

UKRAINIAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
Series: Ukrainian Jewish Studies, No. 1

SYMON PETLIURA AND THE JEWS:
A REAPPRAISAL

by

Taras Hunczak
Rutgers University

Toronto

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Editor: Lubomyr R. Wynar

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Preface

The first issue of this new UHA series is devoted to Symon Petliura (1879-1926) in the context of Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1921. In his study, Professor Taras Hunczak, noted historian of East European history, reappraises the role of Symon Petliura in Jewish pogroms in Ukraine and critically reexamines the myth of Ukrainian governmental anti-semitism during the short lived existence of the Ukrainian National Republic.¹

It is only fair to state that the question of Jewish participation in either the Ukrainian National or the Bolshevik movements of 1917 and the following years requires an impartial analysis based on thorough external and internal analysis of historical sources.

The creation of the Ukrainian independent and sovereign state in 1918 under the leadership of Professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866-1934) and later under Symon Petliura as well as their attitudes to the Jewish minority in Ukraine is very essential toward the comprehension of the spirit and scope of the Law on National-Personal Autonomy of January 22, 1918. This law, passed by the Ukrainian Central Rada, provided the Jewish population in Ukraine with its national-cultural autonomy—a unique case in European political history of this period.² Professor Solomon I. Goldelman, one of the leaders of the Jewish socialist party "Poalei Zion" (Workers of Zion) and a student of Jewish-Ukrainian relations during this period, stated that "The Jewish national autonomy and the Ukrainian Revolution came on the scene as siamese twins. With the fall

¹Dr. Taras Hunczak is professor of Soviet, Russian, and East European history at Rutgers University. He is editor of *Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1974), *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), *Ukraine and Poland in documents, 1918-1922*, 2 vols. (New York, 1984), *Ukrainska suspilno-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti*, 3 vols. (New York-Munich, 1983), *The UPA in Light of German Documents*, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1984), and others. Professor Hunczak has also published articles in major professional journals.

²The text of the Law on National-Personal Autonomy is published in the section on "Documentation," see p. 49-51.

of an independent Ukrainian state, the end of Jewish National autonomy came automatically."³

Another major topic, which requires impartial historical analysis, is linked to the activities of Jewish political parties in Ukraine and their attitude toward the creation and functioning of a Ukrainian national independent state during this turbulent period.

It is hoped that Taras Hunczak's study on Petliura and the Ukrainian-Jewish relations will fill an essential gap in East European and American historiography. It is interesting to note that his article on Symon Petliura, which appeared in the *Jewish Social Studies*, originated at a lecture series of Professor Salo Baron at Rutgers University. During one of the usual post-lecture discussions Professor Hunczak objected to what he considered as an unfounded and unfair criticism of Symon Petliura. Subsequently, Professor Baron suggested that he prepare a well-documented article on Petliura and the Jews and submit it for publication in *Jewish Social Studies*.⁴

The present publication consists of the following parts: 1) brief preface, 2) Hunczak's study, "A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, 1917-1923," 3) Hunczak's "Letter to the Editors," 4) Documentation; sources pertaining to Ukrainian-Jewish relations in 1917-1923. The last section also includes an excerpt from S. I. Goldelman's study, *Jewish National Autonomy in Ukraine, 1917-1920*. The name index concludes this publication.

It is not within the scope of this preface to raise additional questions pertaining to Jewish-Ukrainian relations during the various historical periods. In the 20th century, both nations were exposed to physical annihilation by foreign governments. During the 1930s (Stalin's purges and the famine of 1933) and during the Nazi occupation of Ukraine in 1941-1945 millions of Ukrainians perished. The Jewish people suffered terrible physical extermination (the

³Solomon I. Goldelman, *Jewish National Autonomy in Ukraine, 1917-1920*, (Chicago, 1968), p. 123.

On the activities of Goldelman see Leo Bykovsky, *Solomon I. Goldelman: A Portrait of a Politician and Educator (1885-1974)*, (New York-Toronto, 1980).

⁴Letter of Professor T. Hunczak to L. Wynar, January 14, 1984. In his letter Hunczak writes the following: "As was to be expected, my arguments did not go unchallenged, for in the same issue the late Zosa Szajkowski wrote a vehement rebutal to my article. A year later appeared a response to the rebutal of Mr. Szajkowski and again it was accompanied by another rebutal by the same author. Viewing the intellectual confrontation from the distance of fifteen years, I can honestly say that the substantial research in the area since the publication of my article, proves that my conclusions were correct. . . . To conclude, it might be appropriate to mention that both my article and the "Letter to the Editor" have been favorably received by the Jewish scholarly community."

Holocaust) during the Nazi period. Many Ukrainians and Jews in the present Soviet Ukraine are persecuted by the Communist Government.

I think it is appropriate to conclude this preface with an excerpt from the speech of Ivan Dziuba, Ukrainian literary critic, which he delivered on September 29, 1966, at the Babi Yar in Kiev, commemorating the Jewish and Ukrainian victims of the Nazi terror. Dziuba stated:

"The way to true brotherhood lies not in self-oblivion (samozabutti), but in self-knowledge; not in renunciation of one's identity and adaptations to others, but in being one's own self and respecting others. Jews have the right to be Jews, Ukrainians the right to be Ukrainians, in the most profound sense of these words. Let Jews know their history, culture and language and be proud of them. Let Ukrainians know their history, culture and language, and be proud of them. Let them know the history and culture of each other, and of other peoples, and let them value each other, and others, as brothers.⁵

This UHA new series is intended to publish studies and source materials pertaining to Ukrainian and Jewish historical experiences in Ukraine. It is hoped that this first issue will contribute to a better understanding of Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the turbulent years of 1917-1921. If this publication contributes to the development of a constructive dialog among researchers of East European history, then we feel it will have served its purpose.

Acknowledgements

A number of individuals and institutions contributed to the initiative of this publication. First and foremost, we wish to express our gratitude to the late Mrs. Miriam A. Goldelman (d. 1984) from Jerusalem who provided some financial assistance to initiate a series of Ukrainian Jewish Relations in memory of her deceased husband, Solomon I. Goldelman (1885-1975), a prominent Jewish educator, scholar and noted political activist in Ukraine and Israel. We especially wish to thank Professor Taras Hunczak for procuring permission from Mr. Tobey B. Gitelle, managing editor of *Jewish Social Studies*, to republish his article, "A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura

⁵Ivan Dziuba, "Vystup u Babynomu Iaru 29 veresnia 1966," in V. Chornovil, *Lykho z rozumu* (Paris, 1967), pp. 307-308. An English translation was published in *The Chornovil Papers* (New York-Toronto, 1968), pp. 222-226.

and Ukrainian Jewish Relations, 1917-1921," published in *Jewish Social Studies* (vol. 31, no. 3, 1969, pp. 163-184), and his "Letter to the Editor" (vol. 32, no. 3, 1970, pp. 246-253). Also Mr. Leo Bykovsky, a noted bibliographer and educator, deserves our gratitude for his encouragement of this series. Finally, we wish to express our thanks to members of the UHA chapter in Toronto, who provided a major part of the financial support toward the publication of this study.

L.R. Wynar, Editor



Петлюра

Symon Petliura

A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, 1917-1921

Sensation-loving Paris has recently been treated to the most titillating of thrills, a spectacular murder trial. When we add that international politics and rampant race hatreds were thrown in by way of good measure, it will be realized that the dish was seasoned highly enough even for the jaded tastes of the boulevardiers. Emotion dominated the scene from start to finish. Such cold abstractions as law and reason found no place in the crowded courtroom. Theatrical display and the appeal to sheer feeling were everywhere present in the trial of Samuel Schwartzbard, a young Jewish watchmaker, for shooting down General Simon Petliura, the Ukrainian army chieftain, on the streets of the capital some 15 months ago.¹

This is a most fitting description of the atmosphere of the trial which, from October 18 to 26, 1927, claimed the attention of the entire world. The only item that is missing in this eloquent summation of the entire affair is the appreciation that in reality Petliura, not his assassin, was placed on trial posthumously on the charge of instigating and tolerating some of the bloodiest Jewish pogroms the world had ever seen before World War II. The attorney for the defense, Henri Torrès, one of the most successful criminal lawyers in France, skillfully diverted the attention of the court from the defendant by concentrating on the horrors of the pogroms. Thus the roles of the accuser and the accused were completely reversed.² Torrès sought to prove Petliura's personal responsibility for this tragedy that befell Ukrainian Jewry. Since there was no concrete evidence to prove this point, however, after two days of cross-examining various witnesses, Torrès changed his line of argument. He proceeded to claim that Petliura as the Chief of State and Commander of the Army was responsible for the acts of his soldiers and for all developments in the territory under his control. This substantially was the argument of some of the witnesses, particularly that of Henry Sliosberg, a distinguished Russian-Jewish law-

¹"Lurid Trial of Petliura," *Literary Digest*, vol. lxxxv (November 19, 1927), pp. 36-42.

²Iakovliv, A., *Paryzka Tragediia [Parisian Tragedy]* (Paris 1958), pp. 24-6. (U). (U) denotes Ukrainian and (R) Russian.

yer, who also imputed Petliura's moral responsibility.³ The defense was successful; the French jury found Schwartzbard "not guilty."

Viewed as an avenger by some, and as a Bolshevik agent or at least a tool of a Communist conspiracy by others, Schwartzbard may well remain an eternal enigma.⁴ Whatever the truth may have been, the object of this study is not to try to convict the assassin nor even to examine his motive in perpetrating such an irrevocable act. The principal purpose of this study is to establish, as far as historical sources and human failings permit, the culpability, if any, of Symon Petliura for the pogroms.

The origin of the pogroms in the Ukraine during the stormy days of the revolution, foreign invasion, civil war, and western intervention presents a complex problem. Yet it is against this background, together with that of deep-seated historical socio-economic animosities, that one must try to understand the horrors that engulfed the Ukraine during one of the most critical periods of her history. It should be noted, however, that whatever explanations may be offered, nothing, absolutely nothing, can possibly justify the vicious pogroms which shed so much innocent blood, causing untold suffering to those who survived, and leaving thousands of widows and orphans in their wake.⁵

When we examine closely the entire period of the Ukrainian Revolution, we find that the fortunes and misfortunes of the Jewish community were directly related to the successes or failures of the Ukrainian government to establish a solid foundation for the peaceful and independent existence of the newly-created Ukrainian state.

³See *The New York Times*, October 25, 1927, p. 5; also the special daily issues of *Tryzub* [Trident], Paris, no. 5 (Oct. 25, 1927), p. 1; no. 6 (Oct. 26, 1927, p. 1; no. 7 (Oct. 28, 1927), p. 1; no. 8 (Oct. 31, 1927), p. 3. (U).

⁴Allen W. Dulles, the late chief of the CIA, wrote that "in Paris in 1926 the Soviet security murdered General Petliura. . . ." See his "The Craft of Intelligence," *Encyclopedia Britannica: Book of the Year 1963*, p. 20. Also Petr S. Deriabin, former officer of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB), testified to "have heard it said in the Emigré Department of State Security that Petlyura was assassinated by Soviet State Security." "Hearing before the Subcommittee to investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on Judiciary, United States Senate, 89th Congress, First Session," *Murder International, Inc.: Murder and Kidnapping as an Instrument of Soviet Policy* (Washington, D.C. 1965), pp. 54, 60, 62, 64. Elie Dobkowski, former Deputy Commissar General of the Central Jewish Commissariat, maintained in 1926 that the assassination of Petliura was the work of the Bolsheviks. See his *Affaire Petliura-Schwarzbard* (Champigny 1927 [?]).

⁵Pogroms took on different forms at different times depending on the needs, objectives, and imagination of the perpetrators. As the word itself suggests, a pogrom was a purposeful devastation of property generally accompanied by beatings, rape, and massacres of innocent victims.

The collapse of the tsarist empire marked the triumph of social and national democracy in the Ukraine. The *Centralna Rada* (Central Council), which set itself up as the highest political organ in the country (March 17, 1917-April 29, 1918), initiated reforms that were progressive, enlightened, and democratic, even by the standards of our times.⁶ For the various national minorities in the Ukraine, the first truly significant act of the new Government was the proclamation of the Second Universal (Decree) on July 16, 1917, which established autonomy for the Ukrainian people and provided a status of complete equality for all minority groups.⁷ In accordance with the spirit of the Second Universal, the Government, which included Petliura as Secretary of Military Affairs, prepared the draft of a statute for the autonomous order in the Ukraine. This basic law (completed on July 29, 1917) provided that henceforth the national minorities (that is, Jews, Russians, and Poles) were to be directly represented in the General Secretariat (the executive branch of the government) through their chosen representatives who were to hold the position of Under-Secretaries. The Under-Secretaries were to enjoy full equality with the General Secretary for Nationalities in the area of their jurisdiction. From the point of view of the legal status of minorities under the new "Constitution," Article Twenty is of special significance. It provided that "all laws, administrative rules and decisions, published in the Ukrainian language, will also be published in Russian, Jewish, and Polish languages."⁸ The first Under-Secretary for Jewish Affairs in the

⁶The attitude of the Central *Rada* toward social, economic, minority, and other questions manifested itself as early as the resolution of April 19, 1917, in the First, Second, Third and Fourth Universals, in the Agrarian Law, and finally in the Constitution of the Ukrainian National Republic of April 29, 1918. For details see Doroshenko, Dmytro, *Istoriia Ukrainy 1917-1923* (New York 1954), vol. i, pp. 58-9, 89-92, 148-50, 177-81, 264-8, 285-9. (U).

⁷*Ukrainskaia Zhizn [Ukrainian Life]* (Moscow 1917), no. 3-6, pp. 149-51. (R) The sincerity of the Central *Rada* in promulgating the Second Universal was further emphasized by a series of articles in which its President, Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi, most emphatically rejected any mistaken notion that "the Ukraine was only for the Ukrainians." He clearly stated that the Ukraine was for everybody who was an inhabitant regardless of his ethnic origin. See Hrushevskyyi, Mykhailo, *Vilna Ukraina [The Free Ukraine]* (New York 1918), pp. 17-25. (U).

⁸For the "Constitution," or as it was known, "Statut Vyschchoho Upravlinnia," see Khrystiuk, Pavlo, *Zamitky i Materialy do Istorii Ukrainskoi Revoliutsii 1917-1920 [Notes and Materials on the History of the Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1920]* (Vienna 1921), vol. i, pp. 96-7. (U). In the fulfillment of this provision the Ukrainian currency also bore its inscription in the languages of these three major minority groups. See Schwarz, Solomon M., *The Jews in the Soviet Union* (Syracuse 1951), p. 83. For a good, concise treatment of the policies of the Ukrainian government toward the Jews, see Janowsky, Oscar L., *The Jews and Minority Rights, 1898-1919* (New York 1933), pp. 230-40.

newly-enlarged General Secretariat (sometimes referred to as *Mala Rada*) was Moshe Silberfarb.⁹ The Jewish community reacted favorably to these democratic measures and began to identify its interests with the Ukrainian cause.

The Russian Provisional Government, however, refused to recognize the Ukrainian demand for national autonomy, as it contradicted basic Russian centralist policies. Equally adverse to Ukrainian statehood were the Bolsheviks who overthrew the weak Kerensky regime. It is noteworthy that despite the inimical attitude of the Russian Provisional governments, the Ukrainian Central *Rada* continued to hope that eventually a democratic Russian republic would emerge which would become the base for a federation of free and equal states. So as not to prejudice the nature of the anticipated federal structure, the Central *Rada* was careful to avoid any unilateral decisions of fundamental significance before the convocation of the Russian Constituent Assembly. These utopian considerations of the Ukrainian Socialist parties which dominated the Central *Rada*, were dashed by the Bolshevik *coup* of November 7, 1917. This prompted the Ukrainian political leaders to assume a more independent attitude vis-à-vis Russia and to adopt more energetic measures in the realm of domestic affairs.¹⁰

This was in reality the meaning of the Third Universal which solemnly proclaimed the establishment of the Ukrainian People's Republic on November 20, 1917. For the national minorities, this Universal is a landmark of toleration in the Ukrainian struggle for independence. It declared that the Ukrainians, having gained freedom for themselves, would staunchly defend the freedom of national development for all people living in the Ukraine. "Therefore let it be known," the Third Universal affirmed, "that we recognize the right of the Russian, Jewish, Polish, and other people for national-personal autonomy in order to secure for themselves the right and freedom of self-rule in questions of national life."¹¹

Ukrainian Jewry, with but few exceptions, hailed the Third Universal as a fulfillment of its hopes and political aspirations. Indeed, it met the expectations of the Bund (the General Jewish Workers'

⁹For a summary of his activities see Silberfarb, Moshe, *Dos Jiddish Ministerium un di Jiddish Oitonomie in Ukraine* (Kiev, 1918); also his *Di Jiddish Oitonomie un der Natsionaler Sekretariat in Ukraine: Materialn un Dokumentn* (Kiev 1920).

¹⁰For a more detailed account of Ukrainian national aspirations see Borys, Jurij, *The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine* (Stockholm 1960), pp. 99-121.

¹¹For the full text of the Universal see Vynnychenko, Volodymyr, *Vidrodzhennia Natsii [Rebirth of a Nation]* (Vienna 1920), vol. ii, pp. 74-80. (U).

League) which, despite the quixotic internationalism of some of its activities, adopted a program in which the question of national-cultural autonomy figured prominently.¹²

Zionists of various shadings were equally satisfied with the declaration of the Ukrainian Government since it was consonant with their idea of "synthetic Zionism," which meant "a combination of the Palestine idea with the fight for national and cultural autonomy in the Diaspora."¹³

As a political action, granting national-personal autonomy to the Jewish community had no precedent in history, and as such constitutes one of the brightest pages in the Ukrainian Revolution. It speaks highly of the moral fiber and political vision of the Ukrainian leaders.¹⁴

On January 22, 1918, what had been essentially a promise became a reality: the Ukrainian Government unanimously adopted the Law of National-Personal Autonomy which was then formally announced in the official *Vistnyk Derzhavnykh Zakoniv* (*Journal of State Laws*).¹⁵ This was accompanied by a new wave of enthusiasm among the Ukrainian Jews. The Secretary for Jewish Affairs, Moshe Silberfarb, moved by the occasion, declared: "The Law which we have approved can be compared only with the acts of the great French Revolution. At that time the rights of men were promulgated, today the rights of nations have been proclaimed." The law was likewise praised by Moisei Rafes, the Bund representative. "This is an act of the greatest value, which is not to be found in any other country of Europe," he said. The Zionist leaders and those of the other Jewish parties expressed themselves in the same spirit.¹⁶

¹²Baron, Salo W. *The Russian Jew Under the Tsars and the Soviets* (New York 1964), p. 171. See also Rafes, M., *Ocherki' po istorii "Bunda"* [Outlines of the History of the Bund] (Moscow 1923), p. 270. (R).

¹³Dubnow, S. M., *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland* (Philadelphia 1920), vol. iii, pp. 144-5.

¹⁴It might be interesting to note that writing in 1945 Janowsky anticipated the solution of minority problems in eastern Europe by "national federalism," which is almost exactly what the Ukrainian government sought to implement from 1917 to 1921. See Janowsky, Oscar I., *Nationalities and National Minorities* (New York 1945), pp. 145-54, 166.

¹⁵Goldelman, S. I. *Zhidyvska Natsionalna Avtonomiia na Ukraini* [Jewish National Autonomy in the Ukraine]. Hereafter cited as ZNA. (Munich 1963), pp. 34-5. (U). For a contemporary Polish view see Jablonski, Henryk, *Polska Autonomia Narodowa na Ukrainie 1917-1918* [Polish National Autonomy in the Ukraine 1917-1918] (Warsaw 1948). (P).

¹⁶Tcherikower, L., *Antisemitizm i Pogromy na Ukrainye 1917-1918* (Berlin 1923), p. 73 (R). Indeed "the Ukraine was the first country of the world to introduce extra-territorial cultural autonomy for minority nationalities." Cf. Schwarz, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

The moment was unique and historic, but it came at the worst time. Accompanying the voices of jubilation were the anguished cries of pogrom victims. Eventually the latter drowned out the former as the population of the Ukraine, particularly the Jews, found themselves defenseless victims of the merciless caprice of innumerable marauders. The Ukraine became a land without pity.

The period of disorganization and anarchy was, if not precipitated, then certainly enhanced by the Bolshevik seizure of power. For the Ukraine, more than any other portion of the former tsarist empire, it bore tragic consequences. With the fall of Kerensky, the already demoralized troops left the front in ever greater numbers and roamed the countryside at will. Moving in large units, they became the terror of the civilian population. According to the distinguished Jewish historian Tcherikower, they carried out the first pogroms in the Ukraine. These troops were not exclusively Ukrainian or Russian, but more likely a cross section of multi-national Imperial Russia.¹⁷ In his well-documented work, Tcherikower wrote:

The frontline as well as the roads for the demobilized soldiery led through Jewish cities and towns which densely covered the Dnieper's right bank of the Ukraine. All the consequences of the willful demobilization and of the unsuccessful war fell first of all upon the Jewish population of the front area. . . . Anarchy seizes our country increasingly into its clutches. . . . The Jewish population finds itself in a particularly bad situation. People in soldiers' uniforms are plundering, devastating and burning. The horror that is suffered by the population is indescribable. The soldiers here call themselves Bolsheviks; they create terror and increase anarchy.¹⁸

According to Volodymyr Kedrovskiy, the former Chief Inspector of the Army of the Ukrainian Peoples' Republic, the first large-scale pogrom was perpetrated by the Russian Second Guard Corps

¹⁷Tcherikower, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50. Colonel Kedrovskiy refers to the ethnic composition and geographic distribution of the Imperial Russian army when he discusses the efforts of the Ukrainians to turn some of the army units into Ukrainian ones. Thus we find the number of Ukrainians on the northern front was sufficient (110,000) to Ukrainize an entire army corps, while in the Caucasus several battalions were Ukrainized. At the same time the so-called "Wild Division," made up mostly of people from the Caucasus, served on the southern Ukrainian (Rumanian) front. Cf. Kedrovskiy, Volodymyr, *1917 Rik [The Year 1917]* (Winnipeg 1967), vol. i, pp. 15, 225, 226. (U).

¹⁸Tcherikower, *op. cit.*, p. 50 ff. Nahum Gergel corroborates Tcherikower's report when he writes that the "first anti-Semitic excesses took place in the fall of 1917, . . . The starving soldiers who were deserting the front plundered Jewish settlements on their way. In some places there were excesses on the part of the Ukrainian peasants, but these were merely isolated cases." Cf. Gergel, Nahum, "Pogroms," *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia* (New York 1948), vol. viii, p. 561.

in the Podolia Province in November of 1917. In the course of that pogrom, seventeen Ukrainian villages were looted and completely destroyed.¹⁹ It is possible that some of these pogroms were not necessarily a product of general anarchy, but were rather centrally directed and politically motivated. A. E. Shiller, a lieutenant in the Russian Army, reports that they "were ordered to ruin and destroy . . . [the] Russian villages along the way, and to rob the helpless peasants of their last possessions." As could have been anticipated, the "order" bore tragic consequences for the civilian population against which it was directed. "The soldiers . . . lost all military semblance, strutted in crowds through the streets and unceremoniously broke up stores, entered private residences and robbed the inhabitants of their property."²⁰ In response to the increasing number of pogroms, Petliura, who was Secretary for Military Affairs, called upon the military to prevent future pogroms and disorders. "No pogroms should be permitted on our land," he said.²¹

What proved to be particularly important was the effect of the increasing violence on the progressive "radicalization of the operative forces of the revolution and its effect on the Ukrainian as well as the Jewish camp." The Ukrainians viewed the Jewish concern for a "one and indivisible Russia" with suspicion; it appeared to them as a lack of regard for the Ukraine despite the privileges the country gave them.²² The Jews, on the other hand, apprehensive of the growing national consciousness of the Ukrainian masses, remained either neutral during the initial phase of the Russo-Ukrainian struggle or eventually, in many cases, moved to the side of the enemies of Ukrainian statehood.²³ The deterioration of po-

¹⁹Kedrovskiy, V., "The Battle with the Pogroms in the Ukraine," *Svoboda [Liberty]*, (Jersey City, N.J.), no. 6, June 26, 1933, p. 2. (U).

²⁰Shiller, A.E. (Lieutenant), "An Officer's Experience With Bolshevism," *Current History*, vol. x (1919), no. 3, p. 514. (From the rest of the article, which is the first of twenty, it is obvious that the author really refers to Ukrainian villages.)

²¹Petliura Memorial Committee in America, *Symon Petliura: Statti, Lysty, Dokumenty [Symon Petliura: Articles, Letters, Documents]* (New York 1956), pp. 219-20. (U).

²²Goldelman, ZNA, pp. 30-1.

²³The Jewish attitude cannot be explained by any temporary disenchantment with the Ukrainians, but rather by the traditional inclination on the part of the Jews to side "with the Great-Russian culture as against the Ukrainian peasants and the handful of Ukrainian intellectuals who were striving to create a Ukrainian language and literature, and beginning to aspire to autonomy for their culture and their land. . . . Thus, almost unconsciously, most of the Jews of the cities of Poland, Lithuania and the Ukraine tended to become opponents of the national separation movements that arose during the breakup of the empire." Wolfe, Bertram D., *Three Who Made a Revolution* (New York 1964), pp. 182-3.

litical order, brought about by internal and external forces, deepened the chasm between the Ukrainian and Jewish population, a factor that henceforth figured prominently in the tragic history of both people.

The progressive alienation between the two groups during what one may consider the most promising period of Ukrainian statehood, was revealed with unprecedented clarity on January 24, 1918.²⁴ In a tense yet festive atmosphere, the Fourth Universal proclaimed that henceforth the Ukraine was the independent and sovereign republic of the people of the Ukraine. After the document was read confirming the right of national minorities to national-personal autonomy, the Ukrainian deputies of the Little (*Mala Rada*) found that the Jewish representatives did not share their sentiments. On the contrary, the representatives of the Bund, and the "Russians," who for the most part were Russified Jews, voted against the Universal, while the representatives of other Jewish parties abstained from voting altogether.²⁵ Thus, politically at least, the Ukrainians and the Jews parted company.

Reflecting upon those fateful days, Professor Solomon Goldelman stated that "the Ukrainian Revolution, and with it the Jewish national movement, both reached, together and with a certain interdependence, the realization of their highest national aspirations. However, the high point soon gave way to the beginning of a tragic process, a beginning of the movement into an abyss. The highest success turned into the beginning of the end."²⁶

The Bolshevik invasion of the Ukraine in January, 1918, prevented any possible stabilization of the deteriorating Jewish-Ukrainian relations. The advancing Bolsheviks drove the *Rada* out of the capital, forcing it into the arms of the Germans and Austrians who promised to aid the young republic in return for food supplies.²⁷ With the support of the Austrian and German armies, the *Centralna Rada* returned to Kiev only to be replaced several weeks later by the German-sponsored regime of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi. The eight-month rule of Skoropadskyi was a period of reaction to the preceding economic, social and national legislation of the *Centralna*

²⁴Although January 22, 1918 has entered Ukrainian history as the date when the Fourth Universal was proclaimed, it actually occurred on January 24th. See Zozulia, Yakiv, ed., *Velyka Ukrainaska Revoliutsiia* [The Great Ukrainian Revolution] (New York 1967), pp. 46-47, 73-77; also Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 103-06. (U).

²⁵Goldelman, *ZNA*, pp. 32-35.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 32.

²⁷For details of the agreement see Wheeler-Bennett, John W., *The Forgotten Peace: Brest-Litovsk* (New York 1939), pp. 392-402.

Rada. As early as July 18, 1918, the new regime annulled the law of National-Personal Autonomy for the minorities in the Ukraine.²⁸

The resultant popular dissatisfaction hastened the demise of the Hetman State. Under the leadership of the Directory, a temporary insurrectionary government consisting of Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Symon Petliura, Fedir Shvets, and Andrii Makarenko, launched a general uprising. The rebels were successful; the victorious army of the Directory entered Kiev on December 14, 1918. In the provinces, the popular armies were able to establish the rule of the Directory even earlier.²⁹

During those stormy days, Vynnychenko and Petliura emerged as the representatives of Ukrainian aspirations for political independence. Although both belonged to the Social Democratic Party, they differed markedly in their approach to certain basic problems. Vynnychenko, a utopian socialist, emphasized the primacy of the socio-economic factors in the revolutionary struggle. Consequently he was torn between national interests and his quixotic brand of socialist idealism—a factor that may, at least partially, explain inconsistencies in Vynnychenko's political life.³⁰

Petliura, on the other hand, sought the realization of his ideals of social justice and equality within an independent Ukrainian Republic. Thus he emphasized the practical side of the struggle for independence. This has led some observers to conclude erroneously that Petliura subscribed to extreme nationalism with its usual exclusive, discriminatory, and frequently intolerant tendencies. For lack of a better word in the English language one may, indeed, use the term "nationalist," but only in its most general connotation.³¹ In trying to comprehend Petliura's political thought, one comes

²⁸Goldelman, *ZNA*, p. 47.

²⁹*Die Deutsche Okkupation der Ukraine: Geheimdokumente* (Strasbourg 1937), p. 15.

³⁰There is no study which explains the many-sided nature of that extremely talented and active man. The works which offer us the best insight into his political ideas are his *Vidrodzhennia Natsii* [*Rebirth of a Nation*] (Vienna 1920), 3 vols. (U); and his novel *Nova Zapovid* [*New Commandment*] (Neu-Ulm 1950). (U). In 1953 the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences published a book in New York entitled *Voldymyr Vynnychenko* which commemorated his activities.

³¹As an active member of the Ukrainian Social Democracy, Petliura was conscious of the dangers of rising nationalism. Therefore as early as January, 1906, he cautioned the Galician Ukrainians against excessive zeal in emphasizing the purely nationalist elements in the struggle for social justice. Observing the prevalent conditions, he said that the rule of the bourgeois-nobility "awakens nationalist-chauvinist feelings not only in the dominant nation, the Poles, but in the subjugated as well. Because of this," said Petiura, "the party must fight through verbal and literary propaganda against the development of chauvinism." See *Symon Petiura: Statti, Lysty, Dokumenty*, p. 208.

closer to the truth by realizing that he was first and foremost a "Samostiinyk," (Independentist), that is, one who regarded national independence as the *sine qua non* for fulfillment of all other aims. Their differences notwithstanding, Petliura and Vynnychenko were both devoted champions of popular democracy.³²

In accordance with this underlying tenet of their political faith, Vynnychenko, Petliura, and other members of the Directory readily accepted Professor Goldelman's suggestion that national-personal autonomy for the minorities of the Ukraine be renewed.³³ It is significant that the Directory decided to act on this important matter while the uprising was still in progress. As early as December 10, 1918, it issued the Decree reestablishing national-personal autonomy which became law by the unanimous decision of the Council of Ministers on January 24, 1919. Thus despite the conspicuous absence of the Jews in the anti-Skoropadskyi uprising, the Jewish population received its much cherished status within the Ukrainian Republic at the suggestion of Solomon Goldelman, the only prominent Jew who actively supported the cause of Ukrainian independence.³⁴

In view of Petliura's growing prominence, the Judeophile attitude on the part of the Ukrainian Government is not at all surprising. As a champion of equality and a tribune of the downtrodden, Petliura displayed a lively interest in the Jewish problem. Even as a boy, according to his classmate Ivan Rudychiv, he defended the Jews against the abuses of the other students. For this he was called "the Jewish father."³⁵ Professor Fedir Shcherbyna, who employed Petliura when he was ousted from the seminary, reported that the young Petliura always displayed sympathy for the Jews.³⁶ As a

³²Livvytska-Kholodna, Nataliia, Ivasyshyn, Zakhar, Zubenko, Artem, eds., *Symon Petliura: Derzhavnyi Muzh* [Symon Petliura: Man of a Nation] (New York 1957), pp. 89-90. (U).

³³Professor Solomon Goldelman, an active and prominent member of Ukrainian Jewry, was elected to the *Centralna Rada*. During the uprising against Skoropadskyi, he accepted the post of Secretary of Labor. Subsequently, until Abraham Revutsky became Minister of Jewish Affairs, Goldelman was also acting Secretary of Nationalities. Today Goldelman lives in Jerusalem and is the author of more than twenty-five books and articles dealing with Jewish history.

³⁴Goldelman, *ZNA*, pp. 58, 71-3, 92. For details of the Law and the Statute of the Jewish Community Self-Government see The Ukrainian Information Bureau, *Materials Concerning Ukrainian-Jewish Relations During the Years of the Revolution, 1917-1921* (Munich 1956), pp. 78-102.

³⁵See Rudychiv, I., "Memories of Symon Petliura," p. 7, an unpublished manuscript, The Ukrainian Museum-Archive, South Bound Book, New Jersey. also Zhuk, Andrii, ed., *Symon Petliura v Molodosti* [Symon Petliura in His Youth] (Lviv 1936), pp. 8-9. (U).

³⁶*Symon Petliura: Derzhavnyi Muzh*, pp. 139-40.

young revolutionary in 1905, Petliura denounced the oppression of one nation by another. Referring to the plight of the Jews, he opposed the discriminatory policies of the Russian government regarding settlement and education when Jewish children were not admitted to school on the basis of equality with the children of other groups.³⁷

Probably the most eloquent plea of Petliura on behalf of the Jews was made in his preface to Chirikov's play, *The Jews*, published in Kiev in 1907. "The suffering of Nachman in the *The Jews* by Chirikov," said Petliura, "will evoke a profound sympathy in everyone even if he does not belong to this nation whose historical destiny has been to carry the heavy cross of oppression and violence . . . And even if not everyone will agree with the thoughts of Nachman, that the precise medicine he wants to use to heal the wounds of his people will produce the desired results, nevertheless, he will perceive the necessity to pour the healing balm on these wounds."³⁸

The restoration of autonomy to the Jewish community was more than a gesture by the leading members of the Ukrainian Government. It was also a political act which aimed at establishing an understanding and, hopefully, Jewish-Ukrainian cooperation. The former leader of the Bund, Moisei Rafes, wrote that "one of the favorite ideas of Petliura as well as of many other Ukrainian nationalists was always the idea of creating an alliance of the Ukrainian and Jewish democracies. To put the Jewish intelligentsia and the merchant class in the service of the Ukrainian state idea meant to them saving 'independence'. . . . On the eve of the overthrow of the Hetman state Petliura spoke of his passionate desire to realize this alliance."³⁹

The efforts of the Directory were not rewarded to the extent expected, however, since only a few of the Jews decided to join with the Ukrainians. Some, realizing that the trend was not to be reversed and that the Ukraine, having proclaimed her independence, would not revert to the previous autonomous status, entered the government as early as April, 1918.⁴⁰ Others, particularly the Bundist, remained adamant in their opposition to Ukrainian independence, even after the restoration of autonomous rights to the Jews. The occasional anti-Jewish excesses during the uprising and

³⁷Symon Petliura: *Statti, Lysty, Dokumenty*, p. 202.

³⁸Chirikov, E., *Evrei* [The Jews] (Kiev 1907), p. XVI.

³⁹Rafes, M. G., *Dva Goda Revolutsii na Ukraine* [Two Years of Revolution in the Ukraine] (Moscow 1920), p. 133. (R).

⁴⁰Goldelman, *ZNA*, pp. 45-6.

the seemingly victorious march of communism to world leadership, pushed the Jewish socialists into the Russian camp. Some joined the purely Russian national cause in order to reestablish a "one and undivided Russia."⁴¹ Commenting on the political loyalties of Ukrainian Jewry, Arnold Margolin, a distinguished jurist and Jewish civic leader, stated: "But a fact remains a fact. . . Jews were prominently represented in the ranks of the Bolsheviki and at the beginning, in the ranks of Denikin's army. The Ukrainian movement, on the contrary, attracted but a handful of Jews."⁴² Whatever the actual statistics, there can be no doubt that Jewish actions heavily influenced Jewish-Ukrainian relations.

The question of minorities became particularly acute in the Ukrainian Republic's struggle for survival, which, in reality began at the moment the Directory triumphed over Skoropadskyi. As early as December, 1918, various Bolshevik military groups appeared in the southeast and, together with some peasant bands, began to fight the troops loyal to the Directory. The Bolshevik invasion of the Ukraine was successful. Their troops steadily pressed upon the retreating forces of the Directory until they captured Kiev on February 6, 1919.⁴³

In the course of its retreat the army of the Directory melted away; by the end of January, Petliura was left with little more than 21,000 men. Professor Arthur Adams suggested that this could have been prevented only if swift and competent measures had been taken to transform the many partisan bands into military units obedient to a central command.⁴⁴ Since Petliura did not initiate these meas-

⁴¹*Ibid.*, pp. 79-80. These circumstances go far to explain the explosive situation the Directory encountered upon entering Kiev. See Vynnychenko, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 201.

⁴²Margolin, Arnold D., *The Jews of Eastern Europe* (New York 1926), p. 130. Arnold D. Margolin was a man of high ideals and great strength of character, who was not afraid to face adversity. He was born in Kiev in 1877 and received his high school and university education there. In 1900 he was awarded a law degree from the St. Volodymyr Kiev University. As a member of the Russian bar, Margolin represented Jews in numerous pogrom trials. In 1911-1913 he participated in the Beiliss ritual murder trial. Margolin also compiled a distinguished record as a civic leader. From 1905-1917 he was secretary-general of the South Russian Branch of the Union for the Achievement of Equal Rights for the Jews. Between 1906-1918 he was a founder, secretary-general, and later the president of the Jewish Territorial Organization. For details of his activities see "Arnold Margolin," *Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, (New York 1942), vol. vii, p. 353; see also the special issue devoted to the memory of Arnold Margolin of *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy* (New York 1959), vol. vii, pp. 1671-94.

⁴³For details see Antonov-Ovseenko, Vladimir A., *Zapiski o Grazhdanskoi Voine* [Notes on the Civil War] (Moscow 1932), vol. iii, pp. 11-5, 26, 155-7. (R).

⁴⁴Adams, Arthur E., *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: The Second Campaign, 1918-1919* (New Haven, Conn. 1963), pp. 78-9, 112.

ures, perhaps due to lack of time, the various "otamans" and "batky," who were previously engaged in the popular anti-Hetman cause declared themselves independent. As a result, the military engaged in an orgy of abuse in various localities. The "otamans" and commanders terrorized the population, particularly the Jews.⁴⁵

It seemed that in 1919 the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse galloped through the Ukraine spreading war, famine, pestilence, and death. According to Richard Pipes, the entire area "fell into innumerable regions isolated from each other and the rest of the world, dominated by armed bands of peasants or free booters who looted and murdered with utter impunity." Pipes wrote:

In Kiev itself governments came and went, edicts were issued, cabinet crises were resolved, diplomatic talks were carried on—but the rest of the country lived its own existence where the only effective regime was that of the gun. . . . Throughout the Ukraine there appeared bands of peasant partisans who attacked estates, robbed and killed the Jewish inhabitants, and from time to time launched bold forays on large cities. The whole country was for the larger part at their mercy.⁴⁶

In the stormy sea of violence and unrest that was the Ukraine of 1919, no one was safe. Professor Oleksander Shulhyn described it as one gigantic pogrom of the entire Ukraine.⁴⁷ The only effective recourse left to Jews and Gentiles alike was to organize military units of self-defense.⁴⁸ Petliura realized that his small army was not equal to the task of fighting on three different fronts and keeping order in the country as well. He, therefore, favored the organization of Jewish self-defense units. Unfortunately, the parties of the Jewish left, particularly the powerful Bund, opposed such arrangements, thus leaving many Jewish communities completely defenseless.⁴⁹

The general deterioration of the social and political fabric, accompanied by the defeat and demoralization of the Ukrainian army,

⁴⁵For details concerning the anarchy in the hinterland of the Directory see Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 105-08.

⁴⁶Pipes, Richard, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*, (Cambridge, Mass. 1954), p. 137. See also Krasny, Pinhas, *Tragedia Ukrain-skogo Yevreistva [The Tragedy of Ukrainian Jewry]* (Kharkov 1928), pp. 2-3 (R).

⁴⁷Tryzub, October 25, 1927, no. 5, p. 2. (U).

⁴⁸Mazepa, Isaak, *Ukraina v Ohni i Buri Revoliutsii [Ukraine in the Fire and Storm of a Revolution]* (Munich 1950), vol. ii, p. 224. (U).

⁴⁹Ivanys, Vasyl, *Symon Petliura—Prezydent Ukrainy, 1879-1926* (Toronto 1952), pp. 155-7. (U). The Bundists also opposed the creation of Jewish self-defense units on ideological grounds. One of them, for example, suggested that the Jewish soldiers, who would take upon themselves the role of defense of the Jewish communities, might eventually become "a Jewish military aristocracy." See Tcherikower, *op. cit.*, pp. 85, 87, 213, 217, 230.

released an undercurrent of resentment and prejudice against the Jewish population. Jews became the scapegoats for the suffering of all the people. This, in reality, forms the background for the genesis of Jewish pogroms in the Ukraine during the period of the Revolution and Civil War.

In many ways the tragedy that befell the Jews of the Ukraine was the fruit of past Russian policy. Particularly from the early 1880's, antisemitism had been a hallmark of the Imperial internal administration. To take the wind out of the sails of the revolutionary movement, the tsarist government maintained that the agitation and clandestine activity was the work of the Jews. With the support of the Russian Imperial government, various organizations waged a campaign of hatred against the Jewish population.⁵⁰ The tsarist Judeophobia reached its zenith during the reign of Nicholas II. The tsar not only accepted an honorary membership for himself and his son in the "Soiuz Ruskago Naroda" (the League of the Russian people), popularly known as "The Black Hundreds," but also contributed 12,239,000 rubles from his private purse for the publication and dissemination of antisemitic literature.⁵¹

This literature was distributed primarily in the Pale of Settlement, that is, in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Lithuania. The efforts of the Black Hundreds bore fruit since there were always peasants who resented the city people (who for the most part were either Russians or Jews), for their monopoly of power and property in the Ukraine.⁵²

The rural-urban antipathy emerged with a new intensity in 1918-1920. The socio-economic alienation, a determining factor in the previous outbursts of violence, was further aggravated by the change in the political situation in the east.⁵³ During their struggle for independence, especially from the fall of 1918, the Ukrainians, who drew their support predominantly from the villages, found most of the cities hostile to their cause. Therefore, when the village, taking advantage of the existing chaos, asserted itself, it sought out the proverbial scapegoat—the Jew—who allegedly was responsible for the misfortunes of their country. Traditionally, the Jew was characterized as an exploiter and speculator. Now, more timely

⁵⁰Dubnow, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 31 ff.

⁵¹Baron, *op. cit.*, pp. 67, 74.

⁵²Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. Statistical data can also be found in Dushnyck, Walter, ed., *Ukrainians and Jews: A Symposium* (New York 1966), pp. 48-50.

⁵³Tcherikower, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

and more dangerous accusations were added. Now, Jews were identified with communism.⁵⁴

In his excellent study on the Ukrainian turmoil, Professor Adams, analyzing the attitude of the peasants toward the Jews, concluded that:

Urban Jewish Communists sent to the villages excited vicious passions of anti-semitism, and all in a moment hatred of the city and the Jew became hatred of communism. In the peasant brain, Jew and city man and Communist coalesced into an image of a hook-nosed commissar who deprived peasants of land rightfully theirs, enforced grain requisitioning, confiscated movable property and weapons, and carried out the Cheka's execution.⁵⁵

Under these circumstances, fighting and murdering Jews became synonymous with the anti-Bolshevik struggle.⁵⁶

To be sure equating Jews with Bolshevism was not only unfair, but a gross oversimplification of a complex problem. After all, there were Jews in Denikin's ranks who fought against the Bolsheviks, while some of the most distinguished Jews supported Petliura in his fight for Ukrainian independence. There was also a large block of Ukrainian Jewry that chose to remain neutral.

Nevertheless, great numbers of politically-active Jews, especially the youth, joined the Bolsheviks, whose determination, revolutionary zeal, and internationalism they found particularly attractive. Professor Leonard Schapiro, who has studied the role of the Jews in the revolutionary movement, concluded that Jewish participation on all levels of party organization was very significant. Of the twenty-one full members of the Central Committee, five were Jews—among them Trotsky and Sverdlov. What was perhaps even more significant was the heavy participation of Jews in the lower echelons of the organization. According to Schapiro, "Jews abounded at the lower levels of the party machinery—especially in the *Cheka*," and if anyone "had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the *Cheka* he stood a very good chance of finding himself confronted with and possibly shot by a Jewish investigator."⁵⁷

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

⁵⁵Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

⁵⁶For a good account of how the various "Batky" (band chieftains) used antisemitic propaganda to justify their acts of banditry see Heifetz, Elias, *The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919* (New York 1921), pp. 57-83. The book as a whole could have been more useful had the author been able to restrain the strong anti-Ukrainian prejudice which dominates most of this work.

⁵⁷Schapiro, Leonard, "The Role of the Jews in the Russian Revolutionary Movement," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, vol. xi (December 1961), pp. 164-5.

Taken together, the historical, social, economic, and political sources of animosity between the Ukrainian and Jewish populations of the Ukraine, augmented by the Bolshevik agitation, created an explosive situation which expressed itself in tragic pogroms.⁵⁸ The unscrupulous "otamans" and "batky" exploited the situation for their own ends, catering to the base instincts of their followers and encouraging them in their criminal activity. In the chaos they helped to create, these peasant leaders established themselves as absolute masters reminiscent of Chinese war lords, with all the concomitant evils of their regimes.⁵⁹

The position of the Directory was desperate. In addition to the internal turmoil, it was forced to fight against three armies converging from different directions, each of which was larger and better-equipped than the army of Petliura. Because of the fluid military situation, the government moved frequently from one place to another, often carrying out its functions from railroad cars.⁶⁰ Its authority extended but a few miles from army headquarters; elsewhere the government exercised only nominal jurisdiction.⁶¹

In the face of what appeared to be imminent disaster, Petliura continued the struggle for independence without, however, abandoning the ideals of democracy. After Vynnychenko's resignation as the head of the Directory and Petliura's election to that post on May 9, 1919, he had a free hand in pursuing his objectives.⁶²

As was noted earlier, almost as soon as it came into existence, the Directory took a positive stand on Jewish participation in the political life of the Ukraine. Aside from granting a privileged status to the Jewish community, the Directory also gave the Jews an equal opportunity to serve in the Ukrainian Government. As a result, we find Jews occupying several ministerial posts, some held important positions in the Ukrainian foreign service, and over two hundred others held lesser posts.⁶³ In accordance with the principle

⁵⁸The Bolsheviks were interested in spreading anarchy and expended great efforts in infiltrating the army of Petliura. See Pipes, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁶⁰See Reshetar, John S. Jr., *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920* (Princeton 1952), p. 267.

⁶¹Fedenko, Panas, *Ukrainskyi Rukh u XX Stolitti* [Ukrainian Movements in the Twentieth Century] (London 1959), p. 183. (U).

⁶²Yakovliv, Andrii, *Osnovy Konstytutsii U.N.R.* [The Fundamentals of the Constitution of the U.N.T.] (New York 1964), pp. 26-7. (U).

⁶³See Goldelman, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-3, 98; also Margolin, *Arnold Ukraina i Politika Antanty: Zapiski Yevreia i Grazhdanina* [The Ukraine and the Politics of the Entente: Notes of a Jewish Citizen] (Berlin 1922), pp. 105-7. (R).

of social equality, Petliura ordered that Jews be admitted to the officer candidate school.⁶⁴

Equally enlightened was the attitude of the Directory towards Jewish educational needs. At the suggestion of Abraham Revutsky [Revusky], the Minister of Jewish Affairs, the Government passed a law placing all Jewish schools and educational establishments under his jurisdiction. The law also provided that the Government designate one-ninth of its educational budget specifically for Jewish education.⁶⁵

Professor Mark Wischnitzer, a distinguished Jewish historian and journalist who observed Jewish life at firsthand in the Ukraine, declared:

The Jews in Ukraine have the most extended national rights. The Jewish language is officially recognized, a Jewish ministry has been able to develop its activity, Jewish congregations have been able to thrive in freedom, and new Jewish schools have grown up. In the newly founded University of Kamenetz Podolsk, the government has established a professor's chair for Jewish history and literature, and hereby the national rights of the Jewish people have been still more emphasized.⁶⁶

The Judeophile policy of the Directory, which included an active struggle against the anti-Jewish pogroms, was unpopular. However, Petliura, Vynnychenko, and other prominent Ukrainian revolutionary leaders refused to abandon their principles for the sake of popularity. They continued to fight against the anti-Jewish excesses. Unfortunately, due to the limited resources of the Directory, their efforts were not successful. Consequently, the looting, raping, and murder of the Jewish population continued unabated throughout the spring of 1919. The Government appeared helpless. After the particularly brutal pogrom at Proskurov carried out by troops of the Directory, the Deputy foreign Minister, Arnold Margolin, resigned his post in protest.⁶⁷ In his letter of March 11, 1919, to

⁶⁴*Dokument Sudovoi Pomylyky [Document of Judicial Error]* (Paris 1958), p. 53; also *Tryzub* (October 1927), no. 4, p. 3.

⁶⁵Goldelman, *ZNA*, p. 91.

⁶⁶Batchinsky, Julian; Margolin, Dr. Arnold, Wischnitzer, Dr. Mark, Zangwill, Israel; *The Jewish Pogroms in the Ukraine* (Washington, D.C. 1919), pp. 22-3.

⁶⁷The Proskurov pogrom of February 15, 1919 was provoked by the Bolsheviks, who with the support of the Jewish population, started an uprising against the troops loyal to the Directory. After the insurrection was put down, the self-appointed commandant of Proskurov, Otaman Semesenko, ordered a general pogrom against the entire Jewish population of the city. For this crime he was arrested and executed in May, 1920. See *Tragediia Dvokh Narodiv [The Tragedy of Two Nations]* (Zakordonna Delegatsiia USDR: Prague 1928), pp. 55-6. (U). For a comprehensive report on

Kost Matsievich, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Margolin explained the Government's inability to cope with the forces unleashed by the revolution:

The heavy, responsible task which rests on all members of the government is now further complicated by the tragic fact that the Jewish pogroms do not cease, and by the realization that the administration has proved powerless to check the terrible violence and murders which took place in Proskurov, Ananiev, etc. I well know that the government does all that is in its power to fight the pogroms. I also know the helplessness of all its members. . . My own sufferings as a Jew, however, are further intensified by the consciousness that the results of the anarchy from which the other elements of the population suffer in the main only economically, prove dangerous and fatal to the very existence of the Jewish people.⁶⁸

Two months later, Margolin reaffirmed the statements of his letter of resignation. In an interview with the representative of the London *Jewish Chronicle*, he stated emphatically that "the Ukrainian Government has steadfastly set its face against the pogroms, and it has had no part in, or responsibility for them."⁶⁹ A similar view was expressed by Tcherikower who thought that the Ukrainian Government fought against the anti-Jewish wave of violence with all the means at its disposal. However, he thought it was well beyond the capacity of the Directory to master the stormy situation.⁷⁰

As the Ukrainian-Bolshevik front stabilized, the position of the new government of Premier Borys Martos became more tenable.⁷¹ Under the changed conditions the government undertook a series of measures which provided some security for the population, particularly the Jews, in the territory that the Directory controlled.

The first vital act of the Government which was aimed at protecting the Jewish population against violence, was its proclamation of April 12, 1919. It stated:

the origins of the Proskurov pogrom and the role of the Bolsheviks see Heifetz, *op. cit.*, pp. 40 ff, 202; Gusev-Orenburgskii, S.I., *Bagrovaia Kniga: Pogromy 1919-20 g.g. na Ukraine* [The Red Book: Pogroms in the Ukraine 1912-1920] (Kharkov 1922), pp. 7, 42; Alekseev (Nebutev), Iv., *Iz Vospominanii Levogo Esera; Podpolnaia Rabota na Ukraine* [Memories of a Leftist Social Revolutionary: Underground Activity in the Ukraine 1912-1920] (Moscow 1922) (R); Lysiuk, Kalenyk, *V Oboroni Ukrainskoi Pravdy* [In Defense of Ukrainian Truth] (Ontario, California 1964), pp. 21-7. (U).

⁶⁸Margolin, A., *The Jews of Eastern Europe*, p. 143.

⁶⁹*The Jewish Chronicle* (London) May 16, 1919, p. 16.

⁷⁰See Tcherikower, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-3.

⁷¹Petliura instructed Borys Martos to form a cabinet with the participation of the Socialist Parties. This signaled the return of the Social Democratic Party to a position of power. See Reshetar, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-7.

The Ukrainian Government will fight with all its power against violations of public order, will strike the brigands and pogrom instigators with the severest punishment and expose them publicly. Above all the Government will not tolerate any pogroms against the Jewish population in the Ukraine, and will employ every available means for the purpose of combating these abject criminals.⁷²

The following day, the High Command strengthened the Government's stand by ordering that all troops involved in pogrom agitation among the Cossacks be arrested and immediately turned over to an extraordinary court.⁷³

It should be noted that the ultimate responsibility for the anti-pogrom orders rested with Petliura. His detractors maintain that his anti-pogrom legislation was only intended to create a favorable impression in the west. This position is completely untenable and unjustifiable in view of the available evidence. There is but one way in which we can evaluate anybody's behavior and motivation, and that is by following the Aristotelian principle of *agere sequitur esse*, (the action follows upon being) or the biblical "by their fruits ye shall know them." What other yardstick is there to measure the true motives of a man besides his acts?

The fight of the Directory against pogroms and various forms of excesses proceeded along several lines. Petliura realized that the rank and file of his army included elements of the old Black Hundreds, as well as others more recently infected with antisemitism.⁷⁴ Therefore, it became obvious to Petliura that in order to provide security for the Jewish population, he had to reform the army. He accomplished this important objective in the course of May and June, 1919. During that time, when Petliura's army was in relative security in Galicia, various unreliable volunteer units were disbanded while others were integrated into the regular army.⁷⁵ As a result of these measures, the army was diminished in numbers, but it became more dependable and effective.

To help complete the reorganization of the army and to re-educate it, ensure discipline, and stop pogromist propaganda as well as actual pogroms, Petliura created a State Military Inspectorate with

⁷²Material Concerning Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, p. 52.

⁷³Margolin, *Ukraina i Politika Antanty*, pp. 389-90.

⁷⁴Goldelman, Solomon, *Lysty Zhydivskoho Sotsial-Demokrata pro Ukrainu: Materiialy do Istorii Ukrainsko-Zhydivskykh Vidnosyn Za Chas Revoliutsii* [Letters of a Jewish Social-Democrat Concerning the Ukraine: Material for the History of Ukrainian-Jewish Affairs During the Revolution] (Vienna 1921), pp. 20, 40. (U).

⁷⁵Tragediia Dvokh Narodiv, p. 57; *Zbirnyk Pamiaty Symona Petliury* [Symposium in Memory of Simon Petliura] (Prague 1930), pp. 74, 93, 140-1.

Colonel Volodymyr Kedrovskiy at its head.⁷⁶ The new institutions justified Petliura's expectations. Through the network of the Inspectorate, the Government was able to achieve some success against the antisemitic outbreaks. The Ministry of Jewish Affairs was particularly impressed by the dedication of Kedrovskiy in discharging his duties as Chief Inspector.⁷⁷

The Directory took another significant step in combating violence and anarchy when, on May 27, 1919, it approved the law concerning the establishment of an Extraordinary Commission for investigating anti-Jewish pogroms. The law empowered the Commission to investigate the pogroms that had occurred as well as the antisemitic propaganda in the Ukraine. It was also empowered to turn over to a special Military Court those found guilty of participation in pogroms. Of particular significance was the provision that the Jewish population would be directly represented on the Commission.⁷⁸

Simultaneously the Government sought to render assistance to the victims of the pogroms. Although short of funds for the conduct of state business, its army ill-equipped, poorly-clothed, and hungry, the Directory spent millions in aiding the Jewish population in areas where pogroms had taken place.⁷⁹

Since sporadic excesses continued to occur even after these measures were taken, Petliura persisted in combating them with all the means available to him. In his circular telegram of early July, 1919, which appeared in the official *Journal of the Ukrainian Peoples' Republic*, he tried to convince the Ukrainian population and his army that the Jews were not only sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause, but were in fact actively fighting for it. He also encouraged the Cossacks to organize special units for the defense of Jewish life and property.⁸⁰ His intention was obvious; Petliura wanted to counter the propaganda that the Jews were enemies of Ukrainian statehood.

Even more important was Petliura's order to his troops of August 26, 1919:

⁷⁶The Inspectorate was formally introduced into the Ukrainian Army by the division of the government on May 13, 1919. The author was fortunate to work in the personal archives of Col. Kedrovskiy who lives in Metuchen, New Jersey. These archives offer the best sources for the organization and work of the Inspectorate.

⁷⁷Margolin, *Ukraina i Politika Antanty*, p. 288; Goldelman, *ZNA*, p. 97.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 273; Goldelman, *Lysty pro Ukrainu*, p. 54; *Tragediia Dvokh Narodiv*, pp. 57-8.

⁷⁹For a detailed record of the Directory's contribution to the Jewish communities see *Documents sur les Pogromes en Ukraine et L'Assassinat de Simon Petliur á Paris* (Paris 1927), pp. 173-82.

⁸⁰Margolin, *Ukraina i Politika Antanty*, pp. 273-4.

. . . Officers and Cossacks! It is time to know that the Jews have, like the greater part of the other members of our Ukrainian population suffered from the horrors of the bolshevist-communist invasion and follow the way to the truth. The best Jewish groups such as the 'Bounde,' the 'Unified,' the 'Poaley-Sion' and the 'Folks Party' have willingly placed themselves at the disposal of the sovereign and independent Ukraine and cooperate with us.

It is time to learn that the peaceable Jewish population, its women, its children, have been imprisoned in the same way as ours and deprived of national liberty. The population has lived with us for centuries and divides [shares] our pleasures and sorrows.

The chivalrous troops who bring fraternity, equality, and liberty to all the nations of Ukrainia [sic] must not listen to the invaders and the provocators who hunger for human blood. They cannot either remain indifferent in the face of the tragic fate of the Jews. He who becomes an accomplice to such crimes is a traitor and an enemy of our country, and he must be placed beyond the pale of human society. . . .

. . . I expressly order you to drive away with your arms all who incite you to pogroms and bring them before the courts as enemies of the state. And the tribunal will judge them for their acts and the most severe penalties of the law will be inflicted on all those found guilty.⁸¹

According to reliable contemporary testimony, the numerous appeals and orders of Petliura and his government were not a mere smoke screen behind which the criminal elements were free to ply their trade. On the contrary, they reflected the real policy and actions of the Directory. Colonel Oleksander Dotsenko, who was Petliura's adjutant, reported that four Ukrainians were executed near Kiev for their part in pogroms. Similarly, an officer named Mishchuk and several Cossacks were executed after the pogrom at Rajhorod. The Colonel also confirmed the execution of the notorious Otaman Semesenko.⁸²

Colonel Kedrovskiy, who was in a position to know, informs us that in Smotrych (Volhynia) alone, fourteen Cossacks were exe-

⁸¹For the full text of Petliura's Order No. 131, see *Eastern Europe* (Paris, November 1919), pp. 149-50; Khrystiuk, vol. iv, pp. 167-8; also Committee of the Jewish Delegations, *The Pogroms in the Ukraine under the Ukrainian Government 1917-1920* (London 1927), pp. 214-5. In his appeal to the Ukrainian Army issued on August 27th, Petliura again tried to convey the idea that the basis of Ukrainian statehood should be the cooperation of the democratic forces of all nationalities of the Ukraine. He also reminded his soldiers that pogrom agitators would be punished by death. See Margolin, *Ukraina i Politika Antanty*, p. 276. For all the subsequent orders of Petliura, including the execution orders of those guilty of pogroms without the usual court procedure, see *Ibid.*, 285-6, 289-93.

⁸²*Tryzub*, October 26, 1927, p. 2; *Dokument Sudovoi Pomylky*, pp. 52, 88.

cuted for participating in a pogrom.⁸³ Elsewhere, for example in Oryny and Kytajhorod, and in Talny and Vakhnivka, others found guilty of violence suffered the same fate.⁸⁴

Arnold Margolin also reports numerous executions for participation in pogroms. Particularly instructive is the following testimony:

Finally, there is in my hands an officially attested copy of the sentence passed by a special military court on August 22, 1920 in the case of Varyvan Vynnyk who was accused of inflicting wounds upon Yossel Aster in the village of Zalukivtsi (near Stanislau, Galicia), which endangered his life. The case was tried behind closed doors. The court condemned Vynnyk's action as "inhuman" and sentenced him to death by shooting. The same day the sentence was executed.⁸⁵

The active and resolute struggle of the Directory against pogroms and all kinds of inflammatory agitation was partially effective. Notable results in combating anarchy were achieved in the period of June-October 1919.⁸⁶ This led Solomon Goldelman to conclude that the situation had improved to the point where "Otaman Petliura will be the real military authority which will determine the behavior of the subordinate commanders and the army, and not vice versa."⁸⁷

The efforts of the Directory in combating violence against the Jewish population were recognized and acclaimed by Jews and Gentiles alike. In recognition thereof the meeting of the Podolian Province and the City Committees of the Poale Zion, held on August 26, 1919, in Kamenets Podolski adopted a unanimous resolution favoring Jewish participation in the Ukrainian Government, which asserted that "the Government and the Supreme Command fight resolutely against pogroms."⁸⁸

The general amelioration of conditions was followed by a progressive Jewish-Ukrainian *rapprochement*. Since the summer of 1919, numerous delegations of the Jewish communities and representatives of various political parties met with Petliura and expressed

⁸³Kedrovskyi, V., "Borotba Z Pohromamy," *Svoboda* 1933, no. 11, p. 2.

⁸⁴*Tragediia Dvokh Narodiv*, p. 58. In an interview for the *London Jewish Chronicle*, Dr. Jacole Bernstein-Cohen alluded to the execution of thirteen officers and the arrest of five others who were involved in organizing massacres. Cf. American Jewish Congress, *The Massacres and Other Atrocities Committed Against the Jews in Southern Russia* (New York 1920), p. 61.

⁸⁵*Material Concerning Ukrainian-Jewish Relations*, p. 38. For details concerning other executions and punishments see Margolin, *Ukraina i Politika Antanty*, pp. 280, 286-8.

⁸⁶Goldelman, *Lysty pro Ukrainu*, p. 7.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, p. 53; *Material Concerning Ukrainian-Jewish Relations*, p. 36.

their solidarity with and their support for the Ukrainian cause. Perhaps, the most impressive was the delegation of Kamenets Podolski which visited Petliura on July 17, 1919. Its members, representing the Jewish community (Dr. Meier Kleiderman), the rabbis (Gutman), the Zionists (Altman), the artisans (Jakob Kreis), the United Socialist Parties (Elias Bohrad), and the Paole Zion (Drachler), told Petliura "that all circles of the Jewish population were ready to defend, together with Ukrainian people, the independent Ukrainian State, strongly believing that only the Democratic Ukrainian Government can guarantee equality to the Jewish people."⁸⁹

Encouraged by this show of good faith by the Jewish community and anxious to secure the success of its efforts in combating pogroms, the Directory also took preventive measures. An outstanding example of this is the story of Reverend Volodymyr Klodnycky, who in 1962 received the Torch of Liberty Award from the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League for preventing a pogrom in Chmielnik in 1919.⁹⁰ According to Klodnycky, he was given a command consisting of one infantry battalion, a unit of calvary, a company of field *gendarmerie*, and a battery of artillery, which was to perform garrison duty in Chmielnik. He was particularly charged with the responsibility for preventing the pogrom which was threatening the town, which had a Jewish population of fifteen thousand.⁹¹ Klodnycky, at that time a major in the Ukrainian Army, succeeded admirably in preventing the imminent bloodshed and in pacifying the entire county of Lityn.⁹²

Petliura's efforts in combating pogroms produced a significant improvement in the position of Ukrainian Jewry. For this they

⁸⁹For details see Margolin, *Ukraina i Politika Antanty*, pp. 281-3; also Lewitzky, Wladimir and Specht, Gustav, ed., *Die Lage der Juden in der Ukraine: Eine Dokumentensammlung* (Berlin 1920), p. 60.

⁹⁰The author wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Klodnycky who assisted him with his personal archive and invaluable insights into Ukrainian-Jewish relations.

⁹¹The tension Major Klodnycky found upon entering Chmielnik was brought about, oddly enough, by the love of a peasant boy for a Jewish girl. The girl eloped with the boy to his village where she converted to Christianity and got married. The girl's father, to vent his anger, secretly came to the house of his son-in-law and set it on fire. A breeze carried the sparks to other houses and soon the entire village of straw-thatched houses burned to the ground. Since the peasants did not know exactly who was responsible for their misfortune, they accused the Jews of Chmielnik of the crime and threatened them with a pogrom.

⁹²For details see *Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 88th Congress, First Session*. Remarks by Senator Clifford P. Case and Congressman Cornelius E. Gallagher; also Klodnycky, Volodymyr, "My Service in the Ukrainian Galician Army," *Za Derzhavnist: Materialy do Istorii Viiska Ukrainshkoho* [For Statehood: Materials for the History of the Ukrainian Army] (Toronto 1966), vol. xi, pp. 73-91.

rewarded him with their confidence, and some became his loyal and active supporters in the fight for an independent Ukraine.⁹³ It was ironic that precisely at the time Petliura was lauded for his constructive work by numerous Jewish delegations, he was depicted abroad as an antisemite who stained his hands with Jewish blood. This was not accidental. The enemies of the Ukrainian state hoped to discredit the Ukrainian struggle for independence by tarnishing the good name of Petliura, the man who personified Ukrainian political ideals and aspirations.⁹⁴

Hoping to put an end to this offensive smear campaign, Petliura suggested through the Ukraine's representatives in Paris, that the various Jewish organizations appoint their members to a commission for the investigation of anti-Jewish pogroms in the Ukraine. The objective of the proposed commission would be to establish responsibility for criminal acts against the Jewish population.⁹⁵ Unfortunately the efforts of the Ukrainian Government remained unrewarded. The Committee of Jewish Delegations in Paris decided not to accept the invitation of the Ukrainian Government because "the anarchistic conditions, in which Ukraine finds herself, preclude," according to the Committee, "the possibility of examining on the spot and recreating the true picture of the pogroms." Dr. Margolin decried the Jewish refusal to take the opportunity offered to them by Petliura to sit in moral judgment over those responsible for the Jewish tragedy.⁹⁶

The only consolation to the Directory resulting from its efforts to form the commission came on October 20, 1919, in a letter from Israel Zangwill, the founder of the Jewish Territorial Organization. Although unable to represent his organization in the proposed

⁹³Goldelman thinks that the suffering the Jews endured during the few weeks of Bolshevik rule was also a factor in causing the Jews to shift to a pro-Ukrainian position. See his *ZNA*, p. 97.

⁹⁴According to Margolin, "the people abroad know much more about the pogroms of the 'Petliurovtsy' than they do about those of Denikin's army, although the latter were both more numerous and more terrible than the former. This can be explained not only by the propaganda of the reactionary 'United Russia' groups, who availed themselves of old connections and of their great resources in America and Western Europe, but also by the indubitable fact that the first series of pogroms was bound to attract the most attention." See *The Jews of Eastern Europe*, p. 131. For figures confirming Margolin's statement, see "The Tenth Anniversary of Denikin's Pogrom," *Zbirnyk Prats Yevreiskoi Istorychno-Arkheohrafichnoi Komisii* [Collection of Works of the Jewish Historical-Archaeological Commission] (Kiev 1929), vol. ii, p. 388. (U).

⁹⁵It should be noted that Petliura took the initiative in suggesting that a commission composed of Jews be organized; this suggests that he had nothing to fear or hide.

⁹⁶For details see Margolin, *Ukraina i Politika Antanty*, pp. 296-300.

commission because of ill-health, the distinguished Jewish leader expressed his confidence in the good intentions of the Ukrainian Government. He wrote in part:

I take the opportunity of saying. . . that it needed not this step, nor even your honest admission of the deplorable facts as regards the towns, to convince me that your Government is working hard, if not perhaps its hardest, to stop massacres for which the unsettled state of Russia is largely responsible. The national rights you have given to the Jews are a manifestation of true statesmanship and in shining contrast with the Jewish policy of Poland, and I can only hope that your Republic will be preserved to give the rest of the world an example of the strength and the exalted patriotism that comes from the cordial cooperation and mutual respect of all the varied racial and religious elements that make up a modern state.⁹⁷

Petliura continued to evince lively interest in the plight of Ukrainian Jewry even after the Bolshhevik forces compelled him to retreat into Poland. Aware of the existing state of lawlessness which was particularly deleterious to the Jewish population, Petliura called upon the Ukrainians not to become involved in any anti-Jewish acts. His 1921 proclamation to the Ukrainian people, had the familiar ring of his orders of the earlier period. "I order you," commanded Petliura, "to punish without mercy the bolsheviks, communists, and other bandits who perpetrate Jewish pogroms and slaughter the population." Petliura concluded the proclamation with the promise that upon his return to the Ukraine he would punish all those found guilty.⁹⁸

Anticipating a popular anti-Bolshevik uprising which would have facilitated his return to the Ukraine, Petliura undertook measures to effectively guarantee the safety of the Jewish population. Taking advantage of the Twelfth Zionist congress held in Carlsbad, Petliura sent his representatives (Roman Smal-Stotskyi and Maxym Slavinsky) there with the proposal that the Jews agree to form their own corps of *gendarmierie* financed by the Ukrainian state.⁹⁹ The discussions of Petliura's proposal by Slavinsky and Jabotinsky ended successfully. On September 4, 1921, they signed an Agreement which provided that a properly trained and equipped Jewish *gendarmierie* would be attached to the Ukrainian Army in order to

⁹⁷"The Jewish Question in Ukraina," *Eastern Europe* (Nov. 1, 1919), p. 160.

⁹⁸*Symon Petliura: Statti, Lysty, Dokumenty*, pp. 287-9.

⁹⁹Smal-Stotskyi, Roman, "Symon Petliura," *The Slavonic Review*, vol. v (London 1926-27), p. 156; also *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn [International Life]* (Moscow 1922), p. 42.

ensure the safety of the Jewish population in the areas which might be occupied by the Ukrainian Army.¹⁰⁰

The Jabotinsky-Slavinsky Agreement was never implemented because no large-scale operation against the Bolsheviks proved possible. It remains, nevertheless, important evidence of Petliura's preoccupation with the well-being of Ukrainian Jewry.

In view of the evidence presented, the frequently repeated charge that Petliura was antisemitic is absurd. Vladimir Jabotinsky, perhaps one of the greatest Jews of the twentieth century—a man well-versed in the problems of East European Jewry—categorically rejected the idea of Petliura's animosity towards the Jews. He wrote:

It is a fact that neither Petlyura, nor Vynnychenko, nor any other prominent member of the Ukrainian government were pogrom makers. I have grown up with them, and I have fought together with them against antisemitism; no one will ever succeed in convincing any Zionist of Southern Russia, or myself, that people of such type can be qualified as anti-semites.¹⁰¹

Equally absurd is the attempt on the part of some to establish Petliura's complicity in the pogroms against Ukrainian Jewry. Particularly disturbing is the recent attempt by Hannah Arendt to draw a parallel between the case of Petliura and Adolf Eichmann, Hitler's notorious henchman.¹⁰²

A critical and balanced examination of the complex issue of the pogroms is not only desirable, but necessary. One should pursue it, however, with objectivity and care, lest one feed the insatiable appetites of the Judeophobes, the Ukrainophobes, or both, by indulging in unfounded, one-sided generalizations.

Doctor Joseph Lichten, the National Director of Inter-cultural Affairs of the Anti-Defamation League, deplored the situation which results from a biased and oversimplified approach to the existing complex problems. He wrote:

¹⁰⁰For a complete text of the agreement, see *Documents sur les Pogromes en Ukraine*, pp. 168-9; for its background and the reaction of the Jews, see Schechtman, Joseph B., *Rebel and Statesman: The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story* (New York 1956), pp. 399-415; also "The Project of a Note of October 17, 1921," in the Archive of Professor Evhen Onatskyi, Document no. 50, pp. 2-3 in the Ukrainian Museum-Archive, South Bound Brook, New Jersey.

¹⁰¹*Material Concerning Ukrainian-Jewish Relations*, p. 16; also *En Notre Ame et Conscience: La Verité Sur Simon Petliura* (Edité par le Comité pour la defense de la memoire de Simon Petliura: Paris, n.d.), p. 77.

¹⁰²Hannah Arendt, usually a fair-minded and careful scholar, grossly overstated the case in an attempt to prove her point. See her *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York 1963), pp. 243-5.

It is unfortunate that in the non-Ukrainian world, his name [Petliura's] became almost a symbol of an enemy of the Jewish people. How Petlyura could do more than he did in combatting pogroms during a period of anarchy, when he did not have full control over his own army, remains to be answered, and such an answer will be of great importance to future harmonious Ukrainian-Jewish relations. One thing is certain. We must consider it an act of great historical injustice to blame Petlyura personally for crimes committed by various *otamani* like Makhno, Hryhoryiv, Semesenko, or individuals close to the Hetmanite.¹⁰³

The question of Petliura's culpability in the anti-Jewish pogroms seems to be only academic in view of the then prevailing conditions and in light of all the measures he took to stop or prevent them. The contention that Petliura did not exercise enough determination or that he could have done more to prevent the pogroms is a matter for speculation. This area of conjecture should not, however, be exploited in order to promote an emotional atmosphere which contributes to the development of visceral attitudes.

In view of the evidence presented in this paper, to convict Petliura for the tragedy that befell Ukrainian Jewry is to condemn an innocent man and to distort the record of Ukrainian-Jewish relations.

¹⁰³Lichten, Joseph L., "A Study of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* (New York 1956), vol. v, pp. 1167-8.

Communications

Letter to the Editors:

As I read Mr. Szajkowski's "rebuttal" it became evident that his interest and argument transcended history and historical evidence. It has a psychological quality which may help to explain his zeal and compelling need to find a symbol incarnate guilty of the terrible deeds against the Jewish people. Such a symbol Szajkowski obviously found in Symon Petliura.

The embarrassing pose of know-it-all creates a situation which makes a scholarly dialogue with Mr. Szajkowski extremely difficult. Yet, I feel I owe it to the readers of my article to correct his errors and tendentious statements.

To make his theses more convincing and to create the impression of being in possession of hidden truth, Mr. Szajkowski resorted to a most unorthodox method. He secured a verbal promise from me not to use, that is, to cite Tcherikower's *Di Ukraïner Pogromen in Yor 1919 (The Pogroms in the Ukraine in 1919)* as one of my sources. The importance of Tcherikower as a decisive source and an authority for Szajkowski is quite obvious.¹ His position was further strengthened when I was denied access to the Tcherikower archive and the other materials dealing with the pogroms at the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research.² However, while I deplore the fact that I was not permitted to study the Tcherikower archive, upon examining Szajkowski's evidence based on it, I came to the conclusion that I probably did not miss much and that Mr. Szajkowski mistook fiction and hearsay for factual information. Two examples may suffice to illustrate my contention:

- 1) On page 212 of his article Mr. Szajkowski invokes Tcherikower's authority to prove that Petliura promoted Otaman Yakiv Shepel, who operated in the Lityn-Chmielnik area, to the rank of general. This was Tcherikower's testimony at the Paris trial. In fact it was Volodymyr Shepel, a native of Zolotonosha and

¹While I kept my word, I must confess that I had pertinent portions of Tcherikower's book translated for me in order to find out whether it contained any decisive evidence. From these translations, I concluded that the case against Petliura in Tcherikower's book was based on pure conjecture.

²My inability to read Yiddish was the reason given for the rejection of my request to do research at the YIVO Institute. That would, I was told, prevent me from using "most of the items in the Tcherikower's archives." Shmuel Lapin to Hunczak, Jan. 20, 1969.

no relative of Yakiv, who was promoted to the rank of brigadier general and placed in command of a cavalry division.³

- 2) On page 193 Mr. Szajkowski commits a gross error. Perhaps, more than anything else, it can help us explain the myth of Petliura's anti-Jewish acts. Let me quote Szajkowski:

. . . on August 30, 1918, when the Bolsheviks evacuated Kiev, its city council organized a voluntary militia. On the next day, Petliura's men occupied the city; they arrested and massacred thirty-seven Jewish militiamen. Jacob Safran, the father of one of the victims, tried for many years to do what Schwartzbard was able to accomplish in 1926.

I can state with complete certainty that except for Safran's vile intentions, nothing of the above quoted statement is true. It was a well-known fact that following the German-organized coup d'état of April 28, 1918, which placed Pavlo Skoropadskyi as Hetman of the Ukraine, Petliura retired to private life. Because of his popularity, however, he was soon elected head of the Zemstvo of the Kiev Province, a position Petliura held until his arrest on July 12, 1918.⁴ He was kept in jail for four months during which time he had long discussions with Moisei Rafes about the possibility of Ukrainian-Jewish collaboration.⁵ To speak of Bolshevik evacuation of Kiev on August 30, 1918, and of Petliura's men occupying the city on the following day, is to display an utter innocence of the political realities in the Ukraine; any basic book on the Ukrainian revolution will confirm this.⁶

Mr. Szajkowski is also guilty of misreading and quoting out of context. The treatment of Schwartzbard and the discussion surrounding the Fourth Universal are cases in point. Nowhere in my article did I make the categorical statement that Schwartzbard was a Bolshevik agent. On the basis of the evidence which I presented in footnote no. 5, I simply stated that "viewed as an avenger by some, and as a Bolshevik agent or at least a tool of a Communist

³Oleksander Dotsenko, *Litopys Ukrainskoi Revolutsii* [A Chronicle of the Ukrainian Revolution] (Lviv 1923), vol. ii, Book 4, p. 260. (U). I also have a picture of Volodymyr Shepel in uniform. It might be interesting to note that Szajkowski constantly confuses Hetman with otaman. There is a basic difference between the two titles.

⁴K. Matsievich, "Na zeemskii roboti," *Zbirnyk Pamyati PETLIURY* [Symposium in Memory of Symon Petliura] (Prague 1930), pp. 195-202 (U).

⁵Moisei Rafes, *Dva Goda Revolutsii na Ukraine*, [Two Years of Revolution in the Ukraine] (Moscow 1920), p. 133. (R).

⁶On page 188 Szajkowski makes another fantastic revelation that "on October 16, 1918, the day after Petliura's arrival in Kiev, the *Ukrainskaya Stavka* (Ukrainian Headquarters) carried an attack against the Jewish bourgeoisie. . . ." Again the reader should be reminded that from July 12 to November 12, 1918, Petliura was in jail and therefore could not have led an army.

conspiracy by others, Schwartzbard may well remain an eternal enigma. Whatever the truth may have been. . ." (p. 164). This statement hardly amounts to a judgment. Yet Szajkowski read it as an "accusation that Schwartzbard was a Bolshevik agent. . ." (p. 184). It might be interesting to note that while I merely mentioned Schwartzbard in passing, Szajkowski makes an issue of it. The reason for his preoccupation becomes obvious when Szajkowski confesses to have known Schwartzbard for many years (p. 203). It seems that even a suggestion of the possibility that Schwartzbard acted as a Bolshevik agent in assassinating Petliura opens some old wounds for Mr. Szajkowski. However, the evidence is of such a nature that a historian cannot simply dismiss it.

In his discussion of the Fourth Universal of January 22, which proclaimed the Ukraine as an independent and sovereign republic, Mr. Szajkowski makes two rather serious mistakes. First, he falls prey to the outdated propaganda of the enemies of Ukrainian statehood, who, bent on discrediting the Ukrainian aspirations in the eyes of the Allied powers, maintained that everything the Ukrainian government did was inspired and supported by the Germans.⁷ Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, it was the inimical attitude of the Russian Provisional Government and later, the open hostility of the Soviets, that convinced the Ukrainians that nothing short of national independence would secure their political aspirations. The proclamation of the Fourth Universal was, in effect, the final step in the realization of that basic premise. The Germans had nothing whatsoever to do with the entire matter! Perhaps Mr. Szajkowski is confusing the Fourth Universal with one of the provisions of the second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which in effect forced Soviet Russia to recognize Ukrainian independence.⁸

An even more serious matter is Mr. Szajkowski's quoting material out of context. In my discussion (pp. 168-69) of the attitude of the Jewish representatives in the Central *Rada* toward the Fourth Uni-

⁷An example of such a home-grown truth prepared for the gullible may be found in the report of the British Charge d'Affaires to Bucharest (Rumania) of May 2, 1919. In it he informs his government of a conversation with the Russian Minister Mr. Poklewski who ". . . was very bitter about French infatuation with [the] Ukraine. He said the very constitution of this state was a German idea, the population being mostly German Jews. . . ." See F.O. 371/3979 Doc. No. 72130, Public Record Office, London.

⁸The First Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed between the Central Powers and the Ukrainian Republic on February 9, 1918. On March 3, 1918 a treaty of peace was signed between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers. For details of the two treaties see John W. Wheeler-Bennet, *Brest Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace* (London 1956), pp. 392-408.

versal, I paraphrased Solomon Goldelman to the effect that "the representatives of the Bund and the 'Russians' who for the most part were Russified Jews, voted against the Universal, while the representatives of the other Jewish parties abstained from voting altogether."⁹

Mr. Szajkowski lifts one part of the statement (the "Russians" were for the most part "Russified Jews") (p. 189) out of the context of the voting procedure concerning the Fourth Universal, disregards the source, (Goldelman), and applies it to an entirely unrelated context. This methodology of purported scholarly discussion is completely new to me, and I would seriously question its validity, unless, of course, the purpose is to confuse. I also have serious reservations regarding Szajkowski's presentation of the unsupported prejudiced opinion of Mr. Heifetz (pp. 188, 190) as reliable testimony.

Of the several problems I wish to discuss in my reply to Mr. Szajkowski's "rebuttal," the question of Bolshevism and the extent of Jewish involvement in the Bolshevik movement occupies a prominent position. With his usual self-assurance Szajkowski accuses me of failing "to discuss the fact that the Ukrainian independence movement was basically a local Bolshevik effort." Moreover he charges that I ignore "the fact that the pogroms were responsible for the rise of Bolshevism and anti-independence feeling among the Jews" (p. 184). Further on he reassures the reader that "it would be easy to repeat the many proofs that Bolshevism was stronger proportionally among Ukrainians and Russians than among the Jews" (p. 190).

Is it really true that the pogroms won Jewish converts to Bolshevism, that there were proportionally more Ukrainians and Russians in the Bolshevik movement than Jews, and that the Bolsheviks represented the Ukrainian movement for independence? The first part of the question cannot be answered one way or the other simply because no study has ever been made of the motivation for joining the Communist movement. This is not to deny, of course, that some Jews might have been pushed into the Communist camp in the wake of the pogroms. However, any assertion to that effect

⁹Solomon Goldelman, *Zhydivska Natsionalna Avtonomiia na Ukraini* [*Jewish National Autonomy in the Ukraine*] (Munich 1963), p. 35. (U). In 1968 Professor Goldelman's book was translated into English and published in Chicago. The corresponding reference can be found on p. 50. For the names of those who opposed the Fourth Universal or abstained from voting see Dmytro Doroshenko, *Istoria Ukrainy 1917-1923* (New York 1954), vol. i, p. 268.

must be considered at best, an educated guess and therefore should not be couched in categorical terms.

That Jews were significantly involved in the radical movements is a matter of record. At the Fifth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party which was held in London in 1907, the Jewish delegation was the second largest one, having twelve representatives or 11.4% of the total delegation. By contrast, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks were represented by one delegate which was equivalent to 0.95% of the total Bolshevik delegation.¹⁰ During the fall of 1917, when many Mensheviks went over to the Bolsheviks, and later when the Bund did likewise, Jewish participation in Bolshevik activities became significant. Jews were prominently represented both in upper and lower echelon positions of the Bolshevik Party.¹¹ Jewish participation on the local level is perhaps best illustrated by a report forwarded from the British commanding admiral of the Black Sea area to the Admiralty on June 6, 1919. It reads:

. . . Bolshevism in the Ukraine is rapidly losing ground. . . . The [peasants and workmen] found that their own local Soviets were formed, for the most part, by the hated Jews; that these Soviets carried out their requisitions on the workers and peasants as well as the landowners; and that the Bolshevik reign was even more tyrannical than any Government they had ever suffered from. Rightly the blame is apportioned to the Jews. And there are signs of a violent anti-Jewish movement spreading all over the South of Russia. . . . This anti-Jewish movement is, in effect, an anti-Bolshevik one [as] practically all the regimental Commissars are Jews, and Jews largely predominate in nearly all the Soviets.¹²

The Admiralty report is supported and corroborated by other contemporary sources. It is therefore, a reliable source.¹³

Mr. Szajkowski completely misrepresents the role of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks in the Ukrainian fight for independence. At no time

¹⁰*Londonskii Syezd Rossiiskoi Soc.-Demokr. Rab. Partii: Polnyi Tekst Protokolov [The London Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party: A Full Text of Minutes]* (Paris 1909), p. 449. (R).

¹¹Leonard Schapiro, "The Role of the Jews in the Russian Revolutionary Movement," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, vol. xi (Dec. 1961), pp. 164-5.

¹²For the details of the report see F.O. 371/3965 Doc. No. 96522, Public Record Office, London.

¹³For details see "Political Report from the Ukraine of 3.3.20," F.O. 371/3966 Doc. No. 187175; *Secret Report of the War Office on the British Military Mission, South Russia*, Oct. 8, 1919; pp. 50-51. F.O. 371/3979 Doc. No. 157024; Report of Major H. B. Mockett of the British Military Mission in Poland on operations against the Bolsheviks in the neighborhood of Lida (Sept. 29, 1920), F.O. 371/5398 Doc. No. 196/196/55; Reprt of the British Military Mission, South Russia (Ekaterinodar, July 4, 1919) W.O. 196/1190 Dec. No. 3591.

during the period from 1917 to 1921 was the Communist Party in the Ukraine a majority party, nor, even more significantly, did it represent the Ukrainian fight for independence. The Soviet sources indicate that in March of 1917 the Bolshevik organization of Kiev had only about 200 members.¹⁴ This relative powerlessness of the Bolsheviks in the capital of the Ukraine manifested itself very clearly during the elections to the Kiev City Council held on August 7, 1917, in which the Bolsheviks received only six of the total of ninety-eight seats. The situation did not change much even after the Bolshevik victory in Russia. Thus, for example, when the Bolsheviks of the Ukraine convened the All-Ukrainian Congress of Workers,' Soldiers,' and Peasants' Deputies on December 17, 1917, they discovered that only sixty of the 2,500 deputies supported the Bolshevik program.¹⁵ The lack of strength of the Bolsheviks in Ukrainian political life was further demonstrated in the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly held in November-December, 1917, when the Bolsheviks received 10% of the 8,201,065 votes cast, while the Ukrainian parties received 53% of the total vote.¹⁶

Even more critical to the issue was the national composition of the Bolshevik Party of the Ukraine and its relevance to the Ukrainian political aspirations. Unfortunately, prior to 1922 there are no reliable statistics on the ethnic composition of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. From various sources, we can infer, however, that it was non-Ukrainian in spirit and composition. The national makeup of the CPU in 1922 was: Russians (53.6%), Ukrainians (23.3%), Jews (13.6%), and others (9.5%). Only in 1926 could the CPU boast of having attained 43.9% Ukrainian membership in the party organization.¹⁷ Prior to that time, the Ukrainians were a distinct minority in the CPU rank and file. The non-Ukrainian Character of the CPU can be seen in microcosm when we consider the membership of the Bolshevik city committee of Kiev elected at a conference held in May, 1917. Of the fifteen members elected, only one, Volodymyr Zatonskyi, was of Ukrainian origin. The other members of the committee were: G. Piatakov, A. Horvits, M. Zar-

¹⁴I. Kulyk, "Kievskaiia organizatsiia ot fevrala do oktiabria 1917 goda," *Letopis Revoliutsii* [A Chronicle of Revolution] (Kharkiv) No. i, 1924, p. 189. (R).

¹⁵Pavlo Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materialy do istorii Ukrainiskoi Revoliutsii, 1918-1920 rr.* [Notes and Materials on the History of the Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1920] (Vienna 1921), vol. ii, p. 69. (U).

¹⁶For details see O. H. Radkey, *The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917* (Cambridge 1950), p. 161.

¹⁷Jurij Borys, *The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine* (Stockholm 1960), p. 155.

nitsyn, E. Bosh, I. Kreisberg, R. Farbman, M. Kugel, a Mr. Liber, a Mr. Nusbaum, V. Primakov, a Mr. Loginov (Pavel), S. Shreiber, M. Reut, and a Mr. Dovnar-Zapolskii.¹⁸

The same political anomaly that we find in the Ukrainian capital was further reflected in the predominantly non-Ukrainian composition of the Central Committee of the CPU as well as in the fact that Piatakov, Kviring, Molotov, Kossior, Kaganovich, and Postyshev, the First Secretaries of the CPU, were also non-Ukrainian.¹⁹

In view of the non-Ukrainian ethnic make-up of the leadership and members of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, and the centralist orientation of the Russian Communist Party, the indifference and even hostility toward the Ukrainian national movement becomes more readily understandable. Serhii Mazlakh and Vasyl Shakhrai, two leading Ukrainian Bolsheviks, have most graphically portrayed the allegedly "Ukrainian character" of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.²⁰

Mr. Szajkowski's blatant attack upon Rev. Klodnycky, equating him with Otamans known for their anti-Jewish excesses, is both unfair and unjustified. Certainly, his imposition of a contribution upon the civilian (Jewish) population was an extra-legal act. As a representative of the army he had no right to do it, yet he felt compelled to do so in order to help the needy Jews who were suffering from all kinds of privations. His noble motivation and the equitable distribution of funds for the various needs of the Jewish population, a fact Szajkowski himself recounts (pp. 209-210), could not possibly place Rev. Klodnycky in the ranks of bandits and extortionists, as Mr. Szajkowski suggests.

The evidence that we have from the Jews of Chmielnik contradicts completely Mr. Szajkowski's assertion. In a document of May 13, 1920 signed by over one hundred Jews, Rev. Klodnycky is praised for his concern for the well-being of the people, "regardless of their nationality."²¹ This testimony has been supported by Mrs. Golda Liebeskind, an inhabitant of Chmielnik until 1921, who wrote that Rev. Klodnycky always "displayed a profound concern for all people, regardless of their nationality or religion. . . . For his concern for the Jewish people and his efforts to improve their lot,"

¹⁸Kulyk, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

¹⁹Borys, *op. cit.*, p. 142-153.

²⁰See Sherhij Mazlakh and Vasyl Shakhrai, *Do Khvyli: Shcho dietsia na Ukraini i z Ukrainoiu* [On the Current Situation: What is Happening in and to the Ukraine] (Saratov 1919; 2nd ed., New York 1967) particularly pp. 97-99, 107, 162, 165, 168, 191-192, 242. (U).

²¹Rev. Klodnycky has the original document.

continued Mrs. Liebeskind, "Rev. Klodnycky gained [the] respect and genuine confidence of the Jewish community of Chmielnik and Lityn." Mrs. Liebeskind ends her letter by praising the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League for giving Rev. Klodnycky the Torch of Liberty Award as "a well deserved reward, for in a time of crisis he proved himself a truly good human being."²²

Important corroborating testimony on behalf of Rev. Klodnycky has been rendered by a most unimpeachable source, Chief Rabbi Bilik of Chmielnik. As spiritual leader of his community, Rabbi Bilik expressed the sentiments of his people when he referred to Klodnycky as a man "who distinguished himself for his great spirit, love of truth, and love for the Jewish people." As a representative of the Ukrainian military authority in the county of Lityn, Rev. Klodnycky not only "saved all the Jews of the area from the sword and looting," but also "organized hospitals, homes for the aged, took care of the poor and provided bread and firewood for them." Rabbi Bilik paid the ultimate compliment to Klodnycky's humanity when he said that Klodnycky could be entrusted with "the leadership of the sons of Jakob in their pilgrimage to God's mountain."²³

Certainly Mr. Szajkowski should have considered Rabbi Bilik's testimony before embarking upon a campaign of unjust accusation and character assassination. But then, the method employed by Szajkowski is not confined to his treatment of Rev. Klodnycky alone. Relying on the unfair judgment of Vladimir Tiomkin, Mr. Szajkowski denigrates Arnold Margolin, a noble man and a life-time servant of the Jewish community, as a "weaking." In the days of severe tsarist reaction, Margolin courageously acted as defense counsel in many anti-Jewish trials. The most spectacular of these was the Mendel Beiliss trial in which Arnold Margolin alone challenged the tsarist machinery of persecution. For this he was disbarred, but Beiliss was acquitted and the good name of the Jews was vindicated before the whole world.²⁴

Mr. Szajkowski in general seems rather fond of hasty judgments. Thus B'nai B'rith committed an act of "sheer stupidity" by pre-

²²Liebeskind to Hunczak, Nov. 19, 1969. The author is in possession of a copy of the letter — the original was sent to the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League in New York City to complete their file on the subject.

²³For the complete text of the certificate see *Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 19th Congress, Second Session* (Washington, July 13, 1866), no. iii, pp. A3654-A3655.

²⁴For the details of the Beiliss case see Arnold Margolin, *The Jews of Eastern Europe* (New York 1926), pp. 155-247, and Maurice Samuel, *Blood Accusation* (Philadelphia 1966).

senting the Torch of Liberty Award to Rev. Klodnycky, the Jews engaged in the Ukrainian-Jewish dialogue "represent only themselves," and, besides, are not of "Schechtman's stature." Does Mr. Szajkowski feel that he is called upon and qualified to pronounce such cavalier opinions?

It seems to me that Mr. Szajkowski's criticism of Arnold Margolin and Dr. Joseph Lichten, Director of the Department of Intercultural Affairs of B'nai B'rith, is directly related to what Szajkowski may consider to be the "danger" of a Jewish-Ukrainian dialogue. He conveys unmistakably his preoccupation with the Jewish-Ukrainian dialogue assuring us that a Ukrainian *mea culpa* and an open condemnation of Petliura are a *sine qua non* for any discussions. Dr. Lichten, in contrast to Mr. Szajkowski, always favored and actively participated in the Jewish-Ukrainian dialogue which he considered to be a necessary precondition for a lasting understanding. To be sure, his interest in the Ukrainian-Jewish understanding is but one aspect of his many-sided activities whose goal is a better relationship between the gentiles and the Jews in the Diaspora.

I would like to assuage Mr. Szajkowski's anxiety as to the purpose of my article. My principal, indeed my sole objective in undertaking the study of this controversial topic, was not to effect a change in Jewish attitudes through my findings, but rather to discover the truth and to disseminate it. My role as a historian is different from that of a publicist or a political partisan. Although it is one of my most cherished hopes that Jews and Ukrainians, who shared a common history for one thousand years, would finally seek and achieve a much-needed understanding. However, as a historian, I cannot change the past to fit the exigency of the situation, that is, I shall not sacrifice Petliura, or any other individual, whom I know to be innocent, or for that matter my own intellectual integrity, on the altar of a Jewish-Ukrainian understanding, as Mr. Szajkowski demands.

To conclude, one may well ask, what, if anything, has Mr. Szajkowski proven? An unsubstantiated harangue cannot be taken seriously. I stated in my article that there were pogroms for which Petliura's army was responsible.²⁵ What is crucial for the entire issue is the fact that no positive evidence was found that would establish Petliura's responsibility. Mr. Szajkowski stated himself

²⁵Throughout history one can discover, even in the most disciplined armies, some units whose activities did not represent the social and political ideals of the army. Such is the nature of violence. The reported American atrocity at Song My in March 1968 may well be a case in point. See *Newsweek* Dec. 1, 1969, pp. 35-37.

that the evidence against Petliura was "not sufficient for a criminal court of law" (p. 195).²⁶ Under these circumstances, to disregard Petliura's proclamation against the pogroms and all of the positive measures he took against their perpetrators, and to base the thesis of Petliura's culpability on prejudiced *opinion*, is to do violence to history.

TARAS HUNCZAK.

²⁶Mr. Szajkowski feels, however, that the evidence "was sufficient for a political trial." This double-standard is completely artificial and juridically untenable, for without reliable evidence the question of innocence or guilt cannot possibly be resolved.

Documentation

No. 1

Excerpts from Solomon I. Goldelman's, *Zhydivs'ka Natsionalna Autonomia na Ukraini, 1917-1920 rr.* Muenchen, 1963, pp. 8-10, 102-102.

Fatal Alienation.

What did the average Jewish citizen, the intellectual or laborer, know about the Ukrainian national movement in Kiev before the revolution where Ukrainian community cultural life, a regular Ukrainian theatre, Ukrainian political groups, and Ukrainian folklore was still alive? What did the Jewish community circles of this period know about the harsh suppression of every manifestation of Ukrainian national life, about Ukrainian sufferings, dreams, and expectations? Exactly nothing! The Ukrainians had no desire to admit strangers to the inner chambers of their intimate national life, nor did the Jews exhibit any real interest in closer relations with the Ukrainian community. It was as if a wall, a nontransparent curtain separated these two peoples, although they lived side by side for centuries, suffering under the heavy tyranny of the Tsarist regime, and dreaming of liberation. It would seem that a common fate would have brought them together in the struggle against a common enemy, but they have remained unchangeably isolated from each other. It was not until the waves of the Ukrainian movement began to flood the streets and squares of Ukrainian cities at the beginning of the revolution in March 1917, that the new events compelled the Jewish community-political circles to seek a clear orientation and to take a distinct position, one way or another.

Ukrainians incline to cooperate with the Jews.

There can be no doubt that at this early stage the elite of the Ukrainian community, which led the national movement, acknowledged every possible advantage that would flow from an understanding with an ally such as the Jewry in Ukraine. In view of such cooperation, the most important element was the great number of Jews living in cities where Ukrainians alone were

powerless. Both the leading Ukrainian politicians, and certain Jewish leaders from the Zionist and labor-Zionist camps, regarded such an understanding as the first rung in the ladder leading to the union of those two main factors of the revolution—the Ukrainian village and the Jewish city—agreement and active cooperation of which would ultimately decide its fate. Such Ukrainian-Jewish cooperation at the time seemed like a dream to those circles, a dream towards the realization of which great efforts should be taken, without making any significant concessions. In fact, the very idea of a national-personal autonomy for the Jewry originated in the process of considering this active cooperation of both peoples. This autonomy was regarded as a parallel establishment to the political-territorial autonomy of Ukraine, which during this initial period of the Ukrainian revolution was considered to be the highest possible achievement of the Ukrainian national liberation movement.

It is true that the circumstances kept changing rapidly, and with them changed the moods and tendencies of the main forces of the revolution. Already at the very beginning of 1918 the dreamers of this Ukrainian-Jewish united front must have understood that the former psychological ground for such mutual understanding had been forfeited, at least on the Ukrainian side. This occurred during the time of the first military-political crisis of Ukrainian statehood, when the government and Rada were compelled, under pressure from Muraviov's "Red Guard," to evacuate Kiev for the time being and retreat to Zhytomir. There the Little Central Rada met without any representatives from the national minorities, who did not arrive in Zhytomir.¹ During this military-political crisis a change of government also took place. Heading

¹The absence of the representatives of the minorities at the sessions of the Rada at Zhytomir was interpreted by the Ukrainians as a purposeful deviation of those representatives from mutual cooperation and responsibility over the fate of the state at such a critical moment. This interpretation, insofar as it relates to the behavior of the Jewish representatives, had particularly negative results as was clearly stated above. Jewish historiography accepted it without reserve. The historian of the anti-Jewish pogroms in Ukraine, Cherkover writes in regard to the absence of Jewish representatives at Zhytomir that "the Jewish representatives did not consider it essential to go along with the Rada to Zhytomir" (*Anti-Semitism and Pogroms in Ukraine*, page 111). In respect to this, I must say that I, who during the whole time of the existence of the Central Rada was one of the representatives of the Jewish parties in the little Rada, had received no indication of the intention of the Government and the Rada to leave

the new government were elements which did not hide their nationalistic leanings, because they felt that the way to end the disruptive influence of the extreme social slogans on which the Bolsheviks capitalized against the new Ukrainian state was to counter with equally extreme slogans of Ukrainian nationalism. The absence of representatives of the national minorities at Zhytomir, particularly of the Jewish delegates, helped to promote those attitudes, which took concrete form in the activity of the government and Rada during this period. A few new acts, directed against the minorities, particularly the Jewish minority, were passed. With the return to Kiev, a certain normalization took place, and the internal international relations were renewed. However, the psychological effect of this "transitory period" left its mark on both sides.

For that part of the Jewish community which consistently tied the realization of Jewish national autonomous aspirations with the triumph of the idea of Ukrainian statehood, it then became clear that the plan of active Ukrainian Jewish cooperation would not in the long run justify its initial hopes. But now in retrospect, we can say that if this fine idea of Ukrainian statehood had not sunk under the seething waves of Bolshevik demagoguery and otamanic anarchy, and if those elemental forces of the revolution had not proved themselves stronger than the leading elite groups of both peoples, then this plan of Ukrainian-Jewish cooperation had been very fine opportunity which history would have advised both sides to accept.

Summary.

Jewish National Autonomy flashed by on the horizon of Jewish life like a brilliant comet and then disappeared without a

Kiev. Exactly on the day of departure from Kiev, I met W. Holubovych, the current Head of the new Government, on the street, not far from the Central Rada building. On this occasion we discussed events—Bolshevik bombers flying overhead—and we then parted, each on his own way, without the Head of the government giving me so much as a hint that at night he was abandoning Kiev along with his Government, the Rada, and the Army. No notice of this retreat was sent to me from the office of the Rada either, although hitherto and afterwards there were many occasions, even at nighttime, when I was called to a meeting when I was needed. At this time, quite evidently the ruling circles did not consider me, or any other representative, as essential in the mutual activity and cooperation, or as responsible for the fate of the state in this grave moment of its existence. I went into hiding for a few days in Kiev from Muraviov's Cheka, and sometime later I was able to find my way out of Kiev and head towards Vynnytsia.SG.

trace. There was nothing left of four years of revolution, except misty reminiscences of something brilliant, that had drowned in dark fear and torment; these were preserved in the national memory from the pogrom era, which came in paradoxical concurrence with the structure of autonomous national life.

The Jewish National Autonomy and the Ukrainian National Revolution arrived on the world scene as Siamese twins. With the fall of an independent Ukrainian state, the end of Jewish National Autonomy came automatically.

A historical summary of Jewish National Autonomy in Ukraine provides a balanced loss, but the defeat of the Ukrainian National Movement during this great era takes on a different aspect. It is true that national-state independence also blazed across the Ukrainian sky like a streak of lightning. But the Ukrainian balance shows that, following the defeat of armed opposition against the superior forces of the Muscovite conqueror, there is a visible net profit. Although the Ukrainian Democratic National Independent Republic does not currently exist, even the Bolsheviks did not dare to destroy the principle of Ukrainian statehood. "The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic" is not a free, independent state of Ukrainian people, and the Soviet Union, in which this "Ukrainian state" is included as a "Federative" section, is really only a surrogate of a real federation. However, "Ukraine," the very name of which was forgotten throughout the world before the revolution of 1917, after the revolution became a psychological and political reality in world consciousness, including the Jews in the entire world. The world today realizes that there is, in Eastern Europe, a country with a territory as large as that of France, with a population over 40,000,000, and that, next to Russia, this country is the largest Republic of the Soviet Union. The world knows, too, that Ukraine is a founding member of the United Nations; it becomes aware of the international status of Ukraine every year because of the presence of her delegates at the Assembly of the United Nations, even though that delegation does not dare to take a position independent of the delegation of the Soviet Union. The world knows also that this country does not accept its position as a captive nation and that its people keep fighting, in ways and forms possible under a totalitarian regime, for their national rights.

When, at the beginning of the 1917 Revolution, the Ukrainians in St. Petersburg and Kiev came out into the streets in masses of thousands, the Russians in St. Petersburg and the Jews in Kiev actually could not believe their eyes that there exists such a large nation whose people are called "Ukrainians," and such a large country known as "Ukraine." Who, then, can doubt the existence of such a country or such a people?

This, indeed, was the real victory of the Ukrainian Revolution. This victory is also in part, attributable to the fact that, during this period of the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920, National Autonomy for the Jewish population in Ukraine, was under preparation.

Jerusalem, Israel.
Summer, 1960.

**THE PERSONAL-NATIONAL AUTHONOMY OF THE
NATIONAL MINORITIES IN UKRAINE***

Art. 1—Each nation living in Ukraine has the right to national-personal autonomy, within the limits of the Ukrainian National Republic, that is to say, the right to arrange its national life independently which is implemented by the organs of the National Union “whose power extends to all its members, wherever they may reside, but within the limits of the Ukrainian National Republic.” It is an imprescriptible right of each national minority and none of them can be deprived of their rights or limited in their application.

Art. 2—The Great Russians, Jews and Poles residing within the territories of the Ukrainian National Republic have the right to national-personal autonomy by the act of this law. The White Ruthenians, Czechs, Moldavians (Rumanians), Germans, Tartars, Greeks and the Bulgarians can take advantage of the right to national-personal autonomy on condition that the Supreme Court receives a special petition from each nationality signed by a least 10,000 citizens of the U.N.R. without distinction of sex and creed, who have no influence on these civic rights, and declaring that they belong to one of these nations. The Supreme Court must examine this petition at its public session within a period of six months from the date of its receipt and advise the General Secretary (Government of the State) of its decision and bring it to the notice of the people. The nationalities which are not mentioned in this article can present their petitions to the Parliament of the U.N.R. which will examine them.

Art. 3—For the execution of the right mentioned in Article 1 the citizens of the U.N.R. who belong to any of these nationalities in question organize on the territory of the Ukrainian Republic a Na-

*Reprinted from *Ukrainians and Jews*. A Symposium. New York, N.Y., 1966, pp. 154-156. Ukrainian text was published in Yakiv Zozula, ed. *Velyka ukrains'ka Revolutsia: Kalendar istorychnykh podii za liutyi; 1917 roku-berezen 1918 roku*. New York, 1967, pp. 85-86.

tional Union. For all the members of each National Union, personal lists will be made which will form a National Register published after its composition in order that all and every citizen has the right to demand his inscription in the National Register of such a nationality, as well as his exclusion, by making the declaration that he does not belong to such and such a nationality.

Art. 4—The National Union enjoys the legislative right and privilege within the limits of the departments established specifically in the order mentioned in Article 7 of this law. The National Union enjoys the exclusive right to represent the members of its nationality residing within the territories of the U.N.R. before the governmental and public institutions of the State. The laws enacted by the National Congress within the limits of the competence of each National Union (Article 9) must be published by the method generally adopted for laws.

Art. 5—Out of the general receipts of the U.N.R., as well as the autonomous local organs, a certain sum will be taken out of the budget, which the state places at the disposal of the National Union for the affairs which it directs and proportionately to the number of members of each National Union.

Art. 6—Each National Union will establish its annual budget and has the right to impose taxes on its members on the basis established for the taxation by the State in general. Each National Union has the right to raise loans on its own responsibility and to effect any other financial operations indispensable to assure its normal activity.

Art. 7—The domain of the affairs belonging to each National Union, its departments as well as the statutes of its administration, is determined by the Constituent Assemblies of each nation which at the same time defines the conditions whereby changes (modifications) can be effected. The resolutions adopted relative to the domain of the departments of the National Union are under the jurisdiction of the Constituent Assembly of the U.N.R. or of its Parliament.

Remark—The dissensions which may arise from this act between the National Constituent Assembly and the Constituent Assembly of the U.N.R. or its Parliament are solved by a special commission which is composed of an equal number of representatives of these

two institutions. The decisions come to by this Conciliatory Commission go before the Constituent Assembly of the U.N.R. or to its Parliament for definite confirmation.

Art. 8—The Constituent National Assembly is composed of members elected by universal suffrage, equal, direct and secret, with the application of a proportional principle for the representation of sex or of creed. The citizens of the U.N.R. belonging to the said nation who are aged 20 years or over have a vote.

Art. 9—The organs of each National Union are the organs of the State, The Supreme representative organ in each National Union is the National Assembly which is elected by the members of the said Union following the conditions fixed by Article 8 of this law. The Supreme Executive organ in each Union is the National *Rada* which is elected by the National Assembly and is responsible to it.

Art. 10—All discussions concerning the departments which can emerge among the organs of each National Union on the one hand and the Government organs, the local autonomous organs as well as the other National Union, on the other hand, will be solved by an administrative Court.

Signed: Michael Hrushevsky, President of the Ukrainian Central Rada; Onatsky, Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Rada; Ivan Myrny, General Secretary of State.

January 22, 1918

**AN APPEAL OF THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT TO
JEWISH CITIZENS AND WORKERS (1919)**

*To All Jewish Citizens and Workers in Ukraine**

The Ukrainian Democratic Republic is waging violent war against the enemies on its right and on its left for its existence and independence, for the preservation of the rights of the toiling people to ownership of land, and for laws to protect all workers. The Russian Communist-Bolsheviks cannot wean themselves from traditional Russian imperialism; they consider themselves the tsarist heirs in Ukraine. In the hope of establishing Communism by means of bayonets and civil war, they incite the ugliest instincts and the worst impulses in the masses. This kind of work has brought the desired results: a hurricane of anti-Jewish pogroms has swept throughout the Ukraine.

The government at the head of the Republic and the military Commander-in-Chief, Petliura, are waging a vigorous struggle against the pogroms.

For the purpose of investigating all cases of pogroms and pogrom instigations, as well as for delivering the guilty ones to military court, a special Investigating Commission, with extensive powers, has been appointed. Members of this Commission include representatives of Jewish democrats.

An office of State Inspectors with extensive authority has been set up in the army; these inspectors are conducting a powerful campaign against pogrom elements in the army.

The last conference of inspectors approved the proposal of the Minister for Jewish Affairs to have representatives of that ministry among the inspectors.

The Commander-in-Chief, Petliura, has issued a series of orders by which he demands the radical suppression of all attempts at pogroms, and the execution of all pogrom instigators,

**Visnyk Ukrain's'koi Narodnoi Respublyky*, Aug. 9, 1919. See also *The Materials concerning Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Years of Revolution (1917-1921)*. Munich, 1956, pp. 62-64.

making the military and civil authorities responsible for carrying out his orders. The special Military Tribunal has passed a series of death sentences; many pogrom instigators have already been executed.

In his many proclamations, the Commander-in-Chief, Petliura, emphasizes the fact that large-scale support is being given by the Jewish population to the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in its struggle for existence and independence, and appeals to all the people as well as to the partisans on the other side of the battlefield to thoroughly suppress the pogroms which are ruining the country and endangering, to a large extent, the very existence of our republic.

The government is willing to help in a positive way with the "All-Ukrainian Central Relief Committee of the Ministry for Jewish Affairs for Aiding the Victims of the Pogroms" in the matter of reconstruction and repairs of Jewish settlements. 20 million hryvnas from the State Treasury have been assigned as the first step in that direction.

The Government stands behind the law on national-personal autonomy, and is resolved to enforce it fully. Recently a new law has been promulgated which gives the Jewish community self-government, with broad powers and the right of taxation.

The Jewish population actively supports the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. At their numerous meetings all the Jewish political parties have expressed their support for the complete independence of Ukraine.

The Jewish democrats—with Bund, Obyednantsi, Poalej-Zion and the People's Party at their heads—whose representatives belong to the Council of the Ministry for Jewish Affairs and whose important leaders hold many responsible positions in the Ministries, support the Ukrainian People's Government.

The Jewish population, and especially the Jewish workers, took an active part in the celebration of the First Proclamation because they are conscious of the fact that the day of the First Proclamation was for the Jews the first herald of their national and personal autonomy which, in fact, was soon afterwards proclaimed (on January 9, 1918). A healthy national feeling induces the Jewish population to fight side-by-side with the Ukrainian democrats for the independence of Ukraine; for, the liberation of Ukraine means at the same time the liberation of Ukrainian Jews, who are bound by a thousand threads to the

social and economic structure and to the fate of Ukraine. Only in an independent and democratic Ukraine is the development of trade and handicraft on which the Jewish laboring masses subsist possible.

Meanwhile in the Republican Army the idea of peaceful companionship among the peoples of the Ukraine is gaining a firmer footing; while the Army purges itself more and more of the pogrom elements and the many bodies of troops show signs of recovery,—the Bolshevik army shows more threatening signs of inner demoralization and dissolution. Recently a whole series of anti-Jewish pogroms took place; there were perpetrated by various Bolshevik troops. And the faster the victorious march of the united republican and Galician armies advances (which, incidentally, includes a considerable number of Jewish soldiers and officers in their ranks), the more demoralization increases in the Bolshevik army.

Bolshevism, by its terror and dictatorship, has crushed the forces of united democracy, and has prepared the ground for the successful advance of Russian reaction in the form of a Denikiad, which brings with it the danger of a tsarist restoration in the most real sense of the word.

Jewish citizens and workers! Remember the threatening danger! Remember that it is your duty to help save Ukraine from the threatening Bolshevik anarchy, and to defend your civil, political and national rights against the fearful reaction which is coming with the Denikin regime.

Remember that the paths of the Ukrainian and Jewish peoples are closely bound together, and that they have three hundred years of annihilation and enslavement by Russian tsars behind them.

As Ukrainian citizens with equal rights, defend-together with the Ukrainian people—your common fatherland!

Long live the Independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic!

Long live the brotherly and just companionship of the Ukrainian and Jewish peoples in the Ukraine!

Long live national-personal autonomy!

Long live the united laboring masses of all peoples in the Ukraine!

Long live Socialism!

President of the Cabinet Council: Borys Martos.

Minister for Jewish Affairs: Pinchos Krasny.

DAILY ORDER BY THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE
TROOPS OF THE UKRAINIAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC*

August 26, 1919

Order No. 131

Officers and Soldiers!

It is time for you to realize that the Jews—together with the majority of the Ukrainian population—have recognized the evil of the Bolshevik-Communist invasion, and know where the truth lies. The most important Jewish parties, such as: “Bund”, “United Jewish Socialists”, “Poalei-Zion” and “People’s Party”, have decidedly placed themselves on the side of the Ukrainian independent state and are working together for its good.

It is time for you to understand that the peaceful Jewish population, their children and women have been oppressed and deprived of national freedom, just as we have. They cannot be alienated from us, they have always been with us, and they have shared with us their joys and sorrows.

The gallant army which brings brotherhood, equality, and freedom to all peoples of Ukraine should not lend an ear to various adventurers and provocateurs who long for human blood. Likewise, the Army should not be a party to causing hardship for the Jews. Whoever is guilty of permitting such a heavy crime, is a traitor and enemy of the country and must be cast out of human society.

Officers and soldiers! The whole world cannot but admire our heroic deeds in the struggle for freedom. Do not stain those deeds—not even accidentally—by disgraceful actions; do not bring down burning shame upon our state in the face of the whole world. Our many enemies, external as well as internal, are already profiting

*Reprinted from *Materials concerning Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Years of the Revolution (1917-1921)*. Munich 1956, pp. 68-69. Slightly different stylistic version was published in *Eastern Europe* (Paris), Vol. 1, No. 5, 1919, pp. 144-150. Ukrainian text was published in *Symon Petliura Articles, Correspondence, Documents*. Vol. 1. New York, 1956, pp. 228-230.

by the pogroms; they are pointing their fingers at us and inciting others against us, saying that we are not worthy of an independent national existence and that we deserve to be forcefully harnessed to the yoke of slavery.

I, your Commander-in-Chief, tell you that at this very moment the question of "to be or not to" for our independent existence is being decided before the International Tribunal.

Officers and soldiers! The judgement on this question rests in your hands, so decide it by showing an armed fist against our enemies, remembering always that a clean cause demands clean hands. You may be sure that a severe and lawful punishment by a people's court will overtake all enemies of our country; but remember also that vengeance—often the result of lack of careful consideration—is not the way of the Ukrainian Cossacks. I most positively order that all those who are instigating pogroms be expelled from the army, and—as traitors to the fatherhood—be handed over to the court. Let the court punish them according to their crimes by giving them the severest lawful penalty.

The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic recognizing the harm done to the state by the pogroms has issued an appeal to the whole population of the Ukraine to withstand all attempts of the enemies who might arouse it to anti-Jewish pogroms.

I command the whole army to obey this appeal and to provide for widest dissemination among comrades-in-arms and among the population.

This Army Order is to be read to all division, brigades, regiments, garrisons and squadrons of the Dnieper and Dniester armies as well as the partisan detachments.

PETLIURA

Commander-in-Chief

YUNAKIV

Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander

THE JEWISH QUESTION IN UKRAINE

October 20, 1919

*The President of the Delegation of the Ukrainian Republic**

Dear Sir,

I feel highly honored at the invitation of the Ukrainian Government to take part in the proposed Commission for the investigation of Anti-Jewish pogroms but I am away in Wales, resting under medical advice, and do not feel the strength to undertake the journey. Moreover if Doctor Yocheiman, a member of the Council of the Jewish Territorial Organization, forms one of the members, the organization will be sufficiently represented. I take the opportunity of saying, however, that it needed not this step, nor even your honest admission of the deplorable facts as regards the towns, to convince me that your Government is working hard, if not perhaps its hardest, to stop massacres for which the unsettled state of Russia is largely responsible.

The national rights you have given to the Jews are a manifestation of true statesmanship and in shining contrast with the Jewish policy of Poland, and I can only hope that your Republic will be preserved to give the rest of the world an example of the strength and the exalted patriotism that comes from the cordial cooperation and mutual respect of all the varied racial and religious elements that make up a modern state. That these massacres, if they continue, will destroy your State no less surely than its innocent victims, adds to the regret with I, as a supporter of the principle of self-determination, observe your present failure to suppress them entirely.

Again thanking you for the honor of your invitation,
Sincerely yours,

Israel Zangwill

**Eastern Europe* (Paris) Vol. I. No. 1. 1919. p. 160.

Slightly different stylistic version of the letter was also published in *Materials Concerning Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Years of Revolution (1917-1921)* Munich, 1956.

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UKRAINS'KYI ISTORYK — THE UKRAINIAN HISTORIAN

Historical quarterly published by the Ukrainian Historical Association

Edited by
Lubomyr R. Wynar
Kent State University

The journal is devoted to Ukrainian and East European history. Special attention is focused on political and social history, historiography, history of ideas and auxiliary historical sciences. A separate section is devoted to archival sources and reviews.

Articles appearing in *U.H.* are abstracted and/or indexed in *Historical Abstracts*, *America: History and Life*, and *American Bibliography of Slavic and East European Studies*. Articles published in Ukrainian and English. Correspondence concerning editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor.

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