

Multiculturalism and Ukrainian Canadians



Edited by Stella Hryniuk & Lubomyr Luciuk

Series Editor

Gabriele Scardellato

Polyphony is a series published by the
Multicultural History Society of Ontario
and appears in single or double volumes.

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Cover: *Sculpture commemorating the Ukrainian-Canadian pioneering experience by John Boxtel, Gananoque, Ontario.*

Multiculturalism and Ukrainian Canadians:
Identity, Homeland Ties, and the
Community's Future

Edited by
Stella Hryniuk and Lubomyr Luciuk

Polyphony Volume 13
1993

***Polyphony* is available from:**

University of Toronto Press Incorporated
5201 Dufferin Street
Downsview, Ontario
Canada M3H 5T8

Toll Free 1-800-565-9523

Series subscribers receive the volume and
invoice upon publication

Single volume — \$12.00

Double volume — \$24.00

Individual purchases

Single volume — \$16.00

Double volume — \$32.00

Multicultural History Society of Ontario
Multiculturalism and Ukrainian
Canadians: Identity, Homeland Ties, and
the Community's Future

ISBN 0-919045-63-4 (v. 13)

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Printed and bound in Canada.

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Acknowledgments


The organizers of this symposium wish to thank the Ministry of Multiculturalism and Citizenship, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), the Ukrainian Canadian Centennial Committee, the Ontario Ministry of Culture and Communications, and the Ukrainian Canadian Congress for financial support. We are also grateful to the Multicultural History Society of Ontario, whose director, Professor Paul R. Magocsi, co-hosted the symposium and arranged for the publication of the proceedings. The staff of the MHSO, particularly Dr. Lillian Petroff, worked for many months to ensure the success of this venture. Of course, that success is due mainly to our panellists, chairpersons, and discussants, and other participants, whose cogent contributions form the basis of this volume.

Maria Mihailovich assisted with the transcription of the symposium proceedings, and Peter Dorn, of the Graphic Design Unit at Queen's University skilfully prepared our symposium materials. Both the Department of History at the University of Manitoba and the Department of Politics and Economics at the Royal Military College of Canada supported our organizational efforts. We are especially grateful to Mr. John Boxtel of Gananoque, Ontario, for letting us use a photograph of his original sculpture commemorating the Ukrainian-Canadian pioneering experience. We are also grateful to the Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre (UCEC), in Winnipeg, for providing us with many of the illustrations that appear in this volume of *Polyphony*. Photographs, illustrations, and other documentary material were also made available by the Multicultural History Society of Ontario, Dr. Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, Messrs. G.R.B. Panchuk, and Stanley W. Frolick.

Finally, our spouses, Ms. Alexandra Chyczij and Dr. Fred Stambrook, offered us good advice and, perhaps more important,

good cheer, over the past few years as we organized the Ukrainian Canadian Centennial Seminar series in co-operation with the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Toronto, as we planned this symposium, and as we saw to the publication of proceedings in this volume of *Polyphony*. □

Stella Hryniuk and Lubomyr Luciuk
Toronto, Ontario
October 1992



*Cunard steamship company business card, 1927,
Dymtro Elchesen Papers, UCEC.*

Introduction

Stella Hryniuk and Lubomyr Luciuk

This issue of *Polyphony* is based largely on papers presented at a symposium organized by the Ukrainian Canadian Centennial Commission and held in Toronto on 30 November 1991. The main theme was the Ukrainian experience in the “New World” of Canada. In part, the intention was to commemorate the centennial (1891–1991) of the arrival of the first Ukrainians in Canada.

The year 1991 was significant for another reason. Across the Atlantic, Ukrainians in the “old country” were voting overwhelmingly in favour of Ukraine’s independence. Thus, the question of Ukraine’s future was, not surprisingly, a common sub-theme in discussions at the symposium. From the beginning of Ukrainian immigration to Canada at the turn of the century, one of the most—if not the most—important reasons for deliberately maintaining the Ukrainian language and an organized cultural and political life has been an abiding desire on the part of many Ukrainian immigrants and some of their progeny to help bring

about the freedom of their homeland. One way of achieving that goal has been to create and maintain an organized Ukrainian community in Canada.

The centennial of Ukrainians in Canada presented a good opportunity to explore the past and the future of this community in the light of the remarkable events taking place in Ukraine. A selection of Canadians, some, but not all, of Ukrainian origin, were invited to respond to questions about the nature of the organized Ukrainian-Canadian community’s relations with the larger host society, in particular with the Canadian state. They were also asked to consider specifically how Canada’s Ukrainians might restructure or reform their community organizations to meet the challenges of a dramatically new international situation, one in which Ukraine would be recognized as a nation-state. Given that Ukraine’s independence was just being re-established, the panellists were asked to consider these questions: Does Canada’s Ukrainian-Canadian community have



Breaking the virgin soil, Manitoba c 1900, Provincial Archives of Manitoba.

a future, or at least a role similar to the one it had in the past? What ties between the diaspora and the new Ukraine should properly be established or developed? What implications does the existence of a Ukrainian state have for the way in which Canada's Ukrainians will hereafter deal with other ethnic, religious, and racial minorities in Canada's multicultural society? And what, if anything, has the historical experience of the past hundred years taught about the consequences, beneficial or otherwise, of identifying oneself as a Ukrainian in Canada?

Of course, readers will not necessarily find complete or even entirely satisfying answers in this collection to all these questions and others that were broached during the symposium. In one sense, they are not meant to. This volume expresses the ideas and beliefs of some very prominent Ukrainian Canadians and other Canadians who were gathered to report on their observations and reflections at a critical moment in the history of the modern Ukrainian independence movement and a watershed in the Ukrainian-Canadian experience. Their views are bound to change; indeed they will probably have done so by the time this issue of *Polyphony* appears. But that does not weaken the utility of this issue. Some very provocative observations and recommendations can be found in these pages. They should inspire well-considered (and probably much-needed) changes in the way Canada's Ukrainians in future present themselves and their interests to the larger Canadian host society and even to the new government in Ukraine. We have also included contributions from other commentators on the Ukrainian-Canadian scene. These additional essays, we hope, will both complement the proceedings and offer other views, in particular because they are written in the light of changes that have taken place both overseas and at home since our meeting.

Two issues raised in these pages seem especially thought-provoking. First, there is the more or less candid admission of moral responsibility, made here by the now weakened Ukrainian-Canadian left, for helping cover up the



Crossing the Atlantic, 1952, Iwan and Anastasia Lech Collection, UCEC.

Stalinist Terror and especially the politically engineered Great Famine of 1932–1933. This candour may come as no surprise to some students of the Ukrainian-Canadian experience, but it is welcome nevertheless. Second, as several commentators suggest, there seems to be a scarcity of “new thinking” on the centre and right of the Ukrainian-Canadian political spectrum. Mainstream organizations, like the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, have evidently given little thought to what role they can or should have in the future. Should the Congress concentrate on Ukrainians as a constituent part of Canada's population? Or should it devote more effort to helping with Ukraine's economic, political, religious, and social redevelopment? Or both? And how?

It seems increasingly evident that some of the larger national organizations that were once the backbone of the Ukrainian-Canadian community, have become largely dated and redundant, or have even expired, like the Hetman movement, or are in the process of doing so. These supposedly influential organizations do have memberships, but they represent only a minority of a minority of the total Ukrainian-Canadian population, which some claim is one million strong. What we propose is a “new commons,” both a way of doing things and a way of representing collective Ukrainian-Canadian interests. It would involve Canadian Ukrainian

professionals regardless of background, region, generation, politics, or religion, in new or revitalized organizations tailored to meet specific goals within the Canadian and international political forums. It is not clear how this can be achieved, although the precedent, as several panellists made clear, has been set through the formation of groups like the Civil Liberties Commission, its successor, the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association (UCCLA), Canadian Friends of Rukh, Canada-Ukraine Business Council and so forth.

Certainly, each presentation led to lively discussions. Edited versions of those papers are presented here along with the remarks of some of the discussants, the distilled contents of some of the resulting question-and-answer sessions, and the essays solicited after the conference. All the lecturers were given the opportunity to revise their presentations, but not every one did.

It is worth adding that the editors do not necessarily agree with, nor endorse all the ideas or conclusions of the panellists. Each contribution represents the viewpoint of its author.

Indeed, the aims of the organizing committee were modest. While we did bring together some very talented and thoughtful people and suggested possible themes for consideration, we otherwise let the participants express themselves as they saw fit. In our view we succeeded in providing thought-provoking commentaries on the Ukrainian Canadian past and future, as we trust our readers will agree. We hope that the publication of the proceedings of this symposium will help to inform members of Canada's Ukrainian community, and others, about how one of Canada's largest minority groups defines its evolving role both in Canadian affairs and in the fate of Ukraine at a critical time in the history of both countries.□



The Right Honourable Prime Minister P.E. Trudeau announcing Canada's new multiculturalism policy, Winnipeg, Manitoba, October 1971, UCC Collection.

SESSION I

A Question Of Identity: Canada's Ukrainians And Multiculturalism

Reginald Bibby, University of Lethbridge

For some time I have been convinced that multiculturalism gone wrong is having a divisive effect on the country and that we need to bring the government back to the drawing board. And it seems to me that Ukrainians, as the cultural community that helped to inspire the government's original policy, may well be in a position to provide leadership by calling for important revisions.

In the late 1960s, at a time when the federal government was preoccupied with bilingualism and biculturalism, that is, with people of British and French origin, it was important that the Ukrainian community reminded the government that Canada was also made up of people of many other national backgrounds. It was a matter not just of gaining political recognition, but also of drawing attention to the fact that cultural diversity can be an invaluable national resource.

When a society is made up of people who have been exposed to a wide array of social structures, ideas, experiences, and beliefs, the cultural pool on which that society can draw is dramatically enriched. To have subscribed to bilingualism—or rather biculturalism—over multiculturalism would not only have been ethnocentric, but masochistic. We would have deprived our collective selves of immeasurable benefits.

Now, lest anyone need be reminded, however, the trick is to figure out how best to tap that diversity in order that everyone can benefit. It seems to me that there are three essential elements. First, newcomers need to know that within the limitations of the law, features of their old cultures that they value are welcome in the new country. Second, they need to know

that their places of origin will not count against them, that they will be treated equitably. And, third, in the interests of the society as a whole, it is essential that people share their various cultures with each other. Centrally important to this third feature is interaction. New arrivals and members of the host society have to communicate with one another and reflect together, in order that the best features of their cultures can be passed on to everyone.

To the credit of the much maligned federal government, the policy that Pierre Trudeau outlined in the House of Commons on 8 October 1971, contained, each of those three elements. Its main objectives were, first, to permit Canadians who so desired to retain the features of their culture that they value; second, to assist all Canadians in overcoming the cultural barriers including language, to a full participation in the life of this country; and third, to promote creative interaction among all cultural groups in the interest of national unity. People of various cultures and ethnic groups, said the Prime Minister, would “be encouraged to share cultural expressions and values with other Canadians, and so contribute to a richer life for us all.”

Now, in the document it had tabled, the government made it very clear that it did not intend to help individual groups to cut themselves off from the rest of society. On the contrary, the government would promote creative encounters in the interchange among all Canadian cultural groups.

However, I am arguing that the multiculturalism policy in practice has failed to meet its primary objective of contributing to a richer life for all of us. But contrary to the claims of anti-



Mundare, Alberta, n.d., Father Philip Ruh, O.M.I. Collection, UCEC.

multiculturalism crusaders, this does not mean that nothing of value has been accomplished. Let us give credit where credit is due. The federal multicultural program has been reasonably successful in achieving the first two of the original objectives, those of preservation and participation. Canadians are certainly more aware these days of cultural diversity than they were in the 1970s and the conditions of minorities have become more just and fair.

My national surveys have found that, despite the claims of growing racism, there has been a general decrease in prejudice in all regions of the country since the mid-1970s. That progress is partially hidden by the fact that the remaining blatant bigots, about 10 per cent of the population, receive disproportionate amounts of publicity. The multiculturalism program needs to be commended, rather than axed, for helping to raise the public's awareness of both cultural diversity and the unacceptability of prejudice and discrimination.

But the extremely important third objective of stimulating creative interaction between all groups, thereby enabling us to tap our rich national resource of diversity, has seemingly been forgotten. The result is that the multicultural program has not succeeded in bringing

Canadians together for the dialogue, reflection, and evaluation that are essential to producing a so-called richer life for us all.

The social value of our cultural diversity lies in our being able to reflect together on our rich body of ideas and behaviour so that we can separate the true from the trivial, the banal from the best. Through such open and dynamic interchange, we can creatively improve the collective quality of life in the country. Such a milieu, where uninhibited expression and thoughtful discernment are encouraged by governments, schools, the media, and religious groups, is the key to tapping the collective contributions of diversity.

And so it is a great dream: natives, French Canadians, and English Canadians joined by people from around the world, respecting traditions and ideas, yet openly discussing, examining, and selectively adopting them as individuals and as a society, and thereby enhancing the life of the country. Sadly, that dream has not been pursued adequately by the multiculturalism program. In my mind, the failure to emphasize the importance of interaction is the primary reason why multiculturalism has not been particularly successful in bringing Canadians together. But it is not just a case of hav-

ing failed to tap our rich diversity: we have also made our means of enhancing collective life into uninspiring ends in themselves.

Simply to encourage the preservation of cultural heritages has no particular benefit for the country as a whole. On the bright side, contrary to frequent claims, it has not been demonstrated that funding contributes to the solidarity of cultural groups at the expense of their participation in the larger society. But that is not to say that it does no harm to provide government funds for cultural preservation.

There is good evidence, found by the Spicer Commission, for example, that in times of economic strain such dollar outlays contribute to hostility toward both government and participating cultural groups. And even if grants do not foster solidarity of individual groups and indifference toward the rest of society, during the dark days when politicians are claiming we have a serious unity problem, a program that is aimed at the parts instead of the whole is, to put it mildly, a hard sell. In addition to contributing to concern about the economy and national unity, cultural heritage programs that are not tied to some kind of collective purpose run the risk of trivialising the social significance of cultural diversity. Multiculturalism becomes synonymous with festivals and food fairs, not to mention paternalistic civic proclamations that acknowledge, in the words of one city's statement, "the contribution of the multiculturalism community to the community at large"—whatever that means.

In short, unless the cultivation of national heritages is designed to contribute to Canadian society as a whole, it is a dubious social venture with a potential for divisiveness. But perhaps of greater importance, to stop at the point of stressing the value of full participation, with the accompanying themes of tolerance and fairness, is to encourage a debilitating preoccupation with discrimination. This suggests that when social justice becomes our only end, intergroup relations can become extremely strained and unenjoyable.

Ours is a society where we have learned to be on the lookout for any signs of prejudice and

discrimination, with the media playing the role of town crier. Given the ease with which labels such as "racist" and "bigot" can be assigned, it is frequently not wise to speak up in public, let alone speak to each other. And so it is that we often make a virtue of silence. I have suggested a number of times that there are perhaps only two places where Canadians really say what they think of each other—behind closed doors and open-line shows. Stripped of the inclination to interact, we find ourselves in the bizarre position of not being able to extract the best from our diverse culture. What we are left with are the consolation prizes of multicultural days and the continuous admonition simply to be tolerant. In the words of one government employee, "The end-all of Canadian life is simply that we are supposed to stay out of the way of each other."

Multiculturalism, rather than stimulating the kind of group interaction that is so essential to the tapping of our diversity, has inadvertently tended to inhibit it. We are a diverse nation alive with attitudes, opinions, and beliefs, but the multicultural rules have had the peculiar effect of making it difficult for us to talk to each other, and certainly for us to evaluate each others' ideas and customs. I would suggest to you that the time has come to stop wasting our diverse resources. The solution does not lie in abolishing the multiculturalism policy and program. We need to continue to encourage newcomers, as well as the people who are already here, to enjoy and cultivate those features of their heritages that they cherish. It also is essential that we ensure that people are not kept from participating fully in Canadian life because of their race or nationality. But we need to do more. We have to make it possible for Canadians of diverse backgrounds to interact with one another, to speak openly about their differences, to reflect on their values and dreams, to evaluate the merits of their various ideas and customs.

Let me close by suggesting to you that the diversity of Canadian society has been exaggerated. National surveys of young people—and we have been carrying them out every five


years since 1975—along with the research of others, show that we in Canada have far more in common than we realize, that we have very similar values, very similar concerns, very similar hopes.

Over the last six months or so, I have enjoyed, in speaking to audiences out west, pointing out that there is a province in this country where the foremost concern of people these days is the economy, the number two concern is unemployment, and the number three concern is government incompetence. And as those Albertans start to puff out their chests, I tell them, “And you know what province I am talking about? Quebec.” About three weeks ago I had the chance to be in Quebec, and enjoyed telling those audiences too, “You know, there is a province in this country. . . .” And I said, “You know, we could look at you and say that

province is Quebec, but I am here to tell you the province I am talking about is Alberta.”

And the same is true of British Columbia and of the Atlantic region. My point is that we have far more in common than we realize. Diversity does have limits. We need to do a much better job of drawing on our rich collective resources so that we can experience what it seems to me that we all want, namely economic prosperity and good interpersonal lives. We have been simply coexisting, putting up with each other for too long, and it is time to move on to better things.

To return to where I began, twenty years ago the Ukrainian community helped to shape intergroup policy in Canada. The times call for your help to reshape both the concept of multiculturalism and the policy of multiculturalism in the 1990s.□



Paul Yuzk, the third Senator in Canada of Ukrainian origin, courtesy of the Yuzk family.

SESSION I

Manoly R. Lupul, University of Alberta, Edmonton


The central fact in any discussion of Canada's identity is unquestionably the great variety of its people—their ethnic backgrounds, religions, and races. Canada is a multicultural, multi-religious, and multiracial country because of its people, all of whom, even the native peoples, came to Canada as immigrants. Since 1971 the identity of Canada has been officially defined as multicultural within a bilingual, French- and English-speaking framework, and one can no more change that multiculturalism than one can change the phases of the moon. And this is so because the definition merely reflects the nature of the people who have immigrated to Canada.

Canada's multiculturalism is not a political construct. Canada is multicultural, not because of its governments, but because its people are conscious of their immigrant or ancestral roots, though the degree of consciousness can vary greatly across groups, generations, and individuals, depending on the group's size, its acceptance by the larger society, and the needs of its members. The fact of Canada's multiculturalism is incontrovertible. In contemporary terms, it is non-negotiable. What is negotiable is our understanding of the term and of the place it should have in our public philosophy and the extent, therefore, to which it should influence public policy.

Although the multicultural movement was spearheaded largely by Ukrainian Canadians, it was not always well understood by them or by others to whom it appealed. To most, it was a convenient way to counter the bicultural movement that powerful voices in Quebec and elsewhere were advancing in the throes of the 1960s Quiet Revolution. From the outset,

however, the concept underlying both the bicultural and multicultural movements was the same. That concept was equality. To the equality of the anglophones and francophones at the heart of the bicultural movement was to be added the equality of the so-called others. In reality, of course, both movements were part of the equality movements of our time, among which are the feminism with its advocacy of the equality of males and females, and even the earlier black-American civil rights movement.

At bottom, therefore, multiculturalism was not just a reflection of Canada's demographic reality—at its most meaningful level, multiculturalism was really a social philosophy like biculturalism, feminism, or the black civil rights movement, whose central tenet was equality, and whose ultimate goal was a greater sharing of power and opportunity in all social areas, in the workplace, education, the media, the civil service, and of course in politics, law, and government. The emphasis on equality was present from the earliest days of the multicultural movement. To overcome inequalities became, in 1974, one of the two long-term goals of the federal government's Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism. The other goal was "the retention of language and culture." From the outset, the overcoming of inequalities was closely linked to the human rights movement, and with the establishment of the Canadian Human Rights Commission in 1977, pressure from the women's movement and the visible minorities, including the native peoples and the physically handicapped, captured the attention of government; thus inequalities came to be associated primarily with race, sex, and physical disabilities. What is needed



Ukrainian/English letter-writing manual 1951, UCEC Library.

today is to return to the original intent of overcoming inequalities broadly. Put another way, what is needed today is to counter discrimination on a broad scale, ensuring thereby the sharing of power and opportunity among people of every racial and ethnic origin.

It is, of course, true that wherever Ukrainian Canadians have successfully pursued the main part of their ethnocultural agenda, the retention of language and culture, they have experienced something of the benefits of multiculturalism as a social philosophy. Thus, the English-Ukrainian bilingual classes—trilingual when French is added in grade four—in the public and separate schools in the Prairie provinces; the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta; the Ukrainian Resource and Development Centre, primarily for the fine arts, at Grant MacEwan Com-

munity College in Edmonton; and the Ukrainian Cultural Heritage Village east of Edmonton; the Centre for Ukrainian Canadian Studies at the University of Manitoba—all these achievements are good examples of how the power to retain and develop Ukrainian-Canadian culture is being shared with the public institutions of the Prairie provinces.

In the process, of course, multiculturalism too is being institutionalized. Such public programs, however, are only one way of institutionalizing multiculturalism. Another way is through the power that people of various ethnocultural backgrounds are able to exercise at all levels of Canada's public and private institutions. And, while the emphasis must be on individuals because of the importance of merit, it is well to remember that equality of opportunity for individuals and equality of participation for groups are closely related. In fact, when members of certain groups are totally absent from, or consistently under- or over-represented, in specific jobs, institutions, or programs, there is *prima facie* evidence of discrimination.

The above comments should not be seen as a plea for quotas where ethnocultural groups are concerned; all that is needed is to recognize the legitimacy of ethnocultural claims and then to exercise greater sensitivity during hiring, awarding, and programming. Thus, while the conscious recruiting of Chinese, Italians, or Ukrainians for particular tasks is not envisaged, it is legitimate for members of Chinese, Italian, or Ukrainian groups to seek information with which they might influence the hiring, awarding of grants and other goods, and programming practices of public and private institutions. Of course, it would be ideal if the larger groups, those that fall into the Anglo-Saxon and Celtic categories, were blind to ethnic origins when they make decisions about jobs and access; that is, it would be ideal if perspectives that favour the Anglo-Celts were not built into job advertising, recruiting, training opportunities, or the evaluation process.

Such is not the case, however. And it is therefore important to ensure that social and economic opportunity is distributed as equally

as possible among ethnic groups in Canada. Only then will multiculturalism be taken seriously by governments and the public at large. That is real multiculturalism, not that song-and-dance thing that was referred to earlier. Identified with a serious agenda, and removed forever from its association with folklore, multiculturalism would finally come into its own as a social philosophy.

The extent to which the Anglo-Celts stick together or resort to favouritism in allocating power and determining opportunity in Canada was first demonstrated in great detail by John Porter in his sociological study *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada*, published in 1965 and based on research done in the early 1950s. Another sociological study, twenty years later, by Wallace Clement, *The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power*, showed that very little had changed between 1951 and 1971, at least where domination by the Anglo-Celts of the corporate elite and of the media elite was concerned. Clement wrote:

Ethnic representation in the corporate elite satisfies neither the "official bicultural nor multicultural models of Canadian society." Neither in the economic nor mass-media elite is there even anything close to approaching the proportions required to say there was sufficient French representation for the bicultural model nor was there sufficient "third ethnic" representation for the multicultural model. The conclusion must be that the corporate elite is represented by Anglo dominance in both its mass media and economic forms. The limited "third" economic penetration which has occurred with Jewish Canadians has not been through integration with the dominant Anglos; rather it has been by creating a parallel elite within a few dominant corporations, for the most part separate from the mainstream of economic power. Members of the other ethnic groups are virtually absent from both elites, never reaching over 2%, while comprising about one-quarter of the population. (pp. 335-56)

Because Porter's study relied heavily on the 1951 census, and Clement's on that of 1971, we do not know how much change, if any, has occurred since then.

In these circumstances, I would submit that Ukrainian Canadians have a very important contribution to make. To furnish the accurate information needed, they must assume their historic leadership role, form alliances with other ethnocultural groups, and together create a powerful lobby on behalf of what I call the Canadian Institute for the Study of Human Relations, an arm's-length, federally-endowed research institute located perhaps in Ottawa. Studies, which the research institute would repeat at regular intervals, might fall into three categories:

- (1) Studies that profile large samples of leaders and decision makers in the public and private sectors, especially with respect to
 - (a) generation born in Canada,
 - (b) country of origin of both paternal and maternal ancestors,
 - (c) country of origin of ancestors of the spouse on both the father's side and the mother's side,
 - (d) educational institutions attended from the elementary to the post-secondary levels,
 - (e) language or languages spoken,
 - (f) nature of work experience, and
 - (g) memberships in organizations and clubs.
- (2) Studies that monitor social mobility by examining the extent to which Canadian society is "open" or "closed," that is, the degree to which Canadian society gives various ethnocultural groups in what are usually referred to as the "non-English" category, the opportunity to improve their socioeconomic status. The goal would be to determine the

extent to which equality of opportunity actually exists, as well as the precise barriers against it and the best avenues toward mobility.

I am not prepared to accept Professor Bibby's second point, namely, that there

has been some greater equity established in Canada as a result of the multicultural movement. I want to know how much there is. I want the knowledge, not the rhetoric.

(3) Studies that will ask the following questions:

VOTERS' LIST, 1914

MUNICIPALITY OF STUARTBURN

COUNTY OF MANCHESTER

POLLING SUB-DIVISION No. 2

WARD No. 2

No.	No. on Roll	NAME	Occupation	Description of Property	How Held	Address	Resident	Non-Res
1	500	Andrejiw, Iwan	Farmer	S.E. 19-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
2		Arsenij, M.	Farmer	N.E. 6-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
3	153	Bilan, Iwan	Farmer	S.W. 7-1-7	O.	Gardenton	1	
4	154	Bilan, Mytro	Farmer	S.E. 7-1-7	O.	Gardenton	1	
5	155	Badiuk, Illuca	Farmer	N.E. 7-1-7	O.	Gardenton	1	
6	192	Bjornson, J. A.	Farmer	W1-2 25-1-7	O.	Vita	1	
7	199	Badiuk, Koznia	Farmer	S.W. 30-1-7	O.	Gardenton	1	
8	209	Bilan, Wasyl	Farmer	N.E. 32-1-7	O.	Gardenton	1	
9	212	Badiuk, Simeon	Farmer	S.E. 33-1-7	O.	Gardenton	1	
10	552	Bojko, Jakiw	Farmer	S.E. 6-2-6	O.	Gardenton	1	
11	557	Bugera, Mytro	Farmer	S.W. 7-2-7	O.	Gardenton	1	
12	559	Boranicki, Iwan	Farmer	N.W. 7-2-7	O.	Gardenton	1	
13	576	Bednar, Marcin	Farmer	E1-2 of N.W. 14-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
14	578	Baczynski, Nykola	Farmer	S.W. 15-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
15	580	Baczynski, Michol	Farmer	N.W. 15-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
16	596	Bilinski, Michol	Farmer	S.E. 20-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
17	606	Bodnarczuk, M. and Szmyr, D.	Farmer	N.E. 22-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
18	620	Bilinski, Wladyslaw	Farmer	S.W. 25-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
19	622	Boziuk, Mytro	Farmer	N.W. 25-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
20	643	Bodnarczuk, Andrij	Farmer	N.E. 33-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
21	645	Boziuk, Dmytro	Farmer	S.E. 35-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
22	646	Bilinski, Frank	Farmer	N.E. 35-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
23	648	Bugera, Kyrylo	Farmer	N.W. 35-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
24	654	Baczynski, John	Farmer	S.E. 11-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
25	693	Bodnarczuk, Jakiw	Farmer	N.E. 33-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
26	850	Bodnarczuk, Leon and Oleska		N.W. 5-3-7	O.	Vita	1	
27	890	Bugera, Iwan	Farmer	S.W. 28-3-7	O.	Vita	1	
28	545	Baryluk, Stef	Farmer	N1-2 of N.W. 2-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
29		Baczynski, Jos.	Blacksmith	S.W. 22-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
30		Baczynski, H.	Farmer	N.W. 15-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
31		Bilan, D.	Farmer	S.E. 7-1	O.	Gardenton	1	
32		Baryluk, Iwan	Farmer	N.W. 21-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
33		Byak, A.	Farmer	S.E. 25-1-7 E.	O.	Vita	1	
34		Balaban, J.	Farmer	5-3-7	O.	Vita	1	
		Bjornson, J. A.	Farmer	N.W. 23-1-7	O.	Vita	1	
		Bodnarczuk, N.		Pt. of N.W. 5-3-7	O.	Vita	1	
35	156	Czaban, Dmytro	Farmer	N.W. 7-1-7	O.	Gardenton	1	
36	175	Cerniuk, Nykola	Farmer	W1-2 of N.E. 18-1-7	O.	Gardenton	1	
37	600	Czornyj, Onufrij	Farmer	S.E. 21-2-7	O.	Vita	1	
38	651	Chawrun, Fedor	Laborer	Pt. of S.E. 22-2-7	O.	Vita	1	

- (a) What kinds of discrimination are the most endemic and why?
- (b) How do such factors as social context, type of contact, and economic conditions affect discrimination?
- (c) Who are the main victims of discrimination?
- (d) What, if anything, do we know for certain about fighting discrimination? I include this point because I am told that education is the answer to discrimination and prejudice. But is that certain? This is a favourite theme of all editorial writers: when everything else fails, education will overcome everything. Well, will it?
- (e) What is the precise effect of sex, age, socioeconomic status, and educational, cultural, and physical factors on the nature and degree of discrimination?
- (f) Finally, how well equipped is each of the following institutions to combat discrimination: (i) human rights commissions, (ii) police forces, (iii) criminal codes, (iv) government contracting agencies, (v) private corporations, (vi) the educational system, and (vii) the mass media?

Besides asking the usual questions in small-scale and longitudinal studies, the research institute would also employ in-depth, quantitative interviews and comprehensive and intensive analyses of sample-tape census data, along with the full arsenal of investigative techniques available to scholars. The goal would be to reveal the roots, nature, and prevalence of the discriminatory practices that ensured—and still ensure—the over-representation of certain groups in less desirable occupations and positions, and the under-representation of other groups in more desirable occupations and positions. In short, the object would be to ensure that the Canadian establishment in all areas of Canadian life is representative of the heterogeneous ethnocultural makeup of Canada's multicultural society through the first

ever full-scale and concentrated attack, with facts, on discrimination in Canadian society. For this, accurate information is essential on how power and opportunity are distributed in Canada, who gets what, and how and why.

From the outset, the thrust of Quebec's Quiet Revolution was precisely to obtain for the French, in and outside Quebec, the power and opportunity that the so-called English, in and outside Quebec, had always enjoyed. It is now time to examine thoroughly how well French Canadians, and the rest of Canada's peoples are doing in that respect. The proposed Canadian Institute for the Study of Human Relations would, with one stroke, facilitate three important ends: first, it would provide a new and vital base for networking or coalition building among ethnocultural organizations; secondly, it would reinvigorate the multicultural movement; and, thirdly, it would begin the transformation of Canada's vertical mosaic into one of greater socioeconomic equity.

Now, whether the Ukrainian Canadian Congress would be open to such a challenge is difficult to say. However, if one accepts the fact that Ukrainians, as the earliest proponents of the multicultural movement, have completed most of their linguistic and cultural agenda, there may be room for optimism. After all, an outstanding part of that agenda has always been the need to diminish the amount of discrimination that they and others experience in Canadian society. The present would be a good time for Ukrainian Canadians to undertake the most difficult part of their ethnocultural agenda. Recently, multiculturalism has come under considerable attack for its allegedly inconsequential agenda, and perhaps there are inadequacies that require correction. Certainly, it is not clear to some, at least in the academy, that multiculturalism as a policy has had no serious political agenda. Three years ago, Professor McNeil of the University of Calgary put it this way:

The introduction of the policy of multiculturalism by the Trudeau Government was not an attempt to bring about profound cultural change in Canada. It was a calculated,

political manoeuvre intended to maintain the economic and political status quo of this country. As Evelyn Kallen states, "The multicultural, bilingual policy was a technique of domination designed to entrench the power of the ruling Anglo elite when its superordinate national position was threatened by Quebec's claim to political power on the one hand and by the growing numerical and economic strength of immigrant groups on the other." The federal policy of multiculturalism was not intended to change the socioeconomic structure of Canada, enabling the cultural minorities equal access to economic and political opportunity without paying the price of assimilation. Rather, the policy was intended to appease the ethnic minorities, the French Canadian minority included, although in this case the price of appeasement was much higher. The intention was to give a little while appearing to give a lot. What

was anticipated by the minorities was equal access to economic and political opportunity on equal terms, that is, without the loss of cultural identity and language. What was gained was the approval of cultural expression, song and dance, without any assurance of equal opportunity on equal terms. The policy of multiculturalism ... was a political act meant to maintain Anglo-Celt dominance while sharing that dominance as little as necessary with the French Canadian minority. What began as a political ploy need not remain such forever. Official multiculturalism may be the basis for profound social change in Canada.

But for this to happen, multiculturalism must first be seen as a social philosophy with explicit egalitarian implications that would permit greater socioeconomic opportunity and participation for a greater variety of individuals and groups in Canada.□



Ukrainian railway workers, Ottawa, c 1920, MHSO Collection.

SESSION I

*Thomas Flanagan, Reform Party of Canada, Calgary**

It seems that the Anglo-Celts have arrived. But I think we should look a little more beneath the surface when we use a term like "Anglo-Celtic." I do not normally talk about myself in presentations like this, but perhaps I can give Professor Lupul a few lines for the data file that he wants to build.

It is true that I am named Flanagan. My great-great-grandfather left Ireland in the 1840s, in the midst of the potato famine, and came through Canada to the United States. My mother's name was Lawniczak. She, in turn, was half Polish and half German. I grew up in the United States. I have been married twice; my first wife was a Protestant girl from New England, classic WASP, English and Scottish background. My second wife was a Mormon. She is, however, no longer a Mormon. I am not sure if you can ever stop being a Mormon, in the same sense as you can perhaps never stop being a Catholic. However, we have compromised and we now worship at an Anglican church, although if you worship at a contemporary Anglican church it is not always entirely clear what you are worshipping, but, nonetheless, we are there. I have three children, two of whom are adopted. My older daughter is a mixture of black, Chinese, and white ancestors. She is now a Green Beret in the American Army, serving at Fort Bragg. And my younger daughter is a mixture of Ukrainian and Irish ancestors, I believe, although it is not something that I ponder a great deal. Anyway, little remains of the Anglo-Celtic group when you start to probe the social conditions of present-day North America.

My main topic today is to present to you the multiculturalism policy of the Reform Party.

I am not going to try to analyse multiculturalism as a phenomenon. I simply want to present to you what the Reform Party's policy is. Although the Reform Party's multiculturalism policy has received a lot of attention in the press, most recently through one of our favourite interpreters, Liberal MP Sheila Copps, it is actually a fairly minor part of the overall policy of the Party. It is not something that we devote a great deal of attention to; it is there, it is part of overall policy, but it is by no means the major emphasis. But, because it has received so much attention, it deserves to be discussed and explained.

The Reform Party was founded in 1987, and its first policy document was the campaign platform for the 1988 election put together after a meeting in Calgary. There was nothing in that document about multiculturalism. Multiculturalism appeared for the first time in the 1990 *Blue Book*, the official policy manual of the Party, which was based upon a meeting held in Edmonton in 1989. In the 1990 *Blue Book*, which is the one that Ms Copps has been quoting recently, we find the following three short paragraphs about multiculturalism.

- (a) The Reform Party of Canada opposes the current concept of multiculturalism and hyphenated Canadianism pursued by the Government of Canada and would end funding of the multiculturalism programme.
- (b) The Reform Party supports the preservation of cultural background as a matter of personal choice. Whether or not an ethnic group preserves its cultural background is the group's choice.
- (c) The Reform Party supports the responsibility of the state to promote, preserve and enhance the national culture. The state

may assist and should encourage ethnic cultures to integrate into the national culture.

Now, the phrase "national culture" is one that has been interpreted unfavourably by Ms Copps and others, and it is also a phrase that I personally would not use, because it is not the business of government to promote a culture. To me, culture is a spontaneous social reality, and I think of it, in a modern liberal democracy, as rather like religion—something that should ultimately be the result of personal choices. So I am not particularly happy with the phrase "national culture." However, I don't think it should be given a sinister interpretation, because the phrase came directly from a speech delivered to the Edmonton assembly by Professor Rais Khan, the head of the Political Science Department at the University of Winnipeg, and the phrase "national culture" is his.

The *Blue Book* was revised after the Saskatoon Assembly held in April 1991, and the phrase "national culture" no longer appears in it. The wording from the current *Blue Book* is as follows:

The Reform Party stands for the acceptance and integration of immigrants to Canada into the mainstream of Canadian life. The Reform Party supports the principle that individuals or groups are free to preserve their cultural heritage using their own resources. The Party shall uphold their right to do so. The Reform Party of Canada opposes the current concept of multiculturalism and hyphenated Canadianism pursued by the Government of Canada. We would end funding of the multiculturalism programme and support the abolition of the Department of Multiculturalism.

In an attempt to explain this and other policies further, we are drafting at the national office a series of what we call "issue statements." They will be distributed to our members for use in the political struggle. Our issue statement on multiculturalism reads:

The Reform Party of Canada welcomes Canadians of all origins into the Party. We recognize that all Canadians are equal and should be treated equally. Unfortunately, the present multiculturalism policy does not

live up to this ideal. It categorizes people on the basis of ethnic and racial origin, thus ghettoizing our society and promoting hyphenated Canadians. It sets immigrant groups apart from their fellow Canadians, rather than encouraging them to participate fully in society. The Reform Party would put an end to the present policy of multiculturalism. We would repeal the Canadian Multiculturalism Act and dismantle the odd-couple Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship. Citizenship programs would be returned to the Department of the Secretary of State, where they belong both logically and historically. Other worthwhile programs, such as those designed to combat racial prejudice, could be transferred to agencies such as the Canadian Human Rights Commission. We would terminate all programs which subsidize ethnic and racial organizations. The Government of Canada should promote those things that are essential to all of us. The rule of law in an orderly society; equal opportunity to participate in society; a dynamic open-market economy; genuine democracy; and an efficient economical public administration. Within this framework, ethnic groups can use their families, churches, social organizations and lower levels of government to preserve their cultural heritage.

I should point out that the Reform Party of Canada is solely a federal party, and we stay out of provincial affairs as much as possible. So, if the political process in a province yielded the result that the people of that province were willing to subsidize ethnic societies or cultural-preservation programs, the Reform Party would not have a problem with that; we would regard that as a matter for the voters in a particular province. We are only concerned with what the federal government should do.

We may not yet have succeeded in expressing our multiculturalism policy in the best possible way. As you can see, it has been going through alterations since 1990, and we are groping for the best way to say this. But, whether or not we have found the best way of saying it, I do think that our views are shared widely among Canadians today.

In August of 1991 we commissioned a survey in preparation for the coming election. This was a sample of about fifteen hundred respondents in what is now known as "ROC"—the rest of Canada. Quebec was not included because we do not intend to run any candidates there at this time. We gave the respondents twelve policy statements drawn almost word for word from the *56 Reasons* pamphlet. One of

those was a multiculturalism statement: "The government should stop funding multiculturalism projects. These projects should be funded by the organizations themselves."

In total, 44.3 per cent of respondents strongly agreed with that statement; 24.1 per cent agreed; 18.3 per cent disagreed; 9 per cent disagreed strongly; and 4.3 per cent had no response. Roughly 68 per cent of those who

C O P Y

Montreal April 11, 1960

Ukrainian Canadian Committee
722 McIntyre Bldg.
Winnipeg, Man.

Dear Sirs:

I wish to inform you that have applied for Canadian Citizenship papers and have encountered difficulties. The officials of the department refuse to enter my nationality - Ukrainian - but insist that it should be AUSTRIAN. I was born February 5th, 1909 at Bobiatyn, pow. Sokal, West Ukraine.

I will greatly appreciate your assistance in this matter.

Yours truly

Ilko Bozylo

4152 St. Urbain St.
Montreal.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Ilko Bozylo', with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke underneath.



The M. Lysenko Band, Toronto, Ontario, 1918, photograph MHSO Collection.

responded either agreed or strongly agreed that it was not the business of the federal government to use public money for the promotion of ethnicity or for cultural preservation.

I do not think that one should give too much weight to the answer to a single question on a survey. We all know that answers depend on the way that questions are phrased. I am sure that somebody phrasing the question differently could get a different set of answers. But I have seen the results of many other surveys, and the conclusion of the overall sweep of data that I have seen is that there is in the Canadian public today a sceptical attitude toward the use of public money for the preservation or promotion of ethnicity.

Let me conclude by reading a letter I saw recently. This immigrant to Canada sent in his membership renewal with a modest additional financial contribution for the Reform Party. His name may come from a Slavic background, I am not sure. It does not sound Anglo-Celtic! He wrote:

I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to you and your colleagues for under-

taking the arduous task of reforming Canada. For the first time since I reached these shores in 1963, I shall be able to vote as a Canadian citizen for a real Canadian party. The concept of the two "feuding nations" is not acceptable to us, the so-called "ethnics." I should like to see the following definition of a Canadian used by the Reform Party: "A Canadian is a person who feels Canadian, who wants to be Canadian and who works towards the betterment of the country in all fields of human endeavour." This simple definition will bring together the real Canadians of all creeds, colours and origins. The same idea you have expressed in a slightly different way in your talks. The potential pool of the Reform Party voters is very great indeed, particularly among us who were relegated to the citizens of the third rank.□

[*Thomas Flanagan is no longer working with the Reform Party. He has returned to his position at the University of Calgary as Professor of Political Science.]

SESSION I

Commentary

*Raymond Breton, University of Toronto, Toronto**

I will begin by noting that there is a profound ambivalence among Canadians about the ethnocultural reality of this country and with regard to multiculturalism as an ideology and as a policy. On the one hand, it is valued by people; it is seen—to use Professor Bibby's expression—as a “valuable national resource.” On the other hand, people sense that it is full of dangers, that it is potentially divisive, that it is fragmenting the country, and so on. The ambivalence is manifest in the more or less constant debate. Ever since 1971 there has been a debate about this issue. It is also reflected in the fact that different people single out different components of the policy for consideration. This happened today: Professor Bibby focused on the “communication” dimension of the multiculturalism policy, Professor Lupul on its “equal participation” dimension, and Professor Flanagan on its “cultural” component.

A few years ago, however, the positive aspects seemed to predominate in the political discourse: the policy was seen as a contribution to the definition of Canadian identity. We were a multicultural society and valued the cultural heritages of the groups constituting our society. We were not like the United States, a melting pot society.

Of course, even though positive aspects were emphasized, there were criticisms expressed after the policy was promulgated. In recent years these criticisms have become louder and the focus has shifted to the negative aspects. Attention is increasingly drawn to the dangers of this venture.

Part of the explanation for this new emphasis may have to do with the ways in which the policy was implemented (its so-called

song-and-dance features), with the fact that governments are involved in it, and should not be, with the kinds of programs that have been supported, with the electoral interests and manipulations that are seen behind it, and with the McNeil kinds of interpretations, which have been mentioned not only by Professor McNeil but by many others. There may be also, as Professor Bibby mentioned, the economic crisis of recent years, which causes people to argue that members of cultural groups should do what they want without government money.

These factors are probably relevant. I think, however, that something more fundamental has been going on. I would like to suggest that the ideology and the policy of multiculturalism are seen and interpreted differently because the social, political, and economic circumstances have changed in recent years in Canada.

What are some of these changes? First, there has been a great emphasis on market institutions and processes by the Reagan, Thatcher, and Mulroney governments. There is a celebration of individualism, self-reliance, and competitiveness. The underlying ideology is that the well-being of a society is best achieved when private individuals, groups, and firms pursue their self-interest. This has become very much a part of the public culture of our society, as of most liberal democracies. A second factor is continentalism and globalization. Canada is increasingly part of the emerging world system. Business elites, assisted by government—thus in favour of government intervention—are desperately busy establishing themselves in the continental and global economy. Third, single-issue politics, in which each interest group seeks to obtain the maximum benefit for itself

from the rest of the society, and particularly from government, are now a normal part of our political system. Reduce the debts and deficits, people claim, but do not cut my programs or those of my group; in fact, do the opposite, increase them. Fourth, there are the continuing federal-provincial conflicts over the distribution of powers. Each government appears to be attempting to get as much as possible for itself. Seen in this light, it should be noted, Quebec independentists are just an extreme example in

this venture toward the acquisition of power. Fifth, there has been enormous growth of the providential state. Its accompanying culture is that people can legitimately expect that government will assist in the pursuit of individual goals and those of sub-groups, whether these be cultural, economic, recreational, or what have you. It is not only that people expect assistance from government, but that they believe they have a right to it. As Daniel Bell has pointed out, this is the culture of entitlements.

No More "Hyphenated Canadians"

One of the most consistent messages we heard from participants was a desire to see an end to "hyphenated Canadians." The practice of attaching our origins to our citizenship is very pervasive in Canada, but over and over, from new Canadians as well as others, participants asked the government to understand that our citizens just want to be *Canadian*.

The Muslim Women's Study Circle told us: *"Ethnic Canadians find it hard to identify themselves as Canadians because they're always asked about their roots."* An Ottawa man said, *"I speak as one whose own heritage is basically north European — German, Russian, Danish and English — and I did not come to Canada to try to maintain those heritages, but to leave them behind and do what I could to be Canadian."* While some contributors either strongly favoured or strongly opposed a culturally diverse society, most enjoyed and embraced our diversity while criticizing the official attitude toward it: *"The society that I envision would understand and accept the differences which each individual and each culture bring to it."* From another, *"The effect of your 'multiculturalism' — nobody is Canadian; instead everyone remains what he was before he came here and 'Canadian' merely means the monetary unit and the passport."* Still another said, *"...if, indeed, we aspire to be a Nation, then such a notion must be more than just an assortment of hyphenated Canadians."* And, from another, *"there should be no such thing as French Canadians, Jewish Canadians, Irish Canadians...we are all 'Canadians' not hyphenated Canadians."*

"...I did not come to Canada to try to maintain those heritages, but to leave them behind and do what I could to be Canadian."

"...nobody is Canadian; instead everyone remains what he was before he came here..."

One consequence of these trends is the vague feeling that no one is minding the “general store” any more. Whether it is provinces, businesses, cultural groups, or citizens’ groups of various sorts, all appear to be out for themselves and few appear concerned with the country as a whole. I think cynicism has grown in Canadian society, in the sense that people are considered to be pursuing their self-interest and not being concerned with the common good. It is a generalized feeling. One hears about it from commentators and observers of the social scene. This feeling includes the notion that few people care about the vitality of society-wide institutions, the cohesion of an inclusive civil society that cuts across social divisions, or an overarching Canadian identity. On the contrary, the feeling is that the society is being slowly but surely fragmented and that there is little to hold it together—neither symbols nor social ties nor links between organizations.

This is not to say that nobody cares about the common good; in fact, most people probably do. What is happening is that people are drawn into the self-interest-seeking process almost in spite of themselves. One has to get into the act, or one will be a loser, thus reinforcing the tendency towards fragmentation. Incidentally, this cynicism seems to underline the low level of confidence in public institutions expressed in opinion polls. And the public institutions are not only those of government; they include businesses, educational institutions, labour unions, universities, and professional groups. The lack of confidence is also apparent in the many groups and political parties that are expressing the dissatisfaction of different segments of the population with this or that aspect of our public institutions and policies. There is a wide array of reform groups and parties. In these circumstances the aspirations and claims of ethnocultural groups are given a particular meaning. They are seen as another set of claims on the society and its institutions. They are seen as another force fragmenting the society, another set of groups seeking their own advantage, rather than that of the society as a whole. They are considered to be more interested in

their own collective identity and symbols and in the vitality of their own institutions than in those of the society; more interested in the cohesion of their own groups, than in that of an inclusive civil society. I am not saying I agree with those views. Rather, it is my interpretation of the underlying uneasiness among a number of Canadians concerning present-day Canadian society. As I mentioned earlier public opinion polls give some support to my observations. The uneasiness is also expressed strongly in the report of the Spicer Commission.

What are some of the implications of these trends and phenomena for multiculturalism as an ideology and a policy? The first, it seems to me, is that the contribution to multiculturalism in the fragmentation of Canada and its problems of identity and cohesion is vastly exaggerated. Multiculturalism is only one factor, and probably not a determining one. It probably has only a minor influence in comparison to all the other social forces. The Reform Party seems to agree with me on this point: as Dr. Flanagan pointed out, it gives it relatively little importance.


I would suggest that people are blaming multiculturalism because it is something easily identifiable and something they feel they can change, unlike continentalism or globalism, single-issue politics, and the ideology of the market economy that emphasizes the pursuit of individual interests. Another implication is that all institutions and their leaders, and not only the ethnic communities, are responsible for the state of affairs. It should be noted in this connection that there is a great need to do something towards articulating a compelling conception of Canadian society, to do something to counter the fragmenting forces noted earlier, rather than simply bemoan the dangers. The third implication is that the ideology and policy of multiculturalism have a problem of legitimacy. Multiculturalism as an element of the culture of public affairs in our society must emphasize cultural diversity as a feature of *the social fabric of the society as a whole*. It must emphasize links between groups and cultural enrichment. In this regard I agree with Pro-

fessor Bibby. Multiculturalism must dissociate itself from the image of the parallel or layered coexistence of ethnocultural communities.

Equal participation, mentioned by Professor Lupul, is certainly part of the policy; it may not, however, be what people identify as one of its crucial elements. So, perhaps the problem of legitimacy is that this aspect was not sufficiently emphasized. In addition, the implementation of the policy should perhaps de-emphasize the support of the internal activities of ethnic groups and give prominence to those that lead to contacts between groups, cross-cultural

awareness, and social links across ethnic boundaries, as well as—to quote Professor Lupul—to equal participation in all institutions of the society (which includes, as a basic minimum, the fight against discrimination and all forms of intolerance).

An important distinction, however, should be made between “immigrants” and “ethnic groups.” Many people who talk about multiculturalism lump the two categories together. All immigrants are members of ethnic groups, but all members of ethnic groups are clearly not immigrants, and although the dividing line is



Kassandra Luciuk eating a varenyk, Michael Lea photograph, The Whig Standard, Kingston, Ontario, 1992.

not clear-cut, there is a difference between policies and programs to assist immigrants and those oriented toward ethnocultural groups. It should also be noted that the problems of equality and participation, as Professor Lupul pointed out, may exist for all groups and generations but are particularly serious for particular groups and in the first generation.

Moreover, multiculturalism as an ideology and as a set of practices on the part of ethnic organizations, government agencies, schools, and other institutions must promote and sustain the notion and reality of multiple loyalties. There is among some the feeling that being loyal to one's ethnic heritage and group is being disloyal to Canada, although this is rarely stated explicitly. The reverse may also be felt by some: that a commitment to Canada means the rejection of one's heritage and disloyalty to one's group. I think this is related to the ambivalence mentioned earlier; but somehow the two kinds of identity and loyalty must be seen as reconcilable, not in opposition to each other.

Finally, as Professor Flanagan noted, there is the question of government intervention in that domain. This is a real issue that deserves serious attention. It is not enough to assert dogmatically that the government should or should not be active in the ethnocultural field; nor is it enough to declare that those who oppose government intervention are simply prejudiced or racist. I have two brief comments in this connection. First, we need a theory about government intervention; a theory that would legitimate its involvement in this area. The theory would deal with such matters as the

goals sought with regard to the ethnic minorities and to the society as a whole, the best means of intervening in order to attain such goals, and the range and limits of intervention. When I say a "theory," I do not mean a sociological theory, but rather a public philosophy providing a rationale for government involvement in this area (although social science theory would no doubt be useful in the formulation of such a legitimating framework). Moreover, the basic legitimating ideas must become part of the political culture of the society.

To a large extent, this task remains to be done. Governments have wandered in the domain under the pressure of events and organized groups. And because of the lack of legitimation, some people have seen government involvement as a cynical exercise in the maintenance of a power structure or as part of the manipulations of electoral politics.

Second, the main issue may be, not whether governments should be active in this domain, but rather what the means of intervention should be. Too often the issue seems to be framed in all-or-none terms: since there have been problems with the policy, it should be abandoned. (Similar arguments have been made about the policy of bilingualism: there are problems with it; therefore it should be abolished). The task may be to modify the policy and its implementation in more or less substantial ways rather than scrap it entirely.□

[*Professor Breton has recently retired from the Department of Sociology, University of Toronto.]

SESSION I

Discussion

Reginald Bibby, Raymond Breton, Thomas Flanagan, Greg Gauld, Manoly Lupul

Question: Would it be useful for Canadian government policy makers to consider developing a policy on interculturalism or transculturalism and to retire multiculturalism as an idea that has outlived its usefulness?

Professor Bibby: It seems to me that the third objective of the original multiculturalism policy is, in fact, one that is transcultural; it is to encourage Canadians of diverse backgrounds to come together and through interaction and reflection to tap the best of diverse backgrounds. So, in fact, this third objective already is in place and needs to be again put in the forefront. We do not want an ethnocultural council, though. The whole point is that we want Canadians of diverse backgrounds, including those much maligned WASPs, to enter into this interaction process, so that we can find that Asians and WASPs, for example, can look each other in the eye and talk to each other.

Dr. Flanagan: What we want, though, is something that is not going to exclude any Canadians, so that when we talk about multiculturalism we are talking about everyone. We have to set up situations in Canada where we can talk openly to each other and pursue the best in life, which we all want.

Professor Breton: At one level, Canadians of different ethnic origins are probably in communication with each other every day, and this is perhaps where some research—as Professor Lupul has suggested—would establish how far. But I suspect that at the community level, in volunteer associations, and so on, many of these associations cut across ethnic groups. So, I think there are probably more groups of different origins in contact every day about community affairs than meets the eye.

I think the question is about contacts between such people as members of different ethnocultural groups. That is, a Ukrainian organization having some sort of links with an organization or community association of Italians or Swiss, for example. That would be a different level. And I think this may need to be fostered in a special way. This is a very important issue.

My second point concerns legitimacy. The government needs to legitimate its intervention in this field by emphasizing communications among groups through all sorts of activities, whether it is in schools or in community organizations, or through the media—because a lot of communication between groups takes place through the media, and not directly. Most French-English relationships, by the way, in this country are through the media. People do not meet or talk to each other, they talk to each other through the media. If government policy concentrated on intracultural communication it would have much more legitimacy with the Canadian public.

Questions for Dr. Flanagan: If a culture is defined as the sum total of a way people live, does not the government have a role in creating a Canadian culture?

If individuals and groups are to self-finance their culture should not programs that subsidize the culture of the Anglo-Celtic group—that is opera, ballet, and museums, for example—be eliminated as well? Should government stop funding all cultural programs?

Though the Reform Party is a federal party, what is your view on the use of provincial funding for heritage-language programs, since

those programs presumably divert federal transfer payments to provinces for education?

Dr. Flanagan: I will have to answer these questions mainly with my personal opinions, because Reform policies simply are not worked out in the detail that would provide answers to questions of that type.

To take the second question first: I am not entirely clear why things like opera are part of an Anglo-Celtic cultural agenda; but, in any case, I personally have never been able to understand what the argument is for using public money to subsidize the leisure pursuits of the upper-middle class.

I am quite prepared to push the argument across the board when I argue against using public funds to subsidize ethnic organizations. I am not making a particular target of them; I think there are all sorts of things that are being subsidized by public money that should not be subsidized. Or, at least, I haven't seen a good argument in favour of that.

The third question was "How would the Reform Party feel about the use of provincial funding for heritage-language programs?" The Party would take no position on it. If the voters in a particular province are willing to do this, it's not a political issue for the Reform Party.

Personally, I would want to see what the public-good argument would be for using public money to subsidize the preservation of ancestral languages. There certainly is an argument to be made for having a good educational system that teaches the knowledge of foreign languages, but I don't know of a compelling reason to use government money to encourage children to learn the particular language of their ancestors. If there is a good argument, I would like to know what it is. Professor Breton said that there may be some, but I have not encountered any that are persuasive.

The first question was "If a culture is defined as the sum total of a way people live, does not the government have a role in creating a Canadian culture?"

The word "culture" is a very slippery thing today and covers much territory. People will live in a certain way, regardless of whether the

government promotes it or not. People are capable of living without government.

My view is that government has vital roles to play in things like an efficient and economical public administration and the rule of law. If you want to call that "culture," it seems to me to be stretching the term, but these are important functions that government has to carry out that make social life possible.

Beyond that, we get into questions of what further things government should subsidize: Should government subsidize sport? Should government subsidize high culture? I tend to be sceptical of the arguments in favour of many of these things, but I think that a national culture will emerge from the life of the people, whether or not government pays for it.

Question for Professor Lupul: Let us be serious, is the Ukrainian-Canadian community, the "corporate community," really concerned about equality, or was it using multiculturalism as an ideology to advance its own political goals, especially vis-à-vis Ukraine? And to use public funds in support of its goals?

Professor Lupul: As I said, the Ukrainian-Canadian agenda is very broad. Certainly it concentrated on the whole question of linguistic and cultural retention and development, but at the same time there a great concern about how power and opportunity are distributed in this country.

Very few people in the early part of the twentieth century were the targets of as much censure as people of Central and East European background, of whom the Ukrainians were the largest group. This was part and parcel of life in Canada.

I suppose one tries to realize the parts of one's agenda which that are the easiest. This question of discrimination is one of the most difficult in any society, especially a society built as ours is, on immigrant groups.

I am saying specifically that it is time that the Ukrainian-Canadian community addressed it and really made the debate over multiculturalism significant, because what we are hearing here is just quibbling. These criticisms are



"They know how to dress a shop window ..." from Vsesmikh: Ukraïns'kyi Humorystychnyi zhurnal, no. 10 (June 1992).

as old as the hills: "hyphenated Canadians" is pre-First World War. "Ghettoization," "balkanization," this foolishness over diversity and harmony; this is on the level of small "p" politicians.

If we are going to fight about multiculturalism, let's fight about important things. We used the same kind of verbiage when we dealt with separate schools. And somehow we learned to live with the fact that there are separate schools—not in every province, I agree—but

now we even support private religious schools. And there seems to be money for this, too.

I think Dr. Flanagan's leader probably would support that policy fairly strongly, because his father made it possible in Alberta. But it's not a problem any more: we learned to live with it. We have to learn to live with multiculturalism too, but in a significant way, by getting down to the fundamentals.

I submit that it is wrong to cater to the lowest common denominator intellectually in

our society, that is, to opinion polls. You can always find the kind of reaction that Spicer found, and that you are finding. Where would these people ever learn to think differently? How long has all this been around? The whole century?

Some would be scandalized, I think, if they examined the Alberta school curriculum and saw how little influence multiculturalism has had on it. It is only a 1980s phenomenon, hardly begun. And they are scrambling there, too. This is the most difficult question a society can face; let's not cheapen it with the usual type of sloganeering and epithets.

Question for Professor Bibby: You say that the objective of interaction between groups has been overlooked by Canada's multiculturalism policy. Apart from Dr. Lupul's suggestion of an institute of human relations, what are your suggestions for improving interaction between groups?

Professor Bibby: This is a big question. It seems to me we have to work through our institutions. For example, I spent a day in Toronto about three weeks ago, with a number of people who are involved with curriculum for Catholic schools. And one thing that is very clear is that in the schools there was an emphasis on the diversity of Canada when they are talking about cultural groups. There is a lot of exposition, but there is not a coming together where we can all reflect on those differences, and explore what kinds of ideas and customs, might be perhaps even better: there is a bland approach by which there is simply an exposition of diversity.

It seems to me that our educational institutions have to encourage students, not to think less, but to think more, to reflect on diversity and to do some point-blank evaluating. As a university professor, I am embarrassed to think how over the last fifteen years—even in little Lethbridge, Alberta—I have had fairly diverse classes from time to time, as far as their racial and cultural makeup is concerned, and yet have not tapped that diversity. So we sit and talk

about intergroup relations while the Asians take notes, the natives say nothing, and so on.

Only in the last year or so have I been trying to look out and say, here is a little microcosm of what you are talking about, Bibby, why not draw on these resources instead of talking to a class about stereotypes? Let's look at the Asians and say, "What about some of the stereotypes about you people?"

I invited a former student who is Asian, to come into a class about a year ago, and we handled it like a talk show. (Incidentally, about twenty-five out of a hundred students in that particular semester were Asian.) I would say to him, "Wayne, what about the stereotype that Asians never sleep?" Let's talk about that sort of thing. What about the fact that we have a notion at this university that "every Asian is wealthy, and that's why they're here." Let's talk about it.

The immediate reaction of the Caucasians was, "My goodness, you can't bring up things like that." I'm saying that even in that small group we have a starting point, an opportunity for people of diverse backgrounds to do some thinking.

How do you respond, for example, when someone calls a phone-in show, as someone did in Vancouver, and says, "I can't stand the way Asians drive on the streets of Vancouver." The host handled it very calmly and very well. He said, "You know, a lot of people hearing that think that you are racist, but I've lived in this community long enough to know that's the way a lot of people are talking in Vancouver, and I think it's time we began to talk about this together." I was hoping that a Hong Kong person would phone in and say, "I can't stand the way you whites drive on the streets of Vancouver, you scare me to death." So we could begin to talk.

What I am saying is that through our institutions, the media, and so on, there are all kinds of opportunities for us to begin to talk. The very fact that we cringe when we hear some of those statements, shows, I think, the fact that we aren't speaking openly to any great extent.

Mr. Greg Gauld, Director of Policy and Research for Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada, asked permission to address the audience.

I am very interested in the discussions and the points raised by the panellists. I thought it might be useful for me to respond briefly to some of the points, particularly with respect to changes that have taken place in multiculturalism policy and citizenship policy in recent years. I was a little disturbed that perhaps some of these changes were not reflected or acknowledged in some of the comments of the speakers.

I must say at the outset, though, that I found myself agreeing—and if you read our documents on current policy they also agree—with a number of the points raised by the panellists. I will try to stick to facts. I am not a minister, and bureaucrats only speak points of fact, as Professor Flanagan, I think, attempted to do with respect to policy in the Reform Party.

The point was made by Professor Bibby with reference to the 1971 policy that more explicit work should be done on sharing what we each have with other Canadians. I would draw everyone's attention to the fact that the 1971 policy is no longer the multiculturalism policy of the Government of Canada. In 1988, Parliament unanimously adopted the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, which contains a new policy and sixteen points. This policy reflects many of the preoccupations the panellists have raised, as do the projects that we have undertaken in the last four or five years, and perhaps even further back than that. And I would refer people to the annual reports that we have submitted to Parliament in the last two years, which give details of the projects.

In the projects that we have supported, you will see many that deal with sharing, with promoting interaction between Canadians of different backgrounds. I think Professor Bibby made the point that diversity has been exaggerated, that it has its limits, and that we share more than we stress differences.

I would refer people to a new booklet that we have just put out called *Multiculturalism: What Is It Really About?* which reflects the current policy orientations, and, in fact, reflects these points specifically. And to the constitutional paper *Shaping Canada*, the main document put out by the Government of Canada. The first chapter, which is called "Citizenship and Diversity," makes, in fact, the same sorts of points that many of the panellists were making. There is also another paper in the same series *On Canadian Values*, which again goes into even more detail on those points.

Professor Lupul's points about the need to make multiculturalism an equality-seeking policy, a social philosophy to eliminate discrimination and to ensure social mobility, are, I think, well taken. In fact, that was the thinking behind the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. And if you go back to the documentation that accompanied the tabling of that Act, the term "equality-seeking" occurs very frequently.

Again you can see this in a number of other documents that we have produced, and we would be glad to make these available to anyone who is interested.

With respect to the question of research that Professor Lupul raised, I certainly take his point that more research should be done on issues of inequality, but I should also mention that a lot of work is being done at the moment. There is a major study by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) with a research team of twenty people entitled "Reviewing the State of Research into Canada's Multicultural Reality," with the possibility of looking at ways to promote more research in this area. That report I believe is due at the beginning of 1992.

The government has also passed legislation to establish a Canadian Race Relations Foundation with a \$24 million endowment, which will look at promoting and doing research into inequalities and discrimination in Canada.

With respect to Professor Flanagan's points about his poll, we are aware of a number of other polls that show considerable support for

multiculturalism and for measures to deal with discrimination in society.

My final point is briefly to mention the new Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada. This department was created in April of 1991, after the legislation was passed. The goal of the department is the promotion of full and active citizenship for all Canadians and the removal of barriers to active and equal participation in Canadian society: barriers like racism, discrimination, illiteracy, disregard for human rights, and long-term integration problems; in fact, multiculturalism is a major part of this department. □



Member, Ukrainian Maky Dancers, Kingston Folklore '92.

SESSION II

Divided Loyalties? Homeland ties in Times of Crisis

Chairman's Remarks

N. Fred Dreisziger, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston

Let me say that I have had some dealings with the subject of divided loyalties. I have examined the reaction of, in particular, the Hungarian community, to homeland ties, ties to the mother country, in times of crisis. From about 1930 there was a problem for the Hungarian-Canadian ethnic community concerning ties to the homeland, as well as problems in Canada. At that time, two issues came up in the Hungarian community. One of them was related to the plight of Hungary in Europe and the apparent mistreatment of Hungary by the international community, and the Hungarian community of North America wanted to do something about this situation. At the same time, the Hungarian-Canadian lobby, the Hungarian Canadian Federation, also had a problem: it had debts that amounted to about \$3,000. Hungarians in North America came up with a scheme to bring attention to the problems of Hungary. They wanted to buy an airplane, which they would call *Justice for Hungary*, and fly it all the way from North America to Budapest, to improve on Charles Lindbergh's record flight from North America to Paris. That project needed \$30,000.

I should tell you—and this illustrates where the loyalties of immigrants to this country are—the \$3,000 that the Hungarian Canadian Federation needed could not be collected, but the \$30,000 that was needed for the ocean flight was found. This illustrates how much more the immigrant communities in North America are concerned with the problems of their homelands in crisis and how much they tend to neglect their problems in the new country. We must admit that the ocean-flight money was collected in both the United States

and Canada, but the story still suggests that, for immigrants, ties to the mother country and the difficulties of the mother country, are much more important than any other concern. □



Mother and child, Arbakka, Manitoba, 20 August 1921, Iwan Boberskyj Collection, UCEC.

SESSION II

Desmond Morton, University of Toronto, Toronto

It is a great pleasure to share in the centennial of an event that, quite unconsciously, enriched this country of mine and my own life. I grew up on the Prairies, was born in Calgary; I am not sure the previous panel could say that. I lived, worked in the Army, I have been in academic life, and I suppose my awareness of the centennial of a Ukrainian presence in Canada is really marked by a series of faces and friends. They were all of us, as we all are, Canadians with a difference, and they helped me understand that whatever one might wish, and whatever the Reform Party may legislate someday, we all seem to come with hyphens attached.

Ukrainian Canadians today are looking back a century to their association with North America, and to a millennium of the birth of a faith. And tomorrow, utterly unexpectedly—I do not think any of us would have expected this sort of historic day—to the rebirth of a sovereign homeland, that will, I am certain, make desperate appeals for their allegiance, their support, and their funds. A dream, almost a fantasy, has come true, as it did for Polish Canadians in 1919, for Irish Canadians in 1921, for Jewish Canadians in 1947, and I could add to the examples throughout my allowed speaking time. What these events have in common, though, is that they are a reminder that history does not end with independence; and that allegiances, single and divided, have a price. We Canadians—as was pointed out earlier—have trouble remembering what it is we share, though unconsciously we share a lot. But one experience that we share, even with the First Nations, is that we all came here from somewhere else.

Generally—I use the term bluntly and deliberately—we were losers. We were looking for another chance. The common thread found in every immigrant story is the dream of some day going back in triumph, of wiping out memories of political or economic defeat. And this Canada that people came to was a hard country. It offered few easy fortunes. Unlike the United States, Canada never seduced newcomers, it never enticed people to join a compelling new loyalty. When Armand Lavergne rose in the House in 1905 to discuss the proposition that Canada should have its own Statue of Liberty, his comment was that there was already on the heights over Quebec the Quebec jail. “That,” he said, “is the symbol to people coming here that we have laws and enforce them.”

Canada took people on sufferance, allowed them a stake, presented its identity, and still does in hesitating negatives. Well, we were not Indians: that was pretty much apparent to any European immigrant. We were not Americans: two brutal wars established that. We were not even British, though it took another two very hard wars as Britain’s devoted ally to prove that to our collective national unconscious. And, even now, it is hard to define the Canada to which we are presumably, at least with part of our souls, loyal.

I recall my formal declaration of allegiance; a bleak winter day in 1952, when King George VI had died. I was a very under-age militia private. My colonel was also my history teacher, and as we stood there shivering outside the Winnipeg cenotaph, we were led through an oath of allegiance to an English woman of mixed British-German-Scottish—especially German—ancestry. Meanwhile, I might add that

our Ukrainian-Canadian sergeant major—we called him Dimytriuk, I do not know what he should have been called—whose knees were also shivering under his kilt—this was the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders—his status, to stand goddamned still, and, of course, we did. Now, that was my oath of loyalty to the Crown of Canada. Of course, I am now told that such allegiance is obsolete, irrelevant, even offensive to many Canadians, and that, only our government here in Ontario is up-to-date on these matters.



Victoria Cross winner Corporal Philip Konowal, 5 October 1917, National Archives of Canada (PA 6733).

Well, I don’t change my allegiance with fashion, even when I no longer wear a military skirt, and, like others who have been here longer, I do not like to be told to change the country where I was born to suit the taste of newcomers. But as an historian of this country, I want to tell you that that process of enforced change is as Canadian as maple syrup. We have always changed to fit newcomers. That may surprise you, but think of the Indians; where was their history when the French arrived and announced that this country was the property of His Most Christian Majesty, the King of France? When the Loyalists—losers like all the rest—arrived in the 1780s, they assumed that the whole of the Province of Quebec would, of course, be proclaimed Protestant and British. And Ontario, as the former Ontario government decreed, dates from 1784, which ignores not only Indians but also the French presence around places like Sandwich and the Sault. So there is nothing new in this. Black Canadians now want their place in our history enlarged.

And so I want to suggest to you that restarting Canadian history with each successive arrival is quite Canadian. Does it lock us out of inherited achievements and thin the binding agent of common identity? Perhaps. But history is the way it is; it is also, of course, the way it is re-written. The fact of divided loyalties is as old as the way we re-write our history. After the United Empire Loyalists came the so-called “late Loyalists,” Americans who cared more about good soil than allegiance, and founded an Upper Canada. Now, perhaps with time, good luck, and better management, many of them might have become as loyal as Governor Simcoe expected them to be; but, given the War of 1812 and the certainty of an American victory, instinct and self-interest took them to the winning side. Sorry, they guessed wrong. Most of them then moved on to another southern frontier. A few faced the Ancaster Assizes and died at the end of a rope near Burlington Bay, and still others hung on to become the core of Mackenzie’s rebels in 1837. Beaten by newer arrivals, more recently from Britain. Divided loyalties. Among immigrants

from Europe's larger offshore islands, the Irish were both the largest single group and the clearest paradigm of divided loyalties.

When Professor Lupul refers as a group to the "Anglo-Celts," he may be right in the twentieth century, although I would question it; he is certainly not right about the nineteenth century. The transported battles of Orange and Green shattered the peace of Canada and left this beautiful city of Toronto with the nickname "the Belfast of North America." To be Catholic and Irish in the wrong place in Toronto was to risk death. To be Catholic and Irish and looking for a job was to risk the Orange Order. Starvation was more common. The Fenian threat to invade and seize Canada in the 1860s as hostage for Ireland's freedom was certainly a case of divided loyalties. Remember, the first victim of those loyalties since Confederation was one Thomas D'Arcy McGee, the poet of Confederation, and also the victim of, I believe, Fenian assassins, because he dared to combine loyalty to Canada with a somewhat diluted loyalty to Ireland, which, in the eyes of the Fenians, was treason and a capital offence.

The Fenians go on mattering; they are something of like the Communist Party in the nineteenth century: there may not be many of them but, oh, are they useful when you want to explain what is going wrong. In fact, they justified our original secret service, the militia, which I have studied so enjoyably over the years, and provided a really popular bogey. The last Fenian I know of who got into trouble was a man named Luke Dillon, who tried to blow up the Welland Canal in 1900, and was released only in 1914, after fourteen really terrible years in prison. Divided loyalties. Fenians aside, the Irish pioneered all the crudities of ethnic politics. Ogle Gowan rallied the Irish Protestants against Catholics or American conspiracies, creating a block vote that he usually marketed to the Tories, though occasionally he could slip it across to the Liberals.

Irish Catholics had different views about the woes of Ireland, and just enough votes in Canada to give weight to their opinions. Among Sir John A. Macdonald's many headaches was

a man named John Costigan, a New Brunswick Irish Catholic who wanted to commit Canada to home rule for Ireland; a proposition not unrelated to things going on today, you might say, but which was devastating to a Conservative Party that depended upon a very shaky alliance of Orange and Green. Macdonald regarded Costigan with all the hostility in private and all the affection in public that any hypocrite who wants to succeed in politics could recognize.

I talk about these because in a country of ethnic minorities, nothing that was being described in the earlier session struck me as either terribly new or terribly surprising. And I want to remind you that among at least the Anglo side of the Anglo-Celt alliance—the Celts were divided on the issue—a predominantly British Canada went to war in 1899, 1914, and even 1939, not because we really felt strongly about President Kruger or the Kaiser or Hitler—though some Canadians did—but because the majority had an allegiance to what they regarded as their mother country.

Fred Dreisziger is perfectly right: people do care about their homeland. Canadians, even in that cultural majority called the Anglos, did. And at great cost; sending troops to South Africa almost shattered Sir Wilfrid Laurier's government. Certainly the French Canadians and the Irish Canadians did not think much of it, and they had members in the Cabinet, too. But the Prime Minister, even before there were polls, and Professor Bibby to interpret them, could read the signs. It was a year before an election, the Anglos had numbers; he would send troops, as few as he could get away with. Sort of like the Persian Gulf.

In 1914 Henri Bourassa really had only one loyalty, to Canada. In the eyes of many of his contemporaries, I suspect, it was unfortunate that he did not get put in a German internment camp; he was in Alsace when the war broke out, and he should have been interned, but a German border guard was too stupid to catch him, so he got across and did the Germans (if you believe Ontarians) great service during the war. Bourassa did not have a divided loyalty—



Homeland loyalties, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 1922, Iwan Boberskyj Collection, UCEC.

he felt his loyalty was exclusively to Canada. Later, of course, he recognized a more primary allegiance—to la nation canadienne française.

War is a harsh test. Undivided loyalty can cause trouble, too, though perhaps not for those who could find reasons to be loyal to Canada and to the war effort. The great J.W. Dafoe, editor of the *Winnipeg Free Press*, is probably not one of the saints in the Ukrainian hagiography, because he had a pretty low view of our friends and fellow Canadians. In 1914 and 1939 he insisted that these were not Britain's wars, they were Canada's wars. . . . Which, of course, meant that everybody had to participate or be put in jail. He had very strong views on that, too. But in Bourassa's French Canada, there was no divided loyalty either. Laurier, in 1915, demanded of his Montreal audience, "If you will not fight for England, will you fight for France?" The answer, on the whole, was no, though they did insist that they would fight if Canada was threatened. Talbot

Papineau, or Henri Bourassa's lieutenant, Olivar Asselin, were exceptions. In both world wars, Quebec felt no compelling loyalty to any homeland but its own.

Nor, it becomes obvious, did Canadians of British ancestry who had very deep roots. It is notable, although not noted in history books, that areas of long settlement, like the Maritimes and western Ontario—dare I admit it—had very low enlistment records, too. The West did superbly well, largely I think because there was a massive depression in 1914, crop failure and widespread unemployment—all classic incentives to enlist.

Divided loyalties, in short, without reference to Ukrainian Canadians particularly, are part of our history. They proliferate as Canada grows more diverse. We began with four nations, not two. Cartier, at least, did not refer to two nations, he referred—as suited his time and his demography—to French, English, Irish, and Scots. Now, Ukrainians were not among

them, but I think you would have had a hard time finding any in the Canada of 1865. He would have had, I think, 483 people of Russian ancestry, according to the 1871 census, and I am not sure Ukrainians will want to be numbered among them at this particular moment. But it was not a two-nation world to him, nor to Macdonald.

Now, of course, we are infinitely more diverse. A year ago at this time, I was holding meetings with Arab-Canadian students at my college to discuss the way they felt they were being treated because of their loyalty to what they saw as an Arab cause when that cause, they felt, was being unfairly discriminated against. And I probably did not reassure them at all except to tell them they were part of the great mainstream of Canadian history. History is another word for experience. I do not think it is a very good weapon, nor is it a user's manual; at best, it encourages patience and a long view. A country that has to describe medicare and Via Rail as keys to its national identity cannot complain if many of its citizens seek more passionate allegiances. But I think—and here I took strength from the previous session—that this apparently weak identity may be more apparent than real. Part of our weak identity in appearance is our willingness to accept the notion of diversity, to endorse instinctively

—perhaps with too little thought—words like “multiculturalism.” To go abroad is to be reminded by people in internally divided countries like Belgium that we Canadians are crazy to have these kinds of ideas, that these groups should be suppressed and brought into line. I had this from a distinguished Flemish politician last year, who felt that Wallonia was getting too high and mighty and should be forced to speak Flemish. I felt superior until I returned home and resumed the normal Canadian grovelling.

But let me remind you that we are the third—oldest federal system in the world—which does not say perhaps too much for federalism, but it does remind people that we are not some sort of blue baby, imminently going to die. We have lived together for a very long time, we have an awful lot in common, we do not notice transculturalism—and I don't even know how to pronounce it—therefore we do not even know what it means but it is a kind of innate process that goes on.

Our virtues as a country may be boring, so tiresome that many Canadians despise them or do not recognize them; but I fear that we may lose them one day at an incredible cost that none of us, if we thought about it, would wish to pay. I think we have divided loyalties. I am confident that over time we have learned to live with them and can live with them a lot longer.□



William and Anna Kozubovych wedding in front of the Ciuciura home in Preston, Ontario, 1911, MHSO collection.

SESSION II

*Bohdan Kordan, Grant MacEwan College, Edmonton**

Several years ago, while in London, England, I happened upon a smallish book at a dealer noted for scholarly and antiquarian esoterica. It was called *On Being Canadian*; the author was none other than Vincent Massey, Canada's one-time Governor General and High Commissioner to Britain. I believe it was part of a CBC Radio special lecture series on citizenship. I bought the book, not so much for its content, as for its value as a historical statement and perhaps even as a historical oddity. I do not say this with derision, and no malice is intended. I feel that Massey's vision of Canada was, and may very well continue to be, a legitimate one. But when I briefly examined the contents of the slim volume, it was a vision that was foreign to me, one that I did not easily recognize and certainly whose sentiments I did not share. And so Vincent Massey's work sits on a shelf along-side other notable Canadiana, including Susanna Moodie's *Roughing It In the Bush*, Robert Service's war sonnets, and, yes, even Vera Lysenko's *Men in Sheepskin Coats*.

I am relating this anecdote because it addresses in a small way the problem of identity with loyalty at its core, single or "divided." When I read Massey's essay and made no connection, I did not feel any less a Canadian for it. I understood the words on the pages, but the description left me empty and somewhat detached. Moreover, although I do not share Massey's meaning of being Canadian, I feel no less loyal for it. What I have come to appreciate—and here I am borrowing Norman Robertson's words—is that even though I feel that I view the world through "Canadian eyes," as no doubt Massey did, Massey's world is not mine. And why should we assume otherwise?

Class, status, and different experiences have so determined it.

My understanding of Canada has largely, though not exclusively, been filtered through the prism of a community with a long history in Canada. It is a community that is celebrating a century of settlement and in which the vast majority—some 92 percent—were born in Canada. And yet strangely enough, when we speak of this community, we usually refer to divided loyalties or unreasonable demands that appear out of keeping with the general tenor of the Canadian nation-building process.

The current pressure on the Canadian government to extend diplomatic recognition to Ukraine is a case in point. There is no denying that the events in the territories of the former Soviet Union are momentous, and therefore one may excuse Canadians whose origins can be traced to Ukraine for looking wistfully over their collective shoulders, hoping for the best for those in the ancestral lands. But there is a sense that these emotions are not confined to the current crisis. The notions of separateness, group intransigence, and militancy, descriptions commonly used to cast doubt on the allegiance of this community, have been closely identified with the group's history. Indeed, in both official and non-official circles there has persistently been an impression that Ukrainian Canadians are not playing cricket. Was it not Ukrainian Canadians who led the assault on the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission? And then there is internment and redress and those who speak of the tragedy of "white ethnics" while arguing for guarantees for group rights in the current round of constitutional talks. All this leads me to ask two questions: Are "divided

loyalties" more imagined than real and, if real, how should we interpret this?

I would argue that "divided loyalties" are real but a fuller appreciation of the precise meaning of Ukrainian-Canadian claims requires careful evaluation. Ukrainian Canadians are, to use a much maligned word today, quite militant about their "distinctiveness." They are political and adamant about their position in Canadian society. They are also concerned about events in the ancestral lands. But is this necessarily threatening? Three points of view are offered here for assessment.

In 1943, at one of the first meetings between Soviet diplomats and Canadian officials in Ottawa, an interesting exchange of views took place. Norman Robertson, Canada's Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, was asked by the head of the Soviet legation what Canada proposed to do about the noxious activities of the Ukrainian-Canadian population who were agitating for Ukrainian independence. Robertson placated the Soviet envoy by claiming Ukrainians had no influence on government policy. He argued for patience and understanding. If the Soviets had problems with their minorities, so too did Canada, and he added that External Affairs would on the whole "be happier if Ukrainians would look through Canadian eyes and think of themselves solely as Canadian citizens." But, he pointed out significantly, "the process of assimilation takes time."

It was a line that was taken up as a policy matter on several other occasions, for example, when it was thought that by granting diplomatic status to the Soviet Ukraine in 1944 the Canadian government would drive "the mirage of absolute independence" from the minds of Ukrainian Canadians, thereby hastening their assimilation. And in the fresh afterglow of the successful Yalta agreements, Canadian officials, in the atmosphere of shared musings between friends, chided their Soviet counterparts for being alarmist and unhelpful: drawing attention to Ukrainian-Canadian activity, they claimed, only retarded the process of their assimilation.

And what of the position of the Ukrainian Canadian? No one at the time suggested that

Canada liberate Ukraine. Nor was there an expectation that Canada would alter its foreign policy to accommodate the wishes of a forgotten people in a far-away land. What Ukrainian Canadians wanted was Canada to give voice to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, the document guiding Canada's war aims and those of the other Allied powers. The expectation was that the principle of self-determination enunciated in the charter would be applied equally, not selectively. Ukrainian Canadians wanted for Ukraine what other Canadians wanted for their various homelands. No more, no less. It was a positively Canadian position.

If Robertson and the other officials at External Affairs were looking at the world through Canadian eyes, then they were obviously shut. It was not that Ukrainian Canadians failed to appreciate the import of the global struggle that was taking place at the time. On the contrary, Canadians of Ukrainian extraction were "doing their bit" by enlisting in record numbers. The issue fundamentally was that of "principle," which presumably was what the fight was all about; not grand politics but a world free of want, poverty, and tyranny.

It is a truism to say that political morality is often sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. And no one would seriously advocate in the current context of global politics that states should formulate policy or engage in war on the basis of some moral argument. This would be nonsensical and irresponsible. What is disturbing in the case of the officials at External Affairs was their contempt for the Ukrainian-Canadian position. That contempt was amply demonstrated in the remarks that Ukrainian Canadians were somehow lesser Canadians for holding views that, although technically squaring with Canada's public position, tend to complicate the affairs of state. The fact that Canadian officials looked to assimilation as an answer to their troubles says as much about the predicament of Ukrainian Canadians vis-à-vis the official world and their position in Canadian society as it does about the prevailing attitudes among the political leaders of the day.

The View from Below

It was grade one and I was attending Dewson Street Public School in downtown Toronto. It was an old building of clinker brick with oak wainscoting throughout. There was a mustiness to the air, and at the time I thought if history had an odour then this was it. As if in a dream, I recall that one day the principal entered the classroom with a wide-eyed, terrified little girl in tow. I had the distinct impression she was a child of immigrant parentage from somewhere in the Mediterranean.

Without much introduction, the principal asked the class the name of the newly elected Prime Minister, who, he was proud to say, had once been a pupil at Dewson Street. In the process and perhaps as an example to the gathering, he turned to the child and inquired whether she knew. She meekly replied “no.” I also thought I heard a simple “no” through the flood of tears when, adding insult to injury, he asked her whether she knew the name of the first prime minister and later yet who the Queen of Canada was. Looking away for fear or embarrassment, my eyes focused on the Union Jack displayed proudly to one side of the blackboard. The colours appeared a little sharper to me at that moment. It did not seem to concern him that no one save one brave soul responded. His duty done, off he went with the poor girl in hand to the neighbouring classroom to repeat the exhibition. I wonder to this day whether my feelings of shock and horror registered on my face as they did on the faces of the children around me.

This brief introduction to Canadian civics had an immediate effect. I ran home after the episode and memorized the names and dates of all of Canada’s prime ministers for fear that the following day I would be hauled from class to class and interrogated as to who was Canada’s fourth, fifth, or even sixth prime minister. It also, however, gave me pause to reflect on the double life I was leading. For most of the day and night and to most of my nearest and dearest friends I went by the name Bohdan. But from the sound of the schoolyard bell at 9:00 a.m. to 3:30 in the afternoon, I existed only as Robert,

the name assigned to me by Mrs. Scott, who, I would like to think, simply had difficulty in wrapping her tongue around the awkward combination of unlikely syllables. The transition from Bohdan, to Bob to Robert was no doubt a logical one for her, but it left me feeling uncomfortable. In the end, however, I felt this was the price that I had to pay as a foreigner.

That I would feel this way was not accidental. Everything around me drove the message home that I was a stranger living in a strange land, even though I had been born here. It was not yet clear to me whether I was wanted or unwanted. But to be accepted meant accepting the received text of what constituted Canadian identity. There was for instance the large Neilson Dairy Chocolate map of the world, which showed half the globe, including Canada, awash in a sea of pink. I found no comfort in being part of something larger. In fact it seemed rather peculiar. But perhaps no more peculiar than singing “God Save the Queen” in the morning and “Rule, Britannia!” at the end of the school day. Or, for that matter, reading of the life and times of Isaac Brock, who, although palmed off as a Canadian hero, seemed to me to belong more in the company of Pitt, Gage, Nelson, Kitchener, and Rhodes than of the Victoria Cross winner Philip Konowal.

There was confusion in those early years. But the confusion did not centre on who I was—I knew who I was—rather I was confused about my place in the order of things. Though I wanted desperately to belong, the world around me nevertheless appeared surreal and elusive. In comparison, my life before and after school—in the embrace of family, friends, and community—appeared tactile and solid. It was certainly more real. And yet from what I could see there was no place for them. But to reject, question, or remain ignorant of the other world, if only because it remained unrecognizable, was to invite and suffer humiliation, as did that unwitting child dragged from classroom to classroom. The price, therefore, was to continue living a double life.



Val D'Or, Quebec, 1938, Ukrainian National Federation Concert for an independent Western Ukraine National Republic, Emil Wolkowych Collection, UCEC.

The View from the Playing Field

I now like to think of myself as a little less confused. The fear and anxiety of dislocation are gone but the struggle around identity continues. It is not the struggle of choosing one identity or another. Rather, having recognized and accepted the legitimacy of one's own being, it is the struggle for equality and acceptance. It is, I believe, a universal theme worthy of closer examination. The case I have in mind is the story of Gordon Bohdan Panchuk. That story in full is told better elsewhere, but one incident, in what can only be considered a remarkable life, is worth commenting on.¹

On D-Day, in 1944, Flight Lieutenant Gordon Panchuk, a Saskatchewan boy who was serving as an intelligence officer with the Second Tactical Air Force, found himself on the beaches of Normandy. His first encounter with a "German" was a dead soldier lying on the beach. The documents on the young man revealed that he was Ukrainian. Some time later, reflecting on the incident, Panchuk remarked, "But for the Grace of God, there go I." The experience left a profound impression on him. Until then Panchuk had been only marginally active in community life. After this and other encounters with Ukrainian displaced persons in Europe, his efforts to provide assistance to these people and his involvement in the Ukrainian independence question intensified. The emotional source behind the activity was the realization that the lives of these people would continue to be buffeted by the unforgiving winds of history unless efforts were made to secure a "place" for them.

What Bohdan Panchuk failed to realize, however, was that he shared the same dilemma as those Ukrainians in Europe, and in his Promethean efforts to help Ukrainians and Ukraine he was acting out of many of his own insecurities and anxieties. For example, what he shared with that dead Ukrainian lad on the Normandy beach, however misled that young man may have been, was the need to secure a metaphysical place called Ukraine. It was not that Ukraine as a physical entity would offer Panchuk sanctuary. Panchuk already had a

home called Canada. What he sought was a place that would offer him legitimacy, that would legitimize his existence and the very history of his family and community in Canada. How else but by appreciating the drawing power of, and almost mystical attachment to, the Ukraine metaphor could one understand the paradoxical situation where Second World War Ukrainian-Canadian veterans stand side by side with veterans of the First Division of the Ukrainian National Army, the former Galician Division, in comradely salute to the fallen dead. Despite their opposing histories, both share a common thread in the idea of a free Ukraine because a free Ukraine satisfies the need in both for legitimacy.

For Gordon Bohdan Panchuk, as for many Canadians of Ukrainian extraction, the question of Ukrainian independence is linked to the history and future of the community in Canada. It is not an issue restricted to the political agenda of the expatriate segment of the community, but an issue being addressed by a largely non-immigrant community with its own needs and concerns. Nor is this an "ethnic" question as the term is traditionally understood.

Historically, Canadian ethnic communities—and here I use this classification to include majority and minority cultures in Canada—have sought to legitimize their presence in Canada by creating myths, by looking to the homeland for nourishment, or a combination of both. Thus in the absence of a levelling revolutionary ideology, such as the American revolutionary myth—and with all due respect to Lipset's theories regarding the homogenizing effects of a Canadian counter-revolutionary ethos—it should surprise no one that efforts have been made, and will continue to be made, by all of Canada's communities to secure a "place in the sun." Ukrainian Canadians will continue to look toward an independent Ukraine in the hopes of resolving their so-called "special predicament." The Québécois will continue to argue for their distinctiveness and for legal recognition of their historical claims. So too will the aboriginal peoples of Canada, and I suspect that as the

debate sharpens, the Anglo-Canadian majority will also soon feel compelled to stake out their historical place. (Although some will argue that Anglo-Canadians, as “non-ethnics,” will feel no such need.)

What I am describing is a conflict of sorts. It is a conflict in which history is up for grabs in the marketplace of competing historical interpretations. I for one view this as healthy, although I recognize that there may be dangers. There are not a few unreasonable voices out there. On the other hand, to step aside and ignore the hard questions is to contribute nothing to the discourse about the nature of Canadian society. I have in mind the current policies of the Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship, which in its discussions with the Ukrainian-Canadian community on the question of internment and disenfranchisement, has failed to recognize that what matters here is not redress per se, which is simply a tangible element in the acknowledgment process, but rather the

denial of an important and formative event in the collective history of a Canadian community.

This is not revisionism, nor should it be viewed as “restarting history.” A reconstituted Canadian history embracing the histories of communities takes nothing away from the established communities. To be sure, the old orthodoxy is challenged, but only because that type of history, when it sets out to affirm the faith, is asking to be challenged. The myth of two founding peoples is a good illustration. Such myths are simply not convincing in Canada’s Peoria, Estevan, because they delegitimize the contribution of other important and closer communities, notably the settler peoples of the Canadian West. In the struggle for identity nothing can be taken for granted.

Je m’excuse, Vincent

That the question of Ukraine’s independence resonates in the issue of redress is not coincidental. The two are distinct but not



Ukrainian National Home Ukrainian School, Sandy Lake, Manitoba 1928, Iwan Boberskyj Collection, UCEC.

separate because what is fundamental here is the group's search for "Ithaca." Since both issues challenge existing orthodoxies—both the orthodoxy of those who would look from on high and the orthodoxy of those who would claim that changes invite disaster—it is not surprising that they would be described as divisive, disloyal, or something less Canadian. Loyalty, however, is not the issue. The issue is legitimacy and acceptance. Without those, there will continue to be young Canadians who will go overseas in support of foreign causes. When the moral courage of the country of which they are a part falters, young Canadians in search of their own identity will be compelled to take up the cause of the mother country. In their minds, this is the right thing to do because, in many respects it is the only thing they can do. Without legitimacy, what is left is the vacant stare of history and the confusion of living a double life.

It has been said that nationalism is defined by history: having done great things together in the past; intending to do great things together in the future. I agree in principle with the statement. The inherited achievements of all of Canada's peoples will be the ties that bind. The

Canadian nation has done great things in the past and, the future willing, will continue to do great things. At the moment, however, there appears to be some difficulty in defining the contours of that past. But I am hopeful. I do not pretend to know precisely what those images are or should be. I do believe that a fuller picture is needed. As for Vincent Massey, in the context of the current debate on national identity, I doubt that he would be as certain as he once was. So Vincent will have to excuse me if for the time being I leave his book on the shelf with other interesting and rare Canadiana: the works of Susanna Moodie and Robert Service and, oh yes, Vera Lysenko's *Men in Sheepskin Coats*.□

1. Lubomyr Y. Luciuk (ed.), *Heroes of Their Day: The Reminiscences of Bohdan Panchuk* (Toronto, Ontario: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1983).

[*Dr. Bohdan Kordan is now Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, St. Thomas More College, University of Saskatchewan.]



Ukrainian Museum of Canada of the Ukrainian Women's Association of Canada—Ontario Branch, Toronto, photograph MHSO collection.

SESSION II

Marco Carynnyk, Associate, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Toronto

Since the revolution of 1917 and the subsequent victory of Soviet communism and the defeat of the Ukrainian nationalist efforts to establish an independent state, Ukrainian politics throughout the world—and this includes Ukrainian-Canadian politics and public life—have been shaped by one overriding metaphor, a metaphor that, for all its reach, has rarely been examined, and that is the metaphor of a state of siege.

The besieged state was Ukraine itself. This metaphor, as I say, has rarely been examined, rarely been articulated, except possibly by one Ukrainian historian Yuri Badzio, who wrote a perceptive, although unfortunately short work, *Stan Oblohi*, “a state of siege.” In it he made the argument that Ukraine itself, its culture, its nationhood, and its very survival, were besieged from all sides. This image has determined Ukrainian-Canadian politics as well. Not only was survival in Canada for Ukrainian Canadians based on the model of Quebec, that is, survival for survival’s sake, but it also emerged out of a conviction that Ukrainians were envoys, messengers who had escaped from that besieged homeland. French Canadians were convinced that their homeland had betrayed them; most Ukrainian Canadians were certain that without them their homeland would not survive.

From this, it followed that Ukrainian dance groups were important, not because Ukrainian dance was a flourishing art form, but because Ukrainian dance could not flourish in the homeland and because Ukrainian dance here would attract Irish or English or French eyes and ears. Chairs of Ukrainian studies were needed, not because Ukrainian history and literature were important parts of the liberal arts curriculum,

but because they were distorted, suppressed, or simply banned in Ukraine itself. So, these highly polarized homeland politics, the politics of a majority that considered itself to be besieged and a smaller pro-Soviet group that had no sense of being besieged, have by and large shaped the Ukrainian-Canadian political experience. It has stressed loyalty to one or another political group, rather than to the homeland.

An excellent example is the issue of the famine of 1933. I have spoken and written about it at some length—some say at too great length—so let me say here simply that for more than fifty years Ukrainian pro-Soviet groups denied that there had been a famine. From the time that the first reports of famine conditions emerged in the early 1930s until two or three years ago, they argued, in the words of one of my colleagues here today, that the famine was “imaginary, a slander against Ukraine.”

And yet there is direct evidence that pro-Soviet, pro-communist—whatever the correct term is—Ukrainian Canadians did know about the famine. They read the reports that were appearing in the newspapers, not only Ukrainian newspapers but also the *New York Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*, and the *Christian Science Monitor*, and so forth. And they had the words of their own party colleagues who visited Ukraine and then reported to their colleagues in Toronto that the population was starving. I should add the qualification that the opposite side, the nationalist side—if we can call it that again, for lack of a better term—also had a blemished record. In 1932 and 1933, reports in Ukrainian-Canadian nationalist newspapers about the famine in the homeland were accompanied by anti-Semitic insinuations; the

famine was a “Jewish conspiracy” to wipe out all Ukrainians as a race. These insinuations have re-emerged within the last ten years, particularly since 1983, when once again it was said that the famine itself and its subsequent treatment by historians, writers, and journalists was being manipulated by Jewish interests.

I want to conclude by expressing the hope that the expected “yes” vote in tomorrow’s referendum for an independent Ukraine and the emergence of Ukraine as a nation state will allow Ukrainian Canadians to develop a loyalty to their ancestral country, rather than to a particular political position. The distinction is a fine one, but an important one. That larger loyalty may remove the partisan tensions and may bridge the divided loyalties that have marked Ukrainian-Canadian history. Ukrainian-

Canadian loyalties by and large have not been divided between Ukraine and Canada. I say “by and large” because there was one major exception to this generalization that I’m making, a division of loyalty in respect of a Canada whose foreign policy was shaped by people like Norman Robertson, already mentioned by Bohdan Kordan; that is, a foreign policy shaped by the view of the Soviet Union as an inalienable whole. Ukrainian-Canadian loyalties have been divided between ideological positions. And yet, if we look at the historical record, as long as Canada and Ukraine are not at war with each other, Ukrainians will not have to choose between loyalty to one and the other. I believe—to re-state an old saw—that they can be good Ukrainian Canadians, good Canadians, and good Ukrainians.□



Members of the Brotherhood of Veterans of the First Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army at the opening of their war memorial, Oakville, Ontario, photograph MHSO collection.

SESSION II

Mykola Hrynychshyn, Association of United Ukrainian Canadians, Toronto

The national identity of a person comes basically from the country of his or her birth. Thus, if you were born in Canada, you are a Canadian. You can also become a Canadian by acquiring Canadian citizenship through naturalization. Then there are your roots, your heritage, which also become part of your identity. But the basic identity is the country of your birth or adoption—in our case, Canada.

Canada is a country of people of many ethnic groups. They are all Canadians. They have their roots of origin, their heritages that help them make their contributions to the building of Canada and the development of Canadian culture. To a great extent the people of the ethnic groups in Canada indicate their ethnic origin by calling themselves Canadians of a particular ethnicity—Ukrainian Canadians, Russian Canadians, German Canadians, Japanese Canadians, and so on.

I was born in Canada, in Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan. My parents immigrated to Canada from Ukraine, and I have no problem with my national identity—I am a Canadian, a Ukrainian Canadian. My organization—the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians—fully supports the multicultural policy of Canada, recognizing it as a Canadian reality and the best way to build and develop our Canadian nation. That policy gives Canadians of all origins an opportunity to carry on their activities in a manner that recognizes the multicultural reality of Canada. The only criticism we have is that the funds for cultural activities and programs provided by the federal and provincial governments are very skimpy, and especially in the last few years the cuts in funding by the present federal government have

been drastic. There is very little government support for the cultural activities of ethnic groups that are contributing to the building of Canadian culture. How can the government take such a careless attitude toward the nurturing and development of Canadian culture?

Multiculturalism is clearly an essential part of the Canadian identity. Far from undermining national unity, as some like the Reform Party of Canada claim, it promotes unity by taking into consideration the diversity of Canadians with regard to race, national or ethnic origin, colour, and religion. It recognizes all these elements as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society. It is designed to preserve and enhance the cultural heritage of Canadians. The organizations of Ukrainian Canadians played an important part in promoting and ensuring the incorporation of multiculturalism as a federal policy.

On the subject of “divided loyalties and homeland ties in times of crisis,” I feel that loyalty to a country must be associated with the highest human ideals and principles—democracy, social justice, humanism, peace in the world, friendship amongst people. This is what our loyalty to Canada is based on. In support of these ideals and principles Canada made a fulsome contribution in the Second World War against Nazi Germany and her fellow aggressors who were attempting to enslave the world.

There were forty thousand men and women of Ukrainian origin in the Canadian armed forces in the war. That was proportionately the highest percentage contributed by any ethnic group in Canada. Loyalty to the country does not mean loyalty to the government or any party in the country.

There are good governments and bad, and governments come and go, but the country remains.

Loyalty to one's country means being devoted to it and supporting and defending it. The high ideals and democratic principles that are part of our loyalty to Canada, we also hold in our feelings and relationship to Ukraine. We agree with the remark made by Lord Tweedsmuir that "to be a good Canadian one has first to be a good Ukrainian."

Ukraine, as part of the Soviet Union, and Canada were allies in the Second World War against our common enemy. Over twenty million citizens of the Soviet Union, over five million of them Ukrainians, died in the struggle to defeat the Nazis in defence of democracy in the world. There were no divided loyalties here—Canadians of Ukrainian origin and Ukrainians in their homeland were allies fighting a common enemy. If you have high human ideals and principles in your loyalty to Canada, they will

guide you in the best way in your relationship with your ancestral Ukrainian homeland and there will be no divided loyalties.

The Ukrainian-Canadian community has not been monolithic. There are divisions along religious and political lines. The basic division has been on the question of Ukraine and the Soviet Union: pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet. There have been many sharp clashes and a continual struggle between the two camps with detrimental effects for the community as a whole. How much more could have been achieved in our endeavours and activities in all fields, for the good of Canada and the good of Ukraine, had we been a united community!

The dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and in Ukraine, have removed the source of the long-lasting sharp division in the Ukrainian-Canadian community. A path has been prepared for unity of all of Canada's Ukrainians—Canadians of Ukrainian origin who stand for an independent, sovereign, and democratic Ukraine.



Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association on Bathurst Street, Toronto, Ontario, closed in 1993, MHSO Collection.

As in the mother country, where the people are uniting to work together to build an independent, sovereign Ukraine, so here in Canada we Ukrainian Canadians have to work together for the best interests of Canada and Ukraine. We must do all we can to help Ukraine achieve its independence and build a democratic state. In regard to the kind of system and government Ukraine is to have, we take the position that it is for the people of Ukraine themselves to decide, and whatever choice they make democratically we must respect.

I want to state that the progressive Ukrainian-Canadian community, its organizations, and its press sincerely believed that a truly just socialist society was being built in Soviet Ukraine, that the principles of social justice, democracy, and Ukrainian nationhood were being realized. We believed that this was happening because authoritative people in Ukraine—writers, journalists, scientists, and historians—were reporting to us and writing extensively that a new and better society was being built.

Amongst those that wrote and spoke words of praise of the socialist society of Soviet Ukraine were the present leaders of the Rukh movement in Ukraine, Ivan Drach and Dmytro Pawlychko. We believed that it was so, and so did many other people throughout the world. (We realize now that all the praise of the “new socialist society” was written in conditions of repression, terrorism, and fear.) When it was revealed that what had been written and what we had been told was not true, that it was a fraud—obman, as we say in Ukrainian—we were deeply shocked and hurt.

The national convention of the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians held in Toronto on 12–14 October 1991, adopted a resolution unanimously condemning Stalinism and its terrible consequences for Ukraine—repressions,

famine in 1932–1933, suppression of the Ukrainian language and culture, the subjugation of Ukraine as a colony of the Soviet empire under the cover of fake socialism, which actually was despotism of the worst kind. The convention warmly greeted the declaration that had been made by the Ukrainian parliament for the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine.

We feel that the contacts our organization maintained with the Soviet Ukraine had a beneficial feature. Hundreds of people from Ukraine—artists, writers, representatives of many fields—were able to visit Canada, and many delegations and groups from Canada visited Ukraine. From these exchanges the whole Ukrainian-Canadian community benefitted, and it was of great help to the people in Ukraine for the development of the processes that contributed to the changes we see in Ukraine today.

We are confident that in the referendum to be held in Ukraine on 1 December 1991, the people will endorse by a large majority the Act of Independence of Ukraine that was adopted by the Ukrainian parliament. That will be an historical achievement of the Ukrainian people. It is something we are looking forward to with elation and joy.

We are entering the second century of Ukrainians in Canada at a time when tremendous changes are taking place in the world. We are facing new situations, new ideas, and new opportunities. In their first century in Canada the Ukrainians made a marked contribution to the building and development of this beautiful country of ours. I am confident that in the second century new generations of Ukrainian Canadians will continue to make their contribution in all spheres of Canadian life on the same high productive level as their forefathers did, a contribution for the good of Canada, for the good of Ukraine, and for the good of all mankind. □

SESSION II

Commentary

Donald Avery, University of Western Ontario, London

It seems that the conference has started with the various speakers disposed to declare their ethnic and geographical backgrounds. I might therefore mention that, although Avery is an English name and I teach in London, Ontario, I too can submit a claim to “non-establishment” roots since my grandmother was Austrian and I grew up in Winnipeg!

I have interpreted my function as a discussant as having two parts: one is to state my own views on the subject of “divided loyalties”; I will then attempt a brief response to the four interesting presentations. Unlike Raymond Breton, I approach the topic not as a sociologist, but as a historian. As a result, my comments will deal primarily with the Canadian experience before 1960, when Professor Lupul’s thesis about the economic and political dominance of Anglo-Canadians was a reality. In my comments, however, I will concentrate on the relationship between Ukrainian Canadians and the Canadian state.

Let me start by suggesting that there were four main ways that the Canadian state interpreted the question of divided loyalties. The first was during the First World War and the early stages of the Second World War, when there was a tendency to regard some Canadian Ukrainians as overtly or potentially disloyal. The most spectacular manifestation of this bias occurred between 1914 and 1920 when most of the Canadian-Ukrainian community were categorized as “enemy aliens,” subject to registration, internment, and the loss of their civil and political rights.

A second tendency has been for the state to view some Ukrainians as having higher loyalties than Canadian citizenship. Although, at

times, outspoken Ukrainian-Canadian nationalists were so labelled, as a group it was the Ukrainian pro-communists who were to have the most unusual and interesting relationship with Canada’s security agencies. For the RCMP there was little doubt that Ukrainian communists had dangerous ideological loyalties and an obsessive commitment to the policies of the Soviet Union. State coercion of this group was particularly pronounced during periods of serious internal unrest, most notably during the Red Scares of 1919 and 1931, the early stages of the Second World War, and the Cold War.

A third trend has been the inclination of Canadian security officials and their political masters to interpret émigré homeland loyalties as an impediment to Canadianization and therefore, by definition, a threat to national unity. Such attitudes were certainly at the fore in 1916, when, for example, the influential *Winnipeg Free Press* launched its crusade against Ukrainian-born intellectuals and clerics who had the audacity to defend the province’s bilingual schools. Yet another example was the post-1945 screening procedures that often sought to limit the entry of Ukrainian displaced persons who were priests or other “cultural workers,” on the grounds that they would help perpetuate Old World identities among Canada’s Ukrainian population.

Fortunately, there were some occasions when the dominant elites were prepared to concede that a sense of Ukrainian identity and nationalism were not only compatible with Canadian patriotism but could actually enhance it. Or in Lord Tweedsmuir’s words, “to be a good Canadian, one has first to be a good Ukrainian.” Unfortunately, this spirit of


generosity and tolerance was rarely evident during national crises.

A second approach to the subject of divided loyalties is to recognise that the Ukrainian-Canadian experience has much in common with the experience of other ethnic groups. This was certainly true during the First World War, when the rights of German Canadians were also circumvented. Moreover, pro-communist Finns and Jews shared many of the trials and tribulations of their Ukrainian comrades during the Red Scares of 1919 and 1931. Similarly, Polish, Hungarian, and Italian intellectuals seeking entry to Canada encountered much of the same suspicion and hostility from Canadian immigration officials when they came either as immigrants between the wars or as displaced persons after 1945. Part of this attitude can

perhaps be attributed to the fact that before 1960 most Anglo-Canadians were both indifferent to and uninformed about the country's diverse ethnic cultures. At best, ethnic identities were considered Old World relics, at worst, a threat to national unity and development.

Let me conclude by quoting an interesting analysis by Nathan Glazer, a highly respected American scholar of ethnicity, writing about the loyalty American Jews feel towards Israel:

Israel evokes a much deeper and more emotional commitment by American Jews than I think any homeland issue has for other American immigrant groups. It has, inevitably, the capacity to raise the question of dual loyalty, of the problems of the attachment of American citizens to a foreign state.¹



Ukrainian Canadian internees at the Castle Mountain internment camp, Banff, Alberta, 1915, MHSO Collection.

How will Canadian Ukrainians, now that the Ukrainian Republic is a reality, reconcile their dual loyalties? This is a subject beyond the scope of my brief presentation, but perhaps one that the experts of the current situation in Ukraine might address later in the symposium!

Of the presentations made this morning, Desmond Morton's approach is perhaps unique, for his paper concentrates on various aspects of Canadian nationalism during the nineteenth century. He has pointed out, for example, that "divided loyalties" was a question of great importance during the War of 1812, the 1837 Rebellions, and the latter part of the century, when many English Canadians became enthralled with British imperialism. The fact that French Canadians did not share many of these symbols of loyalty, he suggests, was a cause of considerable national turmoil.

For the other three speakers, the identity of Ukrainian Canadians is of primary interest. All seemed to agree on the importance of the First World War in creating different conceptions of a separate Ukraine, or more specifically, the nationalist and socialist alternatives. There was also the metaphor of being besieged: in Canada, it was the cultural and economic vulnerability of the Ukrainian community; in the Soviet Union, it was the ever present threat of Russification and political repression. The enforced

famine of 1932-1933 was a grim testimony to the ruthlessness of the Soviet regime.

The Second World War was also singled out as another critical period in the development of the Ukrainian-Canadian community. On one hand, there was the opportunity of proving one's loyalty to Canada through military service—and many Canadian Ukrainians gave up their lives for this cause on the European battlefields or in the skies of Germany. On the other hand, many Canadian Ukrainians saw the war as an opportunity to create an independent and democratic Ukraine, free from Soviet tyranny. However, they soon discovered that Canada had other goals, namely post-war international stability and good relations with the USSR.

In closing, I note that there is a significant difference of opinion among the speakers about the pro-communist Ukrainians, especially their relationship with the Soviet Union. I might also suggest that the negative picture of the mandarins of the Department of External Affairs is quite different from that painted by Professor Jack Granatstein in his biography of Norman Robertson. Perhaps one or more of the speakers would care to address this point.□

1. Nathan Glazer, "The Jews," in *Ethnic Leadership in America*, edited by John Higham, 1978, p. 32.



Ukrainian Catholic Women's League with parcels for Ukrainian-Canadian servicemen, Yorkton, Saskatchewan 1944, Mary Cherewyk Collection, UCEC.

SESSION II

Discussion

Donald Avery, Marco Carynnyk, N. Fred Dreisziger, Mykola Hrynchyshyn, Bohdan Kordan, Desmond Morton

Professor Dreisziger: I would like to ask Mr. Carynnyk to speculate on what the effects of a free, independent Ukraine would be on Ukrainian-Canadian attitudes; and on the need for such things as journals of Ukrainian studies in Canada and Chairs of Ukrainian Studies in Canada, that is, institutes for the preservation and promotion of Ukrainian culture.

Mr. Carynnyk: I sense in your question a fear or an assumption that independence will lead to a withering away of Ukrainian-Canadian research institutions. I suspect that the opposite will happen, that the emergence of an independent Ukrainian state will revitalize and encourage Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Canadian topics for research and study here. And I base this optimistic conclusion on the sense that independence will lead to greater cultural and business contacts and exchanges, and will—we have already witnessed this in part over the last two or three years—lead to the arrival of many Ukrainian scholars in Canada and visits by Ukrainian-Canadian research scholars to Ukraine. Scholarly institutions will benefit from the greater interest in cultural, political, and business exchanges.

Professor Dreisziger: There is a question from the floor for Professor Morton about anti-Ukrainianism, in the sense of anti-Semitism; Professor Morton is asked whether he thinks these kinds of sentiments exist in Canada.

Professor Morton: You should probably ask Professor Avery, since he has a much broader view of these attitudes. Of course these attitudes exist; they cannot be denied. They can only be sustained, however, by evidence; and my impression at the moment is that evidence

happily, is lacking.

My fear is that the crises that now will beset an independent Ukraine, as in other independent countries in that shattered and troubled area, will lead to scapegoating—not exclusively though perhaps ideally of a non-existent group in that society, but even of other groups. The difficulties facing the countries across the fragmented Soviet world and the Warsaw Pact world need to be addressed massively and urgently by all freedom-loving, democracy-preferring countries instead of leaving them to sink in their own Adam Smith soup.

I have written a little bit on this in the *Toronto Star*, where I have certainly been much condemned by people who assume that I want to help even the Russians or Croatians or Serbians, or any other group except the specific group that demands all the money. I think the whole system needs help; I think we need a Marshall Plan for these countries, and it should not limit itself to any borders, because you cannot save one without creating an economy for all.

Professor Dreisziger: There is a question for Dr. Kordan about the internment redress: “What do you feel the Ukrainian Canadian Congress wants as redress for the internment of Ukrainians in the First World War?”

Dr. Kordan: I think the question of redress is, and has been, misplaced at this time. It’s not a dollar-and-cents question; I think ultimately it’s a question of legitimacy. It’s something I’ve tried to address in my paper. It is, in fact, acknowledgment of a wrong that looms large in the collective history of a people who are, in effect, attempting to lay claim to that history. There is,

for instance, the current position of the government. I'm not sure whether Mr. Gauld is still in the audience or not, but the current position of the government is that somehow the Ukrainian acknowledgement and redress process will, in effect, be subsumed into a larger package for the Chinese community, the Italian community, the German community, and so on. I think it's misplaced, and it is misplaced largely because, in effect, it does not address the fundamental issue; and the fundamental issue is that people are attempting to lay claim to their history, trying to fit in as a people. Any attempt to sidestep it is a denial of that collective history of a Canadian community.

I have in mind, for instance, the Japanese community, which was granted a large sum of money to establish a race relations foundation. There has been some discussion of the possibility that the aggrieved communities might tap into that kind of fund. My sense is that not only would it be unacceptable to those communities looking for their own place in the sun, but it would be offensive to the Japanese Canadians, who, for whatever reasons, which don't need to be explained here, would see this as an offence to them as well.

Professor Dreisziger: There is a comment addressed to Mr. Carynnyk, to the effect that the view that the Ukrainian famine was a so-called Jewish plot, has been held by so few Ukrainians that it is not worth mentioning in such a general forum as this one.

Mr. Carynnyk: It is impossible to measure how much anti-Semitism there is. The fact is, though, that such views were expressed, and they are reprehensible, whether they were expressed by 1 per cent of the population or 10 per cent or 50 per cent. They cannot be defended; they have to be exposed and criticized. The circumstances out of which they emerged have to be studied and understood. I don't think these questions should be swept under the rug because they are too small quantitatively to be worth mentioning in such a distinguished general audience. They should be discussed as often as possible until they are understood.

Professor Dreisziger: There is a general request here from the floor for a historical footnote; someone would like to ask Professor Morton to comment on the views of Sir William Otter on the internment of Ukrainians in the First World War. Since you are a biographer and author, you might be able to summarize those views.

Professor Morton: All I know about his views are in his correspondence when, as a good, though elderly—very elderly—soldier, he was summoned to do the only job the government wanted him to. He would have loved to lead the army to Europe, though he knew very well if he did lead it on his own past experience, it would not be a great success. He was given a job, and he did it as best he could.

His views on it are, unfortunately, confined to a diary in which there are the usual three or four days to a page, and the diaries are very long, and not always easy to decipher.

I think he felt rather sorry for the prisoners, particularly as the years went on. He felt sorry for them, but he would continue to do his duty by the government and the country to intern them. That was his job, he would do it.

But particularly—and I think there were relatively few Ukrainian internees by the end of the war—he began writing letters about the deleterious effect on their health, particularly in the winter of 1918–1919, when the war was over but the government showed no inclination to hurry them home, partly because in the situation of the world in 1919 it was not very easy to see where you would send them. And so the easy thing was to leave them there; easy in Ottawa, pretty bloody tough in Kapuskasing.

Professor Dreisziger: There have been requests for Mr. Hrynchyshyn to comment on the position of his association on the matter of the Ukrainian famine and the Soviet-German Pact. Will the association now apologize for its former views on these issues, or is that not under consideration?

Mr. Hrynchyshyn: I'm not sure just what the question is directly, in reference to the organization.



Free Ukraine demonstration, n.d., Toronto, Ontario, MHSO Collection.

Professor Dreisziger: Will the association now change its views on the matter of the famine and the Soviet-German Pact in the light of historical developments?

Mr. Hrynchyshyn: Well, briefly, friends, I will say that the association has published a statement on these events in which we dissociate ourselves completely from the effects of Stalinist rule in the Soviet Union and Ukraine. We have a very rich heritage of activities in Canada in many fields, participating in the struggles of the people for a better life here in Canada, for democracy, pensions, medical health, and all these things. As for our activities in connection with the events that took place under Stalinist rule in the Soviet Union and in Ukraine, we dissociate ourselves completely, and, not only dissociate, we condemn them. And, yes, we feel bad about believing the propaganda that was spread, which was not true. But, as I mentioned before, this was told to us by responsible people, writers, historians, and I am sure you must have read a lot of material on that, by people that we thought we could believe.

Anyway, we understand now that they were living under terrorism; it was a question of their lives. Yes, they had to. One fellow told me in Ukraine that he would write one poem praising Stalin, and then he could write anything else he wanted.

Another thing that I wanted to mention is that we felt very deep appreciation, as I am sure all Canadian people did, for the contribution of Ukraine—and the Soviet Union, I mention here—in the defeat of fascism, which threatened the world. And I recall those days where that threat hung over the world. Hitler's empire was to last for one thousand years. He was out to enslave the people and destroy the Slavic people. He considered them a people that had to be destroyed. They made their contribution to that victory, which was a victory for us here in Canada, too.

We fought together, we were allies, and five million Ukrainians gave their lives in the war against fascism. And we made our contribution in Canada, as was mentioned here.

Some forty thousand Ukrainian Canadians were in Canada's armed forces, a very high percentage, from among the national ethnic groups.

So, we regret all the terrible things that happened there, but responsibility was with the people that committed those crimes. Yes, we condemn them. We condemn the Stalinist totalitarianism in Ukraine. We condemn the Hitlerite, the fascist totalitarianism, and we are for democracy, for a democratic Ukraine, a democratic Canada, a democratic world.

Professor Dreisziger: Has the Ukrainian community overcome its image of being pro-German in the Second World War and pro-communist throughout the Second World War and in the years after that? First of all, has either image been valid? Second, have they been able to overcome those images and create a new image for themselves?

Dr. Kordan: The question of divided loyalties, I believe, is a problematic one, and in many respects the issue here is fitting into the body politic. In many respects I, quite frankly, did not consider Ukrainians during the Second World War to be either pro-Soviet or pro-German, and my sense is that they were Canadian, they were taking a solidly Canadian position. They supported the Atlantic Charter, which necessarily spoke about self-determination of peoples and nations. That is, it was fundamentally a Canadian position, and I hope that is something that, in the historical record, will come through fairly loud and clearly.

Professor Morton: As a non-Ukrainian, let me remind you that most Canadians have no historical memory at all.

Professor Dreisziger: You are talking as a history teacher.

Professor Morton: With plenty of experience. Anything before Diefenbaker is somewhere next to the pyramids or the Sphinx. Except perhaps in their own hyphenated histories, where they may be more aware.

You may recall an interesting debate on a Toronto radio station about the Serbo-Croat fight, in which one spokesman said, "But in 1357. . . ." When the host said, "Forget it. I mean what about now?" the fellow replied,

“No, you can’t stop, you have got to go back to 1357.”

And they’re right, he could remember, but no one else could in this country. I don’t think people particularly remember which side Ukrainians were on. They knew they were part of the Soviet Union. The assumption in Canada is that nobody particularly enjoyed that regime—with some exceptions at the time—who now say they were misled. Most Canadians don’t have much political or historical culture; and I’m often grateful for it, because those who have it often want history used as a weapon. I am sometimes grateful for my own increasingly senescent forgetfulness, about a whole range of things.


I think people will judge Ukraine very much on what happens, what is happening, and what will happen, not on what happened in the past. In that past Ukrainians are seen as victims; they are victims of Hitler, they are victims of Stalin, they are victims of their history and their experience and their location. If only they had lived in high mountains like the Swiss. ...

Professor Avery: I just want to build on or follow up Desmond Morton’s point about history as a weapon. The question was posed earlier about relations between the Canadian Jewish community and the Canadian Ukrainian community, and the charges of anti-Semitism. And I wonder whether there can now be a different approach to that taken by the Deschenes Commission, as far as war criminals are concerned? Because, rightfully I think, the response earlier was that evidence taken from the Soviet Union would be doctored evidence and very controversial and would be used for propaganda purposes rather than have any historical accuracy.

I wonder if any of the speakers feels that now that we are looking to the prospect of a free and democratic Ukraine, there is a possibility of getting into the historical records and re-interpreting the agonies of the Second World War?

Mr. Carynnyk: I am unhappy about the notion of dealing specifically with war crimes, as those crimes are defined here today. I would

welcome a full investigation of all war crimes and all crimes against humanity that were perpetrated before, during, and after the Second World War. And if the Ukrainian government—whatever it may be—cooperates to investigate all such crimes and bring all people charged with such crimes to justice, then that effort must be supported, and that would perhaps be preferable to the process that we have had in Canada.□



Cover of publication by Civil Liberties Commission of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, [1992].

SESSION III

A New Commons? The Viability of Ukrainian-Canadian Organizational Structures in the 1990s and Beyond

Chairman's Remarks

Wsevolod Isajiw, University of Toronto, Toronto

Let me say a few words about the question of the Ukrainian-Canadian organizational structure, or the issues involved in analysing and looking at the organizational structure of Ukrainians in relation to the future, the so-called New Commons.

I think the problem of the ethnic organizations should be examined first in relation to several general issues and general theories of all voluntary organizations, and then, second, in relation to the kind of goals that one would expect ethnic organizations to have. As far as the general theories of voluntary organizations are concerned, perhaps I may suggest one. It is a theory that was proposed long ago by Charles Horton Cooley, an American social theorist, who suggested that voluntary organizations go through a life cycle just like people, that they are established, they develop, they reach a peak, and then they go into old age and decline. Then they dissolve or dwindle away, and that is the end of them. An interesting issue raised by his theory is to what extent an organization of this type can revive, and whether, when it is in its afternoon period, as it were, it can revive and become young again. Charles Horton Cooley's answer was no, that they just finish and new organizations have to start.

My question here for you is—are Ukrainian organizations, those with which we are familiar, indeed in this kind of a process? Was Cooley right? Perhaps he was wrong, perhaps there are many lives for an organization.

The second thing we should look at in relation to ethnic organizational structures is their activities and goals. Do the structures of an

organization—and that includes its relationship to other organizations and other institutions, including the societal institutions—allow it to address new issues? Obviously, as history goes on, there are always new issues. Are some organizations able to handle those new issues, or are all organizations tied to the original issues with which they started, and do they then have difficulties restructuring themselves in view of new issues that arise?

The last question you may want to think about is to what extent ethnic organizational structures allow for a turnover of personnel, particularly to what extent they allow new generations to come in and participate actively in the organizations. We often hear that an organization has the same members for years, decades, and longer, and that new people, young generations, have no place in the established organizations. Is this so among the Ukrainian organizations? Are they able to admit younger generations? Are they able to have a turnover of personnel?□

[Editors' note: Dr. Frances Swyripa, University of Alberta, also presented a paper in Session III but it was not available for inclusion with these proceedings.]

SESSION III

Peter Galadza, St. Michael's College, University of Toronto, Toronto

When we speak of the Ukrainian churches' future place in the Ukrainian-Canadian community, the first question that might be asked is whether the Ukrainian churches in Canada have a future. The statistics for the Ukrainian churches do not bode well. A study by Professor Wsevolod Isajiw shows that whereas in 1931, 58 per cent of all Ukrainians in Canada belonged to the Ukrainian Catholic church, by 1981 that number had dropped to 30 per cent. For the Ukrainian Orthodox church the percentages for the same years dropped from 25 per cent to 17 per cent. Isajiw's study also shows that, in the mid-1980s, while 71 per cent of first-generation Ukrainian immigrants to Canada belonged to the Ukrainian Catholic church, the percentage of third-generation Ukrainian-Canadians was only 19 per cent. With the Ukrainian Orthodox, the figures were 17 per cent for first generation and 4 per cent for third generation. As it has now been more than four decades since the last large influx of immigrants, these statistics indicate something that is readily apparent from a visit to most of our churches, namely that our congregations are generally composed of the elderly. In spite of these figures, however, only the gloomiest of pessimists would be willing to predict the actual demise of the Ukrainian churches in Canada.

But in speaking of the churches' future we need to distinguish between three things: 1) simple membership, 2) regular attendance at services and other functions, and 3) requests for so-called "rites of passage," such as baptisms, weddings, and funerals. Even if simple membership and the request for "rites of passage" were to remain high, the Ukrainian churches could still end up without any significant place

in the lives of Ukrainian Canadians. One can be a member of the YMCA and go there from time to time, for example, without that organization influencing one's worldview and existential choices.

In the past, and to the present in certain elderly circles, the churches have had a prominent place both in individual and community Ukrainian-Canadian life. I would like to examine two reasons for this prominence, and I have chosen them because they have a direct bearing on our discussion of the future. (Of course, one of the reasons for the churches' prominence in the past would have been the general respectability of religion in most Western societies, but here I wish to concentrate on the specificities of the Ukrainian experience.)

For Ukrainians of the past, especially nationally conscious, pro-independence Ukrainians, the church was important because it had shared in certain crucial existential crises. In the case of the immigrants of the late 1940s and early 1950s, the church had shared with them the trauma of the Second World War. Even some nationalists who had little use for Christianity still respected the church because it was among their enemy's enemies. In the case of pre-First World War prairie Ukrainians, the Ukrainian Orthodox church had shared in the difficult struggle to establish a Ukrainian presence in Canada.

It is an axiom of pastoral theology, and could probably be used as a category for sociological study, that whenever a church, or any other body for that matter, enters fully into people's existential situation, that church grows or at least remains vibrant. In standing side by side with and sharing the plight of, refugees



Blessing Ukrainian Easter baskets, St. Demetrius Ukrainian Catholic Church, Toronto, Ontario, Lu Taskey photograph, MHSO Collection.

during the Second World War, for example, the church was responding to a fundamental need in those people's lives. For many of them, one of the most basic existential questions was "Why is Ukraine not free?" (*Chomu nema Ukrainy?*) It was an existential question because they had personally experienced hell on account of Ukraine's lack of freedom. Today the existential questions are shifting, or rather, because of assimilation (not to mention the changes in Ukraine's status during the last year), the questions that one might say were submerged for many years are now becoming dominant once again. For most Ukrainian Canadians the existential questions are not "Why is Ukraine not free?" but "Why is my marriage failing?" or "Why is my son an alcoholic?" or "Why am I usually depressed?" If the Ukrainian churches can be present to people as they cope with these questions, the churches will remain vibrant. To state it differently, crisis creates community. In the past, our people shared crises and as a result solidified their community bonds. Incidentally, I believe that older Ukrainian Canadians tend to be active in

the church not only because it is socially expected of them, but because they endured crises together. Younger Ukrainian Canadians, on the other hand, have not experienced those kinds of collective trauma. Consequently, if their individual crises are to bring them into community, then it will usually be through an individual intermediary, like a priest.

Unfortunately, ministry to substance abusers, family counselling, and youth ministry, just to mention three areas, are not the forte of Ukrainian clergy. Among the manifold reasons is that apparently Ukrainian clergy have been able to "live off the fat" of previous years. In other words, the status gained by the church because of its previous presence among its people in their travail has caused the church's leadership to limit itself to easier tasks, such as administration, perfunctory celebration of the liturgy, and superficial socializing. In addition, the fact that, after the Second World War in particular, the Ukrainian churches, especially in cities, often came to be dominated by political immigrants, meant that the lay leaders themselves discouraged the church leaders from

developing the kinds of ministries mentioned above. Ukrainians bent on gaining acceptance from the world at large naturally insisted, and at times continue to insist, that substance abuse occurs only in other communities, that wife abuse is rare among Ukrainians, and that most forms of depression are a “Western” phenomenon, best treated by being ignored.

Sociologists like Durkheim and Weber were among the first to draw attention to what we Ukrainians used to call the *pop i khlop* syndrome. In other words, societies that are sociologically less developed, for example, without elites, tend to give far greater prominence to religion and religious figures than developed societies. More “primitive” societies are less specialized, and so the clergy frequently step in to provide the civic leadership that would otherwise be provided by lawyers, professors, and politicians. All of us remember the commendable role played by Ukrainian clergy in developing the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, various Saturday schools, and community retirement homes. With the development of secular Ukrainian-Canadian elites during the last several decades, one should not be surprised that the clergy’s role in such civic areas will diminish.

This brings us directly to the question of the future, and the church’s role in the future Ukrainian-Canadian “commons.” If the church is to be a meaningful institution for future Ukrainian Canadians, it must be allowed to “specialize” in that area where it cannot be replaced, that is, in communicating to people and celebrating with them the sense of life’s meaning that flows from the Gospel of Jesus Christ. When the church turns to other pursuits, it often ends up simply duplicating what a secular organization is doing just as well, if not better. This, of course, does not mean that the church of the future should not have a direct role in Ukrainian community affairs. What it does mean, however, is that the church’s ministry to the Ukrainian “commons” should focus on those areas where the church is uniquely qualified both by virtue of social circumstances and the mandate of the gospel to bring assistance.

I will give just one example, which incidentally seems paradoxical—but even the paradox is indicative of the church’s unique status and potential. The Ukrainian churches can retain a “civic” ministry by standing by someone like John Demjanjuk while at the same time trying to develop a Ukrainian-Jewish dialogue. Demjanjuk became a “leper” whose case some Ukrainian leaders were afraid to touch. As the church is, ideally, beholden to no one, it is uniquely qualified to intervene on his behalf. On the other hand, Ukrainian-Jewish dialogue is an area where many Ukrainian secular organizations feel constrained either because of understandable political strategies or because of the biases of their members. Again, the church, which is supposed to be free of such encumbrances, can perform an important service here. Those are examples of “civic” ministry. However, to the dismay of certain members of the community who would prefer to see the church primarily as a kind of religious appendage to the Ukrainian national movement, I suggest that what the Ukrainian churches need to do, both for their own good and for the ultimate good of the Ukrainian community, is to regain a universally human agenda.

I have already spoken of the kinds of existential situations that are often ignored by our parishes. Not infrequently, when one suggests that a parish should develop ministries to the divorced and separated, substance abusers, and so on, a common retort is that people who want those kinds of services can go to other churches. The statistics show that this is precisely what people are doing!

I draw attention to this issue because I think it is where the greatest conflicts may arise in the future between the church and the Ukrainian community at large. Certain civic leaders fear that a church focusing more on fundamental human problems will become a less Ukrainian and therefore less desirable church. But allow me here to present the following analogy.

Many of us belong to Ukrainian credit unions. We belong to them essentially because these institutions are Ukrainian. However, if

suddenly these Ukrainian credit unions started being delinquent in their financial services, in other words, if the credit unions stopped being sound financial institutions, there is no amount of Ukrainian sentiment that could keep us from taking our money elsewhere. I would suggest that the Ukrainian character of our churches is not enough to entice most younger members of our community. Consequently, we are losing them. And incidentally, until now I have been emphasizing various forms of ministry that are lacking, but I have no intention of overlooking the importance of more basic services like good preaching and engaging worship, not to mention religious education.

Oddly enough, however, even this turn by the church to a more universal mode of activity has civic benefits. Many Ukrainians who are at best nominally Christian would still like, for example, to see the Ukrainian Patriarchates recognized by non-Ukrainian sister churches. And while it is generally not the fault of Ukrainians that they have not been recognized, non-Ukrainian church leaders sometimes ask us how it is that churches without a single noted theologian, or without various programs of ministry, or without even a full program of religious education for their young people can expect to be recognized as fully autonomous local churches of Jesus Christ. The Ukrainian churches, which could serve as dynamic windows for the Ukrainian community into the world community at large, are hampered in their efforts to do so by those in the Ukrainian community who refuse to see the need for real theology and basic Christian ministry.

Fortunately, however, that is changing. For example, the English section of Winnipeg's *Pravoslavnyi Visnyk*, a newspaper published by the Ukrainian Orthodox church, boasts of a large group of young graduates of St. Andrew's College who are writing on basic human and religious problems. And in the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the bishops of Canada took the bold step in 1990 of creating a theological institute at St. Paul's University in Ottawa—the Sheptytsky Institute in Eastern Christian Studies.

As we stand on the threshold of complete Ukrainian independence, I think many of us will soon be overwhelmed with joy, not only because our people will finally be free, but also because this freedom will finally give Ukrainians the luxury of meditating on the great universal questions of life. Ukrainian thinkers will be able to write essays that transcend the particular Ukrainian condition, and Ukrainian clergy will be given the opportunity again to become "mystagogues," those who lead others into the Mystery. And they will be able to do this without the oft-heard complaint that they are engaging in irrelevant navel gazing. And lest anyone doubt the importance of such "mystagogy" for the Ukrainian community, may I conclude with the time-tested scriptural adage that a people without a vision perishes (Proverbs 29: 18). Instead of bemoaning the re-orientation toward more universal questions, the newly emerging Ukrainian "commons" should welcome this shift that may give rise to a new generation of Ukrainian visionaries, twentieth century Skovorodas and Mohylas.□

SESSION III

Ostap Skrypnyk, Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Saskatchewan

I work for the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC), Saskatchewan Provincial Council, as its executive director. And that makes me unique amongst the speakers here, because, other than Father Galadza, I am the only one who works in the organized Ukrainian community. We are a rather large operation, with seven full-time employees, a large office in downtown Saskatoon, and an operating budget of over \$350,000 a year. We are unlike any other Ukrainian organization or public community organization in the country, for we are supported by Saskatchewan lotteries. We have some political influence in Saskatchewan; at least, we are consulted, which to a large degree most Ukrainian organizations are not. We offer programs formulated by the Saskatchewan Provincial Council in arts, education, and communications that will continue to be cultivated and expanded. We have a mailing list of over thirty-five hundred names, with which we keep in touch regularly.

It is very interesting to think about the established community structures. This is especially true since I work in what has been referred to as the "relic hinterland." If you are from Western Canada, you do not like to be referred to as a "relic" or living in the "hinterland." At the same time I can recognize that Saskatchewan, when viewed from other parts of the country, does remind one of a relic and of a hinterland. Being from Edmonton—which is not exactly in the hinterland—when I accepted my position in Saskatchewan, it was with some trepidation. Another problem I had with the briefing notes for the symposium, was that there was an implication that the Ukrainian Canadian Congress had somehow failed the

Ukrainian community. To be perfectly honest, I believe that the Congress, as it has evolved since the 1940s, has been remarkably successful as a Ukrainian lobby group and as an umbrella organization. The problem with factionalism always seems to be brought up. People never seem to want to join an existing group; rather, they always form their own. For example, in Toronto there's a new Ukrainian newspaper. Instead of going and working in an established Ukrainian newspaper, these people for some reason formed their own. Now, is this a weakness or a strength? I argue sometimes that this is a strength of the Ukrainian community; that diversity in our organizational life allows more people to take an active part in the Ukrainian community. The role of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress is to act as an umbrella for all those organizations.

The solutions to the problems of factionalism—and they do exist—and the rigid structures of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, are my next point. The Congress has a constitution that, to be blunt, is outdated. To get this constitution changed takes a lot of hard political work, and this will eventually be done, but as it is we have to live with this outdated structure.

One of the things that the Congress has been able to do successfully, especially in Saskatchewan, is to give the impression to the public that the Ukrainian community is strong, united, and—strange as this may seem—wealthy and that it has a lot of political influence. When people think of the UCC, at least, in Saskatchewan, they are impressed by our organizational structures. Saskatchewan is also unique in Canada in that it has a high percentage of

Ukrainians in its population, yet it had almost no post-Second World War Ukrainian immigration. It can be argued that the Ukrainian community in the province had its zenith in the 1920s and 1930s; a good proportion of mainstream Ukrainian-Canadian organizations and institutions were organized and formed in Saskatchewan in those years.

I will list a few Saskatchewan achievements. The first convention of Ukrainian teachers was held in 1910 in Canora, Saskatchewan. In 1916 the Mohyla Institute was founded. The Mohyla Institute is for Saskatchewan Ukrainians and Orthodox Ukrainians in western Canada much what Upper Canada College is for the WASP elite in Toronto. The year 1918 saw the formation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Saskatoon. In 1926 the founding of the Ukrainian Women's Association of Canada took place, also in Saskatoon. In 1927 the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League was founded. In 1932 the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics and the Ukrainian National Federation came into being. The year 1939 saw the formation of the first Ukrainian credit union in Canada. In 1944 the first university-level Ukrainian-language courses in the country were taught, at the University of Saskatchewan. And in 1948 the first Slavic studies department at a Canadian university was established. In 1952 Ukrainian was offered as a regular high-school subject for the first time in Canada, again in Saskatchewan. You will note that these achievements all took place before the Second World War and without the help of the post-war immigration. I will argue, as does Frances Swyripa, that the basis of our organized community life came into being in Western Canada before the Second World War.

Another thing that bothered me somewhat in the pre-symposium package was the phrase "the often filiopietistic attention paid to the pioneer experience." Again, as Dr. Swyripa said, it shows some dismissal of this experience and perhaps a misunderstanding of what it means to the Ukrainian population in Western Canada. The pioneer experience is close to most Canadian Ukrainians living in Sas-

katchewan because it is not a myth but is part of their lives. We in Saskatchewan in our daily lives are part of that experience. Most people living in Saskatoon or Regina can get into their cars and in ninety minutes or so be at what is called "the home place"; this is where their great-grandparents homesteaded, built their houses, and lived. These buildings, physical artifacts, to a large part still exist. Beside these buildings, there might be a modern farm bungalow where your Uncle or your Baba still lives. On the way you pass a graveyard where generations of your family are buried. There are the churches that you still go to for special events. People go out to country halls—even if everyone lives in the city, these country halls are still used for weddings; you are still buried in your traditional plot; the funeral service may be in Saskatoon or Regina, but then everyone drives for three hours to the burial near the ancestors. These things are lacking in a place like Toronto. You do not have the same connection with the land and with a specific time, the one hundred years of our settlement. So, I would think that this "filiopietistic attention paid to the pioneer experience" is a statement based on a misunderstanding of that experience.

The role of the post-Second World War immigration, the "DPs" as they are called, is indisputably very important. But the big cities of Canada are not the only places where Ukrainians live. For the most part, the new institutions created by the DPs serve the interests of the post-war elites. On the broader scale, new immigrants only took over existing institutions or created new ones that were not very original. The cottage ghetto society of the Eastern Ukrainian post-war immigration has little to offer or to be envied. Ironically, the institutions that were in existence before the Second World War, as I mentioned, provide the basis for our community life to this day. Our community was already in existence before the arrival of the DPs.

Political refugees and displaced persons, to a large degree, also became part of the existing structures. The Congress existed before these immigrants arrived; they joined into the



Primary Grade, George V School, Winnipeg, Manitoba, n.d., Iwan Boberskyj Collection, UCEC.

Congress and, together with the earlier immigrants, have built on that existing structure.

Does the Ukrainian Canadian Congress need to be re-drawn or dissolved? A general impression I got from some of the questions raised in the briefing notes was that the Congress could be done away with. I believe it has been a success. Does the plurality of the Ukrainian community hold it back? Again, I believe that our plurality is something to be envied. What new forum would we put in the place of Congress? The government will, of course, ask, "Whom do you represent? How are you elected? Whom do you speak for? To whom are you ultimately responsible?" and "How will you administer and deliver your programs?" One of the things is that Congress, to grow, must, in fact, deliver programs; it cannot just exist. At the moment, the Congress does have answers that seem to satisfy the federal government. This has not been easy, but slowly the community has educated the State to the point that it turns to the Congress when it wants to gauge the opinion of the Ukrainian community. We have regular meetings on the federal and provincial levels with government

officials and politicians on the cause of Ukrainian independence, for example.

Does the Congress represent all one million Canadians of Ukrainian descent? When we talk to politicians, we say, "You had better listen to us, because one million Canadians of Ukrainian descent are just waiting to find out from the Ukrainian Canadian Congress how to vote in the next federal election." I believe that this is a good question, whether we really represent these people, and I, to a certain degree, believe that the federal government would like to believe that we do represent these people.

I think the Congress's greatest quantifiable success, and an early one, was ensuring the admission of members of the Galicia Division to Canada. The Congress played a large role in this, was able to identify which government people to lobby, and was able to defeat the efforts of other organizations and people who did not want to admit these Ukrainian soldiers.

The good examples of what we should do are to continue the committees we have now. For example, there is the Redress Committee, dealing with the question of internment during the first World War; and the greatest experi-

ment of all, the Ukrainian Canadian Development Committee (UCDC), which in Western Canada was able to publish a large document called *Building the Future: A Blueprint for Action in the 21st Century*. These committees all deal with specific questions. People with the highest qualifications are drafted to them, independently of the community structures. People that do not have official positions in the community can sit on these committees, but ultimately they work for and report to the national Ukrainian Canadian Congress. They complete jobs that need to be done and this solves the problem of bringing in new people. We continually regenerate these committees as necessary, circumventing the organizational framework, if need be.

One of my basic questions is, "If you get rid of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, who does the co-ordinating work?" The large national organizations, the political and religious organizations, provide the resources for the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. They provide members to sign petitions and the like. For example, there is a petition asking Parliament to support the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. My office sent out 150 petitions to various organizations across Saskatchewan, and I have received responses from places like Ituna and Yorkton, where the parish priest may have said, "We have sent off 150 signatures to support Ukrainian independence." These are from little towns, where 150 people may be 15 to 20 per cent of the population. We provide the membership, sign petitions, raise funds—very important things. If we did not have the Congress, how would the Ukrainian Canadian community be able to raise funds internally for those for whom certain services must be provided?

Things that we do in Saskatchewan might be a model for the rest of the country. A hitherto overlooked aspect of the Ukrainian community in Saskatchewan is our growing aged population. You may be aware that on average Ukrainians are much older, I think, than any other ethnocultural group in Canada, except for the Jews. For too long social

programs for the elderly have been ignored by our Ukrainian organizations, and now we have to start thinking about taking care of our aged populations. These elderly people have been ignored by our mainstream agencies for a variety of reasons, including cultural differences, lack of English, low self-esteem brought on by the behaviour of the dominant culture, rural isolation, and changing social, as well as economic, conditions. Our Ukrainians have culturally unique requirements for their elderly. To a startling degree, our elderly are not in a position to take advantage of government programs to which they, as taxpayers and Canadians, are entitled. After conducting a study, the UCC plans to develop programs that will meet the specific needs of the Ukrainian aged population in Saskatchewan. These programs might include translation services, information hotlines, income tax clinics, and home and hospital visits. Another problem we have in Saskatchewan, which is rare for the Ukrainians of Ontario, is posed by the existence of a rural elderly population, many of whom live on isolated farmsteads and need special services. Women make up a large segment of this group.

The problem of the low self-esteem brought on by the behaviour of the dominant culture is an issue for Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Saskatchewan. For some that do not realize why we need multiculturalism as a philosophy, it is important to remember that in Saskatchewan in the 1920s the Ku Klux Klan had over forty thousand members, and in 1929 the province elected as Premier a man supported by the Klan. The Anglican bishop of Prince Albert was openly a Klan member.

Many of our older people who grew up in this atmosphere learned that to be Ukrainian was to sit down, shut up, and not say anything, because they were not as good as the dominant culture. Their children, to a startling degree, also have that attitude to this very day. I have seen people in Saskatoon on the street speaking Ukrainian among themselves. They will go into a department store or some other place where people can hear them, and begin to speak an English that is barely identifiable as such. They

lo so because if they spoke Ukrainian publicly they would be subject to derision or worse. We also have to examine the effects of the Methodist and Presbyterian missions, which to a large degree during the First World War, also caused much lack of self-esteem.

We have an arts council with hired people to take charge of these matters. There are Ukrainian dance programs on the Prairies. Sometimes the UCDC report is known derisively as 'Red Boots Across the Prairies,' because it places so much emphasis on dance. But Ukrainian dance continues to be a mass activity in Saskatchewan, with over five thousand involved either as dancers or volunteers. I suggest that this number of volunteer hours equals that of most other community activities in Saskatchewan. We have the problem that our youth are not involved in our activities. We are trying to

plan things for them. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress has an education resource officer in Saskatchewan, whose job is to emphasize and contribute to Ukrainian education programs.

I believe that many things that we do provincially can be implemented on the national level, and this would enable the Ukrainian Canadian Congress to change its focus into a service-providing organization. But I wonder if there will be the money to continue this in the future or to extend it to the national scene?

I could talk about Ukraine also. I think Ukraine will, in fact, rationalize our existence in Canada. We will spend less and less time dealing with Ukrainian problems and lobbying for Ukrainian causes on the international scene. Ukraine will be able to take care of this for itself; we will be able to place more emphasis on our life in Canada. I think that is right.□



Vasile Avramenko, choreographer and dancer, Ukrainian National Dance School, n.d., Iwan Boberskyj Collection, UCEC.

SESSION III

Commentary

Stanford Lucyk, Toronto

The invitation to take part in today's symposium has led me to recapitulate my own experience as a Canadian of Ukrainian ethnic origin. My personal experience was that of being on the boundary between two very different commons, two different psychological and societal spaces, in which Ukrainian Canadians could live. In some sense, I represent a Canadian of somewhat marginal Ukrainian background, and there will be more and more who are part of that "commons."

I grew up in the tiny hamlet of Whitkow, Saskatchewan, a farming community peopled largely by immigrant Ukrainian farmers. My father was a general merchant who had a lumber yard and was also an implement agency dealer. He founded his business as the Great Depression was beginning in 1931. I can still see the "relief orders" issued by the municipality of Round Hill and turned in for supplies at our store by some of those poverty-stricken Ukrainian farmers.

About the time the Second World War ended, my father and the city-based area salesman for the farm implement company for which my dad was an agent—the salesman happened to have an Irish name—applied for the city agency then available in nearby North Battleford. There was a lot of pooled experience in this proposed partnership of agent and area salesman. But they were refused by the superintendent of the farm implement company on the ground that my dad was Ukrainian and that would not do for the city agency.

In one of life's ironic twists, we moved to North Battleford, where Dad, experienced, sharp merchant that he was, operated a flourishing grocery business. I attended the United Church

and received my call to the ministry. Within the polity of the United Church of Canada, to become a candidate for the ministry and to be certified to the college for theological studies, the first test of the call process was to pass one's peers, a group of lay officials known as the session. Among those who would have to judge and recommend me to the court of this church, known as presbytery, as one who was called by God and had qualifications for the ministry, was the superintendent of the farm implement company who had rejected my father a few years before for the city agency because he was Ukrainian. Life's ironies! And I must say, I do not know of any instance when my unabashedly Ukrainian name militated against me in any congregation during my forty-one subsequent years of ministry. Those personal experiences put me on the borderline of one commons and well into another.

Another anecdote. In 1959 I was called to be minister of Saskatoon's St. Thomas–Wesley Church, located at 20th Street and Avenue H—on the wrong side of the literal tracks in the minds of some—right in the midst of a large Ukrainian population, and with Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic churches as neighbours. Because suburban churches had not been built at that time, St. Thomas–Wesley had the largest number of people under pastoral care in the province. Its radio broadcasts and its tradition of openness in ministry gave it a reputation such that, if one had nowhere else to go, one could turn to St. Thomas–Wesley.

One autumn, early in my time there, I was asked to conduct the funeral of a young family man killed while hunting deer. It was quite tragic: another hunter's shot had hit the bullet

pouch this young man was wearing. As it turned out, the man I buried belonged to the Ukrainian Labour Temple a few blocks away. I am not certain, but my suspicion is that Orthodox and Catholic priests would not have been very willing to minister to members of the Labour Temple. Whether or not it was St. Thomas-Wesley's community reputation, coupled with the fact that Lucyk was a Ukrainian name, in any event I seemed to become the funeral chaplain to members of the Labour Temple. They used the same funeral home, the secretary of the group was always one of the pallbearers, and he was the one who could be counted on to help lead the singing of the hymns. One day, one of the co-owners of the funeral home said to me, "Stan, do you know that the RCMP come in and lift the names of all the people attending these funerals you conduct from the guest register?"

Again, a life on the border of two commons. In the one commons, to have a Ukrainian name could put one stereotypically under suspicion as a fellow traveller with Bolsheviks and, unknowingly at times, under police surveillance. As the ecclesiastical functionary at those funerals, I do not know what the RCMP may have done with my name. But in the new commons, my involvement with members of the Labour Temple did not prevent the appointment of my wife as a judge in Her Majesty's courts.

Still another anecdote. To assist me with background for this symposium, Professor Magocsi made available to me the special issue of *Polyphony: The Bulletin of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario*, titled "Ukrainians in Ontario" (vol. 10, double issue, 1988). Since I have been a minister there for five years, I was attracted immediately to Professor Lubomyr Luciuk's article "Ukrainians in Kingston: Their First Seventy-Five Years." He documents how relatively small the Kingston Ukrainian contingent has been through the years, how the desire to "make it" in that city led some "to accept Anglo-conformity as a way of life," but how this Ukrainian community "nevertheless displayed great vitality from the interwar period to the present," (p. 104). That "nevertheless" is

put over against what Luciuk describes as Kingston's "relatively homogenous Anglo-Celtic quality."

Pondering that article, again I thought of myself as someone living on the border. Chalmers United Church, where I was minister, was named after Thomas Chalmers, leader of the Free Church, which dissented from the State Church of Scotland. The name of the church, its history, its position in relationship to Queen's University, its then make-up, could argue the case that Chalmers United was a quintessential reflection of Kingston's "Anglo-Celtic quality." Kilts could be seen in the congregation, summer and winter, on many a Sunday. So what was the meaning of a prairie Slav being called to minister to a congregation that could be taken as representative of the Anglo-Celtic majority that had made it difficult for Ukrainians both to be attracted to Kingston and to maintain their identity there?

So what do these anecdotes imply about the new commons? I was worried that my space or commons might be what it has been because of what Luciuk's article calls an acceptance of "Anglo-conformity as a way of life." But when I read Bob Magocsi's preface to Luciuk and Hryniuk's new book, *Canada's Ukrainians*, I found that he named my experience, and what had been my dilemma, when he differentiated between "Canadians of Ukrainian background" and those who conceive of themselves as "Ukrainians living in Canada." My dilemma, as one who has experienced within Protestantism the God who transcends and is to be Lord over nation states, is the fact that so much of the presentation of what it meant to be Ukrainian involved the Orthodox and Catholic divisions and the pro-Soviet and nationalist Ukraine dichotomies. That self-definition through what one is against did not appeal to me. The space, the commons, within which I live is definitely that of a Canadian of Ukrainian background.

In answer to the question of how one sustains one's Ukrainian background in the new commons, I bring my remarks to a close with an analogy from religious life and with a final anecdote.


What we are wrestling with today is like the baptism of children in the church. My theological tribe would say that by baptism one is made a member of the church and no further ritual is needed to make it complete. But the implications of that for the Christian education ministry of the church is that Christian education has the task of saying to people at various stages in their growth and maturation: this is who you are; this is your identity. And how one stays Ukrainian in Canada is not dissimilar.

In July of 1983 I flew to Saskatoon with my wife Mary, who happens to be a Celt, so that I might preach at the seventy-fifth anniversary of my former parish there. The next day we drove north and west—a reliving of my roots. At the Petrofka Bridge on the North Saskatchewan River, I could point out that here

was where my German Baptist-Mennonite great-grandfather had established the first school for the Doukhobors, and where he taught in Russian, German, and English. It was here his son, my grandfather, met and married one of those Russian Doukhobors. German and Russian roots! Three-quarters of an hour later we drove into the dwindling town of Krydor, where we visited the Ukrainian Catholic church. Beneath the church bell is a bronze plaque, a Saskatchewan historical marker, stating that my Ukrainian grandfather had been one of the two founding fathers of that Slavic community. Then we went on to another little Ukrainian hamlet, with only ten souls left today. We crept into an old abandoned log store—a business my father had started with three hundred borrowed dollars when the Depression began in 1931. This was the place where I grew up, attending



Szewczenko [Shevchenko] Elementary School, Vita, Manitoba, 1930, National Archives of Canada (PA 178591).



Vasile Avramenko's Ukrainian School of Ballet, Toronto, Ontario, 1926, photograph MHSO collection.

school in the dance hall, clerking in a general store, skiing in winter, picking mushrooms and Saskatoon berries in the summer, and learning Ukrainian after school.

Mary said to me, "In eight or ten years you will have to do this with Jeremy." Jeremy was our infant son at the time. But the reason why is so that he might understand who he in fact already is—one who has those prairie Slavic roots. That's something about which he has no choice. And by visiting, by being told stories, by thumbing through yellowed photo albums, he will learn who he is.

So who are today's storytellers, and what is the counterpart of yellowed photo albums that will tell us of the Ukrainian background of

those of us who consider ourselves Canadians of Ukrainian background? Can we institute something akin to Scottish clan emblems? Can we conduct heritage study tours to a Ukraine that is now more accessible? Can we have colourful, itinerant storytellers who can synthesize and capture us marginal Ukrainians with our heritage and history? And, just as Rabbi Lionel Blue says that "the changes of the liturgical year are marked out for the Jew by smell and taste, by the aromas of the kitchen," can the Ukrainian folk customs, like spreading straw under the Christmas table and then burning it in the yard in the shape of the cross, be used to deepen our sense of being Ukrainian? That is part of the agenda for us in the new commons. □

SESSION III

Commentary

Ihor W. Bardyn, Chair, Ukrainian Studies Foundation, Toronto

It is an interesting coincidence that at the same time that Canada is searching for a “new commons,” or a new order of things, this conference is exploring a new commons for the Ukrainian Canadian community. The Canadian Government has received many briefs and has heard many solutions for a new commons for Canada. We are undergoing this process out of necessity. The organizers of this symposium, in anticipation of the need for a new commons for the Ukrainian-Canadian community, have put this topic on the agenda, presumably hoping to avoid a crisis conference sometime in the future.

To give some definition to the term “new commons,” I have borrowed from two political thinkers. In the fifteenth century, Machiavelli (1469-1527) wrote in *The Prince*, “There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.” Later John Locke (1632-1704) wrote, “New opinions are always suspected and usually opposed, without any reason but because they are not already common.” What new commons, what new order of things, or new space should the Ukrainian-Canadian community seek? Let me try to suggest an answer.

The events of recent months in Ukraine open up for the Ukrainian-Canadian community and the Ukrainian Canadian Congress—its national executive and its member organizations—a new commons. The challenge for the UCC will be to take the lead in moving the community into that new commons.

To do this, the Congress need not change its organizational structures significantly.

What it should do is make it very clear to the Ukrainian-Canadian community and our government that it intends to be in the forefront of that move to the new commons. That move includes the cementing of relations between Canada and Ukraine with our community’s and our own government’s support and participation.

It is true that there has been a loss of interest in community organizations, an erosion of financial support, and a decrease in the number of volunteers willing to work. Fewer of us use the Ukrainian language, and Ukrainian youth organizations are attracting fewer new members. These facts are well-known to most of us. But the new directions being proposed open up for the Congress and the community a splendid opportunity to recapture some of that lost support, to re-invigorate community life, and, one hopes, to stop the erosion.

I will concentrate on the UCC, the organization to which I have most recently devoted a considerable amount of time and effort. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress, earlier known as the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, was founded in 1940. It was incorporated in 1963. To allow for some comparison and some indication of the direction we might take toward the “new commons,” I have looked at two other national congresses, that of the Canadian Jewish Congress, which was incorporated in 1952, and the German-Canadian Congress for Multi-Cultural Unity, which was incorporated in 1985.

The first three recorded purposes and objects of the Canadian Jewish Congress are (a) to develop the highest standards of citizenship in the Jews of Canada by encouraging, carrying on and participating in activities of national

patriotic, cultural and humanitarian nature, in the furtherance of the best interests of the country and of the Jewish people; (b) to act in matters affecting the status, rights and welfare of Canadian Jewry; (c) to investigate the causes of anti-Semitism and to devise means of abating its influence throughout the world generally and in Canada in particular; and to promote the growth of a spirit of toleration, understanding, and goodwill between all ethnic elements in Canada, and particularly between non-Jewish and Jewish citizens.

The recorded purposes and objects of the German-Canadian Congress for Multi-Cultural Unity are (a) to preserve the German language, culture and customs within the scope of Canadian multiculturalism; (b) to foster co-operation between German Canadians; (c) to achieve recognition of the positive contributions by Canadians of German descent; (d) to promote

positive co-operation between Canada and the German language and culture area; (e) to promote and encourage the involvement of German-Canadians in public affairs; (f) to disseminate information and news for the benefit of the German-Canadian community; (g) to counteract negative stereotyping of Germans in the Canadian society.

The first three recorded purposes and objectives of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress are (a) to act as an authoritative spokesman for the Ukrainian-Canadian community before the people and Government of Canada; (b) to strengthen and co-ordinate the participation of Ukrainian Canadians in the Canadian social and cultural life based on Christian and democratic principles, for justice, freedom, and independence; (c) to safeguard the aspirations of the Ukrainian people in Europe for independence and sovereignty of its ethnic territories.



Some of the founders of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee at the second all-Canada congress, 1946, UCEC Collection.

In considering what a new commons for the congress might be, it would be helpful to compare the visibility of the three congresses. The Canadian German Congress for Multi-Cultural Unity is headquartered in Ottawa and carries on its activities in a subdued and low-profile manner. It does not feel compelled to take strong public positions on events in the former homeland. There is relative stability and prosperity in Germany, and this no doubt has some bearing on the work of the organization. The Congress' president, Gerry Meinzer, has said, "Locating our headquarters in Ottawa was the most important and best decision we ever made. It gives us immediate access to our government. Our lines of communication go out from Ottawa throughout the country."

The Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) is also headquartered in Ottawa and carries on its activities in a very politically active and visible manner. It promotes its activities in support of the State of Israel and does not stand idle in the face of criticism it considers detrimental to its interests. There is relative instability in Israel, and that country does not enjoy the same prosperity as Germany. Israel is in some ways still in a building stage as a country and it faces many challenges, including threats to the security of its borders. Those circumstances, no doubt, affect activities of the CJC.

Currently, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress carries on its activities in a moderate and subdued fashion, somewhere between the low-profile level of activity of the German Canadian Congress and the high-profile activity of the Canadian Jewish Congress. Would the UCC become more effective if its headquarters was moved to Ottawa?

If the results of the Ukrainian referendum turn out to be as has been predicted, then we will shortly have in Canada the new Embassy of Ukraine. Just as the election on 4 March 1990, of over one hundred democratic deputies to the Ukrainian parliament changed significantly the lines of communication between Ukraine and Ukrainian communities throughout the world, the establishment of the Embassy of Ukraine in Canada will, let us hope, change for-

ever the relations between Ukraine and Canada and the Ukrainian-Canadian community. We will move into a new realm of what is possible to plan and achieve, into a new commons of relations and activity, very similar to the one that the Jewish and German communities enjoy with their former homelands. To be effective, the Congress will have to consider moving its headquarters to Ottawa. If it fails to do so, it may be relegated to a secondary role that may diminish its effectiveness as voice for the Ukrainian-Canadian community.

Has the time arrived for the UCC to become more politically active? I firmly believe that the answer to this question is yes! To do that the UCC, after moving its headquarters to Ottawa, must give that office the staff and money to carry on a program similar to that of the Canadian Jewish Congress. The administrative office should remain in Winnipeg, in recognition of that city's historic place in the history of Ukrainians in Canada, firstly as the junction terminal for Ukrainian settlers to the West and secondly as the headquarters of the UCC since 1940.

There is a theory that an organization goes through a development stage, during which it is on the upward climb, a levelling off stage, during which the organization reaches the peak of its activity, and then a downward stage that leads the organization to inactivity or complete dissolution. It is my belief that the UCC is still in its development stage, in spite of some premature announcements of its demise. I will explain why I believe that.

In Edmonton in the spring of 1990 at a conference held by the Congress, Professor Bohdan Krawchenko stated that Canada's Department of External Affairs was "the most reactionary" of those of all Western governments regarding the question of developing ties with Ukraine. "We have been highly respectful in our dealing with External Affairs and have achieved little. It is time to get tough and launch a very serious lobby effort," Krawchenko said. The lobby effort was launched on a question of greatest importance to Ukrainian Canadians and Ukraine, namely, the drive for independence and



Staff of the Ukrainian Information Bureau and the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, 1991.

the securing of that independence by Canada's early recognition of it.

In August of this year, the UCC began to move towards this new commons. During a meeting in Edmonton, the Congress urged Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to invite Leonid Kravchuk to visit Canada. More important, the UCC urged the Government of Canada to recognize the independence of Ukraine and to be the first western country to do so. After receiving submissions from the Congress on 30 August 1991, the Prime Minister extended an invitation to Leonid Kravchuk. Within days, the UCC was asked to participate in the work of the External Affairs committee that was to plan the visit of Leonid Kravchuk to Canada.

During those meetings, important negotiations took place, and the UCC stood firm in its demands that the visit be at a high diplo-

matic level, that the Ukrainian flag be flown at all official sites in Ottawa, including the offices of External Affairs, and that the meetings of the Ukrainian delegation be held in suitable forums. At the first meeting of that planning committee, the Ukrainian delegation was represented by Ambassador Gennadi Oudovenko, Ukraine's ambassador to the United Nations. The ambassador publicly thanked the UCC for making possible the visit of Leonid Kravchuk to Canada. He stated that the Ukrainian government was aware of the intervention and efforts of the UCC, and that without the continued determination of the Ukrainian-Canadian community in urging the Government of Canada to establish state-to-state relations, that would have happened slowly or possibly might have happened at all. The lobbying to urge the Government of Canada to recognize Ukraine's

independence did not end with the meeting with the Prime Minister in Edmonton.

Meetings with the then Minister for External Affairs, Barbara MacDougall, took place in Toronto in September and in Ottawa in November. Most of the premiers were asked to lend their support for independence and to urge the Government of Canada to be the first to recognize the independent Ukrainian state.

In taking on this new politically active role, the UCC began to act upon the third main mandate contained in its incorporating documents and thus to move into the new commons. But to buttress that move, the UCC should establish a fully operational office in Kiev. Such an office would serve as the eyes and ears of the Ukrainian-Canadian community. While the Canadian embassy in Ukraine will carry on its mandate in the diplomatic and political fields, the UCC could begin to build and expand relations with community, cultural, educational, and economic groups and organizations.

After more than seventy years of isolation, the people of Ukraine are reaching out for contacts with the rest of the world. The UCC and the Ukrainian-Canadian community should begin to facilitate these contacts for the people of Ukraine. Also, this new commons for the UCC should serve as a vehicle for revitalizing community life in Canada. The UCC, if it takes up the challenge, can ensure for itself and its constituent organizations of a constructive and long-term existence for the good of Canada and Ukraine.

Machiavelli said that nothing is more difficult than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Yet that is precisely what the UCC must do. It must take the lead in moving the Ukrainian-Canadian community and our government into this new commons. John Locke said that new opinions are always suspect or even opposed only because they are not already "common." But to energize and sustain

its activities, the Congress must not be deterred by the faint-hearted or the closed-minded who question whether it has any part to play in developing relations between Canada and Ukraine. German Canadians and Jewish Canadians have no such reservations.

The UCC must lead the community into this new commons, it must become politically active and confident in its added role as a bridge builder for relations between Canada and Ukraine, and it must look into the 1990s and beyond in the formulation of its plans and policies, which will henceforth include the independent state of Ukraine.□



Stella Hryniuk, Alexandra Chyczij, and Lubomyr Luciuk at the launch of Canada's Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity, at the MHSO, Toronto, 1991.

After Words

*The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada**

Mr. Chairman, Archbishops, Members of the Clergy, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen.

I am very pleased to be back in Manitoba and to have this occasion to meet again with the members of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. Just a year ago I was in Edmonton to participate in the opening celebrations of the Centennial of the Ukrainian settlement in Canada—the centennial that marked the century of historic and unlimited contribution by the Ukrainian community to the Canada that they all helped to build.

As Prime Minister, I had just appointed, not so long before, Ray Hnatyshyn, to be Canada's first Governor General of Ukrainian extraction, and I had just appointed John Sopinka to the Supreme Court of Canada making him the first Justice of Ukrainian descent on the Supreme Court.

...I suppose I can tell the story about our esteemed Governor General. I just saw him on TV the other day in Kyiv getting better publicity than me. ...That's not hard, but he did. I can remember when I had him out to Harrington Lake and we were sitting behind the cottage on a sunny day in the afternoon. ...I said "Ray, the Government has decided to appoint you as Governor General of Canada," whereupon his eyes clouded up and became misty, he stopped talking, which for him is a big accomplishment.

And he was obviously overcome, I went inside to get him a glass of water, I came back a couple of minutes later and he was fully composed and he said "Prime Minister, I am sorry for being overcome with emotion, but you have to understand. As you talked, I was thinking how surprised my father would be to see me accepting this job."

And I said "Ray, not half as surprised as

my father would be to find out I offered it." As we were leaving, I said to him "Ray, I will be meeting my Cabinet tomorrow, and I do not want anybody to know about this, I don't want this leaked to all my friends and supporters in the press." I didn't want them to know before the Cabinet.

He was in his car backing away and he looked out the window and said "Well, can I tell anybody?"

And I said "Well, you can tell Gerda [Mrs. Hnatyshyn], but don't tell anybody else."

So he rolled the window up and started to back away and all of a sudden he came back up



The Honourable Ramon Hnatyshyn, Governor General of Canada, 1990.



Mrs. Mary Manko Haskett, the last known survivor of Canada's first national internments, with Lubomyr Luciuk and John Gregorovich in Ottawa, March 1993, Fernando Monte photograph.

again and said "Prime Minister, can I ask you for a favour?"

And I said, "Sure."

He said "If anything happens to me from here to Ottawa, leak this one to the press."

So I remembered then, that your principle concern in Edmonton was what might happen to Ukraine in through its referendum and how Canada might react. And Yuriy Shymko, among others, made a rousing speech in respect of the referendum. The referendum was won by the forces of freedom and I am honoured to say, as Prime Minister, that Canada was the first major government of the world to extend diplomatic recognition to Ukraine. I had received President Krawchuk at 24 Sussex and I told him that Canada would stand by the Ukraine and we have done precisely that every step of the way.

The history of Ukrainian immigrants to this magnificent country is one of hope and of hard work and rich and varied contributions to others as well. I know that some of you remain keenly interested. The problems are ongoing and they

are never resolved overnight. I know that many of you are aware and interested in the issue of redress. Well the Minister of Multiculturalism and Citizenship, the Honourable Gerry Weiner, has met with representatives of the Ukrainian Canadian community, as we seek together, how best to symbolize our recognition of past injustices in Canada. My government remains committed to securing a mutually satisfactory resolution of this matter in a manner which will allow us to reaffirm the common values that we share.

Over one hundred years ago the first Ukrainian settlers made their way to Western Canada. The first of many of tens of thousands from that land chose Canada as their new home. They were followed in their footsteps by thousands of others. And eventually, we have almost a million Canadian citizens, if not more, of Ukrainian heritage.

Many of these settlers came seeking sanctuary from terrible and dehumanizing oppression. Some sought to escape famine, and others to rewrite their future. Others to escape the

limit which society had blindly assigned to them. They shared these motivations with most immigrants to Canada, yet all came to a country that was young and fresh and hopeful. To a country that is still young today. They arrived to find abundant land and natural resources, to learn that many well-established citizens were themselves first generation Canadians. They came to a land and to a society that they would shape as much as they, in turn, would be shaped by it. Here Ukrainian immigrants found what others, escaping poverty and tyranny, also found across this vast land. They found peace and they found promise. One of the enduring qualities of the Canadian society then as now is its openness to newcomers, its support for and defense of the principle of respect of diversity.


Today, not in any token fashion, but in a very significant and a very substantial way that mirrors decades of unremitting contributions by Ukrainians, people of Ukrainian heritage are found at the highest levels of social, political, academic and professional spheres. They with you, have kept a proud heritage alive. Alive and vibrant as a treasure not only for themselves and their children and their grandchildren, but for all Canadians to learn about, to appreciate and to share. Moreover, the principles of freedom and self-determination which were sought and found in Canada generations ago have been reborn in the Ukrainian homeland itself. A homeland with which we have much to share and much to build together.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the triumphant reemergence of the people of Ukraine, your ancestors' hopes and prayers have been realized, your brothers and sisters and cousins are free again, and I say thank God for a free Ukraine. If somebody had told me five years ago that I would meet the Ambassador from free Ukraine in Winnipeg this afternoon, I would say, you know what I would say. What I would have said is my father-in-law is a psychiatrist and maybe I could introduce you to him. ... and it is amazing what has taken place. With the opening earlier this year of a Canadian Embassy in Kyiv, the fruits of your labour here are nurturing that regained in-

dependence. Our ancestor, yours and mine, working together in this country have achieved a spectacular success. Not a small one, not a modest one, a spectacular success.

Now on the eve of the crucial national referendum, the eve of Thanksgiving itself, all of us must ask ourselves, how do we best sustain that success. How do we build together for a better tomorrow. I think that this country more than any other in the world represents as close to the ideal of social harmony that most states strive for, but seldom ever achieve. ...□

**Partial Transcript of Prime Minister Mulroney's Address to the Seventeenth Congress of Ukrainian Canadians Held in Winnipeg, Manitoba, 6-11 October 1992.*



The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada at the Seventeenth Congress of Ukrainian Canadians, Winnipeg, Manitoba, October 1992, UCC Collection.

*His Excellency the Ambassador of Ukraine to Canada, Levko Lukianenko**

....With regard to the methods of work, they depended not only on your old traditions but also on who conducted the meeting and consequently, how it was conducted. In any case, I do not think that Mr. Bilak conducted this meeting in the most democratic way. His response that the ambassador would not participate in the discussion would make sense if we were simply dealing with [Canadian] citizens. Certainly, as an ambassador of Ukraine I cannot participate in the political life of Canada and therefore could not participate in the discussion. Yet, I came here to you as Ukrainians and not merely citizens of Canada. And when you were dealing with the question of the Ukrainian embassy that relates to me directly, I do not think that keeping me away from the discussion was a good choice. Without asking me the chairman announced that I would not participate in the discussion. Of course, in Ukraine with our contemporary understanding of democracy, this would not seem to be a democratic approach.

Yet, for me, the most undemocratic decision was not to allow the young participants from Plast to express their opinion on the statute. It looked like an attempt to freeze this statute and not to give to our youth an opportunity to talk. It is your own internal issue. I am just expressing my opinion as an external observer. However, I feel that I should express my opinion on the issues that are included in my series of responsibilities. ...I passed a statement to the chairman that I would like to explain the policy of Ukraine on these issues [policies that were discussed above in the text]. The chairman, Mr. Bilak, did not give me a chance to talk. I do not think that this is a very democratic method of work. ...I want you to look at each other and notice that the overwhelming majority of you are not young people. Why is


this so? I think we have to care about the continuation of our generation. And how can we do that if there is no youth here? Why are there so few young people? And how could many of them be here if nobody wants to listen to them? When they came with the corrections to the statue, nobody wanted to listen to them. ...And therefore, I would like to think over the following question—how to attract youth into the Ukrainian ranks. How to increase the number of young people here. I cannot suggest all the ways possible, obviously there are many ways, but I can mention just a few that are necessary. The important thing is to ensure rotation of the leadership in different organizations. I would like you to look at the different organizations and to see how many years the leadership is in power. And lastly it is well-known that if the youth does not have any prospects to get into the leading position in the organization, it will leave. ...In order to continue our generation, more people have to go to Ukraine. We have to send children to Ukraine into the higher educational institutes; let the young people meet, get married. More young people have to be invited here. Without any doubt, it would be favourable, in order to keep Ukrainian generation in Canada, to have some degree of Ukrainian immigration from Ukraine. I think that the Congress of Ukrainians in Canada has to put this question before the government. I will appeal to the government on my side as well. We would be able to coordinate this activity and to aim for a quota from the Canadian government. ...Some time ago you had an aim to free Ukraine. This aim created a psychological environment around you. It supported you. Now Ukraine has become independent. It is necessary to develop a different psychological environment based on a new ideology. Earlier the idea was to free

Ukraine from bondage. Now, Ukraine is free. Thus, we need to form a new philosophical basis, more precisely, we need to acknowledge that a portion of Ukrainians live in the old country of our fathers and another portion lives here. It is necessary that we live here as well forever and not assimilate. To this end it is not only necessary to give a philosophical foundation, but also to develop a sociological environment. This will give a theoretical explanation and reinforce communication with Ukraine and cherishing traditions, folksongs and so on here in Canada. ...From this point of view, I thought, your Congress would consider the very important issue of the restructuring of Ukrainian organizations in Canada. You have a whole chain of organizations that need to be reorganized. The League for the Liberation of Ukraine is a good example because Ukraine is already liberated; or the Anti Bolshevik Bloc of

Nations is another example—there are no more Bolsheviks in Ukraine and so forth. Looking forward it is necessary to modify these organizations. Ukraine has been free now for a year, and you have not prepared yourself for a reorganization. This is an expression of the old way of thinking. In order not to lag behind the pace of history, it is necessary to reconsider and reorganize the organizations, so they will carry out the task of consolidating Ukrainians here as a separate ethnic community that will continue its generation forever. ...□

*Excerpts from a speech by His Excellency, Levko Lukianenko, Ambassador of Ukraine to Canada on 11 October 1992 to the Seventeenth Congress of Ukrainian Canadians held in Winnipeg, Manitoba, 6–11 October 1992.

(Translated by Bohdan Tkachenko, MHSO)



His Excellency, Levko Lukianenko, Ambassador of Ukraine receives books from Lubomyr Luciuk, Ottawa, Ontario, September 1992.

The Ukrainian Canadian Congress: Some Thoughts on Its Past, Present, and Future

John B. Gregorovich, LL.M

The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) is a national umbrella organization that regards itself as the only legitimate representative of the Ukrainian-Canadian community. Indeed, since its formation in November 1940, when it was known as the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, the UCC generally has been considered to be the main voice of the organized Ukrainian Canadian community. The UCC comprises roughly forty Ukrainian organizations, some that are deemed to be of national importance, and some that are more regional, provincial, or local. A now insignificant pro-Soviet and pro-communist organization known as the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians—formerly the Ukrainian Labour and Farmer Temple Association, ULFTA—has never belonged to the UCC. Headquartered for historic reasons in Winnipeg, the Congress is structured along provincial lines, with UCC councils of various levels of activity present in most provinces and municipal branches in many cities like Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa, Edmonton, and Saskatoon.

From its inception, the Congress has operated on a veto principle. In other words, on all questions of importance, it has always been agreed that a unanimity must be reached before any action is taken. In effect this has meant that any of the major national organizations, now known as “the Big Five”—that is, the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine (since 1993 the League of Ukrainian Canadians), the Ukrainian National Federation, the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League, Ukrainian Professional and Business Association, and the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics (a former member of what used to be “the Big Six,” namely, the Ukrainian Canadian Veterans’ Association, is no longer active) may block virtually any proposed effort on a “matter of principle.” That power is reflected also in the fact that at present

the “Big Five” essentially appoint all of the officers to the UCC’s national executive, save for the president, who is elected during triennial meetings. Since 1940, these have been held regularly in Winnipeg, with the exception of the second congress, which was held in Toronto in 1946.

Generally speaking, the “Big Five” are able to send more voting delegates to these national assemblies than any other group. Over time they also have worked out delicately defined, if unrecorded, protocols for the sharing of the UCC’s power amongst themselves, and there is no possibility of any significant changes to that order. Thus these five organizations have effectively remained in firm control of the Congress almost from its inception, the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine being added only in the late 1950s, after years of internal wrangling about whether or not these revolutionary nationalists should be admitted. This reluctant inclusion of the League was one of the few significant structural changes that has ever been tolerated, and that just barely, in the UCC’s history. What we may term the “Ukrainian-Canadian Establishment” has otherwise not been open to democratization.

It should be remembered that the original Ukrainian Canadian Committee arose because of internal and external pressures on the Ukrainian Canadian community. In the 1930s, organizations like the Ukrainian National Federation realized that one of the main goals they had set for themselves, namely to persuade the federal government to support the Ukrainian independence movement, could not be realized unless the Ukrainian-Canadian community itself presented a more united front. This point was eventually grasped by the leaders and members of the Ukrainian-Canadian organizations active during the interwar period, with the exception

of the pro-Soviet Ukrainian Labour and Farmer Temple Association. Externally, the outbreak of the Second World War and the desire of the Canadian government to engage the Ukrainian Canadian community in support of the war effort provided yet another motivation for the majority of the Ukrainian-Canadian community to unite. The easiest way for Ottawa to convey its messages to Canada's Ukrainians while securing that community's support for the government's war aims was to work through one central organization. In our era of big government and big bureaucracies, central groupings of organizations are, both implicitly and explicitly, encouraged by government. The Ukrainian-Canadian case appears to have been the first occurrence of this practice in relation to an ethnic minority in Canada.

In the post-Second World War period, two trends shaped what became the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. The first amounted, in some cases, to a hostile takeover of several of the UCC's pre-war constituent organizations by postwar political refugees and émigrés. That is how the Ukrainian National Federation, originally a secular nationalist group that attempted to unite all Ukrainian Canadians in defence of Ukrainian independence, came to be dominated by postwar refugees affiliated with the nationalist movement headed by Colonel Evhen Melnyk. The second was the UCC's deliberate policy of concentrating on internal community relations as opposed to external affairs. The first process, the takeover of organizations by political émigrés, and the concomitant squeezing out of the Canadian Ukrainians that had set up those organizations, arose because these two different groups of Ukrainians—however similar they may have appeared—were really very different. Ukrainians born or raised in Canada could blend rather easily into non-Ukrainian Canadian organizations, and by participating in them they found satisfaction in their lives. The émigrés, in contrast, could not usually adjust as easily to Canadian conditions, often feeling themselves to be strangers in non-Ukrainian organizations, awkward and unwanted. Not surprisingly,

therefore, these émigrés concentrated on winning over some of the established Ukrainian-Canadian organizations, or else they set up their own groups. Eventually, by dint of their organizational vitality, émigrés of both the Bandera and Melnyk nationalist factions took over the Congress. This, in my view, set the Congress back at least two generations in its transformation into a thoroughly Canadianized body. Instead it continued to reflect the worldview and experiences of an essentially transplanted western-Ukrainian underground nationalist network dating back to the 1930s. New organizations that were formed in Canada after 1945, such as Plast or the Ukrainian Youth Association (CYM), also tended to remain fixed firmly in their East European origins, unbendingly opposed to any changes that would reorganize their Ukrainian life in Canada, even though conditions obviously are different here. Although, being youth organizations, they evolved greater flexibility over time, they remained largely unintegrated into the established Ukrainian-Canadian community, until well into the 1970s.


During the last two decades, the UCC has continued to concentrate on internal affairs. Any significant external necessities, like the constitutional hearings of 1980 on bilingual schools, the Deschenes Commission on war criminals, and the campaign for acknowledgement and redress for World War I internment, were all handled for the community by outsiders, even if they were acting formally on behalf of the UCC for appearances' sake. The UCC's efforts outside of the community seem to have been concentrated on staging periodic banquets and concerts, and striving for photo opportunities with politicians, as if these efforts would be sufficient to promote Ukrainian Canadian interests. As a result, the distance has grown between the majority of those said to constitute the Ukrainian Canadian community and those who are sometimes referred to as its official representatives, namely the national UCC executive. Much of this is due to the fact that the image of Ukrainian Canadians projected by the UCC is often rooted in our predecessors'

immigrant experiences. When our spokespersons speak broken English, appear marginal to Canadian thought and society, act as if it is good enough to hang around government tables waiting for scraps, then the reality of contemporary Ukrainian-Canadian life is debased. We must keep in mind that today most members of our community were born in Canada; in fact, the Canadian-born percentage is higher than in any other ethnic group with the exceptions of the French Canadian and native populations. Moreover, our people are increasingly well educated, have a higher than average per capita income, and consistently compete successfully in Canadian society at all levels. People of such accomplishments have no need for an organization that still projects an image of itself that is long outdated and has become counter-productive. The disenchantment of the majority of Ukrainian Canadians with the UCC is obvious in the continuous decline of the number of Ukrainian Canadians under sixty years of age who participate in the triennial congresses of the UCC. The UCC has an aged membership, and it is now, increasingly, the preserve of a constituency of aging immigrants; moreover, there is little apparent prospect for change because there is no impulse for change within the Congress structure itself. As a result, it has and will become increasingly irrelevant to the life of the community and, in time, will probably wither away.

The intriguing questions are what structures will then arise to represent the community and when. There are already some non-UCC organizations performing functions relevant to the needs of the community and responding to serious issues. Immigration, ostensibly part of the UCC's concerns, is in fact handled largely by activists outside the UCC structure, organized as the Canadian Ukrainian Immigrant Aid Society. Questions of civil liberties and human rights have long been taken care of by the Civil Liberties Commission (CLC), a body independent of the UCC executive, organized in 1985 to deal with the war crimes issue and, more recently, responsible for initiating and managing the redress effort. In late 1992 the

CLC became known as the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association.

Aid to Ukraine is increasingly being organized by professionals and business people, many of whom have no Ukrainian ancestry or interests or, even if they are of Ukrainian heritage, are not active in any UCC body. Are these professionals, community activists, and academics likely to conclude that in unity there is strength? Will they eventually form a new Ukrainian Canadian organization truly able and ready to represent their community before the external world? The answer is, obviously, yes. The only unanswered question is when. □



John Gregorovich in a pensive moment, Seventeenth Congress of Ukrainian Canadians, Winnipeg, Manitoba, October 1992.

The Ukrainian Canadian Community at a Historic Turning Point: Its Goals Revisited*

Wsevolod W. Isajiw, University of Toronto, Toronto

Today the Ukrainian Canadian community stands at a turning point: both its adopted homeland—Canada—and its original homeland—Ukraine—are going through profound changes that are not only giving both countries a new character and a new place in history, but will also have a significant influence on the life of the Ukrainian Canadian community for decades to come. However, the events taking place in the two countries—constitutional changes in Canada, changes in the ethnic composition of Canada, changes in Canada's economic and cultural relations with its neighbours, and the independence of Ukraine, and all the political and economic consequences that it implies—are not the only processes that necessitate change in the organized Ukrainian Canadian community. As will be pointed out later, there are a number of other sources of change embedded in the demographic and other sociological processes taking place within the structure and culture of the community itself.

In the face of these events and processes, it is important for the community to revisit and re-examine the goals of its organized life, particularly those of its umbrella organization. Since I was asked to do so, I will talk about the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. But it should be understood that many things said here will also apply to other community institutions and organizations, especially since most of them make up the constituency of the Congress.

Principles

In a discussion of goals, it is important to recognize the principles on which the organization is established and the broader social and political context in which it exists. These principles and context are all well-known to you, but in the whirlpool of new, exciting

events or the day-to-day routine of community life, it is easy to forget them. Hence, a discussion of goals must first revisit these principles.

It is important to keep in mind that organized Ukrainian-Canadian life takes place in a society in which the democratic process governs all major decision making. This implies not only (a) election of representatives by a constituency, but much more. It involves, in addition, (b) a careful adherence to the rules and steps of established democratic procedures as the prime guarantee of justice and well-being in community life, and (c) a perpetual accountability by those in positions of power to those affected by their decisions. True democracy takes seriously the idea that those in authority are there to serve the people rather than for their own privilege, prestige, or aggrandizement. For that reason an inseparable part of the democratic process is (d) vigilance by the subjects of authority. As is well-known by all raised in a democratic system, this vigilance is made possible by the inherent right of free speech, and it necessitates a constant evaluation and criticism of those in authority, regardless of their rank. By the same token, it places an obligation on those who criticise authority to be considered, educated, and rational in their criticism. A purely emotional or pathetic criticism of authority is antithetic to democracy. There are further implications of the democratic process.

The above considerations make it, (e) imperative for all democratic institutions to limit the tenure of positions of authority to clearly designated terms. In most democracies the same person may be elected to the same position of authority for more than one term. Yet, there has been a trend to limit at least the

top positions of authority to not more than two terms. In long-established democracies, there is a widespread feeling among voting constituencies that occupancy of authority positions by the same persons over prolonged periods of time, or "too many" terms of office, may not be beneficial to the community as a whole.

Finally, (f) the process of wielding democratically-mandated power in addition to the regular leadership function typical of all authority positions, involves responding to periodic demands from the constituency. In well-developed democracies, constituencies are expected to make persistent demands on those in power, provided the making of these demands itself follows the rules of democratic procedure. In a democracy, any group of citizens is not only a group of voters, but it is also a potential lobbying group. Full democratic citizenship implies that this right also be exercised.

The first principle underlying the structure of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress is that it represents Canadian Ukrainians and acts on their behalf. That means that it can act on the community's behalf before the Canadian government and before any other Canadian or non-Canadian public or private institution. That does not mean, however, that the UCC makes decisions for all or any of its constituent organizations or associations or for individual Ukrainians. The UCC is a co-ordinating body, and its actions derive from the decisions and consent of its constituent organizations. We can say it is an executive body that carries out decisions made democratically by member organizations. The UCC can only legitimately execute the policies that its member organizations accept collectively. Several other things must be understood clearly.

First, the UCC cannot come under other jurisdictions, and it may not carry out orders that are not those of its constituency. Secondly, the UCC may become a voluntary member of other structures but *only* with the consent of at least two-thirds of its constituent organizations and only if every activity that it undertakes either jointly with, or on behalf of, this other structure

is put to a vote of its entire constituency, its congress.

The reason for making this point is that many ethnic institutions are democratic in name more than in fact. Many of them have heads or executives who are continuously "re-elected" from year to year, often because there are no other candidates or the members are very passive, or any potential opponents become discouraged and withdraw from active participation. As a result, many organizations become either "one-person" or a-few-person shows, that act single-handedly or become authoritarian. A variety of conditions account for such a state of affairs. Among these are a frequent lack of professionalism in organizational activities, lack of resources, a decline of interest among members, manipulation by the leaders to retain top positions, and self-aggrandisement by leaders. Though these conditions are indicative of organizational decay an organization may exist like this state for a long time and may perform functions quite different from those it purports to perform. Let me turn now to more specific UCC activities that constitute or may constitute its goals.

Activities in the Canadian Context

The UCC's activities can be divided into two basic types: (1) those in the Canadian context and (2) those outside of a purely Canadian context. What I want to emphasize here is that the first type of activity is the legitimizing basis for the second type. It must be the starting point for all UCC activities. The success of the activities directed outside of Canada, such as help for various causes in Ukraine or elsewhere, depends on the success of all the work at home. This cannot be over-emphasized. The credibility of any activity undertaken by anybody rests on the credibility of the basis from which this activity derives. Without this basis any undertaking may be only an ephemeral or passing endeavour, usually not taken seriously by serious people. The basis for UCC activities is the mandate that comes from people who are Canadians and can claim

various rights as Canadians. It should be remembered that over 90 per cent of all Ukrainians in Canada were born in Canada. There are also other sociological reasons that make successful community activities a prerequisite for success in activities outside the community. To outsiders the validity of demands presented by any community group depends on whether the community is seen to be well organized and able to keep its own house in order.

Let us look at UCC goals in the Canadian context first. I will discuss here only what I consider to be the most important goals. The constitutional change taking place in Canada at present is a historic process. Whichever way constitutional questions might be decided, Canada will not be exactly the same as it is now. Its structure has been changing and will change even more. That change can be characterized as centrifugal, or away from tight centralization. It is a process that is also taking place, in different forms, in other parts of the

world. Eastern Europe is experiencing this centrifugal type of change deeply. Western Europe in one sense is going through the opposite process, one headed in the centripetal direction. Yet it is already obvious that the new European unity will never be the same as the old traditional centralized states have been. In fact, Western European nations are trying to ensure as much as possible that their new unity will be relatively decentralized. In fact, while centralized government is functionally important, it appears that no one any longer wants highly centralized political structures.

In this process of change, multiculturalism has been playing a significant role. In its twenty-year history in Canada, the policy of multiculturalism has gone through various shifts, but it has persisted in spite of opposition. Some types of opposition to it, particularly the type presented by the Spicer commission report and the two conservative political parties, are actually a sign of success rather than failure.



Members of the Ivan Franko Chytalnia Prosvita, Toronto c 1922, Iwan Boberskyj Collection, UCEC.

That is, they show that multiculturalism has finally reached the mainstream even if the mainstream does not like it. What is, however, interesting to me is that Ukrainians in Canada legitimately can be said to be the original builders of the multicultural policy. The best briefs on the need for this policy were written by Ukrainian students, scholars and politicians, and the pressure of the organized Ukrainian community can be credited to a significant degree for the enactment of the policy. In 1980

about this absence. It is true that many “other” ethnic groups have not been involved in this process either. The new constitutional arrangements, however, actually weaken the emphasis on the multicultural nature of Canadian society, give less protection to ethnic communities, including new immigrants, and provide less protection against discrimination and unequal treatment. It is very important at this time for Ukrainians to reassert their strong support for the idea of equal and fair recognition of all



Kitchener, Ontario, 1935, members of the Ukrainian Hetman (Sitch) Organization, MHSO Collection.

–1981, Ukrainians fought successfully for the incorporation of the idea of multiculturalism into the Charter of Rights. Yet, in the period between Meech Lake and the referendum (1988 to 1992), while Quebec has vigorously fought to incorporate a maximum of rights for itself into the Constitution, and the Native Peoples have achieved concessions from the federal government that it was unwilling to make for the past hundred years, Ukrainians have been virtually absent from the process. One wonders

minority ethnic groups. There has been an attempt to do this, expressed in the group New Visions Canada, which UCC apparently has supported. But this has been a very weak and ineffective movement that has not been able even to get much attention from the media, let alone have a strong influence on the debate.

I think it is important for the UCC to take a definite stand on behalf of multiculturalism in these current constitutional debates. This should be one of the main goals for the UCC’s new

agenda. Furthermore, recent statistics on retention of mother tongues show a sharp decrease since 1986 and 1981 of those reporting Ukrainian as their mother tongue.

While this does not mean that Ukrainians are rapidly losing their identity, it does mean that those institutions in the Ukrainian Canadian community that are concerned with language or identity preservation ought to pay close attention to the cultural processes taking place in the community. We know that in many places the attempts to introduce heritage languages into the regular school curricula have remained, as it were, in limbo. I think the UCC must include among its goals the task of carefully looking into the cultural processes in the Ukrainian community with the idea of supporting institutions or citizens' groups that want to teach their children the language or want to introduce it into regular programs in Canadian schools and those working both to preserve and to change or develop Ukrainian Canadian culture.

Another important issue for Canadian ethnic communities is immigration. Canadian policies on immigration have also been changing. For close to three decades after the end of the post-World War Two Ukrainian immigration to Canada, there was virtually no Ukrainian immigration to this country. The new situation in Eastern Europe, however, has opened new doors to Ukrainian immigrants. These have been primarily Ukrainians from Poland and secondarily Ukrainians from Ukraine. Many of them came as visitors who then asked for refugee status. Many of them, however, met with serious adjustment problems. Services like the provision of information about rights or personal psychological counselling, were available within some immigrant communities but were not available in the Ukrainian community. At present, the pressures to leave Ukraine or Poland are even stronger, but the government has restricted the entry of immigrants to Canada even more. Some problems related to the present and future immigration from Ukraine or Poland derive from the lack of recognition by some influential individuals and organizations, both in Ukraine and the Ukrainian diaspora,

that Ukrainians from Ukraine or elsewhere have a valid and inalienable right to emigrate to Canada, just like any other people in the world.

The UCC must take a serious look at the problem of immigration and develop a reliable and consistent way of persuading the government to make Ukrainian immigrants as acceptable to Canadian government as are other immigrants.

Social welfare for their own people is another important issue that many minority groups see as their own responsibility. Care for the needy, aged, and sick is something that many ethnic groups provide. There are, however, very few organizations in the Ukrainian community that provide these types of services, and even the few that do have not been able to obtain adequate resources from the agencies that normally help with this type of funding, particularly the United Way. Here again, the UCC can be instrumental in exerting pressure both to improve the structures of community institutions that at present provide such help, and to inform the government and charitable agencies of the potential that these community institutions represent for dealing with problems created by Canadian society.

Ethnic organizations often have a style of organization that functions to maintain the originally established leaders in power for as long as possible. The consequence is small generational turnover of leadership or at times virtually no change at all for as long as twenty or thirty years. There is a sociological explanation for this, but there is no time here to go into it. The problem, however, is that this style of organization endangers the continuity of organized community life. Some organization leaders may not care. For them, community organizational life may be wrapped up mostly with their own status, prestige, or fame. The younger generations often readily see this and after a while completely remove themselves from these organizations.

This apparently has been the case with the UCC. In fact, the UCC's own constitution has substantially slowed generational change. It is hence imperative that the UCC democratize its

own constitution and take steps to stimulate generational turnover among other Ukrainian organizations.

I will turn now to the external goals and activities of the UCC. Two of these types of activities have to be distinguished: relations with Ukraine and relations with Ukrainian communities in other countries of the diaspora.

Relations with Ukraine

Today is a historic moment for Ukraine. The newly independent nation is in the process of building its statehood. This is the moment for which many Ukrainians have been waiting for years, indeed centuries. Hence organized contact with Ukraine and activities aimed at helping Ukraine to bring about a democratic, rationally organized society that will guarantee all citizens a fulfilment of their human rights, are of cardinal importance. To assist Ukraine in this process, however, a number of things must first be understood.

(1) There have been two stages in this building of an independent nation: a symbolic stage and a stage of structural change. The symbolic stage refers to the initial marking of independence by means of a visible, emotional, collective expression of approval for the new state of affairs. It is celebratory in nature and involves an abundant display of the new flag, mass rallies, reaffirming speeches, visits and conferences that bring previously separated people together, and the like. The stage of structural change is completely different. It involves changing institutions and staffing them with new, younger people. It involves the transfer of power or decision-making authority to the new institutions and to new, perhaps previously uncommitted groups of people.

In Ukraine the first stage is almost ended; it lasted for about a year. The second stage, however, has hardly begun. It is in its very early period. There seem to be many in the Ukrainian diaspora who feel that the essence of national independence consists of the first, celebratory stage. Yet it is the second stage that is crucial for the establishment of independent statehood, and there are some who have doubts

whether it will proceed far without reversals.

(2) The Ukrainian community in the diaspora has been very willing to offer assistance to Ukraine. This assistance has taken a variety of forms, most of them involving some transfer of resources from here to there: assistance with medications for the Chernobyl victims, collection of books to build up libraries, collection of money to be given to different institutions in Ukraine, computers, sending of skilled personnel, undertaking of business transactions, and others. The delivery of assistance, however, is not necessarily understood in the same way by the people in Ukraine as it is by the people in the diaspora. Each side tends to understand it in terms of the practices in the societies in which they live. Thus, much of the assistance may never reach the targets that those in the diaspora expect it to; it may never get to the people it is expected to help. There is a problem of control and accountability. Many of those to whom assistance is transferred would like the diaspora not to ask any further questions. It is, however, essential that any assistance with resources be given rationally, according to Western standards. Accountability to the donors is essential. Many people from Ukraine have commented to travellers from the diaspora that their aid does not reach them and that "it is often used to support and maintain the old system," meaning the system that existed under the Soviet Union. This is somewhat demoralizing to the general population in Ukraine, since many people there will come to believe that the diaspora supports the old exploitative elite—whom they often label as the "mafia"—and to feel that it is doing little to help bring about real change that would benefit everyone.

(3) A sociological explanation of this phenomenon may be useful. It can be given in terms of one of the most famous theories of social elites, that of Vilfredo Pareto. (The term elite does not refer to an aristocracy, but simply to those who have positions of power, that is, the authority to make decisions that affect the lives of large parts of the population.) All societies are run by elites, according to Pareto, purportedly for the benefit of all in society.

Elites, however, experience cycles. New elites emerge with a strong commitment to ideals of liberty and justice for all and with plans for improving society. As time goes on, the elites become well established, they age, and they begin to be concerned with their own interest, gain, and prestige more than the common good. Pareto calls the first type of elites the "entrepreneurs" and the second, the "rentiers." Over time new, younger elites displace the old ones and the cycle begins again.

The replacement of old elites by new ones takes place particularly in periods of decolonization, when new states emerge and declare their independence. In the twentieth century we have observed this in India, Africa, the Middle East, and other places. The problem with Ukraine is that independence arrived but the elite remained the same. Furthermore, even in the old Soviet system, this was the "rentier"

elite, one that tended to be concerned with its own positions and interests.

It is important to remember that the old system made it very difficult for the average Ukrainian citizen to become part of the elite. This was not a system based on individual achievement. Rather, it was one based on patronage. For this reason it is important that in the new system the process of social mobility be stimulated. In the long run this will be the process that makes democracy meaningful and real to the majority of the population. Hence it is imperative for the diaspora to ensure that the assistance they provide to Ukraine will promote the process of democratization there.

(4) One more point should be made about the UCC's relationship with Ukraine. Currently there is an attempt to subordinate key institutions in the Ukrainian diaspora community under government-sponsored and financed organizations in Ukraine. This may involve making the umbrella body of all organized life of the Ukrainian diaspora, namely the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, an institution whose mandate for decision making would come not from the people of the diaspora but from the government of Ukraine. As was pointed out before, the structure of the UCC and, by the same token, of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians is final. They are coordinating bodies, and their mandate must come only from the people of the diaspora. This type of change would be harmful to both the diaspora and Ukraine. In the contemporary world, the most fruitful type of co-operation is one in which the participating parties are independent entities.

Relations with Other Countries: Ukrainians in Former Yugoslavia

This is a large topic worthy of more attention than I can give it here. The UCC must keep informed about changes taking place among Ukrainians in other countries but in particular about Ukrainians in East European countries outside Ukraine. Of most urgent importance are the former Yugoslavia and the brutalization and expulsion of Ukrainian com-



Sheena Kalevig, Ukrainian Maky Dancers, Folklore '92, Kingston, Ontario, June 1992.

munities there. Ukrainians and Rusyns have constituted a minority of about 40,000 people in former Yugoslavia.

Since the beginning of hostilities in mid-1991 until March 1992, 747 of them were killed or executed, 592 put into concentration camps, 682 were tortured, abused, or otherwise maltreated, 900 disappeared without a trace and 4,551 were banished from their homes. In other words, 7,472 persons or about 20 per cent of the total Ukrainian and Rusyn population in the former Yugoslavia were denied their basic human rights. This is a conservative number and by early 1993 this number can be estimated to have multiplied by at least three times. As is well known, the existing international mechanisms have done nothing to prevent mass killings and forcible deportations of minorities and very little to safeguard other human rights. (*The Protection of Minorities*, brief submitted to the United Nations by the World Congress of Free Ukrainians on the occasion of the UN Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, June 1993.)

The Canadian government has promised to accept a certain number of refugees from the former Yugoslavia. It is essential that the UCC lobby the Canadian government and work with it closely in order to enable Ukrainian refugees from this devastated region to come to Canada. It would also be very useful to create a special commission to visit the refugee camps in former Yugoslavia and neighbouring countries to obtain first-hand knowledge of conditions there and find out what can be done to assist the resettlement of the refugees. This is something that must not wait. For many refugees it is a matter of life and death. About forty years ago, the UCC accomplished much in helping the Ukrainian Displaced Persons in Europe. It is imperative that the UCC show as much concern and resolve today.

Conclusion

From now on UCC work must take a professional route. As much of its work as possible should be professionalized. This does not mean that volunteers need be excluded, but they must take a secondary place to, and be directed by,

professionals. Furthermore, there must be a re-emphasis on the democratic process. The UCC must democratize its own constitution and practices and insist that other Ukrainian institutions and organizations, including those in Ukraine, behave in a democratic way. An essential feature of all the UCC's work must be accountability to the Ukrainian community in Canada. This includes all UCC officers and their activities, and all UCC committees. The UCC must also insist on accountability from those who receive its support and the support of any other Ukrainian organization. It is only just that all donors be given a clear picture of the uses to which their donations are being put.

UCC's commitment of resources should no longer be for purely symbolic causes, such as monuments, anniversary celebrations, and commemorations. Rather, resources should be committed to permanent projects that produce continuous activities and results, for example, endowments of institutions whose works result in books, films, educational activities, community health and welfare activities, and the like. The commissioning of new and original works of art, including compositions, films, and plays, would also contribute to the future well-being of Ukrainian and Canadian culture.

The UCC has had a very good record of standing up for the Ukrainian language and culture in Canada. Among ethnic groups, Ukrainians were leaders in the early multiculturalism movement and have done their part to help other ethnocultural groups. It is time for the UCC to rejuvenate and reinvigorate itself and to take a leadership role again among other established ethnic groups in Canada. □

*A revised version of a paper presented at the Seventeenth Congress of Ukrainian Canadians, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 9 October 1992.

Multicultural History of Ontario
43 Queen's Park Crescent East
Toronto Ontario M5S 2C3

ISBN 0-919045-63-4