UKRAINIAN-JEWISH RELATIONS

in historical perspective

Edited by
Peter J. Potichnyj and
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Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies

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Ukrainian - Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective

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Dedication

To the late Professor Shmuel Ettinger
and Professor Omeljan Pritsak, whose spirit of
collaboration permeates this entire volume.

Preface

Every idea has its time. Thoughts that may be unthinkable or heretical to one generation may become commonplace and acceptable to another. At least among intellectuals and in an academic community, one hopes that there is enough courage to take on unusual ideas and to consider them carefully, dispassionately and with self-critical candour. One such idea is Jewish-Ukrainian relations.

For some years now, academicians in various countries have had the courage to suggest that it may be the propitious time to undertake a discussion of Jewish-Ukrainian relations. A number of efforts, on an individual and collaborate basis, have been undertaken. Small meetings, discussions and public conferences have taken place. On the basis of these preliminary dialogues and with the urging of a wide variety of eminent scholars and community leaders, it was decided in early 1983 that a full-scale, organized conference of eminent scholars in the field should take place. The resulting Conference on Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective took place at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, from 17 to 20 October 1983.

Two eminent scholars, in particular, showed the collaborative spirit and strong desire to ensure the success of this conference—Professor Omeljan Pritsak of Harvard University and Professor Shmuel Ettinger of the Hebrew University. From the early planning stages of this conference to its conclusion, both gentlemen offered the support, intellectual guidance and commitment to honest discussion so urgently needed in such an undertaking. It is to these two gentlemen that this volume, which represents the papers and the proceedings of the conference, is dedicated.

The scope of the conference was exceedingly ambitious. As a result, the papers range across ten centuries of an extremely complex relation-

ship between Jews and Ukrainians. It is to the credit of the contributors that they have undertaken their tasks with honesty, scholarship and openness. Dr. Richard Pipes, Dr. George Gajecky, Dr. Roman Szporluk, Mr. Boris Stein and Dr. Andrzej Kaminski, all of whom made major contributions to the conference, have decided not to submit their papers for publication. Dr. Alexander Baran, a participant at the conference and a chairman of one of the sessions, submitted a paper to us following the conference concerning Jewish-Ukrainian relations in Transcarpathia. We have decided to include this important contribution in this volume.

As editors, we have tried to offer counsel, editorial guidance and advice to the contributors of the papers in their revisions. However, the perspectives and views expressed by the various scholars in their papers reflect their own—and at times highly personal—perspectives on the problems under examination. The final versions of their papers remain their own responsibility. We have also included the written records of the round-table discussion and the session of the conference that dealt with Jews and Ukrainians in Canada. The spirit of openness, sincerity and cooperation that marked the proceedings of the entire conference comes through very clearly in these two sessions.

Many individuals and institutions contributed generously to the organization, funding and success of the conference. Among them are: the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta and its former director, Dr. Manoly R. Lupul; McMaster University and its president, Dr. Alvin A. Lee, Vice-President Academic, Dr. Les J. King, and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Dr. Peter J. George; the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Toronto and its holder, Dr. Paul R. Magocsi; the Bronfman Family Foundation, whose grant assisted the publication of this volume; the Women's Branch of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee in Hamilton; the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and its director, Dr. Omeljan Pritsak; the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Michigan and its former director, Dr. Zvi Gitelman, the Hadassah-WIZO (Women's International Zionist Organization) of Hamilton; and the Multicultural Directorate, Department of the Secretary of State, Government of Canada.

It is with deep sadness that we publish Professor Ivan L. Rudnytsky's paper, the last that he presented before his untimely death. It is appropriate that the thoughts, erudition and, above all, courage that he brought to the discussion of Jewish-Ukrainian relations stand now as his final scholarly contribution.

Howard Aster
Peter J. Potichnyj

I

The Early Period

Omeljan Pritsak

The Pre-Ashkenazic Jews of Eastern Europe in Relation to the Khazars, the Rus' and the Lithuanians

At the outset, let me note that the title of my lecture, should not be taken literally. In fact it delineates only this lecture's time-scope and uses the current terminology. My discussion focuses on the pre-Ashkenazic Jewry of Eastern Europe in relation to the three subsequent political powers in the forest-steppe zones of Eastern Europe—the Khazars, the Rus' and the Lithuanians—and the people whom they ruled. Hence it is necessary to divide the lecture into three parts: the Khazar period, 650–960; the Rus' period, 960–1360; and the Lithuanian period, 1360–1495. In 1495, the Lithuanian Grand Prince, Alexander, issued an edict, unprecedented in these territories, which simply expelled Jews from Lithuania. It marked the end of an era and the end of the pre-Ashkenazic Jews in Eastern Europe. Therefore, 1495 is a fitting end point for my discussion.

I

The first problem scholars face in studying the Khazar epoch is terminology. Paradoxically, there were neither ethnic Khazars, nor a Khazar language. By the seventh century, the name "Khazar" was already a geographic term, which the fugitive West Turkic (T'u-chüe) kagan introduced into his title, replacing "*Türk* Kagan" with "*Khazar* Kagan." Having been forced by the victorious Chinese to abandon Turkestan, the

kagan transferred the seat of his government to the Northern Caucasus and to the Crimean cities located on the territory then called "Khazar."[1] He also approved the continuous use there of the Hunnic language, which previously had the status of a *lingua franca*; that language would later be designated in some sources, falsely, as "the Khazar language."

In the 830s, the religious controversy forced the ruling Khazar kagan to emigrate. He took refuge in one of the trading factories of the international company called *Rūs,* where he found an opportunity to exchange the now unrealistic designation "Khazar" for "Rūs," after the name of the trading company that sheltered him.[2] This factory was located in the middle course of the Volga, between the future cities Iaroslav and Rostov.[3] In this way, a second kaganate, the "Rus kagan," was established in the Volga basin. Historians subsequently termed his branch of the dynasty as the "Rurikids," in the spirit of the addage *Lucus a non lucendo*.

The next terminological problem concerns the concept of "nomadic empires," among which the Khazar state is usually included. The so-called nomadic empire was not a creation of the steppe-zone pasturalists, but a joint venture of charismatic clans, which usually resided near an important city and specialized in military leadership, and international merchants, who wanted to establish a *pax* that would allow them to act without hindrance. From about 400 B.C. the Altaic peoples (Huns, Turks, Mongols, Tunguz) were the main suppliers of the charismatic clans, although the international traders of the region were usually eastern or western Iranians.

Contrary to the general assumption, the economy of the nomadic empires was based not on pasturalism, but on the "milking" of multi–ethnic cities along the important trade routes, and especially along the frontiers with sedentary states. There was, therefore, no religious or linguistic discrimination in a nomadic empire. The role of languages was functional, and at least two *linguae francae* were in use.[4]

In order to assure the security of the *pax*, a trained military force was needed. Only in the steppe zone proper were mobile pasturalists actually drafted. In territories with no adequate pastures, other solutions were sought. For instance, the Avars in Central Europe organized along the Danube limes an amphibial force of specially trained Slavic slaves.[5] The Ottoman Turks created an elite Janissary corps by drafting male children from among their Balkan Christian subjects, while the Khazar kagan maintained a standing army by recruiting professional soldiers from among the Muslim Khwārizmians in Central Asia.

The empire of the Khazar kagan (the Khazar Empire) was a creation of the Turkic charismatic clan (as mentioned above) and of the Western Iranian mercantile clan of *Varāz* (Turkic *Barč*).[6] The history of their pol-

ity can be divided into two periods: the North Caucasian (650–750) and the Volga-Donets (750–965). During the first period, the Khazars concentrated their efforts on the conquest of the Southern Caucasus (the city of Derbend and the Alan Gate) in order to gain control over the Iranian trade routes. But they suffered a crushing defeat by the Omeiyad Arabs (737) and consequently had to change the direction of their activities.[7]

By 750, the Khazars had transferred their capital from the Northern Caucasus to the estuary of the Volga. With the emergence of the Abbasids' Baghdad as the foremost economic centre of the known world, the new capital soon proved advantageous. Now the Volga became an important highway for international trade. The first international merchant company to establish commercial ties with the Warāz clan was the Rādāniya from the French Midi. They so impressed the chief of the clan that he accepted their brand of rabbinical Judaism.[8] The Rādāniya were responsible for bringing the designation *zhid* to Central and Eastern Europe.[9]

Special mention should be made of the Crimean and Taman cities that came under Khazar domination. Of them, Kherson and Doros were known centres of Christianity, whereas Phanagoria, Kerch (old Panticapaeum), and Tmutorokan, also called Smkrč al-Yahūd, ("Jewish," old Hermanassa), were cities with hellenistic traditions, known for their Judeo-Greek syncretism and literary productivity in many languages.[10] On the other hand, the North Caucasian cities, such as Semender (the first Khazar capital), had along with Christians and Jews a strong Muslim element in their population.[11] Their religious tolerance is best described by an Arabic author of the first half of the tenth century (al-Mas'ūdī): in the new Khazar capital seven judges functioned: two each for the three major religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and a seventh specifically for the "pagans."[12]

Four ninth-century events determined the fate of the Khazar state. The chief of the Iranian Varāz, then also functioning as the state's majordomo, forced the kagan to accept Judaism. The struggle that ensued led to the creation of the Rus' kaganate (c. 830), mentioned above.[13]

After Charlemagne destroyed his Khazarian western neighbour, the nomadic empire of the Avars in Central Europe, he felt it necessary to secure his western frontiers, now in a political vacuum and therefore subject to unpredictable activities. His solution was to engage Slavic-speaking Avar marines and Altaic Onogurs and to settle them in a system of fortresses. Included were Sarkel on the Don, and Kiev on the Dnieper.[14] In the 880s, a major shift in historical development occurred. The Byzantines established themselves as the dominant power in the Mediterranean, and Constantinople replaced Baghdad as the centre of economic activity. The routes (rivers) leading there took on new importance; the

Dnieper gradually replaced the Volga in commercial supremacy. Two polities immediately understood the implied consequences and acted accordingly.

The Pechenegs had to leave the Syr-Daria basin. Originally defeated by the Khazars and their allies, the Pechenegs nevertheless succeeded in crossing the Khazar territory and creating a wedge in the steppe zone by controlling the maritime towns.[15] From 895 to 1783 the steppe zone remained in nomadic hands.

Around 930, the Volga Rus' kagans decided to take control over the Dnieper route and to eliminate the Volga competition. The first objective was realized by Kagan Igor, and the second, in the 960s, by Kagan Sviatoslav. These achievements also marked the end of the polity of the Khazar kagan, i. e., of the Khazar empire.

The demise of the realm of the Khazar kagan, perceived as the Jewish state, became a mystery to Jews from the time of Judah Halevi's "Kuzari," which was written in the 1130s–1140s.[16] The romantic yearning for Jewish greatness resulted in the fictional creation of a mighty Jewish Khazar kingdom. Whatever type of state was considered attractive in a given period, Jewish scholars and writers projected Khazarian political glory accordingly. On the other hand, tales about fugitive Jewish Khazar tribes came into being. One variant depicted the proselytic Khazarian Jews as the progenitors of the Ashkenazim. It was recently revived and propounded by the late Arthur Koestler.[17] Fortunately, a brilliant article by Zvi Ankori has put to rest this absurd notion of the otherwise judicious Koestler.[18]

My analysis of the Khazarian political system shows that the empire of the Khazar kagan could not have been a Jewish national state in any sense of the word. The Jews, both proselytes and those from the Jewish diaspora, made up a significant but not total part of the Khazar ruling elite, the significant exception being the military. They lived both in towns and in strongholds.

Recent archaeological excavations, mainly by Mikhail Artamonov and Svetlana Pletneva, have established that in Khazaria there were fourteen towns (six in the Crimea, two in Ukraine, two in the North Caucasus and four in the Don-Volga basin) and about twenty military strongholds (twelve of them, "the whitestone towns," were in the Siverskyi Donets basin).[19]

The Arab writers of the first half of the tenth century al-Mascūdī and al-Istakhrī noted that the Khazar capital's population consisted of four religious groups, in the following proportions: 2/7 Jews, 2/7 Christians, 2/7 Muslims and 1/7 "pagans."[20] Since al-Istakhrī says that the Muslims in Itil numbered 10,000 (i. e., 2/7),[21] the capital city must have had approximately 35,000 inhabitants. Since the other towns ranged between

10,000 (Crimea) and 1,000, the figure of 5,000 can be taken as an average. The total urban population (14 towns) would therefore have been about 70,000 and 35,000 additional population for the capital, i.e., a total of 105,000 townsmen, which is somewhat high for that period.

Constantine Porphyrogenitus (ca. 948) cited the figure of 300 men as being "posted and annually relieved" in the stronghold of Sarkel.[22] Multiplying that figure by twenty, i.e., the number of strongholds, results in an approximate total of 6,000 people in strongholds. Hence, the Khazar town and settlement population numbered approximately 111,000.

Taking as a basis the religious make-up of the capital city of Itil as noted above, one can assume that about 30,500 Jews lived in the state of the Khazar kagan. This comparatively small number of Jews in Khazaria, dispersed over a large territory, may account for the lack of Jewish religious-intellectual centres there.

Only four Khazar towns (Tmutorokan, Semender, Kiev and Chernihiv) came under Rus' domination after the dissolution of the Khazar Empire. (Except for Tmutorokan, the Crimean towns were not directly affected by the political change.) Their total population was not more than twenty-five thousand. This means that only about eight thousand Khazarian Jews (two-sevenths of the total urban population) could potentially be included in the pagan Rus' state. If one takes into account that there were war casualties, that some Khazarian Jews left and that others later (by 988) joined the pagan Rus' in accepting Christianity, the number decreases still further.[23]

We should keep in mind a figure of less then 8,000 for the number of Jews in the area in the first half of the tenth century as we enter the next era in the history of Jews in Eastern Europe—the Rus' period.

II

Kiev was founded as a stronghold by the Khazars in the first half of the ninth century.[24] This is corroborated by the archaeological finds of the Saltovo culture recently discovered in Kiev.[25] The Saltovo culture was typical for all Khazarian strongholds of the ninth-tenth centuries. With the opening of trade routes, first (after 843) the land route Regensburg-Itil and then (after 880) the fluvial route "from the Varangians to the Greeks,"[26] Kiev acquired importance as the trading station Sambata (literally "Saturday," as the market was held there on that day). The author established the Khazarian origin of the old Kiev toponymy as represented in the *Rus' Primary Chronicle,* in *Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century,* published jointly with Norman Golb.[27]

The original inner town of Kiev consisted of only one borough

(konets), the *Kopyrev konets,* a name derived from the important Khazar tribal group *Kabar/Kapyr.* In the twelfth century the borough had two gates: the *Podol* gate connected *Kopyrev konets* with the commercial industrial suburb (Podol); while the *Zhidovskye* or "Jewish" gate linked the (later) "Iaroslav town" (imperial Kiev after 1030) with this borough. The western and southern areas of the affluent *Kopyrev konets* were still called *Zhidove* (accusative *Zhidy),* or "the Jews," in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. In the commercial suburb of Podol, the main district was called "Kozare," or "the Khazars"; there, near the harbour on the Pochaina stream, was the Khazarian customs office (*Pasyncha beseda).*[28]

The Hebrew scholar Norman Golb, of the University of Chicago, found a letter among Hebrew texts from the Cairo Geniza (held in Cambridge, England), which he suspected was written in Kiev. He came to Harvard and showed me a photograph of the text, thus initiating a cooperation that resulted in the monograph cited above, which was published last year. There it is shown that the letter is authentic and that it is only known surviving document from the Khazarian administration. It is written in Hebrew, but with an added chancery remark in the Hunnic-Khazarian language for which the so-called Turkic runic script was used.

The Kievan letter was issued around 930 by the Jewish community of Kiev (*modicīm ānū lāḵem qāhal šel Qiyyōḇ* "we, community of Kiev, [hereby] inform you").[2] The names of the signatories are—as one might expect—of both Hebrew and Khazarian origin. Of special importance is that the father of one signatory had the designation *Kybr*, which is the usual Hunnic equivalent to the Turkic form *Kabar/Kapyr.*[30] This finding clearly connects the Kievan letter and the *Kopyrev konets* of the Kievan *Primary Chronicle.*[31]

Some sixty years after the Rus' conquest— between 988 and 1037—Kiev started to develop as the centre of the Christian Rus' polity. Its sacred and literary language was an artificial Church Slavonic idiom. Sometime during the first decades of the twelfth century, the Rus' church began to follow the path of Byzantine orthodoxy. However, in general the Byzantine prelates were not successful inculcating among the Rus' rulers an intolerance of Roman Catholicism or other religions.[32]

The Rus' period has two subdivisions: the Kievan, 960–1200, and the Galician-Volhynian, 1200-1360. If we set aside the frequent references in Christian literary works (usually translations from Byzantine Greek) to the Biblical Jew (called *Iiudei, Evrei, Zhidove or syny Izrailia*), the sources of the Kievan Rus' period do not explicitly mention Jews.[33] This is regrettable, since it is known that Jews lived in Kievan Rus'. But, following the adage that "no news is good news," we can surmise from the lack of reference that there was no discrimination or pogroms against the

Khazarian Jews, and that they acquired no special privileges. They were just part and parcel of the political structure and but one component of the local population. To cite an example from the "Lavrentian Chronicle": in 1106, the Kievan king Sviatopolk sent two of his commanders against the foreign foes, the Polovtsians. One was Ivan Vysatich, an elderly member of the ruling clan who died soon after this successful campaign; the other was the Khazar Ivanko Zakharich ("posla... Ivanka Zakharicha, Kozarina").[34] This old Testament patronymic (Zakharich), unusual for Kievan Rus', may indicate that Ivanko's father (and probably he himself) was a Khazar Jew by origin.

Fortunately, the Jews of Kievan Rus' (Hebrew Rusy') are mentioned several times in the Jewish Hebrew sources of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, mainly in the "Responsa" of the rabbis from the Rhineland, Champagne and Prague.[35] In the majority of cases their information is based on the personal experience of merchants (who were often scholars of a kind) travelling along the Regensburg-Kiev trade route.[36] These data make clear that there were few problems in the relations between Jews and the Rus'. The Jews were not numerous (as postulated above) in Rus', and their religious life was not particularly significant. We are told that, as in Poland and Hungary at that time, religious teachers and cantors were often lacking among Jews in Rus'.[37] Nevertheless, during the twelfth century at least two Rus' Jews went to West European centres of Jewish learning to study and became famous there. One was the Talmudist Moses of Kiev, who probably knew the tosaftist Rabbenu Jacob I. Meir Tam of Ramerupt (d. 1171) personally,[38] and the other was r. Isa (Yishaq) of Chernihiv, probably a pupil of Judah Ob. Samuel ha-Hasid of Regensburg (c. 1150-1217), who supplied Moses b. Yishad of London with some linguistic material about the Rus' Slavonic language.[39] This was probably the same *Ysaac de Russia,* who, together with two other Jews (Ysaac Ruffus and Ysaac de Beuerl), appears in the great roll of the pipe marking the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King Henry II of England (1181–2). According to this source, the trio had borrowed money and returned it honourably to their creditors.[40]

Since Samuel b. Ali (d. 1194), the head of the Babylonian academy in Baghdad,[41] corresponded with R. Moses of Kiev, the latter must have returned from the West and established his reputation in Kiev.

Moses of Kiev, also known as Moses of Rus', asked for and received two responsa from Samuel b. Ali. One has been preserved in a talmudic lexicon, edited probably by Judah b. Kalonymus of Speyer (d. 1196/1199), and the other in the collection of responsa by Meir of Rothenburg (1220–93).[42] This is one of the rare instances when we can deduce from our meagre sources the existence of Jewish intellectual activity in Kiev for a certain period.[43]

In 1171, in Cologne (Germany), a Jew from the city of Volodymyr Volynskyi, rabbi Benjamin ha-Nadib̲, became—together with the rabbi Abraham ha-Sōpēr of Carinthia (Austria)—a victim of blackmail by a local Christian woman. The incident is related by Ephraim b. Jacob of Bonn (Germany) (1133–96), in his chronicle Sēlper Zak̲ira.[44] The responsa mentioned above provide some interesting details about everyday life. One learns that Jewish merchants visiting Rus' had both fixed and negotiable prices. There was great demand in Rus' for overcoats, probably of Frisian production. One Jewish merchant describes a type of shoe unknown to him that he saw in Kiev. Another speaks about a certain beverage used during the Orthodox mass and still another about the piety of the Rus', or the softness of the soil, or the small sized cups in Rus'.[45]

One important testimony concerning the sojourn between the Jews and the Rus' is found among the Geniza documents currently kept in the Bodleian Library in Oxford. A Rus' Jew arrived in Byzantine Salonica sometime in the eleventh century. The source states that he "does not know either the Holy tongue (i.e., Hebrew) or the Greek tongue, nor does he know Arabic, but it is only the Knaanic language that the people of his native land speak."[46] Max Weinreich maintains justifiably that the source signifies "Eastern Knaanic," that is, the Slavonic language of Ukraine.[47]

"Eastern Knaanic" became the sacred language of Rus' after Iaroslav introduced the Slavonic rite into his empire (c. 1036). The author's work, *Origin of Rus'*, shows that Constantine-Cyril, the designated Slavonic apostle, first went (c. 860) from Constantinopole to the Khazarian Crimea to learn Hebrew and to master the art of translation. Only then was he able to accomplish his task. It also stresses that in the Crimea and Taman peninsula until the twelfth century, as in Turkestan, Hellenism based on the idea of marriage of cultures continued and that the role of Sogdians as translators in Central Asia was carried out in Rus' by Jews with Hellenistic traditions. In the second half of the eleventh century, the city of Tmutorokan (in Arabic sources, "the Jewish Smkrč") played an important role as the transmitter of Slavonic literature from "Black Bulgaria" to Kiev.[48] There the "Jewish War" of Josephus Flavius was translated, and the author of the "Povest vremennykh let" had at his disposal a Slavic translation of Josippon made directly from a Hebrew version in Tmutorokan.[49]

III

In March 1972, an international conference on "Jews and Slavs: Contacts and Conflicts in Russia and Eastern Europe" was convened in Los

Angeles. At that conference, Professor Henrik Birnbaum presented a learned paper entitled "On Jewish Life and Anti-Jewish Sentiments in Medieval Russia," subsequently published in Birnbaum's collection of essays (1981).[50] Birnbaum rightly opposes the pessimistic view of Professor Bernard Weinryb that "most of the theories and hypotheses concerning the [pre-fifteenth century] beginnings of East-European Jewry are no more than fiction."[51] He also expertly dismisses information about Jews given in the Old Rus' hagiographic literature as cliches having no factual value. Yet even Birnbaum failed to give an accurate assessment of one more important event, namely the so-called first Jewish pogrom in Kiev in 1113.

Jan Długosz (d. 1480), the famous Polish historian of the age of Polish Humanism—he was also a Judeophobe as will be seen later in this paper —misinterpreted one passage in the Rus' chronicle of the Hypatian type.[52] His error was repeated by the eighteenth-century Russian historian Vasilii Tatishchev (1686–1750).[53] Regrettably, their misinterpretation has also been universally accepted by modern historians. The death of the Kievan King Sviatopolk II on 16 April 1113 generated great confusion about the succession. There were two possibilities: either to follow the new patrimonial system, established only sixteen years earlier during the rule of the deceased ruler (in 1097, in Liubech), or to return to the previous, ultimately Turko-Khazarian system of "ascending the ladder." In the first case, Iaroslav Sviatopolchych, son of the deceased (and brother of the King Peter-Iaropolk, crowned in Rome by Pope Gregory VII), would be recognized as the new king.[1] According to the old system, the Kievan throne would pass to Davyd Sviatoslavych of the Chernihiv branch of the dynasty. The latter prospect did not please the Kievans who were linked with Kiev's Tmutorokan competition.[55] Thus they established a strong organization made up of Kievan boyars and supported by the head of the Rus' church, the Greek Nicephoros, who was also as active proponent of Orthodoxy.[56] They decided to invite to Kiev the prince of Pereiaslav, Volodymyr Monomakh, the son of a Kievan usurper and a Byzantine princess.

Differences also stemmed from two distinctive political (and religious) systems. Iaroslav the Wise (d. 1054), having created his *renovatio imperii*, had settled his hitherto nomadic retinue (*druzhina, vsia Rus'*) on the territory of the three major southern lands: Kiev, Chernihiv and Pereiaslav, now collectively called "the Rus' land" (*rus'skaia zemlia*). In other lands, however, nomadic retinues of the old type continued to exist. As a result, two types of ruling elites were forced to co-exist even in Kiev: the new settled boyars under the leadership of the Kievan *chiliarch* (*tysiatskyi*) (originally the head of the city's militia), and the deceased king's nomadic boyars of the old type. The leader of the former

faction is named in the source—the chiliarch (*tysiatskyi)* Putiata Vyshatich, close collaborator of Sviatopolk II, who belonged to the semi-ruling Rus' dynasty rooted in Novgorod.[57] The other faction is styled simply as *boiary*, ("best men").

The truth is that neither party was ready to co-exist with the other, and each was prepared to use any means to eliminate the other. Apparently one faction incited a rebellion, which soon turned into a "popular" revolution—the second in the history of Kievan Rus' with the result that both the legalists and supporters of Monomakh were endangered.

Fortunately, the chronicle gives both a shorter and a longer list of the parties involved:[58]

"But the Kievans looted
[1]the mansion of Putiata,
the chiliarch,
[3]and went toward *Zhidy*, and
despoiled them."

"For not only do they loot
[1]Putiata's mansion
[2]and the hundreds,
but also *Zhidy*.
[4]And in addition they will
turn against your [Monomakh's]
sister-in-law [Sviatopolk II's
widow, Byzantine princess
Barbara Komnena],
[5]and against the boyars;
[6]and against the
monasteries."

I left the word *Zhidy* untranslated. This term, the accusative form of the collective noun *Zhidove*, is used in the chronicles both as an ethnic-religious designation and as the name of a town quarter in Kiev.[59] In our text, *Zhidy* refers to the latter, as it does in the entry for the year 1124 (the Hypatian text), which states: "But the following day the Hill [*Gora*, the designation for Kiev's citadel] and all the monasteries on the Hill in the town, and the Zhidove burned down."[60]

The names of city quarters as well as of town gates are universally not subject to change. The term *Zhidove* for the basic part of the *Kopyrev konets*, or city proper, probably came into use soon after the conquest of Kiev by the Rus' (ca. 930). Since it referred to the inner town, that is, the residence of the rich Kievans, looting *Zhidove* would have been attractive to any hoodlums during a period of crisis.

During the Khazars' administration the borough *Zhidove* was—as stated above—in the hands of the Jewish Khazarian clan of Kabar/Kopyr, hence the name *Kopyrev konets*. One can assume that after the Rus' conquest, many possessions located there would have changed

hands and that the originally religious term *Zhidove* was retained only as a relic of the past.

In any event, this analysis combined with that on the social-political problems of that time, refutes the false supposition about a Jewish pogrom in Kiev in 1113.

As a addendum another alleged pogrom in Kiev can be removed from scholarly discussion. In the article cited above, Professor Birnbaum, using secondary sources writes as follows: "[There is] the first unequivocal information about a Jewish settlement in Kiev dating from 1018 and telling of Russian soldiers attacking the houses of Jews and robbing them during the short occupation of Kiev by the Polish king Boleslav the Brave coming to the aid of the Kievan Prince Svjatopolk. This event is referred to in Jan Długosz's famous fifteenth-century chronicle, *Annales seu cronice inclyti Regni Poloniae*."[61] Yet this macabre story does not occur in Długosz's history at all. The existing manuscripts and editions of that work make no mention of Jews in connection with the 1018 campaign, let alone of any pogrom.[62]

There is only one mention of Jews in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, the main source from the Galician-Volhynian Rus' state. But it has relevance to the rise in the commercial importance of the city of Volodymyr Volynskyi.

When Roman II, Prince of Volhynia (1170–1205), was first invited to assume the Galician throne (1189), he was so pleased that he immediately (and, as it turned out, prematurely) turned over his own principality to his brother. Galicia was connected by Carpathian mountain passes with Hungary and by the Dniester River with the Black Sea and Constantinople, hence its commercial importance. But by the second half of the thirteenth century the roles of Galicia and Volhynia were reversed. With the commercial revolution introduced by the Germanic association of Rheinish and Saxon towns and merchants called the Hanse, international commerce shifted to the Baltic, the North Sea and the Atlantic. The old Mediterranean, luxury-oriented trade became secondary to the new, vigorous trade in bulk.

Volodymyr Volynskyi was located near the river Bug, a tributary of the Vistula, which assumed importance because it empties into the Baltic. In the 1260s the German city of Thorn was built near the estuary of the Vistula. From the first half of the thirteenth century the Mediterranean trade was controlled by the Venetians from their colony in Sudak/Surozh.

The Volhynian chronicler clearly indicated the pivotal location of the city of Volodymyr in his description of Great Prince Volodymyr Vasylkovych's funeral in 1289: "Thus he [Prince Volodymyr] was mourned

by the entire vast [population of the city of Volodymyr]—men, women and children [and also] by Germans [Hanse merchants], Surozhians [Venetian merchants from Sudak], men of Novhorodok [Lithuanian merchants] and Jews, who wept as during the fall of Jerusalem, when they were led into Babylonian captivity."[63]

One can appreciate this warm depiction of these Rus' Jews, who were probably from Kiev. The list of mourners represents a catalogue of merchants trading with Volodymyr. Had the Jews not been mentioned, the important trade route Volodymyr-Kiev would have been unrepresented.

In the Lithuanian Grand Duchy of the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries there were six Jewish urban communities, as established by Serhii Bershadsky: one in Lithuania proper (Troki), one in Belorussia (Grodno) and four in Ukraine (Berestia/Brest, Volodymyr, Lutsk and Kiev).[64] But Jews also had landed properties (later called *folvarky)* in the rural districts of these cities, for which Bershadsky collected archival documentation.[65] It is most likely that this situation, like many other social and legal peculiarities of the Grand Duchy, was a continuation from the previous Rus' period.

In all other aspects the Lithuanian period up to 1495 was merely a continuation of Rus' times. One change, however, had been made. In the second half of the thirteenth century, after the Fourth Crusade and the Mongolian invasion, the Venetian Crimean colony Sudak (Surozh) was replaced by the Genoese colony Kaffa, which from about the 1260s was the capital of the Black-Sea trade.

The period from the mid-thirteenth century to 1440 is one of the darkest in the history of Kievan Rus'. When the Lithuanian ruler Olgerd (1345–77) first occupied Kiev, he respected local tradition and in 1362 established his son, who had received the Rus' princely name of Volodimer, as Grand Prince of Kiev. But Olgerd's successors, Jagiełło and Vitold, favoured centralization, and in 1394, after thirty years of rule, Volodimer was forced to abdicate (he died in 1398). Internal difficulties during the 1430s induced the Lithuanian government in 1440 to restore the Kievan Great Principality under the Lithuanian dynasty. Volodimer's son Olelko (1440–55) and grandson Semen Olelkovych (1455–70) ruled there as semi-independent rulers. But when the Lithuanian situation stabilized, the long-range policy was finally executed. In 1471, despite the protest of the Kievans, Martyn Semenovych was forced to resign and Kiev had to make way for a Lithuanian Catholic *voevoda*. This was also the end of the Kievan Great Principality as a polity.

Nevertheless, the thirty years during which political life in Kiev had been restored also brought about a cultural revival. For instance, it was then that two reworkings by the monk Kassian of the beloved Kievan Caves Monastery *Patericon* were executed, one in 1460 and the other in

1462. With Constantinople declining, and finally falling into Ottoman Turkish hands in 1453, it was natural that culturally reborn Orthodox Kiev should give refuge to intellectuals leaving Byzantium.[66]

It is not surprising therefore that the contemporary Russian sources named Kiev as the home of the controversial, but highly intellectual sect called *Judaizanti,* or *zhidovstvuishchie* by its foes. According to these sources, the sect was brought to the north by Mykhailo Olelkovych, the brother of the ruler of Kiev, who in 1470 was invited by the Great Novgorodians to become their prince. His entourage supposedly included several intellectual leaders of the sect, who then spread their new beliefs to Moscow, where they became a real threat to Moscow's Orthodoxy.[67]

Space precludes a discussion of this extremely important and controversial topic here. There is good reason however, to subscribe to Shmuel Ettinger's view about the essentially Jewish roots of the *Judaizers*.[68] The particulars, of course, still require investigation, for example, how great was the contribution of Kievan Jews to this intellectual movement, and did the stimulus of the movement come from places of Jewish learning in the Byzantine Empire?

But two decades after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Kaffa, too, was taken by the Ottoman Turks (1475). In consequence, the Crimean Tatars, hitherto vassals of Lithuania, recognized Ottoman supremacy. Soon, in alliance with ascendant Muscovy, the Tatars became the scourge of the Ukrainian and Lithuanian territories. The first event marking the new situation was the Tatars' devastating attack on Kiev in 1482, planned with the consent of the Tsar of Muscovy.

The Biblical and Talmudic scholar Moses ben Jacob of Kiev, whom scholars also call Moses of Kiev II, lived during these turbulent years. His life story epitomizes the new developments. Born in the district of Kiev in about 1449, he spent his *Lehrjahre* in Constantinople, studying with both Rabbanite and Karaite teachers. As during the Rus' period, the Jewish community in Lithuanian Kiev was too small to have schools of higher learning. Upon his return to Kiev, Moses established himself as a polymath scholar. He contributed to Biblical exegesis, Talmudic studies, Kabbala, etc., but he also acquired fame as a book collector. During the Tatar attack on Kiev in 1482, all his possessions—including his library—were plundered and Moses himself was captured and taken to the Crimea. He was ransomed and returned to Kiev to continue his scholarly work, this time on Hebrew grammar and the Hebrew calendar. His creativity was interrupted by the edict of 1495 that expelled all Jews from the Duchy. After the edict was abolished, he spent some years in Lithuania proper, but apparently could not adjust to the new life. He left for Kaffa and died there in 1520.[69]

One has to agree with Salo Baron that the background behind the sud-

den expulsion of Jews from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (including Ukraine) in 1495 by Grand Duke Alexander (1492–1506) has not been fully clarified.[70] Undoubtedly several elements were at play. First was the negative influence (religious intolerance) of Alexander's tutor, the historian Jan Długosz. Second, the sensational expulsion of Jews from Spain (1492) by the "Catholic" rulers Ferdinand and Isabella invited emulation for religious, but also for economic reasons (i. e., the confiscation of Jewish possessions). Alexander's wife Elena, daughter of the Muscovite tsar Ivan III, may have instilled a fear of Jewish proselytism into her husband since at that time Moscow was faced with the rise of the attractive religious sect of Judaizers. Nevertheless, Alexander's decree, as noted earlier, marked the end of an era in the history of Jews in Eastern Europe.

Eight years later (1503), Alexander found it expedient to readmit the Jewish exiles and even to order the restoration of their confiscated property. But his change of heart could not set back the clock of history. The expulsion caused a great emotional shock and gave rise to a feeling of Jewish solidarity, previously unknown in Eastern Europe, since Jews had been dispersed over a wide territory for centuries.

The Jews who returned to the Grand Duchy, now having been united for the first time, had learned their lesson. Instructed by their Polish co-religionists and introduced to the principles of Western corporational society, they decided to obtain juridical security for their status. Their concerns met with the understanding of the new Lithuanian duke and king of Poland, Sigismund I (1507–48). In the spirit of the time, during which it was important to give charters an aura of antiquity, the documents securing the status of Jews that were issued in 1507 were backdated to the year 1388, the supposed beginning of the reign of Grand Duke Vitold, the actual founder of the Catholic Lithuanian state.

I might add, as an aside, that the Lithuanian chancery of Sigismund I was notorious for preparing false documents for a price; the interesting details are given in a study by the renowned Polish legal historian Juliusz Bardach, published in 1970 in a collection of his articles.[71]

At this point, my presentation differs from the generally accepted view of Jewish historiography, which upholds the genuineness of Vitold's charters; on this matter Jewish historians follow Serhii Bershadsky, the eminent Ukrainian historian of the history of Jews in Lithuania.[72]

It was Bershadsky's younger colleague, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who in his "History of Ukraine-Rus" (volume 5) advanced several convincing arguments (chronology, titulature, diplomatics, philology) proving beyond any doubt that the so-called Vitold charters for the Jews were fabricated in 1507 (three—a general charter [Bershadsky himself had doubts about its genuineness], the Troki charter and the Berestia charter)

and in 1547 (the Grodno charter).[73] Unfortunately, Hrushevsky's findings remained unknown in Jewish historiography.

Two arguments support Hrushevsky's view. First, in 1388, Vitold was not yet ruler of Lithuania. He became Jagiełło's deputy only in 1392,[74] and although, beginning in 1395, he sometimes used the title of grand duke,[75] he officially received that status no earlier than 1401, as a result of the Vilnius agreement.[76]

By 1388 and later, even Vitold's sponsor, the Great Master of the Teutonic Order, in his correspondence with Vitold addressed him as "Duci Witoldo" or "Herczoge Witowd."[77]

If someone wanted to obtain juridical security, he had to turn to the legal authority, i.e., to Władysław Jagiełło, who at that time was both King of Poland and the Grand Duke of Lithuania. Nobody would take seriously any charter issued by a pretender, such as Vitold before 1401. Thus in 1388 no one could foresee that Vitold would in fact be recognized as the Grand Duke of Lithuania in 1401.[78]

The second argument is of a general nature. It concerns the legal concept of a corporation with special charters. Writing charters for specific communities, guilds and estates, and bilateral agreements, was a unique product of developing Catholic society. The practice began in Western Europe in the eleventh to twelfth centuries, and was transplanted with the western-type city (based on Magdeburg law, financially attractive to rulers), to Catholic Central Europe (Bohemia, Hungary, Poland) during the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries. The corporational system, with its charters and special privileges, was completely unknown and indeed alien to the patrimonial world view of Orthodox Rus' and Lithuania prior to the sixteenth century.

In conclusion, during the Khazar, Rus' and Lithuanian periods (until 1495), the Jews of Eastern Europe were part and parcel of the local patrimonial society. They were not granted any special privileges (which were unknown in that society), but they were also not subjected to discrimination. They lived both in towns and in the country and mixed at will with non-Jews, united by a common Slavic (Knaanic) language and common customs.

The situation changed completely after the Jews' return to the Grand Duchy in 1503, and especially after the Union of Lublin (1569). Then they were absorbed by the Ashkenazic Jewry from Poland, Bohemia and Germany, who appeared in Eastern Europe as foreigners with a foreign language (Yiddish) and culture, and who were also endowed with special privileges that assured their pre-eminent status.

NOTES

1. See O. Pritsak, "The Origins of the Khazars" in the forthcoming *Festschrift for Shmuel Ettinger* (in preparation).
2. See O. Pritsak, *The Origin of Rus'*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass. 1981), 26–31, 182.
3. O. Pritsak, "Where Was Constantine's 'Inner Rus'?" *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 7 (1984), 555–61, and map.
4. Pritsak, *Origin*, 1: 11-20, 72-3.
5. O. Pritsak, "The Slavs and the Avars" in *Centro Italiano di Studi sull'alto medioevo. XXX settimana internazionale di studi. Gli Slavi occidentali e meridionali nell'alto medioevo, Spoleto, 15-21 aprile 1982* (Spoleto [1984]), 2: 56-72, 389-424.
6. O. Pritsak, "The Khazar Kingdom's Conversion to Judaism," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies 2* (1978): 261–2.
7. D. M. Dunlop, *The History of the Jewish Khazars* (Princeton 1954), 58–87.
8. Pritsak, "The Khazar Kingdom's Conversion to Judaism," 280–1.
9. Details are provided in O. Pritsak's *Origin of Rus,'* vol. 3 (forthcoming). Max Vasmer explains *zhid* as derived from the Italian *giudeo* via the Balkan Romance languages. *Russisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg 1950), 1: 423.
10. See A. L. Iakobson, *Rannesrednevekovyi Khersones* (Moscow-Leningrad 1959) (*Materialy i issledovaniia po arkheologii SSSR,* no. 63); O. I. Dombrovsky, "Serednio vichnyi Khersones," *Arkheolohiia Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev 1975), 3: 443–54; E. I. Solomonik and O. I. Dombrovsky, "O lokalizatsii strany Dori," *Arkheologicheskie issledovaniia srednevekovogo Kryma* (Kiev 1968), 11–44; I. A. Baranov, "O vosstanii Ioanna Gotskogo," *Feodalnaia Tavrida* (Kiev 1974), 151–62. Cf. V. A. Moshin, "Eparkhiia Gotthias v Khazarii v VIII-m veke," *Trudy IV. sezda russkikh akademicheskikh organizatsii za granitsei* (Belgrade 1929), 1: 149–56. On the influence that Kherson (Rus' *Korsun*) exercised over early Kievan Christianity, see A. Poppe, *Państwo i kosciół na Rusi w XI wieku* (Warsaw 1968), 22. 46–7. On the Judeo-Greek syncretism of Phanagoria, Kerch and Tmutorokan, see V. F. Gaidukevich, *Bosporskoe tsarstvo* (Moscow-Leningrad 1949), 347, 377; S. W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, 2d ed., 17 vols. (New York 1952–80), 3: 200–6. Cf. Pritsak, *Origin,* 1: 67–9.
11. See al-Istakh-i, *Via regnorum,* ed. M. J. de Goeje, 2d ed. (Leiden 1927): 222–3; I. Hauqal, *Opus geographicum,* ed. J. N. Kramers (Leiden 1939), 2: 393.
12. al-Mas udi, *Les prairies d'or,* ed. C. Pellat (Beirut 1966), 1: 214; cf. al-Istakhri, *Via regnorum*, 221.
13. Pritsak, *Origin*, vol. 3.
14. M. I. Artamonov, *Sarkel-Belaia Vezha* (Moscow-Leningrad 1958) (*Materialy i issledovaniia po arkheologii SSSR,* no. 62). On the findings of the Saltovo culture that were recently unearthed in Kiev, see P. Tolochko, *Drevnii Kiev* (Kiev 1983), 55.
15. On the Pechenegs, see O. Pritsak, *The Pečenegs* (Lisse, Holland, 1976).
16. See Pritsak, "The Khazar Kingdom's Conversion to Judaism," 269–70.
17. A. Koestler, *The Thirteenth Tribe* (New York 1976).
18. Z. Ankori, "Origins and History of Ashkenazi Jewry (8th to 18th Century)." In *Genetic Diseases among Ashkenazi Jews,* ed. R. M. Goodman and A. G. Motulsky (New York 1979), 19–46.
19. M. A. Artamonov, *Istoriia khazar* (Leningrad 1962); S. A. Pletneva, *Khazary* (Moscow 1976); S. A. Pletneva, *Ot kochevii k gorodam. Saltovo-maiatskaia kultura* (Moscow 1967) (*Materialy i issledovaniia po arkheologii SSSR,* no. 142).
20. See note 12.

21. al-Istakhrī, *Via regnorum,* 220.
22. C. Porphyrogenitus, *De administrando imperio,* ed. G. Moravcsik (Budapest 1949), 182.
23. This is by no means a small number. Shmuel Ettinger established that six hundred years later, at the time of the Union of Lublin, there were in Ukraine proper (the four palatinates of Volhynia, Kiev, Podillia and Bratslav) "about four thousand Jews." See Ettinger, "Jewish Participation in the Settlement of Ukraine in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,"
24. O. Pritsak, "The *Povest' vremennyx let* and the Question of Truth." In *History and Heroic Tale: A symposium* (Odense 1984),
25. Tolochko, *Drevnii Kiev.*
26. *See Fritz Rörig, Die europäische Stadt,* ed. L. Rörig (Göttingen [1955]), 17. Cf. F. Kupfer and T. Lewicki, *Źródła hebrajskie do dziejów Slowian i niektórych innych ludów Środkowej i Wschodniej Europy* (Wrocław 1956), 25–6; G. Labuda, "Ratyzbona," *Słownik starożytności słowiańskich* (Warsaw 1961–), vol. 4, pt. 2: 474–5. On the fluvial route, see S. V. Bernshtein-Kogan, "Put iz variag v greki," *Voprosy geografii* 20 (1950): 239–40; J. Sahlgren, "Wikingerfahrten im Osten," *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie* 8 (1931): 309–23; and H. Chlopocka and W. Kowalenko, "Drogi handlowe," *Słownik starożytności słowiańskich,* vol. 1, pt. 2: 382–5, map.
27. Pritsak, in N. Gold and O. Pritsak, *Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century* (Ithaca, New York 1982), 53.
28. Ibid., 55–9.
29. Ibid., 71, 12.
30. Ibid., 36–7, 56–7.
31. *Ipatevskaia letopis,* ed. by A. A. Shakhmatov (St. Petersburg 1908), col. 286 (s. a. 1121).
32. A. Popov, *Istoriko-literaturnyi obzor drevnerusskikh polemicheskikh sochinenii protiv latinian* (XI–XV vv.) (Moscow 1875).
33. See I. Sreznevsky, *Materialy dlia slovaria drevne-russkogo iazyka* (St. Petersburg 1893), 1: cols. 871–2; *Lavrentevskaia letopis,* ed. E. F. Karsky (Leningrad 1927), 559b; *Letopis po ipatskomu spisku,* ed. by S. N. Palauzov (St. Peterburg 1871), *Ukazatel geograficheskii,* 8b; *Novgorodskaia pervaia letopis starshego i mladshego izvodov* (Moscow-Leningrad 1950), 601.
34. *Povest vremennykh let,* ed. by D. S. Likhachev (Moscow-Leningrad 1950), 1: 186.
35. The usual Hebrew name for Kievan Rus' was *Rwsy', Rwsy'h,* or *Rwsyyh;* see Kupfer and Lewicki, *Źródła hebrajskie,* 302. The name was sometimes "historicized as *Tiras*. See Kupfer and Lewicki, *Źródła hebrajskie,* 173–5. following the usage of "Josippon." See A. Ia. Harkavy, "Skazaniia evreiskikh pisatelei o khazarakh i khazarskom tsarstve," *Trudy Vostochnogo otdeleniia Imperatorskogo Arkheologicheskogo Obshchestva* (St. Petersburg 1874), 300.
36. Kupfer and Lewicki, *Źródła hebrajskie,* 65, 165.
37. Ibid., 159.
38. "Moisei iz Kieva," *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia* (St. Petersburg 1914), 11: cols. 205–6. S. Eidelberg, "Moses of Kiev," *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (Jerusalem 1971), vol. 12: col. 431; R. Tam, *Sefer ha-Yasar* (Vienna 1811), no. 522: 55. Cf the edition by S. P. Rosenthal (Berlin 1898), no. 522.
39. A. Harkavy, *Ha-Yehudim u-sefat ha-Slavim* (Vilnius 1867), 11, 14, 62. A. Drabkin, "Itse (Isaak) iz Chernigova," *Evreiskaia èntsiklopediia,* 8: 523. Kupfer and Lewicki, *Źródła hebrajskie,* 173–5.

40. V. I. Matuzova, *Angliiskie srednevekovye istochniki IX–XIII vv.* (Moscow 1979), 49–50; cf. Kupfer and Lewicki, *Źródła hebrajskie,* 174.
41. S. Z. Havlin, "Samuel ben Ali," *Encyclopaedia Judaica,* 14: cols. 803–4.
42. A. Epstein, "Das Talmudische Lexikon Jechuse Tannaim we-Amoraim und Jehuda b. Kalonimos aus Speier," *Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums* 39 (1895): 511. *Responsa,* reprinted by R. N. Rabinowitz (Lviv 1860), no. 433; S. Poznanski, *Babylonische Geonim im nachgeonaeischen Zeitalter* (Berlin 1914), 53–6.
43. Kupfer and Lewicki, *Źródła hebrajskie,* 161–4, suggest that Moses of Kiev was identical with Moses Tagu, or Moses b. hisdai, who like Samuel b. Ali opposed the concepts of Maimonides.
44. Kupfer and Lewicki, *Źródła hebrajskie,* 271–2
45. Ibid., 98, 128–39.
46. Ibid., 269–70.
47. M. Weinreich, "Yiddish, Knaanic, Slavic: The Basic Relationships." In *For Roman Jakobson* (The Hague 1956), 625–6.
48. Pritsak, *Origin*, 1: 56–73.
49. G. M. Barac, *Sobranie trudov po voprosu o evreiskom elemente v drevne-russkoi pismennosti* (Berlin 1924), 2: 248–55. N. A. Meshchersky, "Otryvok iz knigi 'Josippon' v 'Povesti vremennykh let," *Palestinskii sbornik* (Moscow 1956), 2 (64–5): 58–68.
50. H. Birnbaum, "On Jewish Life and Anti-Jewish Sentiments in Medieval Russia." In *Essays in Early Slavic Civilization* (Munich 1981), 215–55.
51. B. D. Weinryb, "The Beginnings of East-European Jewry in Legend and Historiography," *Studies and Essays in Honor of Abraham A. Neuman* (Leiden 1962), 445–502.
52. I. Dlugossii, *Annales seu cronicae incliti regni Poloniae,* ed. Jan Dąbrowski (Warsaw 1970), 2: 263–4 (s. a. 1112): "... milites in seditionem versi curiam primum Putata palatini Kyowiensis, viri ca tempestate locupletis, deinde signulos Iudeorum in Kyow consistencium invadunt et deripiunt."
53. V. N. Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia* (Moscow-Leningrad 1964), 4: 179–80.
54. Concerning the circumstances leading up to the crowning, see A. Velyky, *Z litopysu khrystyianskoi Ukrainy* (Rome 1968), 1: 214–33.
55. Pritsak, *Origin*, 1: 69–71.
56. Velyky, *Z litopysu,* 2: 13–32.
57. On this clan, see D. S. Likhachev, *Russkie letopisi i ikh kulturno-istoricheskoe znachenie* (Moscow-Leningrad 1947), 100–14.
58. *Ipatevskaia letopis,* ed. A. A. Shakhmatov (St. Petersburg 1908), cols. 275–6. See also the English translation by S. H. Cross, "The Russian Primary Chronicle," *Harvard Studies and Notes in Philology and Literature* (Cambridge 1930), 12: 319.
59. *Slovníc jazyka staroslověnského,* ed. J. Kurz (Prague 1966), 1: 605–6, gives all forms of the word. From these data it is clear that the nominative singular form was *zhidovin*, the nominative plural *zhidove* or *zhidovi,* and the accusative plural *zhidy* or *zhidovy*.
60. *Ipatevskaia letopis,* col. 288.
61. Birnbaum, *Essays in Early Slavic Civilization,* 244.
62. *Ioannis Dlugossi Annales* (Warsaw 1964), 1: 280–1; Jan Długosz, *Roczniki czyli kroniki sławnego królewstwa polskiego,* edited by Jan Dąbrowski (Warsaw 1961), 1: 355–7.
63. *Ipatevskaia letopis,* col. 920. Cf. the English translation by G. A. Perfecky, *The Galician-Volynian Chronicle* (Munich 1973), 109.

64. S. A. Bershadsky, *Litovskie evrei. Istoriia ikh iuridicheskogo i obshchestvennogo polozheniia v Litve ot Vitovta do Liublinskoi Unii, 1388–1569 gg.* (St. Petersburg 1883), 251.
65. S. A. Bershadsky, *Russko-evreiskii arkhiv. Dokumenty i materialy dlia istorii evreev v Rossii.* Vol. 1, *Dokumenty i regesty k istorii litovskikh evreev (1388–1550)* (St. Petersburg 1882). Unfortunately, there are no extant documents before the second half of the fifteenth century. On Jewish landed properties, see the oldest preserved document, no. 5 from the years 1463–78, pp. 35–6.
66. On cultural life in Kiev and Ukraine at that time, see M. Hrushevsky, *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury,* vol. 5, 2 parts (Kiev 1926, 1927).
67. On this sect, see Baron, *A Social and Religious History,* 17 (1980): 121–2; Y. Slutsky, "Judaizers in Russia," *Encyclopaedia Judaica,* 10: cols. 398–402.
68. See Ettinger's seminal study, "Jewish Influence on the Religious Ferment in Eastern Europe at the End of the Fifteenth Century"(in Hebrew) in *Yitzhak F. Baer Jubilee Volume* (Jerusalem 1960), 228–47.
69. S. Eidelberg, "Moses ben Jacob of Kiev (also called Moses ha-Goleh and Moses of Kiev II," *Encyclopaedia Judaica,* 12: cols. 420–421.
70. Baron, *A Social and Religious History* 10 (1965): 39–40. See also Bershadsky, *Litovskie evrei,* 240–65.
71. J. Bardach, *Studia z ustroju i prawa Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego XIV–XVII w.* (Warsaw 1970), 351–78.
72. Bershadsky, *Litovskie evrei,* 172–239.
73. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* (Lviv 1905), 5: 652–3.
74. See A. Prochaska, *Dzieje Witolda W. Księcia Litwy* (Vilnius 1914); L. Kolankowski, *Dzieje Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego za Jagiellonów* (Warsaw 1930), 1: 54–97; J. Ochmański, *Historia Litwy,* 2d. ed. (Wroclaw 1982), 79–82. On the juridical aspect, see Bardach, *Studia z ustroju,* note 85, 21–38, and *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi,* ed. A. Prochaska (Cracow 1882), 30–1.
75. For example, in June 1395: "Wir Wytowt von gotes gnaden grosfurste zu Littowen." *Cotex epistolaris Vitoldi*, 39.
76. The documents concerning the Vilnius agreement of January 1401 are in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi,* 71–4.
77. *Codex epistolary Vitoldi*, 58–68. In 1388 and later Vitold styled himself "Witołd książe Litewski, dziedzic na Grodnie, Brześciu, Drohiczynie, Łucku i Włodzimierzu" (24 July 1388, modern Polish translation in *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi,* 15), "Alexander alias Wytowt dei gracia dux Hrodnensis, Brestensis, etc." (29 May 1389, *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, 18), "Wir Wythout von gotis gnadin herczog czu Luczik und czu Garthin" (19 January 1390, *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi,* 20).
78. It is with good reason that Antoni Prochaska, the editor of Vitold's correspondence, did not include "Vitold's Jewish charters" of 1388 in his collection of Vitold's documents. On the fierce struggle of the pretender Vitold in 1382–1401, to establish himself as Grand Duke of Lithuania, see K. Heinl, *Fürst Witold von Litauen in seinem Verhältnis zum Deutschen Orden in Preussen während der Zeit seines Kampfes um sein Litauisches Erbe: 1382–1401* (Berlin 1925), 200 pp.

Shmuel Ettinger

Jewish Participation in the Settlement of Ukraine in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries

The assessment of the role of Jews in any of the major developments in European, and particularly East European history is a very difficult task. The attitude to Jews in historical documents and chronicles, and even in modern historiography is influenced by the negative stereotype of the Jew, which existed in various forms from the Hellenistic period onward and became an integral part of European culture. The Jew was generally thought of as a harmful stranger, a dangerous plotting parasite, an enemy inside the existing states and societies. Therefore even in the writings of Jewish and so-called philo-Semitic historians, one can find apologetic attempts to defend Jews from false accusations or to explain their "faults" by various historical circumstances. In the case of Ukraine in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this trend was particularly emphasized because already contemporary chronicles, let alone the historical literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, permeated by nationalist hopes and passions, tried to justify their claims and demands by historical arguments. After all, the strenuous effort of the people in Ukraine to achieve independence was not only a failure but brought with it a massive destruction ("Ruina") of this prosperous area. Whom "to blame" for that was a very important question for the intellectuals of the nations involved in the sweeping settlement movement of the Ukrainian steppe: the ruling Poles, the expanding Muscovites, the militant and resourceful Cossacks? The seventeenth-century chroniclers and nineteenth-century historians agree almost unanimously that a major cause of the Cossack

revolt, which was a cause of endless strifes later, was the godless, greedy and patronizing attitude of the Jew.

Not perceiving the historian's role as one of sitting in judgment over quarrels of past years, I should like to start with a definition of the social and economic role of the Jews in Europe in the Middle Ages and early modern times: servants and advisers to kings and rulers in financial and commercial matters, money-lenders and middlemen, merchants and artisans, sometimes physicians and scholars. The more the Jews became detached from agriculture, navigation and government service the smaller was their foothold in the surrounding Christian society. Among other functions that they fulfilled in the service of the rulers was their participation in new settlements, in the colonization of deserted and scarcely populated territories in need of development. A classical formulation of this role of the Jews is to be found in the charter granted by the eleventh-century bishop of the city of Speyer in Germany: "cum ex Spirensi villa urbem facerem, putovi millie amplificare honorem loci nostri si et Judaeos colligeram," i.e., the acceptance of Jews was a sure way to increase the importance of his city. Protection by the rulers was a necessity for the Jewish minority, which suffered from persecution during such social and religious upheavals as the Crusades and from blood libels, and also felt insecure at night or while travelling on the roads. This special protection increased the animosity of the general Christian population to the Jews, and the latter were frequent victims of popular hatred in times of unrest. For example, during the popular revolt of the burghers of Kiev against the prince Sviatopolk in 1113, they "plundered the court of Putiata, the captain of a thousand, attacked the Jews, and robbed them of their property." (Translation by Pritsak, p. 14.) It would be difficult to assume that the Christians of Europe, so eager to eradicate Christian heretics like Monophysites or Albigenses, would be more tolerant toward the "real infidels," the Jews. We should not overlook also the social position of European Jews and the character of their autonomous organization. Though the Jews were economically and even culturally interdependent with the surrounding society, their ethos and ideals were strongly opposed to the customs and principles of the latter.

The expulsions of the Jews from the states and cities of western and central Europe in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries considerably diminished their numbers and gave a new driving force to their movement to Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia and Poland on the one hand, and to the Ottoman Empire on the other. For various reasons, religious, economic and social, they were unwelcome in cities founded on the autonomous principles of the "German law," and even in Poland, which was considered as "paradisum Judaeorum," many cities obtained

the right not to admit Jews, "de non tolerandis Judaeis." It was mainly in newly founded towns and villages, either royal or private, that the Jews were more accepted. Therefore, the opportunity that opened up in the latter part of the sixteenth century to settle on the vast territories of the Ukrainian steppe, particularly east of the Dnieper, was a major event in Jewish history of the time. It was a result of the success of the Cossacks in repelling the frequent incursions of the Tatars in Ukraine and of the feeling of greater security that came with it, and of the Lublin Union of 1569, which transferred Ukraine from Lithuanian administration to the Polish crown and gave Polish and Lithuanian magnates the incentive to promote rural and urban settlement in the area.

During the nearly eighty years between the Lublin Union and the Khmelnytsky uprising, the number of Jews in the four provinces of Volhynia, Podillia, Kiev and Bratslav, according to cautious estimates, rose thirteenfold, from about four thousand to nearly fifty-two thousand, living in 115 towns and townlets. In some of the older cities they lived mainly in special Jewish quarters, or Jewish streets, the usual form of Jewish habitation created by religious and social needs and security conditions. But even there many Jews lived in other, non-Jewish streets, despite the protests of the local burghers. Mixed dwelling was sometimes looked upon by Jews as an advantage, as for example in Liuboml. In 1558 the Jewish leadership there forbade Jews to buy houses or plots of land from non-Jews inside the city walls because "if Gentiles live among Jews inside the town there is less danger of burning of Jewish houses or attempts to expel Jews from it." On the other hand, in 1556 Queen Bona ordered the Jews of Kovel to move their houses into the Jewish street according to the request of the local burghers.

The situation was different in the newly founded towns. Their private owners were keen to increase their population with new settlers, Gentiles and Jews alike, and granted them various "liberties." We do not hear about Jewish quarters but about frontier-like life: Jews in Bila Tserkva in 1662, who, it seems, lived mainly outside the city wall but kept houses inside where they could hide during Tatar invasions, etc. Jews not only participated in the defence of the town walls, but were obliged to train for military action, as we learn from a rabbinic responsum from the early seventeenth century: "this was at the time of tension in Volhynia on account of the Tatars. It has been a custom among the inhabitants of the [frontier] district that everyone should be on the alert with his weapon in his hand to engage in war and battle against them (the Tatars) according to the order of the dukes and lords. One day the above-mentioned man was shooting with his gun from his window at the target on the wall in his yard, in the usual way. . . . The Gentile who was the commander of

the Jew, and his superior, because he was the head of ten, stood outside to warn people not to enter the yard. . . . " Jews participated in pursuing the enemy on horse, together with other burghers.

It is no wonder, therefore, that among the many Jews who accompanied the Cossack units in their campaign against the Muscovites in 1610, we find purveyors and merchants, as well as members of fighting units. One of eleven fighting Jews, who served with three horses and was killed in action, is mentioned in a Hebrew source as "rycar Berko." With time a growing number of Jews settled in villages, a fact frequently mentioned in court documents and in rabbinic responsa.

It seems that the increase of the Jewish population of Ukraine before 1648 was a result not only of migration, but also of natural growth, a new development after the steady decline during the Middle Ages. We can assume that the opportunity of free settlement played a role in it. From where did the new settlers come? They came mainly from various parts of Poland-Lithuania, where despite royal protection and support by the magnates there was a constant struggle against the Jews in royal cities from the end of the fifteenth century. In 1495 all Jews were expelled for several years from Lithuania. In the 1620s the burghers of some of the major cities in Poland attempted to co-ordinate their struggle against the Jews and many of them obtained royal charters "de non tolerandis Judaeis." The impact of the Counter-Reformation was felt not only through the increase of the attacks by the students of Jesuit colleges, but also from the intense anti-Jewish propaganda of clerics like Sebastyan Miczyński in his *Zwierciadło Korony Polskiej* (1626) and Przecław Majecki in his *Żydowskie okrucieństwa, mordy i zabobony* (1589). Already early in the second half of the sixteenth century, a Lithuanian writer mentioned the influx of Jews ("pessimu gens judaica") into Podillia, Volhynia and "other fertile lands." It seems that some Jews were brought to Left-Bank Ukraine by the colonizing magnates; some fled from persecution, and others who had competed unsuccessfully with the lower *szlachta* for positions in service to the higher nobility and their estates looked for new opportunities. In the responsa we find among the new settlers Jews from Italy, Moravia and Germany, some of whom fled from the calamities of the Thirty Years War.

The major occupation of the Jews in Ukraine were money transactions and commerce. As reflected in historical sources, very few of them were engaged in direct money-lending. The major need was not for cash for consumption, but for investment or turnover. Some nobles or monasteries assembled large amounts of money, but their religious principles or social convention prevented them from participation in economic activities. Jews were forbidden to lend money on interest to other Jews. It is not by chance that the legal fiction which enabled observant Jews to do

banking business (until today), named "heter iska," was formulated in the early seventeenth century in this region.

The rise in population and rapid urbanization, particularly in western Europe, increased the demand for agricultural products, timber, potash and wax. The Ukrainian territories, especially those east of the Dnieper, became a major source of agricultural supply. There were the vast fertile lands, on one hand, and a constant stream of people into them, on the other. The migration was a result of the same European developments because the landlords in Poland, Muscovy and neighbouring countries started to increase the demand of corvée in their manors, which again made many peasants flee to the frontier territories, where they could be free Cossacks, or at least to gain many years of "liberties" and freedom from taxation and forced labour.

Jews served as merchants, buying agricultural products from the manor (*folwark*) and the surrounding villages and supplying them with manufactured and imported goods, mainly luxuries. But through their personal contacts with the nobles they became in many cases financial advisers, involved in the management of the estate. When one of the nobles was in financial difficulties some of the very rich Jews, like Abraham of Turijsk (even in official documents he is mentioned as Pan Abraham, a very unusual title for a Jew), received a whole estate for exploitation for a number of years for a fixed sum of money, sometimes together with a non-Jewish partner. (In 1601 Prince Grigory Sanguszko gave his estate, which included several towns and villages, with all their buildings, cattle, tools and services, to two Jews for three years for the enormous sum of forty thousand złoty.) They had the right not only to manage the estate, but also to administer justice, including death penalties. In 1580 the supreme body of the autonomous organization of the Jews in the Kingdom of Poland, the Council of Four Lands, was created. The first regulation of this body known to us was a strict order prohibiting individual Jews from holding leases on large estates and custom houses, farming taxes on salt or collecting excise on intoxicating liquors, in order not to antagonize the local population. It seems that in the Ukrainian provinces in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries some Jews did not obey this regulation. There are many instances in which Jews, mainly in Volhynia, served as tax collectors, keepers of custom houses and salt and liquor monopolies, large estate lease holders, etc., but their number diminished during the 1620s and 1630s.

More Jews were "arendars" (*dzierżawca*) of single villages, sometimes as settlers trying to attract peasants from manors in the surrounding area to their place. Still the term arendar, which later became identified with a village Jew in general, was used for those who took lease for exploitation of a single branch in the estate—the mill, the fish-pond or the

inn for selling spirits. The right to produce and sell alcohol belonged to the nobles in their estates and to the cities. Both used to give it on lease for a fixed sum of money, mainly to Jews (the reason being not only their experience in commercial matters and their dependence on the nobles, but also their abstention from using large quantities of alcohol for themselves). The importance of the income from alcohol is connected with the structure of the economy in the agrarian states of Eastern Europe: the peasants, who constituted the great majority of the population, were burdened with duties to the estate and heavy direct taxation. Very few items could be subject to indirect taxation—salt and the only luxury of the poor, alcohol. Since the liquors could have been produced by the peasants themselves, the monopoly of the nobles was considered to be particularly oppressive and increased the tension between the peasants and the Jews. Still documents do not reflect a particularly hostile attitude toward Jews by peasants before the revolt.

Not only landlords and cities, but also government officials gave their incomes on lease to Jews. Farming of government taxes was given to Jews in Ukraine in the first half of the seventeenth century, and in some cases it was the main source of income of the *starosty*. In the censuses of 1616 and 1622 in the province of Kiev almost 80 per cent of the general income of the *starosty* came from *arendy*, which in their great majority were in the hands of Jews. Thus the Muscovite emissary Kunakov wrote in 1649 that "the senators protect the Jews because the Jews hold in lease the income sources of their estates."

Jews were prominent in assembling agricultural products from the manors and villages, and their transportation to the rivers by which they were sent to the maritime ports, mainly to Gdansk. The main exporters were foreign merchants, mainly Dutch. It is difficult to assess the role of Jews in the shipment of merchandise, because in the custom lists appear mainly the names of the nobles, owners of the estates, who were free from custom duties. On the other hand, a rabbinic source dealing with the observance of the Sabbath mentions shipments by raft and carriage.

The main protectors of Jews were said to be the magnates and other members of the higher nobility; while their chief opponents and competitors were reportedly the city dwellers, the burghers, especially those who had their autonomous organization built on the "German Law." But even these relations were ambivalent: antagonism, struggle but in many cases also co-operation. A royal edict of 1580 demanded that the burghers of Lutsk grant the Jews a part in their "liberties" since the Jews gave the town money to pay for these "liberties." The Jews of Pereiaslav were included in the framework of the town's autonomous organization in 1620. In some towns Jewish artisans could be members of the guilds. After the attack on Lutsk by Loboda, the commander of the rebellious

Cossacks, in 1595, both the burghers and the Jews presented their complaints to the court. An evidence of good neighbourly relations can be found in a rabbinic responsum: the rabbi was asked if Jews were allowed to lend clothes and jewellery to Gentiles during their holidays because they wore them during the service in church.

On the other hand, the burghers not only demanded a greater share of Jewish participation in the defence of the town and in taxes, but tried to limit the rights of Jews to engage in various trades. There was a constant struggle between the municipalities, representing the burghers' autonomous body in royal cities, and Jewish merchants and artisans who lived in the *Jurydika*'s houses or quarters under the protection of nobles or clergymen, outside the jurisdiction of the city organization.

The growth of the Jewish population and the increase in its economic activity increased the tension between the Jews and other social groups. There were instances of assaults on Jews, for example in Volodymyr Volynskyi in 1599. The representatives of various towns complained to the authorities that the Jews usurped their "ancient rights" and demanded that Jews be limited to dwelling in the Jewish street and that their trade be curbed. Some like the burghers of Kiev in 1619 succeeded in obtaining a royal charter "de non tolerandis Judaeis." This attitude was supported and sometimes stepped up by members of the clergy, both Uniate and Orthodox. The Orthodox synod in Kiev in 1640 repeated the old canonical laws forbidding Christians to buy meat from Jews and to serve in their homes as cooks or wet-nurses.

There are very few documents on the attitude of the Cossacks toward Jews in this period. Despite some complaints of Jews, sometimes together with the Christian burghers, against the raids of Cossacks units on their towns, there is evidence of co-operation between Jews and Cossacks. If the case of the Muscovite campaign of 1610 is characteristic, we see even participation in Cossack activity. In general, there is no evidence of persecution of Jews by Cossacks before the 1630s. It seems that only after the Cossack leaders assumed the role of protectors of the Orthodox faith did hostility to Jews increase. The antagonism of the Cossacks, like that of other Ukrainian groups, grew stronger with time and with the rise in numbers and activity of the Jews. The cruel attack on the Jews during the Khmelnytsky rebellion and the complete destruction of the Jewish communities in Left-Bank Ukraine was the final stage of a continuous process.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Jews took an active part in the development of the urban life and economy of Ukraine in the period between the Lublin Union and the Khmelnytsky revolt. They contributed to the strengthening of the economic connections between Ukraine and the major commercial centres in Poland and Central Europe and to the

growth of an economy built on capitalist, money-oriented foundations. They participated in the creation of a fiscal administration and in the management of estates.

The opposition to their activity was not only a result of a religious and social antagonism, but also in certain ways a protest of agricultural settlers against the city and city activities. As we have seen, the Jews adapted successfully to frontier and steppe conditions, but their very existence and activity undermined the foundations of the frontier way of life, of a society built on "freedoms" and "liberties" and opposed to the political and social conventions of the time. It seems that the brutality of the assault on Jews in 1648 and after was not so much a result of religious zeal or social revenge as of the growing political influence of the Muscovite state with the long tradition of Jew-hatred and denial of the very possibility of Jewish existence in a Christian state.

Jaroslaw Pelenski

The Cossack Insurrections in Jewish-Ukrainian Relations

No other historical event, or combination of historical events, has had such a profound impact on the relations and, what is more important, on the mutual cultural perceptions and socio-political assessments of the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples and their elites, and especially on the Jewish image of Ukraine and the Ukrainians as the Khmelnytsky uprising or revolution, in combination with the Haidamak rebellions in particular, and the Cossack insurrections in general. The latter events have also strongly influenced the development of the historical consciousness and modern national ideology of the two peoples.

In the Jewish case, as in the Ukrainian, the problems of historical consciousness and national ideology have played an extremely important role, because for extended periods of time both peoples did not inhabit national states of their own, but lived as extraterritorial or intraterritorial populaces within the frameworks of other states or empires. For this reason, historical and national, or national-religious ideology often became synonymous with historical reality and politics and even served as a substitute for the latter two. The problems have assumed even greater significance in the Jewish case, because Jewish elites have been probably the most history-minded and as a result have treated what is generally perceived as national-religious ideology as an extraordinarily serious matter. Since historical consciousness and national-religious ideology have been so closely interrelated with the development of mutual Jewish-Ukrainian perceptions and perspectives arising from the experiences of the Cossack

insurrections, it is mandatory at this point to identify the factors that have contributed to the development of realities, myths, symbols and defined conceptual paradigms, all of which represent integral components of a historical consciousness and a national-religious ideology.

Curiously enough, in spite of the enormous popular awareness of the traumatic impact of the Cossack insurrections and the Khmelnytsky uprising on Jewish-Ukrainian relations, the scholarship devoted to this complex problem has been scanty and often of a very general and ambiguous nature. Only a few articles and individual chapters in books devoted to this crucial problem stand up to normal scholarly scrutiny and meet the standards of contemporary historical scholarship. Traditional Ukrainian national historiography has left us some rather modest, pragmatically oriented treatments of the problems in question. Jewish historiography is permeated with a perception that represents a modernized version of the historical and ideological legacy of the Jewish-Hebrew chronicles. The authors of the chronicles on which this perception is based had been the contemporaries of the Khmelnytsky uprising and of the war between the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, whose aim was to provide a religious and ideological interpretation of the events they had witnessed. Jewish interest in the early Cossack insurrections has been rather limited for the obvious reasons that the first three phases of the Ukrainian Cossack insurrections, namely those of the late sixteenth century and those of 1625 and 1637-9, did not produce repercussions that would influence the mutual Jewish-Ukrainian historical perceptions to any considerable extent. With regard to the insurrections of the 1590s, the Jewish factor was practically non-existent.[1] According to Jewish historians, the first serious anti-Jewish outbreak perpetrated by the Ukrainian Cossacks occurred during the so-called Pavliuk insurrection of 1637–9, in the course of which approximately two hundred Jews were allegedly killed.[2] The only evidence in support of this contention is to be found in the famous Jewish chronicle, the *Yeven Metzulah* ("the Deep Mire" or "the Abyss of Despair") of 1653 by Nathan Hanover, about which much more will have to be said in the future research on Jewish-Ukrainian relations, and which will be discussed briefly in this presentation.[3]

Of all the Cossack insurrections, the famous or infamous Khmelnytsky uprising has become the focal point of contrasting interpretations in Jewish-Ukrainian relations. What for Ukrainians of all socio-political persuasions has been one of the greatest nation-building events of their history, regardless of how they have evaluated the second epochal act of the Khmelnytsky period, the Treaty of Pereiaslav of 1654, has become known in the annals of Jewish history as a great catastrophe, or the dreadful year of the Ukrainian massacre—the Gezerah of 1648.[4]

What then are the principal realities, myths, conceptual paradigms and symbols of the revolution that has continued to exert such a traumatic effect on practical Jewish-Ukrainian relations and on the peoples' mutual perceptions? Let us begin with the most difficult and the most painful problem, namely the magnitude of the losses of Jewish population in the fatal years of 1648–9. The average figure for Jews who perished in the Khmelnytsky revolution offered by Jewish scholarship until the early 1960s ranged from approximately 100,000 to 250,000 victims. Even conservative estimates provided in traditional encyclopaedias fluctuated between 100,000 and 180,000 persons.[5] It should be noted that these figures represent revised estimates of those used in Jewish literature at the beginning of the twentieth century, when the number of Jewish victims suggested by Jewish scholarship ranged from a quarter to a half million. In a doctoral dissertation devoted to this subject and published in 1912, a Jewish scholar proposed a round figure of 250,000 Jewish losses.[6] Only recently have these inflated figures, which in fact were based exclusively on Jewish seventeenth-century chronicles, been subject to critical evaluation, as reflected in two Jewish scholarly articles. One should be attributed to Professor Shmuel Ettinger, who in his article on "Chmielnicki" in the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* states that "it is impossible to determine accurately the number of victims who perished, but it undoubtedly amounted to tens of thousands; the Jewish chronicles mention 100,000 killed and 300 communities destroyed."[7] The other belongs to the late Professor Bernard D. Weinryb, whose work represents the first modern analysis of the problem. He has shown clearly that the figures of Jewish victims provided in Jewish chronicles are not only highly exaggerated, but also amount to a demographic impossibility if one considers the estimates for the Jewish population living on the Ukrainian territories on the eve of the Khmelnytsky uprising.[8] Weinryb, like Ettinger, also spoke of "the annihilation of tens of thousands of Jewish lives."[9]

The earlier estimates for the Jewish population in Ukraine ranged from 180,000 to 380,000 or 480,000.[10] However, these estimates must be revised if we extrapolate Shmuel Ettinger's computations of the Jewish population in the palatinates of Kiev, Volhynia and Bratslav and the region of Podillia (Podolia) in 1648, the year of the beginning of the Khmelnytsky uprising. According to Ettinger, the Jewish population of these four areas amounted at that time to 51,325.[11] On the basis of this estimate, it can be maintained that the Jewish population living on all the Ukrainian territories in 1648, that is, on the eve of the Khmelnytsky uprising, could not have exceeded 125,000 to 150,000. Incidentally, how could the losses have been so high given that the Jewish community in Ukraine experienced a revival very soon after the Khmelnytsky uprising and continued its vigorous existence in Right-bank Ukraine? Ettinger

estimates that the Jewish population of the four aforementioned areas amounted in 1765 to 131,865, which represents a significant increase as compared to his estimate for the period around 1648.[12]

The Ettinger-Weinryb estimates of Jewish population losses during the Khmelnytsky uprising are lower than those proposed by Nathan Hanover, whose figures, according to accepted scholarly extrapolations, ranged from 60,000 to 80,000 for those Jews who were killed, 41,000 or 141,000 for those who died in epidemics, and 20,000 for those who were taken prisoner by the Tatars. Other Jewish chronicles dealing with the Khmelnytsky uprising provide estimates such as 100,000 Jews killed and up to 670,000 Jewish households wiped out. A computation based on the proposed household figure would amount to a staggering number of 2.4 to 3.3 million Jewish victims—a highly improbable total.[13] It should be pointed out that in spite of their extraordinary importance for Jewish history and culture, the Jewish chronicles in question have received little attention in antiquarian scholarship and practically none in modern textological-contextual analysis.[14]

Of all the Jewish chronicles on the Khmelnytsky uprising the one by Nathan Hanover deserves special attention. It provides the least inflated figure of Jewish victims; it has had a tremendous impact on the Jewish historical consciousness and national ideology, and it has remained one of the most, if not the most, influential works in the history of Jewish-Ukrainian relations. Nathan Hanover was born in Ostrih, Volhynia, in the 1620s. He lived in Zaslav, whence he fled in 1648. He apparently left Poland in 1649 for Germany, Holland and Venice, where he published his famous chronicle in 1653. He probably had personal knowledge of the historical events up to 1649; his chronicle covers the time-span until 1652. Of the five extant Jewish chronicles, Hanover's is the most comprehensive and evidently the best. It has been classified traditionally as a chronicle or a historical work. History, however, is only one of its concerns. It could be more appropriately characterized as a thematic politico-ideological treatise aimed at portraying the misfortunes that befell the Jewish community in the course of a violent social, religious and national revolution in Ukraine. The work has served as a basis for many assumptions about the nature of the Khmelnytsky revolution, the relations between the Ukrainian and the Jewish peoples, and the losses the Jewish community suffered in the course of that revolution. Hanover's interpretation of the Khmelnytsky revolution is basically monocausal, that is, socio-economic, in spite of the fact that he was aware of the existing religious differences. He intimated no special hostility on the part of the Ukrainians vis-à-vis the Jews, and offered not a single example of what could be described as anti-Semitic attitudes. He stated frankly that the followers of Greek Orthodoxy became the slaves and handmaids for the

Poles and the Jews. The latter happened to be on the side of the lords and the masters, that is, the establishment, usually a convenient and a wise move, except when the establishment becomes shaken or defeated. In such cases, its followers unfortunately have to suffer.

One problem, however, which has caused many misunderstandings in scholarship and which has even contributed to traditional ethnic animosities, is the discrepancy between the actual number of Jewish people killed in the course of the revolution and the figures offered by Hanover. Professor Weinryb has pointed out correctly that Hanover's figures for the armed strength of the various fighting forces, as well as the number killed, are grossly exaggerated.

Table of Jewish Victims in the Khmelnytsky Revolution Based on Hanover's Figures

Jews who perished at the very beginning of the Revolution ("several thousand," according to Hanover)		5,000
Nemyriv		6,000
Tulchyn		1,500
Polonne		10,000
Ostrih		600
Zaslav		200
Konstantyniv		3,000
Ukrainian and Belorussian localities and towns designated by Hanover as Lithuania (?) ("tens of thousands," according to Hanover)		20,000
Bar		2,000
Dubno		1,100
Narol (?)		12,000
Volhynia ("thousands of Jews," according to Hanover)		5,000
Ostrih ("the second massacre")		300
Total of Jewish victims based on Hanover's figures	approximately	66,700

Hanover centered his account on the massacres in various communities and offered concrete figures, always in round and even numbers. One example will suffice to illustrate Hanover's approach. In the case of Polonne, Hanover proposed a figure of 10,000. According to a contemporary official Polish source, 2,000 Jews were killed in Polonne.[15] While

working on similar problems in Slavic-Turkic relations (particularly on the problem of captives), this author has concluded that there was an inbuilt mechanism to exaggerate the number of captives and those killed by five or ten-fold in order to magnify the sufferings of the victims and the dangers that beset them.[16] Therefore, on the basis of comparative analysis, I wish to suggest that the number of Jews killed in the Khmelnytsky revolution amounted either to a minimum of 6,000 to 7,000, one-tenth of the figure offered by Hanover, or to a maximum of 12,000 to 14,000, approximately one-fifth of the figure claimed by Hanover.

Hanover stated that 10,000 people perished of starvation and disease in Lviv. His figures concerning the epidemics cannot be taken into consideration, because there is no evidence of any major epidemic in Ukraine or Poland at that time. Concerning the 20,000 who were taken prisoner by the Tatars, two observations can be made. First, the figure is greatly inflated and should be substituted either by 2,000 or 4,000. Second, it should be noted that Ukrainians also were taken into Tatar captivity, even during the period of the Khmelnytsky alliance with the Tatars.[17] Thus, if one were to rely on a critical analysis of Hanover's figures, which are, with qualification, the only dependable figures, then one arrives at an approximate minimum/maximum figure of 7,000 to 13,000 and a median figure of 10,000 Jews killed in the Khmelnytsky revolution. Even if one accepts the revised median figure of 10,000, it still indicates a waste of 10,000 precious lives, and a testimony to man's everlasting inhumanity. On the other hand, the amount does not represent an unusually high number of victims in the context of the upheavals and wars of the period under consideration. If one were to take into account the fact that 1648, the opening year of the Khmelnytsky revolution, was the last year of the protracted Thirty Years' War, and compare its material and particularly human losses to those suffered in the Khmelnytsky revolution, then the median figure of 10,000 Jewish victims would be not only within the range, but even below the average of human losses suffered by the contestants and bystanders of the Thirty Years' War.

Similar distortions of the figures have been handed down to us by traditional Jewish, as well as Polish scholarship with regard to the *Haidamachchyna,* that is, the fifth and, at the same time, the last major wave of the Cossack insurrections in Ukraine, which culminated in the *Koliivshchyna* of 1768.[18] In his article on the Haidamaks in the *Encyclopaedia Judaica,* Shmuel Ettinger offers realistic figures for the Jewish victims in the early *Haidamak* uprisings: 27 in Korsun in 1734; 35 in Pavoloch, and 14 in Pohrebyshche in 1736. He mentions the massacres of 1738, 1742 and 1750 without providing any specific figures.[19] However, for the year 1768, in which the Uman massacre took place, he repeats the same old and highly inflated estimate of the victims, that is, 20,000 Jews and Poles

killed, an estimate based entirely on narrative sources.[20] As Ivan Franko suggested long ago and as this author has shown recently, the figure of victims of the Uman massacre could not have exceeded 2,000.[21] In similar manner, the subsequent extensive and extremely repressive pacification action conducted under the leadership of Józef Stepowski, the commanding officer of the Polish troops in Ukraine, resulted in the execution of approximately 5,000 to 7,000 Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants, and a realistic figure for the active Ukrainian participation in the *Koliivshchyna* can be put at approximately 500 to 600 Cossacks and nearly 4,000 to 5,000 peasants, and not at tens of thousands either of the Ukrainian combatants in the *Koliivshchyna* or of those killed by the Polish forces as attested by traditionally accepted figures for which there is no evidence in documentary sources.[22]

Now let us turn to the use of conceptual paradigms as applied in Jewish scholarship with regard to the Cossack insurrections. Regardless of its shortcomings and numerical exaggerations, until the Second World War Jewish scholarship tended to view the Cossack insurrections and the resulting massacres of the Jews in their own historical context. Thus, the Cossack insurrections and the Jewish calamities were regarded as part of medieval and early modern history and were put into the category of medieval persecutions of the Jews, such as those that occurred in connection with the catastrophes of the Crusades and the black death in Western Europe. Its representatives explained the social, economic, national and religious antagonisms in historicist terms and spoke openly of the Jewish elements who served as "the more conspicuous subordinates" in the Polish latifundia economy which exploited the Ukrainian population. They also refrained from using the modern concept of "anti-Semitism," and in speaking of anti-Jewish excesses and massacres employed the historically correct form of "anti-Jewish pogroms."[23]

After the Second World War, however, an ominous and ideologically loaded concept of "holocaust," as applied to the Cossack insurrections and, in particular, to the Khmelnytsky revolution, entered Jewish scholarly terminology. Contemporary Jewish historians and social scientists not only freely apply the term holocaust to the Khmelnytsky era, but also make the hetman personally "responsible for the holocaust of the Polish (or the Ukrainian) Jewry in that period."[24] According to Howard Aster, "this period is recognized as having a status equivalent to the Holocaust of the Second World War."[25] Even more troublesome is the fact that this statement precisely reflects the mood of Jewish scholarship and the opinion of the educated Jewish public. As of today, only one well known Jewish specialist on the problem in question has clearly dissented from this unhistoric and highly emotional assessment. I have in mind Bernard Weinryb, who has expressed a more sober and balanced opinion as

far as the historical classification of the Ukrainian-Jewish relations in the Khmelnytsky revolution is concerned. According to Professor Weinryb, "Writing today about the killings in the seventeenth century one must clearly distinguish between the Nazis, for whom *total* extermination of the Jews became a goal and a policy in the 1940–45 holocaust, and the seventeenth-century Cossacks, who had no such policy. That was a period of frequent murder, violence, and brutal revenge. The Cossacks also originally wanted to bar Jews from their region. But they were neither interested in nor desirous of totally exterminating Jews in Europe or Poland. Nor did they possess the technical means to establish death factories like those of the Nazis. The Cossacks were not racially oriented. This explains the high rate of survival in the seventeenth-century catastrophe as compared with the holocaust in the twentieth century."[26]

The use of the concept of holocaust as applied to the Cossack insurrections is particularly unjustified because it is based on inadequate quantitative evidence. Although the Khmelnytsky revolution was a tragic and devastating experience for Ukrainian Jewry, its primary objective was not the extermination of the Jewish population, but the abolition of the Polish system, represented by the latifundia economy of the Polish magnates, of the rule of the *szlachta*, of the domineering position of the Polish Catholic Church and even of the Ruthenian Uniate Church. The Jews suffered because they had been an integral part, that is, the lower strata representatives of that system and because of the traditional Christian, in this particular case Orthodox Christian, hostility toward what has been perceived as an alien religion. Religious hatred and xenophobia had been authentic social phenomena from which not only the Jews, but also other peoples and denominations had suffered. For example, religious hostility between the Ruthenians/Ukrainians of the Orthodox denomination and those of the Uniate had persisted during the later phases of the Cossack insurrections. The *Haidamak* insurrections, in particular, aimed at the expulsion or destruction not only of the Jews, but also of the Poles, as well as of those in the service of the Polish nobility, and the Ruthenian/Ukrainian Uniates. Furthermore, their goal was the removal of all non-Orthodox religious institutions and their adherents from Right-Bank Ukraine. Beginning in the late 1730s and early 1740s, the *Haidamaks* first began to direct their hostility toward Polish Roman Catholic and Ruthenian/Ukrainian Uniate clergy and to commit extraordinary acts of cruelty against them. Their contempt and hatred for all but the Orthodox Eastern Slavs were reflections of a xenophobia that assumed its most obscurant and drastic forms in the *Koliivshchyna* insurrection as a reaction to the religious intolerance of the Polish ruling elite that had accompanied the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the eighteenth century.

The *Koliivshchyna* originated as a movement against the Confederates of Bar, who, the *Haidamaks* believed, intended to destroy all Orthodox believers. Zalizniak's detachment began its campaign in the vicinity of the Motronyn Monastery, and sufficient evidence can be found to maintain that a number of monks, as well as of Orthodox lower clergy, sympathized with the objectives of the *Haidamaks* to extirpate both Roman and Uniate Catholicism and Judaism. These ecclesiastics seem to have provided religious and ideological guidance to the *Haidamaks,* and some of them instigated religious excesses similar to those that occurred during the Uman massacre. The question of the relationship between Melkhisedek Znachko-Iavorsky, the archmandrite of the Motronyn Monastery, and the *Haidamaks* and their excesses has yet to be settled. Znachko-Iavorsky was accused by his Polish and Ruthenian Uniate contemporaries of having incited the *Haidamaks* and peasants to undertake the *Koliivshchyna* insurrection and of having been the chief ideologue and principal architect of a campaign to reconvert the Ruthenian/Ukrainian Uniates to the Orthodox Church. His involvement in reconversion activities can in fact be fairly well proved, but it is more difficult to establish his direct connection with the *Haidamaks*. In his pastoral epistle of 1768, Znachko-Iavorsky advised his compatriots not to participate in *Haidamak* activities, but instead to use legal channels in their struggle for religious rights. However, it deserves to be noted in this particular context that although Znachko-Iavorsky did condemn the killing of Jews, he never specifically discouraged the annihilation of the Uniate or Roman Catholic fellow Christians.[27]

Modern scholarship cannot be satisfied with simplistic traditional explanations or modern nationalistic justifications of the complex causes of the motivations and behaviour of early modern society. It cannot accept a projection of modern or contemporary concerns, including those of anti-Semitism and genocide, into earlier periods of history, in particular when such concerns simply did not exist, just as it cannot tolerate simplistic monocausal explanations offered by various Ukrainian learned and popular authors regarding the placement of the blame for the anti-Jewish excesses and massacres that took place in the course of Ukrainian insurrections and revolutions at the hand of the combatant or civilian Ukrainian elements, on the Jews themselves by making well known proverbial comments, such as "anti-Semitism is an international phenomenon and only we, the Ukrainians, are being blamed for it," or "it was their (Jewish) fault anyway." Such naïve and self-serving justifications not only do not help to put Jewish-Ukrainian relations into a proper historical perspective, but also contribute to the perpetuation of antagonisms, mistrust and deeply felt hatred. Jewish scholarship and the Jewish public have the right and even the obligation to ask hard and probing questions, such as, for

example, why at the various occasions of significant Ukrainian national revivals and nation-building periods, extremist elements of Ukrainian society and sometimes even Ukrainian regular combatant units engaged in pogroms and massacres of the Jewish population, elements of which, while serving in the economy of the oppressive systems, did not kill Ukrainians in significant numbers.

Can one be assured that future Ukrainian national movements and revivals will not be accompanied by anti-Semitic excesses and even extreme anti-Jewish acts similar to those that occurred in the past? In order to avoid future tragedies, Jewish and Ukrainian scholars must together lay solid foundations for a Jewish-Ukrainian dialogue and for the normalization of Jewish-Ukrainian relations. Serious and responsible scholars can agree on verifiable facts, methodological approaches and areas of research that require the most urgent attention. The best approach is to face the thorniest and most complex problems, to analyze not only periods of co-existence and co-operation, but also to deal with the crucial transformations that have shaped the histories of the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples, which for prolonged periods of time have lived side-by-side in peace and even in symbiotic relationship, periods that were punctuated by insurrections and revolutionary upheavals. But the most important contribution scholars can make is to remove prejudices and barriers based on national mythologies, which at the same time can be both a nation-building and a nation-destroying force, as is well known from the German and Russian experience. A search for the real significance of the Cossack insurrections in Jewish-Ukrainian relations will be best served if, on the basis of intellectually honest research, Jewish and Ukrainian scholars will not only come to terms with the past, but also will accept the past for what it was in its own terms.

NOTES

1. For the most recent work and the literature on the subject, see L. Gordon, *Cossack Rebellions: Social Turmoil in the Sixteenth-Century Ukraine* (Albany 1983).
2. S. M. Dubnov, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland* (Philadelphia 1916), 1: 144; S. W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews,* 2d ed., *Poland-Lithuania 1500–1650* (New York-London 1976), 16: 306.
3. For a convenient English translation of Nathan Hanover's *Yeven Metzulah,* see *Abyss of Despair,* translated by A. J. Mesch (New York 1950), especially p. 32.
4. This catastrophic conception of the Khmelnytsky revolution permeates all the major Jewish works on the subject and has been incorporated into all Jewish encyclopaedias. For the more extensive Jewish treatments of the Jewish experience during the Khmelnytsky revolution, see H. J. Gurland, *Le-Korot ha-Gezerot al-Yisrael,* 1-2 (1887–9); Dubnov, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland,* 1: 139–87; J.

Shatzky, *Gezerot 1648* (1938); J. S. Hertz, *Di Yidn in Ukraine* (1949); N. Wahrman, *Mekerot le-Toledot Gezerot 1648 ve 1649* (1949); M. Hendel, *Gezerot 1648–1649* (1950). For representative concise summaries, consult the following encyclopaedic articles: M. Bu., "Chmielnicki (Kozakenaufstand)," *Jüdisches Lexikon,* 1: cols. 1364–7; A. Safanov, "Chmielnicki Massacres," *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia,* 3: 161–2; N. R., "Chmielnicki, Bogdan Zinovi," *The Jewish Encyclopedia,* 4: 39–40; S. Ett., "Chmielnicki, Bogdan (1595–1657)," *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 5: cols. 480–4.

5. See *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva. Slovnykova chastyna,* ed. V. Kubiiovych (1955), 2: 671; *Encyclopaedia Judaica,* 15: cols. 1513–19. It should be noted that these estimates have been repeated in a recent essay by H. Aster and P. J. Potichnyj, *Jewish-Ukrainian Relations: Two Solitudes* (Oakville, Ontario 1985), 24, 39.
6. J. Schamschon, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Judenverfolgungen in Polen 1648–1658* (Berlin 1912), 98–9.
7. *Encyclopaedia Judaica,* 5: col. 482.
8. B. D. Weinryb, *The Jews of Poland: A Social and Economic History of the Jewish Community in Poland from 1100 to 1800* (Philadelphia 1972), 192–5; 362–3, n. 26; B. D. Weinryb, "The Hebrew Chronicles on Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack-Polish War," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* (cited hereafter as *HUS*), 1, 2 (1977): 153–77, especially 174–6.
9. Weinryb, "The Hebrew Chronicles," 163.
10. Weinryb, *The Jews of Poland,* 192.
11. For the computations, see the seminal article by Sh. Ettinger, "Jewish Participation in the Colonization of Ukraine [Hebrew]," *Zion*, 21, 3–4 (1956): 107–42, especially 107–124. Another highly informative study on the Jewish population in Ukraine by the same author is "The Legal and Social Status of Jews in Ukraine from the Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries [Hebrew]," *Zion*, 20, 3–4 (1955): 128–52.
12. Ettinger, "Jewish Participation," 124.
13. Weinryb, *The Jews of Poland,* 194.
14. For the introductory studies on these chronicles and the literature on the subject, see D. Maggit, "Podii 1648–1656 rr. na Ukraini i v Polshchi v evreiskii literaturi XVII–XIX v.; Bibliografiia i regesty," *Zbirnyk prats evreiskoi istorychno-arkheohrafichnoi komisii,* (Kiev 1929), 2: 246–71; S. Ia. Borovoi, "Natsionalno-osvoboditelnaia voina ukrainskogo naroda protiv polskogo vladychestva i evreiskoe naselenie Ukrainy," *Istoricheskie zapiski,* 9 (1940): 81–124; Weinryb, "The Hebrew Chronicles."
15. M. Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* (1922/1956), 8, pt. 2: 43.
16. J. Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438–1560s)* (The Hague—Paris 1974), 237–40.
17. The inflated figure of captives is paralleled by the exaggerations made in chronicles regarding the number of the redeemed Jewish captives. In Constantinople, for example, there were 2,000 Jewish captives until the mid-1750s, which represents a significantly smaller figure than that reported in the chronicles. I. Halpern, "Capture and Redemption of Captives in the Time of Persecutions in the Ukraine and Lithuania, 1649–1660 [Hebrew]," *Zion*, 25, 1 (1960): 17–56.
18. Concerning recent treatments of the *Haidamak* insurrections and the literature on the subject, see Z. E. Kohut, "Myths Old and New: The Haidamak Movement and the Koliivshchyna (1768) in Recent Historiography," *HUS* 1, 3 (1977): 359–78; J. Pelenski, "The *Haidamak* Insurrections and the Old Regimes in Eastern Europe," *The American and European Revolutions, 1976–1848: Sociopolitical and Ideological Aspects,* ed. J. Pelenski (Iowa City 1980): 228–47.

19. S. Ett., "Haidamacks," *Encyclopaedia Judaica,* 7: cols. 1132–3.
20. Ibid., col. 1133. Dubnov was already using the figure of 20,000 for Poles and Jews killed during the Uman massacre and referred to "1768 as a miniature copy of the year 1648." *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland,* 1: 185–6.
21. [Franko], "Materiialy do istorii Koliivshchyny. III Polska poema pro Umansku rizniu," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka,* 13 (1904): 1–40, especially 33–5; Pelenski, "The Haidamak Insurrections," 237.
22. Pelenski, "The Haidamak Insurrections," 237–8, 233. The same applies to the number of Jews killed in the pogroms conducted on Ukrainian territory during the Revolution of 1917–20. In Jewish literature, the figures range from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of Jewish victims, with the understanding that the overwhelming majority, if not all, were killed by the Ukrainian combatants. According to information provided by reliable Jewish sources, approximately 28,000–35,000 Jews were killed on Ukrainian territory during the period in question. Most of the victims perished at the hands of the Russian White Guardist forces, and only approximately 25 per cent by the Ukrainians, of whom only 1,500–2,000 can be connected in one way or another with excesses perpetrated by military units under the command of the Ukrainian national government, which had little or no control over those actions, and the remaining 5,000–6,000 on account of the pogroms carried out by various anarchist military units under the command of Otamans Nestor Makhno, Danylo Zeleny, Matvii Hryhoriiv and others. It should be pointed out that during the period of the conservative Ukrainian regime of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, not a single pogrom took place on the territory under the authority of the hetmanite administration. Although Skoropadsky was not sympathetic to the Jews, as a genuine law-and-order conservative he simply would not tolerate excesses perpetrated against any specific group.
23. Baron, *Poland-Lithuania 1500 –1650,* 298.
24. S. Ett., "Chmielnicki," *Encyclopaedia Judaica,* 5: col. 481.
25. Aster and Potichnyj, *Jewish-Ukrainian Relations,* 38.
26. Weinryb, *The Jews of Poland,* 196 n.
27. Pelenski, "The *Haidamak* Insurrections," 234–5.

Frank E. Sysyn

The Jewish Factor in the Khmelnytsky Uprising

> I named my book *Yeven M'tzulah (The Deep Mire)*, because the words of the Psalmist allude to these terrible events, and speak of the oppressors, the Tatars and the Ukrainians as well as of the archenemy, Chmiel, may his name be blotted out, may God send a curse upon him.
>
> Nathan Hanover, *Abyss of Despair*

> An overwhelming crowd, all the populace, greeted him at the outskirts [of Kiev]. The Academy welcomed him with orations and acclamations [calling him] a Moses, a saviour, a redeemer, a liberator of the people from the Polish servitude, well-named Bohdan, given by God.
>
> Wojciech Miaskowski, "Diary of a Journey to the Zaporozhian Host . . . 1649"

There two quotations typify the different questions and conclusions of the Jewish and Ukrainian communities and historical traditions about the Khmelnytsky uprising. What is not typical about them is that the statements are contemporary to the events and come from two of the few such texts that discuss the wider context of the revolt. In particular, Hanover's work analyzes the social and religious oppression that caused the revolt and does not merely describe the afflictions it brought to the Jewish people. Hanover explains,

> The king was a kind and upright man. He loved justice and loved Israel. In his days the religion of the pope gained strength in the Kingdom of Poland. Formerly most of the dukes and the ruling nobility adhered to the Greek Orthodox faith, thus the followers of both faiths were treated with equal regard. King Sigismund, however, raised the status of the Catholic dukes and princes above those of the Ukrainians, so that most of the latter abandoned their Greek Orthodox faith and embraced Catholicism. And the masses that followed the Greek Orthodox Church became gradually impoverished. They were looked upon as lowly and inferior beings and became the slaves and the handmaids of the Polish people and of the Jews. Those among them who were trained warriors were conscripted by the king to serve in his army. This group numbered approximately thirty thousand fighting men, and they were called Cossacks. They were exempt from taxes to the king and the nobles. It was their specific task to guard the frontier. . . . The Cossacks therefore enjoyed special privileges like the nobility, and were exempt from taxes. The rest of the Ukrainians, however were a wretched and an enslaved lot, servants to the dukes and the nobles. "Their lives were made bitter by hard labour, in mortar and bricks, and in all manner of services in the house and in the field." The nobles levied upon them heavy taxes, and some even resorted to cruelty and torture with the intent of persuading them to accept Catholicism. So wretched and lowly had they become that all classes of people, even the lowliest among them, became their overlords.[1]

The most troubling aspect in studying such a momentous problem as the Jewish question during the Khmelnytsky uprising is that the sources are so few and so laconic. Even those that do exist, particularly from the non-Jewish side, have been insufficiently studied. A vivid example of this situation can be found in the Soviet scholar S. Borovoi's article "The National Liberation War of the Ukrainian Nation and the Jewish Population," in which an intriguing brochure published in Lublin, charging that the Jewish leaseholders were the major cause of the revolt, is mentioned as written by a Father "Fovor Nebelsky."[2] In reality it refers to a panegyric by the Dominican Pawel Ruszel on the heavenly favour bestowed by the election of Jan Kazimierz (*Fawor Niebieski . . . pod czas szczęsliwey elekciey na Królestwo Polskie Pana naszego miłościwego Jana Kazimierza* [Lublin 1649]).[3] Such is the present state of the art. One can add to the problems of the paucity of sources and their poor state of study the tendency to treat sources of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as if they were reliable witnesses to views and events of 1648. Over fifty years ago Hrushevsky argued that the Cossack chronicles are first-rate sources for the political and intellectual history of the Ukraine of 1700, not for the Ukraine of 1650. Nevertheless, the dearth of

Ukrainian sources and programmatic statements from the early years of the revolt, above all due to the destruction of the Hetmanate's archives, prompts historians to turn to Velychko and Hrabianka as evidence of Ukrainian views and programmes in Khmelnytsky's time.

We are also hampered by the insufficient monographic research and limitations in choice of subject by modern historians. Jewish, Polish, Ukrainian and Soviet historiographies have all contributed something to our knowledge, but far from sufficiently. All these historiographic traditions have blinders and limitations. There are, of course, no rigid divides between those traditions or no clear-cut classifications of historians, since Jewish historians in particular worked in Polish, Ukrainian and Russian milieus and belonged to these cultures. Still, we can speak of traditions in general terms.

The accomplishments of Jewish historians, it is true, have been considerable.[4] They have edited, translated and studied the Hebrew chronicles and have described the extent of the violence against the Jewish communities. Historians such as Shmuel Ettinger, Salo Baron, Bernard Weinryb and Maurycy Horn have furthered our knowledge of the Jewish settlement of Ukraine and the community's economic and social life. But I think that they would be the first to admit that much remains to be done both in the study of internal community sources such as the responsa, as well as in discussing the relation of the Jewish community to the rest of Ukraine's population and in analyzing the role of the Jews in the Ukrainian economy. The problems are difficult ones because of the deplorable state of Ukrainian economic and social history. How, for example, can we estimate the proportion of Jewish leaseholders when we have no authoritative studies on landholding patterns or on the institution of leaseholding?[5] The problem of context is, in fact, even broader. For the sake of Jewish and Ukrainian understanding of 1648, we can only hope that some day a Jewish specialist will continue Jacob Shatzki's original work on the Jewish question in the Khmelnytsky uprising and then will write a history of the Khmelnytsky revolt that will integrate the Jewish problem into the discussion of the totality of the revolt, thereby providing a perspective so lacking in Ukrainian, Polish and Russian historiography.

The treatment of the Jewish question in the Khmelnytsky uprising by Polish scholars has been rather superficial and at times tendentious. In general, Polish historiography on the uprising remains quite weak. The major biography of Khmelnytsky is still that of Rawita-Gawroński, whose racism and fanaticism make his work more important for a study of Polish nationalism than of Khmelnytsky. His work holds interest largely for his contention, clothed in inferences, that Khmelnytsky was of Jewish origin.[6] In more worthwhile works, such as those of Kubala or Szajnocha, one searches in vain for discussions of the Jews. Modern Pol-

ish historians rarely deal with Ukrainian problems or the uprising, and only Maurycy Horn deals with the Jewish population of Ukraine.

Although the Khmelnytsky uprising has been extensively studied by generations of Ukrainians, the Jewish factor has received all too little attention. It is impossible to discuss this voluminous literature in detail, but certain major trends can be identified.[7] The Cossack chroniclers who initiated Ukrainian historical writing on Khmelnytsky faced the problem of justifying revolt, although in their conservative world-view social and political revolt was an evil. They were able to justify the revolt and to legitimize the position of their social stratum by insisting that the Poles had transgressed on the rights of the Cossacks and the "Little Russians," and that the Holy Orthodox Church had been persecuted. An additional legitimizing factor was the charge that the Polish regime subjugated the Cossacks to avaricious Jewish leaseholders.[8] In the nineteenth century, the traditionalist anti-Jewish attitudes of the Cossack historians passed into the newly forming Ukrainian historiography, which saw Khmelnytsky as a great hero, and the Poles and the Jews as the enemies of the Ukrainian masses. But as new liberal and socialist ideals reached the Ukrainian populists, traditionalist anti-Jewish sentiments were abandoned, although populists continued to sympathize with the downtrodden rural masses and to emphasize the social aspect of the revolt and the complicity of many Jews with the elite of the old social order. Indeed the left-leaning position of the Ukrainian movement kept it relatively free of the traditionalist anti-Semitic views of the Russian rightist clergymen and nationalists who, in contrast to the Russian left, were active in debates on Ukrainian historical questions. The political struggle between such forces was to emerge in the debate over the Khmelnytsky monument in the 1880s.[9] More research on Ukrainian historians' views is necessary, in particular of Panteleimon Kulish, the mercurial figure who was both conservative and anti-Cossack.[10] In general, discussions about the Jews concentrated on such peripheral matters as the affirmation of the Ukrainian folk and Ukrainian and Polish chronicle traditions that the Jews were leaseholders of churches—a point disputed by the Jewish historian I. Galant, who asserted there was no documentary proof.[11]

Only the greatest of the populists, Hrushevsky, attempted to integrate fully the Jewish question into his history of the uprising. As opposed to modern anti-Semitism as he was to traditionalist anti-Jewish attitudes, Hrushevsky obviously found the Jewish issue extremely disturbing. Dedicated to social revolution and the interests of the masses, Hrushevsky was troubled by the problem of popular anti-Semitism in seventeenth-century Ukraine and preferred to examine issues of socio-economic conflict. But the successors to the populists, the "statists," above all Viacheslav Lypynsky, were to have no such devotion to the right of the

socially oppressed to revolt. Condemning the peasant revolt and violence of 1648, they turned their attention to the statebuilding elements of the uprising. Regrettably this also meant a turning away from the Jewish problem.

The flowering of Soviet Ukrainian and Jewish studies in Kiev in the 1920s was destroyed before major works on the Jews and the Khmelnytsky revolt were produced.[12] Although Marxism encouraged studying the important question of social divisions with the Jewish community, the only major Soviet work on the question of the Khmelnytsky revolt and the Jews, by S. Borovoi, demonstrates the clumsiness of an application of "internationalism" and Marxism that insists on seeing sympathy and co-operation among the lower classes, Jewish and Ukrainian, in support of the revolt. Since Borovoi, Soviet scholars have raised Khmelnytsky and the uprising to a central place in Soviet political mythology by reworking traditional Russian nationalist thought in an attempt to describe the entire purpose of the revolt as the "reunification" of Ukraine with Russia. In such an environment, any discussion of the Jewish issue has been abandoned as extraneous to the real significance of 1648. With the rise of anti-Semitism as Soviet official policy, there is little hope that any research will be conducted in the USSR.

In addition to the undoubted neglect of the Jewish issue in the Khmelnytsky revolt, one finds anachronistic thinking comparable to Borovoi's among many Soviet and pre-Soviet Ukrainian scholars. In particular, there exists implicit condemnation of seventeenth-century Jews for their "failure" to break with or criticize the Polish social order and to sympathize with the economically and socially downtrodden masses and the Ukrainian people's struggle against religious and national persecution.

For the historian of the Khmelnytsky uprising, and consequently for the historians of all early modern European revolts, the underdeveloped state of research on the Jewish factor impedes understanding of the nature and dynamics of the revolt. The Ukrainian revolt, after all, stands out among the "contemporaneous revolutions" (to use Merriman's designation) of the 1640s and 1650s because it resulted in real social and economic change that benefited the lower orders. This social change was, of course, accompanied by changes in the elite, the administration and religious relations in Ukraine, or at least in that part of Ukraine where the revolt succeeded. It is questionable to call even such a complete transformation a "revolution" in the absence of "revolutionary ideology," or to see the Ukrainian uprising as fully successful without the formation of a recognized sovereign state. Still, it is clear that Ukraine witnessed a challenge to the political and social order as radical as that in England, that it contained rebellious masses as determined as those in Naples or Catalonia, harboured religious grievances as deep as

those in the Low Countries, and engendered a rebel political leadership more sophisticated and creative than that which led the bloody but unsuccessful Russian revolts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Of course, the causes of the revolt were numerous, the factions within the uprising were complex and disparate, and the nature and goals of the revolt were constantly changing. But one of the most salient features of the Ukrainian frontier was its rapidly expanding Jewish population, and one of the most salient aspects of the revolt was the slaughter of Jews, particularly in the early phases of the uprising. Hence every student of the uprising must take this Jewish factor into account.[13]

It is the rapid increase of Jewish communities and of the total Jewish population that is the most striking factor in seventeenth-century Ukrainian Jewish life. Professor Ettinger has calculated a growth from 4,000 Jews in 1569 to 51,325 in 1648 in the palatinates of Kiev, Podolia, Volhynia and Bratslav.[14] To this must be added the larger and older Jewish community in the Ruthenian and Belz palatinates, which Maurycy Horn estimates at 54,000 in 1648.[15] Our estimates of the total population of the Ukrainian lands vary widely for this period (from two to an undoubtedly inflated five million), but it is clear that Ukraine was an area of booming population increase, rapid economic development and settlement of new towns and villages.[16] The period thus constituted a new age for both Jews and the population at large. The frontier offered Jews tremendous opportunities to enter new occupations and to adopt a way of life far different from that of the central European ghettos. In a frontier society Jews took up arms, had to be specifically forbidden from joining Cossacks on Black Sea raids, and began wearing clothes similar to those of their Christian neighbours. As Salo Baron put it, "in these sparsely settled territories a new type of Jew began evolving, different in both socioeconomic and cultural make-up from the majority of his coreligionists living in the older centers of the dual Commonwealth."[17] But at the same time, the indigenous Ukrainian populace was also facing new conditions: the formation of a new rural economy controlled by landlords who limited more effectively the economic rights and the political liberty of the populace in order to produce more agricultural produce for the market. Thus, despite the economic boom, tension grew and the intermediary position in the economic order of Jewish leaseholders, who collected duties and administered estates and revenue-producing establishments (inns, mills), and of Jewish town dwellers, who competed with Christian burghers, made their situation, and hence that of the entire Jewish community, extremely precarious. The more attention that can be devoted to these social and economic problems, the better we shall understand the depth of antagonisms.

National xenophobia and religious xenophobia were also important

causes of the revolt. That the Pole and the Catholic were seen as the principal alien yoke did not mean that xenophobia did not also increase against the Jews. Indeed, it would seem that the two resentments fed upon each other. We must examine them together in order to understand each one separately, although they exhibited substantial differences. The Polish and Catholic problem was aggravated above all by conversion and assimilation that alienated the Ukrainian upper classes from the masses, therefore creating a coincidence of religious, national and socio-economic factors. After all, Jeremi Wiśniowiecki (Iarema Vyshnevetsky) himself was a Ukrainian by birth and "became a Pole" only by conversion and assimilation. The religious conflict, and above all the long struggle of the Orthodox for their rights, undoubtedly sharpened all religious tensions in Ukraine.

The increase of the power of the Counter-Reformation in the Commonwealth made the environment ever more hostile to all non-Catholics, including Jews. The magnates protected the Jews because of economic self-interest and hence frustrated Catholic zealots as well as the petty nobles and townsmen who were the Jews' economic competitors. As Kazimierz Bartoszewicz demonstrated in 1914, the vehemence and number of anti-Jewish tracts increased in the early seventeenth century.[18]

Although the Eastern Church has been seen as more Judaeophobic than the Western, we do not yet have sufficient study of the dissemination of earlier Judaeophobic texts or the writing of new tracts by the clergymen of the Eastern Church in seventeenth-century Ukraine. From my reading of the Eastern Church polemical literature, I find that the Orthodox were so preoccupied with the Catholics and the Protestants that they had little energy to discuss the Jews. The Jewish issue seems most pronounced in denunciations of Anti-Trinitarians. But even when we do know more of literary texts, we shall be far from knowing how they influenced village priests, peasant parishioners and popular Orthodox Judaeophobia. Nevertheless, the existence of relative Jewish religious liberty must have been an irritant to an Orthodox population that felt humiliated and persecuted.

While the extent and nature of economic and religious friction are always hard to assess, it is surprisingly difficult to determine what role the Jewish question played in the goals and plans of the rebels. This is partially the result of destruction of so much correspondence and so many tracts. It is also, however, a result of the preoccupation of the Cossack and Ukrainian rebels with their Polish adversaries and of the Polish nobles with the Cossack rebels. This preoccupation made for little comment on Jewish affairs. I believe Salo Baron is correct in asserting that in the early phase of the revolt, Khmelnytsky displayed little interest in the Jewish issue and that he "almost parenthetically" made his first com-

ment on the Jews in a letter to the Crown Great Hetman Mikołaj Potocki, complaining that his people "suffer even from Jews intolerable injuries and insults of a kind no Christians sustain in Turkish lands."[19] (I question, however, whether there is sufficient documentary evidence to prove Baron's assertions that Khmelnytsky was "archenemy of Jews and chief architect of the massacres" and harboured "venomous hatred of Jews".)[20] In fact, the Cossack statements and demands of 12 June 1648 deal almost exclusively with Cossack grievances as do those of 15 November.[21] The demands of 24 February 1649 differ because of their attention to Orthodox church matters and request for the expulsion of Jesuits.[22] It is only at Zboriv on 17 August 1649 that demand is made for the expulsion of Jewish leaseholders and even this has a codicile allowing Jewish merchants to carry on trade.[23] It would seem that an anti-Jewish policy was not part of the Cossacks' original programme and that it was ultimately adopted to satisfy burgher and peasant supporters. It is to Orthodox burgher-Jewish relations that particular attention should be paid. Although in the western Ukrainian lands the Catholic burghers were undoubtedly viewed by the Orthodox burghers as the major enemy, in the eastern areas, where Catholics were few, the Jews must have loomed larger in the burghers' consciousness.[24] The views of peasants on Jews, like their views on almost all other issues in the Khmelnytsky uprising, have not come down to us in written form. The whole issue of popular anti-Semitism remains difficult to study, particularly since folklore and the *dumy* have been questioned as authoritative sources. Still the "Duma about the Oppression of the Leaseholders" offers considerable evidence about the reasons for, and expressions of, popular antipathy toward the Jews.[25]

One of the most difficult problems to study is the level of violence against Jews in the Ukrainian revolt. Seventeenth-century Ukraine obviously stood out even in the turbulent Europe of its age for the frequency and magnitude of violence in times of "peace." Tatar attacks, nobles' raids, and peasant and Cossack revolts all were frequent throughout the early seventeenth century. When the revolt broke out in 1648, accompanied by social warfare, the level of cruelty and butchery was tremendous on both the rebel and the government side of the struggle. It was amidst this general carnage that the tragedy of the Jews unfolded, and it is only in the context of this struggle that we can understand the massacres. Within this problem, we must deal with the initiators and forms of the violence against Jews and with the issue of conversion.[26] Finally, we must deal with the emotional issue of estimating the number of deaths. All estimates will, of course, be approximate. Just as we shall probably never know how many peasants and Cossacks were butchered by Wiśniowiecki, or how many Poles were sent to Tatar captivity, so we shall

never know certainly how many Jews were massacred. Crucial to this is the problem of why earlier Cossack-led revolts had not turned against the Jews to the same degree, and whether this difference can merely be attributed to the increasing Jewish presence in Ukraine and the magnitude of the revolt. Here the role of the burgher competitors of the Jews (sometimes seen to be embodied in the figure of Maksym Kryvonis) and of foreign states, merchants and clergymen (Greek, Arabic and Muscovite) should be examined. It is important to examine the sources carefully and to arrive at an authoritative estimate. It is time to put to rest tendencies by Ukrainian scholars to minimize the number and of Jewish scholars to use inflated statistics.

It is, of course, the lack of contemporary discussion that makes the Jewish factor so difficult to discuss in the Khmelnytsky uprising. The Jewish suffering went on largely without commentary by non-Jews in the midst of the Polish-Ukrainian struggle. It was an issue about which the Polish side was extremely sensitive since the raising up of Jews over a Christian people was hard to justify according to the contemporary Christian world-view. Some contemporary historians, such as Kochowski, were willing to admit "error" in this policy, while those even more antagonistic toward the rebels passed over it in silence.[27] It was a particularly difficult issue to deal with after 1648 in a commonwealth where Catholicism was becoming more and more intolerant.

On the rebel side, new concepts of society and culture emerged which sought not toleration, but a homogeneous Orthodox polity. The triumphant Orthodox no longer had to argue that religious pluralism should be preserved. Now similar to the Orthodox Russians, they could seek to maintain a religiously pure state. Indeed, Professor Ettinger sees Muscovite influence predating 1654, or even 1648, as fanning Judaeophobia in Ukraine. We lack extensive commentary by Ukrainian churchmen, but Paul of Aleppo's enthusiastic endorsement of the young Orthodox Hetmanate, as a result of his travels in 1654, reveals this *ex post facto* affirmation of the revolt. In cataloguing the blessing of the new land, the Arab clergyman praises Khmelnytsky for driving out not only the Latin Poles, but also the Armenians and Jews.[28] It is in Paul's placement of the Armenians first that a lesson can be derived in understanding commentary on the struggle in mid-seventeenth century Ukraine. For it would seem that destruction of Armenian communities affords particular pleasure to the Orthodox Arab prelate. Indeed, this commentary shows how each group in Ukraine of that time saw events solely in light of its own situation and illustrates how necessary it is for the modern scholar to look at all the groups in order to understand any one.

To return to the initial question: How important was the Jewish factor in explaining the radicalism and violence of the great uprising? It would

seem that while the major confrontations were on other issues, the large and visible Jewish community served as a target for many grievances and a stimulus to further radicalization of the rebellion. The shock waves that were sent through East European Jewry because of the massacres mark 1648 as a turning point in Jewish history. The year 1648 was also a turning point for Eastern Europe in general, initiating the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the birth of Cossack Ukraine. Although 1648 will continue to have very different connotations for Jewish, Ukrainian and Polish collective memories and traditions, the time has come for specialists in the history of each group to expand their horizons and research in order to provide a better understanding of the complex events of the Khmelnytsky uprising.

NOTES

1. Rabbi Nathan Hanover, *Abyss of Despair (YEVEN METZULAH). The Famous 17th Century Chronicle Depicting Jewish Life in Russia and Poland during the Chmielnicki Massacres of 1648–49,* translated by A. J. Mesch (New York n. d.), 27–8.
2. S. Ia. Borovoi, "Natsionalno-osvoboditelnaia voina ukrainskogo naroda protiv polskogo vladychestva i evreiskoe naselenie Ukrainy," *Istoricheskie zapiski*, 9 (1940): 99.
3. F. E. Sysyn, "A Curse on Both Their Houses: Catholic Attitudes towards Jews and Eastern Orthodox during the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising in Father Ruszel's *Fawor Niebieski*," *Israel and the Nations: Essays Presented in Honor of Shmuel Ettinger* (Jerusalem 1987), ix–xxiv.
4. For basic Jewish historical works, see S[hmuel] Ett[inger], "Chmielnicki (Khmelnitskii), Bogdan (1595–1657)," *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (Jerusalem 1972), 5: 483–4. Also see S. W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* 16, *Poland-Lithuania 1500–1650,* 2d ed. (New London 1976); B. D. Weinryb, *The Jews of Poland: A Social and Economic History of the Jewish Community in Poland from 1100 to 1800* (Philadelphia 1972); B. D. Weinryb, "The Hebrew Chronicles on Bogdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack-Polish War," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 2 (1977): 153–77; and the works of the Polish Jewish scholar Maurycy Horn, *Żydzi na Rusi Czerwonej w XVI i pierwszej połowie XVII w. Działalność gospodarcza na tle rozwoju demograficznego* (Warsaw 1975) and *Powinności wojenne Żydów w Rzeczypospolitej w XVI i XVII wieku* (Warsaw 1978). For older works by Jewish and non-Jewish scholars mostly in Hebrew, Yiddish and Slavic languages, see M. Bałaban, comp. *Bibliografia historii Żydów w Polsce i w krajach ościennych za lata 1900–1930,* no. 1 (Warsaw 1939); Jacob Shatzki, introduction to Yevein Metzulah in *Gzeires Tach* (Vilnius 1938), in Yiddish; R. Mahlen, *History of the Jews in Poland: Economy, Society and Juridical Status* (Merhavya 1946), in Hebrew.
5. One of the few useful works is A. Iaroshevych, "Kapitalistychna orenda na Ukraini za polskoi doby," *Zapysky Sotsialno-ekonomichnoho viddilu VUAN* 5–6 (1927).
6. F. Rawita-Gawroński, *Bogdan Chmielnicki do elekcyi Jana Kazimierza* 1 (Lviv 1906), 41–2. See also his *Żydzi w historii i literaturze ludowej na Rusi* (Warsaw n. d.).

7. For historiography on the Khmelnytsky uprising, including the Jewish question, see M. Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* 8, no. 2 (Rpt. New York 1956), 199–224. For a discussion of Ukrainian historians, D. Doroshenko, "A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography" and O. Ohloblyn, "Ukrainian Historiography 1917–1956," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States* 5–6 (1957). A useful, if tendentious, discussion is contained in Borovoi, "Natsionalno-osvoboditelnaia voina," 81–2, 102.
8. See Borovoi, "Natsionalno-osvoboditelnaia voina," 102.
9. See the article "Khmelnitskogo Bogdana pamiatnik (risunok so statei 'istoricheskii ocherk ego sooruzheniia'), *Kievskaia starina* 1888, no. 7, 145–156.
10. Borovoi calls Kulish a continuer of traditionalist anti-Jewish views, "Natsionalno-osvoboditelnaia voina," 81.
11. I. Galant, "Arendovali ievrei pravoslavnie tserkvi na Ukraine," *Ievreiskaia starina* 1 (1909): 71–87. Olena Pchilka defended the Ukrainian tradition. See Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy,* 8, no. 3: 126–7.
12. The only major work to appear from the Jewish historical commission in Kiev was D. Maggit, "Podii 1648–1656 r. na Ukraini i Polshchi v evreiskoi literaturi XVII–XIX. Bibliografiia i regesty," *Zbirnyk prats ievreiskii istorychno-arkheografichnoi komisii,* 2 (Kiev 1929), 246–71.
13. For a discussion of the general literature on seventeenth-century revolts and the Khmelnytsky uprising see F. E. Sysyn, "Seventeenth-Century Views on the Causes of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising: An Examination of the 'Discourse on the Present Cossack or Peasant Wars'," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* 5, no. 4 (December 1981): 430–66.
14. See Baron, *Poland-Lithuania,* 208.
15. Horn, *Żydzi na Rusi Czerwonej,* 310.
16. On Ukrainian demography, see F. Sysyn, "The Problem of Nobilities in the Ukrainian Past: The Polish Period, 1569–1648," in I. L. Rudnytsky, ed. *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton 1981), 85–6. Also, see A. I. Baranovich, *Ukraina nakanune osvoboditelnoi voiny serediny XVII v.* (Moscow 1959).
17. Baron, *Poland-Lithuania,* 191–2.
18. K. Bartoszewicz, *Antysemityzm w literaturze polskiej XV–XVII w.* (Warsaw 1914).
19. Baron, *Poland-Lithuania,* 299.
20. Ibid.
21. *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnyts'koho 1648–1657,* comp. I. Krypiakevych and I. Butych (Kiev 1961), 36–7, 80, 83–4.
22. Ibid., 105–6.
23. Ibid., 128–30.
24. For an example of this burgher discontent, see the protest of the Lviv Ruthenian burghers of 1608. It mentioned the existence of four nations in Lviv—Ruthenians, Poles, Jews and Armenians—and asserted that while the latter two had their own laws and administrations, the former two should be equal. It argued, however, that the Poles had kept the Ruthenians in a slavery worse than Egyptian servitude and had prevented the Ruthenian from exercizing his rights, in his native land, in Ruthenian Lviv. While there is no hostility to the Jews in the protest, it does illustrate the anomaly of Jews enjoying privileges at a time when the Ruthenians saw themselves as subjects of discrimination. *Chteniia v Istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora Letopistsa,* book 5, section 3 (1907): 209–10.
25. *Ukrainian Dumy: Editio Minor,* translated by G. Tarnawsky and P. Kilina (Toronto-Cambridge 1979), 162–9. "Orendar" is mistranslated as "merchant."
26. It is interesting that some contemporary testimony asserts that Jews were at times per-

mitted to convert to save themselves, while Poles were not, thus indicating different attitudes toward the two groups. Borovoi, "Natsionalno-osvoboditelnaia voina," 116.

27. For commentaries by Kochowski and Gradski, see Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 8, pt.: 120.
28. Pavel Aleppskii, *Puteshestvie antiokhiiskogo patriarkha Makariia v Rossiiu v polovine XVII veka,* part 2 (*Ot Dnestra do Moskvy)* translated by G. Murkos in *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete,* 183 (1897): 26–8.

II

The National Reawakening

Moshe Mishkinsky

The Attitudes of the Ukrainian Socialists to Jewish Problems in the 1870s

A number of remarks are in order before the presentation of some facts, theses and hypotheses. First, historiography does not seem to have made any comprehensive attempt to deal with the subject as a whole, but only with aspects of it. The main interest has been in the position of Mykhailo Drahomanov, which is of course very important, but does not exhaust the subject. Second, the relevant literature frequently displays bias of one kind or another: Soviet historiography of the past few decades is guilty of omission; Ukrainian historiography is often silent or apologetic, and Jewish historiography shows a tendency to simplified generalization in the opposite direction. There is an inclination to ignore changes of attitudes, the mixture of opinions and prejudices, differences between individuals, regional nuances and internal contradictions that appeared at all stages of the historical development even within relatively short periods of time. Be that as it may, the contribution made heretofore to the clarification of facts and processes related to the subject by historical research and writing (including its Polish branch) is by no means unappreciated. A critical analysis of the relevant literature is not given here though it is necessary and will hopefully be provided in the future.

The year 1875 may be regarded as marking the beginning of Ukrainian populist socialism. The following years of the 1870s will be divided here into two sub-periods, 1875-6, 1877-80.

In 1875-6 there appear to be three major issues within the context of our subject:

a) Drahomanov's attempt (1875) to analyze the "Jewish question" by means of a multi-dimensional analysis (in his article "Jews and Poles in the South-Western land"),
b) the publication of propaganda pamphlets in the Ukrainian language, in the populist-socialist spirit, which were directed mainly toward the people of the villages of Russia and Galicia,
c) the controversy between the Ukrainian socialists and the editorial staff of *Vpered,* the most prominent revolutionary Russian journal during the 1870s, which was edited by Petr Lavrov and Valerian Smirnov. Smirnov disapproved of the anti–Jewish notion of the Ukrainian pamphlets.

Serhii Podolynsky and Ostap Terletsky were associated with the publication of the propaganda pamphlets in Vienna; however, the former was primarily responsible for all that was related to ideational content. Although the first booklets were essentially translations of Russian pamphlets, they served as the expression for the first organized public appearance of Ukrainian socialism.

Podolynsky was of the opinion that the Ukrainian people had gone far in their criticism of the existing regime, but were very backward in the conscious moulding of a positive socialist ideal of life in the future. From this he concluded that, despite the Russian essays, the Ukrainians needed to limit their criticizing of that which existed and to expound a description of a synthesis of the new.

Nevertheless, it appears that on at least one point Podolynsky saw a need to extend the criticism of that which existed, i.e., the issue of the Jews. This found expression in the first propaganda pamphlet, "Parova mashyna" (Steam Engine). The pamphlet soon arrived in Russia and we have evidence from that period by an active narodnik dealing with the anti–Jewish prejudices in the revolutionary milieu who described how the central ideas of that pamphlet applied to the Jews, who set root there.

These ideas can be summarized in two points. First, the landlords and the Jews controlled all the wealth of the nation, and thereby sentenced the peasants to hunger and poverty. Second, from this arose the operative conclusion: the Jews and the landlords deserved to be destroyed.

It must be pointed out that the issue of harming the Jews does not appear here as an acceptance of a violent spontaneous outburst of the mob, nor does it appear in the context of a tactical perception which saw rioting as an unavoidable intermediate stage to popular social revolution. As a matter of fact, it was seen as an essential and integral part of the very struggle which the revolutionaries had to initiate and guide.

Apart from this pamphlet, Podolynsky gave a more extensive and articulated expression to his views on Jews in 1876 (in letters to Smirnov,

whom he insisted on referring to, in his writings in Russian, by the derogatory term "zhid"). He discussed the reasons for the hatred of the Jews by Ukrainians, Poles, Romanians, Russians and Germans; in other words, he discussed it this time not just in a Russian or Ukrainian context but as a general historical phenomenon. He claimed that it was not sufficient to use the explanations of the "Judaeophobic socialists," a term which can be seen as a hint to Bakunin and the Bakuninists, or at least a considerable part of them. This explanation thrust the blame onto the Jews for being exploiters. This is not so, said Podolynsky, for there are Jews who work and there are sincere socialist Jews. However, there is nothing to learn from this about the general problem of relationships between Jews and non-Jews. A socialist Jew can be an exemplary individual and Podolynsky would honour him as he would the best of his friends. Such a one was, for example, Rozaliia Idelson, the wife of Smirnov. But it is quite a different matter to live with him in the same community, and to come into daily contact with him. Such a thing would cause him, Podolynsky, no less repulsion than if he were a kulak-Jew. Moreover, one cannot see here a purely subjective view or feeling. This is a phenomenon of general significance concerning the "quality of the hatred of the people for the Jews." The explanation that Podolynsky offered for this, as opposed to the people called by him "progressive cosmopolitans," is very close to being racist in character.

Podolynsky did not limit himself to posing the question, but also offered two alternative solutions. The first was the complete assimilation of the Jews by the nation in whose midst they lived. Podolynsky did not see this alternative as becoming manifest in the near future, and, on a personal level, he was opposed to it "in order not to mix a spoon of tar into a keg of honey." The second alternative, and the preferred one, in his opinion, would be the removal (*"vyselenie"*) of the Jews and their resettlement as an independent nation. This solution would be to the benefit of both sides. The European nations would be freed of the Jews, and the Jews could develop their own civilization and thus benefit mankind with their "undoubtedly powerful and original minds."

As one can see, in both cases there was no place for Jewish existence not only in Ukraine but in Europe generally. The preferred solution, and apparently the benevolent one, of turning the Jews into an "independent nation" would not be achieved by their free will, but would be imposed on them.

Podolynsky maintained that if a solution to the Jewish question was not found, bloodshed against them could be expected. This was—as regards Tsarist Russia—an early prediction of the wave of pogroms that occurred in the early 1880s. However, Podolynsky not only envisioned the spontaneous manifestation of the second alternative, but as a matter

of fact recommended in his pamphlets encouragement of the process by practical advice.

At this point we come to the issue of the controversy with the editorial staff of *Vpered* which did not take place publicly, but occurred through correspondence. At the end of 1875, Podolynsky and his associates decided to publish a Ukrainian translation of the popular pamphlet *Khitraia mekhanika* (Astute Mechanism) by Vasilii Varzar under the title *Pravda*. This pamphlet, in its original Russian form, refers to different combinations of the enemies and exploiters of the people as conceived by the Narodnik— "The Tsar and the nobles," "The Tsar, the manufacturers, the Boyars and the kulaks," "The Tsar, officials, vampires and rural kulaks," or "The tsar, the monasteries, the industrial boyars, estate holders and the hypocritic monks." There is no mention of the Jews. However, this is not true of the Ukrainian translation. Here the word "Jews" was written in a way that implied that they represented a class of their own. Even references to the tsar were changed in the translation to reference to Jews. Because of this, Smirnov professed he was opposed to the anti–Jewish terminology and connotation which did not appear in the original.

We shall add an additional paragraph on this controversy. This is the affair of Aharon Shmuel Liberman, the pioneer of Jewish socialism and the Jewish labour movement. Liberman, who began his activity in Vilnius and was living at that time in London, published in *Vpered* a number of unsigned articles and correspondences about the life of the Jews in the towns and townships of Lithuania and Belorussia. These articles described and underlined the existence of the social split between the rich and the poor among the Jews in general, and, more specifically, between the employers and the workers. The wealthy Jews were a thin stratum. The bulk of the Jews lived in misery but, nonetheless, they too were blamed for the exploitation of the people. Thus, Liberman emphasized the Jews' lack of civic rights and the discrimination and persecution against them. He suggested that the solution would come only with the forthcoming social revolution. Thus, there was an objective possibility and a vital need for socialist propaganda among the Jews in their language, and even for the establishment of a Jewish socialist organization as an integral part of the general revolutionary movement which must take into account the reality of ethnic and linguistic differences among the working people.

Lavrov and Smirnov supported Liberman's views and his attempts to make them manifest through *Vpered*. However, as a result of this, there arose on the part of Ukrainian socialists a strong opposition which is also reflected in the correspondence with the editors of *Vpered*. The opponents claimed that the Jews were not a nationality, but a harmful and exploiting social class. The Jews' sympathy for the revolution was not to

be believed. In their condemnation of what they called the "zhidophilia" of the staff of *Vpered*, they stated that every pamphlet they would publish in Ukraine would "necessarily be replete with hatred for the Jews precisely as it was saturated with hatred for the *pan*, and perhaps with even more hatred." This last gradation although qualified, seems to express an even more extreme attitude than that taken by the *Parova mashyna*. The negativism associated with denying the possibility for socialist action among the Jews and, even more so, with the organization of Jews to this end, is a part of the "zhidophobia" to which Podolynsky and his associates were attached.

This combination of facts and views leads us to the assumption that the question of organized Jewish socialist action should be seen as one of the major cornerstones for understanding the different approaches of the revolutionary Russian and socialist Ukrainian movements to the Jewish problem in general in the mid-1870s, and *mutatis mutandis*, in the second period of this decade too (as shown afterward). Moreover it may serve as a demarcation line between revolutionary Jews themselves.

It is against this background that we should recall Drahomanov's stand on the issue of the status of the Jews in Russian Ukraine as mentioned above. Drahomanov claimed that the special character of the Jews was that they represented a national group, a social stratum, a population with one religion. Unlike the Russian Narodniki, Drahomanov did not remain silent about the discriminatory laws against the Jews, and he demanded full and immediate emancipation for them. He felt that the abolition of the Pale would give an opportunity to the willing emigration of the Jews and thus to the thinning-out of the Jewish population in Ukraine. The basic remedy for the Jewish population, in his view, was to be found not in acts of suppression and discrimination, but rather in fundamental changes in the Jews' economic and social life.

With reference to the present time, Drahomanov admitted that there existed exploited elements within the Jewish population itself and he even emphasized the distress and poverty of the general population of Jews who were exploited by a small number of wealthy Jewish tycoons. However, Drahomanov defined the Jews of Ukraine as a pathological social phenomenon, and he spurred the idea of "the Jewish exploitation."

Drahomanov tended to disagree with Chubynsky's comment, which could be explained as an apotheosis of the tradition of anti–Jewish massacres in Ukraine. He most certainly did not approve of the pogroms. But the theory of "the exploiting *zhid*" served to encourage revolutionaries and socialists to move from sociological terminology and statistical calculations to vulgar agitation for riots against Jews under social slogans.

We can also assume that Drahomanov did not entirely approve of the

pamphlets of Podolynsky and his associates, but I have found no evidence of any attempt by him to halt their Judaeophobic agitation.

The Years 1877–1880

During this period, a direct association evolved between the Ukrainian socialists and Liberman, who had moved to Vienna, and his supporters. Drahomanov corresponded with Liberman (unfortunately, this correspondence has not been preserved). In Vienna, Liberman established a friendship with the Ukrainian socialist students and especially with Ostap Terletsky. There is also evidence of a contact between an emissary of the Viennese and a supporter of Liberman in Kiev. It is difficult to evaluate the influence of all these relations and the discussions that accompanied these contacts. However, it appears that these relationships left their mark on the evolution of Ukrainian socialism, which emerged toward the end of the decade as a group with a radical national and socialist character.

We shall limit ourselves to a brief discussion of two documents which are, in fact, three documents. One document is an appeal (published by a group of Jewish socialists in 1880) which was, apparently, in part compiled and edited by Drahomanov. It is accompanied by an epilogue signed clearly by Drahomanov, M. Pavlyk and Liakhotsky (Kuzma). The other document is the programme of the journal *Hromada* (September 1880). This second document is signed not only by Drahomanov and Pavlyk, but also by Podolynsky, whose signature does not appear on the first.

Concerning the definition of the collective-group character of the Jews, the "Programme" refers to them as being "among the religious sects" which should be granted equal rights. But in the other documents they are portrayed as being a national unit in their own right. The appeal, which contains an analysis of the social and cultural conditions of the Jews, is basically a call to the socialist Jewish intelligentsia to organize socialist propaganda for the Jewish population in Yiddish (and includes a reference to Liberman's attempts to do so in Hebrew). It should be remembered that this idea was rejected fiercely by the Ukrainian group several years earlier.

In the framework of the period that we have been discussing, it is worth noting the efforts that were invested to establish a united socialist party in Galicia (in 1880) and in crystallizing a common programme for this party. We know of the controversy between B. Limanowski, the nestor of Polish socialism, and Drahomanov about "the Programme of the Galician Socialists" or the "Programme of the Polish Socialists."

But it is important to stress a significant aspect of the programme itself that is often disregarded. There is clear mention of workers of three national groups: Poles, Ukrainians and Jews. We can assume that the trend which found expression in the documents mentioned above, documents for which Drahomanov and Pavlyk were responsible, were influential in the crystallization of this concept.

In the epilogue to the appeal, we find a negation of the general claim that the Jews are exploiters and an emphasis on the social differentiation between them. The social division among the Jews is described as follows: one-third was attributed to the exploiting class, one-third to the toiling class (Drahomanov himself, around this time, attributed 50 per cent to this class), and the remaining sector lived by serving the exploiting class. The toiling class and a considerable portion of the latter class were described as living in "a poverty that is often deeper than the poverty of the Christian proletariat."

The appeal emphasizes the old national social struggle between Ukrainians and Jews, which left vivid traces in the memories of both sides. The epilogue warns of the danger that under the existing conditions, any active uprising among the Ukrainians against the regime may lead to bloodshed which would be "much more unjust than the bloody spectres of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries." As will be remembered, Podolynsky had raised a similar warning in 1876 but in a very different spirit.

The epilogue raises the issue of the need to effect change in the existing relationship between Jews and Ukrainians. It emphasizes that the primary aim in organizing socialist propaganda in Yiddish is to differentiate between the Jewish working masses and the wealthy Jews, and to unite the workers of all nations.

There is reason to assume that Drahomanov's approach to the social structure of the Jews changed less than the appeal and the epilogue suggest. In any event, we know of no special appeal by Drahomanov and his associates to the Ukrainians against the generalized anti–Jewish enmity. In addition, the distribution of the anti–Jewish propaganda pamphlets did not cease from the mid-1870s.

However, there is little doubt that a new point of perception emerged. Drahomanov crystallized the idea of an autonomous federal state. This view led him to attempt to mobilize the forces of different nations with the purpose of weakening the state centralism, and mainly the organizational centralism in the revolutionary socialist camp.

Through these ideas, Drahomanov began to assess the political potential of the Jewish population. Being mainly urban, the Jewish population might serve as a bearer of Russian culture and also as a weapon in the hands of the Russian regime against minority groups. Drahomanov

aspired to gain an alliance with the Jewish lower classes against Russian centralism and against Polish hegemony in Galicia. On the other side, one can trace the echoes, if not the direct influence of some ideas of Drahomanov in the development of the Jewish Socialist and Workers' Movement, particularly in the realm of the efforts made to combine socialism with a national programme and special organizational forms.

Now I would like to formulate some of the methodological and meritorial assumptions that directed me in dealing with the topic and may also serve for further research.

1. The Concept of "Ukrainian Socialism"

The term "Ukrainian socialism" does not refer to the views and philosophies of socialists of Ukrainian origin in general. By analogy with the distinction generally made in regard to the radical Jewish intelligentsia of the period, it is possible to draw a line, though not unbroken, between socialist Ukrainians who participated in the general Russian populist movement and did not specifically connect their revolutionary or socialist views and activity with Ukrainian ethnic-national identity or special organizational association (e.g., Stefanovych, Debogory-Morkevich, Volkhovsky). The reference here is to those Ukrainians who in one way or another had a declared consciousness of being Ukrainian and acted in accord with this. While they recognized the international nature of socialism, they saw it first and foremost as a solution to the specific problems of Ukrainian existence and considered the Ukrainian people to be the target of their activity. Accordingly, they aspired to formulate an ideology of their own, and to establish a special programme, organizational structures and a press. The periodical *Hromada* was doubtless the salient achievement in this area. The unavoidable reservation here is that, unlike the general Russian revolutionary movement which, although split, had at different times some acting centres, but like the Jewish socialist circles of the referred period, Ukrainian socialism does not seem to have had an organized supreme body whose stand could be taken as representative and definitive. Great importance was accorded the authority of more prominent individuals such as Drahomanov (especially), Podolynsky, Terletsky, Pavlyk and Franko.

2. The Jewish Component

As opposed to the "Jewish Question," a term often interpreted rather narrowly, it is necessary to deal with "Jewish problems," construed as a

complex comprising problems of: the legal status of the Jews, relations between Jewish and non-Jewish society, anti-Semitism or Judaeophobia, the social stratification in Jewry, the stereotype of "Jewish exploitation" and the "exploiter Jew," Jewish group identity and its indications, Jews and the national struggles in the East European empires, organized labour and socialist activity among Jews and its connection with forms of organization and propaganda among other national groups, reciprocal influence of Ukrainian and Jewish socialist groups and persons. These problems interconnect and in part even overlap. They are not dealt with here consecutively or exhaustively, in part because too few primary sources have been made available.

3. The Periodization Question

The 1870s saw the beginning of Ukrainian socialism in both Russia and Galicia. Chronologically and substantively, the early 1880s should also be added to these formative years, not least because Drahomanov's influence was greatest then. These years were also the period of the anti-Jewish pogroms in Russian Ukraine in conditions of political crisis, or what in Soviet terminology is called "the second revolutionary situation." The pogroms were a focal and testing point for the positions and views on the Jews that were formed and transformed in the 1870s. Echoes of the pogroms reached Galicia, including the Ukrainian socialists there (as is testified, for example in Pavlyk's anti-pogrom leaflet). At the same time, the heavy impact of those events in the context of the changes in the array of public forces in general, and in the revolutionary wing in particular (including its positions on the pogroms) requires separate treatment.

4. The Geopolitical Aspect

From the geopolitical point of view, there were two different imperial units. Ukrainian socialism developed in Tsarist Russia and Austrian Eastern Galicia through close contact and reciprocal influence. This is shown by their co-operation in the publication and distribution of popular propaganda (Terletsky and Podolynsky), by the visits of Drahomanov and Podolynsky in Galicia, by the constant connections between Drahomanov, Pavlyk and Franko, and by the historiographical and publicist consideration that treated the Ukrainian region as a single unit despite its differences and peculiarities. That reciprocity reflected both the similarities and differences in the historical situation in the two Ukrainian

zones. The similarities lay first of all in their agricultural character, in the way the old rural relationships collapsed, and in the capitalistic modernization they experienced (though not at the same pace). As is well known, the primacy of the agrarian problem in the life of the Ukrainian population had an impact on public thought in national, political and social matters. Ukrainian socialism of the 1870s was basically agrarian. Russian *narodnichestvo* also favoured rural socialism but did not ignore the social contradictions within Russian society itself, especially the existence of a class of estate owners and the role of the kulaks, or richer farmers.

The Ukrainian socialists' version of the structure of the Ukrainan people was that it was fundamentally classless. On that basis the relationship with the environment was conceived mainly within the framework of the agrarian relationship between the exploited working Ukrainian people and its exploiters. Accordingly, economic exploitation and national oppression almost paralleled each other. That outlook also nourished the view of the Jews as an exploiting people on the other side of the fence. The Jewish-Ukrainian antagonism as perceived in the villages appeared as an overall antagonism mainly against a class background. That perception, insofar as Russia is concerned, was influenced by Russian populism, particularly in the Bakunin faction, where the generalization "Jewish exploitation" was widespread. The rebellious character of Bakuninism and its Ukrainian counterpart endowed these views with a potential for violence. Also the influence of another tenet in the sphere of the relationship between revolutionary morality and revolutionary action current in Russian populism should not be disregarded: the end justifies the means. This involves the very intricate problem of moral judgment in history, but one cannot escape trying to tackle it.

At the same time, there were also differences between Eastern and Western Ukraine. The constitutional regime in the Hapsburg Empire and the hegemony of the Polish landowners in Galicia led to the reconsideration of the specific weight of the social-class problems compared with the political-national ones. Added to these were the federal and autonomist elements in the life of the empire and Galicia, in particular, and the desire to change the balance of power among the nations of the region, and especially to weaken the Polish factor. All in all, this also operated to counter the influence of anarchist elements in Russian populism on the Ukrainian socialists and in the late 1870s with the growth of the faction with the political orientation (*Narodnaia volia)* to the tactics of terrorism.

Drahomanov considered the matter of equal civil rights for the Jews, and afterward their status as a national group, and in a sense became the pioneer of the radical camp, which tried to deal with all aspects of the Jewish question theoretically and programatically. The situation in Gali-

cia seems to have contributed to this, as did his notions of constitutionalism and liberal socialism and his rationalistic recoil from prejudice.

5. *The Historical Tradition*

The question of historical perspective occupies a prominent place in considering Jewish-Ukrainian relations throughout the centuries, and it cannot be disregarded in relation to the subject under discussion here. There may be various opinions regarding the vitality of the tradition of the Cossack revolt in the seventeenth century, and of the Haidamak movement during the time in question. There are several testimonies about their existence. In fact, modern Ukrainian national awakening in the nineteenth century was nourished to a large extent by these traditions and their promotion. The Russian revolutionary movement assumed that memories of the Pugachev revolt on the Volga and the Razin revolt on the Don were still alive as were traces of the rebellions on the Dnieper. That assumption also led to practical conclusions regarding revolutionary activity. The Pugachev and Razin affairs did not embody any anti–Jewish element. That was not the case in the Ukrainian rebellions. There are grounds for investigating the effect of those traditions on the Ukrainian socialists of the period being studied, from three points of view: to what extent did they consider those traditions an active vital element in the popular consciousness; how important did they consider them for tactical purposes?; and what value did they ascribe to their social content per se? Concentrated testimony on this matter is contained in the 1880 document signed by Drahomanov, Pavlyk and Liakhotsky mentioned above. Clarification of this question will lead also to the examination of the Ukrainian-Polish-Jewish triangle as an historical category with current implications regarding the socialist movement. And one may add in some measure the Russian factor, too.

6. *Reality and Ideology*

There are, without doubt, real socio-economic elements underlying the attitude to the Jews—conflict of interests, exploitation and competition. However, the connection between reality and consciousness is often construed, in the area of our interest as well, mechanistically, perhaps, under Marxist or quasi-Marxist influence. Thus, the connection between reality and folk awareness is viewed not dialectically, but with a linear functional approach. Otherwise the result is the elimination or underestimation of elements such as religion, nationalism, prejudices and the emotions deriving from them.

Still, whatever the relative weight of the various factors that influenced the atmosphere and actions (Judaeophobia and pogroms) regarding the Jews in broad sectors of the population, another criterion should be used in regard to a well-defined ideological faction. Such a faction should be judged on the basis of the set of theoretical principles and intellectual models used in evaluating the relations of nations and classes and the bases of human existence in general. A judgment of that sort must include a moral element. For aside from the fact that the tenets of the revolutionaries and socialists include moral principles of equality and freedom, moral motivation and idealism affected their way of life and activity under conditions of oppression and want. The visual field of the Ukrainian socialists (not always and with varying degrees of realism and bias) excluded obvious elements of the social scene such as the national and civil oppression of the Jews, class distinctions among them, Jewish poverty (which was noticeable even under the conditions of the famous Galician poverty), and the Jews' right to exist as a group with a religious-ethnic identity of its own.

A few years later, although the situation was similar, the interpretation had changed. Among the Ukrainian socialists too in the late 1870s there were signs of a retreat from the stereotype of "Jewish exploitation" which had coupled nationality and class. They now raised the need and possibility of co-operation between Jews and Ukrainians on social and political matters, and tried to design a form for Jewish group life in the future. Certainly utilitarian calculations were involved, but these are not taboo in political movements. This does not mean that ambivalence and fluctuations disappeared, but the basic attitude changed.

Ivan L. Rudnytsky

Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Nineteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Thought

Martin Buber relates in his biographical sketch of the great Hasidic teacher, Rabbi Nachman of Bratslav (1772–1810), that when the Rabbi felt the approach of death, he decided to move to the town of Uman.[1] In 1768, a few years before Rabbi Nachman's birth, Uman had been seized by Ukrainian peasant and Cossack rebels, the Haidamaks, and the Jewish inhabitants, along with the Polish nobles and Catholic and Uniate clergy, were slaughtered by them.[2] In Uman, Rabbi Nachman took a house whose windows overlooked the Jewish cemetery. He believed that the souls of the martyred victims still hovered over the burial place, and he wished to be close to them.

What this moving tale fails to convey is that the perpetrators of the massacre were, from a different perspective, victims and martyrs, too. They were victims of social and religious-national oppression, against which they revolted. Soon, after the uprising had been put down by the joint forces of the Polish magnates and the Russian army, thousands of the Haidamaks were executed under atrocious torture or mutilated. For the Jews, the Haidamaks were assassins. But in the Ukrainians' eyes the Haidamaks were avengers of the people's wrongs and freedom fighters, while the Jews were seen as agents of a system of injustice and degradation. This traditional, popular view later found powerful expression in Taras Shevchenko's poem, *Haidamaky* (The Haidamaks, 1841), a classic of Ukrainian literature.

This episode may serve as an illustration of the tragic nature of the

Ukrainian-Jewish involvement; two peoples living for centuries side by side on the same soil, both victims of unfavourable historical circumstances over which they had no control, and yet separated by a wall of incomprehension, mutual fears, resentments and recriminations, by the memories of past grievances and by present conflicts of interest.

It should be evident therefore that the problem of Ukrainian-Jewish relations presented a special challenge to the political thought of the two peoples. Because of the difficult and emotionally charged nature of the problem, its treatment placed high demands on the thinkers who felt compelled to approach it. It called for an attitude that would be at once realistic and idealistic. Realistic—in order to do justice to the complexities of the situation; idealistic—in order to rise above ingrained prejudices and mental cliches, in search of a workable solution, acceptable to both sides. And if a totally satisfactory solution could not be found at once, it was extremely important at least to open up channels of communications, to create a platform for continual rational dialogue, to break out from the vicious circle of blind emotional reactions and counter-reactions. The work of the theorists had great practical relevance, inasmuch as ideas serve as catalysts of social and political actions.

A consideration of the "Jewish answers to the Ukrainian guestion" does not enter into the plan of this paper. Let me observe merely that the first Jewish publicist to have dealt extensively and constructively with the Ukrainian problem during the pre-First World War era seems to have been Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880–1940), the future founder of the revisionist wing of the Zionist movement.[3] I propose to discuss the "Ukrainian answers to the Jewish question" in the nineteenth century, concentrating on the ideas of three men, Mykola Kostomarov, Mykhailo Drahomanov and Ivan Franko. It is noteworthy that Ukrainian efforts to deal with the problem considerably preceded those by Jewish authors.

* * *

The first major Ukrainian statement concerning Ukrainian-Jewish relations was the article by Mykola (Nikolai) Kostomarov (1817–85), "Iudeiam" (To the Jews), published in the January 1862 issue of the monthly *Osnova* (The Foundation) in St. Petersburg.[4] Kostomarov, a brilliant and prolific historian, may be considered the ideologist of Ukrainian populism. *Osnova* was the organ of the Ukrainian national-cultural movement during the short period of a liberal "thaw" in the Russian Empire following the Crimean War, and it published materials in both Ukrainian and Russian. Kostomarov was the journal's chief contributor of programmatic articles. "To the Jews," like most of his scholarly and journalistic productions, was written in Russian.

"To the Jews" was a contribution to the polemic between *Osnova* and

the Russian-language Jewish journal in Odessa, *Sion* (Zion).[5] In his article Kostomarov spoke out against any persecution of the Jews and in favour of Jewish emancipation from existing legal restrictions:

> We must wish that the Jews obtain completely equal rights and that the widest possible field [of activity] be opened to them. . . . We sympathize with every effort on the part of the Jews to preserve and develop their age-old pecularities. Any hostility toward the Jews on the grounds of religious differences is in our eyes a symptom of extreme ignorance and stupid fanaticism, contrary to the spirit of Christian piety. We respect the Jewish religion, especially as the high teachings of our own religion obligate us to do so.[6]

At the same time, the article contained a number of anti–Jewish barbs. Thus Kostomarov stated: "The Little Russians candidly acknowledge that they generally dislike the Jewish tribe [*Iudeiskomu plemeni*], living in the midst of their homeland,"[7] and he charged the Jews with clannishness and indifference to the welfare of the host country. He recalled the past role of the Jews as instruments of the oppression and exploitation of the Ukrainian people by the Polish lords, and he alleged their present inclination ruthlessly to take advantage of the ignorance, helplessness and even vices of the peasantry.

The irritated tone of Kostomarov's article was a result of the circumstance that in the course of their controversy with *Osnova*, the editors of *Sion* had assumed the stance of Russian super-loyalists; they insinuated that the work of the Ukrainophiles (as Ukrainian patriots were referred to at the time) was subversive to the cultural and, potentially, political unity of the Russian Empire. This smacked of a denunciation, and, indeed, *Sion*'s arguments were picked up by the chauvinist Russian press. The members of the *Osnova* circle strove to convince Russian authorities and public opinion of the politically harmless character of the Ukrainian cultural-literary revival. This explains the acerbity of Kostomarov's polemic against *Sion*, but it does not excuse his aspersions against the Jewish people as a whole. One must agree with Mykhailo Hrushevsky's comment that Kostomarov had been carried away by his "subjective emotions," and that this prevented him from elucidating adequately the causes of Ukrainian-Jewish friction, although in principle he wished to overcome it.[8]

* * *

Kostomarov's relative failure will help us to appreciate better Drahomanov's intellectual achievement. Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95), the outstanding Ukrainian political thinker of the second half

of the nineteenth century, dealt at considerable length and systematically with the problem of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. His ideas on the subject, therefore, merit our special attention.[9]

Drahomanov's perception of the Jewish question must be seen against the background of his general social and political world view.[10] His thought represented a sophisticated blend of liberal-democratic, socialist and Ukrainian patriotic elements, with positivist philosophical underpinnings. Drahomanov envisaged the final goal of mankind's progress in a future condition of anarchy: a voluntary association of free and equal, harmoniously developed individuals, with the elimination of compulsory and authoritarian features in social life. He assumed that the practical approach toward this ideal was federalism, implying decentralization of power and self-government of communities and regions. Drahomanov insisted on the priority of civil rights and free political institutions over economic class interests, and of universal human values, which he saw embodied in the world-wide progress of science, over exclusive national concerns. However, he believed that nationality was a necessary building stone of mankind, and he coined the slogan: "Cosmopolitanism in the ideas and the ends, nationality in the foundations and the forms." Drahomanov declared himself a socialist, without fully subscribing to any school of current socialist thought; he rejected Marxism, as theoretically erroneous and ill-suited to Ukrainian conditions. He was convinced that in agrarian Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, socialism ought to be oriented toward the peasantry. Because of this, he may be classified as a populist in the broad meaning of the term. However, he strongly objected to certain typical features of Russian populism, such as reliance on terror, glorification of elemental peasant revolts and disregard for Western-type liberal political institutions. Drahamanov regretted that the Ukrainian people had not preserved an independent state in the past, since in principle they were entitled to independence, but he thought that a policy of separatism was unrealistic under the present circumstances. Moreover, his philosophical anarchism did not allow him to envisage national statehood as a wholly desirable objective. He admonished his fellow countrymen to concentrate their efforts on the democratization and federalization of the existing states, Russia and Austria-Hungary, and he assumed that this would assure sufficient scope for a free development of the Ukrainian nation. Such a policy necessitated collaboration with the libertarian and progressive forces of all the other peoples of Eastern Europe, particularly those with whom the Ukrainian lived in closest contact, namely the Russians, the Poles and the Jews. While staunchly defending the legitimate social and national claims of the Ukrainian people, Drahomanov consistently combatted all expressions of a xenophobic Ukrainian nationalism.

Drahomanov devoted two major papers to the Jewish problem, "Evrei i poliaki v Iugo-Zapadnom krae" (The Jews and the Poles in the Southwestern Land, 1875)[11] and "Evreiskii vopros na Ukraine" (The Jewish Question in Ukraine, 1882).[12] The former was written when Drahomanov was still a Russian subject and it appeared in a "legal" St. Petersburg periodical; thus the author had to be somewhat guarded in the expression of his views. The latter piece belongs to the period when Drahomanov lived as an exile in Switzerland and could speak out in full freedom. In addition, comments on the Jewish problem are scattered through many of Drahomanov's writings. Over the years, one can notice certain minor variations in the formulations of his ideas, but the basic conception remained constant. I shall present Drahomanov's thoughts on this subject as an organic whole, culling together statements made by the author at different times.

Drahomanov estimated the Jewish population in the Ukrainian lands of the Russian and Habsburg Empires at over one million.[13] According to him, "the Jews represent in Ukraine [simultaneously] a nation, a religion and a social class" (*soslovie,* literally "estate").[14] As a nationality, they were differentiated from the rest of the population by certain specific traits in their physical and mental make-up and by a separate language, Yiddish. Their national identity was bolstered by the religious distinctiveness of Judaism. Moreover, "the Jews, including those living in the countryside, belong here [in Ukraine] almost exclusively to the so-called urban classes, and among the latter predominantly to those not engaged in the production of goods."[15]

Using various statistical methods, Drahomanov demonstrated that the majority of Ukrainian Jews were occupied as petty tradesman, innkeepers, peddlars, middlemen, etc. He concluded that "the Jewish nation in Ukraine . . . forms, to a large extent, a parasitic class. . . . In those regions the terms 'exploiter' and 'Jew' have became synonymous in the people's speech."[16] In another article Drahomanov qualified this harsh judgment to the effect that one-third of Ukrainian Jewry should be considered "workingmen," by which he meant labourers and craftsmen.[17]

Drahomanov was well aware of the fact that most Jews in Ukraine were poor, many of them living in abject poverty. But he asserted that even Jewish paupers had no feelings of solidarity with their working-class Christian neighbours, but rather identified with their wealthy co-religionists whom they served as agents and operatives. According to Drahomanov, the Jews tended to display a supercilious and arrogant attitude toward the Ukrainian peasantry. "All Jews in Ukraine look upon themselves as a class superior to Ukrainian peasants. I have myself heard extremely poor Jews say: 'The peasant is a fool, a reptile, a pig.' I have heard expressions which indicate that the Jews consider themselves as

belonging to the ruling class, together with the gentry, in contradistinction to the peasantry."[18]

Drahomanov held the Russian government largely responsible for the unenviable condition of Ukrainian Jewry and the growth of Ukrainian-Jewish tensions. The Tsarist regime, contrary to its general policy of centralization and levelling of all regional distinction, maintained the so-called Pale of Settlement, which caused an excessive concentration of the Jewish population in the western provinces. "This accumulation has been created quite artificially by the Russian legislation which, in this instance, was motivated not only by narrow Great Russian considerations, but also by the manifest intent to repress the development of a national Ukrainian middle class that still existed in the eighteenth century in the cities, enjoying the Magdeburg Law. . . ."[19] The Russian government, while restricting the Jews' opportunities for gainful employment, used their services in order to extract money from the people for the benefit of the state. "As lease-holders of taverns and collectors of tax arrears, the Jews are nowadays agents of the fisc."[20] Drahomanov chided those short-sighted Ukrainians who approved of existing anti-Jewish laws. In his opinion, not only universal liberal principles, but also Ukrainian national interests called for the abolition of the Pale, which would facilitate the dispersal of a part of Ukrainian Jewry to other regions of the empire.[21]

In 1881 a wave of anti-Jewish riots occurred in Ukraine. Many Russian and Ukrainian revolutionary populists were tempted to approve of the pogroms, since their ideology implied a positive attitude toward all expressions of social protest and popular rage, and also because they deluded themselves with the hope that ethnic disorders might escalate into a general revolt against the established order. Furthermore, sheer anti-Semitic prejudice was also present among certain members of the socialist-populist milieu.[22] Thus the prominent Ukrainian socialist Serhii Podolynsky (1850-91), the one-time collaborator of Drahomanov in Geneva, confessed in a letter to a friend, in 1875, that he had "not yet resolved [for himself] the question of Judeophobia."[23]

Drahomanov's reaction to the 1881 pogroms differed markedly from that prevalent in populist circles. He noted, in the first place, that owing to the Russian revolutionaries' habitual neglect of the multinational character of the empire, the Ukrainian events had caught them quite unprepared and without any steady line of policy. "The mass of the Russian revolutionaries, which consists [to a large extent] of Jews, Poles and Ukrainians, was confused by abstract formulas and centralist proclivities, and hence unready to comprehend local social and national relations in their concrete forms."[24] In his article "The Jewish Question in Ukraine," Drahomanov addressed himself to the proclamation, issued

by the executive committee of Narodnaia Volia (the terrorist People's Will party) on the occasion of the pogroms. The proclamation, which was written in Ukrainian, elaborated on the exploitation of the popular masses by the "Jewish *kulaks*," and advised the peasants to revolt not only against the Jews, but also against the landowners, the officials and the tsar. Drahomanov commented that some of the facts mentioned in the proclamation were "basically correct," but that "the altogether inexcusable side of the proclamation was its complete disregard of the fact that among the victims of the riots were also poor people, and that in many places, particularly in the cities, those were the only ones to suffer. These were people engaged in the same productive physical labour as the Christian peasants and artisans."[25] In another article, written at about the same time and dealing with general issues of revolutionary strategy, Drahomanov called the proclamation of Narodnaia Volia "ill-considered," and pointed out that, because of the low educational and civic level of the masses, elemental popular riots and revolts were bound to be "of a purely negative significance."[26]

In moving from the critical to the constructive side of Drahomanov's programme, we may ask what measures he proposed for the alleviation of the distressful condition of Ukrainian Jewry and an improvement of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. He certainly supported full emancipation of the Jewish people from all legal restrictions, which he dubbed "medieval survivals." He cautioned, however, that the granting of equal rights "would in itself change but little the condition of the Jewish masses and their relations with the Christian masses"; an immediate benefit would accrue only to the minority of well-to-do and western-educated Jews.[27] He rebuked the liberal Russian-Jewish press for concentrating solely on the single issue of emancipation, while neglecting other, equally vital dimensions of the problem.[28] What was needed, according to Drahomanov, was action on several fronts simultaneously, in order to achieve results "beneficial to the majority of both Christians and Jews."[29] The areas of action included: first, a raising of the Ukrainian people's educational and socio-economic standards; second, a weakening of the Jewish workingmen's dependence on their own wealthy bosses and obscurantist religious leaders; and, third, the simplest task, the emancipation of the Jews from legal discrimination, "until the time, which has already been reached in other European countries, when persons of all religious dominations will possess equal rights."[30]

Drahomanov believed that there was an urgent need for a specifically Jewish socialist movement. He noted that many participants of Russian and Polish socialist groups were of Jewish origin, but that these were assimilated Jews who had lost touch with their own people and who, therefore, were unable to influence and guide them. "This is why Ukrainian

socialists consider it a matter of major importance that a propaganda campaign be organized with a double objective: first, to separate Jewish workers from Jewish capitalists and, second, to bring together Jewish workers with workers of other nationalities."[31] This called for the formation of Jewish socialist organizations, and, first of all, of a socialist press in Yiddish, the Jewish vernacular.

During his Geneva years, Drahomanov undertook certain steps to start a Yiddish-language socialist press, which I shall not discuss here. The attempt failed, because of the opposition of Russian and Polish socialists, among whom those of Jewish background were often most hostile.[32] Thus his efforts had no immediate practical result. Still, Drahomanov's biographer, David Zaslavsky, hails him as the precursor of Jewish socialist and labour movements:

> It is hardly necessary to stress the profundity of these observations [of Drahomanov on the Jewish question]. Drahomanov perceived phenomena and processes in the life of the Jewish people which the Jewish socialist intelligentsia began to see only ten or fifteen years later [that is, by the 1890s]. . . . It would be impossible to formulate more precisely the tasks which subseguently became the foundation of the first Jewish labour groups, and still later of the Bund and the other socialist and communist organizations, working among the Jewish proletariat.[33]

Let us consider the long-range perspective in Drahomanov's ideas concerning the future development of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. In this, the originality of his conception is most strikingly apparent. The common assumption of nineteenth-century Western liberals was that the Jewish problem would be solved ultimately by the assimilation of the Jewish minorities to the respective host nations. Drahomanov demurred. He maintained that the assimilationist programme, whatever its merits in the West, was impractical under East European conditions. "In respect of the Jews, Russia is no Switzerland, nor even Germany. In any event, in the western half of Russia there live more than three million Jews. This is an entire nation. Somebody should be concerned about them, particularly as they find themselves in the most abnormal relations with the other nations that live there."[34] The crucial point in the cited statement is the thesis that the Jews ought to be considered a distinct *nation* and that in Ukraine, as well as in other East European lands, they constitute an ethnic-national minority. This basic position entailed portentous practical consequences.

Drahomanov defended the notion that after the coming overthrow of Tsarist autocracy, Ukraine's national minorities, particularly the Jews, should not only possess equal civil rights with the Ukrainians, but also be

endowed with national-cultural self-government, protected by appropriate constitutional guarantees. In those communities and regions where the minorities formed local majorities or a sizeable portion of the population, their respective languages ought to have official standing.[35] In other words, Drahomanov was a pioneer of the concept that in our time has become known under the name of multiculturalism.

> Their [national minorities'] societies and communities ought to be free from any compulsion toward [conformity with] the customs and the language of the Ukrainian people. They must have the right to establish their own schools—elementary, secondary and institutions of higher education—and to associate freely with those nations [outside Ukraine] whence they had come. These labouring people of foreign extraction will serve as a link between the Ukrainians and their neighbours, with whom the Ukrainians ought to join in a great international federation.[36]

I propose to conclude the presentation of Drahomanov's ideas on the problem of Ukrainian-Jewish relations by submitting a few critical observations. Certain limitations of his thought are obvious. Thus, Drahomanov tended to speak much too sweepingly of Jewish "parasitism." In this one can discern a reflection of the prejudice, common to Ukrainian and Russian populists of his time, who often equated productive work with physical labour. Another blind spot in his thinking was a lack of appreciation of the spiritual value of Judaism as a religion and of its irreplaceable function in the preservation of the Jewish national identity. In this respect, Kostomarov's insight was better than that of Drahomanov. One can only add that Drahomanov, the agnostic and militant anticlerical, displayed the same bias in his treatment of the role of religion in the life of the Ukrainian people. Drahomanov's shortcomings, however, are amply compensated by the manifestly high merits of his intellectual attainment. The pioneering nature of his conception has been stressed recently by the Israeli historian Moshe Mishkinsky: "Indeed, Drahomanov was apparently the first radical political thinker to try to formulate a comprehensive view of the Jewish question in the empire and particularly in Ukraine."[37] Drahomanov maintained rightly that the normalization of Ukrainian-Jewish relations depended on the socio-economic restructuring of both the Jewish community and Ukrainian society at large; with his proposal of an institutional system of national-cultural pluralism he was far ahead of his time. Most praiseworthy and exemplary is his basic humane and democratic orientation and his striving for objectivity and rationality in dealing with a problem of whose complexity he was fully aware.

The third figure whose ideas I shall discuss is the Galician Ukrainian

writer and scholar Ivan Franko (1856–1916). He was a man of truly prodigious productivity and versatility. His *oeuvre* included poetry, fiction, literary criticism, historic and folkloristic studies, and political journalism. In all these fields he made outstanding contributions. Ideologically, Franko was a disciple of Drahomanov, who exercised a formative impact on his intellectual development. In his later years, however, Franko moved gradually away from the pure Drahomanovian doctrine. The political philosophy of the mature Franko may be defined as democratic nationalism.

Jewish topics of various kinds occupy a prominent place in Franko's writings.[38] Thus in his scholarly works he studied Hebrew influences in Old Rus' literature and Ukrainian folklore. Biblical motifs loom large in Franko's poetry, as exemplified, among others, by the narrative poem *Moisei* (Moses, 1905), which is considered his masterpiece. In the novels and short stories based on contemporary Galician life, Franko frequently depicted Jewish characters. All this, however, falls outside the scope of the present paper.

Here our concern is with Franko the social and political thinker, not the man of letters and the scholar. In his publicistic writings, he dealt repeatedly with the problem of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Franko's earlier pronouncements on this subject have a Drahomanovian flavour, although they refer specifically to Galician conditions, while Drahomanov had in mind primarily Russian Ukraine. Franko's later statements are more original, and hence of special interest to the historian of ideas.

The article "Semityzm i antysemityzm v Halychyni" (Semitism and Anti-Semitism in Galicia, 1887) is representative of Franko's Drahomanovian phase.[29] It contains the following declaration of his political faith: "No religion, no persuasion, no race and no nationality has ever been or can ever become the object of our hatred. Such an object was and shall forever remain only every kind of oppression, exploitation and hypocrisy."[40] Franko expatiated on the preponderance of Jews in Galicia's economy: nearly all the province's commerce and industry was in Jewish hands, and a growing portion of landed estates was also passing from Polish nobles to Jews. In the author's view, these phenomena threatened not only Galicia's non-Jewish nationalities, but also the Jews themselves. Ukrainians and Poles should strive to become equal to the Jews in the economic sphere and the provincial government ought to support these efforts. The internal reform of the Jewish community was the responsibility of the Jews themselves, but relations between Jews and non-Jews must be settled by mutual discussion. Finally, in reviewing some recent Polish proposals, Franko expressed himself on the issues of Jewish assimilation and emigration. He gave a restrictive interpretation to the concept of assimilation, reducing it to "the task of [achieving] civic

equality on the basis of equal rights and equal duties."[41] He stressed that assimilation rightly understood implied neither religious apostasy nor absorption of the entire Jewish mass into the host nations, which, under Galician conditions, was unfeasible and undesirable. As to emigration, it might be useful as a safety valve, and, therefore, would be welcome, provided that it was partial, gradual and well-planned; it might also serve as a basis for future national independence (*samostiinist)* of the Jewish people.[42]

The hint at possible Jewish national independence is intriguing, but Franko did not elaborate on it in the 1887 article. He confronted this issue nine years later, in a review of Theodor Herzl's celebrated treatise, *Der Judenstaat* (1896).[43] We know that Franko and Herzl (1860–1904), the founder and prophet of Zionism, met in Vienna, in February 1893 and were mutually impressed.[44] Franko's review appeared only three weeks after the publication of Herzl's work, which not only testifies to his extraordinary intellectual alertness, but also suggests that the book must have struck a responsive chord in his mind. Franko recapitulated sympathetically Herzl's arguments; his only reservation was that Herzl probably underestimated the practical difficulties of the establishment of a Jewish state. The conclusion of the review reads: "The plan, however, undoubtedly has a future before itself; and if the present generation turns out to be yet immature for it, it is bound to survive to see, in the course of time, young people who will be willing and able to implement it."[45]

The positive evaluation by Franko of the idea of Jewish statehood must be seen in the context of the evolution of his Ukrainian national-political programme. After the death of Drahomanov, in 1895, Franko dissociated himself from his mentor's philosophical anarchism and embraced the concept of Ukrainian state independence. We can only wonder whether the knowledge of Herzl's *Der Judenstaat* prompted him to move in this direction. But it is significant that in his defence of the idea of Ukrainian statehood Franko advanced arguments that closely paralleled those in his review of Herzl's work. Also in the case of Ukraine, as in that of the Jewish nation, Franko believed that the idea of independence was unrealistic, "beyond the bounds of the possible," from the viewpoint of current practical politics. At the same time, he asserted that this idea, or rather ideal, could provide an inspiring beacon for the national liberation movement and that its future realization ultimately depended on the dedicated will of the Ukrainian people itself.[46]

The fullest formulation of Franko's thoughts concerning the Jewish question and Ukrainian-Jewish relations is to be found in the novel *Perekhresni stezhky* (Crossroads, 1900).[47] They are voiced by one of the novel's protagonists, Wagman, but we can assume that they represent Franko's own position. Let it be said, by way of introduction, that Wag-

man is a Jewish money lender who at first is presented as a supposedly sinister character, but then is gradually revealed in the course of the narrative as a wise and good man. He discreetly helps the novel's hero, a young Ukrainian lawyer, to defend the peasants' interests against the local Polish landowners. The action is set in an unnamed Galician provincial town in the early 1880s. Wagman expresses his ideas during an encounter with the city's mayor (*burmistr)*, an assimilated Jew and former participant in the 1863 Polish insurrection.

The discussion between Wagman and the mayor turns on the issue of Jewish assimilation. The mayor confesses that all his life he has tried to eradicate in himself the feeling of Jewishness, but has not yet fully succeeded. Wagman replies:

> "These modern Jews of yours, the assimilants or assimilators, have split their old Jewish soul into two halves [by rejecting the better, and retaining the worse part]. . . . You have started assimilation by throwing out from your heart the remnants of the community spirit that used to be the strength of our nation. . . . You ceased to love your people, its tradition, and to believe in its future. From all the nation's treasures, you retained only your ego and your family, like a splinter from a wrecked boat. You cling to this splinter and try to attach it to another boat, to find a new fatherland, to buy another mother who is not your own. Do you not deceive yourself in thinking that a strange mother will love and fondle you, as if you were her own? Do you not deceive this adoptive mother when you assure her that you love her more than your true mother? . . . But I see also certain good sides in your assimilationist movement, although they are small. . . . You are our tribute to those peoples and countries which gave us shelter and sanctuary in hard times. But you should not demand that this tribute be excessive. It is unreasonable to ask of a wanderer who has drunk water from a well that in repayment he should jump into the well and drown in it. What you are doing and what those similar to you often have done before is justified and necessary from the historical point of view, and is even beneficial for the Jewish nation, but it cannot be its programme, because this would amount not to a programme, but to suicide."
>
> "In what consists this benefit for the Jewish nation?" asked the major without a trace of mockery in his voice.
>
> "In what, indeed? That's quite clear. You are the intermediaries between us and those nations which have received us. You are the bridge over the chasm. . . . Formerly, in the Middle Ages, when we lived among foreign peoples completely isolated, we were much worse off than today. . . . Now you will concede that I am no such enemy of your assimilation as the ordinary Hasidim, and that I recognize to some extent its rationality and usefulness. But there is one thing which largely detracts

from its value and reveals its insincerity. This is the circumstance that the Jews usually assimilate not to those nearest, but to those more powerful. In Germany they are Germans—this I understand. But why are they also Germans in Bohemia? In Hungary they are Magyars, in Galicia Poles—but why are they Russians in Warsaw and Kiev? Why do the Jews not assimilate to those nations that are weak, oppressed, injured, and poor? Why are there no Slovak Jews, Ruthenian Jews?... "

"Listen, Wagman! This is really too much. You begin to talk like that Ruthenian lawyer who upbraided me for my Polish patriotism."

"And rightly so," said Wagman, "because Polish patriotism is somewhat out of place here, in Ruthenian land."

"In the end you will try to convert me to Ruthenian patriotism!" the major guffawed.

"God forbid! In my opinion, no Jew can or should be either a Polish or Ruthenian patriot. And there is no need that he be. Let him be a Jew,—this will be enough. However, we can be Jews and yet love the country where we were born, and be useful, or at least not harmful, to the people who, although not our own, are closely connected with all the memories of our lives. It seems to me that if we were to uphold this view, the entire assimilation would become unnecessary.... You see, the pogroms in Ukraine showed me that we Jews living in Ruthenian land are collecting the fire of Ruthenian hatred over our heads. Even when we strive to assimilate, we do this only to those who oppress and exploit the Ruthenians, and by this we increase the burden which weighs them down. We forget that more than half of the Jewish people live now on Ruthenian soil, and that their hatred, accumulated over the centuries, may well burst forth into such a flame and assume such forms that our protectors, the Poles and the Russians, will be unable to help us in any way. This is why I felt the need to start building a bridge from our shore also to the Ruthenian shore, in order that the Ruthenians could have more than just bad memories of us. I know well that as soon as they advance a little and attain some strength, then more and more Jews will begin to incline to their side. But, in my judgment, it is important to assist them now, when they are still weak, downtrodden, and unable to straighten up."[48]

Franko's quoted passages were written at the very turn of the century. Thus it seems fitting to end this survey of nineteenth-century Ukrainian throught on the problem of Ukrainian-Jewish relations with them. I hope that I do not stand alone in the belief that today, more than eighty years later, they might still serve as a starting point for a fruitful discussion on a subject of vital importance to both nations.

NOTES

1. M. Buber, *The Tales of Rabbi Nachman* (Bloomington, Ind. 1962), 32.
2. W. A. Serczyk (*Koliszczyzna* [Cracow 1968], 97) estimates the number of Jewish victims in the Uman massacre at about three thousand.
3. See I. Kleiner, *Vladimir (Zeev) Jabotinsky and the Ukrainian Question,* a forthcoming publication of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.
4. Reprinted in *Naukovo-publitsystychni i polemichni pysannia Kostomarova,* ed. M. Hrushevsky (Kiev 1928), 111–23.
5. The exchanges between *Osnova* and *Sion* are summarized in M. Hrushevsky's introductory essay, "Z publitsystychnykh pysan Kostomarova," in *Naukovo-publitsystychni i polemichni pysannia Kostomarova,* xiii–xv.
6. Ibid., 123.
7. Ibid., 122.
8. Ibid., xiii.
9. The following account is based on my earlier, more detailed article, "Mykhailo Drahomanov and the Problem of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," *Canadian Slavonic Papers,* 11, no. 2 (Summer 1969): 182–98; certain passages from it have been incorporated into the present paper. See also E. Hornowa, "Problem żydowski w twórczości Drahomanova," *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego,* no. 57 (January-March 1966): 3–37.
10. See I. L. Rudnytsky, "Drahomanov as a Political Theorist," in *Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings,* ed. I. L. Rudnytsky, *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S.*, 2 no. 1 (Spring 1952): 70–130.
11. *Vestnik Evropy* (St. Petersburg), July 1875, reprinted in M. P. Dragomanov, *Politicheskiia sochineniia,* eds. I. M. Grevs and B. A. Kistiakovsky, vol. 1 (the only volume published) (Moscow 1908), 217–67. "Southwestern Land" was the official administrative term for the three provinces of Kiev, Volhynia and Podillia, the territory commonly known as Right-Bank Ukraine.
12. *Volnoe slovo* (Geneva), nos. 41 and 45 (1882), reprinted in *Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii M. P. Dragomanova,* ed. B. A. Kistiakovsky (Paris 1906), 2: 525–40.
13. Ibid., 327.
14. Ibid., 540.
15. Ibid., 534.
16. Ibid., 534 and 537.
17. Ibid., 327.
18. Ibid., 539.
19. Ibid., 527.
20. Ibid., 539.
21. Ibid., 529.
22. See M. Mishkinsky, "The Attitude of the Southern-Russian Workers' Union Toward the Jews (1880–1881)," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* 6, no. 2 (June 1982): 191–216.
23. R. Serbyn, "In Defense of an Independent Ukrainian Socialist Movement; Three Letters of Serhii Podolinsky to Valerian Smirnov," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 7, no. 2 (Fall 1982): 11.
24. *Istoricheskaia Polsha i velikorusskaia demokratiia* (Geneva 1882), reprinted in *Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii M. P. Dragomanova* (Paris 1905), 1: 235.
25. *Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii M. P. Dragomanova,* 2: 531.
26. Ibid., 394 n. 1 and 399.

27. Ibid., 542.
28. Ibid., 531.
29. Drahomanov, *Politicheskiia sochineniia,* 226.
30. Ibid., 227.
31. *Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii M. P. Dragomanova,* 2: 328.
32. For details, see Rudnytsky, "Mykhailo Drahomanov and the Problem of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," 190–1.
33. D. Zaslavsky, *Mikhail Petrovich Dragomanov: Kritiko-biograficheskii ocherk* (Kiev 1924), 111 and 112–13.
34. *Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii M. P. Dragomanova,* 2: 542.
35. Drahomanov's proposal of provisions that would secure ethnic minorities' rights is contained in his draft of a democratic-federalist constitution for Russia, *Volnyi soiuz — Vilna spilka: Opyt ukrainskoi politiko-sotsialnoi programmy* (Geneva 1884), reprinted in *Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii M. P. Dragomanova,* 1: 273–375; see esp. 280, 316.
36. "Perednie slovo do *Hromady*" (1878), reprinted in M. P. Drahomanov, *Vybrani tvory,* vol. 1 (the only volume published) (Prague 1937), 149.
37. Mishkinsky, 193.
38. See P. Kudriavtsev, "Ievreistvo, ievrei ta ievreiska sprava v tvorakh Ivana Franka," *Zbirnyk prats ievreiskoi istorychno-arkheohrafichnoi komisii,* (Kiev 1929), 2: 1–81.
39. Originally published in Polish, under the title "Semityzm i antysemityzm w Galicji," *Przegląd Społeczny* (Lviv) no. 4 (1887): 431–44. The Ukrainian version, in the author's translation, in I. Franko, *V naimakh u susidiv* (Lviv 1914), 115–31.
40. Franko, *V naimakh u susidiv,* 117.
41. Ibid., 129.
42. Ibid., 140.
43. I. Franko, "Państwo żydowskie," *Tydzień. Dodatek literacki "Kurjera Lwowskiego"* (Lviv), 9 March, 1896. The original Polish text, with an English translation, is reprinted in A. Wilcher, "Ivan Franko and Theodor Herzl: To the Genesis of Franko's *Mojsej," Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* 6, no. 2 (June 1982): 238–43.
44. The encounter between Herzl and Franko is described in the first half of A. Wilcher's article, cited above, 233–8.
45. Ibid., 243.
46. See I. Franko, "Poza mezhamy mozhlyvoho," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* (Lviv) no. 10 (1900): 1–9.
47. Reprinted in I. Franko, *Zibrannia tvoriv u piatdesiaty tomakh* (Kiev 1979), 20.
48. Ibid., 389–93, condensed.

Roman Serbyn

The *Sion-Osnova* Controversy of 1861–1862

The liberalizing and reformist atmosphere of the early years of Alexander II's reign reawakened the national aspirations of the oppressed peoples of the Russian Empire. Jewish and Ukrainian leaders revived old goals and put forward new ones while debating various tactics for their attainment. Some Jewish intellectuals and businessmen sought civic emancipation, social integration and spiritual regeneration of their co-religionists in linguistic and cultural assimilation.[1] A number of educated Ukrainians hoped to improve the lot of their peasant and working-class compatriots by extending the use of the Ukrainian language, especially in primary education, local administration and popular publications. The promotion of the Ukrainian language and culture stimulated the revival of the Ukrainian nation, and by the same token, worked for the de-Russification of Ukraine.[2] Since the majority of Russian Jews lived in Ukraine, where they constituted a sizeable and economically important community,[3] all Russophile tendencies among them would be perceived by the Ukrainophile populists as a threat to the Ukrainian national revival. Hostilities between the two communities could hardly be avoided; the conflict came into the open in 1861, in the form of the *Sion-Osnova* controversy, the first public debate in modern times on Jewish-Ukrainian relations.[4]

The *Sion-Osnova* dispute was provoked by Veniamin Portugalov. Son of a Jewish merchant from the town of Lubni, in the Poltava gubernia, and a reformed Jew by religious conviction, Portugalov enrolled in the medical faculty of Kharkiv University in 1854. There he became aware

of the exceptional situation of Jewish students in Russian universities. Jews often concealed their identity to escape insults and derogatory nicknames and thought of themselves as outsiders. To alleviate the burden of their race, Portugalov and a few of his Jewish friends joined a secret student circle organized by Iakiv Bekman and a group of Ukrainian students.[5] Bekman's circle accepted Jews as equals and promoted a tolerant attitude toward them among the students. These efforts seem to have been quite successful, for Portugalov could later claim: "With our joining [of the circle], the vile nickname *zhid*[6] disappeared from the university and Hebrew students changed. In recent years we have been true Russians, only of Hebrew origin." Portugalov remained close to the circle even after many of its members, including Portugalov, were expelled from Kharkiv University for participating in the 1858 student disturbances.

Portugalov, Bekman and several other students decided to move to Kiev, where the St. Vladimir University was then at the height of its reputation owing to the liberal administration of its humanitarian curator, Dr. Nikolai I. Pirogov. The ancient capital of Rus' also provided a wider arena for the socio-political endeavours of the young activists. Under the patronage of the liberal professor of history, Platon V. Pavlov, students helped to set up a network of Sunday schools where they taught literacy and liberal ideas to the youth of the working classes.[7] They also worked for the *Kievskii telegraf*, a newly founded Russian-language newspaper of liberal leanings.

The very first issue of the new periodical carried a serialized article under the title "Prejudice Against Hebrews," signed with the cryptonym P-v, and most likely written by Pavlov himself.[8] Condemning anti-Jewish prejudice in Russia, the author drew attention to the offensive terminology which tended to perpetuate this prejudice. "To refer to Hebrews in print as *zhidy* is as unacceptable as to insult Little Russians with the nickname *khokhly* and the Russians with *katsapy*."[9] No educated, self-respecting Jew could tolerate such an insult and gentiles, who cannot be persuaded by scholarly arguments, are invited by the author to "go up to any decent Hebrew and try to call him *zhid* to his face."[10] The good qualities of Jews (sobriety, thriftiness, commercial and academic skills) were pointed out, as were their shortcomings (resistance to assimilation and spiritual demoralization). The author urged Jews to reform their religion, to reject the Talmud as their guide for religious life and to stop waiting for a Messiah to lead them to Palestine. Finally, he enjoined them to reaffirm their allegiance to Russia by declaring: "We recognize no other fatherland but the one to which we are bound by birth and citizenship."[11]

Portugalov's ideas on the Jewish question coincided with those ex-

pressed in Pavlov's article, and the condemnation of the word *zhid* by the revered professor only strengthened his young admirer's conviction of the unacceptability of the term.

In January 1860, Portugalov was arrested along with other members of the Kharkiv circle, but after several months of interrogations he was released and allowed to finish his studies at the University of Kazan.[12] Although the old friends were now dispersed throughout the empire, they kept in touch by correspondence. It is probably from one of his Ukrainian friends that Portugalov got his first copies of *Osnova*, the new journal of Ukrainian studies.[13] Published in St. Petersburg by the Ukrainian *hromada*, a loose and unofficial circle of former members of the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius, *Osnova* was the only legal organ of the Ukrainophiles.[14] The editors of *Osnova* sought to reach both the Russian and the Ukrainian literate public and, therefore, printed articles in both Russian and Ukrainian. How surprised Portugalov must have been to come across the cursed word *zhid* on the pages of this progressive journal supported by his own Ukrainian friends.

Portugalov expressed his discontentment in a letter addressed to the editor of *Osnova*. He described the evolution he had witnessed in student attitudes toward the Jews and in the use of the term *zhid* during the six years he had spent at three different universities. When he had just begun his studies, "the abusive nickname *zhid* still resounded in the university, and it was often used to denote students of the Hebrew faith. But with the renewal of Russia the nickname disappeared from the universities. From then on my numerous friends designated with that reproachful word every cheat and swindler, be he of Hebrew, Catholic or Orthodox faith."[15]

Portugalov saw no objection to the use of *zhid* in the sense of "scoundrel," as long as it was not employed in the meaning of "Jew," and he implored the editors "in the name of Hebrews insulted by the expression" and "for the sake of the success of the journal and the welfare of Ukraine," to use the correct national name, *evrei*.[16]

In that letter, written in Russian, Portugalov did not specify whether he objected only to the Russian *zhid* or also to the Ukrainian *zhyd*, the two terms being easily distinguishable phonetically but having an identical orthography in the Cyrillic alphabet. This lack of precision on Portugalov's part would suggest that he considered the two terms as identical and equally objectionable. This failure to distinguish the two words is surprising since Portugalov, along with several other Jewish students, was active in the Sunday school movement, where the Ukrainian language enjoyed wide usage, especially among the mainly Ukrainian local pupils and the Ukrainophile student-teachers from the Chernihiv and the

Right-Bank gubernias. In spite of this Portugalov either ignored the fact that the Ukrainian language knew only one word for "Jew"—*zhyd*— or if he knew this linguistic detail, refused to accept it.[17]

Portugalov's quarrel with *Osnova*, however, went much further than a simple objection to name-calling. He questioned the editor's motives:

> You . . . want to awaken medieval hostilities; you want to take your people (at least in this respect) back to the times of Bohdan [Khmelnytsky]. Pray tell, will you get spiritual gratification when the infuriated mob passes its merciless knife over its luckless victim and the innocent blood of half a million Jews spills over Ukraine? . . . Or do you want to increase your subscription by catering to low and crude natures? . . . [18]

These were serious accusations of crass Judeophobia and social agitation.

Portugalov's letter came as a challenge that *Osnova* could hardly ignore because his interpretation of *Osnova*'s attitude toward Jews was probably shared by other educated Jews. Furthermore, Portugalov also asserted that even the younger generation of Ukrainians which sympathized with *Osnova* did not share the journal's "backward notions on Hebrews."[19] The charges were serious, but *Osnova* was not ready to accede to Portugalov's demand for terminological changes, nor did it accept his suggestion that the whole question be submitted for arbitration to the universities or to Professor Pavlov.[20] Instead, ignoring the fact that Portugalov had written a private letter, and arguing that "only falsehood and evil like to hide,"[21] *Osnova* decided to reproduce extensive passages of the letter and entrusted the writer Panteleimon Kulish to answer the accusations.

Kulish's reply, entitled "A Misunderstanding Regarding the Word *Zhid*,"[22] declared *Osnova*'s sympathy for Jews, reaffirming,

> that never has a hostile feeling toward the Hebrew tribe penetrated *Osnova*; that we do not consider ourselves justified to insult anybody; that occurrences like the slaughter of Hebrews in the time of Bohdan [Khmelnytsky] and Maksym [Zalizniak][23] appear to us as sorrowful symptoms of a disordered social organism; that according to our deep convictions no apparently good consequences from similar painful upheavals can expiate that evil which is brought to others and to one's self by retribution for revenge cruelty and murder. . . . [24]

Kulish pointed out that Ukrainian writers took a pro-Jewish stand when three years earlier they protested against an anti-Jewish attack by the Russian periodical *Illiustratsiia*.[25]

Declaring that he never used the term *zhyd* himself, Kulish nonetheless upheld its usage by Ukrainian writers. Etymologically, he pointed out, the term is identical with the Latin *Judeus,* the German *Jude*, the French *juif* and the Polish *żyd*; all these words are considered correct in their respective languages. The term, according to Kulish, was in no way inferior to *evrei* or *izrailtianin.*[26] As for the Ukrainian language, he said that it knew no other term but *zhyd* and that its acceptability had been sanctioned by long usage:

> The author [Portugalov] is unaware that Little Russians began to call Hebrews *zhydy* a long time ago and continue to do so now, not in a contemptuous, insulting and abusive sense, but in the same way they call Great Russians *moskali* and Poles *liakhy*, and that they know practically no other word for the Hebrew tribe. This word came to South Rus' together with the Hebrew population from Poland where it [the name] continues to be used as a national designation not only by Poles but by Hebrews themselves.[27]

Kulish also noted that the term *zhyd* is found in old legal documents and charters granting rights to Jewish lessees. It was used by Ukrainian writers including Taras Shevchenko, because "Our South Rus' literature takes its origin and replenishes its forces directly from the [common] people: popular examples of oral literature serve as its base. Ukrainian writers either came directly from the people or, having been cut off from it by class education, returned to it with the reawakening of their consciousness, and for many years not only studied the people but also learned from it."[28]

Kulish rejected Portugalov's request that Ukrainians drop the term *zhyd*; such a demand was an intrusion on the Ukrainians' right to keep old, traditional terms. Even if Ukrainians replaced *zhyd* by another word, argued Kulish, what would that change? "A rose will always be a rose, no matter what we call it."[29] There are problems in Ukrainian-Jewish relations, but they do not lie in the choice of names.

It should be noted that although Kulish distinguished between the Ukrainian *zhyd* and the Russian *zhid*, he did not delineate the appropriate usage of each. Defending the word *zhyd* as the only available and legitimate term in the Ukrainian language, he refrained from condemning the Russian term *zhid*, which by then had been generally recognized as derogatory. Just as Portugalov's condemnation of *zhid* could, by implication, be extended to *zhyd*, so Kulish's defence of *zhyd* could encompass *zhid*.

Kulish then took up the issue of the Ukrainian attitude toward Jews. "The [Ukrainian] people fashioned an unflattering image of Hebrews because of the oppression it once suffered from them."[30] Quoting a popular *duma* (historical song), he showed the various forms of exploitation the

common Ukrainian population suffered from the Jewish lessees; they sublet the land, kept taverns, imposed road taxes, took commerce away from the Cossacks, collected customs duties, leased churches for marriages and baptism and held fishing rights.[31] It was because of their role as middlemen that Jews, as a race, acquired a bad reputation, and a reputation does not change with the name but the change of behaviour of its bearer. Kulish was optimistic, however, that the future would be different because, "the relations depicted in the popular *duma* have changed."[32] Kulish was probably anticipating the social transformation that the emancipation of peasantry, then being introduced by the Russian government, would bring.

According to Kulish, one last obstacle stood in the way of Jewish-Ukrainian reconciliation: the voluntary isolation of Jews from the Ukrainian population.

> To this day the Hebrew tribe lives separately from the South Russian [i.e., Ukrainian] population; to this day it has nothing in common with our people and has not made one move to draw closer to it. Instead, it often acts contrary to the spirit and the interests of our people. There can be nothing more harmful to a nation than to have in its midst nationalities that keep themselves apart and are indifferent to its fate, or—what is even worse—that try to subordinate it to their own authority or influence.[33]

The conflict of interests would, of course, disappear once the Jews in Ukraine integrated into the Ukrainian community and identified their own fate with that of Ukrainians. Kulish ended the article by calling for a rapprochement of the two communities based on the needs of the local population:

> We know how gifted the Hebrew tribe is, with what rich capacities it is endowed, especially with regard to certain types of activities; still we remain convinced that only that development of Hebrews will be durable and beneficial for South Rus' which will emanate from the needs of our country and our people and finds sympathy in it. We shall meet every move made in that spirit with happiness and love, as we did when we found out about the participation of the Kiev Hebrew students in the setting up of Sunday schools.[34]

In its turn, *Osnova* was throwing out a challenge to the Jewish community in Ukraine, and in particular to the educated idealistic youth exemplified by Portugalov.

Osnova's challenge was picked up by *Sion*, the Russian-language Jew-

ish journal published in Odessa.[35] In an article entitled, "*Osnova* and the Question of Nationalities," the editor chastized Portugalov for his impolite letter and rejected as ludicrous his assertion that any Jew who does not feel offended when called a *zhid* is insensitive to any insult. On the contrary, argued *Sion*, anyone who loses his temper over the word shows that he is not yet aware of the dignity and the historical importance of his people. Such a man will bring little benefit to his people since he will waste all his energy on insignificant bickering and have little time for important work.[36]

Sion was willing to accept *zhid* as a legitimate designation for Jews because etymologically there was no difference between *zhid* and *evrei*.[37] In some languages, such as the Russian, where the two forms exist, *evrei* is official while *zhid* is more popular, and the latter has acquired a derogatory connotation probably because of its association with the name Judas, so distasteful to Christians. However, in languages where there is only one designation for Jews, *Sion* finds "no reason why the [common] people and the writers should change their language for our whim."[38] In the same way that there is no reason for Germans to abandon *Jude*, Frenchmen to give up *juif* or Poles to proscribe *żyd, Sion* maintained that to demand that "Little Russians change the name *zhyd* is also void of any foundation."[39] On the terminological issue *Sion* was ready to give *Osnova* the benefit of the doubt: "As long as the editors [*of Osnova*] maintain that there is nothing insolent in the word *zhyd* and that in the South Russian dialect [*narechie*] it should not be changed by any other, there is no reason at all not to agree with them."[40] Furthermore, *Sion* found it degrading and insulting when Christians forced themselves to avoid the term *zhid* in conversations with Jews and suppressed any reference to national shortcomings of the Jewish people. In this way Christians betray that they actually have a low opinion of the Jews and only hide it for the sake of politeness.[41]

It was one thing for *Sion* to endorse, albeit half-heartedly, *Osnova*'s terminology on Jews, but it was quite a different matter when it came to accepting the Ukrainian journal's image of Jews and its definition of their present role in Ukraine. What purpose, other than to fan old hatreds, was served "by recalling, with reference to the present situation, the repressions that the Little Russians once suffered from Hebrews, who were then used as tools by the Poles . . . [*or*] by pretending that even now Hebrews act in a harmful way toward the [common] people."[42] In relations between nations, Jews had nothing to learn from Ukrainians; in fact, "in the domain of uniting the interests of their nationality with that of the state and with the general human or cosmopolitan interests, Hebrews could serve as a model to other people."[43] They were ready to

make concessions and even sacrifice some of their national traits but only on the condition that this be done for the benefit of the whole Russian state and not just a part of it.

Sion rebuffed *Osnova*'s complaint against the lack of Jewish integration into the Ukrainian community with the counter-accusation that Ukrainians were pursuing their own narrow, "exclusively national," interests. *Sion* pointed out that *Osnova*'s "editorial speaks constantly only of the South Russian people," which is "only one part of the Russian people, only one tribe—the Little Russian one."[44] *Osnova* was accused of being "indifferent to the common fate of our fatherland—Russia," of "not yet having made one move for the rapprochement with the Russian people," and even of "actions contrary to [Russia's] interests."[45] The very existence of *Osnova* was considered harmful by *Sion* because, instead of working for one common literature in one common Russian language, *Osnova* was dividing the already small reading public along dialectal and sub-dialectal lines.[46] "Exclusive national strivings" are always bad, but in this case *Sion* considered them particularly dangerous. "Those strivings are especially without benefit, and even harmful, that have as their aim the separation of peoples which by their tribal origin or by common practical political and politic-economic interests should form one whole."[47] Not content with pursuing this harmful course by itself, *Osnova* tried to get Jews involved as well. "On what grounds," asked *Sion* rhetorically of *Osnova*, "do you exact sympathy from any nationality for the sake, not of the whole [*Russia*] but for what is still only one of its parts [*Ukraine*]?"[48]

Sion's attack on *Osnova* was formidable. Siding with the most reactionary element in Russian society, *Sion* denied the very existence of a separate Ukrainian nation, culture or language. Furthemore, *Sion* accused the Ukrainian movement of political overtones. *Osnova* could easily defend the existence of a Ukrainian nation since even some Russian intellectuals expressed sympathy for the linguistic and cultural revival of Ukraine. What was more threatening was the suggestion that underneath the Ukrainian cultural revival lurked Ukrainian separatism. In the tense atmosphere of reform Russia—with peasant unrest, student disturbances and Polish agitation—the appearance of a Ukrainian political movement would be considered an added threat to the unity and stability of the Russian Empire, and the authorities were not likely to pass over it lightly.

Ukrainians regarded *Sion*'s rebuttal as no longer keeping within the limits of literary debate. The Jewish journal was denouncing Ukrainians to the Russian authorities for political sedition. Answering such serious charges demanded cool-headed reflection, fact and diplomacy. *Sion*'s answer to *Osnova*'s first editorial came after four months; *Osnova* respon-

ded immediately, betraying the outrage Kulish must have experienced upon reading the *Sion* article.

In his reply to "the foremost Jews,"[49] Kulish reviewed the debate since its inception. He considered that *Osnova's* answer to Portugalov's letter expressed sympathy toward the Jews living on Ukrainian soil, "a people who instead of love and respect, continue to inspire contrary feelings in all the non-Hebrew population of Ukraine."[50] *Osnova*, Kulish argued, had expected the Jewish leaders to take to heart *Osnova*'s complaint against Jewish isolationism and take all the available means to spread among the Ukrainian Jews "new civil ideas for the mutual benefit of the newcomers [Jews] and the indigenous population [Ukrainians]."[51] How did the Jewish leaders react? The only positive thing that Kulish could see in *Sion's* response was the recognition that Ukrainians had the right to use the word *zhydy*. (This explains Kulish's own use of the term in his current article.) As for the rest:

> *Sion* concluded that the objectives of *Osnova* are exclusively national: that *Osnova* does not admit that Little Russians could live in Little Russia; that *Osnova* does not allow anyone to be indifferent to the fate of the Ukrainian nation; that that [Ukrainian] nation is ready to resort to massacre or expulsion of Jews; that *Osnova* demands from the Jews not sympathy for the whole fatherland but sympathy for only one of its parties.[52]

Kulish also claimed that Jewish leaders proclaimed Ukrainians as "preachers of the Inquisition and revivers of barbarism and feudal times," only because Ukrainians were not enraptured by the past acts of Jews on Ukrainian soil, and did not consider the present activities of Jews as a heavenly blessing.[53]

Finally, Kulish disapproved of the way *Sion* sought to ingratiate itself with the authorities. "In the five-column article of *Sion*," he wrote, "we come across at least five references to 'fatherland,' 'interests of the fatherland,' 'our whole fatherland,'—in a word, with regard to the 'collection of Russian lands,' the foremost Jews outdo the Ivans [Tsars] of Moscow." "We have no truck with such literati."[54] Furthermore, the author claimed that *Sion*'s polemic abused such notions as "progress," "civilization," "humanity" and "enlightenment." Remarking that national egoism had driven the foremost Jews to such indecent behaviour, Kulish equated these tactics with those used three years earlier by those who attacked Jewish literati themselves, in the journal *Illiustratsiia*.[55] As proof of his own integrity in the debate, Kulish quoted in full the statement made in 1858 by five Ukrainian writers concerning the *Illiustratsiia* affair.[56]

Kulish's hasty reply was not well thought out. He did not answer

Sion's charge of Ukrainian separatism. Whether he meant to give the impression that it was too far-fetched to merit rebuttal or simply felt that the less said about it the better is not known. The spectre of Ukrainian separatism, however, would certainly not disappear from the minds of the Russian polemicists when they joined the debate, and Ukrainians would have to return to these charges time and again. Kulish's jibe against Jewish "gathering of the Russian lands" might have been an effort to prevent them from siding more closely with the regime, and if they did so, to discredit this alliance before the progressive and oppositionist elements within the Russian society. Kulish's style, however, with recourse to innuendos, invective and irony, could not gain him much support among the very readers he invited to judge for themselves "whether there is even one word of truth in anything that was said by *Sion*."[57]

While Kulish appealed to the judgment of *Osnova* readers, *Sion* called for a public trial by Russian journalists. In a short editorial note, "To the Russian Journals," *Sion* affirmed that Kulish's article did not discuss the ideas on the national question expounded in *Sion*'s previous editorial, but contained "unprecedentedly impudent abuses and completely unfounded accusations . . . made in a manner repulsive to any decent man. Such accusations, brought against any organ of the press in Russia, in our opinion, cannot and should not remain outside the attention of Russian literature."[58] Russian men of letters were then asked to decide which of the two journals was to blame:

> [*Sion*], which "uses illegal weapons to attain its objectives, conducts its polemics with undignified literary means, insults the dignity of the printed word, and in the process uses trickery and slyness with the known kind of dexterity and foresight," or that journal [*Osnova*] which permits itself to stigmatize in such an unmerited way its own counterpart, raising against it such foul misdeeds, without any right or basis.[59]

The whole question was thus turned over to the Russian press, and *Sion* was convinced that all the Russian periodicals would consider it their moral obligation to tackle the problem and to publish their verdict in forthcoming issues.

Sion's appeal to the court of public opinion was eventually answered by at least a dozen Russian periodicals. They were by no means unanimous in their conclusions: a few gave full support to *Sion*; several were on *Osnova*'s side; some found fault with both, and two refused to be drawn into the debate.

Among the first to come out in defence of *Sion* was *Russkii vestnik*. In an unsigned editorial, "What Harm Can Result from Monopoly?" the publisher, M. N. Katkov, unleashed a long theoretical diatribe against

the evils of monopolizing public opinion, which easily falls prey to sycophancy and campaigns of defamation. These sins were attributed to Kulish and *Osnova*. Katkov then held up Kulish and the whole Ukrainian movement to ridicule: "Kulish so loved his Little Russian dialect that, as experts assure us, he even made a separate language out of it," — a language which, to boot, was not well understood even in Ukraine.[60] Noting that *Sion* had approved the use of the term *zhid*, Katkov still faulted *Osnova* for insisting on using it in a pejorative sense on the pretext that Jews had oppressed Ukrainians in Polish times.[61]

Sion, according to Katkov, had no choice but to answer the charges brought against the Jews by *Osnova*, and he presented Kulish's rebuttal as nothing less than a denial of *Sion*'s right to defend the Jews. Not only was *Sion* right to answer but, according to Katkov, it picked the right arguments: "What did the Jews answer? What else could they answer but the fact that loving their nationality they are capable of sacrificing it in the interest of their common fatherland; in the interest of Russia to which they belong: in the interest of the whole Russian people among whom they live. That is the best argument they can give in their defence. That is the only thing that has to be proven."[62] *Sion*'s Russophilism had obviously struck a sensitive chord in *Russkii vestnik*, for Katkov continued "In Russia, a Hebrew is still a Hebrew, but he wants to be a Russian."[63]

In the light of the openly declared Jewish rapprochement with the Russian nation and the Russian state, Katkov felt that *Osnova*'s accusation of Jewish isolationism had to be exposed for what it was: an accusation from only one part of the Russian people, the Ukrainians, and *Osnova*'s own exclusively national, Ukrainian aspirations. Katkov considered that *Sion* had to point this out in its own defence and, "too bad for other journals, which have not guessed that this is the way they too should build their defence."[64]

Katkov also took Kulish to task for allegedly dishonest tactics in his polemic with *Sion*. "Hebrews are accused of national egoism, of tribal isolationism, of aspirations to separatism. But they are not allowed to accuse their accusers of the same."[65] While throwing suspicion on the Jews, Kulish attempted to pass himself off as a victim of *Sion*'s plot of denunciation. But what was there for *Sion* to denounce? Every one knew of Kulish's efforts to develop the Little Russian nationality and language. Even Kulish did not hide it; it contained nothing dangerous and was not forbidden by the authorities. "When it is forbidden to write in Little Russian, and to speak of the Russian nationality, then—and only then—will danger appear: for *à la longue* a southern nationality would appear," for "so great is the power of prohibition."[66] As proof of his conviction that there was nothing seditious in Kulish's ideas, Katkov invited Kulish to submit his ideas in writing to *Russkii vestnik,* promising that these would

be published together with Katkov's comment and reply.

Russkii vestnik's intervention in the *Sion-Osnova* controversy was of prime importance for *Sion*. As a leading moderate journal which had defended two Jewish writers maligned by *Illiustratsiia* three years earlier, *Russkii vestnik* carried much weight among Russian liberals and its support for *Sion* bolstered the Jewish periodical against possible attacks from other periodicals. Katkov's attitude is interesting in the light of later events. At this time he was not yet opposed to the Ukrainian cultural revival, which he considered harmless and without any possible political consequences for Russia. In this sense, in playing down or discounting the political overtones of the Ukrainian national revival, Katkov was de-escalating the dispute and actually rendering the Ukrainians a service. It is one of the ironies of the period that only a year or so later the same Katkov would demand the suppression of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian separatism.[67]

Sion also received the support of *Illiustratsiia, Russkoe slovo* and *Iskra*. *Illiustratsiia* reprinted *Sion*'s appeal to the Russian press and declared its own solidarity with the Jewish organ, even though admitting that it had not read the *Osnova* article.[68] The editor of *Russkoe slovo* had not read Kulish's article either, but agreed to reprint *Sion*'s appeal and declared his faith in the accuracy of *Sion*'s presentation of the matter. Oblivious to the whole debate on the word *zhid, Russkoe slovo* found the very title of Kulish's article indecent and patronizingly advised *Sion* to pay Kulish in kind by publishing an article on his works, under the title "Khokhlatskaia poeziia." The low level of this journal's polemic can be seen from its caricature of the Ukrainian attitude to Jews: "In Ukraine there exists this logic: a Hebrew is no Little Russian, therefore . . . he is a *zhid*."[69] The satirical journal *Iskra* touched on the subject on two occasions, each time exposing *Osnova*'s use of the pejorative *zhid*. It is doubtful that *Iskra*'s editor had bothered to read Kulish's article either.[70]

Osnova's side was upheld by *Odesskii vestnik* and *Severnaia pchela*. *Odesskii vestnik* placed the *Sion-Osnova* conflict in a somewhat different setting than the other periodicals. N. Sokalsky, its editor, was a native of Poltava and a Ukrainian patriot. He was then expounding the theory that Ukraine, like Muscovy, was a province of the Russian state, and proposing a three-way partnership of Muscovites, Poles and Ukrainians. In this federalist theory there was no separate place for the Jews, and Sokalsky dismissed as equally pretentious Jewish demands for equality with the Ukrainians and *Sion*'s promotion of cosmopolitanism.[71]

Sion responded quickly to the article in *Odesskii vestnik,* attacking two main points. It rejected Sokalsky's interpretation of Sion's pro-cosmopolitan stand. To *Sion* cosmopolitanism meant neither national nihilism nor abstract Christian love. Instead, cosmopolitanism was supposed "to

counsel the Hebrews living in Little Russia against the pretentions of *Osnova* to absorb their nationality by Little Russia, and to prove that if Hebrews must renounce any of their national peculiarities, then [it will be done] in the interest of the whole Russian people and not a separate part."[72] *Sion* also reiterated that Jews were cosmopolitan in relation to other men in all respects except for their religion and their fatherland.

Pursuing the polemic on a more personal level and referring to Sokalsky's admonition to Jews not to deny their Jewish nationality for they could no sooner become Little Russians than he—a Little Russian from Poltava—could become a German by simply moving to Baden-Baden, *Sion* replied:

> [Sokalsky] would become a German sooner than a Hebrew would become a Little Russian for two reasons: first, because the German nationality with its solid civilization would have much more attraction and assimilationist force than the Little Russian; secondly, in the latter [Little Russian nationality] there would be much less inner substance, energy and stamina than in the Jewish, to resist foreign influence.[73]

Finally, *Sion* denounced *Odesskii vestnik*'s refusal to recognize Jews as equals in spite of praising them as a respectable nationality. The alternatives that Sokalsky proffered to the Jews—to remain Jews, respectable but without rights, or to go over to the dominant, Ukrainian nationality—were equally unacceptable.[74]

According to *Sion*, Jews had no intentions at all of espousing the Ukrainian nationality, as they had already experienced enough difficulty in switching over to the Polish and Russian. In a subsequent article, "On the Possibilities of an Inner Rapprochement of Hebrews with the Russian People," one reads:

> . . . Hebrews did not assimilate the national languages in Polish and Russian regions not because they simply did not want this to happen, but because: 1) forming, as it were, a separate cast of merchants, they came much less frequently into contact with the natural inhabitants of the country than in Germany, where trade was not exclusively in their hands; 2) the local languages, being at a relatively lower level of development, and not presenting in their literature anything particularly noteworthy in the scientific sense, did not deserve any particular attention from them even on that account.[75]

Severnaia pchela came to the rescue of *Osnova* and defended Ukrainians against the claim that there was no Ukrainian language, no Ukrainian literature and no separate Ukrainian nationality. A nation that had

Shevchenko already had a literature even if it had no other author. Ordinary citizens, and especially travellers, knew very well that there was a difference between the Russian and the Ukrainian languages. If there was no separate Ukrainian nationality, then why were there separate customs, songs, music and even desires? As for the *Sion-Osnova* debate, it was obvious to *Severnaia pchela* from the statements in various periodicals that few of them had read *Osnova*. Was it Ukraine's fault that it had only the word *zhyd* in its language and ignored the word *evrei*?[76]

The rest of the periodical press was reluctant to endorse either side. *Moskovskiia vedomosti* withheld judgment completely on the pretext that it had no time to make a decision.[77] *Otechestvennye zapiski,* in a section edited by S. S. Gromeka, while defending Jews from attacks by Aksakov's *Den*, refused to become drawn into a discord between two "injured national prides."[78] *Russkii invalid* and *Russkaia rech* attacked both *Osnova* and *Sion* for their rudeness and lack of tact. The former periodical considered the Ukrainian people merely a branch of the Russian nation and therefore, saw no reason for the Jews not to integrate into the Russian nation via its Ukrainian branch.[79] *Syn otechestva* regretted the dispute, which showed that there was still a lack of unity of interests in the populations of Russia.[80] *Vremia* saw in Kulish's article a tactless gesture, a poisoned arrow (i.e., the accusation that the Jews were isolated from the Ukrainian population) which *Sion* answered with an equally poisoned arrow (accusing Ukrainians of national exclusiveness).[81] Finally, *Svistok*, a literary supplement to the liberal *Sovremennik,* touched on the controversy in G. Z. Eliseev's essay, "862–1862 or the Millennium of Russia." The author condemned *Osnova* for trying to justify the uses of the term *zhid* even in the derogatory sense and then criticized *Sion* and *Russkii vestnik* for accepting the term as legitimate.[82]

Russian public opinion, as expressed in Russian periodicals, seemed to sway in favour of the Jewish journal. In order to counter this trend, to correct some of the unsavoury impressions left by Kulish's article and to take advantage of *Russkii vestnik*'s rejection of the political overtones in *Sion*'s charge, the historian N. I. Kostomarov undertook a long rejoinder. Declining to use either *zhid*, which was offensive to the Jews, or *evrei*, which he found imprecise, Kostomarov adopted the term *iudei* (Judean), and entitled his article "To the Judeans."[83] Kostomarov's long essay was built around two main points: the negative role played by the Jews in Ukraine both in the past and at the present time, and the unfair tactics used by *Sion* in the dispute.

Kostomarov reminded the readers that *Sion* had promised to discuss Ukrainian-Jewish relations at a later date. "In our opinion" Kostomarov explained, "that is where *Sion* should have commenced its reply to *Osnova*'s statement on the Little Russians' convictions about Hebrews. The

dispute between *Osnova* and *Sion* could have been useful: *Osnova* trying to present the dark side of Hebrew influence on the Little Russian country, and *Sion* its bright side; this confrontation of ideas would have led to their synthesis and an elucidation of the Hebrew question."[84] As *Sion* did not see fit to develop the debate along these lines, Kostomarov decided to reiterate the Ukrainian complaint on the past and present conduct of the Jews in Ukraine.

Jews had been blamed for being indifferent to the interests of the country in which they lived. Kostomarov did not consider this to be a serious accusation in itself. The attitude of the Jews was worse, however, for they always tried to discover the weak spot of a country and use it exclusively to their advantage. Thus in Poland, they monopolized trade and artisanry, the only means of popular emancipation. From Poland they spread to Ukraine, where they continued their nefarious activities:

> When the Judeans settled in Poland and Little Russia they occupied the place of the middle class [*soslovie*], becoming willing servants and agents of the mighty nobility; they clung to the stronger side, and they fared well until the people, rising against the lords brought under their judgment the helpers of the latter. Judeans, caring only about their own comforts and that of their tribe, began to extract [advantages] from the relationship which then existed between the nobles and the serfs. In this way Judeans became the *factotum* of the lords; the lords entrusted to them their income, their taverns, their mills, their industry, their property and their serfs; and sometimes even the faith of the latter.[85]

A Jew had no qualms about participating in this relationship for he "considered himself to be acting justly and according to law, and the latter represented the will of the strong class ruling the land."[86]

Kostomarov repeated the familiar argument that the role of the oppressive middleman was responsible for the negative perception of the Jews by the Ukrainian masses and had provoked the massacres during the Cossack uprising. Religion might have played a role, as there were Christian fanatics among the insurgents, but it was an insignificant factor. After all, Ukrainians had been friendly with the Catholic Poles and the Muslim Tatars. Ukrainians disliked the Jews because they would take advantage of the common people, especially in time of difficulties. A Ukrainian peasant could not count on Jewish sympathy when he became indebted, when his son was conscripted to the army, or his daughter was abducted by the lord for debauchery. Peasants had recourse to the Jews only in time of need, fully realizing that they would be exploited.[87]

Admitting that there was no love lost between Ukrainians and Jews

and that Ukrainians considered the present conduct of Jews in Ukraine to be harmful to Ukrainians, Kostomarov rejected as unfounded the conclusions that *Sion* drew from that fact. There was no justification in accusing "the South Russian journal and the South Russian writers of the intention of expelling Jews, exterminating them, raising inquisition against them," just because Ukrainians did not display much sympathy for Jews.[88] On the contrary, stated Kostomarov, *Osnova* suggested humanitarian means for solving the problem: integration of the Jews into the local community and their taking to heart the interests of the country.

According to Kostomarov, in its reply to *Osnova, Sion* was guilty of exploiting the spectre of separatism:

> Whoever is used to looking at Russia and Russian life from the outside (and there are many among us who do so) will easily come to the following conclusion: to write in the South Russian language, to support the South Russian nationality—doesn't that amount to undermining the unity of Russian life, doesn't that mean fanning national antipathy, preparing future division, separation and even destruction of the state? And writers who use the Little Russian [language], aren't they enemies of the political unity of Russia, opponents of absolutism?[89]

Kostomarov further claimed that when *Sion* reproached Ukrainians with national exclusiveness, it was actually accusing "Osnova and all those who share its tendencies with striving to separate the South Russian nationality from the Great Russian," ignoring the fact that the Russian nation has always existed in the form of two nationalities.[90]

Kostomarov condemned *Sion* for passing itself off as a champion of humanitarianism and equality while misrepresenting the aims of the Ukrainian movement and playing up to the feelings of the Russian society and the Russian government. "*Sion* also knows that, in the name of humanity and equality, there is a predisposition in favour of Judeans; Judeans are now the darlings of avant-garde Russia."[91] Counting on such prejudice, continued Kostomarov, *Sion* distorted *Osnova*'s statement, ignored its well-founded objections, and in this way succeeded in gaining public support. However, even though he scoffed at *Sion*'s accusations, which presented Ukrainians as "ill-wishers and destroyers of the fatherland's unity," Kostomarov refused to elaborate his own ideas on Ukrainians' relations with the "Great Russian fatherland," referring the reader to the few remarks an this subject by Kulish.

In the end, the verdict of Russian journalism in the *Sion-Osnova* dispute was not an unqualified endorsement of *Sion*'s claims, but is was undoubtedly a victory for the Jewish journal. Four months after launching its appeal, *Sion* declared itself satisfied with the public response. In a

long article, "*Sion* and *Osnova* before the court of Russian journalism,"[92] the editor summarized the statements of various journals, quoting long passages, especially from *Russkii vestnik*. Then *Sion* reiterated the essence of its own arguments on the dispute. *Sion* reaffirmed that by its charge of isolationism, *Osnova* tried to force Jews not to Russify but to become "Little Russianized."

> *Osnova* accuses Hebrews not of indifference to the fate, interests, language, literature, etc., of the whole of Russia, and not of not having made a step toward a rapprochement with its indigenous population in general—not of indifference or acts harmful to the interests of Ukraine, Little Russia, the Western Country—in a word, to all those regions, where they [Jews] are allowed to live; but that Hebrews do not draw close to the Little Russian nationality [*narod*].[93]

To *Sion* even this demand of "Little Russianization" would not have raised such strong protest from the Jews had it been presented in a civil and friendly manner, without insults, without recourse to the memory of past enmities.

Then *Sion* introduced a new note on the friendly disposition of contemporary educated Jews toward the Ukrainian nationality. Had *Osnova*'s overture been friendly,

> We would have replied to it that in the contemporary generation of Jews, living among the Little Russians, the very memory of what had once been between the two tribes has disappeared; while educated Jews, familiar with the history of the country, will not begin to remind their co-religionists how in the old days Little Russians cut and broiled their ancestors; that you yourself, without any need or pretext reintroduce old accounts, and call us Jews [*zhidy*] in the pejorative sense, when you write not only in Little Russian but even in Russian. Then we would have said that there is much in the Little Russian with which we are in sympathy: we like his language, and it is quite widely known in our midst; we delight in his songs and sing them ourselves; few of us (that is of the educated people) have not read Shevchenko—in one word, we would not have been opposed in the least to becoming Little Russianized.[94]

Confident of its victory, *Sion* could now allow itself a condescending air and a certain dose of irony.

Jewish-Ukrainian rapprochement would be illusory because Jews saw nothing to attract them to the Ukrainian nation. Even if educated Jews wanted to become Little Russianized, where would they find the necessary means and incentives?

> Where, in what schools, by what textbooks, with the help of which dictionaries could we learn the proper use of the Little Russian language? And in fact, do such rules exist; that is, has the language become established in lexicon and grammar? Is it distinguished from related languages and dialects? Is the language of Kulish himself correct? . . . Where are your great poets, besides Shevchenko? Where are your prosewriters, besides Kvitka; where are your scholars? Weren't they obliged to follow the example of the great Gogol and, after perhaps some unsuccessful attempts in the Little Russian language, to adhere to the general Russian literature, in which we also, who have only recently joined the circle of Russian education, take a sincere participation, and have even made some contribution. Weren't they obliged to adopt Russian in order to find in it the breadth of their thought, their feeling and their fantasy, and in order, finally, to assimilate and transmit pan-European scholarship to others.[95]

When to this, stated *Sion*, is added the fact that Russian is the language of the church, of trade and industry, that it is already pushing out the Little Russian language even in the villages and that, in the long run, the Little Russian language will disappear together with the Jewish language, it then becomes clear that educated Jews have no reason to want to learn Ukrainian. As for the Jewish masses, they "integrate unwittingly, in the face of given circumstances, on the prodding of their instincts, with that nationality which is more developed in all respects, or at least in some, and is less infected with prejudice, and offers more guarantees for a great future."[96]

One person who must have been very concerned about the *Sion-Osnova* debate is the man who started the whole affair. Unfortunately, there are no articles or letters in any Russian periodical signed by Portugalov and directly pertaining to the controversy. Either he never wrote such items or the journals never saw fit to publish them. There are, however, some indirect indications of his feelings about the matter.

A. Shymaniv, a former student at Kharkiv University and a friend of Portugalov, sent a letter to Kulish describing his travels in Ukraine. Kulish published excerpts from this letter in *Osnova*, revealing that the two friends had recently discussed Kulish's article—and the Jewish question. Shymaniv wrote:

> I am personally acquainted with the man who provoked it [Kulish's article]; I met him recently and we are corresponding. That article, which on the whole is profoundly true, cannot refer to the man who gave rise to it. He is really a rather rare exception to his cold [*zamerzloi*] nationality. I had occasion to speak with him about that question and now he writes to me for permission to publish in *Sion* a few words on the situation of Jews among

> the South Russian population, but from that non-*Sion* point of view from which I had communicated to him several different facts. Your article did not provoke any irritation in him as it might have done with other people, but rather complete respect for the sincerity and the force of your convictions.[97]

No such article appeared in *Sion*, but several months later a letter signed by Portugalov and L. Zelensky, a fellow Jew, appeared in the Slavophile journal *Den*.

The Zelensky-Portugalov letter in *Den* was a protest against an article on the Talmud written for the same journal by Alexandrov. It had no direct connection with the *Sion-Osnova* debate, but some of the issues touched are pertinent to the problem of Jewish-Ukrainian relations. The two correspondents defended the Talmud and the Jewish religion in general, and found that faith is not the main reason for discord between Jews and other nationalities. They admitted that in the past Jews nurtured enmity toward the local population. "Not abandoning truth for one inch we will not pass silently over the fact that in the lower levels of our nation, hatred for the population among which they suffered is only now beginning to disappear."[98] The Jewish question could be solved in only one way, and that was through dispersal and assimilation: "We are convinced that the only way to fuse Jews with the local population is to disperse them across the whole span of our wide motherland. The more they disappear in the mass of other tribes, the more they will be touched by civilization, the easier and closer will be their rapprochement with the Christians."[99]

Thus Portugalov upheld the idea of integration and assimilation (with the exception of maintaining religious identities) into the local population, or, as he calls them, tribes. This indicates that Portugalov, in opposition to *Sion*, supported Jewish fusion with the Ukrainian nationality. Had Portugalov written an article propagating such ideas, however, it would have had little chance of getting printed in *Sion*.

The public debate initiated unwittingly by Portugalov's letter to *Osnova* did not resolve the conflict between Jews and Ukrainians. It identified a certain number of disputed issues—the legitimate use of the terms *zhyd* and *zhid*, the traditional Jewish exploitation of the Ukrainian population, the massacres perpetrated by Ukrainians against the Jews and the isolation of Jews from the Ukrainian community, but failed to submit them to objective, scholarly analysis. Thus while *Osnova* could easily claim that in the Ukrainian language the term *zhyd* was the only existing word for "Jew," it could hardly justify the use of the Russian epithet *zhid* on the grounds that it was being employed by Ukrainians. Nor did it

make much sense for *Sion* to recognize the term *zhyd* as legitimate and then object to its use on the grounds that it was used in a derogatory sense.

The question of economic relations between the two communities suffered from similar analytical weaknesses. Neither side attempted an in-depth analysis of the socio-economic position of each national community or of the interaction of the two communities in that field. Ukrainians did not bother to differentiate between the various segments of the Jewish population, but saw *all* Jews as traditional exploiters and swindlers. Jews either denied these accusations or dismissed them on the pretext that they had only been the tools of the Polish nobility. They refused to discuss the issue any further because such discussions would allegedly stir up anti-Jewish passions among the Ukrainian masses and lead to new massacres.[100]

Neither side was completely honest with regard to the long-term implications of the Ukrainian cultural revival for the unity of the Russian Empire. It was not tantamount to separatism as *Sion* implied, but neither was it as politically innocent as *Osnova* pretended. Both *Sion* and *Osnova* were more interested in scoring points before the reading public and the tsarist authorities than in establishing historical truths, in acquiring a better understanding of the issues involved and in arriving at some compromised agreement.

Underlying the whole debate were the conflicting interests of the two national communities. Both Jews and Ukrainians belonged to the oppressed nations of the Russian Empire, but the forms of their oppression were different. In addition to the civil restrictions suffered by all the subjects of the Russian tsar, Jews were subjected to special limitations on their civic rights. They could not, for example, reside freely outside the Pale of Settlement and had limited access to higher education and public offices. They could, however, maintain the Hebrew and Yiddish languages in the school and in print. Ukrainians, on the other hand, had no special civic restrictions, but were hampered in introducing the Ukrainian language into education and publications.

Although both communities had the majority of their respective populations concentrated in Ukraine, this fact had a different meaning for each nationality. The Ukrainian intelligentsia standing behind *Osnova* was populist. Their ties to Ukraine came through their connection with the Ukrainian peasants, the traditional inhabitants of that land. The peasants provided the link with the Ukrainian language and culture, the Cossack tradition and the autonomous Hetmanate state. The Ukrainian national revival was fatally Ukrainocentric. For the moment, its demands were limited to cultural and linguistic autonomy, but there was no guarantee that if the movement succeeded in this field it would not eventually ex-

tend its demands to the political sphere. The Ukrainian movement was at the embryonic stage of the nation-state building process and, as such, dangerous to the integrity of the Russian state and, by implication, to the interests of the Jewish community in the Russian Empire.

In contrast to the Ukrainian elites backing *Osnova*, the Jewish intelligentsia and commercial bourgeoisie which stood behind *Sion* had no particular attachment to Ukraine as such. On the contrary, Jewish concentration in Ukraine and the other western provinces of the Jewish Pale was a constant reminder of the arbitrary limitations on Jewish freedom of movement. The *Sion* Jews wished to be able to develop their economic and cultural life within the wider framework of the whole Russian Empire and therefore strove to break down territorial and linguistic barriers. To achieve this goal, Jews needed a unified state and a common language operative within the whole state. Ukrainian particularism was a potential threat to these plans. Jewish opposition to the Ukrainian national revival was typical of all national groups in a similar situation: to align its interests with the majority and combat the demands of the rising and now threatening minority.[101]

The Jewish community saw itself as pan-Russian and did not want to be fragmented into smaller units which would happen if local national movements succeeded. In its quest for upper social mobility it demanded equal rights with the Russian subjects of the tsar and unrestricted access to education, public offices and the economic markets of the whole Russian state. Abandoning Yiddish and Hebrew for Russian was not so much a sacrifice as a means to achieve these ends. On the other hand, the populist programme of the Ukrainian *Osnova* demanded the insertion into the movement not only of the Ukrainian elites, but also the elites of the other national minorities living in Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationally conscious intelligentsia was too weak to carry out the national revival among the Ukrainian population, the majority of which consisted of illiterate peasants; it needed the help of the educated elements and upper classes of the non-Ukrainian population living in Ukraine. To some degree such an espousal of the interests of the Ukrainian labouring population was already happening. A group of young Polish intellectuals led by V. Antonovych had joined the Ukrainian movement in 1861.[102] *Osnova* hoped that progressive young Jews, especially students who had been involved in such populist activities as the Sunday schools, would follow their example.

To the same extent that the revived Ukrainian movement was a threat to Jewish interests, the Russophile movement among the Jews was a direct threat to Ukrainian interests. It threatened to increase the hold of the Russian language and culture on Ukraine and still further reduce the chances of social promotion and upward mobility of the Ukrainian popu-

lation. To appreciate the *Sion-Osnova* controversy it is necessary to go beyond the historically conditioned Ukrainian anti–Semitism and Jewish Ukrainophobia. More pressing immediate concerns led each community to define its national interests and to seek their attainment in such a way as to clash with those of the other group.

NOTES

Much of the material used in this paper was collected at various sessions of the University of Illinois Summer Research Laboratory, in which I was in fortunate to participate and to whose organizers I wish to express my gratitude.

1. On the Russophile tendency among Russian Jews and the way it expressed itself in the Jewish press, see A. Orbach, *New Voices of Russian Jewry: A Study of the Russian-Jewish Press of Odessa in the Era of the Great Reforms. 1860–1871* (Leiden 1980), especially chapter 2.
2. The intensity and extent of the Ukrainian national revival has been underestimated by historians and has not received the scholarly attention it deserves. A somewhat dated examination of the period can be found in M. Iavorsky, *Narysy z istorii revoliutsiinoi borotby na Ukraini* (Kiev 1927): chapters 4–7 and D. Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian History* (Winnipeg 1975), chapter 27.
3. In Ukraine the Jews were concentrated in the three Left-Bank gubernias. Around 1860 Jews numbered about 600,000 or 12 per cent of the total population of that region, outnumbering the half-million Poles. Cf,. V. M. Zaitsev, *Sotsialno-soslovnyi sostav uchastnikov vosstaniia 1863 g.* (Moscow 1978), 197. In the rest of Ukraine the Jewish population was much lower except in Odessa, a commercial port of note, which was rapidly becoming an important Jewish centre. Cf. P. Herlihy, "The Ethnic Composition of the City of Odessa in the Nineteenth Century," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* no. 1 (1977): 65–70.
4. There is as yet no study dedicated specifically to the controversy. Soviet scholarship avoids the question; in a recent study of *Osnova,* not a word is said about the *Sion-Osnova* clash. Cf. M. D. Bernshtein, *Zhurnal "Osnova" i ukrainskyi protses kintsia 50–60–kh rokiv XIX st.* (Kiev 1959). In the West the controversy has been studied in connection with other problems of Jewish history. See, for example, J. D. Klier, "The *Illiustratsiia* Affair of 1858: Polemics on the Jewish Question in the Russian Press," *Nationalities Papers,* no. 2. (1977): 117–35; Orbach, *New Voices of Russian Jewry,* 49–53. Traditional Jewish and Ukrainian references to the dispute are rather biased. See for example S. L. Tsinberg, *Istoriia evreiskoi pechati v Rossii v sviazi s obshchestvennymi techeniiami* (Petrograd 1915), 86–8; I. Sosis, "Natsionalnyi vopros v literature 60-kh godov," *Evreiskaia starina* (1915), 51–6; A. Zhytko, " 'Osnova' (1861–1862)," *Ukrainska knyha* (Lviv) 1938, no. V, 86–8.
5. On the Kharkiv secret political student society, see R. Serbyn, "La 'Société politique secrète' de Kharkiv (Ukraine), 1856–1860," *Historical Papers* (Ottawa 1973): 159–77.
6. B. Kozmin, *Kharkovskie zagovorshchiki 1856–1858 godov* (Kharkiv 1930), 40. Kozmin quotes from a statement made by Portugalov at a police inquiry in 1860. In this paper I shall use the term Jew, Jewish and Jewry as the correct English designation for the people and the nationality. Where direct quotations are used the term *ev-*

rei is translated as *Hebrew,* but the terms *zhid* and *zhyd* are retained in their original and only transliterated. On the history of the term *zhid* in the Russian language, see J. D. Klier, "Zhid: Biography of a Russia Epithet," *Slavonic and East European Review,* no. 1 (1982): 1–15.

7. On the Sunday schools, see R. Zelnik, "The Sunday School Movement in Russia, 1859–62," *Journal of Modern History,* no. 2 (1965): 151–70. The article's treatment of the origin of schools in Ukraine is inadequate, because it fails to take into account the peculiarities of the movement in its Ukrainian setting (use of the Ukrainian language, preparation of Ukrainian text-books, ideological content of the teaching, etc.)
8. P-v, "Predubezhdenie protiv evreev," *Kievskii telegraf* (1859), no. 1, 2, 15, 17, 18. The cryptonym P-v could be an abbreviation for Pirogov, Portugalov or Pavlov. However, the historical knowledge displayed by the author as well as his references to Jews in the third person suggest that the article was written by the Gentile historian Pavlov.
9. *Kievskii telegraf,* no. 1 (1 July 1859), 4. The analogy is misleading. In the Ukrainian language the term *zhyd* (Jew) was then in the same category as *liakh* (Pole) and *moskal* (Russian). None of the three terms had a pejorative origin and all were the proper traditional designations of the respective nations. Such was not the case with *khokhol* and *katsap*, which maintained their original derogatory connotations: the first ridiculed the Ukrainian Cossacks' custom of shaving their heads except for a single tuft of hair; the second laughed at the goat-like beard of the Russian peasants and the Russian Don Cossacks.
10. *Kievskii telegraf,* no. 1 (1 July 1859): 4.
11. Ibid., no. 18 (29 August 1859): 76.
12. Bekman, M. Muravskii, P. Efimenko and V. Ivkov received death penalties, but their sentences were commuted to terms of exile. Portugalov and the others were luckier: they received reprimands and were allowed to transfer to other universities. F. Iastrebov, *Revoliutsionnye demokraty na Ukraine, vtoraia polovina 50–kh—nachalo 60–kh godov XIX st.* (Kiev 1960), 280–1.
13. Unable to get permission to print their organ in Kiev, the older genaration of Ukrainophiles established their organ *Osnova* in St. Peterburg. The nominal editor was V. M. Bilozersky, but Panteleimon Kulish ran the show. On *Osnova,* see M. D. Bernshtein, *Zhurnal "Osnova" i ukrainskyi literaraturnyi protses.*
14. There was also the periodical published by the Ukrainian writer L. Hlibov, called *Chernihivskii lystok,* but the level of the material published and its impact on the society was much inferior to that of *Osnova.*
15. "Nedorazumenie po povodu slova 'zhid'," *Osnova*, no. 6 (1861): 134.
16. Ibid., 135.
17. Portugalov worked in the Podil Sunday school run by the students of the so-called cosmopolitan orientation; these students favoured the use of Russian textbooks and of the Russian language in their teaching. The more nationalistic students, who insisted on using the Ukrainian language as much as possible, taught at the Novostroenie school. In spite of a certain amount of friction because of ideological divergencies and personal ambitions, there was close co-operation between the two groups and one can presume that Portugalov became familiar with the Ukrainian term *zhyd* and its popular usage.
18. Ibid., 134–5. The insurrection of Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants led by B. Khmelnytsky in 1648 was accompanied by massacres of those the peasants considered to be their traditional exploiters: the Polish nobles and the Jewish lessees *(arendari).* Innocent Poles and Jews also suffered in this often uncontrollable na-

tional upheaval. Cf. B.D. Weinryb, *The Jews of Poland from 1100 to 1800* (Philadelphia 1972), esp. Chapter 9.

19. Ibid., 135.
20. Ibid., 136.
21. Ibid., 135.
22. "Nedorazumenie po povodu slova 'zhid'," *Osnova*, no. 6 (1861), 134–42.
23. Zalizniak led a Haidamak uprising against Polish rule in Right-Bank Ukraine in 1768 (*Koliivshchyna*).
24. *Osnova*. 1861, No. 6: 136.
25. In 1858 Kulish and four other Ukrainian writers made a public statement in defence of maligned Jewish writers. This was the first public statement of Ukrainian literati on the Jewish question and on Jewish-Ukrainian relations. The original text was published in *Russkii vestnik* (November 1858), Book 2: 245–7. For an English translation of the document, see R. Serbyn, "Ukrainian Writers on the Jewish Question: In the Wake of the *Illiustratsiia* Affair of 1858," *Nationalities Papers,* no. 1 (1981): 101–3. John D. Klier mistranslated passages of the text and consequently misinterpreted Kulish's position as being hostile to Jews. See J. D. Klier, "The *Illiustratsiia* Affair of 1858: Polemics on the Jewish Question in the Russian Press," *Nationalities Papers,* Vol. 5, no. 2 (Fall 1977): 117-35.
26. *Osnova*, no. 6 (1861): 137.
27. Ibid., 137–8.
28. Ibid., 138.
29. Ibid., 139.
30. Ibid., 140.
31. Ibid., 140–1.
32. Ibid., 141.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 142. The participation of Jewish students in Sunday schools was shortlived. The 1860 arrests of the members of the secret students society, referred to in note 2 led the Governor-General of Kiev to recommend to the curator of the Kiev educational district, Pirogov, to exclude from Sunday schools friends of the arrested students as well as students of Jewish background. See "Otnoshenie I. I. Vasilchikova i N. I. Pirogova o deiatelnosti tainogo obshchestva v Kharkovskom i Kievskom universitetakh," in *Obshchestvenno-politicheskoe dvizhenie na Ukraine v 1856–1862 gg.* (Kiev 1963), 52. Following this order Jewish students disappeared from published lists of Sunday school teachers. Cf. R. Serbyn, "Les étudiants de L'Université de Kiev d'après les registres académiques, 1858–1863," *Studia Ucrainica* (Ottawa), no. 2 (1984): 197-212.
35. Successor to *Razsvet* (1860–1), the first Russian-language Jewish journal in Russia, *Sion* reflected the Russophile tendency among the Jewish intellectuals and economic elites. Its editors at this time were Leo Pinsker, Emanuel Soloveichik and Nathan Bernshtein. See Orbach, *New voices of Russian Jewry,* 42 ff.
36. "Osnova i vopros o natsionalnostiakh," *Sion*, no. 10 (10 September 1861): 159.
37. Ibid., 158.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 159.
41. Ibid., 158.
42. Ibid., 158, 160.
43. Ibid., 160.

44. Ibid., 159.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., 161.
47. Ibid., 160.
48. Ibid.
49. P. Kulish, "Peredovye zhidy," *Osnova*, no. 9 (1861): 135–8.
50. Ibid., 135.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., 136.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid. See also note 25.
56. Ibid., 137–8.
57. Ibid., 136.
58. *"K russkim zhurnalam," Sion,* no. 21 (24 November 1861): 325.
59. Ibid.
60. "Kakoi byvaet vred ot monopolii?" *Russkii vestnik*, 1861, No. 11. P. 47.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., 48.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 52.
65. Ibid., 53.
66. Ibid.
67. Katkov was editor of *Moskovskiia vedomosti* (1863–87) and also published *Russkii vestnik* (1856–87).
68. *Illiustratsiia,* no. 196 (1861). Reported in *Sion,* no. 28 (1862): 446.
69. "Smes," *Russkoe slovo*, no. 12 (1861): 11–13.
70. *Iskra,* no. 3 (1862): 40: no. 6, 78.
71. "Umesto feletona. 1-go ianvaria," *Odesskii vestnik,* no.1 (1862): 1–3.
72. "Blagozhelanie 'Odesskago vestnika' k novomu godu," *Sion*, no. 28 (1862): 445.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. "O vozmozhnosti vnutrenniago sblizheniia evreev s russkim narodom," *Sion*, no. 29 (1862): 462.
76. "Nashi zhurnaly. *Vremia* i *Osnova*," *Severnaia pchela,* no. 44 (1862): 174.
77. "Otvety redaktsii," *Moskovskiia vedomosti*, no. 276 (1861): 2245.
78. "Sovremennaia khronika. Rossia," *Otechestvennye zapiski,* no. 2 (1861): 71.
79. "'Osnova' i 'Sion'," *Russkii invalid*, no. 2 (1862); "Evrei i sovremennyi vopros o narodnostiakh," *Russkaia rech*, no. 102 (1861).
80. "List," *Syn otechestva*, no. 11 (1861).
81. "Polemicheskii sluchai s 'Osnovoi' i 'Sionom'," *Vremia*. no. 12 (1861): 114–17.
82. "862–1862, ili Tysiacheletie Rossii," *Svistok*. no. 1 (1862), Reprint: Moscow, 1981, 240–1.
83. "Iudeam," *Osnova*, no. 1 (1862): 38–58. In fact, in this article, Kostomarov used interchangeably the two terms *evrei* and *iudei*.
84. Ibid., 54.
85. Ibid., 43–4.
86. Ibid., 44.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., 42, 56.

89. Ibid., 49.
90. Kostomarov elaborated his theories on "the two Russian nationalities" in his article "Dve russkiia narodnosti," *Osnova*, no. 3 (1861) Part 2. 38–80.
91. *Osnova*, no. 1 (1862): 53.
92. "'Sion' i 'Osnova' pred sudom russkoi zhurnalistiki," *Sion*, no. 37 (1862): 581–8.
93. Ibid., 583.
94. Ibid., 585.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid., 586.
97. A. Shimanov, "O puteshestvii po Ukraine," *Osnova*, no. 1 (1862): 78.
98. "Pismo dvukh evreev v redaktsiiu *Dnia*," *Den,* no. 32 (1862): 6.
99. Ibid., 6–7.
100. Some authors describe the Jews as being trapped between the hammer of the nobles and the anvil of the peasantry. This metaphor is inaccurate for it was the "anvil," made of the more pliable material, that suffered the brunt of the impact.
101. Identical behaviour could be seen recently in Quebec, where the Jewish minority aligned itself with the Anglophone element, which composes the majority of the Canadian population but a small minority in Quebec, to combat the resurgent Quebecois (French-Canadian) nationalism. This time the Ukrainian group found itself in an analogous situation with the Jews and behaved in like manner: it sided with the English against the French.
102. Antonovych's justification was elaborated in his now famous "confession," in which he enjoined the Polish ruling classes of Ukraine either to join the Ukrainian people whom they had oppressed and exploited for centuries or to go to Poland. V. Antonovich, "Moia ispoved: Otvet panu Padalitse," *Osnova*, no. 1 (1862): 83–96.

John-Paul Himka

Ukrainian-Jewish Antagonism in the Galician Countryside During the Late Nineteenth Century

The Ukrainian national movement in the Austrian crownland of Galicia began to penetrate to the masses of this overwhelmingly agricultural nation after the abolition of serfdom in 1848 and the introduction of constitutional reforms in the 1860s. It reached the peasantry through newspapers written specifically for the masses and read aloud in reading clubs (*chytalni)*. Its arrival in the village exacerbated ethnic antagonisms, between Ukrainians and Poles, as well as between Ukrainians and Jews. The Ukrainian nationalism that took root in rural Galicia had a distinctly anti-Jewish component, which constitutes the subject of this study. The study does not pretend to survey the entire complex of Ukrainian-Jewish relations in the Galician village, since discussions of both positive aspects of these relations and anti-Ukrainian attitudes among Jews have been left aside.

This study employs a new methodology that was developed for a larger work on the diffusion of the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia, entitled *Galician Villagers*. The main feature of this method is the close reading of a selected corpus of sources written by village activists and describing the progress of the national movement outside Galicia's capital city, Lviv. The sources are correspondence (*dopysy)* sent to the popular newspaper *Batkivshchyna* (Patrimony) in 1884 and 1885. *Batkivshchyna* contained a special section entitled "Visty z kraiu" (News from the Crownland) that published correspondence from various local activists of the Ukrainian movement. Excluding items of corre-

spondence originating from outside Galicia (Vienna and Bukovyna), 281 items appeared in *Batkivshchyna*'s "Visty z kraiu" in 1884-5. These items have been thematically analyzed to reconstruct the world-view of the correspondents as well as their vision of what was transpiring in the village. This micro-analysis of a limited body of sources has been complemented by wide reading in other primary sources and secondary literature.

Of the 281 items of correspondence appearing in *Batkivshchyna* in 1884–5, almost 40 per cent (107) referred to Jews, testifying to the importance of the Ukrainian-Jewish nexus in the development of the Ukrainian national movement. The correspondence was decidedly anti-Jewish: of the 107 items referring to Jews, only one (*CC* 248)[1] mentioned Jews in a neutral context and only one (*CC* 200) in a positive context.

The authors of the correspondence were the leaders of the national movement in the small towns and villages. It has been possible to identify as members of reading clubs the authors of 16 of the 107 items of correspondence referring to Jews (*CC* 5, 6, 12, 22, 41, 42, 67, 143, 162, 173, 194, 237, 241, 246, 248, 268). The occupations of the authors of 33 of the 107 items have also been established. Most were peasants, who contributed 20 items (*CC* 31, 34, 36, 55, 77, 78, 107, 110, 112, 118, 125, 141, 151, 166, 178, 182, 240, 248, 251, 281); these were an elite of the peasantry: not only literate, but generally also wealthier than average.[2] Five of the items were submitted by teachers (*CC* 1, 26, 42, 67, 268), four by burghers, i. e., artisans (*CC* 197, 239, 246, 249), two by village store-keepers (*CC* 3, 116) and only one by a cantor (*CC* 162) and one by a priest (*CC* 44). When we compare the authors of the 107 items of correspondence concerning Jews with the authors of the total 281 items of correspondence we find that peasants were overrepresented among the authors who mentioned Jews (61 per cent compared to 45 per cent of the authors of the total correspondence) and both cantors and priests underrepresented (3 per cent to 17 per cent and 3 per cent to 10 per cent).

The newspaper in which the correspondents published their articles, *Batkivshchyna*, was founded in 1879 by the national-populist (*narodovtsi)* wing of the Ukrainian national movement. From the first, the paper took an anti-Jewish stance. The first editorial of the first issue declared that Ukrainians in Galicia had "two terrible enemies: one of them is the clever Jew, who sucks our blood and gnaws our flesh; the other is the haughty Pole, who is after both our body and soul."[3] Four of the first eight issues of *Batkivshchyna* were suppressed by the Galician authorities for propagating hatred of the Jews.[4] From 1879 until 1883, the paper ran a long series of tendentious articles entitled "The Jews" ("Zhydy"). In 1880 the series went so far as to write: "Only God alone can save us, by

sending a whirlwind, tempest and fierce winds that will sweep them [the Jews] from our land."[5]

Batkivshchyna's most important and programmatic statement on the Jews was its response to the pogroms of 1881 in Russian-ruled Ukraine. *Batkivshchyna* sympathized with the pogromists, who according to the paper, were fighting against exploitation and displayed a true Cossack spirit. However, it noted, no one should think of organizing pogroms in Galicia. Not only are they immoral and illegal, but they offer no lasting solution to the Jewish problem. The Cossack revolt led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1648 had devastated the Jewish population of Ukraine, yet later the Jews returned and regained their economic influence. The only remedy against Jewish exploitation is a boycott of Jewish stores and taverns, in fact the complete abstinence from economic relations with Jews: . . ."Then we shall not have to drive out the Jews, they will leave us of their own volition. And if some were to remain, then they would not live from speculation and swindling, but from the labour of their hands as we do, and not doing "Jewish work." And even we would have nothing against such Jews."[6]

Batkivshchyna's anti-Jewish editorial policy undoubtedly encouraged village correspondents to emphasize enmity to the Jews in their contributions. Also, the editors may have deliberately sharpened the anti-Jewish tone of village correspondence and censored passages showing Jews in a positive light. A former editor of the paper, the radical publicist Mykhailo Pavlyk, published one sample of passages omitted from an item of correspondence by *Batkivshchyna*'s chief editor, Vasyl Nahirny. The paper published these lines of the article:

> [The newspaper] *Kurjer Stanisławowski,* satisfied with the village elections, is now beginning to deal with workers. So, for example, in issue no. 158 it demands that Christian servants stop working for Jews on Sunday.

These lines, however, were deleted:

> Very nice! But unfortunately, maids who work for Jews have much more rest than those working for Christians. A maid in the employ of Christians works much harder not only before Sundays and holy days, but especially *during Sundays and holy days* (and there's no shortage of holy days). Work for Jews is done mostly *before* Saturdays and holy days, and on holy days tha maid is free; this pertains as well to Sundays and Christian holy days.[7]

Such tampering may not have been general policy. At the time the above item of correspondence was submitted, in the spring of 1889,

Nahirny was growing increasingly uncomfortable with the anticlericalism and social radicalism that Pavlyk was introducing into the paper and he may been unusually interventionist in his editing. Even if the policy was general and affected the correspondence of 1884–5, the correspondence retains its value as a source on Ukrainian-Jewish antagonism. Since the editors of *Batkivshchyna* at most deleted rather than created passages, the correspondence reflects, if one-sidedly, authentic attitudes of village activists of the Ukrainian national movement.

Galician Ukrainians and Jews: Demographic and Social Characteristics

Galicia was Austria's easternmost crownland, acquired by the Danube monarchy during the first partition of Poland in 1772. The population of Galicia was ethnically mixed. Poles inhabited the western third of the crownland; in Eastern Galicia they formed the landholding nobility, the majority of the population in the large cities and, after the 1860s, the majority of the civil servants. A small German minority was scattered throughout the crownland as agricultural colonists and civil servants. There were about as many Ukrainians as Poles in Galicia and they inhabited the larger, eastern part of the crownland. A sizeable Jewish minority was dispersed throughout Galicia, with the major concentration, however, in the east.[8] In 1869 there were 575,433 Jews in Galicia, accounting for 11 per cent of the population; Greek Catholics, i. e., Ukrainians by origin, numbered 2,311,909 – 43 per cent of the population. In 1900 Galicia had 811,183 Jews (still 11 per cent) and 3,080,433 Ukrainian-speakers (42 per cent).[9]

As can be seen from the accompanying tables, the Jews were most prominent in Galicia's commercial sector, also prominent, though to a lesser degree, in its so-called "industrial" sector and only minimally engaged in its agricultural sector. Seven out of ten commercially active Galicians were Jewish, but only one of every fifty engaged in agriculture was a Jew. Three out of five Jews made their living from commerce and industry, but only one in seven from agriculture—this in a land where over three-quarters of the population were agricultural. Thus the Jews exhibited, in relation to Galician society as a whole, a markedly warped social structure. But so did the Ukrainians, who were overwhelmingly peasants and so were only minimally represented in other sectors.

The co-existence of two such complementarily warped social structures established the conditions for frictious interaction, especially in a period when the natural economy was being eroded by a money economy. Moreover, in the late nineteenth century both peoples sought to break out of their social confines—the Jews by acquiring land, the Ukrainians by engaging in commerce. Had this mutual unwarping of social

TABLE 1. JEWS AND UKRAINIAN-SPEAKERS IN OCCUPATIONAL SECTORS, GALICIA 1900

	Jews	Ukrainian-Speakers	All Galicians
Agriculture and Forestry	116,098	2,886,269	5,603,385
Industry	232,917	69,893	641,729
Trade and Communication	279,571	20,029	394,622
Bureaucracy and Free Professions	44,517	24,012	169,878
Others	138,080	80,230	506,286
Total	811,183	3,080,433	7,315,900

SOURCE: Józef Buzek, *Stosunki zawodowe i socyalne ludności w Galicyi według wyznania i narodowości na podstawie spisu ludności z 31. grudnia 1900 r.*, Wiadomości statystyczne o stosunkach krajowych, tom XX, zeszyt 2 (Lviv 1905), "Tablice."

Note: The occupational statistics given above include the dependents of those engaged in each sector. There is some overlap in the two national categories, since 5 percent of all Jews were, for census purposes, Ukrainian-speakers (Yiddish was not admitted as a valid *Umgangssprache*). The occupational category "Others" includes day labourers, military personnel, rentiers, persons in institutions, domestic servants and persons without specified occupation.

TABLE 2. JEWS AND UKRAINIAN-SPEAKERS, OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION, GALICIA 1900 (IN PERCENTAGES)

	Jews	Ukrainian-Speakers	All Galicians
Agriculture and Forestry	14.3	93.7	76.6
Industry	28.7	2.3	8.8
Trade and Communication	34.5	0.7	5.4
Bureaucracy and Free Professions	5.5	0.8	2.3
Others	17.0	2.6	6.9
Total	100.0	100.1	100.0

SOURCE: Calculated from Table 1.

Note: Among the Jews in the category "Others," 45 per cent were day labourers, 23 per cent were without specified occupation, and 18 per cent were rentiers.

structures occurred in conditions of economic growth, it would not have magnified national conflict to the extent it did in impoverished Galicia; here every bit of land in Jewish hands was resented by Ukrainian peasants, just as every Ukrainian co-operative was perceived as a threat by the Jewish shopkeepers and lenders.

Given the contrasting social structures, it is not surprising that Jews were much more urbanized than Ukrainians. In Lviv, Jews made up 31 per cent of the population in 1869 and Ukrainians (Greek Catholics) 14 per cent; in 1900 the Jews were 28 per cent, Ukrainian-speakers 9 per cent. In both census years, roughly one of every twenty Jews lived in the

TABLE 3. OCCUPATIONAL SECTORS BY NATIONALITY, JEWS AND UKRAINIAN-SPEAKERS, GALICIA 1900 (IN PERCENTAGES)

	Jews	Ukrainian-Speakers	Total
Total Population	11.1	42.1	53.2
Agriculture and Forestry	02.1	51.5	53.6
Industry	36.3	10.9	47.2
Trade and Communication	70.9	5.1	76.0
Bureaucracy and Free Professions	26.2	14.1	40.3
Others	27.3	15.8	43.1

SOURCE: Calculated from Table 1.
Note: In the "Others" category, Jews accounted for 52 per cent of all Galicians with no specified occupation, 40 per cent of all day labourers and 29 per cent of all rentiers.

capital, but only one of every two hundred Ukrainians. In the nineteen East Galician cities (excluding Lviv), Jews made up 45.6 per cent of the population in 1880 (38.5 per cent in 1910); in the eighty-three East Galician towns, they made up 48.1 per cent in 1880 (42.0 per cent in 1910). About 60 per cent of Eastern Galicia's Jews lived in cities and towns.[10]

Rural Jews still represented a sizeable portion of Galicia's Jewish population (36.6 per cent in 1910). As Jacob Lestschinsky noted, the weight of rural Jewry in Galicia was anomalous in comparison to Jewish demographic patterns as a whole: "Except for Bukovyna, Galicia is the only land in the whole world where such a large percentage of Jews lives in villages."[11] The legislation of Joseph II had forbidden Jews who were not registered as farmers to live in the countryside.[12] Although the ban was poorly enforced, it seems that the early nineteenth century witnessed an exodus of Galician Jews from village to town and that the emancipation of the Austrian Jews in the 1860s brought a re-immigration into the countryside. The correspondence published in *Batkivshchyna* records an influx of Jews into the village. One correspondent wrote ironically that "the people of Mshanets [Staryi Sambir district] are very fortunate, because they have as many as seven friends of the Jewish faith in their village, where once, some thirty years ago, there were only two Jewish families" (*CC* 66). Another correspondent noted that in the village of Perehinsko, Dolyna district, there were only two Jewish families in the 1840s, but by 1885 the village had seven hundred Jews (*CC* 257).[13]

The new influx of Jews into the countryside coincided with the period when the money economy was penetrating and, in the peasants' view, ruining the village. Since rural Jews were chiefly engaged in money-related occupations (tavern-keeping, commerce, lending, renting and buying land), their very presence was considered, as we shall see, the cause of the peasants' poverty.

Marx was fond of repeating that the Jews in old Poland were a trading

people who lived in the pores or interstices of feudal society.[14] The feudal economy was based on use value rather than exchange value. For the most part wealth was held in the form of land rather than in the form of money. The major economic transaction of that mode—the landlord expropriating the surplus of the serf—was primarily conducted without the mediation of money; in old Poland the largest portion of feudal rent was paid in labour, and rents in kind and money were subsidiary. The cities, with their commerce and crafts, were marginal and in Poland deliberately strangled by the nobility. But even in the natural economy of feudalism, especially as it developed, there were still interstices where exchange value—money—was necessary. And it was in these interstices (as well as in the often coincident interstices between lord and peasant) that the Jews of old Poland, including Galicia, clustered.

The Jews' relegation to the marginal sphere of exchange during the feudal epoch gave rise to the warped social structure evident in 1900, just as the Ukrainians' relegation to the role of serfs had given rise to theirs. In the period with which we are concerned, the natural economy inherited from feudalism was being rapidly destroyed and replaced by an economy based on exchange value, money. The previously marginal sphere was now becoming dominant. And just as the two economic modes were locked in conflict, so too were the two peoples who represented each.

Wealth and Poverty

Ukrainians complained frequently in our corpus of correspondence that the Jews were growing rich at their expense. A full account is given by a peasant from the village of Korchyn, Stryi district:

> Our Korchyn sustains seven Jewish families. Oh was God ever generous! Korchyn fed them and still feeds them and has fattened them up well. With their insatiable eyes they'd be glad to get at our very hearts. But who's to blame for this? The villagers of Korchyn have themselves to blame! They made the Jews into lords, leaseholders and estate owners, and themselves into ragamuffins. . . .
>
> Khaim Vaitsner arrived in Korchyn with a walking stick, and today he owns an estate. . . . And Berko Vaitsner has permanently rented the tavern from the noble Podhorecki family; that's how well he's doing in Korchyn. Iosio Vaitsner opened stores and became the leading merchant; for several years now he's been renting the manorial lumber mill and has thousands [of gulden] to play with. What did Hershko Kislier have when he came? And today he's an estate-lessee here. Baila—she rents the sanatorium where sick Jews come to bathe. . . . That leaves two Jewish families who still haven't made it to such a good state, but even they aren't poor and they do business among our villagers. . . .

From what source did these Jews accumulate so much money that today they're lessees and lords among us? The answer is simple. That is our own property that we ourselves contributed to the Jews, because they neither plough nor sow (*CC* 107). The last phrase was a folk proverb, repeated by another correspondent: "The Jew neither sows nor ploughs, but lives from people" (*Zhyd ne siie, ni ore, a z liudei zhyie) (CC* 104).[15]

Overall the correspondents felt that they were getting poorer and the Jews richer and that these were two sides of the same coin. Ilko Sheshor, a school teacher in Khmelivka, Bohorodchany district, wrote:

> Jewish leaseholders and speculators use their clever minds and take advantage of people's ignorance in the villages (and outside the villages) to make thousands of gulden from one gulden. And those thousands are sprinkled with the bitter sweat of Ruthenian [i. e., Ukrainian] peasants, while Jewry lives like lords and acquires riches. . . . Jewry . . . grows richer every day, while we . . . are perishing (*CC* 1).

> . . . Jewry [will continue] to get rich off our property. . . . More than one Jew eats tasty dishes and dresses fine and whatever he wants, he has. But we—oh woe unto us! Woe! (*CC* 26).

Other correspondents concurred: "There's no one in the world so easy to deceive and exploit, even today, as our poor Ruthenian villager. . . . The Jew cheats whenever he can, on all sides" (*CC* 157). "Jewish guile has brought more than one of us to poverty, driven us from our land and settled in the house where formerly lived the landed peasant" (*CC* 30). "The Jews here [Dobromyl district] exploit the poor people terribly, and everything goes very well for them" (*CC* 141). When the village of Korchyn, Stryi district, received a new, activist parish priest, a member of the reading club expressed the hope that "during the tenure of our new pastor Jewish prosperity will cease, and the people will begin to be better off" (*CC* 194). A non-peasant commented: "In the Kolomyia region the Ruthenian people are a large force; this is well known by the Jews, who grow wealthy through this force" (*CC* 164).

When peasants hold domestic celebrations (such as christenings), "the host has a great expenditure, which chiefly flows into the Jew's pocket" (*CC* 66). The landlord sees to it that "he enriches himself and the Jews by our peasant labour" (*CC* 77). "The Jews have made enough of a conquest of us, and it won't be long before we can be called true slaves!" (*CC* 178). "Let us move, let us wrest ourselves . . . from a slavery even worse than serfdom, because under serfdom a man per-

formed his labour for the lord, and afterward he worked for himself; but how many people work all year, not for themselves, but for the Jew and for liquor" (*CC* 125).

What these quotations document (and see also *CC* 33 and 72) is the correspondents' *image* of Galician Jews as people who grew wealthy by ruining them. The peasant certainly knew his own economic circumstances well, and the dismal picture painted in the letters is accurate in that regard. He was right too that the Jewish tavern-keepers and money-lenders were often enough the instruments of his undoing. But how much did he really know about the *wealth* of the Jews? Jews and Ukrainians were often at odds in the village; they were separated by differences in dress, speech, diet, religion and occupation—they did not spend much time as guests in each others' homes. Most peasants, therefore, were unlikely to know how the Jews really lived, the actual state of their prosperity.

There would be exceptions, however, such as peasants who for one reason or another spent time in Jewish homes. My grandmother, for example, was hired to light the fires on the Sabbath for the Jews of her village, Khlivchany, Rava Ruska district. In the course of her weekly duties, she grew close to the Jewish children and gained a reasonably accurate knowledge of how well off the village Jews were. When I asked her whether the Jews were wealthier than the peasants, she said: "They were poor, just as we were."

There is a great deal of evidence that the Jews of Galicia were, on the whole, in straits as wretched as the peasants'. In the early years of Austrian rule "even the district administrators, despite their unconcealed hostility toward the Jews, had to admit that these rural Jews were poor, destitute and, for all their exploitation of the peasants, themselves exploited by the owners of the *latifundia*."[16] Prince Wenzel Anton Kaunitz in 1772 had reported to Maria Theresa not only that the Galician Jews lived off the peasantry, but that "taken as a whole, they are very poor and merely the sponge that the clergy and nobility squeeze."[17] The point made by the Austrian bureaucracy of the late feudal era also applies to the post-emancipation period in Galicia, with its strong feudal remnants: it was possible for large segments of the Jewish population to be involved in the exploitation of the Ukrainian peasantry without thereby gaining much for themselves, in fact, while remaining destitute.

Anyone who leafs through the Zionist press from the turn of the century will be struck by the urgent attention paid to the plight of Galicia's poverty-stricken, famine-ridden Jewry,[18] the same Jewry that the correspondents imagined "eats tasty dishes and dresses fine." The Austrian poet Hugo von Hoffmansthal was deeply impressed by Jewish poverty while stationed, as a soldier, in the East Galician town of Tovmach in

1896.[19] Roman Iaroshevych, a Ukrainian deputy to the Austrian parliament as well as a physician, stated in an interview in 1897: "When I am called to a Jewish patient the prescription is almost invariably the same: food. The answer to this prescription is a silent gesture. This tells all."[20] The Ukrainian poet and publicist Ivan Franko also stated that "the overwhelming majority [of Jews] in our land are even poorer and more unfortunate than our peasants."[21]

The Jews were poor for good reasons. Every tavern-keeper was at the mercy of the noble landlord, as were all Jews engaged in any form of leaseholding. And the nobility of Eastern Galicia was not known to be generous either to its peasants or to its Jews. The majority of rural Jews had to make their living in one form or another from the peasants: by selling them drinks or salt, by lending them money at interest, whatever. The problem with this was that the peasants themselves were abjectly poor, on the average not even possessing sufficient land for subsistence. The purchasing power of the peasantry was therefore minimal, and Jews who depended on it suffered. Moreover, Jews were much like Ukrainians in following traditional occupations (and also like the Ukrainians they had little alternative until emigration appeared as an escape valve). Thus the number of tavern-keepers and merchants by the late nineteenth century had far surpassed any economically reasonable limit, just as the subdivision of peasant farms had also proceeded much too far. Underemployment and the expansion of claims on limited recources were problems as much for Jews as for Ukrainians. Also, in the 1860s Galicia was connected by railway with the rest of Austria, including industrially developed Bohemia and the Vienna basin. This undermined the Galician artisans, Jews and non-Jews, as factory-made shoes and clothes reduced the cobbler and tailor to mere menders. The capitalist concentration of trade also adversely affected the Jews in commerce.[22]

The correspondents' image, then, of the rich Jew was very distorted. Ignorance of real Jewish life has already been mentioned as one factor explaining this misperception, but there are others, including the grains of truth in what the correspondents wrote. There was a stratum within Jewish society that possessed great wealth by Galician standards, enough to purchase estates from the nobles. Also, it is possible that rural Jews were better off than urban Jews (whom the peasants would know less), because the cities and towns might have siphoned off the lowest depths of the Jewish rural proletariat. The correspondents' misperception of Jewish wealth might also have stemmed from the difference between a natural and money-based economy. What "wealth" the Ukrainian had was in land; what "wealth" the Jew had was generally in money (or, what amounts to the same thing, commodities). The Galician peasant was certainly land-poor, but he was even more money-poor. To him the

Jew seemed rich, because he had, relatively, a great deal of money. That in most cases this money was in lieu of land did not seem to affect the peasants' image of the Jews.

Usury

Perhaps no point of contention between Ukrainians and Jews in the countryside so clearly highlighted the economic aspects of the conflict as the naked confrontation between the natural economy and money that usury represents. Usury, a marginal but indispensable component of the feudal economy, was transformed by the 1860s into the vanguard of the young and rising money economy. Moreover, it served as an effective solvent of the confines of the traditional national social structures in Galicia: it drove Ukrainians and Poles, both peasants and nobles, from the land and brought Jews into possession of it.[23]

Money-lending was a traditional Jewish occupation. In feudal Poland Jews had lent peasants money and sold them alcoholic beverages on credit, but from the beginning of Austrian rule in Galicia a series of laws limited both peasant indebtedness and Jewish lending. The legal fetters on lending were removed in 1868 as part of the triumph of constitutionalism and strategy for economic development. All restrictions on interest rates were abolished, and Galician peasants began paying rates of 52 and 104 per cent. Because of such abuses and the widespread indebtedness of the peasantry, a special law of 1877 attempted to reimpose interest limits in Galicia and Bukovyna.[24] Although usury was not an exclusively Jewish occupation in post-feudal Galicia, Jews were dominant. In the 1880s nearly nine out of ten persons convicted of usury in Galicia were Jews.[25] Most Ukrainian peasants tended to identify usury with the Jews,[26] but two of our items of correspondence recognized that non-Jews were also involved in it. A peasant wrote: "We still have one evil, and that is usury. And it is not only Jewry that fleeces the poor peasant, but—what is more saddening—one peasant flays another through usury" (*CC* 78). A non-peasant complained that many peasant-run loan associations displayed less "brotherly Christian love" than a desire for "Jewish usury" (*CC* 111).

Resentment of "Jewish usury" was expressed by many correspondents (*CC* 1, 6, 26, 33, 48, 67, 77, 107, 111, 148, 184). According to a peasant from the Carpathians,

> there are villages where out of a hundred households it's hard to find a single landed peasant who is not in debt—to the Jews, of course. . . . In almost every one of the local towns, such as Stare Misto, Khyriv, Dobromyl,

> Ustryky and others, there is some rich Jew who has [peasant land] under his control, i. e., in his pocket. . . . Often on a single day he will summon from ten to a hundred of his debtors to court for their debts; and he does not usually do so in vain (*CC* 141).

Another correspondent summarized the situation as follows: "It's often the case that someone borrows a dozen or so gulden from the Jew for some requirement and after that can't get the Jew off his back; he pays and works off the debt, but still ends up losing his land" (*CC* 30).

Land was the penalty or reward for borrowing or lending: "Some of these Jews came naked to Mshanets, but today they all have their own houses and plots of land which they bought and snatched away from people. One of them, Abramko, took a house and land away from a certain widow for a debt of twenty-five gulden" (*CC* 66). A correspondent from Chortovets, Horodenka district, reported:

> Several years ago he [Ivan Lubyk] borrowed a hundred gulden from the Jew Shulim Naiberger. He gave him one *morg* [0.575 hectare] of arable land as collateral and worked off sixty gulden by carting. But Mr. Shulim counted these sixty gulden as interest and in the end, after several years, the forty gulden [debt] grew to four hundred gulden of interest. [Allegedly] as insurance, the Jew tried to convince Ivan to sign a promissory note in court for four hundred gulden, which the Jew [said he] would keep until death. Ivan, through his ignorance, let himself be talked into it by the Jew, not foreseeing that it would be his ruin. And in Obertyn he signed a promissory note in court for four hundred gulden. Now the Jew is driving poor Lubyk off his land and from his house: Ivan, grab your sack and go begging! (*CC* 2).

Sometimes the credit could be extended in liquor rather than money, but with the same result:

> Ten years ago the lessee Khaim Breslier came here [Kryve, Berezhany district]. And there was a landed peasant here named Nykola Pytel, number one in the village, but also number one in the tavern. He had twelve *morgy* of land, a house, a garden and a fine orchard. When his wife died and his children went to live with other families, Nykola took to drink until all he had left was four *morgy* of land, the garden and the house. One day Khaim said to him: "Listen, Nykola, you're always drinking, but you never give me any money. Let's reckon it up: I'll pay you the difference and you sign over to me the house with the land and garden." Nykola agreed and the Jew reckoned the debt af 160 gulden. They went to a notary in Koziv and signed a document which said that the Jew could keep Nykola's property

> for ten years as interest. If by that time Nykola hadn't paid up, the arrangement would become permanent. It wasn't easy for Nykola to earn 160 gulden to pay the Jew, so he decided to sell the property. A certain landed peasant offered him 200 gulden just for the house and garden, but the Jew didn't want to give up the property until the ten years had passed. When the allotted time had expired and Nykola didn't return the money, the Jew took over all the property. Nykola's son Stefan had meanwhile earned some money and wanted to pay the debt, but the Jew wouldn't take the money. The matter went to court, where it is still being contested (*CC* 281).

The auctioning of peasant land in order to pay debts was very common in Galicia. Between 1873 and 1894, there were 49,823 such auctions ordered by the courts, over two thousand a year.[27] Although land was the most important of the means of production from which usury separated the peasant, livestock also changed hands through debt.[28]

With the encouragement of the national populists, the peasants took a number of measures to combat Jewish usury. They founded reading clubs, which raised their educational level and thus, as some believed (*CC* 6), indirectly helped them in the contest with usurers. They also founded their own loan associations to compete with Jewish lenders. The village of Korchyn, Stryi district, planned such a loan fund "which would do much to rescue us. Instead of going to the Jew to borrow money at high interest, we'd prefer to borrow from ourselves at lower interest" (*CC* 107). A peasant from Strilkiv, Stryi district, boasted that "no one goes to the Jew to borrow, only to the communal fund" (*CC* 34). Similarly, in Kolodribka, Zalishchyky district, "no one has to go to the Jew anymore to borrow, because there is our own fund. In this way we have driven out of our village one enemy—Jewish usury" (*CC* 67). Loan associations were founded throughout Galicia and some were affiliated with various national institutions. The popular educational society Prosvita (Enlightenment) was the patron of 257 credit unions in 1912.[29]

A close cousin of the loan association was the communal granary, which also competed with Jewish lenders. Particularly in the spring before sowing and in the lean months preceding the harvest, peasants could feel an acute shortage of grain. To avoid borrowing either cash or grain from Jewish usurers, peasants set up communal granaries to take care of their needs: "Let's establish . . . a communal granary so that in case of need we won't go to the Jew to borrow grain or money" (*CC* 2). Some granaries worked out well, such as the one in Korchyn:

> We have a lot of people who sometimes run out of grain either for sowing or for bread, and straightway they go to the Jew, borrow money at usurious interest and pay dearly. But now it's completely different. Now if they bor-

> row from the communal granary, they don't have to pay anything back until after the harvest; and if they contribute more, it remains theirs in the future (*CC* 107).

Other communal granaries, like one in Kiidantsi, Kolomyia district, had trouble accumulating a sufficient fund of grain to perform their function:

> For eight years now we've had a granary . . . but what good does it do us if it's empty! That's a great pity, because thanks to our carelessness the Jews clean us out every time. And they have plenty of time to clean us out, because it's a long time from Christmas to the fall and it's a rough stretch before the harvest. No one is able to remedy this evil, except for the granary. So to work, landed peasants! (*CC* 185).

Both the loan association and the communal granary meant competition for the Jewish lenders in the village. It is not surprising, then, that they opposed these institutions. As one correspondent wrote: "The priest . . . advised us . . . [to establish] a communal granary; but this, too, is somehow not in the Jews' and mayor's interest" (*CC* 265). Thus usury not only engendered conflict between Ukrainian peasant debtors and Jewish creditors, but between peasant lending institutions and private Jewish lenders.

The loan associations and more sophisticated credit institutions contributed to the economic decline of Galician Jews by restricting their opportunities to engage in usury. According to Raphael Mahler, by the turn of the century "the development of modern banking, mortgage banks, and savings and loan associations practically did away with private moneylending, which had become particularly widespread among Galician Jews, especially among the village shopkeepers, after the abolition of serfdom in 1848."[30]

Jews themselves, however, particularly petty shopkeepers and artisans, also suffered from Jewish usurers. To combat usury, the Jewish Colonization Association founded loan associations in Galicia where Jewish tradesmen could obtain loans at 6 per cent. Six associations had been established by 1903. According to a contemporary account, the Jewish credit associations were also undermining the usurers.[31]

Agriculture and Forestry

The estrangement of the Jewish people from agriculture goes back many centuries before Jews immigrated to the territory of Galicia. By the time they did enter old Poland in mass, they were already an almost exclu-

sively commercial people who found employment on the fringes of the feudal economy, wherever exchange intervened or in the ground between master and serf. Even had they wanted to, Jews could engage in farming only at considerable cost. It would have cost them their religion to join the nobility and thus acquire ownership of an estate. And it would have cost them their social status and relative freedom and dignity to merge with the peasantry and directly work the land, for themselves and for the nobles.

Emperor Joseph II had hoped to force Jews on to the soil, but his measures to this end were so drastic as to preclude enforcement. He tried to banish all Jews from the villages save those who were farmers or artisans. In an attempt to render both nobles and Jews more productive, he prohibited Jews from leasing estates, taverns and other sources of revenue owned by the nobility;[32] the prohibition had little effect.[33] He ordered the Jewish *kehilot* to settle at their own cost thousands of Jews in Galician agricultural colonies, but the scheme failed.[34] In addition to these forcible and radical measures, the emperor also tried gentler incentives. A patent of 16 September 1784 freed Jewish farmers from the special Jewish taxes. The patent of 7 May 1789 permitted foreign Jews to immigrate to Galicia, provided they settled on the land and worked it. The patent of 1789 permitted Galician Jews to buy (rustical) land, on the condition that they farmed it, a similar decree was issued in 1805 and confirmed several times subsequently. Yet from 1789 until 1848, in all of Galicia excluding Cracow, there were only forty-six cases of Jews buying farms.[35]

Joseph's reforms were unsuccessful because he would not permit Jews to become the owners of tabular land, i. e., traditional noble estates, but wanted them to farm as peasants. He was limited by the traditional view of a society of estates (*Stände*), in which the ownership of a demesne was the exclusive privilege of the hereditary nobility.[36] His scheme was perversely misguided: Jews, who traditionally managed the nobles' lands, had more practical experience in agricultural management than the hereditary owners. When Jews finally were allowed to purchase tabular land, they very quickly gained a substantial portion of it and managed it better than the Polish nobles had. But farming on a small scale, as engaged in by Ukrainian peasants, was never attractive to Galician Jews. This is borne out by the inevitable failure of all Jewish-sponsored colonization attempts in Galicia.[37]

There was one sizeable Jewish agricultural community in Galicia in the early twentieth century, in the village of Cherniiv, Stanyslaviv district. According to an article published in *Batkivshchyna* in 1879, there had been only one Jewish family in Cherniiv before 1848. Within the next thirty years, however, several dozen Jewish families moved in and

acquired land through usury.[38] The census of 1900 showed 178 Jews in the village (commune and manor), but the village remained largely Ukrainian, with 2,024 Greek Catholics out of a total population of 2,279.[39] In 1903 Cherniiv was visited by two German Jewish women reformers who left an account of the Jewish farmers there. The reformers claimed no knowledge of the origins of the community, which they referred to as a "colony." What the reformers found in the community demonstrates why small-scale farming did not appeal to Galicia's Jews: the Jews of Cherniiv were mostly illiterate; entire families worked on small plots of land of 2.5–3 hectares, which were insufficient to support them.[40] In a word, the entire community had been reduced to the same cultural and material conditions as the surrounding Ukrainian peasantry.

In 1900, 116,908 Galician Jews were engaged in or supported by agriculture and forestry; this was 14.3 per cent of the total Jewish population and 2.1 per cent of the total agricultural population. Over fifteen thousand Jews actually owned farms. About five hundred of the farms were great estates[41] and perhaps several hundred more were owned by the agricultural Karaites. The rest were peasant farms that Jews bought or received as payment for debts. After a false start in 1848,[42] the acquisition of peasant land began in earnest in the 1860s. Our correspondence, of course, mentions the purchase of peasant farms by Jews (*CC* 1, 2, 54, 72, 101, 136, 143). Although the Galician Jewish social democrat Max Zetterbaum wrote that there were Jewish peasants and even agricultural labourers in Galicia and Bukovyna,[43] they are not mentioned in our corpus of correspondence. Most Jews who bought land did not farm it themselves, but hired peasants to work it or leased it out.[44] A correspondent from Drozdovychi, Horodok district, wrote that the Jewish owner of a former peasant holding "does not want to work the land himself, and really, why should he when people will work for him? Whenever he needs a worker he can get many more than he wants, because our village is poor and there's no other source of earnings. So whenever the Jew calls, people fall over one another [to be hired]." (*CC* 101).

Because Jews rarely worked the land they acquired, the correspondents accused them of buying it for speculative purposes:

> Ten years ago, when Jewish usury was at its height, there was as much farmland for sale here [Novosilka Iazlovetska, Buchach district] as anyone could want, because Jews were speculating in land. They took land from one peasant, from whom nothing else was left to take, and they sold on installment to another, after doubling the price. The best farmers then were completely ruined: they couldn't pay for the land they got from the Jew, and they lost their own land as well (*CC* 48).

The correspondent from Kiidantsi said that Jews wanted land "in order to have an easy profit from people by renting it out"; he also reported that the peasants of Kiidantsi refused to sell land to Jews (*CC* 183). (The census of 1880 recorded no Jews in Kiidantsi.)

The Ukrainian peasant of land-hungry Galicia resented losing land to Jews. At the turn of the century, rural Jews noticed that some Galician peasants expected in the future to receive back gratis whatever land they had sold to the Jews.[45] This expectation may have been connected with naive tsarism, i. e., the hope that the Russian tsar would conquer Galicia, expropriate the estates, divide the land among the peasants and drive out the Jews.[46]

Jews were prominent as the officials attached to estates (stewards, overseers, labour recruiters, etc.). In 1794 the emperor had prohibited the employment of Jews in any clerical capacity on estates,[47] but the law was not enforced and, of course, was formally invalidated by the full emancipation of the Jews in 1868. In 1900 there were 1,495 Jewish estate officials in Galicia. There were almost three-and-a-half times as many Jewish as Ukrainian officials, although there were thirty-four times as many Ukrainians as Jews engaged in agriculture.[48] Almost all the officials on estates owned by Jews were Jewish,[49] and Jewish officials also worked on Polish estates. It was customary for Polish nobles to keep

> Jewish factors, factotums and familiars, popularly known as "Moszki." Their task was to supply "the honourable lord" with news, gossip, information and advice on prices, characterizations of merchants and lessees of taverns and mills, etc. These familiars perforce had enormous influence on events in the demesnes, among Jewish merchants and even among the authorities, depending on how much they were trusted by their masters. And for the most part they were trusted 100 per cent. This guaranteed the "Moszko" a comfortable and even ample living.[50]

Estate officials were in a very exposed position, between landlord and peasant, and could easily replace the landlord as the object of the peasants' hatred. An item of correspondence in *Batkivshchyna* illustrates this:

> In the neighbourhood of Bovshivets, in Kukilnyky, Medukha, Sloboda, Iabloniv, Zahirie, Dytiatyn, Byblo and other villages, wherever you turn, there's such poverty that one is overcome by sadness. Jewry has settled in the region and conquered it as spear-grass does an empty field. The villages mentioned above are the property of the Latin-rite archdiocese. So all of them have lessees (*posesory*), who bring with them the whole gang of sublessees (*pakhtiari*), tavern-lessees (*arendari*), mill-lessees (*miroshnyky*), stewards (*faktory*), dairy-lessees (*vydiinyky*), familiars (*povirnyky*)

> and whatever else they're called. Those who are best at dealing with peasant skin become officials (*zhondtsi*). And wherever there's one of these caftan-garbed officials, a Christian is fortunate if he's left with his shirt (*CC* 264).

Another statement of peasant hatred for Jewish estate officials is contained in a leaflet confiscated by the police during an agricultural labourers' strike in Borshchiv district in 1900. The leaflet was hand-written, obviously by a peasant, on the back of a printed invitation to join the Prosvita society. The leaflet urged peasants to stop working on the estates because wages were so low: "Look! The Lord is ashamed to cheat you [himself], so he keeps Jews to cheat you. Because the Jew is a devil. He'll even swindle the Lord!"[51]

Jews acted as labour recruiters, both for local estates[52] and for estates abroad. Several items of correspondence complain about the practices of Jews who recruited peasants to work in Bessarabia and Moldavia. A correspondent from the town of Lysets, Bohorodchany district, wrote: "Jews also deal in labourers; they send them by the hundreds to work in the fields of Bessarabia. The Jew receives three thousand gulden a year to supply a certain number of workers. During the winter he gives [peasants] an earnest of a dozen or so gulden. Whoever takes it must go where the Jew tells him. The most important dealer in people is named Moshko Shporn" (*CC* 62). The correspondent went on to describe the terrible working conditions in Bessarabia. Another correspondent from Lysets also registered complaints about Shporn (*CC* 82). The correspondent from Kiidantsi wrote that some of his impoverished fellow villagers went to work in Moldavia. "When they didn't work off the money they took in advance and escaped home, the Jew who recruited them brought the runaways to court and during the autumn before last the court auctioned off their property" (*CC* 165).

Another source of conflict between Ukrainian peasants and Jews was investment in livestock. Jews frequently bought young animals which they gave to peasants to tend and feed. When the animal matured and was sold, the original Jewish investor and the peasant who raised the animal would divide the money received from the sale. There are many references to this practice in the correspondence, all of them negative (*CC* 1, 26, 30, 33, 141, 178). A clear and full statement of the dissatisfied peasant viewpoint was provided by a correspondent from Vyktoriv, Stanyslaviv district:

> And now [the Jews] have started buying small bull-calves with their own money and giving them to the poorer peasants to feed for several years. After two or three years the bullcalves become oxen. The Jew then says to

> take them to the marketplace, and they both [the Jew and the peasant] sell them. From the money they get for the oxen, the Jew takes as much as he paid for the bull-calves and the rest they divide in half. If this went fairly, perhaps there would be some benefit for the peasant, but the Jew isn't stupid! He makes an arrangement in the marketplace with the Jewish merchants, and the latter, speaking aloud, name a price that is lower than what they whispered into the ear of the Jew [the investor]. As a result, there is less money to split after the sale, and the peasant is cheated. Sometimes, if the Jew is very fortunate, a peasant will only receive a few gulden for several years' feeding; and sometimes a peasant even ends up paying the Jew. If a peasant runs out of fodder during the second winter, he returns the oxen to the Jew; the Jew takes them, but the first winter's feeding is unrecompensed and the peasant loses his right to the oxen (*CC* 30).

A peasant from the Carpathian foothills complained that twenty or thirty years earlier, i. e., before Jewish emancipation,

> every farmer had his own cart and horses or oxen, but today perhaps in every tenth household someone has oxen, and rarely his own, because most of the cattle is owned jointly with Jews, which had not been the case in the past. . . . Now the Jews not only invest in cattle, but in our region they even invest in pigs, although they don't eat them themselves (*CC* 178).

In addition to investments in peasant livestock, some Jews invested in peasant grain. They could buy it relatively cheaply in the fall after the harvest and sell it back to the peasants at higher prices in the spring, when peasants were most in need of it. A peasant from the town of Zboriv, Zolochiv district, wrote: "Mr. Berko runs the granary[53] . . . . He is a very obliging man and therefore only takes very low interest. For example, if someone sells him a bushel of rye for five gulden in the fall, he will take for the same grain, but a skimpier measure, only twice as much, i. e., ten gulden, in the spring" (*CC* 112).

Jews invested not only in peasant property, but also in the appurtenances of the manor: stands of wood, lumber mills, pastures, hayfields, grain mills and ponds. In old Poland, renting these appurtenances from the manor provided a major source of livelihood for rural Jews, who would then charge the villagers for their use. Joseph II had prohibited Galician Jews from leasing mills and similar sources of revenue in 1785, but enforcement of this legislation, especially after his death, was lax.[54] After emancipation Jews openly returned to their old occupation of leaseholding and sometimes bought, rather than leased, a specific manorial appurtenance.

Renting or owning the appurtenances brought Jews into direct conflict with peasants. After the abolition of serfdom in 1848, the nobles appropriated the forests and pastures as private property, but the peasants believed they had a traditional right to their use. They therefore resented having to pay for wood or grazing rights. Rights to hayfields and ponds were also contested. Grain mills seem to have been more clearly associated with the manor, but peasants were nonetheless resentful of the nobles' monopoly. Inasmuch as Jews rented or bought these contested appurtenances from the nobles, they deflected the peasants' enmity to themselves.

Jews had been involved in the lumber trade in Eastern Galicia since at least the seventeenth century.[55] Emancipation and the economic decline of the Polish nobility allowed them to purchase 7.4 per cent of Galicia's forest land by 1902.[56] A correspondent from Zhuzhil, Sokal district, felt that Jewish ownership of forests meant higher prices for wood:

> In the village of Zhuzhil neither the manor nor the peasants have even a bit of woodland, therefore wood for fuel and construction are purchased from Jewish retailers who bought up the larger tracts of forests from the neighbouring landlords. It is no wonder that wood bought at second or third hand is very expensive. . . . The Jews set whatever price they like just to extract the greatest profit from our Christians (*CC* 261).

A correspondent from Perehinsko, Dolyna district, reported that Jews paid a hundred gulden for sixteen hundred trees from a village-owned forest and then sold the wood back to the peasants for two thousand gulden (*CC* 258). (On Jews in the lumber trade, see also *CC* 1, 33, 107, 203, 242, 258.)

The leasing of pastures and hayfields by Jews is also mentioned in the correspondence (see *CC* 107, 151). In Volia Iakubova, Drohobych district, the Greek Catholic pastor owned a pasture; every year until the mid-1880s the pastor leased it for 90 to 110 gulden to a certain Khaim, who in turn charged the village another 100 gulden to use it (*CC* 92). In Drozdovychi, Horodok district, the Jewish tavern-keeper rented a meadow from the landlord and charged the peasants three or four times as much as he leased it for (*CC* 101). Jewish mill owners and lessees also figure in the correspondence (*CC* 66, 151, 257).

Control of the manorial appurtenances could occasion more than purely economic conflict between peasants and Jews. A peasant from Verbiv, Pidhaitsi district, wrote to *Batkivshchyna* to complain of a Jew who used his control of the mill and hayfield to discourage peasants from joining the village reading club. The correspondent urged his fellow villagers to boycott the Jew's mill and hayfield until he mended his ways.

The proposed boycott also had an economic aspect, however. Currently, when the peasants cut hay for the Jew, they received only every sixth haystack, after the boycott they should be able to receive every fourth (*CC* 151: see also *CC* 242).

In old Poland, Jews had frequently leased the estates themselves from the nobility. Ineffective Josephinian and subsequent legislation had prohibited this leaseholding,[57] but after emancipation Jews again openly leased estates. Peasant complaints about lessees of estates were similar to those about the owners of estates. Jewish lessees, for example, were accused of expropriating peasant cattle that had either strayed or been driven by a lackey of the estate on to the manorial pasture (*CC* 107, 110).

Actual Jewish ownership of estates was an innovation of Austrian rule. Some exceptional Jews, with the rights of *Hofjuden*, were allowed to acquire estates in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[58] The revolution of 1848 removed restrictions on Jewish acquisition of real estate, and some Jews then purchased tabular land. Jews were prohibited from buying estates in October 1853,[59] but were allowed to do so again in 1860. They very quickly acquired a significant share in the ownership of estates. By 1902 Jews owned 18.5 per cent of the tabular land in private estates in Eastern Galicia. In all of Galicia there were 543 Jewish-owned estates, averaging 555 hectares each.[60] Jewish estate ownership was concentrated in Eastern, Ukrainian-inhabited Galicia.[61] To purchase an estate required considerable wealth, which might have derived from trade,[62] tavern-keeping or usury.[63]

Jewish estate owners are mentioned in the correspondence only three times: for influencing village politics (*CC* 58), for underpaying labourers (*CC* 251), and for polluting the village water supply with a distillery and cattle (*CC* 265). Jewish estate-owners may figure relatively infrequently in the correspondence because peasants may have preferred them to Polish nobles. Several Jewish writers maintained that this was the case[64] (and my grandmother told me the same). As one former Jewish estate-owner has argued, Jewish owners were preferable because they were more efficient than the spendthrift nobility, less reliant on intermediaries ("Moszki") and not separated from the peasantry by so great a social distance as were the Polish nobles.[65]

Trade

To an East European peasant, the word Jew was almost synonymous with the word shopkeeper. Abram Leon tells the story of a peasant woman in Hungary who sent her son to buy some things. She wanted him to stop at the quasi-nationalized co-operative and not at the Jewish-

owned store. So she told him: "Pista, go to the Jew; not to the Jew who is a Jew, but to the new shop."[66] The pre-eminence of Jews in trade was also reflected in Galician Ukrainian folk proverbs: "Without a Jew, there's no trade" (*Bez zhyda i torhu nema*) and "From infancy a Jew has his own bazaar within" (*Zhyd z malenku v seredyni svii iarmarok maie*), i. e., he is an inveterate merchant.[67] In 1900 over one-third of Galicia's Jews were engaged in or supported by trade and communications, making up over two-thirds of all Galicians in that occupational sector. The census understates Jewish involvement in commerce, since many of those who listed no profession probably engaged in jobbing, and retail trade could often complement another primary occupation such as tavern keeping[68] (which in Austrian statistics was included in the industrial sector).

The concentration in commerce was one of the factors contributing to the impoverishment of Galician Jewry. Poor and rural Galicia had proportionately twice as many tradespeople as the rich industrial provinces of Austria.[69] At the turn of the century, the inventory of many Galician Jewish shops barely exceeded ten crowns (five gulden).[70] Contemporaries reported that Jewish merchants often made a profit of only three or four gulden a week[71] or else barely enough to provide for Sabbath bread and candles.[72]

The Jewish merchant, of course, makes his appearance in our corpus of correspondence. A peasant from Kalush district wrote that his former pastor, Hnat Rozhansky, "had abolished the practice of giving engaged couples wreaths of feathers,[73] which cost four gulden from the Jews, as well as other idiocies, for which unintelligent people give the Jews considerable profits and destroy [the fruits of] their labour without the slightest need or benefit" (*CC* 31). The peasant feels that the traditional wedding wreaths, plaited by peasant women from flowers or myrtle, were both more fitting and more economical than the store-bought variety. Here tradition and the natural economy are opposed to innovation and the money economy, and Jews are seen as the agents of the destructive process of innovation.[74]

But in late nineteenth-century Galicia, more was at issue in Ukrainian-Jewish conflict in the realm of commerce than merely the universal peasant antagonism toward the merchant. The leaders of the Ukrainian national movement in the cities were also then urging Ukrainians to develop their own potential as merchants, to establish stores, both private and co-operative. A Ukrainian store-keeper in Barani Peretoky, Sokal district, urged his co-nationals: "Found stores in the villages and towns while there is still time . . . , because if Jewry makes its nest in the villages and founds its own stores, then it will be too late for us" (*CC* 3).

The notion, radical in its time, that not only Jews, but also Ukrainians could operate stores intensified and, in a certain sense, modernized

Ukrainian-Jewish antagonism in the village. It was no longer merely a phenomenal expression of the conflict between the peasant and the representative of the money economy. Now more conscious villagers began to abandon their traditional distrust of commerce as such and expressed their dissatisfaction that only Jews engaged in it. In response to frequent exhortations in *Batkivshchyna* to establish Ukrainian shops, a correspondent from Kostarowce, Sanok district, wrote: "You say we should set up shops in the villages, and really: why shouldn't our peasant draw the profit that [now] goes into a Jewish pocket? We will heed your advice and will try to set them up. Maybe it's not such a big deal to run a shop if even an ignorant, shaggy Jew can do it" (*CC* 254). Already in this item of correspondence one can detect more contempt for Jews as such than in previously cited items referring to more traditional spheres of conflict. Also, one hears the voice of an embryonic shopkeeper breaking through. Both of these notes are sounded more clearly in another item of correspondence:

> In our land Jews have taken over commerce to such an extent that it seems no one else can have a store or state concession [to sell tobacco or salt], only a Jew. . . . In Bereziv [Kolomyia district] it happened that a Jew did not sell tobacco honestly and in accordance with regulations, so his concession was revoked and given to a Ruthenian merchant [the author?]. . . . Over a dozen times already it's happened that a travelling Jew, seeing the eagle [i. e., the state emblem, signifying a state concession] displayed on the building, entered it with the certainty that he would find one of his own people; and he was very amazed when he saw not a Jew sitting in there, but a Christian. One such Jew drove up to the commission and even unhitched his horse, thinking he would spend some time there; but when he entered inside and saw images of the saints on the walls, he became so frightened that he immediately fled, and didn't look back. If only in all our villages the Jews would flee so! (*CC* 174).

We witness here the birth of shopkeepers' anti-Semitism in Ukrainian Galicia.

To emphasize their non-Jewish character, the new Ukrainian-owned stores were sometimes referred to as "Christian stores" (*CC* 33, 206, 207). One store, in Stariava, Mostyska district, was actually founded by the church committee to raise money for the church. The manager of the store wrote to *Batkivshchyna*: "People have recognized the Jewish trap set for them, and they remember the beautiful aim of our commerce, so their pious hearts do not permit them to go to the Jews, but draw them instead to the church store" (*CC* 116).

The item just quoted implies that the Ukrainian shopkeeper, unlike his

Jewish counterpart, entered business for disinterested motives. The same point is made by a correspondent from Bereziv, Kolomyia district: "Good people have opened a Ruthenian variety store, not so much for their own profit as in order to prevent the Jewish shopkeepers from fleecing [people] completely" (*CC* 168). The rest of the article concerns the false weights and inflated prices to be found in Jewish stores.

There is frequent mention in the correspondence of competition between Ukrainian and Jewish shops (*CC* 36, 80, 86, 189) as well as Jewish opposition to the Ukrainian-owned stores (*CC* 30, 78, 118, 207, 265). A correspondent from Vyktoriv, Stanyslaviv district, described the ruin of a community-owned store because of opposition from Jewish competitors: "There was a community shop, the only one, and it was developing very nicely; the whole village shopped there. But the Jews were resolved against it. They tied the mayor's hands, in the way they know how, and set up no less than four of their own shops. The community store collapsed and today barely manages to stay in existence" (*CC* 30). A less successful, but more colourful, attack on a community-owned store is described at greater length by a correspondent from Trybukhivtsi, Husiatyn district:

> When the community council resolved to establish a community store and the Jews learned of it, they at first did not want to believe that peasants could do such a thing; but when they found out it was the honest truth, they became very alarmed. One Jew who had his own store came to the community office and said: "Listen, what do you need stores for, who's going to tend it [sic]? And even if you find someone, you will have to pay him well, so that you will have nothing left of your profits. It would be best if I gave you four hundred gulden; don't set up the shop and you will save yourself much trouble." But the councillors saw what lay behind this offer; they would have returned the four hundred gulden with usurious interest. . . .

The store was established and in its first week it had a turnover of 150 gulden. "When the Jews saw there was nothing they could do about it, four of them rode to the rabbi in Husiatyn to request him to curse Mr. Pynkovsky and Mr. Cherevatiuk [the shop managers]; but they, as faithful Christians, were not afraid even of this curse" (*CC* 207).[75]

The correspondence also mentions the conservative peasant reaction to the innovation of Ukrainian-owned stores. Some peasants continued to prefer shopping at the traditional Jewish-owned stores. A correspondent from Dmytriv, Kaminka Strumylova district, stated that the newly-opened Ukrainian store had lower prices than the local Jewish store: "But there are still people who go to Radekhiv, buy salt at the same price [as in the Ukrainian store, but] from the Jews and carry it a mile [7.6

kilometres] home. When will they get some sense!" (*CC* 269).

The memoirs of the pastor of Manaiv, Zboriv district, quote a peasant, circa 1897, who was reluctant to contribute his share to a co-operative store: "That's Jewish stuff and what does a peasant know about it? It requires a Jew's head for that business, not a peasant's."[76] The mayor of Novytsia, Kalush district, built a store building at his own cost and refused to rent the building to Jews, even when they offered 120 gulden. He wanted to rent it to a Ukrainian for 50 gulden and even offered to give the shopkeeper a piece of land and the right to graze a cow along with the mayor's cattle. But no Ukrainian was willing to take up his offer, though, according to the correspondent, the village had a population of three thousand (*CC* 155).[77]

In spite of the initial peasant reluctance to break with tradition, the Ukrainian co-operative movement was flourishing by the eve of the First World War. In 1913 the Ukrainians had 92 consumer co-operatives with 12,500 members, and the co-operative umbrella organization *Narodnia torhovlia* (National Commerce) had 19 branch offices.[78]

The development of co-operatives in Galicia undermined "Jewish country shopkeepers, the village peddlers and the Jewish grain and cattle dealers."[79] Although Galician Jews viewed the Polish rural co-operatives, "Kółka rolnicze" (Agricultural Circles), as their most serious threat,[80] they also felt threatened by Ukrainian co-operatives. A Jew from Bolekhiv, Dolyna district, wrote the following to a Zionist newspaper in Vienna at the turn of the century:

> The local Ruthenian intelligentsia is intently pursuing the founding of a consumer co-operative, which is aimed at reducing the Jewish petty tradesmen of our city to complete beggary. Toward this beneficent aim a committee has been struck, which recently put on an amateur theatrical performance to raise money for the planned "charity." An anti-Semitic play was produced; it bore the title "Arędarz" (The Jewish Lessee) and its author was a local Ruthenian clergyman.[81]

Non-Jewish merchants and co-operatives benefited from the anti-Semitic practices of the Galician government. The crownland administration systematically took salt and tobacco concessions away from Jewish merchants and gave them to non-Jews, and Jewish storekeepers had to pay higher income tax than their non-Jewish competitors.[82]

Tavern-Keeping

Ownership of taverns in Galicia was the hereditary privilege of the Polish nobility. This feudal vestige—the so-called right of propination—was

not completely abolished in Galicia until 1911. Beginning in the seventeenth century, Jews rented the right of propination from the nobility.[83] Early Austrian legislation forbade Jews to engage in tavern-keeping,[84] but the prohibition was frequently evaded.[85] In 1900 Jews made up over 80 per cent of all Galicians involved in any way in the liquor trade. The clients of the taverns were Ukrainian peasants, who had grown addicted to liquor under feudalism; even after Austrian law prohibited it, landlords forced peasants to buy large quantities of liquor every year as part of their feudal duties.[86] In the second half of the nineteenth century priests and secular leaders of the Ukrainian national movement waged war on the epidemic alcoholism in the Galician countryside. The war against alcohol also meant war against the tavern and the Jewish tavern-keeper.

In the correspondence referring to Jewish tavern-keeping the theme most often repeated is that Jews grew rich from the peasants' drunkenness (*CC* 27, 62, 66, 67, 77, 87, 157, 254, 278, 281). A peasant from Ivachiv Dolishnii, Ternopil district, wrote:

> When Sunday comes or a holy day, and sometimes even on a work day, the taverns are full of people, men and women. First they drink immoderately and then they fight. Thus do our people bring joy to the side-curled tavern-keepers and to our landlord. . . . The tavern-keepers, even though they pay thousands for propination, still grow rich from it and all of this they take from our stupid goy-peasant. . . . Through liquor the Jewish tavern-keepers have become lords, while we Ruthenian peasants are becoming beggars (*CC* 77).

The correspondent from Kostarowce, Sanok district, in arguing the need for Ukrainian-owned stores, also spoke of the tavern:

> If only we would be allowed to establish stores with concessions, where peasants could buy tobacco and snuff from their own people, then the sun would shine in the villages and the Iudky and Mekhli would slowly have to retreat from them! Take us, for example, in Kostarowce: over half of the village no longer . . . drinks liquor, and more than one of us would not so much as look at the tavern, were it not for the need to go in and buy tobacco or snuff without which it is hard to get by once you get the habit. So, you go into the tavern for tobacco, and the Jew begins to talk smoothly, he begins to praise his liquor, and make fun of [the] sobriety [movement] and the apostles of sobriety [i. e., priests active in the temperance campaign]. Before you know it, you've had one drink, then another, though you promised yourself to flee from the tavern with your tobacco and not so much as look at the liquor! In more than one case, someone has just begun to abstain from alcohol, but his will is weak. Because of tobacco or snuff he

goes on such a binge again that he sells his boots for liquor and pays double for whatever he drinks.[87] And Iudka just puts his hands in his pockets, jingles his money, laughs and makes fun of the drunk (*CC* 254).

The correspondents' tales about the tavern-keepers' easily acquired wealth were exaggerated. If Iudka was jingling the money in his pockets, he may have just wanted to hear how it sounded before he turned it over to the landlord, the owner of the tavern. Leases on propination were high, not only because of the greed of the nobles, but because so many Jews sought to obtain them.[88] At the turn of the century, Galicia had 17,277 taverns, i. e., one for every 420 inhabitants; this was an improvement over the 1850s–1870s, when there was a tavern for every two to three hundred inhabitants.[89] A reading club member from Fytkiv, Nadvirna district, reported that this village with a hundred households[90] had four taverns (*CC* 22). Another correspondent, from Mshanets, Staryi Sambir district, wrote that some Jews who did not legally lease the right of propination nonetheless sold liquor to supplement their incomes (*CC* 66). As Mahler noted: "The exceptionally large number of taverns and saloons, reflecting the frightful extent of alcoholism in the country, could nevertheless not provide a livelihood for the considerable number of Jews in the villages and towns who were engaged in this deplorable occupation, because of the terrific competition existing in the field."[91] To all this must be added the effects of the sobriety movement, which also contributed to the economic decline of the Galician tavern-keeper.[92] In 1900 the weekly income of an average tavern-keeper was estimated at 1.2 to 2.2 gulden (in Pechenizhyn, a district capital).[93]

The tavern-keeper's poverty only exacerbated Ukrainian-Jewish conflict. If the tavern-keeper wanted to pay his rent and make something for himself, he had no choice but to foster the alcoholism of the peasants and to extract as much as possible for them in payment by employing sharp practices or by encouraging them to drink on credit. This is why the Jewish tavern-keeper, the agent of demoralization and economic ruin, was such a hated figure to representatives of the Ukrainian national movement.

The national movement called on peasants to abstain from alcohol. Several items of correspondence mention that the sobriety movement was directed against the Jews (*CC* 12, 158) and others that Jews opposed the sobriety movement (*CC* 254). During a temperance mission[94] held in Kolodribka, Zalishchyky district,

The Jews walked about in the distance, for some reason saddened. They looked and listened, shaking their heads, even tearing their beards. "Ei, *gvalt!* What are those lads doing, what do they need this for? Why are they

> spending money [on the pageantry of the mission]? We told them, but did they listen?" And the bolder ones sneaked into Andrii Mehera's orchard near the church, set a little table with bottles of liquor and glasses under a cherry tree and kept calling out from behind the fence: "Gentlemen, ladies, good liquor! Please, we invite you!" But no one even looked in that direction (*CC* 67).

In order for the national movement to combat the tavern's influence, it had to develop an alternative institution that would assume the tavern's social functions. The reading club became this rival institution: "What a great thing the reading club is in a village; it is education, recreation and life. We no longer need taverns" (*CC* 153). "Better our own reading club than the Jewish tavern" (*CC* 42). In Vynnyky (a suburban village incorporated into the city of Zhovkva), the church fraternities and sororities had traditionally celebrated their feast days in the tavern but when a reading club was established in Vynnyky, the celebrations were transferred to its premises (*CC* 5, 153).

Sometimes the community would continue to frequent the tavern and content itself with putting the tavern under Ukrainian control. The Ukrainian-managed tavern was analagous to the Ukrainian-owned store. The change in management may have been accompanied by a reform of the functions of the tavern. In Utishkiv, Zolochiv district, the landlord Leopold Obertyński ousted the Jewish tavern-keeper at the community's request and replaced him with "our man." The new tavern-keeper transformed the tavern into a combination of reading club and store by subscribing to the popular press for his customers and offering for sale "the most necessary and inexpensive things" (*CC* 216). In Kurivtsi, Ternopil district, the community itself leased the right of propination from the landlord. The priest who reported this to *Batkivshchyna* commented: "Thus the inhabitants of Kurivtsi have shown that where the community is conscious and sober, it does not allow an unbaptized one to rake in money from the community and to exact such high tribute for spreading demoralization" (*CC* 44). It should be mentioned that it is difficult to see how Ukrainian-owned taverns could survive for long as "reform taverns," given the high costs of propination leases.[95]

Local Government

Until now, this study has presented the socio-economic dimensions of Ukrainian-Jewish antagonism in rural Galicia. However, conflict in the political sphere was also very important and reflected in the correspondence.

In the small towns and villages of Eastern Galicia, Jews were prominent in municipal government, and their prominence was resented by the Ukrainians who contributed correspondence to *Batkivshchyna*. No less than twenty-three items of correspondence complain of Jewish preponderance and influence in town councils (*CC* 25, 62, 112, 197, 206, 232, 278) and village councils (*CC* 1, 16, 30, 36, 54, 58, 78, 86, 151, 173, 237, 241, 249, 257, 258, 270), testifying to the significance of local government as an arena of ethnic conflict. Another item relates that when no Jews were elected to the village council in Dmytriv, Kaminka Strumylova district, the Jewish population of the village (99 of a total population of 1,717 in 1880) contested the election (*CC* 269). Only one item of correspondence, from Novytsia, Kalush district, depicts an overtly anti-Jewish mayor (*CC* 155).

The correspondents opposed both the election of Jews to councils and the subordination of ethnically Ukrainian councils to the influence of Jews who were tavern-keepers or the owners or lessees of estates. The collaboration of village councils, composed of the relatively wealthier Ukrainian peasants, with the relatively wealthier Jews who controlled estates or taverns was probably a quite natural alliance of elites with common interests and enemies. Neither had much use for reading clubs and peasant co-operatives, village reformers and correspondents of *Batkivshchyna*; both enjoyed from their positions prestige and influence which they hoped to preserve.

The influence of Jews on village government was also part of the informal, but still important influence of the manor in village affairs. A correspondent accused the mayor of Fytkiv, Nadvirna district, of having a special understanding "with the landlord Khaskel and other Jews" (*CC* 58). Of the mayor of Berezhnytsia, Kalush district, it was said that he "clings to the Jew like a burr to a sheepskin coat, and whatever Iudka [the lessee of the estate] says, the mayor considers sacred" (*CC* 173). Jewish manorial influence on the peasant community is corroborated, and assessed more sympathetically, in the memoirs of the son of a Jewish estate owner. He recalls that the peasants of Petlykivtsi, Buchach district, sent a delegation to his father to advise them whom to elect as mayor—the former mayor Havrylo, who was experienced, or the new candidate Danylo, who was literate. The landlord was hesitant to interfere and tried to surmise whom the majority preferred; he ended up recommending the literate Danylo.[96] The Jewish landlord, lessee or tavern-keeper would tend to be more educated than the Ukrainian peasant as well as much more versed in the management of affairs. It was natural, then, that peasants, including councilmen, would turn to him for advice on difficult questions.[97]

In the correspondence, the reason most frequently given for Jewish in-

fluence on municipal government is bribery (*CC* 12, 36, 86, 197, 241, 278). Indeed, both the landlord-lessee and the tavern keeper were well positioned to influence village affairs by offering various allurements. In parliamentary and diet elections in Galicia bribery was commonplace, and the same was no doubt true in village elections and in the conduct of village government. Often village affairs were settled in the tavern,[98] where the innkeeper could sway decisions with liquor (*CC* 36). A correspondent from Peremyshliany district complained that ignorant people, giving in to pressure from the landlords and Jews, elected "drunkards" to village councils (*CC* 241); another correspondent said that the tavern-keeper "daddy Iosio" (*tatko Iosio*) ran the town of Khrystynopil, Sokal district (*CC* 12). Another item of correspondence from Khrystynopil reported: "The municipal elections turned out well for them [the Jews]. They were able to dissuade some burghers from coming to the polling place; others they won to their side with liquor and sweets [*gugli*, Yiddish *kuglen*]. Thus there are now a Jewish council and Jewish town officers; and even the burgomaster is now a Jew!" (*CC* 278). Yet another correspondent charged the Jews of the town of Radekhiv, Kaminka Strumylova district, with bribing the mayor by supplying him with refuse that was good feed for livestock (*CC* 197) (perhaps scraps from tavern meals and waste products from a distillery, both excellent feed).

The correspondence also attributed Jewish predominance in local government to their control of the first circle of electors, comprising the wealthiest taxpayers (*CC* 232).[99]

Related to local government was another point of contention between Ukrainian peasants and rural Jews: the performance of community duties, such as *sharvarok* (repairing roads), *forshpan* (carting on community business) and *varta* (keeping watch over the village). Under feudalism these duties had been performed by serfs as part of their inventory of obligations. *Forshpan* was especially loathsome for peasants, since it could involve long absences from farm work and family. With emancipation, *forshpan* duties were curtailed, because it was no longer the lord's, but the community's, needs that determined when *forshpan* had to be performed; the development of the railway also made *forshpan* less burdensome. But *sharvarok* duties increased as communication and transportation grew in importance during the nineteenth century. The Ukrainian peasants hated *forshpan* and *sharvarok*, which seemed to constitute a continuation of feudal duties. In 1887 there were anti-*sharvarok* disturbances in Eastern Galicia: at least one peasant was killed by gendarmes; many were wounded and forty-nine peasants from thirteen villages were brought to trial.[100]

Traditionally, i.e., under feudalism, Jews—as non-serfs—were ex-

empt from *forshpan* and *sharvarok*.[101] As a result of the great reforms of the mid-nineteenth century, Jews became liable for the performance of these duties. However, according to our correspondence, they preferred their traditional exemption and managed to evade the duties, sometimes by contributing a cash fee in lieu of labour: The Jews "perform neither *sharvarok* nor *varta*, but only pay a small fee instead" (*CC* 33). In Iamnytsia, Stanyslaviv district, the mayor made a peasant work six days on *sharvarok*, "but the Jews haven't done it one day yet" (*CC* 86). The mayor of Perehinsko, Dolyna district, "never made Jews perform *sharvarok*" (*CC* 257). The Jews "do not perform *varta*, do not perform *sharvarok*, do not travel to perform *forshpan*, do not perform any community duties" (*CC* 107). The authorities should strive to make the Jews and lords who have rustical land [i. e., the so-called *shliakhta khodachkova*] perform all community duties as we do" (*CC* 110; see also *CC* 118).

There were other complaints of Jews evading obligations to which peasants were liable. One correspondent remarks on the extraordinary fairness of an officer conducting the draft in Stanyslaviv district in 1884: he even drafted Jews! (*CC* 86). In old Poland, Jews were not expected to perform military service. Joseph II made them liable, but in 1790 Leopold II replaced compulsory military service for Galician Jews by exemption through purchase.[102] In the late nineteenth century Jews were bound to serve in the army, but the obligation was a burdensome innovation.[103] Other correspondents complained that Jews did not have to or simply did not pay taxes on the income from their speculations (*CC* 131) and that Jews did not have to pay fees to the government when they married (*CC* 178, 182). The latter accusation is easily explained. Jews registered their marriages with the state authorities only indirectly, through the local Jewish *kahal*.

Ukrainian peasants believed that not only the municipal, but the district government favoured Jews over Ukrainians (*CC* 65, 144, 182, 197). They felt, too, that local government officials treated Jews with more respect than they treated Ukrainian peasants.

> The Jews acquired equal rights, and soon they were able to exploit these rights to gain the advantage in everything. Even some government clerks treat a Jew differently from a peasant. Often, if a simple Jew, an onion-eater [*tsybulnyk*], comes to an office, he is greeted politely: "Ah, Mister Zisman, or Mister Hersh, or whatever—please sit down [*proshe siadats*]!" But if a peasant comes, even a respectable proprietor, then he will often hear at the entrance: "What do you want [*Tso khtsesh*]? Go wait in the corridor!" (*CC* 182).

Elections to Parliament

The political antagonism between Ukrainians and Jews was not only that between the Ukrainians and the Jews as Jews, but between the Ukrainians and the Jews as agents of the Polish nobility, the Ukrainians' primary social and political antagonist.

In the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Galicia, the Jews as a group sided with the Poles, especially in the 1880s when our corpus of correspondence originated. Jewish co-operation with the Poles was motivated by several factors. The Poles were indisputably the ruling nation in Galicia, and a vulnerable, dispersed minority like the Jews could barely afford to side with anyone else. This alliance with the strong was typical of such national minorities, not only in Galicia and not only Jews. Moreover, Galician Jews feared the anger of the surrounding peasantry, especially after the pogroms across the Russian border in 1881, and regarded the Polish authorities as their protectors.[104] Poles and Jews also shared an antipathy to certain aspects of the Ukrainian movement, such as the sobriety campaign, which threatened the economic interests of both the propination-owning Polish nobles and Jewish tavern-keepers. Most important, perhaps, rural Jews were dependent on the Polish landlord class.

The majority of Galician Jews did not assimilate to any of the surrounding non-Jewish cultures. An elite, however, did, at first to German and later to Polish culture. The Polish assimilationist movement among Galician Jews attained its height in the 1880s.[105] There was almost no assimilation to Ukrainian culture in the late nineteenth century. During the Austrian census of 1900, only 5 per cent of Galician Jews gave Ukrainian as their language of intercourse, while 77 per cent gave Polish and 17 per cent German (Yiddish, the actual *Umgangssprache* of Galicia's Jews, was not considered a language in the Austrian census).[106] Thus educated Jews—and these would take a leading role in politics—gravitated toward Polish culture and not toward Ukrainian culture; and the unassimilated mass of Galicia's Jews would, in their own way, follow the elite's lead.

The first parliamentary elections in Galicia since the revolution of 1848–9 were held in 1873. At that time Jewish (pro-German) assimilationists as well as conservatives supported the German centralists against the Poles. During these first elections, therefore, the Jews formed a block with the Ukrainians. In the 1879 and 1885 elections, however, the Jews allied with the Poles. All Galician Jewish candidates ran on Polish slates and afterward joined the Polish Club in parliament. Jews, specifically Zionists, were to ally themselves with the Ukrainians again in 1907, after universal manhood suffrage was introduced, but for most of the late nineteenth century Poles and Jews collaborated closely during elections.[107]

The political collaboration between landlords and tavern-keepers was particularly close.[108]

The correspondence mentions Jewish support for Polish candidates during elections to parliament. "Supporting the government and Poles, naturally, were the Jews, those 'brother Poles of the Mosaic confession' [*bracia Polacy mojżeszowego wyznania*]" (*CC* 211; see also *CC* 203, 208, 241).

At least as important as the Jews' pro-Polish votes, however, was Jewish participation in the pervasive electoral chicanery in Galicia (*CC* 166, 182, 203, 204, 225, 239). Electoral chicanery was facilitated by indirect elections in the peasant curia, which meant that each village was ultimately represented by only a few electors. Jewish tavern-keepers could bribe and confuse peasant electors, Jews of the manor could apply economic pressure and Jewish thugs—recruited from the Jewish lumpenproletariat in the towns—could steal the precious legitimation cards from peasant electors. In participating in such abuses, Jews were only carrying out the will of Galicia's ruling class, the Polish *szlachta*.

Bribery was common during Galician elections. It was rumoured that Krizer, a Hungarian Jew then engaged in the lumber business in Perehinsko, hosted the Perehinsko electors at "Rubin's Restaurant" before polling (*CC* 203). In the hill region in the south of Galicia, peasant electors were said to allow themselves to be bribed by Jews "with liquor and sausages to our shame and detriment" (*CC* 182). A peasant who served as an elector several times reported to *Batkivshchyna* a practice that he heard of from other electors:

> It would happen that when an elector would come to town, the Jews would lie in wait for him as a cat for a mouse, they would surround him like crows, drag him to the tavern and tell him that the electors from all the villages had already gathered there. All the while they would speak to him smoothly. Before long they would drag in a second and a third elector and whisper to each that all had already agreed to vote for the Polish candidate, that there was nothing he himself could do about it and that he would do better to eat and drink his fill rather than listen to the priest[109] and vote in vain for a Ruthene (*CC* 166).

Another elector reported that votes were bought with money: "Like black crows, Jews in caftan robes and in suits wove their way among us and traded in votes as if at a bazaar" (*CC* 225).

Another electoral abuse documented in our correspondence (and elsewhere)[110] was the theft of peasant electors' legitimation cards. In Sokal district, according to one elector, "the [electoral] commission was composed exclusively of landlords, and they did not allow two peasants to

vote without their legitimation cards, which Jews had torn from their hands, and the gendarmes even arrested one elector because he wanted to hold on to the arm of a Jew who grabbed his card" (*CC* 204). The elector who reported that Jews were buying votes with money went on to say: "When [the Jews] did not succeed in buying off a peasant, they distributed money among Jewish thugs and criminals like Symkhe Bart or Shmaie Grintal and others, and these leapt on us like wolves . . . and grabbed our legitimation cards" (*CC* 225).

Whatever the role of Jews as instruments of electoral chicanery in Galicia, it should not be forgotten that ultimately it was the Polish nobility that assigned them this part. A clear example of this subordination appears in an item of correspondence from Lviv district. Dawid Abrahamowicz, a wealthy landowner and prominent Polish conservative politician of Armenian extraction, sold Jews in the lumber business the right to cut trees from his forest. Peasants from Dmytrie drove to Abrahamowicz's woods, hoping to earn money by hauling lumber. But the Jews could not hire them. Abrahamowicz had forbidden hiring peasants from Dmytrie, because the village had voted against him in the parliamentary elections a few weeks earlier (*CC* 242). Thus Jews had to execute the economic punishment dictated by a Polish landlord for a political offence.

Reading Clubs and Peasant Enlightenment

The centre of the Ukrainian national movement in the village was the reading club. Jewish opposition to this institution was frequently mentioned in the correspondence (*CC* 5, 16, 22, 55, 104, 151, 173, 188, 194, 206, 240, 249, 270, 278). The correspondence records only one case of Jewish support for the reading club, in Lopatyn, Brody district, where a Grinfeld, Kats and Rozenbaum—not identified as Jews by the correspondent—were among the donors to the reading club (*CC* 200).

A correspondent from Shliakhtyntsi, Ternopil district, reported how a Jewish tavern-keeper used his influence with the village government to thwart a reading club:

> At first the reading club developed well . . . but in time certain people came to dislike the fact that the tavern was becoming deserted. Therefore the tavern-keeper began to suggest to the village scribe, and he to the mayor, that the community hall, where the reading club met, should be turned into a village chancellery and not used for some sort of public readings. Unfortunately for the community, the scribe and former mayor, who

> did whatever the scribe told him, were influenced by the Jews' whispers and ordered the reading club to vacate the community hall (*CC* 249).

Several items of correspondence mentioned that Jews threatened misfortune to members and activists of reading clubs. A peasant from Hvozd, Nadvirna district, reported:

> The Jews started a rumour among the people that if they joined the reading club serfdom would return. But our pastor immediately that Sunday told the people: "Serfdom will return when water flows uphill." Since then people do not allow themselves to be deceived so easily by the Jews and many now even make fun of the Jews (*CC* 55).

From the small town of Khrystynopil, Sokal district, a correspondent wrote:

> Our burghers . . . do not rush [to join the reading club], to which they are not accustomed. Moreover, the Jews confuse them by saying there will be "big trouble." It's strange, though, that on account of their Jewish reading club they don't have even a little trouble, but us they frighten with nothing less than "big trouble" (*CC* 278).

In Korchyn, Stryi district, a new pastor revitalized the reading club.

> For this reason the Jews disliked our priest very much. They at once began to murmur: "If the priest doesn't keep quiet, we'll ask God that he have bad luck and die, because God listens to us." Of course, we laughed at this (*CC* 194).

A reading club was about to open in Verbiv, Pidhaitsi district: "The Jew frightens credulous people that they will pay taxes on it, that he will not allow them to grind grain in the mill or to drink liquor or to work for hay. . . . " (*CC* 151).

Jews also opposed other forms of enlightenment brought by the national movement. In *Batkivshchyna*, a priest from Tsebriv, Ternopil district, stated that "Jewry has quite proliferated in Tsebriv and uses all methods to fight against the light of learning" (*CC* 44). Jews were also depicted in the correspondence as enemies of the Greek Catholic cantors' movement (*CC* 193).

Jews opposed reading clubs, but the reverse was also true: the peasants viewed the reading clubs as anti-Jewish institutions. In Olesha, Tovmach district, "the members [of the reading club] gladly gather and dis-

cuss how to drive out poverty and trouble and especially how to free ourselves from the grasping hands of Jewish tavern-keepers and usurers" (*CC* 78). A correspondent from Bereziv, Kolomyia district, wrote: "Jewry has waxed rich and become lords. . . . But with the establishment of the reading club all that is changing" (*CC* 206).

The education brought to the peasant by the national movement had an anti-Jewish edge. "As long as we ignorant peasants know nothing and read nothing, things will go well for the landlords and Jews" (*CC* 77). Ilko Sheshor, the teacher in Khmelivka, Bohorodchany district, wrote:

> Let us get an education while there is still time and make something of ourselves! Then no one will dare say: "You stupid goy!" Let us establish in all villages schools, even small ones, reading clubs, loan associations, granaries; let us send our children to school and let us ourselves go every Sunday to the reading club. . . . And then Hershko Shlioma will say: "*Ai vai*, hard times, Sura! There's no way here to become boss of the community. As long as Hryts Khrun [that is, a peasant who supported the landlord and Jews] was here, things were good; but now with that Ivan Pysarchuk [a literate peasant], we will probably have to go to work, because he'll give us nothing for free!" Then the Jew . . . will know that the Ruthene . . . is not a goy, but a lord on his own land and an honourable person (*CC* 1).

A Zionist newspaper from the turn of the century correctly noted that "in general, the peasant's hatred for the Jewish population increases in proportion to the growth of education among the rural population." The situation of Jews was especially bad "in regions where peasants already read a newspaper."[111]

Religion

Although Ukrainian peasants were not free of religious prejudices against Jews, these prejudices found little reflection in our corpus of correspondence. There is no mention of the blood libel against Jews.[112] There is one reference to Jews as responsible for the death of Christ, but it is in the context of a lament that peasants are too quick to take each other to court over trifles: "After all," wrote the correspondent, "the Jews crucified Jesus Christ, and Christ prayed to God and said, 'Forgive them, Father, for they know not what they do' " (*CC* 8). Only rarely, in three instances, does the correspondence use a religious epithet for Jews, referring to them as "unbaptized" (*nekhrest, nekhryst, nekhreshchenyi zhyd*). If one considers all the 281 items of correspondence appearing in *Batkivshchyna* in 1884–5, the 107 items relating to Jews had a much smaller

proportion of priests and cantors as authors than did the remaining 174; this indicates that the anti-Jewish component of Ukrainian nationalism was not the specialty of the pulpit.

The chief religious theme in the correspondence is that Jews disrespect the Christian religion: tavern-keepers get peasants to ridicule the Christian faith while drunk (*CC* 41, 55, 151); Jewish opponents of the national movement slander the Greek Catholic clergy (*CC* 41, 166, 194, 204); Jewish merchants hold bazaars on Sundays and holy days (*CC* 25, 156); and Jewish landlords and lessees make peasants work on Sundays and holy days (*CC* 237, 241, 251, 264).

A reading club member from Horodyshche, Ternopil district, said that people who spend their time in the tavern sometimes allow themselves "to speak ill before the Jews of those who work for the good of the people and to submit their faith to ridicule" (*CC* 41). A peasant from Verbiv, Pidhaitsi district, wrote that "when [a Ukrainian peasant] comes to the tavern, the Jew . . . works on him until he often is ready even to ridicule his faith and church together with the Jew" (*CC* 151). Most probably what is meant in these cases is that the tavern-keeper was trying to undermine the peasants' respect for the sobriety movement, which freely used religious pageantry and religious oaths to conquer the countryside.

The tavern-keeper would also be interested in diminishing the influence of the clergy, which led the sobriety movement; so would Jews who opposed reading clubs and Ukrainian candidates to the parliament and diet, since priests were prominent local leaders of the Ukrainian movement. When Jews agitated against priests, they appealed to a real grievance of the peasants: "the priests fleece you for funerals and for weddings and at every step" (*CC* 166, also *CC* 204).

When Jews held bazaars on Sundays and holy days, this was not only a religious offence, but a matter of national prestige: "Ruthenian holy days" (*CC* 25) were being violated, but "why do Jews honour their own Sabbath?" (*CC* 156). Also, if bazaars were held on Sundays and holy days, it meant Jewish, rather than Ukrainian, influence in the town council.

There was nothing particularly Jewish about making peasants work on the estates on Sundays and holy days. Polish nobles had done this under serfdom and, as our correspondence[113] and other sources[114] maintain, they continued to do so throughout the late nineteenth century.

Conclusions

Our documentation shows that the anti-Jewish attitudes of village activists of the Ukrainian national movement were motivated by economic

and political factors. The economic antagonism between Jews and Ukrainians had its roots deep in the feudal era, when Ukrainians were, broadly speaking, serfs, and Jews were representatives of merchants' and usurers' capital as well as middlemen between noble and peasant. The abolition of serfdom in 1848 and the constitutional reforms of the 1860s (including the emancipation of the Galician Jews in 1868) did not mitigate the economic antagonism inherited from feudalism, but in fact exacerbated it. Such, for example, was the effect of repealing Austrian legislation aimed at limiting traditional Jewish economic activities in the village. More important, however, were two other moments. First, the abolition of serfdom and other restraints on modern economic development pushed the formerly marginal sphere of the money economy into the foreground and afforded its representatives, the Jews, opportunities that could not exist under feudalism. The case of usury illustrates this most clearly. Under feudalism, the usurer could not aim at the total expropriation of the peasant, because the landlord, who required landed serfs to work his estate, would not allow it. But when the former serf became an independent producer, the usurer could, and did, aim at the total expropriation of the peasant farm. The usurer's aim was consonant with the interests of the post-feudal landlord, who now had to hire labour and therefore welcomed the creation of a large reserve of landless peasants. Secondly, the great reforms of the mid-nineteenth century also created new opportunities for the Ukrainians. Freed from serfdom and with more access to education than ever in the past, the Ukrainians became interested in engaging in economic activities that hitherto had been pursued almost exclusively by Jews (commerce, lending, tavern-keeping). In the late nineteenth century Ukrainians became for the first time economic rivals of the Jews.

The economic antagonism described in this study existed, with variations, throughout Eastern Europe (excluding ethnic Russia), and certainly in the regions neighbouring Ukrainian Galicia: Polish (Western) Galicia, Russian-ruled Ukraine, Bessarabia and Romania. In these neighbouring regions, however, there were periodic outbreaks of mass violence (pogroms) against the Jews in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the same period, not a single instance of mass violence against Jews occurred in Ukrainian Galicia.

The reason for this lay in the politicization of Ukrainian-Jewish conflict by the Ukrainian national movement. The national movement taught peasants to struggle against the Jews by forming educational and economic institutions in the villages and by boycotting Jewish economic enterprises. This was not only a more civilized method of struggle than pogroms, but—as *Batkivshchyna* had stated clearly in 1881—more effective. The absence of blind violence, therefore, did not mean that anti-

Jewish feeling in Ukrainian Galicia was less intense than it was elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the national movement intensified conflict by adding an overtly political dimension to the essentially economic antagonism. The Ukrainian national movement, which was struggling against the political domination of Galicia by the Polish nobility, also opposed Jews as the allies of the Polish nobles.

The anti-Jewish component of Ukrainian nationalism was, as we have seen, based on economic and political conflict. Religious anti-Semitism was hardly articulated in the correspondence. So-called modern anti-Semitism, which was emerging as a political force in Austria at the same time that the Ukrainian national movement was penetrating into the Galician village, had some influence on the editors of *Batkivshchyna*, but was only palely reflected in the writing of village activists (the most influential anti-Semitic works were August Rohling's (*Der Talmudjude* and Teofil Merunowicz's *Żydzi*). This is not to say that there were not irrational elements present in the anti-Jewish attitudes of local Ukrainian activists. The correspondent from Mshanets, Staryi Sambir district, was adamant that no Ukrainian should befriend a Jew (*CC* 25, 66, 72), and the correspondent from Korchyn, Stryi district, referred to a special Jewish stink (*CC* 107). But both of these attitudes, which seem so characteristic of modern racism, were in fact rooted in peasant folklore[115] and were not introduced by the Ukrainian national movement. The movement consistently opposed the Jews, but its opposition rested on real economic and political grievances.

NOTES

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1. The number refers to an item of correspondence listed in the appendix to this article, "Corpus of Correspondence."
2. Detailed information on the authors of the correspondence appears in *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century*, (Edmonton, 1988).
3. Vid redaktsii "Batkivshchyny," "Do dila!," *Batkivshchyna* 1, no. 1 (1 October 1879): 1.
4. Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv URSR u m. Lvovi (TsDIAL), 152/2/14789, pp. 1v–2; 14790, p. 4v; 14898, p. 2v; 14899, p. 2v.
5. Ivan Bachny [pseud.], "Zhydy. IX," *Batkivshchyna* 2, no. 2 (16 January 1880): 11. This passage was censored by the Galician authorities. TsDIAL, 152/2/14899, p. 5.
6. "Borba protyv zhydiv," *Batkivshchyna* 3, No. 11 (1 June 1881): 85–6.

7. M. Pavlyk, ed., *Perepyska Mykhaila Drahomanova z Mykhailom Pavlykom (1875–1895),* 7 vols., numbered 2–8 (Chernivtsi 1910–12), 5: 367. The item of correspondence was originally published in *Batkivshchyna* 11, No. 18 (17 May 1889).
8. Only 67 per cent of the crownland's total population lived in Eastern Galicia, but 77 per cent of its Jews and 98 per cent of its Ukrainians (1900).
9. Unless otherwise indicated, statistics from 1869 and 1900 are taken from: *Bevölkerung und Viehstand von Galizien nach der Zählung vom 31. December 1869* (Vienna 1871); J. Buzek, *Stosunki zawodowe i socyalne ludności w Galicyi według wyznania i narodowości, na podstawie spisu ludności z 31. grudnia 1900 r.,* Wiadomości statystyczne o stosunkach krajowych, tom XX, zeszyt 2 (Lviv 1905).
10. M. Rosenfeld, *Die polnische Judenfrage: Problem und Lösung* (Vienna-Berlin 1918), 77.
11. J. Lestschinsky, *Dos idishe folk in tsifern* (Berlin 1922), 99.
12. J. Tenenbaum, *Galitsye, mayn alte heym,* Dos poylishe yidntum, 87 (Buenos Aires 1952), 122. F. Friedman, "Landvirtshaft, kolonizatsye un grundbazits bey di galitsyanishe yidn. (Arum der helft fun des 19–tn yorhundertn)," *Yunger historiker* 2 (1929): 135–6.
13. The census of 1880 recorded 548 Jews in Perehinsko; the total population of the village was 4,294. All statistics concerning individual localities in 1880 are taken from: *Special-Orts-Repertorien der im oesterreichischen Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder,* herausgegeben von der K.k. Statistischen Central-Commission, Bd. XII: *Galizien* (Vienna 1886).
14. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft),* trans. M. Nicolaus, The Pelican Marx Library (Middlesex 1973), 223, 253, 487, 858. Karl Marx, *Capital*, 3 vols. (New York 1967), 1 : 79, 3 : 330; and cf. 3 : 598. Marx borrowed the image, but by no means the sociological content, from Bruno Bauer, who wrote that Jews in *bourgeois* society were like the gods of Epicurus living in the interstices. B. Bauer, *Die Judenfrage* (Braunschweig 1843), 9. I am grateful to Professor Moshe Mishkinsky for making available to me a copy of the relevant passages of Bauer.
15. The Jewish leaseholder "neither ploughs nor sows." Vasyl Ilnytsky [Denys], "Zhydy. II," *Batkivshchyna* 1, no. 2 (16 October 1879): 13.
16. R. Mahler, *A History of Modern Jewry 1780–1815* (New York 1971), 317.
17. R. Rosdolsky [Rozdolski], *Stosunki poddańcze w dawnej Galicji*, 2 vols. (Warsaw 1962), 1: 76.
18. See, for example, N. Sperber, "Massenelend in Galizien," *Die Welt,* no. 13 (1897): 8–9. S. M. Dubnov, *Noveishaia istoriia evreiskago naroda,* 3 vols. (Berlin 1923), 3: 75, writes that "among the seven hundred thousand Jews here [in Galicia in the early 1890s], there are about half a million persons deprived of a specific source of earnings, and in part they live on charity." This statement is misinformed (see Table 1), but it testifies to the general image of Galician Jews among their co-nationals as extremely poor relations. Galician Jews themselves, of course, recognized their poverty. A Lviv Jewish newspaper wrote that "the situation of the great majority of the Jewish population is indeed deplorable and . . . its poverty will increase from day to day." "Juden als Ackerbauer," *Der Israelit*, no. 19 (15 October 1885): 6.
19. C. E. Schorske, *Fin-de-Siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York 1980), 315–16.
20. R. Mahler, "The Economic Background of Jewish Emigration from Galicia to the United States," *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science* 7 (1952): 259.
21. *Radykaly i zhydy* (1898), cited in P. Kudriavtsev, "Ievreistvo, ievrei ta ievreiska

sprava v tvorakh Ivana Franka, *Zbirnyk prats Ievreiskoi istorychno-arkheohrafichnoi komisii,* 2, Zbirnyk Istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu, 73, II (Kiev 1929), 75.

22. Mahler, "Economic Background," 259.
23. I am using the term "usury" in the technical, Marxist sense of pre-capitalist money-lending. The high rates of interest characteristic of usury cannot be compared to capitalist interest rates; usury in pre-capitalist modes of production can assimilate almost *all* of the surplus product of an independent producer, while interest under capitalism is only a part of surplus value. The ruinous *effect* of usury—the separation of the labouring producer from his means of production—was the *starting point* of capitalism. See Marx, *Capital*, 3 : 594–7; Marx, *Grundrisse,* 535.
24. L. Caro, "Lichwa na wsi w Galicyi," *Studya społeczne,* 2d ed. (Cracow 1908), 125–238.
25. More accurately, for seven consecutive years sometime between 1877 and 1892, 87.5 per cent of all persons convicted of usury in Galicia were Jews. I. Franko, "Żydzi o kwestji żydowskiej," *Tydzień. Dodatek literacki Kurjera Lwowskiego* 1, no. 6 (6 February 1893): 42.
26. A Galician Ukrainian proverb had it that "every Jew is a usurer" (*Shcho zhyd, to lykhvar).* I. Franko, ed., *Halytsko-ruski narodni prypovidky,* vol. 2, pt. 1: *(Dity-Kpyty)*, Etnografichnyi zbirnyk, 23 (Lviv 1907), 113.
27. M. M. Kravets, *Selianstvo Skhidnoi Halychyny i Pivnichnoi Bukovyny u druhii polovyni XIX st.* (Lviv 1964), 103–4.
28. H. Oliinyk, "V Amerytsi spomyny pro staryi krai," *Emihrantski virshi halytskoho selianyna,* ed. O. Zilynsky (Toronto 1972), 38–9.
29. *Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva*, ed. V. Kubiiovych (Paris 1949–), pt. 1, 3: 1118–20.
30. Mahler, "Economic Background," 260.
31. B. Pappenheim and S. Rabinowitsch, *Zur Lage der jüdischen Bevölkerung in Galizien: Reise-Eindrücke und Vorschläge zur Besserung der Verhältnisse* (Frankfurt a. M 1904), 30, 73–4. For more on Jewish credit institutions, see Rosenfeld, *Die polnische Judenfrage,* 120–1.
32. Mahler, *History*, 327.
33. The ineffectiveness of the legislation is proven by the documentation on disputes between lords and peasants over ownership of forests and pastures (the so-called "servitudes" cases). The manor very often adduced the testimony of Jews who had (illegally) held leases on all or part of the estate before 1848. See, for example, TsDIAL, 146/64b/1119, p. 82; 3219, pp. 71–2; 4248, pp. 27v-29. Enforcement of the ban on settlement in the countryside was primarily the responsibility of the landlord, who found it difficult to manage his estate without relying on Jewish intermediaries. To evade the ban, a Jew could enter a fictitious contract with a favourably disposed lord, stating that he would farm a rustical plot and pay feudal dues in money or labour. The contract would enable the Jew to register with the circle *(Kreis, okruh)* authorities as a so-called "farmer-Jew" with the right to live in the village. See the case of Moses Lech, who, under the cover of such a fictitious contract, rented the tavern and engaged in trade in the village of Kryve, Zhovkva circle. TsDIAL, 146/87/1126, pp. 104–106v. For a sample of a contract between a farmer-Jew and landlord, see TsDIAL, 168/1/421, pp. 39–39v.
34. Friedman, "Landvirtshaft," 136–7. W. Häusler, *Das galizische Judentum in der Habsburgermonarchie im Lichte der zeitgenössischen Publizistik und Reiseliteratur von 1772–1848,* Österreich Archiv (Munich 1979), 35–7.
35. Friedman, "Landvirtshaft," 135 and 132.
36. Speaking of Joseph II's peasant legislation, Ivan L. Rudnytsky aptly remarked:

"One has to recognize the limitations of these reforms. The Austrian government did not aim at a condition of civic equality. The empire was to remain a hierarchical 'society of estates.'" "The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule," in *Nation-building and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia,* ed. A. S. Markovits and F. E. Sysyn (Cambridge, Mass. 1982), 24.

37. See Friedman, "Landvirtshaft," 137–9.
38. Vasyl Ilnytsky [Denys], "Zhydy. I," *Batkivshchyna* 1, no. 2 (16 October 1879): 12.
39. *Gemeindelexikon der im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreiche und Länder. Bearbeitet auf Grund der Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 31 Dezember 1900,* herausgegeben von der K. k. Statistischen Zentralkommission, 12: *Galizien* (Vienna 1907), 636–8.
40. Pappenheim and Rabinowitsch, *Zur Lage der jüdischen Bevölkerung,* 40, 69–70. The Soviet historian M. M. Kravets (*Selianstvo,* 71) characterized East Galician peasant holdings from two to five hectares as "semi–proletarian."
41. According to Rosenfeld, *Die polnische Judenfrage*, 111, there were 543 Jewish estates in 1902; according to Friedman, "Landvirtshaft," 140, there were 438.
42. Moszko and Jankiel Zipper acquired four peasant farms in Kutkivtsi, Ternopil circle, in 1848–51. One was an outright purchase, another was a purchase involving a debt, a third was a cession in payment of a debt (the status of the fourth is unclear). TsDIAL, 488/1/653, pp. 1–6, 75–77v.
43. Max Zetterbaum, "Klassengegensätze bei den Juden," *Neue Zeit* 11 (1893): 41–2.
44. Friedman, "Landvirtshaft," 133.
45. M. Frühling. "Bauer und Jude. Aus dem Leben der galizischen Landbevolkerung," *Die Welt,* no. 42 (19 October 1900): 5.
46. See J.-P. Himka, "Hope in the Tsar: Displaced Naive Monarchism among the Ukrainian Peasants of the Habsburg Empire," *Russian History* 7 (1980): 125–38.
47. Mahler, *History,* 334.
48. Since Ukrainians here are calculated by language and Jews by religion, and 5 per cent of the Jews listed Ukrainian as their language, a significant proportion of the 429 Ukrainian officials may have been Jewish. Friedman, "Landvirtshaft," 140, states that Jews made up 30 per cent of the 4,000 agricultural administrators in Galicia in 1902 and that Jewish estate officials were concentrated in Eastern Galicia.
49. O. Kofler, "Żydowskie dwory (Wspomnienia z Galicji Wschodniej od początku XIX wieku do wybuchu I wojny światowej," typescript in YIVO library, New York [Poland 1979?], 3. "Juden als Ackerbauer," *Der Israelit,* no. 20 (30 October 1885): 6.
50. Kofler, "Żydowskie dwory," 3.
51. TsDIAL, 146/4/2209, p. 38.
52. Referring to the town of Márámoros Sziget, in a Ukrainian-inhabited region of Hungary, a journalist observed: "If the peasant wants to be hired, he usually goes not directly to the farmer, but to the Jew, who at daybreak is arranging his terms in the large central market-square and in the court-yards surrounding it." J. Pennel, *The Jew at Home: Impressions of a Summer and Autumn Spent with Him* (New York 1892), 33–4. Although Pennel was prejudiced against Jews, his descriptive account of Ukrainian Jewry is of some value. For one thing, he was a complete outsider to the society he visited and so described many phenomena that insiders considered too commonplace to describe. Also, he was a graphic artist who sketched what he saw, and his writing abounds in visual descriptions.
53. The author is using irony in referring to Berko's investment as a granary. He also calls the tavern a reading club and the usurer a loan association.
54. Mahler, *History*, 327–8.

55. Fr. Rawita-Gawroński, *Żydzi w historji i literaturze ludowej na Rusi* (Warsaw n. d.), 106.
56. Rosenfeld, *Die polnische Judenfrage,* 111.
57. Mahler, *History*, 327–8.
58. Kofler, "Żydowskie dwory," 17–18.
59. Friedman, "Landvirtshaft," 132–3.
60. Rosenfeld, Die polnische Judenfrage, III. See also P. V. Sviezhynsky, *Ahrarni vidnosyny na Zakhidnii Ukraini v kintsi XIX—na pochatku XX st.* (Lviv 1966), 20.
61. Rosenfeld, *Die polnische Judenfrage,* 111. Friedman, "Landvirtshaft," 141.
62. Kofler, "Żydowskie dwory," 17.
63. Zetterbaum, "Klassengegensätze," 36–7. Zetterbaum estimated that a usurer had to foreclose on thirty to fifty peasant farms in order to buy an estate; or a noble debtor might lose his estate directly to a Jewish creditor.
64. Kofler, "Żydowskie dwory," 4, 90–3. K[arpel] Lippe, *Symptome der antisemitischen Geisteskrankheit* (Jassy 1887), 47.
65. Kofler, "Żydowskie dwory," 2, 4.
66. A. Leon, *The Jewish Question: A Marxist Interpretation* (New York 1970), 231.
67. Franko, *Halytsko-ruski prypovidky,* 106–7.
68. "Our village [Bereziv, Kolomyia district] had . . . two Jewish stores, and besides them every tavern keeper . . . retails all sorts of things at a good price" (*CC* 168).
69. Mahler, "Economic Background," 257.
70. Rosenfeld, *Die polnische Judenfrage,* 117.
71. Zetterbaum, "Klassengegensätze," 41.
72. Pappenheim and Rabinowitsch, *Zur Lage der jüdischen Bevölkerung,* 29.
73. It was customary in the Ukrainian marriage ritual to crown the couple with wreaths during the church service, whence derives one of the Ukrainian words for marriage, *vinchannia* (from *vinets*, wreath).
74. "The average Jew all over the southeastern part of the Continent is doing his best to crush out all artistic sense in the peasants by supplanting their really good handiwork with the vilest machine-made trash that he can procure." Pennel, *The Jew at Home,* 56.
75. The "curse" referred to here must have been the *kheyrem* (excommunication), which placed a person and his business under a ban.
76. F. Tarnavsky, *Spohady. Rodynna khronika Tarnavskykh iak prychynok do istorii tserkovnykh, sviashchenytskykh, pobutovykh, ekonomichnykh i politychnykh vidnosyn u Halychyni v druhii polovyni XIX storichchia i v pershii dekadi XX storichchia,* ed. A. M. Bazylevych and R. I. Danylevych (Toronto 1981), 174–5.
77. The census of 1880 recorded a total population of 2,382 of whom 2,247 were Greek Catholics and 78 Jews.
78. Rosenfeld, *Die polnische Judenfrage,* 119.
79. Mahler, "Economic Background," 260.
80. Ibid. Tenenbaum, *Galitsye*, 82. M. Lehrfreund, "Zur Lage der Juden in Galizien," *Die Welt*, no. 2 (12 January 1900): 3.
81. N.L., "Correspondenzen. Bolechów," *Die Welt*, no. 10 (9 March 1900): 11. *Arędarz* is Polish for lessee; the Ukrainian equivalent is *orendar*, or *arendar* in dialect.
82. Mahler, "Economic Background," 260–1.
83. Rawita-Gawroński, *Żydzi . . . na Rusi*, 104. Although it owes much to the conceptions of Immanuel Wallerstein and considerably less to research, an interesting essay on how and why Jews became involved in the lease of propination is Hillel Levine's

"Gentry, Jews, and Serfs: The Rise of Polish Vodka," *Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies* 4, no. 2 (Fall 1980): 223–50.

84. Mahler, *History,* 326. Rosdolsky, *Stosunki poddańcze,* 1 : 98.
85. Mahler, *History*, 339–40. See TsDIAL, 146/64b/3219, pp. 71–72; 146/87/1126, p. 105; 146/87/1130, p. 18. "... If we consider that the Jews in these times were almost the exclusive representatives of merchants' and usurers' capital in Galicia as well as almost the only purchasers of the peasants' products, then we will not wonder that—with the exception of the last three years of Joseph II's rule—the legislation concerning Jewish leaseholds remained largely on paper and that in spite of legal prohibitions Jewish tavern-keepers in the villages of Galicia continued to ply their trade under the most diverse pretenses. . . . " Rosdolsky, *Stosunki poddańcze,* 1 : 99.
86. Zetterbaum, "Klassengegensätze," 9. Rosdolsky, *Stosunki poddańcze,* 1: 74. Propination was extremely profitable for the nobles, sometimes accounting for a third to a half of the income of an estate (1774). Ibid., 1 : 98. That forced liquor purchases still existed in Galicia in the 1840s is mentioned by Joseph Burszta, *Społeczeństwo i karczma. Propinacja, karczma i sprawa alkoholizmu w społeczeństwie polskim XIX wieku* (Warsaw 1951), 10, 29.
87. Galician tavern-keepers understood "the art of watering schnapps, and of doubling the chalked score of anyone who went upon the tick." K. E. Franzos, *The Jews of Barnow* (New York 1883; reprint, "The Modern Jewish Experience," New York 1975), 321.
88. Franko, "Żydzi o kwestji żydowskiej," *Tydzień* 1, no. 5 (30 January 1893): 35.
89. K. Wyka, *Teka Stańczyka na tle historii Galicji w latach 1849–1869,* Instytut Badań Literackich, Studia historycznoliterackie, 4 (Wrocław 1951), 51–6.
90. The census of 1880 recorded 567 inhabitants in Fytkiv.
91. Mahler, "Economic Background," 258.
92. Kohos Leib Szparer, tavern keeper of Pidhorodyshche, Bibrka district, petitioned the administration of the Potocki estates in 1884 to lower the cost of the propination lease. Among the reasons he cited for his request was that "almost the entire village, bound by an oath, has stopped drinking vodka." Lvivska naukova biblioteka im. V. Stefanyka Akademii nauk URSR (LNB AN URSR), Viddil rukopysiv, Arkhiv hr. Pototskykh z Lantsuta (Pot.), no. 272, p. 15.
93. N. Blickstein, "Die Lage der Juden Galiziens," *Die Welt,* no. 18 (4 May 1900): 6.
94. On the sobriety movement and its missions, see John-Paul Himka, "Priests and Peasants: The Greek Catholic Pastor and the Ukrainian National Movement in Austria, 1867–1900," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 21, no. 1 (March 1979), 7. Sobriety missions among the Polish peasantry were very similar to those among the Ukrainian peasantry. See Burszta, *Społeczeństwo i karczma,* 106–8.
95. In Pidhorodyshche (see note 92) a peasant was given the lease of the tavern in 1872. He was unable to make the payments on the lease and was removed after seven years. LNB AN URSR, Viddil rukopysiv, Pot., no. 272, p. 17.
96. Kofler, "Żydowskie dwory," 91.
97. A characteristic episode from the early history of the Ukrainian socialist movement in Galicia: an illiterate peasant had received radical, anticlerical booklets and knew he should not approach the priest to read them to him, so instead he asked the Jewish tavern-keeper. J.-P. Himka, *Socialism in Galicia: The Origins of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism (1860–1890)* (Cambridge, Mass. 1983), 126. On the tavern-keeper as advisor to the peasants, see also Burszta, *Społeczeństwo i karczma,* 173–4.
98. "The peasants made a village parliament out of the tavern, where all local affairs were decided in accordance with the advice of the Jewish tavern-keeper, with liquor.

The Jewish tavern-keeper had orders from the lord, the owner of the manor, how to decide each community matter." Tarnavsky, *Spohady,* 41.

99. The manorial estate of the village of Perehinsko, Dolyna district, belonged to the Greek Catholic metropolitan see. The estate and all its appurtenances therefore were leased out, to Jews. By law, taxes paid on income from the manor were excluded from consideration in drawing up the lists for elections in the village community proper. However, in Perehinsko the Jews of the manor allegedly used their manorial taxes to assume control of the first circle of electors (*CC* 257).
100. M. M. Kravets, "Dzherela z istorii selianskoho rukhu u Skhidnii Halychyni v druhii polovyni XIX st.," *Arkhivy Ukrainy,* no. 4 (1974): 65.
101. A farmer-Jew, however, was obliged to perform *sharvarok*. See TsDIAL, 168/1/421, p. 39.
102. Mahler, *History,* 333.
103. Although, as a rule, Galician Jews did not drink much alcohol, some young men would drink a mixture of schnapps and snuff for several months in order to make them unfit for military service. Pappenheim and Rabinowitsch, *Zur Lage der jüdischen Bevölkerung,* 51–2.
104. L. P. Everett, "The Rise of Jewish National Politics in Galicia, 1905–1907," in *Nationbuilding*, ed. Markovits and Sysyn, 155–6.
105. Tenenbaum, *Galitsye,* 73–5; E. Mendelsohn, "Jewish Assimilation in Lviv: The Case of Wilhelm Feldman," in *Nationbuilding,* ed. Markovits and Sysyn, 99–110.
106. V. Okhrymovych, "Z polia natsionalnoi statystyky Halychyny," *Studii z polia suspilnykh nauk i statystyky* 1 (1909): 68.
107. Tenenbaum, *Galitsye,* 80–1, 109, 112. Everett, "Rise of Jewish National Politics," 156–7, 173–7.
108. The tavern's co-operation with the manor during elections is well documented in the archives of the Potocki family, in the folders dealing with leaseholding (*orenda*). See, for example, LNB AN URSR, Viddil rukopysiv, Pot., No. 292, p. 1. Also: Ie. Humeniuk, "Arkhiv Pototskykh," *Naukovo-informatsiinyi biuleten Arkhivnoho upravlinnia URSR* 17, no. 4 (60) (July-August 1963): 58.
109. Another elector reported: "I heard a Jew approach our peasant [at the polling place] and say: 'So you listen to the priests, but they fleece you' [*To wy księzy słuchacie a oni was drą*]." (*CC* 204).
110. *Die Reichsratswahlen in Ostgalizien im Jahre 1897,* verfasst vom Ausschusse des ruthenischen Landeswahlkommitees (Vienna 1898), 52, cited in B. Staruch, "Der Kampf der galizischen Ukrainer um ihr Selbstbestimmungsrecht im alten Österreich 1772–1918" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Innsbruck, 1948), 69. (The family had the dissertation retyped circa 1980; this is the version to which I had access.) E. Olesnytsky, *Storinky z moho zhyttia,* 2 vols. (Lviv 1935), 2: 104, 113–14.
111. Frühling, "Bauer und Jude," *Die Welt*, no. 42 (1900): 5.
112. In commenting on the Tisza-Eszlar case in Hungary, *Batkivshchyna* wrote that there was no evidence that Jews used Christian blood for their matzoh, but it was possible in the Tisza-Eszlar affair that fanaticized Jews had committed the murder. "Sprava Tysa-Esliarska," *Batkivshchyna* 5, no. 33 (17[5] August 1883): 202–3.
113. O.T.P., "Pysmo z sela," *Batkivshchyna* 6, no. 44 (31[19] October 1884): 275–6.
114. Sviezhynsky, *Ahrarni vidnosyny,* 63.
115. A sampling of Galician Ukrainian proverbs: *Aby zhyd buv z neba, viryty mu ne treba* (Even if a Jew came from heaven, one shouldn't trust him). *Zhyda ne mai za liudynu, a kozu za khudobynu* (Don't consider a Jew a human being or a goat a cow). *Kozhdyi zhyd shybenytsi vart* (Every Jew deserves the gallows). *Aby zhyd iakyi umytyi, vse bo parkhamy chuty* (No matter how a Jew washes, you can always

smell his mange). *Zhyd vse zhydom smerdyt* (A Jew always stinks like a Jew). Franko, *Halytsko-ruski narodni propovidky*, 105–11.

Corpus of Correspondence

Batkivshchyna 6 (1884)

2. Ilko Sheshor, "Pysmo z Bohorodchanskoho," 4–5.
3. Pryiatel, "Pysmo vid Obertyna," 5.
4. Ivan Ivanets, "Pysmo vid Sokalia," 6.
5. Chlen chytalni, "Pysmo vid Zhovkvy," 10.
6. Chlen chytalni, "Pysmo vid Khorostkova," 10.
7. Tanas, "Pysmo vid Zalozets," 11.
8. Myroliub, "Pysmo z mistochka," 16.
12. Z vydilu chytalni, "Pysmo vid Nadvirnoi," 22.
16. Svii, "Pysmo vid Buchacha," 28–9.
18. Kamianetskii Bobroid, "Pysmo z Ravskoho," 34–5.
22. Chytalnyk, "Pysmo vid Nadvirnoi," 46.
25. O. I., "Pysmo z Staromiskoho povitu," 52–3.
26. Ilko Sheshor, "Pysmo z Bohorodchanskoho," 53.
27. [Kost Vykhtorivsky], "Pysmo vid Halycha. I," 53–4.
30. Kost Vykhtorivsky, "Pysmo vid Halycha. II," 64.
31. Selianyn, "Pysmo vid Kalusha," 64–5.
33. Susid, "Pysmo vid Dolyny," 65–6.
34. Stryian, "Pysmo z Stryiskoho," 69–70.
36. Selianyn, "Pysmo vid Zolocheva," 70.
41. Chytalnyk, "Pysmo z-pid Zalozets," 77.
42. Ivan Petryshyn [Liubomyr Seliansky], "Pysmo z Zolochivskoho," 82.
44. Ks[iondz], "Pysmo z Ternopilshchyny," 89–90.
48. Susid, "Pysmo z Iazlivtsia," 98.
54. Pysmennyi, "Pysmo vid Burshtyna," 112–13.
55. Seliukh, "Pysmo vid Nadvirnoi," 113–14.
57. "Pysmo vid Peremyshlian," 118–19.
58. Oden, "Pysmo vid Nadvirnoi," 119.
62. Zar., "Pysmo vid Stanislavova," 130.
65. Vl. R., "Pysmo z Zhydachivskoho," 136.
66. "Pysmo vid Staroho-mista. I," 136–7.
67. [Hryhorii Tymchuk], "Pysmo vid Zalishchyk. I," 137–8.
72. "Pysmo vid Staroho mista. II," 148.
77. Trokhym, hospodar, "Pysmo vid Ternopolia," 156–7.
78. Pravdoliub [=Hospodar], "Pysmo vid Tovmacha," 157–8.
80. Ivan Tverdyi, "Pysmo vid Zbarazha," 164.
86. R., "Pysmo vid Stanislavova," 173.
87. Svii, "Pysmo vid Tartakova," 173.
88. Roz., "Pysmo z Bohorodchanskoho," 173–4.
90. "Pysmo z Husiatynskoho," 186–7.
92. "Pysmo z pid Drohobycha," 194.
101. Drozdivets, "Pysmo vid Horodka," 217–18.
104. K. A. Lisovyk, "Pysmo vid Buchacha," 233.
107. Selianyn, "Pysmo vid Skolioho. I," 240–1.

110. Selianyn, "Pysmo vid Skolioho. II," 245.
111. I. I. V., "Pysmo z Zhydachivskoho," 253–4.
112. Ivan Pidhliadaiko, hospodar, "Pysmo z Zborova," 254.
116. [Mykhailo Pikh], "Pysmo vid Mostysk. I." 274–5.
118. Hospodar [=Pravdoliub], "Pysmo vid Tovmacha," 276.
125. Hospodar, "Pysmo vid Rozdolu," 292–3.
136. N., "Pysmo vid Krystynopolia," 318–19.

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141. Hospodar oden v imeny mnohykh, "Pysmo vid Dobromylia," 11–12.
143. Chlen chytalni, "Pysmo vid Halycha," 12–13.
144. Toi sam, "Pysmo z-nad Buha. I," 19–20.
148. Toi sam, "Pysmo z-nad Buha. II," 29.
151. Hospodar, "Pysmo vid Pidhaiets. I," 36–7.
155. Pryiatel, "Pysmo vid Kalusha," 45–6.
157. N. -i, "Pysmo z Dolynskoho," 53.
158. Narodovets, "Pysmo vid Kalusha," 53–4.
162. Havriyl Posatsky, diak, pysar i holova chytalni, "Pysma vid Kalusha. II," 61.
164. "Pysma z Kolomyishchyny. I," 69.
165. [Kr.], "Pysma z Kolomyishchyny. II," 69.
166. Vasyl, hospodar, "Pysmo z Pidhaiechchyny," 75–6.
168. N. Iu. S., "Pysmo z-za Kolomyi," 77.
173. Aleksii Maneliuk, chlen chytalni, "Pysmo vid Kalusha," 85.
174. N. Iu. S., "Pysmo z-za Kolomyi," 85–6.
178. Selianyn, "Pysmo z Pidhiria. I," 99–100.
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183. [Kr.], "Pysma z Kolomyishchyny. IX," 109–10.
184. K.S.T.A.Kh.Zh., "Pysmo z Ternopilshchyny. III," 114–15.
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225. "Pysmo z Zhovkvy," 211–12.
232. "Pysmo z Kopechynets," 225–6.
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250. Blyzkii, ''Pysmo z-pid Stanislavova,'' 272–3.
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269. Dmytrovets, ''Pysmo vid Radekhova,'' 330.
270. -i -i, ''Pysmo vid Kalusha,'' 330.
278. ''Pysma z Sokalshchyny. II. Z. Krystynopolia,'' 348–9.
281. L-k-v, selianyn, ''Pysmo z Berezhanshchyny,'' 354–5.

Alexander Baran

Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Transcarpathia

The Jewish situation in Transcarpathia was entirely different from that in the other regions of Ukraine. Carpatho-Ukraine, formerly called Carpatho-Ruthenia, was the only Ukrainian territory where there was no conflict or antagonism between the Ukrainian and Jewish communities; it was an area where anti-Semitism was unknown among the Ukrainian population and where the Jews never took the side of the oppressors of the Ukrainian community. The real relationship between the Jewish and Ukrainian populations in Carpatho-Ukraine was always a tolerant co-existence, which during the Second World War evolved into a useful co-operation.

The twentieth-century historian may well ask: what caused such a correct relationship between the Jews and Ukrainians in Transcarpathia, and why were the traditional conflicts between Jews and Ukrainians eliminated in this region? A sentimental and biased answer may be found in a recent Hungarian publication, *The Jewish Question, Assimilation and Anti-Semitism*, in which Anton Stefanek, the one-time cultural leader of the Slovak minority in Hungary, analyzes the Jewish question in Slovakia and Transcarpathia and comes to the conclusion that only the natural goodness of the Slovaks and the Carpatho-Ukrainians (Ruthenians) did not allow these two peoples to enter into any conflict with the local Jewish population.[1]

Such an oversimplification appears to be naïve and untrue. The truth is that Jewish-Ukrainian relations in Carpatho-Ukraine remained correct

and tolerant primarily for socio-political and economic reasons. The Jews and Ukrainians during their co-existence in this area were always socially and politically on the same side and were never pressured by any internal or external influence to fight against each other.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the reasons for the tolerance between the Ukrainians and the Jews in Transcarpathia and to describe the history of Jewish-Ukrainian relations in this area during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The whole territory of Transcarpathia (Carpatho-Ukraine) was occupied from the ninth century to the First World War by the kingdom of Hungary, which did not attract as many Jewish settlers as neighbouring Rus', Poland and Bohemia. Nevertheless, "Carpatho-Ruthenia" was well known to medieval Jewish merchants because it was located on the most important trade route, which crossed the Carpathian Mountains to the north and was used very often by the Jewish merchant caravans. Many Hungarian documents from the period of the Arpad dynasty (of the tenth to thirteenth centuries) refer to the special protection, rights and privileges given to medieval Jewish traders while they crossed the Carpathian Mountains through the Passage of Verecky.[2] However, there is no evidence that larger Jewish communities existed in that area before the late eighteenth century.

Jewish immigration to the territories of Old Hungary began only after the liberation of the Carpathian Basin from Turkish occupation in 1686. According to the official census of 1700, the Jewish population of Hungary at that time was only 4,071.[3] By 1805, following a rapid increase in immigration, the Jewish population in Hungary totalled 126,620, and represented 1.8 per cent of the population.[4] At the beginning of the eighteenth century all the Jewish immigrants to Hungary came from Bohemia and Moravia. Later, prompted by the instability of the Polish kingdom and the pogroms of the Haidamaks, a mass exodus began from Western Ukraine to the Carpathian Basin.[5] At the same time the enlightened Habsburgs were favourable to Jewish immigration and treated Jews better than did any other dynasty in Europe. This attitude is reflected in Emperor Joseph II's "Edict of Toleration" (1781), by which all Jews were accepted as free citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[6] Following the proclamation of this edict the imperial authorities not only tolerated their Jewish citizens, but began to give them patents of nobility. Statistics as early as 1818 note three noble Jewish families (Sina, Mor and Ullman) in Hungary. During the nineteenth century, the number of these families increased substantially, so that by 1918, there were 346 Jewish families with noble titles in Magyar territories.[7] Such new noble clans not only possessed their titles, but became very wealthy and as

landowners, bankers and industrialists, influenced the whole of Magyar society.[8]

The Jews in Hungary were thus much freer and more independent than their brothers beyond the Carpathian Mountains, and they were not restricted in their living or working conditions, as were the Jews in neighbouring countries. Consequently, they did not need to look to the ruling classes for protection or to exploit the other national minorities for their own survival, as in Russia and Poland. The Jewish community in Hungary simply became one of the many officially accepted religious and national minorities of the country.[9] With a few minor and sporadic exceptions, there was no open anti-Semitism within the Magyar nation, or on the part of the other national minorities usually antagonistic to Jews.

Most of the Jewish immigrants in Hungary settled in Transcarpathia. This was a logical result of their emigration process.[10] Coming from Galicia, they had to pass through the territory inhabited by the Carpatho-Ukrainians. The life-style of these Ukrainians was familiar to the Jewish immigrants, because they spoke the same language, belonged to the same religion and had the same ideological, national and cultural aspirations as the Ukrainians in Galicia. At the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, when the migration of the Jews from Ukraine to Hungary became a mass movement, the Carpatho-Ukrainians were in the "golden age" of their millenial history. Bishop Andrei Bachynsky (1773–1809), the most important national and religious leader in Transcarpathian history, created, as a result of his imperial connections and enlightened national ideology, a very strong cultural, national, religious and economic revival for his people. In the areas of education and organizational co-operation the Carpatho-Ukrainians were better off than the Magyars themselves.[11] It was, therefore, understandable that Jewish immigrants from Galicia stopped here for a short time or for a lifetime in order to adapt to the new country, to learn the Hungarian language and to acquire a place in Hungarian society. Consequently, the number of Jews in Transcarpathia was always the highest in the territory of old Hungary.[12]

In Transcarpathia the possibilities for Jewish immigrants in local business and industry were very limited. Not even one-third of them could find occupations as merchants or craftsmen. They had to rely on the only possible work that remained for them—agriculture. According to V. Suk, before the First World War Transcarpathia was the only country where the majority of the Jewish population worked in agriculture, cultivating the land or raising cattle and sheep.[13] Hungary's feudal system had eased substantially following the reign of Joseph II, and anyone

with money could rent land for cultivation from the lethargic nobles. After 1848, the Jewish immigrants had no difficulty in buying land for themselves or in working it for their own profit.

Until the second half of the nineteenth century, the relations of the Jews with the local Ukrainian (Ruthenian) population were always equitable. Both Ukrainians and Jews lived in religious communities without any independent national or social organizations. Their religions provided them with a legal, cultural and educational framework; as a result, two separate societies were created, neither interfering in the existence of the other.

The upsurge in Hungarian nationalism drastically changed this situation. During the Hungarian revolution of 1848, the revolutionary Magyar government forced every national minority to support the revolution or be branded a community of traitors. However, the real oppression of the minorities in Hungary began in the second half of the nineteenth century. After their unsuccessful revolution in 1848–9, the Magyars realized that the national minorities had become more numerous in Hungary than the Magyars themselves. Therefore, after the political compromise *(Ausgleich)* with Austria in 1867, the new Hungarian government with complete control over the entire Carpathian Basin started to "Magyarize" all the nationalities in its territory. In 1868, a Proclamation by the Hungarian Parliament that "All citizens of Hungary constitute a single nation, the indivisible, unitary Magyar nation, of which every citizen, to whatever nationality he belongs, is equally a member," made all of the non-Magyar communities automatically illegal, and made it difficult for them to propagate their cultures in any organized way. They all had to belong to one nation, the Magyar nation.[14]

The assimilation of the minorities proceeded slowly, in an organized fashion. The first of the nationalities to be "Magyarized" was the smallest, the Carpatho-Ukrainian. The strongest pressure for assimilation was thus put on Transcarpathia, where it affected the Carpatho-Ukrainians, the Eastern Slovaks and the Jews.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Carpatho-Ukrainians or "Ruthenians," as mentioned previously, had a well organized educational system. During the episcopacy of Andrei Bachynsky every parish church possessed an elementary school. The same bishop established a college in Uzhhorod for the training of the teachers and a theological seminary for the education of "Ruthenian" priests. In four gymnasiums special religious courses were taught in the "Ruthenian" language, and many Carpatho-Ukrainian students studied in Hungarian and Austrian universities. The whole educational system in Transcarpathia was controlled and administered by a "Ruthenian Inspectorate," which closely co-operated with the "Ruthenian Greek-Catholic Church" in Transcar-

pathia.[15] For this reason, the Magyarizing administrators primarily wanted to liquidate this Carpatho-Ukrainian institutionalized education. They succeeded with the help of the government-appointed bishops Stephan Pankovych and Ivan Valyi. Between 1867 and 1909, 90 per cent of the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) schools in Transcarpathia were closed, and only the remaining 10 per cent had some kind of bilingual instruction.[16] The population categorically rejected any instruction in the Hungarian language and started to boycott the existing schools. By the end of the nineteenth century this boycott had resulted in a horrifying illiteracy among the Carpatho-Ukrainian peasants. On the other hand, because of the Hungarian schools and the pressure of the Hungarian society, the Carpatho-Ukrainian intelligentsia and the middle class businessmen and professionals were slowly assimilated into the Hungarian milieu. Even in the families of Carpatho-Ukrainian priests and teachers, Hungarian became the spoken language at home. The sons of these families, who completed university and became lawyers, doctors and engineers, easily removed themselves from their national community.[17]

As a result of the assimilation policy of the Hungarian government the very same transformation occurred in the Jewish community of Transcarpathia. The Jews of the rural areas had little or no schooling and came to constitute the most ignorant and backward group among world Jewry. According to Dr. Chaim Kugel, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 30 per cent of the Jews in Transcarpathia were illiterate.[18] They lived in the same poverty as their Ukrainian neighbours, and their only organization was the ultra-conservative "Hasidic" sect, dominated by miracle-worker rabbis.[19] The Jewish middle class of this region, which consisted of the intelligentsia, the landowners and the urban professionals, wanted to free themselves from the strict rabbinic domination and became easily "Magyarized." They changed their Judaeo-Slavic names (Moshkovich, Berkovich, Hershkovich etc.) into Hungarian ones (Viranyi, Rozsa, Laszlo, Balazs, etc.) and tried to integrate themselves into Hungarian society. Hungarian became their only language at home, and they called themselves Magyars of the Jewish religion. According to statistics, 25 per cent of the urban Jews did not register as being of Jewish nationality, but only of the Jewish religion.[20]

Because the Ukrainian and Jewish communities were experiencing similar conditions, an age of co-operation and toleration between the two national groups existed in the 1870s. It became endangered only in the 1890s as a result of new Jewish immigration from Galicia.

In the 1890s, under the influence of the Russian pogroms and the Ukrainian national revival in Galicia, many Jewish merchants no longer felt secure in their old environment, and so they began to move southward through the Carpathian Mountains to Transcarpathia. These new settlers

did not till the soil as the earlier Jewish immigrants did; instead, they began to establish taverns, inns and village stores and to loan money to peasants at usurious rates. This process is well illustrated by the Hungarian Jewish historian Ferenc Mezei in his study, published by the Jewish-Hungarian Literary Association. According to his description, the rabbis and teachers who came from Galicia frowned on occupations connected with agriculture and pushed their people into trade. The Jewish teachers from Galicia tried to take over all teaching in Jewish schools (cheders), where they began to instill in the younger generation a new ideology, which promoted the exploitation of both the Jewish and the Gentile peasant population. Even though their activities were condemned by the Jewish middle class, and also by the local Jewish peasantry of Transcarpathia, these "Galician" immigrants continued to engage in their harmful work.[21]

Their work was harmful because in the 1890s, Transcarpathia experienced a dreadful economic crisis, which destroyed almost the entire peasant population of the region. The precarious social conditions in Transcarpathia were the result of Hungary's failure to resolve the question of land reform, following the abolition of serfdom in the nineteenth century. The large government forest tracts and the huge estates of the nobility did not allow the peasantry to obtain more land. On the other hand, the region's agriculture and forestry industry could not absorb the landless element, nor could it support an increase in this segment of the population. The landless "proletariat" constituted such a large segment of the population that a small decrease in forestry work and the lack of a good harvest immediately resulted in unemployment, hunger and despair. In order to sustain themselves, the Transcarpathian peasants and their families were forced to leave their ancestral lands and to emigrate to the Americas.[22]

Initially, the Hungarian government was not unduly concerned about the "Ruthenian" emigration and was even pleased that there would be fewer national minorities in the country. The government did not expect that the "northern emigration" would one day create an economic crisis in the country. However, in the 1890s, the government's views changed. In 1895, the Third Congress of the Hungarian National Economic Association presented a desolate picture of the situation that had resulted from the mass exodus of the population from the northern provinces. The Economic Association, through its "Emigration Committee" and later through the resolutions of its "Emigration Congresses," strongly urged the government in Budapest to stop further emigration through the imposition of appropriate laws.[23]

The government, however, had problems with parliament, which proclaimed that to forbid freedom of movement contravened a basic prin-

ciple of human rights and that a law forbidding emigration would be unconstitutional. What was needed here were not laws forbidding emigration, but basic social and agricultural reforms. To convince the government of the necessary changes, a populist reform-movement was created in Transcarpathia headed by the highest moral authority of the Ukrainian population, the Greek-Catholic Church. In February, 1897, the Bishop of Mukachiv, Iulii Firtsak, with government approval, called together all the parliamentary deputies from Transcarpathia and some senior civil servants from northern Hungary. They prepared a memorandum in which they stated their demands "for the improvement of the material and spiritual well-being of the Ruthenians and for their assistance." Their demands centred on better education, the development of industry and transportation, the possibility of renting out good lands and pastures to the peasants, and the establishment of lower rents and easy credit for the rural areas. One of the most important demands was "that the government limit the entry into Transcarpathia of usurers, tavern-keepers and illegal merchants, who mercilessly exploit the inhabitants."[24]

The latter demand was clearly directed against the Jewish newcomers from Galicia, but it was not anti-Semitic for it was not addressed to the whole of the Jewish population of Transcarpathia. The word "Jewish" was not used, and the Judaic community as such was not specified.

On 7 March 1897, this memorandum was presented to the Hungarian parliament, which passed it and gave it to the ministry of agriculture for implementation. In fulfilling his mandate, the minister, Ignac Daranyi, created the so-called "Highlander Action" and handed it over to a high-rank civil servant, Edward Egan. On 5 November 1897, Egan, as the official representative of the Hungarian government, visited the "Ruthenian" provinces (counties), investigating the fundamental problems and the means for amelioration. He sent his observations to Minister Daranyi in a lengthy memorandum, which was published later in Hungarian, Ukrainian and Czech. This memorandum analyzed in detail the socio-economic problems of Transcarpathia and blamed the government and the local authorities for the misery of the Carpatho-Ukrainians. In his writing, Egan also attacked the "Jewish merchants" who mercilessly exploited the "Ruthenian" peasantry. He did not distinguish between the local Jews and the newcomers from Galicia, but condemned the whole Judaic community of Transcarpathia. He could not be blamed for this, because in two months he could not have acquired a basic knowledge of the internal divisions in the Jewish society. The blame rests on his advisors, the Hungarian local authorities, who wanted to transfer their responsibility for and their feeling of guilt about the Carpatho-Ukrainian misery to the Jewish merchants.[25] To make their point very clear, the authorities began an anti-Semitic propaganda

campaign in Transcarpathia. The campaign increased in scope after 20 September 1901, when the enemies of social progress in Transcarpathia killed Edward Egan. At that time, many anti–Semitic articles, pamphlets and critical descriptions were published in Hungarian. The most important was M. Bartha's book, *Kazár földön.*[26] However, at the same time, no anti–Semitic literature was published in the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) language. In Transcarpathia anti–Jewish feelings existed only among the Hungarian middle class and the urban groups. The Carpatho-Ukrainian peasants never disliked their poor Jewish neighbours; in fact, they even tolerated the so-called "Galician usurers," since it was only from the usurers that they could borrow money to emigrate to North America.[27]

The well-being of the Carpatho-Ukrainian peasants was restored not by the Hungarian "Highlander Action," but by the work of "American Emigration." One-third of the entire population of Transcarpathia had emigrated to North America and almost every family had someone on the other side of the ocean, who continually sent money for the survival of his relatives. Re-emigration, which had reached 20 per cent before the First World War, also played an important role in the restoration of the economy in Transcarpathia. With the savings brought back by the returnees the peasants started to buy up lands from bankrupt Hungarian nobles and organized 149 credit unions and co-operatives. Moreover, not only did these returning Ruthenians raise their standard of living, but they brought back with them an understanding of human rights, social equality and a national identity as Carpatho-Ruthenians and later Carpatho-Ukrainians. This new national identity rejected the traditional ties with the kingdom of Hungary. In 1918, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated, the Carpatho-Ukrainians categorically decided to secede from Hungary and unite, first with Ukraine, and when this country fell, with the newly established Czechoslovakia.[28]

The Czechoslovakian Republic was fundamentally a democratic state which in its 1920 constitution provided special protection for all "national, religious and racial minorities," proclaiming any forcible denationalization a criminal offence. With respect to the language law this constitution permitted the use of minority languages in the courts, schools and colleges in any area where that language was spoken by at least one-fifth of the population. Finally, Czechoslovakia in its constitution promised a "Statute of Autonomy" for the entire region of the so-called "Carpatho-Ruthenia."[29]

Such laws encouraged the Carpatho-Ukrainians and the Jews of Transcarpathia to strive for a national awakening and for a cultural and economic renaissance. Even though the Carpatho-Ukrainians could not achieve the complete autonomous status assured them by the constitu-

tion, they nevertheless enjoyed in Czechoslovakia their cultural freedom, their renewed national education and a higher standard of living.[30] The Jews gained even more. First of all, they were freed from the defamations and calumnies of Hungarian anti–Semitism. The new social studies and the new statistics made on the Jewish community in Transcarpathia showed that the local Jews were not wealthy bankers, but hard-working people who were not afraid of physical work to make enough money for their survival.[31] The best statistics on the Jewish occupations in Transcarpathia were gathered in 1921 by the American Joint Distribution Committee, which assessed 60 per cent (55,900 out of 92,000) of the Jewish population of this region.[32] According to these statistics in Transcarpathia there were in the Jewish community 12,500 agricultural workers or shepherds, 10,000 journeymen, 6,000 wagon workers, 7,500 shopkeepers, 5,900 tavern-keepers, 6,900 craftsmen, 1,500 dealers, 400 butchers, 4,000 educators, 800 free professionals (doctors, lawyers) and 400 owners of estates or industry. These data show that more than half of the assessed Jewish population (28,000) worked physically and were always closer to poverty than to wealth. Finally, a Czech writer, Ivan Olbracht, who dedicated most of his works to illustrating the social problems of Transcarpathia, radically destroyed the Hungarian myth about the Jewish exploitation of the local Gentile population.[33]

The Czechoslovakian government wanted to compensate the peoples of Transcarpathia for their loyalty toward their new country and tried to solve the most important problems of their existence: education and land reform. Both the Carpatho-Ukrainians and the Jews obtained schools with instruction in their native languages. According to the 1935 statistics, the Carpatho-Ukrainians had 465 elementary schools, 18 citizen schools (junior highs), 3 gymnasiums, 2 teachers' colleges, and 2 higher schools of commerce with 100,000 students.[34] The Jewish community had only 7 Hebrew elementary schools and 2 gymnasiums with 900 students.[35] But, as is commonly known, Hebrew was just a religious language for the Jews of Eastern Europe, and for this reason, not many people studied it apart from the religious instructions of the "cheders." The Jewish vernacular in Transcarpathia was Yiddish, which never became a language of education. Most of the Jewish youth went to Czech or Ukrainian schools.[36] The urban Jewish families usually sent their sons and daughters to the Czech schools, where they could learn the official language of the country. In contrast, the rural Jews were satisfied with the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) schools of the villages. One may say that there were only 158 Czech elementary schools in Transcarpathia, and not many villages could offer elementary instruction in the Czech language; therefore, the rural Jews were forced to send their children to Ukrainian schools. But the Jewish attendance in the high school education shows a

different picture. Here the Jews were free to choose anything they wanted. The Ukrainian and the Czech gymnasiums in Uzhhorod, Mukachiv and Khust existed side by side, and everybody could attend one or the other. Surprisingly, many Jewish students chose the gymnasiums with the Ukrainian language of instruction.[37] The Jewish attendance in the Ukrainian high schools may prove that there was no anti-Semitism among the Ukrainians in Transcarpathia, and the Jews never discriminated against them during the interwar era. This obviously could never have happened in neighbouring Galicia, where co-operation between the Jewish and Ukrainian communities was much more difficult.

The second important Transcarpathian problem was the land reform, also partially solved by the new republic. After the 1919 decrees of parliament, the Czechoslovakian government distributed 17.8 per cent of all arable land, haylands and pastures of the region among the landless peasants, and secured the survival of the agricultural proletariat.[38] The Transcarpathian villages became more quiet and not so antagonistic for acquisition of lands. The co-operatives and the rural credit unions with government aid created easy credit for the Ukrainian peasants, who no longer had to borrow money from their Jewish neighbours.[39] All these events created a condition of peaceful co-existence between the Jewish and Carpatho-Ukrainian rural communities.

With the renewal of education and limited well-being, the Ukrainians and the Jews of Transcarpathia also experienced a patriotic revival of national consciousness. Unfortunately, with the growth of national consciousness, internal struggles began in both communities. The Ukrainian community of Transcarpathia as a united whole fought against the Czech government for the autonomy of the region. On the other hand, it became divided internally into three language groups (Ukrainian, Ruthenian and Russophile). These language groups unfortunately, never could agree to any common ideology or cultural programme for their nation.[40] Similarly, the Jewish community after the age of Magyarization became more conscious of its national identity, and in 1930, more than 90 per cent of the Jews in Transcarpathia were registering Jewish nationality. At the same time, the whole Jewish community was deeply divided between the religious Hasidic sect and the Zionists. The old rabbinic rule in Transcarpathia could not accept the modern nationalistic movement of the Zionists, supported by the younger urban population and the middle class. Chief Rabbi Spera of Mukachiv many times publicly condemned the Zionists, especially their ideological leader, Dr. Chaim Kugel, the principal of the Hebrew high school in the same city.[41]

In 1939, all the internal disagreements vanished from the Jewish and

Carpatho-Ukrainian communities. Hungary reoccupied the entire region of Transcarpathia and tried to renew the old regime and the old methods to rule the nationalities. Free elections disappeared in Transcarpathia, and the government chose the so-called "Ruthenian" representatives to the Hungarian parliament.[42] Similarly, the rights for autonomy or self-determination were cancelled and the local Magyar government *(Kirendeltség)* began to administer the subdued minorities. In addition, as an ally of Nazi Germany, Hungary introduced an active anti–Semitic and anti–Slavic ideology into the official policy of the country. In the opinion of Miklos Kozma, the "Regent's Commissioner" *(Kormányzoi Biztos)* of Transcarpathia, the "Ruthenians" and the Jews were not to be trusted and their existence had to be controlled by the secret police. This control in 1944 ended with active persecution and for the Jewish community with a holocaust.[43]

The fear of persecution and the hope of a restored democracy after the Second World War ideologically united the Jews and the Ukrainians in Transcarpathia. For a short time, the two nations shared the same goals and hopes. Unfortunately, the Jewish hopes were not fulfilled. On 19 March 1944, Nazi Germany occupied Hungary and the new pro-Nazi Magyar government decided to eliminate the Jewish minority from the Carpatho-Ukrainian territories. A month later, all the Jews were concentrated in ghettos, in the neighbouring towns, where, because of a lack of accommodation and sanitation, epidemics of typhoid and other contagious diseases broke out. In May 1944, at the request of the German military command, all the Jews of Transcarpathia (about 100,000) were transported to German concentration camps.[44] The Carpatho-Ukrainians did not suffer a holocaust like the Jews did. The distrusted "Ruthenians" usually were sent to labour camps, where they survived.[45] But many young Carpatho-Ukrainians also joined the various partisan movements in the Carpathian mountains.

In conclusion, it must be reaffirmed that Jewish-Ukrainian relations in Transcarpathia were always peaceful and correct. There were no national, racial or religious conflicts between the two communities. The reason for this tolerant and peaceful co-existence lies primarily in the political, social and economic situation of this region. The economic situation in Hungary before the First World War created equal opportunities for both nations to develop their potential without any competition and did not place them in mutual opposition. On the other hand, political pressure resulting from the assimilationalist policy of the Hungarian government toward the national minorities brought these minorities closer together. Later, the democratic rule of Czechoslovakia gave the Ukrainians and the Jews a sense of national identity in the context of a broad

society of nations, and created an atmosphere of acceptance and socio-political co-operation between the two peoples. Finally, the Nazi persecutions united them ideologically.

The Carpatho-Ukrainian experience provides proof that Jews and Ukrainians could live together in peaceful co-existence, without antagonism or hatred. These two peoples in Transcarpathia were no different from their co-nationals in Galicia and Eastern Ukraine, but the general circumstances and living conditions were more favourable to mutual tolerance and co-operation.

NOTES

1. P. Hanak, ed., *Zsidokérdés Asszimilaciò Antiszemitizmus* (Budapest 1984), 91–7.
2. See F. Grunvald and S. Scheiber, *Magyar-Zsidò oklevèltàr,* 3 vols. (Budapest 1960–2).
3. R. L. Braham, *The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary* (New York 1981), 1: 2. See also *Hungarian Jewry Before and After the Persecutions* (Budapest 1949), 1–25.
4. Ibid.
5. W. O. McCagg, *Jewish Nobles and Geniuses in Modern Hungary* (New York 1972), 59–63. See also E. Marton "The Family Tree of Hungarian Jewry," *Hungarian-Jewish Studies,* ed. R. L. Braham (New York 1966–9), 1: 39–59.
6. H. Marczali, *Magyarorszàg törtènete II Jòzsef koràban* (Budapest 1885), 2: 268–80.
7. Ibid., 25–40.
8. Ibid., 30–47.
9. In 1867 the Hungarian Parliament decreed that "the Israelite inhabitants of the country are declared to possess equal rights with the Christian inhabitants in the exercise of all civil and political functions. All laws, usages and ordinances contravening this principle are hereby rescinded."
10. See the detailed information on Jewish settlements in A. Kovàcs, *A zsidosàg tèrfoglalàsa Magyarorszagon (Budapest 1922).*
11. A. Baran, *Iepyskop Andrei Bachynsky i tserkovne vidrodzhennia na Zakarpatti* (Yorkton 1963), 1–47.
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Yury Boshyk

Between Socialism and Nationalism: Jewish-Ukrainian Political Relations in Imperial Russia, 1900–1917

1. Introduction

Toward the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of our century, Jews and Ukrainians in the Russian Empire entered a new phase in their centuries-old relationship. Both peoples were on the eve of momentous events, but their immediate concerns were focused on great social and economic upheavals. In response to industrialization and increasing social differentiation, a remarkable rise in social, national and political consciousness was taking place. The emergence of political parties at this time was a reflection of these new realities that brought Jewish-Ukrainian relations into the modern age because they were now based on political parties and groups that spoke for, or claimed to express the concerns of, various social groups within each nation.

This paper will try to examine the nature and extent of political contacts between Ukrainian and Jewish political parties and groups in Imperial Russia. The chronological period betrays the obvious focus of the paper: it discusses mainly the views of Ukrainian political groups toward the politics and perspectives of the Jewish political organizations, from the time when Ukrainian political parties first appeared in 1900 to February 1917.

My conception of "Ukrainian" is "ethnic" or "national" and not territorial. In other words, I shall discuss only those political parties that had an ethnic or national conception of their political affiliation. The

only exception will be the Ukrainian Social Democratic Spilka (Union), an autonomous organization within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP)—(Menshevik).

Of the 5,215,805 Jews in Imperial Russia, 30 per cent lived in Ukraine, and nearly 8 per cent of the population in the eight ethnically Ukrainian provinces was Jewish.[1] Thus, the size of the Jewish minority and the fact that it was such a vital and dynamic community, especially in the urban centres (in which, on average it accounted for 27 per cent of the population) led all the major Ukrainian political currents to take both principled and strategic positions on various aspects of Jewish-Ukrainian relations.[2] An attempt will be made to analyze the positions of the most important Ukrainian political parties, including the social democrats, revolutionary socialists, constitutional democrats and the small, but vocal chauvinistic groupings.

Of these groups it was the left-wing Ukrainian movement, more precisely, the social democrats that enjoyed consistently fraternal relations with their Jewish counterpart—the General League of Jewish Workingmen in Lithuania, Poland and Russia — commonly known as the Bund. The liberal Ukrainian wing also enjoyed very good relations with the Zionists and some Jewish liberal representatives, but here we shall see an important element of ambiguity and antagonism that revealed the darker side of the essentially progressive nationalism among the liberal Ukrainian intelligentsia. Indeed, the more "progressive" forces within the liberal camp sometimes found themselves fighting a rearguard action against the more intolerant elements within the Ukrainian intelligentsia on the issue of Jewish-Ukrainian relations. The major complicating factor here was the dramatic growth of Ukrainian nationalism between 1905 and 1917. The views of non-Ukrainians on the relations between Ukrainian and Jewish political parties and groups ranged from those who thought the entire Ukrainian question, and hence, Ukrainian-Jewish relations a "Judaeo-Kadetist" plot,[3] to those who felt that the socialist Jewish Bund had passed on its "bacilli" to the revolutionary socialist Ukrainians.[4] Although these views leave little to the imagination, we can, nevertheless, ask why it was that relations between Jewish nationalist and Zionist parties and Ukrainian liberal parties were not very extensive before 1917. The paper concludes by offering some explanations as to why this was the case and why political relations between the two nations were on the spectrum between socialism and nationalism.

2. *Emerging Political Differentiation, 1900–1905*

The Ukrainian national movement underwent a profound transformation from 1900 to 1917. Political issues and political solutions to the Ukrain-

ian question became the main concern of the national movement and replaced the previous emphasis on cultural activities. Organizationally, the national movement's traditional clandestine *hromady* (societies) were superseded by formal political parties and party discipline. Socially, the national movement, which was composed largely of urban declassé intellectuals and students, considerably broadened its links to include the peasantry, the workers and the village-based "semi–intelligentsia"; at the same time it raised social, political and economic issues that were of concern to these groups. The national movement's influence expanded from its traditional territory, Left-Bank and parts of Right-Bank Ukraine (Kiev province) to other Ukrainian ethnic regions in Right-Bank and southern Ukraine, including the Kuban area. By 1917 most of the major Ukrainian political parties and groups that played a role in the revolution had been formed and the leading Ukrainian participants in that revolution had received their basic political education.

Ukrainian political parties arose at a time when political unrest and socio-economic change were sweeping Russia. At the end of the nineteenth century, under the influence of developments in Russia and the rise of nationalism and political parties among Ukrainians in Austria-Hungary, a new generation of young people, primarily students, came to view themselves as a "new" Ukrainian intelligentsia—"Moloda Ukraina" or Young Ukraine. In the words of one contemporary,

> In every larger provincial town in Ukraine where there were secondary schools, groups of revolutionary Ukrainian youth were being formed independently from the organized influences of provincial and university centres.
>
> Everywhere Young Ukraine was being born. It was a spontaneous movement called forth by changes in the economic life and social structure of society. Ukraine was industrializing, towns were growing, attracting the most active elements from the villages. Secondary-school students began to fill up considerably with those of peasant background.... Fresh emigrants from the villages brought the Ukrainian element into the life of the towns. The general situation in the state encouraged youth to engage in political work for the people. And the desire to work for the people brought people to national self-awareness.[5]

Young Ukraine believed that it was its historic task to change the Ukrainian national movement from an isolated, intelligentsia-dominated and mainly culturally orientated movement to a politically differentiated, mass-based movement that espoused the overthrow of autocracy and the creation of Ukrainian autonomy or independence (for both Russian and Austro-Hungarian ethnic Ukrainian territory) and a socialist economic system.

This generation founded the first and most important political party in the 1900 to 1905 period—the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP), later to become the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party (USDLP) with a membership in 1906 of more than three thousand.[6] The party not only aroused Ukrainian youth to political activity, but was also one of the first political parties in Russia to work extensively with the peasantry, fomenting strikes and boycotts through agitators and its numerous publications. Members of the RUP also played a role, directly or indirectly, in the formation of other Ukrainian political parties and groups.

As can be seen in the evolution of its name, the RUP became a social democratic party in 1905, but it had a clear social democratic orientation from 1902 onward. The evolution in its ideology cannot be dealt with here, but it should be mentioned that it involved a turn away from initial nationalistic concerns.[7] This change in perspective had an important influence on relations between the RUP and non-Ukrainian political parties active in Ukraine.

Among the non-Ukrainian revolutionary political parties in Ukraine, the RUP had the closest ties with Jewish political parties because, according to one RUP member, they shared hostility toward the Russian centralist revolutionary parties and the Russian state.[8] Just as important, the Bund's ideologist were the most outspoken and eloquent in defending the importance of the national question against the attacks of the RSDLP. For the youthful and inexperienced RUP leadership, the works of Bundist ideologists provided inspiration and insight into their own situation.

These contacts first developed on an individual basis as early as the secondary-school level, mostly in Left-Bank Ukraine and especially in the province of Poltava. One RUP member, Volodymyr Doroshenko, has described this relationship:

> The struggle for national self-expression [*samovyiavlennia*] and political freedom united the Jewish and Ukrainian youth into groups in the gymnaziums, the university and beyond the lecture rooms. This was the case in Poltava, Lubni, Pryluka, Nizhyn and Kiev, which I know from personal experience. This relationship was sometimes so strong that individual comrades from the Jewish revolutionary youth joined the RUP. I myself remember the good comradely relations that linked our group with the Zionists in Lubni at the beginning of the 1900s. With the rise of socialistic influences on RUP members, they began to abandon gradually the "bourgeois nationalist" Zionists and to deal with the Bundists, to whom they were linked ideologically and by close contacts in local practical party work.[9]

Apparently, the Jewish activitists who joined the RUP did so because they saw the merit and importance of using the Ukrainian language in

agitational work among the peasantry in Ukraine.[10] Perhaps another reason for the empathy between the RUP and the Bund was the RUP's position on the Jewish question in Ukraine and Russia. Even during the years of intense involvement in the student movement, the RUP consistently defended the right of all Jews to attend institutions of higher education at a time when a quota system was in effect.[11]

The party categorically condemned the anti-Jewish pogroms, denouncing them as the work of the rich, the government and priests. The RUP also issued proclamations and published articles on the Jewish question highlighting the history of persecution of the Jews by the Russian government and showing how the overwhelming majority of the Jewish population lived in poverty and, therefore, could not be considered an exploiting nation.[12] The RUP frequently reminded its readers that the defence of Jewish workers and the Jewish nation was not just a matter that concerned Jews, but that it was "our issue, the struggle of the entire proletariat."[13]

Finally, one historian has suggested that the contacts between the RUP and the Bund were good because the two parties were similar in many ways: both were searching for a political ideology; membership did not include the industrial proletariat but artisans in the case of the Bund and peasants in the case of the RUP; and finally, they were non-Russian in culture and stressed the national question.[14] Before 1903 no official contacts were made between the Bund and the RUP central committees; it seems that both parties co-operated on local matters and issues without the official sanction of either organization. The Kiev RUP organization, for example, began working with the Bund toward the end of 1902 when two Bund members, M. Hutnyk and M. Hekhter (who were also members of the RUP), established close links with workers in Makariv, a village near Kiev whose population was mostly Jewish.[15]

There were signs that this relationship would in time become permanent and official. The RUP's leadership strongly encouraged members to consider more formal relations with the Bund. In 1903, Dmytro Antonovych (then the acknowledged leader) pointed out in a long article on the history and political evolution of the Bund that RUP members had to take into account the Bund's expansion of activity to Left-Bank Ukraine, that its organization was composed of more than twenty committees with two central organs, that it stood for a federated social-democratic party for Russia and that even the renowned leaders of western European socialist parties supported the Bund. For all these reasons, Antonovych stated, the time had come for the RUP to become thoroughly familiar with the Bund's politics and organization and to enter into more formal and consistent relations with it.[16] However, no formal agreement was reached with the Bund at this time.

Ideologically, the RUP did not adopt a political programme until

1905, but in a published version of a draft programme in 1903, the Kiev RUP organization called for an autonomous Ukraine within a federated Russian republic that would be "based on historical and national differences" with "full autonomy for every region in matters regarding internal affairs on the basis of a democratic constitution, with guaranteed rights of every constituent member of the federation for full state separation after the will of the majority of its people is expressed in a general election." For Ukraine and its national minorities, this meant "full autonomy for Ukraine in internal affairs with the guarantee of equality for all its peoples of all nationalities on the basis of the most comprehensive democratic constitution with a Peoples' Council as the highest legislative assembly and representative political institution in the country."[17]

The nature of this relationship between the Bund and the RUP changed considerably in 1904 due primarily to a change in the RUP's leadership. The new leader, Mykola Porsh, under the influence of the Bund's experience, introduced a "new course" in which he stressed the national organization of the Ukrainian proletariat and peasantry and the restructuring of the all-RSDLP on a federative basis along national lines. To underscore his determination to make RUP such a party, he gave non-Ukrainian workers in the RUP to their respective national organization and the Russian workers to the RSDLP.

Led by the Bund, the national social democratic parties put pressure on the RSDLP to reconstitute itself. The RUP clearly sided with the Bund, stating that "in these differences we cannot but stand on the side of the Bund for a union of all national social democratic organizations on the basis of equality."[18] Not surprisingly, with the "new course," the RUP wanted to develop even better relations with the Bund than under the previous leader, Dmytro Antonovych. There were good reasons why the Bund reciprocated in 1904. The RUP firmly supported the national principle of party organization. The Bund also had local organization in some areas and towns of Ukraine where the RUP was active. For example, the Bund organization in the small town of Pryluka in the Poltava province had about a hundred members.[19] The Bund press reported on the RUP. In *Vestnik Bunda*, the organ of the Foreign Committee, were reprinted statements, and its approval of the RUP's social democracy is apparent.[20] The Bund praised the RUP's position on the Jewish question and wished it success in organizing the Ukrainian proletariat.[21] This mutual sympathy soon became concrete co-operation, both formally and on the local level. Joint proclamations were issued and each group helped the other smuggle literature and contraband across the border.[22] The Bund always included the RUP in its activities on the all-Russian level, much of which was directed against the RSDLP's attempts to deprecate the federalist proposal.[23] One former Bund member who became a well-known

Ukrainian Marxist historian in the 1920s described the alliance against the RSDLP:

> In 1904 the RUP began to expand its influence among city workers, and in this work agitators were frequently confronted with the question of relations with the RSDLP and its organizations, which operated in the same branches of industry. This was a question of vital importance. The heart of the matter was that at the Second Congress of the RSDLP, the Bund differed with the congress on the question of the organizational structure of the party, demanding a federative basis for it. Then the Bund took the RUP under its patronage. As is known, the Bund demanded not only a federation but also recognition that it was the sole representative of Jewish workers. . . . In a number of towns, especially in the provinces of Poltava and Chernihiv, the RUP and the Bund carried on a struggle against the "Iskrovtsy" [RSDLP] . . . . I myself was a participant in this pathetic [sic] friendship between the Bund and the RUP in Nizhyn, Konotop and other towns under the leadership of the Ukrainian social democrat Petro Dialiv. The struggle against "Iskra" was waged as a "united front."[24]

Also in 1904, the RUP and the Bund, together with six other socialist parties, refused to attend a conference in Paris of liberal and revolutionary opposition groups from Russia, condemning such a potential alliance as benefiting only the liberals.[25]

Mention should also be made of several other Ukrainian socialist groups that had something to say about Jews in Ukraine and Jewish-Ukrainian relations on the eve of the 1905 revolution. The Ukrainian Socialist Party (USP or *Ukrainska Sotsiialistychna Partiia)* was founded about the same time as the RUP, that is, in early 1900. But unlike the RUP, it was always a small group (with perhaps no more than twenty-five members) and was, furthermore, composed of Polonized Ukrainians or Poles sympathetic to the Ukrainian situation. In 1902 it joined with the RUP for a short time, until the end of 1903, and then went on its own, only to disband in 1904.[26]

The USP stood for an independent socialist Ukrainian state, which was the main reason why the RUP and the USP did not stay together for very long. The RUP came out in support of national autonomy in 1903, abandoning its initial support of independence. The USP's programme strongly condemned "foreigners"—Russians, Poles and Jews—for their economic exploitation of the Ukrainian peasantry and workers, but the points dealing with the rights of non-Ukrainian peoples on Ukrainian territory stated that full rights would be guaranteed for these minorities.[27] The USP condemned the pogroms against the Jews in Kishinev, and in April 1903, it issued a proclamation on this subject to the workers of

Kiev.[28] When the USP and the RUP were still united, both parties strongly criticized the pogroms and devoted much space to the Jewish question in their organ for the peasantry and workers, *Dobra novyna*.[29]

Another socialist group, the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party, emerged in 1903, but the real foundations for this party were laid later, in 1905–6, and nothing is known of its attitudes toward the Jewish parties, except that it worked closely with some Jewish activists at this time.[30] Finally, mention should be made of another very small grouping, the Ukrainian Social Democracy *(Ukrainska Sotsiial Demokratiia)* (1897–1905), composed of perhaps no more than a handful of members. It was, however, influential, composed of such persons as the poetess Lesia Ukrainka, the literary critic Ivan Steshenko and the writer Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky. From the few pamphlets that this party put out and from its correspondence, we know that it stood for Ukrainian autonomy, the national principle of party organization and the reorganization of the RSDLP into a federation of national parties. Not surprisingly, it was very favourably disposed toward the Bund.[31]

Besides the socialist groups, Ukrainian liberals and nationalists first began to organize their own political parties during this period. The liberals or "progressives" remained divided and weak up to the time of the elections to the First State Duma in 1906. They belonged to clandestine *hromady* or societies. After 1897, these societies were part of the General Ukrainian Organization (GUO) *(Zahalna Ukrainska Orhanizatsiia),* a secret body whose main task was to co-ordinate cultural activity and agitation aimed at abolishing the decrees prohibiting the use of the Ukrainian language in publishing and the school system. Toward the end of 1903 the GUO *rada* (council) discussed the possibility of making the GUO a political party. The rationale for such a change was that the time had come to broaden the concerns of the liberal national movement to political questions. Otherwise, argued one contemporary, the Ukrainian national movement would lose support and "extreme socialist elements" would gain leadership of it.[32] Most of the members of the GUO were older than the socialist Ukrainians and already professionals, government and *zemstvo* employees and men of commerce.[33] Perhaps because of the risk that political involvement would entail, there was considerable opposition to the idea of forming a political party. But after much heated debate, the Ukrainian Democratic Party was established in the autumn of 1904. As regards the fate of national minorities in Ukraine, the party programme stated that it would recognize all national minorities as equals and that they would be allowed to pursue freely their cultural and economic aims.[34] Unfortunately, nothing is known about the USP's relations with Jewish parties at this time.

Finally, our discussion would not be complete if we did not mention a

group that came to be referred to as the "zoological nationalists," for by their attitude to Jews, and to all non-Ukrainians, they reflected the darker side of Ukrainian nationalism.[35] In 1902 Mykola Mikhnovsky and a few individuals from the intelligentsia together with some students from the Kharkiv Ukrainian student *hromada* founded the Ukrainian People's Party (UPP) *(Ukrainska Narodnia Partiia)*. In that year they put out a few brochures in which they stated that the UPP stood for a "free, independent, democratic Ukraine without lord and slave" and called on Ukrainian workers to expel all "foreigners" from Ukraine and to establish an independent state.[36] The UPP tried to attract the intelligentsia by putting forward socialist ideas as well, but according to one member, this was a tactical manoeuvre and did not reflect the true ideology of the party.[37] Another associate of the UPP stated that he heard "next to nothing about socialism in this group but only about nationalism . . . and a hatred for everything Russian."[38] The ideological orientation of the UPP was made clear in 1903, when it published "The Ten Commandments of the UPP." The commandments called for an independent Ukraine composed only of Ukrainians: "Ukraine for Ukrainians! Drive the foreign exploiters out of Ukraine." The UPP's views require little analysis, for the document went on to state:

> All people are your brothers, but the Russians, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians and Jews—these are the enemies of our nation as long as they rule over us and exploit us. Respect the activists of your homeland, hate its enemies . . . . Do not become friends with the enemies of our nation, because you strengthen and encourage them. Do not fraternize with our oppressors, for you will become a traitor.[39]

When criticized in the Ukrainian press and at public forums, the UPP refused to back down from its views and instead specified its reasons for such animosity toward the Jews in particular.[40] It was not that they were racists or intolerant of other religions, but that they considered the Jews to be like all other "foreigners" on Ukrainian territory—they were "exploiters" and "Russifiers." In the UPP's words: "Not one educated Jew wants to learn Ukrainian, everywhere he speaks Russian and even looks at the Ukrainian people as if they were from the lower orders. All this is too much . . . . The Jews behave as if they were on foreign territory which they want to control . . . ."[41]

The UPP was bitter that the Bundists did not use the Ukrainian language in their political work in Ukraine. To the UPP this was an insult to the Ukrainian people who gave the Jews shelter and at whose expense the Bundists were educated. The Bundists, declared the UPP, were "extremely hostile to the Ukrainian movement."[42] The UPP concluded by

stating that it would sincerely welcome Jews if they showed that they were supporters of the Ukrainian nation "because we fight against foreigners not because they are foreigners, but because they are exploiters."[43]

In the pre-1905 period the UPP remained a very small group with little influence on Ukrainian national life. But as we shall see later, the UPP and its ideas surfaced again and even gained some support among wider circles of the intelligentsia, although the vast majority of the revolutionary and liberal Ukrainian intelligentsia condemned such chauvinism. Certainly, as we have seen, the left-wing of the Ukrainian national movement, the most dynamic and influential in this period, denied the very premises of the UPP's arguments through its own example and experience.

3. Revolution and Reform, 1905–1907

The 1905 revolution and the events up to 1907 brought the RUP and the Bund even closer than in the pre-1905 period. On the Bund's initiative, in January, the RSDLP, the Latvian Social Democratic Party and the RUP were invited to a secret conference in Riga to discuss the worker unrest and to plan a common strategy.[44] Also in the first few months of 1905 the RUP adopted in its work with urban workers the Bund's tactics of organizing special groups of workers to carry out agitation and propaganda at the "birzhi," or street markets.[45]

Local RUP groups entered into close relations with the Bund. In April, the Kiev organization together with the Bund and the RSDLP established a "federative commission" to prepare and co-ordinate the commemoration of May Day (18 April O.S.).[46] The Poltava RUP committee was also active with workers and students. Along with the Bund, the RSDLP and the socialist-revolutionaries, the RUP participated in meetings that were attended by two—three thousand workers.[47]

One of the pressing tasks at this time was the protection of the Jewish population, the students and the intelligentsia from the government-instigated pogroms that broke out soon after 17 October 1905, first in the cities and then in several villages in Ukraine (mainly in Left-Bank Ukraine).[48] Local RUP committees issued proclamations urging the peasantry not to succumb to government-inspired anti-Jewish propaganda and not to take part in pogroms.[49] RUP committees, often with other parties, organized armed self-defence groups that protected public meetings and the Jewish population against pogroms. The Lubni RUP organization, and Russian and Jewish socialist parties formed a coalition committee headed by the RUP members Andrii Livytsky and M. Sa-

khariv. The committee organized a "Jewish self-defence group" numbering about three hundred people whose responsibilities were "defending the revolution" as well as protecting the Jewish population from pogroms.[50] In Kharkiv, Borys Martos organized an armed unit composed of ten telegraph workers and ten students to protect Jews.[51]

The Bund and the USDLP (formerly the RUP) also worked very closely on two other important matters: the elections to the First and Second State Dumas and the issue of the USDLP's entry into the RSDLP. The Bund strongly supported the USDLP's efforts to join the RSDLP at the Stockholm congress in 1906, but although the Bund was allowed to "rejoin" the RSDLP, the RSDLP's Central Committee set such conditions on USDLP entry that the latter refused to join and never did become a constituent organization of the RSDLP.[52] As for the elections to the First Duma in 1906, the USDLP decided to boycott them, but in the elections to the Second Duma, the USDLP cooperated with local Bund committees in presenting a social democratic bloc to the voters.[53]

One of the most influential parties in Ukraine in 1905 was the Ukrainian Social Democratic Union or "Spilka" (RSDLP). Formed by RUP members who left the pary in December 1904, Spilka joined the RSDLP (Mensheviks) as an autonomous group. Throughout the period of upheaval from 1905 to 1907, it established itself as an important mass-based organization with between six and seven thousand members in 1907,[54] causing considerable consternation among both RUP and fellow RSDLP members.[55] In joining the RSDLP, Spilka sought autonomous status with the right to organize the Ukrainian-speaking proletariat in order, it was alleged, to prevent the "bourgeois democratic" elements remaining in the RUP from manipulating the Ukrainian workers for their own ends.[56] Believing that the social and political revolution in Russia was imminent, Spilka's founders maintained that Ukrainian social democrats must ally with the stronger RSDLP and Bund so that the social revolution would be a success. The Ukrainian national question, they believed, was not of acute interest to the Ukrainian peasantry and working class and would be "resolved" in any case after the overthrow of tsarism and the establishment of a democratic Russian republic; under new democratic conditions, Ukrainian culture would be allowed to assert itself both politically and culturally.[57]

By March 1905, Spilka established strong organizations in the Kiev and Kherson provinces and in another area where the Ukrainian political presence had been rather limited—the other two provinces of Right-Bank Ukraine, Podillia and Volhynia. Throughout Spilka's active existence, 1905–7, it completely dominated this area of Ukraine, which, together with some areas of southern Ukraine, witnessed the most radical and widespread peasant uprisings, strikes and boycotts.[58] The provinces of

Poltava and Chernihiv were also very strong centres for Spilka.[59] In Right-Bank and Left-Bank Ukraine, Spilka organizations worked closely with the Bund and had many Jewish members.[60]

The strength of the Spilka increased dramatically by the time the elections to the Second Duma took place in 1907 (the First Duma elections having been boycotted by most socialists). Its growth was the result of hard work by a capable leadership and the greater co-ordination among RSDLP committees during the elections to the Second Duma, a task largely assumed by the Spilka. The Kiev RSDLP committee, which was one of the most important in Ukraine and which had previously refused to unite with the Spilka, began to reconsider its position toward the end of 1906, and union might have been achieved were it not for the mass arrest of the Spilka's Main Committee in mid-1907.[61] One former Spilka member stated that even the Jewish Bund had been holding talks with the Spilka on "entry . . . on autonomous conditions, into the organizational structure of the 'Spilka',"[62] and there was close co-operation between the Bund and the Spilka in the elections to the Second State Duma.[63]

Although the initiatives in the first year of the revolution were taken primarily by the left, the concessions forced from the government regarding greater individual and civic rights, as well as the promise to the newly created State Duma, allowed the liberals within the empire a chance to mobilize supporters. The Ukrainian liberals were divided and weak, but by the end of December 1905 they managed to regroup into the Ukrainian Democratic Radical Party—an amalgam of the UDP mentioned previously and the Ukrainian Radical Party, a much smaller but prodigiously active group, especially in the publications area.[64] The UDRP's programme was similar to that of the UDP, and it defended the rights of national minorities in Ukraine.[65]

During the elections to the First State Duma, the UDRP together with the Cadets and Jewish organization (mainly the Union for Jewish Equality) entered into a "bloc" in Kiev, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kherson and Odessa.[66] Characteristically, the UPP was against such a "bloc."[67] The elections gave considerable representation to Ukrainans: from eight provinces of Ukraine (excluding Tavria), 63 Ukrainians, 22 Russians, 5 Poles, 4 Jews and one German were elected to the 497–seat Duma. Together with Professor Hrushevsky and St. Petersburg UDRP members, they organized the Ukrainian national faction in the First and then the Second Duma. Their activities included the publication of a Russian periodical, *Ukrainskii vestnik*, intensive lobbying for cultural rights and for Ukrainian autonomy, participation in the "Faction of the Union of Autonomists" and the drafting of bills, especially on the agrarian problem.[68] *Ukrainskii vestnik* contained many articles on the rights of Jews in Russia, and included articles by the Zionist, V. Jabotinsky.[69] The editorial offices of another publication, *Kievskii otliki*, served as the political

"centre" in Kiev where Ukrainian and Jewish representatives gathered, among them M. B. Ratner and N. P. Vasylenko.[70] The First Duma was soon disbanded, and the URDP once again entered into a "bloc" with the Cadets and Jewish organizations, this time including the Zionists.[71]

Although the Ukrainian faction was now smaller, it still remained steadfast in its support of complete equality and autonomy for all nationalities in Russia.[72] The 1905 revolution and its aftermath clearly ushered in a period of increased political differentiation within the Jewish and Ukrainian national movements by altering the balance of forces. The liberal and Zionist political organizations became leading contenders for hegemony of the respective national movements. In the Ukrainian case, the liberals proved particularly energetic in what came to be called the "national revival." Newspapers, economic co-operatives, Ukrainian chairs at leading universities, educational-cultural organizations for the peasantry and clubs for the intelligentsia proliferated to an astonishing degree once the October manifesto abolished the main restrictions on the Ukrainian language.[73] The liberal wing of the Ukrainian movement attracted the youth, and many social democrats and non-party socialists joined in this cultural work, neglecting party politics in the process. This could not but help the liberal cause, and the severe repression of socialist parties that followed in 1906 and 1907 decimated the socialist ranks by the end of 1907.

By 1908 even the once powerful and influential Spilka collapsed under the pressure and the arrests, never to return to anywhere near its previous strength. In this hour of defeat, Jewish and Ukrainian parties co-operated in smuggling wanted men and women out of Russia. The Jewish Bund, for example, helped Symon Petliura and other social democrats escape to Lviv in Austro-Hungary.[74] The Ukrainian Democratic Radical Party also suffered from a depletion of its membership and from the growing disinterest in open political activity and affiliation. In 1908, the party was restructured along the same lines as the General Ukrainian Organization of the pre-1904 era. Now calling itself the Society of Ukrainian Progressives *(Tovarystvo Ukrainskykh Postupovtsiv),* it carried out cultural and political activities as a clandestine organization and required all members to be supporters of Ukrainian autonomy.[75] Without question, this organization became the most important and influential centre of cultural and political life from 1908 to the February Revolution.

4. Repression and the Growth of Nationalism, 1908–1914

As we have seen, the question of the Jewish minority in Ukraine and its future within an autonomous or independent Ukraine was of concern to all Ukrainian political groups. In 1908 and early 1909, a serious polemi-

cal discussion began in the Ukrainian press that represented three distinct political currents within the Ukrainian national movement: socialist, nationalist and chauvinist.

The polemic was started by an article in the "chauvinistic" Ukrainian-language periodical *Ridnyi krai*.[76] One author argued that the Jews in Ukraine were a nation of "economic exploiters," incapable of becoming farmers. They cared only about their own people and culturally played the role of Russifiers in Ukraine. In an obvious reference to the UDRP position on equality of all minorities in Ukraine, the author argued that to grant them equality would be a slight against the oppressed Ukrainians. In any future Ukrainian government, the proper action would be to ensure the rise in influence of the oppressed majority, the Ukrainians, over the stronger minority, the Jews. However, it was in everyone's interest that Jews be allowed to live beyond the Pale of Settlement. Ukrainians would benefit from this reform, in that the "economic struggle" would be reduced and Ukrainians would be able to take the place of Jews in certain economic and other sectors.[77]

The editor of *Ridnyi krai* also complained that the "progressive" Jewish intelligentsia hindered the efforts of the Ukrainian intelligentsia by its hostility to Ukrainian culture and language. The Jewish intelligentsia always chose to join the ranks of the "ruling nations"—Russians in tsarist Russia, the Germans and Poles in Austro-Hungary.[78] *Ridnyi krai* condemned what it called the hypocrisy of Ukrainian liberals in their "diplomatic" treatment of Jews in Ukraine. Why was it, asked the editor, that *Rada* condemned the Poles in Galicia for their politics toward Ukrainians but did not criticize the Jews for their hostility toward the Ukrainian movement in Russia?[79]

There was some support for these views, especially among the members of the small Ukrainian People's Party, but they seem to have been a distinct minority within the Ukrainian intelligentsia.[80] Nevertheless, the fact remains that with the growth of nationalism after 1905, several activists within the Ukrainian national movement noted a concomitant rise in chauvinism among students, the intelligentsia and even the peasantry.[81]

To another commentator, Dmytro Doroshenko, writing in the liberal Ukrainian daily *Rada* (an organ of the Society of Ukrainian Progressives), the Jews in Ukraine had no choice but to ally with the "ruling" nations (Polish or Russian) for otherwise they would not have received even the few rights they already had. But as they were identified with Polish and Russian oppression, the Jews paid for this alliance in human suffering and loss of life in times when the Ukrainian peasantry rose up against its oppressors. Doroshenko recognized that Jews still did not side with the Ukrainian movement or with Ukrainian culture despite the fact that the Ukrainian national movement was growing and had already

made considerable inroads among the masses. He warned the Jews in Ukraine that history would repeat itself if the Jewish intelligentsia did not attempt to bridge the gulf between itself and the indigenous population.[82] *Rada* also published an article that brought a different perspective to the discussion. The author, Stepan Rosovy (presumably Maksym Hekhter), argued that it was incorrect to talk about "the Jewish nation" as if it were a monolithic and undifferentiated entity. Rather, it would be more useful to see the Jewish community for what it really was—a minority with a petty bourgeoisie and a proletarian intelligentsia. Previous authors in both *Ridnyi krai* and *Rada* had failed to make this distinction, thus rendering their analyses and arguments "unscientific." As long as the Jews represented themselves as an oppressed nation, wrote Rosovy, Ukrainians would always be fully and uncompromisingly supportive, but if a certain class within the Jewish minority, or the Jews as a whole, ventured forth against the Ukrainian movement, then the Ukrainians had no choice but to oppose the Jews. This was to be done not by demanding or supporting repression of the Jews but by strengthening the Ukrainian national movement, its cultural, economic and national institutions.[83]

In private, leading Ukrainian liberals such as Ievhen Chykalenko, Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Volodymyr Leontovych felt that the less educated Jews were sympathetic to Ukrainian demands, but that the Jewish "progressive" intelligentsia was the "worst enemy" of Ukrainian nationalists. These Jews presented a greater threat than even the Black Hundreds because the government itself did not believe their "tales" about the imminent danger of the Ukrainian movement. The Jewish "progressives," on the other hand, (editors of leading periodicals and newspapers) simply refused to pay any attention to the Ukrainian movement, thereby rendering a great disservice to both the Ukrainian people and the struggle for national rights in Russia.[84] Nevertheless, in public, these leaders felt it was unworthy to attack the Jews in general because they were a "shackled" people.[85] Hrushevsky went even further and warned publicly that there was great danger for everyone concerned when such slogans as "Ukraine for Ukrainians" were used. This chauvinism could find a receptive audience among the ignorant and impoverished masses. The chauvinists were therefore acting irresponsibly and immorally.[86]

Clearly then, there were important differences of opinion on the Jewish question and on Jewish-Ukrainian relations within the non-socialist Ukrainian intelligentsia, a fact that did not escape the attention of one of the worst enemies of the Ukrainian movement in Russia, N. S. Shchegolev, a political reactionary who, in his book on the Ukrainian movement, devoted several pages to Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Shchegolev noted that while *Ridnyi krai* was clearly anti-Semitic, the Ukrainian daily

newspaper *Rada* was noted for its "Judaeophilism," but even this orientation, stated Shchegolev, was within certain limits.[87] The SUP was very much in support of co-operation with other liberal groups, both Russian and Jewish. Miliukov and other Cadet leaders often met with SUP representatives. The SUP had very good relations with the Zionists through Vladimir Jabotinsky. After 1907, alliances of this variety were made in order to make the best of a very difficult situation. That the Ukrainian and Jewish movements were up against rather severe obstacles was plain for everyone to see. Stolypin had launched a major offensive against non-Russian cultural institutions, charging that they were advocating the dismemberment of the indivisible Russian people.

In 1911, government authorities initiated the case against Beiliss, charging him with "ritual blood murder." Under such circumstances, an alliance seemed a necessity, and Jabotinsky came especially to Kiev to make an appeal to Ukrainian newspaper editors for such co-operation. He argued that Jewish nationalists and Zionists had identical enemies and goals. National schools and the fight against Russifiers and Polonizers were issues on the agendas of both nations. Jabotinsky argued not only that Ukrainians and Jews should co-ordinate their activites, but also promised that the Zionist press would write about the Ukrainian movement and show the Jews "that they must turn their attention toward Ukrainians and the Ukrainian movement and not be Russifiers." The Ukrainian movement had a future, he stated, "and there will come a time when the Jews will be sorry that they went along with the Russifiers."[88]

The outpouring of Russian chauvinism naturally brought the Jews and progressive Ukrainian closer. Not only did this lead to articles in the Ukrainian-language press against the arrest and trial of Beiliss, but it also contributed to close political co-operation in the elections to the Fourth State Duma in 1912.[89] Ukrainian members of the SUP formed an election bloc with Jewish "nationalist" parties and groups in Odessa, Kiev and some other cities in Ukraine.[90] But the results were not good due to the inequitable electoral qualifications. No SUP members or sympathizers were elected, and three relatively unknown Jewish representatives entered the Fourth Duma.[91]

From 1908 to the beginning of the war, the Ukrainian social democrats, like the rest of the revolutionary movement, were in considerable difficulty during the period of reaction. The USDLP Central Committee painted a bleak picture of the party's situation in its report to the Second Socialist International. Not only was the repression significantly reducing the party's activities and membership, but the factional disputes within the party were causing consternation and ill-will. Despite the Bund's support, the party remained officially outside the RSDLP, because the latter refused to give the USDLP the same status as the Bund.

The party also felt somewhat demoralized since the leadership of the Ukrainian national movement had shifted from the revolutionaries to the constitutional liberals and democrats. To complicate matters even more, the party witnessed a significant "desertion" of its membership to the liberal and "nationalist" camp. More precisely, many former comrades felt it more important to participate in the legal Ukrainian cultural and economic institutions that sprang up after 1905 than to continue revolutionary activities under such difficult political and social conditions.[92]

Despite these drawbacks, the USDLP did take several initiatives in the area of Jewish-Ukrainian political relations, even though these were not anywhere near on the scale seen during the pre-1907 period. Indicative of the times was the fact that some of this co-operation took place in emigration. In Paris, for example, Ukrainian political refugees from Russia (mostly either social democrats or revolutionary socialists) and other Ukrainians from Galicia formed a Ukrainian *hromada* in 1909. This group had extensive contacts with all émigré political organizations and institutions, including the various Jewish ones. The *hromada* sent its representative, Oksen Lola, to meetings at which representatives from various organizations in Russia discussed political matters and sometimes co-operated on specific projects.[93]

The USDLP press included reports on the activities of the Bund, its publications and articles by leading Bundists.[94] It also provided its own materials to the Bund and, in particular, to Medem, who was writing on socialist organizations among the empire's nationalities.[95] Finally, it is interesting to note that both the USDLP and the Bund faced similar problems at this time. Both suffered from severe repression, a depletion of their respective memberships, and competition from the increasingly vocal and well organized "nationalist" parties within their own national movements. Both the Bund and the USDLP found it necessary to decide what strategy to adopt in dealing with the Jewish and Ukrainian cultural institutions controlled by the liberal and nationalist wings of their movements.[96]

In 1909, the USDLP joined the discussion in the Ukrainian press on the Jewish question by condemning what it saw as the growing "chauvinism" and anti-Semitism among Ukrainian liberals and "national democrats" in both Russian Ukraine and Galicia.[97] To the USDLP it was a matter of principle to uphold the aspirations of the Jewish nation, particularly those of the Jewish proletariat.

A USDLP member argued that even a cursory glance at the 1897 census statistics would disprove the myth that Jews were unproductive and involved in "easy" labour. The Jewish nation was a "capitalist nation," and as such it was divided socially into the proletariat and various bourgeois segments. Because it was socially differentiated, political differen-

tiation occurred along class lines within the Jewish nation. Because the Jews lived an environment with many different nations and classes, it was not surprising to see class alliances developing between Jewish entrepreneurs and their Russian and Polish counterparts against the Jewish proletariat and likewise, to see the Jewish proletariat allying itself with the proletarians from other nations against the capitalists. From this it followed, argued the USDLP member, that the Ukrainian proletariat could not support the Jewish nation entirely and unswervingly, even though it was oppressed. Only the proletariat of the Jewish nation could be supported unequivocably. Nevertheless, he continued, it was in the interest of the Ukrainian proletariat to demand equal rights for the Jewish people, to call for an end to the administrative and other rulings against the Jewish nation and in particular, to demand an end to the restriction of residence to the Pale of Settlement. Unlike the Ukrainian liberal progressives, the Ukrainian proletariat supported this reform not because it wanted the Jews out of Ukraine in order to allow Ukrainians to take the place of Jews in the economic sphere, but because it wanted the Jews to live freely and to make their valuable services and talents available to a wider circle of society.

But all reforms were meaningless without a complete restructuring of society on an autonomous basis. The creation of an autonomous Poland, Lithuania, Belorussia, Ukraine and so on would allow self-rule to develop. All nations and people could develop economically and culturally. The writer used the example of London and its boroughs to make his point. As in the various boroughs of London, so too in an autonomously governed Russia, a network of national communes would allow Jews and all other nations to satisfy their cultural needs through their own efforts. Such a solution was possible and necessary in view of the multinational composition of Ukraine's cities, towns and the Jewish areas of settlement.[98]

These then, were the three major positions on the Jewish question and Jewish-Ukrainian political relations in the 1908–14 period.

5. *World War I: "Between the Anvil and the Hammer"*

Despite the initial declarations of loyalty and even enthusiasm for the Russian war effort expressed by the Jewish and Ukrainian communities, the military authorities and the government closed down their periodicals and once again began a policy of open repression.[99] The right-wing Russian press was full of articles linking the Jews and Ukrainians in alleged subversive work against the regime and the war effort.[100] The Jews were blamed for much that was going wrong, and the military issued several

orders and drew up plans to remove Jews from the army and other institutions.[101]

It was a tragic period, for both nations shared the territory on which most of the front-line fighting took place and had their compatriots on the Austrian side of the border. Caught between the "hammer and the anvil," they fell victim to the extreme manifestations of anti-Ukrainian and anti-Jewish policies carried out by the victorious Russian forces in Galicia. Thousands of people were forcibly deported because they were considered to be potential or actual German spies.[102] The Ukrainians and Jews in Russia reacted by forming self-help committees to provide aid to the refugees and deportees.[103] Both groups reiterated on several occasions their desire to see full national autonomy and national rights in a democratic and federal Russia, but concrete political co-operation was severely curtailed due to governmental repression and the suspension of civic rights.[104] But when progressive public opinion in Russia was alerted to the events in Galicia and when it was becoming clear that Russia was losing the war because of tsarist incompetence and mismanagement, the nationalities issue once again became a matter of concern to progressively minded people.

Both Jewish and Ukrainian groups stepped up their attempts to raise the matter of the repression of the nationalities by the tsarist regime.[105] But there is no evidence to suggest that this was a co-ordinated campaign by Jews and liberal Ukrainians. The only exception appears to have taken place in February 1916, when an unsuccessful attempt was made to organize an all-Russian radical democratic party with the goal of changing Russia into a federation of nations.[106]

With the general resurgence of political activity in Russia in 1915, other Ukrainian political parties and groups also began organizing and carrying out clandestine propaganda. Among the liberal but less tolerant elements, a small group calling itself the Initiating Commitee of the Ukrainian Independentist Union (*Initsiiatyvnyi komitet Ukrainskoho samostiinoho Soiuzu)* was formed in 1915. It issued a programme in which one article dealt directly with Jewish-Ukrainian relations. Although not much is known about this group, the contents of the programme and its views of this relationship suggest that the authors were from the circle associated either with *Ridnyi krai* or with the Ukrainian People's Party (UPP). The union said it would not co-operate with any political party that did not recognize Ukrainian independence. As far as the Jews were concerned, the union would support the aspirations only of those Jews who were not "assimilationists."[107] The fortunes of the Ukrainian left were also reviving at this time. The USDLP even called a conference in 1915 in Katerynoslav at which it reiterated its desire to see co-operation with all national social democratic parties in Russia.[108] Ap-

parently most USDLP activists supported the Zimmerwald and Kienthal socialist positions, as did the Jewish Bund.[109] The Okhrana also noted that USDLP revolutionary proclamations were being smuggled into Russia and Ukraine by Jews in Galicia.[110] The Ukrainian socialist revolutionaries were not idle either. They published a clandestine newspaper and issued several proclamations. They also released a programme in which they stated that they would fight for the rights and interests of national minorities in Ukraine.[111]

One of the more interesting aspects of Jewish-Ukrainian political relations during the war was attempted in the émigré communities. In various countries, but primarily in France and Switzerland, political émigrés from Imperial Russia, among them Ukrainians and Jews, tried to maintain political contacts with Russia and Ukraine. A group of Ukrainian social democrats from Russia had organized what they called the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine *(Soiuz vyzvolennia Ukrainy)*. Based at first in Lviv in Austro-Hungary and then in Vienna and Berlin, the union was financially supported by the Austro-Hungarian and then the German government. The basic idea behind the formation of the union was to carry out agitation and propaganda on behalf of Ukrainian political independence and in favour of dismantling the Imperial Russian state. The union had extensive contacts with émigrés from Russia throughout western and eastern Europe. Its representatives worked with such people as Christian Rakovsky in Romania and Parvus (Helphand) in Constantinople and, secretly and from time to time, with the Bolsheviks. In order to gauge the opinion of Russian émigrés, the union sent an emissary to Switzerland, Dr. Ievhen Liubarsky-Pysmenny, who for two months, from 12 September to 15 November 1914, visited various people to sound out their views on Ukrainian independence and their potential co-operation with the union.

In his report to the union's leadership, Liubarsky-Pysmenny outlined his discussion with leading representatives of the Jewish Bund and the Zionists in Switzerland. It should be mentioned that the emissary was not sympathetic to what he considered to be the two nations that were responsible for Ukraine's economic and political bondage—Russians and Jews—but he informed the union that he put his personal views aside in order to fulfill his assignment for the union. In general terms he noted that the Russian and Jewish émigrés to whom he talked showed less sympathy to the Ukrainian question than even before the war. Liubarsky-Pysmenny believed the reason for this was that the case for Ukrainian self-determination *(samooznachenie)* had received a sympathetic hearing in the past because the Ukrainian movement was politically weak. But now that the Ukrainian question had becomed a serious factor in international politicsm Liubarsky-Pysmenny sometimes experienced hostility or

refusals to answer his queries on where the Jewish and Russian representatives stood on the issue of independence for Ukraine and, in general, on self-determination. The only exception to this generalization, he noted, was Lenin.

In his discussion with the Bundist A. Litwak in Zurich, Liubarsky-Pysmenny encountered evasions. However, the union's representative did not make a precise distinction between Litwak's possible opposition to the close identification of the union with German and Austrian interests, and his views on the Ukrainian question in general. In Geneva, Liubarsky-Pysmenny met with Aberson, a Zionist, who told him that the Ukrainians could count on the support of the Jews because the Ukrainians were becoming a stronger force politically. Liubarsky-Pysmenny added that he had heard this from the Zionist leader Borokhov in Belgium and that this view was typical for the Jews, who always allied themselves with the strongest political force. Aberson wanted Liubarsky-Pysmenny to give a lecture to the Geneva community on the present state of the Ukrainian movement in both Galicia and Russia and promised to provide a hall for this purpose free of charge.[112]

6. Conclusions

We have seen that Jewish-Ukrainian political relations from 1900 to 1917 were based on relations between Jewish and Ukrainian political parties. Both nations were, of course, influenced by the rising tide of social and political discontent, and it is not surprising that the revolutionary social democrats and socialists gained the leadership of their respective national movements at this time, from 1900 to 1906. Jewish and Ukrainian social democrats co-operated with each other throughout their entire political history to February 1917 because their co-operation was based on shared political principles and ideology and respect for each other's national goals. This is in sharp contrast to several decades earlier, because we do not see the use of anti-Semitism in the agitational work of Ukrainian socialists and social democrats.

However, with the reforms and then the "reaction" that followed the 1905 revolution, new circumstances brought the more nationalistic and liberal wings of both national movements to the helm of their respective national movements. These two currents co-operated in election campaigns to the State Duma and on several other fronts. There were good reasons why this co-operation developed. After all, both the Jews and the Ukrainians (along with several other nationalities) were severely repressed by the government and reactionary forces. But the truth of the matter was that the Ukrainian movement, even in 1917 and during the

Revolution, "attracted but a handful of Jews."[113] As one conservative critic of the Ukrainian movement observed, relations between Ukrainians and Jews were not as strong on the political level as they were in the cultural sphere.[114] And there was much truth in this observation. Jews in the cities liked to attend Ukrainian theatrical productions,[115] and there was much sympathy for, and interest in, Ukrainian culture and the desire by Ukrainians to have schools in their own language.[116]

Several memoirs from that time mention that, in general, Jews could speak the Ukrainian language.[117] Several Jews were active in Ukrainian cultural institutions such as the press and supported Ukrainian culture. And it was obviously uncomfortable for the Ukrainophobe Shchegolev to report that the smaller the city or town, the more the Jewish press in those cities openly sympathized with Ukrainian culture and with the Ukrainian people.[118] But the question still remains as to why political relations were not closer and stronger after 1906 when there was, at least on the surface, a commonality of purpose. Part of the answer must lie in the difficult circumstances under which political and civil life developed in the Russian Empire. With the rise of Russian chauvinism and harsh government reaction after 1905, political life was constricted. The left-wing groups, in particular, suffered most from this repression, and they did not regain their former political strength and influence until 1917.

But what of the liberal, or "progressive" Ukrainian intelligentsia, as it has been called? Why was it not able or willing to establish closer relations? We can venture several opinions on this matter. First, one finds in the literature reference to the psychology of the "stateless" person. For example, in a letter to the socialist revolutionary Feliks Volkhovsky in 1902, Lesia Ukrainka argued that one of the reasons why Ukrainian socialists would not go out of their way to make alliances with other socialist parties in Ukraine was that had been treated badly or else with indifference in the past by non-Ukrainian socialists in Ukraine. Certainly, there was an element of pride that she sometimes found hard to take on the part of the younger Ukrainian political activists. But she, nevertheless, suggested to Volkhovsky that if he wanted to see closer collaboration between Ukrainian revolutionaries and with the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the initiative would have to come from the SRs.[119] Disillusioned with what they perceived as a lack of sensitivity on the part of the Russian SRs and social democrats, the constitutional democrats, trudoviks and others, Ukrainian political activists were not willing once again to bear what they probably saw as arrogance and even worse, indifference toward the plight of the Ukrainian nation. Except in the cases of the Bund and, to some degree, the Zionists, Jewish political parties did not show as strong an interest in co-operation with Ukrainian liberals as did the Bund with left-wing Ukrainian political parties. This apparent

indifference no doubt fuelled the Ukrainian sense of grievance and neglect. This was especially the case after Struve's attack on the Ukrainian movement and Ukrainian culture in 1911–12 and with the obvious divisions in the Cadet leadership on the national question in Russia.

It has often been said that nationalism is the modern Janus, with progressive and reactionary features. In our discussion, we have seen the darker, chauvinistic side of Ukrainian nationalism. Such forces as the Ukrainian People's Party and those grouped around *Ridnyi krai* saw the Jews as "Russifiers" and "exploiters" and even made pronouncements that they did not care for "Jewish character traits." With slogans such as "Ukraine for Ukrainians" and ambivalent statements on the Beilis trial, these groups even argued against an alliance between Jewish and Ukrainian representatives during the Duma elections. Although such attitudes were held by a minority among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, they could not but put into question among some Jewish political circles the benefits of co-operation with Ukrainians. Certainly, this chauvinism did not escape the attention of the Jewish press.[120]

It should also be added that this chauvinism was not directed exclusively against the Jews, but against all "foreigners" in Ukraine. The question of sincerity of motives must have been particularly difficult for Jews to come to terms with. While such organizations as the UDRP and later the SUP among the liberals often stated their sympathy for the plight of the Jewish nation, the statements made in the Ukrainian press warning the Jews of their close cultural association with the Russian ruling circles and potential repercussions at the hands of a violent and spontaneous Ukrainian peasantry did not make matters any better. And the oft-repeated argument that freedom for Jews to settle beyond the Pale would end the "exploitation" of Ukrainian peasants because then there would be fewer Jews in Ukraine and that their place would be taken by Ukrainians, seriously begged the question. Some Ukrainian "progressives" understood why the Jews placed such emphasis on gaining and maintaining the protection of the dominant cultural and political nation in the Russian Empire, but what these Ukrainian liberals failed to take into account was that for any diaspora, these veiled and unveiled threats of potential displacement by what the nationalists called the growing tide of the "less privileged" Ukrainians, most likely caused considerable consternation and hence suspicion as to the real motives behind Ukrainian statements of solidarity. As Armstrong has shown in his study of archetypical diasporas, the "mobilized diaspora" is always acutely aware of its insecurity and potential displacement.[121]

Another reason for the weakness of these political contacts must lie in the rapid rise of Zionism after 1905 and the mass emigration of Jews from Russia. Many Jews were leaving a land that had brought them great

suffering. Under such circumstances, this could not but have caused a weakness in resolve to come to some agreement with the indigenous population, in order to find some long-term solution to their situation in Russia and Ukraine. Another reason for the lack of developed political relations was given by one contemporary, Arnold Margolin:

> A most difficult and complicated situation confronted the Jews of Ukraine. The Ukrainian national movement had its roots in the villages, where the Ukrainian language, national songs and customs were preserved. In the cities this movement was represented only by small groups of Ukrainian intelligentsia, who resisted the policy of forcible Russification practiced by the tsar's Government. As urban dwellers, Jews knew little about the Ukrainian question and could not envisage the real power and importance of this movement, which came to light immediately after the revolution of 1917. . . . [122]

There is much truth to this statement, but it should be further elaborated to include the fact that the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the Ukrainian national movement did not have strong political ties either with the countryside or with Ukrainian workers before 1917. The centuries-old Russificatory policies and persecution of Ukraine culture, the ever watchful secret police and the abysmally low priority that education had in the Russian budget and in government policy, not to speak of the government's refusal to allow Ukrainian-language schools, all contributed to what the Ukrainian intelligentsia referred to as "the gulf" between it and the "people." Although the intelligentsia had made great strides in creating cultural, economic and educational societies and institutions in order to bridge this gulf and better the life of the peasantry, it was also well aware that the national movement was still geographically and hence politically restricted to only a few provinces of ethnic Ukraine and that much work had to be done.

At the same time, it should be mentioned that the urban centres were the natural home and breeding ground of Ukrainian national identity among the intelligentsia, a fact that must have also tainted its perception of the Jewish predicament and of Jewish "assimilationists." Furthermore, the Ukrainian intelligentsia, liberal and revolutionary, could not control, and even feared, the spontaneity and violence of the Ukrainian peasantry, which in 1902 and 1905 showed that it cared little for reasoned discussion and consistent organization. But to its credit, the progressive Ukrainian intelligentsia, both social democratic and liberal, stood unanimously against catering to this primitive but understandable sense of grievance held by the peasantry. Realizing that the Ukrainian question was both national and social, the progressive Ukrainian intel-

ligentsia knew perfectly well the consequences for all if clarity of purpose and a positive perspective were lost in the pursuit of mass appeal. In the RUP's refusal to foment violent revolution among the peasantry and in Hrushevsky's warning that such slogans as "Ukraine for Ukrainians" would find a ready but disastrous response among the politically undeveloped peasantry, we see that Ukrainian political activists refused to gain politically from a political approach they believed to be morally unacceptable.[123] There is no need here to dwell on the events after February 1917, when the less principled political groups and parties, both Russian and Ukrainian, appealed to baser instincts in the name of a "higher goal." Simple and clear solutions to poverty, lack of land and the suffering of war were provided by the unscrupulous. Under such circumstances, the enlightened and reasoned men and women from both the Jewish and Ukrainian nations suffered. As the Jewish merchant Shafer said to the Ukrainian landowner Chykalenko in the first few turbulent months of 1917:

> "Natural water does not harm a person; and boiled [water] is even better than [natural] water, but [water] that is not completely boiled is harmful. Likewise, with the nation: when they were still natural and uneducated, you could still live with them, but now [the people] are not completely boiled—oh, how difficult it is to live with them!"[124]

Indeed, when one looks back at this rich but difficult relationship, what is remarkable is not the lack of political contacts but the fact that there were any at all.

NOTES

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1. Novus, "Evreiska sprava i ukrainski techii," *Slovo*, no. 5 (1909): 3; no. 7: 5.
2. B. Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth Century Ukraine* (London 1985), 9. He includes Tavriia.
3. *Snip*, no. 12 (18/31 March 1912), 1.

4. Ukrainets-Iskrovets [Pavlo Tuchapsky], "Ob Ukrainskoi Revoliutsionnoi partii," *Iskra*, no. 80 (15 December 1904), 2–3.
5. A. Zhuk, "Symon Petliura (Zi spomyniv)," *Kaliendar almanakh 'Dnipro' na rik 1934* (Lviv 1934), 103.
6. Y. Boshyk, "The Rise of Ukrainian Political Parties in Russia, 1900–1907," D. Phil thesis, Oxford University, 1981, 347.
7. On the ideological evolution of the RUP, see Boshyk, "The Rise," especially Chapter 2.
8. V. Doroshenko, "Dr. L. Tsehelsky i naddniprianska molod pochatku 1900–ykh rokiv. Storinka z istorii vzaiemyn mizh skhidnymy i zakhidnymy ukraintsiamy," *Ameryka,* no. 109 (December 1950): 3; also, V. Doroshenko to J. Lawrynenko, 23 February 1957. J. Lawrynenko Private Papers, New York.
9. Ibid.
10. N. Romanovych-Tkachenko, "Na dorozi do revoliutsii. Uryvky zi spomyniv," *Ukraina*, bk. 4 (1925): 110–11.
11. *Haslo*, no. 6–7 (1902): 11.
12. See, for example, *Haslo*, no. 4 (1903): 52; no. 5: 1–2, 23–30; *Dobra novyna*, no. 6–7 (1903): 5–10, 19; *Selianyn,* no. 6 (1903): 3–4; no. 7: 5–6; no. 12: 4–6; O. Hermaize, *Narysy z istorii revoliutsiinoho rukhu na Ukraini* (Kiev 1926), 1: 176, 178–9.
13. *Dobra novyna,* no. 6–7 (1903): 5–6.
14. Hermaize, *Narysy*, 247–8.
15. Romanovych-Tkachenko, "Na dorozi," 110–11; Hermaize, *Narysy,* 108–16.
16. Severyn Voinylovych [D. Antonovych], "Bund," *Haslo*, no. 3 (1903): 9–14.
17. For the full text of the programme, see *Haslo*, no. 4 (1903): 36–41; also Hermaize, *Narysy*, 71–4, and more recently in T. Hunchak and R. Solchanyk, comps. *Ukrainska suspilno-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti. Dokumenty i materiialy* ([Munich] 1983), 1: 114–21.
18. *Pratsia,* no. 1 (1904): 4–5.
19. Report of the Bund to the International Socialist Congress in Amsterdam, *Vestnik Bunda,* no. 5 (1904): 2.
20. *Vestnik Bunda,* no. 1–2 (1904): 22.
21. See *Vestnik Bunda,* no. 1–2, no. 3 (1904): 18–22. The *Vestnik Bunda* also reprinted a large part of the RUP's report to the Amsterdam Congress. See no. 5 (1904): 24–6. An article also appeared on the RUP in the New York *Eorwarts,* no. 29 (1904). For the RUP's statements on the pogroms, see, for example, *Selianyn*, no. 16 (1904): 1; no. 21–22 (1904): 5–6; *Pratsia,* no. 6–7 (1904): 3–5, 14.
22. Andrii Zhuk's comments to Ol. Merkling's letter, A. Zhuk Archive, vol. 3 (file 43), Public Archives of Canada. Merkling was a former RUP member. See also V. Doroshenko to J. Lawrynenko, 21 February 1957. J. Lawrynenko Private Papers, New York.
23. For example, in May 1904, the Bund proposed that a conference of social democratic parties be convened to discuss joint action. Among those invited was the RUP, but the conference never took place. See H. J. Tobias, *The Jewish Bund in Russia. From its Origins to 1905* (Stanford 1972), 281.
24. M. Ravich-Cherkassky, *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi partii (b-ov) Ukrainy* (Kharkiv 1923), 30–1, 33; also cited in Hermaize, *Narysy*, 248–9; cf. M. Rafes, *Ocherki po istorii "Bunda"* (Moscow 1923), 145–6. For more details about the Bund-RSDLP conflict, see Tobias, *The Jewish Bund,* 259–94.
25. See *Pratsia*, no. 8, 9, 10 (1904): 1, for the text of their statement, and also S. Galai, *The Liberation Movement in Russia, 1900–1905* (Cambridge 1973), 214–15.

26. On the Ukrainian Socialist Party, see Boshyk, "The Rise," 55–62.
27. For an English translation of the programme, see Boshyk, "The Rise", 404–9.
28. S. Zahorodny [B. Iaroshevsky], "Rewolucyjno-społeczny ruch ukraiński pod zaborem rosyjskim," *Krytyka,* no. 3 (1905): 426.
29. "Samoderzhavie, zhydivski pohromy i revoliutsiinyi prolietaryat," *Dobra novyna,* no. 6–7 (November-December 1903): 1–6; also, "Zhydivske pytannia," *Dobra novyna,* no. 6–7 (November-December 1903): 6–11.
30. Boshyk, "The Rise," 376–7; and N. Hryhoriiv, "Tvortsi moho 'ia'," *Trudova Ukraina,* no. 6 (1933): 14.
31. Boshyk, "The Rise," 41–3, 59–61.
32. I. Chykalenko, *Spohady (1861–1907)* (New York 1955), 353–4.
33. Ibid., 358.
34. The final version of the programme was not published until June 1905. For the text see *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk,* bk. 6, 1905; republished in Chykalenko, *Spohady,* 359–61.
35. O. Mytsiuk, "Uryvky spohadiv i rozdumiv (1883–1920)," *Samostiina dumka,* no. 5–6 (1935): 412. Mytsiuk once belonged to the group.
36. See *Robitnyche sviato pershoho maia* (Chernivtsi 1902) and *Robitnycha sprava v prohrami Ukrainskoi partii* (Chernivtsi 1902).
37. S. Shemet, "Mykola Mikhnovsky (Posmertna zhadka)," *Khliborobska Ukraina,* bk. IV (1924–25), 11.
38. Mytsiuk, "Uryvky," no. 2–3: 196.
39. Proclamation, "Ukrainska Narodnia Partiia," Andrii Zhuk Archive, vol. 17 (file 25), Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa.
40. "Uvany," *Samostiina Ukraina,* no. 1 (1905): 7–8.
41. Ibid., 7.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., 8.
44. M. Porsh, "Na spilnomu shliakhu," in A. Zhuk, ed., *Symon Petliura v molodosti* (Lviv 1936), 45. Porsh was the RUP's representative at the conference. See also Tobias, *The Jewish Bund,* 303, 324.
45. L. Rybalka [Iurkevych], "Pochatky masovoi roboty sered kyivskykh robitnykiv (Spohady z diialnosty)," *Nash holos,* no. 6–8 (1911): 334.
46. The commission planned a strike and an armed uprising, issuing leaflets urging the support of the intelligentsia and workers. Workers' groups were organized and given arms. The authorities learned of their intentions and let it be known that if any May Day events took place, the government would counter with severe reprisals against the Jewish community in Kiev. The revolutionary parties decided the risk was too great to carry out their original plans, but the RUP committee brought out four hundred workers, most of whom were from small craft shops. In Nizhyn (in the Chernihiv province), similar fears forced the cancellation of another demonstration that the Bund and the RUP had planned. Although the mass demonstrations were thwarted, the RUP nevertheless managed to distribute thousands of its May Day leaflets among peasants and factory workers. See, for example, M. Mebel, ed., *1905 god na Ukraine. Khronika i materialy* (Kharkiv 1926), 91–3 and 118.
47. Rybalka, "Pochatky," 336–7; *Selianyn*, no. 30 (June 1905): 9–10.
48. N. Mirza-Avakiiants, *Selianski rozrukhy na Ukraini 1905–1907 roku* (Kiev-Kharkiv [?] 1925), 18; D. Doroshenko, *Moi spomyny pro davnie mynule, 1901–1914* (Winnipeg 1949), 73–4.
49. See, for example, the Kiev RUP proclamation in Hermaize, *Narysy*, 360–1; *Selianyn*, no. 29 (May 1905): 11–12.

50. Andrii Livytsky to Andrii Zhuk, 19–26 May 1921. A. Zhuk Archive, vol. 3 (PAC); A. Margolin, *Ukraina i politika antanty. Zapiski evreia i grazhdanina* (Berlin 1921), 25–6.
51. Interview with Borys Martos, 27 September 1974, Irvington, New Jersey and with Ievhen Batchynsky, 20 February 1976, Bulle, Switzerland.
52. *Protokoly obedinitelnogo sezda Rossiiskoi Sotsial-Demokraticheskoi Rabochei Partii* (Moscow-Leningrad 1926), 20–2.
53. See for example, *Nash holos,* no. 6–8 (1911): 289.
54. A. Rish, *Ocherki po istorii ukrainskoi sots. dem. "Spilki"* (Kharkiv 1926), 23–4.
55. Boshyk, "The Rise," 320.
56. *Iskra,* no. 89 (24 February 1905): 8; on the terms of entry into the RSDLP, see Rish, *Ocherki,* 16 and Hermaize, *Narysy*, 267–8.
57. For Spilka's most complete statement on this issue, see Hermaize, *Narysy*, 383–8.
58. Boshyk, "The Rise," 323 and 328.
59. M. Halahan, *Z moikh spomyniv* (Lviv 1930), 1: 140–4; and Boshyk, "The Rise," 328–9.
60. See, for example, Halahan, *Z spomyniv*, 150–2.
61. Rish, Ocherki, 23–4.
62. M. Melenevsky, "Z ukrainskoho zhyttia (Materiialy). Do istorii Ukrainskoi S.-D. Spilky," *Nova hromada*, no. 3–4 (October-November 1923): 132.
63. See, for example, Rish, "Iz zhizni Spilki (Po lichnym vospominaniiam)," *Letopis revoliutsii,* no. 5 (1923): 128–9.
64. For a list of these publications, see Boshyk, "The Rise," 436. On the URP programme, see 338–41.
65. For the UDRP's programme, see Chykalenko, *Spohady* 415–21; *Prohrama Ukrainskoi Demokratychno-Radykalnoi Partii* (Kiev 1905); for an English translation, see M. H. Voskobiynyk, "The Nationalities Question in Russia in 1905–1907: A Study in the Origin of Modern Nationalism, with Special Reference to the Ukrainians," Ph.D. thesis., University of Pennsylvania, 1972, 499–503.
66. Boshyk, "The Rise," 345–6; T. Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia* (Cambridge, Mass. 1983), 176, 197, 275, 464, 491; and Margolin, *Ukraina,* 19.
67. *Slobozhanshchyna*, no. 1 (March 1906).
68. For further details, see Voskobiynyk, "The Nationalities," 237–52.
69. See Vladimir Jabotinsky's articles in *Ukrainskii vestnik*: V. Z[habotinsky], "Tochka nad i," *Ukrainskii vestnik,* no. 7 (2 July 1906): 399–404; V. Z[habotinsky], "Non multum, sed multa," *Ukrainskii vestnik,* no. 9 (16 July 1906): 645–50.
70. Margolin, *Ukraina,* 24.
71. J. B. Schechtman, *Rebel and Statesman. The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story*, vol. 1 (New York 1956), 400; also Voskobiynyk, "The Nationalities," 449.
72. Voskobiynyk, "The Nationalities," 505.
73. For example, in Kiev province the number of village co-operatives increased from 3 in 1904 to 197 in 1907. Voskobiynyk, "The Nationalities," 395.
74. V. Doroshenko, "Moi spohady pro S. Petliuru," *Svoboda,* no. 5 (1953).
75. Chykalenko, *Spohady,* 429.
76. N. A. Rubakin, *Sredi knig*, vol. III, part I. 2d edition, (Moscow 1915), 144.
77. F. Nemo, [Pylyp Nemolovsky], "Chym nam korystni zhydy?" *Ridnyi krai*, no. 40 (1908); also "Ukrainstvo i evreiska sprava," *Rada*, no. 208 (1908); and M. H. [Maksym Hekhter?] "Antisemitizm chy rozumnyi natsionalnyi egoizm," *Rada*, no. 173 (1908). *Ridnyi krai* also believed that Ukrainian economic co-operatives would help in the struggle against "Jewish exploitation." See "Zizd zastupnykiv vid potrebytelskykh tovarystv." *Ridnyi krai*, no. 42 (1908).

78. Olha Kosach [O. Pchilka], "Nasha sprava z zhydamy," *Ridnyi krai*, no. 44 (1908).
79. *Ridnyi krai*, no. 4–5 (January 1911), 7.
80. I. Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk: (1907–1917)* (Lviv 1931), 40, 42–3. Mykola Mikhnovsky was considered one if its leaders.
81. See, for example, Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk,* 289.
82. As cited in Novus, "Evreiska sprava," no. 6: 3–4.
83. As cited in Novus, "Evreiska sprava," no. 7: 5.
84. Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk,* 263–4. For the attitude of poorer Jews, see 59–60.
85. Ibid., 39.
86. See M. Hrushevsky, "Na ukrainski temy," in *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk,* 38 (1907), as cited in M. Sosnovsky, *Dmytro Dontsov: Politychnyi portret* (New York – Toronto 1974), 52–6.
87. S. N. Shchegolev, *Ukrainskoe dvizhenie kak sovremennyi etap iuzhnorusskago separatizma* (Kiev 1912), 469.
88. Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk,* 185–6.
89. See, for example, the article by S. Iefremov, "Volchaia taktika (Beilis)," *Ukrainskaia zhizn,* no. 11 (1913), 5–11.
90. Shchegolev, *Ukrainskoe dvizhenia,* 471. A. Zhuk notebook on meeting with Zhebunov in Lviv, 1912, A. Zhuk Archive, vol. 1 (file 15), PAC; for the UPP's position against such a bloc, see *Snip*, no. 23–4, 15(28) (June 1912), 11–12.
91. L. Greenberg, *The Jews in Russia,* vol. II, *The Struggle for Emancipation, 1881–1917,* (New Haven 1951), 119.
92. For more details on this episode, see Ukrainska Sotsiialdemokratychna Robitnycha Partiia, *Doklad USDRP Rosii Mizhnarodnomu Sotsiialistychnomu Kongresovy u Kopenhazi* (Lviv 1910).
93. See Ievhen Batchinsky's bibliographical notes on Lola in the Ie. Batchinsky article, Symon Petliura Ukrainian Library, Paris; and Ievhen Liubarsky-Pysmenny's report (November 1914) to Headquarters, Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, Vienna, p. 19, A. Zhuk Archive, vol. 8 (file 24) PAC.
94. See, for example, Novus, "Ievreiska sprava"; V. Levynsky, "Zhydivske pytanie i zhydivska sotsiial-demokratiia v Halychyni," *Nash holos,* no. 3 (January 1911): 148–56; and V. Medem, "Novochasnyi antysemityzm v Rosii," *Nash holos,* no. 3 (January 1911): 156–61 (translation from *Neue Zeit,* 25 November 1910, by Dmytro Dontsov [Dm.-ov])
95. See Mykola Porsh to Andrii Zhuk, 4 February 1908, A. Zhuk Archive, vol. 3 (file 7); V. Medem, *The Life and Soul of a Legendary Jewish Socialist,* ed. and transl. by S. A. Portnoy (New York 1979), 450.
96. D[ontsov, Dmytro], Review of *R.S.D.R.P. Vseobshchii evreiskii rabochii soiuz v Litve, Polshe i Rossii. VIII konferentsiia Bunda.* Izdanie zagranichnago komiteta Bunda. (Geneva 1910). In *Nash holos,* no. 5 (March 1911): 269–70.
97. Novus, "Ievreiska sprava i ukrainski techii," *Slovo*, no. 5 (1909): 2–5; no. 6: 2–4; no. 7 (1909): 4–7.
98. Novus, "Ievreiska sprava," no. 7 (1909): 4–7.
99. See, for example, O. Lototsky, *Storinky mynuloho* (Warsaw 1934), 3: 270; "Ohliad literatury pro ievreiv za desiatyrichchia pislia Zhovtnevoi revoliutsii (1917–1927)," in *Zbirnyk prats Ievreiskoi istorychno-arkheohrafichnoi komisii* (Kiev 1928), 1: 198; and C. Abramsky, "War Revolution and the Jewish Dilemma," Inaugural Lecture Delivered at University College, London (London 1975), 10.
100. Lototsky, *Storinky mynuloho,* 3: 275–7.
101. "Storinka z istorii evreiv za vsesvitnoi viiny," *Zbirnyk prats ievreiskoi istorychno-arkheohrafichnoi komisii* (Kiev 1928), 1: 244.

102. Ibid.; also *The Jews in the Eastern War Zone* (New York 1916), 48–56.
103. Abramsky, *War*, 10.
104. See the SUP's proclamation in S. Iefremov, comp., "Ukraintsi i sprava zamyrennia. Dva dokumenty z nedavnoho chasu. 1. Nasha pozytsiia. 2. Lyst do prezydenta Vilsona," *Nashe mynule*, no. 3 (1918): 129–31.
105. S. W. Baron, *The Russian Jew under the Tsars and Soviets* (London 1964), 200; D. Doroshenko, *Istoriia Ukrainy 1917–1923 rr.*, 2d edition (New York 1954), 1: 11–17.
106. Margolin, *Ukraina*, 33.
107. O. Hermaize, comp., "Materialy do istorii ukrainskoho rukhu za svitovoi viiny," *Ukrainskyi arkheohrafichnyi zbirnyk,* vol. 1 (1926), 339; Hunchak and Solchanyk, *Ukrainska . . . dumka,* 1: 239.
108. Ibid., 230.
109. Hermaize, "Materiialy," 337.
110. Ibid., 334.
111. Ibid., 320–1.
112. Liubarsky-Pysmenny's report to the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, A. Zhuk Archive, pp. 7, and 12.
113. A. Margolin, *The Jews of Eastern Europe* (New York 1926), 130.
114. Shchegolev, *Ukrainskoe dvizenie,* 470–71.
115. Notes by Andrii Zhuk on his discussion with Zhebunov, A. Zhuk Archive, vol. 1 (file 15), PAC.
116. Hryhoriiv, "Tvortsi," no. 6, 14. See also many articles by Zhabotynsky recently translated and published in Ukrainian: V. Zhabotynsky, *Vybrani statti z natsionalnoho pytannia.* Translation, introduction, notes and commentary by I. Kleiner ([Munich] 1983).
117. See, for example, Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk,* 59–60.
118. Shchegolev, *Ukrainskoe dvizheniia,* 470.
119. Lesia Ukrainka to Felix Volkhovsky, 17 March 1903, Felix Volkhovsky collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University; also recently published in *Lesia Ukrainka 1871–1971* (Philadelphia 1980), 291–98.
120. Shchegolev, *Ukrainskoe dvizhenie,* 472.
121. J. A. Armstrong, "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas," *American Political Science Review,* 70 (1970): 394, 398–9.
122. Margolin, *The Jews of Eastern Europe,* 81.
123. Hrushevsky, "Na ukrainski temy."
124. I. Chykalenko, *Uryvok z moikh spomyniv za 1912 r.* (Prague 1932), 15–16.

III

The Revolution and After

Geoff Eley

Remapping the Nation: War, Revolutionary Upheaval and State Formation in Eastern Europe, 1914–1923

As I understand it, my role in this paper is to say something about the general context of the settlement in Eastern Europe after the First World War. In doing so, I enter an immediate disclaimer. I am no specialist in these matters, either by period, by geographical area or by linguistic expertise. On the other hand, I do have a general interest in problems of nationalism, in the European revolutionary conjuncture of 1917–23 and in the varying forms of anti-Semitism. As a German historian, it is hard not to be interested in such things. But it is essentially as an outsider that I come to Jewish-Ukrainian relations—as, so to speak, a German historian looking East. This being said, I shall try to do three things: to say something about the general period 1914–23, by highlighting certain features of the overall picture which may sometimes be neglected in more particularized discussions; to place the various affirmations of Ukrainian nationhood in the comparative context of similar movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and to say something more specifically about the Ukrainian Revolution in the years 1917–20. Among whatever virtues my comments may have, originality will not be high on the list. I am painfully conscious of my dependence on the empirical and interpretative labours of others whose detailed understanding of East European society I shall never possess. I offer these sometimes disconnected thoughts simply as a possible basis for discussion, therefore, and hope that some serviceable agenda of interesting questions will emerge.

I

A first point concerns periodization. How do we define the boundaries of the postwar settlement? The obvious conventional focus is the period between the end of the war and the Versailles Treaty in 1918–19. But these boundaries should be extended in a number ways. Most immediately, of course, come the Central-East European supplements to Versailles: St. Germain in September 1919 (with Austria), Neuilly in November 1919 (with Bulgaria), Trianon in June 1920 (with Hungary) and Sèvres in August 1920 (with Turkey). But beyond these were other agreements ratifying new territorial arrangements in the East—those concerning the Balkans (the Treaty of Lausanne 1923), those concerning the Baltic (the Treaty of Dorpat-Tatru 1920, the Peace of Moscow 1920, the Peace of Riga 1921, the Polish seizure of Vilnius 1920–2, the Lithuanian annexation of Memel 1923–4), and those concerning Transcaucasia and Central Asia (the Treaties of Alexandrapol and Kars 1920–1). Each of these was preceded by bitterly contested military conflicts, and it was no accident that most of them concerned the great power that had been absent from the deliberations at Versailles, namely Soviet Russia. Most of them also carried the dimension of a civil war.

Above all, therefore, we have to extend our definition of the postwar settlement *backward* in time to include the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918) and its adjunct, the Peace of Bucharest (May 1918). In a very important sense the Baltic, Balkan and Transcaucasian conflicts of 1919–23 were attempts to reassemble the ethno-political territorial wreckage left by the short-lived greater-German imperium of Brest-Litovsk. In a similar vein we can regard the most dramatic diplomatic coup of the early postwar years—the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922—as a German attempt to resume the ambitions of Brest-Litovsk under new and more normal conditions.[1] For the East, therefore, the conventional stress on Versailles (i. e., 1918–19) is singularly inappropriate. At the very least we should extend the period of the postwar settlement from March 1918 (Brest-Litovsk) to 1921 (when agreements with Poland and Turkey finally regulated the Soviet state's northern and southern theatres of contention). Arguably, we should extend it further to include 1922–3, which brought temporary resolutions for other points of difficulty in the East (Treaties of Rapallo and Lausanne, seizures of Vilnius and Memel).

Of course, once we make central reference to the Soviet state we remind ourselves that the postwar settlement was not simply a matter of territorial rearrangement and relations among states; it was also a matter of revolutionary upheaval. Eastern Europe's political instability was so acute in these years because the redistribution of territory took place amidst the collapse of existing state authorities: it involved less the read-

justment of existing boundaries than the creation of entirely new states, whose internal social and political relations had to be constituted from scratch. This was perhaps marked in those parts of Imperial Russia subject to German occupation between the summer of 1917 and the autumn of 1918, but particularly in the aftermath of Brest-Litovsk: as the destructive and rapacious German administration receded, it left a calamitously anarchic situation, in which it proved extraordinarily difficult to overcome the disorganization of civil society and to re-establish a stable governing authority. Of course, by 1917 the Russian autocracy and its state apparati had already reached an advanced state of decomposition. But the main effect of the German military sledgehammer was to smash whatever was left of the old fabric of social cohesion in the Baltic, Belorussia and Ukraine. In other words, the consequences of the German occupation were causally imbricated in the difficulties of building a stable post-revolutionary governing order after the Bolshevik seizure of power.

By interposing itself between the peoples of the Russian Empire and their practical rights of self-determination at a crucial moment of revolutionary political rupture—after the old order had collapsed, but while the new was still struggling to be born (to adapt a saying of Gramsci)—the German military administration suspended the process of democratic experimentation before it had hardly begun. The Germans' essentially destructive impact explains some of the difficulty experienced by the competing political leaderships in the western borderlands of Russia during 1918–20 in creating a lasting relationship to a large enough coalition of social support. The various political forces—Bolshevik, left-nationalist, autonomist, separatist, counter-revolutionary—operated more or less in a political vacuum in a fragile and indeterminate relationship to the local population, not just because the Belorussian and Ukrainian societies were so "backward" (the explanation normally given), but because the cumulative effects of war, imperial collapse and German occupation had radically dislocated existing social organization, strengthening old antagonisms between groups and inaugurating new ones.

Turning to the revolutionary dimension of the postwar settlement in the East, pride of place obviously belongs to the Russian Revolution. But as the above remarks will already have intimated, even here we have to differentiate. Given the primary Petrograd-Moscow axis of the central revolutionary contest, the urban basis of most Bolshevik support, the unevenness of their penetration outside the central Russian regions, and the independent dynamic of events in the non-Russian ones, there are grounds for seeing the major regional experiences (Baltic, Ukrainian, Transcaucasian, even Belorussian) as separate revolutionary processes with an integrity of their own. This was the view of Reshetar's now classic account of the Ukrainian Revolution, and the same case can readily be

made for Finland, the Baltic and the Caucasus.[2] In this instance the coherence of the overall revolutionary experience was only fitfully imposed by the Bolsheviks' universalizing vision of a new European order, combined with the centralizing logic of the new state's efforts to survive during the Civil War. In their different ways, both major accounts of the history of the Revolution in its first six years make this into a major theme of their work.[3]

At the same time, the revolutionary radicalism of the postwar years was also a European-wide phenomenon, whose internationalist character resulted not just from the unifying interventions of a prestigious international vanguard (the Bolsheviks). That character also resulted from the occurrence of common problems, originating in the interventionist structure of the war economy and the associated changes in the state-society relationship. Taking this global setting into account, a number of major theatres may be mentioned: the war-related industrial militancy in Germany and Austria in the early months of 1918, followed by the major working-class insurgencies which lasted from the end of the war to the early 1920s; the similar events in Italy which reached their climax in the famous occupation of the factories in the autumn of 1920; the Hungarian Soviet in March-August 1919 and its reverberations elsewhere in Central Europe (including the shortlived Slovakian Soviet in July); the *Trienio Bolchevista* of 1918–20 in Spain; the less dramatic militancy in Britain and France; and the brief flourishing of Communist insurgency in Poland between late 1918 and early 1919.

After the initial revolutionary changeovers in Germany and Austria in November 1918, the most concentrated period of revolutionary agitation was framed by the first and third Comintern Congresses in March 1919 and June 1921. Its high point coincided with the Second Congress in July 1920, as the Red Army marched on Warsaw. As Carr says: "The second Congress marked the crowning moment in the history of the Comintern as an international force, the moment when the Russian revolution seemed most certainly on the point of transforming itself into the European revolution, with the destinies of the RSFSR merged in those of some broader European unit."[4] Yet by August the tide was already running in the opposite direction. After the Polish counter-offensive of 16 August "the Red Army was retreating as rapidly as it had advanced,"[5] until an armistice was signed on 12 October followed by the Peace of Riga in March 1921. By October 1920 the council movement in Milan and Turin was defeated and the Italian labour movement entered a period of advancing demoralization. In Germany, "the key-point of the European revolution,"[6] the March Action in 1921 proved to be a fiasco. Then in March 1921, in a dangerously disintegrating domestic situation, the Soviet government adopted the New Economic Policy (NEP) and con-

cluded a trade agreement with Britain. This brought the period of decisive revolutionary politics west of the Vistula to a close, and the Comintern's adoption of the "United Front" line at the third Congress in June 1921 was the logical international correlate of the NEP. Measured against this contraction of the European-wide revolutionary movement, the subsequent instances of Communist-directed (or misdirected) insurgency (Bulgaria, September 1923; Hamburg, October 1923; Reval-Tallinn, December 1924) had the character of a mistimed and adventurist coda.

Now, both these dimensions—the territorial-political one, and the revolutionary one—are essential to an understanding of the postwar settlement in Eastern Europe. Moreover, each was linked to a particular configuration of socio-political forces in East European society and to a particular ideological representation of that society's dominant characteristics—to the competing claims, that is, of *nationality* and *class* as the organizing principles of the post-imperial East European order. Simplifying wildly and confining our remarks in the first instance to the former territories of the Romanov as opposed to the Habsburg Empire, we might say that the primary claims of nationality were affirmed by broadly reformist coalitions among the respective national intelligentsias, with varying but normally quite indeterminate links to a larger popular constituency and equally varying but far more definite links to the external patronage of a foreign great power. The primary claims of class, on the other hand, were asserted by the smaller revolutionary fractions among the national intelligentsias, whose "national" origins (in the socio-cultural as opposed to the subjective-ideological sense) were frequently obscured by a "Russian" orientation and the supra-regional character and centralist bias of the political apparatus into which they had become assimilated (the Bolshevik Party). Each of these tendencies (best exemplified perhaps in the contrast between, say, the Vynnychenko-Petliura leadership of the Ukrainian Directory and the Katerynoslav faction of the Bolsheviks during 1918) *claimed* affinities with the people at large (whether peasant, proletarian or middle-class), but in most cases this relationship was more rhetorical than real. Only in the towns, where peculiarities of social structure might deliver various types of ready-made support (e. g., students, railway workers and other uniformed working class, certain grades of administrative and professional personnel), could the parties progress to genuine popularity. In the case of the Bolsheviks, for whom the heavily Russian-cum-Russified character of the industrial working class in the major Ukrainian cities provided the main popular recruiting ground in that region, this exacerbated rather than improved their access to a specifically Ukrainian popular legitimacy.

How exactly these political dynamics worked themselves out varied

region by region, depending on the degree of urbanization, the exact nature of the town-country relationship and the precise ways in which ethnic divisions shaped or determined the class structure. But broadly speaking, the following pattern prevailed in the non-Russian regions: a patriotic intelligentsia, small but highly motivated, with long traditions of expatriate and semi-clandestine political activity, educated in the classical nineteenth-century ideologies of nationality, but essentially frustrated in its desire for popular proselytizing by the politically repressive and Russifying policies of the tsarist government; sharing in the general upsurge of political organization in the Russian Empire between the late 1890s and 1905, well rooted in increasingly dense associational networks of a cultural, educational and recreational kind which extended potentially outward into the ranks of the artisanate, small tradesmen and even the working class, but with far more tenuous links to the countryside; catapulted into a more ambitious political consciousness by the events of 1905–17, which decisively recast the national-political imagination and placed federalist-autonomist and separatist projects realistically on the agenda; faced in 1917 not only with the unforeseen but exhilarating possibilities of the newly hegemonic ideology of national self-determination, but with the self-confident intrusion of the peculiar Bolshevik version of that ideology, which made self-determination contingent upon the implementation of a programme of social revolution whose combined urban-rural base had yet to be constructed.

The balance of political forces varied from region to region, and it may be possible to order the resulting complexity in relation to two ideal-typical scenarios. Where the ethnic composition of the towns had become relatively homogeneous by the early twentieth century and the national movement enjoyed a longer provenance, under a less repressive tsarist administration, and with the benefit of a somewhat broader urban public (e. g., Finland, Estonia, to some extent Latvia), the nationalist intelligentsia could be far more successful in establishing its hegemony over the urban popular movement during 1917–18; but the urban population was far more mixed before 1914 (as in Belorussia, with its large population of Russians, Jews and Poles, as well as the smaller Belorussian elements) and the national movement as yet unformed, the Bolsheviks managed to establish themselves reasonably securely. Of course, in practice particular situations tended to distribute themselves somewhere between these poles. Where a fairly self-conscious nationalist intelligentsia co-existed with other urban groups who were ethnically distinct with well developed corporate identities (Jews, "official" Russians, proletarian Russians), as in Ukraine, the situation was far more inchoate and confused.

Two other points may be made about the character of the nationality-

class dialectic. First, a comparison with the Habsburg territories will re-emphasize the importance of the imperial political structures in the half-century between the 1860s and the period 1914–23. I have already suggested briefly that the particular regional configuration of nationality-class alignments varied in the Romanov territories at least in part with the degree of repressiveness of the tsarist administration, and the salience of this factor increases once we look westward to the more flexible imperial structures of the Dual Monarchy. It is clear, for instance, that the limited post-1867 guarantee of constitutional freedoms and the Habsburg willingness to co-opt the more important national minorities combined with the higher levels of educational provision and cultural development to create a far greater public space for the proselytizing activities of nationalist intellectuals. The availability of a legally tolerated public sphere in this sense made all the difference between a fully developed and a merely nascent or emergent nationalist movement, a contrast which the disparity between East Galicia and Russian Ukraine makes readily apparent. In a similar way, the much longer sedimentation of urban political culture in Bohemia and Moravia combined with the ethnic solidarities between the Czech intelligentsia and working class to hold the Czech labour movement firmly within the hegemonic framework of national-reformist politics and self-determination at a time (1918–19) when its German-speaking and Magyar counterparts were striking out in dramatically independent revolutionary directions. On the other hand, where the working class was divided from the local-regional bourgeoisies by ethnic differences it was often easier to mobilize it for revolutionary politics, and in this sense the Russian-cum-Russified working class of the western borderlands acted as a Bolshevik wedge into the anticipated popular hegemony of the respective nationalist movements. As a number of authors have pointed out, this was particularly marked in Ukraine.

Second, we also need to ascend still one level of explanation before the interpretative framework is complete, namely to the level of the international system. When the East European imperial structures disappeared in 1917–18, they were not replaced by a totally "Balkanized" international polity. Most obviously in this respect, the Bolsheviks aspired to reassemble the various Romanov territories on some sort of federated basis, while in the former Hapsburg lands some attention was paid to the creation of viable successor states, either through pandering to the "greater-national" claims of some nationalities (like the Romanians and Poles) or by amalgamating others into newly fashioned artificial entities (like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). More to the point, the competing conceptions of self-determination—the abstract liberal one and the increasingly differentiated Bolshevik one, which linked the legitimacy of the claim to self-determination to the specific class configura-

tion of the nationality-region concerned—were also articulated into powerful ideologies of an international new order, nicely encapsulated in Wilson's Fourteen Points of 8 January 1918 and Lenin's "Theses on the Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" of March 1916. As Arno Mayer pointed out in his classic account of the "new diplomacy," the Bolshevik stance on self-determination at Brest-Litovsk (as represented in Joffe's opening declaration on 22 December 1917) had the effect of decisively upping the ante for the Western Allies. Ideas of national self-determination for Eastern Europe had hardly been completely absent from certain sections of Allied opinion earlier in the war.[7] But henceforth they increasingly dominated the "public framework" of discussion concerning the postwar order in a way that could never have been anticipated three years before.[8]

Several comments need to be made about this global political framework. While the ideology of self-determination became generally hegemonic in the East European discussions during 1917–23 and while the shorthand "Wilson vs. Lenin" captures a vital reality in that sense, Mayer also concedes the presence of a third position, namely the "old diplomacy" practiced at Versailles by Clemenceau and Sonnino (and corresponding "in the field," one might add, to the Allied military intervention in the Civil War, which amounted to a reactionary insertion between the Bolsheviks and the democratic political representations of the non-Russian nationalities). Similarly, the new climate did not prevent the newly emancipated nationalities from riding roughshod over one another's claims, as the Poles and Romanians in particular proceeded to confirm. The post-1917 shifts in Bolshevik nationalities policy should also be noted. Mayer puts these down to changing tactical circumstances, like the diplomatic pressures arising from the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk.[9] But to get a better grasp of their complexities we have to turn to Carr, where they are plotted in relation to (a) successive phases of the revolutionary process through "dispersal" to "reunion" of the former imperial territories, and (b) the theoretical distinction drawn by Lenin and Stalin between nations yet to have experienced their bourgeois revolutions (where the right of national self-determination *tout court* should be upheld) and those "where a cleavage had already been established between proletariat and bourgeoisie" (where Bukharin's formula of "self-determination for the working masses" could apply).[10] Finally and most important, as Mayer also pointed out, Bolshevik policies also extended from Europe itself to the colonies—in Lenin's words "toward the Orient, Asia, Africa, the colonies, where this movement is not a thing of the past but of the present and the future."[11] As well as asserting "the inextricable connection between the national movement and the class struggle," therefore, Lenin also invoked the importance of the "colonial

awakening" and of colonialism as (in Mayer's words) "an integral part of an historically conditioned yet waning world-power configuration."[12]

Pulling this together, we might say that for Eastern Europe it is precisely in the question of national self-determination that the territorial-political and revolutionary dimensions of the postwar settlement dramatically intersect. Moreover, their complex interaction extends from the very local (e.g., the fluctuating allegiances of Ukrainian peasants) to the most global levels of the political process between 1917 and 1923 (e.g., the rival internationalist projects of "reactionaries," "reconstructionists" and "revolutionaries," as Mayer calls them). To gain an adequate purchase on both the perceptions of political actors and the conditions-pressures that structured, directed and constrained their actions, a sophisticated analysis of the postwar settlement has to move back and forth *between* these different levels (locality/region/nation /state/state-system). This should not be taken as an argument against the social history of the revolution in the western borderlands or against explanations that stress the social determinants of the revolution's outcome. But after the heady liberalizing release of 1917, the Ukrainian national movement found itself increasingly squeezed between the superior military and organizational resources of rival international designs—the counter-revolutionary and self-interested ambitions of the great powers (first the Germans, then the British and French) and the revolutionary ambitions of the Bolsheviks—neither of which proved particularly sensitive to the complexities of regional, let alone local situations. The importance of this international level—the political dynamics of the emergence of [the] New Diplomacy," as he puts it—is well stated by Arno Mayer:

> Before long Lenin, Wilson, and Clemenceau converged in Eastern Europe, each statesman raising the national self-determination banner in the pursuit of different objectives. Against great odds Lenin sought to connect the East European nationalist movements with the class struggle and the Third International. On the other hand, with greater chance of success, while seeking to arouse the nationalities against their Austro-Hungarian masters, Wilson also tied these movements to the Central European bourgeois-democratic revolution and the League of Nations. As for Clemenceau, his ambitions were basically very traditional: he encouraged the formation of the small Eastern European nation-states primarily in the hope that these new states would take the place of Russia as France's partner in an alliance calculated to keep Germany at bay.[13]

Before moving to an evaluation of the Ukrainian national movement in these years, I want to make a number of additional discrete points about the context. Again, these are not particularly original. But they are worth

drawing attention to, partly because they help to illustrate the general argument made above (concerning the dual character of the postwar settlement, territorial-political and social revolutionary) and partly because they provide additional points of reference for the specifically Ukrainian discussion that follows.

(a) The fundamental East European geopolitical shift from the four historic multi-national empires (Romanov, Hapsburg, Hohenzollern and Ottoman) to the new nation-states (some historic, some not) introduced a new degree of territorial fragmentation into the political landscape of the region. Economically speaking, this proved to be profoundly disruptive, and combined with a misguided commitment to protectionism did much to retard the development of the successor states in the interwar years. Sidney Pollard, the recent historian of European economic integration, summarizes this situation:

> Altogether there were now 38 independent economic units in Europe instead of 26, 27 currencies instead of 14, and the frontiers had been lengthened by 12,500 miles. In the former Austrian lands, in particular, economic relationships of a fundamental nature, some of them going back over centuries, were thereby destroyed. Thus in the textile industry the spinning and finishing mills were now in Austria, the looms in Czechoslovakia; Austrian tanneries lost the sources of their hides and tanning materials; the Alpine ironworks lost their coal, Czech industries lost their markets, Hungarian flour mills both sources of grain and markets. The Hungarian irrigation and flood system was now separated by the frontiers from its control points; frontiers separated workers from their factories, cattle from their grazing grounds, towns from their traditional food supply, sugar-beet factories from their fields. Worst of all, the railway system had no relation to the new political geography: centred on Vienna, it failed to connect different parts of Czechoslovakia with each other, some of the sidings near the frontiers were left without purpose, and in some areas they crossed frontiers several times back and forth. Much of East-Central Europe became cut off from its former sea outlets, while Trieste and Fiume decayed.[14]

For Pollard the postwar settlement stands at a major intersection of two fundamental tendencies of modern historical development. On the one hand, there is an unmistakeable long-run tendency toward European economic integration, through the construction of international transportation systems, the freeing of waterways, the internationalization of commercial law, the creation of international agencies to regulate postal and telegraphic communication, the free movement of labour and capital across state frontiers, reciprocal trading agreements and so on. This amounted to the institutional consolidation of the capitalist world

market, whose global penetration has been characteristic of the epoch beginning in the period 1848–73.[15] The trend was compellingly apparent before 1914, and the more visionary economists and politicians were already turning their minds to more ambitious forms of economic co-operation among states, among which British notions of imperial preference and the German idea of *Mitteleuropa* were the most ambitious.[16]

On the other hand, the sustained vitality of the nation-state ideal showed no signs of diminishing in the early twentieth century. In his polemics with Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin distinguished "two historical tendencies in the national question," both of which were "a universal law of capitalism," each predominating at a different stage of development, "early" and "mature": first, "the awakening of national life and national movements, the struggle against all national oppression, and the creation of national states"; and second, "the development and growing frequency of international intercourse in every form, the breakdown of national barriers, the creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, science, etc."[17] This serviceable distinction created the principled basis for the Bolsheviks' formal nationalities policy after 1917. But despite Lenin's extremely classical faith in historical process and the laws of capitalist development (sometimes obscured by discussions of Bolshevik voluntarism), there is little evidence that the internationalization of capital has brought a lessening of national antagonisms in its train, or that ideologies of national difference (and superiority) have lost their efficacy. The First World War itself was powerful evidence to this effect, as were the nationalist cast of the peace settlement and the subsequent history of European inter-state relations. Furthermore, contrary to the Bolsheviks' internationalist expectations, the "completion of bourgeois-democratic reforms" and the primacy of the proletarian-bourgeois cleavage in the class structure (the Bolshevik criteria for qualifying the "pure" advocacy of self-determination for individual nations) did not destroy the hold of national-particular allegiances on the mass of the working class. So far from atrophying, one might argue, these became firmly entrenched, although (as the working-class supporters of the Third International Communist Parties were to show) they could also co-exist with sincerely held internationalist beliefs. Finally, we should also remember (*pace* Pollard) that the greatest single force for European economic integration (in the sense of helping such tendencies to political fruition) has been the regional continental predominance of a succession of great powers (Germany, the United States, the Soviet Union).

(b) Viewed over the long term, the postwar settlement of 1917–23 was the most recent phase in a general process of national state formation which goes back to the American and French Revolutions of 1776 and

1789. Nairn (following Gellner) links this process to the uneven diffusion of industrialization-modernization, as "the advancing capitalism of the more bourgeois societies bore down upon the societies surrounding them—societies which predominantly appear until the 1790s as buried in feudal and absolutist slumber":

> The "tidal wave" invaded one zone after another, in concentric circles. First Germany and Italy, the areas of relatively advanced and unified culture adjacent to the Anglo-French centre. It was in them that the main body of typically nationalist politics and culture was formulated. Almost at the same time, or shortly after, Central and Eastern Europe, and the more peripheral regions of Iberia, Ireland and Scandinavia. Then Japan and, with the full development of imperialism, much of the rest of the globe.[18]

What Nairn calls "the nationalism-producing dilemma" originated in the structured developmental handicaps that the unevenness of industrialization imposed on the more backward societies—in the awareness among the various national intelligentsias that the developmental gap could only be bridged by determined efforts to cast off the domination of the more advanced and exploitative cultures, whether British, French, German or Italian. How exactly this affected individual societies depended very much on the particularities of the economies and social structures concerned, the nature of the political system and the local relations of domination and subordination among nationalities. As Nairn says, "The dilemma of under-development becomes 'nationalism' only when it is (so to speak) refracted through a given society, perceived in a certain way, and then acted upon"; and Nairn distinguishes the composition of the intelligentsia and the modalities of popular mobilization as the key variables in this respect.[19] I shall be returning to this discussion in the context of Ukrainian nationalism. For the moment it is worth noting the following periods of concentrated "nation-forming" activity:

1. c. 1800–c.1830: early definition of "national categories" in regions outside the western rim of older territorial states (i.e., Spain, France, Britain, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden), together with early independence struggles in Greece and Latin America;
2. c.1830–48: the "Young Europe" movement inspired by Mazzini in most of Western Europe (Italy, Switzerland, Germany, France, Ireland and Poland, a kind of honorary "Western" nation), and the "national awakenings" in East Central Europe (Czech, Hungarian, Slovak, Croatian, Serb, Romanian);
3. 1848–49: the revolutionary precipitation of national political identity;

4. 1859–71: national unification and state formation in central Europe (Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary);
5. c.1876–1914: further national awakenings on the north-eastern and south-eastern periphery (Norway, the Baltic and Finland, Albania, Bulgaria) and Galician Ukraine, intensified political agitation in East Central Europe (Poland, Bohemia, Croatia);
6. 1914–1923: consummation.

(c) From the point of view of national self-determination, the postwar settlement was an extremely imperfect one. This is well-known, but there is no harm in spelling it out. On the one hand, the settlement significantly alleviated the East European nationality problem: "The effect of Versailles was to reduce the numerical scale of the eastern European minority problem by about one-half: whereas one half of the population were minorities in 1914, only one-quarter were in 1919."[20] Moreover, by contrast with the old dynastic empires, "After 1919, every state featured a nationality with a numerical majority or, in the cases of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, a near-majority, which automatically rendered it 'dominant'."[21] On the other hand, the new states reproduced the older patterns of ethnic heterogeneity on a smaller but no less bothersome scale, which made them "mini-empires" rather than "nation-states" in any pure sense. Pearson divides the larger states into three pairs: (1) "artificial, multinational states with a dubious legitimacy in an age of nationalism," where the relatively weak position of the dominant nationality placed a premium on forms of federation and pluralist compromise (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia); (2) the main Eastern beneficiaries of Versailles, where "greater-national" ideologies and the "relatively small proportion of minorities" (around 30 per cent) created a greater temptation toward repressive "integral nationalism" (Poland and Romania); and (3) the Eastern victims of Versailles, who were essentially "cannibalized to provide the territorial gains of the beneficiaries," showed a high degree of ethnic homogeneity (85–90 per cent), but developed strong "revisionist" hostilities as a result (Hungary, Bulgaria). Moreover, the corollary of the minority problem was the existence of large expatriate populations, ranging from 0.8 per cent of all Serbians to 44 per cent of all Albanians. The smaller states of Albania and the Baltic basically exhibited the same problems.[22]

(d) Demographically, the period 1914–23 was an East European catastrophe. In addition to direct military and civilian casualties of the First World War itself (rising as high as 20 per cent of the 1914 population in Serbia), we also have to consider the effects of the 1918–19 influ-

enza and other epidemics, the enormous refugee migrations (formalized for the first time in the Greco-Bulgarian and Greco-Turkish population transfers of 1919–23), the shortfall in anticipated births because of population losses, and large-scale postwar internal migrations. In greater Russia these effects were magnified by the Revolution and the Civil War. The resulting "demographic earthquake" meant that "By 1923 Russia's population was about thirty million people fewer than it might have expected: the shortfall included about sixteen million dead as a result of war and civil-war killings, famine and epidemics, and the remainder was accounted for by the calamities which befell potential parents."[23] By 1923 the "Russian" émigré population may have been as many as two million. Between 1917 and 1920 there was an extraordinary urban population loss (33 per cent in 357 cities of the European RSFSR), massive reemigration to the countryside and equally massive migrations among rural regions (including a major process of "decolonization" or "de-Russification" east of the Urals, what Kulischer calls "the reflux of the great wave which had gone eastwards beginning in 1915 and from which had spread a southbound segment"). In addition there was the movement in and out of armies, and the impact of those armies themselves as they moved back and forth through the countryside. Until the respite of the NEP and the brief stabilization of the mid-1920s (and before the renewed convulsions of collectivization and the Five-Year Plan), Soviet Russia was essentially a society on the move.[24]

(e) The period 1917–23 began the division of the world system into two ideological blocs. Even allowing for the vital dualism of Soviet foreign policy and Comintern strategy,[25] which necessitated different kinds of bilateral agreements with the capitalist world (not to speak of the functional accession to the conventions of international law and diplomatic exchange), the Bolsheviks had still effected a fundamental restructuring of the international system. The very existence of the Comintern was testimony to this fact, as were the audacious attempts to revolutionize the colonial and non-European world.[26] Similarly, the original conception of the Third International had included a number of regional bureaus, and one of these, the Southern Bureau in Kiev in 1919–20, was the linear predecessor of the Balkan Communist Federation, which embodied a fairly serious commitment to federal co-ordination between 1920 and 1928.[27] On the other side, of course, the Russian Revolution decisively refocused the priorities of the capitalist powers onto the problems of isolating or containing the new Soviet state. As the Civil War and the fate of the Hungarian Soviet made only too clear, this created the possibility of international counter-revolutionary intervention wherever successful revolutionary initiatives took shape. Henceforth the *threat* of foreign inter-

vention became almost as important as the actuality and introduced a massive constraint on the left's capacity for decisive action even in relatively favourable situations.[28] Equally decisively, the experiences of 1917–23 heightened the vigilance of governments against the oppositional activity of their own popular classes.

(f) The years 1914–23 were a crucial watershed in the shape of the European socialist movement. Before 1914 we are dealing with parties that had achieved a high degree of inclusive organizational unity within their national societies at the expense of tolerating a fair degree of ideological diversity within their ranks; after 1923 we are faced with national movements that are organizationally disunited but ideologically increasingly cohesive in their individual parts. As Hobsbawm says, after 1923 the Second International norm of "single national socialist movements organizationally united but ideologically pluralist" becomes exceedingly rare, and since the early 1920s the European left has been permanently split between Communist and Social Democratic/Socialist Parties, "neither of whose patterns of behaviour or traditions can be understood without constant reference to the October Revolution."[29] Taking up the same theme, Anderson has drawn attention to the mass transfer of popular political allegiances within the working class on a scale and with an intensity which have been quite unusual in the period between the mid-nineteenth century and the present. "In a short period of time, running approximately from 1919 to, say, 1922 or 1923, something historically very rare occurred in many European countries; there was a transfer of loyalties within large sections of the working class from one political organization and programme to another." As Anderson says, "That process is something that has later proved very difficult to repeat," the only comparable "founding moment" coming during the Second World War, "from about 1942 to 1945, which witnessed a further great wave of communisation within popular and labour movements."[30]

(g) It is worth comparing the European revolutionary conjuncture of 1917–21 with the earlier European-wide revolutionary crisis of 1848–9. Aside from the more sophisticated popular mobilizations further to the west and the generalized ferment of the countryside, 1848 in Eastern Europe was "overwhelmingly a full-scale nationalist challenge to the Imperial establishment" of the Hapsburg monarchy.[31] By 1917–21 the assertion of nationalist claims was immeasurably complicated by the social revolutionary content of the political struggles and by the presence of a nationally and internationally organized socialist movement. In some areas (e.g., Bohemia, Hungary, Poland, to a lesser extend Finland, Latvia, Estonia) this complexity was indigenously generated as industrial-

ization created the distinctive urban social structure and its associated civic institutions. But in other areas, where organized national consciousness was only now approaching the levels displayed by, say, the Magyars and Czechs in 1848 (for which Russian Ukraine may stand as the classic example), such complexities were intruded from the "outside," by groups whose relationship to the "awakening" nationality was perceived to be problematic (in the case of Ukraine the Russian/Russified working class, important sections of organized Jewry, and preeminently the Bolsheviks). This "alien" character of a large part of the urban social movement simply entrenched the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the abstract self-determinationist ideology to which they felt they were historically entitled, but which could never be purely realized. The "non-Ukrainian" character of the urban social movement was pivotal to the revolutionary configuration. It kept the classical nineteenth-century aspiration of nationality alive, while constituting a decisive obstacle to its practical pursuit. Consequently, although 1917 elicited a patriotism of the intelligentsia which was fully comparable to that of 1848, a new "springtime of the peoples" could never be straighforwardly experienced.

(h) The military dimension of the comparison with 1848 is also important. The disintegration of peasant conscript armies played a vital part both in the initial revolutionary crises of 1917–18 and in the ability of the various revolutionary leaderships to raise popular armies going beyond the usual urban militias. By contrast, the Imperial armies of 1848 proved to be extremely durable "supra-national" instruments of order and repression—"most effective agencies of the political establishment, bastions of the status quo and the last institutions to succumb to either the pressure or the appeal of nationalism."[32] As Sked has shown, it was mainly the Imperial army in Northern Italy under Radetzky that stood between the Hapsburgs and political collapse in 1848 and as such was the vital element of institutional and ideological cohesion for the forces of order.[33]

(i) The experiences of 1914–23 had the effect of radically hardening the perceptions of national difference. Given the drastic territorial reorganizations that succeeded one another during and after the war, in the context of such immense human carnage, this was hardly surprising. With the triumphs of some nationalities and the disappointments of others (and the revisionist resentments of Bulgars, Magyars and Germans menacing the horizon), the postwar settlement provided obvious materials for various kinds of radicalized adversary nationalism, of which anti-Semitism was the most virulent. In Germany after 1917–18 there was an unmistakeable harshening of the general racist and anti-Semitic

climate,[34] and similar processes may be identified in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.[35] Here again, the expansionist projects of the great powers played a key part, both by repressing some nationalities and by converting others into clients. For example, the alignment of the Jews with the occupying German administration (actual and perceived) during and after 1915 not surprisingly stimulated Polish animosities, as did the equally fragile Ukrainian-German co-operation in 1918. The vast population movements of these years, in the form both of conscript armies and of refugees, also played their part, as previously remote peoples were brought face to face for the first time. It was in encounters of this kind, as the German officers, soldiers and civilian personnel recorded their reactions to the ways and appearance of the peoples of the East (Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians and above all the reviled *Ostjuden*) that the radical-right racism of the interwar period had many of its origins.[36] In essence this was similar to the hostility of host societies to the backwardness, exoticism and "otherness" of immigrants and to the suspicions and disregard of metropolitan cultures for the primitive society of peasants. In each case a dramatic cultural dissonance was easily linked to more specific ideologies of national and racial inferiority. In that sense the German nationalist (and German Jewish) image of the *Ostjude* was the particular form of a general ideological syndrome, with its counterpart in many other ethno-cultural contradictions (e.g., the Polish and Polish Jewish image of the Litvak, or German attitudes toward Polish migrant labourers before 1914).

(j) Another effect of this hardening of national differences was to remove what we might call the residual indeterminacy in an individual's national allegiance and national identity. As many authors have now pointed out, "nationality" was an ideological construct of the nineteenth century and "nations" were culturally and politically created rather than naturally pregiven, the distinctive achievement of patriotic intelligentsias and their proselytizing activities, borne by social processes of modernization and consolidated by the unifying interventions of a political movement.[37] A sense of national belonging had to be consciously cultivated, and from this it follows not only that different degrees and modes of national identification were possible, but that at a certain level, membership of a particular nationality might involve an act of conscious political choice. There is a salutary if ultimately overstated exploration of this argument in Magocsi's study of Subcarpathian Rus'.[38] The point I wish to make is that the intensified nationalist atmosphere of 1914–23 and the global ideology of national self-determination that emerged from the manoeuverings of 1917–18 increasingly eliminated this element of choice, if only because the bureaucratic requirements of the new "successor

states" imposed stricter definitions of individual identity. This was felt most acutely of all by the Jews of Eastern Europe, the classic "indeterminate" nationality. Whereas before 1914 Jewish intellectuals could credibly advocate a variety of national orientations on a broadly assimilationist basis, after 1918–19 this increasingly subsided before the logic of the Jewish nationalist, autonomist and separatist alternatives.[39]

(k) Finally, it is worth drawing attention once again to the importance of the abortive greater German imperium ushered in by Brest-Litovsk in unlocking much of the potentialities of nationalist politics in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Baltic, Transcaucasia and Ukraine. Some of the literature tends to play down the radicalism of German expansionism in this sense.[40] But after the decisive research of Fischer and his students,[41] there should be less room for ambiguity on this score. However, clarification has probably been somewhat impeded by the fact that much of the relevant discussion has been conducted in German rather than in English.[42]

II

Where does this leave the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–20? Obviously there is no space here for a comprehensive answer to this question. Instead I shall confine myself to a few selected remarks, which are, I hope, not too disconnected. In particular I shall try to place the Ukrainian experience in a comparative framework of nationalist movements. I shall also try to mention a few problems that may deserve future investigation.

It is important to acknowledge the essential *normality* of the Ukrainian experience. There is nothing either particularly "backward" or particularly marginal about events in Ukraine. This applies to both the "nationalist" and the "revolutionary" dimensions of those events. In each case Ukrainian developments may be appropriately ordered in relation to comparable experiences elsewhere, both regionally (in the context of East European nationalist movements) and conjuncturally (in terms of the surrounding revolutionary upheavals of 1917–21). This is worth saying outright, because the significance and autonomy of events in Ukraine are rarely given their due, largely, it seems, because the Ukrainian Revolution was unsuccessful and because the faculty of attained statehood is an indispensable condition of historiographical legitimacy. As Ukrainian historians have repeatedly pointed out, Western historiography incorrigibly subsumes the particularities of Ukrainian development in homogenized conceptions of "Russian" history. As Motyl (1980) ob-

serves,[43] the Ukrainian example is invariably omitted from general discussions of nationalist movements in Eastern Europe, whether before or after the watershed of 1917–20.[44]

What is typical about the Ukrainian nationalist tradition? While the political openings of 1917–20 derived immediately from the collapse of tsarism and the newly hegemonic international ideology of national self-determination, the Ukrainian national movement drew most of its strength from the classical nineteenth-century ideologies of nationality, which until the 1890s remained predominantly liberal and democratic in character. Before the early twentieth century the characteristic architects of Ukrainian nationality—Franko, Shevchenko, Drahomanov, Hrushevsky and so on—were squarely within the mainstream of Central and East European nationalist doctrine in this sense. Much the same could be said (in terms of the European parameters of their thought) of the next generation of social democrats and student radicals (best represented probably by Vynnychenko) who began to succeed them after 1900. In every respect, Ukrainian nationalism reproduced the familiar patterns of its predecessors, particularly the German and Italian movements of mid-century, the Czech movement of the 1860s and after, and the close competitor movements of the Poles. This was true of the "national awakening" itself, with all its characteristic preoccupations— adoption of the vernacular as a medium of literary creation (original works and translations); of instruction in schools of all levels, beginning with the elementary, and leading gradually to the establishment of universities and learned societies; the development of a periodical press in the language; and the use of the language in original books of other than the merely literary type."[45] It was true of the forms of organization (e.g., the *Sokil* and *Sich* gymnastic movements formed in 1889 and 1900 on the model of the Czech *Sokol*; the paramilitary scouting organization *Plast* set up in 1912; the *Sich* and *Sokil* sharpshooter societies launched in 1913–14; and above all the reading clubs sponsored in the Galician countryside by the *Prosvita* and *Ridna Shkola* societies after the 1870s and 1880s), which were increasingly embedded in the party political networks that crystallized in the 1890s and 1900s. It was also true of more specific forms of ideological indebtedness, whether we think of the popularity of Schulze-Delitzsch's ideas of co-operation, education and self-improvement among the artisanal organizations of the 1860s and 1870s in Galicia, of the populist and conspiratorial traditions in Eastern Ukraine or of the continuing attractions of Mazzini's Young Europe ideology in a journal such as *Moloda Ukraina* in 1900–3.[46]

In all these ways the Ukrainian case deserves to be brought into the general European framework in which such matters are usually discussed. The right-wing radical nationalism attributed by many outsiders

to the movement for Ukrainian independence was very much a later phenomenon, which dated from émigré circles of the 1920s and fed on the disappointments of 1917–20.[47] Until then, in forms of action, social recruitment and ideological trajectory, it closely paralleled some other East European movements, such as the Polish or the Czech. This was true both of the movement's nineteenth-century formation and of its response to the new opportunities opened by July 1914. In this respect Masaryk's passage from autonomist-cum-federalist to separatist ideas at the outbreak of war was paradigmatic for the national/nationalist revolutions in Eastern Europe as a whole. As Szporluk says: "Just as the Poles, the Czechs, and the Slovaks associate the beginning of their respective national revolution with the work of Pilsudski and his Legion in 1914 (as well as with the action led by Dmowski on the other side of the barricade) in the Polish case, and that of Masaryk and Kramar—also in 1914–15—in the Czech case, so the Ukrainians may view 1914 as the *terminus a quo* of their revolution." In this sense the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine and the Sich Riflemen scripted the first act of a drama that was to be hectically improvised in the later circumstances of 1917–20.[48]

Of course, we should not go to the opposite extreme by making the Ukrainian example conform straightforwardly to a general East European model. The salient *particularity* of the Ukrainian situation, which distinguished it from most other East European nationalities (with the partial exception of the Poles) was the high degree of political and administrative fragmentation among the national territories. Rudnytsky lists the Russian divisions of Left Bank, *Slobidska,* Southern, and Right-Bank Ukraine; the Hapsburg divisions of Galicia, Sub-Carpathia and Bukovina; and the "marginal lands" of Kholm and the Kuban region of the Caucasus.[49] These also corresponded to a certain extent with ethnographic subdivisions and—more important—with significant variations of social structure and levels of economic specialization and development. Now, this fragmentation and the diversity of experience that accompanied it make it extraordinarily difficult to keep the entire Ukrainian national region clearly in focus during the confusing events of 1917–20. The internationally recognized incorporation of Ukrainian lands into other new states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania), the loss in particular of the East Galician heartland of the pre-1914 nationalist movement (aptly called the "Ukrainian Piedmont"), the disparities of national consciousness in Russian Ukraine on a rough west-east gradient (and the low "Ukrainian-ness" of the cities in particular), the importance to the Bolshevik state of the Donets and Kryvyi Rih industrial belts and the fact that Ukraine proved to be the main theatre of the "Russian" Civil War—all these factors militate against an integrated all-Ukrainian history of the revolutionary years. In fact, none of the accounts manage to over-

come these difficulties. Usually they accommodate in practice to the greater-Russian and Bolshevik-centralist framework which customarily rationalize the multiple histories of "the" revolution, often to the extent of omitting the "non-Russian" Ukrainian lands altogether.[50]

So we may agree with Rudnytsky that nineteenth-century Ukraine's lack of territorial integration "was a sure sign that a Ukrainian nation, in the full meaning of the word, did not exist at the time."[51] But we have to be careful about what this means. Recognizing the efficacy of this fragmented historical geography, we should not overstate its importance. To conclude, as does Adams, that "there is no meaningful political history of the Ukraine as a whole prior to 1917," is to go much too far.[52] In a similar vein, it is also possible, as Magocsi has shown, to draw ethnographic and culturally based distinctions of great refinement.[53] But neither these nor (to take another important but barely researched and dimly understood example) the effects of the different agricultural economies east and west of the Dnieper should be regarded as objections to the existence of a coherent and objective Ukrainian nationality *per se* or impediments to its formation. In fact, the creative political action of nationalist leaderships upon segmented and disunited target populations for the purposes of national education and patriotic mobilization—"the transformation of an ethnic-linguistic community into a self-conscious political and cultural community"—was *the* central feature of nineteenth-century nation-forming experiences.[54] To postulate a break in 1917 of the sharpness that Adams seems to imply (after 1917 an explosive popular political consciousness; before 1917 none) is to obscure the frequently subterranean process of popular-cum-populist ideological activity.[55] It is this *social process of politicization* that sets the most interesting agenda of questions.

The real labour of unifying a culturally and socially diverse population into a relatively cohesive political nation, in Ukraine no less than the rest of Eastern Europe, was conducted by a nationalist intelligentsia. Rudnytsky, and Pritsak and Reshetar provide valuable guidance to the formal emergence of that intelligentsia, with the latter authors distinguishing five stages during the nineteenth century, each designated by a principal centre of intellectual activity (Novhorod-Siversk, Kharkiv, Kiev, Geneva, Galicia).[56] But as Hroch has suggested, it is the wider public resonance of such activity that deserves first claim on our attention, and in this respect Hroch postulates three clear stages in the life of an active nationalist movement: Stage A, when small groups of academic intellectuals first elaborate the category of the nation concerned; Stage B, when wider networks of patriots grouped around newspapers, journals and cultural societies begin to spread the word by a more concerted agitation; and Stage C, when serious popular mobilization gets under way.[57]

In other words, the nationalist intelligentsia required access to a public. And a broadly disseminated sense of political nationality could be properly constituted in the chosen national territory only by organized interaction with some kind of popular social coalition, with or without the benefit of a sympathetic state apparatus (usually without), but certainly with the benefit of a ramified and legally protected civil society. So, the crucial question is not whether the objective conditions of Ukrainian nationality or nationhood had come into existence by the early twentieth century or whether a self-conscious nationalist intelligentsia had already established itself (it obviously had). The key question concerns the conditions under which that intelligentsia was able to conduct its proselytizing activity.

It is here that the principal administrative divisions (between Romanov and Hapsburg Ukraine, and within the latter between the lands under Austrian and Hungarian rule) have their significance, namely facilitating or hindering the growth of political society. As most writers have stressed, there is a dramatic contrast between East Galicia, where Ukrainian activity attained high levels of political sophistication, and the Russian lands further to the East, where the tsarist state kept the people in "a state of perpetual civic infancy."[58] Despite its small size (some 3.4 million in a total Ukrainian population of some 28 million before 1914) and extreme socio-economic backwardness (in 1910 for every 1,000 gainfully employed Ukrainians, 950 worked in agriculture), Galician Ukraine possessed a disproportionate importance in the constitution of Ukrainian national identity, both by providing a refuge for East Ukrainian intellectuals from the tsarist cultural repression sharpened in 1876 and by the exemplary popular political vitality demonstrated between the 1890s and the First World War. Relative to its size and the unpromising socio-economic environment, the Ukrainian society of East Galicia generated one of the most impressive peasant political movements in pre-1914 Europe, comparable perhaps to the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and the Irish Land League. In Franko's words, this amounted to "the rebirth of a nation, which from a morally and politically degraded state advances toward a normal life."[59]

Two points may be made about this Galician achievement. First, as Himka has shown, it is ripe for the kind of analysis pioneered by Hroch in his comparative investigation of the so-called "small nationalities" and their conditions of emergence—namely one that concentrates on identifying the social settings that proved particularly conducive to the implantation and growth of an active nationalist commitment.[60] The burgeoning co-operative and associational activity of the notoriously impoverished Ruthenian/Ukrainian peasantry was simultaneously a statement of national identity, and using Hroch's techniques of analysis

(which focus on the sociology of patriotic activism, by considering factors like the intra- and intergenerational mobility of patriotic activists, the differential penetration of new market relations in agriculture, the relative density of small handicrafts production, the spread of village schools and so on), much interesting light can be shed on the modalities of this politicization.

Second, this East Galician experience, which increasingly "connected Ukrainian national gains in Galicia with political democratization, defense of the social interests of the peasantry and anti-clericalism," casts the experience of Dnieper Ukraine sharply into relief.[61] The politico-cultural repression which set in after 1875 and which aimed "to prevent the transformation of Ukrainian folk culture, associated with the world of the village, into a modern culture which would appeal to educated, urban people," successfully intercepted a comparable process of mobilization in the territories of Imperial Russia, so that "Ukrainian political efforts remained suspended, as it were, in a social vacuum."[62] The 1905 Revolution brought a certain liberalization, but the labour of constructing the nation's cultural infrastructure was still in its infancy when war broke out. As Szporluk says, by 1914 "the Ukrainians had had behind them less than ten years of more or less (rather less) normal development in such matters as the press, popular culture, education, and so on."[63]

Finally, how in general should the Ukrainian national movement be categorized? Hroch argues for a basic distinction between the dominant or "large" nations (England, France, Holland, Sweden, Spain, more ambiguously Germany and Italy), whose sense of nationality was constituted during the bourgeoisie's struggle against the social domination of the aristocracy, and the "small" nations under his immediate investigation, whose independence could only be secured *against* the emerging domination of a foreign, metropolitan or "denationalized" bourgeois-aristocratic coalition. In other words, in the "large" nations the struggle *against* feudalism was also a struggle *for* the emancipation of the nation, in which the so-called third estate both installed itself at the head of society and self-consciously identified itself with the nation-in-general. In the "small" nations, by contrast, the dissolution of feudalism was accompanied by the predominance of a bourgeoisie whose culture evidently diverged from that of the "people." Such "small" nations had a very distinctive make-up: they lacked a native aristocracy and were subject to a landed class with an alien language and an already formed nationality; they lacked a claim to historic statehood or recent political independence; thay had no strong or continuous tradition of high or literate culture in the native language; and they frequently lacked a strong native bourgeoisie. In these circumstances the emergent nationalist movement

necessarily drew on a distinctive kind of popular social coalition: a new secular intelligentsia linked to the mobilization of the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry (as per Hroch's Stage C).

Some version of this distinction is probably accepted by most writers on the subject of nationalism. It is present, for instance, in Seton-Watson's typology of "old continuous nations" and "new" ones, though here it is carefully divested of its strong social content: the "old nations" are those that "had acquired national identity or national consciousness before the formulation of the doctrine of nationalism," whereas the "new nations" are those for whom "the formation of national consciousness and the creation of nationalist movements" occurred simultaneously.[64] There are certainly advantages to this more institutionally and politically oriented definition. Elsewhere I have suggested a three-way conceptual distinction of this kind centred on the experience of the French Revolution:

> First, there are definite processes of institutional growth within territorial states which allow specifically patriotic (as against parochial or cosmopolitan) loyalties to take shape. Secondly, there is a special type of ideological commitment (nationalism) which seeks to rationalize (or initiate) these processes in a particularly pointed way, normally through some democratic or populist conception of social and political order. Thirdly, there are further processes of cultural unification, normally but not necessarily consciously directed, which presuppose the nation's established existence as a territorial, linguistic, religious or other type of community. These three phenomena—underlying processes of state formation, the elaboration of nationalist ideology, the drive for cultural conformity . . . may follow one another in a rough chronological sequence (France would be the strongest case). But things are usually more confused. Political independence can be either a condition or a consequence of the ideological and cultural activity, and the growth of nationalism can just as easily follow as precede, the formation of territorial units of the "nation-state."[65]

In terms of Hroch's three stages of patriotic activity (academic, cultural, political) the second and (to a lesser extent) third parts of this distinction are the relevant ones. The drive for cultural uniformity can clearly precede the formation of the nation-state itself, but such processes of unification usually owe far more to the widening penetration of a centralizing government (as in the classical spheres of railway-building, schooling and conscription). At all events (I have argued), the emergence of nationalist movements should be seen as an "instance of historical contingency, linked to political intervention, new ideologies and cultural

change, and expressing a transformation of social identity, initially on the part of individuals but eventually for whole populations."[66]

But the virtue of Hroch's "large"/"small" distinction and of the older nineteenth-century distinctions between the "historic" and "history-less" peoples or the "state-nations" and the "state-less" peoples from which it largely derives is that they focus on the distinctive social structure of the small or emergent nationalities in Eastern Europe.[67] As Himka says:

> The historical nations had the more differentiated social structure. In the 19th century, historical nations retained and nonhistorical peoples lacked an aristocracy of the same nationality (more exactly, of the same faith and language) as the mass of the nation. The historical nations dominated the cities, even in areas whose hinterland was inhabited almost exclusively by peasants of nonhistorical peoples, and therefore artisans and merchants tended to be members by birth or by assimilation of the historical nations. The nonhistorical peoples were formed predominantly of peasants and have therefore been referred to also as "peasant" or "plebeian" nations.[68]

Of course, there are problems with the typology of historic/history-less peoples, originating as it does in mid-nineteenth-century conceptions of progress and the civilizing missions of the great "cultural nations" in relation to the backward "dying nationalities" of the European periphery.[69] But if we do not interpret the concept of "nonhistoricity" literally and take it to refer to an absence of state tradition, the distinction retains its uses. Rudnytsky again puts this quite well:

> When nationalist movements got under way in nineteenth-century Eastern Europe, they were of two different types. In one, the leadership remained with the traditional upper class (nobility), into which newcomers of plebeian background were infused only gradually. Their programmes were characterized by a historical legitimism: their aim was the restoration of the nation's old state within its ancient boundaries. In the movements of the second type, leadership had to be created anew, and the efforts were directed toward the raising of a "natural" ethnic community to a politically conscious nationhood. These latter movements had a slower start than the former, but they drew strength from their identification with the strivings of the masses, and they were able to profit from the inevitable democratization of the social structure.[70]

This framework provides a useful means of placing the Ukrainian experience. Despite the familiar mythology of a heroic past and the remem-

brance of incipient statehood from the seventeenth century, the Ukrainians may be numbered with those peoples—Irish, Czechs, Latvians, Finns, Lithuanians, Croats, Belorussians—who "lacked an independent statehood at the beginning of the modern period of European history, i.e., the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries." As Szporluk says: "This meant that they experienced the major sociocultural transformations of the modern period within larger structures which were dominated by people of different ethnic identity."[71] Or, as the Polish saying put it: "There is no Ruthenia; there are just priests and peasants."[72]

III

In conclusion I wish to make a number of points about the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–20 itself, partly as observations, partly in the form of questions. Although they are not an exhaustive list, they seem to me to be the main points at which discussion (and future research) might usefully be directed.

(a) It is difficult to weigh the relative importance of the long and short-term aspects of the national awakening. One view, expressed by Rudnytsky, sees the revolutionary years as the climax of a process already brought to fruition by the nationalist intelligentsia, in the senses described above—the culmination of "the movement of national regeneration," when "the making of the nation was basically completed."[73] Another, best represented by Adams, argues that the awakening "only began in 1917," becoming "an almost universal phenomenon only in the next two years," through "a complex process" in which the nationalist movement *per se* was only one component among many.[74] Adams links this to a second argument which contrasts the level of *formal politics* ("the actions of a number of political leaders and parties, the governments they established, the armies they raised and the negotiations or battles they carried on with other parties, governments and armies") with the general insurrectionary turbulence of the countryside beneath ("The Great Ukrainian Jacquerie"). For Adams the sovereign influence on the outcome of the revolutionary process in Ukraine was exercised by the latter, which is presented somewhat rhetorically as a furious and uncontrollable explosion of essentially unpolitical peasant longings:

> "parts of a vast and elemental social revolution in which agrarian rebellion played a predominant role . . . a torrential agrarian social upheaval whose complex manifestations and principal characteristics were not then and are not even now fully comprehended . . . a cataclysmic social process . . . a

> series of bloody rebellions, expressing in the most violent terms the agrarian population's protest at the conditions of its life . . . a social chaos so turbulent that it literally destroyed the best-laid plans of political parties and governments."

Here, it is strongly implied, was the real "soul" of the revolution. By comparison, the efforts of the nationalist political leadership were insignificant, dwarfed by a social movement they had no ability to control.[75]

Now, these twin dichotomies (long-term/immediate origins of the national awakening; isolated and ineffectual political leadership/anarchic and unpolitical popular movement) seem to me artificial and not terribly helpful. We can certainly concede that the successive stages of the revolutionary process, from the German occupation through to the defeat of the Whites in the Civil War, were ultimately decisive in forging a common sense of popular Ukrainian identity in the former Imperial Russian territories. They also forced the nationalist intelligentsia to take the step already embraced by their compatriots in Galicia, namely to abandon Russian federalism for full-scale political independence. But if we are to explain the uneven emergence of national consciousness within the revolutionary period and its variant forms of expression, it becomes precisely important to examine the prior penetration of the nationalist intelligentsia in the countryside, in the period of relative liberalization that began in 1905. It would be interesting to know which regions and localities responded earlier and more enthusiastically to nationalist rhetoric than others, which elements in the countryside proved to be the most active in the different forms of protest and rebellion, and which expressions of patriotic ideology tended to be the most appealing.[76] Such questions would also dismantle Adams's sharp dichotomy between the politically conscious but isolated city and the turbulent but unpolitical countryside. For while the decisive strategic problem of the Ukrainian Revolution was clearly the difficulty of organizing a stable political relationship with the peasantry, it is by no no means clear that the Ukrainian peasants were quite as defiantly localist, unpolitical and primordial in their outlook as Adams and others suggest.

(b) In general we remain staggeringly ignorant about the peasantry in the Ukrainian Revolution. We encounter the peasants mainly through the policies announced in their name, particularly by the Ukrainian SRs. As political actors they appear at the most as the mass recruits for the various military formations and partisan bands. Otherwise, they figure in most accounts as a violent and volatile mass, acting spontaneously in pursuit of what Adams calls their "primitive egalitarian economic and political ideals,"[77] but essentially responding to political initiatives rather than taking them, with no concrete organizational or institutional links to the

various parties or the urban political process. None of the existing general accounts of events in Ukraine—Reshetar, Adams, Hunczak, Borys—deals adequately with the peasantry. Essentially, this reflects the preference for narrative and party political approaches to the problem (perfectly defensible in themselves, of course) and as such reproduces a general feature of the historiography of the Russian Revolution.[78] Though a necessary part of the picture, such approaches are not equipped for asking certain kinds of questions, which seek to specify the impact of socio-economic forces on the course and outcome of the revolutionary process. This neglect of the social-historical dimension is especially unfortunate in the case of Adams,[79] who makes some extremely forthright claims in this respect, but in a general narrative fashion which still requires more detailed verification.

Several points can be made about this situation. First, the peasantry was very far from being politically inert in its "primitive" and isolated village world, whether in 1917 itself or in the longer period inaugurated by 1905. Adams reduced the peasants' conscious relationship to the wider social and political world to a series of traditional and not particularly coherent attitudes—"the Cossack traditions of insurrection and anarchic freedom, the peasants' dimly perceived class rivalries and hatred of townsmen and Jews."[80] Yet during 1917–20 the peasantry was a class restlessly *in motion*—passing in and out of armies, regular and irregular; migrating for food and work, over short and long distances; experimenting with the full repertoire of violent, direct-action and peaceful protests; meeting locally to discuss and formulate grievances; combining more ambitiously at the district and regional levels; issuing petitions; instructing deputies; and, of course, voting. It is important to grasp that this was a process of active and self-conscious political mobilization. Here, for instance, is Shanin's eloquent description of the peasant ferment in 1905–7 (there is no reason why things should have been any different in 1905–20):

> While the deputies and delegates to the peasant congresses and to the Dumas argued out the demands and dreams of the Russian [sic] peasantry *in toto*, every village proceeded with its own never-ceasing debate through 1905–7. Scraps of news were endlessly re-told, discussed and embellished, printed sheets were read and read out, the thirst for knowledge seemed infinite. A rumour that a meeting was to be held or that a "knowledge man" was visiting a village brought neighbours on foot, in carts and on horseback from many miles away. The villagers also sent out delegates "to find things out" and to invite "an orator" from the local towns or neighbourhoods. A village in the south [Ukraine?] specified such a request, ordering its messengers "to bring over a student or a Jew to tell

> of the news" while another village voted to offer payment of an "orator's wages" from the communal purse. At the centre of this immense process of communications was not outside propaganda, but rather a grandiose and spontaneous effort at political self-understanding by millions of illiterate and half-literate villagers. In an endless, slow, often clumsy and ill-informed and over-heated debate, masses of peasants looked at their life and environment anew and critically. They conceived and expressed what was often unthinkable until then: an image of a new world, a dream of justice, a demand for land and liberty. For, once again, it was not only land which was in question.[81]

Second, this political mobilization was as much "spontaneous" as it was instigated. We should be clear about what this statement means. By "spontaneity" I am not suggesting that peasant actions were not reflected or were somehow instinctive expressions of a primordial peasant mentality, or that they were therefore lacking in coherence or revolutionary maturity (as in the Leninist couplet of "spontaneity" and "organization"). By using the term I am simply countering the alternative and equally misleading model of a peasantry inspired (or manipulated) by a superior political intelligence from the outside. Here is Shanin again:

> The direct and representative nature of the peasant petitions and instructions was manifest. The documents themselves declared time and time again "we wrote it ourselves" (*sami sochinili*), to which the language used readily testified. So did the signatures, which usually began with that of the village elder (the document certified "true" by his stamp) and continued with those of all the village literates. Then followed a long line of crosses made by all the illiterates, declaring not only the support of a view formulated by somebody else, but direct participation in the wording of the letter or the decisions. The sophistication of some of these tracts, especially in areas from which every active member of the intelligentsia had by then been removed by arrest or exile, showed to what extent knowledge of politics is not chiefly a matter of books or of universities.[82]

At the same time it would be foolish to deny the constructive contribution of various categories of "intellectuals" (in the widest sociological sense) to this process (and Shanin's implied conception of the intelligentsia in the above quotation is far too restrictive). "Outsiders" in the strict sense (party agitators, or "Jews and long-haired students," as one report put it) were certainly active in the countryside, but the key sectors of revolutionary ideas should probably be sought elsewhere—in the rural intelligentsia ("village teachers, members of the clergy, medical workers and employees of the local *zemstvo* organizations"), in "a

literate stratum of 'peasant intellectuals'" (such as peasant artisans), in peasants with experience of the outside world (from working seasonally in agriculture and industry) and in peasants returning from the army and navy.[83] In other words, to argue for the existence of a developed political consciousness in the countryside we do not need to postulate the presence of a radical intelligentsia in the classic sense (though such a nationalist cadre would certainly have been active among Ukrainian peasants, particularly by 1917–20). Instead we need a subtler understanding of how new ideas were conducted into the village and of how specific groups such as the above could act as intermediaries between town and country.

Third, the peasantry was indisputably the decisive factor in the outcome of the revolutionary process. Of course, it was certainly possible for political forces to establish themselves without the mass support of the peasantry by drawing upon other resourses, such as control of the cities in the case of the Bolsheviks or the patronage of the German army in the case of Skoropadsky. But the peasantry had at least to be neutralized. Moreover, by tolerating (and in many cases embracing) an adversary relationship to the peasantry (and not only in Ukraine), the Bolsheviks immensely complicated the future process of socialist construction (whether conceived as economic development or popular-democratic participation). In other words, winning the consent of the peasantry was absolutely fundamental to the democratic legitimacy of the competing political leaderships between 1917 and 1920, as well as to their actual political survival. This was pre-eminently true of the Ukrainian nationalists, for the Russified nature of the cities deprived them of an alternative social base, and the failure to bid strongly enough for the peasants' support proved fatal to both the Hetmanate and the Directory. As Szporluk rightly says, "the natural social constituency of Ukrainian politics was the peasantry, and . . . the critical task facing Ukrainian leaders was to mobilize the peasants in defence of Ukrainian independence and to satisfy their economic and social aspirations."[84]

(c) The role of the church in the revolutionary process is also in need of investigation. The importance of the Uniate church in East Galicia, as the institutional guardian of certain national autonomies, as the source of an activist cadre in the early years of the nationalist movement and as a buffer of professional and educational opportunity against the effects of ethnic and linguistic discrimination, is well attested (as is the place of the church in certain other national traditions, like the Irish, the Polish or the Romanian). But we know far less about the contribution of the church in the Russian territories to the East. It is clear that in 1917–18 the debates in the Ukrainian church apparatus reproduced the familiar conflicts over federalism/autonomy (i.e., Ukrainization) or independence/secession (i.e., autocephalism), but in a more sudden and bitterly divisive way (in

the sense that previously the Orthodox church had been a principal agency of Russification). But despite their value in delineating the terms of these conflicts, the essays of Bociurkiw fail to penetrate downward from the formal political process to the rural grass-roots.[85] There are some tantalizing hints both to the existence of peasant anti-clericalism (as in the expulsion of priests by village assemblies) and to the popular basis of Ukrainization (e.g., the resolutions of the Kiev gubernia peasant congress in April 1917 and of the Third Ukrainian Military Congress in November). There are also suggestions that the Ukrainian church movement "found some of its earliest proselytizers and leaders among military chaplains, some junior officers and especially former seminaries who had been exposed to clandestine Ukrainian circles that were active in these institutions before the war."[86] But at present we lack the detailed research to evaluate these claims.

(d) The whole subject of Ukrainian-Jewish relations is desperately in need of illumination. We are best informed about the two nationalities' deep-historical perceptions of each other, hinging on the trauma of 1648–54, and there can be little doubt that deeply entrenched appropriations of that painful history continued to function in the two cultures during the early twentieth century.[87] But despite Goldelman's valuable but somewhat memoirist account of the movement for Jewish national autonomy,[88] we know next to nothing about the detailed behaviour of the Bund, Poalei-Zion and the other Jewish political orientations during the revolutionary years. It is also extraordinary that in the English language we are still dependent on contemporary accounts for detailed information concerning the pogroms.[89] For the detailed sociology of the anti-Jewish activity, its ideological content and geographical distribution (particularly as these affect the attitudes and behaviour of the Ukrainian peasantry), we must still derive our insights *indirectly*, from primary research on anti-Semitism elsewhere, particularly Poland and other parts of Imperial Russia.[90] The most disastrous escalation of anti-Jewish violence began in the early months of 1919 and coincided with a chaotic political conjuncture: the imposition of a more uncompromising Bolshevik administration, with neither the resources nor the political commitment to build a genuine political bridge to the Ukrainian peasantry (despite the positions advocated by Lenin himself, as in "On the Soviet Power in Ukraine"); the disintegration of the Directory's political authority; and the local despotisms of freebooting partisan commanders. It seems clear that the pogroms were mostly a phenomenon of the *partizanshchina,* which ravaged the social relations of town and country for most of 1919, and until we know more about the recruitment and *modus operandi* of the various partisan bands, we should perhaps reserve judgment on the involvement of the peasantry as a whole.[91]

(e) The question of anti-Semitism is intimately linked to the issue of Jewish national autonomy and Ukrainian relations with the other national minorities (Russians, Poles, Germans). In this respect the prospects for fruitful Ukrainian-Jewish co-existence seemed initially very good: in both Galician and Eastern Ukraine (by contrast with Poland) the nationalist movement showed itself in a constructively conciliatory light, inviting both independent Jewish political representation and proposals for Jewish cultural autonomy.[92] There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of this policy, still less to see it as a cynically self-interested manoeuvre—which "represented a political calculation on the part of the weaker nations to procure the support of the Jews whom they considered to be a weighty factor in international relations during the Paris Peace Conference."[93] As Szporluk observes, there was a valuable complementary in the two nationalities' situations, based on the need for self-government on one side and legal emancipation, civil rights and cultural autonomy on the other, and on different positions in the social division of labour.[94] However, there were a number of problems. Though non-threatening in the abstract, the contrasting social structures of the two nationalities were also an obvious source of potential tension. Moreover, the Ukrainian Jews were by no means undivided in their political affiliations, and the powerful Bundist current in particular showed itself profoundly ambivalent on the subject of Ukrainian national self-government. Finally, the political disintegration of 1919 produced both a collapse of confidence in the Directory's ability to discipline the pogromist elements and a wavering in certain quarters of the nationalist leadership's own ranks.[95]

In Eastern Ukraine (though not in Galicia) the co-operative experiment dissolved during the 1920s into mutual recriminations, certainly at the level of the expatriate nationalist leadership. In the event of a successful assertion of Ukrainian independence, it is hard to know what might have happened. Probably, given the inevitable international weakness of such a Ukrainian state, the powerful rightward logic of an anti-Soviet orientation and what we know of comparably embattled nationalisms elsewhere in Eastern Europe, some erosion of Jewish autonomy might have been expected. The experience of Lithuania, where a similar co-operative project was actually brought to fruition during 1919–21 only to be subsequently dismantled, lends a certain weight to this speculation.[96]

(f) The relationship between the declaration of Ukrainian independence in January 1918 and the unfolding of Germany's war aims in the east remains a vexed question. Fedyshyn states flatly that "the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 was without question an independent and truly spontaneous development in which neither the Allies nor the Central Powers played any significant part."[97] Specifically, neither the Union for the Liberation nor the Germans' general "destabilization" plans played an

appreciable part in nurturing the Ukrainian opposition. "The Rada was a freely constituted... body—as representative, or unrepresentative, as the Provisional Government of Russia at the time."[98] This is persuasive. Though the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine and related activities should not be discounted, they could initiate nothing by themselves.[99] Moreover, in the first three years of the war the German government was overwhelmingly preoccupied with Poland, Lithuania and the Baltic rather than Ukraine, and while voices were certainly raised regarding the latter's strategic importance for the long term destruction of Russia's great-power capability (Rohrbach, Schiemann, Pan-Germans, the entire radical nationalist war aims chorus), their influence is hard to evaluate, as are the programmes which rapidly materialized among German business. Apart from the general statement that "Russia must be thrust back as far as possible from Germany's eastern frontier and her domination over the non-Russian vassal peoples broken" (radical enough, however), Bethmann Hollweg's "September Programme" was confined to the west.[100] Neither Fischer nor Borowsky have shown the existence of detailed ministerial discussions of Ukraine before mid-1917.[101]

On the other hand, it is also clear that Ukraine's definite emergence as an independent political entity during 1917—and especially the Rada's participation as a separate delegation at Brest-Litovsk—precipitated an extraordinary escalation of Germany's imperialist ambitions in the south of Imperial Russia. By the start of 1918 the existing Eastern policy—*Mitteleuropa*, buttressed by a quasi-independent Poland, a client Romania and new satellites in the Baltic, the whole being subject to general German economic penetration and limited colonization—had been abruptly jettisoned for something far more grandiose. The original concept of a German "security cordon" in Eastern Europe presupposed a future resurgence of Russian power after the war. But the Bolshevik Revolution and the incipient disintegration of the Greater Russian state opened up new vistas of a Carthaginian peace. As Hillgruber says, "the possibility, which leaped to the fore in the spring of 1918, of winning the entire, expansive eastern sphere [*Ostraum*] with its supposedly inexhaustible supplies of raw materials as a 'German hinterland'" radicalized the German leaders into thinking the Russian Empire was now "unstable enough that it could, with some skilful help from the outside, be broken apart."[102] Quite unexpectedly, therefore, Ukraine suddenly acquired a pivotal importance in German thinking. A plethora of demands emerged from business, the economic bureaucracy, the right-wing war aims bloc and the High Command for ruthless economic exploitation of the territories from Galicia to Georgia. These plans were essentially realized in Brest-Litovsk and continued to be strengthened up to the military collapse of August-September 1918.

It is quite wrong to represent these schemes as a personal "chimera" of Ludendorff and his "megalomania," the product of a mind that "was always resistant to the restraints of reality."[103] Though Fischer exaggerates the continuity between the September Programme and Brest-Litovsk, and the ideological continuum from Bethmann Hollweg to Ludendorff, the evidence for the seriousness of such plans is now irrefutable. In the short term the aim was one of "getting out of Ukraine what there is to be gotten," in the long term of binding Ukraine into the Greater German economy.[104] This meant appropriation of grain surpluses, Germanization of the iron and manganese industries, creation of a labour reserve for the German economy, control of the railway system and of the Black Sea ports, and in fact of the entire Ukrainian infrastructure.[105] This paralleled similar schemes for the Baltic region.[106] In combination this would lay the basis for exploiting what was left of Russia and for opening the way to the Middle East. The long-term significance of this development is well described by Hillgruber:

> At the moment of the November 1918 ceasefire in the west, newspaper maps of the military situation showed German troops in Finland, holding the line from the Finnish fjords near Narva, down through Pskov-Orsha-Mogilev and the area south of Kursk, to the Don east of Rostov. Germany had thus secured the Ukraine. The Russian recognition of the Ukraine's separation exacted at Brest-Litovsk represented the key element in German efforts to keep Russia perpetually subservient. In addition, German troops held the Crimea and were stationed in smaller numbers in Transcaucasia. Even the unoccupied "rump-Russia" appeared—with the conclusion of the German-Soviet Supplementary Treaty on August 28, 1918-to be in firm though indirect dependency on the Reich. Thus, Hitler's long-range aim, fixed in the 1920s, of erecting a German Eastern Imperium on the ruins of the Soviet Union was not simply a vision emanating from an abstract wish. In the eastern sphere established in 1918, this goal had a concrete point of departure. The German Eastern Imperium had already been—if only for a short time—a reality.[107]

How are we to balance these two views, the "internalist" one stressing the Ukrainian Revolution's autonomous origins and trajectory and the "externalist" one stressing the overpowering causality of German imperialism? Both, in their different ways, are true. Any reading of the German sources (and not just the captured Foreign Office documents) can leave little doubt that the Germans called the shots, both at Brest-Litovsk and during the subsequent regime of occupation. Moreover, the Germans certainly *saw* the Ukrainian leadership as clients. Groener spoke disparagingly of the "kiddies" in their "ministerial baby-

carriages," a reference presumably to the striking youthfulness of many of the Rada, and similar references (e.g., to a "club of political adventurers" or to a "comic-opera regime") are not hard to find.[108] Recent accounts agree that the Skoropadsky coup was stage-managed by the Germans and that the Hetmanate was practically a front for German requirements.[109] In the light of Fischer's and Borowsky's evidence, it now seems forced (and unnecessary) to maintain that German occupational policies were an unplanned and experimental response to short-term exigencies and that the system of Eastern buffer states was simply an unanticipated "by-product" of the latter, without ulterior significance.[110]

But while the rampant expansionism of German imperialism decisively structured the options of Ukrainian politics for most of 1918, there is no reason why this should diminish the autonomous significance of or causality of the Ukrainian Revolution. Much of German historiography (though not Fischer and Borowsky) may be criticized for its ignorance of this specifically Ukrainian dimension. References to a "puppet state" or "a richly comic end" to a "pathetic career" are more a reflection on their authors than on the revolutionary authenticity of the Rada.[111] Though its lines of political representation to the putative popular constituency among the peasantry were desperately thin, the radicalism of the Rada's land policy and the general social democratic content of its overall programme were clear enough (as were the German anxieties that they evoked). And, of course, the German moves to suppress these radical and popular democratic potentialities in April 1918, combined with the oppressiveness of the Hetmanate's extractive regime, contributed enormously to the further radicalization of the peasantry and (one imagines) their growing national identification.

The tragedy was that Ukrainian independence had to be initially secured (because of Bolshevik ultra-leftism on the spot, the centralist logic of the Soviet state's need for consolidation and the inescapable regional reality of Germany's expanding continental imperialism) under conditions of foreign patronage which continuously reduced the room for political manoeuvre. The acceptance of German sponsorship trapped the democratic nationalists into an adversary relationship with the Soviet state (which Bolshevism's regional representatives did little to allay), which endowed the need for military survival with a higher priority than the kind of constructive political work with the masses on which the popular legitimacy of Ukrainian independence would have to be based.

(g) These thoughts prompt a sobering conclusion. Given the dynamic mentioned above and the essentially destructive effects of the German occupation, the political ineffectuality of the Directory and the failure to build a well organized social bloc as the basis for an independent state,

the gradual consolidation of the Soviet state and the Bolsheviks' growing internationalist self-confidence—given all of these things, by the spring of 1919 there may have been no *practical* alternative to the Bolsheviks. By the time the Bolsheviks began their second Ukrainian campaign the national territory was in an advanced state of social and political fragmentation, so that the difficulties of reconstituting a viable central authority, capable of restoring administrative efficiency and rebuilding the cohesion of society, were now enormous. Such tasks were further complicated by the progress of the Civil War, which was rapidly converting Ukraine into one of the principal theatres of operations. It was this, above all, that ultimately destroyed Ukrainian independence. Despite the promising circumstances of 1917, when (in the abstract) the peasantry's vigorous self-mobilization, the Rada's social democratic radicalism and the Bolsheviks' formal commitment to self-determination might have combined into the basis for a more genuinely internationalist federation between Russia and Ukraine, the democratic nationalist groupings never demonstrated a very convincing capacity for building a "third force" between the Bolsheviks and the Whites. By the spring of 1919, in fact, political solutions were on ice and the task of maintaining Ukrainian independence had devolved onto the shoulders of Petliura's undisciplined military formations. In the light of these chaotic circumstances, the short-term alternative to the Bolsheviks was not a functioning democratic nationalism rooted in a cohesive popular movement of the peasantry, but continuing fragmentation of the polity and civil society, with consequences (given what we know of the expoits of Hryhoriiv and Makhno) akin to the warlordism that dominated provincial China in the 1920s and 1930s. Otherwise, Ukrainian independence was calamitously squeezed in the logic of the international situation: "The choice was not between dependence and independence, but between dependence on Moscow or dependence on the bourgeois governments of the capitalist world."[112]

NOTES

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4. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution,* 3: 200.
5. Ibid., 217.
6. Ibid., 220.
7. H. Seton-Watson and C. Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary* (London 1980); M. Swartz, *The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War* (Oxford 1971).
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9. Ibid., 302.
10. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution,* 1: 265–81. Quotation from 274.
11. Mayer, *Wilson vs Lenin,* 298.
12. Ibid., 299–300. Also D. Boersner, *The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question, 1917–1928* (Geneva 1957; Westport, Conn. 1981).
13. Mayer, *Wilson vs Lenin,* 301.
14. S. Pollard, *Peaceful Conquest: The Industrialization of Europe, 1760–1970* (Oxford 1981), 286ff.
15. E. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital, 1848–1875* (London 1975).
16. H. C. Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815–1945* (The Hague 1955); F. Fischer, *War of Illusions* (London 1974), 26–43, 439–58; F. Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (London 1967), 247–79, 444–72, 475ff; D. Stegman, *Bismarcks Erben* (Düsseldorf 1970), 54–8.
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18. T. Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* (London 1977), 96–8; E. Gellner, "Nationalism" in *Thought and Change* (Chicago 1964), 147–78.
19. Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain,* 100.
20. R. Pearson, *National Minorities in Eastern Europe, 1848–1945* (London 1983), 136.
21. Ibid., 149.
22. For a full analysis, see Pearson, *National Minorities in Eastern Europe,* 147–89.
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24. E. M. Kulischer, *Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917–47*

(New York 1948), 30–78; F. Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva 1946).

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31. R. Pearson, *National Minorities in Eastern Europe, 1848–1945* (London 1983), 45.
32. Ibid., 95.
33. A. Sked, *The Survival of the Habsburg Empire: Radetsky, the Imperial Army and the Class War, 1848* (London 1979).
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36. S. E. Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in German and German Jewish Consciousness* (Madison 1982), 139–84; Golczewski, *Polnisch-Jüdische Beziehungen,* 121–80.
37. For a summary, see G. Eley, "Nationalism and Social History," *Social History*, 6, no. 1: 83–107.
38. P. R. Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848–1948* (Cambridge, Mass. 1978).
39. See J. Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism and the Russian Jews, 1862–1917* (Cambridge 1981); E. Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe;* Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers;* and especially E. Mendelsohn, "Jewish Assimilation in L'viv: The Case of Wilhelm Feldman," *Slavic Review* 28, no. 4: 577–90, reprinted in A. S. Markovits and F. A. Sysyn, eds., *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, Mass. 1982), 94–110.
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44. H. Rogger and E. Weber, eds., *The European Right* (London 1965); I. J. Lederer and P. F. Sugar, eds., *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle 1969); S. J. Woolf, ed., *European Fascism* (London 1968), *The Nature of Fascism* (London 1968) and *Fascism in Europe* (London 1981); P. F. Sugar, ed., *Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918–1945* (Santa Barbara 1971); E. Nolte, *Die faschistische Bewegungen* (Munich 1975); W. Laqueur, ed., *Fascism: A Reader's Guide* (London 1976); S. U. Larsen, B. Hagtvet and J. P. Myklebust, eds., *Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism* (Bergen 1980). An exception is H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (London 1977).
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46. For these points, see especially J.-P. Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism: Austria, 1867–1890," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1977; and I. L. Rudnytsky, "The Fourth Universal and Its Ideological Antecedents." in T. Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass 1977), 186–219.
47. See J. A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (New York 1955, 1963); and Motyl, *The Turn to the Right.*
48. R. Szporluk, *The Political Thought of Thomas G. Masaryk* (New York 1981), 101–46; and R. Szporluk, review of T. Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine, 1917–1921,* in *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States* 14 (1978–80): 268.
49. I. L. Rudnytsky, "The Role of the Ukraine in Modern History," in D. W. Treadgold, ed., *The Development of the USSR: An Exchange of Views* (Seattle 1964), 211–28.
50. For a particularly striking example, see Hunczak, *The Ukraine, 1917–1921,* which rather suprisingly acquiesces in a Russocentric notation of Ukrainian history for these years.
51. Rudnytsky, "The Role of the Ukraine," 226.
52. A. E. Adams, "The Awakening of the Ukraine," Treadgold, ed., *The Development of the USSR,* 229.
53. Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity.*
54. Rudnytsky, "The Role of the Ukraine," 214.
55. Adams, "The Awakening of the Ukraine."

56. Rudnytsky, "The Fourth Universal"; O. Pritsak and J. S. Reshetar, "The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building," in Treadgold, ed., *The Development of the USSR,* 236–67.
57. M. Hroch, *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas* (Prague 1968).
58. Rudnytsky, "The Role of the Ukraine," 220.
59. Quoted in I. L. Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule," in Markovits and Sysyn, eds., *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism,* 52, which is the best general introduction to Galician Ukraine.
60. Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism"; Hroch, *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung.*
61. Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia," 57.
62. Szporluk, *Ukraine,* 44, 47.
63. Szporluk, *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States* (1978–80), 270.
64. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States,* 6f.
65. G. Eley, "State Formation, Nationalism and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century Germany," in R. Samuel and G. Stedman Jones, eds., *Culture, Ideology and Politics: Essays for Eric Hobsbawm* (London 1983), 279.
66. Eley, "Nationalism and Social History," 93.
67. See R. Rosdolsky, "Friedrich Engels und das Problem der 'Geschichtslosen Volker'," in *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 4: 87–282.
68. Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism," 7.
69. See especially Rosdolsky, "Friedrich Engels and das Problem der 'Geschichtslosen Volker'," and I. Cummins, *Marx, Engels and National Movements* (London 1980), 28–48.
70. Rudnytsky, "The Role of the Ukraine," 211–12.
71. Szporluk, *Ukraine*, xi.
72. Quoted in Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism," 8.
73. Rudnytsky, "The Role of the Ukraine," 211, 214.
74. Adams, "The Awakening of the Ukraine," 230. See also A. E. Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: The Second Campaign, 1919* (New Haven 1963).
75. A. E. Adams, "The Great Ukrainian Jacquerie," in Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine*, 247ff.
76. For a suggestive discussion on the example of Makhno, see F. E. Sysyn, "Nestor Makhno and the Ukrainian Revolution," in Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine*, 271–304.
77. J. S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton 1952); Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine;* Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine, 1917–1921;* J. Borys, *The Sovietization of Ukraine: The Communist Doctrine and Practice of National Self-Determination* (Edmonton 1980).
78. See R. G. Suny, "Toward a Social History of the October Revolution," *American Historical Review* 88, no. 1: 31–52.
79. Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, "The Awakening of the Ukraine," "The Great Ukrainian Jacquerie."*
80. Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine,* 386.
81. T. Shanin, "The Peasant Dream: Russia 1905–7," in R. Samuel and G. Stedman Jones, eds., *Culture, Ideology and Politics,* 236.
82. Ibid., 237.
83. M. Perrie, *The Agrarian Policy of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party from its Origins through the Revolution of 1905–1907* (Cambridge 1976), 127–30.
84. Szporluk, *Ukraine*, 71ff.

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Mattityahu Minc

Kiev Zionists and the Ukrainian National Movement

Jewish and Ukrainian interaction in Russia following the February 1917 revolution, as well as the widespread national awakening that was part and parcel of that interaction, has been a central issue examined by Jewish historiography of the First World War and will continue to be studied more and more. The reciprocal ties and friendly discussion on the one hand, and displays of hostility and suspicion, and pogroms and murders on the other, play an integral role in the issues examined. It goes without saying that even when research is undertaken in a supposedly cool and considered manner, it nevertheless bears a heavy emotional load also arising out of the dismal Jewish-Ukrainian experience of the Second World War.

This lecture will not attempt to go into great detail about the overall relations between Jews and Ukrainians. It will, rather, deal with a limited though in my opinion significant aspect of the relations between the Zionist Organization in Russia—primarily its Ukrainian branch—and the Ukrainian national movement in the wake of the February Revolution and also at the end of this phase, the Ukrainian movement struggling to establish the partial or total autonomy of the Ukrainian republic. One important element that must not be ignored is the attitude that developed in Jewish, including Zionist, political circles toward the idea of Jewish autonomy.

The notion of a real alternative in formal-legal terms for the organization of Jewish life in the Russian diaspora within a structure of ex-

territorial autonomy—personal autonomy to use the term current at the time—sprang up among Russian Jews in the late nineteenth century and took shape as an ideology and theory of political practice in the early twentieth century.[1] From that time on, the concept expanded and increasingly forced itself upon the Jewish public until all the political streams—Zionist and non-Zionist—gravitated to it, some greatly enthusiastic, others adapting in a more moderate fashion.

Within the Jewish community several factors combined to nurture the belief that Jewish national rights and autonomous Jewish life in Russia were a real possibility, three of which are in my opinion crucial:

a. The expectation that Russia would be democratized but would retain its character as a large country of nations. What seemed clear was that the democratic Russian constitution would be unable to avoid making reference to certain forms of autonomy in response to the national aspirations of the minorities.

b. The observation that the nations of Russia had as a result of demographic-economic events planned or spontaneous—become territorial and ex-territorial entities at one and the same time. Consequently local self-government, significant as it may have been, could not be the answer to the national imbroglio fermenting within the general public. The next step was an ideological, sometimes programmatic evaluation that international arrangements implemented in Russia would have to include both territorial autonomy setups and ex-territorial stipulations, i.e., personal autonomy. This was the opinion of the minimalists.[2] Those who went further held that when the time came, preference would have to be given to an ex-territorial arrangement, which to them was more integral, could better extricate the country from its centrifugal pulls and at the time could guarantee the political and economic integrity of greater Russia. It was this latter consideration that seemed the most important to the Jews.

c. The permanent crisis of Zionist ideology's ability to realize its goals in Palestine. As a result, the Zionist outlook, which saw things in terms of catastrophes, had to relinquish its position to more balanced and more moderate approaches. Instead of terminology that spoke of Zionist fulfilment through a drastic uprooting from exile, so to speak, came outlooks that viewed Zionism as an extended historical process in which there was alternately a forging ahead and a regression in work for Palestine, periods of rise and fall; hence there would necessarily be co-existence between Jewish life in the diaspora and Jewish life in Palestine. Naturally the activities of the Jewish establishment in the diaspora (in Zionist terminology "work of the here and now") were gnawing at the energy and organization needed for Palestine activities. But this was unavoidable. Moreover, the Zionists had to view the situation very earnestly and do their utmost to avoid losing control over Jewish public life, which was

being forced to put down roots in the diaspora. Consequently work of the here and now in its most advanced form became working for and shaping Jewish national rights in Russia within the framework of personal autonomy.

We can see, however, that there was no uniform attitude within the political Jewish public toward personal autonomy. Three basic trends, which do not necessarily overlap with specifically party-based views, can be distinguished. Let us call the first the historical approach of "principle." Rooted in the teachings of Dubnov, it viewed positively, even as a privilege, the fact that the Jews were an ex-territorial nation.[3] The phenomenon was perceived as resulting from progressive evolution. (Every nation—according to Dubnov—including the Jewish, is necessarily a union of tribes, followed by a political-territorial unification moving to the uppermost unity, which is ex-territorial-spiritual.) This process is, therefore, irreversible and any effort to turn the hands back, i.e., to take the Jewish people back to phases already passed or skipped over is a denunciation of historical wisdom, of its objective logic. This historiosophic outlook was the basis for re-evaluating the perpetuation of the diaspora in Jewish history to the point where autonomy was claimed to be the essential quality of Jewish life, which would be implemented both because of the necessities of that way of life and because of the attitude of the nations among whom Jews were living.

Unlike the historical approach of principle, the second was an instrumental-political approach. It was first and foremost presented by the Seimists (SERP), and in 1917 it was partially adopted by the remnants of the Socialist-Zionist Workers' Party (the Territorialists) who were swallowed up by the Jewish Socialist Workers' Party (the Seimists), which later become known as the United Party. The Seimists condemned the Zionist Organization as a body that was incapable of carrying out Jewish territorialization in Palestine.[4] They constantly pointed out that a mighty enterprise such as settling Jews on the land and their consolidation into a political-territorial entity could not be accomplished by voluntarism or spontaneity of any sort. Only personal autonomy based on the democratic constitution would give Jews strong formal coercive tools to carry out their territorialization within a specific area. The basic democratic laws would be attained through overall reform of the regime in Russia and necessitated by the existing national problem. The Seimists were careful not to claim that personal autonomy could replace territorial autonomy. Quite the contrary. They never stopped insisting that only territorialization could save the Jews from the distress of national exploitation and anti-Semitism. Furthermore, they said, only a Jewish state would have power to accumulate the attributes necessary to exist as a territorial and ex-territorial nation at one and the same time—a character-

istic of all modern nations—growing with modernization. The Seimists insisted, therefore, on the existence of a bilateral interdependent system, a sort of mutual inter-relationship of the ex-territorial Jewish centres and the Jewish territory, alongside each other, with the territorial physically and spiritually influencing the autonomous ex-territorial systems.[5] Personal autonomy would, of course, have to continue as a form of Jewish life alongside the prospective state. From the Seimist approach, which was partially adopted by Poalei Zion, derived the notion that Jewish autonomy would have to be more constitutional and more sovereign, i.e., the way Jewish personal autonomy was to be estblished would be linked as closely as possible to the overall setup so as to give the autonomous body the authority and international standing that would advance the territorial interests of the Jews. The general rule then was autonomy and not self-government.

The third approach, which may be called an educational-instrumentalist one, was accepted by the Russian Zionist organization. It stressed the general educational value of the demand for autonomy and this mainly as an internal Jewish matter. Unlike the other streams, the Zionists put no faith in the possibility of a solution to the Jewish question that was not Zionist-territorial, not even in the form of temporary measures. In their view the *idea* of administrative autonomy for Jews was merely a frame for conducting a public battle that would not be aimed at actual implementation, but would serve as a school for strengthening and deepening national awareness and national solidarity. As Ze'ev Jabotinsky expressed it so well, all activity in the diaspora is an integral part of the national Jewish awakening and Zionism, whether it is aware of it or ignores it, is historically bound to integrate within it all the streams in the national struggle. Hence the role of the Zionist movement is "to demand in the name of the Jewish people conditions that will ensure it the greatest possible freedom for multi-faceted independent national activity."[6]

The operative significance of this was the guaranteeing of Jewish self-rule which would not be interfered with from the outside and which would be subject as little as possible to external formal setups.

Moreover, the political-instrumentalist trend strove to turn the Jewish people in Russia into one of the country's state nationalities alongside the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, etc; each of which was organized into its own ex-territorial national association. In this way the Seimist platform avoided the issue of Jewish dual subjection which could have arisen had the liberal Russian constitution granted local autonomy to territorial minorities.[7]

The position of the Zionists was quite different. They doubted the effectiveness of autonomous ex-territorial bodies and strove toward territo-

riality as a stable solution. They also believed that local autonomy for territorial minorities in Russia was about to become a reality and hence wished to guarantee that Jewish self-government would not depend on local national constitutions. The resolutions of the Third Congress of Russian Zionists held at Helsingfors in November 1906 stated: (1c) "The national rights of the Jewish population are determined and guaranteed by the all-inclusive constitutional authority for the entire Russian territory, and individual local legislation cannot alter them."[8] A similar version was included in the resolutions of the Petrograd Congress in May 1917.

It is generally accepted that the actual test of these political concepts took place after the outbreak of the February 1917 revolution. The revolution, which brought with it democratization of public life in Russia, encouraged Jewish political awakening, focusing it on the question of national rights and personal autonomy. In March, April and May all the parties were able to come up with clearly formulated autonomy platforms which suited the new circumstances.[9] Notwithstanding the sharply divided opinion within the Russian Jewish community which undermined the organizational effort for arranging a general congress of Russian Jewry, it is possible to say that there was no significant controversy about the demand to shape Jewish life in democratic Russia within a national framework of personal autonomy.[10]

It is also important to note that on the issue of recognition of national rights and definition of the formal shape they would take, the political Jewish public was oriented toward the central government in Petrograd and hoped that the liberal constitutional process would indeed guarantee a solution to the problem.[11] As a result, the Jewish community was insufficiently aware of the growing parallel awakening of territorial minorities in Russia, first and foremost the Ukrainians. Consequently it did not properly consider the relationship between its own activities for Jewish national rights and the political aims and tactics of the minorities.[12]

Moreover, the preparatory process for a planned debate in the Russian Constituent Assembly regarding the status of ethnic minorities could have been different for the Jews as compared with other nations. The perspective of personal autonomy, which was the object of the Jewish struggle, forced them to concentrate their efforts on organizing the Jews into political power. Even the attempt to form democratic communities could not be interpreted as a disruption of the regular constitutional process on the part of the Jews, as the communities were free associations of citizens within legally recognized organizations. Thus, as long as the belief dominated that future Russia would be a democratic country, the policy of the

central government, which purposely retarded the constitutional process, was not viewed by the Jews as potentially dangerous, even though it aroused fears and annoyance.

Not so territorial minorities. The demand for territorial autonomy channelled their political activity from the very beginning toward territorially-based institutions. Indeed, these implied a serious challenge to the status of the central government and the procrastination tactics of the constitutional process, while at the same time revealing haste and persistence in establishing accomplished facts.

The gap between the interests of the Jews and those of the territorial minorities progressively widened. The Jews were in no hurry to organize on an all-Russian basis and did not even avoid deepening the friction and disagreement among the various elements active in Jewish politics, while on the other hand, the national political activity of the territorial minorities was increasing as was the intensive unification process that outwardly characterized them. The danger of this gap had still to become evident to both sides. The Jews had to realize that their autonomy could no longer be attained solely through the goodwill of the all-Russian constitution. Not only was the weight of the territorial national elements much more significant, but their intense political organization and presenting of established facts would also necessarily dictate how the game was to be played in the all-Russian Constituent Assembly. However, even the territorial minorities were forced to consider the national status of the Jews within their autonomous territories, for an oversight regarding a possible agreement with the Jews of Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania, where they constituted a sizeable section of the urban population, played into the hands of the Great Russian interests and threatened to dwarf the achievements of the Ukrainians, Belorussians and Lithuanians when the crucial moment came. Almost certainly in May 1917 this issue was pronounced in Ukraine and forced both the Jews and the Ukrainians to relate to each other.[13]

Neither the organizational impact of the Ukrainian national movement, which took over the political arena at an amazing pace, nor the rise of national aspirations in Ukraine spreading to the regions of Kiev, Podollia and Volhynia were marginal as far as the Jews were concerned. It should, however, be noted that as a result of events on the war front, the Jews of Poland and parts of Lithuania and Belorussia were cut off from Russia. Hence in 1917 the majority of Russian Jews were in Ukraine, and Jewish-Ukrainian issues automatically became cardinal questions for Russian Jewry.

Unlike the Jewish socialist parties, which were prudent enough to establish their own authoritative leadership in Kiev in good time, the Ukrainian Zionist organization was ineffective and helpless. This derived in

part from the weakness of the Kiev leadership (the aged "Bnei Zion" circle),[14] but more important, from the retention of the decision-making centre for the Zionist organization in the hands of the Petrograd and Moscow leaders. This leadership was incapable of objectively evaluating the turn of events in Ukraine and even determined from the outset that there was no room to veer from the directive that the shaping of Jewish rights in Russia was to be based on the all-Russian constitution independent of and unalterable by any local legislation. This decision was reinforced by the Seventh Zionist Congress in Petrograd held between 24 and 31 May 1917.[15]

This meant that unlike the leaders of the Jewish socialist parties, who were aware of what was happening politically in Kiev and even put out feelers to Ukrainian national elements, the Zionist organization in Kiev displayed reserve and only occasionally sympathized with the Ukrainians' street demonstrations. The spokesman for the Kiev Zionist movement, N. S. Syrkin, later admitted: "The Ukrainian national movement found the Jewish community uncertain and 'unprepared,' as the Ukrainian movement aroused great confusion as to how to relate to and evaluate it." Furthermore, he claimed that most of the Jewish community was pleased with the achievements of the February Revolution and put its trust in the intentions of the Provisional Government, which in his view manifested the unity of the country—a slogan which was a central pillar of political Jewish orientation.[16]

He also claimed that "all these questions (like the Ukrainian struggle) which are a source of concern and fear, stir up the Jewish population and force it to question seriously its own fate; to this is added a bitter awareness that the nation is facing a (new) 'split of Judaism' and until such time as 'self-determination of the nations' is implemented and logically concluded, united Russian Jewry will split into Ukrainian Jewry, Latvian Jewry, Lithuanian Jewry, etc . . . if steps are not taken in time to prevent this process."[17] The Russian Zionist organization (including the Kiev wings) therefore preferred a course of events that would avoid splitting Russia and with it Russian Jewry.

However, events in Ukraine were moving rapidly, and with the publication of the First Universal and the proposed legislation to establish a general secretariat, the Provisional Government began to understand the urgent need to hold discussions with the Ukrainians. A high-level delegation was sent to Kiev to open the way to a series of practical steps, one of which was the intensive integration of the national minorities in Ukraine into the local autonomous government set-up.

We do not know how the contacts between the Jews and Ukrainians developed before July 1917.[18] We have no sources to determine who made the first moves and what the phases of the negotiations were. How-

ever, with all due respect to precise historical research, it does not detract from the fact that toward the beginning of July there was already a framework for agreement between the Jewish elements conducting the negotiations and the Ukrainian set-up.[19]

The agreement was almost certainly based on two fundamental assumptions, but I would not wish to claim that these were accepted collectively (for I have no information as to whether the two were formulated at the same time or whether they were accepted sequentially as a result of the bargaining). I shall present them here together as they focus on the differences of opinion. One assumption stated that the national minorities would be represented by their democratic organizations and the second defined the status of the deputy-secretaries in the Secretariat for National Minorities within the Ukrainian General Secretariat as well as the status of personal autonomy within the Ukrainian establishment .

Let us examine the development of the Kiev Zionist organization's attitude to these two points. As to the first, the Zionist organization encountered an attempt by the Jewish socialist parties (mostly the Bund and the United Party), which were aided by the Ukrainian Social Democrats, to interpret the term democratic organizations as "revolutionary democratic" organizations and under the guise of this formulation to disqualify the Zionists from partnership in the Ukrainian government.[20] In this controversy the Zionist organization was more successful as it was supported by the Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries.[21] I have no doubt that this support was, among other things, aimed at drawing the Zionist organization into talks with the Ukrainian national movement in which the Social Revolutionaries played a central role. But in the argument around this issue, another demand was involved—the question of proportions in the planned representation of Jewish parties in the small Rada—one representative for each of the five parties. Syrkin negated the principle of equality and claimed in the debates that the Jewish parties represented only the margins of the Jewish community, and that the mainstay of the Jewish public had not yet manifested itself politically; when and if it did so in democratic elections, it would stand by the Zionist organization.[22] It was therefore necessary to determine true Jewish public opinion in a fully legitimate manner. On the practical level, such a formulation meant that it was impossible to compose a Jewish delegation to the Rada without democratic elections. On the other hand, it was impossible to hold elections within the entire Jewish community if they were dissociated from elections within Ukraine itself, and this contained a stumbling-block for consolidation of an autonomous Ukrainian government. The seemingly straightforward slogan of "trustworthy, democratic representation" was not only inconvenient for all the other Jewish parties, but challenged the entire praxis of Ukrainian national politics, which indeed

was striving to draw things out for as long as possible so as to cement independent political and administrative tools before the election campaign for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Moreover, the claim that political forces represented only the margins could also be thrown at the newly-formed Ukrainian national organization and was, by the way, voiced both in Petrograd and within Russophile circles in Ukraine. With it went the view that democratic elections would prove what usurpation lay in the Ukrainian national movement. Hence the very questioning of the method of determining Jewish representation contained more far-reaching repercussions than was at first evident.

Concerning the second item, the brunt of the alienation and confrontation between the Zionist organization and the Ukrainian national movement in the Rada focused on the talks around defining the status of the deputy for matters of Jewish nationalism in the Secretariat of Internationality Affairs within the Ukrainian government, i.e., the General Secretariat. As is well-known, the Provisional Government demanded that the Ukrainian authorities make allowance for proportional representation of the national minorities in self-government bodies.[23] But this demand was in no way interpreted as an order to establish autonomy. This is clear. For the Provisional Government could not raise an idea which it believed had to be dealt with by the Constituent Assembly and hence was as yet untimely. It only intended to point out to the Ukrainians that Ukraine was of mixed population and that its problems could not be solved in an exclusively Ukrainian way. Undoubtedly the Provisional Government strove to create a situation whereby the question of national minorities would be an obstacle in the path of Ukrainian separatism, on the assumption that the minorities would do their utmost to hamper such a development.

The Ukrainian authorities for their part, being forced to respond to the challenge, desired to blunt the anti-Ukrainian edge as much as possible and were prepared to direct their considerations to any plan that would transform the problem of national minorities into an internal Ukrainian matter. That is, having taken steps to recognize minority rights, they wished to make the most of it and willingly sought ways to legitimize and define them in the framework of Ukrainian autonomy. The arguments centred on whether minority representation should be by ministerial appointments according to the potential candidate's qualifications or by direct appointment of national representatives as secretaries.

Discussions on this matter continued for some time, both in open conferences and in secret meetings, with friction between national and party interests which I have discussed in a separate article.[24] When it came down to it, a special committee, headed by A. Shulhyn, declared that the principle of qualified representation for ministerial positions of secretar-

ies should be upheld and that an additional status of comrade or deputy secretary should be provided for alongside the General Secretary for National Affairs. Each of these comrades was to be responsible for the personal autonomy of his national association, participate in all regular meetings of the Ukrainian secretariat, with decision-making power over all matters concerning his specific national minority and with the right to render advice on any other matter. It was also determined that these deputy secretaries would not be appointed by the General Secretariat (in fact clerks) as were other deputy secretaries, but by the Rada in accordance with the regulation binding upon general secretaries. Hence, with every resignation of a general secretariat, these deputy secretaries on national affairs also had to resign and be re-elected together with the new cabinet.[25]

Elsewhere I have already claimed that such a decision could not be accepted without the agreement of the Ukrainian factor, which tended toward it solely because of the consideration that the more the leaning of national minorities toward changes taking place in Ukraine was based on their specific national interests (directed mainly at the Jews), the greater would be their indebtedness to the Ukrainian national movement. It can perhaps be presumed that the Ukrainian national movement would be entitled to demand explicitly this decision as part of a give and take.

In other words, the Ukrainian national movement wished to form a binding reciprocal relationship between itself and the Jewish national movement: for the first time in modern history the Jews were being given the opportunity to institutionalize their autonomy in the diaspora, in return for promising to be partners in the Ukrainian ruling coalition whose goal was to guarantee as much Ukrainian sovereignty as possible. It must be acknowledged that even the left-wing parties, which took upon themselves this condition of reciprocity, were disturbed by the danger involved in it—the decentralization of Russia and the division of Jewry. Nevertheless, they decided to walk the tightrope and attempt to keep a balance between the extremes, meanwhile clutching enthusiastically at autonomy. Did the Zionist organization adopt this tactic? In my opinion, no. All along Syrkin continued to claim on behalf of the Zionist organization in Kiev that the appointment of M. Zilberfarb to the position of deputy secretary for Jewish national affairs came about as the result of a plot between the three Jewish workers' parties (the Bund, the United Party and Poalei Zion).[26] On the surface it would seem that the Zionist organization was reluctantly omitted from this political game. However, a more careful reading will reveal that the Kiev Zionists were unwilling to enter into any agreement whatsoever with the other Jewish parties represented in the Rada. The Zionists claimed to represent most of the Jewish community and hence had to be given priority when it came to defin-

ing the role of and appointing the deputy secretary. This tactic was, by the way, even adopted by the Zionists on an all-Russian basis in the debates over the all-Russian Jewish congress. However, if in the latter instance the method led to delaying preparations for the congress, in this case the tactic would put the Jews outside the political processes that had occurred in Ukraine and would enable them to maintain a pose of neutrality.[27] Moreover, let us even assume that the Zionist organization in Ukraine indeed zealously supported democracy, then in practice here again it returned to the demand for general elections, a move that had to be accepted by the entire population, first and foremost by the Ukrainians. From an operational point of view, it would have led to a cessation of the process of establishing accomplished facts in Ukraine.

In the second, no less important confrontation, the Zionist organization questioned the integration of deputy secretaries with half-member status into the General Secretariat. In their estimation they should have been secretaries (of state) only, i.e., *senior clerks* in the government, representing and therefore controlling a certain sector in the country. They did not need to participate in the work of the General Secretariat and be part of the government coalition responsible for the declared policy of Ukraine. Hence their election had to be based on a democratic majority within the national association under their charge and they would first and foremost be subject to it.[28] On Syrkin's evidence this was at first their way of perceiving the proposition and only later became a demand in itself.[29] It is worth noting yet another short-term manoeuvre employed during negotiations on the character of the Jewish Establishment. In a special committee convened within the framework of the Rada to examine international issues connected to the General Secretariat for Educational Affairs, there were two rival controversial approaches. The first, that of the Jewish left-wing parties, including the Peoples' Party (Folkspartei), proposed that educational affairs of national minorities be put into the hands of the deputy secretary to the General Secretariat for Relations between Nations, while the second, submitted by the Zionist organization, demanded the convening of a special collective authority "made up of representatives of all streams in the General Secretariat for Educational Affairs."[30] Syrkin, who presented the proposal and even expounded it in the Rada and in a special booklet, claimed that the difference in principle between the two was that one strove for a centralized, one-sided solution of educational problems that were by nature pluralistic—he was referring to the problem of two languages in Jewish teaching—whereas the second rejected the "fiction of centralization" for practical reasons and aimed to create an authority that would reflect the various tendencies within the nation, while striving to reach a conciliatory middle-ground.

An official resolution along these lines was also passed on 2 August by the General Assembly of Kiev Zionists, which discussed Jewish representation in the Ukrainian Rada.[31] It is clear that it aimed at stripping the National Deputy Secretariat of its autonomous role and elevating in a vital area (the Education Secretariat), an authoritative Jewish representation whose authority was not based on the resolutions of the special committee which had discussed division of portfolios between the national minorities and had formulated the proposal concerning the status of national deputy secretaries (on 15 July). Again on the surface there was an insistence on the need for compromise between the various approaches within the Jewish community, but the proposal essentially bypassed the specific agreed arrangement regarding the character of the Secretariat for Relations between Nations, which adhered strictly to a procedure of reciprocity between the two national movements. Consequently the Instruction of the Provisional Government (4 August) meticulously noted the formal status of deputies to the General Secretary for Relations between Nations and did not do so for other possible deputy secretaries.

It is possible to deduce from this that the authority representing Jewish autonomy could dissociate itself from the forms of democracy and representation current at the time in Ukraine. That is, even if the demand for establishing a constituent assembly had not yet ripened in Ukraine or insistence upon it was fundamentally rejected because of the Provisional Government's decisions, then the Jewish community could do otherwise and elect someone to stand at the head of its organization on the basis of general elections. Furthermore, Jewish autonomy would not be attained in exchange for a commitment to Ukrainian interests whether in their present dimensions or on a scale which could mushroom if and when the Ukrainian movement extended its desire for greater sovereignty.

In general, in Kiev, Zionists adhered to the tactic of avoiding a strengthening of relations with the national movement, as the unity of Russia was at stake. It did not follow from this, however, that the Zionists opposed Ukrainian autonomy, only that the latter was to form part of an arrangement settled by the all-Russian Constitutional Assembly.[32] In such a situation personal autonomy for the Jews and local autonomy for the Ukrainians would be determined at one and the same time without the burden of the Jewish-Ukrainian-Russian triangle.

From this angle the resolutions passed at the Kiev Zionist conference that convened between 3 and 8 October (16–21)may be of some interest. In a special paragraph which discussed "our attitude to the Ukrainian question," the resolutions praise the activities and tactics of the Zionist movement in the Ukrainian Rada and encourage that movement to insist vigorously on its demand to form the *Jewish national representation on the basis of democratic elections*. In the second paragraph, it is stressed

that the "peaceful co-existence of the peoples populating Russia is possible only on the basis of the political change of Russia into a federal democratic republic guaranteeing the rights of national minorities."

Paragraph 3, the most important, read as follows:

> The Zionist Congress of the Kiev region, basing itself on the resolutions of the Seventh all-Russian Zionist Congress, finds it necessary: a. That in the basic legislation to be passed by the all-Russian Constituent Assembly and which *will not be open to changes by any local legislation whatever, the all-Russian Jewish community* national association will be recognized as a legal party representing the entire range of public rights guaranteeing the Jewish people its right to self-determination. b. Until the convening of the Constituent Assembly, the reciprocal relations between the Ukrainian and Jewish peoples will be regulated through representatives of Jewish nationality in the Ukrainian representative and executive bodies.[33]

Therefore, in October the Zionist organization of Kiev still maintained its all-Russian orientation while ignoring in its resolutions the changes that had taken place in Ukraine as well as the formal achievements gained by the Jews in the agreement with the Ukrainians.

Adhering to its assumptions, the Zionist organization of Kiev followed a persistent policy of aloofness toward the Jewish deputy secretary's activities, while itself swaying between tactics and principles, but clearly without wishing to find alternative ways of strengthening its ties with the Ukrainian national movement, which was increasingly expanding its foothold. The situation did not alter even after October 1917, when Ukraine began to take the path of independent state sovereignty and there was already an objective need to support what was happening. At this stage the leaders of the Ukrainian movement began to display a more intensive interest in talking with the Zionist organization. This trend was manifested in Item 9 of the Law of Personal Autonomy for National Minorities in Ukraine, with the deletion of the assertion that Jewish autonomy must be represented by a ministerial-level appointment.[34]

It was only during the Hetman government that the Zionist movement changed its attitude, as the Jews were permitted a certain degree of self-rule, without obligation to the Ukrainian national movement. But this development is a departure from our present discussion.

NOTES

1. For an extensive survey of the subject, see O. Y. Janowsky, *The Jews and Minority Rights 1898-1918* (New York 1933).
2. "Printsip natsionalno-politicheskoi avtonomii," in *Vozrozhdenie, Evreiskii proletariat i natsionalnaia problema, sbornik statei* (1905), 47–58.
3. S. M. Dubnov, *Pisma o starom i novom evreistve 1897–1907* (1905), 1–52 and 74–112.
4. *Vozrozhdenie,* 59–78; M. Mints, "Shalosh Teudot Miymei pulmus Havozrozhdenie Erev Veidat Poltava Shel Mifleget Poalim Sozial-Democratit Yehudit—Poalei Zion," *Hazionut* (Tel Aviv 1978), 5: 310–41; *Khronika evreiskoi zhizni*, no. 4, 31 January 1906, 9–10.
5. *Vozrozhdenie,* 74ff; Ben-Ader, "O natsionalno-politicheskoi avtonomii," *Serp, sbornik vtoroi* (St. Petersburg 1908), 129–48.
6. Y. Slutsky, *Ha itonut Hayehudit Rusit Bereshit Hame'a Ha-20* [The Russian-Jewish Press in the Twentieth Century] (Tel Aviv 1978), 218–24. For Jabotinsky's points of view, see *Khronika evreiskoi zhizni,* no. 25 (1905): 28; no. 23 (1906): 25–8; and *Razsvet,* no. 13 (1907): 3.
7. "Printsip natsionalno-politicheskoi avtonomii," 47–58.
8. A. Refaeli, "Veidot Arziyot Shel Zionei Rusya" [Conferences of Russian Zionists], *Katsir, kovetz lekorot hatnua hazionit berusya* [Collection on the History of the Zionist Movement in Russia] (Tel Aviv 1964), 1: 99. A similar text is included in the resolutions of the Petrograd Conference of May 1917. See also Refaeli's article under the same title in *Katsir* (Tel Aviv 1972), 2: 287.
9. See M. Lirov (Moshe Litvakov) "On Personal Autonomy" in *Kievskaia mysl,* no. 88, 1 April 1917, and no. 89, 2 April 1917.
10. M. Altshuler, "Ha-nisayon leargen kinus klal-yehudi be-rusya ahrei hamahpekha" [The Attempt to Organize an All-Russian Jewish Congress after the Revolution], *He avar,* 12 (1965): 75–89.
11. N. S. Syrkin, *K ukrainskomu voprosu* (Kiev 1917), 9ff.
12. See N. S. Syrkin, "Na Ukraine," *Evreiskaia zhizn,* no. 17 and 18 (April 1917), reprinted in Syrkin, *K ukrainskomu voprosu,* 54ff.
13. It is difficult to examine this problem because of the lack of sources, but M. Lirov in *Kievskaia mysl* and Syrkin, *K ukrainskomu voprosu* contain some relevant information.
14. This issue is dealt with in the author's book *Hogrim Umfathim, Letoldoteha Shel Havurat "Dror" Harusit* [The Lame and the Nimble: The Story of the "Dror" Group in Russia] (Tel Aviv 1983). See also M. Hindes' confidential letter to the Zionist Bureau in Copenhagen, 8 May 1918, in the Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, L6/31/4.
15. *Katsir*, 2: 287.
16. Syrkin, *K ukrainskomu voprosu*, 10.
17. Ibid.
18. See M. Minc, "The Secretariat of Internationality Affairs (Sekretariiat mizhnatsionalnykh sprav) of the Ukrainian General Secretariat (1917–1918)," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 6, no. 1 (March 1982): 35ff. See also M. Silberfarb, *Dos yidishe ministerium un di yidishe avtonomie in Ukraine* (Kiev 1918), introduction and 1–3; *Kievskaia mysl,* no. 173, 10 July 1917; P. Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materiialy do istorii ukrainskoi revolutsii, 1917–1920 rr.* (Vienna 1921), 1: 96; *Der yidisher proletarier,* no. 6–7, 7 (20) August 1917.

19. One of the few sources on this subject is Zolotarev in the Cherikover Archives at the YIVO Institute, New York, p. 12546 ff.
20. Syrkin, *K ukrainskomu voprosu,* 24.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materiialy,* 1: 88ff.
24. See M. Minc, "The Secretariat of Internationality Affairs."
25. Silberfarb, *Dos yidishe ministerium,* 2.
26. Syrkin, *K ukrainskomu voprosu*, 27ff.
27. Some of these problems are discussed in the report from Kiev, "Na Ukraine," *Razsvet,* no. 8, 30 August 1917, 25–6.
28. Syrkin, *K ukrainskomu voprosu*, 27. On the functioning of the Secretariat for Jewish Affairs, see M. Postan, "Tsu der shtats-sekretar frage," in E. Cherikover, ed., *Di yidishe avtonomie un der natsionaler sekretariat in Ukraine: Materialn un dokumentn* (Kiev 1920), 20–34.
29. Syrkin, *K ukrainskomu voprosu,* 27.
30. Ibid., 29.
31. Ibid., 53 ff.
32. M. Aleinikov, "Avtonomiia Ukrainy," *Razsvet,* no. 2, 16 July 1917, 4–5.
33. *Razsvet,* no. 20–21, 13 December 1917, 32ff. Emphasis added.
34. Omitting paragraph 10.

Jonathan Frankel

The Dilemmas of Jewish National Autonomism: the Case of Ukraine 1917–1920

In the years 1917–20 far-reaching attempts were made to establish Jewish personal—that is, diaspora or non-territorial—national autonomy in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. For this, as for all the experiments in democratic government, the circumstances turned out to be disastrously unpropitious. Dictatorship, civil war, barbarism and massacre—on a vast scale—made a mockery of long-laid and sophisticated plans for a new multi-tiered parliamentary order. Nonetheless, for the student of Jewish politics, the events of that period are of exceptional interest, because as the parties tried to turn theory into practice, they were forced to grapple with the realities long hidden behind abstract slogans. Fundamental dilemmas, hitherto largely ignored, could no longer be evaded, and choices, however harsh, had to be made. This paper will seek, in the brief compass allowed, to describe those dilemmas and those choices as they crystallized in Ukraine—the dilemmas of the Jewish politicans, let it be stressed, not of the Ukrainians (that, of course, is a separate and major subject in its own right, no less fascinating and likewise deeply tragic).

Before entering the jungle of the real political world, however, let us describe the development of autonomism in strictly schematic, juridical terms. The theory of national-personal autonomism held that in multinational states, the nationalities, in taking over many basic functions of government, should be organized—in part or even in entirety—on a non-territorial basis. In short, the Jewish population, for example, even

though a relatively small minority throughout the Russian or Austro-Hungarian empires, would constitute an officially recognized corporate body, with its own democratic elections, its own legislative body and executive, its own state budget and with responsibility for its own school system, cultural affairs, perhaps for health and welfare. In its maximal form, this theory envisaged all the nationalities as organized on a non-territorial basis for strictly national affairs (primarily education and culture); minimally it envisaged every citizen enjoying the right to vote not only for the territorial organs of general local and central government but also for his own national "cultural" assembly (the Jews for the Jewish Seim, a Ukrainian or Georgian even though living permanently in Moscow or St. Petersburg for a Ukrainian or a Georgian legislature).[1]

This theory, ascribed primarily to a school of Austro-Marxism—notably Rudolf Springer (Renner) and Otto Bauer—was championed from the 1890s in the Russian Jewish world by Chaim Zhitlovsky and Shimon Dubnov.[2]

Adopted by the Bund tentatively in 1901 and fully in 1905, it was soon accepted, albeit in variant versions, by nearly all the specifically Jewish parties (by the Russian Zionist Organization, by Vinaver's liberal *Evreiskaia Narodnaia Gruppa*, by Borochov's Poale Zion, and of course by the SERP or Seimists as they were sometimes called).[3] As an article in the Bundist *Poslednie izvestiia* in September 1905 put it:

> It is not so many years since the Fourth Congress of the Bund formulated the principle of national-cultural autonomy, is it? We were then entirely isolated on this question. . . . [But now] a veritable deluge of articles, declarations, resolutions, petitions, an entire wave . . . has come out—in more or less disguised form—for that same Bundist national-cultural autonomy. Now it is up to date, a fashionable slogan.[4]

Very soon after the February Revolution of 1917, the Jewish parties with their headquarters in Petrograd began to prepare for the organization of elections to an All-Russian Jewish Congress. After long-drawn out negotiations, the parties (including both the Bund and the Zionists) drew up an agreement on the agenda of the congress, which, as its first item of business, was to "work out the principles of Jewish national self-government."[5] The elections were not held until December and because of the Bolshevik take-over, the congress never met.[6] It should be mentioned, however, that in July 1918 a conference was held in Moscow which could claim to speak for the Jewish people in the RSFSR—the delegates represented the local Jewish communities (*kehilot*) reorganized during 1917 on the basis of democratic elections. But this conference had

no future given the increasing centralization of Bolshevik power. Bolshevism and parliamentarianism proved incompatible.

However, Ukraine witnessed a very different and far more complex development. There, the burgeoning movement of Ukrainian nationalism hastened the institutionalization of Jewish national self-government. In its struggle for a broad measure of home rule, the Central Rada—constituted in April 1917 as a purely Ukrainian body—decided in late June as part of the proposed agreement with the Provisional Government in Petrograd to invite the minority nationalities (Russians, Poles, Jews) to join its ranks. In accord with the agreement of 3/16 July, the minorities were to receive 30 per cent of the total representation, which meant that fifty Jews drawn from all the major parties (including, that is, both the Bund and the Zionists) now joined the Central Rada and five, the Small Rada.[7]

Moreover, members of the Jewish parties also entered the Ukrainian government, the General Secretariat, with a Bundist (first Rafes, then Zolotarev) taking the post of controller.[8] Within the Secretariat for Nationalities, sub-departments were set up to deal with the affairs of the respective minorities and Moyshe Zilberfarb of the United Jewish Socialist Labour Party (the "Fareynikte") was appointed vice-secretary for Jewish affairs. In the wake of the Third Universal (9/22 November), which declared Ukraine a people's republic (within a putative Russian federation), Zilberfarb became general secretary for Jewish affairs, enjoying thereby full ministerial rank. And with the Fourth Universal (9/22 January 1918), he was, in fact, given the title of minister for Jewish affairs.[9]

The department for Jewish affairs began immediately in the summer of 1917 to organize departments to deal, for example, with education and the communities (*kehilot*). The vice-secretary, Zilberfarb, was empowered to call together an advisory body, a national council (*natsyonal-rat*) representing the main parties. And this council, which first met on 10 October 1917, became a permanent institution acting in co-operation with the department (respectively, vice-secretariat, general secretariat, ministry).

In the Third Universal, specific recognition was given to the principle of "national personal autonomy" for the minority nationalities and a pledge was given to put forward "in the nearest future" an appropriate bill. The preamble stated that: "The Ukrainian people which itself had to fight for many years for national freedom and has now attained it, will firmly defend the freedom and national development of all the peoples living in Ukraine."[10]

Zilberfarb (who had been an enthusiastic autonomist since at least 1903) worked with great drive to prepare the appropriate legislation. On

2/15 December 1917, the Central Rada passed the bill that he had prepared to ground the local Jewish communities (*kehilot*) on the basis of universal suffrage. And on 9 January the Rada made into law the Bill on National-Personal Autonomy (defined in the act as the "right of the non-Ukrainian nationalities to manage their national life independently through the organs of a national union").[11]

By this time, of course, the Bolshevik forces were on the march across Ukraine. They entered Kiev on 28 January and held the city for five weeks before being driven out by the German army in alliance with the government of the Ukrainian Republic.[12] Now that the new Holubovych government was set up, the work of the ministry for Jewish affairs was renewed (first under I. Khurgin of the Poale Zion as vice-minister and then from April under V. Latsky [Bertoldi] of the Folkspartey as full minister). On 28 April, the Central Rada was dispersed and the Skoropadsky period (the *Hetmanshchyna*) initiated. But this swing to the right did not put an end to the autonomist experiment. It was not until July 1918 that the law of 9 January on national-personal autonomy was rescinded and that the ministry of Jewish affairs was finally closed down.[13]

But even then party life continued and work went ahead to lay the foundations for a measure of Jewish self-government. Before the National Council (*natsyonal-rat*) dispersed it arranged for the organization of a provisional Jewish national assembly to be made up of representatives chosen by the community boards (*kehilot*), which had been newly elected according to the democratic rules set down in the law of 2 December 1917. The indirect elections (in which some 209,000 people were represented, it seems)[14] were held on 21–23 July, and the Provisional Assembly met in Kiev on 3 November. This assembly elected *inter alia* a national secretariat and a small assembly (of twenty-five members) to ensure continuity after its own recess on 11 November 1918.

Of course, these were also the months of the Ukrainian uprising against Skoropadsky and of the victory of the Directory. Headed by Ukrainian Social Democrats (Vynnychenko, Chekhivsky, Petliura), the Directory decided to recognize as valid the law on National Personal Autonomy, and to reappoint a minister of Jewish affairs, Avrom Revutsky.[15] When the Red Army reconquered Kiev early in February 1919, the Directory and Council of Ministers were evacuated to Vinnytsia. Throughout the rest of 1919, they were constantly on the move—in Vinnytsia, Rivne, Stanislav (Stanyslaviv), Kamianets-Podilskyi—and its composition frequently changed. But the minister for Jewish affairs (Pinkhes Krasny, who had replaced Revutsky in February 1919) remained throughout at his post. Indeed, even after the highly controversial Ukrainian-Polish (Pilsudski-Petliura) pact, Krasny stayed with the Ukrainian regime.[16]

When described in these terms, the autonomist experiment cannot fail to impress the observer with its sheer staying-power. It obviously could not have sprung back to life so often and clung to life so long if there had not been important forces in both the Jewish and the Ukrainian political worlds strongly committed to its survival. And, indeed, Jewish nationalists hoped that in Ukraine, Jewish consciousness could develop freely in the cultural space opened up as the weight of Ukrainianism came to counter-balance Russification. As one Bundist leader put it in June 1917: "We shall be asked: 'What are you: Russians or Ukrainians?' And [we] . . . shall reply: 'We are Jews.' . . . The struggle for Yiddish, the struggle for the rights of the national minority, means that the right of the national majority must be recognized. Only if we recognize the rights of the Ukrainian people can we demand that our rights be recognized."[17]

Again, of the three minorities that together formed the great bulk of the urban population in Ukraine, only the Jews—in contrast to the Poles and Russians—had no nearby state (or any state for that matter) to which they owed national allegiance or to which they could turn for support. Thus, the Ukrainian-Jewish alliance could be seen (and so was seen by many) as based on the firm bond of shared interest—two "underdog" nationalities, the one almost entirely agrarian, the other almost entirely urban, each thus dependent on the other to attain its national rights and freedoms.[18]

It is thus by no means unusual to find the autonomist experience described in basically positive terms—as an intrinsically successful venture frustrated by outside circumstances, above all by the Bolshevik takeovers and the invasions from without. Such a view underlies, it is probably fair to say, the writings of Goldelman, Revutsky, Zilberfarb and Janowsky.

But to adopt this view is to ignore the profound dilemmas that the autonomist plan had to face as soon as theory began to give way to practice. These dilemmas were not produced by random circumstance, but were built into the structure of Jewish politics, on the one hand, and into the relationship between the Jews as a minority and the majority or host nation (in this case, Ukrainians) on the other.

As one rule of thumb, it can be said that the greater the polarization in the Jewish world and the greater the hope of one faction or another finding powerful allies outside that world, the less was the chance of autonomism becoming a reality. Again, the weaker the forces of parliamentarism at the macro-political level, at the level of government and dominion, the quicker the flight from autonomism at the micro-political, the Jewish, level.

The most basic question within Jewish politics was whether the minority at any given moment would accept the rule of the majority in the autonomous institutions. Or would it rather seek support from outside the

Jewish world? There were, after all, the most bitter divisions between different schools of thought: Zionists and anti-Zionists; clericals and anti-clericals; Hebraists and Yiddishists; integral nationalists (*klal-yisroel politiker*) and disciples of the class war.

But, beyond this, there was no guarantee that even the majority would give priority to autonomism if that idea clashed with some other basic political goal. For the major parties, after all, autonomism was only one—not necessarily the most important—of a number of planks in their programme. For the Zionists, there was the Palestine cause; for the Bund, the full triumph of the revolution and Marxism; for the orthodox Ahdut, the defence of religion and its institutions. Only the Folkspartey and the SERP had autonomism as their top priority—but in 1917 the SERP united with the SSRP to form the United Jewish Socialist Labour Party (Fareynikte) thus weakening its initial commitment.[19]

Even before 1917 there had been clear indications of the pitfalls ahead. During the 1905 Revolution, an attempt by the so-called "bourgeois" camp (with Jabotinsky in the lead) had been made to call together a Jewish national assembly (from the empire as a whole), which would present its plans for national autonomy to the (All-Russian) Constituent Assembly that was then confidently expected. All the parties of the Left (including the Poale Zion) rejected this initiative. The Jewish proletariat, declared *Der veker*, is "a minority in the Jewish people—true, an important and active minority, but still a minority." So why should it take part in such a venture "in the first place?" "The Jewish proletariat does not have to go to your Seim in order to gain a political Torah; it has already received one from Karl Marx."[20] Jabotinsky, of course, accused the Left of hypocrisy. "What of cultural autonomy? What of the cultural Seim?"[21] he asked rhetorically.

But here it should be recalled that the attempts to call together an American Jewish Congress (a form of non-state, voluntary, "autonomism") had fared little better. After years of negotiation, an agreement was reached in 1916 on democratic elections, a congress and its agenda. At that stage, though, the Zionist leadership worked with the American Jewish Committee to postpone the actual assembly of the congress for eighteen months for complex tactical reasons (connected, on the Zionist side, with the need to obtain and digest the Balfour Declaration).[22]

In the light of this experience, it is remarkable that the Jewish parties in Russia in 1917 could all agree on the need to call elections to a Jewish national congress. There is no doubt that the quick success of the February Revolution and the establishment of the democratic Provisional Government had a moderating effect and that the rival parties felt under public and moral pressure to compromise. Even then, though, the Poale Zion accused the Zionist leadership of pursuing the same delaying tactics as

their American counterparts, thus making early elections impossible.[23] As for the Bund, it welcomed the idea of the Congress, but added (to quote an official statement of October 1917) that "the decisions of the Congress cannot have any binding character. . . . The struggle over the competence and limits of national autonomy will be transferred to the [All-Russian] Constituent Assembly."[24]

In Ukraine, extreme friction between the Right (or "bourgeoisie") and the Left (or "proletariat") made itself felt from the very first stage of the autonomist process. The pact concluded in early July to bring the minorities into the Rada and the government was interpreted in such a way as to give a clear-cut majority to the bloc of the three socialist parties—the Bund, the Fareynikte and the Poale Zion. As the Ukrainian General Secretariat was socialist in composition, it followed (according to Zilberfarb and his comrades) that the Jewish representation in the government and official institutions would have to be predominantly socialist. Otherwise, there could be no mutual trust between the regime as a whole and its members from the national minorities. Be that as it may, the result was that the Zionist organization decided to boycott the National Council (*natsyonal-rat*), the advisory body set up to co-operate with the vice-secretariat for Jewish affairs. (The religious Ahdut movement had not even been asked to patricipate.)[25] The thought that large sums of state money were to be vested in a strictly Yiddishist and anti-clerical school system infuriated the Right (whether Hebraist, religious or both).

This situation prevailed essentially unchanged even in the months of March and April 1918 (that is, after the Germans had expelled the Bolsheviks). Instead of a socialist, a member of the Folkspartey—a liberal, but also strongly Yiddishist—was appointed as minister of Jewish affairs in the Holubovych government. "One could not," as Zilberfarb puts it, "allow the running of the ministry to fall into the hands of the Zionists who had kept it the whole time under bombardment."[26] Similarly, during the Holubovych interlude, the Jewish socialist leaders concluded an agreement according to which the proposed provisional Jewish national assembly would be made up of seventy-five elected members (from the *kehilot*) and of the fifty members of the National Council (*natsyonal-rat*) which they dominated.[27] They were very much aware of how fast public opinion in the Jewish world was running against them at that juncture.

Of course, a radical change was bound to come after the Skoropadsky coup. The socialists were now all but outlawed; the "bourgeoisie" was back in favour. So the Left bowed graciously to necessity and agreed to have the National Council reconstructed on a basis of strict parity. ("We can no longer go forward," declared the Bundist *Folks-tsaytung* on 28 May 1918, "but they cannot drag us backward.")[28] Far more significant was another concession made by the Left: the provisional Jewish national

assembly would be chosen solely from elected delegates. It was this understanding that made it possible to hold the community (*kehile*) elections in July.

The Provisional Assembly did not actually gather in Kiev until 3 November, on the eve of the successful uprising led by the Directory. During the next three months the division between the two camps of Right and Left rapidly opened up to become a chasm. On the one hand, the Provisional Assembly was dominated by the Zionist bloc; on the other, there was once again a government in Kiev (the Directory) ready to support the socialist parties within the Jewish world. And each side was willing to use to the full whatever power base it had.

Thus, the majority in the Provisional Assembly pushed through a decision to send a delegation to the Paris peace talks empowered, *inter alia*, to demand a "national political centre" for the Jews in Palestine and to do so in the name of "the three million [Ukrainian] Jews."[29] The delegation was headed by the veteran and hard-line Zionist leader, M. M. Ussishkin, and among its five members were Ahad Ha-Am and the Kiev rabbi, S. Aharonson.

In retaliation against this Zionist coup, the socialist bloc began to boycott or drop out of the institutions created by the Provisional Assembly, because, as they put it, "the majority does not take any account of the minority."[30] They refused to join the newly formed National Secretariat (the executive organ of Ukrainian Jewry as the majority in the Provisional Assembly saw it) and came to the first meeting of the Small Provisional Assembly on 30 December only in order to explain why they were about to leave. The Bundist statement was read by M. Rafes:

> The election results showed the National Assembly could not satisfy the Jewish working class. The bourgeoisie had exploited its power. The majority had strengthened its dictatorship. The communities [*kehilot*] did not take part in the elections . . . to solve the problems of world Jewry. But such problems were put before the Assembly and decided in the spirit of Jewish clericalism and Zionism. The majority linked itself to the imperialism of the "Entente." . . . We are leaving the Assembly and so you will have no right to speak from its platform in the name of the broad Jewish masses.[31]

The Zionist-Ahdut bloc proposed that rather than renew the post of minister for Jewish affairs, the Directory should permit the Provisional Assembly (or its organ, the National Secretariat) to appoint a state secretary for Jewish affairs. He would fulfill the functions previously assigned to the minister, but he would not be a member of the government so much as a senior civil servant representing the interests of the Jewish na-

tion that had elected him (albeit indirectly). Otherwise, it was argued, the entire concept of autonomy would be rendered empty of practical meaning.[32]

Delegations from the National Secretariat met three times with Vynnychenko in late December 1918 and early January, as well as sending him a detailed memorandum which declared, *inter alia*, that the Jewish socialist parties were hoping to use the Directory in order to establish "the minority over the majority in cultural, national and religious affairs."[33] But all was to no avail. The government decided to reappoint a minister for Jewish affairs (this time, Revutsky) responsible to the Council of Ministers, not to the Provisional National Jewish Assembly. The Small Provisional Assembly retaliated by calling on the local communities (*kehilot*) to boycott the ministry for Jewish affairs, declaring its reestablishment to be "against the expressed will of the Jewish people in Ukraine and . . . a crime against the principle of national autonomy."[34]

Given this crisis, it is little wonder that on the arrival of the Bolsheviks in February 1919, many in the Jewish socialist parties declared it time to rethink the principle of autonomy. This was the theme running through the pages of the Bundist *Folkstsaytung* in March and April 1919: "We have seen it, the national autonomy: constant conflicts with the Zionists, the degradation of the Jewish school, a deepening abyss between the two Jewish cultures—the Hebrew and the democratic. Our friends have been the Russian and Ukrainian socialists. . . . they were much nearer to us than the majority in the *kehilot* and the National Council."[35] Or, again, as it was put by Ester Frumkina, the Bundist leader in Belorussia: "The Jewish workers have outlived the democratic Jewish *kehile*. . . . we must not give power into the hands of the bourgeoisie. In this sense we denounce democracy."[36] It was necessary, we read in yet another article, to establish "autonomous proletarian organizations" which would be responsible "for the new Jewish culture."[37] Of course, there were many who refused to draw such radical conclusions and who (like Litvak, Liber and Zilberfarb) remained true to parliamentarianism and autonomism. But the tide was flowing very hard in the other direction. The ministry would now be replaced by the Commissariat for Jewish Affairs and the Jewish socialist parties by the Jewish Sections of the Communist Party of Ukraine (Evsektsiia). The democratic *kehilot* were simply closed down and not—as proposed for a time—even replaced by soviets of Jewish worker deputies. All this added up to what was now often called "the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Jewish steet."[38]

However, the decline of the autonomist idea was the result not only of the growing polarization within the Jewish world, but even more, of the failure of parliamentary democracy to consolidate itself in the wake of the February Revolution of 1917—whether in Russia proper or in

Ukraine. Autonomism had been envisaged as an integral part, after all, of an overall democratic order. As a programme it made sense only so long as it was possible to believe in the stabilization of a parliamentary (or quasi-parliamentary) system in Russia or Ukraine. Thus, the degree to which the Jewish parties and politicians were ready to try to implement autonomist programmes was, to a very large extent, dependent on their attitudes to the future of the Ukrainian regime. Jewish autonomism, as a programme of government, was a joint Ukrainian-Jewish venture.

Writing in 1906, Borochov had foreseen the problematic nature of an autonomy attained as the result not of long-term political reconstruction but of revolutionary turmoil:

> In a time of chaos, with the final collapse of Tsarism, in the period of preparation for the Constituent Assembly, it may be possible—as the result of chance and convenient circumstances—to achieve national-political autonomy for the Jewish people and some other national minorities. It is possible . . . but autonomy attained in a revolutionary moment such as that would be very short-lived.[39]

In the case of Ukraine, there were particular problems. The Jews could not for a moment forget that popular uprisings in Ukraine had been accompanied almost invariably since the seventeenth century by physical attacks on Jewish population centres. And the wave of pogroms in 1881–2 and again in October 1905 had been centred above all in Ukraine.[40] The fundamental question was, then, whether the moderate forces in the Ukrainian regime would be able and willing to maintain law and order. If not, they could not expect co-operation from the Jewish parties, and all the plans of these parties—autonomism among them—would have to go by the board. For their part, the Ukrainian Social Democratic leaders tended to expect absolute loyalty from the Jewish population and saw in the grant of autonomy and the creation of the ministry for Jewish affairs measures that would ensure such loyalty.

It was thus only natural that the months from July to October 1917 marked the happiest moments in the relationship between the Jewish parties and the Ukrainian government. At that stage, the Rada was not demanding independence from Russia but only a large measure of home rule. The Bund and other Jewish socialist parties in Ukraine gave their support to this position and put pressure to bear on the Provisional Government in Petrograd to grant the necessary concessions to the Rada. The establishment of the vice-secretariat for Jewish affairs was seen as a natural development given the high degree of co-operation between the Jewish and Ukrainian socialists.

Even though there was much dissatisfaction with the qualified declara-

tion of independence pronounced by the Third Universal, little actually changed even in November-December. The Jewish parties all voted for the Universal; and Zolotarev of the Bund could declare: "We sign the Universal with all our heart."[41] Certainly, the preference among the Jewish population and its leaders was for the preservation of unity between the various parts of the former Russian Empire. Fragmentation would mean the break-up of the Jewish nationality into scattered and much weaker units; the loosening of close economic ties; and—this was crucial—a fall in status from constituting one nationality among very many to becoming a minority in what would be essentially single-nation states. But all the Jewish parties were totally opposed to the Bolshevik Revolution of 25 October 1917 and rallied to the Central Rada as a last haven of parliamentary democracy. "At a moment when the struggle against the Bolshevik uprising is in process," we read in the Bundist *Folks-tsaytung* of 9 November 1917, "it is clear that the question could be put only thus: either with the Bolsheviks against the Ukrainians or the reverse. We chose the second path."[42] The decision to grant "national-personal autonomy" reflected the fact that the alliance (although now very uneasy) was still in force.

With the declaration of the Fourth Universal on 9 January, this was no longer the case. The response of the Jewish parties was negative and confused; the Bund actually voted against the Universal, and on 10 January Zolotarev resigned from the General Secretariat.[43] Why did the Bund take so extreme a position? The answer in briefest form is that the Bund in Ukraine was still closely linked to the Bundist leadership in Russia proper and to the Mensheviks. (After all, since 1906, the Bund had been an integral part of the RSDRP.) In the declaration of full independence, the Bundists saw not only a betrayal of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly (which had been dispersed only a few days earlier with still unpredictable results), but also an opening to a possible "separate peace" between Ukraine and Germany—an idea still anathema in Menshevik circles.[44] And to all this has to be added the growing anarchy in Ukraine, the inability of the government to control unruly generals and the fear of pogroms. The Bundist vote of opposition was seen as a drastic gesture. (Liber, speaking in the Central Rada, was interrupted by the call: "He has already destroyed one state; now he wants to destroy another.")[45] Nonetheless, even the Bund was finally left with no choice but to support the war effort of the Ukrainian People's Republic against the Bolshevik army till the bitter end.

The other Jewish parties (including the Zionists) abstained in the vote; and Zilberfarb remained at his post as minister of Jewish affairs. Unlike the Bund, the Fareynikte and Poale Zion had no special links to the Mensheviks (or the Russian SRs for that matter) and, therefore, were

more willing in principle to see an independent Ukraine as a positive option. They also were more unequivocably committed than the Bund to autonomism—national-"personal" (as distinct from merely "cultural") autonomy was their slogan. However, the growing violence throughout Ukraine; reports of pogroms (albeit not of catastrophic proportions); the arbitrary measures taken by the army in Kiev—all showed how desperate the situation was becoming. The Jewish ministry, which (with the Jewish socialist parties) had hitherto resolutely rejected the idea, long called for by the Zionists, of supporting the establishment of self-defence units by Jewish soldiers, now, on 15 January 1918, reversed its position. (Ironically, Petliura had supported the idea in the Small Rada as early as November 1917.)[46] On 16 January, Zilberfarb resigned.[47] He was not replaced until the short-lived Holubovych regime.

With the revival of autonomist plans under the Directory, a radically new situation fast developed. Where, in 1917, the Rada had appeared to be the one viable option, now there was a desperate search for a *deus ex machina* to salvage something from the wreckage of the world war, the civil war and the economic collapse. After the experience of January 1918, when the Ukrainian army (the Galician units apart) had largely disintegrated in the face of the Bolshevik offensive, there was little confidence in the ability of the Directory to build up effective military power. And, further, the Directory itself had declared for some kind of toilers' dictatorship to replace the principle of parliamentary democracy. The Zionists were inclined to support a pact between the Directory and the Entente (the French had a contingent at Odessa). The Jewish socialist parties hoped for an agreement between the Directory and the Bolsheviks in Moscow.

But while the Bund and to a lesser extent the Fareynikte decided to keep some distance from the Directory, "to see which way the wind was blowing," as Revutsky put it,[48] the Poale Zion opted for a policy of full co-operation. Thus, the post of minister for Jewish affairs fell to that party *faute de mieux*. Revutsky took office in the second week of January 1919 just as the news of the major pogroms in Berdychiv and Zhytomyr was reaching Kiev. This placed him and his party in a cruel situation. In these same days (14–15 January) the Bund under the leadership of Rafes had opted for a pro-Bolshevik strategy, thus renouncing "parliamentary illusions" (including autonomism).[49] The Red Army was already marching through north-east Ukraine.

Revutsky weighed the possibility of immediate resignation. With the support of the Poale Zion in Kiev, however, he finally decided to retain his post and seek to work in the Council of Ministers against the pogroms. This was a thankless enterprise as a situation of triple power had developed at the governmental level (the Directory, the Council of Mini-

sters, the army staff), and anarchy was spreading fast at lower levels. Nonetheless, anti-pogrom proclamations and orders were issued, and they may have had some positive effect (as Revutsky argued).[50] He stayed with the Chekhivsky government until it resigned en bloc in Vinnytsia in February. Throughout 1919, Goldelman, also of the Poale Zion, (together with Pinkhes Krasny as minister for Jewish affairs) remained with the government of the Directory serving in civil service posts. His book of letters dating from that period still provides the most cogent defence of the strategy of "working from within"; co-operating with such Ukrainian socialists as Borys Martos. "Is it not our duty," he asked Revutsky in a letter sent from Kamianets-Podilskyi in August 1919,

> to help a handful of Ukrainian socialists who are investing their last energies to establish order in the country, fight the Ataman and Commissarial [Bolshevik] camps, overcome the personality politics of some members of the Directory, organize a regular and disciplined army . . . in a word to build a democratic order?[51]

The reference to "personality politics" was, of course, directed above all against Petliura who, it was widely rumoured, not only did little to stop the pogroms committed by units of the Ukrainian army, but even secretly encouraged them.[52]

In conclusion, it remains only to emphasize that Jewish autonomism was a concept posited on the consolidation of parliamentary democracy in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian states. A sophisticated idea, it would have required a high degree of order, stability and liberalism for its success. In practice, it was launched into a world of war, revolution and bloodshed. Under such circumstances it could not survive, despite the herculean efforts of supporters and the genuine good-will of important Ukrainian social democrats. Indeed, by exposing and adding to the deep fissures within the Jewish world it contributed its own small share to the general disillusionment with parliamentary democracy, thus hastening the swing by so many Jews on the Left to fully fledged Communism, although it should at once be added that the ever growing wave of pogroms did far more to destroy the central forces in the Jewish world. (The pogroms, in turn, fed on the idea that the Bolsheviks and the Jews were united inextricably, even identical.)

Of course, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland did emerge from the Civil War as independent states. Given a somewhat different alignment of forces, Ukraine could conceivably have done likewise. But the experience of those states in the interwar period suggests that even then there would have been no place in the long run for Jewish auton-

omy, which even in Lithuania (where it had been established smoothly) did not survive beyond 1925.[53] After all, parliamentary democracy per se fast disappeared in the 1920s and 1930s from East-Central Europe (Czechoslovakia apart).[54] It was a time when, to use the words of Yeats: "Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold."

NOTES

1. On autonomism and the autonomist experiments, Oscar Janowsky's two books retain their value: *Jews and Minority Rights (1898–1919)* (New York 1933); and *Nationalities and National Minorities (with Special Reference to East-Central Europe)* (New York 1945).
2. See, e.g., C. Dresner, "Hayim Zhitlovski: teoretikan ha-leumiyut ha-galutit be-zikata le-sotsyalizm," Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1975; and S. Dubnow, *Nationalism and History: Essays on Old and New Judaism,* edited and introduced by K. S. Pinson (Philadelphia 1958).
3. The full name of the SERP was the *Evreiskaia sotsialisticheskaia rabochaia partiia* (Jewish Socialist Labour Party). The term Seimists referred to the demand made by this party—as a major priority—for diaspora autonomism and for a Jewish national assembly or parliament in the Russian Empire (from the Polish *Sejm*).
4. "Sovremennyi politicheskii moment i nashi natsionalnye trebovaniia," *Poslednie izvestiia,* no. 250, 12/25 September 1905, 1.
5. "O vserossiiskom evreiskom sezde," *Evreiskaia zhizn,* no. 19 (1917): 16.
6. On the elections to, and fate of, this congress, see M. Altshuler, "Ha-nisayon le-argen kinus klal-yehudi be-rusya," *He-avar,* no. 12 (1965), 75–89.
7. See, e.g., E. Cherikover (Tcherikower), *Antisemitizm un pogromen in ukraine 1917–1918 (tsu di geshikhte fun ukrainish-yidishe batsiyungen)* (Berlin 1923), 62–4.
8. For a recent study of the Bund during the period of the revolution, see A. Gelbard, *Der jüdische Arbeiter-Bund Russlands im Revolutsionsjahr 1917* (Vienna 1982).
9. On the establishment and work of the secretariat (later the ministry) for Jewish affairs, the most important source remains M. Zilberfarb, *Dos yidishe ministeryum un di yidishe avtonomye in ukraine (a blete geshikhte)* (Kiev 1919). A Ph.D. thesis has been written on Jewish autonomy in Ukraine: A. Zaidman, *Ha-avtonomiya ha-leumit ha-yehudit be-ukraina ha-atsmait ba-shanim 1917–1919,* Tel Aviv University, 1980.
10. Zilberfarb, *Dos yidishe ministeryum*, 47.
11. Ibid., 75.
12. On the Bolshevik attempts to establish Communism in Ukraine, see A. E. Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: the Second Campaign 1918–1919* (New Haven 1963); J. Borys, *The Sovietization of Ukraine 1917–1923: The Communist Doctrine and Practice of National Self-Determination* (Edmonton 1980); R. S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine 1917–1957* (New York 1962). Cf. J. S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution 1917–1920: a Study in Nationalism* (Princeton 1952); T. Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass. 1977).

13. See e.g., "Di tsaytvaylige natsyonale farzamlung un der yidisher natsyonaler sekretaryat in ukraine (geshikhte un anshtedung)," in M. Grosman and others, *Di yidishe avtonomye un der natsyonaler sekretaryat in ukraine* (Kiev 1920), 5–9.
14. Ibid., 16. According to the official report, elections were conducted for 168 community boards.
15. A. Revutsky, *In di shvere teg oyf ukraine: zikhroynes fun a yidishn ministr* (Berlin 1924), 73–90.
16. See e.g., S.I. Goldeman, *Jewish National Autonomy in Ukraine 1917–1920* (Chicago 1968), 116–122.
17. D. Z. [Zaslavsky], "Di ukrainer un di yidn," *Di arbeter shtime* (Petrograd), 25 June/8 July 1917, 2.
18. See, for example, the letter from Goldelman to Revutsky sent from Vinnytsia in December 1918, in which he writes that the Ukrainian leadership "at long last has come to understand that its pure interest dictates that the state can be built up with support from the Jewish city population and that the Jewish popular masses have no basic reasons for refraining from such co-operation in this state-building." S. Goldelman, *In goles bay di ukrainer: brif fun a yidishn sotsyaldemokrat* (Vienna 1921), 13. The German edition, also published in Vienna in 1921, is entitled: *Juden und Ukrainer: Briefe eines jüdischen Sozialdemokraten*.
19. The full title of the Folkspartey was *Di yidishe folkspartey* (or, in Russian, *Evreiskaia narodnaia partiia*) or Jewish People's Party; that of the SSRP was *Sionistsko-sotsialisticheskaia rabochaia partiia,* or Zionist Socialist Labour Party.
20. "Der yidisher seym," *Der veker*, no. 12, 8 January 1906, 1–2.
21. V. Zhabotinsky [Jabotinsky], "Bund i natsionalnoe sobranie," *Khronika evreiskoi zhizni,* no. 2, 17 January 1906, 7.
22. Cf. J. Frankel, "The Jewish Socialists and the American Jewish Congress Movement," *The YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science* 16 (1976): 202–341.
23. E.g., R. Kendzhersky, "Yidishe politik," *Dos naye vort,* no. 1, 13 July 1918, 14–20. The author, on the one hand attacked Rafes of the Bund for "appealing in the Ukrainian Rada to the Ukrainians that they should not let themselves be robbed of their rights by leaving it to the Jewish Congress to define the competence of Jewish national autonomy." On the other hand, he denounced the Zionists who wanted "Palestine for themselves rather than that the Jewish Congress demand it. On this point, the Russian Zionists are true followers of their American comrades. . . . Once they knew that the Redemption [*atkhalte degeula*] was beginning—so down with the Congress!" ibid., 18.
24. A resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Bund published in *Der veker*, no. 104, 19 October 1917, as reproduced in A. Kirzhnits and M. Rafes, eds., *Der yidisher arbeter; khrestomatye tsu der geshikhte fun der yidisher arbeter, revolutsyonerer un sotsyalistisher bavegung in rusland* (Moscow 1918), 4: 117.
25. Zilberfarb, *Dos yidishe ministeryum,* 23, note. The full name of the Ahdut movement was Ahdut Yisrael (*Akhdes yisroel)*, the Unity of Israel.
26. Ibid., 68.
27. M. Grosman and others, *Di yidishe avtonomye,* 3–6.
28. "Der nayer natsyonal-rat," *Folks-tsaytung* (Kiev), no. 28 (90), 28 May 1918, 2.
29. For the text of this document, see L. Motzkin and L. Chasanowitsch, eds., *Die Judenfrage der Gegenwart: Dokumentensammlung* (n.p. 1919), 41–2. Cf. Grosman and others, *Di yidishe avtonomye,* 311–12.
30. Ibid., 19.
31. Ibid., 259.
32. See, e.g., the memorandum prepared for the National Secretariat by M. M. Postan of

Zeire Zion (who was later to become well known as an economic historian in England), "Tsu der shtats-sekretar frage," ibid., 20–34.

33. "Tsu der direktorye fun der ukrainer folks-republik fun dem yidishn natsyonaln sekretaryat in ukraine: memorandum," ibid., 53.
34. "Rezolutsye vegn bashtimung fun a yidishn ministr," ibid., 275.
35. K-r [Yekhezkl Kantor], "Di yidishe avtonomye," *Folks-tsaytung,* no. 24/285, 15 March 1919, 2.
36. Quoted in K-r [Kantor], "Oyf der minsker konferents fun bund," ibid., no. 37/298, 2 April 1919, 2.
37. A. S-k, "Tsu di frage vegn avtonomye," ibid., no. 45/306, 11 April 1919, 3.
38. On the formation and role of the Evsektsiia, see; Z. Y. Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics: the Jewish Sections of the CPSU 1917–1930* (Princeton 1972); and M. Altshuler, *Ha-yevsektsiya bi-vrit ha-moatsot 1918–1930: bein leumiyut lekomunizm* (Tel-Aviv 1980).
39. B. Borokhov [Borochov], "Nasha platforma," *Evreiskaia rabochaia khronika,* no. 3, 23 June 1906, 27.
40. Cf. Y. Slutsky, "Ha-geografya shel praot 1881," *He-avar,* no. 9 (1962): 16–25; *Die Judenpogrome in Russland,* ed. L. Motzkin, 2 vols. (Cologne 1910); L. Motzkin, ed., *The Pogroms in the Ukraine under the Ukrainian Governments (1917–1920): Historical Survey* (London 1927); J. Batchinsky and others, *The Jewish Pogroms in the Ukraine* (Washington, D.C. 1919).
41. *Naye tsayt,* no. 49, 10 November 1917 (as quoted in E. Cherikover, *Antisemitizm un pogromen*, 67). Cf. A. Zolotarev, "Der driter universal un undzer positsye," *Folks-tsaytung,* no. 24, 10 November 1917, 1.
42. A. Zolotarev, "Der proklamirung fun der ukrainer republik," ibid., no. 23, 9 November 1917, 1.
43. On the response of the Bund to the Fourth Universal, see, e.g., M. G. Rafes, *Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine (evoliutsiia i raskol Bunda)* (Moscow 1920), 71–7.
44. The declaration of the Bund on the Fourth Universal, read out at the Small Rada, on 14 January 1918, stated *inter alia:*

    Ukrainian democracy has broken its ties with the all-Russian democracy at a tragic moment for the all-Russian [*rossiiskoi*] revolution and just at the time when the All-Russian Constituent Assembly has declared Russia a federal, democratic republic. Ukrainian democracy has taken the path of a separate peace and has not taken into account the interests of international democracy. . . . The growth of nationalism, the inevitable result of the separation of Ukraine, endangers the revolutionary achievements which have been gained. At this crucial moment, the proletariat of Ukraine must unite all its forces in order to defend what the revolution has gained and not allow the citizens to be divided into those with full rights as against aliens with limited rights. The rights of the national minorities, proclaimed in the Third Universal and reinforced in the Law on Personal National Autonomy must remain inviolate. [Ibid., 75.]
45. Ibid., 74.
46. The issue of anti-Jewish pogroms was discussed in the Small Rada on 28 November 1917. Y. Shekhtman [J. Schechtman], a general Zionist, argued that permission should be granted the "Jewish soldiers to organize self-defence units." Petliura replied that he had "nothing against [such] self-defence." *Folks-tsaytung,* no. 41, 30 November 1917, 4.
47. On the self-defence issue and the pogroms in the winter of 1917–1918, see, e.g., Zilberfarb, *Dos yidishe ministeryum,* 61–2; Cherikover, *Antisemitizm, 7–94.*
48. A. Revutsky, *In di shvere teg,* 113. On the problems of the Directory in gaining the

support of the non-Ukrainian parties, Revutsky quotes one of his Poale Zion comrades, Volf Averbukh, as having said: "For the Right SRs and Mensheviks, the Directory was too left; for the Left it was too right; for the Bolsheviks too democratic; for the democrats too proletarian. The common denominator for them all was that the Directory was too Ukrainian." ibid., 67.

49. For the text of the resolution adopted by the Bundist conference, 14 January 1919, see Rafes, *Dva goda,* 139–42.
50. Revutsky, *In di shvere teg,* 137–47.
51. Goldelman, *In goles bay di ukrainer,* 61.
52. Goldelman, in a letter of June 1919, stated his view of the pogroms carried out by units of the Directory's armies: "It is a well-known rule that military pogroms take place when the regime wants and there are none when it does not want them." Ibid., 40.

    In this same letter, he argued that: "It is really fortunate that the [Ukrainian] social democrats and also a section of the [Ukrainian] socialist revolutionaries—Dr. Odrino, for example—are far from holding the ideology which sees the pogroms as inevitable." (p. 49).

    On Petliura's role, particularly in relation to the Proskuriv pogrom of February 1919, see E. Cherikover, *Di ukrainer pogromen in yor 1919* (New York 1965); 145–63; T. Hunczak, "A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," *Jewish Social Studies* 31 (1969): 163–83; and Z. Szajkowski's "Rebuttal," ibid., 184–213.
53. Cf. S. Gringauz, "Jewish National Autonomy in Lithuania (1918–1925)," *Jewish*
    Social Studies 14 (1952): 225–46. For a recent study of the attempts to establish Jewish national autonomy in Poland, see S. Netzer, *Maavak yehudei polin al zkhuyateihem ha-ezrahiot ve-haleumiot (1918–1922)* (Tel-Aviv 1980).
54. See E. Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars* (Bloomington 1983).

Mordechai Altshuler

Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in the Soviet Milieu in the Interwar Period

When relations between Jews and Ukrainians are examined the focus is invariably on periods of crisis. In addition, in most cases the two groups are depicted in generalized terms: all Ukrainians as one entity and all Jews as another. Insufficient attention has been paid to the ideological and institutional subdivisions within each of the two national groups, which displayed, for the most part, quite different approaches to an entire array of problems, including the question of inter-ethnic relations.

In any discussion of the relations between Jews and Ukrainians, it is also necessary to take account of the third national factor involved—either Polish or Russian—that has a direct impact on the character and pattern of those relations. This third factor, which in our context is the Russian one, has two manifestations: the Russian population in Ukraine and the central Soviet government.

The ethnic relations among Jews, Ukrainians and Russians are further complicated by the fact that ethnic differentiation has been accompanied by a parallel socio-economic and geographic differentiation. The tensions inherent in this pattern of relations do, indeed, come to the fore particularly in times of stress, but they also continue to exist over periods of relative calm. Given this understanding, the present study aims to examine the positions taken by the Jewish and Ukrainian population, from the stabilization of the Soviet regime in Ukraine until the Second World War.

When Soviet rule was established in Ukraine, almost all Jewish and

Ukrainian political bodies were disbanded, and the few groups that remained active for a few years were without significant influence.[1] As a result, one must look within the Communist Party, or in intellectual circles that were close to the party, to find public expression of the various approaches taken to current issues. The positions taken were therefore couched in communist phraseology, and of necessity formulated in accordance with the frequent changes in nationality policy in the Soviet Union as a whole, and in Ukraine in particular.

A. Ukrainian-Jewish Relations on the Eve of Soviet Rule

Among the various factors that determined the range of positions in Jewish and Ukrainian public opinion in the wake of the establishment of the Soviet regime were the distribution of the respective ethnic groups between urban and rural areas and the bitter experiences of the Civil War period.

Let us begin with the urban-rural distribution of the population. The Ukrainian population constituted the vast majority of the inhabitants of Ukraine as a whole, but was a minority in the cities. Thus, according to the census of 1897, of the nearly twenty million inhabitants of the seven provinces of Kharkiv, Kherson, Katerynoslav, Kiev, Podillia, Poltava and Volhynia, 78.2 per cent were Ukrainian. The rest were divided as follows: Russians, 9.8 per cent; Jews, 9 per cent; and other nationalities, 3 per cent.

However, urban ethnic distribution figures show an entirely different picture. In the cities of those seven provinces, Ukrainians accounted for only 31.1 per cent of the population; 33.1 per cent were Russians; 28.7 per cent were Jews, and the remaining 7.1 per cent was comprised of other nationality groups. Moreover, between 1897 and 1917 a variety of factors caused a decrease in both the proportion of Ukrainians in urban areas and the Jewish share of the rural population. The rural Jewish population had been set by the 1897 census at close to 446,000 or 2.5 per cent of the total rural population, in the seven provinces mentioned. However, the tsarist government pursued an anti-Jewish policy aimed at reducing the "deleterious influence" of the Jews on the peasants. This, coupled with the processes of economic development in the region, brought about a significant decrease in the rural Jewish population by 1917.

On the other hand, the rapid influx of Jews, Russians and members of other nationality groups into the cities of Ukraine served to diminish the Ukrainian share of the urban population, which was growing at a slower rate. The example of Kiev is instructive in this context. In 1897, Ukrain-

ians constituted 22.2 per cent of the population of the city; by 1917 their share had dropped to 16.4 per cent. At the same time, the Jewish share rose from 12.1 per cent to 18.7 per cent.[2] The process of the concentration of Jewish population in the cities—especially the larger cities—accelerated during the Civil War, in particular during the time of the pogroms.

Jews fled in great numbers from Ukrainian villages during this time. Although Jews organized self-defence measures in their farming colonies in the Kherson and Katerynoslav districts, even here they were forced to flee.[3] The Jews of the small market towns sought refuge in the big cities, which offered a measure of security.[4] Tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees concentrated in the cities. Pogromists looted and burned their former homes, so that the majority of the refugees had nowhere to return to and decided to remain where they were. The demographic result was a significant increase in the Jewish share of the population in the large and medium-sized cities of Ukraine.

The opposite process occurred among the Ukrainian population. With the establishment of the Soviet regime, which pursued the policy of "war communism" in this area until 1922, food became scarce in the cities, while peasants in the countryside often succeeded in hiding a certain minimum from the Red Army units for their own subsistence. Part of the urban Ukrainian population, some quite recently settled in the cities, and retaining family ties with their old villages, returned there. Thus, the Ukrainian proportion of the city population declined. Once again, we find this reflected in the data for Kiev. Ukrainians constituted 16.4 per cent of the inhabitants in 1917, but only 14.3 per cent in 1920. The Jewish share increased from 18.7 per cent in 1917 to 31.9 per cent in 1920.[5] This phenomenon was probably repeated in other Ukrainian cities. In general, one can say that with the rise of Soviet rule, the cities of Ukraine were less ethnically Ukrainian than they had been at the turn of the century, and were instead more heavily Russian, Jewish and Polish.

The Ukrainian city was the setting for cultural and linguistic assimilation. The language most in use was Russian, and many Jews and Ukrainians who settled in the cities underwent a rapid process of acculturation. Russian became their second and in some cases even their first language. Any distinction between city and country, therefore, also carried national-cultural implications for the struggle of Ukrainians against Russians and the Russified Ukrainians and Jews, who were barely distinguishable from the ethnic Russians themselves. By the same token, any national distinctions took the form of "city versus village." This combination of factors fed and, indeed, heightened the tensions felt on both levels.

These tensions erupted with brutal violence at the time of the Civil

War, in which Ukraine became a major arena of conflict. During the years of Ukrainian independence, which coincided with the Civil War, the Jews of Ukraine were granted national-personal autonomy and there was even a ministry for Jewish affairs.[6] But the attitude of most Jews toward the Ukrainian national movement was not conditioned by the formal decisions of the Jewish ministry, which, to a great extent, was cut off from the Jewish public, but by their experience at the grass-roots level. This was expressed in no uncertain terms by one of the participants in a Jewish conference that took place at the time in Berdychiv, also attended by Pinhas Krasny, the Minister for Jewish Affairs.

On 11 September 1919, Krasny appeared before the Jewish community board of Berdychiv and asserted that the Ukrainian government was doing all in its power to prevent pogroms and that the Jews ought to view the Ukrainians as their allies. The chairman of the Jewish community of Pohrebyshche I. Krupnik, replied: "Yesterday the honourable minister stated that it was not the government but dark, obscurantist forces that were responsible for the pogroms. I wish to point out that in Pohrebyshche the pogrom was carried out by the troops of Zeleny, who is working hand in hand with the government. In the surrounding area, pogroms were carried out by Tiutiunnyk units."[7]

Thus, it was the pogroms that were the decisive factor in the minds of most Jews in judging the Ukrainian national movement. In the period of the Civil War, it is estimated, over a thousand separate pogroms against Jews took place in Ukraine. Of these, about half were perpetrated by units and armed militias that fought under the banners of the Ukrainian national movement.[8] A very conservative estimate puts the number of Jews killed in these attacks at thirty thousand; the total casualty figure, including the wounded, is estimated at one hundred thousand.[9] It is no wonder, then, that most Jews viewed the Ukrainian national movement as a whole and the Directory in particular as directly or indirectly responsible for the wave of pogroms. This explains Jewish reservations and even hostility toward this movement, which they viewed as bringing to the fore forces of chauvinism and deep-rooted anti-Semitism.

Nationalist Ukrainians, including the most liberal elements among them, charged that the organized Jewish community displayed a lack of understanding and loyalty for Ukrainian aspirations at the critical moment of independence. It is in fact true that, right from the start, there was a conflict of interest between the Jewish public and the Ukrainian radicals who were demanding full independence and sovereignty. But at that juncture these were in a secondary position within the Ukrainian movement, which was led in this early stage by moderates who championed the idea of a federative union between Ukraine and the Russian state. This demand won widespread support in organized Jewish circles.

However, as relations between Ukraine and Soviet Russia deteriorated, the influence of the pro-independence faction grew. Mainstream Jewish opinion opposed this trend for three main reasons:

(1) An independent Ukraine would split the Jewish community of old Russia, thereby reducing its political strength, inhibiting its ability to organize and possibly harming its cultural and spiritual life.
(2) An independent Ukraine would interfere in the free exchange of goods and services with Russia, something that could only hurt the Jewish economy, dependent as it was on Russian markets.
(3) Most important, the Jews feared that independence would mean the coming to power of the most chauvinist and anti-Semitic wing of the Ukrainian movement, and that its first victims would be the Jews.

These fears, which were shared by broad sections of Jewish opinion, were bluntly expresed by Moishe Rafes in the leftist newspaper *Folksshtime* on 23 August 1917:

> There is a chauvinist trend within the Ukrainian movement. The Ukrainian people, which is primarily a nation of peasants, has begun in recent years to develop a petite and middle bourgeoisie. As in Poland, here, too, these classes are permeated with anti-Semitism and xenophobia. They would like to effect a "Ukrainization" of all public life. They would like to drive Jews, Russians and Poles out of all sectors of the economy and take those positions for themselves. The ideological leaders of these groups are offshoots of the bourgeoisie: this is the intelligentsia, whose position is even more aggressive than that of the bourgeoisie itself.

It was precisely because of these fears that the Jewish socialist parties did not vote on 22 January 1918 in favour of the Fourth Universal, which declared the independence of Ukraine. The Bund, together with the Mensheviks, even voted against it. The Zionist party, although it did not have to make its position public in this manner because it was not part of the Rada, was similarly inclined to a negative approach, if we are to judge by the articles appearing in its journals.[10]

The differences between Jewish political bodies and the Ukrainian national movement were also expressed in the fact that no Jewish representation accompanied the Rada when it fled to Zhytomyr at the approach of the Red Army under Muraviov. The gap between the Ukrainians' aspirations and those of the vast majority of the Jewish population widened as the wave of pogroms spread across the length and breadth of Ukraine. In response to the pogroms, an increasing number of Jewish youths enlisted in the Red Army, which was in effect a Russian army, although it also included Russified Ukrainian elements. The readiness on the part of Jews to become part of the organs of Soviet rule also increased

as Soviet power took hold over wider portions of Ukraine. In turn, as more Jews were to be seen in the ranks of the Soviet army and governing apparatus, Ukrainian national circles were increasingly prone to identify the Jews with the Bolsheviks and with the Russians.

It can therefore be stated that on the eve of the establishment of Soviet rule in Ukraine, the gap between nationalist Ukrainian elements and broad sections of the Jewish community became extreme. The links that had once existed between Jews and Ukrainians in the villages and small towns were also severely undermined. At the beginning of Soviet rule the relations between the two national groups were at their lowest possible point.

B. From Neutralization of National Communist Elements to Disregard of National Aspirations (1920–3)

The first three years of Soviet rule in Ukraine—1920 to 1923—were characterized by the neutralization of the national communist forces and by a reserved and even negative attitude toward the Ukrainian and Yiddish languages and cultures.

Under the impact of the oppressive regime of Pavlo Skoropadsky, on the one hand, and of the revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe on the other, the Jewish and Ukrainian socialist parties began a process of reconciliation with the Soviet regime, culminating in their acceptance of the principles of Bolshevism. The differences that remained between the Communist Party of Ukraine and the national communist parties were chiefly in the area of nationality policy. The Ukrainian national communist groups demanded a greater role for the Ukrainian language and culture and a smaller degree of dependence on Moscow. The Jewish communist parties similarly aspired to a broader cultural activity in Yiddish and the assurance of their own organizational position within the party.[11]

These demands were totally rejected by the Communist Party of Ukraine, which was led by Russians and Russified Ukrainians. (The opposition of the latter to anything Ukrainian often surpassed that of the former.) It is not coincidental either that it was G. Zinoviev, the communist leader of Jewish descent, who argued at the Fifth Conference of the Communist Party of Ukraine, in November 1920, that the Russian language, with its cultured dynamism, had an important role to play in Ukraine, though he conceded that the peasants would, of course, be able to use the Ukrainian language as well.[12] On the other hand, the majority of the leadership of the All-Russian Communist Party—beginning with Lenin himself—recognized the need to integrate the national communist parties in Ukraine into the Communist Party and pressed the party leaders in Ukraine to accept the national parties' members.

The national communist parties were faced with two choices: they could remain outside the Communist Party of Ukraine and be hounded and eventually liquidated; or they could join the ranks of the Communist Party in the hope of reinforcing the nationally conscious elements already inside and act from within. After much hesitation and internal debate, most members of these parties opted for the second choice. They hoped that by virtue of their numbers and the justice of their position and with a certain amount of help from the leadership in Moscow, the Communist Party of Ukraine would come around to a position recognizing their national needs. Most of the Jewish and Ukrainian national communist factions had joined the Communist Party of Ukraine by the beginning of 1921.

The Ukrainian communists integrated themselves in the party machinery, with the aim of maximizing party activity in Ukrainian. The Jewish communists reorganized themselves in the Jewish sections of the Communist Party, known by their Russian acronym, *Evsektsiia*. The task they set for themselves was to broaden and strengthen the cultural work being done in Yiddish. The organized addition of these important segments to the party cadres was meant to exert their influence in favour of a new attitude toward the Ukrainian and Yiddish languages.

The Ukrainian Communist Party was quite small. In 1918 it counted only five thousand members—most of them Russians, Jews, Poles and Russified Ukrainians. After the establishment of Soviet rule, the party in Ukraine grew considerably and in 1921 included seventy-five thousand members, although its ethnic composition remained largely as before, as did its general approach to national cultures.[13] The element within the party that was most active in promoting Ukrainian and Jewish communist activity was the former membership of the national communist parties. But their power to influence policy was limited.

The Tenth Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party (in May 1921) decided to "purge" the ranks of the party. In the directives for the "purge" it was stated that particular severity was to be applied to former Mensheviks, among whom, in Soviet terminology, were included most of those who had belonged to Jewish and Ukrainian national communist movements.[14] In Ukraine the purge took on the connotation of a campaign against so-called "nationalist deviations," both Ukrainian and Jewish. The resolution of the "purge" adopted at the First All-Ukrainian Party Conference (in May 1921) stated:

> Approaching the painful manifestations of national sentiment among the backward Ukrainian masses outside the ranks of the party carefully and tolerantly, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine must wage an uncompromising struggle against nationalist deviations within the party. Our party . . . does not make [concessions] to the petit bourgeois and

> opportunist elements in the party. It cannot allow party organizations to be made into a stage for playing out the national conflicts that exist outside the party among the Russian and Ukrainian petite bourgeoisie.[15]

The resolution speaks of Russian and Ukrainian "deviations" in equal terms, but in fact it signalled the start of a campaign to rid the Communist Party of nationalist Ukrainian elements, as N. Popov testifies.[16] At the height of the "purge," Lenin published an article on the subject in which he remarked that "it would be wise to permit only one per cent of the Mensheviks who joined the party after the beginning of 1918 to remain, and then only after three or four examinations of each individual case."[17]

It is noteworthy that the communization of the Jewish and Ukrainian socialist parties began only at a later stage. The "purge" was an effective means of ousting from the party a sizeable proportion of national Jewish and Ukrainian elements which had but recently joined its ranks. The effects of the "purge" were discernible in the general decrease in party membership, from seventy-four thousand in 1921 to fifty-four thousand in 1922.[18] But more important is the fact that the overwhelming majority of former members of the national socialist parties were expelled from the Communist Party. At the Twelfth Party Congress, Mykola Skrypnyk pointed out that out of four thousand former Borotbisty who had joined the party, after the "purge" in Ukraine only 118 remained party members.[19] In 1922, only 1,023 former members of the Jewish socialist parties remained in the Communist Party of Ukraine—or 1.9 per cent of the total membership. Only 197 remained from among former Ukrainian socialists, about 0.4 per cent of the party membership.

Even among the Jewish and Ukrainian members of the party, those who had come out of the national socialist parties were a small minority. Thus, of 12,600 Ukrainian communists, only 1.6 per cent had been members of Ukrainian socialist parties. Of 7,400 Jewish members of the party, about 13.8 per cent were former members of Jewish socialist parties.[20] The majority of Jews and Ukrainians in the Communist Party, therefore, lacked political experience in national parties and, it may be surmised, were indifferent, if not actually hostile, to party-sponsored activity in their respective languages. Their own attitudes were also partly determined by those of the ethnic Russians, who made up 53.6 per cent of the total membership in Ukraine.[21]

Opposition to Ukrainian culture found expression in the theory of Dmytro Lebid (1893–1937) on "the struggle of two cultures." The Ukrainian language and culture, Lebid contended, were inferior and it was chiefly the rural population that was using them. The Russian lan-

guage, on the other hand, was the language of the urban proletariat. Therefore, according to Lebid, any trend toward Ukrainization amounted to support for inferior elements in society.[22]

If this theory was never formally adopted as the basis of policy, it was, nevertheless, true that the Communist Party leadership—Khristian Rakovsky and Dmytro Lebid—in fact effected a policy of preference for Russian language and culture in Ukraine, despite official party resolutions that spoke of the equality of languages.

This policy also influenced some of the Jewish communists who had come out of the Jewish socialist parties and had, since then, distanced themselves from all Jewish activity or tried to restrict such activity. A prominent member of the latter group was Moishe Altshuler (1887–1969), who at that time was head of the Evsektsia in Ukraine. He argued that trends toward proletarization were well under way in the Jewish population, and that Jewish workers were not interested at all in Yiddish activities. He therefore recommended that Yiddish education be made available, but only in the primary grades, for the sake of the children of Jewish artisans—just as Ukrainian schools were intended mainly for children of the peasants. Even in such schools, it was felt, it would be wise to construct the curriculum so that a transition to Russian as the language of instruction might be made in the shortest possible time.[23]

This approach was the guiding principle behind a resolution adopted by a conference of the *Evsektsiia* in Ukraine (Kharkiv, June 1922), in which it was stated: "It is good to be able to note that among Jewish workers . . . one may discern a natural aspiration to learn the language of the non-Jews, because [lack of such knowledge] limits their ability to take part . . . in the general proletarian social life. [The Evsektsia should] support this aspiration as far as possible."[24] This sort of language policy left its imprint on Soviet activity in both Ukrainian and Yiddish. The main Yiddish newspaper for Ukraine, *Der komunist,* failed to appear on a regular basis, for example, because the pressmen were transferred to Russian printing shops.[25] Cultural clubs that operated in Yiddish were combined with non-Jewish clubs, and activities were then conducted in Russian.[26] The number of Yiddish books—Ukraine had been one of the most important centres of Yiddish publishing—declined dramatically. Whereas 274 Yiddish books and pamphlets were published in 1919 in all the territories later incorporated into the Soviet Union, in 1921 the number dropped to 85; by 1922, to 68; and by 1923, to 40.[27] Jewish children's homes were "internationalized" and their activity thereafter conducted in Russian.[28]

Similar phenomena occurred in Ukrainian cultural activities. Some Ukrainian-language newspapers and journals ceased publication and

were replaced by Russian publications. Whereas 33 per cent of the newspapers published in Ukraine in 1919 were in Ukrainian, in 1922 the corresponding figure was only 21 per cent.[29] Of the total number of books published in Soviet Ukraine in 1923, only about 18 per cent were in Ukrainian.[30] All administrative work and the majority of the propaganda work was conducted in Russian. Soviet offices frequently would refuse to answer citizens' requests addressed to them in Ukrainian and demanded that the requests be resubmitted in Russian.

One can say, therefore, that from 1920 to 1923 the Communist Party of Ukraine pursued an open policy of preferential treatment for Russian language and culture, accompanied by the repression of even Soviet-oriented cultural activity in Ukrainian and Yiddish. But there seemed to be little understanding or attempts at co-operation between Jewish and Ukrainian elements in the party. One of the factors militating against co-operation was the mutual hostility built up during the period of the Civil War. It is also possible that the "purge" and the atmosphere that accompanied it also did their part in thwarting mutual understanding. In any event, we do not find during this time, among Ukrainian communists or circles close to them, any expression of understanding for Jewish activity, or among Jews of sympathy for the cultural demands made by some Ukrainians.

The fact that during this time most of the cultural and educational activity in Ukraine was conducted in Russian, as were all administrative functions, made it considerably easier for the Jewish "semi-intelligentsia" to become integrated in these branches of Soviet government. In addition, the fact that the city was given preference over the countryside also aided this process. Moreover, while many Ukrainians were held suspect because of their possible connection with the "Petliurivshchyna" and/or "Makhnovshchyna," there was little such suspicion with regard to the Jews. Many Jews, just as many Russified Ukrainians, became part of the Soviet apparat, particularly in the economic and educational branches. Most of these people were not communists, but saw in the new conditions a chance for personal advancement—something that had been barred to them under the old regime. The role played by Jews in the middle echelons of the Soviet apparat was reflected at the Fifth and Seventh Conferences of Ukrainian Soviets (in February-March 1921 and December 1922), at which Jews constituted 15.5 per cent of the delegates.[31] For the individual Jew, who knew Russian and was loyal to the regime and who was not particularly interested in his national culture, even when expressed in Soviet form, a path of self-advancement lay open in which his nationality seemed to play little or no part.

C. Ukrainization and the Jewish Dilemma

In early 1923 a change took place in the All-Russian Communist Party's approach to the nationalities question. This policy change, in our opinion, had six causes:

(1) The "scissors crisis" threatened to alienate the peasants from the Soviet regime. A rapprochement between the peasants of the non-Russian borderlands and the cities was essential.
(2) A policy of consideration for the national sensibilities of the non-Russian peoples was calculated to win sympathy for the Soviet Union among national groups across the border. This was particularly important in Ukraine, since a portion of the Ukrainian people lived in Poland, where they were subjected to Polonization.
(3) A desire to ensure the loyalty of the largely non-Russian population in the borderlands to the newly-established Soviet Union;
(4) A need to offer proof that instituting the new political framework—the Soviet Union—would not work against the needs and interests of the non-Russian nationalities;
(5) Stalin feared that party members from the nationalities would act against him by using Lenin's letters criticizing his nationality policy;
(6) Stalin desired to win the support of the party leadership in the national republics in his struggle with Trotsky.

This constellation of factors made Stalin the foremost spokesman for the encouragement of the non-Russian national cultures and languages—a position he took at the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923. His speech, and the resolutions adopted afterward, laid particular stress on the dangers of Russian chauvinism. Expressions of nationalism among the other nationalities, he argued, were only a response to Great Russian domination. In practical terms, it was decided that the national republics were to encourage the use of the local languages.[32]

In Ukraine, this took the form of a wider use of Ukrainian in administrative, political and propaganda activities, as well as of aid and support for Ukrainian culture. Ukrainization also meant ensuring that Ukrainians were proportionally represented in all facets of public life such as culture, government and management, as well as increasing the percentage of Ukrainians in the proletariat (*korenizatsiia*).

This policy, which was applied in Ukraine roughly until 1934, had two stages. In the first stage, which came to an end in the late twenties, the regime pursued a comparatively liberal policy that allowed even the pro-Soviet intelligentsia outside the party to engage in activities that broadened the use of Ukrainian and lent Ukrainization a more profound cultural and historical significance. During the second stage, however,

the possibilities for independent expression of Ukrainian culture were severely limited, although the encouragement of the Ukrainian language and the drive to achieve a fair Ukrainian representation in various social spheres continued until about 1934. The distinction between these two periods of Ukrainization and *korenizatsiia* was clearly reflected in the terminology that was applied. Thus, in the first stage, as was mentioned, the stress was on the dangers of Russifying trends. In the second stage a two-front struggle was spoken of—against Russian chauvinism on the one hand and against the chauvinism of the non-Russian nationalities on the other. The end of this second period was signalled by the shifting of the focus in this two-front war toward the danger presented by the Ukrainian "national deviation."

Changes in the leadership accompanied the shift in nationalities policy instituted at the Twelfth Party Congress. This was meant to ensure that those who supported the new policy would occupy the top positions. Rakovsky, head of the government of the Ukrainian Republic and well known for his Russophile views, was replaced by Vlas Chubar. Emmanuil Kviring, who in the past had expressed his sympathy for Ukrainization, replaced Dmytro Lebid, whose theories of a cultural crusade of Russian against Ukrainian were discredited. The most conspicuous change, however, came with the appointment of Oleksandr Shumsky as head of *agitprop* on the Party Central Committee in Ukraine. Shumsky was one of the few remaining Borotbists who had survived the "purge," but had been kept out of party affairs since 1921. Mykola Skrypnyk, a fervent supporter of Ukrainization, both for the republic and for the millions of Ukrainians throughout the Soviet Union, also joined the government at this time. The sensitive and important post of education commissar went to Volodymyr Zatonsky. According to Robert Sullivant, Zatonsky was a compromise candidate, standing between "the enthusiastic demands for Ukrainization made by the nationalists within the CP(b)U and the confirmed opposition of the pro-Russian faction."[33]

Although it encountered a certain amount of opposition within the party, the new leadership did succeed in pushing through, especially between 1923 and 1928, a series of directives that obligated the entire bureaucratic machine to adopt Ukrainian.[34] It was also decided to broaden the scope of Ukrainian-language propaganda activity and publishing, and to effect a transition to Ukrainian as the language of instruction in the majority of the schools. This was to apply to technical and engineering institutes as well. In the same vein, cultural work in Ukrainian was to be stepped up in the trade unions. Encouragement of work in Ukrainian was extended to the universities and research institutes.

Beyond this attention to the linguistic issue, however, a clear position was taken on enlarging the Ukrainian representation in Soviet offices,

management, the professions, secondary and higher education, and even the urban proletariat. Preferential recruitment and promotion of Ukrainians now became a matter of policy in the Communist party apparatus and was directed toward filling the lower and middle echelons with Ukrainians. This policy, which in the first stage of Ukrainization was carried out with a certain indulgence toward national Ukrainian elements, won the support of significant portions of the intelligentsia and the "semi-intelligentsia" as well as among the rural population. Russified Ukrainians who viewed the measures as concessions to the backward and anti-Bolshevik village or to the already defunct Ukrainian socialist parties were unable to mount an effective opposition, since the policies reflected the new line taken by the party.

Thus, despite a certain amount of opposition, the Ukrainization campaign produced practical results in a relatively short time. The percentage of Ukrainians in the Communist Party of Ukraine rose from 23.3 per cent in 1922 to 43.9 per cent in 1926.[35] Their share in the Ukrainian Komsomol rose from 50.9 per cent in January 1924 to 66.1 per cent in October of 1928.[36] The Ukrainian share of delegates to the Conference of Soviets of the Ukrainian republic grew from 43.8 per cent at the Sixth Conference in December 1922 to 64.6 per cent at the Eleventh Conference in May 1929.[37] By mid-1926—two-and-a-half years after the start of the campaign—almost half of the books and pamphlets published in Ukraine were in Ukrainian (3,446 out of a total of 7,216).[38] By 1930, 84 per cent of all newspapers and periodicals were in Ukrainian (552 out of 654).[39] As early as 1925, 71 per cent of all elementary-school children were enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools. This percentage rose to 82 per cent in 1929.[40] A similar trend is observed in secondary, technical and higher education.[41] The absolute number of Ukrainians in these institutions also grew, as it did among the urban proletariat. According to a census conducted by the trade unions in Ukraine in April 1926, the ethnic breakdown of the labour force (excluding hired farm labourers and the unemployed) was as follows: Ukrainians, 49.9 per cent; Russians, 31.6 per cent; Jews, 12.8 per cent; other nationalities, 5.7 per cent.[42]

These developments represented a partial realization of Ukrainian national aspirations, and it is not surprising, therefore, that part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia began to view the Soviet experiment favourably. This was particularly understandable given the fact that at this time the regime was tolerant of cultural and spiritual expression, even when it did not always fit the communist mould. During 1923-4, a number of Ukrainian intellectuals returned to Ukraine, including Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Pavlo Khrystiuk and Mykola Chechel. All were allowed to carry out research at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The various literary groups active in Ukraine were permitted to function in relative free-

dom from party domination. All these factors were legitimate expressions of Ukrainian nationhood, and any Ukrainian was entitled to feel that the Ukrainian republic was fulfilling at least part of his national aspirations—albeit within the confining limits of the overall Soviet framework.

What impact did Ukrainization have on the Jews?

In the mid-twenties, 58.7 per cent of the Jews of the Soviet Union lived in the Ukrainian republic, and they constituted 5.4 per cent of the population there. Seventy-seven-point-four per cent of the Jews in Ukraine lived in cities, where they constituted 22.7 per cent of the population.[43] Given the historical role of Ukrainian cities as centres of Russian culture, it was inevitable that acculturation among Jews in the cities had always been oriented toward Russian culture. Another factor was the government's usage of the Russian language, and possibly, too, the Jews considered Ukrainian culture, more than the Russian, to harbour anti-Semitic sentiments. Whatever the reasons, it is a fact that in the 1926 census 76.3 per cent of the Jews in Ukraine declared their mother-tongue to be Yiddish; 22.7 per cent Russian; and only 0.9 per cent Ukrainian.[44] The Russian-acculturated Jew in the ranks of the Soviet bureaucracy now found himself faced with a demand to learn a new language for which he felt no affinity—something which aroused in him a certain natural resistance to what he viewed as an expression of Ukrainian "chauvinism." He was particularly hurt that in the wake of Ukrainization and *korenizatsiia,* he was being passed over in the party, the bureaucracy, management and even the factory in favour of a Ukrainian who had the same qualifications as he had or less. The Ukrainization and *korenizatsia* campaign did in fact result in a decline of the Jewish share in various spheres of activity.

Both in relative and absolute terms, there was a decrease in the number of Jews in the free professions. In 1926-7, 9,800 Jews were employed in the professions in Ukraine, representing 1.6 per cent of the total; in 1928-9, these figures declined to 9,300, or 1.4 per cent. A similar trend occurred in the ranks of the Soviet bureaucracy, where the Jewish share dropped from 20.6 per cent in 1926-7 to 20.4 per cent in 1928-9, falling more rapidly in the next few years in every sector.[45] In 1931 Jews represented only 12.4 per cent of trade union members—or half their share in the urban population.[46] The proportion of Jews among members of the Communist Party declined from 13.6 per cent in 1922 to 11.2 per cent in 1926,[47] a process that became more pronounced afterward. It was reflected in the Jewish share of delegates to the Conferences of Soviets in Ukraine, which fell from 15.5 per cent in 1921 to a mere 8.1 per cent in 1929. But the most conspicuous example of the impact of Ukrainization on the Jews is in the data on higher education. In 1923, 18,488 Jewish

students were enrolled in institutions of higher education in Ukraine, constituting 47.4 per cent of the total student body. In 1929, only 9,527 of the students, or 23.3 per cent were Jews.[48] It is not difficult to imagine how a young Jew might feel, being denied entry to a university and seeing his Ukrainian colleague being enrolled. The campaigns for Ukrainization and *korenizatsiia* were occasionally marred by anti-Semitic incidents, but these were marginal phenomena by and large, forthrightly opposed by the party leadership in a number of directives and in propaganda activity. But since *korenizatsiia* and Ukrainization in effect halted the personal advancement of the individual Jew—whether because of his nationality or because he was a Russian-speaker—many Jews were openly or covertly opposed to the Ukrainization campaign.

Opposition to the pace of Ukrainization was voiced publicly by Iurii Larin (Luria) on the front page of *Pravda* in an article entitled "On Linguistic Freedom."[49] Larin sharply attacked the policy being pursued in Ukraine that was forcing Jewish and Ukrainian children to study in their national languages. He demanded that "freedom of choice in language of instruction be restored to the people" and argued that "the fear that this might slow down Ukrainization . . . in the cities of Ukraine . . . and the fact that [the position of] the 'foreign' Russian tongue will be reinforced cannot take precedence over our obligation to refrain from coercion in the matter of language." A number of letters to the editor were published in response to this article. One of these stated that "The Ukrainian teachers will never agree to Larin's suggestion . . . that schools be organized only on the basis of the free choice of the population, for the result would be that many Ukrainian . . . and Jewish parents, whose children speak only Ukrainian . . . [and] Yiddish will send their children to a Russian school."[50]

Larin responded to the letters in a second article in which he contended that Ukrainization was hurting the national minorities in general and the Jews in particular.[51] Ostensibly, Larin defended the Jews' right to use Yiddish in the public sector, but in effect he was also attacking the "Jewish chauvinists" for forcing Jews to send their children to Yiddish schools. He asserted that "the representatives of 'Black Hundreds' thinking among the Jews also use the same methods [as the Ukrainians] and maintain that no attention need be paid to those 'who lack self-awareness' and speak Russian at home, who must be forced to enter the Jewish paradise." It is clear that this attack on "Jewish Black Hundreds" was directed not against Zionists or religious circles—neither of these supported the Soviet Yiddish school—but against the Jewish communists and intellectuals who preached Yiddishization.

Larin repeated his charges about the excesses of Ukrainization and discrimination against national minorities at the Third Conference of

Soviets where he was answered by Hrynko and Butsenko.[52]

It is reasonable to assume that Larin's opposition to Ukrainization stemmed at least partly from his sensitivity to its implications for Ukrainian Jews. It is quite possible that Larin viewed the policy of preferential treatment for Ukrainians over Jews as a form of discrimination tinged by anti-Semitism, and that since he could not condemn Ukrainization, the declared policy of the party, he chose instead to condemn the "excesses" in its implementation. For a Jew like Larin, brought up on Russian culture and committed to the idea that a man should be judged only on the basis of merit, Ukrainization could only appear to place an obstacle in the path of Jewish integration in Soviet society. In this respect he certainly echoed the sentiments of many acculturated Jews.

On the other hand, the Ukrainization campaign opened up many possibilities for Jewish activity in Yiddish. The forces working for Ukrainian national development understood that when given the choice, acculturating Jews gravitated toward the Russian sphere and not the Ukrainian. Since Russian culture, rather than Yiddish, was seen as the chief threat to Ukrainian development, Ukrainian leaders favoured Soviet Yiddish activity. The Jews who supported and fought for a broader field for Yiddish became the natural allies of the Soviet Ukrainian nationalists.

The Jewish communists involved in Jewish work and the Yiddishist intelligentsia were fully aware that Ukrainization was pushing the Jewish youth out of academic institutions and that Jews were losing their position in the Soviet elite in Ukraine. This is hinted at in decisions adopted by the Ukrainian Evsektsia in 1926:

> There are certain [Jewish] strata, especially the youth, who are seeing the economic ground being pulled out from under them. . . . In part, they are being excluded from the state apparatus for objective reasons, because workers' elements are being promoted and because *the apparatus is undergoing Ukrainization.*[53]

Yet, in contrast to Larin, these Jewish circles were not socially or culturally connected with the sectors in Jewish society that were being directly affected by Ukrainization policies and their feelings on the matter were, in any case, less sharply defined than Larin's. Moreover, many Jews in the Soviet elite whose positions were being threatened were also those who opposed Yiddish activity as a "nationalist deviation" and as a vestige of the past—just the same negative view they took of Ukrainization. The result of Ukrainian support combined with a wide-ranging initiative by pro-Soviet Yiddishist elements was a considerable expansion of Soviet Yiddish activity. Between 1924 and 1930, the number of pupils at Yiddish-language schools in Ukraine almost doubled (42,000 in 1924

and over 83,000 in 1930).[54] Some of the technical training schools were also converted to Yiddish instruction.[55] Four pedagogical institutes were set up in Ukraine to train teachers for these schools. The student body at these institutes grew from 295 in the 1923-4 school year to 835 in 1931-2.[56] In order to supply faculty for Yiddish secondary schools, six institutions of higher education in Ukraine included Yiddish departments during the 1920s. In 1930-1, these departments served a student body of 916.[57]

Work in Yiddish also extended to the sphere of administration. Many administrative offices took on clerks who could deal with the Jewish population in Yiddish. In villages and small towns Yiddish soviets—whose work was to be conducted in Yiddish—were established. In 1926, 117 soviets of this kind were in existence in Ukraine. By 1931, their number had grown to 156.[58] Courts that operated in Yiddish were also established, increasing between 1924 and 1930 from two to forty-six.[59]

Accompanying the expanded field of work in Yiddish was an increase in the number of Yiddish publications in the Soviet Union as a whole, and in the proportion of such publications being printed in Ukraine.[60] To be sure, a large part of what was published was of a propagandistic nature, but literature and research of considerable value was also included. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences afforded ample opportunity for research in Jewish history, linguistics and literature. Those who engaged in such research included scholars who had only recently returned to the Soviet Union and whose work was not always tailored to the orthodox communist pattern.[61] Kharkiv and Kiev became important centres for Jewish writers, among whom, once again, were some only recently back from abroad. The regime did not directly intervene in the debates conducted between various literary factions and supported in equal measure the "fellow travellers" and the proletarian writers. Many of the works of Yiddish literature published in Ukraine during this period maintained a high literary quality and significant Jewish content.[62]

At the end of the 1920s national content began to come under greater restriction, both in Ukrainian and Yiddish cultural activity. But the expanded use of Ukrainian and Yiddish in the public sphere continued until the mid-thirties.

The second stage of Ukrainization and *korenizatsiia* coincided with the agricultural collectivization drive and the acceleration of industrialization. Historical research, both Ukrainian and Jewish, now became the target of a vigorous campaign for conformity with party views.[63] Ukrainian and Yiddish writers who did not march to the approved rhythm were attacked scathingly, and a few were forced to make public "confessions." Ukrainian and Yiddish literature were now required to conform rigidly to the formula "socialist in content, national in form," the latter

aspect being confined to language.[64] In the field of linguistics, too, sharp criticism was now levelled at those who sought to base modern usage on historical sources and who objected to the deluge of Russianism.[65] Any links between Ukrainian and Yiddish cultural activity abroad were cut and declared dangerous. Thus, Ukrainization and Yiddishization lost a great deal of their depth and content, although their quantitative aspects survived.

One factor operating in favour of continued quantitative growth in Yiddish activity was the desire of Ukrainian national activists to defend themselves against charges that Ukrainization was hurting the minorities, and particularly the Jews. They referred explicitly to the expansion of Yiddish activities as proof that these charges were false. The number of pupils at Yiddish schools indeed reached its peak in 1934.[66] In 1932, an Institute for Jewish Proletarian Culture was established at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.[67] The printing of Ukrainian and Yiddish newspapers reached its height in 1935.[68] The number of Yiddish-language Soviets and law courts also continued to increase until the mid-thirties.

Thus, the Ukrainization campaign tended to encourage Soviet Jewish culture, within the given limitations imposed by the regime. At the same time, however, Ukrainization placed a number of obstacles in the path of the Jews' social advancement. There were basically two answers to this dilemma. One approach was based on the premise that Jews *as individuals* must be permitted to become integrated into Soviet society, solely on the basis of personal merit. From this point of view, Ukrainization blocked the Jews' progress and where Jews suffered deliberate discrimination, Ukrainization was to be opposed.

The second approach, taken by Yiddishist circles, looked toward the potential in the Ukrainization campaign for support of the Jews' group existence. They reached the conclusion that the losses represented by Jews being pushed out of cultural and government work were compensated for by the growth of cultural activity in Yiddish. It is not surprising, then, that these circles tended to support Ukrainization. This position was articulated in an editorial of the main Yiddish communist newspaper, which criticized the members of the Jewish intelligentsia who opposed Ukrainization. The editorial dismissed out of hand the contention that the cultivation of Yiddish and Ukrainian would lead to a growth in the forces of chauvinism. It went on to warn that "a situation could be created in which the Jews would be the agents of Russification in Ukraine . . . and we cannot permit such a thing to occur."[69] In this fashion, Yiddishist circles became the allies of Ukrainian national circles, united against the common enemy, Russified Jews and Ukrainians.

This is not to say that relations between the Yiddishist and the nationalist Ukrainians were always idyllic. Thus, for example, some of those

active in Ukrainian circles opposed setting aside land for Jewish agricultural settlement at a time when many Ukrainians were leaving Ukraine in search of land.[70] By the same token, there were Jews who complained that "the Ukrainization is too strong, and the Yiddishization too weak."[71] But despite such frictions, there existed a certain understanding between the two groups. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that when Ukrainian national circles came under attack in the mid-thirties, their Jewish allies suffered a similar fate.

D. The Demise of Ukrainization and Yiddishization

The famine that swept Ukraine in the wake of collectivization and the difficulties in meeting production quotas, on the one hand, and the heightening concern about external threats that came with the Nazis' rise to power in Germany, on the other, reinforced the centralizing tendencies in the Soviet Union and led to a vigorous repression of all centrifugal forces. Ukrainian and Yiddish activities, because both groups had ties to large populations abroad, were considered particularly dangerous, even though those who worked in these fields went out of their way to repudiate their non-Soviet brethren.

The central figure in the drive against Ukrainization was Pavel Postyshev, who became the most powerful man in Ukraine in 1933.[72] The most dramatic evidence of the change in policy was the removal of Skrypnyk from the sensitive post of commissar for education and his replacement by the Russophile V. Zatonsky.[73] The resolution adopted by the party during the second half of the 1930s referred to Ukrainian nationalism as the main danger to be combatted.[74] This situation allowed the opponents of Ukrainization—Russians as well as Russified Ukrainians—to raise their voices against any form of encouragement or development of Ukrainian language and culture. These elements now advanced to top ranks in the party and state apparat, and it was they who carried out the new policy.

In the poisonous atmosphere that resulted, Jewish activists also sought to uncover the "sins" of Yiddish cultural work. Itzik Feffer, the Yiddish poet, published an article condemning what he called "forced Yiddishization," and inveighed against Jewish linguists who "cast out of the language every Russian word, even when it had long become part of the pattern of speech of so many working men." "Very often," he continued, "the national form is exploited so as to fill it with national content"—a blatant manifestation of Jewish chauvinism.[75]

But although some of the Yiddish cultural activists jumped on the new bandwagon, the new policy gravely hurt Soviet Yiddish activity. The

number of Yiddish schools declined steadily.[76] The Yiddish Soviets disappeared almost completely through the administrative merging of non-Jewish villages with largely Jewish districts. Yiddish courts stopped functioning. Yiddish publications decreased, and party activists even suggested that new literary works be published not in Yiddish, but in Russian translation. The number of translations from Yiddish literature did in fact increase.[77]

Ukrainizationist and Yiddishist forces were severely hurt by the "great purges" of the late thirties. A large proportion of those who had taken a prominent part in these activities were accused of national chauvinism, arrested and either exiled or executed. Those who took leading positions in the party apparatus and in cultural affairs at this time did not view Ukrainian or Yiddish work as their vocation; in any case, they could tell which way the wind was blowing and strove to distance themselves from these activities so as to avoid being accused of nationalism. Ukrainization as a policy almost disappeared, although not yet in the realm of language. Activities in Yiddish, on the other hand, were halted almost entirely, leaving only literature and the theatre.

The question that we ought to raise is: Did the drastic restriction of Ukrainization and the almost total liquidation of work in Yiddish open up greater opportunities for the Jews *as individuals* in Soviet society? We do not have sufficient data for a fully satisfying answer. We can nonetheless surmise that any advancement by Jews at this time did not amount to anything significant or lasting, for several important reasons:

(1) Over the years the number of ethnic Ukrainians versed in Russian had grown considerably, so that the regime no longer had any special need of Russified Jews;
(2) the "purges" included some anti-Semitic themes, which almost certainly would have hurt individual Jews and blocked their personal advancement;[78]
(3) personal advancement in the public and social spheres was now not a matter of individual merit, but of one's ability to kowtow to the regime, and in this, surely, Ukrainians and Russians became as practiced as Jews.

The Russifying drive that all but destroyed Jewish group activity and gravely damaged the fruits of Ukrainization did not, therefore, benefit the Jews as individuals.

Concluding Remarks

During the twenty years of Soviet rule in Ukraine before the Second World War, Soviet policy came full circle, beginning and ending with a

Russification drive. However, although in its first stage this policy opened up a range of opportunities for the individual Jew who sought advancement in Soviet society, at the same time limiting collective Jewish activity even in Soviet forms, in its last stage, Jewish group activity was liquidated, but the individual Jew gained nothing in return.

During this period, a large part of the Ukrainian public—communist elements as well as those who were drawn to communism—endeavoured to realize within Soviet conditions the legitimate rights of the Ukrainian people. This tended to harm the interests of Jews who were seeking upward mobility and who hoped that their ethnic identity would become irrelevant in this regard. Yet it was during this time that the opportunity for Jewish group activity was the greatest—of course, always within the limits of the Soviet system.

The Jew, as opposed to the Ukrainian, was faced with a difficult dilemma. Different groups in the Jewish community arrived at different responses to this situation, depending on the priority they assigned to Yiddish cultural activity. But beyond the positions taken by this or that group of Jews on the question of Ukrainization, we are faced with a more general problem: what is the position of the Jews, both as individuals and as a group, in a milieu where the majority nationality endeavours to fulfill its national rights and to promote its own role in all sectors of social activity? The problem transcends the Soviet situation and applies to many other states in Eastern Europe.

NOTES

1. The Ukrainian Communist Party continued to exist legally until March 1925, but its influence was extremely limited. See R. S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine 1917–1957* (New York 1962), 119–20. The Jewish communist party Poalei Tsion existed in the Soviet Union, including Ukraine, until June 1928. See Z. Blum, *Poalei tsion in ratnfarband* (Tel Aviv 1978), 23–5.
2. *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar* (St. Petersburg 1899), 27: 76–7. Cf. I. Vikul, "Liudnist mista Kyiva," *Demohrafichnyi zbirnyk* (Kiev 1930), 221.
3. Z. Livne-Libman, *Toldot haklaim yehudim be'arvot rusia* (Merhavia 1965), 28–130.
4. From forty-eight villages in Ukraine which had a Jewish population of 87,777 in 1897, only 17,089 Jews remained according to the census of 1920. V. Lestchinsky, *Hayehudim berusia hasovietit* (Tel Aviv 1943), 53.
5. Vikul, "Liudnist mista Kyiva."
6. For the main government documents on Jewish autonomy, see *Die Lage der Juden in der Ukraine: Eine Dokumentensammlung* (Berlin 1920). Much of the material appears in translation in F. Pigido, ed., *Material Concerning Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Years of the Revolution (1917–1921): Collection of Documents and*

Testimonies by Prominent Jewish Political Workers (Munich 1956). For a collection of sources related to the differences of opinion in the Jewish community, see *Di yidishe avtonomye un der natsionaler sekretariat in ukrayne: materialn un dokumentn* (Kiev 1920). For a general overview, see S. I. Goldelman, *Jewish National Autonomy in Ukraine, 1917–1920* (Chicago 1968).

7. M. Altshuler, "Kehilat berdichev bitkufat milhemet ha-ezrahim (protokolim mishnat 1919)," *He'avar,* 21 (1975): 180.
8. N. Gergel, "Di pogromen in ukrayne in di yorn 1918–21," *Shriftn far ekonomik un statistik* (Berlin 1928), 110.
9. The number of Jews killed and wounded in the pogroms has been variously estimated, and I have cited the lowest figures. See Lestchinsky, *Hayehudim berusia hasovietit,* 53; S. Baron, *The Russian Jew under Tsars and Soviets* (New York 1976), 184; and Z. Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics* (Princeton 1972), 162.
10. On changing trends within the Ukrainian national movements from the formation of the Rada until the Fourth Universal, see J. Borys, *The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine* (Stockholm 1960), 99–121.
11. See Borys, *The Russian Communist Party,* 246–66; I. Majstrenko, *Borot'bism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism* (New York 1954); Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics,* 149–230; and M. Altshuler, *Hayevsektsia bivrit hamo'atsot 1918–1930* (Tel Aviv 1980), 41–71.
12. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine,* 101.
13. Borys, *The Russian Communist Party,* 154–5.
14. "Postanovlenie po voprosu o proverke, peresmotre i o chistke partii," *Pravda,* 30 June 1921.
15. *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy v rezoliutsiiakh i rishenniakh zizdiv, konferentsii i plenumiv TsK* (Kiev 1976), 1: 150. Cf. *Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy* (Kiev 1964), 310.
16. N. N. Popov, *Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy,* 273–6, 290.
17. V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow 1958–65), 44: 123.
18. Borys, *Russian Communist Party*, 155. Popov notes in *Ocherki,* 310, that of 97,869 party members, 21,260 or approximately 22 per cent of the total, were expelled in the purge.
19. M. Skrypnyk, *Statti i promovy z natsionalnoho pytannia* ([Munich] 1974), 26.
20. Calculated on the basis of Borys, *Russian Communist Party,* 115, and M. Ravich-Cherkassky, *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy* (Kharkiv 1923), 241.
21. Borys, *Russian Communist Party,* 115.
22. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine,* 104–5.
23. Altshuler, "Internatsionalizirung-protses," *Der emes*, 13 October 1922. Cf. his article, "Nit bakvemlekhkeyt, nor historishe noitvendikeyt," ibid., 13 December 1922; and M. Levitan. "Di grunt-problemen fun der yidisher kultur boyung." *Di royte velt,* no. 4 (1926): 64. For an opposing view, see A. Strelits, "Internatsionalizatsye oder bakvemlekhkeyt," *Der emes,* 14 October 1922.
24. *Der emes,* 5 July 1922.
25. "Di yidopteylung baym TsK KPU (barikht fun april biz aygust 1921)." *Der emes,* 23 September 1921.
26. Ibid., 18 October 1921.
27. Kh. Shmeruk, "Hapirsumim be-yidish bivrit hamo'atsot beshanim 1917–1960," in *Pirsumim yehudiim bivrit hamo'atsot* (Jerusalem 1961), lxv.
28. Ester, "Der ershter alukraynisher tsuzamenfor fun yidishe kultur tuer." *Der emes*, 3, 13, 15, 22–23 June and 1, 18 July 1922.

29. *Presa Ukrainskoi RSR, 1918–1973* (Kharkiv 1974), 176.
30. Calculated from ibid., 14, 21.
31. *Sezdy sovetov Soiuza SSSR, soiuznykh i avtonomnykh sovetskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik* (Moscow 1959–65), 2: 84, 145.
32. For the resolutions of the Congress on this matter, see *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza v rezoliutsiiakh,* 2: 433–43. For Stalin's speech, see I. Stalin, *Sochineniia* (Moscow 1949–51), 5: 236–75.
33. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine,* 109.
34. *Kulturne budivnytstvo v Ukrainskii RSR, vazhlyvishi rishennia komunistychnoi partii i radianskoho uriadu, 1917-1959* (Kiev 1959), 1: 229–32, 239–47, 282–6, 298–300, 304–6, 312–18, 336–7, 340–51, 357–60, 364–85, 423–7.
35. *V.K.P.(b) v tsifrakh* (Moscow 1926), 26–7.
36. F. Holub, "LKSMU v kulturno-natsionalnomu budivnytstvi," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy,* no. 7–8 (1929): 49–60.
37. *Sezdy,* 5: 130–2.
38. *Kulturne budivnytstvo*, 325.
39. *Presa Ukrainskoi RSR,* 176.
40. H. Weinstein, "Language and Education in the Soviet Ukraine," *The Slavonic Yearbook,* 1 (1941): 124–48. See also Meir Buchsweiler, "Ethnic Germans in the Ukraine towards the Second World War," Ph.D. thesis, Tel Aviv University 1980, 134–44.
41. Of all the students at institutes in Ukraine, those enrolled in schools whose language of instruction was Ukrainian constituted 18.6 per cent in 1923 and 27.4 per cent in 1929. At secondary vocational schools (*tekhnikumy*), 37.6 per cent of the students were studying in Ukrainian in 1928, and 53.1 per cent in 1929. At workers' schools (*robitfaky*), instruction was given in Ukrainian for 64 per cent of the students in 1928–9. In the professional schools (*profshkoly)* in 1928, 52.9 per cent of the students studied in Ukrainian; the figure rose to 60.8 per cent in 1929. The only institutions in which Ukrainization did not greatly expand were the factory workshop-schools (*fabzavuchi)*. In 1928, only 12.3 per cent of those enrolled at such schools studied in Ukrainian, and in 1929, 16.8 per cent. Calculations based on *Narodnia osvita Ukrainy* (Kharkiv 1931), 12, 42.
42. *Istoriia robitnychoho klasu Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev 1967), 2: 131.
43. According to the census of December 1926, 1.57 million Jews lived in Ukraine, out of a total Soviet Jewish population of 2.68 million. See S. M. Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union* (1951), 15–16.
44. I. Kantor, *Di yidishe bafelkerung in ukrayne* (Kharkiv 1929), 30.
45. L. Zinger, "Di sotsiale struktur fun der yidisher bafelkerung in di yorn 1926/27–1928/29," *Di royte velt*, no. 7–8 (1930): 124.
46. L. Zinger, *Natsionalnyi sostav proletariata SSSR* (Moscow 1934), 78.
47. *VKP(b) v tsifrakh,* 26–7.
48. Z. Halevy, *Jewish University Students and Professionals in Tsarist and Soviet Russia* (Tel Aviv 1976).
49. Iu. Larin, "O svobode iazyka," *Pravda,* 12 February 1925.
50. *Pravda*, 11 March 1925.
51. Iu. Larin, "Nesoznatelnoe otnoshenie naseleniia k voprosu o iazyke," *Pravda,* 20 March 1925.
52. *Tretii sezd sovetov SSSR, stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow 1925), 270–80, 281–2, 290–2. On the national minorities in Ukraine, see A. Butsenko, "Natsionalnye menshinstva na Ukraine," *Sovetskoe stroitelstvo*, no. 4 (1928): 89–93.
53. *Rezolutsyes ongenumene oyf der al-ukraynisher baratung fun di yidishe sektsyes fun*

KP(b)U (Kiev 1926), 14. Emphasis added.

54. Ts. Lipset, "Batei sefer hayehudiim bivrit hamo'atsot ushki'atam," *Behinot,* no. 1 (1970): 59.
55. Secondary vocational schools whose language of instruction was Yiddish had a student body in 1928 of 588 (2.2 per cent of the total students) and in 1929 of 300 (1.1 per cent). Professional schools taught in Yiddish had a student enrollment in 1928 of 2,046 (2.8 per cent of the total) and in 1929 of 3,357 (3.8 per cent). In the factory workshop-schools, Yiddish instruction was given to 304 students in 1928 (1.3 per cent of the total) and to 658 (2.2 per cent) in 1929. *Narodnia osvita,* 12, 42.
56. See Sylvia Fucks' M. A. thesis, which the author supervised, "Teacher Training for Soviet Yiddish Schools, 1917–1937," 128. The teachers' colleges for Yiddish schools were located in Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kiev and Kharkiv.
57. Ibid., 35. Yiddish departments existed at the Institute for People's Education in Kiev, Zhytomyr and Odessa, the Institute for Physics and Chemistry in Odessa and the Institutes for Vocational Education in Kiev and Kharkiv.
58. A. Glinski, *Dergreykhungen un felern in der arbet tzvishn di natsionale minderhaytn* (Kharkiv 1931), 31.
59. B. Pinkus, "Batei mishpat be-yidish bivrit hamo'atsot," *He'avar,* 18 (1971): 124–50.
60. In 1924, 76 books and pamphlets in Yiddish were published in the Soviet Union; in 1929, the figure was 319. In 1924, 36 per cent of the Yiddish publications appeared in Ukraine; in 1929, the proportion was 39 per cent. The number of newspapers and periodicals also increased, from 21 in 1923 to 40 in 1927, many of which appeared in Ukraine. See Shmeruk, "Hapirsumim be-yidish bivrit hamo'atsot beshanim 1917–1960," cxv-cxix, cxxix.
61. A. A. Greenbaum, *Jewish Scholarship and Scholarly Institutions in Soviet Russia, 1918–1953* (Jerusalem 1978), 25–71; M. Altshuler, "Jewish Studies in the Ukraine in the Early Soviet Period," *Soviet Jewish Affairs,* 7 (1977): 19–30.
62. Kh. Shmeruk, "Yiddish Literature in the USSR," in L. Kochan, ed., *The Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917* (London 1972), 232–68. Cf. M. Altshuler, *Briv fun yidishe sovetishe shrayber* (Jerusalem 1979).
63. Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine: A Study of the Decade of Mass Terror (1929–39)* (New York 1960), 49–53.
64. Ibid., 47–9. See also Shmeruk, "Yiddish Literature in the USSR," and Altshuler, *Briv fun yidishe sovetishe shrayber.*
65. Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule,* 56–7.
66. During this year, 85,500 students were enrolled in Yiddish schools. See Lipset, "Batei sefer hayehudiim bivrit hamo'atsol ushki'atam," 59.
67. Greenbaum, *Jewish Scholarship and Scholarly Institutions in Soviet Russia,* 65.
68. Buchsweiler, "Ethnic Germans," 220–1.
69. "Di ukraynizatsye, di yidishe svive, un unzere oyfgabn," *Der emes,* 2 June 1925.
70. M. Kowalewskyi, "Schauprozess gegen ukrainische Patrioten in Charkiw, 1930," in *Russischer Kolonialismus in der Ukraine* (Munich 1962), 83.
71. M. Kiper, "Di oyfgabn fun bolshevizirung un sovetizirung in der yid.-arbet," *Di royte velt,* no. 12 (1926): 68.
72. Postyshev was removed form his post in Ukraine in 1937 and was afterward condemned for lack of political alertness. In 1938 he was expelled from the party and arrested. He died in prison or was executed on 10 December 1940. On a partial change in his attitude during his last year in power, see Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule,* 117–18.
73. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine,* 149–208; Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule,* 117–18.

74. *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy v rezoliutsiiakh,* 1: 764–79; *Kulturne budivnytstvo,* 632–33. Cf. in Yiddish translation, Postyshev, "Di sovetishe ukrayne—an ayznfester forpost fun groysn fssr," *Forpost,* no. 1 (1934): 145–62.
75. I. Fetter, "Tseshmetern dem yidish natsionalizm," *Forpost,* no. 1 (1934): 188–98.
76. Z. Halevy, *Jewish Schools under Czarism and Communism* (New York 1972), 192–202; E. Schulman, *A History of Jewish Education in the Soviet Union* (New York 1971), 146–61.
77. Shmeruk, *Hapirsumim,* lxvi, xc; M. Altshuler, "Pirsumim rusiim bivrit hamo'atsot al nosim yehudiim beshanim 1917–1967," in M. Altshuler, ed., *Russian Publications on Jews and Judaism in the Soviet Union, 1917–1967* (Jerusalem 1970), lxxiii.
78. Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union,* 279–308; S. Shvarts, *Antisemitizm v Sovetskom Soiuze* (New York 1952), 108–22; Sh. Ettinger, *Antishemiut ba'et hahadasha* (Tel Aviv 1978), 182–3, 242.

IV

Literary and Social Reflections

Israel Bartal

On Top of a Volcano: Jewish-Ukrainian Co-Existence as Depicted in Modern East European Jewish Literature

Thus would Mykhailo sing as well, and his sad
Song would touch soft Elyakim's heart, and in the
peasant's song he would also hear
A heart weeping bitterly, a spirited heart full of
strength and courage. . . .
Then Mykhailo would sing a Cossack song, and
armies would appear
Before Elyakim, and in his imagination a strange
world would be depicted: killing, strangling,
and fire. . . .
Elyakim wonders within himself:
If he were there, would he too have been among those
ruffians?[1]

A significant part in the creation of modern literature in Hebrew and Yiddish was played by natives of Ukraine or by writers who settled there. Nevertheless, the role of Ukrainian gentiles in modern Jewish literature was quite limited until after the First World War. There are many reasons why Ukrainian figures were commonly represented only marginally or in passing in Jewish literature even though Jewish writers had been depicting life realistically and from various angles for several generations. First, Jewish literature in both Hebrew and Yiddish was closely bound up with the *Haskalah* (Jewish Enlightenment) movement which turned its

gaze to the cultural and social models of the ruling nations and displayed little or no interest in the social classes identified with the Ukrainian language. That connection with the *Haskalah* movement did not actually produce many literary efforts dealing with Russian, Polish or German society,[2] yet it did set clear models for the representation of the indigenous peoples in the multi-national empires, which were limited to the most marginal areas of literature. Second, the Jewish experience, which was the subject of literary works, was set off clearly within the bounds of a familiar structure of relations with the Ukrainian surroundings, characterized in an almost stereotypical manner. The Ukrainian people, like the other indigenous nationalities in the multi-national fabric of Eastern Europe, were often treated as part of the landscape, or of nature, and for a long time they did not serve as a focus for the plot or as a central subject for literary treatment. Third, the traditional attitude of East European Jews toward their neighbours persisted in literature, an attitude composed of contempt, a feeling of social superiority and a constant fear of the violence that lurked within them. Despite the small number of Ukrainian figures in Jewish literature and the constant repetition of a fixed cast of figures and types of encounters between Jews and their environment, the presence of the Ukrainians in the consciousness of the authors was profound and highly significant.

It should be pointed out that the members of traditional Jewish society did not differentiate very clearly among the various nations of Eastern Europe. They called them by the collective appellation "goy" or "goyim," and their language was "goyish," as opposed to the Poles, Russians or Germans, who were referred to by other names. That lack of distinction was reinforced during the nineteenth century by the Russifying policies of the Tsarist regime, with which many Jewish *Haskalah* writers identified for some time. The question asked by a Jew in a historical novel describing the horrors of 1919 is typical:

> "If you please, I have heard about 'Ukraine' from time to time. . . . What is 'Ukraine'? . . . The land where we are living is called 'Ukraine,' and the goyim around us are called 'Ukrainians.' . . . They want Ukraine to be independent . . . not attached to another country . . . and who is it that won't give that to them? Great Russia? . . . That is a complicated question. Ukraine, Ukraine. . . . They [the Jews] never knew of Ukrainians: this is what they knew: Ivan! Ivan is a drunkard. Ivan is a thief. Ivan is a murderer. And suddenly, 'Ukraine'. . . . And if Great Russia, for example, doesn't let them be a people dwelling apart, why are the Jews guilty? . . . Did anyone ask us for advice? . . . It's their wedding and their dance band. . . . Conspiracies, confusion . . . Jewish Bolsheviks . . . Jewish middlemen . . . business, confusion, dreams.[3]

As distinctions among the nations became stronger, the political consciousness of the Jewish population also became sharper, so that clear national identifications were found increasingly in literature, and they became endowed with ideological and artistic significance. Since its beginnings, modern Jewish literature has become increasingly aware of the wider segments of the non-Jewish society around it. That process is inseparable from the tendency to grapple with the "reality" which that literature inherited from the *Haskalah* movement. Two extra-literary factors were constantly involved in that growing awareness, determining the directions of its development: historical events and ideological influences. Thus one discerns a correlation between the changes in the presentation of Ukrainians and their society in literature and the growing awareness of the changes in reality, and one can demonstrate a high degree of co-ordination between the direction of that change, historical events and shifts in ideology.

The first Jewish cognizance of Ukrainians in literature is found in works inspired by the *Haskalah* movement at the beginning of the nineteenth century. That literature did not, at first, deal with the native populations of the multi-national empires, except to the extent that they served as a background for the social and economic activities of the *shtetl* and village Jews. Moreover, the elitist social attitudes of the *Haskalah* writers tended to merge the lower social classes of the Jewish population with the peasant environment and to view them all as an ignorant and unenlightened mass. Just as from its origins *Haskalah* literature took a universalistic, supranational view of the elite and educated classes, so it also grouped the uneducated classes together. The *Haskalah* satirists enjoyed comparing *Hassidic* society to the Ukrainian peasants, and they even traced various links between them. In his anti-*Hassidic* satire, *Megale temirin* (He Who Reveals what is Hidden), Yosef Perl introduced the story of a peasant woman who became pregnant from her relations with a *Hassid*, and he wrote at length of the indecent manner in which the *Hassidim* tried to solve the problem.[4] S. Y. Abramovitz criticized the values of the traditional society quite severely in describing the activities of a Ukrainian sorceress (*Znakharka*), who is compared to the Jewish *Baleshaymes* ("masters of the name"). The mother of a young Jew who is caught reading *Haskalah* literature takes a volume of Genesis with the translation of Mendelssohn, a central symbol of the dissemination of *Haskalah* in Eastern Europe, and is about to hide it in the *geniza* (store room for books too holy to be destroyed). On her way she meets another woman who advises her to combat her rebellious son's new ways by means of the sorceress' spells. The struggle against the *Haskalah*, of German origin, waged with the combined forces of the past as expressed in Jewish and Ukrainian superstitions, is unsuccessful, of course, for

"her magic had no effect."[5] The whole structure of social and economic bonds between traditional Jewish society and the Ukrainian peasants was ridiculed in *Haskalah* literature, and it was accompanied by severe criticism of what seemed to be a Jewish lack of productivity. The Jewish *shtetl,* surrounded by Ukrainian villages, was viewed as a backward remnant of a past age pursuing economic activities which had seen their day. Y. Y. Linetsky, in his anti-Hassidic satire, *The Polish Lad,* included a section of the account books of a Jew who was engaged in various business with the Ukrainian peasants, and through it he indicated the Jew's ignorance and his irrational way of managing his affairs.[6] With Abramovitz the *shtetl* depends on the villages for food. Without the peasants who bring the fruits of their soil to market every day, the Jews could not exist. The Jews are alien to nature, to the earth and its fruits, whereas the peasants are productive: "The market and the stores, the merchants and the middlemen, with the taverns, the inns and the servants and the middlemen—all of them belong to the Jews, but the earth, the fields round about them, belong to the goyim, if you please."[7]

That *Haskalah* view was prolonged for some fifty years in the case of Abramovitz, from the 1870s until the second decade of the twentieth century.[8] Behind it we see the dialectically contradictory attitude of the *Haskalah* toward the East European peasantry in general and Ukraine in particular: while the peasant does belong to the lower and ignorant strata of society, he is productive, healthy and "normal," the opposite of the Jew, who is defective in his economic activities and social behaviour. That ambivalent attitude toward the peasant was resolved over many years by distinguishing between the serfs, so familiar to the Jews from their everyday experience, and the free peasantry, such as the German colonists in the southern provinces. The former appeared in the literature of the *Haskalah* as part of the natural landscape, but the traits attributed to them were usually not very different from the traditional image of the Ukrainian peasants. The latter were presented as a fine example for Jewish colonization and they corroborated the generally positive image of the social and economic ethos connected with Germany. Despite what has just been said, the literature of the *Haskalah* displays both some understanding of the miserable state of the peasant and optimism concerning the survival of Jewish society within the Ukrainian population. The hopes for order, for a stable central government and for rational behaviour on the part of the ruling authorities also included the Ukrainian peasantry. Memories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were moderated and attenuated, viewed as characteristics of the pre-enlightenment period. Gottlober, an author born in Volhynia, attributed the uprisings of the seventeenth century to the irrational behaviour of the Polish aristocracy, which the Jews shared:

> [Bohdan Khmelnytsky] grew stronger and stronger for five successive years, from 5408 until 5412, and he marched through the length and breadth of the land, and everywhere he went, he laid the countryside waste and smote the Poles and Jews mightily, unto destruction. For the sin of Judea and Israel was inscribed on the tablets of Khmelnytsky's heart with a stylus of steel. When the leaders of Poland made their yoke heavy upon the necks of the peasants, their serfs, and they oppressed them with hard labour, and they appointed the Jews as their excise officers and the lessors of their fields, to collect taxes from those unfortunate people, and many of the Jews hardened their hearts and showed no mercy to that flock of men, and they became the tools of the cruel noblemen with their high hearts to oppress the peasants and destroy their portion and their flesh. After Khmelnytsky girded his loins like a hero to free the serfs from their suffering under hard masters, he reached out his arm powerfully against the lords of Poland and turned his attention to the Jews. It was easy for him to wreak his vengeance upon them and to tread upon them like the dust, as is written in the chronicles of those times, when Jews were held in contempt and Israel was trodden under and ensnared in traps and pitfalls, and they had no spirit to withstand their persecutors.[9]

It is no wonder that the liberation of the serfs in the early 1860s was viewed by all the *Haskalah* writers as a positive development that would rescue the peasants from the dreadful conditions which retarded their development.[10] In an article written in 1884 Abramovitz says, "that evil order [serfdom] which was fundamentally unjust, was a source of livelihood for the Jews. . . . The Jew acted as a "*merchant*" ship for the benighted peasants and also for the lazy aristocrats. . . . The foolishness of the benighted, on the one hand, and of the nobility, lolling in the lap of luxury, on the other, were a source of salvation to the Jew."[11] The gap between ideological understanding of the causes of the peasant's plight and his literary depiction as a stereotypical figure according to the traditional Jewish image of him was not, therefore, so deep as to stifle the optimism so typical of the *Haskalah*: frightening memories of the past, an integral part of Jewish consciousness, were almost completely suppressed in the literary works or given the rational explanation outlined above.

That trend became dominant when Russian populism began to influence Jewish literature. While the direct ideological argument became less prominent, a fixed pattern for the depiction of reality gradually emerged in Jewish literature in Eastern Europe, prevailing from the 1870s until just before the First World War. That pattern, at the centre of which stood the *shtetl*, contained a more or less stable array of contact points with the non-Jewish environment and a set cast of non-Jewish types who

were to be found in the *shtetl*, at its margins, or around it. In fact those points of contact and the figures associated with them were an extension of the *Haskalah* depiction of the relations between the Jews and their non-Jewish environment, although certain changes in their significance and emphasis occurred. The central line, which persisted and was even strengthened in the literature of the 1870s and afterward, was the depiction of various national groups in Eastern Europe (among them, the Ukrainians) in almost complete identity with their social class: just as almost all the Russian figures who appear in that literature are officials, the previous identification of the peasantry with the Ukrainians was also maintained. They are still not clearly Ukrainians in that identifying traits such as those applied to Poles or Russians are not attributed to them, but they turn out to be Ukrainians in that they speak the language or reside in Ukraine. The galley of Ukrainian types includes two basic groups, and both of them belong to the lowest classes in the society: the Ukrainians who live in the Jewish *shtetl* and the peasants who live in the surrounding villages. The first group is generally described in more detail, evincing sympathetic features in accordance with the populistic formula combined with the traditional characterization and realistic material. Again and again the reader comes upon the maid in the Jewish home, the sorceress who deals in folk medicine, the local policeman, the artisan, the apprentice or the *shabbes-goy* (that member of the lower social class who does for the Jew what his religion forbids him to do on the Sabbath and holidays). These types live with their Jewish neighbours, who constitute the majority in the town or *shtetl*, in a well-defined form of co-existence where the meeting ground is demarcated by people's occupations. Frequently they appear collectively and represent the only penetration of non-Jews within the Jewish milieu and that of the literary work:

> Havrylo, the *shabbes-goy* who trimmed the Sabbath candles, took the brass candle-sticks off the table and lit the ovens in Jewish homes, Tekle, the laundress . . . and dairywoman, Kondrat the drunk, to whom, for a cup of brandy, they sell all the *hametz* [leavened products forbidden during Passover] in Kabtsansk.[12]

These types are always marginal in literary works, although sometimes their appearance promotes the authors' central aims. For example, they serve to introduce and bring out certain traits of the Jewish characters by contrast or by enlarging the perspective. Moreover, these characters and types are always seen from the inner Jewish point of view of the works, and they are "Judaized" both in the historical and sociological, and in the literary sense. The maid in Jewish homes, for example, speaks Yiddish and is more scrupulous in observing the commandments than the children of her master:

> For example, to go to the Rabbi with a question, to help in salting the meat and the fowls to make them kosher, to help prepare the house for Passover, and things of that sort about which Hapka was more careful than a son of Israel. She trembled at the thought of mixing milk and meat as before death and refrained from eating leavened foods all seven days of Passover, eating Matsa with the other children of Israel, chewing the bitter herb with all her strength and deriving pleasure from it, just like a daughter of Israel.[13]

These are the representatives of the surrounding world of the peasantry who were softened and "Judaized" in the context of *shtetl* life. But beneath the surface, the Jewish author already discerns hints of another world, violent and free, which will become more and more apparent with the waning of the optimistic *Haskalah* tradition. Encounters with these set types are also, as we have mentioned, part of a set structure and characterized in certain places by repeated actions and fixed patterns of speech. The main type of encounter is based on *economic* relations, of which there are three sub-types:

(1) the encounter with peasants from the surrounding areas in the market or at fairs;
(2) relations with urban artisans;
(3) contacts in the Jewish tavern.

The contact in the market is, as we have said, deeply significant with regard to *Haskalah* criticism of Jewish economic activities. but in fact it gives a realistic picture that was valid throughout Ukraine until after 1910. In the market, we sometimes hear conversations in a mixture of Yiddish and Ukrainian: "Dos bissel goyish vos Senderl hot zikh oisgelernt reyden geyndik mit zayn vayb tomid oyfn mark" (the little bit of goyish that Senderl learned to speak going to the market with his wife all the time).[14] Generally it was the women who knew Ukrainian. They tried their skill at speaking this language instead of the Russian used by the officials, which they did not know.[15] Contacts with artisans and workman bore the character of economic co-existence which benefited both sides and they are described in a manner sympathetic to the productive classes among the various peoples.[16] Encounters in the inns, however, had a much more complex character, since they were connected to the accusations commonly levelled against the Jews for taking an active part in the distribution of alcoholic beverages among the non-Jews. Here one must clearly distinguish between two sorts of taverns: those patronized by the Polish aristocrats and Russian officials, and those frequented by the Ukrainian peasants. Descriptions of the peasants in the tavern are very common in literature from the 1880s onward, and they are connected both with friendly contacts between Jews and Ukrainians (as in the works of Abramovitz)[17] and with a feeling of alienation, repugnance and fear of violence.

Other Jewish-Ukrainian contacts depicted in Jewish literature take place against the background of geography: the Jew who sets out for the village or the forest often needs to travel in a peasant's wagon. Many of the contacts between *shtetl* Jews and Ukrainians in the works of Abramovitz and Sholem-Aleykhem take place against that geographical background. Sometimes the Ukrainian introduces the *shtetl*-dweller to the Jewish world or returns him to it, and that return occasionally has an ideological character. Thus, for example, those who attempt to flee from the *shtetl* of the 1870s to the legends of Jewish travellers of the Middle Ages are brought back to the real world by dialogue with the Ukrainians in their own language: "'The dog knows you, Jews, how you mix up my head. That's the road to Pievke, and they only talk about Eleslael, Eleslael,' [Erets Yisrael, or the land of Israel] the peasant imitated them, spat, and drove on."[18] Another Ukrainian peasant brings the liberal proponent of *Haskalah* who wishes to improve the conditions of the lower classes back to reality, where there is no chance of reaching an understanding between the villager who transports wood to the market and the Jewish member of the intelligentsia who seeks his benefit: "The devil take you and your society! Stop pestering me, you maniac, in the name of all the black spirits, I have no time to argue with you. I have to leave early and bring my wagon to the city with a load of wood. . . . Are you crazy or drunk or a clown—or what? Phooey, stop pestering me, you degenerate, by heaven," the gentile shouted in anger, urging on his horse.[19]

Those encounters and others, to which *shtetl* types are linked, persist and are developed over a long period of time, until just before the First World War. The populist sympathy for the lower classes varied in strength, depending on the period and the writer, but it did not entirely disappear. Moreover, that depiction, which for decades represented contacts between Jews and Ukrainians on the level of the relations between city and village, moderated the tensions between the sides. The past was depicted with nostalgic idealization and romanticization at the same time as extensive changes increasingly took place within the social and political reality of Eastern Europe. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, portrayals of life appear in which members of the older generation of the two nations maintain ideal neighbourly relations, despite their religious and social differences. But both parties are impotent in the face of the new forces that are destroying the pre-modern idyll: industrialization, migration from the villages to the city, modern anti-Semitism and new political movements. The clinging to the past represented a continuation of some of the populistic views that had previously been accepted by the radical writers of the Haskalah movement, and it obscured the enormous tension that was latent in the pre-modern era. Even though

those stereotypical figures and encounters that have become familiar to us from the literature of earlier decades continue to characterize the contacts in their totality, the nostalgic tone softens them even further and they are presented as an idyll containing no tension whatsoever.

> And they often meet in the market, and they know each other well by name, and they honour each other: Hrytsko calls Hirshko "Swindler," and Hirshko calls Hrytsko "Villain," but they both mean well. And if they quarrel too sharply, they go "Do Rabina," and the Rabbi, Rabbi Yoyzefil whose knowledge of Ukrainian is rather shaky, always takes the middle ground: "Nekhai bulo polovyna," anything to prevent the desecration of the Name [of God].[20]

The sorceress familiar to us from the *Haskalah* stage reappears at the idealizing-nostalgic stage as a trustworthy and loyal neighbour, devoted to the Jews of her village. The Jewish women say of her:

> "Doctors—witch—doctors! What does a doctor know about sickness?
> Doctors are in fashion today! In the past who ever heard of a doctor?
> What does the doctor do? Tell me! What does he do?
> He comes and writes the name of a drug. What good do they do, written words?
> Have sorcerers and people who know spells vanished from the village?
> Where is Taras, and where is Khrushch, and Volkhovitka?"[21]

The friendly meeting in the village between old people representing the two nations is found in several works. The following conversation is typical:

> A generation is growing up, how sad are the walls of the monastery!
> When I come to the courtyard—who is there? A blind man, a lame man and another beggar,
> The walls of the house are sad, and father Vasyl is within,
> And the sound of the bells is sad too, as if bewailing the temple's abandonment.
> Your children are scoffers and atheists too, eating unclean meat and pork and smoking on the Sabbath.
> I was a girl once, I remember, and life was dead on the Sabbath.
> There was peace and quiet in the market, I was almost gripped by fear.
> Now there is nothing but shame, the Sabbath—buying and selling
> I am embarrassed, I, by my soul, to go on the Sabbath
> And buy something in a Jewish store.[22]

Nevertheless, alongside this almost positive trend, the experience of the violent encounter penetrates literary works very powerfully, essentially nourished by the spreading influence of modern anti-Semitism, the events of 1881–2, and the pogroms of 1903–6. The *Haskalah* tradition, which was deeply rooted in the literature, occasioned a rather peculiar interpretation of those two phenomena. It attributed them to forces external to Ukrainian society at large and accused the authorities as well as various negative interests of certain segments of the population, or even the behaviour of certain sectors of Jewish society of being responsible for anti-Semitism. Thus, Sholem-Aleykhem was able to conclude his novel dealing with the events of 1905 with this statement: "Hungry people, drunk because of their many griefs, and incited, fell upon their brothers and sisters of another faith like wild beasts," for it was the conditions that brought on the pogroms.[23] He was following in the footsteps of the giants of Russian literature who wrote items like the following to him as early as 1903: "The only guilty party, not only for the horrors of Kishinev, but also for that hatred, which has taken hold of a well known and small part of the Russian population, is not the people themselves, but the government."[24] That tendency produced special literary models for the depiction of anti-Semitic characters as caricatures with negative features, and it also developed a particular type of the Ukrainian peasant, the government official, who grew up within the village-*shtetl* and changed from an ignorant village lad to a Jew-hater in the spirit of modern anti-Semitic literature. "He has become, with God's help, extremely clever with a regard to Jewish matters, a genius in the world of the Talmud and the legal codes and all the laws and customs of the Jews: the taking of interest, swindling and fraud, and even the use of Christian blood on Passover."[25] Sholem-Aleykhem even went so far as to depict the spread of modern anti-Semitism and the resulting conflict between a father and a son in a work in which Romanenko, the father, is active in the Black Hundreds together with other people well known in the history of the early twentieth century, while the son, an idealistic revolutionary, works together with his Jewish comrades and falls as a sacrificial victim upon the altar of his principles. Romanenko the son, beloved of the Jewess Tamara, is an internationalist whose supra-nationalism follows the tradition of contacts between Jews and their environment in the universalistic spirit of the *Haskalah*: "My best friends . . . are Jews, and I have never detected any lack of fidelity in them, my most devoted friends are Jews, and they never showed me that they were above me or below me."[26]

However, that post-*Haskalah*, populistic interpretation touched only superficially upon the situation of Jewish exiles in the midst of the Ukrainian population. At the same time, the feeling of dread and being a

stranger broke into literature, a tradition dating back hundreds of years living on in the consciousness of the traditional society, although it had been relegated to the margins of literary works. Not only did the experience of the pogroms, which undermined longstanding faith in the power of the government and the chances for progress and rationalism, contribute to the emergence of fear, but changes in literary trends also brought out that fear, primarily the influence of neo-romanticism, which legitimized the depiction of a total conflict between Jews and their Gentile surroundings, making it a central motif in the crystallization of modern Jewish national consciousness. In Sholem-Aleykhem we can discern the feeling of alienation behind the models we have mentioned, the fear and loneliness of the Jew in a strange and hostile sea of Ukrainians. The writer does make those feelings softer and gentler by means of ideological digressions and in his fidelity to *Haskalah* models of reality, but, nevertheless, they come out in the remarks of the heroes as references to the threatening presence of the past and of place names. A Jewish boy, who sets forth to wreak vengeance upon the plants grown by Okhrim the gardener, mentions the disasters of the distant past in the same breath as the pogroms of the recent past:

> Vengeance! I have not ceased to call wildly for vengeance! I will settle accounts with you for Jewish blood! I will pay you back for Jerusalem, and for the rest, for the Jews of Spain and Portugal, and for the Jews of Morocco, and for our own [Jews of Ukraine], in the past in Uman and other places, and for today too, and for the Jewish Torah scrolls that were torn up.[27]

The boy's actions are very significant in that they remove the veil of tranquillity from the relations between Jews and Ukrainians. The figure of the Ukrainian gardener Okhrim is one of the most positive depictions of a Ukrainian peasant in the entire work of Sholem-Aleykhem and it has many idealized features in the spirit of populism. Now the boy appears, whose mother does business of the traditional sort with that peasant and he destroys that co-existence in the name of memories of the violent past which have risen to the surface in response to the pogroms of 1903.

In dealing with the shattering of the thin veneer that had masked that seething tension, one should discuss the crisis that occurred after the First World War. The work of the Hebrew novelist Freeman, *1919*, is a most impressive literary document in which we see the final development of all the literary currents discussed hitherto. In that historical novel, based on the experiences of 1919 in a *shtetl*, in the Podillia region the relations between the rationalistic-ideological veneer and the feeling of impotence in the face of the violent forces latent within the Ukrainian population

emerges clearly. Just as the literature of the 1870s and 1880s dealt, among other things, with the disappointment of the Jew who attempted to join forces with the dominant nationalities in the political world of that time, the Russians and the Poles, so now we find disappointment in the attempt to share the political and national aspirations of the Ukrainians. That effort came rather late, as did its disappointment, because the historical development of the Ukrainian national movement was also late. Solomon, the Jewish hero who returns from the Austrian front at the end of the First World War, identifies with his Ukrainian surroundings and shares Ukrainian aspirations and culture (here we have a continuation of the pre-modern village experience). He speaks the language of the peasants, he behaves like them and even takes part in anti-German actions with the young people of his village. The peak of his identification with the Ukrainian cause comes at a party with his friends, who sing Shevchenko's "Testament." Solomon's Jewish friend, who comes with him, is repelled by the overly close contact with the peasants and especially by the Christian ikon which is there. The ensuing argument between the two recalls many similar arguments about the issue of Jewish identification with the peoples of Eastern Europe during the period of the crystallization of their national identity:

> Some aggressive power throbs inside them, an independent alien power, concentrated within itself, the feeling of envy and worry mixed together. They sang "Testament" with almost religious awe!... They are all strong... tense... and Solomon? Who is he? Half Jew and half goy... or neither one nor the other.... The "Testament" by Shevchenko... and the bones of Gonta... the martyred saint. Who knows where he is buried? [Shevchenko] asks in one place... 'the martyred saint'... and the massacre of Uman? But for them he's a hero, isn't he?... Ultimately he was fighting for the downtrodden and humiliated Ukraine. Where, then, is the yardstick by which he can be measured?[28]

However, as the violent and unstable character of the village environment becomes increasingly evident, Solomon's ties with the Jewish city become stronger, until one day he catches himself trying to return to the village to ask for help. He discovers that he belongs to the city and not to the village: "Where have I gone to look for help?"[29] Solomon becomes the organizer of Jewish self-defence, but he still maintains ties with his friends from his village. Some of them even try with all their power to keep up the good old life they lived in common before recent events. In one of the scenes in the *shtetl* market, a beggar draws a mixed Jewish and Ukrainian crowd by singing this song:

Oi, iak ne veselo tobi spivaty, Ukraino.
Ty nikoly ne zaznala
Dobroi hodyny.[30]

The melody is shared by both peoples:

> A long chain of humiliation and troubles, of mutual hatred and mutual persecutions peeped out and was drawn from who knows where, from the ancient past, transmitted from generation to generation, hung around the neck.... Who spun it? Will it ever be broken? Where did that melody come to us from, and who sang it first?... Was it a Moldavian shepherd pouring the moans of his heart and his longing for the wild plains into it?... Or was it a poor Jewish cantor burdened with children who thus gave vent to his bitterness and begged for mercy from heaven?... Did it come from the days of the "Panshchyna," some gentile crying because of his servitude?... Who knows?[31]

When the Ukrainian teacher approaches and asks the beggar to sing the song again, giving it contemporary national significance, "all the Jewish men and women, the boys and girls who were standing around him without moving suddenly, as if at a command, started slipping away and leaving the beggar one by one."[32] From that point of view, the encounter between Solomon's friend from the village, Artem Moskalenko, with a little Jewish girl on the night when the Cossacks run wild in the city is more impressive. In order to calm her down he reverts to their common experience, using the few Yiddish words he knows:

> "Don't be afraid, little girl.... Don't be afraid, meydele....
> "Where's your mother?... Gibmir a broyt... " he stroked the girl's head with his hand....
> "Don't be so afraid, little girl... my dove... " Artem became more and more upset. "I... I'm not a Christian... not a Haidamak.... I'm a goy, meydele, I'm gibmir a broyt.... " Great fear for that tender soul, for the little Jewish being who was curled up in his arms and dependent on him, overcame him, and it was as if he had suddenly discovered his whole existence in her, and he slowly walked out without knowing where he was going.[33]

Artem is but a single figure confronting the outburst which brings back memories of the blood-soaked past. No alliance based on ideology or common economic interests is strong enough to stem the outburst. The

Jews return to the days of Khmelnytsky and Gonta in their imaginations and the villagers around them are carried away by the anti-Semitic propaganda and their heroic memories of the great uprisings:

> The odour of uprootedness and abandonment overcame them, and it seemed as if the war . . . was rolling into their dwelling place, to their village. . . . The little mud houses full of ikons and impregnated with warmth and peace were astonished by the noise and the crowding, and they listened attentively to the seething words and dreadful tales. . . . They did not let slip a single word of the dreadful tales about the judges of the commune, which was approaching, and whose cannons were already thundering somewhere in the muffled distance, about the Christian churches that had been made into stables by the Jews, about the lands that had been transferred from Christians to Jews, who did with them what they wished. . . . And who told those stories? . . . Ukrainian Atamans, schoolteachers who had been banished from their villages, Cossacks who had survived the war. . . . Everything was clear here and at hand, flesh of their flesh and bones of their bones, everything was stamped with the seal, "Ours, Ukrainian . . . ." And that seal inspired respect and esteem, and everything beside it bore the stamp, "Zhyd . . . " a sign that called for uprooting and destruction. . . . "We'll come back and get you!" That cry was heard from village to village, ringing like a promise of redemption from every possible future persecution, like a great obligation to renew the ancient glory of the Cossacks dating back to the Sich, like a herald of deadly hatred and revenge.[34]

Disillusionment with *Haskalah* populism along with longings for the tranquillity of pre-modern life were developed and extended in the novel *1919* both in response to historical reality and in accordance with the trends of Jewish literature during the previous decades. Types such as Artem who fights at the side of the Jewish self-defence groups against the Ukrainian rioters also existed in reality. In a manuscript journal from the town of Bershad a very similar event is recalled, the saving of the town's Jews from a gang with the following argument: "What are you doing here? Who called you out against our quiet neighbours? If you came to spill innocent blood in this holy place, we will defend them with our own blood. We will liquidate the commissars without your help, and you, villains, violating all that is holy, get out of here quickly, because we won't let you do any harm to our Jews."[35] The figure of Solomon, along simplistic lines, was heralded by Sholem-Aleykhem's Shmulik, a Jew who lives among the villagers and interprets the events of the 1905 Revolution to them. When the rumour reaches them that the Tsar has ordered them to carry out pogroms against the Jews, they come to Shmulik to have him

explain them, "for how could we have a pogrom against the Jews without Shmulik?"[36] But Sholem-Aleykhem was faithful to his method of softening the conflict between Jews and Ukrainians, and he presented the rioters as simple people who were misled by the anti-Semitic authorities. (That is also true in the stories of Tevie the Milkman published several years later, in 1914–16.)[37] Therefore Shmulik's ways influence them:

> Shmuel was born, educated and raised among the goyim, Shmuel speaks goyish like a goy, he dresses like a goy, lives like a goy, thinks like a goy, and is devoted completely to the cause of the goyim, expert in what Ivan wants, what Ivan has, and what Ivan lacks, feeling what oppresses Ivan, knowing what Ivan couldn't do and what he could do if he wanted.[38]

However, it would seem that the events of 1919 laid bare the forces beyond that purportedly idyllic life in their full power and continuity. Thus in 1918, shortly after the pogrom that took place in Zhytomyr and before the dreadful horrors of the following year,[39] J. H. Brenner wrote about the events of 1881 as few had written of them before him, magnifying the violent horrors that were committed beyond their actual dimensions. The perspective of 1903–6 shed a different light on 1881. In calling for self-defence despite the slim chances of success, given the relation of forces, he recalls the traditional dread that he had learned from his mother:

> The evils of 1648 and the years of Khmelnytsky. The Cossacks—did my mother not give birth to me in a Ukrainian city? There—Khokhols, the Zaporizhzhia, the Sich. The ruins of Mazepa were half a day's trip away from us. . . . And the daughter of landlords . . . also read *Taras Bulba* and enjoyed the heroic deeds and the mockery of Yankl. She even laughed at the sight of the sandals and socks up in the air and the heads down below. The picture was clear—what a charming picture.[40]

The quiet Ukrainian countryside and the Ukrainian melodies tempted one to forget the past, but Brenner's mother told him about it, and he also remembered his father, who had been murdered on a dung heap by the "innocent" peasants. That was what impelled Brenner not to forget and not to act in a cowardly way even under the given conditions as a Jewish minority in a city surrounded by hundreds of villages. The critic Dov Sadan who, in 1948, decades after Brenner, wrote an article about the events of 1648, termed the ignoring of the true situation of the Jew in Ukraine "the sin of forgetfulness." For the great movements among the Jewish people in recent generations, *Hassidism*, and, a fortiori, the *Haskalah*, and even the Jewish national movements, paid little heed to the

events of 1648 and did not understand, in the writer's opinion, "that 1648 and 1649 do not speak only in the past tense, but also in the present tense."[41] Among the three writers chosen by Sadan to illustrate the true stratum of Jewish-Ukrainian reality, Tchernikhowsky, Brenner and Steinberg, the feeling of the traditional generation appears to be correct: they do not delude themselves even though their children expound new ideas of Jewish-Ukrainian co-existence to them. The traditional chronicles and the fear of the great steppes where violent forces are latent outweigh the new-fangled books in their eyes. The sons are wrong in thinking that their fathers erected a barrier between themselves and the world of the peasantry. It is the neighbour's axe cutting off the father's head that reveals the dreadful truth to the son: "And among those nations thou shalt find no ease" *(Deut.* 28: 65).[42]

NOTES

1. S. Tchernikhowsky, *Brit milah* (Scenes from the Life of the Jews in Taurida), *Sefer ha-idylliyot* (Tel Aviv 5760), 30–1.
2. I. Bartal, *Non-Jews and Gentile Society in East-European Hebrew and Yiddish Literature, 1856–1914,* Ph.D. thesis, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1980; I. Bartal, "The Porets and the Arendar: Polish-Jewish Relations as Portrayed in Modern Jewish Literature," paper presented to the International Conference on Poles and Jews, Myth and Reality in the Historical Context, Columbia University. 1983.
3. A. Freeman, *1919* (Tel Aviv 1968), 269–70.
4. [J. Perl], *Megalle Temirin* (Vienna 1819), Epistles 21, 22, 33, 35 ff.
5. S. Y. Abramovitz (Mendele Mokher Sepharim), *Ha-avot ve-habanim,* in *Kol Kitvey* (Tel Aviv 5714), 23–5.
6. Y. Y. Linetsky, *Dos Poylishe yingl* (Odessa 5633), 84.
7. Abramovitz, *Shloyme reb Khayns,* in *Ale Verk* (Warsaw 1928), 18: 62.
8. Bartal, *Non-Jews and Gentile Society,* 107.
9. A. B. Gottlober, "Ha-gizra ve-ha-binya," in *Memoirs and Travels* (Heb.), (Jerusalem 1976), 30–1.
10. Cf. Abramovitz, "Mishpat Aniyey Ami," *Ha-melits,* 7 (1867), 30, p. 239.
11. Abramovitz, "Eleykha sar ha-elef," *Ha-melits,* 20 (1884), 103, 169.
12. Abramovitz, *Dos vintsh-fingerl,* in *AleVerk*, 11: 17.
13. Sholem-Aleykhem, *Di groyse behole fun di kleyne mentshalakh,* in *Ale Verk* (New York 1937), 3: 167.
14. Abramovitz, *Masoes Binyomin ha-shlishi,* in *Ale Verk,* 9: 91.
15. Linetsky, *A protses in revutsker Mirovoy-Sud,* in *Dos meshulakhas* (Zhytomyr 1875); Sholem-Aleykhem, *Tsvey shalakh-mones* in *Ale Verk*, 3: 100.
16. Abramovitz, *Be-seter raam,* in *Kol Kitvev*, 386.
17. Ibid., 263, 283, 330.
18. Abramovitz, *Masoes Binyomin ha-shlishi,* in *Ale Verk*, 9: 45.
19. Abramovitz, *Di kliatshe* (Wilno 1873), 105.

20. Sholom-Aleykhem, *Di groyse behole fun di kleyne mentshalakh,* Ale Verk, 3: 166–7.
21. Tchernikhowsky, *Berele Khole* (1907), *Sefer ha-idylliot,* 49.
22. Tchernikhowsky, *Levivot*, 13.
23. Sholem-Aleykhem, *Der mabl* (Warsaw 1924), 449.
24. Sholem-Aleykhem, *Oysgeveylte briv* (Moscow 1941), 293.
25. Sholem-Aleykhem, *Di groyse behole fun di kleyne mentshaklakh,* in *Ale Verk*, 3: 172.
26. Sholem-Aleykhem, *Der mabl*, 131.
27. Sholem-Aleykhem, *Grins oyf shvues,* in *Ale Verk*, 8: 127
28. A. Freeman, *1919*, 78.
29. Ibid., 275.
30. Ibid., 244.
31. Ibid., 244–5.
32. Ibid., 245.
33. Ibid., 343–4.
34. Ibid., 321–3.
35. Z. Cohen, *Toldot ha-kooprativ ha-Barshadai* (unpublished manuscript, private collection, Jerusalem), 36.
36. Sholem-Aleykhem, *Shmulik* (Warsaw 5613), 6.
37. Sholem-Aleykhem, *Tevye der milkhiker,* in *Ale Verk*, 1: 199–230.
38. Sholem-Aleykhem, *Shmulik,* 4.
39. In his papers Brenner noted that this piece was written "the day after the pogrom in Zhytomyr."
40. D. Sadan, *Al gzerot t'akh* [On the 5408 atrocities] in *Orkhot u-shvilim* [Ways and Byways], 2: 21–2.
41. Ibid., 25–28.
42. Ibid., 28.

George G. Grabowicz

The Jewish Theme in Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Ukrainian Literature

The range of issues subtended by the formulation "Jewish-Ukrainian relations" differs considerably from those posed by our previous conferences held at McMaster University—the Polish-Ukrainian and the Russian-Ukrainian. This, I submit, is particularly evident in the realm of literature, and in the discipline of literary history. On both of the earlier occasions one could speak of the literary relations as having historical extension and multifarious content; one could, furthermore, postulate in both instances a model of cultural and intrinsically literary exchanges.[1] The subject at hand, however, calls for another historiographic formula, not so much of literary *relations* as of literary *perceptions* (precisely as suggested by the title of this session). The reason for this state of affairs, the all too typical case of great social and physical proximity and great cultural and spiritual distance, is the very subject of our conference and need not be elaborated at length. Still, a few salient moments ought to be noted. The most central of these is that in the course of the nineteenth century, Jewish society and Ukrainian society were both in the process of formulating their national consciousness, their very sense of political identity, and in so doing were consciously, or more often intuitively, focused on the fundamental issues of national existence and survival, on "first things first"; for both groups the relationship with the dominant political society, the Russian (or *mutatis mutandis* the Polish), overshadowed the question of relations with each other. (In the early modern period, the highly pre-secular cast of both societies made intellectual or

literary contact extremely unlikely. In Ukrainian literature, for example, apart from the occasional folkloristic or oral (*duma)* references, there is perhaps only one work that is extensively focused on Jews and Judaism. Characteristically, it is a huge polemical-religious tract, Ioannikii Galiatovsky's *Mesiia pravdyvyi* [The True Messiah, 1969].[2] In short, for much of the nineteenth century, the fact that both groups were politically subordinate, and, what is more important, largely saw themselves as such, did not at all serve to establish a sense of common cause, let alone close contacts. It goes without saying, of course, that a number of other causes, from the concretely economic to the more general and emotional moment of collective memory and grievances, and finally the very different cultural profile of each group, its system of values, tended to militate—in the absence of political necessity—against closer intellectual and cultural relations.

In the literary sphere, the limited nature of Jewish-Ukrainian relations becomes most apparent when contrasted with the situation that obtains in Polish and Russian literature. In a word, there is no analogue at all to the significant number of Jews participating in Polish literature, as belletrists and critics, not only in the twentieth, but in the nineteenth century as well.[3] And while in Russian literature that phenomenon was later in developing, it culminated in a broad range of writers and ultimately in the phenomenon of a Russian-Jewish literature as such;[4] and this too, of course, has no analogue in nineteenth-century Ukrainian literature. It does appear, to be sure, and it is indeed a significant factor in Ukrainian literature, but only after the Revolution of 1917, in the Soviet period. By the same token, for much of the nineteenth century, there are few if any developed or programmatic treatments, whether in belletristic form or literary criticism, of the Jewish problem; the equivalent of Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz's novel *Lejbe i Siora* (1820), which directly addressed the question of Jewish culture and religion and the future role of Jews in Polish society, is to be encountered—assuming that one can establish analogues—only at the end of the century. To the extent, of course, that such deliberations on the Jewish question in Polish and in Russian literature, for example in the publicistic writings of Dostoevsky, were often the occasion of outright anti-Semitism, their absence can hardly be regretted;[5] the fact of the gap remains, however, and must be accounted for in terms of the overall system of Ukrainian literature as it develops over the course of this period. Finally, it is more than evident that scarcely any comparison can be made between the quantity and quality of the scholarly and literary-historical treatments of the Jewish element in Russian and Polish literature on the one hand, and in the Ukrainian on the other.[6] In the case of the latter, except for a very few specialized studies,[7] the field lies totally fallow; there is not even a rudimentary overview of

the problem. Here again, the scholar's task, apart from simply filling in the gaps, is to examine the very absence of attention as part of a broader cultural problem.

These various difficulties and structured absences notwithstanding, however, the question of Jewish-Ukrainian relations as refracted through the prism of literature constitutes a very specific and in various aspects rather complex problem of Ukrainian literary history. And while in its overall dimensions the content is much smaller than its analogue in Polish and Russian literature, it is not at all insignificant.

My purpose here, of course, is not simply to trace and recapitulate the various depictions of Jews and Jewish subject matter, but rather by focusing on a selected number of representative works of differing artistic quality, to attempt a typology of such treatments. The scope of this paper, it goes without saying, precludes detailed analysis of individual works. Nor do I hope to encompass the entire field in the manner of V. Sypovsky's exhaustive survey of perceptions of Ukraine in Russian literature.[8] The focus on the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, is not merely a matter of convenience, but is determined by the fact that this period constitutes by far the most central moment in the problem here posed: prior to the nineteenth century there are too few literary (as opposed to folkloric or oral) texts to contemplate, while in Ukrainian literature of the post-1917 period the Jewish question, having become a conscious presence and being conditioned by a new political reality, is no longer so much a literary-cultural as a social and ideological phenomenon. My concern, in other words, is precisely with the way in which the shifting perceptions, in effect, the typology of the Jewish theme, corresponds with and throws light on some of the mechanisms of Ukrainian literary history. That these perceptions are often as much a product of collective and unconscious thought as of conscious values and conventions makes them all the more significant and revealing of this particularly literary process.

In the entire range of works under discussion we can distinguish three basic modalities of perceptions and narration, modalities which can also serve as a rough periodization of the Jewish theme. For lack of better terms I would call them the stereotypical, the social-moralizing or "realistic" and (the conjunction here may seem somewhat paradoxical) the political-ethical. These categories are largely diachronic; they do mark the rough phases of the theme, but they are not exclusive. Thus, while in the early part of the nineteenth century only the first mode will be in evidence, in the latter part all three may be found to co-exist. This co-existence, however—as is true of the appearance and duration of literary norms or "styles" in general—will be marked by differences of dominance/marginality, or simply, acceptability. In a word, reliance on, for

example, the stereotypical mode at the turn of the century will define the work—in terms of the system of the literature as a whole—as something old-fashioned or retrograde, or, more precisely, as belonging to low-brow or popular literature. By stating it in this fashion I do not intend to diminish the significance of the noticeable shift in attitudes, from negative to positive, in depictions of the Jew; here, the growth of tolerance and enlightenment is as real as it is welcome. My point, simply, is that in terms of literary history this is only a subset of the deeper changes in the literary system as a whole.

The first mode and phase is by its very nature the broadest, but at the same time its treatment of the Jews is invariably fragmentary and, of course, one-sided and more or less hostile. Here the stereotypes, reflecting as they do in each culture the group's collective thought, its conservatism and resistance to things alien, draw on popular tradition, on the one hand the images of the comical, often feckless and cowardly Jew of seventeenth-eighteenth century *intermedii,*[9] and on the other, which is more central here, folkloric and oral versions of historical events and experiences. An example of the latter is a *duma,* more precisely, a pseudo-*duma* published by Panteleimon Kulish, which tells how Jewish leaseholders (*zhydy-randari*), acting for the Polish nobles, proceeded to tax all aspects of Cossack life-road and river traffic, markets and, worst of all, churches.[10] That this was repeated in countless oral variations is hardly to be doubted. Perhaps the first literary-and, of course, generally historical—text in which this image and function of the Jews is codified, so to speak, is the *Istoriia Rusov,* an inspired and eloquent treatise masquerading as history. Its authorship and time of origin are unclear and still the subject of scholarly debate, but its effect on early nineteenth–century Ukrainian historical thought and literary imagination (it circulated in manuscript copies some twenty years prior to its publication in 1846) was *massive* indeed. The central focus of the early parts of the *Istoriia* are the cruelties and iniquities of Polish rule, and here the Jew functions as loyal executor and middleman. The single longest passage concerning the Jews, coming directly after the fictionalized account of Hetman Nalyvaiko's execution, describes with characteristic pathos the role of the Jews in effecting Polish persecution of Orthodoxy:

> The churches of those parishioners who did not accept the Union [with Rome] were leased to the Jews and for each service a fee of one/five talers was set, and for christenings and funerals a fee of one/four zlotys. The Jews, unreconciled enemies of Christianity, universal wanderers and outcasts, eagerly took to this vile source of gain and immediately removed the church keys and bell ropes to their taverns. At every Christian need the cantor was obliged to go to the Jew, haggle with him, and depending on the

> importance of the service, pay for it and beg for the keys. And the Jew meanwhile, having laughed to his heart's content at the Christian service, and having reviled all that the Christians hold dear, calling it pagan or, in their language, goyish, ordered the cantor to return the keys with the oath that no services that were not paid for had been celebrated.[11]

More than any moment, this image of the Jew holding the keys to a Christian church came to serve as a defining topos in both Ukrainian and Russian literary works on the historical theme. More generally, on the basis not only of the *Istoriia,*[12] but of other sources, historical as well as folkloric, Jews appear as Polish spies or agents, and even if they are simply go–betweens, with access to both sides, they are not to be trusted. This is largely the profile of Jankel in Gogol's *Taras Bulba* (1835; 1842). This depiction, as Kunitz correctly observes in his study, is marked by caricature and condescension, but not by malice as such; in contrast to various contemporary Great Russian writers who depict the Jew, Gogol, as a Ukrainian, so his argument goes, has real–life contact with Jews and is not guided by abstract hostility.[13] (This assumption of actual, first–hand knowledge of Jews requires, as we shall see, some rethinking.) By reason of Gogol's great talent and the popularity of *Taras Bulba* in particular, this model of the *historical* Jew became for many decades something of a standard presence, a commonplace, in fiction dealing with the Cossack past. It must be remembered, however, that already in Gogol's time this was a stock character; as noted by a contemporary critic in the *Moskovskii vestnik,* "These, [i.e., literary] Jews are in great fashion; they take their origin from Shakespeare's Shylock and Walter Scott's Isaac. He should be an omnipresent figure, to appear everywhere as a *deus ex machina*, to tie and untie all the knots of the plot. . . ."[14]

A variation on this theme, clearly written under the influence of Gogol, is found in Ie. Hrebinka's novel *Chaikovsky* (1843).[15] Here the Jew, Hercik, is a concealed villain and schemer who has pretended to be a Christian and who reveals himself for what he truly is only in a deathbed confession. The numerous, and for the most part artistically indifferent, variations on the theme of the Cossack past, for example, the novels of V. Korenevsky, M. Sementovsky, or A. Churovsky, predictably and conventionally portray the Jew either as *arendar* or Polish collaborator.[16] This narrowly circumscribed role becomes even more evident in dramatic works. In M. Kostomarov's *Pereiaslavska nich* (1841), which depicts, along with a melodramatic love plot, an uprising against the Poles, the Jew, Ovram, is fully stereotyped; the range of his functions does not vary an iota from the above model. His role consists of holding the keys to the church and haggling over payment, denouncing the Or-

thodox priest to the Polish lord, and bowing and scraping before the latter; he is contemptible in the eyes of both sides.

By far the best known stereotyped "historical" portrait of the Jew is the figure of Leiba in Shevchenko's *Haidamaky* (1841). As much as this character is a product of the stereotypical mode, the case here requires some qualification—of both content and context. For one, Shevchenko's Leiba is a fuller and considerably less negative character than the analogous figures encountered so far: he is abusive to his servant Iarema (who later becomes a *Haidamak*), and he does send the Polish (i.e., Bar) Confederates off to search for non-existent money at the Orthodox cantor's home, but he does so, clearly, under duress—to save himself from further whipping by the Poles; he is not simply the willing toady or spy of other contemporary depictions. Beyond that, despite the fact that the narrator's words (and as much as in any of Shevchenko's long poems the narrator does intervene here between the author and audience) are derogatory—he is for him a "zhyd pohanyi" and "zhydiura"—Leiba has specific, non-stereotypical, indeed redeeming features: he banters with and mocks his tormentors, and (under his breath, to be sure) curses them back. He is clearly not presented with utter hostility. More important, however, is the question of the fundamentally mythical mode of Shevchenko's poetry and the fact that for him collective representations, including specifically a whole gallery of types (e.g., the luckless, wandering Cossacks, the lovelorn maiden and so on) and stereotypes (of all outsiders—of Poles, Russians, Jews), are among the basic components and determinants of the poetic universe.[17] Thus, although much of early nineteenth-century Ukrainian literature attempts and purports to speak in the language (in the broad sense, i.e., including values, perceptions, etc.) of the people, in no writer is this so manifestly dominant as in the case of Shevchenko.[18] In other words, what is in most instances merely a stereotype, a conventional literary device, is here part of an overarching symbolic code and specifically part of the ongoing, multifarious oppositions between victimizers and victims.[19] To the extent that Leiba is both, he signals a real departure from the simple, two-dimensional stereotype.

A very different opposition is found in the writings of the second most important Ukrainian Romantic, Panteleimon Kulish. On the one hand, in such early works as his long poem *Ukraina* (1843), which attempts, in the form of the *duma*, to trace Ukrainian history from the time of the Mongol invasion to the time of Ostrianytsia and the Cossack rebellions against Poland, he speaks of the Jewish presence in Ukraine with even greater pathos and fervour, but in the same basic terms as the *Istoriia Rusov* and indeed the oral accounts that overtly serve as the model here.[20] It is the same Kulish, however, who in 1858 drafts a letter to the editors

of *Russkii vestnik* (one that is signed, along with him, by such prominent Ukrainian writers as M. Kostomarov, Marko Vovchok, M. Nomys, and Shevchenko), which protests against anti-Semitic comments in the journal *Illiustratsiia* and at the same time frankly states some harsh truths about relations between Ukrainians and Jews in the past:

> The Jews became, and could not help but become, sworn enemies of people of other religions who heaped abuse on their [Jewish] faith, their teachers, their temple schools and their sacred customs. Hampered everywhere by the laws themselves, the Jews unwillingly turned to slyness and trickery, and involuntarily sanctified by their religious teachings every unpunished evil which they were able to inflict upon the Christians. The Jews reached fanaticism in their hatred of Christians. However disturbing may be for us much of what we know of the Jews from reliable written and printed testimony, it can only serve as a measure of the evils to which the unfortunate descendants of Israel have been subjected for so long and so widely. On the other hand, experience proves very convincingly that the hatred of Christian nations toward the Jews has not led the latter to any good, and that only unhindered education and equality of civil rights can cleanse the Jewish nation of all that is hostile in it to the people of other faiths.

The Ukrainian voices raised in this issue, he continues,

> . . . are of particular importance in this affair, for they express the opinion on the Jewish question of that nation which more than the Great Russians and the Poles has suffered from the Jews, and in days gone by expressed its hatred toward the Jews in thousands of bloody victims. The [Ukrainian] people could not delve into the cause of the evil, vested not in the Jews but in the religious and civil order of Poland. [They] [a]venged [themselves] on the Jews with such simple-hearted conviction of the justice of bloodlettings, that [they] even glorified [their] terrible feats in [their] genuinely poetic songs.[21]

Three years later, in *Osnova*, even when polemicizing with the Jewish journal *Sion* concerning what Kulish—correctly, it seems to me—saw as *Sion*'s distortion and maligning of his argument,[22] he still maintains his earlier stance of seeking rapprochement and enlightenment and mutual respect in Ukrainian-Jewish relations. And yet there is a tension, an opposition in Kulish's views on this matter. It is rooted in his deeply Romantic conviction, a conviction he modified only late in his life, that the collective perception and memory of the people, the *narod*, contains and conveys, by its very nature, a higher, unimpeachable truth. His be-

lief in the moral value of the *narod* led him to accept its stereotypes as well. Thus, in an unfinished drama on the *Haidamaks, Kolii* (1860), he presents the Jewish innkeeper and his family in the traditional and stereotypical manner—as obsequious informers for the authorities, as simultaneously arrogant and cowardly. Thus, too, he published as editor of *Osnova*, under the highly revealing rubric of "z narodnikh ust" (from the lips of the people), a story by Mytrofan Aleksandrovych, "Zhydivska diaka" (Jewish gratitude), which, as we shall see, unabashedly elaborates on the existing stereotype. The final—and certainly most eloquent—break with this conviction, not concerning the moral value of the *narod*, but the veracity of its perceptions, comes in his bitterly polemical *Maliovana haidamachchyna* (The Haidamak Era in Pictures; 1876) in which he debunks all those, beginning with Shevchenko, who in his mind glorify mindless violence (particularly against Poles and Jews), primitive passions, bloodshed and the cult of ruins.

In overview, it appears that the prime characteristic of the stereotypical mode is the fact that the figure of the Jew is basically secondary and at times quite incidental to the narrative. Even if he plays the functional role of intermediary Jankel in (*Taras Bulba)* or mysterious villain (Hercik in Hrebinka's *Chaikovskyi*), he is not at centre stage. Just as his role is functional—to speed the plot, to illustrate the iniquities of the past—his character is formulaic, a stock convention. Since there is no interest in him as such, there is seldom if ever any depth to his character, and certainly no development; he is invariably a static figure, and for the most part (though not always) a figure drawn with only marginal reference to any social, economic or cultural context. He is more a function and a symbol than a person.

The second period in my schema presents a very different, and much more heterogeneous picture. The most fundamental intrinsic difference is that now the Jew is an object of interest in his own right; the depiction and evaluation of his role may vary widely, from the highly negative to the strongly positive, but he is no longer peripheral. Sociologically and historically speaking, the major difference is that it is only now, roughly beginning with the 1860s, that many Ukrainian writers begin to have actual, firsthand contacts with Jews. For despite some vague assumptions to the contrary (for example, Kunitz's on Gogol) the great majority of Ukrainian writers of the first half of the nineteenth century, including Gogol and the author of the *Istoriia Rusov,* coming as they did from Left-Bank Ukraine, which was beyond the Pale of Settlement, had no immediate experience of or contacts with Jews. Now, as a result of the policies of Alexander II, this was changing. Concurrently, the poetics of realist literature (which, to be sure, was much more qualified in the Ukrainian case than, say, the Russian one) did establish a new social and moral, or

rather moralizing focus. At the same time, the earlier traditions and conventions did not, of course, immediately die out, and we do see, especially at the outset, a continuation of stereotypical thinking.

A writer whose treatment of the Jewish theme seems to bridge the two modes is Stepan Rudansky, significantly, perhaps, a native of Podillia, in Right-Bank Ukraine. In the period 1857–9, while a student at the school of medicine and surgery in St. Petersburg, Rudansky wrote some 160 short anecdotal poems which he called "prykazky," but which are often, incorrectly, known as "spivomovky," the Ukrainian term he coined for poetry as such. Employing the traditional anecdotal short narrative (which most probably stems from the Baroque *intermedii*), and broadly subdivided as dealing with "Foreigners," "Natives" and "We, ourselves" *(Na chuzhykh, na svoikh, na sebe samykh)*, these poems constitute a kind of catalogue–encyclopedia of the variegated small-town and village life of his native Podillia: of Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, Russians, German and Gypsies; of peasants, merchants and soldiers; of priests, rabbis, noblemen and Cossacks; of tricksters and losers. The "prykazky" are often satiric and ironic, but their dominant tone is one of wry humour, and of a general sympathy for this motley crew of human beings. The picture of the Jew that emerges from the dozen or so anecdotes devoted to this group does draw on some stereotypical judgments, as regards his verbal cleverness, for example, or his "excessive" book-learning, or his fear of physical confrontation, but it is hardly a negative, let alone a hostile depiction. Like every other group in these poems, Jews divide into tricksters and those tricked, and the overall effect is of an impressionistic, if traditionally conceived sketch of a colourful segment of Ukrainian society. In contrast with Rudansky, the few poems that touch upon the Jews in *Vorsklo* and *Slobozhanshchyna*, two collections of Iakiv Shchoholiv that also survey various strata of society, are critical and bitter, focusing solely on the issue of economic exploitation.

In this period, this, in fact, becomes the first major leitmotif in the Jewish theme. In one of the first works that can be included here, the above-mentioned "Zhydivska diaka," we are told in the guise of a simple peasant's narrative the story of a poor Jew, Leiba, who arrives in the village without a penny to his name and who is set up in his business by a loan from a rich peasant, Maksym. Leiba refuses to pay his debt, and when Maksym, in frustration, takes a sack of grain from Leiba's cart to even the debt, he has Maksym arrested, and the latter—somewhat mysteriously, given the nature of the offence—loses all his property in trying to fight the charge in court, and ends up in Siberia. The tendentiousness of the story is as apparent as its artistic mediocrity: although the bulk of the account deals with the injustices of the law, the magistrates and the courts (prefiguring, it would seem, the utter helplessness of the

peasant Rzepowa of Sienkiewicz's *Szkice węglem)*, it is still the Jew who, judging by the title, is the prime villain. In fact, the programmatic and generalized nature of the accusation is apparent from the moment that we are told in the beginning of the story that the Jew "settled in in order to cheat and trick the people."[23] Thus, as in much of the preceding, the basis is a stereotype, but now it is in the service of ostensibly moral judgment and social protest.

Recourse to stereotypes when portraying the contemporary Jews was not confined to interior works. It appears, for example, in *Ne sudylos* (1883), generally considered to be the outstanding work of the major Ukrainian dramatist of that time, Mykhailo Starytsky. In this play, which satirically depicts the vanity and hypocrisy of part of the landed gentry in their relations with the peasants, the role of the Jew, Shlioma, is decidedly secondary and merely adumbrates his landlord (who, however, is a Ukrainian here); for that reason, perhaps, we are not overly surprised if he is a typical *orendar*—both scheming and contemptuous of the peasants. More developed, but thereby also still more negative, is the innkeeper Moshka Shpigel in Starytsky's *V temriavi* (1892) who, along with the major villains of the play, the rich peasant Kolomiichykha and the local administrations, ruthlessly exploits the poor peasants. The opposition is different here, not ethnic and religious, but economic, but it is as stock and unqualified as in any earlier treatment. A similar figure of an economic exploiter, though one that is not brutal but simply cunning, is found in Panas Myrmy's unfinished novella *Za vodoiu* (written in 1877–9 and reworked in the early 1880s by his brother I. Bilyk).

A marked development in the treatment of the Jewish theme comes with the writings of Ivan Franko. As already noted, his attention to Jews and Judaism, in his poetry, prose, translations and publicistic work, was massive. In this brief space I shall focus on only a few salient aspects. By far the most striking is his study of the Jewish capitalist Herman Goldkremer in in the novella *Boa Constrictor*, the first edition of which appeared in 1878, the second, with considerable revisions, in 1884, and the third, with even more changes, in 1907. It is a study very much under the influence of Zola, not only in its naturalist fascination with social and individual corruption, with the debilitating effects of environment and heredity, the socio-pathology of unbridled capitalist exploitation, and so on, but with the very possibility of making literature (Zola's notion of the "experimental novel") into an analogue of a laboratory, of testing and proving a "scientific" social thesis. (The very fact of the many redactions of this work, and Franko's returning to the same setting and character in his much longer, but still unfinished *Boryslav smiietsia* [1880], seems to bear this out.) But just as Zola's theory is touchingly naïve, so also is Franko's version of the capitalist and his world. From the central

and none too subtle metaphor of the boa constrictor (a painting of which hangs in the office of Herman and stimulates nightmarish visions), to the juxtaposition of Herman's poor but pure childhood as a peddler's assistant walking the healthy countryside collecting rags and his present urban existence as a millionaire, miserable with his insane wife, degenerate and homicidal son and guilty conscience, and finally to the ending (modified in the second version and deleted in the third version) where to assuage his guilt he secretly and at night hurls through a window money for the widow of a worker murdered by his subordinate, in all this there is more sentiment and melodrama than knowledge of the phenomenon he is purportedly analyzing. And yet though the morality is simplified and monochromatic, the Jew is not the object of righteous bias; for all the flaws in the social analysis, Herman figures in the work as a capitalist (and one not yet totally bereft of human values) who is—typically for that place and time—a Jew, and not as a Jew who is the quintessential exploiter. The short story *Do svitla* (1890), in which the highly sympathetic hero is a poor young Jew, unjustly imprisoned, is further evidence, if such is needed, that for Franko it was the social and moral and certainly not the religious or ethnic considerations that were of importance. In this work, too, there is much pathos—the young boy, thirsting for light by which to read is shot by a prison guard for standing too close to a window—but the moral issue is clear and, for some, the artistic effect is moving.

There is, however, one more work by Franko which demands our attention, and that is the novel *Perekhresni stezhky* (Crossroads; 1900). In his paper, Professor Rudnytsky cites at length from a long discourse by the novel's central Jewish character, the moneylender Vagman, and suggests that the ideas propounded by him are "the fullest formulation of Franko's thoughts concerning the Jewish question and Ukrainian-Jewish relations."[24] Now, to the extent that Vagman (like the hero of the novel, the Ukrainian lawyer Rafalovych) is in various respects, and undoubtedly in this context, a *porte parole* for the author, and to the extent that this work, like so much of Franko's prose, remains only belletricized social critique and political programme, this claim has a certain validity; the passages in question do constitute the most extensive, and intensive, cogitation on this problem that Franko offers in his artistic works. But certainly more than just this is involved here. The central, complicating factor, of course, is that the ideas and sentiments voiced in these passages are embedded in an artistic work that for all its extraliterary import and motivation is still determined by an imaginative vision, by literary conventions, patterns of association and, yes, symbolic moments that, taken cumulatively, thoroughly reshape the ostensibly clear-cut political and intellectual argument. While a more thorough examination of this

work must wait for another occasion, one can at least note some of these reconstituting or "distorting" structures. The most obvious and central one is that this work—in terms of narrative style, character portrayal and plot, in effect, in its genre—is a lurid and sentimental melodrama, replete with several murders (including the heroine's dispatching of her sadistic brute of a husband with mallet and cleaver—in a raging storm at that), madness and suicide, public scandals, assorted crimes, malfeasances and conspiracies, and a mysterious lady in black who turns out to be the hero's former love, and then is revealed as the long-suffering wife of his egregiously villainous former tutor and false friend, Stalsky. Vagman is cut from this same cloth. A self-professed usurer, reputed to have caused the ruin of many a man, he undergoes a radical transformation, becoming a kind of mix of good Shylock and financial Robin Hood. After his only son, by dint of the machinations of some local Polish noblemen, is drafted into the army and dies there, Vagman clandestinely turns his considerable resources and acumen to the tack of economically destroying the nobility, primarily by aiding their natural enemy, the Ukrainian peasants. The problem with this scenario is not its psychological and social implausibility; in fact, Vagman's transubstantiation from a ruthless "boa constrictor" to a secret supporter of the Ukrainian cause is as probable as any other melodramatic twist and turn of this story. The problem, of course, is that the easy manipulation of a sensational plot does not necessarily reflect deep structures of perception; the rhetorical and programmatic flourishes of Vagman's tirade notwithstanding, or, indeed, precisely because of them, the cause of Ukrainian-Jewish collaboration, or even mutual understanding, is shown to be wishful thinking, at best a distant dream.[25] It is most revealing that from the implicit Ukrainian respective, the Jewish side, apart from Vagman, is shown as economically hostile and politically duplicitous—with the *orendar* as the eternal enemy of the peasant, with his *shynok* as an infernal maw, with the collective behaviour of the Jews, vis-à-vis the Polish nobility above them and the Ukrainian peasants below them, as cowardly and opportunistic.[26] In short, while Vagman's—in effect, the author's—words do carry political and moral validity, the actual Jewish-Ukrainian relations are again perceived by Franko as all but exclusively determined by large, impersonal socio-economic forces.

The discovery of the Jew as a possible, sympathetic hero, indeed as a fellow sufferer, is reflected in a number of works appearing at the turn of the century. In some short stories of Modest Levytsky, for example, "Shchastia Peisakha Leidermana" or "Porozhnim khodom," the author's general concern with the little people, the poor and the downtrodden, turns its focus on Jewish characters who are remarkable only for

their simple humanity. In Tymofii Borduliak's short story "Bidnyi zhydok Ratytsia" (1899), the issue is broader and the focus is sharper. While the poor fishmonger Ratytsia is becoming progressively more pauperized, just like the rest of the village in which he lives, the author's concern is not just with showing his misery, but also the empathy of the peasant community for a member—and albeit different, he is indeed a member—who, paradoxically, finds it harder than others to survive in the hard times that have come. Whether this is historically and statistically probable is quite beside the point; the central structure of the literary fiction being conjured up here is the possibility of finding a sense of universal humanity—concretely, not abstractly. As the peasants gather around his frozen body one says, "A quiet Jew was that Ratytsia . . . a peaceable man, never muddied another man's waters," and another adds, "Yes, our Jew, the community's *(Nash-taky zhydok, hromadskyi . . .*).[27]

A much less positive picture of the surrounding Ukrainian peasant community, but, if anything, an even more sympathetic treatment of the Jewish protagonist is found in I. Tohobochny's melodrama *Zhydivka-vykhrestka* (1907), a play about Sarah, a Jewish girl who forsakes her religion to marry a Christian and then takes her own life in despair when he abandons her for a former lover. This play, which had many editions and stagings and was popular in Galicia well into the 1920s and 1930s, is quite remarkable both for the way in which it bares the prejudice and ignorance of the community (for example, the discussion between two old women whether the Jewess has a soul) and the way in which it establishes sympathy for the Jewish characters, not just Sarah, but her unforgiving, mad, Lear-like father. Here we see most clearly that nothing so establishes the sense of common humanity as the experience of victimization.

By way of transition to our final group of works I should mention a subset of the Jewish theme that does not figure in the scheme I have proposed, i.e., works translating, paraphrasing or generally drawing on the Bible. This, too, of course, is a way of finding a universal and sacred common ground, and the list of writers turning to this source is significant indeed—Shevchenko and Kulish, Fedkovych, Franko, Lesia Ukrainka and others. But it is clear that the biblical theme, even when it has specific references to the Israelites, remains in the domain of the sacred, the allegorical, the distanced, and is very seldom compounded with an understanding or perception of contemporary Jews, or those of recent history. An important exception here is Franko's major long poem "Moisei" (1893–1905), a work which not only closely elaborates the parallel between the biblical Jews of Moses' time and the benighted,

leaderless Ukrainians of Franko's time, but a work at whose origins lie Franko's recently documented contacts with Theodor Herzl.[28] As such it deserves special attention.

The works to which we turn now reflect not only a new sophistication in the treatment of the Jewish theme but, first and foremost, a maturation and differentiation in Ukrainian literature itself. Each of them, in articulating a new, heretofore unprecedented moral sensitivity to the Jewish problem is also drawing on recent, traumatic political events, specifically the Revolution of 1905 and the accompanying waves of pogroms. Undoubtedly, the most successful aesthetically is Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky's "Vin ide," a short story, subtitled "a picture," in which the unchallenged master of impressionist prose creates uncannily real images of a pogrom on the verge of breaking out, images that draw their strength from imperceptible shifts between a coldly objective and a totally subjective, indeed hyperaesthetic, mode of perception. The resultant effects of depersonalization, of egosplit, make the experience stunningly resonant. Thus, Kotsiubynsky's story works not just through intellectual and emotional compassion, but above all through the power of his imagination, and in that it establishes the bond of common experience.

Hnat Khotkevych's drama *Lykholittia* and Volodymyr Vynnychenko's drama *Dysharmoniia*, both published in 1906, are each a programmatic statement on the Jewish question and the central role it assumed at that juncture of Ukrainian history. For both writers it is manifestly clear that *volens nolens* the Jew and the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the progressive forces, are allied. Indeed, in the eyes of the Black Hundred all of the Left, all the intelligentsia, all the students are by definition "Jews." This identification, however, is not merely imposed by the reactionary enemy—it is accepted as a political and ethnical choice and dramatized in different ways, for Khotkevych by the fact that the hero, Borys, is engaged, despite his father's objections, to a Jewish girl and for Vynnychenko by the central role of the Jewess, Liia, in her group of revolutionaries. While both writers share the same political and ethnical stance—of the solidarity of both groups, of their commitment to revolutionary change—they differ greatly in their understanding of the aftermath. For Khotkevych, the pogroms and the failed revolution are not only a political setback, a great human tragedy made emblematic by the death of the hero, Borys, but also a noble legacy of common effort and common martyrdom. By virtue of a beckoning ideal order, the tragedy and sacrifice is made meaningful. Vynnychenko, however, is much more sombre in his analysis. Liia, who at the outset had spoken of herself as both a Ukrainian and a Jew, finds such an identification impossible after witnessing the horrors of a pogrom. Indeed, she leaves the party and announces that as a Jew she must be with her people and that in the moment of trial the ideal

of solidarity has been exposed as a fiction. Like virtually all the characters in the play, she loses her faith in her erstwhile ideals and her sense of harmony with herself. And yet, despite the pessimism of this work, Vynnychenko makes no concessions to the possibility—i.e., the political and ethical validity—of renewed Jewish-Ukrainian enmity. In fact, in probably his best drama, *Mizh dvokh syl* (1919), where the incompatibility of Bolshevism and the Ukrainian national cause is made tragically clear, Ginsberg, the Jewish leader of the Bolsheviks, remains a positive character to the end. At least in this symbolic way, Vynnychenko refuses to turn the clock back on history.

The paucity of scholarship on the subject and the admittedly provisional nature of this overview prevent us from formulating any broad, synthesizing conclusions. One can observe, however, that in its rough outlines the Jewish theme, while in various respects reflecting overall political and socio-cultural developments, also casts light on the intrinsic literary process. In short, when viewed over the course of the nineteenth century, it shows Ukrainian literature breaking out of the confines of populism (and, indeed, in its initial stages, of nativism) and attaining a long-awaited differentiation. With this differentiation, of course, also comes an unprecedented degree of maturity and understanding.

NOTES

1. Cf. G. Grabowicz, "The History of Polish-Ukrainian Literary Relations: A Literary and Cultural Perspective," *Poland and Ukraine Past and Present* (Edmonton-Toronto 1980), and "Ukrainian-Russian Literary Relations in the Nineteenth Century (A Formulation of the Problem)," forthcoming.
2. Although a quintessential example of Ukrainian Baroque scholasticism, it is surprisingly rich in its depictions of Jewish life and history.
3. Cf., for example, A. Hertz, *Żydzi w kulturze polskiej* (Paris 1961).
4. Cf. V. Lvov-Rogachevsky, *A History of Russian-Jewish Literature* (Ann Arbor 1979).
5. In the case of Niemcewicz the philo-Semitism of *Lejbe i Siora* is countered by the anti-Semitism of his *Moszkopolis. Rok 3333, czyli sen niesłychany* (1817).
6. Cf. Lvov-Rogachevsky, *History of Russian-Jewish Literature*, or J. Kunitz, *Russian Literature and the Jew* (New York 1929); cf. also Hertz, *Żydzi w kulture polskiej*.
7. See P. Kudriavtsev, "Ievreistvo, ievrei ta ievreiska sprava u tvorakh Ivana Franka," *Zbirnyk prats Ievreiskoi istorychno-arkheohrafichnoi komisii* (Kiev 1928), 2: 1–81.
8. V. Sypovsky, *Ukraina v rosiiskomu pysmenstvi* (Kiev 1928).
9. Cf. *Ukrainski intermedii XVII–XVIII st.* (Kiev 1960).
10. P. Kulish, *Zapiski o Iuzhnoi Rusi*, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg 1856–57), 2: 58; cited again in Kulish's article in *Osnova*, no. 6 (1861): 134–42.
11. *Istoriia Rusov* (New York 1956), 59.

12. Ibid., 74 and 146.
13. Kunitz, *Russian Literature and the Jew,* 35–42.
14. Cited in V. Gippius, *Gogol* (Leningrad 1924), 70.
15. The argument for considering these works and these and other writers as part of Ukrainian literature is developed at length in my paper on Ukrainian-Russian literary relations; cf. also my "Three Perspectives on the Cossack Past: Gogol', Ševčenko, Kuliš," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* 5, no. 2 (1981).
16. Cf. Sypovsky, *passim*.
17. See G. Grabowicz, *The Poet as Mythmaker: A Study of Symbolic Meaning in Taras Ševčenko* (Cambridge 1982).
18. In his poetry, of course, not his prose. Cf. Chapter I, ibid.
19. Ibid., Chapter III.
20. Cf. the ending of the tenth *duma*.
21. Cited in R. Serbyn, "Ukrainian Writers on the Jewish Question: In the Wake of the *Illiustratsiia* Affair of 1858," *Nationalities Papers* 9, no. 1, 99–103. See also J. D. Klier, "The *Illiustratsiia* Affair of 1858: Polemics on the Jewish Question in the Russian Press," *Nationalities Papers* 5, no. 2, 117–35.
22. I.e., by asserting that he saw the Jewish question in strictly nationalistic terms and thus saw no room for anyone but Ukrainians in Ukraine; cf. *Sion*, no.10 (1861). See also *Osnova*, nos. 6 and 9 (1861).
23. *Osnova*, no. 9 (1861): 74.
24. I. L. Rudnytsky, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Nineteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Thought," p. 79–81.
25. The willingness of Kudriavtsev *(op. cit.,* 62–3 and 79–81 and before him apparently Iefremov (cf. his *Ivan Franko,* Kiev 1926) to take Vagman and his stance "seriously," i.e., as fully reflecting Franko's understanding of the Jewish problem and constituting the sociological core of the work, reveals the same reductive and naive reading of the text.
26. Cf. I. Franko, *Zibrannia tvoriv v piatdesiaty tomakh* (Kiev 1979), 20: 288, 312–14 and passim.
27. T. Borduliak, *Tvory* (Kiev 1958), 123–4.
28. See A. Wilcher, "Ivan Franko and Theodor Herzl: To the Genesis of Franko's *Mojsej,*" *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 6, no. 2 (June 1982): 233–43.

Alexander Malycky

Soviet Ukrainian Translations of Yiddish Literature

When Vasyl Atamaniuk included in his anthology of Ukrainian translations of a dozen Soviet Yiddish poets a bibliography of Ukrainian translations of Yiddish literature, he was able to cite only one Soviet book and only a handful of translations in periodicals.[1] Several reasons could be suggested for the paucity of Yiddish literature available to the Ukrainian reading public as late as the early 1920s. First, in most of Ukraine (until recently under the control of the tsarist regime), the Russian authorities prohibited the use of Ukrainian in print. Second, Yiddish had only recently been accepted as a full-fledged vehicle of creative writing by both Jews and non-Jews alike. Third, there was a lack of skilled translators who knew Yiddish and Ukrainian well enough to offer adequate, let alone good, translations. Finally, there still prevailed a lack of interest in Yiddish literature among the Ukrainians, combined with a disinterest on the part of the Jews in enabling the Ukrainians to become acquainted with Yiddish literature.

The next listing of book editions of Yiddish literature published in Soviet Ukraine appeared almost four decades later in the 1960 bibliography of all creative literature published in Ukraine, compiled by O. O. Maiboroda, H. D. Ruban and O. O. Starchenko.[2] By then several important events had taken place. First, the intensive development of Soviet Yiddish creative literature and culture; second, the destruction of Jewish cultural institutions in the late 1930s (which in a sense forboded the fate that was to befall this literature after the Second World War);

third, the silencing of Yiddish literature as a result of this war; fourth, its short revival in the immediate postwar years; fifth, the massacre of most of the foremost authors of Soviet Yiddish literature by Stalin and; finally, the disappearance of any Soviet publication in Yiddish that lasted until the late 1950s.

This bibliography lists, for the period between 1917 and 1957, 758 book editions (volumes) written by 58 authors of Yiddish creative literature.[3] Of them, 551 titles (72.7 per cent) are in Yiddish, and 207 titles (27.3 per cent) represented translations from Yiddish into six languages. In particular, 157 titles (20.7 per cent), by 39 authors (67.2 per cent of all the authors) are translations into Ukrainian;[4] forty-four titles (5.8 per cent)—translations into Russian; two titles (0.25 per cent)—translations into German; two titles (0.25 per cent)—translations into Moldavian; one title (0.1 per cent)—translation into Bulgarian; and one title (0.1 per cent)—translation into Polish.

The material presented in this 1960 bibliography was by no means complete. This is evidenced by the Yiddish literature offered in the next bibliography, published in 1969, almost a decade later.[5] The latter lists 943 book editions (volumes). This represents the works of individual authors and twelve anthologies (the latter category being included now for the first time; ten of them are in Yiddish, while two offer Ukrainian translations; several authors are represented only in them, but their exact number could not be ascertained because of the inaccessibility of most of these anthologies). However, inasmuch as this 1969 bibliography left out four authors listed in the 1960 bibliography[6] (with their total of eleven book editions, all in Yiddish; the omission of those authors might have been because they were proscribed at that time by the Soviets—this would have to be ascertained by those specializing in the history of Soviet Yiddish literature) as well as six book editions by authors who were otherwise retained,[7] there are eighty-seven authors with individual publications accounted for.

The total of the authors who were added now stands at twenty-nine (their works fall almost entirely into the period covered by the 1960 bibliography,[8] as do also all twelve anthologies) and the number of book editions on record was 907 volumes.[9] Six hundred and fifty-two of them (71.9 per cent) are in Yiddish while the translations from Yiddish, into six languages, account for 255 volumes (28.1 per cent). The latter group comprises the translations of works by fifty-two individual authors (62.7 per cent of all the authors) into Ukrainian (i.e., thirteen authors[10] more than in the 1960 bibliography, but a drop of 4.5 per cent); the two anthologies of translation into Ukrainian and four unlisted authors otherwise unrepresented,[11] totalling 199 volumes (22.0 per cent, i.e., an increase of 1.3 per cent by comparison with the data of the 1960 bibliography), and

furthermore, fifty volumes (5.5 per cent)—of translations into Russian; two volumes (0.2 per cent)—into German; two volumes (0.2 per cent)—into Moldavian; one volume (0.1 per cent)—into Bulgarian; and one volume (0.1 per cent)—into Polish. In terminating the discussion of the 1969 bibliography, one should note that its incorporation of so much material which should have been included in the 1960 bibliography points to the haste (or carelessness) with which the Yiddish literature section of the latter was being prepared.

Data for the subsequent years (1967–79) were obtained from the yearly bibliographies of works published by the writers of Ukraine which have been appearing, since 1969, in the yearbook *Literatura i suchasnist* [*Literature and Present Times*], in Kiev; and from the yearbook *Ezhegodnik knigi SSSR* [*Yearbook of the Book of the USSR*], published in Moscow,[12] as well as on the basis of editions available for inspection. These sources add six new authors to our list, thus yielding a total of ninety-three authors of Yiddish creative literature whose individually published works have appeared in Soviet Ukraine (and evacuated Soviet Ukrainian publishing houses) between 1920 and 1979. All six of these new authors have translations into Ukrainian.[13] In addition, one of the authors who earlier had no Ukrainian translations, acquired one now,[14] thus bringing the total of all authors of Yiddish creative literature with individually published Soviet Ukrainian translations to fifty-nine. To writers represented with Ukrainian translations of their works only in anthologies, one more author can also now be added,[15] thus bringing the total in this category to five.

All forty of the book editions that appeared in Ukraine between 1966 and 1979 were translations from Yiddish:[16] thirty-two volumes into Ukrainian and eight into Russian. By adding these figures to our hitherto obtained statistics, we arrive at the following data. By the end of the 1970s, 946 book editions (volumes) of Yiddish creative literature had been published in Soviet Ukraine. Of these, 652 volumes (68.9 per cent) appeared in Yiddish, and 294 volumes (31.1 per cent) were translations into six languages. Of the latter, 230 volumes were translations into Ukrainian (24.3 per cent, an increase of 2.3 per cent over the figures of the 1969 bibliography; they were written by sixty-four authors, fifty-nine of them listed with individually published works in the bibliographies, and five unlisted there and represented only in the three anthologies); fifty-eight volumes were translations into Russian (6.2 per cent); two volumes translations into German (0.2 per cent); two volumes, translations into Moldavian (0.2 per cent); one volume, a translation into Bulgarian (0.1 per cent); and one volume, a translation into Polish (0.1 per cent).

With respect to the volume of Ukrainian translations, as far as the individual authors are concerned, the dominant figure is Sholem Aleichem,

who alone accounts for thirty-nine volumes of translations.[17] He is followed, by Lev (or Leib) Kvitko, who has twenty-two volumes of translations.[18] Furthermore, there are still two authors with more than ten translations: Khana Levina with fifteen translations,[19] and Khaim Hildin with twelve.[20] There follows Abram Kahan with nine titles.[21] M. Daniel[22] and Matvii Talalaievsky[23] have seven translations each. Faivl Sito[24] and Khanan Vainerman[25] have six translations each. Ikhil Falikman[26] and Mendele Mocher Seforim[27] have five translations each (the latter surprisingly few). Seven authors show four titles each: Moier Alberton,[28] Riva Baliasna,[29] Davyd Hofshtein (surprisingly few for him),[30] Dora (or Debora) Khaikina,[31] Isak Kipnis,[32] Iosyp Kotliar[33] and Noiiakh H. Lurie.[34] Nine authors have three titles each: Davyd Berhelson,[35] B. Erkes,[36] Itsyk Fefer,[37] Beniamin Hutiansky,[38] Note Lurie,[39] Hershl Orliand,[40] Itskhok Peters (surprisingly few translations for him),[41] Mykhailo Pinchevsky[42] and Hryhorii Polianker.[43] Eight authors account for two translations each. They are: Petro Altman,[44] Betsalel Borzhes,[45] Iosyp Bukhbinder,[46] Matvii Hartsman,[47] Aron Kushnirov,[48] Miriam Marholina,[49] Elia Shekhtman[50] and Abram Veviuko.[51] A large group of twenty-one authors have one translation each: Moisei Aronsky,[52] Shloime Cherniavsky,[53] Der Nister,[54] A. Hindes,[55] Perets Hirshbein,[56] Shymon Holdenberh,[57] Abram Hontar,[58] Avram Katsev,[59] Petro Kyrychansky,[60] Perets Markich,[61] Khaim Melamud,[62] Mykhailo Mohylevych,[63] Abram Reizin,[64] Lipe Rieznik (or Reznik),[65] Motl Shapiro,[66] Nekhemie Shmain,[67] Osher Shvartsman,[68] Khaskel Tabachnykov,[69] Moishe Taitsh,[70] I. Vaisenberh[71] and Semen Vilensky.[72] Finally, Samuil Helmond and Hryhorii Diiamant share a book edition,[73] and Moisei Khashchevatsky shared an edition with Shymon Holdenberh (who also had a translation of his own, listed above).[74] The three anthologies offer Ukrainian translations of thirteen authors in 1923, twenty-three authors in 1948, and thirty authors in 1976.[75]

The proportion of works published in the original Yiddish to works published in Ukrainian translation is different for each writer. In the case of several authors, their Ukrainian translations outnumber their works in Yiddish. Thus, Falikman has five Ukrainian translations and two editions in Yiddish; Levina has fifteen Ukrainian translations and twelve editions in Yiddish; and Hildin has twelve Ukrainian translations and eleven editions in Yiddish. Others have the same number of Yiddish and Ukrainian editions. Vainerman, for instance, has six of each, and Borzhes has two of each. For some authors the number of their Ukrainian translations is very close to that of their works in Yiddish, as is the case with Talalaievsky, who has seven Ukrainian translation and eight books in Yiddish, or with Alberton, who has four Ukrainian translations and six works in Yiddish. Other authors, on the other hand, have had few or

none of their works translated into Ukrainian. There are no Ukrainian translations for Bloshtein (who has eighteen Yiddish editions), Abchuk and Spektor (with nine Yiddish works each), Kassel (with six Yiddish works), and Abarbanel, Lopatin and Tabachnykov (with five Yiddish editions each), whereas Khashchevatsky, (who published fourteen Yiddish works), Markish (who published eleven), Hontar (who published nine), Der Nister (who published eight) and Reiznik (who published seven) have each had only one Ukrainian translation. Fefer shows three Ukrainian translations to his twenty-seven Yiddish books. Also, a number of authors with few book editions have no Ukrainian translations.

With respect to the chronological distribution, there are no Ukrainian translations in the period 1917–20, which are covered by both the 1960 and the 1969 bibliographies. The reason is that Soviet sources disregard the existence of the independent Ukrainian state during that period.

In the 1920s, Ukrainian translations appeared for the most part in the last two years of the decade (seven titles for each year).[76] One translation of stories by Peters appeared in 1920 (the first Soviet Ukrainian translation), and Alemaniuk's anthology was published in 1923. Thus, we have a total of sixteen titles for this decade.

With 121 book editions, the 1930s constitute *the* decade for Ukrainian translations. The most prolific year was 1930—it boasts forty-six translations![77] The least productive one was the year of the great famine, 1933, with only two titles.[78] During the other years of the decade the production ranged between five and thirteen titles per year: twelve in 1931,[79] ten in 1932,[80] nine in 1934,[81] seven in 1935,[82] thirteen in 1936,[83] nine in 1937,[84] eight in 1938,[85] and five in 1939.[86]

In the 1940s, due to the war and the persecution of Jewish culture by the Soviets in the last years of the decade, the translation figures dropped to twenty-nine titles. But even during the war, Ukrainian translations appeared, very sparingly, in Soviet Ukrainian publishing houses evacuated eastward, so that only one year, 1942, shows no Ukrainian translation. Seven translations appeared in 1940,[87] six in 1941,[88] one each in 1943, 1944 and 1945,[89] two in 1946,[90] six in 1947,[91] four in 1948[92] and one in 1949.[93]

The ban on Yiddish was lifted in the USSR toward the end of the 1950s, but some Ukrainian translations had appeared earlier—one each in 1950, 1955, 1956 and 1957.[94] The years 1951–4 remained empty, and the publication tempo picked up somewhat only toward the end of the decade: eight translations appeared in 1958,[95] and three in 1959.[96] The total for this decade is thus fifteen publications.

There was a slight increase in the 1960s in that twenty-eight Ukrainian translations appeared in this decade: two each in 1960, 1961 and 1963,[97] three in 1962,[98] none in 1964, four each in 1965 and 1968,[99] five each in

1966 and 1967,[100] and one in 1969.[101]

And, finally, the 1970s show a further decline by accounting for only twenty-one titles: three each in 1970, 1972 and 1976,[102] two each in 1971, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1979,[103] and one each in 1977 and 1978.[104]

In summing up, it can be stated that in the USSR the effort of publishing in book form Ukrainian translations of works of Yiddish creative literature has been very large indeed, both in terms of the number of authors represented (sixty-four) and in the number of volumes published (230). Virtually all of these translations were published in Ukraine. They began to appear in the late 1920s, probably because of the time needed for overcoming the shock of the tragic events that marred Ukrainian-Jewish relations before 1920. In the 1930s, this translation activity underwent a tremendous expansion, but it has since been in decline. The body of the translated literature however, bears eloquent witness to an intense and fruitful co-operation between Ukrainians and Jews.

NOTES

1. V. Atamaniuk, "Pokazhchyk perekladiv iz ievreiskoi na ukrainsku movy [A Listing of the Translations from the Yiddish into the Ukrainian Language]," in his *Nova ievreiska poeziia Antologiia* [The New Yiddish Poetry: An Anthology] di neye idishe poezie [The New Yiddish Poetry] (Kiev 1923), 33–4. His listing contains the translations of the works of eleven authors of creative literature. Seven of these works appeared in book form and ten of them, or selections thereof, in periodicals and miscellanies (four of the latter during the Soviet times).
2. O. O. Maiboroda, H. D. Ruban, and O. O. Starchenko, comps. "Ievreiska literatura [Yiddish Literature]," in their *Khudozhnia literatura vydana na Ukraini za 40 rokiv, 1917–1957. Bibliohrafichnyi pokazhchyk* [Creative Literature Published in Ukraine in the Course of forty years, 1917–1957. A bibliographical listing]. Part 2. *Rosiiska khudoznia literatura, literatura inshykh narodiv SRSR, literatura zarubizhnykh kraiin* [Russian Creative Literature, Literature of Other Peoples of the USSR, Literature of Foreign Countries] (Kharkiv 1960), 323–64.
3. Forty-two titles listed in this bibliography (twenty-six of them in Ukrainian and sixteen in Russian) are not considered in this paper, since they are not listed as translations from Yiddish. The inaccessibility of these titles themselves makes it impossible to ascertain whether they represent translations from Yiddish (but the note to this effect is left out by mistake), or whether they are works written originally in either Ukrainian or Russian (titles of both—works that appeared in Yiddish and of the translations from Yiddish into Ukrainian—are given in this and in the subsequently cited bibliography in Ukrainian). This does not apply to the titles for which corrections were entered in the subsequent bibliography. The Ukrainian titles of this group are: Der Nister, *Kazky* (Kharkiv-Odessa 1936); I. Fefer, *Vitchyzna v boiu* ([Voronezh] 1942); M. D. Hartsman, *Poezii ta balady* (Kiev 1940); M. Hartsman, M. A.

Talalaievsky, M. Bazhan, et al., *Duma pro Ostapa Nechaia* (Kiev 1938); Kh. Hildin, *U nas v kraini traven* ([Khrakiv] 1932); D. N. Hofshtein, *V nashi hrizni dni* ([Voronezh] 1942); L. M. Kvitko, *Liam i Petryk* (Kharkiv 1931); idem, *Lyst* tovaryshu Voroshylovu (Kharkiv 1935); idem, *Pisni ta kazky* ([Kharkiv] 1937); idem, *Pisni ta kazky* ([Kharkiv] 1939); idem, *Pro Chervonu Armiiu* ([Kiev] 1939); J. S. Kotliar, *Vesnianyi dar* (Odessa 1941); Kh. M. Levina, *Druzhba* ([Kiev] 1940); idem, *Na soniachnii storoni* (Kharkiv-Odessa 1935); idem, *Vilia* (Kharkiv-Odessa 1936); H. Orliand, *Molodshyi brat* ([Ufa] 1942); M. I. Pinchevsky, *Iura* (Kharkiv-Odessa 1936); H. Polianker and R. Baliasna, *Kalinindorfski narysy* (Kiev, 1938); F. S. Sito, *Z vulytsi* (Kharkiv-Odessa 1931); M. A. Talalaievsky, *Tvoi syny* (Kiev 1949); idem, *Vid shchyroho sertsia* (Kiev: 1938); Sholem-Aleichem, *Dva antysemity* ([Kharkiv] [1928]); idem, *Etap: Nimets* ([Kiev] [1928]); idem, *Himnaziia* (Kharkiv [1930]); idem, *Meni dobre—ia syrota* (Kharkiv 1930); and idem, *Nivroku* (Kharkiv 1930).

4. P. S. Altman, R. N. Baliasna, D. R. Berhelson, M. Daniel, Der Nister, B. Erkes, I. Sh. Falikman, I. Fefer, M. D. Hartsman, Kh. Hildin, A. Hindes, P. L. Hirshbein, D. N. Hofshtein, A. Iu. Hontar, A. Ia. Kahan, I. N. Kipnis, S. Kotliar, A. D. Kushnirov, L. M. Kvitko, Kh. M. Levina, Noiiakh H. Lurie, Note M. Lurie, P. D. Markish, Mendele Mocher Seforim, H. Orliand, I. L. Perets, M. I. Pinchevsky, H. I. Polianker, A. Reizin, L. B. Rieznik, M. Shapiro, E. Shekhtman, N. Shmajin, Sholem-Aleichem, F. S. Sito, M. Taitsh, M. A. Talalaievsky, Kh. A. Vainerman and A. V. Veviurko. In the case of M. Shapiro, the translation was from Russian, presumably a Russian translation of a work written in Yiddish: *Dilovi mriinyky* (Kiev 1948).
5. "Ievreiska literatura [Yiddish Literature]," in *Spivdruzhnist Literatur. Bibliohrafichnyi pokazhchyk, 1917–1966* [The Inter-Friendship of Literatures: Bibliographical Listing, 1917–1966] (Kharkiv 1969), 349–82.
6. Davyd Moiseiovych Bendas (1896–1953), Sh. Brehman, Aizyk Shmulevych Huberman (1906-) and N. Rozovsky.
7. Among these titles were two translations from Yiddish into Moldavian, possibly because they appeared in Moldavia, which at the time of their publication was an autonomous republic within the Ukrainian SSR.
8. Only four of the works of those writers were published between 1958 and 1966; ninety-nine volumes appeared between 1917 and 1957.
9. In addition, this bibliography lists eight titles which are not marked as translations (seven of them in Ukrainian and one in Russian) and which are excluded from present consideration because of the conditions that applied also for publications listed in note 5. The Ukrainian titles of this group include: D. Kassel, *Boiove khreshchennia (Meirka z "Maloho Bundu"* (Kharkiv 1929); idem, *Boiove khreshchennia (Meirka z "Maloho Bundu"*, 2d ed. (Kharkiv 1930); K. H. Melamud, *Hlybochok* (Kiev 1962); M. I. Burbak [Ukrainian writer] and K. H. Melamud, *Za Prutom, u Sadhori* (Stanislav [now Ivano-Frankivsk] 1960); V. Kulichenko [Ukrainian writer?], M. Spektor and L. Iuzefovych [Ukrainian writer?], *Postyshevska ialynka* (Kharkiv-Odessa 1936); M. A. Talalaievsky, *Piesy* (Kiev 1958); and idem, *Sertse materi* (Kiev 1962).
10. Four of these authors (M. A. Aronsky, I. Sh. Bukhbinder, Sh. A. Holdenberh and O. M. Shvartsman) were already represented in the 1960 bibliography without having any Ukrainian translations there; the remaining nine authors (M. J. Alberton, B. Borzhes, H. D. Diiamant, H. D. Helmond, B. S. Hutiansky, D. H. Khaikina, M. Marholina, I. Vaisenbern and S. D. Vilensky) are new.
11. Jona Hruber, M. Kobriansky, H. Kosoi and Abram Veliednitsky. Hruber wrote otherwise in German.

12. Neither yearbook was totally reliable, and both left a number of book editions unreported.
13. Sh. Cherniavsky, A. Katsev, P. Kyrychansky, Kh. H. Melamud, M. Mohylevych and Kh. Kh. Tabachnykov.
14. M. I. Khashchevatsky.
15. Volf Vernik.
16. For several decades now, Soviet books in Yiddish have been published mostly in Moscow. No Yiddish book has appeared in Soviet Ukraine since the 1940s.
17. *Adel* (Kharkiv 1930); *Himnazii* (Kharkiv 1930); *Idy sobi* (Kharkiv 1930); *Iosyp* (Kharkiv 1930); *Komedii* (Kharkiv 1929); *Lykhi pryhody Menakhem-Mendelii* (Odessa 1929); *Mandrivni zirky* (Kiev 1963); *Mii pershyi roman* ([Kharkiv] [1928]); *Nimets* (Kharkiv [1929]); *Nozhyk* ([Kiev] 1941); *Nozhyk* (Kiev 1958); *Opovidannia* (Kiev 1947); *Pisniia pisen* (Kharkiv 1930); *Porada* ([Kiev 1928]); *Porada* (Kharkiv 1930); *Potop* ([Kiev] [1928]); *Shistdesiat shist* (Kharkiv [1930]); *Simdesiat piat tysiach* (Kharkiv-Kiev 1930); *Slovo po slovo* (Kharkiv 1930); *To brekhnia; Cherez shapku* (Kharkiv 1930); *Try kalendari* ([Kharkiv] [1930]); *Trynadtsiat spoluchenykh shtativ* ([Kharkiv] [1928]); *Tvory v chotyrokh tomakh* (Kiev 1967–68); *U likaria* (Kharkiv 1930); *Velyka udacha* ([Kharkiv] 1930); *Vitaite, my vzhe v Amerytsi* (Kharkiv 1930); *Vybrane* (Kiev 1959); *Vybrani tvory* (Kharkiv 1930); *Vybrani tvory,* vol. 1 ([Odessa] 1932); *Vybrani tvory,* vol. 2, 2d ed. (Odessa 1932); *Vybrani tvory* (Kiev 1939); *Vybrani tvory* (Kiev 1940); *Vybrani tvory* (Kiev 1948); *Vyhrashnyi kvytok* (Kharkiv 1930); *Z iarmarku* (Kiev 1941); and *Z pryzovu* (Kharkiv 1931).
18. *Dva tovaryshi* (Kharkiv-Odessa 1932); *Dva tovaryshi (Liam i Petryk)* (Kharkiv-Odessa 1935); *Koly ia vyrostu* ([Kharkiv-Odessa] 1937); *Koly ia vyrostu,* 2d ed. ([Kharkiv] 1938); *Kolyskova* ([Kharkiv] 1938); *Kytsenka* ([Kharkiv-Odessa] [1935]); *Liam i Petryk* (Kiev-Kharkiv 1936); *Lyst tovaryshu Voroshylovu,* 2d ed. ([Kharkiv-Odessa] 1937); *Lyst tovaryshu Voroshylovu* ([Kharkiv] 1938); *Naikrashche imia* ([Kharkiv] 1929); *Panats* (Kharkiv 1930); *Porosiata* ([Kharkiv-Odessa] 1935); *Porosiata*, 2d ed. ([Kharkiv-Odessa] 1936); *Porosiata*, 2d ed. [?] ([Kharkiv] 1938); *Ranok* ([Kharkiv-Odessa] 1935); *Skryponka* (Kharkiv-Kiev [1933]); *Skryponka* ([Kharkiv-Odessa] 1936); *Sviato* ([Kharkiv] 1931); *Sviato,* 2d ed. (Kharkiv 1932); *Tramvai* ([Kharkiv] [1931]); *U mene taina* (Kiev 1958); and *U portu* (Kharkiv 1930).
19. *Chudesnyi lyst* ([Kiev] 1941); *Chudesnyi lyst* (Kiev 1946); *Chudesnyi lyst* (Kiev 1960); *Ispanska pisnia* ([Kiev] 1939); *Kachechka* (Kiev 1958); *Kazka pro duzhoho vedmedia, dobru vedmedytsiu i zloho-prezloho vovka* (Kharkiv 1946); *Kazka pro khorobroho Abu* ([Kiev] 1940); *Kazky ta opovidannia* (Kiev 1965); *Moim druziam* (Kharkiv 1949); *Naprovesni* (Kharkiv [1947]); *Poezii* (Kiev 1961); *Ridne* (Kharkiv 1967); *Taina* ([Kharkiv] 1938); *Vesinni holosy* (Kiev 1950); and *Zamazura* (Kiev 1969).
20. *Krynytsi* (Kharkiv 1930), *Krynytsi* (Kharkiv 1930), *Kukurudza* (Kharkiv 1930); *Lykhomanka* (Kharkiv 1930); *Mendl Hraf* (Kharkiv 1934); *Na Dniprelstani* (Kharkiv 1931); *Na novi reiky* (Kharkiv 1930); *Na perevali* (Kiev-Kharkiv 1935); *Na svitanku* (Kharkiv 1930); *Pokhoron* (Kharkiv 1930), *Pokhoron* (Kharkiv 1930); and *Vesillia Zbory* ([Kharkiv] 1930).
21. *Arn Liberman* ([Kiev-Kharkiv 1935); *Chudo bozhoi materi* (Kiev 1958); *Enerhiia* ([Kharkiv] 1932); *Moloko* (Kiev 1939); *Sholom-Aleikhem* (Kiev 1963); *Sholom-Aleikhem* (Kiev 1974); *Svynia* ([Kharkiv] 1930); *Ulamky* ([Kharkiv] 1930); and *Vybrane* (Kiev 1958).
22. *Chotyry dni (Iulis)* (Kharkiv 1934); *Na porozi* ([Kharkiv] 1930); *Na pustyri* (Kharkiv 1930); *Piesy* (Kiev-Kharkiv 1937); *Tam, de pochynaietsia Polshcha* (Kharkiv 1930);

Vynakhidnyk i komediant (Johan Huterbern) ([Kiev-Kharkiv] 1937); and *Ziamka Kopach* (Kharkiv-Odessa 1936).

23. *Chereshnevyi zaspiv* (Kiev 1972); *Knyha materi* (Kiev 1979); *Peredchuttia vesny* ([Kiev 1977]); *Poezii* (Kiev 1956); *Vesniana prysiaha* (Kiev 1935); *Vid sertsia do sertsia* (Kiev 1978); and *Zeleni vruna* (Kiev 1968).
24. *Bezsmertia* (Kiev 1938); 2) *Dytbudynok No. 40* (Kharkiv 1932); 3) *Kuchma* ([Kharkiv] 1933); 4) *Kuchma*, 2d ed. ([Kharkiv] 1934); 5) *Otse my* (Kharkiv-Odessa 1934); and 6) *Senka horobets—mii krashchyi pryiatel* (Kharkiv 1931).
25. *Do pratsi* (Kharkiv 1932); *Liubliu i viriu* (Odessa 1962); *Shchedra osin* (Odessa 1970); *Svitlo i tin* (Odessa 1966); *Vid shchyroho sertsia* (Odessa 1958); and *Vittia* (Odessa 1976).
26. *Liubov zhyve u Shvartsvaldi* (Kiev 1966); *Opovidannia pidpolkovnyka Savchenka* ([Ufa] 1943); *Proba vohnem* (Kiev 1947); *Pryrecheni berut zbroiu* (Kiev 1962); and *Pryrecheni berut zbroiu* (Kiev 1973).
27. *Dolyna sliz* (Kiev 1928); *Fyshka Kryvyi* (Kiev-Kharkiv 1936); *Mandry Veniamina Tretoho* (Kharkiv 1934); *Persten shchastia* (Kiev [1928]); and *Vybrane* (Kiev 1940).
28. *Birobidzhan* (Kharkiv 1930); *Birobidzhan* (Kiev 1930); *Shakhta "BIS"* (Kharkiv-Kiev 1932); and *U shakhtu* ([Kharkiv] 1930).
29. 1) *Divchyna z Ivankova* ([Kiev] 1947); 2) *Iun moia* (Kiev 1961); 3) *Vitry krylati* (Kiev 1971); and 4) *Zolotyi lystopad* (Kiev 1967).
30. *Vybrani poezii* (Kiev 1938); *Vybrani poezii* (Kiev 1939); *Vybrani poezii* (Kiev 1945); and *Vybrani poezii* (Kiev 1965).
31. *Kinets lita* (Kiev 1968); *Kvity zasnizhenykh hir* (Kiev 1975); *Poezii* (Kiev 1979); and *Zhyttia ide* (Kiev 1962).
32. *Bohdanyni notatky* ([Kharkiv] 1930); *Dvi probochky* (Kiev 1947); *Kazka pro rozumnoho zaitsia* ([Kiev] 1940); and *Na stavku* (Kiev 1941).
33. *Chudesna pryhoda* (Kiev-Kharkiv 1936); *Nashi znaiomi* ([Kharkiv-Odessa] 1937); *Ranok* ([Kharkiv 1941]); and *Sad Postysheva* ([Kharkiv-Odessa] 1936).
34. *Elia Iorsh* (Kiev 1941); *Novely* (Kharkiv-Kiev 1931); *Zavl-"nohy"* (Kharkiv-Kiev 1931); and *Zvychaine zhyttia* (Kiev-Kharkiv 1936).
35. *Burkhlyvi dni* ([Odessa] 1930); *Nad Dniprom* (Kiev-Kharkiv 1936); and *Po vsomu* ([Kiev] [1928]).
36. *Orden "Biloho orla"* (Kharkiv 1930); *Sud* ([Kharkiv] 1930); and *U pavutynni* (Kharkiv 1930).
37. *Dzherela* ([Lviv] 1940); *Liryka* ([Kharkiv] 1934); and *Skarb* (Kiev-Kharkiv 1937).
38. *Iashko z holubamy* (Kiev 1966); *Idut armiitsi-pikhotyntsi* (Kiev 1947); and *Salo za shkiru* ([Ufa] 1944).
39. *Pered bureiu* (Kiev 1973); *Step klyche,* pt. 1 (Kiev 1934); and *Step klyche* (Kiev 1976).
40. *Ahlomerat* (Kiev[-Kharkiv] 1936); *Hrebli* (Kharkiv 1930); and *Hrebli* (Kharkiv 1931).
41. *Bontsia Shvaih* (Kharkiv-Odessa: 1931); *Narodni opovidannia* (Kiev 1920); and *Pisnia tkachiv* (Kharkiv 1931).
42. *Dvi kazky* (Kiev 1959); *Khvala zhyttiu* (Kiev 1960); and *Poezii* (Kiev-Kharkiv 1936).
43. *Shmaia rozbiinyk* (Kiev 1940); *Shoil z Zapillia* (Kiev 1939); and *Syn Vitchyzny* ([Kiev] 1948).
44. *Pozytsii* (Kiev 1934) and *Vybrani tvory* (Kiev 1957).
45. *Vasyl-pioner* (Kharkiv-Odessa 1932) and *Zoik okupovanoi Volyni*, pt. 1 ([Kharkiv] 1931).
46. *Doroha v zhyttia* (Kiev 1966) and *Mizh vovkamy* (Kiev 1970).

47. *Poezii* (Kiev 1955) and *Poezii* (Kiev 1966).
48. *Mertva sopukha* (Kharkiv 1930) and *Tverda zemlia* (Kharkiv 1930).
49. *Hadiuka* (Kiev [1929]) and *Koteniatko* (Kiev 1930).
50. *Na vistri* (Kiev-Odessa 1934) and *Zoriani mezhi* (Kiev-Kherson 1937).
51. *Mii voroh* (Kiev-Kharkiv 1936) and *Piesy* (Kiev-Kharkiv 1937).
52. *Vybrane* (Kiev 1958).
53. *Vysoki topoli* (Kiev 1970).
54. *Z moikh skarbiv* ([Kharkiv] 1930).
55. *Tse znachyt blef* (Kiev-Kharkiv 1937).
56. *Navkolo svitu* ([Kharkiv] 1929).
57. *Soniachna sonata* (Kiev 1958).
58. *Iasnyi den* (Kiev 1940).
59. *Liudna vulytsia* (Symferopol 1972).
60. *Svitanok* (Kiev 1974).
61. *Tovaryshi kustari* ([Kharkiv] [1930]).
62. *Zhyvi zerna* (Uzhhorod 1967).
63. *Zhyttia* (Kiev 1971).
64. *Opovidannia* ([Odessa] 1929).
65. *Rekrut (Tak bulo)* ([Kiev-Kharkiv] 1936).
66. *Dilovi mriinyky* (Kiev 1948).
67. *Hist* (Kiev 1938).
68. *Poezii* (Kiev 1965).
69. *U velykyi svit* (Kiev 1975).
70. *Smert tovarysha Vuli* (Kharkiv-Kiev 1932).
71. *Vybrani tvory* ([Odessa] 1931).
72. *Povni vidra krasy* (Lviv 1965).
73. *Poezii* (Kiev 1959).
74. *Obrii* (Kiev 1972).
75. V. Atamaniuk [comp. and transl.], *Nova ievreiska poeziia* (Kiev 1923); [A. I. Katsnelson and H. I. Polianker, eds.], *Nasha Batkivshchyna—Radianskyi Soiuz* (Kiev 1976); and [O. Zholdak, ed.], *V simi iedynii* (Kiev 1948).
76. In this, and subsequent footnotes, mentioning of the name only implies one book edition published; more than one edition is indicated in brackets. In 1928: Berhelson, Mendele two, and Sholem-Aleichem four; in 1929: Hirshbein, Kvitko, Marholina, Reizin, and Sholem-Aleichem three.
77. Alberton three, Berhelson, Daniel three, Der Nister, Erkas three, Hildin nine, Kahan two, Kipnis, Kushnirov two, Kvitko two, Marholina, Markysh, Orliand, and Sholem Aleichem sixteen.
78. Kvitko and Reizin.
79. Borzhes, Hildin, Kvitko two, Noiiakh H. Lurie two, Orliand, Perets two, Sito, Sholem-Aleichem and Vaisenberh.
80. Alberton, Borzhes, Kahan, Kvitko two, Sito, Taitsh, Sholem Aleichem two and Vainerman.
81. Altman, Daniel, Fefer, Hildin, Note M. Lurie, Mendele, Shekhtman and Sito two.
82. Hildin, Kahan, Kvitko four and Talalaievsky.
83. Berhelson, Daniel, Kotliar two, Kvitko three, Noiiakh H. Lurie, Mendele, Orliand, Pinchevsky, Rieznik and Veviurko.
84. Daniel two, Fefer, Hindes, Kotliar, Kvitko two, Shekhtman and Veviurko.
85. Hofshtein, Kvitko four, Levina, Shmain and Sito.
86. Hofshtein, Kahan, Levina, Polianker and Sholem Aleichem.
87. Fefer, Hontar, Kipnis, Levina, Mendele, Polianker and Sholem Aleichem.

88. Kipnis, Kotliar, Levina, Noiiakh H. Lurie and Sholem Aleichem two.
89. Falikman in 1943, Hutiansky in 1944 and Hofshtein in 1945.
90. Levina two.
91. Baliasna, Falikman, Hutiansky, Kipnis, Levina and Sholem Aleichem.
92. Polianker, Shapiro, Sholem Aleichem and an anthology.
93. Levina.
94. Levina in 1950, Hartsman in 1955, Talalaievsky in 1956 and Altman in 1957.
95. Aronsky, Holdenberh, Kahan two, Kvitko, Levina, Sholem Aleichem and Vainerman.
96. Helmond and Diiamant (shared volume), Pinchevsky and Sholem Aleichem.
97. Levina and Pinchevsky in 1960, Baliasna and Levina in 1961, and Kahan and Sholem Aleichem in 1963.
98. Falikman, Khaikina and Vainerman.
99. Hofshtein, Levina, Shvartsman and Vilensky in 1965 and Khaikina, Talalaievsky and Sholem Aleichem two in 1968.
100. Bukhbinder, Falikman, Hartsman, Hutiansky and Vainerman in 1966 and Baliasna, Levina, Melamud and Sholem Aleichem two in 1967.
101. Levina.
102. Bukhbinder, Cherniavsky and Vainerman in 1970, Katsev, Khashchevatsky and Holdenberh (shared volume) and Talalaievsky in 1972 and Note M. Lurie, Vainerman and an anthology in 1976.
103. Baliasna and Mohylevych in 1971, Falikman and Markisch in 1973, Kahan and Kyrychansky in 1974, Khaikina and Tabachnykov in 1975 and Khaikina and Talalaievsky in 1979.
104. Talalaievsky in 1977 and 1978.

Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak

Jewish and Ukrainian Women: A Double Minority

More than other contemporary women, Jewish and Ukrainian women held up the fabric of society within their respective communities by keeping the extended families together and by fostering the continuity of community existence in adverse conditions. The organizations both groups of women formed, whenever it was possible for them to do so, be it in the 1890s for some Ukrainians, or later for the Jewish diaspora, were oriented toward the community and served the needs of the whole people. This is the type of woman's organization, not yet fully studied, that is characteristic of the women's organizations that emerge among colonial, pre-industrialized peoples.

Neither the Jewish nor the Ukrainian communities were interested in women's issues as these were defined in traditional feminism. Rather, considerations of national survival constituted the primary concern of both nationalities. Both the Ukrainian and the Jewish communities were racked by divisive politics, contradictory ideologies and passionate debates of their leading intelligentsias. The modern historical studies of both groups are generally presented in terms of the development of the intelligentsia and of the formulation of the national ideal. Both are silent on the crucial community role of the women. On the stage of that history, the women hold up the set but do not as a rule take a visible part in the production.

Women, lacking education and socialization into ideological thinking, rarely contributed significantly to the formulation of the ideology that

shaped the political and community groups. Nevertheless, as members of a pre-industrialized society both Jewish and Ukrainian women played an active, albeit subordinate role within their communities. They did not, however, articulate that role. In that they either deferred to the man or used categories accepted by the group when they presented their thoughts on "the role of women."

Usually, feminism is considered to be the product of an articulate, educated, somewhat leisured middle class. Its goals are legal equality, educational opportunity and the right to participate in political life. Since these, along with some type of national rights, were the goals of the entire Jewish and Ukrainian communities, they could not readily define the goals of women. Ukrainian women, however, developed a different kind of feminism, which, I would suggest, was also a characteristic of the Jewish women, although neither group recognized it. Since the women were not socialized into ideological thinking, they neither defined their brand of feminism nor realized its originality. It can be best identified as "pragmatic feminism." It was characterized primarily by the involvement of women in grass-roots community life, by the lack of interest in the theories of feminism and by very little discussion of sex except in terms of hygiene. This feminism demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to existing institutions, and its practitioners often denied being feminists, since for them feminism referred to the emancipation movement of the middle classes, which at the time strove for suffrage, education and career opportunities for women. In Ukraine, those were the goals of the entire population, not solely of the women. While stressing the importance of women, pragmatic feminism also underscored the importance of family and community and turned much of its attention to the upbringing of children as valuable members of the community. Its real goal was economic, social and cultural progress, but it was phrased in terms readily acceptable by the group, such as nationalism, Zionism or revolution. This type of feminism is characteristic of Third World women's organizations as they emerged after the Second World War. The Eastern Europeans, however, saw themselves as Europeans and failed to discern the differences between "traditional" and "community" feminism. The pragmatic, community-oriented women relied on self-help, worked within the accepted social structure and tried to create a better life for the community. Even the rationale for a career was made not in terms of individual gain, but as an argument for the welfare of the community. Yet the women functioned on their own, and their organizations were not extensions of male organizations. They were, therefore, in a broader sense, also feminists.

Neither the Ukrainians nor the Jewish women in Ukraine shared the Western European middle-class ideal of mothering and domesticity.

Grounded in a society where both wife and husband performed useful labour, the women did not have the middle-class identity problems crucial to the development of modern feminism. The realm of the private flowed into that of the public, since the public was the readily identifiable community and not the abstract state or political forces. The work of the woman, moreover, was as essential as that of the man to keep the family alive. The reality of imminent outside threats for the Jews and Western Ukrainians, as well as the cohesion inherent in a homogeneous society in most of rural Eastern Ukraine, created a sense of community for the women.

Jewish and Ukrainian women frequently came into individual contact with one another, but neither group looked at the relationship in any systematic fashion. Nor did the fate of the women of the two groups offer obvious parallels. In this article I should like, nevertheless, to offer some educated conjectures on the position of women in both groups and to discuss a number of points of contact. I do this primarily on the basis of the study of Ukrainian women and with a cursory familiarity with Jewish women. I shall try to encompass the whole Ukrainian territory, regardless of political boundaries.

The women of both groups had been particularly vulnerable to the violence perpetrated against the whole nation, be it the savagery of the Tatars, the brutalities of the Poles, the wanton killing and pillage and rape of the Cossacks or the more methodical harassment of the tsar's forces. The periods of persecution of both nations, however, were seldom congruent, so that, especially among the ahistorically minded women, a consciousness of joint exploitation did not develop.

In most Ukrainian territories, Jews were the foreigners women would be most likely to meet. Before the twentieth century, many of the shopkeepers with whom the women came into contact were Jewish. The differences in social class and the insularity of social relationships prevented the fostering of closer contacts between the two groups.[1] The lifestyles of Jewish and Ukrainian women varied considerably. The Ukrainian women were for the most part rural, generally peasants or a generation removed from them. The Ukrainian upper classes, both rural and urban, idealized the village, were peasant-oriented, and looked for validation of their political strivings in the democratic variant of a modern nationalism whose core was the village. The stress in the Ukrainian development was upon the autonomy of the community, generally of community self-help. Group, or at least couple, reliance was essential for any amelioration of the economic condition of the family. Ukrainian women worked in the home and in the field. Ukrainian men handled the major monetary transactions. It was only in the interwar years that Ukrainians began discussing the novel fact that 80 per cent of the family's budget

went through the wife's hands. Jewish women, on the other hand, had traditionally handled the family income.

Jewish women usually lived in the ghettoes of the little towns. Even when they were able to farm legally, few Jewish families turned to farming. Those that did—Trotsky's family is an example—were not very successful and the Jewish youngsters who grew up in the Ukrainian countryside resented having learned Ukrainian since that only made them stand out more as country bumpkins in the cities. Most Jews lived in close proximity to one another and developed skills characteristic of successful life in crowds. Individual resourcefulness, agility and the ability to make the best of a bad situation, to endure the inevitable and to change what could be changed in the external conditions affecting them were the virtues cultivated by the Jewish community. The synagogue, very visibly and pointedly a male institution in which the women were literally relegated to second place, exercised a pervasive influence on Jewish life. Leaving the synagogue meant cutting oneself off from the Jewish community. For the non-Jews however, the Jew remained a Jew. Anti-Semitism made the Jews aware of their Jewishness, even as the Jews tried to break the ties with their communities.

For Ukrainians, the source of income was the land, which was sacred by tradition. Its nourishing powers had to be preserved to last for generations. The land could not be exploited since then it would cease to produce. For Jewish women, the source of income was generally trade or labour outside the home, usually in a small store. It was utilitarian. Income could be increased by intelligent management, and the Jewish society stressed the practical side of women's socialization. The earnings of a Jewish woman were not a threat to the Jewish male. On the contrary, promising Jewish scholars, for instance, were often married to women who were capable by their skill and intelligence of supporting their husbands. Hence, more Jews than Ukrainians, proportionately, recognized the utility of education for women. In Galicia, for instance, more Jewish girls than Ukrainian ones attended secondary schools. Ukrainians tended to glorify either idealized peasant simplicity or to ape gentry indolence in "mere money matters." Jewish women were as loath as other women to leave the security of their known, even if destitute, life. But once forced to leave it, they demonstrated an enviable drive, resiliency and intelligence in making their way successfully in new surroundings. We need only look at the Jewish immigration to the United States for ample illustrations of this impressive story.

Ukrainian cultural traditions were closely connected with the rhythm of the agricultural cycle and were firmly grounded in the land. Women as nurturers fit readily into the settled picture. Jewish tradition, in contrast, was an intellectual and spiritual one. It weighed heavily on the individ-

ual, but it did not shackle the person to the necessity of group action to achieve results. Even the enjoinder that each Jew was responsible for other Jews could be fulfilled by giving aid to a colleague, but not necessarily to the whole group.

Within their own national communities, Jewish and Ukrainian women played different roles. The preservation of the Jewish ethos, in whatever form, was in large degree a male function. The synagogue, schools and political groups were in the male domain. Even the family-oriented rituals of which women were in charge were composed by the men. Jewish women were responsible for the preservation of the physical aspects of the Jewish tradition, as for instance the keeping of a kosher kitchen. These functions, however, were taken for granted, and were never considered to be as significant as those performed by the men. Jonathan Frankel pointed out that ideologically the Jewish community was self-oriented. Ezra Mendelsohn, referring specifically to the Zionist milieu, remarked that women had severe difficulties in finding a niche for themselves in the Jewish movements. As the manifestations of Jewish identity became more secular, Jewish women came to perform the standard support functions of women in any national liberation movement. (A further step in this argument would be to view Israel as a frontier society in which the women must perform non-traditional functions and thus achieve equality when the attention of society is taken by other matters.)[2]

The most visible Jewish women in Europe were those who broke with the Jewish tradition and joined the social democratic movements. (Golda Meir's views crystallized in the United States and in Israel, not in Ukraine.) Just as the Jewish men, so the Jewish women, once they made the choice to go outside the Jewish community, generally identified with the colonizer rather than with the second-class local citizens. That is, they became Russian or Polish or German in culture. They could, of course, converse in Ukrainian for purposes of carrying on daily business, but they showed little interest in modern Ukrainian culture. That this culture was frequently rural-oriented made it less attractive than the cultures that offered a way out of the ghetto into the broader world. The Ukrainians offered only a change of one subordinate culture for the other; the Poles, the Russians and the Germans held out a chance to become part of the dominant group, part of European civilization. Within the Jewish movement itself, the Enlightenment (the *Haskalah*) fostered an intellectual cosmopolitan model that facilitated the break with parochialism and its regional romantic sentimentality. Dominant groups viewed Ukrainianism as regionalism or parochialism. The Hasidic Jews, of course, remained unaffected by the *Haskalah* and by the rise of modern Ukrainianism. I presume the same could be said about the average uneducated woman, Jewish or Ukrainian, for whom cosmopolitanism remained as

incomprehensible as it was irrelevant. The pogroms further undermined the optimism inherent in the *Haskalah* outlook.

In contrast to cosmopolitan rationalism, Ukrainianism and especially the sensibilities of Ukrainian women thrived on romantic nationalism and on a romantic conception of seemingly indigenous religious customs. Once they discovered "the people," Ukrainians began to see the women as the preservers of the national ethos in the family and in the folk arts. That trend was foreign to the Jewish experience. Unlike the Jewish spiritual or intellectual basis of the definition of Jewishness, the Ukrainian conception was deeply rooted in the land and its traditions. Thus, while sometimes encouraging the women to participate in the "national life," the Ukrainian men sought to limit that participation to what they perceived, in the manner of the nascent middle-class values, to be the role of the mother.

As an entity, Jews may have been poorer than Ukrainians, but there were enough financially successful Jews to offset the image of the Jews as being universally exploited. On the contrary, anti-Semitic lore fed the image of the rich Jew living off the local population. As merchants, Jews appeared to the average non-monied Ukrainian peasant as being well off. Hence there was little possibility that a common solidarity of the downtrodden would develop and would become strong enough to overcome all the other differences. There was no question that the Jews constituted a beleaguered minority in Ukraine proper. As such, they often established self-help associations that performed the functions women's philanthropic societies undertook elsewhere. Ukrainians in Eastern Ukraine, despite tsarist persecution, including the banning of Ukrainian publications, did not feel threatened in their own element. Ukrainian self-help community organizations emerged late and were hampered at each step by the tsarist police, which feared a link-up between the pro-Ukrainian democratic movement and the Ukrainian-speaking village.[3] In Galicia, the direct threat came from the resident Poles, who wanted to make the Ukrainians Polish. Since the Austrian regime made the existence of community organizations possible, there was a flourishing of Ukrainian Galician community life. This autonomous and original development of Ukrainian women's organizations permits us to suggest the existence of the pragmatic feminism mentioned at the outset of the article. The most significant women's organizations among Ukrainians developed within the clergy milieu, that is, the wives and daughters of priests became the main activists among the women.

Women generally caused most difficulty for the educated, who dealt with abstractions. In theory both Jewish and Christian faiths put down the woman as the source of corruption, although Mary's role in the redemption sanctified motherhood for a noble purpose. But the clergy of

the Jews and the Ukrainians at the time were married men who had little time to ponder on the evil effects of women. On the contrary, the woman was necessary for the management of the parish household, and procreation of children was considered sacred. A matter-of-fact acceptance of sexuality seemed to characterize the daily life of the typical Jewish (non-Hasidic, however) and Ukrainian family. Anti-feminism, of course, played some role in the lives of both nations; among Ukrainians it came to be articulated most openly in Western Ukraine by the men who were the sons of married priests and who did not follow their fathers into priesthood, but entered secular professions. Ukrainian men, moreover, tended to be more critical of the "conservatism" of the Ukrainian women than the Jewish men seem to have been of their own women. Perhaps the Jewish men had more pressing issues than criticism of the women in their own society.

Women who found the community too limiting had another method for women's emancipation through the overall workers' movement. Social democracy defended the rights of working women, but opposed the strivings of the feminists as being class-constricting. Proportionately more Jewish women in the Russian and Austrian empires than Ukrainian women joined the social democratic labour parties. Those who were most successful in the Russian party, such as Evheniia Bosh or in a slightly different fashion Aleksandra Kollontai, overlooked the particular needs of the nationalities and identified with the Russian brand of internationalism. They showed little sympathy either for the Ukrainian cause or for the special needs of the Jewish community.

At the grass-roots level, however, there seem to have been fair degrees of co-operation among the Jewish and Ukrainian women in the social democratic movement in the Russian Empire. Comrades-in-arms against the overpowering tsarism, few were prescient enough to foretell the anti-Ukrainianism and later the anti-Semitism of the Bolsheviks. In 1905, for instance, at Lenin's behest an autonomous social democratic organization, the *Spilka* (Alliance), was created in Ukraine. It was to have served primarily as a link with the peasant and worker masses in Ukraine. Later it was to serve as a link for all peasants in the empire. In contrast to the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, the *Spilka* attracted a number of peasants and workers, as well as women. Nastia Hrinchenko and Mariia Vinogradova were the best known Ukrainians. They co-operated very closely with their colleagues: Genia-Leia Moiseevna Kirnos, Gilda Vulfovna Vulfson and Sara Iosefovna Shatz. Both the police and the party leadership noted the success of the *Spilka* in reaching the peasants, and the party dissolved it before the *Okhrana* got to it.[4] On another occasion in Lubni, near Kiev, a coalition of Ukrainian and Jewish parties successfully prevented the outbreak of a pogrom in 1905. Mariia Tkachenko

Livytska, whose husband would much later become president-in-exile of the Ukrainian People's Republic, was extremely influential in that undertaking. She did not consider it seemly, however, to take on the actual leadership of the co-ordinating committee.[5]

Within the Bolshevik party in the Russian Empire and in the Soviet Union, none of the women became involved in the nationality debate, and throughout its history the party inhibited the discussion of the cause of women jointly with that of the cause of the nationalities. Only in the 1920s, very briefly, was a Ukrainian placed in charge of the women's sections of the Communist Party in Ukraine. But Russian women were used as organizers in Ukraine, and frequently they were Russified Jewish women, thus precluding the co-operation of the two nationalities. We do not know whether this only reflected the existing relationship or whether the policy was a deliberate one. In the 1920s, however, when Ukrainization policies speeded up the identification of the Jews with the Ukrainians, the Bolsheviks nipped the development. The Ukrainian-Jewish historian Iosyf Hermaize and his wife, Anna Georgievna, were arrested in the first show-trial of the Ukrainians in 1930.

The latter, in the first decade of the century, had been active in one of the women's clubs in Kiev which was characterized by the co-operation of some Russian, Jewish and Ukrainian women. The Kievan branch of the Society for the Protection of Women, in contrast to its Moscow counterpart, was composed of hard-working women of the intelligentsia. They ran a dormitory, cafeteria, employment bureau, literacy school and legal advice office, as well as programmes for the cultural enlightenment of the workers. Individual Jewish women of Kiev were active in the society, among them Rosalia Isaakovna Margolina, the mother of the lawyer Arnold Margolin, who defended Mendel Beilis and would later enter the service of the Ukrainian People's Republic; Elizaveta Moiseevna Sholtz, Olga Iakovlevna Rabinovich and Sofiia Arnoldovna Shatz. The society tried to establish a separate Jewish women's section in an attempt to attract more Jewish working women to the organization. But the Jewish women avoided organizations that developed an implicitly pro-Ukrainian colouration. The fact that the society was shunned by the socialists also prevented it from making greater inroads into the working class.[6]

The most original Ukrainian socialist woman came from Western Ukraine. Natalia Kobrynska tried to fuse socialism with feminism, arguing unsuccessfully with Klara Zetkin that socialism in itself would provide no guarantees for women; that the patriarchal system oppressive to the women would remain even under socialism unless the attitudes of the men changed. This could be done, she maintained, only if women made men aware of the issues involved. Kobrynska, daughter of one priest and widow of another, was instrumental in initiating a secular women's

movement among Ukrainian women in the Austrian Empire. Although apparently religious herself, she insisted that there be no customary religious services or prayers during the opening ceremonies of the women's society. Kobrynska did not directly address the Jewish issue, primarily because the major problem for the Galicians were the Poles who Polonized the Jews and tried to Polonize Ukrainians. Her personal secretary, however, was Jewish. Whether Kobrynska, eventually at odds with the Ukrainian women, pointedly hired a Jewish women, or whether the person suited her best, we do not know. We do know that the two of them worked well and that Kobrynska at times sheltered Jewish orphans in her home.

Kobrynska, one of the most intellectual of Ukrainian women, tried to use the women as a new political force that would be potentially more powerful that even the nascent workers' and peasants' movements. She hoped that the realization of feminist interests would lead to feminist solidarity. But her experiences with the Polish women (among whom there were Polonized Jewish women, such as Felicja Nossig-Próchnikowa) in a number of joint demonstrations for the vote and for access to higher education in the 1890s and 1900s only provided additional proof for her that for the Polish women national concerns always came first. Jewish women likewise did not speak up for the interests of Ukrainians. Thus, the joint rally of Ukrainian and Polish socialist women, held in Lviv on 10 April 1892 and chaired by Próchnikowa, disintegrated when Kobrynska demanded Ukrainian-language schools for Ukrainian peasants. At other joint women's rallies, national rather than feminist issues were stressed. The solidarity of women's concerns was not recognized even by the majority of women.

Nevertheless, individual Jewish women, just as individual Jewish men, co-operated on occasion with Ukrainians. Thus, at the First Ukrainian Enlightenment-Economic Congress held in Lviv on 2 February 1909, among the seventy-two women participants was a Jewish medical student from Lviv, Rachel Schneiderson.[7] But Jewish women as a group tried not to antagonize the Poles by an openly pro-Ukrainian stand. Rather, on occasion, they joined Poles and Ukrainians in common actions, as they did in supporting the candidacy of Maria Dulebianka, a Polish socialist, to political office in Lviv in 1908. On the whole, women reflected the prejudices of the men in their relations with women of other national minorities. While individual women were willing to surmount ideological and national differences, the majority of women felt more comfortable in a non-threatening homogeneous environment. At times, early women's societies were grouped not only by nationality but even by age.[8]

Differences between the Jewish and the Ukrainian women are further

evident in the types of visibility within their own communities. The Jews produced a number of prominent political activists among women, but only in movements going beyond the traditionally Jewish orientation. I am not aware of a Jewish woman writer of the time, nor am I aware of a specific literary work, either in Ukrainian or in Yiddish, on Jewish and Ukrainian women.

Ukrainian writers, including women, generally wrote about peasants. The major exceptions were Lesia Ukrainka, Kobrynska and Olena Pchilka. Ukrainka, a major writer, like many of her contemporaries, used biblical themes to present the plight of the nation or to exhort it to faith and action. She did not address herself to the plight of contemporary Jewish women, but addressed universal themes. The plight of Ukrainians had more than adequate drama. Kobrynska, who wrote a number of short stories set in her own milieu, wrote sympathetically about Jewish women, but they were not her primary concern. Pchilka, the mother of Lesia Ukrainka, an Eastern Ukrainian community activist and writer in her own right, consciously tried to write about active women who either came from strata other than the peasants or who were trying to build a life outside the traditional village structure.

Pchilka (the "Bee"—her real name was Olena Drahomanov Kosach) emerged as a visible spokesperson of the Ukrainians during the Revolution of 1905. Concurrently, she was involved in the activities of the All-Russian Union for the Equality of Women, which was established in Moscow in March 1905 and which found a responsive chord among women in the urban centres of the empire. Mostly women of the liberal camp joined the Union; the non-Russians used it to raise the nationality issue. At the first Congress of Women, held from 6 to 9 May 1905, in Moscow, some Ukrainian, Polish, Belorussian and Jewish women insisted, in return for joining the Union, that it accept the principle of national ethnic and organizational autonomy and the right to cultural and national self-determination for all nationalities of the Russian Empire.[9]

Russian feminists, neophytes to open public debate, responded more readily to these demands than their male intelligentsia counterparts. At the third congress of the Union, in October 1905, "there were political resolutions from Lithuanian, Polish and Ukrainian women demanding a federative structure of Russia." The congress even passed a resolution "to the effect that the liberation of women is inseparably tied to the attainment of autonomy for their native land (*Rodnoi krai)* and its liberation from the yoke of Russification."[10]

The principle of the autonomous development of the nationalities had to be argued at each succeeding congress. The Jewish issue seemed to become separated from that of the nationalities and was viewed as an issue in itself. The Russians recognized anti-Semitism as a problem in society,

but were not ready to accept the rights of the non-Russian nationalities. The women in the Russian Empire did not get the vote, and the feminists resented the national-minority men who acquired the right that had been denied them. Women of the national minorities failed to create an effective coalition. Ukrainian men conveniently overlooked the whole enterprise. The renewed reaction that spread over the land brought with it another wave of pogroms.

Among the many activities in which Pchilka engaged was editing the journal *Ridnyi krai* (Native Land). It was on its pages, in the difficult year of 1908, when the tsarist police closed one Ukrainian organization after another and when no one among the Russian liberal and radical intelligentsia came to the defence of the Ukrainians, that Pchilka wrote a series of articles on Jewish-Ukrainian relations. She was prompted to publish the articles partly because the Russian intelligentsia repeatedly spoke up on behalf of the Jews, but maintained complete silence about Ukrainians.

Reflecting the views of her brother, Mykhailo Drahomanov, Pchilka acknowledged that the majority of the Jews in Ukraine were tradesmen and thus could not share the interests of the Ukrainian peasants or of the growing working class. That, she readily maintained, was not the fault of the Jews, who for centuries had been hemmed into certain professions. Pchilka complained about a totally different matter. She openly objected to the tendency of the Jews to side with the Russian colonizers against the Ukrainians. She conceded that the exploitation by the Jewish bourgeoisie of the Ukrainian masses was understandable and argued that the entire people did not bear a direct blame for it. She naturally abhorred the pogroms. But she complained that the Jews actively combatted Ukrainian cultural and national strivings and that no one condemned the pogroms against the Ukrainian cultural institutions.

Pchilka's articles were met with severe censure by the Ukrainian intelligentsia. "We considered her a chauvinist in the fullest sense of the word," commented one of the younger Ukrainian activist women.[11] Pchilka had never been very popular among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, partly because she criticized the sacred heroes of the Russians and partly because she was very blunt in expressing her likes and dislikes. These articles diminished her community standing. Although she lived until 1930, she did not play a prominent role in Ukrainian political life after this episode. She was, however, a consistent critic of the Bolsheviks, and only her advanced age saved her from the arrest that befell all of her living kin.

The emergence and the legalization of formal political parties among the Jews and among the Ukrainians, especially after 1905, reduced the effective participation of women in community life. In the social demo-

cratic parties, which alone prompted the cause of woman as a programme plank, women lost the degree of influence they had exercised in clandestine movements.

During the First World War and the various subsequent revolutions, Jewish and Ukrainian women were both more active in the daily management of the lives of their families and more victimized by the carnage, violence and military occupation. Within both groups the vision that nourished them was often that of a homeland at peace, although not necessarily the same homeland. When Ukrainians managed to wrest independence they passed legislation that vouchsafed the rights of the minorities, and some Jewish leaders participated in the government. The legislation did not seem to have an impact on Jewish women. Anyway, Ukrainians were not strong enough to prevent the pogroms or stop the Bolsheviks.

When given a chance to develop autonomously as a group, both Jews and Ukrainians promoted political rights for women. In terms of political achievement, however, Jewish women in independent Israel surpassed Ukrainian women in federated Ukraine. Politically oriented women of both nationalities for the most part gravitated toward work in social service and education. The service of women was for the welfare of the nation, and issues of international co-operation were not their prime concern.

A number of Jewish-Ukrainian women achieved some prominence in Ukrainian political life in the early twentieth century. Volodymyr Vynnychenko, a prolific Ukrainian writer and a radical political leader, married a Jewish woman who promised to learn Ukrainian so that their children could be raised in that language.[12] The couple remained childless, and Vynnychenko's political career ended with his early disillusionment with Lenin's democracy. Marie Zarchi, a Jewish Ukrainian woman, the wife of a diplomat in the service of the Ukrainian People's Republic, set up a Ukrainian women's organization in Berlin in the 1920s and for a number of years was very active on behalf of the Ukrainians on the international women's forum. Energetic and flamboyant, she was very effective among British and American women; continental women thought her too flashy. She seems to have retained her adherence to the Jewish ethos while at the same time remaining an ardent Ukrainian patriot. She vanished from the scene by the end of the 1920s.[13]

In Western Ukraine, after the area was formally incorporated into Poland in 1923, there were two prominent Ukrainian women whose Jewishness was simply overlooked, except by the Polish pundits who wrote against the Ukrainians.

Severyna Paryllie—a rarity among Jewish women in Ukraine—was converted to Eastern Catholicism. She became a Basilian nun and for

years taught at the major Basilian Ukrainian secondary school for girls in Lviv. She was a leader in the collection of artifacts, especially peasant dress, and brought a whole collection of such costumes to the United States in the 1930s. We do not know why she chose Uniate Catholicism, but she was followed by her niece and nephew. The latter, refusing shelter and false papers, was killed by the Nazis. Mother Severyna died at the home of friends after the Bolsheviks took over the area.

The most significant woman activist among Ukrainians in interwar Poland was the daughter of a Jewish woman and a Ukrainian man. Milena Rudnytska's mother came from a tradesman's family in Zboriv. She married Ivan Rudnytsky for love, bore five children, and after his death, when Milena was ten, moved to Lviv, where she took in boarders to help all the children through very successful schooling. Milena Rudnytska, a mathematics teacher by profession, became the president of the mass women's organization in Western Ukraine, was elected deputy to the Polish Sejm and acted as the spokesperson of the Ukrainian parliamentary group. She identified wholly with Ukrainians, co-operated with the national minorities in the Sejm and ran into continual opposition from the Poles. She did not seem to experience any Ukrainian-Jewish tension, nor did she appear to be interested in the issue. After the Second World War, however, when she openly berated those Ukrainians who for whatever exigency had played a public role under the Nazis, her Jewish origin was part of a nasty innuendo campaign against her. She argued that the women's organization, having been liquidated by the Nazis, was in the best position to represent Ukrainians, since none of the women could be charged with collaboration with the Germans. That turned out to be an unpopular stand among Ukrainians.[14]

There were, of course, even less well known examples. During the First World War, Ukrainians in Vienna organized a secondary school that offered courses for women. Among the five women who graduated with the 141 young men was Khaia Keisler of Rohatyn.[15] Yet that approach, in view of our limited sources, threatens to be anecdotal.

I have not come across evidence of Ukrainian women marrying Jews. In any case, their conversion would not guarantee the full Jewishness of their children. Jewish women who married Ukrainian men usually identified with the Ukrainian cause.

In conclusion, what can be said for the men can be said even more strongly for the women: neither common suffering, nor common fate, nor an objective common enemy were enough to encourage the co-operation of the two opposed nationalities. The women, not socialized into ideological thinking, could not initiate moves to develop a bloc encouraging co-operation between the two nations. The men did so in spurts, but their primary interests also lay in more fundamental matters of

survival. Nor could the women, relegated and elevated to the tasks of bearing children and nourishing families in the most adverse conditions, articulate the contribution they were making to their respective nations as well as to the cause of women, by simply managing to keep their families alive and by developing formal or informal mechanisms of participating in their community.

NOTES

I should like to thank Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal for her helpful comments on a draft of this article.

1. A convenient listing of the merchants, tradesman and shopkeepers in the towns and villages of the Kiev, Podillia, Volhynia and southwest gubernias is found in a handbook published by the Southwestern Section of the Russia Export Office in Kiev in 1913. It was edited by M. V. Dovnar-Zapolsky and is entitled *Ves Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai. Spravochnaia i adresnaia kniga.* A cursory perusal would suggest that especially the ubiquitous food stores were run largely by Jews, and frequently by Jewish women. In fact, in the 1913 edition of the publication only S. F. Shevchenko of Kiev advertised his soda-water concern as an "ukrainskii zavod," p. 359.
   This same source offers the following breakdown in the nationality makeup of the area—the Kiev gubernia had 79 per cent Ukrainians, 6 per cent Russians, 12 per cent Jews, and less than 2 per cent Poles; Podillia had 81 per cent Ukrainians, 3 per cent Russians, 12 per cent Jews and 2 per cent Poles; Volhynia had 70 per cent Ukrainians, 3 per cent Russians, 13 per cent Jews and 6 per cent Poles; the Southwest had 77 per cent Ukrainians, 4 per cent Russians, 12 per cent Jews and 3 per cent Poles. Jews were familiar sights in Ukraine; it was the Russian peasants and merchants who elicited curious stares from the passer-by.
2. See particularly E. Mendelsohn, *Zionism in Poland: The Formative Years, 1915–1926* (New Haven 1983), 339–41, and J. Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism and the Russian Jews, 1862–1917* (Cambridge 1981).
3. A listing of Jewish organizations is given in *Ves Iugo-Zapadnyi Krai.*
4. Police report on the activities of the *Spilka* in Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv, Moscow, f. 102, D.P. VII, no. 8468, see esp. p. 121.
5. *Na hrani dvokh epokh* (New York 1972), especially 175.
6. Unpublished materials of the branch, as well as its published reports, are located in the Tsentralnyi Derzhavnyi Istorychnyi Arkhiv, Kiev, f. 442, op. 643.
7. There is a fuller discussion in M. Bohachevsky-Chomiak, "Socialism and Feminism: The First Stages of Women's Organizations in the Eastern Part of the Austrian Empire," in T. Yedlin, ed. *Women in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (New York 1978), 44–64.
8. Information from the notes of Oksana Duchyminska, located in the Archive of the Ukrainian National Women's League of America in New York, uncatalogued.
9. TsGIA, Moscow, f. 516, ed. khr. 5, 12 and 28; fuller discussion in my article "Ukrainian and Russian Women: Conflict and Co-operation," in *Ukraine and Russia in their Historical Encounter*, forthcoming, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Edmonton.

10. TsGia, Moscow, f. 516, ed. khr. 5, p. 68 and 37.
11. S. Rusova, *Nashi vyznachni zhinky* (Kolomyia 1934), 40. *Ridnyi krai* appeared in Kiev; Pchilka's articles were published throughout 1908.
12. Evhen Chykalenko Diary, entry for 19 March 1911, in the Archive of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in New York, uncatalogued.
13. There is some information about her in the uncatalogued papers of Hanna Chykalenko Keller in ibid.
14. Rudnytska's autobiographical note formerly in the possession of her late son, Ivan L. Rudnytsky. Her papers are deposited in the Archive of the Ukrainian Academy. See also I. Knysh, *Pershi kroky na emigratsii*(Winnipeg 1955).
15. *Zvit Upravy gimnaziinykh kursiv z ukrainskoiu vykladovoiu movoiu u Vidni 1914–1915* (Vienna 1916).

V

The Holocaust and the Contemporary Period

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Methodological Problems and Philosophical Issues in the Study of Jewish-Ukrainian Relations During the Second World War

To write critically and objectively about any subject pertaining to the Holocaust, which took the lives of six million Jews, would seem to many like quibbling in the face of horrible murder. This is especially the case if one chooses such a sensitive and ultimately tragic subject as Jewish-Ukrainian relations during the Second World War, which in the minds of some is but a euphemism for Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust. Some forty years have passed since that catastrophe; many of the witnesses are advanced in years or have already died; many documents may have been lost. The traditional approach would have been to plunge into historical research to reconstruct those years while the memory was still alive. But even then we should have had to ask ourselves: "Can we ever establish the historical record in the context of the Holocaust, or is this an impossible objective?"

For a number of reasons I believe that a novel approach is called for, one I have chosen here. It is to pause and ask some question about methods and philosophical issues that we are likely to confront in our quest for the true historical record, before immersing ourselves in the data. It is to pause before acting with renewed energy. In the long run this may turn out to be the faster, more efficient approach, for it is my premise that Jewish-Ukrainian relations during the Second World War are much too involved a subject to be tackled by one person alone. It took Raul Hilberg twelve years to write the first edition of his magisterial book.[1] I do not think that we have the time to wait so long for the results of our inquiry.

The study should be done by a commission of scholars, ideally by a mixed Jewish-Ukrainian scholarly commission. Any such research in archives in Western Europe, Israel and North America, any survey of the remaining witnesses, scattered as they are all across the world, calls for effective community support. The posing of questions and the establishment of hypotheses in advance of the main research is sound individual scholarship. It becomes indispensable with intricate, community-supported and organized team research. Such a novel approach—of waiting before leaping—is particularly important when economy of effort is called for. On such a politically sensitive topic Ukrainian-born scholars in the diaspora cannot realistically depend on any co-operation from Soviet Ukraine with her superior archives and manpower.

In their wise and courageous 1982 conference paper, which was later published in a book, Howard Aster and Peter J. Potichnyj aptly called the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples "two solitudes," two communities living in close proximity but not understanding each other, talking past each other, interpreting their common history in diametrically opposite ways, cultivating stereotypes rather than bringing out historical facts.[2]

One stereotype that shows no signs of disappearing, even from scholarly literature, is that Ukrainians as such are inveterate anti-Semites.[3] For instance, in her book *The War Against the Jews, 1933–1945,* Lucy S. Dawidowicz writes:

> Like a tornado, the "Einsatzgruppen"[4] swept through the Jewish settlements of Eastern Europe in the summer of 1941, destroying age-old communities in a cyclonic upheaval. The German invasion found the Russians unprepared militarily and the civilian population disoriented and demoralized. Exploiting the superstitions and *anti-Semitic prejudices* of the Lithuanians, Balts and Ukrainians, and activitating their accumulated hatred for the Soviets, the Germans harnessed the violent energies of these *willing collaborators* to round up and kill the Jews. In Vilna and Kovno the Lithuanians roamed the streets, capturing Jewish males, hauling them away, purportedly to work. In Lvov, the Germans and Ukrainians, in house-to-house hunts for Jews, shot them randomly on the spot. Belatedly, avenging the assassination by a Jew back in 1926 of Semyon Petlura, *notorious anti-Semite* and Ukrainian national hero, the Ukrainians staged mammoth pogroms, slaughtering thousands and carrying off other thousands to Einsatzgruppen headquarters. . . . Within hours or days, those Jews who had been taken away were machine-gunned en masse at some remote desolate area. The disaster was epic.
>
> There was everywhere terrible grief,
> Everywhere panic, and death in full many a form.[5]

This, so to speak, is tragedy with a poetic touch, but for scholarship or even a reference work, it is somewhat lacking in analysis. Not surprisingly, Professor Dawidowicz's approach has been picked up by such popular authors as Gerald Green, who later wrote the script for the influential 1978 television Film *Holocaust*.[6]

The hoped for scholarly commission should pay attention to the following methodological points. First, as was brought out during the discussion at the Hamilton conference on Jewish-Ukrainian relations, there were no pogroms in Western Ukraine after the First World War. Why then do we find bloody "mammoth" persecutions during the Second World War, in the first weeks of the German-Soviet war? It would seem to me that the scholarly team should weigh very carefully four factors: the deliberate incitement to pogroms by the Nazi occupation authorities; the possibly inadequate resistance to those incitements by Ukrainian organizations that were temporarily collaborating with the Nazis; the particular provocation consisting of mass executions of Ukrainian political prisoners by the retreating NKVD; and, lastly, the possibility that the pogroms were carried out by both Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian mobs.

First, the trial of the "Einsatzgruppen" before the American military tribunal at Nuremberg, held from 3 July 1947 to 9 April 1948, proved beyond doubt that the Germans used every conceivable method of provoking the local population to commit pogroms. The Germans did so in such a way that the initiative appeared to come from the local population, and that the latter, not the Germans, were responsible for killing the Jews.[7] This had also been noted, unfortunately too briefly, by the late Philip Friedman, who, as a bonus, included an objective discussion of his evidence.[8] Raul Hilberg emphasized the decisive role of the Germans in instigating pogroms,[9] something that neither Lucy Dawidowicz nor, to an even lesser extent, Gerald Green did.

Second, under the impact of the German-Soviet war in general and contacts with Soviet-educated Ukrainians in particular, the attitudes of the Bandera wing of the OUN toward Jews changed from the strong hostility expressed at the Second (Cracow) Grand Assembly of early 1940 to their acceptance at the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly of 21–25 August 1943.[10] But future researchers will not only have to note that the favourable resolutions of 1943 are non-specific (they do not mention Jews by name, as does the 1940 resolution), but will also have to inquire to what extent the 1940 resolution, which apparently had been inspired by Nazi ideology, was representative of the feelings of the majority of the Ukrainian community both in Western and Eastern Ukraine. (In my judgment, it was not.) Another sensitive question for research is whether the Ukrainian nationalist movement, which because of German persecutions soon went underground, changed its views on the Jews long before

August 1943. An argument could be made that an early change—if indeed there had been such a change, which remains a question—could have helped to prevent or alleviate later pogroms.

Third, in Galicia, where semi-spontaneous pogroms against the Jews were organized or, at the very least, partially organized by the Germans,[11] particular conditions prevailed in the summer of 1941. The Bolsheviks had arrested thousands of Ukrainian patriots, and prior to their retreat, they killed them savagely.[12] For some reason even highly regarded Jewish authors understate the number of Ukrainians victims of Bolshevik terror. Gerald Reitlinger gives a figure of three to four thousand in Lviv alone.[13] Hilberg speaks of "the Bolsheviks deporting Ukrainians," but he does not furnish any overall figures.[14] But on the basis of a German document (RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR no. 28, 20 July 1941, No-2943), which I was unable to verify, he recounts one particularly horrible episode:

> In Kremenets 100–150 Ukrainians had been killed by the Soviets. When some of the exhumed corpses were found without skin, rumors circulated that the Ukrainians had been thrown into kettles of boiling water. The Ukrainian population retaliated by seizing 130 Jews and beating them to death with clubs.[15]

He also quotes the French collaborator Dr. Frederic as saying that the Bolsheviks killed eighteen thousand Ukrainian political prisoners in Lviv and its outskirts alone.[16]

Basing his remarks on an anonymous article entitled "The Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the USSR," in the dissident journal *Ukrainian Herald,* Issue 7–8, the Ukrainian-American publicist Lew Shankowsky gives the following number of victims of Bolshevik terror in Galicia and Volhynia: as many as *forty thousand* killed in the prisons of Lviv, Lutsk, Rivne, Dubno, Ternopil, Stanyslaviv (now Ivano-Frankivsk), Stryi, Drohobych, Sambir, Zolochiv and other towns and settlements.[17] The fact of the matter is that, justifiably or not, some Ukrainians felt that some Jews were in the employ of the Stalinist secret police, the NKVD. For instance, it was pointed out to me by a resident of Western Ukraine that a high NKVD official in Lviv, a certain Barvinsky, was Jewish, despite his Ukrainian name. Under pressure of German agents-provocateurs, some Ukrainians assaulted innocent Jews more often than guilty ones.

A number of serious questions of fact and of moral judgment would have to be addressed by future researchers. First, were there Jews among those executed by the NKVD just before its retreat, and if so, how many? Did local Ukrainians know this, did they keep silent about this, and did they, by their silence, facilitate the pogroms? On the other hand, is it

possible to deny the Jewish background of various NKVD personnel simply by saying that they abdicated their Jewishness upon joining the Soviet government, that they were no longer practising Jews, that fellow-Jews, especially Zionists, no longer accepted them as Jews? Or is it morally correct to say that the question of collaboration cuts both ways: Ukrainian extremists on the right worked with Hitler, but Jewish extremists on the left helped to implement the policies of Stalin? History shows that both groups came to grief: Hitler almost destroyed the OUN in 1941–2, while Stalin began an all-out pogrom against Soviet Jews in 1948. In any case, the question of passive accommodation to, or active collaboration with, a stronger power is a multifaceted and controversial subject, which might occupy the mixed scholarly commission for many a day and week. The question exists; it cannot easily be defined out of existence.[18]

Fourth, there is some very interesting testimony by the son of the chief rabbi of Lviv as to how the pogrom in Lviv broke out: "Immediately after the entry of German troops, anti-Jewish riots started in which many thousands of Jewish inhabitants of Lviv lost their lives. The pogrom *was organized by the Germans,* but the atrocities were committed by the *Polish* and Ukrainian mobs."[19]

Similarly, Whitney R. Harris, an experienced member of the United States prosecution staff at the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, gives an interesting example regarding mistaken identity and how easy it was to label anyone a "Ukrainian": "Postwar investigation by the Central Commission for the Investigation of German Crimes in Poland disclosed that the principal forces used by the Germans 'consisted of a police brigade in which criminals and Volksdeutsche served, and of the Vlasov Army composed of Soviet prisoners of war' *which the Warsaw population usually called Ukrainians.*"[20] This would certainly raise the question whether Ukrainians are not being blamed for some misdeeds that were committed by non-Ukrainians.

One may summarize by saying that pogroms, particularly those which occurred in Western Ukraine in 1941, comprise an extremely tragic but also very complex, confused and delicate subject, which needs to be thoroughly studied with the aid of documents and surviving witnesses, not by shoving everything onto alleged "deep-seated" Ukrainian anti-Semitism.

Ukrainians served in various units of the so-called *Ostpolizei* (Police of Eastern Territories). But one cannot dismiss out of hand, and, indeed, it may be very likely, that a multitude of non-Ukrainians, former members of the Red Army, were acting under the guise of Ukrainians. Having fallen captive to the Germans, such individuals saved their own lives by serving in the German police. This is another important question worthy

of careful study. Obviously, this could not be done by one person alone. In any event, the so-called Ukrainian police or militia, which surfaces, for example, in the documents of the major Nuremberg trial,[21] was in fact a German police force that operated in Ukraine and was composed of various elements—Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian.

Did some Ukrainians serve as guards in the so-called death camps? Yes, they did. Nevertheless, we should be sensitive to cases of mistaken identity. Petro Mirchuk, who himself was a political prisoner in the Oświęcim (Auschwitz) camp, relates in his memoirs that he engaged in conversation members of an auxiliary guard detachment in the second half of 1943, a unit of the "Ukrainian SS": "To the extent of that I could determine, it was a unit comprised of representatives of various so-called "Eastern peoples"—primarily Russians, Belorussians, Caucasians and others, and least of all Ukrainians, although for some reason the unit was officially called 'Ukrainian'."[22]

The preface to the Ukrainian edition of Mirchuk's memoirs contains a long list of Ukrainian political prisoners in Oświęcim-Auschwitz and other German concentration camps. It would be most useful to obtain from them confirmation of Mirchuk's interesting testimony about the so-called Ukrainian SS members in Auschwitz.

Also very interesting are the remarks of the French publicist Louis Saurel. In an analogous book about the death camps he writes: "Part of the SS soldiers were not Germans. There were many Romanians, Slovaks, Hungarians, Croats and so on. . . . Interpreters were required to convey explanations between the Germans and the foreign SS troops."[23] In Saurel's account Ukrainians are not mentioned at all, and probably fall under the category of "and so on." Reading certain Jewish literature, however, gives one the impression that the death camps were guarded almost entirely by "Ukrainians." Why is that so?

The Ukrainians have also been taken to task by Green for participating in the bloody suppression of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising.[24] (He also attacks the Balts who, in all likelihood, did not take any part in that activity). Fortunately, the major Nuremberg trial provides us with a very detailed account by the chief of the German police in Warsaw, General Stroop, who lists all the German units that participated in that action, as well as the names of all those killed and wounded on the German side. One battalion of "people from the Travnicki camp" (from the so-called foreign, but not necessarily Ukrainian, guard units) were involved in suppressing the uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto. Travnicki (or Trawniki) was a training camp for the German auxiliary police in Poland. Killed from that batallion (in the exact order that their names appear in the German document) were *Wachmann* [Guard] *Willi Stark* and *Wachmann* Borys Odartchenko. The first, in all probability, was a German, while

the latter may have been a Ukrainian from the eastern regions. The wounded included the following: *Wachmann* Paul Nestarenko, Andrej Dawidenko, Michael Minenko, Nikolai Huzulak, *Boris Roschdestwenskyj, Andrej Prottschenko,* Iwan Knyhynyzkyj, *Emil Schmidt, Gruppen-Wachmann* [Senior Guard?] *Wladimir Usik, Gruppen-Wm.* Jurko Kosatschok.[25] Some of the names are Ukrainian, others (underlined by me) are German or Russian. But for some reason certain American authors consider all the "people from the Travnicki camp" to be Ukrainians.

Next to the semi-spontaneous pogroms in Galicia and the misdeeds of the German *Ostpolizei* in which both Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians served, the most important event for the study of Jewish-Ukrainian relations during the Second World War is the tragedy of Babyn Iar (Babi Yar), which still awaits an incisive but dispassionate analysis. In essence, within eight days of their occupation of Kiev, the Germans rounded up the totally unsuspecting Jews of that city. Practically all of them, a total of 33,771, were shot in the ravine of Babyn Iar on 29 and 30 September 1941. Hardly dispassionate, but rather sweeping and stereotypical is the following assertion by a Jewish scholar:

> There were Ukrainians who came to help their Jewish friends, to accompany the old and the sick, though most watched the mournful procession with indifference. And some Ukrainians even rejoiced in the misfortune of the Jews—people who had been neighbors, schoolmates, shop mates, even friends, jeered. The Jews were unprepared for abandonment and betrayal by those among whom they had lived in peace for two decades. They were unprepared for the ease and speed with which some Ukrainians slipped back into *the anti-Semitism that had tainted Ukrainian history for centuries.*[26]

Much more credible is the statement of a Ukrainian woman writer who lived in Kiev during the German occupation. Dokiia Humenna wrote: "There was not a person in Kiev who did not abhor, who inwardly did not shudder at Hitler's butchery of the Jews."[27] This would, of course, not exclude the actions of some anti-Semitic bandits, but our scholarly team really would have to ask themselves the question whether the Ukrainian people hold a monopoly on banditry. Apart from the difficult question how the population of Kiev reacted to the Jews being led out of the city (the most likely explanation is that the onlookers suspected no more that the victims themselves),[28] what was the actual role of the Ukrainians in the Babyn Iar massacre?

On the basis of Soviet evidence and evidence from Dina Pronicheva, a Jewess from Kiev who literally crawled out alive from under the corpses

at Babyn Iar, Anatoli Kuznetsov emphasizes the role of the Ukrainian police dressed in black uniforms with grey cuffs, who, together with the German police, let the Jews pass through the barrier next to the Jewish cemetery, beat the hapless victims, ordered them to undress, and then, after they had been shot by the Germans, covered their bodies with soil.[29] In an autobiographical article, citing a sketch he had previously submitted to the editor of *Novyi mir*, Viktor Nekrasov, too, speaks of "huge soldiers with rolled-up shirt sleeves and policemen in a black uniform with grey cuffs" who guarded the barrier at the cemetery, without, however, identifying the nationality of the policemen. (He also gives the Soviet figure of one hundred thousand victims in three days, which is much too high).[30] However, my witness from Kiev, the late K.T., who had provided Pronicheva with refuge, heard directly from her that she only saw individuals in grey-green overcoats, i.e., Germans. From a German document it is clear that in Babyn Iar the Jews were shot by soldiers of "Sonderkommando 4a," staff members of the "Einsatzgruppe C," and two Kommandos of the [German police regiment "South." The German document does *not* mention participation in the horrible executions by Ukrainians.[31] However, both the German document[32] and my witness from Kiev say that the "Sonderkommando 4a" gave part of the Jews' clothes to the Kiev Municipal Council for distribution to the poor and part to the Nazi Party's Public Welfare Organization, the so-called NSV, to be distributed among the Germans.

Parenthetically, any scholar who is interested in the future of Jewish-Ukrainian relations must note that in 1966, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the massacre, the unofficial memorial meeting at Babyn Iar, which was attended mostly by Jews, was also addressed by the liberal Russian dissident writer Viktor Nekrasov, the Ukrainian writer Borys Antonenko-Davydovych and the literary critic Ivan Dziuba, who until his recantation in late 1973 was the leader of the democratic liberal Ukrainian dissenters. Dziuba's eloquent speech, which called for mutual reconciliation and understanding between Jews and Ukrainians, is particularly well documented. But referring to the Babyn Iar commemorative meetings three times, Professor Dawidowicz studiously avoids mentioning Dziuba.[33]

A most painful question for Jews, and particularly for Ukrainians, is whether the latter served only as guards or also shot the Jews. The evidence, though fragmentary,[34] would have to be very carefully investigated by our scholarly commission. For instance, a brief survey of the literature revealed an ambiguous reference to the composition of "Einsatzgruppe D," which operated in the south of Ukraine. It consisted of five hundred men, not including *local* members who had been taken on as auxiliary personnel. The witness Ohlendorf does not provide the number

of local cadres or their nationality.[35] Later testimony by the head of "Sonderkommando 4a" states that in Korosten the Jews were shot by a detachment consisting of members of "Sonderkommando 4a," the militia (from the text it is clear that this a reference to the "Ukrainian" auxiliary police) and the German police.[36] Blobel might well have been lying. For instance, in the very same deposition he asserted that the number of 33,771 Jews who had initially been shot in Babyn Iar, which is the number taken from the official account, was an exaggeration. He had no more than half that number shot, he said.[37] But he could have been telling the truth about Korosten. Hilberg alludes to certain dreadful German documents, which I was unable to check. Thus, in Radomyshl, the Germans from "Einsatzkommando 4a" killed Jewish adults and then gave their "Ukrainian helpers" the order to shoot the children.[38]

All this is horrible, but even the most terrible things must be seen in the historical context. The role of the Jewish councils and, above all, that of the Jewish police in the ghettos was, to put it mildly, very controversial.[39] In a conversation with me, one witness claimed that the Jewish police in Lviv, on orders from the Germans, hanged Jews. Another painful detail would also bear careful doublechecking, which I was unable to do. In his memoirs of the German death camps (admittedly only in the Ukrainian edition), the former prisoner of Oświęcim Petro Mirchuk writes: "All the time the hangman in Oświęcim [Auschwitz] was a Jew named Jacob, the former trainer of the German boxer Schmeling."[40]

In order to place the painful question of Ukrainian collaboration with the Germans against the Jews in a historical perspective, I would propose that we carefully and thoroughly review Professor Possony's assertion that documents held by the Israeli War Crimes Investigation Office show that during the Second World War eleven thousand Ukrainians took part in all sorts of "anti-Jewish activities," mass killings and deportations. Eleven thousand is a very significant number, but when compared with other nationalities per ten thousand population this figure is the second smallest. Least guilty of wrongdoing vis-à-vis the Jews were the West European nations (0.5 per 10,000), followed by the Ukrainians (3 per 10,000), the Poles (4 per 10,000), the Germans (6 per 10,000), the Russians and Belorussians (8 per 10,000), the Austrians (10 per 10,000) and the Balts (20 per 10,000). (Incidentally, Possony feels that the number of criminals among the Balts is exaggerated.)[41]

Permit me to note in brief another aspect of the topic. The Ukrainians suffered a great deal at the hands of the Bolsheviks in the 1930s and suffered a great deal because of the Germans as well. The late Ukrainian demographer Volodymyr Kubijovyč has calculated that some two million Ukrainians were killed in Ukraine during the first years of military operations (1941–3), along with two million Jews.[42] This represents two

million Ukrainian victims in addition to the approximately nine-ten million whom the Bolsheviks had killed, according to the estimates of the anonymous author in the *Ukrainian Herald*.[43] We must finally write a basic history of Ukrainian martyrology, which would at the very least match in quality Hilberg's work on the destruction of the Jews! This is not an easy task—Hilberg took twelve years to write the first edition of his book.

Did Ukrainians rescue Jews? Yes, of course they did. Hilberg writes that the SS "Sonderkommando 4b" shot the Ukrainian *Bürgermeister* [mayor] of Kremenchuk, Synytsia-Vershovsky, because he tried to protect the Jews.[44] On the basis of other documents (announcements of German field court martials), Philip Friedman has established that, only between October 1943 and June 1944 and just within Galicia itself, the Germans executed some one hundred Ukrainians for the specific "crime" of having rendered help to the Jews (*Judenbegünstigung)*. In Friedman's judgment, this is a "substantial" number. First, not all the Ukrainians who helped Jews were apprehended and executed. Second, "in many instances those guilty of this 'offense' were executed on the spot and do not figure in the official statistics." Third, this figure refers only to a short period of time (not quite nine months) and only encompasses a small portion of the Ukrainian territory.[45] A pamphlet issued by the B'nai B'rith mentions a Ukrainian peasant, Fedir Mykhailovych Kalenchuk, who, despite the danger to him and his family, hid four Jews on his farm.[46] There were Jewish doctors, pharmacists and craftsmen in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and they were treated well.[47] There is also the complaint by the German police that the Banderites (supporters of the nationalist leader Stepan Bandera) furnished their members and the Jews who collaborated with them with false passports.[48]

There are moving cases of a Ukrainian school teacher hiding a five-year-old Jewish boy and another Ukrainian, Andrii Kvasha, saving the life of a Jewish teenage girl. The boy, now an American citizen and university professor, in 1981 won a Nobel Prize in chemistry.[49] But first and foremost, the late Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Catholic Church Count Andrei Sheptytsky distinguished himself with his beneficence. He saved the lives of 150 Jewish children and 15 adults. The *Encyclopedia Judaica* has written about him. Kurt Lewin, son of the Chief Rabbi of Lviv and one of those who, with his father, was saved by the Metropolitan, has also written about him, in greater detail.[50] The Ukrainians should have immediately distributed, as widely as possible, the pastoral letter of Metropolitan Sheptytsky.[51] He dared do what his ecclesiastical superior Pope Pius XII did not: virtually alone in Europe he publicly defended the

Jews and in a letter to Himmler protested against using Ukrainians to annihilate the Jews.[52]

Finally, our scholarly commission will have to come to grips with the judgments of the various "denaturalization trials" (i.e., revocation of citizenship of non-native born or "naturalized" United States citizens) that have been going on in a number of federal courts since about 1977. Despite some scepticism voiced at the Hamilton Conference, I remain firmly convinced that those trials are not only relevant but of crucial importance to the study and understanding of Jewish-Ukrainian relations in the Second World War.

First, a considerable number of defendants in those trials have been Ukrainians and other East Europeans (Balts and at least one Pole and one Romanian). In this group of cases, the subject is invariably participation in anti-Jewish pogroms, massacres and similar crimes of war and crimes against humanity. Although, strictly speaking, the defendants are not being tried for the substance of the crimes, but only for having fraudulently obtained American citizenship by having kept hidden their participation in those crimes and although these are *civil* actions brought against the defendants by the United States government, this is—not to mince words—a pretence. In essence, though not in form, these are little Nurembergs—war crimes and crimes against humanity trials—with the significant difference that they are being held some thiry-five to forty years after the events. Any reasonably alert researcher would expect to find in these trials a goldmine of detailed, court-tested and hence presumably correct information of Ukrainians' and other East Europeans' relations with the Jews. In fact, some of the cases raise almost as many questions as they purport to answer. Taking the judgments at their face value may impede rather than help the cause of an eventual Jewish-Ukrainian reconciliation.

Second, many members of the Ukrainian and other East European communities in the United States—and some American federal judges as well—have been aghast at the ease with which agencies of the United States government have accepted and used incriminating documents and testimonies obtained in the Soviet Union. Many naturalized American citizens of Ukrainian and other East European extraction are political refugees who fled from the tender mercies of Stalin, Beria and co. in the 1940s. It simply does not quite enter their heads how in the 1970s and 1980s the U.S. Department of Justice, in order to catch alleged Nazi war criminals, can stoop so low as to collaborate with the Soviet KGB. Yes, it is the KGB that has jurisdiction over the prosecution of war and political criminals. Certainly politics makes for strange bedfellows, but justice? Nothing is better calculated to poison the atmosphere between the

Ukrainian and Jewish diaspora for a good many years to come than this sort of collaboration, which is most probably needless. In such a poisoned atmosphere any collective research is bound to suffer.

Third, it is shortsighted to assert that, because so far the defendants in the war crimes denaturalization trials have been relatively marginal members of the Ukrainian-American community, this will always be so. On the contrary, once the machine is set up and brought into motion, the odds are high that increasingly more prominent members of the Ukrainian diaspora will be hauled before courts on all kinds of accusations. This would please no end the late Mr. Andropov's associates in the Kremlin and might also delight some so-called Nazi hunters among the Jews, but will effectively block any joint efforts among both liberal Jews and liberal Ukrainians to get to the bottom of the question of Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust, to put those ghastly deeds in the proper historical perspective and to achieve a reconciliation based on justice and objective mutual interests, not on myths and sentiments.

There is no room in this article to analyze all the relevant cases in detail. I propose to raise some questions in the primary text and to deal more fully with the most controversial aspect—the use of Soviet supplied evidence—in an appendix.

A number of more specific points, all of which bear on the question of how difficult it is to establish the historical record in the context of the Holocaust, emerge on examination of several court cases. Since more than a generation's time has passed, ideally the cases should follow scrupulously fair procedure and be based on unimpeachable documents, and eye–witnesses should appear in court rather than simply depose on videotape, not to mention in writing.[53] Furthermore, the initial selection of such eyewitnesses must not be biased by "impermissibly suggestive" photospreads.[54] Researchers using the court materials must also bear in mind that a basic procedural inequity exists in those trials in that resources available to the prosecution and the defendants are badly mismatched: in de facto war crimes trials relatively impecunious defendants have to face the full resources of the United States government. *Civil* defendants are deprived of the public legal assistance that is taken for granted in *criminal* trials by such ordinary sociopaths as the "Son of Sam."[55] Researchers should also note the possibility that some individuals will be falsely accused of anti-Jewish crimes for all kinds of extraneous reasons.[56]

Serious distortions may also occur because of biased media coverage based on leaks from the prosecution.[57] This is an excellent way of poisoning relations between the Jewish and various East European communities. Being a sort of intergenerational multiplier of distortion, biased

publicity leads in turn to exceedingly painful confrontations when children from different ethnic groups meet in school.

But perhaps the most serious philosophical issue emerging from some cases is whether the defendants in Nazi war-crimes trials may in fact be part-victims of Nazi genocide and also of sophisticated Nazi policies to spread the guilt for the destruction of the Jews to the non-Germans.[58] Related to this issue is the absolute necessity to avoid employing a double standard, according to which Jewish part-victims and part-collaborators are being judged less harshly than non-Jews performing the same or analogous acts.[59]

In conclusion, I am painfully aware that I have not assembled all the material on the positive aspects, on the "good Ukrainians" who have saved Jews from destruction at the peril of their lives. A great deal still remains to be done in this field. The late Ukrainian Catholic Archbishop Metropolitan Count Andrei Sheptytsky has not received the recognition that he deserves. On the other hand, I note with pleasure the historic meeting in Philadelphia on 4 May 1981 of Rabbi Mark Tanenbaum, a leading American rabbi and the national spiritual director of the American Jewish Committee, with Archbishop Metropolitan Stephan Sulyk, the highest ranking Ukrainian Catholic leader in the United States, "to join hands especially in affirming religious and cultural human rights for Jews and Ukrainians now living in the Soviet Union."[60]

Nor have I been able to go beyond Possony and recalculate the number of "bad Ukrainians" during the Second World War, those who helped the Germans to pillage and shoot Jews. There were some such Ukrainians, others would say that there were many of them, but that is a delicate subject that calls for a deliberately slow and thorough investigation by a group of scholars with full access to archival resources in the United States, Western Europe and Israel. It is also a subject that calls for a great deal of restraint because the Nazis were killing not only Jews but a great many Ukrainians as well, even though by 1942–4 they had not yet decided on a "final solution" for the Ukrainians, as they had in the case of Jews (after all, even Stalin, for all his great desire, simply could not deport all the Ukrainians to Siberia).

Nor have I been able to adopt the comforting attitude that, American courts being omniscient, omnipotent and basically just, Fedorenko and those like him are "rotten apples" that are found in every community. So let them be chucked out by the proper authorities, the sooner the better, and the less said about them, the better too. My reading of the court opinions in a number of major denaturalization cases has shown that there are certain ragged edges in the court procedures that objective scholars should not try to gloss over.

The Jewish and Ukrainian communities are indeed "two solitudes," and the barriers to mutual knowledge and understanding are higher than many persons of good will realize. It would seem to me that to break down these barriers, the Ukrainian-American community must show itself more sensitive to legitimate Jewish concerns. The Ukrainian-American leadership has been remiss in not condemning, as the late Metropolitan Sheptytsky had done, any provable co-operation of the Ukrainians in the Holocaust. The Ukrainian-American leadership also should have drawn up guidelines on how the community should deal with proven war criminals. Obviously, if there be such, any officers in the administration of Nazi death camps, any privates in the blood-covered "Einsatzgruppen" cannot remain members of the Ukrainian diaspora in the free world. But rank-and-file auxiliary policemen, concentration camp *prisoner*-guards, not to mention former members of German-led *combat* units may present very difficult moral issues. Possibly the deciding factor there should be actual, convincing proof of their having participated in crimes against humanity and of having committed traditional war crimes, coupled with a consideration of the circumstances under which they had done this, not membership in those organizations per se. But this is a question for debate, in which, hopefully, Jews, Ukrainians and other East Europeans will participate. I shall be quite satisfied merely to have raised the question.

Besides their being "two solitudes," *both* the Ukrainians and the Jews have been in recent history traumatized and very sensitized, which makes the desired dialogue between the two peoples even more difficult. Many Ukrainians felt in 1983, the fiftieth anniversary of the "Great Famine," that the world owed them sympathy for the over seven million Ukrainians who had been the direct or indirect victims of Stalin's brutal collectivization drive. Many Ukrainians also feel that the world, which by and large ignored the fatal plight of the millions in 1933, is morally responsible to uncover and denounce those who decreed the man-made famine. It would be unhistorical and dangerously misleading, however, for some Ukrainians to pretend that only non-Ukrainians were guilty: the Russified Georgian Stalin and such Jewish Communists as Kaganovich. First, Ukrainian Communists who had helped to defeat the democratic Ukrainian governments in 1917–20, and even simple Ukrainian peasants who denounced their richer neighbours to the authorities or participated in the grain search commandos did contribute to the immense tragedy of their fellow-countrymen in 1933. Second, the role of Soviet Jews cannot be defined solely by Kaganovich and their ilk: there were Jews who worked in the NKVD and there were also Jews who participated in the Ukrainian national and cultural renaissance of the 1920s and who in the 1930s were imprisoned and shot together with Ukrainian cultural leaders by the very

same NKVD. This is emphatically *not* to draw a causal connection between alleged collaboration of Jewish-born Communists in the collectivization or agriculture and the Great Famine and any proven collaboration of Ukrainian-born extremists in the Holocaust. It is to assert that each national community is bound to ask pointed questions about the share of guilt and that each national community may draw premature conclusions and erect streotypes. To obviate the emergence and cultivation of dangerous stereotypes on the Ukrainian side, let us study the responsibility for the Great Famine as carefully as many Jews are studying the responsibility for the Holocaust. Both logically and morally, the two tragedies are equivalent. Genocide is genocide.

For a number of reasons—the large number of direct victims (six million human beings), the diabolically clever manner of execution (death from exhaust gases piped into "transfer vans," death from "showers" of poison gas, in addition to ordinary mass shootings and hangings) and the ample documentation left by the Nazis—the Jewish Holocaust caught the imagination of the world. But many Jews feel that the world could have done much more to prevent the slaughter, that it ignored the Jewish victims of the concentration camps until the American and British armies overran the camps in the spring of 1945. No large-scale immigration of Jews was allowed into any of the large Western democracies in 1938–9, when the positions of the German Jews became very precarious. During the Second World War, neither British nor American planes interfered with the transports of victims to the death camps, not to speak of the grisly business of the latter, though the Polish underground had passed on to London—and presumably to Washington, too—information about the location of those camps and what was transpiring in them. Understandably, many Jews now want the world to help them track down every single person who in any way whatsoever collaborated with the Nazis in their grisly work.

Less understandably, some Jews refuse to contemplate that some of the so-called Nazi war criminals may have been part-victims of the Nazi system themselves, that like some of the Jewish collaborators, particularly the Jewish police in the ghettos and the kapos in the death camps, they may have acted under extreme duress (the question raised by the Fedorenko case). Less understandably, even taking into account the immensity of the crimes, in their desire to punish all the guilty, some Jews may cut legal corners themselves and even persuade the American government to do so, with the result that innocent persons are sometimes caught in the legal juggernaut (the lesson of the Walus case). Or, in their zeal to prosecute, American authorities have increasingly come to rely on suspect evidence supplied by the KGB, which essentially amounts to allowing Stalinist procedural and substantive standards of justice to be in-

troduced into American courts by the back door, so to speak (the Kungys case is an illustration to the contrary, but it may be an exception). But who really needs the Civiletti agreement with the KGB? Cannot the prosecuting evidence be obtained in West German and Israeli archives, evidence that has not been specially prepared in the kitchens of Andropov?

Given the surcharged atmosphere that is generated by the media and repeated trials of persons who may or may not have collaborated with the Nazis in the Holocaust, scholars face an almost impossible task of sifting out the true facts. But to establish those facts is absolutely crucial for the future of Jewish-Ukrainian relations. Organized and reasonably well financed *group* research is needed: for all their good intentions individual scholars acting on their own are courting ultimate failure.

Possibly scholars can also persuade the powers that be in their respective communities to practice more restraint, which, in these difficult times, is almost, but not completely, a counsel of perfection.

Above all, let us be mindful of the reality of some 800,000 Jews still living in Ukraine who are not likely to emigrate to Israel in the foreseeable future. It is in the common interest of those Soviet Ukrainian Jews and the forty-odd million Soviet Ukrainians to achieve a mutually satisfactory modus vivendi based on the observance of religious and other human rights. This is also in the interest of Israel and of the Jewish and Ukrainian diasporas. The existence of a large Jewish minority in Ukraine, above all, calls for a great increase in mutual understanding.[61]

NOTES

Professor Tönu Parming, University of Maryland, helped with the Linnas and Walus cases, and Professor Lew Shankowsky enabled me to track down a major article. The Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise, Judge of United States District Court, District of New Jersey, sent me his opinion in the *U.S.A. v. Juozas Kungys* case. I want to thank all of them. Special thanks are due to the helpful staffs of the US Documents Section, Morris Library, University of Delaware, and of the library of the Delaware Law School, Widener University. Opinions reflected in the article, however, are exclusively the author's.

1. R. Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*. (Chicago 1961); revised and definitive edition (New York 1985), 3 vols. All citations in this paper refer to the 1961 edition.
2. H. Aster and P. J. Potichnyj, *Jewish-Ukrainian Relations: Two Solitudes* ([Oakville, Ont.] 1983), 20ff. and passim.
3. Ibid., 13ff.
4. A specific formation within the German army or police entrusted with special assignments. During the Second World War, the Germans made use of such units in occupied territories to fight the partisans, slaughter the Jews and others.

5. L. S. Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews, 1933–1945* (New York 1975), 279. A sober and more objective American Jewish historian, the late Philip Friedman, however, bears her out on the substance of *Aktion Petlura*. See P. Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation" *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Studies,* 12 (1958–9), 278 and note 45.
6. G. Green, *Holocaust* (New York 1978). I have dealt with the film in "Prychynok do studii ukrainsko-ievreiskykh vraiemyn pid chas Druhoi svitovoi viiny (Reaktsiia na televiziinu prohramu 'Holokost')," which was first printed in Ukrainian in *Suchasnist* (September 1978): 47–68, and then was published in English in *Contact* (Public Committee for Jewish-Ukrainian Cooperation, Jerusalem), no. 2–3, 129–68.
7. The *locus classicus* is document L–180, Prosecution Exhibit 34, from the trial itself. This is an excerpt from the report of "Einsatzgruppe A," which, admittedly, operated not in Ukraine, but in Baltic countries:

   > . . . Native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start pogroms against Jews during the first hours after capture, *though this inducement proved to be very difficult.* Carrying out orders, the security police was determined to solve the Jewish question with all possible means and determination most decisively. But it was desirable that the [German] security police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German circles. *It had to be shown to the world that the native population itself by way of natural reaction against the suppression by Jews during several decades and against the terror exercised by the Communists during the preceding period. . . .*
   >
   > In Lithuania this was achieved for the first time by partisan activities in Kovno. *To our surprise,* it was not easy at first to set in motion an extensive pogrom against Jews. Klimatis, the leader of the partisan unit . . . who was used for this particular purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the basis of advice given to him by a small advance detachment [Vorkommando] operating in Kovno, and in such a way that *no German order or German instigation was noticed from the outside.*

   See Einsatzgruppe A, "Comprehensive Report up to October 15, 1941," in *Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal under Control Council Law no. 10* (Washington, D.C. n.d.), vol. 4, "The Einsatzgruppen Case," Military Tribunal II, Case no. 9 (The United States of America against Otto Ohlendorf, et al.), 155–6, 159. Henceforth cited as "Einsatzgruppen Case," *TWC,* 4. In its verdict, the Nuremberg military tribunal ruled as follows:

   > Certain Einsatzkommandos committed a crime which, from a moral point of view, was perhaps even worse than their own directly committed murders, that is, their inciting the population to abuse, maltreat, and slay their fellow citizens. To invade a foreign country, seize innocent inhabitants, and shoot them is a crime the mere statement of which is its own condemnation. But to stir up passion, hate, violence and destruction among the people themselves, aims at breaking the moral backbone, even of those the invader chooses to spare. It sows seeds of crime which the invader intends to bear continuous fruit even after he is driven out. (Ibid., 435).

8. Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," 278. On page 274 he writes: "The following is an attempt at a comprehensive account of that tragic period on the basis of numerous Jewish eye-witness testimonies, records and diaries. There is a remarkable

dearth of data from non-Jewish sources—Ukrainian, Polish and German—on Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the Nazi occupation. Conceivably, the picture emerging from the available materials may be somewhat one-sided. The events depicted in Jewish sources may have been tinged with emotion. Most of the chroniclers of these events were not trained historians. But they did not invent the occurrences related. To be sure, the sheer massive quantity of so many reports in itself is no earnest of their veracity. However, the concurrence in detail of so many of these reports, written independently and under diverse circumstances, is ample warranty for their evidential admissibility.''

9. Hilberg, *The Destruction*, 205.
10. Compare Point 17 of the 1940 political resolutions with resolutions I, 10(b) and 11–12 and II, 14 of the 1943 resolutions:

> The Jews in the USSR constitute the most dedicated support for the ruling Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of Muscovite imperialism in Ukraine. The Muscovite-Bolshevik government exploits the anti-Jewish sentiments of the Ukrainian masses in order to divert their attention from the real perpetrator of evil and in order to channel them in time of uprising into pogroms against Jews. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists combats Jews as a support of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime and at the same time makes the popular masses conscious of the fact that the principal foe is Moscow. (''Postanovy II (krakivskoho) Velykoho zboru Orhanizatsii Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv,'' in T. Hunchak and R. Solchanyk, comp., *Ukrainska suspilno-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti. Dokumenty i materiialy* ([Munich] 1983), 3: 15.
>
> In the ranks of the OUN are fighting Ukrainian peasants, workers and intellectuals against the oppressors and for a Ukrainian Independent and United State—for national and social liberation, for a new political and social order:
>
> 10b) For free profession and performance of [religious] cults that are not opposed to public morals. . . .
>
> 11. For the full right of national minorities to cultivate their own national culture, which is separate in form and content.
>
> 12. For the equality of all citizens of Ukraine, regardless of their nationality, in their political and social rights and duties, for equal right to work, earnings and leisure. . . . [Political decisions]
>
> 14. Conscious of their common fate with the Ukrainian people, the national minorities of Ukraine are fighting together with it for the Ukrainian State! (Materiialy III Nadzvychainoho Velykoho Zboru Orhanizatsii Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv [S. Bandery],'' ibid., 66, 67–8, 71.)

11. Friedman, ''Ukrainian-Jewish Relations,'' 274–9. In my opinion, Friedman understates the true role of the Germans.
12. Ibid., 273–4. In note 24 on page 273, Friedman brings out the little-known fact that there were also Jewish politicians among the slain political prisoners. Nazi propaganda tried to cover this up.
13. G. Reitlinger, *The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe, 1939–1945* (New York 1953), 229.
14. Hilberg, *The Destruction*, 204.
15. Ibid., 204.
16. Ibid., 330 (Memorandum by Dr. Frederic, 19 September 1943, Document CXLVa 60, Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, Paris).

17. *Ukrainskyi visnyk,* Issue 7–8 (Baltimore) 1975), 56; also L. Shankovsky, "Holocaust in the Ukraine, III," *America* 1 June 1978.
18. On the general subject of Ukrainians in the Second World War, see the stimulating symposium presented at the 13th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS), 1981, with Professors Stephan M. Horak (Chm.), John A. Armstrong, Basil Dmytryshyn, Kenneth C. Farmer, George Kulchycky, John S. Reshetar and Orest Subtelny, "Ukrainians in World War II: Views and Points," *Nationalities Papers* 10, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 1–39.
19. K. I. Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas Sheptytsky and the Jewish Community in Galicia during the Second World War," *Unitas* 12 (Summer 1960): 136.
20. W. R. Harris, *Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg* (Dallas 1954), 201. Harris cites the English text of the report *German Crimes in Poland* (Warsaw 1946), 187. See also K. Pankivsky, *Roky nimetskoi okupatsii, 1941–44,* 273.
21. For example, in his testimony, the German engineer Graebe described how in October 1942 "armed Ukrainian militia" brought the Jews in trucks from Dubno to their place of execution. One SS soldier shot them to death. See Internationaler Militärgerichtshof, *Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof* (Nürnberg), 31: 446–8. English translation of this document (2992–PS) in *Encyclopedia Judaica* 8: 867. See also Harris, *Tyranny on Trial*, 356–7.
22. P. Mirchuk, *U nimetskykh mlynakh smerty. Spomyny z pobutu v nimetskykh tiurmakh i kontslageriakh 1941–45* (New York-London 1957), 132.
23. L. Saurel, *Les camps de la mort* (Paris 1967), 110.
24. Green, *Holocaust*, 357ff.
25. *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg 1947), 26: 628–31. Henceforth abbreviated as *IMT*.
26. L. S. Dawidowicz, "Babi Yar's Legacy," *New York Times Magazine,* September 27 1981, 50.
27. D. Humenna, *Khreshchatyi Iar* (New York 1956), 203.
28. For a brief discussion of this, see also Y. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II* (New Brunswick, N. J. 1964), 407.
29. A. Anatoli (Kuznetsov), *Babi Yar: A Document in the Form of a Novel* (New York 1970), 101, 106, 107–9, 110–11.
30. V. Nekrasov, "Zapiski zevaki," *Kontinent* (1975): 73.
31. Evidently using the very same document, Professor Dawidowicz *adds* to it as follows (see the words I have italicized):

    > According to an official report, Sonderkommando 4A—assisted by the staff of Einsatzgruppe C, two units of the police regiment South *and the Ukrainian militia*—"executed" a total of 33,771 Jews in two days.

    (Dawidowicz, "Babi Yar's Legacy," 54. The relevant excerpt from the German official report, referred to above reads, however:

    > . . . All Jews of Kiev were requested . . . to appear on Monday, 29 September by 8 o'clock at a designated place. *These announcements were posted by members of the Ukrainian militia in the entire city.* Simultaneously it was announced orally that all Jews were to be moved [in the sense of "resettled"—Y.B.]. *In collaboration with the group* [Gruppen—added by official translator] *staff and 2 Kommandos of the police regiment South*, the Sonderkommando 4a executed on 29 and 30 September, 33,771 Jews. "Einsatzgruppen Case," *TWC* 4: 148 (The Chief of the Security Police and the SD, R no. IV A 1–1 B/41—top secret; Berlin, October 7, 1941 . . . Operational Situation Report USSR no. 106).

32. Ibid., 148–9 ("Money, valuables, underwear and clothing were secured and placed partly at the disposal of the NSV [Nazi Public Welfare Organization] for use of the racial Germans, partly given to the city administration for use of the needy population.")
33. Dawidowicz, "Babi Iar's Legacy," 49, 63, 65. For a vivid eye-witness description of the Babyn Iar meeting of 29 September 1966, see L. Plyushch, *History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography* (New York 1979), 114–16 (Plyusch's wife is half-Jewish and half-Russian). Also, Nekrasov, "Zapiski zevaki," 74–8. For the full text of Dziuba's speech, see V. Chornovil, comp., *The Chornovil Papers* (Toronto 1968), 222–6; and A. Brumberg, ed., *In Quest of Justice: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today* (New York 1970), 200–4.
34. This contrasts with the very precise and detailed documentation available—admittedly through Soviet sources, which raises a great many problems of authenticity—on the Lithuanian auxiliary forces (police) subordinated to Einsatzgruppe A. See "Einsatzgruppen Case," *TWC,* 3: 165 (Document L–180, Prosecution Exhibit 34: Einsatzgruppe A, "Comprehensive Report up to October 115, 1941") and R. Hilberg, ed., *Documents of Destruction: Germany and Jewry, 1933–1945* (Chicago 1971), 47–57 (The Commander of the Security Police and Security Service, Strike Commando 3, Kovno, December 1, 1941: Recapitulation of Executions Carried Out in the Area of Strike Commando 3 until December 1, 1941. Photostats of documents derived from Soviet sources, in Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich, Fb 85/2).
35. *Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher*, 4, 361. ("My unit had some five hundred members, apart from local people who had been taken on for support functions.")
36. "Einsatzgruppen Case," *TWC,* 4: 213 (Document no. 3824, Prosecution Exhibit 31: Affidavit of Paul L. Blobel, 6 June 1947, Concerning Extermination in Russia).
37. Ibid.
38. Hilberg, *Destruction*, 205, note 101 (RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR no. 88, 19 September 1941, NO-3149).
39. Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews*, 234–5.
40. Mirchuk, *U nimetskykh mlynakh smerty*, 97.
41. S. T. Possony, "Antisemitism in the Russian Area," *Plural Societies* 5, no. 4 (Winter 1974): 92.
42. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia* (Toronto 1963), 1: 204b.
43. ["The Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the USSR,"] *Ukrainskyi visnyk,* Issue 7–8: 38.
44. Hilberg, *Destruction*, 201, citing RSHA IV-A-1, Operational report USSR no. 156, 16 January 1942, NO-3405.
45. Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," 288.
46. "The Saviors: Fiodor Kalenczuk, USSR: Ukraine, The Farmer," in Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith in Cooperation with the Council for the Social Studies, *The Record: The Holocaust in History, 1933–1945* (1978), 15.
47. Anonymous (A Former Officer of the UPA), "The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Jews," *America,* 11 May 1978, 2–3.
48. *Tätigkeits- und Lagebericht Nr. 11 der Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in der UdSSR* (Berichtszeit vom 1.3. – 31.3.1942), p. 20: "In Zhytomyr, Kremenchuk and Stalino [now: Donetsk] several followers of Bandera were arrested for trying to win the population over to the idea of the political independence of the Ukraine. At the same time it was established that the Bandera group supplied its members and the Jews working for its movement with *false passports.*" [Emphasis in the original. Documents from the archives of Professor Taras Hunczak.]

49. The boy was Roald Hoffmann, now John A. Newman, Professor of Physical Science at Cornell University. See the *New York Times,* 20 October 1981, C2 for a brief biographical note and *Svoboda*, 20 November 1981, for a longer biographical sketch ["A Ukrainian School Teacher Saved a Scientist from the Nazis"]. See also Anna Babinskaia, member of the Ukrainian-Jewish Cooperation Committee in North America, *Novoe russkoe slovo*, 13 April 1983 ["A Kind World for Ukrainians"].
50. *Encyclopedia Judaica* 8: 875, 910; Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas Sheptytsky," 133–42.
51. "Hirtenbrief des Metropoliten Andreas Scheptytskyj vom Jahre 1942 'Du sollst nicht töten'" [Pastoral Letter of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky "Thou Shalt not Kill"]. Ten typed pages with several errors, a German translation of the pastoral letter, from the archives of Professor Taras Hunczak. A facsimile of the beginning of the letter, as published in Ukrainian, is reproduced in Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," 292.
52. Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas Sheptytsky," 137–8. The text of the letter to Himmler is not presented. However, Lewin worked in the Metropolitan's archives. He saw his letter to Himmler as well as Himmler's reply and conveys the substance of both.
53. The reason for insisting that witnesses be present during the trial has been convincingly stated by United States District Judge Norman C. Roettger, Jr.: "... In order to enable the court to observe the witnesses' faces, body language and reactions in the courtroom, particularly in the presence of the defendant, and also his reactions to their testimony." *US v. Fedorenko,* 455 F.Supp. 893 (1978), 897.
54. Ibid., 905–6, citation on p. 906. See also United States Circuit Judge Wilbur Frank Pell, Jr., in *US v. Frank Walus, a/k/a Franciszek Walus*, 616 F.2d 283 (1980), 292–4 and F. Johnson, "The Persecution of Frank Walus: The story of a modern day witchhunt conducted by the US Government, a federal judge, the Israeli police, and the press, who worked together to convict an innocent man for Nazi war crimes," *Student Lawyer* [Law Student Division, American Bar Association], 9, no. 9 (May 1981): 23. Johnson's article was excerpted in the *Washington Post*, 10 May 1981, B1, B5. See also extended discussion by Chief Judge Battisti in *US v. John Demjanjuk,* 518 F. Supp. 1362 (1981), 1371–6. Unlike District Court Judge Roettger and Circuit Judge Pell, however, District Court Judge Battisti found for the United States government.
55. *US v. Fedorenko,* 455 F.Supp. 893 (1978), 899 and Johnson, *Student Lawyer,* 21, 50, 52; as opposed to US Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, per curiam opinion of *US v. John Demjanjuk, aka Iwan Demjanjuk, aka Grozny Ivan* [*sic*] *(Ivan the Terrible),* 680 F.2d 32 (1982), 32–4. Incidentally, the Appeals Court, evidently believing that John Demjanjuk had indeed been the brutal guard at Treblinka, laid it on with a trowel and slipped up in the sticky substance. Nobody who knows European history or is fluent in Russian would have rendered Demjanjuk's alleged nickname as "Grozny Ivan." District Chief Judge Battisti had used the correct form "Ivan Grozny" (518 F.Supp. 1362 (1981), 1370). If the circuit court judges and their clerks could not copy an alleged nickname correctly, how attentively have they reviewed the rest of the trial court's record? Concretely, in 1983 the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) of the Department of Justice was said to have an annual budget of 2.7 million and to employ twenty-seven full-time lawyers. (J. Hanchette, "Some Nazis hired by the US also worked for the Soviets," *Sunday News Journal* [Wilmington, DE], 21 August 1983, A11.)
56. The classic example, is of course, that of Frank Walus, who was the victim of a personal vendetta. See Circuit Court Judge Pell, *US v. Frank Walus*, 616 F.2d 283

(1980), 295; Johnson, "The Persecution of Frank Walus," 22–3.

57. "Half of the people in Chicago wanted to deport Frank Walus to the middle of the Atlantic Ocean and leave him there with an anchor wrapped around one leg. (The other half don't read the daily press.)" Johnson, ibid., 22 Ms. Johnson gives further details on pp. 46 and 50.
58. This bears, in particular, on former Soviet POWs who were held in German POW camps and saved their lives by allowing themselves to be transferred to the German guard training camp at Trawniki. In my opinion, Fedorenko barely managed to escape from a "low technology" extermination camp himself, at the price of serving as a *prisoner*-guard at the "high technology" extermination camp at Treblinka. On conditions in German-run POW camps for Soviet soldiers, see *US v. Fedorenko,* 455 F.Supp. (1978), 900, also materials of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, *IMT* 7: 375; 22: 472f., 535–6. Both Appellate Court Justice Wisdom (597 F.2d 946 [1979], 947) and Supreme Court Justice Marshall, writing for the majority (449 US 490 [1980], 494) completely ignore Fedorenko's experience in German POW camps. On the life of *prisoner*-quards at Treblinka, see 455 F.Supp. 893 (1978), 912–14, 916, 917.
59. In the Fedorenko trial at district-court level, Judge Roettger drew an implicit but clear parallel between Fedorenko, the involuntary prisoner-quard, and "every Jewish prisoner who survived Treblinka because each of them assisted the SS in the operation of the camp. Each did so involuntarily and under the utmost duress. [Concrete examples follow.]" 455 F.Supp. 893 (1978), 913. Judge Roettger noted in particular: ". . . Each of the Israeli witnesses testified that the [Jewish] kapos [i.e., trusties] did only what they had to do and the witnesses were quite indignant when asked whether they had ever testified against the kapos. The witnesses replied that there was no reason to do so. . . .

    Unanimously the [Jewish] survivors of the Treblinka prison camp defended the actions of the [Jewish] kapos. They pointed [out] that the kapos had administered beatings at the command of the SS with just enough strength to avoid getting themselves into trouble with the SS while not being severe enough to injure the prisoner." (Ibid., 912–13). The majority of the Supreme Court rejected District Judge Roettger's parallel between the status of Fedorenko and that of the Jewish camp survivors (*Fedorenko v. US,* 449 US 490 [1980], 512, esp. note 34). In his dissent, however, Justice Stevens squarely challenged the majority's interpretation (ibid., 534–5 and note 6). He accepted Judge Roettger's reasoning, as do I. Later I was told, although I have not been able to confirm this so far, that an Israeli court exonerated an Israeli camp survivor who had been accused of what Demjanjuk had been accused of doing, namely, guiding and pushing intended Jewish victims into the gas chambers. The ground allegedly was extreme duress. If this information from a trustworthy source is correct, what is good for X, a Jew in Israel, should also be good for Ukrainian-born John Demjanjuk, if Demjanjuk had indeed been "Ivan the Terrible," which, in my judgment, is still an open question.
60. "Top Jewish, Ukrainian Spiritual Leaders Meet in Philadelphia," *Ukrainian Weekly,* 17 May 1981, 3, and "A Historic Meeting: Sulyk and Tanenbaum," ibid., 24 May 1981, 3, as cited in Aster and Potichnyj, *Jewish-Ukrainian Relations,* 15.
61. Aster and Potichnyi, *Jewish-Ukrainian Relations,* 48.

APPENDIX

USE OF SOVIET EVIDENCE IN AMERICAN COURTS

Many of the anti-Jewish crimes were committed on Soviet or Polish territory, allegedly by former Soviet citizens. Nothing would, therefore, appear more natural than for United States prosecuting authorities to conclude an agreement with their Soviet counterparts to help them track down alleged Nazi war criminals. Already under President Ford, on 10 February 1976, the United States Department of State is alleged to have made a "formal approach" to the Soviet authorities for the purpose of obtaining witness testimony and documentation.[1] Under President Carter, in the fall of 1979 U.S. Attorney-General Benjamin Civiletti signed an agreement in Moscow with the late USSR Procurator General Roman Rudenko. He announced that "Soviet officials had 'made a firm and explicit commitment' to assist the United States to 'locate, investigate and deport proven participants in Nazi atrocities.'"[2]

Everything seemed to be most proper and legal except that not all officials in the American government and certainly very, very few ordinary citizens realized that Civiletti had signed the agreement with a front man who stood in for the KGB, that the true title of the Civiletti-Rudenko agreement should have been the Civiletti-Andropov agreement.

For a number of reasons that need not concern us here the Soviet Union has considered former Soviet refugees as its political enemies. A favourite way to discredit them has been to accuse them of war-time collaboration with the Nazis, of committing war crimes, etc.[3] Such accusations are designed to "sow discontent in the exile community itself and to discredit it as an active anti-Soviet political force in the West" (as communicated by Professor Tönu Parming).

By Soviet law it is the KGB that has jurisdiction over the detection and pretrial investigation of such "political crimes" as political dissidence.[4] A fortiori, the KGB has jurisdiction over preparing materials against alleged Nazi criminals living outside the USSR. There exists direct testimony on this by Latvian-born Imants Lesinskis, who was a KGB agent from 1956 until his defection to the United States in 1978. From 1970 to 1976 he was chairman of the presidium of the Latvian Committee for Cultural Relations with Latvians Abroad, receiving instructions from the KGB. (Lesinskis also said that there was a similar committee to deal with Lithuanians abroad, and we can take it for granted that there is one to maintain "cultural relations" with the Ukrainian diaspora). He said, as

paraphrased by District Court Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise:

> [The Latvian Committee's] objective was also to discredit Latvian emigres, particularly those who actively sought the end of the Soviet occupation. This was accomplished by publication of books and articles purporting to describe the war crimes and collaboration of which emigres were guilty. *The facts were often embellished and supplemented with forged documents, false testimony and pure invention.*[5]

Lesinskis also confirmed that trials of war criminals in the Soviet Union were considered "political trials."

The role of the KGB in war-crimes trials was also confirmed in a 1983 two-part article in *Izvestia,* according to which between 1976 and 1981 KGB officials gave "evidence and materials concerning 140 war criminals to organs of justice of the USA."[6] [The Soviet commentator who has written up that hunt for war criminals makes it very clear that it is the KGB that is responsible for tracking them down (his entire interview had been with anonymous "responsible officials" of the KGB). He writes:

> The search for war criminals is continuing and will continue until that day when only the very last one of them will be left on this earth. . . .
>
> It is not vengeance that we are talking about because our people have never and nowhere been guided by a feeling of vengeance. The purpose of those who are searching former Nazis, traitors and individuals who had committed war crimes is the defence of the interests of our state and justice. *It is state interests that dictate* [the course of] *all the essentially tense and complex work of searching for war criminals, work that is noticeable on the surface.*[7]

But the star witness for the defence at the Kungys trial was undoubtedly Soviet émigré Frederick Neznansky, who had worked "as a lawyer in the Soviet Union for 25 years—15 years in the Procurator's office of the USSR and 15 years as a member of the Moscow Bar."[8] For good measure, Neznansky had no reason to be sympathetic to suspects accused of having committed crimes against the Jews, his grandparents having been shot by the Germans and his uncle and eight of his children having been "buried alive in the grave they dug at the command of the Germans." So realistically insightful is his testimony, of such great documentary value, that it deserves to be reproduced practically in full, despite its length. Neznansky stated:

> The political cases are investigated mostly by the investigative arm of the KGB. Other cases are investigated by the procurator's office or the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Witnesses are indeed trained to testify according to

the wishes of the prosecution. Sometimes they are threatened, not in a serious way, but people could be told that they will be fired if their testimony was not appropriate. Or sometimes if a witness is in line for a new apartment, they would take him off that line [waiting list], or they would threaten to telephone his manager at work or his Communist Party organizer and make trouble for that witness.

Sometimes witnesses are threatened in a more serious way of being accused of perjury, threatened with being accused of complicity in the given crime. And evidence is also falsified on occasions.

For example, a witness would be asked, did you see this man there at a given time. And the witness would say, no, I didn't. So he would be called to the interrogator again and again. He will be bothered sufficiently enough to change his testimony in the desirable way eventually. And the investigation would continue even after the case was given to the court. For example, when I was an investigator myself, a judge would call me sometimes and tell me, you sent us this witness and he changed his testimony in court. You told me one thing and he's telling us something else. We will recess the court for a couple of days. Could you work him over a little bit more. So call the witness back and make him change his testimony.

From the experience of my colleagues and people I knew in the KGB, sometimes they falsified the transcript of a witness' testimony. For example, a witness would testify to one thing and the transcript would say another thing, and then the KGB will simply force the witness to sign this testimony, usually appealing to his sense of civic duty. The way it's explained to the witness is quite often very lofty. The accused is a criminal against the Communist Party, against the state, and is probably a parasite and an enemy of the people. So it is the civic duty of the witness to testify in the appropriate way.[9]

To top this all off, there is proof that the KGB has gone much further than "doctored" evidence pertaining to alleged Nazi collaborators. "Since 1976," according to the 1980 Congressional testimony of John McMahon, Deputy Director for Operations of the CIA, "they resumed using forgeries as an integral part of their covert activities program. . . . The new spate of bogus documents includes high quality, technically sophisticated falsifications of a caliber which the Soviet and bloc intelligence services were evidently incapable pf producing in the 1950s and even in the 1960s." Mr. McMahon further complained that "in two cases Soviet forgers directly attributed false and misleading statements to the *President and Vice President of the United States, something they had refrained from doing in the past.*"[10]

The point of this auxiliary argument is that once the admittedly skilful KGB forgers have grown so cheeky as to forge documents purportedly

emanating from the president and vice-president of the United States (note that both President Carter and Reagan were victimized), secretary of state and assorted ambassadors, all of whom are protected by the United States counter-disinformation services, they will not bat an eyelash when asked to fabricate evidence against so-called Nazi collaborators. According to Lesinskis, they have had plenty of practice at that.

Forgeries of documents apart, which ideally will be shown up by experts in the United States, how is it possible to distort and falsify videotaped depositions of witnesses in the Soviet Union that are taken in the presence of American lawyers representing both the prosecution (OSI) and the defence? Warren Rogers, a veteran Washington journalist and editor of the *White House Weekly,* an independent newsletter on the presidency, shows exactly how this is being done:

> In [a] 1982 case brought by the OSI, involving deportation proceedings against Edgar E. Laipenieks in San Diego, Immigration Court Judge John C. Williams faulted depositions obtained in the Soviet Union on three counts. "In evaluating the weight to be given to the deposition testimony," Judge Williams observed, "we have been mindful of the prejudical language used by Soviet officials, the restricted right of cross-examination which limited the opportunity to expose faults in the perception and memory of witnesses, and the intimidating atmosphere."[11]

Rogers also tells us of the interesting experience of Fred Bartlitt Jr., a *pro bono* lawyer for Liudas Kairys (a defendant in a denaturalization proceeding in Chicago in 1982), when he questioned a Soviet-supplied witness named Ivan Zvezdun in Moscow on 14 November 1980. In Rogers' words:

> The videotape showed that when Bartlitt questioned Zvezdun about an earlier meeting with the Soviet authorities the Soviet prosecutor interrupted. Bartlitt had asked who delivered a subpoena ordering Zvezdun to that meeting, and Zvezdun had replied, "KGB." The Soviet public prosecutor lectured Bartlitt that his questioning was "of no relevance." "Under our law," Bartlitt argued, "the circumstances under which a meeting like this was set up and what was said are relevant. That is why I pursue it, respectfully." "Under our law," the Soviet prosecutor responded, "these questions are of no relevance, and that is why we come to the conclusion to be guided by the Soviet law." *The question and the answer about KGB's delivering the subpoena did not appear in the transcript.* But it remains on videotape.[12]

The situation described by Lesinskis, Korneshov and Neznansky—two defectors and one Soviet journalist in good standing—as well as the KGB's diplomatic forgeries have been known for some time by specialists in Soviet law and politics. But their reservations must have been overruled in the quest to bring the last Nazi collaborator to justice. It would seem that the minimum upshot of the Civiletti-Rudenko-Andropov agreement is that when you work closely with the KGB you cannot help adopting some of its procedural standards.

How have American judges faced the problem? In essence, they have gone in two opposite directions: giving the benefit of the doubt either to the government or to the defendant. This constitutes quite a challenge to a researcher who wants to establish the historical record on the basis of court proceedings. Chief Judge Jacob Mishler, of Westbury, Long Island, decided against Karl Linnas, a naturalized American citizen of Estonian descent, which decision was upheld on appeal as far as the U.S. Supreme Court.[13] In the same year, 1981, Chief Judge Battisti of Cleveland, Ohio, decided against Ukrainian-born John Demjanjuk, which decision, too, was upheld on appeal.[14] I understand that at the time of writing (February 1984) Mr. Demjanjuk is facing a hearing on deportation to Israel, where he is to be tried on the *substance* of the charges against him. But on 28 September 1983, Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise of Newark, N.J., in an exceedingly well researched and argued opinion, held for the Lithuanian-born Juozas Kungys, which decision may or may not be appealed by the government.[15]

Why this disparity of judgment in cases that are fundamentally similar (Linnas was accused of having been an officer at the Tartu concentration camp and of having shot Jews; Demjanjuk was alleged to have a guard at the Treblinka concentration camp where he drove prisoners into the gas chambers and operated the motors pumping gas; Kungys allegedly shot Jews in Lithuania)?

Linnas was convicted on the basis of eyewitness testimony that had been videotaped in the USSR, Soviet-supplied documents and a document that may or may *not* have been captured by the British and Americans after the Second World War.[16] Linnas may have fallen victim to bad defence strategy. On advice of counsel, he defied the court order to answer interrogatories, refused to testify in court after raising the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and did not challenge in detail depositions of prosecution witnesses that had been videotaped in the USSR.[17] The defence strategy evidently rubbed Judge Mishler the wrong way. He wrote somewhat angrily:

> Each of the video-taped depositions [by Hans Laats, Olav Karikosk, Oskar Art and Elmer Puusepp] was admitted into evidence. The defense refused

> to attend the depositions held in the Soviet Union because it contended that any such proceeding conducted there would be a sham. Evidence offered at trial through defense witnesses attempted to show that the Soviets, on many occasions, have manipulated and, at times, have manufactured evidence to convict innocent Soviet citizens for the purpose of attaining political objectives of the Soviet Communist party. In essence defendant contends that we must adopt a *per se* rule excluding all evidence deriving from Soviet sources. In rejecting this contention we simply note one of the fatal flaws in defendant's broadbush [sic—broadbrush?] attack on Soviet-source evidence. In the context of this case, the defense witnesses were unable to cite *any* instance in a western court in which falsified, forged, or otherwise fraudulent evidence had been supplied by the Soviet Union to a court or other governmental authority.[18]

Judge Mishler further noted that Special Agent Michael Noblett, an expert FBI document examiner, had examined the four Soviet-supplied concentration-camp documents and had determined that there were "strong indications" that Linnas had signed them and that "the defense failed to produce a document expert to challenge either their authenticity or the conclusion that defendant was the signatory."[19] Read superficially, the case against Linnas appears to be very strong.

When examined more closely, however, the Linnas decision, despite its having been affirmed on appeal, is weak on two counts: the probable use of forgeries in this and similar trials and the tainted evidence of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. When Chief Judge Mishler rendered the sentence on 30 July 1981, evidence was slowly building up in parallel trials that videotaped testimonies *were* being tampered with by Soviet authorities.[20] But proof of forgery of *diplomatic* documents, which had been uncovered at a Congressional hearing early in 1980, was already in the public domain. This is not to say that the Soviet-supplied documents accusing Linnas were *necessarily* false: the defence may have made a mistake in not challenging the findings of FBI document examiner Noblett.

Second, Chief Judge Mishler did not bring out the importance of a Soviet trial in January 1962 at which Linnas had been sentenced to death in absentia. That trial was very interesting indeed.

The trial in Tartu, Estonian SSR, against defendants Yureiste, Linnas and Viks (the latter two in absentia) started on 16 January 1962. But "when the trial began . . . , people entered the courtroom carrying copies of the latest number of the [official journal of the Soviet Procuracy, *Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost*]. Each had already read there a report of the trial that had not yet begun, the death sentence passed. . . . " The rather vivid and well-written report listed the defendants' misdeeds, the testi-

mony of witness Elmer Kh. Puusepp, the final speech of Prosecutor K. I. Kiummel, the death sentence handed down by the presiding judge, and the "barely containable storm of indignation" against the defendants among the audience. There was only one little thing wrong with it: the timing. That particular issue of *Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost* had been signed for the typesetter on 7 December 1961, for the printer of 27 December 1961, and was to be delivered to its subscribers by 10 or 12 January 1962. The trial had indeed been originally scheduled to be over by 8 January 1962 but because of Yureiste's state of health it was suddenly postponed until 16 January. The Soviets fired the chief editor and his deputy and drummed the hapless author, Grigorev, out of the journalistic profession.[21]

It so happened that the four primary witnesses against Linnas at the Westbury, N.Y., trial in 1981 had all been witnesses in the interesting Soviet trial of 16–20 January 1962.[22] It is, of course, possible that those four Soviet witnesses had been true witnesses who had fallen victims to very bad circumstances. Nevertheless, an American layman, knowing that the Soviet trial of Linnas had been shown up as a sham both in popular (Vladimirov) and in legal literature (*Manitoba Law Journal)* would have thought that a prudent American federal judge would not have touched those four witnesses with a ten-foot pole or, alternatively, that he would have been told to be more prudent by the Appellate Court or the U.S. Supreme Court. But apparently anything goes as valid evidence against accused Nazi collaborators.

A major part in the conviction of Demjanjuk was played by an undated(!) Soviet-supplied identification card, which allegedly placed him in the Trawniki guard training camp and on the reverse even bore his photograph.[23] Against Demjanjuk there also testified in court five Jewish survivor witnesses from Treblinka and on videotape Otto Horn, a German guard from Treblinka. There does seem to be, indeed, something fishy about that identification card. Syndicated columnist Patrick J. Buchanan, in his article "KGB's shaky evidence used by US in Nazi hunt," in the *Los Angeles Daily News,* as summarized in the *Ukrainian Weekly,* wrote:

> Citing Mr. Demjanjuk's attorney, Mr. Buchanan wrote that he was told that the Soviet-supplied photostat of a Treblinka ID card was a transparent forgery produced by the courts by the KGB. "One official expert on Nazi records, who has seen hundreds of documents from Treblinka, claims never to have seen one similar to that produced from the official records of the USSR," wrote Mr. Buchanan.[24]

Demjanjuk's attorney, Mark J. O'Connor, said publicly: "The KGB-

produced evidence in the Demjanjuk case has been exposed as being totally corrupt and fraudulent. The OSI witnesses have also admitted their perjury during the denaturalization hearing."[25] Is this merely the hyperbole of an advocate? Perhaps not. There is a very curious statement in Chief Judge Battisti's judgment: "Although Dr. Scheffler testified that he had never seen a card identical to Exhibit 5 (Tr. 99–100), his testimony verified all the indicia in the card as being historically accurate."[26]

In the Kungys case, both the defence and the court kept an open mind. Co-counsel Berzins, the very same who had unsuccessfully defended Linnas, this time went to the Soviet Union to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and found, despite many frustrations, that this was helpful in the end. Judge Debevoise, though he was intensely conscious of the procedural deficiences of the Soviet trial practice, made an honest effort to cull out plausible, convicting testimony. In his words: "Before I concluded that the deposition testimony cannot be admitted for the purpose of implicating defendant in the Kedainiai killings, I attempted to separate the most clearly objectionable questions from less objectionable ones, but the entire proceeding was improperly affected by this form of questioning."[27]

But ultimately this proved to be judicial labour lost. A most revealing section of his judgment is *Conducting Foreign Depositions*. Judge Debevoise found that that "testimony may have been affected by the Soviet Union's interest in this case and by undue pressures brought to bear upon the withesses." Witnesses were being intimidated by the presence at deposition of officials from Moscow. The OSI attorneys showed "extreme deference" to the Soviet procurator. Defence co-counsel was hamstrung in the performance of his duties by the Soviet procurator, with OSI attorneys occasionally helping to limit unduly defence counsel. But what really upset Judge Debevoise were "strategic omissions of testimony," i.e., falsifications, by biased Intourist interpreters (when, for instance, witness N. said that he could not recognize defendant from a photospread, the Intourist interpreter simply translated, "No, I can't," omitting the revealing exclamation, "You can chop my head off—I don't know."[28]

The government's case rested almost entirely on witness testimony videotaped in Lithuania. Judge Debevoise threw the case out when he ruled most of that testimony inadmissible under American law for the following reasons:

> The Lithuanian depositions will be admitted for the limited purpose of establishing the happening of the killings in Kedainiai in July and August 1941. They will not be admitted as evidence that defendant participated in the killings. In summary the reasons for this ruling are: (i) The Soviet

> Union, which cooperated with the United States government by making these witnesses available, has a strong state interest in a finding that defendant participated in the Kedainiai killings; (ii) The Soviet legal system on occasion distorts or fabricates evidence in cases such as this involving an important state interest; (iii) These depositions were conducted in a manner which made it impossible to determine if the testimony had been influenced improperly by Soviet authorities in that a Soviet procurator presided over the depositions, a Soviet employee served as translator, evidencing actual bias in the manner of translation, and the procurator limited cross-examination into the witnesses' prior statements and dealings with Soviet authorities; (iv) The content of the deposition testimony suggests that the Soviet interrogators distorted the witnesses' testimony when they prepared the 1977 protocols; and (v) The United States government failed to obtain and the Soviet government refused or failed to turn over earlier transcripts and protocols of the witnesses which most likely would have disclosed whether the testimony in this case was the subject of improper influence.[29]

To me, this appears to be an eminently fair decision, and all researchers will be interested to see whether it will be appealed and if so, with what outcome.

Once the Soviet agency involved in preparing documentation against alleged Nazi criminals has been identified as the KGB, once it has been shown to what lengths it will go to discredit alleged enemies of the Soviet state, an objective observer cannot but have serious misgivings about the entire procedure. An eminent former victim of Soviet justice, Sviatoslav Karavansky, who was imprisoned for a total of thirty years under Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and who now lives in the United States, has warned strongly against the use of KGB-supplied evidence in American trials.[30] So far, the results have been nil: the 1979 Civiletti-Rudenko-Andropov agreement still stands, and American prosecutors in denaturalization cases are still as zealous as ever and as dependent on evidence supplied by—and frequently also made in—the USSR.

An even more serious problem is that—procedural standards apart—the KGB's substantive concept of justice is, to put it mildly, very politicized. In other words, it is indistinguishable from the current political interest of the Soviet state. It was not a slip of the tongue that the KGB officials cited in Korneshov's *Izvestiia* article put the interests of the state *before* justice. The Soviet concept of justice encompasses making arrangments for assassinating His Holiness Pope John Paul II. (It is not the KGB's fault that the attempt of 13 May 1981 was botched.)[31] In the USSR, a country under its control, the KGB secretly assassinated the Ukrainian artist and human rights activist Alla Horska (1970, by beating,

allegedly by her father-in-law, who then committed suicide by lying down on railroad tracks); the Russian lawyer Evgenii Brunov (1975, he was thrown from a train by unidentified persons, just after he had visited Andrei Sakharov); the Russian translator, literary scholar and human rights activist Konstantin Bogatyrev (1976, after a severe beating by unidentified thugs); the very popular Ukrainian rock composer Volodymyr Ivasiuk (1979, by hanging from a tree in a forbidden military zone, after his eyes had been gouged out); and Father Bronius Laurinavicius, a Catholic priest and member of the Lithuanian Helsinki Human Rights Group (1981, after being pushed in front of a truck).[32] It should also be remembered that the Soviet secret police under Stalin-Beria is responsible for the mysterious death in Minsk, in 1948 (after he left his hotel, following a telephone call from a highly placed official), of Solomon Mikhoels, Shakespearean actor, Jewish community leader and chairman of the Soviet Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, and that in 1983, under Andropov-Chebrikov, it continued to torture the eminent young Jewish dissident and member of the Moscow Helsinki Human Rights Group Anatolii Shcharansky, who in mid-1978 had been sentenced to thirteen years' imprisonment on trumped-up charges of treason.[33]

But what are hardships for a few possibly innocent individuals in the United States compared with the possibility of obtaining justice for the millions of Jews who have been killed? There are two answers to this rhetorical question. First, past sufferings should not lead to relatively pointless present sufferings. At least two possible or actual suspects have taken their own lives rather than face the inquisition of the denaturalization trials and the attendant publicity, and at least one of them, a fifty-three year old Ukrainian-born woman, was innocent by humane, decent standards.[34]

Second, and perhaps more important, unless the judges are as resolute and able to protect the defendants' rights as Judge Debevoise, the danger exists that the absolute quest for justice for the victims of the Holocaust will be perverted into a judical and political terror campaign against the victims of many other tragedies of the twentieth century, moreover, a campaign masterminded by Moscow. Warren Rogers put it best when he wrote:

> Thus the Soviet secret police and Soviet public prosecutors, with the help of the US Department of Justice, are deciding who among dissident refugees are to be branded as war criminals. There are 2 million Ukrainian ethnics alone in this country and many are vocal and effective critics of the Soviet Union. How easy to reach out and pluck a few, thereby silencing hundreds of thousands of others who, should they speak up, could be next.[35]

All this is not to say that Linnas and Demjanjuk are necessarily innocent, but that with all its tremendous resources, the OSI has not been able or willing to look for incriminating Nazi documents in West Germany or Israel, but has relied on evidence so conveniently assembled by the KGB. Caveat emptor!

NOTES

1. L. Demjanjuk, "'Nazi war criminals': time for truth to emerge," *The Ukrainian Weekly,* 31 July 1983.
2. "Congressmen, senator question OSI about its use of Soviet-supplied evidence" [editorial], *The Ukrainian Weekly,* 3 July 1983.
3. In the case of Ukrainians in the West, see Mykola Pidhorny's [Nikolai Podgorny's] speech at the United Nations, *Radianska Ukraina,* 6 October 1960, Y. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II* (New Brunswick, N.J. 1964), 439; Petro Shelest in *Sotsialistychna diisnist i natsionalistychni vyhadky* (Kiev 1968), 4; and V. Cherednichenko, *Collaborationists* (Kiev 1975). Pidhorny and Shelest were First Party Secretaries of Ukraine.
4. F. C. Barghoorn, *Politics in the USSR,* 2d ed. (Boston 1972), 280; P. J. Juviler, *Revolutionary Law and Order: Politics and Social Change in the USSR* (New York 1976), 100, citing *Ugolovno-protsessualnyi kodeks RSFSR. Ofitsialnyi tekst s izmeneniiami na 10 dekabria 1972 g.* (Moscow 1973), Art. 126.
5. *US v. Kungys,* 571 F. Supp. 1104 (1983), 1124. Emphasis added.
6. L. Korneshov, "Vysshei meroi spravedlivosti. 2. Imenem zakona," *Izvestiia,* 26 February 1983, 3, as cited in W. Rogers, "Justice's helper: KGB is getting use out of Nazi-hunting," *The Philadelphia Inguirer,* 29 May 1983, 7E.
7. Korneshov, "Vysshei meroi spravedlivosti. 1. Bez sroka davnosti," *Izvestiia,* 25 February 1983, 3; Rogers, "Justice's helper." Emphasis added. See also *US v. Kungys,* 571 F. Supp. 1104 (1983), 1126.
8. *US v. Kungys,* ibid., 1125.
9. Ibid., 1125–6.
10. See McMahon's statement in the US Congress (96th: 2d), House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Oversight. Hearings before . . . , 6, 19 February 1980: *Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive),* 9. Emphasis added. Other interesting material in ibid., 117–21, 146–9, 154–5. See also "Soviet Active Measures: Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations," *Department of State Bulletin* 81 (November 1981): 52–5; "Soviet Active Measures: An Update," *Department of State Bulletin* 82 (October 1982): 42–6. See also L. S. Eagleburger, "Unacceptable Intervention: Soviet Active Measures," *NATO Review* 31, no. 1 (April 1983): 6–11; or *Department of State Bulletin* 83 (August 1983): 45–9.
11. Rogers, "Justice's helper."
12. Ibid. Emphasis added.
13. *US v. Linnas* 527 F. Supp. 426 (1981). Confirmed by US Court of Appeals for Second Circuit without a published opinion on 25 January 1982; see 685 F. 2d, 427. US

Supreme Court review on certiorari denied 4 October 1982; see 103 S. Ct. (1982), 171 or 51 LW 3258.

14. *US v. Demjanjuk,* 518 F. Supp., 1362 (1981); confirmed by per curiam opinion of US Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, on 8 June 1982. See *US v. John Demjanjuk aka Iwan Demjanjuk, aka Grozny Iwan* [*sic*] [*Ivan the Terrible*], 680 F. 2d. 32 (1982).
15. *US v. Kungys,* 571 F. Supp. 1104 (1983). See also the long article by Nestor L. Olesnycky, "Analysis of a denaturalization decision: the Kungys case," *The Ukrainian Weekly,* 20 and 27 November, and 4 and 11 December 1983. Mr. Olesnycky is a member of the Ukrainian American Bar Association.
16. "Captured by the allies," which in 1945 did include the Russians. F. Supp. 426 (1981), 443.
17. Ibid., 426, 433; counsel's petition for certiorari by US Supreme Court, as summarized in 51 LW 3151.
18. 527 F. Supp. 426 (1981), 433–4. Emphasis in the original.
19. Ibid., 434.
20. See the Zvezdun deposition of 14 November 1980, in the Kairys case, as per Rogers, "Justice's helper."
21. L. Vladimirov, *The Russians* (New York 1968), 90. The report in question was by special correspondent G. Grigorev, "Iz zala suda. Fashistskie palachi," *Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost* 39, no. 1 (January 1962): 73–4. This episode is also mentioned in "The Role of Defense Counsel in Political Trials in the USSR," *Manitoba Law Journal* 7, no. 4 (1977): 314–15.
22. Information supplied by Tönu Parming. See also the mention of Puusepp in "Iz zala suda."
23. *US v. Demjanjuk,* 518 F. Supp. 1362 (1981), 1365–9; admission that the card was undated—a highly unusual circumstance for an identification card, I would think—on p. 1368.
24. "Columnist's articles criticize OSI 'collaboration with the KGB'" (editorial), *The Ukrainian Weekly,* 1 January 1984, 3. See also "Cleveland businessman convinced that Demjanjuk is not Nazi collaborator," ibid., 22 January 1984, 3.
25. *The Ukrainian Weekly,* 18 December 1983, 14.
26. 518 F. Supp. 1362 (1981), 1366.
27. *US v. Kungys,* 571 F. Supp. 1104 (1983), 1128.
28. Ibid., 1127–9.
29. Ibid., 1132–3.
30. S. Karavansky, "Soviets Work 'in Full Accord' with US Prosecutors," *Spotlight* (Liberty Lobby, Washington, D.C.), 23 May 1983, 14–15. Ukrainian version in *Svoboda*, 9 February 1983. An appropriate memorandum was submitted by Karavansky to then Presidential Counsellor Edwin Meese III, who is now U.S. Attorney General.
31. The pioneer work was done by Claire Sterling and Marvin Kalb. See C. Sterling, "The Plot to Murder the Pope," *Reader's Digest,* September 1982: 71–84. NBC's special report, written by Kalb, was first aired on 21 September 1982. There is some important new information in N. Gage, "The Attack on the Pope: New Link to Bulgarians," *The New York Times,* 23 March 1983, A1, A12.
32. On Horska, see *The Ukrainian Herald, Issue 4* (Munich 1972), 7–30; and L. Plyushch, *History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography* (New York 1979), 234–8. On Brunov, see A. Sakharov, *Alarm and Hope,* ed. E. Yankelevich and A. Friendly, Jr. (New York 1978), 60, 132. On Bogatyrev, see "An Interview with Andrei Amalrik," *Radio Liberty Special Report* RL 368/76 (29 July 1976), 3–4; Sakharov, *Alarm and Hope,* 47, 60–1, 71, 183. On Ivasiuk, see "Ivasiuk,

Volodimir,'' *Materialy Samizdata,* no. 45/79 (24 December 1979); and ''Big Brother Is Everywhere,'' *Time,* 23 June 1980, 39. On Father Laurinavicius, who was killed three days after being attacked in an official newspaper, see US Congress, 97th:2d, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings and Recommendations Seven Years After Helsinki* (Washington, D.C. 1982), 131.

33. On Mikhoels, see Y. A. Gilboa, *The Black Years of Soviet Jewry, 1939–1953* (Boston 1971), 81–6, 335. On Shcharansky's trial, see *Newsweek,* 24 July 1978, 18–28. According to Joseph Harris, ''Shcharansky, despite failing eyesight, laboriously handweaves eight potato sacks a day in his dimly lit cell at Chistopol Prison, 540 miles east of Moscow.'' J. A. Harris, ''Made in USSR—by Forced Labor,'' *Reader's Digest,* September 1983, 102.
34. See the moving letter to the editor of the *Boston Globe* by Gabriela Broniski, the daughter of the woman, ''Searching for truth in the court of one's conscience,'' reprinted in the *Sunday News Journal,* Wilmington, DE, 4 September 1983, H3. The other suicide, Ukrainian-born Michael Popczuk, was facing a denaturalization trial. He vehemently denied guilt.
35. Rogers, ''Justice's helper.''

Aharon Weiss

Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Western Ukraine During the Holocaust

The main object of this paper is to review and assess the Jewish-Ukrainian relationship during the Holocaust period of 1941–4 in Western Ukraine. In those few years, the Jewish community in the area was almost completely destroyed. At the beginning of the German occupation in July 1941, the Jews in Western Ukraine (i.e., Eastern Galicia and Volhynia), numbered 870,000. After the German withdrawal in 1944, only about 17,000 Jews, or 2 per cent of the entire prewar Jewish population, survived.[1] These figures speak for themselves and indicate the Jewish people's tragic fate in that region.

Previous historical research has analyzed mainly the Nazi policy of the "Final Solution," examining the operation of the German extermination machinery. More recently, regional research has developed and taken into consideration local conditions, relations between the Jews and the local population, and how they influenced the situation of Jews in those crucial years.

Relations between Jews and Ukrainians in the interwar period fluctuated from sporadic co-operation to tension and mutual suspicion.

With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War, and the new political and territorial settlement in Europe, a struggle for power began in Eastern Galicia between Poles and Ukrainians. Both sides expected the support of the Jews, who were caught between the hammer and the anvil.

The recently established Western Ukrainian People's Republic fought

against the Poles, who made efforts to annex Eastern Galicia to the reborn Polish state. In such a complicated situation the Jews decided to remain neutral.

During the existence of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, the Jewish national councils were officially recognized and some basic rights for the Jews as a national minority were negotiated. Jews served in the Western Ukrainian army and in several places the Ukrainian authorities granted them permission to create their own police units.[2]

After the Polish conquest of the Western Ukrainian republic, attempts to reach a modus vivendi between Jews and Ukrainians ceased temporarily.

The Poles, for their part, did not reconcile themselves to the neutral position of the Jews and accused them of co-operation with the Ukrainians. One of the extreme expressions of hostility was the pogrom carried out by Polish soldiers and the local Polish population in Lviv on 22 November 1918, in which at least a hundred Jews were killed.[3]

The Polish government's estrangement from the policy of national minority rights led to the formation of the "Bloc of Minorities," which participated in the elections to the *Sejm* and Senate in 1922. This was a most interesting historical experience. The Ukrainians boycotted the elections in Eastern Galicia, but in other places common electoral lists achieved important results.[4]

These contacts were interrupted in 1925, when some of the Jewish leaders, mainly those of Eastern Galicia, signed an agreement with the Polish government in an attempt to ensure elementary rights for the Jewish minority. The Ukrainians argued that the Jews preferred an understanding with the Polish government to the maintenance of solidarity with the Ukrainians.[5]

It is worthwhile to note the existing ties between the Jewish circle and UNDO (*Ukrainske Natsionalno-Demokratychne Obiednannia)* in the Sejm. Itzhak Greenbaum, head of the Jewish circle in the Sejm, repulsed decisively every attempt of the Poles to limit the rights of the minorities, especially those of the Ukrainians. On the other hand the UNDO representatives in the Sejm condemned the Polish anti-Semitic policy.[6] During the municipal elections of 1927 Jews and Ukrainians co-operated once more. In addition to contacts on political level, friendly relations existed between both peoples.

Yet, parallel to those positive interactions, other events hindered these neighbourly relations. Jews were very sensitive to economic competition from Ukrainians. They also suffered from the discriminative Polish economic policy. A new factor appeared in that field: the Ukrainian co-operative movement, which ousted many Jews from their economic positions.[7] On the other hand, many Ukrainians perceived the Jews as a pro-

Polish element that was helping to promote Polonization in Western Ukraine.

But the development that overshadowed Jewish-Ukrainian relations in the 1930s was the political and ideological rapprochement of important sections of the Ukrainian national movement with Nazi Germany; more precisely, the convergence of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) with Germany and its adoption of the methods and of some elements of Nazi ideology.[8]

The analysis of the reasons that caused those Ukrainian groups to orient themselves politically toward Germany is beyond the scope of this paper. But ideological sympathy with the Nazi approach to "the solution of the Jewish question" had a tragic influence on the attitude of some elements of the Ukrainian national movement toward the Jews during the Holocaust.

Actually, from the early twenties there existed close ties between some elements of the Ukrainian emigration and the German military intelligence service. Riko Jary had contacts with Rosenberg, Göring and Roehm.[9] After the establishment of the OUN in 1929, it consistently relied on Germany. It should be mentioned that the OUN gradually developed into a major factor in the Ukrainian national movement, being especially influential among the Ukrainian population.

Moreover, after the split within the OUN in 1940, and despite the dispute between the Bandera and Melnyk factions regarding nationalist strategy, both groups continued to co-operate with the Germans.[10]

After the outbreak of the war and Hans Frank's decision of 17 December 1939, an auxiliary Ukrainian police of about one thousand men was established in the Generalgouvernement. In 1940, a special "Ukrainian Training Unit" was organized by the OUN-B with the permission of the German security service. The unit was located in Zakopane, and Germans were at the head of this centre.[11]

Two Ukrainian battalions, "Nachtigall" and "Roland," were created in the spring of 1941. These units were supposed to participate together with the *Wehrmacht* in "purging" the occupied area of "undesirable elements,"[12] by which the *Wehrmacht* presumably meant both Communists and Jews.

The Ukrainian nationalists also organized so-called "expeditionary groups" whose task was to follow the Wehrmacht and to strengthen local Ukrainian institutions in the occupied territories. They also prepared secret lists of Soviet activists among whom there were Jews.[13] It is quite likely that some of these lists were used for the extermination of the people recorded in them.

In April 1941, the Second General Congress of the OUN (Bandera faction) in Cracow adopted the following resolution:

> The Jews in the USSR constitute the most dedicated support for the ruling Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of Muscovite imperialism in Ukraine. The Muscovite-Bolshevik government exploits the anti-Jewish sentiments of the Ukrainian masses in order to divert their attention from the real perpetrator of evil and in order to channel them in time of uprising into pogroms against Jews. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists combats Jews as supporters of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime and at the same time makes the popular masses conscious of the fact that the principal foe is Moscow.[14]

We can draw two conclusions from the above passage. The OUN-B adopted the Nazi approach in which the Jews were identified with the Bolshevik regime. The OUN-B leaders confirmed that the Ukrainian population had absorbed deep anti-Jewish feelings. The last sentence in the resolution is formulated ambiguously: the definition of the Jews as supporters of the Bolsheviks is emphasized once again, but Moscow is presented simultaneously as the chief enemy.

It may be considered that this formula hints at the intention of the OUN to avoid pogroms. But the results on the spot were different. The OUN activists and the Ukrainian population influenced by them were ready to fight against the Soviets, but first of all they settled accounts with the "secondary enemy," the Jews in the occupied territories.

Actually, anti-Jewish riots broke out immediately after the withdrawal of the Soviets in the summer of 1941. In those days Jews were accused of involvement in the murder of Ukrainians found in the cellars of the NKVD, which was used as a pretext to carry out pogroms against the Jews.

It should be mentioned that in some places Jewish corpses were found among the murdered Ukrainians, but the Germans preferred to conceal this fact from the local population.[15] Indeed, German propaganda and that of the Ukrainian nationalists presented the Jews as the sole and only supporters of the Soviet regime, and according to their ideology, they spoke about the "Jewish commune" or "Judeo-Bolshevism."[16]

But what really happened in Western Ukraine under Soviet rule in 1939–41? The Soviets dissolved all Jewish national institutions; many Zionist leaders were arrested and expelled; their enterprises were confiscated; private commerce was almost liquidated; thousands of Jewish refugees were expelled. It is true that Jews accepted jobs in the civil service. Yet the Ukrainization process was the outstanding one in public life. Most of the key positions were held by Russians and Eastern Ukrainians, as well as local Ukrainians.[17]

Thus, the conception that in 1939–41 the Jews in Western Ukraine

were the basis of the Soviet regime has no foundation in reality. But, naturally, such slogans fitted Nazi propaganda purposes.

And now let us return to the pogroms of July 1941. In my opinion, the cause for taking revenge on the Jews on account of the NKVD murder was secondary. Thus, for instance, pogroms took place in memory of Petliura to which thousands of Jews fell victim.[18] Obviously, the pretext for those pogroms had nothing to do with the NKVD crimes that had occurred shortly before.

As already mentioned, immediately after the German occupation of Western Ukraine, a wave of pogroms spread throughout the area. Twenty-four thousand Jews were killed in fifty-eight cities and towns and in many villages.[19]

The main reason for these pogroms and the further consistent hostile measures against the Jews was rooted in two sources: the traditional anti-Semitism among various layers of the Ukrainian population and the fostering of Nazi ideology by the Ukrainian extremists, especially by the OUN. Pankivsky defines the OUN as "people who for many years were connected with Fascist and Nazi ideologies, preached totalitarian ideas and acted to realize them."[20]

Armstrong writes: "The theory and teachings of the Nationalists were very close to Fascism, and in some respects, such as the insistence on 'racial purity,' even went beyond the original Fascist doctrines."[21] The pogroms were carried out by the local population, including the peasants. The Ukrainian militia was an important factor in those cruel events. Some Ukrainian sources have ignored these facts, claiming that only marginal groups were involved in the atrocities.[22]

In some places the leaders of Ukrainian communities either initiated or joined the riots. These took place in Stanyslaviv, Ternopil and other localities.[23] In Skalat, for instance, a local Ukrainian priest participated in a delegation that demanded the imposition of hard restrictive measures on the Jews.[24] In Kosiv, the Ukrainian municipality mobilized the Ukrainian youth to dig large mass graves for Jews before their execution.[25]

The Germans welcomed the wide popular outburst of Ukrainian hostility against the Jews. This phenomenon was well integrated into their "Final Solution" policy. The *Einsatzgruppen* active in that area reported with deep satisfaction about the pogroms.[26] They considered that it would be useful to have at least part of the "dirty work" carried out by the Ukrainians.

The Germans also used these events to try to prove that the Jews were an "alien body" within the local society, hated by their neighbours. Yet the Germans did not stand aside in the summer of 1941. Not only did they encourage the Ukrainians, but they also organized and participated

in the mass killings. In the south-eastern part of Western Ukraine, occupied temporarily by the Hungarians, tension between the latter and the Ukrainians was felt when the Hungarians tried to prevent the Ukrainians from attacking Jews.[27]

Although the anti-Jewish riots had a mass character, it is worthwhile to present some cases of help and rescue afforded by Ukrainians to Jews, especially in the summer of 1941. In his pastoral letter of 1 July 1941, Metropolitan Sheptytsky welcomed the proclamation of the Ukrainian state and even blessed the German army for having liberated Ukraine from Soviet tyranny. But in the same letter he stressed the importance of assuring the elementary rights of all the national groups of the area. The Jews were not specifically mentioned, but may well have been encompassed by Sheptytsky's commment.[28] In the first pogrom in Lviv, the Metropolitan offered Rabbi Levin shelter in his own residence.[29] In Tovste and its surroundings, about two hundred Jews were killed in a pogrom, but many were saved through the intervention of a Ukrainian priest, Izvolsky.[30] In Ianiv, near Lviv, a pogrom was avoided because of the intercession of some members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.[31] Also, in Lopatyn and Melnytsia, Ukrainian priests prevented pogroms.[32] In Korostkiv, the Ukrainian mayor tried to prevent a pogrom, but extremists prevailed.[33] We also have evidence of rescue and help by Ukrainians from Buchach, Bibrka, Obertyn, Hlyniany, Horodok Iahailonskyi, Boryslav, Ozeriany and so on.[34] But it should be stressed that such humanitarian actions were undertaken only by individuals or small groups.

The prompt abolition of the Ukrainian state proclaimed at the end of June 1941 compelled the Ukrainian nationalists to reassess their relations with the Germans. Some nationalists considered the solution of their national problem to be found in the framework of the "New Order" in Europe under German leadership. The Ukrainian nationalists persisted in regarding the Bolshevik regime as their main enemy and the Jews as the main supporters of that regime. Such a strategic point of view prevented the nationalists from opposing the German policy of extermination of Jews. This fact had a tragic influence on the attitude of many in Western Ukraine toward the Jews during the Holocaust.

In an article in the newspaper *Volyn* signed "U.S." and dated 1 September 1941, we read: "The Jewish problem is on the way to solution and will be solved within the framework of the general reorganization of the New Europe."[35]

Let me quote another slogan referring to Bandera's people, issued after German-OUN-B relations had deteriorated: "Long live a greater Independent Ukraine without Jews, Poles and Germans; Poles beyond the river San, Germans to Berlin and Jews to the gallows."[36]

But daily reality was the most convincing evidence of the dominant tendency regarding the Jews among the Ukrainian leadership and population. The period of pogroms during the July-August 1941 events has been reviewed already. The extermination process continued more intensively. Mass killings proceeded in autumn 1941. In October 1941, forced labour camps were established in Western Ukraine, and thousands of Jews were incarcerated in them. Conditions in these camps were dreadful: slave labour, hunger, epidemics, torture and executions resulted in an enormous number of victims. The Ukrainian police was engaged in guarding the camps, causing the death of many Jews.[37]

In October 1941, the Ianivska street camp in Lviv was converted into a closed camp and gradually became the biggest in the area. Actually the Ianivska street camp could be qualified as a death camp since 200,000 Jews were exterminated there. Here too the Ukrainian guards acted with the utmost cruelty.[38]

In the winter of 1941-2, the first ghettos were set up in the area. The process included most of the Jewish communities. During the transfer of Jews to the ghettos, at least part of their property fell into the hands of the Ukrainians. According to some reports, many Ukrainians refused to assist or rescue Jews because of their fear that Jewish property might be returned to the survivors.[39]

In March 1942, mass deportations of Jews to death camps began. The transports were directed mainly to the death camp in Belzec, which started to operate early that year. In March and April, the deportations to Belzec included Jews from Lviv, Rava Ruska, Drohobych, Zhovkva, Stanyslaviv and Kolomyia. Parallel to the deportations to Belzec, killing on the spot continued in 1942, and many thousands of Jews were murdered. In August 1942, the deportations to Belzec reached their culminating point and, by November, over 254,000 Jews had been sent to their deaths.[40] The deportations to Belzec continued in early 1943. In the summer of that year almost all of the latest ghettos and the majority of the labour camps in Western Ukraine were liquidated.

In those crucial years of 1942–3, it became clear that it was no longer a question of sporadic killings, but of sheer genocide of the Jewish people. Therefore, an essential question arises: what was the real attitude of the Ukrainian forces, namely the Ukrainian police and the UPA units, toward these events? And how did the Ukrainian population face the fact that hundreds of thousands of their Jewish neighbours had perished?

First, I shall refer to the behaviour of the Ukrainian police. We are in possession of the Ukrainian police reports from Lviv, which illustrate their activities precisely. Among other things, they participated in gathering the Jews during the actions, in conveying them to the concentration squares and to execution spots, shooting those who tried to es-

cape. For instance, the report of 29 March 1942, signed by Roman Dubko, head of the second commissariat, read as follows: "We captured 376 head of Jews . . . later we delivered 280 additional head."[41]

On 13 August 1942, Ukrainian policemen gathered 1,660 Jews in the area of the fifth commissariat. They killed eight Jews on the spot and wounded four; nineteen bullets were used for that purpose. A report dated 22 August from the same comissariat declares that 805 Jews were delivered to the place of assembly. Nine Ukrainian policemen killed nine of them and wounded three, using twenty-six bullets. And so on, and so forth . . . . We have original reports of thousands of Jews delivered by the Ukrainian police for execution during the actions in Lviv. Hundreds were killed by these policemen on the spot. As noted, the reports detail the precise number of bullets and their victims.[42]

The above evidence proves that the Ukrainian police became an integral part of the extermination process. This evaluation refers also to the Ukrainian police in Volhynia. Indeed, the Ukrainian police was part of the German police and acted under its close control. The involvement of the Ukrainian police in the extermination process increased during 1942–3.[43] This fact enables us to assess indirectly Bandera's and other nationalist factions' real approach to the solution of the Jewish question.

As for the Ukrainian population itself, we can generalize three different patterns of behaviour. Some persecuted Jews, handing them over to the Germans and actively participating in murder. Some were indifferent to the fate of their neighbours. And some assisted Jews, even at the cost of their own lives. It is hard to define the size of each group, but it can be proved that the third was the smallest.[44]

Shmuel Spector in his recently concluded, updated research on Volhynia mentions that:

> "The German civil and police establishments in Volhynia were relatively small. These German forces could not cover all the towns and communities. In early 1943 the number of German policemen was below eight hundred. Scarce German forces and the convenient topographic conditions could facilitate proper hiding, but the hostility of the Ukrainian national underground and the Ukrainian population prevented it. The Ukrainians helped to capture the remaining Jews in fields and in forests. These Jews were either killed directly by the Ukrainians or handed over to the Germans . . . ."[45]

Also Pankivsky, who was sensitive to the Jewish tragedy and even devoted several pages to the Jewish topic in his memoirs, noted that only a very few of the Jews who tried to hide in the forests survived.[46] No further explanations were given by him: he preferred not to indicate who

caused the death of those Jews. Documents concerning the activity of the UPA units show that in 1942–3, they controlled large parts of the forests in Western Ukraine.[47] These months were decisive for the survival of the remaining Jews.

Philip Friedman, in his essay on Jewish-Ukrainian relations, notes that UPA commanders wrote to him personally after the war. He claims that they ordered these units to avoid harming Jews, but we have neither documents nor verified testimonies to confirm these statements.[48] Only in exceptional cases were the UPA units ready to help Jews. In the Stanyslaviv area, a Ukrainian unit headed by Stakh Babii granted protection to some Jews.[49] In Volhynia a Jewish family camp near Kudrynka was also protected for some time by an UPA unit.[50] Some UPA units took advantage of a number of Jewish physicians, dentists, pharmacists and craftsmen for their urgent needs, but then exterminated these Jews shortly before the Germans' withdrawal from Western Ukraine.[51]

Thus, the efforts of the Ukrainian righteous become outstanding, if we bear in mind the background, the public atmosphere and the German measures against anyone who attempted to rescue Jews.

In February 1942, Metropolitan Sheptytsky sent a letter to Himmler in which he protested against the use of the Ukrainian police in the extermination of Jews.[52] In November 1942, Sheptytsky issued a pastoral letter calling on Ukrainians to adhere to the commandment "Thou shalt not kill," and it was clear that he was also referring to the crimes committed by his co-religionists against the Jews.[53] The hiding and rescue of about 150 Jews by Metropolitan Sheptytsky with the assistance of his relatives and monks was the climax of his humanitarian activities.[54]

But not all Ukrainian priests followed his example. Raphael, head of the monastery in Kryvchytsi, refused to help Jews, adducing that the destruction of Jews was a punishment from God.[55] In this case we can see the combination of traditional anti-Semitism with the new form. Kost Pankivsky, the chairman of the Ukrainian Regional Committee, cooperated with the Jewish Council in Lviv by helping Jewish prisoners.[56] About a hundred Ukrainians were executed by the Germans in Eastern Galicia for their attempts to hide Jews.[57]

In the Peremyshliany area, Polish and Ukrainian foresters together with the monks of the neighbouring monastery hid about seventeen hundred Jews.[58] These figures of rescued Jews should be verified, since, as far as could be ascertained, the number of Jewish survivors in that area was lower.[59]

Further cases of rescue by Ukrainians can be found in testimonies and memoirs.

The Ukrainian Baptists and Sabbatarians, for example, helped consistently in rescuing Jews.[60] Allow me to present also my personal case.

My family and I were rescued by a Ukrainian woman who hid us for twenty-two months in Boryslav. But I cannot forget the fact that after the withdrawal of the German army from Boryslav, only 70 Jewish survivors out of 14,000 Jews in Boryslav came out into the daylight.

Itzhak Levin, the son of the murdered Rabbi Levin from Lviv, who was saved by Metropolitan Sheptytsky, expresses in his memoirs his deep appreciation for the Ukrainian righteous: "Among the Ukrainian black clouds which covered the Jews, it is necessary to mention the noble minority of Ukrainians who did their utmost to help Jews during the Holocaust."[61] Therefore, it is important to proceed with our efforts to assemble all possible information about the Ukrainian Righteous. But this still does not alter our basic assumption that only a small part of the Ukrainian population participated in these humanitarian activities.

In the research on Jewish-Ukrainian relations during the Holocaust, which is sometimes complicated and laden with deep emotions, the last word has not been said. Any new material that can contribute to a comprehensive and precise historical picture will be welcomed. Unfortunately, one fact cannot be changed: only about 17,000 Jews survived in Western Ukraine—2 per cent of the whole prewar Jewish population in that region. A certain part of those survivors was saved by their own efforts, and others by Polish, Czech and Ukrainian Righteous.

Full responsibility for these crimes falls on the Nazis, but if the attitude of the Ukrainian national movement and a great part of the Ukrainian population toward the Jews had been different, the number of survivors might well have been much larger.

NOTES

This paper is based on research carried out at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and at Yad Vashem.

1. Pinkas Hakehillot, *Eastern Galicia, Poland* (Jerusalem 1980), 2: xxii, xxix; Shmuel Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews* (Jerusalem 1982), 3, 349–51.
2. R. Fahan, *Geshichte fun der Yidisher Nazional Otonomie in Period fun der Maarav Ukrainisher Republik* [The History of Jewish National Autonomy during the Western Ukrainian Republic] (Lviv 1933), 21–3.
3. A. Reiss, "The Jews of Eastern Galicia at the Rebirth of Poland," World Federation of Polish Jews, *Yearbook* (Tel Aviv), 3: 102–3.
4. M. Landa, *Gush Ha-Mi'utim 1922* [The Block of Minorities], *Gal-Ed* (Tel Aviv 1978), 4–5: 363–96.
5. P. Korzec, *Heskem bein Memshelet Grabski ve-Ha-Neizigut Ha-Yehuoit ba-Seym Ha-Polani* [The Agreement between the Grabski Government and the Jewish Representation in the Polish Parliament], *Gal-Ed* (Tel Aviv 1973), 1: 190.

6. P. Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation," *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science* (New York 1958/59), 12: 261.
7. L. Krumholz, "Kwestia żydowska w świetle politycznej opinji ukraińskiej," *Nowy Dziennik* (Cracow), 11 July 1934, 4–5.
8. P. Fedenko, *Ukrainskyi rukh u XX stolitti* (London 1955), 240. M. D. Kosakivsky, "Z nedavnoho mynuloho," and his *Remarks on Modern History,* pt. II (Munich-London, July 1978), 5–12; K. Pankivsky, *Roky nimetskoi okupatsii*, (New York and Toronto, 1965), 13, 136-44; J.A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism 1939-1945*, (New York 1955), 38, 279.
9. R. Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy, 1933–1945* (Warsaw 1972), 116, 120.
10. J. A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism,* 73–75; Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska,* 199.
11. Kosakivsky, *Remarks on Modern History,* pt. 2: 3–5. YVA, TR-10/626/690; YVA 03/1804; YVA 016/3269, 3717, 3272.
12. R. Ilnytzkyj, *Deutschland und die Ukraine, 1934–1945* (Munich 1958), 2: 107, 135–6, 144; Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska,* 221.
13. Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska,* 222-3; Ilnytzkyj, *Deutschland und die Ukraine,* 2: 144.
14. *Litopys UPA,* vol. 6, *UPA v svitli nimetskykh dokumentiv* (Toronto 1983), 41.
15. Pinkas Hakehillot, 390; Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation," 273.
16. Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation," 272–4.
17. Pinkas Hakehillot, xx-xxi; A. Liebesman, *With the Jews of Stanyslaviv in the Holocaust* (Tel Aviv 1980), 6.
18. D. Kahana, *Yoman Getto Lvov* [The Diary of the Lviv Ghetto] (Tel Aviv 1980), 6; T. Zaderecki, *Gdy swastyka Lwowem władała* (Jerusalem 1982), 62–5.
19. The total of Eastern Galician victims is obtained by adding all figures appearing in the "Pinkas Hakehillot" entries; Spector, 61–341. The sources for the number of Jewish victims in these pogroms, as well as in the further stages of extermination, are Jewish, Polish and German. The Ukrainian sources for the most part do not refer to the number of Jewish victims, especially when Ukrainians were involved in the events. The pogroms are either generalized or completely ignored. In most Ukrainian sources the responsibility for the pogroms in July-August 1941 is laid on the Germans.
20. K. Pankivsky, *Roky nimetskoi okupatsii*, 13.
21. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism,* 279.
22. Pankivsky, *Roky nimetskoi okupatsii,* 74.
23. Pinkas Hakehillot, 245, 369.
24. A. Weisbrod, *Azoy shtarbt Shteytl* [Thus died a town] (Munich 1949), 20–21.
25. T. Fuchs, *A Wanderung iber okupirte Gebit'n* [Wanderings through the occupied territories] (Buenos Aires 1947), 221–4.
26. *Einsatzgruppen* report no. 24, 16 July 1941, p. 5, YVA, 051/ER-24.
27. Pinkas Hakehillot, 49, 77, 136.
28. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism,* 80–81; Ilnytzkyj, *Deutschland und die Ukraine,* 2: 274.
29. Kahana, 29.
30. Pinkas Hakehillot, 269.
31. Ibid., 283.
32. Ibid., 300, 321.
33. Ibid., 230.

34. Ibid., 49, 67, 142, 147, 290.
35. U. S., "Zavoiuiemo mista," *Volyn,* 1 September 1941, 2.
36. *Einsatzgruppen* report no. 126, 27 October 1941, YVA 051/ER-126. Michael Hanusiak reproduces a photocopy of a document signed by Iaroslav Stetsko in which he declares that he sees in Moscow the main enemy and in the Jews the main factor to help the Bolsheviks subjugate Ukraine. "Therefore, I am firm in my opinion that the Jews must be liquidated and that it is worthwhile to use in Ukraine the German methods of exterminating the Jews." M. Hanusiak, *Lest We Forget* (Toronto 1976), 26–7. Hanusiak's publication is utterly tendentious, and I refer to it with great caution. Stetsko's writing is supposedly housed at the Lviv Oblast Historical Archives. If the document proves to be genuine, it will show once again that the principal trend of the Ukrainian national movement adopted the Nazi programme for the total extermination of the Jews.
37. YVA, TR-10/625, 80; TR-10/605, 42.
38. Zaderecki, *Gdy swastyka Lwowem władała,* 199, 310; Kahana, 106.
39. Spector, 215.
40. Report of F. Katzman, *Documents on the Holocaust* (Jerusalem 1978), 270.
41. YVA, 06/22/1.
42. Ibid.
43. YVA, M-1/E 2487/2558, M-1/E 339/252, M-9/11; 0-33/951; 0-53/31; 03-487, 03-1800, 03-3030, 03-2935, 03-1319.
44. Spector, 213–19.
45. Ibid., 184.
46. Pankivsky, *Roky nimetskoi okupatsii,* 72.
47. This assumption is based mainly on the documents in *Litopys UPA,* 6.
48. Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation," 283–4; Eliyahu Yakiva, YVA, 03/2372; Steinshneid-Orinstein, YVA, 03/1775.
49. J. Tenenbaum, *Malchut Ha-Geza Ve-Ha-Resha* [Race and Reich] (Jerusalem 1961), 378.
50. Spector, 240.
51. Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation," 286.
52. Kahana, 155; Pankivsky, *Roky nimetskoi okupatsii,* 29–30.
53. Kahana, 173–85.
54. Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation," 293.
55. Kahana, 161.
56. Pankivsky, *Roky nimetskoi okupatsii,* 63–77.
57. Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation," 288.
58. Ibid., 289.
59. According to the "Pinkas Hakehillot," the final number of survivors in this area was less than seventeen hundred. Jews from other regions who might have sought temporary shelter there are probably included.
60. Spector, 217–18.
61. Itzhak Levin, "Iz spohadiv K. Levina," *Ukrainskyi samostiinyk,* June 1966: 32.

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The Jewish Question and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Ukrainian Samizdat

The roots of the Ukrainian national movement can be traced back to the movement of the Ukrainian intelligentsia which began in the Russian Empire in the mid-nineteenth century. In this sense it has long-standing traditions. In view of the large Jewish population on Ukrainian lands (at the turn of the century there were approximately three million Jews living on ethnically Ukrainian lands in Russia and Austro-Hungary),[1] the Ukrainian movement always devoted considerable attention to the Jewish question. At the same time the democratic and socialist part of this movement was pro-Jewish in orientation and viewed the Jews as its potential allies in the struggle for national rights both in Tsarist Russia and in the Ukrainian lands of Austro-Hungary.

Since it would not be possible within the framework of this article to dwell at length on the history of the attitude of the Ukrainian national movement to the Jewish problem, I shall mention only the pro-Jewish position of two Ukrainian pre-revolutionary journals—*Ukrainskii vestnik* (Ukrainian Herald, St. Petersburg, 1906), which was published by the leading Ukrainian historian, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, and *Ukrainskaia zhizn* (Ukrainian Life, Moscow, 1912–17), in which a leading role was played by Symon Petliura.[2] It is also worth mentioning that the Ukrainian press at the turn of the century struggled decisively against the Russian Black Hundreds and their anti-Semitic activities, a fact particularly evidenced during the famous affair of the Kievan Jew Beilis in 1911–13, when the Ukrainian press came out strongly in his defence.[3]

Furthermore, there is evidence that the Ukrainian national movement had long proclaimed a fraternal attitude toward all peoples. Thus it is expressed, for example, in the programme of the Taras Brotherhood — a Ukrainian organization founded in 1891 with the goal of struggling for the cultural renaissance and political emancipation of the Ukrainian people:

> As cosmophiles, loving all people and wishing all human beings alike well-being and abundant freedom, we *must be nationalists* for our moral feeling demands it. We must concentrate all our forces in order to liberate our nation from the yoke under which it now exists and to create, for the good of humanity, one more (national) unit which is free in spirit.[4]

Thus, it can be argued that the Ukrainian national movement had a positive attitude toward other peoples and their national interests, including the Jewish people and the Jewish problem on Ukrainian territory. Unfortunately, pro-Jewish attitudes were widespread only among the leadership of the democratic and socialist part of the Ukrainian national movement (quantitatively it was specifically the socialist and democratic wing of this movement that constituted the overwhelming majority). As for the Ukrainian masses, they remained, to a significant extent, where this issue was concerned (to a much greater degree in the eastern regions of Ukraine than in Galicia and Bukovina, at that time part of Austro-Hungary), under the influence of the anti-Semitic attitudes which, in the Russian Empire, enjoyed official or semi-official support from the tsarist authorities.

These facts are important for understanding the position of the contemporary Ukrainian national movement on the Jewish question. This movement is attempting to preserve and develop the best humanistic and democratic traditions of the pre-revolutionary Ukrainian movement and to analyze its defects and errors critically, in order to prevent their repetition.

The conditions existing in the USSR do not permit the Ukrainian national movement (or other opposition movements) either to formulate an organization or to organize in any form regular public information on their ideological positions or practical activities, or to have any sort of normal communication with the foreign public. We are able to judge the existence, positions, ideas and activities of this movement only on the basis of *samizdat (samvydav)* materials appearing in the West and from testimonies and memoirs of people who have met with activists from this movement in the USSR (usually in prisons or labour camps) and who later left.[5]

With regard to the scale of the contemporary Ukrainian national move-

ment, it occupies the second place after the Russian opposition movements in quantity of *samizdat* material known in the West (one could say that it shares second or third place with the Lithuanian national movement).[6] The enormous number of attacks in the Soviet press and propaganda literature on so-called "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" indicates the extent of the concern of the Soviet regime with respect to the scale and possible consequences of this movement. All sources without exception indicate that persons convicted of Ukrainian nationalism compose the largest group among political prisoners in the USSR.

The contemporary Ukrainian national movement evolved out of a movement that began during the "Khrushchev Thaw" of the late 1950s. At an early stage in its history, the activists of this movement came out in support of the national and civil rights of those national minorities in Ukraine whose rights had been subjected to limitations by the authorities, and above all, in support of the rights of the Jewish minority. The first of the acts in defence of the national and civil rights of the Jews in Ukraine of which we are aware is the petition by a Ukrainian dissident of considerable authority in his own circle, Sviatoslav Karavansky, to the Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, dated 10 April 1966. Here is an excerpt from this petition which deals with the Jewish question:

> First of all I wish to draw your attention to discrimination against the Jewish population, for the attitude toward the Jews is the litmus paper that shows the degree of international consciousness of a given society. The closing of Jewish cultural institutions, of newspapers, schools, theatres, publishing houses; the execution of Jewish cultural workers; the discriminatory practice in the admission of Jews to the higher and secondary institutions of learning—all these are phenomena which blossomed forth luxuriantly during the time of the Stalin personality cult. It would seem that the condemnation of the cult should also have put an end to these discriminatory phenomena. Unfortunately this has not happened. To quiet public opinion in foreign countries (he paid no need to the public in this country), N. S. Khrushchev was compelled to rehabilitate the unjustly executed and unjustly condemned Jewish cultural workers. And here he stopped. And where are the Jewish theatres, newspapers, publishing houses, schools? In Odessa, where there is a Jewish population of 150,000, there is not a single Jewish school. And the policies of admission to schools of higher learning? Again, in Odessa where the Jewish population amounts to twenty-five per cent, only three to five per cent of the Jews study in institutions of higher learning. This is the norm which secretly exists in the admission to institutions of higher learning. The Jewish youth of Odessa who forwarded documents to institutions of higher learning in other cities of the Union received

> the following reply: "But Odessa has a fine institution of higher learning, go to your own institution." Yet at the same time young people from the Urals, from Siberia, Moscow, Tula, and Saratov study at the institutions of higher learning in Odessa—they are provided with dormitories especially built for this purpose—but the local Jewish youth (as well as Ukrainians and Moldavians) have very restricted rights in respect to education.
>
> Can such facts advance the friendship of peoples?
>
> On the contrary, they help to develop in the Jews a feeling that they are an inferior nationality without equal rights, and drive them onto the road towards Zionism. And it must be admitted that never were the ideas of Zionism so popular among the Jewish population as now. This is the consequence of discrimination against the Jewish minority.[7]

In the concluding section of his petition, in which he presents a proposal for a thirteen-point programme of measures for "the development and strengthening of the friendship among the peoples of the USSR" (a standard Soviet propaganda phrase into which Karavansky infused new meaning), he demonstratively put forth, in the first point, the demand "to stop every kind of national discrimination against Jews." Such demonstrative attention to the rights of the Jewish minority in Ukraine was evidently intended to demonstrate the humanistic and democratic face of the Ukrainian national movement and to counter-balance the negative image of this movement which exists, in particular, among the Jews and which Soviet propaganda attempts to strengthen. It is altogether apparent that, in addressing his petition to the Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Karavansky did not count on arousing this high Soviet official. He was counting on the effect that the petition would have as a result of its distribution in *samizdat*. In calling for a struggle for the rights of the national minorities in Ukraine, together with a struggle for the rights of the Ukrainian people, Karavansky was, in fact, indirectly summoning these minorities—and above all the Jews—to join with the Ukrainian national movement in its struggle for national and human rights.

This motif—the call for understanding of the totality of destinies and goals of all the peoples of the Soviet empire whose national rights are subjected to limitations—was sounded even more clearly in Ivan Dziuba's speech. In his desire to emphasize the movement's attitude to the Jewish people, Dziuba chose to give his speech at Babyn Iar, on 29 September 1966, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the execution of Kievan Jews there by the Nazis. Dziuba spoke before a crowd of Jews who had gathered to honour the memory of the dead.[8]

Dziuba's speech was devoted exclusively to Ukrainian-Jewish relations and to the condemnation of anti-Semitism. The entire speech

sounded like a passionate call to overcome old resentments and alienation between the two peoples, an alienation which the enemies of both peoples used to their advantage. Naturally, Dziuba could not name these enemies, but his thinly veiled analogies between fascism and the Soviet regime made it easy to guess what he had in mind. The speech was a challenge—almost a plea—to unite the forces of the various peoples in a struggle against evil and for the preservation of civilization. Here are some excerpts from Dziuba's speech:

> I want to address you as men, as fellow humans. I want to address you, the Jews, as a Ukrainian, as a member of the Ukrainian nation to which I proudly belong.
>
> Babyn Iar is a tragedy of all mankind, but it happened on Ukrainian soil. And that is why a Ukrainian, not only a Jew, has no right to forget it. Babyn Iar is our common tragedy; a tragedy, first and foremost of the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples.
>
> This tragedy was brought to our peoples by fascism.
>
> But one must not forget that fascism did not begin at Babyn Iar, nor did it end here. Fascism begins with disrespect to the human being and ends with the annihilation of man, the annihilation of entire peoples, but not necessarily only with the kind of annihilation as that of Babyn Iar.
>
> Let us imagine for a moment that Hitler had been victorious, that German fascism had triumphed. There is no doubt that they would have created a brilliant and "flourishing" society which would have reached a high level of economic and technological development, which would have attained all those achievements that we have attained. And certainly, the silent slaves of fascism would subsequently have "conquered" the cosmos, would have flown to other planets to represent mankind and the earthly civilization. The regime would have done everything to affirm its "truth" so that people would forget the price with which such "progress" was bought, so that history would justify or even forget the immeasurable crimes, so that an inhuman society would appear to men as a normal one, even the best in the world. And it would not be on the ruins of the Bastilles, but on the defiled places of national tragedies, levelled with a thick layer of sand and oblivion, that an official sign would stand: "Dancing ground."

Having paid his respects to the memory of the fighters who perished in the struggle against fascism, Dziuba continued:

> Are we worthy of his memory? Apparently not, if till the present day various forms of hatred are still found among us, including one that is referred to by the overused, banal, but terrible word—anti-semitism. Anti-semitism is an international phenomenon; it existed and still exists in all societies.

> Unfortunately, our society, too, is not free from it. Perhaps this should not seem strange, because anti-semitism—an off-spring and companion of age-old barbarism and subjugation—is the first and unavoidable result of political despotism, and it is not readily overcome. But it is something else that astonishes us: that, in fact, there was no effective struggle against it during the post-war decades, and furthermore, that periodically it was artificially nurtured.

Inasmuch as Dziuba spoke in 1966, when it was still permitted to speak of Stalin's "cult of the personality," shifting all the blame for all the crimes of the Soviet regime onto it, he was obviously speaking about his own time. His listeners, naturally, understood very well that he was speaking not only of Stalin and not only of the time of his government:

> And in the time of Stalin there were clear and obvious attempts to play on the mutual prejudices of Ukrainians and Jews—attempts to destroy the Jewish culture under the pretext of combating Jewish bourgeois nationalism, Zionism, and so on; attempts to destroy the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. These cunningly devised campaigns brought harm to both peoples and did not facilitate their friendship; they only added one more unpleasant memory to the difficult history of both peoples and to the complicated history of their relations.
>
> We must recall these memories not in order to irritate old wounds, but to heal them completely.[9]

Having condemned the oppression of Ukrainian and Jewish cultures being carried out in the USSR, Dziuba continued in words which, it would seem, not a single representative of the Ukrainian national movement ever pronounced so unambiguously either before or after him. He expressed shame that anti-Semitism exists among his people and called for its eradication. As a rule Ukrainian nationalistic sources condemn anti-Semitism, both Soviet and Russian pre-revolutionary anti-Semitic policies, but skirt in silence the fact of Ukrainian anti-Semitism or assign it one euphemism or another, as though anti-Semitism in Ukraine has always been an alien phenomenon, imported from Russia or from Nazi Germany, but altogether atypical of the majority of the Ukrainian people. Dziuba was able to rise above this naïve position, to recognize the presence of Ukrainian anti-Semitism and to condemn it as a shameful phenomenon, unworthy of humanity:

> As a Ukrainian, I am ashamed that in my nation, as among other nations, there is this shameful phenomenon, unworthy of humanity, called anti-semitism.

> We, the Ukrainians, should combat in our midst any manifestations of anti-semitism, or disrespect to a Jew, and the incomprehension of the Jewish problem.
>
> You, the Jews, should struggle against those in your midst who do not respect Ukrainians, the Ukrainian culture, and the Ukrainian language, those who unjustly perceive in every Ukrainian a disguised anti-semite.
>
> We should drive out all kinds of hatred among men, overpower all misunderstanding and dedicate all our lives to attain genuine brotherhood.[10]

Referring further on to Vladimir Jabotinsky as "the brilliant Jewish publicist," who "was on the side of the Ukrainian people in the struggle against Russian tsarism and appealed to the Jewish intelligentsia to support the Ukrainian national liberation movement and Ukrainian culture," Dziuba then moved to the concluding portion of his speech, which is very close in spirit to many of Jabotinsky's articles of 1904–14, when he was struggling against the assimilation of the Jews of tsarist Russia and for their union with other oppressed peoples of the empire:

> The road to genuine brotherhood consists of self-knowledge, not of self-oblivion. We must not renounce ourselves, adapt ourselves to suit others, but be ourselves and respect others. Jews have the right to be Jews, Ukrainians the right to be Ukrainians, in the most complete and profound sense of these words. Let the Jews learn Jewish history, culture, and language and be proud of them. Let the Ukrainians learn their own history, culture, and language and be proud of them. Let both people know each other's history and culture and the history and culture of other peoples. Let them know how to esteem themselves and others—as their brothers.
>
> It is hard to achieve this, but it is better to aspire toward it than to indifferently give up hope and drift with the wave of assimilation and opportunism that will result only in bigotry, blasphemy, and the hidden hatred of humanity. . . .
>
> This is our duty towards millions of victims of despotism, our obligation before the best men and women of the Ukrainian and Jewish peoples, who appealed for mutual understanding and friendship, our duty towards the Ukrainian land, on which our both peoples have to live together. This is our obligation before humanity.[11]

Dziuba's speech at Babyn Iar made an enormous impression in Ukraine and produced considerable reaction both among Jews and Ukrainians. It was a decisive historical landmark, after which the existence of the Ukrainian cultural-national and national-political movement *as a deeply humanistic and democratic force* became a widely acknowledged fact in the USSR.

Publications of Ukrainian *samizdat* on the Jewish question were close in content to the speech of Ivan Dziuba, with the single exception of the expression of shame with regard to the existence of Ukrainian anti-Semitism. The attitude to the Jewish minority in Ukraine and to the Jewish problem proclaimed by Karavansky and specially by Dziuba was perceived by Ukrainian national forces, as far as can be determined, without any resistance, as a valid position and one that was in their interest. At the same time Ukrainian *samizdat* sources, while expressing the most positive feelings with regard to the Jews and the government of Israel, as a rule, avoid or only mention in passing the massive Jewish pogroms carried out on Ukrainian soil several times in the course of history. The reason for this is probably that the Ukrainian movement does not have at its disposal means of information that would permit it to open a discussion on the complex and painful questions which are capable of evoking negative or contradictory feelings in a significant portion of its potential readers. Such discussions are possible where there is a free press, but not under the conditions of *samizdat*. Therefore, Ukrainian *samizdat* limits itself to emphasizing the circumstance that under present conditions, from the point of view of Ukrainian national interests, the Jewish people should be viewed not as an enemy of the Ukrainian people, but as a potential ally in the common struggle for national rights.

At the same time *samizdat* authors often call their readers' attention to the policy of "divide and conquer" being conducted by the Soviet authorities. The incitement of anti-Semitism in Ukraine is viewed specifically as the most characteristic element of this policy, which is directed against Ukrainian national interests to no less an extent than against the Jews. Issue 7–8 (June 1974) of the journal *Ukrainskyi visnyk* (The Ukrainian Herald) is a case in point. This issue of the journal, which appeared after a wave of persecutions of Ukrainian nationalists in 1972 and 1973, is distinguished by a much sharper tone with regard to the Soviet regime in Ukraine, which it calls "occupational," "Russian imperialist," etc.[12]

Decisively demonstrating their respect for other peoples and their rejection on principle of chauvinism, the authors of this issue of *Ukrainskyi visnyk* polemicize with the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Shcherbytsky, asserting that internationalism in the USSR means, above all, love for the Russian people, its language and culture:

> . . . why primarily of the Russian people, language and culture and not of the German people and its extremely rich spiritual and material culture, and the German language—the language of Marx and Engels? Why not of the talented, much-suffering Jewish people, whose history so closely

> resembles Ukrainian history, especially during its tragic moments? Why not of the brotherly Polish people? Why not of the English language—which is really the most international language? Why not, in equal measure, of all the peoples of the earth which is not so vast as it once was?[13]

As we see, in demonstrating their "internationalist nationalism," if one can apply such a term, the authors of the Ukrainian *samizdat* consistently count the Jewish people among the peoples who have made the greatest contribution to world culture. It is true that there is nothing new in such an affirmation. However, one must consider the circumstances of Ukraine and the entire USSR, where anti-Jewish myths, disseminated since earliest times with the support of the authorities and currently disseminated and supported by the Soviet regime with particular intensity, acquired the character of the only reality known to the broad masses of the people. Under such circumstances the pro-Jewish speeches of the Ukrainian *samizdat* have an enormous significance, capable of bringing about a revolution in the consciousness of the ordinary reader.

The authors of this issue of the *Ukrainskyi visnyk* attempt to counterbalance the policy of the authorities of playing the Ukrainians and the Jews against each other by means of various examples with their commentaries. Here are some excerpts from these speeches:

> The occupiers skilfully exploit the national minorities in Ukraine for their shameful ends: while russifying the national minorities they at the same time use them to russify the Ukrainians, thus attempting to set them against the conscious part of the Ukrainians and provoke mutual hatred. In particular, this policy is constantly conducted towards the Jews and the Ukrainians, although in recent times it has been a total fiasco.[14]

> . . . Shelest's[15] opponents in the leadership of the Ukrainian CP as well as KGB people attempt to use for their shameful ends the two Jewish pogroms organized by the KGB in March and May 1972 near the Kiev synagogue.[16] It is rumoured among the Jews that Shelest was behind the pogroms while they were trying to provoke a wave of anti-Semitism among the Ukrainians by spreading myths that the Jews demanded the creation of a Jewish autonomous republic in Ukraine; in reality, the Jews were seeking free emigration to Israel and the satisfaction of their national and cultural demands. It is true that this time the plans of the chauvinists were thwarted and that they did not succeed in driving a wedge between the Jews and the Ukrainians, thereby provoking a wave of antagonism between them.[17]

It is worth noting in both of the above excerpts the emphasis on the fact that the policy of setting the Ukrainians and the Jews against each

other "has been a total fiasco" and that "the plans of the chauvinists were thwarted." These assertions are not proven, but their authors probably wanted to caution their readers, to warn them that they must not fall into the trap of anti-Semitism and hostility between the two peoples that the authorities had set.

The picture of pro-Jewish positions among the top leadership of the Ukrainian nationality-oriented intelligentsia was unexpectedly spoiled by Valentyn Moroz who, after Ivan Dziuba's abdication, was considered the most authoritative and heroic figure in the Ukrainian movement. Russian *samizdat* sources announced that in 1977, in the Potma labour camp for political prisoners, the prisoners formed a committee composed of two Ukrainians and one "prisoner of Zion" (Eduard Kuznetsov) to investigate the conduct of Ukrainian political prisoners Valentyn Moroz and Ivan Hel in connection with their anti-Semitic and anti-Russian speeches.[18] The committee emphatically condemned Moroz's anti-Semitic positions, emphasizing that it cast a shadow on the Ukrainian dissidents who made up the majority of the prisoners in the camp and on the entire democratic movement.

Inasmuch as all the Ukrainian political prisoners, as emphasized in the committee's declaration, condemned Moroz's position, the incident could be considered atypical and uncharacteristic, if it were not for several circumstances that put one on one's guard. First, Moroz was not alone—he was supported by Ivan Hel. Second, it is very difficult to explain how anti-Semitism and fanatical chauvinism came suddenly to strike the most honoured of Ukrainian dissidents, all of whose activities up to this time had been a model for the struggle for national-democratic ideals. It leads one to suspect that the germ of anti-Semitism exists among a certain segment of the top leadership of the Ukrainian national intelligentsia as well. Although the leading participants of the Ukrainian movement are clearly attempting to suppress and overcome this illness, in certain cases it is still capable of appearing.

In December 1977, immediately after the incident with Moroz, another leading Ukrainian dissident, Evhen Sverstiuk, wrote in a labour camp and smuggled out the article "Seeds of Ukrainian-Israeli 'Solidarity'."[19] The article is a repetition, with certain variations, of the pre-Jewish motif of the Ukrainian *samizdat* already stated in the articles of Karavansky, Dziuba and the journal *Ukrainskyi visnyk*. Sverstiuk, like Dziuba, finds parallels in Ukrainian and Jewish history and enumerates Ukrainian national activitists who have come out in defence of the Jews or have written works in which Jews are depicted in a positive light. Sverstiuk affirms that a positive attitude to the Jews is a profound idea, characteristic of he Ukrainian intelligentsia and intrinsic to the national consciousness:

> On the spiritual level, our common sources are found in broad terms in the writings of Skovoroda. On the human level in the writings of M. Kotsiubynsky and a number of our other illustrious personalities—this is not cold tolerance, episodic sympathy or temporary political slogans. Rather it is something more profound, emanating from the national consciousness of our common fate and spiritual sources.[20]

Further on Sverstiuk makes an interesting attempt to analyze and generalize the extent to which anti-Semitism is found among the mass of the Ukrainian people:

> To what extent does the Ukrainian nation partake of this consciousness? To a large extent, particularly in those in whom there is a high level of culture and national consciousness of the individual. I myself, by no means the best and most brilliant leader of the Ukrainian nation, most often encountered among the simple people a lack of understanding of what anti-Semitism is, of who needs it and why, and an unwillingness to speak of the Jews openly. I also encountered cold scorn: "They hate all of us!" I encountered reproaches: "The Jews are all bound by a mutual guarantee." I encountered envy of their wealth or irony on the level of anecdotes. I rarely encountered the futile version of the Jew-masons. I encountered everything that exists among the lower middle classes, and the lower I descended, the worse I saw.[21]

Thus, Sverstiuk acknowledges, although not as demonstratively and unequivocally as Dziuba, that anti-Semitism exists among the Ukrainian people. At the same time he postulates, first, that anti-Semitism is found more frequently in the lower cultural levels of Ukrainian circles and, secondly, that Ukrainian anti-Semitism has, so to speak, an everyday, lower-class character. If it is permissible to cite as an argument the personal experience of the author, who lived in Ukraine for more than thirty years, then Sverstiuk's argument is rather close to the truth.[22]

Further, Sverstiuk states that, in general, among the Ukrainian people a positive attitude to the Jews "always overcame the hostility of the propagated 'divide and conquer' strategy."[23] Obviously, in this statement, particularly in the word "always," there is significant exaggeration.

In a spirit highly typical of the Ukrainian *samizdat*, Sverstiuk enthusiastically praises Zionism in general and Jabotinsky in particular. He decisively condemns both the anti-Jewish and anti-Ukrainian policies of the Soviet authorities and the entire atmosphere of "fear and lies" in the USSR, which generates anti-Semitism, hostility between peoples and other negative phenomena. It is worth noting Sverstiuk's statement that

he has never encountered anti-Semitic notes in the Ukrainian *samizdat*. As far as can be ascertained, this statement is true. On the other hand, Sverstiuk complains, there exists a Jewish "*samizdat* with anti-Ukrainian notes (as a means of arousing people to emigrate to Israel)." These words (especially in combination with the enthusiastic praise of the Zionists) sound like a hidden call to the Jewish national movement to modify its opinion of the Ukrainians and to support the Ukrainian national movement.

Sverstiuk goes on to describe his vision of the "Ukrainian-Jewish alliance" (which is obviously desirable, but which does not yet exist):

> I see the present-day Ukrainian-Jewish alliance above all from the moral point of view—as a turning point in the course of positive feelings, as a dialogue between equals who have been liberated from the alien garb of a false disguise in the guise of an alien language, an alien truth, alien interests and an alien slippery bridge, which allegedly unified, but in reality caused clashes and stimulated cunning and deceit. We wish them well, we honour that which they hold sacred, their promised land; they wish us well, they wish to be masters in their own land.
>
> Thus, we are following a positive course leading to dignity, self-respect and mutual respect.[24]

Sverstiuk developed this highly optimistic evaluation of the possibilities for a "Ukrainian-Jewish alliance," as he himself confirms, as a result of contacts with Jewish political prisoners sentenced for Zionist activities. Numerous sources indicate that a high degree of mutual respect and understanding has evolved between the Ukrainian political prisoners and the Jews in Soviet prisons and labour camps.[25]

To generalize, one could say that Sverstiuk's article was written, in all likelihood, as a declaration of the attitude of the Ukrainian national movement to the Jewish question after the unpleasant incident with Moroz and Hel. Sverstiuk was attempting to smooth over the impression left by this incident and to emphasize the intention of Ukrainian national circles to overcome the tragic inheritance of the past and to establish the most friendly possible relations with the Jewish people and its national movement.

It is worth noting that Sverstiuk used the expression "Ukrainian-Jewish alliance," as though paraphrasing the phrase "criminal alliance of Zionism and Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism"—a typical cliché applied by Soviet propaganda to Zionism and Ukrainian nationalism.[26] In this way, Sverstiuk apparently intended to show that the "alliance" of the two peoples, in spite of Soviet propaganda statements, not only con-

tained nothing criminal, but was undeniably positive and useful for the two peoples.

Analogous ideas on national rights and co-operation between peoples are found in more general form in the documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki group—one of the human rights groups formed in the USSR in order to supervise the observance of the Helsinki Accords by the Soviet Union. The members of the Ukrainian Helsinki group were, for the most part, known to be participants in the Ukrainian national movement, and the majority of them are currently imprisoned. The following is a typical appeal by the Ukrainian Helsinki group:

> We extend our hands to the defenders of human rights in Russia and Armenia, Lithuania and Estonia, to the defenders of Poland and to the supporters of the Czech Chapter, to all the peoples of the Earth who are concerned with the defense of human rights in a land free from political cordons, and we say: let us unify our forces at once, before we are hurled into the abyss of a world war, whose smoke is already hovering above our planet.[27]

In this passage one clearly senses the "line of descent" of these "cosmophiles" from the Taras Brotherhood, which we mentioned above. The exalted idealism of these appeals reflects the spirit of idealism which characterizes the entire Ukrainian *samizdat*.

Conclusions

Statements by contemporary Ukrainian dissidents on the Jewish question indicate, quite obviously, their desire to alter decisively the negative image of the Ukrainian movement engendered by the Jewish pogroms in Ukraine. Soviet (and not only Soviet) propaganda has exerted colossal efforts, in broad circles throughout the world, in order to instil in people's consciousness the idea that "Ukrainian nationalist" and "pogrom-maker" are identical concepts, and these efforts have, to a large degree, succeeded.

Since it is not possible within the framework of this article to examine this question more fully, I shall mention only that it is a gross error to identify the Ukrainian national movement with anti-Semitism and pogroms. The phenomenon of the Ukrainian movement—at least if one looks at the recent period, from the second half of the nineteenth century—is a complex and broad-based phenomenon, with regard both to its activities and to its potential consequences. The anti-Jewish

pogroms in Ukraine were essentially a phenomenon of another dimension, evoked by a variety of reasons. For example, the 1881 pogrom in Ukraine and in Russia was in no way connected with the Ukrainian national movement. The organizers of the pogroms in Ukraine in 1917–20 were not only forces which were actually or formally acting under the auspices of the Ukrainian People's Republic, but also the Russian White (Volunteer) army and all sorts of anarchist and other motley bands, many of which were fighting against the Ukrainians People's Republic and, in a number of cases, including Bolshevik forces.[28] On the other hand, the Black Hundreds movement in the Russian Empire, which was the chief source and instigator of anti-Semitism and which was supported by the tsarist authorities, was the enemy of the Ukrainian and other non-Russian movements as well as the enemy of the Jews. These facts suggest that the pogrom movement within the territory of the Russian Empire was a phenomenon which should be attributed to a totally different sphere of reasons, ideas and interests than the Ukrainian national movement. If some of the Ukrainian national forces in 1918–20 were caught up in the wave of pogroms (which did not involve the highly-educated leadership of this movement), then various historical and social reasons not related to the ideological foundations of this movement were responsible.

Contemporary Ukrainian dissidents apparently feel a colossal burden of negative images connected with their movement and are attempting to present their movement to society as a humanistic, democratic and progressive force. The emotional saturation and profound conviction in the work of the Ukrainian *samizdat* leads one to conclude that these writers are not merely acting out of tactical considerations, but rather that they are truly and profoundly dedicated to the ideas of national and civil rights, democracy and co-operation between peoples.

A more concentrated examination of the ideological foundations and activities of the contemporary Ukrainian national movement is essential both from the point of view of clarifying and elucidating historical events and from the political and social perspective, in particular—from the viewpoint of the interests of the Jewish minority in Ukraine. There is a great deal of truth in the assertions found in one of the documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki group: "The fate of all the peoples of the USSR depends on whether Russian chauvinism [by this the authors mean Russian imperialist policies, in particular the policy of Russification of non-Russian peoples in Tsarist Russia and the USSR] wins the war against the Ukrainian national organism."[29] The pro-Jewish position of the Ukrainian *samizdat*, as well as its generally democratic and humanistic position, is a positive phenomenon which, unfortunately, has not yet attracted sufficient attention from Western investigators.

NOTES

1. *Evreiskoe naselenie Rossii po dannym perepisi 1897 g. i po noveishim istochnikam* (Petrograd 1917), ix-x; *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia* (St. Petersburg 1913), 6: 98, 11: 527–30; *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva. Slovnykova chastyna* (Paris 1957), 2: 675.
2. Both journals called for equal rights for the Jews in the Russian Empire. Both published Vladimir Jabotinsky, and *Ukrainskaia zhizn* considered him a regular contributor.
3. Cf., "Rezoliutsia ukrainskikh demokratov po povodu belostokskogo pogroma," *Ukrainskii vestnik,* no. 6 (25 June 1906), 391. Also of interest is S. F. Rusova's *Sudovi rytualni ievreiski spravy* (St. Petersburg 1912) and the review of this brochure in *Ukrainskaia zhizn,* no. 5 (1912): 125–6.
4. "*Profession de foi* molodykh ukraintsiv." First published in April 1893 in the Lviv newspaper *Pravda.* Reprinted in T. Hunchak and R. Solchanyk, comps., *Ukrainska suspilno-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti* ([Munich] 1983), 1: 20.
5. I. Suslensky, "Ukraintsi v borotbi za status politychnykh viazniv," *Suchasnist* (May 1978): 54–66; "Pro ievreisko-ukrainski vzaiemyny v taborakh i tiurmakh dlia politychnykh viazniv SRSR," *Suchasnist* (January 1979): 84–103; M. Ulianovskaia, "Frahment spohadiv pro ukrainskykh politychnykh viazniv," *Suchasnist* (July-August 1976): 191–5; M. Kheifets, "Viacheslav Chornovil—zekivskyi heneral," *Suchasnist* (April 1983): 52–71, May 1983: 81–96.
6. The fullest collection of *samizdat* documents is the series *Arkhiv Samizdata* (Samizdat Archive), published by Radio Liberty in Munich. Documents of Ukrainian *samizdat* are often published by Ukrainian émigré organizations.
7. V. Chornovil, *The Chornovil Papers* (New York 1968), 199–200. The Ukrainian dissident Sviatoslav Karavansky is the author of many *samizdat* documents. He spent more than thirty years in Soviet prisons and labour camps.
8. Ivan Dziuba, the well-known Ukrainian literary critic, is the author of the widely acclaimed *Internationalism or Russification?* (London 1968). In the 1960s Dziuba was considered the leading figure in the Ukrainian national movement. Arrested in 1972, he did not withstand the conditions of imprisonment and publicly renounced his views.
9. *The Chornovil Papers,* 222–4.
10. Ibid., 226. Similar statements can be found in Jabotinsky's early articles, the best of which were collected in *Feletony* (St. Petersburg 1913). See the articles "Na lozhnom puti," "Falsifikatsiia shkoly" and "Urok iubileia Shevchenko."
11. Ibid., 226.
12. See I. Kleiner, "New Issue of the *Samizdat* Journal 'Ukrainskii Vestnik,'" *Radio Liberty Research,* PC 204/76, 15 April 1976.
13. *Ukrainskyi visnyk,* issue 7–8 (Spring 1974) (Baltimore 1975), 72.
14. Ibid., 89–90.
15. Petro Shelest, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine from 1963 to 1972, was accused of Ukrainian nationalism and replaced by Volodymyr Shcherbytsky.
16. The authors have in mind incidents that occurred near the Kiev synagogue during the Jewish holidays, when police agents and the KGB prevented activists in the Jewish movement for emigration to Israel and several other people they considered undesirable from entering the synagogue. Several Jewish activists were beaten up during these incidents.
17. *Ukrainskyi visnyk,* issue 7–8, 115–16.
18. *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii,* no. 47 (1978): 98.

19. "Zerna ukrainsko-izrailskoi 'solidarnosty,'" *Suchasnist* (June 1979): 107–13.
20. Ibid., 108. Hryhorii Skovoroda (1722–94) was a Ukrainian religious philosopher. Sverstiuk probably has in mind Skovoroda's tract *Knizhechka, nazyvaemaia Silenus Alcibiadis*. See H. Skovoroda, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv* (Kiev 1973), 2: 6–31. Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky (1864–1913) was a prominent Ukrainian writer. Sverstiuk is referring no doubt to Kotsiubynsky's short story "Vin ide," in which he describes the inhumanity of a pogrom with striking force.
21. Ibid., 108.
22. This is also significant for an understanding of the difference between Russian and Ukrainian anti-Semitism. Russian anti-Semitism is mystical and irrational and incorporates the idea of the Jewish people as the incarnation of evil, involved in a conspiracy to take over the world and destroy or enslave all non-Jews. Ukrainian anti-Semitism is of an everyday, practical nature, entirely devoid of mysticism.
23. Ibid., 109.
24. Ibid.
25. See note 5. Also of great interest is "Budni mordovskykh taboriv," written in the labour camp by Viacheslav Chornovil and "Prisoner of Zion" Boris Penson. *Suchasnist* (January 1976): 118–19; (February 1976): 50–69.
26. See I. Kleiner, "The Soviet Ukrainian Press on Zionism and Israel," *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 4, no. 2 (1974): 46–52.
27. Ukrainian Public Group for Promoting Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, *Information Bulletin No. 2* (New York 1980), 37.
28. I. Cherikover, *Istoriia pogromnago dvizheniia na Ukraine 1917–1921 gg.* Vol. 1, *Antisemitizm i pogromy na Ukraine 1917–1918 gg. (K istorii ukrainsko-evreiskikh otnoshenii)* (Berlin 1923); I. Shektman, *Pogromy Dobrovolcheskoi armii na Ukraine* (Berlin 1932); I. Bikerman, "Russia and Russian Jewry" in *Russia and the Jews* (Berlin 1923); I. Trotsky, "Jewish Pogroms in the Ukraine and in Belorussia (1918–1920" in *A Book about Russian Jewry* (New York 1968).
29. *Information Bulletin No. 2,* 36.

Zvi Gitelman

Contemporary Soviet Jewish Perceptions of Ukrainians: Some Empirical Observations

There is no consensus on even the broad outlines of the history of Ukrainian-Jewish interactions in the last several centuries. The sensitivity and complexity of the multiple issues involved, no doubt, explain both the reluctance of many scholars to enter this minefield and the controversy that inevitably seems to surround most serious attempts to deal with Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Yet, despite the linguistic demands and formidable problems of access to materials which confront any serious research, there is a considerable body of historical scholarship on the subject.[1] But although Jews in Ukraine still constitute over a third of the total Soviet Jewish population—and are far more numerous than the Jewish populations of any other country in the world except Israel and the United States—we know very little about Ukrainian-Jewish relations in contemporary Soviet Ukraine. Perhaps some of the traditional factors impeding research in this area are also at work here, but it is primarily Soviet conditions that account for our lack of information. Official Soviet pronouncements on inter-ethnic relations, including those between Ukrainians and Jews, are usually self-congratulatory and optimistic. Empirical studies of ethnic relations are quite limited in number and score,[2] and as far as I can tell, no Soviet empirical study of relations between Jews and Ukrainians has been published. Needless to say, it is impossible for outsiders to study this, or similar, questions in the USSR. For these reasons, Western studies of Soviet nationalities have focused on Soviet policies in this area, on particular nationalities and regions, and

on demographic trends and their implications for ethnic survival and identity, for the Soviet labour force, the military and the economy, and for the future strength and stability of the country.[3] We remain largely ignorant of the subjective dimensions of the Soviet nationality situation. How do the nationalities regard one another, and how do popular sentiments and perceptions interact with official policies? To what extent do those policies clash with or support popular sentiment? Has the USSR really achieved "friendship of the peoples," let alone the creation of a "fundamentally new social and international community of people . . . a single and friendly family of over one hundred nationalities jointly building communism," where social relations are based on "friendship, complete equality, multi-faceted fraternal co-operation and mutual . . . assistance"?[4] We can answer these questions only tentatively, relying often on dissident literature and on inferences made from aggregate, non-attitudinal data. While one may be able to tease out plausible hypotheses about a nationality's self-image from census and linguistic data, the latter do not provide many clues to inter-ethnic relations, or to group and individual attitudes.

The mass emigration of over a quarter million Soviet Jews since 1971 gives us an opportunity to probe ethnic sentiments of at least this geographically dispersed and culturally heterogeneous nationality. Since nearly 70,000 of these emigres came from Ukraine, they should be able to shed light on several dimensions of ethnic relations in the republic. True, information provided by émigrés may be biased and unrepresentative of the total population from which they emerged. But because the likelihood of being able to do field work on ethnic questions within the USSR is next to nothing, a second-best strategy should be followed, especially since assumption of émigré bias may well be exaggerated. In any case, for some research purposes political bias and demographic unrepresentativeness are largely irrelevant. It should be pointed out that the emigration is demographically not representative not because only Jews, Armenians and Germans have chosen to leave the country, but because Soviet policy has made it possible for only those groups to leave. Therefore, the ethnic imbalance of the emigration is as much a product of Soviet emigration policy as it is of special feelings of alienation on the part of those who have left.

Second, when questioned about their reasons for leaving the USSR, our sample, to be described below, cited a wide variety of reasons, many of them having nothing to do with alienation from the system. Thus, 23 per cent gave as their primary reason for leaving the fact that they had relatives abroad, or that they were following—often reluctantly—spouses, parents or children who had decided to emigrate. Another 23 per cent cited their desire to live among people of their own ethnic group, and

nearly a fifth give such varied answers as to defy coding under common rubrics (e.g., "Soviet life had become boring"; "My sister in Israel fell ill and I felt I had to come and help her"; "Everyone was going, so we went too"). Only 15 per cent cited "political reasons" or "hatred of the Soviet system" as their primary reason for emigrating. In the absence of reliable data on the attitudes of the Soviet population toward the system, it cannot be assumed that the émigrés are significantly more hostile. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that ethnic attitudes are quite widespread in society and that the opinions of the émigrés might be representative in *direction,* if not in *intensity*. We may assume that any biases present in the sample as a whole are distributed fairly uniformly across population sub-groups. Therefore, any differences observed across subgroups are similar to those characterizing those same groups within the Soviet population. This means that relationships among variables—say, the relation between education and ethnic prejudice—are likely to be brought out in our sample and are also likely to be present within the Soviet population, though perhaps in different intensity.[5]

Jews in Soviet Ukraine

For at least three centuries Jews in Ukraine have been involved in triangular relationships with other nationalities, most recently with Ukrainians and Russians. These relationships have not been the most tranquil, perhaps because the Jews have usually been in an intermediary position between two larger, more powerful and generally mutually hostile nationalities. In the early Soviet period, Ukrainian Jews continued to function as a "mobilized diaspora," playing a significant role in the economic modernization of Ukraine, but arousing resentment among the other nationalities.[6] In the turmoil of the Bolshevik Revolution and the many-sided political-military struggle in Ukraine, a political rift opened between the Jewish and Ukrainian populations. Most Jews in Ukraine, and the parties representing them, viewed Ukrainian political independence with trepidation, and their fears were reinforced by a wave of pogroms, in which all sorts of Ukrainian nationalists were heavily involved. The pogroms resulted in the death of at least 30,000 Jews, and some estimate that five times as many died as a result of the hunger, disease and physical destruction accompanying the pogroms. Half a million Jews were left homeless, and nearly a third of the Jewish homes destroyed.[7] The pogroms were perpetrated largely by Ukrainian nationalist forces, by Ukrainian bands led by various hetmans and anarchists and by White opponents of Bolshevism, while the Red Army did not engage in systematic pogromizing. Therefore, Jews were confronted by the "di-

lemma of the one alternative" and many joined the Red Army both as a means of self-defence and as a way to take revenge.[8] This further widened the gulf between most Ukrainian nationalities and most Jews.

In the 1920s, as part of the "nativization" (*korenizatsiia)* and economic rehabilitation campaigns, the Soviet government and Communist Party encouraged Jews to settle on land in Ukraine and form agricultural colonies and co-operatives. By 1925, 15,000 Jewish families in Ukraine registered for such settlement, and some Jewish colonies, and later "Jewish districts," were formed. This aroused the hostility of some peasants who felt that their lands were being taken away and that Jews were getting excessive financial aid. At the Tenth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, Vlas Chubar, chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars, had to reassure the population that the Jews were not getting special privileges. A Ukrainian journalist reported: "'The Yids will take over all power on the steppes,' hooligans whispered. And in some places priests even prayed to God to 'save us from the Jewish nemesis'."[9]

Though the collectivization-industrialization drive, begun in 1928, radically transformed both the Jewish and the Ukrainian social and economic structures and put the brakes on Jewish cultural and agricultural development in Ukraine, the enormous traumas of the Second World War aroused once again severe tensions between Ukrainians and Jews.[10] The extent to which individual Ukrainians participated in atrocities against Jews or helped save them from the Nazis and the policies toward Jews of Ukrainian nationalist and partisan movements are matters of great controversy. For our purposes, who is "right" and who is "wrong" is less relevant than the fact that these question are disputed, sometimes bitterly, and are, therefore, a source of tension between Jews and Ukrainians not only outside the USSR, but—perhaps less visibly—within it.

These are some of the modern historical influences on Jewish-Ukrainian relations. We can assume that other factors also influence those relations. The first is selective historical memory, which, as we shall see, appears to be the basis of a collective myth that is developed and transmitted across generations. This myth forms the basis for stereotypical images that nationalities develop about themselves and about others. It is not historical fact that shapes peoples' attitudes toward each other, but the interpretation of fact, the explanation given as to why things happened the way they did (or are supposed to have happened). Therefore, historical research is unlikely to have much effect on those attitudes except among a small stratum of the intelligentsia. In the USSR, despite the infrequent and mostly indirect discussion of Jewish-Ukrainian history and relations,[11] Jews and Ukrainians there are aware of the histor-

ical problems of the Ukrainian-Jewish relationship. There is every reason to suppose that ethnic myths and images based on historical interpretation condition contemporary Jewish-Ukrainian relations in the USSR.

A second influence on mutual perceptions of Ukrainians and Jews is the tendency of Jews to acculturate into Russian rather than Ukrainian culture. In 1970, in Ukraine, only 20.3 per cent of the Jews claimed a Jewish language (mainly Yiddish) as a "mother tongue" (*rodnoi iazyk*) or as a second language with which they were familiar. Fully 84.2 per cent of Ukrainian Jews claimed Russian as their mother tongue, and only 2.3 per cent gave Ukrainian, a slight decline in the latter since 1959.[12] It appears that the vast majority of Ukrainian Jews are familiar with Ukrainian, understand it and can converse in it, but their first language—and the culture they identify with—is Russian. Most Jews send their children to Russian-language schools, buy Russian books and periodicals and probably look upon Russian as a "higher" and less "provincial" or "peasant" culture than Ukrainian. While many Ukrainians are equally Russified, the perception of Jews as agents of Russification and as people who prefer another culture to the Ukrainian is an element in the Ukrainian assessment of Jews and their role in Ukraine.

In the Soviet period, the Ukrainian population has become more urbanized, and cities in Ukraine have gained larger proportions of Ukrainians. Nevertheless, although over 97 per cent of the Jewish population (and over 80 per cent of the Russian) in Ukraine are classified as urban dwellers, well over half the Ukrainian population is still classified as rural. Though the Jews have declined drastically as a proportion of the urban population (from 24.8 per cent in 1926 to 4.3 per cent in 1959, and to 2.1 per cent in 1970), their near total urbanity contrasts sharply with the distribution of the Ukrainian population. Thus, whatever ethnic differences exist are compounded by urban-rural differences—and tensions.

Despite Soviet attempts to dismiss as the work of isolated individuals expressions of Ukrainian dissatisfaction, there is no doubt that a fair number of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with what they see as Russian dominance of their country and with Soviet cultural and political policies. By and large, Ukrainians have not been successful in significantly changing Soviet policies or gaining more cultural autonomy. The frustration of their efforts may have led some to displace their frustration not only on Russians but also on Jews who, as we have pointed out, can plausibly be seen as "objective," if not "subjective," agents of Russification.[13]

The last factor conditioning contemporary ethnic relations in Ukraine is the emigration of the 1970s. The effects of emigration on Jewish-Ukrainian relations have not yet been researched. Hypothetically, it may have aroused jealousy of Ukrainians who are unable to emigrate; equally

plausibly, it may please them, since the departure of Jews frees up jobs and apartments and reduces the proportion of Russian speakers in the republic. Whether most people wish the Jews "Godspeed" or "good riddance" cannot be determined yet. But it should be remembered that the reduction of a Jewish population is not necessarily accompanied by a commensurate reduction in anti-Jewish sentiment, as the case of Poland in 1968 and thereafter shows most dramatically.

These, then, are the historical and contemporary elements that are likely to condition the mutual perceptions of Jews and Ukrainians. In the absence of systematic empirical data on Ukrainian attitudes and perceptions, we must confine ourselves to those of the Jews living in Ukraine or recently departed from it.

In addition to our survey data, there is some relevant documentary material, including the anecdotal memoirs of a Jewish émigré from Ukraine, Israel Kleiner. "It is necessary to admit that the relations between Jews and Ukrainians in the USSR, and especially in Ukraine, are extremely strained," he writes:

> From the Ukrainian side we see, and not only among the uneducated strata of the population, hatred for the Jews and repugnance for everything Jewish, openly expressed at every step. Such expressions, for example, as "we can still arrange another Babyn Iar for you," or "it's too bad the Germans didn't succeed in slaughtering all of you, but it's not too late!" every Jew in Ukraine has heard a dozen times . . . . It is not surprising that Jewish children, having grown up, have become alienated from the Ukrainians and have developed enmity toward them. The disproportionately high cultural level of the Jewish masses compared with the Ukrainians gives the Jews a basis for feeling a certain scorn for Ukrainians. The situation is becoming still worse as a result of the official anti-Semitism which has been Party-state policy for several decades in the USSR. Now it is impossible to encounter a Jew among Party workers, even at the raikom level. . . . Things have gone so far that they don't even take a Jewish woman as a cleaner in a building where there is some kind of Party or KGB institution.[14]

Kleiner asserts that Russian authorities incite anti-Semitism and "unfortunately, such a policy finds fertile ground in Ukraine. In this way the impression is created among Jews that their most terrible enemy are the Ukrainians and not Russian great power chauvinism." According to Kleiner, Jewish emigration activists in Kiev were more sympathetic to "democratic" political oppositionists than to Ukrainian nationalist ones. "Many Jews sympathized with the Ukrainian nationalist movement, understanding the similarity of our interests. Yet there was widespread scepticism about the perspectives of this movement. From their experi-

ence Jews know that any kind of outburst of Ukrainian national feelings takes the form of a great pogrom against the Jews."[15] Obviously aware of the problem, since the 1960s, some leading Ukrainian dissidents have tried to acknowledge and discuss the problem of Ukrainian anti-Semitism. The best known instances came in 1966 when Sviatoslav Karavansky protested against the suppression of Jewish culture and the imposition of quotas on Jewish admission to higher education. Later that year Ivan Dziuba made a speech at Babyn Yar in which he charged that no attempt had been made after the Second World War to combat anti-Semitism and that "periodically it was artifically nurtured." He went on to acknowledge that "as a Ukrainian, I am ashamed that in my nation, as among other nations, there is this shameful phenomenon, unworthy of humanity, called anti-semitism." He called for mutual respect between the two peoples.[16] On the other hand, other prominent Ukrainian dissidents were later accused of making anti-Semitic speeches, though the prevailing tone seems to be one of regret for past misunderstandings and desire for reconciliation beween the two peoples.[17] Of course, one cannot tell how widely these sentiments are shared even within the Ukrainian intelligentsia, let alone among other sectors of the population. But the acknowledgement of the problem and its frank discussion are highly instructive, especially when contrasted with the denials of Ukrainian anti-Semitism—ironically—by both official Soviet spokesmen and by some émigré Ukrainians. Soviet officials raise the issue almost exclusively in order to tar Ukrainian opponents of Communism with the brush of anti-Semitism, putting forth the familiar argument that ethnic and racial prejudice is a capitalist phenomenon, alien to socialism. In recent years the Soviet Ukrainian press has stressed the theme that Zionists and Ukrainian anti-Semites have always made political alliances of convenience since they have a common class interest, opposed to that of both Ukrainian and Jewish "toiling masses" and "honest people."[18] By definition, therefore, there can be no official or even popular anti-Semitism in Soviet Ukraine. Apparently, the perception of Jews who have lived recently in the Ukraine is different.

Jewish Emigration from Ukraine Since 1971

The Jewish population of Ukraine declined from 840,000 in 1959 to 777,000 in 1970 to 634,000 in 1979. Part of the decline is explained by the emigration of 64,000 Ukrainian Jews in the intercensal period. Jews made up 1.27 per cent of the population in Ukraine in 1979. Ukrainian Jews are the second largest group of Soviet Jews (after those residing in the RSFSR) and constitute 35 per cent of the total Soviet Jewish popula-

tion (down from 37 per cent in 1959 and 36 per cent in 1970). The proportion of émigrés from Ukraine was high compared to the other Slavic republics. While émigrés represented 8.2 per cent of the population in Ukraine, only 3 per cent of RSFSR and Belorussian Jews emigrated. (In other republics, the picture is radically different: thus, émigrés made up 53 per cent of the Georgian Jewish population, 42 per cent of the Lithuanian, 24 per cent of the Latvian, and 19 per cent of the Moldavian).[19] Before 1973, almost all émigrés went to Israel, but in 1974–9 about 13,000 of the Ukrainian émigrés went to Israel, and 30,000 emigrated to the United States, with smaller numbers going elsewhere. A higher proportion (73 per cent) of the émigrés from Ukraine came to the United States than from any other republic, though nearly as high a percentage of the RSFSR émigrés did so.[20] In the late 1970s there was a strong tendency for those from the larger cities to emigrate to the United States. Thus, over 90 per cent of those leaving Odessa came to the United States, and high proportions of those from Kiev and Kharkiv did likewise, while those from smaller cities were more likely to go to Israel. About 35–40 per cent of the Ukrainian Jewish émigrés had some form of higher education in the USSR, a somewhat higher proportion than that which can be derived from the 1970 census data, which showed that nearly 20 per cent of those over ten years of age had completed higher education, and another 4 per cent had incomplete higher education.[21] Thus, about half of them are professionals, artists, engineers, technicians and other higher level white-collar workers. There are substantial proportions of skilled blue-collar workers among the men and of low-level white-collar employees (clerks, sales personnel, etc.) among the women. The educational and occupational profile of the Ukrainian Jewish émigrés is most similar to that of the RSFSR Jews, with slightly lower levels of education and occupation.

Sample and Method

A group of 1,161 ex-Soviet citizens who had left the USSR in 1977–80 were interviewed during 1980–1 in Israel (n = 590), the Federal Republic of Germany (n = 100) and the United States (n = 471). Six hundred women and 561 men were interviewed, the youngest being 22, and half the sample having been born in the 1930s and 1940s. Nearly half the respondents have had higher education (the immigrations to Israel and the United States have consistently had about 40 per cent with such education). Seventy-seven per cent, or 889 people, had been registered as Jews on their internal Soviet passports; 129 were registered as Russians; 98 as

Germans; 18 as Ukrainians; and 27 are of other nationalities. The areas in which the respondents had lived most of their lives are as follows:

TABLE 1. RESPONDENTS' AREA OF RESIDENCE IN THE USSR

RSFSR	*Ukraine*	*Moldavia*	*Baltic*	*Georgia*	*Central Asia*
330	247	210	174	120	165

Men and women are quite evenly distributed in the age and regional categories, but men dominate the blue-collar professions and women the white-collar ones, despite very similar educational levels (48 per cent of the men and 46 per cent of the women have higher education). Educational levels are highest among those from the RSFSR, and from the ethnic groups, among the Russians (69 per cent of the former and 72 per cent of the latter have higher education). The lowest educational levels are found among people from Central Asia (18 per cent with higher education) and from Moldavia (23 per cent). Those from Moldavia also had the lowest income of the European groups, and the Central Asians had the lowest income of any group.

These people were interviewed in Russian or Georgian by native speakers. Despite the fact that the interview lasted between two and three hours, remarkably few declined to be interviewed.

The Ukrainian Jews in our sample do not differ significantly from the others on most socio-economic and demographic variables. Interestingly, however, they turn out to be the least geographically mobile, along with Georgian Jews. Eighty-eight per cent of the respondents lived in Ukraine all their lives, in contrast to Moldavia (71 per cent) or the RSFSR (60 per cent), the latter always a magnet for upwardly mobile people. In addition, a higher percentage (71.4) of Ukrainian Jews married spouses from their own republic than any other group except the Georgians (74.1). So these respondents are deeply rooted in Ukraine and should be in a position to provide accurate reflections of attitudes prevalent there. About 44 per cent of the respondents lived in the Ukrainian capital, 15 per cent in Odessa, 15 per cent in Western Ukraine, 7 per cent in Kharkiv, and the rest in various parts of Eastern Ukraine. As could be expected, 47 per cent had obtained higher education (the same as among the Baltic respondents, and less than those from the RSFSR, but more than those from the other areas). Their income levels were lower than those in the RSFSR and Baltics and higher than in the other areas. Nearly 40 per cent are professionals; 23 per cent are workers, mostly skilled, and 22 per cent have technical occupations, such as engineers, technicians and "economists."

The cultural background of the Ukrainian Jews is quite similar to that

of the RSFSR respondents, and markedly different from the more traditionally Jewish backgrounds, not only of the Georgian and Central Asian émigrés, but also of the Moldavian and Baltic ones. Thus, 85 per cent of the Ukrainian respondents gave Russian as their mother tongue, and only 12 per cent gave Yiddish. This is almost exactly the same as the 1970 census results (where the percentages were respectively 84 and 13). Slightly more than half of the Ukrainian respondents came from homes where Yiddish was the most frequently spoken language between the parents, but obviously, a great deal of Russian acculturation has taken place. In religious observance, the Ukrainians resemble the other European Jews, a majority describing themselves as non-religious, but about a third reporting that they observed some religious rituals and customs. Examining several measures of acculturation, we find the RSFSR Jews to be most acculturated, followed by the Ukrainians, Baltics and Moldavians, among the European groups. No doubt, this went hand in hand with their varying rates of social mobility and different family background. Thus, among the Europeans, Moldavian Jews have the highest proportion of fathers who were unskilled—and themselves have the lowest levels of education—whereas RSFSR Jews, at the other end of the acculturation scale, had the fewest such fathers and the most education themselves.

Their social lives reflected the cultural background of the respondents. Asked to describe the ethnic makeup of their circle of friends, the Moldavians had the most Jewish social circles, the Ukrainians and Balts considerably less so, and the RSFSR Jews had the least Jewish group of friends. Perhaps surprisingly, both Central Asians and Georgians had less largely Jewish social circles than any of the European groups. Among the Ukrainian Jews, as among the others, the younger and more educated people tend to have had more non-Jewish friends. Those whose native language was Yiddish and came from homes with strong Jewish atmospheres tended to more homogeneously Jewish circles. Although 82 per cent of the Ukrainian Jews report having a Jewish spouse, this is a lower proportion than among all other groups except the RSFSR Jews (73 per cent).

Jews from Ukraine are not more alienated from the Soviet system than the other European Jews, who, as a group, are less enthusiastic about it than the Georgian and Central Asian Jews. On some of our measures, the Ukrainian Jews manifest less dissatisfaction than the Moldavian and Baltic Jews and on none of them do they show significantly more dissatisfaction. Their relation to the system is quite similar to that of the RSFSR Jews.

It does not seem, then, that Ukrainians Jews were driven more than others to leave the USSR because of their dissatisfaction with the politi-

cal system and its values. Nor do the Ukrainian respondents report anti-Semitism as a motivation for emigration more frequently than the others. Respondents were asked an open question as to why they left the USSR. Coding the first two responses given reveals that Ukrainian Jews are only very slightly more disposed than others to mention anti-Semitism or ethnic prejudice first among the reasons for leaving, and only a quarter of them do so. Looking at the first two responses, we find that anti-Semitism is mentioned with just about the same frequency by RSFSR, Ukrainian and Moldavian Jews (42–3 per cent of all the reasons given), but much less frequently by those from the Baltic (27 per cent). For Russian, Ukrainian and Moldavian Jews anti-Semitism is the modal second response, though not by much, whereas the Balts are much more inclined to cite the desire to live with other Jews as their reason for emigrating. However, when asked to assess the motivation for emigration of *others,* both Russian and Ukrainian Jews cite anti-Semitism as the first reason more frequently than any other, and the other European Jews do so as well, but to a lesser extent. The reason for this is not clear. But in light of findings to be reported below, one may speculate that there is a widely held belief that palpable anti-Semitism is widespread in the USSR, and that even if one were not constantly and deeply affected by it oneself, other Jews are deeply sensitive to it, to the point where it drives them out of the country. But in this regard Jews from Ukraine do not appear to differ from the other European Jews. Nor do they mention ethnic discrimination any more frequently than the others when asked what it was about life in the USSR that disturbed them most. They also do not differ from the others in response to several specific questions about whether or not ethnicity entered into dealings with several state bureaucracies.

Finally, it appears that Ukrainian Jews are at least as amenable to having Ukrainians as spouses, close friends, co-workers, neighbours and employees as any of the other regional groups are to having the titular nationality of their region in those roles. Thus, Ukrainian Jews are just as prepared to have Ukrainian friends or neighbours as Georgian or Russian Jews are to have Georgians and Russians. In fact, in most of these roles, Ukrainian Jews are more favourably disposed to Ukrainians than the others are to their non-Jewish neighbours. However, some of the non-Ukrainian Jews—Balts and Moldavian, especially—display reluctance to have Ukrainians in the roles mentioned above. This may indicate that Ukrainians have a negative image among Jews beyond the borders of their republic, but that within Ukraine, whatever their image may be among Jews, they are not rejected as social or work partners. In fact, on most of the questions we see Ukrainian Jews preferring Ukrainians to Russians, and certainly to Central Asians, Georgians and even Georgian Jews, though not to European Jews.

Perception of Ethnic Relations

Soviet leaders rank their achievements in inter-nationality relations with the greatest accomplishments of their system. Leonid Brezhnev proudly claimed that the achievements of "Leninist nationality policy . . . can truly be put on the same level with achievements in the constitution of a new society in the USSR such as industrialization, collectivization, the cultural revolution."[22] On the sixtieth anniversary of the October Revolution, the Central Committee of the Party declared: "Factual equality of all nations and nationalitites in all spheres of . . . society has been assured . . . and genuine brotherhood of the people of labour, independent of nationality, has become established, a brotherhood welded by a community of fundamental interests, goals, and Marxist-Leninist ideology."[23] However, it is acknowledged that progress toward the goal of amalgamation (*sliianie)* of the peoples is slow, and that not "all questions of nationality relations have been solved . . . . The degree of development of such a large multinational state as ours gives rise to many problems which demand the Party's close attention."[24]

Our respondents take a substantially different view of inter-nationality relations. Asked, "In your opinion, to what extent does 'friendship of the peoples' [*druzhba narodov*] exist in the USSR?" more than half of all respondents answered "hardly at all," and three-quarters fell into the two categories of "to a small extent or "hardly at all." These feelings were especially strong among the Europeans, though even among Georgians and Central Asians a majority took a negative view. Jews from the RSFSR had the most negative evaluation, and there was not much difference among the other Europeans. The entire sample was asked to characterize the relations between ten pairs of nationalities. In order to test the degree to which the respondents paid serious attention to the questions and were willing to differentiate among inter-nationality relations, we included pairs of nationalities between whom tensions are widely reported, and those among whom there are few difficulties. Summarizing the answers given to all the questions by all the respondents (including non-Jews), we get the following picture.

Not surprisingly, the Jews in the sample rated Ukrainian-Jewish relations as poorest of all the pairs. But it was not the Jews from Ukraine who gave this relationship the lowest rating. Rather, the Russian and Baltic Jews were somewhat more negative in their characterization of this relationship. People from all republics were prepared to rate this relationship, except the Jews from Central Asia, a slight majority of whom did not provide a rating. Only the Russian-Jewish pairing drew more frequent response than this one. So the Jewish-Ukrainian relationship is salient

TABLE 2

Best Relations	Lithuanians-Latvians
	Russians-Belorussians
	Jews-Moldavians
	Russians-Uzbeks
	Russians-Ukrainians
	Russians-Estonians
	Georgians-Armenians
	Jews-Russians
Worst Relations	Jews-Ukrainians

Note: Since 59 per cent of the respondents did not characterize Russian-Kazakh relations, we have eliminated this pair from the table.

even to those outside Ukraine, and it has a generally bad reputation, even slightly worse outside Ukraine than among those who lived there.

Views of the dyadic nationality relations are not affected by the sex or age of the respondents. However, education does influence perceptions of these relations in two ways. More educated people are more prepared to comment on relations among the nationalities. They are also more inclined to see tensions in those relations. These two tendencies hold for all of the ethnic pairings presented to the respondents. Taking the Georgian-Armenian relationship as an example, we find that while only 53 per cent of those with elementary education answer the question, 71 per cent of those with secondary education and 83 per cent of those with higher education answer it. The percentage characterizing the relationship as "poor," is as follows: grade school = 37 per cent; secondary education = 57.5 per cent; higher education = 73.5 per cent. The more educated also differ markedly in their far stronger perception that ethnicity makes a difference in contacts with Soviet officials. This may be due in large part to their experiences with higher educational institutions and with employers of university graduates, where ethnic quotas and considerations are more prevalent than in the institutions with which the less educated normally come in contact.

In order to test the salience of problematic ethnic relations, respondents were asked to identify the nationalities that would be involved in such relations. The question was left open and up to four replies were coded. Table 3 lists the frequency with which the poor relationships were mentioned by the entire sample.

When the results are analyzed by ethnicity of the respondents, Jews and Russians prove to have very similar views, except that Russians mention the Ukrainian-Russian as problematic significantly more often. (Germans have a quite different order, reflecting their own experiences. Their

TABLE 3. FREQUENCY OF MENTION OF POOR ETHNIC RELATIONS BETWEEN

Balts and Russians	495
Armenians and Georgians	389
Jews and Ukrainians	362
Jews and Russians	318

most frequent response is that "relations among all nationalities are bad," and they also identify Russian-Asian relations as poor, which is explained by the fact that many Germans spent long periods in Central Asia.) Both Russians and Jews mention Jewish-Ukrainian relations third in order of frequency, and for both this is the pair mentioned second most frequently. (Jews mention Jewish-Russian relations most frequently, and Russians mention Armenian-Georgian relations.) Taking the first four pairs mentioned, irrespective of order, we find Jews mentioning most frequently the following pairs: Armenian-Georgian (34.4 per cent of Jews mentioned this somewhere); Jewish-Ukrainian (33.2 per cent); Jewish-Russian (29.6 per cent); Russian-Baltic (29.4 per cent).

Analyzing the responses by republic of respondents produces some enlightening results. In every case but one, people are much more likely to mention as tension-filled relations involving nationalities prominent in their republic. Thus, for example, people from Moldavia overwhelmingly identify Moldavian-Russian and Moldavian-Jewish relations, but very few people outside Moldavia mention these. The one exception is the Armenian-Georgian relationship, which is mentioned more frequently by Jews from both the RSFSR and Ukraine than by Georgian Jews. Almost as high a proportion of Ukrainian Jews as Russian ones mention Jewish-Russian relations, but Ukrainian Jews identify Ukrainian-Jewish relations in 40 per cent of the cases mentioned, whereas Russian Jews mention this less than one-fourth of the time. European Jews are far more prepared than Georgian and Asian ones to comment on ethnic relations with which they have no direct acquaintance. This may be a function of the higher educational levels of the former.

Within each republic group of respondents, the level of education has no consistent effect on whether or not people will identify a relationship as tension-filled. The Jewish-Ukrainian relationship is a partial exception to this. Among respondents from both Ukraine and the RSFSR, the less education a respondent has, the more likely he or she is to cite this relationship when asked the open-ended question about problematic relations. It is not clear why this is so. One explanation might be that Jewish-Ukrainian relations are, indeed, more tense among the lower strata of Soviet society, and the Jewish and Ukrainian intelligentsias who have expressed a desire to improve relations do not reflect the mood of those with less education. Another, perhaps more plausible, explanation is that

Jewish-Ukrainian hostility has been enshrined as a popular folk belief. This is more likely to be accepted *prima facie* by less educated people, since the highly educated would be more likely to reflect on its contemporary validity. Moreover, our data indicated that the more educated respondents are reluctant to engage in ethnic stereotyping and shy away from popular beliefs about various nationalities.[25] These hypotheses are called into question by the responses to the request for characterization of specific relations, including Jewish-Ukrainian relations. Among Ukrainian Jews, though not among Russian ones, there is a very slight tendency for the more educated to characterize these relations as poor. Moreover, we shall observe below that in choosing between eight pairs of adjectives to describe several Soviet nationalities, there is a positive correlation between education and less complimentary descriptions of Ukrainians. The contradiction between the answers obtained to the open-ended question about tense ethnic relations and the other questions specifically on Jewish-Ukrainian relations may be more apparent than real. The first question measures the salience of the ethnic relations, while the others attempt to elicit judgments about their nature. The more educated, as we have seen, are aware of more dyadic problematic relations. Hence, they can cite many more than the Jewish-Ukrainian one, but that does not mean that they are more positively disposed toward Ukrainians. The less educated, with a more limited repertoire of ethnic relations to call to mind, think first of the most familiar and nearby relationship, though it does not necessarily follow that they view Ukrainians less favourably than their more educated fellow Jews.

Images of Ethnic Groups

In order to ascertain the images of Soviet nationalities held by our respondents, the latter were presented with pairs of adjectives ranged along a seven-point scale and asked to locate each nationality along the scale. Thus, for example, they were asked to indicate where on a scale of "anti-Semitic-not anti-Semitic," or "uncultured-cultured," they would place Russians or Ukrainians. Eight adjectival scales were presented for each of ten nationalities, including Jews themselves. Responses to the items about Jews give us confidence about those regarding the other ethnic groups, because the responses on Jews are quite differentiated and apparently well thought out, as are the other responses. On a "prejudiced-fairminded" continuum more Jewish respondents put Jews toward the "prejudiced" end, whereas on a "uncultured-cultured" spectrum, most put them definitely on the cultured side and only 12 per cent at the other end. Jews rated themselves as "goodhearted" rather than "mean," but

TABLE 4. MEAN SCORES OF NATIONALITIES, BASED ON ADJECTIVAL SCALES

Total Sample (Jews)		*Ukrainian Jews*	
Ukrainians	4.9393	Central Asians*	5.2857
Moldavians	4.8226	Ukrainians	5.0013
Central Asians	4.7396	Georgian Jews	4.5796
Russians	4.0612	Moldavians	4.39096
Lithuanians	4.0318	Georgians	4.1111
Latvians	3.8706	Russians	4.0191
Georgian Jews	3.6677	Lithuanians	3.963
Georgians	3.4956	Latvians	3.8498
Jews	3.4262	Jews	3.5014

*The n is only 26 (cf an n=202 answering the question of Ukrainians), and so the result should be discounted.

divided almost evenly on the issue of trustworthiness. While Jews see themselves as kind, rather than cruel, more of them rated themselves "dishonest" than "honest." These evaluations, remarkable in their candour, are not affected by education, age, sex or Jewish background of the respondents.

By combining the scores on each pair of adjectives we are able to get a mean "rating" of each nationality. The table above shows the mean scores given to the nationalities by the total Jewish sample and, for comparison, by the Jews from Ukraine. The nationalities are ranked from the least favoured to the most (the higher the score, the more negative the valuations).

As expected, Jews are rated most favourably. The Georgian Jews placed both Georgian Jews (listed separately) and even Georgians ahead of other Jews, but all other regional groups rated Jews highest. Georgian, Central Asian and Baltic Jews gave Ukrainians the lowest rating, Russian and Ukrainian Jews the second lowest, and Moldavian Jews the third lowest. Thus, the low ranking of the Ukrainians cuts across the regional differences among Jews. In absolute terms, Ukrainians got the lowest score from Baltic Jews and next lowest from their Jewish neighbours in the Ukrainian SSR. Ukrainian Jews rate Ukrainians significantly less favourably than other Jews on many of the adjectives, seeing them as anti-Semitic, cruel, untrustworthy, mean, dishonest and prejudiced (!). But they see them as cultured and efficient, and these positive assessments keep their overall rating from being even much lower. Thus, it is the putative personality traits of the Ukrainians that are regarded in a dim light, whereas their culture and their abilities are not denigrated. This contrasts sharply with the positive view of Georgians held by Georgian Jews and the generally positive ratings of Latvians and Lithuanians by

Jews from the Baltic. Only Moldavian Jews come close to Ukrainian Jews in their negative attitude toward the indigenous nationality.

Again, education proves to be the demographic variable that has the greatest impact on attitudes. On all but one of the adjectival pairs, the most educated Jews in all republics rated the Ukrainians more negatively than the lesser educated, and this relationship obtains among Ukrainian Jews alone, though the correlations are not extremely strong in either case. Curiously, older Jews do not differ from others in their evaluations of Ukrainians, despite the pogroms of 1918–21 and the Holocaust. Perhaps unfavourable views have been passed down the generations quite effectively. It should also be noted that one's Jewish background has no bearing on attitudes toward Ukrainians—they are not more negative among those with more intensely Jewish training.

That Ukrainians are seen less favourably than any other nationality by Jews within Ukraine and, to a large extent, beyond it, may be due to a perception of high levels of anti-Semitism among Ukrainians. In other words, that perception may colour all the judgments about the supposed traits of the Ukrainians and may be at the root of the Jewish postures toward the Ukrainians. On an adjectival scale of "anti-Semitic-not anti-Semitic," 57.7 per cent of the respondents from Ukraine gave Ukrainians the most anti-Semitic rating possible, and another 20.7 per cent gave them the second most anti-Semitic rating. Jews from the RSFSR, by contrast, rated Russians more kindly, only 21.2 per cent giving them the most anti-Semitic rating, 26.9 per cent the second most. The RSFSR Jews rated Ukrainians as more anti-Semitic than Russians.

Moving from generalized images to personal experiences, we asked whether respondents "personally experienced anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union." The responses by republic are presented in the table below.

TABLE 5. FREQUENCY OF ANTI-SEMITIC ENCOUNTER, BY REPUBLIC

	RSFSR	*Ukraine*	*Baltic*	*Moldavia*	*Georgia*	*Central Asia*
Often	33.2	38.0	26.8	25.2	6.3	13.1
Sometimes	40.4	31.9	36.9	37.4	20.5	34.3
Rarely	21.2	16.9	22.3	18.3	30.4	31.3
Never	4.1	12.7	11.5	18.3	40.2	19.2
Don't Know, No Answer	1.0	0.5	2.5	0.9	2.7	2.0

The most frequent anti-Semitic encounters are reported by people from Ukraine. But if the first two response categories are combined, there is little difference between the RSFSR and Ukraine. Nor is there that great a difference between these two republics and the other European republics of the Baltic and Moldavia. The sharpest difference is, of course, between European republics and Georgia-Central Asia, where the incidence of reported anti-Semitism is dramatically lower. In light of the much sharper difference among the European republics on the adjectival scales, and recalling the frequency with which Jewish-Ukrainian relations were cited as tense and problematic, we would have expected dramatically more encounters with anti-Semitism to be reported from Ukraine than from the other European republics. This did not happen. We do observe, however, a relationship earlier remarked upon. More so in Ukraine than in the other areas, there is a positive correlation between education and frequency of anti-Semitic encounters: the higher one's educational level, the greater the tendency to report having experienced anti-Semitism. No other background variable—income, age, Jewish background, religiosity or even party membership—is consistently related to reported anti-Semitic experiences.

Conclusion

When we try to sum up the findings on Jewish émigré attitudes toward Ukrainians, and reported experiences living among them, we find something of a disparity between abstractions and concrete experiences. When Jewish émigrés are asked to mention problematic ethnic relations, Jewish-Ukrainian relations are widely mentioned, and when the émigrés are asked to paint a generalized picture of Ukrainians in abstract terms a portrait more negative than that of any other nationality is drawn. Yet when Jews from Ukraine are asked to place themselves in specific and concrete situations with Ukrainians—as neighbours, friends and the like—one finds no particular animosity. Though anti-Semitic encounters are reported more frequently by Ukrainian Jews, the differences between them and other European Jews are not nearly as great as one would have been led to expect by the much greater contrasts on the abstract questions. Only a tentative explanation can be offered for this disparity between the extremely negative abstract view of Ukrainians and the more benign response to concrete questions regarding them. It may be that we have a case of consciousness lagging behind reality, in Trotsky's phrase. A historical myth has been created and effectively transmitted. Jews continue to view Ukrainians with suspicion and even hostility because historical experience has taught them to do so. Even if their personal life ex-

perience does not reinforce the lessons of history, as they have absorbed them, the historical legacy exercises a powerful hold on the mind. It is also likely that this legacy sensitizes the Jew to the possibility of Ukrainian anti-Semitism, so that an expression that, coming from a member of some other nationality, might be dismissed casually, is interpreted as anti-Semitic when it comes from a Ukrainian. There is a readiness to believe in Ukrainian anti-Semitism, a historically shaped mind-set that can understand and interpret Ukrainian actions and characteristics.

One should not expect the Soviet system to alter this state of affairs. Despite all the talk of overcoming ethnic tensions and achieving "friendship of the peoples," the historic tension between Jews and Ukrainians is unlikely to be much diminished in the USSR, even if individuals' experiences do not support a continuation of that unfortunate legacy. Many Jews and many Ukrainians seem not to buy the dogmas and shibboleths of the system and are unlikely to be persuaded by pious talk. To the extent that the Soviet regime follows a policy of "divide and conquer" by tolerating and even fanning tensions among nationalities, Jewish-Ukrainian tensions are even likely to be resolved. Since the system does not permit the kind of unfettered research, free discussion and spontaneous social action that could diminish Jewish-Ukrainian misunderstanding, Jewish-Ukrainian relations are likely to stagnate and to be conditioned by a past frozen in myth as much as by a present that is perhaps changing.

NOTES

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1. See H. Aster and P. J. Potichnyj, *Jewish Ukrainian Relations: Two Solitudes* ([Oakville, Ont.] 1983) and the bibliographical references therein.
2. Some examples are: V. K. Bondarchik, ed., *Etnicheskie protsessy i obraz zhizni (na materialakh issledovaniia naseleniia gorodov BSSR)* (Minsk 1980); Iu. V. Arutunian, *Opyt etnosotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia obraza zhizni* (Moscow 1980); A. M. Lisetsky, *Voprosy natsionalnoi politiki KPSS v usloviakh razvitogo sotsializma (na materialakh Moldavskoi SSR)* (Kishinev 1977); L. M. Drobizheva, "Sblizhenie kultur i mezhnatsionalnye otnosheniia v SSSR," *Sovetskaia etnografiia,* no. 6 (1977); Iu. V. Arutiunian, "Sotsialno–kulturnye aspekty razvitiia sblizheniia natsii v SSSR," *Sovetskaia etnografiia,* no. 3 (1972).
3. The literature is extensive, so only a few recent examples of each genre need be cited. A study of policy is J. Azrael, ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (New York 1978). Studies of particular nationalities have focused largely on the

Baltic and Central Asian peoples, the Jews and the Ukrainians. Studies of the latter two include T. E. Sawyer, *The Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union* (Boulder, Colo. 1979) and M. Browne, ed., *Ferment in the Ukraine* (New York 1973). For demographic trends, see M. Feshbach, "The Soviet Union: Population Trends and Dilemma," *Population Bulletin* 37, no. 3 (August 1982) and B. D. Silver, "The Ethnic Dimension in Russian and Soviet Censuses," paper for Conference on Russian and Soviet Censuses, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Washington, D.C., May 1983 (revised August 1983). Two works which discuss implications of ethnic trends for the Soviet Union's stability are: J. Azrael, *Emergent Nationality Problems in the USSR: A Project Air Force Report* (Santa Monica 1977); and E. Jones and F. Grupp, "Socio-Cultural Development and Political Stability in the Soviet Multinational State," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 1981.

4. P. N. Fedoseev, et. al., *Leninism and the National Question* (Moscow 1977), 327–34.
5. The best discussion of émigré research and control of the effect of sample bias is A. Inkeles and R. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge, Mass. 1961), chapter 2.
6. On the concept of "mobilized diasporas," see J. Armstrong, "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union: The View of the Dictatorship," in E. Goldhagen, ed., *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union* (New York 1968), 3–49.
7. See N. Gergel, "De pogromen in Ukraine in di yorn 1918–1921," in Y. Lestschinsky, ed., *Shriftn far ekonomik un statistik* (Berlin 1928); S. Baron, *The Russian Jew under Tsars and Soviets* (New York 1964), 220–21; J. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution 1917–1920* (Princeton 1952), 253–6; E. Tsherikover, *Antisemitism un pogromen in Ukraine 1917–1918* (Berlin 1923); E. Tsherikover, *Di Ukrainer pogromen in yor 1919* (New York 1965); I. B. Schechtmann, *Les pogromes en Ukraine sous les governements ukrainiens* (Paris 1927); B. Lecache, *Quand Israel meurt* (Paris 1927); A. D. Rosental, *Megilat hatevakh* (Tel Aviv 1927); L. Khazanovich, *Der idisher khurbn in Ukraine* (Berlin 1920).
8. See Z. Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics* (Princeton 1972), 155–76.
9. S. Sumny, "Tsvishn a natsmindisher natsmerheit," *Shtern,* 26 May 1927.
10. Some literature of this subject is cited in Aster and Potichnyj, *Jewish Ukrainian Relations,* 10, 12 and 14. See also P. Friedman, "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations During the Nazi Occupation," *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science 12* (1958-9); S. Schwarz, *Evrei v Sovetskom Soiuze s nachala vtoroi mirovoi voiny* (New York 1966), 95–114; K. Lewin, "Andreas Count Sheptytsky, Archbishop of Lviv, Metropolitan of Halych, and the Jewish Community in Galicia during the Second World War," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.,* vol. 7, 1–2 (1959): 1656–7. Lew Shankowsky claims that "organized and systematic anti-Semitism never existed in Ukraine," unless it was aroused by a foreign power. See his "Russia, the Jews and the Ukrainian Liberation Movement," *Ukrainian Quarterly,* 1 and 2 (Spring and Summer 1960).
11. By "indirect discussion," I mean fictional or poetic portrayal of such relations, rather than historical or sociological writing. For a fictional portrayal of Jewish life in Ukraine in recent times, see the Soviet novel *Tiazhelyi pesok* by A. Rybakov (first serialized in *Oktiabr,* nos. 7, 8 and 9, 1978; published in book form by *Sovetskii pisatel*, 1979, and then translated into Yiddish and published in *Sovetish haimland.*) An English edition is *Heavy Sand* (New York 1981. Also Penguin, 1982). The positive portrayal of most of the Jewish characters is unusual for contemporary Soviet literature, but Jewish-Ukrainian relations are treated largely according to prevailing literary and political orthodoxy.

12. Data from the 1959 and 1970 censuses are conveniently arranged in Altshuler, *op. cit.,* 220.
13. Some theories of ethnicity hold that frustration leads to aggression toward outgroups who are perceived as a cause of that frustration. See R. A. LeVine and D. T. Campbell, *Ethnocentralism* (New York 1972), 115–35.
14. I. Kleiner, "Ukrainsko-evreiski vzaiemyny i ukrainska emigratsiia," *Ukrainskyi samostiinyk* (June 1973).
15. "Anekdotychna trahediia," *Suchasnist* (September 1973): 5–13. Kleiner's complete memoir, *Anekdotychna trahediia,* was published in book form (Munich 1974).
16. Karavansky's petition is reprinted as "To the Council of Nationalities of the USSR," *The New Leader,* 15 January 1968. Dziuba's speech is reprinted in *The Chornovil Papers* (New York 1968), 223–6. See also V. Swoboda, "Ukrainian 'unpublished' literature on the Jews," *Bulletin on Soviet and East European Jewish Affairs,* no. 4 (December 1969), and Z. Haleni, "Noseh Yehudi besifrut Ukrainit," *Shvut,* no. 1 (1973).
17. See I. Kleiner, "The Jewish Question and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Ukrainian *Samizdat*," 421–36.
18. Two examples, both aimed at émigrés rather than domestic readers, are P. Kovalchuk, *Antysemitska diialnist ukrainskykh natsionalistiv* (Kiev 1965); O. Kartunov, *Yellow-Blue Antisemitism* (Odessa 1981). Another book, intended for Soviet readers, is Iu. I. Rimarenko, *Antikommunisticheskii alians* (Kiev 1981).
19. See M. Altshuler, "The Jews in the 1979 Soviet Census: Initial Data," *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 10, no. 3 (November 1980): 3–12.
20. N. Magor, "Haolim miBrihm vehanoshrim shehigiu leArhab—skirademografit hashvaatit (1/1/74–6/30/79)," (Jerusalem: Ministry for Immigrant Absorption, July 1980) mimeo, 3 and 25.
21. Y. Kapeliush, "Yidn in Sovetnfarband," *Sovetish haimland,* no. 9, (1974): 177.
22. L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskom kursom* (Moscow 1975), 4: 50.
23. Quoted in M. I. Kulichenko, "Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie osnovy vzaimovliianiia i vzaimoobogashcheniia natsionalnykh kultur v usloviakh razvitogo sotsializma," *Voprosy istorii,* no. 5 (1977), translated in *Soviet Law and Government* 17, no. 1 (Summer 1978) 53–4.
24. Brezhnev's report to the Twenty-sixth Party Congress, *Pravda*, 24 February 1981.
25. See Z. Gitelman, "'A New Historical Community?' Ethnocentrism and Popular Perceptions of Ethnic Relations in the USSR," *Problems of Communism* (September-October 1983).

VI

Jews and Ukrainians in Canada

Manoly R. Lupul

Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Canada

Any treatment of Jewish-Ukrainian relations in Canada must contend with the fact that there are no significant histories of the Jews or the Ukrainians in Canada,[1] and those that exist do not discuss Jewish-Ukrainian relations. In fact, each group barely notices the other. As a result, the scholar can draw on very little that is research-based.

The essential facts are reasonably clear. Demographically, Ukrainian Canadians are twice as numerous as Jewish Canadians, the figures in the 1981 census being 529,615 and 264,025 respectively. Geographically, 60 per cent of the Ukrainians live in the Prairie provinces, with almost 25 per cent on farms, while 85 per cent of the Jews live in eastern Canada, with the vast majority in the cities and fully three quarters in Toronto and Montreal.

Historically, the Jews arrived in Canada early, and though few in number, they were immediately prominent socially and politically. Excluded from settlements in New France, the 131 Canadian Jews by 1832 had challenged the Legislative Assembly of Lower Canada and established themselves as legally equal to other Canadians, a full twenty-six years before British Jews were granted comparable status.[2] Persecution in Tsarist Russia after 1881 brought the first large Jewish immigration from eastern Europe. Despite the establishment of several agricultural settlements, mainly in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, by 1914 there were only 75,681 Jews in Canada, and the agricultural colonies, plagued by numerous natural disasters, were rapidly disappearing.[3] Compared to the Jews,

the first Ukrainian settlers arrived much later (in the 1890s) in very large numbers and, instead of social or political prominence, acquired immediate notoriety for their strange dress, customs and language. By 1914, 170,000 had entered Canada, and by 1941 the Ukrainian and Jewish populations were 305,929 and 170,241 respectively.[4]

The small Jewish population in the Prairie provinces, where Ukrainian settlements were most pronounced, ensured that contact between the two groups would be minimal. The conventional Jewish view of the relationship between Jews and such prairie groups as Ukrainians up to the Second World War was that of the "country storekeeper" familiar with "the needs, language and customs" of fellow-immigrants from "Russia, Poland, Austria and Rumania," to whom services in "German, Russian, Ukrainian and Polish" were provided.[5] "As country merchants they were more than mere storekeepers. They served as interpreters, counsellors and trusted friends and their stores became informal gathering places—institutions of friendship. Those associations led to rich, mutual loyalties between storekeeper and customer."[6] However true this may have been for the early pioneer period, the situation was far from idyllic by 1939, as a recent study makes clear:

> Anti-Semitism, perhaps most overt in that province [Quebec], was prevalent throughout English-speaking Canada as well. . . . Jewish quotas existed in various professions, universities, medical schools and industries. Jews were restricted from buying property and in some areas, from holidaying at some resorts, from joining many private clubs or using their recreational facilities and even from sitting on the boards of various charitable, educational, financial and business organizations. Anti-Jewish sentiments were being voiced regularly—and with impunity—by many respectable newspapers, politicians, businessmen and clergymen, and by leading officers of such groups as the Canadian Corps Association, the Orange Order, the Knights of Columbus and farm and business organizations. . . .
>
> If it is possible to overemphasize the extent of anti-Semitism in Canada at this time, it is not possible to ignore it. . . . In March 1939 Reverend [Claris] Silcox . . . delivered what he called a "post-mortem" on Canada's refugee policy to a large audience at the University of Toronto. He listed a series of reasons for Canada's failure to respond to the crisis [the suffering of German Jews], ranging from timid leadership and a bad economic situation to the success of Nazi propagandists and xenophobia in Quebec; but, most important, he claimed, was "the existence throughout Canada . . . of a latent anti-Semitism."[7]

To youngsters growing up in the Ukrainian bloc settlements in western Canada, the "latent anti-Semitism" manifested itself in several ways.

Perhaps the most pronounced was the general feeling that Jewish storekeepers ought not to own businesses in Ukrainian prairie villages. In Willingdon, Alberta, where the writer grew up, the boast was common that if any Jew dared to establish a business, a local farmer, who spent much time drinking beer in the village hotel and regularly beat up his wife and numerous children, would personally drive him out, resorting, if necessary, to the proverbial neck yoke, which was a regular feature of fisticuffs at weddings and other socials. Unlike the Chinese cafe, which was a regular feature of life in prairie villages, Jewish businesses in Ukrainian settlements were not common. In fairness, however, the hostility toward Jewish businessmen was likely as much a manifestation of the *svii do svoho* (patronize your own) trading philosophy bred by the anti-Ukrainian prejudice of mainstream Canadian society, as it was a display of anti-Jewish feelings imbibed from old-country parents.

The conversations of Ukrainians in the same villages were often sprinkled with unflattering references to Jews—"Vin ie hirshyi vid zhyda" (He is worse than a Jew) or "Ne bud zhydom" (Don't be like a Jew) or "Shcho ty, zhyd?" (What, are you a Jew?)—references usually exchanged during economic transactions or during such minor transgressions as wearing male headgear to the dinner table. But to most village or farm people the Jew was really a stranger—even a mythical figure—or merely someone whose linguistic skills, if he was from eastern Europe, could occasionally provide a familiar bridge when shopping in the equally hostile and alien city. The Jew was usually as distant as the Elders of Zion, whose protocols the Social Creditors in Ukrainian settlements condemned to knowing nods. The villagers themselves organized no anti-Jewish activities, and Ukrainian organizations in Canada adopted no anti-Jewish policies and made no anti-Jewish statements.

Although both Jewish and Ukrainian leaders are drawn today toward multiculturalism by the same tenacious ethos of group survival, one cannot say that the multicultural movement has brought them closer together. To Ukrainians, multiculturalism is primarily a language issue to ensure the preservation and enhancement of Ukrainian culture. To Jews, it is primarily a movement to build tolerance to combat evils like hate literature and other forms of discrimination. In short, for the Jews, multiculturalism is a weapon against racism, the same as for minorities that are much more visible. And the disparity of Jewish and Ukrainian interests has discouraged the close co-operation needed to make multiculturalism a stronger movement than it is at present.

In the absence of studies on racism or anti-Semitism among Ukrainians in Canada, one can only wonder how anti-Semitic or racist Ukrainians really are. During the extensive discussions of the Green Paper on Immigration in the mid-seventies, some Ukrainian opposition to immigration from Third World countries certainly had racist overtones. And, today, it

would not be difficult to find anti-Semitic views among Ukrainians who condemn the long-standing crisis in the Middle East. However, at bottom, the issue of racism is not so much one of attitude and belief as of behaviour: "There is a distinction between instinct and behaviour, between feelings and policy, and the distinctions are crucial," wrote Robert Fulford, *Saturday Night*'s editor, recently.

> In the 1940s my parents [he added] told me that racism (we called it "intolerance" or "discrimination" in those days) was evil, and I accepted their teaching. Ever since, I have tried not to be a racist. Yet I still find myself more comfortable with and more reliant on people of my own race or closely related races. Logic suggests that in my dealing I probably favour those like me. In a sense I am, therefore, a racist—and would distrust anyone, of any colour, who claimed that he or she was not. We can consciously affect our behaviour and policy; we are, for the most part, unable to change our instincts and feelings, however shameful we may think them.[8]

Thus, it is not necessary for Ukrainians in Canada to love Jews to condemn such anti-Semitic acts as the pogroms in Ukraine, the Nazi Holocaust or the by-laws against admitting Jews to exclusive clubs in Canada which have only recently disappeared.[9] Such condemnation would not justify the pogroms or the Holocaust or rationalize the discrimination and persecution that Gentiles have heaped upon Jews for centuries. Nor is it necessary for Jews in Canada to love Ukrainians to admit that, as the landlord's agent, the Jew in Ukraine was bound to reap the hostility that oppressed peasants usually heap upon such agents. Such an admission would say nothing about the inherent character of Jews as human beings. Similarly, Jews do not need to love or admire Ukrainians to recognize the legitimacy of Ukraine's national and cultural ambitions by not referring to the whole Soviet Union as Russia. Such recognition would not transform them into Ukrainian nationalists. In the same vein, nothing personal is involved for Jews to admit the horror of Ukraine's own Stalin-induced genocidal famine in 1932–3 in which millions of Ukrainians perished. The admission would not deprive the Holocaust of its terrible, special place in human history. Nor is anything personal involved for Ukrainians to commend the almost uncanny ability of Jews to make their way in the business and financial world. To recognize that it is normal for human beings to prefer their own to others even to the point of racism, and to recognize also that it is absolutely essential to exercise one's preferences with minimal harm to others because of the fundamental dignity of human beings is not a blueprint for hypocrisy but an antidote to platitudi-

nous sermonizing and an exclusive preoccupation with one's own national wounds.

What is most needed, therefore, in Jewish-Ukrainian relations is greater realism, at least in North America and especially at scholarly and educational levels. There have been enough articles such as those in the so-called symposium on *Ukrainians and Jews,* published in 1966 by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America,[10] in which external circumstances (in the main political) are used to justify the massacre of Jews in Ukrainian history, as if the Ukrainians themselves were a people without feelings, hates and desires or myths, legends and institutions that could move people to kill, pillage and persecute. (To admit the latter is not, of course, to subscribe to any theory or notion of national character,[11] which such references to anti-Semitism as "a way of life in eastern Europe" and to eastern Europe as the "heartland of anti-Semitism" tend to suggest.)[12] Badly needed also is an end to passages such as the following in what is a basic textbook for secondary school social studies classrooms in Alberta:

> At Auschwitz, Belzec, Chelmno, Majdanek, Sobibor, and Treblinka, the Jews encountered a standard procedure. At camps with labor installations, like Auschwitz, 10 per cent of the arrivals were selected for work. The remainder were consigned to the gas chambers. They undressed; women and girls had their hair cut. They were marched between files of auxiliary police (Ukrainians usually) who hurried them along with whips, sticks, or guns.[13]

There are many who are better qualified than this writer to treat Ukrainian-Nazi relations in Europe during the Second World War. But from reading such books as *None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe 1933–1948,* it is clear that no country wished to open its doors to Jewish emigration from Europe and all countries and all peoples were therefore auxiliaries of the Nazis. Singling out Ukrainians can only be the work of diabolical minds.

In the same realistic vein, Ukrainians must appreciate the importance of war crimes trials to the Jewish people, and such war criminals as may exist among Ukrainian Canadian émigrés must not be shielded or have their deeds rationalized. The war criminal, regardless of national origin, is first of all a criminal and must be treated as such. Jews, on the other hand, must realize that nothing is more suspect to the Ukrainian than evidence derived from Soviet sources, because no one is more vulnerable to Soviet attack than the émigré who has consciously and deliberately turned his back on the Soviet Union and its way of life. With Ukrainian-

Russian relations difficult for centuries, the temptation to smear an entire group of critical Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalists" as treacherous fascists and Nazi collaborators should be easy to understand. It is difficult to imagine anything that could poison Jewish-Ukrainian relations in Canada more than the trial and conviction of a Ukrainian émigré mainly on Soviet evidence.

Finally, both Jewish and Ukrainian Canadians should appreciate that, despite the difference and distance, the Jewish people—richer, better educated and better organized, more urban and more urbane, and, above all, members of a persevering and successful diaspora that has regained its promised land—have always been the model for Ukrainians in Canada. Discussions of Ukrainian Canadian problems are replete with references to the Jewish experience, and "Dyvitsia na zhydiv" (Look at the Jews) has been the coup de grâce or call-to-arms of many a Ukrainian Canadian leader. Neither side has capitalized on this admiration, probably because a common agenda would be difficult to establish. As indicated earlier, the dominant interests of both minorities vary greatly. Moreover, the Jews of Canada tend to look for assistance to the large and powerful Jewish community in the United States, also concentrated in the East. American Ukrainians, in turn, although twice as numerous as those in Canada, are without a multicultural policy to sustain them, and being weak, are of little interest to the American Jews.[14]

A recent hopeful collaborative sign in Canada, however, was a meeting in February 1983 in Toronto of Jewish and Ukrainian leaders in their private capacities. Significant for having taken place at all, the half-day meeting was also noteworthy for its frankness and the fact that the sensitive issues raised did not arouse acrimony or ill-feeling. At another level, a joint meeting with the Community Relations Council of the Jewish Federation of Edmonton was organized in March by the Ukrainian Professional and Business Club, at which the Council's chairman, Herb Katz, proposed a joint standing Jewish-Ukrainian co-ordinating committee to consider such issues as the media's "anti-Jewish flavor" as a result of events in Lebanon, the "rising tide of anti-Semitism world-wide and locally" and the release of Jews and Jewish dissidents in the Soviet Union.[15] The committee came into being almost immediately, and the first fruits were letters to the editor from the presidents of the Ukrainian Club and the Jewish Federation, and another from the president of Edmonton's Ukrainian Canadian Committee, all attesting (to quote the Federation president) to the "warm associations being developed."[16] The letters were prompted by the volatile "Keegstra affair," which descended upon Albertans after the media's unearthing of one James Keegstra, mayor and high school teacher in Eckville, Alberta, who taught that the Holocaust had never happened and that the Protocols of the Elders of

Zion proved the existence of a Jewish conspiracy to dominate the world.

The letter from the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, in particular, was a marked departure from the arm's-length relationship which the Ukrainian leadership has traditionally believed Ukrainian organizations and their conservative members should follow where other ethnocultural groups are concerned. Carefully worded, it is a formal and correct political statement which overstates the traditional Ukrainian Canadian interest in other groups. Although it undoubtedly pleased an apprehensive Jewish community, it is too general to be a basis for future co-operation. Nor are such other bases as those recently suggested by Professors Aster and Potichnyj overly promising.[17] Ukrainians generally are no more interested in the state of Israel—the compelling concern of all Jews—than are Jews generally in the independence of Ukraine—the compelling concern of most Ukrainians and especially those of the postwar immigration.

Furthermore, while Ukrainian Canadians have been less indifferent to the state of human rights in Ukraine than Jewish Canadians have been toward the fate of some 800,000 Jews in the same country, Ukrainian Canadians are not generally known for their advocacy of human or civil rights at home. To them, hard work and self-reliance rather than constitutional or legal provisions are the best guarantors of the good life. With attention to human rights not part of the tradition of Ukrainians in Canada and indifference to the fate of Ukraine, let alone Israel, the usual attitude of Canadian-born Ukrainians, who today constitute 80 per cent of the group, all who wish to improve Jewish-Ukrainian relations in the future must recognize the high odds against success. Yet the effort must be made, for the stakes in improved human relations are even higher.

NOTES

1. The most recent historical account of the Ukrainians in Canada is *A Heritage in Transition: Essays in the History of Ukrainians in Canada,* ed. M. R. Lupul (Toronto 1982); the most comprehensive treatment is M. H. Marunchak, *Ukrainian Canadians: A History,* rev. ed. (Winnipeg 1982). *The Encyclopedia Judaica* (Jerusalem 1972), vol. 5. S. E. Rosenberg, *The Jewish Comunity in Canada: Volume 1 A History* (Toronto/Montreal 1970), and M. Weinfeld, W. Shaffir, I. Colter, eds., *The Canadian Jewish Mosaic* (Toronto 1981) provide the best historical overviews of Jewish life and issues in Canada.
2. For the best account of the issue, see B. G. Sacks, *History of the Jews in Canada* (Montreal 1964), 69–113.
3. Sacks, 191–204; A. A. Chiel, *The Jews in Manitoba* (Toronto 1961), 43–56; *Census of Canada,* 1911, 163.
4. Heritage in Transition, 32; *Census of Canada,* 1941, 335.

5. L. Rosenberg, "Some Aspects of the Historical Development of the Canadian Jewish Community," quoted in S. E. Rosenberg, vol. 1, 120.
6. Chiel, 58.
7. I. Abella and H. Troper, *None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe 1933–1948* (Toronto 1982), 50–1.
8. *Saturday Night,* September 1983, 8.
9. P. C. Newman, *The Canadian Establishment,* rev. ed. (Toronto 1979), 1: 456–60.
10. "Articles, Testimonies, Letters and Official Documents Dealing with Interrelations of Ukrainians and Jews in the Past and Present," subtitled *A Symposium* and published in New York.
11. For rejection of the concept of national character by Jewish and Ukrainian scholars in Canada, see H. Aster and P. J. Potichnyj, *Jewish-Ukrainian Relations: Two Solitudes* (Oakville, Ont. 1983), 16–17, and also the discussion of Americans who see Ukrainians as "inveterate anti-Semites," 13–14; L. Rosenberg, *Canada's Jews: A Social and Economic Study of the Jews in Canada* (Montreal 1939), xxviii-xxix, who quotes John Stuart Mill approvingly: "Of all vulgar modes of escaping from the consideration of racial and moral influence on the modern mind, the most vulgar is that of attributing the diversities of conduct and character to inherent natural differences"(xxviii).
12. Abella and Troper, 4, 194.
13. D. Roselle and A. P. Young, *Our Western Heritage: A Cultural-Analytic History of Europe since 1500* (Lexington, Mass. 1981), 479.
14. M. B. Kuropas in *The Ukrainian Weekly,* 31 October 1982.
15. *Edmonton Journal*, 26 March 1983.
16. Ibid., 24 June, 7 July 1983.
17. Aster and Potichnyj, 46–8.

COMMENTS

Alan Shefman

I would like to begin my remarks by echoing Walter Tarnopolsky's sentiments in regard to the presentation of this conference. I have to congratulate Howard and Peter for the work they have done to ensure that this conference takes place. It is long overdue and, hopefully, it is the beginning.

My perspective this afternoon is not as an historian even though I also would consider myself an amateur historian of sorts. It is not as an expert on Jewish-Ukrainian relations in North America, and indeed it is not as an academic. Rather I will make my remark as a practitioner in the area of human relations.

The League for Human Rights is an agency created by B'nai Brith Canada thirteen years ago to work in the area of human rights for all Canadians. Very obviously, our base is within the Jewish community, but our practice over the years of our existence has been on education in the area of human rights and human relations. It is focused on increasing inter-cultural dialogue and contact. We have also been involved in the area of responding to the major needs and the situations in human-rights issues in this country. An example of what we are dealing with today is the proliferation of hate propaganda in this country. This is an extremely significant issue for the Jewish community in Canada today.

Some observations: First, the relationship between the Jewish and Ukrainian communities has a historical dimension. It is ruled by the generations that left Europe, rather than those who were born and brought up in this country. Also, we have yet to take any substantive measures to address our preconceived notions about each other; those beliefs that have resulted in mistrust, bitterness and, indeed, hatred. Let me cite a remark, in fact more than one remark, that people made to me last year when we announced that Judge Walter Tarnopolsky was to receive a special human-rights award from the League for Human Rights. People came to me, and I have to say not very many people, but people did come up to me and asked, "Is he okay?" The implications were obvious. Probably no one in this country has more impeccable credentials in the area of human rights and still this was the first reaction of some people.

A second observation: We have a growing number of common issues that may provide a catalyst for a more all-encompassing dialogue. For example, the genocidal attacks that both Jews and Ukrainians have faced in Europe, the Soviet dissident movement, the situation for Jews and Uk-

rainians in the Soviet Union today. We have a similar settlement pattern in this country. We have a somewhat similar socio-economic development in this country. The new generations of Jews and Ukrainians have somewhat similar patterns of entering universities and entering professional schools. There are also other common concerns such as the patterns of assimilation of our communities. All these possibly could be used in the future to encourage and develop a dialogue. We have, in comparison to other ethno-cultural communities in this country, mature community structures. Both the Jewish and the Ukrainian communities have national structures that have been developed and have operated over a number of years. When we talk to our friends in the Black or the Chinese communities, you get a certain perspective on how well established our communities are. I think we have a similarity of interest in regard to the changing multicultural policies of the federal government. There seems to be an increasing stress on multicultural being directed only to the visible minority communities. As I am sure you all are aware a Special Parliamentary Committee on Visible Minorities has been established to look into the situation between the visible minority communities and the rest of Canadians. Our brief to that committee, presented a couple of weeks ago, expressed our concern over the terms of reference that for some reason conceives that there is this polarity between visible minority people and the rest of Canadians. The problem is race relations, the problem is cultural relations. It is not a problem of the visible minorities and the rest of Canadians.

I think we have a common interest in reviewing the multicultural policy of the federal government to help it to recognize the true nature of multicultural interests in this country. Judge Tarnopolsky remarked earlier on the lack of involvement of the Jewish community in the area of multiculturalism. I would agree that Jews have not been active in the cultural, the singing and dancing of Multiculturalism. It is a reflection in part of our concern focusing on such recently recognized aspects of multicultural policy as race relations. It is also reflects the organized Jewish community's inability to identify its role. The Jewish community has yet to resolve the question of whether it should be considered a religious group or an ethno-cultural group. Traditionally, the stress has been on the religious community. My own feeling is that this is no longer relevant to our present situation in this country. My operating mode is that the Jewish community is to be considered an ethno-cultural community. The growing involvement of the Jewish community in dealing with the multicultural aspects of Canadian society is something that we have been working very hard to promote.

I would now like to turn to some of the history of the Jewish-Ukrainian experience in this country. What attempts have been made for dialogue?

Some months ago I came across a brief of a session that was held in Sudbury in May 1975. As I read this discussion about a dialogue programme that took place between the Jewish and the Ukrainian communities at that time, the first thought that came to my mind was—why Sudbury? I am sure there are a number of people here who might be able to answer that question. But also why has that disappeared into history? When I talk to people in my own community, people who were involved at that time, it has just been totally forgotten. But that initial attempt to begin dialogue did take place in 1975. A second attempt at dialogue occurred at the University of Toronto in 1981. I became involved with that programme when the Hillel Director approached me and said, "I've got something happening and I'm not sure what to do about it." He had talked to other people in the community, and some said "Don't do it, It's dangerous." That was the immediate reaction. My own advice to him was "go full steam ahead, deal with the issues. You are in an environment where, to a certain extent, the outside community and those outside forces are not going to have as great an effect as they would in the general community. You are in an environment at the university where you should be exploring things that may not be, or cannot be explored outside the university environment." And they went ahead. From time to time I heard the results of the very frank discussions.

A short time later I attended a meeting in Toronto of concerned members of the Jewish community and it was probably one of the most fascinating meetings I have attended in many years. At one point, the demand was made that the U. of T. experiment stop—that the dialogue stop. Fortunately, for everyone concerned, that was a small minority of people. The ultimate decision of that committee was not only to not intervene, letting it continue but in fact to commend the actions that had been taken on the initiative of the students at the University of Toronto. Regrettably that experiment in dialogue has stopped. It is something that I would love to see begin again and possibly, arising from this meeting, we can begin that dialogue once more.

Another important point for a dialogue over common interests is now occurring in Manitoba, where the Jewish community and the Ukrainian community have been the leaders in providing support to the Francophone community for language rights. And, once again, I think that when there are areas where there are common issues, where we can work together, we enhance our ability to broaden the basis for our own dialogue.

What are the future approaches? What approaches can we use to ensure that the dialogue that I believe has begun here over the last few days can be continued? The first step must be to look for academic leadership. In my reference to the University of Toronto students, I think

the onus is also on the academic leadership to continue their dialogue. There is a certain somewhat sad situation where, in many communities where there are significant numbers of Jewish academics at the universities, there is very little involvement with the community itself. It is something that I find somewhat disheartening. But at the same point where a community might have differences over establishing a formal dialogue between the Ukrainians and Jews, it is very possible within the academic community to provide a certain catalyst for meetings to continue and expand to the general community.

We should take the oportunity to make alliances on specific issues. The Manitoba situation is an ideal one, but there are many others where the Jewish and the Ukrainian communities can stand up and provide support to each other. The Keegstra affair in Alberta is one very obvious one where many people in the Jewish community came to me and said, "where are the other communities? Why haven't we heard from the other communities in condemning what has been going on in Eckville, Alberta?"

It took a while, but gradually they began to hear the condemnations, the statements of support. I told a number of the leaders in Calgary and Edmonton that those statements of support, the sensitivity to know when to make those statements, do not come simply out of the blue. You have to create an ongoing relationship. You have to develop a dialogue in order to generate the type of relationship where you feel comfortable making those sorts of statements in support of one another. It is a marvellous opportunity for dialogue that should never be missed.

In the area of teaching, so very often the negative preconceived notions that we have of one another have been developed in the home. Even in schools, our understanding is retarded not by negative teaching, but by the lack of teaching, by the failure of being instructed on who our neighbours are and where they originated. If it is possible to develop good, concise histories of ourselves, if not jointly, then as the Jewish community in Canada and the Ukrainian community in Canada, and if we can bring those types of material to the classroom and be a part of a larger package of multicultural studies in the schools, I can see that as being a very positive way of dealing with our misunderstandings.

At the grassroots level, we have to begin to build facilities to develop a dialogue. We have developed an Intercultural Dialogue Programme, at the League for Human Rights on an experimental basis in both Toronto and Montreal. In the last three years, for example, one of the B'nai Brith lodges in Toronto has met with the Black community, the Chinese community and the Sephardic Jewish community (which is in essence a different cultural group in many ways). Last year when the lodge asked me for a suggestion in regard to what group to approach, my response was,

"why don't you look at having a programme with the Ukrainian community?"

Ultimately, after some consideration, they decided not to do that for a number of reasons. But I think the time is right where those sorts of things should not have to be a matter of discussion, and it should be totally obvious that the programme should take place. The Dialogue programme operates in a very simple manner. A small group of people from each community get together and spend a cultural and educational evening, learning, exchanging names, finding out what are some of the concerns, what are some of the interests of the two communities. It is a grass roots programme. It has been most successful and I feel that it is time to begin this programme for our communities.

Finally, we have a common skill, a common experience that we should be sharing with other ethnocultural communities. It is a point that I made somewhat earlier. We are senior communities in the sense that we have been here much longer than other communities. We are considered to be somewhat more sophisticated in our structures than other ethno-cultural communities. We do have professional infra-structures that have been developed. One area where we can work very closely together is in providing this resource to other ethnic communities dispensing the knowledge and experience that we have developed.

Walter Tarnopolsky

I'd like to start by saying how very pleased I am that this conference is taking place. We owe a great debt to Peter Potichnyj and Howard Aster, for a great amount of hard work over the past few years, for their studies of Jewish-Ukrainian relations and their presentation of papers on this subject and their organization of this particular conference. A large number of us had hoped for this for many years. Back about 1972–3—unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I don't have exact dates because my files are either still in Ottawa or in packing cases in my basement—Ben Kayfitz, David Neuman, Stan Frolick and I got together to try to approach this issue of how, within our communities, we might start raising the issue of Jewish-Ukrainian relations, both in Eastern Europe and in the diaspora, particulary in Canada. I am very pleased indeed that this initiative has been taken here at McMaster, following—I shouldn't say following in the sense of any order of priority—the conference that was held in Washington last year, at which again Professors Potichnyj and Aster participated.

Before I became a judge and still had the almost absolute freedom of

expression of an academic, I used to say that among Ukrainian Canadians there were no political divisions on two points. I used to say this to Peter Savaryn who was on the opposite end of what used to be my political persuasion. One was the matter of human rights in the Soviet Union. The other was the matter of multiculturalism and human rights in Canada. And I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, without having had the opportunity to hear or feel what has gone on in the last few days, that the past which divides us might be overcome by these two themes. My hope is very deep that they can form the basis between Jews and Ukrainians for reasons of both altruism and mutual self-interest to co-operate and thereby to overcome past animosities and conflicts. Using these two themes of human rights in the USSR and multiculturalism and human rights in Canada, I think we can make progress. I think it is important for us to remain realistic. Just as I feel it is inaccurate, unfair and destructive to label all Ukrainians as anti-Semitic or all Jews as anti-Ukrainian, so it would be naïve to believe that all Jews and Ukrainians, particularly in the diaspora, will join in this endeavour or even welcome it or even give a damn whether we do it or not. I think it will only be the leading elements in both communities that will be in a position to do something about this.

Let me deal with these two themes of human rights in the USSR and multiculturalism and human rights in Canada as two separate matters. As a purely amateur historian, one to whom history is a hobby, I will not attempt to review East European history before the professional experts that we have here today. But from my readings, including the papers of Potichnyj and Aster, it seems to me that one might summarize the mutual attitudes between Jews and Ukrainians on Ukrainian territories as arising from a common historical experience. One gets the clear impression that many Jews viewed Ukrainians with a certain amount of contempt and superiority, tinged with a certain amount of fear. The contempt, as described in these papers and in historical documents was for a Cossack people, for a peasant people who were referred to as heavy drinkers and given to fighting. The fear obviously arises out of the fact that in most cases, the hand that killed the Jew was a Ukrainian hand, regardless of who ordered or incited it. In the diaspora, much of the fear has gone, for obvious reasons, but not all of the contempt has left. On the other hand, many Ukrainians also viewed Jews with a certain amount of contempt and superiority, often Christian-inspired, from the teachings of Christianity, tinged with a certain amount of jealousy. In the diaspora, much of the superiority is gone, but much of the jealousy, either in terms of relative success in Canada and the United States or in attainment of a national state, has remained. The result is that, especially in the diaspora, many Jews do not look to Ukrainians as allies, because Ukrainians have never had enough power and influence, either in Eastern Europe or, more

recently, in the United States, to be worth allying with. This is somewhat less true in Canada, where the balance, as far as the Ukrainians are concerned, is much higher than in the United States. On the other hand, many Ukrainians do not look to Jews as allies because they feel that they never have been their allies.

Since the Second World War, the situation has changed considerably in the Soviet Union. A totalitarian state is using modern technology to deprive both groups of their human rights. A major difference, however, continues, and it is one that has to be recognized and faced up to, and that is that Soviet Jews seek protection of human rights and/or immigration, whereas most Soviet Ukrainians who do seek protection of human rights also seek autonomy or even independence. In other words, self-determination, which in the International Bill of Rights is Article 1 of both the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, leads to somewhat different aims. Where a Jew, or Jews as people, seek self-determination, it finds its expression within Israel. Ukrainians, as a people, seek self-determination in the Ukrainian territories in the Soviet Union. And one of the things that emerges and that Ukrainians find very difficult to understand and accept is that there is very little sympathy among the states of the world for their independence. Everyone supports self-determination, but, as you know, the self-determination has been largely for former colonial overseas territories, and you even find theories widely accepted that self-determination can be exercised only once. Obviously you can understand that states like Nigeria wanted it understood that self-determination took place when Nigeria become independent from the United Kingdom, but it did not mean that Biafra would have the right to self-determination. Similarly, Pakistan asserted that self-determination came with independence from the United Kingdom; there was no room for Bangladesh to achieve independence. The fact is that there are no countries in the world (except when they're interested in trying to bother some other country), that are prepared to accept self-determination going as far as independence.

The Ukrainians in the diaspora must recognize—I cannot speak for those in the Soviet Union—that they cannot expect Jews, or for that matter anyone else, to support movements for the independence of Ukraine. One of the things that one has to refer to, nevertheless, is that there has been some evolution of what self-determination means. Perhaps the most important of these has come in the Helsinki Final Act, where self-determination has been defined in the following terms: "by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right to full freedom, to determine when and as they wish their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural

development." I have suggested that this is a bit of an advance from the definition of self-determination in the two Covenants constituting the International Bill of Rights, in that the emphasis is on the right, always, not a one-time determination. This has two ramifications, one being that one must always be able to advocate self-determination. As Canadians, we would all hope, I think, that Quebecers will self-determine to remain a province of Canada, so that self-determination can take the form, obviously, of federalism or independence. Nevertheless, the second part of the self-determination, which has become extremely important since the Helsinki Final Act, is that it has an implication for the whole field of human rights. The right to determine one's political, economic, social and cultural development is always there. That means you have the right to change a government. That means you cannot have a one-party state. That means the whole issue of human rights is tied up with the right of the individual and the right of the group. And so one of the things that one must emphasize, as far as Ukrainians are concerned, is that there will not be any sympathy among the states of the world, unless they are out for their own self-interest, to see the destruction of the USSR. Certainly we cannot expect Jews to support us in our search for independence for Ukraine.

On the other hand, what I would suggest to the dissidents who have left the Soviet Union, whether they be Russian, Jewish or of any other nationality, is that human rights cannot be achieved in the Soviet Union unless the right to urge and advocate self-determination is recognized. In other words, until the Soviet Union faces its nationalities question, there will be no human rights for anyone. Because if one asserts the fundamental freedoms of expression, assembly, association, then one must contemplate the possibility of urging self-determination. I think that one has to emphasize that there will be no human rights for Jews, Armenians or Russians unless there is also the human right to advocate self-determination in whatever form it takes; and I will not take sides as to what form it might take.

There is another aspect concerning human rights, partly in the Soviet Union, that I want to refer to briefly, and that is the matter of war criminals. I will briefly state two propositions, which, it seems to me, each side has to accept. As far as Ukrainians are concerned, we must accept that a war criminal is a murderer. A war criminal has either murdered or has ordered murder, or can be charged with complicity. Relations between us and the Jews in the diaspora will never be resolved if we are not prepared to accept that a war criminal has to be dealt with under international law and under the Covenant on Genocide, as someone who has to be pursued anywhere, either in other parts of the world or in Canada.

On the other hand, one of the things that the Ukrainians would insist

upon is that the determination of who is a war criminal and what war crimes may have been committed cannot be based upon Soviet sources. Both with recent developments with respect to Soviet Jews and with respect to everyone else in the Soviet Union, the Soviet authorities will label anyone who is a nationalist, or if you wish a non-Soviet supporter, as being a fascist and therefore will try to imply or find ways of manufacturing the evidence of the persons involved in the war crimes. Let me just finish on this point and move on to the other one by saying that, particularly among Ukrainians, it would be self-defeating and wrong to respond to requests for pursuit of war criminals by saying that it is only possible if one pursues all war criminals. I think it is mistaken to try to compare, if you wish, Holocausts. The real issue that one has to consider here in Canada is this: what do we do to war criminals who are in this territory and what should we do with them. Either we pursue war criminals in Canada or we extradite them to the countries where they would get a proper trial and just punishment. From our point of view, as far as who perpetrated, who participated, who brought on the perpetration, we just don't have those people in Canada. So although one can feel that there are people in the Soviet Union who could be punished, it is not the same situation as the issue of those war criminals who did come into our country, where we have to face our own consciences as well as the international responsibility under the Genocide Convention.

Let me turn to the other topic, and that is multiculturalism and human rights, particularly in Canada, and again, I do not know the American situation quite as well. We have to recognize that there is no question that Jews have been leading advocates of human rights in North America. If one goes back to the earlier human-rights movements in Canada starting during the Second World War and on with people like Kalman Kaplensky going to today with people like Alan Borovoy, both of whom I am fortunate to have as close friends, one can see the involvement of Jews in the human-rights movement in Canada. (There are just too many in the United States to mention and so I won't even try.) Unfortunately, too few Ukrainians have been involved in this. On the other hand, as far as multiculturalism is concerned. Ukrainians have been a leading force in the constitutional entrenchment of the multicultural heritage of Canada. If one looks at the submissions made to the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission, Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, you will see that of some thirty-four briefs submitted to the B & B Commission, by groups other than of British and French extraction, the Ukrainians submitted something like nineteen. If one considers the involvement of people like Senator Yuzyk and Professor Rudnyckyj in the period near the end of the report of the commission, it becomes clear that our influence in that area has been very important. Unlike the human-rights situation where it is the

reverse, here, apart from people like Saul Hayes, very few Jews have been involved. Having spent many years in the human-rights movement, I have felt that one cannot achieve the one without the other. In other words, unless one supports the human rights of others, one does not have the legitimacy necessary for requesting support for one's own human rights. And further, human rights cannot be achieved, the right of everyone to equal treatment to liberty, unless group rights are recognized as well. I know that for those of you who are American, there is less acceptance of this than there is in Canada. Nevertheless, I think we are on the right track on this, and I might just remind our American friends that recent pressure for Black studies, Black history, recent movements to bilingualism in places like New Mexico, to some extent Los Angeles, to some extent in communities in Connecticut and New York, are all indications that people must be able to participate in the culture that they wish if there is to be real equality. In other words, if the cost of equality is homogenization, then there will not be equality. Instead, what one arouses is racism and inequality. Based upon this, let me conclude that what I would have suggested under the issue of human rights in the Soviet Union is just as applicable to the matter of multiculturalism and human rights in Canada. That is, unless we base our attitude on respect and love of human being for human being, unless we accept that the deprivation of human rights of anyone, anywhere, is a deprivation of humanity which then in turn affects us, we are not going to achieve anything for any of us.

VII

Round-Table Discussion

Professor Gitelman:

I'd like to open this morning's session, which has been listed as a round table discussion. It is our intention in the Leninist tradition to combine spontaneity and consciousness. I think there will probably be more spontaneity than Lenin would have liked and a little less consciousness, but neither I nor Professor Pelenski will impose any form of democratic centralism. On the other hand we would like to structure the conversation in some way, and we thought the most efficient way to do this would be, in light of the comments made at the various sessions, to suggest some directions for future research in the area of Jewish-Ukrainian relations. I would like to turn the floor over to Professor Pelenski, who will list some topics which were mentioned in the course of the various conversations we have had, and then we will throw the floor open for discussion. I would ask first that we address those topics which Professor Pelenski will list shortly and people who have suggestions for research, or comments on the way research ought to be done, ought to do those in relation to the topics listed. Following that, we would welcome any discussion of any other topics which have not been included in this list.

Professor Pelenski:

We had a conversation with Professor Gitelman following yesterday's sessions and we have prepared a tentative six-point list of topics, which we thought would be worthwhile for future research and, of course, topics on which some additional discussion may be needed after yesterday's exchanges. This is the list:

(1) The Jewish role in the Ukrainian famine and collectivization.
(2) The Second World War, the Holocaust problem and its ramifications.

(3) A comparison of regional and systemic variations of Jewish-Ukrainian relations, in other words, whether relations between Jews and Ukrainians were similar or dissimilar in various areas of Ukraine.
(4) Soviet policy toward Jewish-Ukrainian relations.
(5) Once more, the subject of Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the Revolution including, of course, the unpleasant aspects, namely the pogroms on Ukrainian territory regardless of whether they were committed by Ukrainians or non-Ukrainians.
(6) The last one on our list is the one on which again there is a broad agreement, namely, the role of historical consciousness and national or national/religious ideology in Jewish-Ukrainian relations.

There are our six topics. If you have any concrete proposition in terms of topics, please indicate so. I will then mark them seven, eight, or whatever.

Professor Rudnytsky:

One possible topic which comes to my mind is Ukrainian-Jewish interrelations on the level of folk culture. I think there is a very definite Ukrainian dimension in East European Jewish folk culture.

Professor Pelenski:

So, we've got no further propositions right now, additional comments may come. Zvi, would you now take over the floor.

Professor Gitelman:

There is just one other point which we might make and which is quite different from the other topics listed and, therefore, Professor Pelenski did not include it. I think that in the back of some of our minds is the question of how to disseminate the research that has already been done and that will presumably be done in the future beyond the academic communities. We are, after all, dealing with a topic which has real life ramifica-

selves to those issues. You have the list that Professor Pelenski suggested and if anyone would like to offer comments on any of those topics, this would be the appropriate time to do so.

Professor Ettinger:

I want to object to the inclusion of item one on the list as outlined. To me, it betrays a certain anti-Semitic bias which must be overcome. It is categorically wrong to speak of the "Jewish role in the Ukrainian famine." We may want to speak of the role of certain individuals in the specific problem. But it is wrong to speak of "the Jewish role" in such matters.

It is true that Jews believe that a Jew is always responsible for his fellow Jewish brethren. But you cannot move from that view to the assumptions which appear to lie behind the notion that "Jews" as a people had a role to play in the famine. The Ukrainian famine was a tremendous tragedy of the Ukrainian people and of the Soviet Union in general. I do not know how many Jews were at that time in the GPU, or in other Soviet agencies. One of the interesting developments of the Jewish community in the Soviet Union was that after they had been excluded from the state apparatus of the Russian state for over two hundred years, they became in some sense over-represented in the state apparatus after the Revolution. That is a fact. But does it mean that that is the key to Jewish-Ukrainian or Jewish-Russian relations? If a Jewish political party or a Jewish intellectual group had said, "Well we should kill Ukrainians, we should bring the Ukrainians to starvation," then I think there would have been a collective responsibility. But it was nothing of the kind. There were people in the state apparatus who we actually, or who I personally, don't consider Jews at all. What is Jewish in them? They were born to Jewish mothers and I, not being a racist, do not see anything in it. They were not culturally or religiously Jewish, not in any organization connected with the Jewish movement, or a Jewish political party; they did not know Jewish literature, Jewish thought and so on. But now we come to the real problem—as I see it. Are we to say that if a Jew, an individual Jew, is a criminal, does that mean that all Jews are criminals, or guilty? And that all Jews are responsible for his or her action? I do not see how a nice, kind and intelligent person such as Professor Pelenski could suggest this sort of topic.

Professor Pelenski:

I did not suggest this topic. We made a survey and it was Zvi as a matter of fact who suggested it.

Professor Ettinger:

It does not matter who suggested it. Let me get to the point again. I think the suggestion of this topic betrays an anti-Semitic stereotype and a non-scholarly attitude to problems.

Maybe if we make a personal list of the members of the NKVD who participated in the persecution of Ukrainian peasants, in the early 1930s we will find the proportion of Jews among the people of the NKVD was three times as high as their percentage in the population. Then if you'll take poets or members of the Academy of Sciences you will find the same. You see, this attitude is, in my opinion, from the outset, a false one. But more than that I am not cross and angry with those people who suggested these topics. My greatest anger is against myself. You see I wanted to come to this session in order to say that I was leaving after yesterday's paper by Professor Bilinsky, to leave the conference and to say I have finished with the whole thing. But that was an emotional outburst. To my surprise what I actually started to think was just the opposite.

The first actual horrifying representation of the famine in Ukraine was the work by Vassily Grossman in "Vse techet" (Forever Flowing). This Jewish author pictured the extermination of the Ukrainian peasants earlier and with more force than any other author. Then there are other Jews who have done this and that, you see, and exposed the Soviet policy of inciting one nationality against the other and so on and so forth; but then I became ashamed of myself. All my life I preached to my students that it's not a problem of collective responsibility, guilt and so on; you should be an objective historian. The problem is what is the real scholarly objective attitude to this question? For me it was a horrifying experience to sit and to hear this proposal. Not only because, in my opinion, it is factually and academically false, but because if we pursue this question we don't have a basis for that exchange of opinions, for just that scholarly co-operation which I, at least, by attending this conference had hoped that we would have.

I will tell you the truth. When this conference was suggested I approached several scholars in Israel and suggested that they should attend the conference. Some agreed and you see them here. Some said "Not with Ukrainians. Ukrainians will always remain our enemies." My effort was to show that it is not so, that there is an objective basis for scholar-

ship, that I personally know people for whom co-operation, understanding and objective scholarly research are the main thing. I really know them, and therefore, not only did I agree to participate, but I gave a hand in organizing this conference. I will tell you that now I am not so sure that I was the one in the right. I hope that maybe at the next conference other people will create—I hope and I pray—will create this co-operation. I am really disappointed, not because someone, an individual or two individuals, presented views which I think are false, but because not one of my Ukrainian friends stood up and said that this is not the way to deal with the problem of the Holocaust in Ukraine.

Professor Gitelman:

Just as a historical footnote. The list which Professor Pelenski read was a compilation of suggestions from the floor. I have four names of people who indicated a desire to speak and any others who wish to do so please raise your hand. I have them in the following order: Professors Bilinsky, Serbyn, Rudnytsky, Pritsak.

Professor Bilinsky:

Monsieur le Président. I take it that it is legal to address you in Canada in French. I'm awfully sorry Professor Ettinger if you interpreted my paper in that way. I've been subject to conflicting advice. Very serious and practical people have cautioned me to tread softly on the emotional and political minefields whose location has been barely sketched at our conference. On the other hand, one of the most distinguished guests from Israel, Professor Shmuel Ettinger, has called for openness in our approach. Since by temperament I'm not inclined to beat around the bush, but would rather call a spade a spade, permit me to follow Dr. Ettinger's wise counsel. I fully agree that there are unique aspects to the Jewish Holocaust. After all, obviously more than two per cent of Ukrainians survived various genocidal attempts at the hands of the Soviet and the Nazi governments.

Martyrology has been developed into a fine science in Israel, and I would seriously urge my Ukrainian fellow scholars to emulate the example of Dr. Weiss and others like him, instead of simply crying that Ukrainians have been persecuted and killed without saying how many, where and by whom. At the same time I would not go so far as to equate the OUN with the Ukrainian national movement. Nationalist movement in my judgment would have been a more appropriate formulation. For

Bandera, Melnyk and Stetsko were not representative of the Ukrainian people, especially not of the bulk of the Ukrainian population in Eastern Ukraine. And if you refuse to accept collective guilt, please allow us to do the same. At the same time, at a scholarly conference one ought to be permitted to draw attention to certain parallels in genocide everywhere, whether it be the Armenians, the Jews or the Ukrainians. That is, to wit, the objective of the oppressor government, to destroy the national group as a national group, whether it be in one massive action, the Holocaust, or in stages in the Armenian or the Ukrainian case. Millions of Ukrainian peasants died and they are human beings too, not just misguided creatures who should have known better than to oppose Stalin's "necessary collectivization drive."

My plea to my Jewish colleagues—and may I be permitted to say Jewish friends—is, you are analyzing your Holocaust and as a by-product presenting us with a bill of charges for complicity. Allow us equally to analyze the great famine since its impact on the Ukrainian community has been very grave and as a by-product allow us to present our bill of particulars. If we freely admit that some Ukrainian extremists were imitating Hitler, we would welcome an equally frank admission on your part that some Jewish radicals were over-zealous in furthering the interests of Stalin, with the result, that starting in the 1940s, the Soviet regime turned against Jews as a national group, as it had turned against Ukrainians a decade before. For goodness' sake, let's courageously admit that certain groupings of both peoples have committed tragic misjudgments. Let's clear the thick air and let's then get down to the difficult, long drawn out business of defining common interests and common divergencies.

Two final remarks: the general stereotype of Ukrainians held by Jews is bad. There are certain objective reasons for this (see Dr. Weiss). But consciousness may be behind present reality (see Dr. Gitelman). But the general stereotypes of the Jews held by the Ukrainians is also bad. The Jews have been frequently identified as siding with the stronger power. Now to be quite frank, and possibly blunt, so long as Ukraine is moving in the direction of Little Russia this attitude of some Soviet Jews is a perfectly rational and pragmatic decision. Under those circumstances it may even be rational for Ukrainian Jews to become assimilated to the Russians. After all, many Ukrainians do so as well and who are we to criticize the Jews for doing what generations of Enkos have been doing for centuries. But if Ukraine should become more and more of Ukraine, not Little Russia, the position of the pro-Russian Jews in Ukraine is bound to become very awkward. The Ukrainian's question to our Jewish friends is simply, "Do you place your bet on Little Russia or on an eventually independent Ukraine?"

The last remark is on a more hopeful note, ladies and gentlemen. More

than twenty years ago, I interviewed Soviet-Ukrainian refugees. I found that for all the differences, Soviet Ukrainians were hopeful about relations with Soviet Ukrainian Jews, stereotypes apart. The themes that run through the conversations were, you could talk to them, you could make a deal with them, some Jewish office holders were relatively more humane than Russians and Russified Ukrainians. Ladies and gentlemen, let us jointly clear away the burdens of the past, but let's then proceed to build on the more hopeful developments of the present. Thank you.

Professor Serbyn:

First, I would like to add one more topic to the list. I think for myself (I mentioned this the day before yesterday, and I think repeated it yesterday), I would very much like to have seen the Ukrainian problem, or the image of a Ukrainian as it appeared in Jewish political thought before and after the Revolution. For example, Professor Mishkinsky gave us a paper on the Ukrainian perception of the Jews, especially Podolynsky's very negative view, Drahomanov's more or less ambivalent one and so on. But I do not think we had the other side of the coin. I think this is important for understanding, and if we are going to talk about relations (if we are going to have a hyphenated Jewish-Ukrainian conference), then I think both sides should be analyzed. That's my first remark.

Second remark. I came here with an open mind. I certainly do not have the answers to a lot of questions that I had asked myself. I came here to learn and to contribute the little that I have done in my own research. I viewed this conference as perhaps being much more, to myself, interesting and stimulating than the conference on Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-Polish relations because in the other two cases perhaps the stereotypes are in some ways easier. The Russian state, the Polish state, was the dominant state, Ukrainians were the oppressed people and so on. It is very clear-cut. But on Jewish-Ukrainian relations, the situation is much more complex. Both are often viewed as oppressed nationalities, as oppressed communities within the Polish, the Russian or the Austro-Hungarian state. So it would seem that on one hand, there should be an alliance, that should almost automatically apply. On the other hand, each community viewed the other as being a part of the oppressor. In other words, the Jews viewed the Ukrainians as being the oppressors, especially with the pogroms and so on, and the Ukrainians viewed the Jews as being the oppressors or helping the oppressors oppress the Ukrainian nation. Therefore this problem was charged perhaps with more explosive elements than the Ukrainian-Russian or Ukrainian-Polish relations. I was quite aware and I did not know exactly what would happen here because

the conference could turn either way. But as I said, I came here with an open mind. To me, scholarship is research, exploration, looking at things together. In my view there are no sacred cows. If we are being honest academics and scholars, everything can be discussed. We can make errors, we have a lot to learn from one other. Obviously the point has been stressed often enough here in the last two days, that these have been two communities living together, but not really knowing each other very well. So, frankly speaking, I have learned quite a bit, and a few of the things Professor Ettinger came up with were new ways of looking at things. I really appreciate them, and, therefore, I do not see why we should get so emotional about it. If this is going to be an academic scholarly conference, let's keep it that way. Even if we finish by completely disagreeing with each other, it's still a worthwhile experience.

I brought up the subject of the famine. In no way did I challenge the perception of the Holocaust, in Jewish history or in Jewish or world historiography and so on. That was not my point. My point was that we are studying the 1930s and 1940s. Two great events, very sad and tragic events, took place in both nationalities that we are studying here; and I thought that it would be fitting to study them. I said yesterday that it might have sounded preposterous to suggest Jewish participation in the famine. However, it is a sort of established truth; we talk about stereotypes, myths and so on, I'd like to call it an established truth that Ukrainians collaborated with the Nazis, both on two levels. In other words, there was talk yesterday about the collaboration of Ukrainian organizations or organized groups of Ukrainians, which are clearly identified as Ukrainians, with the Nazis and then there was collaboration on an individual level. Now, I see no reason why the same measuring stick, if we're going to use measuring sticks, cannot be applied to both. Why cannot the same measuring stick be applied to the Jewish element, the Jewish population in Ukraine? Here we have to distinguish the participation of Jews as organized bodies, and here we did not have such bodies. However, we can apply it to the other and this was done in the case of Ukrainians. There was talk about how the Ukrainian population reacted to the Nazi atrocities against the Jews. Well, we can certainly apply the same thing to the Jewish population, what was the attitude of the Jewish population during the famine in Ukraine? As I said yesterday, unfortunately, one side is very well documented, the other side is extremely poorly documented. I brought up this example, that when some people were interviewing survivors of the famine, one of the points that came out was that the Jewish attitude in many cases was negative. Now, they were afraid to talk about it. They said well this sounds like anti-Semitism so we won't talk about it. But I think here again if we are going to have an objective, scholarly, honest approach, and Professor Ettinger mentioned

it several times, that we should have an open, honest approach, and an analysis of this then I think that all these points can be discussed. I stand to be corrected, I will accept, if I see that I am wrong, but let us discuss this in an honest, open manner.

Professor Rudnytsky:

I would like to say something about the formal side of our discussions. Just yesterday I talked with a colleague who has some experience like myself in the way of international conferences where Soviet scholars participate. Those who have had this experience know that Soviet delegations operate as a team. They come almost as a football team and one can see that they have divided their roles, they have assigned functions. This is not the case here, at least not as far as the Ukrainian side is concerned. Everybody speaks only for himself. Nobody speaks for the Ukrainian Nation, with capital letters, or even for Ukrainian Scholarship, with capital letters. Professor Bilinsky is fully capable of taking care of himself and I am taking care of myself and Professor Pritsak of himself. We don't have divided roles. There was no preliminary agreement about the contents, what we are going to say. What I have said may be good or bad, but this is my own personal responsibility. I would maybe appeal to Professor Ettinger—approach the Ukrainian participants of this meeting in that spirit. Treat each of us as an individual scholar and not collectively. This is one plea.

Secondly, Professor Bilinsky has been very severely criticized and it would be unfair now to jump on him, but I must say honestly that I had reservations about his paper yesterday. I had this in my notes and I was not recognized by the chairman of this session yesterday. If I had spoken, maybe the overall impression would have been different. Although, maybe I would have presented my comments in a different tone than they have been presented, but I had some reservations about that paper.

Now, moving away from these formal points, the overall title of our conference is Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective. Although we have been dealing with many individual aspects of those relations, there has been no attempt to give an overall perspective and I will be very daring and I will try to say in a few minutes how I see the overall perspective of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Of course, I shall not begin with the Khazars, with all respect for Professor Pritsak, but I will deal with the more modern world. I see the first stage, historically as the old world, the pre-modern world, the world of peasants, Cossacks, land owners, Hassidim. The heritage of that world is still with us to some extent, but it obviously belongs to the past. This was pre-modern, the

agrarians of the East European world, also the nationalities were identified with certain occupational groups and certainly the religious communities. Then we move, by the second half of the nineteenth century, into the modern world in Eastern Europe, in Russia, in the Hapsburg Empire. Here Jewish-Ukrainian relations assume a totally different aspect than in the pre-modern world. As far as the Ukrainian side of that relationship is concerned, I think the democratic Ukrainian spokesmen of the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came up with the concept of how Ukrainian-Jewish relations could be approached or solved. I would call it "The Drahomanovian concept of cultural political pluralism." As the discussions have shown, this was not a perfect prescription which guaranteed success. There were difficulties, there were tensions, there were breakdowns, but I do believe that that formula, which was developed by progressive Ukrainian thinkers of the late nineteenth century, namely co-existence on the basis of democratic humanism and also recognition of cultural national pluralism, was correct. This was a formula which at least offered possibilities. There was a future in it and, indeed, during the year of the Revolution, despite breakdowns, despite the difficulties or even tragic incidents, this was a formula which was tried out and I believe this is a tradition of which neither the Ukrainians nor those Jews who are willing to go along with it, have to be ashamed of. I too believe this is a positive tradition.

The great tragic happening in Ukrainian-Jewish relations is that, indeed, over the last half a century, our roads moved totally apart from these beginnings. This was not a perfect solution, but I would say the constructive beginnings were lost. This is a fact. What happened? This has come out in our previous discussions, but I believe it has not been pinpointed clearly enough. In 1933—half a century ago—two things happened; the Nazi *Machtergreifung* and the Ukrainian famine. Things which happened simultaneously, say on two different planes, but which had profound results. It is obvious that what with Hitler's coming to power, the entire Jewish community, which was divided on many other issues, was united in hostility to Nazi Germany. This is very clear; it hardly needs to be explained. Even those Jewish groups or personalities who were not Communist, not even sympathetic to Communism as a philosophy or as a system, still viewed Soviet Russia as a potential factor in the struggle against Nazi Germany. What happened to the Ukrainian side? There were great divisions within the Ukrainian community, as within any nation, but in the 1920s the strongest Ukrainian current was the one that bet on the evolution of Soviet Ukraine. During the era of NEP, during the era of Ukrainization, Soviet Ukraine represented not a sovereign state, but at least an autonomous entity. There was great, great cultural advancement and one could hope that on that basis a Ukrainian

nation might develop; it would grow into something better in the future. With the coming of Stalinism, particularly with the famine of 1933, this chance or this alternative was eliminated. Ukraine, as a Ukrainian political alternative, vanished. What remained was the one alternative, namely, the one which was going for a total revision of the existing order in Europe. After 1933, no Ukrainian who was a thinking patriot could defend the international status quo. This point was already made yesterday by Professor Bociurkiw and I will stress it again. Indeed, you know the situation was such that in the 1930s, Ukrainians were spontaneously orienting themselves toward the revisionist power in Europe and this power was Germany. This did not necessarily imply that Ukrainians were in favour of the Nazi regime. This pro-German orientation preceded the rise of Hitler to power. This orientation was older than the Nazis. This was not oriented toward that regime. It was oriented toward the power and very often the ideology of Germany. The implications of Nazism were not understood. This was the shortsightedness. But, this is a fact. Let me also add one point.

Germany was traditionally the one country of Western Europe which had represented the West for the Ukrainians. For one Ukrainian who knew French or English, there were a hundred who knew German. Germany stood for European civilization. This might seem paradoxical, thinking of what happened. But this was the historical experience of the Ukrainian people. Now, this situation, this constellation, worked in favour of those Ukrainian groups which were going further and which were ideologically identifying themselves with international fascism. Here I would disagree with those Ukrainian speakers who tried to minimize the role of fascism in Ukrainian political life. Indeed, by the 1930s, this was the most dynamic Ukrainian political force outside the Soviet Union and during the war years this was, I would say, almost the only active Ukrainian political force — the various OUN factions. This is a fact. We have to admit that the Ukrainian democratic groups and forces politically collapsed for a number of years and the Ukrainian political scene was taken over by extremist fascist groups. I am one of few of my generation who has never been within that movement, so I can speak, I think, with clear conscience and have nothing to apologize for as an individual. Let me say this because these are people of my generation whom I knew very well, and I knew hundreds of them. In North America where (I should say native North Americans), there are many people who have never seen a living communist and then they go to the Soviet Union and some tell them "it's communist" and they are surprised! They are nice guys, they are like everybody else. I tell them, "what did you expect, that they have tails and hooves?". A Communist is a human being like anyone else and a fascist too is a human being. And believe me or not I knew as well a

good many German fascists who were personally nice. Excuse me for saying this, this is a fact, but I knew many Ukrainians who in their political outlook and philosophy were totalitarians, were fascist, but otherwise were idealistic young men who were sacrificing their lives for the liberation of their nation. So this has to be seen in context. Professor Potichnyj, who is one of the organizers of this conference, is now in charge of a very important editorial project, namely publication of the papers of the Ukrainian nationalist underground of the Second World War. Seven or eight volumes have come out and further volumes are in progress. These are very interesting documents, very important documents and they allow us also to see that phenomenon in perspective, to see that not everything was evil or bad about it. I want to stress this. Although in Ukrainian politics I was always on the other side, but I would not condemn them out of hand, not even Mr. Lebed who has been mentioned yesterday and so on. I cannot go into details about this matter.

I want to come now to a conclusion. I believe that if one sees tragic events, one has to approach them on two levels. First of all, an individual always has to be judged as an individual, as a person. If someone is guilty as an individual, his circumstances or his origin, his background, or whether he is Jew or Gentile, or whatever, is irrelevant. Yesterday there was a discussion in which it was mentioned that some Ukrainians participated in anti-Jewish crimes and crimes against their neighbours, fellow humans, Jews. Some others helped them. Most people, as would normally happen under such circumstances, are simply neutral. Standing back is bad enough, I think, but this is simply on an individual level. The tremendous, I believe, blame—and the Ukrainians have to accept this—is that during that period, there was no Ukrainian group or organized body which would speak out in the name of the Ukrainian people and to condemn the crimes which were committed against the Jews and also to warn the Ukrainian community against participating in this crime. Now, who potentially could have taken this stand? Ukrainians did not have a government in exile in the camps of the western nations, so that the legal parties could not function under the Nazi occupation. This is self-evident. The only body which could have taken that stand was the Ukrainian nationalist underground because during the years of the German occupation, there was, indeed, a well developed nationalist underground, with its military detachments and its underground press. They were holding conferences and so on, meetings, passing resolutions, and they were fighting the Germans by that time. It is really incredible, and this is something which should not be played down by the Ukrainians, that these men, who had themselves been fighting the Germans to death and when the Germans fought with them they shot them or put them in concentration camps. It simply did not occur to them to pass a

declaration or resolution condemning the Holocaust. This shows to my understanding the terrible results of the totalitarian way of thinking. Once you are under the influence of a totalitarian philosophy, and I think the extremist movements, either the Communist or the fascist type are a world-wide phenomenon of the twentieth century, and hardly any country has been spared this. You begin to act inhumanely. But I must confess, as a Ukrainian, that Ukrainian democracy has shown weak defences against the pressure of totalitarian forces. This is what the Ukrainians have to take upon themselves, the responsibility of not trying to play that down. On the other hand, I believe there is a lesson to be made for all, not only for the Ukrainians, but I think for Jews as well as for any nation. No pact with totalitarianism, either of the Left or, of the Right, is correct. It is so easy in opposition to Nazism, to see Communism as a potential ally or vice versa. This has been done too often and I believe that this is the basic mistake. One has to stick to the humane road of liberal political philosophy, representative government, basic principles of human rights and not to deviate. Within this, there is a place for the Left and the Right. That is, a place for, let's say the Conservative Party, and a place for the NDP. Put in that way, but not beyond that, never an alliance with fascism nor with communism. Ukrainians have sinned on that count, I believe, but large parts of the Jewish community were not completely free of responsibility on the other side. Everybody should make some house cleaning first within his own group and it would be improper for Ukrainians to tell Jewish scholars what they have to do with Jewish history. This is their problem, but we should begin now to clean our own house, and we have not been good enough at it.

Professor Pritsak:

I have to direct my plea to Professor Ettinger to be more patient with us. The very fact that it was possible for us to come and to risk a meeting, I think, has a very great historical significance. And unfortunately some of us, maybe all of us, are carrying different stereotypes and it was probably good that, at this very early stage, we recognized them as such. I wanted to take a stand yesterday. I was not given the time. I also believe that it would be better to discuss this matter today since we have round table discussion.

We learned many things and I am very grateful to Professor Ettinger and other Jewish friends that they made it clear, and I think rightly, that there are other things which don't belong together from a scholarly point of view. They may be on the level of stereotype and then other things could be put together. But on the level of a scholarship, we cannot put on

the one side the Jewish Holocaust, on the other side the famine. This point was made very clearly that the individual Jew or somebody born by Jewish parents, for him or her the only Jewishness is that they are just born. This is his personal problem, but I don't recall any statement on the part of any organized body, whether in the Soviet Union or abroad, which will just incite, or something like that, the Jews to take part in this famine, or to organize it, or whatever. Just the contrary was the case! Therefore I believe that in future conferences, and I hope we will have them, and I hope Professor Ettinger will attend because we owe so much to him, that such a topic, or such comparisons, will never occur. There is no common denominator. How can we discuss things which are on completely different levels? It is clear that every national historian is under the spell of the stereotypes, and Ukrainian historiography is full of them. So it probably is sometimes necessary to deal with other cultures, to get other perspectives. Therefore, I think that my Ukrainian friends and colleagues should try to revise their intellectual approach to the problems and try to get rid of these very unpleasant stereotypes. Just because something happened in the 1930s, does that mean that it must be identical. Must one catastrophe be identical with another? No, they are completely different dimensions. Therefore, I hope that topic number one will not be discussed because it apparently is based on the wrong perspective. In the future we should probably be more careful and especially, because we are, I hope, doing something very important. We are establishing contact, bridges and so on, and here we should be also a little more sensitive to our partners. There were for instance, some previous attempts to organize Jewish-Ukrainian conferences without asking the Jews, just assigning them such or another role. Here, this was fortunately not the case. We co-operated together and I must confess, I personally urged my friend, Professor Ettinger, to participate. I very sincerely appreciate his kindness and willingness to co-operate. So to a certain degree, I feel guilty if there were some inappropriate statements from the Ukrainian side and I beg your forgiveness. On the other side, it was probably necessary first to come and see. Here I am very thankful to you and some other of the Jewish colleagues, Professor Altschuler and so on, who just put the finger on the point and showed what is not appropriate. Certainly we as scholars have to discuss everything. We don't have sacred cows. But we should not look for sacred cows when there are no such things as that. As I said earlier, before one establishes comparisons and so on, it is necessary to be very careful, whether such a comparison is in place. With this sort of a plea again I ask you Professor Ettinger and all other friends not to despair and please continue this dialogue with us.

Professor Gitelman:

The list that I have reads as follows: after Professor Himka, we have Bohachevsky-Chomiak, Bociurkiw, Kaminski, Frankel and Osadczuk.

Professor Himka:

Professor Rudnytsky, I wanted to say that I'm uncomfortable with the nationalist view of history, which Professor Ettinger and Professor Bartal, Professor Weiss and others represent. This stems maybe from a philosophical, or historical philosophical differences; and it's just there. It is my reaction against something in Ukrainian society, which is pervasively nationalistic. Those of us who are within it, and in some sense in it but in some sort of opposition to it are disturbed by the nationalism in one's own society, and try to liberate ourselves from nationalism, and to seek different philosophical approaches. So that makes me uncomfortable also. To give you just an idea of what Ukrainian nationalism is like in the sphere of popular history, I know a journalist who is saying that in regard to the whole famine project, one should take the League of Nations debates and study them. There are actually very good materials in them, and I thought yes, that's a good idea. But his conclusion was that no one could see now how the different countries voted, and by studying these debates we would ultimately discover who our friends are and who are not our friends. So I ask, does that really solve any question of Ukrainian history or Ukrainian life? It doesn't. In reaction to that way of thinking one tries to free oneself from nationalism and it is uncomfortable to see it reappear here. Some of the pitfalls of nationalism I think have come out in this and some of the earlier discussions. I resent the notion that I am responsible for anything just because I am Ukrainian. I may be responsible for something bad which a lot of other Ukrainians may be responsible for as well. But I'm responsible for it as being something bad, not as a Ukrainian. I don't represent anything it's true. But although I state this I'm keenly aware that I can be embarrassed at any scholarly conference where any Ukrainian says something weird. It used to be common enough in the older days. When I first started out there were a lot of 'pretend scholars' of Ukrainian origin around and we would be at the same conferences and I would be younger, and I thought that I also would be an outcast as they were. Conversely, it always pleases me when a Ukrainian does something good. So in a sense, although I resent the notion that I am responsible, I admit that I am sort of responsible, that I feel this emotionally. Professor Ettinger mentioned that some of the Israeli historians would not even

come to the conference because the Ukrainians were involved. I find this, with its implication of collective responsibility, disturbing. The same implication is to be found in Lucy Dawidowicz's writings; she very often talks about "the Ukrainians" as a group. While resenting the notion of collective responsibility, I do not wish to deny that there were Ukrainians who took part in actions deserving condemnation. I just think it is a pitfall to make accusations lightly about what Ukrainians as a group did and then to apply the accusations to individual members of the group. Such an approach is almost like inverted anti-Semitism.

Now about Professor Weiss's paper. What disturbed me most of all was that his list of sins, although correct in general, did not pay careful attention to the sources. We must pay attention to sources and also be cautious about accusations on an individual level, especially when the accusations involve something as terrible as complicity in murder. I have in mind, for instance, the use made of Friedman's study. At one point Friedman steps back and says, "Well, we are not sure what happened to the Jews; it could have been that they were killed by the UPA or it could have been that they were not." Yet Weiss just put it down (with Friedman as his only source) that the UPA killed the Jews. Or the fact that Weiss makes use of Hanusiak. Hanusiak is a Ukrainian-American Communist with a political axe to grind; he is not a source to be cited in a scholarly text. As for the evidence about Mykola Lebed, this is a memoir of dubious merit. The whole Lebed case is extremely touchy. There is an internal Ukrainian campaign against Lebed, related to what Lebed did or did not do to some of his conationals during the Second World War. The literature on these matters is extremely tendentious, and facts should be checked. One must be careful not to pick out a tendentious political pamphlet from an émigré community and to represent it as a piece of evidence. It is very easy to blacken someone's reputation. There is even lack of care with the Sheptytsky letter of November 1942, which Dr. Weiss did not actually cite, but in which, he says, Sheptytsky implicitly called on his coreligionists not to participate in crimes against the Jews. If you read that letter more carefully, you will see that, although it has become a standard point in the Ukrainian defence of their position in the Second World War, it is not very outspoken on the question of Jews. It mentions the shedding of Christian blood, but never once specifies non-Christian blood. It singles out political murder, but that very clearly in the context of the internecine strife between the Bandera and Melnyk factions of the Ukrainian national movement; it also has a long statement on abortion. You will not find anything there which could lead you to that conclusion except perhaps the date (November 1942).

Professor Bohachevsky-Chomiak:

I could be very dramatic and say "Gentlemen" with impunity, since around the table I'm the only person who can get away with it. Let my try to take the discussion from a slightly different perspective. In a sense the difference in perspective probably stems from the following facts: First, I am currently working on women's movements; second, no one else is working on Ukrainian women's movements; third, I have difficulty finding colleagues who are working on the Jewish women's movement; and fourth, from what John-Paul Himka stated in rather dramatic terms, the problem of national history. When Potichnyj and Aster write about Ukrainians and Jews as two solitudes, I sit back and from my own personal experience, if I consider myself Ukrainian and even that might be questioned, if one determines one's place of origin and where one grew up, there was really no solitude between the Ukrainians and our next door neighbours that can be generalized. It's not only a question as Pipes said, that he played ball with a Ukrainian boy; it is that in a sense as non-Anglo-Saxons, as recent immigrants, our natural friends were the other outcasts, who were the Jews. I cannot recreate in my own life this feeling of separateness or solitude as far as the Jews were concerned. The other problem I have is a sense of being responsible for rescuing the half of the population whose history is not adequately studied in any particular country and in this respect, if you were to divide us into two groups, and if you were to ask me where would my loyalties lie, the answer would be half here and half there. This is the only way I can look at it. Professor Ettinger raised the point this morning but it has not been picked up by others although in a sense, it was slightly echoed by Professor Pritsak. The issue we are facing is one of defining what constitutes the realm of history, that is the history of the Jews, what constitutes the history of Ukrainians; what is Jewish history, what is Ukrainian history? And this, it seems to me, would be a productive issue for mutual exploration. With Russification in Ukraine, with so many of us growing up, being born and identifying with countries that are not on Ukrainian ethnic territory, we all will have to come to grips with essentially what constitutes one's given national history and not only on a linguistic base, as has been done since for Ukrainians. The other concern I had is that I sense we're sitting around the table and it's almost as if we're trying to engage in a game of who suffered most, almost a gradation of horrors. The element of horror is there and has always been there. The parallel that comes to mind is the atmosphere that sometimes is reflected in conferences dealing with black and white ethnics where similar tension arose. It's almost as if we wanted to con-

vince ourselves that the group that suffered most ought to be our only distinction. What I see happening here is a movement away from the traditional political history, from the development of ideologies, from the study (I can even be feminist now), of male-oriented, male-articulated ideology, to a type of social history, to an underlying assessment of the broader social and political processes. This is the area in which there would be most productive, most scholarly co-operation, and I would like to encourage those of us who are working, dealing in terms of social history or social sciences, to come up with specific and manageable topics of joint research.

Professor Bociurkiw:

I am very much disturbed by the turn taken by our discussions and the mix, I would say, of accusatory and defensive notes in the process. Like Professor Rudnytsky, I never think of myself, of, nor can I escape from what I have been socialized into, namely always carrying the blue and yellow, or yellow and blue flag and whenever I speak, I speak to people who also carry a flag. In other words, I never perceive and I did not perceive in our discussions of individual speakers being Jews or Ukrainians, but rather as individual scholars giving more or less successful papers. And I may add that I belong to perhaps a not very large number of people but still it is not completely insignificant, who suffered from German rule and who spent some time in prisons, camps and who barely survived in a concentration camp. I do not want to discuss this at the present gathering but quite often I read in the press about Ukrainians who are presented sometimes, occasionally by well meaning people, as people who are anti-Semites until they are proven innocent, and I find that terribly hurtful. I think that in a sense expressions can sometimes be perhaps generalizations which are not deliberate but are tormenting. I don't want to parade my wounds as I am sure people around the table don't intend to do it. But I think that we ought to realize that even though there are individuals and people like me who were not arrested or imprisoned for being born of a Ukrainian mother, that is on a racial basis, still, in terms of what one experienced, what one inhaled and how close one came to dying, there is some analogy with those Jews who were more fortunate not to have been destroyed in the great death camps and who managed to survive until the last moments of the war. I think that one of the great problems is hindsight that we apply to interpretation, reconstruction of events in the past, and when my friend Professor Rudnytsky, speaks of fascist ideology or totalitarianism, I try to think of these times, and what these words meant

to a great many young people in Ukraine. Totalitarianism was unknown, of fascists, they thought of something in Italy; and they simply thought of themselves whatever their leaders were as Ukrainian patriots; and they acted not with some kind of ideological blueprint but rather subjectively believing that they were doing the best that they could.

Professor Rudnytsky:

The same thing applies to communists.

Professor Bociurkiw:

The problem arises in imputing motives from hindsight or imposing ideological structures on something which, if you look, not abstractly, but at the living people who change over time, who learn from experience—that is the problem. But perhaps I should say that if I detected implicit criticism of my commentary yesterday, on the three papers, I have quite deliberately decided, today rather than to curse the darkness, to try to light the candle. One can, of course, focus on the short comments of individual papers, but one can also contribute to the broader perspective or to the filling in of the gaps which are left by individual papers. I feel like some of the people before me that one's sincerity which has been shown here is extremely valuable because if we speak like United Nations ambassadors to each other we won't proceed far in this exercise. On the other hand, we have to try, in a sense to display (and I refer to all of us, no one individual in particular), sufficiently open minds and tolerance of our shortcomings and our limited perspectives, and in particular not to impute motives to each other or what might be an error or omission, or a sin of commission. We do have fundamental problems of perceiving the same events, very, very understandably so. The same events, at the same time which affected differently different groups, in particular Jews and Ukrainians, in a very different manner and one of the benefits of this and future conferences would be to expand our cognitive framework to the extent where we could somehow relate them to each other and in the process improve our own, or if I could use a terrible jargon type of expression, and learn better to decode each other's communications.

In terms of practical options, there are three areas in which compatible scholars, dealing in this field with Jewish-Ukrainian relations, could perhaps co-operate. One would be to spend a much longer period with the Ukrainian-Jewish, or Jewish-Ukrainian relations in the Soviet Union, es-

pecially Ukraine. One can not limit them to Ukraine alone. Secondly, Ukrainian-German relations and the Holocaust. There is a real gap as far as Ukrainian scholarship is concerned in studying Ukrainian-German relations. I am using the neutral term but that should include both collaboration and opposition. And finally Ukrainian-Jewish relations abroad. In these three areas perhaps we could marshal different perspectives, complementary insights, perhaps some resources, complementary resources as well and advance perhaps scholarly work in this area further. In conclusion, I would like to add a footnote. I don't know if Dr. Himka is here, but Metropolitan Sheptytsky did in fact write several messages and letters. I carried yesterday a suitcase full of books among which there is a collection of most of the letters by Metropolitan Sheptytsky during the German occupation. There are some in which he leaves no doubt that he speaks about non-Ukrainian, non-Christians and that of course leaves only Jews. There is no doubt about it. Some were written later, and there was a special rule adopted during the Archdiocese synod, which met through 1943, which meant that this particular rule was read in all the churches of Archdiocese, that is of Galicia, which dealt with the killing of men, women and children, of the shedding of innocent blood of men, women and children. That presumably meant the Jews, though they were not named. Any contemporary and, indeed, any present reader knows what was involved.

Professor Kaminski:

My remarks will focus on the Polish example rather than the Ukrainian one. I believe that it may have some relevance. Let us imagine a conference such as this one, but called Polish-Jewish relations. There would be a paper like that of Professor Weiss and the emotional outburst of Professor Ettinger. The reactions of the Poles would be to quickly call on Bartoszewski's role in time of the Holocaust or at least in couloirs between ourselves to speak about the role of the U.B. (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa). I am here as a representative of the culture, that is the Polish culture, which is extremely proud of its own toleration in the past, and which would like to bring that up all the time, especially how good we were to Jews, to Ukrainians, to everybody throughout the whole of our history. Of course, it could be said that in the 1930s we were responsible for pogroms, or rather we didn't call them pogroms, we called that a pacification of Ukrainians in Volhynia and we are now a nation, or a state, without the Jews. Nevertheless, we still like to be extremely proud of our toleration, which brings me to the real problem that I wanted to mention

here. After all, we are not only scholars, or if we are scholars and historians, we know very well that we rewrite history. Historians were always doing that. That is one of the reasons why we exist. Societies or our own nations want us to do it. Every generation has other questions to ask, other problems. Yes, we ask different questions, but we are not changing facts, rather we rewrite them, we answer the need. What troubles me, and always troubled me in our own historiography was precisely the lack of asking questions. In a sense, I learned about the pogrom in Kielce, where Jews were killed by Poles after the war, in the United States. I also found out that the pogrom did not really happen because it was a U.B. provocation—as if that explained everything. But that was false. A lot of people prepared themselves for three days to kill Jews and they did. Now, there was the Polish army in place, which did not do anything. Apparently the pogrom was in the U.B. interest and apparently it was in Moscow's interest and obviously that is true, but it is not the entire story. There was the U.B. and there was Moscow's interest in it but it was also in Moscow's interest to have the Jewish pogrom in Cracow, in Katowice, and in ódź. And there were preparations for it, but it didn't work there. Now I'm coming to the question why? Why didn't it work in Cracow, why was it stopped there, why was it stopped in ódź? Well, in ódź it was easy. Jews were very strong there and they had arms and the pogroms didn't work in Katowice. In Cracow and Katowice, the role of the Polish socialist party, which still existed then, was essential. And now comes the point that in order to understand the events it is very important for the Polish scholar to know what underground organization was most influental in the Kielce region during the German occupation. What type of underground newspapers were there? What types of sermons were given by the clergy there? If we knew that, we would probably better understand the pogrom. After all, it is always more interesting to speak from the position either of what we achieved or what we ourselves did suffer. I know that is the case of Polish-Jewish conferences and I believe that if Professor Weiss was Ukrainian, the whole atmosphere of our conference here would be very different. But somehow it is so difficult for a Pole to write about the pogrom in Kielce without looking for the Moscow and U.B. hand in it; it is so difficult to look at what makes this possible in our culture. We may add that we Poles didn't really explain even the events of 1846. Jews were not involved. Our good Catholic peasants were killing our good Catholic noblemen who were trying to start the uprising and emancipate the peasants. It's still too difficult. When killings come somehow we run away. In 1846 without the Jews, we still found the possibility of explaining these killings, through Austrian provocation this time. I am afraid that there is something in every nation which stops us from going to

the real problems. But we, as historians, have to do it. I think if we don't want to be only scholars, but also civic minded, we must explore our culture and frankly speaking I really do not care what Ukrainians did to Poles, if they did anything. I know of course that they are not without blame and I know that the Poles will produce many, many facts. The same is true concerning the Jews. But that is a Ukrainian problem or a Jewish problem, but I'm always very much concerned to understand how come my own nation did what it did in 1946. We understand, we Poles and Ukrainians, that if we stand together today it is much worse for the Soviet Union. Sure, and that's good but that cannot, I believe, excuse our own feeling and our own responsibility to those of future generations who will come after us, and who will try to understand our culture through our own work inside of those problems which are precisely so difficult to deal with, like the Kielce pogrom. I really only wish that the organizers of the conference will be less democratic, and I am speaking here about the imaginery Polish-Jewish conference, that really if we ever meet and talk, that the talk about the pogrom in Kielce will be presented by a Pole and not by a Jew and if Jews would like to take their part, whatever that might be, if they want to present what caused the difficulty of common understanding, that is their responsibility.

Professor Frankel:

I agree very much with the view that a conference of this kind should be seen entirely as a conference of individual scholars and not as some kind of United Nations delegation from our respective nationalities. I think that does have some implications for the shape of such a conference and I would have thought that one should be very careful to completely leave out contemporary politics. I do not think it's for a group of academics, at an academic conference, to start planning political action or even really talking about it. That would be for a group of political organizations and we have plenty of them, heaven knowns, both in our own country and in American Jewry and in Canadian Jewry; and the Ukrainians are also organized. I would have thought that these things should be kept stricly apart.

I agree with Professor Himka that when one writes, or to put it somewhat differently, when I write about Jewish history, I do feel in some way that I'm a national historian. That is, I write as a Jew about Jewish things and it's obvious that my particular interest is in this area because, in some sense, I see myself as part of that history. Of course when one writes about something else it has a lot of advantages. It is much less emo-

tionally involving. One can keep one's distance much better. But when I write about Jewish history I do write, I think in some sense, as within a group. I'm no expert on Jewish theology, but, I believe, it has been rather central in Jewish thought that Jews, theologically at least, see themselves as responsible for each other. Even when, of course, they have nothing to do with each other, or may strongly dislike each other. This is a theological concept and as modern people, many of whom are not really clear whether we are in any way attached to the theology, we can take this or leave it. Apparently Professor Himka feels the same way about Ukrainians. That is, one cannot feel entirely the same about somebody who belongs to one's own group as one can about somebody who belongs to another group; even though perhaps this is irrational, and even though I don't know, perhaps, whether we should accept this or reject it. As a rule of thumb I would say that it doesn't do any harm if one sees one's own people responsible for the committed evil, or its evil-doers, for negative factors. Coming from within that people, I don't see that it can do any harm whatsoever. On the contrary, to the extent that it may have some restraining influence and some educational influence—and as academics we are somewhat responsible for education—I think it's probably a good thing that this idea should be in people's subconscious.

When one is dealing with other peoples, other nations, then this approach is infamous and there one has to be extremely careful to say that one is talking about groups, individuals, percentages, strata, and absolutely avoid such designations as *the* Germans, *the* Ukrainians, *the* Jews, like the plague. I think this is the simple rule of thumb. When I write about Rosa Luxemburg of Trotsky, let's be frank, I do not write about them with exactly the same feeling as when I write about Lenin or Dzerzhinsky. This is a fact. I feel somewhat more emotionally involved; my hostility to them is greater. I hope this doesn't come out very strongly in my writings. If it comes through a bit, I don't mind. It's a fact. I don't know, perhaps one should reject this? I personally don't see why one should. If somebody else is writing, if a non-Jew is writing about Russian history, and if you see that he is constantly picking on Trotsky and making him primarily responsible rather than Lenin or rather than Stalin, then of course it becomes extremely objectionable.

Now about this issue of Jewish participation in the communist movement—the fact is, as I mentioned yesterday, that organized Jewish opinion in Russia, as it happened in 1917, was exceptionally hostile to Bolshevism. There were many reasons for this. I assume that it was not because of national character that there was tremendous identification with the Provisional Government or at least with the Constituent Assembly.

Nevertheless, in the middle of the Civil War in 1919 and after, the Jews more and more felt themselves forced in some way or other to choose sides out of self-defence, and here what Professor Bociurkiw said yesterday I think is 100 per cent correct—politics is about the lesser evil. When one gets involved with politics, one aims for the good or maybe for the bad, but there's no such thing as the good anymore because life becomes too complicated and it's really a choice of lesser evils, often a question of survival. I was actually brought up to regard "Uncle Joe" as a hero because I grew up in England from the age of five during the Second World War. My good fortune was that I was there, not somewhere else, but "Uncle Joe" was our greatest friend. That was the English line, everything else was put aside and this was under Churchill. I don't know how much of this was a cynical move or how much it was an emotional necessity of the Second World War.

Jews moved on to the Bolshevik side in 1919 in order, as they saw it, to survive. Although, by then many of them joined the Communist Party out of enthusiasm. Of course, we're dealing with very small percentages of the Jewish people. I asked Professor Altshuler yesterday what was the percentage of Jews in the Ukrainian Communist Party in the early 1930s. He thinks 11–12 per cent. So we're dealing with a small percentage of the Ukrainian Communist Party. I think these facts have to be researched, I think they're important, they're interesting from my point of view. They tell us a lot about the position of the Jewish people. This 12 per cent of the Communist Party was probably about not more than one percent of the Jewish population, but that's not the point. There was at this point Jewish participation in the Communist Party. However, if one is going to start talking about any kind of responsibility, then from the Jewish point of view, this was unfortunate; it brought down a lot of harm on the Jewish people. It would have been better if the Jews had stayed out of the Communist movement or at least if the percentage had been the same as that in the general population. But for other people to start pointing at this and saying Jews as such have some responsibility for the famine is in my opinion ridiculous—the top leadership of the Communist Party at that time was more or less free of Jews. We now know a great deal about collectivization. It was Stalin, Molotov, Kuibyshev, I think, who took that decision. This again doesn't make the Georgian people responsible in any way for Stalin, although many Georgians still admire Stalin. But that's their problem.

So I think one should be incredibly careful about picking on other nationalities be it this or be it that. One has to be 100 times careful to make the distinction about which parts of that people one is talking about, who

did what, who was opposed, who was being persecuted by the regime, by which particular regime and, of course, in the case of the Jews we're obviously particularly sensitive because the fact is that since the Civil War the attempt has been made, as I again said yesterday, to depict the Bolshevik regime as a Jewish regime. This is a complete absurdity, but led to massacres on a major scale and to some extent was one of the major factors in the rise of Nazism and the Holocaust. It is a terribly sensitive subject and anybody approaching Jewish history I think should be aware of that. This problem is particularly difficult because of the attempt that has been made since 1919 continuously by right-wing and fascist groups throughout Europe to identify as Jewish a regime that was in no way any more Jewish than it was Polish or Latvian.

Professor Osadczuk:

I must say that my English is not so perfect that after yesterday and about this morning I can speak of my reflections and remarks in English. Hence I must speak in Ukrainian, or Russian or German, or Polish, although I prefer German.

What should be ascertained first of all? From my point of view a conference without a crisis is not a conference. If we are to decide something by a vote then we need no conference. That is my simple opinion. And the more the various opinions are brought to bear on the controversy and the more we learn, so much the better. Even when it leads to such dramatic episodes as the biblical wrath and outburst from our friend Ettinger, even this, in my opinion, is not bad. For the conference such things are highly instructive. I think it shows that we have a lot in common from the point of individualism that is. We Ukrainians have learned individualism not only from the Poles but also from the Jewish culture. This ensures that we do not sink into a grey mass.

Professor Frankel:

Some people would like a translation.

Professor Osadczuk:

Rabbi Potichnyj will give a résumé later.

Professor Osadczuk: (continues)

That is the first thing. The other thing is that the intervention by Professor Ettinger is instructive for this conference in still another way. It shows us the phenomenon of supersensitivity concerning the problem of our relations. But why is this so in the final analysis? This conference has shown that we do have a common history and that we cannot flee from it. One must overcome it, one must search for the truth. This is our responsibility of which my friend Kaminski spoke so well, the responsibility before the future. My guess also is that we share a part of common European history. From this cultural, political and geopolitical space came not only Khmelnytsky and Sheptytsky, but also Golda Meir and Leon Trotsky. And not only Arkhypenko but also Oistrakh, Horowitz, Sperber and Elisabeth Bergner among others. Today's American ambassador in Bonn is the son of a Rabbi and the mayor of Solotyna near Stanyslaviv (Ivano-Frankivsk). And he was born in the village and this also belongs to this common aspect that I mentioned. But what is particularly difficult especially for us is that our research about anti-Semitism is underemphasized. Important work does exist. A Ukrainian, Roman Rozdolsky, has produced a fundamental work about F. Engels' anti-Semitism, but because it appeared in German and not in English it is completely unknown. Yet it is a fundamental work. But what we Ukrainians do not have, and this is a tremendous handicap, are the specialists in Judaism and Hebraistics. And it would be very good indeed if this our first step, this exchange of views, this meeting would result in our young Ukrainian researchers, scholars and students going to Israel in order to begin working for the future.

Professor Gitelman:

The last name I have on the list is Professor Bartal. If anyone else would like to speak this morning, this might be the appropriate time to say so.

Professor Bartal:

Concerning the deep emotional involvement and the accusations I made to my good colleague Professor Himka about being a nationalistic historian, I would like just to make an observation about the deep connection between the emergence of modern Jewish nationalism and events which took place in Ukraine even though this may irritate some of my Ukrainian

colleagues. I suggest we pay attention to three dates in the modern history of Jewish nationalism and to the correlation between them and events in Ukraine. The first wave in the emergence of the modern Jewish nationalistic movement occurred around 1881–2. Something took place then in Ukraine. The second wave, which is called the Second Aliyah to Palestine, to Eretz Israel, took place somewhere around 1904, 1905, 1906. Again something happened in Ukraine. The third wave, which is called the Third Aliyah with its aftermath in Palestine, took place from 1919 on. So we have to bear in mind that there were some other conclusions drawn from the political and historical events taking place in Ukraine which were rather different from the optimistic views held by Jewish radicals or Jewish liberals and by non-Jewish radicals and liberals as well. What I wanted to allude to is just as simple as that—the modern Jewish nationalism is closely connected with the trauma that the Jewish population suffered from the Ukrainian situation. Well, someone can come out with the conclusion that the Ukrainian pogroms caused modern Jewish nationalism which is maybe quite good or quite bad, it depends on your point of view. But you cannot deny the fact that this kind of, I would say pessimistic Zionist, Jewish nationalistic, point of view has much to do with the historical experience of the Jews in Ukraine.

Mr. Kagedan:

I'd like to share with you some preliminary results of some research I am doing relating to projects to colonize Jews in Ukraine and the Crimea and to relate it to this specific discussion. The project of Jewish colonization initially, and I will have to be very brief, and of course you distort the results when you are overly brief, caused concern among Ukrainian leaders. There was fear that there would be a part of Ukraine that would become largely settled by Jews. There was a suspicion of the motives of the central Soviet government in initiating colonization, when in fact it had most to do with the very desperate economic situation of the Jews after the Revolution in 1917. But within a few years it was admitted there was an agreement worked out. Some Jewish districts were created in Ukraine. Ukrainian leaders, the members of the intelligentsia who disappeared in the 1930s, were part of this co-operation and Jews who were involved in the Soviet apparatus who had been very critical of the Ukrainian intelligentsia's resistance to this plan, said, well things have gotten better over the course of a year or two. These colonies existed. The most serious blow for them from which they never recovered was collectivization and it was destructive. There are all sorts of instances of repopulation

and so on. Of course the Soviet sources do not discuss why this happened, but it you read between the lines you see what a destructive impact collectivization had on this particular experiment which did not go terribly far and there were even in the Soviet press in the late 1930s instances of co-operation, Cossacks visiting Jewish colonies and vice-versa. Perhaps there might be some truth in this but the point was that the situation did not get out of hand and there was some ability to resolve it. But this is in contrast to what happened to Jewish colonization in the Crimea, where the situation was not resolved with that satisfaction, where the Crimean Tatars felt that, because they were only 29 per cent of the Crimean Tatar population, that their very existence as a Soviet ASSR was thrown into doubt by Jewish colonization and in fact part of the tensions over this project had domething to do, with the execution of a Crimean Tatar leader Vali Ibrahimov in 1928. Now what I mean to say by this is that context is very important. The reactions of Ukrainians, the reactions of Tatars, have to be understood in the context of their relative weight in the population of perceived dangers this colonization seemed to impose. But I think as historians, when we speak of context, which is essential to our work, we must remember that by no means does context, or should context ever be used to relativize actions or to explain away things that occur. And this is very difficult. If you say there were these and these reasons for this, you don't mean to say that, well, then it wasn't so serious or it wasn't so bad. But I think we have to remember that it is a very difficult psychological mechanism but I think it is important to move. We must discuss the context of events even if those events had the most terrible consequences. At the same time we must remember that discussion, and thorough discussion of them, is not in opposition to remembering their seriousness and also considering the moral questions that arise in that discussion.

Professor Mishkinsky:

I'm not so fluent in English and especially after three tiring days, it is a little bit difficult. I would like to make some remarks. Generally the discussion today pointed in two directions. One was about the way to discuss the problems and to make research and so on. The other one was different. Speakers spoke about concrete problems. The organization of national movements and so forth. I think in some sense you can say that we all reached some common conclusions. First of all, about the danger of stereotypes and we all recognize that this is a real problem. We have heard about them also in various lectures in the course of the conference.

Stereotypes involve generalizations and therefore, for example the discussion about terms like *zhyd* or perhaps also *khokhol*. I do not think it is as meaningless as some colleagues think. It is worthwhile to analyze such problems.

I would like to make only two remarks about the historical perspective of Jewish-Ukrainian relations. The crucial point in the formation of the Ukrainian national movement and its development in modern times was in a great measure connected with some of the heroes who became the symbols of the movement—that is, Khmelnytsky and Petliura. I think these figures had a very big impact on the stereotypes which were created both on the Ukrainian and on the Jewish side. The reason that such heroes are significant in the development of the Jewish national movement and can become a symbol for the attitude of the Jews toward the Ukrainians are complex. My other comment is that I do not exactly agree with my colleague Bartal in his conception of the development of the Jewish national movement. The pogroms by themselves were important, but they were not the only factor in the rise of the Jewish national movement and of that national consciousness which cannot been be fully identified with the Zionist movement. It is a broader movement and a broader way of thinking. And in this context I would also like to underline that some aspects in the development of the Ukrainian movement (in all its shades), including the Ukrainian socialist movement, made their impact on the development of the Jewish national movement. And this occurred as early as the 1870s, the 1880s and the 1890s. I cannot now go into details, but it is a matter of fact. Now, I would like to say another thing. I don't regret that I took part in this conference. I think that the most important conclusion here is a dialogue and we must continue this dialogue.

Professor Ettinger:

I may be trying your patience again but I wanted to stress again several points which for me, personally, are of crucial importance. Hence I do not think that I was over-emotional as it was said here.

I hardly slept last night, after some very difficult personal turmoil. You may say well, in such a situation one is somehow out of balance and therefore it is an emotional outburst and so on and so forth. Well, maybe again I'm subjective, I don't think so. I am all for free scholarly discussion of every problem, not only this one. More so, I think that the intellectual must encourage such discussion. But this discussion must be done in the framework of common cultural and moral values. For me, group accusations are immoral and I don't think that we can reach any

agreement or that it is helpful for anyone if people who have different points of view on moral questions to sit together and discuss things. Therefore I'm again returning to the definition of anti-Semitism. For me anti-Semitism is not criticism of Jews, and of Jewish history and culture. For me, anti-Semitism is that you judge Jews differently than you judge any other national, cultural or religious group. This is the way in which the Jews were made outcasts and removed from mankind. I don't find any common language with persons who think along such lines. Therefore I say again, if someone wants to say on the basis of the statistical approach, because the Jews in the Communist party were represented three times more then Ukrainians, or the Russians and so on, that the Jews had a role in the famine in Ukraine, I disagree totally. You may think that my opinions are completely unscholarly, but I think this view is immoral, which is much more important for me. It is immoral. The Jews as a group after the Revolution, became very active in the Soviet apparatus, that's a fact, well established statistically. At the same time the Jews suffered from the Soviet government and many were opposed to the Soviet government. The actual fact is that the Jews as a group, culturally, religiously, socially, were completely non-represented in the Soviet Union. Not only were the political parties of the Jews disbanded in the early twenties, but even the Communist organization of these Jews, the so-called Evsektsiia, was dissolved in 1930. After 1930 you don't have any expression even of a marginal group of Jews that would warrant one's saying the Jews have done this and that. Later on, in the late 1940s, the Jewish intelligentsia, at least in part, was physically destroyed. For all the suffering of other nationalities, I think that maybe only the Tatars suffered as much as the Jews. There was an attempt at the complete destruction of culture and group consciousness by Stalin in 1948–53. Therefore we should see objectively, who are the Jews? The Jews are many different people. Some were communists who believed—mistakenly—in Communism as some nationalists believed in co-operation with the Nazis in order to achieve their goals. There were some Jews who believed in Communism and some were opportunists who joined because, you see, to be in the party you can have better jobs. Here the individual judgment is important. But I'm not in agreement with Professor Himka that I am a nationalist historian. If I think that there is a national representation of groups, I mean that if I would have found a political party, one single Jewish political party, no matter how negligible, which had said that we must exterminate Ukrainians, we must exploit Ukrainians, we must oppress Ukrainians, I wouldn't feel responsible for it, but I would say that in the spectrum of political cultural life for Jews, there was one very unhealthy element. I don't find such a group among Jews. Not a single one! But I find quite a

considerable number of Ukrainians and I don't know how many there were, three per cent, two per cent, five per cent and so on, who actually said that the extermination of Jews was their goal and I'm not going to criticize Ukrainians. I agree with Professor Kaminski. Ukrainians should criticize Ukrainians. I will not write even a single article on Ukrainians. But I would say one thing, that with people who did not understand such criticism and for whom the persecution, let's say of three innocent people, is a major topic in dealing about Holocaust, I cannot find common ground, a common basis. We're two different people with a different approach. Again, everyone as I said is entitled to his opinions. But why should they sit with these people, that's the problem.

I am looking forward to a dialogue, but a dialogue must have a basis and therefore I was really moved by the words of Professors Pritsak, Rudnytsky and Kaminski. Yesterday I felt that, because these words were not said, that in a way they somehow identified with others. Now I see that I am mistaken and it's a great relief for me to see it. But you see the basis must be found, so that when this conference is over, we can create a basis for dialogue. We must remember the framework of the whole thing and therefore come only with an objective attitude to historical, social, cultural and economic problems. We must remember that there are things which are outside the scope of our activity as scholars, as human beings. And I again apologize for taking so much of your time.

Professor Lupul:

I really don't know how much I can add to this, but I'd like to try, from a Canadian historian's point of view. I take courage from the fact that Professor Kaminski did it from a Polish historian's point of view and I just heard that we found the views very useful. The talk here is about dialogue, and of course this is why we're here. For the past thirteen years at least, I, in Canada, have tried to dialogue with another very major and very important minority and the Jews certainly are a minority, not in Israel, but they are a minority every place else. These are the French-Canadians and I found out that you don't get very far in dialoguing with them until you recognize, well, some of the basic premises or postulates, if you like, some of the givens in their intellectual framework which is part and parcel of their culture. For example, you will not get very far with any French-Canadians if you don't grant them, whether you like to or not, that they are one of the founding peoples of Canada. If you don't grant them that, you can't even begin a discourse. From that premise if you do not go farther and say that we should strive to develop an English-

French bilingual country, no matter how detestable this may be to you from Western Canada, where you may regard your own people as founding peoples, and where you are bilingual in a different way, if you do not endorse that point of view, if you are not sympathetic toward it, I assure you, you will not dialogue long. And from there also you will find a third position that will emerge. If you grant them they are a founding people and if you believe that this is a bilingual country from sea to sea, then you should help them achieve a larger share of the power and opportunity in this country, and more specifically in the public sector, especially at the federal level. And if you don't go along with these things you will not have a dialogue, unfortunately. And I suggest, therefore, from one who is truly an observer, although I am of Ukrainian background, that it is incumbent upon both sides, the Jewish and the Ukrainian, and especially incumbent upon the historians of both sides, to articulate clearly and well what are the given on your sides. What are the premises, the postulates, that are literally unquestionable, the things that you must simply accept as being there, out there so to speak? I would not even attempt to articulate those for either side, but I submit to you that if you really want dialogue you must pay attention to that. Otherwise you will have great difficulties and I would hope that the institute which I direct will in the future be able to sponsor a conference where there might be, in fact, a consideration of just what are our basic premises, our postulates, those givens which are in a sense really unchallengeable.

Professor Pritsak:

Ladies and Gentlemen, yesterday during his address, Professor Pipes mentioned one event and this event came back to my mind, and I must confess that since it was an abortive effort, I never returned to it. But there is some documentation and I am mentioning it right now, not simply because I was involved, but also because a group of Ukrainian students were ready to follow me. As you all know, the Seven Day War started under very difficult conditions for the Israelis and this disturbed me very much. And I thought, what could be done? Following the concept of Professor Szporluk, that if a Ukrainian is going to be political, he must act politically, the idea came to me to organize a Ukrainian Legion and whatever impact the 500,000 or 1,000 people will make, it is not so important; but what I believed was that it was very important to show to the world, and first of all to our Jewish friends, that there are some Ukrainians who believe that they have to pay for their sins with their own blood. That was the time I started to organize Ukrainian studies at Harvard, and

at that time I had connections to the Ukrainian student organization. Therefore, I immediately had some discussions and I was very pleased to find within a few hours at least thirty young men who were ready, like myself, to die for that cause. There were, of course, many problems. First of all, to get more people, to get some money, and also to convince some Ukrainian political groups, that they should take advantage and express their position, during that particularly difficult situation. But there was still another very difficult problem — the problem whether the Jews would be willing and ready to talk with us. It was also a time of the birth of Jewish consciousness and my friend, Professor Pipes, belonged to those who regained a consciousness during that period. I went to him and we discussed the matter of how to convince the Jews at that hour we want to do something which is very serious. So we started to make preparations, but fortunately for the Israelis and unfortunately for me, the war ended in just a few days, before I was able to do something. But, of course, others were ready, like myself, to die for that cause. I forgot about this attempt, but yesterday Professor Pipes resurrected it and I just wanted, as a historian, to remember it, that there was such an attempt and first of all what I must stress again that there were young people who were ready to do something and in a clear consciousness they were planning to do this as a kind of recognition of the guilt.

Professor Pelenski:

Ladies and gentlemen, our time is running out and I would like to say a few words in the form of a summation and permit me to make one more final comment on this whole problem which has brought out the strong reaction of Professor Ettinger. Professor Ettinger, and I have to be personal here, all of us who are around this table of Ukrainian background including the colleague who was criticized by you most severely, we have been engaged with the Ukrainian community in a protracted thirty-year debate. There is a body of opinion, of people, who always bring up this Jewish factor or Jewish role or whatever you call it in the 1930s to our attention. All of us, including the criticized colleague, are those people who tell them exactly what you told us today. When this concern was brought to our attention by some participants, we could have very easily omitted it from the list of discussion. However, together with Zvi, we decided to bring it out into the open because otherwise we would be charged with sweeping things under the rug. I personally am grateful that even if your words were strong, that you presented this view because, particularly in our community, it should be known what you think, not only you

as a person, but also what you represent in scholarship and in Jewish life. This is something from which we should not run away. So, aside from this I presume that we are in complete agreement on all other proposed topics for future research including such thorny questions as the Ukrainian factor in the Second World War and the Holocaust. Or as we agreed completely already yesterday, that when we come to deal with the Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the Revolution the problem of pogroms must be finally discussed in a serious and open manner. May I conclude from your final remarks that we will be doing it again, that we will be working together and that always things will come up which will irritate us. Difficulties will be always there, but it is our function and, as you correctly observed, our moral obligation to overcome them.

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Contains papers from the 1983 conference on Ukrainian-Jewish relations that was held at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. The essays reflect the dynamic and often controversial nature of the conference and cover the period from the seventh century to the present day, in both Eastern Europe and Canada. The contributors are noted Israeli and North American scholars. The book also contains transcripts of two discussions: one on the issues arising from the conference panels; the other concerning Ukrainian-Jewish relations in Canada.