

The Ukrainian Quarterly

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A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS



Historic Event for Ukraine:
First World Congress of Free Ukrainians
Editorial

Russia, Ukraine and the World:
50 Years of Conflict

By Lev E. Dobriansky

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THE VULNERABLE RUSSIANS

AN AMERICAN ANSWER TO THE "50TH"— THE FRAUDULENT RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

By

Lev E. Dobriansky

Georgetown University

*DEDICATED TO ALL FREEDOM FIGHTERS AND HEROES
OF THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY (UPA)*

With an Introduction by

The Hon. Edward J. Derwinski,

*Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. Congress*

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HISTORIC EVENT FOR UKRAINE: FIRST WORLD CONGRESS OF FREE UKRAINIANS

Editorial

"...Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and the decisive role of such peoples in the attainment of their independence...."

(From DECLARATION on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted unanimously on December 14, 1960 by the U.N. General Assembly.)

In November, 1967, the mammoth Soviet propaganda machine will blare forth to the world the great festivities which the Kremlin is now preparing in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. On this occasion, the Russian Communist leaders will also trumpet that Moscow brought "freedom and national independence" to the non-Russian nations as well, despite the fact that these nations had proclaimed their independence after the fall of Russian Czardom in 1917 and all had been reconquered and forcibly incarcerated in the new Russian Prison of Nations which the USSR is today.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is well aware of the importance of the non-Russian nations; above all, it realizes the great potential which their presence in the USSR offers to the politically flexible and sophisticated West. Therefore, it is doing everything possible propaganda-wise to demonstrate that the "nationality problem" in the USSR has been blissfully solved, and that any attempt on the part of the Western nations to prod the Kremlin on the colonial enslavement of the non-Russian nations, would quickly be rebuffed as "interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet state."

It is to be recalled that of the 230 million of the present population of the USSR, *at least 115,000,000 are non-Russian.*

In order to forestall any possible "intervention" from the West, which may introduce some discordant notes in the festive "50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution," the Communist Party issued its own "Theses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central

Committee on the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution." These "Theses" have been analyzed by Western specialists on the USSR.¹

It has this to say on the "liberation" of the non-Russian nations:

While overcoming economic and cultural backwardness and remnants of national discord, the party and Soviet authorities patiently organized co-operation among the peoples... the formation of the USSR, affirmed in the Soviet constitution of 1924, was an event of tremendous importance. The October Revolution, the building of socialism, awakened and roused to independent historical creative work, peoples which in the past had been backward, some of them being saved from physical extinction. In the course of the building of socialism they attained their own statehood, they did away with their economic and cultural backwardness....

The free people, enjoying equal rights in the Soviet Republic of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, the Uzbek SSR, the Kazakh SSR, the Georgian SSR, the Azerbaijanian SSR, the Lithuanian SSR, the Moldavian SSR, the Latvian SSR, the Kirghiz SSR, the Tadzhik SSR, the Armenian SSR, the Turkmen SSR, the Estonian SSR — all nations and peoples of the Union of the USSR — built socialism in a common effort...

But the Russian masters and enslavers, in order to forestall any illusions as to the real master in the USSR, hastened to add:

As generally recognized by all the peoples of the Soviet Union, a major role in the implementation of Lenin's national policy was played by the Russian working class, the Russian people...

RUSSIAN FRAUDULENT REVOLUTION vs. FACTS AND REALITIES

These spurious claims, especially the ludicrous one that the October revolution brought freedom and national statehood to the former colonial victims of Czarism, simply cannot stand up to the facts.

In 1917 the far-flung Russian Czarist empire met its inevitable doom. Without waiting for any fraudulent Russian revolution, the non-Russians rose to freedom and in a series of *national* revolutions gained their long-awaited freedom and national independence.

The Ukrainian people rose to freedom in March, 1917, engendering the great Ukrainian National Revolution, which was in both content and purpose very much like the American Revolution of 1776. In contrast to the fraudulent Russian revolution, it sought a genuine freedom for individual men and nations and peoples alike.

¹ "Communist Party Theses Emphasize World Revolt," *Hatrenik Weekly*, September 14, 1967, Boston, Mass.

For over six months, from March to October, 1917, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, the *de facto* government of Ukraine, had to deal with the weak and ineffectual Russian Provisional Government of Alexander Kerensky. Despite the resistance of the "democratic" Russians, the *Rada* issued two *Universals* (on June 23 and July 16, 1917), organized a national Ukrainian army, established Ukrainian schools, introduced Ukrainian judicial and administrative systems, laid the groundwork for a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, granted autonomy to the national minorities and secured the recognition of a number of foreign states. On November 20, 1917, after the Bolshevik *coup*, the *Rada* issued its Third *Universal*, by which it established the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR), which was recognized on December 17, 1917 by the Soviet of People's Commissars (*Sovnar-kom*) in the following note:

The Soviet of People's Commissars of the Russian Republic recognizes, without any limitations or conditions, and in all respects, the national rights and independence of the Ukrainian Republic. . .²

While granting diplomatic recognition to Ukraine, Communist Russia, acting in a manner which was to become traditional, attacked Ukraine by armed aggression and compelled the young Ukrainian Republic to wage a defensive war until April, 1918.

In the meantime, the *Rada* in its Fourth *Universal* on January 22, 1918, proclaimed the full and unqualified independence of Ukraine and on February 9, 1918, it concluded the Treaty in Brest Litovsk, by the terms of which Ukraine received full-fledged recognition from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. France and Great Britain also granted *de facto* recognition of Ukraine.

On November 1, 1918, Western Ukraine, then part of Austria-Hungary, proclaimed its independence and was forced to wage a defensive war against newly-born Poland, which coveted this Ukrainian ethnic territory as its "own historic land." On January 22, 1919, the Western Ukrainian National Republic (with Carpatho-Ukraine and Bukovina), was united by the Act of Union with the Ukrainian National Republic in one, sovereign and independent state of the Ukrainian people. Although Ukraine, from November, 1918, to the fall of 1919, was first under the monarchist government of *Hetman* Paul Skoropadsky and then under the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic, headed by Simon Petlura, the undeniable historic

² *Organ of the Provisional Government of Workers and Soldiers*, No. 26, December 20, 1917, Petrograd.

fact remains that Ukraine had been re-established as *an independent state, supported by over 75 percent of the population of Ukraine.*

This is true, unpurged history concerning the Ukrainian people in the crucial moment of their life fifty years ago.

Not a fraudulent Russian Bolshevik revolution but a freedom-bearing Ukrainian National Revolution freed the Ukrainian people and resurrected the free and independent Ukrainian state.

Thus when the Kremlin masters say on the 50th anniversary of their revolution that it brought "freedom and independence" to Ukraine, neither the Ukrainians in captive Ukraine nor the Ukrainians in the free world could possibly agree.

WORLD CONGRESS OF FREE UKRAINIANS: VOICE OF FREE UKRAINE

This is why the forthcoming first World Congress of Free Ukrainians (WCFU), which meets on November 16-19, 1967, in New York City, must be considered as an important and epochal event not only in the history of the Ukrainian nation, but in that of the USSR and the other captive nations as well.

Ukraine, in its present captive status as the "Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic," is one of the pivotal countries in the Soviet empire. Although it is a charter member of the United Nations, it is neither free nor independent; for all intents and purposes it is a colony of the Russian Communist empire.

There are about 45 million Ukrainians in the USSR: some 36 million live in what is known as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and some 9 million in other parts of the USSR.

Soviet Russian rule over the Ukrainians was and still is ruthless and barbaric. Constant purges and deportations, cultural and religious genocide, economic exploitation and linguistic and cultural Russification—these are the characteristic features of Soviet Russian colonial domination over Ukraine. At the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February, 1956, Khrushchev stated:

Stalin had wanted to deport all Ukrainians, but there were too many of them and there was no place to which they could be deported . . .³

The Ukrainians in the USSR pose a permanent danger to the Russian rule, because their desire for freedom and independence is

³ cf. "Khrushchev's Report to the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the SU," February 20, 1956.

unquenchable, and because there are too many of them to be annihilated or silenced.

VOICE OF UKRAINIANS IN DIASPORA

Important, too, is the presence of some 3,000,000 Ukrainians and their descendants in the free world who are incessant advocates of Ukraine's freedom. There are over 2,000,000 American citizens of Ukrainian descent in the United States, about 500,000 in Canada, 300,000 in Argentina and Brazil, and over 200,000 in other countries of the free world.

They constitute a powerful voice of Ukraine.

For several years leaders of the national organizations in the diaspora have been planning to call a World Congress of Free Ukrainians. Full agreement was finally reached last year, and the City of New York, the U.N. and world capital, has been selected as the first meeting place of the Ukrainian world conclave.

In its *Manifesto*, issued on January 22, 1967, the anniversary of Ukrainian independence, the Pan-American Ukrainian Conference (PAUC), the agency which is calling the Congress, stated the over-all purpose of the World Congress:⁴

- 1) To demonstrate before the world the unbending will of the Ukrainian people to struggle for the restoration of their free, sovereign and united state.
- 2) To manifest the solidarity of the Ukrainian community in the free world with the struggle of the Ukrainian people and its readiness to help them by all means at its disposal.
- 3) To unite all the forces of Ukrainians who are citizens or residents of the countries of the free world towards a close collaboration among themselves.
- 4) To ascertain ways for a strengthening and an all-embracing expansion of all sectors of life of the Ukrainian community in the free world.

The overall aims and objectives of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians are understandably much broader, both in scope and significance. The Congress will seek to mobilize the liberation forces of the Ukrainian people throughout the world and to direct them into more effective and constructive channels.

Above all, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians will appeal to the United Nations, with at least three specific demands:

- (1) To prevail upon the U.N. to investigate the present enslavement of the Ukrainian people in accordance with the U.N. Resolu-

⁴ "Manifesto" of the Pan-American Conference in the Matter of the Convocation of a World Congress of Free Ukrainians, *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, February 1 - February 15, 1967, New York, N.Y.

tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples, adopted on October 14, 1960.

(2) To appeal to all members of the U.N. to support the aspirations to freedom not only of the Ukrainian people but of all other captive peoples throughout the Russian Communist empire.

(3) To secure approval for Free Ukrainians to participate in the various U.N. committees and agencies on the basis of non-governmental agency status.

The World Congress also will appeal to the many countries of the free world in which there are substantial numbers of Ukrainians.

The World Congress of Free Ukrainians will be attended by delegates from the United States, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Venezuela; France, Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, Austria, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland; New Zealand and Australia.

The Ukrainian conclave meets at a time when the free world is disunited and divided; when the forces of Communism, despite the deadly schism between Moscow and Peking—are determined to pursue further their goal of world revolution, as is amply demonstrated anew by the Communist support given the Viet Cong and North Vietnam and by the rapidly-spreading Communist insurgency in Latin America.

It meets also at a time when the American people are torn apart by racial strife and Communist-inspired dissidents and unpatriotic riots and disorders.

As for the forthcoming 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians will ringingly reject the Communist thesis that it brought freedom and social equality to the Russian and non-Russian peoples alike.

The World Congress will be expressing the free voice of embattled and enslaved Ukrainians. It will be the true and only voice of Free Ukraine, a Ukraine which lies prostrate under the heel of Russian Communist imperialism and colonialism.

Undoubtedly, Moscow, through its agents and puppets in Ukraine and abroad, will decry the Congress as a conclave of "fascists" or "agents of American imperialism." But neither the Ukrainian people at home nor the world at large will swallow this Soviet propaganda.

The American people, known for their innate generosity, good will and sympathy for all those who fight for freedom, will be asked to tender their moral help and warm understanding to the brave and martyred Ukrainian people, who are our silent allies in the struggle against the common and ruthless adversary.

RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND THE WORLD: 50 YEARS OF CONFLICT

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

The 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution isn't the only "50th" to be celebrated in this period of 1967-68. As a whole-some offset, and counteracting the basic fraudulence of the Russian Bolshevik revolution, numerous celebrations in the Free World will mark the 50th Anniversary of the non-Russian Revolutions for National Independence. From the celebration of Ukraine's Independence in January to Latvia's Independence in November, the year of 1968 will be highlighted with many ceremonial expressions of what was fundamentally the general non-Russian Revolution of Independence in the Russian Empire in 1917-18.

While captive White Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Lithuanians, Estonians and other non-Russian nationals are forced to join in the celebration of the "national holiday," dated November 7, really the day of tragedy for their independent national existences, free citizens in the Free World will observe the genuine revolution that occurred in 1917-18. Doubtless, while many unthinking Americans will participate in the Russian Bolshevik festivities, totally oblivious of what the tragic day of November 7, 1917 meant in time for the dozen and more independent non-Russian nations in the former Czarist Russian Empire, the more informed and morally responsible will support the "50th" of the non-Russian nations now in the Soviet Union.

There is a crucial difference in essence between the Russian Bolshevik revolution and the non-Russian Revolutions for National Independence. Despite its fraudulent promises and objectives, the former was in essence a socio-economic revolution, aimed to eliminate autocratic Czarist oppression, economic injustices, and sacrifices borne in war. It was to usher a new era of "proletarian democracy," "socialist economics," and "peace." On the other hand, the non-Russian Revolutions for National Independence, as staged in Lithuania, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Turkestan and elsewhere in the Russian Empire, had one consummate objective, namely the end

of Russian colonialism and independent national statehood. In short, then, it was this revolution that partook of the same essence as our own American Revolution—surcease of colonialism, the attainment of national independence, and the pursuit of free, national development.

Unfortunately, to this day, the non-Russian Revolutions for National Independence have not been clearly understood and certainly not appreciated by the democracies of the West. It is no exaggeration that the turbulent period of 1917-23, when these revolutions were in vogue against the new Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, has been a blind spot in general Western knowledge of East European and Central Asian affairs. The persistence of this blind spot constitutes one of the grave disadvantages of the Western democracies in their present Cold War contest with the Soviet Russian totalitarians. About this, there can be no doubt.

THE FRAUDULENT RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

By way of general observations on the celebrations of the "50ths" for the year ahead, it would be a terrible fallacy for any of our leaders to equate the fraudulent Russian Bolshevik revolution with our American Revolution, and because of a protracted ignorance on the subject, the prospect for this is not entirely negative. As Congressman Edward J. Derwinski has well pointed out, there are four determining factors about the Russian Bolshevik revolution.¹ "First, the Russian Bolshevik revolution was the source and incubator of Soviet Russian imperiocolonialism." The early destruction of the independent states of Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and others substantiates this well. "Second," as he puts it, "The second colossal fraud of the Bolshevik revolution was Lenin's promise of 'land, bread, and peace.'" This promise has been so negated, even to the extent of importing wheat from the capitalist countries in our day, that the fraud is glaring, to say the least." "The third prominent fraud," states Derwinski, "is Moscow's 'peaceful coexistence.'" Moscow's involvements in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, the Middle East, North Korea and other places demonstrate how "peaceful" the coexistence is. And the "fourth fraud," he declares, "is communism itself, which has no objective existence and is entirely a deceptive ideological tool of Soviet Russian imperiocolonialism." The myth of communism is yet to be fully exposed.

¹ "The Fraudulent Russian Bolshevik Revolution—The Vulnerable Russians," *Congressional Record*, August 10, 1967, pp. H - 10334 - H - 10335.

During the celebrations of the "50ths" these four determining factors should be pondered well by all free men. They embrace almost categorically a vast amount of detailed knowledge and data in the scope of what is called "Soviet history." Much too often we lose sight of the forest because of the trees. And this failing is Moscow's asset for further adventures and further aggressions under the banners of "peaceful coexistence" and "wars of national liberation."

50 YEARS OF CONFLICT

If insight is to be reflected during this period, the "50ths" represent and symbolize above all 50 years of continuous conflict between those who support the results of the Russian revolution and those who side with the aims and aspirations of the non-Russian Revolution for National Independence. This is no oversimplification. For example, the record of Russian-Ukrainian conflict is quite clear. One need only recount the following highlights: the first international war between the Ukrainian National Republic and Soviet Russia, the upsurge of Ukrainian nationalism in the 20's, the stubborn resistance to Stalin's Russification program in the 30's, the gallant and heroic fight of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) against both the Nazi German imperialists and Soviet Russian imperio-colonialists in the 40's, and the many manifestations of psycho-political resistance against Russian colonialism in the 50's to present date.

Anyone familiar with this record—and it is only one of the non-Russian records within the USSR these past 50 years—cannot but arrive at the firm conclusion that the USSR has never been a monolith. On the occasion of these "50ths," with clear perception and a firm grasp of the dominant factors, one can even advance certain clear working formulae on this issue. One is that the USSR—Ukraine (the largest non-Russian nation both in Eastern Europe and the USSR) = 0. If perception and vision prevail, we can derive a more general formula from this, namely Red Empire — Ukraine = 0, since the entire Red Empire is really based on ultimate USSR strength and power. The logic of these formulae is indisputable, given the record of so-called "Soviet history."

But logic is not enough. It must be supplemented by a genetical perspective of how all this came to be what it is. Such a perspective must begin with the period of 1917-23, when the first wave of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism involved the conquests of neighboring, independent non-Russian states. The forcible annexation of Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine and the others into the USSR was the stepping-

stone for further Russian expansion in power and control from the 40's to the present. Genetically, Russian involvements in Vietnam, the Middle East, Cuba and elsewhere are by no means irrelevant to that first wave of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. By perspective, they are really founded on this early historical basis.

Now, turning to the very present, one can raise again these appropriate questions in this period of the "50ths." "What about Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia?" "What about Ukraine, Byelorussia, Armenia, and Georgia?" "Indeed, what about Poland, Hungary, Cuba and others that are not situated within the Soviet Union, the imperium in imperio?" Apparently for the first time, these were some of the questions raised by a few editors and commentators, like Huntley and Brinkley, after having heard on June 20 the hypocritical address delivered by Premier Kosygin to the U.N. General Assembly.

"In the course of its 50-year history," declared the Russian dictator, "the Soviet Union has regarded all peoples, large or small, with respect. Every people enjoys the right to establish an independent state of its own. This constitutes one of the fundamental principles of the policy of the Soviet Union." This statement alone fully measures the degree to which the United Nations forum has been prostituted by Moscow and its Red Syndicate puppets and associates to advance their propaganda and diplomatic goals. What's even worse is that such statements, purposely repeated over and over again, go largely unchallenged and in time appear as "truths" to the uninformed, the unwary, and the uncritical.

Lying through his teeth, Kosygin well knows in his mind that the Soviet Union hasn't been in existence for 50 years. The establishment of the Soviet Union is not coincidental with the tragic Russian Bolshevik revolution. The USSR came into being in 1922-23, only after Kosygin's Soviet Russia had conquered and destroyed over a half-dozen independent non-Russian states, such as Byelorussia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkestan, Idel-Ural and others now held captive in the USSR. This first wave of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism he would seek to bury under the myth of the USSR's creation in 1917.

Also, Kosygin knows all too well that he sharply contradicts Khrushchev's famous admissions in 1956 of the rampant genocide, Russification, and politico-economic oppressions waged against the captive non-Russian nations, "large or small," under Stalin's rule. Ukrainians as well as the Chechen-Ingush, deported Lithuanians as well as the Crimean Tartars, Turkestani as well as the Bashkirs, all large and small, have been severely ravaged by Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. With far greater subtlety and less barbaric crude-

ness these Stalinist policies have continued to this day, but the dour-faced premier of an empire unto itself would also have these facts buried by his shameless contradictions.

TIME FOR DEBATE DURING THE "50THS"

These cynical representatives of the world's worst imperio-colonialist system lose no opportunity in Potemkinizing, i. e. in staging false appearances, as apostles of national self-determination and independence, not to mention "peace." The lengths to which they will go to conceal their own political crimes and at the same time firmly fortify their big lies were further shown in the United Nations this past spring. For example, the Russian mouthpiece, Pavel F. Shakov, insisted that Puerto Rico is a "colonial territory" and urged the U.N.'s colonialism committee to investigate this case of "American imperialism." Repeated enough with propaganda skill and cunning, such fabrications cannot but receive some credence in the minds of uncounted millions, particularly when our own representatives are found constantly on the defensive and oftentimes mute.

Clearly, the time is now to debate the fundamental issue of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. In fact, it is long overdue. As far back as September, 1961 President John F. Kennedy himself sensed the urgent need for it when in his United Nations address he declared, "Let us have debate on colonialism in full—and apply the principle of free choice and the practice of free plebiscite in every corner of the globe." This fitting challenge virtually paralyzed Khrushchev who, like Kosygin, ranted at the time about the USSR's defense of national independence and our furtherance of imperialism and colonialism. Two months later, our Ambassador to the U.N., Adlai E. Stevenson, unmistakably directed this challenge against the widespread Russian imperio-colonialism within the Soviet Union itself.

The Stevenson memorandum of November 25, 1961 represents the best and most intelligent statement yet made on this basic subject by any of our ambassadors to the U.N. But in this world conflict where, with truths or with propaganda distortions and respectively for better or for worse, the minds and passions of men are shaped and moved, it is scarcely effective policy to deprive the truth and facts of the impact of sustaining repetition and forceful elaboration. Over these years the Stevenson lead should have been expanded, developed, and detailed so that the spotlight of world opinion, study, and concern would be fixed on the imperio-colonialist network present in the USSR itself. After all, this is the determining power base in

the Red Empire; it is the fundamental source of colonialist exploitation propelling Red designs and aggressions in Vietnam, Cuba, and Latin America, Algeria and Africa, and in the Middle East; it is the resource reservoir of Moscow's frantic, technological push for space and military superiority, with all its blackmail implications.

In the U.N. debate on the Middle East crisis it wasn't exactly instructive or inspiring for any free man to view the acquiescent silence of the U.S. Ambassador on this subject while the Federenkos, Kosygins, and Gromykos hammered away on "American imperialism," "American aggression in Vietnam" and other propaganda themes. To stop these boys in their tracks, all Mr. Goldberg had to do was to re-issue the Stevenson memo. Nor is it anything but another sign of weakness, especially after the Russians triggered the Middle East crisis, for our Secretary of State to say "We will continue to do our full share to try to improve relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist nations," as though the Soviet Union is a "nation" or any "nation" in the Red Empire, in conceptual contrast to a "state," is communist. Ostrich-like and befuddled diplomatic behavior cannot erase the stark reality of the captive nations, primarily those in the USSR.

TENTH CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1968

Because the underlying aspirations of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR for independence and freedom constitute a major lever, if not the key, for deterrence to further Red aggression in the Free World, the avoidance of a hot global war, and Cold War victory in the cause of indivisible freedom, the Tenth Observance of Captive Nations Week in July, 1968 and during the "50ths" will highlight as one of its chief themes this necessary United Nations debate on Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism within the USSR. A debate of this nature would encourage psycho-political forces within that substrate empire so that colonialist Moscow would be compelled to reassess very carefully its stepped-up aid to totalitarian Hanoi, its rearming of extremist Arab factions in the Middle East, its back-up to North Korean guerrilla excursions into Free Korea, its support of Cuba and subversive operations in Latin America and, in general, its Cold War strategy and tactics toward the West. In this, genuine peace would be served, not further undermined as at present.

For those who have grasped the meaning and significance of the Captive Nations Week Resolution (Public Law 86-90) and the annual observance, it is not at all surprising that at the Glassboro summit

Kosygin was very anxious to learn whether the President would issue a Captive Nations Week Proclamation in July, 1967. Suggesting politico-moral surrender, the Russian dictator indicated that to do so would not improve U.S.-USSR relations. The President is reported to have replied, "If one is issued, the name Soviet Union would not be mentioned."

Since Congress passed the resolution in 1959, Khrushchev, Suslov and numerous other totalitarians have vehemently denounced the resolution, and have sought its abrogation in the name of "improved relations," whatever that, in tangible deed, means. In 1966, in a tactical switch, Moscow egged its minions on to execute the task of public denunciation which it concentrated on backstage diplomacy, such as Kosygin's at Glassboro, to have the Week eliminated. For example, Latvia's *Radio Riga* blurted, "The announcement that the so-called Captive Nations Week has been proclaimed, reaches us from the USA like a demagogical ghost. . . It cannot be fully ignored because such manifestations have become an important part of the U.S. political attitude" (July 17, 1966).

Another interesting switch was the attempt to associate the captive nations movement with anti-Semitism. For instance, the fall 1966 issue of *Political Affairs*, a Communist periodical, featured an article on "Anti-Semitism in the USA" which refers to "criminals who are active in the organizations of the so-called captive nations . . . have their own press and conduct war-inciting activities through demonstrations, picket lines, etc." This makes as much sense as the Russian genocidists in the U.N. recently accusing the Israelis of being "Hitlerite aggressors." But, as shown by the article, the Reds are apparently concerned that the "captive nations organizations are often connected with similar organizations in other countries in Europe and Latin America." And indeed they should be, for Captive Nations Week is now not only observed in the United States but also in over a dozen other nations.

The book *Captive Nations Week: Red Nightmare, Freedom's Hope* (U.S. GPO, 1966) vividly describes in 310 pages the expansion of the Week both here and abroad. The 1966 observance was the best on record up to that year, the 1967 one surpassed it, and the Tenth Captive Nations Week Observance, that will be held during the period of the "50ths," will undoubtedly top them all. In addition to the President, thirty-seven Governors and fifty-three Mayors have issued proclamations regularly each year. As usual, Congress has led the observances with far-seeing addresses, and thirty-eight local Captive Nations Committees have conducted observances from Boston to

Miami, Philadelphia to Spokane, New York to Chicago to Los Angeles. All major cities participated, and new ones have been joining for the first time.

What seems to disquiet Moscow and the Red Syndicate has been the addition of nations to the international observance of the Week. Argentina, Australia, Ceylon, and India have now joined South Korea, Japan, Free China, the Philippines, Turkey, Malta, West Germany, France, Great Britain, and Sweden in the annual event. President Juan Onganía of Argentina has issued a proclamation that was prominently expressive of our Congressional resolution. Groups in Canada, Spain, Italy, Denmark, and Brazil have participated in the 1967 Week, and thus the list grows.

MORE THOUGHTS FOR THE "50THS"

In a real sense, though the Week is observed every third week of July, it is not limited in activities to that week. The Week serves as a community and national forum to crystallize the issues and themes of the observance, but the participants devote themselves to actualizing them the rest of the year. The 1967 Week stressed the fraudulence of the Russian Bolshevik revolution, and this message has been carried well beyond the Week. The objective of a U.N. debate on Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism is but one major end requiring continuous action in the period ahead, during the "50ths" and well before the "10th," i. e., the Tenth Observance of Captive Nations Week next July. While the Middle East debate continues in the U.N., the known genocidal treatment of Moslems in Turkestan should be of interest to those Arabs playing with colonialist Russian fire.

Other equally important themes in this eventful period of the "50ths," are: (2) unprecedented Congressional hearings on U.S. policy toward the USSR, (3) the creation of a Special Committee on the Captive Nations in the House of Representatives, (4) on the basis of the Dirksen - State Department agreement, a "Nyets Campaign against the establishment of Russian consulates" in our port-cities, (5) victory in Vietnam through psycho-political liberation of 17 million captive North Vietnamese, and (6) the full exposure of the fraudulent 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik revolution which, as the writer shows in his current book *The Vulnerable Russians*, incubated the real force of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism that has produced the stark reality of captive nations and today threatens our security and world peace.

Each of these themes is a story in and of itself. Well before the "10th" Week, each will be advanced by constructive action based on the conviction that we can never afford the avowed enemy psychopolitical sanctuary in his captive empire. Those who delude themselves with the achievements of paper agreements might well take a leaf from Karl Marx—"Russia only throws out so many notes to the Western diplomats, like bones to dogs, in order to set them at an innocent amusement, while she reaps the advantage of further gaining time."

THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION AND RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY

By MATTHEW STACHIW

I. BEFORE OCTOBER, 1905

The political situation in 1654 forced the contemporary Ukrainian state to conclude a defensive-offensive alliance with Czar Alexei in order to maintain its existence as an independent international entity.¹ Later, the head of this Ukrainian state, *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky, tried to cancel the alliance and for Ukraine's safety conclude another one (with Sweden, Semigorod, Moldavia, and others). His premature death, however, prevented his carrying out these measures. The political heirs of *Hetman* Khmelnytsky were unable to protect their rights accorded to them by the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654 against infringements on the part of the Russian Czars, owing to a change in the international situation in northern and southern Europe, and in the Near East as well, because of Moscow's increased military potential. After various initially successful military attempts to defend the national rights of Ukraine ended in adversity, the Muscovite Czars (who in the meantime changed their title to Czars of Russia), with overwhelming military might, nullified the practical execution of the above-mentioned treaty. Destroyed was the last factual vestige of Ukrainian statehood — the Zaporozhian *Sich*, a fully autonomous military region—and nullified were all its autonomous rights (1775). For reasons unknown — be

¹ Historians and jurists evaluate the international and legal status of the Pereyaslav Treaty of January 8, 1654, in various ways. Of these various interpretations most popular is the one which considers this treaty to have been one of a protectorate over the Ukrainian State of the Muscovite Czar in his capacity as head of an Orthodox monarchy. The author of this article is inclined, however, to accept the theory of Prof. Dr. Socrat Ivanytsky that this treaty established only a religious protectorate of the Czar as the defender of the Orthodox faith, and not a political protectorate, and that the military articles of this treaty derived from its religious-defensive character. See: Dr. Socrat Ivanytsky, *The Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654. The Legal Status of the Relationship of the Two Contracting Parties*. Scranton, 1954.

they of historical irony or superstition — the articles of the Pereyaslav Treaty relating to the independence of the Ukrainian Kozak State continued to be carried in the cumulative code of laws of the Russian empire.

The Russian intellectual class, since the days of Peter I, raised by Czarism in an autocratic fashion, helped the Czars to establish the monolith of the empire. It contrived a new slogan: "One Czar, one religion, one people," and popularized it throughout the conquered lands as well as in Muscovy-Russia proper. All the unique, national traits of the vanquished and subjugated peoples were to be wiped from the face of the earth. As a rule, with very few exceptions, this slogan was worshipped by all classes of Russian intellectuals who put it in force by all available means. On the other hand, the West European democratic ideas brought about by the Great French Revolution began to bud amidst the Russian intellectual class. But in the prevailing atmosphere of autocracy, under the scepter of the Czar and his ministers, these ideas acquired peculiar characteristics.

The slogan "One Czar, one Orthodox religion, one people" was modified into the seemingly democratic "one central and centralized authority, one common faith, and one Russian people." This admixture of democratic ideas with the traditional autocratic tenets was at the base of all attempts to modify the government of the Russian empire, belying its alleged kinship with the West European democratic ideas. The program of a revolutionary attempt in 1825 demonstrates this point.² The revolutionary organization, which intended to seize power with the help of military officers, was in its prepared constitution determined to keep the Russian empire intact, disregarding the problem of the subjugated non-Russian nations to the point of not even offering them some sort of a federation.

The subsequent development of the political liberation ideas of the Slavic peoples, subjugated by four empires — the German, Austrian, Turkish, and Russian — found its travesty among the greater part of the Russian intellectual class in the form of Russian Slavophilism. This "good will to all Slavs" was manifested in the form of a slogan calling for the unification of all Slav peoples under the scepter of the Russian "white Czar." Thus the liberation idea of the Western Slavs merely became another driving force for a new imperialistic enterprise of Russia.

² The revolutionary attempt of December 26, 1825 in St. Petersburg. Hence the name of this movement: *Decabrist*.

The newly-established Russian political parties of the second half of the nineteenth century supported in fact the imperialism and colonialism of Czardom, discarding in reality their "popular" and "democratic" tenets. Some of them advocated a revolution against Czardom which would employ individual terror against the Czarist dynasty and its outstanding ruling representatives. But, as a rule, they did not consider that the subjugated peoples, after the envisioned downfall of the autocratic rule, should have the right to decide their own destiny. Instead, they strove to preserve Russia in its imperial Czarist boundaries. The exception of one of the revolutionaries, M. Bakunin, who advocated freedom for subjugated nations, only confirms the above-mentioned rule.³

The Ukrainian national movement of that time, which struggled to regain for Ukraine its political rights previously guaranteed by Czar Alexei, found no support whatever from the Russian intellectual class nor from its political parties. While opposing just the autocracy of the Czar, the Russian intellectual class, and especially its leading literary men expressed themselves at one and the same time as being in favor of the widening imperialistic and aggressive policies of the Czarist government. As if this were not enough, the outstanding men of Russian literature, led by Vissarion Belinsky, demanded even sterner measures to be taken against a group of Ukrainian intellectuals who, in the 1840s, on a direct order of the Czar himself, were arrested and given harsh sentences for advocating freedom for all Slavic nations, including Ukraine, and the establishment of national republics in a free union of all Slavic peoples.⁴

Thus, having this moral support of the Russian intellectuals in their effectual leadership, the autocratic Czarist government could easily repel all national and cultural endeavors of the subjugated non-Russian nations. According to the official census of the Czarist empire, Russia proper accounted for only 40 per cent of the total population. Non-Russian nations constituted an overwhelming majority of the population of the empire, but each nation separately was smaller in comparison with the Russian. Largest were the U-

³ This undemocratic stand of Russian democracy up to the year 1880 has been thoroughly and penetratingly examined by the Ukrainian scholar, Prof. Michael Drahomaniv in his work *Istoričeskaja Pol'shcha i velikorusskaja demokratija* (Historical Poland and Great Russian Democracy), Geneva, 1882.

⁴ V. Belinsky, commenting on the verdict against renowned Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, who was condemned to serve as a private in the Ural regiments and forbidden to write or paint, stated that he would have given him a much stiffer sentence.

krainian, Polish, and the Byelorussian nations. The majority of the non-Russian nations, from the point of view of the totality of human culture, constituted an enriching and civilizing value. At the time of their subjugation these peoples were on a markedly higher cultural, political, and civilization level than Muscovy-Russia proper. At the end of the sixteenth century the Ukrainians developed the first really democratic republic in Central and Eastern Europe in the form of the Zaporozhian Kozak State, which in 1648 extended its holdings to include almost the entire ethnographic territory of Ukraine, with *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky as head of this Ukrainian Kozak State. Poland's aristocratic democracy of the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries with its elective King evolved into a modern bourgeois-democratic constitutional monarchy in the second half of the eighteenth century. With the tacit consent or at times even outright acclaim on the part of the Russian intellectuals, the Czarist government was able with redoubled energy to demolish the civilizations of the subjugated countries and to destroy their cultures. The Czarist regime, pursuing its program of "one Czar, one religion, and one people," applied various tactics with regard to the various subjugated peoples. The principle of these tactics might be characterized by the saw: "do not bite more than you can chew, since by doing so you could cause a deadly sickness: a joint revolution of the non-Russian nations." Hence, the Czarist government decided to digest Ukraine first, thereafter Poland and the other subjugated countries in turn.

Russian Czardom applied the severest possible measures against Ukraine. Precisely in this period of the second half of the nineteenth century, when on the surface of Russian life under Czarist autocracy the talk and writing about liberal-democratic reforms hit their peak — the final assault against the Ukrainian people as a separate national-cultural entity had begun. Right after the abolition of peasant serfdom in 1861, a reform which won the praise of the Russian intellectuals as the cornerstone of still newer and more far-reaching liberal reforms, the Czarist government issued a ban on the literary output of the Ukrainian people. At first, Czarist Minister Pyotr Valuev, by means of a circularized order to all *gubernial* and local governments throughout the entire empire, "explained" to them that they should remember at all times in their administrative practice that "there never was, is, and never shall be" a Ukrainian nation. The first measure undertaken in this regard was a ban against publication of any works whatsoever in the Ukrainian language which

could get into the hands of the people. From that time on until 1905 there existed in the Russian empire a rigorous censorship on all printed matter. It meant that an author or publisher had to submit his manuscript to the censor, who had the right to eliminate certain passages or even to proscribe the entire work. As regards Ukrainian works Minister Valuev issued a secret instruction that they be not passed at all if their contents were not strictly scientific in nature and were not limited in number of pages. This directive was issued on July 30, 1863. It constituted the next to the last step in the deliberate crime of genocide against Ukraine.

Soon this measure was deemed inadequate. On May 18, 1876, Czar Alexander II himself signed an executive order (*ukase*) with the power of a law which banned the use of the Ukrainian language in any printed form whatsoever, the importation of Ukrainian books printed abroad, the use of the Ukrainian language in any office, court, school, the Church, at public assemblies, in theaters and concert halls. With this genocidal order of Alexander II — the “liberal Czar” in the eyes of Russian historians — the Ukrainian people as a national-cultural entity were to have been destroyed once and for all and their spiritual creativity stamped out forever. Through this anti-cultural measure the “one Russian nation” was to have been enlarged by several tens of millions of Ukrainians. It is self-evident that from that moment on the Czarist administration would not permit the formation not only of a political but even a purely cultural or church organization of Ukrainian national character.

This genocidal policy of the Russian Czars between 1876 and 1905 had been applied only to the great Ukrainian people, the largest in Eastern Europe after the Russian. Persecution and restrictions dogged the other non-Russian peoples inside the empire: the Poles, Latvians, Letts, Estonians, Georgians, Armenians, Jews, and others. The Jews were forbidden to migrate across an arbitrary line that ran across the middle of the empire, and they were subjected to bloody *pogroms*, organized by an extreme nationalist Russian group known as the “Black Hundred.” No other non-Russian nation, however, was forbidden the use of its own language in print or public functions, nor was its national Church organization (or synagogue) liquidated. This treatment was accorded the Ukrainians only. “The liberal Czar” and his government, supported by the above-mentioned Russian social strata, anticipated that in the period of approximately a generation, (25-30 years), the Ukrainian people as a distinct national entity would be buried forever in the grave of historical non-

existence. These expectations did not materialize; nevertheless, this genocidal policy inflicted immense losses on the Ukrainian people. They were spiritually crippled, and quite intentionally were brought to the point that in 1917 seventy percent were illiterate.

OCTOBER 10, 1905 — MARCH, 1917

Internal social contradictions among the Russian people, the national resistance of the subjugated non-Russian peoples and the defeat of Russian imperialism on the field of battle in Manchuria in 1904-1905 — all brought about widespread revolutionary unrest throughout the entire expanse of the Russian empire. Up to the time of this uprising no change of attitude had occurred on the part of Czarism and the larger part of the Russian intellectual class as far as the genocidal policy against Ukraine was concerned. When "Czar-the-Liberator" Alexander II issued his *ukase* in 1876, which, forbidding the use of the Ukrainian language in all public life, was unprecedented in human history—of all the contemporary Russian intellectuals with a liberal tinge Turgenev alone protested against this cultural genocide. Inwardly, a compact majority of the Russian liberals exulted in their nationalistic Russian feelings of megalomania that, with the hands of the Czar, whom they assailed, the "dirty politics" of unifying Russification of the entire empire was being brought about, making the empire ripe for a Russian democratic unification at a later date.

Thus, without its own press, its own language in the church, its own schools, theaters, or concerts the Ukrainian nation was to suffocate. But as a matter of fact, when an entire generation came and went after the *ukase* of 1876 and the Ukrainian nation stubbornly continued to breathe under the pressure of the autocratic Czarist regime, — some nobler minds and more tender hearts were found in the Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg. In 1904 these savants issued a scientific ruling in the name of this Academy which — contrary to the thesis of the Czarist Minister Valuev that "there never was, is, or ever shall be" a Ukrainian people—maintained that this nation did and does exist, has continued to develop its cultural creativity throughout the ages and that its language is not a dialect of the Russian, but is an independent Slavic language. These academicians had not only apparently intellectual knowledge but intellectual conscience as well.

This opinion of the Russian Academy, issued on the verge of the first mass revolution upon the entire territory of the Russian

empire, the underground rumblings of which were already to be heard and felt by keen minds, failed to produce any desirable effect as far as Czarist legislation was concerned. The Czarist regime did not recall its *ukase* forbidding public use of the Ukrainian language. However, the people of Eastern (Dnieper) Ukraine, living under Czarist Russian autocracy, had no intention of being extinguished or dissolved in the Russian ethnic sea. Their cultural, national and political activities continued at the cost of increased effort and many more difficulties, since they all were carried out clandestinely. Minor works were printed secretly right inside the borders of the empire, while large editions were published in the neighboring Austrian empire, where the Ukrainian people were recognized by the constitution and enjoyed equal rights with all other national entities of this monarchy. There existed freedom of the press and scholarship. Works by Ukrainian intellectuals, living under the Czarist regime, were printed here and transported illegally into Russian-occupied Ukraine. In the Austrian-dominated Western Ukraine, for the most part political works of the recently-established political parties were published and smuggled across the Russian border for clandestine distribution by fellow members among the people. Although a whole generation had passed since the Czarist *ukase*, in 1899 in Russian-occupied Ukraine, the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party was established, composed mainly of youth, whose program featured the slogan: Independent Ukraine. An entire assortment of Ukrainian political parties was established there after the West European pattern: a socialist party with a labor background; socialist with the ethical tendencies of all working people; liberal-democratic and nationalist.⁵

Owing to their illegal status all cultural activities in Ukraine were severely hampered. Only underground political organizations could carry on their activities, i. e., they could rely only on a network of local organizations which were extremely limited in membership. In addition, this kind of activity entailed much expense and sacrifice on the part of the members, who in great numbers eventually were put in jails and deported to Siberia.

An opposition democratic movement of Russians themselves in Russia proper and the fierce resistance of nationally suppressed

⁵ The full denomination of these socialist parties was: the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Marxist); the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries (non-Marxist and ethical socialism); the Ukrainian People's Party (with nationalistic tendencies).

peoples like the Ukrainians and Poles, on the one hand, and, on the other, defeats on the fields of battle in Asia, in Manchuria, brought about a general feeling of uncertainty, strikes and revolutionary action throughout the entire empire. The last autocratic monarchy in Europe became apprehensive lest it perish in this revolutionary movement. Therefore, it decided to compromise in an effort to appease the masses. For the purpose of pacification the Czar, on the advice of his ministers, issued his constitutional manifesto on October 30, 1905. In it he promised henceforth to rule the empire according to laws passed by an elected peoples' representative body (*Duma*). Moreover, the Czar guaranteed personal civil liberties, including freedom of the press and assembly.⁶

When these promises, including the prospect of the *Duma* as a source of reforms, had their desired effect, then the Czar arbitrarily limited his promises in consecutive constitutional decrees. Nevertheless, as a result of the October 30th manifesto, for the first time since 1876 the Ukrainian national, cultural, religious and political activity emerged into the open. In addition, public economic enterprises as well as professional organizations of workers and farmers were established. Promptly Ukrainian newspapers and books were published, mass educational associations were organized, and private schools, the Ukrainian Scientific Society in Kiev, and Ukrainian political parties begun to function in the open.

But for the Ukrainians it proved only a short respite. Soon reactionaries became dominant in the administration throughout the entire empire. The lasting concession as far as Ukrainians were concerned, was the cancellation of the 1876 *ukase* which forbade the use of the Ukrainian language. Everything else reverted to its original condition. The Ukrainian language was not allowed in the primary public schools in Ukraine, and private schools did not receive public accreditation. Theaters, it is true, could function and Ukrainian choirs could give concerts, but in the churches sermons could not be delivered in Ukrainian. The entire educational apparatus could function only privately, without official accreditation. The existing U-

⁶ At that time in Russia the old Julian calendar was in official use which was 13 days behind the Gregorian (sun) calendar. Therefore, the date of the Czar's manifesto was October 17. Later on a conservative-democratic party was formed which called itself "the Party of the 17th of October" and hence the popular designation *Oktiabrysty* (October—*oktiabr* in Russian). Another, more liberal party was that of "constitutional democrats (*konstitutsiyniye demokraty*—*k.d.*) members of which were called *KaDety*. Subsequently this party changed its name to the "Party of National Liberty."

krainian press was burdened with heavy censorship, and for each administratively candid word editors and publishers were punished with high monetary penalties and prison sentences. This financially ruined a considerable part of the press. The establishment of Ukrainian educational associations was hampered by administrative chicanery, especially in the small towns and villages. Nevertheless, the determination of the awakened people surmounted all these difficulties of the so-called constitutional Czarist regime.

Again it is to be stressed here that the leading Russian liberal-democratic class did not come to the defense of the thus restricted and suppressed Ukrainian people. Although the programs of these parties contained articles calling for the fight for the individual rights of the citizen, no mention was made of national rights and their defense. In fact, the programs of the Russian socialist parties had slogans relating to the right of peoples for self-determination, which slogans were adopted by the Second Socialist International, but they were interpreted in a diametrically opposite sense. As the best tactical wisdom of the socialist class workers' movement: a tenet was proclaimed which stipulated that the socialists of a ruling nation should recognize the right of a subjugated nation to self-determination, including the right of secession into an independent nation, but, on the other hand, that the socialists of a subjugated nation should, in the interests of the proletariat, vigorously fight against the realization of this right and should maintain the necessity for a subjugated nation to remain in the framework of the alien great power. This "dialectical" principle of Marxism was expressed by Lenin himself in a debate with some Ukrainian social-democrats before World War I.⁷

The relative possibility of such limited political and cultural freedom for the Ukrainians under Czarist rule did not exist for a long time anyway (lasting only eight and a half years). All this was wiped away with one order at the outbreak of World War I.

To be underscored at this point is that the Ukrainian political leadership in Russian-occupied Ukraine was oriented at this time of ripening world conflict towards the Western *Entente* of Britain and France, of which Russia also was a part. These Ukrainian leaders were convinced that a victory of the *Entente* over the German and Austrian monarchies would end with the victorious Western

⁷ This thesis of Lenin on the solution of the nationality problem on a later date was sharply and satirically analyzed by the Ukrainian Communist Vasyl Shakhrai in his book: *Do khvyli* (Concerning the Present), Saratov, 1919.

democracy influencing the Russian Czarist regime towards a democratization of the Russian empire and the granting of more freedom for its subjugated peoples. Therefore, with the outbreak of war in August, 1914, the daily *Rada*, organ of the Ukrainian liberal-democratic group, issued a declaration that Ukrainians under Russia ought loyally fulfill their military duties in the fight against Germany and Austria. A similar declaration was issued by the editorial staff of the magazine *Ukrainskaya Zhizn* (Ukrainian Life), headed by S. Petlura, its contributors mostly of socialist persuasion (V. Vynnychenko, V. Levynsky and others). But this loyal attitude of the Ukrainian political leadership in Russia did not evoke a corresponding attitude on the part of the Czarist Russia regime. Immediately, in August, 1914, with the aid of the police the Russian government closed down all Ukrainian newspapers and publishing offices and dissolved all educational associations. The *ukase* of 1876 again came into full force.

As one of the far-reaching imperialist goals set forth by the Czarist Russian regime in connection with World War I was the "liberation" from Austria of Polish Western Galicia and of the Ukrainian lands — Eastern Galicia, Bukovina and Carpathian Ukraine. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich, promised autonomy to the Poles, including the old Russian Province ("The Congress Poland"), and he exhorted the Ukrainian population to confluence with the "great Russian people." In accordance with this policy, in all above-mentioned Ukrainian lands where in the years 1914-1916 the Russian army established its occupational administration, the Ukrainian press, schools, libraries, and educational associations were destroyed at once, and the core of Ukrainian lay and religious intelligentsia, including Metropolitan Andrew Sheptytsky, was imprisoned and deported. Ukrainianhood within the boundaries of the Russian empire, it is clear, was to have been destroyed according to the aims of the 1876 *ukase*.

Such conditions prevailed from August, 1914, until March, 1917. At that time internal political differences among the Russian society, military defeats on the fronts, confusion of the reactionary imperial administration in the rear, with its lack of provisions and bread and, last but not least, an acute sense of injustice on the part of all subjugated non-Russian nations — brought about, unexpectedly for the regime, the outbreak of the revolution in the capital, Petrograd.

During only 4 days of fighting March 9 to 12, 1917, it became obvious that the police forces were too weak to quell this bold rebellion of the working masses of Petrograd.⁸ Indeed, by March 12, the rebels had succeeded in disarming the entire police force. The situation could have been saved only by the army. According to an order issued by the Czar himself, Gen. Khabalov, military commander

⁸ The details of the first disorder, which later on changed over into a political demonstration against the government and culminated in revolutionary action against the police, are very important. These details point to a complete incompetence of the then existing administration of the capital and of the central Czarist government. First of all, it must be kept in mind that during the war the Cabinets of Ministers changed very often. In January, 1916, the Cabinet under the leadership of Goretmikin resigned and was replaced by the Cabinet of Premier Stuermer. In November, 1916, Stuermer resigned and was followed by Trepov. In December, 1916, Golitzin replaced Trepov. This demonstrates that the Czar, who nominated the Cabinet without the approval of the *Duma*, very often wavered in his confidence towards his own ministers. On March 6, 1917, the management of the large Putilov industrial concern which was supplying the army dismissed over 40,000 of its workers owing to a lack of raw material. This caused dissatisfaction among the 40,000 employees, left without work and any means of livelihood. The dismissed workers tried to get the rest of the employees out on strike in order to force the management into a reversal of its action. Simultaneously, there was a shortage of bread in the capital. The city administration bungled the supplying of needed wheat and flour for the capital. On March 8 the bakeries sold ration quantities of bread and were besieged by long lines of women. The latter began to demonstrate against the administration not only at the stores but throughout the city. The dismissal of 40,000 workmen, the lack of bread and the ensuing demonstration of the women led to a general strike in the capital and political demonstrations by workmen demanding a change of government and of the entire system. Clashes between the police and the demonstrators erupted, with police firing at the mob. Mounted units were called in but could not contain the ever-increasing mass of demonstrators. At the same time the Czar dissolved the *Duma* because it was demanding a change of the Cabinet for one which would have its confidence. This action of the Czar increased the opposition of the deputies at this critical time. The President of the *Duma*, Rodzianko, advised the Czar to dismiss his Cabinet and to appoint another which would have the confidence of the *Duma* and the people at large. The Czar ignored these telegrams of the President of the *Duma*, and instead ordered Gen. Khabalov, military commander of the capital, to send troops at his command (up to 100,000 soldiers) into the streets to crush mercilessly all revolutionary outbreaks. On March 11 Gen. Khabalov ordered up three Regiments: the Volhynian, Izmailsky, and Preobrazensky, composed of drafted Ukrainian soldiers, to march against the mob. A similar order was given to the Lithuanian Regiment, which also contained many Ukrainians. The three mentioned regiments refused to obey, and on the morning of the second day, March 12, crossed over to the side of the revolution. The Lithuanian Regiment followed suit. This action of the three Ukrainian regiments decided the fate of Czarism: on March 12, 1917, Czarism fell in the capital, never to rise again,

of the capital, called for the elite military regiments stationed in the capital, the so-called Guardsmen. The day of March 12, 1917 was to be a decisive one as far as the fate of the revolution in Russia was concerned. It was at this moment that three regiments: the Volhynian, Izmailsky and Preobrazhensky, composed almost entirely of Ukrainian soldiers, determined the whole matter. Under the influence of a clandestine organization of Ukrainian social-democrats operating inside the regiments and led by S. Avdienko and Haydar, the soldiers ignored Khabalov and went over to the other side of the barricade: against Czarist Russia. Later on other military units, also under the influence of the above-mentioned Ukrainian clandestine organization, followed suit. As it was ascertained later on after the victory of the revolutionary forces in Petrograd, in all the 60 military units, stationed in the capital, Ukrainian social-democrats had the decisive influence, since consequently they all were elected to the Council of Military Deputies. Even the unit of palace guards, consisting of Kuban Kozaks, descendants of Ukrainian Zaporozhian Kozaks, went over to the side of the revolutionary forces.

Without the active participation of these military units, the revolutionary tide would have subsided and the revolution itself would have been drowned in a sea of blood. The revolution succeeded thanks to the action of the military regiments, consisting of Ukrainian soldiers, led by conscientious Ukrainian patriots. Following the capital's example, everything that was associated with autocratic Czarism throughout the empire went under.

Therefore, it was the Ukrainians who, inspired by their national struggle against Czarism, helped to bring about the victory of the all-Russian revolution in March of 1917.⁹

The course of the revolution in Russia-proper went on according to its own specific nature. It was a political revolution. It had to decide the political structure of Russia. All questions were to be

⁹ The decisive role of the Volhynian Regiment, composed of Ukrainian soldiers, as the first regular army unit to join the revolutionary forces, is attested to by a series of documents. Alexander Kerensky also confirmed this fact in his book on the history of the revolution in Russia: *A. Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point*, New York, 1965, p. 195. Ukrainian sources on this matter are quite abundant. The two mentioned leaders of the named regiments, Avdienko and Haydar, later on were delegates to the All-Ukrainian National Congress in Kiev, April 19-24, 1917, and were elected honorary members of the presidium of this congress because of their exploits. For this and other statements, see reprints from the contemporary Kievan press in the *Herald of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine* for the year 1917, pp. 295 ff.

decided with the Russian people as the ruling nation. In the first months of the revolution no particular socio-reforming slogans were brought forward. The empire was ruled by a conservative-democratic regime, which only slowly developed a liberal-democratic trend with socialists taking part in the government and even leading it.

We should, nevertheless, not forget that in the period of March 9th to March 12th, 1917, on the streets of the capital of the Russian empire two parallel revolutionary trends came into being: *one* — the Russian political revolutionary movement, and the *other* — the Ukrainian revolutionary movement. In those days they had a common initial goal: the elimination of Czarism. But though one victory was won the aims of the one revolution did not coincide with the aims of the other revolution.

The Russian revolution in its original premise was solely political, since it strove to change the autocratic Czarist system of government inside the boundaries of the great empire created by Czarist conquests. In the camp of this Russian revolution sprang up various ideas about the degree of reforms of the existing Russian system of government. Desire for fundamental changes of some facets of economic and social systems could also have been felt. Out of this welter of opinion inside the Russian revolutionary camp and the events of the revolutionary process, various trends evolved which competed in the shaping of the political future inside the former empire. We shall mention here only that besides the democratic-social Russian Provisional Government, the official leader of the entire revolutionary process in the former empire, a well-defined conservative revolutionary trend had seceded from this camp. Headed by Gen. Kornilov, this movement, after his death, continued under the leadership of Generals Aleksiev, Denikin, and Admiral Kolchak. Parallel with this conservative revolutionary movement another trend, the dictatorial Bolshevik one, asserted itself with the intent to seize power in the entire former empire for the purpose of communist experimentation at a later date.

The entire Russian revolutionary camp, including all of the above-mentioned exponents of its main currents, had, from the very beginning of the victory in Petrograd in March, 1917, conflicted with the Ukrainian revolution. The latter revolution had helped the Russian; they together eliminated Czarism, the common enemy. But each of these revolutions had its own further aims which were basically contradictory. The Russian revolution sought to preserve the former empire undivided, changing only the *form* of its central government.

The Ukrainian revolution, as early as the second day after the victory, strove to restore the national rights of Ukraine, lawlessly cancelled by the Czars. In conjunction with this the Ukrainian national revolution proposed an extensive program for the rebuilding of all Eastern Europe in the form of a voluntary union of national states, i.e., its program was basically in opposition to the aims of Russia's indivisible revolutionary policy.

That is why we have in Eastern Europe since March, 1917, a history of *two distinct revolutions* which have had and still continue to have entirely contrary goals. These contradictory aims determined the subsequent relationship between Ukraine and Russia, especially in the turbulent period between March and November, 1917, that is, until the moment when the interior struggle for political power inside the Russian revolution ended with the victory of the Bolshevik trend on November 7th. The latter continued the policy of its Czarist predecessor in the struggle against the Great Ukrainian National Revolution, which revolution managed to achieve its planned restoration of the Ukrainian state in the form of the Ukrainian National Republic. Finally, this Russian-Ukrainian relationship culminated in the declaration of war on the part of Soviet Russia against the Ukrainian National Republic on December 17, 1917.

A review of the course of events between Ukraine and Russia from March to December, 1917 may prove to be enlightening for the entire Western world.

THE UNITED STATES IN LENIN'S IMAGE

By STEPHAN M. HORAK

Because of the peculiar nature of the Soviet system, Lenin's writings, even today, have an enormous impact upon formation of opinion and understanding of facts for the two hundred million people in the USSR. Compulsory studies of Marxism-Leninism at all levels in Soviet schools contribute greatly to popularization of Lenin's views. Moreover, the almost total lack of opposing or differing views deepens the overwhelming force of Lenin's interpretations, including the image of America as it appears in his voluminous writings. Because his political writings have assumed dogmatic strength, Lenin has become for Soviet writers the highest authority for a wide variety of subjects beyond the scope of political action. It has become standard practice to quote Lenin, and no one in his right mind would dare to disagree with unimpeachable Vladimir Illich.

Although technological progress has made our world smaller, this has not necessarily affected the Soviet conception of the outside world.¹ The best source of information on anything outside the Soviet Union—first-hand experience—is still out of range for the average Soviet citizen. In 1960 only 673 Soviets tourists had the privilege of visiting the United States. On the other hand, 14,209 Americans travelled to the Soviet Union that same year.² In 1963 only 96 individual Russian tourists went to the United States and about 1,700 more were permitted to go in delegations as athletes, artists, writers and scholars.³ The true impressions of even these travelers are rarely made known to their fellow citizens; their reports must serve a different purpose.

¹ A Standard work describing the Soviet people's image of the U.S.A.: Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Image of the United States: A Study in Distortion*. New York, 1950.

² Mary Jane Moody, "Tourists in Russia and Russians Abroad," *Problems of Communism*, XIII, (1967), No. 6, p. 5.

³ J. A. Livingston, "Russians Treat Tourism as Investment," *The Courier-Journal* (Louisville, Kentucky) September 2, 1964.

Thus Lenin and the official Soviet propaganda machine dominate the mass media which to a very great degree determine the Soviet citizen's image of the U.S.,⁴ an unflattering and ominous image which is reflected daily in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*.

Lenin, as so many Russian radicals before him,⁵ paid special attention to America. During his exile, he undertook special studies on American agriculture and capitalism.⁶

Lenin's writings on America indicate a drastic shift in attitude. There is evidence which shows that, prior to 1917, Lenin believed in the possibility that the United States and Britain could achieve socialism without violent revolution. This view gave way in 1917 to one diametrically opposite, and was expressed in his well-known pamphlet *State and Revolution*, in which he argued that the British and American states "had become police machines which must be smashed in order to carry out a people's revolution."⁷

Thus, in 1963, a lengthy article by Zubok, "V.I. Lenin on American Imperialism and the Worker's Movement in the U.S.A.,"⁸ serves the purpose of denigrating the American system. As Lenin observed, the "United States has become one of the first countries which shows the wide gulf between a handful of millionaires, insolent, choking

⁴ A typical official Soviet presentation of the United States and its society aimed at Soviet readers, can be found in A. Kirsanov's *Americanski obraz zhizni bez prikras*. Moscow, 1963. Furthermore, and perhaps of greater weight in informing the individual, is the description of the United States in *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia* (The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia). Over two hundred million people will at one time or another be exposed to images and ideas expressed therein. Seldom has such distortion been practiced with so much devotion, or on such a scale. Thanks to the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, the greater parts of sections of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia dealing with American history are now available in the English translation: *A Soviet View of the American Past; An Annotated Translation of the Section on American History in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia*. Chicago, 1960.

⁵ On the attitude of nineteenth century Russian radicals toward America see: D. Hecht, *Russian Radicals Look to America, 1825-1914*. Harvard University Press, 1927.

⁶ V. I. Lenin, "Kapitalizm i zemledelenie v Soedinenykh Shtatakh Ameriki," *Sochineniia*, (4th ed.) Vol. 22, pp. 5-89. English text in *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, pp. 13-102. Manuscript had been completed in 1915 and first published in Petrograd in 1917.

⁷ In another article "The Agrarian Program of the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07," Lenin discusses agrarian and political implications in the U.S., Britain, Germany and Russia.

⁸ L. I. Zubok, "V.I. Lenin ob amerikanskom imperializme i rabochem dvizhenii S.Sh.A." *Novaya i noveishaia istoriia* (1963) No. 2, pp. 50-64.

in dirt and luxury, on the side, and millions of working people, externally living on the borders of poverty, on the other.”⁹

Zubok is able to write with authority: “The position of supremacy of the largest corporations in the United States, half a century after the appearance of Lenin’s great work about imperialism,¹⁰ expressly confirms his position that ‘ten thousand of the largest enterprises have everything; millions of small enterprises — nothing.’”

AMERICAN CAPITALISM

To Lenin, America was “the leading country of modern capitalism,” because of the country’s advanced industrial stage and because of the vastness of its territory. Economically, he divided the territory into three major areas: the homestead west, the industrial north, and the former slave-owning south. Analyzing all three areas from the position of Marxism, he foresaw a “growth of capitalism in American agriculture and an increase in the employment of hired labor, which is proceeding at a faster pace than the growth of the rural population and of the number of farmers.” Precisely the opposite development had taken place some years later: the technological and industrial progress soon resulted in a decline of hired farm labor, and capitalism in America remained elastic rather than static.

Lenin viewed American capitalism as a two-pronged force: on the one hand extremely progressive and even leading all other countries—“the greatest development of technology, the greatest speed of progress — all of these compel Europe to reach out for the Yankees.”¹¹ On the other hand, in Lenin’s judgment, “a small group of not millionaires, but billionaires, brazenly rules a whole nation in in slavery and captivity.”¹²

Lenin’s negation of the existence of political freedom in the greatest democratic republic followed his observation that since “all the factories, plants, banks and all the wealth of the country belong to the capitalists and side by side with the democratic republic we see the servitude of millions of workers and the hopeless poverty, then it is to be asked: Where is your celebrated equality

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 50, otherwise, V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia*, Vol. 28, p. 45.

¹⁰ *Imperialism, kak novoiushii etap kapitalizma* was written in 1916 in Switzerland and published in 1917 in Petrograd. English text in *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, pp. 187-304.

¹¹ Lenin, *Soch.* (4th ed.) Vol. 18, p. 556.

¹² *Ibid.*, Vol. 28, p. 71.

and brotherhood?"¹³ Then proclaiming emphatically: "No! If 'democrats' rule here there is unvarnished and authentic robbery. We know the true nature of the so-called democrats."¹⁴

Lenin's identification of political freedom with abolition of private ownership — which is the essence of Marxism — led soon, in his own "first socialist state," to the elimination of personal freedom, reaching its peak in the years of Stalin's purges and terror. Lenin, obsessed by Marxist philosophy, could not grasp the very nature of freedom of which ownership is just a part and, more, a tangible symbol of one's independence and security.

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Lenin did not accept the American thesis of political freedom and equality before the law. He saw two unequal major groups: "Statistics calculate the number of families in America to be about 16 million. Of these, less than half a million belong to the group of capitalists. The remaining mass of the people are hired slaves or small farmers who are oppressed by capital, etc."¹⁵

To support his arguments, he applied the income scale of the workers in different groups, concluding that the income per worker—in 1910—amounted to \$500 per year; that of capitalists, \$11,000 per year. "A half million capitalist families receive an income larger than almost nine million worker families."¹⁶

Referring to the experience of other countries, Lenin predicted that in America "there can be no escape from the yoke of capitalism unless the communal type of agriculture will succeed."¹⁷

Lenin's recommendations to transplant the "mir" system of the Russian villages to the American soil seem strange indeed. He should have known that even in Russia the unfortunate "mir" accounted at least partly for the failure to meet Russia's agricultural needs at the beginning of the twentieth century. Stolypin's reform had proved the superiority of individual farming over the collectives. American farming, moreover, has always been highly productive.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 19, p. 171 (article *Capitalism and Taxes* first published in *Pravda*, June 7, 1963).

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. 24, p. 465 (Speech on the Agrarian Question delivered at the First All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies, May 22, 1917).

Lenin's inadequate knowledge of the American society is indeed not surprising, one of the reasons being his lack of firsthand experience, another his extremely biased views rooted in his Marxist understanding of historical processes. His writings on American life are typical of a Marxist publicist who is painting a picture that is consistent with his sole purpose — to demonstrate the superiority of Marxism. Thus, the United States *a priori* was considered an adversary, a rival appearing on the horizon of contemporary history. American economic and political institutions seemed to be of greater danger to Lenin's philosophy than the European monarchies, which very often showed themselves incapable of meeting the new economic and social forces growing out of industrialization. His dogmatic mind refused to accept new developments as progressive. This is evident from his writings on the American agricultural system *in toto*. Another example is offered in Lenin's condemnation of the so-called Taylor system.¹⁸

All that Lenin saw in Taylor's methods — which in fact took into account progressive automation — was: "Of what does this scientific system consist? In this, to be able to squeeze out of the worker three times as much work during the course of the same working day."¹⁹

A man who had never spent a day in a modern factory either as a worker or as a manager could only fall back on the cant of "exploitation." The future leader of the Soviet state thus promised his workers the exclusion of new methods, retaining the outmoded and inefficient nineteenth century standards instead.

But Lenin was not so much concerned with the welfare of the workers. The worker was merely the prime vehicle for his experimental revolution, and the American worker must not be left out. The increasing circulation of the workers' newspaper, *The Appeal to Reason*, was quickly interpreted by Lenin as a signal for the approaching revolution.²⁰ In his "Letter to American Workers" of August 20, 1918, Lenin prophesied: "The American workers will not follow the bourgeoisie. They will be with us for civil war against the bourgeoisie. The whole history of the world and the American

¹⁸ Frederick W. Taylor (1856-1915), U.S. engineer known for his new method of tempering tool steel permitting metal-cutting operations at high speed and for new methods in the field of management, later known as scientific management.

¹⁹ Lenin, *Soch.*, Vol. 18, p. 556.

²⁰ Lenin, "The Successes of the American Workers," *Soch.*, Vol. 18, p. 307, first published in *Pravda*, September 18, 1912.

labor movement strengthens my conviction. . . I also recall the works of the American proletarian Eugene Debs, who wrote in *The Appeal to Reason* that he knows only one holy and, from the standpoint of the proletariat, legal war, namely: the war against the capitalists, the war for the liberation of mankind from wage slavery." ²¹

In this, as in other opinions about America, Lenin was proved wrong.

POLITICAL SYSTEM

Having arbitrarily separated the American society into two groups, "unequal in their rights," Lenin consequently did not believe in a democratic United States ruled by the will of the people. In comparing the Soviet state to the United States he states the former is "an example of true democracy" and the latter merely an apparatus for "exploitation."

In 1919, Lenin lectured students at Sverdlov University on the principles of democracy by comparing the United States with Soviet Russia. "Is the capitalistic state such as the democratic republics and especially such as Switzerland and America — the most democratic republics," he asked, "an expression of the people's will, a cumulation of public determination, an expression of the national will, etc. — or is the state a machine which helps capitalists wield their power over the working class and the peasantry? This is the basic question around which political controversies in the entire world now revolve. What does one say about Bolshevism? The bourgeois press abuses the Bolsheviks. . . nowhere does the power of capital, the power of a small group of millionaires over the entire society appear so flagrantly with such open graft as in America. Capital, once it exists, rules over the entire society; and no kind of democratic republic, nor any sort of suffrage, will change the essence of the matter." ²²

These democratic republics, in Lenin's opinion, fulfilled only one positive purpose: "They gave the proletariat the opportunity to achieve that unification, that solidarity which it has; to educate those well-disciplined ranks which carry on a systematic struggle with Capital." ²³

He regarded the constitutions of western democracies as formal expressions of amassing private property, and that is why "your

²¹ Lenin, *Soch.*, Vol. 28, p. 52.

²² *Ibid.*, Vol. 29, pp. 447, 449.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 449.

freedom is such that it is freedom on paper but not in fact." ²⁷ Accordingly, the freedom of assembly as guaranteed by the British and the American constitutions is yet another "deception because it binds the hands of the working masses, who are continually passing toward socialism." ²⁵

Little can be found in Lenin's *Collected Works* on the nature and function of the United States Congress. However, it may be safely assumed that his opinion did not differ from that expressed about the United States Constitution.

It is puzzling that Lenin should on no occasion have felt it necessary to look into the structure of political power in the United States and to see the role and place of the U.S. Congress. He never went beyond generalizations and propagandistic phraseology, which he generously employed when talking or writing on the subject of America.

Election of the president and other public officials was treated in his article "Results and Significance of the Presidential Elections in America."²⁶ Discussing the elections of 1912, Lenin wrote: "The world significance of the American elections consists not so much in the greatly increased number of Socialist votes ²⁷ as it does in the supreme crisis of the bourgeois parties, in the staggering force with which their decay has made its debut. The final significance of the elections is the extraordinarily clear and sharp appearance of bourgeois reformism, as a means of struggle against Socialism." Subsequently "explaining" the origin of the American political parties, Lenin draws the conclusion that the two-party system has failed in America because of the "growth of socialism, the force of the working class movement." ²⁸

Encouraged by Mr. Debs' relative success, Lenin emphatically passed on his Marxist judgment: "The old parties are the result of the epoch whose task lay in the fastest possible development of capitalism. The struggle of the parties came to this: how better to accelerate and facilitate this development. The new party is the result of the contemporary epoch, which raises a question about the very existence of capitalism. In America, the most free and most

²⁴ From a speech about the deception of the people through the use of the slogan of freedom and equality, delivered on May 18, 1919, at the all-Russian Congress on extra-scholastic education, *Soch.*, Vol. 29, pp. 311-351.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Lenin, *Soch.*, Vol. 18, pp. 373-375.

²⁷ The socialist candidate Eugene Debs received 800,000 votes.

²⁸ Lenin, *Soch.*, Vol. 18, pp. 373-375.

advanced country, the question is becoming in turn clearer and more extensive... We will save capitalism through reforms — says this party (National Progressive Party)... It is clear that all reforms are an empty fraud. Roosevelt was deliberately hired by the multi-millionaire dodgers for the propagation of this fraud... But the American proletariat have already awakened and stand at their posts. They meet Roosevelt's success with brisk irony." ²⁹

In 1921, Lenin, to his great disappointment, had to acknowledge the fact that the American workers and the American Socialist Party were a far cry from the Soviet-Russian type of socialism. He bitterly complained: "Don't delude yourself, comrades, with regard to this name (of the party). It doesn't at all resemble what we in Russia call the Workers' and Peasants' Party. It is purely a bourgeois party, openly and decidedly hostile to every kind of socialism and acknowledged as completely acceptable by all of the bourgeois parties." ³⁰

Lenin refused to accept the fact that the overwhelming majority of Americans were supporting their government. Instead, he managed to spot a few radicals and pacifists as the "representatives of the working masses of Americans." He reacted with hate and contempt towards the official policy of the United States. "The American 'Republic' is stifling the working classes. Now all have found out what a democratic republic is. Now it is clear to everyone that either victorious imperialism or Soviet power will survive — there is no middle course." ³¹

On November 21, 1918, Lenin scored America for its role during the time of intervention: "The idealized democratic republic of Wilson proved in practice to be a form of the most rabid imperialism, the most shameless oppression and suppression of the weak and small nations... Either the Soviet government triumphs in every advanced country of the world, or the most reactionary imperialism triumphs, the most rabid imperialism which is stifling all small and weak nations and is reestablishing reaction all over the world... Anglo-American imperialism, which has perfectly mastered the art of using the form of the democratic republic. One or the other. There is no middle course." ³²

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ From the report to the VTsIK and SNK of the IXth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on December 23, 1921. *Soch.*, Vol. 33, p. 121.

³¹ From a speech at the meeting dedicated to the honor of V. I. Lenin, on November 20, 1918. *Soch.*, Vol. 28, p. 164.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 169.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Lenin was extremely critical of American foreign policy, particularly after 1917 when American policies were considered "imperialistic" due to the economic structure of the American society. Lenin's references concentrate on three major issues: 1) U.S. entrance in World War I, 2) the United States' role during war and peace settlements and 3) Soviet-American relations, including the period of intervention and afterwards, with special focus on the problem of concessions.

America's decision to enter the war on the side of the *Entente* Powers was born out of the desire to make "enormous profits," according to Lenin. As the United States was about to enter World War I, Lenin immediately referred to the origin of this "profit-making policy" by pointing to the American-Japanese conflict in the Pacific, asserting "that war has already been in preparation for some decades... and the real aim of America's entry into the war is preparation for the future war with Japan." ³³

But nothing compares with the outburst of Lenin's anger which was provoked by Wilson's decision to participate in the intervention and blockade of Soviet Russia: "This very day, the Anglo-French and American bourgeois newspapers are spreading lies and slander about Russia in millions of copies and are hypocritically justifying their predatory campaign against her on the plea that they want to 'protect' Russia from the Germans!" ³⁴

Lenin rejected out of hand the considerations that led to the intervention of the Allied Powers. "The Anglo-French and American imperialist vultures 'accuse' us of concluding an 'agreement' with German imperialism. What hypocrites! What scoundrels they are to slander the workers' movement, while shivering with fear at the sympathy displayed towards us by the workers of 'their' own countries. But their hypocrisy will be exposed." ³⁵

The failure of intervention and the end of the blockade immediately softened Lenin's vocabulary. This became obvious in his talk about economic relations with western countries and about

³³ *Ibid.*, *Soch.*, Vol. 24, p. 381.

³⁴ From the "Letter to the American Workers," *Soch.*, Vol. 28, p. 46.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

the concessions³⁶ which were desperately needed for the economic reconstruction of Soviet Russia. The unexpected but successful seizure of power in Russia necessitated a period of political respite in the area of foreign relations and also required economic aid from abroad to strengthen the domestic economy. Thus, Lenin, as in the case of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, was offered no choice; the frequently announced impending world revolution had not yet dawned, consequently revolutionary phraseology had to be toned down in order to bring about negotiations with the deeply-hated capitalist countries which, contrary to Marx' and Lenin's prophecies, showed no signs of withering away.

In a prepared answer to questions submitted by the correspondent of the American newspaper, *The Chicago Daily News*, Lenin, in the last days of October, 1919, categorically stated that "we are decisively for an economic agreement with America, and with all other countries, but especially with America."³⁷

Lenin was aware of the importance of trade relations with the United States, admitting that "we will need American industrial wares — locomotives, cars, etc. — more than the goods of any other country."³⁸

He went on to say: "I don't know any reason why such a Socialist state as ours cannot have unlimited business relations with capitalist countries. We are not against the capitalist locomotives and agricultural machinery; why do they have to be against our Socialist wheat, flax, and platinum? The Socialist brain is of the same taste as every other grain, isn't this so? Certainly, they are

³⁶ On the importance of concessions to the Soviet state, especially as far as the United States was concerned, Lenin elaborated extensively in a speech at the meeting of the Moscow organization of the RCP (B) on December 6, 1920. (*Soch.*, Vol. 31, pp. 410-429) and then again in his concluding remarks concerning the report on concessions at this same meeting (*Voprosy istorii KPSS*, VII [1963] No. 4, pp. 3-6). While reporting on Washington Vanderlip's interest in concessions and exploitation of Kamchatka (in the fall of 1920), Lenin repeatedly pointed to the possibility of a Japanese-American rivalry and even war which he would only welcome, for it would provide him with desperately needed time for the economic and military reconstruction of Soviet Russia. Besides, he believed that countries obtaining, or about to be granted, concessions would not be interested in another war against the Soviet state. Therefore, concessions were intended to serve a two-fold purpose: 1) to intensify economic reconstruction and 2) to secure politically the Soviet regime within Russia.

³⁷ *The Chicago Daily News*, October 27, 1919; *Soch.*, Vol. 30, pp. 32-33.

³⁸ "A Conversation with Correspondent Lincoln Ayre of the American newspaper, *The World*." *The World*, February 21, 1920; *Kommunist* (1957) No. 15.

going to deal with horrible Bolsheviks, i. e., with the Soviet government. However, for the American employers producing steel to have business relations with Soviets wouldn't be a more difficult task than when they had to deal with the *Entente* governments during the war, when they supplied them with military equipment." ³⁹

The Soviet-American trade was to take place on the condition of a certain *status quo* or under the terms of a "peaceful coexistence." "Let the American capitalists not disturb us. We will not disturb them. We are ready, even to pay them with gold for their useful machines for transport and production. Not only with gold, but with raw materials as well." ⁴⁰

Lenin's courtship with American industrial products need not necessarily be understood as a basic change in Soviet foreign policy, nor as a change in Lenin's attitude toward the United States. In this same press interview (February, 1920) the old hate of and aversion to all non-Communists emerged anew: "Because the capitalists are stupid and greedy, they have made so many stupid and greedy attempts to interfere that one must fear repetitions, until workers and peasants in every country 're-educate' their capitalists." ⁴¹

Undoubtedly, "re-education of capitalists" had to be accomplished on Soviet terms, since according to Lenin: "While Capitalism and Socialism remain, they cannot live together peacefully; either one or the other will finally win; the requiem will be sung either for the Soviet Republic or for world Capitalism. This is a postponement in war." ⁴²

It would be a serious error to insist that Lenin's views on the United States are no longer in step with official Soviet propaganda. Quite the contrary; Lenin's statements are widely quoted and his opinion is of fundamental importance in the writings of Soviet historians and in official publications. In documents issued by the XXII Congress of the CPSU the Soviet attitude toward the United States manifests itself this way: "American monopolistic capital, swelling on the yeast of war profits and the armaments race, seized the most important sources of raw material, of the market and of capital investment spheres, created a distinctive colonial empire, and became

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ "Answer to Questions of the Correspondent of the American newspaper *New York Evening Journal*." *N.Y.E.J.*, February 21, 1920, *Soch.*, Vol. 30, pp. 340-342.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Lenin, *Soch.*, Vol. 31, p. 427.

the largest world exploiter. American imperialism, hiding under the false flag of freedom and democracy, in reality fulfills the role of a world gendarme supporting reactionary dictatorial regimes, rotten to the core monarchies, speaking out against democratic revolutionary reforms, and unleashing aggression against people fighting for their independence."⁴³

Zubok strives to remain in accord with Lenin and emphatically concludes: "The vanguard of the American working class is the heroic Communist party of the USA, following Lenin's course, unselfishly defending the genuine national interests of the people of the United States."⁴⁴

The Soviet regime today, as in Lenin's days, maintains a double-minded position toward the United States. On the one hand it fosters the concept of "peaceful coexistence" as a protective measure against war, which could mean a total disaster for the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it pursues a policy of vilification of the United States, hoping to undermine the prestige of this nation not only among the peoples of the Soviet Union, but, through the channels of international Communism, strives everywhere to portray the American society and its institutions as an evil thing.

From this perspective the popularization of Lenin's heritage, naive, fanatic and hostile, must be treated as an extremely ominous development in the USSR. In the long run this can lead to an intolerable situation. We need only recall that Hitler's ill-conceived judgment about the American society and its political structure contributed its share to the outbreak of World War II.

⁴³ *Materialy XXII S'ezda KPSS*. Moscow, 1961, p. 341.

⁴⁴ Zubok, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

MOSCOW'S TRADITIONAL INTEREST IN THE ORIENT

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

It is admittedly difficult to analyze precisely the motives of the Soviet Union in interfering in or in becoming involved in the present crisis in the Near and Middle East and, in fact, in the whole of Southern Asia. These motives have varied in past years and have taken many shapes, claims and promises. However, as in so many other areas of Soviet diplomacy and interference since the rise of Communism and the putting forth of the theories of the present day, the net results have led to a curious fusion and almost an identification of its role with that which in different forms was played by the old Russian Empire and the sum total of all peoples included in it by the later consolidations and colonial ambitions of the rulers of Moscow. It may therefore be instructive to consider some of the efforts put forward by Moscow and later by St. Petersburg for Russian aggrandizement.

We may begin by recalling that from the earliest days of the Kievan Rus state and even centuries earlier two great trade routes crossed near Kiev. One was the land route from China to Western Europe. It passed through the Asian mountains, skirted the northern end of the Caspian Sea, ran between the Ural Mountains and the Black Sea and then, after crossing the Dnieper, went still further west to Western Europe. Merchants from the East called on various centers along this route which can be traced by the remains of those unfortunate travellers who failed to traverse it safely throughout the centuries. Over it passed spices, silks and other Asian luxuries that were in great demand. It was the cutting of this route that ended in the establishment of sea routes around Africa to India and the other rich lands of the East.

But there was another route, called the "Road from the Varangians to the Greeks." It ran from the northern lakes and gulfs with short portages down the Dnieper River to its mouth and from there to Constantinople and the ports on the Mediterranean Sea. The cutting of this route by the Polovtsi and other nomadic tribes brought about the weakening of the Kievan state and its trials and hardships.

To these times belong some of the so-called *byliny* and *staryny*, many of which deal with the East. Thus we have the tale of India the Rich, obviously reflecting the enigmatic story of Prester John, the Christian lord of Asia. To later times belong the stories of Opuniya, which seem to echo the missions of St. Francis Xavier and others. On even firmer ground we know that one Athanasi Nikitin, a merchant of Tver, actually spent some time in India during the fifteenth century before the breaking of the control of the Tatar Horde over Moscow.

Even before this, as early as the tenth century, the custom had grown of holding a yearly fair for the exchange of goods between East and West near the junction of the Oka and the Kama with the Volga. Merchants from Novgorod in their wanderings to the northeast approached the Suzdal-Moscow area, and from there it was relatively easy to go down the Volga, just as those starting due south went along the Dnieper. Later, when Moscow had broken the power of the Tatar Horde by the capture of Kazan, Nizhny flourished. It was only a few years later that the armies of Ivan the Terrible captured Astrakhan at the mouth of the Volga on the Caspian Sea. With the decline and capture of Constantinople and the impoverishment of the Ukrainian lands, this wholly new route to the interior of Asia promised a flow of Asian goods from the neighborhood of the Caspian Sea and from various nations, some Christian, like the Georgians and Armenians, and some Mohammedan, situated in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire and Iran or Persia.

This new route opened a new period for the ambitions of Moscow. It was not long before the princes of Georgia were seeking protection from Moscow against their non-Christian neighbors. In exchange they were able to offer goods of a type hitherto scarcely known in Moscow. Special relations between Moscow and Georgia were a natural consequence, setting the stage for the later complete subordination of Georgia.

The late sixteenth century saw the rise of two irregularly organized bodies of peasant adventurers who were later to play an important role in history. The more western group was composed of those Ukrainians who objected to the domination of the Poles in Ukraine and who later established an armed camp below the rapids of the Dnieper. Hunting and cultivating the broad steppes around that river, this group became known as the Zaporozhian Kozaks. They developed into a formidable fighting force even be-

fore they were fully organized by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, making many raids even on Constantinople and freeing thousands of Christian slaves.

The more eastern group was composed of Great Russians. They showed more loyalty to the Czars and developed less organization but they ranged far and wide through the lower Don and the Volga valleys and penetrated the Caspian region. Later they were organized as the Don Cossacks. The two groups, western and eastern, always remained distinct and rarely cooperated with each other. Although both were proudly Orthodox, owing to historical developments they had no connection even through the Church, for the centre of Zaporozhian Orthodoxy was Kiev and of the Don, Moscow, especially after it had been elevated to a Patriarchate. It was from among the Don Cossacks that the detachment was recruited which was later to cross the Urals and, within a few generations, find its way to the Pacific Ocean north of the Amur River which bends sharply northward as it approaches its mouth in the Sea of Okhotsk.

For the Don Cossacks the most proximate country was Iran, and so we find that just as the Zaporozhians found their chief foes in the Turks and Crimean Tatars, the Don Cossacks found theirs in Iran. Indeed, there were moments when he dreamed in the late down the Volga spent much of his time in collecting booty from Iran. Indeed, there were moments when he dreamed in the late seventeenth century of being able to overthrow the government and present it to the Czar in the hope of obtaining pardon, if not rank and fame as well. He fell, unfortunately for him, into Russian hands and was executed before he could do much about his grandiose scheme.

Yet the general tendency of Russian foreign policy in the seventeenth century centered on securing an outlet on the Black Sea, where the mouths of the Russian and Ukrainian rivers were held by the Turkish Sultans in Constantinople and by various Tatar tribes, such as those of the Crimea. The regent Sophia, the half-sister of Peter, made several unsuccessful attempts to secure Azov at the mouth of the Don but she was uniformly unsuccessful largely because each time the Russians set out from Moscow it was so late in the summer that the lower steppes had already become parched and inflammable — a situation the Tatars unfailingly took advantage of.

Peter was more successful. After a first failure along the steppes, he adopted the advice of his foreign advisers and built a fleet to

sail down the rivers. He finally took Azov before he made his celebrated journey through Europe.

After his return to Moscow and the inauguration of his reforms Peter became involved in the Northern War against Charles XII of Sweden, a new sovereign hardly more than a boy. Peter, together with the Kings of Poland and Denmark, regarded him as easy prey. Charles, however, developed into a military genius, his star setting only after the battle of Poltava in 1709. (Charles escaped to Turkey from which Peter could not secure his surrender, and later succeeded in returning to Sweden.) During the years of fighting Peter achieved his country's first secure hold on the Baltic Sea by opening a window to the west at St. Petersburg and later he secured Swedish and Polish holdings in a broad belt on the eastern shore of the Baltic.

His appetite merely whetted, Peter in 1711 led an expedition into what is now Rumania. Almost inextricably trapped on the Pruth, he succeeded through bribery in escaping the clutches of the Grand Vizier. Peter next tried Iran in an attempt to open up and increase his holdings on the Caspian Sea. An expedition into that area resulted in the acquisition of Baku and Derbent and some provinces on the Caspian. But Peter had shot his bolt; the campaign had exhausted him and he died very soon after, his main goal to the east unachieved.

After Peter's death the Russian crown passed around in a somewhat haphazard manner, and in the struggles of the various Guards Regiments and the pretensions of their high commanders to the favors of the Empresses, little thought was given to the east until the time of Catherine in the last half of the century.

Catherine was a German princess who put much store by intellectual activity, but she was also insistent on wiping out any free institutions, even the semi-free, such as the Ukrainian Hetmanate and the Zaporozhian *Sich*. She and her generals, especially Prince Potemkin, increased the imperial holdings on the Black Sea coast. Then she conceived the more ambitious plan of capturing Constantinople and reconstituting in her own person the Byzantine crown. The background was there: the rulers of Moscow had claimed for a couple of centuries to be the heirs and had adopted as their standard the double-headed eagle. Catherine determined in her Greek program to make it meaningful. Yet although Turkey had become much weaker, the old diplomatic game which had been played by the Western powers in Constantinople since the Turkish conquest sufficed to keep Catherine at bay. At the last she had to be content

with relatively minor gains. Her grandson, however, was able to secure control of the province of Bessarabia and its capital of Kishinev, which was reorganized as a constituent part of the Russian Empire.

The reigns of Peter and Catherine and their conquests had, by the end of the eighteenth century, more or less decided the directions of Russian expansion. Russia was by then solidly established on all the four seas and oceans which washed the shores of her territory — the Arctic, the Pacific, the Black Sea and the Baltic. To the north and west she still aspired to control Finland, but she was unable to advance beyond that into Sweden proper. She had secured through the weak Polish King Stanislaw Poniatowski a controlling voice in Polish affairs, but in order to hold it she had to compromise with the Hapsburg dynasty and the King of Prussia. The outcome was the division of Poland, with Russia securing the greater part of Ukraine and control of the Vistula, while the provinces of Galicia and Volhynia remained in Hapsburg hands. To the south the growing revolutionary movements among the Christians of the Balkans were preparing the way for a more aggressive role against the Ottoman Empire — but this was still in the future.

In Asia there were three likely directions. The first was from the Russian holdings north of the Amur. From there it was but a small voyage to North America and the establishment of Russian America in what is now Alaska. This was pushed only sporadically, although such men as Nicholas Rezanov and Baranov, the representative of the Russian American Company, dreamed of acquiring the Hawaiian Islands. (The aspirations of Rezanov even included the annexation of San Francisco and California, which were in opposition to the growing turbulence in Mexico and New Spain.)

In the same general direction the Russians were still pinned down north of the Amur. But it was already evident that the rulers of China no longer were the capable generals of the early Manchu dynasty, thus promising that it would not be long before Russian arms would be able to cross the river and move into the more fertile lands to the south.

Iran, too, was in a state of disintegration. The banks of the Caspian Peter had secured offered a springboard for penetration southward, perhaps in time as far as the Persian Gulf and thereby a share of the rich trade in spices and other exotic materials that had come to some of the western countries. All depended upon the skillful use of both arms and diplomacy, for it was already evident

that Great Britain with her position in India would oppose any new rival in that area.

In the Balkans, the results often seemed incommensurate with the efforts and the elaborate intrigues machinated by the St. Petersburg bureaucracy. It is true that in the Greek Revolution, a fleet of French, English and Russian warships under an English admiral defeated a Turkish-Egyptian fleet at the battle of Navarino. When the smoke cleared and a severely truncated Greece was set free, however, the British ended up with the most influence upon the new government and the sovereign selected was not the one which Russia had selected. Russia, trying again, shielded Turkey against rebel Mehernet Ali of Egypt, but this proved to be small consolation.

There were many other wars in the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I, but all culminated in the Crimean War of 1853 when Turkey, Great Britain and France landed at Sevastopol in the Crimea and compelled the Russian army to withdraw. In consequence, Russia lost for a time the possibility of even stationing a warfleet in the Black Sea and, despite the obvious weakness of Turkey, the sick man of Europe, Russia saw little hope of achieving her main goal of bringing Constantinople and the vital straits under her control. Turkey signed any number of agreements with Russia and promised all kinds of reforms, made Russia the Protector of the Balkan Christians, and so on. However, by virtue of foreign influence or by Turkish diplomacy all these inroads were soon negated and the situation remained much as it had been.

On the other hand, Georgia had now been almost completely brought under Russian control. The Northern Caucasus took longer. The leader Shamyl united the fierce mountain tribesmen and mustered a resistance which took many years of hard fighting to overcome. More or less casual punitive raids led by local Russian commanders seemed to be more successful: step by step, during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century, they added nearly all the khanates of Central Asia to the Czar's possessions, so that from 1830 to 1877 most of the interior of Asia north of India was added and organized as Russian Central Asia, bringing Russia face to face with the British in India at last.

In the same way General Murayev-Amursky in the Far East succeeded finally in crossing the Amur and moving into the areas around the Ussuri River, winning for the Russians a rich domain in the Far East, including the area and harbor where now Vladivostok stands, at the expense of a decadent and disorganized China.

Russia also secured large holdings on the island of Sakhalin off the Asian coast. Thus, hardly a decade passed that did not see a substantial increase of Russian influence.

Widespread in Russia at the time was the feeling that Great Britain was the main barrier to Russian expansion toward the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Several times the two countries were on the verge of open warfare, as the one when the British forced Russia to compromise in the case of Afghanistan. To the end of their stay in India the British maintained a tight guard over the Khyber Pass and the other passes through the Himalayas and westward. The same situation obtained in the areas around the Persian Gulf. Later, when Germany had been organized and Kaiser Wilhelm II had assumed the direction of German policy and become friendly with Turkey, he set up the general plan of the Berlin-Baghdad railroad. It was the rivalry over this route that was reflected so strongly in the diplomacy before World War I.

The Balkan crisis of the seventies and the accompanying massacres of the Bulgarians by the Turks led to several more confrontations, but again the results were in general the same. Although Bulgaria received its practical independence, it received a German prince as its ruler. The relatively profitable Treaty of Berlin was set aside by the advance of a Russian army on Constantinople, but this was checkmated in turn by a British fleet operating on the side of Turkey in the Dardanelles, forcing Russia to accept the less favorable Treaty of San Stefano, which gave a diminished independence to Bulgaria but saved Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. From this time on, despite several Balkan crises as that caused by the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, the situation remained relatively stable but uneasy until the new series of wars beginning with the Italo-Turkish War of 1911.

In the meantime, shortly after the turn of the century, a new crisis erupted in Iran, where the rule of the old shah had been one interminable series of scandals. He had hoped to profit by the rivalry of Russia and Great Britain but was thwarted when in 1907 the two rivals effected a compromise whereby Russia extended her sphere of influence in the north and Great Britain in the south. An American named Shuster was appointed to superintend the finances of the country, especially the still unclaimed central zone, but the compromise was not effective and Shuster was soon forced to quit the country. The situation, however, remained static, as it did also in India and Afghanistan.

The new field for Russian expansion now became the Far East. Russia had built the Trans-Siberian Railroad, a single track line reaching to Vladivostok, but it skirted the Russian lands south of the Amur and involved a wide detour. So Russia put pressure on China to obtain permission to build a leased line under both Russian and Chinese control, the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Soon after, Russia secured a lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, which was the southern gateway to Manchuria and commanded the sea approach to Peking. At once Russia developed a military base at Port Arthur and hurriedly began connecting this base with the older parts of the Chinese Eastern line.

Japan, now emerging on the world scene, still coveted this area, having made similar claims after her successful war against China in 1894. She made a withdrawal after the other European powers had united in demanding it but she strongly resented the Russian lease. The outcome was the Russo-Japanese War of 1905-06, which resulted in an unexpected victory by Japan and the capture of Port Arthur and a Japanese advance into Manchuria. Soon the South Manchurian Railroad, similar to the Chinese Eastern but owned jointly by Japan and China, came to be the dominant factor in the whole of southern Manchuria. It was very evident to all that the peace drawn up at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, under the pressure of President Theodore Roosevelt, provided only a breathing spell, which was prolonged when Russia was plunged into the Revolution of 1905 which to some extent limited the powers of the Czar and in a sense was a rehearsal for the Revolution of 1917.

In the second decade of the twentieth century, the intrigues of the big empires became more involved and dangerous. The first steps toward a Triple Entente of Great Britain and Russia were taken to rival the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy. The Italo-Turkish War had compelled the ceding by Turkey to Italy of lands in Africa and the Dodecanese Islands in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the First Balkan War, an alliance of Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria against Turkey brought the victorious Bulgarian army to the gates of Constantinople, but the plans of the allies were sharply upset by the insistence by Italy and Austria-Hungary on the territorial creation of Albania and the appointment of Prince Wilhelm of Wied as sovereign. The Albanians, too, objected and the Prince received the contemptuous epithet of Mayor of Durazzo, denoting the extent of his power. Important or not, the alliance was broken up. Turkey joined a new grouping of Serbia, Greece and Rumania against Bulgaria, and when the turbulence subsided Bulgaria had

lost most of her long sought territorial gains, while Greece and Serbia had been able to keep most of theirs except on the Adriatic Sea.

Adding fuel to the smouldering fire before World War I was the discovery of oil in the Middle East (although no one had any inkling of the mineral wealth of the petroleum fields). Russia, still hoping to secure the Turkish fortresses in the eastern part of Asia Minor, did at one time send in a division of Russian Cossack cavalry which cut its way south to join the British in the area north of Baghdad.

Yet it was in a sense a new era which opened in World War I. All the injured feelings, imagined and real, of the past centuries flared up again. At the end, the Communists were in control of Russia, a new leader, Mustapha Kemal, was the leader of a new Turkey, Germany had been reduced almost to chaos, the Kaiser had fled into exile, and Austria-Hungary had been separated into its component parts with only Ukraine or at least the Austrian part left, in an uneasy relationship, to Poland. The United States, still unprepared for world-wide problems, willy-nilly had become a world power and it found that try as it would, it could not abdicate that role, while the world and especially Europe moved into the still blacker promise of World War II as the toothless League of Nations showed its full helplessness.

Although that was a different story with new motives, new claims, new aspirations, it brought into focus onto a world stage the fight between the forces that make for liberty and freedom and those that tend to slavery with strange faces on both sides. It is still an era of broken pledges, of Aesopian language and of a still fierce struggle for right and freedom keynoted by Russian expansionism.

75TH ANNIVERSARY OF UKRAINIAN SETTLEMENT IN CANADA

By SENATOR PAUL YUZYK

The year 1966 marked the seventy-fifth anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in Canada. It was in early September, 1891, that the first two Ukrainian settlers, Ivan Pylypiw and Wasyl Eleniak (died in 1956 at the age of 97) arrived in Winnipeg. Pylypiw and Eleniak were the first permanent Ukrainian homesteaders in Canada whose example and appeals attracted many thousands of their countrymen to Canada from the Western Ukrainian lands, which at that time were part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. In 1966, over a half-million Ukrainian Canadians paid tribute to these and other pioneer settlers and leaders.

TREMENDOUS CONTRIBUTION TO AGRICULTURE

The outstanding and everlasting contribution of the Ukrainian pioneers is the bringing under cultivation of millions of acres of virgin soil in the Canadian West and the bringing of civilization and prosperity to these vast, hitherto unsettled regions. The significance of this contribution can be fathomed when a comparison is made: the Ukrainians brought under cultivation considerably more land (my estimate is approximately 10,000,000 acres) in seven decades than the ten-times more numerous French Canadians in Quebec (over 5,000,000 acres) in over 300 years. It took courage, faith, good-will and perseverance for these humble folk to leave their native land forever, settle in an unknown wilderness to face and endure all the trials and hardships of a tough pioneering venture in order to establish a new home and a new life. They pushed back the frontier on the periphery of settlement at that time, establishing numerous new communities which formed a long and almost continuous belt commencing in the south-eastern corner of Manitoba and scattering diagonally across the three prairie provinces in a north-westerly direction to the Peace River area in northern Alberta, in some places the width of the belt being over 100 miles. To their

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eternal memory, they have left over 130 place-names of Ukrainian origin in this vast strip of territory, such as Ukraina, Komarno, Senkiv and Medika in Manitoba; Gorlitz, Tarnopol, Dnieper, Krydor and Sokal in Saskatchewan; Myrnam, New Kiev, Shandro and Stryi in Alberta. Together with the British and French, the Ukrainians are builders of Western Canada and, therefore, partners.

The advent of Ukrainian settlement in Canada was preceded by two other Ukrainian innovations. One was the introduction of Red Fife wheat in the West in 1876, which because of its early maturing as well as superb milling and baking qualities, made possible the settlement of the Prairies. Red Fife wheat was Galician (Ukrainian) wheat planted first in Ontario, from which later were developed over 80 other North American varieties, such as Marquis, Ceres, Reliance, Reward, Thatcher and Apex. It is also remarkable that Red Fife was first produced in the West in the Red River Valley, whose soil on both sides of the river is officially designated in agricultural atlases as *chornozem*, the Ukrainian name meaning "black earth," after the fertile soil in central Ukraine, "the granary and breadbasket of Europe." Adjacent to the *chornozem* of the Red River Valley is a lighter, greyish-black soil labelled *podzol*, named after the soil in the Western Ukrainian region known as Podilia or Podolia, of which *podzol* is a Polish version. (The *Chornozem* and *Podzol* soils extend southward to Minneapolis). And so, when Ukrainians arrived in Manitoba in the 1890's, they felt at home on a Ukrainian-type soil and with a Ukrainian variety of wheat.

Consequently, as could be expected, with their centuries-old background of farming in their native land, and their devotion to hard work and their families, the Ukrainian Canadians have made the most spectacular progress in agriculture. Almost half of the Ukrainian population in the Prairie Provinces is still engaged in farming, the size of the average farm having increased to approximately four quarters, 630 acres, or one square mile. Farming today is highly mechanized and costly, bringing in a good income and wealth to the country.

Ukrainian farmers are ranked among the best in Canada and in the world. The Canadian National Railway Community Progress Competition, held in 1930, awarded the Ukrainian municipalities of Rossburn and Ethelbert first and second place, respectively, in Manitoba, and first and third place in Alberta—a remarkable achievement. Examples of individuals recognized for the highest grade of grain production are the following: William Skladan of Andrew, Alberta, won the title of the World's Oat Champion at the Chicago

International Fair in 1939, and again in 1941; in 1940, Paul Pawlowski of Vilna, Alberta, won the world oat championship and Elia Lastiwka, also of Andrew, Alberta, won the world barley championship; in 1941, Pawlowski won the barley championship. The Pushka brothers, of Angusville, Manitoba, gained the greatest number of awards at the Manitoba Seed Fair in 1938; John Palidvor of Hazelridge, Manitoba, won that distinction in 1949; William Desitnyk, of Sandy Lake, Manitoba, became Canada's barley champion in 1951. The Ukrainians are the best vegetable growers in Manitoba and rank high in dairying.

Agricultural experts and scientists of Ukrainian descent have made important contributions in their specific fields. Among the outstanding scientists are: Dr. T.K. Pavlychenko, (died in 1958), former professor of Plant Ecology at the University of Saskatchewan, and author of a number of scientific publications and an outstanding researcher of world renown in chemical weed control; Dr. Isidore Hlynka, an internationally recognized cereal chemist with the federal Board of Grain Commissioners, is author of several scientific papers, former president of the Manitoba Section of the Chemical Institute of Canada, and member of the editorial boards of the publications *Chemistry in Canada* and *The Cereal Chemist* (U.S.A.); Dr. W. J. Cherewick, with the Dominion Plant Pathology Laboratories in Winnipeg, was for two years supervisor of the Colombo Plan agricultural activities in Malaya, Asia.

ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS

Rapid progress was made in agriculture because the pioneers were of farmer stock but progress was slower in business, industry and the professions. Their first business efforts were with small stores, shoe-repair shops, barber shops, bakeries, etc., which required little capital. The first co-operative ventures ended in failure. It was not until the Canadian-born generation moved on the scene after the First World War that the professions began to expand and that larger economic enterprises began to go forward.

Without a survey or study of the economic activities of the half-million Ukrainian group scattered from coast to coast it is not possible to appraise their achievements in this field. The co-operative movement of the 1930's has not expanded much beyond grocery stores in a few centres, except in savings and loans. With the establishment of the first Ukrainian credit union in Saskatoon in 1939, the credit union movement has advanced rapidly. In 1966

there were at least 60 Ukrainian credit unions across Canada with assets amounting to over \$50,000,000. In Toronto there were 9 credit unions with a membership of 16,400 and assets over \$20,000,000, the largest being the Ukrainian National Federation with 4,900 members and capital of \$6,500,000. Winnipeg had 9 branches with a total of 6,000 members and assets of \$7,000,000, the largest being Carpathian with 3,030 members and assets of \$3,800,000. In the future it is expected that these credit unions will apply the principles of co-operation in the fields of finance and business.

Private enterprise has surged ahead in leaps and bounds. An example is the Ukrainian community of Toronto, where a recent survey revealed there were 416 groceries, many of which had large turnovers, the largest being the UBA Trading Co., established in 1955, which in 1966 reported a gross income of over \$5,000,000; the real estate firm of R. Cholkan Ltd. employs 55 agents and had an annual turnover of \$30,000,000 last year. Large-scale enterprises have produced several Ukrainian millionaires. Among many successful entrepreneurs are such men as Mark G. Smerchanski of Winnipeg, geologist, with gold and uranium mining interests in Northern Manitoba and Quebec, and an owner of chemical plants in Moncton, N.B. and Winnipeg; Hnat Poworoznyk, President of Essex Packers in Hamilton; Harry Winton, Toronto, construction contractor of large apartments, office buildings and large store, and R. Cholkan, Toronto, a realtor, and many others. The Settlers Savings and Mortgage Corporation in Winnipeg is the first large financial firm established by Ukrainian business and professional men.

With Michael Szafraniuk's survey of the economic activities of the Ukrainians in Toronto we have a good picture of the achievements in this field of one large community. To offer a valid assessment of Ukrainian economic achievements for the whole ethnic group in Canada, it will be necessary to have similar surveys made in all communities. Here is a valuable and useful project for the Ukrainian Professional and Business Men's Clubs.

ACHIEVEMENTS IN CANADIAN POLITICS

Perhaps the most important criterion of the integration of any group into Canadian society and life is its active participation in politics and public life. In this respect the Ukrainians are far in advance of many other ethnic groups. This can be explained by at least four factors: 1) The Ukrainians settled in compact communities in the rural areas, and generally in towns and cities, thus being in strong position to elect their own candidates; 2) In Ukraine, they

had been oppressed by foreign rule, which manipulated elections and deprived them of representation in parliament; here they possessed complete freedom and the opportunities were open to them; 3) They were anxious to prove that they were active, rather than passive, citizens in politics; and 4) Discrimination and prejudices demonstrated by some segments of the British population served to spur them to political activity through Canadian parties.

The Ukrainians first started at the lowest rung of the political ladder, in municipal affairs, a school for higher politics. The first Ukrainian reeve was elected in 1908; it was Ivan Storosczyk for the Stuartburn Municipality in southeastern Manitoba. Ever since, they have been electing hundreds of Reeves and councillors in many of the municipalities of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. Besides aldermen and school trustees in several cities in Canada, many Ukrainian Canadians have been elected as mayors, e. g., William Hawrelak of Edmonton, who in 1956 was president of the Canadian Federation of Mayors; Stephen Juba of Winnipeg, twice re-elected by acclamation; Michael Patrick of Windsor, Ontario; Peter Ratuski of Kenora, Ontario.

To date, there have been 63 Ukrainian members of the provincial Legislative Assemblies, some having been re-elected many times, and four of whom have served as cabinet ministers. The first parliamentarian of Ukrainian origin to be elected in Canada was William Shandro, in 1913, as a Liberal for the Vegreville constituency to the Alberta Legislative Assembly. The first and only Ukrainian woman legislator was a lawyer, Mary Batten (Fodchuk), Liberal, Humboldt, Saskatchewan (1956-64) who subsequently became a judge. A record in parliamentary service was established by Nicholas V. Bachynsky, first elected in 1922 in the Manitoba riding of Fisher, which he served, as Liberal, for 34 years: several years as Vice-Speaker and the last two years as Speaker of the provincial house, retiring in 1956. Of the 63 provincial members, 20 were in the Alberta Legislative Assembly, 11 in Saskatchewan, 30 in Manitoba and 2 in Ontario.

So far, there have been four provincial ministers of Ukrainian ancestry, each from a different party and each in a different province. The first was Alexander G. Kuziak, businessman and municipal secretary in Canora, Saskatchewan, who was appointed by the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.) government of Saskatchewan in 1952 as Minister of Telephones, Minister in charge of Government Finance Office and Minister of Natural Resources, having served 12 years. In 1955, Michael N. Hryhorczuk, barrister and former Reeve of Ethelbert, became Attorney General in the Liberal

Government of Manitoba, serving until 1959. John Yaremko, a Toronto barrister, has been Minister of Transport, Citizenship and Provincial Secretary in the Conservative Government of Ontario since 1958. Subsequently in 1962, the Social Credit Government of Alberta appointed a former federal Member of Parliament, Ambrose Holowach, musician and businessman, as Provincial Secretary.

Representation of Ukrainians in federal politics was not achieved until 1925, when Michael Luchkowich, American-born teacher, was elected in Alberta. Since that time 13 Ukrainians have served in the House of Commons, one of whom, Michael Starr, former Mayor and businessman of Oshawa, Ontario, served as Minister of Labor from 1957 to 1963 in the Conservative Government of Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker. There have been 3 members of the Canadian Senate appointed for life, the first being William M. Wall (Wolochatiuk), a High School principal of Winnipeg (1955-1962), the next John Hnatyshyn, a barrister of Saskatoon, and myself (Paul Yuzyk, professor of history, Winnipeg).

Thus, at the time of the 75th anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in Canada, the Ukrainians can list 63 provincial members, 13 federal members, and 3 senators for a total of 79 parliamentarians.

SERVICE TO THE COUNTRY

As Canadians of Ukrainian origin have been graduating from colleges, universities, technical and vocational schools, and other educational institutions, they have been increasingly entering in the administrative branches of the federal, provincial and municipal governments. Being almost 80 percent Canadian-born, being among the best students for over two generations and having highly qualified specialists among the newcomers, they are found in almost every department of the federal and provincial civil services and government bodies. It would be a fairly long list if all the judges, magistrates and top civil servants were named.

Special mention must be made of Ukrainian Canadians serving in important bodies associated with the federal Canadian Government. Dr. Stephanie Potoski, a physician in Yorkton, Saskatchewan, is a member of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, where R.A. Choulguine is the French editor of the staff magazine *Closed Circuit Fermé*. Peter J. Lazarowich, Q.C., a lawyer in Edmonton, is a member of the Board of Directors of the National Film Board. Leo Kossar, a former journalist with the *Winnipeg Tribune* and the *Toronto Evening Telegram*, is the Execu-

tive Director of the Canadian Folk Arts Council, associated with the Canadian Centennial Commission. For three years, 1961 to 1964 Monsignor Dr. W. Kushnir, President of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, was a member of the Board of Directors of the Canada Council. In 1963, the Liberal Government of Prime Minister L.B. Pearson appointed to the ten-member Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism—Dr. J. B. Rudnycky, Slavic linguist and Head of the Department of Slavic Studies at the University of Manitoba; its report to the Canadian Parliament will have an important bearing on the cultural life of Canada and the relations of the component "races" and ethnic groups.

The real test of loyalty and devoted citizenship is brought out when a country finds itself in a crisis or at war. An estimated 10,000 Ukrainians (a high percentage) were in the ranks of the Canadian army during the First World War; many gave their lives for their adopted country, and Philip Konowal received the highest award for valor in the British Commonwealth, the Victoria Cross. During the Second World War (1939-1945), the Ukrainians were no longer regarded with suspicion, but as full-fledged Canadian citizens; approximately 40,000, predominantly Canadian-born, served in the Canadian Army, Navy and Force, which was a proportionately higher number than the Canadian average; among them were many officers, NCO's and winners of medals for bravery, thousands having paid the supreme sacrifice. Being an integral part of the Canadian population, Ukrainian Canadians participated with the Canadian forces fighting in the Korean War and are active in the military forces wherever they serve Canada in defense of freedom, democracy and peace.

Their cultural contribution is known in most parts of Canada. Ukrainian folk-dancing in colorful costumes, choirs, orchestras, embroidery and handicraft have been winning the enthusiastic applause and praises of audiences, leaders, critics and monarchs, at local and national celebrations, since the Diamond Jubilee in 1927, and have been featured in greater magnitude at the Centennial Celebrations in 1967. All forms of Ukrainian literature have been flourishing, in Ukrainian as well as in the English language, which would require a chapter to do it justice. The Ukrainian language, literature and history are taught at the leading universities in English-speaking and French-speaking Canada, and as an elective subject in the secondary schools of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. Ukrainian culture is being woven gradually into the multi-coloured fabric of the composite Canadian culture.

MISSION OF THE UKRAINIAN CANADIANS

Seventy-five years ago the Ukrainians came to this land of freedom. Having faith in God and in Canada, they have given their best as constructive citizens, to make Canada greater and a better place to live in. Above all, the Ukrainian Canadians cherish the freedom and democracy of this country, which their compatriots in the land of their origin, Ukraine, have not enjoyed for over two centuries, except for the brief interval of the Ukrainian state, 1917-1921. Ukrainian freedom and democracy were destroyed by the false propaganda and military forces of the Soviet Russian communist empire, which has become the largest colonial power in the world, having designs upon Canada. Ever aware of the catastrophe that befell Ukraine, the Ukrainian Canadians have constantly been keeping before the public and informing the Canadian government, that Soviet Russian communism is engaged in subtly undermining our democratic institutions and freedom, as was disclosed by the former Soviet agent, Igor Gouzenko after the Second World War. Canadians are warned that constant vigilance is necessary in order to preserve our way of life. The defense of freedom and democracy must be the cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy, in which, because of their background, the Ukrainian Canadians should be playing an increasing role; for several years delegations to the United Nations and NATO have included them as members.

The mission of the Ukrainian Canadians also includes the perpetuation of the consciousness of cultural values in the development of the Canadian nation. Their fate is bound with the fate of the non-British and non-French element of the Canadian population, known as the Third Element, which today forms almost one-third of the Canadian population. The "melting-pot" theory with its colorless uniformity has been rejected by Canadian governments for a "mosaic-type" of Canadian culture, based on the voluntary integration of the best elements of the cultures of each of the ethnic groups as partners. This is the multi-cultural concept of the Canadian nation, which maintains the dignity of the individual and the ethnic group. It is as leaders and part of the Third Element that the Ukrainians can continue to make an important contribution to Canada.

THE KRONSTADT REVOLT OF 1921 AND STEFAN PETRICHENKO

By HUNTER ALEXANDER

*The Kronstadt uprising was more dangerous
for the Soviet regime than "Kolchak,
Denikin and Yudenich put together."*

.....Lenin

Most of the evidence indicates that the trouble in Kronstadt began when the sailors became involved in a number of strikes in nearby Petrograd in February 1921. The Petrograd workers had endured too many years of War Communism and were fed up with the arbitrary arrests of the Cheka, the "road-block detachments" who confiscated bartered goods from railroad passengers, and the use of Trotsky's Labor Army men (*trudoarmeitsi*) in factories. The real wages of factory workers had declined since the Bolsheviks had come to power in 1917 and food and fuel were in very short supply in Petrograd.

The Kronstadt sailors had since 1917 enjoyed the right to participate in mass meetings of workers in Petrograd (20 miles from their base) and to report back to their units on the grievances of the workers. The sailors had as good a claim to be the bearers of revolution as the Bolsheviks themselves. Trotsky had called them the pride and joy of the revolution.

One of these sailors, Stefan Petrichenko, has written that one of the main reasons for the suspicion and anger of the Kronstadt sailors was the discrepancies between what their own delegates reported and the official Soviet communiques and commentaries which tried to play down the Petrograd riots and slur over government measures for suppressing them. The Bolsheviks were faced with a very serious credibility gap.

The reports of the sailor-delegates of the suppression of strikes were made at meetings of the various units held on the decks of the ships and in the forts of Kronstadt. On February 28, a meeting of the ships' companies of the *Petropavlovsk* and the *Sevastopol* was

held on the *Petropavlovsk*. The meeting was presided over by Petrichenko, a senior clerk (*starchiy pisar*) on the *Petropavlovsk*. The only document available of the proceedings is a resolution passed by the sailors.

Perhaps most objectionable to the Bolshevik Government was the demand:

To abolish all *politotdeli* (Political Education and Agitation Departments) because no party should be given special privileges in the propagation of its ideas or receive support of the State for such purposes. Instead educational and cultural commissions should be elected, which should be provided for financially by the Government.

This was an attack on the Communist Party's claim to be the only custodian of correct proletarian ideology.

The next day (March 1) the sailors of the First and Second Squadrons of the Baltic Fleet held a mass meeting in Kronstadt. When the Commissar of the Baltic Fleet, Kuzmin, arrived, he was allowed to speak, but his warnings were interrupted by such taunts as, "Have you forgotten how you had every tenth man shot on the Northern front. Kick him out."¹

One sailor addressed the 16,000 sailors, soldiers and workers as follows:

Comrades, look around you and you will see that we have fallen into a terrible mire. We were pulled into this mire by a group of Communist bureaucrats, who under the mask of Communism have feathered their nests in our republic. I myself was a Communist, and I call on you, comrades, to drive out these false Communists who set worker against peasant and peasant against worker. Enough shooting of our brothers.²

The meeting approved the *Petropavlovsk* 15-point program demanding immediate elections, free speech and freedom of assembly. Communists in the crowd either abstained or supported the resolution. Here for the first time Communists opposed Lenin's government. This program appears as Appendix 1.

Revolts were nothing new to Kronstadt. Its garrison had risen against the Czarist Government in October 1905 and July 1906. In April 1917 the sailors had revolted against the Provisional Govern-

¹ Leonard Shapiro, *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy, Political Opposition in the Soviet State, First Phase, 1917-1922*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955) p. 302.

² Eugene Lyons, *Our Secret Allies* (New York: Little Brown, 1954) p. 124.

ment and by May all power was in the hands of the Kronstadt Soviet.

At the mass meeting, on March 1, Commissar Kuzmin angrily told his men: "If you want open warfare, you shall have it. For the Communists will never give up the reins of government. We will fight to the bitter end."³

Kuzmin and his deputy were arrested by the sailors the next day. At first Moscow considered negotiations but later refused to discuss Kronstadt's demands and ordered the sailors to surrender or, as Trotsky put it, be shot down "like partridges."⁴ The Kronstadt-ers refused to yield and the rebellion, which was to last fifteen days, began.

The sailors, soldiers and workers of Kronstadt elected Stefan Maxsimovich Petrichenko chairman of their Provisional Revolutionary Committee. Relatively little is known about Petrichenko. We know that he had only two years of formal schooling, and that he was a plumber before entering the navy, and that he had been arrested several times by the Bolsheviks.

The Provisional Revolutionary Committee consisted of 15 sailors and workers, all of whom were of worker or peasant origin.

Once they had taken control of Kronstadt, the sailors sent a delegation to Petrograd to enlist workers in their struggle, but the delegation fell into the hands of the Cheka and was not heard from again. The sailors' rebellion was political rather than military; it took no offensive action, contenting itself with broadcasting to the world in Morse code and publishing a daily newspaper, *Izvestia*.⁵

The sailors were rebelling against what they thought were the abuses of the Communist system and not the Communist system itself as they understood it. They believed they could persuade the Petrograd Communists and the Party Leadership to change their ways. They hoped the workers would support them. The government immediately saw how dangerous the rebellion was. Lenin branded Kozlovsky, who happened to be living in Kronstadt at the time, of it "counter-revolutionary" and accused a certain ex-czarist General leading the revolt. Thus the battle between the government and Kronstadt was begun on the propaganda front.

The allegation of the Soviets that the Kronstadt revolt was inspired by Kozlovsky and foreign imperialists is based on very

³ Alexander Berkman, *The Kronstadt Rebellion* (Berlin: Russian Revolution Series, 1922), Series 1. p. 13.

⁴ Eugene Lyons, *supra*, p. 124.

⁵ Isaac Deutscher, *Trotsky*, (Oxford University Press), 1954,

slender evidence. Kozlovsky was in Kronstadt as an instructor at the time of the revolt. The French newspaper, *Le Matin* did discuss the "conflict between the sailors and Soviet authorities" on February 14, 1921, two weeks before the revolt occurred. *Le Matin* of March 10 said the revolt was planned by the Social Revolutionary Party. But Soviet historians must produce more evidence if their story is to be accepted.

The military phase of the struggle began when Lenin sent Trotsky, the second most important figure in the government, to deal with Kronstadt. It was ironical that Trotsky, who had so often spoken to the Kronstadt sailors in 1917 and so often been wildly acclaimed by them, should now be their executioner.

The battle of Kronstadt was a desperate one for both sides. Trotsky's troops were deserting and refusing to fire on the sailors. The Moscow press was full of reports of soldiers and officers shot for treason and desertion. Trotsky was on bad terms with Zinoviev, President of the Petrograd Soviet.

If Trotsky had not taken Kronstadt before the thaw, he probably never could have taken it. When the ice around Kronstadt melted outside help could reach the rebels and the fleet could have attacked Petrograd.

Kronstadt had ample stocks of food, small arms and ammunition. The fortress of Kronstadt and its outlying system of forts bristled with guns, but it was not impregnable. The czars had built this complex to protect Saint Petersburg from sea attack. They placed the guns pointing westward leaving the eastern side of the fortress vulnerable. The fortress had been so designed that if it ever fell into enemy hands, it could be bombarded from the coastal forts of Krasnaya Gorka. At the time of the revolt government troops held Krasnaya Gorka.

In forts Kronstadt, Obrutshev, and Riff there were two 11-inch, six 10-inch, eight 9-inch and twenty 6-inch guns as well as other pieces of smaller calibre. Of the six other forts, three were without armament and three were armed with 6-inch and 3-inch guns. The rebels also had the battleships *Sevastopol* and *Petropavlovsk*, each with twelve 12-inch and twenty 130-millimeter (5-inch) guns.⁶

One report said the Kronstadt garrison numbered 40,000, but this is probably too high. It was closer to 14,000, of which 10,000 were sailors. Only about 6,000 took part in the fighting. The de-

⁶ *The Times*, (London), March 30, 1921.

defenders of Kronstadt were dispersed among nine forts and two battle-ships.

The government forces probably numbered 60,000. They were made up of *kursanti*, from the local military schools, Cheka formations and regular Red Army units of proven loyalty to the regime. M.N. Tukhachevsky, at 28 one of the most successful generals of the civil war, commanded the troops.

Kronstadt seemed impregnable and would be even more so once the ice melted. The winter had been exceptionally mild and springtime was advancing prematurely.

A number of ex-czarist officers were in Kronstadt and offered their services to the revolutionary committee. Their advice was to capture the fortified port of Oranienbaum, which would have opened up communications between Kronstadt and the outside world. The officers also warned the committee to break the ice around the fortress. The committee rejected this advice and did nothing. Had the sailors delayed their rebellion until the ice around Kronstadt melted, they would have had a much better chance of success.

However, the committee was thinking primarily in political rather than military terms.

On March 7, the government guns started shelling Kronstadt. On March 8, Tukhachevsky's infantry, clad in white, advanced over the ice under cover of mist. They took the defenders by surprise. The big guns of the fort were useless against the onrush of troops at close range.

The defenders fought desperately with rifle fire and drove off the attackers with heavy casualties. Masses of ice cracked up under fire and hundreds were drowned in the freezing water.

The Communist Party Congress, meeting in Moscow, sent 300 of its delegates to Petrograd, led by Kliment Voroshilov, to fight the rebels. According to Voroshilov, who wrote an account of the battle 40 years later, the first assault failed because of insufficient preparation. Tukhachevsky demanded more troops and delayed a second major attack until their arrival. During this relative lull in the battle "decisive measures were taken to remove enemy elements" from certain units, according to Voroshilov.⁷ Loyal Communists were brought in to lead the troops and if necessary to drive them into battle.

⁷ Kliment E. Voroshilov, *Iz Istorii Podavleniya Kronshtadskogo Myatezha* (In *Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, March 1961), pp. 15-35.

On March 12, a party of sixty Communists entered Kronstadt with the object of winning over the rebels. They were arrested and shot. On March 14, Tukhachevsky's artillery began another major barrage.

On March 17, the Bolsheviks made a concerted attack from three sides, the north, the south and the east. The weary defenders began to run out of ammunition. There were large supplies in the magazines, but no transport had been organized to bring the ammunition to the front lines. Petrogradskaya Gate was captured. Street fighting continued until the morning of the eighteenth. General Tukhachevsky, a veteran of many sanguinary campaigns said, "It was not a battle, it was an inferno. . . The sailors fought like wild beasts. Each house where they were located had to be taken by storm."⁸

There were so many dead on the ice that the government of Finland demanded that they be removed as the bodies, if left there when ice melted, would be washed up on the Finnish beaches and constitute a grave danger to health.

Many of the rebels were able to escape over the ice to Finland. The crew of the *Sevastopol* was left to cover the retreat. Before fleeing, the sailors spiked all the guns of the southern forts and batteries. Petrichenko was one of the last to leave Kronstadt.

The government was merciless in dealing with the rebels who fell into its hands. News correspondents in Finland reported hearing rifle fire from Kronstadt for many nights after the capture of the island and speculated that mass executions were taking place. One report indicates that as many as 18,000 were executed.⁹ No public trials were held.

Petrichenko escaped to Finland and told a reporter: "We were defeated, but the movement will succeed because it comes from the people. . . There are 3,000,000 like me in Russia, not reactionary
3 — Kronstadt

Whites and murderous Reds, and from these plain people will come the overthrow of the Bolsheviks."¹⁰

Soviet claims that the revolt was led by General Kozlovsky, or inspired by anarchists, Mensheviks, or Socialist Revolutionaries are based on very slender evidence. There is much more evidence that

⁸ Emanuel Pollack, *The Kronstadt Rebellion*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959) p. 49.

⁹ *The Times* (London: March 28, 1921).

¹⁰ *The Times* (New York: March 31, 1921).

Petrichenko was the real leader of the revolt. The Resolution of the General Meeting of the Crews of the 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the Baltic Fleet, March 1, 1921, was signed by Petrichenko. The Interview with Petrichenko, published in the *New York Times* of March 31, 1921, indicates that Petrichenko was one of the leaders of the revolt. A radio message dated March 3, 1921 to Victor Chernov, former president of the Constituent Assembly, giving a noncommittal reply to an offer of support, indicates that Petrichenko was the official spokesman of the revolt.¹¹

In their accounts of the Kronstadt uprising the Soviets have described Petrichenko as one of the leading counter-revolutionaries. A 1939 pamphlet published in the USSR describes Petrichenko as "a sworn enemy of Soviet power" and as a left Socialist Revolutionary.¹²

An earlier Soviet source describes Petrichenko as "an SR, for the whole of his time in the service he carried on such an active agitation against Soviet power, that the crew called him 'Petlura'..."¹³

This seems to indicate that Petrichenko was a Ukrainian. It is interesting to note that there were at least two other men with Ukrainian names on the Revolutionary Committee, Yakovenko, a telephonist, and Romanenko, a worker. A large but unknown proportion of the Kronstadt sailors were Ukrainians. Petrichenko may have been chosen Chairman of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee because of his nationality, because of his writing and speaking ability, because of his charismatic or demagogic appeal, or for a combination of these.

There are vague insinuations by Soviet historians that Petrichenko had anarchist leanings but all these amount to are rumors that Petrichenko had spent a certain period in Ukraine in an area where Nestor Makhno's groups were operating.

During the 1920s Petrichenko wrote an account of the uprising, *Pravda o kronstadtskikh sobytiyakh*, and a number of articles in emigre periodicals. In the 1930s he dropped from sight.

After World War II, Petrichenko was handed over to the Soviet Union, apparently by Finland, and was executed, according to a letter the author has from the late Boris I. Nicolaevsky, dated September 17, 1960.

¹¹ Ida Mett, *La Commune de Cronstadt* (Paris: Spartacus, 1949) (p. 66, contains text.)

¹² O. Leonodov, *Likvidatsiya Kronshtadskogo Myatezha* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoye Voennoye Izdatelstvo, 1939).

¹³ M. Muzmin, *Kronshtadskiy Myatezh* (Leningrad: Ogiz, 1931).

Kronstadt was more dangerous to Lenin than Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenich all put together because it was a genuine revolt of the proletariat and peasants against the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

The Kronstadt insurgency failed because it was physically contained by the Cheka and the Red Army. The Cheka arrested Kronstadt delegations sent to Petrograd to enlist worker support and prevented the circulation of Kronstadt anti-Bolshevik literature. Red Army units occupied the forts along the coast facing Kronstadt. The insurgency also failed because the government took military as well as political action against it almost immediately. Although Petrichenko doubtlessly possessed some revolutionary leadership qualities, he was a novice when compared to Trotsky and Tukhachevsky.

A P P E N D I X I

Resolution of the General Meeting of the Crews of the 1st and 2nd Squadrons of The Baltic Fleet, March 1, 1921

Having heard the Report of the Representatives sent by the General Meeting of Ship Crews to Petrograd to investigate the situation there,

RESOLVED:

1. In view of the fact that the present Soviets do not express the will of the workers and the peasants, immediately to hold new elections by secret ballot, the pre-election campaign to have freedom of agitation among the workers and peasants.
2. To establish freedom of speech and press for workers and peasants, for Anarchists and left Socialist parties.
3. To secure freedom of assembly for labor unions and peasant organizations.
4. To call a non-partisan Conference of the workers, Red Army soldiers and sailors of Petrograd, Kronstadt, and Petrograd Province, no later than March 10, 1921.
5. To liberate all political prisoners of Socialist parties, as well as all workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors imprisoned in connection with the labor and peasant movements.
6. To elect a Commission to review the cases of those held in prisons and concentration camps.
7. To abolish all *politotdeli* (political bureaus) because no party should be given special privileges in the propagation of its ideas or receive the

financial support of the government for such purposes. Instead, there should be established educational and cultural commissions, locally elected and financed by the Government.

8. To abolish immediately all *zagradytelnye otriadi* (punitive detachments-H. A.).
9. To equalize the rations of all who work, with the exception of those employed in trades detrimental to health.
10. To abolish the Communist fighting detachments in all branches of the Army, as well as the Communist guards kept on duty in mills and factories. Should such guards or military detachments be found necessary, they are to be appointed in the Army from the ranks and in the factories according to the judgment of the workers.
11. To give the peasants full freedom of action in regard to their land, and also the right to keep cattle, on condition that the peasants manage with their own means; that is, without employing hired labor.
12. To request all branches of the Army, as well as our comrades, the military *kursanti*, to concur in our resolutions.
13. To appoint a Traveling Commission of Control.
14. To permit free *kustarnoye* (individual small scale) production by one's own efforts.

Resolution passed unanimously by Brigade Meetings, two persons refraining from voting:

Petrichenko
Chairman Brigade Meeting

Perepelkin
Secretary

Resolution passed by an overwhelming majority of the Kronstadt garrison.

Vassiliev
Chairman

Together with Comrade Kalinin (President of the Soviet Republic votes against the Resolution.)

(taken from Pollack, *Kronstadt Revolution* p. 13-15)

(Pollack cites Berkman, *Kronstadt Rebellion*, pp. 9-11.)

MONGOLIA AND SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION

By STEPHEN BOYCHUK

The Mongolian People's Republic (M.P.R.) has a small and scattered population of 1,018,800 inhabitants¹ in an area of 600,000 square miles. Geographically, it is remote, largely semi-desert, and landlocked between the giants of China and the Soviet Union. Because of its primitive economy, it depends heavily on foreign models for development.

Before 1911, Manchu China exercised control over, and greatly influenced, Mongolian society and government. Since 1921, however, the principal model for Mongolian development has been the Soviet Union; even by 1911, Russians had already begun to play that role.² Thus Chinese-Russian rivalry for predominance in Mongolia bears a historical, nationalistic, and non-Communistic element of real importance.

Outer Mongolia, a Chinese province before the Revolution, became a Russian protectorate in 1912-1913; its ties with Russia were severed in 1917-1918, when Russia plunged into civil war and Lenin's government renounced all rights to alien territories. After the defeat of the White Armies, the Red Army was stationed there for a period of four years. It withdrew in 1924-1925—but not until the vast province was transformed into a Soviet dependency, a Mongolian Army actually under Soviet command, and the Mongolian economy gradually being integrated into the Soviet economic blood stream. Renamed the Mongolian People's Republic, Outer Mongolia was the first component where area and people became a part of the Soviet sphere. It has been a fixed contention with both Mongol and Soviet centers to refer to the Czarist policy in Mongolia as imperialist, predatory and exploitative and to present Soviet policy in contrast as an altruistic "big brother" protection of Mongol independence.

¹ Mongolian People's Republic, *Encyclopedia Americana*, Annual Ed., 1964.

² A. D. Barnett (ed.), *Communist Strategies in Asia*, (New York: Praeger, Inc., 1964.), p. 262.

The Mongols could not avoid being involved and subordinated to events in China except by leaning against the other wall of the compartment in which they lived—which meant that they had to adjust themselves so closely not only to Russia but to events in Russia that Russia became the primary external factor in the process of internal change in Outer Mongolia. One master thread can be traced throughout the maze of these confused years. That thread is the political question, in Mongol minds, of the degree of trust to be placed in Russia. By following this thread, moreover, it is possible to determine at any phase of development not only the orientation of Mongolia toward Russia, but the relative orientation toward other countries, such as Turkey or China.

It has been frequently maintained that the unfavorable outcome for Russia of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, while bringing the furtherance of her ambitions in Manchuria to a standstill, in compensation stimulated her activities in Mongolia.

From 1921, until the Chinese established their regime in Peking in 1949, Russia alone exerted Communist influence in Outer Mongolia; the "new China" did not move seriously to reassert its influence in the area until 1952.

Prior to 1945, when the M.P.R., isolated and cut off from the rest of the world, suffered under total Soviet domination, the Mongol economy made little progress toward providing a richer material life for its people. While the sown area of the republic increased substantially during the war years, primarily as a result of Soviet inability to meet the basic grain needs of the Mongols, acreage again fell to near the prewar level in the immediate postwar period. The population had remained relatively stable, with livestock outnumbering the Mongols by three to one.³

The Communist success in China, however, dramatically changed the situation in Mongolia. The M.P.R. no longer constituted a buffer between the Soviet Union and Nationalist China or a shield against attack on the Soviet Union by Japan. Now Communist Mongolia, recognized as independent in 1950 by the Chinese Communists, became a territorial link between Moscow and Peking, joined by a common ideology.

When the Chinese Communists began to re-enter the scene, the Soviet Union had operated and influenced Mongolian society and government for thirty years. The Soviet Union had impressed on

³ W.A.D. Jackson, *Russo-Chinese Borderlands*, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962), p. 80.

the M.P.R. its pattern of education, government, and organization and to some degree, even its dress, diet, and language.⁴ In the past decade of Sino-Soviet "socialist competition" in the M.P.R., Chinese influence has once again become a factor in the situation, but to date it has not displaced or even seriously challenged the predominance of Russian influence. Typically Soviet phenomena appear in all aspects of Mongolian organization and society, and the M.P.R. has experienced, on a small scale, many of the same phases of development and changes as the Soviet Union. Many of these changes have closely followed those in the Soviet Union. The Soviet model has inspired the Mongolian party, its governmental organization, its constitution, its Five-Year Plans, its Secret Police, its architecture, and literature. Russians have trained the M.P.R.'s teachers, often in Soviet schools. Mongolian leaders and officials usually speak a fluent Russian.

Before the war, the Soviet Union had been extremely niggardly in its assistance to Mongolia, probably because the Russians could ill afford to give much, while Mongolia itself was remote, exposed, and difficult to defend in case of war. In 1946 a beginning was made at speeding up growth, assisted by the Soviet Union. To a new ten-year treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with the M.P.R., there were added supplementary economic and cultural agreements.⁵ To improve communications a railroad was constructed south from Ulan Ude on the Trans-Siberian to Ulan Bator, the capital. The ensuing five-year plan, 1948-1952, brought with it some increase in agricultural production and a start in the modernization of the capital. Further agreements with the Soviet Union have insured continued developmental progress for Mongolia.

REASSERTION OF CHINESE INFLUENCE

The year of 1924 threw light on Soviet Russia's attitude toward Outer Mongolia. First of all, in the "Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Soviet Union," finally signed on May 31, 1924, the Soviet Union recognized that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China. In that very same year the Soviet Union made it clear that it did not intend to tolerate any interference by China in Outer Mongolian affairs. It recognized the M.P.R.'s auto-

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

mony in so far-reaching a sense that it regarded Mongolia not only as independent of China in its internal affairs, but also as capable of pursuing its foreign policy independently.

In early 1945, Stalin had secured an agreement from the U.S. and Great Britain that the M.P.R. would become independent of China. The Sino-Soviet treaty later that year pledged China to recognize the independence of Mongolia,⁶ to be confirmed later by a plebiscite in that republic. The plebiscite was held, supervised by Soviet Russia, and Mongolians voted almost 100 per cent for independence. In January 1946 Nationalist China recognized the independence of the M.P.R.

According to the *New China Daily*:

To each and every truly patriotic Chinese, our recognition of Mongolia... was a right and proper act, but to the reactionary Kuomintang... it has always been a bitter memory... while the various ethnic groups within China were still under the oppression of both imperialism and feudalism... Mongolia found rightful assistance from a socialist country—the Soviet Union... Such liberation and independence we Chinese should hail... and we should not drag them to share our suffering...⁷

Insofar as contemporary China is Communist, much of what it represents has already been impressed upon Mongolia by the Soviet Union. Insofar as Communist China is Stalinist and opposed to liberalizing tendencies, it challenges trends favored by the Mongols. China's industrial and agricultural weakness means that the Soviet Union can easily trump every Chinese card.

But China's re-entry on the Mongolian scene has already affected the M.P.R. in many ways, and it has led the Russians to take conscious counteractions.

The five-year plan, 1953-1957, witnessed a speed-up in development, as Chinese assistance was now made available. In 1952, the Chinese and the M.P.R. signed a ten-year agreement for cultural and economic cooperation, while arrangements were made whereby Chinese labor could migrate under contract to Mongolia. A number of industrial enterprises were planned under the terms of these agreements, including the construction of a large woolen textile combine. The combine, built by Chinese labor to specifications drafted by Soviet engineers, has since been put into operation.

⁶ *New China Daily* (Nanking), March 5, 1950.

⁷ *Ibid.*

One thing China continued to resent was Soviet preponderance in the M.P.R.⁸ China continued to show her interest in the area when she signed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with Mongolia on May 31, 1960. This agreement was accompanied by agreements on Economic and Technical Aid and on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Peking undertook to provide a long term loan (1961-1965) and assistance in the carrying out of new projects, including the construction of utilities and water conservation measures. These agreements were followed in September 1960 by another on Chinese labor in Mongolia. In the same month, the USSR agreed also to provide additional aid and in December they reached a new trade agreement with Mongolia. Subsequently, in April 1961, the Soviet Union promised economic assistance to Mongolia's new five-year plan, and this was followed a week later by a new Chinese-Mongolian treaty.⁹

After Stalin's death, and before Khrushchev established himself as an effective successor, China apparently moved to exploit the Russian interregnum and attempted to displace the Soviet Union as a protector of the M.P.R. This conclusion is supported by the following facts, which suggest a steady growth of Chinese influence immediately after 1953.

Jargalsaikhan, who served as the first Mongolian Ambassador to Peking, replaced Lkhamsurun as M.P.R. Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1954. This change may well have increased Chinese influence in the M.P.R.¹⁰

On September 24, 1954, Ho Ying replaced Chi Ya-t'ai as Chinese Ambassador to Ulan Bator. Ho had been Deputy Director of the Asian Affairs Department in Peking's Foreign Ministry, and his appointment signified higher level Chinese representation there.

In November, 1954, Ulanfu—a member of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee—headed a large Chinese delegation to the M.P.R.'s Twelfth Party Congress in Ulan Bator, and his speech strongly stressed closer Mongolian-Chinese relations.¹¹ By contrast, a comparatively small and low-level Soviet delegation appeared at the Congress.

⁸ G. Vernadsky, *A. History of Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 466.

⁹ Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

¹⁰ Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 264.

The role of China in the M.P.R. probably attained its peak in August 1956, when there were more than 10,000 Chinese laborers working in the country and Peking made a grant of 160 million rubles to the M.P.R. At the same time, Soviet influence appeared to be declining. The Soviet soldiers withdrew from the M.P.R. in 1956, and the number of Russian civilians there was greatly reduced. Continuation of this trend might, before many years, have changed the M.P.R.'s basic orientation from Moscow to Peking.¹²

But the Soviet Union then acted to oppose Chinese displacement. On May 15, 1957, Bulganin and Tsendenbal issued a joint statement that reasserted Moscow's role—a document of great significance in Sino-Soviet relations as well as in M.P.R. affairs.¹³

Now Soviet aid to the M.P.R. far exceeds China's. Moreover, the Soviet Union still overwhelmingly dominates the Mongolian export and import trade. And Russian cultural influence continues to affect Mongolia far more than does that of the Chinese.

Nevertheless, there has been significant evidence of renewed Chinese influence in the M.P.R. New transportation ties have increased Sino-Mongolian contacts, and since 1956 there has been a direct rail connection from Peking to Ulan Bator.

While collectivization of livestock and the organization of co-operatives in the M.P.R. have generally followed the Russian pattern,¹⁴ the recent merging of basic territorial units (*somons*) with cooperatives appears to follow the Chinese model rather than any Russian example.

While the regime has always based Mongolian economic development plans on its livestock industry, it now seems possible that the M.P.R. may embark on new experiments, partly as a result of the influence of the Chinese model. China has established in Inner Mongolia, at Paotow, a major industrial complex, which turned out 70,000 tons of steel in 1959, was scheduled to attain 500,000 tons annual production and will ultimately be one of China's largest producers. This would suggest that steel production will begin in the M.P.R., more because Inner Mongolia now produces steel than because conditions favorable for it exist in Outer Mongolia. In June 1961, it was announced that plans for the construction at Derkhan of

¹² *New China Daily*, *op. cit.*

¹³ Text in *Izvestia*, May 17, 1957, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. IX, (June 26, 1957), p. 27-28.

¹⁴ W. Kirchner, *History of Russia* (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1965), p. 316.

Outer Mongolia's first steel plant, with an annual capacity of 300,000 tons, are being considered. The Russians may actually build the plant to maintain their predominant position, but the impetus appears to have been Chinese.

LOANS AND GRANTS

Both the Soviet Union and China have made significant loans and grants to the M.P.R., which may be summarized as follows:

	Communist China	U.S.S.R.
1947-1957		900 million
1956-1959	160 million	
1958-1960		200 million loan 100 million grant
1959-1961	100 million loan	
1961-1965	200 million loan	615 million loan

The timing of the announcement of these loans and grants suggests a pattern of Soviet reaction to Chinese moves. In August, 1956, China extended to the M.P.R. a grant of 160 million rubles. As if to answer the Chinese challenge and to emphasize its own longer record of aiding the M.P.R., the Soviet Union in a statement of May 1957, publicized, for the first time, the amount of its past and promised loans and gifts, and it detailed the uses to which the money was being put. It was only after the Chinese had announced in May, 1960 a 200-million-ruble loan that the Russians, on September 9, announced their own 615-million-ruble loan for the same period.¹⁵

PURGES IN THE M.P.R.

Four major top-level purges have occurred in the past six years, but no clear linkage to Sino-Soviet relations emerges. Nationalistic strivings and competition for power may have been of some importance. But the purges make quite clear that internal political stability did not follow the Soviet reassertion of primary influence, except that Tsedenbal won in every case, and the Russians back Tsedenbal.

A two-stage purge that took place in November, 1958 and March, 1959, saw the replacement of Damba by Tsedenbal as First Secretary of the Party and Surenjav by Tsende as Second Secretary.

Although, in Damba's case, it had first been reported that the Politburo met on November 20-22, 1958, to relieve him "at his own

¹⁵ C. Rupen, "Outer Mongolia," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXIII (June, 1960), p. 126.

request," in March, 1959, a Party plenum announced Damba had been dismissed for "lack of principle and dishonesty before the Party, egotism and faulty self-criticism, opportunistic conciliation with distortions, and defects in work."¹⁶ It is conceivable that this purge may have been related to the Sino-Soviet competition for influence: Damba's term as First Secretary (April, 1954 to November, 1958) corresponded roughly with the period of special Chinese activity in the M.P.R., so that labeling him "pro-Chinese" would appear reasonable.

On July 4, 1960, the Politburo member and Party Secretary, Tomor-Ochir, was removed. Others replaced at the same time were two Politburo candidates; the chairman and the Secretary of the Presidium of the Great Khural; the Chairmen of the Mongolian-Soviet Friendship Society, of the Committee of Peace and Friendship Organizations, of the Geological Research Bureau, and of the Committee of Sciences; and the Ministers of Transport and Communications and of Trade Resources.

On January 29, 1962, at the same Central Committee meeting that announced "de-Choibalsamization" and an attack on the "cult of personality" in the M.P.R., Tomor-Ochir rejoined the Politburo, replacing the man who had replaced him in July, 1960.

Direct Soviet interference in Mongolian internal affairs was evidenced more openly than usual in May, 1962. The Mongols celebrated the eight-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Genghis Khan on May 31, 1962, and on that date dedicated a 36-foot monument at his reputed Mongolian birthplace, issued memorial stamps, and held ceremonies in the capital and at the site. But the Russians attacked this manifestation of nationalism.¹⁷ L.F. Slichev, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was appointed to lead the Soviet delegation to Ulan Bator for a Mongolian Party meeting, dealing with the question of ideological work, January 8-10, 1963, where Tomor-Ochir's replacement on the Politburo, Lkhamsurun, labeled Genghis Khan a reactionary.¹⁸

CONCLUSION

Russian policy is based on theories and practices of self-sufficiency. Eventual expansion of the Soviet system is regarded as desirable, indeed, as the inevitable outcome of history. The Russians,

¹⁶ *Pravda*, April 1, 1959, *The New York Times*, April 7, 1959.

¹⁷ *Pravda*, November 1, 1962.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

though they have overreached themselves on occasion, usually delay expansion while waiting for the situation to open. While waiting, their primary concern is to buffer their frontiers against what they regard as the danger of counterattack and "imperialist war." Consequently, in any territory bordering on the Soviet Union the first priority is to prevent the success of local regimes.¹⁹ This kind of foreign policy can be implemented, according to varying conditions, by use of satellites, by the projection of spheres of influence, or by neutralization.

A careful study of Soviet and Chinese Communist maps of the Sino-Mongolian boundary reveals a number of discrepancies. On Soviet maps, the international boundary in the west is drawn along the crest of the Mongolian Altai southeastward from the Soviet frontier, but the Chinese maps show the boundary considerably to the east. Other variations in the Sino-Mongolian boundary occur through the sparsely occupied Gobi to the east as well as in the plateau region near the Siberian border.

On February 23, 1964, a delegation of Soviet experts on frontier questions arrived in Peking to discuss certain matters of common interest.²⁰

Commenting on the talk between Mao Tse-tung and a group of Japanese Socialists which had been held in Peking on July 10, 1964, the Mongolian News Agency unequivocally sided with the Soviet Union's interpretation of the border dispute. "It is clear that if the plans of the Chinese leaders were realized, our people would share the fate of the Inner Mongolians and other national minorities of China who are dealt with on the basis of a policy of great-Han chauvinism. . ." ²¹

In summary, the M.P.R. has solved many of its basic problems mainly by following the Russian model. The Chinese would face great difficulties in any attempt to replace Russian influence. Manpower constitutes the most effective tool the Chinese possess, but any attempt to make massive use of it would frighten the Mongols into even closer dependence on the Soviet Union.

¹⁹ Owen Lattimore, *Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 43.

²⁰ D.J. Doolin, *Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict*, (California: Stanford University, 1965), p. 37.

²¹ *Ibid*, p. 64.

BOOK REVIEWS

LE SAINT SIEGE ET LA SITUATION RELIGIEUSE EN POLOGNE ET DANS LES PAYS BALTES, 1939-1945. (Premiere Partie, 1939-1941, p. 1-513; Deuxieme Partie, 1942-1945, pp. 515-961). Edited by Pierre Blet, Robert A. Graham, Angelo Martini, and Burkhart Schneider. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1967.

Several months ago the Holy See published a two-volume collection of more than 600 letters and messages taken from the Vatican's secret archives. These documents relate to the tragic fate of the Catholic Church in Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania under both the Nazi and Communist occupations during World War II. This new and important work, *The Holy See and the Religious Situation in Poland and in the Baltic Countries, 1939-1945*, is a sequel to the two-volume collection, *The Church in Europe in 1939-1940 and in 1941-1945*, previously published. The second two volumes of the present collection include the situation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine, and also the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

Publication of the new collection should help to dispel the continued and organized campaign against the late Pontiff, Pius XII. Some anti-Catholic forces have repeatedly accused him of remaining "silent" in the face of Nazi atrocities. They have even written plays on the subject. However, the mass of documents show convincingly that Pope Pius XII vainly tried every feasible means to alleviate the suffering of Catholics and the others in the Nazi and Communist-occupied countries.

The documents also reveal the fixed determination of Nazi Germany to isolate Polish Catholics by convincing them that the Holy See had deserted them and that the establishment of an "independent" National Catholic Church was the objective.

This National Socialist policy succeeded in part, to the extent that some Polish Bishops complained that the Pope had kept silent regarding the persecution in Poland. For example, Bishop Charles Radonski of Wloclawek, one of the three Polish Bishops in exile during the Nazi occupation, so complained. On the other hand, the documents show that a number of Polish Bishops urged the Pope to keep silent so as not to provoke even harsher persecution. For instance, Adam Cardinal Sapieha, the then Archbishop of Cracow, wrote:

"We are sorry that we cannot communicate publicly the letters of Your Holiness to the faithful because this would set the stage for new persecutions. We already are victims of the suspicion brought against us of having communicated secretly with the Holy See..."

The new collection contains 18 letters, chronologically arranged, from or to the Ukrainian Catholic Bishops. Most of these are from the late Metro-

politan Andrew Sheptytsky. Others are from such prelates as Bishops Gregory Khomyshyn, Gregory Lakota, Josaphat Kocylovsky, and Joseph Slipy. These letters, especially those written during 1941, immediately after the retreat of the Soviet troops from Western Ukraine, deal with accounts of Communist persecution. For instance, Bishop Khomyshyn reported an attempt by the Communists to poison a Ukrainian Bishop (p. 423).

Not all the letters extant have been published, nor are all of them necessarily in possession of the Vatican. Thus, mention is made of an unpublished letter from Metropolitan Sheptytsky to the Pope, dated October 10, 1939. Mention is also made of a letter by Nuncio Orsenigo in Berlin reporting on the state of the Ukrainian Catholic Church under Soviet occupation. His comments are based on information received from the Very Rev. Peter Werhun, the Apostolic Visitor for the Ukrainians in Germany. His report also refers to a synod of the Catholic Church, held in Lviv in April, 1940, which indicates the vitality of the Church despite the incessant Soviet persecution.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky, in his letter, dated November 7, 1941, speaks of possible "unity" with the Orthodox Ukrainians, which apparently he believed could be explored upon the retreat of Soviet troops from Ukraine (p. 491). Again, on March 24, 1942 the Ukrainian Metropolitan asked the Pope to clarify his jurisdiction over Catholics of the Eastern and Latin rites in Eastern Ukraine, as well as in the rest of the USSR. Such authority had been granted in 1907 by Pope Pius X, at which time Metropolitan Sheptytsky was given the additional title, "Bishop of Kamianets" (a city in Eastern Ukraine). Acting upon this prerogative, Metropolitan Sheptytsky appointed four exarchs and administrators apostolic for predominantly Orthodox areas: Bishop Mykola Charnetsky for Volhynia, Polissia and Pidlassia; Rev. Clement Sheptytsky (brother of the Metropolitan) for Moscow and Siberia; Bishop Joseph Slipy for Central and Eastern Ukraine, and Rev. Anthony Niemancevych, a Byelorussian Catholic priest, for Byelorussia.

This matter of continued and extended jurisdiction was touched upon in several letters of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, addressed either to Pope Pius XII or to Cardinal Tisserant (p. 552). In regard to Eastern Ukraine and the non-Ukrainian lands in the USSR, these special jurisdictional rights were recalled by Pope Pius XII on May 30, 1940. However, the nomination of the four exarchs or administrators apostolic for these areas was confirmed, and the jurisdictions are still in effect, even though the prelates may be in exile.

The fate of the Jews in Ukraine was of special concern to Metropolitan Sheptytsky. Thus, on August 29-31, 1942 he reported to Rome on Nazi brutalities, underscoring that "the Jews were the first victims" of the sadistic Nazi regime. In comparing the Soviet and the Nazi regimes, he referred to both as cruel and inhuman, but added "the Ukrainians believe that the German regime is almost diabolical."

As regards the extermination of Jews, the Metropolitan wrote in the same letter that "as many as 200,000 had been killed in the country," and in "Kiev alone some 130,000 had been massacred in a few days."

"I wrote several Pastoral Letters, threatening to excommunicate those who are engaged in homicide; all Pastoral Letters are being confiscated. However, I succeeded in reading them to a group of gathered clergy," Metropolitan Sheptytsky wrote.

Furthermore, Metropolitan Sheptytsky reported that he had written to Himmler, chief of the Gestapo, protesting the extermination of the Jews. He also warned Ukrainian youth not to join the German-sponsored police, so as not to "scandalize themselves" by the brutal acts they were compelled to commit. From other sources it is understood that Himmler wanted to arrest Metropolitan Sheptytsky, but was barred from doing so by the German Army Command. The latter was aware of the great popularity which Metropolitan Sheptytsky enjoyed among Catholic and Orthodox Ukrainians. His arrest would greatly enhance the resistance of the Ukrainian people to the Nazi occupation.

In these letters, Metropolitan Sheptytsky poured out his soul. There can be no doubt as to what he thought of the Nazi master:

"The authorities had, at the beginning, felt a measure of shame for the acts of inhuman injustice, and tried to insure themselves with documents which might prove that the inhabitants of the country, or the militia (auxiliary police, organized by the Nazi authorities—W.D.) were the perpetrators of these murders. But with time, they (the authorities—W.D.) began killing the Jews on the streets in plain view of the population, and without any scruples..."

"We foresee that the regime of terror will increase, and that it will turn with greater force on Christian Ukrainians and Poles. The hangmen, accustomed to the massacres of the Jews—thousands of innocent people—are inured to seeing blood flow and are thirsty for blood..." (pp. 625-628).

As we know from several sources, on Metropolitan Sheptytsky's instruction hundreds of Ukrainian Jews were sheltered by Ukrainian Catholic priests, monks and nuns, and also by ordinary Ukrainian townspeople and villagers. Many Ukrainians were hung by the Gestapo and the *Einsatzgruppen* just for that.

Letters of the other Ukrainian prelates have to do with such matters as the religious situation in their dioceses, and also the religious situation among the Ukrainian Orthodox, their harassment by the Nazis and their eagerness to rebuild their Church, destroyed by the Communists. Bishop Slipy also reported about missionary activities in Eastern Ukraine and of two priests from Western Ukraine, Rev. George Prociuk and Rev. Joseph Kladochny, who established a parish in Kiev.

Of the four exarchs appointed by Metropolitan Sheptytsky for Eastern Ukraine and other areas in the USSR, only Cardinal Slipy has survived. Bishop Charnetsky died in 1958 in a Soviet dungeon; Very Rev. Clement Sheptytsky perished at an early date under mysterious circumstances (an unconfirmed report was that he was executed by the Nazis), and the Byelorussian priest, Fr. Niemancevych was tortured to death by the Gestapo.

The collection of documents was released in Rome on May 31, 1967 in a brief ceremony attended by the Secretary of State, Amleto Giovanni Cardinal Ciocognani and Cardinals Joseph Slipy, Joseph Beran, and Antonio Samore. The last named, who for some years was Secretary of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, said at the time that the fourth volume of the documentary series will be published by the end of this year. The Rev. Angelo Martini, one of the editors, on this occasion outlined in detail the religious position in the Baltic States, and Rev. Robert A. Graham, an American editor

of the collection, spoke of the suffering and persecution of the Catholic Church in Poland and Ukraine.

This collection of documents is of considerable historical importance. It deals with the strategical area of Eastern Europe, which was ravaged by two totalitarian regimes during World War II. Neither of them succeeded in destroying Catholicism nor were they able to undermine extensively the faith in the traditional Church. The attachment of the people concerned to the Holy See remains over the years.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

THE CHANGING STRATEGIC MILITARY BALANCE, U.S.A. VS. USSR.

By a Special Subcommittee of the National Strategy Committee, American Security Council, Chicago, Illinois, 1967, pp. 103.

One of the most important and constructive works prepared by the American Security Council is this careful and systematic analysis of the really changing strategic military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The study was done at the behest of the Armed Services Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives. It was undertaken by a special subcommittee made up of distinguished members of the American Security Council's National Strategy Committee, all with vast experience in military strategy and technology. General Bernard A. Schriever, General Curtis E. Le May, Admiral Felix B. Stump, Dr. Edward Teller, Professor Stefan T. Possony, and General Albert C. Wedemeyer are only a few of the well-known names gracing the special subcommittee.

Regardless of one's political persuasion, this study is *must reading* for every alert American leader and every thoughtful American citizen who treasures the blessings of national freedom and personal liberty. Several Members of the House Armed Services Committee have already expressed themselves in complete agreement with the finding of the study. One deliberative legislator on that committee now regards this studied work as his "bible." And indeed it can be so regarded, for it strives toward maximum objectivity, achieves an unusual clarity of expression, and presents in a most telling way the facts of the comparative nuclear picture between the United States and its prime, avowed enemy. In short, the picture is horrifying for us, if present developments and policies are permitted to continue. Notwithstanding this, the picture is drawn in this study with unemotional description and analysis, with a sound scholarly approach and hard-core reason.

A rapid succession of chief points in the work will alone reveal the superlative nature of this study. As pointed out clearly in the foreword, the work is based on "unclassified sources only." However, judging the backgrounds of the members of ASC's subcommittee, one needn't think twice about the perspectives and insights that guided this study on the basis of "unclassified sources only." Quite pointedly, reference is also made to the fact that the Russian installation of missiles in Cuba "came as a complete surprise to official Washington despite the massive preparations which had extended over several months." A few of the subcommittee members were in active duty then and at the highest echelon of our Government. The foreword is explicit, too, in defin-

ing the bases of the study. For one, the strategic weapon systems "are considered to be forces designed to carry out long-range strategic missions and to carry the main burden of battle in a general nuclear war." Second, like kinds of weapons—ICBM's with ICBM's, strategic bombers for strategic bombers, etc.—are used for the U.S.-USSR comparison, and not only the numbers are involved but also the yield of nuclear warheads.

The authors of the study also adopt the measurement provided by Mr. McNamara, namely, the payloads of the missiles and not just their numbers. In other words, the comparative megatonnage of the delivery vehicle, the missile itself. They also make the striking point that Secretary McNamara omits from his estimate of comparative megatonnage the USSR's 900-odd Badgers, which are comparable to our phased-out B-47's and have an intercontinental range with in-flight refueling, and about 750 IRBM's based in what they call "western Russia." This plus other factors, according to the authors, tip the scale of overall nuclearity in favor of the USSR.

It is somewhat regrettable that this excellent study is marred by a recurring misconception of the USSR. "Russia" is used indiscriminately, as though the strategic, military posture of the USSR cannot be affected by stimulated politico-economic pressures within that peculiar state. There is no question that Moscow seeks victory over the United States, whether in the Cold War or a hot global war in which it would try for a knockout nuclear first strike. In the event of the latter we, too, would seek victory, and the non-Russian nationals in the USSR would be a crucial force for us to consider. We should be considering it now for Cold War victory. Thus the major criticism of the study is this basic and unfortunate misconception that precludes any possibility for outweighing to some extent Moscow's growing nuclear superiority. A few nuclear strikes in the territory of the USSR would produce such chaos that the latent non-Russian force would inevitably come into full bloom.

Of course, our military strategy should effectively aim at the avoidance of a nuclear outbreak. Only complete nuclear superiority can guarantee such stability in the relative strategic picture, and we should strive for it regardless of what Moscow does. Our current policy of mere deterrence and equality will fail to provide this guarantee. It is essentially non-innovative, stagnant, and perilous. We should be applying the same principles of technologic innovation in this field of military technology as our economic system does for every other conceivable sphere of cultural activity. A basic cultural discrepancy exists here, and increases the chances of a global holocaust. To afford the enemy the opportunity of a first nuclear strike, to refrain from an innovative pursuit of complete superiority in all essential fields, such as ICBM's, IRBM's, long-range bombers, military-space technology, and hydronuclear development, and to expose ourselves to further "surprises," which is the stock in trade of typical Russian cunning and deceit, scarcely constitute a true cost-effective policy, founded on vision, experience with the Russians, and long-range wisdom.

In addition to the statistical tables justifying the prime finding of this study, the reader will acquire much food for thought in the many perspectives and insights surrounding the issue. One, for example, is the well supported observation that "The Soviet Union has a goal of strategic superiority designed to win a nuclear war rather than merely deter one." Another is that "Soviet ABM tests in 1961 and 1962 provided the knowledge which has permitted the USSR to rush ahead with its ABM development and outstrip the United States."

The Nuclear Test Ban treaty has already placed us at a distinct disadvantage in this vital respect. In short, the study is packed with incisive observations and judgments. Its contribution to inevitable changes in policy is incalculable.

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LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

PRINCE MAZEPA, HETMAN OF UKRAINE IN CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH PUBLICATIONS. By Theodore Mackiw, Prof. of the University of Akron. Chicago; Ukrainian Research and Information Institute, 1967. 40, pp. 126, illus. List of bibliography, appendices.

For a scholar, Prof. George W. Knepper's observation that Dr. Mackiw has performed a major feat of historical research is as stirring as it is accurate. In full agreement will be anyone who reads this finished product of a labor which consumed many years of meticulous research into a variety of materials, widely and haphazardly scattered in European and American libraries and archives. The impressive result is an organized selection of all pertinent data which is presented to the reader with coherence and with as little interpretation as possible.

Dr. Mackiw, a professor of modern languages and a noted historian of Ukrainian descent, modestly refers to his substantial work as just an essay made possible by a post-doctoral research fellowship at Yale University. Its sole purpose, he asserts, is the presentation of contemporary English sources concerning Mazepa (which includes diaries, memoirs, diplomatic reports of English eyewitnesses, numerous articles in magazines and newspapers) and an analysis thereof as far as historical facts are concerned. The citations from the press (*The Daily Courant*, *The London Gazette*, *Monthly Register*, *The Boston News-Letter*, etc.) of the investigated period (1687-1709 in particular) are not considered as prime historical sources. Nevertheless, they serve as a barometer of English public opinion of the time and help to illuminate various facets and circumstances of that significant era in the history of Ukraine, a time during which its Chief of State, Ivan Mazepa, courageously fighting the Muscovite imperialism, was catapulted into international focus, as had been the case a few decades earlier with another *Hetman* of Ukraine, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who successfully led his country's bitter struggle for independence from the Polish yoke.

The author undertook no easy task in objectively depicting *Hetman* Mazepa, Chief Executive of Ukraine in the early XVIIIth century, considering the conflicting attitudes and accounts with regard to such a prominent figure of the time. As a scholar, he felt a keen need to investigate and lay to final rest all the fanciful tales surrounding Mazepa, including that of a "love affair's beau" (mainly concocted by the *Hetman's* embittered adversaries). What emerges is the picture of a prudent, determined and enlightened freedom fighter against the Czar's ruthless rule over Ukraine (see General Patrick Gordon's references to the "tyranny and barbarity of the Russians," p. 101). The testimony of English eyewitnesses (e.g., the diaries of General Patrick Gordon, statements by Civil Engineer John Perry, the testimony of English Envoy Lord Charles Whitworth) far outweighs such malicious fabrications as those of Mazepa's personal enemy, Polish writer Jan C. Pasek, judged "an incredible

liar" by A. Brueckner, student of Polish literature. To be discounted, too, is Czar Peter's charge of "traitor" levelled against Mazepa, his staunch political antagonist and, subsequently, an ally of Swedish King Charles XII, in view of the fact that Mazepa did his utmost to serve his own nation and not Muscovy.

Besides showing the *Hetman* of Ukraine in a proper perspective, especially in his military confrontation with Czar Peter (the Battle of Poltava, July 7, 1709), Mackiw has contributed in several other ways to the study of a man whose name became, in Ukrainian eyes, symbolic of the centuries-long struggle for liberation. New, for example, is the detail that Mazepa was granted the title of Prince by Austrian Emperor Joseph I on September 1, 1707. Mackiw also has supplied evidence as to the correct spelling of the name Mazepa (only one "p" instead of the two used heretofore). Numerous photostats, reproducing the front pages of the contemporary press dealing with the Prince, maps and other illustrations, particularly an authentic portrait of Mazepa from the German monthly magazine *Die Europaeische Fama* (1706), add considerably to the value of his work. Prof. Mackiw also establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that the year of 1639 is to be accepted as the one of *Hetman* Mazepa's birth, a matter which, as is well known, has made for much academic speculation.

A few constructive remarks may be made about the book. The account of the English press, not necessarily an integral part of the work, can be condensed to advantage in future editions. Terminology could be corrected: the term "Russia," to avoid confusion, should be replaced by the proper one of "Muscovy" for the period under study. Muscovy (comp. "Moscovitica," J.B. Homan's *Neuer Atlas ueber die ganze Welt*, Nuremberg, 1714) did not officially become the empire of Russia until, after the Nystad Treaty of 1721.

Finally, the term "Ukraine" should be always used without the definite article.

All in all, Dr. Mackiw's work is warmly recommended to readers for its impeccable scholarship.

Kansas State College

ROMAN V. KUCHAR

CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM: Revised Edition. By Leo Pfeffer. Beacon Press, Boston, 1967. Pp. 832.

The present revised edition of the original volume which appeared in 1953, is a prolongation without any diminution of Dr. Pfeffer's unwavering proposition that American constitutional law commits us to an absolute separationist thesis on matters that concern church and state. And this, despite the increase and expansion of federal and state benefactions to church-related schools and their attending students. The Higher Education Act of 1963, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (relevantly, Section 205 [a]). And if it be true to admonish that these and other legislative provisions have not been submitted to the Supreme Court for an ultimate ruling, it is no less true that the no aid at all formula is far less than absolute in the minds of the majority of legislators and of the constituencies they represent. There is so much more to church-state constitutional questions besides aid to education but this is the stirring controversial issue of our times.

No one who had read and studied the original volume denied that the author was one of the more knowledgeable jurists on church-state questions and the demand upon his services across the country in lower and higher courts attests to his pre-eminence as the foremost advocate of absolute separation. Anyone who holds to the contrary (as I do) must reckon with Dr. Pfeffer's legal literature. His work reaches out in all directions but not to every evidence. He does draw up arguments *pro* and *con* for a fair evaluation of contending propositions but his own prepossessions are not always insulated from his process of reasoning. It is a comprehensive work that fails of being complete. It is a genuinely earnest effort at objectivity that is unfortunately compromised by an occasional exercise in utility-dialectic, at other times by silence about important data, and not infrequently by a summary disposal of an argument that deserved fuller treatment and more enlightening understanding.

Those who are convinced of the constitutional permissibility of tax-benefactions to secular education in religious schools rely on *Pierce* (accredited private and church-related schools can fulfill public law requirements for civic education); on *Cochran* (the child benefit theory of the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted by the United States Supreme Court); on *Everson* (public provision of transportation to a secular education in a religious school); on *Zorach* (the constitutional permissibility and even desirability of a tax supported administrative accommodation in a released-time problem); on *McGowan* and *Schempp* (the inviolability of a primary secular education and its appropriate secular means even when intertwined with beneficent consequences to religious claim of conscience in the application and disbursement of state employment compensation benefits.) All these reasonings provide propositions in the light of which the specific issue of aid to every educable child might be favorably determined. Dr. Pfeffer, on the contrary, holds that if the *Mellon* doctrine on standing to sue could be overcome either by legislative exception or by judicial willingness to accept appeals in this particular area, that the Supreme Court would then be confronted directly with this specific issue and, he is confident, rule against it.

And now an illustration of each of the restrictive criticisms I made above: On p. 61 we read:

"The Blaine amendment, which received a majority in both houses of Congress in 1876, expressly prohibited the non-preferential aid to religion which the protagonists of the narrow interpretation contend the First Amendment permits on the part of the Federal government. But the Blaine amendment was specifically limited to the states; it did not impose any restrictions on the Federal government beyond what was imposed by the First Amendment. It is difficult to believe that a more severe restriction would be imposed on the states than governed action by the Federal government, whose powers derived from the states. The sponsors of the Blaine amendment did not so construe it. Senator Christiancy, arguing for the amendment, stated that "it is simply imposing on the States *what the Constitution already imposes on the United States.*" (Dr. Pfeffer's Italics)."

The fact is that Senator Isaac Christiancy from Michigan, a staunch advocate of absolute separation, was *rejecting*, not arguing for the (Blaine) Joint

House Resolution No. 1 that was being debated in the Senate. (cf. 4 Cong. Rec. 5245, 5246 [1876]). The Senator summed up his objections:

"It simply prohibits, after a fund has been raised for public schools or after lands have been devoted to public-school purposes, the diversion of that fund or those lands to sectarian schools or for the benefit of churches. That is all it does... (T)here is no prohibition there upon the States raising any amount of money or devoting any amount of public lands to the support of private schools for instruction in the religion of the sect."

"This resolution, then, prohibits the States from committing the wrong when it is attempted *indirectly*, but leaves the States full power to commit the same wrong whenever they choose to do it *directly*."

After exposing the "main defect" the Senator turned his critical mind upon "another defect."

"It simply prohibits the States from doing these things; it does not prohibit the United States; and *under the Constitution of the United States, as it now stands, it is entirely competent to devote lands or impose taxes and appropriate money for sectarian purposes.*" (Italics mine)."

And he then concluded that the amendment should cover "the whole ground: it ought to prohibit the Federal government, as well as the State governments from doing anything of the kind." Let us also note that the last five words were omitted from Senator Christiancy's statement by Dr. Pfeffer which in fact add emphasis to the senator's objections. Fully, his statement reads "it is simply imposing on the States what the Constitution already imposes and that is all correct." (Not only is Senator Christiancy quoted out of context, but worse still, contrary to the Senator's understanding of H. R. 1 and of the federal First Amendment).

Almost as little reverence is shown for Jefferson's mind on integral education and the state accommodations to that purpose in his educational plans of 1814, 1817, 1818, 1822, 1824. Dr. Pfeffer defers to Dr. Butts evaluation when he might have consulted Jefferson's private correspondence with Thomas Cooper (Letter, November 2, 1822), in which Jefferson insists on the correct intent of his plans against the misconstructions placed on them by some of his adverse critics. The State accommodations of library facilities, of lecture halls for study and even worship, of a mutual adjustment of university curricula with that of the schools of divinity and the invitation to build these theological schools within or adjacent to the state university grounds were all directed to remedy the "chasm" of an educational process that is not related to theology. A cloak of complete silence covers Jefferson's treaty with the Kaskasia Indians (1803) wherein federal funds were appropriated for the construction of a Catholic Church, for the support of a priest, and instruction in secular and religious subjects. Surely whatever its relevance to the question of aid to education, this action of Jefferson is at least cognate to the discussion of *his* mind on the First Amendment religious clauses.

Great reliance is placed on President Grant's address to the Grand Army of Tennessee recommending taxation of church-owned properties with the ex-

ception of houses of worship and Grant's messages to Congress (1875) calling for an amendment forbidding the teaching of religious tenets in public schools and prohibiting the use of tax funds to sectarian schools. Now one would suppose that it is no less significant in understanding the ulterior motives and prepossessions behind Grant's recommendations to mention as well his unique contribution to a program of Christian missionary work among the Indians at government support, a program which had begun with the Administration of Washington and concluded in 1900. A vigorous promotor of this religious program, he appointed a Board of Indian Commissioners who were to be nominated by various religious boards, allocated two million dollars to their use, and decided that the missionary societies should nominate the men who would serve as Indian agents. The Episcopal Bishop, Henry B. Whipple, was placed in charge of the government funds for the relief of the Sioux Indians. Such facts as these and others in our national history may suggest that it was not a constitutional scruple of conscience that set the forces against any subventions to Catholic schools, and contemporary literature will disclose how much of it proceeded from political opportunism and cynicism as well as from religious bias.

In my own volume, *THIS NATION UNDER GOD*, Church, State and Schools in America, I wrote of the contractual arrangements between Yeshiva University and the City and State of New York which entrusted the entire governance of the Bronx Municipal Hospital Center and the State Mental Hospital to an Orthodox Jewish University at a time when Yeshiva had not yet a medical school. What of the "releasing of funds" and "indirect benefits" arguments that the author presses so strongly against tax benefactions to schools of other religious confessions?

The author, too, tries a subtle form of intimidation, a sort of subliminal suggestion (and at that not too subtle) by endeavoring to arouse ancient fears and animosities of church-state mutual involvements in past history and what does happen to governmental schools when tax aid is provided for every educable child. There are simply two issues in such a fearsome prospect. First, is the author afraid of the truly free choice of parents in an open democratic process? Second, American democracy, like every other democracy, is concretely situated in history and politically and legally structured according to the will of the people. American democracy is not Canadian democracy, nor English democracy, nor Swedish democracy, nor Netherlands nor Israeli democracy. American democracy has been and will continue to be no more nor less than what its people determine. If Americans are a complex of diverse European origins, we have also our own distinctive and unique political and legal institutions. We are not now nor have we ever been in the past subject to historical determinism—what takes place elsewhere will necessarily occur here. This has not happened in regard to other American experiences, it will not happen in regard to the government-church-school issue.

It is unfortunate that Dr. Pfeffer who knows so much, could not have been a source of enlightenment to all and even contribute not only a genuine and authentic integral work of scholarship, but also have assisted to leading the entire nation in a unison of purpose, in fashioning a uniquely American experience of separation of church and state, and a truly free and democratic choice in the education of all students.

Fordham University

JOSEPH F. COSTANZO, S. J.

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1967," addresses. *Congressional Record*, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., July 19, 1967.

As in previous years, since July 1959, the U.S. Congress observed the Ninth Captive Nations Week. This July 19 issue of the *Congressional Record* contains the results of the Congressional observance. Of course many statements usually appear weeks before the official observance, and these continue far beyond the Week itself, in some years well into December. The statements coupled with field observance reports run well into over a 1,000 pages. The 1967 Congressional Captive Nations Week observance was one of the best on record.

Congressman Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania led the proceedings, stating "We in Congress join with millions of fellow Americans in expressing to the world our firm determination never to forget the freedom aspirations of all the captive nations and to work in every possible manner for the achievement of their eventual liberation from the bondage of Red totalitarianism and Sino-Soviet Russian colonialism." He read President Johnson's proclamation of the Week, and followed this with a stirring talk on "The Lessons of the Observance."

Some eighty other legislators joined in the celebration. Congressman Edward J. Derwinski of Illinois, who is the leading Republican counterpart to Mr. Flood in these matters, began his statement by taking "this opportunity to remind the Members of the House that the gentleman from Pennsylvania, the gentleman in the well, has been untiring in the cause of the captive peoples." So has Mr. Derwinski, who included in his address the release "Captive Nations Author Challenges *Washington Post* Editors on Soviet Russian Imperio-Colonialism." This National Captive Nations Committee release publicized Dr. Dobriansky's challenging reply to the *Post's* vicious editorial against him and the Week on July 10. To this day the *Post's* editors have not replied to the challenge, one way or another.

"PROCEEDINGS, THE 12TH CONFERENCE OF THE ASIAN PEOPLES ANTI-COMMUNIST LEAGUE," a compilation. Secretariat of the 12th APACL Conference, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 1967.

Released in the summer of 1967, these proceedings deal with the APACL conference held in Korea from October 31 to November 8, 1966. They contain the minutes of all the sessions, the addresses of notables attending the conference, and the reports of member and observer groups. The adopted resolutions of the body are also presented in full text.

Throughout the proceedings the active participation of the National Captive Nations Committee is reflected in the numerous statements, report, and address made by its chairman, Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University. For example, the NCNC chairman informed the Conference about the hospitalization of President Johnson and urged the Conference "to send a cablegram of concern and good hope to the President of the United States." He made the motion, which was unanimously approved, prepared the cable, and also unanimously carried, it was dispatched.

In his address to the Conference the NCNC chairman emphasized the need to internationalize further the annual Captive Nations Week Observance. He paid glowing tribute to the Republic of China for its outstanding leadership in this regard. Also, the NCNC chairman pointed out that all must zero in on the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, such as Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, etc. if we're to cope with Soviet Russian power and machinations in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

"RUSSIAN COLONIALISM IN ASIA," an article by Edmund Stevens. *The Sunday Star*, Washington, D.C., June 4, 1967.

Since 1963 the Chinese Reds have been strongly attacking the Russians for their colonialist exploitation of what is really Turkestan in Central Asia. This has placed Moscow on the defensive and, as pointed out in this refreshing article, in somewhat of an embarrassing situation. Czarist Russian imperialism annexed this area into the Russian Empire and, as the author says, for "the Soviet to say nice things about the Czarist autocracy which they reviled and destroyed, is a ticklish proposition which requires a measure of doublethink."

So, let it not be said that the Soviet Russian imperio-colonialists are ever to be found wanting in Potemkinizing.

The author could have used the last phrase with telling effect. To meet the problem, the wily Russians dig up a Tadzhik historian named Mukhtarov, who in turn digs up a 19th-century Tadzhik poetess named Dilshod. In a widely publicized article about her, the puppet historian shows how Dilshod composed poetry for the emancipation of Oriental women and in denunciation of local Moslem despots.

With this contrived setting, Mukhtarov now writes: "The poetess welcomed the annexation of Central Asia" and ends by saying that still "others were attracted by the humane attitude of the Russians towards the native population. One wonders how much the historian received for this piece of distorting "scholarship." Despite their sinister objectives, the Chinese Reds are correct in their accusation of the Soviet Russians, whose subtle genocidal policy extends beyond Turkestan into Ukraine, the Baltic nations and other non-Russian parts of the USSR.

"KARL MARX EMBARRASSES THE SOVIET IDEOLOGISTS," a reference paper by Andrei V. Babich. *Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union*, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Germany, 1967.

This well-written paper should be read by every American analyst who still believes "Marx and his teachings started it all." The author quickly

points out that the program for the 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik revolution, as set forth in the Party Central Committee of January 4, scarcely mentions Marx. The reason? "Soviet ideologists are reluctant to draw attention to the fact that both the origin of the Soviet and other Communist states, and current Kremlin policies, bear little relation to Marxist teachings."

A number of perceptive points are brought out in the paper. For example, "Communist victories are actually the result of the *lack* of capitalist development, a fact which Stalin admitted as early as 1938." Another, "Communist doctrine actually expresses not the interests of the workers, but those of the revolutionary intelligentsia." As Lenin himself admitted, "In Russia the theoretical doctrine of social democracy (i.e. Bolshevism—L.E.D.) arose completely independently of the spontaneous growth of the workers' movement; it arose as the natural and inevitable result of developing thought among the revolutionary intelligentsia" (V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 347-348). Still another, the "Soviet leaders are aware that the experience of fifty years has not confirmed but completely disproved Marx's theory." As the writer well substantiates this, the official Soviet decree itself stresses that the greatest victory in "Russia" was "the transformation of the Soviet Union into a mighty industrial power," with the CP totalitarianizing the SU and at incalculable cost and suffering instituting hyper-capitalistic formation of capital.

There are many other instructive points developed in this analysis. But it all really goes back to Berdyaev's keen perception that if you want to understand Russian Bolshevism, dwell upon Russian imperial history, not Marxism. This early admonition is yet to be generally received in the United States. A research paper of this sort contributes wholesomely to it.

"CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK," an address by the Honorable Thaddeus J. Dulski. *Congressional Record*, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., July 20 1967.

Congressman Dulski's address is one of many that soon followed the Congressional observance of Captive Nations Week. In his brief talk he alludes to an article titled "Review of U.S. Policy Toward the U.S.S.R." As he puts it, "One of the highlights of this ninth observance is the theme for a general and thorough review of U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.R." He continues, "As a matter of fact, in the whole history of the U.S.S.R., since its founding in 1922-23, there has never been a thorough examination by any governmental body in the free world of this colossus in the East."

The article referred to was written for this journal by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky. The entire and rather lengthy article was republished in this issue of the *Record*. The response to it has been both illuminating and encouraging. Resolutions have already been introduced in Congress for such a review. There is no question that somewhere along the line such a review will take place in Congress. Of course, the sooner, the better.

"GOOD QUESTION," a brief item. *Newsletter*, Republican Congressional Committee, Washington, D.C., June 26, 1967.

On the very first page of this widely distributed publication, Soviet Premier Kosygin is quoted as saying in his United Nations speech, "In the 20th Century, no country has the right to expand borders by military action." This

is only one of several blatant falsehoods uttered by the dour-faced premier, if one views it in terms of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism.

A reply to this is quoted from the remarks of Senator Charles H. Percy of Illinois. It is another example of ignorance with regard to the Soviet Union, its history and aggressions. Percy retorts: "Hurray! Does this mean the U.S.S.R. plans to free the millions of people contained in the 146,000 square miles of territory it took during and after World War II on the grounds that it was essential to the security of the Soviet state?" Mr. Percy obviously is unfamiliar with the still greater millions and territory taken following World War I, which also belongs to the 20th century.

"OUR DUTY TO HELP AMERICA," a published lecture by Professor Roman Smal-Stocki. Center of Ukrainian Studies, The Ukrainian Catholic Seminary, Washington, D.C., 1967.

The powerful foreword to this highly instructive pamphlet, written by the Very Reverend Constantine Berdar, Rector of St. Josaphat Ukrainian Catholic Seminary, is a most apt introduction to this lecture. The Rector minces no words when he states that the United States must address itself to not only war on physical poverty but also "another poverty, more abject and dangerous to America than the physical poverty which is now being waged with millions of dollars." That poverty he calls an "Intellectual Poverty" against which "every American must wage this war," and those of Ukrainian heritage, he rightly feels, "must have the moral courage to stand up and be counted as loyal Americans who stand in the vanguard of leadership and helpfulness to this great nation of ours, precisely because we are loyal American Ukrainian Catholics, precisely because we are strong in our knowledge of ourselves and our backgrounds."

With these fitting words, the lecture delivered by the world renowned scholar, Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki, explains forcefully and eloquently the duty each American of Ukrainian background has to his country. His chief points are telling and convincing. The professor shows, for one, how modern sociologists decry the use of the term "melting pot." He points out quite accurately that since World War II the United States has become the leading world power, and "this very variety of nationalities from which and by which she has grown, must and do constitute her greatest single strength and resource." How profoundly true!

The learned professor elaborates well on his other points. These are that "America, at the present time, requires of its citizens a knowledge of foreign languages and cultures; that the American educational system demands of Americans of Ukrainian background a knowledge of the Ukrainian language and culture; and that every human must remember his origins, the land and the people from which he sprang." All that the professor has said, and more, is in the finest American tradition. The vibrant spirit of the lecture shows up especially in one sentence; "I became an American citizen with a specific purpose in mind, to continue the work I have done all my life, that is, to fight for the freedom and self-determination not only of Ukraine, but also of America and of every nation in the free world which is under attack or endangered by the Moscow inspired communist conspiracy." The ideas expressed in this

stirring lecture cannot but impress every thoughtful American, of Ukrainian background or no.

"WE ALL MISS KHRUSHCHEV," a book review by Bernard Gwertzman. *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., June 5, 1967.

Mr. Gwertzman, a writer for *The Washington Star*, reviews the book written by Mark Frankland and titled *Khrushchev*. Actually, most of the review is an article of Gwertzman's thoughts about the Russian figure and his days of Kremlin leadership. The caption is really a quotation of a remark made by an old Moscow hand at a cocktail party. Some Kremlinologists are reported to be jumping ship and becoming China watchers because of the funny chaos in Peking and "the predictable dullness of the Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny crowd."

No doubt Khrushchev was a most colorful personality. His antics, proverbs, and peasant crudeness evoked the laughs of even his sternest opponents. The writer is careful to point out the butcher qualities of the man. However, he is a bit naive to think that if Nikita had remained in power, the situation in Vietnam might have been different. Khrushchev is seen as having cared less about China or Vietnam or Korea. He even goes to the extent of saying that "Khrushchev's foreign policy was unpredictable," as though one man in the Kremlin could set this policy according to his wishes and contrary to the well-known framework of Soviet Russian imperialist drives and tendencies. This notion of personalized foreign policy, particularly in the case of the Russian totalitarians, is almost childish. The policy pursued by Lenin and Stalin was faithfully observed by Khrushchev, as it is also by the dull crowd in the Kremlin today.

"COMMUNIST OPPRESSION OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE," a pamphlet. Conference of Americans of Central and Eastern European Descent (CACEED), New York, N.Y., 1966.

This pamphlet of forty pages contains much valuable data on the organizations in CACEED and also with regard to the captive nations related in name to these groups. Member organizations are nine in number and consist, of the Polish American Congress, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, the American Latvian Association and others. The initial part of the pamphlet deals with the founding, composition and objectives of CACEED. The very first of several objectives is the "Defense of the American way of life against insidious Communist infiltration and subversion."

However, the main portion of the work concentrates on "the deeds and practices of Russian Imperialism and Colonialism in the heart of civilized Europe." These are shown through a useful format of presenting essential data on each of the captive nations centering on this heart. Thus Albania, Bulgaria, Czecho-Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine are interestingly covered in terms of geographic location, areas and population, religion, history, and persecution under Russian imperialist rule.

The remaining portion treats of three general, summarizing points. One is "How real is the relaxation of Communist rule," and the consensus is that it is more apparent than real. The second calls for a re-examination of U.S. foreign policy with respect to the captive nations. The last point shows the way to uphold the captive nations cause. For an understanding of some of the captive nations and what to do about their eventual liberation, this pamphlet presents its material effectively and convincingly.

"RUSSIA: THE ENEMY IN VIETNAM?", a commentary. *U.S. News & World Report*, Washington, D.C., January 30, 1967.

By mid-1967 increasing numbers of Americans have become convinced that the real and determining enemy in Vietnam is not Red Hanoi, but Moscow and to a much lesser degree Peking. This development has only confirmed an analysis made earlier in the year by this prominent periodical, one which we purposely kept aside for this kind of Monday-morning appraisal. When one reviews the developments on the world scene and in Vietnam in particular, it is remarkable how sound and predictive this early analysis turned out to be.

The very pitch of the analysis is provided in the sub-caption: "Facts now emerging make it clear that it wouldn't be so much of a war for the U.S. if it weren't for the Russians." How much more so since Moscow's announcements in the spring of 1967 on stepped-up material aid to Hanoi. Facts which we are all familiar with now, are enumerated with impressive effect in this piece: the Russian investment of close to \$1 billion in North Vietnam, the almost scandalous military position Moscow has tied us to in Vietnam, while it pushes ahead on its ABM defense system, and the Russian use of Vietnam as an instrument of its larger, world strategy. Thus, SAM's, anti-aircraft batteries, over 100 MIG warplanes, II-28 light bombers and numerous other vital items shipped to Hanoi are all intended to tie our military in knots in Vietnam to embarrass the giant in the world arena, and to buy time for a still more improved USSR military and political posture vis-a-vis the U.S. A sorry picture supported by captive resources both within and outside the Soviet Union.

"ARM TWIST FOR ARABS," an article by Fred Sparks. *The Washington Daily News*, Washington, D.C., August 28, 1967.

Moscow's heavy involvement in the Middle East was amply revealed in June 1967. It brings up the basic and oft-made point that this unusual penetration of the Middle East would never have occurred if Moscow were deprived of the Ukrainian and Caucasian springboards for such adventure. That such involvement always entails the primacy of Russian interests is fully revealed in this article.

It is reliably disclosed here that "to control the more warlike Arabs, Moscow quietly has threatened to allow hundreds of thousands of Russian Jews—perhaps a million—to leave to settle in Israel." The actuation of this threat obviously would mean an even greater Israel midget for the Arabs to cope with. Behind it is Moscow's fear of another Arab debacle and a possible confrontation with the U.S. The use of humans as a lever in the political, international game is not a new exercise for Moscow.

L. E. D.

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UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

An Outline of History of Political and Military
Relations

(December 1917 - April 1918)

By

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(Ukrainian Free University)

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