

# The

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# Ukrainian Quarterly

A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

The Traditional Captive Nations Week

*RED NIGHTMARE, FREEDOM'S HOPE*

*By Lev E. Dobriansky*

**Just Published**

## **UKRAINIANS AND JEWS: A SYMPOSIUM**

### **Contents:**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **CHAPTER I: FEATURE ARTICLES**

"Why the Jewish Problem Has Been Connected with Ukraine"—Matthew Stachiw; "Ukrainians and Jews"—Leo Helman; "Russia, the Jews and the Ukrainian Liberation Movement"—Lew Shankowsky; "The Puppets of Soviet Russian Colonialism"—Michael Broida; "The Revived Myth of Ukrainian Anti-Semitism"—Lev E. Dobriansky; "Shevchenko and the Jews"—Roman Smal-Stocki.

#### **CHAPTER II: TESTIMONIES**

Dr. Volodymyr Bemko, Ivan Lyuty-Lyutenko, Stepan Lisovy, Alexander Hladyshovsky, Petro Pyasetsky, Yaroslava Forovych, Moses Diamond, Dr. M. Shkilnyk.

#### **CHAPTER III: UKRAINIAN STATE DOCUMENTS**

Decree of the Ukrainian Government on Assigning a Budget to the Ministry for Jewish Affairs; Decree of the Ukrainian Government Concerning Pogroms in Ukraine (No. 171); Order of the Supreme Command of the Ukrainian Army Concerning Pogroms in Ukraine (Order of the Day No. 131); A peal of Petlura to the Ukrainian Army; The Personal-National Autonomy of the National Minorities in Ukraine.

#### **CHAPTER IV: UKRAINIAN-JEWISH DISCUSSION IN *THE NEW YORK TIMES***

Walter Dushnyck, Judd L. Teller and Eugene Sanjour.

#### **CHAPTER V: STATEMENTS REJECTING MOSCOW-SPONSORED ANTI-SEMITISM**

Statment of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America; Statment of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee; Statement of Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky before the House Sub-Committee on Europe.

#### **CHAPTER VI: EDITORIALS AND COMMENTS**

"Moscow's War on Judaism and Religion in General" (Editorial, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*); "Kichko: Latest Pawn in Anti-Semitic Game" (Editorial, *The Ukrainian Bulletin*); "Kizya's Interview on Kichko's Book" (*The Ukrainian Bulletin*); "Radio Free Europe, NCWC News Service Comment on UCCA Statement Denouncing Anti-Semitism" (*The Ukrainian Bulletin*).

#### **INDEX**

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## CONTENTS

The Soviet Myth of Cultural Freedom <i>Editorial</i> .....	101
The Traditional Captive Nations Week Red Nightmare, Freedom's Hope <i>Lev E. Dobriansky</i> .....	107
Ivan Franko and the English Poets <i>Vera Rich</i> .....	122
Baltic Exiles Continue Struggle for Freedom <i>Rt. Rev. Msgr. John Balkunas</i> .....	129
From Erevan to Eternity <i>Victor Simonian, as told to Leo Heiman</i> .....	137
Ukraine in the Twentieth Century: A Brief Survey <i>Nicholas Andrusiak</i> .....	152
A Diary which Horrified Moscow <i>Vasyl Symonenko</i> .....	164
The Twenty-Third Communist Party Congress <i>Clarence A. Manning</i> .....	169
 BOOK REVIEWS	
<i>The Soviet Empire.</i> By Commission on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate <i>Lev E. Dobriansky</i> .....	177
<i>Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age.</i> By George Vernadsky <i>The Bolsheviks.</i> By Adam B. Ulam <i>Walter Dushnyck</i> .....	179
<i>Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age.</i> By George Vernadsky <i>A History of Russia.</i> By George Vernadsky <i>John V. Sweet</i> .....	181
<i>The Berlin Wall.</i> By Pierre Galante with Jack Miller <i>Austin J. App</i> .....	184
<i>The Development of the Communist Bloc.</i> By Roger Pethybrudge <i>Clarence A. Manning</i> .....	186
UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS .....	187

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## THE SOVIET MYTH OF CULTURAL FREEDOM

### *Editorial*

So that prisons should vanish forever, we built new prisons. So that all frontiers should fall, we surrounded ourselves with a Chinese wall. So that work should become a rest and a pleasure, we introduced forced labor. So that not one drop of blood be shed any more, we killed and killed and killed.

*Andrei Sinyavsky,*  
Imprisoned Soviet writer

The case of Sinyavsky and Daniel, Soviet writers recently imprisoned for writing "anti-Soviet" works, once again brings to the fore the eternal muzzling of free thought and expression in a land historically characterized by absolutism. What optimistic students of the Soviet scene tend to overlook is that Muscovy is a mystical autocracy in which the Communist revolution only confirmed and perfected a traditionally collectivist pattern of society. The Kremlin has always feared ideas.

In this century, the Kremlin's present occupants are simply more sophisticated than the autocratic Czars. The Soviet goal of dominating a Communist one-world—which itself is rooted in Russian messianism—demands totalitarianism, and the present rulers realize full well that individual freedom and totalitarianism are wholly incompatible. Hence, despite worldwide protests from intellectuals of every political persuasion, the harshness of the sentences meted out to Sinyavsky and Daniel. It is high time that all of us in the West come to understand that cultural freedom under the Kremlin is of necessity a myth. The perennial exile to Siberia will exist so long as not only the Kremlin survives but so long as the prevailing slavishness of the Russians themselves, induced during long centuries of oppression, persists.

### CZARIST OPPRESSION

Numerous theories have been advanced to account for the dark cravings of the Russian soul, ranging from the influence of the Asiatic culture of the Mongols and Tartars to the depressant effect of the long bitter winters on terrifyingly lonely expanses of land.

What is beyond question is that the Muscovites never experienced the liberating winds of change that swept through and revolutionized the West. Despite individual voices of protest, no political institutions evolved which are based, as in the West, on a simple trust in the common man. Viewed against their development—or lack of it—it is hardly surprising that the Muscovites should have merely exchanged one set of tyrannical rulers for another in the October revolution. Its tragedy is to be measured in their naive use of the word “democracy” to describe a system that has not the faintest resemblance to what democracy historically and morally signifies.

Possibly the first work of social protest was that of Aleksander Nikolayevich Radishchev (1749-1802), who was packed off to Siberia by an infuriated Catherine the Great for penning his *A Journey from Petersburg to Moscow*. No work could appear without the approval of the omnipresent censor. The secret police, a typically Russian institution, helped regulate all aspects of Russian life. Even Dostoevsky did not escape a few years' imprisonment in Siberia.

Throughout the nineteenth century the enslaved Ukrainians represented even a more overt threat than any reformers. The great rebirth of Ukrainian national consciousness kindled by Kotliarevsky and set aflame by Taras Shevchenko, the great bard whose writings were acclaimed through all Eastern Europe, constituted an immediate danger to this older version of the Russian empire. In his works Shevchenko advanced the dangerous (to Russia) idea of national independence, human equality and social justice, and mercilessly condemned the entire Russian system with its serfdom, despotism and suppression of other nationalities. Along with fellow writers Panteleimon Kulish and Nicholas Kostomarov, Shevchenko was arrested. He was sent to the Orsk fortress near Orenburg, forbidden to write or even paint. Imprisoned for ten years, Shevchenko was dead four years after his release (1861).

Shevchenko had been the first to understand the importance of a Ukrainian literary language; he drew from both historical elements (archaisms, old Church Slavonicism, etc.) as well as geographical (dialects). This Ukrainian literary language began to spread to new areas—science, journalism, the schools—before an alarmed despotism banned it in 1863, and, because of its pervasive power, found a second ban necessary in 1876. Even printing of Ukrainian folk-songs in Ukrainian was prohibited.

The Soviet parallel with this awareness of the power of language and ideas is an even more drastic one: Russification. With the crushing of the free Ukrainian Republic in 1920, the Soviet takeover also brought with it a theory of the “conflict between two cultures”



(A. Lebed), which unabashedly held that since the future belonged to the "proletarian culture"—therefore the Russian culture and the Russian language—the Ukrainian culture had to be merged in the Russian. Although in the twenties Ukrainian resistance held this genocidal policy in check, the thirties saw a re-doubling of Russian linguistic attacks. Publication of a Ukrainian academic dictionary was stopped, old editions were banned and the majority of Ukrainian philologists—Syniavsky, Kurylo, Hancor, Holoskevych, Nimchynov, Johansen, Smerechynsky, Hladky—found themselves in exile or in prison. Henceforth all Ukrainian terminology and spelling which differed from the Russian was "nationalistic sabotage."

The Soviet onslaught on the Ukrainian language was part of an action undertaken throughout the entire Soviet Union, whose verbal justification lay in a theory by N. Marr. (This theory, based on the method of dialectic materialism, holds inevitable a unity, or fusion, of thinking and language—the Russian, of course.) This policy continued until World War II, at which time it was dropped for obvious reasons of expediency.

Since the war a more subtle attack on the non-Russian languages has taken the form of extolling the "great" Russian language as that of "progressive humanity." Indeed, it is now heralded, as opposed to English as a jargon of "traders," as the first language of "internationalism." Use of Russian, then, not only signifies loyalty to Communism, (the Russian brand) but further underscores the ultimate goal of the Kremlin overlords. Towards this goal, always a unity of thought and language.

#### CULTURAL "THAW"

Against this historical backdrop it is not surprising that the recent (23rd) Congress of the Communist Party should have decided to tighten Party discipline, and to follow a harder line with writers and artists who favor reform. The slight relaxation over controls with the death of Stalin and his condemnation released forces which played no small role in Khrushchev's ouster and whose ramifications are still being felt.

Whatever intellectual weight was sincerely given the teachings of Marx has long been swept away by the history of Russia. According to Marx the state would wither away once the economic foundations of society were nationalized. Not only did this *not* happen under the modern Kremlin; a totalitarianism fiercer than under the Czars has been the result. The Soviet Union is left with a bankrupt Marxism, a police state terror, and an intellectual constraint which is exercised in every field, let alone that of literature.

Since renunciation of faith and liberalization of institutions on the part of the Soviet leaders is unthinkable, given their Russian natures, the response will probably be increased repression.

Literature, by its communicability, remains the field where we can most accurately and quickly gauge Russian repression. Moreover, poetry and fiction are media which lend themselves to the advancing of ideas (as in allegory) that would be too dangerous to expound in other contexts. The very sensitivity officially to such attempts would be indicative of the repressiveness of the regime.

In the last few years such sensitivity has in the main been growing, rather than decreasing in the USSR. The cultural "thaw" was an unavoidable reaction to the passing of the tyrant that was Stalin; on the other hand, it was bound to be short-lived.

Thus in 1956, despite *GLAVLIT*, which censors all manuscripts for publication, Vladimir Dudintsev's *Not By Bread Alone* saw the light of Soviet day. At this time, too, *Novy Mir* was able to run a devastating attack on Soviet letters by Vladimir Pomerantsev, who described the sick literary climate and who pleaded eloquently for, at long last, intellectual and emotional honesty and independence. In Ukraine the press called for an intensive rehabilitation, not only of individual writers, but of the whole period of 1920-30, which had been branded by the Party as "chauvinist-separatist."

In 1962 an account of his visit to Italy and the United States by Victor Nekrasov almost occasioned his dismissal from the Party. His report, which simply asked for a greater objectivity in accounts of life in foreign countries, infuriated Khrushchev. Again, poets Yevtushenko and Andre Voznesensky were publicly chastised for not meeting the demands of "socialist realism."

Today a significant amount of Soviet literary effort is covert. Some of popular poet Yevtushenko's works have found their way into print after an underground route; some probably never will. And some works, like the long pent-up thoughts of Sinyavsky and Daniel, find their way abroad.

Arrested, too, for smuggling a Ukrainian poet's work abroad were two Ukrainian writers, Ivan Svitlychny and Ivan Dzyuba, who were tried after the publicized trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel. Significantly, the work of these writers is characterized by a humanistic and highly individualistic approach to the problem of man in relation to society and government. Moscow saw them, above all, as true Ukrainian patriots.

The work they had smuggled abroad was that of young Vasyl Symonenko, who had died in 1963 at the age of 29 of cancer and who, a year before, had lamented in his diary: "I have learned to keep

my mouth closed and be prudent when I should have shouted. Most terrible of all, I have learned to be insincere." But he saw his work as fertilizing the soil "from which a giant will spring—a future Taras or Franko" (Shevchenko and Franko, the two most renowned Ukrainian national poets).

Symonenko, the son of a peasant in central Ukraine, saw the Bolshevik system as one of perpetual horror, a system of legalized terror in a gigantic prison city

Where the warden jangles his keys and the  
protecting gate creaks.  
Executioners with bloody swords in coats as  
black as the night play with oddly-shaped balls,  
With heads guillotined from shoulders.  
Blood flows beneath phlegmatic ramparts,  
the cry dies on the lips.  
A century's scorn and outrage cause the dead  
to turn in their graves.

Both Symonenko and Sinyavsky (Tertz) complained about "socialist realism," which demands the "truthful, historically concrete representation of reality on its revolutionary development" and which must be "linked with the task of ideological transformation and education of workers in the spirit of Socialism." In the service of this political prostitution of art, Soviet writers must free themselves of belief "without regret in an afterlife, from love of our neighbor, from freedom of the individual and other prejudices—by now rather shopworn and looking all the sorrier by comparison with the great ideal before us," wrote Tertz ironically in his smuggled works.

Comrade Peter Shelest, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, put the matter plainly at the Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party:

Ideological warfare is primarily a warfare for the souls, hearts and minds of men. That is why all our ideological works must be decisively directed against all and any manifestations of bourgeois ideology... The imperialists are attempting to undermine the fraternal unity of the peoples of the Soviet Union. For this purpose they seek out nonexistent contradictions among our peoples and do everything possible to underestimate the Leninist nationality policy and the grandiose achievements of October. To these low ends imperialist propaganda is also taking advantage of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, who betrayed their own people and loyally and truly serve the imperialists.

The Russian ideological mold is in process again of stamping out the new "Soviet man."

## IMPOSSIBILITY OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM

The fate of cultural and individual freedom, then, is foredoomed in the Soviet Union. Democracy is impossible apart from a profound belief in the dignity and worth of individual men and women— a belief which has been completely alien to the Muscovite people up to the present. Rather, their personality structure, as molded by their experience, has inclined them to the perpetuation of the totalitarian elite. Stunted throughout history has been the free, healthy development of the potentials of their generic and individual natures.

In the last analysis the democratic faith is not simply a belief that each man should and can participate in the common decisions and activities of society. It is also a conviction that each person can and should contribute something to the total life of society that only he is able to contribute.

A glance at the Soviet Union should suffice to show the paucity of its masquerade as a "progressive" and "revolutionary" government. In fifty years it has changed, except for military and scientific technology, very little. The fossilized religion of Marxism serves as the cloak for perennial dictatorship. There are no political parties, no free elections, no free speech. Inflexible, rigid, enslaving—the theology of Marxism provides no air in which individualism can flourish. The October Revolution, in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat, merely provided greater and tighter chains.

Our form of society, because it is a self-correcting one, has exhibited tremendous changes in the same span of time. This is because the democratic doctrine is a growing and developing faith, capable of constant reconstruction by virtue of the basic freedoms possessed by every individual and by virtue of an ultimate trust in the rule of the majority.

Seen in this perspective any talk of cultural thaw in the Soviet Union is merely an academic scrutiny of how tight the chains are tightened at any particular time. To see the burgeonings of freedom because a few voices are raised in protest is not only to be wildly optimistic. It is also to misunderstand the whole socio-historical development of Russia; it is also to fail to understand the unfavorable reaction of Soviet intellectuals to the smuggling by Sinyavsky and Daniel of their works abroad. It is, finally, to fail to see that the promise of increased consumer goods may, for the average Russian, outweigh even tighter repressive controls.

Old Mother Russia, in short, has historically failed to let her people go.

## THE TRADITIONAL CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK

### RED NIGHTMARE, FREEDOM'S HOPE

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

Confusion, misdirected thinking, and the repetition of old errors dominate the current scene in the United States and thus much of the Free World. These dominant trends are, in part, the logical consequences of the superb maneuver engineered by Moscow in the last decade under the deceptive banner of "peaceful coexistence." Continue to build and strengthen the empire within, while all feasible forces are utilized to undermine the enemy without has been the practical essence of this highly successful maneuver. The functionaries in Moscow's *Agitprop* have good reason to gloat over the results and doubtless are banking on even phenomenal successes in the near future.

The needless mess in Vietnam, the NATO rupture, self-paralyzing absurdities about "arrogant power," escalation," and "containment" again, the steady over-all Red penetrations in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, the repeated softening-up process on communism in our own body politic, and the insidious deterioration of our national will for positive victory, whether military or psycho-political, are only a few evidences of the new pattern of confusion and old errors. As though the lessons of U.S. trade with the Axis powers into World War II were never learned, the present drive for easy trade with the Red Empire is another point of evidence. Self-nurtured illusions about "national independence" among the so-called satellites in Central Europe, "the evaporation of the Cold War," a materially explosive Peking-Moscow showdown, and the spread of peace-orienting "capitalism" in the empire also have their able precedents in the illusions of the 30's, when the nature of modern imperio-colonialist totalitarianism eluded the understanding of that generation.

What in all these years has been a cardinal objective of the totalitarian Red Syndicate is a progressive Free World disinterest in the genuine liberation and independence of the captive nations, the oppressed peoples themselves as against the Red states dominated by totalitarian Communist Parties. The enormous advantages of

achieving this should be obvious: easier consolidation of the empire, stronger posture for Cold War successes in the Free World, and the moral and political demolition of Free World democracies. This Red objective, shared by all in the syndicate, is a crucial and integral part of Red psycho-political warfare which Brezhnev, in his report to the 23rd Party Congress last March, lauded as the prime, unsurpassed weapon wielded by "a political army of revolutionaries for class struggles."<sup>1</sup> The heavy emphasis placed at the Congress on the "great, complex art" in "leadership of class struggle"—meaning the imperio-colonialist art of psycho-political warfare—is unmistakable as to what we can expect in the years ahead.

High on the priority list in Red psycho-political warfare is the downgrading and eventual elimination of Captive Nations Week. This has been evident since 1959, and unfortunately some in this country have sought to assist Moscow and the syndicate in realizing this aim. One major element that they hope to capitalize on is a protracted American ignorance of the many captive nations in the Red Empire, particularly in the USSR. Another is the significance of the Week in the current struggle, measured especially by their own reactions. The mountain of evidence formed since 1959 clearly shows that Captive Nations Week is a deep thorn in the side of the Red totalitarians and their efforts to expand the Red Empire chiefly through the art of psycho-political warfare. As in many other cases, they depend on apathy, distraction, indifference, ignorance, and even educated stupidity to accomplish their work for them.

#### THE ABC'S OF CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK

When this writer wrote the Captive Nations Week Resolution in June, 1959, little did he appreciate the extent to which elements of misunderstanding and cultured ignorance can contribute to Moscow's ends. A sterling example of this was an editorial in a Washington paper that was promptly refuted by the writer.<sup>2</sup> In 1964, another editorial attack against the captive nations in the same organ evoked delight and praise in Moscow.<sup>3</sup> To identify the misleading and disinforming sources among us and, at the same time, to prevent Red manipulation of such misguiding opinions, it is most essential for every American to become familiar with the ABC's of Captive Nations Week.

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<sup>1</sup> Leonid Brezhnev, Report to 23rd Party Congress, *Pravda*, March 31, 1966.

<sup>2</sup> "Irritating the Bear," *The Washington Post*, July 24, 1959; author's reply, July 29, 1959.

<sup>3</sup> *Izvestia*, July 15, 1964.

The Week is sponsored each year by the National Captive Nations Committee with headquarters at 1028 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. The Honorable Herbert C. Hoover was the honorary chairman of the Committee from 1960 to 1964; Mr. George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, has occupied this position since 1965. Over one-third of the House of Representatives and close to one-third of the U.S. Senate are members of NCNC. Every year half of the Governors issue Captive Nations Week proclamations, as does every Mayor in each of our major cities.

NCNC is supported by voluntary contributions from individuals and organizations. Its activities are mainly supported by local Captive Nations Committees that extend from Boston to Miami, Washington, D. C. to San Francisco. Almost every major city has a committee made up of citizens who are quite versed in the ABC's of the Week. In the past few years the movement has extended overseas so that observances now are held in Free China, West Germany, Turkey, and Sweden. Much of this steady growth is regularly noted in the U.S. Congress which legislated the Week in 1959.

#### THE CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK RESOLUTION

It is often curious that some commentators who write about the Week give every evidence of never having read the resolution and law upon which it is based. For example, one writer has this to say: "When I was in Moscow during the October Party Congress, Khrushchev once again violently denounced the innocuous Captive Nations Week Resolution which Congress passes every year to attract minority votes." <sup>4</sup> As I pointed out in another article, this comment is "a gem of fact, illogic, and fiction." <sup>5</sup> Fact, the Russian's violent denunciation; illogic, the supposed innocuousness of the resolution; fiction, Congress' passing it every year to attract minority votes. Now, to see how writers can misguide, read the resolution which is Public Law 86-90, one of the ABC's:

#### CAPTIVE NATIONS RESOLUTION

*Whereas*, the greatness of the United States is in large part attributable to its having been able, through the democratic process, to achieve a harmonious national unity of its people, even though they stem from the most diverse of racial, religious and ethnic backgrounds; and -

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<sup>4</sup> Stewart Alsop, "The Berlin Crisis: Khrushchev's Weakness," *Saturday Evening Post*, December 16, 1961.

<sup>5</sup> Lev E. Dobriansky, "Soviet Russian Imperio-Colonialism and the Free World," NATO's Fifteen Nations, September 1963.

*Whereas*, this harmonious unification of the diverse elements of our free society has led the people of the United States to possess a warm understanding and sympathy for the aspirations of peoples everywhere and to recognize the natural interdependency of the peoples and nations of the world; and

*Whereas*, the enslavement of a substantial part of the world's population by Communist imperialism makes a mockery of the idea of peaceful coexistence between nations and constitutes a detriment to the natural bonds of understanding between the people of the United States and other peoples; and

*Whereas*, since 1918, the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Russian Communism have resulted in the creation of a vast empire which poses a dire threat to the security of the United States and of all the free peoples of the world; and

*Whereas*, the imperialistic policies of Communist Russia have led through direct and indirect aggression to the subjugation of the national independence of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria, Mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Vietnam and others; and

*Whereas*, these submerged nations look to the United States as the citadel of human freedom for leadership in bringing about their liberation and independence, and in restoring to them the enjoyment of their Christian, Jewish, Moslem, Buddhist or other religious freedoms and of their individual liberties; and

*Whereas*, it is vital to the national security of the United States that the desire for liberty and independence on the part of the peoples of the conquered nations should be steadfastly kept alive; and

*Whereas*, the desire for liberty and independence by the overwhelming majority of the people of these submerged nations constitutes a powerful deterrent to war and one of the best hopes for a just and lasting peace; and

*Whereas*, it is fitting that we clearly manifest to such peoples, through an appropriate and official means, the historic fact that the people of the United States share with them their aspirations for the recovery of their freedom and independence.

*Now, therefore*, be it resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, that the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July, 1959, as "Captive Nations Week" and inviting the people of the United States to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

*The President* is further authorized and requested to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world.

#### THE CAPTIVE NATIONS: WHO'S NEXT?

The reader will observe that in its fifth paragraph the resolution contains an open-end clause as concerns the enumeration of captive nations. In 1959, after a year of disputes with certain House members who were offered the first opportunity to consider the measure, the writer found it necessary to insert "and others" in order to allow for new captive nations, such as Cuba in 1960, and



to gradually familiarize many segments of our public with some old ones. Here, too, the force of stubborn and narrow preconception had to be combatted.

Perspective is the usual, lacking quality in the thinking of those who draw mythical distinctions between "fat" and "lean" Communists, "liberal" and "doctrinaire" Communists, and "independent" and "Soviet-dominated" Red states. Similar distinctions were concocted in the 30's with respect to the imperio-colonialist totalitarians of that period, and easy trade, cultural exchange and other devices were also employed then in the interest of world peace. The list below clearly shows the unitary base of the Red Syndicate; it shows the phenomenal success of the Red imperio-colonialist totalitarians, building an unprecedented empire in the span of less than fifty years and with strikingly inferior resources; it also indicates the poverty of U.S. foreign policy, which committed two colossal political blunders in this century (contributing to the power of the Soviet Russian Empire both after World War I and during World War II) and is now on the brink of committing another with East-West trade plans, the Consular Convention and other myopic measures.

There is nothing like success, and this list is the roll call of Red success, primarily in psycho-political warfare. Given the same course of U.S. foreign policy and the pathetic absence of psycho-political warfare training, this list is bound for extension. Read it carefully and think:

THE CAPTIVE NATIONS — WHO'S NEXT?

Country and People	Year of Communist Domination	Country and People	Year of Communist Domination
Armenia -----	1920	Albania -----	1946
Azerbaijan -----	1920	Bulgaria -----	1946
Byelorussia -----	1920	Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, etc. in	
Cossackia -----	1920	Yugoslavia -----	1946
Georgia -----	1920	Poland -----	1947
Idel-Ural -----	1920	Rumania -----	1947
North Caucasia -----	1920	Czecho-Slovakia -----	1948
Ukraine -----	1920	North Korea -----	1948
Far Eastern Republic	1922	Hungary -----	1949
Turkestan -----	1922	East Germany -----	1949
Mongolian People's Republic -----	1924	Mainland China -----	1949
Estonia -----	1940	Tibet -----	1951
Latvia -----	1940	North Vietnam -----	1954
Lithuania -----	1940	Cuba -----	1960

Who's Next? South Vietnam? Guinea? Colombia? Congo? Laos? Tanzania? Bolivia? Thailand?

## REPRESENTATIVE RED REACTIONS

A most important part of the ABC's of Captive Nations Week is the three R's, representative Red reactions to the Week. Accumulated since July 1959, they can fill several volumes. Be they the Khrushchevs, the Maos, Gomulkas, Titos, Castros, and all other squabbling or non-squabbling members of the Syndicate, the Red totalitarians screech at the list of captive nations and vituperatively condemn the Week. There's no mystery as to why they react so. The two mirror their wretched past and their deceptive present—and perhaps their doomed future. Conquest, terror, tyranny, genocide, totalitarian oppression, Cold War operations, the USSR as an "imperium in imperio," illegitimacy, imperio-colonialism, philosophical fraudulence and many other things are reflected by the mirror.

The following, selected at random, scarcely require comment:

"This resolution stinks." (Then, according to Vice President Nixon, "he spelled out what he meant in earthy four-letter words.")<sup>6</sup>

Nikita S. Khrushchev, July, 1959.

It represents an "hysterical campaign of petty provocation, proving that panic-stricken monopolists are losing the faculty of controlling their own actions."<sup>7</sup>

N. S. Khrushchev, July, 1959.

"The resolution is a new American provocation and a hostile act."<sup>8</sup>

Protest of Red Czech regime, 1959.

"I would not be telling the full truth if I did not say that the adoption of this ill-starred resolution was regarded by the Soviet people as an act of provocation."<sup>9</sup>

Khrushchev, August 1959.

"Take, for instance, the much-to-be-regretted decision of the American Congress to hold the so-called 'Captive Nations Week' and to pray for their liberation. In this case words other than 'rolling back' were used, but the gist remained the same, the same appeal for interference in other people's affairs."<sup>10</sup>

Khrushchev, October, 1959.

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<sup>6</sup> Richard M. Nixon, *Six Crises*, 1962, p. 252.

<sup>7</sup> *The Washington Post*, July 24, 1959, p. A 8.

<sup>8</sup> *Associated Press*, Prague, July 24, 1959.

<sup>9</sup> Nikita S. Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1959, pp. 6 - 7.

<sup>10</sup> N. S. Khrushchev's *Report to Supreme Soviet*, Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, November 2, 1959, pp. 1 - 2.

"When in July of this year American Senators officially shed crocodile tears over the captive nations, they did not forget to cry for Ukraine... It would appear that the Ukrainian people are enslaved."<sup>11</sup>

Red publication, August 1960.

"Some members of the U.S. Congress, who apparently are not too busy with state affairs, deliver 'moving' speeches, using the same mimeographed crib concerning the so-called 'week of captive nations'...<sup>12</sup>

Nicholas V. Podgorny, U.N., October 1960.

"It is not at all fortuitous that this time the farce presented by the 'Captive Nations Week' should coincide with the hullabaloo created by American propaganda around the West Berlin question."<sup>13</sup> (Khrushchev again denounced the Week at the Communist Party Congress in October, 1961.)

Moscow, 1961.

"All progressive mankind greeted the news of the so-called 'Captive Nations Week' with a feeling of anger and indignation. With foaming mouths the imperialist predators insist on the fantastic idea of restoring the capitalist order in the lands of the peoples' democracies and Soviet socialist republics."<sup>14</sup>

*Radyanska Ukraina*, July, 1961.

"The Americans who invented the 'Captive Nations Week' are like those proverbial thieves who are yelling 'Catch the Thief', while they themselves are living off the exploited masses in many countries of the world."<sup>15</sup>

Petro Panch, poet, USSR, August 1961.

"On the basis of the 'weeks' held in the past, we already know what these appropriate ceremonies represent—unbridled anti-Soviet and anti-communist slander... Yes, it is only thanks to American bayonets that oppressors of freedom and blood-thirsty dictators are sustained in power in a number of countries of the Latin American continent and Southeastern Asia."<sup>16</sup>

Moscow, 1962.

(In 1962 the Russian imperio-colonialists scored a victory in getting UNESCO to publish the scandalous and fraudulent *Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the USSR*.)

"Is it not high time to discontinue the 'Captive Nations Week' in the United States? That is just as much a dead horse as the 'Hungarian Question.'"<sup>17</sup>

Moscow, January, 1963.

"The President of the United States, losing his sense of reality, has declared 'a week of the Captive Nations' and is trying to turn attention away from the struggle of the Negroes for their liberation."

*Pravda*, Moscow, July 8, 1963.

<sup>11</sup> *For the Return to the Homeland*, No. 57/444, August 1960.

<sup>12</sup> Address, U.N. General Assembly, New York, October 4, 1960.

<sup>13</sup> *Pravda*, July 21, 1961.

<sup>14</sup> "Dirty Provocation," *Radyanska Ukraina*, Kiev, July 25, 1961.

<sup>15</sup> *Visti z Ukrainy*, No. 63, August 1961.

<sup>16</sup> *Izvestia*, July 17, 1962.

<sup>17</sup> *The New Times*, Moscow, January 23, 1963.

"Kennedy is a third-class clown proclaiming Captive Nations Week, which is a despicable animal campaign of the U.S. ruling circles."

Pyongyang Radio, N. Korea, July 10, 1963.

"With every passing year 'Captive Nations Week' becomes a nuisance. The stupid situation in which the Washington legislators and rulers found themselves is becoming evident even for those who earnestly propagate the imperialistic policy of the U.S.A."

*Izvestia*, Moscow, July 15, 1964.

"In the United States a farce entitled 'captive nations week' is held every year. The people's democratic system has been in existence for 20 years but the imperialists still ramble on with nonsensical ideas of 'liberating' the nations of eastern Europe."<sup>18</sup>

Khrushchev, August 1964.

"An annual, pitiful undertaking. One could treat it as a joke... One could treat it like that, if it were not for the fact that Captive Nations Week, an annual undertaking organized by men who have long since lost contact with their nations, is supported by the U.S. Congress and by a proclamation of the President of the U.S."

*Trybuna Ludu*, Poland, July 27, 1965.

"They are beating the drums again across the sea, filling columns in newspapers and delivering hypocritical speeches. For the umpteenth time the ruling circles of the United States are holding the so-called 'Captive Nations Week.' And the propaganda machine is deafening the citizens with 'atrocious' inventions about the fate of nations which are suffering under the yoke of the Kremlin regime."

*Radyanska Ukraina*, Ukraine, July 25, 1965

"Especially disgusting is the villainous demagoguery of the imperialistic chieftains of the United States. Each year they organize the so-called captive nations week, hypocritically pretending to be defenders of nations that have escaped from their yoke. These international gendarmes, stranglers of freedom and independence, would like again to enslave the free nations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. But that will never happen."

Mikhail Suslov, chief Russian ideologist,  
Vilnius, Lithuania, July 17, 1965.

One can go on and on with these denunciations, drawn from Red China, Cuba, Hungary and elsewhere in the Red Empire. The most important place is, of course, the Soviet Union, which in every respect is the central power base of the empire. In ultimate calculation, every other Red regime, including the Chinese, Yugoslav, Rumanian, and Cuban, depends for its survival on the USSR. No amount of inter-Party squabbles and rifts can hide this supreme truth. So, when Vice President Nixon candidly reported "The Captive Nations

<sup>18</sup> *Reuters*, Banska Bystrica, Czecho-Slovakia, August 29, 1964.

Resolution was the major Soviet irritant throughout my tour," what in effect he was saying was that the resolution's ideas tore into the whole tenuous, psycho-political fabric of this power center of "world communism." It opened up a fundamental and promising opportunity that we haven't even begun to explore and cultivate.

#### THE PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS

Another integral part of the ABC's of Captive Nations Week is the successive Presidential Proclamations. Prepared by the restraining and unimaginative hand of the State Department, the general content of these proclamations explains in part why we are still faced with fear and reluctance to seize this opportunity. The reader will find it a most productive exercise to read these proclamations carefully, compare a number of them, and then compare all of them with the resolution upon which they are based. Your comparisons should reveal the essence of our foreign policy plight in the most recent period. They should also motivate you to fight for the elimination of this plight. Read them carefully:

#### CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1959 A PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*Whereas* many nations throughout the world have been made captive by the Imperialistic and aggressive policies of Soviet communism; and

*Whereas* the peoples of the Soviet-dominated nations have been deprived of their national independence and their individual liberties; and

*Whereas* the citizens of the United States are linked by bonds of family and principle to those who love freedom and justice on every continent; and

*Whereas* it is appropriate and proper to manifest to the peoples of the captive nations the support of the Government and the people of the United States of America for their just aspirations for freedom and national independence; and

*Whereas* by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959, the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July, 1952, as "Captive Nations Week," and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world:

*Now, therefore, I, Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 19, 1959, as Captive Nations Week.*

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to study the plight of the Soviet-dominated nations and to recommit themselves to the support of the just aspirations of the peoples of those captive nations.

*In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.*

*Done* at the city of Washington this 17th day of July in the year of our Lord 1959, and of the independence of the United States of America the 184th.

By the President:  
(Seal)

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER  
*Secretary of State*

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1960  
A PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*Whereas* many nations throughout the world have been made captive by the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Soviet communism; and

*Whereas* the peoples of the Soviet-dominated nations have been deprived of their national independence and their individual liberties; and

*Whereas* the citizens of the United States are linked by bonds of family and principle to those who love freedom and justice on every continent; and

*Whereas* it is appropriate and proper to manifest to the peoples of the captive nations the support of the Government and the people of the United States of America for their just aspirations for freedom and national independence; and

*Whereas* by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959, the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July, 1959, as "Captive Nations Week," and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world:

*Now, therefore, I, Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 17, 1960, as Captive Nations Week.*

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to study the plight of the Soviet-dominated nations and to recommit themselves to the support of the just aspirations of the peoples of those captive nations.

*In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.*

*Done* at the city of Washington this 18th day of July in the year of our Lord 1960, and the independence of the United States of America the 185th.

By the President:  
(Seal)

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER  
*Secretary of State*

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1961  
A PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*Whereas* by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959, the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July, 1959, as "Captive Nations Week," and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

*Whereas* many of the roots of our society and our population lie in these countries; and

*Whereas* it is in keeping with our national tradition that the American people manifest their interests in the freedom of other nations:

*Now, therefore, I, John F. Kennedy*, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 16, 1961, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to recommit themselves to the support of the just aspirations of all peoples for national independence and freedom.

*In witness whereof*, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

*Done* at the city of Washington this 14th day of July in the year of our Lord 1961, and the independence of the United States of America the 186th.

By the President:  
(Seal)

JOHN F. KENNEDY  
DEAN RUSK  
*Secretary of State*

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1962  
A PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*Whereas* by a joint resolution approved July 1, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July, 1959, as "Captive Nations Week," and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

*Whereas* there exist many historical and cultural ties between the people of these captive nations and the American people; and

*Whereas* the principles of self-government and human freedom are universal ideals and the common heritage of mankind:

*Now, therefore, I, John F. Kennedy*, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 15, 1962, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.

*In witness whereof*, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

*Done* at the city of Washington this 13th day of July in the year of our Lord 1962, and of the independence of the United States of America the 187th.

By the President  
(Seal)

JOHN F. KENNEDY  
DEAN RUSK  
*Secretary of State*

**CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1963  
A PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

*Whereas* by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July, 1959, as "Captive Nations Week," and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

*Whereas* the cause of human rights and dignity remains a universal aspiration; and

*Whereas* justice requires the elemental right of free choice; and

*Whereas* this Nation has an abiding commitment to the principles of national self-determination and human freedom:

*Now, therefore, I, John F. Kennedy*, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 14, 1963, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.

*In witness whereof*, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

*Done* at the city of Washington this 5th day of July in the year of our Lord 1963, and of the independence of the United States of America the 188th.

By the President:  
(Seal)

**JOHN F. KENNEDY**  
**DEAN RUSK**  
*Secretary of State*

**CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1964  
A P R O C L A M A T I O N  
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

*Whereas* the joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), authorizes and requests the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation each year designating the third week in July as "Captive Nations Week" until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

*Whereas* the cause of human rights and personal dignity remains a universal aspiration; and

*Whereas* this Nation is firmly committed to the cause of freedom and justice everywhere; and

*Whereas* it is appropriate and proper to manifest to the people of the captive nations the support of the Government and the people of the United States of America for their just aspirations:

*Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson*, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 12, 1964, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.



*In witness whereof*, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

*Done* at the city of Washington this 18th day of June in the year of our Lord 1964, and of the independence of the United States of America the 189th.

By the President:  
(Seal)

LYNDON B. JOHNSON  
DEAN RUSK  
*Secretary of State*

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1965  
A P R O C L A M A T I O N  
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*Whereas* the joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), authorizes and requests the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation each year designating the third week in July as "Captive Nations Week" until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

*Whereas* all peoples yearn for freedom and justice; and

*Whereas* these basic rights unfortunately are circumscribed or unrealized in many areas in the world; and

*Whereas* the United States of America has an abiding commitment to the principles of independence, personal liberty, and human dignity; and

*Whereas* it remains a fundamental purpose and intention of the Government and people of the United States of America to recognize and encourage constructive actions which foster the growth and development of national independence and human freedom:

*Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson*, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 18, 1965, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.

*In witness whereof*, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

*Done* at the city of Washington this 2nd day of July in the year of our Lord 1965, and of the independence of the United States of America the 190th.

<sup>2</sup> By the President:  
(Seal)

LYNDON B. JOHNSON  
DEAN RUSK  
*Secretary of State*

THE ABC'S AND SOME BASIC ISSUES

The ABC's of Captive Nations Week go a long way in enabling us to think clearly and responsibly on the issues basic to the security and freedom of our nation. Some of these issues deserve mention here. One is an intelligent, concentrated effort focussed on the fundamental reality of Sino-Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. In the U.N. or elsewhere we have done virtually nothing in this fundamental respect. The more the Red totalitarians prattle about "Amer-

ican imperialism," the more millions of minds about the world will believe it. One would think that Goebbels taught us something thirty years ago.

A second basic issue is the formulation of a sensible liberation policy as the best guarantee against both a hot global war and an interminable string of guerrilla wars. This policy, with its almost exclusive emphasis on psycho-political activity and skillful paramilitary engagement, wasn't sufficiently understood in the 50's, and with the re-emerging discussion on "containment" today, not to speak of further communist takeover tomorrow, it stands as the real and winning alternative to the policy of patched-up containment. How unrealistic the proponents of containment are can be gleaned from the evident fact that the Red Syndicate leaped over the Maginot-like containment wall years ago, into Cuba in our hemisphere, into the Middle East, into Africa and Asia. All this through means of calculated, psycho-political warfare, which is even being applied forthrightly in our own country today.

Thirdly, a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations is necessary for obvious symbolic, legislative, and educational reasons. Equally necessary is the establishment of a Freedom Commission and Academy for psycho-political warfare training. Had this been in existence ten years ago, with a do-it-yourself course for foreign nationals, I am convinced that we wouldn't today be sacrificing American lives and treasure in Vietnam. Last-minute recourse to military arms is not the answer to the Red-staged conflict of our day; nor is economic aid and welfare the answer.

Other significant issues are the Consular Convention with the USSR, which should be repudiated by the Senate because it plays into Russian imperio-colonialist hands, and liberalized East-West trade, which should be strongly opposed as a blind repetition of our errors of the 30's and falling into the trap of an over-all Red economic strategy that by now should have been honestly portrayed to our people. Representative Mills of Arkansas has earned the praise of all sober-thinking Americans who refuse to be stampeded into the Syndicate's trap.

#### THE UNITARY REALITY OF CAPTIVE NATIONS

Through all the foggy and murky talk about "East European independence," "the nationalism of Rumanian Communists" and other such ghosts, "containment," "building bridges of understanding" (with whom?), "detente with the Russians," and similar figments of confused minds, there is one massive, unitary reality that cannot

be beclouded by these illusions and exercises in self-deception—the captivity of close to a billion people. These are the people who constitute the captive nations. They are in Red states, but they are not of these states.

Our primary appeal, our foremost efforts should be directed toward the freedom of the captive nations, and not the freedom of action of their unrepresentative Red regimes which will always confront us with syndicated action aimed at the expansion of the Red Empire. The mistakes being made today are in great measure a repetition of those committed in yesteryear. Real, progressive change demands revisions of thought, policy, and action; an ever-broadening knowledge of all the captive nations, particularly those in the USSR, propels such change—a change for a more secure peace, expanded freedom, and positive victory in the Cold War.

## IVAN FRANKO AND THE ENGLISH POETS

By VERA RICH

In considering the work of so widely read, and, in a sense, so "cosmopolitan" a poet as Ivan Franko, to estimate the effect upon his work of this literature or that is no easy task. A poet of such diverse interests as to produce translations or adaptations from practically every major European language, as well as from certain Oriental literatures,<sup>1</sup> may surely be compared to a great river, fed by many streams, which, once blended in a single flood, can nevermore be resolved into the constituent waters. Nevertheless, if we examine the influence upon Franko of one such "river," that of English poetry, we may well find that we have revealed, not a mere table of correspondences, but some significant light upon the poet's work as a whole.

In this article, I shall take "English" literature, and more specifically, English poetry, to mean work written in the standard English language. It will include, therefore, not only the poets of England, but also the Anglo-Irish Tom Moore (whose position as regards Irish literature may well be compared to that of Hohol with respect to Ukrainian). It will not, however, include the Scottish poets, named or anonymous, since the intricacies of dialect seem to have been a little beyond Franko, so that although, for instance, he seems to have used Child's edition for comparative purposes,<sup>2</sup> his translations of the Scottish ballads and of the work of Burns were made through German intermediaries.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In addition to various translations from other Slavic languages, Franko translated poetry from Greek, Latin, "Indian" (presumably Sanskrit), Arabic, Middle and Modern German, Scots, Icelandic, Norwegian, Albanian, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Chinese, Rumanian, French and English.

<sup>2</sup> See Franko's projected Preface to his collection of Scottish ballads in *Tvory*, XV, p. 576, 1955

<sup>3</sup> The Scottish ballads are taken from the versions in O.L.B. Wolff's *Halle der Völker. Sammlung verenglischter Volkslieder der bekanntesten Nationen, grösstenteils zum ersten Mal, metrisch in das Deutsche übertragen*, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1837. The Burns translations are, presumably, from the Vienna *Allgemeine Zeitung*, Nos. 178-179, 1879. It is worthy of note that even Franko's version of Tennyson's *St. Simeon Stylites* was first made from a German translation, and only "compared" afterwards with the English text. (See Letter 267, p. 553, *Tvory*, XX). Later translations, however, were made directly from English.

There are many possible approaches to the problem of "influences" upon a poet's work. The first, and most mechanical, is the examination of letters and diaries, to find allusions by the poet himself to the works he was reading, the themes which fascinated or repelled him. This method, however, is of purely limited application. Thus in the case of Franko's letters, although we find numerous references to English poets and authors, it would be highly unsound to draw any quantitative estimates from the occurrence or frequency of the names—at least from the limited material accessible to the Western scholar.<sup>4</sup> We may well deduce, for example, that the frequent references to Dickens<sup>5</sup>—to stray for a moment into the realm of prose—reflect an interest and fascination in the works of that author, and illustrate the sociological interests of Franko's reading—until we find that the five references to Byron<sup>6</sup> are in no way concerned with Franko's interest or appraisal of his work in general, but merely with the practical details of the publication of his own rendering of Byron's *Cain*, or the *Don Juan extracts*. Some poets are referred to in context other than that of their own poetry—Andrew Lang is mentioned only for his appraisal of the "Chanson de Roland,"<sup>7</sup> while the now-unknown Watson is mentioned solely in connection with the finances of a religious sect.<sup>8</sup> Tennyson is not mentioned specifically, although Franko does refer to his *St. Simeon Stylites*,<sup>9</sup> while neither Milton nor Tom Moore are mentioned at all, in spite of Franko's translations of their work. We are, of course at a disadvantage in not having the complete material at our disposal, but until such time as the entire corpus of letters becomes readily accessible, any conclusions which may be drawn from the presence or absence of a poet's name in Franko's letters is of strictly limited significance.

Another approach is that of internal evidence of the works themselves. Here we strike an anomaly. Franko, we have said, was a widely-read poet; indeed, as a University man and working journalist, his chances for formal and self-education were incomparably greater than those of his *primus inter pares* Shevchenko. Yet it is in

<sup>4</sup> The fullest readily available edition of Franko's works is the 20-volume *Tvory*, Kiev, 1955-1956, to which all references in this article are made.

<sup>5</sup> Letters 9, 10, 24, 28, 31, 33, 201, 289, pp. 20, 22, 65, 72, 78, 87, 453, 582, in *Tvory*, XX.

<sup>6</sup> Letters 23, 24, 145, 237, pp. 63, 65, 341, 342, 506 in *Tvory* XX.

<sup>7</sup> Letter 227, p. 492, *Tvory*, XX.

<sup>8</sup> Sir William Watson, (1858-1935). He sent Franko some money for the literature of the Stundist (evangelical) sect. Franko was much perplexed as to what should be done with this money.

<sup>9</sup> Letter 267, p. 553, *Tvory*, XX.

Shevchenko that we find the striking correspondences, as between the "Bannock and Croft" passage in the *Caucasus* and Burns' attack on the Earl of Breadalbane,<sup>10</sup> or of theme, as between Richard III and the closing section of *The Dream*<sup>11</sup> or between *Romeo and Juliet* and the unnamed poem beginning "In Vilna City Famed in Glory."<sup>12</sup> Franko has very few such immediate correspondences—at least so far as English is concerned. Perhaps the sonnet "O autumn wind"<sup>13</sup> may be related to Shelley's *Ode to the West Wind*, but this is an isolated, and far from certain, instance. Such echoes are rare even in the case of German literature, which was familiar to Franko from his very school days, though the image of the serpent on the gold in *Moses* seems to come from the *Nibelungenlied*.<sup>14</sup>

Nor do we have, from English poetry, the tags and direct quotations which Franko introduces into his work from time to time. We may note that these tags are, in general, no more than the most well-known quotations—"Lasciate ogni speranza,"<sup>15</sup> "Guarda e passa,"<sup>16</sup> but, nevertheless, the absence of such English tags is worthy of note.

There are, of course, the occasional references within poems themselves to English literature, the most well-known being that in the *Free Sonnets*,<sup>17</sup> where the beauty-loving poetry of the original Italian and English sonneteers is contrasted with what came after: the "Armoured sonnets" of Rueckert and the new need for the Ukrainian people for sonnets to be

... rehammered  
To ploughshares, so to plough the time that's coming  
Sickles, so that to reap life's rye we're able,  
A pitchfork, to cleanse the Augean stable.

<sup>10</sup> See J. Bojko *Taras Shevchenko and European Literature*, London, 1956, pp. 9-10.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

<sup>12</sup> See Vera Rich; *Shevchenko and Shakespeare*, part 2, *Ukrainska Dumka*, 28, v. 1964, p. 6.

<sup>13</sup> "Osinniy vitre, shcho mohuchym stonom," *Tvory*, X, p. 20.

<sup>14</sup> *Moysey*, part xix, *Tvory*, XIII, p. 527. The allusion could, of course, have come from many sources in the corpus of Northern mythology, but in view of Franko's lifelong interest in the *Nibelungeulied* (see P. Cundy, *Ivan Franko, The Poet of Western Ukraine—Selected Poems, Translated with an Introduction*, New York, 1948, p. 27).

<sup>15</sup> *Prison Sonnets*, *Tvory* X, p. 147.

<sup>16</sup> "From the Book of Kaaf," Part II. *Tvory*, pp. 293-294.

<sup>17</sup> *Free Sonnets*, xvii. *Tvory*, X, p. 146, Cundy (*op. cit.*, p. 180), erroneously places this among the *Prison Sonnets*.

These original sonneteers "Dante and Petrarch," "Shakespeare and Spenser" were far more than names to Franko; not mere lay figures to illustrate the corruption of the "wine of music" into "armoured" sonnets—they were poets whom Franko had studied and translated.<sup>18</sup>

For the contribution which Franko made in introducing the literatures of Western Europe, indeed of the world, into Ukraine, was immeasurable. The sonnets of Shakespeare, the poems of Milton, Byron, Shelley, Tennyson, Moore, as well as many prose works,<sup>19</sup> all these he gave in excellent versions to his people. He did not, however, select his passages for translation, primarily for their artistic beauty—at least in my opinion. Had he done so, we would have been spared the anomaly that Franko, although a fine sonneteer, who wrote almost 100 original sonnets,<sup>20</sup> should in his translations from Shakespeare's sonnets so often depart from the sonnet form and present his versions in, e.g., quatrains. It is barely relevant to quote at this point Franko's letter on his technique of ballad-translation, since there is a world of difference in the omission of a near-meaningless refrain "to save space"<sup>21</sup> and a departure from the original form of so renowned a poet as Shakespeare—particularly, when the very title of the poem "Sonnet No. so-and-so" would reveal that this had been done.<sup>22</sup>

However, although Franko seems, in the case of the sonnets, to have translated works largely on their literary merits, or to have assisted in presenting to the Ukrainian public the translations of others, notably Kulish's translations of the plays of Shakespeare, for which he wrote a series of *Prefaces*,<sup>23</sup> as I have said, Franko's interest in the translations he made did not seem to be primarily their literary value.

Let us turn for a moment from the translations, and consider Franko's great collection of poems: *My Emerald*. Of this work, Cundy writes:

<sup>18</sup> *Geharnischte Sonnette*, 1814.

<sup>19</sup> Prose works translated from English include not only English (British) authors, but also selections from Mark Twain, and a number of Australian novelists. For a complete list of translations, see *Ukrainski pysmennyky, Bibliohrafichny slovnyk*, Kiev, 1963, vol. 3, pp. 362-376.

<sup>20</sup> In all, there are 98 original sonnets in the 20-volume of *Tvory*.

<sup>21</sup> Preface to the Scottish Ballads, *Tvory* XV, p. 576.

<sup>22</sup> Of the 8 sonnets published in *Tvory*, XV, p. 174, 2 are in quatrains, 1 is in the correct form, but with the "long" duodecasyllabic lines of Polish sonnet-tradition, 3 are in a 14-line pentameter form, but with some divergencies from the Shakespearean pattern, while only 2 are formally correct.

<sup>23</sup> i. e. to *Hamlet*, *Macbeth*, *Coriolanus*, *The Taming of the Shrew*, *Julius Caesar*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Much Ado About Nothing*, *Antony and Cleopatra* and *King Lear*. *Tvory*, XVIII pp. 309-407.

*My Emerald* was different from his previous volumes of verse. For a long time—he had been gathering materials for it for fifteen years—he had desired to produce a volume of practical moral and ethical philosophy for his generation in the form of a collection of poems of various kinds, legends, parables, and didactic reflections on various aspects of human experience, such as; riches, poverty, work, prayer, wisdom, mercy, wrath, passion, love, beauty, friendship, gratitude, humility, joy, sorrow, death and so on. The materials were drawn from a variety of sources, foreign, native and original. It was inspired by and patterned on similar didactic collections which the old-time Ukrainian Church Fathers used to gather together in volumes and issue under the generic title of *Emerald*.<sup>24</sup>

While I would not disagree with Cundy's analysis of Franko's "gentle teacher of morality,"<sup>25</sup> I would add the observation that this didactic work was not produced for its own sake entirely, but as an inspiration in the Ukrainian national awakening, and, just as in *Moses*, Franko, speaking in the person of the prophet, says that he loves his people

not only because  
Of the good that is in you,  
But also (although I bewail them)  
Your folly and sin, too!<sup>26</sup>

so he hopes that *My Emerald* will inspire a compassion for "the errors, failures and sins"<sup>27</sup> of others, a compassion and a feeling of humanity which he longed so deeply to see as the basis of the Ukrainian reawakening.<sup>28</sup>

Now compare the titles which Franko translated: Tom Moore's "Remember Thee?,"<sup>29</sup> Shelley's *Ozymandias* and extracts from *Prometheus Unbound* and from *Queen Mab*,<sup>30</sup> Byron's *Cain* and "The Isles of Greece" from *Don Juan*,<sup>31</sup> Milton's *Samson Agonistes*,<sup>32</sup> Hood's *Song of the Shirt* and *Dream of Eugene Aram*<sup>33</sup>—taken together, do

<sup>24</sup> Cundy, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 76.

<sup>26</sup> See *Tvory*, XII, pp. 404-405. All translations quoted in this article are from an unpublished version of the author's now in progress.

<sup>27</sup> Cundy, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>28</sup> See, e. g. The "Love and Hate" Sonnets in *Prison Sonnets*, xxix-xxx, *Tvory* X, 159-161.

<sup>29</sup> In *Dumy i pisni naiznatnshykh evropeiskykh poetiv* (selected and edited by Ivan Franko), Lviv, 1879, reprinted in *Tvory*, XV, p. 284.

<sup>30</sup> *Ozymandias* in *Dumy i pisni*... reprinted in *Tvory*, XV, p. 179, where the other Shelley extracts appear, apparently for the first time.

<sup>31</sup> *Bayron, Kayin. Misteriya v trokh diyakh*, Lviv, 1879, *Novohretska pisna*, Zorya, 1885, (21), pp. 244-245, reprinted in *Tvory*, XV, pp. 179-197.

<sup>32</sup> *Milton, Samson borets. Drama*, Lviv, 1913.

<sup>33</sup> *Song of the Shirt*, in *Molot*. Ed. M. Pavlyk, Lviv, 1878, pp. 62-63; *Dream of Eugene Aram* in *Dumy i Pisni*...



not these titles reflect the same didactic spirit as *My Emerald*? Franko was well able to appreciate English literature for its own sake—the Shakespeare prefaces draw as much from his original thought as they do from the English and German critics whom, upon points of fact, he cites<sup>34</sup>—but, except possibly in the case of the Shakespeare sonnets, he does not select works for translation on aesthetic grounds, but chooses rather, in King Alfred's phrase: "the books most needful to know"—needful, that is, from the point of view of the resurgence of Ukrainian national awareness.

Not only in translation did Franko draw upon foreign literature—there are also many cases of adaptations, many poems written "after" this poet or that. In the case of English literature, if we except the case of the Indian legends which came to Franko at least partly through English intermediaries,<sup>35</sup> the clearest example of such adaptation is the theme of *Cain*, which Franko takes from Byron and adapts into his own *Death of Cain*. It was perhaps inevitable that Franko should have a high regard for the works of Byron, for the anti-Byron reaction of the latter part of the nineteenth century never really penetrated into Europe, but he is remarkably unaffected by the "Byronism" which at once fascinated and repelled Shevchenko.<sup>36</sup> Franko makes of *Cain* far more than the typical "misunderstood" Byronic hero, just as the poem *The Death of Cain* is far more than a continuation of Byron's "Mystery." Byron's work aims at the dramatic, the effective, and, as with all of his works, the unfolding of a gripping plot; Franko's work goes far deeper, it is a deeper search of man's soul and although it makes no overt claim "To justify the ways of God to men" in its treatment of the themes of suffering, justice, atonement, and reconciliation, it certainly comes close to doing so. To a certain extent, had Byron himself written a *Death of Cain*, one would have expected the same difference in approach; compare, for example, the (for a Greek play) violent action of *Oedipus Rex* with the gentle reconciliation of *Oedipus at Colonus*—and hence the use which Franko makes of Byron's character of Cain, and the extent to

<sup>34</sup> Critics cited include G. Brandes *Shakespeare* (in English) Alois Brandtl *Shakespeares Dramatische Werke*, Simrock *Shakespeares Quellen*, A. Brown *Shakespeare's Autobiographical Poems*, Sidney Lee *William Shakespeare. Sein Leben und seine Werke* (Presumably a translation from English), Th. Fischer *Vorlesungen über Shakespeare*, and papers in the *Jahrbuch der deutschen Shakespeare-Gesellschaft*.

<sup>35</sup> He knew, for example Reed's *The Hindoo Literature or ancient books of Hindoo*, Letter 187, *Tvory*, XX, p. 127, although the immediate sources he quotes for his translations are German. See *Tvory*, XV, p. 571.

<sup>36</sup> J. Bojko, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

which he departs from his interpretation cannot be dismissed in an article of this length, since the difference in subject would, to a certain extent, inspire such a difference in approach. Franko's debt to Byron is considerable, not least perhaps in that the translation of *Cain*, occurring relatively early in Franko's career (1879) may well have quickened his interest in the use of Biblical themes, and it is possible that, without *Cain*, we would have had no *Moses*.

It should also be observed that Byron's *Hebrew Melodies* (and, to a certain extent, Tom Moore's *Irish Melodies* which inspired Byron's work) had at least the effect of inspiration upon Franko's *Hebrew Melodies*, and although the latter work is somewhat different in tone, being concerned less with pure lyricism than with the harsh everyday realities of Jewish life in Ukraine, it again seems likely that Byron's work supplied the theme and germ of an idea, which Franko then developed in his own way and towards his own goal.

These brief notes can hardly do more than indicate a few general prolegomena on Franko's use of English literature, a subject of such vastness that several volumes would be required to do it justice. Nevertheless, even at this stage we can see that, to Franko, English literature, whether translated, adapted, or used as a source of inspiration was not something apart from his general literary progress, no mere source of the quoted epigraph or stray allusion to display his erudition; it was a weapon, and a powerful weapon in that armory of his literary activity, which was aimed, not primarily at the production of belles-letters, but at the awakening and reawakening of the Ukrainian national conscience and consciousness, both in and beyond the confines of his own Galicia, indeed, wherever throughout the world Ukrainians were, or are, to be found.

## **BALTIC EXILES CONTINUE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM**

*By* RT. REV. MSGR. JOHN BALKUNAS

On November 13, 1965 New Yorkers witnessed the largest demonstration ever in front of the United Nations building. Following a mass rally at Madison Square Garden, a one and a half mile long parade numbering 14,000 marched to the World Organization with banners and posters demanding self-determination for the Baltic States. The organizers and most of the participants in this demonstration were Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians of the younger generation.

The young marchers were continuing a tradition as old as the Baltic peoples themselves. The history of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania may be best summed up as an endless struggle against submersion in foreign seas. The Baltic landscape of meadows, forests, lakes and gently rolling hills speaks of peace, but its geopolitical location spells endless trouble. Situated between two expansionist powers, Germany and Russia, the Baltic countries have suffered an almost unbroken string of invasions and occupations.

Archeologists tell us that the Baltic peoples had settled on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea some 4,000 years ago. They have been living there ever since and have developed their own, predominantly Western, cultures and institutions. While the Latvians and the Lithuanians belong to the Baltic branch of the Indo-European family, the Estonians, like the Finns, and Hungarians, stem from the Finno-Ugric tribes that once lived along the Volga and Kama Rivers. None of the three are of Slavonic or Germanic lineage.

One of the biggest threats to the Baltic peoples arose in the 13th century, when the Order of Teutonic Knights, a much more military than monastic organization, launched its *Drang nach Osten* movement. Although the Latvians and the Estonians succumbed to the invaders, they did not cease struggling for the end of foreign rule. The Lithuanians, having established a kingdom in 1251, managed to withstand the Teutonic onslaught. In 1410, Lithuania and Poland inflicted a crushing defeat on the Teutonic Knights at Zalgiris (Tannenberg).

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the rapid expansion of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania extended her territories from the Baltic to the Black Sea. It was then that the Lithuanian State was in closest contact with Ukraine—an era remarkably free of bitter memories and recriminations both for the rulers and the ruled.

A Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth was established in 1569. Meanwhile the Estonians and Latvians saw a succession of foreign armies sweeping their lands and yet tenaciously held on to their soil and customs. Finally, Moscow seized Estonia and part of Latvia as spoils of the Great Northern War in 1721, the year that marked the end of Swedish power in the Baltic. Most of Latvia and Lithuania was absorbed by the expanding Russian Empire during the "partitions" of the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth in 1772-1795.

The economic and cultural development of the Baltic nations stagnated under the brutality and inefficiency of the Czarist regime, but the desire for freedom remained unextinguished. During the period of "national awakening" in the 19th century a spiritual and cultural ferment swept Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and solidified the sense of national identity. Uprisings exploded in Lithuania in 1830 and 1863, and a Baltic eruption against Russian rule in 1905 was also suppressed. Finally, World War I and the collapse of the Russian Empire provided the Balts with a long-awaited opportunity. In 1918, the three nations proclaimed their independence within their ethnic boundaries and repulsed the invading Red Army in bitter fighting which lasted until 1920.

The independence period of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was marked by astonishingly swift strides in economy, culture and education. The once exploited and oppressed provinces of Imperial Russia rapidly healed the wounds of war and occupations and became prosperous and forward-looking members of the European community.

Free again but small in numbers and facing the same covetous neighbors, the three Baltic nations immediately considered some sort of a closer union among themselves. Many projects were proposed, aimed at keeping the Baltic area from becoming a Russian or a German preserve. A "Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania" was signed on November 3, 1934, providing for close collaboration on questions of foreign policy and for mutual political and diplomatic help in their international relations. This Baltic *Entente* made an impact on international political life and was steadily progressing until the Soviet aggression in 1940.

The events of 1939-1940 are today a matter of recorded history. As the Council of Europe put it in its Report on the Baltic States (Doc. 1173, August 23, 1960) :

On August 23rd, 1939 the Soviet leaders concluded a "non-aggression pact" with Hitler (Molotov-Ribbentrop pact). According to a secret protocol to this pact Estonia, Latvia and a part, later the whole, of Lithuania, Finland, and some other areas of Eastern Europe were given over to the Soviet "sphere of influence." While World War II was absorbing the attention of the world, the Soviet Union thought it proper to collect its rewards.

In the wake of Soviet troops and tanks came Moscow's emissaries who set up puppet governments and staged one-list mock-elections to the so-called "People's Diets." These fictitious parliaments then "asked" for incorporation of the three Baltic States into the Soviet Union.

"The decisions of the 'Diets' were prepared in Moscow," the Council of Europe continues in its Report, "and carried out by order of the occupying Power. Soviet acts were perpetrated in violation of the obligations of the USSR arising from its (subsequent) signing of the Charter of the United Nations and many other conventions and international agreements."

The 26 years of Soviet rule in the Baltic States have meant genocide, terror, ideological indoctrination and economic exploitation. Over one half million Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians have perished in Soviet concentration camps. Soviet colonial policies were met in the first decade with Baltic armed resistance. The guerrilla war was especially fierce in Lithuania, where it lasted from 1944-1952 and took a toll of 30,000 lives from Lithuanian freedom fighters alone. Lacking any support from the West, the Baltic guerrillas were compelled to lay down their arms, but the resistance spirit in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania remains alive. Hardly a day passes without complaints about remnants of "bourgeois nationalism" being published in the Communist newspapers in Riga, Tallinn, or Vilnius. Yet this resistance must be nourished by the non-Communist world.

Cooperation among the Baltic resistance groups began with the first days of the Soviet occupation (1940-1941) and continued during the Nazi rule (1941-1944). When in 1944-1945 one quarter of a million Balts fled their native countries, they immediately established national organizations for the continuance of their struggle abroad. Most of these organizations have their headquarters in the United States and Canada, where they have received a helping hand from the older Baltic immigrants. Committees for a Free Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all composed of political personalities who have retained their Baltic citizenship, are located in New York, as is the Supreme

Committee for Liberation of Lithuania, founded during the Nazi occupation and embracing the major political parties. Some important Baltic political bodies are active in Europe (The Estonian National Council in Sweden) and Latin America (e. g., the Lithuanian Center in Argentina).

The major Baltic political parties of the independence period continue their activity abroad. Professional organizations are especially numerous. The Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian students and writers have their own associations. The main Estonian political bodies are located in New York: Estonian World Council and Estonian National Committee in the United States. The American Latvian Association, Inc. and the World Federation of Latvians, both led by Professor P. Lejins, are located in Washington. The Lithuanian American Council has its seat in Chicago, the "capital of Lithuanians abroad," while the Board of the World Lithuanian Community is in Cleveland.

The continuing trend toward closer Baltic cooperation and unity has led to the formation of new joint bodies or joint activity in international groupings. The Assembly of Captive European Nations, an international organization of East-Central European democratic national representations, has provided the Balts with a forum for such cooperation and enabled them to bring their cause to the attention of the main political bodies of the world. National Delegations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have taken active part in the Assembly's work ever since its establishment in 1954, and Baltic political leaders have served as Chairmen of ACEN (Alexander Kutt, Estonia; Vilis Masens, Latvia; and Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, Lithuania, at present).

Through the Assembly of Captive European Nations the Baltic political representatives have regularly requested the members of the U.N. to deny the Soviet delegation the right to speak on behalf of the Baltic countries and have challenged on every occasion Soviet lies and slanders about Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. On February 12, 1963, for instance, ACEN asked UNESCO for the immediate withdrawal from circulation of the booklet, *Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the USSR*, published under the UNESCO imprint, extolling the alleged social and political equality in the USSR and asserting that the Baltic States "voluntarily joined the Soviet Union in 1940." The ACEN letter charged that the authors of the booklet "abused the authority and good name of UNESCO" for "cheap Soviet propaganda." As a result of this and other protests, UNESCO was forced to review its publication policy and *The New York Times* (February 18, 1963) credited ACEN and its Baltic member-organiza-

tions with a "substantial victory in asserting its members' right to freedom." Similarly, the Baltic representations in ACEN developed a specially strong action in connection with the discussion of the question of colonialism in the 85th General Assembly of the United Nations.

Through ACEN, the Baltic cause was taken up by the Council of Europe. In 1960, on the occasion of the the 20th anniversary of the forced incorporation of the Baltic States, the Council adopted a resolution in which it expressed "sympathy with the sufferings of the Baltic peoples" and assured them that they were not "forgotten by their fellow Europeans."

Another important body in which U.S. citizens of Baltic origin are active is the Conference of Americans of Central and Eastern European Descent (CACEED). By their participation in the Conference's work, the Balts bring their case to the attention of U.S. legislators and government officials. Through such undertakings as the Captive Nations Week, the issue of Baltic freedom reaches the general American public. In CACEED Balts work shoulder to shoulder with Ukrainian delegates for the stated common goal of "liberation of the captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe, their national self-determination and the restoration of their national independence and their basic human rights."

In addition to the already mentioned organizations, new political bodies were created by Baltic exiles as a spontaneous response to pressing needs. One of the outstanding among such bodies is "Americans for Congressional Action to free the Baltic States," founded by Leonard Valiukas, a Lithuanian, with its headquarters in Los Angeles. Starting from scratch, the organization now features the names of Governors Hatfield, Kerner, Romney and Scranton, Mayors Collins, Daley, Shelly, Yorty and other distinguished American public figures in its Honorary Committee. The aim of the Committee is to achieve passage of Congressional Resolutions asking for concrete political and diplomatic steps to promote freedom in the Baltic countries. Many such resolutions have been passed by the U.S. Congress—a powerful expression of American support for the Baltic cause. A typical conclusion of one of such resolutions, introduced by Senators Kuchel, Scott and McIntyre on February 14, 1963, reads:

*Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America request the President of the United States to bring up the Baltic question before the United Nations and ask that the United Nations request the Soviets (a) to withdraw all Soviet troops, agents, colonists, and controls from Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, (b) to return all Baltic exiles from Siberian prisons and slave labor camps; and be it further*

*Resolved*, That the United Nations conduct free elections in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia under its supervision.

Publications form an important part of the Baltic political activity abroad. The most venerable among them is the magazine *The Baltic Review* (29 West 57 St., 10 fl., New York), published since 1953 and still going strong, with issue No. 32 now in preparation. Monthly information bulletins published by the Balts supply newspapers, researchers and academic institutions with data on recent events in the Baltic area: ELTA Information Service (29 West 57 St., 10 fl., New York) — Lithuanian; *Newsletter from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Estonian Information Centre, Drottningatan 851, Box 45030, Stockholm 45, Sweden; and the *American Latvian Information Bulletin* (Room 913, Shoreham Bldg., 806 — 15th St., N. W., Washington, D.C. 20005). ELTA Information Service also publishes its bulletins in German, Spanish, Italian and Arabic. The Lithuanian students' quarterly *Lituanus* and its Latvian counterpart, *Bulletin of the LSWA*, both published in the United States, have acquired a respectable status in the academic community.

Of the many actions of the Baltic exile political organizations, at least one should be discussed in greater detail. For this I have chosen one of the most recent and extensive undertakings—the activities in connection with the 25th anniversary of Soviet aggression against the Baltic States.

The Soviets had resolved to turn the anniversary into a huge propaganda show and to influence world public opinion in favor of recognition of the legality of Moscow's rule in the Baltic area. The Baltic exiles, meanwhile, mobilized their forces for a counterattack and established the Baltic States Freedom Council for this purpose. The battle was joined in the spring of 1965.

The Baltic exiles first addressed an appeal to the world-at-large, recapitulating the record of Soviet oppression and requesting peaceful action to restore the exercise of self-determination to the Baltic people. The appeal, which set in motion many actions of sympathy and support, was followed by a discussion of the Baltic case before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, on May 17, 1965. The deliberations of the Subcommittee were followed by a debate on the Baltic States on the Congress floor. Over 150 U.S. senators and representatives expressed their views on the Baltic case; many asked for inclusion of the Baltic issue in U.S. negotiations with the Soviets and on the agenda of the United Nations.

June 1965, marking the month of Soviet aggression, brought a flurry of articles in the United States and all over the world, sup-



porting the Baltic claim to freedom; many of the newspapers used the material and suggestions supplied by Baltic exiles. Simultaneously, public demonstrations of support for Baltic self-determination were taking place at the grassroots and official levels. On June 21st, the United States Congress formalized its commitment to the Baltic cause by adopting the Concurrent Resolution (H. Con. Res. 416) on the Baltic States. The Resolution emphasized the Baltic peoples' right to self-determination and urged the U.S. President "to direct the attention of world opinion at the United Nations and at other appropriate international forums. . . to the denial of the right of self-determination for the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania."

The initiative of the U.S. Congress found a favorable response in the U.S. State Department. On June 23rd U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk received a delegation of the Joint Baltic American Committee in Washington, D. C. The meeting was timed to coincide with the 25th anniversary of Soviet aggression and emphasized the continuity of U.S. policy toward the Baltic States.

The Soviet leaders had apparently underestimated the scope and success of the pro-Baltic demonstrations in the non-Communist world. (The Communist press later grudgingly credited the Baltic "bourgeois nationalists" abroad with "some achievements"). The Congressional Resolution and the Dean Rusk reception were obviously the last straw for Moscow's patience to bear, and the Soviet tone of restraint and jolliness gave way to harsh denunciations. Three top-ranking Soviet Communists—Kosygin, Suslov, and Mikoyan—went to the Baltic capitals to deliver speeches at festivities organized to celebrate the "voluntary accession" of the Baltic States to the Soviet Union. They denounced in harsh words the American support of the Baltic cause and scored the "villainous demagoguery of the imperialistic chieftains of the United States."

The 25th anniversary year was climaxed by the mass rally and march to the United Nations, of which I spoke at the beginning of this article. A committee of young Lithuanian activists conceived and executed this huge and complex undertaking in less than five months. They had the support of major Lithuanian cultural and civic organizations in the U.S. and Canada and were soon joined by young Latvian and Estonian activists. In addition to the demonstration, they published an "Appeal to the Conscience of the World" in *The New York Times* (November 7, 1965), carrying the signatures of 130 noted American statesmen, political leaders, business and civic leaders, churchmen and educators.

The Baltic organizers of the Freedom Rally of November 13, 1965 did not lay down their arms after the successful demonstration

but proceeded beyond the gates of the United Nations building which had been closed to the demonstrators. Delegations representing the three Baltic nations have visited eighty U.N. missions and are planning to visit the remaining thirty-four before the World Organization adjourns itself. The Baltic delegates have established valuable personal contacts with the diplomatic representatives of the various U.N. missions, which were supplied with informative material on the Baltic case.

In February, 1966, after three months of joint activities, the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian organizers of the Baltic Appeal to the United Nations (BATUN) resolved to continue their activity as a "permanent, organized and well-defined joint Baltic action." For this purpose they elected a Board of Directors and charted a plan for action during the current year. Promotion of the Baltic case in the United Nations heads the list of the planned activities. In a statement on its principles BATUN emphasizes the idea of universal self-determination, and states that the ultimate decision "on the internal political, social and economic systems for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania belongs to the peoples of the respective countries, excluding the colonists of the occupying power."

As President of BATUN's Board of Directors I represent the older generation. The rest of the members of the Board, however, are young people, some of whom were children when they left their native countries. This fact bodes especially well for the future and the ultimate success of the Baltic exiles' freedom struggle. Moscow had hoped that Baltic resistance would die out together with the generations that had reached maturity during the aggression of 1940. The young Balts at home and abroad have destroyed these hopes. The torch of the Baltic freedom struggle is today being passed to another generation and its flame is as bright as ever.

## FROM EREVAN TO ETERNITY

By VICTOR SIMONIAN

As told to LEO HEIMAN

In the involved manner of all Armenians storytellers since time began, I cannot start this article without telling a joke, and I cannot tell jokes without relating the circumstances surrounding them.

In the little Armenian village which was the home of my maternal grandparents, and where our family originated before the exodus began, I met a gnarled old man who was carving figures of animals out of olive tree roots, and muttering angrily to himself while whittling away.

I was about to pass him on my way to the *Selsoviet* village administration building, where helpful officials promised to check birth registry records in an effort to trace distant relatives, when I heard the old man muttering in Russian rather than his own tongue. "Is he a Russian?" I asked my escorts.

"No, he is an Armenian like you and we," they replied.

"Then why is he talking to himself in Russian?" I persisted.

They laughed. "His mind is gone ever since he came back from Taishetsky Lager' (the notorious Taishet Concentration Camp in Central Siberia). He talks to strangers in Armenian, but tells jokes to himself in the Russian language only. . ."

"Will you sell me one of your carvings, grandfather?" I asked the old man.

He looked at me with angry eyes, but relaxed when he saw my Italian-made suit and British "regimental" striped tie. "Sure, why not? I make them for stupid tourists like you," he grinned, "fifty *kopecks* each. . ."

I bought a dozen and asked him to tell me one of his Russian jokes.

He nodded. "You want a Vyshka joke or a Katushka joke?"

I blinked, and he hastened to explain. "Vyshka means death by firing squad in Russian underworld slang. There are some jokes which used to be punished by shooting in Stalin's days. Katushka means a 25-year sentence. I got it for telling the story about the farmer and his donkey."

"May I hear it?" I ignored the dirty looks my escorts gave the old fellow.

"My throat is parched from sitting all day in the sun. Mind if I lubricate it a little bit, before talking?" he laughed uproariously.

I took him to the village tavern, where he indignantly refused beer, wine and vodka and settled for a bottle of Armenian ararat (brandy).

"Now I will tell you the Katushka joke about the farmer and his donkey. There was a poor Armenian farmer in a village near Erevan, who had one *ishak* (small donkey) and two acres of vineyards. He toiled from dawn to dusk, trudging in the donkey's wake, bringing up manure and hauling down grapes, carrying wine to the market and bringing back flour for his wife and children. Then came the Soviet regime and its policy of agricultural collectivization.

"The authorities took the farmer's vineyards away from him and forced him to breed pigs. So he took his *ishak* and escaped from the *kolkhoz* collective. He hid in the mountains for several years, until he taught his donkey to speak Russian and recite by heart whole chapters from the official history of the Soviet Communist Party,

"Lenin's 'April Theses' and Stalin's *Voprosy Leninisma*. Then he took his *ishka* to Moscow and introduced the politically educated animal to comrades of the Central Committee's *Agitprop* Sections. They examined the donkey, and found him to be an outstanding orator, though a trifle weak in the dialectical materialism department.

"He could, however, influence the masses and exhort them to greater efforts on behalf of the Soviet Union and world communism. The donkey and his owner travelled the *Agitprop* circuit from Moscow to Murmansk, and from Vitebsk to Vladivostok. They received generous allowances and bonuses on top of their salaries as party functionaries. Both the *ishka* and his owner grew fat off the racket, until a senior official suggested they visit their native Armenia and demonstrate the triumph of communism to the people.

"Thousands of eager listeners assembled in the Erevan City Soviet club to hear the donkey lecture on bourgeois trends in pseudo-revisionist materialism. The donkey, a veteran speaker by now, stepped up to the lectern, drank a bucketful of mineral water, belched loudly and turned to whisper to his master: "Listen, are all those people here Armenians?"

"Sure, all of them. We are back in Armenia, remember?"

"Not a single Russian among them?" the donkey persisted.

"No, only Armenians here. Go ahead now, they are waiting..."

"The donkey raised his head, lifted his tail and brayed loud enough to crack the plaster on the ceiling. He continued braying until all listeners fled in disgust, and the enraged communist activists beat up both man and animal, and tossed them into the gutter.

"Now why did you do this to me?" the donkey's owner protested. "You were lecturing like crazy all over Russia, and suddenly start braying in Armenia?"

"Listen," the donkey tells his enraged master, 'in Russia I was addressing other donkeys, so I had to sound like a human being. Here I found myself in front of human beings, so I could sound off like an *ishka*. . .'

The old man drained the last drops of brandy from his bottle, and got up to leave. I clutched at his sleeve. "For this joke they gave you 25 years?" I asked incredulously. He nodded. "And I did nine of them, until this crummy Georgian horse thief Stalin was taken away by the Devil to reorganize Hell on a collective basis."

I had one last question. "By the way, grandfather, why do you tell yourself such stories in Russian? Are you afraid of being understood by the people of your village?"

His tired eyes blazed angrily. "Afraid? me? After Taishet? Certainly not. But I am like the *ishka*—I speak Russian to the docile donkeys and bray to my own kind. Understand?"

I did. And I found out a few more things which made my visit to Armenia less enjoyable, but much more realistic.

In spite of having been subjected to Russian Czarist and Russian Soviet domination for 160 years, Armenia has been less colonized and Russified than any of the Soviet "constituent republics." This is due to several factors which will be evaluated below. Contrary to the rule that nobody can be fond of his jailer and exploiter, most Armenians are not anti-Russian. On the other hand, being a highly individualistic people devoted to private initiative, they resent communism and openly ignore some basic tenets of Soviet rule. What is even more surprising is that they can get away with it too, as long as they steer clear of several touchy subjects the Kremlin is determined to defend at all costs.

The Armenians have been likened often to Jews, in that both nations have been the victims of foreign despotism, persecutions, pogroms, massacres, banishments, cruel reprisals and deportations. Both have a heritage of closely-knit family life, clannish communities abroad, dispersed on a worldwide basis, commercial acumen, banking and administrative skills, as well as an inclination to applied sciences, acting, literature, music and arts.

But their historical background is vastly different. Faced with a direct threat to their faith and way of life, the Jews revolted against Rome rather than accept peaceful integration within the Roman Empire. They fought well, but lost against the overwhelming superiority of Roman Legions. Then the Kingdom of Israel ceased to exist, to be resurrected by the Zionist movement 2,000 years later.

Faced with a similar choice 160 years ago, between integration in the Ottoman Turkish Empire, submission to the equally hostile Persian Moslem Kingdom, or acceptance of a Russian protectorate, the Armenians opted for the latter course. Their decision was influenced by Moscow chicanery and blackmail, and their lot under the Russians has not been an easy one. But Moscow always knows how to incite the Armenians against their "traditional enemies," the Turks and the Persians, and pose as the "Big Brother" willing — and eager — to help.

It goes without saying that Moscow had no intention of honoring its promises to the Armenians. In Czarist Russia, the Armenians were lumped together with Jews and gypsies in population censuses, under the heading "and others". Czarist envoys did their best to incite the Turks to massacre the Armenians on their side of the border, to provide Russia with a valid excuse for stepping in as a "liberator" and "protector." Using the Armenians as a pawn, the Russians invaded Turkey three times in the 19th century, and once again in the 20th.

The most cynical gambit ever devised by Machiavellian tyrants took place early in the First World War. Russian secret agents in Istanbul spread vicious rumors of an armed uprising allegedly by the Armenian minority in Turkey. They reinforced the rumors with leaflets printed in the name of an Armenian national liberation committee, and planted phony evidence to implicate Armenians in anti-Turkish conspiracies and subversion.

The result was predictable. The Turks, enraged by their losses on the Caucasus and Dardanelles battlefronts, took out their anger on the hapless Armenians, massacring them wholesale, and sending the survivors on death-march treks across waterless deserts to the Middle East. The atrocities which took place at that time are still remembered with a shudder, but Russian leaders rubbed their hands gleefully and issued grand proclamations to the "victimized Armenians," promising speedy liberation and creation of a Greater Armenia on the carved-up body of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, Armenian regiments fought well on the Caucasus battlefront, and were used up as cannon fodder by inefficient Czarist generals, who regarded them as expendable in any case.

The Russian Democratic Revolution of February-March 1917, which was subsequently overthrown and betrayed by the communist *coup d'état* of October-November 1917, and Turkey's surrender to the Western Allies in October 1918, provided Armenia with a rare opportunity to regain its lost independence and proclaim a sovereign statehood. Alas, political disunity coupled with internal strife, and intrigues between pro- and anti-Russian factions, paved the ground for another Muscovite betrayal.

Ignoring the treaties of friendship and non-aggression they had signed with the socialist government of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Russians invaded the three Caucasus republics the moment the bulk of Red Army forces disengaged themselves from combat against Pilsudski in Poland, Petlura in Ukraine and Wrangel in the Crimea. Led by Stalin's heavy-handed pal, Serge Ordzonikidze, the Special Army of the Caucasus swept across the frontiers of the three friendly republics, to "restore order" and "protect the revolution."

Resistance crumbled by December 1920, and although guerrilla fighting in the mountains continued till 1925, the Russians were able to strengthen their positions by the time-honored "divide and rule" device of imperialists and colonialists. A pro-Turkish "bourgeois-nationalist" Moslem underground was active at that time in Azerbaijan and Turkestan. Turkish officers instructed guerrilla bands in the mountains, and the movement's clandestine center in Baku proclaimed a Pan-Turkish Union of all Turk-speaking Moslem minorities of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Incited by Soviet agents, Moslem Azarbaijanis and Christian Armenians massacred each other along the shores of the Caspian Sea. Once again, Moscow stepped in to "restore order." New borders between the "constituent republics" were mapped out, and a thorn was left in Armenia's side to make sure it does not step out of line.

The Nakhichevan *Oblast* along the Araxes River on the Persian border was detached from the Armenian S.S.R. and administratively attached to the Azerbaijan S.S.R. Although Nakhichevan is separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by 150 miles of Armenian territory, its presence in Armenia's hinterland is a painful reminder that the 1.6 million Armenians are a small minority encircled by the Turks, Persians and Azerbaijanis on all sides. Ergo, their only hope for national survival lies in close cooperation with Moscow.

The most recent attempt to utilize the Armenians as pawns in Moscow's power politics took place after the Second World War, when Stalin demanded control of the Dardanelles and annexation of three Turkish provinces (Kars, Erzurum and Van) by Soviet Ar-

menia. While the three districts did once upon a time form the outer rim of the Armenian Kingdom, and the Armenians never renounced their historical claims to this land, Stalin's demand was preposterous, as it ignored the fact that since the First World War all Armenians living in the three border provinces were either killed or deported by the Turks, who moved in over a million of their own people to settle the disputed territories.

In any case, the Turks had fought thirteen wars in two centuries with the Russians over this particular issue, and would have done so again if they had to. But the Soviet ultimatum gave birth to the Truman Doctrine and NATO alliance. When President Truman undertook to guarantee Turkey's security in 1947, Moscow had no choice but to scuttle the Greater Armenia scheme, as the Czars had done 32 years before.

But there was one other development which brought me into direct contact with Soviet bureaucracy and my people cross the Iron Curtain. This was the formation of the communist-sponsored "Armenian Repatriation Committee."

I remember the day well, although more than twenty years have passed since that memorable date in September 1945, when a heavy-set, swarthy man in a French colonel's uniform walked into my souvenir shop across the street from St. George's Hotel in downtown Beirut.

The two former French protectorates of Syria and Lebanon were seething with unrest at that time. Turkish provinces until the First World War, both were grabbed by France in the wake of the Ottoman Empire's disintegration. The promises of home rule and national autonomy were not honored, of course, and European imperialism had its brief but hectic heyday until the Second World War.

Following France's rapid defeat by Nazi Germany, a pro-German administration took over in Beirut and Damascus. This group was finally overthrown by the Free French Forces of General de Gaulle, whose agents set up a subversive operations base in nearby Palestine, and raided Syria and Lebanon with the active support of British Intelligence Service.

Britain and France were allies, but did not mind fighting each other in the Middle East over colonies which did not belong to them in the first place. In 1944, shortly before D-Day and the liberation of Paris, British agents fostered anti-French uprisings in Syria and Lebanon, and Britain hastened to move its own troops into both countries under the time-honored imperialist pretext of "restoring order."



President de Gaulle waited until France was liberated and Nazi Germany surrendered in May 1945, before sending crack regiments of the Foreign Legion and North African mercenaries to crack down on the Arab nationalists in Beirut and Damascus. British troops refused to pull out, and an explosive situation developed in the autumn of 1945. In the end, rather than face an unpopular colonial war against British-supported Arab nationalists, at a time when they were already engaged in Indo-China and encountering unrest throughout North Africa, the French granted full independence to Syria and Lebanon and ordered the withdrawal of their troops and administration. The British had no choice but to follow suit: there was unrest in Cyprus, Egypt and Iraq, and in the Holy Land the banner of insurgency was raised by Zionist underground movements struggling for the liberation of Israel.

The situation was tailor-made for communist infiltration and subversion, and Moscow did not miss a single loophole. The colonel who walked into my shop on a sunny Monday afternoon was Georges Artunyan, a hero of the French Resistance, decorated with the "Croix de Guerre" by President de Gaulle. He claimed to be a distant relative of mine, and for all I know this may be quite true, for Armenians, like the Jews, are an ancient and compact nation, with family ties reaching back for hundreds of years.

He said his parents and my parents originally came from the same village near Erevan before being deported by the Turks in the First World War. His parents moved on to France in the 1920's, and settled in Paris. He graduated from the Sorbonne and enlisted in the French Air Force when the Second World War broke out, refusing to surrender to the Nazis, and joining General de Gaulle in his London exile, to be retrained as a secret agent, and parachuted over Occupied France to organize anti-Nazi resistance among Armenian immigrants in Paris.

What was he doing in Beirut and why did he call on me? Well, sighed the colonel, he was an Armenian first, a Frenchman second. And he came to the conclusion that Armenians could survive as a nation only in a state of their own. The Soviet authorities, he said, were willing to help Armenian patriots abroad, irrespective of their political views and affiliations, to set up repatriation committees and foster the territorial ingathering of Armenian families and communities, dispersed on a worldwide basis.

"How can you trust the Communists?" I wanted to know. The colonel shrugged.

"You do not have to trust them. A Greater Armenia is in Moscow's own interest. The Soviet Union is now the world's most

powerful state. The Turks will not be able to hold on to the territories they have stolen from us. In the end, they will have to bow to Soviet pressure, or be wiped out like the Germans were. And then we'll get back Kars, Erzurum and Van. Why, even Ararat, our national mountain and symbol of historic tradition, like the Fujiyama in Japan, is now in Turkish territory. But we cannot press territorial claims unless we have more Armenians where they belong. Finally, how secure are the Armenians in the Middle East? The Turks hate them, the Arabs despise them, and the Jews fear their commercial competition. The Jews will soon have a state of their own, and then the Arabs will vent their ire on the Armenians. In any case, a wave of nationalism will sweep the Middle East from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. How long do you think will the Arabs allow Armenians to run their banks, department stores, travel agencies, loan-and-credit institutions, import-export corporations and other lucrative enterprises? They will either nationalize everything, or grab it under other pretexts? Have you thought of that?"

I admitted this possibility worried me too, and I was actually thinking of migrating to the United States, where relatives of mine were running a poultry farm near Boston. The colonel snorted. "American pipe dreams, eh? America is declining, old boy, and the future belongs to the Soviet Union and its republics, including Soviet Armenia. Why feel like an outcast among strangers, when you can be boss in your own home?"

To cut a long story short, although the colonel's pep talk did not make me pack up and leave for Moscow, together with my wife and children, he did persuade me to join the Soviet-controlled "Armenian Repatriation Committee" which began operating in Beirut and other Mid-Eastern capitals as of September 1945.

I would like to add here that Colonel Georges (Black Ehora) Artunyan died in a Moscow hospital in 1956, probably from what is generally described as "natural causes." He, and others of his ilk, were veteran communist agents who did their best to exploit the age-long Armenian hunger for national unity in the cause of Moscow's imperialist plots.

Shipping was scarce in the early post-war years and the only ones with any extra tonnage to spare were the Greeks. Artunyan, who resigned from active service in the French Armed Forces in October 1945, to mastermind the repatriation committee, appointed me in charge of negotiating long-term charters with Greek ship-owners. Competition was terrific, because the Zionist underground in Palestine bought up anything that floated for its blockade-running illegal immigration fleet.

We sent a few transports by train, via Aleppo and Istanbul to Sofia, Bucharest and Odessa, but Moscow was not satisfied. Things started moving only in February 1947, following the establishment of a Soviet Embassy in Beirut and the arrival of Ivan Androsyan on a diplomatic passport. Androsyan was known to most of us as a good-for-nothing punk who played hooky from school, had a police record for misdemeanors and street violence, and ran away from home in 1936, to join the communist International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War.

He now cropped up in Beirut, with a blonde Russian wife and a Soviet diplomatic passport which designated him an "*Osoby Upolnomochenny*" (Special Representative) of the "Committee for Repatriation of Armenians to their Homeland." He brought with him a travelling theater show from the Sundukyan Academy of Dramatic Arts, which toured the Middle East to play its spiel to would-be repatriates. The troupe had two routine shows ("Test of Humanity" and "Dreams of the Future") and one "special" which was shown whenever the response to the first two was lukewarm. This was Andrei Oshtunyants' "They Died At Dawn," describing the tragedy of Armenian freedom fighters who attempted to protect their people from Turkish genocide drives in the First World War and during the brief Turkish occupation of Armenia in 1917-1918.

Its message was so powerful, and the acting so convincing that even hardened cynics, like myself, were moved to tears. Before each show, Androsyan or one of his stooges from the repatriation committee (I am ashamed to admit that this included me, too) climbed the stage and delivered a pep-talk to the audience. Needless to add, Armenians in Cairo, Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, Alexandria, Port Said, Nicosia, Beirut, Baghdad and Aleppo flocked to the shows—especially since tickets were free or handed out at reduced prices through committees and front organizations.

But, as the old saying goes, money talks better than a thousand speeches. The show got off the road to a running start when Moscow came through with gold and dollars. I suppose that foreign currency and gold were pretty scarce in the Soviet Union in the early post-war years, as they are now. But Androsyan gave me trunk-loads of gold coins (mostly Czarist 10-ruble pieces confiscated from Russian peasants and hoarders who were then shot for hiding gold from the authorities) and greenbacks to charter Greek passenger ships for the repatriation business.

In 1946, we sent only 28,000 repatriates to Armenia. But in 1947, we were able to round up over 100,000 suckers. Transports left Alexandria and Beirut almost every week, calling at Famagusta, Lat-

takia and Haifa en route. A special branch of our organization dealt with the Western Hemisphere and there was a sub-division operating among the Armenian immigrants in France. All told, the committee shipped to Soviet ports 202,000 Armenians in 1946-1948.

This pace petered out somewhat after 1948, for two reasons. First, the Truman Doctrine showed Moscow, its stooges and the Armenians abroad, that Turkey is not, and will never be a pushover. Moreover, the Kremlin's insistence on linking the Greater Armenia scheme with control of the Dardanelles, revealed the true purpose of Russian imperialism. On top of everything, those suckers who fell for the repatriation spiel had already left for the USSR, and it was getting more and more difficult to persuade the others.

Despite everything, the committee rounded up another 68,000 Armenian repatriates in the years 1949-1965. But the emphasis has shifted in recent years from repatriation to delegation. The Russians are now more interested in winning friends and influencing people among Armenian communities abroad than in bringing in additional repatriates to the overcrowded republic. Any organized Armenian community or group is authorized to send a delegation to the Armenian S.S.R., all expenses paid by the Soviet government. Individual travel is encouraged also, and the INTOURIST organization grants special reductions (very substantial ones, too) to Armenian visitors who subscribe to the standard 10-, 15- or 21-day tours to the Armenian S.S.R. There are "quickie" tours of 3 to 4 days each, but no reductions are granted on those.

Unlike other citizens who are blacklisted if they have relatives abroad, let alone correspond with them, the Armenians are actually encouraged to write their folks and friends in foreign lands, describing the "good life" in the USSR and inviting them to visit them.

If a Jew, Ukrainian or Lithuanian citizen of the USSR receives a gift parcel from the United States, he can make a reservation at the nearest forced labor camp. Perhaps they won't arrest him right away, but he can be sure that his name has been entered on the blacklist of security risks, and he will be among the first victims of any purge, roundup of suspects or police crackdown on potentially disloyal elements.

The Armenians, however, are not only permitted, but even encouraged to receive gift parcels and cash money from friends and relatives abroad.

If the Jerusalem Rabbinate or the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the United States dared to transfer funds to restore synagogues in Moscow or churches in Lviv, the recipients of such aid could hang themselves, to avoid being tortured in the interrogation rooms

of Moscow's dreaded Lefortovo Prison. But the Soviets not only permit such generous aid to be received by the Armenian Orthodox Church in the USSR, but go out of their way to encourage religious pilgrimages, church delegations and other contacts between the Soviet Armenian Republic and the Armenian Orthodox churches abroad.

The huge new INTOURIST Hotel in downtown Erevan has recently opened a special downstairs lobby where local and foreign relatives can meet each other in air-conditioned privacy (there are microphones and other electronic bugs in the walls and tables, of course), and a luxurious conference room, where visiting priests and religious delegations can discuss church affairs with local priests and monks. Erevan itself was a sleepy dead-end provincial town of 30,000, when the Soviets overthrew Armenia's democratic left-wing government, and set up a communist administration. Today, with a population of 720,000, Erevan is the Soviet Union's showcase, on a par with Lenin-grad, and much more impressive than Moscow.

The Russians have shut down Jewish synagogues, and confiscated Ukrainian churches throughout the Soviet Union. The old Kiev Synagogue is now a sports club, and the Kiev Lavra, cradle of Ukrainian faith and culture, is now utilized as an atheistic museum by Moscow colonialists. But Armenia's oldest church, the famed Etshmyadzin Monastery near Erevan, which was founded in the year 301, has been restored to its former glory with funds donated by the Soviet government. Indeed, new buildings have been added all around on order of the Soviet Council of Ministers, to provide room for praying and temporary living quarters for Armenian pilgrims from all over the world.

The priests and monks are encouraged to receive gifts and donations from foreign visitors and maintain independent contacts with Armenian priests abroad. If this sounds like freedom behind the Iron Curtain, come with me to the squat grey building on May Day Avenue, which houses the "*Respublikanskoye Upravleniye*" (Republican Administration) of KGB—State Security Committee of Soviet secret police.

Here, behind the smooth facade of polished granite and shuttered windows, strings are pulled and plots manipulated by swarms of Russian officials and their local stooges. Lifts and pneumatic tubes hum with activity all night, as bulky "*zapiska*" dossiers on foreign visitors, relatives, friends and contacts are opened, new information added, material brought up to date, and files transferred to the Department of External Relations for further action.

There are over six million Armenians in the world, but only 2.5 million live in the Soviet Union. And of those, less than 1.6 million actually reside in the Armenian S.S.R.

The "republic's" population includes 120,000 Azerbaijanis, 30,000 Kurds and 60,000 Russians, most of whom are concentrated in the capital of Erevan. Before the repatriation committee was set up in 1945, there were just over a million Armenians in their "republic" and had Stalin succeeded in annexing the three Turkish provinces for his pet "Greater Armenia" scheme, he would have lacked Armenian settlers to populate them.

By fostering Armenian nationalism, and presenting the Armenian S.S.R. as the hub of Armenian culture, religion, historical heritage and national consciousness, the Russians have achieved several long-range aims.

Their agents and front men abroad can now count on the more or less active support of Armenian businessmen, community leaders and intellectuals. One does not have to look very far for examples. A couple of years ago, the Greek Government put up for sale or long-term lease to private buyers, over 200 uninhabited islands in the Aegean, Mediterranean and Ionian Seas. Without water or arable land, these islands were unfit for permanent human habitation, and were a liability rather than an asset to the Greek Treasury.

By selling them to wealthy investors, international playboys, millionaires, oil-rich sheikhs, shipping magnates and industrial tycoons, the Greeks not only earned some badly-needed foreign currency and developed neglected real estate into valuable property, but boosted tourism, yachting, inter-island travel, coastal shipping and related branches.

Naturally, the Russians were eager to join the island-buying spree, by getting in on the ground floor and climbing the playboy bandwagon for a free ride. The advantages of buying an island or two were obvious to the Soviet Intelligence Service. There are American missile bases in Crete, naval and radio communications installations in Crete and Rhodes. American warships and nuclear submarines of the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean must pass through the Greek islands on their way to Turkey and the Dardanelles, or from the Near East to the Black Sea, or in any other direction towards Russia's "soft underbelly."

If a couple of islands could be bought or rented by Soviet front men, who posed as playboys or retired businessmen, to operate listening posts and Naval Intelligence stations from their walled-in island residences, the benefits to Moscow's espionage apparatus cannot even be estimated.

In fact, the Greeks almost sold two small islands to a Beirut-based syndicate which planned to operate a private yacht club and holiday village in Carpathos Channel. They cancelled the deal after being tipped off by reliable NATO Intelligence sources that the Armenian businessmen who bankrolled the syndicate were security risks, in view of their previous connections with the "Armenian Repatriation Committee." Thus, the Soviet Intelligence plot was nipped in the bud this time. But who knows how many other spy rings were set up through "repatriation committee" stooges?

Armenia's pride is the kidney shaped Lake Sevan, a hundred miles due north of Erevan. Here the Soviet built the famed Armenian Riviera at Krasnoselsk. Over 250 cottages, detached villas and luxurious bungalows were built along the beach, facing the lake, their backyards looking out into a tangled wilderness of trees and underbrush climbing the sheer slopes of Red Mountain Ridge.

The villas look like a playground for Rome's Dolce Vita set, with TV, refrigerators, well-stocked bars and wall-to-wall carpeting. A retreat for Kremlin big shots? A secret "pleasure camp" of the Cominform? No, none of these things. The Krasnoselsk settlement is the Soviet Union's first attempt to reintroduce private property since the 1917 revolt. Armenians resident abroad are encouraged to buy or rent the villas at Lake Sevan as vacation spots, or retirement retreats. Local residents can buy them too, provided their relatives abroad pay for them in hard foreign currency. A four-room bungalow, furnished in the "Modern Causacus" style, sells for about \$60,000 and rents for \$450 a month.

Is it real, or is it an illusion? Is Armenia the Soviet Union's "Paradise Corner," or is it some kind of tremendous swindle? Listen to this, and draw your own conclusions:

At the far end of Lenin Avenue in Erevan, a K-shaped four-story building houses the K.P.O. (Headquarters of Frontier Defense Forces) administration in Armenia. All officers and men of *Pogranichniki* troops along the border with Turkey and Persia are Russians. The few Armenians among them serve as interpreters or "*Druzhniki*" (auxiliaries).

Armenia's frontiers are among the most heavily defended in the Soviet bloc. The border runs along the Arpa and Araxes Rivers. The deep gorges, swift currents and icy waters are a sufficient obstacle by themselves. But the Russians have in addition planted multiple mine fields, regular and electrified barbed wire, watchtowers, searchlights, electronic alarms and chicken-wire fences for hundreds of miles.

One may well ask what for? Why should Armenians try to escape from their "Paradise Corner" to seek asylum with their mortal enemies, the Turks? Or risk death by drowning and bullets to become penniless refugees in Persia? The answer is that more and more Armenians are trying to get away every year. No one knows how many are killed on their way to freedom, and how many actually make it all the way. But from time to time, the Soviet press praises the vigilant security troops on Armenia's southern borders. And there were two unsuccessful attempts to hijack aircraft in mid-air and force it to land across the line in Turkey.

The answer was provided by an elderly Armenian who relaxes in a villa bought for him by a wealthy brother in Britain. He was fishing in Lake Sevan, drinking wine with ice cubes and musing aloud: "I guess I am better off than most Soviet citizens. Yet the better things are the unhappier I get to be. This is no paradox. Rebellions and uprisings erupt not when oppression is at its worst, but usually after it has been relaxed a little bit. When a person worries about food, he has no time to think about fashion trends. When he is fed and clothed, he wants a decent roof over his head. But when he has all these things, he desires man's most precious possession of all—freedom.

"Now, I am not fooling myself. Freedom means little to hungry, homeless and underprivileged people. But it can be more important than life after all material needs have been satisfied. That is the way human nature works. Look at Armenia. There is no denying that materially we are better off than other parts of the Soviet Union. Food shops and farmers' markets are stocked to capacity, and prices are not excessive. There is no unemployment, and the average standard of living must be among the highest between East Berlin and Vladivostok. And we have an illusion of freedom too, through frequent contacts with relatives, foreign visitors, tourists and recent repatriates. And that is the trouble, my friend. We do not wish to be Moscow's singsong canary in a gilded cage. We prefer to be a simple sparrow, but free. That is what really bothers us. We realize that our freedom is an illusion, to be granted and denied at Moscow's whim. We know that our Armenian Soviet and Central Committee are rubber-stamp organizations of yes-men who do whatever the Kremlin tells them to do. We are not hungry or terrorized, thank God. But we want to get out of the cage."

—I was shopping for souvenirs and Ararat brandy at a department store in Erevan, when a grey-haired woman touched my elbow. "Don't you recognize me?" she smiled, "I am Harutunia K. from Beirut. You helped us return to Armenia in 1947." I looked em-



barrassed. Not only because she was a young and pretty woman then, and looked like a grandmother now—almost two decades have passed since then—but I did not know whether she was going to thank me, or curse me, for repatriating her to the USSR. Her father was a shoemaker who hardly made a living among the barefooted Arabs, so I guess she could not be worse off in Armenia.

"Well, how are you?" I smiled back.

Tears cascaded down her wrinkled cheeks and I led her out the building and into a public park to avert attracting attention.

"You know my husband Simon? No, of course you don't. We got married here in Erevan. He was repatriated from Aleppo by your committee. He was arrested by the KGB last year and sentenced to 25 years in a special detention camp. I'll never see him again. I do not even know where he is, because we are not allowed to correspond for the first three years of imprisonment..." she wailed.

I felt uneasy. "What did he do?" I stammered.

"He drew a red triangle on a green background on the cover of a book he had borrowed from the public library."

"And for this he got 25 years?" I asked incredulously.

"Yes, don't you know what the sign means? It is the symbol of the Caucasus Federation. Many Armenians believe in it, and Moscow fears it worse than fire. You see, the Armenians realize they cannot exist as an independent nation, not only because of Moscow, but for geographical reasons. They lack an outlet to the sea and communications with the outside world. But if Armenia is united with Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus Federation, we shall combine Baku oil with Georgian agriculture and our minerals, and reach the outside world through Black Sea ports. This is the dream of many Armenians. My husband believed in it too."

"But why did he have to draw the sign on the cover of a book?" I wanted to know. She shrugged. "To test whether the librarian was an Armenian patriot, or a secret police stooge. Now we know, but we have paid a price for learning it the hard way."

## UKRAINE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A BRIEF SURVEY

By NICHOLAS ANDRUSIAK

In Czarist Russia the Ukrainians occupied all the southern provinces around the Black Sea: Bessarabia (together with Rumanians), Podolia, Volhynia, Kholm, Kiev, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kherson, Tavria and the Crimea, along with remnants of the Tatars), the Caucasian Black Sea country, Kuban, and Stavropol; the southern parts of Grodno, Minsk, Kursk, and Voronezh provinces, and Ukrainians also were mixed with the Don and Terek Kozaks in their provinces. Ukrainian colonies crossed the Volga River between Saratov and Tsaritsyn (Volgograd), and were intermittently to be found up to the Sea of Japan, forming two larger accumulations, one in the northeast of Kazakhstan: "Siryi Klyn" (The Grey Wedge), and the other between the Amur River and the Sea of Japan: "Zelenyi Klyn" (The Green Wedge).

In Austria-Hungary the Ukrainians, officially called the Ruthenians (a Latin derivate), occupied Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, and the northeastern part of the Carpathian Mountains in Hungary (Carpatho-Ukraine). In Galicia the provincial government was in the hands of the Poles, who treated the Ukrainians as an inferior race but who could not deny the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) national identity; nevertheless, they constantly attempted to Polonize the Ukrainians. In South Bukovina the Ukrainians were mixed with Rumanians, who were of the same Orthodox faith and who sought to Rumanize the Ukrainians through their common metropolitan. In Hungary the government had gradually Magyarized the Ukrainians since 1867.<sup>1</sup>

The idea of Ukrainian independence rose not in Galicia under the Austrian imperial regime, although there were a few Ukrainian chairs at the University in Lviv, eight state high schools and a like number of private Ukrainian ones, Ukrainian elementary schools in the villages, a Ukrainian press, and cultural, economic, and sport societies. Instead, this idea rose in Ukraine under the Czarist des-

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<sup>1</sup> Clarence A. Manning, *Twentieth-Century Ukraine*, p. 19.

potism where the use of the Ukrainian language was forbidden in all schools and churches, and where any publications in Ukrainian also were proscribed. As early as 1900 the secret Ukrainian Revolutionary Party had been formed with the independence of Ukraine as its aim. Members of this party fell under the influence of the Russian socialist parties, and consequently they formed various affiliations of the Ukrainian Socialists who were active during the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917.<sup>2</sup>

At the beginning of World War I Galician and Bukovinian Ukrainian political leaders formed the "Main Ukrainian *Rada*" (Council), which was loyal to the Austrian government, and called upon the Ukrainian people to enlist in the Legion of the Ukrainian *Sich* Riflemen. (The name *Sich* was taken from the name of the Ukrainian Kozak fortress upon the Dnieper River, destroyed in 1775 by Catherine II.) A few East Ukrainian political emigres in Austria organized the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine."<sup>3</sup> Some East Ukrainian political leaders, however, wished at the time to see all Ukraine united within the Russian Empire<sup>4</sup> as a federated republic.

Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky, professor at the University in Lviv, who had returned to Russia from Austria in order to avoid arrest as a "Russophile" by the Austrians, was arrested in Kiev by the Russian police and sent to the Volga region. Also, the Ukrainian Uniate Metropolitan Andrew Count Sheptytsky was arrested when the Russians entered Lviv in September, 1914, and sent to Kursk. Both were liberated by the Russian Revolution in 1917, and returned as Ukrainian national heroes. Hrushevsky came back to Kiev just at the time that the Ukrainian socialist parties—the Social-Democratic, the Social-Revolutionary, and the Party of the Social Federalists—were organizing the "Ukrainian Central *Rada*" (Council). Hrushevsky became the leader of the *Rada*, and joined the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party.<sup>5</sup>

The Ukrainian Central *Rada* demanded of the Russian Provisional Government the autonomy of Ukraine, but the Russian Prime Minister, Prince Lvov, did not reply. The Ukrainian Central *Rada* thereupon (April 19, 1917) summoned the All-Ukrainian National Congress in Kiev. Subsequently convened were two military

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<sup>2</sup> *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, Ed. by V. Kubijovych, vol. I, 1963, pp. 689-96.

<sup>3</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 35-6.

congresses and the Congress of Peasants' Delegates. All these broadly representative congresses supported the *Rada* in its demand for Ukrainian autonomy. This was especially true of the Second Ukrainian Military Congress, which was held in Kiev on June 18-23 against the wishes of Alexander Kerensky, Minister of War in the Provisional Government.<sup>6</sup> The latter then decided to negotiate with the Ukrainians. The five Russian Cadet ministers, among them Prime Minister Lvov, thereupon resigned from the Cabinet on July 15, 1917, in protest against the intention of their socialist colleagues to grant autonomy to Ukraine in advance of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.<sup>7</sup> The socialists Kerensky, Tereshchenko and Tseretelli reached a compromise with the Ukrainian Central *Rada* under which Ukraine would be governed by the *Rada*, the *Rada* would not press its demand for Ukrainian autonomy until the convocation of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, and the supreme command of the Ukrainian armed forces would still remain in Russian hands.<sup>8</sup>

The Provisional Government, however, decided to arrest the members of the Ukrainian government when the Ukrainian Central *Rada* published on July 29, 1917, its Statute of the Higher Administration of Ukraine. Enmity rose steadily between these two governments, but the troubles of the Provisional Government with the Bolsheviks prevented it from carrying out its plan to dismiss the Ukrainian government. With the Bolshevik overthrow of the Provisional Government, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* proclaimed on November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian National Republic. The Bolsheviks purportedly recognized the right of a nation to self-determination and even to separation. But in fact they did not hesitate to interfere in the activities of the Ukrainian government, because in the conception of their messianic mission the Communist Party was to keep under its domination all other groups and peoples, by force of arms if necessary.<sup>9</sup>

The Bolsheviks called an assembly in Kiev on December 17, 1917, but at this meeting (which was allowed by the Ukrainian Central *Rada*) the Ukrainians voted their support of the *Rada*. The Bolsheviks withdrew only after failing to disrupt the proceedings. At Kharkiv the Bolsheviks established a government of the Ukrainian Soviet (in Ukrainian: "Radyanska") Socialist Republic, headed by two

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<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 38-40.

<sup>7</sup> Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia*, 1947 p. 474; Frederick L. Schuman, *Russia Since 1917*, 1957 p. 74.

<sup>8</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-1

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 41-5.

Russians and a Ukrainian Jew. In the support of this fictional government Soviet Russia sent in an army, one of whose leaders was the Ukrainian George Kotsiubynsky, son of the prominent Ukrainian writer, Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky.<sup>10</sup>

In order to defeat Ukraine the Soviet government began to negotiate with the Central Powers in Brest Litovsk on December 3, 1917.<sup>11</sup> The armistice at the front allowed the Bolshevik troops to march through Ukraine and to attempt to persuade the Ukrainian army to desert by crying, "Peace."<sup>12</sup>

#### THE WAR IN UKRAINE

In this situation the Ukrainian Central *Rada* decided to send its own delegation to Brest Litovsk on January 12, 1918. Passing through Lviv, the Ukrainian delegates took the opportunity to establish contact with the local Ukrainian political leaders and scholars. In Brest Litovsk they surprised the German and Austro-Hungarian delegations with their demand not only for the recognition of Ukrainian independence but also for the inclusion in the Ukrainian state of the Ukrainian territories under Austro-Hungarian rule (Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, and Carpatho-Ukraine).<sup>13</sup>

In the meantime the Ukrainian Central *Rada* proclaimed (January 22, 1918) the independence of the Ukrainian National Republic.<sup>14</sup> When the Bolshevik troops approached Kiev,<sup>15</sup> the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was compelled to move to Zhytomyr. On February 9, 1918, the Bolsheviks entered Kiev and commenced a reign of terror. Over five thousand civilians fell in the massacre of those suspected of being anti-Bolshevik.<sup>16</sup>

On the same day (February 9) the Ukrainian delegation signed a treaty with the Central Powers,<sup>17</sup> which recognized the independence of Ukraine, including the territory claimed by the Ukrainian Central *Rada* and that section which was occupied by the Germans and the Austrians. The Ukrainians asked the Central Powers for military aid against the Bolsheviks, in return promising the Central Powers a million tons of food. The Central Powers promised to return to

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 46-7.

<sup>11</sup> Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 91-2.

<sup>13</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50.

<sup>15</sup> Alan Moorehead, *The Russian Revolution*, 1958, p. 270.

<sup>16</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

<sup>17</sup> Alan Moorehead, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 278.

Ukraine all their prisoners of war and to arm and equip them for the struggle against the Bolsheviks. Set up in a secret protocol between the Ukrainian delegation and Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs Count Czernin, a Hungarian, was the establishment in the Austrian Empire of a Ukrainian autonomous crown province consisting of the Ukrainian parts of Galicia and Bukovina, but not of Carpatho-Ukraine, subjugated by Hungary. This arrangement was kept secret because of the Poles, who exerted a great influence upon Austrian policy and who had protested against the return to Ukraine of the Kholm province, which back in 1912 had been separated from the former Congress Poland by the Russian Czarist government. This at the time had met with no strenuous objections on the part of the Poles. (In 1918 the Poles did cry out against the "fourth partition of Poland."<sup>18</sup>)

In accordance with the agreement between the Ukrainian delegation and the Central Powers, the general advance of the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians against the Bolsheviks started on February 17, 1918.<sup>19</sup> By March 1, 1918, the Bolsheviks had been driven out of Kiev, and the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was able to return.<sup>20</sup> The Bolsheviks were compelled to renew their negotiations with the Central Powers in Brest Litovsk, signing a treaty there on March 3, 1918. In consequence of that treaty Russia lost 1,267,000 square miles with 62,000,000 people, a third of its best crop areas, half of its industrial plants and three quarters of its coal and iron.<sup>21</sup> The Bolsheviks promised to leave Ukraine and to negotiate the Ukrainian-Russian boundaries<sup>22</sup> with the Ukrainian government.

But the German forces in Ukraine acted as if they were the real masters of the country. Without consulting the Ukrainian Central *Rada* they instituted their own methods of collection of grain. When the Ukrainian Central *Rada* protested against their methods, German troops surrounded the *Rada* building on April 28, 1918, and forced the *Rada* to disperse.

In pursuance of an agreement with Field Marshal von Eichhorn, the Commander-in-Chief of the German army in Ukraine, the great landowners held a congress on April 29, 1918, which elected as the new *hetman* of Ukraine General Paul Skoropadsky, a descendant of the eighteenth-century *hetman* of the Ukrainian Kozaks, Ivan Skoro-

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<sup>18</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>19</sup> Moorehead, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

<sup>20</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

<sup>21</sup> Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

<sup>22</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

padsky. Many Ukrainian nationalist and socialist intellectuals and the commanding staff of the Kievan *Sich* Riflemen boycotted the *hetman's* government. In consequence Russian intellectuals and military officers occupied the most important positions in this government. The discontent of the Ukrainians with Skoropadsky's regime was exploited by the Bolshevik diplomats in Kiev: Christian Rakovsky, a Rumanian Jew, and Dmytro Manuilsky, a Ukrainian Communist. They delayed their negotiations with the *hetman's* government concerning the Ukrainian-Russian peace treaty and boundaries, meanwhile trying to instigate the Ukrainian socialists into a revolt against Skoropadsky, assuring them of Soviet aid and the independence of Ukraine.<sup>23</sup>

In the meantime the Central Powers went down to defeat. Seeking freedom, as were other nations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ukrainian representatives of Galicia and Bukovina under the presidency of Dr. Eugene Petrushevych, a lawyer, established in Lviv, on October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National *Rada* of the Western Ukrainian National Republic, consisting of Eastern Galicia, Northwestern Bukovina, and Northeastern Hungary. Early on November 1, 1918, in Lviv, Ukrainian soldiers of the Austrian army who had been stationed in Eastern Galicia disarmed their colleagues of other nationalities and occupied all the government buildings, where later Ukrainian political leaders established their offices. The Ukrainian soldiers, however, were attacked by Polish military officers, soldiers, and university students. A battalion of Ukrainian *Sich* Riflemen left Bukovina for Lviv, thereby allowing the Rumanians to occupy this province without a struggle. The battalion of *Sich* Riflemen was too small to cope with the Polish troops sent in from Cracow through Peremyshl and the Ukrainians were forced to leave Lviv on November 22, 1918. The Western Ukrainian government moved to Ternopil, and later to Stanislaviv.<sup>24</sup>

Deprived of the support of the Germans, Skoropadsky now tried to curry favor with the Allies by proclaiming on November 14, 1918, a federation of Ukraine with a non-Red Russia to be restored after the defeat of the Bolsheviks. This proclamation caused the Ukrainians to revolt against Skoropadsky. On December 14, 1918, the *hetman* abdicated and settled in Berlin. In Kiev a Directorate, consisting of five members as the government of the Ukrainian National Republic, was established. The former General Secretary of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, was its head; the

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 58-9.

first Secretary of Military Affairs, Simon Petlura, became vice head of this Directorate and the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army. In February, 1919, Petlura succeeded Vynnychenko as head of the Directorate.<sup>25</sup>

On January 22, 1919, the Western Ukrainian National Republic united with the Ukrainian National Republic. The Western Ukrainians counted on receiving the aid of the Ukrainian National Republic against the Poles. But the Bolsheviks forced the army of Petlura to evacuate Kiev on February 4, 1919. His army, supported by the Ukrainian Galician troops, held back the Bolsheviks on the rivers Horyn and Zbruch in the spring of 1919 in the course of the latter's march to Hungary to support the Communist revolution under Bela Kun. France meanwhile equipped the Polish divisions under General Joseph Haller, who forced the Western Ukrainian (Galician) army to retire eastwards in July of 1919.<sup>26</sup>

The now united Ukrainian forces were able to defeat the Bolsheviks and to re-enter Kiev on August 30, 1919. At the same time the White Russian army of Czarist General Denikin approached the capital of Ukraine. The Ukrainian command, wishing to conclude an alliance with Denikin's army against the Bolsheviks, sent a Galician general to Denikin's staff to negotiate. Denikin's troops used this opportunity to enter Kiev as friends of the Ukrainian Galician Army, where they proceeded to disarm the Galician units. Consequently, the Ukrainians were compelled to leave Kiev,<sup>27</sup> but continued their struggles against both the Red Russians (Bolsheviks) and the White ones (Denikin). An epidemic of typhus broke out in the Ukrainian armies, decimating their ranks, in the fall of 1919. This calamitous blow forced the Ukrainian Galician Army to conclude a treaty with Denikin's army, while Petlura sought asylum in Poland.<sup>28</sup>

In mid-October of 1919 the Bolsheviks crushed Denikin's forces at Orel and Voronezh, and then expelled the Whites from Ukraine, using slogans of its liberation from the old Czarist regime which had denied Ukrainian nationhood. On April 4, 1920, Denikin withdrew in favor of Baron Peter Wrangel in the Crimea and fled abroad.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 54-5, 65.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 61.

<sup>27</sup> Walsh, *op. cit.*, p. 405; reviewed by N. Andrusiak, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, vol. XVIII, 1962, pp. 87-8.

<sup>28</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-8.

<sup>29</sup> Schuman, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-20. Michael Terpak, "The Monolithic Myth of the USSR," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, vol. XXVI, No. 10, 1960, p. 315.



But on April 24, 1920, Petlura as head of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic, concluded an alliance with Polish Marshal Joseph Pilsudski, by which Petlura relinquished Western Ukraine to Poland. In exchange Pilsudski promised to liberate that part of Ukraine west of the Dnieper River, including Kiev, to occupy this territory with the Polish army, and, under his protection, to facilitate the organization by Petlura of a national Ukrainian government and state.

On May 7, 1920, the Polish-Ukrainian army reached and entered Kiev. But the return of the Polish great landowners to their former estates in Ukraine provided fuel for the Bolshevik anti-Polish propaganda aimed at the Ukrainian peasants. Moreover, Czarist General Brussilov rallied to the defense of Russia against the Poles. Soon (June 13) Budenny's cavalry forced the Poles to quit Kiev. During the summer the Bolsheviks occupied Volhynia and Podolia and entered Eastern Galicia, whose southern part was defended by the troops of the Ukrainian National Republic along the Dniester River, as well as by the old fortress Zamosc, manned by the Ukrainian Kievan division. In late August, 1920, the Bolsheviks were pushed back toward the east but on October 11, 1920, Pilsudski obtained an armistice by agreeing not to support the army of the Ukrainian National Republic any longer.

The armistice allowed the Bolsheviks to crush Wrangel's army in the Crimea, November 7-14; its remnants fled to Istanbul in British, French, and American warships. A week later the army of the Ukrainian National Republic was pushed by the Bolsheviks westward to the Zbruch River, where it was disarmed by its recent allies, the Poles, on November 22, 1920, and the war was over. A small group of Ukrainian soldiers did escape from Polish internment camps in the fall of 1921 and attempted partisan warfare against the Bolsheviks, but they were quickly rounded up by the latter; 376 Ukrainian prisoners were machine-gunned to death by order of Bolshevik General Yakir on November 21, 1921, near Bazar in Volhynia.<sup>30</sup>

Thanks to the Ukrainian-Russian war, Poland was able to compel the Bolsheviks to yield the territories with Ukrainian and Byelorussian populations in the Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921. Poland received, outside of the so-called Congress Poland in which the Ukrainian Kholm province was included, 110,000 square kilometers, with a population of about 4,000,000.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Pares, *op. cit.*, p. 485. Schuman, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-3. Alexander Skrzynski, *Poland and Peace*, 1923, pp. 42-6. Manning, *op. cit.*, Maxim Litvinov, *Notes for a Journal*, 1955, p. 280.

<sup>31</sup> Skrzynski, *op. cit.*, p. 46. Bernard Pares, *Russia*, 1952, p. 65.

After the defeat of the Ukrainian national forces the Russian Bolsheviks established the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. A paper republic, its higher administration was composed of exactly those persons who had sat in Moscow previously. The conduct of its foreign affairs and defense was handed over to the All-Union government, although for a while the custom was followed of allowing a Ukrainian secretary in all the Soviet missions sent abroad. The Soviet government tolerated the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev, established by *Hetman* Skoropadsky, and it permitted the use of the Ukrainian language in the schools and the administration.

In 1929 a stronger Soviet government began to persecute the Ukrainian scholars and writers. Harsher and harsher methods were introduced to extract grain from the unwilling peasants. In 1931 a drought and poor harvest hit Ukraine. The Soviet government had long awaited such an opportunity. It created the artificial famine of 1931-32. The peasants were left at the approach of winter without food supplies and with no way of securing any, even though there was an abundance of grain in the hands of the government. The government cruelly refused to allow even the smallest amounts of food to be brought into the area from any source, on the ground that the shortage had been caused by anti-governmental activity. When news of the famine leaked out to the outside world, the Soviet government brazenly denied its existence and forbade the Soviet papers to publish any reports on it. Foreign correspondents were denied permission to visit the stricken area; far too many of them obsequiously accepted the Soviet version of events. An outstanding exception was William Henry Chamberlin, who reported the full extent of the horror. Nearly 10 per cent of the rural population—some five million people—perished that winter in Ukraine.<sup>32</sup>

#### WESTERN UKRAINE UNDER POLAND

The Council of the Ambassadors of the Allies recognized Eastern Galicia as a part of Poland on March 15, 1923, despite President Wilson's Fourteen Points and the protest of the Western Ukrainian government in exile. The Polish government undertook a policy of forced assimilation and disintegration of the Ukrainian communities and of exerting pressure on the outstanding Ukrainian leaders. The large estates of Polish landowners were distributed among Poles in order to alter the character of the population in the predominantly Ukrainian districts. The government refused to allow the establishment of

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<sup>32</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-93.

a Ukrainian university in Lviv, and the Polish police persecuted a secret Ukrainian university. Only a negligible number of Ukrainian students were admitted to the Polish universities. The Ukrainian elementary and secondary schools were Polonized gradually. In Volhynia, the Kholm province, Pidlassia and Polissia, Orthodox priests were compelled to use Polish in their official acts. Many Orthodox churches in the Kholm province and Pidlassia were destroyed by the Polish police and by mobs in 1920-22 and in 1938. In Galicia in 1930 Pilsudski ordered and carried out a cruel "pacification" of the Ukrainians by units of the Polish army.<sup>33</sup> As a consequence the Poles earned the enmity of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian populations.<sup>34</sup>

The Rumanians virtually liquidated the entire Ukrainian school system in Bukovina by introducing the Rumanian language into it. The government attempted to repress all manifestations of Ukrainian activity.<sup>35</sup>

Carpatho-Ukraine, under the name "Podkarpatska Rus," had been occupied since 1919 by the Czechoslovak Republic. The Minority Treaty signed by Czechoslovakia provided for this province "the widest autonomy compatible with the unity of the Republic." In reality, the Czechs placed the administrative power of this country in the hands of Czech officials. Nonetheless, the rule of the Czechs was more enlightened than the former Hungarian one.

In the fall of 1938 Carpatho-Ukraine had become autonomous, but after three weeks a decision by both Hitler and Mussolini deprived it of the area surrounding the two principal cities, Uzhorod and Mukachevo. Its capital became Hust. Elections for the Carpatho-Ukrainian diet on February 12, 1939, supported the government of the educator, Monsignor Augustine Voloshyn. At the first meeting of the newly elected representatives Monsignor Voloshyn was installed as president, but on the same day, March 14, the Germans occupied the Czech provinces, and by agreement with Hitler the Hungarian government ordered the withdrawal of all Czech troops from Carpatho-Ukraine and invaded the country. The Hungarians, equipped with modern weapons, attacked the small troops of the Carpatho-Ukrainian *Sich*-Riflemen. The Ukrainian resistance was crushed in a few days. The Hungarians executed the Carpatho-Ukrainian officials and soldiers who fell into their hands and the province was reor-

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 107-114.

<sup>34</sup> Norman J. G. Pounds, *Poland Between the Two Wars, Ferment in Eastern Europe*, 1965, pp. 23-4.

<sup>35</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-6.

ganized as Ugro-Rus'. Ukrainian schools were closed, and the institutions that had come into being in the Czechoslovakian period were abolished.<sup>36</sup>

#### UKRAINE DURING WORLD WAR II

On August 23, 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed a "pact of friendship and non-aggression." Its immediate result was the German attack on Poland on September 1, 1939. Warsaw and Lviv held out for a few days. When the Soviet Union announced on September 17, 1939, that the Red Army had invaded Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia in order to take "under Soviet protection" the lives and properties of the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians, the Polish command in Lviv decided to surrender Lviv to the Bolsheviks.<sup>37</sup>

According to the agreement between Ribbentrop and Molotov of September 23, 1939, the new Soviet-German boundary was established on the rivers Bug and San. West of these rivers, the Kholm province, and the Carpathian belt of the Ukrainian mountaineers, the Lemkos, fell under German occupation. Also a belt of Ukrainian settlements along the San River and its tributaries joined the Lemko country with the Kholm province. During the Polish regime in 1919-39 the Poles had not allowed the founding there of any Ukrainian schools and had destroyed or transformed into Roman Catholic the Ukrainian Orthodox churches. The German officials allowed Ukrainian schools and restored to the Orthodox Ukrainians some of the churches appropriated by the Roman Catholics.<sup>38</sup>

On June 27, 1940, the Soviet Union restored to Ukraine the northwestern part of Bukovina and the northwestern and southeastern parts of Bessarabia; Central Bessarabia, with its mixed Ukrainian and Moldavian population, became the Moldavian SSR.<sup>39</sup> But during the German occupation of Ukraine in 1941-44 Hitler returned Bukovina and Bessarabia to Rumania, adding, moreover, southeastern Podolia and the Odessa region. In their policies upon the Ukrainians the Rumanians followed the example of their German allies.<sup>40</sup>

The first victories of the Germans in their war against the Soviet Union were due to the discontent of the population with the Communist rule. But soon the population saw that the Germans, if anything, were no better than the Bolsheviks. The Soviet diplomat Maxim Lit-

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 117-30. Litvinov, *op. cit.*, pp. 288, 295-6.

<sup>37</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-3. Pares, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

<sup>38</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

<sup>39</sup> Robert Bass, *The Communist Take-over, Ferment in Eastern Europe*, p. 34.

<sup>40</sup> Sidney Harcave, *Russia*, 1959, p. 645.

vinov wrote in September, 1941: "Our only hope is Hitler's stupidity. The Third Reich and its army are a powerful but brainless war machine. How fortunate for us that at the helm of this machine is Corporal Hitler with his simpleminded philosophy and political cretinism.." <sup>41</sup> On June 30, 1941, as the Germans were approaching Lviv, a Ukrainian National Assembly proclaimed the independence of Ukraine. The German Gestapo, however, arrested the organizers of this Assembly. Soon the Ukrainians saw Hitler's intentions plainly: Eastern Galicia was included in the General Gouvernement, and Ukraine became a "Reichskommissariat." The Ukrainian answer to the German brutality was the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) at the end of 1942. The UPA went on to fight the Russians up to the beginning of the 1950's. <sup>42</sup>

In order to enlarge the scope of Communist influence in the free countries Stalin won the consent of President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in 1945 at Yalta for the admission of Ukraine and Byelorussia to the United Nations. The spokesmen for "Ukraine" in the United Nations, however, do not defend the interests of Ukraine; to this day they are absolutely and exclusively loyal to the interests of Moscow. <sup>43</sup>

The plight of Ukraine in the Soviet Union after the Second World War is shown by a comparison of its population figures for the years 1940 and 1956. The total Soviet population in 1940 was 191,700,000, and, in April of 1956, 200,200,000. In Ukraine in 1940 the population was 41,000,000; in April 1956, however, the number of the Ukrainian population was lower (40,600,000) although the territory of Ukraine had been enlarged by Carpatho-Ukraine and the Crimea. <sup>44</sup> The loss reflected the deportation of the population to Siberia. <sup>45</sup> In the camps of forced labor today there are many Ukrainians and other nationalities as well. <sup>46</sup>

In 1917 Lenin said: "Russia cannot exist without the Ukrainian sugar industry. The same can be said regarding coal, grains, etc." <sup>47</sup> In his report to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU Khrushchev stated that in 1960 Ukraine gave the state some 5.9 million tons of grain. <sup>48</sup>

Ukraine remains a captive nation.

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<sup>41</sup> Litvinov, *op. cit.*, pp. 307-8.

<sup>42</sup> Manning, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-46.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 146-7.

<sup>44</sup> Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

<sup>45</sup> Salisbury, H. E., *To Moscow and Beyond*, 1960, p. 22.

<sup>46</sup> Terpak, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 314.

<sup>48</sup> Khrushchev *Reports to the 22nd Congress of the CPSU*, 1961, p. 99.

## A DIARY WHICH HORRIFIED MOSCOW

By VASYL SYMONENKO

EDITOR'S NOTE: The following excerpts from the famous diary of Vasyl Symonenko, young Ukrainian poet who died of cancer in 1963 at the age of 29, come from translations appearing in the Spring 1966 issue of *The Ukrainian Review* of London. The diary was allegedly smuggled to the West by two fellow Ukrainian writers, Ivan Svitlychny and Ivan Dziuba: it was reported that both Svitlychny and Dziuba were arrested, and at least Ivan Svitlychny was sentenced to an unspecified term at hard labor.

18 September 1962

I begin this diary not because I wish to delude myself with a sense of importance. I need a friend with whom I might share my questionings. I know of no more loyal and gracious comrade than paper.

The earth is now bearing me around the sun for the 28th time. So far, I have accomplished little of any merit. I have, however, learned to drink hard liquor and stink of tobacco. I have learned to keep my mouth closed and be prudent when I should have shouted. Most terrible of all, I have learned to be insincere.

Lying is probably my profession. I was born with the liar's gift. Liars come in three categories: some lie for moral or material gain; others lie for the mere sake of lying; still others approach lying as an art—they actually devise or contrive logical endings to the truth. These liars, from my mendacious point of view, seem noble. They are artists. They form the reserve units of literature. Without them, life would be tedious. Without them, even truth would be deficient and mundane, tiresome and petty. Noble lying enhances truth.

Believing this, I most commonly resort to the third category of lying. People like me are essential to literature. We use our feeble thoughts to fertilize the soil from which a giant will spring — a future Taras or Franko<sup>1</sup>. I await him as the devout await the advent of Christ. I think I shall be fortunate enough to hear a joyful hosanna to his coming. Only let him not despise us, the groundlings of poetry. It is from us that he will spring...

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<sup>1</sup>) Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) and Ivan Franko (1856-1916), the two most renowned Ukrainian national poets.

19 September 1962

Children, without knowing it, once in a while say profound things. I remember the time about a year ago when Oles and I were walking past the Kezbet Market. Looking at the tyrant's statue, he asked, "Papa, who's that?"

"Stalin."

He stared at it for a moment, and then said: "But why did he climb up there?"

Stalin, of course, did not ascend the pedestal, nor did people place him there. He clawed his way up by treachery and wickedness. He clawed his way up arrogantly and bloodily, like all butchers. Today this tiger who fed on human flesh would explode in fury if he were to learn what a windfall for scrap metal collectors his crude and trashy statues have become.

It is terrible when what was glory and deification in life becomes curse in death. His was not true glory but a toy to gladden grown-up people. Only the weak in heart and in head fail to understand this.

8 October 1962

Three days and a hundred impressions. Vinhranovsky, Pyanov, Kolomyets, and your humble servant made a bachelor excursion to Kryvy Rih and Kirovohrad.<sup>2</sup> Our audiences were small, but I was content. Mykola's<sup>3</sup> poems simply burst with thought and passion. Being with him makes one's soul expand.

Pyanov and I argued about *Roses of Mourning*. It seems to be a mistake to confuse the Madonna of the artists with the truly religious Mother of God. Hypocrites in the garb of the excellent Jesus and His Mother have changed them into violators of the human flesh and spirit. When a legend of transcendent beauty (and I consider Jesus and the Virgin Mary uniquely that) becomes a means of spiritual oppression, then I cannot judge the "dramatis personae," no matter what the infidel hiding behind their names does. No exaltedly noble or humane precepts of any teaching can serve progress when they become fixed dogma. . .

Besides, in *Roses of Mourning*, I had not the slightest intention of "overthrowing the gods." I was opposing the new religion, opposing the hypocrites who, not without success, are trying to turn Marxism into a religion and a Procrustean bed for science, art, and love.

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<sup>2</sup>) In Russian *Krivoi Rog* and *Kirovograd*.

<sup>3</sup>) Mykola Vinhranovsky — a young poet and film actor.

The depressing use of cybernetics and genetics, the rapid blossoming of toadstools in literature and art, the constant appeals for sacrifice, the endless promises of a "future paradise" — is all this so far removed from the tragedy of Bruno and Galileo, the psalmists and the icon painters, the monasteries and the Kingdom of Heaven?

If Marxism proves unable to withstand the insane offensive of dogmatism, it is doomed to become a religion. No teaching can monopolize the intellectual life of humanity. Einstein, after all, did not share my own political thinking, but he was able to make discoveries that have shaken science.

16 October 1962

There is nothing more terrible than unlimited power in the hands of a limited man. In frustration and fury, the collective-farm chairman from Yeremenko's village screamed at a meeting:

"I'll give you a new taste of 1933!"<sup>4</sup>

Naturally nobody thought of grabbing this scoundrel by the scruff of the neck. Yet with one idiotic phrase, the fool was destroying the work of dozens of sensible people. If our leaders had more brains than they do, such loudmouths would be admiring the sky from behind bars.

21 October 1962

I can't stand official, patented, well-nourished wisdom. It makes no difference what quotations the worthless use to shore up their intellectual ceiling, it is still too low for a normal man. Just as space is unthinkable without movement, so is poetry unthinkable without thought...

Our humor is debased, our satire impoverished. Teddy boys, tightfisted merchants, drainpipe trousers, chic hairdos — is it worth the time of serious people to waste words, not to mention their nerves, on such pettiness? Yet how our literary bigwigs brood over them! I have never tried to write penetrating reviews of trivial works. You can dive only so deep into the mud even if you are a Japanese pearl fisherman...

21 June 1963

It is half a year since I last looked into this book, although things have happened that should have somehow been recorded.

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<sup>4</sup>) 1933 was a year when the forced collectivization of agriculture was at its height, and millions were dying from famine and police action.



I have nearly choked with the powder smoke from the ideological battles. "Realism" has won another victory — not by works, of course, but by administrative measures.

The formalist madness,<sup>5</sup> it seems, was about to swallow us all. Yet, in Ukraine at least, I have never met a single abstractionist or neo-futurist. It is true, nonetheless, that the threat of formalistic stupidity is real, it was real then and is real now. For isn't it formalism when hundreds of hacks use patterns handed down to them to rehash a dozen so-called imperishable ideas — love your work, honor your father and your mother, don't sniff at your neighbor? Formalism begins where thought leaves off.

If the poet produces no new thoughts or emotions, he is a formalist, no matter how much he may advertise his imagined adherence to the realists. Lickspittle realism is a contradiction in terms. There is the realism of Shevchenko, and there is the realism of Dmyterko's lackeys.<sup>6</sup> They are quite different things! The heirs of literature are hardly the Dmyterkos of this world. They live with it but not for it. They are in no position to condemn me for formalism when they themselves produce nothing.

6 July 1963

Is this true of everybody, or only of me? My courage is undermined by doubt. How will I respond when real troubles hit me? Will I stay a man, or will I shut my eyes and my mind? To lose one's courage is to lose one's human dignity, and dignity I prize above all else. Even above life itself. But so many of our people — sensible people, talented people — have saved their lives at the cost of their dignity, and have turned into animals — and unwanted ones at that. What a terrible thing!

Last Sunday we went to Odessa. The local nitwits regaled us with their terror. Think what might happen! They refused to let us read at the Shevchenko celebration. Some people seem still to be scared of Taras. Philistines of the revolution!

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<sup>5</sup>) "Formalism" is one of the main artistic crimes in the Soviet Union. The term refers to an emphasis on form at the expense of "socialist" content. The regime damns anything highbrow as formalist, but lauds trite "realism." All "socialist realism" is formula stuff, the ultimate being an idyll of life on a collective farm, culminating in a scene of a handsome young man embracing a tractor.

<sup>6</sup>) L. D. Dmyterko is a Ukrainian Party writer, praised more for his political time-serving than his creative work.

22 July 1963

I suppose now I've begun to die. Physically I am nearly finished; morally I still have strength. I don't feel afraid to die. Perhaps because death still seems distant. Strange: I don't want to die, but I don't particularly want to live. If I could have ten years more, it would be enough, and more than enough.

I look back with irony. I shall soon be 29, but what have I done — what have I even begun — that is worth anything? It hasn't been life; it has been petty worries, petty failures, petty disappointments, petty successes. I haven't lived as I dreamed of living. The happy man is he who expects little of life. The simplest and shortest road to happiness is to be a Philistine. A brain capable of thought is incapable of giving its possessor happiness.

3 September 1963

This summer, filled with physical and moral powerlessness, is behind me. Autumn is nearly here, and I look with hope at its limpid eyes. And yet what a poor and meagre autumn! . . .

I hear nothing from my friends. Not a word. The press grows ever more worthless and insolent. *Literaturna Ukraina* castrates my article; *Ukraina* demolishes my verse. The lackeys all do as they wish. Let us pray morning and night in gratitude for this freedom . . .

Our master is the press.  
That makes for progress!

5 September 1963

I get lonelier and lonelier here in Cherkassy. I miss my old newspaper friends. The paths of friendship between me and Nehoda and Ohloblyn can be said to be overgrown with rank weeds. One of them needed me as long as I could be of help; the other shifts with the wind, and will undoubtedly attack me with the same enthusiasm with which he used to praise me. He has already shown this at a number of public meetings. Let us, however, go on with the job.

20 September 1963

I feel no disdain of people. If I have no friends any more here in Cherkassy, it does not mean that I regard everyone as abject and unworthy (as my wife tries to tell me) . . .

It seems my writing is worse now than a year ago. My brain and heart have become indolent.

## **THE TWENTY-THIRD COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS**

*By* CLARENCE A. MANNING

The Twenty-Third Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR was held in Moscow from March 29 to April 8, 1966. Like all such gatherings held since World War II, it brought together the leading members of the Communist apparatus in the Soviet Union and a distinguished number of high official representatives of other Communist Parties. There were 84 Parties in all present, for the only Parties which had declined were those of Communist China (which had answered the invitation with insults), Albania, New Zealand and Japan, all of which were following in the footsteps of the Red Chinese.

As we look back over the history of the preceding Congresses, we can notice several differences and developments during the past years. In the early years of the Soviet regime, the Congresses met at least annually. It was at them that the feuds between Stalin and his opponents both of the Right and the Left were fought out bitterly and ended with the full autocracy of the iron despot and tyrant. Also at that time the Communist International was still a viable body and it too, was holding less frequent Congresses to express the voice of the various Communist Parties outside of the USSR. However, with the defeat of Trotsky and the decision of Stalin to "build Communism in one country," it gradually withered away; it became evident that the leaders present were mere pensioners of Moscow, and when Stalin ended the Communist International (to pull the wool over the eyes of the Western leaders) these Congresses ceased to be held, although in theory a Congress of World Communist Parties would be the supreme authority for the Communist world. Nikita Khrushchev during his last years in power and at the height of his feuds with Red China had endeavored to call one but did not succeed. When he fell, the talk of such a Congress gradually receded into the background, even though the idea has never been totally abandoned as a means of expressing the general Communist unity and point of view.

Once Stalin was firmly in control, these Congresses became less frequent. In 1934 at the Sixteenth Congress it was decided to hold

them every three years but even this principle was neglected. Before, during and after World War II, very few were held. The Nineteenth took place only on the eve of Stalin's death and it was at the Twentieth that Khrushchev ventured to denounce the Stalinist regime and to commence the process of de-Stalinization. Now it was Khrushchev's turn. As he had used a Congress to denounce the former ruler, so was the Twenty-Third Congress seriously concerned with the de-Khrushchevization of the Soviet Union with all that that implied. Even when the fallen leader was not mentioned by name, it was evident from the few details published that it was one of the important facets of the Congress. Nearly all of Khrushchev's favorite reforms had been already condemned and abandoned by the Central Committee and there was a marked tendency in many ways to seek a return to the Stalin period and mode of operation.

The most striking instance of this was the abandonment of the nomenclature introduced by Khrushchev. The Congress approved the use by Brezhnev of the term General Secretary for the post that Stalin had held and the passing into disuse of the Khrushchevian term, First Secretary. In the same way the Presidium of the Party resumed its old name of Politburo, used before the rise of Khrushchev. It is not clear whether this change of titles has increased the actual power of Brezhnev. So far as we can judge, the power struggle between Brezhnev and Kosygin, if there is one, remains secret and there were no important changes in the personnel of the Politburo. Mikoyan, it is true, was formally relieved but was still retained on the Executive Committee and the aged Voroshilov was restored to some of his former prestige, but this can easily be explained as a tribute to his age and past services, all of which were disregarded by Khrushchev in his drive for power. Nor does there appear to have been any marked promotion of the younger Shelepin, although rumor had picked him out as an ambitious man slated for a swift rise.

Yet there were other events that cast a shadow over many expectations for the Congress. It was only a little over a month before the Congress opened that the two Russian authors, Andrey Sinavsky and Yuli Daniel, were sentenced to prison for slandering the Soviet Union and its people and government. Arrested, too, were two Ukrainian writers, Ivan Svitlychny and Ivan Dzyuba, for "anti-Soviet" acts. There were rumors that other writers had been deported or placed in mental hospitals and one of these, Tarsis, had received permission to go abroad only to find that he had been deprived of citizenship shortly after he crossed the boundary of the Soviet Union and so had been denied the possibility of returning. All this had

made a large part of the liberal intelligentsia unhappy. It aroused fears that a new era of repression was at hand, and at the Congress this was confirmed in part by the failure to rename the relatively liberal editor of the *Novy Mir*, Tvardovsky, as a member of the Central Committee. It is true that at one stage the scheduled performance of a symphony in praise of Stalin was cancelled but this probably had little significance.

More disturbing was that numerous speakers protested strongly against the toleration of the so-called liberal group of writers. One of the strongest protestors was Mykhail Sholokhov, author of *And Quiet Flows the Don*. This work had been awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature and Sholokhov had been allowed to go abroad to receive the award, something denied by Khrushchev to Pasternak. Sholokhov, who is by no means a prolific writer, was the first Russian author in good standing to be honored abroad and no one, not even the most confirmed anti-Communist, could question the award, for *And Quiet Flows the Don* is perhaps the outstanding prose work of Soviet literature. But there was general surprise at the bitterness with which Sholokhov attacked all who were seeking to get away from the old interpretation of Socialist Realism, for he went so far as to urge imprisonment and concentration camps for all literary offenders. He was ably seconded by many others who called for a stricter scrutiny of all Soviet writers and artists permitted to go abroad and conversely of all foreign artists and writers who are admitted under the various exchange agreements. Recently reports of the arrest and disappearance of several Ukrainian artists, critics and writers, seem to justify the fears of many Russians that a new era of a return to Stalinist methods is actually under way and that the authorities of the non-Russian republics have known how to read the meaning of the Congress.

The speeches of the Congress, at least those which have been officially reported, were probably influenced by another coming event—the approaching visit of President de Gaulle to Moscow. De Gaulle has sufficiently muddled the organization of NATO by insisting with an increasing sense of urgency on the need of French control over all NATO installations in France and by withdrawing all French personnel from serving in the general organization, even though he has apparently still allowed them to serve as observers. No one knows what de Gaulle really has in mind, for in his speeches glorifying his conception of Europe he seems to envision the inclusion of the Soviet Union west of the Urals and he seems to imply that the Soviet possessions and colonies in Asia should rightly be taken by Red China. This can hardly be palatable to Moscow especially in

view of de Gaulle's theory that he is the voice of France and he is therefore the voice of all Europe in the traditional sense of the word. In his distaste for the Anglo-Saxon world, he would in some of his moods undoubtedly wipe off both Great Britain and the United States as nations rightly concerned with a free and united Europe. In any event, he seems to be angling for a renewal of the old Franco-Russian alliance under French hegemony for which France strove before World War I. Apparently it is the hope of Moscow that the Communists can use this as bait in such a way as to complete the dissolution of NATO—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the full sense of the word, and they will probably endeavor to bring this about at all costs. Even the recent visit of Gromyko to the Vatican may form a part of this scheme, which has not been revealed sufficiently even for criticism, but it is certainly connected with the growing coolness between France and West Germany and the growing attacks of Moscow upon the West German "warmongers" and "fascists."

The probability of such an event is strongly hinted at by the general tone of the Congress. There were the traditional attacks upon the United States and other imperialists over Vietnam and other Asian developments but these, at least in the published reports, were treated merely as slogans. The new leaders tried so far as was possible to gloss over the aggressive efforts of Moscow and to present the Congress and the Communist world as peace-loving and as being merely on the defensive. Certainly it is definite that when the Cuban representative ventured to upset this aspect of harmony by urging the creation of an international Communist force to assist North Vietnam on the field of battle, he was greeted either with disapproving silence or with cries of opposition. In fact the Congress went so far in the speech of Brezhnev as to express the hope that Communist China, too, would come back into the peaceful Communist fold, despite the savage attacks which Peking had been making on the Congress, on the Soviet Union and on its leaders. It had accused Moscow of trying to cooperate with the United States in its imperialistic actions and it had almost proclaimed Moscow as no longer even a member of the Communist group of nations. None of these threats and denunciations was publicly mentioned and Brezhnev's speech was noticeable for its relatively mild and forgiving tone, although there is no reason to think that all of his statements were utterly and absolutely sincere or that it is necessary to reevaluate the nature of the Moscow-Peking feud, either as more or less serious than the other speeches of the Communist leaders have tended to indicate. But it was here essential for the plans of

Moscow to maintain its hostile attitude to America and the West externally, while it continues to feed the flames of the new intellectual groups in the United States who are busy attacking the administration of President Johnson.

This same note of a restrained sobriety was evident in other parts of the Congress except for those speeches dealing with literature and the arts. The past Congresses under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev were dominated by his bombastic and ebullient declarations, that by his latest brainstorm he would in a very few years, yes, by a definite date, see to it that the Soviet Union surpassed the United States in the production of corn, of meat, of grain, that in a few years he would rebuild the Soviet Union, remove any obstacles, and surpass the United States in all sphere in which the latter was now ahead. It is hard to believe that level-headed Communists ever gave credence to his boasts and rantings. That many did not is evident from his quiet removal from power. These Communists pointed out the many ways in which his wild predictions had fallen short and that he was following his momentary inspirations instead of confronting hard facts.

Such Khrushchevian behavior was completely absent. Premier Kosygin gave a realistic and reasoned account of the Soviet internal situation. He emphasized that Moscow had been compelled because of American imperialism to step up its military expenditures and for that reason to curtail many improvements in the conditions of the population that the government had wished to undertake. He pointed out how this had hindered increase in production of both agriculture and consumer goods and he outlined many needed reforms in the effort to make the Soviet plants more economically successful and to obviate many of the prime causes of waste and failure. He and the Soviet theoreticians sought to show that more discretion would be given to the managers of Soviet plants and factories and that they should have the opportunity to handle some of their business in the way of securing raw materials from more available sources. It was strenuously denied, however, that this was an imitation of the processes of capitalism or a tendency to seek to deny the sacred principles of Communism or even to introduce into the Communist system a crypto-capitalism, such as had been implied by Peking. It may well be that the assembled Communist officials and leaders heard more serious and sober truths about the actual state of the Soviet economy at this Congress than they had learned for many years.

All this, however, most emphatically does not mean a difference in anything but the external form of approach. In many ways the

defects of Communist methods have been long evident to many of the people who lived and worked in the country. Their seeking of the old goals will not be prevented even if some of the difficulties on the way have been pointed out and the moment of the actual introduction of Communism as distinct from Socialism is pushed to an indefinite date in the future instead of pinpointing it, as within five or ten years. It shows rather a more definite acquaintance with facts and real possibilities instead of the will o'the wisps which Khrushchev was constantly dangling before their eyes. It may well prove to be the fact that the questions of internal production and internal conditions in general were the important subjects for discussion, but as is characteristic of these Congresss, the outside world and even the Soviet world itself knows little about what subjects were paramount or whether opposing points of view on some questions were allowed to be presented. As previously, there was agreement in the Communist manner, and in the reports presented in the Soviet press very few final decisions were reported. Perhaps we may regard many of these as dependent on later developments. Again, we cannot tell if in some subjects the leaders outlined alternative modes of action in case of the failure of some of their preconditions for later events. At least the Congress maintained the tone which it had apparently set for itself or the leaders set for it at the moment when it was officially convened.

Noteworthy was clever use of propaganda to emphasize the advanced character of the scientific work of the Soviet Union. A striking example of this came when the Soviet satellite orbiting the moon played the Internationale to the assembled Congress. It was the first time that any such feat had been attempted by any country and it was an impressive example of both Soviet achievement and Soviet technique. Any gathering anywhere in the world would have responded to such a stirring revelation of the power of advanced electrons. The Congress was no exception. The demonstration indicated what the second half of the twentieth century promises mankind in the way of good and ill in the next years and decades. But the Communist reaction, which was more than enthusiastic, carried a strong reminiscence of A. N. Tolstoy's *Aelita*, in which the Soviet citizens who succeeded in landing on Mars proclaim it and its hypothetical population a member of the Soviet Union to the exclusion of all other nations and peoples. It is already evident that Moscow, whatever its agreements, intends if it can to annex the universe as well as the population of the entire world and will not stop until it achieves its goal.



In the past, in theory and perhaps partly in practice, the Communist Congress was supposed to be the one place where the tried and true Communist leaders could discuss and perhaps differ by their votes with the policy outlined by the Politburo and the standing staff of the Party in Moscow. In the days of the struggle of Stalin for absolute power, this was perhaps true but Stalin's victories were due in large part to the fact that as General Secretary, he played an overwhelming role in the promotions and nominations to high posts of the appropriate leaders. As a result, none of his opponents, when there was perhaps some choice, was ever able to come near to the attainment of a majority and whether his decisions were popular or not, Stalin triumphed. Since the Congresses have been resumed, it appears that they have taken on a different purpose, now being used chiefly to acquaint the various local and republican leaders of sufficient rank with the desires and thinking of the present leaders. To this extent, the outlined program, long and wordy as it is, is well adapted, for the governmental apparatus which has previously prepared the agenda has the opportunity to include in it all those aspects of the different problems which it desires. It is therefore a verbal explanation of what has been, is, and will be—all of which is to be included in the instructions that are sent to the Communist leaders of lower grades with guiding notes as to how they are to be interpreted. There is little indication that there was at this or preceding Congresses any definite discussion as the free world understands the term. A typical Congress is rather a series of speeches emphasizing the ability of the current leaders to present the correct solution and explain the Party line, whether it is rigid or flexible at the moment. The Communist Congress is like the various parts of a jigsaw puzzle in which each piece bears a definite relationship to the whole and the final picture becomes clear only when all the pieces are in place. Yet the Congress usually does not end with a publication of a clear statement of policy. Even the Soviet press publishes only an abridged account of any decisions arrived at, and some of these appear only when the decisions had been really put into form and substance after the closing of the Congress.

It is the same with the speeches of the representatives of the Communist Parties from abroad. In the Congress they all have a place to speak and extend greetings. (The Cuban spokesman was an exception in that he struck out publicly against the tide.)

At the same time we have to remember that intense activity goes on outside the walls and meetings of the Congress. As in any such gathering anywhere in the world, the presence of a picked group thrust into a long and diverse program of social events, concerts, and

all kinds of performances offers an unparalleled opportunity for cementing personal relations and for learning the real, even if carefully controlled, ideas of the participants. There can be little doubt that the Soviet leaders and their most trusted aides exploited this Congress to the utmost and certainly made themselves more aware than even before of some of the underlying problems and desires of Communism abroad, if only to find ways to exploit them for the benefit of Moscow.

As a result of all this, we can scarcely as yet define the real purpose of the Congress, the real theme that was presented to it. Not improbable is the suggestion that sees in it the continuous adaptation of the Soviet internal policy to the needs of the present day and to the correction of the often reckless innovations of Khrushchev. Yet at the same time the stress on the indiscretions and sins of the progressive writers likewise suggests that, if the adaptation in methods of production is to continue, it is far less likely that there will be any relaxation of the pressure on writers and artists to conform. The inviting of the foreign press to Kiev to hear a tirade on the evils of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists abroad does not point to a relaxation of pressure on the non-Russian republics, but rather to an intensification in the effort to create a new Russian Soviet man, the type of which will be the universal one throughout the entire Union.

It is true that many reporters and sympathizers have tried to emphasize the relatively pacific tone of many of the speeches but this can mislead only those persons who have persistently tried to explain away and deny the intense hostility of the Soviet leaders to freedom of any sort. The free world should indeed wonder whether all this assumed coexistence is sincere or whether it is the classic device to lure the unsuspecting victim into a snare. Wherever the subject touched became vital, the old language spoke out, and this is the part to be noticed, if the free world is to do its part in making secure its own freedom and extending it to the rest of the human race.

## BOOK REVIEWS

**THE SOVIET EMPIRE.** A Study in Discrimination and Abuse of Power. Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1965, pp. 197.

Most Americans are unfamiliar with both the composition and developments of the Soviet Union, and this fact applies to the highly educated citizen as well as the less educated, to those in the highest public offices of our country as well as those in private vocations. This knowledge deficiency is a serious handicap when one pauses to think about the central power position of the USSR in the entire Red Empire and as the chief threat to the Free World. It is scarcely the general intellectual condition necessary to cope with the cold war thrusts of colonialist Moscow.

The work reviewed here can go a long way in overcoming much of this deficiency, provided it is read carefully by those who influence public opinion and those who are actively engaged in scholarly and communal activities. The study was prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress for the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Updating a previous study in 1958, it contains much valuable data on realities in the USSR and develops a conceptual framework which runs counter to the usual, overall misconception held by most Americans. The maps in the appendix are helpful to a notable degree, though, as in the body of the work itself, they are in many respects inaccurate and thus somewhat misleading. For example, map No. 2 on *Communist Expansion Since 1917* is based on a legend beginning with "November 7, 1917, U.S.S.R." This is obviously contrary to fact since the USSR didn't come into being until 1922-23. Soviet Russia would have been accurate.

One could use this cartographic inaccuracy as a useful point of departure to evaluate the study as a whole. In most objective terms, the work represents a further advance and progress in thinking about the USSR by at least this segment of our government. Although it certainly provides a great deal of worthwhile material, it conceptually and in logical generalization does not measure up to the products of the House Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression some twelve years ago. It is not difficult to substantiate this inasmuch as many sections of the work contradict, on this conceptual and interpretative level, the maps themselves. As one among many examples, on page 46 it is accurately stated, "At the time of the Bolshevik revolution, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Armenians, along with the Baltic peoples dissolved their ties with the former Russian Empire and established independent national republics." Obviously, this sharply contradicts map No. 2, not to mention other passages in the study.

Despite this and other criticisms below, the study is a veritable contribution to our understanding of the USSR. It undoubtedly would have been more so with a surer grasp of guiding and determining concepts. In fact, most of the material and data presented easily justify an alternative and more convincing

title for the study: *The Soviet Empire: A Study in Colonialism and Genocide*. The present title is weak and does little justice to the quality and novelty of the study's contents.

The foreword to the study states explicitly the main points of the study: "(1) That the Soviet Union is in reality an empire made up of many different peoples and cultures; and (2) that, contrary to the Communist propaganda charge, the old colonialism and imperialism of the West has been in the process of dissolution, while that of the Soviet Union and its Communist allies constitute in reality the new colonialism and the new imperialism" (p. iii). Here, too, more accurately the empire-state of the USSR consists of eleven distinct and substantial captive non-Russian nations, in addition to the Russian nation and numerous ethnic groupings. Also, Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism is in reality not new; rather, it is a projected continuation of a traditional Russian imperio-colonialism behind a new mask of Communist mythology.

Aside from these basic, conceptual strictures, the study abounds in rich content. There is a fairly good analysis early in the work of the grounds for American misconception of the USSR (pp. 2-3). The predominance of the so-called "Great Russian" in the rule of the USSR is stressed throughout (e.g. p. 3, 52-53 etc.). Also accurately and well treated are the numerous accounts of the Soviet Russian conquest of Ukraine, the Baltic countries, and other non-Russian states (p. 6). The study's theoretical examination of Leninist, Stalinist, and Khrushchevian genocide, concealed as Marxian theory on the fusion of nations, is solid and impressive (pp. 7, 20-21, etc.). Furthermore, numerous sections are devoted to non-Russian nationalism, and on the whole they are incisive and penetrating. "Particularly intense was the campaign against nationalism in the Ukraine, an area of special concern for Soviet leaders" (p. 74).

The reader will also find the analysis of Russian colonialism in Turkestan of lasting benefit. The impact that this could have on the Moslem countries in the Free World is tremendous. But, unfortunately, there is little appreciation of this open possibility among leaders in the Free World. Exceptionally good and instructive are the sections dealing with Russian anti-Semitism, Moscow's oppression of religion and the churches, its institutionalized policy of Russification in culture, historical science, and language, and its methodical abuse of education to abet this policy. After covering this material the reader might well wonder what our representation at the United Nations has been doing all these years in the defense of human rights and liberties.

We have scarcely scratched the surface of Russian economic colonialism in the USSR. However, the chapter dealing with this fundamentally important phenomenon provides many sound indicators of the scope and intensity of this force, such as the distribution of skilled and professional employment, the geographic incidence of industries, problems of "localism," investment allocations and the like. Some phrases, such as "metropolitan Russia," will be confusing to the reader, but this supports our initial criticism about the conceptual ambiguities strewn about the various fields of inquiry. Nevertheless, an alert reader will profit from the analysis of Russian economic colonialism and indubitably raise the question, "Where have we been all these years in not propagating the truths about Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism—in the U.N., over VOA and elsewhere?"

As I view the study, it represents another higher stage in official understanding of this most crucial area. It should serve as a basis for a further study which would be free of all the conceptual discrepancies and historical inaccuracies found in this one. Careless, interchangeable use of "Russia" and the USSR,

ethnic and national, "the Soviets" and Russians, "the Soviet people" and different peoples should be eliminated. It is erroneous, it is confusing, it is misleading, and it does violence to the richly accumulated data. Moreover, the bibliography and source material should be vastly broadened. To deal with this all-important subject and yet to omit, for example, the works of Professor Roman Smal-Stocki, an international authority in the field, is like studying modern philosophy and omitting Alfred Whitehead. These are only a few criticisms of the many that can be made. Yet, in light of all that needs to be done in this crucial field so to advance both American thinking and policy, the work is nonetheless commendable and worthy of intensive study in our diverse institutions.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

**RUSSIA AND HISTORY'S TURNING POINT.** By Alexander Kerensky. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 558 pp. 1965. \$8.95

**THE BOLSHEVIKS: The Intellectual and Political History of the Triumph of Communism in Russia.** By Adam B. Ulam. 598 pp. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$8.95.

The work of Alexander Kerensky is the personal narrative of a man who is well recorded in the history of Russia and of that of Eastern Europe as well. Since Mr. Kerensky is a man of international renown, his writings do not need much salesmanship to attract a market.

His book, however, described by the publishers as one of "essential historic value," does not attain such stature. What value it may have lies in the fact that it was written by an eyewitness. Although he was one of the key figures of the Russian revolution, his autobiography does not treat of important events outside Moscow. Virtually ignored, as examples, are Ukraine and the Baltic states, where outstanding developments took place just during Kerensky's ill-fated leadership of the new Russian Provisional Government, labelled as the "first Russian democratic government" ever established in Russia.

Undoubtedly, Mr. Kerensky's views on a number of known historical figures—Czar Nicholas II, Monk Rasputin, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and others—will provide convenient research material for historians, as will his reminiscences as a bright student and defense attorney, or his role as war minister and prime minister in the Russian Provisional Government, which he ardently defends despite its utter impotence in coping with the revolutionary events which not only swept away the old regimes of the Czars, but the "new and democratic Russia" of Mr. Kerensky as well.

As a great Russian patriot the author cannot at the same time be an impartial judge of history. Therefore, his book, *Russia and History's Turning Point*, constantly provides interpretations from the vantage point of the interest of the Russian empire.

This bias accounts for the neglect of Ukraine, Finland, the Baltic States and the Caucasus. Yet Ukraine, for example, was a major field of great events, in which Mr. Kerensky himself had been deeply involved. Outside of a few passing references to the "Ukrainian separatist *Rada*," or Petlura and Skoropadsky (the former is described as a "protege" of the French, and the latter as having proclaimed the independence of Ukraine through the grace of Kaiser Wilhelm, both assertions being incorrect historically), we find no definitive comments on Ukraine. And yet in 1917 Ukraine was the first of the non-Russian nations of the empire to begin its own national revolution.

In March of that year the Ukrainian Central Rada was established in Kiev and assumed the direction of the Ukrainian liberation movement. Soon concrete steps taken by the Rada toward the implementation of Ukrainian autonomy led to the proclamation of the full independence and sovereignty of Ukraine: the creation of the Secretariat General, the "Ukrainization" of the army, establishment of a Ukrainian administration, issuance of the First and Second *Universals*, the proclamation of Ukraine's independence on January 22, 1918, and, finally, the signing of the Peace Treaty in Brest Litovsk on February 9, 1918 between the independent government of Ukraine and the Central Powers. All this is absent in Mr. Kerensky's book. Missing, too, is mention of the developments in other non-Russian countries which won their freedom *against* the will of the empire-minded "Democrat Kerensky."

One significant reference in the book, however, is the reproduction of an official American commentary on the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, regarding the non-Russian nations. It reads:

The first question is whether Russian territory is synonymous with territory belonging to the former Russian Empire. This is clearly not so, because Proposition XIII stipulates an independent Poland, a proposal which excludes the territorial reestablishment of the Empire. What is recognized as valid for the Poles will certainly have to be recognized for the Finns, the Lithuanians, the Letts and perhaps also for the Ukrainians . . .

This can mean nothing less than the recognition by the Peace Conference of a series of *de facto* Governments representing Finns, Letts, Lithuanians and Ukrainians. This primary act of recognition should be conditional upon the calling of National Assemblies for the creation of *de jure* Governments, as soon as the Peace Conference has drawn frontiers for these new states (all italics added).

Also included in the book is a dispatch from the Paris Peace Conference to Admiral Kolchak; Paragraph 5 therein also refers to the non-Russian nations:

Fifthly, that if a solution of the relations between Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and the Caucasus and Trans-Caspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and cooperation with the League of Nations and that until such settlement is made the government of Russia agrees to recognize these territories as autonomous and to confine the relations which may exist between *de facto* governments and the Allied and Associated Governments (all italics added) . . .

Mr. Kerensky's book, therefore, is written from the narrow viewpoint of a Russian patriot who blindly believes (as he did in 1917) in the "holy mission" of Russia, and regards the conquered non-Russian lands as a legitimate Russian domain. Its lack of objectivity disqualifies it as a serious historical document.

In writing his book, *The Bolsheviks*, Polish-born Professor Adam Ulam, now professor of Government at Harvard University, has contributed a valuable and important documentary work on the rise of Communism in Russia and its influence upon the world today. His book is an impressive intellectual and massive political history of Communism, interlaced with intimate and comprehensive biographies of the great men of the Bolshevik movement.

In the appraisal of this movement Prof. Ulam's book is much superior to that of Mr. Kerensky. Free of Russian nationalist bias, it is a reliable source for research scholar and layman alike.

The book necessarily concentrates upon that principal figure, Vladimir Ulyanov-Lenin, the great ideologist, master tactician, and electric personality of Bolshevism and Communism.

Unlike Kerensky, Prof. Ulam treats objectively and at some length the relations between Soviet Russia and Ukraine during the ascent to power of Lenin and his Bolshevik group. He stresses the fact that in Ukraine it was the Ukrainian nationalists who made the revolution, and not the Bolsheviks. In this connection the author cites part of the speech delivered against Leon Trotsky at Brest Litovsk by the young Ukrainian diplomat, M. Lubytsky:

"The Bolshevik regime has proclaimed the principle of self-determination only to fight more resolutely the introduction of this principle into life. The government of the Bolsheviks which is pushing out the Constituent Assembly—this government which is based upon the bayonets of mercenary soldiers—will never adopt the just principle of self-determination, because it knows that not only regions like Ukraine, Don, Caucasus and others don't recognize it as the legitimate government.... but the Russian people as well."

Prof. Ulam states further that the Ukrainian government of the *Rada* which concluded the peace treaty with the Central Powers in Brest Litovsk was the legitimate government of the Ukrainian people. This was demonstrated by the elections to the Constituent Assembly in which the Bolshevik list of candidates received less than 10 percent of the votes.

"The Ukrainian Bolshevik regime was a fraud and imposture. What was the principle behind the Bolsheviks' demagoguery? It was as the French proverb has it: 'Slander, calumniate, some of it will always stick,'" writes Prof. Ulam.

Much of the material published in *The Bolsheviks* is claimed by the publishers to be printed for the first time, especially new biographical material on Lenin which was either released by the Soviet government or recently uncovered by Western scholarship.

Indeed, Prof. Ulam has masterfully absorbed this new material into the most well detailed and comprehensive book to appear on this subject to date.

Sum-up: this book is an excellent and reliable addition to the long list of publications dealing with Bolshevism, and should find a major place in the libraries of our higher schools of learning and in individual homes at large.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

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RUSSIA AT THE DAWN OF THE MODERN AGE. By George Vernadsky. New Haven. Yale University Press, Vol. IV, X-347 pp. Bibliography and Indexes. \$7.50.

A HISTORY OF RUSSIA. By George Vernadsky. New Haven. A Yale Paperbound. 512 pp. \$1.95. Revised and with Additions. Index.

The first of these books is the fourth volume of the projected 10-volume *History of Russia*. It is to be recalled that our review of the third volume of the series—dealing with the period from the Mongol invasion until the decline of the Golden Horde and the "rebirth" of Russia—appeared in the Autumn, 1955 issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* (Vol. XI, No. 4). At that time we dwelt at length on the unfortunate interchangeability of the names of peoples in relating the history of Muscovy, Russia and the present USSR. Volume Four has the same drawback, except that it is now more marked as the author analyzes a much larger period of history of the Muscovite principality, which gradually was transformed into a centralized and absolutist monarchy, the basis of the future empire.

The period from the middle of the XVth to the end of the XVIth centuries witnessed a gradual expansion of Muscovy, the state north of Ukraine. The middle of the XVth century saw its liberation from the Mongol yoke, permitting a consolidation and expansion of Muscovy, especially in the reigns of Ivan III and Vassili III. The program of Czar Ivan IV envisioned "union" of Byelorussia, Ukraine and Muscovy. This attempt led to a series of conflicts with Poland, the consequences of which are felt even today.

The author correctly points out that "it is in the post-Mongol period that the foreign policies of Modern Russia and the basic patterns of its political institutions were laid down... the subsequent course of Russian history down to our own day..." (p. V).

We should like to note that the attempt of various writers to make the history of Muscovy inseparable from that of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine very often leads to considerable confusion, inasmuch as "Western Russia" had no organic connection whatsoever with Muscovy at that time. Even the systems of these countries varied much one from another, as attested by the author himself on p. 5:

"In contrast to the growth of the authoritarian and centralized regime in Muscovy, the government of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was based on the principles of federation and constitutional rights..."

On p. 7 we find the statement that Kiev remained a small city for a long time after the Mongolian invasions, a statement which cannot be accepted as true. In the light of known documents the city of Kiev was not so damaged as not to remain an important center. For instance, Plano Carpini states that at the time in Kiev lived 70 Italian merchants, in addition to other foreigners. Reportedly, these merchants came from Genoa, Venice and Pisa.

The volume contains some curious remarks on the depth of Mongolian influence upon the life and administration of the Muscovite state. On p. 10 and following, for instance, the author dwells upon the great difference between Christianity and Islamism, a difference which allegedly prevented the latter from exercising influence upon the religious life of the Muscovites. This is rather dubious, inasmuch as the religious outlook of the Muscovites began developing later on. On the other hand, the Islamic influence upon the Tartars at that time was rather superficial (cf. Gerhardt Miller's *History of Russia*).

It would seem to us that the author should have at least struck some balance on the Mongolian influence on Muscovy, which influence merged so successfully with the mentality of the Muscovites. M. Pravdin in his *The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy* (London, 1940, p. 514) writes:

"...so it was not detachment from the Golden Horde, not by throwing off the Tartar 'yoke' but by the conscious and deliberate acceptance of the Tartar heritage with all which it entailed, that Moscow became great and powerful... He (the Czar-J.V.S.) levied Mongol princes and their warriors to help him in his own struggles against rebellious... cities and his *boyars*."

This quotation is extremely important if one would grasp the real significance of the bases of Muscovy's growth. The same view regarding the Mongol influence upon the formation of the Muscovite state is maintained by author A. Sanders (*Um die Gestaltung Europas*, Munich, 1938, p. 314), who stated that as "long as the Northern principalities were under the influence of Kiev, they belonged to the European system, but the Tartar domination transformed them into an Asian province..."

In Chapter VI, "West Russia in the XVIth Century," Prof. Vernadsky is constantly guilty of an interchange of terms which contributes greatly to



the already existing confusion. For instance, he writes about "the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Russia and Samogitia," and later on uses the adjective designations of "Veliki Kniaz Litovsky, Russky i Zhomoitsky," where the terms "Russia" and "Russky" relate surely to Kievan Rus (Ukraine), and not to Muscovy.

This confusion further persists as the author states that the "Russians" in the framework of the Lithuanian state continued to preserve for some time the ideals and institutions of the Kievan period. "It was only gradually that the new patterns changed the political, religious, social and economic aspects of life in both Byelorussia and Ukraine," Prof. Vernadsky states.

The complexity of the problem lies in the fact, the author says, that the territory changed masters several times during the centuries and up to the present day. But we cannot subscribe to his conclusion that "Russian influence" was significant in the Lithuanian state. Whatever influence on Lithuania was exerted by Eastern Slavs, came from Kievan Rus, and not from Muscovy. The Second Lithuanian Statute of 1566, Part III, Art. 9 says: "The Grand Duke shall never appoint foreigners to the offices of administration but only native Lithuanians and *Rusins* (collectively called *Litva i Rus*; individually, *Litvin i Rustin*)" p. 173 (italics added-J.V.S.).

Regarding the "Russian" influence in Lithuania, it is a mystery why Prof. Vernadsky uses the term "Russian" when the Statute speaks of the original *Rusin*, which term is the historical name of the Ukrainians and one which is never applied to the Muscovites or Russians.

On pages 175-176 the author gives some statistics on the population of the territory which at the end of the XVIth century was incorporated into Poland, thus: Galicia-573,000; Volhynia and Podolia-392,000; Kiev and Bratslav Provinces-545,000—altogether 1,510,000 people. The reviewer believes that this number is too small. O. Baranovych, for instance, gives the population for Volhynia and Podolia as 655,000 at that time. None of this territory, incidentally, is Russian-Muscovite.

Chapter VIII, dealing with the decline of Lithuania and the emergence of the Ukrainian Kozaks, pays considerable attention to the origins of the Kozak movement. The author's interpretation and explanation are quite objective and full, except for his unpardonably erroneous use of "Russian" and "West Russian" in designating the Ukrainians.

The author points out that after the unsuccessful revolt led by M. Hlynsky the Ukrainian population (in the original: "Russian") turned to the defense of the Orthodox faith and to general education, and underscores that the people were overwhelmingly set against the Muscovite threat. This is another contradiction of Prof. Vernadsky, for why would the "Russians" be set against the Muscovites, unless these "Russians" were actually Ukrainians—which they of course were.

The same chapter is also dedicated to the Union of Brest, in which the author creates additional confusion by stating that the Union (with Rome—ed.) was introduced among the "Russian" population of Poland and Lithuania (p. 269). This is even more inconceivable of the author since he leans heavily on such Ukrainian historians as Hrushevsky, Doroshenko and Shmurlo.

It is gratifying that Volume Four, despite its several flaws, employs more Ukrainian terminology in the translating of titles and of localities (although the author sets such terminology with quotation marks).

The other book of Prof. George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, is written from the same viewpoint. The new edition thus has many inaccurate explanations and statements.

Significantly, too, and in line with the author's thinking, he writes herein that the "Russian political institutions of the Kiev period were based upon free society." Prof. Vernadsky here blithely appropriates the Ukrainian Kiev period as "Russian," which is a typical result of the lack of differentiation between the two peoples.

The volume features an analysis of the political and social-economic life of the empire, especially with regard to the period embracing the end of the last century up to the outbreak of the revolution in 1917. The author's characterization of the political parties of the XIXth and XXth centuries is that they were small groups of theoreticians without support of the masses. Social-Democrats were interested in propagating socialism, while Constitutional Democrats blindly tried to imitate French and British parliamentarism without taking into account the specific conditions of the land. The author touches on the ultra-reactionary activities of such organizations as the "Union of the Russian People," which was the initiator of anti-Semitic and anti-Ukrainian outbursts and pogroms.

In discussing education in the XIXth century in Russia the author fails to mention how Empress Catherine II by a series of acts of 1765, 1783 and 1796 abolished liberty in the "new lands" (Ukraine), including a network of parochial schools.

In conclusion, the overwhelming impression received is one of general confusion, the inevitable result of using the names of different peoples synonymously. Also, the author should have pointed out that the Russian empire was built upon conquests of non-Russian nations, a process which began in the times of Czars Ivan III and IV, and Vassili III, a historic fact which had not escaped the attention even of such a well-known Soviet Russian historian as Pokrovsky in the 1920-30's.

JOHN V. SWEET

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THE BERLIN WALL: *The story of the people who escaped over, under and through . . .* By Pierre Galante with Jack Miller. Published by Doubleday & Co., Garden City, N. Y. 1965, 277 pp. \$4.95.

Of all the monstrous Red crimes and stupidities—the starvation of millions of Ukrainians in the Thirties, the murder of 11,000 Polish officers at Katyn, the rape of a million German and Austrian women, the vengeful execution of General Andrey Vlassov and his men, the expulsion of East Prussians from their homeland, the aggression against the three Baltic and most of the Balkan nations and their enslavement—none has so dramatized and epitomized Bolshevik barbarism and its slave system as has the Berlin Wall. Its erection on August 13, 1961—not to keep enemies out but inmates in—was not only an atrocity but a monumental blunder.

Pierre Galante's *The Berlin Wall*, reading grippingly like a novel, is a dramatic account of the hardships the Wall created and the heroic escapes and cruel tragedies it provoked. With narrative skill, it unobtrusively weaves in many facts, statistics, and judgments. In 1945, Berlin, a city of 3,350,000 people, was divided into the Western Sector of twelve boroughs, 188 square miles, and 2,225,000 inhabitants, and the Soviet Sector of eight boroughs, 144 square miles, and 1,100,000 people. Before the Wall, 500,000 would cross the internal bounda-

ries every day; and 52,000 East Berliners would go back and forth to jobs in West Berlin.

But also thousands of Soviet Zone Germans had voted with their feet against the Ulbricht-Eisler "paradise" by crossing to West Berlin and staying. Between 1945 and the Wall, 3,875,000 had thus fled. In the 7½ months preceding, 150,000 had gone so, averaging almost 700 daily. On the Saturday of August 12, no less than 4,130 crossed to freedom. On June 16, 1961, when a reporter alluded to Senator Mike Mansfield's plan for combining East and West Berlin into a free city, Ulbricht had answered, "...there are people in West Germany who would like us to mobilize the building workers... to build a wall... Our building workers are busy erecting new houses. Nobody wants to build a wall" (p. 9). But on July 30, 1961, Senator J. Wm. Fulbright opined that the Soviet Zone would be justified in closing the border to escapees. Similarly, President Kennedy intimated to advisor Walt Rostow, who relayed it, that Khrushchev could not but soon have to stop the flow of refugees through Berlin. (See *Volksbote*, Munich, Sept. 4, 1965). Thereupon Ulbricht on August 7 reversed himself and said, "The frontiers of our republic will be protected at any cost" (p. 15). On Sunday, August 13, the concrete blocks started going up.

Stunned at first, 300,000 West Berliners then reacted by demonstrating against it in the town hall square and heard Mayor Willy Brandt demand "the right of self-determination for the people of Germany and the people of Europe as a whole." He cried, "What took place on August 13 was nothing less than a plot to kill the morale of the German people" (p. 71). But the Western Powers failed to act to prevent the Wall; in fact, for three whole days they did not even protest its going up! By that time it was a *fait accompli*.

This monstrosity from any viewpoint zigzags some twenty-five miles through Berlin. Made of concrete blocks and barbed wire, it averages ten unscalable feet in height. The material used in only the first two weeks of its construction was enough to build 150 family homes. It bars East Berliners from working in West Berlin, and 1,500,000 West Berliners from visiting relatives in the East. The checkpoints for legal crossing were reduced from 81 to 13, and finally to 7, of which Checkpoint Charlie on the Friedrichstrasse for foreigners and Allies is perhaps the best known. The desperate escapes the Wall has provoked constitute a tribute to man's daring and ingenuity, and the resulting stark tragedies a pathetic indictment of Communist inhumanity to man.

The chief unifying personality of the book is that of Harry Seidel, 22, amateur cycle champion, called the Pimpernel of the Wall. On the eve of the Wall he crossed to the West. After liberating his wife Rotraut and baby son, he developed a sense of mission and under the wire or through tunnels helped some hundred people to escape. During a large-scale tunnel escape project, which was to include his mother, he was caught by the Vopos, imprisoned, tried, and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The second most important unifying thread is Paul Schultze's attempt to liberate his pregnant sweetheart. It is young Harry Seidel who, finally, manages to get her and her baby out. In the first two years, 16,500 breached the wall, 618 were shot at, eighteen were caught and sentenced to life imprisonment, and four executed. The first to die at the Wall was Rolf Urban, 47; the fiftieth, whose brutal killing was most publicized, Peter Fichter, 18. A Berlin school boy, 15, trying to swim the Spandau Canal, died in a volley of bullets; another boy, 12, was shot to death by the Vopos in a park. On New Year's, 1962, the girl Christl, conquered the icy Spree to become the No. 21,356 successful escapee. On its

fourth birthday the Wall was supplemented by 159 watchtowers and 235 pill-boxes—yet others still managed to escape and others suffered tragedy for trying.

On its fourth anniversary Mayor Willy Brandt said, "The Wall is against the stream of history, against the precepts of humanity, against the right of self-determination written in the United Nations Charter" (p. 248). But what will probably prove to be the most historic pronouncement at the Wall was that of the late President Kennedy in 1963, when he said:

"There are some who say that Communism is the wave of the future. *Lasst sie nach Berlin kommen...* Freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect. But we have never had to put up a wall to keep our people in... I take pride in the words '*Ich bin ein Berliner.*'" (p. 212).

Pierre Galante graphically presents the facts of the barbaric Wall. He does not go into the philosophy of it, nor does he say that the post-war treaties which had isolated Berlin 110 miles behind the Iron Curtain and which had made the Iron Curtain possible in the first place were a crime against humanity and a betrayal of the American and European peoples. But he who reads his book will inevitably come to such a conclusion.

LaSalle College,

AUSTIN J. APP

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC. Studies in History and Politics. By Roger Pethybrudge. Boston. Heath and Company, 1965, pp. xii + 244.

This is a very well chosen collection of excerpts from many works on the development of the Communist Bloc especially since World War II up to 1960. It is preceded by a short introduction noting the methods used by "Soviet Russia" to increase its empire during the earlier period. This is interesting but it does have obvious defects, for the author does not seem to notice that the methods of infiltration and the creation of pseudo-states and governments as opposed to lawful and democratic authority was practiced as early as 1917 in Ukraine as well as in the twenties in what was then called Russian Central Asia or Turkestan.

Later, however, other selections make up for part of this defect. For example, on page 73, R. Burks notes that the bulwark of Communism are the Great Russians, whereas the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Poles have Communist movements substantially below average in strength. The same author notes the long tradition of the bitter Ukrainian wars with the Russians. In addition, on page 241, Milovan Djilas notes that the Soviet government is still having difficulties with the nationalism of Ukraine and the Caucasus to the embarrassment of the governments which it set up.

The editor has usually chosen his excerpts well and has provided them, except in the one case mentioned, with excellent introductions. He has added also an excellent bibliography for the student who wants to read further. The one title omitted and one that could have been added to the journals quoted would have been *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, now completing its twenty-first volume.

It is a good omen that such a book has been prepared and we can only hope that it will have a favorable reception.

Columbia University

CLARENCE A. MANNING

## UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"RUSSIA PRESSES ATTACK ON NATIONALIST GROUPS," a report. *New York Herald Tribune*, New York, April 20, 1966.

In totalitarian Russian eyes there is no greater sin than "bourgeois nationalism," which means national patriotism and dedicated opposition to Russian imperio-colonialism. This report discloses Moscow's morbid fear of natural nationalism.

The attack is centered on the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The United States and West Germany are particularly criticized and denounced for supporting these "bourgeois nationalists." According to the report, Western observers view the attack "as the beginning of a new campaign to stamp out these organizations, known to be operating underground in the non-Russian parts of the Soviet Union."

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"KREMLIN ACCUSES NATIONALIST GROUPS," a report. *UPI*, Kiev, Ukrainian SSR, April 19, 1966.

It is always illuminating to witness different reportorial slants given to the same event. This report also covers the news conference held by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, at which Stepan I. Dzugalo was featured to relate his past activities with Ukrainian nationalists in Munich, Germany.

Emphasis is placed here on the training of spies by the OUN. Dzugalo minced no words at the conference. On the basis of his alleged ten years with the OUN, he claimed that "the organization trained spies among Ukrainian emigrants and sent them back into Ukraine."

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"KREMLIN OPENS CAMPAIGN AGAINST 'NATIONALIST' GROUPS," a report. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., April 20, 1966.

Victor Zorza of the *Manchester Guardian* offers here an interpretative comment on the same event. He says, "The Soviet press and official personalities have missed few opportunities to attack incipient nationalism in Ukraine." What is so incipient about an historical force that has been combatting Russian imperio-colonialist domination since the early 20's, only the commentator can try to explain.

Somewhat more sensible is Zorza's further comment that the news conference "appears to be a Soviet attempt to counter recent reports in the West of action taken against two Ukrainian writers of nationalist persuasions, Ivan Svitlychny and Ivan Dzyuba." The attack against the two writers is part and parcel of the same substance—Moscow's dread of "bourgeois" Ukrainian nationalism.

"ANOTHER SOVIET WRITER DEPORTED TO SIBERIA," a report. *The London Times*, London, England, April 7, 1966.

That all has not been well for Moscow's domination over Ukraine is also shown by its persistent attacks against nationalist-inclined Ukrainian writers. This organ, as well as many others in the Free World, reports about the arrest of Ivan Svitlychny and Ivan Dzyuba. The former was tried and deported to Siberia; the latter was not put on trial because he is suffering from tuberculosis.

It appears that the main charge against the two writers revolves about their smuggling verses to the West. The verses were written by Vasyl Symonenko, a young Ukrainian poet who died three years ago. The poetry expressed nationalist feelings.

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"ARREST OF TWO MORE WRITERS FOR ANTI-SOVIET ACTS REPORTED," a report by W. Granger Blair. *The New York Times*, New York, April 17, 1966.

A more thorough report on this development appears in this paper. Both Svitlychny and Dzyuba are literary critics who are well known "for their spirited defense of young Ukrainian poets against attempts by the Soviet literary bureaucracy to impose conformity." In addition to smuggling Symonenko's verses the critics were also accused of delivering to the West a bitter diary kept by the young poet.

The reporter mentions, too, that the poet's mother accused Svitlychny of the so-called crime. The accusation was supposed to have appeared in a Ukrainian party newspaper. What this report fails to appreciate is the integral importance and significance of this development in the full framework of Ukraine's captive status. In short, Ukrainian nationalism versus Russian imperio-colonialism, the basic issue underlying all of these developments.

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"NO LETUP ON UNITED STATES-USSR CONSULAR PACT," an address by the Honorable William Bray. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D. C., March 30, 1966.

Proponents of the US-USSR Consular Treaty have been beaten for the third time in their attempts to obtain Senate ratification of the pact. There is no chance for this in the second session of the 89th Congress. Advocates now pin their hopes on the 90th Congress next year.

Noting all this in his address, Congressman Bray, who is the author of a book on the Russian Empire, stresses the fact that "We have been fortunate that since June 1964, when this pact was signed, nationwide organizations such as the National Captive Nations Committee, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and several others have conducted educational drives to inform our citizens of the absurdities and dangers of this treaty." He goes on to emphasize the need for a continued educational campaign along the lines set forth in the pamphlet written by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky on "Ten Reasons Against the United States-USSR Consular Treaty," which was appended to the address.

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"SOVIETS DOOM 8 IN MASS KILLINGS," a report. *Daily News*, New York, March 29, 1966.

One way of liquidating hated nationalists is to accuse them of collaborating with the Nazis and hold them responsible for some acts of Nazi genocide, which

is exceeded only by Soviet Russian genocide. According to this report, eight men from a Ukrainian village named New America were sentenced to death for engaging in mass murders.

The eight were supposedly attached to a Nazi SS group, and during 1942 they allegedly killed more than 3,000 people in Ukraine, Moldavia, Rumania, and Poland. Doubtless, at the time there were such cutthroats; many innocent natives were coerced into such detachments; and still others have been wrongly accused of belonging to them. Apprehension after twenty-four years generates many grave doubts concerning both the charge and the victims.

By their own admission, when it comes to mass killing, the Russians are unsurpassed. It is the height of cynicism finding the criminal accusing most likely the innocent.

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"U.S. GROUP TO TACKLE RUSSIA ON UKRAINE," an article by Doreen King. *The Jersey Journal*, Jersey City, New Jersey, January 28, 1966.

In a rather interesting article the writer points out that plans have been made by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America to bring the question of national self-determination before the United Nations this year. Much of the article is based on an interview with Mr. George Drance who represented the UCCA at a Ukrainian Independence Day observance in the area.

Many essentials regarding the Ukrainian-Russian conflict are well described. For example, "Soviet Russia, it is hoped, will be tackled about her continuing reluctance to allow independence for Ukraine." Of course it involves far more than just a sense of reluctance, but the idea of independence is significantly stressed. Russification, Russian genocide of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, linguicide and other essentials are also mentioned in this fairly lengthy article.

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"RUSSIA'S SECRET BLAST AT PEKING REVEALED," a report. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., March 22, 1966.

This extensive report on the secret letter sent by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to the "fraternal" Parties contains numerous observations that are worthy of close analysis. The letter in part states, "The Soviet Union delivers to the DRV (North Vietnam) a great quantity of weapons, among them rocket installations, anti-aircraft artillery, airplanes, tanks, coastal defenses, warships and others." For 1965 alone the aid amounted to a half billion rubles.

Another important item in the letter is the claim that the Red Chinese have refused to resume negotiations over fixing the Sino-Soviet border, which apparently were broken off in May, 1964. The Chinese Reds demand the return of Chinese territories in the Far East.

What is highly significant in the letter is the reference to the nationalities or the non-Russian nations in the USSR. Peking, it is charged, seeks "to set various social classes among the Soviet people against one another, to disturb the friendship among the nationalities in the USSR, and undermine the trust" in the Soviet leaders. The Chinese Reds know the depth of this Soviet Russian weakness, if most Free World leaders don't. And the Russian imperio-colonialists have on numerous occasions displayed their fearful concern over this.

"OUSTED TARSIS ASSAILS REDS IN D. C. SPEECH," an article by Stephen S. Rosenfeld. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., May 11, 1966.

Some of our Irish associates may not appreciate it, but a blind advocate of Holy Mother Russia, i.e. the sanctity of the Russian Empire, was led by hand to place a wreath at the statue of the Irish patriot Robert Emmet. From all accounts, Valery Tarsis, the Russian writer—more accurately the Russified writer of Greek-Ukrainian parentage—didn't know who Emmet was. But this didn't matter. The important thing was the publicity gimmick, and surely the Shevchenko statue wouldn't do.

The superficiality of this whole visit to the nation's capital was underscored by the fact that the NTS, so-called Russian solidarists, took over the management of the visit and Tarsis' appearance at the National Press Club. The NTS has a long record of propaganda spoofing. As shown in this well-written article, Tarsis didn't hesitate to spoof his listeners about Nikita Khrushchev being a "Ukrainian boor." More than can be said for Tarsis, at least the former Russian leader denied this form of ethnic bastardy.

Also, Tarsis' address and his answers to questions about being permitted to leave the USSR evidently failed to satisfy the audience. The writer concludes in this vein: "This answer seemed to wrap things up a little too neatly for most of Tarsis' listeners. Most of the town's followers of Soviet affairs are frankly puzzled." As well they should be, to hear that he was sent out merely to "blunt the criticism aroused in the West by the Moscow trial of writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel." Tarsis loses no time in making the Russification pitch.

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"LEADERS IN SOVIET FEAR WEST'S RADIO IS ENSNARING YOUTH," a report. *The New York Times*, New York, March 25, 1966.

Before the 23rd Congress of the CPSU convened, puppet congresses were held in the non-Russian republics with the general theme being "ideological purity." Of all things, fairly innocuous Western radio broadcasts, including the "Voice of America," were scored across the board for corrupting "Soviet youth." One of the reasons for Moscow's ending the radio jamming in June, 1963, was the rather ineffectual character of the VOA and some other Free World broadcasts.

Evidently, to reinforce so-called doctrinal dedication to Communist mythology, Moscow and its puppets have seized upon this weak scapegoat. One of the puppets, Peter Shelest, a member of the ruling party Presidium, railed at the Ukrainian party congress in this manner: "The poisonous seeds of bourgeois ideology are hitting us through various channels." The playwright Alexander Korneichuk added his piece, "We have more than just a few young people whose ears are swollen from listening during the night to sly and perfidious anti-Soviet propaganda."

This spurious complaint was voiced, apparently according to plan, at the other non-Russian party congresses. Those held in Byelorussia, Georgia, and Armenia played on the same tune. One wonders what Moscow and its puppets would do, other than jamming, if the programs were politically effective.

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"EVILS OF UNSCRUPULOUS POWER," an article by Jenkin Lloyd Jones. *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., March 12, 1966.

Ever so often the American reader has to be reminded of some lessons of the past. To many it might well be the first lesson. But to repeat the most



colossal political blunder of this century, committed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe, places many elements of the present in proper focus.

This writer recounts the period of twenty-five years ago when Hitler's legions swept into the Soviet Union. He writes, "a humane policy might have speeded the German advance until both Moscow and Leningrad could have fallen before the snows came. The Ukrainians, unhappy with Muscovite rule, actually met the panzers with garlands of flowers."

Crucially important is our political orientation toward the USSR. The realities within this empire-state furnish us with the most powerful weapons for cold war victory over the Russian imperio-colonialists. The question is whether in time our leaders will understand these realities.

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"USSR JURISTS QUESTION THE FICTION OF SOVIET REPUBLICS' 'SOVEREIGNTY,'" a commentary. *Elta*, New York, N. Y., February 15, 1966.

This periodical of the Lithuanian Information Service provides some eye-opening accounts about the matter of supposed sovereignty among the non-Russian republics in the USSR. Of course, these republics enjoy as much sovereignty as an inmate of an Arabian harem. But the significant aspect of all this is the enhanced questioning on the part of Soviet Russian jurists concerning the validity of the legalities involved.

A. L. Lepeshkin is quoted from *Soviet State and Law*, No. 2, February 1965, as follows: "While it contains a degree of autonomy, the Soviet system presupposes a highly centralized administration from Moscow. The federated units are tied to the sources of power through both the leadership of the Communist Party and control of the federal agencies." The Soviet jurist criticizes the lack of principles justifying the structure, which he deems different from those in the West, and calls for an intensive study "of the experience of the 15 Union Republics, 20 autonomous republics, 9 autonomous provinces, and 10 national regions which together constitute the present federal system of the Soviet Union."

For several years now preparatory work has been undertaken by the Constitutional Commission to formulate a new constitution. Western analysts, particularly those with an appreciative understanding of the Russian/non-Russian conflict, can hardly wait for its results.

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"MOSCOW PLAGUED BY JITTERS OVER BALTIC EXILES," an article by Charles Bartlett. *The Evening Star*, Washington, D. C., May 2, 1966.

It is evident from some of the selected items here that Ukraine receives a great deal of attention in current newspaper writing. This interesting account dwells on the Estonian Erik Heine case and its impact on American concern with the captive Baltic countries. Who knows, tomorrow a Ukrainian or Armenian case of like proportions may emerge.

Several statements in the article reveal the writer's keen perception of developments in this area. For example, the author soundly points out, "Soviet policy toward exiles from the Baltic states and Ukraine is to keep them penetrated, intimidated and, if possible, divided." Elsewhere he states, "'Bourgeois nationalism' is a serious sin in Communist eyes but its persistence is attested to by reports reaching the West that a large number of writers, more than 20 and less than 40, were arrested in Ukraine last fall." More accurately,

he could have said "Russian eyes," with the Communist mythology serving only as a front.

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"THE CONFOUNDING YOUNG," an article by John Chamberlain. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., February 10, 1966.

Dealing with the general restiveness of youth both in the Free World and in the Captive World, the writer depends in part on a Ukrainian writer for some of his information. As he puts it, "Andrei Babich, a Ukrainian on the staff of the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, has recently documented the latest turns in the 'fathers and sons' conflict inside Soviet Russia." Much of this documentation also covered the non-Russian republics in the USSR.

The traits and attitudes of concern to Moscow and its puppets are "passivity" toward society about the youth, "self-seeking attitudes," "private-property complexes," indifference to Marxist-Leninist teaching and the like. It could have been noted that nationalism and religion enter into the picture, too.

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"COMMUNISM CAN BE DEFEATED, By 'Wars of Liberation' in the Captive Nations," an interview with Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky. *Manion Forum*, South Bend, Indiana, May 8, 1966.

Covered in part by a lengthy article in the *Chicago Tribune* issue of May 9, this text of a radio and TV broadcast shows how tragically we're missing the boat today by not seizing a psycho-political offensive in the Captive World. The unfinished wars of liberation in the Red Empire are mainly political.

A section of the program stresses the power center of the Red Empire, which is the USSR itself. Special emphasis is placed on the captive status of the numerous captive non-Russian nations in that empire within an empire.

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"PEOPLE? YES, YOU'LL MEET PEOPLE," a commentary by Tony Weitzel. *Chicago Daily News*, Chicago, Illinois, February 26, 1966.

The following was written from Kiev, Ukraine (S.S.R.), and is self-explanatory. "The express train from Rostov panted into this lovely Ukrainian capital city after 28 hours of fascinatingly tedious meandering.

"Outside the depot our Intourist guide led us to a waiting taxi. The Intourist man, one Sascha, looked up at the blue and cloudless sky. He took a deep breath of the balmy air.

"Ah," he said, "this is my country!"

The cab driver growled, "You are born in Ukraine?"

"No," said Sascha, "in Moscow."

"Then, comrade," snapped the Ukrainian, "this is NOT your country!"

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L. E. D.

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