

The

VOL. XXIV, NO. 2, 1968

Ukrainian Quarterly

A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

A Petition to the Council of Nationalities of the USSR

By Svyatoslav Y. Karavansky

BOOKS ON UKRAINE AND THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE

THE VULNERABLE RUSSIANS

By Lev E. Dobriansky

Introduction by Hon. Edward J. Derwinski

☐ ----- \$5.95

AN INTRODUCTION TO RUSSIAN HISTORY

By Nicholas Fr.-Chirovsky

☐ ----- \$4.50

UKRAINE AND RUSSIA: An Outline of History Of Political and Military Relations

By Prof. Matthew Stachiw, LL.D.

Preface by Prof. Clarence A. Manning

☐ ----- \$4.00

THE UKRAINIAN-RITE CATHOLIC CHURCH AT THE ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, 1962-1965

By Walter Dushnyck

☐ ----- \$3.00

UKRAINIANS AND JEWS: A Symposium

☐ ----- \$3.00

IN QUEST OF FREEDOM, 1918-1958

By Walter Dushnyck

☐ ----- \$2.00

PERSECUTION AND DESTRUCTION OF THE UKRAINIAN CHURCH BY THE RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIKS

By Gregory Luznycky

☐ ----- \$2.00

IVAN MAZEPA, HETMAN OF UKRAINE:

Collection of Articles and Essays

☐ ----- \$2.00

THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY:

CUMULATIVE INDEX — 1944-1964

(Subscribers to *The Ukrainian Quarterly* only \$1.00)

☐ ----- \$2.00

CAPTIVE UKRAINE:

Challenge to the World's Conscience

World Congress of Free Ukrainians

☐ ----- \$1.00

UKRAINIANS IN THE FREE WORLD

World Congress of Free Ukrainians

☐ ----- \$1.00

Order from:

Ukrainian Congress Committee of America

302 West 13th Street

New York, N.Y. 10014

Checks or money orders payable to:

Ukrainian Congress Committee of America

The Ukrainian Quarterly

A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

Published by the UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA, INC.

SUMMER, 1968

VOLUME XXIV — No. 2

\$1.50 A COPY



CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE:

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, Professor of Economics at Georgetown University; in October, 1966 he was elected President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America for the sixth consecutive term; author and lecturer; in September, 1967 he took part in the first World Anti-Communist Conference in Taipei, Taiwan; his latest book, *The Vulnerable Russians*, was published by Pageant Press, Inc. in November, 1967.

SVYATOSLAV Y. KARAVANSKY, poet and translator of Shakespeare, Charlotte Brante and Byron from the English into Ukrainian languages; sentenced to 25 years imprisonment in 1944 by a Soviet court, he was amnestied after 17 years in Arctic slave labor camps; he returned to Odessa, but in 1965 he was arrested and without trial sent to a prison camp at Potma, Mordovian ASSR, to serve the remainder of his original 25-year sentence; from a slave labor camp he wrote his famous "Petition" denouncing Russian enslavement and persecution of Ukrainians.

GEORGE NAKASHIDSE studied at the Universities of Tbilisi (Tiflis), Heidelberg at the Charles University and the Ukrainian Free University in Prague; a doctor of law and Ph.D. degrees; former lecturer at Columbia University; at present Instructor at the Bureau of Special Research in Modern Languages, Catholic University of America in Washington.

STEFAN T. POSSONY, educated in Austria, Germany, Italy, France and the United States; author of books and articles; lecturer on international affairs, strategy and communism; his latest book, *Lenin, The Compulsory Revolutionary*, was published in 1964; at present Director of International Political Studies Program, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.

ALEXANDER SYDORENKO, born in 1943 in Poltava, Ukraine; after World War II came with his parents to Brazil, but re-emigrated to U.S. in 1959; member of SUMA organization in Chicago, Ill.; at present is president of Ukrainian Student Association at University of Illinois; academic degrees: B.A., University of Illinois, Chicago (1966); M.A., University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (1967); working for Ph.D. degree in Russian and Ukrainian history at University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS YEAR AND COMMUNIST RUSSIA

Editorial

From April 22 to May 13, 1968, the International Conference on Human Rights was held in Teheran, Iran. The year of 1968 had been proclaimed "International Year for Human Rights" by the United Nations General Assembly in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948.

The U.S. General Assembly had asked its members that the international Year be devoted to intensive national and international efforts and various activities in order that human rights be promoted and also that an international review of achievements be conducted.

But of one hundred thirty-two States invited to participate, only some 87 sent representatives. Also attending the three-week conference, however, were observers from many organizations, both inter-governmental and non-governmental. The Conference focused upon problems which have taken up a major part of the time of many United Nations bodies over the past two decades. These include the General Assembly's Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural); the Economic and Social Council and its Commission on Human Rights, Commission on the Status of Women, and Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities; special committees on colonialism and *apartheid*; and such specialized agencies as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

At the International Conference on Human Rights, countries with widely differing economic and social conditions, legal systems, cultural traditions and political outlooks undertook to set guidelines for the continuing work of these U.N. bodies for the forthcoming years.

It is hardly possible, however, to declare that the conference in Teheran succeeded in achieving the task it had set out for itself.

TWO IDEOLOGICAL BLOCS AT CONFERENCE

Although in recent years the U.N. Assembly has voiced its concern and that of the world community over many aspects of the situation of human rights in various parts of the world, and although it has condemned "violations of human rights wherever they occur, especially in all colonial and dependent territories" — the international gathering swiftly degenerated into an arena of ideological contest between the two powerful political blocs: the Western bloc headed by the United States and that of the Communists, led by the USSR, with a substantial part of the Afro-Asian countries supporting the latter.

Thus many delegates used the forum of the Conference strictly to air their own viewpoints and propaganda. This was especially true of such delegations as those of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, and some of the satellite countries still fast in the Soviet Russian grip: Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. Also, many of the delegates from the Afro-Asian bloc almost continually leveled their attacks against South Africa (*apartheid*) and Rhodesia, while almost every representative of the Arab countries saw no other violations of human rights but those allegedly committed by the Israelis in the Arab territories they have occupied.

In contrast, serious and constructive statements and speeches were made by delegates from the United States, Canada, the Holy See, the Republic of China, South Korea, South Vietnam, Australia, some Latin American delegates and, unsurprisingly now, the delegate from Czechoslovakia, whose utterances in defense of freedom were a far cry from the hypocritical pronouncements of the other Communist representatives.

But, on the whole, the Western nations remained on the defensive throughout the entire Conference, despite the fact that many violations of human rights had been committed in places other than South Africa or Rhodesia.

The U.S. delegation was distinguished by its caution in not provoking any "cold war" debate with the USSR and its subservient puppets. All other delegations of the West meekly followed suit.

The only reference to the captive nations at the Conference was made on May 4, 1968, by John J. Grogan, former Mayor of Hoboken, N.J., and a member of the U.S. Delegation, who cited a statement on human rights made by the AFL-CIO:

The AFL-CIO in the resolution on International Human Rights expressed its solidarity with the workers, agricultural producers, and freedom-loving intellectuals of nations denied the right of self-determination, of captive nations, in their aspirations to obtain political freedom and the fundamental human rights of which today they are deprived. . .¹

The irony of the International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran was unmistakable. The leading role was played by the delegations from the USSR, Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Byelorussia, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, all of whom were exceedingly vociferous in condemning "racism" in the United States and racial discrimination and colonialism in Africa, but who were prompt to put down any attempt by the Western delegates to raise the problem of the destruction of human rights in the Communist-dominated countries as an "interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states." The great mass of today's victims of oppression virtually went unchampioned.

THE SOVIET REGIME: VIOLATOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS

From the viewpoint of this review the International Conference was significant in that a Ukrainian delegation from the Ukrainian SSR sat as a full-fledged member of the International gathering. Although the Ukrainian SSR is a charter member of the United Nations and also a member of UNESCO and of ILO, its delegation was a mere shadow of the Soviet representation. A statement released by the Free Ukrainian Delegation in Teheran characterized the Ukrainian Soviet delegation thus:

On this occasion we cannot bypass the presence at the Conference in Teheran of the separate delegation from Ukraine which carried a mandate from the so-called government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Regrettably, the conduct of this delegation was deprived of sovereignty and independence in word and action, and revealed its complete subservience to the colonial center in Moscow and to the real ruler over the enslaved and oppressed peoples in the USSR — the Communist Party of the USSR. . .²

For at the very time that the Soviet and Ukrainian Soviet delegations were heaping condemnations and vituperation upon Western colonialism, the Soviet courts in Ukraine were busy meting out severe

¹ "International Conference on Human Rights and Free Ukrainian Delegation in Teheran," *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, Nos. 11-21, June 1-15, 1968, p. 42, New York, N.Y.

² *Ibid.*, p. 48; also, see "Statement" appearing on page 165 of this issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*.

sentences to Ukrainian intellectuals who had tried to exercise their constitutional rights in captive Ukraine and to live up to the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Yet the Soviet government is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and it makes much of this fact in its massive and relentless propaganda drives abroad.

For instance, an article which appeared in *Izvestia* before the International Conference on Human Rights met in Teheran, boasted about Soviet contributions to human rights:

...But under the conditions of capitalism the Declaration's basic tenets remain unfulfilled to this day. The bourgeois democracies, which serve the interests of imperialist monopolies, have turned the rights and freedom assured by their constitutions into a farce. Thanks to the unstinted efforts of the Soviet Union... the U.N. has taken a series of measures aimed at restoring the independence of colonial people, the ending of all forms of racial discrimination, and (has) signed conventions condemning racialism and genocide. However, much remains to be done...³

But in actual practice how does the Soviet government implement the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Ukraine?

We need but cite a few examples to appreciate the gross violations by the USSR of almost every paragraph of the Declaration. For example, Art. 18 assures the right "to freedom of thought, conscience and religion." But what has happened in Ukraine?

a) The Soviet government destroyed the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church in the 1930's by murdering over 30 archbishops and bishops, and over 20,000 clergy and monks;

b) In 1945-46 Moscow brutally destroyed the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine, arrested 11 bishops and over 2,000 priests, and forced over 6,000,000 Ukrainian Catholics into the fold of the Communist-controlled Russian Orthodox Church;

c) It relentlessly harasses and persecutes other Christian believers in Ukraine — Baptists, Evangelics, Seventh-Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses—and those who profess the Judaic faith as well.

Art. 19 of the Declaration, guaranteed by the USSR, insures all peoples "the right to freedom of opinion and expression: this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

³ "The Chornovil Papers," by Gabriel Lorince, *New Statesman*, February 23, 1968, London.

This vital aspect of the Human Rights Declaration has especially been violated by the Soviet government in Ukraine. From August of 1965 to the present hundreds of Ukrainian intellectuals have been arrested and tried *in camera* and sentenced to long terms at hard labor under Art. 62 of the Penal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, which is in direct contradiction to Art. 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They were charged with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," glorification of the Ukrainian past, and dissemination of the texts of speeches by Western leaders, such as an encyclical of the late Pope John XXIII and the address which former President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered at the unveiling of the Taras Shevchenko monument on June 27, 1964, in Washington, D.C.

These arrests, which in scope and intensity far surpassed the dramatic trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel, were revealed by Vyacheslav M. Chornovil, a Ukrainian journalist who for this act was himself arrested and sentenced to 3 years imprisonment on November 15, 1967, in Lviv, Ukraine.⁴

Of these mass trials of Ukrainian intellectuals, Edward Crankshaw, a noted British authority on Soviet affairs, stated:

What had these men done? They had discussed among themselves and among their friends, ways and means of legally resisting the forcible Russification of Ukraine and the continued destruction of its culture. They possessed books dealing with this problem, some of them written in Czarist times. They possessed notebooks with quotations from the great Ukrainian patriots.

No evidence whatsoever was produced to show that they agreed with these opinions or were contemplating subversive action. Unlike some who had gone before (and others still active) they were not advocating secession in any form and even had they done so, there would have been no violation of the constitution. They were deeply concerned because the Moscow government was still persisting in its efforts to blot out Ukrainian consciousness, which even Stalin with his massive deportations and killings had failed to do...⁵

Other crass violations of human rights by the Soviet government include its wholesale destruction and annihilation of entire ethnic groups and entities in the USSR, such as the Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, Chechen-Ingushes, Kalmyks and Karachais.

The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, along with the

⁴ Cf. "A Voice from the Soviet Prison Camp," by Vyacheslav M. Chornovil, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, Spring, 1968; also, the McGraw-Hill Book Co. will soon publish *The Chornovil Papers*; see Svyatoslav Y. Karavansky's "A Petition to the Council of Nationalities of the USSR," appearing elsewhere in this issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*.

⁵ Edward Crankshaw, *The Observer*, February 11, 1968, London.

World Congress of Free Ukrainians as well as the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, prepared a factual Memorandum, entitled, *Violation and Destruction of Human Rights in Ukraine*, which was submitted by its representative to all the participants of the International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran. In a concluding Appeal, the document stated:

In view of the flagrant and systematic violations by the Soviet government of Articles 2, 13, 15, 18 and 19, as substantiated by mounting irrefutable evidence;

In view of the open violations of other Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, specifically Arts. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and especially Arts. 9 and 10, which protect all persons from arbitrary arrest and assure all of impartial tribunal; Art. 14, guaranteeing the right of political asylum; Art. 26, assuring that each person is entitled to free education, as well as Arts. 27 and 29, assuring everyone the right of protection of moral and material interests, as well as a social and international order in which all the freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized, we entreat the International Conference on Human Rights:

- 1) To establish a Special U.N. Committee to Investigate the Violations of the U.N. 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights' in Ukraine and in other Union Republics of the USSR; especially, to investigate the religious persecution involving Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism and Islamism; the unbridled Russification of the non-Russian nations, now ruled by Moscow; the relentless persecution of the intellectual elite in Ukraine and in Russia proper, and the willful destruction of ethnic minorities in the USSR, such as the Jews, the Crimean Tartars, Volga Germans, Chechens, Ingushes, Kalmyks and the Karachai peoples.

- 2) To prevail upon the Soviet government to release some 200 Ukrainian intellectuals arrested in 1965-67, and all Ukrainian political prisoners who are languishing for long years in Soviet Russian prison camps without benefit of amnesty and leniency on the part of the Soviet government; to release also those Russian writers who have been convicted for not conforming to the official policy of the regime by advocating more freedom for intellectual life in the USSR.

- 3) To prevail upon the Soviet government to return all deportees to their native countries, such as Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and to repatriate Russian nationals brought as settlers to become the dominant element in the non-Russian Republics of the USSR.

- 4) To prevail upon the government of the Soviet Union to adhere to the basic principles espoused in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

We recall that the United Nations, in a resolution adopted in 1952 on "The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination," called for the implementation of this fundamental right of all peoples—freedom and national independence. Although a number of African and Asian nations, once subject to the rule of colonial empires, have been granted the right to rule themselves, no such implementation has occurred in the Soviet Union, a great empire based on conquest and domination of captive nations.

The full and unqualified liberation of these captive nations languishing in

the USSR is a prerequisite to the enjoyment of all human rights and to the attainment of a lasting peace in the world.⁶

These violations are indefensible infractions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the part of the Soviet government.

Yet no western government has yet deemed it timely and necessary to challenge the Kremlin dictators, to call on them to answer for these crimes against humanity before an international forum of public opinion.

Conferences on human rights are hollow affairs so long as the Soviet Russian empire remains a breeding ground for genocide, religious and cultural persecution, and the denial of human rights to all peoples and races. Pathetically, potential victims, such as the peoples of the African and Asian lands, seem to be least capable of detecting the menace posed by their fraudulent "champion," the Soviet Union.

⁶ *Violation and Destruction of Human Rights in Ukraine*. Memorandum to the International Conference on Human Rights, April 22 - May 13, 1968, Teheran, Iran. Submitted by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Inc.

A PETITION TO THE COUNCIL OF NATIONALITIES OF THE USSR

BY SVYATOSLAV Y. KARAVANSKY

EDITOR'S NOTE: In the Spring 1968 issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* we carried an article, "A Voice from the Soviet Prison Camp," written by Vyacheslav M. Chornovil. He is a Ukrainian TV journalist who is now in a Soviet jail for speaking up for the freedom of the Ukrainian people. In his book, *The Chornovil Papers* (which originally was titled *Portraits of 20 'Criminals'*), he revealed that a number of Ukrainian intellectuals who were imprisoned by the Soviet government for resisting the Russification of Ukraine. Among them was 47-year-old Svyatoslav Y. Karavansky, a poet and translator of Shakespeare, Charlotte Bronte and Byron from the English into Ukrainian languages. On April 10, 1966 he wrote, from prison, this famous "Petition," in which he assailed the repressive policies of Moscow in Ukraine. The "Petition" was circulated underground before reaching the West. It appeared in the January 15, 1968 issue of *The New Leader* (New York, N.Y.), and is reprinted here with special permission of the editor of said review:

Over the last 30 years, the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR has investigated very few of the pressing problems that should be of primary concern to it. Obviously, one can neither criticize nor condemn the Council's activities up to 1953, for like all Soviet state organs, it was represented by Stalin personally. During this period it existed formally, but did not in fact perform any official business. Unfortunately, inertia still characterizes the Council, although it is high time that it undertook the correction of a long list of abuses resulting from the Stalinist cult of personality — abuses which even today restrict and undermine friendly relations between the nations of the USSR.

Such friendship will develop successfully and increase in strength only when all the nations of the Soviet Union are accorded equal rights in every branch of social and political life. This is a truth

that is self-evident. It is the principle that has compelled me to address the Council of Nationalities, and to petition it for the implementation of measures to remove the vestiges of discrimination against nationalities in our society.

JEWISH VICTIMS

To begin with, I call your attention to the discrimination against the Jewish population. I state this problem first because the attitude of a society toward its Jewish population is the litmus paper indicating that society's level of international consciousness. The closing down of Jewish cultural institutions (newspapers, schools, theaters, publishing houses); the execution of Jewish cultural workers; discrimination in admitting Jews to institutions of higher and secondary learning — these are all practices that flourished in the era of the personality cult. It would seem that the condemnation of the cult should have put also an end to these flagrant injustices, yet this did not occur. To appease public opinion abroad, Nikita Khrushchev (who paid little attention to public opinion in the Soviet Union itself) was forced to "rehabilitate" the innocent Jewish cultural leaders executed under Stalin. But he went no further.

Where are the Jewish theaters now, the newspapers and publishing houses, the schools? In Odessa, there are approximately 150,000 Jews but not one Jewish school. And what about admission to institutions of higher learning? Again in Odessa, where 25 per cent of the population is Jewish, Jews make up only 3-5 per cent of the student body at those institutions. That is the *unofficial quota* maintained in processing admissions. Yet Jewish students applying to institutions of higher learning in other cities are told: "You have a school in Odessa — go to your 'own' school." Students from the Urals, Siberia, Moscow, Tula, Saratov (all with their own large, well-established universities) are permitted to study in Odessa, where they are provided with specially constructed dormitories, while local Jewish students (as well as the local Ukrainians and Moldavians) are severely restricted in their right to a higher education.

Practices such as these can only lead the Jews to an awareness of the fact that in the Soviet Union they belong to an inferior and unequal national group, and so drive them to Zionism. One must admit that never before has Zionism been as popular among the Jewish population as it is today, and this is a direct result of discriminatory practices against the Jewish minority.

CRIMEAN TARTARS, VOLGA GERMANS, OTHERS

An equally glaring example of national discrimination was the mass deportation of the Crimean Tartars and the Germans from their own territories and the *confiscation* of their statehood. The expulsion of the Tartars from the Crimea was an act of open injustice that no argument can excuse. How, in the 20th century, could a society that wants to create the most just order on earth deport a nation of 900,000 from its historic lands for "treason against the Motherland" committed by a few of its people? Who has the right in this century to delve into the archives of an imperialism long past to come up with an argument that "historically" this land belonged not to the Tartars but to the Russians? If one followed this line of reasoning then Khabarovsk Kray, Prymorsky Kray, and the Amursk *Oblast* should all be immediately returned to the Chinese Republic because the imperialistic Czars of Russia forcefully seized these lands from the Chinese rulers. Can friendship among the Soviet nations possibly be encouraged by depriving the Crimean Tartars of statehood, by scattering them throughout the expanses of Kazakhstan and Siberia, by depriving them of their schools, newspapers, and theaters?

And how are the Germans of the Volga Region responsible to society for Hitler's crimes? Does Marxism solve complex problems by judging people on the basis of their nationality rather than their social contribution? Does not the slogan "Workers of the World, Unite!" apply to the Jews, the Crimean Tartars, and the Germans of the Volga Region? We have no bourgeois Jews, no capitalist Tartars, no German landowners in the Soviet Union. We have only workers.

How can our young people be educated in the spirit of internationalism when they see entire nations deprived of their right to national autonomy and of their right to an education in *both* their native and foreign languages? What friendship can there be between the man who has been exiled from his own home, from his native land and the man who has taken over this home and this land?

To the injustices above, one must also add the errors committed in the restoration of national statehood to the Chechens, Ingushes, Kalmyks, Karachais, and a number of other nationalities. This seemingly just act toward the smaller national groups was not accomplished without blunders, making it obvious to these nationalities that they are still less than equal. According to the established procedure, the families of these unjustly exiled national groups are not

given back their immovable property — their buildings and their homes; if they wish to return to their ancestral lands, they must buy back their homes from the local state authorities, or else build new ones. Having given them the right to return, the decree of the Supreme Soviet did not secure for them the means to realize this return. It is the same as presenting someone with an expensive cake, after first eating the chocolate icing and filling. Can such a gift be considered a gift?

RAPE OF BALTIC NATIONS

During the era of the personality cult many injustices were likewise perpetrated against the Baltic nations. The Estonian population occupying regions near the Soviet-Estonian border was deported *en masse* to Siberia — although the only crime of these people was that they happened to live near the border. They could at least have been resettled in another part of the Estonian Republic; but, no, the entire population of the town of Silamaye was transported to Siberia.

As everyone knows, in 1940 the Latvian Republic joined the Soviet Union of its own accord. Therefore, no repressive measures should have been taken against the military personnel of the Latvian Army. Strangely enough, however, officers of the Latvian Army were invited in 1941 to military maneuvers from which they never returned; they were interned, and their fate is unknown. Not one of these officers ever came home. This is true, too, of the thousands of Lithuanians who were unjustly repressed and deported in 1940-41. The suspicion arises that under Beria's arbitrary rule, these Soviet citizens may have been liquidated in one way or another in the concentration camps. This is in itself a crime against humanity and can hardly strengthen friendship among nations. To prevent similar occurrences in the future, it is time to investigate and, if necessary, perform the appropriate excavations and exhumations of bodies in order to prosecute those criminally responsible for murdering thousands of Lithuanian and Latvian citizens of the Soviet Union.

PERSECUTION IN UKRAINE

Meanwhile, inordinate damage to the friendship of nations has been and is being done by the distorted national policies applied in one of the largest republics of the USSR, Ukraine. The *Russification* of Ukrainian institutions of higher learning introduced after 1937, has been condemned and partially corrected in Western Ukraine,

but in Eastern Ukraine, these institutions remain completely *Russified*. This discriminatory policy is explained by the supposed difference between the two regions; but if this is the case, why did the Ukrainian nation unite into one Ukrainian Soviet state in the first place? Obviously, so that the entire Ukrainian nation, previously deprived of statehood, could develop into one national organism. Now, in the field of education the united republic is divided into two parts. Practices of this kind not only discourage friendship; they even divide one nation into two.

It is no secret that the unjust acts against the Ukrainian nation — the execution of leaders such as Chubar, Kosior, Zatonsky, and Lubchenko; the execution of writers such as Mykytenko, Vlyzko, Falkivsky, and dozens of others; the groundless exclusion of the Communist party of Western Ukraine from the Comintern; the liquidation and deportation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia of Lviv between 1939-53; the compulsory mass deportations of Ukrainians to Siberia; the forced *Russification* of the Ukrainian population in Kuban, Bilohorod, Stavrodub — that all these acts could not fail to provoke the national outrage which developed into a national revolt between 1943-49. The majority of the participants in this revolt and even mere witnesses (there are more of these) are still living beyond the borders of their own republic.

These victims of the personality cult should be returned to their native homes. A true friendship among the Soviet nations requires a wide and general amnesty for all those prisoners who (after 15, 18, or 20 years) are wasting away in prisons and concentration camps for their active opposition to the personality cult and to Beria's terror. If there is really to be friendship among the nations of the USSR, then it must be based on humane relations, and not on national hatreds and fratricide.

PLIGHT OF UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS

The fact that there has been no amnesty for participants in the 1943-49 national uprisings against Stalin's personality cult and Beria's terror in Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia does great harm to the ideal of friendship among Soviet nations. Today in Komi ASSR (Vorkuta, Inta, Pechora), in Siberia (Irkutsk Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Kray), in Kazakhstan, and in Kolyma, there are large numbers of Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians who were deported on the suspicion of opposing the personality cult between 1943-49.

One can only presume that it is precisely because it intends to prevent the release of these persons that the USSR continues to maintain its barbaric 25-year prison term. For at this time 25-year sentences are being served primarily by Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Byelorussians, and Moldavians. Why is there no pardon for them? We have generously pardoned those who contributed to the mass extermination of Soviet citizens in 1937-39, excusing them on the ground that they were not responsible for the conditions of those times and were only obeying orders.

Why is there no similar pardon for such Ukrainian women as Katheryna Zarytska, Halyna Didyk, and Odarka Husiak, each sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment? Should it be permissible to hold women in the Vladimir Prison for 18-20 years: Kateryna Zarytska since 1947, and Halyna Didyk and Odarka Husiak since 1950? At one time Khrushchev condemned the inhuman execution of a pregnant woman-revolutionary in Albania; bearing this condemnation in mind, can one condone the imprisonment of women so many years in a stone grave?

ASSAILS INFLUX OF RUSSIANS

The practice of settling the cities of the national republics with Russians further contradicts true friendship among the Soviet nations. In the UkSSR the Russian population systematically increases while the Ukrainian population decreases. Similar migrations are still taking place in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, and elsewhere. The colonization of Ukraine with a large number of Russians (retired officers, retired KGB officials, and other privileged categories of citizens) who settle in the cities and get all the comfortable jobs and professional positions, has forced the native Ukrainian population into low-salaried jobs as unskilled laborers, ambulance drivers, caretakers, stevedores, construction and farm workers. Such arbitrary settlement of prehistoric Ukrainian lands produces nothing but national enmity. Let us remember the bloodshed among nations between 1917-20 in the Caucasus and in the Middle East.

In 1958, when the Chechens and the Ingush finally returned to their native lands, they were greeted by the Russian population of Grozny with banners reading, "Chechens and Ingush, get out of the Caucasus!" and "Long live Stalin's National Policies!" Is this not typical of the colonizer's attitude toward age-old inhabitants in any given locality and toward the legal owners of the land? Is this not

a shameful expression of international enmity? Is it not clear proof of the fact that the policy of colonization of the national republics has led not to friendship, but to hostility? One cannot support the concept of friendship among nations and at the same time support the policy of arbitrarily and deliberately intermingling nationalities and dividing among them the social functions of work and leadership. From the point of view of a true friendship between the Soviet nations, it is necessary to re-examine this discriminatory policy of deporting national minorities to Siberia and of settling the national republics with foreign, usually Russian or *Russified* groups.

An equally pernicious vestige of the personality cult is the so-called *system of passport registration* that exists in the Soviet Union. According to this law, a person may live only where the militia allows him to live; he does not have the right to move about freely in the country — or more precisely, he has the right to move to Siberia, to the Urals, to Kazakhstan, but he does not have the right to live in the so-called “regime” cities. Thus an inhabitant of Ukraine is not free to settle in Kiev, Odessa, or Lviv; an inhabitant of Lithuania, in Vilna or Kaunas; an inhabitant of Latvia, in Riga. Why? How could the fact that Ukrainians live in Kiev threaten the safety of the Communist society there?

VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION

In 1948, the Soviet Union signed the International Convention on Human Rights, which contains a paragraph concerning the right of people to move about freely within a given country. But this freedom does not exist in the Soviet Union, where the inhabitants of a national republic do not have the right even to settle in the cities of their own republic. The discriminatory system of registration presently in force makes it possible only for foreigners, usually Russians, to settle in these cities. Inevitably, such a practice evokes antagonism between the local population and the Russian population, an antagonism that is felt today in all the national republics.

Discrimination against certain nationalities is further manifest in the “errors” made in designating the borders of the national republics. Large regions settled by Byelorussians in the Smolensk and the Bryansk *Oblasts*, for instance, were not included in the Byelorussian SSR; Krasnodarsk *Kray*, parts of Voronezh, Bilhorod, and the Tahanrih *Rayon* of the Rostov *Oblast* were not included in the UkSSR; regions settled by Moldavians in the Odessa *Oblast* were

excluded from the Moldavian SSR; the Horno-Badakhshansk Autonomous *Oblast* was excluded from the Armenian SSR.

AGAINST DIVISION OF NATIONAL TERRITORY

In the case of the autonomous republics, the division of lands might have been carried out by the lion in Aesop's fable. A part of the Penza *Oblast* and the city of Penza, settled by Mordvinians, were excluded from the Mordovian ASSR. Large territories of the Ulyanovsk and Orenburg *Oblasts*, settled by Tartars, were excluded from the Tartar ASSR. The homeland of Musa Dzalil was left in the Orenburg *Oblast*. Part of the Kirov *Oblast*, settled by Udmurts, was excluded from the Udmurt ASSR. And what conceivably could have been the reason for excluding Vyborg from the Karelian ASSR, or for artificially dividing the Komi nation into two republics — the Komi ASSR and the Komi-Permyak National *Okrug*? Similarly, the Ossetians were divided into the North and the South Ossetian ASSR, while the Buryat-Mongols were divided into the Buryat-Mongol ASSR, the Ust-Orda Buryat National *Okrug*, and the Aginsk National *Okrug*.

DEMANDS RECTIFICATION OF WRONGS

Such arbitrary dissection of nationalities serves only to create hostility. The true development and strengthening of friendship among the nations of the USSR demand that these problems be investigated and rectified within the briefest possible period. I therefore propose that the following measures be quickly adopted and implemented:

1. Cessation of all forms of discrimination against the Jewish population.
2. Return of statehood to the Crimean Tartars and the Germans of the Volga Region.
3. Return of all immovable property to the families of unjustly deported and repatriated national groups.
4. Permission for the members of the Baltic Nations, Western Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Moldavia, who were unjustly deported to Siberia, to return to their homelands.
5. Investigation of the disappearance of the Latvian Army officers.
6. Proclamation of a general amnesty encompassing all victims of Stalin's personality cult.

7. Release of the women-martyrs: Kateryna Zarytska, Odarka Husiak, and Halyna Didyk.

8. Investigation of the question of discriminatory practices toward Ukrainians living in Kuban, Bilhorod, and Stavrodub and appropriate action to abolish such discrimination.

9. Removal of all forms of discrimination in education against nationalities in Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, and the other republics.

10. Condemnation of the deportation of peoples from their national republics to Siberia, and of the settlement of these republics with Russians.

11. Review of the system of passport restrictions and condemnation of passport discrimination that is in contradiction to the International Convention on Human Rights.

12. Review of the borders of national republics so that they may conform more closely to ethnographic settlements.

13. Wide discussion in the press of all questions broached in this petition.

UKRAINE AT BREST LITOVSK

A CASE OF INCIPIENT NATIONHOOD

By ALEXANDER SYDORENKO

INTRODUCTION

In the predawn hours of February 9, 1918, the gray and cheerless walls of the Brest Litovsk citadel witnessed an unusual and significant ceremony: the signing of a peace treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers, the first peace treaty since the outbreak of the Great War. It was a product of long and tortuous negotiations, in the course of which the independence of the newly created Ukrainian National Republic became a matter of bitter dispute between the Ukrainian and the Bolshevik delegations. While the issue was settled in favor of Ukraine, the Ukrainian delegates at Brest Litovsk, far from being elated, were dominated by a sense of impending doom. Indeed, their apprehensions were justified, for only a few hours after the treaty was signed they were informed that their government, the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, had abandoned the capital and that Kiev had fallen to the Bolsheviks.

THE STAGE

In March of 1917 the centuries-old edifice of Romanov rule collapsed like a house of cards, tumbling down meekly and without a murmur of protest. The Russian Revolution marked the beginning of one of the richest and most costly periods of social and political experimentation in modern times, costly both in human and material resources. It was during this chaotic and often tragic and irresponsible period that Ukraine made its bid for nationhood. The creation of the Central *Rada* was an important element in the reawakening of Ukrainian national consciousness, but the weak and socialistically-minded *Rada* fell victim to the pressure applied first by Kerensky's Provisional Government and then by the Bolshevik regime, both of which nursed no sympathy for the separatist movement in Ukraine.

Recognizing its own impotence and unable to obtain any moral or material support from the Allied Powers, the *Rada* hoped that a speedy recognition by foreign powers would curb the Bolshevik activity in Ukraine. It was this fallacious consideration that prompted Kiev to join the diplomatic roulette at Brest Litovsk.

The need for a peace had long been felt in Russian official circles and the cry for "Bread, Peace and Land" had been an important factor in the collapse of both the monarchy and Kerensky's government. An immediate peace, therefore, was a primary concern for the Bolsheviks, who needed to embellish their rule with an aura of legitimacy. As Lenin explained in his *The Aims of the Revolution*, the Bolsheviks did not contemplate a separate peace, but rather a general European peace based on the dictatorship of the proletariat, which in turn would ignite a proletariat revolution in Europe, putting thus an end to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. But as the Allied Powers failed to show any enthusiasm for the Bolshevik peace overtures, it became obvious that Russia would have to deal with the Central Powers alone.

In 1917 the Central Powers had little hope of breaking the stalemate on the Western Front if the hostilities were to continue in the East. Moreover, there were also non-military considerations that warranted a peace with Russia. While Germany was still holding, Austria was beginning to show the effect of the Allied blockade through economic exhaustion, and only access to the rich natural resources of Russia and Ukraine could preserve the existing order. These were the considerations, therefore, that prompted the German government to arrange the release of Lenin from his self-imposed retreat at Zurich and transport him to Finland in the famous "sealed car."

While the Bolsheviks were returning from exile or imprisonment in 1917, the Ukrainians were undertaking their greatest experiment in modern times — the creation of the Ukrainian State. The Central *Rada*, formally established in March of 1917, was faced with the enormous task of creating order throughout the land. Unfortunately, it was composed of individuals representing all shades of political ideology. Thus, the *Rada* failed in the beginning to manifest any serious desire for autonomy, striving instead for the creation of an ill-defined "federation" with Russia. The decisive step — the proclamation of Ukrainian independence — was taken only during the eventful days of January of 1918, when the momentum had petered out and all was lost.

The initiative in regard to peace came from the Bolsheviks themselves. On November 6, through Krylenko, the commander-in-chief, Trotsky made a formal application to the German High Command, calling for a ceasefire and the opening of negotiations for a "just and democratic peace, without annexations or indemnities" and in accordance with the principle of self-determination. At first blush, it would appear that such an adherence to self-determination would have been disastrous for the Bolsheviks, for large areas would certainly detach themselves from Russia. One must keep in mind, however, that this was still the "pure" stage of Bolshevik ideology, when the harsh realities were overridden by a wild optimism. Intoxicated with their own success, the Bolsheviks believed that the forthcoming proletarian revolution in Europe would make all national frontiers meaningless.¹ Trotsky's proposal was accepted on December 2, with Brest Litovsk being determined as the site of the peace talks.

Since the Bolsheviks had negotiated an armistice in the name of all Russia, without consulting Ukraine, the *Rada* found itself in a dilemma. At this point the Ukrainian government was confronted with the creation of a rival Bolshevik government in Kharkiv and with an ultimatum from Petrograd, which in fact created a state of war between Russia and Ukraine. The Bolshevik impudence at Brest Litovsk, therefore, made the *Rada's* position an extremely difficult one: if it refused to accept the armistice, it would have to cope with the possibility of a German invasion: if, on the other hand, it accepted the ceasefire, it would incur the wrath of the Allies, whose recognition was still sought by Kiev. But since the *Rada* lacked the armies and the materiel to continue the war effort, it would be folly to face the Germans alone. Thus, on December 24 the *Rada's* General Secretariat issued a note declaring that Ukraine would join the peace talks if these would be conducted in accordance with the principle of self-determination. Two days later an answer came from Brest Litovsk, announcing that the Central Powers considered the participation of Ukraine "an absolute necessity." On that same day the *Rada* appointed its delegation, consisting of Alexander Sevriuk, Mykola Liubynsky, Mykola Levytsky and Vsevolod Holubovych, who was to

¹ The principle of self-determination, as interpreted by Lenin, was but a meaningless abstraction: it did not include the right of secession from Russia, allowing only a degree of territorial autonomy without voice in legislation or administration. For a good study of the problem, see Jurij Borys, *The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine: A Study in the Communist Doctrine of the Self-Determination of Nations* (Stockholm, 1960).

head the delegation. Strangely, the delegates did not receive any detailed instructions at this time. Only Prof. Hrushevsky had a lengthy conference with them, instructing them unofficially as to what should be demanded at Brest, particularly in regard to the territorial question. Accordingly, they were to demand from Austria the cession of Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, Transcarpathia, Kholm and Polisia, so that "not a single shred of Ukrainian soil remained under foreign rule." If this were not granted — which was almost a certainty — then as a *sine qua non* condition they were to demand the creation of a crown state composed of the mentioned regions to be governed by Austria. "You will manage somehow and do the best for our interests," was Hrushevsky's parting admonition. On December 30 the delegates headed for Brest Litovsk.

THE CONFRONTATION AT BREST LITOVSK

At Brest Litovsk formal negotiations already had been in progress since December 22. The town at the time had been almost completely destroyed. Only its citadel was intact, and its dingy premises were quickly made habitable for the accommodation of the various delegations. It was here that the great diplomatic battle was to take place. Indeed, it was a strange confrontation: on one side there were the aristocratic representatives of the Central Powers, seasoned diplomats bred in the traditional Western school of polite diplomacy; on the other, the representatives of a revolutionary regime, professional agitators and saboteurs who viewed the proceedings with suspicion and cared little if at all for diplomatic niceties. The Germans were headed by Richard von Kuhlmann, an individual of profound culture and one of Germany's most astute diplomats. His immediate assistant and the representative of the German High Command was General Max von Hoffmann, a typical Prussian officer. The distinguished Count Ottokar Czernin, the Austrian foreign minister, represented the Dual Monarchy. The Bolshevik delegation consisted of Joffe, Karakhan, Sokolnikov, Madame Bitsenko, various officers and soldiers, and one peasant.² The delegation was completed with the later arrival of Leon Trotsky, whom the Germans soon tagged

² The peasant delegate was Roman Stashkov, who was picked up by the Bolsheviks on their way to the railroad station of Petrograd. It seems that the delegates realized at the last moment that the peasant class was not represented in the delegation. Through bribes and threats Stashkov was persuaded to accompany them to Brest and the lacuna in the "truly representative" Bolshevik delegation was filled.

"Mephistopheles." It was against this galaxy of celebrities that the inexperienced and youthful Ukrainians were to match their wits and, hopefully, win concessions. But as events were to prove, in this atmosphere of mutual suspicion, sheer determination was far superior to diplomatic skill, and determination was the one thing that the Ukrainians possessed in abundance.

The Ukrainians arrived in Brest Litovsk on January 1, 1918. Since they had not received detailed directives from their government, they had to decide on one important issue — mainly, their relationship with the Bolshevik delegation. It was agreed, therefore, that while they would act independently, they would nevertheless attempt to form a bloc with the Bolsheviks in order to strengthen their bargaining position. During the consultations that followed, the latter not only agreed to the Ukrainian proposal but even expressed a willingness to recognize the Central *Rada* as the *de jure* government of Ukraine, obviously thinking that the Ukrainians could easily be manipulated. The Russians, however, urged the Ukrainians to adopt their policy of delay. This, together with the Russian failure to support the *Rada's* territorial claims, opened a deep chasm between the two delegations.

But the arrival of the Ukrainians proved to be a source of irritation for Count Czernin, for apart from the natural humiliation of having to deal with those whom he considered to be mere "school-boys," he was deeply disturbed by the prospect of having to pay for Ukrainian grain with the cession of Austrian territory, a development that would certainly earn for him the full wrath of the Austrian Poles. Thus, when faced with the *Rada's* territorial demands, the old aristocrat was prompted to ask sarcastically who were the victors and who were the vanquished. But as the preservation of the Austrian monarchy now depended on an immediate *Brotfrieden* (Bread-peace), he had no alternative but to continue the talks.³

A plenary session took place on January 10, with Kuhlmann presiding. Holubovych took the opportunity to read a note from the *Rada*, announcing that until a federal government were established in Russia, Ukraine would act independently at the negotiations.

³ Polish nationalists have questioned the validity of the argument that Austria was plagued by an acute food shortage and claim that there was a doubleplay between the Austrians and the Ukrainians at Brest Litovsk. They dismiss the treaty between the Central Powers and Ukraine as "an intentional camouflage for another partition of Poland." See S. W. Wojstomski, *Russia and the Principle of Self-Determination* (London, 1955). Needless to say, there is absolutely no evidence to substantiate these charges.

Kuhlmann welcomed the *Rada's* note as "an important historical document" and proceeded to ask the Russian delegation whether it also recognized the independent status of Ukraine. To this Trotsky replied that his delegation was in full accord with the principle of self-determination, even if this would lead to a complete severance of Ukraine from Russia, and that he saw no obstacle to an independent participation of Ukraine at the peace talks. Having received this assurance, however, Kuhlmann reserved the formal recognition of Ukraine as a sovereign nation as a matter for the impending peace treaty.

The Ukrainians were heartened by Trotsky's announcement, but since they were seeking nothing less than an immediate recognition of Ukraine, Kuhlmann's declaration was clearly a disappointment. In any case they were not about to give up the effort. Of course, one obvious drawback was Czernin's taciturn attitude towards them, but the Ukrainians were well informed about Austria's desperate straits and were determined to exploit this situation fully. Unquestionably, it was this recalcitrant stance of the Ukrainians that Czernin had in mind when he wrote in his diary: "The Ukrainians no longer treat with us; they dictate!"

Meanwhile, the great battle of words between Trotsky and Kuhlmann reached a new peak of intensity. In subject matter their debates ranged from China to Peru, including such irrelevancies as the degree of dependence of certain English colonies on the British Crown and the powers of the Supreme Court of the United States. It seemed that the two archrivals, put on their mettle, would carry on indefinitely. Czernin and the Ukrainians, however, were in no mood to enjoy the oratorical duel: the former received daily reports of hunger riots in Austria, while the latter were troubled by the Bolshevik military activity in Ukraine. But it was Hoffmann, possessing the soldier's practical mind, who decided to put an end to the harangue. On January 14 he approached Czernin and received his authorization to begin separate negotiations with the Ukrainians, hoping that an agreement with Ukraine would bring Kuhlmann and Trotsky back to their senses. While regarding the Ukrainian territorial demands as a "piece of impudence," Hoffmann was nevertheless willing to sacrifice Austrian interests to accomplish his end. The Ukrainians, on the other hand, themselves came to the realization that their demands would have to be limited. Therefore, while remaining firm on the cession of Kholm, they agreed to renounce their claims to Transcarpathia and Polisia if a crown state were formed of Galicia and Bukovina. But even this placed Czernin in a dilemma: if he consented

to the cession of Kholm he would become the target of Polish antagonism; if he agreed to the creation of a crown state he would introduce the issue of self-determination among the numerous Austrian national minorities and, finally, to cede Kholm arbitrarily without consulting the local population would be in fact to violate the principle of self-determination. But since the Ukrainian grain had become an absolute necessity for Austria, the aging count dejectedly agreed in principle to the proposal, reserving the right to refer the final decision to Vienna.

But the spectre of starvation was facing Russia as well. One of the main reasons for Trotsky's increasingly agitated opposition to a possible separate Ukrainian peace was his realization that it would entail the deflection of the flow of grain away from the North at a time when Russia was on the verge of an economic disaster. Radek, the Polish Bolshevik accompanying Trotsky, took advantage of the food shortage in Petrograd to launch a virulent attack on the *Rada*. "If you want food", he wrote in a widely circulated article, "cry 'Death to the *Rada*!'... The *Rada* has dug its own grave by its Judas-like treachery!"

On January 18 a short recess was called so that the delegations might consult their respective governments. In their previous discussions the Ukrainians had requested the presence of E. Petrushevych, the leader of the Ukrainian parliamentary representation in Vienna, so that the Galician interests could be represented at Brest Litovsk. When this was refused, the Ukrainians, while passing through Lviv on their way to Kiev, were able to elude the Austrian guard and hold a conference with various Galician leaders.

THE BURDEN OF NATIONHOOD

While the negotiations were being conducted at Brest Litovsk, relations between the *Rada* and the Bolsheviks deteriorated considerably. On January 12 the Kharkiv Executive Committee rejected the peace efforts of the *Rada* and appointed a delegation of its own to represent Ukraine at the peace talks, consisting of Medvedev and Shakhrai. Five days later the Kharkiv Bolsheviks denounced the *Rada* as "an enemy of the people" and sent Muraviev and his Red Guards toward Kiev. Thus, when the Ukrainian delegates arrived in Kiev the situation looked quite bleak, for not only was the capital being slowly encircled by Muraviev's forces, but a Bolshevik uprising was in the making within the city itself. Again the delegates did not have any lengthy consultation with the General Secretariat, being

only instructed to sign the peace as soon as possible. Despite the fact that the *Rada* issued its belated *Fourth Universal*, the sense of uncertainty was so great that the delegates were empowered to ratify the impending treaty in case the *Rada* should prove unable to do so. On January 29, to the sound of cannon from nearby Kruty, the delegates left Kiev.

At Brest Litovsk the Ukrainians were faced by a reversal in position by Trotsky, who now questioned the *Rada's* right to represent the Ukrainian people. He argued that since all the Ukrainian *soviets* were represented at the All-Russian Congress in Petrograd, Ukraine had in fact joined the Russian federation. Therefore, the Central Powers should now deal with the Kharkiv representatives, for any agreement between Ukraine and the Central Powers would require the endorsement of the All-Russian Federation to become valid. The *Rada's* delegation, of course, would have none of this, but now everything depended on Kuhlmann and Czernin. The Ukrainians decided to avoid any outward sign of apprehension, as if the situation in Kiev were completely normal: it was a gamble, but at the moment it was the only thing to do. Moreover, they had the good fortune of receiving unexpected help with the arrival of Mykola Zalizniak from Western Ukraine, who proved to be a valuable link between Czernin and themselves.

On February 1, during a plenary session, a bitter dispute arose between the Ukrainians and the Bolsheviks. Sevriuk, who now headed the Ukrainian delegation, denied Trotsky's declaration concerning the formation of a federation in Russia, a fact that he supported by informing the assembly of the *Rada's Fourth Universal* and by pointing out the absence of various other national minorities at the negotiations to prove the existence of such a federation. As Trotsky remained firm, he was subjected to a highly emotional verbal attack from Liubynsky. While Liubynsky's tirade visibly upset Trotsky, the latter contented himself by declaring only that the authority of the Central *Rada* had vanished and that "the only territory in its possession was the living quarters of its delegation at Brest Litovsk." The occasion, however, was completely spoiled for the Bolsheviks when Czernin announced that the Central Powers were disposed to recognize Ukraine as an independent nation.

This declaration was an important accomplishment for the Ukrainians, but their position by no means became an easier one. The Germans were aware of the developments in Ukraine; Hoffmann had in fact told the delegates that if Kiev fell during the course of the negotiations all the previous agreements would become null

and void. Moreover, while the general terms had been agreed upon, no positive program for a workable treaty had been drawn by either side. Zalizniak, therefore, proposed that all the interested parties write down their conditions. Accordingly, on the evening of February 2, the Ukrainians were asked to come to Czernin's room and were handed a piece of paper on which were stated the German conditions. These consisted of only three points: 1) the state of war between Ukraine and the Central Powers was to be considered at an end; 2) diplomatic and consular relations were to be established, and 3) Ukraine was to provide the Central Powers with various food-stuffs, including one million tons of wheat. There was no reference to the cession of Kholm or to the creation of a crown state. This was clearly a dictate and the hotheaded Liubynsky even threatened to break up the negotiations. Furthermore, at this critical stage, because of a malfunction in the Hughes telegraph, the Ukrainians were not in communication with Kiev and hence had to decide on their own what steps to take. The Ukrainians speculated that the Germans either were informed about a possible catastrophe in Kiev or were simply testing their moral fiber, hoping to profit from any demonstration of weakness. They decided to reject the German dictate and to remain firm in their demands. They proceeded to produce a draft of their own, which they presented to Czernin on the following day and which included all the previous agreements. To their immense surprise and relief, the Austrian accepted it in principle and left for Berlin, where a conference was to be held between the Austrian and German authorities. There he received the final approval for the treaty with Ukraine.

At this critical stage both the Ukrainians and the Bolsheviks were not in communication with their respective governments. This created problems, for no one knew about the developments in Kiev. In order to prevent the Central Powers from signing a peace with Ukraine, Lenin and Stalin bombarded their delegation with radio announcements concerning the impending fall of Kiev, which during this time already was being shelled by the Bolsheviks. Indeed, on February 7 Trotsky informed the delegates that Kiev had fallen and proposed that a commission be sent to the Ukrainian capital to ascertain this development. Gambling once more, the Ukrainians calmly agreed to the proposal. Fortunately, Trotsky himself probably questioned the veracity of his sources and withdrew the suggestion.

Thus, after what seemed an eternity, the final draft of the treaty was concluded and was ready for signature. Zalizniak himself appropriately described the occasion:

Finally, on February 8, the drafting of the treaty was concluded, together with all its additions. In the afternoon all the signatories sat down to verify its text. This lasted until the late hours of the night. During this time all the members of the various delegations gathered in their bright uniforms. Only the Ukrainian delegation looked as it usually did, for it did not have any gala wear. We (the Ukrainians) were all apprehensive... for we still could not believe that we had carried out our task to its end. Besides, we knew that at that very moment Kiev was being bombarded by the Bolsheviks and we had reason to believe that the Bolshevik delegation could be correctly informed about our national catastrophe. But during the night of February 8-9 nothing unusual happened. Finally, at 2 a.m., in the great hall properly arranged for the occasion, under the glare of photographer's lights and in the presence of a large number of military officials, the treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers was signed, the first peace treaty since the outbreak of the war.⁴

On February 9 Czernin received a telegram from Emperor Kari, thanking him for the successful conclusion of the peace. "I wonder if the *Rada* is still sitting in Kiev," wrote Czernin in his diary on that day. The answer came only too soon: in the afternoon a messenger arrived from Kiev announcing that the Ukrainian capital was in Bolshevik hands.

CONCLUSION

So the long awaited peace was finally signed. It had become obvious in the winter of 1917-1918 that the Central *Rada* would not be able to withstand the Bolsheviks alone. The treaty with the Central Powers was therefore the last hope in the struggle for the *Rada's* political survival, not so much because it would give legitimacy to the Kiev government among the European nations, but rather because it would bring German military aid. Of course, the *Rada* was greatly responsible for many of its own shortcomings, but the attitude of the Allies, who thoroughly misunderstood the significance of the Ukrainian national movement, had a great bearing on what was to constitute the demise of the independence movement in Ukraine. As far as the Central Powers were concerned, there is no question that they had little sympathy for the Ukrainian national aspirations, seeing Ukraine only as a convenient granary, which, through the in-

⁴ See Mykola Zalizniak, "Moia uchast' u myrovykh perehovorakh u Beresti-Lytovskomu" in I. Kedryn, ed., *Berestelskyi myr* (Lviv, 1928) pp. 132-33.

strument of a peace treaty, they could exploit at will. Yet it is quite possible that the access to Ukrainian grain saved Austria, at least temporarily, from internal upheaval.

For Ukraine the treaty had an enormous significance. The recognition of the independence of Ukraine constituted a triumph for Ukrainian diplomacy, even at the cost of one million tons of wheat. While the Ukrainians did "dictate" its terms, they did not allow themselves to be dictated to either: the treaty was, above all, a marriage of convenience, a compromise. But even so it was a bitter blow for the Bolsheviks, for it not only deprived them of the food resources of Ukraine, but also weakened greatly their bargaining position. (They were finally forced to face up to the harsh realities and sue for peace in March of 1918.) In accordance with the dictated Russo-German peace, the Bolsheviks promised to recognize the independence of Ukraine and sign a treaty of peace and friendship with her.

A result of the treaty, no less significant was the subsequent German occupation of Ukraine, which prevented an immediate Bolshevik takeover. The German-supported regime of *Hetman* Skoropadsky was often ruthless and harsh, but it provided a brief breathing spell during which the Ukrainian national consciousness was allowed to reach a new stage of maturity. Thus, in 1918, the concept that Ukraine was but an unnatural growth of Russia was no longer tenable. Ukraine was rapidly undergoing the process of nation-building even during this period of strife, and the peace treaty with the Central Powers gave a glimpse of what Ukraine might have become had conditions been more favorable. This is perhaps why, at least to Ukraine, the Peace of Brest Litovsk is not a "forgotten peace."

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bunyan, James and H. H. Fisher, eds., *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918* (Stanford, 1961). Documents.
- Chubarian, A. O., *Brestskii mir* (Moscow, 1964).
- Czernin, Count Ottokar, *In the World War* (New York, 1920). Memoirs.
- Doroshenko, Dmytro, *Istoria Ukrainy, 1917-1923* (New York, 1954), 2 vols.
- Fisher, Louis, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (New York, 1960).
- Golder, Frank A., ed., *Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917* (New York, 1927).
- Gratz, Gustav and Richard Schuller, *The Economic Policy of Austria-Hungary During the War: Its External Relations* (New Haven, 1928).
- Hoffmann, General Max von, *The War of Lost Opportunities* (New York, 1925). Memoirs.
- Kedryn, I., ed., *Beresteiskyi myr: spomyny i materialy* (Lviv, 1928). Includes the memoirs of Sevriuk and Zalizniak.

- Khrystiuk, Pavlo, ed., *Zamitky i materialy do istorii Ukrainiskoi Revolutsii, 1917-1920* (Vienna, 1921-22), 4 vols.
- Magnes, Judah L., ed., *Russia and Germany at Brest Litovsk* (New York, 1919). Documents.
- Reshetar Jr., John S., *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, 1952).
- Wheeler-Bennett, John W., *The Forgotten Peace: Brest Litovsk, March 1918* (New York, 1939).
- The Treaty of Brest Litovsk and Germany's Eastern Policy* (New York, 1939).
- U.S., Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Russia, 1918* (Washington, 1931), 3 vols.
- USSR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Documenty uneshnei politiki SSSR* (Moscow, 1957-65), 10 vols.

WHAT HAPPENED TO GEORGIAN CONSCIOUSNESS UNDER RUSSIAN RULE*

By GEORGE NAKASHIDSE

The Russian Revolution of March, 1917, created conditions for many nations under the Empire to restore their independence. Among others, the Georgians proclaimed their democratic republic—the date was May 26, 1918. The Georgian Democratic Republic was soon recognized *de facto* and *de jure* by almost all of Europe, including Soviet Russia.

Almost three years later—February 11, 1921—the Russian Bolshevik armies invaded Georgia completely unexpectedly, and occupied it after five weeks, despite desperate resistance on the part of the Georgians.

What has since happened to the ethnic, national consciousness of the Georgian people under alien domination and what was and is the attitude of Georgians to Russian Bolshevism is the theme of this article.

First of all some words about the population.

The following statistics on the Georgian SSR, cited by Professor Gugushvili (Georgian Scientific Academy), compare the ethnic make-up for the two years, 1926 and 1939:

Total population	-----	2,677,200	-----	3,542,300
Georgians	-----	66.8%	-----	61.4%
Armenians	-----	11.5%	-----	11.7%
Russians	-----	3.6%	-----	8.7%
Azeri Turks	-----	5.2%	-----	5.2%
Ossetians	-----	4.2%	-----	4.2%
Abkhastians	-----	2.1%	-----	1.6%
Others	-----	6.6%	-----	7.1%

* From the paper read at the conference of specialists on the question of the national minorities, October, 1965, Brandeis University.

We see that over a period of thirteen years the percentage of Russians increased almost three times, while the percentages of all other minor groups remained virtually constant.

In the Soviet Union, where no one dares move from one village to the next town without special permission, such an influx of Russians can only be the result of planning by the highest Soviet authorities. The great majority of these people were purposely settled in the cities as workers, specialists and intellectuals. Meanwhile almost every year thousands upon thousands of Georgian specialists and intellectuals were sent to the various corners of the Soviet Union and even to the Asiatic and African countries.

The census of 1959 showed the total population of Georgia as having increased to 4,044,045, the percentages of the component nationalities remaining almost the same with the Russians at 10.8%.

Before considering the question whether the ethnic and cultural consciousness of the Georgian people is growing or declining, I think it would be advisable to say some words about the situation in Georgia at the moment the Russian Bolshevik armies invaded the country. It must be said that during the three years of their independence the Georgians managed to have a democratic, freely elected Parliament, a National Government composed of socialists, along with departments of administration, justice, finance and economy, and an army. Radical agrarian reform had been carried through, the number of schools had nearly tripled. The Georgian State University had been founded, and literature and arts of every kind were in the process of an extraordinary development. The national renaissance was felt everywhere. A Constitution was drafted. The high cultural level of the people, the inexhaustible riches of the country and its favorable geographic situation promised Georgia and the Georgians a happy future.

Because of that it was quite natural that the completely unexpected invasion and forcible occupation of the country by the Russian Bolshevik armies should have provoked general indignation, followed by Georgian anti-communist manifestations, sabotage and armed revolts. Indeed, the opposition of the whole nation was so great that the representatives of the puppet government and Moscow's special commissar, Sergo Ordjonikidze, in their public speeches solemnly promised that the Russian Army would withdraw as soon as a Georgian Red Army was organized, and that Georgia would maintain her independence—but this within the framework of a Socialist Soviet Republic.

In their concessions to public opinion they even allowed to take place in 1921 the celebration of the 26th of May, the day of the declaration of the Independence of Democratic Georgia. In a special memorandum to Georgian Communists, Lenin urged them to try at any price to form a coalition government with Georgian social-democrats and other socialist parties.

At the end of July, 1921, Stalin-Dzugashvili came from Moscow to see for himself the situation in recently conquered Georgia.

His reception was not cordial. The huge, specially convoked assembly of workers in Tbilisi, to whom he intended to explain why the Russian Bolsheviks had occupied by force an independent Georgia which they had formerly recognized, greeted him with angry shouts, hisses and calls such as "fratricide," "traitor," "renegade," "blood-thirsty henchman," and so on. He would have been lynched had it not been for the strong guard of Chekists that always accompanied him. He met everywhere the same hostile attitude to his person, to the Communists and to the Russian terrorist regime. Leaving Georgia enraged, he furiously ordered the local puppet government to "plough under all Georgia and uproot, eradicate every trace of Menshevism and bourgeois nationalism." *

The order was strictly followed. The era of ruthless oppression, persecutions, arrests and general terror began and raged throughout Georgia. In the course of one year about thirty thousand people were imprisoned and held in inhuman conditions. About these events Julius Braunthal, special delegate of the International Workers' Bureau, writes in detail in his book *Vom Kommunismus zum Imperialismus*; they are examined also by the renowned socialist Iracli Tsereteli in his book *Terror in Georgia*, and even Trotsky mentions these tragic facts.

The persecutions and terror only exacerbated the already tense relations between the occupying forces and the Georgian people.

Peasants, workers, intellectuals, writers and, in particular, students—in the capital as well as in the remotest corners of Georgia—

*) The writer was astonished to learn from the recently published book of Mrs. Allilueva that her father, Stalin-Dzugashvili, was enthusiastically and sincerely greeted in Georgia, a country where there was not a family who did not have a member killed or sent to a concentration camp by order of the same Stalin. Mrs. Allilueva apparently also does not know that in 1924, after a general uprising in Georgia, all the women of the land wore black as a sign of national mourning until the puppet government forbade the practice.

created one irreconcilable, united front against the alien forces and their local stooges.

Either as a result of this united front of people, or perhaps impressed by the ruthless exploitation of Georgian natural riches by Moscow, or as an outcome of the New Economic Policy, which gave more freedom and initiative to the National Soviet Republics, the fact remains that there emerged a strong group of Georgian Communists who wanted to manage Georgian affairs independently of Moscow and in accordance with Georgian needs.

This group came out into the open for the first time in 1922 by opposing an order from Moscow to form the Transcaucasian Federation of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The creation of the federation was Lenin's wish. The plan was put to a vote and accepted unanimously in the Politburo by Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kameniev, Molotov and Stalin as early as the end of 1921, although no member of the allegedly independent governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan or Georgia had been consulted in the matter. In such arbitrary fashion did Lenin dispose of the fate of the so-called independent Socialist Republics of Transcaucasia. This policy, in complete disregard of local interests and the opinion of the indigenous Communists, continues until today, and, faithful to Lenin's example, every decision about political, economic, cultural or other questions concerning Georgia, is taken not by the Georgian Soviet government or the Georgian communist party, but by Moscow.

Beginning with the Genoa Conference and Treaty of Rapallo (1922), Soviet Russia scored important victories in the international arena. She was not only recognized by everyone, but her friendship was sought by every European state. In September, 1934, she was triumphantly admitted to the League of Nations. Only the President of noble Switzerland, Mr. Motta, protested vehemently against admitting the state which had invaded and destroyed the independence of Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and other nations.

Finally the ruthless annihilation of all opposition—more than ten thousand killed and about a hundred thousand sent to concentration camps—combined with the complete indifference of the civilized world to the fate of the Caucasian peoples at last forced the Georgians to cease their resistance and search for some common language with their new masters.

This policy, preached from the beginning of the occupation by Professor Shalva Nucubidse—to give in, to yield to the stronger force, a policy which formerly had provoked only indignation—began to find more and more followers. The saving of the mere physical existence

of the nation—so ruthlessly subjugated to extermination—became the most important task. The several literary groups which had conducted the bitter opposition to the communist regime and the occupying forces began slowly but steadily to seek some self-saving accommodation to this tragic situation. In their poems and novels they denounced the terror and the atrocities of every description of the hated regime, but at the same time voices were raised calling for reason and cold calculation.

In the meantime, as they crushed the inter-party opposition and revolts of the oppressed nations, Stalin and his clique began to govern with an iron hand. Neither Stalin nor the communist party brooked criticism from anyone. They decided to put an end to any kind of publication that did not preach the infallibility of the leader and of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. All poetry, literature, the theater and every kind of art was in the future to glorify the Soviet regime and its achievements. The Central Committee of the party decided as early as 1932 to create an all-Union writers' organization, one which would be subservient to party aims. The first congress of representatives of the peoples of the USSR took place in 1934 in the huge hall of the Union House in Moscow. Maxime Gorky presided; Zhdanov was the chief speaker.

There the directive "Socialist in content and national in form" received its baptism, and from that time on it became the nightmare of all writers in the Soviet Union.

It is perhaps not uninteresting to note that in spite of the fact that the congress was attended by delegations from all the nations included in the Soviet Empire, the walls of the beautiful hall of the Union House were adorned only with portraits of Russian writers. Only after a four-hour long lecture by the chief delegate of Georgia, Malakhai Toroshelidse, on the rich and remarkable achievements of medieval and modern Georgian literature, did there appear the next day a great picture of Shetha Rusthaveli on the first column and, in front of it, a picture of the great Ukrainian bard, Taras Shevchenko (*Literaturuli Sakarthvelo*, August 28, 1964).

After this conference the different groups of writers still existing in Georgia were given the alternatives either of dissolving and entering the communist-directed and supported Georgian Writers' Association or of ceasing to be published and being subjected to every kind of persecution, to boot. Opposition was reduced to silence. Since that time compliance with the orders and directives of the Central Committee of the Party in the cultural area has become mandatory for every writer and intellectual worker in all the corners

of the Soviet Union. Consequently, every change in the policy of the party caused by internal or external developments was and is always reflected in the literature. Above all, since this conference so-called "Socialist realism" has been the sole guiding principle of every creative effort. For the national republics it included also the obligation to emphasize on every occasion and in every writing the benign influence of Russian culture on the culture and civilization of the other peoples of the Soviet Union.

To cultivate love and gratitude toward the Russian nation, to stress, to underline endlessly the enormous progressive significance of the unification of Georgia and Russia (even with Czarist Russia) became an unwritten law for every Georgian historian or writer.

When some renowned Georgian historian violated this general rule and in his work dared to aver that the joining of Georgia to Russia was a great mistake adversely affecting the fate of the Georgian people, he was immediately reprimanded—and worse. When in 1932 the Georgian Professor Shalva Nucubidse published his book, *Rusthaveli and Eastern Renaissance*, he was strongly criticized for omitting mention of the beneficial influence of Russian culture on the Georgian. This was true also of the historical novels of the renowned Georgian writers Shalva Dadiani and Constantine Gamsakhurdia. The utter absurdity of all this becomes obvious when we realize that the above mentioned authors were treating of events which occurred in the 11th and 12th centuries, a time when Georgia stood at the peak of her political and cultural development, possessing famous poets and philosophers, while the Russian principalities were only at the starting point of their history, and many thousands of miles distant from Georgia.

In spite of having been conquered for more than ten years, the Georgians disdained speaking Russian publicly. Even the former representatives of the *Gosudarstvennaia Duma*, once renowned orators in the whole Czarist Empire, would not speak with Russians in the Russian language. This was the natural reaction of a nation which is characterized accurately by the great American statistician and economist, Vl. Woytynski, in his beautiful book, *La Democratie Georgienne*, published in 1921. Mr. Woytynski wrote: "Georgia, which maintained order and freedom at the same time fires of civil war and anarchy were raging around her, became the refuge of hundreds of Russian scientists, artists, writers and painters. The constant and friendly relations between Georgian poets, musicians, painters and artists and their Russian confreres, contributed greatly to the flourishing of the artistic life in Georgia." Pasternak, Ehrenburg and

others wrote in a similar vein about Georgian hospitality and friendship. But this was in independent Georgia. The attitude of the Georgian people and writers towards the Russians changed completely in the first years of the occupation.

As we know, the European countries which experienced German occupation ended by hating not only Hitler and the Nazis but the whole German nation. Conquerors are never loved by their victims. Still, the Russian Communists demand devotion from peoples arbitrarily submitted to their power. One of their especially absurd and revolting practices is that, after invading, despoiling and occupying once free and democratic countries they compel them to celebrate the date of their enslavement as the happiest day of their history.

During the thousands of years of her existence Georgia was many times occupied and dominated by alien forces — Persians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Mongols, Turks, and others — but never had the Georgian people been forced by any of these conquerors to suffer the humiliation of celebrating the date of their conquest.

Be that as it may, one cannot survive on hate and animosity — on protests and uprisings. The Georgian people grew conscious of this especially when it became clear that the Russian Communists found not only financial and economic support but even genuine admiration in all layers of the European and American societies. Peaceful collaboration with Moscow became the universal rule.

Armed uprisings came to be seen as senseless and criminal, since they endangered even the physical existence of the nation. The Georgian people proved to be realists; they accepted as a fact of life the devastating and implacable power of their conqueror. The people followed the wise Georgian proverb: *Dathvma rom moguerios, baba daysakha* (if you are overpowered by the bear, call him your father). And so the Georgians cannily began calling the Russians their father, their brother, protector, benefactor, liberator, and so on.

This collaboration, this submission, not only physical but inevitably in part also spiritual, became unmistakable during and after the Second World War, a period when the Georgians saw clearly that the democratic world behaved more or less according to the wish and demand of Stalin and Russian Communists.

The Russian language, until now neglected, was introduced and made obligatory in Georgian schools. Russian literature already had enjoyed every kind of privilege and advantage in the time of Stalin-Dzugashvili, who as a renegade of Georgia strove to appear as the most enthusiastic admirer of Russian culture and the Russian people. The Russification policy was in full swing when Joseph Stalin

finally died. In spite of the "thaw" which reigned for some time after Khrushchev's accession to power, the hours of instruction in Russian in the schools increased almost daily. Even so, the newspapers and the party leaders in their official declarations complained that "the state of teaching of the Russian language and literature in the schools of Georgia is unsatisfactory..." "Georgian schools seldom arrange meetings devoted to Russian literature..." "Not sufficient textbooks in Russian..." and so on for many years.

Now none of these shortcomings exists. Textbooks in Russian are numerous. In one year alone (1959), more than 665 titles in the Russian language were published in Georgia, with a combined total of 2,536,000 copies. Now Georgians study Russian diligently. There are even Georgians who are remarkable specialists in Russian literature. But the Moscow rulers are never content. The October 11, 1959 issue of *Pravda* complained that the "Georgian SSR publishes many books which treat of the events of the remote past of Georgia and idealize pre-feudalistic and feudalistic times..." In June of 1960, the Russian newspaper *Zaria Vostoka* in Tbilisi reported a speech delivered by the General Secretary of the Party in which Georgian historians were warned not to spread doubtful hypotheses and attributes "to our people and history, things that in fact never existed..."

Another outstanding Georgian Communist, President of the National Council, Mr. Dsotsenidse, was more explicit: "Who needs the histories of feudal times of Ivane Djavakhishvili, Simon Djanashia, Pavle Ingorokva and others? Stop digging in the past, you have more serious things to do..." Such warnings and reproaches appear frequently in Moscow's *Pravda*, *Izvestia* and other Russian sheets.

As if goaded by the restrictions imposed, the Georgians have taken advantage of every opportunity to develop their national literature and culture. Never in the past had so much been achieved in every branch of science and art by Georgian scientists, historians, literary workers and artists. The Georgians, deprived of political freedom and material commodities, while praising the communist regime on every suitable and unsuitable occasion, have managed to devote all their talent and energy towards the creation of monumental achievements in the arts and sciences. It is enough to read *Science in Soviet Georgia*, by the president of the Georgian Scientific Academy, Niko Muskhelishvili, to appreciate, if only in broad outlines, the tremendous work achieved by these selfless men and women.

From *Itogi vsesoiusnei perepisi naselenia* 1959 in the Georgian SSR we learn: for every 1000 people there were 38 persons with a

university education. The total number of Georgians with university, high school or special education was no less than 1,000,000 people in 1959. As regards scientists, for every 100,000 people there were 175 Russians and 269 Georgians.

One cannot deny the Soviet Union's great efforts to advance science and the arts as much as possible. But if Georgians, by virtue of the level of their education and the number of their scientists, occupy first place in the world in proportion to their population, that does not prove the superiority of Soviet education in itself. Rather, it shows the individual effort of the people concerned. It demonstrates how accurate were those medieval travelers and Catholic missionaries as well as modern tourists who had detected and described the inquisitive mind of the Georgian and his yearning for knowledge and science. Not counting newspapers and magazines — which seldom are more than tools of communist propaganda — in the year 1959 alone there were published in the Georgian language 1,548 various titles with a total of 9,699,000 copies.

The Georgians have always been proud that their kings, clergy, statesmen, writers and scientists knew many languages, such as Greek, Syrian, Armenian, Hebrew, Arabic and Persian — but they always cherished their native language above all. To cite but one example from the tenth century: a renowned religious writer, the monk Ioanne Zosima of the Saba Monastery in Palestine, in his hymn "The Glory and Greatness of the Georgian Language," asserted that the Georgian language is so perfect and rich in internal treasures that it should be adopted as the common language of all Christianity and that God Himself would use the Georgian language to judge mankind on Doomsday. . .

When today one reads the poems dedicated to the Georgian language by modern Georgian communist poets he becomes convinced that the Georgian language has remained the greatest treasure and inspiration for every Georgian, regardless of epoch or confession.

Because of that it was quite natural that the Georgian writers and people should have opposed the proposal made by some Russian writers to use only the Russian rather than the Georgian for literary and scientific works.

In December, 1961, a conference of literary specialists took place in the M. Gorky Institute of World Literature in Moscow. Besarion Djguenti, a Communist literary critic and chief representative of the Georgian delegation, declared during the discussions: "...As far back as five years ago, when I participated in the Conference called to review the Tadzhikistan Soviet literature, I was forced to come

out very strongly against an analogy repeatedly found in many works of our specialists in literature. According to this analogy the literature of the non-Russian peoples is like rivers which drain into the all-Union sea or ocean. It is not a good analogy. When a river falls into the sea, it loses forever its own face, its existence. Meanwhile, the more our national literatures approach one another the more they enrich and develop one another, and the more clearly and deeply every one of them expresses its people's identity, the national soul. . . No, comrades, in the world there has never existed nor does there exist now — and, I think, never will — some super-national literature outside a native language. Literature always has been and I am sure always will be national, developed on a certain national ground, in a certain national language. . . The communist party program asks us to secure the free development of the Soviet peoples' languages. This means the development and progress of the Russian language, the language of Pushkin and Tolstoy, of Russian literature and poetry which we like very much; and also the Georgian language, in which sang Rusthaveli and Guramishvili, Barathashvili and Chavchavadse, Akaki Tsereteli and Vaja Pshavela, the language which was created and developed throughout thousands of years by our people, which was defended with our own blood and brought through the fires of countless disasters and adversities of fate. This language will go on developing and flourishing. The same can be said about the Ukrainian, Armenian, Tadzhik, Uzbek, Azerbaijanian, and all the other peoples' languages of our multi-national Soviet Union. . ." (*Literaturli Gazethi*, May 1, 1962).

After the aforementioned Conference in Moscow there took place in Tbilisi in March, 1962, an assembly of Georgian writers and cultural workers. The theme of the assembly was: "The Georgian Writers and the New Problem." The main speaker was the Secretary of the Georgian Writers Association, Sergui Tchilaia, well-known critic and essayist. Present were Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee D. Sturua and Minister of Culture and Education Th. Buachidse.

From the long and extremely interesting speech of Mr. Tchilaia on the program of the Twenty-second party congress, I cite but one little part: ". . . The national language is the sole form of the national culture, its force, its shield and its sword. The language of the Russian people is not only a simple language of communication, not merely a means of mutual understanding. It is at the same time the image of the Russian character, its nature, its soul. Great Lenin

was justly proud of the great Russian language. To us it is completely understandable for the famous Russian poet Alexander Tvardovsky to have said at the Twenty-second party congress. 'I am glad, immeasurably glad, to see how my Russian language has thrived and flourished...' So can every Soviet poet repeat these words about his own national language. Who has the right to be proud of and to enjoy the development and blossoming of his native language, if not a writer..." It must be added that this assembly was attended by more than five hundred people, none of whom supported the idea of obliteration, amalgamation or fusion of languages; on the contrary, almost every speaker expressed indignation at one or another writer who publicly demanded the replacing of the other Soviet nations' languages by the Russian.

The General Secretary of the Georgian Writers' Association, academician and leading poet of today, Iračli Abashidse, in his book *For the Masterhood*, writes: "...Over the years every cosmopolitan has said that our native country, Georgia, is only a dot in the limitless cosmos and nothing more, that national feeling is no longer necessary, thus leaving completely without consideration great Lenin's words about national feeling and national pride..."

Almost every one of these Georgian writers and fervent communists have cited Lenin. But they have not taken into consideration the fact that precisely what was praised in Lenin and Russian poets was censured and found blameworthy in national writers. We know that Lenin was a fervent purifier of the Russian language; he simply could not tolerate the substitution of foreign words for existing Russian words. But when three faculty members of the Pedagogical Institute in Batumi followed Lenin's example and initiated with other Georgians a purification of the Georgian language of unnecessary foreign terms — including Russian — they were severely censured, accused of local nationalism and forbidden to continue their "harmful" activities by party officials and by *Izvestia* (September 24, 1963).

The Georgian case, at the last, is not ill put by these lines from the well-known poem "Palestine, Palestine" by the leading Georgian poet and Communist Iračli Abashidse:

O, my language,
The mother tongue,
You our endowment,
Our race and flight,
You, the great banner of our breath,
You, the sweet ointment of our
ailments,

I have said goodbye
To every mortal,
Only you, the immortal,
Only you, the eternal,
You — the unique
I cannot give up
At the door of the grave!

You, the lime of our cement
and stones,
You alone remain to me
at the door of the grave.

Thousands of kin,
Thousands of friends,
Crooked and righteous,
Enemies and brothers,
Have I left;
It is finished.
Everything is ended.

All fortresses may fall,
All warriors may be killed,
Dust may cover all the great
memories,
Every tree be hit by a thunderbolt,
Every monument be trodden by feet,
Only you, unwithered,
You, transformed into an icon,
Not time, nothing, could erase
Your immortal nature!..

UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA AND THE USSR*

By STEFAN T. POSSONY

There may be some who would criticize this book as "repetitious." The author, although his perspectives change constantly, does indeed repeat the same points over and over again. He is perfectly justified in hammering his theme: American decision-makers and the American public have been unable so far, to grasp the elementary facts which he is trying to elucidate. There is, clearly, a mental block; and a sledgehammer is needed to break it.

The misinformation which bedevils the vast majority of Americans is that the USSR is a "nation-state," and more specifically the state of the Russian nation. In reality, the USSR is the inner ring of a totalitarian and colonialist Russian empire within which there are imprisoned a considerable number of captive nations. The outer ring of this empire is formed by various "people's republics" in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America; all of those also are held in captivity. The energy and command center of this empire is Russia, but its main resource bases are located in the areas inhabited by captive nations.

The average American, including the majority of our intelligentsia and our political leadership, fails to understand the political and ethnic structure of the USSR. If Americans ever heard of the "other" languages spoken in the USSR, they believe them to be "dialects." It is, unfortunately, quite clear that only few Americans ever thought about the proposition that the captive nations within the USSR are just as much entitled to self-determination as any other nation in the world and that, for example, Ukraine and the Turkic SSR's "belong" to Russia as little as Canada and Mexico belong to the United States.

Dobriansky is right when he says that American misunderstandings about the Russian empire and its various "nationality questions" go back to President Wilson who, he asserts, committed a colossal

* Lev E. Dobriansky, *The Vulnerable Russians*. New York, Pageant Press, Inc., 1967, 454 pages with index, \$5.95.

political blunder "when out of plain ignorance, he failed to apply the principle of national self-determination to the many subjugated non-Russian nations in the Russian empire." A period of 50 years would seem to be time enough to recognize an obviously enormous error and to correct the underlying misinformation. But the American "image" of the USSR remains completely distorted.

Granted that the Free World is confronted by Russian "imperialism" — but what about communism? According to Dobriansky, "Marxist-Leninist ideology is only one tool among many used by the Russian totalitarians, when and where it suits their purposes. Its impact in the USSR was lost under Stalin over 30 years ago, though Khrushchev and his twin successors have lip-serviced it on appropriate occasions."

Dobriansky rejects the argument that the real enemy is international communism and that "the term 'totalitarian Russian imperialism' lays the crime of communism on the Russian nation and people, rather than on the Marxian ideology." The author thinks that "Moscow has no quarrel with this argument." Communism, he believes, is a "mythology." By contrast, imperialism and colonialism have "flesh and blood meaning in the world of today," while communism is an abstract concept which few people know or understand. The reality is "Soviet Russian imperialism." He clinches his argument with this statement: "In the past Russian tyrants cloaked their totalitarian rule and imperialist conquests with equally fictitious ideologies of super-religious Orthodoxy and racist Pan-Slavism. Today it is millenarian communism, interspersed at times with these old ideologies in what suits the occasion." "The major source of trouble and threat to the peace of the world is not Peiping, Havana, Hanoi, Cairo and what have you, but solely and exclusively Moscow."

These points are well taken but the analysis is incomplete. There are in fact several trouble spots, although the power of all communist states is, ultimately, derived from Moscow. Secondly, communism is an ideology and a utopia and, therefore, can be rightly regarded as a "mythology." It is equally true that the systems built up behind the Iron Curtain are not "communist" but totalitarian in their essence. But communism — "Soviet communism," not "Marxism" — is the legitimizing political formula of the USSR and, therefore, one of the ties which is holding the empire together. (A typical American misconception which Dobriansky might have slain while he was laboring is that the majority of Soviet citizens believe in communism: this ideology holds its main attraction for people living outside the dictatorship.)

The body of communist doctrine is, furthermore, the intellectual basis on which the policies of the various communist states are coordinated and from which key policies are derived. Finally, it is the foundation of the "international communist movement." This movement is a system of communist parties and organizations or, if one prefers, of communist "politbureaus," and it is running the double empire and dependent outside political movements. Leaving aside the complex question of "polycentrism," the world-wide party apparatus, in turn, is commanded by the dictatorship in the Kremlin.

There is no question but that the Kremlin leadership group is predominantly Russian in composition, though some of its members are "Russified" non-Russians. Yet the question is whether the Kremlin dictatorship is acting out of a commitment for Russian imperialism and is pursuing a goal of maximum Russian expansion and power? Or do the Kremlinites act as Communists for the purpose of establishing communist world power? Do they reach for that power for the sake of a communist social order? And do they aim at preserving the so-called communist system within the USSR?

It can be argued that the *de facto* imperialism engaged in by the Kremlin is not an integral part of communism and, therefore, must be ascribed to Russian motivations. It can equally be argued that world revolution is a key element of communism and that the Kremlin's imperialism can best be described as the strategy of world revolution. Geopolitically, of course, all Kremlin strategies must be centered on Moscow, Russia (the RSFSR), and the USSR.

I agree that communist ideology has changed fundamentally during Stalin's regime. The so-called "Soviet society" has few of the characteristics that should be displayed by a communist society, except that private ownership in the "means of production" has been abolished. The Soviet system is most accurately described as "fascist in content, and communist in form" is little else but a social and political myth. But it should not be overlooked that in recent years, attempts have been made to rejuvenate the communist ideology and that many policies of the Kremlin, and of virtually all other communist governments, continue to be logically explicable only on the assumption that these men still believe in communism as their main "theology" and follow the communist doctrine as their main guide of action. There are numerous similarities between the white and red Czars but the differences are no less important.

The Kremlin leadership has been using the communist ideology as a tool of power and politics (just as, in varying ways, it has been

using nationalism as its tool). But the situation is complicated because these men also think in communist categories and their long range goals, at the very minimum, include the communist objective. Communism, therefore, is *more* than a mere Kremlin tool. On the other hand, the fact that the Kremlinites, or most of them, are true believers in communism, does not prevent them from using the ideology as a manipulable tool.

There is the further complication that the Kremlin leaders undoubtedly plan that the communist world empire would be run from Moscow which, of course, leads back to Dobriensky's argument.

These interrelationships are very difficult and elusive and the levels of conviction and purpose must be carefully differentiated. Since the analysis of this complex of motivations and thought patterns has not yet been driven too far, it is at present almost impossible to find descriptive formulas which are correct, complete, simple, and brief.

As a corrective against the multiple mythologies about communism, maximum stress must be placed on totalitarianism and imperialism and, more generally, on the Kremlin's power urge. But I believe Dobriensky is going too far in minimizing the role of communism. Precisely because he himself emphasizes the role of the ideational factor in politics, he should not belittle the function and impact of formula and myth. In fact, he himself often uses the term "Soviet Russia" or Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism," yet he also explains that the term "Soviet involves a deception — a democratic window-dressing." The author uses "Soviet" in preference to "communist," possibly because he fears a contradiction with his analysis; but this usage discloses that the "communist dimension" simply cannot be neglected. But I agree with him that the term "communist" implies too much theory and involves a loss of realism. To avoid this difficulty, some people occasionally have used the term "Bolshevik," but this expression is too historical. The semantic difficulties of this problem remain immense, even after the problem has been fully analyzed and comprehended.

If my point were integrated with Dobriensky's findings, four factors would be involved: totalitarianism, communism, colonialism, and Russian imperialism. Hence we could coin the expression: "communist totalitarian Russian colonio-imperialism." Stylistically, this formula is awful, but does it have at least the merit of being accurate?

Alas, a further difficulty becomes manifest in Dobriansky's treatment of Russia. He points out, correctly, that "no foreign army or subversive machine had ever overtaken Russia in the imperialist manner" and that, therefore, Russia "properly and technically speaking is not a captive nation." "The Bolshevik revolution and all that followed was thoroughly and completely a Russian phenomenon." Even if I buy most of this sentence, the words "and completely" are wrong. With excellent reason, the author stresses the importance of the many national revolutions which took place in the Russian empire during and after 1917. But non-Russian Bolsheviks were quite strong in some of those revolutionary movements, the Russian Bolshevik party organization was full of non-Russians, and non-Russian popular movements were a vital factor allowing Lenin to seize and hold power. Surely, we cannot forget that the Bolsheviks, in complex relationships which we cannot discuss here, were pushed and supported by foreign strategists. There may be disagreement about the extent of German involvement but the Bolshevik take-over was partly engineered by German imperialism. The Germans did not "capture" Russia and in any event the captor no longer exists, but the captor's instrument has remained. The elections of 1917 showed that Russia did not want the Bolsheviks. Hence, Russia must be regarded as a captive nation *sui generis*, like Germany was a captive of national socialism. China also could be classed in the same category of imperialist powers captured by a conspiratorial power elite.

There is no denying the fact of a perennial Russian imperialism or imperialist "mood" surviving under communism and indeed this "mood" may be the single most potent source of "Soviet expansion." Lenin himself, and Djilas, have admitted the imperialist character of *sovietskaya vlast*. But if we look toward the future, we should not assume that all Russians and all Russian policies necessarily are imperialistic. Rather we should assume that there are strong elements within the Russian nation who oppose imperialism and who are most anxious to establish a proper *modus vivendi* with neighboring and distant nations. Such a *modus vivendi*, of course, must be applied specifically to the relations between Russians and the nations presently held captive within the USSR, notably Ukraine. After all, since the Communists themselves put Article 17 into the Soviet constitution, why shouldn't we insist that it be taken seriously?

Moreover, we must work from the proposition that the Russians are held captive by the Kremlin dictatorship in the sense that they

are denied the freedoms which are their right, as they are the right of *every* nation. There is no reason to minimize the historical and psychological traditions which never yet have allowed liberty to blossom in Russia. But the stimulation of a reasonable system in Russia surely is one of our major objectives. It could be argued that it is impossible to pursue simultaneously the freedom of the captive nations and of the Russian nation. In this case, obviously, we would have to make a choice. But this demonstration has not yet been made, and I doubt that the case would be convincing, unless there are compelling reasons to believe the Russian elite and the majority of the Russian people want to adhere to imperialism. There is no evidence one way or the other. The assumption of perennial imperialism is plausible but not highly probable. Until we have firm knowledge, I prefer to operate on the assumption that Russia is a captive nation requiring and deserving liberation.

Dobriansky places his strategic thinking on a fundamental syllogism which says: "We are in a persistent cold war with a Messianic enemy, the Soviet version of traditional Russian imperio-colonialism." This situation "poses the inescapable issue of victory or defeat." Hence, the United States must seek to defeat the enemy.

This stark truth has been obfuscated "by a rapid succession of slogans" and an unending "verbal parade" of arguments for "flexibility" and "non-predetermination." Once all these expressions, which have been disgorged by the "semantic mill," are analyzed, they are "essentially reducible to . . . containment and liberation." Dobriansky adds that any liberation policy must necessarily be "founded on containment." Yet containment is by itself incapable of holding the enemy: it needs "re-enforcement through liberation." I entirely agree.

American strategy has not faced up to this reality but is hampered by five major weaknesses. *First*, we allow the enemy "adequacy of arms" and have assured the USSR security even in those periods when we possessed overwhelming superiority. *Second*, the United States and the Free World have been progressively accommodating themselves, mentally and materially, to the expansion of Soviet totalitarianism. More specifically, we have done nothing "to disturb the consolidating processes within the vast Soviet Russian empire." *Third*, we have accepted the peaceful coexistence slogan and are doing very little against the imperio-colonialist international conspiracy "under the guise of communism and the communist parties' network." But "multi-billions of rubles haven't been spent for fun to train professional revolutionaries in the hundreds of thousands." *Fourth*,

we do not match "the highly concentrated psycho-political propaganda waged by Moscow," nor do we effectively oppose their various political and peace offensives.

The *fifth* factor "is the real advantage of the first shot which we also guaranteed to Moscow. . . This possibility of a nuclear Pearl Harbor for America cannot be ruled out in the event of a major technologic breakthrough." As a result of its political practices since 1917, but especially since World War II, the United States, "through ignorance and inadvertent errors, . . . has become the historic guardian of the Russian empire."

Dobriansky suggests we use "propaganda" as the "major clue for beating the Russians in the Cold War." His definition of propaganda includes ideas, concepts, doctrines, and systems of thoughts which "ultimately determine and shape the behavior and actions of men." Within this approach "one of the most strategic concepts in our psycho-political warfare against imperialist Moscow is the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR." We must re-orient our thinking toward the USSR and recognize the strategic significance of the non-Russian nations. We should place emphasis on Moscow's totalitarian imperialism, expose communist-Russian colonialism, and work for "the development of a universalized Declaration of Independence."

Dobriansky does not think we need to worry about specific methods of implementing those concepts: "The devices are endless." The main task is, *first*, to understand the problem; *second*, to adopt firm principles and fixed goals; *third*, to gain a complete and essential knowledge of the enemy, notably the USSR and its vulnerabilities; and *fourth*, to clarify and revitalize such concepts as national self-determination, national independence, religious freedom, personal liberty under just law, individual freedom of speech, economic investment, association, and representation. Again, I entirely agree.

If we genuinely support those principles, we would in effect be strengthening the captive nations and help them advance on the road of progress.

The steady dissemination of these truths is a *sine qua non* for the success of the liberation policy and for the success of the liberation policy and for our victory in the Cold War. After all, the USSR is the heart of the Red octopus; our sporadic absorptions with its tentacles in Asia, Africa, Latin America and elsewhere would not in themselves bring us substantially closer to victory. In fact, it is central to Russian strategy to have us spread ourselves thin and on the fringes, while powerful nationalist trends within Russia's inner empire go virtually unnoticed in the public forum and certainly unexploited by our government.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

In essence, Dobriansky's message is that if we ever want to succeed, peripheral conflicts, though they may be unavoidable, are not the answer: the task is to dissolve the empire and replace it by free and independent actions. Dobriansky clarified the true meaning of liberation which is not that of a military or nuclear crusade but that of an *intellectual confrontation* — remember that even according to the Communists, "co-existence" does not extend to the "ideological sphere."

No one knows whether war can be avoided and no one can predict how long it will take, even in the absence of war, before a world-wide clarification of the basic principle of national independence will result in real national independence, regional cooperation, and "a genuine United Nations of Free Nations." Such a change would mean "the end of all imperio-colonialist systems and, with this, probably the end of any major threat to world peace. Certainly the freedom and security of the United States would be guaranteed for the long future."

Those are basic insights which Americans need if our political survival is to be ensured. Once Dobriansky were at long last understood by the American political elite, this long delayed comprehension of the crucial facts of international life would mark a Copernican turn in American foreign policy.

I want to express my thanks to Lev Dobriansky for a stimulating book which I hope will be read widely and, above all, will be studied thoroughly.

TEN YEARS OF CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

In July, the Tenth Observance of Captive Nations Week was celebrated in the United States and seventeen foreign countries. Since that first July in 1959, immediately after the United States Congress passed the Captive Nations Week Resolution and President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed it into Public Law 86-90, we, and then in time our allies have conducted ten annual weeks in symbolic behalf of the captive nations as one of the chief keys to the security of the Free World and the freedom and independence of all nations. A tradition has been built and solidly maintained. This is no mean feat, considering the powerful forces that have in this long period militated against the Resolution and have sought the elimination of the Week.

At the time of the tenth observance many friends inquired of the writer as to how he now felt about the movement, its rate of growth, the main obstacles confronting it, the reactions of the Red regimes, and its prospects and institutional significance. Having been in it from the very beginning, the writer was asked on both TV and radio programs to assess these ten observances of Captive Nations Week. "Do you think it has accomplished what it set out to do?" "How has 'the disintegration of the Communist monolith' affected the course and goals of the movement?" "Why hasn't Captive Nations Week received far greater publicity in the United States than has actually been the case?" "What do you think of its future?" "Are the captive nations still captive?"

These are some of the questions that dominated the discussions during the tenth observance. And this article contains the answers that were given to these and other questions raised by interested and concerned Americans. Actually, many of these questions aren't new. They've been raised time and time again in the past. But for some reason, perhaps the "10th" itself, they received more widespread currency than before. Thus, in a real sense, this presentation is an accounting of one's observations and reflections on a move-

ment that will enjoy a tenth anniversary in 1969, during the week of July 13-19. The observations and reflections are purposed not only to answer the recurring questions but also to penetrate the confetti diplomacy of this decade which has really caused many to ask these questions.

THE ERA OF CONFETTI DIPLOMACY

Of course, the easy approach would be to answer these dominant questions in a yes or no fashion and then refer the questioner to a mass of literature dealing with the subject for nearly a decade. Yes, the Week is accomplishing what it set out to do. The so-called disintegration of the Communist monolith favorably reinforces the course and goals of the movement, particularly the force of patriotic nationalism which the Resolution stresses. At the start, Captive Nations Week received world-wide publicity, but as many in powerful places began to fear its implications, the pressure was on to play it down as much as possible. The future of Captive Nations Week is guaranteed by the congressional resolution itself; so long as there are the captive nations in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, the Week has its existential basis for the long and substantiating future. Needless to say, squabbles and rivalries between and among totalitarian Communist Parties, which dominate the regimes of the Red states, do not make the peoples, the nations themselves, any less captive.

In this period of confetti diplomacy, with paper treaties and paper bridges of understanding as far as the captive nations are concerned, these are the direct and well-substantiated answers to the prevailing questions of the moment. The factual bases and detailed background to these specific answers can be easily acquired by consulting the outstanding literature on this fundamental subject. The book by Professor Smal-Stocki will give the inquirer a keen insight into the captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union.¹ This dimension is a blind spot for most Americans. The writer's own current work provides in outline the origin, development, and meaningful ramifications of the Captive Nations Week tradition and institution.² The book has received many favorable reviews, but the one that intrigues the author starts this way, "This is an impassioned volume in which the author depicts the United States as a gigantic fool, unwilling to

¹ Roman Smal-Stocki, *The Captive Nations*, Bookman Associates, New York, 1960, pp. 118.

² Lev E. Dobriansky, *The Vulnerable Russians*, Pageant Press, New York, 1967, pp. 454.

be convinced of Russian ruthlessness and unwilling to react positively to the Communists' continual aggression." ³ Where the passion comes in the writer himself can't tell, but for the most extensive documentation of the subject, the reader will find this volume valuable.

During this decade numerous other source materials came into being to analyze the congressional resolution, describe the meaning of the movement, and to justify its existence in the light of changing developments in the Red Empire. The book *Captive Nations Week: Red Nightmare, Freedom's Hope* furnishes an excellent account of Congress' role in the annual Week. ⁴ "Why Captive Nations Week?" is an informative article, pointing out that despite the Chinese-Russian rift and other rifts in the Red Empire, more than 27 nations are still held captive in the Red Empire. ⁵ A background article on "The Roots of Russia" still goes a long way in contributing to an understanding of Moscow's current repressions in the Soviet Union, its heavy involvement in the Middle East and in Asia, and its graduated handling of the Czecho-Slovak crisis. ⁶ As we shall see more clearly with the passing of the year, the real enemy is not the mythology of Communism, at best a psycho-political tool of deception and assigned philosophical respectability, but rather a crude Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, which was well depicted with reference to Captive Nations Week a few years ago. ⁷ The mythical independence of Rumania, the introduction of Liebermanism in the USSR, the squeals of a Castro and the ranting of Peking, the demands for Czecho-Slovak reform, and the continued meanderings of a Tito, none of these superficial developments have in any way altered the main thrust of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism.

Equally applicable to today's conditions as they were only a few years ago are a dozen pieces on the captive nations. For example, "Captive Nations vs. Red States" advances the crucial distinction between the nation, the people itself, and the Red-dominated state, and explodes the whole notion of building bridges that serve to entrench the Communist apparatus. ⁸ Too often, Americans fail to draw

³ *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1968, p. 133.

⁴ *Congressional Record* reprint, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1966, pp. 310.

⁵ *The New Guard*, Washington, D.C., July 1965, pp. 12-14.

⁶ *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, Annapolis, Md., April 1963, pp. 40-57.

⁷ "Soviet Russian Imperio-Colonialism and the Free World," *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, August-September 1963, pp. 92-97.

⁸ American Security Council *Washington Report*, July 19, 1965, pp. 1-4.

this basic distinction, as shown by the erroneous concept of Communist nation, and fall for schemes which only on balance conduce to the benefit of the particular Red regime. Another example is the fundamental deterrent value of the captive nations, taken as a whole, against the outbreak of a global war.⁹ With rampant insecurity sown for the Red regimes, the oppressed peoples could alter the aggressive designs of these regimes. There isn't one such regime that doesn't support the aggression of Hanoi against the Republic of South Vietnam. "Forget the Captive Nations?" has been the prime objective of Moscow and its syndicate members, but as the article with this title clearly demonstrates, the realization of this aim in the United States and elsewhere would be a tremendous psycho-political victory for the Red aggressors.¹⁰

Despite all that has been written, said, and done about the captive nations and their significance for world peace and freedom, the course pursued by two Administrations in this decade has been detrimental to the cause of these nations and inhibiting to the movement in the Free World. Added to this has been the protracted ignorance and even illogic on the part of several of our popular opinion media. The evidence also shows a certain amount of insincerity and self-defeating expediency concerning our policies toward the Red regimes and the captive nations in this era of confetti diplomacy.

As the writer publicly stated before an official body of the 1963 Republican National Convention, both Administrations in the 60's have pursued "a confetti diplomacy in regard to the main enemy, which can be accurately depicted as the international dimension of the credibility gap."¹¹ The statement continued, "The whole train of paper-making—the Test Ban Treaty, Consular Convention, Outer Space Treaty, the Non-Proliferation one and even the Moscow-New York flight run—are so much confetti on the scale of fundamental problems, serving to hoodwink our people as to the harsh realities in the Red Empire and the real threats to our security. The Consular treaty, as written, doesn't even make semantic sense. These superficialities tend, in the myopic tradition of the Roosevelt Administration over two decades ago, to convey an implicit partnership between Independent America and Imperio-Colonialist Moscow. None of these

⁹ "The Captive Nations — A Major Deterrent Against Global War," *The Marion Forum*, South Bend, Indiana, February 6, 1966, pp. 1-4.

¹⁰ American Security Council *Washington Report*, July 18, 1966, pp. 1-4.

¹¹ "A New Republican Policy of Dynamic Independence," Testimony before Republican Platform Committee, Miami Beach, Florida, July 30, 1968.

treaties is of any concrete net advantage to us, and each is of nothing-to-lose-much-to-gain advantage to Moscow. The confetti helps to enshroud the real enemy of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and its communist weapons which are dramatically at work today in Czecho-Slovakia."

With regard to the captive nations, which after all involves the basic issues of Soviet Russian power, aggression, and continual threat to the independence of nations in the Free World, the crucial point is the virtual surrender by the United States of its enormous ideologic power in favor of what is deemed a pragmatic "Soviet-American survival pact."¹² The fear of "mutual annihilation," or better "nuclearitis," is what supposedly has led us to placate Moscow with fundamentally meaningless treaties as far as the main issues are concerned, to play down the cause of the captive nations, to permit the historic meaning and significance of America in terms of national independence and self-determination to seriously corrode, and, as Franklin Roosevelt attempted to do in a period devoid of nuclear weapons, to consummate an implicit partnership with the last remaining empire of its size for the ostensible purpose of maintaining world peace. We have even sacrificed an across-the-board superiority in weaponry for a tenuous parity in order to display our national desire and want for a live-and-let-live existence. These are the dangerous straits into which Moscow's skillful policy of "peaceful coexistence" has led us.

It is no accident as concern the Tenth Captive Nations Week Observance and the forthcoming elections in the United States that for demonstration effect Moscow plunged into a gestural rash of ratifying the Consular Convention, advancing and signing the non-proliferation pact, calling for new talks on control of missile systems, and opening up the Moscow-New York flight run. It sought certain responses and successfully obtained them. Reveling in the web of confetti diplomacy, President Johnson, who still thinks the Soviet Union is a nation, views all this as having "proved that our two countries can behave as responsible members of the family of nations. And that is a very hopeful sign indeed."¹³ Not realizing that all this has been from Moscow's viewpoint a vital and integral part of its Cold War against the United States, he sees it as steps toward the

¹² Harry Schwartz, "The Soviet-American Survival Pact After Five Years," *The New York Times*, July 8, 1968.

¹³ "Johnson, at Glassboro, Urges U.S., Soviet Efforts for Peace," *The Washington Post*, June 5, 1968.

cessation of the Cold War for "I believe," he naively proclaims, "that the old antagonisms which we call the Cold War must fade — and will fade."

Viewed against the real background of Russian Cold War operations on all continents, the responses to Moscow's diplomatic maneuvers are almost Pavlovian in nature. This was shown, too, in the President's proclamation of Captive Nations Week which, issued on July 10, reads as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1968

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS the joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212) authorizes and requests the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation each year designating the third week in July as "Captive Nations Week" until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

WHEREAS human freedom, national independence, and justice are fundamental rights of all peoples; and

WHEREAS the enjoyment of these rights, to which all peoples justly aspire, remains severely limited or denied in many areas of the world; and

WHEREAS the United States of America, in keeping with the principles on which it was founded, has sought consistently to promote the observance of fundamental human rights throughout the world;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 14, 1968 as Captive Nations Week.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this tenth day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-third.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

One need only compare this proclamation with previous ones to appreciate the trend of ideologic emasculation so necessary to the illusory content of our confetti diplomacy. For one, the Secretary of State's signature has been quietly disposed of in order to reduce the proclamation's official standing. Also, in sharp contrast to all preceding proclamations, the 1968 one disposed of the President's public invitation "I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all peoples for national independence and human liberty." This is highly indicative of the sorry state we have drifted into while Moscow feverishly promotes its Cold War operations.

A quick glance at these operations encompasses an unrelenting drive to demolish NATO, to convert the Mediterranean into a Red lake, to establish Russian hegemony in the Middle East, and to undermine all Free Asian efforts toward expanded freedom. Working directly and also through Red syndicate members and Communist Parties in the Free World, Moscow is striking different keys and playing various tunes as it extends its interests in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Through necessary intermediation, it naturally has a keen interest in political warfare developments on the American terrain. Woven into all of this, its anti-American propaganda continues at a high pitch. Upon the assassination of Senator Kennedy, *Tass* didn't hesitate to call it "a new, convincing example of the terrifying gangster 'democracy' in the United States."¹⁴ Moscow's government paper hammered away at the old reliable, "Imperialism carries violence within itself,"¹⁵ and Brezhnev let it be known that the United States is a "rotting society, a degrading society, a decadent society," words with an old Hitlerian ring.¹⁶ Such statements are a daily diet in Moscow's propaganda network, and the chief aggressive thrust against the United States has been and is psycho-political, for which this country in its illusions of peace and co-engagement is ill-prepared.

PROTRACTED IGNORANCE ON CAPTIVE NATIONS

One of the paramount objectives of Captive Nations Week is the education of the American people regarding the captive nations,

¹⁴ Moscow, June 6, 1968.

¹⁵ *Izvestia*, Moscow, June 6, 1968.

¹⁶ "Soviet Leader Assail U.S. 'Rotting Society,'" *The Washington Post*, July 4, 1968.

especially those in the Soviet Union. In this decade, remarkable progress has been made in this respect. But we would be deluding ourselves to think that the task is close to completion. If this were so, our policy toward the Soviet Union and the Red Empire would be sensibly different. Much remains to be done to overcome and eradicate numerous strands of protracted ignorance and even obscurantism in many sectors of our Nation.

For a more thorough study of this unfortunate condition the reader might well find several sections of my book on *The Vulnerable Russians* of profitable worth. Here, let us just cite a few examples where public opinion is being swayed. A columnist who has been taunting former Vice President Nixon for his performance with Nikita Khrushchev back in 1959, writes that "Just before he arrived, Congress had passed the so-called Captive Nations Week Resolution calling for the liberty of the 'captive nations' of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, now under the Soviet Union."¹⁷ This balderdash is aggravated later when in another article the reader is told that the Captive Nations Week resolution "was a resolution periodically passed at the initiative of certain Baltic refugees, calling for the liberation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, now part of the Soviet."¹⁸ This is the kind of nonsense being fed the American people. It is doubtful that the writers ever read the resolution, which goes far beyond the captive Baltic states, had never anything to do with the initiative of "Baltic refugees," and is not periodically passed. With their nonsense as a background, the reader can safely discount much of what they say about Nixon. The second chapter in my work on "Nixon's Testimony of American Bewilderment" presents an objective account of the episode.

In his acceptance speech in Miami, Mr. Nixon emphasized, "To find the truth, to seek the truth and to live the truth, that's what we will do."¹⁹ Should he win, ample opportunity will arise to apply this commitment in connection with the captive nations. Surely, in the hoped-for environment statements such as this—"Khrushchev was then nettled because just before Nixon's departure, the U.S. Congress had adopted a routine resolution referring to the slave peo-

¹⁷ Drew Pearson, "Why the Russians Don't Relish Nixon," *The Washington Post*, April 20, 1968.

¹⁸ Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson, "Nixon's Positions," *The Washington Post*, August 4, 1968.

¹⁹ Richard M. Nixon, "This Time We're Going to Win," *The Washington Post*, August 9, 1968.

ples within the Soviet orbit—could scarcely thrive.²⁰ The writer, who availed himself of the first New York to Moscow run, significantly during Captive Nations Week, evidently doesn't know how the supposedly routine resolution emerged, and for him the USSR is a "nation."

Considering the appeasement and diplomatic confetti atmosphere in this country, it was no easy task to promote a captive nations plank in the 1968 Republican Platform. It is a general plank that fails to include the captive nations of Asia and Cuba. Some of the reactions in the press cause one to wonder about journalistic knowledgeability and honesty. In a supposedly interpretative report one writer views it as "the usual anachronistic references to the 'captive nations' of Eastern Europe," as though that area is free, independent, and self-determining.²¹ The editors of the *Washington Post* display their usual fatuousness and disregard for honest expression in an editorial that gloats over the generality of the plank, excluding any enumeration of the captive nations such as occurred in the forthright 1964 Republican Platform.²² With silly intent, Armenia is compared with Quebec and "the Ukraine" was supposed to have been captured between 1960 and 1964. As for journalistic honesty, the reader should compare this editorial with the *Post's* April 28 one on the "Cause of the Ukraine," where concerning Ukrainian independence it states "The last time a separate Ukrainian government tried that was in 1918" and "Soviet troops suppressed it with a vengeance still bitterly recalled." Many satisfied readers of the article "From Moscow's 'Izvestia' to Washington's 'Post'" can appreciate these dialectics.²³

STEADY GROWTH OF THE WEEK'S OBSERVANCE

What is truly remarkable is the fact that in spite of the heavy forces opposing Captive Nations Week, the annual observance has steadily grown and expanded over these years. One need only peruse the pages of the *Congressional Record* since 1959 to see the scope and extent of the annual Week. Traditionally, Congress observes it with impressive report and dedication.²⁴ About 35 Governors and

²⁰ Ralph McGill, "U.S., Moscow Add Another 'Bridge,'" *The Evening Star*, Washington, July 23, 1968.

²¹ Crosby S. Noyes, "A Platform Tuned for Violins," *The Evening Star*, August 5, 1968.

²² "Rollback in Miami Beach," August 9, 1968.

²³ *Congressional Record*, August 1, 1968, pp. E7230-7232.

²⁴ *Congressional Record*, July 17, 1968, pp. E6864-6887.

over 40 Mayors of our large cities issue their proclamations of the Week. Activities under the guidance of the National Captive Nations Committee in Washington are conducted by local committees in cities ranging from Boston to Los Angeles, Miami to Seattle, New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Buffalo, Chicago, St. Louis and many others.

The press coverage in these cities is fairly impressive, and change in circumstances will undoubtedly project it further. For example, the column by Ted Lewis in the July 16, 1968 issue of the *New York Daily News* publicized the Week for millions of New York readers. TV and radio reporting of the Week is not as extensive as it should be, but here, too, future international developments will determine more than anything else the range of such reporting. The Georgetown University TV-Radio Forum has consistently staged programs that have had a broad audience through its network. These and other functional bases of the Week would be greatly enlarged should another nation fall captive or Soviet Russian power express itself overtly and massively in Czecho-Slovakia or elsewhere. Tragic though such events may be, we must be prepared for them and their policy implications.

One of the outstanding developments of the movement has been its reception in foreign countries. In seventeen countries, ranging from Korea to Australia, India to Turkey, and West Germany to Argentina, the observance is now held regularly. Particularly in Asia, the movement has gained a firm foothold. For years now the Republic of China has been in the forefront of Captive Nations Week rallies.²⁵ For the first time, the Republic of Korea issued a Captive Nations Week stamp to commemorate the tenth observance. Requests for a similar stamp in the United States, the home of the Week, were denied. It appears that the closer a nation is to the battleline of freedom the deeper its understanding is of the issues at hand.

A new and highly important development arose at the end of 1967 when the first conference of the World Anti-Communist League adopted a resolution on the 10th Observance of Captive Nations Week. The resolution called for maximum effort on the part of its members and affiliates, representing over 80 countries, to advance the captive nations movement.²⁶ Meeting in Taipei, Free China, the members of WACL enthusiastically undertook to implement the resolution in the years ahead. They understood quite well the psycho-political na-

²⁵ "Captive Nations Rally in Taiwan," *Congressional Record*, August 2, 1968, pp. E7436-7439.

²⁶ *Congressional Record*, November 29, 1967, pp. H16052-16053.

ture of the world struggle and the time element involved. Thus, if America as a sleeping giant follows the present confetti course, the captive nations cause can find permanent support from those nations immediately threatened on an overt basis by the Red Empire. Better that its future is insured by firm hearts rather than confused minds.

THE RED TOTALITARIAN DREAD OF THE WEEK

On evidence, except for our relatively declining military strength, there has been no other factor that the Red totalitarians have dreaded more than the Captive Nations Resolution and Week. This expressed fear is not, as some simpletons have scoffed at, induced by the resolution and the Week themselves, but rather by their implications, potential implementation, and practical ramifications. The nature of the prime enemy, the essential history of the Red Empire, the victims of this tragic history, the essence of victory over it, and a firm basis for psycho-political action—all these fundamental ingredients are in the resolution and the forum of the annual Week. It requires only some sober reflection to discern these. Moscow recognized all this instantly, and as the following samples show, so have its syndicate members:

"This resolution stinks." (Then, according to Vice President Nixon, "he spelled out what he meant in earthy four-letter words.")²⁷

Nikita S. Khrushchev, July, 1959.

"Take, for instance, the much-to-be-regretted decision of the American Congress to hold the so-called 'Captive Nations Week' and to pray for their liberation. In this case words other than 'rolling back' were used, but the gist remained the same, the same appeal for interference in other people's affairs."²⁸

Khrushchev, October, 1959.

"Some members of the U.S. Congress, who apparently are not too busy with state affairs, deliver 'moving' speeches, using the same mimeographed crib concerning the so-called 'week of captive nations'..."²⁹

Nicholas V. Podgorny, U.N., October 1960.

"It is not at all fortuitous that this time the farce presented by the 'Captive Nations Week' should coincide with the hullabaloo created by American

²⁷ Richard M. Nixon, *Six Crises*, 1962, p. 252.

²⁸ N. S. Khrushchev's *Report to Supreme Soviet*, Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, November 2, 1959, pp. 1-2.

²⁹ Address, U.N. General Assembly, New York, October 4, 1960.

propaganda around the West Berlin question." ³⁰ (Khrushchev again denounced the Week at the Communist Party Congress in October, 1961.)

Moscow, 1961.

"On the basis of the 'weeks' held in the past, we already know what these appropriate ceremonies represent — unbridled anti-Soviet and anti-communist slander... Yes, it is only thanks to American bayonets that oppressors of freedom and blood-thirsty dictators are sustained in power in a number of countries of the Latin American continent and Southeastern Asia." ³¹

Moscow, 1962.

(In 1962 the Russian imperio-colonialists scored a victory in getting UNESCO to publish the scandalous and fraudulent *Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the USSR*.)

"Is it not high time to discontinue the 'Captive Nations Week' in the United States? That is just as much a dead horse as the 'Hungarian Question.'" ³²

Moscow, January, 1963.

"The President of the United States, losing his sense of reality, has declared 'a week of the Captive Nations' and is trying to turn attention away from the struggle of the Negroes for their liberation."

Pravda, Moscow, July 8, 1963.

"Kennedy is a third-class clown proclaiming Captive Nations Week, which is a despicable animal campaign of the U.S. ruling circles."

Pyongyang Radio, N. Korea, July 10, 1963.

"With every passing year 'Captive Nations Week' becomes a nuisance. The stupid situation in which the Washington legislators and rulers found themselves is becoming evident even for those who earnestly propagate the imperialistic policy of the U.S.A."

Izvestia, Moscow, July 15, 1964.

"An annual, pitiful undertaking. One could treat it as a joke... One could treat it like that, if it were not for the fact that Captive Nations Week, an annual undertaking organized by men who have long since lost contact with their nations, is supported by the U.S. Congress and by a proclamation of the President of the U.S."

Trybuna Ludu, Poland, July 27, 1965.

"Especially disgusting is the villainous demagoguery of the imperialistic chieftains of the United States. Each year they organize the so-called captive nations week, hypocritically pretending to be defenders of nations that have escaped

³⁰ *Pravda*, July 21, 1961.

³¹ *Izvestia*, July 17, 1962.

³² *The New Times*, Moscow, January 23, 1963.

from their yoke. These international gendarmes, stranglers of freedom and independence, would like again to enslave the free nations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. But that will never happen."

Mikhail Suslov, chief Russian ideologist,
Vilnius, Lithuania, July 17, 1965.

"Criminals... are active in the organizations of the so-called 'captive nations'... have their own press and conduct war-inciting activities through demonstrations, picket lines, etc... are often connected with similar organizations in other countries in Europe and Latin America."

Political Affairs, 1966.

"The thing is that every year in July the rulers in Washington put on an eye-sore of a propaganda spectacle, titled 'Captive Nations Week'... This time the advent of the notorious 'Week' is being violently commented upon by the reactionary American press."

Izvestia, July 7, 1967.

These are only a meager portion of the vehemence and vituperation poured on this movement. What, above all, the totalitarian Red regimes need is relative security and stability in their empire in order to gain necessary time for political and economic consolidation, reconciliation between and among the squabbling Communist Parties, more technologic progress and augmented material means to meet expanding Cold War commitments in the underdeveloped world, and greater overall military strength to challenge directly the power of the United States. The captive nations cause strikes at the very basis of their strategic plan for the years ahead.

TOWARD THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK

As was mentioned above, in the period of July 13-19, 1969 the Tenth Anniversary of Captive Nations Week will be celebrated here and abroad. For it was in July, 1959 that Congress passed the Captive Nations Week resolution upon which this annual observance is founded. Plans for this anniversary are already under way. But the most effective planning must take into account the fact that the annual observance is in large part a springboard for the discussion of issues which are important to the cause and must be advanced and supported through the year. In the last analysis, it is these issues and their determination that provide the substance for the perpetuation of the Week and the positive progress of the captive nations movement.

The dominant issues are many and require in their own right detailed exposition and analysis. However, here we can review them quickly with brief comment in relation to our fundamental educational task. First, the advocacy of a debate in the United Nations on Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. Despite President Kennedy's move in this direction in 1961, no such debate has ever been held in the U.N. forum. As concern the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, the need for this is more urgent than ever before.³³ Russian genocide of these nations will only strengthen Soviet Russian totalitarianism against the Free World. Second, a full-scale review in Congress of U.S. policy toward the USSR.³⁴ Here, too, never in our history have we undertaken such a review. It would be unprecedented and most productive for our national course.

Third, opposition to liberalized East-West trade without political concessions. Our trade experiences with totalitarian states in the pre-World War II period should provide solid historical lessons for not repeating our mistakes again.³⁵ Fourth, the establishment of a Special Committee on the Captive Nations in the U.S. House of Representatives. There is no agency, public or private, in this country that continually investigates the interrelated developments in the captive nations as a whole. The multiple advantages of such a committee to the fund of knowledge and security of the United States and its allies scarcely require emphasis. Fifth, the creation of a Freedom Academy by congressional passage of the Freedom Academy bill. For the struggle ahead, the deficiencies in the psychopolitical warfare preparations and equipment of Americans are grave, indeed. And nowhere have they come to fuller light than in South Vietnam itself. The plain fact is that, as in any other activity, we cannot hope to cope with the thrusts and gyrations of Red political warfare without methodical training in this discipline.

A sixth issue and objective is victory in Vietnam, clearly defined as South Vietnamese liberation of the 17 million captive North Vietnamese. It is one of the sorry aspects of our Vietnam experience

³³ See E. Derwinski, "Anniversary of First Revolution By Captive Nation," *Congressional Record*, November 13, 1967, pp. H15120-15122; also T. J. Dodd, "Persecution of Islam in the Soviet Union," *Congressional Record*, June 28, 1967, pp. S9058-9063.

³⁴ See J. Broyhill, "Necessity of Review of Nation's Entire Diplomatic and Economic Policy in Relation to Soviet Union," *Congressional Record*, July 18, 1967, pp. H8879-8880; also, Lev E. Dobriansky, *Review of U.S. Policy Toward the USSR*, p. 16.

³⁵ "Historical Lessons in Totalitarian Trade," *The Intercollegiate Review*, Nov.-Dec. 1966, pp. 55-65.

that none of our leaders even mention the captive plight of the North Vietnamese people. A positive victory cannot be realized without their freedom. Seventh, close examination of the situation of Russian consulates in our country. Despite the ratification of the U.S.-USSR Consular Convention, our position against it still is valid and true.³⁶ Bearing on the Dirksen-State Department agreement which made ratification possible, we should oppose the placement of Russian consulates in cities with a heavy East European ethnic complex. And eighth, the evolvement of a new U.S. policy of unfinished liberation.³⁷ This policy is based on premises of political warfare, such as the totalitarian Red regimes persistently wage, and is the best guarantee against more Vietnams and the outbreak of a global war. The alternative to our present policy of patched-up containment is clear, far less costly, and more productive for world freedom, thus our freedom.³⁸

These, then, are the formidable issues confronting all who understand and support the strategic value of the captive nations in toto. One does not expect the average American to grasp the insight that there will never be peace of a genuine sort in the world as long as the Soviet Union exists. But such will be the case until the Free World begins to concentrate on the key captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, peacefully, understandingly, and courageously. Until that time arrives and given the illusions of our confetti diplomacy, we had better keep reciting the long list of captive nations as provided in the new brochure of the National Captive Nations Committee, with the overhanging question "Who's Next?":³⁹

³⁶ See "Ten Reasons Against the U.S.-USSR Consular Treaty," p. 16.

³⁷ See "A U.S. Policy of Unfinished Liberation," p. 22.

³⁸ See "New Pathways For U.S. Leadership," *Congressional Record*, July 17, 1968, pp. H6880-6882.

³⁹ *Congressional Record*, July 31, 1968, pp. E7198-7199.

THE CAPTIVE NATIONS
WHO'S NEXT?

Country and People	Year of Communist Domination
Armenia	1920
Azerbaijan	1920
Byelorussia	1920
Cossackia	1920
Georgia	1920
Idel-Ural	1920
North Caucasias	1920
Ukraine	1920
Far Eastern Republic	1922
Turkistan	1922
Mongolian People's Republic	1924
Estonia	1940
Latvia	1940
Lithuania	1940
Albania	1946
Bulgaria	1946
Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, etc. in Yugoslavia	1946
Poland	1947
Rumania	1947
Czecho-Slovakia	1948
North Korea	1948
Hungary	1949
East Germany	1949
Mainland China	1949
Tibet	1951
North Vietnam	1954
Cuba	1960

WHO'S NEXT?

South Vietnam? Algeria? Colombia?
Congo? Laos? Tanzania? Bolivia?
Thailand? Greece? Guatemala? Chile?

STATEMENT OF THE DELEGATION OF FREE UKRAINIANS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN TEHERAN

From April 22 to May 13, 1968 the U.N. International Conference on Human Rights was held in the capital of Iran, Teheran, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948. The basic objective of the Conference was to review the practical application of the provisions of the above-mentioned Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the course of the past twenty years, and to ascertain ways and means which would have to be applied in the future for the purpose of assuring for all men and nations in the world the full enjoyment of political, social, economic and cultural rights, and thus create the necessary conditions for the implementation of international instruments in the field of human rights.

In connection with the Conference a Delegation of the Ukrainian Churches, political and social organizations which exist and are active outside Ukraine in the countries of the free world, came to Teheran. The Delegation included the following:

The Most Reverend Mstyslav Skrypnyk, Archbishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A.;

Rt. Rev. Msgr. Dr. Basil Kushnir (Canada), President of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, and Chairman of the Delegation;

Dr. Walter Dushnyck (U.S.A.), Deputy Chairman of the Delegation;

Dr. J. Y. Musianovych (France), Deputy Chairman of the Delegation;

Michael Sosnowsky (Canada), Secretary of the Delegation;

Dr. Bohdan Halajczuk (Argentina), Member;

Dr. Denys Kwitkovsky (U.S.A.), member.

The principal task of our Delegation was to bring to the attention of the participants of the Conference the present conditions in Ukraine, the population of which remains under colonial enslavement which violates all the rights and privileges outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. With this in mind, our Delegation held a series of meetings and talks with the delegates, and submitted to the Presidium of the Conference and the delegations of a number of states as well as representatives of the Iranian and international press, radio and TV, a series of memorandums, appeals and documents which thoroughly assess the tragic conditions of the Ukrainian people from every viewpoint: spiritual, political, national, cultural, social and economic.

We state with regret that the course of the Conference in Teheran overwhelmingly bore the imprint of the present international situation, in which the only remaining colonial powers, such as the USSR and Communist China, dictate their will not only to the nations enslaved by them, but even to the many nations which enjoy their independence. It was this very fact which prevented the Conference from making an objective and all-sided analysis of the status of human rights in the whole world, especially in the above-mentioned totalitarian systems of the USSR and Communist China.

Moreover, even the procedure of the Conference clearly manifested an understanding between a few leading nations of the world and the USSR, whose delegation qualified any effort to present an objective analysis of the status of human rights in the Russian colonial empire as an interference in the internal affairs of the USSR. Understandably, under such conditions the range of possibilities for the activity of the Delegation of about 3 million Ukrainians in the free world who enjoy all the rights and privileges envisioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was strongly limited.

Despite all this, we are in a position to state that the majority of the Conference participants have demonstrated a great understanding for the informational activities of our Delegation, expressing at the same time sincere sympathy for the unbearable fate of the Ukrainian people in the colonial system of the USSR. The same may also be said about the members of the delegations of some states which still are in the orbit of political and economic influence of Moscow behind the so-called Iron Curtain, but which are striving to secure for themselves full independence from Russian influence and control.

To all these people of good will special gratitude is due on behalf of the entire Ukrainian nation, in addition to thanks already expressed by our Delegation.

On this occasion, we cannot bypass the presence at the Conference in Teheran of the separate delegation from Ukraine which carried a mandate from the so-called government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Regrettably, the conduct of this delegation was deprived of sovereignty and independence in word and action, and revealed its complete subservience to the colonial center in Moscow and to the real ruler over the enslaved and oppressed peoples in the USSR — the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

As one and the only representation from the captive nations in the USSR, we did not lose a single opportunity to illustrate with documentary evidence the aspirations of other peoples of the USSR toward full freedom and independence.

Far from considering our activities in Teheran fully satisfactory, we nevertheless feel it necessary to assure our community that the honorable task undertaken by us, to defend the human rights of the Ukrainian people, we endeavored to fulfill within the scope of our resources and objective possibilities, in full agreement of thought and action of all members of our Delegation. We are certain that our activities, backed and supported by the entire organized Ukrainian community in the free world, will have a positive significance for the cause of the full and unqualified independence of Ukraine, and will further enhance and strengthen the struggle of the Ukrainian people for their national and human rights. Especially, we hope that our activities will constitute an act of recognition on the part of our entire community for those Ukrainian patriots in Ukraine, who, under extremely difficult conditions, are defending the rights of their people, and are paying enormous sacrifices in this struggle against Russian colonialism and imperialism.

Most Rev. Mstyslav Skrypnyk, Archbishop of Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A.; Rt. Rev. Msgr. Dr. Basil Kushnir, Chairman; Dr. Walter Dushnyck, Deputy Chairman; Dr. J. Y. Musianovych, Deputy Chairman; Michael Sosnowsky, Secretary; Dr Bohdan Halaiczuk, Member; Dr. Denys Kwitkovsky, Member.

Teheran, May 14, 1968.

BOOK REVIEWS

- MY SILENT WAR. By Kim Philby. Grove Press, New York, 1968, pp. 262, \$5.95.
- THE PHILBY CONSPIRACY. By Bruce Page, Phillip Knightley and David Leitch. Introduction by John Le Carre. Doubleday and Co., New York, 1968, 300 pp. \$5.95.
- THE THIRD MAN. By E. H. Cookridge. G. P. Putnam's Sons. New York, 1968, 281 p. \$5.95.
- KIM PHILBY. The Spy I Married. By Eleanor Philby. Ballantine Books, Paper. New York, 1968, 173 p. 75 Cents.

The greatest espionage story in modern times has finally been told in a bumper crop of books that exhaustively treats of the activities and defection of one Kim Philby, British-born Russian master spy. Harold Adrian Russell Philby is deemed by former CIA chief Allen Dulles to have been "the best spy the Soviets ever had." In 1963, the former British Secret Intelligence Service agent fled to the USSR from Beirut; he was subsequently revealed to have effectively spied for the Russians over a long period of time. More, he was Britain's top intelligence officer, in which capacity Philby once spent two years in Washington as a liaison with the CIA and FBI.

The Philby Conspiracy was written by Bruce Page, David Leitch and Phillip Knightley, all of whom work for *The Sunday Times* in London and who, along with a staff of experts, are part of that newspaper's noted "Insight Team," which spent months interviewing everyone who had known Philby either socially or businesswise. They succeeded in compiling a powerful dossier on the man, re-creating his life before his defection to Moscow. They proved that Philby was a Soviet spy beyond any possible doubt and that he penetrated the British Secret Service so effectively that in 1944 he became the director of its counter-Soviet department, a feat of duplicity and boldness unequalled in the annals of world espionage. The nature of his career can be spelt out rapidly by citing his titles and decorations: Order of the Red Banner (USSR), Red Cross of Military Merit (Spain), Order of the British Empire (withdrawn), member of the Athenaeum (struck off), former director of the counter-Soviet section of the British Secret Service (MI 6), former liaison officer between that service and the American Central Intelligence Agency (with the highest security clearance!), and now openly a high-ranking member of the Soviet KGB espionage service.

E. H. Cookridge, a former agent and author of a number of books dealing with international espionage, in his *The Third Man*, traces Philby's career from his undergraduate days at Cambridge to his defection to the USSR in 1963, dwelling extensively on Philby's association with Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, an association which subsequently was to inflict great and irreparable harm upon the Western defense system. Both these Englishmen defected to the USSR as Soviet spies; undoubtedly both collaborated with Philby. The au-

thor further describes in detail Philby's activities during the civil war in Spain where Philby was reporting from the Nationalist side and where he even was decorated by Franco. During World War II Philby first enlisted in SOE (Special Operations Executive) and then transferred to SIS (Secret Intelligence Service), popularly known as MI 6. While secretly reporting to his Soviet Russian masters, Philby became a leading member of the British secret service, after the war heading a section dealing with espionage and counter-espionage against the Soviet Union.

The third book, *Kim Philby: The Spy I Married*, is the work of Eleanor Philby, an American and Philby's third wife. It deals with her life with Philby in Beirut and Moscow until the time of her substitution in Philby's affections by Melinda Maclean. The book has none of the intricate details dealing with spy activities which the other books do: nonetheless it provides an intimate close-up of life with Communist Russia's greatest spy. How does one feel after finding out you've been married to a Russian spy for four years? What do you tell the children? And what do you do yourself — follow your husband behind the Iron Curtain? Mrs. Philby did.

Eleanor Philby gives an appealing woman's view of these dramatic events and problems. Her book is the only authoritative source we have for a detailed knowledge of Philby in Moscow, where he, the revered spy was allowed to socialize only with the Don Macleans, who had fled to Moscow under similar circumstances ten years before. The reader gains a unique insight into Philby's character, a "most lovely and devoted husband."

But perhaps the most important work on the subject is the book written by Philby himself, *My Silent War*, the story of a spy's life devoted to the advancement of Soviet power which is sure to become a classic.

Those interested in the anti-Russian resistance movements in Ukraine, Georgia and Russia itself will learn from Philby that a veritable tug-of-war was waged between the British and American intelligence services regarding "clandestine" operations in Ukraine, which, along with Albania, Philby contends, was earmarked for Western infiltration. Concerning the Ukrainian "operations," Philby writes:

"Disagreements over Ukraine were even longer drawnout and just as stultifying.

"From the years before the war, SIS had maintained contact with Stepan Bandera, a Ukrainian nationalist with marked Fascist views, and the collaboration had developed since the war. The trouble was that, although Bandera was quite a noise in the emigration, his claims to a substantial following inside the Soviet Union were never seriously tested, except in the negative sense that nothing much ever came of them. A first party, equipped by the British with W/T (wireless-telegraph) and other clandestine means of communication, was sent into the Ukraine in 1949, and disappeared. Two more parties were sent the following year, and remained equally silent. Meanwhile, the Americans were beginning to nurse serious doubts about Bandera's usefulness to the West which the failure of the British-sponsored parties to surface did nothing to allay..." (pp. 199-200).

Philby further states that CIA proffered three "serious objections" to Bandera: his extreme nationalism, which was seen as prejudicing Western dealings with other groups inside the USSR, such as the Russians; he was alleged to have roots only in the old emigration, lacking all contact with the

new, "more realistic" emigration which the Americans were busy cultivating and, finally, his alleged anti-Americanism. The British contended that Bandera was being used only for the purpose of gathering intelligence, but the Americans argued that Bandera's connection with the British necessarily inflated Bandera's prestige in Ukraine."

Philby writes:

"They professed fears that any reinforcement of Bandera's following must risk splitting the 'resistance movement' in Ukraine, with which they were themselves working..."

The results produced by the 'more realistic' emigration, and by the 'resistance movement' in the Ukraine, were scarcely less meagre than the results of the British-Bandera connection. It is true that CIA claimed to have received some couriers from the Ukraine in the winter of 1949-50, but the wretched quality of the information suggested rather that they were tramps who had wandered into the wrong country. In 1951, after several years of hard work, CIA were still hoping to send a political representative, with three assistants, to establish contact with the 'resistance movement.' They had also scratched together a reserve team of four men, to be sent in if the first party vanished without trace... (Ibid., p. 200-201)."

Philby's extreme cynicism is manifest in the following passage:

"In order to resolve Anglo-American differences on the Ukrainian issue, CIA pressed for a full-scale conference with SIS, which was duly held in London in April, 1951. Rather to my surprise, the British stood firm, and flatly refused to jettison Bandera. The best that could be agreed, with unconcealed ill temper on the American side, was that the situation would be re-examined at the end of the 1951 parachute-dropping season, by which time, it was hoped, more facts would be available. Within a month, the British had dropped three six-man parties, the aircraft taking off from Cyprus. One party was dropped midway between Lwov (Lviv) and Tarnopol; another near the headwaters of the Prut River, not far from Kolomeya; and a third just inside the borders of Poland, near the source of the San. In order to avoid the dangers of overlapping and duplication, the British and Americans exchanged precise information about the timing and geographical coordinates of their operations. I do not know what happened to the parties concerned. But I can make an informed guess.

"Some eight years later, I read of the mysterious murder of Bandera in Munich, in the American zone of Germany. It may be that, despite the brave stand of the British in his defense, CIA had the last word... (Ibid., pp. 201-202)."

If any other proof be needed, this last statement of Philby clinches the argument that he was not only a master spy for the Russians, but that he had swallowed the Soviet Russian line on the Ukrainian liberation movement. Thus Bandera is described as being of "marked Fascist views," which is the old Moscow refrain. His murder is ascribed in no uncertain terms to the CIA, which is also the line of the KGB, although the latter tried to implicate also the Bonn secret services.

It is to be recalled that Bandera was killed on October 15, 1959, and that two years earlier, on October 12, 1957, Dr. Lev R. Rebert, an outstanding Ukrainian nationalist, also was murdered in a mysterious way. In August, 1961, the killer of both Ukrainian leaders, Bogdan N. Stashynsky, a KGB-

trained agent, defected to West Germany and confessed to their slayings. He was tried in the fall of 1962 by the Germany Supreme Court in Karlsruhe and sentenced to 8 years at hard labor.

The trial was internationally publicized but apparently Philby thought his readers would confine their reading to his book.

The book does, however, furnish a sad commentary on Western policies with regard to the captive nations of the USSR. Resistance leaders of these nations — the Ukrainian, Baltic and others — tried in vain to secure Western support for their struggle against Soviet Russian domination and enslavement. It is tragic that whatever meager support they did receive was immediately reported to the KGB by spy Philby; the Soviet executioners, informed of the exact time and place of the descent of the infiltrators, had no difficulty in apprehending and disposing of them.

In the meantime in some official circles in Washington and London new "myths" were being created that refugee groups were infiltrated by Soviet agents. Philby proves the contrary.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE. By John Kenneth Galbraith, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1967, pp. 427.

It would not be inaccurate or mischaracterizing to classify Professor John K. Galbraith as an eminent, contemporary institutional economist. Though the reviewer normally shies from such classifications, to a professional economist the designation immediately signifies a given methodology, a peculiar line of analysis, and a flavor of discourse not generally found in other schools of economic thought. Whether the Harvard professor would accept this characterization is immaterial, for his whole discourse in this truly absorbing work is unmistakably in the institutionalist tradition. As Veblen, Commons and many others before him, Galbraith addresses himself primarily to the institutional fabric of our society, with an intellectual bent to see it critically and operationally as a whole.

Before any criticism can be laid against the work, it is doubtful that any reader can deny its scholarly qualities and literary artistry. Undoubtedly, some economists will take issue with the lack of statistical data and inductive bases for many of the author's generalizations, but this in no way can detract from his interpretative insights and refreshing observations on business enterprise in America. Considering the breadth and scope of his treatment, it appears rather picayunish to insist upon these requisites for every general statement he makes. Actually, the book contains an adequate amount of such data to justify some of his most critical observations. In any case, the institutional generalizations made with regard to the industrial system, the technostructure, advertising and so forth are stirring enough to serve as theoretic points of departure for more inductive study of a specialized sort. This was the case of every institutionalist writer, and the results proved most productive in time.

As to the literary stature of the work, it is superbly written, so unlike what one normally finds in socio-economic treatises. Although by no means Veblenesque in tone and character, the book is replete with witty expressions and lucidly stated positions. It allows for smooth and even entertaining reading

as one passes from topic to topic covering prices, trade unions, considerations of motivation, the Cold War and the like. Whether one agrees with them or not, the ideas expressed cannot but have an impact on one's thinking, and largely because of the colorful manner in which they are cast. Of course, in the final analysis the substantive nature of his ideas is the determinative matter, not their terminological garb and dress.

The major points of interest and critical content for the reviewer are the essential lack of novelty regarding Galbraith's dominant ideas, the defects in his comparisons with the Soviet Union, and his faulty comprehension of the Cold War, particularly the imagery he delights in assigning to it. These points of basic criticism are made in full awareness of the task the author has assumed for himself. In standard economic courses we enjoy making the distinction between micro-economic and macro-economic analysis, but what few professional economists appreciate, i.e. unless they have had some training in the exclusively American school of institutional economics, is the holistic and cultural economic analysis that is pursued integratively and organismically in interlacing the economic and other spheres of social existence for a realistic approach toward the actually unified object of societal being. In large degree, Galbraith follows this path and thus becomes vulnerable from many angles, which is the risk all institutionalists necessarily take.

Having had the good fortune of reading all that Thorstein Veblen produced (see *Veblenism, A New Critique*, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C.), the reviewer finds it extremely difficult to discern anything new in Galbraith's chief ideas and theses. To be sure, the empirical content he assembles is naturally different because of a span of some forty years, and the manner of exposition is likewise different, but the basic ideas scarcely differ. From any viewpoint, the fact that Galbraith entertains these ideas at this time, in the 60's, is a veritable tribute in itself to the intellectual prowess of Veblen who was really generations ahead of his time. To point this out is in no way an unfavorable reflection on Galbraith; on the contrary, it attests to his acuity and perception, which are at a premium in much of the sterile economic thinking undertaken today.

From a Veblenian viewpoint, "The New Industrial State" is really an old one, but now, in this connection, newly stated. Galbraith's stress on the large corporation as an institutional response to the imperatives of technology is thoroughly Veblenian. His ideas of consequent detailed specialization, organization, mobilization of human and financial resources, and the necessity for planning can all be found in Veblen's theory of the business enterprise, engineers and the price system and other works. His idea of the technostructure, implying group decision-making, is an old Veblenian notion underlying ultimately Veblen's program for industrial soviets. In his treatment of the price system, Veblen long ago scotched market determination of prices, production, and profit, as indeed does Galbraith. One difference between them, however, is that maximization of profits is a thriving concept in Veblenism; it is not so in Galbraith's thinking which emphasizes the subordination of this goal to other goals contributing to the security of the technostructure. But his underscoring of growth, market price control, demand management, the role of the state in the economy, and separation of ownership from management was well preceded by Veblen. On expansion of output and efficiency, there are again differences.

Though the author refers to Veblen only a couple of times, one cannot but wonder whether he is more familiar with the early institutionalist than he is willing to admit. The striking identity and similarity of views causes one to dub Galbraith as the miniature Veblen of mid-century America. Interestingly enough, in the 20's Veblen turned to the Soviet Union for socio-economic comparisons, as indeed does Galbraith. On planning, price control, enforced saving, the market process and other facets of the economy, one can do what the author does in setting up parallels and projecting a similarity or even an identity of situations along the technostrutural spectrum. Except for the market process, which plays a greater role in our economy than the author thinks, there is really nothing too significant about this parallelization. After all, the Soviet Union is an industrial state, even more so than the United States. Despite Galbraith's definition, the United States has long ceased to be exclusively an industrial state, which now in terms of human activity makes up one-third of our structure, the other two being devoted to services and non-profit making enterprises.

By no means unique, what is so grave a defect in Galbraith's comparisons is his complete misunderstanding of the Soviet Union. For him, it is a nation like the United States, and its imperio-colonialist structure escapes him entirely. It would seem that this is primary for any sensible institutionalist treatment, but such is not the case. The author demonstrates as much understanding of the USSR, in its basic elements, as he does of Vietnam or the Cold War. For him, the latter now is so much imagery, and the tendency of his treatise is toward the convergence theory, which sees some institutional blending between the West and the East. It is quite evident that this is new territory for his intellectual explorations, but in time, perhaps, he may develop more realistic observations in what some would regard as extra-economic fields. The reviewer dreads to think how Galbraith would appraise his current work on *The Vulnerable Russians*. Nonetheless, his work is stimulating, in many respects well-founded, but in essential matters of market competition, the service economy, the USSR, and the Cold War it is rather wanting.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

GALICIA-HALYCHYNA: FROM SEPARATION TO UNITY. By Michael Yaremko. With an introduction by Clarence A. Manning, Columbia University. Shevchenko Scientific Society, Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 18, English Section, Vol. 3. Toronto-New York-Paris, 1967. Pp. 292, \$7.50. Illus., maps, bibliography, index.

Many years of professional dedication and strenuous study preceded the publication of this pioneering work on the history of Western Ukraine, which has also been known as the Duchy of Halych-Volhynia, Halychyna or Galicia, and the Western Ukrainian National Republic. Prof. Yaremko has well earned the right to author this important book; he gave to it all the love and knowledge he possessed, making it his life's work. As far back as 1944, for his doctoral dissertation at the University of Vienna he dealt with the struggle of Galician Ukrainians since 1848 for their representation in the Vienna Parliament. A specialist in East European history and Slavistics, he taught

these subjects at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg (1959), Slavic Languages and Literatures at South Dakota State University (until 1965), and has taught at Western Illinois University since 1965. Previously (1945-46) he had served on the faculties of the U.N.R.R.A. University and the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, Germany. He is the author of the book, *Greek Orthodox Church and the World Council of Churches* (1956), and has prepared manuscripts on 2 Slavic writers of Ukrainian descent of the 18th and 19th centuries.

The book under review merits special recognition. According to historian Dr. S. Horak, it is a scholarly and comprehensive work covering the history of Galicia from earliest times to the present, being in fact the first publication of this kind in any language. The work has been acclaimed by Prof. Clarence A. Manning for its presentation of Galicia for the first time in English.

It is true that Galicia, that centuries-long "bone of contention" between several European powers, already had been discussed at some length in a number of important publications, yet never as pointedly or in its entirety as in this work by Dr. Yaremko. Historians no lesser than Michael Hrushevsky and S. Tomashivsky have studied this strategic Western Ukrainian area; they have done so, however, within the frames of their respective histories of Ukraine. Another scholarly treatment of Galicia, that of Prof. Y. Pasternak, does not trespass the limits of archeological research. Polish authors, on the other hand, could not refrain from expressing a Polish bias that often mars the real picture. Pashuto offers a Russo-Soviet slanted interpretation of Halych-Volhynia Rus'.

A younger Ukrainian scholar, P. Hrycak, has written an interesting account of the Duchy of Halych-Volhynia, closing it with the 14th century, whereas S. Horak discussed the Galician problem in the period between two world wars in his book *Poland and Her National Minorities*. It was left for Dr. Yaremko to cover all the fateful stages of historical development of this troubled country. Its past has been coherently outlined within four well defined topics: The Princely Period (907-1340), Galicia under Polish Occupation (1349-1772), Galicia under the Habsburgs (1772-1918) and Galicia from 1914 to 1945. This account of Galicia — its national sovereignty of the Halych-Volhynian Principality, its subsequent subjugation by imperial Poland and lowly status of "vae victis," and the resurrection and renewed struggle of Western Ukraine towards freedom and independence — this account moves with the stateliness of material meticulously researched and objectively interpreted. In this the book differs substantially from the argumentative if often brilliant interpretations of a multitude of historical data by P. Hrycak.

Dr. Yaremko's study provides both analytical insights and panoramic views of Galicia through its well grounded and yet popular approach. The general reader thus encounters the proper dimensions of a Christian civilization that survived the Mongolian invasion and which held its own after being overtaken by the Polish deluge, against such evil omens as the Tatar standards of the "burnt grass" or the policy of "fire and sword" applied by the former Polish imperialism. Indicated clearly is that the stalwart Ukrainian nation, of which Galicia is only a part, will survive the present and most formidable trial, that of the Soviet Russian onslaught of godless communism. To a Ukrainian student the book offers the first complete account of the great and tragic efforts of a part of his nation to achieve its place in the sun.

The book has other strong points as well — forceful, faultless English, extensive bibliography (although Hrycak's work is not listed), use of original

native nomenclature. Among imperfections the following should be pointed out: misprints and typographical errors, occasional chronological gaps (e.g., period from Konashevych Sahaydachny to Khmelnytsky) improper terms (such as "Zapadna" instead of "Zakhidna" Ukraine, and Ukrainian "Reaction" instead of "Counteraction"). There are a few inaccuracies (the location of the old city of Cherven, mentioned as difficult to determine, has actually been placed at the site of the present-day village named Cheremno on Buh, near Hrubeshiv; the role of the bishop, J. G. Strossmayer, in relation to the Croats had been not nearly as positive as that of the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Count Andrew Sheptytsky).

These blemishes, however, are minor; the book is an extremely valuable and timely one, written by a man who is both an able and dedicated historian and a linguist.

Fort Hays Kansas State College

ROMAN V. KUCHAR

STALIN, HITLER, AND EUROPE, 1933-1939. The Origins of World War II. Volume 1. By James E. McSherry. Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1968. Pp. viii + 308. \$10.00

Sir Winston Churchill's oft-repeated "riddle-mystery-enigma" quip about the Soviet Union is found to be, as no doubt the Briton realized, early or late—rather unsubstantial. There is absolutely no mystery about Stalin's greed, rapacity, and duplicity, nor about his uncanny ability to surround himself with like-minded cohorts. Even more than Louis XIV, Stalin was, for a quarter of a century, the state. If there be any mystery at all it is that he should have lived so long. How could this have been possible in a world as enlightened and scientific as the twentieth century? The author's paramount purpose is to explain this—as well as to unravel the second mystery: Hitler's fantastic rise and Wagnerian defeat.

McSherry's work is the first volume of what may be termed a—if not *the*—definitive history of the coming of the second "World War." Reminiscent of Carlyle's thought that history is the effluvium, or reflection of great—or greatly evil—men, this latest account rests more heavily on the personality facets and eccentricities of the two antagonists (as reflected in the diplomacy of their underlings) than on the conventional portrayal of a Gibbon or a Ranke.

In this sense, *Stalin, Hitler, and Europe* represents an incomplete version of the events leading to the second holocaust to take place in a little more than a generation. McSherry, one-time staff member of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, nevertheless has traced many of the threads in the tapestry of international bluff and counter-bluff to their skeins and has identified their color, strength and texture. As a result his work is one predominantly for the student, specialist, diplomat or psychologist, rather than for the general reader. It is nothing like, for example, Tuchman's engrossing and kaleidoscopic *Guns of August*—although, of course, it certainly was not so intended. In a phrase, then, this book represents an academic exercise—almost a model for a doctoral thesis in contemporary diplomatic relations.

But such an effort is not without its dividends. The infinite thoroughness with which McSherry has labored, his impeccable documentation, his use of sources hitherto unsynthesized, and his flair for apt expression—all recommend

Stalin, Hitler, etc. to those who can take the time to read and unravel the relationships he details—or can remember the names of the diplomatic corps of six or seven nations as they engage in Russian roulette or Prussian poker.

Evil was unquestionably present at the Kremlin and in the *Auswartiges Amt*. The abdication of responsibility or simply heavy-handedness, however, is to be ascribed to many other highly-placed parties, whether to be found at Downing Street or the Quai d'Orsay. Washington, too—although McSherry makes scant mention of American politics—appears to have been far too neutral—something which is only beginning to dawn on most Americans. For their gallant leader, within the years adumbrated, was none other than FDR, the people's choice, whose humanity is unquestioned but whose judgment was as subject to fatal error as that of Oedipus Rex or Charles de Gaulle. In fairness it must be said that Roosevelt relieved the depression. Would it have been too much to ask that he fathom the inscrutable Georgian or the madman from Munich?

This work begins, properly enough, with Manchuria, since World War II actually began on September 18, 1931, a fact little recognized at the time. Yet it was enough to create in Stalin that phobia, or fear, that was to characterize his future stance and, consequently, the whole history of Europe. Newly come to power and desperately anxious to hold that power, J. V. Stalin began the employment on the national and international scene of those means by which he had risen to the top within the ranks of the Bolsheviks. (The catalogue of his crimes included at that time the destruction of his party's god, Lenin; but this was only the prologue.)

McSherry's presentation of Litvinov sheds new light on his peculiar personal qualities. One almost believes that this apostle of the League and world brotherhood was basically sincere; his end tends to clinch the thought. Apparently, Joseph feared him too; but he was a useful man and so he was used. Molotov, successor to the liaison role, can hardly be accorded even a Marxist honesty—in him Stalin had found an alter ego, albeit of somewhat smaller size.

Hitler does not receive the etching accorded the bank-expropriator from Tiflis but this doubtless is correct: he was of lesser stuff. Hitler is shown to have harnessed histrionics—Stalin moved with muffled oars, at the stroke of low twelve, insistently toward his objectives. But we never learn Stalin's true character; was he only an egomaniac, or a scared rabbit, possessed of power and the immorality to use it or did he, in his own mind, at least, become a statesman? There have been many great statesmen who were not always ethical—yet who have truly served their country's cause. No need to list them here. Stalin is reported as saying (in Milovan Djilas' *Conversations*) that all the other Czars had lacked vision; he intended to supply it. It is, naturally, difficult to ascribe higher motives to Stalin—and McSherry does not encourage us to do so.

Over and above the compact nature of this book the main divisions show artistry and charm: "Retreat from Rapallo," "Mainstream to Munich," "The Last of Litvinov," "Hitler Plays the Russian Card," and "Stalin Fans the Flames." The author's conclusion—"Did Stalin Start World War II?"—answered, "Of course not, Hitler did," serves to consolidate his main theme: the diabolical genius of Stalin, unsuspected by the great majority of those with whom he came into contact, was sufficient to ruin Hitler and Germany, make dupes of France and England, and reduce to impotence—or nothingness—a dozen grand and ancient peoples within the Russian orbit or on its periphery.

The tormented mind that could order the Katyn Forest massacre and, through his henchmen, butcher Ukraine, could not, at the last, provide an adequate succession—the fate of many a prestigious empire. Nor could he build internally and constructively without recourse to assassination, violence and expropriation. But this is another story; McSherry plans to continue his history; we shall see what he says about these things later.

But one parting criticism. Notes, bibliography and appendices (Treaty Documents et al.) take up almost one fourth of *Stalin, Hitler*, etc. There is no index, a flaw that hopefully will be remedied as the work progresses. But an index is essential even now. Its lack is a strange decision—or oversight.

University of California

KENNETH V. LOTTICH

CHINA AND THE WEST. By Wolfgang Franke, University of South Carolina Press, (Columbia, 1967), 165 pp. incl. index.

Mary C. Wright, Yale Historian, and one of Mao Tse-tung's great admirers over a period of years, said of this book (on the packet): "This is the type of book now most needed... well-informed, sensitive and scrupulously fair... a thoroughly reliable introduction to the whole problem of China's relation to the West."

Mrs. Wright is carried away. This little volume is not that all-fired needed, informed, fair or reliable. It is, perhaps, sensitive.

The author is "an old China hand," having lived in China from 1937 to 1950. Today he lives in Hamburg, and is co-editor of *Oriens Extremus*. His "first concern has been to help the reader to understand the Chinese point of view and the Chinese attitude towards the West." He surveys links with the West (but not with Russia) from the Marco Polo days, including the Mongol period, relations with the Portuguese, the Jesuit Mission of Matteo Ricci, the "Colonial Invasion of China," China's Response, and China and the West in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Franke lays special stress on the bad effects of missionary activity, which "evoked powerful expressions of resentment." When the mission schools were taken over by the Communists, and the foreigners were discriminated against, "the Chinese who showed themselves most loyal to the foreigners were often those who were not Christians, who had preserved their personal independence, and who had previously often come into sharp conflict with the foreigners." Here as elsewhere, the author tends to load the dice against the missionaries, while at the same time failing to distinguish between Catholic and Protestant experiences.

Whereas the Western Powers engaged in colonialism, "the attitude of Soviet Russia, on the other hand, was quite different. Its government did not merely plead in theoretical terms for the liberation of the Asian nations from Western colonial rule and imperialism, but took the practical step of renouncing all the privileges which the Czarist regime had possessed in China... Thus the new Russia seemed to many to be China's obvious ally in the struggle against Western and Japanese hegemony."

The answer to this is the research of David J. Dallin, among others, demonstrating that Soviet repudiation of Czarist privileges was more apparent than

real. One has only to recall the cynical Sun Yat-sen — Joffe Agreement of 1923, the Soviet intervention of 1929 and 1945 to realize that in many ways the Soviets (who signed a treaty with the Japanese in April 1941) were the real imperialists.

Somewhat less than fair is Franke's statement (in re the 19th and 20th centuries) that "The Chinese were either characterised as uncivilised, inferior and decadent, or else they were represented as comic figures, who could be used in all kinds of ways as an object of mockery and amusement."

In a subsection of the last chapter entitled "China and the West at the Present Day," the author declares: "The arrogant and superior attitude of the West towards China has increasingly given way in the last ten years to one of fear and hatred. The prevailing idea is expressed in the cliché of a Communist and therefore fundamentally evil and unacceptable 'Red China.'" Franke implies that it is wrong for West Germans to equate East Germany with Communist China, and he says that the "hostile attitude of large sections of the American public to China is based on emotion to an even greater degree."

It strikes me that the ravings and rantings of Mao Tse-tung are emotionalism, and that the restraint and realism of U.S. policy have been to a very large degree unemotional. Ulbricht and Mao repress their people, and strive mightily to keep the refugees from leaving. The hated secret police and Red Guards are little different. They are realities which face not only the Chinese people but the West as well.

Franke refers to "the slight offered to (China) by the refusal of other nations to recognise her, and admit her to the United Nations." This, he writes, is "a particularly bitter insult." I imagine that Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Tojo's Japan were unhappy about certain League of Nations resolutions critical of their expansionism; and certainly the USSR could not have been pleased with its expulsion from the League caused by the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939!

The West, says Franke, must show "a willingness to understand without prejudice the forces that guide the development of China." "Such a willingness on the part of men in the West," he says, "is the only possible basis for a response to this challenge." The encounter "may then perhaps lead to the synthesis between China and the West." I very much doubt that Franke would have urged us in 1935 or so to demonstrate "a willingness to understand without prejudice the forces that guide the development of Germany."

Le Moyne College

ANTHONY T. BOUSCAREN

THE MASTER AND MARGARITA. Michael Bulgakov. Translated by Michael Glenny, Harper and Row, New York and Evanston, 1967, pp. 394.

This novel was first published in Moscow in an abridged (and/or expurgated) edition in 1966, and a copy of this edition has since appeared in the United States. This edition represents the complete text which has also appeared abroad and in print in both London and Italy. It has everywhere aroused great interest, though its interpretation is extremely difficult.

Bulgakov had a curious career. He was born in Kiev in 1891, where his father was a Professor at the Kiev Theological Academy. He was graduated as a doctor from the University of Kiev in 1916, but soon gave up medicine for

literature. He met with considerable success in the 1920's, but was regarded as a counterrevolutionary author and his works were not allowed to be published. He was reduced to being a hack writer, but was neither deported nor allowed to go abroad. He died blind in 1940. His first important work was *The Days of The Turbines* later produced as *The White Guard*, was set in Ukraine in the days of *Hetman* P. Skoropadsky, but his main characters later become Communist to preserve the unity of Russia. However, his fantastic stories of that period contain bitter satire on the Bolshevik bureaucracy and their failure to build a better life, despite the boasted improvements and democracy.

The Master and Margarita is a savage satire on the publishing and editorial world of Moscow, and the ignorance and crudities of the so-called Russian Communist intellectuals who are treated throughout with open disdain. It is no wonder that it was refused publication. On the other hand, the book can be read on at least two other levels. If we accept the title as the main theme, it is the story of an honest writer who has prepared a novel on Christ and Pilate, which is summarily rejected by the publishers. The author seeks refuge in an insane institution, after burning his work. He is saved by his loving and devoted mistress, the wife of a distinguished Soviet scholar and official. She does it by abandoning her husband and becoming a "naked witch" in the "train of the devil," who suddenly appears in Moscow with a weird troop, including several devils, a naked vampire named Hella, and a superblack cat Behemoth, who smokes cigars and shoots with a revolver.

Then we have long extracts from the novel which presents a highly unconventional account of the trial and crucifixion of Christ, who is presented realistically but not theologically Orthodox, but who so impresses Pilate that when he is condemned by Caiaphas, the Procurator himself kills Judas and throws the money into the court of the high priest. The devil (or is it Faust and the devil?) in all his denial of God still is compelled to listen, whether he will or not, to the messages sent to him by Matthew the Levite, depicted as a faithful chronicler of the events and a fulfiller of the will of God.

On the original level, we have a stupid head of one of the mass publication groups who rejects the writing of a young author by emphasizing that he is seeking to secure a novel which will prove that all the religious leaders of the world never existed, to please the new decrees of the authorities.

The interchange of all these levels, plus the fantastic feats of the devil and Faust in demoralizing Soviet officialdom adds up to a mysterious and perplexing chaos, a cross between Gogol and Goethe with reminiscences of the grotesque sides of Gogol and also the Walburgisnacht of Faust with Margarita somewhat in the role of Gretchen. It is a most unusual novel and it represents a Bulgakov almost free from any Ukrainian background, for only one Ukrainian official tries to use chaos as the basis for an attempt to get away from the provinces as Bulgakov himself had done, and make a secure place for himself in the nightmare of Stalin's Moscow and the still greater nightmare of the reality of Communist thinking at its best.

LETTERS OF NIKOLAI GOGOL. Selected and edited by Carl R. Proffer. Translated by Carl R. Proffer in collaboration with Vera Krivoshein. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1967, pp. x + 247.

Gogol (Hohol) — and, to give his full name, Nikolai Vasilyevich Gogol-Yanovsky — furnishes an abundance of riddles for both Russian and Ukrainian literature. He was the son of a Ukrainian serf-holding petty noble whose mismanaged estates brought in little cash and who was content to be almost a client of a more wealthy neighbor for whose domestic theatre he composed Ukrainian comedies in the style of Kotlyarevsky. His mother was only 14 at her marriage and Nikolai was the oldest child who survived. He was brought up in a Ukrainian atmosphere with a good supply of local superstitions and educated in an inadequate school in Nizhyn before going off to Petersburg to seek his fortune as an official and a writer. He became the first prominent Russian prose writer, but there is a wide difference in mood between his stories on Ukrainian and Russian themes. After about ten years he went abroad. Finally he went on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land after publishing his *Select Correspondence with Friends*, a work which alienated many of his literary friends. Then under unclear circumstances he burned the second part of *Dead Souls* and died in agony under the care of "doctors" within a week, leaving the ruling motives of his life confused by his jokes and his admonitions.

This collection of letters will be an invaluable source for all students of Gogol who do not read Russian or do not have access to the full collection of his writings. It disproves incontrovertibly the common hypothesis that Gogol's eccentricity gave way to insanity or some other disease but, as do all previous studies, it leaves the real Gogol still unexplained. What was his object in writing *Taras Bulba*? How could he conceive the comic Inspector General as a call for repentance? What did he intend to do with Chichikov, the eternal get-rich-quick dealer in dead souls?

There is much else left unexplained in the collection despite the usually adequate notes. Did he know or hear of Shevchenko? The two men obviously had many friends in common and they were only five years apart in age. They were both friends of the Reprnins. What was the relationship between N. D. Belozersky and Anna Bilozerska, the future bride of Kulish, who was a member of the Society of Sts. Cyril and Methodius? (The name is the same since the difference depends upon the transliteration of the letter *iat* in Soviet Russian and modern Ukrainian.) Both were friends of such men as S. T. Aksakov and the actor Shchepkin.

The present collection, offering many unsolved problems for the students of both literatures, should lead to a new evaluation of Gogol's real feelings and beliefs. Thus a valuable work may still present new problems for further study and serve as a guidepost for those studies.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

THE ROMANOVs, THREE CENTURIES OF AN ILL-FATED DYNASTY.

By E. M. Almechingen. New York, Chicago, San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1966. Pp. 333.

This is an interesting and well-written account of the Romanov rulers of Russia throughout history which captures the characters of the various indi-

viduals from the beginning down to the tragic end of the last Czar, Nicholas II, in 1918. The author has departed from the old historical views held of the rulers by including their foibles, inanities and some of their crimes, as well as their accomplishments. But the theme throughout is that the family loved the country which they governed, however well or badly, a love expressed in the words of Catherine: "The most I could do for the country would be as nothing compared with the debt I owe her." The book is frankly written to prove this and to show their accomplishments: "They inherited a Muscovy, well-nigh hidden behind the high wall of its fendal separatedness. They moulded a Czardom into an Empire, its voice and its policy reckoned with by the Western comity." If the author condemns the Russophile tendencies of Alexander III and his policy of Russification, she regards it merely as a vulgarization of what the Romanovs were attempting all along.

Yet there are strange omissions quite in the traditional line. Thus on page 58 she mentions — as one of the sources of the sense of insecurity felt by Alexis Michailovich — the schism in the national Church and the subsequent defection of Patriarch Nikon, at one time the Czar's most intimate friend and counsellor, and barely explains it in one sentence on page 65, without ever naming the head of the schism, the Protopope Avvakum, whom the Czar seems to have aided considerably. She scarcely makes clear the early training of such Westerners as Simeon Polotsky, a former student in Kiev and the first to be invited to Moscow, and, in connection with Peter, she does not allude to his friends from Ukraine who were trained in Kiev or in Rome, such as Teofan Prokopovich. Nor does she see any connection of Kiev with the formation of the Uniate Church just before the Troublous Times in Moscow nor the role of the Mohyla Academy in Kiev in the seventeenth century.

The same policy of omission is applied consistently to all the efforts of the Ukrainians to develop in their own way and to maintain contacts with the West. In fact, Ukraine and the Ukrainians do not exist as a separate nation for her but merely as a part of the Russian patrimony to be united when possible. This is carried so far as to say (page 55) of the Cossack (Kozak) Wars: "Ostensibly it wore the noble air of a crusade. In bald reality, it was a Russian attempt not only to safeguard but to enlarge her Western borders." She traces their cause to the following: "The Ukraine and the provinces of Podolia and Volhynia were then in Polish hands. The beginning of the trouble lay in the policy of King Sigismund, who, using the Ukrainian Cossacks as a buffer against the Crimean Tartars, ended by reducing the Cossacks to the level of serfs. In 1653, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Cossack *hetman*, started a revolt and sent a messenger to Moscow to ask for the Czar's help in the struggle." The revolt started in 1649 and achieved great success in the early years. The rest of the story devotes little more than a page to the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667, through which Russia recovered Smolensk and Kiev. This is a summary that fully rivals the propagandistic theses for Pereyaslav issued by the Soviet Union for the tricentennial celebration in 1953.

The author's favorite is undoubtedly Czarevna Sophia Alexeyevna, the half-sister of Peter, respecting the latter for his brilliant flashes and disliking him for his erratic character. Her description of the Northern War is on the same plane as her descriptions of the enemies of Moscow: she scarcely mentions Charles XII and ignores completely Mazepa and Ukraine. It is the same with Catherine II and her attitude toward Peter III. Earlier, she passes over

Elizabeth Petrovna's assumption of power and the origin of Alexis Rozumovsky, the Ukrainian whom she married.

All in all, the book is a highly readable series of thumbnail sketches, but the general reader who is unaware of the course of Russian history will not know that it does not cover even a small part of the complicated diplomacy played throughout the centuries to glorify Russia and to confuse the West.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

EREV. By Elya Schechtman. Translated from the Yiddish by Joseph Singer. New York Crown Publishers, 1967, pp. 268.

This was the first Yiddish work published in the Soviet Union in 25 years. The author, who began to write in 1930, fortunately lived through the period of the virtual elimination of Yiddish literature without yielding to cynicism or pessimism. It is a story of the life of the Hassidic Jews of Ukrainian Polisia during the period of the *pogroms* which preceded and followed the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Although it is a close study of the Hassidic Jews, their strengths and weaknesses, it has very little to say about the Ukrainian peasants among whom they lived. In fact the only Christians sketched in any detail are the Friends of the Russian People, the persecuting officials of the old regime who used their posts to enrich themselves at the expense of all who had to obey them. The Jewish characters range from pious and absorbed students of the Hassidic views of the Jewish religion to poor peasants unable to secure food for their families and rich merchant Jews who come from the cities and more or less disregard the mandates of the law in their marital and other contacts with the Jewish population from which they came. The book provides a vivid picture of a vanished past which must seem to the non-Jewish world a bizarre mode of life, yet one which did admit of a certain type of personal and religious integrity.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

THE TASTE OF POWER. By Ladislav Mnacko, New York: F.A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 235. \$5.95.

As Max Hayward points out in his "Foreword" to this political novel, translated from the Slovak, "Soviet and East European literature is now concerned to the point of obsession with recent history." While the Soviet re-appraisal of the past has been slow and tortuous, some East European writers, by contrast, "have not hesitated — once it became politically possible — to settle accounts with their recent history in a decisive and brutally forthright manner." Instead of trying to "assimilate" the past as an essential part, they have "spat out the Stalinist experience as a whole, as something totally alien and repugnant which can never be digested, let alone justified or accepted."

Of interest is that Czechoslovakia was much slower than the other pro-communist regimes in the Soviet-controlled area to respond in literature and art to the new political situation created by Stalin's death and the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, at which Khrushchev, by his admission

of past crimes and "mistakes," loosened the iron bonds which had bound Eastern Europe to Soviet Russia. The slowness of Czechoslovakia's reaction was due to the stubbornness of the party leaders in resisting change (and weakened only recently by the forced resignation of President Novotny) and to "the unromantic but more than justified caution of the country's intelligentsia." And this caution has gradually "reasserted the autonomy of the creative process." And "as a result, Prague is currently the most productive (often in a startlingly avant garde way) of the East European capitals," claims Hayward, although "in literature (except in poetry which does not survive translation) developments have been less spectacular and until the present novel of Ladislav Mnacko there was little prose that could justly lay claims to the attention of readers outside Czechoslovakia."

In spite of its somewhat quaint translation, Mnacko's novel is an excellent portrait of the *homo stalinensis*. While most Soviet and Eastern European works of this kind have treated the relatively minor tyrants at the lower levels of the power structure and their victims, the central figure in this novel is the "head of the government." It probes the mechanisms of totalitarian politics and strips away the glamor with which in their heyday the Stalinist regimes of Eastern Europe impressed admirers and enemies alike, showing us the shabbiness and sordidness behind the awesome facade. From the standpoint of the Cold War, in an age in which progressively more men are engaged in politics, while the politics themselves have become increasingly complex, any means for understanding these interrelated phenomena becomes correspondingly more valuable. Since its beginning the political novel has fulfilled the ancient function of art; it has described and interpreted human experience, selectively taking the facts of existence and imposing order and form upon them in an esthetic pattern to make them meaningful. The political novel is important to the student of literature and of political sociology as one aspect of the art of fiction; but it is important in a larger context, too. The reader who wants a vivid record of past events, an insight into the nature of political processes, can find it in the political novel. As an art form and an analytical instrument, the political novel, now as never before, offers the readers a means for grasping important aspects of the complex society of today.

In this respect, Mnacko's presentation ranks high.

*Queensborough Community College of
The City University of New York*

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

RUSSIA, POLAND AND THE WEST. Essays in Literary and Cultural History.
By Wacław Lednicki. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, Inc. 1966, 419 pp.

In this book, originally published in 1954 and reprinted in 1966, the author does not give a complete and true picture of the literary and cultural relations between Russia, Poland and the West. He selects only some individuals and problems in order to prove that Poland was a literary and cultural bridge between Russia and the West in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries (up to 1917).

In his first essay about Russia and the West Lednicki considers the works of the Russian philosopher and essayist Peter Chaadaev (ca. 1794-1856), regard-

ed by his friend, the poet Alexander Pushkin (1799-1837, as a "Polonophile," He considers also the works of Pushkin and another contemporary poet, Mikhail Lermontov, all as outstanding representatives of the cultural and literary movement in Russia in the 1820's and 1830's, and, as representatives of the West, he considers the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855), and a Frenchman, A. L. L. Marquis de Custine, whose book *Russia in 1839* was translated into English by Phyllis Penn Kohler and published in New York in 1951. Lednicki shows that Chaadaev and Pushkin dreamed of freedom from Czarist autocracy like the contemporary Decembrists, to whom Lednicki pays attention, too. He quotes Pushkin's allusions to the Decembrists in *Eugene Onegin* and in his poem addressed to the Volkonskys, but he passes over Pushkin's "Message to Siberia," written in 1827 and printed in an English translation by Avram Yarmolinsky (*The Poems, Prose and Plays of A. Pushkin*, New York 1964, pp. 62-3). The poem even in the same year reached Decembrist Prince Alexander Odoevsky, who replied with a poem in which he showed how the Decembrists understood and accepted their historical role. Mickiewicz's statement, cited by Lednicki, "that during the coronation of Czar Nicholas I it was impossible to find a single poet willing to sing the praises of this ceremony," and that at last the French bard from Paris J. A. Ancelot put at the Czar's feet "an ardently legitimistic dithyramb" is important for an accurate estimation of the atmosphere in Russia after the Decembrists' uprising.

Partially Lednicki is contradictory himself. He writes that "Peter's reforms for Europeanization of Russia were an act of Russia's autocracy for adoption of European achievements of material culture. The monarchy neither impelled its subjects to follow the European course nor did it embark upon such a course itself, but the 200 years of cultural coexistence with Europe on the part of the Russian élite—and this was the only Europeanized class in Russia—fatally deepened the influence of European culture in Russia" (p. 401). And then with regard to Pushkin he says that "the abyss created on the ideological level between Russia and Poland and Russia and Europe was the achievement of a man who was the outstanding and captivating symbol of Russian Europeanism—a Russian who indeed might be considered the Peter the Great of Russia in the field of her spiritual culture" (p. 402). Lednicki, however, can dislike them both because they both disregarded Poland as a bridge to the Europeanization of Russia and hated Poland. Since the "Times of Troubles" the hatred between the Muscovites-Russians and the Poles has been traditional. To that time Pushkin paid special attention (his historical drama *Boris Godunov*), because Moscow, as in 1812, was invaded by foreign forces, and in both these foreign invasions the Poles participated. It is wholly in Lednicki's imagination that Pushkin introduced in this tragedy the false Dimitry as strong, self-confident, optimistic, an instrument of Providence, a born leader, a natural nobleman; for Pushkin the false Dimitry was an "unfrosted monk" and a "godless villain," and the Moscow people, silent with horror at the murdering of Godunov's family, represents the poet's true view.

In connection with the political issue in Pushkin's odes concerning the Russian leadership in the Slavic world, Lednicki puts the question: Who was to be the leader, Russia or Poland? But both Russia and Poland had enlarged themselves by enslaving the Ukrainians and Byeloruthenians, and therefore they could not claim the leadership of the Slavic world. Right after the appearance of Mickiewicz's *Books of the Polish Nation and of the Polish Pilgrimage*, the

prominent Ukrainian historian and writer Mykola Kostomarov (1817-1885) wrote the *Book of Genesis of the Ukrainian Nation* as a platform for members of the secret St. Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood in Kiev. In this *Book of Genesis of the Ukrainian Nation* the federation of the Slavic peoples on the basis of freedom and equality was indicated even contrary to the Russian and Polish claims to assimilate other Slavic peoples, while the Polish insurrection of 1830-31, on which Mickiewicz's opinion about the Polish "pilgrimage" was based, was not in consequence of the suppression of the Polish autonomy by the Russian government but the result of the Polish claims to the Ukrainian, Byeloruthenian, and Lithuanian provinces which had belonged to Poland until her partition in 1772-1795. These Polish claims were inspired by the fact that in these provinces the Ukrainian, Byeloruthenian, and Lithuanian peasants were in serfdom to the Polish noblemen-landowners who were favored by the Russian autocratic government.

The secret St. Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood was uprooted by the Czarist police; Kostomarov, Taras Shevchenko and others of its members were arrested and exiled to the Northeast Russian regions, Shevchenko as an army private to Orenburg, and later to Novopetrovsk (now Fort Shevchenko) on the Caspian Sea in Kazakhstan where he remained until 1857. More or less by chance at the same time (1845 to 1848) in the home of the Russian nobleman M. Butashevich-Petrashkevsky in Petersburg a group of (mostly young) radical writers and thinkers met for philosophical and political discussions. At the meeting at Petrashevsky's on April 15, 1849, the writer Fedor Dostoyevsky (1821-1881) read the critical "Letter to Gogol," written by the radical philosopher, critic, and journalist Vissarion Belinsky (1811-1848), who died in 1848 apparently just in time to avoid arrest during the police terror of that year. In his letter Belinsky criticized the Russian writer of Ukrainian descent Nikolai Gogol (Hohol) (1809-1852), as "proponent of the knout, apostle of ignorance, champion of obscurantism and Stygian darkness, panegyrist of Tartar moral." Also, Belinsky regarded the Orthodox Church "as the prop of the knout and the servant of despotism." The priest in Russia represented then "for all Russians the embodiment of gluttony, avarice, servility, and shamelessness." Belinsky denied Gogol's assertion that "the Russian people are the most religious in the world." On the contrary, Belinsky saw the Russians "by nature a profoundly atheistic people" who "still retain a good deal of superstition." He praised the higher morality of the Catholic clergy. For reading this letter Dostoyevsky was sentenced to four years at hard labor in Omsk, followed by service as a private in a Siberian regiment. In Siberia he changed his views. He saw man as a tragic being who therefore has proved to be more complicated and contradictory and, in his polarity, more extreme with regard to good and evil—not at all the placid and reasonable creature imagined by the rationalistic and materialistic radicals of the time. Man needs God and without God he is a beast or on the way to becoming one. Dostoyevsky was deeply impressed by the religious feeling and humility of the Russian people. As a liberal Orthodox Christian and Russian nationalist he twisted in *The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor* the arguments of Belinsky's "Letter to Gogol," attacking the Orthodox Church and comparing it unfavorably with the Catholic one, into an aggression against the Catholic Church, to which he opposed also Christ.

Dostoyevsky hated the Poles, and viewed Bismarck as the principal enemy of socialism and the Papacy. He wished a Russian-German alliance on the con-

dition that Germany become the leader of Western Europe, "leaving the East to Russia. Thus, two great peoples are destined to transform the face of this world." Constantinople was to be in the hands of Russia. England and France would be defeated by the Russian-German armies, and so the triumph of the Russian Christianity would be achieved. In his speech on Pushkin in Moscow in June 1880 Dostoyevsky said that the peoples of Europe "have no idea how dear they are to Russians." He prophesied that the Russians will reconcile in the future all European controversies, solve European anguish in the Russian all-humanitarian and all-unifying soul, embrace with brotherly love all European peoples as the Russian brethren, and finally, perhaps, "utter the ultimate word of great, universal harmony, of the brotherly accord of all nations abiding by the law of Christ's Gospel!" In January 1881, the month before his death, Dostoyevsky prophesied the annexation of the Asiatic Moslem peoples by the Russian Czar, and that in Asia "a new Russia will arise which in due time will regenerate and resurrect the old one and will show the latter the road which she has to follow..." Asia would be the Russian "future outlet." Finally, "when in Europe, because of the overcrowding alone, inevitable and humiliating communism is established, communism which Europe herself will loathe; when whole throngs will crowd around one hearth, and gradually individual economics will be ruined, while families will forsake their homes and start living in collective communes; when children (three quarters of them foundlings) will be brought up in founding institutions, then—Russians—shall still have wide expanses, meadows and forests, and—Russian—children will grow up in their parents' homes, not in stone barracks—amidst gardens and sowed fields, beholding above them clear, blue skies." Dostoyevsky's prophecy on communism proved not correct: it has been established not in Western Europe, but in Russia. But his prophecies concerning the successful Russian conquests in Asia and transformation of the Asiatic peoples into Russians were soundly based on the former similar assimilation of the Finnish and Mongol tribes in the Northeast of European Russia as well as on the fact that the Asiatic peoples were accustomed to autocracy. In our times Russian despotic communism has spread in Asia beyond the boundaries of the former Czarist empire into China. A younger communist country, China, now tries to regenerate and resurrect the older communist country Russia and attempts to show the latter the road of orthodox communism.

Lednicki devotes the last essay to the "Polish Poem" of the Russian symbolist poet in the two first decades of our century, Alexander Blok (1880-1921). The author quotes also passages from Blok's *Diary*, written in 1917-1921. In this *Diary* under July, 1917, Blok confesses: "The separation of Finland and Ukraine today suddenly frightened me. I begin to fear for 'Great Russia.'" Then he mentions the liberation by the Revolution from a Czarist prison of the Ukrainian Catholic Metropolitan Andrei Count Sheptytsky, in connection with the latter's Ukrainian activity and alleged "Austrian orientation."

In his attempts to show the Polish contribution to the Europeanization of Russia, Lednicki ignores the role of the Ukrainians in the Westernization of Russia since Peter I; especially to the Europeanization of Russia did the Ukrainians contribute more than the Poles. Nevertheless Lednicki's book is valuable thanks to its collection of materials bearing on East European political, cultural, and literary problems.

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"THE SECRET SOVIET KILLER SQUAD," an article by Bill Surface. *Argosy*, New York, November, 1967.

Most people in the Free World find it difficult to understand that the Soviet State Security Service, the KGB, has a "thirteenth department" that specializes in silent murder, assassinations that look like accidents, and framed suicides. This piece should be quite convincing, with its examples and evidence. The major part of the article is devoted to the prominent Stashynsky case that resulted in the murders of two Ukrainian nationalists.

"Just how the tube works—as well as how executioners are often recruited and operate — is shown by the corroborated confession of a Ukrainian named Bogdan Stashynsky," so begins the story. It sounds like fiction, but, tragically, it's all true. "A post-mortem on Rebet revealed no sign of violence. Death was attributed to a heart attack." For insights into Soviet technology for political murder, this article is commended.

"15 IN SOVIET TRIED SECRETLY IN 1966," an article by Peter Grose. *The New York Times*, New York, February 9, 1968.

While the United States naively pursues a self-defeating detente with the Soviet Union, Moscow consolidates with Stalinist repression its substrate empire, the Soviet Union itself. This informative article dwells on the now famous Chornovil case and points out that at least 15 Ukrainian writers, teachers and scientists are now held in slave labor camps after a wave of secret trials. A heavy crackdown on Ukrainian intellectuals has taken place these past two years, and the "civilized" state of the USSR employs the secret trial device as the means of repression.

The writer stresses, "National traditions have been strong in the Ukraine." He also points out, "Hints of unrest and discontent have come to light from time to time in other republics, for example, Armenia and Uzbekistan." The dominant fact is that resistance to Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism by the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR has been a continuum that too many Western analysts and commentators have unfortunately overlooked. Once this determining fact is recognized, our prospects for a wiser and more effective policy would be greatly improved.

"HOW KGB STILL KEEPS A GRIP ON THE UKRAINE," a report by the News team. News Diary, *The Times*, London, England, February 7, 1968.

On this latest episode of Russian oppression in Ukraine, the English papers evidently performed best in coverage and analysis. In an extensive treatment

here, the news team of *The Times* highlights the arrest and imprisonment of Vyacheslav Chornovil, the young and courageous Ukrainian journalist, but goes beyond this to show the scope of KGB security operations in occupied Ukraine. Much of the evidence is provided by Chornovil, but the comments of the team arouse one's interest.

For example, the "KGB in Lviv made its victims suffer until they yearned to be transferred to the Mordovian labour camps, unpleasant as they are." In another section, it is printed out that "the treatment by the security police, the KGB, of Chornovil, his fellow witnesses and the accused at the time of these trials comprised interrogations without sleep, electronic eavesdropping, threats, blackmail, humiliation and where necessary, force." Despite the KGB network, the team notes that the "Ukrainians, a perennially proud people, did not take this sort of treatment lying down."

"A GOOD DOCUMENTARY BUT A WRONG CONCLUSION," a commentary.
The *New Approach*, Scranton, Pennsylvania, February, 1968.

This widely circulating monthly bulletin, which is dedicated to the study of Central European affairs, takes Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. to task for several of his views expressed in a *Foreign Affairs* article on the "Origins of the Cold War." According to the historian whose specialty is U.S. history, in the period after World War II "the United States deliberately abandoned the wartime policy of collaboration and, exhilarated by the possession of the atomic bomb, undertook a course of aggression of its own designed to expel all Russian influence from Eastern Europe and to establish democratic-capitalist states on the very border of the Soviet Union." He offers this incredible explanation for the origin of the Cold War since Moscow had no alternative to defend its borders.

When one reads drivel of this sort, he can begin to appreciate the ease with which Moscow applies its various faucets of political warfare in relation to the West. As the commentator states, "It is obvious that the author does not want to recognize the aggressive character of the Soviet policy and does not understand and recognize Communism as a tool of Russian Imperialism." He also dares the author to read the current book by Prof. Lev Dobriansky on *The Vulnerable Russians*. To say the least, the historical perspectives of the historian would be considerably broadened as concerns traditional Russian Cold War behavior.

"SCHOLAR LOOKS AT RUSSIA AND FINDS ITS 'VULNERABLE,'" a column by Walter Trohan. *Chicago Tribune*, Chicago, Illinois, January 24, 1968.

This nationally renowned columnist finds the book *The Vulnerable Russians* instructive and compelling. "An unusual and startling insight into Russian imperio-colonialism is presented" in the work. The column touches on the main points of the book, covering such topics as the fraudulent union of the USSR, the growth of the Soviet Russian empire, and the failures of American foreign policy to cope with Soviet Russian cold war operations.

As he puts it at the close of his article, "Dobriansky launches into a point by point discussion of the ways Russian expansion can be halted by using their own tactics against the Russians." These tactics are of the species of political

warfare which is the very life substance of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. Not all of them are nefarious and unpalatable, as some Americans believe. On the contrary, most of the weapons can be easily adapted to ways and objectives of truth, particularly as concern the captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union.

"FERMENT IN THE UKRAINE," an editorial. *The New York Times*, New York, February 10, 1968.

One of the strongest editorial comments on the mass arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals is this one by the editors of *The New York Times*. What distinguishes it from most others is its grasp of the nationalist ferment in Ukraine. It clearly states that "an important element distinguishes the Ukrainian terror campaign from that in Moscow. The secret police is hounding the Ukrainian intellectuals because of their nationalism, a sentiment which has been reborn in a generation conceived and raised under Soviet rule."

They err in claiming this as a reborn sentiment. Mountains of evidence in the past twenty years and more exist to show that this natural right for national independence has continually been uppermost in Ukrainian hearts and minds. The editorial also points to Moscow's propaganda seeking to inflame nationalism as a force against the West, and then, in conclusion, raises the classic question, "Can there be any surprise, then, that intelligent non-Russians in the Soviet Union see the aptness of this anti-colonial propaganda to their own situation, problems and aspirations?" Need one say more?

"UKRAINIAN SCORES NATIONALIST IDEAS," a report by Henry Kamm. *The New York Times*, New York, February 20, 1968.

Indicating further the widespread ferment in Ukraine, the leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Pyotr Y. Shelest, blasts the indomitable force of Ukrainian nationalism with a pitch of condemnation not witnessed in many years. This concisely written report quotes Shelest from an address delivered at a party conference in Kiev. Both the severity of the attack and the Red press coverage given it lead the writer to state that all this is "viewed as further evidence of the persistence of Ukrainian nationalism and Moscow's nervousness over it."

The Red leader is quoted saying "Drivel about so-called independence, about a sort of degradation of culture and language, is rotten bait that will be taken only by a person who is politically blind, a narrow-minded and embittered man, demagogues or degenerates, or by people who oppose everything our people do." While the United States pursues its naive detente policy toward Moscow, its puppets lash at the United States for fomenting what Shelest calls "bourgeois nationalism." His language measures the depth of his bosses' fears.

"A CANADIAN COMMUNIST ATTACKS 'RUSSIFICATION,'" a report by Peter Worthington. *The Weekend Telegram*, Toronto, Canada, February 17, 1968.

In the face of Moscow's and puppets' denials of cultural genocide in Ukraine, a Canadian Communist, who has been in the Party for over thirty years and

spent two years in the Soviet Union, deplores the Russification of Ukraine. The reporter quickly observes that he "has delivered what may turn out to be one of the most damaging body-blows ever to the Soviet Union's internal policies." The party member is one John Kolasky, and his attack is contained in an innocuously titled book *Education in Soviet Ukraine*.

The extensive quotes from Kolasky's book in substance really reveal nothing new for those who for years have pointed to this cultural genocide in Ukraine and in other captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. However, they provide at this time a pungency to the countless accusations made over the years. At one point he states, "The present Russian rulers, although more skillful, more efficient and more ruthless than their Tsarist predecessors, are not as honest, nor do they call their policies Russification." Elsewhere he says, "Russians were everywhere with their arrogant, overbearing attitude..." In short, he personally learned himself what he could have learned from the experiences of countless others these past four decades.

"SOVIET WINS DELETION OF MOST OF U.S. CHARGE FROM U.N. REPORT," a report by Drew Middleton. *The New York Times*, New York, March 15, 1968.

Astonishing as it may seem, the representatives of the Red totalitarians in the U.N. blandly exercise their temerity in forcing deletions of charges made by U.S. representatives in the U.N. In what is supposed to be a democratic forum, former Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg suffered the indignity of having remarks in his address expunged from the record of the Commission on Human Rights. This was staged by the USSR which disliked what was said. Just like that.

Goldberg's remarks hit hard on Moscow's repressions of free speech in Russia and Ukraine. The USSR objected and succeeded in its move to delete them. The brazen Soviet action has been described as an example of the cynical double standard prevailing in the U.N. As one source put it, "Under it the Soviet Union, its allies and friends are free to criticize United States policies, foreign and internal. But any criticism of the Soviet Union is considered out of order." We really haven't used the U.N., as we should, to fully expose the hideous barbarities of the USSR, but this is a new low in allowing this kind of behavior.

"CLARION PROF BLASTS REDS' COLLEGE GAINS," a news report. *The Pittsburgh Press*, Pittsburgh, Pa., April 28, 1968.

On the occasion of the Freedom Manifestation Rally sponsored in Pittsburgh and other cities by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, two outstanding analysts of the Soviet Union were interviewed in the Pittsburgh area. As reported here, Dr. Katherine Kochno of Clarion State College held that "very dangerous brainwashing procedures are going on in the U.S.—it has affected some professors, intellectuals and even some senators. The source comes directly from the Soviet Union." The professor of psychology also maintained that Communist infiltration is widespread in state colleges and universities and that LSD, the hallucinatory drug, was brought here from the USSR "after first

being used in Africa," the aim being "to destroy the minds of our future generations."

Dr. Walter Dushnyck, who was the main speaker at the rally, emphasized the mass trials and arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals resisting Russian cultural genocide in Ukraine. He pointed out the massive documentation that is available on this crime by Moscow and maintained that efforts in Washington and the United States to curb it have met with little success because the "United States wants Soviet support in Vietnam..." Both analysts stressed the necessity for U.S. victory in Vietnam.

"PREPARATIONS MADE FOR THE 1968 CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK MOVEMENT," an article. *Asia Outlook*, Taipei, Free China, May 1968.

This Asian periodical gives a brief report on the Free Chinese observances of Captive Nations Week since 1961 and the preparations made for the Tenth Observance of the Week this year. Captive Nations Week came into being in 1959 when Congress passed the Captive Nations Week Resolution. The rallies in Taiwan, attended each year by a U.S. Congressional legislator designated by the National Captive Nations Committee, have consistently been some of the best.

The article cites the efforts of Professor Lev E. Dobriansky as chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee in the United States. He has cooperated closely with Dr. Ku Cheng-kang, chairman of the Week's festivities in China, for some six years on this project. The annual Week is now being observed throughout Free Asia.

"EQUAL RIGHTS OF STATES," an article by Victor Chkhikvadze. *The Times*, London, England, November 6, 1967.

One of the chief effects of the West's detente policy toward the Soviet Union has been an easy propaganda penetration by Moscow of the West's literary organs. It matters not that the propaganda reeks with falsehoods and distortions; what is uppermost is "cultural exchange." This article by the Director of the Institute of State and Law is a perfect example of such sophisticated propaganda under the lie of its title and, significantly, belied by several internal contradictions.

Among the usual legal and thoroughly nominal forms cited, the writer points to the constitutional right of each republic to secede freely. He claims that one of the reasons why none has exercised this right is because it "would inflict irreparable damage to the development of its economy linked with the entire national economy..." Previously he told the reader that the USSR is a federation of nations; now the cat comes out of the bag with the USSR as a national economy. Another telltale distorting is that "Fifty years of the Soviet multinational state have demonstrated the efficiency and viability of the Soviet nationalities policy." In truth, fifty years ago a Soviet Union didn't even exist. And it goes on and on, with the director apparently assuring that few in the West will fathom his legalistic potemkinism.

CONFIDENTIAL BY DIRECTOR'S ORDER

"UKRAINIAN A-SCIENTIST ASKS TO STAY IN CANADA," a new report. *The Courier-News*, Plainfield, New Jersey, October 6, 1967.

If one had read the article commented on above, he could hardly conceive of any illustrious scientist escaping from the tranquil federation of states with equal rights. Yet this occurs time and time again. This time a Boris Dotsenko who was the chief nuclear scientist at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev.

In Canada he says, "there is a far more democratic approach here," to put it mildly. He was no spy, and thus cannot be cynically compared with treasonable Western scientists who were compelled to flee behind the Iron Curtain. Quite plainly, he sought freedom. The defection was widely reported in *The New York Times*, the *New York Daily News*, and numerous other organs here and abroad.

"MONEY OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL REPUBLIC," an article by Andrew Gregorovich. *Forum*, Scranton, Pennsylvania, Winter 1967-68.

A number of highly informative articles have appeared in this new magazine published by the Ukrainian Workingmen's Association. This one, written by the editor of the publication, is a particularly absorbing piece. It describes with several illustrations the decimal currency established by the Ukrainian National Republic in 1918.

The basic importance of a money system for a new and independent republic cannot be overemphasized. It provides a badge of authority, publicity, and economic facility. The *Hryvna* notes, the *Karbovanets*, and *Shah* are all well explained in detail, as well as the counterfeit problems confronting the young republic. The writer properly concludes, "The Ukrainian bank notes, which are quite rare today, are now prized by collectors as a relic of an independent Ukrainian state." The time will surely arrive again for an independent money system in Ukraine, a mark in itself of genuine sovereignty.

"RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN RELATIONSHIP STILL UNEASY," an article by Paul Wohl. *The Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, Massachusetts, April 17, 1968.

With a coupling title "One Movement too many," the author of this broad-sweeping article begins by quoting a Ukrainian writer, "We have one monument too many in Kiev." When asked which one, he answered, "the monument to Bogdan Khmel'nitsky." This then signifies the Pereyaslav treaty, the supposed Russian-Ukrainian union, and Russian domination. All this introduces the author's themes, some of which are sound, some invalid.

"Of all the nationalist movements in the Soviet Union," he writes, "none is more dangerous for the Soviets than Ukrainian nationalism." The author recounts how many powers sought to capitalize on Ukrainian nationalism to destroy the Russian power, both Czarist and Soviet. His further point is that a "Soviet Union shorn of the Ukraine would be a much poorer country with a very unfavorable economic geography and a strategically dangerous position." In fact, the USSR would be a second-rate power, bereft of one-quarter of its population, over one-quarter of its grain supply, 65 percent of sugar, 35 percent

of coal, 40% of high-grade iron ore, about 30 percent of steel, and 45% of its rolled metal.

The piece develops a weakness when it regards as exaggerated the view that Ukraine has been occupied by an alien power, this because of the presence of Ukrainian Bolsheviks. He evidently never heard of Quislings and the divide-and-conquer principle. A Red America under Gus Hall would be equivalently favorable, it seems. Also, he appears to think that emigre organizations nurture only a hatred of communism; Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism is of little or no consequence. However, most elements in the article are strong and well-founded; some of the interpretations suggest in degree a lack of insight into Russian-Ukrainian problems.

"UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM. .," a letter to the editor by Konstantin Serenko.
The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Massachusetts, May 17, 1968.

Soon after the above article was published, the senior editor of the Novosti Press Agency in Moscow, which is supposedly given to Western modes of journalism, felt it his "duty" to supplement and clarify Wohl's article. This because, very cutely, the *Monitor* in his judgment "is one of the few newspapers in the United States which tries to seriously study and assess everything that is being done in the Soviet Union on the national question." In other words, it has its soft spots to work on.

What the puppet voices is of old fabric, viz., the distorted Russian version of Khmel'nitsky, the disowning of Mazepa by the Ukrainian people, and the fabrication that the "Ukrainian people cannot but realize that in the long run, thanks to the support of the fraternal Russian people, they only preserved themselves as a nation, but for the first time in their history they were able in the Soviet period to unite in a single whole the entire Ukrainian lands." What is not said is that at its origin the nation had its territorial unity; also overlooked is the mere broadening of Moscow's colonial base in Ukraine following World War II. Further convoluted explanations to make black look white entail Moscow's investment contributions to Ukraine, from which it drains billions of ruble value on net balance; the cost of military protection for Ukraine, which really is the cost of colonialist occupation; and the "joint struggle against enemies," as though known events of massive Ukrainian defection in 1942 never occurred. Yes, indeed, detentism has its heavy price of propagandistic penetration, which in whatever character is not reciprocal.

L.E.D.

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR

is located in Munich, Germany and has been engaged since 1950 in continuous research and publication on the Soviet Union. Its purpose is to study developments in the Soviet Union and to make the results of its studies available to persons and institutions everywhere.

ITS LIBRARY

of more than 55,000 volumes is one of the richest specialized collections on the Soviet Union in Europe and is widely used by visiting researchers from all parts of the world.

ITS PUBLICATIONS

include books, based on the results of research by staff members and by outside contributors, and periodicals, such as the monthly *Bulletin*, the quarterly *Studies on the Soviet Union* and the weekly *Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union*. Periodicals are also published in Turkish, Arabic, Spanish, German and French and are mailed to more than 25,000 serious students of Soviet affairs throughout the world.

ITS ACTIVITIES

include an accredited summer school, international symposiums, conferences, study seminars and lectures by emigre scholars and other specialists on Soviet affairs.

ITS SERVICES

include furnishing information in response to requests from individuals and organizations and providing facilities for advanced resident research.

FOR INFORMATION AND SUBSCRIPTIONS:

New York Office:

9 E. 41st Street

New York, N.Y. 10017

CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968!

UKRAINE IN 1918-1920!

Fifty years have not changed the aggressive character of Russia. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is an exact replica of the Soviet Russian invasion of Ukraine in 1917-1918. Then and now Soviet Russian totalitarians brought "freedom" and "liberation" to the peoples of these countries, on the blades of their bayonets! To understand the essence of Russian imperialism and colonialism, and to comprehend the tragic events happening in Czechoslovakia,

r e a d

UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

**AN OUTLINE OF HISTORY OF POLITICAL
AND MILITARY RELATIONS
(December 1917 — April 1918)**

By

MATTHEW STACHIW, L. L. D.

TRANSLATED FROM UKRAINIAN AND EDITED

By

WALTER DUSHNYCK

Preface by

PROF. CLARENCE A. MANNING

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

INTRODUCTION — By Author;

PREFACE — By Clarence A. Manning;

CHAPTER ONE: "Preparation of Soviet Russia for Military Aggression Against Ukraine";

CHAPTER TWO: "The War of Soviet Russia Against Ukraine";

CHAPTER THREE: "The System of Soviet Authority During the First Russian Invasion of Ukraine";

CHAPTER FOUR: "The Brest Litovsk Treaty Negotiations and Soviet Russia's Stand on the Nationalities of Eastern Europe";

CHAPTER FIVE: "Russia and the Nationality Problem in Brest Litovsk"

CHAPTER SIX: "The Effective Offensive of the Ukrainian Armies and Their Allies";

CHAPTER SEVEN: "Bolshevik Policy with Respect to Peace and Ukraine"

CHAPTER EIGHT: "Proclamation of Independence of Soviet Power in Ukraine";

CHAPTER NINE: "The End of the First 'Ukrainian Soviet Republic'";

CHAPTER TEN: "Review of the Development of Soviet Power in the Occupied Parts of Ukraine and the First Soviet Ukrainian Government."

APPENDIX: "Text of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk."

Published by

THE UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA, INC.
New York, N. Y.

1966

\$3.00 — A COPY