

**DOCUMENTING THE UKRAINIAN
NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS**

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
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Spring, 1981

With my best wishes,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'A. Hryhoruk', written in a cursive style.

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DOCUMENTING THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

Introduction

Published primary documents describing the Ukrainian nationalist movements (UNM) during and just after the Second World War vary in quality. Materials brought before the public have often been tendentious and presented seemingly only to substantiate the claims of one or another ideological faction.

Possibly this situation could be corrected if the documents now scattered throughout the diaspora were gathered into a centralized, professionally managed archive. Such a collection could be complemented with the taped testimonies of adherents of the various UNM now living in the West. Any such repository would soon become an invaluable resource for students of the UNM.

Such an undertaking is, regrettably, unlikely. No academic institution now functioning in the West seems willing to attempt such a long-term project. Another impediment lies in the fact that many important papers are held presently by individuals disinclined to present them for scrutiny by non-partisan scholars. Now inaccessible, most of these documents ultimately will be lost as their guardians die and their personal archives fall into disorder or are destroyed. Coupled with this is the unwillingness of many former activists to detail their own experiences during and just after the war. When it is realized that vast numbers of documents were lost or destroyed during the tumultuous years of their origin and that others were captured by enemies of the UNM, the full gravity of the situation is understood.

In consequence, distortions about the UNM abound. While many untruths have been cultivated by those hostile to the UNM, it is ironic that many participants in the struggle even now refuse to discuss their experiences. Thus they confine their own pasts to the peripheries of history. To all intents and purposes, what is not recorded as history is forgotten.

Efforts are now being made to publish selectively important documents about the UNM.¹ Such undertakings are to be applauded. However, information about this critical conjuncture in East-European history cannot continue to be restricted to those fluent in Ukrainian. Published Ukrainian documents have little impact if they are not accompanied by unabridged and professionally translated English versions.

* * *

Non-Ukrainian sources have likewise remained under-exploited. Yet, it is clear that if the successes and the failures of the UNM are to be thoroughly understood, then the archives of other peoples and governments, friends and foes, need to be searched. Any assessment of the UNM based only on Ukrainian sources runs the risk of being considered biased. It will certainly be incomplete.

Fortunately, more than thirty years have elapsed since the UNM were most active. Thus, many papers dated before 1951 are now open for public inspection. Even if the selective "weeding" of many files has removed possibly crucial evidence, the fact remains that preliminary studies can now begin.

The importance of one non-Ukrainian archive has already been described,² and another is discussed in this issue.³ Finally, it might be mentioned that increasing numbers of scholars, notably T. Hunczak, E. Shtendera, M. Yurkevich and Z. Zvarych, are now gathering and cataloguing primary-source materials on the UNM.⁴

* * *

¹ See, for example, the *Litopys UPA* series of documents, ed. E. Shtendera and P. Potichnyj (Toronto, 1977-), four volumes published thus far.

² Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, "The Public Record Office: An Important Source for Archival Materials on Ukraine," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 5, no. 1 (Spring 1980): 74-80.

³ See Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, "The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace: Its Significance for Ukrainian Studies" in this issue.

⁴ See, for example, Myroslav Yurkevich's "The Ideology and Program of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists: A Preliminary Bibliography" to his Ph.D. dissertation (in progress), University of Michigan.

Journal

The Public Record Office (PRO) in London, England houses a considerable number of documents pertaining to the UNM. One of the more intriguing sets of documents uncovered is the Foreign Office file FO 371 47597, titled "Ukrainian Nationalist Movements." Prepared in 1945, it was utilized by officers of the FO, the Foreign Office Research Department (FORD) and the War Office (WO) for several months. This is attested to by the signatures and initials of such prominent members of the FO as Thomas Brimelow (of the Northern Department) and Mrs. B. Miller, the FORD's "expert on Ukrainian affairs."

The documents appear to be largely a recapitulation of captured German (probably SS) materials, which themselves were probably based to some extent on reports of informers within the UNM. They confirm that the British and, probably, other Western powers not only knew about the UNM, but also had a partial idea of their antecedents and importance. They also reflect the extent of naivete and erroneous information within British intelligence. The Ukrainian expert, Mrs. Miller, does not seem to be aware that the Skoropadsky movement had virtually no influence within Ukraine and probably based her judgement on Danylo Skoropadsky's activities in England. Her information on Stepan Bandera's death in 1943 is simply incorrect. In fact, it was Bandera's brothers, Vasyl and Oleksander, who died in Auschwitz, at the hands of Polish inmates. This misinformation might possibly be the result of the efforts of someone highly placed in the British Foreign Office who played a role not unlike that of Kim Philby.

The documents have been bracketed and annotated to correct factual errors, transliteration (which seems to be based, curiously enough, on the Russian) and to indicate questionable interpretations. The reader is left to judge the value of the Foreign Office's appreciation of the UNM. However, these documents do not represent the entire FO view. They illustrate the (probably misplaced) reliance of the British on German sources and contain only partial clues to the British policies towards the UNM. A more complete unravelling of British views remains to be done. Nevertheless, these documents indicate a need for the Ukrainian intellectual community to clarify errors of fact and opinion about Ukrainian nationalist movements, both past and present.

Lubomyr Y. Luciuk

FO 371 47957 XIN 07286

Registry
Number N 17195/4356/38**FROM War Office**
(communicated)No M/3c/Ext/146/45
secret

Dated 13th Dec. 1945

Received
in Registry 18th Dec. 1945Ukrainian Nationalist Movements.

Transmits copy of a study on the Ukrainian Nationalist Movements, prepared from German military documents. Copies F.O.R.D. [Foreign Office Research Department]

(Minutes)

This is a most interesting report. The odd thing about it is that the local population seems to have been willing to support both Ukrainian Nationalist Partisans and Soviet Partisans. This seems to indicate that they were not greatly interested in the Ukrainian Nationalist issue as such, but were willing to help anybody who claimed to be fighting in their interests.

TB [Thomas Brimelow] 23/12/45

This report is most useful, but in places so much telescoped as to be somewhat misleading. For example, no mention is made of any Ukrainian political organisation save O.U.N.; this was admittedly the most important [although] there were several others. In particular the most pro-German of all the movements, the S.H.D. [Soiuz Hetmansiv Derzhavnykiv], followers of Hetman [Pavlo] Skoropadsky, had by [now] nearly died out. Skoropadsky himself died in April 1945, but before his death he appointed one Boris Homsinav [Borys Homzyn] his successor. His followers have recently made application to the British authorities in Germany to contact the old Hetman's son Danylo who is living in England.

Para 1 section b. It seems most unlikely that Andreas Melnik [Andrii Melnyk] should have joined the Soviet partisans, as he was the leader of the whole O.U.N. movement, even though [Stepan] Bandera & [Mykola] Lebed, being younger & more fanatical, had usurped some of his authority.

According to a Stockholm source Bandera died in a German concentration camp about November 1943.

In connection with Mr. Brimelow's point concerning the volatility of Ukrainians, some distinctions must be made. First, the main nationalist

Journal

centre was Galicia—the Volhynians were more inclined to compromise. Second, the Communist partisans were strongest in the towns, & the local population there tended to go in with them, while in the countryside the Ukrainian partisans were better able to continue with their hand against every man.

In any case the Soviet partisans were far better armed than any others & many Ukrainians joined them simply in order to secure arms.

B. Miller F.O.R.D.

Minutes.

ROOM 17.

I should be grateful if you could pass the attached papers to Major Seton-Watson. The entered paper is the one I promised to let him see when he and Mr. Footman came to see Mr. Allen. The loose paper is the property of Mrs. Miller of F.O.R.D., our expert on Ukrainian affairs. I should like to know whether this Bulletin is regularly and easily obtainable.

Thomas Brimelow
13th January 1946.

MI3c/Ext/146/45

SECRET

From: M.I.3(c)
War Office

To: T. Brimelow Esq.,
Northern Dept,
Foreign Office.

13th December 1945.

I enclose for your information one copy of a study on the UKRAINIAN Nationalist Movements, prepared by this section largely from German military documents. A copy has also been sent to F.O.R.D.

Any comments you may have would be appreciated.

Please acknowledge receipt on attached duplicate memo.

[Illegible signature]
Captain
for Major G. S.

UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS.

CONTENTS.

1. General
 - (a) Historical Background (1917-1939)
 - (b) Wartime Developments (1939-1941)
 2. The TARAS BULBA Movement.
 - (a) Origins
 - (b) Partisan Activities
 - (c) Organisation, Strength and Membership
 - (d) Armament
 - (e) General Policy
 - (f) Later History (1942-1944)
 3. The OUN-UPA Movement (1942-1945)
 - (a) Origins
 - (b) Partisan Activities
 - (c) Organisation
 - (d) Strength and Membership
 - (e) Armament
 - (f) Policy (g) Later History
 4. Soviet Counter Measures
 - (a) Military Action
 - (b) Deportation of Families
 - (c) Pan-Slav Propaganda
 - (d) Anti-Separatist Propaganda
 - (e) Constitutional Changes
 5. Recent History of Ukrainian Movement.
 6. Future Prospects.
- Appendix 1 — GERMAN report on UPA Organisation.
Appendix 2 — RUSSIAN order concerning anti-BANDERA Measures.
Appendix 3 — SMERSH order concerning security with reference to OUN-UPA.

Journal

1. General.

(a) Historical Background (1917-39). The collapse of the Russian Empire early in 1917 and the defeat of the Central Powers in November 1918 were in each case followed by the setting up of Ukrainian Governments in the areas thus liberated, which, for a short period at the end of 1918, bid fair to unite the Ukrainians in one state. The campaigns of the Poles and Bolsheviks in the next two years however left the Ukrainian people once more divided between three foreign rulers in Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

In Poland, the Ukrainians retained a considerable liberty of organization, particularly in the social, cultural and economic fields, and Polish East Galicia continued to be the main centre of Ukrainian nationalism. Political unity of the Ukrainians in Poland was largely achieved, both in the parliamentary field and also in the shape of the O.U.N. (*Organizatsiya Ukrainskikh Natsionalistov* — Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), a para-military secret society formed in 1929. This latter body carried out sabotage and assassinations directed against the Polish administration, as it was later to do against the Soviets in 1944-45. Ukrainians had largely looked to Germany for support in establishing their aim of an independent Ukraine, and after Hitler's rise to power the O.U.N. came strongly under Nazi influence.¹

The Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia, in the Carpatho-Ukraine, were comparatively backward and not actively nationalist, though here also irridentist forces received support from Germany. The settlements of 1938-39, which distributed the Ukrainians of these regions between Hungary and the Soviet Union, caused considerable disillusionment among the O.U.N. as well as other Ukrainians of similar leanings who had counted on Germany for support.

In Soviet Ukraine an extremely liberal policy towards Ukrainian nationalism was followed at first, in spite of the abolition of the separate diplomatic service of the Ukraine S.S.R.² From 1930 onwards however Ukrainian separatism, in conjunction with the discontent caused by Soviet agricultural policy, became a serious danger to the Soviet Union. This danger was substantially aggravated by the advent to power of Hitler in 1933. Ukrainian nationalism became an object of attention by the G.P.U., and simultaneously the movement was undermined by the policy of industrialization which brought large numbers of Russians into leading

¹ Links did exist between certain German ministries, the Abwehr (German army intelligence) and the UNM. However, the OUN never came "strongly" under Nazi influence.

² It is debatable whether the Soviet Ukraine ever witnessed a "very liberal" policy towards Ukrainian nationalism.

administrative positions in the Ukraine and greatly increased the economic dependence of the Ukraine on the rest of the Soviet Union.

The arrests and trial of Ukrainian nationalists in the Soviet Union from 1930 onwards offered prima facie evidence of attempts to form Ukrainian separatist bodies inside the Soviet Ukraine, and also of the connections of Ukrainian individuals with the O.U.N. and foreign powers. There is evidence that, during the period of German occupation of the Ukraine, the O.U.N. had branches throughout the Ukraine which worked in the utmost secrecy (including, of course, secrecy from the Germans). No evidence is to hand, however, of the activities of the O.U.N. or of any other separatist organization in the Soviet Ukraine before the war.

(b) Wartime Development (1939-41). During the years 1939-44 [sic] the movement appears still to be suffering from disorganization as a result of the assassination of the leader of the O.U.N., Colonel [Ievhen] KONOVALETS, and the manifest failure of his pro-Nazi policy.³ (One group, led by Andreas Melnik, split away from the O.U.N. and in 1942 had almost become a part of the Soviet partisan movement).⁴

On 28 Jul[y 19]41,⁵ the O.U.N. leadership in LVOV [Lviv] issued a proclamation of Ukrainian independence; the arrest by the Germans of the O.U.N. leader, Stefan Bandera, which followed, led to further disintegration. The organizations which emerged, the "TARAS BULBA" Movement and the U.P.A. (Ukrainska Povstanchiska [Povstanska] Armiya—Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army) were, however, not mutually hostile and the latter eventually largely absorbed the former.

2. The Taras Bulba Movement (1942-44).

(a) Origins. Was led by [Taras] Borovets, a prominent member of the O.U.N., who before the war had been engaged in literary activity against Polish and Soviet authorities. In 1940 he started to organize partisan and other disruptive activity in the part of Poland which had been occupied

³ Konovalets never expounded a pro-Nazi policy. See Ihor Kame-netsky, "Ukrainske pytannia v nimetskii zovnishnii politytsi mizh dvoma svitovymy viinamy," *Ievhen Konovalets ta ioho doba* (Munich, 1974), pp. 851-82.

⁴ Melnyk did not split away from the OUN. In 1940 a split occurred between the older, moderate leadership under Melnyk and the younger, "revolutionary" cadres inside Ukraine led by Bandera, Lebed and others. This led to the creation of two OUN factions with different orientations and tactics, both claiming to represent the Ukrainian nation. See John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2d ed. (New York, 1963); re-printed 1980 by Ukrainian Academic Press, Littleton, Col.

⁵ The actual date was 30 June 1941. The proclamation was made by the Bandera faction of the OUN and was followed by German arrests.

Journal

by the Soviet Union. During the German advance in 1941, he disarmed the Soviet authorities in the town of Sarny [in northern Volhynia] and later handed over the town to the Germans.

At his own suggestion Borovets was then entrusted by the German forces with the task of forming a special police force, the "Poliska Sitch", to mop up Red Army stragglers in the forests of North Volhynia.⁶ He accomplished this task and had several successful engagements with Red Army units, his force having at one time a size of 2 thousand men. Negotiations for further "operations" and expansion, however, broke down and the "Poliska Sitch" was disbanded by the Germans. In February 1942 Borovets started negotiations for its reconstitution, but without success.

Thus Borovets saw himself frustrated in his aim of building up under German auspices the nucleus of a future Ukrainian army. In the meantime with the introduction of the German civil administration in the Ukraine, it had become clear that, far from independence, the Ukrainians could expect little but sanctions and repressive measures from the Germans. In the summer of 1942 Borovets took to the forests with some of his men, and adopted the name of "Taras Bulba".

(b) Partisan Activities. Activity by Bulba bands is reported from September 1942 onwards, and included the following:

- (i) battles with Soviet partisans.
- (ii) attempts to dislocate the German civil administration, e.g. redistribution of requisitioned grain, raids on state farms, liberation of prisoners.
- (iii) raids on German units and posts, with a view to getting supplies, in which, however, the shedding of German blood is said to have been avoided.

These operations took place mainly in the region PINSK-LUNINETS-SARNY-ROVNO-LUTSK-KOVEL, that is to say roughly the Southern half of the Pripet Marshes.

(c) Organization, Strength and Membership. No evidence is available of any form of rigid organization in the Bulba movement. German estimates of the armed strength of the movement during the years 1943-44 vary between 5,00 and 20,000. A statement of June 1943, which may possibly emanate from Bulba himself, gives the strength as 40,000 men organized in 15 camps. It is likely that the active strength was in fact limited by the supply of equipment.

⁶ Bulba-Borovets acted on his own initiative and was not "entrusted" to form the Poliska Sitch by the Germans. He had set up his resistance force in northern Volhynia before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war.

(d) Armament. This consisted mainly of machine guns, machine pistols and rifles, though anti-tank guns are also mentioned. Sources of supply are raids on German units, actions against Soviet partisans, deserters who bring their own weapons and deception of Soviet planes carrying supplies to Soviet partisans.

The movement recruited its members exclusively from Ukrainians but included amongst them those of every political leaning. The original nucleus of the movement consisted of deserters from the German auxiliary police formations and other Ukrainians who had come into conflict with the German civil administration. Later, however, Bulba was able to institute a compulsory call-up in parts of Volhynia and Polyessia [Polissia], the German administration being permanently effective only at focal points.

(e) General Policy. The principal aim of an independent Ukraine was to be achieved, either after the mutual exhaustion of Germany and the Soviet Union, or alternatively by developing Partisan activities to such an extent that Germany would be forced to modify her Ukrainian policy. As regards political conditions in the planned "independent Ukraine" the movement appears to have had no policy at all. This vagueness of policy may have been deliberate, with a view to enrolling the largest possible number of supporters; it was however to prove a weakness when competition developed between the UPA and the Bulba movement.

During the German occupation of the Ukraine the movement preserved an attitude on the one hand of willingness to negotiate with the German Army and on the other hand of hostility to the German civil administration and Soviet partisans. There are however isolated reports of temporary non-aggression agreements between Bulba and Soviet partisan groups during actions against the German civil administration.

(f) Later History (1942-44). Attempts by the Germans to induce Borovets to give up his illegal existence and to join them in fighting Soviet partisans lasted from October 1942 to April 1943. In those negotiations Borovets characterises the German administration in the Ukraine as "plundering" and the Reichskommissar himself as a "bandit". In his final letter to the chief of the "Sicherheitsdienst" in Rovno he threatens reprisals against German military objectives and lines of communication for any further German acts of barbarity against the Ukrainian civil population. A further meeting between Borovets and German agents took place in June 1943, at which it appeared that he was willing conditionally to negotiate with the German forces, but nothing seems to have come of this.

By this time the U.P.A. in VOLHYNIA had become a substantial force, and increasing penetration of the Taras movement by U.P.A. mem-

bers was taking place; in addition the movement is reported to have been losing members to the Soviet partisans. In November 1943 Borovets found himself so much weakened as to swallow his objections to negotiations with the German "Sicherheitsdienst" (Security Service). His offer, details of which are not known, was referred by Himmler to Hitler and turned down. In January 1944 Borovets was in the custody of the German Sicherheitsdienst in WARSAW under safe-conduct. Early in 1944 Borovets reappeared as the head of a new organization, the UNRA, Ukrainian National Revolutionary Army, which was active in the same region as, and presumably largely identical with, the Taras Bulba. Like that organization it considered itself an inter-party organization, and tried to recruit followers from Ukrainians of all political views. A propaganda leaflet suggests that the UNRA was hostile to the UPA, and was sympathetic to, or possibly even included, the radical Melnik group. Information as to its activities and organization is extremely scanty. Nevertheless the fact that the UNRA and the UPA were the joint objects of an appeal to come over to the Soviet side, issued by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, indicates that the UNRA must have been of some importance.

The unification of Ukrainian parties which took place in June 1944⁷ is reported to have included the UNRA and the Melnik group. Partisan activity, directed against Soviet line[s] of communication, and directed by Taras Bulba, is reported in the Polish [?] region as late as December 1944.

3. The OUN-UPA Movement (1942-1945).

(a) Origins. At about the same time as Borovets' attempt in 1941-42 to train up the nucleus of a future Ukrainian Army under German auspices, another section of the OUN Leadership was seeking, with greater success, to achieve the same end by sending its members to join the German Army as volunteers. It appears that a large part (perhaps 50%) of the personnel of the German SS division "Galicia" fell into this category. The eventual military leader of the U.P.A., [Roman] Shukhevich, is said to have served as a captain in this division. The setting up of the

⁷ This probably refers to the creation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR) in July 1944 by the Bandera faction. The Melnyk faction did not join. The council proclaimed itself the "supreme organ of the Ukrainian people in its revolutionary liberation struggle." The goal was to create a broad basis for military struggle against both the Germans and the Soviets. The council controlled the UPA and through the OUN conducted anti-Soviet actions and propaganda. Membership was open to all parties that supported the aim of Ukrainian national independence.

UPA Movement began in mid-1942, but the nucleus of trained fighting men arrived only in the winter of 1942-43, in the shape of mass desertions from German SS volunteer divisions, which desertions continued at intervals throughout 1943.⁸ By the middle of 1943 the UPA was estimated to have 50,000 armed men in the region KOVEL-ROVNO-ZVIAHEL [Novohrad-Volynskiy]; by the end of 1943 it had spread to Galicia and was able to undertake the clearing from the N[orthern] slopes of the Carpathians of Soviet partisans with a view to using that region as a base. Immediately prior to the reoccupation of the Western Ukraine by the Red Army the UPA was in control of large areas between the Carpathians and the River Pripet.

(b) Partisan Activities. Before the Soviet reoccupation of the West Ukraine the main activities of the UPA were recruitment and training. Its only practical achievements during this period appear to have been the expulsion from parts of the West Ukraine of Soviet partisans and Polish peasants. Many of the latter had been settled there by pre-war Polish governments and placards were put up in villages announcing the dates by which Poles had to remove themselves to the West side of the San River. Those who failed to comply had their houses burnt down.

The UPA was also antagonistic to the German civil government in the Ukraine, and to Polish Partisans of all kinds. The extent of actual hostilities between the UPA and these bodies is however not known.

Hostilities on any substantial scale between the UPA and the Soviets date from April 1944, when UPA territory began to be reoccupied by the Red Army. The movement of the Soviet-German front across the region caused some disorganization in the UPA's activities, but in September 1944 95% of UPA units were reported to be behind the Soviet lines. The disappearance of the German civil administration in the Ukraine had by then removed the main obstacle to cooperation with the Germans. UPA activities included:

⁸ The UPA's origins are misrepresented here. It was organized before the SS division Galicia was even formed, and the Bandera OUN even boycotted it in its formative period. Shukhevych was never a captain in the division, although he was active in the Ukrainian legion (Roland and Nachtigall battalions), which fought alongside the Wehrmacht in the early days of the German-Soviet war. The legion was interned after the 30 June 1941 proclamation of independence. Then it was transferred to the Belorussian front, where many of its officers and men escaped into the forests and swamps and formed the UPA. See Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*; Wolf-Dietrich Heike, *The Ukrainian Division "Galicia": The History of Its Formation and Military Operation (1943-1945)* (Toronto, 1970).

Journal

- (i) Attacks on Soviet supply columns moving up to the front, both by road and by rail; some stretches of railroad were rendered unusable, and armed escorts for convoys moving by road were becoming essential.
- (ii) Battles, apparently mainly defensive, against NKVD and Red Army troops.
- (iii) Liberation of conscripts from the reoccupied areas.
- (iv) Terrorism, directed mainly against officials of the Communist Party, the NKVD and the Soviet Government. One German intelligence unit regards it proved that General Vatutin's death was the result of such an attack at SHEPETOVKA [Shepetivka].⁹
- (v) Annihilation of Soviet parachutists.
- (vi) Transmission of intelligence on the Red Army to the German forces.
- (vii) Assistance to German stragglers, including their passage through the Soviet lines.
- (viii) Assistance to occasional German long-range reconnaissance groups.¹⁰
- (ix) Extensive propaganda amongst the Ukrainian civil population and amongst Ukrainians in the R.A. [Red Army].

Operations by the UPA against Soviet line[s] of communication and officials are reported up to and including March 1945, the date of the latest available information, the operations covering roughly the quadrilateral KOVEL-PRZEMYSL-STANISLAV [Stanyславiv, now Ivano-Frankivsk]-KIEV.

(c) Organization. During the years 1941-44 the leadership of the OUN-UPA movement was in the hands of Lebedj [Lebed] (Alias Maxim Ruben [Maksym Ruban]) and Shukhevich (alias Klim Savur), the political and military deputies respectively of Bandera, who himself was in German custody in BERLIN.¹¹

⁹ General Vatutin was indeed ambushed and mortally wounded by an UPA group. See Mykola Lebed, *Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia* (n.p., 1946) and Enrique Martinez Codó, "Guerilla Warfare in the Ukraine," *Modern Guerilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerilla Movements, 1941-1961*, ed. Franklin Mark Osanka (New York and London, 1962), pp. 112-27.

¹⁰ Fraternalization and cooperation with the German forces was expressly forbidden by the high command of the UPA well before 1944. The court-martial and execution of UPA leader Orel was a result of one such breach of discipline. See Lebed, *Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia*.

¹¹ Bandera was initially in Berlin in Gestapo custody, but he spent most of the war in German concentration camps.

A report of November 1943 describes a combined headquarters of the movement, then situated in the town of STYDIN [?], 45 km North of ROVNO. With the staff of the UPA there were said to be:

- (i) Headquarters of the security service (a secret terrorist organization).
- (ii) Supreme party executive.
- (iii) Directorate of medical services.
- (iv) Supply department.
- (v) Training school for officers and NCOs.

In the same report the UPA itself was stated to be organized in three divisions, each of 10-12 thousand men. These divisions were divided into regiments and companies (termed "Sotni" or "hundreds"). Further details of the organization at lower levels is given in Appendix 1.

(d) Strength and membership. German estimates agree on a strength of 40-50 thousand men for the UPA in the latter half of 1943, which towards the end of 1944 had risen to about 100,000. It is not known whether at this latter stage the UPA forces were still organized into divisions of about 10,000 men. There are many reports about this time of UPA groups acting in strength of 2-5 thousand. This great increase of strength in 1944 is partly to be accounted for by the reoccupation of the West Ukraine by the Red Army which had unwelcome consequences for a large part of the population. The reoccupation of every village was followed within a few days by a call up of all men between the ages of 18-50 usually conducted by an officer of the NKVD. Those who had collaborated with the Germans were, according to the degree of their offences, either summarily executed, sent to the interior for further investigation or sent direct to penal companies. The remainder, with the exception of certain party officials and those who had been with the partisans for more than one year, were sent to ordinary companies of reserve regiments. For the West Ukrainians these units appear to have been only a modified form of punishment company, where by bravery in the face of the enemy they might expiate their offences against their Fatherland in not having actively resisted the Germans. They were given 5-10 days training and were sent ill-armed and ill-clothed in the most dangerous parts of the front; casualties and desertions seem to have been heavy.

Originally the UPA had encouraged its supporters to present themselves for recruitment as the Red Army reconquered the W. Ukraine, hoping thereby to utilize the training facilities of the Red Army for its own benefit, as it had used previously those of the German Army. The use of the West Ukrainian recruits as cannon fodder caused this policy to be reversed. Cases were frequently reported in autumn of 1944 wherein UPA units attacked the guards of parties of recruits, the majority of whom were alleged to join the UPA after their liberation.

Journal

During 1944 a number of German stragglers joined the UPA. They were found in command of units and also in technical capacities. Units composed of dissident nationalities in sympathy with the aims of the OUN, e.g. Caucasian, are also reported as having fought with it.

(e) Armament. Originally light and heavy machine guns, machine pistols, rifles. Later in November 1943 each division of 12 thousand men is reported to have at its disposal two 3in guns, four to six anti-tank guns, as well as mortars. In 1944 tanks are occasionally reported. Further details are given in Appendix 1.

(f) Policy. As with Ukrainian Movements, the cardinal point in the policy of the OUN was the establishment of an independent greater Ukraine. Its political propaganda spoke much of civil liberties, and had a mildly socialist character; MOSCOW and BERLIN were depicted as foreign imperialisms coveting Ukrainian wheat, while LONDON came in for criticism as a stronghold of capitalism. After the unification of Ukrainian parties in June 1944, a more precise political programme was adopted.

The movement was uncompromisingly hostile to the German civil government in the Ukraine, the Soviet Government, the NKVD, Polish forces of both the London and Moscow groups, Poles living in the Ukraine, and the Vlasov movement. The movement was willing to negotiate, always solely with a view to its own benefit, with the German Army and the Hungarian Army. The only non-Ukrainian body with whom the OUN appear to have been on good terms was the Serbian national partisans, with whom an agreement is reported to have been concluded in March 1944 not to assist Tito's organization. As has been stated above, the OUN originally hoped to achieve its aims with German assistance but these hopes were repeatedly shattered. As in 1944 the impending defeat of Germany became increasingly obvious, there are reports of the OUN seeking support in England, and vice versa. All these reports lack confirmation; the most specific one of them states that Maxim Ruben, (alias Lebed), the political leader of the OUN, travelled to England via Spain in April 1944, presumably in order to canvas support.

(g) Later History. Negotiations between UPA and the German Army units at a purely local level are reported from early 1944 onwards on a basis of mutual non-aggression and the exchange of German arms for intelligence on the Red Army. During negotiations on a higher level in June 1944, the UPA sought without success to make the agreement conditional on the German Army using its influence to improve the treatment of the Ukrainian population by the German civil administration. A final agreement, between German Army Group North Ukraine and the UPA leadership was made in August 1944, with the approval of the Reichsminister concerned and Himmler, the German civil administration in the

Ukraine having ceased to exist. The UPA insisted throughout on negotiations with the Germans being kept secret, in order not to prejudice its propaganda inside the Red Army.

The policy of the German Army on the Ukraine question was reviewed late in 1944. The conclusion was reached that the Ukrainians did not institute a separate nation, and that as the freedom of the national minorities depended on the defeat of the Red Army, all the forces of the dissident minorities should unite under General VLASOV. This decision represented a considerable victory for VLASOV, who had been putting forward this view for several years without securing German agreement; sympathy in the Ukraine for the German cause was however likely to be annulled by it.¹²

4. Soviet Counter Measures

(a) Military Action. During 1944 military action by the Soviet authorities against the UPA is reported on an increasing scale. The troops used for this purpose were drawn in roughly equal numbers from the Red Army and the NKVD; the direction of the campaign against anti-Soviet partisans was, in rear areas, the responsibility of the NKGB. The number of troops engaged was estimated at one time as about 40,000, of which the Red Army contribution would naturally be drawn from the most reliable divisions. It is known that Soviet Ukrainian partisan personnel were often employed for this purpose under the control of the NKVD, after their zone of operation had been re-occupied by the Red Army.

(b) Deportation of Families. The removal (mainly to Siberia) of families of known UPA members, as of other politically unreliable persons, was widely carried out in the West Ukraine, and seems to have been one of the most effective methods of undermining the UPA movement. It does not seem however that these measures were normally applied collectively to whole villages.

The policy of deportation of dis-affected elements naturally brings with it the danger of building up centres of resistance in the reception zones. Mixed German-Ukrainian partisan activity in the Soviet Far East was in fact reported in November 1944, from a reliable source.

¹² The vagaries of German policy manifested themselves long before 1944. Conflicts on policy between the Wehrmacht, the SS, the Ostministerium and Hitler effectively destroyed any opportunities the Germans may have had for securing the cooperation of Ukrainians in their war with the USSR. See Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-45: A Study of Occupation Policies* (New York and London, 1957), and G. Reitlinger, *The House Built on Sand: The Conflict of German Policy in Russia, 1939-1945* (London, 1960).

(c) Pan-Slav Propaganda. A Pan-Slav movement was founded by the Soviet authorities in August 1941, in order to turn to the advantage of the Soviet Union the fact that Germany either had destroyed or was seeking to destroy all independent Slav states, and to represent the Soviet Union as the protector of the Slavs. Though not designed solely or even primarily with a view to the Ukraine, this propaganda move appears to have had a wide response there; this is no doubt partly to be accounted for as a natural reaction on the part of the population of the occupied territories to foreign rule in the Ukraine and in particular to the Nazis' estimate of themselves as "Herrenvolk" and Ukrainians as "asiatisches Untermenschentum" (Asiatic sub-humans).

(d) Anti-Separatist Propaganda. Reference has been made above to the appeal issued in early 1944, from the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine S.S.R. to the members of the UPA and UNRA. A free pardon was offered to those who deserted to the Soviets. In the same document the Soviet Union was represented as having achieved the union of the Ukrainian people by its march into Poland in 1939.

(e) Constitutional Changes. Early in 1944 the constituent republics of the Soviet Union were granted the right to maintain their own separate Ministries for defence and foreign affairs. There can be little doubt that this measure was largely intended as a concession to nationalist feeling in these republics particularly in the Ukraine.

5. Recent History of Ukrainian Movement. As mentioned above, in June 1944 the various Ukrainian resistance groups united into a Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (Spilka Visvoleniya Ukraine [Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukrainy]), from which there was constituted a Supreme Liberation Council (Ukrainska Golovna [Holovna] Vyzvolna Rada). Under this, a shadow government was set up with ministries, supreme court, etc. It is not certain that this government had any but a nominal existence. There are, however, a number of reports of areas in the West Ukraine coming under the control of Ukrainian resistance movement, during the winter of 1944-45. It is likely that the Soviet hold on this region at that time was concentrated on big towns and lines of communication.

The political programme put forward by this organization attempted to cater for both the peasantry and those of liberal and socialist leanings. This programme provided for civil liberties, and the socialisation of heavy industry and transport, while for agriculture it was proposed to set upper and lower limits to the amount of land that an individual might hold.

6. Future Prospects.

In World War II, as in World War I, the Ukrainian movement did not begin to attain the necessary unification and organization until it was

too late for full advantage to be taken of the mutual pre-occupation of Germany and Russia. With the defeat of Germany and the disappearance of the operational commitments of the Red Army, NKVD and NKGB it cannot be expected that the UPA will be able to keep its forces in being for many months. Moreover, the UPA like all partisan movements was dependent in many ways on the whole-hearted support of the population of the territory in which it worked, and up to April 1945 there was every indication that [the] policy of transporting UPA sympathisers to Siberia and elsewhere was being remorselessly carried out. When we add to these considerations the inevitable Sovietisation and Russification of the West Ukraine under Soviet rule it will be seen that Ukrainian nationalism has little prospect of being anything more than a nuisance to the Soviet Union in future years of peace.

APPENDIX 1.

The following data on UPA organisation, tactics and supply circumstances are given by a German reconnaissance group, who spent a month behind the Soviet lines in the Carpathians in Oct-Nov 1944. Throughout this period the group received guidance and hospitality from the UPA organization:

Frontaufklarungskommande 202
bei Heerengruppe A

In the field,
22nd November 1944

Subject: Results of Operation "Kirn"
Results of Observation of UPA

SECRET.

I. Organization. The smallest tactical unit is the group (RIY) strength one leader and nine men.

4 groups form a platoon (CHOTA) 4 platoons form a company (SOTNYA) 3-4 companies form a battalion (Larger tactical units were not observed)

Specialist personnel are attached to a company for particular duties, e.g. scouts, liaison, supply and provost personnel.

The total strength of a company in the field may be 160-180 men.

The issue of orders takes place daily, mostly in the evening through the C.S.M.

Battalions work for the most part independently of one another, liaison being maintained by couriers or despatch-riders.

Journal

In addition to the above combat units, there are so-called "local" or "political" combat groups (MISTSEVI BOYOVKI). These differ from the regular troops by being resident in their zone of operations. Their strength does not normally exceed ten men. They carry out police duties.

The leaders of the various UPA units from group to battalion are known as "RIYOVIY", "CHOTOVIY", "SOTENNIY" and "KOMANDIR" respectively.

The official mode of address is "DRUZH" (comrade) e.g. "DRUZHNE KOMANDIR".

Other ranks also address one another as "DRUZH".

II. Discipline. The discipline is patterned on that usual in German units.

Relations between superiors and their subordinates are largely on a comradely basis.

A smart soldierly bearing is maintained.

Orders are carried out with precision.

Disobedience is severely punished.

For severe offences floggings are a common form of punishment.

Desertion is punished by shooting (deserters are sought out and arrested by police).

III. Tactics.

Meticulous selection of an opponent.

Only profitable actions undertaken.

Avoidance of open battle.

Preparations for a typical undertaking.

Thorough reconnaissance.

(a) through the civil population (TSIVILNA ROZVIDKA) the results of which are often exaggerated and vague. Hence, in addition —

(b) military reconnaissance (VIYSKOVA ROZVIDKA).

When these two types of reconnaissance agree with one another, a plan of attack is drawn up.

Duties are allotted and arrangements made in consultation with someone who knows the locality concerned.

Time and place for rendezvous are fixed. Approaches to the locality involved are watched. Telephone lines are cut. One to two hours after dusk is regarded as the most favourable time for the attack.

The scene of the attack is left the same night. Retreating units endeavour to cover up their tracks.

When a unit stays in the same area for some time, actions are carried out only in neighbouring areas. Conspicuous movements are forbidden in the locality where the unit is situated except for essential tasks, e.g. procurement of supplies.

Movements of larger formations take place mostly by night. Marching in the day time is only possible in large stretches of forest. A company proceeds by platoons. Guides escort the units from place to place, or from forest to forest. The destination is reconnoitred a day or two beforehand. While on the march roads and inhabited places are avoided. Occasionally a platoon will be billeted in one place. Camps are pitched in the forest. Camps are guarded day and night by double sentries up to a radius of half a mile. Persons with local knowledge are sent out to spy out the land and procure food. When a unit intends to stay some time armed patrols are sent out into the neighbouring countryside. It is difficult to take a UPA unit by surprise, since the population to the extent of 99% work for the UPA willingly and with enthusiasm. The population is extraordinarily suspicious and wary of any stranger.

IV. Armament. Units are armed for the most part with Russian weapons. Pistols and hand-grenades are 90% of German or Hungarian origin.

German sub-machine guns and machine guns occasionally.

Members of the S.S. division "Galicia", however, are armed and equipped 99% with German material (LG 34 and 42; MP 40 and 43).

Automatic weapons of Slovakian or Hungarian origin are rare.

Armament of a group:

- 1 light machine gun (Russian)
- 2-3 carbines (Russian)
- 1-2 carbines (German or Hungarian)
- 2-3 sub-machine guns (Russian).

Platoons mainly armed with heavy machine-gun; occasionally mortars and special weapons.

The local and political combat-groups are less heavily armed. Occasionally machine pistols, mai[n]ly pistols or carbines, small arms being better for their tasks.

Ammunition:

Apparently plentiful. Dump about seven miles away from actual quarters.

Shortage of pistol ammunition 7.65mm and 9mm.

German weapons are preferred, but German ammunition in short supply.

Care and maintenance of weapons: great shortage of material for this purpose. Weapons nevertheless in good condition.

V. Equipment. A great shortage of equipment of all kinds. Bivouac tents, haversacks, slings are uncommon; rucksacks are improvised from sacks; spades and axes are even more scarce; ammunition pouches are likewise improvised by the individual; mess tins and water bottles

Journal

are also in short supply; shortage of washing and shaving utensils, tooth powder and tooth brushes (one razor blade to ten to twenty men).

VI. Dress. Footgear is mainly of German and Hungarian origin. Shoes and boots are made locally. However material available does not suffice to cover requirements. German Army and locally produced underwear is worn. As a result of the shortage of underwear there is widespread infestation.

For uniform, items of German, Russian and Slovak uniforms are worn. Greatcoats are in short supply.

VII. Supplies. The inhabitants of individual villages are made collectively responsible for supplies to UPA units, 90% of which process takes place without friction. In some places "Ukrainian State Stores" are formed for this purpose. Elsewhere a village headman (Starichi) is made responsible for supplies to the troops.

Inside the units distribution of food takes place through a Q.M.S. equally for officers and men.

The usual cooked dish is a nourishing tasty stew. Captured field kitchens are available.

Distribution of provisions for morning and evening, e.g. butter, etc., takes place according to availability (similarly tobacco).

Salted and smoked ham, and sausage, are put by as an "iron ration". A great shortage of salt and spices.

Signed in Draft
KIRN
Captain & Kdo. fuhrer.

Witnessed
Oblt & deputy Kdo. fuhrer.

(Translation of a translation
of a captured order).

APPENDIX 2.

Defensive and Counter-espionage measures
against the Banders [Bandera]
Movement.

Translation
of Regimental Order of the 258th KHABAROV Rifle Regt
of 14. Jan. 1944.

With the entry into the Western regions of the Ukraine the regiment may come into contact with anti-Soviet elements, the bands of Bandera, and must be prepared in the near future for acts of terrorism.

It is ordered that:

1. No one may go out alone.
2. No one may go out unarmed.
3. Baggage wagons may not go out singly, but only in groups of not less than five. For every group of wagons a baggage commander is to be detailed. Drivers must be armed. Ammunition supplies are to be guarded.
4. The rear services will deal with the security of the operational zone.
5. Headquarters guards are to be strengthened. Their quarters must be close together.
6. If necessary the civil population is to be moved out of houses occupied by H.Q. personnel.
7. No arms are to be left unguarded in quarters.
8. Care is to be taken in guarding W/T stations, telephone cable-offices and telephone lines.
9. The vigilance of personnel is to be intensified. All necessary measures for the preservation of secrecy are to be strictly carried out.
10. Acceptance of alcoholic drinks from the civil population is to be strictly forbidden.
11. Individual partisans and partisan groups in the battalion area are to be carefully scrutinized.
12. Guard duty in the battalion is to be strictly maintained.

The battalion commander is personally responsible for the execution of the above orders.

A report that the order has been carried out is to be submitted by 0800 hours 15. 1. 1944.

Chief of Staff (Maj. KHARLAMOV).

APPENDIX 3.

STRICTLY SECRET.

To the
Senior Commissioner in the 985th Regt.,
Comrade [RASKATOV].

Find out immediately who, in the units of your regiment, was born in, has lived in, or was recruited as replacement in the districts of MALIN [Malyn], POTIYIVKA, and CHOPOVICHY [Chopovychi] [in Zhytomyr oblast]. All such persons are to be carefully watched by agents, in order to seek out among them agents of the "OUN".

In the forests of these districts armed bands of OUN followers (Ukrainian Insurgent Army — UPA) are in hiding.

Journal

It is not impossible that amongst the new replacements from these districts members of the OUN-UPA could infiltrate into our units.

Lists, with statements and evidence, are to be sent to the "SMERSH" department.

The plan for the employment of agents in respect of the above category is to be submitted in person on 11. 1. 1944.

Chief of the Counter-Espionage Dept "SMERSH"
of the 226th GLUKHOV [Hlukhiv]-KIEV
Red Banner Rifle Div.
(Signed) Capt. GRAVILOV.

8. 1. 44

