

The

VOL. XXV, NO. 1, 1969

Ukrainian Quarterly

A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

Ukraine's Right of Secession from the USSR

By Ivan O. Kandyba

The Ukrainian Quarterly


A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

Published by the UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA, INC.

SPRING, 1969

VOLUME XXV — No. 1

\$1.50 A COPY



All articles published in this journal and signed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America.

**EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE
UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA:**

Chairman of the Board: *Prof. Lev E. Dobriansky*

Editor: *Dr. Walter Dushnyck*

Members: *Anthony Dragan, Walter Dushnyck and Matthew Stachiv*

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD:

<i>Prof. Adolfo Munoz Alonso</i>	University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain
<i>Prof. Austin J. App</i>	LaSalle College (Ret.), Philadelphia, Pa.
<i>Prof. James D. Atkinson</i>	Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
<i>Prof. Anthony T. Bouscaren</i>	LeMoyne College, Syracuse, N.Y.
<i>Prof. Raffaele Clasca</i>	University of Rome, Rome, Italy
<i>Prof. Jose Fernandes Silva Dias</i>	University of Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal
<i>Prof. Kurt Glaser</i>	South Illinois University, Alton, Ill.
<i>Prof. Jeray Hauptmann</i>	Park College, Parkville, Missouri
<i>Prof. Jan Karski</i>	Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
<i>Prof. Watson Kirkconnell</i>	Acadia University, Wolfville, N.S., Canada
<i>Prof. Jun-Yop Kim</i>	Korea University, Seoul, Korea
<i>Prof. Yintang Koo</i>	Taiwan University, Taipei, China
<i>Prof. Peter Lejins</i>	University of Maryland, College Park, Md.
<i>Prof. Kenneth C. Lottich</i>	Montana State University, Missoula, Montana
<i>Prof. Clarence A. Manning</i>	Columbia University, (Ret.), New York, N.Y.
<i>Prof. Birger Nerman</i>	State Historical Museum, Stockholm, Sweden
<i>Prof. Michael S. Pap</i>	John Carroll University, Cleveland, Ohio
<i>Prof. Stefan T. Possony</i>	Hoover Institution, Stanford, California
<i>Prof. Joseph S. Roucek</i>	Queensborough Community College, Bayside, N.Y.
<i>Prof. Roman Smal-Stocki</i>	Catholic University, Washington, D.C.
<i>Prof. Georg Stadtmueller</i>	University of Munich, Munich, Germany
<i>Prof. Peter G. Stercho</i>	Drexel Institute of Technology, Philadelphia, Pa.
<i>Prof. Franco Valsecchi</i>	University of Rome, Rome, Italy
<i>Prof. Paul Yuzyk, Canadian Senator</i>	University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada

Subscription: Yearly \$ 6.00; Single Copy \$ 1.50

Checks payable to: UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA, INC.

**Editorial and Managing Office: THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY
302-304 West 13th Street, New York, N.Y. 10014
Tel.: WAtkins 4-5617**

CONTENTS

A Fresh Look at a Dedicated Enemy	5
<i>Editorial</i>	5
Ukraine's Right of Secession from the USSR	
<i>Ivan O. Kandyba</i>	12
"Vigorous Russian Roots of the Modern Society of Jesus"	
<i>By Roman Smal-Stocki</i>	26
"We Told You So"	
<i>By Lev E. Dobriansky</i>	42
Growing Soviet Threat to the Mediterranean World	
<i>By Joseph S. Roucek</i>	54
President Nixon and American Policy	
<i>By Clarence A. Manning</i>	67

BOOK REVIEWS

<i>The Chornovil Paper.</i> By Vyacheslav Chornovil	
<i>Walter Dushnyck</i>	75
<i>Fifty Years. The USSR versus the USA.</i> By Susanne Labin and Daniel Lyons, S.J.	
<i>Lev E. Dobriansky</i>	78
<i>The Great Terror. Stalin's Purge of the Thirties.</i> By Robert Conquest	
<i>The First Circle.</i> By Alexandr I. Solzhenitsyn	
<i>Stefan T. Possony</i>	80
<i>Years of the Golden Cockerel. The Last Romanov Tsars.</i> By Sidney Harcave	
<i>Clarence A. Manning</i>	81
<i>August 21: The Rape of Czechoslovakia.</i> By Colin Chapman	
<i>John G. Lexa</i>	84
<i>The 900 Days. The Siege of Leningrad.</i> By Harrison E. Salisbury	
<i>Lew Shankowsky</i>	86
<i>Never Ending Flower.</i> By Susie Younger	
<i>Geraldine Fitch</i>	88
<i>The War for the World.</i> By Major General Thomas A. Lane	
<i>Joseph S. Roucek</i>	89
UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS	91

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE:

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, Professor of Economics at Georgetown University; in October, 1966, he was elected President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America for the sixth consecutive term; chairman, National Captive Nations Committee in Washington; author and lecturer; his latest book, *The Vulnerable Russians*, was published by Pageant Press in November, 1967; in December, 1968 he attended Second Conference of World Anti-Communist League, held in Saigon, South Vietnam.

IVAN O. KANDYBA, born in 1930 in the Volodava District of Pidlisia (now part of Poland); in 1953 he graduated from the faculty of law at the Ivan Franko University in Lviv, Ukraine, and worked as an attorney; in 1961 he was sentenced to 15 years at hard labor for writing a treatise on Ukraine's right to secession from the USSR; he is reportedly now at the Dubravno labor camp in the Mordovian ASSR.

CLARENCE A. MANNING, Ph.D., former Associate Professor of Slavic Languages at Columbia University; author of several books on literature and history of Ukraine and other Eastern European countries; has completed his latest book on the parallel between the American and Ukrainian revolutions, which will be published soon.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK, Ph.D., author, co-author and co-editor of some 90 books; has written articles for leading American and foreign periodicals; was Visiting Professor in numerous American, Canadian and European colleges and universities; former Professor and Chairman of the Department of Sociology and Political Sciences at the University of Bridgeport; now on the staff of Queensborough Community College of the City University of New York.

ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI, Ph.D., former Deputy and Foreign Minister of the government of Ukraine; former professor at the Universities of Warsaw, the Ukrainian Free University in Prague, Visiting Professor at King's College in London, and Marquette University in Milwaukee; at present Visiting Professor at Catholic University of America and Director of the Ukrainian Studies Center at the Ukrainian Catholic Seminary in Washington, D.C.; President of Shevchenko Scientific Society in New York.

NOTE TO OUR CONTRIBUTORS

That manuscripts may be processed more readily and that precision in meaning not suffer from extensive editorial revision, contributors whose native language is other than English are respectfully urged to have their papers scrutinized by a colleague experienced in writing for professional journals in the English-speaking world.

A FRESH LOOK AT A DEDICATED ENEMY

Editorial

In 1969 Ukrainians the world over observe two of the most important dates of their history: the 51st anniversary of Ukraine's independence and the 50th anniversary of the Act of Union. The latter event took place on January 22, 1919, one year after the full and unqualified independence of Ukraine had been proclaimed by the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, in its famous Fourth *Universal* (January 22, 1918).

These anniversaries are no commemorations of occurrences in a time divorced from ours, no celebrations that have merely nostalgic value. The spirit of free Ukraine is very much alive, as Moscow daily learns to its chagrin. Ukraine is a pivotal country in the USSR. Its sheer economic and industrial weight, its size, the numerical strength of its population — "Too many to kill off!" Stalin once lamented — and, above all, its undying desire for freedom and independence — all these are constants which enter importantly into the political equation embracing East and West.

As the new Administration of President Richard M. Nixon settles down in Washington to its awesome task of preserving freedom and human dignity in the face of the predatory USSR, it would be well to cast a fresh look at that conglomerate state which thrives only on aggression and our accommodation.

RE-STALINIZATION OF THE SOVIET RUSSIAN EMPIRE

After its invasion of Czechoslovakia last August, there can be no doubt that the Kremlin is on the march again. The pattern remains the same. Once it stomped out the fires of freedom in the neighboring state, Moscow set about repairing the damage incurred by its aggression. Internally, it consolidated ranks under the guidance of the "hard-liners," especially those who had pressured for the quick and ruthless liquidation of the Dubcek liberalization program in Czechoslovakia lest the fires of freedom spread to the tinderbox that is their slave empire.

Externally, the pattern called for deceit and propaganda to clear up the Soviet image, tarnished by the depredations in Czechoslovakia. Thus its apologia: it was merely acting within its "sphere of influence." And thus its sudden talk about reaching an "understanding" with the United States.

The American presidential elections had played nicely into the hands of the Kremlin overseers. The Czechoslovakia aggression did not elicit the American reaction it might have in a non-election year. A no longer strong NATO was scarcely heard. The "hard-liners" were vindicated: outside of a weak denunciation voiced here and there the latest Soviet Russian transgression went virtually unchallenged. Until the advent of the new President of the United States, there was an admirable opportunity for the Kremlin to mend its barbed-wire fences which the Kremlin did not overlook.

An incoming President does not make warlike noises upon assuming office. President Nixon was no exception, voicing the hope that "the era of confrontation has been replaced by an era of negotiation."

Nothing could have seemed better for the Kremlin, which has proceeded to talk out of one corner of its mouth about "peace and understanding," and, with the other, to order and implement a renewed policy of terror and Stalinist centralization both at home and in the satellite countries.

The term "understanding," we might underscore, is an indispensable weapon in the Russian propaganda arsenal. It is employed to allow us to indulge our wishful thinking as regards peace and a *détente* and, under its cover, to pursue their political and strategical objectives.

A reliable English publication recently warned against "*détentes*":

In Moscow today, policies are shaped around concepts of confrontation and ideological offensive on all sensitive fronts rather than on coexistence. This being so, it is hardly the right time for the West to try to repopularize the trite *détente* theme. A good time was had with that theme by propagandists, politicians, and statesmen in 1968 until the illusions it had created were shattered on August 21.

It is an over-simplification to protest that there is no alternative to *détente* in the nuclear age. By this is usually meant that the West must accommodate itself one way or another to situations created by the Kremlin.

With the Communist masters of Russia holding fast to the positions they capture and insisting on the extravagant price they usually charge for conceding an inch where they have encroached a mile, compromises can be

found at no better than half way — usually at the expense of Western interest, with the Russians pocketing the rest of the gains.¹

Unfortunately for the Russians, there is no indication whatsoever that the new American President will be complaisant as regards continued encroachment. Mr. Nixon knew about the nature of communism long before; as Vice-President, he met its Soviet personification in Mr. Khrushchev at the famous "kitchen debate." Indeed, he has always represented for the Kremlin a more aggressive and forthright America, as the calumny heaped upon him by Soviet leaders and the Soviet controlled press attest. An experienced statesman, Mr. Nixon is an old hand at Soviet Russian poker games.

His trip to five Western European nations, including a visit to harassed and beleaguered Berlin, is not only in line with his stated policy of prior consultation with the Western allies before the undertaking of any "summit" talks with the Communist leaders. It is also a demonstration of U.S. determination to impress upon the peoples of Europe, including those behind the Iron Curtain, that the United States is not "withdrawing" from Europe, nor that it will be intimidated by any display of Soviet Russian force and saber-rattling.

THE SOVIET SPHERE OF INFLUENCE

During the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact powers last summer much was said and written about the fact that Czechoslovakia was located within the "Soviet sphere of influence."

There is no question as to where it begins — in the Kremlin, heart of Muscovy — but there is considerable doubt as to where it ends. For the Kremlin, of course, the "sphere" is boundless. It already includes the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, such as Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkestan. There are many still alive today who can remember the three *free* Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; but these lands are supposedly within the "Soviet sphere of influence." One must be under thirty not to recall the "satellite" countries as independent nations — but now Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania have somehow become included within the expanding Soviet sphere. Even Yugoslavia does not escape; as a "socialist country" (by Moscow's definition!), it is considered to

¹ "Russia is Untrustworthy and Unpredictable," *Intelligence Digest*, No. 363, February 1969, London.

belong as well. So does Finland — by virtue of several treaty arrangements dictated by the Soviet Union.

Since the Black Sea is considered to be a Russian lake, this has the effect of sucking the countries around into the Soviet orbit. The Russians have seen to it that anti-American and pro-Soviet demonstrations take place in Turkey.

It is a fact that Cuba is in the "Soviet sphere of influence." This is due not to any convenient geography, however, but to ineptitude and timidity on the part of the United States.

But if Eastern Europe and the non-Russian nations in the USSR are indeed in the "Soviet sphere of influence," this is true not because of any predestined or special affinity toward Russia, but simply because the Red Army and the Soviet secret police moved into these countries and ruthlessly enslaved them.

The Red fleet is currently extending Soviet encroachment into the Mediterranean and its littoral. Targets slated for absorption are the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the North Pacific. Meanwhile, North Africa, especially Algeria, is becoming a Soviet air and naval base, preparing the ground for the whole African continent to be claimed by Moscow as being within its purview.

Pushing deeper into Europe, Moscow asserts Berlin, not only East Berlin, but all *Berlin*, is the prize zone of the "Soviet sphere of influence." Moscow further asserts that it has the right to intervene in West Germany by military means in order to defend "socialism" and prevent the "revival of Nazism or militarism."

As James Burnham, noted American political writer, sardonically pointed out:

We may lament what goes on in their sphere, but of course it's none of our business really, and besides there's nothing we can do about it anyway... We'll just get out the atlas and check the Soviet Sphere so there won't be any misunderstanding about exactly where we're staying out of... "The Soviet Sphere," that is to say, is the globe itself. Isn't that what the Communists have always told us?²

THE WEAKNESSES OF THE AGGRESSOR

But despite the ever-growing menace of Communist Russia, the West still has a chance to survive, more, even to achieve victory. This is not because of any innate wisdom and sagacity. Rather, it is because of the nature of Communist Russia itself.

²James Burnham, "The Discord of the Spheres," *National Review*, February 25, 1969, p. 165, New York.

The USSR is a conglomeration of Russian and non-Russian peoples. Vitally important is the fact — woefully unappreciated in the West — that the various cultures and nations making up the Soviet empire cannot be homogenized by Russification and Sovietization. The USSR remains a seething caldron of nationality conflicts.

Within the satellite sphere, Moscow also has acute troubles. Despite its unremitting efforts to “consolidate Eastern Europe” politically, economically and militarily, it can produce no tangible or lasting results. COMENCON, the Soviet-bloc economic organization, is torn by dissension, and Moscow is unable even to call a COMENCON conference. The most determined opposition against Moscow’s aggressive designs is being exerted by the coalition of Tito-Ceausescu. Their stand has gone in recent months from the defensive to the offensive in diplomacy, politics and the press and broadcasting.³

OPPRESSION IN UKRAINE: A PRIME SOURCE OF WEAKNESS

Within its own imperial domain Moscow encounters growing opposition on the part of intellectuals and the younger generation, who no longer can abide the dried-out and meaningless clichés of Communism. Trials and sentencing of Russian intellectuals are daily occurrences, indicating the degree of unrest and ideological ferment within the Russian elite.

In Ukraine, the situation is much worse for the Russians.

In the last few years hundreds of Ukrainian intellectuals, all of them reared and educated under the communist system, have been arrested, tried and sentenced for “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.” The utter failure of Communism is demonstrated by the fact that the *new* generation of Ukrainians is fed up with the oppressive Russification, the stifling of the free spirit and the destruction of the Ukrainian cultural and ethnic heritage.

Moscow, of course, cannot admit its Communistic and genocidal bankruptcy. In 1967 the KGB made extensive arrests throughout Western Ukraine of many young Ukrainian men and women under the pretext that they belonged to a secret organization, “The Ukrainian National Front,” which was said to have as its political objective the secession of Ukraine from the USSR. In 1968 the KGB organs conducted a “purge” among the Ukrainians in the city of

³ Tad Szulc, “East European Defiance of Soviet Reviving Despite Czech Invasion,” *The New York Times*, Feb. 20, 1969.

Dnipropetrovsk because these Ukrainians dared to protest against the lawlessness of the Soviet security organs.

On November 26, 1968, a fire destroyed the Church of St. George in the Vydubetsky Monastery in Kiev, along with its priceless Slavic and Hebrew manuscripts. The Ukrainian archives included historical documents from the Czarist and Hapsburg past, when Ukraine was divided between Russian and Austro-Hungarian rule. Also to be recalled is that on May 14, 1964, a library employee named Pohruzhalsky was tried for setting fire to the library of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev, which destroyed thousands of documents on Ukrainian history and culture. And there is book-burning in general — for example, *Sobor* (The Cathedral), a novel by Oles Honchar, went up in smoke.

The New York Times commented recently on the significance of the the oppressive measures being exerted on the Ukrainians:

...To Ukrainians living in this country and Canada, and to many analysts of Soviet affairs, the fires have political implications concerning the whole problem of national minorities under Soviet Russian rule.

Cultural and religious suppression of the Jews of the Soviet Union has been widely noted through the years. *The Ukrainian nationality and heritage has been a more intermittent target of the Kremlin's drive for cultural assimilation.*

Starting with the arrests and secret trials of dozens of Ukrainian intellectuals in the autumn of 1965, there is mounting evidence of a Soviet police drive to clamp down on dissident writers and teachers whose calls for cultural freedom are blended into their pride in the Ukrainian national heritage.

Soviet spokesmen often denounce this interest in the pre-revolutionary culture as "bourgeois nationalism," anti-Soviet and subversive. *The existence of nationalist dissent in the Ukraine is cited by Western analysts as one of the main reasons why the Kremlin decided to occupy Czechoslovakia last August and reverse the liberalization movement in Prague, before its effects spread across the Carpathian Mountains to Western Ukraine...* (all italics supplied —Ed.)⁴

The arrest on January 27, 1969 of Bishop Welychkovsky of the secret Ukrainian Catholic Church in Lviv indicates the scope of Soviet repression, intermittent in Czechoslovakia but continuous in Ukraine.

Ukraine, as the largest non-Russian nation, is the veritable "Achilles Heel" of the USSR, yet it must be remembered that there are scores of other peoples in the slave empire that are equally irreconcilable to Russian domination.

⁴ Peter Grose, "Archive Fires in Ukraine Stirring Suspicions of a Plot," *The New York Times*, February 20, 1969.

MOSCOW'S ETERNAL OBJECTIVE: WORLD DOMINATION

Despite these grave weaknesses inside the Soviet Russian empire, Moscow has never changed its primary objective: world conquest. It has never had to.

Of immeasurable help has been the distracting flow of history and the tension and drastic changes brought by science and technology — from the appearance of Hitler through burgeoning nationalism over the world down to the student agitation of the day. But equally it has been helped by the pervasive ignorance in the West of the nature and make-up of this essentially predatory empire. By and large, Soviet propaganda has been believed because there was no yardstick of knowledge against which to measure it. Its amoral force and Western ignorance have combined to perpetuate and even permit the aggrandizement of the largest empire in history.

Thus as a new American president takes center stage of the free world, Moscow, as indefatigably as ever, is consolidating its position in Central Europe, penetrating the Mediterranean, making inroads into the Middle East and Africa. Simultaneously it is conducting, as mendaciously as ever, its propaganda through massive foreign broadcasting and "front" organizations, and is burrowing ever deeper into the free world through subversion and its far-reaching espionage tentacles.

Yet the free world disposes of greater and more powerful resources than the whole terror-bound communist world. Our resources include a matchless economic strength, political dynamism, commercial, industrial and technical know-how. Most important of all, we dispose of free men.

It is because of this latter attribute that the Soviet totalitarian regime cannot ultimately countenance us. We must be destroyed if the goal of Soviet world domination can even begin to become a reality.

This is the avowed enemy that Mr. Nixon must clearly see. At any Soviet Russian poker table, may he see that the Soviet Russians hold but two cards, both self-defeating: force and deceit. These may take a hand or two, but they cannot possibly win humankind.

UKRAINE'S RIGHT OF SECESSION FROM THE USSR

By IVAN O. KANDYBA

EDITOR'S NOTE: The Spring and Summer issues of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* (No. 1 and No. 2, 1968) carried articles by Vyacheslav M. Chornovil and Svyatoslav Y. Karavansky, Ukrainian writers both of whom are now in Soviet jails for advocating national and cultural freedom for Ukraine. The Autumn 1968 issue (No. 3) featured another article, "'Soviet Legality' in the Light of Trials and Detention of Ukrainians" by Yuriy Shukhevych-Berezynsky and Volodymyr Horbovy, dealing with their plight in Soviet imprisonment.

The present essay is an important document prepared by Ivan O. Kandyba, 38-year-old Ukrainian lawyer who was sentenced to 15 years at hard labor in 1961 for advocating the secession of Ukraine from the USSR. From his jail cell Kandyba addressed this letter to Peter Y. Shelest, first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. In a long process of struggle for the right of the Ukrainian people to be their own masters in their country, and against the Russification of Ukraine, the Kandyba letter treats of the political element in the struggle which has been spearheaded by Ukrainian intellectuals in the last few years.

This document, circulated by the hundreds of copies in Ukraine, eventually reached the West. It was published in the December 1967 issue of the Ukrainian-language monthly magazine *Suchasnist* (Contemporary Times), Munich, Germany.

Its importance lies in its demonstration of the fact that the extensive Ukrainian independence movement in Ukraine is now in the hands of young people, formed and educated under the Soviet system. It also shows why the Moscow puppets in Ukraine, such as Shelest, Grechko, Kirilenko and Podgorny, insisted on the occupation of Czechoslovakia. They knew that further spread of freedom would engulf Ukraine and thus threaten their rule as Communist martinets and *gauleiters* in the service of totalitarian Communist Russia.

(Since this article was set, *The New York Times* of February 24, 1969 reported that V. Chornovil has been released after 18 months in a Soviet jail; he was originally sentenced on November 15, 1967 to three years, but the sentence was later reduced to 18 months. He is reported to be free in his home in Lviv — Ed.)

P a r t I

IN THE NAME OF THE ENSLAVER

Political prisoner KANDYBA, IVAN
OLEKSIYOVYCH,
Mordovian ASSR, Postal District
Yavas, P. O. Box 385/11.

Confidential

Case No 1961.

V E R D I C T

In the name of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

On May 20, 1961, the Lviv Provincial Court Collegium for Criminal Cases, consisting of:

President: S. I. Rudyk,
People's Jurors: P. M. Lyuborets, K. M. Hershunenko,
Secretary: V. H. Lyubashchenko,
Prosecutor: I. I. Nebyamenko,
Attorneys: S. M. Orhanovych, Y. T. Koval,
B. A. Bardyakov, H. N. Tkachenko,
V. V. Honcharov, A. F. Yurko,
T. A. Sapovych,

in a closed court session in Lviv investigated the charges against (excerpts from page 1 of the verdict):

1) LUKYANENKO, Lev Hryhorovych, born in 1927 in the village of Khrypivka, District Horodnyansky, Province of Chernihiv, Ukrainian by nationality, citizen of the USSR, of peasant birth, member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (expelled from the Communist Party as a result of this charge), married. In 1957 he was graduated from the law faculty of the Lomonosov State University in Moscow. After graduation he worked as a state propagandist in the Radekhivsky and Hlynyansky party regional committees. Beginning on February 1, 196..., he was a member of the Hlynyansky legal consultation Office of the Province of Lviv;

2) KANDYBA, Ivan Oleksiyovych, born in 1930 in the village of Stulno, District Volodavsky (Pidlissia, now part of Poland), Ukrainian by nationality, citizen of the USSR, of peasant birth, not a party member, unmarried. In 1953 he was graduated from the law faculty of the Franko State University in Lviv. Since then he has worked in the Justice Departments of Lviv and Province of Lviv — as notary in the Shevchenko district of Lviv, as attorney in the Hlynyansky Province, and at the time of his arrest, as attorney in the Peremyshlyansky legal consultation office in the Province of Lviv. He lived in Lviv, Dekabrysty Street 57/37;

3) VIRUN, Stepan Martynovych, born in 1932, in the village of Strumline, District Lopatynsky (now Brodivsky), Province of Lviv, Ukrainian by nationality, citizen of the USSR, member of the CPSU (expelled from the CPSU as a result of this charge), married, did not complete a higher education. After his graduation in 1955 from the higher party school in Lviv, he worked in the Comsomol (The Young Communist League — translator's note) and the party in the Ivano-Frankivsky Comsomol regional committee, the Lviv Comsomol provincial committee, and, at the time of his arrest, as a state propagandist in the Radekhivsky party regional committee;

4) LIBOVYCH, Oleksander Semenovych, born in 1935, in the village of Hludno, District Berezhivsky (now Lemkivshchyna, part of Poland), Ukrainian by nationality, of peasant birth, a citizen of the USSR, not a party member, married. In 1958 he was graduated from the Lviv Agricultural Institute and worked as an engineer-geodesist in the Province of Lviv Agricultural Administration;

5) LUTSKIV, Vasyl Stepanovych, born in 1935, in the village of Pavliv, District Radekhivsky, Province of Lviv, of peasant birth, Ukrainian by nationality, USSR citizen, member of the CPSU (expelled from the CPSU as a result of this charge), unmarried. Completed nine grades of school. Until his arrest he worked as director of the village club in Pavliv.

The above persons were charged under Paragraph 56, No. 1, and Paragraph 64 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. SSR.

6) BOROVMYTSKY, Yosyp Yulianovych, born in 1932, in Syanik (Lemkivshchyna, now part of Poland), of working-class parents, Ukrainian by nationality, citizen of the USSR, member of the CPSU (expelled from the CPSU as a result of this charge), married. In 1956 he was graduated from the law faculty of the Franko State University of Lviv, and until his arrest worked as an investigative officer in the District Peremyshlyansky, Province of Lviv, prosecutor's office; and

7) KIPYSH, Ivan Zakharovych, born in 1923, in the village of Hludno, District Berezhivsky (Lemkivshchyna, now part of Poland), Ukrainian by nationality, of peasant birth, citizen of the USSR, not a party member, married. Completed eight grades of school. Until his arrest he worked in the militia organs of Lviv.

The above two persons were charged under Paragraph 19 and Paragraph 56, No. 1, of the Criminal Code of the Ukr. SSR.

ILLEGAL ORGANIZATION

All of us were charged with the following (excerpts from the record of the trial):

"The defendant, L. H. Lukyanenko, being opposed to the Soviet order, has since 1957 been cultivating the idea of Ukr.SSR's breakway from the USSR, undermining the authority of the CPSU, and slandering the theories of Marxism-Leninism.

"Aware of the defeat of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, and especially of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in the western provinces of Ukraine after the Great War for the Fatherland, and hoping to find favorable surroundings for his hostile activities, L. H. Lukyanenko managed to obtain a job in the Province of Lviv. While working in the Radekhivsky

district, Lukyanenko made criminal contacts with the defendant, S. M. Virun, who was also anti-Soviet in his views, and together in November 1959 they planned the formation of a nationalist organization — the "Ukrainian Workers and Peasants Union" (UWPU).

"The program of the UWPU was written later by L.H. Lukyanenko. As is obvious from this program, the UWPU had as its goal: a struggle against the Soviet state and social order and against the CPSU and the Soviet government, a breakaway of the Ukr. SSR from the USSR, and the formation of a so-called 'Independent Ukraine'; the program falsified the history of Ukraine, justified the activities of the former nationalist underground, and indicated a deep conspiracy in all the activities of the UWPU.

"The defendants L. H. Lukyanenko and S.M. Virun agreed between themselves about the text of the program of the UWPU and L. H. Lukyanenko printed the text of the program on his typewriter. Together with S. M. Virun, L. H. Lukyanenko began recruiting members for the UWPU and succeeded in drawing the defendants I. S. Kandyba, V. S. Lutskiv and O.S. Libovych into the organization.

"As members of the UWPU and supporting its program, Lukyanenko, Virun, Kandyba, Lutskiv and Libovych discussed anti-Soviet subjects, sought out unstable people and former members of the OUN for recruitment into the UWPU, and formulated the program of the UWPU and the means for its realization.

"On November 6, 1960, a meeting of the leaders of the UWPU was held in Kandyba's Lviv apartment. Lukyanenko, Virun, Kandyba and Lutskiv were present at the meeting. This meeting was called to plan the form and methods of struggle against the Soviet order and subversive nationalistic anti-Soviet activities.

"The program of the UWPU, its goals and methods of opposition were discussed at this meeting.

"In their speeches at the meeting, Lukyanenko, Virun, Kandyba and Lutskiv agreed that the final goal of the UWPU is the breakaway of the Ukr.SSR from the USSR. Many slanderous remarks were made against Marxist-Leninist theory. At that stage the participants of the meeting gave special attention to questions of organization, enlarging the organization, and forming centers in business and industrial establishments, institutions, districts and provinces of the Ukr.SSR. The defendant Lutskiv urged the need for increasing activity in the army and armed opposition against Soviet order.

"A second meeting of the UWPU was set for January 22, 1961, but did not take place because the leaders had been arrested.

"Thus, L. H. Lukyanenko, S. M. Virun, I. S. Kandyba, V.S. Lutskiv and O. S. Libovych committed treason against the Fatherland — the USSR, organized the subversive organization UWPU, held as their goal a struggle against the Soviet state order, the CPSU and its Marxist-Leninist theories, and aimed at the breakaway of the Ukr.SSR from the USSR and the creation of a so-called 'Independent Ukraine.'

"The defendants Kipysh and Borovnytsky received texts of the program of the UPWU. Fully aware of its anti-Soviet contents and that it was directed against the Soviet state and the CPSU, they, nevertheless, read the program and concealed it as a means to committing a crime of treason against the USSR,

separation of the Ukr.SSR from the USSR, and the creation of a so-called 'Independent Ukraine.'"

The verdict concludes (pp. 2-3 of the verdict):

"When determining the extent of punishment, the Court Collegium took into consideration defendant Lukyanenko's position as a state propagandist in the Radekhivsky Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine at the time of the organization of the UWPU, his leading and organizing role in the UWPU, and the exceptional cynicism with which he led the opposition against the Soviet order and the CPSU.

"When determining the extent of punishment for Virun, Kandyba, Lutskiv, Libovych, Kipysh and Borovnytsky, the Court Collegium took into consideration the personalities of the defendants, the degree of their guilt and the dangerousness of their crimes.

"On the basis of paragraphs 324, 333, 334 and 335 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR, the Court Collegium of the Lviv Provincial Court.

SENTENCED:

Lukyanenko, Lev Hryhorovych, on the basis of Paragraph 56, No. 1, of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR, to the death penalty — by firing squad, and a confiscation of his property; on the basis of Paragraph 64 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR, to fifteen years imprisonment in corrective labor camps; and for his combined crimes, on the basis of Paragraph 56, No. 1, CC Ukr.SSR, to death by firing squad and a confiscation of his property.

Kandyba, Ivan Oleksiyovych, on the basis of Paragraph 56, No. 1, CC Ukr.SSR, to fifteen years of imprisonment in corrective labor camps; on the basis of Paragraph 64, CC Ukr.SSR, to twelve years of imprisonment in corrective labor camps; and for his combined crimes, on the basis of Paragraph 56, No. 1, CC Ukr.SSR, to fifteen years of imprisonment in corrective labor camps and a confiscation of his property.

Virun, Stepan Marynovych, on the basis of Paragraph 56, No. 1, CC Ukr.SSR, to eleven years of imprisonment in corrective labor camps and a confiscation of his property; on the basis of Paragraph 64, CC Ukr.SSR, to ten years of imprisonment in corrective labor camps; and for his combined crimes, on the basis of Paragraph 56, No. 1, CC Ukr.SSR, to eleven years of imprisonment in corrective labor camps and a confiscation of his property.

Lutskiv, Vasyl Stepanovych, on the basis of Paragraph 56, No. 1, CC Ukr.SSR, to ten years of imprisonment in corrective labor camps and a confiscation of his property; on the basis of Paragraph 64, CC Ukr.SSR, to ten years of imprisonment in corrective labor camps; and for his combined crimes, on the basis of Paragraph 56, No. 1, CC Ukr.SSR, to ten years of imprisonment in corrective labor camps and a confiscation of his property.

Libovych, Oleksander Semenovych, on the basis of Paragraph 56, No. 1, CC Ukr.SSR, to ten years of imprisonment in corrective labor camps and a confiscation of his property; on the basis of Paragraph 64, CC Ukr.SSR, to ten years of imprisonment in corrective labor camps; and for his combined crimes, on the basis of Paragraph 56, No. 1, CC Ukr.SSR, to ten years of imprisonment in corrective labor camps and confiscation of his property.

"The Court will deduct from the properties of L. H. Lukyanenko, S. M. Virun, I. O. Kandyba and V.S. Lutskiv, I. Z. Kipysh and Y. You. Borovnytsky 50 rubles each to cover court costs.

"The same preventive measure — detention under guard — is to be applied to all those sentenced.

"The verdict may be appealed to the Supreme Court of the Ukr.SSR within seven days from the day of receiving the copy of this verdict.

President: Rudyk,

People's jurors: Lyuborets and Hershunenکو.

This is a copy of the original: Head Of the Lviv

Provincial Court

signature (S. Rudyk)

(pp. 7-8 of the verdict)."

DRAFT OF ORGANIZATION'S PROGRAM

As is evident from the above verdict, the charges preferred against us were very serious and resulted in very severe sentences. But these charges are not consistent with the actual circumstances of our case; our acts were not such that they should have been considered as treason — they were not even crimes.

I do not deny the fact that we had in our possession, read, and gave others to read a brochure provisionally entitled "A Draft of the Program of the UWPU" which was written by Lukyanenko, but its subject is not as dangerous as it was made out to be in the verdict.

The brochure analyzes the existing order on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theories. From this point of view it severely criticizes the policies of the Party and the government in the years of famine in Ukraine, in 1933-34, and the mass repressions in the 30's in the eastern provinces of Ukraine; in other words, that period which has since been politely named the "personality cult." The conclusions drawn in this brochure regarding this period did not deviate much from the official appraisal of this period made by the party and government leaders at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

Shortcomings of the post-cult period and bureaucratic methods in the administration of national economy were criticized; the centralized method of planning in industry and agriculture was condemned; the curtailment of rights of the trade unions whose leaders had become directors' right-hand men in violating socialist justice was emphasized; policies towards peasants who suffer social, political and cultural oppression and whose position does not differ at all from the position of the serfs of the 17th-19th centuries were strongly criticized.

This brochure was particularly critical of the nationality policy in Ukraine throughout the entire period of the Soviet regime; the mass accusations of nationalism leveled against millions of Ukrainians and their physical destruction, including the liquidation of thousands of political, academic and cultural leaders of Ukraine; the proscription of hundreds of Ukrainian poets, writers, historians and leaders in art and culture.

The brochure also pointed out various limitations of Ukraine's political and economic rights. It stated that Ukraine is deprived of sovereignty, deprived of the right to enter into political and economic treaties with other states of our planet. The Ukrainian language has not become the official state language; it has been forced out of state organs, out of academic associations, out of institutions of secondary and higher learning, out of the sphere of business, out of the social and cultural life of the nation. It further stated that Ukraine is in fact an appendage of Russia, that two-thirds of Ukraine's products are shipped outside her borders, and that the imperialistic Russian chauvinistic policies weigh heavily over all branches of her economy.

On the basis of the described position held by Ukraine, the brochure concluded that Ukraine does not have the opportunity for a normal political, economic and cultural development within the framework of the USSR, that in certain aspects her position is much worse now than it was under Czarist rule, and that actually she is a colony of Moscow, or at best has only a cultural autonomy.

The author concluded that under such circumstances, in order that the Ukrainian nation be given an opportunity for normal development of its statehood, Ukraine should secede from the USSR on the basis of Paragraphs 14 and 17 of the Constitution of the Ukr.SSR and the USSR, respectively, and become an absolutely independent state.

The brochure stated that in order to achieve this it was essential to form an organization provisionally named the Ukrainian Workers and Peasants Union, which could legally and in accordance with the Constitution agitate and propagate among the Ukrainian people the separation of the Ukr.SSR from the USSR and which could present this question for realization to the highest organs of state.

It also stated that if the majority of the Ukrainian population should not support this proposition, the organization would be disbanded.

Should this idea be realized, however then the political order of this independent Ukraine would be Soviet, and the economic order — socialist.

Ukraine, as an independent and socialist state, would remain on friendly terms with other socialist states.

"The Draft of the Program of the UWPU" was included in the case record in Vol. 10.

Following are a few excerpts from it:

"We are fighting for an independent Ukraine, which, while firmly ensuring the material and spiritual needs of its citizens on the basis of a socialized economy, could evolve towards communism, and secondly, a Ukraine in which all citizens could truly make use of their political freedoms and participate in determining the direction of the economic and political development of Ukraine — this is the final struggle of our "party." (p. 3 of the "Program")

"The question of creating an Independent Ukraine will in the end be decided not by the Party, but by the entire Ukrainian nation.

"Therefore, the aim of this first stage of our struggle is centered in gaining democratic freedoms, essential to the organization of the entire Ukrainian nation towards a struggle for creating an independent national state. The means for achieving this end are peaceful and constitutional (p. 3 of 'The Draft of the Program of the UWPU')."

In its verdict the court falsified "The Draft of the Program of the UWPU" by calling it a program of the UWPU. From the verdict it would seem that:

1) an organization under the name of UWPU had already existed,

2) the organization under the name of UWPU had a program and members of the UWPU were putting into practice their means towards realizing it.

But all of this is not consistent with what actually happened. This kind of ideological purposefulness and a completed organization was created by the investigation organs of the KGB (Secret Police — translator's note) of the Province of Lviv in their offices, and formalized finally by the court in its so-called conference room while they compiled the verdict; nothing of this nature existed among us prior to our arrest.

There were several of us who saw many types of injustice around us — mass violations of social justice and infringements on the political rights of citizens, national oppression, the spread of imperialistic Russian chauvinism, oppression of the peasants, and many other abnormalities.

Thus, there was no organization and no program; no one took any oaths; no one paid any membership fees; there was no defined party discipline; there was no nucleus of leadership, each of us considering himself free in all respects.

On November 6, 1960, five of us met in order to create an organization. In addition to the four mentioned in the verdict, there was also Mykola Vashchuk, originally from what was once Novo-Mylyatynsky (now Kamyano-Buzky) district, Province of Lviv, who was at that time studying in a Higher Party School. He informed the KGB about us. As a result we were arrested and our case was brought to trial. At this meeting, and not "mass gathering" as it was called by the court, we discussed "The Draft of the Program of the UWPU" and decided to change it in several respects. We decided to compile a new draft of the program which would reflect the essential struggle for Ukrainization, for unlimited political rights of citizens, for democratization in general, and other questions. The question of Ukraine's separation from the USSR was not to enter into the new draft. We decided to meet again when the new draft was completed in order to discuss it and approve it, after which this proposal would have become a program document. Only then would an organization have been formed, the members of which would have been bound to uphold the designated position and put them into practice with a view to achieving our goal. Only then would there have been an organization and a program.

We presented evidence for all of this at both the preliminary and the court investigations. In addition to this, the court had such a document as Lukyanenko's "Notes," which he compiled after our meeting on November 6, 1960, before the arrest. In them he faithfully recorded the entire course of our meeting — what questions were examined and what decisions were adopted.

However, the investigative organs and the court did not take this evidence into consideration, omitting it from both the charge and the verdict. Obviously this kind of evidence did not suit their case, for it would have left them no grounds on which to lay criminal charges, and even if one or two of us had been charged, we could not have been charged with treason, but at worst only with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.

Thus, the investigative organs and court found it more convenient to take "The Draft of the Program of the UWPU" as the basis for their charge. But as we stated above, even under these circumstances there can be no talk of classifying our acts as treason

— even with this complete falsification of “The Draft of the Program of the UWPU.”

Thus, in its verdict, the court interprets the “Draft’s” criticism of Party and Soviet organs and their leaders as a struggle against the Soviet government and social order, a struggle against the CPSU and its Marxist-Leninist theory. The court also changed the word “separation” used in discussing the question of Ukraine’s leaving the USSR in accordance with Paragraphs 14 and 17 of the Constitution of the Ukr.SSR and the USSR to “breakaway” in order to give the practical realization of this question a connotation of a violent nature. In this they see this so-called treason, which is dealt with in Paragraph 56, No. 1, of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR. They led us to understand this not only in conversations. In his accusation the prosecutor told us that our treason lies in the fact that we supposedly “conspired with an aim to taking over power”; in other words, we violated the last article of Paragraph 56, No. 1, of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR. But there is no concrete mention of this anywhere. The verdict does not state what this treason consists of, whereas our repeated petitions to various Court and Party institutions to define this exactly, always produce answers which avoid the issue and contain only general phrases such as “because the court’s designation of your crimes is correct, there are no grounds for changing the verdict.” We receive such answers endlessly, and even high, higher and the highest officials-bureaucrats of the court come up with such hasty replies as “the classification of the crime is correct; the sentence was handed down with all mitigating (!?) circumstances taken into consideration.” From this it would seem that we were done a favor and that we should be grateful for their humaneness.

In the “Applied Scientific Commentary on the Criminal Code of the RSFSR,” published by the All Union Institute for Study of Causes and Means to Prevent Crimes, edited by a doctor of law, Prof. V. S. Nikiforov, in 1964, in the chapter “Particularly Dangerous State Crimes,” in Paragraph 9, it says that “a conspiracy aimed at seizing power consists of a conspiracy by two or more persons to overthrow Soviet order and set up another state and social order in the USSR.” It would seem that attainment of any end, in this case the separation of Ukraine from the USSR by means of conspiracy, should be carried out by violent means.

Where do they see “conspiracy aimed at seizing power,” etc., in our acts, when “The Draft of the Program of the UWPU” pro-

posed that Ukraine's separation from the USSR be realized by peaceful means — by means of a national referendum in absolute accordance with Paragraphs 14 and 17 of the Constitutions of the Ukr.SSR and the USSR? Of what then does our treason consist?

WORK OF MOSCOW'S CHAUVINISTS

According to Paragraph 2 of the chapter on "Particularly Dangerous State Crimes" it seems that "treason" consists of acts or omissions purposefully committed by a Soviet citizen to harm the state independence, territorial inviolability or military strength of the Soviet state, and includes the execution of one or several definite acts which are listed in Paragraph 64 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (Paragraph 56, No. 1, CC Ukr.SSR which deals with treason), namely:

- 1) to go over to the enemy (we were not accused of this),
- 2) to be involved in espionage (we were not accused of this),
- 3) to hand over state or military secrets to a foreign country (we were not accused of this),
- 4) to escape abroad or to refuse to return from abroad (we were not accused of this),
- 5) to give aid to a foreign state in carrying out hostile acts against the USSR (we were not accused of this),
- 6) to conspire with a view of seizing power (we have proved above that we have not been guilty of such an act).

Again and again the question comes up — of what does our "treason" consist? In order to betray a homeland, one must first have one. We do not have a homeland because for centuries it has been under an oppressor's yoke; we have been deprived of a homeland. But it is clear to us why we are considered to be traitors of our homeland: only because we posed the possibility of freeing it from the oppressor's yoke. But that is another side of the question.

In order to make it clearer why we were made out to be traitors, it is necessary to say something about the people and the methods they used in the preliminary and court investigations. These persons were: the assistant prosecutor of the Province of Lviv, who is in charge of the investigative organs of the Lviv KGB, Starikov, a Russian chauvinist; our investigative officer from the Lviv KGB, Serhadayev, also a one hundred percent Russified chauvinist; the senior investigative officer of the Lviv KGB, Denisov, who was no better than the above two; the investigative officer Volodin, and the Russified Ukrainians: investigative officers Klymenko, Chorny

and others. All of them have lived scores of years in Ukraine, but they have not learned the Ukrainian language. Not because it was too difficult for them, but because they completely ignored it. Therefore, the investigation was carried on in Russian, a fact which violates Paragraph 90 of the Constitution of the Ukr.SSR, and Paragraph 19 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR — because they did not want to “soil the Russian language with a dog’s dialect.”

Prosecutor Starikov got so carried away that he brazenly boasted to Borovnytsky that he did not know Ukrainian, that the Ukrainian language does not deserve to be the state language, that the Ukrainian people are not capable of having statehood, that because of this B. Khmelnytsky surrendered Ukraine to the Russian state, and in 1922 Ukraine became part of the USSR. The head of the Lviv KGB, Shevchenko, did not differ in any way from the others.

All of them called us bandits, cutthroats, renegades and a number of other names, such as rabid nationalists and so on.

When it came to Ukraine’s right to leave the Soviet Union in accordance with Paragraphs 14 and 17 of the Constitution of the Ukr.SSR and the USSR, then all the above-mentioned officials told us that as educated people we should not pretend to be naive simpletons, because the mentioned paragraphs of the Constitutions were published not for practical adaptation, but for the benefit of the outside world. They added that the Ukrainian nation decided the fate of Ukraine once and for all by joining the USSR and it has not authorized us to consider the question of separation because it is inconvenient and unnecessary for the Ukrainian nation, while we are merely renegades.

Prosecutor Starikov, head of the investigation section Serhadeyev, and senior investigation officer Denisov, told Lukyanenko and Virun that if it ever should come to the point where the majority of the Ukrainian people express a desire to break away from the USSR, the Soviet government would not hesitate to use force in order to keep Ukraine in the Soviet Union.

Throughout the entire preliminary investigation, these men violated Paragraph 22 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR which forbids the investigative organs to obtain evidence from a defendant by means of force, threats, or other illegal acts.

Shevchenko told Lukyanenko that we could be as stubborn as we wished, because although the law allows the investigative organs two months for investigation, if necessary they would hold us 5, 6, 8 months, and in the end get Lukyanenko and the rest of

us to sign whatever they liked. The investigative officers, Denisov, Klymenko and others, told us the same thing.

In each of our cells they placed agents. Lukyanenko shared his cell with a Lviv KGB secret agent; Kandyba shared his with agents Stepan Khomyak and Mykola Sokyrrko; Kipysh — with Oleksander Tarasovych, who had previously been in the same cell with Virun where he called himself Vakhula. All these agents pretended to be Ukrainian nationalists arrested for various fictitious crimes. At all times they attempted to provoke discussion of various anti-Soviet topics, told of various terrors which KGB organs were capable of perpetrating against prisoners, and assured us that the only alternative in order to avoid torture is to admit one's crimes, repent, and go along with various other compromising situations.

By means of threats and promises, head of the investigation section Serhadayev and senior investigative officer Denisov succeeded in making Lutskiv give them evidence which injured our case. As a reward, they promised to set him free even before the trial.

Thus, throughout the entire investigation Lutskiv alleged that Lukyanenko had tried to convince him to prepare for armed battle against the Soviet regime, because he believed that it would be impossible to attain Ukraine's separation from the USSR by peaceful means, and that at the November 6, 1960, meeting, Lukyanenko, Kandyba and Virun spoke about the necessity of preparing for armed battle at the earliest possible time, to place fellow-thinkers in the army, to recruit officers, and so on.

But Lutskiv was deceived and was sentenced along with the others as a traitor, after which they told him that it had been necessary to do so and that he would be released in two years time if he continued to cooperate with them in the camp. However, five years have passed and Lutskiv, like the others, is still in the camp. At the beginning of 1964 he began writing appeals to various justice and party organs, demanding his release. In these appeals he disclosed the names of all those who recruited him to give false evidence against us. This did not appeal to the authorities, and so they decided to place Lutskiv in a mental institution; he is at present spending his second year in the central hospital of the Mordovian camps — P. O. Box 385-3. Two copies of his statements, which I am including with this report, speak clearly of this.

Therefore, the question arises: could these men — rabid imperialistic Russian chauvinists and their supporters, Russified Ukrain-

ians — maintain an objective approach in investigating the case of men who had fallen into their hands essentially only because they had taken upon themselves the defense of their native language, their rights, their nation and its statehood against men very similar to those judging them? Obviously not. Their approach to this case was obviously prejudiced; in the position of power, they considered the matter with falsifications, ill-will and vengefulness, making us out to be ardent enemies of the people in the guise of so-called traitors.

Nor was their attitude towards us much better during the trial. Instead of holding the trial on the premises of the provincial court, or in a club or any other place to which the populace would have entry, the case was tried in the KGB isolator where we had been held throughout the preliminary investigation. This was done deliberately so that the trial would be held in absolute isolation from the people and the nation as a whole, regardless of the fact that according to Paragraph 91 of the Constitution of the Ukr.SSR and Paragraph 111 of the Constitution of the USSR, "trials in all courts of the USSR are public, in so far as the law does not foresee an exception." But what is constitutional (basic) law to men for whom criminal law is higher than the highest law and in which they find all sorts of loopholes? According to Paragraph 20 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR (Publicity of Trial), "the trial is in all cases public, except in cases which would endanger state secrets." Thus, the court concluded that our case is such that it "endangers state security" and therefore decided to completely isolate the trial from society and hear the case in the isolator, behind closed doors. For five days (May 16 to 20) the trial was held in the presence of only three judges (actually only one, the President of the Provincial Court, Rudyk, because the so-called people's jurors are only a formality for propaganda purposes), a secretary, the prosecutor, seven defendants, and a whole division of guards (soldiers) with guns and unsheathed bayonets. Deprived of moral support both inside this prison cage and from the outside, because almost no one, except our families, knew we had fallen into such hands and that we were being tried not by a court but by the travesty of a court, our protests were completely meaningless and futile. Under such circumstances, they did whatever they chose with us; we were helpless to do anything about it.

(To be continued)

"VIGOROUS RUSSIAN ROOTS OF THE MODERN SOCIETY OF JESUS"

By ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI

The November 5, 1967 issue of *Eastern Catholic Life* carried an interesting photo of two individuals, the Soviet ambassador to the United States and the then president of Boston College. The caption was explicit enough:

Father Michael P. Walsh, S. J., president of Boston College, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, took part in the opening of the first major showing of a Russian educational exhibit touring U.S. cities. The exhibit, "Education-USSR," is designed to display advances made in Russia during the 50 years following the Revolution of October, 1917. Father Walsh recalled that when the Jesuits were ordered to disperse in 1773, the writ of suspension was not executed in Russia because of the admiration of Catherine II for the Jesuit teachers and schools. "And so for 40 years," he said, "until the order was restored to its full life in 1814, it existed legally and flourished without restriction only in Russia. From these vigorous Russian roots the modern Society of Jesus took its rise. ."

(Since this photo was snapped, we may add, Father Walsh has been appointed President of Fordham University.)

Needless to say, Soviet propaganda promptly fastened its jaws on the fact that a Jesuit institution had opened its gates to Russian Communist infiltration. The January 1968 issue of *Soviet Life*, which appears in Washington, D. C., carried an enthusiastic report on the happening in Boston, accompanied by a photo showing Ambassador Dobrynin and the former president of Boston College at the opening ceremony of the vaunted "Education-USSR" exhibit.

It is with no little regret that we undertake this article. Yet we do wish to try to help Father Walsh as regards his embarrassing dilemma and his kow-towing position vis-a-vis "Russia" and Catherine the Great. At the same time we are equally desirous of scrutinizing these "vigorous Russian roots of the modern Society of Jesus." Indeed, it is our duty to do so and thereby help check any growth of a cult of gratitude to "Russia" as well as a Jesuit cult of gratitude to the Empress (who looms large in some Jesuit eyes at Fordham). For the growth of these cults would tarnish the image of the Jesuit

Order in the eyes of all the non-Russian nations of Eastern Europe and in those of their descendants in the United States and Canada, especially their scholars, educators and clergy.

Let us begin by providing the essence of the facts quoted by the former head of Boston College:

1. Because Catherine II did not allow the Jesuits to execute the Pope's writ of suspension of the Order, the Jesuits "existed legally and flourished without restriction only in Russia";

2. Catherine II was motivated in her action by her "admiration for Jesuit teachers and schools."

As a consequence, some Jesuits feel grateful to the Old Russian Empire, for here is where it happened, with the blessings of one of its well-known rulers, to boot. Moreover, some Jesuits proudly point before the American academic world and the public at large to the "vigorous Russian roots of the modern Society of Jesus."

It is not our intention here to discuss the strictly legal aspects of Canonical Law: whether or not the Order existed "legally in Russia" from the Roman Catholic viewpoint; whether or not the Jesuits in Russia needed the permission of the Orthodox Czarina to obey the Pope's behest, or whether or not the "flourishing" of the Order in Russia was a direct breach of the special oath of obedience solemnly made to the Pope by all Jesuits.

Instead, we should like, first, to re-examine Catherine II, the ruler and the woman, who seems to have been elevated by the modern Jesuit Order as their Russian guardian angel. Some even venerate her as godmother of the "vigorous Russian roots" — an extraordinary contribution to Muscovite imperial iconography. "There was and still is a mutual admiration between Catherine and the Jesuits" — such is the actual thinking of some Jesuits.

In passing, we may note that the *places* of Jesuit activities in "Russia" were not to be found on the Muscovite ethnographic territory, that is, in Muscovy. Instead, it was on the Byelorussian ethnic territory that the Order "flourished." Byelorussia is not Russia, Byelorussians are not Russians. Along with Ukraine, Byelorussia is a charter member of the United Nations.

**
*

As we see from the statement of the former president of Boston College, the notion of Russian Jesuit roots is closely linked with the "empire of Russia" and its empress, Catherine II, to whom the Russian imperialistic historians appended the title "great." Historians

of the free world, among them many belonging to the Jesuit Order, repeatedly parrot this epithet without bothering to examine and evaluate the facts of her life and rule.

Catherine II, as the Empress of Russia, was an unbridled tyrant and autocrat. Thus all the "roots" are imbedded in her rule over Russia (1762-1796). We present the following facts for their proper understanding.

1. These "roots" cannot be attributed either to "Russia" as a "Slavic empire" or to a "Russian" dynasty. Consequently, the attitude of the Jesuits and the national qualification of the "roots" are misdirected; they can be properly ascribed only to Catherine's original country and family.

Catherine was a German, originally a Lutheran, baptized Sophia Augusta, Princess of Anhalt-Zerbst; her father was a rather poor officer in the army of Frederick II of Prussia and her mother was a political agent of the Prussian King.

2. The Jesuit stress on Catherine's title, "Empress of Russia" (which the Russian imperialist Dobrynin must have enjoyed very much), requires an explanation how she acquired this title. The facts are as follows:

Empress Elizabeth (1741-1762) brought to Russia her nephew, Charles Peter Ulrich, Duke of Holstein, and made him a Grand Duke. On August 21, 1745, he married the future empress Catherine (who was re-baptized by the Orthodox Church as Catherine). In 1762 Peter ascended the throne, saved Frederick II of Prussia in the Seven Years War and concluded with him an alliance against Catholic Austria.

How did this German princess, wife of an originally German Czar, get on the throne of the "Romanovs?" What legal rights did she have to the throne of the "Russian empire?"

a) Catherine, when still the wife of Grand Duke Peter, became an English agent. She established close relations with the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams; she solicited and obtained substantial money from the British government.¹ Rightly, the Russian scholar Chechulin concludes "that Catherine shall reign was considered settled between her and Williams. . ." Where the mother was a Prussian agent, the daughter, Catherine, was an English one.

¹ *Russia, A History and Interpretation*. By Michael Florinsky, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1953, Vol. 1, p. 500.

b) On June 28, 1762, Catherine, with the help of Guard officers, in part her lovers and in part bought hirelings, organized a *coup d'état*. The army officers backed her, and the senate was forced to agree. Her husband, the Czar, was forced to abdicate. Exiled to the country estate of Ropsha, there on July 6, 1762, he was assassinated. Even Russian scholars who rate highly Catherine's political achievements in the territorial expansion of Russia cannot help remarking:

The impunity of Orlov and the other men involved (in the murder) suggests that the assassination, if not directly instigated by Catherine, had her approval...²

Let us state it openly: Catherine was a murderess. Horace Walpole in England coined the proper title for her: Catherine Slay-Tsar.³ In addition, Catherine was a liar, for she officially announced that her husband died of colic...⁴

c) But Catherine was not a simple murderess. She was a double murderess as well. As her husband and then she "ascended" the imperial throne, the lawful Czar, Ivan VI, since his deposition as a fifteen-month-old baby in 1741, was kept a prisoner in the notorious Czarist dungeon, the Schluesselburg Fortress. He was the great grandson of Peter the Great, a half-brother of Ivan. In 1764 a revolutionary attempt to liberate the child was made by an officer, Mirovich, but Catherine had ordered the prison guards to slay the lawful Czar in any such event. His identity was known only to her and her henchmen.

How Catherine masterminded this murder was tersely described by the famous Russian liberal, Alexander Herzen:

Catherine first ordered the captive's murder and then executed the luckless officer who had carried out her command...⁵

Thus, Catherine ruled the country for 34 years without any legitimate right to the throne, ignoring the claims to the throne of her illegitimate son Paul (fathered by one of her lovers, Saltykov). That such a thing was possible at all only underscores the moral decadence of the ruling classes of Russia and their Orthodox Synodal Church. It also demonstrates the absence of all Christian values and virtues in the Muscovite empire.

² Florinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 502.

³ *Catherine the Great and the Expansion of Russia*. By Gladys Scott Thompson. Collier Books, New York, 1965, p. 68.

⁴ *An Introduction to Russian History and Culture*. By Ivan Spector. D. van Nostrand Co., 1949, p. 85.

⁵ *Imperial Russia*, edited by Basil Dmytryshyn, 1967, p. 220.

Let us not forget, moreover, that two great events in the west occurred in Catherine's lifetime: the American and the French revolutions.

3. What kind of a woman was Catherine II, this angelic protector and benefactor of the Jesuits? The current vogue in the United States is to engage in "psycho-historical" studies (ever since the neo-Freudian Eric Ericson published his *Young Man Luther* in 1958). Now de Gaulle, Gandhi, Kiesinger, Bismarck, even Newton, are the subjects of such studies.⁶ Catherine II should prove an especially engrossing one.

Catherine II was indisputably one of the most immoral women in world history, ranking with the infamous Messalina of Rome. She ruled Russia with a male harem of lovers,⁷ who brought her to power and others who preserved her in power. Once losing her favor, however, her lovers were not discarded in disgrace; she no doubt would have felt such treatment as reflecting unfavorably on her exalted presence. Her lovers, instead, were honored with high positions and granted hundreds of thousands of acres of land, including thousands of serfs, from the confiscated property of the Orthodox Church, especially in Ukraine. Examples: the five Orlovs received 17 million rubles, Potemkin 50 million, Lanskoj 7 and a half million.

This arch-harlot had no less than 56 certified lovers,⁸ and her rule was a unique example of an autocracy ruled by a male harem. Catherine's last lover, when she was 67, was 22 years old.

4. What are the facts of Catherine's foreign policy? Her rule consisted of an unending series of political crimes against the neighboring states and nations through methods ranging from bribery and duplicity to military aggression and outright genocide. The result was "the world empire" of Russia.

According to the moral laws of the time imperialistic expansion and conquest were regarded as "leaves of glory." But, today, a Christian priest should certainly take a second look at Catherine's "glorious achievements" instead of boasting proudly of the "vigorous Russian roots" originating in her brutal, tyrannical and evil rule.

Let us examine some of the highlights of Russian foreign policy under the rule of this political gangsteress:

⁶ *Daedalus*, Vol. XCVII, No. 3, 1968.

⁷ *A History of Russia*, by Nicholas V. Riasanovsky. Oxford University Press, New York, 1963, p. 284.

⁸ *The Course of Russian History*. By Melvin C. Wren, second edition, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1963, p. 295.

a) *Courland* (present-day Latvia), was a small duchy between Russia and the Baltic, ruled by the son of the Polish King, Charles. By bribing the members of the diet and through the military aggression of Russian troops Catherine eliminated Charles, placing in his stead the notorious gangster, Biren. Subsequently, she made the country a dependency of Russia, in 1795 incorporating it fully into the empire;

b) *Poland*. There is no question that the Polish Constitution was written only for the gentry (but there was a constitution, nonetheless, as the West and the East were ruled by the absolutist "divine-rights" autocrats!). There were its *liberum veto*, its Catholic intolerance toward Orthodoxy, its elective office of the King, but the plight of the enserfed peasantry undermined the Commonwealth, which included also Lithuania, Byelorussia and Ukraine, and a Jewish community enjoying complete religious and cultural autonomy. There could have been an evolution of the Commonwealth along the lines of a genuine federation (Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine attempted to establish such later through the efforts of the Ukrainian *Hetman* Ivan Vyhovsky in Hadiach in 1658) but Catherine succeeded in preventing such a combination by finding docile partners in Frederick II of Prussia and Maria Theresa of Austria, who joined in her plans to destroy the Commonwealth.

Catherine put on the throne of Poland Stanislaw A. Poniatowski (1764-1795), her retired lover. The gentry understood immediately what was in store for the country, and tried to stop the march of Russian imperialism toward the Black Sea and into Central Europe.

The first attempt was made in 1768 from the Ukrainian city of Bar. Organized there was the "Confederation of Bar," which extended also into Lithuania; it was led by a descendant of the Ukrainian gentry, Joseph Pulaski,⁹ who fought for "Faith and Freedom" for four years and without receiving any help from the neighboring nations. The rebellion collapsed. Pulaski went into exile, first going to Constantinople, then to Paris, whence Benjamin Franklin sent him to America. In the United States Pulaski became the father of the American cavalry, and ultimately fell in battle.

In 1772 came the first partition of Poland. It was followed by a second, and then a third, and Poland disappeared from the map of Europe.

⁹ Dyoniza Poniatowska, *Polska i Rus. Rodowody Slowian* (Poland and Ruthenia. Origins of the Slavs). Paris, 1861, p. 83 (in Polish).

King Poniatowski, in his way, was a patriot who unsuccessfully attempted to save Poland by introducing a new Constitution (May 3, 1791). The last tragic attempt to stop the Russian encroachment westward also is connected with American history. A former general in the American Army in the War of Independence, Tadeusz Kosciuszko, led a revolution in 1794 against Russia from the city of Cracow. Catherine II sent the notorious General Suvorov against Warsaw; for one murderous week the Polish city was pillaged, the civilian population slaughtered, the women raped.¹⁰

The American-Polish hero Kosciuszko ended in Catherine's dungeons, where he could meditate on the "vigorous roots" of Russian imperialism. A great admiration of Catherine II by American Jesuits would have been the last thing anticipated by the American general.

c) *Ukraine*. Catherine II ruthlessly eradicated all traces of independence of the Ukrainian nation: she abolished the *Hetmanate* and liquidated the famous Zaporozhian *Sich*, stronghold of the freedom-loving Ukrainian Kozaks. The last *Hetman*, Petro Kalnyshevsky, while negotiating with Russian representatives, was kidnapped by Catherine's agents and imprisoned in the Solovetsky Monastery on the White Sea. He was kept there for 25 years, locked in a small cell, until his death. Catherine sent Russian troops to liquidate the rebellion of the Ukrainian Kozaks and peasants in 1768 — the Haidamak movement¹¹ which was directed against their landlord exploiters. Catherine II earned a special epithet in Ukrainian folk-songs, that of "daughter of a bitch" (*sucha dochka*).

d) *Lithuania and Byelorussia (White Ruthenia)* also were lost to Russian imperialism when in 1795 the country was occupied by Russian troops. The Russian government divided the country into provinces (*gubernia*), and even the very name of Lithuania disappeared, Moscow substituting the innocuous term, "Northwestern Land" (*Severo-Zapadny Krai*). An exceedingly corrupt administration was imposed upon Lithuania. Catherine abrogated the laws of Lithuania, the famous "Lithuania Statutes," and hundreds of rebel-

¹⁰ Constantine Jurgela, *History of the Lithuanian Nation*, New York, 1948, p. 350: "Praga's (suburb of Warsaw) defenders and residents, more than 20,000 people in all, were massacred to the last man, woman and child..." (Suvorov is presently publicized as a "hero" by the Soviet Union and the "Order of Suvorov" has been conferred on some prominent Americans! — R.S.S.).

¹¹ F. P. Shevchenko: "On the International Importance of the 1778 Uprising on the Right-bank Ukraine," *Ukrainsky Istorychny Zhurnal* (The Ukrainian Historical Journal), No. 9, 1968, Kiev.

lions families were resettled forcibly in the Crimea or Eastern Ukraine, or simply sent to jails.

e) *The Turkish Crimea* was Catherine's next victim. The country was overrun by the Russian army, with thousands of Tartars, including women and children being mercilessly massacred or driven into the Black Sea. At the beginning, the "liberated" Crimea was declared independent (the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji, in 1774), but later on it was incorporated into the empire as a mere province.

f) *Catherine's Greek and Oriental Projects and the Domination of the Near East*. Catherine's insatiable imperialistic designs then turned on Turkey. She planned further aggressions through the Caucasus (Derbent and Baku were from Persia) and the Balkans to reach her final goal: partition of Turkey after the Polish pattern.

The Rumanian territories of Wallachia, Moldavia and Bessarabia were to become a Russian protectorate under the name of "Dacia." Constantinople was to be restored as an imperial city of a resurrected Byzantine empire that would include Thrace, Macedonia and Greece and that would be ruled by Catherine's son, born in 1779 and christened, significantly, Constantine. The Russian Consuls in Alexandria and Smyrna, through propaganda and bribery, were preparing for the final domination of the Middle East.

The "Oriental Project," an elaboration of the "Greek Project," aimed not only at the restoration of the Byzantine Empire with its capital in Constantinople, but also at the invasion and conquest of the Caucasus, Persia, Tibet and India.¹²

g) *The American Continent* was not neglected in Catherine's plans of conquest. Russian merchants already had landed in the Aleutians and Alaska and reached San Francisco. Catherine granted a fur trade monopoly to the Shelichov-Golikov Company.

Russian penetration into South America and a Russian invasion was scheduled for 1787.¹³ The Czarina was in contact with Francisco de Miranda, who visited her in Kiev in February, 1787. But all plans had to be postponed when Turkey and Sweden declared war on Russia.

h) Catherine's aims were clearly stated and formulated in her letter to Derzhavin:

¹² Florinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

¹³ Terrence Barragy, *The Diplomatic Penetration of Imperial Russia into South America*, Papers No. 10, Slavic Institute, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisc., 1961.

If I could live to be a hundred, I should wish to unite the whole of Europe under the sceptre of Russia. But I have no intention of dying before I have driven the Turks out of Constantinople, broken the pride of the Chinese and established trade relations with India. ¹⁴

A despotic ruler with a total disregard for all human and Christian laws, inside the empire, Catherine acted outside the empire as a "defender and protectress of constitutions," which insured the rights of the nobility — in order to claim a "moral right" to intervene in the internal affairs of states in the interest of Russia.

Thus, she "defended" the constitutional rights of the Polish nobility and its rights of *liberum veto*, which paralyzed the Diet. She interfered in Swedish internal affairs, again "defending" the constitutional rights of the nobility against the king. Catherine even attempted to make Russia a "protector" of the German imperial constitution and an arbiter over the Holy Roman Empire. ¹⁵

Catherine hated the American "rebels" and the Declaration of Independence. ¹⁶ The Continental Congress sent Francis Dana as an envoy to Catherine to seek recognition and help from Russia. Catherine refused even to see him, and after two years of waiting Dana returned home empty-handed. ¹⁷

Catherine's overriding desire to make Russia a center of world politics has fascinated Russian imperialists to the present time. Monuments in her honor, as those of Peter I, are untouched in Russia by the Communists.

5. Catherine's internal policy had the following characteristics:

a) The period of her rule is regarded as the "golden age" of nobility and as a veritable hell for the enserfed peasantry. She granted a charter to the nobility in 1785 ¹⁸ and implicitly recognized the peasantry's status as chattel slaves. Thus she aggravated the peasantry's already deplorable conditions by putting them in political and economic bondage. Catherine tied the Byelorussian peasantry to the soil in 1783 and enserfed the free Ukrainian peasantry. During her rule the number of serfs rose from 7,000,000 to 20,000,000. ¹⁹

¹⁴ Gina Kaus, *Catherine, the Portrait of an Empress*, Viking Press, New York, 1935, p. 366.

¹⁵ Florinsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 518, 524 and 527.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 528.

¹⁷ Warren Bartlett Walsh, *Russia and the Soviet Union*, 1958, p. 157.

¹⁸ The text published in *Imperial Russia*, edited by Basil Dmytryshyn, New York, 1967, pp. 98-102.

¹⁹ Peter Lyashchenko, *History of the National Economy of Russia*, New York, 1949, p. 273.

Even some Russian scholars concede that Catherine's rule represented the "zenith of serfdom in Russia."²⁰ The Russian landlords freely sold the "souls" they owned: the bodies of their rightless serfs. The owner could separate a child from its parents, a wife from her husband, and according to Catherine's *ukase* of 1765, he could banish a serf to Siberia or sell him into the "recruits" of the Russian army. Girls were sold to Asiatic harems and brothels, or the "souls" could be gambled away in wagers and card games by "pious Christian landlords." Five hundred strokes of the rod were the serf's punishment for any misdemeanor.

b) *Orthodox Church*. Catherine, as a woman, regarded herself as the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and secularized the immense real estate of the church in Ukraine as well. The Metropolitan Arseniy Matseyevich of Rostov, a Ukrainian, alone had the courage to protest and excommunicate the secular power. For that daring move he was defrocked by the Russian Orthodox hierarchy and immured for life in a tower in Reval, where no one was allowed to speak to him. Such ruthless and brutal persecution silenced the opposition in Orthodox circles. With Catherine a total decline of the prestige of the Russian Orthodox clergy began, the clergy and their families dropping sharply in status.

c) The Catholic Uniate Church in Ukraine was ruthlessly destroyed by Catherine. During the course of nine years of military expeditions and bloody terror, about 1,300 Catholic churches and parishes were "Orthodoxed," while Catholic priests and the faithful were imprisoned, tortured and killed. By the Treaty of Grodno (1793) Catherine promised the Catholics of Latin and Eastern Rites, in fact, "irrevocably guaranteed in her own name and on behalf of her descendants and successors," free observance of cults and discipline and "never to assume supremacy of the Roman Catholic faith of both Rites in all provinces, that by virtue of this Treaty became her domain."

As soon as the treaty was signed Catherine immediately violated this international obligation. She ordered a barbaric persecution of the Uniate Catholics in Ukraine and Byelorussia; in 1794 an *ukase* of Catherine ordered abolition of the Union of Brest of 1596 and all Uniate faithful were ordered to return to the Russian Synodal Orthodox Church (despite the fact that these Uniate Catholics never belonged to Russian Synodal Orthodoxy). Another *ukase* proclaimed joyfully that 2,300 Ukrainian churches had "freely returned to their

²⁰ Riasanovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

Mother Church in Moscow.”²¹ In spite of the stern protests of Pope Pius VI all Ukrainian episcopal sees were liquidated and the bishops exiled or imprisoned.

d) *Russian Militarism*. Catherine's aggressive imperialism in foreign policy and her alliance with the nobility against the peasantry for the perpetuation of their serfdom and merciless exploitation required a large army which was based on compulsory military recruitment of peasants for a service term of 20 years! Thus the army was not only her instrument of foreign policy, but simultaneously also her instrument of terrorism and persecution of the peasants, who between 1762-1773 not only murdered 60-70 landlords every year, but organized forty rebellions.²²

Finally, a widespread peasant war broke out in 1773-1774 under the leadership of Emilian Pugachev, a rebellion that had a marked anti-imperialistic aspect and that endeavored to unite all the subjugated colonial peoples—the Don Cossacks, Ukrainian Kozaks, Bashkirs, Tartars, Kirghizes, Mordvins, Chuvashes, Votyaks, and others. It took the regular Russian army under Suvorov to defeat this ferocious anti-Russian rebellion which posed a real threat to Moscow itself.

e) *Jews* were made second-class citizens of Russia by Catherine. By a decree of 1762 Catherine encouraged large-scale immigration into Russia; all were welcome, regardless of race or religion — except the Jews. In 1742 a law passed by the Russian government prohibited the residence of Jews in Russia-Muscovy, unless they converted to Orthodoxy.²³

f) Catherine's many reforms were partial successes thanks to her Russian collaborators; many, like her charter for towns, remained attractive on paper only. Typical of her mentality was her famous liberal “instruction” for the Legislative Commission. Of a total of 526 articles she had plagiarized “vigorously” 250 from Montesquieu's *Spirit of Law* and 100 from Beccarias' *Crime and Punishment*, a plagiarism which she later freely admitted. An eloquent fact is that in this “Instruction” (*Nakaz*)²⁴ Catherine deemed it necessary to point out to her subjects in the first line of the first chapter that “Russia is a European State...” because the public opinion of the

²¹ Rev. I. Nahayevsky, *History of Ukraine*, America Publishing Co., Philadelphia, 1962, pp. 188-190.

²² James Mavor, *Economic History of Russia*, London, 1925, pp. 204-208.

²³ Herbert Ellison, *History of Russia*, 1964, p. 121.

²⁴ Dmytryshyn, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

West and the Russians themselves had not regarded Russia as a European state.

g) *Russification*. The Russian historian Florinsky writes:

The most lasting, albeit negative, contribution made by Catherine to the theory and practice of Russian government was the forcible enunciation and vigorous enforcement of the principle of administrative unification and Russification. In an instruction given to Prince Viazemsky in 1764, the empress, referring to Ukraine, the Baltic provinces and Finland, observed that although these territories enjoyed special administrative privileges conferred by the Russian Crown, "to call them foreign and to treat them as such would be more than a mistake, it would be plain stupidity. These provinces... should be reduced to a condition where they can be Russified and no longer 'like wolves look for the woods...'. Ukraine was the first victim of this clear-cut policy... The turn of the Baltic provinces came next... By a decree of May 3, 1783 the poll tax was introduced in Finland...²⁵

Catherine's successors remained on the whole dedicated and faithful to the realization of this program inaugurated in 1764 — up to the revolution of 1917.

h) *Persecution of Freedom and Thought*. Catherine's real "liberalism" is on record. Take that treatment of two Russian writers, Alexander Radishchev and Nikolai Novikov. In 1790 Radishchev published a book, *A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow*, which contained a truthful description of serfdom and its evils. It described the separation and breaking up of families by military conscription, the abuses of serfs by their masters. In one place, wrote Radishchev, he was told by serfs that a landlord had violated sixty peasant maidens. The author also denounced the censorship and demanded freedom of the press. On Catherine's order, Radishchev was tried for treason. The Senate condemned him to death, but Catherine commuted the death sentence to 10 years imprisonment in Siberia. The author later committed suicide in prison.

Novikov, a prolific writer, was the editor of *The Drone*. His main target was the corruption in the government. Catherine, alarmed by his vitriolic attacks, accused him of subverting the existing order. She had him imprisoned in the fortress of Schluesselburg, where he remained until her death.

When the French Revolution broke out, book-burning became a regular police practice. Even the Russian translation of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* went up in smoke.²⁶

²⁵ Florinsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 555-556.

²⁶ Avrahm Yarmolinsky, *Road to Revolution: A Century of Russian Radicalism*, Collier Books, New York, 1962, pp. 22-23.

Catherine reestablished the security police as the "Secret Expedition" headed by a sinister brute, S. Sheshkovsky. Although she publicly denounced torture and corporal punishment, she ordered two of her ladies-in-waiting, Countess E. Elmp and Countess A. Buturlin, flogged by Sheshkovsky's agents for passing around a cartoon which offended Catherine.

i) The great achievement of Catherine is the creation of a gorgeous facade of a highly civilized Russian empire purely for the deception of Western Europe. Catherine managed this brilliant *coulisse* — window-dressing by importing from all Western nations scholars, architects, sculptors, artists, officers, gardeners, music teachers, cooks, etc. The foreign architects built the large palaces and museums (Hermitage), which were filled with collections of masterpieces bought abroad, like the Brueghel Collection in Dresden, the Walpole Collection at Houghton Hall, the Choiseul and Croazat Collections, and so forth. She had a veritable mania for large and sumptuous buildings, believing as she wrote: "Great buildings declare the greatness of a reign no less eloquently than great actions."²⁷ The Isaac Cathedral was intended to be the greatest of all Orthodox churches.

Catherine II practiced this great deception of Western Europe during her entire reign. She frankly admitted that she "played a role" before Western Europe; in a letter to Frederick II regarding her "Instruction," Catherine wrote:

I have acted like the crow of the fable who made itself a garment of peacock's feathers...²⁸

The Jesuit Order was merely one of the "decorations" of her "peacock's tail." All Europe was deceived, for Catherine anticipated both modern Russian communist propaganda and Madison Avenue advertising, putting on her generous payroll leading intellectuals of the West who for gold created and perpetuated these "images" of Russia and of herself. Serving her as publicity agents were Diderot, d'Alembert, Melchior Grimm (editor of *Correspondance Littéraire*), even Voltaire, who honored her with the title of "Semi-ramis of the North"! Perhaps the old cynic meant it ironically, who knows...

6. In summing up the age of Catherine, her reign, actions and achievements against the background in which, according to the

²⁷ Louis Reau, *L'Art Russe*, 2 Vols., Paris, 1921, II, p. 76.

²⁸ Florinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 511, Vol. I.

former president of Boston College, the Jesuit Order "flourished without restriction" and where "from these vigorous *Russian* roots the modern Society of Jesus took rise," one can ask the same question as did Will and Ariel Durant in their *History of Civilization*, Vol. X. Discussing Catherine as a woman, the chapter opens with the question: "Was she a woman or a monster?" The Russian historian, R. D. Chagnes, believes she was a monster, pointing out:

The Russian type of autocracy breeds monsters. . .²⁹

By all definitions, it seems, Catherine was indeed a monster. She stood outside all human and divine laws and knew nothing of simple human decency. A Neanderthal type on the throne of Russia!

Thus, the "vigorous Russian roots of the modern Society of Jesus" grew and flourished on the political soil of Catherine's reign, the reign of one who personally was a murderess, a usurperess, a liar, and a deceiver, one who prostituted herself for the sake of personal power, one whose very life was the antithesis of everything Christianity stood for.³⁰

Her reign saw serfdom hit its nadir in Russia and it saw the "golden age" of dictatorship of the nobility over the serfs at the time that the ideas of the American and French Revolutions were ushering in a new age undermining the divine rights of absolutism.

In assessing the persecution of free thought in Russia by Catherine. Florinsky wrote:

The declaration of independence by the American colonies filled her with disgust and horror and with the outbreak of the French Revolution she espoused the cause of *reaction*. . .³¹

Catherine was surely not an "enlightened despot" ³² in the age of enlightened despots, because the latter cared for the betterment of the serfs by limiting the power of nobility and church administrators. She created Catherine's Russia, which Michelet called "Russia the deception, Russia the pestilence," which blocked the path of human progress and culture for centuries, even up to now, because Russian Communism is a worthy successor of the Czarist regimes of Ivan the Terrible, Peter I and Catherine II.

²⁹ R.D. Chagnes, *A Short History of Russia*, New York, 1956, p. 123.

³⁰ V. Pollakoff, *When Lovers Ruled Russia*, London, 1928.

³¹ Florinsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 511.

³² P. Dukes, *Catherine the Great and the Russian Nobility*, London, 1967.

7. But the problem still remains: Why did Catherine not permit the Jesuits to carry out the Papal order?

The *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. VII, 1967, in the article on "Jesuits," informs us:

To take effect, Clement XIV's brief had to be officially promulgated locally. Catherine never permitted this in Russian dominions, because of her esteem for Jesuits as teachers and her resolve to keep alive their schools...

Since this explanation makes no sense, the question deserves special treatment.

8. The Boston Jesuit College was the first academic school in America to open its gates to the Communist exhibition: "Education—USSR." Such blatant communist propaganda should have been balanced with lectures by American independent scholars on the various aspects of Soviet education. In failing to provide such a balance, Boston College only contributed substantially to the misinformation and confusion plaguing American public opinion about the problems of education in the USSR.

Silenced and unchallenged, therefore, are those tragic achievements of Soviet education which are described by Communist sources themselves. The leading Soviet journal, *Za Kommunisticheskoye Prosvishchenie* (For Communist Education), of Feb. 1935 reported on the intensification of the fight against the illiteracy of teachers. In one school in Leningrad a test was held on Russian orthography. The majority "failed, many made 80 mistakes in the dictation." A commission established the fact that in one single district of Leningrad 400 teachers were illiterate in orthography. The November 22, 1935 issue of the same journal reported that Supervisor of Schools Volin said at a meeting of school principals of Moscow that "the teachers of the higher classes in the high schools and the students of the colleges cannot take the simplest dictation without mistakes."

In No. 49, 1935, of *Kommunisticheskaya Pravda*, we read the following:

For the fight against banditry in grammar schools the following measures were introduced: expulsion of the bandits from the schools, trial of their parents by the courts, the division of Moscow into special districts for the fight against the pupil-bandits, the formation of special squads of the militia for this purpose... Brawls, murders, sexual demoralization, alcoholism had become so common in Soviet schools that the Soviet government had no way out but to issue on April 5, 1935 a decree, signed by Kalinin, Molotov and Akulov, unique in the history of education: it demanded the death penalty for children over 12 years old:

"1. Minors, beginning at the age of 12, convicted of theft, hooliganism, murder or the intention of murder, are to be punished by the courts with all the penalties provided by criminal law.

"2. Persons, who it is proved that they have instigated minors to participate in crimes, speculation, prostitution, or begging, will be punished by a jail sentence of no less than 5 years..."

Unmentioned also are other aims and practices of Soviet education: the creation of a Soviet civilization peopled by the atheistic, robot-like "Soviet man," the lack of any academic freedoms in the USSR, the introduction by Khrushchev into the universities of special chairs and departments of atheism, and the like. Above all, no reference has been made to the relentless and enforced Russification of the subjugated non-Russian nations for the purpose of creating a "one and indivisible Soviet people."

There is no doubt that the masters of Russian Communist propaganda are continuing systematically Catherine's program of creating a "progressive image" of the USSR, through, for example, the erection of "Potemkin villages" whereby they beguile the free world, especially many people in the United States.

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, on his visit to the Jesuit Boston College, must have gleefully thought of a Russian adage: "A stupid buyer is the gift of God."

9. The world-famed historian, Arnold Toynbee, ended his 10-volume *A Study of History* with a prayer. As we read the learned historical statement of the former Jesuit President of Boston College, in our despair (that Moscow can always depend on its unfailing ally in the West: Ignorance) we also turn to prayer:

O, Lord, remember all the victims of Catherine's bloody imperialism and of Russian Communist imperialism, nations and individuals alike. We pray that you enlighten the former President of Boston College so that he may see the truth and stop his thanksgiving eulogies to Catherine and Russia; deliver him from his Russomania and induce him to struggle for the victory of truth, freedom, justice and charity for the whole of Eastern Europe. Amen.

It is indeed ironical that the Jesuit Order, which has contributed so much to the Church and world culture, should be made to appear, by such ill-advised and irresponsible actions, as an ally of Russian imperialism in Europe and Asia, in Africa and on the American continent as well.

"WE TOLD YOU SO"

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

The Russian rape of Czecho-Slovakia is a subject that most of our illusionists prefer not to discuss nowadays. They have scarcely recovered from the shock they received in the summer of 1968. Détente, cultural exchange, East-West trade, the psychological sport of reducing tensions, more treaties with the USSR, and all the superficial attitudes induced by almost a decade of confetti diplomacy were suddenly hollowed by the brute reality of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. It still is a real question whether our illusionists in Government, in Congress, the press, and among our numerous organizations will profit from this rude awakening or will continue to blindly pursue their illusions for whatever fearful reason. Regardless, those, like myself, who have consistently and with complete certitude pointed to the real enemy of the Free World — Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism rather than the mythology of communism — can in all humility of truth utter "We told you so."

At an annual function connected with the National War College three months later, the writer was interestingly confronted by this general question raised by colleagues who occupy high positions in State, the Armed Forces, and CIA: "Doc, how do we get out of this bind? For years we have pushed the bridges of understanding policy to fragmentize communist East Europe, only to have it dashed by brute Russian force." My answer very simply was this: "What I tried to teach you ten years ago is that you, and thus we, will never succeed in dislodging the tentacles of the Soviet Russian octopus so long as we do everything to preserve the octopus itself, which in its total form means the Soviet Union." Assuming an accurate knowledge and understanding of the USSR, truly an imperium in imperio, it doesn't require much common sense to perceive its powerful ability to squelch any liberalizing forces at work in its colonial tentacles, particularly a potentially explosive one such as Czecho-Slovakia. It wasn't at all difficult for this writer and others, such as Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki of Catholic University, to publicly

predict the crude Russian action in Czecho-Slovakia.¹ At this point, one can predict that if Rumania attempts what the Reds in Czecho-Slovakia endeavored to do, it will even be easier for the Russian-directed octopus to move in. Indeed, one can soundly speculate that the security of both Yugoslavia and Albania will inversely diminish with the further build-up of Soviet Russian naval power in the Mediterranean. The specific date and time aren't important; the evolving circumstances and will for action are.

Guided by empirical evidence, of which the tragedy of Czecho-Slovakia is only the most recent in a long string of lessons since World War II, those of us who have rationally maintained that in structural terms the Soviet Russian totalitarians cannot and will not change, are in position once again to contend that the so-called dogmatism ascribed to our posture is actually a time-proven realism based on historical experience and existential analysis. The illusionists may by force of communications media perpetuate their myths and wishful thinking, even in the face of the Czecho-Slovak tragedy, but the oft substantiated premises of the mischaracterized "dogmatic position" will re-emerge with impressive impact again and again.

These fact-founded premises are concrete and yet comprehensive. One, in a positive dimension, answers the fundamental question "How has all this come to be what it is?" by stressing the evolution of the Soviet Russian Empire from the RSFSR in 1917 to the USSR in 1923 to points beyond since 1940. Once this line of evolution is understood, the full view of the USSR as an empire in itself comes into full bloom and mythical conceptions, such as "the Soviets," "the Soviet nation," and "minorities in the USSR," are scrapped for their ludicrous worth. Flowing from this is the second perspectival premise, namely, being an empire in its own essence, the USSR must of necessity expand in influence, control, and domination. There can be no inward-turning other than at the risks of structural erosion, non-Russian nationalist explosions, and certain imperial disaster and collapse. Third, interwoven with this, is the empirical premise covering Moscow's systematic build-up of all necessary instruments for such expansionism — military, propaganda, diplomatic, economic, political etc. — all integrated in a working context of persistent psycho-political warfare. And lastly, as a negative premise, is the accommodation of all this and more by our failures to cope properly and adequately with this last, threatening

¹ *Congressional Record*, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., September 11, 1968, p. H8532.

empire in the history of mankind. What has transpired in Czecho-Slovakia is only one additional bit of evidence certifying to the power of the basic forces dominating Eastern Europe — the prime enemy of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and the invincible nationalism of all the captive non-Russian nations, particularly those in the Soviet Union. We haven't even begun to tap the latter force and its overwhelming potentialities.²

TIME FOR REASSESSMENT OF CONCEPTS AND POLICY

It seems almost like stating the obvious that it is high time for a serious and thorough reassessment of our concepts and policy regarding the Soviet Union. On the heels of the brutal Russian invasion of Czecho-Slovakia, Presidential candidate Nixon sensed this when he declared "And a realistic appraisal of the assumptions and premises that underlie American policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of realism toward the Soviet today, will be a policy that is directed toward their prudence and not just toward their good will."³ But, quite logically, before we can sensibly reformulate policy and higher generalizations, we must patiently reexamine our working concepts, the meanings of our words, and the framework of our conceptions. This is a self-evident priority.

Plainly, words have consequences. Repeated over and over again, they can lead or mislead, they can affect or infect, they can persuade or dissuade, they reflect realistic concepts or unrealistic ones. On the world scene today no group comprehends and values this more than do the masters and propagandists of totalitarian Soviet Russia. We, however, pass words uncritically. As a consequence, we continue to wallow in a morass of illusions about Russia, the Soviet Union, and the so-called "Soviet sphere of influence." No matter how you choose to view them, words contain the power of meaning. Needless to say, without them we have no natural way of transmitting our thoughts, be it accurately or inaccurately, truthfully or untruthfully. And no amount of trite and self-indicting utterances, such as "Oh, that's just a matter of semantics," can hide this truth.

It was Socrates who for all time taught, "The beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms." Though we don't always practice it,

² A few of these are pointed out by Victor Zorza, "Nationalism Has Soviet Union Worried," *The Sunday Star*, Washington, D.C., February 23, 1969.

³ Richard M. Nixon. Address to American Legion, *Congressional Record*, October 28, 1968, p. E9522.

you and I know that wise behavior presupposes clear thinking. But such thinking — and thus intelligent behavior — cannot be attained without distinct and rationally defined terms. Put another way, prudent action demands clear thinking and this requires logical concepts with conformable terms or words. When we examine the terms and concepts used by many Americans in relation to the Soviet Union, the beginning of wisdom in our policy and action toward this primary empire remains somewhat remote.

Beyond all doubt, the most common and persistent illusion is the verbal equation of Russia and the Soviet Union. Interchanging and equating the two makes them appear identical with reference to territory and peoples. It is equally inaccurate to identify Russia with the old Czarist Russian Empire, again in terms of territory and peoples. Poland was a part of that empire. Were the Poles therefore "Russians"? The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is at least nominally more in conformity with the basic facts of distinctive nations, cultures, and religions which characterize the present Soviet Russian Empire than was the previous Czarist Russian Empire.

For a realistic policy toward the USSR, it is absolutely necessary for us to extinguish this basic illusion and honestly revise our many misconcepts as we face up to the fundamentals of this not too complex empire within an empire. If some would take the trouble to glance at the constitution or a map of the USSR, they would find that what they call "Russia" is only one national area in that empire. At that it is federated with other national units and thus known as the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. It is only one of the fifteen republics in the USSR. This, in part, is Russia. This is Soviet Russia which by imperialist aggression annexed to itself numerous non-Russian nations to form the first spurious federation called the RSFSR and, through further aggression, the second, even more spurious federation called the USSR. In effect, what emerged is a federation within a "federation." This is confusing to many Americans. Only aggressive Soviet Russia profits by the persistence of this confusion.

When many uncritically use the term "Soviets" with reference to the controlling operations of Russian Moscow, they compound this state of confusion. First, they do violence to the only true meaning of the term "soviet" — a council of workers and peasants. The soviets, in plain fact, do not rule in the USSR. Second, they blur the objective and fundamental distinctions existing between Russian nationals and the different non-Russian nationals in that area. This blinds them to the opportunities open for the building of progressive

restraints on Moscow's warlike policies. And third, in their own minds they nurture the self-deluding thought of the USSR being a monolith, a homogeneity of "Soviets," of Soviet men and generations.

The pointed irony of all this is revealed by these facts. In the old Russian empire the Czars made every attempt to erase the distinctiveness of the non-Russian nationals by throwing the wrap of Russian nationality over them. "Peoples of Russia," "Great Russian and Little Russian" and other verbal devices were contrived to create a monolithic appearance. Their policy of Russification failed. Profiting by the lessons of this failure, the Soviet Russian totalitarians have subtly pursued the same policy under the formula "national in form, socialist in content." In plain language, this is designed to eviscerate the national substance of Moscow's captives as it develops a Soviet man, a Soviet people. Their language, their culture, their allegiance will, of course, be Russian. Red Moscow also aims at a monolithic image. Now we find ourselves, the advocates of national self-determination, unwittingly abetting this process by the uncritical use of "the Soviets." Indeed, what irony!

Thus, for a policy reorientation based on accurate and realistic concepts, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that by language, history, culture and religion, the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union are as different from the Russian — in some respects more so — as the French are from the Italians or the Japanese from the Koreans. By all criteria of nationhood they stand in sharp contrast to the tribal conglomerations we mischaracterize as nations in the greater part of Africa. From the viewpoint of truth alone, to subsume the non-Russian nations of Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia and others under the concept of "Russia" bluntly contradicts objective fact. It makes as much sense as identifying the Irish with England. Obviously, too, the illusion of equating Russia and the USSR weakens our capacity to evaluate the supposedly internal problems of this empire. It blocks a full appreciation of its major sources of weakness. It is as harmful and misleading as calling the Soviet Union a "nation," whether Russian or plain Soviet.⁴ Finally, it is equally evident that this persistent illusion produces an adverse psychological reaction among the peoples in the various nations so misidentified. The reaction of a Turkestanian, Latvian or Ukrainian being called a Russian is similar to that of a Slovak being misidentified as a Czech or an Irishman as an Englishman. In the eyes

⁴ E. g., John F. Kennedy, *State-of-the-Union Address*, text, January 30, 1961.

of the people involved the illusion suggests a stamp of approval on the present Red Russian Empire which holds them in bondage.

THE PITIFUL JOHNSON RECORD

Expressions of this illusion projecting Russia as the Soviet Union abound in this country. Generally, the press is notorious in this regard and, on the basis of it, spreads other fictions. For example, at the time of the 50th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik revolution, we read this bit of fiction: "As the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics approaches its 50th anniversary, the theme of Soviet progress is sounded daily. . ." ⁵ Even as of this writing the USSR hasn't been in existence for 50 years, but then, for the editors of the paper, Russia is the USSR. Many of our intellectuals fare just as badly. For example, a study paper, which influenced heavily the Kennedy Administration, contains these gems of thought and conception: "But since the Soviet Union is now a powerful nation and may in time become an affluent one, it may be possible for the Soviets to learn to identify the cumulative mutual advantages to be gained from restraint, cooperation, or common endeavors"; "American security is precarious because it rests excessively on the threat of punishment against a nation, the Soviet Union, which has and will retain the power to devastate the United States." ⁶ With a determining conception of the USSR as a "nation," all sorts of wild ideas follow.

My good friend, Senator Peter H. Dominick of Colorado, once wrote to me, "You are, of course, absolutely correct in your article, but the public and most of the Congress consider and treat the Soviet Union as one country. Even the press considers one a 'Kook' if talk veers to the theory of separate nations bound together only by a system of common tyranny." ⁷ This interesting observation shows the amount of popular education that still is required on this crucial subject. The examples of fiction given above can be multiplied endlessly, for they appear almost daily in our press, periodicals, and other communications media. Here is a choice "intelligence report" on Czecho-Slovakia: "If you study such a map, you will find that Czechoslovakia, put together 50 years ago as an independent na-

⁵ "Soviet Progress," Editorial, *The Evening Star*, Washington, D. C., November 2, 1967.

⁶ Vincent P. Rock, Study Phoenix Paper, *Common Action For The Control of Conflict*, Institute For Defense Analysis, Washington, D. C., 1963, pp. 20, 58.

⁷ *Letter*, August 13, 1965 with reference to article "The Second Treaty of Moscow."

tion, is bordered by Poland, Russia..."⁸ Of course, facts have it that Czecho-Slovakia is a state of two nations, Czech and Slovak, and is bordered not by Russia but rather by Ukraine in the USSR, but these elude what purports to be an "intelligence report." Worse still is this heavy dose of fiction in the report: "in World War I, Russia suffered approximately 10 million casualties at the hands of the Germans. In World War II, Russia suffered another 20 million, so that today there is hardly any family in Russia which has not lost someone to German militarism." As pointed out in my book *The Vulnerable Russians*, this partial myth was disseminated by President Kennedy in the Adzhubei interview in 1961 and in his American University address in 1963. The non-Russian nations bore the greater brunt of both wars, but by this myth you'd think the Russians did all the suffering!

How can we, in the shortest possible time, extricate ourselves from such illusions so that our policies and plans for all contingencies in relation to the Soviet Union may be more realistic and successful? Is the situation a hopeless one, considering the scope and extent of these illusions? Our ordinary, time-consuming processes of education certainly can't perform this task. What can is the enlightened leadership provided both by the Presidency and the Congress. In the former, addresses, pronouncements and policy statements could set the tone of new thought about the USSR; in the latter, a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations, concentrating on those in the USSR, could also provide our general citizenry with a new outlook on the USSR. It wouldn't take long for the press, academia, and other sections of our society to absorb the new concepts and patterns of thought regarding this most vital of all foreign policy subjects. In both instances, rapid re-education by contrast is provided by the pitiful record of the previous Johnson Administration.

Doubtless, the pathetic Johnson record is far more the responsibility of those cast as advisors than of the President himself, who actually had a minimum of interest in foreign affairs. For a political warfare analyst in the Kremlin, the following few examples of misconception and short understanding must have constituted a source of enormous encouragement and inspiration. In one of his earlier speeches, President Johnson observed "The common interests of the peoples of Russia and the United States are many — and this I would say to the people of the Soviet Union: There is no

⁸ Lloyd Shearer, Ed., "Intelligence Report," *Parade*, Washington, D.C., September 22, 1968, p. 4.

American interest in conflict with the Soviet people anywhere." " Here you have it — the USSR is Russia, the people are Soviet, non-Russian nationals are non-existent, and the substrate empire is a ghost. With this preconception, what can you expect of realism in policy formulation?

The President never learned the fundamentals governing the USSR, nor was he expected to with the type of advisors who surrounded him. Two years later he details further his conception of the USSR as follows: "Two days ago, not very far from here, I met with Chairman Kosygin of the Soviet Union. The nations we spoke for are two of the most powerful nations in all of the world. In the family of nations, two of the strongest have two of the greatest responsibilities." ¹⁰ Contrary to all facts, the USSR is viewed by the President as "a nation," and the participation of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian nations in the United Nations, albeit by puppet representatives, is also an apparition. The nonsensical aspect of this misconception was seen in many of LBJ's messages to the USSR as, for example, on the 49th anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik revolution: "On behalf of the people of the United States I send sincere greetings and best wishes to the people of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the occasion of their national holiday."¹¹ A national holiday for the Latvian nation, Armenian, Byelorussian and the other nations making up the peoples in the USSR? The contradiction is obvious.

One of the major foreign policy addresses by Johnson stressed the continuity of U.S. policies toward the USSR and Eastern Europe, based on these same misconceptions, and the bridges of understanding route, citing the nominally foolish Consular Convention, a new cultural exchange agreement, more East-West trade, an air agreement with the USSR and other superficial paraphernalia of our confetti diplomacy that the Russian rape of Czecho-Slovakia denuded to pulp. "Under the last four Presidents our policy toward the Soviet Union has been the same," declared Johnson.¹² When one looks at the record of phenomenal expansion in territory, influence,

⁹ "Text of President's Speech on U.S. Aim to Keep Peace," *The Washington Post*, June 4, 1965, p. A6.

¹⁰ "LBJ: 'Count Your Own Blessings,'" *The Washington Post*, June 28, 1967, p. A14.

¹¹ "Lyndon Sends Reds Note On Anniversary," *Chicago Tribune*, Chicago, November 7, 1966, p. 18.

¹² "On Improving Relations With Eastern Europe," *The New York Times*, October 8, 1966, p. 12.

and domination by Moscow during the terms of our Presidents, extending to only ninety miles off our own shores, it is hardly one to gloat over for the sake of continuity. And this because the continuity applies also to the underlying misconceptions and misunderstanding of this policy. Johnson continued, "We want the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe to know that we and our allies shall go step-by-step with them just as far as they are willing to advance." What occurred in Czecho-Slovakia is enough to show the naiveté of grouping the USSR and the nations of Eastern Europe together.

The pitiful Johnson record goes on and on, but let us cite just a few more choice examples of unrealism, basic misconception, and negative understanding. In another address the President, with some shallow propagandistic bravado, declares "I call on every industrialized country — including the Soviet Union — to help create a better life for the people of Southeast Asia."¹³ Aside from the evident fact that Moscow, through Hanoi, has had the U.S. by the tail in Vietnam for more years than any American wishes to remember, since when is the Soviet Union, a forced imperium of numerous countries, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which formally we still recognize, a single "industrialized country"? The numerous absurd contradictions one is led into by the fundamental illusions should by now be quite obvious. Far worse, of course, are the higher generalizations derived from these contradictions and misconceptions, which shape our policy determination. For example, in his address to the United Nations, Johnson stated, "The great transition from colonial rule to independence has been largely accomplished."¹⁴ Really? — in a period when the largest empire under Moscow has been formed from the Danube to the Pacific to the Caribbean, all within the short span of fifty years!

Nevertheless, leading to the tragedy of Czecho-Slovakia, President Johnson continued to exhort, "We will continue to build bridges across the gulf which has divided us from eastern Europe. They will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors and of humanitarian aid."¹⁵ And we were all led in part into the bind crystalized by the Russian invasion of Czecho-Slovakia. First, the bridges pos-

¹³ "Text of President's Speech on Viet Nam Policy," *The Evening Star*, May 13, 1965, p. A-7.

¹⁴ United Nations, December 1963.

¹⁵ "Text of President's Speech at Marshall Library," *The Sunday Star*, May 24, 1964, p. A-23.

sessed too few lanes to allow for intercourse with the captive nations themselves as against the Red state toll-takers. Second, and more important, they failed to extend far enough into the Soviet Union, part of which after all is an integral section of Eastern Europe, to circumvent the impasse created in Czecho-Slovakia. Once again, as a fundamental formula, to get out of similar binds and to minimize wastes of effort, capital and even lives, as in Vietnam, the pressures must be directed toward and concentrated on the captive nations in the USSR itself. What a new and innovative departure this would be from a failing policy under the last five Presidents. It cannot be attained without the extinction of our basic illusions.

A SECOND FUNDAMENTAL ILLUSION

A second fundamental and persistent illusion in this country that hampers our policy is the myth of equating the USSR with the U.S. This myth is usually entertained by those who, unlike Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, realize at least the existence of other people than just the Russians in the Soviet Union.¹⁶ This illusion spreads the fiction that the USSR is a federal union of states like the U.S.A. It underlies the present fallacious usage of the nomen "the Soviets." Yet, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the federal union of the United States came into being and expanded by the free will of previously independent and autonomous states and territories; whereas, in sharp contrast, the Soviet Union emerged entirely on the basis of armed conquest and the forced incorporation of conquered countries. However, few can forget how some of our experts have uncritically equated Ukraine with Pennsylvania,¹⁷ others paralleling it with Texas, and one or two comparing Byelorussia with Massachusetts.¹⁸ A *New York Times* editorial artlessly viewed the Soviet Union as "the second richest nation of the world,"¹⁹ while in a report on the Soviet school system a United States Commissioner of Education simply dubbed "the U.S.S.R., as a nation..."²⁰ These examples of

¹⁶ See *Congressional Record*, August 10, 1961, p. 14316.

¹⁷ E. g., George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950*, The University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 135.

¹⁸ *Review of the United Nations Charter*, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 1955, p. 1832.

¹⁹ "Khrushchev Asks for Credits," June 6, 1958.

²⁰ Lawrence G. Derthick, "Inside Soviet School System," *Congressional Record*, June 24, 1958, p. A5746.

fundamental misunderstanding can be multiplied endlessly, across the board of our society. As a matter of fact, even Khrushchev was inspired by the concepts of our former Vice President to speak of the USSR and the U.S.A. as "the largest nations of the world."²¹ This in advantageous but blunt contradiction to USSR's constitution and all his previous and subsequent statements for internal empire consumption.

Sadly enough, this second basic illusion persists to this day. Is it little wonder that our people still cannot appreciate the tremendous fact of Moscow's colonial domain, inside as well as outside the USSR? With no exaggeration, the Soviet Union, behind its nominal façade of federalism, is the greatest and worst empire in the pages of human history. Reading Russian organs, such as *Izvestia*, *Pravda* or *Trud*, will not convey this basic truth. Unlike American correspondents and observers, European analysts concentrate also on the organs of the non-Russian republics and get to understand the scope of colonialism and imperial rule within the Soviet Union.²² Nevertheless, to his very last day in office Secretary of State Dean Rusk believed areas such as Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia are "traditional parts of the Soviet Union." Clinging to the USSR — USA illusion, he never repudiated his observation that "Reference to these latter areas places the United States Government in the undesirable position of seeming to advocate the dismemberment of an historical state."²³ Since when is an imperial state scarcely fifty years old "historical" and its parts "traditional"? But such are the absurdities we arrive at when our fundamental concepts are invalid, unrealistic, and misleading.

It is sincerely hoped that as we enter another decade these and other illusions will be extinguished. Such necessary extinction can only come with a radical revision of our concepts pertaining to the Soviet Union, the sole major threat in this world to the security of the United States. It is ironical, indeed, that Red China, in its rift with Moscow, had alone emphasized the imperial nature of the USSR, so much so that as far back as 1964, Khrushchev screamed "Things have gone so far that the Chinese leaders are making territorial claims on the Soviet Union and one wonders that they do

²¹ Text of Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's Statement, *Soviet News Agency Tass*, August 5, 1959.

²² E. g., an outstanding account on record, "Colonialism in the Soviet Empire," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, Switzerland, November 20, 1960.

²³ Dean Rusk, Letter to the Honorable Howard W. Smith, U.S. House of Representatives, August 22, 1961.

not suggest the dismemberment of the Soviet Union." ²⁴ Other empires have collapsed; there is nothing sacred about the USSR, and its collapse would be the greatest boon to all mankind, including the long enslaved Russian people.

The necessary revision of concepts would naturally lead to an equally necessary alteration of policy. Following the Russian rape of Czecho-Slovakia, Lord Caradon, the British delegate to the U.N., was excessively restrained when he retorted to Jacob Malik's defense of the rape in these words, "I like to remind my Soviet colleague that my country has done more to end imperialism than any other country in the history of the world." ²⁵ The Russian's insular retort was, characteristically, "Don't stick your nose into other people's affairs," the old Russian non-intervention technique where it contravenes Russian intervention in other peoples' affairs. Why the U.S. delegate, in the spirit of Adlai Stevenson's memo of 1961, wasn't more forceful in this debate is a good question. Now with the Brezhnev Doctrine, justifying all sorts of Russian adventures into other peoples' affairs in order to maintain Russian hegemony over Moscow's extended empire, we can prepare for more "We told you so's." For the doctrine, with all its nominal socialist embellishments, is nothing more than a contemporary version of traditional Russian imperialism and can be successfully countered only when we begin to center our diverse efforts on the empire within the empire. Then, too, we may also say "We told you so."

²⁴ Nikita S. Khrushchev, Address, Prague, Czech-Slovakia, September 5, 1964.

²⁵ "Briton's Jibe Angers Soviet Envoy," *The Washington Post*, September 12, 1968, p. A22.

GROWING SOVIET THREAT TO THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD

By JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

The Soviet penetration of the Middle East and the naval build-up in the Mediterranean are explosive-laden moves but not surprising in an area that historically has been a point of conflict among the major powers. It was inevitable that the Soviet Union should challenge United States dominance of the Mediterranean as "an American lake" and would seek to expand its influence into the vacuum caused by Western, especially British, withdrawal from the Middle Eastern lands.

The Soviet Union has moved naval forces into the Mediterranean at a time when the British Navy, once supreme and more recently a complement to American naval power in the area, is rapidly withdrawing from the seas both east and west of Suez.

The Russians are now trying to establish themselves permanently in the Mediterranean and astride the northern exit of the Suez Canal; they have been offered a base in Aden, which gives them an opportunity, should they wish it, to interfere with the only other trade route to Europe round the shores of Southern Africa. (Aden is part of the Republic of Southern Yemen, which became independent of Britain on November 30, 1967.)

Militarily, the Soviet naval build-up means a threat to the south flank of NATO. In the past, any fresh Soviet threat to Europe has worked to prod the Western alliance into more vigorous joint defense efforts. It should be well within the competence of NATO to contain the Soviet fleet, which is gravely handicapped by its exposed access to home bases through the Dardanelles.

Soviet observation of NATO fleet exercises became "a damned nuisance" and a potential danger, according to the Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic, Admiral Ephraim P. Holmes. The American admiral said that during the 9 nation NATO fleet ex-

¹ For details, see: Roucek, Joseph S., "Britain's Retreat from Aden and East of Suez," *Il Politico*, XXXIII, 2, 1968, 413-426.

ercises, in the fall of 1968, the Russians used aircraft, three destroyers, five or six surveillance vessels and two oil tankers for snooping purposes. (The oil tankers meant that the Soviet forces maintained no-stop tracking of the entire exercise, which involved more than 100 vessels and 40,000 men.)²

THE MEDITERRANEAN IN GEOPOLITICS

As long ago as 500 B.C., Themistocles, the great Athenian who defeated the Persians at Salamis, said, "He who commands the sea has command of everything." The advance of science and technology has considerably altered this dictum today: to use the sea in time of war it is nearly always necessary to have command of the air above it as well. The basic thought however, remains as true today as it has ever been. The ability to use the sea is essential to the life of a nation with a sea frontier. This has always been especially true of Mediterranean countries. Command of that sea has for hundreds of years been a vital factor in determining the balance of power among Mediterranean nations; the Romans, the Venetians, the Turks — each in turn found that the ability to control the sea routes of the Mediterranean was essential to their expansion and the maintenance of their security. The vital role played by the British fleet in the Mediterranean in the Napoleonic wars is well known. When the Suez Canal was opened in 1869 this further enhanced the importance of the Mediterranean as a main artery of trade. The decisive role which the ability, or lack of ability, to command the Mediterranean played in World War II is such a recent history that it does not merit emphasis here.³

Today, in any one day, about 2,600 merchant ships are afloat in the Mediterranean. Of these, some 1,500 are at sea and some 1,100 in harbors. Of these totals, about 1,200 ships on any day at sea

² "Nato Chiefs Score Soviet Naval Watch," *The New York Times*, November 5, 1968.

³ For details, see: Roucek, Joseph S., "Geopolitics of the Mediterranean," *Journal of Economics and Sociology*, XXIII, June 3, 1953, 347-354; and "Le Geopolitical del Mediterraneo," *Revista de Política Internacional*, IV Mayo-Junio, 1961, 25-54; Admiral Sir John Hamilton, "The Military Importance of the Mediterranean," *Nato Letter*, XV, 7-8, July-August, 1967, 22-25; Howard, Michael Leiot, *The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War*, New York: Praeger, 1968; Raymond de Belot, *La Méditerranée en Le Destin de L'Europe*, Paris: Payot, 1961; Gasteyger, Curt, "Moscow and the Mediterranean," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVI, 4, July, 1968, 676-687.

would be Allied shipping and the remaining 300 would be neutral or Soviet.

WESTERN MILITARY STRUCTURE

In December, 1950, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe set up three major Subordinate Commands: AFNORTH at Oslo; AFCENT at Fontainebleau; and AFSOUTH at Naples. AFSOUTH is mainly a land-air command, comprising the land and air forces of Italy, Greece and Turkey, but it is supported by the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which would be assigned to CINCSOUTH in war and whose strike potential has a key role in NATO strategy. Since no specific provision had been made at that time to protect the life-line of sea communications in the Mediterranean, in 1952 the North Atlantic Council created a fourth Major Subordinate Command, Allied Forces Mediterranean, entrusted with the defense of the sea lines of communication throughout the Mediterranean.

Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Supreme Commander of North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces, calls the U.S. Sixth Fleet's two carriers and 48 other ships and planes, many of them capable of delivering a nuclear punch, a tremendous "power for peace." "In one part of the Mediterranean or another, planes fly off carriers almost daily in take-off and landing exercises; occasionally, they go loaded for target practice. More often than not, they are watched and tracked by units of the Soviet Union's expanding Mediterranean fleet, numbering about 40 surface ships. When not dogged by Soviet naval vessels, Sixth Fleet commanders usually spot curious Soviet merchant ships, tankers and trawlers wandering through their formations, occasionally at considerable risk." ⁴

SOVIET THREAT

Thus, "United States admirals are openly concerned about the Soviet naval buildup in the Mediterranean and elsewhere." In the summer of 1968 it was reported that the Soviet navy and its merchant marine were operating 1,360 ships, compared with 1,154 ships sailing under U.S. flags, and added that the Soviet Union was building 456 modern ships, while only 51 were under construction in the U.S. In the Mediterranean, Soviet naval units have highly useful port facilities at Alexandria and Port Said in the United Arab Republic, at Latakia in Syria, and at Mers-el-Kebir, a former French

⁴ "6th Fleet Guards Flank of Europe," *The New York Times*, July 23, 1968.

naval base in Algeria. (In other areas, the Soviet Union is operating 250 submarines, 40 of them nuclear-powered, 20 modern cruisers and 150 modern destroyers, including a cruiser and a destroyer permanently stationed in the Indian Ocean.)

Historically, a goal of Russian diplomacy since the days of Catherine the Great has been to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean. Hitherto this has been denied to them, but in recent years a dramatic change has been taking place, Soviet Russia is nearer to achieving her aim today than ever before.

CHANGING SOVIET PHILOSOPHY ON USE OF THE FLEET

Interestingly enough, the growing Soviet threat in the Mediterranean is revealed by a deployment of the Soviet fleet in a manner which is entirely novel for the Soviet Union.

In the past their fleet had been essentially defensive in outlook.⁵ But in 1963 Fleet Admiral Gorshkov, who heads the Soviet Navy, began to propound his new philosophy for the use of the fleet. Its role changing from a defensive to an unequivocally offensive one, it was to be capable of conducting offensive operations in war in the oceans of the world. Since then, the first steps towards putting this new theory into practice have been taken in the Mediterranean. By exploiting modern maritime techniques, demonstrated so effectively by the United States fleet in the Pacific in World War II and which the U.S. Sixth Fleet is employing today, Soviet Russia is trying to overcome the weakness of her geopolitical position. Her navy is now designed to attack shipping, as well as to defend the coastal waters of the Communist bloc. Admiral Gorshkov is determined not to repeat Germany's failure to make adequate preparations for war at sea and also remembers that the Allies were very nearly defeated at sea in World War II and won only by making a supreme effort to control their sea communications. For reasons of geography, the Soviet Fleet is divided between the north, the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Far East. The transfer of warships between these Fleets can be effected by the canal system linking these areas (though only during the summer months).

Since 1957, Soviet Russia has added to its navy virtually all of the ships that now make up its impressive striking power: its

⁵ Basic information is offered in: Vice Admiral Vasilii Danilovich Yakovlev, *Sovetskiiy Voenno-Morskoy Flot* (The Soviet War Navy), Moscow: DOSAAF, 1966; Saunders, M.G., Ed., *The Soviet Navy*, New York: Praeger, 1958; "Russia: Power Play on the Oceans," *Time*, LXXXI, 8, February 23, 1968, 23-28.

360 submarines, 55 of them nuclear, giving the Russians the world's largest submarine fleet, far exceeding the U.S. total of 155 subs — but falling short of the U.S. fleet of 75 nuclear subs. Moreover, unlike other naval powers, the Soviet Union uses its merchant marine and other seagoing services as important arms of the navy. Soviet Russia has the world's fastest-growing merchant fleet, which will surpass the lagging U.S. merchant marine in tonnage in the early 1970's. Its high-seas fishing fleet is the world's largest and most modern; many of its 4,000 craft fish for vital information along foreign coasts as well as for creatures of the sea. The USSR also has the largest oceanographic fleet, whose 200 ships plumb the ocean's depths for military valuable data on depths, currents, bottom topography and other information of interest to its ships and submarines.

ACCELERATION OF SOVIET EXPANSION IN MEDITERRANEAN

In the Mediterranean, the impact of the Soviet fleet has been particularly dramatic. Where Soviet Russia had only half a dozen ships in 1967, it now sails nearly 50 ships there, almost as many as the 50-ship U.S. fleet that for years had made the "Med" virtually an American lake.⁶

Soviet ships have no fixed and permanent bases but rotate between the Mediterranean, Black and Baltic Seas. During their tours in the Mediterranean normally they are sustained by tankers, store ships and tenders. They use anchorages in protecting bights of sea — all in international waterways — for repairs, transfer of supplies and refueling. Such anchorages have been identified off the Greek

⁶ According to Adm. Charles D. Griffin, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, "Now Russia Builds Up Power in the Mediterranean," *U.S. News and World Report*, LXIII, 24, December 11, 1967, 46-52, "The most revealing statistic when talking about the Russian presence in the Mediterranean is ship-days. (A ship-day equals a ship operating one day.) Soviet Navy ship-days in the Mediterranean have increased over 600 per cent in the past three years. The monthly average of Soviet combatant ships in the Mediterranean has increased nearly 1,000 per cent during the same period." Current data are, of course, difficult to obtain. For background information, in addition to the works cited in the previous footnote, see: Woodward, David, *The Russians at Sea, a History of the Russian Navy*, New York: Praeger, 1966; Herrick, Robert Bwaring, *Fifty Years of Theory and Practice: Soviet Naval Strategy*, Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1968; Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, *The Soviet Drive for Maritime Power*, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967.

island of Kithera, in the Gulf of Hammamet off Tunisia, in the Gulf of Sierte off Libya, and off Alborran island east of the Strait of Gibraltar. Visits are paid to Yugoslavian, Algerian and, most often, Egyptian ports.

The Soviet fleets have no sea-based air power, but the naval air arm is sizeable, possessing many long-range planes capable of reaching much of the Middle Eastern areas from Soviet bases. The Russians have developed air-launched homing missiles for use against ships; these, too, are regarded by U.S. officers as formidable weapons.

About half the Soviet ships are combat vessels, including missile-firing cruisers, destroyers and frigates. The rest of the ships provide support — refueling, provisioning and other services. The fleet also is supported by land-based airpower, presumably from Eastern European Communist countries such as Bulgaria.

Until 1961 when the USSR broke with Communist Albania, the Soviet Mediterranean fleet could count on using bomb-proof submarine bases built by Nazi Germany in the Albanian port of Sazan. Now Red Chinese are reportedly in Sazan altering the base into a missile-firing site. The Soviet Union is seeking to obtain rights to the former large French naval base at Mers-El-Kebir, Algeria; the base, part of which is underground, is located just outside Oran in extreme Western Algeria. (The French formally withdrew from Mers-El-Kebir and turned it over to the Algerian Government on February 1, 1968.) The Russians have also used their influence with the Arabs to set up secret stockpiles of spare parts within trucking distance of Arab ports.

Furthermore, the Russians have been using their fleet to play an increasingly important role in support of political objectives. In the traditional naval manner, by maintaining an off-shore military presence, their fleet gives support to their economic and military aid programs in Egypt, Algeria and Syria. Their mobile fleet with its mobile support, combined with the rapid expansion of their merchant navy, is being used as a means of extending their influence in the entire Mediterranean area.

SOVIET RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Soviet build-up in the Mediterranean and the growing political and economic penetration of Middle Eastern states is a definite cause for concern.

Two factors have an important bearing on this situation. The first is the political change which has taken place along the southern

and eastern shores of the Mediterranean since the end of World War II. Hitherto all these territories in North Africa and the Levant had been under the dominating protection of a major European power; now they are all separate, newly independent nations and all are in need of economic assistance and some form or other of military assistance. The other factor is NATO's success in achieving its aim of holding Soviet expansion in Europe. NATO's very success in this respect has given the USSR the incentive to seek expansion in other directions.

The combination of these two factors has contributed to the course of Soviet policy in the Mediterranean. Held in the West, the Russians started to apply their familiar pattern of infiltration by means of economic and technical assistance and military aid in Egypt, Algeria and Syria.

More specifically, the USSR has outfitted the Egyptian Navy; Soviet ships steaming into Alexandria have available large stocks of spare parts, and Soviet naval technicians are on hand. The ships can procure food, and their crews can take shore leaves while repairs are made.

In addition to gaining a better strategic position, the Russians are believed to be hoping to woo the leftist elements taking part in the social and economic revolution that is sweeping the Arab countries.

Soviet naval vessels have maintained an almost continuous presence at Alexandria and Port Said since shortly after the Arab-Israeli war in June, 1967; by their presence they inhibit Israeli actions against Egyptian forces in and around the harbors.

Early in December, 1967, the Soviet flew 10 TU-16 jet bombers to Egypt on a "good-will" visit that is expected to be repeated many times. The jets moved from one base to another during a seven-day stay. After the June, 1967 war, the Soviet Union began shipping ground-to-ground Luna-M missiles to the United Arab Republic. Along with the missiles and the special tanks used to launch them, Israeli sources claim, Moscow has provided a substantial number of military advisers and technicians to teach the Egyptians how to operate and maintain the complex new system and to counsel Egyptian staff officers on how to plan for its use.

The USSR is thought to have kept only 500 to 700 military advisers in Egypt before the war. Many of them were second-rate officers who had relatively little influence. Estimates of the number of advisers now in Egypt range from 1,500 to 7,000, and most

of them are believed to be first-rate men taken from key assignments in the USSR and Eastern countries.

While there are differences of opinion on how much control the USSR has gained over the use of advanced jets, tanks and missiles in the United Arab Republic, the Soviet representatives undoubtedly are now in a much better position to know when the Egyptian trigger is about to be squeezed, and thus are in a much better position to encourage or discourage such an action.

To support its growing naval activities, Soviet Russia is searching for new bases and ports of call in and around the Middle East. Soviet diplomats have set up an embassy in the new Republic of South Yemen, where the Russians have their eye on the former British naval installation at Aden. The installation not only controls entry to the Red Sea but is an ideal base from which to exert influence in the oil-rich sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf. The question in the Mediterranean is whether the Russians will move into the Algerian naval base at Mers-el-Kebit which the French relinquished; it is only 315 miles east of Gibraltar. (The Russians also may be able to use the facilities of the big British naval base at Singapore, which Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has said he will rent to all comers after the British Navy pulls out in 1971).

ROLE OF ISRAEL-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN GAME

The attack made by Israel forces on October 31, 1968, on a Soviet-built transformer station and two Nile River bridges inside the United Arab Republic raised important questions about the Soviet military role in Egypt especially as to how Moscow might react to future Israeli penetration of Soviet-supplied Egyptian defenses.

The Israeli assault hit strategic targets less than 150 miles north of the biggest potential target of all, the Aswan high dam; this has been built largely with Russian financing, engineering skill and planning.⁷ Israel called her attack a retaliation for the Egypt-

⁷ "Israeli Attacks Pinpoint Soviet Role," *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 5, 1968. For the Soviet penetration of the Near East, see: Roucek, Joseph S., "The United Arab Republic's Achievements," *New Africa*, X, 9/10, 1968, 6-8; and "The Middle (Near) East and the Arabs," *II Politico*, XXXII, 4, 1967, 800-819; Kurzman, Dan, *Subversion of the Innocents*, Patterns of Communist Penetration in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, New York: Random House, 1963; Hughes, Edward, "The Russians Drill Deep in the Middle East," *Fortune*, CII, July, 1968, 102-105.

tian shelling a week earlier along the Suez Canal cease-fire line and the commando attacks behind Israeli lines in Sinai. At any rate, Soviet SAM 2 guided missiles — the type used to defend Hanoi and other North Vietnamese cities against American air attacks — guard the dam and other strategic points in Egypt. The Russians also have furnished many batteries of anti-aircraft artillery, deployed around Egypt's main cities, and it has been reported that a squadron of Soviet bombers with permanently assigned Soviet naval pilots now are based near Cairo. If this be true, these are the first land-based Soviet air-units operating permanently from a base in an Arab country, perhaps as air cover for the growing Soviet naval force in the Mediterranean.

SOVIET PRESSURE ON 'CENTO'

CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization)⁸ groups Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan in a regional alliance with the backing of Britain and the United States. In recent years it has concentrated mainly on strengthening economic ties and building roads, railways and telecommunications between the three Asian members, with the unofficial but intensive participation of the United States.

The recent thrust of Soviet power into the Mediterranean is a new challenge to this decade-old organization, disturbing a quiescent state which was a reflection of the East-West *detente* and the improving relations of all CENTO members with the Soviet Union. Then, with the Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967, the USSR began to bypass the CENTO zone and implant its military and economic influence in the Arab countries to the south.

Then, in August, 1968, came the sudden Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the threatening of Romania and Yugoslavia. CENTO's westernmost member, Turkey, found itself near two zones of crisis.

Two vital questions now obsess CENTO military staff officers:⁹

⁸ CENTO was set up on August 21, 1959, by Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and the United Kingdom to succeed the structure which had been established by those countries with Iraq, under the Baghdad Pact; but Iraq ceased to take part in the arrangements relating to the Pact after its revolution in July, 1958, and formally withdrew in March, 1959.

⁹ Cooley, John K., "CENTO Nations Feel Pressure as Soviet Thrust Deepens," *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 5, 1968. The Soviet pressure on Turkey is no more than a continuation of the policies of Czarist Russia to control or acquire the Dardanelles; see: Kilic, Altemus, *Turkey and the World*,

Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959; Percy, G. Etzel, "Turkey and the Straits," Chapt. 20, pp. 281-295, in Percy, G. Etzel, and Fifield, R. H., Res., *World Political Geography*, New York: T.V. Crowell, 1954.

Could the alliance function if Turkey were somehow drawn into the Arab-Israeli whirlpool, especially if there were Soviet and American involvement?

And how would Iran and Pakistan, to say nothing of the United States and Britain, react to Soviet action in the Balkans threatening Turkey, perhaps through Bulgaria?

The Treaty's terms would require mutual consultation in such cases. The United States helped to create the ill-fated Baghdad Pact of 1955, CENTO's immediate ancestor; it joined its economic, anti-subversion, and military committees prior to the Iraqi revolution that swung Baghdad out of the alliance and closer to the Soviet orbit. Headquarters were then transferred to Ankara, and the name was changed to CENTO. In the 1960's the United States also joined CENTO's scientific council and in the many activities of CENTO's peace-oriented cousin, the Teheran-based organization of Regional Cooperation for Development (RDC).

American military support is also assured to Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan in bilateral military accords signed in 1959, although Pakistan has steadily been cutting down its military ties with the United States. Britain, though a full CENTO member, has no such bilateral obligations in the CENTO area.

But it is important to remember that during CENTO's formative years, Turkish opponents of their government's close involvement with the United States were uneasy about CENTO, and Ankara reassured Moscow that CENTO and Turkey's participation in it were strictly defensive. Since then Turkey's relations with Moscow have vastly improved. And in 1965, during the Indo-Pakistan war, Turkey and Iran sent Pakistan military aid, while CENTO as such did nothing. As a result, the Pakistani government, in a huff, withdrew most of its military personnel from headquarters and planning work.

Turkey, however, is becoming quite a difficult ally for the West. While the Western Alliance is still intact, Turkish allegiance is not as steadfast as it once was; a tinge of anti-American, pro-Soviet sentiment is the key. Despite Turkey's long tradition of xenophobia, when the cellophane-wrapped Americans arrived in the early 1950s to stand off the Soviet bogeyman, they were initially welcomed as a novel exception to that tradition. But that novelty has worn off;

today the Turks resent a global policeman, and they are irritated by blatant displays of foreign wealth in their own backyard.¹⁰

Against this background, the United States' stands in a series of Cyprus crises were sure to irk Turkey. A badly couched letter from President Johnson to the Premier warned Ankara in 1964 that it could not use America's arms except for NATO purposes and that Washington would not help Turkey against Soviet military intervention if the Turks invaded Cyprus.

Ever since then the Turkish left has worked to tarnish the American image, especially among a vociferous minority of intellectuals. This campaign, featured inside the small Turkish Labor Party (Communists are legally banned) and by several newspapers, has managed to provoke ugly incidents, including attacks on U.S. buildings and riotous demonstrations against visiting American sailors.

The émigré Communist Party and Moscow are clearly conspiring to guide this anti-American movement. Although the official radio speaks softly, the clandestine Communist "Bizim Radio," broadcasting in Turkish from East Germany, details instructions on how to be anti-American. The combination of a swollen American military presence, resentment at U.S. policy, a changing world climate and a suaver Soviet policy has been undermining the U.S. position in Turkey. This has led to the thaw in relations with Soviet Russia, an easing of tensions that had started before the 1965 elections and that has been carried on by the present government. The Turks have come to feel that they were ignoring "realities" by persisting in a policy of cold-shouldering the Russians and now take in stride such developments as the ever-increasing flow of Soviet naval vessels past their country en route to the Mediterranean.

ROLE OF THE PERSIAN GULF IN GLOBAL POLITICS

The arrival of Soviet naval units to show their flag in the Persian Gulf in May, 1948, warrants a notch on the record of postwar Middle East history.¹¹ For the Russians, it is a landmark — or should we say "seamark?" Because, for the first time in 60 years, Russian warships are now inside the Persian Gulf.

For 150 years, the Persian Gulf has almost been a British lake. The oil sheikdoms from Kuwait to the Arabian Sea have looked to

¹⁰ Sulzberger, C. L., "Foreign Affairs: Too Much of an Ally," *The New York Times*, August 9, 1968.

¹¹ "Russians Reach the Gulf," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 17, 1967.

Britain for protection.¹² But Britain is now pulling out. The mistrust between Iran and Saudi Arabia and between the little Gulf states leaves a power vacuum.¹³ So in comes the Soviet Navy.

Whether Czar or Commissar, Russia's rulers have cherished an age-old desire for a presence in the Gulf, where warm waters come tantalizingly near the Russian land frontier at its most southerly bulge into Asia. In modern times, the British presence had kept them out of the Gulf. But British withdrawal, together with the U.S. alienation of the Arabs, has given Moscow an opening that they would have been obtuse and foolish not to take.

What must be remembered, of course, is that in the Arab world the Gulf is the Arab Gulf. Arab lands border its entire southern shore. And it is in an Arab port at the head of the Gulf — the Qasr in Iraq — that the visiting Soviet dropped anchor. In fact, two Soviet destroyers, one a modern missile-carrier, moved through the Gulf all the way to its northern tier where the oil pipelines of three countries — Iran, Iraq and Kuwait — carry their rich payloads to the saltwater piers.

Welcomed by a 21-gun salute, the Soviet ships settled down to an eight-day visit at the port of Umm Qasr in Iraq, which receives arms and advice from the USSR. This Persian Gulf force is part of a small Soviet fleet, including a guided-missile cruiser that had been touring the Indian Ocean for two months. The Soviet ports of call had included Madras on the Bay of Bengal, Bombay on the Arabian Sea, and Berbera, a port of the Somali Republic on the Gulf of Aden.

Inevitably, the question arises: what should Washington's reaction be to the Soviet naval penetration of what hitherto has been called a Western preserve? Saudi Arabia's American-owned oil in-

REPERCUSSIONS OF CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The Soviet Union's push into Czechoslovakia in 1968 created new tensions beyond the areas of the Warsaw and NATO pacts, and a sense of extending crisis soon reached the Mediterranean.¹⁴

¹² Roucek, Joseph S., "The Middle (Near) East and the Arabs," *Il Politico*, XXXII, 4, 1967, 800-819.

¹³ Roucek, Joseph S., "The Changing Geopolitical Pattern Along the Persian Gulf," *Il Politico*, XXIX, 2, 1964, pp. 440-456.

¹⁴ Morgan, Carlyle, "Czech-Crisis Spillover Toward Mediterranean?" *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 16, 1968.

stallations are concentrated on the Gulf and immediately inland from it!

With five Soviet naval units reported near the entrance to that sea in September, 1968, a threat of encirclement by Soviet power was felt in Romania and Yugoslavia. Will the Russians, having acquired an "initiative" with their invasion of Czechoslovakia, keep a few steps ahead of the Western alliance hence forward? Will they change the military balance elsewhere before NATO will have had a chance to repair it along the frontiers between NATO and the Warsaw Pact?

DANGER SIGNS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Today the U.S. Sixth Fleet remains more powerful than its reinforced Soviet counterpart. But yesterday there was no Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean. Today, Soviet naval, merchant, fishing and oceanographic ships ply all the seas of the world in increasing numbers. The maritime challenge is major and increasing. While the U.S. Navy remains No. 1 on the high seas of the world, the Soviet Navy is a close No. 2, growing and increasingly cocky. The United States thus might well expect more trouble on the high seas with Soviet Russia. In fact, Soviet party boss Brezhnev has demanded that the U.S. Sixth Fleet get out of the Mediterranean, leaving that European sea to Soviet domination. And look out for more than trouble if the Soviet Navy tries to interfere with the oil traffic from the Persian Gulf to Europe. There are still no signs of that now; but Western Europe, fairly indifferent to Soviet Russia's presence in the Mediterranean until very recently, is not likely to remain indifferent if the USSR applies a stranglehold on Mideast oil. Thus, we cannot but agree with the conclusions of Admiral Sir John Hamilton:¹⁵

The continued use of the sea routes of the Mediterranean has been demonstrated to be vital both in peace and war, to the three countries comprising NATO's Southern region. War, as a consequence of direct military attack on a NATO country, may be regarded as a remote possibility so long as we keep our guard up and retain our nuclear strike capability. But the nuclear balance, which may be regarded as a kind of modern Maginot Line, can be outflanked as every defense line in the history of the world has sooner or later been outflanked. It is for NATO to ensure that Soviet Russia does not gain a position which would enable her to exercise pressure by preventing, or seriously interfering with, the use of the Mediterranean by the countries of NATO's Southern Europe.

¹⁵ Hamilton, Admiral Sir John, "The Military Importance of the Mediterranean," *Nato Letter*, XV, 7 and 8, July-August, 1967, 22-25.

PRESIDENT NIXON AND AMERICAN POLICY

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

Early in the present century in a quasi-cynical mood, Winston Churchill, a then popular New Hampshire novelist with ambitions for public office, wrote: "Campaign platforms are to be elected by, inaugural addresses are to get stated by, and after that, what matters?" Today, President Nixon has been in office for a short time and he has duly fulfilled his obligations according to Winston Churchill's dictum and now is beginning to take account of facts and see how the heritage of President Johnson has freed or tied his hands and what he is to do with the situation, both foreign and domestic.

It is already apparent that there has not been a similar inauguration since that of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 on the very edge of the American Civil War. He was threatened with assassination and entered Washington secretly and while all passed off well, he was helpless to stop the beginning of the struggle, and he and his friends and supporters knew it. Within a month the country was involved in a great struggle which lasted four years and did untold damage.

This year a pseudo-inaugural parade moved in the reverse direction along Pennsylvania Avenue, carrying the flag of the enemy of the United States, North Vietnam, and cheering the leader of that country Ho Chi Minh and mocking the duly elected President. Armed helicopters hovered over the inauguration, held behind bullet-proof glass, and the parade up Pennsylvania Avenue was at least once menaced by a hostile crowd. Who knows the seriousness of these events? Who knows whether the mass of the demonstrators are ready to lay down their lives that the enemies of the United States may triumph or are merely irresponsible scoffers of all authority? Who knows whether the real leaders of a planned revolt are behind the scenes in their position or not? The actions of President Nixon, whatever his hopes and words, will be colored by his reaction and judgment of this, just as in his speech he expressed the hope that the time for confrontation has passed and that the time for negotiations has arrived. His address was a calm and even

plea for national unity and peace among nations to continue the progress of the past years. It was his fervent hope that people would begin to listen and not to shout so that words could be made out, but he also declared that the United States would have to be as strong as necessary for as long as necessary to keep from playing a disastrous role in the world and destroying the hopes of its friends. To some all this was a mass of platitudes, and meanwhile the spiritual illness and lack of morale in some quarters at least is becoming more obvious and requiring strong action rather than mere words if government and freedom under law are to remain as the American goal and dream.

The last weeks of the Johnson Administration were crowded with events. There was the epoch-making circumnavigation of the moon. There was the opening session on procedural questions of the conference in Paris. There were new talks on the Near-Eastern crisis, the NATO crisis and many others. President Johnson left a mass of problems which must be sorted out by the new administration, while it formulates its own possibilities and priorities and style. Still, time does not stop and we must see, as well as we can, what may be the important elements in the situation.

From the time of the election, President Johnson apparently did his best to make the transition peaceful, and President-elect Nixon responded but he recognized rightly that he could not take a position opposed to that of his predecessor until he himself was in power. Now the change has come about and the new President must chart his own course with a minim of upheaval. Yet at the final luncheon given to ex-President Johnson by his cabinet after his leaving office, it was noted that some members did not attend and there has been at least speculation that all was not running smoothly during the last days of the old administration. In addition, Congress had not completed work on many of the new appointments of President Johnson which were sent to the Senate in the last days, and President Nixon has wisely withdrawn these pending a reconsideration of their suitability. This has led to an attempt by some of the Johnson stalwarts to prove that Nixon had agreed to allow these to go through despite considerable murmuring about their suitability and to use this as an argument against the reliability of Nixon. So far they have produced no evidence of any set agreement which would be contrary to the general policy of the new President during the past weeks. It agrees with the efforts made by the Democratic Party, inspired by anti-Nixon elements in California during his campaigns for Vice President in 1952 and again in 1960. But

it is an unpleasant circumstance, which will reveal what part of the press and public are still willing to criticize the new President who has obviously tried to avoid the old slogan, "Kick the rascals out" and "To the victor belong the spoils," and may precipitate clashes between the administration and Congress even in what is called often the honeymoon period, when the new administration is taking over.

It is still too early to know how efficiently and satisfactorily the new administration is going to conduct the national business both at home and abroad. President Nixon, who has already served two terms as Vice President with Eisenhower, has proceeded systematically to create a broad network of task forces to study all of the outstanding and important fields and the results of their studies are naturally not yet sufficiently solidified and combined for publication. But the new President has indicated that he will start on the turning of these reports into action within a very short time. In the meantime it is idle to speculate how closely this program is going to follow the one on which he was elected, for he now has access to many secret documents which he and his aides formerly could not quote or use and these may reshape the course of his actions. Thus there are already indications that he may ask Congress to approve such measures as the continuation of the income surtax which was to expire in April, etc.

On the domestic scene, the new President's all-important task is to restore the national morale and unity. If he had hoped to bolster this by his inaugural address, he seems to have been mistaken, for the various rifts which he noticed earlier have become if anything more pronounced, especially as regards the student body and the Negroes or the Afro-Americans, as so many wish to be called. In the shifting tempers of these groups, seeking to be insulted, the discontented elements have scarcely paused to evaluate what he has attempted, much less to learn how he proposes to go about it. It is true that the problems of the cities are so serious that there is little time to wait, but it is also undoubted that the best way of solving them is not to move at random without the formulation of a definite plan. At least that is the impression that the new President wishes to give, and the only question is whether he will have the time for that in dealing with people who are only too happy to show their ill-will and displeasure at everything. He has made certain appointments but is almost certain to be declared a partisan by members of other groups, whose policies and personalities he does

not seem to be favoring, at least in their own opinion. It is also obvious that he has largely chosen individuals for their merits rather than for an attempt to balance in any haphazard way the various elements of the population, and while this may not at first be satisfactory to all, it should serve to insure the satisfactory filling of the various posts in a way that would not be possible if they were to be thrown open to specified groups, regardless of the capacities of any member of that group.

It does little good to try to debate and argue either coldly or emotionally the fundamental question, whether Johnson with his Texan optimism raised undue hopes for the abolition of poverty and his appeals to a good life for all. It is immaterial whether his first intentions were to deal with the rural areas or with the cities, for it was not long before his impassioned rhetoric and high hopes were almost cornered by the populations of the inner cities and their youthful supporters while the assassinations first of President Kennedy and then of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and finally of Senator Robert Kennedy gave an emotional content to this discontent and a renewed and accelerated demand for "all or nothing and anarchy." It is a dangerous mood for the country to be in and one that has never before engulfed such a large part of the American population even in the time of farmer discontent in the late nineteenth century or the depression in the twenties and thirties, both of which the Republic survived without undergoing extensive strains. Yet the relieving of these strains and the calming of the population must be one of the first tasks of the new administration and we cannot say yet what measures the new President will adopt toward this end, for while he has appealed to the thinking minds, he has not touched the task of cooling the emotions or even won the ear of many of the Republican leaders of various cities.

On the other hand, the foreign situation has become even more tangled for a mass of reasons. The long established policy of endeavoring to reduce tensions between East and West without serious confrontation and by working out agreements on peripheral questions while striving differently to settle important questions with Moscow and Peking is receiving new strains. To the end Johnson hoped for the opportunity to meet again with Prime Minister Kosygin and also to see the passing by the Senate of the treaty against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These were also tied up with the settlement of the East Asia crisis and the Vietnam war conference in Paris but new elements have since been added. The recovery in some way of the survivors of the Pueblo and the strange

tactics of the American negotiators have aroused questions in some circles which have not strengthened the American position in East Asia as a whole and the new developments in the Middle East have already still more muddled the waters and offered further dangerous possibilities.

In his inaugural address, President Nixon set forth his ideal of being a peacemaker and he regarded the time as ripe, for, as he said, the people of all states want peace and their leaders are afraid of war. This was of course a true statement but it again needs clarification. The Ukrainians know only too well the desperate hopes that they had for peace in 1917 and the debates that went on in the Central Rada between the various factions. Yet despite their hopes, they discovered that while the people wanted peace, large numbers were willing to fight for their individual views, and what had seemed so easy to achieve was rendered impossible by their failure to construct a Ukrainian army during the months of debate when it seemed as if large or small scale warfare was inconceivable in the new atmosphere that all were trying to construct. There are far too many indications that it is now the leaders who are trying to profit by the difficult conditions on the domestic scene and to embarrass and confuse the American foreign policy still further. Some of these efforts are arising on this side of the Iron Curtain in areas that are desirous in the name of independence and a Europe of nationalities to oust American influence from NATO and other similar Atlantic groups.

Let us review some of those questions which are continuing to fester and grow more serious. There is the affair of the *Pueblo*, which was seized by the North Koreans a year ago. At almost the end of the Johnson administration the crew was freed by an American expression of guilt for the intrusion of the *Pueblo* and as soon as the men were recovered, the American representatives at the meeting declared they had acted only to recover the men and denounced their former statement as false. It was an almost unprecedented act, but was it duplicity or did it cover a payment for ransom, as gossip has had it in Asia? Either way it has not added to American prestige or confidence in the United States foreign policy as is shown by such friendly nations as the Republic of the Philippines. On the other hand, in the naval investigation which is now going on, many strange statements have come to light. There have been allegations that the *Pueblo* was not properly equipped with devices for rapid destruction of the secret equipment. There have been strange omissions and delays in the transfer of informa-

tion exactly as in the case of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor when for some reason dispatches warning of the attack did not arrive in Hawaii or were overlooked.

Moving to the south, we find that Red China has moved to resume the conversations which have been held over a period of years intermittently with American ambassadors and which had been suspended apparently by China almost entirely during the past year, during which Peking has never ceased to attack American imperialism and to stress that the United States and the Soviet Union are cooperating against the Chinese. So far President Nixon has agreed to this resumption but he has decided to see exactly what can be learned about the Chinese plans without committing himself to any hurried acquiescence in the new proposals, if they are made. This again has been in sharp conflict with many of the idealists who are inclined to believe that one swallow makes a summer, while the storms of propaganda are raging as usual.

Yet the Chinese question is intimately bound up with the tangle of negotiations in Paris over Vietnam. The substitution of Henry Cabot Lodge for Averell Harriman has been apparently a fortunate move. Lodge has not only had experience in the United Nations as American representative but he has already served two tours of duty as American ambassador in Saigon and thus he has a broader acquaintance with the problem in general and needs only to be brought up to date over a relatively short period. He knows the nature of the claims of all of the attending parties and their strengths and weaknesses and the way in which the various crises erupted and became escalated and the situation in regard to the Viet Cong assassinations and cruelties against the native population. He can be trusted to spurn the familiar excuse that the weaker power militarily is legitimately empowered by conscience to employ murder and torture on behalf of its claims and both he and President Nixon are well aware that the tactics of Hanoi include the support of those discontented groups in the United States which are demonstrating in behalf of Ho Chi Minh and the New Left and all those who by hypothesis insist that the United States must be always wrong, because it has been so often successful in the past.

Since all of these classes, like the Communists, believe that history is what can be used at a given moment, the texts of the agreements of 1954 and 1962 mean nothing to them. That is why as his first constructive step, Lodge brought up the revivification of the Demobilized Zone and a revived and efficient International Armistice Commission. These were all part of the original agree-

ments and it was their neglect that was one of the reasons why America was drawn into the war. If they were restored, it could then be possible to begin to sort out and remove troops of other than South Vietnamese nationality, whether Communist or not and in some months peace could be restored in a national way. But this is anathema to the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese who in their second meeting declared for a complete settlement of the political issues before they could discuss military affairs, while for his part Gromyko of Moscow protests loudly and longly that America is bombing the territory of the Pathet Lao, the Communists in Laos, who are facilitating the use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail for infiltrating the south. As the State Department answers, there are 40,000 North Vietnamese in Laos where, under the Agreement of 1962, they are not supposed to be. But that is history and therefore false and unnecessary.

Then there is the Middle East question. Long before World War I the Russian Empire was stretching out its paws to reach the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and India but for nearly two centuries the British Empire thwarted them. Now it can play of primacy that role no longer and there is a great power vacuum in the Indian Ocean with no one but the United States and a series of undeveloped powers and unwilling allies to fill out. What is to be done? The oil-rich parts of the Middle East are largely in the Arab world, which is of course disconnected and feuding, but Moscow has largely repaired the Arab losses in the war of 1968, while for various reasons, the Americans have lost the former French bases to the Arabs, and the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean Sea which it had previously penetrated only in connection with England, as at Navarino, is promising to make the Sea untenable for the Americans. Almost automatically, to fill a vacuum, the United States has been compelled to support Israel in the struggle. in the hope that there, and in Turkey, Greece and Spain, it may find the necessary bases and means for reprovisioning and refueling when it is forced to touch land. Even the old British bases at Malta and Gibraltar are being steadily shut off, and the Near and Middle East question is boiling more hotly each day, with France adding new fuel. Thus all along the periphery of Asia, the United States is forced to counter Soviet intrigues, and since it is the desire of both powers to avoid atomic warfare against each other, President Nixon has scant opportunity to settle any of the conflicts, for he cannot assert as much control over his allies and associates as Moscow can with its doctrine that everything is permitted provided it is for the good

of Communism and a war of "liberation" designed to sap American resources and morale. His first task must be to restore these and then to take up the questions that are on the current agenda with the Soviet Union itself. President Johnson tried to treat the two sides of the problem as entirely separate, but it was one point on which his administration foundered, and such agreements as the treaty against the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be carefully considered in all its dangers and ramifications. This and all these questions must be considered not only from the text and the present situation, but plans must be made so that the peaceful uses of atomic energy will be available to the already industrialized states which have the power to go on and build their own installations and still keep their place in the free world. There is no need to say that at this point both Africa and South America as well as Europe can be involved.

Finally, there is Europe itself and the original nations and satellites forced behind the Iron Curtain. For a moment even the iron will of de Gaulle and his high hopes for a Europe united from the Atlantic to the Urals hesitated, with the Soviet armies in Czechoslovakia. It gave a moment of anxiety to NATO and perhaps that anxiety has not yet been fully relieved by the course of events. At any rate it gave a new sense of urgency to the movement to revive the North Atlantic Military Organization and to strengthen it, but it requires more than good resolutions to carry out this task and make it successful. To strengthen that resolution must be among President Nixon's first tasks, not so spectacular as the ending of the Vietnam War, but infinitely more important for the future peace of the world.

As we said in the beginning, he inherited his domestic problems and the domestic disorder and factionalism verging on revolt. In this he has the earnest support of the great majority of the American people except those who are titillated by their zeal or playing at revolt and destruction.

In his inaugural address and his first actions President Nixon and his new cabinet seem to have started well. It is physically impossible for him to do everything first and we can only hope that he will make a wise choice of his priorities and will be given time by a restless and impatient people and a changing world to organize the new administration and get it into action. That is what he is trying to do, and if he succeeds even in small part, he will have laid the basis for a successful administration and one that will rebound to the glory of the United States and freemen everywhere.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CHORNOVIL PAPERS. By Vyacheslav Chornovil. Introduction by Frederick C. Barghoorn. McGraw-Hill: New York-Toronto-London-Sydney-Johannesburg-Mexico-Panama, 1968, pp. 246, \$6.95.

On November 15, 1967, a young and unknown Ukrainian TV journalist by the name of Vyacheslav M. Chornovil was tried by the communist court in Lviv, Western Ukraine, and sentenced to 3 years at hard labor. Despite protests of innocence by the defendant, he was whisked away and put into prison.

His trial, as well as many other trials held behind closed doors in Ukraine in 1965-1967, has received scant and belated attention in the Western press, although Soviet specialists here and elsewhere in the free world rank these trials as high in importance as the much-publicized Sinyavsky-Daniel trial in Moscow. The significance of the Ukrainian trials lies in the light they shed on Soviet abuse of its own laws, and in revealing the Ukrainians' persistent struggle to maintain their national identity and secure their national freedom.

What was the crime of Chornovil, if any? He became embroiled in the KGB struggle against the restive Ukrainian intellectuals in 1966 when, as correspondent for the Kiev Radio and TV Station, he was admitted to the trials of young Ukrainian intellectuals in Kiev and Lviv.

What he saw there shocked him. "The lawlessness and arbitrariness that are permitted today as a kind of experiment," he wrote, "may tomorrow become a terrible and all-pervading epidemic."

By way of background, it should be pointed out that in Ukraine rioting had flared up in 1963 and 1964, fanned by crop failures and intolerable labor conditions in industry. Now prominent in the Ukrainian ferment are the young intellectuals, who seek not only individual freedom but a more authentic nationhood for their people as well. They cite Soviet laws assuring not only freedom of speech and press, but also laws safeguarding the Ukrainian language and culture. Despite these laws, a relentless Russification of Ukraine has been going on for years. Since 1965, the KGB has arrested several hundred of these protesting Ukrainian intellectuals. The sentences meted out have ranged from three years in prison to death by firing squad. There have been at least two executions.

In April, 1966, Chornovil found himself involved personally when he was called to testify as a witness in the secret trial of four Ukrainian intellectuals. He refused to appear on the ground that secret trials were a violation of the Ukrainian Legal Code, which specified that all trials must be public. As a result Chornovil was charged with "disseminating anti-Soviet propaganda with the purpose of weakening the Soviet regime." He appealed to the higher court, and on May 17 the Ukrainian SSR's Supreme Court overruled the charges against him as groundless.

But the all-seeing KGB, which is a law unto itself, kept working incessantly to trap Chornovil. On May 22, Chornovil wrote a 71-page letter to Peter Shelest, first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, protesting the unbridled terror of the KGB. Ignoring the letter, Shelest allowed the KGB to arrest Chornovil. On November 15, 1967, after months in prison (during which the KGB was gathering "material" against him) he was brought to trial and sentenced.

(At this writing the Press Service of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, under the dateline of February 18, 1969, has reported that Chornovil was released from a Lviv prison after serving a sentence reduced from 3 years to eighteen months.)

But clandestine copies of his letters were circulated widely in Ukraine. Eventually finding their way abroad, they have been published in book form, first in Ukrainian in Paris, and now in English.

The Chornovil Papers was originally called *Portraits of Twenty "Criminals,"* or *The Misfortune of Intellect*, the latter a translation of the Ukrainian title of the Chornovil manuscript, *Lykho z rozumu*. It is a description of 20 Ukrainian intellectuals: Yaroslav Hevrych, Ivan Hel, Ihor Hereta, Bohdan Horyn, Mykhaiylo Horyn, Mykola Horyn, Panas Zalyvakha, Myroslava Zvarychevska, Dmytro Ivanchenko, Eugenia Kuznetsova, Alexander Martynenko, Mykhaiylo Masyutko, Yaroslava Menkush, Valentyn Moroz, Mykhaiylo Ozerny, Mykhaiylo Osadchy, Ivan Rusyn, Methodius Chubaty, Anatoliy Shevchuk and Svyatoslav Karavansky.

None of the arrested have been either saboteurs or anti-government "wreckers." By profession they belonged to the Ukrainian intellectual elite: writers, literary critics, archivists, students, artists, engineers, poets, teachers, professors, lecturers, scientists, and research workers. In the words of a British expert, one could ask:

What had these men and women done? They had met and discussed among themselves and with their friends, ways and means of legally resisting the enforced Russification of Ukraine and the relentless destruction of its culture. They exchanged books and manuscripts dealing with this problem, some of them written in the time of the Czars. They possessed and passed on notebooks with quotations from the great Ukrainian writers and patriots of the past. None of them advocated the secession of Ukraine, although in the 1961-63 trials a group was tried on the ground of having formulated plans for a peaceful withdrawal of Ukraine from the USSR. They were deeply concerned, however, over the Kremlin's persistence in eradicating Ukrainian consciousness — which even Stalin with his whole terroristic apparatus had failed to do.

The Chornovil Papers is a severe indictment of the Soviet system as inhuman and barbaric. Almost a third of the book deals with the absence of any law in the Soviet Union, with the contrast between what the constitution says and what the authorities actually do.

The high-sounding Soviet constitution, especially its Art. 125, assures all citizens of every variety of personal and civic freedoms and rights. But Art. 62 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code flatly nullifies them. It reads:

"Agitation or propaganda for the purpose of undermining or weakening the Soviet rule, the commitment by individuals of crimes which are of particular danger to the state, or false or defamatory rumors which discredit the Soviet state and social system, as well as the circulation, production or collection, for the same purpose, of literature of similar contents — are punishable

by imprisonment for a term of from six months to seven years, or with banishment up to five years.

Thus anyone who displeases the authorities can be and, as a rule, is prosecuted under catch-all Article 62.

"A man is not a soulless automaton or robot who can live by a defined program," wrote Chornovil. "He considers each program with his brains and heart. The collision of thoughts, the battle of views, the crossing of ideas — this is the lever that has driven and always will drive mankind forward. The greatest saturation with material wealth without the unfettering of thought and will is not Communism. It is merely a large prison with bigger rations for the prisoners. . ."

But perhaps the greatest value of *The Chornovil Papers* lies in its revelation to the Western world of the abyss of Soviet Russian despotism and of the moral strength of the Ukrainian people in their undying quest for freedom.

Writing in the February 11, 1968 issue of *The Observer* of London, Edward Crankshaw, the noted British Sovietologist, commented on the Chornovil manuscript:

"The Chornovil document, which is supported by many witnesses... is the boldest, the most scathing, the most able indictment of the abuse of authority that has ever come out of the Soviet Union — and is written by a devoted Leninist, an official of the Young Communist League, who knows more about Marx, Lenin and Soviet law than any of his accusers. . ."

Prof. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, former Chief of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, and now Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University, in his "Forward" to *The Chornovil Papers*, states: "Fifty percent of the Soviet people is non-Russian. Among these, the Ukrainians are the most numerous and potentially the most powerful. It is not inconceivable that in the next several decades the nationality problem will become politically more important in the Soviet Union than the racial issue has become in the United States. Chornovil's manuscript is important precisely because it focuses attention on that actual as well as potential issue. . ."

In his penetrating and superb "Introduction" to the book, Prof. Frederick C. Barghoorn of Yale University admits that he had some reservations about writing the "Introduction" on the issue which concerns the conflict between the Ukrainians and the Russians, and adds:

"After he had read these materials assembled by Vyacheslav Chornovil, the young Ukrainian journalist, now imprisoned because of his refusal to aid and abet the Ukrainian authorities in what he regarded as illegal actions, contrary to the laws and constitution both of the Ukrainian Republic and of the USSR, this writer's doubts were over-balanced by a feeling that a useful service to scholarship and public information could be performed by an objective, impartial introduction that might help to place the startling events described in this book in a relevant political and historical context. . ."

Like the other books published recently on the cultural and ethnic dissent in Ukraine (cf. *Internationalism or Russification?*, *Education in Soviet Ukraine*, (*The Ukrainian Quarterly*, No. 3 and No. 4, 1968, respectively), *The Chornovil Papers* is an "eye-opener" for the average Western reader. It is also a scalding exposure of the Soviet system and its policy of Russification toward the non-Russian nations; as such it is a great contribution to the knowledge and study of the USSR for the present and the future.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

FIFTY YEARS, THE USSR versus THE USA. By Susanne Labin and Daniel Lyons, S. J., Twin Circle Publishing Company, New York, 1968, pp. 236.

This well-written work has many values and uses, and because of this it is regrettable to point out at the start that its title is inaccurate and misleading. As of 1969 the USSR has been in existence only forty-six years; when the manuscript was completed for this publication, it was probably below forty-five. The criticism is by no means petty. After all, if one is dealing with facts, he or/and she should strive for precision, and an obvious error of this sort cannot but reflect badly on the general presentation itself. Moreover, the error in itself indicates an unsteady knowledge on the authors' part not only with regard to the early period of 1917-1923, when there was first a Soviet Russia of a vague federative character and later at the end a Soviet Union emerged, but also in relation to the meaningful significance of the various economic and other data treated of in the work. The shortcomings of the book really stem from this misconception of the evolution of the Soviet Union itself.

Notwithstanding this overall criticism, the book achieves its purpose with admirable execution of fact and argument. In essence, it sets out to show the wide chasms that exist between American achievements and Soviet Russian realities. The work is divided into four parts which by their very titles indicate the scope of the comparative analysis: the myth of the economic dynamism of the USSR, Soviet challenge in culture, the military and scientific challenge of the USSR to the USA, and a conclusion embracing chapters on "The Real Force of Soviet Propaganda" and "Facing Reality." The manner in which the data are assembled and presented is highly effective in demonstrating the fatuous propaganda of Moscow and, at the same time, the gullibility of those in the Free World who have uncritically gulped a heavy dose of this propaganda.

However, relevant to our general criticism above, what the authors fail to understand is that from the broader viewpoint of comprehending the Soviet Union as an inner empire and colonial network of numerous captive nations, their data assume a far more significant meaning and magnify even more the day-and-night differences between the American economy and the imperialist economy in the Soviet Union. This, unfortunately, has eluded them because of their evident failure to grasp the real origins and evolution of the USSR. It is necessary to compare the industrial, agricultural, service, cultural, military and other developments between the U.A.A., by nature a nation-state, and the USSR, by its nature an empire-state, but the meaningful significance of the data is not thereby exhausted. In fact, its conclusive impact is actually lost within the inaccurate framework adopted by the authors. For example, so it is necessarily shown that American industry still is almost twice in quantity and quality that of the USSR; on a futural basis of contingent development, even this ratio assumes a different complexion when it is also stressed that as high as forty to fifty percent of the USSR industrial composite rests on Russian colonialist control of non-Russian industry. This qualitative factor is completely ignored here.

Nevertheless, the book is a mine of information for the reader who is unfamiliar with the USSR or for those who have no appreciative understanding of the magnitude, power, and cultural prowess of the American economy. The latter can be attained by the impressive comparative analyses provided in each chapter. Indeed, the work starts off with "The Jungle of Communist Statistics"

and almost entertainingly contrasts the mathematicized fabrications of Russian statistics and the advanced, honest data of the U.S. Quoting S.G. Strumiline, vice chairman for State Planning in the USSR and author of *Essay on USSR Socialist Economy*, it is pointed out, "The USSR industrial production form 1945 to 1956 did not quadruple, as was proclaimed in the official statements, but barely tripled. The phenomenal increase of 12 per cent for the glorious peak year of 1956 bombastically announced by Soviet leaders, was in reality 8 per cent." Notwithstanding a recount of all the fabricative techniques used, it should be no wonder that Moscow indulges in statistical manipulations to further its propaganda objective. Whether with facts or figures, distortion is Moscow's trade, though there are logical limits in both cases.

On "Soviet Achievements in Heavy Industry" the authors do an adequate job of showing their blown-up character, the gross inefficiencies involved, and the incredible imbalances that prevail. The thrust and crash movements of USSR industrial development have been parts and parcels of the cold war economy in that empire-state and basically account for the irrationalities pervading USSR industry. As the writers accurately point out, since the first Five Year Plan in 1928 the Kremlin has frequently sloganized its drive and mythical capability of overtaking and surpassing the American economy. What, however, they mistakenly characterize as "a national economy" is equivalent in output to only about one-half of U.S. industry and, qualitatively, lacks sharply in qualitative strength and sophistication. USSR publications are replete with criticisms on this score. With the growth rate just a few percentage points above that of the U.S., the USSR economy can hardly, for the long future, overtake the American economy that enjoys a far greater base, is oriented toward consumer desires, and has been democratically attuned to a steady and progressive rise in the standard of popular living.

In the chapter on "Soviet Achievements For The People" all the familiar comparisons between U.S. consumer goods production and that of the USSR are invoked. Moscow's cold war economy has always depreciated the value of such goods, even in the course of the present five year plan. In short, what else could be expected from an economic engine geared to the advancement of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism on a global scale. It is somewhat naive of those who have wishes that with the fanciful mellowing of the Soviet Russian totalitarians, a massive conversion would occur from heavy goods production to that of consumer goods. Thus, whereas in the U.S. investment in heavy basic industry to that of light industries stands roughly in the ratio of 3 to 7, in the USSR and several other Red states it is 6:4. Both on an aggregative and per capita basis, outputs annually of private cars, shoes, clothes, lodgings with bath and central heating, TV sets, radios, and so forth far exceed in the U.S. anything the USSR economy is capable of. For many of these items the same holds true for other culturally advanced countries in Western Europe vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

When it comes to agriculture and a stable farm capacity to feed the populace, the same night-and-day comparisons can be made between the USSR and the U.S. The authors undertake the discussion under the apt caption of "The Fairy Tale of Free Bread." They furnish the reader with salient statistics and facts to show the pitiful outputs of USSR agriculture on both an aggregate volume and a per capita basis. In cereals, milk, meat and eggs the out-

put varies in the range of one-third to one-half of U.S. production for a population that exceeds the American by close to forty million people.

Another important chapter is devoted to "The Human Price" of the development achieved in the empire-state. The waste of labor resource is well handled, as is the literal genocide that accompanied this development, particularly the man-made famine in Ukraine in 1932-33. The writers cite this tragic event but talk about "the long martyrdom of the Russian people." Once again, because of the fundamental weakness of the book concerning an alert observance of the basic Russian/non-Russian complex in the USSR, the authors fail time and time again to properly associate prominent economic episodes in the history of the USSR with the given peoples who tragically paid the price for them. It would probably surprise them to know that the huge Russian concentration system was overwhelmingly built on non-Russian political prisoner labor. Despite these deficiencies, the book is useful for most of our youth which is unacquainted with the past histories of Russia and the Soviet Union and couldn't even begin to appreciate the American economy by sheer points of contrast.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

THE GREAT TERROR, STALIN'S PURGE OF THE THIRTIES. By Robert Conquest. New York, Macmillan, 1968. 633 pages with appendices, bibliography, and index, \$9.95.

THE FIRST CIRCLE. By Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn. New York, Harper and Row, 1968, 580 pages, \$10.00.

In his history of the Stalin purges, Robert Conquest brings order into an indescribable chaos of crime, secrecy, misinformation and deception. He has first-rate understanding of the operations of the communist terror apparatus. It is Conquest's great merit that he skillfully sorted out genuine evidence from conflicting morsels of information and elaborate, false stories planted by Stalin, Vyshinsky and the NKVD. Stalin's purges were among the key events of modern history and Conquest has presented a detailed dossier on the most massive crime of all times. He has clarified the basic facts to such an extent that his book greatly facilitates further study. I am planning to publish on these pages several articles in which I will make full use of Conquest's findings and in which I will attempt to carry the analysis a few steps further.

Aside from the need to pierce the secret of the purges — this secret must be understood if we are to comprehend modern communism — the world should become more conscious of this enormous *recent crime*. In 1946, an international convention against genocide was concluded under U.N. auspices and signed, but not ratified by the U.S. This convention outlaws the mass murder of national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups, as it should. But it *also* should have outlawed the mass murder of political groups, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The world was impressed by Hitler's *Endloesung* — the purges should have resulted in far stronger impressions and in at least as much revulsion.

Solzhenitsyn's book is a fictionalized autobiography and recounts his experiences as a political prisoner in a scientific work camp during Christmas time in 1949. In the best tradition of the Russian novel, the book contains

considerable historical information; it is, in fact, an intellectual history of the contemporary USSR. The author presents a masterly portrait of Stalin on the eve of his death, when he was preparing still another purge. One of Solzhenitsyn's central themes is that freedom is not dead in Russia: it flourishes in the prison camps where people can say what they want. Solzhenitsyn describes the changes which the peoples of the USSR have undergone since communism—a return to crudeness and barbarity. "There is no Russia anymore." As the author describes it, his wife knows her way around Moscow very well: she orients herself by the next prison, and each point in the Soviet capital is within easy reach of a jail. Mikhailo Koryakov commented that formerly Muscovites used to find their way by looking for nearby churches.

Despite these depressing findings, the book tends to instill cautious optimism: the miracle is not necessarily that freedom survives in the concentration camps but that the prisoners — and Solzhenitsyn — understand what freedom means. Solzhenitsyn was released in 1956, after an ordeal of eleven years.

He had never been before a judge. After he fell sick with cancer, the Military Supreme Court heard his case. Solzhenitsyn did not bother to explain but simply read to the Court his *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*. He was rehabilitated, and continued working on *The First Circle* which he completed in 1964. In 1965, the author's proofs were confiscated and the police "published" a limited edition of *The First Circle* which was distributed to a small group of party people. The text also was sent abroad, probably in order to implicate him for alleged contacts with the outside world. In a letter to the Fourth Congress of Soviet Writers in 1967, Solzhenitsyn frankly described this abuse by the political police as a provocation and he found much sympathy among his colleagues. The constant harassment of Solzhenitsyn, whom even many Russian writers who are living behind the curtain regard as the USSR's outstanding literary figure, continues. Yet only one of his books was ever published in the USSR.

In all his sufferings, Solzhenitsyn's creativity was not destroyed but enhanced. Solzhenitsyn is an enormously powerful writer whom many have compared with Dostoyevsky. In biographical, political and literary terms the comparison is apt, although literary rank will only be decided by the future. The important fact is that Solzhenitsyn has initiated a more healthy tradition in Soviet literature, and he is *not* a "Soviet writer."

Those who want to begin understanding the nightmare of Soviet reality might do well to read *Conquest* and Solzhenitsyn simultaneously. After reading Solzhenitsyn's masterpiece it will be difficult to remain patient with the decadent literary effusions of our own world. In the midst of untold blessings, fashionable Western writers seem to be fascinated more with dirt than with freedom. But let us be thankful: the spirit liveth.

Hoover Institution

STEFAN T. POSSONY

YEARS OF THE GOLDEN COCKEREL. THE LAST ROMANOV TSARS 1814-1917. By Sidney Harcave. The Macmillan Co., New York, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, 1968. pp. x + 515.

The fiftieth anniversary of the downfall of the Romanov dynasty and the Russian Revolution that followed has brought forth a large number of

new volumes treating of these events both in their historical and political settings with all that they have meant for the world of today. The authors have entertained various theses, some deploring and some glorifying the events of that fateful year of 1917, which in a way completed what the Declaration of War in 1914 commenced: the end of the great Empires and of the old Europe with its virtues and with its defects. The road was paved for the new Communist division of the world. This book is no exception, and although in some ways it is better than many others nevertheless it still has some surprising gaps.

We may properly question the title. It is taken from Pushkin's *Tale of the Golden Cockerel*, published in 1835 and, like his other tales, written at his place of seclusion in Boldino. We cannot be sure that Pushkin was consciously alluding to Russia. Rather, it seems an adaptation of the *Tale of the Arabian Astrologer*, which was included by Washington Irving in his *Sketches from the Alhambra* and which appeared in 1833 just before his return to America and retirement from diplomacy. How seriously Irving regarded this story may be seen from the fact that when he founded the St. Nicholas Society for native New Yorkers, he arranged that a weathervane representing a cock be brought into the banquet room and directed toward Connecticut to give warning of an attack by the Yankees. The similarity of the story of the *Golden Cockerel* has been noted by the Russian poetess Anna Akhmatova and by other modern Russian critics often accused of cosmopolitanism for their writing on the West.

The book's main thesis — the last Romanov Emperors saw what Russia needed but became more and more incapable of persevering in their desire for reform — indeed has some basis. At bottom, however, the same was said of the nobles by the young Mikhail Lermontov in his unfinished youthful novel *Vadim*, which dealt with the revolt of Pugachev in the reign of Catherine II. Writing in the thirties, Lermontov pointed out that the failure of the nobles to realize that they could not continue in their conduct lay in their lack of means to exercise the same control over their serfs as formerly, and their refusal to realize it. The reforms of Peter in the early eighteenth century separated culturally the nobles and the court from the masses in a way that no longer existed in any Western land. From that time on it was a matter of refusing to see the facts. If in 1814 Alexander I seemed to be at the center of Europe, he nonetheless already had laid the groundwork for the destruction of his Empire unconsciously and with the best of intentions.

The author has almost completely ignored many vital factors. He makes scant reference to the free traditions of the more independently thinking Ukrainians and insufficiently stresses the influences of the Poles and of the nations of the Baltic, as well as the aspirations of the peoples of the Caucasus "whose god was freedom and whose law was war" (Ismael Bey-Lermontov). Omitted entirely are the so-called Kozak Epics, which were written in Russian but which, in a scarcely veiled form, praised the past of Ukraine. The greatest of these, *The History of the Rus (Istoria Rusov)*, whose author is still unknown, was read by Pushkin and the leaders of the Southern Society. He has omitted also the *Daughter of Slava*, the Pan-Slavic poem of the Czech Kollar which appeared about the same time and inspired the views of the Southern Society of the Decembrists under Pestel.

His account of the actual rising of the Decembrists is very good. Unfortunately he fails to make clear and to emphasize the curious dichotomy in the mind of Nicholas I, who at once and the same time was intent upon proving that the Ukrainians were "Little Russians," an inseparable part of the Russian state, and yet was anxious lest these same Ukrainians revolt to recover their old independence. Not meriting a word is foremost Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, his participation in the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, which was discovered in Kiev in 1845, and the reports of the Third Section on the case, when the poet was sentenced to confinement in a Disciplinary Battalion across the Caspian Sea and forbidden to write or paint. The author, however, does mention the lesser-known Petrashevsky case.

During the reforming years of Alexander II, things seemed to be better but after the Polish Revolt of 1863, the Czar decided upon another course, especially with regard to the Western Region, i. e. Lithuania, Byelorussia and Ukraine. He decided to Russify the inhabitants by censoring the publication of works in their languages. Count Peter Valuyev accordingly issued a statement that "there never was, is not and never will be a separate Little Russian language" and that it was only a peasant dialect of Great Russian. Proscribed were all books of religious content, textbooks and books for elementary instruction that were printed in the "Little Russian" language. Unaffected at first was the publication of older Ukrainian works as well as peasant stories, but the censors very soon improved on this by preventing publication of Ukrainian books even in the permitted classes on the ground that they could be put to forbidden uses.

Later, in 1875, a time when a Kiev *Hromada* or group of Ukrainian partisans had resumed some publication, the Czar issued at Ems in 1875 a sharper edict. Now forbidden was the importation of books in "Little Russian" and all domestic publications. Exempted were historical documents and monuments, and then only if the "correct" spelling was used, and works of belles-lettres appearing in the standard Russian orthography, but only after careful censorship. Banned were plays in Little Russian and the use of Little Russian in songs and musical pieces.

These rules were kept more or less strictly through the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II up until 1905. The censorship, however, did not prevent considerable Ukrainian progress, culminating in 1905 with a Ukrainian delegation being chosen for the first *Duma*. Thereafter efforts were centered on curtailing Ukrainian participation.

After the Revolution of 1905 and throughout World War I, the author depicts Nicholas II as a strangely appealing and futile figure, vaguely aware of what was needed but determined to maintain the essence of his power, exhorted all the while to be a Czar by Empress Alexandra, herself an hysterical person. He seemed unable to judge for good or ill the persons in whom he placed his confidence; he mishandled and blunted all attempts by his intelligent well-wishers to strengthen the dynasty and its hold upon the country. The author goes to great lengths to discredit the popular rumors about the German intrigues in Petrograd and to discount most of the stories pointing up the malign influence of Rasputin. According to him the Czar, taken by a strange lethargy and a premonition of impending doom, was led from one stupid act to another. The climax finally came in the spring of 1917. The Czar, who was willing to

do anything to help Alexandra, left the army and, almost with a sense of relief, signed the abdication and ended the dynasty.

It is difficult to accept this book as a historical work. The nineteenth century was proceeding with its improved technology and its new ideas. The rulers of imperial Russia saw that century only through their own standard ideas derived from a traditional past. They could not judge the quality of their advisers or their advice and the result was a growing fatalism — far more deadly than the folly of Czar Didon. In that sense the fable of the Golden Cockerel is not appropriate. Instead, the ideas of the Soviet Union are still hewn from the same rock and bid fair to break with even more disastrous results for the entire world. The book is more significant for its literary value than its historical use of detail and its evocation of history as it happened and had meaning.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

AUGUST 21: THE RAPE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By Colin Chapman, Foreign News Editor, *The Sunday Times*, London; With on the Spot Reports from Prague by Murray Sayle, Special Correspondent of *The Sunday Times*, London. J.B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia and New York, 1968, pp. 124.

As the book jacket points out correctly, this is the first account in book form, in the English language, of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and four of its Warsaw Pact allies, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. While this short book was obviously "written under intense pressure" (and this is equally obviously the cause of some of its shortcomings mentioned below), it is an excellent and fascinating account of the August events, including a brief summary of the developments in Czechoslovakia prior thereto, from the Czechoslovak Writers' Congress in June, 1967, through the fall of Novotny and the 7½ months of "liberalization" starting in January 1968. I am sure the experience of every reader will be the same as was mine: Once you start reading this book, you will be unable to put it down before the last page, even if you should happen to be fully familiar with all of the details and know exactly what will happen next.

In his final chapter "Why?," the author draws a parallel between Dubcek's program of 1968 and the demands of the uprising in March, 1921, of the soldiers and sailors of Kronstadt, pointing out that in both cases the brutal reaction of the rulers of the Soviet Union was precipitated by a challenge to the monolithic rule of the Communist Party, the "vanguard of the working class." "The occupation of Czechoslovakia shows that the Russian Communists think they are still the vanguard, not only of the Russian working class, but of the working class of all the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, or for that matter the working class of the whole world." (p. 122). Although the book jacket claims that the book describes "the events between August 21 and October 1, 1968," it would seem that the author actually completed his manuscript sometime between September 21 and 24, for otherwise he would certainly have mentioned the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine" confirming this conclusion of his, which was announced in an article in *Pravda* on September 25. One would have expected a similar reference in connection with the "Warsaw Letter" of July 15, quoted on p. 25: "...Every Communist Party is respon-

sible not only to its own working class, but to the international working class as well, and we therefore think that the fight against anti-Communist forces, which is necessary to save socialism in Czechoslovakia, is not only your fight but ours too...": From there, it was but a short step to the post-occupation "Brezhnev doctrine" entitled "Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist Countries": "...Each Communist party is responsible not only to its own people, but also to all the socialist countries, to the entire Communist movement... The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interests of the world of socialism, of the world revolutionary movement... the norms of law, including the norms of mutual relations of the socialist countries, cannot be interpreted narrowly, formally, and in isolation from the general context of class struggle... laws and legal norms are subjected to the laws of the class struggle, the laws of social development" (English translation by the Soviet Press Agency *Novosti* quoted by *The New York Times*, September 27, 1968). This, I believe, is the most ominous part of the "Czech experience," while the author hopes the Czech experience will have contributed much "if a free and creative form of socialism does finally emerge in Eastern Europe." For the time being, I am afraid we are much farther away from any development of a "free and creative form of socialism in Eastern Europe" than before August 21st.

While we have praised the book for its vivid style and its efficient reporting of the August events, we cannot help mentioning some deplorable shortcomings apparently due to the great haste trying to be "first." Had the manuscript been proofread by a person familiar with the Czech or Slovak languages, incorrect references to very many places and persons could have been avoided, though the errors are not limited to Czech or Slovak words: "Mazaryk" (Masaryk), "Tardubice" (Pardubice), "Strahow" (Strahov), "Chesky Brod" (Český Brod), "Breshnev" (Brezhnev), "Dobryin" (Dobrynin), "Wadislau Gomulka" (Wladislaw Gomulka); the Czech word for sovereignty is not "suverentia," but "suverenita," the Czech word "věrnost" does not mean "faithful," but fidelity or loyalty, and the slogan "Jsme s Vámi, buďte s námi" does not mean "We are with you, you are with us," but rather "We are with you, come be with us." There was no underground newspaper with the cryptic name *Svobodný legální* (*The Free Legal — Who?*) but one called *Svobodný legální československý rozhlas* (*The Free Legal Czechoslovak Radio*). No Czech would refer to the patron saint of Bohemia, St. Wenceslas, as "Good Wenceslas" (p. 83). Smetana's famous composition "Má vlast" ("My Country") is *not* an opera, but a "symphonic poem," the second movement of which, "Vltava," is doubtlessly known to the author under its German name "Die Moldau." Ota Šik's name is not pronounced "Sheek," but "Shick," and the name of "one of the main streets" of Prague is not "Prikopech," but "Příkopech." It would seem that it was not merely Emil Zátopek's English, which was sometimes somewhat "inaccurate" (sic, p. 58): To the chagrin of the Czechs and Slovaks, the occupation newspaper *Zprávy* did *not* cease publication after two days. Apart from these technicalities, there are two statements of the author we would disagree with: Despite Dubček's courage and obvious popularity even among non-Communists in Czechoslovakia, we would not go quite so far as to compare him to Jan Hus. Nor do we believe that it is true, even between January and August, 1968, that the Czechoslovak Communist Party did show "itself ready to share power with other well-intentional organizations." True, its liberal leaders tolerated the

establishment of some organizations of non-party members, but they never went so far as to "show themselves ready to share *any* power" with them, while even the author admits that "not much" power "had, in fact, been shared out."

New York University Law School

JOHN G. LEXA

THE 900 DAYS. THE SIEGE OF LENINGRAD. By Harrison E. Salisbury.
New York, Harper and Row, 1968. \$10.00.

In magnificent prose that captures the reader's imagination, that American top reporter on Muscovite developments, Harrison E. Salisbury, recreates the full story of the awesome Leningrad blockade, 1941-1944. In the words of Harrison E. Salisbury himself (*NY Times Book Review*, 1962) the Leningrad blockade "was the greatest and longest siege ever endured by a modern city, a time of trial, suffering and heroism that reached peaks of tragedy and bravery almost beyond our power to comprehend." I agree with this characterization, though in his interesting study, *The Siege of Leningrad* (Stanford, 1962), Leon Goure suggests that a number of people in the city were in favor of surrendering it to the Germans and that some people in Leningrad did write to the authorities asking that Leningrad be declared an "open city."

It is true, however — as Salisbury observes — that even in the Soviet Union the epic of Leningrad has received only modest attention compared with that devoted to Stalingrad and the Battle of Moscow. For reasons unknown to us, the rulers of Moscow have never wished the full story of the Leningrad blockade to be told as most of it is now told in Salisbury's book. In 1949, they closed the Defense of Leningrad museum. In 1957 a museum of the History of Leningrad was opened, but on display here are only a few rooms of exhibits relating to the heroic defense of the city during the Nazi-Soviet war.

We may also mention the mysterious "Leningrad Affair," in which some prominent leaders of the Leningrad defense, e.g., the head of the Leningrad Soviet, P. S. Popkov, were shot. This action against prominent Leningraders was not made public until Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th party congress in 1956. Khrushchev asserted that Malenkov had played a particularly sinister role in the "Leningrad Affair," which was used to discredit "anti-party groups" (Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich) in the following year. But Zhdanov, who had taken Kirov's place in Leningrad, died under mysterious circumstances shortly before the explosion of the "Leningrad Affair." Zhdanov was prominent in the defense of Leningrad, but as the Central Committee's secretary for ideological affairs he was responsible for the creation of the doctrine of Stalinism which envisaged the monopoly of the Communist Party in all spheres of life.

What lends Salisbury's book special interest is that the author accuses Stalin of helping Hitler to achieve his goal of the total destruction of Leningrad, along with all of its inhabitants. On October 7, 1941, Hitler ordered his generals not to accept Leningrad's capitulation and to "wipe the city off the face of the earth." Refugees from Leningrad, the order read, must be driven back by fire and Leningrad itself razed to the ground by bombardment from artillery

and the air. Hitler thus condemned more than 3 million human beings to a horrible, slow death from starvation and the cold (it was the coldest winter in twenty years). As a consequence, more than a million Leningraders died during the siege, mostly from famine. For his part, Stalin simply let Leningrad die.

To this I must add: Leningrad was never to Stalin's liking, nor did Leningraders ever believe in Stalinism. The holocaust actually began in 1935, following the assassination on Dec. 1, 1934, of Sergei M. Kirov, the circumstances of which indicate Stalin's complicity. The purges of innocent Leningraders developed into the Great Purge. The "Leningrad Affair" in 1949 again cost the Leningraders dearly.

But, in the opinion of the present reviewer, this is not all. He strongly believes that Stalin not only helped Hitler to decimate Leningraders, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and all others whom the insane Nazi leader considered of "inferior race," but also to murder the Jews. Not in the too distant future some student, possibly Harrison E. Salisbury, will arrive at the same conclusion with supporting documentation.

Because of his insane mania of racial superiority, Hitler was quite ready to condemn whole peoples to death. He ordered the slaughter of the Jews, and 6 million people perished in what he called the "final solution" of the Jewish question. Out of power lust combined with an insanity of a different kind, Stalin proceeded along the same lines long before there was any Hitler. This may be hard to accept for many Soviet sympathizers, who would dismiss it as a slur upon their beloved Russia. Yet during the last war Stalin needed the extermination and not the salvation of the Jews. Stalin played willingly into the hands of the Nazi exterminators by forbidding the evacuation of the Jews from Ukraine and Byelorussia. The situation was still more aggravated by the fact that the Jewish population in the USSR was largely unaware of the persecution and extermination that awaited it at Nazi hands because throughout the period of the Hitler-Stalin friendship, the Jews were kept in total ignorance of the Nazi-Jewish policies in Poland, and elsewhere.

Here are the reasons why Stalin fostered the extermination of the Jews by Hitler:

1. Needing something to offset his own crimes in world opinion, Stalin welcomed the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis.

2. The Nazi treatment of the Jews kept Germany and the Western Allies from arriving at some compromise at the expense of the USSR. Stalin was in constant fear of such a possibility.

3. Disasters to the civilian population and political troubles on the occupied territories were welcome to Stalin, since a suffering and discontented population was a reservoir from which to draw reinforcements for his forces, including the important partisan forces. Today, there is no doubt whatsoever that the initial friendly attitude of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Russian populations on the Nazi-occupied territory changed completely in a short time, and that the mass executions of the Jews were chiefly instrumental in effecting this change. "Sharp measures against the Jews, especially the executions, have by now considerably increased the anti-German mood," reported the *Einsatzgruppen*, as quoted by Alexander Dallin (*German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945*, London-New York, 1957, p. 215).

4. The purges of the Jewish Communists in the 1930s, the "homeless cosmopolitans" in 1948, the Jewish writers and intellectuals in 1952, the doctors' plot charge of 1953, the suppression of nearly all Jewish organizations, newspapers, publishing houses, theaters and cultural institutions — all taken together are a towering proof that the extermination of Jews was the long-range policy of the Stalinist totalitarian and terrorist regime. Stalin could only rejoice at the extermination of the Jews by Hitler; the dirty job was done by the enemy, and all advantages accrued to him. Of course, advantages as conceived in Stalin's paranoid mind.

Editor of *America*
Philadelphia, Pa.

LEW SHANKOWSKY

NEVER ENDING FLOWER. By Susie Younger. The John Day Company, New York, 223 pages. \$5.50.

On the jacket of this slim volume is its publisher's description: "A young Western woman's heroic work to bring self-respect and independence to street boys, prostitutes and poor farmers in South Korea." Although this covers the narrative on the surface, the book offers far more. It is the story of deep Christian concern for the people of another race and land; the odyssey of a Westerner trying to adapt to the life and customs of an oriental people; and — before the final page is turned — the account of a pilgrimage from agnosticism to faith, the choice of a denomination, and the dedication to a life of virginity in order to serve God with complete love. Miss Younger had a clear call to devote herself to Korea and the poorest of that country's people. One recalls Abraham Lincoln saying, "God must have loved the common people most because he made so many of them!" A young Korean minister, whose life and work this reviewer knows well, says: "I love the miserable people most because they have no other friend!"

Miss Younger's first social work in Korea was with the street boys, mostly bootblacks, who lived and worked in gangs which fiercely competed with one another, all exploited by older boys who were their bosses. As bosses, these worthies no longer worked, living off the boys' earnings in return for "protection."

Maria, a young Austrian woman with great energy and "an indomitably purposeful way of carrying out any work she had in hand," joined Susie in teaching at the Hyo Sung girls' school in Taegu. Both lived austere in order to take some twenty shoe-shine boys into their home, an old Korean house which Oxfam (of Oxford University) helped them purchase. They taught the boys more meaningful ways of earning a living, gave them a sense of security and, above all, imparted the feeling that someone cared about them. Maria continued alone with this home and work when Susie was persuaded to do for Korean girls, pressured into lives of prostitution, what she and Maria had done for the street boys. She taught the girls dressmaking, machine knitting and hair-dressing, at the same time sharing her home and giving them understanding and affection, nutritive food, medical care as needed, and the hope of marriage if they made good. Miss Younger was helped by a Mrs. Chae, who came in by day and took charge of the whole family, and by the plump

and cheerful Lucia (a Korean assistant), who was outspoken with Susie and who also knew when the girls were "pulling the wool" over their eyes — something which Western Susie did not always realize. The health of the girls needed attention first of all, then came their training. It was not long before they began to envision and hope for a different kind of life.

The book is uneven in its writing. Indeed, so great is the difference from chapter to chapter that one wonders whether the book is the work of a single author. Chapter V, "Burden on the Brain," for instance, is marred by poor sentence structure, grammatical errors and an abrupt, changing tense. On the other hand, a chapter like "Learning from Lucia" and — best of all — the superbly written "Appendix," do credit to her intellectual family and her Oxford and London School of Economics education. Literarily flawless, the Appendix is compelling in its sincerity and elevating in its philosophic content. It might well be reprinted as a Christian tract — a Catholic one, to be sure, yet ecumenical in its message.

The author first arrived in Korea in 1959, shortly before the student uprisings that overthrew the Syngman Rhee government. Unfortunately, she evidently had no opportunity to get to know President Rhee personally, forming her opinions from the charges, both deserved and undeserved, that were leveled against his government in its final stages. In retrospect, she rightly regards the protesting students in the Korean disorders as emotional and uninformed, oft-times left-leaning. But she does not allow for this in assessing the overthrow of President Rhee. She knows little of Rhee the patriot, imprisoned and tortured during his labors for the independence of his country and dedicated to the democratic principles taught him by the professor who also bestowed on him his Ph.D. at Princeton — none other than Woodrow Wilson. He could not usher in full democracy overnight; he never had enough competent and trained officials. There was corruption in the Korean government, as there is still, and as there is in greater or lesser degree in our government and all others. (America has more checks and balances, investigations and surveillance.) Truly, it was a mistake for Rhee to accept a third term (as it was for FDR), considering his age and state of health. But he never resorted to violence or to dismissals without due process of law. (This reviewer speaks on the basis of personal knowledge of Chang Myun, who served as Rhee's first ambassador to Washington, later as his premier, and of Rhee himself, gained from visits to the Rhee home in Washington and many associations in Korea from 1947 to 1951.)

All in all, an instructive, warm, even inspirational account of a spiritual quest in a too often earth-bound world.

GERALDINE FITCH

THE WAR FOR THE WORLD. By Major General Thomas A. Lane (USA, retired). San Diego, California. Viewpoint Books, a Division of Loeffler and Co., Inc., 1968. Pp. 252. \$1.00.

This paperback probably will be hardly noticed by the general public and even less by scholars, for it does not enjoy the powerful promotion that only the leading paperback publishers can muster. Nonetheless, it is quite

an important publication, its "popular" style and paucity of references notwithstanding.

In vigorous and aggressive fashion the author tells us about the weakness of the foreign policies emanating from Washington, unable to shape and direct them from the standpoint of power politics and a position of strength. He develops this theme throughout 19 chapters. Their titles are thrusting and descriptive; some of them are: "The Pulse of History," "The World That Was," "Retreat from Freedom," "The Forces of Tyranny," "The Dulles Interlude," "The Fractured Alliance," "The Strategy of Aggression," and the like.

We learn, for instance, that "The false image of American society in the world was an objective of Soviet strategy, but it was created in large measure by Americans who criticized their own institutions when these were the finest in the world." (p. 61). Or, "The loss of Czechoslovakia, the fall of China, the Korean War, the partition of French Indo-China, do not suggest that United States participation in the United Nations has perceptibly affected the behavior of other nations." (p. 68). Lane is particularly bitter when analyzing American relations with Soviet Russia: "Before the close of World War II, Soviet policies in occupied areas of Eastern Europe and Soviet dealing with the Polish Government in Exile had given signals of the interpretation Stalin would give to his pacts with Roosevelt and Churchill. But the obvious Soviet treachery and deceit were extenuated and excused in Western councils. Any criticism of Soviet policy or operations was condemned as "rocking the boat." Nothing could be more important than Soviet adherence to the United Nations." (p. 81).

Lane concludes with a clear manifesto of the basic principles of contemporary forces in power politics. "The West can achieve nothing while it adheres to its present defensive foreign policy. The area of conflict is entirely in the free world... The communists have frankly stated their objective to destroy democratic government, but the democracies have not adopted a corresponding aim of destroying all communist governments. Only a purpose to destroy communism will save the free world..." (p. 235). In fact, "Within the communist occupied countries, the underground could build strength and destroy the Communist Party structure and program from within. Sabotage and subversion should be used..." (p. 244). "Instead of pacifying the frontiers, we must bring them to life as points of infiltration of the occupied areas, points where we could foment fear and insecurity in the occupying communist regimes and through which we could sustain freedom's underground." (p. 244).

In short, then, Lane is propounding "solutions" in terms of the principles of geopolitics, as developed by Ratzen, Haushofer, and now by Soviet geopoliticians. Such conclusions will, of course, make most pacifistically-minded Americans shudder, but they certainly need to be re-examined, especially from the viewpoint of the implications of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The Index is better than fair. In view of the author's views on the underground potential, however, we regret that Ukraine is granted only one reference, on p. 44.

*Queensborough Community College
of the City University of New York*

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"NATIONALISM HAS SOVIET UNION WORRIED" an article by Victor Zorza.
The Sunday Star, Washington, D. C., February 23, 1969.

It is rare that this writer deals with non-Russian developments in the Soviet Union, but this article perhaps makes up for the long omissions. Its tone is set in the very first sentence: "The rising tide of nationalism among the peoples who make up the Soviet Union is causing concern in Moscow." And, as he points out, the tide extends from Ukraine to Tadzhikistan in Central Asia or, more poignantly, in Turkestan.

More than half of the long article is devoted to nationalist rumblings in Ukraine. In this instance, the expression they take is economic. Quoting from the journal *The Economy of Soviet Ukraine*, the piece contains such public complaints: "huge capital investments went primarily into the heavy industry of Ukraine's old-established industrial centres"; "in our republic whole branches of industry — in chemicals, light industry, engineering — which had still not attained a satisfactory level of development." In short, the cry is for more capital to develop a more balanced pattern of industry, both heavy and light, in Ukraine.

"Nationalism," concludes the writer, "is on the rise throughout the world, but the Kremlin — as its handling of Czechoslovakia shows — is less able to accommodate itself to it than other regimes." He finally warns, "If Moscow does not learn the lesson soon, it will be faced with another Czechoslovakia — this time inside the Soviet Union." More of such writing is necessary in order to refine popular conceptions with respect to the Soviet Union. The title of this article is misleading, for the fact is that Moscow, the imperio-colonialist center, is worried, not the Soviet Union of which Moscow's Russia is only a part. Moreover, nationalism has not suddenly become a rising tide in the USSR, for it has been at a continual, high level pitch since the early twenties. What is rising is the belated recognition of this reality by some Western analysts, which is all to the good.

"UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC BISHOP REPORTED JAILED BY SOVIET," a report. *The New York Times*, New York, N. Y., February 27, 1969.

The inability of Moscow's totalitarians to cope with Ukrainian nationalism, whatever its formal expression, is revealed in this report on the arrest of the Ukrainian Catholic Bishop, Vasyl Welychkovsky. The bishop, it is reported, was consecrated secretly. His arrest took place recently while he "was on his way to a private house to receive the confession of a sick man."

Bishop Welychkovsky is a Redemptorist father who was among some one thousand Ukrainian Catholic priests arrested and deported by the Russians

following World War II. He later was returned to Lviv in Western Ukraine and lived on an old-age pension. Despite the Russian genocide of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the father continued his pastoral work underground, was consecrated a bishop, and apparently was given away by someone into the arms of Moscow's security corps.

"UN AWARD TO UKRAINIAN IS PROTESTED," a commentary. *The Jewish Week*, Washington, D. C., December 12, 1968.

This commentary points out the protest registered by Dr. William A. Wexler, B'nai B'rith president, against the selection of Peter Nedbailo, a puppet delegate of Soviet Ukraine in the UN, as a recipient of the UN's human rights award. The chief matter cited in the protest was his role as "an unblushing apologist" for Trofim Kichko's anti-Semitic diatribe in 1964, titled *Judaism Without Embellishment*.

Dr. Wexler's protest is well justified. It coincides with the one lodged by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America immediately after the announcement was made last fall. To add Nedbailo's name to Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and Professor Rene Cassin, president of the Alliance Israelite Universelle, who received this award previously, could only, as Dr. Wexler points out, "debase the award's significance and impeach the award's significance." The UCCA protest went even further than this, in effect declaring it a disgrace.

In the February 20 issue of this organ, a letter written by Mr. Volodymyr Y. Mayewsky, chairman of the Organization for the Defense of Four Freedoms for Ukraine in the Washington area, commented that Wexler's protest was proper but "presents inadvertently a misleading example of the attitude of the Ukrainian people regarding the UN award." It cited the protest raised by the UCCA.

"HOW THE WORLD VIEWS NIXON," an article by Peter Lisagor. *Nation's Business*, Washington, D. C., February 1969.

According to this contributing columnist, the overall view of foreign observers toward our new President is that he "will be pragmatic, cautious, conventional, favor what will work within the limits of his concept of government's role." The attitude of Moscow seems to be an uncertain one in the light of the Nixon-Khrushchev encounter ten years ago. However, the probability is that the Kosygin-Brezhnev leadership "will not mind waiting to see what early steps the new President will take, even prompting him by a test of his nerve in Berlin."

The writer recounts the prime experience Nixon had in Moscow in July, 1959 in this vein: "Mr. Nixon was flabbergasted when his host sailed into him with earthy condemnations of a 'Captive Nations' resolution which the U.S. Congress had passed a short time before. A similar resolution had gone through Congress in previous years, but Khrushchev didn't like the sound and timing of this one, and he told his U.S. guest in far more flavorful language that the whole thing stunk."

It is evident that the columnist has a shaky understanding of the Captive Nations Resolution. The resolution passed in 1959 differs sharply from any

Congress passed before. It strikes at the very heart of Moscow's imperium, namely the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR itself. The whole essential story of this historic event is in chapter two of *The Vulnerable Russians*, authored by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University. The story is fundamentally based on Nixon's own testimony of the event.

"THE NEW YORK TIMES, 'ALL THE NEWS THAT'S FIT' — OR — 'ALL THE NEWS THAT FITS'?, " a broadcast transcript by Herman Dinsmore. *Manion Forum*, South Bend, Indiana, October 27, 1968.

The former editor of the international edition of *The New York Times* speaks his mind about the basic policy of the paper regarding news dealing with Russian aggressions in Eastern Europe. He minces few words concerning the contents of his book on *The New York Times*. "After World War II," he states, "I began to see what I regarded as a soft attitude in the *Times* toward Russian depredations in Eastern Europe."

In the face of heinous Russian crimes, the forcible incorporation of the Baltic nations into the USSR and many other brutalities, the former editor observes that the "brutish attitude of the Russians, it seemed to me, was being ignored or at least it was being treated very softly." He holds that the paper's policy-makers believed in a "balance of power" and tried to make it work "by appeasing Russia." There can be no question that in different periods the paper did ignore many significant developments among the non-Russian nations in the USSR. In the early 50's, considerable interest was shown by it; for a good part of this decade, this interest evaporated.

"OPINION: RISING TRIBALISM IN EUROPE," an article by C. L. Sulzberger. *The New York Times*, New York, N.Y., January 22, 1969.

Writing out of Belfast, Northern Ireland, the scene of many disorders recently, the author of this strange article sees an "odd feature of this epoch," namely the parallel drive for "bigger supernational organizations such as the Common Market, or what Moscow fondly calls its 'Socialist Commonwealth,' and that for smaller tribal groupings." Then, in rapid fashion, the Irish in Northern Ireland, the Scots and the Welsh, Catalanian and Basque 'nationalism' in Spain, the Sicilians in Italy, Swiss in the Jura Mountains and many other small groups seeking autonomy or separation are mentioned to prove this rising tribalism in Europe.

As though numbers meant nothing on a relative basis, not to mention larger political and qualitatively different political frameworks, the writer indiscriminately throws in several captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. He states, "And the differing 'nationalist' movements in European Russia are renowned — Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Ukrainians." If the writer knew a bit more about the Soviet Union, first he would hardly talk of the movements as being in European Russia. The USSR is not Russia. Second, with a bit more intellectual acumen he would also differentiate between full-grown, recognized nations and small "tribal" expressions of political feelings. It is this type of thought that Mr. Dinsmore above has in mind when he evaluates *New York Times* policy.

"BONN CONFIRMS IT FREED SOVIET AGENT WHO KILLED 2," a report. *The New York Times*, New York, N. Y., February 20, 1969.

From the recent rash of reports and articles appearing in this paper recently, it would seem that as in several past periods its policy is shifting toward more coverage of Ukrainian developments and events. This report concerns the sudden release of Bogdan Stashinsky who was sentenced to eight years for political murder in 1962. He admitted killing Lev Rebet and Stepan Bandera, two nationalist Ukrainian leaders domiciled in Munich, Germany, by orders of the Kremlin. In an unprecedented verdict, Germany's Supreme Court accused the Kremlin of the crimes.

Stashinsky is now reported to be in the United States. Upon his release it appears our CIA has brought him here for further questioning and possible use. Needless to say, in view of his defection from Moscow's murderers' row, not to mention his open admissions in Germany seven years ago, his life will be in continual danger. The Kremlin plotters have both a long memory and a long arm.

"THE DISCORD OF THE SPHERES," an article by James Burnham. *National Review*, New York, N. Y., February 25, 1969.

The Russian rape of Czecho-Slovakia was a rude awakening for many of our naive Americans who thought they saw the Russian totalitarians melting, the forces of liberalism reigning in Central Europe, and the Red Empire peaceably dissolving. Since last August the starry-eyed among us have been reluctant to even discuss this tragic episode of the continuing Cold War. Others have been contriving all sorts of rationalizations to make things look brighter, one of these on spheres of influence being the subject of this incisive article.

As the writer states it, the rationalization holds that, after all, Czecho-Slovakia is in "the Soviet sphere of influence. We may lament what goes on in their sphere, but of course it's none of our business really, and besides there's nothing we can do about it anyway." Myths about our not being a world policeman, the fence theme of non-interference in each other's sphere, and the imagined comforts of this spherical delimitation for world peace are thrown in for good measure.

With blunt directness, this Cold War analyst, whose column is consistently subcaptioned "The Third World War," says "All right, let's get out the atlas 'and check the Soviet Sphere so there won't be any misunderstanding about exactly where we're staying out of.'" Sarcastically, he begins, "Let's see. Starting from Russia, there is the Ukraine, Georgia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and the rest of those original Soviet Socialist Republics — naturally no one in his right mind would question the Kremlin's divine right to do anything it wanted with any of that group." Following the route of the Captive Nations Week Resolution, he winds up with Cuba and Russian sophistry about "socialism" including not only members of the Warsaw Pact "but all nations in some measure socialist and all Communist or socialist groups within any nation — a definition broad enough to be all-inclusive."

Conclusion? — "The Soviet Sphere, that is to say, is the globe itself. Isn't that what the Communists have always told us?" How to contract this sphere, both theoretically and actually? The writer doesn't consider this here.

The answer is to return to the starting point of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism — "Ukraine, Georgia, Byelorussia etc."

"CUT RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS — UKRAINIANS," a report. *Winnipeg Free Press*, Winnipeg, Canada, October 15, 1968.

At its last Congress, the Ukrainian Canadian Committee passed two strong resolutions that are covered in this lengthy report. One "will petition the Canadian government to seriously consider severing all diplomatic, cultural and trade relations with the Soviet Union." The other petitions "the Manitoba government to enact legislation giving minority groups the right to receive school instruction in their respective languages from Grade 1 on up in districts populated by that particular minority," which in that province would mean the Ukrainian language.

The first resolution may appear a bit extreme in present circumstances, but at least it calls for the Canadian government to reexamine its policy toward the USSR. Complete severance can always be held as a trump card while other challenging avenues are explored. The second resolution, if effected, can bring nothing but total benefit to Canada as a whole, culturally, intellectually, and politically. Time for such language learning is at the beginning.

"THE SHOES OF THE FISHERMAN," a guide. *MGM*, New York, N.Y., Fall, 1968.

Distributed throughout the nation with the showing of the film, this brochure obviously relates the same mish-mash and inexcusable nonsense found in the film itself. Aside from the appeasement connotations of the film and peace-loving makeup of the Russian totalitarians, the ignorance displayed toward the chief character is a subject in itself. This is one of the ways myths and falsehoods are popularly perpetuated, in the end to the advantage of our prime enemy, Moscow itself.

"But a Russian Pope! It takes a novelist's imagination to make such a daring supposition," so begins the confused story. However, in the film and here, Kiril Lakota is characterized as the Archbishop of Lvov who had been "held as a political prisoner by the Russians for twenty years..." An Archbishop of Lvov is scarcely a "Russian," Lviv being a Ukrainian city. Moreover, Lakota is not a Russian name, and as a matter of fact was the name of a Ukrainian Catholic bishop (Gregory Lakota), murdered by the Russians back in the late forties.

To compound the nonsense fed the American and other publics, when planed from Moscow to Rome, Lakota was told that he would be domiciled in the Ukrainian college at the Vatican. A "Russian" residing, studying, and teaching at the Ukrainian college? Later in the film, the "Russian Pope" was visited by an emissary from Moscow who delivered "sunflower seeds from our native soil of Ukraine." No sooner done, poor Anthony Quinn, playing the role of Kiril Lakota, spouts from the script about his being a "Russian Pope." In this confused text, one reads "Kiril loves his native Russia and feels he recognizes in Kamenev a true desire for peace," this because the Red Chinese are about to spill over into the imperial realm of Moscow.

For those who know better, the film is essentially a misguiding comedy. On the one hand, its basic misrepresentations may be charitably ascribed to ignorance regarding the nations in the USSR. On the other hand, it can also be interpreted as a skillful performance to confuse the viewing audience and psychologically condition it to the spuriously peaceful motives of Moscow. Whether one or the other, the net propaganda effect is to Moscow's advantage, not ours, the Vatican's or the Free World's. Moscow couldn't have done better with a one billion ruble investment for such propaganda results.

"STEELE DOCTOR WAGING 'IN-ABSENTIA' BATTLE FOR UKRAINIAN COUNTRYMEN," an article by Sam Lowe. *The Jamestown Sun*, North Dakota, January 25, 1969.

This lengthy article about Dr. Anthony Zukowsky and his wife is a veritable tribute to their works in behalf of both the United States and Ukraine. Anyone familiar with their activities, as are the people of this State from the Governor down, cannot but declare "Well deserved." Dr. Zukowsky is the president of the North Dakota branch of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, and it has often been said that "if each State of our Union had a Zukowsky, America's trouble with Russia in the Soviet Union would be practically over." And this is no exaggeration.

Significantly, the article begins, "Probably the first thing a Ukrainian will tell you, if you haven't met one before, is that he's Ukrainian, not Russian." This clears up the ethnic background, and then the whole story is told about this leading American of Ukrainian descent who in his State influences fellow Americans to understand the weaknesses of the USSR and the necessity for us as free men to capitalize on them. The long article deals with Ukraine's fight for freedom and all the highlights of this history in our times.

U.S. AND RUSSIA, SOME QUIET, PRIVATE SOUNDINGS," an article by Harry Schwartz. *The New York Times*, New York, N.Y., January 26, 1969.

This article points to the possibility of deals between the U.S. and Moscow. The groundwork is prepared in discussions on "settlements" in the Middle East, Russian participation in the Washington conference on satellite communications, the missile race and other issues. The Dartmouth conferences are cited as the occasions for such discussions, involving David Rockefeller, Norman Cousins and Soviet Russian journalists and intellectuals.

One point is stressed, "The Russians appear interested in two primary gains. One is an American commitment that the present boundaries in Europe will remain fixed for the indefinite future..." and "The Soviet Union wants an expansion in its trade and other economic relations with the United States." Need more be said? Put in other words, Moscow is seeking from the Nixon Administration an acquiescence to Russian colonialist rule from the Danube to the Pacific and also the acquisition of American technologic power to beat up its own power for more successful political warfare aggressions in all quarters of the globe.

L.E.D.

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR

is located in Munich, Germany, and has been engaged since 1950 in continuous research and publication on the Soviet Union. Its purpose is to study developments in the Soviet Union and to make the results of its studies available to persons and institutions everywhere.

ITS LIBRARY

of more than 55,000 volumes is one of the richest specialized collections on the Soviet Union in Europe and is widely used by visiting researchers from all parts of the world.

ITS PUBLICATIONS

include books, based on the results of research by staff members and by outside contributors, and periodicals, such as the monthly *Bulletin*, the quarterly *Studies on the Soviet Union* and the weekly *Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union*. Periodicals are also published in Turkish, Arabic, Spanish, German and French and are mailed to more than 25,000 serious students of Soviet affairs throughout the world.

ITS ACTIVITIES

include an accredited summer school, international symposiums, conferences, study seminars and lectures by emigre scholars and other specialists on Soviet affairs.

ITS SERVICES

include furnishing information in response to requests from individuals and organizations and providing facilities for advanced resident research.

FOR INFORMATION AND SUBSCRIPTIONS:

New York Office: 9 E. 41st Street New York, N.Y. 10017