few small boats, having been captured, the prisoners were brought to the Bulgarian coast where the Sultan was at the time with his army, and were tortured to death in revenge.

The Cossack deputation arrived in Warsaw in July, 1621, and was favorably impressed by the reception the King gave them, and his promise to "tranquillize" the religious question. Sahaidachny, satisfied with the results of his mission, left Warsaw directly for the front because the main force of the Cossacks had already set out to help the Polish army which at the end of August

stood before Khotin, the Turkish army with the Sultan at its head being already in Moldavia.

The Polish army numbered about 35,000, and was led by the old general Khodkevich, accompanied by Prince Wladislaus. They faced the Turkish army, which was composed of 150,000 regular troops, not counting the Tatar hordes and various auxiliary detachments. This army threatened the complete annihilation of the Polish army, and the Cossacks were awaited with great impatience. The Cossacks, numbering about 30,000 and led by Sahaidachny, who had again been elected Hetman, arrived in time on the eve of the Turkish advance.

The Turks began by attacking the Cossacks, who were still tired after their march, and had not had time to fortify their encampment. However, they repulsed the Turkish attacks. During the two following days the whole Turkish army twice renewed their attack on the Cossacks but were repeatedly repulsed by the Cossacks, who stood like a rock. On the third day the Cossacks having repulsed a third attack, made an advance and, supported by the Polish army ejected the Turks from their advantageous position, destroyed their artillery and forced their way into the Turkish camp. Had they continued the attack instead of beginning to plunder the camp, they would have utterly defeated the enemy, but as it was, the Turks rallied and expelled the Cossacks from the encampment. One Turkish Pasha and several important personages were taken prisoner by the Cossacks led by Sahaidachny.

For two days both armies were forced to rest. On the third the Turks renewed their attack and again directed it chiefly against the Cossacks. The Tartars succeeded in cutting the lines of communication with the base in the town of Kamenets, which led to shortness of ammunition and provisions. However, both sides were exhausted and suffered heavy losses. After several renewed attempts on the part of the Turks to break up the Cossack and Polish encampment, the Sultan offered to negotiate peace.

Peace was concluded on the 8th October, 1621, on the battlefield near the Turkish fortress Khotin.

One of the important points of the peace treaty was that the Cossacks were prohibited from plundering the Turkish coast on the Black Sea. Directly after the conclusion of peace, the Cossacks set out to return home, having sent a delegation to the king insisting on a favorable settlement of the religious question and demanding the confirmation of all their special liberties, rights and privileges, the promised yearly pay of 100,000 ducats, a special reward for the campaign of Khotin, and satisfaction of the demands of the Orthodox Church.

Prince Wladislaus heaped distinctions on Sahaidnachny, their chief deliverer, in recognition of his services to the Polish State. The Cossack Hetman was very ill in consequence of a wound received at the beginning of the Khotin campaign, and returned to Kiev where he died on April 10th, 1622.

The campaign of Khotin was frequently mentioned in contemporary literature. Besides Polish authors, who celebrated it in a series of poems, a Dalmatian poet, Hundulich, in far Dubrovnik, dedicated to it his well-known poem "Osman". But the whole credit for the victory by which the Christian world was once again preserved from a Moslem invasion was in these literary works, attributed to Prince Wladislaus, and the modest personality of the Cossack Hetman remained in the background, though even the official Polish account of the campaign recognized that no other than he with his Zaporogian Cossacks was the real hero of the war.

Worse than all, he did not even receive the satisfaction he most expected, the recognition of the claims of the Orthodox Church, as well as the special demands of the Cossacks. The Polish government deferred the decision until the Seim of 1623.

Sahaidachny did not live to see it. In Easter week of 1622 the whole population of Kiev accorded a very solemn funeral to the Cossack hero. He was buried in the Church of the Kievan Brotherhood (Bratski). We still possess

the funeral oration recited at his tomb by the scholars of the Bratski College of the Kievan Brotherhood and later published, in which were praised the services rendered by the deceased to his country and to the Orthodox Church. During his life-time he was a patron of literature and art, and left by will several thousand ducats to the Brotherhoods of Kiev and Lvov, especially for schools.

Contemporaries who knew Sahaidachny personally, as well as later historians, are unanimous in greatly appreciating his outstanding ability as a military leader and statesman. An interesting description of him is given by Jacob Sobieski, a contemporary author of *Memoirs on the Khotin campaign*. "Petro Konashevich," he writes, "because of his sharp intellect, his surprisingly ripe judgment, his adroitness in speech as well as in action, was so remarkable a man that with full justice we may point him out to posterity as one of the most remarkable men in Poland He was a man of great spirit who liked to face danger, who risked his life, being the first to attack in battle and the last to retreat, always active and lively"

Ukrainian historians rate him very highly, especially for the services rendered by him to his native country. V. Antonovich thinks that "owing to his political flair and tact, Sahaidachny was a most remarkable man for his age, and extremely useful to the national development of the Ukrainian people. He returned to the Ukrainian population the use of their traditional electoral principle in ecclesiastical as well as in secular affairs, a principle very deeply embodied in the instincts of Ukrainians. In doing so, Sahaidachny provided Ukrainians with a method and with strength for their future struggles for national existence". M. Hrushevsky holds Sahaidachny to be a remarkable politician who consciously pursued the aim of obtaining for his people an adequate place in the Polish State. His achievement in reviving the Orthodox hierarchy covered him with undying glory in the eyes of Ukrainians.

CHAPTER XIII

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(57) Cossacks in the Second and Third Decades of the Seventeenth Century. (58) Struggle in the Seim for the Orthodox Church. (59) Interventions of the Cossacks in the Crimea. (60) Uprisings of 1625 and 1630. (61) Peter Mohyla and His Time. (62) Revolts of Pavluk and Ostranin. (63) Ukrainian Territory Completely United Under the Polish Crown.

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57. Cossacks in the Second and Third Decades of the Seventeenth Century.

Shortly after Sahaidachny's death, the Cossacks elected Holub, his close collaborator, for their Hetman. The Polish government was not much pleased with this choice, considering it to be a victory for the Cossack "rabble", but Holub proved to be as loyal to the Polish crown and as conciliatory as Sahaidachny. The Polish King sent his emissaries to the Cossacks with money and instructions to obtain their consent to a partial demobilization, leaving only about three to four thousand registered Cossacks in active service, and their promise not to attack the Turks. The Cossacks were not to be persuaded. On the contrary, they undertook two successive naval campaigns, as usual devastating the shores of Anatolia, seizing Turkish vessels, showing themselves in the immediate vicinity of Constantinople, and causing great alarm.

58. Struggle in the Seim for the Orthodox Church.

The Ukrainian Orthodox party set their hopes on the Seim of 1623 in Warsaw, expecting to force the Polish government to redress their grievances. The Seim of 1623 takes a very important place in the history of the parliamentary struggles, regarding the rights of the Orthodox. Its sessions became the scene of a heated duel between the Roman Catholics and the Orthodox. Both sides took great pains to prepare themselves for the fight, and mobilize all their resources. The Orthodox clergy had drawn up an address to the King in which they de-

clared their loyalty to the Polish crown, and excused the secret consecration of the Orthodox bishops by the Patriarch of Constantinople on the plea of extreme necessity. The newly ordained bishops declared themselves ready to renounce their rights if the King were willing to use his power to nominate other candidates to the Ukrainian Orthodox bishoprics. At the same time, another memorandum was printed and circulated addressed to the Polish nobles in which the Orthodox party declared that the compulsory Union of the Churches alienated the Ukrainian people from the Polish State, and that the whole of the Zaporogian Cossack steppes were not sufficiently extensive to shelter all the Ukrainians who were forced to flee from religious persecution and abandon their homes. The most important point was the support which the Cossacks now gave to the Orthodox Church. They sent a delegation with a petition plainly and categorically setting forth their demand for the restoration of the Orthodox Church to its rightful position in the Polish State. The Orthodox Church was represented in the Seim of 1623 by the Metropolitan Job Boretsky and the Archbishop Meleti Smotrisky.

The other side was no less prepared and armed for the conflict. They also had collected instances where the Orthodox had shown violence to the Uniates, especially in Kiev, where, owing to the presence of the Cossacks, the Orthodox were the stronger. The Uniates were also in the majority in the Seim, and the Papal Nuncio had arrived from Rome for the purpose of strengthening their side.

Neither the parliamentary debates nor all the efforts of the Orthodox availed against the Roman Catholic majority in the Seim. Finally, a kind of truce was effected, suspending all trials and judgments in religious cases, and postponing until the next session of the Seim the final settlement of the conflict between the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Churches. As usual, partial demobilization and complete obedience to the Polish authorities were demanded from the Cossacks.

The Orthodox side well understood that they had lost their campaign in the Seim. The very night when the truce was carried, the Orthodox bishops left Warsaw for Kiev. The leader of the Orthodox party in the Seim, Lawrence Drevinsky, declared that the Orthodox must abandon all hope so long as King Sigismund lived.

The following session of the Seim did not bring any better settlement nor did successive sessions. As a matter of fact, the conflict was rendered even fiercer by the events of 1623 when the Uniate bishop of Polotsk, Josaphat Kuntsevich, was murdered in Vitebsk, a White Russian town, by a crowd of townspeople exasperated by the harsh measures he had used in forcing Church Union on the Orthodox population. Cruel reprisals followed at the hands of the Polish government, who were greatly incensed at the murder. A little later, analogous events occurred in Kiev when the town population assisted by the Cossacks murdered a clergyman and a Church lay-representative who had showed themselves willing to surrender an Orthodox Church to the Uniates. In this case, however, the murder went unpunished. These events show the pitch of hatred to which both sides in the struggle were driven.

Many of the Orthodox began to feel discouraged. The Bishop of Peremysl, Isaiah Kopinsky, and even the Metropolitan himself, began to side with the adherents of the Tsar of Muscovy, contemplating surrender to him who as an Orthodox monarch would be a proper protector for the Orthodox Ukrainian Church. Support for this scheme was widespread on the left bank of the Dnieper, especially in the monasteries near the town of Lubny. Others among the Orthodox clergy, despairing of ultimate victory, were ready to compromise with the Roman Catholics. Conspicuous among them was Meleti Smotrisky, Archbishop of Polotsk, one of the chief champions of the Orthodox Church. He began advocating an immediate understanding with the Uniates, but the adherents of Orthodoxy would have none of it, and Smotrisky was forced to leave Kiev secretly and openly joined the Uniates. His example

was followed by others among the higher Orthodox clergy. But the apostacy of a few individual leaders did not shake the mass of the Orthodox clergy and nobles, and the Orthodox Ukrainians mustered their forces for a renewed struggle, counting on the strong support of the Cossacks.

59. Interventions of the Cossacks in the Crimea.

The failure of the Seim campaign of 1623 cost Hetman Holub his hetmanship, for the Cossacks elected a new Hetman in the person of Michael Doroshenko, a well-known soldier, who had taken part in the campaign of Khotin. He was also highly regarded by the Polish authorities. Jacob Sobieski wrote of him: "Doroshenko is a military leader of good repute among the Cossacks on account of his courage, as well as being a supporter of the Polish state and the King". Doroshenko succeeded in maintaining discipline among the Cossacks. Those who were destined to be demobilized he transferred to the Zaporogian Sich beyond the Rapids, outside the control of the Polish authorities, and directed their energy against the Tatars and the Turks. At that time the internal affairs of the Crimean Tatars were favorable to a Cossack intervention. There were two pretenders to the power of the Khan and the Crimean Tatars were divided among themselves into two hostile parties. One of these, led by Shagin Giray, an able and active brother of one of the rival candidates, Mahomet Giray, was bent on breaking the allegiance of the Tatars to the Ottoman Porte and concluded an alliance with the Cossacks. A detachment of Cossacks appeared in the Crimea, and part of the Cossack fleet sailed against those Turks who supported the rival pretender, Janibek Giray.

This was one of the most successful naval campaigns of the Cossacks. Taking advantage of the fact that the Turkish fleet was engaged near the Crimean shores, the Cossack fleet appeared unexpectedly in the Straits. According to existing reports of the French and British ambassadors, the Cossacks burnt some of the rich suburbs

of Constantinople, Buiuk-Dere, Eni-Kioy and Stenia, seizing rich spoil and departed unmolested. When Sultan Amurad set out in person to pursue them the Cossack fleet mustered in battle order, contrary winds not allowing them to attack first. The Turks, however, did not attack, and the Cossack fleet returned home in safety.

In a fortnight's time (July, 1624) a stronger Cossack fleet appeared before Constantinople, having escaped the vigilance of the Turkish fleet stationed at the mouth of the Dnieper. They burnt down the town of Faros on the Anatolian coast. After plundering for three days, they returned with rich spoil. The Sultan recalled his fleet from the Crimean shores to protect the capital, but the Cossacks were successful in attacking Constantinople about the middle of August, for the third time that summer. Though delayed by tempest for fully a month near Ochakov, they nevertheless were able to reach the Bosphorus and again attacked and plundered Eni-Kioy, a suburb of Constantinople.

Shagin Giray, together with his brother, Mahomet Giray, concluded a formal alliance with the Cossacks at the end of 1624. Thus the Cossacks, as at the time of Emperor Rudolph II at the end of the Sixteenth century, conducted their own international policy. Among others, they sheltered in the Zaporogian Sich, a certain Ahkia, who gave himself out to be a son of Sultan Mahomet III and a Byzantine princess of the house of Comnen. This pretender was supported by the Metropolitan of Kiev also, Job Boretsky, who sent him with recommendations to the Tsar of Muscovy. The Cossacks on their part, sent a diplomatic mission to the Muscovian Tsar in 1625.

The growth of Cossack activities and their interference in Tatar and Turkish affairs, roused the apprehension of the Polish government, unable as usual, to cope with them. The Polish King Sigismund, whose attention was always concentrated on securing the Swedish and Muscovian thrones for himself, feared political complications in the south which might interfere with his plans in the north. He was therefore disinclined to support the dar-

ing enterprises of the Cossacks against the Turks.. On the other hand, he was displeased because of the active support given by them to the Orthodox clergy. He severely admonished them and forbade them to take any steps against the Turks. In defiance of his orders, the Cossack fleet put out to sea, attacked and burnt down Trebizond. A strong Turkish fleet pursued and intercepted the Cossacks at the mouth of the Dnieper, but were defeated by the Cossacks, who succeeded in sailing up the Dnieper, having suffered some damage from tempest.

60. Uprisings of 1625 and 1630.

The Polish King then decided to use armed force to subdue the Cossacks. He succeeded for some time in breaking off their alliance with the Tatars by corrupting the Tatar leaders. The Polish army under Konecpolski appeared in Ukraine in the summer of 1625. Again, as was the case thirty years before at the time of the rising of Nalivayko, it came to regular pitched battles which cost the Polish army great effort and serious losses. After stubborn fights in the region of the middle Dnieper, opposite the present town of Kremenchuk, a treaty was concluded known as the Treaty of Kurukiv, from the Lake near which they met. According to this Treaty, the Polish government raised the number of registered Cossacks to 6,000 and promised them regular pay. Those who were not entered on the rolls had either to return home under the landlords or leave the country with their families. The Cossacks were also bound over not to attack the Tatars or Turks any more, to destroy their fleet and not appear again at sea.

The Treaty of Kurukiv, though advantageous to the Cossacks, in that it doubled the number of registered Cossacks, was at the same time harmful, as it again divided them into two parties, those registered and legally recognized, and those irregulars outside the law. But in the person of Michael Doroshenko, repeatedly elected Hetman, they found a skilful and able leader, who suc-

ceeded in pacifying the growing antagonism in their ranks. Again he transferred most of the non-registered Cossacks to the Zaporogian Sich, leaving the 6000 on the rolls stationed in Ukrainian towns. Favorable circumstances allowed him once more to use the Zaporogians against the Tatars. Hardly had the Treaty of Kurukiv been ratified by the Seim of Warsaw in 1626, when a great Tatar horde invaded Ukraine. Hetman Doroshenko employed all his Cossacks against them, and defeated them near Bila Tserkva in the autumn of 1626.

Further, he renewed his alliance with Shagin and Mahomet Giray, taking advantage of the fact that the Turks were building new fortresses on the shores of the Black Sea to prevent the Cossacks entering it and causing fresh disorders in the Crimea. Finally, the brothers, having decided to free themselves from the over-lordship of the Turks, claimed for themselves the throne of Constantinople. Turkey about this time was much weakened by constant palace revolutions, discords and anarchy among the ruling classes, and the plans of the ambitious brothers Giray were not devoid of a certain hope of success. However, for the time being, the Turks held them in check, and supported Janibek-Giray, who was loyal to the Ottoman Porte. This afforded a welcome pretext for the Cossacks whom the rebel brothers had called in to their help.

In the spring of 1628, Doroshenko at the head of a small but select Cossack force set out for the Crimea. Amidst uninterrupted fighting with the Turko-Tatar forces, who outnumbered them, he forced his way through Perekop and arrived at the capital, Bakhchisaray, where he was welcomed by Shagin and Mahomet-Giray, his allies. But there Doroshenko fell in battle, slain by a Turkish bullet. The Cossacks, though they had lost their leader, did not lose their courage or presence of mind. They continued their campaign on the old plan, crossed the peninsula to Kaffa (the present Theodosia) on the sea, where the Turkish candidate, Janibek-Giray, was besieged, supported from the sea by the Turkish fleet.

The Cossacks defeated the Turkish reinforcements which had been sent from Constantinople to the relief of the besieged Janibek-Giray. Here an unexpected change occurred. The Tatar parties, hitherto hostile, came to an understanding. The adherents of Mahomet and Shagin-Giray left the Cossacks, and having joined Janibek-Giray, fell with their united forces on the Cossacks. These now found themselves between two fires, and only with difficulty fought their way back across the peninsula and returned in safety to the Sich, even bringing as trophies artillery seized by the Tatars from the Poles in the battle of Zezora in 1620. Both the brothers Giray, Mahomet and Shagin, escaped with the Cossacks and opened negotiations with the Polish king for help. At last the Polish government decided, though unofficially, to seize the opportunity to intervene in Tatar affairs, and obtain influence over them by giving help to the pretenders. The Polish King gave his consent to a second Cossack campaign in the Crimea.

However, the two campaigns which followed were unsuccessful, though their forces were greater than those commanded by Doroshenko. They lacked his skilful leadership and unity of plan. The Polish government had intervened too late, and in not having given timely support to the first Cossack victories over the Tatars at the beginning of the Seventeenth century, had lost their opportunity of gaining control over these nomads, who were a real scourge to the Ukrainian provinces of Poland during the whole of the Seventeenth century, menacing Poland often even in its interior provinces.

The Cossack army engaged in the war of Poland with the Swedes returned at the conclusion of peace at the end of 1629. They were ordered to demobilize, since they were not registered. Henceforth they swelled the ranks of the discontented. The chief Polish General, Stanislaus Konecpolski, an advocate of a harsh policy towards the Cossacks, was given a free hand. The Ukrainian population became extremely irritated by the excesses of the Polish soldiers stationed in the Ukraine.

The conflict was exacerbated by Cossacks having taken an active part in religious affairs. An ecclesiastical Orthodox Council had been called in Kiev in 1628 in order to find some compromise with the Uniates. The Cossack representatives at the Council at once took up an irreconcilable attitude, and threatened Bishop Meleti Smotrisky and other advocates of an understanding. The Council condemned the latest writing of Meleti Smotrisky as being inconsistent with Orthodox dogma, and as we already know, the Bishop was forced to leave Kiev secretly.

Those in favor of the understanding with the Uniates, however, continued their efforts, supported by the Polish government. In the Seim in Warsaw in 1629, it was decided to call a "General Synod" in the autumn of 1629 in Lvov, where the representatives of the Orthodox and Uniates were to meet. Preliminary Synods were called by order of King Sigismund, one for the Orthodox in Kiev and another for the Uniates in Volodomir in Volynia. But even before the Synod was called, the Ukrainian nobles of Kiev province made a decided protest against any understanding with the Uniates. Cossack representatives and Orthodox nobles appeared in the Synod and broke up its session, although some Orthodox clergy were inclined to compromise. No Orthodox representatives attended the "General Synod" in Lvov. The Uniates sat alone, and worked out a basis for an understanding, the most interesting point of which was a plan for a common Patriarch for the Orthodox and Uniate Churches.

Religious strife had repercussions among the Cossacks, straining the relations between the Registered Cossacks and those of the Zaporogian Sich. Hetman Gregory Chorney, elected in the place of Michael Doroshenko, was suspected of having sympathy with the Uniates. When Hetman Chorny demanded the disposal of artillery belonging to the Zaporogians, they kidnapped him, brought him into the Sich, tried, condemned and quartered him. In his stead they elected a new Hetman, Taras Fedorovich. This was the beginning of an open conflict with the Polish government. The Registered Cossacks, seized with panic,

shut themselves into the fortified town of Korsun, where a detachment of Polish forces was garrisoned. The Zaporogian Cossacks besieged the place. The townspeople of Korsun as well as some of the Registered Cossacks joined the Zaporogians, and the Polish garrison together with those Registered Cossacks who had remained faithful to the Poles escaped from Korsun.

The Zaporogian army, its ranks swelled by the discontented, concentrated in a fortified camp on the left bank of the river Dnieper near the town of Pereyaslav. The Polish General Konecpolski crossed the Dnieper in May, 1630, and attacked the Cossack camp. The details of this war are not well known. We know that it lasted about three weeks and that Konecpolski was unsuccessful and was forced to accept peace terms favorable to the Cossacks. Peace was signed on the 8th of June in Pereyaslav. The numbers of the Registered Cossacks were raised to 8000, and an amnesty was secured to all participants in the war. As usual, the Cossacks were required to refrain from attacking the Turks and to destroy their own fleet.

Both sides were, of course, dissatisfied with the conditions of peace and the issue of the campaign, but the Cossacks interpreted it to mean, that the conditions of Kurukiv being cancelled, they were free to do as they liked. Accordingly, immediately after the conclusion of the peace of Pereyaslav they put to sea and invaded the coasts about Kilia and Varna. Konecpolski was not strong enough to make reprisals but the Polish army remained stationed in the Ukraine.

About this time, after the campaign of Pereyaslav, a new attempt was made on the part of the Western European powers to draw the Cossacks into the sphere of their international policy. The voevod of Transylvania, Betlen Habor, entered into negotiations with the Cossacks in 1629, through the Patriarch of Constantinople. Later, the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus sent his emissary to the Cossacks to solicit their votes in the election of the Polish King after King Sigismund's death, and to invite

them to send a detachment to help the Swedes in Austria. His emissary failed to arrive, having been intercepted and retained by the Muscovians. In the summer of 1631, Gustavus Adolphus sent another mission to the Cossacks, which was allowed to pass through Muscovy, as the Muscovian Tsar intended to go to war with Poland. The Swedish emissaries were instructed to enter into negotiations only with the Zaporogian Cossacks in the Sich, but they fell into the hands of the Registered Cossacks loyal to the Poles, who delivered them to the Polish authorities.

In April, 1632, King Sigismund died. His death revived the hopes of the Orthodox for the settlement of Orthodox Church affairs. Again all the forces were mobilized for the election campaign of the new King. At the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Nobles were once again Leontiy Drevinsky and Michael Kropivnitsky, well known as Orthodox delegates in former years, and besides them a new name appeared, that of Adam Kissil, a Nobleman of Kiev who was destined later on to play an important part in the Ukrainian history of the period. The Ukrainian nobles again concluded an alliance with the Cossacks who sent their delegation to the election with instructions to vote for Prince Wladislaus and for the abolition of Church Union. The Orthodox again concluded an alliance with the Polish Protestants headed by the great Lithuanian magnate Cristopher Radziwill.

Prince Wladislaus, King Sigismund's son, was duly elected King. He was believed to be tolerant in religious matters, and the affairs of the Orthodox Church were settled in the following way after a hard fight during the elections: 1. The Orthodox population was to be free to confess the Orthodox faith, and was given the right to build new churches, repair old ones, found schools, hospitals, printing offices and brotherhoods. The Orthodox were also admitted to municipal institutions. 2. The Metropolitan of Kiev was officially recognized as head of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine, and the Cathedral of Saint Sophia and the Pecherski Monastery were allotted to him. 3. In addition to the Metropolitan see of Kiev,

the Orthodox population received the bishoprics of Lutsk, Lvov and Peremyshl (Przemysl). 4. Quite a number of churches and monasteries seized by the Uniates were returned to the Orthodox. 5. The Uniates received the bishoprics of Kholm, Vladimir, Pinsk and Polotsk.

So we see that the Orthodox obtained only a partial victory. The Union of the Churches was not abolished. On the contrary it was now recognized by the Orthodox as another rite to which Ukrainians and White Russians belonged, and this cleavage was officially recognized and sanctioned. To the Orthodox, however, it seemed an important victory. They had triumphed and their joyful feelings found expression in the speeches of the Ukrainian parliamentary leaders Drevinsky and Kropivnitsky in the Seim.

61. Peter Mohyla and his Time.

The Ukrainian Orthodox took the greatest care to settle their internal affairs to their best advantage. First, it was decided to annul the election of the Metropolitan, Isaiah Kopinsky, who was too old, and in addition was a notorious partisan of Muscovy. The Ukrainians now wished to nominate a candidate acceptable to the new Polish King. Such a candidate was found in the person of Peter Mohyla, (1596-1647), son of the late Prince of Moldavia, who having been deprived by the Turks of his throne, had taken refuge in Poland. Peter Mohyla was a very learned man, having studied in Paris and Oxford. For some time he pursued a military career and took part in the campaign of Khotin, but later entered a monastery, and at the time of his election to the dignity of the Metropolitan, occupied an important post in the Orthodox hierarchy, being the Archimandrite (Abbot) of the Pecherski Monastery in Kiev. His election was carried out with great pomp in the spring of 1633 in Lvov. Accepted by the Polish King, the new Metropolitan entered Kiev in triumph in July of the same year, after the old Metropolitan, Isaiah Kopinsky had been induced to abdicate, deposed almost by force, and shut up in a monastery. About

the same time a Volynian noble, Hulevich, was elected to the Orthodox bishopric of Peremyshl (Przemysl).

The Orthodox were fortunate in their choice of Peter Mohyla, who fully justified by his brilliant activity the panegyrics and odes composed in his honor. An exceptional leader had been found who in his person united all the gifts necessary in the circumstances of the time. Being of aristocratic birth, Peter Mohyla was highly connected, and moreover enjoyed independent means which he devoted exclusively to religious and cultural purposes. Having the support of the Polish authorities, he enjoyed a freedom of action which none of his predecessors, cramped by their illegal position, ever had. Very gifted, intelligent, and active, and brilliantly educated, he devoted the whole strength of his fiery and sometimes uncontrolled temperament to the interests of the Orthodox Church. He was a true leader, conscious of his aims. First he created a substantial material foundation for the Metropolitan See, so as to enable him to carry out his far-reaching plans, and concentrated in the hands of the Metropolitan the great landed possessions belonging to the Kievan monasteries. He then carried out a wide educational scheme with the wealth so acquired.

Mohyla undertook the discipline of the Orthodox clergy, and restored order in the church hierarchy shaken during the preceding centuries. He closely watched their way of life and their work, and created a special post of Metropolitan's Lieutenant entrusted with the minute control of the clergy. A special ecclesiastical court of justice was created, the so-called Consistorium.

Peter Mohyla did much for the restoration of churches in Kiev, but especially important services were rendered by him in the question of education in Ukraine. He reformed the existing school of the Brotherhood into a college, and later into an Academy like other contemporary European Universities, and introduced the teaching of Latin and Greek. In addition to the Kievan Academy, colleges were created in Vinnitsa in Podolia and in Kamnety in Volynia. He greatly encouraged literary and

publishing activity, and a great number of books, such as theological treatises, school books for the students of the Academy and Colleges. Of course, most works of theology were published in Kiev, among them an epoch-making Catechism approved by the ecclesiastical Council of 1640 in Kiev, and accepted in other Orthodox lands. It is still in general use in the Orthodox Church. Its theological importance is seen from the fact that Mohyla's Catechism was reprinted in a Latin translation in 1927 in Rome by the Curiae Romae. An important work, the "Paterik Pecherski" (Lives of Local Saints) was published in 1635. The former press of the Kievan Brotherhood was enlarged, and quantities of books of all kinds were printed there and circulated throughout Orthodox countries. A number of learned theologians gathered round the Academy of Kiev, and from among its pupils well-known Churchmen and men of letters entered public life during the lifetime of Peter Mohyla. Among his closest collaborators were men well-known in the history of Ukrainian letters, such as Silvester Kossov, Athanasius Kalnofoysky, Isaiah Koslovsky, Joseph Horbatsky, Ok-senti Starushich. Among the pupils of Mohyla we may mention Lazar Baranovich, Anton Radivilovsky, Innocent Gisel.

There was, however, a weakness in the activity of Peter Mohyla which had far-reaching consequences. Mohyla was not a Ukrainian by birth, and though a great zealot for the Orthodox Faith, was not a Ukrainian patriot. He cared for the interests of the Orthodox Church, but not for the Ukrainian nation. Latin was the chief language in his school: his own works he published in Greek. Not only did the living Ukrainian language find no place in the whole system of education and learning, but even the artificial Church-Slavonic was relegated to second place in favor of Latin. This fact condemned the Academy of Kiev to a certain detachment, leaving it without contact with its surroundings and made its learning accessible only to a limited number.

But this drawback was not immediately felt. For the

time being Mohyla's activities rendered an immense service to the Ukrainian national cause by bringing the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the rallying point of national life, to a point from which it could successfully protect itself from Roman Catholic pressure; and this was the chief task of the time.

The Ukrainian Cossacks took almost no active part in this widespread movement of learning and education. Peter Mohyla and those about him had, as we know, adopted a thoroughly loyal attitude towards the Polish King and government, but the Cossacks' love of freedom and independence, not to speak of their uprisings and excesses were distasteful in their eyes. Indeed, when the Cossacks opposed the Polish authorities, they were in the eyes of Mohyla and his associates no more than rebels, as they were in the eyes of the Polish government. Peaceful conditions were essential to the carrying out of the far-reaching religious and educational plans of Mohyla's programme.

62. Revolts of Pavluk and Ostrianin.

During the first years of Mohyla's activities, the Cossacks remained quiet and were loyal. The accession of King Wladislaus meant for the Orthodox population the beginning of internal peace and tranquility; but for the Cossacks his warlike and chivalrous character meant an era of active international military policy. The immediate future promised two wars, against Muscovy for the Muscovian throne and against Sweden for the Swedish throne. King Wladislaus could reasonably claim both; he had once been elected by the Muscovians to occupy the throne of the Tsars, and as a member of the family of Vasa he had claims on the Swedish crown. The Muscovian campaign began in 1633, and in it the Cossacks played an important part. In 1634 a Cossack army of about 20,000 joined the King near Smolensk, who had only 9,000 with him. Other Cossack detachments fought round the Muscovian towns of Viazma, Kaluga and Rzhev. This war closed with the Treaty of Polianov in 1634, and

was very advantageous to the Poles. Although King Wladislaus had not won the Muscovian crown for himself, he had annexed to Poland two great and important provinces, Smolensk in White Russia and Chernigov-Sieversk in Ukraine.

At the same time war almost broke out with the Turks and some successful battles were fought with the Tatars in which the Cossacks naturally played the leading part. The Polish Seim, however, concluded peace with the Sultan in 1635, and in order to restrain the energies of the Cossacks and keep them in check it was decided to build a fortress at Kodak near the rapids of the Dnieper to prevent them putting out to sea. This fortress was built by a French engineer, Beauplan, author of the well-known "Description de L'Ukraine", a book which was translated into English. The fortress was garrisoned by Polish troops under the French Colonel Morion. The Cossack's pride was wounded and they nursed the grievance. In the meantime the war with Sweden broke out, and we see the Cossacks operating in the Baltic and taking part in the blockade of Koenigsberg.

The war was soon ended. Taking advantage of the circumstance that Polish attention was centred on northern affairs, the Cossack Hetman, Ivan Sulyma, took the fortress of Kodak by surprise and razed it to the ground. He was, however, not sufficiently supported by the Cossacks. He was betrayed by some of their number to the Poles, who seized him and beheaded him in Warsaw.

The Polish government, profiting by internal disunion among the Cossacks, and by the sharply marked division into two strongly opposed groups, one being loyal to the Polish crown and the other against it, maintained peace for some time. A commission led by Adam Kissil, Ukrainian member of the Seim, was sent to the Cossacks. Seven thousand of them were entered on the rolls and took the oath of allegiance.

The registered Cossacks were divided into seven regiments, five settled on the right bank of the Dnieper in the towns Bila Tserkva, Kaniv, Cherkassy, Korsun and

Chihirin, and two on the left bank at Pereyaslav and Myrhorod. Each regiment was sub-divided into ten hundreds, and the hundreds into "kureni" (camps) of tens. All their officers were elected from among themselves. Their chief source of livelihood was agriculture, also fishing and hunting. The King's payment was only an insignificant contribution. The land owned by them was not in separate areas but located side by side with private and state lands. The Cossack lands were immune from crown or feudal jurisdiction and had their own court of justice.

For some time there was peace, but it seems that the independent spirit of the Cossacks could not be accommodated within the narrow limits set by the Polish government. The discontented elements were, of course, assembled in the Sich beyond the Rapids. They were for the most part former peasants who had left their homes not wishing to become serfs of the newly installed landowners. They were also hostile to the Registered Cossacks, whom they accused of having seized "lands and meadows and working on their estates in imitation of the nobles." A leader of the opposition was soon found in the person of Pavluk. In the summer of 1637 he appeared in Korsun, seized the artillery of the Korsun Cossack regiment and fomented sedition among them. They mutinied, murdered those of their officers who remained loyal to the Polish authorities, and joined Pavluk. Thus a new Cossack war broke out. Pavluk sent out from his headquarters a "Universal" (Manifesto) to the Ukrainian population, Cossacks and peasants, inviting them to join his army. He met with much success on the left bank of the Dnieper, and uprisings against the landlords began. Jews who had been brought from Poland as agents for the Polish landlords were especially hated by the population and were molested. Some of the Registered Cossacks joined the rebels, others remained loyal to the Polish government.

When at the end of 1637 the Polish army, led by Michael Potocki, took the field against the Cossacks,

they met near the village of Kumeyki near Cherkassy. The Cossacks numbered about 23,000 and had good artillery. Confident of success they fought with great courage, their leaders showing skill and good knowledge of strategy. The battle was, however, lost by them as the Polish cavalry broke through the defence lines of the Cossack camp, which had been fortified by several lines of carts in the Czech manner. Dmitro Hunia, one of the old Cossack leaders, succeeded in closing the broken lines, retreated with the rest of the Cossacks, and gave battle again near the village of Borovitsa, but without any better success. The Cossacks, now discouraged and dispirited, gave in. They delivered up some of their leaders, among them Pavluk and Tomilenko, who were beheaded in Warsaw. The Cossacks accepted the new officers appointed by the Polish government and took the oath, which was signed in their name by the Secretary of the Cossack army, Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

The capitulation of the Registered Cossacks did not terminate the war. In the spring of 1638, Potocki crossed the Dnieper into the present Province of Poltava, and only after a long and stubborn struggle was he able to disperse the armed detachments of Cossacks. Part of the Polish army was left behind in the Ukraine in order to keep the population in check. The Seim of 1638 decided to limit the number of Registered Cossacks to 6000. The Cossack officers were henceforth to be nominated by the Polish government and the fortress of Kodak was to be rebuilt.

Though the Poles had defeated the Registered Cossacks and subdued the provinces on the left bank of the Dnieper, the Polish army could not penetrate into the stronghold of the Zaporogian Cossacks, the Sich, where the remnant of the defeated Cossack armies gathered, embittered yet irreconcilable. Neither they nor the Zaporogians had any intention of submitting. Having elected a new leader, Hetman Jacob Ostrianin, the Zaporogians began to prepare for revenge. An expedition of the Polish army was unsuccessful against them, and in

the spring of 1638, they appeared in the field. Potocki led his army against them, and this time the struggle took place on the left bank of the Dnieper. The Registered Cossacks were on this occasion fighting against their countrymen. The Zaporogians were at first most successful, taking the fortified towns of Kremenchuk and Chihirin and defeating the German lancers employed by Potocki. Hetman Ostriarin was in possession of the whole left bank of the Dnieper, and was in contact with the Don Cossacks and expecting help from them. Nevertheless, in the end the campaign went against the Cossacks, the decisive factor being the arrival of a new Polish army led by Jeremy Vishnevetski, when the united forces attacked the fortified Cossack camp near Zovnin. The Poles succeeded in making a breach in one place, but they allowed Ostriarin to escape with part of the Cossack forces. The remainder, commanded by Dmitro Hunia, continued to defend the camp, repairing the damage and awaiting reinforcements. Hunia expected help from the Sich which was sailing up the Dnieper, and a detachment of Zaporogian Cossacks led by Colonel Filonenko did indeed come to the relief of the besieged in Hunin, but he only entered the camp with great difficulty, having lost all his guns, ammunition and food which he was bringing. The spirits of the Cossacks were almost broken by this failure, but the Polish army was very exhausted, so that both sides were ready to negotiate. This time the campaign ended peacefully, and no reprisals were taken by the Polish government. The Registered Cossacks and the Zaporogians both swore on oath not to avenge themselves on each other. The Registered Cossacks met in the autumn of 1638 in Kiev and accepted the conditions imposed on them by the Polish government; their superior officers were to be nominated from those of Polish origin, subordinates only being allowed from among the Cossacks themselves. The Registered Cossacks were put under guard, and the fortress of Kodak was rebuilt to keep the Zaporogians in check. The Cossacks remained quiescent for almost ten years.

It proved to be the calm before the storm. The ill effects of the decline of the feudal system were felt in Poland as elsewhere in Europe. A tremendous conflict was inevitable because the endeavors of the great land-owners to secure cheap peasant labor for agricultural production on their vast domains were directly opposed to the traditions and aspirations of the Ukrainian peasant class with its ideal of individual small-holders and free labor. This was especially grievous to the Ukrainian peasants in the wide steppe, neighbors of the free and independent Cossacks. Even their better position compared with those in Western Ukrainian territories and their greater material well-being could not reconcile them with these social differences. Therein lay the germ of future conflicts.

63. Ukrainian Territory Completely United Under the Polish Crown.

In the first half of the Seventeenth century almost all the lands inhabited by the Ukrainians were united under the Polish crown, with the exception of the Carpathian Ukraine which belonged to Hungary, and the vast empty steppe to the east of the present province of Poltava. This latter region had nominally belonged to Muscovy since the Sixteenth century, and it was not until the second half of the Seventeenth century that it began to be colonized by Ukrainian refugees who could not adapt themselves to the conditions existing in the Ukrainian provinces under the Polish crown. These settlers were called Slobidski Cossacks, because they took with them the Cossack organization by regiments, and their settlements were known under the name of Slobidska Ukraine.

According to the Treaty of Deulino (1618) Poland obtained from Muscovy the province of Chernigov-Sieversk, the ancient Ukrainian land of Sieversk which the Lithuanian princes had lost to Muscovy at the beginning of the Fifteenth century. Under the Treaty of the "Eternal Peace" of Polianov (1634), this province was confirmed in the possession of the Polish crown, and in 1635

Polish administration and judicial system were introduced throughout its length and breadth. The landed possessions of the local nobles, cossacks and monasteries were confirmed by the Polish government, and free lands were distributed among nobles either from the Ukraine or Poland.

Under the Muscovian princes only the northern part of the province of Chernigov-Sieversk was comparatively densely populated, the right bank of the river Desna, which was naturally protected from invasion from the south. Here also were situated the more important trading towns: Chernigov, Novhorod-Sieversk, and Starodub, and centres of flourishing forest industries. The less well-protected southern and south-eastern parts were sparsely populated, many towns and settlements having been abandoned since the Thirteenth century. The re-population of these was achieved along the same lines as that of the Middle Dnieper countries. That is, soon after the Union of Lublin, the new landlords invited colonists from the more densely populated districts on the right bank of the Dnieper and promised them all manner of privileges and liberties. New settlements were often made on old sites and their ancient names revived, though in some cases the new settlers brought with them the names of their old homes. For instance, most of the Hluchiv district was colonized by immigrants from Podolia who named their new homes after their Podolian towns and villages.

The peasants were required to perform several duties for the landlords. They had to pay duties in money, or give tithes and work a certain number of days on the land. The Lithuanian Statute was introduced in the newly annexed province and justice was administered accordingly in the law courts; the penal court or "grodski"; the civil court of "Zemski"; and the court which dealt with disputes about the boundaries of landed property. The chief places, such as Chernigov, Novhorod-Sieversk, Nizin, Starodub, Mhlin, Pohep, and Pohar were granted municipal self-government according to the

“Magdeburg Law”, though the rights of the Orthodox population to hold office in municipal institutions were always limited by royal charters.

The new administration under the Polish crown was better than that of Muscovy, and at first the requirements of the landlords fell more lightly on the peasant population. But the same causes operating throughout all the Ukrainian territories began to be felt here also; with the intensification of agriculture on the lands of the great landowners, the duties of the peasants became heavier, the control of the administration on the estates more odious. The Ukrainian town population, the burgesses, on their part, felt bitterly concerning the preponderance given to foreigners in municipal self-government, such as Roman Catholics and Uniates, while they, being autochthonous but Orthodox, were relegated to the second place. Generally speaking, the whole Orthodox population viewed with discontent the growing influence of the Roman Catholic clergy who were under the protection of the Polish government. Soon after the annexation of the Chernigov province, Uniate as well as Roman Catholic schools were opened in profusion, and Jesuit and Dominican monasteries were founded everywhere. The province was soon drawn into the religious and national controversies which were seething in other Ukrainian provinces included in the Polish State.

The union of all the Ukrainian territories under one crown had far-reaching consequences for the Ukrainian people; intercourse between the various Ukrainian provinces grew and multiplied, and their bonds were strengthened. The influence of the western Ukrainian centres of culture spread further to the east. Kiev became again the unchallenged centre of religious and national life. The Ukrainian Cossacks were already becoming the leading Ukrainian social class, gradually taking the place of the Ukrainian nobles, and their influence was extending over all the Ukrainian territories, and gaining sympathy everywhere, especially among those peasants who were dissatisfied with the increasing duties and who regretted

their lost freedom, and the townspeople ousted by foreigners from their former leading positions. Even the Ukrainian nobles and the Orthodox clergy adhered to the Cossacks, seeing in them powerful allies in the struggle for the interests of the Orthodox Church. On the other hand, the Ukrainian nobles drawn into the parliamentary politics of the Polish state, were receiving a certain political training and were cultivating political ideals in the spirit of freedom. This had, as we shall see, important consequences, when the Ukrainian independent State very soon came into existence.

The pressure of the Roman Catholic Church and the religious strife it brought about, compelled the Ukrainian population to organize for self-defence, which resulted in the foundation of schools and the spread of education according to west European models. The influence of this education was spreading over all Ukrainian territories now united under the Polish crown, and when, in the middle of the Seventeenth century a sharp conflict broke out between this crown and the Ukrainian population proceeding from religious and national, as well as social and economic causes, it very soon became of a general character, uniting all classes of the population and developing into a true national revolution. The effects penetrated to the farthest corners of the Ukrainian lands. Even the Carpathian Ukrainians, cut off as they were by political frontiers from the rest of the Ukrainian territories and who now for centuries had lived a separate life in quite different conditions were subject to the influence of the Ukrainian Renaissance on the threshold of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries, and drawn into the sphere of national Ukrainian life. It was in this struggle of the Ukrainian people for their political, social and economic emancipation, that their national consciousness was awakened. The traditions of an independent political existence, which had almost been lost under centuries of foreign government, were revived, together with a strong determination to recover political and national independence, and to rebuild the Ukrainian State.

CHAPTER XIV

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(64) Poland on the Eve of Khmelnitsky's Uprising. (65) Causes of the Uprising. (66) Personality of Bohdan Khmelnitsky. (67) Preparation for the Uprising. (68) First Successes. (69) Campaign of 1649 and Treaty of Zboriv.

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64. Poland on the Eve of Khmelnitsky's Uprising.

Historians are correct in pointing out the extremely favorable international position of Poland on the eve of the fatal year in its history, 1648, when the Cossack rising under Khmelnitsky broke out. All the neighboring states were weakened and passing through a crisis in some form or other. Germany was prostrate after the Thirty Years' War. Hungary lay stricken under Turkish domination. Sweden also was exhausted by its participation in the Thirty Years' War. Muscovy had not yet recovered from the Interregnum and had lively recollections of the lessons received at Smolensk in 1632. Finally, Turkey was weakened by recurrent dynastic revolutions and that country also remembered its experiences during the campaign of Khotin in 1621. It was believed that the Cossacks were now subdued and were likely to remain so for a long time to come.

Prolonged peace abroad was conducive to rapid economic development within the country. The chief sources of this prosperity were the Ukrainian provinces. In a comparatively short time wide expanses of very fertile land beyond the Dnieper, now almost safe from the Tatars owing to the protection of the Cossacks, were brought under cultivation. These comprised the present province of Poltava, the land of Sieversk, and the province of Chernigov, then newly annexed from Muscovy, which was also rich in forests in its northern part. Hundreds of towns and thousands of villages and homesteads grew up in a short time, exactly in the same way as we have seen occurring previously on the right bank of the Dnieper,

with an agricultural population chiefly engaged in working the vast lands of the magnates and bringing in enormous wealth to their owners. Great quantities of wheat and other cereals; herds of cattle and horses; products of the forest, such as tar, potash, wood, furs, wax, and honey; all these were exported from Danzig and filled the landowner's pockets with foreign gold and the luxury products of European industry. With all this exploitation of natural wealth and concentration of capital, trade and industry prospered, particularly in towns such as Warsaw, Cracow, Lvov, Kamenets, Vilno and others. As a sign of the growing wealth of the land, we may take the great contemporary building activity in Poland, magnificent churches, cloisters, castles and palaces springing up throughout its provinces. In distant Poltava, amidst the steppe, magnificent Gothic and Renaissance churches and monasteries were built, not to mention the palaces and castles built by great magnates such as Vishnevetsky, Kalinovsky, Potocki and others, on their estates in the Ukraine.

Religious controversies which so lately had disturbed the whole Polish State, and more especially the Ukrainian and White Russian provinces, were laid aside and almost forgotten after the compromise of 1632. On the surface of this attractive picture of peace and prosperity, the golden age of the "szlachta", the freedom of the nobles was expressed in a rich blossoming of political life. Yet, this seemingly so prosperous State, nevertheless harbored hidden germs of disease which were steadily consuming the organism. Attentive foreigners, observing life in Poland, noticed that this great and superficially strong country exhibited, nevertheless, many dangerous symptoms. They saw, for instance, that the boasted freedom of the szlachta, or nobility, which gave Poland the reputation of being one of the freest States in the world, rested on the entire deprivation of rights, and practical enslavement, of all the other classes of the population; that along with the unlimited freedom of the nobles, the burghesses were deprived of all participation in political life,

hampered in their economic development and shut within the walls of the towns. Parliamentarianism was flourishing in Poland, but beside it the executive was powerless to function. The right of the strongest practically prevailed, that is, the strongest among the nobles and great magnates. The royal power was rigidly limited and all decisions were made by the ruling powerful class of nobles. This class, moreover, was degenerating. The Polish nobles had lost their former chivalrous and fighting spirit; they were corrupted by wealth and had lost their former energy which could now be aroused only to fight for privileges against real or imaginary attacks by the royal power. The Jesuits dominated the field of education and spiritual life as a whole in their numerous schools bringing up the younger generations in the spirit of religious exclusiveness and intolerance. Despite the religious peace declared in 1632, new pressure was brought to bear on the Protestants and Orthodox, and fresh religious struggles were foreseen.

At this time the Polish throne was occupied by King Wladislaus IV, a son of Sigismund of the House of Vasa. He had a very attractive personality, was sincerely attached to his Polish inheritance and was a true Polish patriot, though he could not forget his lost Swedish crown. He was very humane and tolerant though extremely fond of military adventure and war in general. His youth had been spent in a series of military adventures in the Swedish and Muscovian wars. Wladislaus, warlike himself, liked the Cossacks, whom he appreciated for their daring and courage, known to him through his military experience.

This warlike king cherished plans for a campaign against the Turks in coalition with other Christian powers. In these plans he was especially supported by the Government of the Venetian Republic to whom opposition to the Turks was a necessity of existence. The Polish Chancellor, George Ossolinski, was on the King's side in this matter. Knowing that the Polish nobles had no desire for war and that the Seim would never vote financial

credits for an army, King Wladislaus decided to adopt a secret policy, and to provoke the Turks to start a war as if in defence, and face the Seim with a fait accompli. Among the King's confidants a plan was formed in 1646 to use the Cossacks for this purpose. They were to start a naval campaign and provoke the Turks to declare war. A Cossack delegation was invited to Warsaw in the spring of 1646. Among them was a Cossack officer, Bohdan Khmelnitsky, who was soon destined to play a very important part in the history of Eastern Europe. The Cossack delegation held secret meetings with King Wladislaus' confidential men, and Wladislaus himself received them secretly at night and gave them money, a flag and a charter authorizing an increase of the number of registered Cossacks to 12,000 and ordered them to prepare for a naval campaign. The Cossacks were to maintain the strictest secrecy regarding the transactions and plans.

At the same time, King Wladislaus began to raise an army of mercenaries at his own expense, and in the summer of 1646 this army, about 16,000 strong, was stationed near Lvov. But the whole enterprise was brought to naught through the opposition of the Seim. Some of the nobles, having discovered that Chancellor Ossolinski was in the King's confidence, pressed him and he betrayed the secret. The Seim assembled in the autumn of 1646 and demanded the immediate demobilization of the mercenary army. All the plans of Wladislaus were crushed. In the year 1647 he lost his only son, an infant, and this was the final tragedy. Completely broken and dissipated, he submitted to all the demands of the Seim. Thus the war with the Turks did not materialize.

This episode of Wladislaus' Turkish plans had also other consequences, in its effect on the Cossacks. Even before this, when opposing the Polish government of the szlachta, the Ukrainian Cossacks had insisted upon their loyalty to the person of the monarch to whom they had taken the oath of allegiance. Now their loyalty to King Wladislaus not only deepened but took on another character. The Cossacks began to consider him their ally

against the nobles. The Cossack officers guarded in great secrecy the charter and flag received from Wladislaus as if it were a pledge of the King's sympathy with them which seemed to give legal sanction to their aspirations. The conspiracy of King Wladislaus with the Cossacks instead of provoking a Turkish war hastened another Cossack uprising against the hated regime introduced into Ukraine by the Polish szlachta.

65. Causes of the Uprising.

The renewed discontent of the Cossacks, increasing in the midst of seeming peace and prosperity, had, besides all the other former deep social and economic causes, its roots in the recent settlement of 1638. The new Cossack officers nominated by the Polish government from the nobles instead of being elected, as was usual, from among the Cossacks themselves, were extremely unpopular. The garrison of the rebuilt fortress in Kodak, composed chiefly of German mercenaries, was hated for its exactions. In the Sich there was stationed a garrison of loyal Registered Cossacks. Not a single Cossack vessel could manoeuvre through into the sea. Those of the Cossacks who were not entered on the rolls had to become serfs if they did not manage to escape over the frontiers. The great landowners, mostly Poles and Roman Catholics, supported by the Polish administration, seized the lands, meadows, forests and other property belonging to the enslaved Cossacks, or exacted tithes and all kinds of tributes from them. These proceedings spread great dissatisfaction among the Cossacks.

The peasants in this part of Ukraine, though much better off than in other provinces, were especially sensitive even to the smallest encroachments on their personal freedom and private property. The Polish landowners had brought with them from Poland Jews, who acted as intermediaries and agents on the estates and were much despised and hated. These Jews rented flour mills, breweries, markets, inns, ferries, roads and bridges, etc., exacting heavy duties, and exhibiting great ingenuity in

inventing ever-new methods of squeezing fresh tolls and taxes out of the population. The Polish army stationed in the Ukraine after the recent uprisings of the Cossacks was also a source of endless grievance to the population. An undisciplined soldier is everywhere a scourge even to the population of his own native country, but much more exasperating and inciting to revolt is it when such a soldiery occupies a country where the people are unsympathetic and seething with discontent.

It was long considered by the old Ukrainian historians that religious persecution of the Orthodox Church was one of the chief causes of the Cossack risings. "The Cossacks", it was said, "rose to defend their Faith". This was not quite the case. At that time the Orthodox clergy in Ukraine appreciated very much the concessions, however small, which had been obtained at the accession of King Wladislaus and realized and secured by Peter Mohyla. For that reason they, and particularly those who ranked high in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, adopted an entirely loyal attitude towards the Polish government, and regarded with disapproval the restless spirit of the Cossacks. The lower Ukrainian clergy, however, being in close contact with the population and having experienced all the iniquities of the arbitrary rule of the Polish szlachta, were certainly in keen sympathy with the Cossack movement. The watchword, "For the Faith" was very popular and was cleverly used from the beginning of the uprising. A demand for further concessions to the Orthodox Church was included in the political programme of the Cossacks.

Dissatisfaction smouldering among the Cossacks, aggravated by the disappointments in the war schemes of the King, could easily be fanned into open rebellion, and every movement of the Cossacks was immediately echoed by the peasants, ever ready to support the Cossacks, whether their leaders wished it or not. That is what now took place.

66. Personality of Bohdan Khmelnitsky.

It only needed a daring and active leader to organize the rising, and such a leader was found in the person of Bohdan Khmelnitsky. He was the Cossack officer of Chihirin who was included in the Cossack delegation sent to King Wladislaus for the purpose of making secret preparations for the war against the Turks. Among the Cossacks he was well-known, having for some time acted as secretary to the Registered Cossack Headquarters, but generally in Poland he was almost unknown until he appeared as leader of the Cossack rising. Not much is known of his life up to that time. Zenobius Bohdan Khmelnitsky came from the lesser Ukrainian landed gentry, and is believed to have been born in 1595. His father, Michael Khmelnitsky, was deputy-starost of Chihirin and owned a property named Subotiv near that town. The future Cossack Hetman received his education in Jesuit Colleges in Lvov and Yaroslav in Galicia. Together with his father he took part in the disastrous campaign of Zolkievski against the Turks in 1620. Michael Khmelnitsky was killed in the battle of Zezora and Bohdan was taken prisoner. After having escaped from Turkey Bohdan Khmelnitsky served with the Registered Cossacks and in 1637 was their Headquarters Secretary, as already stated. Although he had taken part in the Cossack uprisings of 1637-38, his loyalty was probably not questioned, because soon after 1638 he was nominated to the military rank of Centurian (sotnyk) in Chihirin and remained at this post for ten years.

He was a wealthy, prosperous Cossack who very successfully administered his property of Subotiv. He was married to Hanna Somko, sister of the subsequent Hetman, Iakim (Joachim) Somko, and had several sons and daughters. At the time of the uprising he was a widower, and a certain unmarried noblewoman called Helena lived in his house. It appears that it was difficult to induce this elderly and settled colonel to embark on a career of adventure. But the state of lawlessness and anarchy main-

tained by the Polish szlachta provided an event which forced him into the ranks of the disaffected, caused him to risk his life and become leader of a rising. This was the consequence of a quarrel between Khmelnitsky and the new deputy-starosta of Chihirin, a Polish nobleman of the name of Chaplinski. During Khmelnitsky's absence, Chaplinski attacked his house in Subotiv, burned down the mill, carried away his harvest and beehives, flogged his young son to death and carried away Khmelnitsky's mistress, Helena. Violence of this sort was in itself not unusual at that time, when not only secular but clerical persons at the head of armed bands made inroads on their neighbors. But when Khmelnitsky sought justice against his aggressor he failed to obtain it even from the King in Warsaw. Chaplinski, meanwhile, took entire possession of Khmelnitki's property in Subotiv, on the ground that he had not at the proper time obtained the documents necessary to prove his title to ownership. Khmelnitsky's energetic attempts to defend his rights made him suspect in the eyes of the local authorities, until finally he had no choice other than to follow the alleged advice given him by King Wladislaus. According to legend, the King from whom Khmelnitsky had sought justice in Warsaw had told him: "You are a Cossack, you carry a sword at your side and can defend yourself". It cannot be proved whether King Wladislaus actually gave such advice or not, but Khmelnitsky acted as if he had. It is believed that already in Warsaw he had made plans for an uprising of the Cossacks. In any case he was already a suspect in the eyes of the local authorities, was arrested and imprisoned in the Castle of Cherkassy. The Cossack Colonel of Cherkassy, Krichevsky, to whose custody Khmelnitsky was entrusted, and who was godfather to his child, let him escape.

67. Preparation for the Uprising.

Khmelnitsky fled to the Zaporogian Sich accompanied by a group of his adherents. Arrived there at the beginning of 1648, he gathered about him those who were dis-

contented and called upon them to rise against the misrule of Polish szlachta. Reports allege that he alluded to King Wladislau's wish to see the Polish szlachta subdued with the help of the Cossacks. At the end of January, 1648, he was master of the Sich, the garrison of Cossacks stationed in the Sich having taken sides with him. Khmelnitsky sent emissaries to the Crimean Tatars asking them for help, which was promised. At a new election the Zaporogian Cossacks proclaimed him their Hetman. The news of Khmelnitsky's flight to the Zaporogian Cossacks alarmed the Polish authorities in Ukraine. The Polish army was stationed between Korsun and Cherkassy and commanded by Field-Marschals Potocki and Kalinovski. Informed of the preparations for a rising, their plan was to attack the Sich in the spring and quell the rising at the outset without giving it time to spread in Ukraine. Though the King was aware of Khmelnitsky's flight, he advised avoiding bloodshed, wishing to settle the difference in a peaceful manner. Potocki adhered to his plan of using armed force and opened the military offensive as soon as spring set in. He despatched one part of the Registered Cossacks and a detachment of German mercenaries down the Dnieper in boats, intending them to meet at Kodak a detachment proceeding by land and led by Potocki's son, Stefan. It was composed of the rest of the Registered Cossacks, numbering about 2,500 men, and 1,500 Polish soldiers. This was the vanguard, and they were to be followed by the main forces stationed in Korsun.

68. First Successes.

Stefan Potocki with his detachment took about a week to reach the rapids. They were approaching the Dnieper when, on the 29th of April, Khmelnitsky attacked him in the narrow valley of Zhovti Vodi (Yellow Waters). Potocki fortified his camp, and defended himself for a fortnight expecting the arrival of the main army, or at least the Registered Cossacks who were sailing down the river. But these, having annihilated the German lancers and killed those of their officers who were Poles, joined

Khmelnitsky. Hearing this, the Registered Cossacks who were in Stefan Potocki's camp, left him and went over to Khmelnitsky. Potocki attempted to retreat with his small detachment of Polish soldiers, but Khmelnitsky fell on him and utterly routed him. Young Potocki was wounded, taken prisoner and died of his wounds.

The main Polish army advanced as far as Chihirin, but hearing of the disaster at Zhovti Vodi began to retreat beyond Cherkassy towards Bila Tserkva. It was overtaken by Khmelnitsky near Korsun. Korsun was completely destroyed. Both Field-Marschals Potocki and Kalinovski were taken prisoner and surrendered to the Tatars. Just about the time of the battle of Korsun King Wladislaus died.

It is impossible to describe the panic that seized Poland when news of the disaster of Korsun and Zhovti Vodi was circulated. The death of the King coming at that precise moment, the loss of the army and of the two field-marschals were disasters enough, but more was in store for the Polish szlachta, in the effect which Khmelnitsky's initial success had on the Ukrainian population. The whole of the Province of Kiev rose as one man. The peasants burned down Polish houses, killed the landowners, their dependents and the Jews. The uprising spread also to the left bank of the Dnieper in Poltava.

According to the Polish constitution, after the king's death until the election of his successor, power was vested in the hands of the Polish Primate, the Archbishop of Gneisenau. On this occasion it remained practically in the hands of the Chancellor, Ossolinski, though according to the constitution he ought to have resigned. He continued to direct affairs of State, taking extraordinary measures for its defence. The Royal Guards were despatched into the field as a last resource, and important credits were voted by the nobles for a new army. Simultaneously diplomatic efforts were made on all sides. Extraordinary Ambassadors were sent out, to Turkey, asking them to keep back the Tatars, to Muscovy asking them to create a diversion against them, and an Ukrainian

noble, Adam Kissil, a popular defender of the Orthodox Church, was sent to Khmelnitsky with instructions to enter into negotiations with him and try to restrain him from further hostilities.

Khmelnitsky in the meantime arrived at Bila Tserkva and remained there without making any further military advance. He had already achieved considerably more than could have been expected. It is thought that a national rising of such dimensions and taking such a terrible form as the entire extermination of the Polish nobles and the Jews had not entered into his plans. On the other hand, the alliance with the Tatars brought its own difficulties and disadvantages. They invaded the whole of the province of Kiev, taking prisoner not only the Polish landowners but Ukrainians also. This created a very complicated situation for Khmelnitsky. We do not know from direct sources what were Khmelnitsky's plans on the eve of the rising, but it is known that rumors were spread in Poland at the time that the Cossacks intended having an independent State extending as far as Bila Tserkva, and that Khmelnitsky was going to take the title of "Prince of Rus" with Kiev as his capital. This information is valuable to historians as showing that the traditions of the Kievan Princedoms were never entirely lost.

In reality, however, it would seem that Khmelnitsky himself advanced far more modest claims at that time, at least in his official pronouncements. At the time of his first successes he was far from being an enemy of the Polish State; he did not wish its ruin and had no intention of isolating Ukraine. From Bila Tserkva he sent a mission to King Wladislaus ignoring or pretending to ignore his death, and giving his emissaries the following instructions: they were to demand that the rolls of the Registered Cossacks should be raised to 12,000, to claim the pay of the Cossacks for the past five years, demand justice for the Orthodox Church and the return of the churches and monasteries that had been seized from them. These instructions were accompanied by a per-

sonal letter from Khmelnitsky to King Wladislaus in which he complained of the selfish and arbitrary manner of conducting Polish administration and the behavior of the landowners. He described the Cossack uprising as an act of self-defence to which they had been forced by the prevailing misrule. He assured the King of his faithfulness and loyalty to his person, and alluded to their own common interest in combating the tyranny of the nobles.

In the meantime, Adam Kissil had entered into negotiations with the Cossack Hetman, and his intervention was so far successful that Khmelnitsky and the Cossack officers decided to accept the proffered truce, expecting results from their mission to Warsaw. The Tatars returned home to the Crimea taking with them about 20,000 prisoners, most of whom were Ukrainians. At the end of June, 1648, Khmelnitsky retired with his army towards Chihirin.

The Polish szlachta were overjoyed at the news of Khmelnitsky's peaceful attitude, and were able to proceed quietly with the election of a new king. The Seim received the Cossack delegation, promised them an amnesty if they broke off their alliance with the Tatars, returned the prisoners and pacified the peasants. They further promised that a special mission should be sent to them later in order to settle their demands. Thus the Cossack delegation were dismissed. On the other hand, the Seim voted for continuing the military preparations and sending a Commission under Adam Kissil to the Cossacks; for giving them a free hand to promise the enrolment of from ten to twelve thousand Cossacks, and satisfying as far as possible their special demands.

Unfortunately, the Polish and Cossack diplomatic game was hindered by the uncontrollable elemental character of the rising in Ukraine. While the negotiations were going on, the uprising took even more menacing forms, and spread over vaster areas. The peasants burned down the landowners' manors, plundered their possessions, killing them and their followers, agents, servants and

dependents. The Jews were particularly ill-treated. As has already been related, the Jews provoked the special hatred of the population on account of their petty, mean annoyances as collectors of all sorts of tolls and taxes, and as dishonest vendors of necessities at exorbitant prices. The Roman Catholic and Uniate clergy also fell victims to the popular wrath. The rebels gathered in bands, each with its own leader.

The uprising began by spreading in the province of Kiev. In the first months not a single Polish soldier, nor landowner, nor Roman Catholic priest, nor Jew, was left alive between Chihirin in the south to Chornopil on the extreme northern limit of the forest district in the north. From Kiev the uprising spread southwards to Podolia. By June, 1648, the towns of Nemiriv, Tulchin, Bratslav Krasne, Vinnitsa, were already in the hands of the rebels. Thousands of Jews perished as they sought shelter, fleeing from small villages and towns under the protection of the Polish administration. The Jew, Nathan Hannover, eye-witness and author of contemporary memoirs, has left heart-rending descriptions of what the Jews underwent in this tragic summer of 1648.

Almost simultaneously, an uprising broke out on the left bank of the Dnieper in the provinces of Poltava and Chernigov. By the end of June every place in these provinces was in the hands of rebels. Prince Jeremy Vishnevetsky was shut up with his army of many thousand Polish soldiers in his fortress Lubny, which remained as an island in the raging sea. He was forced to escape and fight his way through to Poland by a round-about route northwards through the provinces of Chernigov, and Sieversk and White Russia. By the end of the summer the entire provinces of Chernigov and Sieversk were swept clear of anything that could recall the Polish szlachta rule. The population themselves undertook the reorganization into regiments according to the Cossack system, and the newly formed regiments were placed at Khmelnitsky's disposal to swell his army.

Jeremy Vishnevetsky's army came down to Volynia,

where the uprising was just beginning to spread. To the cruel actions of the rebels he retaliated with worse cruelties by an organized and disciplined body, until several of the leaders of the rebels, among them the famous Kryvonis, a Scot by origin, united and formed a force sufficiently strong to drive him back into Poland. Vishnevetsky's intervention on his own responsibility and in disregard of the negotiations being held by the Polish government with Khmelnitsky and the Cossacks, forced Khmelnitsky to break off negotiations.

In July Khmelnitsky proceeded to mobilize anew, and recalled the Tatars. In his letter to the Polish government breaking off negotiations he gave as the motive the self-willed actions of Vishnevetsky which had provoked the indignation and exasperation of the Cossacks and of the whole Ukrainian people. Thus a new campaign began.

Strictly speaking, neither the Poles nor the Ukrainians had interrupted their military preparations during the parleys. It is believed that Khmelnitsky had lost no time during the two months that the truce lasted. He had before him the very important task of transforming his motley army composed of various revolutionary elements into a regular well-organized and disciplined body furnished with arms, munitions and food supplies. In this he proved himself to be a real organizing genius. He well knew that the Ukrainians could not expect satisfaction even of their most modest and legitimate demands from the Polish szlachta unless he had at his disposal a military force which if necessary he could throw into the balance to strengthen these demands. The campaign of the following autumn showed that Khmelnitsky had accomplished his task of military organization in a masterly manner.

The Polish government did not lose time either, but the Polish army was not yet ready when Khmelnitsky began to march through Volynia. It was not until September when all the Polish forces had united that the Polish leaders moved to meet the Ukrainian army. The

number of the Polish forces is only vaguely known to have been between forty and one hundred thousand, with one hundred guns. This army was followed by an immense transport. One contemporary Polish author remarked that the Polish nobles "set out to war as if they were going to a wedding, taking endless suits of their best clothes, magnificent tents, heaps of rich plate and masses of rich food supplies". Khmelnitsky had 70,000 of a regular army and several thousand lightly armed volunteers. The two armies met near the village of Pyliava on the frontier of the present province of Volynia and Podolia. After a few days of light skirmishing, Khmelnitsky attacked the Poles with his main force. At the same time, Kryvonis encircled the Polish camp and attacked from the rear. The Poles suffered great losses, especially of cavalry. During the night the rumor spread that the Tatars were coming to help the Cossacks. The Polish camp was seized with panic, and all fled. In the morning the Polish camp was found entirely abandoned, and fell into the hands of the Cossacks. In a few hours the brilliant, seemingly powerful army had ceased to exist and been transformed into disorderly bands of fugitives. The Cossacks seized 80 guns, and many thousands of transport wagons full of goods of every description. This spoil was estimated to be worth about 10 millions of zloty, at that time a colossal sum. The Tatars indeed appeared, three days later, and took part in the pursuit of the fugitives. The Royal Guards tried to defend the disorderly remnants of the army and stop the pursuit, but they were almost annihilated. The way into the heart of Poland was now open and undefended.

Khmelnitsky decided to transfer his campaign from Volynia into Galicia. At the first news of the Polish disaster at Pyliava, the population of Galicia was ready to join the Cossacks, not only the peasants who thought that the time of their bondage was at an end, but also the Ukrainian nobles and town population, who had been embittered by religious persecutions. In some places revolts of peasants took place similar to those in Ukraine.

The Polish administrators, landowners and their agents fell victims to armed rebels and were killed in masses. Khmelnitsky, however, did not take sufficient advantage of the sympathies of the Galician population, his campaign in Galicia having merely the character of a demonstration. Probably he was not himself yet clear as to his political plans.

Lvov was the first object of his operations, being a very important place, both politically and economically. Lying at the convergence of the principal trade routes, Lvov played an important part in the economic life of the contemporary Polish State and was very wealthy. The population of Lvov was now very mixed, comprised of Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, Armenians, Germans and others. At the end of the Sixteenth century Lvov, with its wealthy and patriotic Ukrainian schools and printing presses, played a very important part in Ukrainian cultural life, and was indeed its centre. But with most of the Ukrainian nobles having gone over to the Roman Catholic Church and also, imperceptibly, to Polish culture, and with the spread and strengthening of the Uniate movement, the importance and influence of the Ukrainian Orthodox burgesses in Lvov had weakened considerably. Economically also, they were much reduced, though still holding an important place in Lvovan trade. The Polish government well understood the importance of Lvov and the danger of losing it. Already by the summer of 1648 Lvov had been partly fortified. After the defeat at Pyliava, the Polish generals, and among them Jeremy Vishnevetsky fled to Lvov and began to gather forces for its defence. On hearing of the approach of the Ukrainian army they abandoned Lvov to its own resources in order to organize the defence of the capital. The Cossacks very soon appeared, followed by the Tatars, and laid siege to the town for about six weeks. Khmelnitsky was not at all eager to take Lvov and deliver it over to his savage allies to be plundered and ruined, its population being more than half Ukrainian. He declared himself satisfied with a contribution of 200,000 zloty in gold, and the value

of half a million zloty in cloth and other goods. He dismissed part of the Tatars, and in October, 1648, started his march northwards in the direction of Warsaw. He halted, however, in Zamostia, accepted an indemnity and entered into negotiation. He had evidently decided to put an end to the war, and centred his attention on the election of the new King, supporting the candidature of one of the brothers of the late King Wladislaus, John Casimir. Poland lay defenceless before him, but he evidently had no intention of pursuing hostilities or severing the political bonds uniting Ukraine and Poland. He seems only to have wished to strengthen the position of the Cossacks by taking the fullest advantage of their military success. It is difficult to say why Khmelnitsky supported the candidature of Prince John Casimir, who was not intelligent, rather than that of his brother Prince Charles. Also he refused to support George Rakoczy, Prince of Transylvania, who approached him in the matter. Stationed with his army in Zamostia, he insisted on supporting John Casimir who was duly elected King. Khmelnitsky then laid before the new King the conditions on which he was prepared to make peace, namely territorial autonomy for the Cossacks, free access to the Black Sea, dependence of their Hetman on the King alone, amnesty for all who had taken part in the rising, and abolition of the Church Union. The King promised to do his best to satisfy the demands of the Cossacks, and promised to send a special mission to settle their affairs on the spot. In return the King asked Khmelnitsky to cease hostilities and return with his army to the Ukraine. Khmelnitsky agreed and began to retreat.

Past historians have been interested in the question as to why at the zenith of his success, Khmelnitsky ceased his advance, and limited himself to such modest demands, leaving all decisions in the hands of the King. No answer to this question has been found other than that Khmelnitsky had not at that time any intention of severing the political bond between the Ukraine and Poland. To this, however, should be added the difficulties of a winter

campaign, especially on Polish territory where the population was certainly hostile to the Cossacks. The true solution probably lies in a combination of these two motives.

This policy was soon radically changed when Khmelnitsky made his solemn entrance into Kiev on Christmas Eve, and was welcomed by the entire population as a "new Moses", the liberator of Ukraine "from Polish Egyptian bondage", as he was termed in the welcoming speeches of the Orthodox Kievan clergy. He was met at the entrance to the Cathedral of Saint Sophia by the Metropolitan Silvester Kossiv surrounded by all his clergy. Students of the Academy welcomed him in songs and panegyrics. The brilliance of the welcome was enhanced by the presence in Kiev of the Patriarch of Constantinople, who took part in the solemn reception of the Cossack Hetman. Khmelnitsky also found foreign ambassadors waiting for him in Kiev, of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, and also emissaries from the Sultan of Turkey. The Ukraine had now become an international factor, and her neighbors were attempting to draw her into their various political combinations. A letter from Oliver Cromwell of this date has been preserved in which the Protector writes to the Hetman congratulating him upon his victories over the "Papists", and calling him "Protector of Christianity against the Papists".

Khmelnitsky's intercourse during this stay in Kiev with members of the Orthodox clergy as well as the most enlightened Ukrainian representatives of the time had a very important influence on his statesmanship and radically changed his political plans. The best educated of the Ukrainian patriots led him to take a wider view of his historic task, representing to him that he was no longer merely a leader of rebel Cossacks, making the most of his military successes in the narrow interests of the Cossacks as a class, but head of the whole Ukrainian nation with wider duties and more lofty political ideals. They made it clear to him that he must now care for the whole Ukrainian population, and secure to them religious

freedom and national independence. Paisia, Patriarch of Constantinople, who brought diplomatic letters from the Prince of Moldavia, advised Khmelnitsky to take advantage of his military success and power in the interests of all the Orthodox nations in Eastern Europe, and outlined to him a scheme for an alliance of the Orthodox powers, such as Muscovy, Ukraine, Moldavia, and Wallachia, which could then intervene against the Sultan and protect other Christian peoples under Turkish domination.

All that Khmelnitsky gleaned from the confidential conversations with the Patriarch of Constantinople, the Ukrainian clergy and patriots of culture and learning, was confirmed by the menacing attitude of the Ukrainian population towards the now abolished regime introduced by the Polish szlachta. Khmelnitsky had promised the King that the peasants who had taken part in the uprising would return to their landlords, and on this understanding had secured an amnesty for them. But the peasants themselves were of a different opinion. They had no intention whatever of returning to their former bondage, considering that by joining the Cossack uprising they had secured freedom for themselves and would again become independent as before. They lacked confidence in the amnesty promised by the Polish nobles, being assured that the landlords were merely awaiting their opportunity to avenge themselves for their losses. Khmelnitsky very soon came to understand that the peace he desired could only be a short truce, as neither Poles nor Ukrainians would remain satisfied with the status quo, and to compromise was almost impossible. The Polish government was not even satisfied with the conditions Khmelnitsky had made in Zamostia, nor were the Ukrainians to be persuaded voluntarily to return to the position they held before the uprising of 1648. Thus war was inevitable, and from Khmelnitsky's efforts during this period we see that he sought diplomatic alliances for the Ukraine in the event of war breaking out anew.

First he tried to disrupt the "eternal peace of Polianov" of 1634, by which Muscovy was bound to Poland.

He sent the Patriarch Paisia to the Tsar of Muscovy accompanied by his own ambassador. In his instructions he encouraged the Muscovian Tsar to occupy the Province of Chernigov-Sieversk which had been surrendered to Poland by the Treaty of Polianov. Further he asked the Tsar to allow the Don Cossacks to help the Ukrainians against Poland. With Rakoczy, Prince of Transylvania, Khmelnitsky made an alliance to co-operate in military action against Poland to the effect that if the Ukrainians attacked Poland from the East, Rakoczy would occupy Galicia and Cracow. At the same time, Khmelnitsky entered into negotiations with Prince Radziwill, the great Lithuanian magnate, leader of the Lithuanian Protestants and hereditary field marshal of the Lithuanian army. We can thus see no trace of the peaceful disposition Khmelnitsky showed in Zamostia.

It was in these changed circumstances that the Polish Royal Commission arrived in the Ukraine in February, 1649. Most of its members had been chosen from nobles of Ukrainian origin, and at its head was Adam Kissil, who while remaining Orthodox, had the definite reputation of being one of the Ukrainian nobles who wished to remain loyal to the Polish crown.

At their first meeting, Kissil could observe the radical change in the attitude and plans of the Cossack Hetman. Khmelnitsky refused to open negotiations on the old basis, and made clear his intention of proclaiming the independence of the Ukraine and entirely freeing Ukrainians from Polish domination. All Kissil's efforts to come to an understanding on the basis of Khmelnitsky's declaration in Zamostia were without avail. His only achievement was a line of demarcation between the Polish and Ukrainian armies and a truce until the beginning of summer.

69. Campaign of 1649 and Treaty of Zboriv.

Both sides were preparing for a new campaign. In May, King John Casimir gave the order for a general mobilization of the Polish szlachta and the regular troops. Mobilization on the Ukrainian side took place amidst

unprecedented enthusiasm. From all sides came men of different classes, peasants, burgesses, students, and their enthusiasm spread among the remnant of the Ukrainian Orthodox nobles who also came to join the Cossack army. Khmelnitsky again secured the help of the Tatars, who this time were led by the Crimean Khan, Islam Giray himself. The Polish forces were grouped in three armies, one under Jeremy Vishnevetsky massed on the Galician Volynian frontier; the second, under the King himself and composed chiefly of the mobilized szlachta, was on its way to join the first army; the third comprising Lithuanians, was to enter the Ukraine from the north.

At the beginning of July, 1649, Khmelnitsky quickly marched towards the Galician frontier and besieged the first Polish army in its fortified camp at Zbaraz. Having left part of his forces there, he started with his main force and the Tatars to intercept the King's army in order not to allow the two Polish armies to meet. A special Ukrainian army with Colonel Krichevsky in command was sent to protect the Ukrainian frontier from the north. Krichevsky met the Lithuanian army in battle near Loyev on the Dnieper on the frontier of Ukraine and White Russia. This battle was lost by the Ukrainians, Krichevsky being slain. The Lithuanian army, however, suffered heavy losses and was forced to retreat and remain passive until the end of the campaign. Thus at the cost of his life Krichevsky and his Cossacks protected the Ukraine from the north.

In the middle of August Khmelnitsky approached the second Polish army near Zboriv and surrounded it. By a sudden movement he surprised part of it crossing the river Stripa, cut it off from the main force and dispersed it. The battle which began the following day turned to the great disadvantage of the Poles, the King and the remainder of the army were in danger of being completely surrounded. But at the most critical moment for the Poles, Chancellor Ossolinsky, who was with the King, succeeded in entering into communication with the Khan, Islam Giray, and having persuaded him with rich gifts

he promised to make peace. It was not to the Khan's interest to have one of the hostile sides completely overpowered, and this explains the readiness with which he allowed himself to be persuaded to betray his allies. Afraid that the Tatars would turn against him, Khmelnitsky was compelled to interrupt the battle, and enter into negotiations also. It was on the battlefield that the Treaty known in history as the Treaty of Zboriv was concluded. Under pressure from the Khan, Khmelnitsky was forced to modify considerably his conditions of peace.

The Treaty of Zboriv of 18th August, 1649, did not correspond with the actual success of the Cossack arms, nor did it satisfy the expectations of the Ukrainian population which had enlisted with such enthusiasm. The following were the chief points of the Treaty of Zboriv. The number of Registered Cossacks was to be raised to 40,000, who were to hold the territory comprising the provinces, Kiev, Chernigov and Bratslav, under the command of their Hetman, and no Polish army was to be stationed there. The Polish administrators of these territories were to be nominated only from among the Orthodox Ukrainian nobles. Jews and Jesuits were to be excluded. The Metropolitan of Kiev was to have a seat in the Polish Senate in Warsaw. A general amnesty as well as a special amnesty for those Ukrainian nobles who had joined the Cossack army was to be proclaimed. All these conditions were to be ratified by the next Seim.

Analyzing these peace terms we must conclude that within the Polish States there was created an autonomous Ukrainian territory within the bounds of the present provinces of Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava, part of Volynia and Podolia. This territory was governed by the Cossack Hetman at the head of the Cossack army. Within the frontiers of this territory, the Orthodox Church enjoyed the same rights as the official Roman Catholic Church. As for the rest, the old social structure was to remain, and the whole mass of the population with the exception of the 40,000 Registered Cossacks was to return to a condition of serfdom and work for the landlords. Royal admin-

istration was restored as before, and the landowners returned to their estates. This state of affairs threatened such an outburst of popular indignation that the Hetman was obliged to keep secret the conditions of peace, and to ask the Polish side in their own interests to delay the restoration of the old regime as long as possible. Nevertheless the disappointment and discontent with Khmelnitsky was becoming great, and the Tatars added to it, when on returning home they could not refrain from plundering and taking prisoners among the Ukrainian population.

It is quite clear that this situation could not satisfy the leaders of Ukrainian policy with Hetman Khmelnitsky at their head, and it is not surprising that he considered the Treaty of Zboriv to be provisional only, and was actually building up a new State organization on the territory of the Cossack Ukraine without troubling himself about the formal conditions of the Treaty of Zboriv. He acted as if he were the monarch of a Sovereign State and entered into wide international diplomatic relations in order to strengthen his position.

From his capital, Chihirin, he conducted diplomatic relations with Muscovy, Turkey, Transylvania, and at the same time completed the organization of the Cossack territory. The country was divided into separate districts. The regiments were divided into hundreds (sotni) in which the sotnyk (centurian) performed analogous functions in his district as the colonel in his. There were at first sixteen regiments, nine on the right bank of the Dnieper and seven on the left.

Later their number was increased. All staff officers, secretary, head of military transport, as well as the officers of the regiments and of the hundreds had military rank, and at the same time carried out administrative and judicial functions. The country became a military State and its name of Zaporogian Army ("Viysko Zaporozke") was for a long time the official name of the Ukrainian Cossack State.

CHAPTER XV

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(70) The Campaign of Berestechko. (71) The Treaty of Bila Tserkva. (72) Khmelnitsky's Moldavian Policy. (73) New War Against Poland. (74) Alliance with Muscovy, 1654. (75) Ukrainian-Muscovian War Against Poland, 1654-1656. (76) Khmelnitsky's Political Plans. (77) Alliances with Sweden and Transylvania. (78) Khmelnitsky's Death.

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70. The Campaign of Berestechko.

Khmelnitsky sent his delegates to Warsaw with instructions to obtain from the Seim ratification of the Treaty of Zboriv. The Metropolitan of Kiev, Silvester Kossiv, also went to Warsaw, as under the Treaty he was entitled to sit in the Senate. The Seim ratified the Treaty in very general terms. The section dealing with the abolition of Church Union provoked decided opposition from the Roman Catholic clergy. In order not to arouse further conflict, on the advice of Adam Kissil, Silvester Kossiv agreed to forego his right to a seat in the Senate, and the religious question was postponed until the next Seim. King John Casimir issued a solemn proclamation "to the whole Ukrainian nation" in which he said that "the union in one State of the three honored nations", Poles, Lithuanians and Ukrainians, was to their mutual advantage, and that the Greek religion of the Ukrainian people must be safeguarded by the confirmation and widening of King Wladislaus's Act regarding the equality of the rights of the Orthodox and Uniates in the Ukraine. The Orthodox's rights to the Bishoprics of Lutsk, Kholm, Peremysl and Vitebsk were confirmed and a number of monasteries and churches were to be returned. The Orthodox Rites might be freely celebrated throughout Poland and Lithuania and the Orthodox Church was to have the right to found and maintain religious brotherhoods, schools and printing presses. Ukrainian Orthodox burgesses were to be admitted to municipal offices and dignities, while the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy were to enjoy all the privileges

due to their ecclesiastical rank. Thus the Treaty of Zboriv while giving satisfaction to the Cossacks and clergy, completely ignored the peasants and continued the same social order that existed previous to the uprising. The interests of the peasants who had taken such an active part in the war, were entirely overlooked and neglected during the political parleys and negotiations. Their disappointment and discontent were profound. Though most of the landlords were careful enough in returning to their estates to try to start friendly relations with the peasants, some at once set themselves to discover leaders and participants in the rebellion and punish them severely. In consequence, fresh peasant uprisings broke out in different places, and Khmelnitsky was obliged to put them down.

Generally speaking, the Treaty of Zboriv did not make for solid and durable relations. Khmelnitsky was aware that a new conflict would arise sooner or later, and tried to secure his position through diplomatic alliances and different political combinations. His position was a very difficult one. On the one side Ukrainian domestic affairs gave him much trouble, peasant revolts breaking out now and then, in different places, the general unsettlement and dissatisfaction among them causing constant conflicts with the Cossacks and the Polish administration. Also certain differences of view existed among the Cossacks themselves. Abroad, the political situation constantly introduced complications and dangers. The Tatars insisted on drawing Khmelnitsky into a war with Muscovy entirely contrary to his intentions, as he wished to maintain good relations with the Muscovite Tsar, relying on his help in case of a new war with Poland. In the meantime the old plans of King Wladislaus IV for a war against Turkey were again revived in official Polish circles, and there were schemes to set the Cossacks against the Turks and thus break up their alliance. Just then the Venetian government which was at war with the Turks wished to draw the Cossacks into a coalition. An envoy from Venice arrived in the summer of 1650 at Chihirin

with proposals to Khmelnitsky for a united naval campaign against Constantinople. Khmelnitsky very cleverly made his participation in the campaign dependent on the Polish King and on the attitude of the Khan of Crimea. It was rumored that the latter wished to free himself from dependency on the Ottoman Porte.

The Crimean Khan insisted on Khmelnitsky joining in a war against Muscovy, and threatened to break up his friendship. In order to avoid this undesirable war and to deflect the attention of the Tatars elsewhere, as their only aim was plunder, Khmelnitsky proposed a war against the Moldavian Prince Basil Lupul, with whom he was angry because of Lupul's unfriendly attitude towards the Ukraine in the war of 1649. Lupul was defeated, his capital Yassy taken and burnt to the ground. He was compelled to make an alliance with Khmelnitsky and to strengthen it by giving his daughter Rosanda in marriage to Khmelnitsky's eldest son, Timothy. Rosanda's sister was married to Prince Radziwill, actual ruler of Lithuania, and Khmelnitsky hoped through this matrimonial alliance to obtain influence with Radziwill and detach him from Poland, or at least secure his neutrality in case of a new war with Poland.

The reason for the evasive answer given by Khmelnitsky to the Venetian ambassador was Khmelnitsky's desire to maintain Turkish neutrality, if he could not secure their direct help. He opened diplomatic relations with the Porte as early as 1649. In the spring of 1651, Sultan Mahomet IV sent a brilliant mission to Chihirin with rich gifts and promises of help and protection to Khmelnitsky, "glory of the princes of all Christian nations", and wished to have a Cossack ambassador constantly resident at his court.

At the time when Khmelnitsky, anticipating a new war with Poland, was developing intense diplomatic activity in order to secure for the Ukraine allies and friends among the neighboring states, the Polish government was also engaged in negotiations of a similar kind, and with the same purpose of strengthening itself in the

anticipated war. In the summer of 1650 they renewed the old treaty with Muscovy, and made an unsuccessful attempt to break up the Cossack alliance with the Tatars. In the extraordinary Seim of 1650 it was voted to triple the regular Polish army, and to give the king full power to mobilize the whole szlachta. War credits and heavy extraordinary taxes were voted to raise the necessary money. Negotiations were carried on for some time between the two hostile sides, but war actually began in the summer of 1651.

In this war the Poles as well as the Ukrainians wished to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy in order to terminate a situation intolerable to both sides, and making a supreme effort, they endeavored to designate the campaign a holy war for the faith. A special Papal Legate arrived in Poland bringing a benediction for the Polish King, and the Ukrainian Hetman in his turn received a blessing from the Greek Metropolitan, Joseph of Corinth, who also brought Khmelnitsky a sword blessed at the Sepulchre in Jerusalem. The Orthodox East saw in Khmelnitsky the champion of the Orthodox Faith. Not relying on his own forces, Khmelnitsky sent a mission to the Sultan asking him to order the Crimean Khan to come to the help of the Cossacks. The Khan was at this time not inclined to fight. Compelled to take part in the campaign, he came bringing his hordes, but without much enthusiasm.

The decisive battle, like those of other campaigns, was fought on the Volynian-Galician frontier. In the middle of August 1651 the Cossack army led by the Hetman supported by the Tatars met the Polish army led by King John Casimir near a town Berestechko, on the river Styr. Both sides were in command of considerable forces. The Poles numbered over 80,000, among them 20,000 Germans, partly mercenaries, partly lent by the Elector of Brandenburg, and about as many armed servants. The Cossacks were about 100,000 strong, including armed peasant volunteers and 30,000 Tatars. The Polish army had very strong German artillery. The Battle of Berest-

echko took place on 28th-30th June and was a victory for the Poles. Many accounts of the battle have been preserved on both sides but they are so contradictory and contain so many exaggerations and legends that it is difficult to re-trace the actual succession of events and create a true picture of this three days' battle. Till recently, the opinion has prevailed that the Khan of the Crimea once again betrayed the Cossacks as he did in the Battle of Zboriv, and not only fled, leaving exposed the left wing of the Cossack front, but also carried with him the Hetman, who was with the Khan trying to persuade him to stand fast. Modern investigations, however, show that the reason of the Polish victory was the superiority of the German artillery and the presence of 20,000 German infantry, and above all the superiority of the Polish strategy planned by German generals. It is true that the Tatars did not withstand the deadly bombardment of their positions, but were seized with panic and began to retreat leaving exposed the left wing of the Cossack position, but the Cossacks succeeded in closing their ranks about their camp, and for ten days successfully resisted attacks and siege. Khmelnitsky himself was not present. He was recruiting new forces, and trying to organize the defences of the country. The camp was left under the command of Ivan Bohun. On the night of the 10th of July, Bohun began secretly to evacuate his army from the camp, and had succeeded in withdrawing a considerable part of the artillery and cavalry, when the alarm was given to the enemy, who immediately attacked. This caused a panic, and about 30,000 men, mostly transport men and peasant volunteers, perished in the marshy river, Pliasheva, which protected the Cossack position, including the Metropolitan, Joseph of Corinth, who very courageously tried to stem the panic and stop the fugitives. The enemy seized the field office of the Hetman with many diplomatic documents, 28 guns and many arms. The main Ukrainian army, however, succeeded in retreating in good order towards Kiev. The Polish army also suffered losses, and much weakened by epidemics and

lack of food, was not able to pursue the defeated and retreating enemy.

During the campaign of Berestechko, the Ukraine was invaded from the north by the Lithuanian army led by Radziwill. He defeated the small Cossack detachments which defended the frontier, occupied Chernigov and approached Kiev. Colonel Zhdanovich, who was entrusted with the defence of the ancient capital, left the city without giving battle in order to avoid its destruction, and the Lithuanians occupied Kiev. Then the burgesses of the city proposed that the Cossacks should burn down the suburbs, especially the Podol, (lower part of the town) outside the walls, sacrificing their homes in order to force the enemy to abandon Kiev. The Lithuanians, indeed, found it undesirable to remain in a partly ruined city and withdrew. The Lithuanian army then joined at Vassilkov, south of Kiev, the Polish forces which came down from Berestechko.

At this critical moment, Khmelnitsky showed extraordinary energy and presence of mind. In a short time he had made good the losses in the Cossack regiments, mobilized new forces, and by the end of September had mustered a new and powerful army at Bila Tserkva against the united Polish and Lithuanian forces. The Ukrainian people gave him every possible help, the peasants burning their villages and destroying victuals and forage. Every village put up a fight and offered stern resistance, the people being ready to die rather than submit to the enemy. This rendered the campaign very difficult for the Poles, autumn was advancing and with it the bad weather. The forces of Khmelnitsky were daily increasing and from all parts came fresh detachments to swell the army. The Polish commander, Potocki, decided to open negotiations for peace, and Adam Kissel was again sent to the Hetman.

71. The Treaty of Bila Tserkva.

On the 28th September, 1651, the hostile armies concluded a treaty known in history as the Treaty of Bila

Tserkva. It was a reduced edition of the Zboriv Treaty: the rolls of the Registered Cossacks were brought down to 20,000, the Cossack territory was limited to the province of Kiev; Bratslav and Chernigov were returned to Polish administration and were to be evacuated by the Cossacks. Khmel'nitsky had to promise to break off his alliance with the Tatars and abstain from diplomatic international relations. The rights of the Orthodox Church were confirmed and an amnesty was granted to all the participants in the rising.

The Treaty of Bila Tserkva was of a still more provisional character than the Treaty of Zboriv, but both sides were so exhausted that they needed some compromise even if it were only a short pause. The Treaty was to be ratified by the next Seim.

The Treaty of Bila Tserkva had, however, very severe immediate consequences for the Ukraine: the Polish army occupied the left bank of the Dnieper, and the Lithuanians occupied the province of Sieversk. The landowners felt encouraged to return to their estates and restore the former conditions. In some places the peasants tried to break out in fresh revolts, but Khmel'nitsky himself was compelled to put them down. The population brought to extreme exasperation sought a solution in emigration. Thousands left their homesteads and fled with their families and a few movables eastwards beyond the Muscovian frontier, where before them the fugitives after the Austrian defeat of 1638 had found refuge. This was a vast uninhabited area which formed a continuation of the fertile plain of the Ukraine, the present provinces of Kharkov and Voronezh. The Muscovian Government readily gave them permission to settle on these empty spaces and only stipulated that they would protect the country against the Tatars. The fugitives took with them the Cossack organization by regiments. Thus was populated the so-called Slobidska Ukraine, from the word "sloboda" (free settlement) as the fugitives called their new settlements.

The Seim had no opportunity of ratifying the Treaty

of Bila Tserkva. For the first time its session was terminated by the veto of a Lithuanian nobleman on the decisions of the Seim, thus making a precedent which started the pernicious practice of breaking up the sessions of the Seim by the veto of a single member, a practice which proved to be fatal to Poland.

72. Khmelnitsky's Moldavian Policy.

Khmelnitsky's hands were thus freed, and he acted as if he were not bound by a treaty at all. He continued his diplomatic relations with Muscovy, Turkey and the Crimea, and in the summer of 1652 sent his son Timothy with an army into Moldavia in order to wed the Princess Rosanda, whose father, Basil Lupul, had postponed the marriage. The Polish Field-marshal, Kalinovski, who was himself one of the suitors for the hand of the beautiful princess, tried to bar his way with 20,000 Polish soldiers near the village Batoh in Podolia. Khmelnitsky came to his son's help and in the battle of 2nd July, 1652, defeated and dispersed the Polish army. Kalinovski was killed. Khmelnitsky took 57 guns and a great number of prisoners.

73. New War Against Poland.

The defeat at Batoh caused great tension between the two sides. The situation was indeed far from clear since there was neither peace nor war. Negotiations were started and broken up again. Lupul tried to mediate but also failed. Intermittent desperate fighting interrupted the negotiations. In the Ukraine the situation became even more complicated when, at the news of the defeat of the Polish Field-marshal at Batoh, the peasants again rose and the Polish detachments stationed on the left bank of the Dnieper left when they felt they were not strong enough to resist. The situation became still more intricate when Khmelnitsky, having married his son to Lupul's daughter, was involved in far-reaching plans of acquiring the principality of Wallachia or even Transylvania for Lupul, whereas Timothy Khmelnitsky

was to get the throne of Moldavia. These plans brought about a coalition of the princes of Wallachia and Transylvania against Lupul, which was supported by the Poles. Timothy started out at the head of 9,000 Cossacks to help Lupul, but was besieged in the town of Suchava in Bukovina by the allied Rumanians, Magyars and Poles. During the siege Timothy was mortally wounded and soon died. His Cossacks held out for a month, but surrendered at last on condition that they were allowed to return freely to the Ukraine with their arms and the body of their leader.

In consequence of the failure of the Balkan plans and the exhaustion of the country, Khmelnitsky was compelled to seek a closer alliance with Muscovy, and in the summer of 1653 the Muscovian Tsar considered taking the Ukraine under his protection. In the meantime, King John Casimir started a campaign against the Ukraine in August, 1653. Khmelnitsky gave the order for the mobilization of the Cossacks, but it was not received with any enthusiasm, many of the Cossacks having emigrated to Slobidska Ukraine. The Khan of the Crimea came to Khmelnitsky's help at the end of September. Then the Polish King, who had advanced into Podolia as far as Bar, began to retreat. Khmelnitsky besieged him in Zhvanets on the Dniester a little to the south of Kamenets. There were no important battles, the Polish army suffered much from cold, lack of provisions and sickness. They were threatened with starvation and ready to capitulate when, as once before in Zboriv, the Khan stepped in, and compelled Khmelnitsky to make peace on the basis of the Treaty of Zboriv, securing for himself a large contribution from the King. The Treaty of Zhvanets was concluded on Dec. 15th, 1653.

74. Alliance with Muscovy, 1654.

This time Khmelnitsky gave even less thought to the treaty he had concluded. He had other political plans in view, and was about to realize them, namely an alliance with Muscovy and a protectorate of the Tsar over the Ukraine to enable, it was said at the time, the Ukraine to

free herself entirely from Poland. Khmelnitsky hastened to conclude the negotiations at Zhvanets so as to free his hands, as he was expecting the arrival of the ambassadors of the Tsar.

As has already been stated, Khmelnitsky in the first years of his activities had no intention of breaking the political bond with Poland, although he dealt her heavy blows and inflicted severe wounds. He wished merely to compel the Polish Government and szlachta to make the utmost concessions to the Cossacks as the leading section of the Ukrainian nation, and aimed at Cossack autonomy within the Polish Kingdom. He was, however, compelled by events to see that his achievements far out-reached the limits of Cossack autonomy and that the aspirations of the whole Ukraine were directed towards a complete breach with Poland, and that a compromise was quite impossible. So Khmelnitsky was compelled to break with Poland and construct an independent Ukrainian State.

It seemed, however, to Khmelnitsky and his followers that separation from Poland and the erection of an independent state could not be achieved without some help from outside. The help given by the Turkish Sultan in the form of military aid rendered by the Tatars proved to be of doubtful utility. The Tatars were unreliable allies, they had several times betrayed the interest of Ukrainians as well as ruining the land and taking the inhabitants prisoners.

75. Ukrainian-Muscovian War Against Poland. 1654-1656.

There remained the hope of the Muscovite Tsar, who had his own account to settle with Poland. We have seen that since 1649 Khmelnitsky was in constant touch with the Muscovites, persuading them to go to war against Poland. Khmelnitsky appealed to the religious feelings of the Tsar, as the protector of the Orthodox Church, tempting him with the certain advantages to be gained from this war, the recovery of the provinces of Smolensk

and Sieversk taken by the Poles not so long ago. The Muscovite Tsar, indeed, greatly wished to take revenge on Poland for recent losses, but feared to involve himself in war. Home affairs in Muscovy were far from prosperous and external relations with their neighbors, such as the Swedes, Turks and Tatars, very unsettled. So the Muscovite Government in its relations with Khmelnitsky maintained a watching policy, waiting until both sides should exhaust their forces in this fierce strife. As the successes of the Cossack arms dealt Poland new blows and exhausted her means of defence, the Muscovite policy towards that country became ever more and more aggressive. The tone of the Muscovite diplomatic notes stiffened as their government claimed from Poland satisfaction for different imaginary wrongs caused by the Polish government to the Muscovian Tsar. When in 1653, Khmelitsky made a definite proposal to Muscovy for a closer alliance against Poland, having in view the complete separation of the Ukraine, and offering to put himself and his country under the protection of the Tsar, the latter was moved to decisive action. He summoned the Zemski Sobor (convention of officials) in 1653 to examine the Ukrainian proposal and a final decision was taken in October. Considering the dishonor done to the person and name of the Tsar by the Poles and the persecutions of the Orthodox Church, as well as the danger of Khmelnitsky seeking the help of the Sultan, the Zemski Sobor decided to ask the Tsar to take the Ukraine under his high protection out of pity for the Orthodox Faith and the Holy Churches of God. In consequence of this decision a special mission, led by Buturlin, was sent to the Ukrainian Hetman. He arrived in Pereyaslav at the end of 1653 to meet the Hetman.

A few days later, Khmelnitsky arrived from Zhvanets. After a private meeting with Buturlin, the Hetman held a council with the officers of the Cossack headquarters and the heads of the regiments, at which it was decided to accept the protection of the Tsar. On the same day, 18th January, 1654, the public ceremony took place.

First, the Hetman addressed the people assembled in the Market Place inviting them to accept the protection of the Tsar, which invitation they received with acclamations. Then Buturlin handed to the Hetman the charter of the Tsar, and they all went into the Cathedral where the solemn oath was to be taken. The Hetman, naturally, expected the oath to be taken by both sides, first that Buturlin should swear in the name of the Tsar that he would protect the Ukraine from the Poles, and respect the privileges and rights of the Cossacks, Ukrainian Nobles, Burgesses, and all classes of the population. Buturlin refused to take oath, maintaining that according to the Muscovite despotic regime, it was beneath the dignity of the Tsar to take an oath, his word being sufficient. Long negotiations ensued, but Buturlin was not to be persuaded. Finally, the Ukrainians decided that the Tsar's word should be accepted in place of his oath, and the Hetman and Cossack officers swore "that they with their lands and towns were under the protection of the great Tsar forever". Buturlin then handed to the Hetman presents from the Tsar.

The Hetman and Cossacks endeavored to obtain from Buturlin at least a written declaration that the Ukrainian rights and privileges would remain unchanged. Buturlin refused to give this, as he had refused to take oath. Therefore, no written treaty was made in Pereyaslav, and the exact relationship between the Ukrainians and the Muscovy was left undefined. Buturlin left the Hetman on January 26th and went to Kiev. The negotiations had been carried out in a dry cold manner without any manifestation of joy or satisfaction, the conduct of the Tsar's ambassador having cooled any enthusiasm there might have been.

Buturlin took the oath to Kiev. Here he met with some difficulties. The burgesses took the oath without demur, but the Metropolitan, clergy and nobles at first refused. At last, after many evasions, and persuaded by the example of the Hetman and Cossack officers, they swore, but as an eyewitness describing the scene says:

“for tears they could not see God’s daylight”. Buturlin administered the oath in Chernigov and Nizhin and returned to Moscow. In the smaller towns the Muscovian agents took similar action. In several places opposition was shown as for instance, when the regiments of Poltava and Kropivna beat the Muscovite officials with cudgels; some regiments, such as Uman and Braslav refused altogether, as did some of the higher Cossack officers, for example Ivan Bohun and Ivan Sirko, among others.

After Buturlin’s departure, the Hetman and Cossack officers set themselves to work out the condition of the Treaty. After two special meetings in Korsun and in Chihirin a draft was made and taken to the Tsar by two Cossack officers, Samuel Zarudny the supreme judge of the Cossack court, and Pavlo Teteria, Colonel of the Pereyaslav regiment. The draft was drawn up somewhat unsystematically. Historians explain this by the fact that it had been altered several times as the interpolations and addenda in the text plainly show. The chief headings were: maintenance of the rights and privileges of the Cossack courts of justice; increase of the number of Registered Cossacks to 60,000; maintenance of the rights of the Ukrainian nobles. Further it was declared only Ukrainians could hold offices or be tax-collectors; the Hetman was to be elected by the Cossacks and only notified his election to the Tsar. It was stipulated that the Hetman reserved his right to carry on international diplomatic relations. A series of paragraphs dealt with the immediate war against Poland and the form of Muscovite assistance which would be acceptable to the Ukrainians.

The negotiations of the Ukrainian delegates with the Muscovite Boyars lasted for about a fortnight, and finally the Ukrainian draft was accepted. Almost all the conditions of the Cossacks were accepted by the Tsar, but in the matter of international relations the Hetman was limited to the extent that he was not to have direct dealings with Poland or with the Sultan. Simultaneously, with the Cossack delegation, one from the Ukrainian burgesses arrived in Moscow, who wished their rights and

privileges under the Magdeburg Law to be confirmed by the Tsar. This delegation, though it had an introduction from the Hetman, came independently of the Cossacks. This was a very bad precedent for Ukrainian-Muscovite relations, the Muscovite agents at once observing that there was a certain antagonism between the Cossacks and the burgesses, and that the latter were not always satisfied with the Cossack administration, so that the Muscovian government might turn this antagonism to their own advantage. Indeed, the Ukrainian burgesses found a very attentive ear in Moscow and were generously accorded all the privileges they desired, especially in Kiev. In this way the Muscovite government won over the Ukrainian towns which now made it their custom to go direct to Moscow with their requests, disregarding the Hetman administration. The same tactics were also applied to the Ukrainian clergy, though negotiations did not run so smoothly at first. A delegation from the Ukrainian clergy, headed by the Archimandrite of the Kiev-Pecherski monastery, Innocent Gizel, came to Moscow in the summer of 1654. They wished to petition the Tsar to restore all the Ukrainian and White Russian Orthodox Sees which he had won with the Cossacks' help, to the Metropolitan of Kiev, instead of putting them under the Muscovian patriarch, since the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was autonomous and under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Muscovite government, on the other hand, had a settled plan for putting the Ukrainian Church under the Patriarch of Moscow, but its tactics were not to press the matter and irritate the Ukrainian clergy, but to win them over gradually. Thus this delicate point was left open, and the Tsar confined himself to confirming the Ukrainian Church rights to her possessions.

On the whole, the Muscovite policy of penetration, setting their feet firmly on Ukrainian soil must have been very disappointing to the Ukrainian government. Khmel-nitsky, seeing what Muscovite "protection" meant, at once took precautions, and set limits to the Muscovite penetrating tendency. So long as he was in power he

held the reins firmly in his hands, disregarding all the charters and treaties.

Generally speaking, the text of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, more correctly called the Treaty of Moscow of 1654, was so vague, each party interpreting it differently, that even now historians are not agreed as to the character of the political relations which it meant to establish, and which were in fact established by it. Some, as for instance the well-known Russian scholar of political law, V. Sergievich, consider the Treaty of 1654 to have united the two States in the person of their common monarch only. Others see in it a case of so-called "factual Union", the two states becoming one under the same central government. Most Russian and Ukrainian historians, the most important among them being M. Hrushevsky, consider that by this treaty the Ukraine entered into a state of vassalage under Muscovy. Others again consider that the Ukraine became dependent on the Muscovite state on the basis of autonomy, and some say that the Ukraine was simply incorporated into Muscovy with certain local privileges and rights for individual social classes in contra-distinction to the Muscovites who had no rights whatever, the Muscovite Tsar being the unlimited despotic ruler of his subjects. Lastly, recent investigators, for example, the eminent Ukrainian historian, Viacheslav Lipinsky, took the view that the Treaty of 1654 was only an ordinary military alliance of Ukraine and Muscovy against Poland. In this light, it seems it was regarded by Khmel'nitsky and contemporary Ukrainians.

In whatever way we regard the relationship created by the Treaty of 1654, we must always keep in mind that the two parties, Muscovy and Ukraine, certainly interpreted it differently. The Muscovite Tsar, "taking the Ukraine under his high hand" and promising his protection, set himself at once to turn this protectorate into incorporation. The Muscovite government made use of every unguarded word or turn of speech in the addresses of the Hetman to the Tsar as stepping stones to further and wider encroachments, strengthening Musco-

vite influence in Ukraine by every possible means. They were especially skilful in taking advantage of, and turning to their profit, every manifestation of local class antagonism in Ukraine, fomenting it with truly Muscovite craftiness and unscrupulousness, fostering it and instigating it. It was, indeed, on the policy of playing on these local differences that the Muscovites based their tactics in dealing with the Ukraine. On their side, the Hetman and Cossack officers undoubtedly looked upon the protection of the Tsar as a probably temporary political combination enabling them to terminate the hard strife against Poland, in consequence of the Lublin Union. They had tried to do this with the help of the Turks and Tatars, but had not succeeded, so they would try to achieve their ends with the help of Muscovy. The Ukrainian government considered it to be of the first importance to draw Muscovy into war with Poland as soon as possible.

The war, indeed, began in spring 1654. Certain changes took place in the grouping of the belligerent nations; the Tatars went over to the side of Poland, and instead of being allies, became enemies of Ukraine. The Ukrainians now had a new offensive front in the south. Tsar Alexis took the field in April 1654, leading his army to Smolensk. The Hetman sent him 20,000 Cossacks led by Ivan Zolotarenko, a distinguished soldier and statesman. The campaign was very successful, Smolensk and other towns, such as Borisk, Minsk, Vilno and Kovno were taken, thus placing most of the Lithuanian territory in the hands of the Tsar. In the meantime, Zolotarenko occupied southern White Russia and introduced the Cossack organization among the local population, dividing it into hundreds and regiments, and obtained from the Hetman instructions to unite White Russia to Ukraine. The Muscovite generals wished it to be annexed directly to Muscovy, and a conflict was created which was far from improving the already strained relations of the newly allied powers.

In the meantime, when Lithuania and White Russia was being lost to Poland, the Polish-Ukrainian front was

for a time quiescent. Khmelnitsky at this time showed a strange passivity, and let the Poles take the initiative out of his hands. Having won over the new Khan of the Crimea, Mahomet Giray, a Polish army 30,000 strong entered Ukrainian territory in the autumn of 1654 in the province of Braslav, the present Podolia. The population left to its own defences, offered desperate resistance. Each town and borough offered battle to the whole Polish army and was almost annihilated. The Polish commander, Stefan Charnecki, one of the best Polish generals, was at the same time a cruel man, and much incensed with the Cossacks against whom he had fought since the battle Zhovti Vodi (Yellow Waters) in 1648. He ruined the country without consideration, showing mercy neither to old nor young. The campaign took the form of a life and death struggle, and is known in Ukrainian history as one of the hardest and most cruel wars. Among the episodes of this war, the heroic defence of the town Busha specially impressed contemporaries, and is recorded in several chronicles on both sides. After most of the defenders were slain, since they were few in number as compared with the Polish army, and the castle was on the point of being taken by the Poles, Irene, the wife of Zavistny, the slain commander of the castle, with her own hands, set fire to the powder magazine, blowing the castle into the air, and perishing herself, together with the rest of the defenders. Thirty thousand Tatars joined the Polish army and the conquest of the province which had lasted until the summer of 1655 was now complete, and the once rich and fertile province was laid in ruins. According to a report of the Polish General which has been preserved, dated February 1655, 50 towns and 1,000 Orthodox churches were burnt to the ground, and 100,000 of the population taken prisoner by the Tatars; during the later stages of the campaign these numbers should be doubled. Evidence has been preserved in the travel-diary of the Syrian Archdeacon, Paul of Aleppo, who went northwards in 1654 through Ukraine and left a description of the province of Braslav as a rich and flourishing

land, densely populated and highly civilized. On coming southwards again in 1656 through the same country, he noted having seen only ruins, charred remains and wilderness.

Only in January 1655 when the Polish army laid siege to Uman, where the brave Bohun was defending himself, did Khmelnitsky set out to his relief. Khmelnitsky's slowness may be explained by his hope that he might yet win over the Tatars, so he waited until they had definitely sided with Poland. On January 29th-30th, in bitter frosty weather a pitched battle was fought on the fields of Drizhipole. The Poles broke through the Muscovite front line and seized part of their artillery. The Cossacks, however, succeeded in closing the ranks, and repelled the attacks. The position of the Ukrainian-Muscovite army was very dangerous, and only with great effort and after incessant fighting did Khmelnitsky succeed in breaking the blockade of the Polish and Tatar forces and leading his army safely out of danger. About 15,000 men were left slain on the battlefield, the Muscovites alone lost about 9,000, and many perished from the bitter cold. Both sides were exhausted. The Poles retired to the west, and the Tatars returned to the Crimea, plundering and taking prisoners as they went through the southern part of the province of Kiev. Thus ended the first year of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance. These events must have considerably diminished the Ukrainians' hopes of the Muscovite Tsar, the powerful protector who was at last to give to the Ukraine peace and freedom.

76. Khmelnitsky's Political Plans.

As has been stated, misunderstandings between the Muscovite government and Hetman Khmelnitsky began from the very first days of the alliance. The Hetman desired only one definite thing from the Tsar, namely, speedy and powerful assistance against Poland in order to unite the Ukrainian territories into an independent Ukrainian state. The satisfaction he planned for the Muscovite was to be the Lithuanian and White Russian

territories they should jointly win. The alliance was regarded quite differently in Muscovy. First of all, they wished to make the protectorate a reality, and to have Cossack help in conquering Lithuania and White Russia, and to this end they expected the Hetman to be guided in his political and strategic plans exclusively by instructions and orders from Moscow. Under such circumstances, it is only natural that Khmelnytsky should be quickly disappointed in his Muscovite allies, and compelled to seek other political combinations in order to secure Ukrainian safety and independence.

77. Alliances with Sweden and Transylvania.

During the spring and summer of 1655 the Hetman initiated very lively diplomatic action; he received ambassadors from the Transylvanian Prince George Rakoczy, from the Sultan, and from Charles X of Sweden. The Polish government on their side endeavored to win back the Ukrainian Hetman, now offering the widest concessions. Lastly, Khmelnytsky started relations with the Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick William. Up to this time the latter, being a vassal of the Polish King, had helped Poland against the Ukrainians and his excellent Brandenburg regiments were seen not only in Berestechko but also in the last Polish campaign of 1654-55. Now, menaced by Sweden and Muscovy, the Elector of Brandenburg sought reconciliation with the Ukraine. Of all these international relations the most vital for Khmelnytsky was the alliance with Sweden. According to an understanding with the Hetman, King Charles X attacked Poland in the spring of 1655. Khmelnytsky, having with him a Muscovite detachment under Buturlin, then renewed the war against Poland. In the summer of the same year he repulsed them from Braslav province (Podolia) and transferred his military action into Galicia. He defeated the Polish army near Horodok, and for the second time besieged Lvov. But he was hampered by the presence of the Muscovites, who insisted that all the captured towns, being the spoil of the Muscovite Tsar,

should take an oath of allegiance to him. In order to prevent the same thing happening in Lvov, Khmelnitsky refrained from storming it, and declared himself satisfied by a small war levy. His misunderstandings with the Muscovites were already so evident that they were known to the Polish government, and King John Casimir made repeated offers involving a break with Moscow. The Ukraine would again unite with Poland on the easiest terms. He sent his ambassador with a private letter to Khmelnitsky to which his queen added one from her to Khmelnitsky's second wife, Hanna. Khmelnitsky had married a widow of a distinguished Cossack who had fallen in the war. The Polish queen asked her to intervene with her husband in the interest of peace. The Cossacks distrusted the Polish nobles too deeply and Khmelnitsky expressed himself very sceptically as to the possibility of an understanding with the Poles.

The campaign of the Swedish king against Poland was very successful. In July 1655, he took Poznan and very soon most of Poland was in his hands. He took Warsaw, and in the autumn, Cracow also, many nobles going over to him. The King, John Casimir, fled to Silesia.

In the meantime Khmelnitsky's relations with the Muscovites became more and more strained. The chief point of misunderstanding was for the moment White Russia, where Ukrainian administration was being gradually introduced as the conquest advanced northwards. The local population accepted Ukrainian supremacy much more willingly than the Muscovite. Local magnates, such as Chetvertinski and the Princes of Slutsk recognized the Hetman. The town of Old Bykhov took an oath of allegiance to the Hetman and was declared to be the free port on the Dnieper.

The Ukrainians were still more dissatisfied with the foreign policy of the Muscovite government, which, in the spring of 1655 entered into negotiations with Poland. The Polish politicians offered a plan for electing Tsar Alexis to the Polish throne after King John Casimir's

death. In return the Tsar Alexis was to protect Poland against Sweden. Accordingly, the Tsar declared war on Sweden in the spring of 1655 and in August peace negotiations between him and Poland were opened in Vilna. The Ukrainians were not invited to take part in these negotiations which, however, only ended in establishing a truce. Still the fact alone of not allowing Ukrainian representatives to participate in the negotiations caused great indignation in Chihirin. The conduct of the Muscovite government was considered a betrayal. In the first moment of his wrath Khmelnitsky almost decided to break off the alliance. However, he did not formally do so, but concentrated all his energies on the creation of a coalition against Poland from which Muscovy was excluded. His hands were freed by the Muscovites who concluded the truce without even informing him.

Khmelnitsky's chief object was now to make himself independent of the aggressive policy of Muscovy; to wrest from Poland those areas, Volynia, Galicia, Kholm, which had not yet entered the Ukrainian State; keep the Crimean Tatars in check; obtain international recognition of his dynastic plans; strengthen his military title of Hetman by that of a sovereign prince; and secure the hereditary succession for his house in the new Ukrainian State. In order to gain this he set himself to create a coalition of Sweden, Brandenburg, Transylvania, Moldavia, Wallachia and Lithuania. This coalition was directed on the one side against Muscovy until the strife with Poland was terminated, and to obtain the neutrality of the Tatars.

We can obtain a clear idea of the aims and character of the coalition which the Ukrainian Hetman was endeavoring to create from the political treaties which at that time were concluded one after the other between the various members of the coalition. In September 1656 an "eternal alliance" was concluded between Transylvania and the Ukraine by which the Ukraine was to obtain Galicia and White Russia. In December of the same year, Sweden, Transylvania and Brandenburg made a treaty providing for the partition of Poland amongst

themselves. Sweden was to receive Pomerania, West Prussia, Courland, and Livland and a part of Lithuania; Brandenburg was to receive Poznan and Kalish; Transylvania, Cracow and Little Poland; Lithuania was to be an independent state.

Negotiations with Sweden continued while the Ukraine and Transylvania began their campaign against Poland. The Transylvanian Prince George Rakoczy crossed the Carpathian mountains, and, in January 1657, joined the Ukrainians whom Khmelnytsky sent to Galicia under Anthony Zhdanovich. They defeated the Polish army at Zamostie, occupied Cracow, Brest and finally Warsaw, where they were joined by Sweden. When Zhdanovich occupied Brest, the nobles, Orthodox as well as Roman Catholic, of this ancient Ukrainian territory which was called the Princedom of Turov-Pinsk under the Kievan Great Prince, handed him a written declaration of voluntary union with the Ukrainian State and the Hetman accepted them giving a promise to safeguard their privileges. The Volynian nobles followed their example and asked the Hetman to take them under his protection. This was the culminating point of Khmelnytsky's prestige. He was getting old, and in order to secure the succession, he called the General Council of Officers, which met in April 1657 in Chihirin, and chose Khmelnytsky's young son George to be his successor. This choice was certainly made in accordance with his father's wish, for among the old collaborators of Khmelnytsky there was no lack of possible candidates.

Already in the summer of 1657 a change came in the successes of Khmelnytsky and his allies. The political plans of the Ukrainian Hetman and the Swedish king alarmed the neighboring states and particularly the Austrian Court. In February 1657, Emperor Ferdinand III sent his ambassador, Bishop Parchevich, to Chihirin offering the Emperor's services as intermediary with a view to reconciling Poland and the Ukraine. The Hetman received the Imperial ambassador with great honor, but after keeping him for almost three months sent him away

with vague promises not to accept any other mediator than the Emperor, and also to recall the army of Zhdanovich. The latter promise was an empty one, as Zhdanovich continued operations in Galicia. These operations, however, were nearing a crisis. The terrible misfortune which had befallen Poland, threatening to ruin its political independence, roused a spirit of patriotism in the Poles. The Swedes, being Protestants, plundered and ruined Catholic churches, extorted from the population enormous war levies and roused against them the indignation of all classes of the Polish people. Similar ruin and violence was brought by the army of Rakoczy. The Poles were then roused to desperate resistance against the invaders, those who previously had gone over to the Swedish king now left him and took up arms against the Swedes. General Stefan Czarnecki became the heroic leader in this patriotic war. The monastery of Chenstochov became famous because of its heroic resistance to the Swedish army. At this moment, Denmark declared war on Sweden and King Charles X was compelled to withdraw his army, leaving Rakoczy to his own devices in Warsaw. This raised the morale of the Poles. Meanwhile, Austria sent military assistance to John Casimir and in May the Khan of the Crimea also came to Poland's rescue.

Rakoczy found himself in a desperate situation, as the Cossacks refused obedience to their leader and started back to the Ukraine. This last event must be laid to the account of Muscovy, who had attentively followed Zhdanovich's campaign in Poland and kept sending one mission after another to Khmelnitsky requiring him to break his alliance with Sweden and Rakoczy. Seeing that this led to nothing, the Hetman merely ignoring their remonstrances, the Muscovite government took to other methods. They sent agents to Zhdanovich's army to start subversive propaganda among the Cossacks. The Cossacks were on the whole dissatisfied with the campaign, and particularly with Rakoczy, who, to tell the truth, had conducted the campaign without any reasoned plan, never having taken counsel with Zhdanovich, and always pursuing his

own way. His Magyars disliked the Cossacks, and deprived them of their rightful share of booty, wronging them in every possible way. Therefore the Cossacks mutinied and started for home. Rakoczy abandoned by his allies, was surrounded in July, 1657, by the Tatars near Medzibozh in Volynia, and compelled to capitulate. Notwithstanding their promise of free passage, the Tatars rushed his camp, and took prisoner all who had not fled. Rakoczy himself managed to escape.

78. Khmelnitsky's Death.

The Muscovite agents not only caused mutiny among Zhdanovich's Cossacks, but also among those who were under the command of young Khmelnitsky and who had been stationed near Korsun in order to prevent the Tatars invading Ukraine. When the Hetman ordered them to Poland to help Zhdanovich, they refused to obey. These mutinies were more than the old Hetman could stand. On hearing of the retreat of Zhdanovich's army he had a stroke, and in a few days the great Hetman was no more. He died on August 6th, 1657, in Chihirin, and was buried at his country place at Subotiv in the church he had built and where his son Timothy lay buried.

Almost three hundred years separate us from the death of Bohdan Khmelnitsky, yet to this day history has not recorded any unanimous verdict on the character and actions of the great Hetman. Political and national passions that are still alive centering around his name are a hindrance to a detached and scientifically impartial judgment. More than of any other historic personage, the views of Ukrainian historians about Khmelnitsky have varied according to the epoch in which they wrote. Polish historians in general cannot pardon him the blows which he dealt to the Polish State; Russian writers see in him only the man who "united Ukraine to Muscovy" and thus laid the foundation of Russia as a great power. But even those historians who from one reason or another have held a critical opinion of Bohdan Khmelnitsky's place in history, recognize his profound political intellect, his iron

will, his great diplomatic abilities, and his military and organizing genius. Perhaps the best description of Khmelnitsky is to be found in the writings of the Polish historian L. Kubala, who after having studied for many years Khmelnitsky's life and activity, came to the conclusion that in the person of the Ukrainian Hetman, Poland had to do with a formidable rival of exceptional genius. "Foreigners", writes Kubala, "have compared Khmelnitsky to Cromwell. This was indeed very natural, especially at that time when they both held almost exclusively the attention of western and eastern Europe. Both were representatives of the country gentry, springing, so to speak, from the soil, found themselves at the head of an uprising, won victories, and making mock of the theories and experiences of the cleverest strategists and politicians, created strong armies. Almost contemporaneously, with the help of these armies, they won supreme political power, holding it until death, and handing it on to their sons. We must acknowledge that Khmelnitsky's task was by far the more difficult; his country had no natural frontiers, being open on all sides. In contradistinction to Cromwell, Khmelnitsky had at his disposal neither experienced statesmen nor an old and powerful national organization. Army, finance, administration, national economy, relations with foreign powers, all were brought into being by him, provided for and looked after. He had to find men, train them, and look after the smallest details. If his army was not starving, if he had arms, munitions, and spies and clever agents, the merit was his alone. From every point of view he was a man of quite exceptional stature, and gifted far beyond the ordinary. We can say of him that he was a born ruler. Knowing how to conceal his intentions, he never hesitated in a critical moment. Everywhere his iron hand and powerful will were to be felt. There was no situation out of which he was not able to derive some advantage".

If among modern historians who see Khmelnitsky's character and activity in the light of their own respective

national and political opinions, we find a certain divergence of appreciation, his contemporaries as well as the generations who stood near to him saw the great Hetman in quite a different light. To them he was a true national hero about whose person a series of great epics and songs was created. To his contemporaries he was the "God-sent leader", the "Moses who led his people out of Egyptian-Polish thralldom". Odes and panegyrics were composed in his honor in which he was quite sincerely compared with Attic heroes, a Leonidas, a Hannibal, and in which he was celebrated as "our true leader, patron and defender of the Ukrainian 'Fatherland', a great hero, a great and wise ruler", and so on. The Ukrainian historian, Velychko (1720) puts in the mouth of the Hetman's secretary, Samuel Zorka, a beautiful speech on the funeral of Khmelnitsky in which he depicts all the sorrow and despair of the Cossacks at the death of their beloved leader. Another historian, Hrabyanka (1710), begins his chronicle with a laudatory poem on Khmelnitsky "through whom the Ukraine came to stand on her own feet", and who "covered himself with undying glory". Hrabyanka's chronicle is chiefly devoted to depicting Khmelnitsky's heroic deeds. A patriotic drama enacted in 1728 is entitled "God's Grace that freed Ukraine from Polish wrongs through Bohdan Zenobius Khmelnitsky". To the Ukrainian philosopher of the Eighteenth century, Gregory Skovoroda, Khmelnitsky was "a hero and father of freedom". Thus do we see Khmelnitsky on the pages of old Ukrainian literature where the love and almost devoted worship is reflected which the Ukrainians of the Cossack period offered to the great Hetman. The generations of Ukrainians which stood nearer in time to Khmelnitsky well understood that it was he who picked up the thread of Ukrainian national independence broken in the Middle Ages, and that the Cossack State called to life by him, again introduced the Ukraine into the circle of politically independent, sovereign nations.

CHAPTER XVI

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(79) Rule of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky. (80) Breach with Muscovy. (81) The Union of Hadiach. (82) The Battle of Konotop. (83) George Khmelnitsky, Hetman. (84) Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1659. (85) Campaign of Chudniv and the New Ukrainian Polish Alliance. (86) Partition of the Ukraine. (87) Teteria and Brukhovetsky. (88) John Casimir's Campaign in the Ukraine on the Left Bank of the Dnieper. (89) Anarchy in the Ukraine on the Right Bank of the Dnieper.

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79. Rule of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky.

Bohdan Khmelnitsky's death at the moment when the political horizon was dark with black clouds was a great misfortune for Ukraine. The first question to arise was the succession. Who was to "hold the mace" (Bulava), the symbol of the power of the Hetman? Who was to continue the work of the great leader? Bohdan Khmelnitsky had wished to make the succession hereditary in his family. This corresponded fully with the interests of the State as well as with the wishes of the Cossacks, although traditionally, the Hetmanship was elective. Khmelnitsky's dynastic ambitions had received a serious set-back in the death in Moldavia of his eldest son, Timothy, a youth of considerable gifts. His second son, George, was far less naturally talented than his brother, and besides was weak and sickly. The old Hetman, who during the last years of his life had suffered from ill-health, was preoccupied with the question of the succession and had wished to settle it during his lifetime. In April, 1657, he called the General Council of Cossack Officers in Chihirin to settle the succession. All present were unanimously in favor of having George as their Hetman "that the glory for us of having Khmelnitsky as Hetman may be continued" declared the Cossacks. The old Hetman accepted this decision and announced it to the neighboring states, Muscovy, Poland, Turkey, Sweden,

Transylvania, Crimea, Moldavia and Wallachia. George Khmelnitsky was thus acknowledged by all.

In choosing the sixteen-year-old delicate boy for their Hetman the Cossack officers well understood that in the case of the death of the old Hetman there would have to be a regent. Naturally there might have been many candidates for the "Hetman's mace" among Cossack officers of high rank. Quite a number of Khmelnitsky's collaborators had sufficient experience and military qualifications to have had ambitious designs on the office, and many indeed were ambitious in this direction. But Khmelnitsky's authority was so great and the prestige of his name so universal among the Cossacks that no one dared to criticize the choice or put forward another candidate. But when Khmelnitsky's death occurred so suddenly and in such complicated political circumstances, it was evident to all that an immediate regency must be constituted. Almost a month after Khmelnitsky's death on August 23rd, 1657, the Council of Cossack officers was called in Chihirin. At this Council George Khmelnitsky declared that he was too young to take up the burden of office, and that he wished to study at the Kiev Academy and therefore would renounce the office of Hetman. The Council accepted these motives and decided that until George Khmelnitsky came of age the office of Hetman should be temporarily entrusted to Ivan Vyhovsky, the General Secretary of the Cossack Headquarters. In a few days a wider Council, including representatives of the burgesses, was called, and Vyhovsky accepted the office of temporary Hetman. Finally, on October 26th, 1657, a General Council of Cossack Officers with representatives from the ranks of the Cossacks, and the clergy, took place in Korsun, and this Council confirmed the election of Vyhovsky. Having accepted "the mace", Vyhovsky took the title of Hetman and ruled as full Hetman and not as Regent.

Ivan Vyhovsky was the closest collaborator of the great Hetman. He also belonged by birth to the Ukrainian landed gentry of Kiev province, coming from a

northern district. He had studied in the Peter Mohyla Academy at Kiev, was a lawyer in the Courts of Justice in Lutsk, and later deputy of the starost of Lutsk. He was a member of an Orthodox Brotherhood and a very zealous member of the Orthodox Church. The war of 1648 found him in the Polish army. After the battle of Yellow Waters he was taken prisoner by the Tatars, but Khmelnitsky himself ransomed him. He entered the Cossack army and was soon General Secretary at Cossack Headquarters, a post which carried with it the function of a Minister for Foreign Affairs. From that time onwards he was Khmelnitsky's inseparable colleague. Vyhovsky showed brilliant diplomatic ability, and was zealous and devoted in building up and strengthening the Ukrainian State. His four brothers, Daniel, Constantine, Theodore and Basil, followed him in the service of the Ukrainian State. All four tendered great military and diplomatic services to their country, and two, Daniel and Basil, both Cossack Colonels, paid with their heads for their fidelity to the Ukraine, being tortured to death in Muscovite prisons.

Among Vyhovsky's closest collaborators and counselors we see a number of gifted representatives of the Ukrainian gentry who gave their services to the new Ukrainian State. George Nemirich was possibly the most remarkable among them. Like Vyhovsky he was a native of the northern province of Kiev and was well educated, having studied in Holland, Oxford and Paris. He was the author of several works on history and theology. His father had become a Protestant of the Arian sect, and George himself was among the founders of the Protestant Arian Academy in Kisselin and Volynia. He took part in the wars against Sweden and Muscovy and was elected to the Seim. At the beginning of 1657 Nemirich entered into the Ukrainian service and proved to be a faithful follower of Khmelnitsky's political plans. So as not to differ in faith from his people he returned to the Orthodox Church. The period of his most brilliant activity falls in the period of the rule of Vyhovsky.

80. Breach With Muscovy.

The Council of Korsun was important not only because of the election of Hetman, but also on account of the strengthening of the international position of the Ukraine. About that time ambassadors of Sweden, Poland, Austria, Turkey, Crimea, Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia arrived in the Ukraine. The text of the Treaty of Alliance with Sweden was drawn up during the session of the Korsun Council (Rada). According to this Treaty King Charles X of Sweden undertook to obtain from Poland recognition of the independence of the Ukraine, and annexation to the Ukraine of all west Ukrainian territories which would give the Ukraine a common frontier with Prussia. At the same time alliances with the Sultan and the Crimean Tatars were renewed and a mission was sent to Moscow informing them of the election of the new Hetman and asking them to confirm the Treaty of 1654. Like Khmelnitsky, Vyhovsky did not wish to take the initiative in breaking with Muscovy. A truce was concluded with Poland.

The Ukrainian-Swedish alliance was very short-lived, and was practically without result. Sweden was in trouble because of the Danish war and had to withdraw its forces from Poland. The Elector of Brandenburg, who had at first joined Sweden against Poland had now, when the Polish government renounced all claim to Prussia, leaving it entirely to him, no cause to continue the war. On the contrary, the growth of Sweden was a menace to him. So having made peace with Poland, he was anxious to persuade the Ukrainian government to do the same, and offering his services as intermediary, he sent a mission to Chihirin in order to start peace negotiations between Poland and the Ukraine. The Polish government on their side made every effort to recover the Ukraine, promising the widest measure of autonomy and perhaps independence if only they could preserve some political bond between that country and Poland.

Though the Council of Korsun terminated in Vyhovsky's favor and strengthened his position in power, there

was soon seen to be a strong opposition against him. First, the discontent of the Zaporogian Cossacks was felt. After Khmelnitsky's death the Zaporogian Cossacks reared their heads again, for during his life-time they were not much in evidence. Khmelnitsky in accepting the protection of the Muscovite Tsar had not found it necessary to ask their opinion. When the oath was to be taken he had explained to the Muscovites that the Zaporogian Cossacks were only a "small people" of no consequence. But this "small people" gave asylum to all the discontented elements who, formerly in opposition to Poland, were now against the Ukrainian government of the Hetman. Khmelnitsky's iron hand had kept the Zaporogian Sich in subjection. Now that he was dead they showed signs of activity and opposition, and inquired why they had not been invited to take part in the Hetman's election. The commandant of the Zaporogian Sich, Barabash, appealed to Moscow against Vyhovsky. Another leader of the opposition, Martin Pushkar, did the same. He was Colonel of the Poltava regiment and himself had aspirations to "carry the mace". The Poltava Cossacks were the near neighbors of the Zaporogians. They were akin to them in spirit and they supported their Colonel, Pushkar. Vyhovsky was accused of being a "Liakh" (Pole) and of intending to "sell Ukraine to the Poles". Thus an agitation against Hetman Vyhovsky was on foot. The Zaporogians, not content with spreading disaffection against the new Hetman throughout Ukraine, began to make inroads on the neighboring Cossack regiments and to plunder the rich Cossacks. Vyhovsky then ordered a blockade of the Zaporogian Sich, depriving them of food and munition supplies. The Zaporogians had to yield, but were not subdued.

All this was most welcome to the Muscovite Government. Through their agents they watched attentively and observed that a differentiation of social classes was proceeding rapidly in the Ukraine and that social contrasts were becoming sharply opposed. The Cossack

officers (Starshina) and those of the old Ukrainian gentry who remained with them or joined in the insurrection, practically became the upper class, holding not only military and political leadership but also gaining economic preponderance. The Cossack officers were concentrating landed property in their hands and were receiving charters from the Hetman and the Tsar to establish their ownership. The political, administrative and judicial functions were entirely in their hands. Other classes of the population were not satisfied with the predominance of the Cossacks. First the townspeople tried to escape from the control of the Cossacks claiming their Magdeburg right of self-government. From the very beginning of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance, Ukrainian burgesses made it their habit to approach the Muscovite authorities directly, and ask the Tsar to confirm their rights and privileges. The common Cossacks, the so-called "chern" (rabble) looked askance at their officers as they secured in their hands not only power but also "meadows and pastures", and who as time went on became an exclusive caste, access to which depended not on military merit alone, but mostly on noble origin, wealth and connections. The exceptional conditions in the Ukraine at the beginning of the rising of 1648 naturally led to the concentration of the leadership in the hands of the military dictatorship in the persons of the Hetman and his officers. But this temporary state of affairs was maintained in peace time and officers took advantage of their dominating position in order to become great landed proprietors. In consequence they were also compelled to lay their hand on the peasantry, compelling them to work part of their time on the lands, for without such labor these lands were of no value. This process of subjecting the peasants to a new bondage had hardly begun at the time of Khmel'nitsky, but signs of it were felt by the peasants and provoked their discontent. The Zaporogian Sich was like a sounding board for the grievances of the masses, for in opposing the Hetman who protected his officers, it also opposed the new lords and "mighty ones".

In this way the Cossacks were gradually being divided into two separate parties, the officers (*starshina*) supported by the wealthier and more settled elements, and the populace behind which stood the Zaporogian Sich.

The Muscovite government observed and fully understood these affairs, and sought support from one or other of the hostile parties. For instance, they supported the townspeople, to whom the Tsar was very generous, confirming the former royal grants of municipal self-government. These began to look upon him as their protector and defender against the Cossack officers. In the same way the Muscovite Tsar also protected the Zaporogians sending them money and presents. Monarchical traditions in the Ukraine favored the transfer of the fidelity and devotion of the people from the Polish King, whom they had formerly believed to be their ally against the nobles, to the person of the Muscovite Tsar.

Simultaneously ambassadors arrived from Hetman Vyhovsky and from the Zaporogian Cossacks, and, hearing their mutual accusations, the Muscovite Government took the opportunity of arbitrating between them and sent the Boyar Khitrovo with instructions to call a Cossack Council (*Rada*) to decide officially on the form of government in the Ukraine, and unofficially to promote and strengthen Muscovite influence in the Ukraine. Hetman Vyhovsky, though much displeased with this uninvited interference, nevertheless attended the Council which was called in February 1658 in Pereyaslav. The Council unanimously confirmed the election of Vyhovsky who "had burnt his fingers delivering us from the Polish thraldom", and nothing was left to Khitrovo but to acknowledge the election. Vyhovsky, however, was compelled to make concessions to the Muscovite government; he accepted Muscovite voevods in Pereyaslav, Nizhin and Chernigov, promised to surrender to Muscovy the southern provinces of White Russia and break his alliance with Sweden.

The duplicity of Muscovite policy towards Vyhovsky was made clear immediately after the Council of Pereya-

slav. On leaving the town Khitrovo went direct to Pushkar in Lubny, presented him with sabres, and assured him of the Tsar's favor, and this at a time when Pushkar was in open opposition to Hetman Vyhovsky, having attacked near Poltava the detachment sent by the Hetman. For Vyhovsky nothing remained but to attempt to check the mutiny with armed force. He mobilized about 20,000 Cossacks, called the Tatars to his aid and besieged the strong fortress of Poltava. The siege lasted a fortnight, and then Pushkar committed the imprudence of accepting a pitched battle in which he was utterly routed, about 15,000 mutineers being left on the battlefield and among them Pushkar himself. The Zaporogian Cossacks who supported Pushkar took refuge with the Muscovite garrisons of Nizhin and Chernigov. The town of Poltava was burnt down, and many people were seized by the Tatars, but Vyhovsky gave order that they should be returned. He nominated a new colonel in Poltava and new officers from among his faithful followers. Pushkar's mutiny cost the Ukraine about 50,000 lives.

Vyhovsky's energetic treatment of the mutiny made a great impression on the Muscovite government which sympathized with Pushkar and would gladly have seen him Hetman instead of Vyhovsky. On the other hand, Muscovite duplicity in the Pushkar mutiny must have persuaded Vyhovsky and his companions that there was nothing good to be expected from Muscovy. Their eyes again turned to Poland. Sweden was exhausted with wars and began peace negotiations with Poland and Muscovy, so nothing was now to be gained from an alliance with Sweden. After a few years experience in dealing with Muscovy the Cossack officers and even the Cossack clergy had seen that Muscovite policy definitely aimed at gradually depriving the Ukraine of all her sovereign rights and turning the country into a Muscovite province. Men brought up in idea of political freedom, and having striven to realize them in Poland observed with astonishment and repulsion the cruel Muscovite despotism, their coarse and crude manners and customs, their intolerance and religi-

ous fanaticism. The prospect of being turned into the Tsar's "slaves" (kholop) as even the oldest Muscovite boyars used to call themselves, into subjects deprived of every political right, and dependent exclusively on the will of the autocratic Tsar held no temptation to the educated and cultivated Ukrainians who knew political freedom and a highly developed political life. In spite of their monarchical traditions, the Cossack officers having seen at close quarters the Muscovite's life, now preferred to deal with a constitutional Polish king rather than an autocratic Muscovite Tsar. Observing that Poland, now weak and exhausted by war, was ready to make the greatest concessions, Ukrainian political leaders began to lean to the idea of federation with Poland under which the Ukraine could keep her complete internal independence.

Hetman Vyhovsky himself was now inclined towards a political bond with Poland and so were most of the Cossack officers and high Orthodox clergy including the Metropolitan Dionysus Balaban. This idea was especially welcome to the Ukrainian nobles in Volynia, Podolia and Braslav who during ten years of incessant warfare had sacrificed their lives and possessions for the Ukrainian State and were now left outside it. But the mass of the Ukrainian people, the common Cossacks, peasants and townsfolk were against any union with Poland, fearing the former religious and national oppression and serfdom. These apprehensions were cleverly exploited by a few Ukrainian politicians who were openly or secretly opposed to Vyhovsky, and by supporting Muscovy they thought to build up their own ambitious and selfish plans.

After having subdued Pushkar's mutiny, Vyhovsky began more intensive negotiations with Poland, and on September 16th, 1658, he concluded in the town of Hadiach in the province of Poltava, the well-known Treaty of Hadiach, which had for its object the union of Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania. The Polish and Ukrainians met to draw up and elaborate its terms.

81. The Union of Hadiach.

The Treaty of Hadiach contemplated the reconstruction of the Polish state in a federation of three states, Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania. The first paragraph of the Treaty established the Ukraine within the limits of the provinces Kiev, Chernigov and Braslav, which was to become a free and independent state under the name of the great Ruthenian Princedom. The three nations, Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania, were to form three independent states united only in the person of the king whom they were all three to elect.

The three nations, were to conquer the shores of the Black Sea in order to open free navigation upon it. They were to conclude a military alliance by which they were to render mutual help in war, even against Muscovy if the Muscovite Tsar refused to return the conquered Lithuanian and White-Russian provinces. If Muscovy wished it was to be admitted as a fourth member of the Slavic Federation.

The second paragraph dealt with the internal arrangements of the Great Ruthenian Princedom. The legislative power was to be in the hands of a national assembly of delegates from all parts of the Ukraine. The Hetman was to be elected for life, and was to hold executive power, the election being confirmed by the king. The Ukraine was to have its own High Court of Justice for the country, its own Treasury, Mint and Army consisting of 30,000 Cossacks and 10,000 mercenaries. Neither Polish nor Lithuanian armies were to enter Ukrainian territory, except in case of urgent need in which case they were to be under the command of the Ukrainian Hetman. Every year the Hetman was to present to the King 1,000 Cossacks from each regiment to be knighted and receive the hereditary patent of nobility.

The third paragraph treated of religious questions. Church Union was to be abolished in all three countries, Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania; and the Orthodox Church was to have equal rights with the Roman Catholic Church.

The fourth paragraph treated questions of education; two universities were to be founded in the Ukraine, colleges and schools teaching Latin and Greek, and other schools, printing presses were to be opened, as many "as necessary". Freedom of speech and of the press was granted even in religious questions, provided that neither books nor speeches committed treason against the person of the King.

All these paragraphs were accepted after long and heated debate. Most of the Ukrainian delegates insisted on all the Ukrainian lands being incorporated into the Great Ruthenian Princedom, including Volynia and Galicia, but the moderates persuaded them to be content, meanwhile, with the smaller territory in order not to jeopardize the whole Treaty.

The deliberations at Hadiach were still going on when skirmishes and fights between Ukrainian and Muscovite forces began. Colonel Daniel Vyhovsky made an unsuccessful attempt to throw the Muscovite garrison out of Kiev, and was on this occasion assisted by the town population. The Muscovites repulsed the attacks and in revenge devastated and burnt the suburbs.

News of the conclusion of the Treaty of Hadiach was the signal to open hostilities between the Ukraine and Muscovy. Tsar Alexis published a manifesto to the Ukrainian population in which he declared Hetman Vyhovsky to be a traitor, and incited disobedience to his orders. The Ukrainian government on their side published a manifesto, which they sent to all European courts informing them of the rupture with Muscovy and giving the reasons: "We, the Zaporogian Cossack army declare and witness before God and the whole world that the great war we conducted against Poland had no other motive than the defence of the Holy Eastern Church and of our ancestral freedom by the love of which we are sustained. These wars were led by our late Hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and our Chancellor Ivan Vyhovsky. We had set aside our private affairs, putting before them the Glory of God and the interests of the State. To this end we entered

into an alliance with the Tatars and Her Majesty, Queen Christina of Sweden, and later with His Majesty, King Charles Gustavus, and held unbroken our faith with them. We never gave cause to Poland to break the treaties, but kept devoutly our faith, treaties and alliances. We had no other motives in seeking the protection of the great prince of Muscovy than with the Help of God to maintain our freedom won and sanctified by our blood, and bequeath it to our descendents after our death". They proceeded to explain how the Muscovite Tsar did not keep his word, but having with the help of the Cossack arms won Lithuania, he opened peace negotiations with Poland at the expense of the Ukraine, declared war on her allies the Swedes, garrisoned Kiev, and finally schemed to destroy utterly White Russia and the Ukraine with the Zaporogian army, fostering internecine war, supporting mutinies against our Hetman and advancing with armed forces into Ukraine. "The Ukrainians are not responsible for the new war thus beginning, and only under compulsion do they take to arms".

82. The Battle of Konotop.

In the early spring of 1659 a Muscovite army more than 100,000 strong, and led by Princes Trubetskoy, Romodanovsky and Posharsky started out from Putivl for the conquest of the Ukraine, devastating and plundering as they went. Not far from Konotop, a town in the province of Chernigov, the Muscovites were kept in check by the colonel of the Nizhin regiment, Hulianitsky, who had only 5,000 men, the two regiments of Nizhin and Chernigov. The town was fortified and Hulianitsky sought shelter there and for nearly three months withstood the siege of the Muscovite forces.

His courageous resistance gave Hetman Vyhovsky time to muster his forces. He already had organized an army of mercenaries consisting of Serbs, Poles, Germans and Roumanians. The Serbs were specially numerous having enrolled by thousands in the Ukrainian army. The Crimean Khan, Mahmet-Giray, with whom Vyhovsky had

renewed his alliance, also came to their aid. Hetman Vyhovsky was ready in June and came to the relief of Konotop. In a fierce engagement on the 28th and 29th of June, near Konotop, the Muscovite army was completely routed and many of the leaders taken prisoner, among them being Posharsky, who was later beheaded by the Khan of the Crimea. The Russian historian, Soloviov, writes thus about this battle: "The flower of Muscovite cavalry perished in one day and never again was the Muscovite Tsar able to muster such brilliant troops in the field. Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich came out to the people dressed in mourning and Moscow was seized with panic. The blow was the heavier in that it was unexpected. Trubetskoy on whom all hopes were set, a man who was terrible to his enemies and lucky in war, had now lost a great army in one day. Having conquered so many towns in the campaigns of 1654 and 1655 against Poland, and the Lithuanian capital, as well, Moscow, the Tsar's capital, trembled for its safety. The Tsar ordered people of all conditions to work on earthen mounds for the fortification of the capital and often came out himself to watch the progress of the work. The population from the surrounding district flocked to Moscow with their families, their goods and chattels. There were rumors that the Tsar was leaving for Yaroslav beyond the Volga. Vyhovsky was expected to go direct to Moscow".

All this alarm was superfluous, Vyhovsky was unable to take advantage of his brilliant victory. Behind his back treason was being fomented, and a rising against him was in preparation. He pursued the defeated remnants of the Muscovite army as far as Putivl and pressed them hard as far as the river Serim, but was soon obliged to return home with his army. A number of towns, such as Romen, Lokhvitsa, and Hadiach held to the Muscovites and he was forced to take them with arms. Kiev was occupied by the Muscovite garrison against which the Hetman had sent part of his forces under his brother Daniel, but most important of all, the Zaporogian Cossacks led by their chief (koshovyi) Sirko, made an inroad

into the Crimea, the Crimean Khan departed home at once with his horde, leaving Vyhovsky with only about two or three thousand Tatars. Poltava subdued only the previous year, again rose against the Hetman. It was thus impossible to pursue the advance into Muscovy.

Trubetskoy in Putivl offered to open peace negotiations with Vyhovsky and the Hetman accepted this offer although he knew that by so doing he was only giving the Muscovites time to recover from their defeat. In the meantime the Seim in Warsaw ratified the Treaty of Hadiach. The section about the abolition of the Church Union had provoked the greatest resistance. Debates on the subject lasted for a month and finally it was decided to declare general religious freedom. The King, all the lords and magnates, spiritual and temporal, all the members of the Seim took the oath to observe the Treaty, and on their side the Ukrainians with the Metropolitan Dionysus Balaban also took the oath. The beginning of a new era in the history of the nations of eastern Europe was celebrated in triumph. This triumph, however, was premature.

In the Ukraine affairs took a bad turn. Daniel Vyhovsky had not succeeded in delivering Kiev from the Muscovite garrison. The Muscovite party among the Ukrainians was very actively destroying the work of Hetman Vyhovsky, and Trubetskoy was ready to abandon the campaign when a messenger arrived from his Muscovite followers telling him that a conspiracy was on foot against the Hetman and an uprising in favor of Muscovy was in preparation.

83. George Khmelnitsky, Hetman.

Already in September, 1659, an uprising against Hetman Vyhovsky broke out led by three colonels, Zuzura, Somko and Zolotarenko. Vyhovsky found himself in a very difficult position. His rivals were very clever in making propaganda against him saying that he had "sold Ukraine to the Poles" and that he wished to reintroduce the old order. The common people were not able to ap-

preciate the political and national advantages of the Hadiach Treaty, the very idea of returning under the rule of the Polish king was intolerable to them, the remembrance of former sufferings being too fresh. Vyhovsky decided to appeal to the Cossack Council. His rivals made the deliberations of the Council impossible by unruly behavior, saying that he and his followers had sold the Ukraine and Cossack freedom to Poland for class privileges. The Ukrainian delegates in the Seim who had taken the oath to observe the Treaty of Hadiach were killed on the spot, and Vyhovsky had to flee. The Council broke up without any results. Later another Cossack Council assembled in Bila Tserkva, this time without Vyhovsky. He was deposed and young George Khmelnytsky was re-elected, to the disappointment of the members of the Muscovite party, some of whom expected to be put in power. Vyhovsky acknowledged the new election and surrendered the insignia of Hetmanship to George Khmelnytsky, then only eighteen years old. His election was, however, not by an absolute majority, as there were several aspirants to the office, and no unity among them. The Ukraine became a prey to anarchy and ruin. Vyhovsky, writing to King John Casimir, said: "The central Poltava Province is laid in ruins, the towns and villages are over-grown with nettles, the population are partly slain, partly fled in all directions, and partly taken prisoner by the Tatars". The population had, indeed, lost all interest in political or national affairs, wishing only for peace, peace at any price. Some few were tempted by the advantageous clauses of the Treaty of Hadiach, especially as they had been obtained at the price of so much bloodshed. The historian, Kostomarov relates: "Thus sadly the rule of Hetman Vyhovsky came to an end, and with it came to an end also the Great Ruthenian Princedom. The Ukrainian people proved to be unable to understand and appreciate the Treaty drawn up by a mind which was indeed superior".

84. Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1659.

The Cossack officers under pressure from the common people, having unwillingly broken with Poland, now endeavored at least to derive some advantage from the union with Muscovy. The position of the two sides was, however, not to their advantage; the Muscovite army now occupied the left bank of the Dnieper, and Trubetskoy having on his side several allies from among the Cossack officers, could simply dictate to the Cossacks his own conditions. He occupied Pereyaslav where the Cossack Council was to be held, and surrounded it with his 40,000 men. George Khmelnitsky on arriving there, was simply a hostage in his hands. In these circumstances the eighteen-year-old boy was again proclaimed Hetman and on October 17th, 1659 a new treaty was drawn up in order to settle Ukrainian-Muscovite relations.

Now the Hetman and all Ukrainians were to be subjects of the Muscovite Tsar. The Hetman was not to be deposed or a new Hetman elected without an understanding with the Tsar. Kiev was to be held by the Muscovite garrison, and other garrisons were to be placed in Pereyaslav, Nizhin, Uman and Braslav. All Muscovite garrisons were to be provided with food and fodder by the population. The Ukrainians were to return all the trophies taken from the Muscovite army in the battle of Konotop. The Cossack officers known as Vyhovsky's followers were to be deprived of their offices and finally—a dishonorable condition—Vyhovsky's three brothers were to be delivered up to the Muscovite government, the Hetman having fled to Poland.

The Cossack Council which ratified this treaty on behalf of the Ukraine was very incomplete and attended mostly by members of the Muscovite party. The young Hetman had no choice but to acquiesce in the imposed conditions. Trubetskoy returned to Moscow taking with him as captives, the three Vyhovsky brothers in irons. The eldest, Daniel, was tortured to death on the way, and the other two died in Muscovite prisons.

85. Campaign of Chudniv and the New Ukrainian Polish Alliance.

The Pereyaslav Treaty of 1659 did not create friendly relations between Muscovy and the Ukraine, and was far from having solved the Ukrainian question. In order to annul the Treaty of Hadiach and annex the right bank of the Dnieper, Muscovy had to make war on Poland. Besides, the Cossacks on the right bank of the Dnieper had always been hostile to Muscovy. The Muscovite government broke the truce with Poland, and in the summer of 1660 opened the campaign by sending from Kiev an army of 20,000 men, well equipped and trained, and commanded by foreign officers with Sheremetiev at their head. The Ukrainian forces led by Colonel Zuzura, joined the Muscovite army. The combined forces marched into Volynia, where they expected to be joined by the young Hetman with his army. In spite of the Cossack officers belonging to the Muscovite party, there was not a good understanding between the two headquarters and relations were far from friendly. The Polish king withdrew his forces from the Swedish front where at that time a truce had been concluded, and sent an army of 32,000 men. The former Hetman, Ivan Vyhovsky, joined the Polish army with a few thousand followers and about 20,000 Crimean Tatars came to help. The Muscovite army advanced as far as Lubar and was unexpectedly met by superior forces. Sheremetiev retired to Chudniv where he was surrounded. All his hopes were centred on the rescue of young Khmelnytsky, but the Hetman and his army were in no hurry, being unwilling to side with Muscovy. Not far from Chudniv he was met by a detachment of the Polish army led by Field Marshal Lubomirski. After a few skirmishes which were repulsed by the Ukrainians peace negotiations were offered from the Polish side and welcomed by the Ukrainians. There on the field the Treaty of Chudniv was concluded, which in its main lines followed the Treaty of Hadiach, though considerably curtailed. There was no mention of the Great Ruthenian Princedom and the Ukraine was accorded

merely autonomy under a Hetman. Vyhovsky helped very much in the conclusion of this Treaty in order to obtain better conditions for the Ukraine. Lubomirski then returned to Chudniv where Sheremetiev's army, suffering from hunger and exhaustion, and abandoned by most of the Cossacks of the Zuzura detachment, was compelled to capitulate. Sheremetiev, by laying down his arms and surrendering the remaining Cossacks to the Tatars did not save himself or his army. The Tatars, in their usual manner, rushed on the disarmed Muscovites, partly killing and partly taking them prisoner. Sheremetiev himself was carried away into the Crimea where he lived a prisoner for about twenty years. The Muscovite disaster at Chudniv was even greater than at Konotop in 1659.

It should seem that this time Muscovite domination in the Ukraine was at an end, but the Polish government was not strong enough to take advantage of their victory. The Polish mercenaries were unpaid, the soldiers mutinied, the leaders quarreled amongst themselves and the army returned to Poland. The Muscovite detachment advancing under Bariatinsky to help Sheremetiev, hearing of his defeat, remained in Kiev and from there plundered and ruined the country. According to Bariatinsky's own report they murdered about 15,000 of the peaceful population for their hostile attitude towards Muscovites. Among the Cossack officers there was no unity. Those on the right bank of the Dnieper directly exposed to the Polish attacks, were in favor of an understanding with Poland, whereas the Cossack Regiments on the left bank of the river preferred Muscovy, fearing their vengeance. At the same time as the Cossack Rada in Korsun were ratifying the Treaty of Chudniv between Hetman George Khmelnitsky and the Poles, his own uncle, Colonel of Pereyaslav, Yakim Somko, was acknowledging in Pereyaslav in the name of the Cossacks of the left bank of the river their allegiance to the Muscovite Tsar.

86. Partition of the Ukraine.

Ukraine was practically divided into two sections striving against each other, one on the side of the Muscovites and the other on the Polish side. But even within these two sections there was no unity; on the left bank of the Dnieper were whole regiments which opposed the Muscovites, and on the right side of the river the peasants were much displeased with the Polish alliance and frequently rose against their Polish landowners. The Ukraine was entering the period of her history known as "Ruina" (The Ruin).

87. Teteria and Brukhovetsky.

In the Ukraine of the left bank, which under the temporary Hetman, Somko, sided with Muscovy, the situation was complicated by the sharp antagonism between the well-to-do Cossacks and officers on the one side, and the common Cossacks, or as they were called, rabble (*chern*), on the other. These latter were supported by the town population and the Zaporogian Cossacks. The antagonism was exploited by various demagogic adventurers actuated by personal ambition and selfish motives. The temporary Hetman, Somko, who represented the rich Cossacks was opposed by a pretender to the Hetman's mace, Ivan Brukhovetsky, who was put forward by the Zaporogian Cossacks. He pretended to be a defender of the interests of the common Cossacks. A former attendant or "first servant" of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky, Brukhovetsky, after his master's death went to the Zaporogian Sich and after some time was elected commandant of the camp. He was an unscrupulous demagogue, one of these selfish and ambitious men who, according to the contemporary historian Velychko "for silver and gold would give not only one of his eyes but his brother or even his father. How should such as he have pity on our mother Ukraine in her distress?"

Although Somko was duly elected Hetman by a Cossack Council held in Kozelets in the spring of 1662, the Muscovite government distrusted him as he was a man

of independent character and certainly a Ukrainian patriot. Somko was supported by the northern Cossack regiments on the left bank of the Dnieper and in general by the Cossack officers and well-to-do settled Cossacks, while the southern regiments being geographically nearer to the Zaporogians and the common Cossacks on the whole were for Brukhovetsky. The final elections of the Hetman of the left bank of the Dnieper were held in 1663 in Nizhin at the so-called "Chorna Rada" (Common Council or Council of the Populace). Both parties with their respective leaders and candidates attended the Rada as well as a number of Zaporogian Cossacks. The decisive part, however, was played by the Muscovite army which was stationed close at hand. The meeting was very stormy and ended in the victory of Brukhovetsky whose election was promptly confirmed by the Muscovite General Velikogagin. The Cossack officers, followers of Somko, were molested, their houses and property plundered. Somko was arrested and after three months imprisonment, beheaded in Borzna, together with some high officers, others being exiled to Muscovy. Brukhovetsky deposed all the former Cossack officers and nominated his own followers in their places. This was a kind of social revolution, which still further disorganized life on the left bank of the Dnieper on the eve of a new war against Poland and against their own brothers, the Ukrainians of the right bank of the Dnieper.

The situation in this part of Ukraine, from the moment when it was practically separated from the left bank of the Dnieper was also very unsettled and deplorable. There also we see the same anarchy, the same struggle for selfish interests and personal ambitions. As a parallel to Brukhovetsky we see here Pavlo Teteria coming to the surface of political life. He belonged to the Ukrainian country gentry from Volynia, was Orthodox, and by profession, a lawyer. Having joined the Cossack rising of 1648 he became one of Khmelnitsky's closest collaborators, married his daughter, was nominated colonel and was employed in important diplomatic missions; under

Hetman Vyhovsky he became secretary of the Cossack Headquarters (Foreign Minister). Well educated and very intelligent, he was at the same time extremely selfish, covetous, cruel and of unbounded ambition. When the Hetman's power was for the second time in the weak hands of young Khmelnytsky, Teteria had no difficulty in easily persuading him to abdicate. George abdicated at the beginning of 1663, and entered a monastery under the name of Gedeon. The Cossack Council in Chihirin then elected Teteria, and the Polish king confirmed this election.

Thus each part of Ukraine had a different Hetman. The Polish king and government, however, could not be content with only one part of the Ukraine, knowing well that the existence of another Hetman on the left bank of the river under the protection of Muscovy would be a constant menace to Polish supremacy on this side of the river. So Poland made another attempt to recover the left side of the Dnieper, Teteria actually persuading the king to declare war.

88. King John Casimir's Campaign in the Ukraine on the Left Bank of the Dnieper.

In October 1663, King John Casimir was with his army in Bila Tserkva. He was joined by Teteria with his Cossacks. They crossed the Dnieper in November and, avoiding Kiev so as not to be delayed, rapidly advanced in the direction of the Muscovite frontier taking one Ukrainian town after another and laid siege to Hluchov which was almost on the Muscovite frontier. Brukhovetsky joined the Muscovite army coming to his aid near Baturin and came to the relief of Hluchov. In the meantime the Zaporogians attacked the Crimean Tatars hindering the Khan from bringing Poland and Teteria the promised help. King John Casimir was compelled to abandon the siege of Hluchov and since his army was exhausted by the privations of the winter campaign he dared not accept a pitched battle with the united and fresh armies of Brukhovetsky and Romodanovsky. Thus in February 1664

the Polish army began to retreat through Novgorod-Sieversk and Starodub into Lithuania. During King John Casimir's operations in the province of Chernigov Teteria completed the conquest of Poltava province and came to Hadiach. Hearing of the retreat of the king and of the peasant rising in Kiev province, he hastened to recross the Dnieper and dealt in a very cruel fashion with the insurgents. Among the cruel means by which Teteria secured his power was his assassination of the former Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, whom he jealously suspected of designs on the Hetman's mace. Inviting him as if for a Council in Korsun, he had him seized and, after a mock trial, shot as a traitor. This was a flagrant crime, which called forth much indignation at the time.

In the meantime, having expelled the remaining detachments of Teteria and the Poles beyond the Dnieper and with the Muscovites having cruelly taken vengeance on those Ukrainians who had sided with Teteria and the Poles, Brukhovetsky crossed the Dnieper in the direction of Chihirin. Here, however, his advance was checked by the arrival of Polish help for Teteria led by Stefan Charnecki, and of the Tatars. Charnecki's repression of the peasant revolt was especially cruel; he gave the Tatars leave to take as many of them prisoners as they could. Enraged against the Ukrainian population, he gave orders that no mercy should be shown. Resistance however, only grew the more stubborn. In his report to the king, Charnecki wrote: "The Ukrainian peasants are so furious with Poland that they prefer to perish with their huts in flames, suffer cold and every misery rather than to surrender. The whole of the Ukraine decided to die rather than acknowledge the Poles". In consequence of Teteria's intrigues, Charnecki ordered the arrest of the newly elected Metropolitan, Joseph Tukalsky, the Archimandrite Gedeon Khmelnitsky and Colonel Hulianitsky and sent them to the fortress of Marienburg in East Prussia. In vengeance he ordered the grave of Bohdan Khmelnitsky in the Church in Subotiv to be opened and the remains to be scattered. Having at last somewhat broken the resistance

of the peasants, Charnecki returned to Warsaw to attend the Seim but died on his way there.

89. Anarchy in the Ukraine on the Right Bank of the Dnieper.

His death gave fresh hope to the insurgents, but they had neither definite plans nor leadership, and widely-spread guerilla warfare raged over the entire area between the Dnieper and the Dniester. Amidst this anarchy, Teteria passed from the stage of Ukrainian history. Realizing the general distaste and hatred with which he was regarded, and discouraged in his ambitions, he abdicated. Taking the treasury with him he retired to Poland. Later he became converted to the Roman Catholic Faith, and entered a Jesuit monastery, bequeathing to it all his dishonestly accumulated wealth. In the Ukraine he left behind him anarchy, disorganization and ruin. Here and there, an ambitious leader emerged and declared himself Hetman, siding sometimes with the Poles, sometimes with Muscovy. But they all disappeared, swallowed by the raging anarchy of internecine guerilla war. The country was hopelessly and utterly ruined, and the population was ready to accept any rule, Ukrainian or foreign, which could bring about peace and order.

However, amidst the ruin of the demoralized and discouraged population, at the moment of greatest turmoil, a leader appeared, far superior to his contemporaries, who succeeded at least for a time, in inspiring Ukrainians with hope and faith in their own strength, gave them a new ideal, and with a heroic effort, raised the country out of the abyss of anarchy, re-united its divided parts, and created for a time an independent state, as Bohdan Khmelnitsky had done before him. This was Peter Doroshenko.

CHAPTER XVII

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(90) Peter Doroshenko. (91) Brukhovetsky's Journey to Moscow and Introduction of Muscovite Administration in the Ukraine of the Left Bank of the Dnieper. (92) Doroshenko's War Against Poland, 1667. (93) Brukhovetsky's Uprising Against Muscovy. (94) Doroshenko's Conquest of the Left Bank of the Dnieper. (95) Doroshenko's Struggle Against Sukhovi and Khanenko. (96) Mnohohrshny, Hetman of Ukraine of the Left Bank. (97) Doroshenko's Turkish Policy and the War of 1672. (98) Samoylovich (99) Doroshenko's Downfall. (100) Wars About Chihirin. (101) George Khmel'nitsky, "Prince of Ukraine". (102) Treaty of Bakhchisaray.

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90. Peter Doroshenko.

Peter Doroshenko was born in Chihirin in 1627 where his father was a Cossack Colonel. The Doroshenkos were an old Cossack family which had "served the Cossack army well". His grandfather, Michael, had been Hetman and was killed in the Crimean war of 1628. We do not know when and where Doroshenko was educated, but he had a good knowledge of Latin, spoke Polish, knew history and was a very good speaker, all of which points to a school education of the period. He entered active service under Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nitsky in 1648, and received under him a thorough military and diplomatic training. Hetman Khmel'nitsky nominated him in 1657 Colonel of the Priluts regiment. He sided with Vyhovsky, took part in the campaign of Chudniv, and was Cossack Staff officer under Hetman Teteria, whose abdication found him Colonel of the Cherkassy regiment.

When Teteria in the spring of 1665 left for Poland, the office of Hetman had been seized by an insignificant man, Stepan Opara. He made an alliance with the Tatars who were then in the Ukraine as allies of Poland, and in June, 1665, declared himself Hetman. The Tatars, however, soon discerned his insignificance, arrested him and suggested to the Cossacks that they should elect a new Hetman. The Colonels of the Regiments of the

Right Bank assembled in Chihirin on October 10th, and elected Doroshenko temporary Hetman, which election was confirmed by the General Cossack Council called in Chihirin in January, 1666.

In electing Doroshenko the Cossacks had taken into account his descent from an old Cossack family, that he had been trained by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and that in the office of Hetman he intended to do more than satisfy his personal ambitions. At first the new Hetman had to recognize Polish supremacy, were it only for the reason that Polish garrisons were stationed in several of the most important towns of the country, Chihirin, Korsun, and Bila Tserkva, whereas Doroshenko had hardly a thousand Cossacks under his command, all his power "lying with the Tatars", as we are told by a contemporary.

The new Hetman had an enormous and very difficult task before him. The country was ruined and normal life disorganized. First it was necessary to strengthen his power in the country, as in some parts the people held to the Muscovites, and it was necessary to create a strong and reliable army. But above all, he had to deal with the pretenders to the Hetmanship of whom there was no lack. Hardly had Opara disappeared from the stage, when a new pretender, Drozdenko, Colonel of Braslav appeared, and Doroshenko was obliged to proceed against Braslav, taking with him a few Polish detachments. After a siege of a few weeks, Braslav surrendered, Drozdenko was taken prisoner and shot. Having secured eastern Podolia, Doroshenko returned to Chihirin where he had his residence as in the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky. The number of Doroshenko's followers was increasing; at the siege of Braslav he had already 20,000 Cossacks. As a nucleus of his army Doroshenko had formed regiments of "Serdyuki", paid volunteers, who were his main support, as they were not subject to political influences and changes and only knew their leader. Among them also there were foreign officers. Doroshenko had also detachments of Tatars, mercenary or allies, but these, as of old, were unreliable and undesirable

allies, costing the Ukrainian people much, as they could not refrain from plundering and taking the population prisoner, regarding this as the price of their alliance even in the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. In the first months of his rule Doroshenko recognized the supremacy of the Polish King and the protectorate of the Crimean Khan, his ally.

91. Brukhovetsky's Journey to Moscow and Introduction of Muscovite Administration in the Ukraine of the Left Bank of the Dnieper.

When Doroshenko was taking preliminary measures to strengthen his power, and pacify the country, Brukhovetsky advanced on the left bank of the Dnieper, ever strengthening Muscovite power in the Ukraine, coming half-way to meet Muscovite wishes and making concessions to the disadvantage of himself and his followers. In September, 1665, he went to Moscow with a numerous retinue of Cossack officers, clerical representatives, burghesses and common Cossacks, where he was solemnly received in audience by the Tsar to whom he brought rich presents. Then began the business side of his visit. The Hetman expressed the wish to "marry a Muscovite woman", and asked that a bride should be found for him; he requested a grant of land near the Muscovite frontier, and an important detachment of Muscovite military forces for his personal security. Brukhovetsky was advised to marry the daughter of Prince Dolgoruki, one of the most aristocratic Muscovite families, and this marriage shortly took place in Moscow. But the chief object of the visit was Brukhovetsky's "humble offer to the Tsar of all Ukrainian towns" by which he meant that all the taxes paid by the Ukrainian town population as well as Ukrainian State monopolies and customs should henceforth go direct into the Muscovite treasury. He also wished to have Muscovite garrisons in all more or less important Ukrainian towns. He further offered to the Tsar jurisdiction over the Ukraine with the exception of the Cossack class. All this was of course accepted with

the deepest satisfaction, the more so as most of the concessions had been suggested by the Muscovite government and were made to meet its wishes. All these generous concessions made at the price of Ukrainian autonomy were repaid by rich grants of land to Brukhovetsky and his followers. The new arrangements were drawn up in the form of a special charter from the Tsar to the Hetman and signed by both sides on December 11th, 1665. At his departure from Moscow, the Hetman and all who were with him were presented with rich sables.

Brukhovetsky returned to the Ukraine early in 1666. He felt himself secure and looked down on the Cossack officers. Those who opposed him in anything he habitually seized and sent to Moscow, whence they were despatched to Siberia or elsewhere. His officers had always disliked him and intrigued against him, even at the time of their visit to Moscow. Now they were continually sending to Moscow complaints and accusations against him. Brukhovetsky himself could not agree with the Muscovite voevods, and had constant differences with Sheremetiev in Kiev or with others. But the mass of the population were the most disappointed and indignant when they at last understood what kind of "gifts" the Hetman had brought them from Moscow. Muscovite voevods with garrisons made their appearance in the Ukraine early in 1666, followed by Muscovite officials who at once set about making a census of the population, recording their incomes, and imposing taxes in money, corn and other products. By April, 1666, these taxes in money, corn and honey collected from the peasants and townspeople began to arrive in Moscow. The Ukrainians were greatly dissatisfied and their discontent was augmented as Muscovite officials and agents came into closer contact with the local population and vexed them by their conduct, their manners and customs so foreign and so distasteful to Ukrainians. General indignation arose against Brukhovetsky, who lost all the popularity he had enjoyed as protector and defender of the interest of the

common people and Muscovite protection lost its popularity also.

Doroshenko took advantage of this change of sympathy with Brukhovetsky and Muscovy. During Brukhovetsky's absence (September-December, 1666) he attempted to set foot on the left bank of the Dnieper, sending there detachments of his Cossacks and making known his "Universals" (manifestos) in which he invited the population to recognize his power. But Doroshenko's first desire was to free himself from Poland, by taking advantage of a civil war which broke out in Poland in consequence of the uprising of Lubomirski against the king. In February, 1666, Doroshenko summoned the Cossack Council (Rada) and proposed to "chase all the Poles out of the Ukraine back to Poland", conclude an alliance with the Khan of the Crimea, and in spring start a campaign on the left bank of the Dnieper in order to unite it with the right bank into one State under one government. At this time Doroshenko began negotiations with the Khan of the Crimea and the Sultan with the purpose of concluding a military alliance with the former and recognizing the political protectorate of the latter over the Ukraine. He considered it impossible to free the Ukraine with her own forces. He had only an exhausted part of the country behind him, while his opponents, Poland and Muscovy were two powerful states; so following the example set by Bohdan Khmelnitsky, he tried to secure his position by gaining the military aid of the Tatars and the protectorate of the Sultan.

Doroshenko knew that Poland and Muscovy had for some time been conducting peace negotiations in the village of Andrussovo, and that the Muscovite government intended to forsake the right bank of the Dnieper in order to secure their domination over the left bank. He therefore decided to attack Poland and compel the Polish government to give up their claims on the right bank, and thus face the two negotiators in Andrussovo with the fact of the actual independence of this part of Ukraine. In the autumn of 1666, Doroshenko, having

secured strong support from the Khan—30,000 Tatars were put at his disposal—was ready and awaiting his opportunity. The Polish government, having dealt with Lubomirski's uprising, sent an army 6,000 strong into the Ukraine. They crossed the Ukrainian frontier in December, 1666, and began by taking and destroying Ivanhorod, which refused to submit. Doroshenko attacked the Polish forces between Brailov and Braslav, completely defeating them.

This was the beginning of a complete breach with Poland. This defeat of the Polish army by Doroshenko had the same significance for the exhausted Poland as the defeat at Zhovti Vodi and Korsun of twenty years ago. The Polish government hastened to conclude the Treaty of Andrussovo on January 13th, 1667, under which a truce of thirteen years was established between Muscovy and Poland, the right bank of the Dnieper remaining with Poland and the left with Muscovy. Kiev remained in Muscovite hands for two years only, and the Zaporogian Cossacks were put under the supremacy of both Poland and Muscovy. The Treaty of Andrussovo was unwelcome both to Doroshenko and to the Turks and Tatars. It rendered more difficult Doroshenko's programme of uniting both parts of the Ukraine, and the Turks and Tatars had the danger of a united Polish-Muscovite front against them. The Treaty of Andrussovo aroused real panic in the Ukraine of the left bank, the warmest partisans of Muscovy being shocked and indignant with Muscovite policy in thus acknowledging the partition of Ukraine and leaving half of it in Polish hands.

92. Doroshenko's War Against Poland, 1667.

However, the Muscovite government's withdrawal from the right bank freed Doroshenko's hands in his contest with Poland, with the Sultan and Crimean Khan as his allies. He relied on Poland being unprepared, but the Polish Fieldmarshal, John Sobieski, was informed of his intentions. He warned the nobles of the border

provinces of the Tatar danger, and was himself prepared to repulse the attack. In September, 1667, Doroshenko, with 24,000 Cossacks, 40 guns and considerable Tatar forces advanced into Galicia. The Sultán sent him 3,000 janissaries and 12 guns. Against these forces John Sobieski could muster only 15,000 regular and a few thousand armed servants. But he had a very important ally in the commander of the Zaporogian camp, Ivan Sirko, who in January had been in Lvov and declared that he would not recognize Doroshenko as Hetman, and promised to be ready to make a diversion in the Crimea in order to hold Doroshenko's allies, the Tatars. Sobieski occupied a well-fortified position in the village of Pidhaitsi, and it was here that Doroshenko in October, 1667, with the united forces of Cossacks and Tatars, besieged him. Sobieski held out for a fortnight, but his strength was beginning to give way when news came that Sirko had attacked Perekop, plundered northern Crimea, leaving behind nothing but "dogs and cats". This news greatly upset the Tatars who were with Doroshenko, and they no longer wished to continue the siege. Many deserted. Then recurred the usual procedure in Ukrainian-Tatar alliances, the Tatars started independent peace negotiations with the Poles and, in a few hours, a treaty "of eternal friendship and inviolable peace between Poland and the Tatars" was prepared. Doroshenko found himself in such a dangerous position that he was compelled hastily to fortify his camp against his "allies". When Kerim Girey offered to mediate, there was nothing left to Doroshenko but to open peace negotiations with Sobieski. According to this treaty, concluded on October 19th, 1667, Doroshenko and the Cossacks remained under the supremacy of the Polish king, and relinquished any wish to depart from their protection in the future; the Polish landowners were free to return to their estates; the Polish army was not to enter Cossack territory and the Polish garrison of Bila Tserkva was to be reduced. The final wording of the text of the Treaty was postponed until

the next Seim, but both Doroshenko and Sobieski took an oath to observe it.

A Treaty concluded in such circumstances could not satisfy Doroshenko. Seeing that neither Poland nor Muscovy could reconcile themselves with an independent Ukraine, he began to think of the Sultan as his ally in the struggle for this aim. He was, however, compelled to conceal for some time his plans and intentions and carry on diplomatic relations with all sides, and await favorable conditions and the right moment. He had the powerful moral support of his friend, the Metropolitan Joseph Tukalsky, who after three years of imprisonment had escaped from the Polish fortress of Marienburg in East Prussia. Henceforth he stayed in Chihirin and became Doroshenko's counsellor and his best and truest friend.

Doroshenko was very popular among the mass of the population in both parts of Ukraine. Muscovite agents informed their government of this, and how in all Ukrainian churches prayers were offered "for the good and pious blessing, Hetman Peter". The Muscovite government were much afraid of this popularity and opened diplomatic negotiations with Doroshenko. Doroshenko advised the Muscovite Tsar to take the whole of Ukraine under his protection, and even such Galician and Volynian towns as Peremysl, Lvov, Halich, Yaroslav and Vladimir, but the Tsar, after his recent experience had not much confidence in the Ukrainians; he wished no united Ukraine, especially under the rule of such an independent and active Hetman as Doroshenko. Tsar Alexis preferred for the present to maintain the status quo brought about by the Treaty of Andrussovo, and as to Doroshenko, he continually gave him advice to remain under the Polish king and not carry on friendship with the infidel.

93. Brukhovetsky's Uprising Against Muscovy.

In the meantime events were developing on the left bank of the Dnieper which at last made it possible for Doroshenko to realize his aspiration for this part of

Ukrainian territory. Brukhovetsky, seeing the general discontent with his rule because of the introduction of Muscovite fiscal administration, and feeling his position endangered, thought of anticipating the growing revolt against Muscovy by putting himself at the head of an anti-Muscovite uprising. In 1668 he called the Cossack Council to his residence in Hadiach and announced to them that the Muscovite government definitely wished to surrender the whole of the Ukraine to Poland, and that the only solution was to expel the Muscovites and seek the protection of the Sultan. The Cossack Rada accepted this proposal.

The uprising against Muscovy on the left bank of the Dnieper began shortly after. Some of the small Muscovite garrisons were massacred and some capitulated, Kiev, Nizhin and Chernigov alone remained intact. An embassy was sent to Constantinople with proposals to the Sultan to accept the Ukraine as his vassal on the same conditions as Transylvania, and recognize Brukhovetsky as Ukrainian Prince with his seat in Kiev. Another embassy was sent to the Crimean Khan asking for help against Muscovy. The Sultan promised his protection and the Khan sent 7000 Tatars. Then Brukhovetsky, together with his Cossacks and the Tatars, marched to the Muscovite frontier where their army under Romodanovsky awaited him.

94. Doroshenko's Conquest of the Left Bank of the Dnieper.

Brukhovetsky made a miscalculation in trying to gain personal popularity by imitating Doroshenko's policy. Doroshenko at that time was already in relations with the Sultan and the Crimean Khan, and had been promised the help and protection of the Sultan on the same conditions as the Danubian Princes. In promising the same to Brukhovetsky, the Sultan was evidently prepared to wait and see which of the two would gain the upper hand. Doroshenko crossed the Dnieper and was approaching Brukhovetsky's camp when the Cossacks broke out in revolt

against Brukhovetsky and murdered him, and on June 8th, 1668, proclaimed Doroshenko Hetman of the whole of Ukraine on both banks of the Dnieper. This was the moment of Doroshenko's greatest triumph and popularity among the Ukrainian people.

95. Doroshenko's Struggle Against Sukhovi and Khanenko.

The hardest blow of all which Doroshenko received at this time came from the Zaporogians, who had put forward a new pretender to the office of Hetman, a young man, Peter Sukhovi, whom the Crimean Tatars also supported. Doroshenko was enraged by this "blow on the mouth" and threatened the Tatar ambassador declaring that like his grandfather Hetman, Michael Doroshenko, "he would turn the whole Crimea upside down", but he was now compelled to divert all his energies to the struggle against Sukhovi. This went on for about a year, and during this time the left bank of the Dnieper was lost to him, though some of the regiments remained loyal to Doroshenko until the spring of 1670.

96. Mnohohrishny, Hetman of Ukraine of the Left Bank.

His position, however, was far from secure; on all sides he was surrounded by enemies. On the one side the Muscovite army was advancing from the north, on the other the Poles, alarmed by his successes, marched into the Ukraine. Worse still, the northern part of Ukraine on the left side of the Dnieper, the Chernigov and Sieversk provinces, in close proximity to the Muscovite frontier, hesitated to break off from Muscovy. They believed, and rightly, that Muscovy would not so easily relinquish her claims to the Ukraine and that the first blows would fall on the provinces of Chernigov and Sieversk. Surprised to hear of the Polish advance, he being in friendly correspondence with John Sobieski, Doroshenko hastened to the right bank of the Dnieper in order to prepare the defence of the country, leaving behind as his lieutenant on the left side of the river, the Chernigov

Colonel Damian Mnohohrishny. Left by Doroshenko with inadequate forces, the country being strongly garrisoned by Muscovites and threatened by the advance of the Muscovite army led by Romodanovski, Mnohohrishny allowed himself to be over-persuaded by some of the Cossack officers and clergy of the Muscovite party, and entered into negotiations with the Muscovites. The Cossack Council of the officers of the northern regiments assembled in Novhorod-Sieversk and elected Mnohohrishny the "Sieversk" Hetman. The new Hetman then proposed to the Tsar to recall his voevods and armies in order to give those on the left bank of the Dnieper an opportunity of voluntarily returning under his sway. Tsar Alexis hastened to send him a "gracious" answer and thus the parleys started.

In January, 1669, a delegation from the "Sieversk" Hetman, Mnohohrishny, arrived in Moscow, listened demurely to all the reproaches of faithlessness and treason, and then presented a petition containing a draft of a new Treaty, and requested that a date should be fixed for the assembly of the Cossack Council for the final election of the Hetman and the ratification of a new Treaty of Union between the Ukraine and Muscovy. In March, 1669, the Cossack Council took place in Hlukhov in the presence of three Muscovite representatives; Mnohohrshiny was duly elected Hetman and the text of the treaty, known in Ukrainian history as the Articles of Hlukhiv was confirmed. In general outline the Articles of Hlukhiv followed the Articles of Bohdan Khmelnitsky, though considerably curtailed. The text actually began with assurances that "rights and liberties" promised to Bohdan Khmelnitsky were to be maintained. The voevods of the Tsar with garrisons were still to remain in Kiev, Chernigov, Nizhin, Pereyaslav and Oster, but they were not to interfere with the local authorities. The taxes for the Tsar's treasury were henceforth to be collected by the Hetman's administration. The rolls of the Registered Cossacks were to be raised to 30,000 and all Cossacks and Cossack officers were to be paid from the revenue

collected in the Ukraine. Besides the Registered Cossacks a special regiment was formed for public safety and for quelling revolts. These troops, under the name of "Kompaniytsi" (Volunteers) were later increased in number. The Hetman had no right to entertain relations with foreign powers. Ukrainians were strictly forbidden to export to Muscovy spirits or tobacco for sale, these goods being there a State monopoly. The Hetman, Cossack officers and representatives of the common Cossacks and burgesses took the oath of observance of the Treaty.

Though Doroshenko was displeased with the election of Mnohohrishny and at first ignored him, he showed him no hostility and maintained relations with him which in Moscow were looked upon with suspicion. Mnohohrishny was the son of a common Cossack, his contemporaries calling him "peasant's son". He was no diplomat though a straightforward man and a Ukrainian patriot. He did not know how to manage his officers nor the Muscovites, and very soon made enemies everywhere. In a short time this brought about his end.

97. Doroshenko's Turkish Policy and the War of 1672.

Again left with no other resources to rely upon than those of the exhausted country on the right bank of the Dnieper, and being opposed by Poland and Sukhovi whom the Tatars supported, Doroshenko was led into closer alliance with the Sultan and tried to get from him the efficient help he needed to realize his aim, namely a united and independent Ukrainian State. Soon after his return from the left bank of the Dnieper he called together the Council of Cossack officers which drew up conditions for a Turkish protectorate of the Ukraine. These conditions, drawn up under fourteen headings were sent to Constantinople in 1668 by a special ambassador. On general lines these conditions recall the attempt of Bohdan Khmelnytsky to enter into an alliance with the High Porte. The Cossacks did not wish to be dependent subjects nor to pay any tribute. The Hetman hoped with the help of the Sultan to unite all Ukrainian territories as far as

Peremysl and Sambor in the west, Minsk in the north, Pultivl and Sieversk in the east. The Sultan and the Crimean Khan should not conclude treaties with Poland or Muscovy without an understanding with the Ukrainian Hetman. If the Cossacks conquered a town with Turkish help it should remain under the rule of the Ukrainian Hetman and not become a Turkish province. The Sultan gave his formal consent to accepting the Ukraine under his protection; lively diplomatic relations ensued between Constantinople and Chihirin, and a Ukrainian representative was sent to the court of the Sultan. At first, however, Turkish protection was of little use to Doroshenko. Rumors spread by his enemies of his "having sold Ukraine into Turkish thralldom" undermined his popularity with the Ukrainian population. The Tatars continued to support Sukhovi. Khan Adil-Giray helped Doroshenko's enemies because he knew that Doroshenko had complained about him to the Sultan and that he had advised the Sultan to depose him. Hardly had Sukhovi disappeared when a new pretender to the Hetman's power, Michael Khanenko, Colonel of Cherkassy, hastened to pay loyal homage to Muscovy and began propaganda against Doroshenko among the Cossacks. Henceforth Doroshenko had for several years to combat a new and stubborn enemy whose resistance caused him even greater difficulties than even Sukhovi before him had.

Seeing that Turkish protection did not bring him any nearer to the realization of his aim, the unification of the Ukraine, Doroshenko made another attempt to gain an understanding with Poland with whom he maintained relations in the person of the Field-marshal John Sobieski. Sobieski did everything to bring him over to the Polish side. Doroshenko, therefore, sent his ambassador to the Coronation Seim in the autumn of 1669—after the abdication in that year of John Casimir, Michael Wisniowiecki, son of Jeremy had been elected king—and gave him instructions to obtain full autonomy for the Ukraine within the meaning of the Treaty of Hadiach of 1658. But Doroshenko's claims, as his ambassador reported, gave Polish

statesmen "a great shock" and they only sent "compliments" in reply. In the summer of 1670, however, formal negotiations opened in Ostrog in Volynia. Doroshenko put forward such conditions as the abolition of Church Union within the frontiers of the whole Polish State and complete autonomy for the Ukraine, including, of course, the annulment of the Treaty of Andrussovo. Generally speaking, it was a repetition of the Treaty of Hadiach, even including the sections about the freedom of schools, speech and the press. The Polish government would never accept this if not directly forced by overwhelming military strength. Just at that moment Khanenko also sent a mission with far more modest claims. The Polish delegates then concluded a treaty with Khanenko, and on the 2nd of September, 1670, the Polish government recognized him as Hetman of the Ukraine of the right bank of the Dnieper, he acknowledging Polish supremacy on condition of autonomy for the Cossack class only. At the end of the year the Polish Seim ratified this treaty. This signified to Doroshenko a final breach with Poland. On the other hand it made him enormously popular with the Cossacks. In answer to the king's letter in which he advised the Cossacks not to confide in Doroshenko, the Cossack Council assembled in Korsun early in 1671, gave assurances of complete confidence in their Hetman and wrote a letter to the king to this effect. In another joint letter to the Cossacks of the left bank of the Dnieper inviting them to join Doroshenko, the Cossack officers wrote: "In the person of Doroshenko the Ukrainian people have a good and true leader whose only aim is to unite Ukrainian lands". Now Doroshenko set himself to a decisive struggle with Poland. He tried, as Bohdan Khmelnytsky had formerly tried, to start relations with the Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick William, in order to draw him into the anti-Polish coalition, but his letter was intercepted by the Poles. He tried to win over Muscovy, Hetman Mnohohrshny, even Stepan Razin, the leader of the Don Cossacks, but effective help was only obtainable from the Sultan. Meanwhile the Sultan sent to

Doroshenko the Tatars of Bilhorod, independent of the Crimean Khan, and with their help Doroshenko's lieutenant, Ostap Hohol, opened the campaign against Khanenko and the Poles. The year of 1671 was spent in skirmishes and guerilla warfare. In the autumn, John Sobieski began a systematic march against Podolia and took a number of towns. Towards the end of the year Doroshenko obtained considerable help from his Mahomedan allies, 26,000 Tatars and a few thousand Turks. The former Crimean Khan, Andil-Giray, whom the Sultan, in consequence of Doroshenko's complaints had deposed, was replaced by young, intelligent and well educated Selim-Giray. With his allies Doroshenko set himself to the reconquest of Podolia. Against those who voluntarily went over to the Poles, he used severe repressions and surrendered them to the Tatars.

This campaign was only a prelude to a great war between Poland and the united forces of Turkey, Tatars and Ukrainians of the right bank of the Dnieper. It broke out in the spring of 1672. The Sultan had just finished a successful war against Venice and now his hands were free. Sultan Mahomet IV came at the head of his army 100,000 strong. He was joined by 50,000 Tatars under Selim-Giray and later by Doroshenko with 12,000 Cossacks. Together they had 200 guns. This was a tremendous force, against which Poland could only put up a feeble resistance. But Poland was guarded by her good genius, John Sobieski. He put in the field all he could possibly mobilize in Poland, together with a few thousand Cossacks under Khanenko and sent them as a vanguard to cut off Doroshenko and prevent him from joining his allies. Sobieski himself was covering the route to Lvov, and Sirko and his Zaporogians were to make their usual diversion in the Crimea. The chief Polish hope was centred on the inaccessible fortress of Kamenets. Doroshenko defeated the Polish army with Khanenko in July 1672, and joined the army of the Sultan near Kamenets. The siege of Kamenets began in August and after three weeks the

fortress capitulated, and the Sultan and Doroshenko together made their formal entry into the town.

Hardly had Kamenets fallen, when the Cossacks and Tatars began to advance into Galicia. One place after another surrendered without resistance. In the first days of September Lvov again saw the Cossack and Tatar army beneath her walls. Sobieski retreated westward. Doroshenko laid siege, but after a few days ambassadors from King Michael arrived offering peace. Negotiations began at once. Lvov paid an indemnity. The preliminaries of the peace were drawn up on October 5th, 1672, and the Sultan who was at Buchach gave his ratification. According to the Buchach Treaty, Poland renounced her claim to Cossack Ukraine, which became an independent state. Podolia was given to the Sultan. Poland undertook to withdraw the garrison from Bila Tserkva and other places in the Ukraine, and pay to the Sultan an annual war indemnity of 22,000 ducats. These were the chief articles of the Buchach Treaty and according to Polish historians, the most dishonorable in her history.

Doroshenko returned to Chihirin and announced to the people that the war with Poland was over. The towns which formerly adhered to Khanenko recognized Doroshenko's power. But his position was a very difficult one; his resources were completely exhausted. The conquest of Kamenets by the Turks, where they at once turned all the churches into mosques, spread terror in the Ukraine. Rumors were afloat about all kinds of violence and desecration offered by the Mohammedans to the Christian Faith. The indignant population turned against Doroshenko, holding him responsible for all this. In Poland, the danger of Turkish invasion once averted, government circles recovered and began to prepare revenge. The blow of the defeat and of the humiliating treaty provoked a certain reaction amongst the population. Sobieski, who alone during the disaster had not lost his head, did all he could for the defence of the country, and now became very popular, his authority being unquestioned. First Sobieski refused to surrender to the Ukrainians the strong-

holds of Bila Tserkva and others occupied by Polish garrisons, and which according to the Buchach Treaty, Poland was to evacuate. Doroshenko was powerless to enforce this. On the whole Doroshenko had cause to be greatly disappointed with the results of the Turkish alliance, considerable portions of Ukrainian territory, western Podolia and a part of Galicia had become Turkish provinces and Doroshenko had to put up with the half-ruined and depopulated Braslav and Kiev provinces. About Christmas 1672, soon after his return from the campaign, Doroshenko held a Council in Chihirin with his officers, and the question as to whether they should continue to remain under the Turkish protectorate was weighed and examined. The Rada voted to stay under the Turkish Sultan because "besides the Sultan there was nowhere to go for protection".

As Doroshenko was preparing his campaign with the Turks against Poland a "coup d'etat" took place in Baturin, the residence of the Hetman of the Ukraine on the left bank of the Dnieper. On the night of March 13th, 1672, a group of Cossack officers, in accordance with a previous understanding with the Muscovite garrison, arrested Hetman Mnohohrshny, and delivered him to the Muscovites, who secretly brought him in irons to Moscow. Mnohohrshny was accused of having secret relations with Doroshenko and of planning to go over to Turkish protection. It was already said that the Cossack officers disliked Mnohohrshny because by origin he did not belong to their class, and also because of his violent and uncontrolled character. Mnohohrshny was displeased with Muscovite policy in the Ukraine and sometimes spoke of it openly to his neighbors and also to the Muscovites themselves. This was all that the charge of treason amounted to. The unfortunate Hetman was tortured in Moscow and exiled for life to Siberia, whither he was followed by his family.

98. Samoylovich.

Having got rid of Mnohohrshny, the Cossack officers

sent a delegate to Moscow in the person of Ivan Lissenko, with a draft of new conditions for the election of a new Hetman. It was stipulated that the Hetman was not to enter into relations with the foreign powers; he was not to punish the Cossacks or peasants except after judgment by the Cossack Court of Justice; only Cossack officers were in future to elect the Hetman, the common Cossacks were not even to be present at the election; and the Tsar was to send an army to safeguard the election. The Cossack Council took place on June 16th, 1672, in a desert steppe near the small town Kozacha Dibrova, on the Muscovite frontier. Only the Cossack officers took part in the elections, the common Cossacks who came to the number of about 4,000, were merely witnesses. The Council drew up new articles known in Ukrainian history under the name of the Articles of Konotop. In the main they only completed the Articles of Hlukhiv of 1669. The Hetman power was curtailed while the volunteer regiments which could give support to a Hetman, were abolished. Ivan Samoylovich, the Supreme Cossack Judge, was elected Hetman. He had been one of the conspirators against Hetman Mnohohrshny.

The new Hetman was the son of a priest, originally from the right bank of the Dnieper who settled on the other bank and had a parish near Konotop. For this reason, Samoylovich, bore all his life the nickname of "popovich" (son of a priest). He had been in the Kievan Academy and was an intelligent and well-educated man. He was a follower of Brukhovetsky and had taken part in the rising against Muscovy of 1668. He then attached himself to Mnohohrshny, obtained the pardon of the Tsar, and at the Council of Hlukhiv, was elected Supreme Judge of Cossack Headquarters. Samoylovich was very hostile to Poland, but in favor of an alliance with the Sultan. He was against the partition of the Ukraine and insisted on uniting both parts, the right and left banks, under one government, his own, of course, not that of Doroshenko.

The defeat of 1672 caused a patriotic reaction in Poland. The Seim voted an extra grant for an army of

60,000 men. The Pope sent a considerable sum for its armament. The Polish government decided not to pay the promised indemnity and started to prepare for a new war. The Muscovite government, having placidly witnessed Poland's defeat, considered, that by the Treaty of Buchach, the Polish government had renounced their rights and claims to the Ukraine of the right bank of the Dnieper and thus annulled the Treaty of Andrussovo. Therefore, the Tsar began negotiations with Doroshenko, offering him protection and threatening that if this was not accepted there would be war. At the same time Poland made new attempts to win over Doroshenko or to put Khanenko in his place. Under these complicated and uncertain conditions there was nothing left for Doroshenko but to wait and see who would win, and take advantage accordingly to realize his plans.

In the autumn of 1673 Polish preparations for a new war were completed, and the king could, according to a Polish historian, "review an army the like of which Poland had not produced since the battle of Berestechko in 1649"; and consisting of 40,000 well-armed men with 50 guns, and 12,000 Lithuanians not counting armed servants. John Sobieski was at the head of the army. Circumstances were also generally in favor of Poland; the Khan of the Tatars was ill and the whole population of Crimea stricken by an epidemic. Sirko, the Zaporogian leader, was harassing the Tatars; the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia sided with Poland. Doroshenko showed no great wish to fight, although he was promised munitions by the Turks. The Sultan himself was not very active at this time.

In November 1673, Sobieski defeated the vanguard of the Turkish army near Khotin and next day captured Khotin with its powerful fortress. The victory of Khotin made a great impression and soon procured the Polish crown for John Sobieski, as King Michael Wisniowiecki died on the very day of the Khotin victory. The Poles, however, as once before after the battle of Chudniv, could take no advantage of their brilliant victory. The Lithuanian

army refused to go any further and started homewards. The discomfort of an autumn campaign in a ruined and devastated country caused many desertions also in the Polish army. Nearly half of the army left the ranks after Khotin because they had received no pay. When news of the king's death arrived, many nobles also returned home. The campaign was bound to come to an end. When in the spring of 1674 it was renewed the Turks were prepared and drove the Poles out of Moldavia.

In the meantime Samoylovich persuaded the Muscovite government to declare war on Doroshenko just as Poland and Turkey were engaged in their strife. At the end of January 1674, the united forces of Muscovy and Samoylovich crossed the Dnieper. Doroshenko's Cossacks made stubborn resistance, but they were not able to withstand the overwhelming force of the enemy. The Hetman's brother, Gregory Doroshenko, was defeated near Lysianka and taken prisoner. On March 17th, 1674, Samoylovich called a General Council of Cossacks, and was proclaimed Hetman on both sides of the Dnieper. In June Samoylovich and Romodanovski besieged Doroshenko in Chihirin. For a fortnight they bombarded the place, but Doroshenko resisted. He was expecting help from the Turks and Tatars.

At that time, the Sultan was in Moldavia pursuing his campaign against Poland. Hearing of Doroshenko's distress, instead of continuing to advance into Poland, he returned into the Ukraine. The Turkish army crossed the Dnieper at Soroki and entered the territory of Cossack Ukraine. Here the Sultan was joined by the Crimean Khan, Selim-Giray, whom the Sultan had sent in advance to hasten to Doroshenko's help. Hearing of the approaching Khan, Samoylovich and the Muscovites raised the siege and crossed the Dnieper. After that Doroshenko and the Khan on one side, and the Sultan on the other, set themselves to re-conquer the Ukraine under the power of the Hetman of Chihirin. The unhappy country was drowned in blood. The territory of the regiment of Uman who had adhered to Khanenko suffered specially. The

Grand Vizier, Kara Mustapha, having taken Uman, razed the town to the ground, its population being partly butchered and partly taken prisoner. Doroshenko having met the Sultan in September 1674 near the ruined town of Uman obtained pardon for the prisoners. Afterwards the Turks and Tatars returned home, and Doroshenko continued to re-assert his authority in the country. Enraged against those who had gone over to Samoylovich, he took cruel reprisals against them.

The Ukraine of the right bank of the Dnieper was once again under Doroshenko's authority, but at what a price! The country lay half ruined. Many thousands of people, taking their families and belongings, fled to the left bank, hoping to find there more peaceful living conditions. To complete the misfortunes of the unhappy country, immediately following on the Turks and Tatars, John Sobieski now king, advanced into the Ukraine and started the re-conquest of Podolia. Quite a number of Podolian towns were besieged, captured and burnt to the ground, leaving hardly any population at all. The country was turned into a vast desert, covered with ruins and charred remains, and strewn with human bones.

99. Doroshenko's Downfall.

The former popularity of Doroshenko turned to hatred against him. The Ukraine blamed him for the devastation. His closest colleagues and friends, even the members of his family, turned from him and forsook him one after another, being discouraged through the failure of his enterprise. Doubts in the reasonableness of his policy must have penetrated the soul of the Hetman himself. But he did not lay down his arms though the iron ring of his enemies was drawing ever closer and closer around him. In the summer of 1675 the Turks and Tatars again came into the Ukraine on their way to Poland. Their presence brought Doroshenko no advantage; the Turks completely devastated eastern Podolia and the Tatars began negotiations with Poland without even informing Doroshenko. All this convinced him of the necessity of break-

ing with his Mohammedan allies, especially as he was informed that they did not trust him and were at any moment ready to put forward another pretender against him. In the autumn of 1675 we may suppose that the Hetman of Chihirin must have undergone a great crisis. His faithful friend and counsellor, the Metropolitan Joseph Tukalsky, died just at that time. Abandoned and forsaken by all, disappointed and discouraged, he decided to abdicate, only it was hard for him to surrender his Hetman's mace to Samoylovich. He called in Chihirin his last Cossack Council which was attended by the Zaporogian Cossacks, and laid down before the Council his Hetman's mace, as if surrendering it to the Council of Cossacks who had once entrusted him with it. Sirko, the Zaporogian leader, who attended the Council, promised him on oath the pardon and favor of the Muscovite Tsar. Then Doroshenko sent his insignia and colors to Moscow. They arrived early in 1676, and the Ukrainian colors were dragged in triumph through the streets and put at the feet of the Tsar, who ordered them to be exhibited for three days before the public.

This, however, was not the end of Doroshenko. The Muscovite government ordered him to cross to the left side of the Dnieper and take an oath in the presence of Hetman Samoylovich and Romodanovski. Doroshenko having refused, Tsar Theodore (Tsar Alexis had died) declared a new war on him. In September 1676, the united Ukrainian and Muscovite forces with an army of 30,000 surrounded Chihirin. After a short battle, Doroshenko, who had only 2,000 Cossacks, decided to capitulate. On 19th September, he resigned his post and title in the presence of Samoylovich and Romodanovski. Doroshenko's political career was at an end. He was given an honorable exile in Muscovy. The Tsar, who treated him with exceptional generosity, presented him with an estate, Yarpolche, near Moscow, where he lived until his death on November 9th, 1698.

Thus the "last of the Cossacks" as he was called by the Ukrainian historians, left the political arena. He left it

amidst terrible unheard-of ruin and devastation, having exhausted all its strength in the struggle for the realization of the high ideal of a united and independent Ukrainian state. He left it unappreciated by his contemporaries and by the generations immediately following, for they judged him by the results at the close of his career, without taking into account his efforts, the extraordinary energy and enterprise he showed and the extremely difficult circumstances amidst which his activity was carried out. In particular they could not pardon him his alliance with the Mahomedans, the enemies of the Christian world. It is only in modern times that the heroic figure of the Hetman of Chihirin has found true appreciation from Ukrainian historians and from the nation as a whole.

100. Wars About Chihirin.

With Doroshenko's downfall however, the struggle for the devastated and ruined right bank of the Dnieper was not at an end. The Sultan wished to retain it in his hands at any price. Doroshenko having abdicated, the Sultan decided to bring George Khmelnitsky once more into the foreground. After his imprisonment in the Polish fortress of Marienburg in East Prussia, George returned to the Ukraine but was soon taken prisoner by the Tatars. These surrendered him to the Turks who had kept him ever since in honorable imprisonment in the castle of Edicul near Constantinople. Now the Sultan decided to make use of him, counting on the popularity of the name of Khmelnitsky in the Ukraine. George Khmelnitsky was proclaimed "Prince of the Ukraine" and was sent in the spring of 1677 into Podolia with a small military detachment. The Sultan intended to send more substantial forces to conquer Chihirin later on. George settled down in the half-ruined town of Nemirov, and began sending out "Universals" (Manifestos) inviting the population to recognize his power. The appearance of George Khmelnitsky, a pretender to the Ukraine of the right bank of the Dnieper, roused great alarm in Baturin and Moscow. Chihirin was fortified in haste, and

its garrison raised to 30,000, about 24,000 Muscovite forces under the command of German officers, and about 5,000 Cossacks. Considerable Muscovite forces were stationed in Putivl ready to depart at any moment. In August 1677 a strong Turkish army aided by the Tatars besieged Chihirin. They had George Khmelnytsky with them. The fortress resisted the attacks and when in about three weeks the united forces of Romodanovsky and Samoylovich came to their relief, the Turks and Tatars raised the siege.

It was expected both in the Ukraine and in Moscow that the Sultan would return with a stronger army and again try to capture Chihirin. The Muscovite government not wishing to spend money and men on the new struggle for Chihirin was willing to pull the fortress down and arrange with the Sultan to declare the country round about it neutral. But the Ukrainian government was decidedly against this plan; the old Hetman capital was surrounded with a halo of tradition and thus was too dear to the Ukrainians. The Muscovites thus in spite of themselves had to prepare for a new war. Fresh Muscovite forces were sent to Chihirin under the Muscovite voevod, Rzhevski, and the engineering was confided to Patrick Gordon, a Scotsman in Muscovite service. He was at first a mercenary in the Polish army and took part in the battle of Chudniv. Later he entered Muscovite service as a sapper and served about fifteen years in the Ukraine. His diary is invaluable, and is the chief source of our knowledge about the struggle for Chihirin.

In July 1678 considerable Turkish and Tatar forces laid siege to Chihirin. The attacks were very violent, bombardment with heavy artillery, and underground mining went on incessantly causing great damage to the fortress. In the whole Ukraine of the left bank, the defence of Chihirin was considered a question of national importance. Church services, prayers and fasts were ordered by the clergy. Hetman Samoylovich mobilized all his forces, Cossacks and Kompaniytsi (Volunteers). Romodanovsky was sent from Muscovy to the relief of

Chihirin, but received secret instructions not to make any unnecessary efforts, and rather to evacuate and destroy the fortress. Therefore Romodanovsky was in no great haste to come to Chihirin, and when arrived there, he displayed no great energy, paying no heed to the reasonable advice that Samoylovich and Gordon were giving him. In fact, Romodanovsky behaved in such a strange fashion that contemporaries, not knowing of his secret instructions considered him a traitor and believed he had been bought by the Turks. Though his army was now stationed in the proximity of Chihirin, Romodanovsky showed no intention of coming to the relief of the besieged, and the chief burden of the defence lay with the Ukrainian forces. During the attack of August 15th, the commander of the garrison, Rzhevski, was killed and Patrick Gordon took over the command. The fortress held out for about a week longer, undergoing terrible bombardment and uninterrupted attacks. At last, receiving no help from Romodanovski, Gordon set fire to the fortress in several places, and with the remains of the garrison fought his way out to Romodanovski's camp. The Turks immediately occupied the abandoned fortress, but a terrible explosion of the powder magazine followed, blew the citadel into the air, burying under the ruins thousands of Turks. The Muscovite and Ukrainian armies retreated under fire and succeeded in crossing the Dnieper. The Turkish Grand Vizier gave orders to raze the fortress to the ground. Thus the former capital of Bohdan Khmelnitsky and Doroshenko ceased to exist.

The tragic issue of the struggle for Chihirin made an enormous impression on contemporary Ukrainians as is clearly seen from the literature and memoirs of the time. The ruin and downfall of Chihirin was in their eyes a symbol of the downfall of the Cossack Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnieper. One contemporary historian, Velychko, bemoaned Chihirin in moving lines reminiscent of the Biblical prophets; "Thus fell and disappeared the beautiful Cossack Ukraine like unto ancient Babylon, the

mighty city . . . because of their discord the Cossacks fell, and all perished, having fought one against the other”.

101. George Khmelnitsky, “Prince of Ukraine”.

Returning home the Grand Vizier left to George Khmelnitsky small detachments of Turks and Tatars, with the help of which he was expected to command the devastated and almost depopulated country, middle and southern Kiev province and eastern Podolia. George Khmelnitsky chose Nemirov as his residence. He was joined by several active and energetic Cossack officers who formed a little army and helped him with the colonization and organization of the country. Having to some extent induced the impoverished and terrorized population to recognize his rule, George Khmelnitsky attempted to extend his power to the left bank of the Dnieper. Samoylovich however, was very energetic in replusing him. Many refugees, tempted by George Khmelnitsky’s invitations began to return to their former homes. The Muscovite government as well as the Hetman Samoylovich, saw in this great danger to themselves; if the right bank of the Dnieper became populated and prosperous, George Khmelnitsky would be able to draw new forces and resources from it, and be a constant menace to the left bank. In order to prevent this danger, Samoylovich sent his son Simon with a Cossack army early in the spring of 1679 to the right bank. Simon Samoylovich captured and razed to the ground the remaining more or less important towns and forced the inhabitants to come over to the left side of the river. This is called in Ukrainian history “The Great Eviction”, in consequence of which the middle and south of the province of Kiev was definitely transformed into a desert. George Khmelnitsky was now left with only Podolia. He attempted to invite settlers from Moldavia and elsewhere but treated them with such cruelty in exacting taxes that those who found themselves in his power regarded it as the hardest slavery. Finally George Khmelnitsky’s cruelty took an undoubtedly pathological aspect, and he began to show signs of

insanity. The Turkish government wishing to put an end to their experiment, beheaded the unhappy "Prince of the Ukraine" in Kamenets in the autumn of 1681.

All the participants in the struggle for the Ukraine of the right bank of the Dnieper, Muscovy, Poland, the Tatars and Turks were so utterly exhausted that they at last desired peace, at least for a time. Poland was the first to conclude peace with Turkey in Zuravna in Galicia under which the Polish king renounced Podolia and Kiev province with the exception of the northern part of the latter. In July 1678, Muscovy and Poland prolonged the Treaty of Andrussovo. Kiev was finally attached to Muscovy. In return, Poland recovered part of the Vitebsk province and 200,000 roubles. In the spring of 1681 Muscovy and Turkey concluded the Treaty of Bakchisaray, making a truce for twenty years. During this period neither Crimea, Muscovy nor Turkey could permit people to settle in the area between the rivers Bug and Dniester (that is the middle and southern parts of Kiev province) which was to remain desert and neutral.

Such was the end of the long war for the possession of the Ukraine of the right bank of the Dnieper. A desert was created in the very heart of the Ukraine, a rich and fertile country, on the spot where its history had dawned and where Bohdan Khmelnitsky's state had been centred. This desert was as a symbolic tombstone on the grave of the Ukrainian people's aspirations for independence, a people who would rather ruin their country and strew it with their bones than voluntarily accept an alien political and social order. But at the same time the Ukrainian people had shown that they were not sufficiently mature politically nor steadfast enough to grasp the aims of their own more far-sighted leaders and support them in the struggle for the realization of their lofty ideal. Ukrainians were too immature to sacrifice their immediate advantage to a remote ideal. In consequence they remained but the tools of their politically more advanced and better organized neighbors and ceased to be lords of their own land.

CHAPTER XVIII

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(102) Measures Taken by Turkey and Poland for the Colonization of the Right Bank of the Dnieper. (103) "Eternal Peace" Between Poland and Muscovy and Its Consequences for the Ukraine. (104) Subordination of Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the Patriarch of Muscovy. (105) Crimean Campaign of 1687 and Samoylovich's Downfall. (106) Hetman Mazepa. (107) His Home Policy. (108) Petrik's Uprising. (109) War With Turkey and Crimea.

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102. Measures Taken by Turkey and Poland for the Colonization of the Right Bank of the Dnieper.

The conditions created in Ukraine of the Right Bank of the Dnieper by the Treaty of Bakchisaray could not long endure. It was the artificial creation of political opportunism and very soon proved unable to withstand the pressure of events unforeseen by the Articles of any Treaty. After George Khmel'nitsky's death, the Sultan gave the Right Bank of the Dnieper to his vassal, the Moldavian Prince, Duka, who undertook to colonize the devastated country according to the old local principles of Cossack organization by regiments. He issued Universals (manifestos) inviting people to settle, and promising all kinds of liberties and privileges. Settlers began to arrive and soon the old ruined sites awoke to new life. The Hetman government in the Ukraine of the Left Bank of the Dnieper became alarmed and was compelled to hasten the definite settlement of the people previously forcibly evacuated from the Right Bank. They were settled in the southern part of Poltava province, between the rivers Vorskla and Orel, on the very frontier of the Zaporogian steppes.

Not only Turkey but Poland also had failed to observe the conditions of the peace treaty of Zuravna. Under the rule of their active and talented king, John Sobieski, and influenced by ideas of the struggle of Christianity with Mohammedanism, the Poles actually carried on uninter-

rupted border warfare with Turks, and in a few years had expelled them from Podolia, leaving only Kamenets in Turkish hands. The Polish government in their turn took active steps to repopulate the devastated areas of Podolia and of Kiev provinces. John Sobieski did not hesitate to revive the Ukrainian Cossacks in order to retain for Poland the Right Bank of the Dnieper. He nominated as Hetman, Kunitsky, formerly a Cossack officer under Doroshenko, and ordered him to organize a Cossack army loyal to Poland. Kunitsky took up his residence in Nemirov and in his turn invited settlers. Thus he succeeded in repopulating several old Cossack towns such as Korsun, Bohuslav and others, which had lain in ruins since Doroshenko's time. At the end of 1683, just when John Sobieski, having delivered Vienna from the Turks, was pursuing them in Hungary, Kunitsky with his Cossacks set out on a campaign in South Moldavia (present Bessarabia), burned Bendery and Akerman, but being met by superior Tatar forces, was defeated. The Cossacks elected a new Hetman, Andrew Mohyla, who took from the Turks several Ukrainian towns in Podolia, and continued the organization of the Cossack regiments on the old principles. In the celebrated campaign which John Sobieski conducted against the Turks around Vienna, he was accompanied by 5,000 Cossacks.

Having broken with the Turks and not feeling himself bound by the Treaty of Zuravna, John Sobieski formally renewed the old order on the Right Bank of the Dnieper. He published a manifesto on the renewal of the old Cossack organizations, and the Seim in Warsaw voted that those Cossacks who were faithful to the Polish crown, should be restored to their former rights and privileges. Ukraine was soon repopulated; towns grew up as if out of the ground over night. The tide of emigration from the Left Bank was so strong that Samoylovich was compelled to set sentries along the Dnieper to prevent people crossing.

103. "Eternal Peace" Between Poland and Muscovy and Its Consequences for the Ukraine.

This revival of the Cossacks on the Right Bank of the Dnieper was one of the chief obstacles to the conclusion of the "eternal peace" between Poland and Muscovy. John Sobieski, soon after his victory over the Turks, invited Muscovy to join the anti-Turk coalition to which, besides Poland, Austria, Venice, and the Pope belonged. Hetman Samoylovich did all that he could to prevent the conclusion of the "eternal peace", fearing that it would sanction and perpetuate the partition of Ukraine. He never abandoned hope of reuniting both parts of the Ukraine under the power of one Hetman. He also was much opposed to the conquest of Crimea by Muscovy, for the Ukraine surrounded on all sides by Muscovite possessions would then have not a single ally to rely upon. But in spite of Samoylovich's endeavors to the contrary, the "eternal peace" between Muscovy and Poland was concluded in the spring of 1686, as well as an alliance against the Sultan and the Crimean Tatars.

According to this peace treaty Poland renounced in perpetuity the Ukraine of the Left Bank of the Dnieper, and gave up Kiev and the Zaporogian Cossacks to the exclusive supremacy of the Muscovite Tsar. Poland also undertook not to renew or repopulate the central part of the province of Kiev with the old towns along the Dnieper. Muscovy promised to declare war on the Crimean Khan and in case of an invasion by Turkey, to send an army to help. Poland was to send help if the Tatars and Turks menaced Kiev.

104. Subordination of Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the Patriarch of Muscovy.

Hearing of the conclusion of the peace treaty, Samoylovich loudly expressed his dissatisfaction saying: "Ukraine will have to take care of herself". He also sent a letter to the Polish king protesting against the surrender of a part of Ukraine to Poland. But in thus openly

opposing Muscovite policy Samoylovich failed to notice that he could no longer rely on his officers and that his opposition to Muscovy was a tool in the hands of his enemies which would be used against him. His readiness to sacrifice national aims to his personal interests made him destroy with his own hands one of the foundation stones of Ukrainian independence, the autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, for he helped to make it dependent on the Muscovite Patriarch.

From the very beginning of Christianity, the Church in the Ukraine had been dependent on the Patriarch of Constantinople. Until the Seventeenth century this dependence was only nominal, but after the political Union with Muscovy in 1654 it served to protect the Ukrainian Church against Muscovite interference. The Metropolitan, Silvester Kossiv, was very reluctant to take the oath of allegiance to the Tsar of Muscovy; his successor, Dionisiy Balaban, (1658-63) was openly hostile to Muscovy and preferred a federation with Poland. The next Metropolitan, Joseph Tukalsky (1663-1671) was an active promoter of Ukrainian independence; he even transferred his seat from Kiev to Chihirin, the residence of the Hetman. After his death the Muscovite government prevented the election of a new Metropolitan and the see remained vacant for ten years. In 1684 the Muscovite government gave permission for the election of a new Metropolitan on condition that henceforth he should be dependent on the Patriarch of Moscow.

Hetman Samoylovich was ready to meet these wishes of the Muscovite government because he had a family interest in the matter, having proposed as candidate his kinsman Prince Gedeon Chetvertinsky, Bishop of Lutsk. The elections in which the laity were in a majority over the clergy, took place on the 29th of June 1685 in Kiev, and Bishop Gedeon Chetvertinsky was elected under pressure by the secular authorities. The new Ukrainian Metropolitan went to Moscow for his ordination by the Muscovite Patriarch, Joachim, and was presented with sables and gold. It was however, necessary to obtain the consent

of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Envoys from the Tsar and the Hetman were sent to Constantinople, also taking with them sables and gold. But the Patriarch of Constantinople, as well as other Patriarchs and especially that of Jerusalem, would not hear of breaking the tradition that had already existed over seven hundred years. The Muscovite Tsar then appealed to the Sultan, who compelled the Patriarch to consent "voluntarily" to the separation of the Ukrainian Church from the Patriarch of Constantinople making it dependent on the Patriarch of Moscow. The Ukrainian clergy were very much upset at this change but they were of course powerless against the Hetman and Muscovy.

105. Crimean Campaign of 1687 and Samoylovich's Downfall.

Having signed an "eternal peace" with Poland, the Muscovite government broke with the Sultan and planned a campaign against Crimea with the united forces of Muscovy and the Ukraine. Hetman Samoylovich was very much against this campaign as he was also against the breach with the Crimean Khan. But his opinion was not considered, nor his advice to begin the campaign very early in spring so as to cross the dry steppe before the summer heat. The Muscovite government decided to penetrate this time into the very heart of Crimea, whereas Austria, Poland and Venice were to start operations against the Turks. An enormously strong army of about 100,000 men started on its way led by Prince Vassili Golitsyn, favorite of the Tsarevna Sophia who at that time actually governed Muscovy. It was not until the end of April 1687 that this army, with a transport of about 20,000 wagons arrived in the Zaporogian steppes where it was joined, between the rivers Samara and Orel, by the Ukrainian army of about 50,000 led by the Hetman. The united armies advanced towards Perekop. But the summer heat set in early that year: there was a drought and all the grass dried up and burnt under the powerful sun. The heat and dust were unbearable. There was no water

and no fodder for so many horses. Samoylovich suffered from his eyes and openly blamed the Muscovite government for the "senseless" war. Coming down as far south as the plains below the rapids, the army met with steppe-fires. Wide areas of dry grass were turned into a sea of fire and afterwards into a black charred desert. It was the usual device adopted by the Tatars to prevent the enemy from approaching their homes. Rumors were started among the Muscovites that the Ukrainians were responsible for the steppe-fire, having set it ablaze in collusion with the Tatars. The army thus compelled to advance under these conditions through the charred steppe under the burning sun was, moreover, suffering from disease: men and horses died in masses. At last not far from Perekop they were compelled to halt in order not to lose the whole army. It was decided by a council of war to send 20,000 Ukrainians and as many Muscovites south to the Turkish fortress Kizikermen on the Dnieper to watch that the Tatars did not advance into the Ukraine or Poland. The main force was to retrace their steps.

Thus the united army began to retreat under the same, if not worse, conditions not having seen a single enemy. All were enraged by failure and purposeless losses and suffering. As is usual in these cases, someone was sought to bear the blame and finally Hetman Samoylovich was selected as the scapegoat. He was held responsible for the failure of the adventure though he had warned against it. Already for some time past the Cossack officers had disliked him on account of his autocratic behavior, his haughty and overbearing ways and his treatment of them. He was accused of avarice, the selfish pursuit of his own interests and undue favoritism of members of his family to whom he gave the most important State offices. They took bribes and disregarded the law. The plot against Samoylovich was concocted by a group of officers during the campaign itself. They soon won over the Muscovite Commander, Prince Vassili Golitsyn. The Hetman was accused, among other crimes, of having an understanding with the Tatars, especially in the matter of steppe-fires.

Prince Golitsyn was delighted to have found a scapegoat who could be held responsible for the disgraceful failure of a military enterprise on such a grand scale. He hastened to send the accusation against Samoylovich to Moscow and soon in reply received the order to despatch him to Moscow under arrest. Ukrainian Cossacks were to elect a new Hetman.

Samoylovich was arrested on the 22nd of July, 1687, in the camp on the river Kolomac and sent to Moscow. On the 25th of July the Council of Cossack officers elected as Hetman the Commanding General Ivan Mazepa.

Samoylovich, together with his sons, was banished to Siberia without trial or sentence. Thus perished the whole family. Hetman Samoylovich, in spite of his faults, was undoubtedly a patriot. He was a good statesman and an efficient administrator, but his personal interests only too often outweighed the interests of the State.

106. Hetman Mazepa.

The Cossack Council on the river Kolomac, on the frontier of the Zaporogian steppes, much resembled the Council in Kozacha Dibrova at which, fifteen years ago, Samoylovich was elected Hetman. An area on the bank of the river Kolomac was surrounded with Muscovite troops, the tent of Golitsyn being in the middle. The common Cossacks to the number of about 2,000 were to witness the election. When, after the religious service, Golitsyn asked them whom they wished to have as their Hetman, the name of Mazepa, according to previous understanding, was pronounced. Indeed, the previous day a Council of Cossack officers had been held in Golitsyn's tent, and it is probable that Mazepa's candidature was then decided upon. However, Mazepa's name, once pronounced, was received with acclamations and accordingly he was proclaimed Hetman. He swore to recognize the supremacy of the Tsar and signed the new "Articles" which were mostly a recapitulation of former Articles signed by every newly-elected Hetman. The Cossack officers tried to obtain the right to conduct international

diplomatic relations, but in vain: all letters that might come from a foreign power were to be sent to Moscow. The Cossacks, as usual, demanded various rights and privileges, exemption from all taxation and levies and confirmation of their ownership of lands, forests, meadows, mills, etc. The burgesses also had their rights confirmed according to former "Articles". Muscovite garrisons were to remain in Kiev, Chernigov, Pereyaslav, Nizhin and Oster, commanded by Muscovite voevods who, however, were not to interfere in local affairs. The Rolls of the Registered Cossacks were fixed at 30,000. The Hetman's residence was to be in Baturin and a regiment of Muscovite musketeers (streltsi) was to be there at his disposal. Along the southern frontier of the Hetman territory, along the rivers Orel and Samara, a line of fortresses was to be built for protection against the Tatars.

In the person of the Hetman, the Ukraine of the left bank of the Dnieper obtained a highly gifted statesman and administrator of the school of Peter Doroshenko. Ivan Mazepa belonged by birth to the Orthodox Ukrainian landed gentry from the Bila Tserkva district of the province of Kiev. The old seat of their family was the place called Mazepyntsi, still existing. His father joined the Cossacks in 1654 and was commander of Bila Tserkva. The mother of the future Hetman also came from the noble family of Mokievsky and was known for her warm attachment to the Orthodox Church. She had been a "sister" of the Brotherhood of Lutsk and later, when widowed, took the veil. At the time of her son's election she was abbess of a convent in Kiev. Mazepa's only sister was married to a Ukrainian nobleman, Voynarovsky, who having been converted to Roman Catholicism pressed his wife to change over also. She left her husband and took the veil with her daughter Martha. Her son, Andrew Voynarovsky, was brought up at the court of his uncle, the Hetman. This attachment of Mazepa's family to the Orthodox faith and their deep religious feelings were also characteristic of Ivan Mazepa himself.

The exact date of Mazepa's birthday is not known.

Historians put it between 1629 and 1632. It is also uncertain where he was educated. There are indications that he was at one time a student in the Academy of Kiev. According to other information, he was at school in the Jesuit College in Warsaw and also somewhere abroad. At any rate for his period he was brilliantly educated and proved later to be a great patron of the Arts and Learning. But Mazepa's best schooling for life was at the court of King John Casimir where he was a page in the years 1649-1652, with other young Cossacks whom the king wished to bring up in an atmosphere favorable to Poland. Later, Mazepa is known to have been employed on various diplomatic errands, carrying letters and presents from the king to the Cossacks and the Hetmans. But when King John Casimir embarked on his 1663 campaign in the Ukraine, Mazepa left his service and returned home to Bila Tserkva. In the year 1669 we find him in the service of Hetman Doroshenko.

At first he held the modest position of lieutenant of the Hetman's Guards but his gifts and his knowledge of the world and of men were soon appreciated by the Hetman of Chihirin and in a few years he became the Commanding Captain at Headquarters and later General Secretary there. He married the daughter of the Colonel of Bila Tserkva, Polovets, but had no children. In 1674, when Doroshenko's position was very precarious, he sent Mazepa to the Crimea to ask for help against Samoylovich and Muscovy. Mazepa was intercepted by the Zaporogian Cossacks, taken prisoner and would have been put to death but for Sirko, their leader (otaman), who saved his life and sent him to Samoylovich. Mazepa knew how to please Samoylovich who sent him to Moscow having promised, however, that he would be freed and allowed to return into the Ukraine. Mazepa indeed was set free and on his return entered Samoylovich's service. He had to start his career from the very beginning and after having been Doroshenko's General Secretary (Foreign Secretary) he became at the court of Samoylovich a "Hetman's gentleman". But here also he was soon promoted

to the first ranks of Cossack officers and in 1682 was the Commanding Captain of the Cossack Headquarters. This points not only to Mazepa's talents but also to his knowledge of men and how to please them. In Samoylovich's service he carried out important diplomatic missions and was often sent to Muscovy where he had an opportunity of observing government circles and their policy at close quarters.

107. His Home Policy.

News of the events on the river Kolomac provoked disorders in the whole Ukraine. The peasants and common Cossacks everywhere molested and plundered their officers, showing the growing hatred of the oppression of the new Ukrainian aristocracy. The new Hetman was at once compelled to use his volunteer troops to restore order. Culprits and leaders were punished, and at the same time Hetman Mazepa issued a manifesto forbidding recourse to private vengeance for the wrongs caused by the rising; everyone was invited to appeal to the Courts of Justice for the settlement of damages and punishment of the guilty. A little later, in 1691, he issued an Universal in which he restricted the impositions laid on the serfs: landowners were invited not to overburden the peasants on their lands with heavy labor and taxation or to encroach on their possessions of land, forests or meadows and in general not to offer any violence and "not to invent anything newfangled and overdone in the way of impositions".

Having subdued the popular agitation Mazepa was compelled to start fresh preparations for war against the Tatars. First of all, he made new settlements mostly of the refugees from the right bank of the Dnieper; and he also built fortifications along the river Samara which later served as bases for further advances against the Tatars, as well as defences from their unexpected invasions.

The new campaign took place in spring 1689. Austrian and Venetian successes against the Tatars encouraged the Muscovite government to organize a new campaign

against the Tatars. A Muscovite army of about 112,000 men started in March 1689 led by the same Prince Golitsyn. Mazepa joined him in April. This time the united armies reached Perekop about the end of May. The Khan attacked them with all his forces but was repulsed. However, Golitsyn was not able to proceed further, the Tatars having again burned down all the country around. There was no water, no fodder and not sufficient food for such an army. Early in June they began to retreat and in about a fortnight the army again stood on the banks of the river Samara and soon returned home. Once again the campaign had turned out to be merely a military demonstration on a grand scale but without any immediate result whatever. Golitsyn succeeded in representing the campaign as a great success. His protectress, the Tsarevna Sophia lavished distinctions and rewards on him and on his companions as though they really had been victorious. But the days of her power were already numbered.

Early in August 1689, Mazepa arrived in Moscow with a great train of followers to be presented to the two young Tsars Ivan and Peter, who reigned nominally only and to Tsarevna Sophia who had been Regent since 1682. Mazepa had with him all the officers of the Cossack Headquarters and five colonels, his whole company numbering about 300 persons. Mazepa was received with great pomp such as was generally shown only to foreign potentates and their ambassadors. Audiences and receptions had just begun when a palace revolution broke out. The young Tsar Peter began an open struggle against his half-sister Tsarevna Sophia and deprived her finally of her power as Regent, shut her up in a convent and took the whole power into his hands. Sophia's favorite Prince Golitsyn was exiled; among other crimes, he was accused of his unsuccessful campaign against the Tatars. Shaklovitov, one of Sophia's chief followers who only recently had been on a mission to the Ukraine, was beheaded. During the struggle between the Kremlin, which was in Sophia's power and the Triotsko Sergievsky monastery, the stronghold of the young Tsar Peter, Mazepa's position

was very precarious. He had come as the partisan of Sophia's regime and was considered to be Golitsyn's friend. It was to be expected that Mazepa would share his fate. Mazepa decided, however, to go over to the young Tsar. He at once won the sympathies of the young Peter to such an extent that he not only avoided embroiling himself with the new government but enjoyed the young Tsar's entire confidence and friendship for twenty years until their ways parted. Now feeling himself strong and supported by the young Tsar's favor, Mazepa, on his return to the Ukraine, could carry out his policy with more assurance and firmness.

Conditions in the Ukraine of the left bank were on the whole very difficult right from the beginning of Mazepa's rule. The popular masses were profoundly agitated, often breaking out in open revolt. The Cossack officers having by all possible means, fair and foul, acquired considerable landed property, were burdening the peasants on their lands with ever heavier taxation and duties. The State monopoly on spirits, recently introduced in the Ukraine was very unpopular because the population was of old accustomed to free distilling and selling of spirits. This dissatisfaction was the greater as the income derived therefrom was employed to maintain the *Kompaniytsi* (Volunteer) troops which had been formed by throwing together various elements of vagrants, unsettled vagabonds and rogues. These troops were guilty of all manner of violence and oppression, and were extremely unpopular among the population. Hetman Mazepa himself had many personal enemies who constantly plotted and intrigued against him, sending to Moscow veritable showers of denunciations. The demoralized Cossack officers, accustomed to make use of the Muscovite government in settling their home affairs and depose their Hetman with the help of Muscovite force considered Mazepa to be simply a clever man knowing how to take advantage of a favorable situation and use the propitious moment. To the bulk of the Cossack officers of the left bank Mazepa was a "stranger", a "Liakh" (Pole). Neither the common

Cossacks nor peasants saw in the new Hetman anything to distinguish him from the rest of the new gentry and make him popular.

But out of all these difficulties Mazepa emerged victorious. By his clever, tactful, and consistent policy he strengthened his authority among his officers. Feeling behind him the support of the young Tsar, Mazepa dealt vigorously with his overt enemies and by generous grants of lands created around himself a considerable circle of devoted followers. During his long rule Mazepa showed a definite tendency to base his power in the Ukraine on the support of the rich and well educated class of Cossack officers. Ukrainian historians often reproach Mazepa for his lack of democratic idealism and for seeking support among the privileged class of Cossack officers with their aristocratic tendencies rather than among the mass of the people. We must not forget that Mazepa, the child of his age, held this to be the normal way of building up a State with the monarchical power reposing in the leading and privileged class, the national aristocracy, with which he shared his power. Within the limits of the political conceptions of his time Mazepa endeavored to do his utmost for the Ukraine. In supporting and developing the new national aristocracy with grants of land that made them an economically strong and politically independent class, he took great care of their education and promoted culture among them. The Cossack officers soon learned to appreciate their Hetman and he acquired their confidence and high esteem.

From the beginning of his rule Mazepa showed himself to be a strong protector of the Ukrainian Church and a liberal patron of National Arts and Learning. At his own expense he built a number of beautiful churches and monasteries in Kiev, Chernigov, Pereyaslav and other places. He erected a new building for the Academy in Kiev founded by Peter Mohyla and richly endowed it with lands, funds and bursaries in order to "enable all Ukrainian children to indulge any aptitude for learning." Besides the Academy he founded a number of schools and

hospitals taking great care of their buildings. The contemporary style of architecture, baroque, in the Ukraine at this time is designated as "Mazepine baroque". He richly endowed Ukrainian monasteries and convents with their schools and printing presses which were at that time the chief centres of learning. He obtained for the Ukrainian Metropolitan Barlaam Yasinsky (1690-1706) the title of Exarch of the Muscovite Patriarch in order to exalt the head of the Ukrainian Church. For his services rendered to the Ukrainian Church and national education Mazepa acquired the sympathies of enlightened Ukrainians among both clergy and laity. Hardly any Hetman had so many panegyrics, odes, poems and dramas composed in his honor as Mazepa.

Though Mazepa represented the Ukrainian aristocracy, we must admit that to a greater extent than any other Hetman, he protected the interests of the common Cossacks and peasants against the officers and restrained the cravings of the new aristocracy within the limits of the law. In his Universal (Manifesto) of 1691, he had strictly forbidden secular as well as spiritual landlords to impose unduly heavy duties on the peasants occupying their lands or to force the Cossacks into serfdom. He had also forbidden anyone to deprive the Cossacks of lands which "they had acquired with their swords and their blood" having divided among them the lands of former Polish owners. On the whole Mazepa insisted that the landlords should hold their lands "reasonably, according to Ukrainian custom without causing difficulties to the peasants from newly imposed obligations". About this time he deprived of their estates some of the landlords in Poltava province for having overburdened their peasants with obligations. In his Universal of 1692 he again reminded the landlords that they "keep in moderation, inflicting nothing new and immoderate, but be satisfied with the usual tributes and duties". In the Universal of 1701 the Hetman let it be known that he had impeached an officer before the Court of Justice for having overburdened his peasants with new and illegal obligations

and again ordered that the peasants should not work more than two days a week for the landlord.

On several occasions Mazepa sided with the peasants when the Muscovite government tried to compel them to build fortresses and serve in the military transports. Mazepa decreed that only Cossacks should be employed in military service as was their privilege and not the peasants who already were overburdened with all kinds of duties. Later also he took up the defence of the Cossacks when Tsar Peter exhausted them with innumerable campaigns and the building of numberless fortresses. Regarding the State monopoly on spirits which was so unpopular, Mazepa had abolished it on coming into power, but was soon compelled to revive it as it was the only source of revenue for the payment of the *Kompaniysti* troops, though he took care that people should not be "annoyed when buying spirits for marriage or baptismal feasts". Personally he was against a State monopoly on spirits. Thus after a long debate at a Council of Cossack officers Mazepa decided (1692) again to abolish this State monopoly and look for other sources of income. A special Universal was published to make this known to the population. At Easter 1693, the Hetman called in a new Cossack Officers Council from all the regiments, common Cossacks and burgesses, at which it was voted to "abolish the spirits monopoly as a thing hateful of old", for one year, and impose instead a special tax on all breweries and inns. But this new method did not last as it brought too little into the State Treasury. Among other reasons why Mazepa was against brewing and distilling on a great scale was that it destroyed forests, and he took special care of the forests as is seen from his numerous Universals for this purpose.

Hetman Mazepa greatly encouraged Ukrainian trade and protected the interests of Ukrainian merchants. When, in 1700, the Polish authorities put difficulties and hindrances in the way of the Ukrainian merchants in Poland, he specially intervened with the Polish authorities and persuaded that government to publish a special order and

appeal to the population inviting them not to make difficulties for traders bearing Ukrainian passports in Poland. Generally speaking, the whole of Mazepa's home policy proves that, although supporting the privileged class of Cossack officers, as pillars of Ukrainian autonomy, he never lost sight of the interests of the Ukrainian nation as a whole.

The Zaporogian Cossacks were in constant opposition to Hetman Mazepa. They well understood that with the conquest of Crimea and the domination of the steppes on the shores of the Black Sea the very existence of the Zaporogian Sich, the outpost of the Ukraine against the Crimean robbers, would be endangered, and their role of defenders of the Ukrainian frontier would be at an end. Peace on this frontier and the cultivation of these great areas of steppe would render the Zaporogians needless. It was thus to the interest of the Zaporogian Cossacks to leave the steppes in their primeval uncultivated state. The settlement of an agricultural population on the rivers of Orel and Samara, quite near to the rapids and the building of fortresses were distasteful to the Zaporogians so that they at once came into conflict with the Hetman. As at the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Zaporogian Sich was still the refuge of all discontented elements of the Ukrainian population. It was from here that agitators proceeded into the Ukraine to carry on propaganda against the Cossack officers and the Hetman. Here it was also that a pretender to the Hetman's mace finally arose, who once again dreamed of delivering the Ukraine from Muscovite supremacy with the help of the Crimean Tatars. His programme included in addition, the abolition of the rule of the Hetman and Cossack officers. He was a young clerk in the office of the Cossack Headquarters, Peter Ivanenko or Petrik.

108. Petrik's Uprising.

Petrik fled, in the spring of 1692, to the Zaporogian Sich, won over some of them to the idea of a rising against the Hetman, penetrated the Crimea and succeeded in in-

teresting the Khan in his plan so far that they concluded a treaty and an alliance of mutual military support. This Treaty between the two powers, the Ukraine and the Crimea, stipulated: "an eternal peace and brotherly relations" and mutual defence against Poland and Muscovy. The Ukrainian Princedom, according to the Treaty, included both sides of the Dnieper and a part of Slobidska Ukraine. The Crimea and the Ukraine were to have resident ambassadors and peacefully settle all their misunderstandings. Free trade was guaranteed for both sides without any customs and the Ukrainians were to be allowed to fish and hunt in the region of the lower Dnieper, also evaporate salt without any duties or taxation. Having obtained the Khan's promise of help, Petrik advanced into the Ukraine inviting the population to overthrow "the tyranny of Muscovy and the aristocrats". Mazepa sent against him a force sufficient to induce him to flee to the Zaporogian Sich. Next year Petrik made another unsuccessful attempt to provoke a rising in the Ukraine. For several years he gave trouble to the Ukrainian authorities by his plotting in Crimea and took part in several inroads by the Tatars until 1696 when he disappeared. This episode of Ukrainian history is still insufficiently investigated and very little known. There are some unsolved and enigmatic sides to it: how far, for instance, was Petrik supported by some of the Cossack officers who were in opposition to Mazepa. As far as materials and documents go, it is difficult to draw definite conclusions.

109. War with Turkey and Crimea.

Hardly had the agitation caused by Petrik's rising subsided, when the attention of the Cossacks and the Ukrainian population as a whole, was drawn to the struggle which the Muscovite Tsar had started against the Turks and the Tatars for the possession of the approaches to the Black and the Azov Seas. In this long and strenuous war the Ukraine was to play an active part. This struggle also attracted the Zaporogian Cossacks and for some time diverted their spirit of opposition. Tsar Peter made a

plan of campaign on two fronts: on one side operations were to be conducted on the lower Don for the possession of the Turkish fortress of Azov; on the other side the campaign was directed towards the lower Dnieper in order to open an approach to the Black Sea. The object of this war was within the grasp of the Ukrainian population. It lay in the sphere of their vital interests and the Ukrainian Cossacks took an active and even enthusiastic part in it. Tsar Peter's first attempt at the siege of Azov, 1695, was a failure; but at the same time the Ukrainian and Muscovite armies led respectively by Mazepa and Sheremetiev in the region of the lower Dnieper were quite successful, the Turkish fortresses of Kisikermen and Tavansk and a number of smaller Turkish strongholds were taken. Most of them were destroyed but Kisikermen and Tavansk were occupied by garrisons composed of the Hetman's Cossacks and of the Zaporogians. Early in 1696 the Tatars with Petrik penetrated into Ukrainian territory as far as Hadiach but Mazepa soon expelled them.

In 1696 Tsar Peter opened his second campaign with the siege of Azov. Having built on the Don near Voronezh a special fleet, he sailed down the river. After a siege and hard fighting, supported by the Ukrainian forces, he took the strong fortress of Azov. The Ukrainian army, under the command of Colonel Lyzohub, played in this campaign a decisive role, according to the testimony of Tsar Peter himself.

The campaign lasted four years longer. One of its striking episodes was the heroic defence by the Cossack garrison of the fortresses of Tavansk and Kizikermen, when a few thousand Cossacks held the fortress against the united Tatar and Turkish armies with powerful artillery, until they were relieved by the Hetman with his main force. During this siege the Ukrainians lost but 205 men whereas the Turkish losses were about 7,000. Zaporogian Cossacks renewed their maritime campaign on the Black Sea attacking and plundering the Turkish shores. The allies, however, were not able to strike a decisive

blow against the Mohammedans. The war was protracted and the Ukraine being the principal contributor to its expenses, felt the increasingly heavy burden every year. The situation was rendered more difficult by bad harvests with which the Ukraine was almost yearly afflicted at the end of the Seventeenth century.

In the meantime, Austria concluded a separate peace with the Turks at Carlowitz. Soon afterwards Poland did the same, having obtained Kamenets in Podolia. The Tsar Peter, abandoned by his allies, also started peace negotiations and on the 30th of July, 1700, a truce for 30 years was concluded in Constantinople. Muscovy received Azov and the northern shores of the Azov Sea. Both sides undertook not to build fortresses on the lower Dnieper and to destroy those that existed. The truce of Constantinople gave to the Ukrainians access to the Black Sea so vital to their economic interests. But this result no longer satisfied Tsar Peter, who now dreamed of opening the Baltic for his intercourse with Europe. In order to conquer the shores of the Baltic he started a war against Sweden and into this war he forcibly dragged the Ukraine also, though the interests of the Ukrainian population did not lie at all in this direction. This struggle against Sweden had, indeed, fatal consequences for the Ukraine.

CHAPTER XIX

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(110) Ukrainian Cossack State of the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century. (111) Its Territory and Its Constitution. (112) Hetman. (113) Cossack Officers (Starshina) and Cossack Council (Kosatska Rada). (114) The Army. (115) Finance. (116) Trade. (117) Social Classes and Their Mutual Relations. (118) Zaporogian Sich. (119) Education and Culture.

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110. Ukrainian Cossack State of the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century.

When we speak of the Ukrainian Cossack State of the Seventeenth century, which was brought into being as a result of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's uprising, of its frontiers, its constitution and its political and international position, we must bear in mind that this State passed through various phases, in about thirty years of its independent existence, that is, from Bohdan Khmelnytsky's uprising in 1648 until Doroshenko's downfall in 1676. At the moment when Poland and Muscovy partitioned it between them, the Ukraine was very different from what it was on the eve of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's uprising. In his Treaties with Poland, that of Zboriv in 1649 and the Treaty of Bila Tserkva in 1652, Bohdan Khmelnytsky had obtained political autonomy for the Ukraine within the bounds of three provinces, Kiev, Chernigov, and Braslav, that is, the present provinces of Poltava and Chernigov on the Left Bank of the Dnieper. The Treaty of Bila Tserkva, it is true, restricted the territory to the Kiev province only, but already after Khmelnytsky's victory of Batih, the provinces of Braslav and Chernigov were again occupied by the Cossacks. Having broken with Poland in 1654, Khmelnytsky intended to unite all Ukrainian territories under his power. He also annexed the southern part of White Russia which formed one White Russian Cossack regiment. This was important from a strategic point of view involving the protection of the Northern frontier. It was also important from an eco-

nomic point of view since it facilitated Ukrainian exports which up to then had mostly passed through the ports of the Baltic. We know that Khmelnitsky had declared Stary Bykhov, on the Dnieper, a free port. In spite of stubborn resistance on the part of the Muscovite government, the Ukrainian Hetmans retained as long as they could the White Russian lands, even after Hetman Vyhovsky's fall. In the year 1657 the nobles of the district of Pinsk declared their union with the Ukraine; at the same time Ukrainian troops occupied East Volynia also in consequence of an invitation from the local gentry.

111. Its Territory and Its Constitution.

Notwithstanding the acknowledged protectorate of the Muscovite Tsar, Bohdan Khmelnitsky ruled the Ukraine as an independent sovereign. When, after the Treaty of Andrussovo (1667) the Left Bank of the Dnieper alone remained definitely with Muscovia, the Ukraine continued to be an independent State organization within Muscovy. The character of this dependence and the nature of Ukrainian relations with Muscovy were determined afresh at the election of each new Hetman by a special Treaty concluded between the Hetman and the Muscovite government. The basis of these recurring treaties were so-called "Articles" of Bohdan Khmelnitsky. But in every new Treaty there were certain changes, almost always in the direction of a curtailment of Ukrainian autonomy and limitation of the Hetman's power. The relationship between the Ukraine and Muscovy brought about by these Treaties should in our opinion be characterized as vassal dependence of the Ukraine on Muscovy. This dependence still left a wide measure of autonomy to Ukraine: the Cossack State had its own monarch elected by Ukrainians who, after the election, took an oath of allegiance to the Tsar. The newly elected Hetman concluded a formal Treaty with the Muscovite government. Ukraine had its own army, finance, administration, judiciary and law-making machinery. Until 1686 the Ukrainian Church was quite independent of the Muscovite Patriarch.

112. Hetman.

Notwithstanding the restrictions and his dependence on the Tsar, the Hetman still had very wide powers. He was able, for example, to make grants of land as a reward for service or for military merit. He also made nominations to posts in the State service. Thus the Cossack officers were entirely dependent on the Hetman's will. They had, however, a very important weapon against the Hetman if they were dissatisfied with him: they could denounce him in Moscow for treason. Thus it was essential that the Hetman should have the confidence of the Tsar and assured connections among the members of the Muscovite government in order to protect himself from danger from this quarter. Thus Hetman Samoylovich secured the nomination of Sheremetiev as head of the Muscovite garrison in Kiev, to whom he gave his daughter in marriage. He did all he could to place his relatives or his faithful followers in the most important positions in Ukraine. Even the newly elected Metropolitan Prince Gedeon Chetvertynsky was a relative of his. But when he carelessly damaged his relations with the Muscovite government his enemies in the Ukraine took advantage of this and prepared his downfall as well as the downfall of all his family. Hetman Mazepa with his extraordinary gift of winning people, knew how immediately to gain the sympathy and confidence of the Muscovite Tsar Peter, and this safeguarded him for the immediate future against all accusations and denunciations which were showered on him by his countrymen even more than on any other Hetman. On the other hand, with his adroit home policy he acquired, as time went on, such authority among the Cossack officers that he could rule the country with almost unlimited power, caring nothing for the Articles of the Treaty signed on his accession, nor for the dissatisfaction of individuals.

However, it was seldom that a Hetman ruled arbitrarily; his power was, in fact, limited. According to old tradition among the Cossacks, the Hetman conferred on important questions with the General officers of the

Cossack Headquarters and the Colonels. Sometimes also the rest of the regimental officers took part in the assembly. It became habitual for all the Cossack officers (*starshina*) to meet regularly together in the Hetman's residence several times in the year, usually at Christmas, Easter and other important feasts. It was on these occasions that the sessions of the Council of Cossack Officers took place. The most important affairs were here investigated, such as the defence organization of the country, candidatures to the more important posts in the government, and all the more or less important questions of an administrative, judicial or economic character, or the question of the State Monopoly on spirits. On the whole the Council of the Cossack Officers recalled by its character and functions the Council of Lords of the Great Princedom of Lithuania when it embraced Ukrainian and White Russian territories, the Council of Muscovite Boyars, or the Senate of the West European States.

113. Cossack Officers (*Starshina*) and Cossack Council

The General Cossack Council, called "Generalna Rada", began to function during the epoch of the "Ruina" when the Hetmans were so often deposed or elected, and various political changes occurred. Some of these "Generalna Rada", the one in Korsun of 1657, for instance, was called "Seim" by contemporaries, but this name was not generally accepted and the old name "Rada" (Council) was preserved. Most of these Councils were of a haphazard character in the matter of representation, number of delegates and procedure. Those matters depended on the occasion and the political circumstances of the moment. At any rate, it is possible to trace the course of the transformation of the former Cossack Rada, a purely military assembly, into an organ of State at which general questions were debated. Also with regard to representation an important change took place in the same direction. Along with Cossacks, other classes of the population were represented, such as the clergy, burgesses and even peasants, as was the case on the

“Chorna Rada” (Black Council), and the General Council were called together more frequently during the rule of Hetman Peter Doroshenko, who was, so to speak, the most constitutional of all the Hetmans.

On the Left Bank of the Dnieper the General Cossack Council had already at the time of Hetman Mnohohrishny lost its original character of a democratic assembly expressing the will of the Cossacks. Even if such a Council were called together as on the occasion of the election of a new Hetman, it was merely an additional solemnity to sanction the decision made *de facto* by the Council of Cossack officers. In the Eighteenth century the General Cossack Council was nothing but a fiction.

The Ukrainian Cossack State retained the military organization created at the time of the revolution of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and maintained it from military necessity. Even the official name of the State was “Zaporogian Army”; in this form it lasted as late as the Eighteenth century. The title of the Head of the State was: “Hetman of His Majesty the Tsar’s Zaporogian armies of both banks of the Dnieper”. This gave expression to the Tsar’s supremacy and the Hetman’s aspirations to the lost Right Bank of the Dnieper. The Central government consisted of a body of General Staff Officers presided over by the Hetman. Their number included: the General Secretary, the Head of the Military Administration, its chief Standard Bearer, the Bearer of the Ensign, the Hetman’s two aides-de-camp and the two Judges. These posts in the Cossack army date from the beginning of the Seventeenth century. Each of these Cossack officers had his special functions. The General Secretary was head of the Hetman’s Chancellery. He conducted diplomatic relations and carried out the functions of the Foreign Minister; by foreigners he was called Chancellor. The General Secretary was next in status to the Hetman, and a General Secretary such as Vyhovsky, who held this post during the whole rule of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, contributed very much to the importance of this office. He was also the Keeper of the

State Seal: it was his privilege to have it in his custody and affix it to the more important documents. The Head of the Military Administration besides being Commander of the Cossack Artillery, had concentrated in his hands the whole military affairs of the country, and, in modern terminology, he should be called the War Minister. He had his own chancellery with its secretary and his complete staff with its Aide-de-camp, Standard bearer, and Steward.

There were two General Judges. During the Seventeenth century they usually had under their jurisdiction cases which came directly to them, mostly complaints addressed to the Hetman. Later on, in the Eighteenth century, the General Judge or Judges became the Highest Court of Appeal in the country. General Judges had their insignias: "The Judge's Rod", a symbol of office which they received on their election and surrendered on leaving their post. There were two General Ossavuls (Aides-de-camp) as well as two General Khorunzhy (Standard bearers) and two General Bunchuzhny (Bunchuk bearers). The office of General Ossavul had no sharply defined functions. Bunchuky is the horsetail-ensign carried before the Hetman in ceremonies. Its holders were mostly employed to carry out different important missions of the Hetman. Foreigners called them Hetman's aides-de-camp. The Standard bearers and the Bunchuk bearers had also ceremonial functions. During the Eighteenth century the office of the General Under-Treasurer was added to the governing body whose duty it was to administer the State Finances.

Each of the General Cossack officers, besides his normal functions, carried out different missions, civil or military, for the Hetman. The whole body of the General officers acted as the Hetman's government, being at the same time his Headquarters in military affairs and his Cabinet of Ministers. The General officers were usually elected in the General Cossack Council at the same time when the Hetman was elected

or in the Council of the Cossack officers and sometimes they were nominated by the Hetman.

114. The Army.

The Ukraine of the Left Bank of the Dnieper was divided into ten military districts called Regiments. All the Cossacks living in one territorial district formed one military unit or Regiment, which numerically corresponded more or less to a modern division. These ten Regiments were: Kiev, Chernigov, Starodub, Nizhin, Priluts, Pereyaslav, Lubny, Hadiach, Mirhorod and Poltava. The territory of the Kiev Regiment included, besides the small territory on the Right Bank around Kiev, also the districts of Oster and Kozelets in the Chernigov province. At the head of every Regiment stood the Colonel who also was, at the same time, military commander and leader in war-time of his Regiment as a military unit, and civil Head of the administration of the district. He was supported by the staff of the Regimental Officers of the Headquarters, only their functions and authority were limited to one Regiment. Thus there was the Regimental Secretary, the Polkovy Obozny or Head of the Regimental quarters and of the Regimental Artillery, the Regimental Judge and the Regimental Ossavul and Khorunzhy.

A Regiment was subdivided into ten or twenty smaller districts called Hundred. The military and administrative authorities of a Hundred were the Obozny, the Ossavul, the Khorunzhy. There was, however, no Judge in the Sotnia, the Sotnyk (Head of the Hundred) having the functions of the judge for his Hundred. Cities and towns which had the right of municipal self-government confirmed by the Tsar were exempt from the Cossack jurisdiction; non-self-governing towns, smaller places and villages, were under the local Cossack jurisdiction.

According to the Treaty with Muscovy of 1654, the Rolls of the Registered Cossacks were fixed at 60,000. Later on, especially as the Ukraine of the Right Bank fell away, there were, according to the Articles of 1669

and 1687, 30,000 Registered Cossacks. Besides the Cossacks, the Hetmans had several regiments of paid soldiers called "Kompaniytsi" or Volunteers; in the Ukraine of the Right Bank, under Doroshenko, they were called "Serdiuky", on the Left Bank the usual name was "Kompaniytsi". They were composed of mercenaries, at first mostly foreigners: Germans, Poles, Serbs, Rumanians and others. Under Hetman Vyhovsky an attempt was made to organize a regular mercenary army. It was then that many thousands of Serbs entered Ukrainian service. Later there was no such mass enrolment of foreigners, but still among the officers there were several Serbs, Greeks and Rumanians who occupied even high posts such as that of colonelcy. The Cossack army fought on foot though the campaigns were made on horseback and each Cossack had to join his unit mounted and provide his own horse. When fighting, the Cossacks alighted and attacked the enemy or defended the trenches on foot. The Cossack cavalry were few in number, which explains to some extent the constant presence of Tatar horse in the wars of Khmelnitsky, Vyhovsky and Doroshenko. The Cossack artillery was well developed and fairly effective. Besides the "General artillery", every Regiment possessed its own artillery.

115. Finance.

Concerning the Finance of the Cossack State, it must first be pointed out that after the Revolution of Khmelnitsky in 1648, the Hetman had at his disposal all the former royal domains in all three provinces, Kiev, Chernigov and Braslav. These domains brought in to the Hetman's treasury about 100,000 gold ducats yearly. In the second place the Hetman disposed of confiscated property of the Roman Catholic Church and of the lands of the Polish magnates and those Ukrainian nobles who fled, never to return. The unsettled revolutionary character of the time was, it is true, far from propitious for the renewal of the regular farming of these lands, but still in many places it was renewed and we have docu-

mentary proofs that in several places: "rents and taxes on honey-bees, cattle grazing" and such like "were collected for Khmelnitsky", that is into the State Treasury which was at his disposal. Concerning the taxation of the population, we know from the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654 with the Tsar, that Khmelnitsky intended to re-enforce the taxes according to the former scale for the taxation of the peasants and the urban population, exempting Cossacks, clergy and nobles. But he did not succeed in carrying out this scheme. Generally speaking, all the agreements with the Muscovite government about taxation remained on paper. Later on Hetman Brukhovetsky was the first to attempt to collect them. Attempts were then made to collect the taxes directly into the Muscovite State Treasury through Muscovite officials and we know that this attempt had unwelcome consequences for the Muscovite government and was abandoned. Among the chief sources of revenue of the Ukrainian State Treasury were the duties collected on foreign goods at the Ukrainian frontier and direct taxes on spirits such as ale, mead and brandy. Duties and taxes on spirits brought in about 100,000 gold ducats yearly. The chief expenses were the army and diplomatic relations, which cost considerably, as it was customary for foreign ambassadors to be entertained by the Ukrainian government so long as they remained on Ukrainian territory. In the year 1656 was added the office of "Hetman's treasurer", who administered the Hetman's treasury, or as it may be termed, the State Treasury. Tax-Collectors were called "inductors" or "exactors". In every Regiment there was a Regimental Treasurer.

Important sources of State income were also the sums derived from the taxation of the flour mills which was very well organized, and from the iron mines, the owners of which paid fairly high taxes on the iron ore quarried in their mines.

One of the privileges of the Cossacks was free brewing and selling of spirits. But the financial necessities

of the State compelled the authorities to tax the brewing and distilling industry as well as manufacturers of tobacco and tar. During the rule of Hetman George Khmelnitsky, a State Monopoly on spirits was introduced. The Cossacks retained the right to brew ale, mead and to distill brandy but were not allowed to sell them. Besides the Cossacks, burgesses of enfranchised towns had also the right of free brewing and distilling. The Council of Cossack officers in 1669 at Baturin decided to introduce monopolies on spirits, tobacco and tar. Licenses were sold to private individuals as well as to organized bodies. For instance, the Regiment of Lubny bought a license to sell spirits, tobacco and tar within the territory of their Regiment as well as to collect flour-mill taxes, all for the sum of 17,000 gold ducats paid yearly into the State Treasury. Fixed prices for licensed goods were introduced over the whole of Ukrainian territory. The products of these industries were sold only wholesale in great quantities, brandy not less than 100 gallons at a time; ale and mead were free from restrictions.

Monopolies were very unpopular with the Ukrainian population and during Mazepa's rule an attempt was made to abolish them and replace them by fiscal impositions on breweries, distilleries and places of sale, inns, etc. Mazepa himself was very much against the policy of monopolies, but it was found necessary after a year's experience to return to monopoly as the other method proved to be inconvenient and brought the State little revenue.

116. Trade.

Direct trade-relations with foreign countries, interrupted during the period of the "Ruin", were taken up again in the last decades of the Seventeenth century. We know that, before the Revolution of 1648, Ukrainian agricultural products were exported from the Baltic ports, chiefly from Krolevets (Koenigsberg) and Gdansk (Danzig). At that time this export enriched Polish magnates, owners of great estates in the Ukraine. Now the

young Ukrainian aristocracy, Cossack officers (Starshina) and Ukrainian burgesses took their place. Direct commercial relations with Austria, Prussia and Sweden were very soon renewed. The chief products exported were: corn, flax, hemp, cattle, wax, honey, bacon, tallow, hides, tobacco. Imported goods were: textile goods such as fine cloth and fine linen, metal objects and articles such as scythes, objects of luxury, musical instruments, books, groceries, expensive wine, etc. The chief ports for Ukrainian exports were now, besides Koenigsberg and Danzig, also Riga and Breslau, whence Ukrainian products were shipped to Sweden, England and Holland. Lively trade relations were also maintained by land with Poland, Lithuania, Austria, Muscovy, Crimea, Turkey and the Balkans. The chief centre of commerce in Ukraine now became the town of Starodub in the province of Chernigov, and rich local merchants carried on foreign trade on a great scale. The Cossack officers were also actively concerned with foreign trade.

117. Social Classes and Their Mutual Relations.

The erroneous idea that the Khmelnitsky Revolution of 1648 abolished all social distinctions in Ukraine, long prevailed in popular memory. Many years after Hetman Khmelnitsky, the traditional belief was still alive that in his time all the privileges of the nobles and, generally speaking, all the differences between the gentry and the common people were "cut down by Cossack swords". This phrase was set down on the pages of an historical document and greatly influenced subsequent Ukrainian historical writings. From the middle of the Nineteenth century the same view was maintained by Ukrainian historians of the uniform social structure of the Ukrainian population after Khmelnitsky's revolution. More exact study of contemporary documents, however, has shaken this opinion. We now know for certain that the Ukrainian State, at the time of Khmelnitsky, was based on classes and that its social differentiations corresponded almost exactly to the social order which had

existed in the Ukraine under Polish domination. Only the position of certain classes was changed by the Revolution as well as their mutual relations.

Khmelnitsky's uprising found in the Ukraine the following principal social classes: nobles, Cossacks, clergy, burgesses (urban population on the whole) and rural population or peasants. We should also mention the thin stratum of magnates, great landowners, in whose hands immense estates were concentrated. The Revolution of 1648, which had as its object the abolition of the domination of the magnates, swept it out of the Ukraine and it never returned. Though the wrath of the insurgent popular masses also turned against the middle and smaller noble landowners the country gentry, who were subjected to sharpest outbursts of popular temper, many of them Ukrainians by origin, were from the very beginning of the uprising among the ranks of the Cossacks. With the passing of years most of the gentry went over to the Cossacks. By this conduct of the Ukrainian nobles, their position in the Ukraine was, so to say, saved and legalized. Thus we constantly see in all the Treaties which Khmelnitsky concluded with Poland before the final rupture, the insertion of a clause granting an amnesty for the nobles who took part in the uprising. Also in the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654 with Muscovy, one of the first articles stipulates that the rights and privileges of the Ukrainian nobles should be maintained within the territory of the Cossack State. They preserved even their own law administration as established by the Lithuanian Statute. These nobles, numerically few compared with the Cossacks, were soon absorbed by the rising aristocratic class of Cossack Officers.

Khmelnitsky's Revolution was essentially carried out by the Cossacks. Together with the remaining Ukrainian nobles they now built up the Ukrainian State and took up the position of the organizing, ruling and economically strongest class. But a differentiation within the Cossack class very soon took place. Already towards the end

of Khmelnitsky's rule, the class of Cossack officers arose from amidst the Cossack mass, and very soon practically all the power was concentrated in their hands. At first the Cossack officers were composed of men who had risen in consequence of their talents, military merit and the services rendered. This gave them the necessary authority and general recognition. They were joined by those nobles who either because of their education or former military and State experience came to occupy high posts in the Ukrainian State. In time, however, high offices in the Ukrainian State began to be occupied not in consequence of general appreciation shown by election, but by the nomination of the Hetman or the Colonel or the choice of a narrow circle of Cossack officers. Thus Cossack officers gradually became a class apart, access to which was getting more and more difficult to common Cossacks. A common Cossack must have shown special talents and rendered extraordinary services in order to become an officer. Long wars concentrated considerable wealth in the hands of the Cossack officers and this also raised them above the common Cossacks and gave them new power and prestige. From the first they began to concentrate great landed estates in their hands, the only secure basis of wealth at that time. Farming their own lands for the export of corn, or breeding cattle, or keeping bees for the very profitable export of wax and honey, these new landowners were obliged to have recourse to compulsory labor, and the only means of securing labor available at that time was to attach peasants to the land. Cossack officers endeavored to obtain grants of land from the Hetman out of the lands in the possession of the State and for greater security they also applied to the Tsar for confirmation of these grants. On the other hand, the Ukrainian State not being rich enough in cash to pay the officials adequately, a system was introduced of paying them by lending them an estate or a mill for the duration of their office. Thus to each State office an estate was attached, greater or smaller, according to the importance of the office. These were the so-

called "rank estates". From the Hetman down to Regimental and Hundred officers, an estate was attached to every office. The Hetman received "for the mace" the whole district of Chihirin. The Hetman of the Left Bank of the Dnieper, from Brukhovetsky on, disposed of the district of Hadiach. It was further customary to let the officer continue to hold the estate in his possession after he left office, especially as a reward for long service, and another estate was then attached to the office from the State funds. Thus Cossack officers very soon became a class of great landowners who, to a certain extent, took the place of the former nobles. Henceforth, the social policy of this class was directed towards widening and securing land possessions and the right to dispose of peasant labor.

Naturally, this separation of Cossack officers from the mass of the Common Cossacks and their privileged position provoked the dissatisfaction of the latter. Thus the Common Cossacks or "Chern" opposed every political plan or change that came from the Cossack Officers (Starshina) even if it were in the interests of the national and political independence of the Ukraine, since they saw in such plans not the advantage of the State but only that of the privileged class of Cossack officers. The Muscovite government very skilfully exploited this social antagonism. Muscovy took upon herself the role of protector and defender of the Common Cossacks and of the Common people as a whole against the "arbitrary" actions of the Cossack officers. Thus, by such means, the Muscovite government had been able to nullify the military victory of Vyhovsky. But practically, the Muscovite government, in confirming by charters the Hetman's grants of land to Cossack officers, contributed to the strength and importance of this class. Various ambitious demagogues, as we have seen, also took advantage of this class antagonism. They especially found support in the Zaporogian Sich, a hotbed of all the dissatisfied, unsettled elements. Sometimes this class antagonism broke out in an acute form as, for instance, in 1663 after

the so-called "Chorna Rada" or Rabble Council in Nizhin. By degrees, however, the Cossack officers succeeded in asserting and maintaining their leading position and in gradually strengthening their social and economic dominance over all other classes in the Ukrainian State.

After Mazepa's time and as a result of his policy of transforming the Cossack officer class into a nobility, a new category of Cossack officers came into existence: these were the "Bunchukovi tovaryshi" or Bunchuk-officers. This rank was created comparatively late and was mentioned for the first time in 1685, in an "Universal" of Hetman Samoylovich. Later on they became more and more general. These officers were without precise office or functions and were attached to the person of the Hetman and at his disposal for carrying out his various military and administrative commissions. In war time they were not returned to the military unit to which they belonged, but remained with the Hetman and fought under his "Bunchuk". They were exempt from service and regimental duties as well as from jurisdiction of the General Judge and the Hetman himself. This rank was usually granted as a reward for certain merits and mostly to persons who had occupied certain offices in the Cossack army, for instance, a "Sotnyk" (Head of a Hundred). To be placed "under the Bunchuk of the Hetman" was considered an honor and we know of cases, in the Eighteenth century of "Bunchuk-officers" being nominated directly to the office of a Colonel or of a General officer. Sometimes they commanded considerable Cossack detachments in war. There was also analogous to the "Bunchuk officers", a certain number of "Ensign officers" attached to each Colonel, who were exempt from service in their Hundred and placed at the disposal of the Colonel to be employed by him for his various commissions of a military, administrative or judicial character. In the Eighteenth century in every Regiment, there was a fixed number of "Ensign officers", nominated by the General Headquarters on the presentation of the Colonel.

The urban population in the Ukraine of the Left Bank of the Dnieper did not succeed in securing for themselves an influential or leading part in the Ukrainian State. They were not numerous and in small towns were hardly to be distinguished from the ordinary agricultural population. There were about a dozen enfranchised towns which were exempt from the Cossack administration and jurisdiction having their own self-government and their courts of justice. Kiev had received its charter from King Stephan Bathory in 1585; Chernigov, Nizhin, Starodub, Novhorod Sieversk, Mhlyn, Pochep and Pohar held charters from King Sigismund in the years 1620-1625; Oster, Koselets and Poltava received their franchise from the Hetmans. These towns obtained possession of considerable landed property, fields, meadows and forests. They also had the right to impose certain taxes such as duties on foreign goods, taxes on the artisan's guilds, inns, public houses, public baths, mills, breweries, tile-kilns, bridges, public weights and so on. The revenue from these taxes went to maintain municipal offices and the officials. In order to augment their income enfranchised towns had the right to establish fairs. Burgesses were entitled to brew brandy, ale and mead. They had to look after the fortifications of their town and its means of defence. A municipal court, presided over by the mayor, was empowered to administer justice also over foreign merchants within the precincts of the town. Under Polish rule appeal from the Municipal Courts was made to the governor of the province and to the king. Judgments were given according to the Codes, called "the Saxon" and "the Order", compiled on the model of the German "Magdeburg Law".

Under Muscovite protection the towns had had their franchises confirmed by the Tsar. Their old courts of justice remained in power. The mayor was elected by the "free votes" of the whole town population and confirmed by the Hetman. The Municipal courts remained as of old and their jurisdiction extended also to the peasants who lived within the precincts of the town.

Appeal was to be made to the Cossack Regimental court of justice and then to the Hetman. The Municipal courts gave judgment in cases of penal and civil law. All deeds of sale and purchase of lands or houses were entertained in the municipal books. Both codes of Municipal Law, the "Saxon" and the "Order", as well as the Lithuanian Statute, served to guide the judges in their decisions. Though in practice severe laws were mitigated, there was a tendency to render judgment according to inward conviction and not according to the formal letter of the law. The presence of the population as witnesses introduced vitality into the courts.

The Cossack administration showed a tendency to encroach on the affairs of municipal self-government and the burgesses were constantly on the alert to defend themselves against these encroachments. But in spite of this, municipal life in the Cossack State had full opportunity for free development within the limits of their franchise. The German "Magdeburg Law" had, on the other hand, a certain influence upon the Cossack jurisdiction, especially in the interpretation of the law and the procedure in the courts. All the towns in the Ukraine of the Left Bank were gradually organized on the model of the enfranchised towns, only of course, they were dependent on the Cossack authorities.

The clergy in Ukraine did not form a separate caste. With the exception of the monks the Orthodox clergy were married and had families. Parish priests and bishops in the Ukraine were usually elected by the laity, the clerical authorities merely giving canonical sanction. Tradition and recollections of their common struggle for the Orthodox faith under Polish oppression strengthened the part played by the secular elements of the population in Church affairs. Cultural and national services rendered by the Orthodox Church, especially by the monasteries, gave them great authority in the eyes of the population and justified the interference of the Church in political life especially, as we have seen, on the part of Ukrainian bishops. The Hetmans, beginning with Bohdan

Khmelnitsky, from the very commencement of his rule, granted charters to the monasteries confirming their rights to landed possessions and to the labor of the peasants settled on their lands. The "Universals" of Bohdan Khmelnitsky containing these grants of peasant labor to certain monasteries, played an important part in the development of serfdom in the Ukraine. The protection thus given to the monasteries was entirely justified in the eyes of the contemporary population: the monks not only held in their hands the education and learning of the time, they prayed for the Cossack Army and the Cossack State and, in those times of sincere faith, this was a very important function within the understanding of all the population. Thus every Hetman "Universal" containing grants for monasteries contained the words: "because they pray for us, for the Cossack Army".

The Ukrainian Orthodox clergy were quite satisfied with the protection of their rights and those of the Orthodox Church obtained from King Wladislaus. Thus they, and especially the high clergy among them, were completely loyal to the Polish government and very distrustful of the Muscovite protectorate. Very proud of their Orthodoxy, preserved by a hard struggle against the pressure of Roman Catholicism, as well as of their culture and learning superior to that of the Muscovite Church, the Ukrainian clergy feared the interference of the Muscovite Patriarch in their affairs. During the rule of Bohdan Khmelnitsky, Silvester Kossiv, the Metropolitan of Kiev, was openly in sympathy with Poland as was his successor Dionisiy Balaban. The next Metropolitan, Joseph Tukalsky, was Doroshenko's friend and a warm supporter of Ukrainian independence. After his death the Muscovite government made every effort to obtain influence over the Ukrainian Church and succeeded, as we have seen, under Hetman Samoylovich in 1686.

The bulk of the Ukrainian population consisted of peasants. At the time of the Cossack uprising under Khmelnitsky, they were serfs and worked for their land-

lords, mostly Polish nobles. The peasants in the Ukraine were much dissatisfied with their position as serfs, though their duties were lighter than those of the Ukrainian peasants in the Western provinces of Galicia and Volynia. Not only were their duties lighter, but in other respects they were better off since the proximity of the free steppes gave to the more hardy opportunities of escaping to the Zaporogian Sich. The population was accustomed to comparative liberty and were irritated by minor evidences of their dependence on the landlords. They especially disliked the agents of the landowners, their stewards, overseers, intermediaries and collectors of different taxes who often were Jews. We know how the Ukrainian peasants always joined in the Cossack uprisings, especially how unanimously they supported that of Bohdan Khmelnitsky, believing that the Cossack victory would not fail to bring them liberty and independence. Their hopes were far from being fulfilled. We know how, in the Treaties of Zboriv and of Bila Tserkva, the Cossack chiefs disregarded their interests, being concerned merely with securing their own Cossack rights and privileges. However, when Khmelnitsky definitely broke with Poland and the danger of the return of former Polish landowners was removed, the peasants thus became free agriculturists, small landowners, paid taxes to the Ukrainian State Treasury, and were subject to the Cossack administration. In consequence of frequent wars the way was open to many of them to become Cossacks: those who liked the military profession and were well enough off to provide their own horse, arms and means of subsistence, could easily obtain entry on the Cossack Rolls. The peasants in the Ukrainian State were distinguished from the Cossacks not so much by their respective rights as by the duties they bore to the State: the Cossacks defended it by their arms while the peasants paid taxes to the State Treasury either in money, produce or labor. At first the Cossack class was not entirely separated from the peasants; every peasant could become a Cossack if he wished to and were sufficiently rich. Military service

was very hard and dangerous and entailed great expense. Thus a Cossack ruined by frequent campaigns often returned to the status of a peasant, farmed his land and carried out his duties to the State in a quieter and obscurer way, whereas a rich peasant enrolled himself or his sons as Cossacks. At the end of the Seventeenth century, however, the Hetman authorities began to prohibit such transferences and the Cossack class became more and more closed to the peasants.

Already under Khmelnitsky there were, as we have said, noticeable changes for the worse in the position of the peasants. We have already mentioned the charters given by him to the monasteries granting not only lands but securing to them also the labor of the peasants on these lands. These peasants were not allowed to enter the Cossack army even during the general mobilization. The duties they had to fulfil for the monasteries were, of course, infinitely lighter than the former serfdom of the Polish landowners, but they created a precedent. Very soon the Cossack officers also began to receive from the Hetman grants not only of empty stretches of land but of populated areas: this meant that the inhabitants of these territories were bound to their new lords by definite duties and became their dependents. Later we find it clearly stated in the Hetman charters that the inhabitants of such and such places granted to a new owner were to perform for him the "usual duties". On the other hand, owners of empty stretches of land wishing to populate them invited free peasants, helped them to start their farms, gave them the necessary stock of cattle and implements and in return imposed on them certain duties called by a characteristic word "obeisance". These duties usually took the form of helping the landowner on extraordinary occasions such as harvest, haymaking, building of dikes and so on. Later on when the landowners extended their farming not only for their own use but for export, they demanded from the peasants regular work during a fixed time involving a definite number of days. Thus gradually, a return was made to

the former condition of serfdom, though the number of days did not exceed two in a week. As late as 1701, Mazepa's Universal forbade exacting from the peasants work more than two days in a week.

Almost until the end of the Seventeenth century there were in Ukraine of the Left Bank many unpopulated areas which the Hetmans granted freely to anyone undertaking to populate them. There was also no lack of settlers: refugees from the Right Bank of the Dnieper came in masses and there was also, as we have seen, the practice of enforced removals of the population from the Right Bank to the Left. The new settlers, receiving from the landowner their stock and all possible help with regard to the building and equipping of their new homesteads were, of course, more dependent on him than the local population who had lived there of old.

Thus gradually and slowly, the social conditions which existed in Ukraine before the revolution of Khmel'nitsky, were regaining ground with the inevitable, relentless sequence dictated by the general tendency of the economic development prevailing at that period throughout the whole of Europe. The Ukraine stood in close economic relation to neighboring countries, and was compelled to pass with them through the stages of transition from the feudal order to capitalism.

118. Zaporogian Sich.

In order to complete the picture of the structure and life in the Ukrainian Cossack State under the Hetmans, it is necessary to recall the Zaporogian Sich which was closely connected and played an important part, especially in the last decades of the Seventeenth century, after Khmel'nitsky's death. In the first half of the Seventeenth century the Zaporogian Sich was the outpost of the Ukraine against the Turks and the Tatars and at the same time a reservoir of all the active and hardy elements discontented with Polish dominion. On account of this the Zaporogian Sich was the starting point of all Cossack uprisings against Poland. It was also from here that

Khmelnitsky led his revolution. The constant wars made by Khmelnitsky provided a complete outlet for the energy of the warlike Zaporogians and the alliance of the Hetman with the Turks and the Tatars diverted their attention from the southern frontiers of Ukraine. Under Bohdan Khmelnitsky's iron hand the Zaporogians were a docile instrument of the Ukrainian government and did not interfere in politics. But after his death, the Sich at once became the centre of opposition to the Hetman's power and to the ruling class of Cossack officers (Starshina). The Zaporogians began to interfere in political life in the Ukraine, putting forward their candidates for the office of Hetman. The Muscovite government at once took advantage of their attitude and found in them very useful allies against the policy of the Ukrainian Hetmans of defending Ukrainian independence. The Muscovite Tsar opened direct relations with the Sich sending there his emissaries, money, presents and munitions; and the Zaporogians, having no political insight into national policy, supported the Muscovite government in all conflicts against the Ukrainian Hetmans. They gave support to Pushkar against Vyhovsky, to Brukhovetsky against Somko, to Sukhovy and Khanenko against Doroshenko, to Petrik against Mazepa. The Zaporogian leader of that period, Ivan Sirko, was a typical representative of the Zaporogian Sich during the time of the "Ruin". A hardy warrior, he had no notion of national policy and acted without any guiding principle. He sided sometimes with Muscovy, sometimes with Poland; at one time he helped Doroshenko, at another he dealt him a blow from behind at a decisive moment. The Cossack officers once arrested Sirko and sent him to Moscow as a seditious person and dangerous rebel. They feared that Sirko, as once Brukhovetsky, would try to get the Hetman's mace for himself. The Muscovite government let him return to the Ukraine where he continued his destructive and anti-national activity. He died in 1688. According to the Treaty of Andrussovo of 1667, the Zaporogian Sich was to remain doubly dependent on both Poland and Muscovy.

According to the "Eternal peace" of 1668, the Zaporogians were relegated to the Muscovite Tsar alone. They very much appreciated this dependence at a great distance on a far-away Tsar and feared the near Hetman: thus they enjoyed greater freedom. Mazepa alone, having established his authority beyond all dispute, understood how to manage the Zaporogians, though at the beginning of his rule they tried to oppose him, hence their role in the adventure of Petrik. At the end of the Seventeenth century, when the united Muscovite and Ukrainian forces were engaged in war against the Turks and Tatars, the Zaporogians played an important part as the vanguard of the allied armies.

After the consolidation of the Ukrainian State, the inner life of the Zaporogian Sich also took on a more settled and organized aspect. It definitely took the form of a small, purely democratic Republic, where the will of the sovereign people was represented in the General Cossack Council (Generalna Rada) of the type of the old Slavic "viche". This assembly elected their officers for one year: "Koshovyi Otaman" (the Leader of the Camp), a secretary or "Pysar", a Judge and other officials. The country about the Zaporogian Sich, a vast territory corresponding to the present province of Katerinoslav and Kherson, belonged to the Sich; here in peace-time they hunted and fished and had their farms. The Zaporogians stood in close economic and cultural contact with the Ukraine of the Hetmans. Though the Zaporogians had no definite political and national conceptions, they firmly held to their own ideal of Cossack freedom and independence, upheld both in and outside the camp by strict discipline and ascetic rules. Having realized this striking instance of a military democratic Republic; they were devoted to their secular traditions. Through the whole period of its existence the Zaporogian Sich was extremely popular over the whole extent of the Ukrainian territories, whose population constantly supplied Zaporogian ranks with the most active, energetic, independent and warlike men who left their families,

breaking all attachment in order to join this unique Chivalrous Order, accepting their hardy and ascetic life which was full of danger and privation.

119. Education and Culture.

This sketch of life in Ukraine in the last decades of the Seventeenth century would be incomplete without survey of the contemporary culture and learning. Kiev as of old, was the centre of cultural life and the Academy founded by Peter Mohyla continued to be a seat of learning. It had been started in 1616 as the School of the Kievan Brotherhood and had been reformed in 1631 by Peter Mohyla on the plan of West European Universities. Latin was the chief language, Polish and Ukrainian played only a secondary part. Students of the Kievan Academy belonged to all classes of the Ukrainian population, sons of the titled nobility as well as those of the common Cossacks and peasants. As an extension of the Kievan Academy, Colleges were founded in Vinnitsa, in Podolia, and in Hosha, in Volynia. Among the early teachers, Silvester Kossiv, later Metropolitan of Kiev, and Innocent Gisel should be named: the latter, a German from Prussia, and a convert to the Orthodox faith, was a life-long Head of the Academy and a conspicuous man of learning in the Ukraine.

The Kievan Academy was from the first richly endowed by high ecclesiastics as well as by Cossack Hetmans. Wars against Poland, about the middle of the Seventeenth century, and especially the period of the "Ruina" disorganized the normal life of the Academy: most of the students were constantly leaving for the army; the buildings and property of the Academy were greatly damaged and partly destroyed by fire, neglect, and general ruin. But the setting in of comparative tranquillity after 1670, led to the flourishing period of the school. Gifted and learned men succeeded one another as Heads of the Academy, Lazar Baronovich, Yoaniki Haliatovsky, Varlaam Yasinsky, Joseph Krokovsky—all of them celebrated men of letters and learning. From

among the former pupils of the Academy a number of well known preachers, poets, dramatic authors and artists such as Anton Radivilovsky, Simeon Polotsky, Stefan Yavorsky, Dmitro Tuptalenko, Theophan Prokopovich and a number of others should be mentioned. The students were mostly sons of Cossack officers, though the Academy remained accessible to all classes, and besides the sons of Hetmans, there were students from among common Cossacks, peasants and burgesses.

About the middle of the Seventeenth century the Muscovite authorities began to invite professors and pupils of the Kievan Academy to important posts in Moscow. Thus they became pioneers of European education and learning in Muscovy. At the same time they introduced Ukrainian influence in all spheres of cultural life in Muscovy; in the church, in schools, in literature and arts. Former pupils of the Academy became mentors of the sons of Muscovite Tsars. They founded schools and printing offices, created the beginnings of the theatre and inculcated European ways of living. At the beginning of the Seventeenth century, about Tsar Peter's time, almost all the bishoprics of the Muscovite Church were occupied by Ukrainians. The reform of the Muscovite Church by which a Synod of bishops was substituted for the former Muscovite Patriarch, was carried out by two Ukrainian bishops, Theophan Prokopovich and Stefan Yavorsky.

The brilliant development of culture and learning in the Kievan Academy had, however, its weak side, characteristic of the period: the learning was too much separated from life, it was too scholastic. Also, having been founded for the special purpose of defending the Orthodox Faith and Church, the Academy was chiefly a theological school devoted to questions of Christian dogmas and Church life. Latin, Greek and Slavonic were the chief languages studied as well as being the medium of studies. The Ukrainian living language was neglected; its literary development was too much bound up with the ancient Slavonic language used in Church; and the living popu-

lar speech was only seldom and unwillingly introduced into literature. Thus there existed in use at the period two parallel languages in Ukraine, the artificial literary, and the living popular speech. It is in the latter that Ukrainian people created a treasury of unwritten literature, beautiful epics, the so-called "Dumy of the Cossacks", charming lyric songs, and even dramatic poetry, which took the form of short dramatic pieces in the popular idiom and the so-called "interludes" between acts of mystery-plays, which themselves were written in the pompous and heavy artificial language. Ukrainian popular speech was, however, in use in the pulpit by popular preachers. We find it also on the pages of Ukrainian chronicles, memoirs and diaries of the Cossack period, and in everyday correspondence. Its use in literature, however, was considered to be a sign of "undeveloped taste and of bad form". Teachers of Rhetoric in the Academy warned their pupils against introducing the popular idiom "of laborers and shepherds" into serious literature. Thus the Church, State offices, Courts of Justice and schools used the artificial, stiff, unwieldy and pompous language which because of its divorce from real life was destined ultimately to fall into disuse.

After a comparatively peaceful time had begun in the Ukraine of the Left Bank, a wealthy class of landowners, the Cossack officers, was fairly well advanced in formation, and burgesses, owing to flourishing foreign trade, were fast growing prosperous, we see a remarkable flourishing of the arts. First of all we notice in architecture an enthusiasm for building, especially churches. Not only Hetmans, but Colonels and even lesser Cossack officers erected beautiful churches, monasteries, school buildings and so on. Ukrainian architecture of that period is mostly baroque, presenting quite original and peculiar features. A number of beautiful churches and monasteries which have been preserved to this day adorn Kiev, Chernigov, Pereyaslav, Novhorod-Sieversk and many other towns and places, sometimes even insignificant villages. Together with architecture, painting also flour-

ished, especially the adornment of the interiors of the churches. Portrait painting was also popular. The influence of foreign masters, especially Italian, was considerable. Engraving was very much developed as well; it was specially flourishing in the printing office of the Kievan Pecherski monastery, where a school of engravers was formed by artists such as Mihura, Tarasevich, Shirsky, some of them pupils of Kilian in Nuremberg. The most flourishing printing offices of that time in the Ukraine were those of Kiev, Chernigov and Novhorod-Sieversk, which among them printed a considerable number of books in Latin, Church-Slavonic, Ukrainian and Polish, which circulated not only in the Ukraine but also in Muscovy, Poland and the Balkans.

Among the artistic crafts flourishing in the Ukraine at that period, were foundries for copper and tin. The Ukraine had celebrated masters who cast church bells, guns, kettles and all sorts of utensils employed in the distillery of spirits and in households. Centres of foundries were Kiev, Starodub, Hlukiv and Novhorod-Siversk. Glass blowing also rose to great heights about the end of the century of which many samples have been preserved in Ukrainian museums. Paper making, which naturally accompanied printing activity, also flourished. Among other crafts wood carving attained a very high artistic development as we can still see in the beautifully carved church iconostases or screens which separate the sanctuary from the main body of the Church, many of which are still preserved in the churches for which they were carved. Carpet weaving and silk hand-woven textiles were also produced and the many examples which have been preserved are outstanding in their beautiful design, well preserved colors, and the high artistic quality of their workmanship.

When the agitation and turmoil of the period known as the "Ruin" (Ruina) had abated, we see Ukrainian youths renewing the old custom of going abroad to finish their University studies. During the Lithuanian and Polish periods, sons of the nobles and wealthy burghesses,

even sons of Common Cossacks, went abroad and studied at famous Universities. In the Ukraine no prejudice had ever existed against West European culture as being heretical and dangerous for the Orthodox as was the case for instance, in Muscovy, where Tsar Peter I had to use such draconian measures in order to make the Muscovite Boyars send their sons to Europe for education. Ukrainians went there of their own accord and were none the worse for having stayed in Roman Catholic and Protestant schools. For example, a well known Ukrainian churchman, Prince Joseph Kurtsevich who, at the beginning of the Seventeenth century studied in Padua became, after his return to Ukraine, Archimandrite of the Zaporogian Monastery in Traktemyryv; later on he was Bishop of Vladimir and Brest; then having accepted a bishopric in Muscovy, he ended his life in exile. At the end of the Seventeenth century another well known Ukrainian churchman, Theophan Prokopovich, finished his studies in the Jesuit College in Rome, which was no hindrance to his becoming a professor at the Kievan Academy. A great number of foreigners, surgeons, merchants, soldiers and scholars settled in the Ukraine. Ever since Khmelnit-sky's time there had been a considerable in-coming of Southern Slavs, especially Serbs; thousands of them entered the Ukrainian army and at the end of the Seventeenth century, we know of a great many Cossack officers of Serbian origin. At the beginning of the Eighteenth century this intercourse with Serbia was even closer. There were many students from Serbia in the Kievan Academy, some of them remaining in the Ukraine and occupying responsible posts. There was also a considerable Greek and Rumanian immigration into the Ukraine. The Ukraine was attractive to the Southern Slavs and to Orthodox believers in general who were oppressed by the Turks. Beside the Muscovite Tsar, the Ukrainian Hetman was considered a protector of Orthodox Christians persecuted by the Mohammedans.

One of these Eastern visitors, a Syrian, Paulus Diaconus from Aleppo, who travelled in Ukraine in 1654-

1655, has left us in his diary an enthusiastic description of Ukraine. He was struck not only with the flourishing agriculture and material well-being of the population, but also with the high level of education in all classes. He noted that "even villagers can read and write and are able to follow the church service and the singing". He also tells us that "village priests considered it their duty to instruct orphans and not let them run the streets and become vagabonds". "Women in Ukraine", he continues, "are able to follow church service and use their prayer-books, and nuns in the convents of Kiev are all taught reading and writing and some of them are very proficient in learning". He proceeds to give a description of churches in Kiev, their architecture and interior adornment. He also was struck by the civilized, friendly and hospitable population of Ukraine, especially in contrast to the Muscovites. He spent about a year in Moscow, where he had an opportunity of observing the life of the upper classes, even at the court of the Tsar. During his stay in Moscow he felt "as if his heart were padlocked, all his thoughts were repressed because no one is able to feel free and joyous in Muscovy". When he again entered Ukrainian territory his "soul as well as the souls of his travelling companions overflowed with joy and their hearts expanded", because Ukrainians were "all friendly and did not treat us as strangers".

The Ukraine of the Hetmans gave the same impression of being a highly civilized land to other foreign travellers in the late Seventeenth and early Eighteenth centuries under Mazepa's rule. A Muscovite traveller, a priest Ivan Lukianov, visiting Ukraine in 1701, left a description of the beautiful building of Ukrainian towns Hlukiv, Krolevets, Baturin, Nizhin and especially Kiev. He also was very much struck with the acknowledged independent position of Ukrainian women both in domestic and in public life. The Danish diplomat, Justus Jule, whose travelling description dates from 1711, even after the ruin of Ukraine by the Muscovites in 1708-1709, was also struck by the material ease and civilization of the country.

He noted the attractiveness of the Ukrainian population and the cleanliness of their white-washed and thatched cottages which reminded him of Denmark. He was struck with the general politeness of the population and also noted that women were using prayer-books in church.

Thus even the incomplete and limited political independence of Ukraine, at the end of the Seventeenth century, enabled the population, despite devastating wars and ruin, to develop the best sides of their national character and attain a high standard of civilization and culture, infinitely superior to that of Muscovy, which put Ukrainians on the same level as most civilized countries in Europe. There is no doubt that one factor in producing the vitality and comparatively high level of civilization at this period was the circumstance of being allowed, to a certain extent, to arrange their life according to their own ideal and national genius.

CHAPTER XX

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(120) Role of the Ukraine in the Great Northern War. (121) Occupation of the Ukraine of the Right Bank by Mazepa. (122) Imprisonment of Paliy. (123) Alliance with Sweden. (124) Campaign of Charles XII in Ukraine. (125) Baturin and Poltava and Muscovite Terror. (126) Mazepa's Death in Exile. (127) Hetman Philip Orlik and His Constitution. (128) Orlik's Campaign in the Ukraine of the Right Bank. (129) Tsar Peter's Campaign of Pruth. (130) Orlik's Activities in Exile.

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120. Role of the Ukraine in the Great Northern War.

Ukraine was compelled to take an active part in the Great Northern War and suffered heavy losses, though Tsar Peter's aim in opening hostilities was very remote and of no importance for Ukraine. The chief object of the war was to give Muscovy access to the Baltic shores which belonged to Sweden. In the background was the rivalry of two monarchs, Charles XII of Sweden and Peter I of Russia, for the supremacy in the North. Tsar Peter made an alliance with August, Elector of Saxony, who recently had been elected to the Polish throne. August wished to recover for Poland Livonia, surrendered to Sweden by King John Casimir in 1660. He was to enter the war as Elector of Saxony but promised Peter to draw Poland into the war also. The king of Denmark, who claimed the Duchy of Schleswig-Holstein, now under the Swedish protectorate, also joined the coalition against Sweden. The allies had no common plan of action and, as it turned out, were ill prepared for the war. They counted on Sweden being even less prepared because the new Swedish King Charles XII was a very young man. They chiefly relied on taking Sweden by surprise. The Danish king and August of Saxony opened hostilities simultaneously. The Danes occupied Schleswig-Holstein and August besieged Riga. But king Charles XII had a greater surprise in store when he landed unexpectedly near Copenhagen, which was quite unprepared for defence

and thus compelled the Danish king to make a hasty peace and withdraw from the coalition. The Danish campaign was terminated in a few weeks. Tsar Peter was only waiting for news of the conclusion of peace with the Sultan in order to attack Sweden. He at once declared war on Charles XII; the day of his declaration, the 19th of August, 1700, being two days after Denmark's withdrawal from the coalition. Tsar Peter besieged the Swedish fortress Narva, near the Southern shore of the Gulf of Finland. He was accompanied by about 40,000 men but his army consisted mostly of imperfectly trained recruits commanded by foreigners, Peter having no confidence in his own officers. The siege of Narva was progressing very slowly when, unexpectedly, King Charles XII landed with only 8,000 men and, by a daring stroke, defeated the whole Muscovite army on the 20th of October, 1700. The defeat was overwhelming: all the Generals and officers, afraid of their own men, preferred to be taken prisoner. There were thousands of prisoners and the whole Muscovite transport, treasury and artillery fell into the hands of the Swedes. Charles XII decided that his second rival was sufficiently disabled and now turned his forces against the third member of the coalition, August of Saxony.

But Charles XII was mistaken about Tsar Peter; the humiliating defeat of Narva not only did not discourage Peter but roused in him fresh energy and an unshaken determination to continue the war. He at once began preparations for a renewal of the struggle. Though, according to renewed treaties with the Ukrainian Hetmans, the Muscovite Tsars had no right to send Ukrainian Cossacks against an enemy which did not directly threaten Ukrainian territory or their interests, Tsar Peter at once drew Ukrainian forces also into this war. Advancing to Narva he ordered 12,000 Cossacks to join him there under the command of Colonel Obidovsky. The Ukrainians had hardly had time to reach Pskov, on their way to Narva, when the Muscovite army was lost. The Cossacks suffered very much from cold and insufficient sup-

plies: thousands of them perished in this campaign or returned home invalids. After the defeat at Narva, Tsar Peter ordered another Ukrainian corps of 7,000 Cossacks to mobilize. In the meantime Charles XII defeated August in Livonia and transferred the theatre of war to Lithuania. Tsar Peter confirmed his alliance with August promising him further help; thus Poland also was drawn into war. The Polish government claimed from Peter as compensation, the rest of Ukraine of the Right Bank of the Dnieper, which still was in Muscovite hands. This news alarmed Hetman Mazepa and he protested against any compensation to Poland at the cost of Ukrainian territory.

However, he soon received an order to join the Polish allies of the Tsar in White Russia. Further, a corps of the Ukrainian army was to be sent, under Colonel Apostol, to Livonia to help the Muscovite forces engaged there. They defeated the Swedish General Schlippenbach in Livonia and the Ukrainians captured considerable spoils which, however, the Muscovite commanders took from them. On the whole, the Cossacks had much to complain of in their treatment by the Muscovite authorities, the bad organization of the food and munition supplies, the arrears in their pay and the general mismanagement in the Muscovite organization. The Ukrainians, compelled to take part in a hard war in which they had no interest, in circumstances to which they were not at all accustomed—in a northern and uncongenial climate—were not only poorly rewarded, but had to put up with Muscovite discourtesy and outrages. Ukrainian commerce with the Baltic was interrupted in consequence of this war. Ukrainian merchants were suffering heavy losses, and the economic situation was rendered very unstable. All this contributed to make the war extremely unpopular in Ukraine: from all sides came expressions of dissatisfaction and complaints.

121. Occupation of the Ukraine of the Right Bank by Mazepa.

Tsar Peter, however, continually demanded further sacrifices from the Ukraine. When Charles XII utterly defeated August and, in 1702, took Warsaw and Cracow, many Poles now sided with him. Charles put forward his candidate to the Polish crown, the voevod of Poznan, Stanislaus Leszczynski. Poland was split into two parties: one for August of Saxony and Muscovy, the other for Stanislaus Leszczynski and Sweden. The fighting front-line which the Ukrainian forces had to enter, now stretched along the whole Ukrainian-Polish frontier and across White Russia. In order to support the partisans of August in Poland, Mazepa was compelled to send a corps of Cossacks led by Colonel Miklashevsky. With the main Ukrainian forces he, himself, crossed the Dnieper and occupied the Right Bank hoping to remain there and definitely reunite the two sundered parts of Ukraine.

The situation of the Right Bank was at that time very complicated. According to the Treaty of Bakhchisaray of 1691, with the Sultan, and that of 1688 with Poland, the greatest part of the Ukraine of the Right Bank, as we already know, remained with Poland. Kiev with its immediate environs passed to Muscovy, and Kamanets with part of Podolia, was in Turkish possession. The Polish government, however, was bound by the Treaty to leave uninhabited a considerable stretch of land along the Dnieper, beginning a little below Kiev and extending as far as Chihirin. This stretch of land was to remain desert and form a sort of neutral belt between the Cossack State on the Left Bank and the part of the Ukraine under Poland. As a matter of fact, the whole of the Ukraine of the Right Bank returned to Poland in a state of almost complete desert: towns and villages lay in ruins; the population had been exterminated or had fled and was hiding in inaccessible places. At first the Polish government endeavored to repopulate Podolia but made slow progress. Only after King John

Sobieski, having seen that something must be done to protect this frontier from the Tatars, and having decided to renew the Cossack organization, did the repopulation begin to advance rapidly. In 1684 he made it known by a manifesto that former Cossack towns such as Chihirin, Korsun, Lisianka, Uman and others, were to be rebuilt according to Cossack system. The Seim in Warsaw formally renewed the Cossack organizations with Hetman Mohylenko at their head in 1685. The repopulation then went steadily ahead. Mohylenko's appeal brought back refugees and new settlers from everywhere, though chiefly from the Ukraine of the Left Bank, from Volynia, Galicia and Moldavia. All were attracted by promise of freedom and free possession of land, the fertile rich black soil again lying unoccupied, ready for anyone who wished to work on it. As if out of the earth, Cossack Hundreds and Regiments appeared. Every man among the new colonists wished to be entered on the Cossack rolls and was ready to handle the sword as well as the plough. After Mohylenko's death King John Sobieski nominated Samus Colonel of Fastiv, a well educated man, considerably advanced in years. From the first he made far-reaching plans for reuniting the two parts of the Ukraine. Indeed, every Ukrainian leader had at that time the same dreams. First of all he began an active repopulation of his district of Fastiv, about 60 kilometers from Kiev, almost on the frontier of the Ukraine of the Hetmans. He ruled his regiment of Fastiv with an almost independent authority. In the beginning, however, he avoided conflicts with the Polish government. He took a very active part in the struggle against the Turks and the Tatars and in his campaign penetrated as far as the shores of the Black Sea. Through his successful campaign he acquired for himself great military renown. Even more successful was another colonel, Paliy, whose family had lived in the Chernigov area. Paliy was, however, bound to have trouble with the Polish authorities. In proportion as the repopulation of the deserted places advanced, children and grand-children of former

landowners began to put forward their claims. Out of chests and cupboards came charters and documents proving that the lands on which colonization was rapidly advancing had, some forty or fifty years ago, belonged to their ancestors. Paliy would not recognize the rights of former owners and would not allow them to take possession of the lands. He even disregarded the rights of noble landowners who returned to the neighboring districts by quartering his Cossacks on them. These proceedings of Paliy roused discontent and complaints against him.

122. Imprisonment of Paliy.

Paliy was now well embarked upon his plan of uniting the two parts of Ukraine. As early as 1688 he made, through Hetman Mazepa, a proposal that the Muscovite government should take his district and regiment of Fastiv under its protection. But the Muscovite government, having just concluded "eternal" peace with Poland, had no wish to disturb their relations with Poland and declined Paliy's proposal. Rumors about Paliy's clandestine relations with Muscovy reached the Polish authorities who promptly arrested and imprisoned him. He escaped however, rejoined his Cossacks, expelled the Polish garrison from Fastiv and continued to maintain himself there as an independent ruler. He continued his relations with Mazepa and often rose in arms against the Polish authorities and repulsed their attacks on him.

But the Polish government, having concluded peace with the Sultan in 1699, the Turks surrendered Podolia with Kamanets and definitely renounced their claims to the Ukraine. The Polish government had thus no further need of the Cossacks. The Seim in Warsaw voted in the same year to dissolve the Cossack organizations in Poland and the government ordered the Cossack Hetman and all the Colonels to disband their units and to surrender towns and fortresses to the Polish authorities.

The Cossacks would not hear of this. In 1700 the Polish government sent out a corps of 4,000 against Paliy

who, however, defeated and dispersed them. This was an open breach with the Polish government. The latter, however, was occupied with the Swedish war. In order to subdue the Cossacks, a mobilization of the Szlachta was ordered in the three provinces of Volynia, Kiev and Podolia. Hetman Samus on his side, sent an Universal to the whole population, inviting them to join the Cossacks in the war against Poland, and telling them falsely that he had already sworn that they should all obey Hetman Mazepa. Bila Tserkva, being the chief fortified place of the Polish government in the Ukraine, Samus and Paliy laid siege to it, after having at Berdichev defeated the Polish army sent to the relief of Bila Tserkva. After a seven weeks' siege the Cossacks took the fortress of Bila Tserkva, seizing 28 guns and large supplies of munitions. Hetman Samus now laid siege to another important fortified town, the fortress of Nemirov, in Podolia, and took it also. The whole country then rose in arms as one man, as at the time of Bohdan Khmel'nitsky.

Mazepa closely followed these events. He warmly advised Tsar Peter to take the Right Bank of the Dnieper under his protection at least as far as Bila Tserkva, including the area ruled by Paliy. But Peter would not hear of it, wishing to maintain his good relations with Poland. He not only left Paliy to his own devices but advised him to stop the uprising and submit.

The popular movement, left to its own efforts, was quelled by the Polish government and partly subdued. The Cossacks offered a stubborn resistance. The Polish army, after a long siege and heavy losses, took Nemirov and laid siege to Ladizhin, another important fortress held by the Cossack Colonel Abasin. After a heroic defence Ladizhin was taken; on each side about 10,000 men perished. The strength of the insurgents was broken and the Polish government started a cruel persecution; thousands of rebels met their death and others were mutilated by way of punishment by cutting off the left ear. Paliy alone held out in his fortress of Bila Tserkva. Mazepa would gladly have given him a helping hand but

he wished to avoid conflict with Peter. The defeated Cossacks who succeeded in escaping from the Poles, fled to the Left Bank of the Dnieper. Hetman Samus took refuge with Mazepa and surrendered to him his Hetman's insignia.

In these circumstances Mazepa suddenly received an order from the Tsar to cross the Dnieper and advance into Poland to bring help to King August's party against that of Stanislaus Leszczynski. Mazepa occupied the province of Kiev and Volynia. He sent in advance 17,000 Cossacks under Colonels Apostol of Starodub and Myrovich of Pereyaslav to join August's Saxon troops and operate against the Swedish forces in Poznan.

Charles XII, however, defeated August and forced him to leave Poland. The Swedish troops, having taken Lvov, compelled the Ukrainian troops to retreat. Mazepa, however, retained Volynia and Kiev. When Charles XII was pursuing August into Saxony, a Ukrainian army of 40,000 entered Galicia in 1705 and occupied Lvov. Charles XII'S further victories again changed the situation, the majority of the Polish nobles now accepting Stanislaus Leszczynski, the Swedish candidate. Tsar Peter tried to stop the advance of the Swedes into Lithuania and again made use of Ukrainian troops, having Mazepa with 14,000 Cossacks to help him in Minsk, where the Ukrainians had very heavy losses. Charles XII, having inflicted several serious defeats on the Muscovites, and the Ukrainians in Lithuania and White Russia, made a forced march into Saxony and occupied it as far as Leipzig. August was compelled to sue for peace: he renounced the Polish crown in favor of Stanislaus Leszczynski and broke the alliance with Muscovy. Charles XII was now able to turn all his forces against his last enemy, the Muscovite Tsar.

In autumn, 1707, Charles XII left Saxony in an eastern direction. He was, however, obliged now to reconquer Poland, held by Muscovite and Ukrainian troops. No one knew what direction he would take, whether he would advance through Poland into the Ukraine, or

traverse Lithuania and go directly to Moscow. Tsar Peter wished Mazepa to concentrate his troops, mobilize in full his resources and hastily fortify Kiev.

123. Alliance with Sweden.

For seven long years the Ukraine had borne the burden of the Swedish war and made immense sacrifices for it. Thousands of Cossacks had lost their lives in far distant countries in Finland, Livonia, Lithuania, Poland and Saxony, for a cause which was not their own and very remote from their national interests, and Tsar Peter was constantly demanding continual fresh effort and sacrifice. The country was exhausted both militarily and materially. Foreign trade was at a standstill, corn and various other food supplies were continually and endlessly being exported for the needs of the armies. Masses of the agricultural population were taken from their work and forced to build fortification. The population groaned under the burden and serious discontent was growing among the Cossacks as well as the peasants. The question "How long?" and "For what end?" were constantly raised among the leading circles of the Cossack officers. Not only were the minds of the Ukrainian leaders occupied with the burden of the alien war, but the uncertain political outlook compelled them to think of the future fate of their country. It was clear to them that Tsar Peter considered the Ukraine only an instrument for carrying out his personal ambitions which he was recklessly pursuing and which had nothing to do with the interest of the Ukraine. Mazepa expressing the wish of every Ukrainian patriot, desired to retain the Right Bank of the Dnieper. Tsar Peter was ready to give it away to Poland solely in order to retain that country as his ally against Charles XII. There were rumors that he had offered the Ukraine to the Duke of Marlborough, who would thus become his vassal and help him to take a few miles of Baltic coast from Sweden. The Ukrainian government had reason to think that if Charles advanced directly into the Ukraine, Tsar Peter would leave the

Ukraine to her own devices and only defend Moscow. All this uncertainty greatly alarmed the Ukrainian government and compelled it to consider seriously the situation thus created. Hetman Mazepa and the leading Cossack officers, members of the Ukrainian government, in their endeavors to protect their country from reckless and unscrupulous exploitation by the Tsar, were led to seek political alliances other than the Muscovite protectorate. They found the political moment very opportune for a renewal of Bohdan Khmelnitsky's tradition of an alliance with Sweden.

We know how Bohdan Khmelnitsky had tried to rely on a Swedish alliance in his struggle against Poland. He had at that time concluded a close alliance with the Swedish king, Charles X, grandfather of Charles XII, who also was an enemy of Poland. Sweden, on the whole, was a very advantageous ally for the Ukraine, having no common frontiers and there being no litigious questions between them. Indeed, under the circumstances, Sweden seemed by far the best ally the Ukraine could find. After Bohdan Khmelnitsky, Vyhovsky tried to renew relations with Sweden and after him Hetman Doroshenko followed the precedent of seeking a Swedish alliance. Home affairs in Sweden were at that time not favorable to the renewal of war with Poland. Now, at the opening of the Eighteenth century, Sweden appeared once more on the political horizon of Ukraine at a very critical moment when the Ukrainian Hetman and the Cossack officers were faced with the question of the Ukraine's future fate. The circumstances were such that the Ukraine's future would be jeopardized by the victory of either side. In case of Charles XII's victory, the Ukraine would be the spoil of Sweden's ally, Stanilaus Leszczynski. In case of Tsar Peter's victory, Ukrainian independence would be greatly menaced by his further encroachments on Ukrainian life, exhausting her resources to further his political ambitions. Several years of this war had given sufficient proof of his attitude. Tsar Peter had no intention of defending the Ukraine for its

own sake against Sweden or Poland, he merely used her military and economic resources for his own ends and was ready, if pressed, to abandon the Ukraine to her fate in order to serve his major interest, which obviously lay on the shores of the Baltic and not on the Dnieper and the Black Sea.

In these circumstances the Ukrainian Hetman and the Cossack Officers decided, early in the Swedish war, to take an independent course of action, though they had not as yet a definite plan. But as the Ukraine was compelled to make continually greater and greater sacrifices for this war so unpopular in the Ukraine, the dissatisfaction of the population proportionately grew. Mazepa received from all quarters complaints and protests regarding the insults and offences to which the Cossacks were exposed in the Muscovite army, of misrule and mismanagement. The civil population of the Ukraine was suffering even more under the burden of the war: constant mobilizations for the far-away fronts, compulsory transport service and hard work for building fortifications at home, endless requisitions of food supplies, ruin of the foreign trade. All these sacrifices, unnecessary from the Ukrainian point of view, ruined the country every year more and more and shook the very foundation of the well-being of the population. It is only natural that in all these losses and privations the population blamed their own government, the Hetman and the Cossack officers. When, late in 1706, Colonels Apostol and Horlenko are known to have addressed the aged Hetman Mazepa in the words: "We all pray for Bohdan Khmelnitsky's soul for having delivered Ukraine from Polish domination, whereas our children will curse your soul and bones if you leave the Cossacks in such bondage", they certainly echoed the feelings and thoughts of all the Ukraine. Subsequent Russian historians are prone to represent the policy of the Ukrainian Hetman, as inspired by his personal ambitions. Historical facts, however, all point to the conclusion that Mazepa's breach with Muscovy and alliance with Charles XII of

Sweden, was not primarily his personal doing but an action for which the whole Ukrainian government and all the leaders of Ukrainian policy among the Cossack Officers were responsible, and that it was dictated by the evident political interest of their country.

The history of the beginning of Mazepa's relations with Charles XII is to this day shrouded in mystery. All we know about them comes from testimonies and memoirs of contemporaries written post factum, and with evident bias. Some of them were written with a definite political purpose. As far as it is possible to judge from different contemporary indications and later documents, Mazepa's relations with Tsar Peter's enemies began in 1705, when he was in Poland at the head of the Ukrainian army. The initiative came from Polish partisans of Charles XII who supported the candidature of Stanislaus Leszczynski to the Polish crown. There are indications that Stanislaus Leszczynski sent his emissary to Hetman Mazepa in the autumn of 1705. It is to be conjectured that in starting secret relations with Stanislaus Leszczynski, Mazepa had as yet no definite plans, until the Cossack Officers, not even knowing perhaps that he was in contact with the Tsar's enemies, pressed him to break with Muscovy. All his nearest colleagues, members of the Ukrainian government, insisted upon his taking advantage of the strained position of Muscovy to further Ukrainian interests by means of an alliance with Sweden and maintain the tradition left by Bohdan Khmelnytsky. It was only after their insistence, prayers, and persuasions that Mazepa decided to take decisive steps. He then took the whole affair into his hands and shouldered the whole responsibility.

We are here approaching a moment of singular importance in Ukrainian history which by Russian historians, has usually been associated exclusively, but quite wrongly, with the name of Hetman Mazepa. We have abundance of historical evidence to the contrary and know for certain that Mazepa was not acting single-handed. Moreover, Russian historians view this episode

in the light of Muscovite State interest, terming it Mazepa's "treason". We are here concerned with the facts which prove that Mazepa and the Ukrainian government had at heart the interests of their country and were driven to action by Tsar Peter's reckless policy which was directed against the interests of the Ukraine. Very few moments in Ukrainian history were so extremely significant for the future of the Ukraine though, of course, Mazepa and his collaborators could not have foreseen the tragic and fatal consequences. We can safely say that the whole course of Ukrainian history, especially Ukrainian-Russian relations, was for more than two centuries affected by the step taken by Mazepa and the Ukrainian government at this moment. Suffice it to remember that even in our time, at the beginning of the Seventeenth century the Ukrainian national movement was dubbed "Mazepism" by its enemies and Ukrainian patriots were called "Mazepists". On the name of Hetman Mazepa was heaped as much hate and malevolence by one side as there was of romantic idealization by the other. Both influenced historical research to such an extent that almost until the end of the Nineteenth century there did not exist a single fairly unprejudiced historical work which impartially reviewed the life and political activity of the famous Hetman. To this must be added that until the end of the Nineteenth century it was quite unsafe to write impartially in Russia about Mazepa without rendering oneself suspected of disloyalty or even being accused of high treason. It is only in quite recent times, and especially after the perusal of new documents found in foreign archives, which throw much new light on the question that this portentous moment of Ukrainian history connected with the name and personality of Mazepa appears in quite a different light from that in which Russian historians represented it. First of all, it was made clear that breaking with Muscovy and going over to Sweden was far from being an individual act on the part of the Hetman inspired by personal ambitious motives, as Russian historians constantly repeat.

Rather it was dictated by the deliberate policy of the whole group of high Cossack Officers led by Hetman Mazepa, as Head of Ukrainian State, who acted in the real interest of their country, whose position was endangered by the reckless policy of Tsar Peter, indifferent to the wellbeing of Ukraine. It was in the eyes of the Ukrainian government, also, the logical and inevitable solution of a situation created by the war and Peter's policy. Moreover, this solution of a Swedish alliance was in conformity with Ukrainian historical tradition supported by several precedents. Thus Mazepa's alliance with Sweden in 1708 was nothing novel in Ukrainian history.

What were Mazepa's motives in thus warmly espousing this policy? Even if we did not know them from his own words, it would hardly be possible to conclude, as Russian historians do, that he was led by personal ambitious motives. Mazepa was above seventy years old at that time; he was a widower and had no children. For twenty years he had been Ukrainian Hetman under the protectorate of the Muscovite Tsars and enjoyed their esteem and confidence. He held besides the title of Prince of the Holy Roman Empire. In order to take such an important step leading into the unknown, a man at his time of life and in his circumstances at the height of his power and honor, must have been led by motives other than the desire for power and distinctions.

Mazepa himself has disclosed to us the motives of his action in several declarations which, directly or indirectly, have come down to us. For example, the General Secretary of Cossack Headquarters at that time, Philip Orlik who, acting as the Chancellor of the Ukrainian government was, of course, familiar with its negotiations, tells us in several written testimonies that in the autumn of 1707, Hetman Mazepa made a solemn declaration which Orlik noted down. The Hetman said: "I call the Almighty God to witness and swear that it is not for high honors or riches or any other object, but for the sake of

all of you who are under my rule, for the sake of your wives and your children, for the good of our Mother Ukraine and in the interests of the whole Ukrainian people and to secure their rights and liberties, that with the help of God I wish to act in order that you with your wives and our country should not perish from Muscovites or Sweden. Should I act from any other personal motives, may God and the Holy Trinity and the Passion of our Saviour punish me, soul and body". It is hard to believe that a septuagenarian who, during his life had always been an exceptionally fervent Christian, should forswear himself in such an abandoned fashion at its close.

From the very beginning of Mazepa's rule his countrymen sent denunciations and engaged in intrigues. Such intrigues were a sad heritage left to Ukrainian society by the period of the "Ruin" and general demoralization. In Moscow they were accustomed to these denunciations, knowing that they had no serious grounds. Tsar Peter usually directed such invectives with the names of their authors back into the Hetman's own hands. But in 1708 a very serious denunciation against Mazepa was sent to the Tsar by two people, both holding high positions in Ukrainian ruling spheres. One of the denunciators was Basil Kochubey, General Judge, the other, Colonel Iskra of the Poltava Regiment. Kochubey had once been Mazepa's close friend, but in 1704 they quarreled, owing to a love affair of the aged Hetman with Kochubey's daughter Motria. Kochubey, and especially his wife, would not hear of the marriage because Mazepa was god-father to the girl. This love affair, which later furnished much material for poets and playwrights, ended in a quarrel between Kochubey and the Hetman. Kochubey, it is true, himself made peace, and being a member of the government, that is of the Cossack Headquarters, was initiated into the political plans concerning the Swedish alliance. His revengeful wife persuaded Kochubey to denounce Mazepa to the Tsar and thus bring about his downfall. They drew into their secret plan Iskra,

Colonel of Poltava. But in Moscow they were so much accustomed to receiving denunciations sent through personal spite that in this case also they saw in it nothing more than the settlement of a family feud. Kochubey and Iskra had to appear in Moscow for examination. Tsar Peter ordered his Ministers to conduct the inquiry and to "question" them, that is, torture them in order to obtain confessions. Both Kochubey and Iskra were old men and could not endure the "question": they confessed to having written their denunciation of Mazepa out of spite, and the execution was to be held in Ukraine. Both men were brought to Kiev and, in the summer of 1708, beheaded in the Cossack camp near Kiev. At the time the two miserable informers met their fate, the Ukrainian-Swedish alliance was an accomplished fact and Charles XII was advancing into Muscovy.

124. Campaign of Charles XII in Ukraine.

Charles XII's campaign in the Ukraine is one of the most striking instances in history of a disastrous end to a great undertaking which, according to all the circumstances, promised to be a great success. For this reason alone the catastrophe which terminated this campaign impressed all imaginations. There exist an enormous number of books and historical works devoted to the history of this tragic campaign. Until recent times, a more or less unanimous opinion prevailed about the unhappy hero of the campaign, Charles XII: he was considered to be an extremely daring and gallant warrior but devoid of strategic talent. His conduct during this campaign was considered to be a striking instance of adventurous strategy resulting in the loss of the best army in Europe and inflicting on Sweden incurable wounds.

In the last ten years, however, this opinion has been altered. A number of historians, mostly Swedish, have re-examined Charles XII's campaign in the Ukraine in the light of new documents. Examination of the campaign from a purely professional military point of view,

has resulted in a partial rehabilitation of the Swedish king. It was shown that the catastrophe in the Ukraine was not caused by defective strategy, which was good, but by a fatal conjunction of circumstances against which the greatest military genius was powerless.

The peace of Altranstadt (1706) put Charles XII on the pinnacle of fame and power. His stubborn enemy, August of Saxony, was crushed and renounced the Polish crown which was given to Stanislaus Leszczyński. The international prestige of Charles XII stood very high. Prussia and Denmark did not dare to move; Austria, France, England and Holland were on his side; and French diplomacy gave him active support. The Sultan was ready to join him as soon as he was victorious over Muscovy. Sweden was well protected. Charles XII had at his disposal a first class army of 110,000 men, an enormous contingent for that time and was able to direct all these troops against Muscovy. The main force under the King himself, was to deal the Tsar the decisive blow.

Late in the summer of 1707 Charles left Saxony and successfully fought his way through Poland which, during his campaign in Saxony had been occupied by Muscovite and Ukrainian troops. He had two possible routes for the advance on Moscow: a southern one, across Volynia to the Ukraine of the Hetmans and thence, fortified by Mazepa's Cossacks, northward to Moscow; or the direct way to Moscow across Lithuania. Charles chose this latter because it enabled him to keep in contact with the Swedish provinces along the Eastern shores of the Baltic for his supplies. In six months the Swedish army covered over five hundred miles and early in March 1708 reached Smorgon, a small place to the South-East of Vilna. The Muscovite army was encamped along the river Vilia. Charles, very skilfully, turned their right flank and the Muscovites were compelled to retreat before him. The Swedish army fought for a line along the river Nieman and occupied it. The retreating Muscovite army destroyed everything as they went, leaving devastation be-

hind them. Departing from Smorgon, Charles XII took the direction of Minsk. From here he summoned his general, Loevenhaupt, who was stationed with 12,000 men in Courland, to come to his help with all possible artillery, munitions and food supplies. Charles XII himself had 38,000 men with him. It was expected that he would now advance direct to Smolensk and then to Moscow. After having defeated the Muscovites near Golovchin, Charles arrived at the river Dnieper and occupied Mohilev. Here he lay waiting for Loevenhaupt for about a month, but had to leave without him. He was prevented from continuing his way directly to Moscow because the Muscovite army had devastated the country along the road to Moscow, and as he wished to save his troops, he refrained from attacking the Muscovite army, who were strongly entrenched. About a hundred kilometers beyond Smolensk Charles turned rapidly to the south towards the Ukraine. As Swedish modern historians now prove, Charles had not at that time any intention of penetrating far into the Ukraine but intended merely to turn the right flank of the Muscovite army and, passing across Northern Ukraine the province of Sieversk, reach the road Briansk-Kaluga leading directly to Moscow. By forced marches he intended to outstrip the Tsar's army and occupy the province of Sieversk in order to assure for himself its rich supplies and then continue to Moscow.

But all his plans were ruined in consequence of the failure of two of his generals to achieve their tasks: firstly Loevenhaupt, advancing too slowly, allowed himself to be surrounded by Muscovite forces superior in numbers and was defeated near Lisne in White Russia. All his artillery and his entire transport fell into the hands of the enemy; Loevenhaupt himself, with only half of his army, about 6,000, fought his way through the hostile force and joined the main Swedish army of Charles. Tsar Peter was right in later calling the victory of Lisne "Mother of the Poltava victory". The moral significance of this victory was even greater than its purely military

advantage, because it was the first time that Muscovite troops had defeated an important Swedish force in a pitched battle.

On the other side, Charles' general Lagencrona, whom he sent in advance to the chief strategic points in the Sieversk province, lost his way, did not attain his objective point at the right time and altogether failed to accomplish his task. The Muscovite army which was, meanwhile, advancing parallel to the Swedish on its East flank, occupied all the important points guarding the route from the Sieversk province to Moscow. The Muscovites again succeeded in destroying all the supplies in the country before the arrival of the Swedes. The winter was close at hand and Charles XII had no other choice than to advance further into the Ukraine for winter quarters, and that as speedily as possible so as to prevent the Muscovite army forestalling him once more.

There are definite grounds for supposing that Mazepa did not contemplate Charles coming directly into the Ukraine and making Ukrainian territory the scene of military operations. It was to the interest of the Ukraine to have the two formidable rivals fight out their decisive duel elsewhere. From every point of view the Ukraine was not prepared to take an active part in the decisive struggle. Strong though the general dissatisfaction of the bulk of the Ukrainian population was with Tsar Peter's form of Muscovite protection, yet the Ukrainian government had not had sufficient time to prepare a general uprising against him, which would have required more time than they had and considerable organization. The Ukrainian-Swedish alliance was for long kept secret: most of the Ukrainian military forces were stationed in different places outside the Ukraine and several towns within were held by Muscovite garrisons; the Hetman himself had to co-operate with Muscovite generals. When Mazepa heard about Charles advancing directly into the Ukraine he was, according to the testimony of con-

temporaries, seized with despair. He is reported to have said that Charles' presence in the Ukraine would inevitably bring the Muscovite army on the Ukrainian territory and then all would be lost. Mazepa found himself between two fires: the Muscovite army was approaching and the Tsar demanded Mazepa's presence at his headquarters; on the other hand the Swedes were also marching into the Ukraine. Every day's delay would make the Muscovites suspicious, and in order to save time Mazepa declared himself dangerously ill and confined to his bed. It was only when the Muscovite vanguard was about two or three days march from Baturin, his residence, that Mazepa made his decision. He left part of his force, about 10,000 men under Colonel Chechel and the Artillery officer, Koenigseck, a German by birth, in Baturin with orders to keep the Muscovite army off; and with the rest of his force he started northwards to join Charles. It was only now that the common Cossacks were told that he was leading them not against the Swedes but against Muscovites.

125. Baturin and Poltava and Muscovite Terror.

Baturin was a strongly fortified place with good artillery and a great arsenal of munition. The defenders of Baturin were ready to obey their orders faithfully and when Menshikov approached with the Muscovite vanguard, a few days after the Hetman left Baturin, he was met with gun fire. Tsar Peter soon heard of Mazepa's defection to Charles and great were his surprise and alarm. But though he had received a severe blow, he soon pulled himself together and adapted himself to the situation; he possessed to a high degree the quality of never losing his head in the most critical moments. He published a manifesto to the whole Ukrainian people declaring Mazepa a traitor and accusing him of intending to "compel the Ukrainians to become Roman Catholic and to return the Ukraine to Polish domination". He invited the Ukrainian people to remain with him, promis-

ing them "rights and liberties such as no other nation in the world had ever possessed". Further, he ordered all the Cossack officers to appear in Hlukhov for the election of a new Hetman. On the other hand he ordered Menshikov to take Baturin by storm and to use every imaginable severity in order to terrorize the Ukrainian population and to keep them from the alliance with Sweden.

Menshikov did as he was told. Though the onset on Baturin was repulsed, in the night an informer showed the Muscovites a secret underground passage and the Muscovites penetrated into Baturin. The Cossacks and the whole civilian population offered heroic resistance but were overpowered. Menshikov's revenge was fearful: the whole population of Baturin including women and children were slaughtered to a man, while the town was destroyed and burned. Of the brilliant Hetman capital nothing remained but smoking ruins and heaps of corpses. Those of the Cossacks who were taken prisoner, were tortured to death, their bodies being bound to planks and set floating down the river Seim to let the people know of the fate that had befallen Baturin. Menshikov had hardly time to finish his inhuman work when Charles and Mazepa approached and he was compelled to retreat in haste.

Baturin's unexpectedly sudden end was a great blow to Mazepa's enterprise. Not only because his capital was ruined and the rich supplies of munitions so necessary to Charles, were lost, but the moral blow was even greater. Hardly had Mazepa time to join his new ally when Peter's revenge fell heavily on all the members of the Ukrainian government, on whom he could lay hands. By these cruel reprisals on the population the Muscovite Tsar wished to crush all spirit of opposition.

At his headquarters in Lebedin, Tsar Peter installed a special court of Justice for Cossack Officers known or suspected to be in favor of a Swedish alliance. A contemporary chronicler wrote: "Many Cossack Officers

and common Cossacks, suspected of being Mazepa's followers or solely on account of not having appeared at the new Hetman's election in Hlukhov, were hunted down, brought into the Muscovite camp and tortured: broken on the wheel, quartered, or impaled. Plain hanging and simple beheading were mild punishment in comparison. People were forced under torture to confess to anything and were then punished for it. The author of this memoir names 900 Cossack Officers who were tortured to death in Lebedin. But along with the cruel persecutions of partisans of the Swedish alliance, a shower of favors and rewards was lavished on those who promptly acknowledged their loyalty to the Tsar. All those Cossack Officers who had accepted the first invitation and duly appeared in Hlukhov for the new elections were presented by the Tsar's generous hand with charters to lands and estates: in a few days hundreds of great new landowners were thus created. The estates of Mazepa's followers were confiscated and given to those who, appearing in the Tsar's camp, acknowledged their loyalty. Informers and denunciators were richly rewarded. This led to a perfect orgy of denunciation: all the basest elements in the Ukraine tried to take advantage of the occasion to enrich themselves in order to make a start or advance in service. The seeds of a terrible demoralization that were sown among the Ukrainian population at this time bore fruit for many a decade to come. It was not only Ukrainians who had hastened to acknowledge their loyalty and were thus rewarded with confiscated lands, but Muscovite generals and Tsar's favorites like Menshikov, Dolgoruki and others received great estates in the Ukraine contrary to every right expressed in the Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties."

These demonstrations of the Tsar's policy towards the Ukraine were the first consequences of the Swedish alliance. In the meantime military events were taking their course. Charles made haste to advance further south in order to make contact with the Crimean Tatars and

the Sultan. His agents had long since been negotiating with Turkey, trying to draw them into war against Muscovy. French diplomats energetically supported Charles' endeavors. In the meantime, winter was approaching and for a time interrupted military operations. The winter of 1708-1709 was extraordinarily severe, and the Swedes though natives of a northern country, suffered great losses in consequence of the cold. Some thousands perished from it, thus diminishing the already weakened and decimated Swedish army. Early in 1709, during the bitterest cold, Charles made an advance in the Slobidska Ukraine against the Muscovite cavalry and defeated them so completely that for a long time they were powerless; but the advent of a thaw which covered everything with water interrupted these operations. In the meantime the Muscovites began to disturb the Swedish troops in their winter quarters and Charles returned to them. The Ukraine terrorized by the Muscovites, maintained a passive attitude, though in places where the Swedish army was stationed the population was very friendly to them and the Swedes, under the orders of their king, behaved very discreetly. The only effective help which Charles XII had received from his Ukrainian allies up to this time, was the few thousand Cossacks which Mazepa brought with him. Early in the spring 1709, however, the Zaporogians came over to Charles. During the whole of Mazepa's rule they were partly in open, partly in secret opposition to the Hetman but at the decisive moment they followed him. The Zaporogian leader, Constantine Hordienko was a great Ukrainian patriot and an enemy of Muscovy. In the autumn of 1708 the Zaporogian Cossacks had declared their solidarity with Mazepa and the Ukrainian government in the question of the Swedish alliance. Tsar Peter sent in haste great sums of money to the Sich, hoping to win over the Zaporogians to himself, but it was of no avail and, in March 1709, Hordienko brought 8,000 Zaporogian Cossacks to the Swedish headquarters. This was very welcome to Charles as the Swedes were in great need of cavalry in which they had

suffered great losses during the winter campaign. The Zaporogian Cossacks made a special treaty with Charles XII, according to which Charles in making future peace terms with the Tsar, promised to insist upon the independence of the Ukraine and the Zaporogian Sich. At the same time the Zaporogians began to take part in military operations and defeated the Muscovite general Schaumburg at Nekhvoroscha and captured several hundred prisoners.

But the alliance with the Zaporogians was Charles' last success in the Ukraine. His position as time advanced, became more and more difficult. Negotiations with the Turks advanced very slowly and only the Crimean Tatars were ready to join him against Muscovy. Tsar Peter at once grasped the danger menacing him from the Tatars. In the spring he sent considerable detachments south which succeeded in circumventing the main Zaporogian force at the rear; the Muscovites did not go as far as the Crimea but surprised the fortified Zaporogian place Perevolochna on the Dnieper above the rapids at the mouth of the left tributary of the Dnieper, the river Vorskla. Here they destroyed the Zaporogian river fleet. This had later fatal consequences as it prevented the Swedes from crossing the Dnieper. The loss of the fleet in Perevolochna was only equal to the loss of Baturin and was also accompanied by barbaric cruelties on the part of the victorious Muscovites; they tortured and killed all the population that fell into their hands.

Early in May the Swedish army advanced southwards, reached the river Vorskla and besieged the fortified town of Poltava. The siege was pursued without any particular display of energy. Modern Swedish investigators think that the capture of Poltava fortress was not the chief object, it was only a means of provoking the Muscovite army which Charles XII wished at any price to engage in a pitched battle. He very well understood that in the conditions of war in the vast East European plains, the

importance lay neither in skilful manoeuvring nor in taking this or that fortified place or a stretch of territory, the chief aim was to give a decisive blow to the enemy and destroy his main force. In this instance this was of even greater importance because in the event of Charles' success, he would at once gain new allies, namely the Turks and Tatars who were only waiting for him to be successful to join him. Further, the rest of the Ukraine now occupied and held in check by the Muscovite army would join the Swedes.

This consideration, according to the assumptions of Swedish historians, led Charles to make a plan to use the siege of Poltava to incite the Muscovite army and induce them to offer decisive battle. This battle indeed took place on June 27, 1709, and its consequences proved to be of the greatest importance not for the East alone but for the whole of Europe. According to modern historians the forces engaged in the fight were not equal: the Swedes had only 18,000 able men with 30 guns against the Muscovite's 40,000 with 70 guns, excluding the Ukrainian troops which took part on both sides and various irregular Muscovite detachments. The high military qualities of the Swedish army made up for their numerical inferiority, but in the person of Peter I, Charles XII had a worthy rival, who had profited by his previous experience of failures and defeats. The Muscovite army was not the same as that which Charles beat so easily ten years ago at Narva. It was a misfortune for the Swedes that Charles was not able to command in person on the day of the decisive battle. A few days before he had been severely wounded in the leg by a stray bullet, having approached too near the Muscovite positions. He was compelled to surrender the general command to his general, Renschild, who made fatal blunders in consequence of which the Swedish army lost the battle in spite of their valor. Though they had lost only about 5,000 men and were able to retreat in order to the Dnieper, the campaign was irretrievably lost. Tsar Peter, drunk with his success, did

not think of pursuing them. The Swedish army, with Mazepa and his Cossacks, approached the Dnieper but were unable to cross it because the means of mass-transport, the Zaporogian river-fleet, had been destroyed by Muscovites in Perevolochna. The Swedish generals persuaded Charles to cross the river with only a small retinue and seek refuge in Turkey. Mazepa and his followers also succeeded in fleeing. The exhausted Swedish army capitulated.

126. Mazepa's Death in Exile.

Mazepa did not long survive the defeat at Poltava. Tsar Peter vainly offered great sums to the Turkish authorities to have Mazepa surrendered to him. The Turks remained true to the commandment of the Koran, not to give up fugitives who sought refuge with them and as they did not allow themselves to be tempted into giving up the old Hetman to the awful vengeance of the cruel Tsar, Mazepa died on the 22nd of August, 1709, in Bender, and was buried in the Orthodox monastery in Galatz. His cause, however, did not die with his death for he had many successors.

At first, all General Cossack Officers and most of the colonels were with Mazepa. When, however, Swedish success became doubtful, some of the Cossack Officers left him and went over to the Tsar. Peter received them all graciously and left them at their posts. He acted in this way until the battle of Poltava, but thereafter those who came to seek his pardon he arrested and tried for "high treason". The best men, however, followed Mazepa into exile. After his death they decided to continue the same policy and seek support from the Turks and the Tatars for which Charles XII was also looking. The Zaporogian Cossacks were their chief support, their numbers being constantly augmented by refugees from the Ukraine. At the head of the Ukrainian refugees was Philip Orlik, General Secretary, Chancellor and Foreign Minister of Mazepa's government.

127. Hetman Philip Orlik and His Constitution.

Orlik was descended from a noble Czech family who, after the battle of White Mountain, had emigrated to Poland. He was born near Vilna but in his youth went to the Ukraine and for ever linked his fate with that of his new country. He studied at the Kievan Academy and entered the Chancellery of the Metropolitan. From there he came over to the Chancellery of the Hetman. As a talented and well educated man, he was soon advanced to responsible posts. About 1700 he was elected General Secretary of the Cossack Headquarters. He was also a literary man and published several panegyrics on Mazepa in Latin. During twenty years' exile abroad he wrote an extensive and extremely interesting Diary.

On the 5th of April, 1710, at Bender the refugees, the Cossacks and the representatives of the Zaporogians elected Orlik as their Hetman. The Swedish king and the Sultan gave him their recognition. Charles XII concluded a special Treaty with Orlik in which he promised not to lay down his arms until the Ukraine should be delivered from Muscovite domination. Very interesting is the treaty Orlik concluded with the Zaporogian Sich. This treaty was to be the Constitution of the independent Ukrainian State for which Orlik and his adherents were striving. The text of the Treaty is interesting since it illustrates the political views of the Ukrainian Statesmen of the time as influenced by Mazepa.

The Treaty opened with a solemn declaration: "The Ukraine on both sides of the Dnieper must remain free from foreign domination for all time to come". Then followed an exposition of the basis of the Constitution. The Hetman's power was to be limited by the General Cossack Council (Generalna Rada) of General Cossack Officers (Generalna starshina), colonels of Cossack Regiments, and elected representatives from every Regiment. The Hetman was "to take counsel with them on the various affairs of State". Besides the General Cossack

Council there was to be an Assembly meeting three times a year, consisting of elected representatives of the Regiments and Hundreds and of the Zaporogian Sich. The State finance was to be kept strictly apart from the sums put at the Hetman's disposal. A revision of estates held by Cossack officers was to be made; all impositions on peasants were to be abolished. This constitution is imbued with a truly liberal and democratic spirit which makes it one of the most interesting documents of contemporary political thought in Europe.

128. Orlik's Campaign in the Ukraine of the Right Bank.

It proved easier to write the constitution than to carry it into effect. In addition to the Zaporogian Cossacks and the refugees, on whom could Orlik rely? In the first place he relied on foreign intervention. Soon after his election he made a treaty with the Crimean Khan, who promised him help in delivering the Ukrainians from the Muscovites: Slobidska Ukraine, the present Kharkov and Voronezh provinces, populated by Ukrainian settlers in the Seventeenth century, were to be included in the Ukrainian independent State. Orlik naturally counted on the Ukrainian population joining him. From the numerous refugees who continued to pour into the Zaporogian Sich from the Ukraine, he learned about the feelings of the population in the Ukraine, tired and embittered as they were by the Muscovite terror. The refugees were burning with desire to take revenge on Muscovy for their own sufferings as well as for the ruin of the country. Orlik organized a service of information, sending into the Ukraine his emissaries disguised as bandurists, wandering minstrels with banduras*, pedlars, beggars, etc., who carried about his proclamations to the Ukrainian population inviting them to rise against the Muscovite domination. This propaganda met everywhere with success.

* Bandura or Kobza—Ukrainian national musical instrument.

In the spring of 1711 Orlik had an army of 16,000 Ukrainians strengthened by a Polish detachment of volunteers from among the partisans of Stanislaus Leszczyński**. With a considerable force of Crimean Tatars, led by the Khan's own son, Orlik set out to reconquer first the Ukraine of the Right Bank held by the Polish government of King August of Saxony who had been reinstalled by Tsar Peter on the Polish throne. Orlik had in his army about forty Swedish instructors. Hetman Orlik's enterprise met with great success on the Right Bank. The population met him with sympathy and one place after another went over to him without fighting. All the Cossack Regiments of the Right Bank joined him and recognized him as their Hetman. The new Hetman of the Ukraine of the Left Bank, elected by order of Tsar Peter, Ivan Skoropadsky, sent an army against Orlik led by the General Ossavul Butovich. Orlik defeated Butovich's detachment near Lysyanka and took Butovich prisoner. Agitation began also in the Ukraine of the Left Bank. Late in March Orlik approached Bila Tserkva, being thus not far from Kiev. His successes, however, were here at an end, since Bila Tserkva was a strongly fortified place held by Poles, partisans of King August, and protected by his ally Tsar Peter. Orlik's artillery was not strong enough to take the fortress of Bila Tserkva by storming and the siege promised to be a long one. At the same time his allies, the Tatars, began their usual plundering of the population. Though Orlik obtained from the Khan the release of all prisoners taken by the Tatars he lost the warm sympathies with which the Ukrainian population had received him. Hetman Orlik's enterprise was morally ruined. His despair is to be seen in letters he wrote at that time to Charles XII to Sweden, bitterly complaining of the Tatars, the most fatal allies

** After Charles' XII defeat, his candidate, the Polish King Stanislaus Leszczyński was driven by Tsar Peter out of Poland and took refuge in France where his daughter Marie was married to King Louis XV and was French Queen. Leszczyński had still many followers in Poland and very many left Poland to follow him into exile.

the Ukraine ever had. But this was not to be the end of Ukraine's sufferings.

Orlik was still besieging Bila Tserkva when Tsar Peter set out against him. He declared war on the Turkish Sultan, who supported Orlik, and invaded the Ukraine of the Right Bank. Orlik and his Tatar allies retreated in haste, leaving the unfortunate population to the revenge of the Muscovites. Tsar Peter indeed started his operations by reprisals against the Ukrainian population who had received Orlik with sympathy. All who were known or suspected of having helped him were mercilessly punished. Towns and villages whose population had surrendered to Orlik were destroyed and the population forced to cross the Dnieper and either settle among the population of the Left Bank or be driven further eastwards and settle on free areas of Slobidska Ukraine. The population had hardly had time to recover from the Tatars of Orlik early in spring, when these new tribulations drove it almost to despair.

129. Tsar Peter's Campaign of Pruth.

Tsar Peter, having imprudently advanced that summer too far on Turkish territory in present Bessarabia, was surrounded in July 1711 on all sides by superior Turkish forces on the river Pruth. He was threatened with imminent capitulation but succeeded in buying over with a great sum of gold the Turkish Grand Vizier, who was at the head of the Turkish forces. The Grand Vizier let him out of the trap contenting himself with concluding with the Tsar an advantageous peace. According to the Treaty of Pruth, Peter renounced his pretensions to the Ukraine of the Right Bank and promised "not to interfere in Cossack affairs". The text of the Treaty was very vague and each side could construe it in its own way.

Charles XII was beside himself when he heard about Peter's escape and the Treaty of Pruth. The Sultan, to

pacify his Swedish ally, sacrificed his Grand Vizier who thus paid with his head for the Treaty of Pruth. Nevertheless, the High Porte ratified the Treaty as it was very advantageous to Turkish interests; besides, too many of the Sultan's councillors had been bought with Tsar Peter's gold which he had very lavishly bestowed.

Tsar Peter not having succeeded in laying his hands on Orlik and his followers, took to terrorizing their families and relatives in Ukraine. They were arrested, brought to Moscow, tortured, exiled to Siberia and compelled to write to their refugee relatives imploring them to stop their activities in the interest of Ukrainian independence.

130. Orlik's Activities in Exile.

Orlik was now left to his own devices. He lived for about thirty years abroad in Sweden or in Turkey with a handful of faithful followers, Ukrainian patriots. They endeavored to bring about a war between Turkey and Tsar Peter in order to obtain the Ukraine's independence. They watched attentively Europe's political movement and currents, trying to take advantage of every occasion of international conflict and complication in order to put forward the Ukrainian question. Orlik constantly wrote notes and memoranda with which he deluged all European courts. He was indefatigable, but all the efforts of Ukrainian patriots were without avail. Muscovy, after the victory of Poltava, became a powerful Russian empire—Tsar Peter having dropped his title of Tsar of Muscovy, assumed that of Emperor of all Russians—and was the leading power in North and East of Europe. According to the Treaty of Nystad, 1721, with Sweden, Tsar Peter obtained the Baltic provinces and his political influence now extended to the whole Baltic littoral. Turkey was satisfied with the return of the fortress of Azov and of the shores of the Azov and the Black Sea, which Peter had surrendered by the Treaty of Pruth of 1711

and wished no war with Russia. Poland was quite prostrate and under King August of Saxony, Tsar Peter dictated Polish policy and governed the country almost as his own. Sweden was quite exhausted and never recovered again. Orlik died in exile in 1739 and with him was buried the idea of a Ukrainian independent State, to lie dormant for almost a century and a half before coming to life again in 1917 under very different circumstances.

CHAPTER XXI

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(131) Policy of Russian Government Towards the Ukraine After the Catastrophe of Poltava. (132) Demoralization of Cossack Officers. (133) Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky. (134) Works on Canals. (135) Ruin of Ukrainian Foreign Trade. (136) "Little Russian" Board (Collegium). (137) Hetman Paul Polubotok. (138) New Course of Policy Towards the Ukraine in the Reign of Peter II. (139) Hetman Daniel Apostol.

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131. Policy of Russian Government Towards the Ukraine After the Catastrophe of Poltava.

In accordance with the Treaty of Pruth and also in consequence of an understanding with Poland, Tsar Peter definitely renounced all pretensions to the Ukraine of the Right Bank. The rest of the population was transferred to the Left Bank or Slobidska Ukraine, the fortress of Bila Tserkva was returned to Poland and the Russian army evacuated the Right Bank of the Dnieper. In spite of all endeavors of Charles XII and Orlik, Turkey was not to be persuaded into a fresh war with Russia and peace among the two powers lasted for at least twenty-five years. The Zaporogian Cossacks accepted the protectorate of the Crimean Khan and transferred their camp, the Sich, lower down the river at the Dnieper's mouth, near the present town of Kherson. Their position was very hard. Cut off from their country, put under the protectorate of their old enemy, the Tatars, they felt their position very keenly. They suffered materially, especially under the prohibition of trade with the Ukraine, and Tsar Peter strictly ordered the Ukrainian population not to have any relations with the Zaporogian Cossacks. The Zaporogians were not allowed to approach the frontier, arms being used against them. Thus the Zaporogian Sich, which always enjoyed the sympathy of the Ukrainian population, was now completely cut off from Ukrainian life except for the refugees who constantly came from there.

If we look at the consequences of Peter's victory of Poltava we can see that they were very hard for the Ukraine. First of all the whole south of the Ukraine that had been won as far as the shores of the Black and the Azov Seas, was now completely lost in favor of the Turks and the Tatars and access to the Black Sea was again forbidden by the Treaty of Pruth. Moreover, the Ukraine of the Right Bank was definitely surrendered to Poland.

The triumph of Tsar Peter over Sweden fell no less heavily on the Ukraine of the Left Bank. Though before his victory over Charles XII Peter had used Ukrainian resources for his own interest, all of which lay in the north on the Baltic, still he made no attempt to break the Ukrainian constitution. Now he openly boasted of soon having Ukraine "under his thumb", according to his own words. Having learned by experience how important Ukrainian resources were to the interests of the Muscovite State, and how dangerous her separation would be, he decided to put an end to this danger once for all. Being a man who never shrank from any sacrifices to achieve his aims, who never had any regard for his own people but by means of sword and fire tried to beat them into shape and make them look like Germans, how should he have any consideration for Ukrainians whom he always felt to be hostile and independent? Maddened by Mazepa's defection to Charles XII, he gave vent to his terrible vengeance on those on whom he could lay his hands. But he also knew how to wait, and his policy in encroaching upon Ukrainian autonomy was a model of patient but unswerving, truly Muscovite craftiness. Not at once, but slowly and systematically he also weakened the Ukrainian population physically, ruined their material welfare and exhausted their resources.

132. Demoralization of Cossack Officers.

Peter was prevented by external circumstances from making any considerable changes immediately. He could not know what turn his strife with Sweden would take.

On the contrary, it was to his interest to attach the Ukrainian population to himself; so, at the beginning he abstained from making any violent attacks on their constitution. Thus he published his Manifesto to the Ukrainian people promising all possible "rights and liberties such as no people in the world had ever had". He spared no effort to win over those of the Cossack officers who were to be won by material gains. He sent gold and presents to the Zaporogians. But at the same time he firmly held to the principle "divide that you may rule". Nothing can be more characteristic of Peter's policy in the Ukraine than a letter from his minister Golitsyn to the Chancellor Golovkin which contains the whole programme. "For our safety in Ukraina", Golitsyn wrote, "it is necessary first of all to sow discord between the Hetman and the colonels. You will do well not to fulfil any request of the Hetman. When the population sees that the Hetman has not as much power as Mazepa, there is hope that they will turn informers and denunciators. Therefore, it were unwise to treat informers and denunciators harshly; if the first two who come give you false information and you can treat them graciously, you will certainly receive true information from the third. This policy will keep the Hetman and Officers in check and render them powerless. But first of all it is necessary to prevent the Hetman and the colonels from agreement. If you succeed in obtaining this, we shall know all their affairs".

At the time of the election of the new Hetman in Hlukhov only a few Officers appeared and among them only three colonels. All present wished to have Paul Polubotok, the Colonel of Chernigov, a very energetic and courageous man. But Tsar Peter, declaring that Polubotok would turn out to be a second Mazepa, ordered the election of the Colonel of Starodub, Ivan Skoropadsky, an elderly man of quiet and amiable disposition.

133. Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky.

Ivan Skoropadsky was a native of the Ukraine of the

Right Bank and came over in 1674 after the ruin of Uman by the Turks. He entered the service of Hetman Samoylovich and was occupied in his Chancellery. He carried out different diplomatic commissions, took part in the war against the Turk and Tatars under Mazepa and became the first General Bunchuk Bearer and then General Commander. Mazepa nominated him in 1706 Colonel of Starodub. Skoropadsky was a partisan of the Swedish alliance and familiar with its negotiations and conclusion, but the circumstances were such that at the very beginning he and his Regiment in North Ukraine were cut off by the Tsar's army from Mazepa and the Ukrainian government. Thus nothing was left to Skoropadsky but to remain on the Muscovite side. To his lot fell the hard task of trying to save all that could be saved of Ukrainian autonomy. According to precedent, after the election of every Hetman, the "Articles" or constitution had to be renewed. Tsar Peter put off, making the excuse that they were in the middle of a war. Soon after the battle of Poltava Hetman Skoropadsky from his camp in Reshetylivka, where he lay with his Cossacks, sent a petition to the Tsar asking him to confirm Ukrainian "rights and liberties" and requesting the Tsar's decision about certain urgent questions as, for example, if the Cossacks during campaigns were to be put under Russian officers or remain under their own Ukrainians. Further he asked him to return the artillery taken in Baturin, and that the Muscovite voevods should not interfere in Ukrainian home administration and that Muscovite troops should not be quartered on the population, and so on. A reply came from the Chancellor Golovkin: Tsar Peter confirmed in general terms the Ukrainian "rights and liberties" and also promised to have the "Articles" drawn up later on. Ukrainian Cossacks in campaigns were to be put under the orders of Russian Generals; the artillery of Baturin was to be carried to Moscow as trophies; Muscovite voevods would be told "not to take an interest in the Ukrainian population" and, as a special favor from the Tsar the Cossacks were exempt

from taking part in the campaign of 1709 in view of the ruin of the country. Hetman Skoropadsky received a reprimand for his "unseemly" mention to the Tsar of the "rights and liberties" of the Ukrainian people, seeing that "by the Tsar's favor they enjoyed those rights and liberties like no other nation in the world".

At the same time Peter nominated his resident minister Izmaylov, at Hetman Skoropadsky's court. Izmaylov received from the Tsar two different sets of instructions; one open and one secret. The open instructions were drawn up under ten headings: Izmaylov was to watch that there be no "high treason" in Ukraine; that the Zaporogian Cossacks should not under any circumstances cross the frontier or settle too near to it; foreign ambassadors were to be received in the presence of Izmaylov and their letters were to be sent at once to the Tsar; he was to see that the Hetman did not dismiss or nominate General Cossack Officers or colonels; that he did not confiscate or grant estates without having the Tsar's permission and that the Hetman's residence should be fixed in Hlukhov. Baturin and other places, destroyed as punishment for "high treason" were allowed to be rebuilt, but the inhabitants had to pay two ducats per household into the Tsar's treasury by way of punishment. Lastly Izmaylov was to watch that the Hetman informed the Tsar concerning his whole income.

The secret instructions contained orders to watch that the Hetman and Cossack Officers should have no relation with Turks, Tatars, Swedes or those "traitors, Mazepa followers". He was to inquire as to the reserve of the State Treasury in the Ukraine in Mazepa's time and now; to listen to the conversations of the Cossack Officers and observe who was faithfully attached to the Tsar and who was not. Hlukhov was chosen as the Hetman's residence as it was almost on the Muscovite frontier. Two Muscovite regiments were to be stationed in Hlukhov and were at the disposal of the Tsar's resident representative.

All these arrangements and instructions plainly show

that the Tsar had no confidence whatever in the Ukrainian government and wished to have them under his close control. Izmaylov was soon replaced by another resident minister Protasyev, who was given to bribery and inimical to the Ukraine and who constantly denounced Hetman Skoropadsky. It was by his initiative that the Tsar abolished in 1715 the elections of Colonels and all Regimental Officers (*polkova starshina*) and Hundred's Officers (*sotenna starshina*). The Hetman was to nominate them together with the resident minister from the candidates proposed by the Councils (*Rada*) of Regiments and Hundreds. The newly nominated officer was to take an oath of allegiance to the Tsar in the presence of his resident minister.

The Cossack Officers who followed Mazepa were at the beginning promised an amnesty if they would return to the Tsar. Some indeed returned, among them the General Standard Bearer, Sulyma, the Colonel of Myrhorod, Apostol, and other lesser officers. They were left at their posts. But after Poltava's victory all those who returned were arrested, tortured, punished, exiled to Siberia, or in other similar ways disposed of. All the estates of Mazepa's followers were confiscated and out of these lands the Tsar rewarded those who had shown loyalty to him.

After his victory the Tsar's policy was gradually but relentlessly directed towards the curtailment of Ukrainian autonomy. He began, for example, the nominating of Cossack Colonels and General Officers from among inhabitants of Muscovy. Thus the Cossack Regiments of the Northern Ukraine: Starodub, Nizhin, Chernigov, received Muscovites for colonels. In other regiments he nominated foreigners without taking counsel of the Ukrainian government. Thus for instance, he nominated a Serb Miloradovich, to the Regiment of Hadiach. Generally speaking Peter nominated strangers, mostly Serbs and Rumanians to a series of important posts in the Ukrainian administration. He also took to granting lands in the Ukraine to his generals, most of whom were Germans

such as Weissbach, Roop, Munnich and others. All of them, administrators of foreign origin as well as the landowners, treated the Ukraine as a conquered land, permitting themselves all sorts of violence against the population. They were quite independent of the Hetman and the Ukrainian government; they disregarded the local authorities; and all complaints against them were of no avail. The Hetman was powerless against them and the Tsar or the Russian government never took any notice of these complaints. These new landowners, not being sure how long they would enjoy the possession of their estates, made every effort to enrich themselves as quickly as possible and mercilessly exploited the peasants on their lands. They at once introduced serfdom in forms in which it existed in Muscovy but which were unknown and seemed terrible to Ukrainians. In the Ukraine, it is true, the peasants had been bound by certain duties to the landowners. They were, however, always under the control of the government and abuses could be promptly punished. Some of the Tsar's favorites, as for instance Menshikov, the butcher of Baturin, not being satisfied with the estates granted to him, seized the lands of two adjoining Cossack Hundreds and turned the Cossacks into his serfs. It cost Hetman Skoropadsky enormous effort and much time to make him surrender the lands unlawfully seized.

Some of the Ukrainians who, in these sad times now came to the top, were hardly any better than the foreigners. At times of political terrorism on one side and loss of morals on the other, demoralization is apt to set in apace. Unscrupulous men and adventurers of all sorts usually lift their heads at times like these and take advantage of other's misfortunes in order to build up their own prosperity. Thus it was in the Ukraine after the Tsar's victory in Poltava. All those Ukrainians who had shown themselves as the Tsar's "faithful henchmen", having either given information against Mazepa and members of the Ukrainian government or having in any way rendered services to Muscovites, were now lords of

the situation and expected to be rewarded by the Tsar for their services. And the rewards indeed came in a generous shower. Quite a number of mean and despicable persons were nominated to posts of Colonels and other important posts and given estates; such people as Galagan, Kochubeys, sons of the executed informer, Charnysh and many others. All of them, of course, proved to be bad administrators and cruel to the population; they took bribes, practised exactions and in a short time amassed considerable wealth in their hands by such illegal means.

It is superfluous to say that the nomination of foreigners to posts of colonels of Regiments and to other responsible posts, besides being a breach of the Ukrainian constitution, brought disorder into the Ukrainian administration and contributed much to the demoralization of Ukrainian Cossack Officers. The foreigners not bound by any traditions and having no regard for the interests of the Ukrainian State, considered themselves only as the Tsar's servants put there to watch over the "traitor" Ukrainians. They looked down not only on the population but also on the Hetman and the government, feeling responsible only to the Tsar who nominated them. Thus they proved to be obedient tools in his hands. The Tsar's policy in the Ukraine aimed first of all at discrediting the Ukrainian government, Ukrainian institutions, and Cossack Officers in the eyes of the population.

134. Works on Canals.

As has been said one of the methods of Tsar Peter's policy in the Ukraine was the systematic exhaustion of the physical strength of the Ukrainian population. To this end thousands of Ukrainian Cossacks were sent to far northern places to execute hard labors, to dig canals and ditches and to drain the Finnish bog, where the new capital of St. Petersburg was to be built; or they were sent to hot unhealthy places on the shores of the Caspian Sea to dig trenches and to build lines of fortifications. In 1716, 10,000 Cossacks were sent to dig the canal between

the Volga and the Don near the town Tsaritzyn. In 1718 a new detachment was sent to dig trenches and build forts along the river Terek in the Caucasus. In 1721, 12,000 Cossacks were sent to dig a canal around the lake Ladoga, north of St. Petersburg; the Ladoga lake being very stormy and unsafe for navigation, it was thought expedient to make a canal parallel to the lake. Of these 12,000, twenty-four hundred died in the first few months. Another 12,000 were sent the following winter of whom also several thousands died before the year was out and most returned home invalids. Work on these canals lasted until 1725 and it is known that thirty percent of the Cossacks perished from hard labor. The horror of these toils left indelible traces in the popular memory and was echoed in a whole cycle of most melancholy, heartrending songs bearing on the canal works.

Tsar Peter began a war against Persia in 1721. He sent to Derbent on the Persian front 10,000 Cossacks; a year later another 10,000 were sent to the Persian front. In the years 1724 and 1725, 12,000 Cossacks were sent to the same front; more than half of them perished in the hot unhealthy climate from privations and hard work. In 1725 there were 6,800 Cossacks on the Derbent front; according to an official report to St. Petersburg, 5,200 perished on the spot, one thousand were dismissed as invalids and only about 600 were reported to be in good health though they had no clothes and no shoes. In spite of this Cossacks were continually sent there and to similar places even after Tsar Peter's death in 1725. No year passed without another and yet another 10,000 being sent; in 1731, 20,000 Cossacks and 10,000 Ukrainian peasants had to build the line of fortifications along the shores of the Azov Sea; next year another 30,000 joined them. Thus the ruthless process continued. Half of these numbers never returned but perished from privations, unsuitable climate and hard work.

135. Ruin of Ukrainian Foreign Trade.

In the meantime as the Cossacks and peasants were

away at these hard labors, their farms at home were neglected, there being no one to look after them properly and work regularly on them. In spite of this the Ukraine had to furnish enormous quantities of corn, cattle, horses and various food supplies for the Russian army. Besides these requisitions in war time, the whole of the Russian army in peace time was quartered on the Ukrainian population where they were provided with free billets, food and fodder. Even the families of Cossacks working on Ladoga lake or in St. Petersburg or in Persia were not exempt from this burden.

In consequence of this policy the Ukraine of the Left Bank was much impoverished during the twenty years after Mazepa's downfall. Even the Russian generals themselves accused each other of being responsible for this state of the Ukraine: that a country so rich in former times was now unable to provide the necessary supplies for Russia. When in 1735 a new war against Turkey began, the whole burden of it as of old, fell upon the Ukraine. The Russian Field Marshal Munnich, a German, who had no regard whatever for the Ukraine, complained to the Empress Anna that Russian generals who commanded the armies stationed in the Ukraine only thought of their estates there and the income from those estates. The country was getting more and more impoverished, the Cossacks fleeing from hard labor in all directions, to Poland, to Turkey, to Crimea and there entering in the enemies' armies in order to fight against Russia. Munnich continued: "in former times the Ukraine was able to put 100,000 men in the field, now 20,000 could hardly be gathered together". The fighting value of the Cossacks was quite lost for according to Munnich: "they were too long employed on hard labors and their fighting spirit declined". This was the intended result of Tsar Peter's policy since he aimed at reducing the fighting spirit of the Ukrainians so as to make them unfit to defend their own country; and his long premeditated programme was only too well carried out.

This same policy of weakening the Ukraine until her

population would not even dream of national independence also included economic measures started by Tsar Peter. This policy aimed at ruining the Ukraine as an independent economic organism and turning it into a Russian colony, into a market for young Russian industry introduced and fostered by Peter I. In one of the foregoing chapters we related how, after a few years of peace towards the end of the Seventeenth century, life in the Ukraine was stabilized a little and how this was followed by an intense development of agriculture and a revival of foreign trade. Cossack Officers, having considerable landed property concentrated in their hands, turned their energy to the intensification of agricultural production. Cossack Officers being limited and hindered in the free exercise of their political activity, instinctively felt that they would still remain the leading class in the country, even in the case of a loss of the national independence of the Ukraine, if their economic position were strong enough. Wealth, and above all, lands, concentrated in the hands of Ukrainian families would insure them against all political changes which might come as a result of Muscovite (Russian) political centralization. Under the conditions of a natural economy at this time in the Ukraine, land ownership and intensified agriculture were the chief sources of wealth. The export of agricultural products was in the Ukraine the chief means of enrichment. Cossack Officers were thus driven by a kind of feverish instinct to concentrate in their hands as much land as possible, to provide by every means labor on it and to organize large scale export of agricultural products. In a wide sense these included also sheep, cattle, and horse breeding and the products of forest industry such as tar, resin, potash, besides the actual timber. Imports from Central and Western Europe almost balanced the exports. Ukrainian landowners often were also traders, arranging the export of their own products. Only later, about the end of the Seventeenth century, a special class of merchants was arising from among the rich burgesses of Ukrainian towns such as Starodub and

others. The lower classes of the Ukrainian population took an active part in the export trade; common Cossacks and peasants in companies undertaking to provide necessary quantities of certain products. Often indeed they were carriers freighting export goods with their own carts and horses.

The Ukraine was commercially connected in the first place with Poland, Austria and Germany. These countries were the chief markets for Ukrainian products, and the main export from the Ukraine also for other lands went through these two countries. Ukrainian export went chiefly to Silesia (Breslau) and to Baltic ports: Gdansk (Danzig), Krolevec (Koenigsberg) and Riga which until 1700 was Swedish. In 1701 Tsar Peter issued an ukase (edict) forbidding Ukrainians to export to Baltic ports and ordered them to carry their export goods only to Azov on the Azov Sea. This ukase was not carried out and the events of 1709 and 1711 interrupted for a long period trade with the southern countries.

Ukrainian exports were chiefly: cattle, hides, bees wax, bacon, tallow, oil, bristles, wool, brandy, tobacco, hemp, flax, dried fish, corn, salt, saltpetre, potash, tar and pitch. The chief export centres were: Kiev, Nizhin, Chernigov, Starodub. Through the hands of Ukrainian merchants also passed Oriental goods brought into the Ukraine from Turkey, Persia and other eastern regions. These were chiefly tea, coffee, spices, Persian carpets and various Oriental textiles.

One of the chief exports from the Ukraine was oxen. They were driven in great herds of thousands of heads to Breslau, Danzig and Koenigsberg. Cattle breeding was mostly carried on in the southern districts of the Poltava province. We can judge of the numbers exported from the fact that in 1735, the Russian authorities requisitioned in the Ukraine 20,000 oxen; in 1737, 44,000 were requisitioned and another 30,000 purchased for money.

After cattle, tobacco was a very profitable product for export. Plantations of tobacco were cultivated not only on a grand scale on the estates of great landowners

but also in small quantities by common Cossacks and peasants. Many thousands of pounds of tobacco were yearly exported from the Ukraine. Corn and brandy were also important items of Ukrainian export. In some cases Ukrainian merchants carried their goods directly to France and Holland.

Imports into the Ukraine, according to recent researches in various archives, chiefly consisted of: Dutch and English cloth, linen, silk, wrought metal objects, scythes, sickles, earthenware, glass and china, silver plate, needles and knives. Books: Latin, German, French and Italian, were also imported from Silesia, chiefly Breslau, which was the chief market for export of books to the Ukraine, though some were also sent from Leipzig, Danzig, and Koenigsberg. Danzig also sent copper and medicaments. There were in the Ukraine good foundries for bells, guns, kettles, etc., but copper had to be imported. Turkey sent into the Ukraine or through the Ukraine to other countries: silks and satin, brocade, gold and silver cloth, velvet, carpets, silk woven belts and scarves, pearls, corals, tobacco, incense, rice, raisins, coffee, lemons, almonds and different spices. From Muscovy came mostly furs and also Chinese goods.

Concerning the volume of Ukrainian trade we have important indications in ledgers seized by Russian authorities in different towns in the Ukraine, about 1715-1720 when Ukrainian trade was under restrictions imposed by the Russian government, and also from some documents preserved in the archives in Moscow. They show that the chief imported goods during those five years were mostly textile goods from Turkey and Germany to the extent of about a hundred thousand measures (cubits) and several tens of thousands of bales. Almost all these fabrics were used in the Ukraine. There were also about 100,000 leather belts and 20,000 Turkish woven silk belts and scarves besides 417 scarves and belts of embroidered gold and silver cloth. Great quantities of fur were also imported, but the Ukrainian export of fur was higher as the Ukraine also exported fur of her own,

fox, ermine, and marten. Other kinds of imported goods in these five years were: knives, scythes, razors, wine, coffee, incense, ladies' trinkets and cosmetics. Perusal of these documents also leads to the conclusion that commercially Ukraine was more closely connected with Poland, Germany and Turkey than with Muscovy.

Exported goods during these five years were: cattle, especially oxen, sheep, wool, hemp, flax, hides, leather, glue, potash, bees wax, oil, tobacco, fur, linen, bacon, tallow, bristles.

In the interest of trade reciprocal credit was widely used. The Ukrainian merchants received goods on credit in Poland, Austria and Germany and vice versa foreign merchants received Ukrainian products on credit. A great hindrance in the commercial relations of the Ukraine on the one side and Austria and Germany on the other lay in the geographical position: the trade was carried across Poland and Lithuania where unsettled conditions, wars and disorders as well as arbitrary dealings of Polish authorities and of Polish nobles rendered transport unsafe. Since the Great Northern War military operations in Poland and Lithuania caused considerable hindrance to Ukrainian foreign commerce. The Muscovite government, however, was the chief obstacle in the continuation of Ukrainian trade with European countries. Before the actual prohibitions and restrictions, the Muscovite government in the conflicts of Ukrainian merchants with the Polish authorities and Polish szlachta invariably took the side of the Poles against the Ukrainians as Tsar Peter wished to propitiate the Poles and win them over to the side of himself and his ally, August, in competition with the Swedish candidate, Stanislaus Leszczynski. But it was of course, worse when Peter prohibited Ukrainian merchants from carrying their goods to German ports on the Baltic and now ordered them to bring such goods to Russian ports. Further the Russian government prohibited Ukrainian merchants from importing certain categories of goods from Europe and forced them to buy Muscovite goods instead. Besides

quite a number of Ukrainian export goods being State monopolies in Muscovy were now also excluded from private trade. All these measures of the Russian authorities sapped Ukrainian trade to its very foundation and brought about a great economic change for the worse in Ukrainian national economy.

At first, as we have seen, Tsar Peter had the idea of directing all Ukrainian trade through his only sea-port of Azov which was of course absurd and impossible to carry out as this port led nowhere; the Azov Sea had no advantageous exit and no access to Europe. Besides the port of Azov was soon lost by Peter under the Treaty of Pruth 1711. However, Ukrainian merchants were forbidden to take their export goods to Baltic ports and ordered to bring them to Archangel. Thus in 1701 Ukrainian merchants were ordered to export hemp, flax, potash, hides, bees wax, bacon and other goods solely from Archangel. From Moscow to Archangel it was only possible to cart goods during the winter on sledges, there being no road at other seasons of the year because of bogs and morasses. Since the sea voyage from Archangel around Scandinavia was very long and the port of Archangel was frozen for half the year, it can be easily seen how this ukase had the effect of ruining the Ukrainian export of these important goods. It was very little compensation if any, that hemp exported from Archangel was free from Muscovite port duties. In 1711 hemp was allowed to be exported from Riga which now became Russian. In 1714 all Ukrainian export was to be carried out only through Russian ports; St. Petersburg, distant Archangel, and Riga. In 1719 Ukrainian grain was forbidden to be exported at all. This was again a great blow to Ukrainian trade. Further restrictions brought Ukrainian export down to the minimum.

Similar restrictions and prohibitions were used against the Ukrainian importation of foreign goods. In 1714 it was prohibited to import: stockings, gold and silver thread, silk fabrics, sugar, dyes, linen, tobacco, playing cards and cloth. The explanation of these prohibitions

is to be sought in Peter's introduction of the textiles industry into Muscovy. He protected Muscovite mills by extensive privileges when they began to manufacture textile goods and in order to force them to buy inferior and more expensive Muscovite manufactures instead of foreign goods which were cheaper and better.

The artificial displacement of trade routes had very serious consequences for the Ukrainian trade. Apart from the fact that the new routes to St. Petersburg, Riga, and especially Archangel, were much longer other disastrous consequences had to be reckoned with. Old established trade relations with German ports were broken and the customary credit was lost. Ukrainian merchants gradually lost their character of merchants and descended to the role of mere exporters of agricultural products. They were now more or less dependent on the Muscovite merchants, buying at increased prices from them the foreign goods forbidden for importation into the Ukraine, but allowed to enter Muscovy.

By prohibiting the exportation of certain categories of goods, the Russian government brought down artificially the price of these goods, then bought up great quantities of them at a low price and exported them abroad. Very often the Russian authorities made known their decisions about prohibitions only after having enforced them for some time. These proceedings ruined Ukrainian merchants, and deprived them of the ambition to begin any commercial operation at all since no one was certain that any category of goods purchased would not turn out to have been prohibited for some time.

Parallel to these artificial regulations for Ukrainian exports and imports, the Russian authorities introduced special customs on the Ukrainian Muscovite frontier. Up to this time, Ukrainian merchants had paid on the Ukrainian frontier the custom duties for the imported goods, the so called "inducta" and the export duties called "evecta" were collected by the Ukrainian State treasury. In addition to this the Russian government introduced special customs on the Ukrainian-Muscovite frontier

which were collected by the Russian treasury and after having paid these two duties, Ukrainian merchants had to pay for the same goods export duties in Russian sea ports. Custom duties usually amounted to 5 per cent to 26 per cent of the value of the goods and were to be paid in gold. Imported goods brought into the Ukraine across the Muscovite frontier were subject to additional duties on the Ukrainian-Muscovite frontier, the whole duties amounting to 10 per cent to 37 per cent of the value of the goods.

Ukrainian export was also suffering under a new abnormal practice of Muscovite trading agents buying up Ukrainian agricultural products on a grand scale for exportation. Different agents and hangers-on of the new Muscovite landowners made it their practice to buy up the local products and export them. They used their patrons to protect themselves, and being thus unpunishable they bought products for ridiculously low prices in order to sell them much higher in Muscovy. Ukrainian merchants could not compete at all with this sort of agents enjoying high Muscovite protection. The agents about Menshikov, Tsar Peter's omnipotent favorite, were especially notorious. They used to buy up thousands of oxen, beating down the price of an ox to about 10 kopeks (less than ten cents), a price that even at that time was ridiculously low. The same oxen were of course sold in Muscovy or abroad for much better prices.

The control of Ukrainian trade was most thorough and a burden to Ukrainian merchants. After Hetman Skoropadsky's death in 1722, special Ukrainian passports were abolished and in order to go abroad it was necessary to provide oneself with a Russian passport from the voevod in Kiev, whereas the exported goods had to be taken to Briansk on the Ukrainian-Muscovite frontier to receive permission for export and to pay the export duties. In order to protect certain Muscovite products such as tobacco and brandy from Ukrainian competition, the Russian government totally prohibited their import into

Muscovy; later they were imported but with 30 per cent custom duties.

All these measures of the Russian government ruined Ukrainian trade and deprived the Ukrainian population of an important source of income. The Ukraine lost the character of an independent economic organism and, cut off from direct trading relations with other countries, gradually became a colony of Muscovy, a market for Muscovite industry and a cheap source of agricultural products for the Muscovite population.

The prohibitive measures of the Russian government against Ukrainian trade were also very much felt in countries which previously had had direct trading relations with Ukraine. First among them Silesian merchants approached their government in Vienna and in consequence of their complaints the Austrian government, in 1720, intervened with the Russian government in the question of direct trade relations with the Ukraine. After long negotiations in St. Petersburg and in Vienna, the Russian government made a certain compromise on condition, however, that the question was put as concerning "Russian" trade and not specially Ukrainian. Poland was also interested in Ukrainian trade being carried on directly with Austrian provinces across Poland and, in 1723 was drawn into these negotiations. Finally the Russian government allowed such Ukrainian products as cattle, bees wax, bacon, glue, tallow and bristles to be exported direct from the Ukraine into Silesia and other Austrian provinces across Poland. In 1727 a special Treaty was concluded to revive direct export trade between Austria and the Ukraine through Poland. These measures somewhat revived Ukrainian foreign trade, but after twenty years of ruthless suppression it was hardly possible to restore its former prosperity. First of all the Ukrainian merchants as a class were weakened and diminishing in numbers. After the revival foreigners and especially Muscovites took most of the foreign trading operations into their hands and almost excluded the native element. Loss of foreign trade was also felt by the lower classes

of the population in the Ukraine because they were free from the passport duties on the Ukrainian-Muscovite frontier to which Ukrainians were subject. Thus Ukrainian peasants and common Cossacks who had previously carried on the freighting lost much profit. The Ukrainian State Treasury, of course, suffered great losses from the ruin of foreign trade.

Ukrainian cultural life also suffered very much from Muscovite-Russian domination. Soon after the Poltava victory Tsar Peter ordered all students of Kievan Academy, inhabitants from the Ukraine of the Right Bank, to leave; in this way the Academy lost about a thousand students. The Muscovite Patriarch first, and after him the Russian Synod, assumed control of the Ukrainian printing offices and wished to make Ukrainian church books uniform with the Muscovite. Finally, in 1720, the Synod and the Tsar prohibited any books to be printed in the Ukraine which differed from those printed in Muscovy. This in fact amounted to a prohibition to print any books at all unless they were reprinted from Muscovite editions, all Latin, Ukrainian and Polish books falling under this prohibition.

Tsar Peter's ultimate aim being the gradual abolition of Ukrainian autonomy and the reduction of the country to the status of an ordinary Russian province, he ignored the Ukrainian government and the Hetman, interfered in all spheres of Ukrainian home affairs and laid a heavy hand on all manifestations of Ukrainian life. Like the Muscovite government of old, he found a very convenient pretext for so doing in the ever increasing social antagonism between the mass of the Ukrainian population and the Cossack Officers. This gave Peter's policy the apparent aim of protecting the interests of the common people from the abuses of the Cossack Officers. It has already been stated that after the victory of Poltava and Mazepa's downfall the Cossack Officers underwent a radical change. The best of them having left with Mazepa; others were dismissed, exiled, or executed by Tsar Peter. Quite a new stamp of Cossack Officers appeared from among

the distinctly lower elements protected by the Tsar for their "loyalty" to him, this "loyalty" being in the case of Ukrainians by birth, nothing else than a desire to build up their fortunes on the national misfortune. There were, however, now many Cossack Officers who were not Ukrainians at all, but international or Muscovite adventurers of every kind. These new Cossack Officers, who had received great landed estates together with the peasants on them, were now under no control whatever, but were encouraged to reproduce in the Ukraine the conditions of serfdom in Muscovy and had every opportunity of turning the heretofore only half-bound peasants (under Mazepa, peasants had to work two days in a week for the landlord) into fully-bound serfs. Besides being encouraged by the conduct of the new Muscovite landowners such as Menshikov for instance, these new Cossack officers had no scruples in forcing the peasants and common Cossacks to surrender their lands or sell them at a low price and turn the previous free Cossacks into serfs. They could indulge in extortions and all sorts of violence knowing that everything now went unpunished. This demoralization gradually spread to almost all the Cossack Officers. Having seen all their political and national hopes and dreams broken and having lost a higher ideal, even the better elements among them were now thinking only of securing their material well-being in order to insure themselves against any political change. General demoralization and the preponderance of mere material interests had sharpened all the worse instincts of mankind and rare indeed were the Cossack officers, even among Mazepa's former collaborators, who did not now take advantage of their position in order to enrich themselves by illegal means such as extortions, bribes and all sorts of abuses of their administrative or judicial power. The popular masses in the Ukraine, tired of long years of wars with all their heavy burdens, economically ruined and utterly exhausted, bitterly resented the oppression of the ruling class. Failing to obtain just and impartial treatment in the Ukrainian Cossack courts

which were entirely in the hands of the Cossack Officers, the Ukrainian population often turned to representatives of the Russian authorities stationed in the Ukraine or sent complaints to Moscow and later to St. Petersburg. Tsar Peter gladly received these complaints which gave him an opportunity of discrediting Ukrainian courts and Ukrainian authorities in general. In his official papers which he ordered to be made publicly known, the Tsar accused the Ukrainian authorities of partiality and of neglecting the interests of the Ukrainian population and posed as a protector of the Ukrainian people against their own ruling class.

Hetman Skoropadsky's position was very difficult. He was of the Mazepa group and a true Ukrainian patriot. He tried by all means in his power to ameliorate the lot of the families of political refugees, Mazepa's followers, or of those among them who tried to return. He intervened on behalf of those who were arrested, exiled and deprived of their property. He was a very humane and righteous ruler. Tsar Peter on the whole behaved well to the old Hetman, showed him outward consideration but actually he paid scant attention to his advice, neglected his requests and demands and carried out his extermination policy against Ukrainian autonomy with ruthless persistence. Skoropadsky was, however, of too gentle a nature to offer Tsar Peter any effective opposition and besides he was influenced by his relations, especially his wife's relations who were very unscrupulous people and made use of him in their own interests and not in the interests of the country. Hetman Skoropadsky had often to go to Moscow and later to St. Petersburg in order to make personal remonstrances before the Tsar in the interests of the Ukrainian population,

136. "Little Russian" Board (Collegium).

In the spring of 1722 he was in St. Petersburg on one such visit when unexpectedly he received the ukase of the Tsar on the 29th of April 1722, about the establish-

ment of a "Little Russian Board" which actually deprived the Hetman of the remainder of his power. The motives given for the creation of this board were the constant complaints reaching the Russian authorities of the General Cossack courts of justice and of Cossack administration on the whole because of bribes, extortions and turning Cossacks into serfs; because of the failure of the Hetman to furnish sufficient information about the State revenue from taxation, customs, etc.; and because his Chancellery was overworked. Quoting the "Articles" of Bohdan Khmel'nitsky which, he averred, empowered all those discontented with the Cossack courts to appeal to Muscovite vovods, the Tsar now appointed a Board composed of six Muscovite officers from the armies stationed in the Ukraine with Brigadier Veliaminov as their president. The "Little Russian Board" was instructed to hear all complaints from the population against the Cossack courts of justice and to decide these controversial cases; to control Ukrainian finance; and to watch that the Cossack Officers did not oppress the common Cossacks and peasants.

The Hetman at once presented a petition to the Tsar in which he proved that no "Articles", either of Bohdan Khmel'nitsky or of any other Hetman, contained an allusion to an appeal from the General Cossack court of justice to Muscovite vovods. He explained that the abuses of Cossack Officers and the shortcomings of the Ukrainian finance were ultimately to be laid at the Tsar's own door, stating that most of the complaints were inspired by "spite and hate" and he reminded the Tsar of his solemn promise to respect Ukrainian "rights and liberties". Further, he asked in the name of the whole Ukrainian people that "the Ukraine should have her former rights and order". Hetman Skoropadsky received from the Tsar a very curt answer stating that nothing could be done as the ukase had already been published and that there was nothing contradictory to Bohdan Khmel'nitsky's "Articles" in the future functions of the "Little Russian Board". In the meantime the Tsar's

manifesto to the Ukrainian people was published, explaining that the new institution had no other end in view than to "protect the Ukrainian population from the injustices and abuses of the Cossack Officers". Brigadier Veliaminov received detailed instructions as to the control of the Ukrainian Hetman and the government. This was the crowning point of Tsar Peter's brilliant demagogic method of dissolving the Ukrainian State which he introduced after his Poltava victory.

The old Hetman could not recover from this blow. He returned from St. Petersburg and died within a few days, in July 1722.

137. Hetman Paul Polubotok.

Shortly after Hetman Skoropadsky's funeral the Cossack Officers sent a petition to the Tsar asking permission to elect a new Hetman. In the meantime they chose the Colonel of Chernigov, Paul Polubotok, to act as Temporary Hetman since he was the chief candidate for this post. At the same time Brigadier Veliaminov also came to Hlukhov and formed the "Little Russian Board". There were thus in Hlukhov two governments: the Hetman at the head of the General Chancellery of the Cossack Headquarters and the "Little Russian Board" with Brigadier Veliaminov. At once misunderstandings and conflicts arose between them. Hetman Polubotok was a very energetic, active and courageous man and a decided champion of Ukrainian autonomy. He also was held in high esteem by the Cossack Officers and had authority over the common Cossacks. A true son of his age and a typical representative of his social class, he was not overscrupulous in choosing the means to his material interests. Being a man of authoritative nature and commanding character he sometimes treated the common Cossacks, burgesses and peasants harshly. He was actively concerned in foreign trade and became one of the wealthiest men in Ukraine. His courageous opposition to Tsar Peter in defence of Ukrainian autonomy made Polubotok one of the favorite heroes of the old Ukrainian

historians. He was indeed an ardent Ukrainian patriot, though characteristically for his time and social class, he did not neglect his own interests. As soon as Veliaminov began to receive complaints and petitions ignoring Ukrainian institutions, Polubotok protested energetically as he did against Veliaminov's sending orders to the Hetman's Chancellery as if to a subordinate office. Hetman Polubotok secured an order from the Russian Senate instructing Veliaminov to carry on his business in cooperation with Ukrainian institutions. But Veliaminov did not give way; he prepared a draft of various changes to be made in Ukrainian administration, courts of justice and finance and early in 1723 he brought it to St. Petersburg. Tsar Peter approved of it, confirmed most of its twelve headings and especially insisted on all financial business being delegated to the "Little Russian Board".

Polubotok, however, continued his opposition. Above everything else he constantly reminded the Tsar not to forget to give permission for the official election of the Hetman. Peter, who till now had carefully avoided answering, lost his temper and at last declared that "considering that all Ukrainian Hetmans are traitors to Muscovy, he had better wait until some loyal and faithful man were found for this post". In order to take the ground away from under the feet of the "Little Russian Board" and make their intervention unnecessary, Polubotok began a reform of the Cossack courts of justice, appointing assessors to sit with the judge, thus making abuses less likely. He supervised the provincial courts in order to exterminate bribery and delays and introduced an exact procedure of appeal and by strict injunctions succeeded in keeping the Cossack Officers from perpetrating abuses against the population. By all these reforms he deprived Tsar Peter of his alleged motive in setting up the "Little Russian Board" as a would-be protection of the Ukrainian population against the arbitrary rule of the Cossack Officers. This especially infuriated the Tsar. In the summer of 1732 he summoned the Deputy

Hetman Polubotok and several Cossack Officers to St. Petersburg to give an explanation. In order to avoid any complications in the Ukraine, he ordered Prince Golitsyn, commander-in-chief of the Russian army stationed in the Ukraine, to bring most of the Cossack regiments out into the steppe as if against the Tatars.

Arrived in St. Petersburg, Polubotok presented a petition to the Tsar asking for the restoration of all the ancient Cossack rights in administration and judicature. But Veliaminov, in the meantime, arranged through his agents to send Peter a petition from the Cossack regiment of Starodub asking in the name of the common Cossacks that a Muscovite should be nominated as their colonel and the Muscovite courts of justice introduced in their regiment. Peter sent Brigadier Rumiantsev to the Ukraine to investigate and ordered the "Little Russian Board" to publish a general invitation to the population to present any complaints against Cossack Officers, promising every security. A sufficient number of such complaints was collected. But at the same time the Cossack Officers stationed with their regiments in the camp on the river Kolomac on the southern frontier of the Ukraine, prepared a joint petition asking the Tsar for permission to elect officially a Hetman and restore to the Cossacks their ancient rights and liberties. The same was done in all regiments in the Ukraine. Polubotok's spirited opposition made the Tsar, unaccustomed as he was to any opposition from his Muscovites, very angry. He had him arrested together with all the Ukrainians who were with him and thrown into St. Peter and Paul fortress on an island on the river Neva. He also sent orders to the Ukraine for the arrest and despatch to Petersburg of all those who were suspected of drawing up the petitions. Accordingly, the old Colonel of Mirhorod, Daniel Apostol, the General Bunchuk-Bearer, Lyzohub, the General Commander Zhurakhovsky, and many lesser Cossack Officers were brought to St. Petersburg and imprisoned in the same fortress. Hetman Polubotok died there on the 29th of December, 1724, as did also some others of the im-

prisoned Cossacks. The rest were liberated on Tsar Peter's death early in 1725. Instead of exile to Siberia as he had intended for them, the Ukrainian prisoners remained in St. Petersburg for several years; some of them were released and allowed to return to the Ukraine on condition they left their sons behind as hostages.

During the short reign of Tsar Peter's wife, Catherine I, the Russian empire was actually ruled by Menshikov. He continued Peter's regime in the Ukraine. After Hetman Polubotok's death no new Hetman was allowed to be elected. The "Little Russian Board" continued to rule the Ukraine together with newly nominated Cossack Officers, who were all very docile and obedient. The Cossack regiments of Chernigov and Starodub received Muscovites as colonels. Veliaminov was in full control of Ukrainian finance and was forever imposing new taxation on the population.

138. New Course of Policy Towards the Ukraine in the Reign of Peter II.

Late in 1726 the "High Secret Council", the highest institution of the Russian Empire, was considering a possible war against Turkey, and some of the members of the Council thought that perhaps it would be useful to show some leniency towards the Ukraine in order to propitiate the Ukrainian population, as for example, to let them have a Hetman, to remit some of the new taxation, and to restore perhaps their own judiciary. Other members of the Council were very much opposed to this breach of Tsar Peter's policy towards the Ukraine, which consisted in setting the population against the Cossack Officers in order to "keep the Ukraine under his thumb". Tolstoi especially was for continuing Tsar Peter's policy which was "giving good results, seeing that the Cossack Officers and the population are pretty well always quarrelling". The late Tsar's authority was so great that it was decided not to introduce any changes in his policy towards the Ukraine, though the question was again and again put in the "Secret Council".

Soon, however, Menshikov himself changed his mind with regard to continuing Tsar Peter's policy in the Ukraine. As a matter of fact he quarrelled with the "Little Russian Board" which, having taxed all private estates in the Ukraine, also taxed his vast domains in the Chernigov province. He protested and took the "Little Russian Board" to account, and the "Secret Council" where he had a decisive voice, sided with him. Now the "Little Russian Board" had in Menshikov a deadly enemy. When in May, 1727, Catherine I died and Tsar Peter's young grandson, son of the unfortunate Tsarevich Alexis, succeeded to the Russian throne as Peter II, Menshikov became the omnipotent regent. He now advocated in the "High Secret Council" that the Ukraine should be ruled more mildly in order to gain the sympathies of the population, and hardly a week after Catherine's death the "High Secret Council" ordered the abolition of the newly imposed taxation. A manifesto in the name of the youthful Emperor Peter II was sent to the Ukraine with permission to proceed to the election of a new Hetman. At the same time Veliaminov was recalled to St. Petersburg with his books and papers and all his chancellery for examination. About the same time Menshikov quarrelled with Tolstoi, had him arrested and sent into exile; he also deprived Tolstoi's son, Hetman Skoropadsky's son-in-law, of the post of Colonel of Nizhin and banished him from the Ukraine.

139. Hetman Daniel Apostol.

In June, 1727, the "High Secret Council" transferred all Ukrainian affairs from the Senate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The "Little Russian Board" was abolished. On the 1st of October in Hlukhov, with all the traditional pomp and solemnities, Daniel Apostol, Colonel of Mirhorod, was elected Hetman.

Already in the spring the news of the future election of the Hetman was greeted in the Ukraine with great rejoicings. The young Emperor received from all the Cossack Regiments expressions of gratitude in addresses

signed by officers and common Cossacks. The actual election took place amidst great rejoicings. Not Cossack authorities only but municipal authorities of the more important towns arranged popular feasts for the occasion. For instance, the city of Kiev had a feast of this kind from which have been preserved programmes, odes, panegyrics and various addresses and speeches composed for the occasion by the authorities and by teachers and students of the Kievan Academy. The Russian administration, expecting that political refugees would now return, ordered the frontiers to be freely opened for them. So many of them arrived that the Polish administration and Polish landowners in the Ukraine of the Right Bank became alarmed. Zaporogian Cossacks also sent congratulations to the newly elected Hetman asking his protection.

Soon after his election, Hetman Apostol went to Moscow to be present at the coronation of the young Emperor and here he presented a scheme for the restitution of ancient Ukrainian rights and liberties according to the Treaty concluded with Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. He received a written document under twenty-eight headings known in Ukrainian history under the name of the "Confirmed Articles" which served as the written constitution in the Ukraine until the final abolition of Ukrainian autonomy. The chief headings of this constitution were as follows: The Hetman had no right to carry on diplomatic relations with foreign powers and if any ambassadors came to him, he had at once to send their letters to St. Petersburg. He was empowered to have direct relations only with the adjoining countries of Poland, Crimea and Turkey on questions concerning the immediate frontier relations and only with the knowledge and approval of the Russian resident at the Hetman's courts, the Hetman's residence being in Hlukhov. The number of his mercenary troops was limited to three regiments of "Kompaniytsi"; Cossack Regiments remained as usual. In war time the Hetman with his army was put under the command of the Russian Field Marshal.

Candidates for General Cossack Officers and Colonels were to be chosen by Ukrainians, but confirmed by the Emperor. Elections of lesser officers were confirmed by the Hetman.

Certain changes were introduced in the courts of justice. The General court was made the chief court of appeal in the land but it was now composed of six judges; three Ukrainians and three Russians, the Hetman being President of this Court. One of the headings of the "Confirmed Articles" dealt with a special Commission to be constituted to revise the laws and compile a new code. A number of headings concerned economic questions. Jewish merchants were allowed solely on condition that they sold their goods only wholesale and not retail and used the money so obtained for buying local products for export; they were not allowed to export gold or silver. Duties on foreign goods (*inducta*) collected at the Ukrainian frontier were to go to the Russian treasury. Muscovites possessing lands in the Ukraine were put under Ukrainian jurisdiction and were not allowed to bring Russian peasants-serfs to settle on their Ukrainian estates.

The "Confirmed Articles" considerably curtailed, as we see, the rights enjoyed by Ukrainians before Mazepa's downfall. It was, however, important that instead of the arbitrary interference of the Russian government in Ukrainian affairs during the last twenty years, certain limits to this interference were fixed and certain constitutional forms established. It would now depend on the Ukrainian government and above all on the new Hetman to carry this constitution into effect.

The new Hetman, Daniel Apostol, was a very brilliant political figure. Having grown up before the Ukrainian power was broken and when Ukrainian leaders had not lost hope of obtaining freedom and better conditions for the Ukrainian people, he belonged to those few Cossack Officers (*starshina*) who had not soiled their hands with wrong doing. He was, moreover, a warm defender of Ukrainian autonomy. He had also belonged to the inti-

mate circle round Mazepa, who formed the Swedish alliance in order to obtain Ukrainian independence. If he left Mazepa, it was not because of personal advantage or his personal safety, but only because he had soon lost faith in Swedish success. Having decided to return under the Muscovite protection he, like Hetman Skoropadsky, endeavored to save what could be saved after the catastrophe. Indeed, in spite of his advanced age, being almost seventy, Hetman Apostol set himself very energetically to restore Ukrainian autonomous rights neglected during the last twenty years.

In the first place, Hetman Apostol almost entirely changed the staff of General Cossack Officers and Colonels of the Cossack Regiments, himself selecting his candidates who were then confirmed by the Russian Emperor. His candidates were all either good active officers or good administrators: among them should be mentioned Jacob Lyzohub, an old experienced soldier who was made head of Military Affairs. The posts of General Judges were now occupied by two of Mazepa's followers, Andrew Kandyba and Michael Zabila. On the whole, Hetman Apostol succeeded in surrounding himself with colleagues of his choice, who shared his political views and helped him to carry out the political programme of restoring Ukrainian autonomy.

One of the chief tasks of the new Ukrainian Hetman and Government was to restore the economic well-being of the land devastated to a great extent by the chaos and disorder deliberately maintained by the Russian government. The question of ownership, about which there were so many abuses, had to be regulated in the first place. The work of "General Inquiry Into Land-ownership" as the Commission was called, lasted three years. It supervised all the categories of landed proprietorship and also established the position of peasants in the Ukraine. It was found that one-third of the peasants in the Ukraine were free, the remaining two-thirds were bound to the land by fixed obligations. Part of the land belonged to the state, part was attached to mon-

asteries and part belonged to private owners. The statistical material collected by the commission, besides its practical purpose of settling disputes and litigious questions at the time, forms an invaluable source of information to Ukrainian historians.

Hetman Apostol was himself a very successful organizer of his landed estates. He skilfully colonized empty lands which he bought and introduced intensive agriculture and cattle breeding. He was well informed in questions of export trade, having himself exported on a large scale, grain, cattle and butter from his estates. His talents and experience in organization he now applied to the settlement of the various economic difficulties in the Ukrainian State. Hetman Mazepa used to support the class of great landowners endeavoring to raise a landed aristocracy and make them supporters of Ukrainian independence. Apostol saw in foreign trade and those engaged in it on a large scale a useful support for the Ukrainian State.

Hetman Apostol's attempts to establish a fixed Ukrainian State budget (*Viiskovyi skarb*) are very interesting. Before his time this department was unsettled and vague. Also, the Russian government's interference in Ukrainian Finance introduced much disorder. Hetman Apostol was the first to establish a fixed preliminary yearly budget with items such as costs of maintaining the central administration, costs of the mercenary troops, of the artillery, etc. Most of the State expenses were to be covered by the income from export duties.

In the measures taken by Hetman Apostol in order to ameliorate the state of Ukrainian trade we can distinguish two tendencies: first, he tried to induce the Russian government to change their economic policy directed against the Ukraine; in the second place, he tried on his own authority to neutralize the effects of that policy on Ukrainian trade. Even before he went to Moscow early in 1728, the Hetman called to Hlukhov representatives of Ukrainian merchants to a conference on questions of foreign trade. They passed a resolution asking the Rus-

sian government to take off the prohibitions of quite a number of categories of export goods: wax, tallow, hides, hemp and others. In his petition to the Emperor, Hetman Apostol took into consideration all sides of Ukrainian trade, defending the interest not only of the merchants on a large scale, but of other classes of population, mostly common Cossacks and peasants who largely practised export trade, for instance the "Chumaki" or salt carriers who, being peasants or common Cossacks, used to go with their carts and oxen on their own enterprise, selling their products and bringing back salt and dried fish from Crimea and the shores of the Azov Sea for sale.

Hetman Apostol took steps to regulate the credit of Ukrainian merchants. The sudden interruption of Ukrainian foreign trade by Tsar Peter caused the ruin of most Ukrainian merchants. Hetman Skoropadsky had already on his own authority deferred payments and Hetman Apostol published such "moratorii", especially for the merchants with Danzig and Silesia.

Hetman Apostol's rule characterized by an ardent defence of Ukrainian autonomy, or to use a modern term, by the national spirit, in spite of partial failure of his policy, raised the spirits of the Ukrainian people and gave them courage. All classes of the population had some improvement to register. Ukrainian foreign trade was again active. Cossack Officers recovered their rights of being elected, and not nominated from St. Petersburg. Russian troops which had been quartered on the Ukrainian population were removed from the Ukraine. Local administration and courts of justice were much improved.

Better conditions of life in the Ukraine also encouraged the Zaporogian Cossacks to return to their old quarters. During the years 1712-1728 the Zaporogians were settled on the lower Dnieper where they had built their fortified camp, the Sich, near the present town of Kherson. They did not feel morally at ease under the protectorate of the Crimean Khan and suffered materially from the severance from their native country. Often the group among them favoring an understanding with the

Tsar, raised their voices; but still the majority headed by the old leader Hordienko, the irreconcilable enemy of Muscovy, kept the upper hand. Only after Hordienko's death in 1733 did the Zaporogian Cossacks accept the overtures from the Russian government, which was planning a war against Turkey and wished to have the Zaporogians on their side. Negotiations between the Russian government and the Zaporogians begun in 1733, ended in 1734. The terms signed by the representatives of both parties in Lubni, after the death of Hetman Apostol, included these chief points: Zaporogian Cossacks were to receive back all their former lands (present province of Katerinoslav); they were to continue to live under their own laws and orders; in war time they were to stand under the command of the head of the Russian army in the Ukraine, and they were to receive from the Russian government a yearly payment of 20,000 rubles. The Zaporogians came under the Russian protectorate and transferred their Sich nearer the Ukrainian frontier on the river Pidpilna, a small tributary of the Dnieper, near the present town of Nikopol. The Zaporogian Cossacks took part in the next war against Turkey and proved to be extremely useful to the Russians. The reunion of the Zaporogians with the Ukraine of the Hetmans was, from the national point of view, a certain advantage, though with it was lost the last real power that stood in open opposition to the Russian government and their centralizing policy. Exiled Ukrainian patriots with the former Hetman Orlik were, for instance, very much against the return of Zaporogians under the Russian protectorate.

Hetman Apostol died on the 17th of January, 1734. The six years of his rule were a short, bright period on the dark background of Ukrainian life after Mazepa. He succeeded in strengthening Hetman power and his authority against Russian and local Ukrainian authorities. Though not all his measures to raise the welfare of Ukrainian population were brought to completion, still the Ukraine of the Left Bank had time to recover under his

rule from the terror under which the population had lived for the last twenty years.

CHAPTER XXII

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(140) Second "Little Russian Board". (141) Turkish War 1734-1740 and its Serious Consequences for the Ukraine of the Hetmans. (142) Hetman Cyril Rozumovsky. (143) Growing Importance of the Cossack Officers (Starshina) Class. (144) His Reforms of the Courts of Justice. (145) Abolition of the Hetmanship. (146) Peter Rumiantsev, General Governor of Little Russia. (147) Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy. (148) Historic Importance of the Period of the Hetmans.

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140. Second "Little Russian Board".

Even during Hetman Apostol's life the Russian government decided not to allow a new election of Hetman but to return to the system of the "Little Russian Board". On his death-bed Hetman Apostol, according to Cossack tradition, handed over his power to the General Cossack Officers. But after his death an order came from St. Petersburg to the Russian resident, Naryshkin, to take over the power. A new "Little Russian Board" was decided upon and approved by the Empress Anna. It was composed of six members, three Russians and three Ukrainians from among the General Cossack Officers. They were to sit "on equal terms", Muscovites on the right side and Ukrainians on the left side of the table. In spite of formal "equality" a Russian member of the Board, Prince Shakhovsky became actual "ruler". The "Little Russian Board" received instructions to govern the country according to the "Confirmed Articles" of Hetman Apostol. Prince Shakhovsky received additional secret instructions from the Empress Anna: he was to encourage a closer relationship between Ukrainians and Muscovites such as mixed marriages, and prevent any drawing together of Cossack Officers and Ukrainian nobles from beyond the Dnieper or the White Russian nobles.

One of the first steps of the new Ukrainian government was a renewed attempt to codify Ukrainian Law. This was in a somewhat chaotic state. The Lithuanian

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Statute of the Sixteenth century published in Ukrainian and White-Prussian official languages was officially recognized. Municipal courts made use of the German Municipal Law, the "Magdeburg Law". In the Cossack courts of the Regiments and of the Hundreds, Ukrainian Common Law was administered according to ancient Cossack usages and precedents. This latter conception of the law also influenced other courts and prevailed in Ukraine. Still misunderstandings and conflicts between the courts often ensued owing to the different systems and different conceptions of law. Hetman Skoropadsky, shortly before his death, published an Universal in May, 1721, creating a special commission of Ukrainian Lawyers to revise all the codes which were in use in the Ukraine with a view to compiling a general code in the Ukrainian language. His death and the appointment of the "Little Russian Board" interrupted this revision of the law. Hetman Apostol had in view a revision of the codes in his "Confirmed Articles" but only had time to publish the "Direction with Regard to Procedure and Appeal in Ukrainian Courts". After Hetman Apostol's death Prince Shakhovsky received orders from St. Petersburg to create a special Commission of twelve members to codify the Ukrainian Law. This time the translation was to be made into the Russian and not the Ukrainian language. The Commission was to sit in Moscow but after two years it was transferred to Hlukhov. It was composed of the best authorities on Ukrainian Law, both clerics and laymen. The Commission sat for fifteen years and only in 1743 completed the compilation of the Code. Before the code was completed practical necessities urged the publication in 1734, of a short handbook on procedure in Ukrainian courts, compiled by one of the Ukrainian lawyers, and known under the name of "Handbook of Abridged Law". Though not officially recognized, this handbook had a wide application in Ukrainian courts.

From the beginning of the activities of the second "Little Russian Board" with Prince Shakhovsky at its

head, conflicts arose with the Cossack Officers who wished to have a Hetman. Shakhovsky, having reported the situation to St. Petersburg, received secret instructions according to which he was to spread among the population the opinion that the Hetmans were the cause of all the burdens and taxation of the population and that they and the Ukrainian government were responsible for all the wrong doing and injustices.

Prince Shakhovsky did not rule the Ukraine for long. He was recalled in 1736 and Prince Bariatinski was put in his place, but he also remained only a short time. During the whole existence of the second "Little Russian Board" the "rulers" as they were called, succeeded one another with rapidity. It was very much like the period of the first "Little Russian Board" with an arbitrary rule of different Russian (Muscovite) officials and generals. These were the years of the cruel regime of Empress Anna Ivanovna, when all the power was in the hands of her favorite, the German Biron. The whole Russian Empire trembled before the so-called "Secret Chancellery" whose victims were numbered by thousands and tens of thousands. The activities of the "Secret Chancellery" also extended to the Ukraine, where this terrible institution found many victims.

Once again, as in the time of Tsar Peter, the Russian government did not take into account Ukrainian laws or usages and interfered in almost all spheres of popular life, causing offence and violence to the population. In 1734, for instance, the previously confirmed election of the Mayor of Kiev was cancelled and the order given that a Muscovite and not a local burgess of Kiev should be elected as Mayor. New elections were ordered but, notwithstanding the presence of the Russian Governor, a burgess of Kiev was again elected, a Ukrainian by the name of Voynich. The Russian government again refused to confirm the election and only when Shakhovsky himself informed the Senate in St. Petersburg that among the Muscovites resident in Kiev it was impossible to

find a candidate, did the Empress confirm the election of Voynich.

The second "ruler" of the Ukraine, Prince Bariatinski, once arrested the whole municipality of Kiev. Having seized on this occasion all the ancient charters of the city granting privileges, beginning with those of the Lithuanian Princes down to the Muscovite Tsars, he sent them to St. Petersburg. In his letter to the Russian government he advised them "not to return those documents, in order that the burgesses might in time forget what was written in those charters and, not having the text at hand, would not be able to refer to their rights and privileges". Not only Russian administration but also Russian generals and favorites who had estates in the Ukraine interfered in Ukrainian affairs. They behaved like conquerors in a conquered land and often terrorized the Ukrainian administration into executing their openly unlawful and arbitrary wishes.

The heaviest burden that fell on the Ukraine in this reign was the war against the Turks, which broke out in 1735. The Ukraine was the chief base from whence this war was carried on and the population had not only to send out Cossacks but to take upon themselves the provision of the whole Russian army and furnish the whole transport of men and oxen. The war lasted six years and was very incompetently conducted, bringing no results whatever.

141. Turkish War 1734-1740 and its Serious Consequences for the Ukraine of the Hetmans.

The war opened by the campaign of the united Russian and Ukrainian armies in Crimea in 1735. By its inefficient organization and incompetent conduct, it recalled the Muscovite Crimean campaign of the end of the Seventeenth century under the Tsarevna Sophia. As at that time, the campaign was begun too late in the year and the army was compelled to return half way because of the heat and the lack of fodder in the burned steppes. The Ukrainians also had lost 12,000 horses. In the spring

of 1736 a new campaign was started with an army of 54,000 led by Field Marshal Munnich. Some 16,000 Cossacks were called up, but only 12,000 appeared, insufficiently armed and half of them horseless; the rest had deserted. The united Russian and Ukrainian army penetrated into the Crimea and even took Bakchisaray, the residence of the Crimean Khans. Soon, however, the conquerors were compelled to retreat in haste because of lack of food and fodder, and of epidemics in the army. During this campaign Munnich lost half of his army. Especially heavy were the losses of the Ukrainians, whom Munnich used without any consideration and completely neglected their needs.

The vast plans of the Russian generals again gave no results. In spite of the fortifications of the frontier which had cost Ukrainians so many sacrifices, the Tatars broke through into the Ukraine, early in 1737. They crossed the Dnieper on ice near Perevolochna, defeated a Ukrainian-Muscovite detachment led by General Leslie and for several days were masters of Poltava and Mirhorod Regiments' territories. They killed and took prisoner about 7,000 men and women, burned down hundreds of villages and carried off 10,000 horses and 150,000 cattle and sheep. The Russian Commander-in-Chief started in 1737 a new campaign in two directions, against Azov and against Ochakov. The Ukrainian Cossacks, including this time also the Zaporogians and those from Slobidska Ukraine, took part in the campaign. The Ukrainian army was about 50,000 men strong. The capture of the fortress of Ochakov was the only result, whereas the losses were immense, the Ukrainians alone losing 5,000 men. Very soon Ochakov had also to be abandoned because of epidemics and lack of food. During the retreat many thousands of men were lost together with about 40,000 horses and oxen that had been requisitioned in the Ukraine.

These great sacrifices, however, did not stop Munnich from undertakings, all conducted according to the same incompetent methods. Making preparation for the new

campaign of 1738, he ordered the mobilization of 15,000 Cossacks and 50,000 peasants for transport service and requisitioned 46,000 oxen. The country was already exhausted. The Russian minister Volynski, having traversed Ukraine that spring, reported to Biron: "before entering the Ukraine I could hardly have imagined how devastated the country is and what masses of population have perished. Even now so many are mobilized for service in the army that there is no one left to sow the fields sufficiently to keep the population provided with grain. Many fields lie fallow as there is no one to work on them and no cattle because the oxen which they use for tilling here are all requisitioned and lost. In the Regiment of Nizhin alone, 14,000 oxen were taken and how many in other regiments, I have not exact information". But Biron, Munnich and other Germans who ruled Russia, did not care in the least for the interests of the population and continued their policy without stopping to consider the sacrifices which primarily fell on the Ukraine:

The Turko-Russian war was carried on according to the same inefficient methods and always with great losses and sacrifices at the expense of the Ukraine. In the summer of 1738, the Russian army again penetrated into the Crimea and once more was compelled to retreat in consequence of the lack of food supplies. It was not until Munnich had transferred the war to Moldavian territory and defeated the Turkish army near Khotin, in 1739, that the Turks showed any inclination to begin peace negotiations. In this campaign the Ukrainian Cossacks, especially the Zaporogians, played an important role. Austria, Russia's ally in the war, having concluded a separate peace, Russia very soon did the same. According to this peace treaty Turkey renounced her pretensions to the territory of the Zaporogian Cossacks (present provinces of Katerinoslav and Kherson) which remained in the possession of the Zaporogians as before. This was the only result of a war which lasted almost six years and cost such enormous sacrifices and entailed such great effort.

For the Ukraine of the Hetmans the consequences of this war were very heavy, as a great number of human lives, Cossacks as well as peasants, were lost. Great quantities of cattle had perished and the land became impoverished. Newly found official records show that during the six years 157,000 Cossacks were mobilized for active service and 205,000 peasants for transport service. Some 23,200 of these were killed, which for a population of one million, constitute an important percentage. Horses alone perished in numbers of 47,000. The Ukraine had losses amounting to about one million and a half rubles—a colossal sum for that time. The Russian government never paid for the requisitioned cattle nor for food and fodder. Agricultural production in the Ukraine was at a low ebb, the grain harvest having diminished almost ten times, and the Cossacks and peasants being either killed or mobilized or fled to other parts of the Ukraine. In spite of this, in the year 1737, 75 Russian regiments were quartered on the Ukrainian population, 23 of them being cavalry regiments; in 1738 again 50 Russian regiments were all provided for by the local population. The Turkish war dealt such a blow to the welfare of the population that even 25 years later, in 1764, Cossack Officers complained that the Cossacks and peasants were very much impoverished and ruined in consequence of that war and only slowly and with difficulty were recovering ground. Being unable to cope with the difficulties that befell them, they fled in all directions. Even in the first years of the war the frontier administration reported to the Russian government that in a short time the towns and villages of the Right Bank of the Dnieper under Polish government were overcrowded with refugees from the Left Bank.

142. Hetman Cyril Rozumovsky.

Empress Anna died in 1740. Her reign was a very gloomy period, not only for Ukraine but also for the whole of Russia, a period of indiscriminate domination by Germans with the cruel Biron at their head. Anna Ivanovna

left the throne to her niece Anna Leopoldovna, Duchess of Brunswick, with Biron as regent. But Biron was very soon replaced by Munnich and in a few months Anna Leopoldovna herself was put aside and the Russian throne occupied by Elizabeth, daughter of Peter I. Her accession signified the downfall of the Germans and the coming of Russians to power. At the same time it signified the beginning of a better era for the Ukraine. Before her accession to the throne Elizabeth had a close friendship with a Ukrainian, Alexis Rozumovsky, whom she later married. Alexis Rozumovsky was a common Cossack from the Koselets Regiment in the province of Chernigov, who because of his beautiful voice was taken to St. Petersburg to be singer in the Court Chapel choir. He was soon taken notice of by Elizabeth because of his personal beauty and very soon became intimate with her. He also took an active part in the court revolution which procured Elizabeth the crown. She lavished her favors on Alexis Rozumovsky and gave him the highest position in the empire. But he did not abuse his high position. He was a very quiet and unassuming man who never interfered or made enemies. In this he differed very noticeably from other favorites of whom there were so many in Russian history of the Eighteenth century, when the Russian empire was ruled almost without an interruption by five women in succession. Rozumovsky knew how to interest Elizabeth in the Ukraine. In 1774 she visited the Ukraine on a pilgrimage to the sacred places of Kiev. She was welcomed by the population and returned this courtesy by showing considerable interest in the affairs of the country. The Cossack Officers approached her in Kiev with a petition for a renewal of the post of Hetman. Next year a Ukrainian delegation came to St. Petersburg with a fresh petition. Elizabeth gave her promise. She even found the candidate chosen for the Hetmanship which was Alexis Rozumovsky's younger brother, Cyril. He was at that time abroad finishing his education and only his coming of age was awaited so that he might occupy the high post.

In the meantime certain changes for the better were introduced into the Russian regime in Ukraine. When in 1746 the "ruler" Bibikov, president of the "Little Russian Board" died, his post was left unoccupied. Russian regiments quartered on the population were taken out of the Ukraine while free trade in grain was again allowed. A new election for the Kievan Metropolitan was permitted in 1745 after the Metropolitan seat had been vacant for several years. Archbishop Raphael Zborovsky was elected and this was confirmed by Elizabeth. Finally, in 1747, Empress Elizabeth's manifesto announcing an election for Hetman was published. Early in 1750 the election of Cyril Rozumovsky took place in Hlukhov with traditional pomp, he being, of course, the only candidate since everyone knew Elizabeth's wish.

The new Hetman was only twenty-two years old. He had been a simple country lad and was tending his father's cattle in the pasture when his brother started on his fairy-tale career in St. Petersburg. Cyril, at the age of fifteen, was taken to St. Petersburg. Every care was taken about his education; he was sent abroad to finish his studies in France, Italy and Germany. Returning in 1745 to St. Petersburg he was nominated, at the age of eighteen, President of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In a few short years he was Hetman of the Ukraine. Elizabeth gave him as his wife her niece, Naryshkin.

The young Hetman resembled in character his eldest brother, Empress Elizabeth's husband: he was very quiet and gentle. Accustomed to the life at St. Petersburg court, he nevertheless loved his native country, the Ukrainian language and popular songs, though everything now seemed to him somewhat provincial compared with the life he had led in St. Petersburg. He felt dull in Hlukhov and took every opportunity to go to St. Petersburg and remain there as long as possible. He endeavored to transform his residence at Hlukhov into a miniature St. Petersburg: he introduced Italian Opera, coffee houses, French schools for boys and girls and French fashions.

His new palace was built in the Versailles style and the town was adorned with several other beautiful buildings among which the sumptuous palace of the General Cossack Chancellery was especially conspicuous. Not satisfied with Hlukhov, Hetman Rozumovsky began to erect magnificent buildings, among them a University building in Baturin where he wished to transfer his residence; Baturin being beautifully situated on the high bank of the river Seim. But the abolition of Hetmanship in 1764 put an end to all his plans.

Notwithstanding his longing for the court life in St. Petersburg, Hetman Rozumovsky took all possible care for the welfare of his country making use of his court connections and of the Ukrainian sympathies of Empress Elizabeth. He arranged for Ukrainian affairs to be again transferred to the Foreign Ministry; and that Kiev as well as the Zaporogian Cossacks should be included in the Hetman's administration. He found it difficult to defend Ukrainian financial autonomy as the Russian government had introduced a close supervision over Ukrainian finance. Free trade between the Ukraine and Russia was established. Hetman Rozumovsky also did not succeed in obtaining the right to carry on free relations with foreign powers, nor in exempting the Ukraine from participating in Russian wars. The Ukrainians were obliged to take part in the Seven Year's War against Frederick II of Prussia, and several thousand Cossacks lost their lives in the battles of Kustrin, Jagersdorf and others. Several popular songs have preserved for us echoes of this war.

143. Growing Importance of the Cossack Officers (Starshina) Class.

During Hetman Rozumovsky's rule, the Cossack Officers acquired a decisive influence on Ukrainian national politics. During the Hetman's frequent absences in St. Petersburg the country was officially ruled by the General Cossack Officers, as indeed also happened during his residence at Hlukhov. The Cossack Officers

definitely looked upon themselves as the leading and privileged class of the nation. Hetman Rozumovsky's rule gave them hope of retaining their political influence. The periodical assemblies of the Cossack Officers in Hlukhov which again came into being under Hetman Rozumovsky, tended to become regular sessions of the Ukrainian Parliament. During one of these sessions a memorandum from a group of Cossack Officers was circulated, a copy of which has come down to us. It may serve as a proof of the extent of the political and social aspiration of the Cossack Officer's class about this time. The authors of the memorandum well remember the former Cossack glory and bemoan the disappearance of the former warrior spirit in the Ukraine. They idealize the olden times "when we had Cossack General Rada (General Cossack Councils)". It is clearly to be seen that the authors' ideal was a constitutional and parliamentary form of government for the Ukrainian Free Cossack State as opposed to Russian-Muscovite autocratic rule. The authors of the Memorandum, however, stand for purely class rule: in their opinion all political power should be concentrated in the hands of the Cossack Officers who were evidently to become Ukrainian nobles. Some reforms would be necessary, but these reforms were to be of a kind to strengthen and develop the rights and privileges of the ruling class in the State. Reform of the judiciary, for instance, would be necessary but again in the direction of concentrating all the judicial power in the hands of the Cossack Officers.

144. His Reforms of the Courts of Justice.

It was during Hetman Rozumovsky's rule that the reform of the courts of justice, begun in the time of the Hetman Apostol, was carried out. The reform was accomplished fully in the spirit of the wishes of the Cossack Officers. The commission of Ukrainian lawyers which completed in 1743 the Code of Ukrainian Law, based it chiefly on the old Lithuanian Statute, though using parts of the German Magdeburg Law and the Uk-

rainian Common Law. The Code comprised chapters on the rights of the governing sovereign power, on the privileges of the nobles, on military service, Penal and Civil Law, on the right of Private Property and on breaches thereof, on the order of civil procedure, on legacies and inheritance, on municipal selfgovernment, on the relations of landlords and serfs, on the rights of foreigners, and on the position of dissenters in the Ukraine. The whole Code was not confirmed by the Russian government though it was widely and unofficially in use in the Ukraine after 1743. Hetman Rozumovsky succeeded in carrying out, in 1760, the reform of the courts of justice. The whole territory of the Ukraine of the Hetmans was divided into twenty-nine judicial districts. In every district there was a Civil court and a court of landed property. In each of the ten chief regimental towns there was a Penal court which took the place of the former Regimental courts. All judges were elected from among Cossack Officers. A General court composed of two judges and ten elected deputies from the Cossack Regiments constituted the highest Court of Appeal or Tribunal in the country. The Lithuanian Statute was clearly the basis of this reform.

In 1763 Hetman Rozumovsky called in Hlukhov a General Assembly which confirmed the judicial reform. By giving over the jurisdiction entirely into the hands of the privileged class this reform further strengthened the position of the Cossack Officers who about this time became completely transformed into an aristocratic class.

About this time a great change in the position of the nobility in Russia was to be observed. Formerly entirely dependent on the good will of the Muscovite Tsar and deprived of every right, Russian nobles succeeded in getting from Empress Anna certain social privileges. They were, for example, freed from compulsory State service and secured certain hereditary rights of succession. During Empress Elizabeth's reign there was a great advance in the emancipation of the Russian nobles and in the acquisition by them of rights and privileges.

Under Elizabeth's successors these changes in the position of the Russian nobles were fixed by special legislation. This could not influence the new Ukrainian nobles, Cossack Officers, who soon observed that the Russian nobles, without actually possessing the political rights which Ukrainian nobles enjoyed in consequence of Ukrainian autonomy, in fact had far more social and economic privileges and advantages than they in the Ukraine. The Ukrainian nobles were still partly in the hands of the peasants and common Cossacks. Further, they were still far from having control of the peasant labor even on their own lands. Under Hetman Rozumovsky the number of free peasants was considerably diminished, most of them being now actually attached to the land. There then remained but a short step to turning them into downright serfs according to Polish or Muscovite fashion. Social change under Hetman Rozumovsky had thus a reactionary character.

We should also mention Hetman Rozumovsky's attempts to introduce a military uniform into the Ukrainian army as well as military drill according to Central and West European models. In all Cossack regimental schools, besides the general instruction of Cossack youths, military drill and special military instruction were introduced throughout the Ukraine. We have already mentioned Hetman Rozumovsky's plans for a University in Baturin. But the days of the Hetman's rule were already numbered.

Empress Elizabeth died in 1761. As her heir and successor she designated her nephew, Peter III, a son of the Duke of Holstein and Elizabeth's only sister Anna, Tsar Peter I's eldest daughter. After a short reign Peter III was deposed by a palace revolution and killed; his wife, a German princess of Anhalt Zerbst, seized the Russian throne under the name of Catherine II.

145. Abolition of the Hetmanship.

The new Empress was in favor of centralization and her first intention was to abolish all autonomous powers

and special arrangements within the limits of the Russian empire. In a letter from Kiev she wrote: "never in her life had she seen a province whose population were so hateful to her as in the Ukraine". According to her plans the Hetmanship, as the most conspicuous outward sign of Ukrainian independence, was to be abolished in the first place. Even Hetman Rozumovsky's active part in the palace revolution which secured the throne to Catherine could not save him from this fate. Catherine II's intentions may be clearly seen from the secret instruction to the General-Procurer of the Senate, Prince Viázemski, which expressed the political programme of the new sovereign. "Little Russia and Finland", we read in this instruction, "are provinces governed by privileges which have at one time been granted to them; it would be unwise to attempt to cancel those privileges at once; but we cannot consider these provinces different from the rest and rule them differently. This would clearly be foolishness. These provinces as well as Smolensk must be brought by easy and careful methods to feel Russian and be tamed".

Ukrainian nobles as if foreseeing the new sovereign's intentions took certain steps which, contrary to their expectation in fact, served to further Catherine II's plans. Among the Cossack Officers, late in 1763, a plan materialized for making the Hetmanship hereditary in the Rozumovsky family. A petition to the Empress was drawn up and signatures were being collected. Catherine II, informed of this, summoned Rozumovsky to St. Petersburg and asked him to abdicate voluntarily. He offered no opposition and thus Catherine II's wish was fulfilled. Shortly before she had written in a letter: "the word 'Hetman' must disappear; least of all, no person should be elected to occupy this position".

At the end of 1764 an Imperial manifesto was published according to which it was made known that Hetman Rozumovsky having voluntarily abdicated, for the good of the Ukrainian people and in their interests the Hetman government in the Ukraine would be replaced

by a "Little Russian Board" with a President at its head, having the functions of a Governor General. The Board (Kollegia) was to be composed of four Ukrainians and four Russians and to the post of Governor General, in whose hands all the power was actually concentrated, a Russian General, Peter Rumiantsev, was nominated.

Rozumovsky received from Catherine II an enormous pension and great landed estates in the Ukraine to which he retired as a private individual. He lived for forty years more but to the end of his life never interfered in public affairs.

146. Peter Rumiantsev, General Governor of Little Russia.

Rumiantsev received from Catherine II secret instructions outlining the programme of his policy in the Ukraine. These instructions show that Catherine very well understood the weaknesses of political and social life in the Ukraine of the Hetmans. She begins by pointing out that although the Ukraine was a very rich and fertile country, richer than any other part of the Russian Empire, it had not given much regular revenue to the Central Government, at least not under the late Hetman, and that because of its autonomy. Further she drew attention to the mutual dislike existing between Ukrainians and Muscovites, especially evident among Cossack Officers who, "actuated by erroneous ideas of their would-be rights and liberties, keep alive in the population sentiments of hatred against the Muscovites and mistrust of the Russian government". Thus the General Governor's immediate task was to remove all differences and peculiarities of the Ukrainian administration and put it on an equality with all the other imperial provinces.

147. Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy.

The best method of achieving this was to reform the administration and the judiciary in order that all might see that the Russian administration was better than that of the Ukrainian government. "When the population

sees that they are delivered from petty tyrants, they will be thankful and reconciled to the new order". This, as we see, was the old tried method of Russian policy in the Ukraine playing on class antagonism, and assuming the role of a would-be protector of the populace against the dominant class of the Cossack Officers, in order to undermine the political autonomy of the Ukraine. The Muscovite government used this method when Peter I made it his leading policy during the Eighteenth century towards the Ukraine; and it was the same policy that Catherine II was now recommending in her instructions to Rumiantsev.

This, however, did not at all signify that Catherine II had at heart the interests of the popular masses. On the contrary, in the same instruction, she points out as one of the worst instances of the mismanagement of the Ukrainian government that there were still free peasants in the Ukraine. She recommends Rumiantsev to take all possible steps to remedy this evil and to attach all hitherto free peasants to the land they live on and give them over into the power of their landlords as serfs. Recommending Rumiantsev to act as would-be protector of the popular interests against the encroachments of the Cossacks Officers, Catherine II ordered him at the same time to watch closely the officers themselves and put down without delay any signs of opposition or discontent appearing among them.

Rumiantsev arrived in the Ukraine early in 1765. Following the practice of the Hetmans he chose Hlukhov as his residence. Rumiantsev possessed in the Ukraine great and very well administered estates. He was familiar with the internal conditions of the country and to some extent felt himself bound by its interests. As a basis for policy he followed Catherine's advice expressed in her instructions: "to endeavor to root out from the Ukrainian population any idea of being a different people from the Muscovites". It must be admitted that Rumiantsev carried out his political programme very cleverly and consistently. During his twenty years' rule of the country

he succeeded without great upheavals in bringing the Ukraine of the Hetmans almost imperceptibly to the status of an ordinary imperial province.

The chief basis of the national economy of the Ukraine was, as we know, agriculture. The character of land ownership was thus of fundamental importance. But landed property in the Ukraine of the Hetmans, far from being settled or stabilized, was constantly in a state of flux. The tendency was for the land to become concentrated in the hands of the Cossack Officers as it was continually passing out of the possession of small holders, such as common Cossacks and peasants, and being distributed by the Hetman to his Officers out of the State Land Fund. In the former cases the land changed hands in a lawful manner by buying and selling or when, by order of the government, the peasants were turned into serfs and their lands given to their landlord. But because the Cossack Officers wielded so much power, in addition to lawful methods, they constantly adopted unlawful ones and even violence. The various political changes, wars, and irresponsible Russian interference, all constantly upset the economic conditions and the land ownership in the country. Consequently the question of landed property in the Ukraine was a very complicated one. In order to obtain a true picture of land distribution Rumiantsev had to hold another inquiry, as the results of the "Inquiry into landownership" made in 1729-1731 under Hetman Apostol were already antiquated, the progress of land concentration having made great strides in the thirty years. The chief object of the inquiry ordered by Rumiantsev was a census of the population but it included in addition a description of the landownership and its distribution, the number of estates, their dimensions down to the smallest homesteads, as well as the income of their owners and the number of horses and cattle. Rumiantsev's orders were to explain to the population that the object of the census was to free the population from the excessive taxation of the Cossack Officers. The census took two years, 1765-1767,

and resulted in an immense mass of statistical material filling over a thousand folio volumes. There is no evidence that this material served any practical purpose. Volumes valuable to historians lay quietly in archives forgotten by all and part of them perished. In the sixties of the Nineteenth century some volumes of Rumiantsev's census were discovered in the archives of a local administration office in Chernigov where the rest of the Ukrainian State archives were being preserved. Since their discovery Rumiantsev's statistical material has been the object of scientific investigation by a number of Ukrainian historians, which is not yet complete. Compared with analogous sources of Central and Western Europe, Ukrainian statistics are thought to be the most complete known. They give a full picture of economic conditions in the Ukraine of the Hetmans in the Eighteenth century and their evolution.

One of the first changes of practical importance introduced by Rumiantsev concerned the billeting on the population of the Russian army stationed in Ukraine. Instead each household had to pay a monetary tax which brought into the Russian treasury a quarter of a million roubles. Rumiantsev also introduced some order into the system of requisitions during the Turkish war of 1767-1774. He also introduced the first regular postal service in the Ukraine. On the whole he took care of the economic interests of the country with which he was bound as an owner of great estates. Notwithstanding, he also directed his policy according to Catherine's instruction in the question of landownership and serfs: peasants in the Ukraine were deprived of their personal liberty and jurisdiction over them was given to their landlord. Himself a great landowner, Rumiantsev understood and shared the interests of the landowner class and these interests became the basis of home policy in the Russian Empire.

What was the attitude of the Ukrainian population towards the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy and the new regime as announced by Rumiantsev's nomination

to Governor General? The popular masses met the new order with tacit obedience. The changes affecting them amounted to a final loss of personal freedom and the multiplication of working days for the landlord. As they had for long been excluded from all participation in political life and from exercising any influence on public affairs, the happenings in high political spheres did not penetrate to their consciousness. The popular feeling found merely passive expression in a multitude of popular songs which have come down in great numbers to our day, bitterly bemoaning the loss of freedom and complaining of the prevalence of wickedness and injustice in the world. But further than passive complaints the popular masses did not go, and during the last half of the Eighteenth century we only know of one open armed uprising of peasants in Poltava province against their landlords where the military force had to be sent to put down the uprising.

The Cossack officers as a class also accepted very quietly the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy. Their economic interests and their social privileged position were not disturbed by the political change but remained well assured. Their ambition was now to have equal rights with the Russian aristocracy whose position as a class, as we know, had become more dominating and privileged since the accession of Empress Anna. And the Ukrainian patriots of the time were right in accusing the Cossack Officers of indifference toward the abolition of Ukrainian political autonomy and of merely wishing to derive material benefits from it.

We cannot, however, say that the abolition of autonomy was carried out entirely without protest. As soon as the bulk of the Cossack Officers fully realized the significance of the political change they were witnessing and had time to feel the heavy hand of the Russian Governor General, they began to deplore the loss of autonomy. Very soon a convenient occasion presented itself for giving expression to their sentiments and wishes before the central government. Catherine II called in

Moscow a special Commission to revise the laws and compile a new Russian Code. The Legislative Commission was composed of elected delegates from all classes of the population excepting only the serfs. Thus nobles, clergy and Cossacks, Slobidski as well as Zaporogians, sent representatives with special instructions expressing their wishes. The Commission was supposed to be a sort of Parliament with legislative foundations. Catherine II herself drew up instructions for their work in a very liberal spirit. The Ukase concerning the Legislative Commission awakened many hopes in the Ukraine of the return of the lost autonomy. In many places the delegates received instructions demanding the recall of the Hetman and the return to autonomy. In the Regiment of Nizhin (Chernigov province) the instructions given by the electors to their representatives were so categorical that Rumiantsev informed of this, cancelled the elections, arrested the delegates and brought them before a court-martial which condemned the eleven delegates to death for high treason. Catherine, however, pardoned them all and tried to modify Rumiantsev's conduct, which did not accord with her liberal instructions to the Legislative Commission.

The Commission began its sessions in Moscow in 1767. The chief representative of the Ukrainian autonomists was Gregory Poletika, a delegate of the nobles, and Cossack Officers of the Lubni Regiment. In connection with the sittings of the Commission, the movement for the restitution of autonomy in the Ukraine was increasing and spreading. The Commission, however, did not sit for long. Catherine's liberal enthusiasm soon cooled down and, making a pretext of the beginning of war against the Turks, she dissolved the Commission and never called it again.

War against the Turks broke out in 1769 and lasted for five years. It interrupted Rumiantsev's reforms in the Ukraine, more particularly as he was nominated commander-in-chief of the Russian army. The Ukrainian forces had to take an important part in this war, in-

cluding the Zaporogians as well as the Registered Cossacks. The war was better prepared than that under Empress Anna and Munnich and was conducted with great energy. The Russian and Ukrainian forces occupied the whole of Crimea, Moldavia and Wallachia, defeating the Turks in several pitched battles and extending military operations beyond the river Danube into Bulgaria. The Sultan was compelled to sue for peace which was concluded in the summer of 1774 in Kuchuk-Kainardji. Russia obtained a part of the Black Sea coast and the Crimea was declared independent of Turkish vassalage. The Crimean Khan found himself actually under a Russian protectorate. A few years later the Russian government, taking advantage of internal disorder among the Tatars, deposed the last Khan and annexed Crimea in 1783.

Thus at last was accomplished the task which had occupied the Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland and Muscovy for centuries and in which the Ukraine was always in the vanguard to receive the blows and offer stubborn resistance. At last the nest of vultures was destroyed which for three centuries had rendered impossible any permanent colonization of the rich Ukrainian steppe and any degree of peaceful life on the Ukrainian border by destroying settlements, taking the population prisoner and selling them into slavery. Russia and the Ukraine obtained free access to the Black Sea. Following on this, the Russian government expedited the reforms which had for their object the extermination of Ukrainian particularism and what remained of Ukrainian autonomy on these lands. The next victims of this policy were the Zaporogian Cossacks whose stronghold the Sich, fell in 1775, very soon after the Turkish war and was destroyed by the Muscovite army.

Rumiantsev returned to the Ukraine and continued his reforms. In 1781 the Ukraine of the Hetmans was divided into three provinces or governments, Chernigov, Novhorod-Sieversk and Kiev, which constituted Little Russia under a Governor General. Hlukov ceased to be

the capital. Russian administration and courts of justice were introduced in each province which in turn was subdivided into districts.

At the beginning of her reign Catherine had expressed her wish to turn all Ukrainian peasants into serfs. Some of them were free and possessed land of their own: most, however, though personally free, had to work a certain number of days for the landlord in return for the land they held from him. The Ukrainian nobles (Cossack Officers) often enough had asked to have the peasants reduced to serfdom as in Russia, but the Russian government was not anxious to meet their wishes so long as the Ukrainian nobles showed aspirations for autonomy. However, in 1775, the Ukrainian nobles of a certain number of Regiments sent a petition to the Empress declaring their loyalty to the Russian sovereign and government and asking that the Ukrainian Cossacks' ranks should be put on a par with the corresponding ranks in the Russian military and civil service, and also requesting for the recognition of their estates as their hereditary property and that the landlords should be given power over the persons and property of the peasants living on their land, that is, that the peasants should be turned into their serfs. Catherine published the necessary ukase in 1783 declaring that the peasants should be attached to the land and the landlords confirmed in the possession of the lands they had occupied at the time of the last census.

At the same time the old Cossack military organization was also abolished. Ten former Cossack Regiments and three volunteer regiments were transformed into ten regular cavalry regiments of the Russian army, called carbineers with the obligation to serve for six years under very severe military discipline. In future these regiments were to be recruited from the Cossacks who remained a special class of the Agricultural population, distinct from the peasants as being small free-holders, but obliged to serve in the carbineer regiments on special conditions.

In 1785 the Russian "Charter of the Freedom of the

Nobles" was also applied to the Ukraine. According to it the nobles were free from compulsory State service; they had a right to a certain degree of corporate self-government and held provincial and distinct assemblies for the election of their corporate representatives called "Marshals of the Nobles". They had also the right of direct petition to the sovereign and generally became the first and only privileged class in the Russian Empire. The Russian autocrats chose the class of nobles to be the exclusive support of their autocratic power and sacrificed to them the interests of all other classes of the population, especially the peasants. The Ukrainian nobles now had equal rights with the Russian nobles. The price they paid for it was the loss of political autonomy and of all the traditions of the Ukrainian Cossack State founded in the Seventeenth century by Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

In the following year (1786) the abolition of the remaining peculiarities in Ukrainian landownership was completed by the secularization of the estates belonging to the Church. All Ukrainian monasteries and the Academy of Peter Mohyla had to surrender their lands and the peasants attached to them. The Kievan monasteries alone gave up 50,000 peasants. The secularized lands were partly sold by the Russian government and partly distributed as grants among Muscovites. A great number of monasteries were closed; the rest being given small subsidies from the Russian government. The secularization of Ukrainian monasteries was a great blow to popular education, as the monasteries had maintained the best schools; it also ruined the printing presses in the Ukraine which were also mostly connected with monasteries. It took the ground from under the feet of the Kievan Academy and the provincial colleges connected with it. Indirectly it also ruined the paper industry in the Ukraine which was dependent on the monastic printing presses, especially that of the ancient Pecherski Monastery in Kiev.

148. Historic Importance of the Period of the Hetmans.

Of all its former institutions the Ukraine of the Hetmans retained only its former judicial system, administered according to the Lithuanian Statute and Magdeburg Law, adapted to Ukrainian life under the Hetmans. However, though the outward forms of political autonomy were abolished, there still remained deeply embedded in Ukrainian life as the pledge of a new national revival the tradition of national independence, which after the fall of the old Kievan Princedom, had revived in the Cossack State. For more than two centuries the Ukrainian people had, at least in one part of their ethnographic territory, the possibility to a certain extent of living an independent existence and could build up their life and culture according to their own ideas. During this time and especially at the beginning under Khmelnytsky, Doroshenko and Mazepa, the conception of an independent and united Ukraine gradually developed as a practical ideal for which generations of Ukrainians fought and died. In consequence of unfavorable political circumstances, and through lack of inner solidarity, the Ukrainians did not succeed in preserving their political independence. Still they had often enough asserted their determination to have their own independent political life. The aspirations of their national leaders expressed in a series of quite remarkable treaties, concluding with Orlik's constitution of Bender, had shown that they were on a level with advanced contemporary political ideals. We can safely assert that the Cossack State preserved the Ukrainian nation from assimilation with neighboring nations akin to them in culture as, for example, with the Poles; or in religion, as with the Muscovites. After the centres of national culture in Galicia and Volynia were destroyed and had disappeared, the Ukraine of the Cossacks with her cultural centre in Kiev remained the only home of national culture and Orthodox faith for all the Ukrainian territories. Though limited and often curtailed, the autonomy of the Ukraine of the Hetmans provided a shelter for the development of Uk-

rainian art and letters. About the end of the Seventeenth century and during the first half of the Eighteenth century the standard of Ukrainian culture was so high that life under Mazepa, Skoropadsky, Apostol and Rozumovsky was comparable with that of any civilized country in Western or Central Europe. At that time the Ukraine became a radiating centre for the whole of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Even Muscovite terrorism and their policy of depleting the moral, physical and economic resources of the Ukraine, adopted after Mazepa's downfall, could not for a long time destroy this culture.

It is sufficient to cast merely a superficial glance at the state of education, schools and material culture of the Ukraine of the Hetmans in Eighteenth century before the abolition of autonomy to become convinced of the truth of our affirmation about Ukrainian culture of that time. The Left Bank of the Dnieper, the Ukraine of the Hetmans, together with the Slobidska Ukraine (present provinces Chernigov, Poltava, Kharkov and the south districts of Voronezh) had a population of not more than one million and a half. Their cultural centre was Kiev with Peter Mohyla's Academy, which reached its culmination under Mazepa. At the beginning of the Eighteenth century there were in the Academy more than two thousand students. After a short period of ill-fortune directly after the Poltava catastrophe when in consequence of Peter I's repressions the number of students fell down to 160, the Academy revived again and in the years 1715-1717 had about one thousand students. In the year of the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy there were 1,600 students. The Academy was open to children of all classes: sons of Hetmans and Cossack Officers, as well as children of common Cossacks; burgesses and peasants also were admitted. The students were not drawn from Ukrainian territories only, for among them were many Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, Rumanians and Greeks. Among the students of the Academy we see representatives of several generations of almost all the known families of Cossack Officers of the Seventeenth and

Eighteenth centuries. Among the teachers of the Academy we might name several well-known churchmen and authors like Theophan Prokopovich, Stefan Yavorsky, Joseph Krokovsky, Gabriel Buzhinsky, Arseni Matsievich, Sulvester Kuliabka, George Konisky—all of whom were bishops known as learned theologians, remarkable preachers and authors of important works. Among the lay pupils of the Academy we might instance the philosopher Gregory Skovoroda, political men, historians and artists such as: Basil Grigorovich-Barsky, Gregory Poletyka, Peter Symonovsky, Nicolas Bantysh-Kamensky, Alexander Bezborodko, Dimitri Troschinsky, A. Vedel, Dm. Vellansky and P. Hulak-Artemovsky. It was a real "Alma Mater" of several generations of Ukrainians.

Provincial Colleges came into existence as extensions of the Kievan Academy. That of Chernigov was founded in 1700, Kharkov in 1726 and Pereyaslav in 1730. Though the Academy and the Colleges retained their original theological and scholastical character, Latin and Greek were very well taught and interest in classical literature, poetry and drama was great. To meet the requirements of modern times, the teaching of mathematics and modern languages was introduced. The acting of classical tragedies and comedies by the students was very much practised. Besides Greek and Latin or up-to-date pseudo-classical plays, lively and amusing short plays were written and acted in the living Ukrainian idiom.

However, the teaching in the Kievan Academy and provincial Colleges failed to satisfy many of the Ukrainian youths who followed the old traditions and frequently went abroad to European Universities to complete the education begun at Kievan Academy. In the first half of the Eighteenth century we know of several hundreds of young Ukrainians, not only sons of Cossack Officers, but sons of clergy, common Cossacks and burghesses going to French, German, Italian and English Universities. Especially numerous were the Ukrainian students at Koenigsberg, Halle, Leipzig and Strassburg.

About the middle of the Eighteenth century plans were made to found a University in Baturin and in 1760 Hetman Rozumovsky started building. He also intended to transform the Kievan Academy into a second University. In a memorandum presented by Cossack Officers to Empress Catherine II in 1764, we find mention of the desire to have a Ukrainian University. Rumiantsev himself made plans to transform the Kievan Academy and the College of Chernigov into Universities. Ukrainian nobles of the districts of Kiev, Pereyaslav, Starodub, Chernigov, Hlukiv, Nizhin and Baturin in their instructions to their delegates to the Legislative Commission of 1767 expressed their wish to have a University. The Russian government, however, refused to consider any project for a University in the Ukraine and was especially opposed to a University at Kiev, even when the suggestion came from the Governor General Rumiantsev himself. The Russian policy was not to tolerate a Ukrainian University. It was owing entirely to the intervention of Catherine's special favorite, Potemkin, that the project of founding a University in Katerinoslav was confirmed by the Empress. But Potemkin very soon died (1791) and the project was never carried out. Under Catherine's successors the Ukrainian nobles in 1801 again asked for a University in Chernigov or in Lubni. In 1802 they asked for a University in Novgorod-Sieversk. But the Ukraine of the Hetmans did not obtain a national University until the fall of the Russian Tsar's Empire when a University in Poltava was founded. Slobidska Ukraine, however, obtained permission to open a University in Khar'kov, in 1805, and the local nobles and burgesses furnished the funds for it. A pupil of the Ukrainian philosopher Skovoroda, Basil Karazin, who had an influence over Tsar Alexander I in the first liberal years of his reign, obtained his permission.

The Russian government brought about the downfall of the Kievan Academy as well as the extension Colleges in Chernigov and Pereyaslav. In 1783 teaching in Russian was introduced and "special care was to be taken of

Muscovite pronunciation" in the Academy. The teaching was limited exclusively to theological subjects and the provincial Colleges were turned into seminaries for priests. Instead of a centre of learning for all classes of the population, the Kievan Academy became exclusively a clerical school where not only most of the teachers but also many students were sent from Muscovy to keep down Ukrainian particularism. After the end of the Eighteenth century no Ukrainian was allowed to occupy the Metropolitan see of Kiev, and as few Ukrainians as possible obtained bishoprics in the Ukraine, Muscovites being nominated to these posts.

The period of the Hetmans in the Ukraine was also the period when art flourished. In architecture besides foreign artists such as the Italian, Rastrelli, and the German, Schedel, Ukrainian architects were active such as: Stepan Kovnir, Ivan Gregorovich-Barsky, I. Yanovsky, and a number of others. Besides monumental architecture in stone, of churches, palaces and other buildings in European styles of baroque, rococo and Empire, wooden architecture of churches, purely Ukrainian in style, flourished. Among many examples of these which have been preserved to our day, the Church of the last Zaporogian leader Kalnishevsky in Romen, now transferred to Poltava, and the beautiful Zaporogian cathedral in former Samara (now Novomoskovsk) are especially well known. In 1800 an Imperial ukase forbade the building of churches in the Ukrainian style and this order lasted over a century. Ukrainian painting of the Eighteenth century can boast of names such as Lossenko, Dimitri Levitsky, Borovikovsky, whose work adorn the galleries of St. Petersburg, Moscow and some in Europe. Among Ukrainian sculptors Kozlovsky and Ivan Martos, Canova's pupil, are especially famed. Ukrainian music, which since the end of the Seventeenth century was played at the court of the Muscovite Tsars by Ukrainian "Bandurist" (bandura players), organ players and singers, was distinguished by the names of Bortniansky, Vedel and Berezovsky.

Among Ukrainian graduates of West European Universities during the Eighteenth century, several distinguished themselves as mathematicians, scientists and in medicine. Many of them were professors in the newly founded University in Moscow. Among Ukrainian philosophers the name of Gregory Skovoroda is best known. Early in the Seventeenth century knowledge of foreign languages was general among the Cossack Officers, and private libraries, mostly in French, were not seldom to be found. A cultivated Ukrainian cleric Gregory Vinsky, from Chernigov, who in the second half of the Eighteenth century had by chance migrated to Muscovy as a teacher in an aristocratic Muscovite family, wrote in his interesting memoirs that his Ukrainian education alone kept alive in him the sentiments of humanity and prevented him from descending to the low level of the surrounding coarseness and lack of culture. The family life, customs and manners of the Muscovite nobles were loathsome to him, their treatment of serfs roused his indignation and only "his love of books and of reading acquired in the Ukraine" helped him to keep up his spirits amidst the conditions usually prevailing in Muscovy.

Nowhere perhaps was the state of culture in the Ukraine of the Hetmans more evident than in the contemporary system of education and number of schools. From statistics in different archives we have information that in 1748, for instance, on the territory of the seven Cossack Regiments—about the three remaining Regiments we have no information—there were 866 schools, that is, one school per thousand of population. In 1767 in the Chernigov Regiment alone there were 143 schools, that is one school per 746 persons. In Slobidska Ukraine in four Regiments there were 124 schools. This does not include monastic schools. The most remarkable thing about the Cossack schools was that the population maintained them at their own expense: the village community invited the teacher, made a contract with him, paid him, provided his food and lodgings and took care of the school building. In places where the population was

scattered the children of isolated homesteads were taught by so-called "Itinerant clerks" (mandrovani diaky), who stayed for some time in one place then, having brought the pupils to a certain stage, moved on somewhere else doing the same, and again moved to still another place returning and revisiting their pupils, thus keeping up the teaching over quite an extensive area. In every village there was the so-called "hospital" (spytal) where poor and solitary old people lived, and orphans attending school. The high cultural level astonished foreign travellers in the Eighteenth century as formerly it had astonished Paul Deacon of Aleppo in the middle of the Seventeenth century. Joseph Marshal, an English traveller, in his "Travels Through the Ukraine in the years 1768-1770"* who went mostly through Chernigov province, wrote that visiting the villages he was astonished to see them so very much like English villages in any county of England. He wrote of the character of the Ukrainian population which he found very quiet and amiable. Another English traveller, Edward Dan Clarke,** who traversed the Slobidska Ukraine in 1800 wrote in his book: "Ukrainians differ altogether from the inhabitants of the rest of Russia . . . They are a more noble race; stouter and better looking than the Russian, and superior to them in everything that can exalt one class of men above another. They are cleaner, more industrious, more honest, more polite, more courageous, more hospitable, more truly pious, and of course less superstitious. Their language only differs from the Russian as the dialect of the meridional provinces of France does differ from that spoken near Paris. The third nation with whose dwelling I have compared the cottages of Malo-Russia: that is to say, having a Welsh exterior, a Norwegian interior, and the gardens and out-houses of English peasantry".

* Joseph Marshal: "Travels Through the Ukraine in the Years 1768-1770. —London 1772.

** Edward Dan Clarke: "Travels in Various Countries of Europe. —London 1810.

These opinions are by no means exceptional but are typical of the general impression of all foreign travellers, English, German and French, who happened to visit the Ukraine of the Hetmans at the time of her autonomy or soon after its abolition. The superior culture compared with the dominant Muscovite neighbors during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries of the Cossack State was the pledge of national revival at the threshold of the Nineteenth century. Just when it was thought that Ukrainian national life was extinguished for ever, Ukrainian tradition re-awoke and reinforced by the influx of modern western ideas, formed the basis of the Ukrainian national movement of our time.

CHAPTER XXIII

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(149) Population of the Slobidska Ukraine. (150) Cossack Regiments of the Slobidska Ukraine. (151) Their Social and Economic Conditions. (152) Land-ownership. (153) Military Service. (154) Russian Reforms in the Eighteenth Century. (155) Cultural Conditions.

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149. Population of the Slobidska Ukraine.

Simultaneously with the Ukraine of the Hetmans another Ukrainian territory on the Left Bank of the Dnieper lost its autonomy: this was the so-called Slobidska Ukraine. The history of this territory requires a special chapter in the general history of Ukraine because of the peculiar circumstances of its population and their different conditions of life.

The name of Slobidska Ukraine covers a vast territory lying to the east of the present Poltava province, including the area of the present Kharkov province and the southern and south-western districts of the Kursk and Voronezh provinces. From the ethnographic point of view this territory contains a uniform Ukrainian population and belongs to the rest of the Ukraine. From the historical point of view it had a different fate. In the Tenth to the Sixteenth centuries it was at different times settled by Ukrainians and was part of the Principedom of Chernigov-Sieversk. It was the arena of the stubborn fight against the nomads, and the present province of Kharkov was the scene of the fatal campaign of the princes of Sieversk, sung in the epic "Tale of the campaign of Prince Igor" (Slovo o polku Igoreve) against Polovtsi. The Tatar invasion turned this country into a desert until the first half of the Seventeenth century, when it was recolonized by Ukrainians.

From the geographical point of view Slobidska Ukraine is a tableland (plateau) on the watershed of the basins of the Dnieper and the Don. Like the neighboring

Ukrainian provinces on the west, its black earth steppe is cleft by deep valleys at the bottom of which rivers and rivulets flow. At one time the country was rich in forest and the rivers, which then were deeper, were important to navigation. Anchors and remnants of vessels of a considerable size have been found in their beds. In consequence of the destruction of the forests, the rivers have become shallow and have lost their former importance as means of communication.

At the dawn of our era the steppe of the present Slobidska Ukraine was the abode of quite a number of nomadic tribes which succeeded one another remaining only for a short time and moving ever westwards: Huns, Avars, Pechenegs (Patsaks), Turks, Polovtsi (Kumans) and Tatars. Their presence has been proved by numerous archaeological finds. When the Tatar Horde settled on the lower Volga, they traversed the steppe of the Slobidska Ukraine on their way to invade the Ukraine and Great Russia. Their tracks usually led along the watersheds of the more important rivers and coincided with the important trade routes leading to the East and South East.

At the end of the Fourteenth century when the power of the Golden Horde declined and Great Russian territories became united round Moscow, and Ukrainians and White Russians were under the power of the Lithuanian princes, Ukrainians tended to expand towards the south and the Muscovites toward the south-east. The territory of the Slobidska Ukraine was at the same time the so-called "Wild Steppe" whence Tatar bands invaded the southern borders of Muscovy. As this border became populated during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries it was necessary to build permanent fortifications against the Tatar menace from the steppe region. The Muscovite government introduced a system of border fortifications forming a line, to the north of which lived a scanty agricultural population and to the south spread the desert steppe. The Muscovites increased their holdings from time to time always pushing the line of the fortifi-

cations further and further south. But the colonization did not advance as rapidly as the fortification line. The sparse population was mostly composed of military outposts and Muscovite officials. Civilians were occasionally forcibly settled but as they never came by their own volition, they took the first opportunity of returning to Muscovy. Muscovy after the Interregnum and the wars at the beginning of the Seventeenth century, was considerably depopulated and was unable to furnish colonists to settle on those distant borders.

150. Cossack Regiments of the Slobidska Ukraine.

It was toward the middle of the Seventeenth century that Ukrainian colonists once again came to settle in these empty spaces. During a few decades they completely changed the aspect of the country, turning the wild steppe into a flourishing country with an active agricultural and military population. This colonization began in the first half of the Seventeenth century after the failure of the Cossack uprising against Poland in 1638. It was Ostriainin, the Cossack leader, who crossed the Muscovite frontier with about 900 men after having lost the battle of Zhovnin. They received permission from the Muscovite government to settle near Chuhuev, to the east of present Kharkov. The refugees were allowed to retain their Cossack military organization and were employed in the defence against the Tatars.

This first settlement, however, was not a success. The Muscovite border administration proved to be inefficient and moreover, cruel, and this discouraged the refugees. News came of improved conditions in the Ukraine and most of them returned home. Later, the defeat of the Ukrainian forces of Khmel'nitsky in Berestechko in 1651, and the disappointment of the people discouraged because of failure in the struggle against Poland, led a new migration movement eastward beyond the Muscovite frontier. Thousands of Cossacks and peasants with their families and belongings started to seek freedom in the Wild Steppe. From the Muscovite gov-

ernment they received empty areas for settlement and permission to maintain their Cossack military organization which was far better defence against the Tatars than the former fortification lines. In a short time new towns grew up such as Sumy, Kharkov, Okhtyrka and others.

After 1659, unrest in the Ukraine caused successive settlements and new waves of refugees seeking peace and conditions favorable to agriculture. Coming in great numbers with their families, servants, horses, cattle and sheep, they at once renewed their habitual pursuits. Thus in 1652, from the town of Ostrog in Volynia, a train of about a thousand Cossacks came with their wives and children and founded the town of Ostrohozsk in the present province of Voronezh. Colonel Ivan Zinkivsky brought with him his complete regimental staff of Cossack Officers, Commander, Captain, regimental secretary and even regimental chaplains. Kharko, a centurian, came at the head of his staff and Cossacks and together with all their families, goods and chattels, founded the present town of Kharkov. Reports of Muscovite border officials have been found in the archives in Moscow giving exact information about these pioneers, their numbers as well as the number of the horses, cattle, sheep and pigs they brought with them. Thus they did not require any help from the Muscovite authorities beyond permission to settle. It is clear that these settlers, who in a short time turned the Wild Steppe into a flourishing wealthy country, were very welcome to the Muscovite government. In spite of Muscovite centralizing tendencies and practice they left the new settlers their Cossack organization and tolerated a wide measure of local self-government.

Parallel to this colonization by the masses, there was also a very important monastic colonization. We know of similar colonizations by monks in the ancient Kievan State and it is also known in Western Europe. In Slobidska Ukraine the monastic colonization represented the vanguard of settlement. In the year 1624 we

have the first mention of the Svyatohorsky (Holy Mount) monastery that afterwards became very famous. Quite a number of monasteries grew up in the Slobidska Ukraine. The monks settled the peasants who were dependent on their monastery, started agriculture and founded schools. These newly founded monasteries became centres of culture.

151. Their Social and Economic Conditions.

Thus in the course of a few decades, across the Muscovite frontier of the Ukraine of the Hetmans, a new Ukrainian territory was growing up with the same Cossack military organization which the colonists had in their native country. Slobidska Ukraine consisted of five Cossack Regiments, Ostrohozsk, Kharkov, Sumy, Okthyrka and Izum. Each Regiment formed a special territory, a province of the same name, subdivided into districts or hundreds. At the head of each Regiment was the Colonel with his staff of Cossack Officers. Following a different practice to that prevailing in the Ukraine of the Hetmans, the Colonels were here elected for life. The staff of the Cossack Regiment consisted of the Regimental Commander (head of the artillery, fortifications, etc.), Captain and standard bearer, the Colonel's aides-de-camp and two secretaries. The staff of the Hundred consisted of similar Officers. The head of the Hundred (Sotnyk or Centurian) was elected by the Cossack Officers of his Regiment but departing from the custom of the mother country, he himself selected his own staff. A Colonel enjoyed very great power: he was head of the administration of the territory on which his Regiment was settled and chief judge; he led his Regiment in war time and distributed to newcomers free lands belonging to the Regiment. He had the insignia of his dignity, a mace, a standard and a seal. He published manifestos in his own name which in form and style were not unlike the Hetman's "Universal". The post of Colonel became hereditary in Slobidska Ukraine, which was also different from the mother country. The reasons for this were

in the special conditions of the Cossack's settlement. Colonels were mostly leaders of groups of colonists and enjoyed a greater authority with the Cossacks within the Regiment, being also their representatives before the Muscovite voevods. This authority, in the course of time, became transferred to their descendents and in practice it became usual to have Colonels of the same family.

Although the Muscovite government gave the Cossack colonists complete internal self-government within the limits of a Regiment, they did not tolerate the union of the five Regiments under the leadership of one person chosen from among Cossacks themselves. The Slobidska Cossacks did not have a Hetman as in the mother country. Each individual Regiment was dependent directly on the Muscovite voevod who had his residence in Bilhorod and who also confirmed the election of Colonels. The post of the voevod of Bilhorod was considered one of the most important in the Muscovian administration and only great boyars and titled princes were nominated.

The Muscovite government deliberately refused to allow the separate Cossack Regiments to unite under the power of a Ukrainian and dealt with each Regiment separately so as to prevent any feeling of separate territorial or national unity appearing among them. Each Regiment had its own constitution based on a separate charter from the Muscovite Tsar by which the Cossack military organization and the self-government by Regiments was granted. Cossacks were also freed from taxation and had the right of free trade and free distillation of spirits. The Rolls extending over several years of Registered Cossacks bound to active military service have come down to us. In the year 1700 there were 3,500 Cossacks on the Rolls, in the year 1732 there were 4,200. In case of a campaign the Slobidska Cossacks were obliged to put in the field 22,000 men, but altogether they numbered 86,000 men.

But peasants and burgesses, as well as Cossacks came out and settled in Slobidska Ukraine, bringing with them

the social distinctions of the mother country. Reports of Muscovite voevods about the newcomers enumerate different classes, Cossacks, peasants, burgesses, and give their respective numbers. The town population was mostly merchants and artisans though also agriculturists. They brought with them their guild organizations and administered justice according to Magdeburg Law. The artisans' guilds were closely connected with religious Brotherhoods and had a charitable purpose. In Kharkov in 1685 there were, for example, five different artisans' guilds.

The peasants came into Slobidska Ukraine at the same time as the Cossacks. They settled as freemen and had to pay certain taxes for the land to the Muscovite treasury. Most of them, however, settled on lands belonging to Cossack Officers and avoided taking land independently, because it entailed military duties. Cossack military service was very hard and peasants who emigrated in search of peace were unwilling to exchange the plough for the sword.

152. Landownership.

The ownership of land in Slobidska Ukraine, as in the rest of Ukraine was the basis of all economic life. Here there were unlimited areas of excellent arable land. It belonged theoretically to the Tsar. In giving a grant to a Cossack Regiment the Tsar never indicated boundaries: the land was never measured and new settlers were entitled to appropriate as much as they could till. It became their private property. The subdivision within the Regiment was regulated in such a way that every new settler received as much arable land as he could till and also tracts of forest and meadow. Later, the settlers obtained charters from the Muscovite authorities or from the Tsar securing to them the possession of this land.

There was, however, still so much free land that even after the settlement of colonists great empty areas remained as a Cossack land fund at the disposal of the

Colonels and Cossack Officers. These having ample means, servants and cattle, occupied greater areas of land, and settled peasants on them on condition of securing their labor. Thus great landed properties in Slobidska Ukraine immediately came into existence and the peasant labor, which at first was only conditional, later led to the development of serfdom. Tsar Peter made great use of grants of free lands here not only to those Cossack Officers who remained on his side in the Swedish war, but also to Russians. Thus in Slobidska Ukraine already at the beginning of the Seventeenth century the great landed properties were not exclusively in Ukrainian hands.

What was then the position of the peasants and their duties towards their landlords? At the outset, in the second half of the Seventeenth century, these duties were not heavy: the peasants, in return for the use of land, helped to plough the lands of the landlord and to gather his harvest. Thus their duties were seasonal only. But as time advanced the duties increased. Muscovite landowners brought their serfs from Muscovy and settled them on lands granted to them by the Tsar. Muscovite serfdom was very advanced and the serfs' duties very heavy. This could not but influence the position of the Ukrainian peasants and the tendency was for them to become enslaved to the nobles. But generally speaking, serfdom in Slobidska Ukraine was never very hard, even if compared with that in the Ukraine of the Hetmans, and far easier than in Russia. The fertility of the land, of course, had its influence: there was no need of intensified cultivation since the ordinary methods did not require great effort. Thus the peasants' duties in Slobidska Ukraine were only slowly evolving towards serfdom in a severe form, such as prevailed in Muscovy, and which was also rapidly developing in the Ukraine of the Hetmans.

153. Military Service.

The Cossacks of the Slobidska Ukraine besides per-

forming the permanent and very hard border service against the Tatars, took part in a great number of campaigns outside their territory. The Muscovite government, for instance, sent them to fight against Hetman Vyhovsky in 1659, against Brukhovetsky and against Orlik in 1711. They took part in campaigns against Chihirin in 1677-1678. During Tsar Peter's Azov campaign they were all mobilized. They had to protect the Muscovite frontier against the Swedes during Charles XII stay in Ukraine. They took part in the war against Persia in 1724, in the Polish campaign of 1733 and in the Turkish war of Munnich 1736-1739. They took part in the war for the Austrian succession and finally in the Seven Years War 1756-1762. Their military activity, as we see, was very intensive and their military qualities were very much appreciated by the Russian government.

But the Russian government demanded from them not only military service on the border and in numerous wars and campaigns, but also other duties that were harder for them than military service. Thus in 1697 Tsar Peter sent them to build the fortress of Kizikermen on the Lower Dnieper and in 1719 they were set the terrible task of digging the canals in North Russia. From every seven homesteads one Cossack had to go. The mortality among them during the canal digging was fearful. In 1728 they were sent to build a fortress on the Persian frontier. In the thirties of the Eighteenth century they took part in building the fortification line against the Tatars. From every ten homesteads one Cossack and one cart with a team of oxen was sent, and in addition every fifty men had to provide one plough with a team of oxen. They had also to provide food for themselves and fodder for their cattle. In the Turkish war of Munnich the Slobidska Cossacks had to furnish 12,000 carts with oxen and a part of the Russian army was quartered on them. These duties were far heavier than military service which was their constant additional burden. These duties, in fact, exhausted them and destroyed their prosperity.

Not the Cossacks only but also the urban population of Slobidska Ukraine was militarized to a great extent. The burgesses had to keep in order the fortifications of their towns; they had to provide the army with tar, hemp, carts, wheels, collars for horses, saddles and such like and to furnish carts and horses for the transport of food and munitions. The artisans among them, smiths, tailors and cobblers were pressed into service, each in his capacity for the army. Thus most of the population of Slobidska Ukraine was enrolled in military service which was natural enough considering the frontier character of the country and the permanent menace of the Tatars.

In spite of constant threats of war and the burden of campaigns, the country was rich: the fertility of the land, its excellent, healthy and mild climate and its natural wealth and abundance made agriculture very flourishing. Besides agriculture and cattle breeding, the country was rich in orchards, vineyards, tobacco plantations, cultivation of silkworm, beekeeping, brewing and flour mills. Different crafts also flourished. The tanners of Slobidska Ukraine supplied products not only for their own region but for other Ukrainian territories, even for the Right Bank of the Dnieper. Weaving and especially carpet weaving was also wide spread. Trade in the country was very active. Slobidska Ukraine was famous for the fair where trading transactions were concentrated. The chief fair took place in Kharkov four times a year, and in Sumy there were three fairs during the year. Foreign merchants came here, especially from Silesia, Danzig, Leipzig, Crimea, Muscovy and Galicia. The foreign goods imported were mostly wrought metal goods, textiles and household goods.

Slobidska Ukraine had almost no political history, no strifes nor political troubles with the exception of the campaigns outside the country itself and the Tatar inroads. These were a real scourge and caused heavy losses to the country. Especially terrible devastation took place in the last decades of the Seventeenth century when

thousands upon thousands of the population were carried off into slavery and hundred of villages burnt to the ground by the half-savage nomads. Small inroads were an everyday event and continued as late as the end of the Eighteenth century until the conquest of Crimea. These sorts of danger kept the population, especially on the border, constantly on the alert and caused them great strain. The country was protected from unexpected attacks by a line of forts built along the frontier with outposts or wooden watch towers advancing far into the steppe. The construction and upkeep of these fortifications entailed much work and expense. But in spite of all efforts and constant vigilance the nomads often succeeded in eluding the watch and slipping across the fortified line.

Until the end of the Seventeenth century the Muscovite government did not interfere with the autonomy of the Slobidska Cossacks. They were well content to have secured a valuable population for this empty and up to now useless or even dangerous territory. Tsar Peter, as we have seen, drained the resources and wealth of the population in Slobidska Ukraine as much as possible, but this was in keeping with Peter's usual methods. It was his way to extract the maximum effort from all his provinces, and more especially the Ukraine.

154. Russian Reforms in the Eighteenth Century.

It was not until the reign of Empress Anna that changes began to be introduced which ultimately led to the abolition of local autonomy. A census of the population undertaken in 1732 revealed the hard economic state of the population overburdened with duties during Tsar Peter's reign. In order to improve the welfare of the Slobidska Cossacks, a Commission was nominated by Empress Anna with Prince Shakovsky, president of the "Little Russian Board", at the head. He transferred his residence to the town of Sumy to preside over the Commission which was composed of Russians only. The reforms proposed by the Commission consisted chiefly

in cancelling the right of Cossack Officers to distribute free lands; those, however, who had already received land were entitled to keep them. The number of Cossacks who had to do active military service in peace time was settled at 4,500 men; the rest had to pay a tax for being exempt. Several minor curtailments of Cossack privileges were made. The five Slobidska Regiments were put under the power of one man, Colonel Lessevitsky, a protege of Prince Shakovsky.

The reforms of the Commission were, of course, very unpopular and evidently made no improvement in the position of the population. Empress Elizabeth received a delegation from the Slobidska Cossacks on her coronation, accepted their petition and cancelled those short-lived reforms. Slobidska Cossacks received back their rights and privileges. The Rolls of active service were raised to 7,500 men. But at the same time four Russian regiments were quartered on Slobidska Ukraine. Very soon, however, new restrictions were imposed. Slobidska Cossacks were forbidden not only to settle in the Ukraine of the Hetmans, but to change from one regiment to another, thus being made practically prisoners on their estates. Parallel to Cossack Regiments, Hussar regiments were created from among volunteers of the local population and were openly preferred to the Cossacks. The accession of Catherine II to the throne also brought fundamental changes here. As in the Ukraine of the Hetmans, the reforms were preceded by an investigation into the so-called mismanagement of the Cossack Officers; and in order to "protect the population against them" reforms were decided upon. According to the new plan carried out in 1765 the Cossack organization was entirely abolished. Five Hussar regiments enrolled from volunteers took the place of the former five Cossack regiments. The Cossack population remained personally free and had to pay taxes instead of the former military service. The peasants were attached to the land and given into the power of the landlords. Cossack Officers were made equal in rank with the Russian army

and obtained the rights and privileges of the Russian nobles.

During the elections of the Legislative Commission of 1767 the discontent of the population with the reforms found vent in several instructions the electors gave to their delegates. The Russian administration interfered with the elections and as in the Ukraine of the Hetmans, arrested and imprisoned electors and their delegates, showing a complete misapprehension, ignorance, or contempt, of free elections. Perusing the instructions brought by the delegation of Slobidska Ukraine to the short-lived Legislative Commission in Moscow, we can see that the Cossacks especially regretted the abolition of the old regime and of their self-government. The Cossack Officers, now Russian nobles, mostly desired the introduction of complete serfdom. Their desire for a University is an exception among their purely material and frankly selfish wishes.

155. Cultural Conditions.

Though the population of the Slobidska Ukraine had neither the political experience nor the historic traditions which distinguished the Ukraine of the Hetmans, their attachment to national culture and to the Ukrainian language and their love for and understanding of the necessity of education were very evident. These aspects of patriotism played an important part at the beginning of the Ukrainian national revival early in the Nineteenth century to which the Slobidska Ukraine contributed in considerable measure.

With regard to the culture of the Slobidska Ukraine, there is nothing astonishing in the fact that it was identical with that of the Ukraine of the Hetmans. The two territories were intimately connected and lived a common cultural life, the political frontier that separated them being hardly noticed. Sons of Cossack Officers and even of Common Cossacks from Slobidska Ukraine went to schools in the Ukraine of the Hetmans, especially to the Kievan Academy. Books printed in Kiev, Novgorod-

Sieversk and Chernigov, even in Volynia and Galicia, were widely spread among the population of the Slobidska Ukraine. At the beginning of the Eighteenth century an extension College of the Kievan Academy was founded first in Bilhorod and later transferred to Kharkov. Former pupils of the Kievan Academy taught in this College which itself was arranged according to the plan of the Peter Mohyla Academy. Elementary schools were as numerous as in the Ukraine of the Hetmans, every village having one or several schools. The type of the "itinerant teacher" (mandrovany diak) was also very usual here. The activity of the philosopher Skovoroda (1732-1794), who belonged equally to the Ukraine of the Hetmans and to the Slobidska Ukraine, might serve as an example of the unity of cultural life and interests. The same is true of the arts, especially architecture and painting. Ukrainian baroque in church building was very common here and several churches in Kharkov, Ohktyrka and Boromlia, are perfect examples of that style. The influence of Western artists in painting also was much felt: in a very secluded village church in the Slobidska Ukraine very good copies of Murillo were recently found. The houses and interiors of Cossack Officers here show the same taste; the same sample of furniture and household objects are to be met with; while the presence of objects of foreign industry speak also of lively economic and artistic relations with Western Europe. Nowhere, perhaps, did the profound unity of national life manifest itself more than in the sphere of folklore, popular songs, fairy tales, legends, traditions, customs and beliefs, being fully developed in the Slobidska Ukraine and preserved even to the present day. The first description of a popular Ukrainian wedding with all the ritual songs, usages and ceremonies belonging to it was noted down in the Slobidska Ukraine and published in 1777, thus initiating the study of Ukrainian folklore. Nowhere in the Ukraine are the "bandurists" or "kobzars", blind troubadours who sing epics and religious and popular songs to the accompaniment of the

"banbura" or "kobza", to be met with to this day in such numbers as in the Slobidska Ukraine. This wealth of popular oral tradition served as a source of material to the founder of modern Ukrainian prose fiction of the Romantic period, Gregory Kvitka, native of Kharkov. Though not enriching Ukrainian political history to any important extent, the Slobidska Ukraine contributed valuable elements to the common treasury of Ukrainian national culture.

CHAPTER XXIV

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(156) Zaporogian Cossacks After Their Return in 1734. (157) Their Political Constitution and Social Structure. (158) Economic Position. (159) Colonization of Zaporogian Territory by Serbs. (160) Destruction of the Zaporogian Sich. (161) Emigration of Zaporogian Cossacks into Turkey. (162) Their Settlement on the Danube. (163) Return to Russia. (164) Cossack Army of Azov. (165) Cossacks of the Chornomore (Black Sea) or Kuban Cossacks.

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156. Zaporogian Cossacks After Their Return in 1734.

Almost at the same time when the Ukraine of the Hetmans and the Slobidska Ukraine lost their autonomy, a third historical Ukrainian territory ceased to exist as an independent unit and entered into the composition of the Russian Empire. This was the Zaporogian Sich and the territory of the Zaporogian Cossacks. The Zaporogian Sich was destroyed by the Russian army in 1775, the Zaporogian Cossacks were dispersed and their territory became the scene of a new colonization carried out by the Russian government on altogether different principles.

The history of the Zaporogian Cossacks in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth century was intimately connected with the history of the Ukraine of the Hetmans and at certain periods it was identical. In the preceding chapters was indicated the part the Zaporogian Cossacks played in political history and their influence on social relations in the Ukraine. It is especially on the last period of the history of the Zaporogian Sich that we would like to dwell now, after their return in 1734 under the Russian protectorate, this period being the most interesting of the whole history of the Zaporogian Cossacks. It was then that the Zaporogian military Brotherhood showed a tendency to transform itself into an almost independent political organism and to create a sound economic basis for its existence. The Zaporogian Cossacks underwent at

this time a rapid evolution from being a half-monastic, half-military Brotherhood, unique of its kind, exploiting the natural wealth of their territory by hunting and fishing, into a regular political community with a settled agricultural population. The Zaporogian Cossacks then became a true democratic republic carrying, however, in itself the seeds of a class differentiation which would inevitably develop in the normal future of its economic life. But the political constitution of the Zaporogian Cossacks and their social structure and the trend of their development were opposed to the whole autocratic and centralist constitution of the Russian Empire and to the general trend in its development. The Zaporogian Brotherhood was doomed to fall, as did the autonomy of the Ukraine of the Hetmans and that of the Slobidska Ukraine.

The Zaporogian Cossacks returned under the Russian protectorate in 1734, retaining in their possession the vast territory which the Turks formally ceded to Russia under the peace treaty of 1740. Actually this territory now, as before, was dominated by the Zaporogians. It comprised the whole extent of the province of Katernioslav and parts of those of Kherson, Taurida and Kharkov. This vast territory was the property of a comparatively small community of not more than 20,000 men. The circumstances were now very different from those at the beginning of the Eighteenth century under Hetman Mazepa. At that time the Zaporogian Brotherhood lived on the borders of the populated territories and the adjoining steppe was "Wild Steppe" in the true meaning of the word. The Zaporogian Cossacks were dependent on food supplies from the Ukraine. Now a settled population had advanced quite close to the Zaporogian territory, the Ukraine of the Right Bank, the Ukraine of the Hetmans, and the Slobidska Ukraine, surrounding the Zaporogian lands on the North, Northwest and Northeast. This population already felt an impulse to continue colonizing and the Zaporogian territory attracted them. The Russian government was also

desirous of building a continuous line of fortifications against the Tatars, and cherished a plan of utilizing the Zaporogian lands and the Cossacks themselves in this scheme. The Zaporogian Cossacks well understood the situation and began to colonize their territory themselves so as not to let others settle on it. Actually, in a few decades, their lands began to have a different aspect. Instead of the "Wild Steppe" it was rapidly being transformed into a civilized country with a settled agricultural population consisting of free peasants.

157. Their Political Constitution and Social Structure.

The relations of the Zaporogian Cossacks with the Russian government were settled by the Treaty concluded in Lubni in 1734 according to which Zaporogians recognized the Russian Empress as their sovereign, received back their former territory and secured the right to live according to their old traditions; in war-time they were to serve under the command of the Head of the Russian army stationed in the Ukraine. In 1750 they were put under the military leadership of Hetman Rozumovsky. In their internal affairs the Zaporogian Cossacks were completely autonomous and neither the Russian authorities nor the Hetman interfered with them in the Sich. The leader of the Zaporogian Cossacks, "Koshovyi Otaman" (Head of the Kosh or camp), was elected on the first of January for a year. In the last period there was a tendency to re-elect the same man in successive years, or after an interval, the last "Koshovyi Otaman", Petro Kalnishevsky being re-elected ten years in succession. The Otaman enjoyed unlimited power. He was military leader as well as Head of the administration. He also was the chief judge and represented the Zaporogian Cossacks before the Russian government and the Hetman. He carried on negotiations with representatives of neighboring powers as, for example, with the Crimean Khan. The Otaman had special honors, and a staff of officers who helped him to carry out his functions and executed his orders and commissions. In war time he

held dictatorial authority, having the power of life and death over every Cossack. At the expiration of his term every former Otaman entered the honorary category of "elders" who, having formerly held high posts in the Zaporogian Army, constituted a sort of a Council of Seniors of the Zaporogian Brotherhood. The Staff of the Otaman consisted of military judges, a treasurer, a secretary who was head of the military chancellery, and camp commander who carried out the duties of police officers in the Sich and also performed various administrative functions. All these officers were also elected annually. Besides these chief staff officers there were also several other officers with special military or administrative duties. The Zaporogian Officers received comparatively high rates of pay from the Russian government. They also received an income in money and kind from the treasury of the Zaporogian Army. Towards the end of the existence of the Zaporogian Brotherhood, we see considerable property concentrated in the hands of their officers, chiefly consisting of horses and cattle. Though theoretically the supreme power belonged to the whole Zaporogian Brotherhood who expressed their will through the General Assembly or Rada, towards the middle of the Eighteenth century the power actually was in the hands of the Officers, among whom were many gifted and energetic leaders.

The Zaporogian camp, the Sich, was divided into thirty-eight "kurini" or houses based probably on the territorial principle, as certain names seem to indicate, such as "kurin" of Pereyaslav, of Poltava, of the Don, of Kaniv and so on. Every "kurin" represented a military community who held everything in common, board and lodging. At the head of the "kurin" stood a local otaman or leader who held considerable power, similar on a small scale to that exercised by the Koshovyi otaman. Each "kurin" in the camp possessed its own house where all the members of the "kurin" lived. The number of Cossacks belonging to a "kurin" varied, amounting sometimes to several hundred men, but they were seldom all

present in the Sich, considerable numbers of them being absent as guards on the frontier and in the fortresses, others being employed in fishing expeditions.

158. Economic Position.

The whole Zaporogian territory was divided into eight districts called "palanka", being mostly named after the chief tributaries of the Dnieper below the rapids such as, Samara, Kodak, Ingul, Buhogard, Orel, Protovchanska, Kalmius and Prohnoinska. Each "palanka" (district) had its own military and administrative centre where the military officer as chief of the "palanka" lived. The land belonged to the Zaporogian Army as the supreme landlord and was let out to different people as were also the fishing, hunting and grazing grounds. Every year the distribution of lands and rivers took place among the various "kurin" (houses). Special allotments of fishing, hunting and grazing grounds were made to the Zaporogian Officers, and numerous tenants, mostly peasants.

As we have already related, the Zaporogian Cossacks, soon after their return under Russian protectorate in 1734, started colonization of their vast territories. Many Zaporogians left the Brotherhood (which was restricted to unmarried men), married, founded families and settled down on separate farms, or in established villages. Some of the older unmarried Cossacks remained members of the Brotherhood, built farms and settled down on them. Both banks of the river Samara, a tributary on the left side of the Dnieper below the rapids, were strewn with such farms where fruit growing and beekeeping especially flourished. But far more important in number were the peasant colonists who came from all parts of the Ukraine. Legal emigration from Ukrainian territories, whether under Polish or Muscovite domination, being impossible, the peasants were accustomed simply to flee from their native villages. Here, on the free Zaporogian territory they always found a hospitable welcome, for no one persecuted or exacted work from them, while taxes

and duties were very light. The colonists became "subjects of the Zaporogian Cossack Army" and paid to the treasury a small tax. The harder the serf-duties became in the surrounding countries, the greater was the stream of refugees who sought better luck on the free Zaporogian lands and new settlements grew up one after another. We know about the number of the population of the Zaporogian territories first from the Rolls of the Zaporogian Cossacks who took the oath of allegiance in 1762 to the new Empress, Catherine II. The Cossacks then numbered about twenty thousand. It is impossible to tell exactly the number of the peasants who settled on the Zaporogian territory as only for certain ("palanka") districts more or less reliable statistics have been preserved. But it is possible to estimate approximately the number of the peasant population as above 150,000, the total population being about 170,000.

Formerly the view prevailed in historical literature that the Zaporogian Cossacks lived according to severe communal principles and possessed no private property with the exception of clothes and arms. This view is correct about the Zaporogian Sich of the Sixteenth century and perhaps even the early Seventeenth century. But in the period with which we are here concerned the right of private property openly existed. Leaving aside the private farms where farming was certainly carried on individually, many Cossacks possessed considerable wealth in money and especially in horses and cattle. The legacies of several Cossacks have come down to us, from which documents we can see that the legislators disposed of considerable capital. Especially wealthy were their Officers. The last Koshovyi Otaman, Petro Kalnishevsky, for example, erected with his private means four churches in different places in the Ukraine. From the register of his property confiscated after the destruction of the Sich by the Russian government, it is to be seen that he possessed 50,000 roubles in cash, several hundred gold ducats, besides 639 horses, over 1,000 head of cattle and 14,000 sheep. The Zaporogian Secretary, Hloba,

was in possession of about 30,000 roubles in cash, 336 horses, 889 head of cattle and over 12,000 sheep and goats. Similarly other Zaporogian Officers and also common Cossacks possessed many horses, cattle, clothing, arms and other movables. From the same document we see that Zaporogian Officers owned well-managed farms with live stock. Among the possessions of the Zaporogian Officers were found objects of daily use such as silver plate, china, etc., showing that they had habits of culture and even of refinement.

Above all other forms of farming, cattle breeding was best adapted to the natural conditions of life and was much practised. Hunting and fishing were the ancient and traditional occupations in the Zaporogian Sich. The Zaporogians carried on a regular trade with all the neighboring countries, Ukraine of the Hetmans, Russia, Crimea, Turkey, Poland and others. They exported for sale: furs, hides, wool, cattle, horses, butter, cheese, dried fish and salt, oil and wheat. They imported foreign wines, spices, brandy, and other spirits, olive oil, incense, powder, arms, cloth, cotton and silk textiles, morocco leather and other goods. Especially important was the salt trade; salt being brought from the Crimea and exported to neighboring countries. According to a document of 1767, 5,000 men lived exclusively from the salt trade. The Ukraine of the Right Bank imported from Zaporogian territories chiefly bacon, beeswax, dried and salt fish, furs, salt, cheese, cattle and horses. Customs duties were an important item of the income of the Zaporogian treasury: on the ferry of Perevolochna in 1668 alone the custom duties taken by the Zaporogian treasury amounted to 12,000 roubles. The yearly balance of trade of the Zaporogians in the Eighteenth century is estimated by historians at 800 to 835 thousand roubles. Exports were less than imports. In order to facilitate the operations of foreign traders they were given advances of capital from the Zaporogian treasury.

The well-known warlike spirit of the Zaporogian Cossacks was closely connected with their piety. Considering

themselves special defenders of Christianity against the Mohammedan world, Zaporogians profoundly venerated the Orthodox religion. The Zaporogian Sich was embellished with a beautiful church dedicated to the Virgin Mary and richly decorated with silver, gold and precious stones. In every village on Zaporogian territory there was a church. Zaporogians had their special monastery on the river Samara and the ancient Mezhyhorski monastery near Kiev also belonged to the Zaporogian Sich, and sent priests to the church in the Sich. In the Sich there was also a school for boys with about 150 pupils, mostly relatives of Cossacks from the Ukraine. Besides the elementary teaching of the time, pupils were also taught military accomplishments "to use well the sword and to stick like a burr on horseback".

The Russian government in receiving the Zaporogian Cossacks back in 1734 under their protectorate, had promised to respect all ancient rights and traditions among them and not encroach on the territory of the "Liberties of the Zaporogian Army", but it was not long before they began to disregard this promise. Above all, these encroachments on their territory filled the last decades of the existence of the Zaporogian Sich with constant troubles and worries. At the end of the Seventeenth century the Muscovite government had much annoyed the Zaporogians by constantly wishing to build on their territory fortifications for their garrisons. After the return in 1734 a Russian fort was built quite close to the Sich under the pretext of defence against the Tatars. The Zaporogians were compelled to put up with this. In the middle of the Eighteenth century the Russian government started building new lines of fortifications on the southwestern border of the Zaporogian territory along the rivers Boh and Syniukha (Blue river). Thus in the very heart of the Zaporogian territory a line of Russian fortifications came into existence with a permanent garrison. This led to all sorts of misunderstandings and conflicts. In the meantime, other misunderstandings arose with the Don Cossacks on the eastern border. The Rus-

sian government sided with the Don Cossacks and ordered the Zaporogians to abandon their settlement on the northern shores of the Azov Sea and retreat more to the north.

159. Colonization of Zaporogian Territory by Serbs.

Still more bitter conflicts took place in connection with the Serbian colonization which the Russian government undertook in 1751. At that time Serbs of the southern provinces of Austria-Hungaria began to emigrate to Russia, coming not only in considerable numbers but organized in military detachments with leaders at their head. The Russian government at first assigned to them lands along the river Syniukha, on the northwestern border of the Zaporogian territory. A fortress of St. Elizabeth was built here, later transformed into the present town of Elizabethgrad, which became the centre of the new province called New Serbia. This province was entirely cut out of the territory of the Zaporogians without any preliminary understanding with its owners. A few years later a new province populated by Serbian emigrants, the so-called Slaviano-Serbski, was founded, this time on the eastern border of the Zaporogian territory with the town Bakhmut as its centre. All Serbs received great allotments of land, were exempted from all taxation and duty, and moreover, received large subsidies. The Serbs proved to be very turbulent and unpleasant neighbors. Between them and the Zaporogian Cossacks there were constant misunderstandings leading to open armed conflicts. These conflicts very much displeased the Russian government who invariably blamed the Zaporogians.

Complaints to the Russian government against the Zaporogians also came from another quarter: the Polish government accused them of supporting the "Haidamaky" movement. It is sufficient to state here that the official Zaporogian Sich in the person of the Zaporogian Officers never supported the Haidamaky; but on the contrary seized and punished them whenever they had an oppor-

tunity of doing so. But the sympathies of the Cossacks were certainly on the side of the Haidamaky, whom they regarded as champions of the Ukrainian people against the social, national and religious oppression of the Polish government and Polish landlords. Individual Zaporogians not only gave Haidamaky all the support they could, but even joined their ranks.

160. Destruction of the Zaporogian Sich.

If we take into consideration the centralizing plans of Catherine II and her policy of reducing all autonomous territories within the empire to the status of ordinary provinces, we may conclude that with her accession to the Russian throne the doom of the Zaporogian Brotherhood was sealed. The very existence of a truly democratic Cossack Commonwealth with a free population taking direct part in the government of their State was too great a contrast to Russian absolutism, built on a centralistic bureaucratic system of government involving the enslavement of the masses of the peasant population to the noble landowners. The two worlds were radically opposed and irreconcilable. The destruction of the Zaporogian Brotherhood was, however, temporarily postponed on account of the Turkish war of 1768-74, when the Zaporogian Cossacks were very necessary to the Russian government as a military power.

The Zaporogians, indeed, took an active part in this war and rendered the Russian government very great services. They were employed against the Turks on land and on sea. In the summer of 1770 they destroyed the whole Turkish fleet at the mouth of the Danube. They played a very important part in the struggle for the fortress of Ochakov. In 1771 the Zaporogians took and destroyed Kafa (present Theodosia) where the chief slave market of the Tatars was held. In 1773-74 the Zaporogians played an important part in the operations on the Danube. But all their military exploits could not avert the doom that awaited them. The Russian government was only waiting for the end of the war in order

to put an end to the Zaporogian Brotherhood. In the spring of 1775, soon after peace had been concluded with the Turks in Kuchuk Kainardji, Russian troops returning home were ordered to concentrate about the fortress of St. Elizabeth. The main army under the General Tekely, 66,000 men strong with 50 guns, started unexpectedly for the Zaporogian Sich while a corps of 20,000, led by Prince Prozorovsky, crossed the Dnieper and occupied the "palanky" (districts) on the Left Bank of the Dnieper.

The Zaporogians had already for sometime felt that black clouds were gathering above their heads. In order to prevent the storm breaking Zaporogian Officers, led by the very able Otaman, Peter Kalnishevsky, adopted an ultra-loyal policy towards the Russian government. They went a long way to meet all their wishes, and tried to avoid misunderstanding. Almost every year the Zaporogians sent delegations to St. Petersburg trying to win over Catherine II and to avert the impending doom. But it was of no avail. Even the fact that the Zaporogians became fashionable at Court and in society, did not alter the situation. The Zaporogian Cossacks indeed became the mode in the literature of the time. Even abroad in foreign papers, articles were written about them and their original constitution; they were compared to the Maltese Order and admired for their war-like spirit and so on. A number of personages in the public eye entered the Zaporogian Brotherhood as nominal members, considering it an honor to belong to the order of Ukrainian Knights. Among these members we find on one hand Potemkin, Catherine's powerful favorite, and on the other the famous German mathematician, Euler. But all this could not save the Zaporogians: Catherine looked on them with strong personal antipathy.

On the 4th of June, 1775, Tekely appeared taking the Zaporogians by surprise and surrounded the Sich with artillery, ready to start the bombardment of the Zaporogian camp. The Cossacks were quite unprepared and a great tumult arose in the Sich. Some were ready to

offer resistance which, of course, would have been quite inadequate. The prior of the Zaporogian church succeeded in persuading them not to cause unnecessary bloodshed. Some of the Zaporogians surrendered voluntarily, the rest escaped in boats down the Dnieper and sought shelter with the Turks at the mouth of the Danube. Tekely ordered the destruction of buildings of the Sich and the fortifications, and arrested the Zaporogian Officers. Catherine dealt with them with heartless and unnecessary cruelty; the Koshoyi Otaman, Kalnishevsky, was imprisoned in the solitary monastery on the isles of Solovetsky in the White Sea off Archangel, where he died, after having lingered for several years within the walls of the monastic prison, cut off from the world. The Chief Zaporogian Judge, Holovaty, and the secretary, Hloba, were exiled to Tobolsk in Siberia. The Zaporogian Sich was abolished. On the 3rd of August, 1775, Catherine II published a manifesto giving her motives for the destruction of the Zaporogian Sich, accusing the Cossacks of a hostile attitude towards a civilized agricultural life, and of lawlessness and rebellion. All these motives were far removed from truth and merely proved that Catherine felt it necessary to justify herself in some way in the eyes of the public.

The Zaporogian Cossacks who had surrendered to Tekely dispersed and settled in the villages and farms, where they were allowed to join the class of hitherto free peasants. The property of their Officers was confiscated and Zaporogian territory was distributed among Catherine's favorites. Immense landed estates were created, bringing their owners unheard of riches. Prince Viazemski received 200,000 dessiatines (about 500,000 acres); Potemkin received 150,000 dess. (about 375,000 acres); Countess Branitska 21,000 dess. (about 52,000 acres); Count Kamenski, 20,000 dess. (about 50,000 acres) and so on. Every Russian noble could obtain 1,500 dess. (about 3,750 acres) on condition he settled in a given number of years at least thirteen peasant families

on this land. All who received lands were exempt from taxation for ten years.

Most of the lands were only sparsely populated. The peasants who were formerly settled on them had dispersed, fearing the introduction of serfdom. Catherine II, indeed, ordered them all to be turned into serfs, including the former Zaporogian Cossacks. Many newly created landowners brought their serfs from the Ukraine of the Hetmans or the Russian provinces. During nine years, four and a half million dessiatines (about eleven million acres) were thus disposed of. But this exhausted only half of the immense territory taken from the Zaporogians. The Russian government then took to colonizing these lands with foreigners, chiefly Germans.

The fall of the Zaporogian Sich had a great effect on the Ukrainian popular masses. With it fell the last stronghold of freedom, where the hated serfdom was yet unknown, where the principle of elected government still held sway and where the burden of bureaucratic absolutism was not felt. That is why the fall of the Zaporogian Sich was referred to in a great number of folk songs, preserved in popular memory and sung even in quite recent times. Thus the loss of the last stronghold of Cossack freedom was bemoaned by the whole Ukrainian people.

The grief caused by the loss of Cossack liberties was further increased by the fact that serfdom was at once introduced on the former Zaporogian lands, in striking contrast to the regime that had existed under Zaporogian rule. The Zaporogian territory, as we have said, immediately became a country of large private estates and of foreign colonization. This gave to the country a variegated and international character. Having obtained the shores of the Black Sea as a result of the Turkish wars, the Russian government tried hurriedly to consolidate its position and colonize the vast areas which divided these shores from the older provinces of the empire. All the newly annexed lands under the name of New Russia (Novorossia), were given to Catherine's fav-

orite, Potemkin, to be governed. He applied himself assiduously to his task and founded several towns such as Kherson, Nikolaev, Odessa, and Katerinoslav, the latter on the site of an old Zaporogian settlement on the Right Bank of the Dnieper, just above the rapids. All Potemkin's plans had a largeness amounting at times to the fantastic. The Empress gave him unlimited credit on the State Treasury and he also had at his disposal unlimited labor from the army, serfs and hired help. In spite of this, many of his projects led to nothing and enormous sums were uselessly squandered. "The villages of Potemkin", hastily thrown up on the banks of the Dnieper along the course of Catherine II's route to the Crimea, became proverbial. In his hurry to colonize the Zaporogian territories, Potemkin called foreigners in great numbers. After the Serbs, who had settled even during the existence of the Zaporogian Sich, Bulgarians came fleeing from Turkish persecutions; they were followed by Armenians, who founded the town of Grigoriopol on which the Russian government spent great sums.

A more important and considerable colonization was accomplished by Germans. A group of Mennonites of about 230 families arrived from Prussia in 1789. They received large subsidies, were freed from military service and received per family 65 dessiatines (about 160 acres) of the best land in the heart of Zaporogian territory, on the island of Khortitsa and on the Right Bank of the Dnieper. German colonization went on until the present provinces of Katerinoslav, Tauria and Kherson, were covered with a network of German colonies. By 1845 the number of German colonists in Russia had reached about 100,000. Russians, Rumanians, Greeks and Jews were added to this conglomerate, though the local Ukrainian population remained in the majority.

A certain number of the former population remained in the country under the new regime. Peasants, formerly free subjects of the Zaporogian Commonwealth, and Cossacks who remained, were mostly turned into so-called State serfs. Their lot was comparatively better: they

paid taxes and were burdened with some duties but had no other lord over them. Part of the population that lived on the lands granted by Catherine II to private owners became their landlord's serfs. State peasants were the most enviable class and many refugees gradually came from neighboring provinces, even from the parts of Ukraine under Poland where serfdom was hard, to swell their numbers. The Russian authorities were glad to have the population increased and looked tolerantly on these newcomers, registering them among the State peasants. For their part the landlords also received them gladly. Here, where everything was in the early stages of organization, the serf's duties were much lighter than in the old provinces and many peasants were tempted to change their old landlords for new ones, leaving their homes and even their families and fleeing to places where there was comparatively more freedom.

Thus it was that the Russian authorities were compelled to carry out the colonization with great effort and at high costs using an enormous bureaucratic apparatus, inviting foreign colonists and giving them great privileges, whereas only shortly before, the colonization and introduction of agriculture was going on calmly and normally by the autochthonous population, who asked only to be allowed to work freely on their own land without being enslaved.

161. Emigration of Zaporogian Cossacks into Turkey.

The destruction of the Zaporogian Sich on the Dnieper was not yet the end of the Zaporogian Cossacks. About 5,000 of them slipped out of the hands of the Russian army and succeeded in escaping at the very moment when their fortified camp was being pulled down. Partly in boats, and partly by land they arrived in the Turkish town Akerman, in Bessarabia, at the mouth of the river Dniester. From here they sent a deputation to the Sultan, asking for his protection. He gave them the territory at the mouth of the Danube, that is, the vast delta of this river flowing into the Black Sea with numerous and con-

siderable islands (present Dobrudja) and received them under his protectorate. The Zaporogian Cossacks secured their rights of self-government according to their old traditions. Their numbers very soon began to increase as they were followed by those of their comrades who had not escaped at once but managed somehow to do so afterwards. By the next year (1776), the Zaporogian Cossacks at the mouth of the Danube already numbered over 7,000, and their numbers increased every year, the new Sich beyond the Danube becoming the centre of attraction for all who were dissatisfied with the new regime imposed by the Russian authorities on the former Zaporogian territory. Also the more active and enterprising men among the Ukrainian peasants on both banks of the Dnieper, in the Ukraine under Polish or Russian domination, often managed to escape and join the Cossacks on the Danube, as of old when the Zaporogian Sich was beyond the rapids on the Dnieper.

This emigration of the Zaporogian Cossacks much alarmed the Russian government. Catherine II tried to recall them by issuing manifestos to them in 1779 and 1780, inviting them to return. At the same time the Russian government used diplomatic means in order to persuade the Sultan to settle them further from the Russian frontier. The Austrian government on their side invited the Zaporogians, and in consequence of this about 8,000 of them left the Danube in 1785, and settled in the Austrian province of the Banat. Under the Austrian protectorate also they retained their own organization and internal self-government. They, however, found the Austrian authorities too interfering and, leaving Austria 1811-12, rejoined their comrades on the Danube.

162. Their Settlement on the Danube.

The Zaporogians organized their new Sich on the Danube exactly on the model of their former Sich beyond the rapids of the Dnieper. The new Sich was also formed of thirty-eight kurini or houses with the church standing in the middle of the settlement, the whole being en-

trenched and strongly fortified. They had their officers as formerly, having elected them from among the old Cossacks of the Dnieper. According to the old tradition, women were excluded and not allowed to enter the precincts of the Sich. Married Cossacks lived with their families outside the walls. As of old, aged Cossacks retired into monasteries. Formerly there were two Zaporogian monasteries, one on the river Samara, the other the Mezhyhorski monastery near Kiev. Now the Danubian Cossacks had their monastery on Mount Athos, dedicated to the prophet Elijah. In order to increase their numbers the Cossack sent secret agents into the Ukraine to recruit young men.

The Cossacks' position under the protectorate of the Sultan was, however, hard and trying. The Turks often used them in wars with Russia, and the Russian government as we shall presently see, after having destroyed the Zaporogian Sich, very soon started to form new Cossack organizations. Thus the Danubian Cossacks were often compelled to fight against their countrymen. Besides, the Russian authorities constantly carried on propaganda among them, sending their agents into the Danubian Sich to persuade the Cossacks to return to Russia and promising them all sorts of advantages. On the other hand, the Turks often used the Cossacks to put down the revolts of their Christian subjects such as Serbs or Greeks. Taking part in these operations against Christians as well as fighting against their countrymen in the Russian army fell very hard on the Cossacks.

163. Return to Russia.

When, in 1827, relations between Russia and Turkey were strained to such a pitch that both sides were prepared for war, the Russian government increased their propaganda among the Danubian Cossacks to effect their return to Russia, and the Koshovyi Otaman of 1827, Hladky, let himself be persuaded. The Turko-Russian war broke out in 1828 and the Russian army, with Tsar Nicholas I, came to the Danube. Hladky then proposed

that the whole Brotherhood should join the Russians but met with only partial success, a considerable section of the Cossacks refusing to hear of returning to Russia. In the meantime the Sultan ordered them to mobilize and join his forces which were gathering in Silistria against Russia. Hladky was compelled to take his risks and to act. He brought to Silistria part of the Cossacks, mostly from those who wished to remain in Turkey, and declared to the Vizier that he must return to the Sich and fetch the rest. Instead of this, having returned, he took the insignia of the Brotherhood, their flags and treasury and together with the remaining Cossacks went over to the Russians. The Russian army was at that moment trying to cross the Danube. Koshovyi Hladky and his Cossacks, who knew the locality very well, showed them safe fords where the Russian army could quietly cross the river without being noticed by the Turks and Hladky himself even conducted the crossing. This was a very important service and the Tsar rewarded him and all his Cossacks for it.

But the Cossacks who remained in Silistria on the Turkish side fell victims to Turkish vengeance: all those whom Hladky had left in Silistria were thrown into prison; the Sich on the Danube was burned down and those who were found there were mercilessly killed. All the Ukrainian population who lived under the protection of the Cossacks were massacred. After the war Cossack prisoners in Adrianopol were released and allowed to return to the Danube, but only as private simple fishermen. Their descendants are living to this day at the mouth of the Danube in present Dobrudja.

164. Cossack Army of Azov.

The Cossacks who returned to Russia with Hladky were formed into an army, the so-called "Cossack Army of Azov". They received lands for settlement on the northern shores of the Azov Sea. In 1865 this Cossack Army was transferred to the river Kuban and incorporated into the Kuban Cossacks.

Even before the Cossacks who emigrated to the Danube had returned under Russian power, the Russian government renewed the Cossack organizations of the Zaporogian type, though with a very limited self-government. Having destroyed the Zaporogian Sich, the Russian authorities soon understood that their action had been precipitous and ill advised. The struggle with the Turks for the possession of the shores of the Black Sea was far from completed and the southern borders of the Russian Empire required defence. The existing regular army was inadequate, but to support an increased army on the frontier was too costly. On the other hand the existence of the Cossack Sich beyond the Danube necessitated the organization of a counter attraction for the Ukrainian population.

In 1784 a number of former Zaporogians were allowed to start a new Cossack organization under the name of the "Cossack Army of the Boh" and they received lands between the river of that name (Boh) and the Dniester. During the war against the Turks of 1791, this new Cossack formation was used especially at the siege and capture of the Turkish fortress Ochakov. In the same war Danubian Cossacks were fighting on the side of the Turks against the Russian army. Potemkin took great care of this new Cossack army and adopted the quite fantastic title of "The Great Hetman of Boh Cossacks". After his death in 1791, their position became precarious. It was then that the leader of the Boh Cossacks, Colonel Anton Holovaty, solicited from Catherine II and received the territory of the river Kuban, between the Black and the Azov Seas, at the foot of the Caucasus mountains, newly conquered from the Turks. The country was almost unpopulated and required to be defended from warlike Caucasian hillmen. The Cossacks were transferred there and settled around a newly founded town called Katerinodar, on the river Kuban.

After a certain period of unsettlement and even open discontent and conflicts with the Russian authorities, the former Zaporogian Cossacks settled down to a life which

differed much from the old traditions and secular customs of the Zaporogian Brotherhood in the Sich. The Cossacks now lived on individual farms, they were married and had families; their time was divided between peaceful agriculture and military operations against Caucasian hillmen. The villages founded by the Cossacks were called "stanytsi" and in remembrance of old times received the historical names of former "kurini" or the houses in the Sich beyond the rapids on the Dnieper. All the remnants of the former Zaporogian Cossacks were gradually concentrated here by the Russian government, and in addition two regiments of former Registered Cossacks in the Ukraine of the Hetmans disbanded in 1822, were also transferred here. The country was becoming more and more populated. In 1832 several thousand young Ukrainian women were compulsorily brought here from the Ukraine of the Hetmans to marry the bachelors among the Cossacks and so increase the number of families, women being scarce in the Kuban country. Peasant refugees also came in considerable numbers from different parts of the Ukraine. They were allowed to settle freely as agriculturists but were not accorded the rights and privileges that the Cossacks enjoyed.

The former rights of self-government and autonomy of the Zaporogian Cossacks were, however, soon very much curtailed. Instead of an elected leader and a staff of officers, they were put under the orders of Russian generals nominated by the government, the Cossack Council and other remnants of their previous organization now having a purely nominal or ornamental significance.

165. Cossacks of the Chornomore (Black Sea) or Kuban Cossacks.

The chief activity of these Cossacks—they received at first the name of "Chornomorski" (Black Sea) Cossacks—was interrupted fighting against the warlike tribes of Caucasian Hillmen who, after the main conquest of the Caucasus, remained for some time unsubdued.

This warfare demanded different methods and ways from those used by former Zaporogians. The Black Sea Cossacks were compelled to adapt themselves to the new conditions and surroundings of military activity which, together with different geographical and climatic conditions, produced a new and somewhat different type. After the final conquest of the Caucasus, the life of the Cossacks became a peaceful one: they had to perform military service in the Russian army analogous to that of the Cossacks of Muscovite origin such as Don and Ural Cossacks. In 1864 they received the name of Kuban Cossacks instead of former Black Sea Cossacks. Having been settled on very fertile soil and under favorable climatic conditions the Kuban Cossacks became a prosperous and even a wealthy community. They fully preserved the Ukrainian national characteristics: the ethnical type and the language, but separated from the main part of the Ukraine and from the chief Ukrainian centres, they did not play any important part in the Ukrainian national revival of the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries, until the revolution of 1917 and subsequent events.

All these branches of the Ukrainian Cossacks who originated in the Zaporogian Brotherhood are especially interesting to students of Ukrainian history as original manifestations of the Ukrainian national character. They have their roots deep in the Ukrainian people. In the forms of their organization, their ways of life and their methods of meeting life's exigencies, they are true to the Ukrainian type. In them we may see the ideal which Ukrainians had created of social and political life. This ideal of democratic self-government came, as we have seen, into conflict with the Muscovite-Russian State, built on principles quite contrary to those of which the Ukrainian people dreamed and for which they struggled. Muscovite bureaucratic and centralistic absolutism emerged victorious in the struggle. The Ukrainian Cossacks succumbed to the Muscovite-Russian State conception. In part they fell and disappeared in the strife and in part were compelled to adapt themselves to Rus-

sian ideas, enter Russian service and completely transform their traditional organization. Such was the case of the Kuban Cossacks.

The Zaporogian Cossacks and their direct descendants interest us also from another point of view: all these Cossacks whether on the Dnieper, the Danube, or on the Kuban, were pioneers of the Ukrainian colonization which steadily advanced to the shores of the Black Sea. In spite of all hindrances in the form of the foreign artificial colonization, started by the Russian government, Ukrainians advanced in a natural way and occupied the littoral and the areas lying between the Black and the Azov Seas and the old Ukrainian provinces. Finally, all the efforts of the Russian government in the way of artificial colonization merely followed the trail and continued, though not always skilfully and wisely, the work begun by the Zaporogians, the pioneers of Ukrainian colonization. In spite of everything the final result was almost the same: the Ukrainian population advanced close to the shores of the Black and the Azov Seas and surrounded them with a tight wide belt from the mouth of the Danube to the mouth of the Kuban river extending eastwards to the Caucasus Mountain chain.

CHAPTER XXV

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(166) The Ukraine of the Right Bank During the Eighteenth Century. (167) Haidamaky. (168) The Uprising of Kolyivshchyna, 1768. (169) Annexation of Galicia by Austria. (170) Church Union in Galicia and its Consequences. (171) Carpathian Rus.

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166. The Ukraine of the Right Bank During the Eighteenth Century.

Ukrainians of the Left Bank of the Dnieper, though gradually losing their autonomy under the pressure of Russian centralistic policy retained, nevertheless, the cultivated classes in the population who remained the leaders of the national life, and were able to develop and express some part of the national ideal. In 1711-12 the Ukraine of the Right Bank again came under Polish domination, ruined, exhausted and almost depopulated. Fresh colonization from Western Ukrainian territories then began, accompanied by the restoration of pre-revolution social and political conditions, as if Bohdan Khmelnytsky's uprising and subsequent events had never occurred. The Ukrainian population was not reconciled to this restoration, but deprived of its leading class the Cossacks, they were only able to express their enmity by an intermittent series of sporadic uprisings against the Polish authorities and landowners, which went on during the whole of the Eighteenth century, sometimes taking menacing forms. These are known in Ukrainian history as "Haidamaky" uprisings. Popular oral tradition preserved the memory of Haidamaky; it was taken up by the Ukrainian literature of the Romantic period, so that also in the eyes of later Ukrainian generations they were transfigured by a romantic halo into a struggle for social, religious, political and national ideals.

167. Haidamaky.

Like the word "Cossack" in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth century, the word "Haidamaky" in the Eighteenth

century is of Turkish origin. The original meaning of the Tatar word "haida!" is "fly!" It has the same meaning in Ukrainian. Thus the name Haidamaka connotes fleeing, hiding, and suggests a disturbance or a panic. The word only came into use in the Eighteenth century. Ukrainians also gave other names such as "kolia", "opryshky", "leventsi", to those who, discontented with the social order, took up arms to attack it. The causes of these uprisings are the political and social conditions into which the Ukraine of the Right Bank relapsed at the beginning of the Eighteenth century, after the interval of sixty years (1648-1712) which had seen Khmelnytsky's uprising, the unsuccessful attempts of Paliy, Orlik and Mazepa's other unfortunate followers to establish themselves on the Right Bank of the Dnieper.

The Polish government, as we have related, again taking a firm footing in the Ukraine of the Right Bank, started colonizing anew. As soon as the Cossack and Swedish wars were ended and the Ukraine of the Right Bank had been surrendered by Peter I to his protegee the Polish King, Augustus of Saxony, the descendants of the former Polish landowners, dispossessed by Khmelnytsky, returned and claimed their estates.

The great Polish magnates, owners of vast estates, were the first to secure their rights. This was easy for them, holding as they did the supreme power in the Polish State. Some of the old families such as Vishnevet-sky, Konecpolski and Sobieski, having become extinct, their entire possessions descended or were divided among related families. During the Eighteenth century Ukrainian territory on the Right Bank was concentrated in the hands of a few Polish families such as Potocki, Lubomirski, Jablonovski, Czartoryiski, Branicki, Sanguszko, Tyszkiewicz and a few others. Just as before Khmelnytsky's time, the whole political power in Poland was concentrated in the hands of these magnates. Their influence in the government was dominant and the reign of the three last Polish kings contained practically nothing else but the struggle for power of a few great families

among themselves. The Polish "szlachta" or lesser gentry found themselves entirely dependent on them. Only a small number succeeded after their return into the Ukraine at the beginning of the Eighteenth century, in recovering their former possessions. Most of them now received land from the great families as their tenants, or even entered into their service as their stewards, agents and other dependents.

Having once more obtained for themselves vast areas of land, the Polish nobles were again faced with the task of repopulating the country in order to render it productive. In answer to their invitations, promising as of old several free years without any duties, colonists again came from every Ukrainian territory, from Galicia, Volynia, Polissia, even from the Ukraine of the Hetmans, ready to settle down on the vacant lands. Gradually the country again became covered with villages, mostly on the site of the former ruins. Besides Ukrainians, also White Russians and even Poles came. These latter very soon became absorbed into the Ukrainian population, adopting the Ukrainian language and mode of living only, in the case of the Polish peasants, preserving their Roman Catholic faith. The landowners received them all without asking whence they came, receiving those who had fled from their former landlords, even those who presented themselves "with somebody else's wife and somebody else's oxen". During the first free years, as was promised, no one exacted work from them and they were left in peace to start their farms. Even in the first years of serfdom the duties were not heavy. The landlords were too greatly in need of labor and were ready to make all sorts of concessions and to wait patiently until their new serfs had quite settled down and got their farms going.

But gradually those "free years" expired. Most of the land on the great estates was tenanted by the lesser gentry, the szlachta. Serfdom now pressed more closely on the peasants who, in the meantime, had been accustomed to their freedom. The szlachta, now having the peas-

ants directly in their power, began to exact from them more and more work on the land. Moreover, with the return of the Roman Catholic clergy, the former unhappy policy of enforced conversion to Roman Catholicism again came into practice. The popular masses became impatient. They reacted against these encroachments and began to show their discontent. Only now there was no one to organize the popular discontent and direct it into ordered channels. The Cossacks were no more, and those discontented with serfdom were reduced to passive resistance or individual protest. Some again took to flight, going to the Left Bank of the Dnieper, into Moldavia, into Turkey; others were not afraid of becoming outlaws, of organizing gangs or joining existing ones and thus carrying on the struggle and taking vengeance on their oppressors. In the country only newly repopulated, there was no lack of unsettled adventurous elements to keep the robber gangs going. They attacked the houses of the Polish landowners and their agents the Jews, but never touched a peasant. Bearing such distinctions, their unlawful practice took on the character of a social struggle. These outlaws, who gradually became known by the name of "Haidamaky", became very popular with the Ukrainian peasants who began to look on them, if not exactly their defenders, still as the avengers of their wrongs. They were so many Robin Hoods and certainly as popular.

There was another circumstance that played an important part in the development of the Haidamaky movement: this was the vicinity of the Zaporogian Cossacks. The Zaporogian steppes served the Haidamaky as a refuge whither they escaped to lie in hiding from the pursuit of the Polish authorities, rest from their exploits and plan and organize anew. The Zaporogian authorities, it is true, pursued them and if caught also punished them. But the Haidamaky easily found places of safety on Zaporogian territory in forests, glens, caves and other secret hiding places. Sometimes Zaporogians would, secretly of course, enter the ranks of the Haidamaky.

Now and then they organized their gangs, led them, helped them with money, horses, arms and so on. Finally Haidamaky often enjoyed the sympathies of the Orthodox clergy, driven to this pitch of exasperation by the persecutions which the Roman Catholic Church renewed against them. Thus it is easily understood why the Haidamaky though outlaws, became in the eyes of the Ukrainian population defenders of their religion and nationality and avengers of their social wrongs. And indeed, if in peace time the Haidamaky behaved as highwaymen whose violence, however, was always directed exclusively against the Polish landowners and their Polish or Jewish agents, in times of popular uprisings or of any active protest on the part of the popular masses they usually put themselves at their head, organizing and leading the uprising and acting as ready troops for the insurgents.

The Zaporogian Cossacks, after their return in 1734 under Russian protectorate, once more became direct neighbors of the Ukraine of the Right Bank. They brought back with them their traditional hostility against the policy of the Polish landowners and Roman Catholic clergy towards the Ukrainian population. Owing to the support of the Zaporogians, the Haidamaky movement became a sort of well organized continual guerrilla warfare against the Polish nobles and their agents. In addition to the Zaporogians, the Haidamaky found constant support and sympathy on the Left Bank of the Dnieper, in the Ukraine of the Hetmans. Although the population seldom joined their ranks, they constantly helped in every way, affording shelter and providing provisions and arms.

The Polish administration and the landowners were faced with the very difficult problem of how to organize a defence against the Haidamaky's guerrilla tactics which rendered the exploitation of the Ukraine unsafe. The Polish armed forces were quite inadequate. In 1717 the Polish szlachta, refusing credits in the Seim, succeeded in reducing the standing army to a maximum of 24,000.

The size of this force was, moreover, sanctioned by a convention with Russia who was, of course, well pleased with the state of affairs. Poland thus became almost completely disarmed and Russian troops were able, with tolerable impunity, to make armed interventions in Polish home affairs as was the case in 1733 and 1768, or to traverse Polish territory on their way to Turkey (1738) or to Prussia during the Seven Years' War. Whereas one neighbor of Poland, the small State of Prussia, kept an army of 100,000 strong and the other neighbor, Russia, had a standing army of 200,000 men, Poland had actually about 17,000 to 18,000 men. For a considerable State like Poland this was quite an insignificant force. About 12,000 were stationed in Poland, the rest were distributed between Lithuania and the Ukraine, the latter having not quite 4,000 men for the vast territory comprising the present three provinces, Podolia, Volynia and Kiev.

This force was, of course, quite insufficient either to defend the frontiers or to keep order within them. The Polish government made an attempt to organize a militia from lesser and poorer szlachta but it did not lead to anything. An attempt to organize a mercenary militia was also unfortunate: this militia was recruited from all sorts of adventurers and vagabonds who molested the population in peace time and during the troubles invariably went over to the troublemakers. There remained the device which actually was the only means of defence for the Polish landlords in the Ukraine, namely, the so-called private estate-militia kept by Polish magnates, owners of great estates in the Ukraine. Of old, being accustomed to having their own private troops to settle their private quarrels, they returned to this custom. To have private troops now became an actual necessity as the only means of defending their property. The only human material at their disposal from which to recruit military forces being their serfs, the Ukrainian peasants, and the only method of persuading them to enlist being to let them have Cossack organizations, the Polish magnates were forced to have recourse to the old

Cossack tradition of elected officers and all the peculiar Cossack ways of formation in hundreds and so on. These new "Cossacks" were freed from all other duties, and were allowed to elect their under officers: only the colonel, the leader in chief, was to be a Polish nobleman. Some of the Polish magnates thus kept four to five thousand Cossacks by private means on their estates.

Being unable to cope with the Haidamaky trouble the Polish government constantly sought help from Russia, approaching the Russian ambassador in Warsaw or applying directly to St. Petersburg. The Russian authorities gave orders to their frontier authorities and troops to intercept the Haidamaky, not to let them escape over the Russian frontier, to punish those whom they succeeded in seizing and in general to second the Polish government in their struggle with the Haidamaky. The Russian government also gave strict orders to the Zaporogian Cossack authorities to the same effect and these orders were obeyed. On their side, the Polish authorities held the Zaporogians to be the chief instigators of the Haidamaky and made reprisals against the Zaporogian Cossacks whenever they had the opportunity. They often arrested Zaporogians when these crossed the frontier for trading purposes and killed them. Thus about three hundred Zaporogians who came to the fair in Bratslav were seized and executed; another time eighteen Zaporogians coming to Nemirov to buy corn were arrested and hanged. Very often Polish detachments entered Zaporogian territory and destroyed settlements there. This, of course, further embittered their relations.

These hostilities occasionally came to open outbreaks at the first opportunities. An occasion presented itself in 1734. The struggle for the succession after the death of the Polish King, Augustus, the Elector of Saxony, brought about Russian military intervention in Poland. The candidature of Stanislas Leszczyński, supported by France, had a considerable following in Poland. The Russian government on their side supported the candida-

ture of the son of the deceased king, the Elector of Saxony, Augustus III. A Russian army entered Poland. Hetman Apostol's Ukrainian Cossacks marched through the Ukraine of the Right Bank on their way to Poland. This aroused false hopes among the population that Russia would wrest Ukrainian territory from Poland and put an end to the domination of the Polish szlachta.

A peasant uprising broke out in the spring of 1734 in the province of Kiev. The insurgents attacked and killed Polish landowners and Jews and took towns and villages one after another. The uprising very soon spread to Podolia and Volynia. A Cossack officer of the name Verlan, chief of the private Cossack militia of the Prince Lubomirski, went over to the insurgents with his Cossacks. He gave out that he had orders from the Empress Anna to exterminate Poles and Jews, and he proceeded to organize the insurgent peasants into a considerable force. He seized and held a number of towns and was menacing Lvov. The uprising began to look ominous for Poland. It was only by means of Russian military intervention that it was quelled. Having put Augustus III on the Polish throne, whom the Poles were now compelled to recognize, the Russian army turned against the peasants. They were defeated by the regular forces without any difficulty. The leaders of the uprisings with Verlan at their head, succeeded in escaping to Moldavia. After the Russian army had left, the uprising took the form of guerrilla warfare and went on for several years.

Guerrilla war had thus become chronic. So long as the Polish government had to do with the Haidamaky only, who indulged in armed attacks on estates and country houses of nobles or Jewish quarters of towns, there was no immediate danger of the State. But from time to time the latent discontent among the peasants, never reconciled to their social thraldom, would gather strength, come to the surface, and produce a new outbreak. Then the Haidamaky, always on a war footing, would produce from among themselves organizers and leaders of the uprisings, and the unrest would spread

to wide areas. Thus after sixteen years of guerrilla war, following the uprising of Verlan in 1734 which kept Polish administration pretty busy, a serious outbreak of discontent among the peasants led by the Haidamaky took place in the south of the province of Kiev in 1750 and rapidly spread to all three Ukrainian provinces. Several important towns were in the hands of the insurgents and the Polish army, disorganized and unprepared, was quite unable to deal with the rebels. But the uprising was this time not sufficiently well organized: the Haidamaky were unable to abstain from plundering and often left the peasants in the lurch. The struggle went on without any plan. The Polish szlachta, landowners of the three Ukrainian provinces, succeeded in mobilizing all their forces and after prolonged fighting the insurgents were defeated and the uprising quelled.

168. The Uprising of Kolyivshchyna, 1768.

The Ukraine was quiet once again. But only eighteen years passed before a new terrible outbreak followed, which surpassed all preceding uprisings in fury. This was the so-called "Kolyivshchyna", the uprising of 1768. Its immediate causes were the social and political conditions of the Ukraine of the Right Bank, but it was also connected with the international economic crisis of the time. The uprising of 1768 coincided with an epoch of disorganization of agricultural production on the great estates, owing to the transfer of the chief corn-exporting centres from the ports of the Baltic to those of the Black Sea. This change caused a temporary disorganization and unsettlement in agricultural production. The ensuing economic crisis also influenced the relations of landowners and peasants in the Ukraine. The latter, always discontented and impatient with the enforced serfdom, needed very little to unsettle them and bring out agitations and uprising. In the south of the Kiev province, repopulated later than other parts, the so-called "free-years" from serf-duties had lasted longer than elsewhere. Now these free years were at an end. The

population was in a state of unrest and felt even light duties to be an injury. Moreover, next door to them lay free Zaporogian territories where serfdom was unknown.

At the same time religious persecutions here also came to a climax. The Roman Catholic clergy began to exert very severe pressure on the Orthodox population, urging them to conversion. They were supported by the military and civil authorities. The position of the Orthodox Church in Poland was very precarious. The Orthodox parishes in the southern part of the province of Kiev were dependent on the Bishop of Pereyaslav in the Ukraine of the Hetmans and he was not a Polish subject. He ordained priests for this part of the Kiev province. But the Polish authorities hindered by all available means the intercourse of the Orthodox parishes with their bishop. Besides, in order to obtain a parish, the Orthodox priests required the permission of the Roman Catholic dean as well as of the local landowner. Constant misunderstandings and conflicts were bound to arise. The Uniate clergy, instead of open persecution of the Orthodox Church, adopted tactics of petty interference, encroachments and annoyances of the Orthodox clergy, which rendered their existence almost intolerable. The Uniate Metropolitan of the period even caused violence to be used against them, imprisonment and corporal punishment. Many of the Orthodox country clergy were forced to recognize the Union of Churches officially, remaining true to their Orthodox faith in secret. Many of the laymen did the same and hated the Uniate rite in their innermost souls. All this, of course, created an atmosphere of mutual distrust and hatred.

About the middle of the Eighteenth century the bishopric of Pereyaslav was held by an active and energetic man, Gervais Lintsevsky. Being unable to visit his diocese, in 1761, he nominated as his assistant the abbot of the Motronyn monastery (in the southern part of the Kiev province), Melchisidek Znachko-Yavorsky. In the person of this abbot the bishop of Pereyaslav had an able and energetic assistant. The abbot Melchisidek

started a lively Orthodox movement, concentrated in several monasteries in the south of Kiev province amidst thick forests, close to the border of the Zaporogian territory. He established a contact with the Zaporogian Sich and received help and support from them. The spirits of the Orthodox population rose under his guidance and many a parish which the Roman Catholic counted as converted, declared for the Orthodox Church. When the Roman Catholic clergy began to put hindrances in his way, the abbot applied to the Orthodox Metropolitan in Kiev. On his way home from Kiev he was seized by the Polish authorities and imprisoned. He succeeded, however, in escaping and took shelter in the Zaporogian Sich. From there he undertook a journey to St. Petersburg and obtained an audience with Catherine II, who promised to help by means of diplomatic intervention in Warsaw.

Having secured this promise, the fearless abbot returned to his Motronyn monastery. At home he found that the Roman Catholic clergy had taken action against him in spite of the law granting religious tolerance passed by the Seim in Warsaw, which was forced on the Poles by the united intervention of Russia and Prussia in 1767.

The abbot Znachko Yavorsky then plotted with the Zaporogian Cossacks with a view to an uprising which he expected Russia to support. An opportune occasion for this uprising was found in the troubles which began in Poland in 1768.

Part of the Polish szlachta, dissatisfied with Russian intervention and the policy of the last Polish king, Stanislaus Poniatowski, formed the so-called Confederation and declared an open rebellion against their king and government, with Casimir Pulaski at their head. The Polish government had no means of dealing with the Confederation and asked help from Russia. A body of Russian troops entered Polish territory and very soon put down the rebellion.

The political situation so adroitly used by the leaders of the Ukrainian uprising was planned, most probably,

in the Motronyn monastery. At the head of the movement was Maxim Zalizniak. He was a Zaporogian Cossack of these parts of Kiev province. In the spring of 1767, leaving the Zaporogian Sich, he became a novice in the Motronyn monastery where Znachko Yavorsky was abbot. It was from here that, in the spring of 1768, Maxim Zalizniak started the uprising. The nucleus of his force was formed of men who, like him, came from the Zaporogian territory. They were not the regular Zaporogian Cossacks entered on the Rolls but mostly servants who worked on farms and fished in the rivers belonging to the Zaporogians, but they were all well trained in warfare and familiar with Zaporogian ways.

It is believed that the insurgents had a plan to seize the Kiev province by surrounding it on all sides, and as a matter of fact, the uprising did start almost simultaneously in four places on the frontiers of the province under four leaders, of whom Zalizniak was the chief. They were joined by numbers of Haidamaky and peasants. The uprising was directed in the first place against the Polish nobles and the Jews, and all who fell in their hands were slain and their houses and property plundered. The town of Uman was chief object of Zalizniak's campaign. It was an old Cossack stronghold, was well fortified, and an important trading centre whence lively commerce was carried on with Moldavia and Turkey. The town with surrounding territory was now in the possession of a great Polish family of the name of Potocki. The population was numerous and well-to-do: there were many rich merchants, some of whom were foreigners. There was a school kept by the Uniate monks of the order of St. Basil. Thus Uman was not only a military and trading centre but also a place of some culture. Potocki's steward had at his disposal only a small military detachment; the chief defence forces consisted of the Cossack militia with the Sotnyk—officer commanding a Hundred—Ivan Honta, at their head. He and Zalizniak were destined to play the leading roles in this tragic Haidamaky uprising and so attract, even to

this day, the attention of both Polish and Ukrainian historians. The former, of course, esteemed him a traitor, whereas in the eyes of Ukrainians he is considered a hero in the struggle for the freedom of his people and a defender of their religion. As such he has a place in Ukrainian literature.

Honta was a peasant's son and had a distinguished military career in the Cossack militia in the service of the Potocki's. For years he commanded the Cossack militia and was rewarded for his services by grants of land which gave him, what at that time, was a great income. He became attached to the szlachta class on account of his material interests and the advantages of his military position. When the news spread of the Haidamaky uprising and their successes, Uman became overcrowded by Polish and Jewish refugees. Honta went against Zalizniak at the head of his Cossacks, but meeting the insurgents he went over to them with his whole detachment. Together they turned against Uman. What were the motives for his conduct? Certainly it was not for personal or material gain. During his negotiations with Zalizniak, Honta became convinced that the uprising had been started with the objects of returning to Cossack rule, defending the Orthodox Church and abolishing serfdom. He, therefore, considered it his moral duty to join the insurgents. Another factor was also important, the traditional loyalty of the Ukrainian population to the king against the nobles. The history of the beginning of Khmelnitsky's uprising was repeated once more. Haidamaky thought to serve the king by fighting against the nobles and the rebellion of the Confederates. The Haidamaky's uprising was thus directed against the szlachta, who were disloyal to the king. The news that the Russian Empress was giving military support to the Polish king against the Confederates also played an important part in the belief of the leaders of the Haidamaky that they were acting loyally towards the king.

Honta's going over to the insurgents, of course, decided the fate of Uman. The town was taken on the

first day and a fearful massacre of Polish nobles and Jews ensued, during which about two thousand persons perished. The victorious Haidamaky called a Rada in Uman at which Zalizniak was proclaimed Hetman, and Honta, Colonel of Uman; the district of Uman was subdivided into Hundreds as in the old Cossack times. The partisans of the Union of the Churches, the Uniates, were offered the choice of returning to the Orthodox Church or leaving the country. The insurgents made Uman their centre and sent detachments to Podolia, Volynia and Polissia.

But the fate of the uprising depended on the attitude which the Russian government would take. At the beginning, the Russian authorities were quite favorably disposed towards the insurgents, a weakening of Poland through internal troubles being advantageous to Russian policy in Poland. The Russian military expedition sent to Poland against the Confederates, was instructed to treat Ukrainian insurgents mildly, and not to use armed force against them. Thus Russian policy towards the Haidamaky was of a double-faced character and led them to the conviction that they were acting in the interests and according to the wishes of the Russian government.

The situation, however, was immediately changed when one of the Haidamaky detachments pursuing Poles and Jews who had crossed the frontier and taken refuge in the Turkish town of Balta, burned this place. This action brought simultaneous protests from the Sultan, the Crimean Khan and the province of Moldavia. The Turks threatened war. Russia was not yet ready and the Russian government took alarm and lost no time disavowing the Haidamaky. Catherine II, writing from St. Petersburg, instructed Krechetnikov to put an end to the Haidamaky manoeuvre and repress them. Thus the doom of the uprising was sealed. Krechetnikov decided to beguile them and invited the leaders into the Russian camp. They came, not expecting any treason, and then were overpowered, were caught, most of them escaped by scattering. Krechetnikov was instructed to surrender to the

Polish government those of the Haidamaky who were Polish subjects and retain the subjects of the Russian Empress. Thus Ivan Honta, at the head of about 900 insurgents, was handed over to the Poles. They were put to death after cruel tortures to satisfy the fury of the Polish nobles, and this in spite of the intervention of the humane King Stanislaus August.

In punishing the members of the Haidamaky uprising who were Russian subjects, the Russian government chiefly wished to satisfy the Turkish and Polish authorities and persuade them that the Russian government did not sympathize with the Haidamaky and did not feel any responsibility for their doings. Thus the trial, which was intended as a demonstration, took place partly on the Turkish frontier in the presence of the invited Turkish officials and partly on Polish territory. About two hundred and fifty Haidamaky, including the chief leader Zalizniak, were condemned to death and brought to Kiev to be executed. Secret orders were, however, given to the local authorities to commute the death sentence to hard labor and lifelong exile in Siberia.

In this way the uprising was put down, but the causes of popular discontent, persecution of the Orthodox Church and the hard position of the peasants, were not removed. The population was exasperated and nurtured hatred against the Polish nobles and the regime which the szlachta introduced and maintained in the Ukraine. On their side the local Polish administration and the landowners mistrusted the people and suspected them of preparing a new uprising. Every now and again, solely on the ground of vague rumors, panic would seize the Poles who suspected the Haidamaky everywhere, and a new wave of cruel repressions against the Orthodox clergy and Ukrainian population would arise. The alarm of 1789 in Volynia was particularly serious, when the local administration arrested hundreds of probably quite innocent people of whom many lost their lives in prison without any apparent justification. Amidst this atmosphere of alarm and panic and persecutions, Polish

domination in the Ukraine of the Right Bank came to an end. According to the second partition of Poland of 1793 the provinces of Kiev, Bratslav, Podolia and the eastern part of Volynia, were annexed by Russia. According to the third partition of 1795, Russia took the rest of Volynia and the eastern part of Kholm; the greatest part of Kholm province being taken by Austria. The annexed territories were formed by the Russian government into three governments; Kiev, Podolia and Volynia. The Ukraine on the Right Bank thus entered a new phase.

The Haidamaky movement, as a form of active protest against the intolerable condition of life, had analogous phenomena in the history of other Slav people, for example, among the Serbs, where "Haiduki" or "Uskoki" led a guerrilla warfare against Turkish domination. West Ukrainian territories, Galicia and Bukovnia, produced a similar movement as protest against the existing social and political order. Here they were called "Opryshky" or "Leventsi". The causes which inspired their activity were the same as in the Ukraine of the Dnieper, namely, the discontent of the Ukrainian people with their political and social position. Active and energetic men found a solution of their difficulties in outlawry and violence against the dominant social classes of an alien nationality and a different religion. Because of this, these men became heroes in the eyes of the people as avengers of their common wrongs. The population sympathized with them and idealized them, in spite of the fact that often it was not only government officials, landowners, or rich merchants, but also people of humbler position who suffered from the "Opryshky". Among the Galician outlaws, Dovbush was one of the best known and most popular. He lived about the middle of the Eighteenth century. His romantic and successful career and his tragic death in especially romantic circumstances, left deep traces in the popular memory which were echoed in a whole cycle of popular songs of which he is the hero. It was after Galicia was annexed by Austria that the "Opryshky" disappeared. Liberal reforms introduced by

Emperor Joseph II brought about an amelioration of the social and economic, as well as religious conditions of the peasants. From that time outlaws became ordinary robbers without the characteristics of revolutionaries.

Although these manifestations of popular discontent had been frequent in all Ukrainian territories under Polish domination, the "Haidamaky" and still less the "Opryshky" were not able to bring about a change for the better in the position of the Ukrainian population in Poland. Already about the middle of the Eighteenth century the Polish State began to show unmistakable signs of a speedy decline. Only wide and far-reaching reforms of a political, social and religious character could have saved it from downfall. Some of the more enlightened Polish patriots understood at last the necessity for such reforms and were ready to undertake them, but it was now too late. Poland's neighbors, and primarily Russia and Prussia had now for some time looked upon Polish territory as their future spoil. Growing anarchy and internal troubles in Poland, caused by the unwise policy of selfish magnates and the unruly and riotous szlachta, were to the interest of Poland's covetous neighbors; they helped to promote them and only waited for the climax to be reached. An unwise religious policy in Poland, extreme intolerance and persecution of Protestants and Orthodox carried on by the Jesuits and Polish Roman Catholic clergy in general, furnished Prussia and Russia with a convenient pretext for interfering in Polish internal affairs. Since Peter I and the Swedish war, the Russian government had made it their habit to rule the Polish State as if it were their own. The three last Polish kings, both Electors of Saxony, August II and August III, and King Stanislaus Poniatowski, were put on the throne by the aid of Russian military force. The rebellion of the Polish szlachta in 1768, the so-called Confederation, directed against Russian influence in Polish affairs under King Stanislaus Poniatowski, yielded nothing better than a new Russian armed intervention.

169. Annexation of Galicia by Austria.

According to the first partition of Poland among Prussia, Austria and Russia in 1772, Austria received Galicia. This was contrary to the plans of the Russian government which, since the Confederation of 1768 and the Haidamaky uprising under Zalizniak and Honta, had maintained a standing army in Poland. The Russian General Krechetnikov occupied Lvov in 1769 and kept a Russian garrison there for three years. The Russian government looked upon the Ukrainian and White Russian provinces of Poland as their legitimate spoil and were not prepared to share them with anyone. The Prussian King Frederick II, however, insisted on drawing Austria into the Partition of Poland even against her own wishes, her expansion being directed to the west and south, towards Germany, Italy and the Balkans. In order to maintain the political equilibrium, Austria participated in the Partition of Poland and declared a wish to take Galicia, as that once temporarily had been under Hungarian domination. The Hungarian throne, now being occupied by the Hapsburg family, it was alleged that the Hapsburgs had the right to all lands which in the past had belonged to Hungary. Russia was very unwilling to surrender Lvov and Eastern Galicia to Austria, and Russian troops evacuated them only under pressure from the Austrian armed force sent out in the spring of 1772. The Austrians occupied Lvov in the autumn of 1772 and proclaimed it the capital of Galicia and Lodomeria (Volodymyria), which were now Austrian provinces.

Galicia came over to Austria in a state of great economic poverty and ruin. The anarchy prevailing in Poland, the strife of Polish magnates one against the other, the Swedish war, the Russian occupation and the ruin of the foreign trade, had all brought the country to a state of great disorganization and impoverishment. The situation of the Ukrainians who constituted the bulk of the population was especially hard. The Ukrainian town population, the burgesses, having lost their importance early in the Seventeenth century, never recovered their

position. The active religious and cultural movement that went on within the religious Brotherhoods in the chief Galician towns was weakened even before Khmelnitsky's time. As long as there remained Ukrainian nobles who held to their hereditary Orthodox religion and rose in defence of the Orthodox Church in local Seims, so long did the burgesses also remain faithful to the Orthodox religion. But the Ukrainian nobles in Galicia, having sympathized with and participated in Khmelnitsky's revolution were left outside the Cossack State which was limited to the provinces situated on the Dnieper. Their position in Galicia became very much weakened; repressions, confiscations of property, political restrictions and exclusions, undermined their resistance. With a few exceptions the Ukrainian nobles in Galicia could no longer resist Roman Catholic pressure and the colonization that inevitably followed in the train of conversion. Religious Brotherhoods in towns were now left alone to fight the battle of the Orthodox Church and succumbed in the struggle; most of them were compelled to recognize the Union of the Churches enforced on them by the government.

170. Church Union in Galicia and its Consequences.

Under the influence of the intolerant and reactionary Polish szlachta, the government constantly limited the rights of the Orthodox Church in Poland. The Seim of 1676 passed a law forbidding religious Brotherhoods in Galicia to maintain direct relations with the Patriarch of Constantinople. This rendered them completely dependent on the local bishops. Orthodox Brotherhoods were thus deprived of their former initiative and compelled to follow the bishops. If, for instance, an Orthodox bishop recognized the Union, they had no means of resisting him: the entire diocese had to follow him. Further, Orthodox believers were forbidden under penalty of death to go abroad, the object of this law being to prevent them from having any relations with their co-religionists in other countries outside Poland. In carrying out their

plans for enforced recognition and introduction of the Union of the Churches, the Polish government found a very active assistant in the person of Joseph Shumliansky, the Orthodox bishop of Lvov. He was a very energetic man with a literary gift, and not without a feeling for Ukrainian patriotism. He hoped to raise the position of the Ukrainian population in Poland by going over to the Uniate Church. With this object Bishop Shumliansky declared (1677) to the Papal nuncio in Warsaw his readiness to recognize the Union. Shumliansky's plan at first met with great opposition on the side of the Orthodox clergy and the population, especially the Orthodox Brotherhoods. Gradually, however, owing to the clever policy of the bishop and his understanding and influence over the government, the Union of Churches made great progress in the course of some twenty years. In 1700 it was officially proclaimed in Galicia, and the Uniate Church became the recognized religion of Ukrainians. Even the Orthodox Brotherhood of Lvov were compelled to recognize the fact and adhere to the Union in 1708. The Maniavsky monastery in Galicia, situated in the Carpathian hills, was the only one left that adhered to the Orthodox Church for about a century longer, until closed by the Austrian government in 1785.

Polish politicians who thought that the Union of Churches would be merely a stepping stone to complete Roman Catholicism and thus a means to the polonization and quick assimilation of the Ukrainian population were mistaken. With the exception of the nobles, the Ukrainian popular masses in Galicia, though having accepted the Union of Churches, continued to cling stubbornly to their privilege of the Eastern rite granted by the Pope and did not pass over to Roman Catholicism. Under the guidance of a succession of able bishops the Uniate, or as it is officially called, the Greek Catholic Church, in Galicia had rapidly formed a separate religious organization, as different from the Eastern Orthodoxy as from Roman Catholicism. The standard of culture of the country clergy was considerably raised and a more inti-

mate control by the bishops of their dioceses was established. Basilian monks took under their care schools and education in general, having introduced the Ukrainian language in teaching and in their publications. After two or three generations the Galician population accepted the Uniate Church without any reserve and began to look upon it as their national Church. The Uniate clergy maintained and observed the privilege of the Eastern rite as a kind of national sanctum. Indeed, this was the only inheritance that the Ukrainian population of Galicia succeeded in preserving as their own out of the entire wealth of their former independent culture and life. This inheritance served them afterwards as a starting point for their future cultural development and ultimate national "renaissance" in later times. We may safely say that the Uniate or Greek Catholic Church with its Eastern rite was the only thing that preserved the Ukrainian population from being absorbed by the Poles. On the other hand, the Eastern rite of the Greek Catholic Church constituted at all times the bridge that united Ukrainians of Galicia with their Eastern brothers, Ukrainians of the Dnieper, who retained their ancient Orthodox religion. At the same time, as the population of Ukrainian territories, annexed by Russia after the Partition of Poland, returned at once to the Orthodox Church, the population and the clergy in Galicia remained true to the Uniate Church, adopting it as their national Church. The Uniate clergy in Galicia occupied and maintained for a long time a privileged position forming the leading class, which played an especially important part in the national revival of the Nineteenth century.

171. Carpathian Rus.

In dealing with the Ukrainian territory we have not yet said much about its most westerly part, namely the small country called Carpathian Rus or the Ukraine on the western slopes of the Carpathian hills. This part of the Ukrainian population had hardly ever lived the common political life of the other Ukrainian sections with

the exception of some episodes at the time of the Galician Volynian Princedom. Carpathian Rus had, however, maintained relations with neighboring Galicia and even with far away Ukraine on the Dnieper. This contact became livelier when Galicia and Carpathian Rus became parts of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Then Carpathian Ukraine played a definite role in its common cultural life with Galicia.

The Ukrainian population of the Western slopes of the Carpathian Mountains came from the middle Dnieper and settled there not later than the end of the Ninth century. Generally speaking, Slav colonization of this territory preceded the coming of the Magyars and the founding of the Magyar State. The population of the Carpathian Rus had, one might say, no political history of their own: they had no princes, no wars nor treaties in this out-of-the-way mountain country. The history of its population is the record of their hard struggle with nature and adverse political and social conditions. The real "heroes" of the Carpatho-Ukrainian history are the simple peasants who through centuries bore on their shoulders the burden of feudal serfdom and severe bureaucratic control of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy without losing either their national aspect and character, or their language and their historic name. The masses supported by their clergy held firmly to their Orthodox faith which, at the same time, was the safeguard of their nationality. The chief religious centres were the St. Nicholas monastery in Munkach, and that of St. Michael, near Marmarosh. The Carpathian-Ruthenian Church was for a long time dependent on the bishop of Peremyshl (Przemysl), as the bishopric of Munkach was only constituted at the end of the Fifteenth century.

The social and economic position of the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) peasants was very hard. They became the serfs of Magyar magnates and even the clergy were bound to perform certain servile duties. The population of Carpathian Rus, surrounded and pressed on all sides by alien neighbors, Slovaks, Hungarians, and Ru-

manians, and divided from their kindred in Galicia by the Carpathian Mountains, jealously preserved their national character and never lost the feeling of community of interests and purpose binding them to their race beyond the Carpathian Mountains. Conservative like all mountain populations, Carpathian-Ruthenians preserved many manuscripts, literary evidences, which bear witness to the intimate contact which had existed far back through the ages with Galicia and Kievan Rus. The population of Carpathian Rus had long stubbornly resisted the Union of Churches. It was only at the beginning of the Nineteenth century that the Austrian government succeeded in extending the Uniate Church into the western part of the country: at that period the monastery of Munkach passed into the hands of the Uniate clergy. The bishopric of Marmarosh held out until the middle of the Nineteenth century and it was only after certain reforms were made by the Austrian government for the amelioration of the position of the Uniate clergy, that the Union of Churches made progress in that district. The bishopric of Munkach was made independent of the Roman Catholic bishop's control. The Uniate clergy were given the same rights as the Roman Catholic. A Uniate (Greek Catholic) seminary for priests was founded in Munkach. These reforms resulted in a revival of religious and cultural life in Carpathian Rus, leading ultimately to the national revival there which coincided with that in Galicia.

CHAPTER XXVI

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(172) Ukrainian Territories United Under the Russian Governments. (173) Cossack Officer Class Transformed into Russian Nobles. (174) Beginning of Ukrainian National Renaissance. (175) Brotherhood of SS Cyril and Methodius. (176) Russian Policy in the Ukraine of the Right Bank. (177) Kievan "Cossacks" of 1855.

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172. Ukrainian Territories United Under the Russian Governments.

The Ukrainian national renaissance was very much like the revivals of other Slavic peoples such as the Serbs, Czechs, Bulgarians and others who, in consequence of adverse historic circumstances, had succumbed to the domination of their neighbors, lost their political independence and to a certain extent their cultural autonomy. The Ukrainian national renaissance had its roots both in historic tradition and in the awakening of their racial individuality. Historic tradition in the Ukraine was preserved chiefly in those parts of the Ukraine where, until the end of the Eighteenth century, the people lived their own lives and enjoyed political and cultural autonomy. These parts were the territories on the Left Bank of the Dnieper, the Ukraine of the Hetmans and the Slobidska Ukraine. It was in those parts that the awakening of ethnical individuality took place mainly through the discovery of the popular oral epic and lyric poetry, the folklore in those districts having been especially well preserved.

Ukrainian national renaissance began at the end of the Eighteenth century as a reaction to the hard political, social and economic position and cultural stagnation in which Ukrainians found themselves at that time throughout the whole breadth of their territory. After the Partition of Poland in 1772, almost all Ukrainian territory was united under the power of Russia. The existing social and economic order was left unchanged by the Russian

government. Thus the provinces of Kiev, Volynia, and Podolia remained in the state in which they had been under Polish domination. Serfdom, which at the end of the Eighteenth century had reached its climax in Poland, received the full sanction of the Russian government as well as the support of the whole strength of the Russian military and bureaucratic machinery, which Poland did not possess on the eve of its downfall. The Ukrainian people, who expected that some improvement of their position would come from the change, were bitterly deceived in their expectations. The only change that came was the restoration of Uniate Churches to Orthodoxy. Russian authorities not only encouraged but pressed on the population this reconversion. It did not, however, bring any improvement to the position of Ukrainian peasants. On the contrary, abolition of the Uniate Church with its numerous cultural institutions, led to the elimination of the only cultural influence which up to that time had reached the peasant masses through these channels.

The conception of nationality, of an ethnical unity and its aspirations and rights was only beginning to dawn in the minds of some of the most advanced persons towards the end of the Eighteenth century. The "rights of peoples" were proclaimed as one of the revolutionary principles of the French Revolution. Absolutist monarchical governments such as Russia, Austria and Prussia which, taking advantage of the alienation of revolutionary France, had proceeded only shortly before to the Partition of Poland among themselves, were very far from understanding this conception. The Russian government in particular was averse to this idea. Catherine II and her ministers did not or could not see the existence of ethnical differences and opposition in the newly annexed Ukrainian provinces from Poland. They were accustomed to ignore the peasants completely and only reckon with the nobles. Thus, for them these territories were represented by a small number of Polish nobles and not by masses of Ukrainian peasants. Polish nobles accordingly received many privileges, especially in the

realm of education. A few Polish patriots who were at the head of the Educational Department of the newly annexed provinces, in the University town of Vilna, took the utmost advantage of the circumstances. These provinces of which three were Ukrainian, were provided with a great number of very good schools. An institution of higher education was also founded in Kremianets in Volynia. Teaching in these schools was given in the Polish language and in the national Polish spirit, and they became for years nurseries of Polish patriotism and Polish culture. Polish education and learning made greater strides in the Ukraine of the Right Bank during twenty years of Russian government than in a century of Polish rule. The Ukrainian people, oppressed by serfdom and crushed by the strong military and bureaucratic Russian regime, were on the other hand deprived of even the most elementary education and doomed to complete ignorance. The wealth of the folklore and poetry enshrining the memory of former Cossack freedom was their only cultural possession or spiritual inheritance from the past.

Conditions were otherwise in the Ukraine of the Left Bank, where serfdom was not officially introduced until the end of the Eighteenth century. Autonomy was abolished in the Ukraine of the Hetmans, and a short time previously in Slobidska Ukraine. Cossack organization, judicature and municipal self-government were also abolished and uniform imperial Russian institutions introduced instead. The Ukraine of the Hetmans was divided into two "Little Russian" provinces, Chernigov and Poltava; Slobidska Ukraine retained its name for some time, though it was changed later. Although the outward forms were brought into conformity with the Russian administration, yet something remained of the old constitution. Though the Cossack army no longer existed in the three provinces, the Cossacks themselves remained as a class of freeholders and the bonds of serfdom did not touch them. Thus almost one-third of the agricultural population were free. The same happened

in the administration of law. The old Cossack and municipal courts of justice were replaced by new institutions uniform with those in Russia, but the old Ukrainian procedure and laws remained in force. All the posts in the new Russianized administration from the Governor at the head to the lowest clerk were occupied by residents of the provinces. The most important circumstance, however, was that the Ukraine of the Left Bank retained its upper and leading class of the population, the former Cossack Officers, though now transformed into Russian nobles.

173. Cossack Officer Class Transformed into Russian Nobles.

The Cossack Officers, as we have seen, acquired during the Eighteenth century the position of a privileged class. At first their position was even better than that of the Russian nobles, who had no corporate self-government and no special jurisdiction but were bound by compulsory and exacting State service. However, since the time of Empress Anna the Russian nobles had gradually become emancipated: in 1730 they obtained the right to dispose more freely of their landed property, and the compulsory State service was limited to certain periods; in 1763 Peter III granted them emancipation from compulsory military service; and, lastly, Catherine II published in 1785, the well-known "Nobles' Charter", which gave to the Russian nobles corporate or class self-government and fixed their position as that of a privileged class having all rights except that of participating in the political power which in an absolutist country, like Russia, belongs to the monarch alone.

The sanction of the privileges of the nobles in Russia coincided with the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy. The Cossack army being disbanded, Cossack Officers were to receive imperial Russian military or civil rank. The Ukrainian privileged class was now very much interested in obtaining in the Russian empire equal privileges with the Russian nobles, as a safeguard in case of possible

changes and to protect themselves against possible social degradation. At first the Russian government had made known that former Ukrainian military and civil officers were entitled to obtain an Imperial Russian patent of nobility. With the introduction of serfdom in the Ukraine a great number of persons, who never had been Cossack Officers, afraid to find themselves in the ranks of those doomed to serfdom, declared their claim to nobility. Not only former lower officials and clerks in Cossack institutions and offices and their dependents, but also clergy, merchants and others, flooded the offices of the competent authority with their petitions and documents, proving their rights to noble ranking. The Russian government was compelled to examine closely the rights of Ukrainian candidates to a Russian imperial patent of nobility. At first the highest authority in Russia, the imperial Heraldic Office, refused to grant to Cossack military and civil officers the right to imperial Russian nobility. This brought about indignant protests from former Cossack Officers of the three provinces, who now addressed petitions to the Tsar accompanied by documents and historic proofs to substantiate their claims. They appealed to the treaties of the Ukrainian Hetmans with the Muscovite Tsars, produced charters of Polish kings, Lithuanian princes, Ukrainian Hetmans and so on. This common interest of the Ukrainian nobles instigated a mass-research into old historical documents, traditions and precedents in order to prove the rights of old Ukrainian families to imperial Russian nobility. Historical materials of every description, chronicles, memoirs, charters, etc., were searched for and collected. This not only provoked interest in Ukrainian history as a whole but also roused Ukrainian patriotism; in defending their traditional family rights, Ukrainian nobles felt themselves to be defending the rights of their native country.

174. Beginning of Ukrainian National Renaissance.

The struggle for recognition of their rights to nobility through descent from all categories of Cossack Officers

lasted several decades and was finally terminated for the most part favorably for the petitioners by the imperial Ukase of 1835. A consequence of this was the revival of Ukrainian historic traditions in this part of the Ukraine. It revived interest in the past of the Ukraine and led to historical research and even to the idealization of this past, inspired not only by selfish class interests but also by loftier idealistic sentiments.

The breaking up of the Cossack State and the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy brought about a certain reaction on the part of the more enlightened and patriotic Ukrainians. That this reaction was not limited to literary productions, is proved by the journey of a Poltava nobleman, Vassyl Kapnist, to Berlin in 1791, where he tried to enlist the sympathy and help of the Prussian government against "Muscovite tyranny". The same Vassyl Kapnist wrote and published an "Ode on Serfdom" in which he deplored the introduction of serfdom in the Ukraine. But the times for armed insurrections and foreign intervention had long since passed. Literary interest in the past and historical research encountered modern ideas emanating from the West at the end of the Eighteenth century, and which began to be grasped more and more by the educated nobles in the Ukraine of the Left Bank.

The modern conception of nationality was one of the effective causes of the Ukrainian national revival. The idea appeared in Western Europe late in the Eighteenth century; among Slavic peoples the Czechs were the first to adopt it. This idea found expression in a new interest in the life and speech of the people and in folklore generally. It was expressed in that mighty literary movement which is called Romanticism. Ukrainian educated people in the second half of the Eighteenth century did not yet understand nor value the beauty of the living popular tongue and the popular epics and lyrical songs of which there was such a wealth in the Ukraine. They looked down on everything connected with the people as being "ordinary" and "common". They were at-

tracted by foreign forms and examples, formerly by Polish and later by Russian and French. They abandoned their native language very much as they exchanged their old fashioned national clothing for modern, fashionable, foreign garments. The whole wealth and originality of popular traditions and customs, the poetry of popular rites, superstitions and beliefs, popular songs and fairy tales, were in their eyes only provincialisms that did not merit the attention of educated people and were only to be mentioned as a curiosity. But before some twenty or thirty years had passed people were to be found in the Ukraine, who began systematically taking down popular poetry, studying popular speech and even introducing it into literature.

In the years 1798 two notable books were published simultaneously in St. Petersburg. One under the title, "Notes on Little Russia", was a small encyclopaedia of information about the Ukraine, its nature, history, popular language and folklore written by Jacob Markovich. This book was brimful of patriotic enthusiasm which gushed and sparkled in every sentence of its young author. Without being a work of scientific importance, this book initiated a long series of other works on Ukrainian history and folklore which followed one another in the first decades of the Nineteenth century. The second book was far more important since it began the modern period of Ukrainian literature. This was the "Aeneid" by Ivan Kotliarevsky of Poltava. His play "Natalka Poltavka", staged for the first time in Poltava in 1819, was the beginning of the Ukrainian modern theatre.

Endeavors to investigate the past of the Ukraine resulted in a long series of works on Ukrainian history, the most important being the Ukrainian History of D. Bantish Kamensky. These works laid the basis for scientific research into the Ukrainian past and, on the other hand, widely diffused among the population knowledge and interest in national history.

The modern period of Ukrainian literature, intimately connected with the study of Ukrainian history and folk-

lore, opened the eyes of educated Ukrainians to an entirely new world of popular life full of spiritual meaning. It included highly poetical folklore; beautiful epics in which the image of the heroic past of the Cossack period was preserved in wonderful freshness; and touching and delicate lyrical popular songs. From this time the idea of "nation" had a wider content: instead of limiting it to the upper educated classes, the nobles, the whole Ukrainian people was now included. And the conception of the "native country"* now included not merely the limited historical territory of one's birthplace, but all the territories inhabited by the Ukrainian people. Now traces of past glories were no longer sought only in old chronicles, Hetman's Universals or in yellowing family papers or charters of kings and princes, but also in popular epics still on the lips of the people and in the living popular tradition.

Prince Nicholas Tseretelev published in 1819, the first collection of Cossack epics, the so-called "Dumy kozatski". This collection had the same significance for the awakening of Ukrainian national feeling as the publication of Serb popular songs by Vuk Karadjich for the Southern Slavs, or the publication of the Kraledvor manuscript for the Czechs. In editing the Ukrainian historical epics, Prince Tseretelev believed he was doing a patriotic action. "If these epics", he said in the preface, "do not serve as historical documents, nevertheless they show the poetical genius of the Ukrainian people, their spirit, their old traditions and customs and lastly, the pure morals for which Ukrainians were always known and which they jealously preserve even to this day as their only ancestral inheritance saved from the covetousness of their neighbors . . .". It was with the same feelings of love for his country that Professor Michael Maksimovich published his collection of Ukrainian popular songs in 1827. We may judge the deep impression they made

* The Ukrainian word is "batkivschina" and means literally land of father or ancestors.

on other contemporaries, not only Ukrainians, from the enthusiasm with which they were greeted by Pushkin, the greatest Russian poet.*

It was Kharkov, the capital of Slobidska Ukraine, which early in the Nineteenth century became the centre of cultural life in the Ukraine. The University, founded there in 1805, was mainly supported financially by local nobles and merchants. The initiative was due to the local patriot Vassyl Karazin. The learned and cultural Ukrainian scholars gathered around this University, most of them being historians and literary men. The well-known Ukrainian poet, Peter Hulak Artemovsky, was for a long time Rector of the University. The names of reviews "Ukrainski Vestnik", "Ukrainski Journal", published at that time in Kharkov show that they were dedicated to the national interests. Gregory Kvitka, the founder of the Ukrainian novel, was at the head of the literary movement in Kharkov. It was in Kharkov that historians such as Izmail Sreznevsky, Nicholas Kostomarov, Ambrose Metlinski, and others began their activity. Their works concerned, also, other Slavic peoples and they became representatives of the spiritual unity and brotherhood of all Slavs.

In speaking of the Ukrainian renaissance in the first half of the Nineteenth century, we must bear in mind that this patriotic and purely idealistic movement was started and carried on by the upper classes only, that is, by the Ukrainian gentry. This movement did not penetrate the masses for the obvious reason that the common people, enslaved as they had been since the introduction of the serfdom, were entirely cut off from education and schools. About the middle of the Eighteenth century there was a school in every Ukrainian village but with the abolition of Ukrainian autonomy

* Ukrainian folksongs were subsequently translated into several European languages, among others: in German by the well-known German poet, Friedrich Bodenstedt, in his collection "Die Poetische Ukraine"; in Danish by the modern Danish poet, Thor Lange, in his "Fjerne Melodier".

and the introduction of serfdom those schools disappeared. They disappeared even from the settlements of the Cossacks, who though remaining personally free, suffered such severe economic conditions that they could not afford to keep up their schools. Besides, under the Russian regime all careers other than farming were closed to the Cossacks. Education could lead to nothing and so went out of fashion. The standard of education fell even among the clergy. Formerly the sons of Ukrainian clergymen attended schools open to all classes of the population and were not restricted exclusively to clerical schools. Until the end of the Eighteenth century the clerical profession in the Ukraine was not hereditary. Candidates to the office of parish priest were freely elected by the parishioners who could even elect a layman, who would then have to be ordained priest by the bishop if he was found to fulfil the requirements. Thus the Ukrainian clergy were not an exclusive caste as were the Russian priests. After the reforms of Catherine II, which made the State service a privilege of the nobles, sons of clergymen were compelled to take the only career open to them and to which they were destined from the elementary schools. And the standard of education in clerical schools fell very low under the Russian regime. Taking this into consideration, we can understand why the literary movements of the Ukrainian renaissance was represented exclusively by nobles who alone were educated, and that this movement, as such, also showed certain traces of class ideology.

The Ukrainian nobles of the first half of the Nineteenth century showed a considerable spirit of opposition towards the Russian government. The sources of this spirit were above all the discontent aroused by the reluctancy of the Russian authorities to recognize the rights of the Ukrainian gentry. But there were also other causes: in numerous reports and memoirs of high Russian officials both military and civil serving at that time in the Ukraine, we read of the Ukrainian gentry being "full of hatred" against Russia and the Russians. The

causes of this hatred seemed to the authors of these documents to lie in the "disregard of the rights of the Ukraine" by the Russian government, as well as in heavy taxation, the unsatisfactory economic policy of the Russian government, leading to general impoverishment and to inequitable treatment. This hatred and the spirit of opposition in the Ukraine were observed not by Russians alone, but also by foreigners who visited the Ukraine. The German traveller Kohl, who visited the Ukraine later at the end of the Thirties, wrote about this hatred against Russia among the Ukrainian nobles, about their national movement, their patriotism and even their dreams of again separating the Ukraine from Russia. Indeed, the policy of Tsar Alexander I, and Nicholas I his successor, could not give the Ukraine satisfaction. The long wars which Alexander I waged against France and Napoleon were in themselves a burden, and especially so for the Ukraine, which for all her sacrifices of men and material only received further taxation and limitations of rights. Moreover, the Russian government did not keep their promises concerning the Ukrainian Cossacks to whom the Russian Tsars turned in critical moments, and who were always ready for every military service. For example, in 1812 during Napoleon's campaign against Moscow, Tsar Alexander I ordered the Governor General of Little Russia (Ukraine), Prince Lobanov Rostovski, to form several regiments of Ukrainian Cossacks, promising that after the termination of the war they would remain as a permanent Cossack army. This order was received with great joy by the Cossacks of Poltava and Chernigov provinces who, in a short time and without any help from the government, formed fifteen horse regiments, each 1,200 men strong. The government, however, disbanded them in 1816 even without having refunded their expenses of providing their own equipment of arms and uniforms during all the years which, as Russian Ministers themselves admitted, "completely ruined the Ukrainian Cossacks". Instead of keeping the promise of a permanent Cossack Army, they ordered

25,000 men to leave their homes against their will and join the Kuban Cossacks, former Zaporogians settled on the river Kuban. During the Polish uprising of 1831, Tsar Nicholas I again appealed to the Ukrainian Cossacks. The Governor General of Little Russia, Prince Repnin, undertook the formation of eight regiments of Ukrainian Cossacks, Ukrainian gentry giving them means to provide themselves with horses. Again a permanent Cossack Army was promised to the Ukrainians and again, when the Polish uprising was put down, the Ukrainian Cossacks were deceived and partly incorporated in the Russian standing army and partly sent to the Caucasus. When naturally, they protested, they were severely punished and a number of them were put to death by flogging. Thus all these dealings of the Russian authorities with the Cossacks appeared more like provocation on a grand scale than anything else.

The economic policy of the Russian government was at all times directed against the interests of the Ukraine. In the first half of the Nineteenth century the Finance Minister, Count Kankrin, was checking the development of Ukrainian agriculture by his tariffs and customs, and by his whole financial policy ruining the Ukrainian population. The local administration in the person of the Governor General nominated by the Russian government, was compelled to take sides with the Ukrainian population in order to defend them from utter impoverishment and ruin. Taking all this into consideration we can understand that the "hatred against the Muscovites" and the spirit of opposition we read about in the memoirs of Russians and foreigner's travel-diaries was fully justified. We shall then understand such reports as the following: "the gentry of Poltava rejoice greatly at Napoleon's successes and wish that he would destroy Russia" or the reported words of demobilized soldiers, peasants in Pereyaslav district (Poltava province), who said that "when again mobilized they would fight not the French but the Muscovites". The Marshal of the nobles of the same Poltava province of the Piriatin district, Vassyl

Lukashevich, proposed the toast of Napoleon's health and the gentry of the same district openly drank to the "Republic".

After the Napoleonic wars, public opinion in the whole of Russia was seething with liberal and even more extreme ideas resulting from their contact with West European life during Russian campaigns in Germany, Austria and France. During these campaigns not only the officers but also the common soldiers saw another life, not marred by primitive slavery or the serfdom which still firmly held in its embrace the vast Empire in the East of Europe. Many of them returned home bringing with them not only the "latest Parisian fashions", but also blushes of shame for the primitive and ugly conditions and ways of Russian life. In consequence of these experiences of the Russian armies abroad and especially among the officers of the Guards, mostly youths of the aristocratic families, the fashion of Freemasonry became widespread. Masonic lodges and various secret societies with political aims gradually developed into a wide conspiracy, ending in the unfortunate uprising of the 14th of December, 1825, known in Russian history as the "Decabrist-uprising" and its members known as the "Decabrists".

Freemasonry also spread in the Ukraine where it inevitably took on a special tinge in dealing with national problems. From this point of view they are of interest to historians and we must mention the Freemasonic lodge in Poltava to which the famous Ukrainian poet, Ivan Kotliarevsky, belonged. Especially interesting was the Masonic Lodge of Kiev known under the name of "United Slavs", to which Ukrainians belonged together with Poles and Russians, the name of the lodge showing an attempt to introduce friendly relations among the three Slav peoples. The Masonic movement in Russia, as was natural in a country deprived of freedom, was soon transformed into secret political societies, some of which had for their object Russian affairs in general; some took up general Slavic interests, while others devoted themselves to purely Ukrainian affairs. When the

Russian government, after having put down the December uprising of 1825, discovered the existence of secret political societies, the members intimidated by the cruel fate of the "Decabrists", did everything to exculpate themselves, denying their membership in such societies, destroying every possible trace of them and even denying their very existence. In consequence, we now possess very few documents about those societies. Still, according to contemporary memoirs published much later and to documents lately discovered in archives, enough is known for us to be able to reconstruct a sufficiently complete picture of the political movement in the Ukraine before the uprising of the 14th of December, 1825.

There is sufficient data proving the existence of a secret political society whose members occupied public positions. The president of it was Marshal of the nobles of the Piriatin district in Poltava province, Vassyl Lukashevich. According to one author of contemporary memoirs, the aim of this society was to bring about political independence for the Ukraine. The "Decabrists" conspiracy also had its ramifications in the Ukraine and Ukrainian officers and local landowners were among its members. Whilst northern branches of the conspiracy, and among them the Central Committee with Colonel Pastel at its head, were imbued with the principle of centralization and paid no attention to the differences between peoples in the Russian Empire, the southern branches saw the future Russian constitution as an ideal federation of nationalities and put the national question on the order of the day. From this point of view the "Society of United Slavs" in the Ukraine in 1825, into which the Masonic Lodge of the same name was transformed, deserves our special attention. In the memoirs of one of the members of this society we read: "the Society of United Slavs puts as its chief object the deliverance of all Slavic peoples from absolutist power and their union in one federative State. The frontiers of each separate Slavic State were to be exactly fixed and the form of the government was to be a democratic parlia-

mentary republic: affairs affecting the whole Union were to be dealt with by a Congress which alone could change, if necessary, the fundamental constitution of the Union. Each separate State was to have independence and full liberty to decide its internal affairs". During the inquiry into this society a "Catechism" was discovered in which, among other instructions, contained this admonition: "Do not wish to possess a slave if you do not wish to be a slave yourself". In this lay the same condemnation of serfdom which we meet in the early works of modern Ukrainian literature and which, some twenty years later resounded so powerfully in the poems of the famous Ukrainian poet, Shevchenko.

Shortly after the December uprising in St. Petersburg, there was another uprising in the army stationed in the Ukraine in Vassilkov, in the Kiev province. Both uprisings, having been insufficiently prepared, ended in failure and a complete breakdown of the whole conspiracy resulted. Harsh treatment of the revolutionaries by the young Tsar, Nicholas I, terrorized Russia. There was also a lull in affairs in the Ukraine. Opposition, though not extinguished, showed itself in more subdued forms. For some time we know nothing of political societies nor organized bodies, and the national Ukrainian movement only manifested itself in literature and in historical and ethnographical studies.

175. Brotherhood of SS Cyril and Methodius.

The first manifestations of the Ukrainian movement were in the Ukraine of the Left Bank, where the educated classes uniting historic tradition and modern West European ideas had put forward pioneers and partisans of a Ukrainian renaissance. The Ukraine of the Right Bank, dominated by Polish or polonized Ukrainian upper classes, did not participate in this awakening. On the contrary, it was there that the Polish national movement came to light. A Polish uprising against the Russian regime which broke out in 1831, was well supported

by Polish landowners in Ukrainian territories, especially in Volynia.

The suppression of the Polish uprising had also certain consequences for the Ukraine. The Russian government was forced to change its treatment of Ukrainian territories on the Right Bank which they, up to now, regarded as a Polish province. It was now officially proclaimed that the Ukraine of the Right Bank was an ancient "Russian" territory that had fallen under Polish influence and energetic means were taken to weaken Polish influence in these provinces and to support instead the "Russian" population.

First of all the educational system was dealt with. The College of Kremianets was closed as well as all the Polish schools. The University of Vilna was transferred to Kiev in 1832. The Roman Catholic Church was in its turn deprived of its power and influence. Most of the Roman Catholic convents in the Ukrainian provinces were closed. The Uniate Church was abolished in 1839 on Ukrainian and White Russian territories and only remained in Kholm province, where it lasted for some time until definitely abolished in a very brutal fashion in 1875. The Russian authorities now understood well enough that all these limitations only affected a very small part of the population, the upper classes, that is the Polish or polonized Ukrainian nobles. Besides the nobles, there were great numbers of peasants belonging to the Orthodox Church who were Ukrainian or, according to the official terminology of the Russian government, "Russian". These peasants were the serfs of Polish landowners. It was necessary to do something for them. The government indeed attempted some limitation of the number of days peasants had to work for the landlords, but this brought about only a slight improvement in the position of the population, which remained in complete dependence on their owners. As to introducing any education for the peasants or any sort of schools, there was no thought of it. In their endeavors to weaken Polish influence the Russian government never hit on

the idea of supporting the national dignity of the Ukrainian population. In the meantime the spiritual and intellectual movement which was going among the Polish nobles in the Ukraine of the Right Bank, in the twenties and thirties of the Nineteenth century, remained not without influence on the development of the Ukrainian national movement. As a matter of fact, most of the Polish nobles were Poles only in language and culture. In reality they were polonized descendants of the former Ukrainian gentry. Even the anthropometrical investigations of Polish anthropologists show that the Polish nobles in the Ukraine of the Right Bank belonged, anthropologically speaking, more to the local Ukrainian population than to the Polish nobles and peasants from Poland. This relationship of the gentry in the Ukraine of the Right Bank and their attachment to their native land led, in time, to a certain local patriotism among them. When at the beginning of the Eighteenth century under the influence of Romanticism interest in the life of the people was also awakening among the Polish gentry, Polish poets, natives of the Ukraine, created the so-called "Ukrainian schools" in Polish literature. They loved the Ukraine, and drew their inspiration from its warlike past and the exploits of the Cossacks; they took up subjects from Ukrainian history, introduced themes from Ukrainian popular traditions and Ukrainian folklore into their works and imitated the form of Ukrainian popular epics, and so on. While remaining patriots of the historical Poland and taking part in the Polish national movement, the representatives of the "Ukrainian school" in Polish literature yet influenced generally the development of Ukrainian patriotic feeling and the Ukrainian renaissance. Among the more distinguished representatives of this movement are the poets; Malchevski, Zaleski, Hoschinski, and the novel writers and literary critics; Hrabovski, Chaikovski. The famous poet, Julius Slowacki, also belonged partly to the Ukrainian school. Considerably influenced by this school and by the local Ukrainian patriotism of the Polish gentry, a movement

developed in the second half of the Nineteenth century, which brought a number of them into the Ukrainian national camp. Kiev, with its new University, became the meeting place of the polonized Ukrainian nobles from the Ukraine of the Right Bank and those of the former Ukraine of the Hetmans who were now under Russian influence. At this centre of culture, the cross roads of different cultural influences, on a soil rich in historic Ukrainian memories, a great impetus was given to the Ukrainian national movement. The influence of Polish revolutionaries gave it a definitely radical tinge.

It was in Kiev, midway in the forties of the Nineteenth century, that a secret society was founded which drew up the first political programme for Ukrainians. This Society, called "The Brotherhood of SS Cyril and Methodius", in honor of the Apostles of the Slavic lands, united the flower of the Ukrainian patriots of the time, men who had a decisive influence on the further development of the Ukrainian national renaissance. Among them were the historian Kostomarov, Professor of the University of Kiev; Kulish, a well-known literary man; Markovich, an ethnographer of note; Bilozersky, who played an important role in the Ukrainian national movement as editor; and finally, Taras Shevchenko, the greatest Ukrainian poet. The last named was a peasant's son, who only shortly before had been bought out of serfdom. The first volume of his poems, published in 1840 in St. Petersburg, made his name extremely popular in the Ukraine and procured him literary fame. His influence on the development of the Ukrainian national movement was extremely important. Members of the "Brotherhood" were of a different social position from those of former Masonic lodges and political societies of the first decades of the Nineteenth century; instead of aristocrats and rich landed proprietors, we here encounter sons of the middle and even the poorest classes, including a former serf. This was the class which, in the forties, entered the arena of public life in the intellectual field

and took the place of the former nobles. In modern times this class is called "intelligentsia".

The "Brotherhood of SS Cyril and Methodius" was of short duration. Hardly had they formulated their programme and begun practical activity when the government was informed of their existence; its members were arrested, brought to St. Petersburg and after a summary trial by the authorities, punished very severely with imprisonment and exile. Only after ten years, following the death of Tsar Nicholas I who personally conducted the trial and chose the punishments, were the members of the Brotherhood allowed to return to their literary and scientific activities. The ideas put forward by them in the programme of the Brotherhood were, however, of enormous importance for the Ukraine; we can safely say that they determined the chief lines of development of the Ukrainian national revival for a long time to come.

The programme of the Brotherhood, who had put themselves under the protection of the Slav Apostles in order to stress their common Slavic aims, is best seen from the text of the proclamation written by Kostomarov: "To brother Ukrainians! We believe that all Slavic peoples should unite, that every one of them should have its own Commonwealth and settle its affairs independently from others. Each people should have its own constitution, language and literature. To the Slavic peoples belong, we affirm, Muscovites, Ukrainians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Bulgars and Slovenes. There should be one Seim or Slavic Rada (Parliament) where the representatives of all Slavic Republics could meet and settle the affairs of the whole Slavic Union. Each country should have its leader elected for several years, and at the head of the whole Slavic Union there should be a leader, also elected for several years. In each Republic freedom and equality should be introduced and social classes should be abolished. Representative members as well as all officials should be elected, not according to their birth or wealth, but according to their gifts and attainments.

The laws and the administration of the whole Union as well as of the separate Republics should be based on the Holy Christian Faith”.

The Constitution of the Brotherhood supplies further details about the Slavic Federation of which its members were dreaming. According to it the political and spiritual union of the Slavic peoples was the true objective at which they must aim. Kiev should stand outside the States and should be the place where the General Seim (Parliament) should meet. Each State should have a President elected for four years. The General President was also to be elected for four years.

As is seen from extant documents, the struggle against serfdom was the most immediate of the practical aims of the Brotherhood who pledged themselves to carry on ceaseless propaganda in literature, schools and so on, in order to educate a new generation of nobles in the abolitionist spirit. At the same time they considered it necessary at the outset to spread education among the masses by publishing popular and easily understood books and papers in order to raise their level of culture. The plans of the Ukrainian idealists were not destined to be realized, but their ideas were not lost. The struggle against serfdom became the theme of Ukrainian literature. We can safely say that before serfdom was abolished by the government, it had already received its death-blow from Ukrainian and Russian literature.

176. Russian Policy in the Ukraine of the Right Bank.

The whole regime of Tsar Nicholas (1825-1855) was characterized by the blackest political reaction. Starting with the cruel suppression of the “Decabrist uprising”, he declared from the outset an irreconcilable hostility to all liberal ideas. The chief principles on which the Russian Empire was to be based were declared to be autocracy, Orthodoxy and nationality. Orthodoxy meant the exclusive domination of one Orthodox Church, which was entirely subjected to the temporal power and made to serve exclusively the existing political regime. Au-

ocracy meant not only concentration of the whole power in the hands of one absolute monarch, but also the exclusion of the people from all participation in political life, the abolition of all forms of self-government and the giving over of the whole enormous State government machinery with all its complicated economic functions, into the hands of an irresponsible bureaucracy free of every public control. The third principle of the political system of the Russian Empire was nationality: this meant the domination of the Great-Russians or Muscovites and the complete stifling of all the national characteristics of all the numerous other peoples of the Empire. All this was to be maintained by strict centralization which proceeded from the idea of autocracy. All the provinces were to be ruled from one centre, St. Petersburg, where the threads from all the ends of the empire converged. Even local affairs of minor importance were to be reported to St. Petersburg and decided there. Local agents, even in the highest post of a Governor General, were compelled to refer every detail to the Central government or even to the Tsar himself.

On the surface, this enormous State machine could impress by its ostensible shapeliness, by its seemingly integrated function and by its outward order. But all this order was built solely on the fear of punishment and consisted of a purely mechanical fulfillment of orders. The smallest opportunity to escape control led to fearful abuses of power and unprecedented venality. The chief reason for this was the fact that the whole State edifice was based on the slavery of the masses, who never ceased to be dissatisfied and disturbed, to be in a state of unrest even in Muscovy where serfdom had already existed for centuries and to feel their bondage acutely.

The situation in the Ukraine was even more complicated through special local circumstances. The Russian government was always afraid of the spectre of Ukrainian separatism and deeply mistrusted the Ukrainian population. Even when Ukrainians showed signs of official patriotism, as in 1812 and 1830 when whole regi-

ments of volunteers were raised by them, after the danger had passed these armies were immediately disbanded with harsh and cruel measures and even exiled, as were the Cossacks who were sent to Kuban. When Prince Repnin, Governor General of the Ukraine, began proposing plans for the amelioration of the hard economic lot of the Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants, and by his humane administration won their affection, he was suspected of Ukrainian patriotism and separatism, deprived of his post and exiled abroad. In the trial of the "Brotherhood of SS Cyril and Methodius", the Tsar saw nothing other than the intention of Ukrainians to separate from Russia and renew their independent existence under their elected Hetmans. The Polish uprising of 1830 indirectly hastened the abolition of all traces of Ukrainian autonomy. The Magdeburg Law or municipal self-government was definitely abolished in the towns of the Ukraine of the Left Bank. This abolition was once more confirmed by the ukase of 1835, and in 1842 the so-called Lithuanian Statute, which had entirely become Ukrainian Law, was also suspended and uniform Russian legislation introduced. In Kiev, together with the abolition of self-government, the Municipal Militia (Police), composed of about 2,000 men armed and clothed after Cossack fashion, was disbanded. Ukrainian merchants were forcibly transferred to Kievan suburbs and Muscovite merchants ordered for the purpose from Russia, were settled in the centre of the town.

Ukrainian nobles were put on a par with Russian nobles and at last even the post of the "Little Russian" Governor General was cancelled in order that nothing should remain of the former distinctness of this territory. Henceforth, it was to be uniform with other Russian provinces. The Ukraine of the Right Bank was differently situated, especially after the Polish uprising of 1830-31, when the Russian Government was more concerned about the Polish menace than about the Fronde of Ukrainian gentry of the Left Bank and all the dreams of Ukrainian patriots about the Cossack and Hetmans.

Statistics dating from 1838, give the population of the three Ukrainian provinces of the Right Bank; Kiev, Volynia and Podolia. There were 4,200,000 Ukrainian peasants, serfs of Polish landowners. The gentry, mostly Poles, numbered 100,000 of whom only about one-third were landowners possessing large and medium sized properties. About 65,000 were nobles who only had small estates or even no land at all, but were tenants or agents of the great landowners. The Polish szlachta, like the Russian nobles, were free from all taxation and duties. The town population numbering 341,000 were only to an insignificant extent Ukrainians; most were Jews who in large numbers had followed the Polish nobles from Poland. They now controlled almost all the commerce, leased from the landowners mills, breweries, inns and alehouses, ferries on the rivers, sometimes small estates and occasionally those who were rich rented large estates with the right to exact serf labor from the peasants.

Although the Russian government did not adopt the same methods against the Polish revolutionaries as the Austrian government did in Galicia in 1846, when they armed Ukrainian peasants against their Polish landlords, the Russian Field Marshal Osten-Sacken in 1831, published a proclamation to the peasants in the Ukraine of the Right Bank inviting them to denounce those of their landlords who joined the Polish uprising and arrest those whom they saw in arms. In the proclamation the peasants were promised that they should never again become serfs of the landlords who had joined the rebellion. This proclamation was read in the churches throughout the three provinces and was greeted with enthusiasm by the peasants. The attempted uprising of the Poles on Ukrainian territories was abortive, but after it had been suppressed, the Russian government quite forgot to keep its promise.

The Ukrainian masses were reduced to a point of extreme backwardness and ignorance. The Orthodox clergy could not help them much as they also were poorly educated, humiliated, poverty stricken and in complete

material dependence on the Polish landlords. Nothing was done for the popular education. The Russian government, having closed the Polish schools, opened new Russian ones but they were meant only for the privileged class of nobles.

Since the Polish uprising of 1831, the Russian government had realized that the surest means of weakening the Polish element, politically dangerous to them, would be to improve the position of the peasant-serfs of the Polish landlords. But Tsar Nicholas I held the principle of serfdom as sacred and dared not attempt anything against it. Soon after his accession to the throne he declared in a session of the State Council: "I recognize that every thought of setting the serfs free would be a criminal attempt on the safety and well-being of the empire". In time Tsar Nicholas came to the conclusion that the slavery should somehow be abolished. During the thirty years of his reign five secret commissions sat and deliberated various projects for peasant reform, but to the end of his life, Nicholas I did not dare to take any practical steps in this direction.

The post of Governor General of Kiev was occupied in 1838 by General Bibikov. He was a typical reactionary, stubbornly opposed to every liberal thought, and in his administrative practice acted the despot to perfection. But he was an intelligent and an active man. He very soon grasped the abnormal situation, unfavorable to the State interests of the Russian empire, and endeavored to do something to improve the economic and legal position of the peasants in his province. By severe measures he rebuffed the political aspirations of the Polish nobles, and in order to lessen their influence found it necessary to put some check on their exploitation of the serfs. First, Bibikov dealt with the numerous small szlachta who especially oppressed the peasants, being intermediaries between them and the wealthy landowner as stewards, agents or dependents of the latter. At the time of the Polish uprising these poor szlachta had provided a contingent of armed insurgents. During 1840-45 a special

commission under Bibikov himself reduced 64,000 Polish nobles who had not adequate documentary proof of their standing, from the status of gentry to that of free peasants or burgesses. Later these former szlachta, having been compelled to work mostly in agriculture, became merged in the local Ukrainian population and adopted their language, ways of life, habits and customs.

Bibikov's measures for the amelioration of the condition of the peasants began with the category of the so-called State serfs. These were the peasants who worked on the lands of the confiscated Roman Catholic monasteries or on those belonging to Polish Landowners who, having taken part in the uprising, had forfeited their estates to the government. These State domains with their serfs were usually leased by Poles or Jews. The tenants cruelly exploited the peasants in order to obtain the most out of the estates. Bibikov succeeded in obtaining a reform measure from the government, according to which these peasants were to pay a certain regular tax to the State treasury and were allowed to work as small tenants on their own homesteads on the land that belonged to the State. Thus a certain number of peasants in the three provinces were freed from serfdom. Even more important was his reform of 1847, according to which the work of the serfs was strictly regulated in the sense that only a certain number of days were due to the landlords, and if they wished to employ the peasants in excess of this, they had to pay them according to the rate fixed by the authorities. Moreover, the character of work was adapted to the sex and age of the serfs. All taxation for the landlords was abolished, Sundays and feast days were to be observed. Certain limitations were introduced with regard to the rights of landlords to enforce or prohibit marriages of their serfs, to force them to enlist or to punish them by exile to Siberia. The work of the serfs was regulated according to the seasons of the year and it was prohibited to make changes transferring winter work to summer and vice versa. This

reform introduced by Bibikov was known under the name of "Inventory Regulations".

The "Inventory Regulations" were, of course, far from being the enfranchisement of the peasants from serfdom. Yet to a certain extent, they protected the persons and properties of the peasants from the arbitrary power of the landlords and somewhat improved their position. These reforms, however, came to nothing for Bibikov vacated the post of Governor General in 1852, and a liberal, Prince Vassilchikov was nominated instead. He issued "supplements" to the "Inventory Regulations" of Bibikov which nullified the regulations, and the serfs were again oppressed, even more grievously than ever before.

In consequence of these vacillations in the official policy towards serfdom, the peasants became extremely upset. Here and there they revolted and were usually cruelly suppressed. The "Inventory Regulations", being very loosely worded, themselves led to misunderstandings, the landlords reading them in one sense and the serfs in another. In consequence the peasants very often refused to do any work at all: the landlords called in the police and military force and the culprits were severely punished.

177. Kievan "Cossacks" of 1855.

These outbreaks were very numerous, but the most important occurred in 1855 as result of a misunderstanding of the Tsar's manifesto concerning the Crimean war. It took place in the middle of Kiev province and spread over eight districts covering almost half the province. In the spring of 1855, soon after the outbreak of the war, Tsar Nicholas I published an appeal to the population inviting his subjects to join the army as volunteers and defend Russia against the coalition of England, France and Turkey. Some vague passages in the manifesto, which was written in the Russian language and solemnly read in the churches, were naturally misunderstood by the Ukrainian peasants owing to their imperfect

knowledge of Russian. The people interpreted those passages in the way familiar to them: they understood the manifesto as an order from the Tsar to organize Cossack regiments and go to war. The districts concerned were these territories where the Cossack past still lived in popular memory, was cherished and expected to return. Thus the appeal to join the army and to fight fell on very fertile ground. In some villages the priests, wishing no doubt to bring the matter home to them, explained that they must rise in defence of their faith and their native country as their ancestors, the Cossacks, had done. The peasants started to form detachments and demanded that the clergy should administer the oath to them and enroll them as Cossacks. All work for the landlords was, of course, abandoned as the peasants were convinced that enrolment as Cossacks set them free. When in some villages the priests tried to explain their error they would not believe and even used violence against the clergy, accusing them of having hidden the true manifesto granting the peasants freedom. Police and military detachments were sent to reduce them to order. The peasants offered resistance. More military force was sent, their resistance was broken and now cruel reprisals were taken against them. Thousands of peasants, both men and women, were imprisoned and flogged. Hundreds were sent to Siberia as convicts. This extremely tragic episode is known in history under the name of the "Kievan Cossacks of 1855". We can safely say that there innocent people suffered for their mistake and paid in blood and tears for their aspirations to freedom. The much hoped-for freedom was, however, not far away, and the disaster of the Crimean war hastened its coming.

CHAPTER XXVII

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(178) Revival of Ukrainian National Movement in Russia After the Crimean War. (179) Peasant Reform of 1861. (180) Suppressions of Ukrainians in Russia. (181) Galicia Under Austrian Rule. (182) Emancipation of Serfs in Austria. (183) Beginning of National Renaissance in Galicia. (184) Relations With the Ukraine of the Dnieper.

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178. Revival of Ukrainian National Movement in Russia After the Crimean War.

Russia's breakdown in the Crimean war meant the collapse of the whole governmental system of Tsar Nicholas I. The bureaucratic police regime did not stand the severe strain of a war against a coalition of European powers. Russia proved to be insufficiently prepared for war. The communications were bad. The military commissariats showed complete incompetence. The army trained to a soulless, formal discipline, fought courageously but, deprived of good leadership, suffered heavy losses. In technical armament Russia was far behind her enemies. Failure and terrible casualties began to agitate public opinion. Tsar Nicholas could not bear the shame of the collapse of his whole system and it was even rumored that he committed suicide by poisoning himself. The throne passed in 1855 to his son Alexander II, who had been brought up in a liberal spirit by the well-known Russian poet, Zhukovski. Russian public opinion greeted the new Tsar with enthusiasm, expecting from him reform and an alleviation in the severe regime of his predecessor. Relief came as if of itself, even before the new Tsar had made any changes or given any fresh orders. The press began to adopt a tone it had not previously known, and loudly declared the necessity for reform. There was a new stir in literature. People felt easier and used an altogether new language. The new Tsar, soon after his accession, granted an amnesty to the members of the Ukrainian Brotherhood of SS Cyril and

Methodius, and all the more important members, Kostomarov, Kulish, Shevchenko, Bilozersky and others, assembled in St. Petersburg, at that time the headquarters of the Ukrainian national movement.

The general revival which spread throughout all cultivated and educated circles in the whole of Russia also affected Ukrainians. The entire attention of the best representatives of the Ukrainian movement was directed to the expected emancipation of the serfs. Compared with the problem of serfdom, all other questions took a second place. Russian and Ukrainian literature co-operated in propaganda for this purpose; Russian reviews gave a place to Shevchenko's poems in their column; the great Russian novelist, Turgenev, translated into Russian Ukrainian peasant novels by Marco Vovchok,* which were an open indictment of serfdom and played in the emancipation of the serfs in Russia an analogous role to Mrs. Beecher Stowe's "Uncle Tom's Cabin" in the Abolitionist movement in the United States. The peasants and their lot now became the focus of all the thoughts of the Ukrainian "intelligentsia", already prepared by Romanticism for the idealization of the common people as bearers of high moral principles in life. Serfdom was there regarded as the worst of social evils and the greatest injustice which must be removed as soon as possible. These ideas were the foundation stone of the whole movement which characterized this period in Russia, Poland and the Ukraine, and which later received the name of "narodnitstvo".**

In the Ukraine this movement had a distinct nationalistic bias. The Ukrainian "narodniki"** regarded Cossacks and peasants not only as the bearers of those high moral qualities which the cultivated classes were supposed to have long since lost, but as the sole representatives of the Ukrainian nation, in contradiction to the polonized or Russianized nobles. Thus to the Uk-

* Pseudonym of Maria Markovich (1834-1907).

**From "Narod"—the people or nation.

rainian "narodniki" drawing closer to the people, to their language, traditions and folklore, meant also a return to the nationality of their ancestors disregarded by the preceding generations. Thus the Ukrainian "narodniki" were led to view their national history in a critical light: the time of Ukrainian sovereignty, the Hetman period, now meant to them the beginnings of serfdom. The only heroes in the eyes of the "narodniki" were those of the Cossack leaders who had unequivocally striven for popular freedom and whose memory the common people had gratefully enshrined as such in their traditions and songs and above all, the Zaporogian Cossacks. The Ukrainian "narodniki" were thus breaking with the tradition of Ukrainian sovereignty and began to view the Ukrainian renaissance not as a return to political national independence, but as a self-imposed duty of the "intelligentsia", especially of noble origin, "to return to the people", as they said, to adopt popular speech, popular interests and ideals and to sacrifice everything in the service of the common people.

In the meantime these people still remained in bondage. So the whole activity of the Ukrainian "narodniki" was directed to propaganda in favor of emancipation, as well as in attempts to persuade the authorities and public opinion of the necessity for this reform. At the same time school books were hastily prepared for the future popular schools, containing all sorts of elementary reading in the Ukrainian language which they adapted and developed in order to make it a serviceable tool for the purpose of popular enlightenment and education, so neglected during the last century. The study of Ukrainian political history was abandoned for investigations into the past and present life of the common people, which was the object of special attention by the "narodniki". The collection and publication of folklore was especially cultivated.

St. Petersburg, as we said, became the headquarters of the Ukrainian national movement in the "narodniki" period. A Ukrainian Society (Hromada) was founded

there with Kostomarov and Kulish at the head. The wealthy Ukrainian landowners, Tarnovsky and Halahan, gave funds for a Ukrainian publishing centre and printing office, where a number of important Ukrainian works were published. After long and fruitless attempts to obtain permission from the authorities for a Ukrainian daily paper, Bilozerski at last obtained permission for a monthly review, "Osnova", which appeared in 1861-62, and became the central organ of the Ukrainian national movement. In the Ukraine Societies, analogous to that in St. Petersburg, were founded under the name of "Hromada" in Poltava, Chernigov, Kharkov, Kiev and other places. These Societies organized Ukrainian schools, published and distributed Ukrainian books and promoted Ukrainian theatrical performances, concerts and lectures. Wearing the national costume, singing popular songs and using Ukrainian language, gradually came into fashion.

179. Peasant Reform of 1861.

The new imminent emancipation of the serfs was the central point of attention. The new Tsar mentioned it for the first time in the spring of 1855 in Moscow, where he received the delegates from the nobles. He told them that "emancipation must come" and that "it were better to do it from above rather than wait until it is done from below", by the serfs themselves. He, however, proposed not to act in any hurry and recommended the nobles to take counsel as to the manner in which this reform should be carried out. The actual preparation for the reform began by the establishment in the autumn of 1856 of a secret Committee, who were to consider a "gradual emancipation, without sharp and sudden revolution, according to a detailed and carefully prepared plan". The government hesitated for a long time, not knowing how to take up the work. At one time they gave permission to the press to write about it, at another they forbade even the mention of emancipation. When the nobles, landowners of the Lithuanian and White-

Russian provinces, offered to emancipate their serfs of their own accord settling the conditions with them, the Tsar expressed his appreciation and ordered that a special committee should be formed in each of these provinces in order to settle the plan of this voluntary emancipation. Following this example other provinces began to organize committees. The Secret Committee that had sat since 1856 in St. Petersburg was publicly announced in 1858 and openly began their preparatory work under the name of the Chief Commission in co-operation with the work being done by the provincial Committees.

In the Central Commission as well as in the provincial committees, an obdurate struggle at once set in between the representatives of the owners and those who defended the interests of the serfs. In the interests of the nobles the former tried to make the allotments of land to the liberated serfs as small as possible and to make them pay for the land as much as possible, the latter endeavoring to obtain the best possible conditions for the peasants. General Rostovtsev, President of the Central Commission, was a sincere defender of the interests of the serfs and was well supported by Milutin, Minister of Home Affairs. But when Rostovtsev died in 1860, the Tsar nominated to his post Count Panin, the champion of the landowners, who succeeded in considerably curtailing the scheme elaborated by General Rostovtsev. At last the scheme was finished, accepted by the State Council and proclaimed in the form of an Imperial manifesto on the 19th of February, 1861.

The emancipation of the serfs was to be spread over two years. The peasants were to receive allotments of land as their private property and had to pay for it by instalments during twenty years. The size of the allotment for every adult male was to be determined according to the quality of the soil and the condition of farming in general. For this purpose all the provinces of the Russian Empire were divided into special groups. In the Ukraine the peasants received on an average about

11 or 12 acres ($4\frac{1}{2}$ dessiatines) for each adult male. The land was estimated on the whole at more than its real value and the peasants overpaid by about 45%. A certain category of serfs, the so-called "dvorovi" or household serfs who had been taken by the owners from agriculture to perform various household duties, received no land at all. Generally speaking the peasants, though receiving personal freedom, did not receive all the rights which other classes of the Russian population enjoyed. They were put under the special protection of the local administration, were restricted in their movements by the commune to which they belonged, and were subject to corporal punishment.

The peasants were not satisfied with the reform, since it did not fulfil their expectations. In several places in Russia and also in the Ukraine the authorities used military force in order to keep the peasants down. The liberal intelligentsia were also very dissatisfied with the curtailed scheme. Nevertheless, former primitive slavery was abolished and the educated classes of the Russian population were faced with the task of spreading elementary education among the emancipated masses of the serfs and helping them to become more or less responsible citizens by giving them elementary political ideas to widen their horizon. It was the more necessary to do this as the government had promised reform of the judiciary and administration and had in view the introduction of provincial and municipal self-government. Attention in the Ukraine also was centred on the organization of elementary popular schools, the publication of elementary textbooks and the creation of popular educational literature. In a comparatively short time quite important results were achieved in this field. Kulish organized, in St. Petersburg, the publication of popular educational books and textbooks for schools. Kostomarov organized a public collection of funds for this purpose. Others devoted themselves to the organization of schools in towns and in villages. Two types of schools were started, those for children and those for adults; the

latter were mostly evening and Sunday schools for working people. Many students abandoned their studies in order to work as teachers in the elementary schools in villages, others took posts of village scribes, others again took up colportage of books, going about from one fair to another. This was the beginning of the "return to the people" which, when the Russian government later relapsed into reaction, took the character of revolutionary and socialistic propaganda. In the beginning, however, there was nothing subversive or revolutionary in the intentions of all these idealist youths, mostly students of both sexes, who often sacrificed their studies, gave up their future careers and even broke with their parents in order to "return to the people" and take up the service of the masses, wishing nothing but to raise the level of their culture.

The Ukrainian national movement, now entirely consecrated to cultural work among the masses, soon found obstacles in its path. The landowners, afraid for their interests, aroused the provincial administration and even addressed the central authorities direct with denunciations against such enlightenment of the people. This was especially true in the Ukraine of the Right Bank and they succeeded in bringing about various restrictions and prohibitions in these educational activities of the Ukrainian "intelligentsia". Besides the obstacles set by authorities, the Ukrainian national movement soon met with enemies among the Russian "intelligentsia" also. At first Russian liberals and the Russian liberal press even showed sympathy with Ukrainian literature and Ukrainian national aspirations. Russian reviews of both sections, the so-called "Westerners" (*zapadniki*) and "Slavophiles", readily published in their columns articles and works in the Ukrainian language or in defence of the right of Ukrainians to an independent cultural development, also the result of researches into Ukrainian history or folklore. They saw in Ukrainians allies in the work of obtaining the liberation of the serfs. But by 1861 their attitude had altered. The development of Ukrainian literature

and the growth of Ukrainian cultural national activity caused alarm in chauvinistic Great-Russian groups which, though calling themselves "Slavophiles", actually wished the domination of all Slavic peoples, or to use the expression of the Russian poet, Pushkin, that "all Slavic rivers should unite in the Russian Sea". In the columns of the Slavophil press and later in the reactionary papers, voices began to be heard saying that the Ukrainian language was not a language at all but only a dialect, and as such, should not be encouraged to develop its literature; that using the Ukrainian language would only defer the ultimate union of the Ukrainian population with the great Russian, and so on. On the Polish side voices were raised declaring that Ukrainians were only a branch of the Polish nation, and that the Ukrainian language was only a dialect of Polish. The Ukrainian national cultural movement was represented by the Polish press as the result of a foreign intrigue designed to harm Polish interests and weaken Polish influence in the Ukraine of the Right Bank of the Dnieper, which they represented as purely Polish territory.

The Ukrainian review "Osnova" energetically refuted all these attacks. Kostomarov and Kulish in their brilliant articles unmasked Great-Russian chauvinism and intolerance, explaining them as survival of Muscovite dark ages as well as the groundless pretensions of the Poles on Ukrainian territory and population. According to declarations made by representatives of the Ukrainian cultural movement of "narodnitstvo", the partisans of this movement or "narodniki" thought it in the interest of the masses to renounce the political independence and sovereignty of the Ukraine. Thus Kostomarov, in answering the accusations of separatism, formulated the Ukrainian national programme in very modest terms: free development of Ukrainian literature, education and schools for the Ukrainian people. He promised the loyalty of Ukrainians to the Russian State and denounced all political aspirations. Kostomarov brought up this controversy in the columns of the most influential Russian

periodical of the period, the "Kolokol", (The Bell) published in London by Alexander Herzen, a political Russian refugee. In his letter to the editor of the "Kolokol" in the beginning of 1860, Kostomarov thus formulated Ukrainian aspirations: Ukrainians are most grateful to Emperor Alexander II for his intentions in the direction of liberation, expressed not in words only but in deeds, so that the masses may enjoy equal rights before the law with the nobles because Ukrainians, according to their old traditions, do not accept any other conception of freedom. "Besides, we wish", continued Kostomarov, "that the authorities not only would not hinder Ukrainians in our wish to develop our literature and language, but would help us in order that the teaching in the elementary schools in the Ukraine should be given in the native Ukrainian language which our people understand and not in the official Russian language which is strange to them. Apart from this we have no wishes other than those common to all Russians. We wish that other Slav people would unite with us, even under the sceptre of the Russian Tsar, if this Tsar becomes the sovereign of free peoples and not the autocrat of an all devouring Tataro-German Muscovy. In the future Slavic Union in which we believe and which we expect to see, our Southern Rus must constitute a separate State-organism uniting all territories where the Ukrainian language is spoken, conserving a unity based not on pernicious deadly centralization, but on a definite feeling of equality and the consciousness of our own interests". This outline of the Ukrainian programme closed with an energetic apostrophe to Russians and Poles: "Let neither Russians nor Poles call theirs the lands populated by our people!"

The Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-Polish controversy came to a climax when the Poles started another uprising against Russia in 1863. In the preparations for this uprising, Polish noble landowners in the Ukrainian provinces of the Right Bank and in Kiev joined. They contributed, however, in a way to strengthen the Ukrainian national ranks. We have already mentioned

the Romantic Ukrainophiles among the polonized gentry in the Ukraine and the so-called Ukrainian school in Polish literature. A group of these platonic Ukrainian patriots started a movement which offered a practical solution of the Ukrainian question for the Polish or polonized szlachta in the Ukraine. A number of students of Kiev University, belonging to this class of now polonized former Ukrainian nobles, left the Polish national camp and came over to the Ukrainians. They were influenced by democratic ideas reaching the Ukraine from Western Europe, mostly through Polish revolutionaries, exiles of 1831. Like the "narodnitstvo" of the Left Bank of the Dnieper, they tried to approach the Ukrainian masses and received the nickname of "khlopomany".* The partisans of this movement, like the "narodniki", carried on propaganda for the liberation of the serfs, and for democratic reform. They also thought that some service was due to the people on the part of the nobles as a sort of expiation for the faults of their fathers and grandfathers. A group of Polish students, "khlopomans", with Volodimir Antonovich at their head, openly declared themselves Ukrainians, left Polish societies and came over to the Ukrainians. They were accused of treason and disloyalty but in answer to these reproaches and accusations Antonovich published a "Confession" in the columns of the Ukrainian review "Osnova". He said: "Polish nobles living in the Ukraine have two alternatives before them. Either to love the people amidst whom they grew up and live, take an interest in their welfare, return to the nationality once abandoned by their ancestors and by work and devotion gradually expiate all the wrongs done to the people which have brought up several generations of Polish colonists and whom these colonists have repaid by religious persecution, contempt of their morality and customs, by humiliation of their national dignity and economic exploitation, or they may remain as hated strangers, parasites and exploiters,

* From "khlop"—Polish for peasant.

enemies of this people. For himself, Antonovich said, he chose the first one unafraid of any reproaches and with his conscience at rest, he returned to the nationality of his ancestors and from the camp of strangers came over into the ranks of those who wished to work for the interests of the Ukraine and her people". Antonovich was followed by a moderate number of young nobles from among the Polish szlachta in the Ukraine. Though few in number, they were mostly very gifted men who in time rendered great literary or scientific services to the Ukraine. It will be sufficient to name Antonovich himself, who became a great historian and professor at the University of Kiev, Constantine Mikhalchuk, a well-known linguist; Boris Poznansky, a notable student of folklore; Thaddey Rilsky, an economist, and a number of others.

180. Suppressions of Ukrainians in Russia.

At first the Russian authorities paid no special attention to the growth of the Ukrainian national movement in the early sixties, seeing their exclusive occupation with cultural, literary and educational work. The Russian local authorities took to publishing in the Ukrainian language various orders and proclamations to the Ukrainian population in order to be properly understood by them. Kulish was commissioned to translate into Ukrainian the legislation about the emancipation of the serfs and the peasant reform. The School Board in Kiev edited several text-books for Ukrainian schools. This tolerant attitude was, however, very soon changed. The Polish uprising of 1863 gave the reactionary press an opportunity of also accusing Ukrainians: after the Polish uprising, they said, it will be the Ukrainians next if the government does not take precautions in time. The Ukrainian national movement, they said, was only a result of the "Polish intrigue" and was invented by the Poles in order to weaken Russia. A campaign of persecution planned and organized against the Ukrainian cultural movement, Ukrainian elementary schools and

literature now broke out in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov and other towns. A wave of chauvinism spread throughout Russia. The Russian press and authorities were inundated with articles and letters full of calumnies and denunciations against the Ukrainian national movement. This chauvinistic campaign in the press awoke the traditional distrust of the Russian government towards Ukrainians. The activity of the "narodniki" and "khlopomany" for the enlightenment and education of the Ukrainian masses, made the Russian authorities afraid of revolutionary propaganda; and the development of Ukrainian literature brought back the spectre of Ukrainian political separatism. The Russian government, indeed, had never believed that the Ukrainians had altogether renounced political independence or autonomy and no assurances from Ukrainian patriots of the time could make them believe that the Ukrainian national movement had only literary, cultural and educational aims. Local administrators kept on reporting the successes of the Ukrainian national movement among the rural population, in towns, in the army and so on. Repressions then began, in 1862, directed against all Ukrainian societies and centres of cultural work in Kiev, Kharkov, Poltava, Chernigov and other towns. Many persons belonging to the Ukrainian intelligensia were arrested, imprisoned and after a summary enquiry, without any trial, sent into exile in the extreme North of Russia. The Ukrainian schools were all closed. Tsar Alexander's aide-de-camp, Mezentsev, was sent into the Ukraine with a special mission to enquire into Ukrainian propaganda. The Minister of Home Affairs, Valuev, prohibited by his order of 1863, the printing of Ukrainian text-books for schools and of popular reading books giving as a reason: "The Ukrainian language does not exist, has never existed and must not exist". In consequence of these repressions the Ukrainian national movement came to a standstill which lasted until the beginning of the seventies, when it again revived. Unfavorable conditions in Russia made Ukrainian patriots turn their eyes to

the part of Ukrainian territory now under Austrian rule in quite different political conditions, and where a Ukrainian revival had for some time been under way under the influence of Ukrainian literature in Russia. This was Galicia.

181. Galicia Under Austrian Rule.

Galicia was added to Austria in 1772. In order to straighten the frontier of their possessions in the East and put Galicia in communication with Transylvania, the Austrian government annexed in 1774 the northern part of Moldavia with the towns Czernowitz, Sereth and Suchava, on the ground that this territory once formed part of Galicia. This land, indeed, belonged to the former Galician Princedom under the Galician-Volynian princes, and was only seized by Moldavian rulers in the Fourteenth century. The country was called Bukovina. Its population was Ukrainian in the north and mixed Ukrainian-Rumanian in the south. Though the Moldavian Prince protested, his Overlord, the Turkish Sultan, gave Austria his consent in 1775, and Moldavian protestations were of no avail. For some time Bukovina was under Austrian military government; in 1786 it was united to Galicia, remaining thus until 1849 when it was made a separate province.

Both Galicia and Bukovina came under Austrian rule in a very neglected state, economic and cultural. The upper classes of the Ukrainian population were polonized in Galicia, and Rumanianized in Bukovina; the Uniate clergy were much reduced in the Eighteenth century, both materially and morally. The country clergy were extremely poor and ignorant. In some places priests were even compelled to work for the landlords like serfs, and in 1772 the Austrian government made a special law in order to stop this. Though the Uniate clergy as well as the masses firmly adhered to their Eastern rite as the only feature of their Ukrainian nationality, even the more educated among them were losing courage and spirit. The Austrian authorities,

having observed the hard conditions of the Uniate clergy, took measures to improve it. As a beginning the level of education was raised by the founding of two Uniate clerical seminaries, one in Lvov, the other in Peremysl. The material and legal conditions of the clergy were also improved through different measures. This led to the raising of the level of the moral and intellectual life of the Uniate clergy.

The Austrian government, on the whole, paid attention to the state of education in Galicia and especially in elementary schools for the masses. Secondary education in Galicia was then completely in the hands of a few monastic orders who kept about a dozen schools teaching in Latin and Polish. Under Austrian rule they were changed into the German type of "High Schools", where the teaching of Polish was introduced only in 1815; the first "High School" in Bukovina was opened in 1808 in Czernowitz. The measures taken for primary education were more important, as both in Galicia and in Bukovina no elementary schools had existed until they came under Austrian rule. Three types of elementary schools were founded throughout the two provinces in 1774. There were the parish schools with teaching in the native language. The second type were schools with three years teaching in German, and the third type was the normal school of four years with teaching in German. The Ukrainian language was introduced in elementary schools as one of the "native" tongues.

Further, a University was founded in Lvov in 1784 with four Faculties, the teaching being in German with the exception of Theology which was taught in Latin. In order to prepare groups of educated clergy and officials from among the Ukrainians, the Austrian government founded in Lvov in 1787 a University College for theological and philosophical studies specially for Ukrainian students, the so-called "Studium Ruthenum", where the Ukrainian language was introduced. This College was also open to Ukrainians from Carpathian Ruthenia. "Studium Ruthenum" played an enormous role

in the cultural development of Ukrainians in Galicia. It produced an educated group from whom came many well-known Ukrainian scholars and political men. A Theological College was opened in 1827 in Bukovina which existed until 1875, when a University was opened in Czernowitz with three Faculties, Theology, Philosophy and Law.

Special attention was given to the economic position of Galicia and Bukovina and to social relations there, particularly with regard to the condition of the rural population. The census made in 1772 led to the so-called "rural" taxes paid on the basis of landownership. In 1775 Empress Maria Theresa issued orders to the nobles asking them not to overburden the serfs with duties. This order was, however, more or less of theoretical significance only. During Maria Theresa's reign everything remained as of old. With the accession of Joseph II (1780-1790) a new era began for Austria. Joseph II, a brilliant representative of what was termed "enlightened absolutism", was inspired by an enthusiastic wish to do his best for his subjects. "Joseph's conceptions", said the English historian Fife, "were so advanced that the most reckless innovators of the French Revolution could not add anything new ten years later". But in his endeavors to bring social and religious reforms to his "variegated" monarchy, Joseph II did not in the least take into account the different national characteristics of the different peoples, nor their traditions and customs, in which he saw nothing but superstitions and prejudices. He introduced centralization throughout the administration and the predominance of German as the official language and culture, disregarding local native tongues and culture. He closed the monasteries and convents and with their possessions created the so-called "religious funds" for charitable purposes. He prohibited all religious processions and pilgrimages, cancelled all privileges with regard to taxation and reformed the Universities by taking from them their clerical character. Having the best intentions for the benefit of his subjects,

he nevertheless roused against himself all those who cherished traditions, all those who were attached to their religions, to their national ways and customs. Thus a most varied collection of national groups, classes and individuals in the Austrian Monarchy became united in their opposition to the reformer on the throne. A month before his death Joseph II was compelled to repeal all his orders for the abolition of the old institutions in his Empire.

182. Emancipation of Serfs in Austria.

Among the Ukrainian people in Galicia, however, Emperor Joseph II left a good reputation. Having declared in 1781 his intention of "abolishing slavery and serfdom in his realm", the following year he published specially for Galicia an important order making various concessions to the serfs: although remaining under the jurisdiction of the landlords the peasants were to be free to marry, to apprentice their children or send them to school, and to work where they liked with the permission of the landlord, which the latter was compelled to give. Work for the landlord was limited to thirty days in the year. After this order several others followed which gradually reduced serfdom and freed the peasants from petty duties and taxation. The landlord's administration of justice was reformed in the sense that a certain knowledge of law was required and if the landlord did not pass his examination, he was compelled to pay a special judge who was called "justiciarius" or "mandator". Rural communes were allowed to choose their delegates or "plenipotentiaries" who sat in the Court of Justice. A government survey of taxable land (cadastre) was commenced in 1785 and finished in 1789. According to this survey new taxation was introduced on the principle that a peasant's land should serve to maintain him, and only the surplus was to go partly to the State Treasury and partly to the landlord. Thus 70% of his revenue remained to the peasant, 12% went to the State and 18% to the landlord, this being the price

of the serf's labor including all dues, whereas before this reform the landlord appropriated 80% leaving to the peasant 20% of his revenue. We can understand what a storm of protest was raised by the landlords. The next decree of Emperor Joseph II which was entirely revolutionary, replaced the work for the landlord by a tax paid by the serf. This decree was not put into effect as Joseph II died soon after.

During the reign of his successor, Leopold II (1790-1792) a certain reaction took place. But still Leopold II, though not so strong a partisan of the emancipation of the serfs as his brother, was sufficiently liberal to refuse to give effect to the wishes of the nobles to cancel all the reforms of Joseph II. He only rescinded the last decree substituting a money tax for the work for the landlord, but he gave strict injunctions to the administration to watch that the nobles did not hinder the peasants who wished to free themselves from all dependence by a money payment. But Leopold II soon died and his son Francis II (1792-1835) entirely neglected the question of the emancipation of the serfs. His reign was a period of decided reaction in all spheres of life. Austria was going through very hard times owing to constant wars against France and in consequence was totally ruined and on the verge of complete bankruptcy. Paper money issued in great quantities upset the Austrian exchange and led to the ruin of many private persons. It was necessary to restore the balance of the national finances. In these circumstances the government feared fresh economic trouble and was in no hurry to proceed to the liberation of the serfs. So peasant reform was put off for a long time. The position of the peasants became much worse after a new land survey was made in 1819, when many abuses were tolerated in assigning the possession of forests and grazing grounds almost everywhere to the landlords. Innumerable lawsuits took place between the peasants and the landlords in consequence of these abuses; peasants appealing to Joseph II's survey and the landlords to that of 1819, with

the result that the peasants invariably lost their suits. Many villages were thus economically ruined.

183. Beginning of National Renaissance in Galicia.

Reforms in Austria, though conducted in a bureaucratic manner and never completed, nevertheless helped Ukrainians to recover their courage and raise their hopes. Among the clergy in Galicia men began to appear who defended the rights of Ukrainians and demanded recognition for their language in literature and in general usage.

Ideas of Romanticism together with the renaissance of the Slavic peoples, Czechs and Poles, exercised an influence on the beginnings of the national revival of Ukrainians in Galicia. Still greater was the influence of modern Ukrainian literature from the Ukraine of the Dnieper. The pioneers of the Ukrainian revival in Galicia were three former students of the Uniate Seminary in Lvov, the so-called "Ruthenian Trinity"; Shashkevich, Vahilevich and Holovatsky. All three were sons of clergymen and themselves took orders. While still students they became enthusiastic about the ideas of the Ukrainian national revival and decided to develop it in Galicia, supported by contact with the Ukraine of the Dnieper and her rich historical and national tradition. In 1837 Shashkevich published a collection under the name of "Rusalka Dnistrova", the first book to be published in Galicia in the Ukrainian popular language. This book, in spite of its being promptly confiscated by the authorities, made a great impression on Ukrainian youths. Members of the "Ruthenian Trinity" collected and published popular songs, wrote articles to Czech, Polish and German periodicals about Ukrainians in Galicia, their life and folklore in order to awaken the interest of foreigners as well as Ukrainian themselves. The pioneers of the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia had to carry on their work under very hard and unfavorable conditions. Since the Congress of 1815 in Vienna, Austria was under the sway of a general political reaction. The

editor and police jealously watched the emergence of every new idea and pitilessly nipped it in the very bud. The Austrian government was especially suspicious of every evidence of national awakening among the Slavic people, regarding it as a menace to the status quo in the Austrian Empire. The Ukrainian collection "Rus-salka Dnistrova" could not be printed in Lvov but was printed as far away as Budapest and confiscated almost as soon as it appeared in Galicia. At that time the educated Ukrainians in Galicia belonged exclusively to the clergy. They were extremely conservative. Being grateful to the Austrian government for the reforms and their emancipation from Polish oppression, the Ukrainian clergy in Galicia were very reluctant to accept liberal and new ideas. Among the members of the older generation there were a few patriots attached to their Galician Ruthenia—the Latin name Ruthenia was adopted officially in Austria to designate Ukrainians in Galicia—but they were extremely discouraged and downhearted; they could not believe in the possibility of raising the Ukrainian population in Galicia by their own efforts alone. In consequence of the propaganda of the Russian "Slavophiles" relations were established between some of the Ukrainian clergy in Galicia and the leader of the Slavophiles, Professor Pogodin in Moscow, a notorious Muscovite nationalist. Thus the eyes of the Galician clergy now turned towards the mighty Russian empire as the only saviour for Ukrainians against Polish oppression and Austrian reaction. Russian Slavophiles sent them papers and reviews from Moscow and maintained a correspondence with them, assuring them of the "unity and identity of all Russian tribes" and persuading them of the impossibility of creating a new modern Ukrainian literature, and of the advantages of accepting Russian literature in a language so akin to Ukrainian. This was the beginning of the so-called "Moskvophil" movement in Galicia, born of discouragement and lack of self-reliance as well as of the illusion of a great powerful Russian empire which would liberate all the Slavs and

make them happy. Such thoughts among the elder generation of Ukrainians and the general reaction in Austria, caused great resistance to the efforts of the young Ukrainian generation to revive interest in their own nationality, and induce work for the well-being of the masses. Shashkevich, discouraged by unfavorable conditions, broke down and died young; Vahilevich soon followed him. Holovatsky alone survived and showed great energy in his manifold activities as ethnographer, linguist, folklorist, anthropologist and journalist. An article of his in a German review in 1847 in which he described the conditions of life of the Ukrainian people in Galicia and reproached his countrymen with their indifference to the national work met with great success. He outlined a programme for the improvement of the political, economic and cultural life of Ukrainians in Galicia. Plans were then made among the younger generation for future activity. But before anything could be carried out, the revolution of 1848 broke out in Vienna and opened up the field for political activities which up to then had been prohibited.

A few years before the outbreak of the revolution of 1848, Polish revolutionaries had been preparing a revolt against the Austrian government. In order to stultify this the Austrian authorities had set the peasants against the revolutionaries, who all belonged to the Polish nobility. In the Polish part of Galicia, near Tarnow, the Austrian government succeeded in inducing the peasants to attack their landlords on the ground that they were against the Emperor. The Ukrainian peasants in East Galicia, who also had grounds for thankfulness to the Emperor for reforms defending them against the arbitrary power of the Polish nobles without directly attacking the Polish revolutionaries, showed evident opposition to them and fidelity to the Austrian authorities. In order to recompense the loyal peasants, the Austrian government decided to complete the emancipation of the serfs by an Imperial decree of the 16th of April, 1848. The government was to buy the land from the landlords

and grant it to the emancipated serfs, who were to refund its value to the State over a period of 40 years. Here again the difficulties of the forests and grazing grounds were not definitely solved and later led to endless lawsuits which the peasants invariably lost, often being ruined thereby. Further, the noble landowners retained some of their former feudal rights as, for instance, the right to brew and distill and sell spirits, which also for a long time to come remained a source of many misunderstandings and of rightful dissatisfaction among the masses.

The attention of the authorities, however, as well as of all classes of the population was engaged by revolutionary events first in Hungary, then in the Austrian capital, Vienna, and at last throughout the entire Austrian Empire. The French Revolution of February, 1848, had repercussions throughout Europe and almost at once in Austria. By March, 1848, Metternich had to leave his post and the Emperor was obliged to satisfy the demands of the Hungarians for full autonomy. The Czechs followed with a proposal to unite Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, and demanded equal rights with the Austrian Germans in questions of education and administration, as well as the emancipation of the serfs, freedom of press and assembly, religious tolerance and so on. The convocation of a Pan-German Congress in Frankfurt in 1848, led to the convocation of a Pan-Slavic Congress in Prague in the same year where all the Slavic peoples of Austria were represented. The Polish revolutionaries in Galicia at first invited Ukrainians to act jointly with them, but the Ukrainians decided to act independently and began by a petition to the Emperor in the name of all Ukrainians in Austria, stating that the Ruthenians formed part of a great Slavic nation and that they were the autochthonous population of Galicia, having once had their own sovereign State there. They asked for the introduction of the Ukrainian language into the schools and for the publication of laws and governmental decrees in Ukrainian. State officials should

be compelled to know the Ukrainian language; Ukrainian Uniate and Orthodox clergy should have the same rights as Roman Catholic clergy; and Ruthenians (Ukrainians) should have access to all State offices. On the 2nd of May, 1848, a "General Ruthenian Council" (Holovna Ruska Rada) was founded which issued a declaration containing the programme of Ukrainian aspirations. It stated that the Galician Ukrainians or Ruthenians formed a part of the Ukrainian people, a great Slavic branch numbering fifteen millions. The former political independence was dwelt upon and the period of disintegration which must not return. Ruthenians were invited to awake and secure for themselves better conditions within the limits of the constitution given by the Austrian government. Following the General Council (Rada), Local Councils were constituted and the movement spread to the province. The activities of the "General Ruthenian Council" met with opposition in Polish circles where it was desired that Ukrainians should act jointly with the Poles. The polonized Ukrainian nobles formed a separate committee and wished to co-ordinate their activity with the Poles. When the latter began to organize their National Guards, the Ruthenians (Ukrainians) did the same, organizing battalions of "Ruthenian Guards" (Ruski striltsi).

The Austrian government showed themselves favorable to the demands of the Ukrainians who did not go so far in their aspirations as the Poles, showed no separatistic tendencies and everywhere affirmed their loyalty. The Viceroy of the emperor in Galicia, Count Stadion, recommended the government to use the Ukrainians as support because they were the loyal element in Galicia. Thus the alliance of the Ukrainians with the Austrian government began, and though it did not lead to any practical results for the Ukrainians, and did not in the least fulfil their hopes, the legend of an "Austrian intrigue" and of "Count Stadion having invented the Ukrainians in Galicia" was taken up by the Poles and spread against the Ukrainians.

Ukrainians had also taken part in the Slavic Congress in Prague. The General Ruthenian Council sent delegates there who were included in the same section as the Poles. Antagonism broke out in the Congress between the Ukrainians and the Poles, the former demanding the division of Galicia along national lines. By the mediation of the Czechs and the Russian political refugee, Bakunin, a compromise was reached; autonomy for Galicia, recognition of both languages, Polish and Ukrainian, separate elementary and secondary schools for both nations. The revolutionary turmoil interrupted the work of the Congress and they separated.

In the meantime a "Congress of Ukrainian scholars" met in Lvov numbering 118 members. Their object was to establish a uniform Ukrainian spelling, to separate the Ukrainian language from Church-Slavonic and scientifically establish the position of Ukrainian among the Slavic languages in its relation to Polish and Russian. Holovatsky then communicated the valuable results of his investigations into the Ukrainian language and, according to the well-known Slav linguist, Shafarik, proposed a division of the Russian group into three independent idioms, Russian, Ukrainian and White-Russian. The Congress decided to accept the so-called etymological Ukrainian orthography existing in the Ukraine of the Dnieper and a uniform grammar. Further the Congress declared for the introduction of the Ukrainian language into all types of schools in Galicia, and demanded the division of Galicia according to the ethnic principle, into Western or Polish and Eastern or Ukrainian. In the summer of 1848 the General Ruthenian Council (Holovna Rada Ruska) founded a Society under the name "Galician Ruthenian Matitsia" (Halitsko Ruska Matitsia), for publishing Ukrainian schoolbooks and generally to supervise educational affairs in the Ukrainian language. Late in 1848 a chair of Ukrainian language and literature was founded in the University of Lvov by the Imperial decree and Holovatsky was appointed

to it. He began his course in 1849 and very soon published his grammar of the Ukrainian language.

The first Austrian Parliament met in the summer of 1848; of 383 representatives 96 were from Galicia, and among them 39 Ukrainians who at once proposed measures for the division of Galicia into two parts, the Western or Polish and the Eastern or Ukrainian. This proposal was supported by a petition to the crown signed by 15,000 names. Ukrainian members representing peasants energetically demanded various changes in the laws for peasant reform, and above all a reduction in the price they had to pay to the landlords for the land assigned to them on their emancipation. But the Parliament was dissolved in March, 1849. Reaction took the upper hand in Austria, especially after the Hungarian revolution was put down with the help of the Russian army sent by Tsar Nicholas I. The constitution of 1848 was cancelled and the Austrian government returned once more to bureaucratic methods of rule. In the summer of 1851 the General Ruthenian Council (Rada) was dissolved and the Galician Ukrainians went to sleep for ten long years. Disappointment and discouragement at obtaining no results from the national revival of 1848-49 strengthened the Muskvophil party in Galicia; even Holovatsky very soon found himself in that camp.

A revival of the national movement came in 1860 when a new constitution was given, according to which local assemblies of representatives—called in Galicia "Seim"—elected representatives to the State Council (Reichsrat) in Vienna. The Seim in Galicia was composed of 150 representatives. During the first elections Ukrainians obtained 49 seats. A national struggle between the Poles and the Ukrainians at once began in the Galician Seim and continued without ceasing until the beginning of the Great War and the downfall of the Austrian Monarchy. The Poles held the majority of seats and Ukrainian proposals were always rejected. After the unsuccessful Polish uprising in Russia of 1863, national antagonism in Galicia increased and at the

same time the Muskvophil movement in Galicia grew considerably and from being merely cultural and literary, became distinctly political in character. In 1866 Austria was defeated by Prussia at Sadowa, and rumors were about that Galicia was going to be surrendered to Russia. This led to an open movement towards Russia among Galician Ukrainians. Even many Ukrainian patriots, despairing of obtaining anything from the Polish majority in the Seim, now expected everything from Russia and were ready to unite with the Muscovites. Holovatsky, Hushalevich, Naumovich, Diditsky, all talented Galician leaders, declared themselves for Russia. But Galicia remained Austrian and the Austrian government after the defeat was disposed to make concessions and proceeded to new reforms: the State was rebuilt on the basis of a dual Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the separate countries, including Galicia, received a certain degree of autonomy. Now the Austrian government decided to seek support from the Poles, owing to their hatred for Russia in consequence of the suppression of the uprising of 1863. Although equality of rights for both peoples in Galicia was declared on paper, the local administration actually fell into the hands of the Polish nobles, their majority being assured by a system of indirect elections. The Polish language replaced German in all the schools and became the dominant language in Galicia. Ukrainians were reduced to an unequal and discouraging though stubborn struggle in the Seim for their cultural and economic rights.

184. Relations with the Ukraine of the Dnieper.

The Ukrainian national struggle in Galicia was hindered by disunion. The active patriots of 1848 with Holovatsky at their head joined Muskvophils, thus strengthening their ranks. The young Ukrainian generation on the other hand were greatly influenced by the Ukrainian national revival in Russia. Shevchenko's poems were read with enthusiasm, copied and widely disseminated. The writings of Kulish and the review

"Osnova" became known in Galicia and met with an enthusiastic reception. Young Ukrainians in Galicia were seized with the same desire to serve the common people, "returning to the people", and this movement "narodnitstvo", analogous to that in the Ukraine spread throughout the country. Singing folksongs and wearing peasant costumes became the fashion; young students devoted themselves to collecting folklore; reviews in Ukrainian were published and relations with Ukrainian patriots in Kiev were started. The younger generation of "Narodovtsi" declared themselves against the older generation who were mostly Moskvophils, and controlled the most important cultural Ukrainian institutions, such as: "Galician Ruthenian Matitsia", "Stauropigian Institute" — former Stauropigian Brotherhood of the Fifteenth century, "Narodny Dim" (People's Home), "Narodovtsi", the young nationalists, then founded new cultural institutions, among them the "Prosvita" in 1868. Thus each party had their parallel institutions, societies, clubs, press, etc. So Ukrainian public life in Galicia was split up into these two camps, which opposed each other in the cultural and later on also in the political field.

Although the "Narodovtsi" (Ukrainian Nationalists) were at first considerably weaker than the Moskvophils —also called "Old Ruthenians"—who were backed by all the higher Uniate clergy, the development of the national movement in Galicia went forward irresistibly and in its turn exercised an influence on the national movement in the Russian Ukraine. When the Russian government began repressions the Ukrainian patriots made a plan to transfer all literary and publishing activity into Galicia, taking advantage of the more favorable conditions under the constitutional regime in Austria. This plan would strengthen the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia, the results of which could in turn be applied in the Russian Ukraine when conditions of life in Russia had become more propitious. So with funds from the Ukraine, a review was founded under the name of "Pravda", in which the works of the best Ukrainian

authors from the Russian Ukraine were published. With funds given by Elizabeth Miloradovich, a Ukrainian patriot and landowner in Poltava province, a printing press was bought in Lvov and put at the disposal of a "Shevchenko Scientific Society" (Naukove Tovaristvo imeni Shevchenka), founded there in 1873. The help given by Ukrainians from Russia was of the greatest importance to the Ukrainian movement in Galicia. It contributed to the development of literature and encouraged the liberal and democratic tendencies among Galician Ukrainians. Although it shortly appeared that the political and social ideas of the Ukrainians from Russia differed greatly from those of the Galicians, owing to the different political outlook in Russia and Austria, the influence of the former was nevertheless generally beneficial to the political and national development of Galicia. It broadened their provincial ideas and accustomed them to think of themselves as part of the great Ukrainian nation.

In Bukovina life had developed on its own independent lines since its separation from Galicia in 1849; when they were divided into two separate crown-lands, Bukovina's cultural life was strongly influenced by German-Austria and by Rumania in religious matters. The Ukrainian masses were deprived of schools. After 1850, however, the situation improved first, when schools were given to the Orthodox Ukrainian Consistorium and later, when the school administration was taken in hand by the government in 1868. The number of schools grew with rapidity. The "Narodnitstvo" movement in the Ukraine and Galicia found support in Bukovina also, where a number of talented poets and novelists appeared, among whom the first place belongs to Yuri Fedkovich, the "Shevchenko of Bukovina". The first Ukrainian Society was founded in Czernowitz in 1868, and remained for a long time in the hands of the "Moskvophils". In the German University founded in Czernowitz, Ukrainians were granted a chair in 1875 for the Ukrainian language and literature.

The revolution of 1848-49 had a much stronger influence in the Carpathian Ruthenia where its prospects seemed good. At the end of the Eighteenth and beginning of the Nineteenth century this small country produced a series of gifted scholars who occupied Professorial Chairs not only in Galicia but also in Russia. This fact had, however, no other influence on local conditions than to create some Russophil tendencies. When the Hungarian revolution of 1848 broke out, the Austrian government found faithful allies against the Magyars in the Slovak and Ukrainian population. A talented and energetic man among the latter, Adolph Dobriansky, succeeded in organizing his countrymen and in obtaining from the Austrian government autonomy for the Carpathian Rus. His patriotic activity was, however, not of long duration: the Magyars recovered their domination over Carpathian Ruthenia in the sixties and all the results of the revolution of 1848 were lost. The country underwent a long period of forcible Magyarization. Under the rule of the Magyar landowning nobles, the education of masses, as well as their material well-being, suffered a great decline. Neglected economically and culturally, cut off even from adjacent Galicia, Carpathian Ruthenia was left a prey to poverty and ignorance until the downfall of the dual monarchy.

CHAPTER XXVIII

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(185) Ukrainian Movement in the Seventies. (186) The Decree of the 18th of May, 1876. (187) Events in the Eighties. (188) Ukrainian Movement Becomes Radical. (189) Revolution of 1905-06. (190) Successes of Ukrainian National Movement in Austria. (191) On the Threshold of Great Events.

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185. Ukrainian Movement in the Seventies.

The Ukrainian national movement in Russia, which early in the sixties of the Nineteenth century seemed to be so strong and hopeful, did not strike root deeply enough even among the upper classes of the Ukrainian population and still less among the masses. Ukrainian nobles, who in the third and fourth decades of the century conserved to a considerable extent their national historical traditions building on them their claim to a privileged and leading position in the country, gradually lost as a class their Ukrainian patriotism, partly because their aspirations were recognized by the Imperial ukase of 1835 and partly because of a general reaction in Russia. Only individuals among the Ukrainian nobles supported the national movement in the sixties and seventies. The Ukrainian Orthodox clergy were in closer contact with the masses, especially on the Right Bank of the Dnieper and among them groups of patriotic Ukrainian "intelligentsia" were continually arising, but as a class they were too poorly off to be able to play an independent part in public life. Deprived, with but few exceptions, of the support of the most influential and wealthy class in the Ukraine, that of the landowning nobles, the Ukrainian national movement was furthered by the efforts of the "declassé intelligentsia" who chiefly consisted of impoverished nobles, sons of clergy, even peasants who had become State officials, members of the liberal professions—lawyers, doctors, teachers and so on and who, owing to the absence in Russia of political freedom and free political public life, could not have any

influence or importance. It is true that from the class of nobles single individuals continually arose who were warm supporters of the Ukrainian national movement, but usually they had to break with their class and go over into the ranks of the "declassé intelligentsia". This was the reason for the feeble resistance made by the national movement to all the prohibitions and persecutions which the government began to shower on it early in the sixties.

The provincial self-governing body "Zemstvo", introduced in 1864 in the Ukraine of the Left Bank (Poltava, Chernigov and Kharkov) and in the Ukraine of the steppe region (Katerinoslav, Kherson), had among other functions one very important branch of popular education, namely elementary schools and libraries; the same is true of the Municipal self-governing bodies introduced in towns after 1870. At first Ukrainian national interests were not considered. The limited composition and indirect system of elections of these self-governing bodies permitted the election only of totally ignorant peasants or of representatives of the noble landowners whose Ukrainian patriotism had, as we have seen, cooled off. The same happened in the Municipal elections where only Russianized urban upper classes or quite uneducated small artisans could take part in the elections and be elected. It was not till somewhat later and only after great effort that the Ukrainian movement penetrated at all into the self-governing bodies, Provincial and Municipal.

In the sixties Ukrainian youth fell under the influence of the cosmopolitan socialistic and revolutionary ideas spreading in Russia from Western Europe. These ideas were advocated by talented and influential authors in the columns of numerous Russian reviews, though more or less disguised and veiled owing to the censorship. Ukrainians had no press in which to defend Ukrainian positions and make known Ukrainian national ideas. When secret Russian revolutionary societies were founded such as "Zemlia i Volia" (Land and Freedom),

many active young Ukrainians swelled their ranks and perished in the struggle against Russian autocracy, believing that general political freedom in Russia would also bring freedom for the Ukrainian people. Compared with the political and social perspectives by which the Russian revolutionaries attracted the imagination of the young, the small and modest Ukrainian work of improving the education and culture of the Ukrainian people seemed narrow and insufficient. Thus the Ukrainian young generation of the seventies was more and more attracted by cosmopolitan aspirations which were in fact, Pan-Russian, while the Ukrainian language and literature became in their eyes no more than means by which they could more easily approach the Ukrainian masses and propagate among them the extreme and practically Great-Russian conceptions of socialism.

Education gradually began to spread once again among the popular masses but in the Russian language and form; compulsory military service introduced in 1874 took all the young men year after year through Muscovite barracks, especially as Ukrainians were sent to serve outside the Ukrainian frontiers, whereas the troops stationed in Ukraine consisted exclusively of Muscovites. Owing to the prohibition to print in Ukrainian there were no Ukrainian books or papers, thus the spread of the Russian press and literature also led to Russianization. A Russian school was absolutely alien to a Ukrainian child, not only on account of the language but because of the whole spirit of the teaching. The official State Church was transformed into a Russianizing agency. The official administrative and judicial institutions, barracks, factories, and in brief all the various manifestations of the modern life of the country were powerful agents of mass-Russianization against which all efforts of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, bereft of every means, and whose every step was watched by the vigilant political police, were too weak and powerless. The Ukrainian national movement in the late sixties was reduced to a literary current without influence in the press, and

"Zemstvo" or Provincial and Municipal self-governing bodies the only lawful spheres of public life under Russian conditions. Ukrainians of the time of "Osnova" in the early sixties, having voluntarily renounced all political activity and aspirations and so having repelled the more active Ukrainian elements, had themselves contributed to this stagnation of the Ukrainian movement and to its now being excluded from all the realities of political and public life, such as existed in Russia.

But the Ukrainian national movement, reduced though it was to the status of a literary current, contained great potential strength. We have proof of this in the powerful impressions made by Ukrainian books which in spite of all prohibitions reached the Ukrainian masses, by the Ukrainian speech in the mouth of educated people even if it were used for other purposes, revolutionary propaganda for instance. This was evident in the Chihirin affair when a revolutionary propagandist, called Stefanovich, roused several villages because he addressed them in Ukrainian and told them about Cossack times. When, despite all prohibitions, Shevchenko's collected poems "Kobzar" reached peasant readers they never failed to make a powerful impression. Very often, indeed, this book awakened in many a Russianized reader his national consciousness and stimulated him to active work for the Ukrainian national movement. Later the Ukrainian theatre had the same influence. No less an impression was made by Ukrainian books and papers printed in Galicia when, by chance, they penetrated to the masses. Even through the hardest years of black reaction when almost all manifestations of the Ukrainian spirit lay moribund or were barely smouldering under oppression, prohibitions and repressions, a constant flow of new and fresh forces never ceased to swell the ranks of disinterested workers for national liberation, coming from all classes of the Ukrainian populations, from the descendants of the old Ukrainian nobility to simple peasants and workmen, and what was most significant, the latter became more and more numerous as time went on.

Now and then the Ukrainian movement awakened with new power in the depths of the Ukrainian people some hidden force, lulled to sleep by centuries of misfortune. Sometimes the smallest effort sufficed to awaken it. Kostomarov was right when he wrote to the Muscovite Slavophil Aksakov: "Russians make an error," he said, "when they think that they know the Ukrainian people: they hardly suspect that at the bottom of every Ukrainian who is not stupid and can think for himself, there slumbers a Vyhovsky, a Doroshenko, a Mazepa, who will awaken when the destined moment comes". The history of the Ukrainian movement shows us that he was right: after every forced interval, the Ukrainian movement revived with renewed strength to break into the bright flame of the national revival of 1917.

A considerable intellectual and scientific Ukrainian movement was concentrated early in the seventies in Kiev, which thus became once more the chief centre of Ukrainian life. A Ukrainian Society in Kiev, the "Hromada",* included among its members a number of brilliant and talented men in all branches of scientific, literary and artistic activity, who not only succeeded in organizing for the time being active national work in many fields—scientific, literary and artistic, but also modelled the Ukrainian movement according to modern scientific achievements, adapting it and bringing it to bear on the exigencies of their time. The programme of Ukrainian activities was formulated by them in correspondence with the new current of thought. It suffices to enumerate such names as: V. Antonovich, Dragomanov, Zhitetsky, Chubinsky, Mikhalchuk, Lisenko, Vovkov, Staritsky, Nechuy-Levitsky, in order to see that this was a happy combination of talented men among whom there were quite a number of promising young members. The incentive to found a Ukrainian scientific institution under the official name of "The South-Western Branch of the Imperial Geographical Society" founded

* In Ukrainian "Hromada" means society.

in 1873, came from the members of the "Hromada". This scientific society organized its members and adherents throughout the entire Ukraine and set on foot an active and systematic inquiry into all sides of the life of Ukrainian people: history, archaeology, language, folklore, statistics, economy, health and so on. They succeeded in publishing works that were epoch-making in the Ukraine. Outstanding are Chubinsky's work on the ethnography of the Ukraine of the Right Bank, Antonovich and Dragomanov's collection of Ukrainian historical songs, Dragomanov's collection of Ukrainian fairy tales, and Rudchenko's collection of the Chumaki songs. When the results of this colossal work achieved in a very short time were demonstrated at the Historical and Archaeological Congress in Kiev in 1874, they surprised European scholars present there by their volume and importance, and were reported in the French and English press of the time. Taking advantage of a temporary lull in the activity of the political censorship, excellent Ukrainian books were printed in Kiev which, along with scientific works, poetry and fiction had escaped the vigilance of the censors. The talented composer, N. Lisenko, initiated a study of Ukrainian popular music and created Ukrainian opera. The Society "Hromada" bought the daily paper in Kiev "Kievsky Telegraph" which, though in Russian, became a thoroughly Ukrainian organ. Lively contact was established with "Societies" or "Hromadas" in other Ukrainian cities of which the "Hromada" of Odessa was the most active. The political programme of the Kievan "Hromada" and of the Ukrainian national movement as a whole tended to favor autonomy for the Ukraine, including Galicia and Bukovina in a federative Russia, thus continuing the traditions of the Brotherhood of SS Cyril and Methodius. In their social tendencies the members of the Kievan "Hromada" were somewhat radical and some of them were inclined to socialism. The "Hromada" of Odessa was even more radical; both societies were in touch with the Russian revolutionary parties of the time.

186. The Decree of the 18th of May, 1876.

The development of the Ukrainian national movement alarmed the government, who saw therein a new manifestation of Ukrainian separatism. Local reactionary circles afraid of socialism and of revolutionary propaganda, denounced the activities of "Hromada" in St. Petersburg. In consequence of these denunciations Tsar Alexander II ordered in 1875, the creation of a special Commission of ministers to "consider means of combatting Ukrainophil danger". The Commission came to the conclusion that "toleration of literature in this popular Ukrainian idiom would give permanent footing to the idea of the possibility, even in the distant future, of the separation of the Ukraine from Russia". In consequence, the Commission decided to dissolve the "South Western Branch of the Imperial Geographical Society" in Kiev, to close the daily paper "Kievsky Telegraph" and to take repressive measures against some individual Ukrainians. The climax of this new official Russian campaign against the Ukrainian national movement was Tsar Alexander's secret ukase signed in Ems on the 18th of May 1876, decreeing absolute prohibition of Ukrainian books. And further, it was prohibited to print the text of Ukrainian popular folk-songs with the music and to sing them in public. The Ukrainian theatre was likewise prohibited. At the same time the Commission of the Ministers decided to give regular financial support to the Moskvophil movement in Galicia, secretly sending them subsidies to combat the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia.

Michael Dragomanov deprived at once of his chair of history in the University of Kiev, and several other Ukrainians, among them Th. Vovkov, S. Podolinsky, Ziber and others, were compelled to seek refuge by crossing the frontier and becoming political refugees. The "Hromada" of Kiev instructed Dragomanov to found in Geneva a review which could serve as a free tribune and defend Ukrainian interests in Western Europe. Most Ukrainian authors transferred the publishing of their works to Galicia.

The ukase of 1876 did not destroy the Ukrainian movement nor Ukrainian literature but, together with the general reaction in Russia by which the government hoped to put down the terroristic activity of Russian revolutionaries, it had its influence on the Ukrainian movement. The political activities of the Ukrainian societies declined very much. At the same time Dragomanov started energetic activity in Geneva, publishing his review under the name of "Hromada" and a series of Ukrainian books and pamphlets as well as books and articles in different European languages. Ukrainians in Russia were discouraged by the failure of political opposition, and again tended to renounce all political pre-occupations and continue purely cultural national work. Dragomanov was for a time cut off from Ukrainians in Russia and turned his attention to the Ukrainian movement in Galicia, having made connections there with some men of the younger generation. Black reaction which set in after the assassination of Alexander II, forced Ukrainians to turn exclusively to scientific Ukrainian work: history, archaeology, ethnography, language, history of literature and of art, were the branches to which Ukrainians devoted their attention. The review in Russian "Kievskaya Starina", founded in Kiev in 1882, now became the chief centre of this purely scientific activity. Besides the "Kievskaya Starina", a number of scientific societies, historical and others in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa and other Ukrainian towns that were in Ukrainian hands, devoted their activity to the Ukraine but, of course, in Russian and under the eye of the political censorship.

187. Events in the Eighties.

The period of the eighties and early nineties was perhaps the darkest period in the whole history of the Ukrainian national movement, but even this period was not completely sterile. Important scientific work had been secretly carried on and this work became the basis of the future development of the Ukrainian scientific literature in its national language and spirit. It was

also at this time that a number of young authors began their literary career, publishing of course in Galicia. These authors were destined in time to become ornaments of Ukrainian literature. These were Lesia Ukrainka (pseud. of Larisa Kosach Kvitka), Michailo Kotsiubinsky, Volod. Samiylenko, Boris Hrinchenko, Volod. Leontovich, A. Krimsky, T. Zinkivsky and others. During what seemed to be the darkest years, the national organizing activity of A. Konisky was going forward. Imperceptible to an uninitiated eye, in strict secrecy, the Ukrainian movement was skilfully guided by the experienced hand of Professor Volodimir Antonovich. In the person of Vassyl Simirenko, the owner of sugar refineries in Kiev province, the Ukrainian movement acquired a generous patron. Eugen Chikalenko, landed proprietor in the Kherson province, later became another such patron. Both very generously supported the Ukrainian cultural movement with funds, assisting publishing in Galicia and when it again became possible, in Russian Ukraine also.

The most striking phenomenon in Ukrainian national life in the ninth and tenth decades was the brilliant development of the Ukrainian theatre created in the early eighties by Marko Kropivnitsky. His company of actors, which besides himself included first class actors such as Maria Zankovetska, M. Sadovsky, O. Saksahansky, Ivan Karpenko Kary and others, won a great reputation for the Ukrainian theatre throughout all Russia. Divided later into several companies the Ukrainian theatre became an important agent in the awakening of the Ukrainian national consciousness throughout the Ukrainian population.

Ukrainian political thought, limited and repressed in Russian Ukraine, could be freely expressed in Galicia in the columns of reviews published with funds contributed by Ukrainians from Russian Ukraine and with their active collaboration. Such were: "Zoria", "Pravda", "Zhitia i Slovo", "Narod", etc. The most important Ukrainian questions were discussed and settled in their columns. Ukrainians from Russia became the leaders of

the varying currents of political and national thought in Galicia. Professor Antonovich and A. Konisky on one side and Dragomanov on the other, influenced the development and the direction taken by the policy of Ukrainians in Galicia. In 1894 the newly-founded chair of Ukrainian history in the University of Lvov was given to a young scholar from Kiev, Mykhailo Hrushevsky. His arrival in Galicia constituted the beginning of an era in its national and cultural life. Relations between Russian Ukraine and Galicia became more lively and frequent, thus influencing the course of development of national life in both parts of the Ukraine.

188. Ukrainian Movement Becomes Radical.

The new Ukrainian generation entering public life at the end of the Nineteenth century, was far more uncompromising in their Ukrainian nationalism and gave it a wider scope. Unwilling to be restricted to scientific and cultural activities, they claimed for the Ukrainian people their full quota of national and political rights. They did not mix with the Russian liberal movement but worked in their own organizations. In 1897 a Pan-Ukrainian Congress took place, secretly of course, in Kiev, consisting of representatives from the societies "Hromada" in the various Ukrainian towns. A central organization was founded under the name of "General Ukrainian Democratic non-party Organization", which elected its Executive Committee and established regular relations with all Ukrainian societies, as well as regular periodical congresses in Kiev. In a short time the Ukraine became a network of secret societies, not only in the chief provincial towns but also in smaller district towns. Ukrainians living in St. Petersburg also founded a society through which the Ukrainian Central organization entered into relations with Russian secret political organizations. In Kharkov in 1899, a group of Ukrainian students with Dmitro Antonovich at their head founded the "Revolutionary Ukrainian Party", which at the start put the watchword of Ukrainian political in-

dependence in their programme. This party included in its ranks the most active elements among Ukrainian students and younger members of the "intelligentsia". They were very active in publishing revolutionary pamphlets, printing them in Galicia and Bukovina and bringing great quantities across the frontier to be distributed among the population, especially to peasants and workmen. "The Revolutionary Ukrainian Party" was rapidly transformed into a Socialistic Democratic Party formulating general socialist ideas in the first place and limiting its national aspirations to claiming autonomy for the Ukraine instead of political independence. The watchword of political independence was adopted by a branch that separated from the "Revolutionary Ukrainian Party" calling themselves "National Ukrainian Party", who now actively kept this idea before Ukrainians. Based, however, as it was, not so much on national historical tradition, as on theoretical socialist arguments, it as yet attracted little attention among the masses and seemed to many to be only a distant ideal.

The beginning of the Twentieth century is marked in Russian history by the rapid growth of political movements, heralding an awakening from the still prevailing reaction. Russian absolutism surrendered rapidly under pressure of public opinion and of its own inward deterioration. Even the Ukrainian national movement, though always suspect in the eyes of Russian authorities and subject to vigilant observation, actually obtained some concessions. The number of Ukrainian books printed in Russia was rapidly growing, especially those for popular reading. Some elementary text-books for primary teaching had also seen the light. Some Ukrainian law societies under Russian names obtained permission to exist in St. Petersburg. Public Ukrainian demonstrations became fairly frequent such, for instance, as the unveiling of the monument to the poet Ivan Kotliarevsky in Poltava on the 30th of August, 1903, when thousands of Ukrainian intelligentsia came to Poltava, among them delegates from the Galician and Bukovinian societies,

and in answer to the prohibition against using the Ukrainian language from the platform organized a silent and imposing demonstration. The jubilees of M. Lysenko and of I. Nechuy Levitsky in Kiev, turned out to be similar all-Ukrainian festivities. The Ukrainian speech began to be used in public. Quite a number of "Zemstvo" (Provincial) and "Duma" (Municipal Self-Governing bodies) began to pass resolutions about the necessity of using the Ukrainian language in elementary schools. All kinds of congresses (agriculturists, engineers, etc.), followed their example, demanding freedom to use the Ukrainian language. Theatrical companies began to take measures to remove the restrictions on the Ukrainian theatre. Petitions signed by thousands of names were sent to the central government about the necessity of abolishing the special prohibitions against the Ukrainian language.

189. Revolution of 1905-1906.

The Russian government began to realize that the Ukrainian movement had already overstepped the limits of a narrow literary or political current and had entered the open arena of public life. The first breach in the wall of prohibitions that surrounded Ukrainians was the permission to publish a Ukrainian translation of the New Testament in Russia.* The Russian Synod of bishops, which up to now had prohibited all use of the Ukrainian language in church, gave their blessing to the publication of the Ukrainian translation of the Gospels and even published it at their expense. Late in 1904 the Council of Ministers, in a special sitting, considered the question of abolition of the special censorship against Ukrainian books and noticed "the low standard of education in Ukrainian provinces owing to the absence of books in the language understood by the population". The Council of Ministers asked the opinion of the Academy

* A complete Ukrainian Bible had by that time appeared already in many editions abroad, also being published by the British & Foreign Bible Society.

of Sciences on this matter, the Universities of Kiev and Kharkov and the Governor General of Kiev. All were against the prohibition. The Academy of Sciences answered by a memorandum written by its most competent members, and the answer of Kiev University was written by Professor Volodimir Antonovich himself. The Russian government was still deliberating and discussing the matter when the revolution broke out in the autumn of 1905, and the Ukrainian language was allowed under the Imperial manifesto of the 17th of October, 1905, granting Russia a constitution and a Parliament (the Duma). In the chief Ukrainian towns Kiev, Kharkov, Poltava, Odessa, Katerinoslav and others as well as in St. Petersburg and Moscow, Ukrainian periodicals, daily papers and reviews made their appearance. Ukrainian political parties, secret up to now, openly entered political life such as the Radical-Democratic, the Socialist-Democratic, the Nationalist (Narodnia) and the "Selianska Spilka" (Peasants' Union). Ukrainian clubs and educational societies (Prosvita) were called to life and developed energetic activity especially in publishing Ukrainian books for the people.

All Ukrainian parties began to work for autonomy for their country. They all had radical or socialist programmes. Ukrainians freed by means of the revolution from the yoke of prohibitions and repressions were generally rather radical and extreme, and the tone of all their public utterances as well as of the Ukrainian press was rather sharply antidespotic. The very few conservative elements among them, Ukrainian nobles, mostly landowners, made no attempt at organized political action and their voice was not heard. Most of them even saw no significance in the menacing events developing before their eyes and deeply shaking their economic and political position. Instead of joining the national Ukrainian movement for autonomy and by so doing counteracting extreme radicalism and socialism, most of the Ukrainian upper classes had thrown in their lot with the Russian reactionaries and centralization, thus

undermining their own future existence as a social class.

The crushing defeat of the Japanese war once more showed up the incompetence of Russian absolutism with its centralization and bureaucratic government, the lack of organization, and the corruption and venality of the officials, all weaknesses of an autocratic bureaucratic regime. The shock of the October revolution of 1905 was, however, not sufficient. The government, though forced to yield in many respects to the general liberal movement, soon recovered and resumed the stubborn struggle, having mobilized for this purpose all the reactionary and conservative elements in the Empire. The Ukrainian national movement was, in the eyes of the government, only a part—and a most dangerous part—of the whole revolutionary movement which threatened the foundation of the autocratic and bureaucratic regime. After a short period of inaction the Russian authorities reopened the campaign of persecutions and prohibitions: Ukrainian periodicals were suspended, Ukrainian societies dissolved and Ukrainian politicians arrested. But the Ukrainian national movement was spreading with astonishing rapidity, touching ever widening circles of population. It was now welcomed not only by the liberal intelligentsia but by peasants and workmen, taking an ever sharper and sharper tone of irreconcilable opposition to the government as well as to the upper social classes of the population.

The first Russian Parliament, the Duma, met in the spring of 1906. The Socialist parties, both Russian and Ukrainian, refused to take part in the elections as a protest against the limited and curtailed electoral laws. But in spite of the elimination of the extreme left, the elections to the first Duma took place amidst a desperate struggle of the liberal parties against the proceedings of the authorities who prohibited electoral meetings, arrested and imprisoned the candidates and so on. Among Ukrainian parties only the Radical-Democrats stood for election and a few of their candidates here and there succeeded in being elected. Most of them, however, were

either arrested and imprisoned for the period of the election or the election was cancelled by the authorities on some trivial ground. But when the Duma met, the handful of Ukrainian Radical-Democrats—among them Ilia Shrah, Volod, Shemet, Pavlo Chizhevsky—were at once joined by forty to fifty members from the Ukraine who had been elected without being members of a party. A fairly numerous Ukrainian group was thus formed in the Duma, in spite of all the efforts of the authorities to prevent it. This was a great triumph for the Ukrainian national movement; it considerably raised the spirit of Ukrainians and gave them hopes of the ultimate success of their cause. A special Ukrainian centre was at once created in St. Petersburg to help the work of the Ukrainian faction in the Duma. The Society of Ukrainians living in St. Petersburg, the "Hromada", at the head of which were very experienced leaders Petro Stebnitsky and Alexander Lototsky, together with Professor M. Hrushevsky who came purposely from Lvov, founded a review "Ukrainski Vestnik" with the object of creating an atmosphere favorable to the bill for Ukrainian autonomy which was being prepared and was to be proposed in the Duma. But almost on the eve of the presentation of the bill by the Ukrainian faction, the Duma was dissolved, having existed only seventy-two days. Most of the members, including the Ukrainians, assembled in Viborg in Finland, and signed a protest against the dissolution. They were all accused of illegal proceedings, tried and imprisoned, thus losing the right to take part in the new elections. This was a great loss to the Ukrainians for though a Ukrainian faction of 47 members was formed in the Second Duma, most of them were country clergy and peasants lacking in the experience of those in the First Duma. In spite of that they introduced bills for the introduction of the Ukrainian language into elementary schools in the Ukraine and for creating chairs in Ukrainian language, literature and history in Ukrainian universities. They also drew up bills for the introduction of the Ukrainian language into

the courts of justice and the church, and a bill for Ukrainian self-government, etc. But the Second Duma was very soon dissolved, having lived only one hundred and three days, and Russia was again plunged into the blackest reaction. The electoral laws were so modified that only candidates more or less favored by the government could be elected. In the Third and Fourth Dumas there were only one or two Ukrainian members so no Ukrainian group could be formed, and Ukrainian interests were not represented.

The government now began gradually to withdraw all the concessions which the revolution of 1905 had forced them to grant. Many Ukrainian periodicals were stopped, Ukrainian parties and societies were dissolved, many active Ukrainian patriots were exiled to Siberia and the extreme North of Russia. Some fled and took refuge abroad. The Ukrainian lectures and courses started in 1906-07 in the Universities of Kharkov and Odessa were suspended and the authorities began with renewed energy to "sweep the Ukrainian influence out of the schools". Nevertheless a few achievements of the revolution remained: a few Ukrainian clubs and educational societies (Prosvita) continued to exist here and there in various Ukrainian towns, the "Ukrainian Scientific Society" in Kiev and a few Ukrainian periodicals. The only papers left were a daily paper, the "Rada" edited by Eugene Chikalenko in Kiev, and a weekly, the "Ridnyi Krai" edited by Olga Kossack in Poltava and a few others. But the chief achievement of the revolution was the expansion of the Ukrainian movement, which continued to recruit adherents among the intelligentsia, among them a number of political men of mark who, though Ukrainians by birth, were heretofore indifferent to the national movement. A still more important advance was the fact that the Ukrainian movement was now rooted deeply among the masses, especially among the peasants of Poltava and Katerinoslav provinces. The Russian political parties were now compelled to reckon with Ukrainians as an important political power. Uk-

rainian political parties having been dissolved, a new political organization called "The Progressive Party" was secretly formed in 1908, and took the lead of the Ukrainian national movement. From the standpoint of constitutional government and autonomy for the Ukraine, this Society entered into relations with the various Russian liberal political parties which were officially recognized and represented in the Duma, and through them succeeded to a certain point in defending Ukrainian interests in the Duma. The Russian government continued to consider the Ukrainian national movement as a stepping stone to the political separation of the Ukraine. All the Russian authorities were certain of it, from the Prime Minister Stolypin, who openly declared this as his reason for forbidding the use of the Ukrainian language in public life, down to the officials of the local administrations and political police or "gendarmes", as they were called in Russia. And they were not far from the truth. Though the representatives of the Ukrainian organizations officially continued to declare in their public announcements that their aspirations were limited by autonomy, the idea of Ukrainian political independence formulated at the threshold of the Twentieth century continued to grow and to find adherents, especially among the younger generation. The subsequent development of the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia and Bukovina gave considerable support to the idea of Ukrainian independence.

190. Successes of Ukrainian National Movement in Austria.

The "Narodovtsi" movement in Galicia, though steadily growing and developing throughout the seventies, was gradually losing its democratic character and purpose. As it was chiefly supported by the clergy and middle classes who were very conservative and very loyal to the Austrian authorities, it was ultimately reduced to a formal and superficial nationalism, completely out of touch with the real needs of the Ukrainian masses

in Galicia. The very differences and conflicts of the "Narodovtsi" and "Moskvophils" were like family quarrels about grammar and spelling; no one tried to explain to the people the meaning and use of the political constitution or the elements of economic and social life. The Ukrainian people, though living under a constitutional regime in Austria, had no idea how to take advantage of their constitutional freedom. The Ukrainian peasants lived in the belief that the Emperor alone enjoyed supreme power in the country, that he was all-powerful and that everything depended on his will. The Emperor Franz Joseph did not care in the least for his Ukrainian subjects and had no wish to do anything for them. A certain estrangement had taken place in the relations of the "Narodovtsi" with Ukrainians in Russia, owing to difference in their political and social outlook and consequently their interests became confined exclusively to local Galician affairs. The apathy and indifference of the masses to parliamentary policy had reached an extreme stage as is shown by the fact that only two Ukrainian candidates were elected in the Galician Seim in 1879.

The beginning of the eighties brought a revival. In 1880 the "Narodovtsi" founded an important political daily paper "Dilo", devoted exclusively to local Galician affairs, and for the first time held public meetings (*viche*) in order to discuss the political, economic, and social needs of the population. Volodimir Barvinsky, a talented journalist, became the head of this active group of "Narodovtsi". At about the same time Dragomanov's influence on the younger generation in Galicia began to increase. Since the last half of the seventies Dragomanov, who was living in Geneva, had been in contact with some young Galician Ukrainians and was trying to turn their attention to the work of spreading radical and socialist ideas among the masses. A group of young men including Ivan Franko, a very talented poet and novelist, and Michailo Pavlik, started a literary and publishing enterprise inspired by Dragomanov, who thus

became the spiritual leader of the whole generation. Most of Dragomanov's ideas were unsuited or even directly harmful to Galician conditions. His anticlericalism and negative attitude towards the church and clergy were nothing less than detrimental in a country which was deeply attached to the national church, and where both the church and clergy had rendered and were rendering invaluable services to the persecuted nation; his abstract socialism and pedantic political radicalism made no allowance for the peculiar conditions of life in Galicia; his propaganda of cosmopolitanism which actually was nothing else than Pan-Russianism in disguise, took no heed of the national problems of a population which had to struggle for the most elementary national rights. But on the other hand Dragomanov's activity was permeated by a lofty disinterested idealism and a sincere love for the people. Dragomanov called to Galicians to abandon their barren discussions about spelling and devote themselves to practical activity for the good of the masses. He advised his followers to study the matter thoroughly before beginning public activity, and especially he insisted on the use of ethical methods in the struggle against political rivals. All this was extremely necessary in the circumstances, and was of great educational value to Galician Ukrainians.

Late in the eighties under the influence of Dragomanov a Ukrainian Radical Party was founded in Galicia, the object of which was to defend the interests of the Ukrainian peasants in Galicia. Dragomanov's adherents founded two papers. "Narod" and "Khliborob" with the funds they obtained from the Russian Ukraine and started electoral propaganda. The new party succeeded in obtaining several seats in the Seim in Lvov and in the Parliament in Vienna. The activity of the Radicals aroused the "Narodovtsi" and the Moskvophils also to start active work in the interests of the masses. The leaders of the "Narodovtsi", influenced by and in co-operation with Ukrainians from Russia—chiefly Alexander Konisky and Professor Antonovich—and supported by the Galician

Metropolitan Silvestre Sembratovich, entered into an understanding with the Viceroy of the Emperor in Galicia, Count Baden, backed by influential Polish circles. According to the agreement, Ukrainians were to break definitely with the Moskvophils and declare their loyalty to Austria and were to stop their tactics of opposition to the Poles. In return Ukrainians were to receive a series of concessions: financial subsidies from the Austrian government for Ukrainian cultural institutions, Ukrainian training colleges for teachers and a third new Ukrainian "High School" (Gymnasium), a chair of Ukrainian history in Lvov University, Ukrainian shields on all State institutions, in railways, streets, letter boxes. The authors of this agreement expected a "new era" in Galicia as a result, and the Ukrainian member of the Seim in Lvov Julian Romanchuk, made in the name of "Narodovtsi", a suitable declaration at the end of 1890. The understanding (uhoda) was energetically opposed by the Radicals and Moskvophils and did not meet with the expected success but remained unpopular with the Ukrainian people. Politically it did not last long, and the members of the "Narodovtsi" party in the Seim soon returned to opposition. Among the leaders of the Party, Alexander Barvinsky, one of the authors of the understanding ("uhoda") and later Eugen Olesnitsky and Konstantine (Kost) Levitsky, rendered great services to the Ukrainians in Galicia as members of the Austrian Parliament in Vienna.

From the last half of the nineties, political life in Galicia made rapid progress. In 1899 the more moderate wing of the Radicals united with the "Narodovtsi", thus forming a National Democratic Party which took the lead in the political life of the Ukrainian people in Galicia. The ultimate aim of the party as expressed in their programme was "to achieve the ultimate unification of the whole Ukrainian nation into one single national organism". About the same time, the Ukrainian Socialist-Democratic Party in Galicia was founded and its delegate at the Socialist Congress in 1899 in Brunn,

declared that their aim was: "a free Ukrainian State, a Ukrainian Republic". The Ukrainian Radical Party made a similar declaration as early as 1895, stating that political independence was the ideal of the Ukrainian territory: in Kharkov, at a secret meeting of Ukrainian students Nicholas (Nykola) Mikhnovsky, a young advocate of the town, proposed that Ukrainian political independence should be the watchword for young Ukrainians. This was adopted with enthusiasm. In Lvov at a public meeting of Ukrainian students, Longin Cehelsky, later a member of the Parliament in Vienna, proposed a resolution which was carried with great enthusiasm, stating that the building up of a Ukrainian sovereign State was the ideal of the younger generation of Ukrainians.

191. On the Threshold of Great Events.

The realities of life at that time were, however, far removed from this ideal. Everyday life necessitated a constant struggle often for quite insignificant and elementary trifles, but the high ideal of political independence was the torch that illuminated this everyday struggle and widened the narrow limits of the political horizon. During some fifteen years before the World War, the Ukrainian people in Galicia made great progress in the political arena. With every year the ranks of the Moskvophils thinned and the Ukrainians became more and more singlehearted in their political aspirations, thus rendering their efforts easier and their struggle more fruitful. The number of Ukrainian members both in the Seim in Lvov and in the Parliament in Vienna was steadily growing. When in 1907 the electoral laws of general and direct elections were applied for the first time, 30 Ukrainian members entered the Parliament in Vienna and formed an important political group which counted for something in the parliamentary work. In the spring of 1914 an understanding was arrived at with the Poles, according to which Ukrainians obtained 62 seats in the Seim in Lvov—more than one-third—

and a number of posts in most of the important administrative institutions of the country was given to Ukrainians. All East Galicia was covered with a network of sport and gymnastic organizations of the "Sich" and "Sokol". National economic organizations and banks such as the "Dniester", the "Credit Union" (Kraevi Soyuz Creditovi), the "Narodna Torhovlia", and the "Silski Hospodar" were developing splendidly. Co-operative societies were spreading widely throughout the country and the Ukrainian population began to turn to self-aid and economic organization in place of emigration as at the end of the Nineteenth century, or reliance on a benevolent Emperor. Ukrainians in Galicia were becoming a self-reliant coherent nation, conscious of its aims. The Uniate clergy under the lead of the Metropolitan, Andrew Count Sheptitsky, were becoming definitely nationalistic and together with the young intelligentsia played, as of old, an active part in national life.

Parallel with its political development, the cultural life of the Galician Ukrainians was making great progress. Ukrainian school education, gradually and slowly, step by step, was achieving considerable results compared with the immediate past. Shortly before the war Ukrainians had six State "High Schools" (Gymnasiums) and about 15 private secondary schools. The number of primary Ukrainian schools reached 3,000. At Lvov University Ukrainians had seven full Professorships and four lectureships. The "Shevchenko Society" (Tovaristvo imeni Shevchenko) was transformed in 1898 with the initiative and help of Russian Ukrainians into a scientific institution. The flourishing period of the Society began with the arrival of Professor M. Hrushevsky in Lvov, who became its President in 1897. In a short time Professor Hrushevsky succeeded in uniting about the society most of the important scholars from all the Ukraine and with the generous help of benefactors from the Russian Ukraine, he succeeded in developing great activity in scientific research and publishing. In a few years the "Scientific Shevchenko Society" was universally recog-

nized as the Ukrainian Academy. It suffices to mention that up to the year 1914 the Society published about 300 volumes of works of scientific research in different branches, but mostly Ukrainian history, ethnography and folklore. Besides, Professor Hrushevsky, Ivan Franko and Volodimir Hnatiuk, local Galician scholars, played an important part in the activities of the Society. The Metropolitan Andrew Count Sheptitsky rendered great services to the cultural development of Galicia by founding in 1913, the National Ukrainian Museum in Lvov. The end of the Nineteenth century also witnessed an important development of literature in Galicia where, besides Ivan Franko, talented authors such as Vassyl Stefaniuk and Olga Kobylanska in Bukovina, should be especially mentioned. The review "Literaturno-Naukovy Vistnik", founded in 1898 in Lvov and transferred in 1907 to Kiev, edited by Ivan Franko and M. Hrushevsky, became an all-Ukrainian literary review in which the best Ukrainian authors from all parts of the Ukraine published their works. The most important Ukrainian author of the time was Ivan Franko, poet, novelist and scholar, the greatest poet Galicia produced.

The national revival in small Bukovina began early in the eighties and from that time the country was approximating ever more closely to Galician and general Ukrainian national life. A special era in the country's life began with Professor Stepan Smal Stotsky's nomination to the chair of Ukrainian language and literature in the University of Czernowitz; he was a Galician by birth and in time became member of the Austrian Parliament in Vienna and Vice-President of the Seim of Bukovina. Bukovina owes her national and cultural development entirely to his extraordinary energy and patriotic devotion. The first Ukrainian members were elected to the Seim of Bukovina early in the eighties and after the election of 1911 the Ukrainians had 17 members out of a total of 53 in Bukovinian Seim; five members from Bukovina in the Austrian Parliament in Vienna belonged to the same faction as the Ukrainian

members from Galicia. For the Ukrainian population of 300,000 in Bukovina there were three Ukrainian "High Schools" (Gymnasium) one Teacher's Training College and a primary school in every village. Libraries, reading-rooms, gymnastic societies ("Sich") and co-operative societies were also numerous among the Ukrainian masses in Bukovina.

In comparing conditions of life and the development of the Ukrainian people in the last half of the Nineteenth century in Russia and in Austria we must admit that under the constitutional regime in Austria living conditions were far more favorable than those under the Tsarist autocratic regime. Though the Russian government insisted on the Ukraine being a "thoroughly Russian Land" and the Ukrainian population being "the same Russian Orthodox people" as the Muscovites, they nevertheless always treated Ukraine as a colony and exploited her natural riches exclusively in the interest of Great Russia and returned to the Ukraine infinitely less than they collected there by direct and indirect taxation. Shortly before the war the Ukraine contributed more than 26% of the total Russian State income of which only a small part was spent on Ukrainian needs, most going to other provinces of the Empire. The whole financial, commercial and industrial policy of the Russian Empire was conducted in a manner calculated to give overwhelming preponderance to the interests of the "centre" that is the Great Russian provinces. Railways, for instance, were built so as to connect Ukrainian territory not with Kiev, Kharkov and Odessa, but with Moscow. Railway tariffs were calculated so as to bring the products of the Ukrainian territories of Kharkov and Poltava less expensively to Moscow than to Kiev. Under the pretext of Polish danger, the government did not introduce Provincial Self-government ("Zemstvo") in the Ukraine of the Right Bank of the Dnieper until shortly before the war and administered the country by means of bureaucratic institutions. Fearing Ukrainian separatism, they deliberately kept the Ukrainian masses

in ignorance and cultural neglect, withheld from them schools in the language they understood, prohibited Ukrainian literature and press and expelled Ukrainian from the church and from public life. The Russian authorities made a practice of sending teachers, priests and officials from Russia into the Ukraine in order to further the Russianization of the population, paying them a little more for this purpose; it was only natural that those who came were not of the best and did not at all care for the interests of the population. The result of this official policy towards Ukrainians was that compared with Great Russia, the average of illiterates was considerably higher in the Ukraine, although in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries she had been especially lauded for the great number of her well-kept popular schools. The Ukrainian people whose aptitude for learning and arts all foreigners who visited the Ukraine never forgot to mention, was reduced after a century under Russian rule to a state of cultural backwardness and neglect. General political conditions in Russia were, moreover, training the masses not to be self-reliant, free and conscious of their duties as citizens, but dull, embittered slaves, kept in subjection by the knout and flogging, bereft of the very notion of the meaning of patriotism and the importance of political independence. The tragic consequences of this were seen during the revolution of 1917 when the Ukrainian masses lent a willing ear to all kinds of destructive propaganda and were indifferent to constructive national ideals. The responsibility for this falls entirely on the Tsarist autocratic regime, which did almost nothing to satisfy the essential economic needs of the Ukrainian peasants, and embittered them by cruel repressions and deliberately kept them in ignorance.

It is interesting to compare the conditions in the Russian Ukraine with those in Austrian Galicia. In the latter the economic conditions were far worse; there was less protection in the matter of public health; there was a continuous and exhausting struggle against the

Poles; and the intelligentsia were poor to the verge of indigence. Nevertheless, because of the freer political conditions in Galicia, it was possible there to improve the national position and educate the masses along political lines, giving them instruction in their own language. All this rendered the materially poorer Ukrainian peasants in Galicia considerably better educated and more self-reliant than their brothers, the Ukrainian peasants in Russia.

After the revolution of 1905 in Russia and in spite of the reaction that followed almost immediately the Ukrainian national movement began, as we have seen, to develop even more intensively. The intelligentsia were most receptive of the national revival and the numbers of those who joined the national movement was rapidly growing. The masses were far behind, but it was almost certain that with the removal of the most elementary hindrances to the education of the masses and the creation of popular schools with teaching in the mother tongue, the national revival would rapidly advance. Galicia and Bukovina gave proof of this by far outstripping Russian Ukraine, and having great possibilities for national development lying in store for them. It was in these conditions that the Ukrainian nation, divided politically between two belligerent powers, was surprised by the World War which once more opened to them the possibility of a recovery of political independence.

CHAPTER XXIX

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(192) *The Great War 1914-1918.* (193) *Repressive Measures Against Ukrainians in Russia and in Austrian Provinces Occupied by Russian Army.* (194) *Union for Liberation of the Ukraine.* (195) *Revolution of 1917 and Ukrainian National Movement.* (196) *Ukrainian Autonomy.* (197) *Bolshevist Revolution in Russia and Proclamation of Ukrainian Democratic Republic.* (198) *Ukrainian-Russian War.* (199) *Peace of Brest-Litovsk.* (200) *The "Coup d'Etat" of the 29th of April, 1918, in Kiev.*

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192. The Great War 1914-1918.

The Great War of 1914-1918 brought vital changes to the Ukrainian nation. From the very beginning of the war, Ukrainian territories on both sides of the Austro-Russian frontier became one of the chief battle grounds of the Eastern Front and were terribly ruined and devastated. The fight on the Austro-Russian front was, to a great extent, conducted with Ukrainian forces: the Russian armies employed against Austria chiefly consisted of mobilized peasants from the Ukraine of the Right Bank of the Dnieper. They were confronted with their kindred, Ukrainians from Galicia and Bukovina, who fought in the ranks of the Austrian armies. The declaration of war was no less important to the national life of Ukrainians on both sides of the Austro-Russian frontier. Progress of the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia had long since alarmed the Russian government and Russian chauvinistic circles. In order to weaken the Ukrainian movement in Galicia and nullify its influence on Ukrainians in Russia, the Russian government financially supported the Moskvophils in Galicia and long before the outbreak of the war in 1914 made war preparations against Austria in order to annex Galicia.

193. Repressive Measures Against Ukrainians in Russia and in Austrian Provinces Occupied by Russian Army.

Russia entered the war against Austria, intending the annihilation of the Ukrainian national movement in Russia as well as in the Austrian provinces that were to be conquered. Notwithstanding that the whole Ukrainian press in Russia at once declared on the outbreak of the war that Ukrainians would loyally fulfill their obligations towards the Russian State, the administration closed all Ukrainian papers and periodicals on the following day, and exiled some of their editors to Siberia. All Ukrainian societies and organizations were closed, and when Professor Hrushevsky, who was a Russian subject, found his way with great difficulty to Kiev, he was at once arrested and after some months in prison, was exiled to a small place on the Volga. The decree of 1876 entirely prohibiting the printing of books in Ukrainian was again put in force. An even worse fate awaited the Ukrainians in Galicia. On entering Galicia, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, published a manifesto "To the Russian population" of Galicia, declaring that the Russian army was coming to liberate the "Russian population" from Austrian "thraldom" and "restore Galicia the lawful inheritance of the Muscovite Tsars to its rightful monarch, the Russian Tsar". Then a relentless persecution of the population started. The Russian authorities treated the Ukrainians of Galicia as if they were Russian subjects who had rebelled against the authorities and were now to be punished. All Ukrainian institutions, banks, co-operative societies, schools, scientific, cultural and educational societies were closed, and their houses and possessions plundered. All Ukrainian newspapers were prohibited; also printing in Ukrainian or selling Ukrainian books or having them in the libraries. The Ukrainian language was prohibited in public and all who openly recognized themselves as Ukrainians were treated as enemies of the Russian State and army. Numbers

were arrested, sent to Russia and banished to Siberia. During the first months of the war tens of thousands of Ukrainians without difference of sex, age or positions, from members of Parliament and University professors to poor peasants, women and children, were dragged to Siberia or the extreme northern parts of Russia. The Uniate Church met with especially cruel persecutions: the Metropolitan, Andrew Sheptitsky, was arrested in Lvov, carried far into Russia and imprisoned in the monastic prison in Suzdal. Hundreds of Uniate clergy, priests and monks, met with the same fate, being arrested and removed to the extreme northern provinces in Russia. The Russian authorities, breaking all international conventions, at once began forcibly to introduce Orthodoxy in the occupied provinces of Galicia. A half-mad fanatic Orthodox bishop named Aulogi, was sent here from Russia and he began to root out the Uniate Church with methods reminiscent of the Middle Ages. He brought with him hundreds of Orthodox priests from Russia and installed them in parishes taken from the exiled Uniate clergy. Numbers of Galician children were carried away to be baptised with great solemnity as Orthodox. Administrative posts in the occupied provinces were given to Russian officials of the worst kind, who became the terror of the population and completely discredited Russian power in their eyes. This official Russian policy was later called a "European scandal" by the Russian member of the Duma, the well-known Professor Miliukov. Russian Ukrainians sent a delegation to the Foreign Minister Sazonov, who had the reputation of being a liberal and progressive statesman, in order to attract his attention to violence and breaches of the law being perpetrated by the Russian authorities in Galicia. He answered that the present was a favorable moment to exterminate the Ukrainian national movement once and for ever. Later speaking in the Duma, Sazonov was not ashamed to repeat the calumny that the Ukrainian national movement had been initiated and subsidized by the Germans. Not one of the Russian

members of the Duma present lifted his voice in protest against his calumny. Sazonov's declaration and the policy of the Russian government as a whole persuaded Ukrainians that they could not expect any good from a Russian victory and that the military defeat of Russia alone could bring Ukrainians national emancipation.

The defeat of the Russian armies in the summer of 1915, brought certain changes in Russian official policy. In the spring of that year Austro-German armies broke through the Russian front in the Carpathian mountains and forced the Russian armies to retreat and to evacuate almost all Galicia with the exception of a small stretch of country along the Russian frontier. At the same time the Germans pushed the Russians out of Poland, Lithuania and a considerable part of White Russia. The retreating Russian troops devastated and ruined everything behind them, forcing the population to leave for Russia. This led to unspeakable suffering of hundreds of thousands of the population dragged forcibly out of their homes and dispersed throughout Russia to suffer from hunger and cold, bringing besides, disorganization everywhere. Most of these forcibly evacuated were never able to return and perished from privation. In the same way over a hundred thousand Ukrainians from Galicia, converted to Orthodoxy were evacuated with the Russian army from Galicia. They were promised all kinds of advantages in Russia but their fate was no better: mostly they fell victims to hunger, epidemic diseases and general misery.

The complete collapse of the Russian armies in 1915 disclosed widespread treachery besides the incompetence, corruption and venality, especially in the Commissariat of the Russian army. Culprits were to be found everywhere from the lowest ranks to the highest, even including the Minister of War.* These disclosures, as well as military failures owing to incompetence, provoked public indignation: the first nationalistic outburst of war-

* Sukhomlinov.

enthusiasm abated considerably. The government was compelled to make concessions to public opinion: the organization of the Commissariat, armament and munitions, medical and sanitary services as well as general supplies for the army, was taken out of the incompetent hands of the bureaucratic officials and given to public organizations such as the Union of Municipal and Provincial Self-governments and to Military-Industrial Committees. Russian public opinion which at the outbreak of the war had concluded a "Silent Pact" with the government, was again roused to opposition: from the tribune of the Duma voices of critics discontented with the bureaucratic regime were heard again. The system of national and religious persecution of Ukrainians in Galicia and the terrible misdeeds amounting to crimes of the newly installed Russian administration there, now met with severe condemnation from the liberal and progressive section of the Russian press and in the Duma. This had the effect that when, in the summer of 1916, the Russian army this time led by General Brussilov succeeded in reconquering East Galicia and Bukovina, the former persecutions of the Ukrainian population were not repeated. The Russian authorities did not punish the population for having Ukrainian nationality; some of the Ukrainian schools were even re-opened; though still as a rule, the Russian authorities were, as before, hostile to and mistrustful of the Ukrainian population.

At the time when the life of Ukrainians in Galicia under the Russian occupation was an uninterrupted martyrdom, the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian authorities to them was hardly any better. Owing to the existence before the war of certain Russophil tendencies among the Ukrainians of Galicia—the so-called "Moskvo-phils"—the whole failure of the Austro-Hungarian troops and the rapid loss of Galicia were laid at the door of Ukrainians who were accused of treason. A terrible persecution was started of the unhappy and innocent population. Without any enquiry or trial thousands of blameless Ukrainians, including clergy and members of the

intelligentsia as well as peasants, perished on the gallows and in Austro-Hungarian concentration camps, where many of them died in consequence of the deadly conditions and inhuman treatment by the authorities. And yet all these persecutions were entirely unjust: from the outbreak of the war the Ukrainians of Galicia were, as a solid whole, in the defence of the Austrian monarchy which gave them a certain possibility of national development. In the spring of 1915 a "General Ukrainian Council" (Zahalna Ukrainska Rada) was founded in Vienna representative of all Ukrainian parties. This organization, as well as the whole of the Ukrainian press and all the Ukrainian clergy and "intelligentsia", was on the side of the constitutional Austrian government and against the arbitrary autocratic Russia. Soon after the outbreak of war special Ukrainian volunteer detachments were formed which courageously fought on the Austrian side against Russia. But the loyalty of the Ukrainian population, all their sacrifices and the persecutions of the Russian authorities were not appreciated by the Austrian government. The old Emperor, Franz Joseph, who had always been unfavorable to his Ukrainian subjects, soon before his death published a manifesto on the 23rd of October, 1916, in which he promised Galicia general autonomy but without dividing it into a Ukrainian or Eastern part and a Polish or Western, as Ukrainians had tried to obtain since 1848. This signified that the whole country was given into the hands of the Poles. By this the Austrian government wished to secure the sympathies of their Polish subjects after Germany had declared her promise to rebuild the Polish State out of the Polish provinces taken from Russia. The old Emperor died soon after but his successor, Emperor Charles, promised to implement Franz Joseph's promise concerning the autonomy of Galicia. Ukrainians in Galicia as well as in Russia were bitterly disappointed in this deathblow to all their hopes of having under Austrian constitutional rule, in part of Ukrainian territory at least, a possibility of free national development.

194. Union for Liberation of the Ukraine.

The idea of a strong Ukrainian country under the sceptre of the Austrian Emperor which could serve the Ukrainian people as a rallying centre, like the Piedmontese served to unite and liberate Italy, was also supported by Ukrainians in Russia. Soon after the outbreak of the war a group of Ukrainian political refugees from Russia, founded at Vienna in 1914, the "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine" (Soyuz Vizvolennia Ukrainy), whose object was to endeavor to build up, with the help of Germany and Austria, an independent Ukrainian State out of the lands taken from Russia. The Austrian government was at first not very favorable to the extensive plans of the "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine", hoping to annex these lands to Austria. On the other hand the German government gave the "Union" active assistance, treating them as the embryo of the future Ukrainian State. Further, they were given the opportunity of taking care of Ukrainian prisoners of war of the Russian armies concentrated in special camps. Teachers and instructors from among Galician Ukrainians were engaged to conduct courses for the men in order to educate them in citizenship. At the end of the year 1916, military units of several divisions were formed from among the Ukrainian prisoners which should serve as a nucleus of the future Ukrainian army. The Austrian government then followed this example and also arranged special camps for their Ukrainian prisoners of war, who were formed into one division. In this Germany and Austria followed the lead of the Allies who had formed legions of Czechs, Poles and Rumanians, prisoners of war of the hostile armies. The "Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine" at the head of which were four energetic patriots, Volodimir Doroshenko, M. Melenevsky, Ol. Skoropyss Yoltukhovsky and A. Zhuk, also conducted in the neutral non-belligerent countries extensive propaganda for the formation of an independent Ukrainian State, putting this question in the forefront of the problems raised by the war.

195. Revolution of 1917 and Ukrainian National Movement.

Quite independently, and before the plans for the reconstruction of the Ukrainian State made by the Ukrainian patriots who sought the support of the Central Powers could be realized, the idea of an independent Ukrainian State was put into effect by the efforts of the Ukrainian people alone without any foreign help or intervention. In March, 1917, the Revolution broke out in St. Petersburg. It required only a few regiments of the St. Petersburg garrison, among whom Ukrainians played a leading part, to overthrow the old regime. The Romanov monarchy ceased to exist. Revolution soon spread throughout the Empire and everywhere in the provinces local governing bodies were organized which submitted to the Central Provisional government in St. Petersburg. The Ukrainians in Kiev succeeded in seizing power and very soon organized their own national central organ called "Ukrainian Central Council" (Ukrainska Centralna Rada). It was composed of representatives of the Ukrainian political parties, co-operative Unions, clergy, army, workmen, peasants, professional organizations and educational and cultural societies. Professor M. Hrushevsky, who at the outbreak of the Revolution had returned from exile to Kiev, became the head of the "Central Rada". Following the formation of this body, declarations began to come in from newly organized Ukrainian committees in all parts and corners of the Ukraine, recognizing the Central Rada as supreme and announcing their wish to submit to it as to a Ukrainian National government. In a very short time the Ukrainian press was organized, Ukrainian political parties, clubs and such like, schools and publishing societies were formed and vigorous activity started in all fields: various congresses took place in Kiev. Boundless enthusiasm spread throughout all classes of the Ukrainian population. Russianized Ukrainians, who never before had admitted to being anything but Russians, were now inspired with national enthusiasm: high military officers,

clergy, University professors, came to the sessions of the Central Rada offering their services in building up a new life in the Ukraine. Under the eyes of all the renaissance of a nation was taking place.

196. Ukrainian Autonomy.

On the 19th-25th of March a national Ukrainian demonstration in which about a hundred thousand people participated took place in Kiev, followed by an impressive meeting which carried a resolution demanding from the Russian Provisional government autonomy for the Ukraine. On the 6th-8th April a Ukrainian National Congress took place in Kiev, composed of about a thousand representatives from various organizations, institutions, societies, etc., from the whole territory of the Ukraine. It was decided to transform the Central Rada into a truly representative assembly by means of regular elections from all political parties, professional and class organizations according to the territorial principle. Seats were reserved for representatives of the minorities in the Ukraine, Russians, Poles and Jews. Congresses of peasants, of workmen and a military congress followed the National Congress at short intervals and sent their elected representatives to sit in the Central Rada, which thus became a Revolutionary Ukrainian Parliament and very soon the supreme organ of power in the Ukraine. The National Congress decided that the form of the Ukrainian constitution should be territorial autonomy within the Russian Federative Republic. Professor Hrushevsky, who presided at the sessions of the National Congress, was elected President of the reorganizd Central Rada.

197. Bolshevist Revolution in Russia and Proclamation of Ukrainian Democratic Republic.

The revolution of March in Russia, which began as a political revolution against the autocratic regime, very soon took the character of a social revolution. Extreme socialist parties soon seized the reins and pushed the popular movement towards extreme social reforms. The

same also happened in the Ukraine: the revolution which started to vindicate the national aspirations, very soon placed on the agenda questions of the widest reforms of the social and economic order, in the first place the reform of landownership. All the Ukrainian political parties, those which renewed their activity after the revolution as well as the newly formed, adopted socialistic slogans on their programmes. The chief Ukrainian political parties were: the Social Democrats; the Social Revolutionaries formed from the so-called "Peasant Union" (Selianska Spilka) which already existed at the time of the Revolution of 1905; the Social Federalists party transformed out of the secret Ukrainian society of "Progressive Ukrainians' Society" (Tovaristvo Ukrainskikh Postupovtsiv) and which consisted mostly of Ukrainian intelligentsia; and finally the Party of Ukrainian Social Independents or partisans of the political independence of the Ukraine who were chiefly numerous in the army. The first two parties, the Social Democrats and the Social Revolutionaries, were by far the most numerous and influential and took the lead in the Central Rada. Representatives of national minorities in the Rada also belonged to socialist parties, including the Bolsheviks. The far less numerous representatives of non-socialist parties and of minorities, which were at first present in the Central Rada, very soon left. Thus the Central Rada became a Socialist Parliament which in its social policy pursued exclusively the interests of the poorer peasants and workmen and did not care in the least for the interests of the important landowners or well-to-do peasants.

The Ukrainian national movement was strongly supported by the army. In consequence of the general mobilization, the flower of the Ukrainian population and the most active elements were concentrated in the ranks and dispersed on all the Russian fronts. Thus on all fronts Ukrainian military committees were formed which at once demanded to be separated into special Ukrainian military units. At the same time in Kiev, immediately

after the close of the National Congress, special regiments of Ukrainian volunteers were being recruited. Early in May, 1917, a Ukrainian Military Congress took place in Kiev, attended by delegates from one million organized Ukrainian soldiers on all Russian fronts which declared itself ready to support the Central Rada. In consequence of this the Central Rada, feeling itself supported by armed force, took a more decisive tone in the negotiations with the Central Russian government in St. Petersburg concerning Ukrainian autonomy. In July, 1917, Ukrainians succeeded in obtaining the consent of the Russian Provisional government to the autonomy of the Ukraine within limited frontiers including five provinces; Kiev, Poltava, Chernigov, Volynia and Podolia. A Ukrainian Autonomous government was then formed under the name of the "General Secretariat", at the head of which as its Prime Minister was Volodimir Vinnichenko, a Ukrainian author and a member of the Social Democratic Party.

The Russian Provisional government, however, which had only unwillingly and under the pressure of the difficult position in which they were at that time, given their consent to Ukrainian autonomy, postponed putting it into effect. In the same way they put all kinds of obstacles in the way of the formation of Ukrainian military units, notwithstanding the fact that during the last Russian offensive organized by Kerenski, the only military units which fought on the front and suffered heavy losses, were Ukrainian regiments allowed to fight under Ukrainian colors. The Central Rada was compelled to struggle with the Russian Provisional government for every detail in the realization of Ukrainian autonomy granted "de jure". All the energy of the Ukrainian government and the General Secretariat, was spent not so much in organizing the administration of the country on the new basis of autonomy, as on this struggle with the Russian government of St. Petersburg. It was while engaged in this struggle that the Provisional govern-

ment ceased to exist, being overthrown by the Bolsheviks in November, 1917.

After the downfall of the Russian Provisional government the Central Rada proclaimed a Ukrainian Democratic Republic in Kiev, but still in federation with Russia. The territory of this Republic was proclaimed to consist of provinces with a Ukrainian majority of population, thus to the five provinces granted by the Provisional Russian government: Kiev, Poltava, Chernigov, Volynia and Podolia, the provinces of Kharkov, Katerinoslav, Kherson and Tauria—but without Crimea—were added. The minorities on Ukrainian territory within the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, Russians, Poles and Jews, received national and group autonomy but without a territory. In order to secure their rights, special Secretariats were founded in the Ukrainian government, Russian, Polish and Jewish. Extensive reforms of a social and economic character were introduced. Private property on lands formerly belonging to great landowners, the State and the Church, was abolished without compensation to the former owners. The land was to be divided among the peasants as their private property; an eight-hour work day was assured to workmen; freedom of press, assembly and speech, the rights to form trade unions and to strike, inviolability of persons from arrest without warrant and their homes from search were proclaimed; and the death penalty was abolished. Considering that the government of the young Ukrainian Republic endeavored to hold the front line against the armies of the Central Powers on the Ukrainian frontier, and because the Ukraine was an oasis of order and peace among the general chaos and anarchy that spread in Russia following the Bolshevik revolution, the Allied governments of Great Britain, France and Rumania, recognized the "de facto" Ukrainian Democratic Republic and entered into official diplomatic relations with the Ukraine.

The Ukrainian government was in a very difficult position, surrounded by enemies within and without. As

we have already said the Ukrainian Parliament, the Central Rada, was composed exclusively of socialist parties, and thus lost the support of all non-socialist elements in the population. The proclamation of the confiscation of landed property and the extreme policy as a whole threw into opposition the landowners and industrialists. On the other hand the State officials, both Russians and Russianized Ukrainians, neglected or wholly disregarded the orders of the Ukrainian government. The Russianized or non-Ukrainian urban population—for the most part consisting of Jews—were discontented with the separation from Russia and with the introduction of Ukrainian ways of life. The extreme demagogic catchwords scattered by the Socialist parties among the masses, ruined all conceptions of orderly government and roused their worst instincts. By autumn, 1917, the plundering and robbing of landowners' manors, of sugar factories, breweries and distilleries and the cutting down of timber, had become frequent in the Ukraine. The old administrative machinery was in ruins and the new, organized in haste and without the necessary experience, lacked executive power. The economic life of the country especially the railway transport, already weakened and shaken by long years of war, began to give way. The country was on the verge of economic ruin and disintegration. The two chief political parties of the Central Rada, the Social Democrats and the Social Revolutionaries, started a struggle for power which hindered the normal work of the governing bodies, composed chiefly of the members of those two parties. Cabinets followed one another. The break-up of the Russian front line, which in some parts was on Ukrainian territory or very near to it, led to mass demobilization and dispersal of the Russian troops, augmenting the general disorganization of life in the Ukraine.

198. Ukrainian-Russian War.

Having seized power in St. Petersburg and Moscow, the Bolsheviki started systematic and powerful propa-

ganda in order to Bolshevize the Ukraine. Supported by their organizations in Kiev and other important Ukrainian towns which organization chiefly consisted of Russians and Jews and by Bolshevized military units on the front, the Bolsheviks in October, 1917, made an attempt to seize the power in the Ukraine, but the Ukrainian government disarmed the Bolshevized military units and expelled them beyond the Ukrainian frontiers into Russia; the local Bolshevik groups were also put down by the Ukrainian authorities. This incurred threats and protests from the "Council of Commissars of the People" in St. Petersburg. The Ukrainian government, seeking allies against the Bolsheviks, entered into contact with the Don Cossacks who had not recognized the Bolsheviks but had founded their own government in the Don province with General Kaledin at their head. The Don Cossack regiments hastened home from the front in order to support their government and the Ukrainian government gave them permission to traverse Ukrainian territory for this purpose. The Bolshevik "Council of Commissars of the People" sent an ultimatum to the Ukrainian government, demanding that they should forbid the Don Cossacks to traverse Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian government refused to comply with this ultimatum and the first Ukrainian-Russian war broke out. The Bolsheviks sent troops of the "Red Guards" into the Ukraine and endeavored to provoke a Bolshevik uprising in the Ukraine and disrupt the Ukrainian army by propaganda against the Central Rada, accusing the Ukrainian government of neglecting the interests of masses and favoring the rich.

In order to destroy the influence of the Bolshevik propaganda, the Central Rada endeavored to pacify the masses in the Ukraine agitated by this propaganda by promising the most radical reforms: confiscation of lands from the great landowners without compensation and giving it over to the "working people", socialization of the coal and iron mines, of factories, industries and so on. But it was hard to outdo the Bolsheviks in the field

of social demagoguery, which worked on the awakened social aspirations and worst instincts of the masses with catch words like, "steal what had been stolen from you!", inviting the lower classes to seize and divide among themselves the lands and possessions of the upper classes. The Central Rada and the Ukrainian government, composed chiefly of social theorists, doctrinaires, idealists, utopists and pacifists, were unable to create a strong Ukrainian army after the break-up of the old Tsarist army; they even disbanded the regular Ukrainian divisions already formed, fearing and not trusting the old experienced Generals and officers. Instead of regular units they had formed detachments of volunteers led by patriotic but inexperienced young officers and even civilians. These detachments were not able to stem the advance of the Bolsheviks into the Ukraine and were obliged to retreat in all directions. In these very strained circumstances within and without, the Central Rada began its session early in January, 1918, and on the 11th-22nd of January, 1918, proclaimed the complete independence of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, severing every link with Russia. On the very day of the proclamation of independence, a Bolshevist uprising broke out in Kiev, led mostly by Jewish instigators. Amidst fierce fighting in the streets of Kiev which lasted for a week, amidst the thunder of artillery and the continual cracking of machine-guns, the Central Rada remained in session and carried out its resolutions transferring the ownership of the land into the hands of the "working people" and nationalizing the forests, waters and mines, making a State monopoly of the trade in essential foods and declaring the State control of banks, etc. The General Secretariat was transformed into the Council of Ministers. After a whole week of fierce street fighting the Bolshevik uprising in Kiev was put down, but from the north the "Red Guards" were advancing on the Ukrainian capital led by Muraviov. The Council of Ministers was then instructed by the Central Rada to accept an Austro-German offer of peace negotiations

and sent a Ukrainian delegation to Brest-Litovsk where the Bolshevik delegation was already conducting peace negotiations.

199. Peace of Brest-Litovsk.

The Red army advancing into the Ukraine, far more numerous than the Ukrainian defence force, broke the resistance of the Ukrainian volunteer detachments defending the approach to Kiev. The detachment, composed of students and schoolboys which defended the railway junction Kruty to the North-east of Kiev, met with especially hard fighting and after a heroic resistance was annihilated. The Red army approached the Dnieper and now stood within artillery range of Kiev, and began to bombard the city with heavy artillery from across the river. After a few days of continuous bombardment in which the city suffered tremendously, the Central Rada and the Ukrainian government, in order to stop further ruin, decided to leave the capital and with the few remaining thousands of the heroic defenders, retreated to the west in Volynia. The Bolsheviks occupied Kiev and, after having shot several thousand of mostly innocent private individuals, installed in Kiev "a Ukrainian Soviet Government" whose first steps were in the direction of plundering and terrorizing the population. Bolshevik rule was this time of a short duration. At the time when the Ukrainian government and the rest of the Ukrainian army were leaving Kiev, the Ukrainian Delegation in Brest-Litovsk had already signed the Peace Treaty with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. These governments recognized the Ukrainian National government and the Ukrainian Democratic Republic within ethnographic limits, thus including the provinces of Kholm, Berestia and Pinsk. The Ukraine and the Central Powers concluded a commercial treaty on a basis of reciprocity by which the Ukraine bound herself to deliver one million tons of grain and various foodstuffs. Both sides renounced all war compensations and agreed to exchange prisoners of war.

The German government bound themselves to bring into the Ukraine the divisions formed out of Ukrainian prisoners of war for the defence against the Bolsheviks and also lend German troops to clear the Ukraine from their hands. By a special and secret treaty the Austrian government promised to form out of all Ukrainian territories in Austro-Hungaria a special Ukrainian autonomous province within the bounds of the Austrian monarchy.

After the conclusion of peace Ukrainian military forces supported by Germans took the offensive and having defeated the Red army on the 1st of March, 1918, entered Kiev where the population gave them an enthusiastic reception. In two months' time the Ukraine was cleared of Bolsheviks and Ukrainian forces entered the Crimea in order to occupy Sebastopol, which was to be the base for the Ukrainian fleet. The Central Powers, however, mostly interested in the speedy return of normal conditions in the Ukraine from which they hoped to obtain relief from the hunger that already threatened them, especially Vienna, brought into the Ukraine several military corps, thus creating an actual military occupation of the country. They interrupted the Ukrainian advance on Sebastopol and occupied the port with their forces.

The Ukraine government and the Central Rada, having returned to Kiev, failed somehow to establish good relations with their Austro-German allies. Unfortunately they also failed to realize that with the elimination of the Bolshevik danger, a considerable reaction had begun in the Ukraine. Landowners, well-to-do peasants as well as industrialists, now held up their heads and protested against the extreme social reforms, demanding their repeal. Rich and moderately well-to-do peasants would not hear of the socialization of land and kept sending their delegations to the Central Rada, demanding that private property in land should be restored. But the Socialist Revolutionary Party, which had the majority in the Central Rada and in the government, would not hear of rescinding the decisions already taken. So that

the moderate Ukrainian Party of Social Federalists was compelled to recall three of their members who were in the Cabinet.

**200. The "Coup d'Etat" of the 29th of April, 1918,
in Kiev.**

It was then that among conservative circles of the Ukrainian population a conspiracy was made against the Central Rada with the object of overthrowing the Socialist government and proclaiming a monarchy in the form of a Hetman State, traditional in Ukrainian history. The conspirators entered into an understanding with the commanding authorities of the German forces in the Ukraine and obtained their promise of a favorable neutrality. In the meantime successive sharp misunderstandings and conflicts took place between the Ukrainian Socialist government and the German commanding authorities. On the 11th of May, 1918, the Central Rada called the Constituant Assembly of all the Ukraine, which had to give its sanction to the social reforms already voted, knowing well that a majority was assured for the Social Revolutionaries during the elections which already had taken place. On the 28th of April, 1918, the Central Rada definitely passed the land reform and elected Professor Hrushevsky President of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. But this was the final session of the Central Rada. The next day a German military detachment entered the building of the Central Rada interrupting the session, and searched all members for weapons under the pretext of a conspiracy being concocted against the German military forces. On the morrow an imposing Congress of about 8,000 landowners and well-to-do peasants from all parts of the Ukraine assembled in Kiev called by the "Union of Landowners", and proclaimed as Hetman of the Ukraine Pavlo Skoropadski, a General formerly in Russian service, now in Ukrainian. The newly elected Hetman belonged to an old Ukrainian family of Cossack Officers, having already numbered among its members a Hetman, Ivan Skoropadski, at the

beginning of the Eighteenth century. The Germans had disarmed several Ukrainian units which were in Kiev, but no one thought of defending the Central Rada and the change of power took place almost without any bloodshed. Armed detachments of conspirators occupied all the official institutions, and the Ukrainian Democratic Republic ceased to exist, giving place to the "Ukrainian Sovereign State", with a Hetman at its head.

CHAPTER XXX

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(201) Ukrainian Hetman State of 1918. (202) Foreign and Home Policy of the Hetman. (203) Uprising against the Hetman Skoropadski. (204) The Directory. Second Ukrainian-Russian War. (215) West Ukrainian Democratic Republic. (206) Ukrainian-Polish War of 1918-1919. (207) Polish-Ukrainian Campaign Against Kiev in 1920 and the Peace of Riga. (208) "Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic", in the Russian Soviet Union. (209) Ukrainians in Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. (210) Ukrainian Political Refugees.

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201. Ukrainian Hetman State of 1918.

After his election Hetman Skoropadski published a Universal cancelling the law of land socialization passed by the Central Rada and announced an election for a Parliament (Seim), thus actually introducing a Constitutional Monarchy. Owing to the fact that representatives of the moderate Ukrainian parties refused to accept offices offered to them by the Hetman he called men who, though Ukrainian by origin, had for the most part not taken an active part in the Ukrainian national movement but belonged to Russian political parties, chiefly to that of the Russian Constitutional Democrats. Fedor Lizohub became Prime Minister. He was a well-known man and an active representative of the Provincial Self-government (Zemstvo) and belonged to an old Ukrainian family of merit in Ukrainian history. All the Ukrainian parties immediately went into opposition against the Hetman and his government and, late in the summer of 1918, they formed the "Ukrainian National Union" (Natsionalny Soyuz) at the head of which stood Vinnichenko, former Head of the Ukrainian Secretariat. The National Union included all the socialist elements in opposition to Hetman Skoropadski and endeavored to create, parallel to the Hetman government, another unofficial government thoroughly nationalist in spirit.

202. Foreign and Home Policy of the Hetman.

The members of the Hetman government at once found themselves in a false position: they were the official government of the Ukrainian State but the majority consisted of men who had done nothing to win political independence for the Ukraine, and were opposed by the Ukrainian parties which wore the Ukrainian national colors. Supported exclusively by the landowners and rich peasants and immediately adopting a very ultra-conservative line, Hetman Skoropadski soon became very unpopular among the mass of the population, peasants, workmen and democratic intelligentsia, who were mostly socialist and disappointed in their hopes of realizing socialist ideals. Already in the summer of 1918 small peasant uprisings began to take place throughout the Ukraine, supported by the Bolsheviks. The German and Austrian troops had to carry on exhausting guerilla warfare against them. The German and the Austrian authorities, though they had officially recognized Hetman Skoropadski as Sovereign of the Ukraine at whose court diplomatic representatives of the Central Powers, Turkey and Bulgaria were accredited, nevertheless long retained the decisive voice in all Ukrainian affairs of State, the North-east of Ukraine with Kiev being occupied by the Germans and the South-west, including Odessa, by the Austrians. Until the autumn of 1918 the Austro-German military authority prevented the formation of a Ukrainian regular army, thus depriving the Ukrainian government of the possibility of carrying out any active policy. They indefinitely postponed the surrender to the Ukrainian government of the Black Sea fleet seized by them; hindered all their attempts to enter into relations with the Allied Powers and interfered in economic and commercial questions having only one object in view, namely, the fulfilment by the Ukrainians of their promise to furnish grain. The Ukrainian Hetman government was faced by a series of very complicated international and domestic problems. They had to emanci-

pate themselves gradually from Austro-German influence and obtain first of all the recognition of the Allied and neutral Powers. They had to deal with the settlement of war relations with Soviet Russia and the establishment of relations with the States newly created out of the non-Russian provinces of the former Russian Empire; Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, White Russia, Don, Kuban, Georgia and Armenia. Even more difficult was the task before them of stabilizing home affairs, where it was necessary to restore the normal functioning of a vast country shaken to its foundations by war, revolution, and the Bolshevik invasion. It was necessary to organize a regular army, to reorganize the administrative and juridical machinery disordered by frequent changes of power and to re-adjust the economic life of the country, especially in view of the heavy obligations undertaken by the government of the Central Rada towards Austria and Germany in return for their military help against the Bolshevik invasion. There were urgent reforms to be made in almost all spheres of social and economic life in order to secure peaceful conditions in which the new State might develop its material and spiritual powers.

The Hetman government very energetically endeavored to solve all these problems. They obtained the ratification of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by Germany, Turkey, and Bulgaria. To open direct relations with Berlin, Hetman Skoropadski went to Germany in September, 1918, and established friendly relations with Emperor William II. After this the German authorities withdrew their objections to the formation of a regular Ukrainian army and surrendered the Black Sea fleet to the Ukrainian government. Diplomatic relations were established with most of the neutral States: all the Boundary States created out of the former Russian provinces sent their representatives to Kiev, and entered into friendly relations with the Ukraine. The settlement with Austria and Poland presented the greatest difficulties. When the Polish population actually became aware of

the conditions of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, according to which the ancient Ukrainian province of Kholm with the Ukrainian population which for a few centuries had been united to Poland was now attached to Ukraine, they were very indignant calling this the "Fourth Partition of Poland". The Poles were still further disturbed when the existence of the secret treaty between Austria and the Ukraine became known to them. This contained the promise of the Austrian government to divide Galicia into two parts, the Eastern Ukrainian and the Western Polish. The Austrian government attributed great importance to the opinion of the Poles continuing to dream of an "Austro-Polish solution of the Polish problem", and gave way to the pressure of Polish public opinion, especially as it was supported by the Hungarians. Contrary to the obligations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk the Austrian government did not allow the introduction of a Ukrainian administration into the part of the Kholm province occupied in the war by Austrian troops and in July 1918, through the Austrian Minister in Kiev, Count Forgach, declared the annulment of the secret treaty of Brest-Litovsk regarding the division of Galicia. The protests of the Ukrainian government were of no avail, especially as this time the Germans did not support them. In spite, however, of the conflict the Ukrainian government maintained friendly relations with the Council of Regency or the Polish government established by the Germans in the Polish provinces formerly belonging to the Russian Empire.

Endeavoring to unite in the Ukrainian State all the territories populated by Ukrainians, the Hetman Skoropadski's government announced their claim to the Kuban, Crimea, and Bessarabia. The Crimea of whose population the Tatars formed only 15%, the rest being Ukrainians, Greeks, and other nationalities, was linked to the Ukraine by its economic interests; the Ukrainian State especially wished to possess Sebastopol as the chief military port and base for the Black Sea fleet. In the spring of 1918 Ukrainian troops, expelling the Russians,

advanced as far as Simferopol and were greeted joyfully by the population. But the Germans compelled the Ukrainians to stop their advance and evacuate the peninsula. They also hindered the Tatars from forming a government but gave over the power into the hands of the few remaining Russian officials, who formed a Provisional Crimean government in the hope of maintaining "Crimean independence" until it could again be united to the "restored Russian Empire". As the negotiations started by the Ukrainian government about the question of uniting the Crimea to the Ukraine gave no positive results, the Ukrainian government in September 1918, was compelled to declare an economic blockade of the peninsula. After a fortnight of blockade, the Crimean Russian government capitulated and the Crimea was united to the Ukraine with an autonomous Seim, territorial army and a State Secretary for Crimea in the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

The Hetman government endeavored to obtain a similar union with the Kuban territory which, after expelling the Bolsheviks, had declared its independence. The Kuban territory which, since the end of the Eighteenth century (see Chapter 24) had formed the Kuban Cossack Army, was a purely Ukrainian land populated by descendants of the Zaporogian Cossacks. The government of the independent Kuban territory was in the hands of the Cossacks who wished to enter into relations with the Hetman government, but it happened that some of the Russian White (Tsarist) armies, those of General Alexeev and Denikin, fleeing from the Bolsheviks, took refuge on Kuban territory. Being numerically stronger, they compelled the Kuban Cossack government to direct its policy according to their interests. Here also, as everywhere in the Ukraine, the Germans played a double game. When in the summer of 1918, the Kuban government asked the Ukrainian government to send them military help, the Germans prevented the sending of a Ukrainian expeditionary force to Kuban and at the same time enabled the Tsarist Generals to

occupy Katerinodar, the capital of Kuban, and then declared they would not tolerate an armed conflict on Kuban territory between Ukrainians and Tsarist Generals. The delegation from the Kuban government was very cordially received in Kiev and both sides expressed their wish for union; in the meantime a series of treaties covering finance, commerce and transit were concluded as well as various other conventions which practically created a state of economic union between Kuban and Ukraine. The Ukrainian government also sent transports of arms and munitions into Kuban.

The question of Bessarabia was more difficult. The population of the country was very mixed: in the north and in the south Ukrainians lived in a compact mass forming about 30% of the total population of the country; Rumanians constituted about 40%; the rest were Bulgars, Jews, Russians and other nationalities. The country was intimately connected, materially and culturally with the Ukraine and the population expressed itself in favor of Union with the Ukrainian State. But during the Bolshevik invasion of the Ukraine the Rumanians had occupied Bessarabia with their forces and the Germans, when concluding peace with Rumania in the spring of 1918, recognized this occupation. In spite of appeal from the Bessarabia population which suffered under the harsh Rumanian regime, the Ukraine was not able to give them armed help, being prevented by the Austrian and German authorities. The Ukrainian government limited their action to diplomatic intervention and at last was compelled to have recourse to economic blockade. This last measure was effective: pressed on all sides by the hard peace terms of the Central Powers, Rumania was able to get the necessary products only from the Ukraine. A Rumanian diplomatic mission arrived in Kiev, asking for the renewal of trade relations. The Ukrainian government, without renouncing their claim to Bessarabia, accepted a provisional commercial treaty. Both countries established diplomatic relations

postponing the solution of the Bessarabia problem to a more favorable moment.

Home affairs, however, presented the greatest difficulties to the Hetman government. On the arrival of Austro-German troops in the Ukraine, the landowners had organized a reaction against the violence and disorder committed by the peasants during the Bolshevik invasion. The landed proprietors began to organize private armed detachments called "punitive detachments" (*karni viddily*) in order to recover from the peasants their stolen possessions, and exact from them a contribution for the damages committed. The creation of the Hetman government was seized by the landowners as a suitable moment to intensify the operations of the "Punitive detachments", extorting contributions and endeavoring to return to pre-revolution conditions. The Hetman government made every effort to put an end to the arbitrary action of the "Punitive detachments" but, nevertheless, it had to bear the whole odium of their violence which contributed to its unpopularity.

The Hetman government showed great energy in planning order and a return to normal conditions. It accomplished outstanding work in the sphere of legislation, organization of the administration and judiciary and the revival of industry and trade, in addition to passing financial measures. The highest judicial authority, the Senate, was created entirely afresh; the Provincial and Municipal self-governing bodies were reorganized according to more liberal principles than under the Russian Tsarist regime eliminating, however, all the extreme innovations of the revolutionary period. The railway traffic, shaken during the war and the revolution, was put in order in a comparatively short time; the production of coal mines and of the various factories was increased; trade relations with neighboring States were organized; in the realm of national finance the Ukrainian exchange was put on a firm basis; two Ukrainian Universities were founded in Kiev and in Kamianets in Podolia, and the three Russian Universities ex-

isting already of Kiev, Kharkov and Odessa, as well as Polytechnic Schools, were gradually Ukrainized; a Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was founded in Kiev; 150 Ukrainian secondary schools (Gymnasiums) were founded and all the primary schools were reorganized according to Ukrainian national ideas. A Ukrainian National Opera and a State Dramatic Theatre were founded in Kiev, as well as a national Picture Gallery and the National Library and a number of other cultural institutions. The Hetman government gave generous subsidies to all national cultural needs.

Although the personal national autonomy accorded by the Central Rada government to national minorities was cancelled by the Hetman government, national minorities such as Russians, Poles, Jews and others, were given complete freedom of cultural development. For example, secondary schools and Universities which existed under the Tsarist regime were left untouched and the necessary time was granted them for transformation into Ukrainian, while completely new Ukrainian secondary schools and Universities were founded.

The Russian language was left on an equality with the Ukrainian, which was declared the official language of the Ukrainian State. No differences of sex, race or religion were made between the citizens of the Ukrainian State: for example, the portfolio of Minister of Trade was given to a Jew.

203. Uprising Against the Hetman Skoropadski.

All these liberal reforms, however, did not satisfy the bulk of the population. In the most burning question of landownership, the Hetman government passed merely palliative measures which in a peaceful normal time would have aided in the solution of agrarian difficulties but now, after most extreme revolutionary solutions had been proposed, the former seemed to be only pale and insignificant and gave no satisfaction to the masses among whom the Bolsheviks and extreme Ukrainian parties carried on extravagant propaganda. On the eve of his down-

fall, Hetman Skoropadski confirmed the radical law drawn up by his government regarding the compulsory sale to the State of all important landed property and its redistribution among the peasants with the aid of the State Land Bank, but it was too late.

In the same way the government did not consider it necessary to take into account the feelings of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, wrought to a high pitch of enthusiasm at witnessing their dreams fulfilled, and the national revival actually leading to the creation of a Ukrainian independent State. The Hetman government was too complaisant to Russians: it gave responsible posts in the administration to persons indifferent or even hostile to the Ukrainian national movement, officials who neither knew nor respected the Ukrainian language and who often, under pretext of controlling the Bolsheviks, arrested Ukrainians. All this created an atmosphere of reciprocal distrust between the Hetman and the Ukrainian intelligentsia and strengthened opposition currents. According a generous welcome to Kiev to anti-Soviet refugees from Russia, the Hetman government contrived to make the capital a hot-bed of Russian plots and conspiracies, not so much against the Russian Soviet regime as against the independent Ukrainian State and the Hetman himself. All this brought the Ukrainian national parties of Socialist tendency to the point of uprising against the Hetman even with the help of the Bolsheviks. Under these circumstances, Hetman Skoropadski was quite isolated and was actually supported only by the Germans.

In the summer of 1918, the resistance of Germany on the Western Front was clearly weakening and nearing an end. The Germans no longer put hindrances in the way of the Hetman government seeking to establish relations with Allied Powers and also gave way in the question of the formation of a Ukrainian regular army. The Hetman opened negotiations with the "National Union" and formed a new Cabinet including several Ukrainian patriots to replace those of his former ministers,

who were clearly unpopular for their Russian sympathies. But all this did not save the situation. In the meantime Germany entirely broke down and revolution broke out in the Reich early in November, 1918. The Hetman then hoped to rescue the Ukrainian State by getting the support of the Allied Powers, and in order to obtain this support decided to seek help from reactionary Russian circles. He dissolved his Cabinet consisting of Ukrainians, and formed a new one composed exclusively of conservatives and Russophiles and published on the 14th of November, 1918, a manifesto declaring that the Ukraine must first of all throw over the Bolshevik power in Russia and then unite with Russia in a Federation. But on the very day of the manifesto the long prepared uprising of the "National Union" against the Hetman broke out.

The insurgents won over the brigade of Ukrainian troops composed of Galician Volunteers, who became the nucleus of the insurgents' army which was joined, one after the other, by all the other Ukrainian forces. The uprising was conducted by a newly constituted government "Directory" consisting of five members, presided over by Vinnichenko. German troops, demoralized by the revolution in the Reich, could not give the Hetman any help and his only supporters were volunteers formed of Russophil Ukrainian elements and of forcibly mobilized officers of the old Tsarist army. After a month spent in defending Kiev, and seeing the complete hopelessness of his position, Hetman Skoropadski abdicated, and with the help of Germans secretly sought refuge in Germany. The army of the Directory entered Kiev.

204. The Directory. Second Ukrainian-Russian War.

The uprising of the Directory again revolutionized the whole of the Ukraine which had hardly calmed down, and led to another sweeping tide of Bolshevik ideas among the lower classes of the population. The poorer peasants eagerly joined the uprising but not in order to defend national ideals of political independence, but in order to get rid of the hated regime of "landlords",

whom in their eyes Hetman Skoropadski represented. The army of the Directory rapidly grew to several hundred thousand men but as rapidly melted when the Hetman was overthrown. The Directory restored the Ukrainian Democratic Republic but was imprudent enough to destroy the whole governmental machinery organized under the Hetman. At the same time the extreme Socialists in the Directory again flooded the population with demagogic appeals, which only led to general anarchy.

The Allied Powers had, at the last moment, decided to support Hetman Skoropadski, seeing in him an advocate for the restoration of the old Russia but it was too late. A French fleet landed at Odessa a contingent of Greek and French colonial troops and for some time Odessa became the refuge of Russian anti-Soviet refugees now still further embittered against the Ukrainians. They succeeded in persuading the representatives of the Allied Powers in Odessa, in Jassy, in Paris and everywhere, that the Ukrainians were the same as Bolsheviks.

In the meantime the Soviet government in Moscow, which had sympathized with the revolt against the Hetman, now decided to try to get the Ukraine again into their power. Having declared that they were going to help the Ukrainian "workers" to get a "Ukrainian Socialistic Soviet Republic", they began in December, 1918, to advance their forces into the Ukraine. Thus began the second Ukrainian-Russian war. The army of the Directory, consisting of former Hetman troops and volunteers being reduced to quite an inadequate force, was not able to defend the Directory amidst the indifference of the masses fallen a prey to extremist demagogic agitation. Early in February, 1919, the Directory was compelled to leave Kiev. Shortly before leaving on the 22nd of January, 1918, the "Working Congress" (Trudovi kongres) assembled by the Ukrainian government took place, and renewed all the Socialist declarations of the Central Rada, including the Union with Galicia: this latter remained a declaration and was not put into effect.

205. West Ukrainian Democratic Republic.

Before the outbreak of the German revolution, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had ceased to exist. On the 16th of October, 1918, Emperor Carl published a manifesto to his peoples about the transformation of Austria into a Union of National States. Two days following this manifesto to the "Ukrainian National Council" (Ukrainska Natsionalna Rada) assembled in Lvov and proclaimed the formation of a separate Ukrainian State out of all the Ukrainian provinces of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; East Galicia, North Bukovina and Carpathian Rus, with Lvov as its capital. But East Galicia was also the object of Polish pretensions based on the secular Polish domination of Galicia (1340-1772). On the 1st of November, 1918, Ukrainians occupied Lvov with their military forces and began to organize Ukrainian administration in the country and to form a Ukrainian army. The Ukrainian forces were, however, insufficient to hold Lvov with its preponderant Polish population. A Polish uprising against the Ukrainians soon broke out, desperate fighting taking place in the streets. The Poles received reinforcements from Cracow and after three weeks of stubborn fighting in the streets of Lvov, the Ukrainians left the city. Soon, however, they also received reinforcements from the Directory and laid siege to Lvov, bombarding the city. At the same time a Ukrainian-Polish fighting front was formed along the ethnographical frontier between the Eastern or Ukrainian and Western or Polish parts of Galicia. The "Ukrainska Natsionalna Rada" (Ukrainian National Council) after the evacuation of Lvov, transferred its seat to Stanislaviv and there formed the government called "West Ukrainian Democratic Republic", with President Eugen Petrushevich at its head. Though the Ukrainian National Council through their delegates at the "Working Congress" (Trudovi Congres) in Kiev on the 22nd of January, 1919, had proclaimed the Union of West Ukrainian territories with Great Ukraine, their government was practically independent, conducting

their policy independently of the Directory. The position of this government was very difficult. The best Ukrainian forces, about 100,000 men, in the former Austrian army, were still at the Italian front and separated from Galicia by Hungary, where a Communist government had seized the power. In the south, the Ukrainians were menaced by the Rumanians who had already occupied the Ukrainian part of Bukovina. The Directory of Great Ukraine could not send more help as they were themselves retreating from the pressure of the Bolsheviks and were daily losing ground. A Galician army organized in haste, fought very courageously but were soon short of munitions, transport, clothing, medicaments and even food supplies.

206. Ukrainian-Polish War of 1918-1919.

A Ukrainian Delegation sent by the Directory and the Galician Ukrainian government arrived early in 1919 at the Peace Conference in Paris, demanding recognition for the independent united Ukraine. Ukrainians hoped that President Wilson's Fourteen points declaring the rights of peoples to self-determination would also be applied to them. They were, however, bitterly disappointed. The Allies and especially Clemenceau, could not forgive them the separate peace concluded early in 1918 with the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk. Moreover, the former Russian Tsarist statesmen had an important influence with the statesmen of the Allied Powers and succeeded in persuading them of the identity of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic with the Bolsheviks. Thus the Ukrainian conflict with the Poles found no sympathy in Paris at the Peace Conference. France, considering Poland her natural ally in the East and a bulwark against the Communists in Moscow, armed six divisions formed from American Poles and Polish war prisoners taken by the Allied armies, and sent them under the command of General Haller into Poland to help the Poles against the Bolsheviks. These fresh forces, armed and provided with all the new technical devices,

instead of being used by the Poles against the Bolsheviks, were thrown against the Ukrainians on the Ukrainian-Polish front in Galicia and decided the issue of the Ukrainian-Polish war. Early in May, 1919, the Ukrainian army in Galicia was driven back from their positions as far as the Bukovinian frontier on the south-west. Lvov was relieved from Ukrainian siege. It is true that the Ukrainian army, led by General Hrekov, by a hardy offensive in June of the same year recovered most of the lost territory, but complete lack of arms and munitions compelled them to interrupt their advance. The Poles took the offensive, pressing them again. The Ukrainian Galician army then decided to cross the frontier and go over on the territory of Great Ukraine in order to rest and, having helped the forces of the Directory against the Bolsheviks, to recommence the struggle for Galicia with united forces. At the moment of crossing the river Zbruch—the former frontier between Russia and Austria and now separating the Ukrainian Democratic Republic from its Western part, Galicia—in mid July, 1919, the Galician army numbered 60,000. The Galician government with Petrushevich, who was at that time proclaimed dictator, together with the army, crossed into the Eastern Ukraine.

207. Polish-Ukrainian Campaign Against Kiev in 1920 and the Peace of Riga.

In the meantime the Directory had lost almost all the territory of the Ukraine, where terrible anarchy broke out. Independent insurgent detachments were formed everywhere under individual leaders who left the Directory in order to join the Bolsheviks and vice versa, terrorized the population and massacred the Jews. The government of the Directory, torn between different political parties, was helpless to restore order. The Head of the Directory, Vinnichenko, a Social Democrat, after the first mishaps deserted his post and sought refuge somewhere abroad. His post was taken by the second member of the Directory, also a Social Democrat, Simon

Petlura, who shouldered the whole burden of the struggle against the Bolsheviks. He had taken the title of the Supreme Leader of the Ukrainian army (Holovny Ota-man) and practically became dictator. Petlura enjoyed enormous popularity with the masses of the Ukrainian population for his perseverance and courage. With the loss of Kiev, Kamenets in Podolia became for a time the capital of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic where the Galician government of Petrushevich had also settled down. Having with united forces driven the Bolsheviks out of Podolia, the united armies of Petlura and Petrushevich set out in August, 1919, towards Kiev. In a month's time the whole Ukraine of the Right Bank was freed of the Bolsheviks and, on the 31st of August, the Ukrainian army entered Kiev.

But simultaneously with the operations of the Ukrainian army against the Bolsheviks, Russian anti-Soviet troops under the lead of the Tsarist General, Denikin, also began an offensive against the Bolsheviks. During the summer of 1919 they occupied the Ukraine of the Left Bank and held Odessa. Denikin and the Russian political circles backing him would not hear of an independent Ukraine; in their eyes Ukrainians were the "Separatists" whom they hated as much as they hated the Soviet government. Their object was the restoration of a "united and indivisible Russia", and they wished no understanding with the government of Petlura. They did not even try to co-ordinate their military operations with those of the Ukrainians. Thus Kiev was simultaneously occupied by the Ukrainians who entered the city from the West and by Denikin's army from the East; street fighting between the two anti-Bolshevist forces had already begun, and the Ukrainians, not wishing to ruin their capital, evacuated Kiev. This was the crucial moment in the successes of the Ukrainian army: the Bolsheviks very skilfully took advantage of the lack of understanding between their enemies and began by attacking the Ukrainians who were at the same time pressed from the south by Denikin's detachments coming from

Odessa. A terrible epidemic of typhus broke out at that time among the Ukrainian troops, against which it was impossible to do anything as there were no medical supplies to be had. Receiving no help from anywhere, being faced by equally hostile Russian reactionary, and Russian Bolshevik, forces, completely cut from Europe, Petlura decided to enter into an understanding with the Polish government, seeing in Poland the natural ally against Moscow. But Petrushevich and the Galician government would not hear of any understanding with the Poles and preferred to enter into an understanding with Russians, Red or White. In consequence of the divergence of policy of the Galician and Great Ukrainian governments, the Galician army, decimated by typhus, went over to Denikin at the same time as the government of Petlura started negotiations with Poles. But Denikin, in spite of munitions and support he received from the Allied Powers, was completely defeated by the Soviet forces and, in February 1920, the remnants of the Galician army were absorbed in the Russian Red army. Their former three corps had melted down to three brigades, about 18,000 men, the rest having perished in battle or from disease. They did not long remain with the Bolsheviks and, irritated by their terrorist tactics, partly joined Petlura who at that time had formed a new army already in alliance with Pilsudski and the Polish government, and partly surrendered to the Poles. The Galician Ukrainian army thus ceased to exist.

Petlura, after the Galician army joined Denikin was left in a very difficult position. His immediate objective was to obtain active help from the Polish government against the Soviets. He started the formation of a new army on Polish territory. At the same time his army, under the lead of General Omelianovich Pavlenko, continued guerilla warfare against the Bolsheviks, going sometimes as far as the Dnieper and even crossing the river and inflicting on the Red troops a series of defeats and considerable losses, as for instance during his well known "Winter campaign" of 1919-1920. In the spring

of 1920, General Omelianovich Pavlenko rejoined the main forces of Petlura reorganized on Polish territory. On the 21st April, 1920, Petlura concluded, in the name of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, in Warsaw, a treaty with the Polish government according to which he renounced Galicia. In return Poland recognized the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as being a Ukrainian independent State and promised active help in the struggle against the Bolsheviks. A few days after the treaty was signed the united Polish Ukrainian forces began their campaign against Soviet Russia and entered Kiev early in May, 1920.

The allies did not, however, hold Kiev more than a month, and were obliged to retreat, pressed by the superior forces of the Soviet army. The Polish troops retreated as far as Warsaw, whereas the Ukrainian army by their stubborn resistance, hindered the Red forces from turning the Polish troops from the south-east and defended Galicia from Bolshevik pressure. The campaign was decided in battles near Warsaw, where Marshal Pilsudski succeeded in turning both flanks of the Red armies and utterly defeated them. In the autumn of 1920, Poland concluded a treaty with the Soviet government in Riga, having obtained Volynia, and the government of Ukrainian Democratic Republic was thus completely isolated. The small Ukrainian army holding western Podolia continued for some time to resist the Bolshevik forces, but when the Soviets, having defeated the Tsarist General Wrangel energetically supported by the Allied Powers, and forced him to evacuate the Crimea, threw all their armies against the Ukrainians, they were forced to retreat on to Polish territory where the Ukrainian army was disarmed and interned. The government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic with the whole staff of the Ministries and a great number of civilians escaping from Bolshevik terror, became refugees. The Ukrainian government and the army did not at once lay down their arms. In the Ukraine of the Right Bank the peasants who now understood the whole ruinous

significance of the Soviet government for them, carried on for several years guerrilla warfare against the Bolshevik occupation. Whole detachments of the former Ukrainian army secretly, but with cognizance and help of the Polish military circles, for some years were accustomed to cross the frontier and take part in the guerrilla war which distinguished itself by a number of highly dramatic moments. Ukrainians showed often very great heroism, but the forces were too unequal and after two or three years the armed resistance of the peasants was broken. Soviet power established itself in Ukraine, ruined and drenched in blood.

208. "Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic", in the Russian Soviet Union.

At the beginning, in consideration for the feelings of the population, the Moscow Soviet government proclaimed the "Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic" as a federate member of the Union of Soviet Republics. A separate Ukrainian Soviet government was formed with the Bulgarian communist Rakovski as President. This government even had separate diplomatic representation and its own military forces, and took part in the conclusion of the Treaty of Riga. The activity of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was renewed, the Ukrainian language was declared the State language and the teaching in the schools was continued in Ukrainian. The Soviet authorities began to invite Ukrainian intelligentsia who had left the country, to return, promising them freedom of educational and cultural work in the national spirit. Between 1924 and 1926 many Ukrainian scholars, including Professor Hrushevsky, literary men and journalists and a great number of teachers, etc., returned to Ukraine, and took part in the reconstruction of the economic and cultural life ruined by long years of revolution and wars. They adapted themselves as best they could to the conditions of the Soviet regime in the hope of its evolution to more civilized ways. But the Soviet Moscow government feeling themselves more and more firmly in

the saddle in the Ukraine, began to curtail the would-be "independence" of the Ukrainian Socialistic Soviet Republic more and more, until it became a fiction. The Ukraine became an ordinary province of Soviet Russia, and only nominally continues to be called a separate Republic in the Russian Soviet Union. Parallel to this curtailment the Soviet authorities began the collectivization of the agricultural production. This was a great blow and disappointment to the Ukrainian peasants who are profound individualists by nature, and are deeply attached to and imbued with the idea of private property in land. The Ukrainian peasants stubbornly resisted collectivization, but the Soviet government suppressed all revolts and opposition: for many years they continued to exile thousands of the more wealthy and independent peasants to Siberia and to the far North of Russia, and in order to utterly crush the resistance of the Ukrainian peasants, the Soviet authorities allowed millions of the population to perish from terrible hunger in 1932. Parallel to the persecution of the Ukrainian peasants, the Russian Soviet authorities started a campaign against the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Under the pretext of a struggle against the "nationalism" and "Petlurism" all Ukrainian institutions, including the Academy of Sciences, were completely abolished; monstrous political trials were staged resulting in the imprisonment and exile of thousands of Ukrainian scholars, literary men, etc., many being shot or exiled without any trial at all. During the last years when political terror in Soviet Russia has been fiercely raging, the forms it takes in Ukraine are particularly terrible and sweeping: under the name of "nationalism" and "Petlurism" all manifestations of Ukrainian cultural distinction and the most timid aspiration to a minimum of political freedom are destroyed.

209. Ukrainians in Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia.

After the occupation of Galicia by the Polish military forces and the loss of the Galician army, the Galician government with the dictator Petrushevich sought refuge

in Vienna, from where they developed considerable diplomatic activity, endeavoring to make the Allied Powers recognize the independence of the Ukrainian Galician State. Indeed, the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers at first decided, on 21st Novembr, 1919, that Poland was to hold Galicia only as a mandated territory for 25 years, according to a special Statute which guaranteed autonomy to Galicia, and to Ukrainians complete equality with the Poles. A little later the Council of the League of Nations confirmed this Statute, on the 23rd February, 1921, repeating that Poland was only to hold a provisory mandate of Galicia in the name of the Allied Powers. But on the 15th of March, 1923, the Council of Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, in order to stabilize conditions in Eastern Europe, definitely recognized the sovereign rights of Poland over the Ukrainian part of in Galicia. The Ukrainian population of Galicia were long in relinquishing the hope that the Allied Powers would help them in one way or another, and refused to recognize their dependence on the Polish government. They refused all the compromises proposed by the Polish authorities, and boycotted the elections to the Seim in Warsaw. Petrushevich continued his activities in the press and before the League of Nations; but finally losing hope he entered into negotiations with the Soviets, in consequence of which many Ukrainian political refugees from Galicia went to Soviet Ukraine. The Galician population began to build hopes on the Soviets. Several years of the tactics of not recognizing the Polish authorities and boycotting brought detrimental consequences for the Ukrainians in Galicia. Polish political circles being constantly refused understanding, ceased to attempt it: the Polish government undertook a series of reforms in the administration of economic and especially educational matters, which strengthened the predominant position of the Poles in Galicia, and the Polish Seim in which there were no Ukrainian members from Galicia, confirmed all the decisions. Ukrainians did take part in the following elections and elected a number of Uk-

rainian members to the Seim and the Senate. These members, however, declared that the formation of an independent State was the ultimate object of Ukrainians, and continued to use sharp oppositional tactics. At the same time an "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" having its headquarters abroad, developed in Poland terroristic activity to which the Polish authorities on their side answered with reprisals. Ukrainian terrorists then murdered the Minister of the Interior and a number of other high officials. The situation seemed to be without a solution when among a part of Ukrainians disappointed in the tactics of implacable opposition, a certain inclination to a conciliatory attitude towards the Polish State was to be noticed. The sharp anti-Ukrainian policy in Soviet Russia introduced in 1930-32 had considerably contributed to this since Galician Ukrainians lost every hope of any help from the Soviet government. The so-called "normalization" (adjustment) of Polish-Ukrainian relations was initiated by the Polish government, according to which Galician Ukrainians in the elections of 1935 to the reformed Seim in Warsaw received 15 seats and 5 seats in the Senate. Ukrainian members who were elected on a "normalization" ticket declared their complete loyalty to the Polish State, voted for the budget and military credits, declaring that a strong Polish army was in the interests of the Ukrainian population in view of the extermination policy of the Russian Soviet government towards Ukrainians. However, long years of tension and hostile relations between the Polish and Ukrainian population had created a very heavy atmosphere of mutual distrust and the "normalization" of their relations is only very slowly advancing. The Polish government is bound to reckon with the public opinion of the majority of the Polish population, especially of Poles in Galicia, who are brought up in traditions of rivalry with Ukrainians and the Warsaw government does not dare to make any more or less important concessions to Ukrainians. On the other hand, the Ukrainian population cannot forget their lost post-war possibilities and have a sober appreciation of the

realities of the situation. In these conditions the problem of Polish-Ukrainian understanding is still awaiting its solution.

Somewhat different are the Ukrainian-Polish relations in Volynia, which Poland annexed in accordance with the Treaty of Riga, 1920. One million Ukrainians here, not having had the advantage of a constitutional regime, which Galician Ukrainians had enjoyed under Austria, are considerably lacking in education and very backward in political development. Nevertheless, in 1923, Volynia succeeded in electing twenty members to the Seim. At first very revolutionary in their attitude, the action of the population of Volynia was reminiscent of the then recent Russian revolution. The Volynian members in the Seim at once took an irreconcilable attitude, and some of them even entered the Communist faction. This led to violent misunderstanding between the Polish government and the population. In recent times more moderate elements among the Volynian population have taken the lead and the situation seems to be getting quieter. In the last elections for the Seim of 1935 the Volynian members took a strictly loyal attitude towards Poland. They form a group separate from the Galician Ukrainians and represent above all the local interests of the Volynian population. One of the most important questions of Volynia is the Church: Volynian Ukrainians being all Orthodox demand the Ukrainization of their Church, completely Russianized under the Russian Tsarist government; one of the chief items being the introduction of the Ukrainian language into the Church service. They have succeeded in obtaining Ukrainian bishops in the two Volynian bishoprics and are gradually realizing their wishes concerning the Church. Ukrainian cultural life in Volynia as well as in Kholm is developing only very slowly owing to the lack of intelligentsia among them.

After the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Ukrainians of Bukovina taking advantage of their rights to national self-determination, founded in

Czernowitz, on the 25th of October, 1918, their Provincial Ukrainian Committee (Ukrainski Kraevy Komitet) and the general meeting (viche) assembled a few days later and voted for the union with the Ukraine of the four Ukrainian districts in Northern Bukovina. But Bukovina was soon occupied by Rumanian troops who dispersed the Ukrainian volunteers and established a military government which has lasted until recent times. The Rumanian authorities destroyed all Ukrainian institutions and schools which were obtained under Austrian rule: such as Ukrainian chairs at the University of Czernowitz, and Ukrainian secondary and elementary schools. The Orthodox Church was completely Rumanianized. From time to time Ukrainians in Bukovina succeed in electing one or two members to the Rumanian parliament, but their votes carry no weight.

In 1918-1919 one of the most backward Ukrainian territories, the Carpathian Rus, expressed a desire to be united to the main body of the Ukrainian State. After the declaration of the independence of the West Ukrainian (Galician) territory, the population of the Carpathian Rus began to take steps to unite with them. The Hungarian government then made haste to proclaim the autonomy of the Carpathian Rus and accorded certain concessions of the use of Ukrainian language in schools in the University of Budapest. But Hungary soon fell a prey to a Communist revolution and Galicia became the theatre of the Polish-Ukrainian war. The southern part of the Carpathian Rus was occupied by Rumanians, the rest with Uzhorod, capital of the province, was occupied by the Czechs who led a struggle against the Hungarian Communists. The population of the Carpathian Rus then decided to endeavor to unite with Czechoslovakia. In the United States of America, Ukrainian emigrants from Carpathian Rus declared the same wish, at the end of 1918, to Professor Massaryk and concluded, in Scranton, an agreement with him about the union and autonomy for the Carpathian Rus. But having occupied Carpathian Rus the Czechoslovaks were not in a great hurry to fulfil

this promise of autonomy and the country was ruled by Czech officials. Taking advantage of the existence of two currents among the local intelligentsia concerning the use of the Ukrainian language or of an artificial adaption of Russian, and of the differences and discussions between these two camps, Czech officials actually supported the Russophils which brought still more unrest into local affairs. In spite of this and of the unfavorable economic situation of the province having suddenly been cut off from its natural economic base, the Hungarian plain and united to the geographically distant Czechoslovakia, the Carpathian Rus began gradually to revive and from a Hungarian province completely neglected, both economically and culturally became under Czechoslovakian rule, a country which is rapidly progressing in all spheres of political, cultural and national life. In 1937, the Czechoslovakian government began gradually introducing autonomy into Carpathian Rus, having increased the powers of the local administrative bodies and founded a Provincial Seim. It is probable that the life of the Ukrainian population of Carpathian Rus will develop normally and that in a short time they will be the equals of their brothers in Galicia in culture and national development.

210. Ukrainian Political Refugees.

The revolution and the loss of the struggle for political independence have caused Ukrainian political refugees to cross the frontiers of their native country in numbers never before known. Both Ukrainian governments, the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the West Ukrainian Democratic Republic, with their numerous ministerial staffs and State institutions, the army, and a great number of intelligentsia, were all compelled to seek refuge from the Red terror. The greatest number of refugees landed in the neighboring countries: Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Austria, also Germany and France. Petlura's army was, as we have said, interned in Poland where his government also found refuge; the refugees from Galicia

mostly fled to Austria. Czechoslovakia received the Ukrainian refugees most hospitably: during the years 1922-2932 thousands of Ukrainian youths were given the opportunity to study, the Czechoslovakian government paying the expenses of a Ukrainian University and a Pedagogical Institute in Prague and an Agricultural Academy in Podebrady. Prague became for a certain time the centre of Ukrainian cultural life in exile. This relief action of Czechoslovakia included all Ukrainian refugees, from Great Ukraine, Galicia and Bukovina. The Polish government also gave certain help to refugees from Petlura's party, their former allies. Among other things, the Polish government contributed to found a Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw in 1930. Ukrainian refugees also received an important help from Germany where a Ukrainian Scientific Institute was founded, in 1926, in Berlin.

Ukrainian political refugees in exile make it their national duty to continue working for their national cause by spreading propaganda in Europe and elsewhere and making known the Ukrainian problem and the idea of Ukrainian political independence as its solution. The government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic continues to exist to this day and is recognized by most of the Ukrainian refugees as the lawful government of Ukraine; they have their groups and organizations of refugees in all the more important centres of Europe. When, in 1926 the head of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, Simon Petlura, was murdered in a street in Paris by a fanatical Jew, behind whom (more than probably) stood the Russian Soviet government, his post was taken by Andrew Livitsky. Parallel to the government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, a group of Ukrainian monarchists, led by the talented historian and politician, Viacheslav Lipinsky, have united themselves around the person of the former Hetman Pavlo (Paul) Skoropadski, as the lawful pretender to the post of Supreme Head of Ukrainian State. There are also other Ukrainian political groups and organizations which con-

flict with one another on account of divergences in their political views, thus considerably impairing the progress of the Ukrainian cause abroad. However, they all, without distinction of political ideology, hold fast to the principle of Ukrainian political independence.

Ukrainian political refugees take an active part in the national cultural work of their countrymen and countrywomen in Galicia, Volynia, in Carpathian Rus, Bukovina and Bessarabia forming parts of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, as well as among the numerous Ukrainian emigrants on other continents, America and Asia. About 700,000 Ukrainians enjoy the rights of citizens of the United States, and about 300,000 those of the British Empire (Canada). These having unlimited freedom for national development, give considerable financial and moral support to their countrymen and countrywomen in Europe sharing vital interests in common with them.

In spite of their dispersion throughout the whole world, Ukrainians everywhere retain a consciousness of their national unity and live a common life of joy and woe, sharing also the unfailing hope that sooner or later the Ukrainian State will arise on the banks of the Dnieper with its historical capital of Kiev, and insure freedom of national development to the whole Ukrainian people.

APPENDIX A

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NOTE REGARDING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN EUROPE AND THE UKRAINE

In the time between the preparation of this manuscript by Prof. Doroshenko and its present publication, momentous events have transpired in Central Europe affecting the Ukrainian people. The opening pages of the book describing the distribution of the Ukrainian people among the European states must be brought up to date. It was felt that a brief summary of events of 1938-39 should be included in this volume.

The Munich Conference of Sept. 29th, 1938, attended by Herr Hitler, Mr. Chamberlain, M. Daladier and Signor Mussolini, resulted in an agreement to reconstruct the Czecho-Slovak state. There followed the annexation to Germany of the Sudeten areas and the granting of autonomy to Slovakia and Ruthenia. The latter was now called Carpatho-Ukraine. It had its own administration at the head of which was Augustin Voloshyn, a priest of the Uniate Church and a well-known Ukrainian leader. Hungary put forward claims to the southern part of the area. The matter was left to the decision of the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Germany and Italy. The result of this so-called arbitration announced on Nov. 2nd was the awarding of a southern strip of the country, including the two chief towns and administrative centres, Uzhorod and Munkachiv to Hungary. Thereupon the capital of Carpatho-Ukraine was established at Khust. In spite of the difficult situation created by this partition which deprived the state of the southern fertile strip of land and of railway communications with the rest of Czecho-Slovakia, the government and the population set about the vigorous reorganization of the country on its new national basis. News of the formation of an autonomous Ukrainian state, however small, called forth extraordinary enthusiasm among the Ukrainian people in Europe and America.

There still remained certain difficulties of adjustment with the central government at Prague. Nevertheless, a national Diet had been elected and the administration had received an overwhelming vote of confidence. In view of a swiftly approaching crisis, the Diet was summoned to meet on March 15th, 1939. That very day Germany sent its troops into Bohemia and by its action dissolved the Czecho-Slovak state. The previous day the Hungarian government had demanded that Carpatho-Ukraine should be evacuated by Czech troops within twenty-four hours. When the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet met it proclaimed the complete independence of the country. But Hungarians were even then crossing the borders, and in spite of desperate resistance on the part of Ukrainian volunteers the country was over-run and annexed by Hungary.

The international situation became increasingly tense in the summer months of 1939, due to the imminence of war between Germany and Poland. Great Britain gave a guarantee of help to Poland in the matter of maintaining its independence. This was meant to put a stop to German aggression in the East. The Germans, however, signed a non-aggression pact with Russia on Aug. 23rd, 1939, and increased their pressure on Poland. In view of the Polish treatment during the previous twenty years the Ukrainians had little cause to be grateful to the Poles; but the menace of German imperialism and the even darker shadow of Soviet oppression looming in the background, induced the Ukrainian leaders to declare they would stand with Poland in the impending struggle.

The "lighting-war" begun by Germany in the East on Sept. 1st, 1939, brought about the collapse of Poland. Polish resistance was made even more hopeless by the advance of Russian troops into East Poland. A further agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany on Sept. 29th, 1939, provided for the definite partition of Poland between the two states. To the Soviet Union fell the White Russian and Ukrainian section of Poland, with the exception of a few districts of the latter. With the

exception of these Ukrainians in Poland, for the present under Germany, and of half a million Ukrainians in Carpatho-Ukraine now under Hungary, and about a million Ukrainians in Rumania, the Ukrainian people in Europe are under communist Russia. A heavy fog of propaganda and censorship conceals their fate.

The Ukrainian National Question has not yet been solved. The proper solution must form part of any permanent peace settlement in Europe. Whether the principle of freedom and the rights of nations to live their own life can be maintained in the modern world is now being decided on the high seas and the battle fields of Europe; wrapped up in the issue is the future of the Ukraine.

—THE EDITOR.



APPENDIX B



NOTE REGARDING TRANSLITERATION

The transliteration of Slavic names into English is not a simple matter. At present the situation is one of chaos. Added to the problem that names of the same people or places may be spelled differently in Russian, Ukrainian and Polish, is the fact that some of these names have come into English histories by way of German transliteration and some by way of French spelling. In the present work no attempt has been made to maintain consistency of transliteration from the Ukrainian language. So far as possible the spelling usually found in English is the form employed.

APPENDIX C

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MOST OF IMPORTANT WORKS
ON UKRAINIAN HISTORY

The authoritative work which co-ordinates the conclusions of the various investigations on Ukrainian history is

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
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
APPENDIX D

GENEALOGICAL TABLES


GREAT PRINCES OF KIEV OF THE DYNASTY OF RURIK



DESCENDANTS OF ROSTISLAV IN GALICIA




GALICIAN - VOLYNIAN PRINCES




DESCENDANTS OF GEDIMIN OF LITHUANIA

Ruling in Kiev and Volynia




GREAT PRINCES OF LITHUANIA

Descendants of Gedimin



MUSCOVITE TSARS AND RUSSIAN EMPERORS

From the House of Romanovs



APPENDIX E

UKRAINIAN HETMANS

* * * *

- Bohdan Khmelnitsky, 1648-1657.
Ivan Vyhovsky, 1657-1659.
Yurii Khmelnitsky, 1660-1662.
Pavlo Teteria, Hetman of Ukraine of the Right Bank,
1662-1665.
Ivan Brukhovetsky, Hetman of Ukraine of the Left
Bank, 1663-1668.
Peter Doroshenko, 1665-1674.
Mykhailo Khanenko, Hetman of Ukraine of the Right
Bank, 1669-1674.
Demian Mnohohrshny, Hetman of Ukraine of the
Left Bank, 1669-1672.
Ivan Samoilovich, 1672-1687.
Ivan Mazepa, 1687-1709.
Ivan Skoropadsky, 1709-1722.
Pavlo Polubotok, 1722-1724.
Danylo Apostol, 1727-1734.
Cyril Rozumovsky, 1750-1764.
Pavlo Skoropadsky, 1918.

APPENDIX F

POLISH KINGS

* * * *

(a) DYNASTY OF YAGELLONS:

Yagello, 1386-1434.
Wladislaw, 1434-1444.
Casimir, 1444-1492.
Ian Olbracht, 1492-1501.
Alexander, 1501-1506.
Sigismund the Old, 1506-1548.
Sigismun August II, 1548-1572.

(b) ELECTED KINGS:

Henry Valois, 1573-1574.
Stephen Batory, 1575-1586.
Sigismund III Vasa, 1587-1632.
Wladislaw IV, 1632-1648.
Jan Casimir, 1648-1668.
Mikhail Vishnevetski, 1669-1673.
Jan Sobieski, 1673-1696.
August of Saxony, 1697-1733.
Stanislas Leszczinski, 1704-1709.
August III of Saxony, 1733-1763.
Stanislas Poniatowski, 1764-1795.

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
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
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Slavic Tribes in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries. Prehistoric 3, Hontsi; 4, Krivy Rih; and 5, Kiev. Sites in the Ukraine are indicated as follows: 1, Mizen; 2, Tripolie; Non-Slavic Tribes indicated by large type, as "KHAZARS"




The Kievan State in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries




UKRAINIAN PRINCIPALITIES IN THE XI-XIIIth CENTURIES

I, Kiev. II, Pereyaslav. III, Chernigov. IV, Galicia. V, Volynia.
VI, Turiv.

Boundaries between Principalities shown by heavy lines and dashes.
Commercial Routes shown by light lines and dashes.




Galicia - Volynian State in the Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries



LITHUANIA IN THE 14th CENTURY


incorporating the Ukrainian Principalities (shaded)

- 1, Braslav. 2, Podolia. 3, Kiev. 4, Chernigov. 5, Turiv.
6, Pidlashia.




PARTITIONS OF POLAND (1772-1795)

affecting the Ukrainian territories (marked with * * * *). Gains of the three Powers on each successive partition are represented as follows: Russia, 1, 2, 3 in the circles; Prussia, I, II, III; Austria, 1, 2, 3 in the triangles..



BLACK SEA AREA

Showing points of interest in Cossack times.




DNIEPER RIVER

Rapids and Cossack Strongholds.




The Cossack Ukraine (shaded) and surrounding Districts in the Middle of the Seventeenth Century.

- Headquarters of Registered Cossack Regiments.
- ○ ○ ○ Campaign Route of Khmelnytsky in 1648.
- - - - Northern and Western Boundary of Ukrainian Territory in Poland.




Ukrainian Territories in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.



UKRAINE IN 1917 - 1918

1. Area of Autonomous Ukraine recognized by the Provisional Government of Russia, 17th Aug., 1917.
2. Area of Ukrainian National Republic as established by the Third Manifesto, 20th Nov., 1917.
3. Area of Ukrainian National Republic as recognized by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 9th Feb., 1918.
4. Area of the Ukrainian State under the Hetmanship of Skoropadsky.
5. Area of the Western Ukrainian National Republic as established by the National Council, 19th Oct., 1918.
6. Areas Claimed by Ukrainians in the Negotiations with the Bolsheviks.



Europe, 1923 - 1939, showing Ukrainian Ethnographic Territory.

