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U K R A I N E



AND THE

SECOND

WORLD WAR

*"Certain aspects and details of World War II
either not yet fully known or misunderstood"*

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H. J. J. J. J.*

**UKRAINE
AND THE
SECOND WORLD WAR**



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INTRODUCTION

Forty-five years have passed since the end of the Second World War. Volumes have been printed and published about that War, which brought upon mankind, and the Europeans in particular, innumerable sacrifices in human lives and immeasurable losses including billions upon billions of dollars of material goods. Yet, there still are today certain aspects and some details of that War either not yet fully known or misunderstood.

Because of the immense Soviet-Russian propaganda machine, the truth about the role of the Ukrainian people in the struggle has been either suppressed or distorted to serve the ends of the Kremlin's policies. The very purpose of this short essay is to clarify some details of that struggle, which might seem unimportant for some students of the Second World War, who mistakenly think that they've adopted a global approach. However, these details are of great importance for those who sacrificed of themselves and gave their lives to testify to the ideals for which they lived, fought and died, whether on the battlefields or in prisons and concentration camps. The author of this brief essay wants to honor the memory of those who struggled against the Nazis and the Soviet Russians to make Ukraine a free country.

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N. L. Fr.—Chirovsky

CHAPTER 1

THE PRE-WAR MANUEVERS

From the very beginning, the Nazi movement with its leader, A. Hitler and his top associates, R. Hess, H. Goering, J. Goebels and others, was obsessed with the idea of bloody revenge on the Western Allies for the German defeat in the First World War. In addition, the movement was obsessed with the German domination of Europe as a direct result of that revenge. One can easily detect that *Leitmotif* by reading Hitler's *Mein Kampf*.¹ Hence, since Hitler became the Chancellor of the German Reich in 1933, the Nazis were preparing themselves for an aggressive war, politically, militarily, economically and psychologically on both domestic and foreign fronts. The rearmament of post-Versailles Germany, the annexation of the Saar Land, the militarization of the Rhine Land, the annexation of Austria and then, of the Sudeten Land, were the milestones of that German march on Europe between 1933 and 1939, by which Hitler, applying ruthlessness and mendacity, actually "got away with murder." Western politicians showed lack of understanding and unforgivable weakness in dealing with Hitler and his aggressive moves. One should have expected more foresight from the Western statesmen, such as the British Chamberlain or the French Daladier dealing with such an international adventurer as Adolf Hitler. They were indirectly guilty of collaboration with the Nazis. The Western weakness and naivete in fact assisted Hitler in readying the Holocaust of the Second World War. The West was guilty by association.

One can well visualize the return of N. Chamberlain to London from the notorious Munich meetings where he actually surrendered Czechoslovakia to Hitler's mercy. Chamberlain threw Czechoslovakia like a lamb to the lion, as a price for gaining or saving a "permanent peace" in Europe. This was, at least, what he claimed to have achieved. A year later, a war was raging in Europe.

One cannot dismiss the thought of an analogy of the post WW II time of the 1960's and 1970's, to the past. The attitude of the West toward the equally aggressive and mendacious Red Russia was featured by the same shortsightedness and naivete that existed in the 1930's with respect to Nazi Germany, inviting disaster. In these two decades the Russians were slicing one peace of the Free World after another. Actually, President Reagan was the first Western leader who called the Soviet leaders by their right names and adopted the correct attitude toward them; namely, talking with them from the position of strength. Only W. Churchill openly criticized N. Chamberlain in 1938 for selling out Europe to the Nazis, but nobody listened to him at that time.

When Hitler pushed his cause already too far politically and diplomatically, he was prepared for war aggression, but not on two fronts. While Hitler was ready to attack Poland and take into account the intervention of England and France, which gave Poland some kind of guarantees, he was not sure what the Russian reaction would be. Hence, in August 1939 the drama of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was staged. Its pre-history was very interesting.

On the other hand, from the victorious October Revolution of the Russian Bolsheviks under Lenin's leadership, with his associates, L. Trotsky, J. Stalin, G. Zinoviev, and others, the new Red Russia was committed to and obsessed by the idea of spreading communism throughout the world by means of Russian bayonettes. Yet, very soon the priorities were reshuffled by Moscow. At first it seemed that Moscow intended to spread communism by using Russian might in the world. Then in the 1930's and 1940's, it was the insatiable imperialist Russian drive for world domination which used communism as a tool to confuse peoples and issues as well. Theoretically having adopted Marxian doctrine, Moscow chose only some of its ideas as very useful tools for its aggressive plans. According to that doctrine, capitalism was doomed to fail. It survived only because of its political power, which may be destroyed by subversion and war only. One can clearly see these assumptions by reading Marx's *The Capital* and Lenin's *Imperialism As a Higher State of Capitalism* and his instructions to the Red Revolutionaries in his short work, *What Should be Done?*²

The dedication of Moscow to its mission of world domination by means of communist propaganda and subversion became much more aggressive than that of the Tsars. Lies and deceptions were broadly used by the Reds. Ukraine, Byeloruthenia, Gruzia, Azerbeidzhan and other nations, who succeeded in asserting themselves on the ruins of the Tsarist Empire between 1917 and 1921 became the first victims of that Red Russian imperialist drive. In 1923 the Soviet Union was officially established as a supposedly federative state of "sovereign" Union Republics. In fact, the name was a disguise for a new centralist Red Russian Empire, ruled by the iron hand of Moscow. Here, only Russian national interests were valid while the Non-Russian "Union Republics" of Ukraine, Byeloruthenia, Gruzia, Azerbeidzhan, Uzbek, Kazakhstan and others became only administrative districts of the Empire.³

In any case, Lenin and his cohorts succeeded in creating a broad basis for a further drive for world conquest.

Both powers, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia soon recognized their own true faces and natures. Both were planning conquests in Europe and other parts of the world, although their goals and ends were diametrically opposed. Hitler promoted the domination of Europe and the creation of a "One Thousand-Year Reich" through the German "superior race" and Nazi ideology. Ruling the

“inferior” European peoples or destroying some of them, such as the Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, Hungarians and Rumanians completely, through genocide, to make Europe racially “Nordic and pure,” was the objective. These plans were formed by the Nazi political “brain trust” and put to work already before and during the Second World War.

Stalin, promoting international communist ideology, planned to dominate the world through the “superior Russian people,” as he called them in his speech in May 1945.⁴

Ideologically and by their ultimate political ends, the German Nazis and the Russian Reds, at first, hopelessly collided. Moscow exterminated the so-called Volga Germans as potential enemies, while Hitler liquidated or put German Communist activists in prisons and concentration camps. Hitler also blamed Jews for being communists and communist sympathizers and initiated the first waves of persecution of the Jewish population, specifically the Jewish intellectuals. The Germans and Russians collided on the international scene and called each other debasing names. They hated each other at first and promised to annihilate each other for good. To see this, one need only to read the speeches of Hitler and Stalin, as well as those of other Nazi and Red dignitaries, such as Goering, Goebels, Litvinov or Kalinin between 1933 and 1938.

However, the year 1939 came. Not only was Hitler prepared for a major war adventure, but was even forced to start it, driven by his irresponsible Nazi movement, which, in order to grow, had to show forward drive and success. Otherwise, it could easily fall apart and fail. He did not dare to challenge, however, the Western Allies and the U.S.S.R. at the same time, as pointed out. In this way one of the most terrible schemes of world politics was plotted, which unfolded the Holocaust of the Second World War, as mentioned.

The untempered aggressiveness of Hitler toward Poland since the beginning of 1939, finally sobered up London and Paris. Hitler visibly did not plan to keep his promises, given in Munich, and the British and French governments had to give up their pleasant dream of prolonged peace. Hence, the English and French diplomatic delegations were sent to Moscow to negotiate some kind of political arrangement with Moscow that would condemn the mad Nazi drive to start a new war.⁵

The Kremlin then showed its true mendacious self. While delaying the talks with the Western delegations for days and days, the Kremlin was secretly negotiating with the Nazi delegation to conspire against world peace. When everything was ironed out, all of a sudden, to everybody’s surprise, J. von Ribbentrop, Nazi Minister of Foreign Affairs showed up in Moscow and in a matter of hours the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed. Stalin, by signing the notorious Pact, gave Hitler the green light to start war against Poland.

England and France soon had to join Poland because of earlier political commitments. Of course, the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939 aggravated the situation of England and France. They were certainly not yet ready for a war.⁶

Hitler was now assured that the U.S.S.R. would not spoil his war scheme; that he might attack Poland and fight against England and France on the Western front, while his eastern borders would be safe and the second front would not unfold. Stalin offered Hitler tremendous economic assistance in the form of massive food and raw material supplies to support his war machine and war operations. Therefore, in addition to making the eastern border safe, Russia's actions enabled the Nazis to effectively overcome whatever economic difficulties might have arisen from the sudden transition of their economy from peace to war. According to the agreement, Germany was, on the other hand, ready to assist the U.S.S.R. economy with industrial supplies and technological know-how.

The outbreak of the Second World War was an "ideological" and political golden opportunity for Russians to realize their plans. A war between Germany, on the one hand, and Poland, France and England, on the other, was for them a typical "capitalist war." They regarded Nazi Germany as a "capitalist bourgeois" country, as well. That capitalist war was supposed, according the Marxist interpretation, to bleed the "capitalists" to the utmost. This would disorganize and destroy their political and economic power, and render them ripe for a communist revolution and communist take-over under complete Soviet control. That was what the Kremlin hoped for.

The Non-Aggression Pact gave Hitler, according to his calculations, a needed "breathing spell" during which he could militarily knock out the Western Allies, and then turn his cohorts against his arch-enemy, the Reds, the Soviet Union.

No matter what Moscow's plans and calculations were, the Soviet-German political, military, and economic cooperation, made Stalin and his associates the first utmost Nazi "collaborators." They were partially responsible for the outbreak of war, the massive war destruction, the millions of deaths and injuries, the Jewish Holocaust, the Nazi exploitation and plunder of conquered lands, and the immeasurable suffering of millions and millions of innocent peoples, particularly in Europe. Without the disastrous Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact all this would most probably not have happened.

To complete the picture of the pre-war maneuvers, it must be mentioned that the establishment of the so-called Berlin-Rome-Tokyo alliance of the three belligerent nations of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and imperialist Japan, in the middle of the 1930's only enhanced their war-like moods. Soviet Russia simply added fuel to the fire which would soon be consuming the world for four solid years.

FOOTNOTES

¹ A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Berlin, 1937.

² K. Marx, *Capital*, London, Vols I-III 1960, N. Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, New York, 1939; the same, *Chto Dielai*, 1902.

³ W. Loucks and W. Whitney, *Comparative Economic Systems*, New York, 1969, pp. 373-390.

⁴ Stalin's Toast to praise the Russian people as the most outstanding from all peoples of the Soviet Union, May, 25, 1945.

⁵ The Soviet-German Non Aggression Pact: D. Treadgold, *Twentieth Century Russia*, Chicago, 1964, pp. 335-338; N. Riazanovsky, *A History of Russia*, New York, 1969 pp. 564-574.

⁶ Ideological and otherwise controversies between Communism and Fascism (Nazism): W. Ebenstein, *Today's Isms*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1973 pp. 1-43 and 110-127; about the dedication to a world revolution; Loucks, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-153.

CHAPTER 2

THE FIRST NAZI COLLABORATORS: STALIN, MOLOTOV AND CO.

The major matter of fact has been stated above: without the Kremlin's signing of the Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, 1939, Hitler would never have dared to attack Poland a few days later. The Second World War might have been avoided. The fate of Europe might have been entirely different in the years to come, were it not for the Russian political mendacity. The notorious Russian collaboration with the Nazis constituted moral and material support of Hitler's aggressiveness.

Let us quote some excerpts from Molotov's speech to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on October 31st, 1939, to fully comprehend that Russian insincerity. "Instead of enmity which was fostered in every way by certain European powers, we now have rapprochement and the establishment of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany," he said, directly referring to France and England as the instigators of the supposed hostility between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. He called France and England "Aggressors and imperialists," and Poland — "an ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty," while attacking the U.S. for "mixing in the affairs of none of its concern." Molotov strictly repeated Hitler's arguments. Then he added that the Soviet Union could live peacefully with a country of another ideological background and insincerely pointed out that Germany suffered most during the First World War, and that the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact would help Germany "to break the fetters of the Versailles Treaty." Finally, he concluded, that if England and France want to fight against Germany, they may do it, but without the Soviet Union. Today, from an historical perspective of almost fifty years, one can only wonder about the duplicity and shortsightedness of the Kremlin leaders.¹

In reality, the Non-Aggression Pact evolved into a Russian-German Alliance hurling the World into a war, as *The New Republic* stated in its article of September 6, 1939.²

On August 28, *Time* was still writing rather hopefully, that Stalin and Hitler both want peace, and that only "Russia, and her raw materials, and Germany, and her industries, make an economic combination to put the squeeze directly on Poland."³ Already on October 11, 1939 however, *The New Republic* directly accused the Soviet Union of Communist imperialism in alliance with that of the Nazi one, having resulted in their partition of Poland.⁴

However, not less important was the collaboration of the Soviet Union and



Molotov, the Nazi collaborator, shakes hands with Ribbentrop, surrounded by his Nazi friends.

its leaders with the Nazis in the economic sector. Actually, the Non-Aggression Pact in the economic sense was preceded by a Trade Agreement between these two powers on August 19, 1939, which was already an ominous sign, not properly evaluated by the West at that time, and then supplemented by another Commercial Agreement of February 11, 1940. All three treaties actually made Germany and Russia close allies.⁵

The Agreement of August 19 extended to the Soviet Union a 200 million *Reichsmark* credit to purchase industrial products (machinery, industrial installations, machine tools and other goods) in Germany, repayable in Soviet raw materials (grain, lumber, cotton, oil cake, phosphate, platinum, furs, petroleum, and other goods). The total movement of goods envisaged by the Agreement might have reached 1 million *Reichsmark*.

The supplementary Agreement of February 11, 1940 foresaw Soviet deliveries to support the Nazi war machine with up to 500 million *Reichsmark* in the first twelve months, in addition to the deliveries as agreed upon in August of the previous year. The most important raw materials to be supplied by the U.S.S.R. to Germany were as follows:

1,000,000 tons of grain for cattle, and of legumes, in the amount of 120 million Reichsmarks.

900,000 tons of mineral oil in the amount of approximately 115 million Reichsmarks.

100,000 tons of cotton in the amount of approximately 90 million Reichsmarks.

500,000 tons of phosphates.

100,000 tons of chrome ores.

500,000 tons of iron ore.

300,000 tons of scrap iron and pig iron.

2,400 kg of platinum.

Manganese ore metals, lumber, and numerous other raw materials.

. . . Stalin also promised to purchase raw materials in third countries for Germany. ⁶

Hundreds of thousands of carloads of shipments, of raw materials and semi-fabricates faithfully supplied by Soviet-Russia to support the Nazi war efforts, morally strengthened Hitler's position domestically. At the same time, those Russian supplies certainly contributed a great deal to the speedy and successful invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark, and the Nazi victory over and conquest of France and the glaring defeat of the British on the continent, including the massacre at Dunkirk, as well.

The Russians were faithful German collaborators and allies to the very day of the Nazi invasion of the U.S.S.R. on the 22nd of June 1941. Ready cargo trains, loaded with grain, raw materials and other items, to be shipped to Germany, were captured by the German armies, advancing to the East.

It seems, after a thorough evaluation of the Kremlin's role in the pre-war maneuvers, aimed at provoking the outbreak of the war, that Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin and other members of the Politbureau of that time, should have been seated along with Goering, Hess, Keitel and the other leaders of the Third Reich at the Nuremberg Trial as war criminals. That would have meant real international justice. Russians being present as the judges, seems at least a little off color. And subsequent Soviet hunting for Nazi collaborators and war criminals represents, in fact, a most flagrant form of mendacity. By spreading misinformation and distorting the facts as recently as the 1980's, the Soviet *KGB* is trying to shift the accusations of Nazi collaborations onto others in order to cover up their own Soviet war crimes.

FOOTNOTES

¹ *Russia and the War*, Molotov's Speech to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, October 31st, 1939, Modern Books LTD, London, E.L. 1, 8/11/39, pp. 3-9.

² "Non-Aggression — or Alliance," *The New Republic*, September 6, 1939, p. 121.

³ *Time*, August 28, 1939, Vol. XXXIV, Number 9, p. 20.

⁴ "Communist Imperialism," *The New Republic*, October 11, 1939, pp. 257-258.

⁵ J. Grenville, *The Major International Treaties 1914-1973*, A History and Guide with texts, New York, 1974, pp. 194-195.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 200-201.

CHAPTER 3

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The war began on September 1, 1939 with a global German air attack and the German armies crossing the Polish borders without a formal declaration of hostilities. Later on, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Yugoslavia, and Russia were attacked in approximately the same way and manner. The suddenness of the attack was part of the German "Blitzkrieg" operational technique.

The cause of the war was not hard to trace and identify. The leaders of the aggressive powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan frequently talked about the "haves" and the "have-nots," referring here to the Western nations as those who had colonies, resources and expansion opportunities, and to themselves as those who did not. Hence, the motivation of the totalitarian nations was economic, that is, the conquest of "Lebensraum" (living space). The imperialistic slogans of building a "Great Germany," "One Thousand-Year Reich," or "Great Italy" added romanticism and enthusiasm to the whole emotional issue. The small countries, attacked by the Axis powers, defended themselves against annihilation. Russian-Soviet motivation was already indicated: the Bolsheviks wanted to provoke war among various "capitalist" nations to create chaos which would permit the communization of the world under Russian leadership. England and France wanted to protect their own interests within the framework of the "Old Order." The United States wanted to protect the world from totalitarianism, although the West-Soviet alliance was an "unholy" thing in itself. With the help of the aggressive and equally totalitarian Soviet Union, the Allies planned to protect the community of nations against totalitarianism and to establish peace with the assistance of the same Kremlin which had made possible the Second World War by associating itself with the Berlin-Rome Axis.

During the first twelve months of the German-Russian alliance of the Second World War, the U.S.S.R. made very significant progress in advancing socialism and Russian imperialism. On September 17th, the Red Army crossed the Polish border, and according to the secret arrangement with Hitler, Russia participated in another partition of Poland. Without a declaration of war, large areas of West Byeloruthenia and West Ukraine, under temporary Polish administration, were snatched away and occupied by Moscow. Then, the Russians held rigged elections to "legalize" the respective incorporation of those provinces into the Byeloruthenian SSR and Ukrainian SSR. As part of the Nazi-Soviet blueprint for Europe, in November, the Bolsheviks launched a war against Finland, whose borders were supposedly too close to Leningrad and thus produced a Russian



Stepan Bandera, Leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, assassinated by Soviet agent in 1959.

feeling of insecurity. Soviet-Russian aggression against Finland outraged the Western powers, but it did not teach them anything. A few months later, out of political expediency, they allied themselves with the Soviet Union.

The war against Finland was short. It proved clearly, the military deficiencies of the Red army, but the Russians won by sheer manpower. As a result, Russia annexed some 16,000 square miles of Finnish territory and established the so-called Karelio-Finnish SSR. To rectify the shortcomings of the Red army revealed by this war, Moscow immediately undertook a feverish military reorganization.

In 1940, Soviet-Russia invaded the three Baltic Republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, to open a "Wider Window" to the West along the imperialistic plans once launched by Ivan the Terrible and completed by Peter the Great. At first, pacts of friendship were offered to the Baltic nations. But soon, in the summer, having taken advantage of the turmoil, Moscow invaded and annexed the three countries, as three more Soviet Socialist Republics. At about the same time, an ultimatum was presented to Rumania, and subsequently the Soviet troops occupied Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, populated in most part by Ukrainians, and under Rumanian rule since the First World War.

All these conquests enlarged the Soviet-Russian empire by some 170,000 square miles and brought about 22,000,000 more people under its control. Soviet Russia reclaimed the area as once having been under the rule of the Czars, and by so doing, the Bolsheviks proved to be worthy of the Russian imperialist tradition.

Meanwhile, Germany penetrated the Balkan lands, much to Russia's concern. As Poland was partitioned, the Baltic states were absorbed by the U.S.S.R., and Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria came under predominantly German influence, both totalitarian states, Bolshevik Russia and Nazi Germany, faced each other with mutual suspicion. An armed conflict seemed inevitable. Italy's aggression in Albania only aggravated the situation.

Nevertheless, during the German operations in the West, which included the invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, and the occupation of Norway and Denmark, the Russian Bolsheviks faithfully lived up to their friendship commitments toward Hitler. They supplied his war machine with food and agricultural raw material up to the very day of the Nazi surprise assault upon the U.S.S.R., as it was pointed out above. The German penetration of the Balkans agitated Moscow, but did not produce any breakdown of the Russian-German "friendship." The Russians were careful not to antagonize Hitler at the peak of his power. The only advantage the Russians had from the German entanglement in the West was the Soviet territorial acquisitions in the Baltic Area and in Rumania.

In November 1940, Molotov, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, was called to Berlin to straighten out the mountainous difficulties between the two governments. He was told, among other things, to curtail the Soviet-Russian



Yaroslav Stetsko, Prime Minister of Ukrainian Government in 1941. Present Head of OUN and President of the Anti-bolshevik Bloc of Nations.

territorial appetites and to agree to the newly planned aggressive German moves. The situation changed from bad to worse. In April 1941, Germany conquered Yugoslavia, subsequently, Greece, and an invasion of Crete followed. The Soviet leaders now knew that they would not see the "capitalist" world bleeding to death as a result of its own imperialistic wars without having involved themselves. They reorganized internally in a feverish attempt to be ready for the German attack. In order to remove the menace of two fronts, seven thousand miles apart, in Europe and in the Far East, they concluded on April 13, 1941, a non-aggression pact with Japan.

On June 22, 1941, Hitler ordered his cohorts to cross the borders of the U.S.S.R. Why did he attack the Soviet Union before he finished the war in the West? The invasion of Great Britain was too big a job at the time. He hoped to bring the Russians quickly to their knees, before they could successfully reorganize and fully mobilize their military strength, and thus induce Great Britain to sue for peace. This was proven by the mysterious mission of Rudolph Hess to England in May of that year. He suggested that England be given complete control over the British Commonwealth, Germany be given a free hand in Europe, and the U.S.S.R. be confined to Asia. Hess' mission failed; Hitler's long run calculations also failed.

During 1941, the Germans achieved one victory after another over the Russians. The German troops reached the suburbs of Leningrad, took Minsk, Smolensk, Kyiv, the Perekop Isthmus, and for a while, even Rostov. Moscow, itself, was seriously threatened. Millions of prisoners were taken by the Germans, mainly non-Russians. Hoping that Hitler would free them from the Russian-Communist oppression, they threw down their arms and refused to fight. In the Baltic lands, in Byeloruthenia and Ukraine, the German troops were hailed as liberators until bitter disillusion set in.

After having suffered some military set-backs during the winter months, being poorly clad and sometimes poorly supplied, the Germans again achieved substantial gains in 1942. In their advance, they recaptured Rostov, took Voronezh, reached the banks of the Volga and the city of Stalingrad. They approached the Caucasus, fully occupied the Crimean Peninsula, and continued to hold their positions in the North by threatening Moscow and Leningrad. The siege of Stalingrad began in the Fall of 1942.¹

German rule in the conquered East European areas soon became anything but a liberation of the non-Russian nationalities from Russian oppression. Hitler was too sure of himself. He thought Soviet-Russia to be as good as defeated. Hence, he did not deem it expedient to gain the friendship of the Ukrainians, Byeloruthenians, Crimean Tartars, the Balts, and other peoples. Immediately, he began to procure the *Lebensraum* (living space) for the German nation by the extermination and genocide of the Slavic East European nationalities for which



Ivan Klymiw-Legenda, National Leader of OUN, murdered by German Gestapo, December 4, 1942, in Lviv, Western Ukraine.

the Germans always had contempt. Of course, the Hungarians who were not Germanic or Nordic, were included in the Nazi scheme. German atrocities of mass murder and execution, extermination in concentration camps, turning the local population over to forced labor, and the insane genocide of the Jews, soon proved to those East European peoples that the Germans did not bring to them a liberation from Russian-Soviet imperialism, but a new German-Nazi yoke. A large-scale resistance and insurgent movement flared up throughout East Europe, fighting against the German occupational forces and the Bolshevik guerrilla raiders, who were roaming in the forests and inaccessible countryside. The struggle was most determined and merciless. The Germans and the Bolshevik guerrilla fighters, both representing two different imperialist interests, had no mercy for the non-Russian insurgents, and the insurgents repaid the invaders in kind.

The most determined, best organized, and probably the largest was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A.), which at its peak reached almost 200,000 men.²

In January 1943, the Germans were hurled back from Stalingrad, the turning point of the Soviet-German war. From that point on, the victorious march of the

German troops became a tragic defeat and retreat. Meanwhile, the Western Allies scored successes in Africa. The United States had developed its striking power. The bombing of Germany began. Hence, Germany soon had to fight on several fronts. The job was too big and the Germans became weaker from day to day on all fronts.

The turn of the tide in favor of the Russians in the East was largely due to a tremendous Allied military and economic assistance, mostly in the form of Lend-Lease. The Russians received some 17 billion dollars worth of the Lend-Lease supplies, over 11 billion from the U.S. alone. At Stalingrad, for example, the Soviet soldiers ate American food, fought with American weapons and ammunition, and drove American tanks. The Soviet planned collective economy was unable to support its defense demands, and it was on this that Hitler largely counted, having left out of his calculations the possibility of American material assistance to the U.S.S.R.

During 1943, the Soviet armies were pushing hard and steadily to the West. The German armies retreated, applying a policy of "scorched earth." Industrial establishments were either dismantled or dynamited; agricultural equipment was demolished. A desert was left behind. Orel, Bielgorod, and Kharkiv were taken by the Red army. By the very fall, the Russians were already back in Smolensk, Kyiv, and Zaporozhe, along the river Dnieper. Then, they pushed across the river toward Kryvyi Rih, Zhytomyr and Korosten, and reached West Ukraine. In 1944, the Red Army advanced toward Poland, Leningrad was freed from the German siege, the Crimean Peninsula reconquered. The groundwork for an attack on Hungary and Rumania was laid. In January 1945, the Russian troops began to invade East Prussia. Obviously, the Allied invasion in Normandy in June 1944, and their rapid advance in France toward the river Rhine and the German border, aided the Russians in their march on Berlin. The Russians even set up a Committee of Free Germany, the embryo of the future German Communist Government.

With the German military breaking down on all fronts in 1943, Hitler was induced to revise his policies toward the conquered, and to initiate the organization of anti-communist armies of Russians, Ukrainians, Don-Cossacks, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and other nationalities. The Russian Army of Liberation was put under the command of General Vlasov, and recruited from war prisoners and other volunteers. However, Vlasov did not enjoy the confidence of Hitler, and his anti-communist attitude and military strength were not really put to the test. At the end of the war, Vlasov went over to the Czechs, then he was imprisoned and executed by Moscow as a traitor. The Ukrainian Division "Galicia" was also organized and fought in a series of battles against the Soviet-Russians. After the war, many members of the formation went over to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army or were taken prisoners by the British, and subsequently released and allowed to emigrate to various overseas countries. The



The building of the Cultural Society Enlightenment in Lviv where the Proclamation of Ukrainian Independence was issued on June 30, 1941.

Allies did not consider the soldiers of the Ukrainian Division as traitors of the Soviet Union, as Vlasov's men were, but as anti-communist and national freedom fighters. Above all, they were not Russians. Obviously, Moscow did not like that interpretation, and the whole matter aggravated the Soviet-Western relations. Other nationalities also agreed to organize units of anti-communist armies as well.³

The whole plan did not help Hitler stop the advance of the Red army. It was poorly timed. It came after all East Europeans were already gravely disappointed in, and deeply hated, the Nazis.

In the fall of 1944, most of East Europe was again nominally under the rule of the Russian Bolsheviks, while behind their lines large areas were held by the insurgents.


The Second World War was nearing its end. The Allies were holding important international conferences to decide the future of Germany and to outline the post-war order and reconstruction. At Casablanca, Roosevelt and Churchill established the principle of unconditional German surrender. At Teheran, in November, 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin ironed out disagreements and knitted more closely their cooperation. At Yalta, in February, 1945, the Big Three set up the principles of the reconstruction of the post-war world, according to which all countries conquered by the Germans should be freed and their sovereignty restored. The idea of the United Nations Organization was defined. In fact, however, at Yalta, East Europe was sold out by the West to Soviet Russia, since it agreed to the Russian military occupation of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. The Russians, once there, set up Red regimes, and turned them into their own communist satellites. Furthermore, in Yalta, Stalin promised to declare war on Japan ninety days after the capitulation of Nazi Germany, and in return for this, Russia was assured the restoration of her rights in Asia from prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, including the Russian annexation of the Kuril Islands.

Soviet-Russian imperialism had grown out of proportion once the German threat had faded. Russian influences and territorial claims in Europe and Asia outgrew the Tsarist imperialist plans, and even the keenest Tsarist political dreams.

Between April 17 and May 2, 1945, the Battle of Berlin was fought by the Soviet-Russian troops and Berlin surrendered. On May 7, Germany capitulated unconditionally. From July 17 to August 2 the Potsdam conference was held to put the finishing touches on the new political constellation. Mutual suspicion among the Allies was already rapidly growing. The Russians did not live up to their international commitments, having established themselves permanently in Eastern Europe. The United States, in turn, decided to cut the Lend-Lease assistance to Russia after the fall of Germany. A four-power administration system in Germany consisting of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and France was established.

On August 5, 1945, the first atomic bomb was dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima, and on August 9, the second one on Nagasaki. On August 8, the U.S.S.R. declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria. On September 2, the Japanese surrendered. The Second World War was over.

The Soviet Union was in mortal danger during the Second World War. The Soviet war machine and Soviet economic potentials were too weak, but then several developments took place which turned the tide in Russia's favor. Hitler's insane policy of terror, exploitation and genocide in East Europe suppressed the desire of the Ukrainians, Byeloruthenians, Balts, Don-Cossacks, Tartars, and others to join the Germans in an all-out anti-Russian crusade. This policy activated insurgent anti-German guerilla warfare. Then, Moscow appealed to patriotism,



Nazi document pertaining to the confinement of Yaroslav Stetsko in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.

nationalism, and Russian tradition, and liberalized its national and religious policies to gain the support of all segments of the populations. And finally, the West, militarily and materially, assisted the U.S.S.R. so efficiently that eventually the threat of an all-out defeat turned into a glorious "Soviet" victory.⁴

Successful Soviet-Russian diplomacy permitted the U.S.S.R. to derive tremendous gains in the post-war order. The cause of Russian-Communist imperialism was well served before the Western Allies realized their mistakes in their naive dealings with the Soviet rulers. After the war, Soviet Russia incorporated parts of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, West Byeloruthenia, West and Carpatho-Ukraine, Bukovina, Bessarabia and the region of Koenigsberg in East Prussia, while Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, a northern section of Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania were placed under communist rule and included in the Russian sphere of interest. In Asia, the Soviet gains were equally impressive. On the basis of the Yalta agreement, Russia occupied southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, received back her interest in the Chinese-Eastern railroad, occupied northern Korea, and shared with China the administration of Port Arthur and Dairen until a formal treaty could be concluded with Japan. In this way, Stalin, a proletarian and old Bolshevik, realized the plans of the Emperors Peter I and Nicholas I. He even made a diplomatic attempt to establish a Soviet grip over Tripoli and to build there a bridgehead for the communist penetration into Africa, but he was stopped by the West.

When Stalin and Hitler signed their non-aggression pact in 1939, Stalin planned to use it for the advancement of the Russian and communist cause; his hopes were ill-founded, in the short-run. The U.S.S.R. suffered serious military set-backs and heavy economic losses in the hostilities which followed. However, in the long-run, Soviet Russia emerged from the war a victorious power with great international prestige. It made no difference whether this was achieved by a military success or diplomatic skill or both. Although the Second World War did not reduce the Western capitalistic nations to ashes, as it was hoped and planned for by the Kremlin, it still made Russia the second greatest power in the world. In this capacity, Soviet Russia has become a very successful speaker for the communist cause, thereby further enabling the promotion of Russia's imperialist ambitions.

The Soviet territorial acquisitions resulting from the war were the first step in that direction. The firm establishment of the East European nations as satellites, by introducing communist rule and making them something like military and economic "subsidiaries" of the U.S.S.R., was the second step toward the ultimate goal of a communist world under Russian leadership. Communist penetration by propaganda and subversion throughout the globe, conducted by Moscow by means of the Cominform, as it was done prior to the Second World War by the Comintern, the sudden activation of the issue of the so-called economically underdeveloped countries to stir them up against the West, and the advancing of the idea of the co-existence of two systems, socialist and capitalist, were still other devices, successfully used by Moscow toward the same end. Moscow has always, before and after the Second World War, faithfully followed Lenin's blueprint, developed in his writings, to arrange a timetable for the Russian-Communist world take-over. Surprisingly, other nations were alarmed by Hitler's blueprint for German domination of the world as outlined in his book *Mein Kampf* (My Fight), but they remained, for a long time, indifferent to Lenin's program, which incidentally, was much better elaborated and developed than that of Adolf Hitler. Lenin proposed to the Bolsheviks the take over first of East Europe, then the penetration and domination of Asia, the penetration of the so-called economically underdeveloped countries, and finally the "encirclement" of America, which would fall into their hands like a ripe orange. In America, no revolution would be necessary, thought Lenin.

In fact, the tragic reduction of East European nations to either component parts of the U.S.S.R., or to satellites, the communization of China and Cuba, and the Soviet efforts to dominate Guatemala, Congo, Viet-Nam, Nicaragua, Angola and other countries should have indicated clearly the trend which for long has been largely ignored or underestimated by the Western democracies.

After the Second World War, Stalin continued to rule the Soviet Union and its satellites with an iron hand. He also continued to fully control the communist

parties around the globe until 1948, and thereafter, with the exception of Yugoslavia. Although the Soviet actions on the international scene were very aggressive, the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, isolated itself from the "capitalistic" world so completely, that in 1946 Winston Churchill asserted Russia's expansive and "proselytising" tendencies as the descent of an "iron curtain" across the European continent to separate the communist world from the capitalist world.⁵

FOOTNOTES

¹ About the Second World War: W. Churchill, *The Second World War*, 6 vols., Boston, 1948-1953; J. Fuller, *The Second World War, 1939-1945*, New York, 1949.

² O. Martovych, *Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Modern Times*, Edinburgh, pp. 92-170; J. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-45*, New York, 1955; M. Lebed, *Ukrainska Povstanska Armia*, 1946

³ W. Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies* New York, 1952; R. Smal-Stocki, *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism*, Milwaukee, 1952; O. Caroe, *Soviet Empire, the Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, London, 1953.

⁴ N. Riasanovsky. *A History of Russia*, New York, 1963, pp. 574-583; a more detailed analysis of Russia's part in the Second World War; A. Mazour, *Russia, Tzarist and Communist*, Toronto-New York, London, 1962, pp. 741-825; N. Chirovsky, *An Introduction to Russian History*, New York, 1967, pp. 195-204.

⁵ The material in this chapter is a reworking of a section of my *Introduction to Russian History*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1967, pp. 195-204.


CHAPTER 4

THE OUN AND THE UPA STRUGGLE AGAINST THE GERMANS AND THE RUSSIANS

Just as the First World War once sparked the hopes of the Ukrainians that the international conflict would render the opportunity to make their fatherland free and independent, so did the outbreak of the Second World War. Poland, the Ukrainian enemy, collapsed immediately. The Ukrainians hoped that somehow the Soviet Union, the new Russian empire, would also collapse, as the war continued. The subsequent developments were, however, not very encouraging. Almost at the very beginning of the war, the Russians occupied most of the Western Ukrainian regions, except the Kholm, Pidlasha and Lemko lands which, according to the Hitler-Stalin agreement, were included by the Germans in the so-called *Generalgouvernement* (of Poland). On November 1, 1939, the said western regions were annexed to the Ukrainian SSR by the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., while a part of the northern Polissia region was included into the Byeloruthenian SSR. In June 1940, Rumania was forced to surrender to the Ukrainian SSR, the land of Bukovyna and the Ukrainian speaking portion of Bessarabia, as mentioned.

Of all former political formations and political parties in West Ukraine, only the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the *OUN*, continued to be very active in the underground. It resisted the Russian policies and the terror measures used to force Russianization and Sovietization upon the population. In order to suppress and to liquidate that underground opposition and resentment toward the Russians, the Soviet authorities, the Party and the secret police, the *NKVD*, (the *KGB* today) were preparing an all-out terror campaign by increasing the number of arrests, imprisonments and deportations to distant areas of the Soviet Union of the more active elements and top representatives of the old "capitalist-nationalist" society of Western Ukraine.

Because a general expectation prevailed in Western Ukraine, supported by the growing activities of the *OUN*, that the war would ultimately bring the opportunity for Ukraine to regain her independence, the anti-Russian opposition was on the rise. That general trend was perceived by the Russians. Hence, on the eve of the German-Russian war, they incarcerated thousands of people on mere suspicion and during the first days of the said warfare, slaughtered over 10,000 men and women in various cities and towns of Western Ukraine, such as in Lviv, Sambir, Stanislaviv and Ternopil, and subsequently repeated the performances in Eastern Ukraine, in Vynnytsia, Berdychiv and other places as well. In this way, the



General Roman Shukhevych (1907-1950), Deputy Minister of Defense in the Ukrainian Government 1941, Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), Head of the OUN in Ukraine, Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR).

(Sculpture by Michael Cheresniovsky, former fighter of the UPA)


Ukrainian holocaust of the Second World War began. Also, massive deportations were in preparation, but the swift advance of the German armies frustrated this Soviet-Russian terror design.¹

Meanwhile, in the western regions under German occupation, west of the rivers Buh and Sian in the *Generalgouvernement*, the police system of the *Gestapo* prevailed. The German language was made official, while Ukrainian was admitted only as a supplementary and secondary tongue. However, because of the justified fright of the Russian repressions, an avalanche of refugees arrived there. They were mainly from Galicia, Volhynia and Bukovyna, and soon developed considerable activity toward the Ukrainianization of life in these areas, long suppressed by the Poles. The city of Cracow became the center of that Ukrainianization process, which was largely limited to social, educational, cultural, religious and economic aspects. Schools were organized, cultural associations, such as *Prosvita* and *Ridna Khata*, were established, cooperative movements were launched and expanded and publishing businesses were founded. In November 1939, the Ukrainian Central Committee, under the chairmanship of Volodymyr Kubiovych with regional Relief Committees, was inaugurated to coordinate the whole national life of the Ukrainian community. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church was freed from any Russian or Polish influences, while the Catholic Church was reorganized in the Lemko land and enlarged in other regions.

Any political activities were not permitted by German intolerance. Nevertheless, the *OUN* underground was expanding its operations in preparation for the forthcoming events. They were watched with suspicion by the German *Gestapo*, the secret state police. The Nazis were initially playing politics in this respect, not willing to disclose their true designs for solving the "Ukrainian question." The German-Russian war was quickly approaching, which made the problem of Ukraine, as a nation, a very acute one in the appraisal of the *OUN*. The younger generation of its membership was very suspicious of the German plans, though the Nazis kept silent in this respect. It never forgot the treacherous conduct of Berlin during the Czechoslovakian crisis, when Carpathian Ukraine, after having declared its independence, in the spring of 1939, was then given to the Hungarians for annexation.

In 1940, on the eve of the German-Russian war, the Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists (PUN), headed by Col. Andrii Melnyk, was wavering to take into account the possibility of open warfare against the Germans, if they would oppose the formation of an independent Ukrainian state after the defeat of Soviet Russia.

At the same time, the Bandera revolutionary movement in Western Ukraine was definitely ready to wage warfare against the powerful Nazi war machine, if the Germans would not recognize an independent Ukrainian state in the future. This created a conflict between the two wings of the *OUN* and the final split in the summer of 1940.²



UPA Officers School being sworn in, in 1944.

The *OUN* (revolutionary), in order to be ready for the outbreak of the German-Russian hostilities and to get training and arms, sponsored the organization of the two legions of the so-called *Druzhyny Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv*, the *DUN*, the Detachments of Ukrainian Nationalists, with the tacit consent of the German armed forces but without the approval of the Nazi Party. In the framework of the German armed forces, the legions were called the *Nachtigal* and the *Roland* detachments. Furthermore, both of the now separate nationalist organizations, readied the so-called *pokhidni hrupy*, the marching units or task forces, which were supposed to move quickly into Ukraine, ahead of or immediately after the front line, in order to assist the local population in organizing various aspects of national life, which was completely suppressed by the Soviet-Russian terror for too long. As far as the *pokhidni hrupy* were concerned, however, the *Banderivtsi* (*OUN* - revolutionaries) were ahead of the *Melnykivtsi* (*OUN* - solidarists), and largely dominated the scene by their dynamism and uncompromising spirit to fight for the cause.

On the 22nd of June 1941, the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. The two said legions and the task forces were immediately on the move. It was soon apparent that the Nazi leadership was planning to make Ukraine a colony of the *Third Reich*, and not to recognize her political independence. In order to simultaneously keep ahead of the game and to precede the Nazi design to make Ukraine a colony of the Third Reich, on the 30th of June, the Bandera movement


mobilized the top crest of Ukrainian society in the city of Lviv, and in the presence of the *OUN* activists, many of them recently released from Soviet prisons, the proclamation of the restoration of Ukrainian independent statehood was carried out with the backing of almost all Ukrainian political groups. The act was accomplished by Yaroslav Stetsko, the prime-minister of the newly reestablished state. It was, from the political point of view, a mature act, expressing the will of the people. There was no wavering, doubt or outside pressure behind this act, as there had been in Kyiv in January 1918.

The proclamation came as a surprise to the German authorities, who were against such plans and intentions. It forced the Nazis to disclose their secret design for Ukraine as a future colony of the *Third Reich*. The disclosure was against the original secret plan. Then the Nazis acted promptly. A special detachment arrived from Berlin to liquidate the Bandera movement. All top members of the *OUN*, including S. Bandera, Y. Stetsko and others, were arrested. The revocation of the *Act of the 30th of June* was demanded from, but denied by Bandera and Stetsko. The *Gestapo* immediately unfolded a bloodcurdling terror against the Bandera movement. During the subsequent months, thousands of people, many members of both nationalist organizations, were arrested, incarcerated, deported to the notorious German concentration camps, executed without proper trials or tortured to death.

The *Nachtigal* and *Roland* military formations were quickly dissolved, after having refused to take an oath of allegiance to the *Third Reich* and its Führer, while the former was turned into some kind of a guard unit to be sent out of Ukraine. Roman Shukhevych, one of the *Nachtigal's* top men, escaped and joined the *OUN* underground to continue an armed resistance against the German onslaught.³

Meanwhile, the aforementioned *pokhidni hrupy* or task forces of the *OUN* penetrated deeply into Ukraine, assisting the local population in organizing their national life, as it was planned beforehand, in the cultural, religious, educational and economic respects.

The spirit of Ukrainian nationalism spread throughout the right-bank and the left-bank regions, having drafted all active elements in the cities, towns and countryside. The *OUN* was a brewing underground force not only in areas under German occupation, but in Carpathian Ukraine (under Hungarian domination) and in the so-called Transdnistria, a plot of southern Ukraine between the rivers Boh and Dniester (under Romanian domination). The *OUN* was readying itself for the resurrection of an independent Ukraine, after the ultimate defeat of Nazi Germany and Red Russia. At the same time, the *Gestapo* began to arrange hunts for the *OUN* members who dared to crisscross Hitler's political designs. Some of the most prominent personalities of both wings of the *OUN* became victims of the *Gestapo* terror campaign and were imprisoned, shot or sent to concentration




Second group of UPA Officers School after completing training in 1945.

camps. The repression of the *OUN* was going on in all Ukrainian provinces. Executions took place in 1941 and 1942 in all major cities, in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Zhytomyr, Krementchuk, Lubni, Shepetivka, Rivne, Kremianets, Berest, Lviv, Stanislaviv, Drohobych and other towns and townships as well.

In October 1941, the Ukrainian National Council (*Rada*) was established under the auspices of that *OUN*, led by A. Melnyk, in Kyiv, aspiring to become perhaps the central government agency in Ukraine. It was headed by N. Velychivsky. Yet, it was soon disbanded by the Germans without even being able to unfold any serious work on behalf of the Ukrainian national interest.

In order to exploit Ukraine economically and to prepare her for German colonization in the future, the German authorities created, administratively, the so-called *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, which included Volhynia, southern Polissia, Right-bank Ukraine and a part of the Poltava province. In 1942, the Zaporizha region and a part of the Azov Sea area were added to the said Commissariat. Most of the left-bank regions, which were close to the front line, were retained under direct military administration. The *Reichskommissariat* was then divided into the so-called *Bezirke* and *Gebiete*. The entire administration was run by German commissioners. Eric Koch became the *Reichskommissar* and turned out to be a ruthless and bloody hangman in Ukraine. Collective and state farms were retained, since they could well serve the exploitation policies intended by the *Third Reich* for its newly acquired colony. A promised land reform, to



UPA Battalion, of the "TURY" group, during a field inspection.

partially restore individual land possession and tilling, announced in 1942, had little practical effect as far as individual land allotments were concerned. During their occupation, the Germans exported from Ukraine over 12 million metric tons of farm produce, including 9.5 million tons of grain and flour, 7.6 million heads of cattle, 9.3 million hogs, 7.8 million sheep and 3.3 million horses to economically support their war machine.⁴

German political plans, police repression and economic exploitation soon provoked popular resistance. At first sporadically and in isolated areas, units of armed resistance were organized in various parts of Western Ukraine. In the Fall of 1942, the leadership of the OUN-Bandera movement reorganized the separate and isolated units of the insurgents into one popularly based Ukrainian Insurgent Army, *Ukrainska Povstanska Armia*, the UPA. Being a consolidated armed force of the Ukrainian people, the UPA was determined to fight for regaining Ukrainian national independence in the tradition of the Liberation Struggle of the twenties and of the *Act of the 30th of June, 1941*. Anti-German guerilla warfare was on a continuous rise. Taras Chuprynka (Roman Shukevych), already a well known OUN leader, soon became the commander-in-chief of the UPA. The Ukrainian underground, opposing the Germans, penetrated the left-bank and Donbas, and attempted to protect the peaceful population against the terror regime and economic exploitation.



A group of UPA women fighters stands for field inspection.

The Nazis responded, at first, with even greater terror, intending to destroy Ukraine economically; the market places were raided by police and everything of value was taken away from the people, businesses were repossessed by German corporations and individuals for nominally low prices, large cities were inadequately supplied with necessities, causing a decline in their industrial and commercial activities, while the number of their population was sharply reduced by the mass deportation of young people for forced labor in Germany, which by 1943 reached some three million men and women. The Ukrainian workers in Germany, referred to as "Ostarbeiter," were treated very badly. True colonial extortion was practiced. Politically, the so-called "collective responsibility" principle was applied in Ukraine for any self-defense actions of the local population against German reprisals, such as the mass shooting of the innocent, execution of hostages, burning of whole villages, especially in northern Ukraine, and hanging for petty reasons. The number of victims reached hundreds of thousands. At the same time, the military strength and the striking power of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army were rising, counteracting the German terror by damaging military supplies and supply routes, sabotaging requisitions and preventing some German reprisals from taking place.

In order to take advantage of the anti-German feelings, the Russians sent their own guerilla fighters to Ukraine in 1943, directed and supplied by Moscow behind the enemy front line. The largest detachment was led by S. Kovpak. However, the



Youngest soldiers of the UPA in the Lemko area of Ukraine in 1947: Vasylo, 14 years (left) and Tarasyk, 15 years old (right)

Soviet guerillas did not gain any support from the local Ukrainian population, while the *UPA* units immediately began to fight the Polish underground, which was active in the Ukrainian western borderlands, harassing the Ukrainian population.


Yet, the German power began to decline soon and the German authorities began to loose their grip over Ukraine. The Soviet armed forces, aided by arms, ammunition and all kinds of supplies from the USA, began to advance steadily to the West during 1943. In April 1943, realizing that they were losing the war, the German authorities changed the policy and urged the creation of the Division "Galicia," a regular military unit, which was supposed to fight against the Russians, but was not to be used against the Western Allies. For Ukrainians, the very idea of getting arms into Ukrainian hands and resisting the Russian advance, thereby defending the land against the Bolshevik onslaught, was irresistible. The Division "Galicia" was organized and soon sent to the front. At the courageous Battle of Brody in August 1944 against the advancing Soviet-Russian armies, it was completely deserted by the Germans. In time, a second Ukrainian division was organized in the hope that after the German defeat, perhaps with Allied assistance, the Russians would be stopped and the Ukrainian national interest somehow protected.



"Easter Feast" on Easter Sunday in UPA hide-out in the Carpathian Mountains, 1946.

At the same time, the Germans were feebly holding cities and towns, having lost any effective control over the Ukrainian countryside, which was under the protection and administration of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, *Ukrainska Povstanska Armia*, largely on the territories not yet invaded by the Reds. In order to streamline the government on these territories and to prepare the resistance against the new invader, in July 1944, the *OUN* inspired the establishment of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, the *Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada*. This was a kind of Ukrainian government, with its own armed force: the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The German terror considerably subsided, for the Germans, losing the war and their brutal confidence, were looking for friends. Hence, they began to release from prisons and concentration camps, prominent Ukrainian leaders, such as Stepan Bandera, Y. Stetsko, Col. A. Melnyk and some others.⁵

Moving to the west, the Red armed forces took the capital of Kyiv in November 1943. The retreating Germans were destroying everything, factories, mines, bridges, highways, railroads and other objects, leaving behind in Leftbank Ukraine, the so-called "zone of destruction." On the right bank, they had no time to do the same thorough job because of the swift Soviet advance. In April 1944, all of Eastern and Central Ukraine was occupied by the Russians. In July, the Soviet troops entered Lviv, and in October, Carpathian Ukraine was invaded, and so again, all of Ukraine was facing Soviet-Russian terror and exploitation.



Platoon of UPA fighters under the command of Lt. Marko

Thus hoping against reality and believing in some kind of a political miracle, in the Spring of 1945, a Ukrainian National Committee, under the chairmanship of Gen. Pavlo Shandruk, was established. The committee took control over the two Ukrainian divisions created earlier. They were then renamed as the Ukrainian National Army, but the whole attempt was soon terminated by the end of the Second World War. Yet, in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, under Gen. Roman Shukhevych, and the underground units of the *OUN* remained, determined to fight against the Soviet-Russian domination until Ukraine would be free again.

During 1943 and 1944, the Russians theoretically recaptured all Ukrainian territories, but practically, it took a few years until they were able to restore their dominance over all of West Ukraine. In reality, the *UHVR*, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, with its armed units of the UPA and underground units of the *OUN* controlled most parts of the countryside, as it did at the end of the German occupation. Initially, the Russians held the cities, towns, railroad connections and military centers. Gen. R. Shukhevych-Taras Chuprynka, head of the *UHVR* and supreme commander of the UPA, directed the anti-Russian struggle. The organizational system of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, consisting of the UPA North, West, South and East, had soon to be reorganized and consolidated before it truly became an armed force of the Ukrainian people. It



Detachment of UPA - North preparing a raid on enemy positions.

included a substantial number of the *OUN* members, who built the ideological and organizational backbone of the force, the broad popular participation of Ukrainian village and town populations, many former members and officers of the Red army, the Division "Galicia," the former Communist Youth and other social segments of the Ukrainian society, all united in their struggle against the Red-Russian onslaught.


The Red army units, returning from the Western front, were ordered by the Kremlin to liquidate the *UPA* resistance. Yet, these units, largely Ukrainian by their ethnic composition, proved to be fully unreliable. Their officers and soldiers were not willing to fight against the *UPA* forces, and some of them joined the Ukrainian resistance. Hence, the whole campaign was dragging on rather unsuccessfully. For that very reason these troops were soon replaced by special *NKVD* (secret police) detachments. Then, in the course of the first months of 1946, many fierce battles were fought between the *UPA* and the *NKVD* units, while the Insurgent Army undertook numerous raids in the right bank regions and the borderlands near Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Byeloruthenia. Bloody encounters took place, especially in the Kholm and Lemko areas, in opposition to the large scale Russian-Polish resettlement and deportation project, by which entire Ukrainian villages and townships were to be moved either to the northwestern regions of Poland or to distant regions of the Soviet Union. In order

to avoid deportation, many villagers and township dwellers joined the UPA detachments.

Because Western Ukraine was the hotbed of Ukrainian nationalism and anti-Russian resistance, and in order to liquidate the *OUN* and *UPA*, the *NKVD*, later called the *KGB*, unfolded an indiscriminatory mass terror against the Western Ukrainians by employing wholesale deportation, imprisonments, public tortures and executions. Special *NKVD* units "for UPA extermination" were engaged. Threats towards the stubborn and rewards for informers were introduced. Yet, scarcely any acts of treason were committed by the patriotic population, which was largely giving support to the guerilla fighters. False propaganda was spread by the Russians, that supposedly the *UPA* and the *OUN*, identified under the common name of the *Banderivsi*, or Bandera followers, were Nazi collaborators, terrorists, enemies of the Ukrainian people or supporters of the Western capitalists. Mass trials of *OUN* members were conducted in all large cities of Western Ukraine, such as Lviv, Stanislaviv, Stryi, Drohobych and Chortkiv. Anybody accused of Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalism was branded as a *Banderivets*, and exposed to terror and persecution. But, for about two years or more, the Red-Russian authorities could not cope with the problem.

In 1947, an agreement was concluded between the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia to assault the *UPA* units collectively and to liquidate its resistance. Meanwhile, Soviet Marshall M. Vatutin and Polish Gen. W. Swierczewski were killed by *UPA* detachments. Then, the *UPA* command changed its tactics and began to operate in small mobile units, which fortified themselves in bunkers, in forest areas, and in the Carpathian mountains. From there, they undertook their raids against the *NKVD*, the army centers and the seats of Soviet administration. At the same time, several units of the insurgents were sent to the West. The units had to struggle through Polish, Czech and Austrian territories to reach the American controlled regions, in order to deliver eyewitness reports and heavy documentation about the Ukrainian resistance against the Soviet-Russian onslaught. Not all the dispatched units made it through to the West, but those that did fully accomplished their mission.

In defiance of the Soviet regime, Soviet police stations were destroyed and police officers and informers were assassinated by the units of the Ukrainian resistance. How hard it was for the Soviet-Russian authorities to break the *UPA-OUN* resistance was clearly apparent by the fact that some eight amnesty appeals were signed by either top government or Party officials and military dignitaries to persuade the insurgents to surrender. It was, however, all in vain. Yet, in March 1950 in Bilohorshcha, near the city of Lviv, Gen. Roman Shukhevych, the *UPA* commander-in-chief, was killed in action. Then, in 1951, other top leaders, such as P. Poltava and O. Hornovyi, perished. In 1952-53, the Russians succeeded in capturing a number of *OUN* members, whom they tried and



First group of UPA fighters which succeeded in penetrating the Iron Curtain, arriving in West Germany on September 11, 1947.

sentenced to death or long imprisonment. It must be underscored here that the *UPA-OUN* insurgent struggle was carried on solely by the Ukrainian people without any outside foreign military or material assistance. It was, therefore, quite a singular phenomenon during and after the Second World War, when all other guerilla warfares of the time were supported and helped by foreign interventions.

Yet, in spite of the said misfortunes, the underground *OUN* organizational network was not eliminated. An unfortunate incident happened in 1953. This time, in cooperation with U.S.-British intelligence, an *OUN* detachment, under B. Okhrymovych, was sent to Ukraine to contact the underground. It was, however, immediately captured and liquidated by the Russians because of a Soviet spy ring within the British intelligence, which notified Moscow about the project and all of its details. Still, in 1954, A. Kirichenko, the Soviet party chief in the Ukrainian SSR, complained about the threat of *OUN* penetration of all facets of life: of the collective and state farms, industrial and commercial enterprises, educational system, administrative apparatus, labor organizations and other institutions. In 1956, another appeal was made by the Soviet-Russian regime, urging the armed units of *UPA-OUN* to surrender, proving the formidableness of the struggle still going on, though on a smaller scale, especially in the Volhinia regions.⁶

The *OUN* and *UPA* struggle also had other repercussions. In the early 1950's,

large transports of deportees, *OUN* and *UPA* members, soldiers and other patriotic elements, arrived in Soviet concentrations camps. They soon organized and freed themselves from the terror of the common criminals. These criminal elements were actually supported by the camp authorities, who intended to make the political prisoners' lives miserable. The deportees began to stage a massive resistance against the *Gulag* administration and the guards. Soon, the *OUN* network, the *Bandera* movement, was established in most camps. It became, largely, the backbone of numerous uprisings in the camps. In order not to allow a complete break-down of the *Gulag* system, the Soviet-Russian authorities then released about 80 per cent of the inmates and allowed them to assume a somewhat freer life in the Asiatic regions, while not permitting them to return to their homelands. Numerous Western eyewitnesses of these developments, such as John Noble, Fr. Cizek and others, asserted the leading role of the *Banderivsi* in these riots and uprisings throughout the *Gulag* system.⁷ The *UPA* struggle had a significant spiritual and intellectual anti-Russification impact. Numerous underground publications, small booklets, pamphlets, leaflets, periodicals and other printed materials of political and literary contents, authored by such people as P. Poltava and O. Hornovyi, were published and widely circulated in opposition to Soviet pressure and the Soviet way of life. Another projection of the anti-Russification attitude, started by the struggle of the 1940's and 1950's and other political developments, was the Ukrainian cultural and political movement of the sixties: the movement of the so-called Sexagesimals or *Shestydesiatnyky*. The de-Stalinization policies and Krushchev's so-called political "thaw" granted a little more freedom and enabled the movement to grow. The *Shestydesiatnyky* led a literary and intellectual revival in Ukraine, with however, a strong political connotation. This generation of intellectuals, literary figures, poets, writers, musicians, journalists, political thinkers, sculptors and others, insisted on the strict Ukrainianization of all aspects of life in the Ukrainian SSR. The prominent *Shestydesiatnyky* were V. Chornovil, L. Kostenko, V. Symonenko, V. Moroz, I. Dziuba, I. Svitlychnyi, S. Karavanskyi and M. Osadchyi. Their defense of Ukraine's right to develop culturally and politically led them to discuss Ukraine's political status within the USSR, including her constitutional right to secede. Ukraine's political independence was considered the best guarantee of her free spiritual and cultural growth. Secret organizations were formed, such as the United Party for the Liberation of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Worker's and Peasants' Union and the Ukrainian National Front. The trend was a clear-cut one, while the term "nationalism" was carefully omitted in order not to arouse the suspicion of the Soviet authorities. Yet, later on, some of the *Shestydesiatnyky* admitted to having connections with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the *OUN*. The entire movement was a protest against the Russification of all facets of Ukrainian national life. At that time, even P. Shelest, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, made statements in defense of the Ukrainian culture and

language, while the congress of Ukrainian writers and poets dared to become a manifestation in the defense of Ukrainian spiritual and intellectual values.

Russian chauvinism was, however, on the alert. Already in the middle of the sixties, new repressions were introduced, and soon, almost all the *Shestydesiatnyky* were incarcerated in prisons, concentration camps and insane asylums by the Soviet authorities. Some of them were murdered by the KGB, like Alla Horska in 1970, who was an artist and defender of human rights, and V. Ivasiuk, in 1979, a medical doctor and folk-pop musician. Yet, after the movement of the sixties was largely suppressed by traditional Russian cruelty, the Ukrainian dissident movement of the seventies surfaced as another link in the permanent drive toward freedom in Ukraine. Underground papers, such as *Ukrainsky Visnyk*, *The Ukrainian Herald*, began to be published, continuing the defense of Ukraine's rights, culture, language, literature and other values, while Russianization measures were aggressively exposed.

The dissident movement was then projected into the Ukrainian "Helsinki Group," which was organized in 1976, headed by M. Rudenko, and joined by N. Strokata-Karavanska, L. Lukianenko, O. Meshko, I. Kandyba and others. The Ukrainian "Helsinki Group" did not simply demand human rights in the so-called Ukrainian SSR along with the Helsinki Accords, but rather expected that the political liberation of Ukraine from Soviet-Russian oppression would automatically grant human rights for her people. The KGB reacted immediately. Most dissidents and members of the Group were arrested, sentenced and incarcerated for many years. Nothing else was to be expected from the Kremlin leaders. Only a few were allowed to go to the West, like N. Strokata, S. Karavansky and V. Moroz. The suppression of the *Shestydesiatnyky* and the dissidents in the USSR brought waves of protests and demonstrations in Western countries against Soviet-Russian political terror. Public condemnation of the Soviet tactics was unanimous. Protests were organized by Ukrainians in the Free World and joined by prominent political figures in the West, i.e. Presidents of the USA, J. Carter and R. Reagan, as well as, many U.S. senators and congressmen.⁸



**30.VI
1941**



**30.VI
1951**



1951 bonds issued in Ukraine in support of the liberation struggle and to mark the 10th anniversary of the Restoration of the Ukrainian Independent State on June 30, 1941.

FOOTNOTES

¹ *Zlochyny Moskvy u Vynnytsi*, published by the Ukrainian Youth Association of America, SUMA, New York, 1951; Rev. I. Nahayevsky, *History of Ukraine*, Philadelphia, 1975, p. 298; V. Holubnychy and H. M., "Ukraine during the World War II, Central and Eastern Ukraine," *Ukraine, A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1963, Vol. I, p. 878; O. Martovych, *Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Modern Times*, Edinburgh, 1951, p. 91.

² R. Lisovyi, *Rozlam v OUN*, Neu Ulm, 1949, Mirchuk, P., *Stefan Bandera*, New York, 1961 pp. 73-80; V. Kubiowych, "Ukraine during the World War II, Western Ukraine to the Outbreak of the German-Soviet War," *Ukraine, A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 875-876.

³ Ya. Stetsko, *30 chervnia 1941*, Toronto, 1967; the text of the proclamation, p. 330; Mirchuk *op. cit.*, pp. 81-93; Martovych, *op. cit.*, 94-96; as well, L. Shankovsky, *Pokhidni hrupy OUN; prychnyky do istorii pokhidnykh hrup OUN na tsentralnykh i skhidnykh zemliakh Ukrainy v 1941-1943 rr.*, Munich, 1958; V. Markus, "Western Ukraine after June 22, 1941," *Ukraine, A Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 886-887.

⁴ Holubnychy, *op. cit.*, pp. 882-883.

⁵ M. Lebed, *Ukrainska Povstanska Armia*, Munich, 1964; O. Martovych, *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army*, Munich, 1950; J. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945*, New York, 1955: on the anti-German struggle; Nahayevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-331; Martovych, *Ukrainian Liberation Movement* . . . pp. 91-168; A. Bedrii, *OUN i UPA*, New York-London, 1983.

⁶ Martovych, *ibid.*, pp. 127-168; The Ukrainian Liberation Movement versus the Kremlin, 1944-1950; V. Holubnychy, "Ukraine since World War II, 1945-1962," *ibid.: Ukraine, A Concise* . . . Vol. I, pp. 894-911; on the resistance, pp. 900-902, in particular, R. Szporluk, *Ukraine: A Brief History*, Detroit, 1982, pp. 91-93, 96-97; a rather negative appraisal of the UPA and OUN struggle by the Poles: A. Szczesniak and W. Szota, *Droga do nikad*, Warsaw, 1973.

⁷ Rev. W. Ciszek, *With God in Russia*, New York, 1964, the Revolt, pp. 177-199, "For the most part, these were . . . Banderovcy, a famous band of tough Ukrainian partisans who hated the Soviets. None of them went to work at Gor Stroi or elsewhere, but they walked around the camp as they owned it. They dealt with the camp officials in a way which plainly indicated that they didn't want to be bothered. (182); "... , but the Banderovcy ordered the officials to get away from their barracks." (183); A. Solzhenitsin, referred to the *Banderivtsi* incarcerated and active in the labor camps; *The Gulag Archipelago*, New York 1974, pp. 62, 77 86, 91, 99-100 and 519; B. Bailey, *The Captive Nations*, Chicago, 1969, pp. 75-83; A. Kniazhytsky, *Nadnii SSSR*, New York, 1959, particular references to the UPA members, pp. 179-199; An eyewitness report of M. Mytsio, inmate of the camps in the early 1950's, about the OUN and UPA activities. M. Mytsio's residence; Hempstead, N.Y.

⁸ Compare: N. Chirovsky, *An Introduction to Ukrainian History*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1986 Vol. III; the material in this section is a reworking of the respective chapter on the OUN-UPA struggle in the said book.

CHAPTER 5

RUSSIAN DISTORTIONS ABOUT THE UKRAINIAN STRUGGLE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

A. The Facts

In 1958, J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, published a story about Communism in America entitled *Masters of Deceit*. J. Barron published *KGB Today: The Hidden Hand*, in 1983. Both works effectively exposed the Soviet-Russian mastery of distortion of facts, which is one of the Kremlin's tactics toward undermining Western morale, weakening the Western stance, and preparing for the Soviet-Russian takeover of one Western society after another. This triumphant Russian march towards world domination was under the smoke screen of international "Communism."¹

The whole maneuvering of Communist propaganda, orchestrated and led by the KGB, has been a deception, since the very leitmotif behind it has been not communism, but only and exclusively, the insatiable Russian imperialism, praised and glorified by Russian chauvinists in the past and today, such as Dostoyevskii, Danilevskii, Zinoviev and many others.² The same tactics have been used by the KGB to establish in the West a general mistrust and suspicion against the said Ukrainian independence struggle during the second World War, in itself a threat to the integrity of the USSR. Having been the first Nazi collaborators and actually the indirect but powerful cause of the war, the Soviet Russians have persistently attempted to make the West believe that the Ukrainians were then supposedly Nazi collaborators and war criminals, in particular: the fighting units, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the detachments of the Ukrainian Nationalists, the *Nachtigal* and *Roland* units, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Division "Galicia." The slander tactics were fortified recently by KGB disinformation, while some Western liberals became unwittingly and unintentionally the tools of the campaign.

In his article, *The Colonial Policy of Germany in Ukraine Pushes Her into a Ravine*, Ya. Stetsko described the sharp clash between the Ukrainian leaders and the *Gestapo* over the matter of Ukrainian national independence, including the cruel German measures to liquidate, by physical extermination and incarceration, any form of Ukrainian opposition to the Nazi plans to turn Ukraine into a colony of the German Reich.³

In order to corroborate the previous assertions of an uncompromising active

opposition of the Ukrainian freedom fighters toward the Nazis, several documents and statements should be quoted. The Reichs Chancellery minutes of June 26, 1941 (1531/374227) asserted, that

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) has submitted along with the letter of June 23, 1941, addressed to the Fuhrer, a memorandum on the Ukrainian question. The memorandum advocates the restoration of an independent Ukrainian national state in the sense of the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.⁴

Of course, the Nazis ignored the memorandum and started a terror campaign against the OUN freedom fighters and other Ukrainian patriots.

The following document of the *Sicherheitspolizei* and *Sicherheitsdienst* (Security Police and Security Service) of November 25, 1941 convincingly illustrates the extent of the Nazi terror against the Ukrainian freedom fighters.

Service Command of the
Security Police and of
the Security Service S/5
Command Log-book No. 12432/41

Headquarters
November 25, 1941

To the advanced posts of
Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk,
Rivne, Mykolaiv
Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia

Subject, OUN (Bandera Movement)

It has been ascertained that the Bandera Movement is preparing a revolt in the Reichs Commissariat which has as its ultimate aim the establishment of an independent Ukraine. All functionaries of the Bandera Movement must be arrested at once and, after thorough interrogation, are to be liquidated secretly as marauders.

Records of such interrogations must be forwarded to the Service Command C/5.

Head of commands must destroy these instructions on having made a due note of them.

(signature — illegible)
SS — obersturmbannfuhrer.

The German text of the above instruction for all Nazi security services in Ukraine, follows:

Einsatzkommando C/5
der Sicherheitspolizei U.d.SD

O.U. den 25.November 1941

— Kdo — Tgb Nr. 12432¹)/41. G.R.S.²

an die

Aussenposten

Kiew

Dnjepropetrowsk

Nikolajew

Rowno

Shitomir

Winniza

Betr.: OUN (Bandera-Bewegung)

Es wurde einwandfrei festgestellt, dass die Bandera-Bewegung einen Aufstand in Reichskommissariat vorbereitet mit dem Endziel, eine unabhängige Ukraine zu schaffen. Alle Funktionäre der Bandera-Bewegung sind sofort festzunehmen und nach einer eingehenden Vernehmung als Plünderer in aller Stille zu liquidieren.

Die Vernehmungsprotokolle sind dem Einsatzkommando C/5 zu übersenden.

Dieses Schreiben ist nach Kenntnisnahme durch den Kommandoführer sofort zu vernichten.⁵

SS—Obersturmbannführer
Unterschrift (unl)

The Nazi terror measures were responded to by even tougher resistance by the Ukrainian OUN underground as the following announcement demonstrates:

“Fellow Nationalists!

On June 30, 1941, we made known to the whole world that:

- a) Ukraine will rise and fight against anyone who will try to colonize it and enslave its people. Its ideas of freedom and self-determination are not negotiable.
- b) Ukraine fought, is fighting and will fight for its own state, and will not fight for the [Nazi] concept of “new Europe”.
- c) Contrary to the deceitful assertions of the enemy, Ukraine is capable on its own strength of establishing a state.
- d) Ukraine can build its future on the capital of its own blood.

“Fellow Nationalists!

In Eastern Europe the struggle between the old oppressors of

Ukraine [Soviet Russia] and the new ones [Nazi Germany] continues. Our land is running dry of blood, and our cities and towns lie in ashes and ruin. Thousands of our best Ukrainian activists have been punished and died a martyr's death in the prisons of the old and new oppressors.

On the anniversary of the great Act [of Restoration] of June 30, 1941, I bid you to: Stand firmly by your leadership. Consider Ukraine as being on the verge of a great decisive battle. Prepare yourselves and the entire people for it.

Long live an independent and united Ukrainian State!

Long live Stepan Bandera!

Glory to Ukraine!"⁶

The Ukrainian armed resistance was confirmed a little later by many foreign encyclopedic and scholarly publications, which deny any present-day insinuations of the KGB propaganda machine concerning an alleged OUN collaboration with the Nazis. *Encyclopedia Britannica* wrote the following:

On June 30, 1941, shortly after the occupation of Lwov (Lviv) by the German Army, the OUN proclaimed the "restoration of the Ukrainian state" and formed a government headed by Yaroslav Stetsko, with the idea of waging war against the U.S.S.R. Bandera, Stetsko, and most of the ministers were arrested, however, by the Germans, who did not wage a war of liberation. Walther Funk, German minister of economics, declared in December 1941 in Prague that the Ukraine, this "promised colonial land," had become accessible to "European" exploitation.

In 1943 Shukhevych formed an underground Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). He remained in the Polish Ukraine after the Soviet occupation and on March 4, 1950, was killed by the Soviet security forces in Bilohorshcha, near Lwov. (Bandera was killed on Oct. 15, 1959, in Munich by a Soviet agent.)⁷

Encyclopedia International corroborated the facts:

Disaffection among Ukrainians was heightened by the German invasion and occupation of the Ukraine during World War II. Although Ukrainian independence was proclaimed in Lvov (Lviv) on June 30, 1941, the Nazi authorities arrested the responsible persons and suppressed the development of free Ukrainian national institutions. They failed to dissolve the unpopular collective farms and impressed Ukrainian civilians for labor in German war industries. A guerrilla force, the Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army, fought both the Germans and the



Victims of Soviet Russian Massacres in Lviv, Ukraine, 1941.

Soviets, continuing to oppose the latter from the Carpathian Mountains for several years after World War II.⁸

The Ukrainian war on the Nazis 1941-45 was then studied and described by many scholarly works, such as those by A. Dallin, J.A. Armstrong, W.H. Chamberlin and others. Dallin wrote the following:

On June 30 it (OUN — ed) staged a sudden and unexpected coup in L'vov (Lviv). Just as the responsible Army intelligence officer, Professor Hans Koch, an old friend of the Ukrainian nationalist cause, had arranged for a conference to establish a city government in L'vov, he was taken to a rally, carefully staged in advance, where the OUN/B assembly proclaimed a 'Ukrainian State'. A move unforeseen both by the Abwehr and by Rosenberg's men, and proclamation was intended to present the Germans as well as the rival Ukrainian parties with a *fait accompli*.

Professor Koch and like-minded Germans evidently failed to grasp the full meaning of the proclamation or the extent to which it ran counter to Hitler's plans. They considered the OUN/B move "premature and awkward", but hardly dangerous; they "would have waited until we reached Kiev to proclaim Ukrainian statehood". The reaction of other German agencies, however, was bound to be more decidedly negative. The consistent enemies of Ukrainian statehood saw evidence of insubordination, and even "pro-Ukrainians" on Rosenberg's staff could not but question the reliability of Bandera under such circumstance. German forces in L'vov were still meagre, and confusion reigned. Thus for almost a week the new government was allowed to operate under the leadership of Yaroslav Stetsko, Bandera's loyal lieutenant.

Realizing that a direct challenge to German supremacy was involved, the SD on July 2 began arresting Bandera's followers. On July 4 a German city commandant was installed, and the next day the Stetsko government was dispersed; on July 12 Stetsko was arrested; Bandera himself was taken from Cracow to Berlin and, though treated with deference, was kept in jail.

Meanwhile the German authorities were busy establishing 'order' in Eastern Galicia. Pro-Stetsko mayors and chiefs of police were replaced; gatherings suspected of OUN/B sympathies were dispersed. Though Hans Koch and others sought in vain to obtain a 'retraction' of the L'vov proclamation from Bandera and Stetsko, official German policy had written *finis* to its dealings with the OUN/B. After initially leaving open the question of Galicia's disposition, Hitler decided in mid-July to detach it from the future territory of the Ostministerium and to assign it to the Government-General of Poland. Leibbrandt and others

protested that this meant splitting the Ukraine and thus causing 'great disappointment' among the Ukrainian and a gap between the German political leadership and the Ukrainians, but to no avail. On August 1, Galicia became a province of German-ruled Poland.⁹

John Armstrong studied Ukrainian nationalism in particular and published a book where he evaluated the armed struggle of Ukraine against the German-Nazi war machine in the following way:

The Bandera group, on their side, maintain that they anticipated an unfavorable reaction from the Germans but felt that it was necessary to go ahead with the proclamation so as to confront them with a *fait accompli*. They felt it would be difficult for the Germans to take overt action against a widely proclaimed Ukrainian government, since such action might lead to a great loss of support for the German campaign by the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union. At any rate — so they argue — these nationalities would know what to expect from the Nazi regime if it suppressed the Ukrainian state. . . .

About the same time, Bandera (who had never been allowed to leave the Generalgouvernement), Gabrusevych, Bandera's representative in Berlin, Volodymyr Stakhiv, and Stets'ko assistants, Starukh and Ilits'kyi, were arrested. All were assembled in Berlin and questioned thoroughly by both police and Wehrmacht officers. The Germans, however, were obviously proceeding with caution. They realized that at that moment considerable trouble could be caused by the advancing German armies by disturbances in Galicia, which would probably be the result of drastic action against the OUN leaders. At the same time, they warned the group of the possible serious consequences of their actions, and urged the leaders to withdraw that *akt* [Act of Proclamation of June 30 — ed.] and accept a status in eastern Galicia similar to that of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow. Bandera and his followers refused . . .

From the very beginning of the war, the Bandera group had been putting into operation still another ambitious plan. Far from being content with the establishment of a government in the former Polish territories, the OUN-B was determined to extend its scope to include the East Ukraine. Bandera's followers realized that it would be an extremely slow process for the organization to spread from town to town and that in case of opposition by the Germans such a development could be quickly interrupted. Consequently, in the last months before the outbreak of war they had secretly developed a number of groups of young men (and women) to act as propagandists and organizers in the eastern area. In the



Group of Ukrainian patriots escorted by Nazi police for execution, Drohobych, 1943

final days of June these bodies, which were known as *pokhidni hrupy* (literally “march groups,” but translated hereafter as “task forces”) assembled (doubtless with some toleration by the Wehrmacht) at convenient points along the eastern border of the Generalgouvernement.¹⁰

The following summation of Ukraine’s war on the Nazis was made by D.G. Stewart-Smith in his book *The Defeat of Communism*:

The leader of the anti-Nazi faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (O.U.N.-B.), S. Bandera, proclaimed the establishment of the Independent State of the Ukraine in Lvov (Lemberg). I.S. Stetsko was appointed Prime Minister of the Ukrainian National Committee. Because of the anti-Nazi inclinations of this faction of the O.U.N. the Ukrainian State was suppressed by Nazi police (S.D.) units on July 9th, and Stetsko was arrested. Owing to the insanity of Nazi doctrine Germany lost the support of forty million Ukrainians.¹¹

W.H. Chamberlin described very well the Ukrainian armed resistance against the German-Nazi onslaught in his article published in *The Ukrainian Quarterly* in 1945-46:

Active Ukrainian nationalists fled from this area of Soviet occupation. They worked out plans for the development of a nationalist underground movement in the territory under Soviet control. When the

Germans struck at the Soviet Union on June 21, 1941, Ukrainian underground forces took advantage of the confusion and demoralization in the Soviet occupied regions and seized control of many places.


The existence of a Ukrainian state was proclaimed in Lviv, the largest city of Eastern Galicia, on June 30, with Dr. Kost Levitsky, former Premier of the Republic of Western Ukraine, as President of the Ukrainian National Council and Yaroslav Stetzko, editor of the pre-war illegal Ukrainian nationalist "Bulletin" as Prime Minister. This was a clear challenge to the German Government to declare its policy.

Had the Germans been willing to co-operate with the Ukrainian nationalist leadership and to set the Ukraine free from Soviet rule a good deal of popular co-operation might have been anticipated. But the Nazi leadership, drunk with power and success, chose to follow a policy of unilateral conquest, domination and enslavement. The Ukrainian government was liquidated and prominent Ukrainian nationalists were shot or imprisoned.

This was the prelude to an extremely complicated struggle for freedom under Ukrainian nationalist leadership. Ukrainian guerrilla forces fought simultaneously against the German military rule, resisting food requisitions and deportations for labor service in Germany, and against Soviet armed units. According to reports reaching this country from Ukrainian nationalist sources, the popular guerrilla movement in the wooded and swampy and hilly regions of the Ukraine was almost entirely under nationalist leadership. Soviet activity behind the German lines was carried on by regular army groups which had remained behind the line of the front and by picked forces which were dropped by parachute.

The UIA [Ukrainian Insurgent Army — UPA] tried to link the cause of the Ukraine with that of other nationalities of the Soviet Union. Amid the confusion of the war considerable numbers of Red Army soldiers from the Caucasus and Central Asia and from other minority regions became separated from their units or deserted. The UIA was able to enlist Georgians, Azerbaijan natives, Tartars, Calmucks, Uzbeks and others in national formations and sent some of them back to form liberation groups in their own countries.

Representatives of thirteen nationalities, incorporated in the Soviet Union held a secret conference on September 23, 1943, and drafted a general plan and tactics to be employed in the struggle against Communist dictatorship (reference to the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations). Some of the drastic punitive measures which the Soviet



Ukrainian Nationalists hanged by the Nazis in Drohobych, December 1943.

authorities have applied in nationality republics are to be explained by this new resurgence of independent national consciousness.¹²

Early in the Summer of 1943, while the UPA units were battling the Soviet partisans, led by Gen. Kovpak, and the Nazis, in defense of Ukrainian freedom, both the OUN and UPA became the targets of German and Soviet-Russian slander propaganda. Both the Nazis and the Reds, facing the growing Ukrainian resistance, tried to discredit them in the eyes of the population. German leaflet No. 43/1/G 26 distributed throughout Ukraine insinuated:

“Orders and secret directives that have fallen into our hands show that the Jews in the Kremlin are in contact with the OUN, which says it is fighting Bolshevism. . . . The OUN and Bolshevism are the same thing, and this is why they should be annihilated. . . .”

N. Krushchev in his appeal, supposedly to the people of Ukraine, issued in the city of Kiev on June 12, 1944, turned the accusation against the OUN and UPA the other way around:

“Your enemies are not only the German bandits. Your enemies are also the bands of German-Ukrainian nationalists. They are all those *banderovtsi* who have sold out to Hitler and are helping him to subjugate

our people, our Ukraine. . . These mercenaries pretend to fight against the Germans. . . the Ukrainian nationalists are in reality accomplices of Hitler. They want to break the fraternal bonds that unite the Ukrainian and Russian people, to sever the Soviet Ukraine from the family of Soviet peoples. . . ”

Obviously those accusations proved to be entirely false in view of the statement of the Third Congress of the OUN's leadership of February 17 to 21, 1943, which asserted as follows:

“In opposition to the reactionary and anti-popular aims of the Russian and German imperialists who, having launched the current war, continue to wage it at the cost of the sufferings and the lives of millions of human beings and who, under the cloak of lying phrases such as the new Europe or the proletarian revolution, are seeking to achieve the lasting subjugation of the peoples of all Europe, . . . we propose the idea of independent national states composed of all the European peoples within their ethnic borders, which is the most progressive idea of our epoch, the idea of order based on the principles of freedom for peoples and for man.

. . . ”¹³

B. The KGB Distortion of Facts

Soviet-Russian distortionist propaganda slandered the Ukrainian struggle for independence during and after the Second World War, as Nazi collaboration and bourgeois nationalism, guilty of war crimes, treason, anti-Semitism and other imaginary trespasses against humanity. There has been no substance in those accusations, but they were adequate lies to confuse some Western minds. Yet, especially in the 1980's, the slander campaign was substantially fortified. The resolute stand of Reagan's administration towards the Soviet Union and its aggressive policies in the whole world, in Indochina, Central America, Africa and other places, frightened the Kremlin.

In particular, Reagan's friendly stand towards the so-called captive nations in the USSR, including Ukraine, induced the Kremlin to intensify its slander campaign against those peoples to counteract their strong anti-Russian activities, which were steadily gaining ground and popularity in the West. In the 1980's, for example, the leaders of Americans of Ukrainian descent gained broad access to Capital Hill and the White House. The Russians considered it a threat to their interests.

It was unfortunate that some Western circles unwittingly began to repeat and echo those Russian accusations as part of a search for Nazi war criminals, including the American Office of Special Investigation and left and liberal groups.

For instance, the Detachments of Ukrainian Nationalists (DUN), in

BEKANNTMACHUNG

Wegen Verbrechens nach §§ 1 und 2 der Verordnung zur Bekämpfung von Angriffen gegen das deutsche Aufbauwerk im Generalgouvernement vom 2. 10. 1943 (Verordnungsblatt für das Generalgouvernement Nr. 8243) wurden vom Standgericht der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD für den Distrikt Galizien

zum Tode verurteilt:

- 15) Kulak Simeon, geb. 12. 12. 1915 in Hozjów, Ukrainer, verh. Landwirt, wohnhaft in Hozjów, wegen Judenbegünstigung.
- 16) Kulak Nikolaus, geb. 10. 12. 1910 in Hozjów, Ukrainer, verh. Müller, wohnhaft in Hozjów, wegen Judenbegünstigung.
- 17) Nazar geb. Turynik Maria, 35 Jahre, Ukrainerin, verw. wohnhaft in Synowalsko Wyzne, wegen Judenbegünstigung.

Straj, den 18. Februar 1944.

Der SS- und Polizeiführer

im Distrikt Galizien.

1205 II 1944. -- 4074 191

Official Nazi announcement of the execution of Ukrainian patriots for giving aid and comfort to the Jews.

particular the *Nachtigal*, began to be accused in the 1950's and 1960's of perpetrating murderous activities in 1941, when attending the proclamation of the restoration of Ukrainian statehood on June 30, 1941. Later accusations asserted that the legion supposedly murdered Polish intellectuals and some other 7,000 people in those days. The truth is, however, that the KGB (then called the MVD), before retreating in haste from West Ukraine murdered many thousands of Ukrainian patriots in the prisons of numerous cities, such as Lviv, Stanislaw, Sambir, Tarnopil, Vynnytsia, Zhytomir and others.¹⁴ It was very convenient for the Soviet-Russians to make the *Nachtigal* and the *OUN* responsible for their own war crimes. That was exactly the same maneuver the Soviet-Russians employed in the case of the Katyn massacre of Polish officers.

Nevertheless, the accusation of the *Nachtigal* was proven completely unfounded. First of all, the International Tribunal in Nuremberg found the assertions false. It had been asserted there, that all the executions were carried out by the *Gestapo* units according to the plans prepared by German government agencies beforehand. Secondly, the same findings were arrived at by the Soviet Extraordinary Commission, which published the results of its investigation on the 23rd of December 1944.¹⁵ The report exonerated the *Nachtigal*.




Execution of Ukrainian nationalists by the Nazis in Stanyslaviv (Presently Ivano-Frankivsk).

Years later, in the 1950's, in connection with the Russian accusations of T. Oberlander, the member of Adenauer's cabinet in West Germany who was closely connected with the *Nachtigal* legion, the case was reopened in the courts. In West Germany, after a careful investigation, T. Oberlander and the *Nachtigal* were fully exonerated. In East Germany, however, the court, having fully suppressed the report of the Extraordinary State Commission of the USSR of 1944, found *Nachtigal* guilty. It was, of course, a part of the Soviet-Russian political assassination technique and disinformation campaign. The legion was certainly responsible for anti-Soviet activity and had to be sentenced and it did not matter to the Soviet-Russians on what grounds.¹⁶

The accusations against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the *OUN* of any war crimes never had any substance. The *UPA* just carried out guerilla warfare against the Germans and the Russians. Only later was the slander campaign initiated in the West in order to weaken the successes of the former *UPA* soldiers and other East Europeans in their anti-Soviet political activities. It exposed the million-fold Soviet-Russian genocides by artificial famines, deportations of millions of human beings to concentration camps to die, incarcerations in prisons and asylums of hundreds of thousands, and mass violations of human rights in the USSR.

In one respect, the KGB-sponsored disinformation campaign scored considerable success by convincing the American Office of Special Investigations and



Ukrainian patriots executed by the Nazis in Mykolaiv.

the American courts to use Soviet witnesses and Soviet documentation in the process of bringing war criminals to justice. Of course, whatever the Soviet-Russians supplied in this respect is largely a grand forgery, prepared under the auspices of the KGB, the Russian version of the Nazi *Gestapo*. It is hardly comprehensible — how did it happen — that these agencies could have been so easily taken for a ride by the KGB.

It is understandable that the war criminals should be brought to justice, but the innocent should not be punished through the use of Soviet supplied forgeries and falsifications.

The division "Galicia," organized in the framework of the Waffen SS in 1943, was designated to fight against the Red armies only, and never against the Western Allies. Yet, recently it was accused by the KGB disinformation campaign of war crimes committed in 1941. At that time, the division did not even exist. In the book *Arms of Valor* by General P. Shandruk, there is not even the slightest reference made to any possible involvement of the division in any war crimes.¹⁷

BEKANNTSCHAFTUNG

An den weiter unten aufgeführten 30 Personen, die gegenwärtig Bekanntheitschancen von 21. 1. 44 bis 1. 44, und von 3. 2. 44, trotzdem als bereits vom Standgericht der Sicherheitspolizei wegen ihrer begangenen Verbrechen zum Tode verurteilt worden waren **begnadigt** werden sollten, falls in den nächsten 2 Monaten im Bereiche der Kreishauptmannschaften Drohobycz und Stryi keine weiteren Gewalttaten und Überfälle auf Deutsche oder in deutschen Diensten stehende Nichtdeutsche ausgeübt werden, ist der Totenartikel aus heutigen Tage in **Herodyssaea (10) und in Krausberg (23)** durch öffentliches Erschieszen aus folgenden Gründe vollstreckt worden:

Diese Erschiesnungen mussten als Sühnemaßnahmen für den am 11. 2. 44 erfolgten Überfall durch ukr. Banditen auf den ukr. Polizeiposten in **Herodyssaea**, Kreis Drohobycz wobei der Postenkommandant **Roman Kotshubol**, der ukr. Polizist **Ivan Ortyshol**, und die Hauswirtschafterin der Postenkommandanten verschleppt wurden und für den am gleichen Tage durch dieselbe Bande erfolgten Überfall in **Krausberg**, Kreis Drohobycz, wobei die Volksdeutschen, Gemeindeführer **Tatjan Binkler, Wilhelm Schneider, Siegfried Warchewicz und Johann Kalman** stachlich aus **Krausberg** verschleppt und wahrscheinlich ermordet wurden, durchgeführt werden.

Es fanden sich am folgende bereits vom Standgericht der Sicherheitspolizei zum Tode verurteilte Personen:

- 1) **Peczeny Oleksa**, geb. am 26. 3. 1907 in Suchow, Ukraine, verh., wohnhaft in Suchow, Nr. 120, Landwirt, wegen Bandenangehörigkeit.
- 2) **Peczeny Dymtro**, geb. 26. 10. 1911 in Suchow, **Ukrainer**, verh., wohnhaft in Suchow, Nr. 37, Landwirt, wegen Bandenangehörigkeit.
- 3) **Stobola Oleksa**, geb. 27. 3. 1912 in Suchow, **Ukrainer**, verh., Landwirt, wohnhaft in Suchow, Nr. 129, wegen Bandenangehörigkeit.
- 4) **Kaszyrner Wladimir**, geb. 22. 1. 1904 in Skole, **Ukrainer**, verh., **Magazineur**, wohnhaft in Skole, **Straß 25** wegen OUN-Organisationszugehörigkeit.
- 5) **Dyrancew Michael**, geb. 20. 11. 1912 in Korostow, **Ukrainer**, ledig, **Waldarbeiter**, wohnhaft in Korostow, wegen OUN-Organisationszugehörigkeit.
- 6) **Sulistan Michael**, geb. 1. 10. 1932 in Korostow, **Ukrainer**, ledig, **Waldarbeiter**, wohnhaft in Korostow, wegen OUN-Organisationszugehörigkeit.
- 7) **Jaksa Theodor**, geb. 16. 4. 1889 in **Rozatka Wyzna**, **Ukrainer**, verh., **Förster**, wohnhaft in Korostow, wegen OUN-Organisationszugehörigkeit, **Mord** an dem ukrainischen Förster **Babyl** und Überfall auf das Bandenlager in **Sietulow**.
- 8) **Uznowicz Ewa**, geb. Pankiv, geb. 20. 7. 1905 in Korostow, **Ukrainerin**, verwitwet, wohnhaft in Korostow, wegen OUN-Organisationszugehörigkeit.
- 9) **Sawczyn Wasyl**, geb. 27. 8. 1940 in Korostow, **Ukrainer**, verh., **Heger**, wohnhaft in Korostow, wegen OUN-Organisationszugehörigkeit.
- 10) **Iwanowicz Nihilant**, geb. 1. 1. 1892 in Suchow, **Ukrainer**, verh., **Dorfschule**, wohnhaft in Suchow, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 11) **Tur Michael**, geb. 21. 3. 1917 in Stryczow, **Ukrainer**, verh., **Verkäufer**, wohnhaft in Stryczow, wegen UPA-Organisationszugehörigkeit.
- 12) **Myron Orlan**, geb. 29. 9. 1914 in Stryna, **Ukrainer**, **Landwirt**, ledig, wohnhaft in Stryna, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 13) **Pyntushewytsch Iwan**, geb. 4. 6. 1904 in **Mohylowka**, **Ukrainer**, **Arbeiter**, ledig, wohnhaft in **Rosochica**, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 14) **Mamryk Iwan**, geb. 28. 12. 1921 in **Kuba**, **Ukrainer**, **Wagner**, ledig, wohnhaft in **Kuba**, wegen Banden-Organisationszugehörigkeit.
- 15) **Dialiw Iwan**, geb. 15. 1. 1911 in **Lond-Dulce**, **Ukrainer**, ledig, wohnhaft in **Lond-Dulce**, wegen Banden-Organisationszugehörigkeit.
- 16) **Pytyczak**, geb. **Laworek Pankiw**, 66 Jahre alt **Ukrainer**, wohnhaft in **Rosochica**, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 17) **Pytyczak**, geb. **Orestek Anna**, 69 Jahre alt, **Ukrainer**, wohnhaft in **Myta**, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 18) **Magola Wasyl**, geb. 13. 1. 1913 in **Krupiwka**, **Ukrainer**, **Heger**, verh., wohnhaft in **Krupiwka**, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 19) **Fytsch Michael**, geb. 18. 8. 1894 in **Krupiwka**, **Ukrainer**, **Heger**, verh., wohnhaft in **Krupiwka**, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 20) **Petis Nikolas**, geb. 1903 in **Kuba**, **Ukrainer**, verh., **Waldarbeiter**, wohnhaft in **Kuba**, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 21) **Pilak Michael**, geb. 2. 10. 1925 in **Dystrow**, **Ukrainer**, **Buchhalter**, ledig, wohnhaft in **Dystrow**, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 22) **Trivski Emil**, geb. 24. 12. 1921 in **Komarni**, **Ukrainer**, **Landwirt**, ledig, wohnhaft in **Komarni**, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 23) **Cherny Jarko**, geb. 1900 in **Zalokice**, **Ukrainer**, **Landwirt**, verh., wohnhaft in **Zalokice**, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 24) **Wozon Tymko**, geb. 31. 11. 1917 in **Zalokice**, **Ukrainer**, **Landwirt**, ledig, wohnhaft in **Zalokice**, Nr. 78, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 25) **Fecjak Nasek**, geb. 1922 in **Zalokice**, **Ukrainer**, ledig, **Arbeiterin**, wohnhaft in **Zalokice**, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 26) **Horynchen Michael**, geb. 1916 in **Zalokice**, **Ukrainer**, ledig, **Landwirt**, wohnhaft in **Zalokice**, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 27) **Pricak Michael**, geb. 11. 12. 1922 in **Zalokice**, **Ukrainer**, **Arbeiter**, ledig, wohnhaft in **Zalokice**, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 28) **Fecjak Wasyl**, geb. 2. 4. 1903 in **Zalokice**, **Ukrainer**, **Leiter** der freis. **Feuerwehr**, ledig, wohnhaft in **Zalokice**, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 29) **Pricak Wasyl**, geb. 1. 2. 1906 in **Zalokice**, **Ukrainer**, **Dorfschule**, verh., wohnhaft in **Zalokice**, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.
- 30) **Pricak Michael**, geb. 6. 8. 1921 in **Zalokice**, **Ukrainer**, **Landwirt**, ledig, wohnhaft in **Zalokice**, wegen Bandenbegünstigung.

An die gesamte einheimische Bevölkerung ergibt letztendlich das Anbot, in ihrem eigenen Interesse daran mitzuwirken, derartige Überfälle zu verhindern, bzw. den oder die Täter sofort der nächsten Polizeistation zu melden.

Alle sachdienlichen Mitteilungen, die zur Überführung des Täters beitragen können, werden streng vertraulich behandelt werden.

Drohobycz, den 15. 2. 1944.

Der SS- und Polizeiführer
im Distrikt Galizien

1200. II. 1944. — 4994. 261.

Official Nazi announcement of the execution of 30 Ukrainians, members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Drohobycz, 1944.

Typical KGB-sponsored misinformation about the Ukrainian struggle misled and confused some Western journalists, who unwittingly, without corroborating the sources they used, continued to publish distortions in Western papers, including such US papers as, *The Daily News*, *The New York Times*, *The Village Voice*, and others. In May 1985, a typically distorted article to that effect had been published by *The Village Voice* in New York, entitled "Reagan and the War Crimes Lobby."¹⁸ One can wonder right away by reading the title alone. It cannot be right and objective. The intention of slandering Ronald Reagan is obvious here for any serious and objective reader.

When reading the article, one can find the familiar tendency of slandering the Ukrainian struggle for independence in the years 1940-1945, and of accusing the OUN, the ABN (Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations), the *Nachtigal*, S. Bandera and Ya. Stetsko of Nazi collaboration and war crimes. The historical facts, the distortions and the outright lies are thoroughly mixed together to utterly confuse the uninformed.

Other similar essays were published in the West. One may only wonder who was behind such insincere publications.¹⁹

It was a pity that the KGB succeeded even in confusing, in this respect, some Jewish circles, which unwittingly joined that Russian-sponsored misinformation drive to discredit the Ukrainian independence struggle, considered to be quite dangerous for the Soviet Union, the modern version of the Russian empire. Also, the Russian and Polish speaking broadcasts of *Radio Liberty* and *Radio Free Europe* occasionally became victims of the skillful Russian maneuvering of the anti-Ukrainian misinformation drive.

FOOTNOTES

¹ On the role of Communism: N. Chirovsky *The Economic Factors in the Growth of Russia*, New York, 1957, pp. 133-146; M. Bradovich, *Derzhava bez Natsii*, New York, 1952; A. Pankratova, *Velikii Russkii Narod*, Moscow, 1947, pp. 100 and others. Pankratova called the Russian people the most outstanding force in the USSR: also W. Kulski, *The Soviet Regime — Communism in Practice*, Syracuse, 1954, pp. 60-63, 73-79; he wrote about the continuous glorification of the Russian people in the USSR, Congressman Smith of Wisconsin said the following to the point: "Bolshevism is a product of the imperialist spirituality of Russia. A struggle against Bolshevism cannot be separated from the struggle against the Russian Empire — the USSR." *Congressional Record-House*, January 19, 1956, p. 803; V. Stoiko, "Napriamky istoriohraffi v Ukrainskii SSR," *Russification of Ukraine* (in Ukrainian), ed. by L. Poltava, New York, 1984.

² For example, M. Ya. Danilevskii drew the geopolitical lines for the invasion of present Bolshevism as early as 1865-67: "The Russian people who live between two oceans, the eastern and the western, wash by their (human) waves two capitals, Moscow and Peking, and its history is that junction from which grow new centers of the world's history because, for the time being, we see no other possibility of solution of modern problems"; *Yevropa i Rossia*, as quoted in *Congressional Record-House*, January 19, 1956, Smith of Wisconsin, pp. 802-803.

³ Ya. Stetsko, "Kolonialna polityka Nimechchyny v Ukraini vede ii v provalla," *30 Chervnia* 1941, Toronto, 1967, pp. 315-326.

⁴ *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D., Vol. XII, p. 6*; also, *The Restoration of the Ukrainian State in World War II*, Ukrainian Central Information Service, Toronto, p. 43: Any insinuation of the OUN collaboration with the Nazis may be easily refuted on the basis of the work of H. Hohne, *Canaris*, transl. by J. Maxwell Brown John, Garden City, N.Y., 1979, pp. 314 ff., 354 ff., 365, 451-52, 459, 462-63; Also, L. Shankovsky, *Iniitsiatyvnyi Komitet dla stvorennia Ukrainskoi Holovnoi Vyzvolnoi Rady*, New York, 1985, pp. 39-46.

⁵ *Trial of the Major War Criminals*. The International Military Tribunal, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946, Nurenberg, 1949, No. 7, p. 269; also, *Document 014 USSR*, p. 265; *The Restoration...*, pp. 10 and 41; German terror against the Ukrainian freedom fighters: *The UPA in Light of German Documents, Litopys UPA*, T. Hunczak, Ed., Toronto, 1983, Vol 5 (1942-1944), pp. 58-67, and other.

⁶ *The Restoration*, pp. 45-46.

⁷ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1972, Vol. XXII, p. 473.

⁸ *Encyclopedia International*, 1971, Vol. XVIII, pp. 321-322.

⁹ A. Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945*, New York, 1957, pp. 119-120.

¹⁰ J. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, New York, 1963, pp. 81-84. The Ukrainian freedom fighters in German concentration camps: P. Mirchuk, *In the German Mills of Death*, New York, 1976.

¹¹ D. Stewart-Smith *The Defeat of Communism*, New York, 1964, p. 97.

¹² W. Chamberlin, "The Ukrainian Struggle for Freedom," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, New York, 1945-1946, II, 2, pp. 112-113.

¹³ *The Restoration...*, pp. 60-61.

¹⁴ *Zlochyny Moskvy u Vynnytsi*, published by the Ukrainian Youth Association, New York, 1951; Rev. I. Nahayevsky, *History of Ukraine*, Philadelphia, 1975, p. 298; O. Martovych, *Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Modern Times*, Edinburg, 1951, p. 91; V. Kubiowych, "Western Ukraine after June 22, 1941," *Ukraine, a Concise Encyclopedia*, Toronto, 1963, Vol. I, p. 886: "However, the Bolsheviks succeeded in annihilating some 10,000 political prisoners in Western Ukraine before and after the outbreak of hostilities (massacres took place in the prisons in Lviv, Zolochiv, Rivne, Dubno, Lutsk, etc.)."

¹⁵ *International Military Tribunal*, Nurenberg, USSR, Exhibit 6, RG 238, Records of National Archives, Collection of World War II War Crimes, USSR-6; also, *Protokol No. 47; Zasiedanie Chrezvichainoi Gosudarstvennoi Komissii...* ot ... 1944 G.; also, M. Kalba, *Nachtigal, Kurin DUN*, Denver, 1984, pp. 68-106.

¹⁶ Kalba, *op. cit.*

¹⁷ P. Shandruk, *Arms of Valor*, New York, 1959; Shandruk was the Division's Commander-in-Chief.

¹⁸ *The Village Voice*, New York, May 14, 1985, p. 20. A similar article was also published in *The Globe and Mail*, April 22, 1985 under the title "Ukrainian Vets Expect Inquiry." One of the answers to the recent accusations of the Ukrainian resistance: "Letter, SS Smear," a letter to the editor by J. Mace, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, *The Village Voice*, May 28, 1985, p. 4.

¹⁹ The only answer to the unexpected, though largely unwarranted, attacks can be deduced from the mentioned book by J. Barron, *KGB Today: The Hidden Hand*, 1983: Simply, special units of the KGB busily manufacture massive distortions and falsifications just to confuse the issues, and the results manifest themselves in the press, where the correspondents publish poorly researched and poorly verified articles, like E. Nelson in *The Daily News*, J. Ferguson in *The Globe and Mail*, or Joe Conason in *The Village Voice*. Of course, there is no room here to start any detailed polemics.

CONCLUSION

The Second World War did not bring the national liberation of Ukraine in spite of enormous sacrifices of human lives and immeasurable sufferings of millions. Ukraine was at war on two fronts, against the Nazi Germans and Red Russians for many years. The Nazis wanted to turn Ukraine into their colony, while the Red Russians finally achieved that identical goal again after the war. The Ukrainian resistance has continued until the present without interruption on Ukrainian soil, while the Ukrainians in the Free World effectively supported it by all available peaceful means: publications, lectures, press, contacts with Western political leaders, exposing the true face of imperialist Russia under the disguise of the so-called Soviet Union.

Of course, the Soviet propaganda and misinformation machine has fought back by spreading distortions and falsifications about the Ukrainian liberation struggle. To summarize the findings, let us quote two more works, which fully dismiss the Soviet-Russian insinuations. F. Ancevicz, a Polish politician, who cannot be suspected of being partial in the matter, pointed out the following in his letter to the editor of the Polish journal *Kultura*, published in Paris:

The national organization of Lithuanian activists, . . . as well as the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), led by Stephan Bandera, were spontaneous, anti-Communist national movements, which externally manifested themselves by the formation of independent national governments to the contrary of Hitler's plans. Consequently, the Germans liquidated them ruthlessly. . . .

The German government attempted to suppress completely the very fact of the formation of those national governments and to keep it away from the knowledge of foreign newsmen. . . .

While, however, by the end of August 1941, the matter of those two governments was, by my mediation, raised by American reporters . . . *Reichspropagandaministerium* . . . cynically answered, that the Germans know nothing about any formation of such governments in Kaunas (Kowno) and Lviv. . . .¹

In a recent publication, *Initiation Committee for the Creation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR)*, by L. Shankovsky, it has been fully exhorted, how completely anti-Nazi and anti-Communist the Ukrainian

struggle for independence was. Furthermore, Shankovsky brings to light evidence of military protection, extended to the Jewish population by the units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, to save it from Nazi genocide.²

Footnotes

¹ F. Ancewich, "Listy do Redakcji," *Kultura*, Paris, Nr. 6/116, pp. 154-155; other Polish testimonies; "Sprawa Ukraińska" L. dz K. 6923/43, tajne. PRM/124, L. dz. 1737/IV/44, *Zeszyty Historyczne*, Paris, 1985, Nr. 71, pp. 121-137, the cruel Nazi reaction on the reconstruction of the Ukrainian statehood by S. Bandera and Ya. Stetsko in 1941 and their refusal to submit to the German pressure is fully explained there.

² L. Shankovsky, *Iniitsiatyvnyi Komitet dla stvorennia Ukrainskoi Holovnoi Vyzvolnoi Rady*, New York, 1985, pp. 28-29 and many others. As the Red Army approached, the Jewish refugees were set free. In the Carpathian Mountains, the Jewish refugees were helped by the UPA units to cross the borders in order to avoid Nazi extermination. On the German handling of the Ukrainian and Lithuanian questions: *Ibid.*, pp. 41-45.

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