

# The Ukrainian Quarterly

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**A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS**

Tenth Anniversary of Captive Nations  
Week Resolution

*By Lev E. Dobriansky*

# The Ukrainian Quarterly

A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

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## CONTENTS

The Soviet Union: Vulnerable Prison of Nations <i>Editorial</i> .....	101
Tenth Anniversary of Captive Nations Week Resolution <i>Lev E. Dobriansky</i> .....	107
The Three Circles of Communism. Part I: The Purges <i>Stefan T. Possony</i> .....	119
Ukraine's Right of Secession form the USSR. Part II. <i>Ivan O. Kandyba</i> .....	132
Ukrainian Universities: Dreams and Reality <i>Leo Heiman</i> .....	143
Linguistic Studies of Prof. George Y. Shevelov <i>Jacob P. Hursky</i> .....	158
The Position of President Nixon <i>Clarence A. Manning</i> .....	165

### BOOK REVIEWS

<i>Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy.</i> By Adam B. Ulam <i>Walter Dushnyck</i> .....	174
<i>The Canadian Ukrainians: A History.</i> By Michael H. Marunchak <i>W. T. Zyla</i> .....	175
<i>Fifty Years of Soviet Communism.</i> By Louis Fischer <i>Lev E. Dobriansky</i> .....	177
<i>The Good Deed and Other Stories of Asia, Past and Present.</i> By Pearl S. Buck <i>Marta Baczynsky</i> .....	179
<i>Black Snow.</i> By Mikhail Bulgakov <i>Victoria A. Babenko</i> .....	180
<i>The Russians and Berlin.</i> By Erich Kuby <i>Austin J. App, Ph.D.</i> .....	182
<i>Tuha za mitom.</i> By Ostap Tarnawskyi <i>M.S.T.</i> .....	184

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS .....	185
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## THE SOVIET UNION: VULNERABLE PRISON OF NATIONS

### *Editorial*

The evidence shows that the Soviet leaders are afraid of anti-Russian nationalism among their own subjects. Relaxation of the dictatorship might lead to dangerous separatist movements. It would thus seem that the multinational nature of the Soviet Union is an important obstacle to the extension of liberties. The Russian citizen is in the predicament from which the citizens of other empires have suffered. By depriving Ukrainians, Letts, Tartars or other peoples of their liberty, the Russian substantially reduces his own chances of winning liberty.<sup>1</sup>

HUGH SETON-WATSON

Deplorable and shocking as the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia last year might have been — and there were many who were stunned by the naked relapse into the brutal methods of the Stalin era — it had the virtue of at least training the international spotlight where it properly belongs — on the Soviet Union itself. The jail-keeper of the Prison House of Nations acted swiftly and ruthlessly in punishing one of its recalcitrant inmates — one who had decided to pursue “a different road to socialism,” along national rather than Communist lines. Demonstrated vividly even for the most willfully myopic is the truth that the Soviet Union, outside of military and scientific technology, has changed very little in fifty years.

The fossilized religion of Marxist orthodoxy married to Russian chauvinism has produced a totalitarian system as “reactionary” as any system could be. The present wardens betray the characteristic fear of change. To cope with a dissident intelligentsia and to tighten control over all the inmates, the Soviet government has re-established the Ministry of Interior, which was abolished by Nikita Khrushchev in 1960 as part of his de-Stalinization policy. And, significantly, for the first time in five years it has begun to jam western radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union, weak though they may be.

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<sup>1</sup> Seton-Watson, Hugh, “The Evolution of Communist Dictatorship,” *Modern World*, Vol. 6, 1968.

Yet nationalist-minded elites in Czechoslovakia, in the other satellites, in Ukraine and in all the other nations of this far-flung prison empire — all will continue to resist the Russian bear.

The change of administration provides a good opportunity to experiment with some fresh approaches to that area of the world where communist totalitarianism first took root. It is here and not in some far-off Vietnam that our self-avowed enemy must be confronted. The imprisoned nations and their free brothers in Western Europe with their scientific, technical and industrial potential represent an asset in world politics and civilization, the preservation of which justifies the highest stakes.

Let us take advantage of the glaring spotlight.

#### RESISTANCE TO THE RUSSIAN BEAR

The brutal Soviet Russian throttling of Czech liberalization last August was but the latest of a series of repressive, almost desperate, measures that were deemed necessary by the Kremlin for the survival of Russian totalitarianism. On the one hand, the overseers fear the growth of nationalism coupled with liberty in the so-called satellite states — Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and, of course, Czechoslovakia. On the other, there is the ever-present danger of the virus of liberty spreading to the Soviet empire proper.

The countries in Eastern Europe, conquered during and after World War II, already had experienced large-scale revolts and riots. Most notable were the riots of Czech workers in Pilsen, the East German insurrection on June 17, 1953, the Polish workers' uprising in Poznan and the national revolution in Hungary in 1956. All these popular movements were harshly put down by the native Communists with the aid of the Kremlin, aid either covert or overt, including the infamous use of Soviet tanks (Hungary).

That the purges that have been conducted by the native Communists have been most drastic in Czechoslovakia and Hungary is not a result of any unusual fanaticism on the part of native Communists in these countries. Rather, the main reason for their savagery is that both countries had — and, as the recent example of Czechoslovakia bears out, still continue to have — a strong social democratic tradition. In both countries western cultural influences were deep and pervasive, affecting the working class as well as the intelligentsia. The effects of these influences have obviously not been extirpated. Poland has differed from both these countries only in that the western influence did not extend as deeply into the ranks of its Communist party.

Resistance to the Soviet brand of totalitarianism — defined by Prof. Hugh Seton-Watson as a concentration of all power, political, economic and spiritual, in the same hands, along with denial of absolute moral standards and of an autonomous private sector in human life — has been proffered as well by Rumania and, most notably, Yugoslavia. The Rumanian national spirit was aided in the early 1960's by the emergence of the Soviet-Chinese dispute, wresting a greater measure of internal sovereignty as the Kremlin sought the support of all the satellites in its quarrel with Red China. More, the Rumanian Communists allowed expression to the deep resentment of the people against the cultural Russification of the 1950's. As for Yugoslavia, it had long departed the Kremlin camp, and today stands at a clear distance from the Soviet brand of totalitarianism, featuring collectivization of agriculture and the total claim on the individual (although the persecution of Djilas and Michajlov confirms the narrow limits of personal expression that are set by any communist regime).

But if the Kremlin authoritarians fear the liberalization and growth of nationalism in their "safety belt" of states, they cannot begin to abide such developments within their slave empire.

As Prof. Alvin Z. Rubinstein recently put it:<sup>2</sup>

We tend to overlook the ethnic and racial diversity of the USSR and the profound effect that this has on Soviet politics and policy-making. The Russians represent no more than 55 percent of the population. The second largest nationality group are the 40 million Ukrainians who have been a source of trouble for Moscow for more than 300 years. Of all the peoples in East Europe, the Czechs and Slovaks are regarded by Ukrainians as the nearest to them in tradition and culture. The rulers of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union may well have been afraid that the virus of Czechoslovak liberalization would find a congenial breeding ground in the national consciousness of the Ukrainians and stimulate demands in the Ukrainian SSR for greater autonomy and liberalization. . . . That such a line of reasoning loomed large in Kremlin calculations — perhaps more so than is generally appreciated in the West — may be inferred from the important role played in the Czechoslovak crisis by Peter Y. Shelest, the Ukrainian party boss. Shelest and his lieutenants have been waging a relentless campaign against ideological laxness, Ukrainian particularism and "the putrid theories spread by hostile propaganda about the necessity of a 'democratization' and 'liberalization of socialism' . . ."

Prof. Seton-Watson notes: "...it is undeniable that, on the occasions when at least a part of the Ukrainian people has had a

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<sup>2</sup> Rubinstein, Alvin Z., "Czechoslovakia in Transition," *Current History*, April, 1969.



chance to express its views, it has shown itself bitterly hostile to Russia, and has sought independence.”<sup>3</sup>

The occupation of Czechoslovakia by 500,000 Red troops aroused widespread opposition in rebellious Ukraine, according to recent reports appearing in *Der Bund*, Swiss newspaper, and other newspapers. The rector of Kiev University, one of the signers of an open letter protesting the occupation, was removed from his post. It is conservatively estimated that some 200 prominent writers and intellectuals have been arrested in recent months for their opposition.

But this “away-from-Moscow” polycentrism is not confined to Ukraine; it is also in evidence in Georgia, Armenia and even “backward” Muslim countries like Bashkiria.

The Kremlin overlords face here a perpetual nightmare of their own making: it was Stalin who, at the end of World War II, openly declared the Russians to be the “best” of the peoples of the Soviet Union, thus revealing the *Herrenvolk* stature of the Russians in this multi-national state. The nightmare is the one faced by all despots: rebellion.

#### VIRUS OF FREEDOM

The Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia unmistakably shows that the Soviet Union regards East Europe as part of a Soviet-ruled superstate. The Kremlin oligarchs risked letting go by the board the existing limited *détente*, abandonment of the non-proliferation treaty, the support of foreign Communist parties. Once again, the policy of “peaceful coexistence” was revealed as sheer expedience, a stratagem designed simply and exclusively to promote the Soviet Union’s imperialistic interests without risking nuclear war. In the Third World, for example, the Soviet Union has backed the new or newly fervent nationalisms to such an extent that the term “National Liberation Front” automatically suggests an anti-Western, Communist-backed if not Communist-dominated, movement.

But the areas of the world ruled by communist regimes are not immune to the nationalistic drives. What have we done to deepen the divisions in the Soviet superstate? Preoccupied as we have been in Vietnam — almost nothing. Yet from every point of view the rise of nationalism in the Communist sphere is a plus for the non-Communist world. “It diverts Communist energies to their own troubles,” points out writer James Burnham, “weakens the Commu-

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<sup>3</sup> Seton-Watson, Hugh: “The Evolution of Communist Dictatorship,” *Modern World*, Vol. 6, 1968.

nist front against the non-Communist world, and points in the direction of freedom."

The new administration in Washington should face squarely the question whether or not to approve these intra-Communist nationalisms and stimulate their growth. It must decide whether some 200 million people in and around the Soviet Union with long-lived cultural and political institutions should languish under Soviet Russian tyranny or be encouraged to strive for further extension of freedom from Russian domination.

If it does — as it must for the sake of America's sheer self-preservation — decide to tap the weaknesses of the supposed Soviet monolith, it must concentrate on the empire itself, straining under the centrifugal forces of freedom exerted by one-half of its inmates. It is here that liberalization, democratization and eventual freedom must first come before such can be felt and realized in the East European satellites. There is no reason to believe why, after stamping out the buds of freedom in Czechoslovakia, the neo-Stalinists in the Kremlin would not proceed as quickly and as ruthlessly to crush any danger to the monopoly of the Communist party in any other satellite.

Given this emphasis, the administration must guard against concentrating U.S. diplomacy on relations with the Kremlin — that is to say, Russia — and against softening criticism of such naked shows of imperialistic force as the invasion of Czechoslovakia. To behave otherwise is, in effect, to disavow the anti-Kremlin nationalisms. Timid advice "not to rock the boat" must be discarded: we are not fellow travelers, nor are our destinations common.

For a start, our propaganda monthly, *Amerika*, must be overhauled. Although printed in several East European languages, it has the same content in all — a content which is shaped with the Russian edition in mind. For a relatively tiny expenditure, the contents should be recast and take into account the very different conditions within each nation.

Our other instrumentalities are equally faulty. Radio Liberty, our unofficial voice to the Soviet Union, is staffed predominately by Russians. What little broadcasting is done in non-Russian languages is translated from the Russian desk. Yet few Russians, here or in the USSR, can bring themselves to admit that a liberation of Ukraine or any other non-Russian nation would not constitute a "dismemberment" of "Holy Mother Russia."

There is hardly any official concern or interest by the State Department, USIA, Radio Free Europe and other government de-

partments in the enslaved East Asian nations (Uzbek, Tartar, Tadzhiks, etc.) though these nations are becoming increasingly critical as Sino-Soviet tensions rise.

Beyond redressing these and other obvious shortcomings, there is the need to set up a task force to investigate all the possibilities of creating, guiding and exploiting national liberation movements directed against Communist regimes. There have been occasions when this would have been both appropriate and feasible.

There are many responsible officials who claim that in increasing our trade with the Communist bloc (excluding, of course, China, Cuba, North Korea and North Vietnam) we can deepen the divisions in the enemy camp. The realistic goal of such trade is that of gaining political leverage, which can be powerfully used precisely because the satellite countries today are dependent on Soviet trade. It is no accident, they claim, for example, that oil-producing Rumania was able to declare its neutrality back in 1964 in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Further, the U.S.-Rumanian trade agreement of 1964 provoked the ire of the Russians — precisely because this meant a setback to the Soviet effort to dictate which satellite may produce what goods and who may sell to whom. And COMECON (the East European Economic Cooperation), a Kremlin creation, is moribund because countries like Czechoslovakia and Rumania, which need modern technology and machinery, cannot get them from the USSR; they have had to turn to the West.

The safeguards to be set up in such trade are obvious, the same advocates point out. Military and strategic materials, of course, are out, and so are long-term credits. A long-term commercial policy would be tantamount to granting foreign aid for Communist development.

All these measures, welded together and shrewdly employed to thrust the men in the Kremlin off balance, at the very least will help to slow up Soviet machinations in the Mediterranean, the Near East and in Latin America. Also, we will be impressing the captives in the Soviet prison that America continues to be seriously concerned with their fate.

But the virus of freedom may well, contagion-like, sweep throughout the Soviet Union from west to far east, advancing the day when the enslaved peoples will end up by conferring liberty upon the Russians.

## TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK RESOLUTION

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

The 1969 Captive Nations Week Observance is the occasion for the Tenth Anniversary of the Captive Nations Week Resolution itself. As many know, this politically far-seeing resolution was passed by the United States Congress in July, 1959 and caused a ferment in imperialist Moscow that has continued to express itself in numerous ways down to this day. Ten years ago, headlines read in the vein of "Senators Douglas and Javits Rebut Khrushchev's Diatribe on Captive Nations Week Resolution," "American Labor Backs Captive Nations Week Resolution," "Resolution Irritates the Bear."<sup>1</sup> In the course of the decade, Moscow and its syndicate members vehemently decried the resolution as "villainous demagoguery," "propaganda spectacle," "a despicable animal campaign," to mention only a few choice phrases.<sup>2</sup> In 1968, while Moscow was preparing for the rape of Czecho-Slovakia, a policy of silence was tuned on and, instead, with the blind consent of our Government, Moscow answered the annual observance by pulling off the Moscow-New York air run precisely during the Week. This propaganda stunt, staged a month before the Russian invasion of Czecho-Slovakia, made our officials look silly, but it in no way stifled or curbed the expanding observance of the Week, either here or abroad.

On this 10th, if one can look back for a moment, the most significant reaction to the annual Week was registered by Mikhail Suslov on July 17, 1965 in Vilnius, Lithuania. Coinciding with the observance and seizing upon a Russian-staged event in the Baltic, Suslov railed, "Especially disgusting is the villainous demagoguery of the imperialistic chieftains of the United States. Each year they organize the so-called captive nations week, hypocritically pretending to

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<sup>1</sup> For these and other accounts, see *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, New York, August 1-15, 1959.

<sup>2</sup> See author's pamphlet *Ten Years of Captive Nations Week*, New York, 1969.



be defenders of nations that have escaped from their yoke. These international gendarmes, stranglers of freedom and independence, would like again to enslave the free nations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. But this will never happen!"<sup>3</sup> The location was Lithuania, the event was Russia's blessings on the forcible annexation of the three Baltic nations twenty-nine years ago, but the meaning of this calculated statement was with application to all the captive nations.

Why does the writer select this reaction over those of Khrushchev, Podgorny and others? For the simple reason that Suslov is the chief Russian ideologist, a member of the Central Committee's Presidium, and secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Significantly enough, Suslov has weathered all political storms in the Soviet Union. Lest it be forgotten, he had served on the highest echelon under Stalin, he continued without interruption under Khrushchev, and he remains as a prize asset under Brezhnev and Kosygin. Clearly, Suslov is the thinker and principle of continuity of successive totalitarian regimes in colonialist Moscow. He well knows the psycho-political significance of the Captive Nations Week Resolution, even if some of our leaders and many of our citizens don't. Suslov's memorable position on this expresses that of every totalitarian in the Kremlin.

That Moscow's fixed and obnoxious position on the resolution will again reveal itself in full bloom, there can be no doubt. It will play the game of confetti diplomacy with us and our allies as long as it suits its purposes, and in the process hope that resistance to the permanent captivity of all the nations in the Red Empire, particularly as manifested in the annual Week, will subside. Undoubtedly, it will commit more Czecho-Slovakian rapes with impunity and blatant disregard for Western interests.<sup>4</sup> For several years Moscow has been tightening its totalitarian and imperialist reins both within and outside the Soviet Union, building its military strength at an inordinate pace, and intensifying its cold war operations all over the world, including the United States. To think that all this is being done merely to achieve parity with the United States for a deal on division of spheres of influence is a gross misreading of contemporary developments. We will need the captive nations more than ever as our natural allies in the enemy's camp.

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<sup>3</sup> Lev E. Dobriansky, *The Vulnerable Russians*, New York, 1967, p. 154.

<sup>4</sup> For author's interpretation of this, see "We Told You So," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Spring, 1969.

Regardless of the insensitivity and even plain ignorance displayed by some of our leaders toward the captive nations movement, this 10th anniversary bridges the end of one decade and the beginning of another. The 60's have seen its expansion both in the United States and abroad. The expansion has been slow but steady, pinpointed and yet generalized, embattled and doubly persevering. In seventeen Free World countries it has taken hold, and its prospects for the next decade, the 70's, are brighter than ever. The following resolution passed in Saigon last December exemplifies the spirit, conviction, and dedication that permeate the movement: <sup>5</sup>

RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF  
CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, JULY 13-19, 1969

In view of the fact that since 1959 — when the U.S. Congress passed the Captive Nations Week Resolution and President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed it into Public Law 86-90 — all Communist Capitals have bitterly denounced the Annual Week as being inimical to their fundamental interests; and also in view of the fact that to the mounting consternation of Moscow, Peiping, Havana and others, the Captive Nations Week Movement has steadily grown in the United States, and every President in this decade has issued a proclamation in behalf of the independence and freedom of every captive nation in Central Europe, the Soviet Union, Asia and Cuba;

In the belief that the movement to support freedom and liberation of all captive nations has now taken hold in numerous other countries in the free world as evidenced by week observances in the Republic of China, Korea, Argentina, Australia and a number of other countries;

Maintaining that, for the security of the free world and for cold war victory over the deadly forces of communism and Sino-Soviet, Russian imperio-colonialism, it is indispensable for all free men regularly to make known their determination never to acquiesce to the permanent captivity of the 27 nations in the red empire;

The Second Conference of the World Anti-Communist League now resolves that:

The League and its members and associated groups will exert every effort to make the 10th Anniversary of Captive Nations Week on July 13-19, 1969, the most successful yet by:

1. Urging each head of state to issue a captive week proclamation patterned after that of the President of the United States;

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<sup>5</sup> *Congressional Record*, February 5, 1969, p. H799.

2. Conducting observances of the Week in member countries and utilizing all media so that our combined message will be conveyed to the Captive Nations; and

3. Dispatching the published results of this event to the National Captive Nations Committee in Washington, D.C., for its appropriate transmission to the United States Congress and the President of the United States.

*Submitted by Rama Swarup, Chief of Delegation, India.*

#### PEACE WITH FREEDOM AND JUSTICE

As we realistically look ahead, the plain fact to be soberly recognized is that the basic issues that existed at the time of the Congressional passage of the resolution still are with us today and will be so as we enter the 70's. The full reality of the captive nations, the ever-growing threat of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, and Moscow's drive for world domination have been, are, and will continue to be the basic issues. And no amount of confetti diplomacy, political zig-zags, and boundless rhetoric about domestic priorities, nuclear destruction, campus riots, military-business complexes and other sickly symptoms of an abetted implosion can conceal the urgent pressures of these issues. Those in the movement have no doubt that a recovery of our realism lies ahead. This is the time to readjust our perspectives, cease drifting with every ephemeral upsurge, and begin to view essentials *in toto*, with a firm reassertion of national principles and goals.

On the occasion of this 10th, one is reminded of the words uttered by Khrushchev in "the spirit of Camp David" ten years ago. Mimicking past dictators, he claimed that the West is "hit by old age."<sup>6</sup> He illustrated his point by quoting Tolstoy: "When I was young, I was strong with women, but now I feel pain and bitterness — I have a great desire for them but I have no strength." "This," opined Nikita the Sanguine, "is exactly the West's attitude." It is obvious that one of the many fundamental subjects he failed to learn during his triumphant cold war visit here was the full power of the American heritage. That boundless power is reflected in all spheres of our society, regardless of some of its imperfections. And it is this power, diversely generated in the solidity of American institutions, that provides the inspirational drive, the intuitive vision, the courage and will, the principled behavior which have helped to shape the soul of America.

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<sup>6</sup> Interview by Major Salah Salem, *Reuters*, Cairo, November 10, 1959.

Our recurring capacity for placing first things first, for planning under the guidance of fixed principle and toward well-defined ends, is a facility by which the so-called intricacies of international relations could be easily unraveled. A study of foreign affairs and how they impinge on our national security demands the exercise of not only the mind but also the heart. Our gestures, our appeals, whether executed through economic, military, diplomatic or other means, are necessarily directed at both the minds and hearts of peoples elsewhere. The success or failure of these efforts depends primarily on what we stand for, how well and passionately we articulate it, and why we are determined by common will to uphold and advance that for which we really exist. Basically, no matter from what angle of interpretation, the security of our Nation is inextricably tied up with this what, how, and why.

Peace with honor has no meaning without the principles, operational means, and objective ends that are respectively implied by our what, how, and why. Peace with honor carries a price set by these three determinants: by nature, it precludes peace at any price. The very formidability of our military defense structure is also founded on the what, the how, and the why. Billions of dollars worth of the finest military equipment could easily become a heap of junk if the national will to fight were successfully sapped by Moscow's cold war maneuvers. The being of our Nation — what the United States is, means, and symbolizes for people everywhere — subsists in the what of our principles, the how of our methods, and the why of our certitude, will, and vision. Peace with honor is only another way of expressing this national being, which is vitally important to the captive nations as well as to ourselves.

In these times, and on this occasion, it is worthwhile to examine first the what — the principles by which our Nation has become the most powerful on earth. Derived from our rich Judeo-Christian heritage and natural law, the moral and political principles of intrinsic personal dignity, equality before the law, individual liberty, private opportunity and enterprise, communal welfare, and national self-determination have formed the very foundation of the Great Tradition and Experiment which is America. These principles are enshrined in our Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and our Bill of Rights which in whatever age — the machine, the atomic, or space — have steadily mirrored the hopes and aspirations of peoples and nations throughout the world. These documents spell out a living and expanding revolution which affects peoples and nations not only in Africa and Asia but also within the Soviet Union



itself. Freely blessed for self-criticism, we are the first to say that in the perennial light of these principles, many of our institutions require improvement, reconstruction, and change; but this is no reason for us to shy from the prodigious truth that our society stands in a contrast of day to night to the totalitarian jungle of Moscow's empire.

These, who today are assaulting our institutions, had no faith in these principles or in themselves before Moscow evolved as a military contender. But since the launching of the Sputnik and, with it, Khrushchev's concentrated cold war campaign against the United States, many strange voices have been raised in this country. Their number and their depth attest to the effectiveness of Russian cold war propaganda. Without even knowing it, many have become efficient, costless tools of this propaganda. Worse still, in addition to the many other "gaps" thrown at us daily, they give witness to the basic intellectual and spiritual gap found in many quarters of our society.

#### JUSTICE AND FREEDOM FOR PEACE

Ideologically, our firm bent as a Nation can only be along the path of justice and freedom for peace and friendship. Given our time-honored principles, our tested rules of national conduct, logically it could not be otherwise. Moscow's offers of peace and friendship are as spurious as its issue of capitalism versus socialism. Yet it is amazing how many in this country uncritically permitted their thoughts to slide into these contrived conceptual slots. As with Hitler, the overriding issue with the Kremlin and its syndicate is freedom and slavery.<sup>7</sup> One imperialist system was smashed, another surges forth to threaten our national existence. Peace and friendship are the effects, the consequents, of justice and freedom, not their cause. Only through the advance and establishment of justice and freedom can the harmonization of relationships into normal concourse be attained to weld the true bonds of peace and friendship among nations as well as between individuals and groups. As in the case of its predecessors of many centuries, for the present Russian totalitarians the slogan of peace and friendship is only an instrument of calculated deception. Its logic rests only in the complacency, doubt,

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<sup>7</sup> E.g., Russian religious genocide is a striking point today as seen in V. Tancher, "Uniates — Enemies of the Ukrainian People," *Pravda Ukrainy*, November 27, 1968, p. 4.

confusion, and naiveté it can breed in the camp of the targeted non-Russian victim, including the United States.

#### THE PERSISTENT COLD WAR GAP

The issues of ten years ago are the same today when we now consider the how — the means, ways, methods by which we articulate, translate, and objectify the what. The efficacy of our methods — the how — depends on how well we understand and perceive the object against whom they are forged and employed. This involves our own conception of the cold war, our knowledge and understanding of the Soviet Union, and our awareness of the primacy of propaganda in the cold war arsenal of imperial Moscow.

Here, too, it is amazing that in all the 60's dither about "gaps," the truly most essential gap — the gap that will determine whether we'll plunge disadvantageously into a hot global war or face, in moral surrender, a cold war defeat — has scarcely been mentioned. The cold war gap, rather than any other gap, has accounted for freedom's tremendous losses these past three decades. Just bear in mind that the tides of freedom even receded when the other "gaps" were non-existent. "From Atomic Monopoly and Air Supremacy to the Fear of Annihilation" might not be a pretty caption in the book of some future historian, but it cannot be denied that no nation in modern history has lost so much in so short a time as ours. Even during World War II we failed to understand our hot war ally who bore also the face of our cold war enemy.

"The best way to eliminate war," said Khrushchev openly, "is the gaining of power by Communists all over the world." This statement alone gives one an insight into the nature of the cold war. On every continent Moscow has been feverishly pursuing its goal of world domination while at the same time professing efforts aimed at a lessening of world tensions. This cold war maneuver has even succeeded in generating the illusion of a cold war cessation here and with Pavlovian effect, in developing the implosion factor. The plain fact is that cold war activity is a necessary coefficient of the Russian imperialist system and totalitarian structure. On smaller scales, it has always been. In the same way that the elimination of the Iron Curtain or a genuine and extensive liberalization of conditions in Moscow's empire would seal the demise of this empire, so the cessation of cold war operations would dry up its motivating forces of being. In short, the cold war is a basic motive force for the necessary expansionism

of Moscow's empire without which its internal totalitarianism would have no justification for existence.

If eventually, we are not to be cornered into making the drastic, or better, disastrous choice between a hot global war at considerable disadvantage or humiliating cold war surrender, it is indispensable for us now to face up to the persistent cold war gap, to grasp the traditional Russian cold war methods, to establish an efficient cold war apparatus, and to pose our own freedom challenges to Moscow. Those who counter that this might lead to a hot war, not only hide from the realities of the cold war but also, in their thinking, wind up with the *reductio ad absurdum* of this disastrous choice. In a military condition of mutual deterrence "parity" and even in some respects inferiority, the weight of net advantage naturally favors the one better equipped to wage the cold war. With the cold war gap, this advantage in Moscow's. Missiles, boosters, ABM's and evidences of the other gap have no place in so-called intensive revolutions sparked off by patient subversion, infiltration, blackmail and other devices in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Unless one is so far gone with haunting hallucinations of push-button co-annihilation, a skillfully executed cold war operation could even balance off, with much to spare, the effects of the other gaps. After all, man will always be the ultimate weapon; and freedom-aspiring men and nations in Moscow's empire are yet our formidable weapon in an incessant war of diplomatic maneuvers, propaganda, subversion, and a host of other paramilitary phenomena.

Quite precisely, the cold war is a twilight condition of neither peace nor hot war where all the basic elements of a hot war — predatory design, aggressive strategy, tactics, and techniques — are present, except for open military combat between states. But the cold war, as waged by Moscow, is also a planned process leading to victorious results *in time*. This is why it is an illusion to speak of peace while this process is going on relentlessly and with increasing Russian confidence and arrogance. The prevalence of genuine peace, thus, is measured not by the absence of a hot war but also by the absence of a cold war and all that it entails.

Our situation in the cold war gap today embraces both a supreme paradox and an imposing irony. The supreme paradox is that while we fear to meet the demands of the cold war because it might lead to a hot war, Moscow shows no fear of a hot war resulting from its intense cold war operations. The imposing irony is that in any hot war we wouldn't think twice about establishing a politico-psychological apparatus, which is the same that is desperately needed in the present

cold war. For reasons of survival, if not national goals of security and expanded freedom, the cold war gap must be closed. Foreign economic aid, military alliances, and our own adequate military establishment cannot in themselves cope with Moscow's cold war operations.

Of course, the present Russian totalitarians possess the wealth of centuries of experience in cold war methods and techniques. From the 16th century on, their predecessors built an unprecedented empire with these self-same techniques of subversion, infiltration, conspiracy, blackmail, and divide-and-conquer. There isn't a century for which cases cannot be given of the skillful use of these methods. Lenin learned these from the history of the empire, not from Marx or Engels. Being true Leninist, Stalin and all who have followed have exploited the fake philosophy of communism as a cold war instrument in the same way that the previous Czars manipulated the equally fake philosophies of Russian Orthodox supremacy and Pan-Slavism. Also true to tradition, they have bellowed non-interference as concerns free interest in their captives just as their forebears had done in connection with their enslaved nations. Interference, in the Russian view, is only a one-way street, outside the empire and the new Brezhnev doctrine surpasses anything of the past. The Czars were also masters in instigating anti-Jewish agitation to discredit legitimate movements and institutions: the Red Czars have shown equal mastery in dipping into the sewers of prejudice to accomplish similar ends, particularly with the myth of Ukrainian anti-Semitism.<sup>8</sup>

#### THE INTELLECTUAL GAP RE: USSR

When the Captive Nations Week Resolution was passed in 1959, little did we anticipate that it would provoke Moscow to think that this intellectual gap in our country has been spontaneously closed. Its action showed that it has feared this deeply, and with good reason. Once this gap is filled, in our eyes and the eyes of the Free World, Russia *per se* would dwindle to proper size. Russian propaganda, which exaggerates the Potemkin Village achievements of science, technology, economics, and education in the USSR, would suffer irreparable losses. Our added knowledge, understanding, and perception of the Soviet Union, if skillfully used, could render Moscow indefinitely insecure within the Soviet Union itself. They would eliminate, too, many of our baseless fears.

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<sup>8</sup> For a typically foolish editorial on this, see "Soviet Anti-Semitism," *The Evening Star*, Washington, D. C., May 14, 1969.



It is not a stroke of super-patriotic rhetoric to declare that, on the basis of projected current trends, easily within the next fifty years, no nation could be compared in total power and capability with the United States. The Soviet Union, factually and historically, is not a nation. In addition to Russia and its approximately 110 million people, the Soviet Union consists of many non-Russian nations which, significantly, make up the majority of captive nations in the entire Red Empire.<sup>9</sup> One of them, Ukraine, with its 45 million people, is the largest non-Russian nation behind the Iron Curtain. Moscow has its internal satellites as well as its external ones. If the external ones, like Poland and Hungary, are deemed unreliable for Moscow's global purposes, the record of the past forty-six years shows that the internal satellites, like Ukraine and Turkestan, are equally unreliable. Without the rich captive resources of these internal satellites, Russia would be a power no greater than an integrated Germany. Most of us are even unaware of the fact that about 34 million Moslems, many with strong ties with Turkey and Pakistan, are held captive in this primary empire of Moscow.

Give some thought to these fundamental facts and what they signify. These facts are expressed in the Captive Nations Resolution and the Russian totalitarians have recognized well their significance and their portent. Unfortunately, many of us still don't. Our economic and military comparisons are drawn on the basis of false and misleading concepts and definitions. There is no more a gross national product in the Soviet Union than there is a gross global product here. A gross imperial product, with phonetic emphasis upon the GIP, is truer to fact. We approach a far more accurate and different picture of relative economic strength by only comparing the total output of Moscow's entire empire and Red syndicate members, which includes mainland China, with that of the Free World Alliances. The difference is staggering. Comparing the United States, which is a nation, with the Soviet Union, which is an empire of many subjugated nations, cannot suit Moscow's propaganda mill better. It conceals all the facts of economic colonialism within the USSR itself.

For the same basic reasons, our military comparisons are askewed. If we deem the armed forces of the external satellites as being unreliable for Moscow, there are firm grounds for a similar evaluation of the armed forces in the USSR. About 45% of these

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<sup>9</sup> Confirming what the author has held for years is Farnsworth Fowle's article, "Russians Becoming a Soviet Minority," *The New York Times*, April 27, 1969.

forces consist of captive non-Russians, and these, by basic policy, are largely dispersed from their respective homelands in this substrate empire. Our memories are short, and our perspectives are narrow. Only in the past world war, more likely yesterday, millions of these non-Russians deserted to take up arms against Moscow. In the Hungarian Revolution, Ukrainians, Russians and others joined with the Hungarian patriots. In Napoleonic times, Alexander I threatened Europe with his armed might; before World War I, Czar Nicholas II scared Europe with the "steamroller," his imperial armed forces; and now the Red Czars engage with differing intensity in nuclear blackmail. In three major wars in this century, the multi-national forces controlled by Moscow disintegrated early in the deadly game. Contrary to popular myth, both Napoleon and Hitler were defeated not by forces but by the emptiness of their ideologies. Both had nothing but continued slavery to offer to the Russian and non-Russian nations in Moscow's empire.

We, of course, seek to conquer no one. But we richly possess an ideology which emphasizes that freedom is indivisible. And in the permanent cold war it is the deadliest weapon against Moscow's totalitarian empire, the Soviet Union. Terms like "the Soviets," "the Soviet people," "the Soviet nation," or Russia as an equivalent for USSR are marks of our intellectual lag regarding this basic empire.<sup>10</sup> This lag is shown, too, by the fact that nowhere in our Government is there any continuous study made of the sensitive relations between Moscow and its internal satellites. Our ignorance along this fundamental line is appalling. We're like a football team facing an opponent without the advantage of a scout's briefing on his basic weaknesses.

#### THE WILL FOR FREEDOM

Now, finally, the *why* of our position on peace with freedom and justice during this 10th anniversary of the Captive Nations Week Resolution. Principles and know-how are mute without the human will to enforce them. Our will for freedom is not just an emotion; it is a certitude, a vision with a rational outlook. On the basis of our principles and the capabilities set by our know-how, this will works creatively to mould that world order allowing for the free and maximum fruition of individual and national potentialities. Our conception of world order, based on rights and law, is the very

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<sup>10</sup> An example of massive misconception is Stephen S. Rosenfeld's "The Ukraine: Questing for Pride," *The Washington Post*, March 14, 1969.

negation of Moscow's colonial and imperialist totalitarianism. This will for freedom creates, not just preserves; it moves forward, not just rests; it is determined to see things through on the time-honored principle that the best defense is the offense. We are so growth-conscious today about our economy, foreign trade, the underdeveloped countries, space exploration and other fields; the one area about which we should be most growth-conscious is the state of world freedom.

In this year of the "10th" and going into the 70's, we can do much to further this will for freedom. One, you can write to the Members of the Rules Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives and urge them to pass the measures for a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations. The majority is for it, but the chairman of the committee, Rep. William Colmer of Mississippi, has obstructed its very consideration. Two, you can request your representatives in Washington to demand of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee a full inquiry into U.S. policy toward the USSR. The policy of the last thirty-six years has proven to be harmful to our interests, and there are other courses of action to insure the uneasy peace. Such an inquiry is inevitable in time, but better sooner than later. Third, you can also press for a more vigorous and enlightened policy in USIA as concerns all the captive nations. Fourth, to close the serious cold war gap, you can also further the move for the creation of a Freedom Commission and a Freedom Academy. And lastly, you can broaden the observance of Captive Nations Week as a national forum for the basic issues discussed above. With these steps alone, an education for freedom by contrast would be launched to completely dwarf the dangerous nonsense now current on our campuses and in several of our cities.

By doing what you believe in is the true exercise of the will for freedom. Our will for freedom is the backbone of the will to freedom among the enslaved. This will is at the core of peace with freedom and justice. It is the essence and spirit of the Captive Nations Week Resolution.

# THE THREE CIRCLES OF COMMUNISM

STEFAN T. POSSONY

## PART I: THE PURGES

The greatest mass murder of contemporary history, the so-called purges under Stalin, still are a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. The conscience of humanity has not been unduly affected — Hitler's mass murder of Jews made a far deeper impression. Yet this great mystery must be cleared up if we are ever to understand the history of communism and if we are to learn how to deal with the Kremlin dictatorship. I do not believe that the hour has yet come when the mystery can be unravelled. But I hope to be able to identify the real problems that await solution and to shed light on inter-connections which so far have escaped attention.

### THE GENERAL SCHEME OF THE PURGES\*

The notion that the communist party from time to time must be cleansed of careerists, counter-revolutionaries, deviationists and loyal but tired comrades, goes back to Lenin under whose rule the first party purges were conducted. In 1922, Lenin also staged the first show trial (against the S.-R. party.) During the first years of his regime, Stalin systematically replaced top echelon office-holders in the party and in the state bureaucracy with his own creatures and demoted those who were associated with his competitors. Under the title of "Bolshevization" Stalin disciplined the Comintern and the foreign communist parties. In 1928, Stalin ordered his first show trial, the Shakhty case. This was followed by show trials against the "industrial party," the Mensheviks, and the British engineers of Metro-Vickers (April 1933). There also were secret trials as well as executions without trials against bacteriologists,

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\* The following discussion is largely based upon Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror, Stalin's Purge of the Thirties*, New York, Macmillan, 1968. I reviewed this excellent book briefly in these pages and take the opportunity again to recommend its study.

officials of the food industry, managers of state farms, members of the Commissariat of Agriculture, and historians.

In 1934, Stalin was worried about the party opposition which crystallized around Sergey Kirov, the Leningrad boss. Stalin organized the assassination of Kirov. He then turned against prominent party leaders who had competed with him in the past and accused them of having instigated Kirov's murder. (The accused had been confined to jail for many months before Kirov's death.) After he exterminated the "old Bolsheviks," he turned to killing all those party hierarchs who might conceivably oppose him in the future, including many of his closest friends and including most of the men who owed their careers to Stalin.

Initially, the purges were directed against the Politbureau, the central committee, and the main cadres of the CPSU. Thereupon Stalin ordered the execution of prominent second echelon communists who had been carrying out his directives in the various departments and services. The purge soon extended to the collaborators, friends and families of the primary victims. In due time, the Chekists who were doing the dirty work were liquidated. The purge also engulfed the non-Russian elements inside and outside the party, notably the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians and Jews. The purge was like a fire that was spreading from the top of a wooden pyramid to the bottom.

Among professional groups, the NKVD, the supreme command, the officers corps, and the military intelligence services were hit severely.

Ultimately the purge spilled over to the intelligentsia at large and to the men of science and industry. "Workers and peasants" also were victimized, but they had suffered their main bloodletting before.

The purge also liquidated most of the leaders of *foreign* communist parties who were living in the USSR, especially Poles, Finns, Yugoslavs, Germans and Hungarians.

Most victims were killed through torture, or were shot outright, or succumbed in slave labor camps. Some were executed after secret trials. Only a small number were exhibited in show trials, and most of those were condemned to death, while none of those publically convicted to prison terms seems to have lived long. A few outstanding party leaders were driven to suicide or their suicide

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<sup>1</sup> Conquest gives examples on pages 256, 299, 528.

was faked. Some prestigious communists were killed through poisoning, or by medical means, and were said to have died naturally.

The toll was almost incredible. The evidence shows that by 1938, approximately 5% of the total population or some 9 million Soviet citizens were in jails or camps. The ratio of non-party to party arrests was about 7-9:1. More than 1.6 million members of the CPSU were lost.<sup>2</sup> Conquest concluded from census data that within 23 years the Stalin regime caused the death of 20 million persons through terrorism "which is almost certainly too low and might require an increase of 50% or so."<sup>3</sup>

The great purge killed off virtually all of the "Lenin party," but also a large portion of the "Stalin party," as it existed before 1939. Virtually all of the CP leaders who were liquidated had themselves been practitioners of terrorism and some had provided theoretical apologies for mass murder. The cruel punishment they suffered was rarely undeserved.

#### PERIODIZATION

According to Conquest, the purges began after Kirov's murder in 1934 and reached a climax early in 1939 when Yezhov was replaced by Beria. Actually, Conquest did not stick to his own periodization but mentions earlier show trials and subsequent purges (e. g. the Leningrad affair, the doctor's plot, and the murder of Polish officers at Katyn). There had been bloodless party purges since Kronstadt and extensive terrorism ever since November 1917, including terrorism against members of the party. But only a few CP members were involved. In the main the terrorists went after the bourgeoisie and aristocracy and they applied mass terror in civil war. That human lives were cheap was a lesson learned long before 1934, and the purges reflected this lesson. The purges were mass murder, but mass murder is not necessarily a purge.

Conquest also discussed "perhaps... the only case in history of a purely man-made famine" which accompanied collectivization during 1930-1932. Between 5 and 6 million people perished as a result of the "liquidation of the *kulaks* as a class," including more than 3 million in Ukraine, whose "population had sunk from 31 mil-

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<sup>2</sup> For the impact which the purge had on the families of victims, see Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The First Circle*, New York, Harper and Row, 1968, pp. 215-220.

<sup>3</sup> Conquest, *op. cit.*, p. 533.

lion to 28 million between 1926 and 1939.”<sup>4</sup> But collectivization resembled the purges only in the sense that both undertakings involved mass murder; otherwise they were different in kind. Hence I agree that the purges *sensu proprio* did start with the Kirov murder. (Actually the man-made famine decimated at least 5 million people in Ukraine alone — Ed.)

There is a clear-cut historical reason for such dating: Hitler undertook his purges in June 1934, and they served as a model for Stalin's more complex operation.

However, I don't agree with Conquest that the “climax” was reached after Beria took over and that the purge killings were more or less halted. The mass murder of specially selected groups, including elements of the party, continued. Conquest is aware of this and he simply over-stated the point: there was a qualitative change in the purges after Beria's ascension to power. The number of victims declined, but “target selection” was made more precise. On the whole, the operation became more efficient. The purge had become a permanent feature of Stalin's rule.

Many mass murders arose in connection with the war. Those included the killing of prisoners jailed in cities about to be overrun by the Nazis; the denouncing to German security agencies of Soviet citizens, including communists, who stayed behind when the Red Army retreated; the utilization of partisan groups for the purging of unreliaables in enemy-occupied areas; the killing of refugees and prisoners of war; mass deportations and genocide of ethnic groups such as the Crimean Tatars and the Volga Germans; and the deliberate failure to evacuate or even warn Jews living in the Western USSR (which was just about the same, especially in Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, as condemning them to a Nazi extermination camp). This was merely a continuation of the Soviet practice during the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact of extraditing German political refugees, including Jewish communists, to the Gestapo and expelling Polish Jews across the “green frontier” into Nazi-dominated areas.<sup>5</sup> The anti-Semitic operations occurred in Beria's time, whose coming to power coincided with the beginning of the Stalin-Hitler *rapprochement*.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Conquest, *op. cit.*, pp. 22f.

<sup>5</sup> Margarete Buber-Neumann, *Kriegsschauplaetze der Weltrevolution, ein Bericht aus der Praxis der Comintern 1919-1943*, Stuttgart, Seewald, 1967, p. 489f; and Stanislaus Kot, *Conversations with the Kremlin and Dispatches from Russia*, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 247f.

<sup>6</sup> The meaning of this remark will become clear as this analysis proceeds.

The purge of the military forces had come to an apparent stop in the immediate pre-war period. In actuality, "unreliable" officers on all echelons were steadily weeded out.<sup>7</sup> The practice was stepped up after the outbreak of hostilities, when military mistakes or misfortunes became a frequent reason for execution or incarceration. The permanence of the purge was one of the causes of massive military defection, and defection and surrender in turn stimulated the purge mania. Soviet soldiers who returned from captivity were always arrested and often shot, as were returning civilian workers<sup>8</sup> and persons who had been waging guerrilla war against the communists.

The purge was extended to forces allied with the USSR. For example, the Polish home army was promised Soviet help if it rose to attack the Nazis at Warsaw and thus facilitate the crossing of the Vistula by the Red Army. The Poles struck, as agreed, the Red Army stopped immediately, withheld help, and waited till the Nazis had butchered the Polish forces. The net result was that the ranks of Polish nationalists and communists were decimated.<sup>9</sup>

There were mass murders in connection with the conquest of foreign territories. In the areas seized in 1939-40 and retaken after 1944, purges and deportations occurred twice. Communist terrorists hunted systematically for bourgeois, nationalist, and anti-communist elements, even in Western Europe (e. g. in France and Italy). The areas of the USSR which had been temporarily occupied by the Nazis were purged of collaborators. The inhabitants of the German, Polish, Rumanian and Czech territories that were annexed to the USSR were investigated, purged, dispersed and resettled. By 1946 the prisons and camps were probably more crowded than they had been in 1938-39. Very little is known about the fate of some of those

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<sup>7</sup> Solzhenitsyn was purged in January 1945 on the road to Berlin. He had written to a friend that Stalin (whom he did not name) was responsible for the failures of the first year of the war. In the presence of the divisional commander, his medals and insignia were torn off. The General suddenly stood up and shook his hand. Solzhenitsyn was carted off to prison and camp where he remained for eleven years without hearing or trial. The General and Solzhenitsyn are now friends.

<sup>8</sup> Solzhenitsyn (p. 399) tells the story of a returning family who, upon coming "home," was split by the "security organs."

<sup>9</sup> During the Spanish civil war the NKVD had been busy purging communists who were fighting Franco's army. Ferocious purges of Trotskyites led to street fighting behind the front. NKVD activities and Stalin's purge policies, both in Spain and the USSR, greatly facilitated Franco's victory. The purges of the German-speaking communists in the so-called International Brigade were conducted by Walter Ulbricht, still boss today of East Germany (Buber-Neumann, pp. 393 and 462).



people. For example, the Soviet census disclosed that two million Germans are living in the USSR. How and where? The heirs of Stalin are keeping silent.

After the war, the Stalin purges *sui generis*, that is, the mass murders of communists were resumed. There was the Leningrad affair, a purge of Jewish writers and intellectuals (the Crimean affair), and purges of Mongolian and Georgian communists. After the dispute with Tito, large-scale party purges were carried out in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. The Czech purge was outspokenly anti-Semitic. George Dimitroff who was too prominent<sup>10</sup> to be purged, probably died as a result of medical murder. His case resembles that of Maxim Gorki. Dimitroff, together with the "renegade" Tito, had committed the sin of planning to establish a Balkan federation. His collaborator Tricho Kostoff was arrested before Dimitroff's death and was dragged through a show trial in which he was accused of having planned, on Tito's orders, to assassinate Dimitroff.

The fate of a rather considerable number of East German communists remains unexplained. For many years, the Soviet and East German secret services systematically abducted people from West Berlin and West Germany. There also was the widespread practice of assassinating communist defectors, especially if they had been employed by the Soviet secret services.

Stalin died in March 1953, when he was just preparing a major purge. This new blood-letting probably would have resulted in a Jewish massacre and in the destruction of the CPSU as it had been reconstituted by that time. Several of the Politbureau (or presidium) members had Jewish relatives or wives (Molotov and Voroshilov). Kaganovich was the last Jew left in Stalin's entourage,

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<sup>10</sup> Dimitroff had been accused falsely of having burned down the Reichstag in Berlin. After attracting world attention as the star performer in a show trial staged by the Nazis, he was appointed titular head of the Comintern. Dimitroff had defended himself with great courage and came to symbolize the struggle of justice against injustice. He was the foremost civilian hero of world communism. None of the defendants in Stalin's show trials had ever shown so much courage and none would have gotten away with the tactics Dimitroff was allowed to use in Nazi Germany. Merely a handful of the Soviet victims had made feeble attempts to indicate that the proceedings were phoney and only N. N. Krestinsky refused, at one point, to play his assigned role. Thereupon he was tortured and brought back in line. If Dimitroff had been put on trial, the enormous differences between the "jurisprudence" of Stalin and even that of Hitler would have become obvious.

but Beria's mother reportedly was half-Jewish.<sup>11</sup> Khrushchev's daughter was married to a Jew but Stalin's children also had contracted Jewish ties. No one was safe and no one knew what might happen — Stalin might even have purged himself.

The purge had actually begun with the *provokatsiya* which became known as the "doctor's plot." All the doctors who were arrested were employed in the Kremlin; they were accused of having perpetrated medical murder, and most were Jewish. It is not known whether some of those whom the doctors allegedly killed (e.g. Zhdanov) really had been put to death on Stalin's orders. Zhdanov, who was sick and overweight, might have died of cardiac trouble, but the accusations also pointed at living members of the high command (i.e. there were warnings and threats). Almost every member of the Politbureau feared that sooner or later he would be on the liquidation list. Beria clearly was one of the designated targets.

Not surprisingly, there is doubt about the way the dictator met his maker. The testimony of his daughter seems to indicate that Stalin died a natural death, probably from brain hemorrhage, but her story is subject to interpretations. On February 15, about three weeks before Stalin's demise, the commandant of the Kremlin guard died "prematurely," as the obituary stated. There is information which suggests that Stalin might have become incapacitated, or might have died, by February 24 or 25, instead of March 5. Not enough data are available to form a definitive judgment. But it is remarkable that the accounts of Stalin's incapacitation vary, including several stories by Khrushchev. It is no less remarkable that of nine doctors who signed the autopsy report one died and two disappeared from sight within six weeks. If there was violent or medical murder, the finger points at Beria and Malenkov.<sup>12</sup>

#### PURGES AFTER STALIN

Beria was overthrown in June 1953 and probably executed on the spot. However, in December 1953, a report was issued about the secret trial of Beria and his closest collaborators, including V. G. Dekanozov, Georgian Minister of the Interior and former Ambassador to Germany. In December 1954, V. S. Abakumov, former Minister

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<sup>11</sup> Just to round out the picture: Hitler's father probably was half-Jewish, too.

<sup>12</sup> See Robert Payne, *The Rise and Fall of Stalin*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1965, Avon Book paperback, pp. 765-772.

of State Security, and another group of "Chekists" were condemned to death. In 1955, N. D. Ryumin, who had been slated to conduct Stalin's purge of 1953, was executed.

During the same period, several uprisings in concentration camps were cruelly suppressed. Counter-intelligence operations, including *provokatsiyas* with the CIA, led to the suppression of nationalist groups in Ukraine (the UPA or the Ukrainian Insurgent Army) and Byelorussia. Reportedly, the Swedish intelligence was victimized in a *provokatsiya* directed against oppositional elements in Estonia.

The supposedly last purge trial of Beria Chekists took place in April 1956, a few weeks after N. S. Khrushchev's famous speech to the XXth party congress in which he revealed some of the truths about Stalin.

This speech led to rehabilitations of purge victims in Eastern Europe, to an upheaval in Poland, and to the Hungarian revolution. Poland escaped repression but the purge technique was applied with full fury by the Soviets against Hungarian communists and freedom-fighters. Imre Nagy was a victim of Soviet treachery and the most prominent communist to be purged. Many thousands of Hungarians were deported to labor camps in Siberia.

In 1957, the so-called anti-party group was eliminated from power. This group included Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov who had been heavily implicated in the Stalin purges. Mikoyan and Khrushchev who were involved to a lesser extent, fired those men in order to save themselves. This purge was bloodless.

An amnesty had been announced after Stalin's death but prisoners, including prisoners of war who were detained in contravention of the Geneva convention, were released in large numbers only in 1956 and 1957. A new penal law which reorganized but did not abolish the concentration camp system was adopted in December 1958. At the same time article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR which served as the legal base for the trials was repealed.<sup>13</sup> In other words, Stalin's purges survived Stalin by about 5 years.

By 1961, persecutions for "economic crimes" were stepped up and the death penalty was applied almost 200 times within two years. These persecutions, again, had clear anti-Semitic connotations. There also were repeated proceedings against writers. In Poland, Jews were kicked out from office during 1967 and 1968, and a rather acute

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<sup>13</sup> It is not known how many of those deported from Hungary were released, and when they were allowed to return home.

power struggle in the party seemed, several times, to degenerate into a purge. Still another open reversal to the old methods occurred during the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968 when Czech leaders were arrested in Czechoslovakia by the political police of the USSR and were beaten by Soviet security personnel. Alexander Dubcek was photographed with a bandaged head, and Smrkovsky exhibited his welted back to Czech communist meetings. According to rumors current in Prague Dubcek was subjected to radiation and may have been made to ingest radioactive strontium which may kill him within two years. Time will tell.

The Czechs in 1968 revealed that Jan Masaryk, foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, had been murdered by the MVD in 1948 and that his so-called suicide had been faked by Soviet experts. Moscow reacted very testily to this disclosure and promptly accused Thomas Masaryk, Jan's father and first President of his country, of having planned to assassinate Lenin in 1918. This was an untruth, a provocation, and a warning to the Czech party reformers.

No doubt, while there is far less overt killing, the purge mentality still exists. Estimates about the number of Soviet citizens in "corrective labor camps" vary from 200,000 to over one million. The expertise in medical murder and "suiciding" has grown. The KGB remains extremely powerful and there are signs that it participated in the maneuvers that toppled Khrushchev.

And many purgers still are in office. One of the most blatant cases, next to Ulbricht who after Spain continued his purge activity in the USSR, is that of East German Minister of State Security, Erich Mielke, who in 1931 participated in the murder of two policemen and commanded the assassination of Willi Muenzenberg. This crime was committed when Muenzenberg was fleeing from the Nazi invaders in France. Muenzenberg, a disenchanted German communist, had disobeyed orders to go to the USSR.

#### CONFESSIONS

When the later Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky appeared before the court, the judge told him that one of his fellow conspirators, a certain Yushkevich, had confessed to the effect that he and Rokossovsky had both belonged to a counterrevolutionary center. "Can the dead give evidence?" Rokossovsky asked. "What do you mean, the dead?" "Well... Yushkevich was killed in 1920 at Perekop... I accidentally forgot to mention his loss."

An old Bolshevik, serving a 15-year sentence for terrorism, was supposed to have murdered himself. To quote Conquest: "The NKVD maintained that he stole the dead man's papers and passed himself off in his place. When he had them call a witness who had known him since childhood, and identified him at once, they threw her out and sentenced him notwithstanding."

Still another alleged conspirator confessed that he had been plotting against the Soviet navy: the plan was to throw rocks into the harbor of Kronstadt to damage the warships.

A physician from Kharkov with an excellent memory was asked to identify his co-conspirators: he listed all the doctors in town. The interrogator arbitrarily selected five names. Thereupon, as Alexander Weissberg told the story, the physician complained to the judge that the interrogator had suppressed part of his testimony and was a counterrevolutionary. The trick saved the physician's life but also illustrates how the purges snow-balled and soon involved the population.

Confessions were demanded of practically everybody who fell into the hands of the NKVD. The once fashionable interpretation that the "Slavic soul" needs self-abasement and repentance, and that, therefore, the confessions were volunteered by the accused, already was ridiculed by Bukharin in his last plea. The confessions were extracted by various methods of physical and psychological pressure. These techniques are professionally analyzed by Conquest in one of his best chapters. It merely needs to be added that some Western writers, including persons with considerable knowledge about communism, denied that torture was being used and argued that the confessors were prompted by party discipline. These experts were fantastically wrong.

The confessions were *extracted* by the NKVD in order to maintain a façade of "legality." Yet not all of the accused confessed and the stubborn types were usually executed. Although the stupendous labor that was invested in the extraction of confessions was largely wasted, this particular aspect of the purges no longer holds many mysteries.

The real mystery that remains is that of the confessions which were imposed upon the main defendants *in open court* and which were published by the Soviet government in all major languages and distributed all over the world. Stalin was not the first ruler who killed his opponents and competitors — some oriental despots made it a practice to kill off the brothers of the prince. Nor is ter-

rorism a unique phenomenon, and terror acts often are well publicized to serve as warnings. But terror never yet had taken the form of show trials with *confessions* that were not merely false but that were *freely invented*.

If there is any lingering doubt that those public confessions were fabricated, this evidence is presented by Conquest in all necessary detail. For that matter, the fact has been admitted since 1956 by the Soviet government and by its practice of "rehabilitation."

Still, those open confessions were not *completely* phoney and not every detail was invented. In the midst of outrageous lies, some of the defendants — Conquest mentions Yagoda — told true stories. Several of those stories were disclosures about the secret history of Bolshevism. For example, Rakovsky was forced to admit his relations with the Germans during World War I. But while the confessions reveal real events which formerly had remained secret, the particular deeds were ascribed to the wrong persons, they were told about the wrong time and place, and they were distorted by wrong details. Nevertheless, enough facts remain to allow the identification of many events.

These public confessions were in some ways a vast literary canvas, similar to the set of dramas which Shakespeare wrote about English history. The dramatic power that went into the script of the confessions often is astonishing, even though there also were dull scenes and factual errors like a meeting in a hotel which no longer existed. But the confessions were not developed to advance the art of "living theater." They were, in fact, elaborate code messages. Those messages served one or several specific purposes, and they were addressed to unidentified recipients.

In order to get close to the significance of those confessions, a very thorough knowledge of the secret history both of Bolshevism and Nazism is indispensable. Even then, the dechiffrage remains most difficult because there is no single, let alone a simple, key to decipher their meaning and because terms like "Trotskyism" may in various contexts refer to the Nazis or to Leninist communists. Sometimes the name of Trotsky is used where the name Stalin would fit, but the name of Yenukidze also was employed as a code name for Stalin. These examples are merely illustrative.

The confessions contain many statements without particular meaning. Since much prose was needed to fill out the gaps in this gigantic exercise at play-acting, the "signals" are hidden by considerable "noise."

The confessions were prescribed to the defendants who had to learn their "roles" and who sometimes — especially Radek — participated in the writing of the scripts. It is generally agreed that most drama plots were conceived, and all were approved by Stalin himself who also assigned to the defendants their various roles. Reportedly, Stalin witnessed the shows as a spectator from behind a hidden window in the court room.

Why this farce? Solzhenitsyn considered it as the "summa summarum of Stalinist justice" that confession proved guilt.<sup>14</sup> This explanation applies to the run-of-the-mill defendant but *not* to the stars of the CPSU, nor to Stalin's personal enemies. For that matter, if it was merely required to have the accused confess to some capital crime, every single defendant, even Bukharin, was guilty of terrorism. All these men were guilty of numerous illegal acts, and they might just as well have been convicted for crimes they really committed.

The communist system always has been an astonishing failure, hence each defendant could have been charged with his own mistakes as an administrator, he could have been ridiculed, and the top dictator would have been exculpated. Thus, it would have been logical for Stalin to unload the major responsibility for the various famines he organized and for the recent disaster of collectivization and to transfer it to his enemies. But this did not happen: the big catastrophes were entirely ignored.

There must have been a purpose behind this fantastic undertaking. Conquest shies away from moving over such swampy ground and considering the enormous factual labor he accomplished, he should not be blamed for his caution. But unless we unravel Stalin's intentions, we will fail to understand contemporary world history.

#### HAVE THE PURGES BEEN ATONED?

In a very real and political sense, the purges will not have ended until full disclosures and complete rehabilitations are made. There have been furtive disclosures and many victims have been rehabilitated, sometimes even with ceremony. But the full story remains hidden; the Soviet authorities discourage research, and though they clamor for the prosecution of war criminals in *West Germany*, there have been, save for minor exceptions, no prosecutions of purge crimi-

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<sup>14</sup> Solzhenitsyn, p. 365.

nals within the bloc. The legal system of the USSR has not been reformed enough to prevent the recurrence of a mass purge. The complicity of the present rulers with Stalin will not end until they decide to tell the truth and to punish the guilty — by proper legal means.

The time of genuine confession and atonement has not yet come. But I have a suggestion how the wall of deceit and self-deceit and the chain of crime could be broken: the true stories of the death of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin should be disclosed, and Messrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, and Khrushchev should be obliged to write truthful and detailed memoirs; and complete lists of purge-involved MVD, prison and camp personnel and their current job assignments should be published. The rest will be automatic.

Without confession there will be no repentance.

[To be followed]



## UNRAINE'S RIGHT OF SECESSION FROM THE USSR

By IVAN O. KANDYBA

### Part II\*

During all those days of the trial, our closest relatives gathered near this terrible building, separated from us by dozens of doors because they were not allowed to come nearer.

When the sentence was being pronounced, not only were all uninvolved persons kept away from this room with its barred windows, but even our relatives were not admitted, although according to the above mentioned Paragraph 20 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR, "sentences in all cases are proclaimed publicly." The applied scientific commentary "To the Principles of Criminal Legal Proceedings of the USSR and Union Republics," published in 1960, in chapter 12, "Publicity of the Court Examination," Paragraph 12, states: "the principles establish that the sentence of the court is proclaimed publicly in all cases. . . The community must always know the result of the examination of any matter in order to be in a position to give their opinions regarding the rightness of the accepted decision regardless of whether the court examination was public or closed." Thus, there was an obvious violation of the principle of publicity of a court investigation. According to item 9, paragraph 370 of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR, such verdicts are considered illegal and are subject to rescission. Will it be rescinded? Regardless of our numerous protests and the protests made by our relatives, this obviously illegal verdict has been in force for 6 years. In spite of the fact that we live in the most democratic of all democratic states on our planet, in which the law is the most stable and just of all existing legal systems, the illegal verdict has been given all "the liberty and freedom of life in Russia."

Because each of us objected to the verdict, we each petitioned the Supreme Court to re-examine our case in a court of appeal. But the chief of the investigative section of the KGB, Serhadayev, and the senior investigative officer, Denison, told us that our appeals would do us no good because the verdict had been fully approved

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\* Conclusion of an article in the Spring, 1969 issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*.

by the party organs and therefore no one would change it. But we made our protests nonetheless.

Our case was to be heard in the Supreme Court on June 27, 1961. We were informed by completely reliable sources that in the process of preparing the case for a hearing, the judges thought that the verdict against us was definitely illegal because our acts had been incorrectly classified. Therefore, they considered that the verdict should be changed and our acts classified not under Paragraph 56, No. 1, of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR, but under Paragraph 62, No. 1, of the Criminal Code of the Ukr.SSR. In other words, the charge of treason should be dropped and our acts fall under anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. This was to apply only to Lukyanenko, Kandyba and Virun, while the other three prisoners were to be released altogether.

But this did not happen. At that time the Lviv KGB uncovered one more underground Ukrainian organization — "Ukrainsky Natsionalny Komitet" (Ukrainian National Committee) — twenty men in all. In view of this fact, the Lviv KGB were very concerned that our verdict must be changed; this was their "job," their "service," their authority, therefore, they zealously followed the process of preparing our case for review. When they heard that the judges intended to change the verdict, the chief of the Lviv KGB, Shevchenko, protested to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. He stated that anti-Soviet organizations are growing and that a slackening of punitive policies would reflected negatively on the investigation of their new case and generally increase anti-Soviet activities of other underground organizations.

It seems that this interference caused a sharp turn about in the attitude to our case. The review of our case was postponed from June 27, 1961, to July 26, 1961 — in other words, one month. On July 26, the Supreme Court partially changed the verdict of the Lviv Court.

Lukyanenko's death penalty was commuted to 15 years imprisonment; the charges against Kipysh and Borovnytsky were changed from treason (Paragraph 56, No. 1, CC Ukr.SSR) to anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (Paragraph 62, No. 1, CC Ukr.SSR) and failing to inform the authorities that they knew of the existence of such an organization (Paragraph 187, No. 1, CC Ukr.SSR) — their sentences were lessened from 10 to 7 years. The verdict against the rest of us was left unchanged. I enclose an excerpt from the Decision of the Supreme Court.

"Case No. 36k61. Confidential (it seems that everything is confidential — what are they hiding from? After all, the policies of the Party and the government are supported by the whole Soviet Nation! — I. K.) Verdict passed under the chairmanship of Comrade Rudyk. The case was presented by Zahorodnyuk.

#### DECREE

In the name of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

On July 26, 1961, the Court Collegium for criminal cases of the Supreme Court of the Ukr.SSR, composed of:

Chairman: Com. V. M. Zahorodnyuk,

People's Jurors: Com. O. V. Lednikova and Com. V. S. Yevdikimova,

Assistant Prosecutor: Com. V. P. Pohorily, Attorneys: Com. Ya. T. Koval and Com. V. A. Bardyakov, in a closed court session reviewed the case... the Court Collegium

#### DECIDED:

...Kandyba, like other participants of the created nationalistic organization (UWPU), did not merely engage in discussions which were anti-Soviet in their subject. The participants, including Kandyba, who was one of the most involved of the UWPU, were selecting recruits for UWPU from among unreliable individuals and former members of the OUN. Kandyba, especially, involved Borovnytsky and Kozyk, both of whom were already under sentence, in this belligerent organization and familiarized them with the program.

During the court session Kandyba confessed to having been favorably inclined to nationalism. His reason for joining the UWPU was that his beliefs on the matter of program concurred with those of the condemned Lukyanenko. Kandyba also confessed to telling Borovnytsky of the necessity of the separation of the Ukrainian SSR from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and creation of an "independent Ukraine."

Kandyba maintained this insurgent idea during the gathering in his lodgings at which the program was discussed.

The Lviv provincial court correctly qualified these actions of Kandyba, as well as of the convicted Lukyanenko, Virun, Lutskiv and Libovych according to Paragraphs 56, No. 1, and 64 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR.

The court took into consideration the dangers arising from the acts committed by the defendants when deciding upon the punitive measures for the convicted Kandyba, Virun, Lutskiv and Libovych. It also considered each of the defendants as an individual as well as the degree of his guilt.

The body of judges concurred in the opinion that the convicted Kandyba, Virun, Lutskiv and Libovych had deliberately committed crimes against the state and had conducted dangerous, hostile activities. Under such circumstances, the body of judges saw no evidence for mitigation of the imposed penalty for the defendants (see p. 6 of the pronouncement).

#### "DECISION:

To overrule the motion of appeal for the convicted I. O. Kandyba, S. M. Virun, B. C. Lutskiv, O. S. Libovych and his attorney. To uphold the sentence handed down by the Lviv Provincial Court on May 20, 1961, against the

above defendants. And finally, to uphold, without changes, the sentence against Lukyanenko, Kipysh, and Borovnytsky.

Chief Justice: signature

Associate Justices: signatures

In compliance: Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR, signature (Zahorodnyuk)

12 copies. 1/VIII-61 V.K."

It appears that even in the Supreme Court these Lednikovs, Evdokimovs, Zahorodnyuks, and Pohorilys, are absolutely no different in their attitude to our case than such as Starikov, Serhadeev, Denisov, Rudyk and Nebyamenko. Not only did they treat the evidence which was forged against us by the prosecuting authorities and the Lviv Court with coined phraseology, but they themselves engaged in deception in arriving at their decision. How was it possible for Kandyba to enroll Borovnytsky into the organization if they pronounced in the same decision that Borovnytsky was not a member of the organization? And as far as Kozyk was concerned, he bore no relationship to our case, not even being a witness or member of the organization. He inclined to be nationalistic, but only against the Russian great-state chauvinists who, as officials, possessed complete power. As occupants in Ukraine, they conducted themselves as absolute landlords, doing whatever they pleased, and thus harming the Ukrainian nation and its statehood.

It was also not in accordance with reality that we allegedly were recruiting former members of OUN into the organization. No such thing had ever taken place. It was sheer fabrication! This did not mean that they were malicious people. On the contrary, they were dedicated Ukrainian patriots. Of this we became convinced when we found ourselves together in the same concentration camp. What then did we do that was considered treasonous to the fatherland? Did it really consist of the notion that it was imperative for Ukraine to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics? For whom and for what then, are Paragraphs 14 and 17 of the Constitutions? The Supreme Court used stock phrases for the verdict of the Provincial Court, giving it so-called legal force, but at the same time, in essence, illegal force!

#### MORE UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATIONS

There were cases similar to ours. For instance, the Stanislav (Ivano-Frankivsk) case. In December of 1958 many young workers

and students were arrested for forming an organization called "United Party for Liberation of Ukraine" (OPVU). The aim of that party was national liberation and creation of an independent Ukraine. Those arrested were in particular members of this organization. Convicted later in the Stanislav (now Ivano-Frankivsk) Provincial Court in closed door session, March 4-10, 1959, were the following persons: 1. *Bohdan Harmatiuk*, born 1939, special secondary education, civil engineering technician; 2. *Yarema Stepanovich Tkachuk*, born 1933, secondary education, lathe operator; 3. *Bohdan Ivanovich Tymkiv*, born 1935, student in the second course of Lviv Institute of Forestry; 4. *Myron Ploshchak*, born 1932, laborer; 5. *Ivan Vas. Strutynsky*, born 1937, secondary education, choir conductor of amateur artists. The prosecuting attorney demanded capital punishment for these individuals, but the court sentenced each of them to be deprived of liberty up to a ten-year period. 6. *Mykola Yurchyk*, born 1933, laborer, and 7. *Ivan Konevych*, born 1930, laborer, were both sentenced to seven years of deprivation of liberty. All were convicted according to Paragraphs 54-1a and 51-11 of the old Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR as traitors to the fatherland. This corresponded to the new code Paragraph 56, No. 1, of the Criminal Code of Ukrainian SSR; 8. *Ploshchak, Vasyl* — sentenced to 2 years imprisonment for failing to inform the KGB that his brother Myron was a member of this organization. At present the last three have been released after completing their sentences, while the other five are still here in the Mordovian concentration camps.

In December 16-23, 1961, a similar case was tried in Lviv. Twenty persons were put on trial for forming an organization called the "Ukrainsky Natsionalny Komitet" (Ukrainian National Committee), which also had as its aim the separation of the Ukr.SSR from the USSR. For the most part these were workers of Lviv factories, namely: 1) *Koval, Ivan Teodorovych*, 2) *Hrycyna, Bohdan* — both men were given the death penalty and were shot; both were still very young, laborers by profession; 3) *Hnot, Volodymyr*, locksmith at the polytechnical institute; and 4) *Huryny, Roman*, born 1939, worker at the factory P. O. Box 47 — both were given the death penalty but this was later commuted to 15 years of imprisonment; 5) *Zelymash, Hryhory*, and 6) *Zelymash, Oleksiy* — brothers, *kolhosp* (collective farm — translator's note) workers, sentenced to 15 and 12 years imprisonment, respectively; 7) *Melykh* — philologist, graduate of Lviv State University, sentenced to 15 years; 8) *Kindrat*,

Vasyl — a young boy, sentenced to 13 years, as a result of which he went insane; 9) Kyrylo — sentenced to 12 years; 10) Mashtalyer, Mykola — 10 years; 11) Soroka, Stepan — 15 years; 12) Pokora — 12 years; 13) Yovchyk — 15 years; 14) Kaspryshyn — 5 years (has years; 17) Melnychuk, Mykola — 10 years; 18) Khomyakevych — 12 years; 17) Melnychuk, Mykola — 10 years; 18) Khomyakevych — years; and two others — a total of 20 (twenty) men.

The approach used in the preliminary investigation and in the trial towards this group was identical with the approach used towards us, because the same men considered the two cases. The Lviv Provincial Court verdict (except Hnot's and Huryny's) was also completely approved and legalized — or what is more exact, an illegal verdict was legalized. The same thing happened to the group in the Stanislav case.

There are many similar group cases, while cases involving individuals from various provinces number in the hundreds.

In his speech "About Control Figures of the Growth of the National Economy 1959-65" at the 21st CPSU Congress, Khrushchev said:

"At the present time no one is being charged with political crimes in the Soviet Union. Certainly this is a great achievement. This indicates our nation's unusual agreement in political convictions and cohesion in the Communist Party and the Soviet government" (*Pravda*, January 28, 1959).

#### "PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS ANTI-STATE CRIMINALS"

Yes, this is true, because in our Code of 1961, one cannot find the term "political offenders." The former Criminal Code, effective until December, 1958, containing the section entitled *Counterrevolutionary Offenses*, was replaced by the new code with the section entitled *Particularly Dangerous Anti-State Offenses*. In spite of this change in terminology, its essence remains the same.

These are groups of prisoners from all republics of the USSR. Among them, unceasingly being directed to the camps, are those from Moscow, Leningrad, and most of all, those from Ukraine. Although their sentences read that they appear to be particularly dangerous anti-state criminals, each of them considers himself to be only a political prisoner. I think that the change of terminology did nothing to improve the unity of their political convictions, nor to bind them closer to the Communist Party and the Soviet authorities.

The Czarist regime had condemned such a great man as Chernyshevsky as an anti-state criminal. However, in the opinion of the progressive public, he did not cease to be a political worker and prisoner. Nevertheless, is it possible to make mere mortals, like us, equal to such a great political figure as Chernyshevsky? In the opinion of the Czarist regime, he was merely a state criminal whom they condemned to seven years of hard labor. The Soviet government, on the other hand, considers us not only as state criminals, but as dangerous state criminals. Furthermore, not only are we considered dangerous state criminals but *particularly dangerous state criminals*. They punish us not with seven years of hard labor, but with ten or fifteen years of hard labor (until 1959 — twenty-five years), and frequently even with a firing squad. Consequently, our status is two levels higher than that of Chernyshevsky and we are subject to two or three times greater a penalty. And this type of "happiness" is what we owe to the humaneness of the Soviets as a "higher type of humanity!"

There is no logic in this question for some reason. People who were condemned as political criminals in the forties and fifties, since 1959 have been labelled especially dangerous criminals. Suddenly, they lost their status as political prisoners. And there are many such cases. Apart from this, the new legislation stipulates a maximum penalty of up to ten years, in exceptional cases up to fifteen years, or death. There is a rule in the Soviet law that makes the law retroactive if such should mitigate the sentence. In reality, however, it is not so. Since the new law became effective in December, 1958, there are many people who are still serving, to the present day, their twenty-five year sentences.

For instance, a well known Ukrainian lawyer, *Dr. Volodymyr Horbovy*, born in 1899, a citizen of the Czechoslovak Republic, was sentenced up to twenty-five years for being the defense counselor in the Warsaw trial of Stepan Bandera who was accused of having killed the Minister of Internal Affairs of Poland. This was done without any judicial inquest under the so-called OSO (three member special board — *troika*). Already he has served over twenty years of his sentence.

*Kateryna Myronivna Zarytska (Soroka)*, born in 1914, was sentenced to twenty-five years of imprisonment for organizing the Red Cross for the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army). She has spent the last eighteen years serving her sentence in the Vladimir Prison. Her husband, *Mykhailo Soroka*, born in 1919, has been in Soviet pris-

ons and camps with almost no interruptions from 1940 to the present day. He was released in 1948, after serving eight years, only to be deported eight months later. In 1952, he was again arrested and in 1953, sentenced to die before the firing squad. The sentence was later commuted to twenty-five years of deprivation of liberty. His offense consisted of protesting against the existing authoritarianism in the camps. This situation has been partially described by Solzhenitsyn, Halytsky, Horbatov, Diakov, Aldan-Semionov, and others. In 1957, he was rehabilitated for the first of his so-called crimes which consisted of an allegation that he had intended to organize an insurrection against the Soviet authorities in 1940. His eight years spent in prison were not included in his new term of imprisonment. Hence they were served for nothing. Bohdan, their son, was born in 1940 in the Lviv prison, where his mother was a prisoner. Consequently, he grew up and was raised without parents.

There are other women also serving their terms in the same cell with Kateryna Zarytska. They are: *Halyna Didyk*, born in 1912, arrested in 1950, and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment for participation in organizing the Red Cross for the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army). Also, *Daria Husiak*, born in 1924, arrested in 1950, and sentenced to twenty-five years of imprisonment for membership in the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) as a courier of the command. And there are many, many other men and women of various nationalities in hopeless situations serving their terms of fifteen, twenty or more years. . .

Since 1952, under the new regime, none of us is entitled to either food packages or parcels. It is only after serving one-half of the term that one is allowed to receive three packages of five kilograms each per year. Even this is granted in exceptional cases only to prisoners who have fully repented of their so-called crimes and have entered upon the "path to correction."

And so we are deprived of material aid from our relatives. This was not even done by the Czarist regime, for at that time the prisoners were entitled to receive unlimited material aid.

Food parcels up to ten kilograms are distributed only to those prisoners to whom parcels are sent by their relatives, or even by strangers from abroad. These parcels are not addressed to the place of confinement of the prisoners but instead to the following address: Moscow, P.O. Box 5110/1 Zh Kh (the prisoner's name), and Moscow forwards it. Parcels from abroad are not returned but delivered



to the prisoner in order that the authorities not expose themselves to the outside world. These are delivered to Germans, Lithuanians, and certain others. There is an exception — the Ukrainians.

The majority of the prisoners are kept on a semi-starvation diet. We are given provisions which supposedly constitute 2300-2400 calories. Since the products, especially during spring and summer up to the new harvest, are of the most inferior quality, one is fortunate to obtain 1500 calories. The herrings are rotten and stink. The dried potatoes, macaroni, groats and meat are worm infested. Here is the daily ration: 700 grams of bread (black and always sour), 110 grams of groats, 20 grams of poor quality wheat flour, 10 grams of macaroni, 50 grams of meat, 85 grams of fish, 15 grams of oil, 0.4 grams of synthetic fat, 400 grams of potatoes, and 250 grams of fruit.

The prison diet consists of 1937 calories, and the so-called strict ration, 1324 calories, consists of the following: 450 grams of bread, 10 grams of wheat flour, 50 grams of groats, 60 grams of fish, a grams of oil, 250 are given to those who refuse to work.

We are compelled to fulfill one hundred percent of quota. The kind of work we do consumes 3500-4000 calories. (see *Zdorovia (Health)* No 9, 1966, pp. 26-27.)

This kind of existence causes numerous cases of tuberculosis, heart, and other diseases. Medical care is very poor. Indispensable drugs are either scarce or non-existent. To receive these from relatives in a mail package is not permitted. These are either returned, as they were in my case on September 27, this year, or the drugs are destroyed on the spot. However, all around us hang slogans, *E.g.*:

1. Production workers, strive for increase in production work!
2. Production workers, work every hour and minute to produce!
3. Production workers, value every minute of free time!
4. Production workers, do not allow yourselves to quit work prematurely!
5. Production workers, do not allow the waste of working time. Work productively all 480 minutes of the work shift!

We are not allowed to wear our own clothing. Instead, all have to wear uniforms made out of cotton and paper fabric.

We are not allowed to subscribe to such periodicals as *Courier* — *UNESCO*, *America*, or *Anglia*. It is forbidden to subscribe to newspapers and periodicals from the People's Democracies. Consequently, we are almost isolated from the world and deprived of all rights. Instead we enjoy the right to perform slave work

and to an existence of semi-starvation and isolation from the civilized world.

Ukraine is our fatherland. If we have betrayed it, then why are we not held in custody in Ukraine? Why are we not being educated and re-educated by the Ukrainian people? Perhaps the reason for this is that Soviet Ukraine is not really Ukraine, and the rights given to its citizens under the Constitution are not actual rights which may be put into practice. Should someone dare to exercise these rights, as for instance, the right of the Ukrainian SSR to secede from the USSR? One pays for proposing the realization of such a plan: such people are instantly labelled for years to come as traitors to their fatherland.

Perhaps, after all, we are not traitors to the fatherland?

It is known that many people of the intelligentsia were arrested during September of last year in such Ukrainian cities as Kiev, Lviv, Lutsk and Ivano-Frankivsk for alleged anti-Soviet activities. Their trials took place in March and April of this year, and subsequently they were sentenced according to Paragraph 62, No. 1, of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR. Their crimes were qualified as anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. These people are now among us.

This year, during the month of May, KGB (KDB-Committee of State Security) representatives from the western provinces of Ukraine visited us and summoned Ukrainian prisoners for interviews. During one such meeting on May 8, Kozakov, a KGB representative from Ivano-Frankivsk, stated to a prisoner, Myron Ploshchak, who had been sentenced in the Stanislav group case (of eight men) in 1959 to ten years as a traitor to the fatherland, that if they were tried now, they would no longer be tried as traitors. Instead, they would only be tried for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, drawing sentences no greater than three to five years. Captain Harashchenko, a representative of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR, made the exact same statement to me on May 16. When I asked why our case and similar ones were not reviewed, he replied that no one would take such a task upon himself since we had been sentenced during the leadership of Khrushchev. But if Khrushchev corrected some of the infamous deeds committed by Stalin, why then cannot the present leaders correct some of the infamous deeds, among them the cases of political prisoners, which had been committed during the rule of Khrushchev?

In 1964 the representative of the Lviv KGB, Marusenko, came to the prison. He boasted that there were many of his "godchildren" here, *i. e.* prisoners whom he had caught and arrested, such as *Bohdan Skira*. He paid another visit in April of this year. Among other prisoners, I was summoned. During our conversation he stated that as a result of our repeated complaints, the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party demanded that a representative of the Lviv KGB present our case to the Central Committee, in order that a decision be made in regard to the justice of our sentences.

Marusenko himself went to the Central Committee to present our case. He told me that according to the official evidence contained in the case there was really no basis for us to be tried for treason to the fatherland. He shared this opinion with other representatives of the KGB as well as the prosecution, the court, and the representatives of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian SSR. But at the same time he stated that he presented to the Central Committee all the unofficial evidence, such as the tape recording in our lodgings and cells (containing our conversations at a conference on December 6, 1960. It had already been established at the December 6 meeting and earlier that Vashchuk was the KGB agent who had a tape recorder in his briefcase). This unofficial evidence, as well as other secret service evidence, had not been officially admitted to the case because it is forbidden by law. Thus he convinced the officials of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party that we were sentenced justly in the capacity of traitors to the fatherland. This is how our fate and that of many others was decided.

Inasmuch as all of the investigative organs of the KGB, the prosecution, and the court officials constantly refer to the fact that all of the questions in regard to our cases have been agreed upon with the Party organs, then in the future we will turn only to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and demand a review of our case and our return from the foreign land to our fatherland — Ukraine.

If our case is not reviewed in the immediate future and the brand of traitor to the fatherland not removed, and if we are not returned to Ukraine, then we will be compelled to seek further aid in regard to the above problem from the progressive public of Ukraine and the progressive public of our entire planet.

Signature: I. O. KANDYBA

## UKRAINIAN UNIVERSITIES: DREAMS AND REALITY

By LEO HEIMAN\*

A rare insight into the life and mores at Ukrainian universities in the turbulent summer of 1967 can be gained through interviews with Jewish coeds who had studied at Kiev, Odessa and Kharkiv, till their arrival in Israel after the Middle East war.

The author interviewed three refugee girls, one from each university. The first one was Nina Reznick, 21, a mathematics student at the University of Kiev. "Our troubles began a few days before the Israeli-Arab war, when, with tensions mounting in the Middle East, my father filed an application for an exit permit from the Soviet Union and an entry visa to Israel."

Her story follows:

The Israeli Embassy in Moscow was still open, though scurrilous insinuations against the Jews were mounting in the press, assuming the proportions of a major anti-Semitic campaign.

The moment we filed the exit permit questionnaire, my father was summarily dismissed from work at the Administration of Urban Traffic (GAL) and we were ordered to vacate our three-room apartment in the Darnytsia suburb within five days. The next morning I was called to testify before the *Aktiv* (*apparat*) meeting of the Comsomol organization on the campus. I sensed big trouble as I entered the huge oak-paneled room on the second floor of the university's administration building, next door to the Rector's office.

The date was June 8, 1967, the hour 10:15 a. m. Six men and two women were seated behind the horseshoe-shaped table, covered by green baize. Pictures of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin were hanging on the wall. The heavy curtains were drawn, although it was a bright summer day outside, and the room was lit by two naked bulbs hanging down from the ceiling at the end of frayed wires. I remained standing in front of the table for more than an hour, as questions were fired at me from both ends. There was no chair for me, and I was not asked to sit down, but was treated like a prisoner in the dock.

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\* This article was received from Mr. Heiman before his death on April 2, 1969 in Haifa, Israel.

I saw them perusing my personal, scholastic and Comsomol record and I knew I had nothing to worry about on that score. Although I had trouble getting into the Mathematical Faculty in the first place, because of the 320 vacancies only 20 had been made available to Jews, my father got me in by bribing two members of the Educational Control Board with 500 rubles (\$550) each. And I was the faculty's pride, the professors kept telling me.

But now I was in trouble up to my neck. One of the "comrades from Moscow," a burly fellow with a jagged scar across the bridge of his nose, explained that under Soviet law exit permits granted to citizens can be cancelled if objections are raised by their wives, ex-wives, children and step-children, parents, brothers or sisters.

"Did you know your father has applied for an exit permit to Israel?" he asked quietly. I replied in the affirmative.

"Did you object?" he wanted to know. I said I had no objections. He then demanded to know how could a Soviet girl, born and educated in the USSR, a member of Leninski Comsomol since the age of 16, a student at a Soviet university condone such an act of treason. "It is no treason, Comrade Kosygin said any Jewish citizen with relatives in Israel is free to migrate," I attempted to defend myself.

"*Pyes tebe tovarishch!* A dog is your comrade!" the taciturn, greyhaired, hatchet-faced woman burst out.

During the next thirty minutes I was harangued by members of the board. When I refused to sign an application to cancel my father's exit permit, they summarily dismissed me from membership in the Comsomol, suspended me from studies at the University, ordered me to surrender my library card, meal ticket at the campus restaurant, Comsomol membership card, student identification, and keys to the cultural affairs room, where we kept musical instruments, records, tape-recorder and other paraphernalia of gay student parties.

I was on the eve of my graduation exercises, scheduled for June 25, and did not wish to lose my diploma and academic degree.

"But I need the library card for examination studies!" I protested feebly.

"Tell it to your father. The Zionists will help you," a cadaverous Russian remarked cynically.

This made me boiling mad. I quoted chapter and verse from the Soviet Constitution about the rights of citizens, stressing that expulsion from Comsomol by administrative *ukase* is illegal, without condemnation by the organization's general or extraordinary meet-

ing. Ditto with suspension from studies, which can be authorized only by the Rector's Office, and must be approved by the University's Educational Control Board.

My speech made them angry. "*Nakhalnaya sterva!*" (an arrogant tart), the grey-haired woman shouted again.

"*Sterva mat tvoya!*" (your mother is a tart) — I replied and raced out of the room, pursued by insults and shouts of derision.

I was sure the police would come and arrest me now. As I ran to clean my desk at the library, where I kept my examination papers, notes and formulas, a group of students gathered at the foot of the marble staircase leading up to the library building.

We called them "Television Stairs," because whenever TV or movie crews arrived to shoot a propaganda film about students in Kiev or important visitors to the University, they always used the library stairs as a background. The shooting angles were good, there were no shadows, and the pale-grey marble reflected well in the sunlight. But now I felt exposed and vulnerable as I went up to the swinging doors. Two burly "*Druzhinniki*" (auxiliary militiamen) barred my way. They must have been warned by telephone from the Rector's office, because they let other students pass freely and demanded to see my library card.

"I don't have it with me, but my books and papers are inside, you can ask the librarian," I told them.

They pushed me away. "Go and bring your card then, and don't try to barge in without it, or we shall arrest you on vagrancy charges," the taller one, a round-faced Russian, growled.

I had not noticed the students who followed me up the stairs. "Let her in, she studies at our faculty, what the hell are you trying to prove?" called out Ivan Semenenko, a good friend of mine. "Don't push your nose into our business, *Khokhol* (dirty Ukrainian)" — the tall Russian barked.

Semenenko hit him in the face. The other "*Druzhinnik*" grabbed a police whistle, but it was torn out of his hands. It would be wrong to describe the brawl that followed as a nationalist riot. Russian and Ukrainian students joined forces against the hated and despised "*Druzhinniki*," who represented authority and police oppression on the campus. But the forbidden word, not used in Kiev since Czarist times, sparked off a free-for-all.

The "*Druzhina*" squad must have been standing by on the alert, for the auxiliary militiamen waded in with blackjacks and truncheons. The "Television Staircase" became a battlefield. "Go and

clean your desk," Semenenko pushed me from behind," the cops will be here any moment now, we'll give you three minutes and lam out."

But it took me longer than three minutes to get my things together, and when I looked out the glass doors, I saw the students running away, with uniformed and auxiliary militia chasing them all over the campus. Stones and bottles were flying, and a group of students formed an impromptu chorus line, singing "*Parshiviye Legaviye*" (diseased bloodhounds — underworld name for police in the USSR) and running away whenever the officers tried to identify them. A group of "*Druzhinniki*" was coming up the stairs and my retreat route was cut off.

I hid under a desk behind the librarian's partition. She must have seen me, but she did not say a word. They searched the whole building, but did not bother to check the desk on which books were heaped.

"*Gde eta Zhidovka?*"\*) (where is the Jewess?), a militiaman demanded to know.

Rita Nikolayevna, the librarian in charge of the mathematics section, replied indignantly that such uncivilized words must not be used in a cultured society. "*Ona Izrail'skaya shpionka!*" (she is an Israeli spy) another "*Druzhinnik*" shouted.

When the hue and cry died down, I crept out of my hiding place, collected the notes, books and papers and went out the front door. The librarian turned her back to me, pretending not to have seen anything.

I crossed the main square rapidly, without being intercepted, hailed a passing taxicab and asked to be taken home across the river.

That night I slept with relatives, because I was sure the police would come to arrest me on trumped-up charges. They knew my name and regarded me as a criminal. The next morning we met at the station and boarded the train to Kiev, on the first leg of our journey to freedom.

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\*) Actually the author's informant errs as far as this expression is concerned. The name "Jew" in Ukrainian, as well as in Polish, *zhyd*, *zhidyvka* (*żydówka*), is a literary and non-derogatory name, the same as *Le Juif* in French or *der Jude* in German. *Yevrey* is the Russian name for Jew, but the Russians for reasons of their own are using the Ukrainian (or Polish) term *zhyd* in a derogatory and insulting sense. But its use either in Ukrainian or Polish is *not derogatory* — Ed.

Thanks to the notes and papers I had taken along, I had no difficulty getting accepted for university studies in Israel."

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"There is a great credibility gap between the students and the government," stresses 19-year-old Tanya Komornik, a former student of French at Odessa University, and the youngest of the three co-eds interviewed by this writer. She went on:

Western observers, analysts and so-called Kremlinologists fail to evaluate opinion trends in the USSR. The newspapers they read and the radio broadcasts they hear do not reflect public feelings or thinking in any case. For instance, judging by the vehement tone of Soviet press and radio, the average citizen of the USSR thinks of little else than the Israeli-Arab conflict and the Vietnam war. Protest meetings, demonstrations, petitions and angry denunciations of imperialism, colonialism and Zionism are front-paged in all Soviet papers, from *Pravda* to some *kolkhoz* barn sheet.

The truth is, however, that the average Soviet citizen cares little about what is happening outside his territory, does not bother even to read the articles, and if he thinks about it at all, he is only angry with the Soviet leaders for squandering badly-needed materials, goods and resources on wasteful foreign aid programs, which either boomerang, collapse or just fold through inefficiency. One does not need better examples than Odessa students. After all, the young men and women attending colleges and institutes are supposed to be the elite of classless Soviet society, the cream and the flower of *Homo Sovieticus*. If they do not get excited about imperialist war crimes in Vietnam, Zionist aggression in the Middle East and sundry other Kremlin-sponsored causes, who will?

The Odessa people oppose Soviet aid programs more than anyone else in the USSR because their port serves as the main transit center for military hardware, munitions, and other assistance Moscow sends to Vietnam, Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Every day, a dozen ships tie up at piers in the restricted security zone of the commercial port to load strategic cargoes. Other ships dock at the famous Elevator Wharf to fill their holds with golden Ukrainian wheat for hungry Egypt, Cuba and other pro-communist countries impoverished by Soviet-style regimes. There are no secrets in Odessa. Thousands of people work in the port, many students are employed part-time



by the Port Administration and Customs Inspectorate during vacations, relatives and friends tell stories of waste and inefficiency, and while most details are still hidden by the thick veil of secrecy, the general picture is clear — and very negative.

I remember how the Comsomol bureau organized a mass protest demonstration of Odessa University students the week after American planes bombed downtown Hanoi. The demonstration was timed with the arrival of a group of American tourists. Their INTOURIST guides were told to shepherd the visitors towards the demonstration, so as to impress upon the gullible Americans how their Vietnam war poisons their country's relations with the Soviet Union in general, and the young generation in particular.

Many students tried to shirk this duty and take a day off at the Ochakov Bay beach or near the city on the Dnestrovskaya Kossa. But we were warned by the Rector, Comsorg and Administrative Director that attendance is compulsory and students missing the demonstration and protest meeting for no good reason will be regarded as "malingerers" and treated accordingly.

So all of us gathered for what the papers later called "an indignant protest meeting of Odessa students and workers" in the beautiful public park overlooking the waterfront.

The speakers who harangued us for hours looked as bored as we felt. The professional agitators and lecturers were paid by the hour, and they made each speech as long as possible without collapsing. Why not make an extra ruble by adding a few expletives and castigating the imperialists? So they droned on, and on and on. When we moved into the park, according to faculties, departments and study groups, there was a great rush for the flanks and the rear. The mob milled around in confusion as if caught up by a giant whirlpool. Comsomol watchdogs and *Agitprop* organizers restored some order by bellowing into souped-up bullhorns.

The reason for all this confusion was that no one wanted to be in the first row, under the watchful eyes of the organizers, cameramen, TV crews, newspaper reporters, KGB officials and other *apparatchiks*. One had to pretend to be listening, hooting at the right moment, cheering and clapping whenever necessary, booing the imperialists and applauding the heroic freedom fighters of the National Liberation Front.

Those caught up by the glare of publicity and bad luck in the front rows could not yawn, slumber or tell gossip to friends. So the most desired places on such occasions were the back and the rear

flanks. All I know is I cannot remember a word of what was said in three hours of angry speeches. I devoted the first hour to furtive studies of French exam papers which I had hidden in my purse. The second hour was dedicated to juicy gossip with my friends. And the third hour we girls shifted uncomfortably from foot to foot, thinking not of Vietnam and not of imperialism, but where to find a public lavatory.

Then we formed into columns and marched out along Derinbassovskaya, Odessa's main street. Banners, flags, picket boards and cardboard cartoons of a vicious Uncle Sam with a hooked anti-Semitic nose — or should I say a Semitic nose with an anti-Semitic meaning — were taken out of trucks and handed out to the demonstrating marchers. Each group of ten was supposed to wave a cardboard cartoon, each group of 25 a picket board ("Hands off Vietnam!"), each group of 50 a National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) flag and each unit of 100 a red banner saying "Down with the imperialist warmongers!"

The Fire Brigade brass band joined us, and then the big band of the *Profsoyuz* (Trade Union) Cultural Activities committee. I heard the workers exclaiming cheerfully that they had been given a day off at full pay, a bottle of vodka at reduced prices and they wished they had a protest demonstration every day.

Each unit of 100 was shepherded by two Comsomol watchdogs and one *Agitprop* organizer who shouted slogans through portable bullhorns. If they shouted "Long Live the valiant National Liberation front of Vietnam!", we were supposed to yell back "Hurrah, Hurrah, Hurrah!" If they bellowed an anti-American slogan, "*Doloi!*" (down with them) was the proper answer.

As we passed near the railway station, Zina Kravchuk nudged my elbow and whispered she was going to faint if I did not take her to a public toilet right away. So we dropped out of the column and ran to the station lavatories. Other girls followed us, and the *apparatchiks* noticed the sudden exodus, registered our names and filed complaints. The next day seventeen of us were called on the carpet in the Rector's office, to be chewed out by the brass. Long lists of charges were prepared against us, beginning with malicious defection and ending with anti-social activities.

All girls kept quiet, for there was little we could say. But Zina Kravchuk's father was a big shot in the *Gorispolkom* (City Executive Committee) and she was not scared of anything. "Excuse me, Comrade Director," she told the administrative manager who de-

manded our immediate suspension from studies pending investigation, "but do you know the function of the human bladder?" "What's that got to do with the charges against you?" he roared. "Everything," she smiled sweetly, "you see, the boys just suffered in silence but we girls were going to faint. Rather than break up the impressive demonstration, we chose a temporary retreat to the only place where we could relieve ourselves with dignity."

At this moment, Zina Kravchuk's father telephoned the Rector and let him know what he thought of the whole affair.

So, the next time we were called out to demonstrate, the Comsomol people instructed us to swallow salt tablets and not to drink much before the protest meeting.

All of us were Comsomol members. I do not believe you have one single student in the Soviet Union who is not a *Comsomoletz* or *Comsomolka*. In theory, all one needs to enter a university is good marks, not a Comsomol ticket. But in actual practice, one is not allowed to register for exams without a letter of recommendation from the Comsomol bureau. Expulsion from the Comsomol brings about instant expulsion from the University too, and vice versa.

So Soviet institutions of higher learning are actually instruments of the Communist Party which controls the Comsomol organization at all administrative and executive levels.

All Comsomol members are supposed to attend weekly indoctrination meetings and monthly ideological briefings, apart from regular meetings dealing with disciplinary measures against comrades, self-criticism, castigation of offenders and public brainwashing. Although everybody knew I was Jewish, we had no national problems at the University, probably because Odessa is the Soviet Union's most cosmopolitan city. The majority of the population is Ukrainian, but there are many Russians, Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Moldavians and Tartars. The city is always full of foreign tourists, visitors, seamen, trainees and sundry groups in transit.

We had a few minor incidents, such as one last summer when a lecturer described Odessa in glowing terms as "*Starinny Russki Gorod*" (ancient Russian city), and a voice piped up from the back row in the auditorium — "*Ukrainsky Gorod*" (Ukrainian city). The lecturer flushed, swallowed twice and replied "*Eto vse ravno*" (it is the same).

In the summer of 1967, when the Middle East conflict erupted in the Israeli-Arab war, the authorities began provoking and sponsoring anti-Semitic excesses at the University. I was one of the

first victims of the new line. A special meeting of our Comsomol cell was called to protest Zionist aggression against peace-loving Arab countries. Viktor Semkin, my steady boy-friend and half-Jew (his father was Jewish, his mother Ukrainian) stood up and demanded to know how could a nation of two and a half million commit imperialist aggression against one hundred million Arabs.

"Because Israel is a stooge of American imperialism and a lackey of Wall Street bankers," shouted Nikolai Remizov, a beefy student whose father was a director at the *Gosbank* (state bank).

"And all you Jews are the same bunch of vipers, trying to sting the people that harbor you in their midst," he added for good measure.

"You shut up!" Semkin shouted, his face livid with rage, "my father fought for the Soviet Union in the war and lost a leg, your father collaborated with the Germans during the occupation and cleared himself of treason charges by bribes and denunciations of honest neighbors. You are a snake yourself, *svoloch* (scum)!" Pandemonium broke out, cut short by the chairman who declared the meeting closed. I do not know what happened to Semkin afterwards. I am sure he was arrested and deported to a corrective labor camp. I did not return to the University the next day, but begged my father to do something about it. We could get valid exit permits to Poland without too much trouble, but to reach Israel we needed a Hungarian or Czechoslovak transit visa. I had to travel to Moscow for this, but they would not sell me tickets at the railway station, without *komandirovka* (official travel orders) or a letter from the University saying I was on my way to Moscow for studies or exams. I could, of course, buy local train tickets from station to station, inching forward a hundred kilometers at a time. But this would take days, both ways, and I was in a rush.

The authorities could arbitrarily cancel all exit permits (as they did, in fact, a few days after we had left) and we would be left stranded, persecuted and desperate.

Express train tickets to Moscow had to be ordered weeks in advance, or secured with official connections.

There was one more way of reaching Moscow — by air — but it was not legal for me. As a student, I had to state my business and purpose of the trip when buying an Aeroflot ticket. They could refuse to sell, or check with the University.

We had a Ukrainian neighbor downstairs whose daughter was married to an Aeroflot mechanic. I knocked at their door, asked their help to get me a return ticket to Moscow, and hinted I would

be willing to pay any price over and above the official rates. They refused to take money, but called up their daughter and told her a good friend of theirs had to rush to Moscow for urgent medical treatment without the customary certificate. The daughter arranged with her husband to buy me an A-priority ticket at the official price. She refused to take gifts or extra money. "When I was a girl, I was in trouble too and needed a doctor urgently," she patted my shoulder.

What she did not know, would not hurt her. But her parents realized I was not seeking an abortion, but a way out of the Soviet paradise. "When you get to Jerusalem, light a candle for me at the Savior's grave," the old woman begged me. I blinked in surprise. To begin with, I had no idea she was that intensely religious. I had not seen her attending church and there was no *ikon* on the wall of her apartment. Secondly, it was the first time I heard Jesus Christ was buried in Jerusalem. We never learned about such things. But above all, I wondered how did she know the real purpose of my trip. She must have understood the fear, confusion and hesitation on my face, because she patted my head and said quietly: "God be with you, do not think all people are wolves. My husband and I have heard your father listening to Radio Jerusalem in the Russian language. The walls are thin here. But do not worry, we are not going to tell. We are listening to the Voice of Jerusalem ourselves, because that is the source of truth and revelation. . ."

To cut a long story short, I got the Czechoslovak transit visa and went to the Austrian Embassy in Moscow to get a 24-hour stop-over permit in Vienna on our family passport.

There was no time to sell anything, or even withdraw money from our savings account at the *Sperkassa*. We left the furniture, clothes, paintings and books to neighbors and relatives. And we shuddered with fear at every station. Border controls were strict, but the permits were in order, and since we had no heavy luggage, but only a few overnight bags, like casual tourists, the officers did not suspect us. So here we are now. Getting used to a new country, another climate, a different society was difficult at first. But I am becoming integrated rapidly, and although I still miss Odessa—I hope not to see it again. Not as long as it is under Soviet rule, anyway.



"If there is one thing I miss here, it is the spirit of comradeship and fun," says 20-year-old Marina Gurevich, a former zoology major at Kharkiv University.

I do not mean things are bad here. They are different, that's all. Girls are looking for steady boy friends or fiances, and they think a good husband is worth more than a college degree. Even if they do not admit it to others, or to themselves, co-eds here are motivated by such personal interests as love and marriage, but very seldom by intellectual productivity or an unquenchable thirst for knowledge.

So there is no comradeship in the sense I understood it at Kharkiv, where all of us were one big family. The boy-girl friendships here, even those that begin on a strictly intellectual basis, tend to gravitate towards eroticism sooner or later. I am not a prude or old-fashioned, but I miss the boy-girl friendships we had back on the campus in Kharkiv, where holding hands conveyed greater emotions and profounder feelings than engaging in indiscriminate promiscuity.

And it is just the same with fun. Sure, we have lots of fun here we never even heard about at Kharkiv. Such as discotheques, wild parties, striptease competitions and other things I would rather not mention. I was very naive when I first arrived here. They called me "Four-by-Four," that's how square I was. But I learned fast, see? And I know now that pot is not for cooking, but for smoking, and tea is not for drinking either.

I am not saying we had no drugs, drinking or depraved orgies on the campus in Kharkiv. There were scandals, investigations, crack-downs by police. But the general atmosphere was different in a way that is difficult to describe. First of all, we wanted to succeed. Now, here all students want to make good too. After all, what's the use of studying if you don't get a diploma? But there are all kinds of successes here. You can have a doctorate in philosophy and be considered a failure, if your specialty is medieval poetry, you live in a cold-water flat and can't support a family. Or you can be a dropout from college, and be counted as a great success after inheriting a grocery chain from a rich uncle.

Obviously, things are different in the Soviet Union. I am not saying they are better, but we used another measuring stick. Here and there, nothing succeeds like success. But students in the USSR respect learning more than money, possibly because they do not have to work their way through college, or worry about where their next meal comes from. Here, everybody is absorbed in his own narrow sphere. The Israelis are more intensely nationalistic and patriotic than students in the USSR because they are so self-centered. They equate Israel's success, strength and influence as a nation with their own success, strength and power. They do not care about anything

else. Causes which do not affect their own — or their country's — safety leave them cold.

I really cannot say if it is good, or bad. All I know is that back at Kharkiv we regarded nationalism as a dirty word. There was a group of Ukrainian students who were expelled for bourgeois-nationalist activities. They were not from our faculty and I do not know the exact charges against them. But I think they refused to devote more time to studying Russian literature than to their Ukrainian literary heritage.

Now it was obvious they could not get away with it. No one in the Soviet Union can get a degree in literature without being examined all along the line where Russian writers and poets are concerned. A dozen students were expelled, another fourteen or fifteen suspended for six months. Being suspended is bad enough. It means you lose all your rights as a student, and must work in some factory during the period of suspension, or risk being arrested by the militia and convicted on charges of vagrancy, anti-social behavior and the like.

Since no factory manager or cooperative director is going to employ a worker who will return to college before he has learned his job properly, suspended students without connections at local administration level, can work only as dishwashers, hodcarriers, grease monkeys, porters or waitresses. And things are difficult even here. Students who are expelled are blacklisted by the Ministries of Higher Education in all Union "republics." Unless they can fix local officials, they will not be able to enroll anywhere in the USSR, from Armyansk to Zakharovka.

If they really want to study, they can enroll in evening classes, correspondence schools or so-called "workers faculties." But for this, they must have a job and a valid labor ticket.

Being unskilled as well as blacklisted, they usually leave town and make a bee-line to the Far East to join the "*sezonniki*" — seasonal workers who reinforce the Sakhalin, Kamchatka and Okhotsk fishermen during the May through September season, work a 14-hour day without holidays or weekends, and get paid for a whole year, leaving them time enough to study during the long autumn and winter months.

But the housing situation being what it is, the "*sezonniki*" live in barracks, fifty to sixty in a cavernous room heated by a single stove. Studying is extremely difficult under such conditions, not mentioning the fact that many "*sezonniki*" are drunks, hoodlums,

rapists and escaped criminals who assault women, break up the barracks when they go berserk and look for a fight out of sheer boredom.

So, expulsion from a regular college is considered a greater punishment than imprisonment. And it is sometimes worse than jail. To be expelled, one does not have to aggravate the authorities by disloyal, subversive or anti-social behavior. Students who fail the annual exams twice in a row, are booted out and must look for work. If they have rich or influential parents, they can hide in a *dacha* residence to evade militia dragnets. But without a valid labor ticket — or substantial bribe — they cannot register at any off-campus school.

The authorities made sure all expulsions and suspensions were given the publicity they deserved, to intimidate the majority of meek and obedient students. But they were the exception, rather than the rule.

The student card and the privileges that go with it are a more powerful incentive than the big stick of expulsion.

The language of instruction was Russian, although the university prospectus stressed that Kharkiv University was Ukraine's oldest institution of higher learning. I am not sure whether this is historically correct. But our slogan was "*Pervy (first) Universitet Ukrainy*" — and by "first" they meant oldest as well as best. What I could not grasp is why everything — including the slogan — had been written in the Russian language.

Students seeking entry to the university had to fill out some twenty-odd questionnaires. The questions, rubrics and headings were phrased in Russian only, and woe to the applicant who wrote his answers in the Ukrainian language. His application would be tossed into the wastebasket by contemptuous officials. At best, he would have to write out new formulas, and go through an extra tough examination in the Russian language, to prove he knew it well enough for academic studies.

No one dared to question this arrangement, for fear of being accused of bourgeois-nationalist chauvinism. But the professors brought it up from time to time, pointing out that while Russian was a language of technology and science as well as literature, Ukrainian was principally a language of poetry, drama and song. All Russian scientific texts could be translated into Ukrainian. But students at Ukrainian colleges and institutes would deprive themselves of educational, employment and research opportunities if they were not "with it." Being "with it" in the Soviet Union meant mastering



the Russian language for proper scientific expression, learning by heart all Russian technological and bureaucratic nomenclature, not forgetting semantics and dialectics either.

This was an argument we could understand and appreciate. Under Soviet educational policy, students at institutions of higher learning pledged unquestioning acceptance of post-graduation orders. In other words, graduates of Ukrainian universities could not — and did not — expect appointments in their home towns or districts. It was — and is — a basic tenet of Soviet political-educational planning to move college graduates about like pawns on a vast chessboard.

Doctors who graduated in Kharkiv would be sent to the Urals, and if physicians were needed in the Kharkiv *oblast*, medical graduates from Leningrad would be dispatched to Ukraine. This diluted homogeneous populations in the “constituent republics,” stepped up the process of Russification and, above all, gave the authorities a stranglehold on the “intelligentsia” — intellectuals, professionals and white-collar workers.

Since graduates of Kharkiv University could expect being posted for work, research or post-graduate degree studies anywhere but in Ukraine, they needed Russian to get to first base any place. So there were no complaints here, except for students of literature who demanded equal rights for the Ukrainian language.

I do not mind admitting now I enjoyed every single day at Kharkiv University and I was genuinely sorry to leave. I have no regrets now. I can see my father’s position and why our situation was getting truly desperate. They would have kicked me out anyhow, unless I denounced my parents, Zionism, the State of Israel, Judaism and my own people. So it was really the only thing to do under the circumstances.

But when I meet people here who believe all Soviet students are virtual prisoners because the USSR is a police state, I cannot help laughing out loud.

The status, conditions, position and privileges of Soviet students are not inferior — and in many cases actually superior — to those of students in the West. Non-conformists suffer, of course, but they are ostracized in the West too. I do not mean non-conformists who demonstrate their disdain for society by sporting beards, sandals and ragged jeans. You have them in the Soviet Union too.

But I have met a few students at Tel Aviv University who secretly told me they are Communists, but begged me not to mention it, because they are afraid of being boycotted or worse.

The only difference, as far as I can see, is between the Soviet and Western concepts of personal freedom. Here no one tells the graduates what to do and where to work. There, they are guided, directed and controlled by the state from the moment they graduate till the moment they drop dead.

What really matters, after all, is national liberty and self-determination. I had not felt its lack in Kharkiv, though my parents did. But now that I look back at what I still call the best years of my life, I can see where I was wrong. It is just as wrong to force Kharkiv students to use Russian only, as it would be to impose Arabic on Tel Aviv students. And if Israelis could translate the vast scientific and technological literature into Hebrew, coin new terms and be "with it" all along the line, I cannot see why the Ukrainians have to learn Russian to receive a degree in mathematics. But that is a problem of national consciousness, not of education."

## LINGUISTIC STUDIES OF PROF. GEORGE Y. SHEVELOV\*

By JACOB P. HURSKY

Many readers and admirers of Professor George Y. Shevelov, who turned 60 on December 17 last, know him as the author of numerous articles of a literary critical character under the pen-names of "Jurij Šerex" or "Hryhorij Ševčuk." It is through his scholarly works in linguistics, however, that he has gained most recognition not only among Ukrainians but among Slavists all over the world.

His published works total nearly 400. The majority of these deal with various problems of the Ukrainian language and Slavic linguistics. This brief survey will focus on the author's most significant contributions to linguistics.

Professor Shevelov began his scholarly career during the thirties with research in the field of the modern Ukrainian literary language. This is evidenced, for instance, by one of his earliest articles, "Problema movy social'noji dramy" (The Problem of Language in Social Drama), published in *Za jakist' xudožn'oji movy* by the Scientific Institute of Linguistics at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (Kharkiv, 1934), and especially by his dissertation for the degree of "kandydat filolohičnyx nauk," "Iz sposterežen' nad movoju sučasnoji poeziji" (Some Observations on the Language of Contemporary Poetry), which he wrote under the guidance of Professor L. A. Bulaxovs'kyj and defended in 1939. The dissertation was later published in parts in *Učeni zapysky Xarkivs'koho deržavnoho universytetu* (20, Kharkiv, 1940, pp. 43-99), *Naukovi zapysky Instytutu žurnalistyky* (1, Kharkiv, 1940, pp. 127-142), and *Naukovi zapysky Instytutu movoznavstva AN URSS* (1, Kiev, 1940, pp. 3-51).

Although there were interruptions for other investigations, Professor Shevelov has persistently continued his research into the problems of the Ukrainian language until today. As a result of his untiring efforts, the following scholarly works have appeared:

1. *Do henezy nazyvnoho rečennja* (On the Genesis of Nominal Sentences] (1947, 50 + 16 p.), in which the author, on the basis of material selected from the Ukrainian literary language of the nine-

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\* An exception is made here in maintaining the original transliteration of titles of books and articles in the Ukrainian and other languages used by the author, which is at variance with that adopted by this review.—ED.

teenth and twentieth century, traced the development of nominal sentences as a special type of syntactic construction, the peculiarities of their usage, and their connection with the so-called incomplete sentences.

2. *Halyčyna v formuvanni novoji ukrains'koji literaturnoji movy* [The Role of Galicia in the Formation of the New Ukrainian Literary Language] (UVU, Munich, 1949, 93 p.), wherein the author showed the role and importance of Galician linguistic elements in the Ukrainian literary language, and how they penetrated it.

3. *Narys sučasnoji ukrajins'koji literaturnoji movy* [An Outline of the Contemporary Ukrainian Literary Language] (NTŠ, Munich, 1951, 402 p.), which is an attempt to describe the modern Ukrainian literary language as a system, with all the richness of its stylistic variants. The work's value is that it contains much new material, which the author independently observed, analyzed, and skillfully presented.

4. *The Syntax of Modern Literary Ukrainian. The Simple Sentence* (Mouton and Co., The Hague, 1963, 319 p.). This original work, abundant with illustrative supporting data, has a long history. First written in 1940, it was sent to the publishing house *Radjans'ka škola* in Kiev as part of a comprehensive survey of modern literary Ukrainian that was prepared by several authors for the use of university students in the Ukr.SSR. With the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, however, the fate of this work was obscured for some time. Fortunately, the author was able to recover the manuscript and had the opportunity to revise and enlarge it to book length. After the war, efforts were made to publish the book. Professor E. Koschmieder of Munich University translated it into German, but because of a lack of funds the manuscript remained unprinted until the publishing house *Mouton and Co.* suggested its publication in an English translation. Along with this English version, the first version, entitled "Proste rečennja" [The Simple Sentence], was also published in the two-volume *Kurs sučasnoji ukrajins'koji literaturnoji movy* (Vol. II, *Syntaksys*, 1951, pp. 5-141) in Kiev, but without crediting the author. Instead, the following note was added at the end of Professor Shevelov's work: "Opracjuvav za materialamy Instytutu movoznavstva Akademiji Nauk USSR L.A. Bulaxovs'kyj." [Adapted from materials of the Linguistic Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukr.SSR by L.A. Bulaxovs'kyj].

5. *Die ukrainische Schriftsprache 1798-1965 (Ihre Entwicklung unter dem Einfluss der Dialekte)* [The Ukrainian Literary Language

1798-1965 (Its Development under the Influence of Dialects)] (Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1966, viii + 179 p.). This book is based on the previously mentioned work on the influence of Galician linguistic elements on the development of the Ukrainian literary language, the author completely revising and updating it with new data. The book also elucidates the impact of the Chernihiv dialect on the formation of the modern Ukrainian literary language.

Among the smaller works of Professor Shevelov mention ought be made of the following: "Tradycja i novatorstvo v leksyčy i stylistyčy Ivana Kotljarevs'koho" [Tradition and Innovation in the Lexicon and Stylistics of Ivan Kotljarevs'kyj] (*Učeni zapysky Xarkivs'koho deržavnoho universytetu*, 20, Kharkiv, 1940, pp. 131-170); "Mova na dyskusija 1891-1893 rokiv i učast' u nij Ivana Franka" [Linguistic Discussion 1891-1893 and Ivan Franko's Participation in It] (*Ridne slovo*, 6, Munich, 1946, pp. 73-79); "Mova ukrajins'koji emigraciji v Nimeččyni (1945-1948)" [The Language of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany (1945-1948)] (*S'ohočasne i mynule*, 1-2, Munich—New York, 1949, pp. 38-45); "Konsonanten vor *e*, *i* in den protoukrainischen Dialekten" [Consonants before *e*, *i* in the Proto-Ukrainian Dialects] (*Festschrift für Max Vasmer zum 70. Geburtstag*, Berlin, 1956, pp. 482-494); "Die 'Grammatik der kleinrussischen Mundart' von Pavlovskij und ihr Autor" [The "Grammar of the Little Russian Dialect" by Pavlovskij and its Author] (*Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie*, XXVII, 1, Heidelberg, 1958, pp. 49-89) [The revised Ukrainian version: " 'Hramatyka,' ščo naležyt' do istoriji literatury ('Hramatyka malorosijs'koho nariččja' Pavlovs'koho ta jiji avtor)" — The "Grammar" Which Belongs to the History of Literature ("Grammar of the Little Russian Dialect" by Pavlovskyj and its Author) (*Slovo*, 2, New York, 1964, pp. 177-197)]; "Pokolinnja dvadcatyix rokiv v ukrajins'komu movoznavstvi" [The Generation of the Twenties in Ukrainian Linguistics] (*Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. ševčenko*, CLXXIII, Paris — Chicago, 1962, pp. 309-332); "L'ukrainien littéraire" [Literary Ukrainian] (*Revue des études slaves*, XXXIII, 1-4, Paris, 1956, pp. 68-83); "History of the Ukrainian Language" (*Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, I, ed. by V. Kubijovyč, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1963, pp. 481-504, 509-511); about 50 references on linguistic questions which have so far appeared in *Encyklopedija Ukrajinoznavstva*, both in Ukrainian and in English; numerous reviews many of which are on a level of independent studies of separate problems (e.g., lexicology, etymology, history of language, etc), and others.

Worthy of special note are Professor Shevelov's monographs and articles devoted to study of the Ukrainian linguistic heritage. In his *Kost' Mychal'čuk* (21. XII. 1840 - 7. IV. 1914) (UVAN, Serija: Ukrajin's'ki včeni č. 3, Winnipeg, 1952, 39 p.), "Kost' Mychal'čuk (1841-1914) als Dialektologe" [Kost' Mychal'čuk as Dialectologist] (*Orbis*, I, 1, Louvain, 1952, pp. 261-271), *Vsevolod Hancov — Olena Kurylo* (UVAN, Serija: Ukrajin's'ki včeni č. 5, Winnipeg, 1954, 77 p.). "Alexander Potebnja as a Linguist" (*The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, V, 2-3 [16-17], New York, 1956, pp. 1112-1127), and others, he concretely and objectively brings to light the contributions of these scholars to the development of Ukrainian linguistics.

Since the thirties Professor Shevelov has also been known as the author of several textbooks: (in co-authorship with N. Kahanyč) *Hramatyka ukrajins'koji movy* [Ukrainian Grammar] (Vol. I: *Morfolohija*, Vol. II: *Syntaksa*; Kharkiv, 1934; 2nd ed. in 1935; 3rd ed. in 1936); (with L. Dohad'ko) *Lekciji z ukrais'koji movy dlja žurnalistiv* (Lekciji 2, 3, 4, 7) [Ukrainian Language Lessons for Journalists (Lessons 2, 3, 4, 7)] (Kharkiv, 1935); (with D. Kyslycja) *Hramatyka ukrajins'koji movy. Posibnyk dlja himnaziji. Častyno. II: Syntaksa* [Ukrainian Grammar. A Textbook for Gymnasiums. Part II: Syntax] (Munich, 1947); *Holovni pravyla ukrajins'koho pravopysu* [The Main Rules of Ukrainian Orthography] (Neu Ulm, 1946). Although Professor Shevelov himself later wrote negatively about the textbooks published in Kharkiv, and especially about the second part of *Hramatyka* (See: Ju. Šerex, "Pryncypy j etapy bol'se-vyc'koji movnoji polityky na Ukrajinii" [Principles of and Stages in the Bolshevik Language Policy in Ukraine], *Sučasna Ukrajina*, No. 15, 1952), we mention them here only to emphasize that, by virtue of his co-authorship, he already was at that time a recognized authority in his field.

Beginning in 1950, in which year Professor Shevelov left the Ukrainian Free University in Munich and assumed a position at the University of Lund (Sweden), a new field of research, which in time became a leading one, began to be evident. His attention became focused on various problems in Slavic linguistics. Professor Shevelov's interest in Slavic linguistics intensified when he moved to Harvard (1952) and later to Columbia (1954). During his teaching at these three Universities he had written the following significant works:

1. *Probleme der Bildung des Zahlwortes als Redeteil in den sla-*

*vischen Sprachen* [Problems in the Formation of the Numeral as a Part of Speech in the Slavic Languages] (Lunds Universitets Arsskrift. N.F. Avd. 1. Bd 48. Nr 2, Lund, 1952, 171 p.) — a thorough study, comprising two relatively independent parts. In the first part, the author devotes his attention to interesting phenomena in the development of the modern Ukrainian literary language (which do not have parallels in other Slavic languages), such as the tendency to substitute the numerals *dvoje*, *troje*, *četyvero* for *dva*, *try*, *čotyry* whenever they (i.e., *dva*, *try*...) are used with substantives of the neuter gender. In the second part, the use of the nominative and genitive plural of adjectives with the numerals *dva*, *try*, *čotyry* is discussed. In both parts modern literary Ukrainian served as a point of departure.

2. *Participium Universale im Slavischen* [The "Participium Universale" in Slavic] (*Slavistica*, 16, Verlag der Ukrainischen Freien Akademie der Wissenschaften, Winnipeg, 1953, 43 p.), which provides considerable insight into the causes of the decline of the participial system in the Slavic languages.

3. *Problems in the Formation of Belorussian* (Supplement to *Word*, Vol. 9, Monograph No. 2, New York, 1953, + 109 p.), wherein on the basis of a detailed analysis of separate features of Belorussian, chiefly of its phonetic system, and of historical data, the author made an attempt at an historical scheme of the formation of the Belorussian language.

4. *A Prehistory of Slavic: The Historical Phonology of Common Slavic* (Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, Heidelberg, 1964, and also: Columbia University Press, New York, 1965, xx + 662 p.) — the largest linguistic work of the author. According to one reviewer, this book contains more information on Slavic comparative linguistics than any other single volume ever published in English. Using the vast data supplied by both the modern Slavic languages and their older texts, Professor Shevelov systematically presented the development of Common Slavic from its formation as a dialect of Indo-European to its final disintegration into the separate historically attested Slavic languages. Special attention was devoted to the chronology of the main sound changes, with broad use of the data of Slavic etymology and onomastics. The significance of this fundamental work lies not only in the systematic and detailed elucidation of the phonological development of Common Slavic and in the abundance of the utilized linguistic material, but also in the value of the

bibliography added to each of the book's 35 chapters, not to mention the originality of the author himself.

Besides these extensive books, Professor Shevelov has written smaller works on various problems of Slavic linguistics, of which the following are most significant: "Phonema errans" [The "Wandering Phoneme"] (*Lingua*, II, 4, Haarlem, 1950, pp. 399-418); "The Problem of Ukrainian-Polish Linguistic Relations from the Tenth to the Fourteenth Century" (*Word*, VIII, 4, New York, 1952, pp. 329-349); "Zur Frage der Ukrainisch-Weissruthenischen Sprachgrenze" [On the Question of the Ukrainian-Belorussian Linguistic Boundary] (*Orbis*, II, 1, Louvain, 1953, pp. 40-48); "Ukrainisches *vantaž* 'Ladung, Frachtgut, Last' und das Problem der 'Argot-Suffixe'" [Ukrainian *vantaž* 'load, freight, cargo' and the Problem of "Argot-Suffix"] (*Zeitschrift für slavische Philologies*, XXIII, Heidelberg, 1954, pp. 146-167); "On Truncated Compounds in Slavic: Type Pol. *ptakoryb*, Rus. *kosogor*" (*For Roman Jakobson. Essays on the Occasion of His Sixtieth Birthday*, Mouton and Co., The Hague, 1956, pp. 458-466); "The Structure of the Root in Modern Russian" (*The Slavic and East European Journal*, XV, 2, Bloomington, 1957, pp. 106-124); "Трът'-type Groups and the Problem of Moravian Components in Old Church Slavonic" (*The Slavonic and East European Review*, XXXV, 85, London, 1957, pp. 379-398); "A Latent Phoneme in Making: The Affricate 3 in Slavic" (Miscelánea homenaje á André Martinet "Estructuralismo e historia," 1, Canarias, 1957, pp. 251-276); "Die kirchenslavischen Elemente in der russischen Literatursprache und die Rolle A. Šachmatovs bei ihrer Erforschung" [Church Slavic Elements in the Russian Literary Language and the Role Played by A. Šachmatov in Their Investigation] (A. Šachmatov—G. Y. Shevelov, *Die kirchenslavischen Elemente in der modernen russischen Literatursprache*, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1960, pp. 43-106); "Die Wechselwirkung von zwei Akzentuierungstypen der Partizipien Präteriti Passivi von Verben der 3. Klasse mit Infinitiv -at' in den slavischen Sprachen" [The Mutual Effect of Two Accentuation Types of Past Passive Participles of the Third Class Verbs with Infinitive in -at' in the Slavic Languages] (Paul Diels zum 80. Geburtstag, *Die Welt der Slaven*, VII, 4, Wiesbaden, 1962, pp. 359-371); "Prothetic Consonants in Common Slavic. An Historical Approach" (*American Contributions to the Fifth International Congress, Sofia, September, 1963, Vol. I: Linguistic Contributions*, Mouton and Co. (Slavistic Printings and Reprintings, 46), The Hague, 1963, pp. 243-262); "Belorussian and Ukrainian" (*Current Trends in*



*Linguistics*, 1, ed. T.A. Sebeok, The Hague, 1963, pp. 217-264); "*e > 'o* ou '*o > e* das les langues slaves de l'est?" [*e > 'o* or '*o > e* in the East Slavic Languages?] (*Revue des études slaves*, 40 (Mélanges André Vaillant), Paris, 1964, pp. 183-190); "Weak *Jers* in Serbo-Croatian and South Slavic: Developments in the World Initial Syllable" (*Zbornik za filologiju i lingvistiku*, VII, Matica srpska, Novi Sad, 1964, pp. 23-43); "Dwie uwagi o słowiańskim *ě*" [Two Notes on Slavic *ě*] (*Studia z filologii polskiej i słowiańskiej*, 5, Warszawa, 1965, pp. 93-100); "On Endings with Nasal Consonants after Palatal and Palatalized Consonants. An Inquiry into the Allophonic Structure of Common Slavic" (*Die Welt der Slaven*, X, 3-4 (Festgabe für Erwin Koschmieder), Wiesbaden, 1965, pp. 233-244); "Orzeczenia bezpodmiotowe odimiesłowowe na *-no*, *-to* w języku polskim przed rokiem 1450" [Subjetless Participial Predicates in *-no*, *-to* in the Polish Language Prior to 1450] (*Slavia Orientalis*, XVII, 3, Warszawa, 1968, pp. 387-394); numerous reviews, and others.

In surveying the scholarly work of Professor Shevelov on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, a few words about him as a teacher and as a person may not be inappropriate.

All who have had the good fortune to be his students admire his erudition, the high degree of his culture, and his effectiveness as a teacher. His lectures are always material, interesting, rich in content, extremely systematic, and original. He so skillfully teaches difficult and at times rather complicated subject matter that he unfailingly captivates his audience.

In his relations with others, and especially with students and younger scholars, he is always attentive, kind, ready to listen and to provide assistance wherever possible. Therefore, all who know him and especially those who have had an opportunity to work with him for long periods of time hold him in the highest esteem and share a common feeling of indebtedness toward him. So, on this anniversary they wish him good health, courage, and further success in all his future endeavors.

## THE POSITION OF PRESIDENT NIXON

*By* CLARENCE A. MANNING

When Richard Milhous Nixon was inaugurated President of the United States on January 20, 1969, he had been prepared perhaps better than any President of recent years for his high office, and in his inaugural address he deliberately adopted a moderate attitude, which was markedly different from that of his immediate predecessors. Whereas both John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson had been each in his own way flamboyant and challenging, Nixon sought rather to call for quiet and the ability to listen and talk things over in the midst of an angered and demoralized population. It was a highly sensible and peace-making move, if peace were the goal that underlies the demands of the quarreling and alienated classes of the American people. If it were rather power and violence, his words would have little meaning and something more was needed.

There was a peaceful transfer of power. During the post-election period, President Johnson had offered to the new administration all possible opportunities for familiarizing the different members with the work of the previous incumbents and so, far from showing signs of bitterness as had occurred on many previous occasions of the sort, the retiring President seemed almost happy that he was now relieved of responsibility and could pass the burden over to some new individual who would learn very soon the heartaches and the responsibilities of his office. As the exercises went on with the evident tight security methods, the latter spoke more eloquently than anything else of the dangers and the difficulties that the new President was facing. Yet even in the question of the White House and its furnishings, the decorum was strictly observed and everyone seemed satisfied.

President Nixon had had long experience in prominent political posts. He had fought his way to the U.S. Senate in the rough and ready politics of California. He had been Vice President under Dwight D. Eisenhower for two terms and the Vice President had had abundant opportunity to meet the heads of many foreign governments

and he had himself after his election visited several of the European states. He had sent trusted representatives on short trips to report on the actual feelings in many parts of the world and to present a series of reports by which he could check on the extent to which there had been misjudgments by the representatives of the old bureaucracy. In a word, he had done his homework well for his new post, and he had good reason to hope that his attitude would start the long slow process of building up again that close cooperation between the government and the population, the restoration of law and order in the American sense as the people had known it in the past in their saner moments, and of reviving belief in the American form of government.

He was well aware that he had been defeated in 1960, when he first ran for President with Henry Cabot Lodge, by a small margin of the popular vote and a larger electoral vote, and there were many who believed that Lodge could have won for his careful work in the United Nations. Now he had won himself by a small electoral vote and perhaps a larger popular majority with Vice President Agnew, the Governor of Maryland. Unfortunately, he was compelled to start his administration under a great handicap. The Republican Party had secured a majority in neither House of Congress and the success of his administration was, therefore, dependent on his political skill in forming a sufficient majority of both parties to allow him to secure the enactment of the most necessary and desirable legislation. In all this his position was unlike that of President Eisenhower, who had swept into office as the leader in World War II and the great pacifier, though by the end of his second administration, Eisenhower had lost much of his control over Congress, but not his power of charming and winning friends.

The first weeks of Nixon's administration were filled with disappointments and untoward events which cast lurid shadows before them. There was the death of President Eisenhower in Walter Reed Hospital and the relationship between the two men had become closer since Nixon's daughter had married Eisenhower's grandson. Eisenhower had always felt a sense of accomplishment for securing the armistice in Korea. But now, with the growing truculence of North Koreans as a result of the Pueblo affair which had not been settled, the North Koreans shot down an American plane on the charge that it had invaded North Korean air space, even though a Soviet ship was suspiciously close enough to have to pick up the bodies of some survivors far off shore as a proof that there was more truth than fiction in the stories of the neglect of the American gov-

erment in the loss of the Pueblo and strange rumors as to how the crew was released and why.

Then came the Supreme Court scandal over Justice Abe Fortas. Earl Warren, also a former Governor of California, had been backed by Nixon perhaps to remove a rival, when President Eisenhower came into office and was more than entitled to retire from a post about which his admirers and detractors still argue. President Johnson wanted to promote Justice Fortas to the post of Chief Justice and it was arranged that Warren would retire as soon as Fortas was confirmed in it. This was unprecedented and in the last months of the old administration the plan failed. Yet scarcely had Nixon taken office when a new attack on Fortas was launched under such conditions that the Justice felt it necessary not only to defend himself for his actions but also to resign from the Court. It was the worst attack on the integrity of the Supreme Court since the Court was first organized under the Constitution and its consequences are not yet apparent. President Nixon, after having recently appointed a new Chief Justice, still must name a new Justice and he can be very sure that in view of the general partisanship which has broken out, the Democratic majority in the Senate will scrutinize any new appointments with far more than their usual vigor.

In the meanwhile Nixon has had to realize that it is far less easy to free himself from the dead hand of the past and to wipe the slate clean so as to remove the existing evils and defects than he had imagined, both in the field of domestic affairs as well as in foreign relations. A new President sees himself almost automatically forced to propitiate and satisfy the promises of his predecessor as a price of domestic tranquility and to secure for himself a base for operations. Nixon had tried to solve some of these difficulties in the choice of a cabinet. Many of these appointees had held office under President Eisenhower, but there were several who had had key posts in the administration of President Johnson and the new President had apparently hoped that this show of impartiality, and that he would be the President of all America would be of value. This was true only in part and the honeymoon period, in which he had the sympathy of a possibly hostile Congress in Democratic hands, proved shorter than he had hoped. It was perhaps for this reason that he chose Representative Melvin Laird of Michigan to be Secretary of Defense. Laird was perhaps the leading Republican expert on the Armed Services Committee of the House and almost the most mili-

tarily knowledgeable Congressman in the nation but at the same time Nixon risked the loss of a Republican member of Congress, if the seat in the next election went to a Democrat. It seemed worth the risk and now Laird is perhaps the leading member of the President's cabinet and the one most bitterly attacked for some of the problems, in which the old administration was involved.

There is no need to mention more than a few cases. In his often grandiloquent manner, President Johnson had declared that the United States was rich enough to abolish poverty for good and all, not only in the United States, but in the world. President Nixon is being labelled cold and unsympathetic because he has taken a more sober view of some of the situations before him. He has tried to close some of the work camps set up in the country for the underprivileged of the cities and he has aroused the ire of some of the communities in which they were located, even though those same communities had previously complained of their presence, exactly as the neighbors of the various Western forts in the late nineteenth century grumbled at the presence of the troops, but wanted the local markets derived from them. Cities are demanding the money to which they felt they were entitled under the Johnson promises, and complaining that they will not be able to function, if they do not get it. The Johnson Administration presented some views for the control of mergers under the Anti-Trust laws. When President Nixon submitted that report without comment to Congress and commenced to try to unscramble the problem of the conglomerate mergers (so called), he has been accused of harassing business.

The great controversy between President Johnson and the Kennedy family, which embittered his years in the White House, was not allowed to be buried after the murder of Senator Robert Kennedy of New York. His younger brother, Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, secured election as assistant Democratic leader and has continued as the foremost opponent of all the Nixon policies and as the logical speaker for his two murdered brothers has made himself the leading anti-Nixon spokesman in the Senate. The other leaders, such as Senator McCarthy and Senator McGovern, two of the foremost opponents of the war in Vietnam, have renewed their campaign against President Nixon with ever new demands for food for the hungry and undernourished poor and the attack on the waste of the nation's resources on foreign adventures, while Senator Kennedy has referred to the seizure by the American army of a mountain top near Laos as a proof that Nixon is sacrificing American boys to military pride.

At the same time everything is being done to spread discontent among the Black Africans and Puerto Ricans, and the charges of racialism are being pressed with renewed vigor in all the colleges and universities and especially at Harvard and the New York City University, where the old College of the City of New York has been closed down for some weeks amid a series of confrontations, the accepted word today for a riot.

Meanwhile the demands of the Students for a Democratic Society, a frankly self-proclaimed revolutionary group of students, are increasing and the students are trying to sway student thought, etc., to demand the end of all connection between the government and the American educational system. The scenes of general disorder, the claims of the Black Panthers and other paramilitary groups are increasing and so far no effective way has been found to limit their claims and vandalism. All this has been the heritage of the past, while the newfound "conscience" of many ecclesiastical bodies is fostering a disregard for even the most elementary attempts of the American government to obtain even a possible, much less a durable, peace and to secure even the minimum respect for American rights, which to them are merely the outgrowth of a vile white racism. In a word, President Nixon's hope that dialogue could supersede shouting and that people would become reasonable has not been filled and there has been no sign that it will be in the present circumstances.

In the foreign field, the situation has likewise changed in many unexpected situations. During the whole of the recent administrations, the hope that progress could be made in American relations with France, which had cooled considerably, had been raised as a result of President Nixon's attitude to France and General Charles de Gaulle. This was strengthened after the visit to Washington by President de Gaulle for the funeral of ex-President Eisenhower, but the situation took a very different turn, when the referendum demanded by the French President was turned into a statement that the President would retire, if he were not supported. When the French people as a majority refused to give him a majority in that referendum, the President merely announced that he was not continuing to exercise the duties of his office and abruptly retired. It was exactly the opposite of General MacArthur's statement "I Will Return," when that seemed hopeless. Does President de Gaulle expect to be once again called back? He is now seventy-eight years old. The candidates for his post are more or less repeating the old

political splits that almost fatally sapped the position of France before the assumption of power by de Gaulle, but until the completion of the elections, we will not know whether France is going even to try to resume her place in the organization of Europe, or to cooperate effectively with the forces of unification with the Western world.

At the same time President Nixon is facing the need of reorganizing almost from the ground up the diplomatic corps of the United States. Almost all of the diplomats in many key posts not only submitted their resignations, as a matter of courtesy, but they have actually left the service for reasons of age. The so-called Kennan school of diplomats, who have practically passed the post of Ambassador to the Soviet Union around, have definitely retired and so has the popular Ambassador to Japan, E. Reischauer, who has returned to Harvard University as Professor of Japanese. Thus at a crucial moment the new administration sees itself compelled to choose among the younger men in the department and to train them for the more advanced posts in a relatively short time. Most of these disagreed with President Johnson during the last year, but the basis of their charges relate more to the actions of Johnson than to those of Nixon, but it is the new administration that is now responsible and the new President must find his way among the charges.

There is little doubt that President Nixon recognizes the difficulties of the situation in Vietnam. Averell Harriman, who was used by President Johnson to start the Paris negotiations, left Paris on the eve of the change in administration and even he is talking that the United States should risk its position for peace by withdrawing some 50,000 Americans from the battlefield. We can easily see the attacks that would be made on the new administration, if that were to involve the danger of a new Communist takeover of the South and the establishment of Communism throughout Southeast Asia, even after all the cries of the anti-Johnson faction that the United States should not be involved in the name not of isolation but of conscience. Fortunately, he has chosen as his choice of negotiator the very competent Henry Cabot Lodge, who gave up the active search for political power after 1960 and has since become aware not only of Communist intrigues at the United Nations, but of the way in which they have been applied in Vietnam by a long tour of duty there as American ambassador. Nixon's choice of him as the American representative and the wording of the Eight Points for the stabilizing of the political situation seem to offer some an-

swer to the audacious plans of the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front for repeating a planned infiltration of the government for a peaceful unification. Yet, even the carrying on of these negotiations is being hampered by the low morale at home and the divisions of which the Communists are fully informed and on which they are relying for the support of the American intellectuals.

In the meanwhile it will take the President some time to secure the smooth working of a system, which will endeavor to improve morale at home in the administration of the law with the new Chief Justice, who is perhaps more conscious of the problems of disorder than the past administration would have desired. In this sense President Nixon is perhaps engaged in a race against time with his desire to promote dialogue and listening in the American population which has not drawn serious conclusions from the fact that when President Johnson to promote peace ordered the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, the enemy at once began to use the demilitarized zone set by the agreement of 1954 as an open base for attacks upon the American troops and has launched from it some 5,000 attacks upon the Americans and their South Vietnamese and other allies, while continuing to advance in Laos and in Cambodia, and perhaps more secretly in Burma, Thailand and Eastern India. Thus certain seeds of discontent are being sown among the troops by some of the malcontents, who have been drafted into the army.

Another of the problems which is facing President Nixon is that of the A.B.M. system. This was the plan drawn up by President Johnson for spreading across the United States a thin screen of anti-missile missiles for protection against attacks from Communist China. It was largely a protection against a theoretical attack, for the people put no credence in the idea that Communist China would be able to possess a store of intercontinental missiles in the near future. Yet the early reports to President Nixon indicated that there was much progress in this direction by the Soviet Union, and he early decided that some such system should be prepared by the United States in case its present missile protection proved incapable of warding off an attack on American cities. To satisfy some of the critics the sites for these new weapons were to be placed not in the cities, but at a distance in fundamentally open country. This again annoyed the anti-Johnson faction, who transferred to the Pentagon under Nixon and his Secretary for Defense all the accusations, which they had raised in their opposition to President Johnson. These ranged from waste in the procurement of missiles to delays in



spending money that had been voted by Congress and any other charges which they could imagine. In a word, the new President in the relations with the Soviet Union in all its ramifications and counter-preparations has been made fully conscious of the dead hand of history, which has fettered his hopeful dreams that the change of administration could open a new period. He has found instead, as President Eisenhower found late in his term of office, that all such attempts at a reducing of tensions with the Soviet Union have resulted only in a raising of the scope of the Soviet demands and that the attempt to negotiate on the peripheral demands of the Communists, while they are calling for competitive and peaceful coexistence, are counterbalanced and more by the Soviet and Chinese support of "national liberation," which is being applied wherever it offers a prospect of success, while it involves the recognition of the unified character of the Communist-controlled world as exemplified by the "Brezhnev Doctrine" denying the full independence of any Communist-controlled state and granting to Moscow and its associates the right to interfere in the internal affairs of any Communist state, which wanders in an important detail from the true faith.

We could go on at length and discuss the application of all the foregoing to the other continents, and to the negotiations in the Disarmament Commission and the United Nations on the neutralization of the ocean floor and the relation of this to the continental shelf. The same principles will be found to be applicable in each case.

What then is the position of President Nixon? If we can judge from his statements, his position represents a modern version of those principles that have been decisive in fostering the growth of the United States to its present position in the world and in its domestic affairs. Those ideas have been challenged in recent years in several ways. The increasing complexity of the world scene and the speed of communication have led to necessary adjustments, which have yet to be fully acclimated. But there have appeared out of the extremes of both conservatives and radicals new calls for revolution to be conducted, so far as we can judge, for the pleasures of revolution with no idea of what is to be placed in the place of the discarded and destroyed. Many portions of the population, won over by artificial rhetoric and extravagant assurances that the millennium is here, have reacted accordingly with the creation of an opposition which has been more noisy and incoherent than intelligent. President Nixon has recognized this and he apparently took

office with perhaps the hope that he could calm this quietly. He has not been able to achieve this by words. Whether he can accomplish it gradually, while yet there is time, may be doubtful, but there has yet been no sign as to whether he will yield to the new course and once his administration gets firmly in the saddle, we can expect him to be more definite in both his statements and in his use of the necessary force and methods to make those statements effective. He may not become one of the more flamboyant presidents, but that does not mean he will be one of the ineffective leaders.

As President Theodore Roosevelt said in refusing to meet Maxim Gorky on his visit to the United States, "He seems to be more hostile to the ordinary conventions and decencies of life than to the evils and corruptions of society." If President Nixon can assume a position like that of Theodore Roosevelt, he will do more for America and freedom than all his pseudo-moralistic and idealistic critics and will help advance the objectives for which the United States has ever stood and also restore the national morale, the first step in the restoration of law and order.

## BOOK REVIEWS

**EXPANSION AND COEXISTENCE.** The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967. By Adam B. Ulam. Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York-Washington, 1968, pp. 775, \$12.95.

To assess and analyze the course of Soviet foreign policy for the past fifty years is by no means an easy and uncomplicated assignment. The author of the present book, Adam B. Ulam once wrote:

"The student of Soviet affairs has his first task to be neither hopeful nor pessimistic but simply to state the facts and tendencies of Russian politics. It is when he begins to see in certain political trends the inevitabilities of the future and when he superimposes upon them his own conclusions about the desirable policies of America toward the USSR that he is courting trouble..."

Mindful of this precept Prof. Ulam has provided a monumental work on the fifty-year history of Soviet foreign policy, from its infancy all the way to the world nuclear power of the present.

The author has investigated the ways in which the original foundations of Soviet foreign policy, stemming from both Czardom and the Bolshevik's own Marxist and revolutionary dogmatism — have been adapted, changed or preserved during the period of a half century. These two sources — the heritage of Russian Czars and the Marxist ideology — were and still are the decisive elements in the formulation of Soviet policy.

In Chapter II, "The Prelude: 1914-18," Prof. Ulam discusses extensively Russian "nationality policy" with respect to other Slavic and non-Slavic peoples (Poles, Ukrainians, Finns, the Caucasian nations), and demonstrates how Russian governments have tried to suppress these peoples whenever they could, retreating only when pressed and cornered by overwhelming forces. Such was the case in the recognition of the Ukrainian National Republic in Kiev in 1917, and then again, in the recognition of Ukraine and Finland as independent countries at the peace treaty of Brest Litovsk. The failure of the "White Russian" movements to restore the old Czarist regime is ascribed by the author to Denikin's rigid position on the nationality issue, which "made him begrudge not only the claims for independence of the Poles, Ukrainians and Caucasian nationalities but even claims for simple autonomy advanced by such groups as the Don and Kuban Cossacks."

In his detailed and vivid description of the post-war period the author introduces the reader to a number of great Soviet leaders who helped shape Soviet foreign policy, and he provides an excellent and unbiased interpretation of the major themes they were forced to deal with: Russian nationalism, Communist-Marxist expansion and "coexistence" with European and Far Eastern powers and the United States of America.

Of particular interest is the author's analysis of Soviet-German relation prior to the outbreak of World War II. He clearly indicates that Stalin

and his lieutenants were deeply concerned over Ukraine as a key problem, for they realized that the vast non-Russian populations and areas of the USSR could be as easily detached from the Soviet Russian empire as they had been from the Czarist in 1917. The Nazi-Soviet "coexistence" in 1939-41 provided Stalin with a great opportunity to step up the suppression of Ukrainian nationalist groups, particularly in Western Ukraine. It is to be recalled that in 1917-18, when the German-Austrian troops moved into Ukraine, there were Ukrainian detachments accompanying them. In buying off the Nazis Stalin secured Western Ukraine, where he instituted mass terror and deportations, so as to decapitate and make less dangerous the Ukrainian independence movement in the event of a new German-Russian conflict.

Also well assessed and analyzed are the Grand Alliance during World War II and the nascent discord which the victory over Germany, Italy and Japan generated between the USSR and the Western allies. The author then turns to the tangled Soviet diplomacy as it involved Europe and Asia, and discusses the origins of the Cold War. He also traces the cause and rise of Russian hegemony over Eastern Europe, and studies the emergence of a new Communist great power, Communist China, with the ensuing Sino-Soviet conflict in the early 1960's and the growth of "polycentrism" in Europe.

A whole series of events pass under review, such as the Hungarian revolution in 1956, the Suez crisis, the Arab-Israel war, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and the difficult question of Soviet-American relations. Also, considerable space is devoted to the many issues rising from the break-up of the world Communist movement, the nature of West-East coexistence in a nuclear age, and the current ambiguous course of Soviet foreign policy in Eastern and Western Europe, the Far East and in the countries of Africa and Latin America.

The author concludes that for the past fifty years the Soviet foreign policy has been driven by an expansionist urge and a need to "coexist" with other nations of the world. Carried by the momentum of its policies and habits the USSR may continue to pursue its ideological and territorial expansion and the mirage of Communist unity. Or its leaders may make a fateful decision to reorient its expansionist policies -- to break with the past, to forsake expansion, and to seek world stability.

This would involve a series of great risks, both domestically and internationally. "That which stops growing begins to rot" is the old Russian dictum, a precept to which Soviet Russian leaders very much adhere today.

Prof. Ulam has provided a powerful study which goes much beyond the USSR alone; in this respect the book is a weighty contribution to a great number of studies which have been published on the USSR in the course of the past few decades.

The author has written other excellent books, equally competent and authoritative, *The Bolsheviks* and *The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism*. Born in Poland in 1922, he came to the United States in 1938; since 1946 he has been a member of the faculty of Harvard University.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

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*THE UKRAINIAN CANADIANS: A HISTORY.* By Michael H. Marunchak. Winnipeg. Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences. 1968. 467 pages.

This first volume of a recent study of Ukrainian Canadians is an ambitious attempt to portray the history of the Ukrainian settlement in Canada

with its varied social, economic, and cultural problems. Mr. Marunchak, who has published several works since 1963, including *Studies in the History of Ukrainians in Canada* in two volumes, is the best-qualified Ukrainian Canadian historian to write such a work.

In his study he raises several basic issues. What were the forces driving Ukrainians to settle in Canada? How much change was needed to integrate this new immigration into Canadian society? What was the extent of the political, social, and economic transformations that occurred within the immigrants and in the attitude of the Canadians and their government to these new members of their society?

The author divides the history of Ukrainian Canadians into three periods: (1) the pioneer period, which lasted to the end of the First World War; (2) the period of growth, continued integration and disintegration which fell between the two world wars; and (3) the period of Ukrainian organizational solidification, complete integration and differentiation with Canadian society, which began at the end of the Second World War. The author links these three periods with three waves of Ukrainian immigration to Canada and with three generations of Ukrainian Canadians who were born and educated in Canada.

The book is divided into six parts. In the first part Mr. Marunchak portrays the historical events of Ukrainian immigration into Canada from 1891 through 1896, the year of the first major mass immigration, to 1912 and beyond this period, in order to emphasize more clearly the significance of earlier events in their relationship to future growth and development. This material begins with the historical background of the Ukrainian people in general. In his introduction Mr. Marunchak discusses at length all English and Ukrainian historical works and sources concerning the Ukrainian immigration in Canada and gives a brief evaluation of them. The second part deals with the cultural and educational work of the Ukrainians in Canada. The colonists are considered by the author as a spiritually and culturally rich people who preserved the best of their cultural heritage. They started to build schools and churches that were replicas of those in Ukraine. In 1907 the first reading society was established in Canada and soon afterward the settlers began to establish their own church hierarchy. In keeping with the growth and development of the Ukrainian settlement, Winnipeg began to serve as a cultural capital. Already by 1899 the Ukrainians in Winnipeg had established their own social and cultural organizations and achieved a high degree of coordination of their efforts.

For Part Three the author assembled a large amount of material devoted to the Ukrainian press. In 1903 the first Ukrainian newspaper, the *Canadian Farmer* commenced its publication in Winnipeg. It was soon followed by the *Word* in 1904, the *Morning* in 1905, *Ukrainian Voice* in 1910, and others. In this period the Ukrainians also established their magazines, such as the *Home* in 1911, and illustrated periodicals devoted to literature, politics, and current events. In 1913 *Our Strength*, a magazine of criticism, education and information, began to appear. There was also an agricultural magazine, *Agriculturist*. Most representative of this pioneer period, however, was the magazine *Ukraine*, which began to appear in 1918. A brief account of pioneer Ukrainian literature is found in Part Four. Mr. Marunchak discusses some fifteen authors, giving an analysis of their poetry and prose. In Part Five the author considers the first Ukrainian

publications in Canada, the bookstores, and the publishing houses. The volume has a large section of rare pictures in Part Six. Photographs are also to be found elsewhere in the text. The value of the book is enhanced by two extensive bibliographies — Ukrainian and English — and well-organized indices.

This volume ends with a thoughtful discussion of the events that followed World War I. Mr. Marunchak presents the complex problems facing Ukrainian Canadians in the years 1918 and 1919 and discusses the various solutions that were put forward to meet the difficulties of the time. He wisely avoids the temptation to include controversial material in his discussion, with the result that his conclusion is pointed and meaningful.

*The Ukrainian Canadians: A History* is the result of serious research carried on by the author during the last decade. As we have noted, the main purpose of the study is not a mere description of the events, cultural achievements and institutions, but an analysis of the background of the immigration into Canada and an investigation of the political, social, economic, and cultural conditions which resulted from this immigration. Marunchak's study is free of emotionalism; his description of historical events, like his analysis, is within the confines of scholarly research. His presentation of the material is clear, and the reader follows his reasoning throughout the book with growing interest. The volume is also free of national and regional prejudices. Despite the complexity of material discussed, the author displays penetrating insight in his scrutiny of documentary material.

Mr. Marunchak has performed a useful service for the Ukrainian community in Canada, whose interest in its past and present is constantly growing. This study would be of much greater value to Canadians and their scholarship if it were published in English, which we hope will come about in the very near future.

*The Ukrainian Canadians: A History* is recommended for scholars interested in Canadian ethnic groups and in their impact on Canadian life.

Texas Technological College

W. T. ZYLA

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FIFTY YEARS OF SOVIET COMMUNISM. By Louis Fischer, *Popular Library*, New York, 1968, pp. 128.

When, in 1967, Moscow celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik revolution, a number of books appeared on the market to explain the real worth of both the revolution and developments from 1917 to the present. Even this reviewer seized the occasion to publish *The Vulnerable Russians* in order to show for the future the fundamental weakness of the Soviet Union. The paperback work under review here was also motivated by similar objectives. The author has been a student and close observer of Russian affairs for many decades, and with this orientation embarks upon a popular analysis of what he calls Soviet Communism these past fifty years.

As indicated by the chapter titles, the book covers a wide range of topics. The first chapter immediately plunges into "War and Revolution" and, in effect, blames the victory of Bolshevism in Russia on the Czar and his blind policies. The following chapter on "Lenin, the Nationalist" shows how the Bolshevik leader seized power and furnishes certain valid insights into the characters of his two associates, Stalin and Trotsky. In somewhat orderly fashion the subsequent

portions of the book deal with Soviet foreign policy, communist ideology, Soviet power, the Yalta episode, Stalin's death and the dominant problems facing Moscow today. The book is by no means a scholarly exposition. It is written in clipped journalistic style, appears to be the result of a hurried preparation in numerous sections, and unquestionably is riddled with conceptual contradictions and mish-mash throughout.

Though there are many interesting anecdotes and facts in the work, the reviewer would not recommend it to a beginner, whether student or no, who desires to know something about the Soviet Union. And the prime reason is that his whole conceptual framework would be a hopelessly muddled one after pouring over these pages. Another reason is that he wouldn't be able to distinguish essentials from unessentials, appearances from substance, essence from accident. To offer a concrete example, on page 113, under the sub-caption "The Basic Lesson," the author explicitly states "The Soviet Union is a national entity with geographic boundaries guarded by national defense forces." So, according to him, the Soviet Union, in addition to being a state, is a "nation." Yet, a few pages later, in dealing with "The Problems," the author talks about other "national minorities" and "nationalities" in the USSR. Now, clearly, it is obvious that if you recognize the existence of other national groupings in the USSR, that state cannot logically also be "a national entity," but rather a multi-national state.

It is this kind of contradictory conceptions that mar the entire work, even though some of the conclusions arrived by the writer, perhaps more by perception than logic, are well grounded. For him, the fact of numerous, compact nations and peoples in the Soviet Union, seeking their own independent identity and independence, is not the all-important and determining fact. Yet, in sharp contrast to his previous writings, the author admits that the "Soviet Union is a league of nations with compulsory membership," that "the Soviet national minorities are in the Soviet Union but not of it" (p. 120), and that the captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union, despite the economic and military protective benefits of the USSR, would wish to be free, just as the peoples of Africa and Asia (p. 119).

Quite a number of misleading interpretations characterize the work. In the foreword, for example, the writer holds "Russia, China, and other communist-ruled countries are socialist in name only. They are capitalist." The statement appears to be novel and provocative, but in reality it is confusing. Sure, as the author asserts, capital is the means of production—and much more than he thinks—but the fact that these Red states unavoidably utilize capital, doesn't make them systematically capitalistic; no more than feudalism being capitalism for the same reason. To use Lenin's term of "state capitalism," which was erroneously applied to the New Economic Policy in the 20's, and to maintain that the same applies to the present Red states betray a fundamental deficiency in conceptual distinction. In terms of an accurate and precise conception of capitalism, the notion of state capitalism is equivalent to that of a squared circle, and the dynamic idea of capitalism, which entails both the material means of production and private ownership, not to mention other correlative, institutional properties, is completely negated by what exists in the Red Empire. The dominant and applicable idea of economic totalitarianism escapes the writer.

The work reeks with similar misinterpretations and misconceptions. For example, in his treatment of "Czarist Backwardness," the writer talks about

Russia's Gross National Product and shows many of the defects of what he dubs "Russia." Yet he quotes from a source that observes certain "revealed weaknesses in the structure of the state that ... would destroy the empire unless remedied immediately." Now, conceivably, how can one discuss a gross national product of an empire. In this respect, an empire by definition consists of a number of nations; thus a gross imperial product is the aggregate output and nothing else. It is safe to say that when anyone uses the GNP concept in relation to the USSR, his grasp of the nature of this state is lacking and deficient.

Aside from concepts and conformable terms, the book is also studded with countless factual inaccuracies. We have already alluded to the disinforming, interchangeable use of the USSR and Russia, as though the two were identical. This sloppy thinking is, of course, unpardonable. But there are other factual points that cause one to wonder about the observer's formal background concerning the Czarist Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, and now the Soviet Union. The reader is told, for instance, that the "thousand years of Russian history have been a thousand years of autocracy" (p. 17). Now, autocracy and blends of totalitarianism have truly been typical of Russian history, but historically Russia has not been existing for any thousand years.

More? We can go on in this well of misconception and factual misinformation. In another place, for example, the writer states "In the long half-century history of the Soviet Union I know of one, and no more than one, conscious gamble in her foreign affairs: Lenin's decision to send the Red Army into Poland in 1920" (p. 28). It is evident from this assertion alone that the author is unfamiliar with all the facts of the 1917-23 period. Let's just dissect this sentence in the light of what actually transpired. First of all, even at this time in 1969, there has been no Soviet Union in existence for fifty years. After a number of stages in political conquest and coercion, the Soviet Union did not come into existence until 1923. Second, Trotsky's Red Army had to cope not only with Polish forces but also Ukrainian ones in alliance with Poland. Thus the situation was far more complicated than what the author understands.

If one were to rattle off the absurdities in the book, they are these: one, on the cold war, "Moscow commenced this process in 1939" (it began in 1917); two, "The process of substituting Russian nationalism for international communism was initiated by Stalin long before the second world war. It began in 1934 ... (it began with the hypocritical Lenin in 1918); three, for the USSR, "In theory, collectivization should be a better method of farming than private agriculture" (the private plots certainly disprove this); four, "Molecule by molecule, Marxist-socialist-communist ideology has been displayed by nationalism, by Soviet patriotism" (from 1918, by Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism); five, "The Czarist regime neglected the national minorities" (hardly, since it genocided some of them).

The frontiers of publicity apparently have no bounds. Introducing the work is this blurb "Louis Fischer: Distinguished, Prize-Winning Author and Expert on Russia." Need more be said?

*Georgetown University*

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

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*THE GOOD DEED AND OTHER STORIES OF ASIA, PAST AND PRESENT.*

By Pearl S. Buck. The John Day Co., New York, 1969, pp. 227, \$5.95.

Once again Pearl S. Buck spans a bridge of understanding between the East and West.



Born in the United States but reared by her zealous missionary parents in China, where she spent forty years, the author knowledgeably paints vivid characterizations of Asian-peoples based on a thorough understanding of their race, ideology and culture.

*The Good Deed* is a collection of short stories with Asian settings and themes. The time element reaches from World War II to the 1960's; the action travels from New York's Chinatown through India and Korea to China.

"Life in China and with Chinese had taught me much about human beings, for in ancient countries humanity and human relationships are the primary concern," wrote Pearl Buck in *My Several Worlds* (John Day Co., 1954). It is with this understanding that the author depicts the relationships in the stories comprising *The Good Deed* collection. These are normal involvements between men and women, American and Asian, in times of war and peace. The conflicts, however, which climax the stories are not due to individuality of character but stem from the many aspects of culture, religion and philosophy that differentiate the Asian from the Westerner.

In several stories ("Dagger in the Dark," p. 89, "Going Home," p. 213) Miss Buck deals with communism and its early stages in China. She points out its corrupting effect on government and social institutions, but emphasizes its demoralizing and evil influence upon people and their relationships with one another.

There are two points worth mentioning that characterize most of the stories. The first is that the author pleads for understanding, acceptance and respect of other customs, or simply for the rules and conditions governing other ways of life, foreign to our own ("Sunrise at Juhu," p. 15). Second, Miss Buck points out many times that change or "modernization" of ancient cultures is a painful process, one which must proceed slowly if the heritage and identity of a people are to be preserved ("The Sacred Skull," p. 125).

*The Good Deed* is a book to think about and a book to enjoy. Pearl Buck writes seemingly effortlessly, displaying her remarkable story-telling ability and wit at their best.

MARTA BACZYNSKY

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**BLACK SNOW.** A Theatrical Novel by Mikhail Bulgakov. Translated from the Russian by Michael Glenny. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1967, 190, \$4.50.

As one reads this novel by Russia's most distinguished writer, Mikhail Bulgakov, he begins to wonder why such an excellent piece of work was buried for several decades. For, contrary to his *The Master and Margarita*, the *Black Snow* in no way deals with politics or ideologies. With unusual skill, sharpness and perfect mastery of grotesque style, attained previously only by Gogol, it depicts the author's life as it dealt with publishers, writers and the theater.

Reading and rereading this novel, one also must ask: What is most fascinating: the content or the style?

The reader is captured by both: the unfolding tragicomic fate of the playwright Maxudov, who (as Bulgakov himself did) is adapting a play from a novel, thereby discovering all the mysteries of theatrical life backstage; and the unusual manner of writing, which leaves an unforgettable impression of

every detail, so stunning in its effect that it forces the reader to put the novel down from time to time for sheer respite.

Maxudov's material and spiritual sufferings, the lack of food, money and clothes, his feelings and thoughts concerning the theater and his literary work — all seem written with Bulgakov's very blood. In all his remarks about people and situations, this tragicomic hero displays Bulgakov's acuteness of observation.

Most interestingly presented in the novel are the two directors of the independent theater (mirroring the famous Moscow Art Theater and its known K. Stanislavsky and Nemirovich-Danchenko), called Ivan Vasilevich and Aristarch Platonovich. Caricatured are their innovations in the theater, as well as the personal weaknesses of their age. Bulgakov's art here equals that of Gogol. The milder the tone employed with these two feared and admired idols, the greater is the effect of an inimitable irony. But Bulgakov's capability in presenting his characters and situations is an unusual one: on the one side he seethes with ridicule, on the other he is enchanted by the originality of men and their doings.

Although Bulgakov is heir to Gogol's art of the grotesque, he also has Chekhov's precision in presenting people. For example, the house manager, Philipp Philippovich Tulumbasov (Chapter 11), is a master-piece of character portrayal. Under Bulgakov's pen this simple man becomes a philosopher, the most fascinating person in the novel; the passages on Tulumbasov read almost like poetry. Bulgakov depicts details and people in such a way that there are no insignificant characters in his work. Each person is a living, amazing world in himself.

The translation of the novel in general has caught the spirit of the narrator (Maxudov), though it is far from perfect. It is a quick commercial translation with the usual amount of errors, even with omissions of almost whole paragraphs. And there is license: On page 77 (Chapter 9) one reads: "I shrank further into my niche, where I stood motionless as a statue and watched." But the original, published in *Novyj mir*, No. 8/65, had it: "I shrank further into my niche, where a blind statue stood, and watched." (*Ja usel glubze v nizu, gde stojala nezrjajaja statuza, i smotrel.*)

On page 179: "I wanted people to hear the poignant music of the accordion on that bridge, to see the blood spreading on the moonlit snow. That was all:" It should be: "I wanted people to hear the horrible music of an accordion on that bridge, while on the moonlit snow the bloody spot spread. I wanted them to see the black snow. I wanted nothing more." (*... ja xotel, stoby uslysali, kak strasno poet garmonika na mostu, kogda na snegu pod lunoj rasplyvaetsja krovavoe pjatno. Mne xotelos' stoby uvideli cernyj sneg. Bolsego ja nicego ne xotel.*)

On page 177: "After I had offered it all over Moscow I unexpectedly sold it to a man with an enormous birthmark on his cheek in an office on, if I remember correctly, the fifth floor." It should be: "After I had run with the story in my pocket all over the city for three weeks, I unexpectedly sold it in a Zlatousk by-street, at Mjasnickaja, to a man with an enormous birthmark on his cheek in an office on the fifth floor." (*Proxodiv s rasskazom v karmans tri nedeli i pobyvav na Varvarke, Vozdvizenke, na Cistyx prудax na Strastnom Bulvare i daze, pomnitsja, na pluscize, ja neozidanno prodal svoje socinenie v Zlatoustinskom pereulke na Mjasnickoj...*)

The translation abounds with such looseness; worse, there are omissions

of important metaphors which, in the original, make Bulgakov's prose sound like poetry.

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THE RUSSIANS AND BERLIN, 1945. By Erich Kuby. Trans. by Arnold J. Pomerans. Published by Hill and Wang, N.Y. Cloth, 372 pages, 1968. \$6.95.

Kuby's book was written for, and first serialized in, *Der Spiegel*. The jacket calls it the first book by a German on the Battle of Berlin. Erich Kuby served three years between 1939 and 1944 in the *Wehrmacht* on the Eastern front. Just before the siege of Stalingrad he was court-martialed for refusing to obey orders and "demoralizing the fighting forces." His book reveals overtones of bitterness not only against the wartime German government but the military leadership as well.

His topic, like the Fall of Troy, has the ever-fascinating, tragic Aristotelian elements of fear and pity, as indicated by the success of such American books as Cornelius Ryan's *The Last Battle*, John Toland's *The Last 100 Days* and Andrew Tully's *Berlin: The Story of a Battle*. Kuby's book, too, is interesting, skillfully organized, rich in facts and details, but in its political implications it favors the East over the West. It also constitutes almost an apology for the Red looting, murdering, and raping. Its subtle theme lies in the suggestion that in 1945 the defeated Germans should have blueprinted "a modern German state and a modern society based on Marxist and socialistic principles but not on blind obedience to Moscow" (p. 339). Since this is exactly what Czechoslovakia did, or tried to do, we shudder at Kuby's suggestion when we reflect on the Soviet tanks in Prague in August, 1968.

Kuby expresses special gratitude for the courtesy and help given him in his researches in Moscow from March 31 to April 8, 1965 (p. xi), and unfortunately seems to be conscious of it in his attitudes. Though he regrets that "the Great Powers still keep a host of documents locked away in secret archives," like the "unsolved story of the disposal of Hitler's body" (p. xii), he probably comes close enough to the essential facts.

In his chapter on "The Death of Hitler," he found that from the beginning the Russians were bent on proving that Hitler died by poison rather than by the more manly way of the pistol. He felt so, too, until he learned that Hitler since 1919 had always carried a pistol. He concludes, "Thus Hitler may well have shot himself... We shall never know" (p. 177). On August 2, the *New York Times* described a new, so-called definitive Russian book on the subject with the headline, "Hitler's death was due to cyanide poisoning." Perhaps!

Kuby's distinctive military conclusion is that the Battle of Berlin was no mighty Armageddon, as both "the Soviets and Germans would have themselves and the world believe" (Jacket), but a walkover for the Soviet forces. They outnumbered the Germans, who had only 25,000 men, ill-equipped, by ten to one. He makes the interesting point that the German defenders "included representatives of nearly all European nations... allocated as special units, and comprised Belgians, Dutchmen, Danes, Norwegians, Swedes, Estonians, Latvians, Ukrainians, Galicians, Transylvanians, Swiss, Frenchmen, Spaniards and what have you" (p. 126). They carried on their forlorn defense in the misplaced hope of "a last-minute Allied rescue operation" (p. 38). Kuby acidly remarks that

they were wrong only in their timing: "It just took the Western world a little longer to tune in to their wavelength" (p. 38). The Russians, sure of ultimate victory, proceeded cautiously, taking no unnecessary risks.

In a subtle way, Kubly throughout implies that Germany would have been better off in the Soviet orbit, for it would have avoided the present dismemberment. This thesis influences his emphasis in the treatment of what was the chief obstacle to a pro-Russian orientation, namely, the looting, he passes off as little more than the "liberating" of watches. The executions and wild killings he almost ignores, except for a few instances of someone shot trying to prevent a rape. And the raping itself, he implies, "despite German claims to the contrary, was, in fact, the exception," not the rule (p. 274). Yet he concludes that "out of a total female population of approximately 1.4 million (including children) Soviet soldiers violated several tens of thousands" (p. 275). This figure, however, by itself makes rape more the rule than the exception, in line with the judgment of *Time Magazine* (April 1, 1966), "Rape, plunder and suicide became commonplace."

Kubly strains to blunt the terror of all this, to offer a virtual apology for it. He submits that it covered only a short span of time: "About 80% of all the rapes in Greater Berlin occurred between April 24 and May 3" (p. 275). He insists it was not sanctioned officially and quotes several Orders of the Day to the Red Army not to "evict or resettle inhabitants, confiscate property or articles of value or search houses." He cites a "fundamental directive" of March 1, 1945 "to the effect that all undisciplined behaviour would be met with the utmost severity" (p. 266). He ridicules the "idea that a Russian intellectual of Jewish origin by the name of Ilya Ehrenburg was able to order millions of Russian soldiers to violate German women" (p. 271). But the fact is that the Soviet Union's top propagandist had broadcast to the Red Army, "Use force and break the racial pride of these Germanic women. Take them as your lawful booty" (See Ryan, *The Last Battle*, p. 27)!

Laboring his point that the Soviets did not rape "to humiliate German womanhood" (p. 278) and that it was not an officially encouraged atrocity, he blames it on the starved sexuality of the troops. Accordingly, he contradicts the "common belief that the first wave, the actual fighting troops, behaved impeccably, and that it was only the reinforcements that caused all the trouble" (p. 273). He explains, "There was no leave in the Red Army; a fact that should be taken into account when considering Russian behaviour in Germany" (p. 36). He admits that the Red soldiers had come to believe that "they could do as they liked in Fascist Germany" (p. 278), but goes on: "drunk on victory... hand in hand with swilling in alcohol... Soviet soldiers did what they had been pining to do during the many years without leave or women, but they did it neither for the honor of the Soviet Union nor as an act of retribution against Germany" (p. 279).

Curious is Kubly's nasty sniping at German men for not protecting their women. He deplores "the rape of Berlin women, while the men stood idly by" (p. 278), calling it "the most despicable and shabbiest exhibition of cringing on the part of the 'master race.'" He expresses scorn that "individual German men should have done nothing to stem the excesses" and charges that "the vast majority of the men sheltered behind their women's skirts and behaved in an abject and craven fashion" (p. 277). Yet several times he adduces facts which show that the Red soldiers simply shot down any man who attempted

to protect or even to protest the raping of wife, daughter, or friend. He mentions, for example, that "the famous actor, Friedrich Kayssler, tried to save his housekeeper and... was shot for his trouble" (p. 276). He writes "We also know of husbands who were forced to stand by while their wives were being raped. Some of them were allowed to go afterwards, others were shot" (p. 277). Under those circumstances to condemn German men for not protecting their women from Soviet bestiality is merely to bring one's objectivity and motives into question.

In fact, the only ones to whom Kuby pays any tribute in the book are the Berlin women. He credits their "fanatical devotion to duty" (p. 296) for saving perhaps several hundred thousand lives: "Without the women, life would have become extinct in April 1945, but without the men, things would have gone on exactly as they did" (p. 277). He also compliments the women in that they "did not speak of the rapes in tragic terms, and afterwards stopped talking about them altogether" (p. 277). He also makes the point that they resorted to abortion so determinedly that there are no young Germans with Russian fathers.

The most valuable part of the book, and the most original, is the description of life in Berlin during and after the siege. That life could go on seems a miracle, and that it did is a tribute to human will, ingenuity and endurance. For the rest, the book's pervasive slant for a Germany in the Soviet orbit rather than in the Western makes it a trap for the unwary.

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AUSTIN J. APP, PH.D.

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*TUHA ZA MITOM* (Longing for a Myth). By Ostap Tarnawskyyi. New York, Kluchi, 1966. Pp. 159. \$3.50.

Man is a mythmaker. In his continuous search for himself he creates myths and destroys them, yet always on the ruins of destruction new myths arise, changed in form and content perhaps, but basically the same, providing final answers, giving substance to human reality. Ours is an age of longing for a new powerful myth and the search is on in philosophy and in art, in literature and in the theatre.

Such is the basic theme of this collection of literary essays by an emigre Ukrainian poet who chose to make his home in the United States. The author deals with the problems of contemporary culture, with existentialism, and with the search for truth in modern poetry. He analyzes writers such as T. S. Eliot and Albert Camus, G. Seferis and Robert Frost; in his analysis of American culture he seeks a "myth of America." Contemporary Ukrainian literature — both the one at home "under the rule of inquisition" as well as the one in exile — is seen in a wider context of modern Western culture. Students of comparative literature will be especially interested in the parallels the author draws between such writers as Hemingway, Kazantzakes and Lagerkvist on the one hand, and the Ukrainian writers Stefanyk, Samchuk and Mosendz on the other.

Ostap Tarnawskyyi is the author of four books of Ukrainian verse, an essay on modern poetry, and an unpublished collection of short stories. He is a frequent contributor to Ukrainian literary periodicals. The essays collected in this volume were originally published in the bi-monthly *Lysty do Pryjateliv* (Letters to Friends), a Ukrainian magazine of opinion. M. S. T.

## UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"ROMAN S. SMAL-STOCKI, UKRAINIAN SCHOLAR, DIES," an obituary. *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., April 29, 1969.

On April 27, the outstanding intellectual leader in the cause for a free and independent Ukraine, died of cancer in the Georgetown University Hospital in Washington, D.C. Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki dedicated his entire adult life to this noble cause. His death is a heavy loss to the movement, both here and abroad.

This and other obituaries cover at length the highlights of his long and distinguished career. As a scholar and professor, Dr. Smal-Stocki taught in Prague, Warsaw, Berlin, London, at Marquette University in Milwaukee, and Catholic University in Washington, D.C. He authored eleven books and served as an envoy of the Ukrainian National Republic. He also was for many years the president of the internationally renowned Shevchenko Scientific Society.

What the obituaries failed to point out was the most important feature of his life. And that was the dedication of his total personality to the cause of world freedom, in which he rightly saw the objective of a free Ukraine as an integral part. Smal-Stocki combined all his talents and abilities in the pursuit of this general cause.

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"'NEW CANADIANS' INCREASING IN NUMBER AND INFLUENCE," an article by Jay Walz. *The New York Times*, New York, February 21, 1969.

This illuminating article establishes the fact that 27 per cent of the Canadian populace is now not of English or French background. Also, this close to one-third of the Canadian population is rapidly becoming the third force in Canadian life and politics. The largest group, at 40 per cent, is the British stock.

In 1968, about 200,000 immigrants entered Canada. As the writer shows, about half of the annual immigration settles in the industrial cities of Ontario, but "there are now heavy infiltrations of Ukrainians, Germans, Scandinavians (including Icelanders), Japanese and Chinese in the prairie provinces and British Columbia." In the matter of language use in schools and elsewhere, he emphasizes, "Ukrainians and others are pressing for the privilege of using their language in public places, too." With the steady growth of Canada's population and its expanded diversity, it is very likely that Canadian society will undergo the same assimilative pressures long observed in the United States, and yet retain the rich advantages of diversity in unity.

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"R. S. SMAL-STOCKI, SLAVIC EXPERT AT CU," an obituary. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D.C., April 29, 1969.

As other write-ups on the death of Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki, this piece also failed to bring out the most significant characteristic of the man and his works.

The former head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society was far more than a scholar, professor, author or diplomat. He was a wholly and completely immersed activist, whose field was the world and whose purpose for living was national and personal freedom.

The text indicates this in observing that "In Washington Mr. Smal-Stocki was a leader in the effort to bring to this city the statue of Ukrainian hero Taras Shevchenko that now stands at 22d and P Streets nw." It also states that during "his life he had known closely Winston Churchill, Georges Clemenceau, Thomas Masaryk, and other world leaders." All of this is true. Yet the reader would be hard put to discover any note concerning this Ukrainian's stature as a brilliant freedom fighter. What's more, he would note further the character of this organ which omitted any references to Smal-Stocki as both a doctor and professor. The victory of the statue in 1964 evidently still haunts the paper.

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"ARCHIVE FIRES IN UKRAINE STIRRING SUSPICIONS OF A PLOT," an article by Peter Grose. *The New York Times*, New York, February 19, 1969.

Book-burning as a means of cultural genocide and Russification is well described in this eye-opening account. In 1964, documents on Ukrainian history were destroyed in the archives of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences' library. Now, meaning last November and under similar conditions of suspicion and doubt, historic collections of Ukrainian and Jewish archives were destroyed in a blaze of fire. The places this time were in the library of the Church of St. George in the Vydubetsky Monastery and, in the same night of November 26, 1968 in the Great Synagogue in the Ukrainian port of Odessa.

Scarcely any publicity was given to the two significant events. As the writer puts it, "An obscure paragraph in a local Kiev newspaper, *Kyivska Pravda*, reported on the Kievan incident." He shows perspective when he observes, "Cultural and religious suppression of the Jews of the Soviet Union has been widely noted through the years. The Ukrainian nationality and heritage has been a more intermittent target of the Kremlin's drive for cultural assimilation." Placed in the full, unfolding context of long-run Russian genocide, the two incidents are just further expressions of a continuous policy that has been reflected also in the mass arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals and constant fulminations against "bourgeois nationalism."

With official circles of the Western democracies remaining virtually mute on such genocidal acts, one can expect additional incidents of like nature in the future. You don't hear anything of worth in the United Nations, taking the Russians to task for these barbarian deeds. Nor is our Government too much concerned with it as it pursues an insular "peaceful coexistence" with the Russian totalitarians.

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"NEW CZARS' SOCIAL FASCIST TYRANNY," an editorial. *Peking Review*, Peking, Mainland China, April 4, 1969.

Since June, 1963, when the Red Chinese commenced their propaganda on the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, a monumental irony has emerged in international affairs, as well as in the Cold War itself. That is, whereas the United States should be virtually monopolizing this subject in behalf of freedom

and its own security, the totalitarian Chinese have been riding high with it in their rift with the Russian totalitarians in Moscow. This editorial is replete with passages on the captive non-Russian nations under the "new Czars' social-fascist tyranny."

"A Georgian worker," it states, "was exiled to the frontier merely for having shown his dissatisfaction with the wild campaign whipped up by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique against Stalin." The editorial goes on to point out that "In western Ukraine, more than 70 intellectuals were arrested on a single occasion on the charge of 'misinterpretation of the history of Ukraine' just because they had asked the Soviet revisionist renegade clique to 'attach greater importance to the language and culture of Ukraine than it does now.' The wave of arrests spread from Lvov to Kiev, Odessa and several other cities." Examples from Kirghizia and elsewhere are quoted, too.

That the issue of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR will become the most crucial one in the years ahead is well beyond doubt. Every preparation should therefore be made now for this inevitable encounter. Much leverage can be achieved now in our so-called negotiations with Moscow, but much more educational effort is required for our leaders to perceive the critical importance of this issue.

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"THE FIFTH DARTMOUTH CONFERENCE," a commentary by Norman Cousins. *Saturday Review*, New York, February 8, 1969.

How money can be spent wastefully is demonstrated by this series of conferences between so-called Soviet intellectuals and representatives and their counterparts in the U.S. The funds have been provided by the Ford Foundation, and the purpose of the meetings has been "to obtain the fullest possible view of the respective positions of the two countries in order to avoid misunderstandings, misassessments, or miscalculations." One must be quite naive to expect this from such "academic exchanges." Concerning this fifth conference, the writer is honest enough to admit that it accomplished "Very little, if measured by the ability of the participants on either side to change the minds of the others on basic issues."

But what are the "basic issues" that have been discussed? Reading through the discussion of the five conferences, one finds such issues—the Cuban crisis, cultural exchange, the nuclear test ban treaty, enlarged trade with the USSR, the Middle East and the like. These have been construed as "the basic issues." Issues such as the captive nations, Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism in the USSR, the rape of Czecho-Slovakia, just to mention a few, are not regarded as "basic." What a costly exercise in futility.

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"NATIONALIST CAMP FIRES BURNING THROUGH THE USSR," a commentary. *Freedom's Facts*, All-American Conference to Combat Communism, Washington, D.C., March 1969.

Objectively speaking, there is no question but that the spirit and substance of nationalism constitute the paramount anti-communist force throughout the Red Empire. This progressive force is the Free World's most formidable weapon against the basic threat of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and the imaginary



threat of world communism. This commentary is based on this fundamental fact.

It points out that "The Communist Party press is meeting increased evidence of nationalism with its own demands for a 'merciless struggle' against nationalism." The commentator holds, "nationalist camp fires, dampened but never extinguished, are flaring into life again." For those have closely followed the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, these fires have never even been dampened. Year by year, there is evidence of nationalist expression in one form or another. The deficiency in our country is that no individual or group or governmental agency has accumulated this evidence year by year.

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"DEFIANT NEWSMAN FREED IN UKRAINE," a report by Peter Grose. *The New York Times*, New York, February 24, 1969.

This full-column report covers the release of Vyacheslav Chornovil, the Ukrainian journalist, from prison and a summarical background to his incarceration. Chornovil spent some 18 months in a prison camp outside the Ukrainian city of Vynnytsia for defying Moscow by reporting on secret trials of Ukrainian intellectuals. The question that arises here is why the release now?

As the reporter suggests, the publication of *The Chornovil Papers* by McGraw-Hill of New York might well have something to do with this release. The thirty-one year old Chornovil is said to be at liberty today in Lviv. In reporting all this, the writer ably distinguishes between the Russian cases of Andrei A. Sinyavsky and Yuli M. Daniel and this Ukrainian case. He writes, "The issue raised in the Moscow trials was creative freedom; the issue in Ukraine was nationalism—attempts to elevate the Ukrainian heritage at the potential expense of the federal Soviet Union."

However, what is somewhat silly is the writer's quote from Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, who for some obscure reason was elected to furnish the foreword to the aforementioned book. The choice quote is: "It is not inconceivable that in the next several decades the nationality problem will become politically more important in the Soviet Union than the racial issue has become in the United States." This ludicrous comparison indicates both a lack of knowledge regarding the so-called nationality problem and an unfortunate capacity for misleading, misplaced analogies.

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"THE UKRAINE: QUESTING FOR PRIDE," an article by Stephen S. Rosenfeld. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D.C., March 14, 1969.

How easily so-called intellectuals can fall into the error of false comparisons is also shown by this article of mass misinformation. The writer begins with it this way, "The Quest for racial pride which is so striking a feature of the American black community has its counterparts in many places, and not least in the Ukraine, a 'state' in the Soviet Union." One inevitable deduction of this false comparison is that the international problem involving Ukraine in its relations with imperialist Moscow is parallel to the domestic problem of some dissident Negroes in the United States. One might just as well set up a counterpart between oceanic turbulences and either of the two, for what it's worth.

This writer has displayed his amateurishness in so many ways, including a typical stint in the Soviet Union, that space would be wasted to criticize this article at length. Just two examples will suffice. One, the reader is told that "The Soviet Union is a federation containing more than 100 'national' minorities, and the Great Russians at the center (a bare majority) have always feared national distintegration at the edges." What the last phrase means, only God knows. But that there are "national" minorities in the USSR and what makes the Russians "Great" are sufficient to show the reckless indulgence of the writer.

For additional myths, the reader is exposed to the following: "The Ukraine has not enjoyed a very high repute in the United States. For one thing, many Russian, Jewish and Polish immigrants brought to this country a condescending view of Ukrainians, formed on European soil." This myth, which is an obsession with the writer, was advanced by his paper, the *Post*, to oppose the erection of the Shevchenko statue in Washington. It failed miserably. Now as to repute, what group in contemporary times has managed to erect a statue in the name of a foreign freedom fighter in our Nation's capital?

The myth-making hasn't ended. Read this literary concoction: "Moreover, the organized Ukrainian American community is dominated by men with ties to the western Ukraine. Washington's Lev Dobriansky, author of the 'Captive Nations Resolution,' is prominent among them. They tend to favor Ukrainian concerned with Ukrainian affairs *per se*, desire better relations with the Soviet pursuit of this goal they have practiced the harshest tactics of the cold war. Hence they have set themselves apart from the mass of Americans who, unconcerned with Ukrainian affairs *per se*, disire better relations with the Soviet Union." The utter nonsense of this is revealed by the fact that ties are with our own Nation and all of Ukraine; as such, Ukrainian statehood is in line with our own American Revolution and there is nothing sacred about the USSR; our tactics have gone far beyond the call of so-called liberals for peaceful understanding between and among peoples; and that we, too, seek better relations with the USSR, but not at the price of stifled freedom, self-determination, and principle.

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"SOVIET ANTI-SEMITISM," an editorial. *The Evening Star*, Washington, D. C., May 14, 1969.

How easily indiscriminating editors can be duped by Moscow's tactics is superbly illustrated by this editorial. The object of the piece is Trofim K. Kichko who in 1963 published "a crudely anti-Semitic book *Judaism Without Embellishment* and has now come out with another, *Judaism and Zionism*." Referring to the former, the editor asserts with ostensible knowledge "The work fits into a long tradition of Ukrainian anti-Semitism," not that of Russian imperialism using scum to denigrate a nation. To compound the myth, it further states, "In that republic took place the warmest welcome the Nazi invaders received from any Soviet group," not that this provided an opportunity for them to eliminate Soviet Russian domination and, as Ukrainians hoped, to build their own free and independent state.

As though this were written in Moscow, the reader is then told "With that background, Kichko's book was actually a sign of Russian progress, for it was disowned and suppressed by the Soviet government." Now, very simply

in logic if nothing else, if that were so with reference to the first book, then how does one account for this second publication, considering the state-owned publishing enterprise? The editor suspects something is wrong for he observes that like "the Czars" offering "a kind of sop to the population... the Soviets may be using traditional anti-Semitism in the same way." It obviously doesn't occur to him, after having made the earlier statements and fallen as a dupe to the strategy, that Moscow uses the technique to discredit the Ukrainian nation and its aspirations for freedom, above all in the eyes of the Western democracies. The logic used by the editor is similar to this: America has the Ku Klux Klan; Americans are Ku Klux Klanners.

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"REBIRTH OF NATIONALISM COULD CRACK THE KREMLIN," an editorial by Dumitru Danielopol. *Joliet Herald-News*, Illinois, March 24, 1969.

For a long time now cracks have been showing in the Kremlin, but as educational processes go, repetition is necessary both for the mind and soul. This editorial dwells on the 25th anniversary of the Anti-Communist Bloc of Nations and the persistent force of nationalism in the USSR. It goes back to a November morning in 1943, in the woods near Zhytomyr in German-occupied Ukraine, when the ABN was formed and recounts the nationalist drive to this day, seeking the defeat of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism.

In fact, in one paragraph it goes back to 1917 when it states "Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia, Poland, Ukraine, the Don Cossack State, North Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkestan, Idel-Ural, Siberia and Romanian Bessarabia chose freedom.' One may justifiably dispute the characterization of one of these areas, but on the whole the account is accurate as to the nations seeking freedom. Quoting Mrs. Slava Statko, "a Ukrainian whose husband, a former prime minister of Ukraine, is ABN's world president," the writer points out Ukraine in particular is a hot-bed of resistance and nationalist activity."

His conclusion, however, is skeptical when he raises the question on nationalism and the Soviet Russian dominion: "An optimistic appraisal? Probably." Then the invariable hedge: "But nationalism has been instrumental in breaking up one empire after another, including the mighty Roman Empire." The dominant fact is that we haven't even begun to tap the force of nationalism in the Red Empire.

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"AGNEW HAPPY IN BILLY GRAHAM COMPANY," commentaries by Clare Crawford. *Washington Daily News*, Washington, D. C., February 17, 1969.

The caption recorded here is, of course, incongruous and silly as the contents that follow. This piece is mentioned to illustrate the state of some American journalism. The writer, a woman, has apparently great compassion for the American taxpayer. She seems to dread the fact that "the birthday of Taras Shevchenko Day (as she frames it) is not far behind on March 9." But this isn't the pay-off on obtuse journalism.

Read this: "If this doesn't mean anything to you as a hyphenated-American, it might as a taxpayer. Check the several speeches reprinted in the Con-

gressional Record in observance of Ukrainian Independence Day on Jan. 22." Following this is a heap of disinformation that the neophyte received from unknown quarters. What is important is the apparent concern on the part of some with regard to Ukrainian matters being discussed in Congress and elsewhere. Because of the vital issues involved, they can rest assured that much more will be told in the period ahead, no doubt much to their consternation.

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"WOULD YOU BELIEVE — AN EXPERT ON RUSSIA?" an article by Stephen S. Rosenfeld. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., January 27, 1969.

The answer to the titled question is an emphatic NO! Those who have known Senator Allan Ellender for over a decade — and he attended a Ukrainian Independence banquet in Washington — know him to be a thoroughly superficial person as concerns the Soviet Union. The really disturbing question is how does he manage to return to the Senate from the American-bristling State of Louisiana. His views, not to mention his scope of knowledge, regarding the USSR, communism and related subjects are scarcely reflective of the mood of that State's citizens when it comes to a national election.

According to this equally superficial writer, the Senator "has become one of the Senate's most earnest exponents of Soviet-American detente." Why? The analytic answer is, "He dates the start of his awakening from his first trip to Russia (mind you, not USSR) in 1955." Then the supposedly knowledgeable Senator is quoted as saying "I went to Minsk, Orel, Odessa, Volgograd. The damage there from the Germans was... useless, wanton... I don't blame the Russian people at all for fearing the Germans." Minsk and Odessa belong to the Russian people? The Senator sees USSR as "Russia," and no matter, all cities are Russian.

The expert on Russia is broad-minded, too. "Anything that widens differences between us and the Russians, I'm against," he says authoritatively. They expand in power and influence, so that illogic goes, let's narrow the difference. Then the reader faces this typical non sequitur, "We say we want peace but we rearm. We ought to be honest. We have got to be, to dispel the fear of the Russian people." With "expertness" of this sort, is it any wonder that the Senate is the weak spot of our Government today?

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"DESIGN FOR SURVIVAL," a cartoon account by General Thomas S. Power. *American Security Council Press*, Chicago 1968.

This series of cartoons, starting with the lesson of Cuba, is attuned to the pitch given on the inner cover, "Suprise is an old proven strategy, and its possible success encourages war." The cartoon descriptions emphasize the military build-up of the USSR. They are well done, except for the misconceptions.

Poor Karl Marx is drawn in to inspire "the Soviets," "230 million Russians" are inserted too, and the USSR is Russia. It's unfortunate that a sound military thesis is couched in a context of political and intellectual nonsense, but this is the tragedy of American thinking.

**"UKRAINIAN PROTEST AGAINST AWARDEING NEDBAILLO,"** a report.  
*Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, New York, N.Y., December 17, 1968.

On the first page of this Russian newspaper organ in New York an account is given of the official protest lodged by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America against the disgraceful "honor" bestowed upon Professor Nedbaillo by the U.N. for his ostensible human rights achievements. As shown earlier in this section, for a person who defended Russian-inspired anti-Semitic tracts to receive such an award is tantamount to seeing day as night. But this appears to be the way the U.N. is functioning nowadays.

What is indicative of this paper's bias is the omission of any references in the official protest to continued Russian oppression in Ukraine and the struggle by the Ukrainian people for national independence. Human rights extend to all such frontiers and cannot be sifted according to one's likes or dislikes, one's biases or preferences. Evidently, there is still much to be learned about human rights by the editors of this organ.

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**"THE MYSTERY REMAINS THE ENIGMA,"** an article by K. Akula. *Straight Talk*, The Official Bulletin of the Edmund Burke Society, Scarborough, Ontario, Canada, December, 1968.

With the Burkean quote "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing," this highly thought-provoking periodical talks straight on a variety of current issues. In this absorbing article fundamental questions are raised: "What is Russia?," "What is the Soviet Union?," "What is Russian colonialism and its historical base?" and many more. The writer addresses himself to these basic questions.

In the course of it, he asks further, "Why, despite latest historical perspectives, is there so little interest generated among Canadians in the peoples of the Soviet (erroneously called Russia)?" He criticizes severely those in power for not considering the issue of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. The problem is obviously Free World-Wide, including the United States.

**L.E.D.**



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