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A U.S. Policy of Unfinished Liberation

By Lev E. Dobriansky

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE:

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, Professor of Economics at Georgetown University; in October, 1966 he was re-elected President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee for the sixth consecutive term; Chairman of National Captive Nations Committee in Washington, D. C.; former faculty member of the National War College; author and lecturer; in October, 1966 he took part in the annual conference of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (APACL) in Seoul, Korea.

CLARENCE A. MANNING, Ph.D., former Associate Professor of Slavic Languages at Columbia University; author of several books on literature and history of Ukraine and other Eastern European peoples; in January, 1967 he was presented with a recognition plaque by the American Bulgarian League for his co-authorship of *History of Modern Bulgarian Literature*, published recently in New York City.

ALEXANDER OHLOBLYN, born in Kiev, Ukraine; holder of a Ph.D. (1926), Ph.D. h.c. (1941), LL.D. h.c. (1965); former Professor of Ukrainian history at the University of Kiev (1921-1943); Professor of Ukrainian and East European history at the Free Ukrainian University in Prague (1944-1945) and in Munich (since 1945); at present: Chairman of the Historical Section of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., and Chairman of the Historical Section of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in U.S.; President of the Ukrainian Historical Association.

WASYL SHIMONIAK, born in Carpatho-Ukraine, from where he fled to Western Germany in 1945; he studied at German universities before coming to this country in 1951; he received his Ph.D. at the University of Michigan in 1963; he is now Assistant Professor at Marquette University and Director of the Slavic Institute there.

WALTER TREMBICKY, M. A. and Ph.D.; studied at Universities of Berlin, Regensburg, Munich and New York; associated with Oder-Donau Institute in Stetting; the Ukrainian Technical Institute in New York; is a research-fellow of St. Andrew's College, University of Manitoba; member of Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., Shevchenko Scientific Society and Ukrainian Genealogical and Heraldic Society; author of many essays and articles on diplomatic relations of the Ukrainian state.

NEUTRALIZING THE IRON CURTAIN

Editorial

Today, when the straitjacket confinement of individuals and nations alike in the USSR has eased somewhat, it is becoming fashionable to depreciate the Iron Curtain in its function of sealing off the Soviet Prison of Nations. According to some commentators, it was never really effective at all, thus showing once again that men's memories are indeed short. For when Winston Churchill coined the phrase twenty years ago, he was merely reducing to a pithy term the almost total lack of communication between East and West that had already existed for some three decades. In this regard, Ukrainians abroad have known frustration, especially during the Thirties. Six million of their brethren starved to death in Ukraine in 1933 in a man-made famine. When Ukrainians here reported that this catastrophe was a deliberate act of genocide, their protest went unacknowledged for decades for sheer lack of means of confirmation. The Iron Curtain—then—was impenetrable.

The end of World War II saw Stalin move out the Iron Curtain to encompass today's so-called satellite countries in Central and Eastern Europe. But the war also brought about vast changes in every sphere. Not least important was the thrusting upon America of the mantle of world leadership—along with its responsibilities. Simultaneously, the paranoid Stalin was revealing unmistakably the overriding Soviet Russian aim of world domination. An important consequence was the creation in America of a climate which was characterized by an increasing awareness of the actual nature of the Soviet Union and of the necessity to battle the Kremlin for the minds of men.

Naiveté and illusion fell away: America checked the Red takeover in Greece and Turkey, pumped life into the paralyzed economy of Western Europe, confronted the Reds in Korea, sent U-2 reconnaissance planes high over the Iron Curtain. Ukrainians and other victims of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism were finally allowed to testify to and document genocide before a Kersten Committee. Today, the latest step of America's maturation is the creation of a Freedom Academy, whose function is to train special combatants and develop

the services called for by the psychological political warfare of our time.

This period also saw the creation of a radio instrumentality whose function was to propagate abroad the facts of the American way of life—another distinct departure from the foreign-entanglement-shunning America of yesteryear. Unfortunately, the Voice of America, the official radio instrumentality, has never been allowed to develop into a hard-hitting medium of truth and influence.

To fill the gap others appeared, here and elsewhere in the West. Worthy of attention is the private, American-based Radio Liberty, which has not only pointed the way but has progressed far along it.

ASSAULT ON THE CURTAIN

"Most of those things of positive character that are happening in the Soviet Union today," states authority Dr. Ithiel Pool of M.I.T., "are explainable only in terms of the influence of the West, for which the most important single channel is radio."

Despite the extravagance of this claim, it is true that radio is the only truly mass medium that can communicate, free of regime censorship or control, from the outside. Ironically, it is the Soviet regime itself that has made this possible. In Stalin's day, radio sets were so scarce that only two per cent of the people could listen to foreign broadcasts. Today, over a third of the population has the chance.

Radio Liberty is the free world's most powerful voice, directed exclusively to the peoples of the Soviet Union, and there can be no doubt that it is heard. In a letter to Radio Liberty which went by the Soviet censors a girl from Minsk wrote: "This is our station. It helps us to learn the truth." A Ukrainian wrote: "Your radio station removed, as it were, from before my eyes the curtain of mist created by our press."

To wholly dispel this mist, Radio Liberty is on the air round the clock, 24 hours a day. Besides two simultaneous Russian programs, it also broadcasts in 16 other languages of the Soviet Union. These include two more Slavic languages, Ukrainian and Byelorussian; seven languages of the Caucasus: Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Avar, Chechen, Karachi and Ossetian; five languages of the Moslem peoples of Central Asia: Kazakh, Kirghiz, Turkmen, Uigur and Uzbek, and, finally, two languages of Moslem minorities scattered along the Volga and through Siberia: Tatar and Bashkir. Thus, despite Soviet jamming of the broadcasts, virtually every nation of the USSR is afforded up-

to-the-moment news of the world outside and, even more important, what is actually happening in the USSR itself.

Ukrainians, for example, hear Radio Liberty in their own language 14 hours of every day. The daily program consists of a one-hour programming block. To insure reception, this program is repeated 16 times during the course of the day (for two of these hours two transmitters are in operation).

Each one-hour Ukrainian programming block begins with 7 minutes of the latest news, which is updated during the broadcast day. Following the news, a press review reports items of current interest in the world's leading newspapers.

The remainder can be broken down into four general categories: (1) programs whose focus is on Ukrainian life, both in the Soviet Ukraine and abroad; (2) programs which deal with the communist world in general; (3) those which discuss the life and problems of the world outside the Iron Curtain, and (4) those which seek to stimulate listener response to Radio Liberty. In addition, the Orthodox and Catholic liturgies are broadcast on Saturdays, followed by a short talk on a religious theme every Sunday. The gratitude expressed in letters received by Radio Liberty for those religious programs indicates that religion is far from extinct in the supposedly atheistic land.

In dealing with Ukrainian life, for example, this year Radio Liberty celebrated the 110th anniversary of the birth and the 50th anniversary of the death of Ivan Franko, Ukrainian literary immortal. Listeners learned from these broadcasts of the life of the great poet and especially of the content of those of his works which are not published in Soviet Ukraine, such as the *Pre-history of the Socialist Movement*, an expression of his attitude toward the Communist Manifesto. Also beamed was Prof. Clarence A. Manning's evaluation of his poetry. Listeners heard, too, six special broadcasts devoted to excerpts from the essay by Juriy Lawrynenko entitled, "On the Evolution of the World Outlook and Political Thoughts of Ivan Franko." Many listeners in Ukraine were thus introduced to Franko's criticism of Marxist theory.

The programs dealing with the communist world in general have a two-fold aim: to highlight those problems which beset all communist societies and to explain those liberalizing trends in the Eastern European countries which, hopefully, might serve as a useful model for future Ukrainian development. From these programs, at the least, the enslaved Ukrainians learn that in their struggle for self-determination they are not alone.

The broadcasts on the non-communist world are intended to offset the distorted view of life in the West as propagated by the official Soviet media. Two examples of recent topics: the manner in which the Common Market countries have been working toward a common agricultural policy, and a comparison of American and Soviet labor laws with special emphasis on the means by which the American labor movement has gained a high standard of living for its members. A weekly show on new developments in western agriculture is of particular interest to the Ukrainians, whose love of the land is a theme running through all Ukrainian literature.

Relations between former colonies and their one-time rulers are examined in "Colonialism and the Post-colonial World," a program which shows that while peaceful de-colonization has taken place throughout most of the world's major empires, it has not yet begun in the countries subjugated by the Kremlin.

We shall return to this matter of colonialism. For the moment we may note that this essence of the Soviet reality loses emphasis by being treated as merely one, if undesirable, aspect.

The last category, that of stimulating listener response, entails the answering of listeners' questions over the air. Radio Liberty reports that the first quarter of 1966 brought the greatest number of letters to its Ukrainian program yet recorded. When it is remembered that only a fraction of the mail must get by the censor, afforded is a measure of Radio Liberty's reception by its intended listeners.

LISTENER RESPONSE

Based on listeners' mail and interviews conducted with Soviet citizens, repatriates and defectors in the course of the past five years, Radio Liberty has gained a composite picture of its Soviet listener. He is young (under 30), disillusioned about communism as he sees it in his own society, passionately curious about the West and deeply interested in the lives of his countrymen abroad. "Greetings to all Ukrainian people who live abroad," ran one letter. "I hope to meet them soon on the free and independent soil of a Ukrainian state."

Thus it would appear that nationalism has not been stamped out in the Soviet Union, nor is it confined to the older generation. That love of country has been passed down to the youth is confirmed by the Soviet press itself, which has scored the work in Ukraine of such young writers as Lina Kostenko and others, attacks which were recently climaxed with the arrests of critics Ivan Svitlychny and Ivan Dzyuba.

All letters received by Radio Liberty are friendly; most are critical of conditions existing in Ukraine and in other enslaved countries. One listener wrote:

"Listening to your voices, and the voices of all your friends, filled with good will and the sincere wish to help us, it is such a joy to think that somewhere, somebody remembers us, is toiling for us."

Radio Liberty's impact, however, is also indicated by another and unfailing measuring stick: the virulence of attacks in the Soviet press media. Official organ *Izvestia* (8 million circulation) recently unleashed a savage onslaught on Radio Liberty, which had committed the crime of broadcasting *in extenso* the works of Sinyavsky and Daniel, two writers put on trial for sending their works abroad.

This voice of the free West rates its effectiveness in yet another way. It points out that no longer does Radio Moscow, as it did in Stalin's time, pass over important news events in silence, or report them three days late. Nowadays Soviet newscasts are better and much more frequent, even more objectively written. Students of the Soviet scene attribute this improvement to the competition offered by foreign radio, which, despite costly jamming, continues to penetrate the Curtain.*

After mentioning Radio Liberty by name, *Kommunist*, the Soviet ideological journal, recently stated worriedly:

In our time, when there is a radio in almost every home, to fail to mention every event... is to give freedom of action to the falsifications of bourgeois propagandists... We cannot fail to admit that the bourgeois information agencies have attained a high degree of efficiency, responding immediately as they do, to everything that happens in the world, while we are sometimes late... the first announcement sometimes makes a great impression...

MAXIMIZING PENETRATION

Although we focussed our attention on Radio Liberty, other radio agencies—those of Madrid, Rome and the Vatican, for example, also have helped considerably in neutralizing the Iron Curtain. And with

* The extent of Western radio broadcasting and its influence upon the youth in Ukraine was demonstrated by the fact that Peter Shelest, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and Alexander Kornelchuk, top-ranking writer and ideologist, warned the Ukrainian youth against listening to Western radio broadcasts and assailed the United States for its alleged support of Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalists" (cf. *The New York Times*, March 25, 1966, and *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, April 1-15, 1966).

the neutralization, the winds of free Western thought have undoubtedly helped in the abatement of terror and slavishness in the Soviet Union.

There is a tendency, however, to expect a liberalization similar to that of the satellites to take place in the USSR. Western radio, despite its valuable contributions, is not impinging on "public opinion" in the USSR that is to be compared with that of the satellites, countries which have been subjected to the same degree—if at all—to the grinding processes of Russification and collectivization.

The difference may be put another way. The Hungarians were crushed when they rebelled in 1956 as Hungarians; to this day Ukrainians are being executed as mere "bourgeois nationalist rabble." To further minimize their nationality, Ukrainians are identified as "hirelings" of Wall Street capitalists. The most generous Kremlin treatment is to accord the Ukrainians, when identified as Ukrainians, the status of inferior brotherhood to the Russian people.

The mass arrests last year of Ukrainian writers and critics attest to the fact that the winds of Western thought have hardly blown away the genocidal storm that has assailed the Ukrainian identity since 1920. And, in being throttled, the Ukrainian voice was not even identified as such. These merely were lambs straying from the Russian Communist fold. This treatment holds true for all the enslaved peoples: in the dock is not a Byelorussian, Georgian, Armenian or Turkman but "a member of the Soviet peoples" afflicted by deviationism, formalism, chauvinism or bourgeois nationalism.

Since the Ukrainian people have maintained their identity despite man-made famine, endless purges and destruction of their church, we may reasonably expect that a Ukrainian shall remain a Ukrainian, even as an American shall remain conscious of his Americanism. When the day arrives that national identity disappears, the Western radio instrumentalities transmitting to the USSR, both public and private, can comfortably focus their attention on the evils of a political regime. Until that day arrives, however, the overriding evil of colonialism remains.

And it is precisely here that the very gist of what we ought to communicate is uncertain and diffused. Unlike the Hungarians, who were put down for rebelling against an onerous regime in their own country, the Ukrainians have been fiercely persecuted because they have been marked for *total absorption* in the Russian organism.

When we bear in mind that the freedom of scores of nationalities within the USSR was usurped long before the advent of Bolshevism we

can begin to see the true target of Kremlin vulnerability. When we learn of nationalist fervor in the Caucasus producing a major outbreak of riots or of Ukrainians being executed for nationalistic activities or of resistance to Europeanization by the Islamic peoples of Central Asia, we are witnessing the symptoms of a malaise that is centuries old.

Any hopes, therefore, of our influencing a sudden "polycentrism" in the Soviet Union proper are wildly optimistic. The policy of placing Russians in key posts of the ruling bodies of the enslaved countries came in with the Czarist Russian, rather than the later communist, takeover. Add the effect of the Soviet techniques of population dispersal (especially the youth), higher education reserved for the communist pure, and complete control of press and publishing houses and we have some idea of the magnitude of the task.

The point is that the ruling Russian ethnic element of the Soviet Union, entrenched at all levels of the enslaved nations, cannot be expected to identify itself with the nations themselves. In fact, a Russian bureaucrat in Ukraine could not but react adversely to a foreign radio broadcast beamed to Ukraine; it would invariably point up his alienness.

This reluctance apparently stems from a queasiness to offend the sensibilities of the Russian ethnic element (quite apart from the Kremlin overlords themselves). But it must be faced that this Russian element is ever furnishing the cadres for colonial administration. It is true that the "New Class" in Ukraine, communist in form but nationalist in content, has been evident even since the Thirties, when Commissar of Education Skrypnyk committed suicide in despair against Kremlin colonialist policies. But this "New Class" has been as systematically stamped out, as in recent purges.

All our radio instrumentalities, then, must do more than let the enslaved nations know they're not forgotten. For maximum effectiveness, they must, above all, attack Russian colonialism relentlessly. For once this monstrous aberration, both political and moral, is overcome, the problem of coexisting with a Communist ethnic *Russia* becomes a wholly manageable affair.

A U.S. POLICY OF UNFINISHED LIBERATION

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

Time favors the Soviet Russian and Red Chinese imperio-colonialists, not the world's exponents of democratic freedom. Time for economic acceleration, also time for further nuclear development, perhaps a scientific breakthrough, and anti-missile defense, and certainly time for methodical subversion and psycho-political preparations — all these developments require time and in time will produce further Red takeovers. On our side it is well to recall that cultural exchange, trade, diplomatic acquiescence, self-imposed restraints on military, economic, and political power, and other measures of peace-building were applied in even greater degree to the German, Italian, and Japanese totalitarians, and they failed. What rational ground is there for believing that these same measures will succeed in application to the Soviet Russian and Red Chinese totalitarians? In this calculus of basic power and maneuver Red puppets and associates in themselves count for little, and the total context of power play is far more disadvantageous to the Free World today than it was over a generation ago.

In a politically contrived address on improving relations with Eastern Europe, President Johnson placed favorable emphasis on a number of factors which will inevitably intensify this disadvantage and thus repeat the grave errors of only 30 years ago.¹ The first and most significant is the continuity of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. "Under the last four Presidents our policy toward the Soviet Union has been the same," he said approvingly. Relate this policy to demonstrative facts, particularly the grossly disproportionate growth in the power and influence of the USSR, and there is every empirical reason to demand a necessary change in this misleading policy.

Second, for an heir of the American Revolution to declare outright "Our purpose is not to overturn other governments but to help

¹ Address, *National Conference of Editorial Writers*, New York, October 8, 1966.

the people of Europe to achieve together a continent in which the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe work shoulder-to-shoulder together for the common good..." goes a long way in explaining why Moscow can look forward to a comfortable period of rapid build-up for world-wide Russian Cold War aggression. The President's additional stress on liberalized trade, cultural exchange, and tourism has nothing on the British use of these means in relation to Nazi Germany during the 30's.

Most noteworthy was Senator Fulbright's endorsement of this presidential address. The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who also is under the illusion that the USSR is a "nation," could hardly restrain his delight in blessing the address and in quoting from the President's previous Idaho Falls speech where Johnson underscored the need for "cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the benefits of such cooperation, the whole world would share and so, I think, would both *nations*."² Could you have visualized the United States "cooperating" with Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, powers that were not as dangerous and insidious as the Russian apparatus is? Then, too, what are we to "cooperate" in? There is little or nothing for us to gain from the Russian copyists, but there are immensities of knowledge, skills, and technology they stand to gain from us.

Lest we forget, we cooperated with Moscow during World War II; today we should stand aghast at the results of that alliance. The continuity of policy toward the USSR which President Johnson makes so much of is, in the light of cumulative evidence, the best guarantee for additional future disasters and a truly inevitable hot World War III.

THE DISASTROUS U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE USSR

It is startling, indeed, how little perspective has been shown regarding this virtually pro-Russian policy, whose roots really extend back to President Woodrow Wilson. One should judge any policy, whether it's based on false assumptions and loose principles or not, by its concrete results. This is the only final and rational approach to a critical evaluation of any policy. To laud the continuity of a policy that has already led to heavy losses for freedom borders on

² J. W. Fulbright, "Shift From Coexistence to Peaceful Engagement. *Congressional Record*, October 11, 1966, p. 24974.

the irrational. By the record we have nothing to take pride in our insular policy toward the USSR.

Just consider a few highlights of this record. The spectacular expansion of the Soviet Russian Empire—from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the USSR to the Danube, the Pacific, and Cuba—within the brief span of 50 years and with patently inferior resources is a hallmark of political art and genius, regardless of its immoral qualities. Fifty years are but a second in historical time; quite objectively, the empire-building achievements of the Russian totalitarians must be given due and full credit, again despite their brutal and unethical aspects.

A sober contemplation of this all-dominant fact cannot but demand a consideration of its numerous causal reasons. Salient among them are the pronounced American contributions to Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, derived both from errors of commission and omission. Sowing the seeds of our present policy toward the USSR, Woodrow Wilson committed one of the two colossal political blunders of this century when, out of plain ignorance, he failed to apply the principle of national self-determination to the many subjugated non-Russian nations in the Russian Empire. The firm application of this principle would have effectively guaranteed the newly-won freedom and statehood of these nations and thus have prevented the formation of a new Russian Empire under the guise of the USSR and fraudulent Communism. How different the course of 20th century history would have been had the cause of national independence been founded on knowledge and understanding! We still are suffering from this knowledge gap today; needless to say, the price of Wilson's failure still is being paid by us today. A continuity of error is as real as one of truth.

In this broad perspective, the original Wilsonian error was compounded and added to by U.S. economic contributions to the growth of the Soviet Russian Empire (now in the form of the USSR, 1920's-40's), America's diplomatic recognition of this empire-state, Roosevelt's unconditional support of the tyrannical empire during World War II, and his naive trust in Russian words at Yalta and Teheran. Few Americans appreciate the incalculable assistance provided by American capital, skill, and technology in the construction of the industrial foundations of the present chief enemy.³ Today, self-

³ See the excellent survey by Wladimir Naleszkiewicz, "Technical Assistance of the American Enterprises to the Growth of the Soviet Union, 1929-1933," *The Russian Review*, No. 1, January, 1966.

seeking interests are once again clamoring for liberal trade with "Russia" and the Red Empire, which in the nature of things can only mean more efficient technology for the totalitarians to pursue more effectively their Cold War aggressions on all continents of the Free World. The grave error we committed in our economic relations with the totalitarian Axis powers, as well as the USSR, would be repeated again if these interests were to have their way.⁴

Those who argue for the recognition of the Red totalitarians in Peiping and elsewhere in the empire might do well to review the deception and adverse results of our earlier diplomatic recognition of the Russian totalitarians. Progressive humanization and genuine peaceable relations, not to speak of opportunities for expanded freedom, were the lost objectives of that venture. The 1933 step broadened the field for Moscow's Cold War operations against the U.S. Moreover, the cruel aspect of humanitarian America recognizing the USSR while millions of Ukrainians, Cossacks, North Caucasians and others were starving and dying in a massive Russian man-made famine was of no concern to those bent on honoring the world's outstanding genocidists. How foolishly we squander the uses and power of diplomatic recognition was again demonstrated in October, 1956, when the occasion of the Hungarian Revolution called for a strategic withdrawal of such recognition from the USSR. As the most powerful nation in the history of mankind it behooves us, out of self-respect if nothing else, to place greater weight and value on this instrument than we have in the past. Occasions will certainly arise in the future to warrant such prudent discrimination.

Roosevelt's unconditional support of this tyrannical empire during World War II and his unbelievable naiveté at Yalta and Teheran are matters of public record now. However, what is not sufficiently understood is that these repetitive aberrations constitute the continuity of our policy toward the USSR. Roosevelt, too, clung to the basic fallacies in viewing the USSR as a "nation-state," its population as consisting solely of Russians, its policies oriented fundamentally to socio-economic rather than imperio-colonialist objectives, and its capability of evolving into a peaceable, democratic state and yet remain an imperial network. Turned obversely, these ingredient assumptions of the continuous policy toward the USSR spell a protracted ignorance of the nature of that state, the multi-national composition of the population, the widespread condition of rampant

⁴ See Lev E. Dobriansky, "Historical Lessons in Totalitarian Trade," *Intercollegiate Review*, November-December 1966.

imperio-colonialism, and the institutional nexus between internal predation and external aggression, whether in direct military form or by indirect paramilitary means.

Clearly, Roosevelt's errors formed the second colossal, political blunder in this century. They opened up the dikes for the third wave of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, the two preceding ones being the 1918-22 and 1939-40 periods. The conquest of Central Europe, mainland China, North Korea and others are traceable to this egregious blunder. As Anthony Eden plainly shows in his memoirs, the very first thing that troubled Stalin was the allied attitude toward the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR! Being assured that his inner fortress would remain intact, Stalin then planned with ease and in patient time the further expansion of the Soviet Russian Empire. What transpired from 1945 on is now prologue.

Almost in the nature of a political cycle repeating itself after a generation, measures being considered today are once again placing us on the brink of recommitting past errors. The whole illusory concept of "detente with Russia," the US-USSR Consular Convention, increased trade with the empire-state, and notions of an alliance with "Russia" against Red China are based on the false assumptions and preconceptions underlying the continuity of U.S. policy toward the USSR. The presence of nuclear weapons in the current picture is extraneous to the issue at hand and cannot logically be introduced as a basis of rationalization for perpetuating old myths.

In toto, our record of relations with Eastern Europe generally and the USSR in particular is an exceptionally pitiful one. It is as though, through ignorance and inadvertent errors, America has become the historic guardian of the Russian Empire. It is most difficult to see what President Johnson has to gloat about this record. We won two world wars at heavy cost of life and treasure, but because of political unpreparedness and habituated myth-making, we also lost the peace twice. Following World War II we enjoyed atomic monopoly and air supremacy; no power in the world, including the USSR, could have successfully opposed our generated pressures for expanded freedom; yet within the short span of a decade both the monopoly and unrivaled supremacy quickly evaporated. It is doubtful that any nation in history has lost so much in so short a time as we. And the end is not yet in sight.

Simple as it may seem, the chief key to peace, victory and freedom is a principled and rational policy toward the USSR. The major source of trouble and threat to the peace of the world is not Peiping, Havana, Hanoi, Cairo and what have you, but solely and exclusively

Moscow. A bit of reflection will show that the prime and determining power base of the Red Empire is Moscow's inner empire, the Soviet Union itself. In ultimate terms of distributed power the rest of the empire, including mainland China, depends for its survival upon this base. Nevertheless, this power center is so profoundly fraught with vulnerabilities that a sane policy toward the USSR could insure an essential surcease in Russian Cold War aggressions in the Free World, a drastic weakening of the total empire itself, and paramount strides in the direction of world peace and freedom. An equation such as USSR—Ukraine (largest captive non-Russian nation in both Eastern Europe and the USSR) = 0 would then begin to make sense to most Americans; the miserable military record of the polyglot Russian armed forces in this century would also become more intelligible to most of us; and, among other things, the so-called enigma of Russia would be permanently dissolved. Appeasement of the Soviet Russian Empire via "cooperation" and "agreement" only whets the appetite of the Bear more, for it signifies weakness in will and vision. It has been so in the past; it will be so in the future.

In short, a sane U.S. policy toward the USSR would become the focal point of a general American policy of unfinished liberation. Within the USSR, for over 40 years most of the captive non-Russian nations have been seeking liberation from Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, and the Russian nation itself stands to be liberated from five centuries of negated freedom, a liberation necessarily predicated on that of the conquered. In the outer reaches of the empire, extending to the Western Hemisphere, liberation from the manacles of Russian power inflames the heart of every patriotic Hungarian as well as that of a North Korean, every Polish patriot as also his North Vietnamese and Cuban counterpart. And in all the common denominator, both historically and analytically, is their captivity to the ultimate Soviet Russian imperio-colonialist power. There is an aggregate power in the captive nations, taken as a whole, which far exceeds all the power of nuclear weapons now existing. We have not even begun to tap this tremendous power as, indeed, we have failed so far to use effectively our other forms of power, be they technological, economic, military, and moral.

COMEDY AND TRAGEDY IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

For the past two decades comedy and tragedy have marked the discussions, formulation, and effects surrounding general U.S.

foreign policy. The tragedy has been in its effects, as seen in Korea, Vietnam, and the Dominican Republic where unnecessary expenditure of American lives took place in situations that could have been prevented. In this respect, there will be more Koreas, Vietnams, and Dominican Republics if we fail to change our policy. Curious, isn't it, that Russian lives are not as freely spent in diverse parts of the world? Nor will they be so long as the old Russian borderlands policy in its modern Red version of Communist Party transmission belts continues to succeed.

As to comedy, the American people have been entertained by a rapid succession of slogans dealing with our foreign relations. The verbal parade has included "containment," "liberation," "peaceful liberation," "containment without isolation," "massive retaliation," "peaceful coexistence," "the Geneva spirit," "competitive coexistence," "mutual deterrence," "evolution," "escalation," "disengagement," "bridges of understanding," "competitive engagement" and many other scintillating terms. What the semantic mill will disgorge tomorrow is anyone's guess. Similar to the annual dress fashion or auto shows, old ideas evidently require new verbal dresses and bodies. But whatever the dress or body the basic structure of ideas has remained the same. This has been so true for our "changing world," our "nuclear age," our "new horizons"; as though all of the past has been static.

We Americans do not generally go in for rigorous conceptual analyses. The reasons for this condition perhaps are many. However, this quick succession of conceptual constructs indicates the prevalence of much confusion of thought, not to mention an inability to draw proper logical distinctions. Beyond containment and liberation the other concepts are essentially reducible to the one or the other. Careful reflection will show that the unresolved issue still before this nation is fundamentally between the continuation of simple containment in all its patched-up appearances and the projection of liberation, which presupposes and mutually reinforces containment itself. Yet it is amazing how few have understood this.

The evident reason for this condition is that too many of us have not sufficiently comprehended the basic meaning of liberation and what it entails. To those who have devoted considerable thought to the policy of unfinished liberation, it is logical, experientially sensible, and, assuming a will to survive as an independent nation, it is inescapable. The policy is really the only realistic alternative to either relative co-destruction or peaceful and piece-by-piece sur-

render. Since Korea the traditional American instinct for clear-cut victory has lapsed badly, but the assumption holds inasmuch as the instinct can be easily reactivated. As to choice, when Secretary of State Dean Rusk thinks the only two alternatives to his policy of patched-up containment are a hydrogen war and old-fashioned American isolationism, he clearly reveals the limitations of our leadership.⁵ Unfortunately, he also discloses his own unfamiliarity with the literature and developments bearing on this crucial issue.

What are the prospects for liberating the captive nations not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Red Empire as a whole—and without precipitating a global holocaust? Though time is steadily running out, the prospects nevertheless are still bright. There can be numerous opportunities for us if we exert the knowledge, understanding, will, and courageous determination to plan for them and to implement accordingly. The situation calls for a different type of leadership than what we have been getting. Because of our unpreparedness to seize upon fortuitous opportunities, we missed the boat, for example, during the spectacular Hungarian Revolution. The agent of freedom, Oleg Penkovsky, who largely penned the now famous volume, *The Penkovsky Papers*, was not wrong in saying that the Russian General Staff had opposed the “Khrushchev adventure” in Hungary and that if “the West had slapped Khrushchev down hard then, he would not be in power today and all of Eastern Europe could be free.”⁶ From the viewpoint of ideological considerations, it is interesting that the former Russian leader, aided by the West’s ineptitude, rationalized his delayed action on the basis of Czar Nicholas I’s intervention in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848.⁷

The logic and reason for a policy of unfinished liberation can almost be formulated into a syllogism. The first proposition is that, whether we like it or not, we are in a persistent Cold War with a messianic enemy, the Soviet version of traditional Russian imperio-colonialism.⁸ The second proposition is that war, whether cold or

⁵ “Rusk Asks His Critics What They Would Do,” *The Washington Post*, June 1, 1962, p. A19.

⁶ Excerpts from *The Penkovsky Papers*, *The Washington Post*, November 5, 1965, p. A23.

⁷ “Some Aides Questioned Steps in Hungary, Khrushchev Says,” *The Washington Post*, December 3, 1959, p. A4.

⁸ For a penetrating account of this tradition see Dinko Tomasic, *The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism*, Glencoe, Illinois, p. 75.

hot, is a situation that poses the inescapable issue of victory or defeat. Then the third proposition is that as a nation, it is necessary for us—in fact, we cannot but logically seek—to defeat the enemy. In our times the nature of this defeat means political defeat, the political and decisive defeat of the Soviet Russian enemy. All this appears quite simple and clear, and indeed it is. As time will tell, it is a delusion to believe that victory on net balance is not achievable and that the totalitarian Red syndicate, considerably strengthened in time, would sit to gaze at the erosion of its power through “evolution.”

Each of these propositions has been extensively supported by elaborate documentation and rational discourse. In the field of human action, however, logic and reason form just one part of the story; intuitive perception, vision, and will form the other, usually the more important part. But common sense and experienced judgment are sufficient to justify these propositions. Taking the first, we read of the Cold War in the papers, hear about it over the radio, and even discuss it. So there is at least a verbal recognition of the fact that we are in a Cold War. Many engage in wishful thinking about its cessation as, for example, one educator who has proposed a presidential proclamation commencing with these words, “I hereby declare that the cold war is over.”⁹ It sounds foolish, and it is; but this indicates how much has yet to be learned about Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism which alone is the original cause of the Cold War.

On the other hand, the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Patrick Henry Dean, shows common-sense realism in warning of “a continuing cold war” and underscores “independence as the final goal” for international society.¹⁰ The independence of nations and individuals he speaks of is not the image that has blinded some editorialists into thinking that the captive nations of Central Europe are no longer captive because some associates of the Red syndicate have begun to flex their muscles.¹¹ Disconcerting as it may be, the Cold War will continue as long as the Soviet Union exists. Russian cold war activity is not new; it was

⁹ Robert M. Hutchings, “A Declaration to End the Cold War,” *Congressional Record*, November 8, 1965, p. A6301.

¹⁰ Address Commemorating Colonial Revolt, Williamsburg, Virginia, May 30, 1965.

¹¹ E. g., “Satellites No Longer?” Editorial, *The New York Times*, July 24, 1965.

an essential institution of the White Czars as it has been and is now of the Red Czars. The fact that the Bear occasionally cries "peace" doesn't mean its forthcoming. It would do most of us well to re-read Rudyard Kipling's poem about the bear that walks like a man:

When he stands up as if pleading, in wavering, man-brute guise;
When he veils the hate and cunning in his little swinish eyes;
When he shows as seeking quarter, with paws like hands in prayer,
That is the time of peril — the time of the True of the Bear!"

Sheer common sense dictates that once catapulted into a war, whether hot or cold, the issue of victory and defeat be faced by the challenged, and the objective of positive victory be adopted as his consuming goal. Anything less than these will only postpone matters to the accruing advantage of the challenger. If we think that we have won in Korea or Laos, or are winning in positive net balance terms in Vietnam, we are only deluding ourselves. Being primarily concerned here with the Cold War, there should be no question that victory is possible and attainable. The very nature of the Soviet Russian menace predetermines the choice of either victory or defeat. Its victims amply attest to this truth, and its own oft-repeated determination to win is enough to pre-judge our resolution to do likewise. By the third proposition it follows that for survival as a nation we must logically seek positive victory in the Cold War, i. e. net balance gain, or, barring last-minute recourse to military arms and the likelihood of a hot global war, be ready in time to surrender even in a state of ignoble compromise to the enemy. To read the words of the Secretary of State—"Sometimes it seems to me that some of those who talk about a 'no win' policy want to participate in a hydrogen war"—one cannot but wonder about the deep impression created by Moscow's propaganda machine and its coexistence or co-destruction myth on minds in this country.¹² The possibility of such a war scarcely inhibits Red Cold War strategy and tactics throughout the world.

Our third proposition certainly cannot at present be supported by much empirical evidence. There is no Cold War apparatus proportionate to the demands of the objective. The proposition's ultimate support rests in the directions of common sense, the ideals of freedom, and in our dedication to these ideals. Unfortunately, here in

¹² *The Washington Post*, May 7, 1962, p. A28.

the United States we have to some extent lost these requisites, along with a temperate sense of national patriotism. Nevertheless, this indispensable dedication has been one of the very springs of our American democracy, going back to the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. It takes these documents seriously and inspires us to uphold the ideals of freedom by deeds rather than just by occasioned words. Still, much of this dedication has been sapped and, as a consequence, we have had almost everything within the range of irrational excesses, extending from myopic Kennanism over to the unrealistic Fortress America concept.¹³

Knowing that this is war, albeit a Cold War with the main adversary, if we are not dedicated to the defeat of the enemy, then it obviously follows that we are prone to compromise ourselves morally and politically. Logically, there is no middle ground. We are fooling ourselves to believe otherwise, and the Maginot-wall of patched-up containment won't protect our fooleries. We have already developed a sense of compromise in our willingness by omission of deed to accept the status quo of slavery in a substantial part of the world, praying that "evolution" will somehow set things alright. By this we wishfully look for peace where there can be no peace. And as this inclination deepens, we shall continue to compromise more and more until the only alternative will be "I'd rather be dead than Red" or "I'd rather be Red than dead." The policy of unfinished liberation offers the choice of being both alive and free.

To avoid both comedy and tragedy in our foreign policy, this basic logic of unfinished liberation sets forth five factors which support its dominant thesis. The factors constitute in a sense the argument's irreducible general abstracts. The first is adequacy of arms. The McNamara numbers game in the nuclear ratio exemplifies mathematical obtuseness in the fixed framework of psycho-political warfare and the type of computer thinking that will lead to more hot wars, big and small. It isn't necessary for Moscow to enjoy any clear-cut superiority in all arms, including nuclear ones, to realize its goals. For its Cold War purposes a given adequacy of arms to achieve its ends is enough, though its imperio-colonialist economy will surely provide more.

At the beginning of the 50's we hid behind the fact that we had a distinct superiority in arms. We spoke effusively of physical

¹³ See on Kennanism a pamphlet by the Hon. Michael A. Feighan, *The Kennan Fables*, Washington, D. C., 1958; also James Burnham, *Containment or Liberation?*, New York, 1953, pp. 13-73.

deterrence, the great deterrence against the Soviet Russian wave of the future. It was a plain fact that we had overwhelming material superiority; it was also plain that we squandered its uses in the Cold War because of a lack of understanding, timidity, and short vision. Since the *sputniks*, ICBM's and so forth the deterrence became "mutual." Regardless of a 3:1 ICBM ratio in our favor now, there has been a relative decline in our power of overall physical deterrence which has shifted the power play to other elements in the psychopolitical warfare arsenal. Unquestionably, the arms race will continue with inevitable Soviet Russian superiority in some lines of weaponry, particularly anti-missile missilery and all its obvious implications.

The second factor in this calculus is our accommodation of the empire's progressive build-up, both negatively by failing to adopt the policy of unfinished liberation and positively by repeating errors of the past, such as liberal trade, the consular convention, cultural exchange and the like. Our present irresolute posture guarantees for the Russians the steady consolidation of their empire, albeit with its recurring difficulties and problems. Remember, they had even worse problems under Stalin. In other words, the Maginot-wall policy of patched-up containment has us in effect saying "let history do it—evolution, you know," "don't make any firm decision," "let us see pragmatically—day by day, expediently, playing by ear—how things will work out, and let's shift accordingly," "by all means, no long-range plans, no fixed and set objectives; we mustn't appear inflexible." This is the usual jargon you hear in many governmental areas, sometimes spiced up with thoughtless gibberish like "escalation," "confrontation," and "flexible responses." In short, we have unmistakably declared ourselves: in behalf of the captive nations as against the Red states, do nothing of serious import to disturb the consolidating processes within the vast Soviet Russian Empire which, despite family quarrels and the like, includes mainland China, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Cuba where none of the imposed governments would last for long without the ultimate strength of the USSR.

An integral part of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism is its international conspiracy under the guise of Communism and the Communist Parties network. We mustn't overlook this fact despite Moscow's "peaceful coexistence" pretensions. The undercurrent of international conspiracy continues unremittingly. Multi-billions of rubles haven't been spent for fun to train professional revolutionaries, prepare "sleepers" and potential assassins on every continent, and provide unlimited facilities for the Day as determined by conditions

and chance. Moscow persistently plans for political and violent sabotage at the appropriate moment. Spawning a network of subversion, conspiracy, disloyalty, espionage, and sabotage has been a traditional Russian stock in trade both in times of so-called peace and a hot war. Based on the old divide-and-conquer principle, operatives in the network are the cadres forming the enemy from within, and within the United States they are operating as already shown in several dress rehearsals featuring civil rights and Vietnam war dissent.

Our fourth factor is the highly concentrated psycho-political propaganda waged by Moscow and the syndicate. We have really to match it; yes, even lumping together the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Europe. Russian propaganda is essentially faucet-like, adroitly adjusted to changing conditions and tactical considerations. For example, in 1954 there was an intensive political offensive for peace emanating from the Kremlin. Immediately thereafter, Moscow prostituted everything that had been said and the "Spirit of Geneva" expired. Then, at Moscow's initiative, the West was lured into another phase of summit fever, followed again by the turbulences of the U-2 incident, the Khrushchev visit, U.N. theatrics, and the Cuban and Berlin crises. With economic and political problems piling up in its empire, Moscow was forced to shift gears and sue for a breathing period under the umbrella of "peaceful coexistence." This same umbrella has also served as an effective shield for anti-American propaganda and psycho-political, subversive penetrations on every continent. Its effectiveness will undoubtedly wear out at the point of another major takeover attempt. Meanwhile, Moscow will continue to breed confusion, doubt, and debate and sow seeds of disunity in the United States and the Free World. After all, this is the essence of the Russian Cold War against the still independent nations of the world; too, it is the life-blood of survival for both the inner and outer spheres of the Soviet Russian Empire.

Shocking though it may seem, the final factor is the real advantage of the first shot which we also guarantee to Moscow. For various reasons we have shunned from action along lines of a preventive war, although early advocates may be proven right by subsequent history. The Russians are in position to develop their weaponry and seize the real possibility of firing the first nuclear shot. This possibility of a nuclear Pearl Harbor for America cannot be ruled out in the event of a major technologic breakthrough or an advanced Russian system of anti-missile defense. Also, the power of blackmail looms large here.

Briefly, then, when one reflects on these five factors pinned to our present policy of patched-up containment, one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that two real frightening possibilities will face us in time. One is for the United States to suffer military defeat, given a peculiar complex of events and situations. But this will be unlikely as long as we maintain our uninhibited progress in military technology. The other possibility, the much more likely, is a progressive, psycho-political isolation resulting from successful Red takeovers, and this, too, would spell disastrous defeat. The Common Market in Europe, the Alliance for Progress in Latin America and several other similar developments in the Free World are no guarantees against this possible outcome. In fact, they engender tendencies of euphoria, apathy, and indifference that could accelerate it.

Obviously, no rational person would hold that a football team can possibly realize victory by constantly playing on its own side of the fifty-yard line. This is precisely what we have been doing. Building bridges of understanding to the control points of the Red Empire neither advances the enemies' already complete understanding of us, our weaknesses and strength, nor does it place us on the field of real play in the power game of the Cold War. It is that crucial point of really entering the game peaceably, competitively, and for win-keeps that clearly distinguishes the policy of unfinished liberation from that of patched-up containment and its self-defeating bridge-building contraptions.¹⁴ Under the latter, all the major crises and the world's tensions are really on this side of the empire's fences. In Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America—and even here—tensions are being created or aggravated as we are led by the enemy's initiative to spend ourselves reacting and tending to this tension today, that one tomorrow, and so forth ad infinitum. In the meantime, the enemy enjoys psycho-political sanctuary, guaranteed that there will be no precipitation of disturbances or tensions within his imperial domain. This is hardly in the tradition of the American Revolution.

NO EXCUSE FOR NOT KNOWING

Despite Mr. Rusk's mistaken belief, there is a rich background of thought on the policy of unfinished liberation. What it is, what it calls for, and how to do it are incorporated in this literature. There

¹⁴ See author's contributions to *Decisions For A Better America*, New York, 1960, pp. 151-53.

is no excuse for not knowing it. There is every reason to become familiar with it now because once the present phase of appeasing the Russians is over, with of course a price to pay for our lack of real leadership, the liberation policy will be our only alternative. Those responsible for our present errors of both commission and omission will be written off, and self-legitimations in the name of pursuing "peace" will be found groundless. Lost time, repeated errors, and blunderous assists to the Red Empire cannot be whitewashed by mere "peace" utterances.

Most of us, even those in high places, are unfamiliar with the Kersten Amendment to the Mutual Security Act, passed by Congress in August, 1951. The amendment has the distinction of being the first concrete measure aimed at a psycho-political offensive—five years before Hungary! It was designed to attract young escapees from the captive world, rehabilitate them, and form respective national military units, essentially freedom corps with prime psycho-political significance.¹⁵ The Russians feared the implications of this to such a degree that almost half of the U.N. Assembly sessions in Paris that year were exhausted by Vishinsky's tirades against it. To quiet them, President Truman sent as his personal representative Congressman Mike Mansfield to explain to the Assembly that we had no intention of really interfering in the captive nations! However, Russian interference was tolerated and the amendment was never executed.

Had the measure been properly implemented, we would have had a powerful lever in assisting the Hungarians to regain their freedom. In 1957, Senator Russell revived the idea in his Armed Services Committee, but it did not receive any encouragement from the Eisenhower Administration. In implemented form the idea could have been used to thwart the erection of the Berlin Wall during the period of Red hesitancy in August, 1961. It certainly could be applied to captive Cuba today. It is an idea to keep in reserve for application in the future.

In the period of 1952-54 much was written and discussed about the policy of liberation. Months before John Foster Dulles' article on liberation appeared in *Life* magazine in May, 1952, this writer had prepared for the Republican National Committee tracts on liberation which were later distributed at the Republican Convention in

¹⁵ *Mutual Security Act of 1952*, Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, pp. 501-521.

Chicago and during the subsequent campaign. Although much utterance was given to the new policy, it became apparent that very few, even at the highest echelon, grasped its essence and ramifications. General Eisenhower spoke in terms which are applicable to our present deteriorated situation. "Our determination," he said, "must go beyond the negative concept of containment to the positive concept of expanding by peaceful means the areas of freedom. If this is not done, we will once again find ourselves at war. It must be done. It can be done."¹⁶ Because of what had not been done, we were already in a war when these words were uttered. For the same reason a little over a decade later we found ourselves in another war. And there still will be additional hot wars if we fearfully cling to simple but negative containment.

Mr. Dulles also spoke in the same general vein. "But liberation from the yoke of Moscow," he said, "will not occur for a very long time, and courage in neighboring lands will not be sustained, unless the United States makes it publicly known that it wants and expects liberation to occur." During the Eisenhower Administration it was made known, but without substance, understanding, and vision. Lip-service was in abundance; concrete implementation was naught. For example, our policy toward the USSR was as erroneous as it is now. Briefly, the policy of liberation was never applied, and thus it is unfinished in two senses: (1) the invincible dedication to liberation by the captive nations and (2) a realistic application of the policy by us.

Regardless of the timidity of the Eisenhower Administration to implement the liberation policy, various and diverse works appeared to explain its contents and purposes. The book by James Burnham on *Containment or Liberation?* advanced public enlightenment to a notable degree. The reports of the Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression of the House of Representatives are of historic contribution. They appeared in 1954-55 and will be useful in years to come. In May, 1955, General David Sarnoff presented to the President an extensive memorandum which furnishes much detailed expression to the policy.¹⁷ About this time, too, Senator Douglas of Illinois took steps in the Senate to propose a Freedom Administration on the basis of a two-level concept. It was pointed out that Moscow has operated on two levels, the Communist Party

¹⁶ *New York Times*, October 21, 1952.

¹⁷ See author's analysis of "The Sarnoff Memorandum: A Year Later," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, September 1956, pp. 203-210.

with its world-wide conspiratorial network and the conventional diplomatic level. Why couldn't we have a Freedom Administration, subverting for freedom, if you will, with the blunt instruments of truth? Moreover, the Orlando group in Florida was already at work then for the creation of a public Freedom Academy to offer instruction in psycho-political warfare.

Millions of our citizens took to heart the words uttered by President Eisenhower in 1956, "the peaceful liberation of the captive peoples has been and will continue to be a goal of United States foreign policy." But the search for its concrete implementation continued as individuals and groups developed further the concept and its operational modes. *Decisions For A Better America*, congressional hearings on the Freedom Commission and Academy, the annual Captive Nations Week observances, and numerous other books and pamphlets carried forward to this day the thought on the unfinished liberation policy. The reservoir of thought created shall have to be tapped once this wasteful period of appeasement and error ends in disillusionment and reawakened sobriety.

Before it will be too late, by then most will have learned that the best way to prevent a hot global war is to win the Cold War. Contrary to the notions of some writers, they will have understood that the liberation policy never theoretically rejected the concept of containment.¹⁸ It is necessarily founded on containment, though its advocates have consistently pointed out the inherent insufficiency of containment and the need for its reinforcement through liberation. Events have proven them right as we witness the Red totalitarians leaping over the Maginot containment wall into the Middle East, Cuba, Latin America, Africa and elsewhere. Simple containment now is a badly patched-up affair, and the coarse and unsophisticated, last-minute resort to U.S. military assistance, as in Vietnam, will inevitably and rightly tax the good patience of the American public itself. And lastly, in sharp contrast to our present policy of "building bridges of understanding," in itself a desperate variant of crumbled containment, the liberation policy is firmly oriented toward the revolutionary aspirations of the captive nations and not the further strengthening and entrenchment of totalitarian Red regimes which, in effect, the hopeless Johnsonian policy sponsors.

¹⁸ E. g., Joseph Alsop, "Liberation Versus Containment," *The Washington Post*, August 28, 1961.

WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT IT?

It is always a source of amusement in any discussion of this subject to be asked "Yea, what can be done about liberating the captive peoples?" As a pharmacist preparing pills in a drug store for the remedy of a lingering condition, you're supposed to offer quickie formulae and solutions. There are none, no more than can be found in any process of human action. As there are no short cuts to learning and living, so there are no short cuts in liberating and enlarging the environment of world freedom. In both, expressed principles, definite goals, methodical planning, and resolute action are the interrelated ingredients of success. The policy of unfinished liberation demands these ingredients and at the same time, in contrast to mere containment, offers the widest latitude for flexibility, initiative, and creative imagination, traits which are in keeping with our American tradition.

For a simple, direct answer to the above question one would say "start reading and thinking." If you were investing your money wisely, you wouldn't hesitate investigating the prospect thoroughly. Here we are dealing with the most fundamental investment of all: your freedom and security. Though the literature is replete with things that could and should be done, there is no simple blueprint of action, nor is it desirable or feasible to have one. The utmost flexibility requires the following: firm principles, fixed goals, a complete, essential knowledge of the enemy (chiefly the USSR and its greatest vulnerabilities), a whole spectrum of operational devices, prudence in the use of these devices as determined by time and circumstance, and a dedicated commitment to win. Strong and enlightened leadership in our democracy can insure a flexible, interlocking relationship of these basic elements. Anything less will always develop into a rigid will to compromise with an in-time, uncompromising challenger.

In outline form here, the policy of unfinished liberation is structured by all of these elements. Its firm principles are those enshrined in the Declaration of Independence itself: national self-determination and independence, religious freedom, personal liberty under just law, and individual freedom of speech, economic investment, association, and representation. Moral and political responsibility grafted in justice is at the base of each principle. Almost predetermined by these principles are the following fixed goals: the universalization of our Declaration of Independence, the liberation of the captive nations, national independent states, the encouragement

of regional cooperation in whatever suitable form, and a genuine United Nations of free nations. The realization of these goals would mean the end of all imperio-colonialist systems and with this, probably the end of any major threat to world peace. Certainly the freedom and security of the United States would be guaranteed for the long future.

As to an essential knowledge of the enemy, enough has been said here on the urgent necessity of altering our misleading policy toward the USSR. The mythologies of Communism and of the USSR as a "nation-state" or a genuine federated state must give way to the truths of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and the tyrannical empire that exists in the USSR. The steady dissemination of these truths is a sine qua non for the success of the liberation policy and for our victory in the Cold War. After all, the USSR is the heart of the Red octopus; our sporadic absorptions with its tentacles in Asia, Africa, Latin America and elsewhere would not in themselves bring us substantially closer to victory. In fact, it is central to Russian strategy to have us spread ourselves thin and on the fringes, while powerful nationalist trends within Russia's inner empire go virtually unnoticed in the public forum and certainly unexploited by our government.¹⁹ There is tremendous work to be done in this area of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, even that of educating many of our columnists.²⁰

Finally, in the implementation of the policy a whole spectrum of operational devices already exists and, as pointed out above, would be used prudently but with a dedicated commitment to win. The usual superficial arguments about precipitating "premature revolutions," escalating into a hot global war, and failing to help Hungary are well taken account of. It is not difficult to rebut each of these. The first two point up the contradictions inherent in the narrow policy of patched-up containment, which really has not contained the aggressive influences of imperialist Russia. The general counter-argument to all of them is that without careful cold war planning and execution over the years you can scarcely expect a minimization of risks in a contingent world which is becoming increasingly fraught with risks, the greatest being the risk of losing our independence.

Subject to conditions, "climate," and circumstances, these devices

¹⁹ For an occasional incisive report see Victor Zorza, "Nationalist Trend Worries Kremlin," *The Washington Post*, April 24, 1966.

²⁰ E.g., Roscoe Drummond, "Captive Nations Cause," *New York Herald Tribune*, August 19, 1964

and their uses include the Kersten freedom corps idea, a Freedom Commission and Academy, a Special Congressional Committee on the Captive Nations, a revitalized Voice of America and a Radio Liberation as propaganda media, aid to underground resistance groups, a communications network ranging from secret printing to space satellites, economic warfare, diplomatic manipulations, the U.N. forum, facilities of friendly and like-minded countries, subversion of Red control centers, utilization of labor unions, churches, veteran groups and other private channels, money counterfeiting, bribery programs and so forth. The devices are endless, and the enormous difference between our use of them and the enemy's use of some of them is that we could enlist vastly more among the captives to participate than he can among free men. Of incalculable advantage to us is the other important dimension of the Cold War, namely between the captive nation and the Red-controlled state. Building the Johnsonian bridges of understanding helps the state, not the people or nation.

ONLY A QUESTION OF TIME

Now, would this course of psycho-political action lead to thermo-nuclear war? No. Indeed, it is the best insurance against a hot global war. In the 50's, when we enjoyed clear-cut atomic monopoly and air supremacy, opponents said such action would lead to war; mind you, while the Korean War was in vogue. Now in the 60's, with the enemy a member of the nuclear club and its empire more extended, the same short-sighted opponents say the same thing. They offer nothing new and urge us to sit tight on the self-contradictions of patched-up containment. How far behind they are of real developments in Eastern Europe is indicated by this choice observation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman: "the Soviet Union and some of the Eastern European Communist countries are beginning to free themselves from the blinders of Marxist-Leninist ideology and to look at the world and at their own societies in somewhat more realistic terms."²¹ Like many others, the poor Senator, who hasn't the slightest conception of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and thinks both the USSR and Yugoslavia are "nations," finds it difficult to understand that Marxist-Leninist ideology is only one tool among many used by the Russian totalitarians, when and where

²¹ J. W. Fulbright, "The Basic Issue In Foreign Affairs," *Congressional Record*, September 8, 1964, p. 21018.

it suits their purposes.²² Its impact in the USSR was lost under Stalin over 30 years ago, though Khrushchev and his twin successors have lip-serviced it.

It must take some "blindness" and lack of realism to recreate an empire and extend it with relatively inferior resources within the short span of 50 years, and in the process rob atomic secrets from an "ally," bamboozle it with nuclearistic fear, contest the most powerful nation in space and power gaining, as in Cuba, and threaten its whole security with increasing success in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. What all this has to do with "Marxist-Leninist ideology," only the Senator can tell, and perhaps also academicians who like to read Lenin's imperialism into these real developments; they have everything to do with 500 years of Russian empire-building experience and wisdom in psycho-political warfare. By all essential evidence the "blindness" rests on the eyes of those lauding the continuity of U.S. policy toward the USSR, naively seeking bridges of understanding studded with Red toll gates and, like innocent sheep, prone to be sucked into another Russo-American alliance to guard the Soviet Russian Empire, i. e. the USSR, against "the yellow peril."

Some may find a glimmer of hope on the Administration level by referring to the President's awareness that "In today's world, with the enemies of freedom talking about 'wars of national liberation,' the old distinction between 'civil war' and 'international war' has lost much of its meaning."²³ This is progress, but don't bank on it because subsequent addresses nullify it and thus demonstrate the uncertainty and confusion that reign at the steering wheel. The fact is that we are guided by no well-thought-out policy and, as a consequence, are resorting to old errors and approaches that will make a hot global war inevitable. Our state of "mutual deterrence," as long as it exists, necessitates more than ever before the policy of unfinished liberation. To avert hot wars, whether hydrogen, conventional or guerrilla, we must decide to enter the ring where the totalitarian Russians are at their best—the ring of methodical, psychopolitical action.

It is only a question of time before the further cumulation of evidence in rationalized failure, compromise, and no-win psychosis will move sufficient minds to adopt this realistic policy. This breeds

²² Endre Marton, "Fulbright Backs Ties to Yugoslavia," *AP*, July 20, 1965.

²³ President Lyndon B. Johnson, Address at Baylor University, May 29, 1965.

the additional question of moment, whether by then we'll have the time to do what must be done without squandering more lives and treasure for the mistakes now being made. In the meantime we can learn from Marx that "The prestige of Russian diplomacy and the renown of Russia's military strength can be maintained far more easily and securely in peace than in war. . . A system of intimidation is far less expensive than actual warfare."

MICHAEL HRUSHEVSKY — FOREMOST UKRAINIAN HISTORIAN

ON THE CENTENNIAL OF HIS BIRTH (1866-1966)

By ALEXANDER OHLOBLYN

Professor Michael Hrushevsky was called "the true father of our history,"¹ by the late Volodymyr Doroshenko, one of his biographers. These words fully and totally characterize the late Ukrainian historian. For Michael Hrushevsky, above all, is the greatest historian of the Ukrainian people; he established the first scientific scheme of the Ukrainian historical process and on the basis of this scheme he created his monumental 10-volume *History of Ukraine-Rus*, not to mention a host of smaller but nevertheless important general and special works on the history of Ukraine.

A savant of unusually great caliber, Hrushevsky did not limit himself to the study of history alone. He devoted a great deal of attention and energy to the history of Ukrainian literature (e.g., his several volume-odd *History of Ukrainian Literature*) and to ethnography, folklore, archeology and sociology. He also contributed substantially to literature and literary criticism.

Michael Serhiyevych Hrushevsky was born on September 29, 1866, in the city of Kholm, in the western areas of the Ukrainian land, into the family of a known pedagogue-Slavicist, who hailed from an old priestly family in the district of Chyhyryn. Hrushevsky received his secondary education in the Caucasus (in a high school in Tiflis), where his father had been transferred to a government position. Already as a high school student Hrushevsky displayed a serious and keen interest in everything Ukrainian. In his autobiography he was to write:

Under the influence of the stories of my father, who preserved a warm attachment to all things Ukrainian—language, songs and traditions — a Ukrainian national feeling was awakened early in me and developed, supported by read-

¹ *Literaturno-Naukovy Vistnyk* (Literary and Scientific Herald), May, 1912, p. 297.

ing and my rare travels to Ukraine, which was depicted to me in an aureole of a distant "fatherland," and by the contrast of an alien and strange-tongued "foreign land."²

In 1886 Hrushevsky matriculated in the historico-philological faculty of the University of Kiev, where under the direction of Prof. Volodymyr Antonovych, a Ukrainian historian of repute, he acquired a solid scientific foundation in the field of the history of Ukraine. A number of outstanding scientific works on his part at that time assured him the furtherance of his career. When at the beginning of the 1890's a chair of Ukrainian history was established at the University of Lviv, Western Ukraine (then under Austria-Hungary), Hrushevsky, upon the recommendation of Professor Antonovych, was appointed full professor of Ukrainian history at the University (April 21, 1894).

The almost two decades of Hrushevsky's work in Galicia were one of the most productive periods of his scholarly and publicistic activity. Not only did he create in Lviv a scientific school of Ukrainian historians (a chair at the University, the Shevchenko Scientific Society, serving as its head for several years, and a series of scientific publications, and the like), and not only did he write his epochal work on the history of Ukraine, but he succeeded in placing Galicia—this "Ukrainian Piedmont"—at the service of the Ukrainian national rebirth in Greater Ukraine, whose recognized leader he actually became after the revolution of 1905.

In 1898 in Lviv appeared the first volume of his monumental *History of Ukraine-Rus* (the last Volume, X, was published posthumously by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, in Kiev) and in 1904 in Petersburg was published his *Outline of the History of the Ukrainian People* (in Russian).

"To write and publish a compact history of Ukraine," writes Hrushevsky in his *Autobiography*, "was at an early date, in the Kievan days, my inner desire, and to a certain degree, a matter of personal honor and that of my generation."³

Ukrainian and foreign scientific critics alike rated highly the great work of Hrushevsky. "*The History of Ukraine* of M. Hrushevsky," wrote a critic (Dr. B. Herasymchuk), "is undoubtedly the strongest expression of all our scientific creativeness thus far... with his

² *Autobiohrafia* (Autobiography). M. Hrushevsky, Manuscript, 1906, p. 2.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

History the author has given his people the most powerful weapon which could ever be provided." ⁴

According to the well-known Polish historian, Prof. Brueckner, the *History of Ukraine-Rus* of Hrushevsky "is the most beautiful and the richest work, one on which one can rely, a work which cannot be easily produced by any country, not even by a country with an older Slavic literature." ⁵

The power of Hrushevsky's scientific argumentation was so telling that even some major representatives of Russian historical science ⁶ were compelled to recognize the veracity and validity of Hrushevsky's scheme of the history of Ukraine as an independent historical process of the Ukrainian people, as outlined in his prominent study, *The Traditional Scheme of "Russian" History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the Eastern Slavs* (English translation in *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, Vol. II, No. 4 [6], New York, 1952). This scheme, according to Prof. Presniakov, was "brilliantly executed by Hrushevsky in his extensive *History of Ukraine-Rus* and *The Outline of the History of the Ukrainian People*." ⁷

The revolution of 1905 cracked open the Russian police and censorship system which through violent methods had impeded the national and cultural development of Ukraine, separating it with a "Chinese Wall" from the Ukrainian national rebirth in Galicia. Hrushevsky gradually transferred the center of his scientific and public activities to Ukraine, specifically to Kiev. In 1908 he became head of the Ukrainian Scientific Society, and in 1913 he finally came to Kiev to stay.

But his broadly conceived plans for scientific and publicistic activities in Ukraine were ruined by the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The Russian government, which had returned by then to the

⁴ "Mykhailo Hrushevsky yak istoriograf Ukrainy" (Michael Hrushevsky as Historiographer of Ukraine), *Memoirs of the Shevchenko Scientific Society*, Vol. 133, Lviv, 1922, p. 9.

⁵ Cited after Dr. B. Herasymchuk-*Memoirs of the Shevchenko Scientific Society*, Vol. 133, p. 8; also, see the review of Brueckner of the first volume of the German edition of *History of Ukraine-Rus* in *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, Vol. XX, p. 665.

⁶ For instance, Prof. A. Presniakov in his work, *Obrazovanie Velikorusskogo Gosudarstva* (Education of the Great Russian State), Petrograd, 1918.

⁷ Printed by the Russian Academy of Sciences — "Stati po slaviano-venedniu" (Articles on Slavistics), Issue 1, St. Petersburg, 1909.

⁸ Presniakov, *op. cit.*, p. 1, par. 2.

old system of harsh persecution of the Ukrainian national movement, arrested Hrushevsky in the fall of 1914. After keeping him in jail for three months, the Russians brought him to Muscovy, where he stayed under police surveillance until the outbreak of the revolution in 1917.

The new revolution temporarily opened wide horizons for the veteran Ukrainian leader. Hrushevsky, now generally recognized as the leader of the Ukrainians, returned to Kiev, where he was elected President of the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, the highest organ of the new Ukrainian national and political life. In 1918 he was elected President of the Ukrainian National Republic. But the liquidation of the Central *Rada* at the end of April, 1918, brought to an end the leading political role of Hrushevsky, and the general decline of the Ukrainian State compelled Hrushevsky to emigrate abroad. There, outside the borders of Ukraine, he continued to produce his scientific and publicistic works, defending the national and political rights of Ukraine in the international forum.

In 1924, elected a full-fledged member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and having received assurances from the Soviet government that he would be given ample opportunity to work for science, Hrushevsky returned to Kiev, where he proceeded quickly to establish a great scientific-historical center, the so-called Historical Section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, with numerous scientific committees for historic research on Ukraine, and also a Scientific Research Chair of Ukrainian History with the purpose of preparing new cadres of Ukrainian historians. In a brief period of time, despite highly unfavorable conditions for objective work in Soviet Ukraine, the Historical Section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (UAN) produced a great number of important publications in the field of Ukrainian history and on Ukrainian language, culture and folklore (especially in the review *Ukraina*, 1924-1930) with Hrushevsky's works occupying first place among them.

In 1926, the Ukrainian community, regardless of political frontiers, observed solemnly two outstanding anniversaries—the 60th birthday anniversary and the 40th anniversary of the scientific and literary creativeness of Hrushevsky. Indeed, the latter jubilee anniversary was richly deserved. The general number of his publications (as of 1928) reached the impressive total of 1777 titles. Hrushevsky was frequently assailed and persecuted by the reality under which he had to live. But as in the times of Czarist absolutism, so in the period of Bolshevik terror, Hrushevsky remained steadfast in his belief in a better future for his country. "*Ukraina fara da se*"— he

used to repeat often, and addressing a group of his fellow Ukrainians in 1926, he stated:

I want to live in order to work, to suffer and to struggle along with you.⁹

But fate was not kind to him again. Vast and extensive frames of Hrushevsky's activities and their clear Ukrainian national character could not be reconciled with the policy of ruthless destruction of the national life which the Soviet government began to conduct in Ukraine in 1929.

At the beginning of 1931 Hrushevsky was deported to Moscow and the scientific institutions which he established in Kiev were liquidated; his collaborators and students were either arrested or deported. This was perhaps the greatest blow that the aging historian had to sustain. The miserable conditions of a deportee's life in Russia had their effect. Failing in health, he was transferred to Kyslovodsk in the Caucasus, where he died on November 24, 1934. His remains were brought to Kiev and buried at Baikovo Cemetery alongside other leaders of the Ukrainian national rebirth.

II

Hrushevsky was guided throughout his life by two principal ideas both in his scientific work and in his political and social activities. The first idea was *populism* (*narodnytstvo*) and the other, the idea of *federalism*. A close and tight mutual interrelation between the two factors cannot be denied, and in truth, it is difficult to say what brought them together: the scholar's scientific analysis of the Ukrainian people or the experience of a reasoning Ukrainian statesman. But both were the twin cornerstones of all the creativeness and drive of the great historian. From his youth to his death, these ideas accompanied him, grew and aged with him, yet remaining always alive and invincible and imperative for him. He did not create them; rather, he was subordinated to them; and it was he more than any of his predecessors who did everything possible to implement them.

Hrushevsky perspicaciously pointed to the sources of his ideological views. In 1920 he wrote:

I was educated in the severe traditions of Ukrainian radical populism, which derived its ideology from the SS. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood and

⁹ "Yuviley Akad. M. S. Hrushevskoho, 1866-1926," ("Jubilee of Academician M. S. Hrushevsky 1866-1926"), Kiev 1927, p. 38.

which stood firmly on the precept that in conflict between people and authority, guilt was on the side of authority; the interest of the laboring people is the highest law of all social organization, and when the laboring people in a state are not treated well, it is their duty to have an accounting with it (authority).¹⁰

Hrushevsky fully understood the "whole tragedy of the national life owing to this conflict of Ukrainian communities with the Ukrainian state at such a critical moment" (a reference to the so-called "Tatar people" of the XIIIth century). Nonetheless, in appraising the movement his "sympathies were on the side not of the admirer of our ancient historiography," "the wise King Danylo," but on that of the "Bolshevized" (as Hrushevsky expressed it) Ukrainians of the XIIIth century.¹¹

Logically, "in Ukrainian populism . . . and thirty years ago, there were trends, which, standing on the ground of Ukrainian national traditions, sympathetically viewed the popular movements which placed social interests over national interests and waged a struggle with their own state for encroaching upon the social interests."¹² Thus, "the new Ukrainian historiography and all those who had to deal with the past of the people, who were under the influence of these ideas, passionately grasped for manifestations of national activities and, with a particular attention and sympathy, were attracted to such manifestations of the broad masses, regardless of whether they were to be found within the framework of the Ukrainian state or in a struggle against a foreign state."¹³

Understandably, these reminiscences of Hrushevsky, recorded long after the ruin of the Ukrainian state of 1917-1920, reflected the long and complex process of evolution of his political views. But the basic source of the social-political ideology of Hrushevsky — his tradition — is marked faithfully. This tradition — the primacy of social interests over national interests — had a decisive significance for all Ukrainian historiography and social thought of the second half of the XIXth century, whose heir and progenitor was Hrushevsky. It is here that lie the foundations of Hrushevsky's historiosophy and the principles of his political program — with such or other changes made as a result of the personal experience of Hru-

¹⁰ M. Hrushevsky, *Ukrainska Partia sotsialistiv-revolutsioneriv ta yiyi zavdannia* (The Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries and its Tasks), "*Boritesia-Poborete!*" ("Fight and You Will Win") I. Vienna, 1920, p. 12.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

shkevsky and the experience of the whole Ukrainian people. For to Hrushevsky, the scientist,—the leader of the Ukrainian historical process were the *people* themselves (or the “laboring people” as he calls them), and their social interests provide the basic core and contents of this process.¹⁴

At the heart of Hrushevsky's attention is undoubtedly the *Ukrainian people* as an ethnological and social-historical entity. This thought—the primacy of the people—was expressed by Hrushevsky in his inaugural lecture at the University of Lviv on September 30, 1894:

The people, the popular masses, tie them (the separate historical periods—A. O.) into one unity and they are and should be the alpha and omega of historical research. They (the people—A.O.), with their ideals and aspirations, with their struggle, haste and errors—are the only hero of history. To understand their economic, cultural and spiritual state, their adventures, desires and ideals—this is the objective of our history. The political-social system as a rule did not correspond to these ideals. Whether it was their own or an alien one, it never, or almost never was created by them, and the community and the government stood against each other not only in the ancient period. The state system of all times interests us as to how it influenced the welfare of the people, or how it itself was subjected to the influence of the community and to what extent it fitted the community's desires and aspirations. And the culture which develops in the upper strata of the people interests us not so much in itself but by what of the general and national is reflected in it.¹⁵

Thus, “the people are the principal axis with which we should coordinate our results.”

The idea of people permeates, like a red thread, the whole scientific and political activity of Hrushevsky, and the school he created in the Ukrainian historiography could be properly called

¹⁴ In this connection Prof. D. Doroshenko considered a Hrushevsky characteristic a “lack of the state-national guiding idea in his great *History of Ukraine-Rus* and in the general course of Ukrainian history (*Review of Ukrainian Historiography*, Prague, 1923, pp. 191-192). This was written at a time when the work of Hrushevsky on the history of Khmelnytsky had not yet been completed (Vol. IX of *History of Ukraine-Rus* was published only in 1928-1931); it indicated, however, that Hrushevsky, while holding to the ideological position of Ukrainian populism, made a certain move in the direction of the state scientific ideology. See the author's article, “Michael Hrushevsky and the Ukrainian National Rebirth” (in Ukrainian), *The Ukrainian Historian*, 1964, Nos. 2-3, pp. 1-6.

¹⁵ M. Hrushevsky, “Inauguration Lecture on the Ancient History of Rus,” delivered at the University of Lviv, September 30, 1894, p. 10 (in Ukrainian).

populism. It was the same idea that guided Hrushevsky in his monumental *History of Ukraine-Rus* (as in the general courses of Ukrainian history) and in his special historical monographs and his publicistic activities. It guided and directed him as a statesman, and it led him, contrary to all his traditions and customs, into the camp of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries and to the idea of a Ukrainian *Soviet* republic. This idea may also explain why, in the last volume of his *History of Ukraine-Rus* (Volume IX), published by himself, where the true hero is *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the author, in expressing his historic-political *credo*, dedicates this gigantic work not to Khmelnytsky, but to "the leader and the creative sufferings of the Ukrainian popular masses."¹⁶

Closely linked with this principal idea which directed all the creativeness and activities of Hrushevsky is the second idea, that of *federalism*. Even at the moment of the great crisis of federalist ideas in Ukraine, at the beginning of 1918, Hrushevsky called the federalist tradition "a *guiding* idea of our national-political life."¹⁷

Analyzing the program of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries (UPSR) in the preparation of which he took a leading part, Hrushevsky wrote in 1920:

The Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries always considered it its duty to adhere to the old federalist principles, set forth by the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood (and even earlier by the Society of United Slavs), not to mention other older precedents.¹⁸

He wrote further:

In the past we never were partisans of independence in the current and vulgar meaning of the word. To have our own army, custom guards and police, prisons and gallows—this never attracted Ukrainian populists.¹⁹

When there began to be heard the first loud voices for independence, beginning with the *Ukraina Irridenta* of Julian Bachynsky and the *Independent Ukraine* of RUP (Ukrainian Revolutionary Party), the Ukrainian populists of older categories viewed these slogans with "extreme skepticism, fearing that out of this

¹⁶ *History of Ukraine-Rus*, by M. Hrushevsky, Vol. IX, Part II, Kiev 1931, p. 1508 (in Ukrainian).

¹⁷ *Na porozi Novoyi Ukrainy* (On the Threshold of a New Ukraine). By M. Hrushevsky, Kiev, 1918, p. 76.

¹⁸ "*Boritesta-Poboryte!*" (Fight and You Will Win), 1920, I, p. 44.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

egg of independence a chauvinist reaction and nationalist adventures would be hatched." ²⁰

And yet, after 1917 Hrushevsky could not but understand that "events were the water for the independents' mill" and that "federalism has become truly a poor toy." ²¹

Concerning Ukrainian independence, Hrushevsky continued:

The matter of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian people and the integrity of their rights became inflamed and sensitive and emerged as a demand for the full independence and sovereignty of Ukraine, propagated at first by the military circles, but later accepted by the whole, or virtually the whole nationally conscious Ukrainian citizenry. ²²

But even then, "at the threshold of a new Ukraine," where, according to Hrushevsky, "burnt was . . . our orientation on Moscow, on Russia, an orientation which had been imposed upon us stubbornly and for a long time, and finally resulting in an acceptance by a significant part of the Ukrainian citizenry, ²³ the leaders of the Ukrainian life have long been under the spell of these (federalist—A.O.) slogans, and I, for one, do not renounce them," ²⁴ Hrushevsky stated.

He went on to underscore that "he has been and will remain a federalist" ²⁵ and that he "does not consider, before and now, a sole state separation to be a political ideal." ²⁶

Yet Hrushevsky understood well that the policy of Soviet Russia with respect to Ukraine, which in fact continued the old Russian Czarist policy, "buried for the Ukrainians the idea of a federative Russia." ²⁷

He wrote in 1918:

The Bolshevik chieftains . . . have become transformed into "federalist's and into very original "federalists," who put out as their objective a "unity of democracies," the Great Russian and the Ukrainian and, understandably, all other democracies of the former Russian empire . . . I do not know whether the federalist idea will survive and sustain all these blows dealt by the Lenins and the Trotskys while calling themselves federalists . . . Under the mask of this "federalism" lies, in fact, ugly terroristic centralism. ²⁸

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 46-47.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 47.

²³ *Na porozh, op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²⁷ "*Boritiesia-Poboryte!*," 1920, I, p. 49.

²⁸ *Na porozh, op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.

Thus Hrushevsky, being faithful to his federalist idea, sought other ways for its realization in a wider state political system of Eastern Europe.

At the beginning of 1918 the Ukrainian Central Rada, by its Fourth *Universal*, proclaimed Ukraine a free and independent and sovereign republic. In analyzing later this moment in the political and state life of Ukraine, Hrushevsky wrote in 1920:

Was this demand, this slogan inevitable? Perhaps not. What in reality was to be done and should have been done was to preserve the sovereignty of the Ukrainian people, and the integrity of their national, economic and political interests; all these could have been safeguarded in the federalist form as well, if the circumstances were normal and if the time were not so hot.²⁹

Hrushevsky further underscores that even in the Fourth *Universal* the Central Rada "did not break with the traditional idea of federalism."³⁰

In reality Hrushevsky understood the tasks of Ukrainian federalism much more widely and extensively:

Only a world federation is a final objective: I will take as a point of departure a federation of countries, tied together geographically, economically and culturally, but not a federation of slavery, on this simple basis: that once upon a time we would be taken over on various occasions and incarcerated in a prison cage.³¹

And Hrushevsky categorically stated that only "with those who go along on our road, will Ukraine establish a federative liaison."³²

It was at that particular time that the leading Ukrainian political circles were discussing and debating plans for the so-called Black Sea Federation, that is, a federation of countries which were situated in the "sphere of our Black Sea orientation, united by the Black Sea as a center of communication and by various cultural and political relationships."³³

Less popular in Ukraine were the plans for "a Slavic federation, which would comprise the Western Slav and Balkan lands."³⁴ Inci-

²⁹ "Boritiesia-Poboryte" 1920, I, p. 47.

³⁰ *Na porozi*, op. cit., p. 74.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 74.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³⁴ M. Hrushevsky, "In the First Delegation of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries" (in Ukrainian), "Boritiesia-Poboryte," III, 1920, p. 51.

dentally Hrushevsky was wholly negative to a political Slavdom. On the other hand, he was always a partisan of a close union of three peoples—the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Lithuanian—which, in his opinion, had all the bases for the creation of a Black Sea-Baltic Federation, headed by Ukraine.³⁵

In 1920, when the fatal zig-zags of the political line of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries led Hrushevsky to the Soviet platform, he nonetheless believed that it was impossible for Ukrainians to make a full return from an independent Ukraine to a "federative Russia."³⁶

"In relation to Russia," he wrote, "the Ukrainian republic must be independent and sovereign; they could unite only in a higher organization as two equal entities."³⁷

Hrushevsky contended that "without these forms of assured independence and sovereignty a live organism of the people... will remain with its muscles and nerves uncovered by skin; it will be unable to live in the world around it."³⁸ A consequential partisan of the idea of federalism, Hrushevsky deemed that the "Ukrainian republic in the final analysis will be a federation of lands, a United States of Ukraine,"³⁹ that is, a "federation of its own republics-communities."⁴⁰

The recognition by Hrushevsky of Soviet Ukraine, manifested by his return to Kiev in 1924, demonstrated that the old federalist idea, even though in a somewhat modernized form, continued to be the center of gravity of the political philosophy of Hrushevsky. But in 1926, speaking at a solemn observance of his birthday anniversary, he contended that one of the most important tasks confronting Ukrainians is the "task of bringing closely together not only the various parts of our divided territory, but all the peoples of Eastern Europe, frequently divided by historical misunderstanding but far more united by their common tasks and tied together by their future,"⁴¹ and that all this was in no way connected with the cruel reality of the Soviet system, which by its terroristic and centralistic essence was deeply inimical to true federalism.

³⁵ M. Hruschewsky, "Ukraine, Weissrussland und Litauen," *Ukrainische Rundschau*, 1909, II, p. 49-53.

³⁶ "Boritesta-Poboryte" 1920, I, p. 49.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁴¹ "Yuviley Akad. M.S. Hrushevskoho," p. 27.

It was an impasse for the basic ideas of the whole life and creativeness of the great historian. Hrushevsky could not but understand the sharp contradiction of his guiding idea and the horrible reality of Soviet Ukraine. Only the great and sacrificing creativeness of Hrushevsky which spurred such a brilliant development of Ukrainian historical science in Greater Ukraine in the 1920's could exculpate the great historian and citizen in his own eyes. And when Bolshevism took it all away from him, tearing him from his native soil and ruining all the scientific centers created by him—the heart of the great Ukrainian historian and leader ceased to beat.

COEXISTENCE: AMERICAN AND SOVIET STYLES

CLARENCE A. MANNING

It is now almost fifty years since the outbreak of the Revolution in the old Russian Empire. During all that time both the United States government and the American people have never been able to achieve toward the Revolution any consistent attitude and position which would allow for a fruitful and peaceful coexistence with the organization, the Communist Party, which took control within the old Empire and now, under the name of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, has vastly increased its power and influence since World War II. There have been many reasons for this. While some have reflected the mentality and type of American thinking, most have been the result of the curious Aesopian language in which all Soviet utterances carefully veil the truth.

In 1917 neither the American government nor the American people were prepared to understand the course of the Revolution or its astounding developments. They did not understand the complicated population problems of the old order; it is safe to say that, save for the Finns and Poles, the majority even of high officials and university professors had no clear picture of the other non-Russian nations. They were aware of the Jewish problem but they did not see it in its relation to the whole. The United States was engrossed in the war against the German Emperor, and after hearing the lurid stories of the St. Petersburg court and Petrograd, it seemed to them that the advent of the Provisional Government would immediately solve all problems and that in 1917 and 1918 the new Russia would become a more reliable ally, if it could be armed and equipped. In the beginning it was easy to convince the majority that all of the rising of the different nations was merely the result of German-Austrian "intrigue," an idea that was zealously fostered by many of the Russian royalists in Washington, while another but smaller group of American liberals and radicals, understanding the situation no better, thought that the Bolsheviks would guide the staggering Empire to the desired peace and cooperation more easily and quickly.

The growing evidence of the failure of the Provisional Government, the increasing demoralization of the old Imperial Army and the increase of the murders and ravaging of the Bolsheviks commenced to change public opinion. However, it influenced less the theoretical views of the administration, for it soon was suspected that the Bolsheviks, too, were in the service of the Germans, especially after Lenin was taken on a sealed train to Russia to add to the chaos. Many began to look hopefully to the White armies and to wonder whether the new commanders were democratic or monarchistic. Inspired were such actions as the American occupation of Archangelsk with its stores of American arms and ammunition and the dispatch of a part of an American division to protect the stores at Vladivostok and to endeavor to prevent Japan from taking advantage of the situation. Naturally all these endeavors created a great fiasco of which the Americans speedily became the victims, while the conditions of the population of the Empire went from bad to worse. When the nightmare seemed over, it was evident that nothing had been achieved except the saving of the lives of many thousands who had been able to escape from the holocaust.

The failure of the German Communists to seize power in the cities even during the disorganized regime that followed the abdication of the Kaiser strengthened the idea in many American minds that the Communists could not maintain themselves in power in the old Russian Empire and the sections that were struggling for independence. The view became widespread during the period of Militant Communism that sooner or later Lenin and his assistants would be forced to revert to the standards of civilized nations along with normal economic relationships. This seemed to be on its way when Lenin ended the old system of Militant Communism and started the New Economic Policy (NEP) which dominated the Soviet scene for several years.

At the same time the American people became aware of the existence of famine in the war-ravished territory, and Herbert Hoover, who had performed wonders during the war in feeding the Belgians, assumed charge of an extensive Russian War Relief Organization to feed the victims. Yet in a quixotic mood, it was decided that relief should be given to all sufferers and that under no conditions should it be so distributed as to support any political party or seek to impose any special political influence which might prevent the free choice of their government institutions by the "Russian people." Thus the Americans gave up any possibility of trying to rally or assist the anti-Communists and more or less willingly accepted what-

ever restrictions were imposed by the dominant Communist Party, although that organization was tottering on the edge of chaos. Although the interventions in Archangelsk and Siberia had ended in fiascos, there was no serious attempt to evaluate the causes of these fiascos or to consider whether they were ill-advised or merely the result of mishandling.

At the period the American government had a vaguely defined policy of not recognizing or having diplomatic relations with governments, whether in South America or other continents, of which it did not approve. Throughout the twenties the situation remained static except that President Harding recognized the independence of the three Baltic Republics—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—something that President Wilson had refused to do without the consent of a democratic Russian government in accordance with his Fourteen Points. Businessmen were allowed to carry on commercial relations at their own risk but without undue interference from Washington. All this was to the advantage of the Communists in their efforts to create a workable Communist system. Almost the only tangible action was the use of the Baltic embassies, especially the Latvian in Riga for training some young American diplomats in the use of the Russian language and in some knowledge of the Communist realities as they leaked across the borders of the new Republics. It was not without much justification that many of the White Russian emigres and also fugitives from the non-Russian peoples complained bitterly that the Americans were allowing a huge population to become the victims of a weird and impossible political experimentation without regard to the human suffering and deaths that were involved. On the other hand, there was a small but determined group of American anti-Communists who endeavored to force the government to a more determined and resolute stand—the more so as Stalin's moves for collectivization began to feature in the newspaper reports—although there was almost no knowledge of the extent of the man-made famine of 1932-33.

With the inauguration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1933, a new period opened, marked, nevertheless, by as many misunderstandings and confusions as the preceding one. The new President commenced negotiations for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the Kremlin and soon the first American Ambassador was sent to Moscow, fully confident that all difficulties had been smoothed away and that a new era was dawning. He soon found out differently. New arrangements were made with the Russian Orthodox Church over its holdings in the United States, but again

the parishes here found it was a false dawn which merely added other elements of confusion and disorder as the representative of the Moscow organization took over the long contested Cathedral of St. Nicholas in New York. Difficulties appeared with the American Embassy staff in Moscow which was soon reduced to about half its size as Stalin imposed new restrictions and the great trials of the thirties came on.

Still the American people failed to obtain a clear appreciation of Stalinist rule or of misrule by the rise to power of Adolph Hitler and his Nazis. Only slowly, step by step, did distrust of him grow as there came calls for popular front governments in France and other Western countries and it became clear that Hitler was in his own way repudiating all the principles of Christian civilization and also starting a violent campaign against the Jews in the lands under his control. The developments in the League of Nations, of which the United States was not a member, completely baffled both friends and foes of that organization.

The Munich agreement of 1938 confused every one even more and gained many friends for the Soviet Union, while the propaganda of the USSR, Russian emigres, and Poles alike revived all the talk of German influence in the non-Russian nations that had been spread by the same sources after 1918. It seemed impossible that the Western Powers should not receive Soviet help in the approaching crisis. Yet in 1939, as early as April, it was common talk in the Balkans that negotiations between Hitler and Stalin for the division of Poland were far advanced. As late as July no one in England credited these reports. Then in August both dictators tore off the mask and nothing remained but for them to unleash World War II when it suited their convenience. It completely befuddled all except the most determined anti-Communists, broke down the self-confidence of many American liberals and even Communists and led to general confusion when Stalin insisted upon Soviet garrisons in the Baltic Republics in his sphere and declared war on Finland, which had gained a special place in American thinking because of its payment of war debts after 1918.

With Hitler's sudden attack on Stalin in 1941, American opinion assumed a definite cast. The dour and grim Stalin, the spider and the man of steel, now became good old Uncle Joe and all felt that the way had opened for a full cooperation against a common enemy. Regardless of his previous actions, Stalin was invited to sign the Atlantic Charter guaranteeing the four freedoms, and the United States began to take all possible actions for supporting Moscow in

preparing its defense against the Nazi attackers. Carefully overlooked was that the claims asserted by Stalin were impossible to meet and that the American missions were constantly baffled by what Stalin and his aides would and would not allow. Yet various meetings between President Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Stalin were arranged and carried through with an air of success, although the results of each meeting brought favorable results only for the Russians, who received such a free rein that subsequently they needed but to twist the agreements slightly to place them in full control of Eastern and Central Europe. The Russians were brought into the proposed Organization of the United Nations, and the constitution of that body was so drawn up in the latter days of the war that the Soviet Union, if it wished, could paralyze all activity, but this difficulty was laughed away on the ground that the Soviet Union was a peace-loving state and would do nothing to prevent the working out of the hopes and aspirations of humanity.

Meanwhile as uncertainty grew as to the future course of the free nations, Winston Churchill in Fulton, Missouri, forcefully smote the American consciousness with the meaning of the cold war and the Iron Curtain, which had been imposed wherever Soviet control had been extended. All the laboriously drawn up plans for national zones in an occupied Germany and in Berlin were proved inapplicable, and the world settled down to that situation in which it remained until the sudden death of Stalin in 1953.

In the meantime the Communists under Mao Tse-tung had taken control of China and showed their true colors after repeated efforts to make these "peaceful agrarian reformers" merge with the armies of Chiang Kai-shek, who had been forced to retire to Formosa (Taiwan). Also, some strange mood of Stalin led him to withdraw the Soviet delegate from the Security Council while the Soviet-trained North Korean army invaded South Korea, and the Security Council was thus able to commit the world organization to support the United States in its efforts to liberate South Korea from Communist depredations and misrule. The United Nations forces, however, were kept from crossing the Yalu River even when Chinese "volunteers" were thrown into the fighting on the side of the North Koreans, and hostilities were ended by an uneasy armistice along the line of the 38th parallel, the line of demarcation set in the first place.

With our present knowledge we can see that there was never any love lost between Stalin and Mao. The Communists in the Soviet Union had rested their power on the urban proletariat, which they

had first succeeded in winning over in 1917 and 1918, while Mao built his power on certain groups of the poorer peasants and had avoided the cities until they were no longer able to maintain an opposition. Still Stalin, who had taken over from Lenin, had been in control for a couple of decades and Mao, whatever his feelings, had to admit his seniority in the movement. As he waited for Stalin to pass from the scene, however, he profited at every turn from Soviet assistance and aid.

As a result of all these developments, various international alliances were made among the free nations for mutual defense. There was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the South-east Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and another group embracing the nations from Turkey to Pakistan but this was the most insubstantial almost from the beginning. All depended in the last analysis for their strength and efficiency on the power of the United States. It had been the hope of the United States that the other countries involved would ultimately contribute more troops to the common cause of the defense of freedom but various obstacles were advanced and none of these alliances achieved what their founders had hoped for. Nevertheless they represented a great advance over the disorganization that had prevailed before World War II, and all seemed well enough.

In the meantime the movement led by Ho Chi Minh, the Communist leader of Vietnam and French Indo-China, had forced the French to withdraw from the area. A Conference in Geneva in 1954 confirmed this and set up the divided states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, but almost from the first day it was evident that the agreements were going to be treated by the Communists as dead letters. Slowly but surely the United States, against its will, became the protector and supporter of South Vietnam, the anti-Communist section of the country, while in Laos before and after another Geneva Conference, North Vietnamese troops continued to fight side by side with the Laotian Communists.

After Stalin's death in 1953 and various temporary alliances, the power finally passed into the hands of the Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita S. Khrushchev, one of the right-hand men of Stalin. As ebullient and enthusiastic as Stalin was cold and calculating, he offered the people a constant stream of panaceas which would outstrip and bury the United States. He commenced a process of de-Stalinization, revealing the former leader as a jealous and suspicious old tyrant who murdered in cold blood many loyal Communists. The "thaw" which he thus introduced

resulted in uprisings in both Poland and Hungary, the latter culminating in a rebellion which was savagely repressed by Soviet troops and tanks. The United States made no move to assist the freedom fighters but offered refuge to all who escaped across the frontiers. This apparently impressed Khrushchev, for after a visit to the United Nations, where he beat his shoe on a desk and called for the complete removal of all United Nations power through the appointment of three equal Secretaries who had to be in unanimous agreement, and after visits with President Eisenhower, first in Geneva and then in the United States, he propounded his theory of "peaceful coexistence."

Yet this was very different from the coexistence which the United States was seeking. It was not a formal effort to develop peaceful relations throughout the world. Rather, it was an attempt to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union, while still preserving the right of the Soviet Union to enter upon "wars of liberation." Under this set-up the United States and its allies were to respect the territory of all socialist and communist states on pain of being declared "imperialistic aggressors," while it conferred upon the Communists the right to invade any non-Communist state and to support any group seeking to overthrow a non-Communist government. In the event such an overthrow were successful, the country would automatically become a part of the Socialist and Communist bloc, with its territory sacrosanct for the future. In other words, all this was a bare revamping of the old Communist theory of infiltration, disintegration, and occupation which had prevailed since the time of Lenin. A later meeting of Khrushchev, President Eisenhower and other world leaders in Paris broke up as a result of Khrushchev's demand for an apology because an American high-flying plane had been brought down in the Soviet Union, despite all the espionage, etc., practiced by Soviet diplomats and agents in Washington and other free world capitals.

By now the United States had given up the attempt to settle the primary points of conflict with the Soviet Union and the Communist world and was beginning to seek settlements of many of the peripheral lesser matters of dispute and especially the control of nuclear weapons that had been developed until there had been produced a balance of terror which threatened the existence of civilization. Finally, under the next administration, there had been signed an agreement banning nuclear explosions in outer space, the atmosphere and under water (but there was no agreement on the method of inspection of underground explosions). The treaty was signed

by most countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, but it was opposed by both the France of President de Gaulle, who was developing his own nuclear force, and by Communist China. These exceptions in a way nullified the agreements, and it has been difficult to make progress from that point.

Under President Kennedy there was a new flareup over the placing of Soviet missiles in Cuba to threaten the United States. Khrushchev finally agreed to remove them, but he secured a quasi-promise that the United States would not act to expel Castro, who had declared himself a Communist, who is still actively supporting armed conflicts in other countries of South America and who in general is trying to foment wars of liberation.

In the last years of his rule, Khrushchev and Mao clashed over ideological questions; actually, the clash involved primacy in the world Communist movement. When a group succeeded in removing Khrushchev from control, he was replaced by Leonid Brezhnev as Secretary of the Party and Alexei Kosygin as Premier, the present rulers of the Soviet Union, but despite all efforts the old clash with Mao is reemerging with perhaps even more bitterness.

Then as the Viet Cong became stronger in South Vietnam and North Vietnamese regulars began to infiltrate, President Johnson commenced a buildup of American forces in the country until there has developed hostilities almost on the scale of the United Nations struggle to save South Korea from Communist takeover. Simultaneously, President de Gaulle withdrew ostentatiously from the NATO alliance and has sought better relations with the Communists of both Europe and Asia, while there has been an apparent loosening of the close control that Moscow formerly exercised over the European satellite states.

That is the situation today and it is confused at best. Both Brezhnev and Kosygin are demanding the withdrawal of all American forces from South Vietnam as an alternative to the extension of more help to the Viet Cong and North Vietnam. It is an open secret that Moscow and its allies are supplying arms to North Vietnam under the old theory of help for "wars of liberation," while at the same time they are calling for more "peaceful coexistence" and Mao and the new Soviet leaders almost daily are accusing each other of cooperation, conscious or unconscious, with the "American imperialists."

It is to no avail that President Johnson has tried to make it clear that he is trying in the name of the principles of the United Nations to stop aggression and is not trying to de-communize North

Vietnam. He has gone further by seeking to build "new bridges" to the Communist world and has raised the legations in Hungary and Bulgaria to the rank of embassies without asking any preconditions. It certainly seems that any concessions which the United States has made are treated in the same way as formerly — the marks of a weakening imperialistic aggression—even though neither Brezhnev nor Kosygin has spelled out any of the terms that they demand and expect. They have stubbornly declined to reconvene the Geneva Conference on Southeastern Asia or to do anything publicly but to support the right of North Vietnam to do what it will in the name of Communist solidarity.

Thus basically there has been no real change in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union since the time when Lenin seized the power in Petrograd. There have been apparitions and dreams of a relief of tensions but the tensions still exist and can be increased whenever it suits the whims of the Communist leaders, wherever they are. The Aesopian language still prevails and "peace" and "peaceful coexistence" mean whatever the Kremlin and Peking decide they do. Given this situation, real progress in bringing about genuine peaceful coexistence in the American sense is dubious. It remains the primary duty of all Americans to realize that slavery and freedom are diametrically opposite and that any attempts to confuse the issue can only work to the Communists' advantage and correspondingly to our detriment.

NATIONAL COAT-OF-ARMS AND FLAG OF UKRAINE

By **WALTER TREMBICKY**

The contemporary Ukrainian national coat-of-arms is azure with a gold trident, which possesses a very old historical tradition and is the most striking of all Ukrainian insignia.

It is extremely difficult to establish precisely when and why the trident came into use in Ukraine. Archeological findings indicate that the trident in Ukraine has a history going back to the first century A. D.

According to ancient Greek mythology, the trident was a warder of the Greek god of the sea, Poseidon. It symbolized power over the sea. In Roman mythology the trident was a symbol of the power of the old Roman sea-god, Neptune. Russian and Ukrainian scholars see in the design of the trident, a combination of the letters "V" and "O," which allegedly stand for the first letters of the names of those prominent Ukrainian-Ruthenian (Kievan) rulers of the ninth and tenth centuries: Grand Prince Volodymyr and Queen Olga.

In Ukrainian mythology the trident symbolized a beneficent power, bravery, or sign of protection from evil.

The trident is well-known in many European countries: in Greece, Italy, Sweden (on the tomb plate of King St. Eric 150-160), Denmark and even Scotland.

Ukrainian scholars assume that the trident came into Ukraine from the Byzantine Empire through the Byzantine (Greek) colonies or states located on the northern shores of the Black and Azov Seas. The trident, for example, was imprinted on the coins of the Bosphorus or the Pontic Kingdom of 122-261.

In Ukraine of the ninth century, the trident represented, at first, the ruling Rurik dynasty; later it became the official state emblem.

The earliest information about the trident in Ukraine is contained in the Bulgarian Chronicle of Manasia of the 14th century. This historical work carries an illustration of a Ruthenian (Ukrainian) military unit of Grand Prince Sviatoslav the Conqueror (957-

972) marching on Constantinople through Bulgarian territory. The Ukrainian knights hold long staves or lances topped with tridents.

From the 10th to the 13th centuries, the trident was already used not only as a dynastic but as a state coat-of-arms as well.

Tridents were engraved on the first Ruthenian (Kievan) gold and silver coins, called *hryvni* under the Grand Prince of Kiev—Volodymyr (980-1014), the Emperor Yaroslav the Wise (1019-1054), Sviatoslav II (1093-1113), Grand Prince Volodymyr Monomakh (1113-1125), and others.

The trident was imprinted or engraved on many objects of that period, such as the King's official seals, official jewels, signets, on armors, on many portals of old Ukrainian cathedrals, churches, palaces, in many old religious and historical manuscripts and even on tombs, for example, that of Queen Anna (1051-1062), daughter of Kievan Emperor Yaroslav the Wise and wife of the French King Henry I (1008-1061). The tomb still can be seen in Paris.

As a result of archeological excavations and studies, the number of specimens of the trident in various forms has increased to a present total of 200.

The trident symbolized, in those days of ancient history, a glorious and powerful strength of the Ruthenian (Kievan) Empire in which all old Ukrainian ethnic and tribal lands were united in one state. Not only old Ukrainian but also other tribal east Slavic territories (principalities) were united with the Kievan State under the Kievan Grand Princes.

The strength and greatness of Ruthenia was, at the time, equal to that of the existing Germanic Empire, Denmark, the Scandinavian State, and even the Byzantine Empire.

Therefore, when in modern times the Ukrainians created their own statehood (November 20, 1917), the Government Heraldic and Vexillological Commission for the adaptation of the state insignia, accepted as the official state coat-of-arms precisely the old Ruthenian-Ukrainian imperial emblem of the ninth to the thirteenth centuries—the trident. By this choice the Ukrainian Government wanted to emphasize the natural connection between the contemporary Ukraine and the historical and ethnic background of the Ruthenian Empire of medieval times.

In December of 1917, then, the trident as the new, official coat-of-arms was imprinted on the first Ukrainian paper banknotes of 100 *karbovanets* (issued on December 24, 1917).

On January 18, 1918, the trident appeared on the first Ukrainian navy flag. The crosslet was perched on the central part of the trident.

By government law, the trident was accepted on March 2, 1918, and exactly described and again accepted by law as the official State Coat-of-Arms on March 22 of the same year.

The trident taken from the classic coins of the 10th and 11th centuries was located in an oval olive ornamental wreath, symbolizing the peaceful and friendly feeling of the Ukrainian nation toward its neighboring countries and the entire family of European nations.

The national emblem was introduced (after its legal proclamation) into all state paraphernalia, such as army uniforms, and into all government offices, all Ukrainian representative offices, in Ukrainian legations, consulates, and all kinds of missions. It was introduced into all official seals and documents, such as passports; it decorated all newly created service flags of navy, army and diplomacy, and all personal services flags, badges and pennants of *Hetman* Paul Skoropadsky and his family.

The trident was superimposed on all existing Russian postage stamps and imprinted on newly printed Ukrainian stamps: *shahy* and *hryvni* and finally on newly printed banknotes of 10, 25, 50, 100, 250, 1000 *karbovanets*, later on 2, 5, 10, 100, 500, 1000 and 2000 *hryvni* and on the small exchange stamps; and, used as coins: 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 *shahy*.

Incidentally, the new Ukrainian currency units, *hryvnia* = 100 *shahy*, were accepted in the new Ukrainian State of 1918-20 in the same way as was the trident: they were derived from the old Ukrainian historical period of the Ruthenian Statehood of the 9th to 13th centuries, when these currency denominations were used as official monetary units in the Ruthenian State.

The Ukrainian coat-of-arms was accepted by the Preliminary Constitution of the Ukrainian National Republic in May, 1920 (Article 5) and by the second proposed Constitutional Fundamental Law for the Ukrainian State (on October 1, 1920).

In the year 1939 the trident came into use in a newly established but short-lived Carpatho-Ukrainian State by its constitutional law of March 15, 1939, Article 6. The trident with a crosslet was placed on the official coat-of-arms of this state on the left side of the upper sky-blue stripe.

The trident as the Ukrainian national symbol with an almost 1000-year tradition was and is in the time of the Ukrainian enslavement a symbol of the struggle for Ukrainian statehood. Its use was and is still forbidden in Ukraine as a "nationalistic" symbol. The trident is replaced now by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic coat-of-arms (with no national tradition or historical background), created

and accepted less than fifty years ago by the Soviet government in Moscow. This state emblem is very similar to all other Soviet Republic emblems of the Soviet Union.

Therefore, the trident represents today the Ukrainian national movement for fully independent statehood such as all Western European nations or newly emerged states in Africa or Asia enjoy.

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The present flag of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic is only a modified Soviet Union flag designated for Ukraine by the Soviet government in Moscow on November 2, 1949. The Ukrainian national flag, however, has a great historic past and tradition. It has two horizontal stripes: sky-blue (upper) and yellow (lower).


The old Ruthenian historical literature mentions flags used in the early period of the Ruthenian (Kievan) Empire (9th-13th centuries), for instance, *The Chronicle* of Nestor, the famous monumental epos, *The Tale of the Host of Ihor*, and others, as do Bulgarian sources. However, these sources do not spell out the colors that these flags bore. Yet it is known that the sky-blue and yellow colors were used on flags in the Galician (Western Ukrainian) Principality, later in the Galician-Volhynian Kingdom, which was an extension of the declining Kievan Empire in the 13th century, after the invasion of the Tatar-Mongolian hordes (1240). These colors were also carried in the Galician Coat-of-Arms (a golden lion on a sky-blue shield) in the 13th and 14th centuries, at the time of King Lev (1264-1300), King George II (1300-1308) and King Andrew (1308-1323).

After the fall of the Galician-Volhynian Kingdom (1349), the Ukrainian national colors were used in the Galician Kingdom (1349-1378), in the Volhynian Principality until 1435 and later in the quasi-autonomous Galician province under Polish rule approximately until the 18th century.


In modern times, the Ukrainian national colors were used for the first time during the First National Congress of the Supreme Ruthenian (Ukrainian) Council (the highest political representation) in Lviv (capital of Galicia), between April 19 and May 2, 1848. At that time, the National Congress accepted the design of the two-color flag, upon the suggestion of Ukrainian scholars. The Ukrainian national flag was also accepted by the Congress of Ukrainian scientists, held at Lviv on October 19—October 26, 1848. The Ukrainian colors were used by the first Ukrainian military formations created in 1848-49 under Austrian rule. The Ukrainian flag was flown for




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
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
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- (1) National Coat-of-Arms; (2) Flag of Ambassador Extraordinary or Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary; (3) Flag of Minister Plenipotentiary, Minister Resident or Chief of Diplomatic or Military Mission; (4) Flag of Charge d'Affaires; (5) Extraordinary Official State Representative Service Flag; (6) Flag of Consul General, Consul and Vice Consul.

the first time at an international forum—the Pan-Slavic Congress held in Prague, Bohemia on June 2, 1848, at which 61 persons of a Ukrainian delegation were present.

During World War I, Ukrainian flags were carried by the first Ukrainian military units known as the *Sich* Riflemen, created in 1914 in the Galician Province of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. These flags were carried into the Russian-occupied Ukraine by these military formations during the struggle for Ukraine's independence.

The sky-blue yellow flag inspired all Ukrainian national military and professional congresses, meetings and important proclamations that followed the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917 and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 and culminated in the declaration of independence of the Ukrainian National Republic on January 22, 1918. The Ukrainian flag was officially accepted by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Republic, January 18, 1918 and passed by government decree on March 2 and again, along with the national emblem (golden trident on a sky-blue shield), on March 22 of the same year.

On March 15, 1918, by order of the Ministry of the Navy and Ministry of Trade all Ukrainian merchant marine vessels hoisted the Ukrainian national and trade flags. On April 29 of the same year, Ukrainian flags were flown by war ships anchored in the naval port of Sevastopol.

On July 18 and 28 and on September 18, 1918, respectively, new government laws (Nos. 192/44, 372/159 and others) were passed for many state service flags, especially for the Royal *Hetman* Standards, for the Navy, the Ukrainian foreign diplomatic and trade services, and for the Army staff. Many service flags, which featured the Ukrainian Coat-of-Arms (the trident), added a cross over the trident which was a carry-over from the Ukrainian Kozak Navy flags of the 16th and 17th centuries. This attested to the Christian character of the reborn Ukrainian state as opposed to the non-Christian character of the Soviet Russian state after the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917.

Following the collapse of the monarchic *Hetmanite* government in Ukraine on December 15, 1918, a new Republican Directorate government accepted the previous flag laws (of July and August 1918) on January 3, 1919. Only after January 25, 1919 was there a new flag law passed which rescinded some of the flag laws of 1918. The new flag law, published in January 1919, was promulgated in *The Official Gazette of Government Laws and Decrees*, Volume V, Article 79. In July of 1920 and on October 1, 1920, the Ukrainian flag was legalized in two drafts of the Constitution prepared by members of the

Government Commission, which was charged with drawing up a Constitution.

The Ukrainian national blue-yellow colors were accepted also by the Preliminary Government Law (Constitution), Article V, proclaimed on November 13, 1918, by the Government of the Western-Ukrainian National Republic, which was created after the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (end of October 1918) on November 1, 1918 in the Ukrainian territories of the Habsburg Monarchy-Galicia and Bukovina.

The sky-blue and yellow Ukrainian flag was also officially accepted by the Constitutional Law (Art. 5) on March 15, 1939, promulgated by the *Soym* (Diet) of Carpatho-Ukraine, which proclaimed the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine after the fall of the Czechoslovak Republic on March 14, 1939.

The Ukrainian colors have a popular interpretation: the sky-blue color represents the skies and the yellow color the "golden wheat," symbolizing the wealth of Ukraine.

Most importantly, the Ukrainian flag symbolizes the national struggle of Ukrainians for an independent and sovereign state.

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BOLSHEVISM IN TURKESTAN: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOVIET REGIME IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1917-1939

By WASYL SHIMONIAK

The Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 and its communistic designs on the future state and society of Turkestan were foreign to the natives. They were not themselves the initiators of revolution or of radical changes; rather, these ideas and their representatives came from outside influences. These influences were of several kinds.

First of all, the revolution brought to the peoples of Turkestan a complex of events and ideas for which they were unprepared culturally either to lead or follow. The great majority of these peoples—about 95%—was illiterate; there were no information media—press, radio, or other propaganda means—to inspire them with new ideas. Their leading intelligentsia, the clergy, were not interested in political events, except in how they affected the doctrines of Islam and traditional institutions. In terms of social problems, the country had no developed industry and consequently had “no industrial proletariat,”¹ although there were small shop workers. The natives watched with no little astonishment the spectacle of Russians fighting each other on the streets of Tashkent; they stood aloof from the struggle.² It was not until their religious institutions, their traditional way of life, and their legal and social practices were challenged by the Soviet system that the natives became aroused and began to oppose Soviet rule.

Second, Muslim political activity in Turkestan was initiated by local Tatars who managed to organize the intelligentsia into various organizations—*Shuro-i-Islamia* (Islamic Council); *Ulema Je-*

¹ *Lenin i nekotorye voprosy stroitelstva partii*. (Lenin and Some of the Problems of Party Building). Akademiia Obshchestvennykh Nauk pri TsKKSS, Kafedra istorii KPSS, (Moskva: Izdatelstvo VPsh i AON, 1961), p. 106.

² A. M. Tchokaieff, “Fifteen Years of Bolshevik Rule in Turkestan,” in *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, Vol. XX, 1933, pp. 351-359.

myti (Board of Learned Men); Turkestan Muslim Central Soviet—all of which were composed predominantly of Tatars and some local *Jadids* (Muslim intelligentsia).³

Third, the scope attained by Muslim activities were largely a function of the Soviet policies towards Muslims of Russia, in general, and of Turkestan, in particular. These policies tended to determine also the scope of the Muslim national movements, the administrative structure of Turkestan, and the economic development of the country.

MAIN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: 1917-1924

1. *Bolshevik Policies on Government.*

Bolshevik power was not established in Central Asia until February of 1918, when a native-led government centered in Kokand was overthrown by a Bolshevik force.⁴ The local native government had succeeded in displacing a Russian-dominated Soviet government (non-Bolshevik) a few months earlier. Lenin's declared policy in December, 1917, toward Muslims appeared unequivocal. It stated:

From now on your beliefs, customs, your national and cultural establishments are declared to be free and inviolable. Build your own national life freely and without any obstacles. You have the right to that. You know that your rights, as well as the rights of peoples of Russia, are protected by all the might of the revolution and its organs, Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies... Comrades, brothers, we march firmly and confidently toward an honest, democratic peace... On our banners we bring liberation to all enslaved peoples of the world.⁵


A few months after Lenin's declaration concerning minorities' equal rights and freedom to develop their own institutions, the Fifth Congress of the Turkestan Soviets was held in Tashkent (April 20, 1918). It proclaimed the autonomy of Turkestan, under the title "Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR)," as part of the RSFSR but having its own constitution.⁶

³ Zenkovsky, Serge, *A. Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 227. See also: Alexander Park, *Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp. 36-84.

⁴ *Lenin i nekotorye voprosy*, p. 108.

⁵ *V. I. Lenin o druzhbe s narodami vostoka* (V. I. Lenin on Friendship with the Peoples of the East), (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1961), pp. 261-263.

⁶ *Lenin i nekotorye voprosy*, p. 111.



Non-Russian Moslem Central Asia

The constitution of the newly created Turkestan Republic, as well as those of later Central Asian republics (Bukhara and Khiva), provided for local initiative and freedom to develop local cultural, political, and military institutions. But decisions in these matters were subject to the approval of the Council of People's Commissars in Moscow. Furthermore, the new settlers in Central Asia from European Russia, under legal protection of the Soviet government, took advantage of the situation to advance their own property interests to the detriment of the native population.⁷ All key government positions were in the hands of Russian Communists, even though some natives collaborated with the Soviet government. These conditions made it difficult if not impossible for national institutions to develop.

The Central Executive Committee of Turkestan was not elected by the native assembly but appointed by the Russian Communist

⁷ Ryskulov, P., *Revoliutsiia i korennoe naselenie Turkestana* (The Revolution and the Native Population of Turkestan), (Tashkent: 1925), p. 84; cited by Park, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

Party despite the provisions stated in the constitution. Local administration was also in the hands of Russians, who refused to share the administrative functions of the country with Muslims. Not a single native was allowed to occupy a position in the newly created Tashkent government.⁸

The exclusion of natives from public administrative offices by the Russians could not but set the Muslims into opposition to the Soviet regime; the revolutionary events did not offer any real change for the natives of Turkestan in the administrative hierarchy. Hence the Bolsheviks began to ease their posture toward the Muslims, although maintaining power in their own hands. In 1919, the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan was reorganized to consist of six members (all non-natives); M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuibyshev, Ya. E. Rudzutak, Sh. Z. Eliva, G. E. Bokii, and F. I. Goloshchekin. They left Orenburg on October 25, 1919, and arrived at Tashkent on November 4, 1919. Immediately upon their arrival, they began to "correct the mistakes of the past." As they stated in a letter to Lenin: "We promise you, dear comrade, to follow exactly the instructions of the Russian Communist Party and to liberate the East from the imperialistic yoke, regardless of the work and sacrifices that this matter will require."⁹

Lenin also realized that force alone would not gain support from the Muslim population. So he set up in 1919 an evolutionary plan designed to control events in Turkestan. In it Lenin stressed the need for the Party to handle Muslims carefully. In his telegram to "Comrade Communists of Turkestan" on November 7, 1919, he declared that a proper relationship between Russia and Turkestan had a gigantic and world-wide historic significance. The Turkestan Committee was asked by Lenin to take this matter into serious consideration and to provide necessary measures "to prove by deeds, the sincerity of the Soviet government."¹⁰

Proving by deeds meant the willingness of the Party to give some concessions to the Muslim populations of Central Asia. Such concessions even extended so far as to promote Muslim nationalism and to maintain Islamic religious institutions.

⁸ M. Chokaev, "Turkestan and the Soviet Regime," in *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, Vol. 18, 1931, pp. 406 ff.

⁹ *Istoriia sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava Uzbekistana 1917-1924* (History of the Soviet State and Law of Uzbekistan, 1917-1924), Tashkent: Akademiia Nauk UzSSR, 1960), p. 42.

¹⁰ *Lenin o druzhbe s narodami vostoka*, p. 272.

In the first place, to promote Muslim nationalism, in 1920 Lenin invited the Turkish revolutionary Enver Pasha to Moscow and sent him as his representative to the Congress of the Oriental Peoples at Baku.¹¹ Lenin also made an agreement with Enver Pasha by which the latter, after the Congress of the Peoples of the East, held at Baku, was to betake himself to Turkestan to effect a pacification. Pursuant to the agreement, Enver Pasha was to unite all these bands into one body and then at the head thereof, burst into India by way of Afghanistan. His rallying cry was to be: "The liberation of the peoples of the East!"¹² However, following his arrival in Turkestan, he changed his mind and began to organize an army designed to fight the Bolsheviks.

The second main concession, the maintaining of Muslim religious institutions, had much significance because the Soviet laws of 1918, prohibiting any religious schools in the Republic, probably would have had negative influences on most Muslims outside the Soviet Union. Therefore, the law of 1918, regarding the complete separation of school and church, was not applied after June, 1922, in the most populated areas of Turkestan.¹³ Moreover, the sacred Koran of Osman, which the Czarist government had removed from Turkestan to Petrograd in 1869, was sent to Ufa in 1918 and to Tashkent in 1921.¹⁴ This move had international significance in Islam; this copy of the Koran itself was regarded by Muslims as a highly precious document, being one of the oldest of Iraq's collections of Islamic religious writings. It was a work of about the seventh or eighth century. It was also an important historical document, since in later copies it presented material on such events as the rise of the famous Timur who, in 1393, captured the city of Baghdad and brought the Osman Koran with him to Samarkand.¹⁵

The Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party,¹⁶ held in Moscow during March 8-16, 1921, decided that the process of win-

¹¹ *Alone Through Forbidden Land: Russian Central Asia*, Gustav Krist, London: Faber, 1939, p. 76.

¹² *OGPU—The Russian Secret Terror*, George Agabekov, translated by W. H. Bunn (New York: Brentano's Press, 1931), pp. 16-17.

¹³ Park, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-220.

¹⁴ *Druzhba Narodov*, No. XI, 1957, pp. 13-16 (Moscow).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁶ Institut Marksa, Engelsa, Lenina i Stalina, *Kommunisticheskaya partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza v rezoliutsiakh i resheniakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK, 1898-1953* (The Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee, 1898-1953) (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1953), Vol. 1, pp. 553-563.

ning Turkestan would have to be slow because these peoples, the resolution stated, were not able to pass over the stage of capitalism and were behind in political thinking.¹⁷ The result of this decision was that the Bolsheviks adopted a temporary retreat in favor of Islam.

A third major concession was made by the Party in December, 1922, when the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan ordered the reestablishment of the *vakuf* (charitable, pious, or endowment properties) as the properties of the *mosques* and *madrassas* (religious schools).

At the time the concessions were made, however, the Russian Communist Party began to lay the groundwork for establishing a firm communist foothold in Central Asia. The Russian Communists believed that the Muslims, even though they were Communists, could not be trusted. One of the reasons for such an attitude was that Muslim Communists were obviously still more influenced by Islamic ideas than by communistic ones. For example, at the Congress of Orientalists in Baku, Enver Pasha was so popular among the Muslim representatives, including some Communists, that they crawled toward him to kiss his hands and touch his garments. The *chekists* (secret police) had to protect him from being assassinated by other more determined Communists, yet what they saw caused the Bolsheviks to lose all confidence in the Muslim Communists.¹⁸

Therefore, the Communist Party of Turkestan showed extreme caution in recruiting Muslims and in giving them responsible positions. More and more they depended on Russian personnel to carry out the plans of the proletarian dictatorship. In 1920, for example, 596 communists were sent to Tashkent (capital of Turkestan) from Russia: in 1921, an additional 562; in 1922, another 151, and so forth. Many of these were high ranking officials who occupied top administrative positions; the People's Commissariat of Local Nationalities was controlled by central authorities in Moscow. As the Bolsheviks faced and dealt with problems in Turkestan, they assured themselves

¹⁷ *Lenin i nekotorye voprosy*, p. 109.

¹⁸ P. V. Gidulianov, *Otdelenie tserkvi ot gosudarstva v SSSR*, (Separation of Church from State in the USSR), Polnyi sbornik dekretov vedomstnykh razporiadzenii i opredelenii Verkhshuda RSFSR i drugikh sovetskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik; UkSSR, BSSR, UzSSR i Turkmenskoi SSR, ZSFSR (Moskva: Iuridizdat RSFSR, 3rd edition, 1926), pp. 278-280.

¹⁹ Agabekov, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

of firm political control by placing Central Party officials in those key positions where policies were made and carried out.²⁰

NATIVE MOVEMENTS

In reaction to the Russian imposed policies, the natives of Turkestan sought in various ways to gain recognition of their demands and equal rights in administrative practices. There were three major movements in Turkestan: 1) the reformers (Jadids); 2) the pan-Turkists; and 3) the Russian-Islamic nationalists.

1. *Reformers* (Jadids). As mentioned above, the Jadids were a progressive element of the Muslim intelligentsia who wished to modernize the culture and to reform the Muslim traditional school system by limiting certain Islamic influences upon educational practices.²¹

When the revolution broke out in Russia, the Jadids in Tataria (Kazan) were the first group of Muslims to display a willingness to collaborate with the Russians. Their leaders—Munever Kari, Ahmejan Bentimir, Abdullah Hojaev, and others—began to propagate the revolutionary ideas among their peoples. They also established several periodicals: *Khurshid* (The Sun), *Shuhrat* (Glory), *Asia*, and *Sodo-i-Turkestan* (The Voice of Turkestan),²² aimed at awakening the Muslims of Central Asia and preparing them for assuming their own national cultural life.

When the Kokand government was overthrown by the Soviets, the Jadids split. One faction collaborated with Mustafa Chokaev, President of the Kokand Government, which was the strongest center for local nationalism; others were either influenced by Galiev's movement (to be mentioned later) or collaborated with the Soviets.²³

Those who cooperated with the Soviets were able to gain important administrative positions as well as to win considerable influence within the Party itself. In 1919 they succeeded in establishing a Turkestan Regional Bureau of Muslim Organizations of the RKP (b), including in its membership former Jadid nationalists in the persons of Tursun Hojaev (Khodzhaev), T. Ryskulov, and Niza-

²⁰ *Obrazovanie v sovetskom Uzbekistane* (Education in Soviet Uzbekistan), Kh. Turzunov, (Tashkent: Izdat. AN UzSSR, 1957), p. 79.

²¹ Walter Kolarz, *Die Nationalitätenpolitik des Sowjetunion* (The Nationality Policy of the Soviet Union), Frankfurt/M. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1956), p. 326.

²² Zenkovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 227, 241.

meddin Hojaev. By the end of the same year the Muslims represented a majority in the Regional Bureau of the party.²⁴

Having the official support of the central organ of the Communist Party, the Jadids were able to infiltrate the Party apparatus of Turkestan with their own people. These people became so "disobedient" to the central organs that they disregarded the letter sent by Lenin in 1920, "On the Autonomy of Turkestan." They elected their own representatives who departed for Moscow and who aimed at persuading Lenin of the importance of the Muslims' own national and cultural development. The head of the delegation, Ryskulov, insisted on the following: transfer of all powers to the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan; establishment of a Muslim national army subordinated to the Turkestan government; and, subsequently, the liquidation of the Turkestan Commission itself.²⁵ But Ryskulov himself soon was liquidated, as Kuibyshev indicated in his letter to Lenin: "We have succeeded, with great difficulty, in smashing the wall of the Muslim intelligentsia. . . and its leader Ryskulov."²⁶

2. *Turkish Nationalism.* This movement was headed by the same Enver Pasha whom Lenin first received as a spokesman of the Turkic peoples in 1920, but who believed, in fact, that the only alternative for the Muslim population was to fight communism with arms. Pasha had good reason for his attitude. For example, on January 17, 1920, a peace treaty was signed between the Bolsheviks and the Muslim independent revolutionary movement; it was agreed that the Soviets would not only not interfere in the Muslim struggle for independence but, on the contrary, would protect Muslim interests in Central Asia.²⁷ In direct consequence of this treaty, the Muslim armies were demobilized and most of the soldiers left for home. The Soviets, in the meantime, organized an army of 100,000 men under the leadership of Budennyi and Kamenev. They struck the remaining Muslim military forces and occupied most of the territory of Turkestan.²⁸

After the "peace treaty" with the Muslims, Lenin sent his best men to Tashkent—Kuibyshev and Kaganovich—to bolster the military actions by means of Soviet propaganda.²⁹ Mounted was an extensive communistic propaganda campaign designed to neutralize

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 241-242.

²⁵ *Lenin i nekotorye voprosy*, p. 148.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

²⁷ Baymirza Hayit, *Turkestan im XX. Jahrhundert* (Turkestan in the XXth Century) (Darmstadt: C. W. Leske Verlag, 1956), p. 193.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Zenkovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 250 ff.

Muslim political and military unity by promising complete independence and "protection" of Muslim rights. Kaganovich and Kuibyshev were successful; many natives believed in their promises and began to cooperate with the Soviets. They believed that the Soviet military actions in Turkestan were not part of Lenin's policy of nationalities. The Muslim leaders complained to the local Soviet authorities that Lenin and Trotsky did not know the situation in Turkestan and they, the Muslims, had to fight on two fronts: the Muslim clergy and European colonialism.³⁰

It did not take long, however, for the Turkestanian people to awaken to the danger of Soviet propaganda and the meaning of the Soviet military actions against their own people. Enver Pasha was among the first, reorganizing the Muslim army to combat Soviet communism. He began his march from Bukhara, and soon all Turkestan was under his influence, threatening the existence of communism in Central Asia. In 1921 he proclaimed a Holy War against communism, calling on the people to fight for the cause of Islam and promising to unite all Muslims of Russia, and possibly of the whole world, into one Islamic state. He was murdered by the Bolsheviks in August, 1922, and the related Basmachi movement was subdued by the Soviets in 1924.³¹

3. *Russian Islamic Nationalism*. Galiev, the representative of the third movement, believed in an evolutionary policy and in convincing the Party to accept peaceful coexistence with, but not absorption of, the Muslims of Russia. The Second Turkestan Congress of Muslims (1922) supported this view in deciding to protest against the policies of Soviet Russian administration, issuing a resolution that accused the Soviets of imperialism.³² Although accepting the communist world outlook, Sultan Galiev wished to educate the Turkish peoples of the Soviet Union in terms of their own cultural tradition. He proposed to the Central Committee of the Party that the Muslims of Russia be organized into one national republic, not included in the borders of the Soviet Union.³³ Galiev thought that such a move would help the development of communism in other Islamic

³⁰ Zenkovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-251.

³¹ *Istoriia sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava Uzbekistana*, p. 81.

³² G. Wheeler, *Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 16.

³³ There are also some other indications which pinpoint the reasons of the creation of the so-called independent republics of Central Asia. One of these reasons was the activities of Sultan Galiev who proposed the establishment of separate communist parties in the various regions of Central Asian

countries. He was arrested in 1923 and is believed to have been executed in 1930.³⁴

Galiev's plans, as well as the plans of many other Muslim Communists, were in sharp contrast to the plans of Soviet central dictators. The Russian Communist Party had clearly stated at its Eighth Congress (March 1919) that the "Party decisively rejects the idea of the organizational structure of the Party on the basis of the federation of independent communist parties."³⁵ The Congress further instructed the Executive Committee of the Soviet (People's Commissariat) of Turkestan to see to it that severe discipline and unity in administrative matters be carried out.³⁶

ADMINISTRATIVE FORMATION OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

After many unsuccessful attempts by the Bolsheviks to unite all the peoples of Russia into one Federal Republic, Lenin came to the conclusion that it would be better to create so-called independent states. On such premise, the first conference of the Soviets held in Moscow in December, 1922, adopted the resolution of creating the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.³⁷ Turkestan still did not become an independent state, but an autonomous republic within the Russian SFSR. Such an outcome did not satisfy the wishes of the Turkestan nationalities, and the opposition referred to continued to persist for some time throughout all the regions of Turkestan. In 1924 the Soviets decreed another division in territory. Turkestan was divided as follows: Uzbek SSR, including within its boundaries the Tadzhik Autonomous SSR; Turkmen SSR; Kirghiz Autonomous SSR, within the boundaries of the Russian SFSR; Kazakh Autonomous SSR, also within the boundaries of the Russian SFSR. In 1929 the Tadzhik ASSR was transformed into the separate Tadzhik SSR, and in 1936 two other republics were moved up in status from autonomous to "independent" ones, i. e., Kirghiz SSR and Kazakh SSR.³⁸

The above territorial demarcation included not only the territories of pre-revolutionary Turkestan, but also the Steppe and the

territories, not supervised by the Central Committee of Moscow. Chokaev stated that the territorial redistribution of 1924 was the direct result of Galiev's attempted "counterrevolution" (See Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 20).

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³⁵ *Lenin i nekotorye voprosy*, p. 120; *KPSS v rezoliutsiakh*, Vol. 1, p. 443.

³⁶ *Loc. cit.*

³⁷ W. Georadze, *Razvitie natsionalnogo voprosa* (The Development of the Nationality Question) (Moskva: Izdat. Politicheskoi Literatury, 1958), p. 11.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. In regard to Uzbekistan, the first Congress of the Uzbek Soviets officially ratified the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR establishing the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic.³⁹

In 1924 Stalin commented on the importance of the creation of the republics of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan by saying that this demarcation manifested:

...the deepest aspirations of the masses of the people of Turkmenia and Uzbekistan for their own organs of power which are close and intelligent to them... That these states desire to join the Soviet Union as equal members goes to prove that the Bolsheviks have found the key to the deepest aspirations of the popular masses in the East, and that the Soviet Union is the only voluntary union of the working masses of various nationalities in the world. In order to reunite Poland, the bourgeoisie required a number of wars. In order to reunite Turkmenia and Uzbekistan the Communists required but a few months of explanatory propaganda.⁴⁰

But Stalin's statement on just "explanatory propaganda" was false; many people perished (Muslims and non-Muslims) before the Russian propaganda had any significant effect.

CHANGES IN CENTRAL ASIAN POPULATION

The successful suppression of national movements by the Russian Communists in the European parts of the USSR, as well as in Central Asia, deserves a special consideration of the Russian tactics in subduing other nationalities. First of all, the Russian "majority," as of 1717, represented no more than 43% of the total population of the empire.⁴¹ This "majority" was clearly belied by the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1921 when it was stated that the nationality problem was of the utmost importance because there were 65 million non-Russian peoples, or 54%, on the territory of the Soviet Union.⁴²

The extermination of native populations by the Russian Communists was carried out on the same principles as were employed in

³⁹ *Istoriia sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava Uzbekistana*, p. 137.

⁴⁰ J. V. Stalin, "On the Political Tasks of the University of the East," in *Problems of Leninism*, 9th ed. (Russian edition), p. 136; cited by Rudolf Schlesinger, *The Nationalities Problem and Soviet Administration* (London: Routledge and Kegan Ltd., 1956), p. 252.

⁴¹ Hans Kohn, *Nationalism in the Soviet Union* (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1933), pp. 37 ff.

⁴² *KPSS v rezoliutsiakh*, Vol. 1, pp. 533-563.

the European parts of the USSR. For example, in Namangan, one single Turkestanian province, 84,000 people died of starvation when their property was either stolen or confiscated by the Soviet regime during the years of 1921-22.⁴³ As far as the whole of Turkestan is concerned, in 1921 more than 1,114,000 people died (starvation and purges), as a direct consequence of the Bolshevik policy of force and violence. Some sources estimate the casualties to have been even higher, ranging between 1.5 and three million. Even *Pravda* admitted in 1920 that more than one million Kirghiz people were killed by the Russian settlers in Steppe and Turkestan. Sorokin, the Secretary of Turkestan Soviets, stated:

Everything is taken away from Moslems, but not only that, our soldiers kill them, too. Instead of protecting them, they carry on the slaughter of the people still, and do many immoral things. The Moslem population is terrified in towns and villages, they try to escape... The Moslem population asks for help from Russia, but we (Russians) reply that we do not trust them. Their women and children suffer, and how can they like us? We make them nationalists.⁴⁴

The population of Turkestan, as of 1920, was 5,221,936, and by 1924 the population had increased to but 5,254,000,⁴⁵ or a 32,037 actual increase. This "increase" might have vanished were more complete data available.

After the termination of the New Economic Policy (1928) and the introduction of forced collectivization, the terror and liquidation of the opposition even mounted in intensity. The Turkestanian population met a fate similar to that of the Ukrainians. Some sources indicate that during the famine of 1932-1933, about three million Muslims of Turkestan died of starvation.⁴⁶

Another example of Soviet genocide may be noted from the data given by two Soviet censuses, 1926 and 1939, on the population of Kazakhstan. In 1926, the population of the Kazakh SSR amounted to 6.2 million; it dropped to 6.1 million in 1939. As far as the total number of Kazakhs living in the USSR is concerned, their share

⁴³ Ryskulov, *op. cit.*, pp. 84 ff.

⁴⁴ Mustafa Chokaev-ogly, *Turkestan pod vlastiu Sovetov* (Turkestan under the Rule of the Soviets) (Paris: Islam Turkestan, 1935), pp. 16 ff.; *Pravda*, June 20, 1920; *Foreign Policy Report*, February, 1960; Ryskulov, *op. cit.*, pp. 77ff.

⁴⁵ *Istoriia sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava Uzbekistana*, pp. 37, 187ff.

⁴⁶ Baymirza Hayit, *op. cit.*, pp. 264-281.

in the population of the Soviet Union was 3,968,000 in 1926 and 3,099,000 in 1939, or a stunning 21.9% decrease.⁴⁷

It is evident that the losses of non-Russian nationalities during "peaceful" times by far exceeded the losses caused by wars and revolutions. As an example, the Basmachi movements and their revolutionary uprisings between the years of 1920 and 1924, cost approximately 700,000 men (dead and wounded), and an additional 270,000 people were arrested or sent to Siberia during the post-revolutionary period, 1924-26.⁴⁸

The establishment of the Soviet regime in Central Asia, in short, took its customary staggering toll in lives and misery.

⁴⁷ Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism* (London: The Macmillan Co., 1953), p. 167.

⁴⁸ Baymirza Hayit, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

BOOK REVIEWS

KHRUSHCHEV: A CAREER. By Edward Crankshaw. New York: The Viking Press, 1966, pp. 311.

The name of Nikita S. Khrushchev has been all but forgotten by the Soviet press since his ouster from august power in the fall of 1964. But he will by no means be forgotten by history as the dictator of the Soviet Union from the fall of the "collective leadership" to the sudden termination of his reign in the Kremlin, and his influence both in the USSR and the world at large has left an indelible mark.

Edward Crankshaw, one of the best known and knowledgeable specialists on the Soviet Union, has succeeded in producing a compact and authoritative work on the ex-dictator: *Khrushchev: A Career*.

Although the publishers claim that the book is "the first biography of Khrushchev to cover his entire political career . . .," the fact remains that there are many other books with similar coverage. Yet the author can claim authority in approaching the subject matter. Mr. Crankshaw was a member of a British Military Mission to the USSR, and had revisited the Soviet Union as a correspondent for the *London Observer*. He is the author of three other books dealing with the USSR: *Russia Without Stalin*, *Russia and the Russians*, and *Cracks in the Kremlin Wall*. Unlike the work of some "experts" on the USSR, that of Mr. Crankshaw is invariably serious, scholarly and objective.

His latest book deals with the story of a Communist self-made man who rose from humble peasant origins to the glistening palaces of the new aristocracy now ruling the Soviet Russian empire. He finds Khrushchev's whole career to be typical of that of many Communist chieftains. Especially well detailed in the book is Khrushchev's rule as a "viceroy of Ukraine" before, during and after World War II. It was from this background that Khrushchev emerged as a major leader of the Communist Party and began jockeying for Stalin's position, finally beating out Malenkov in 1955. The book also captures Khrushchev's chameleon-like ability to walk the Communist tight-rope: how he adroitly rode on Stalin's coattails for so many years, praising and idolizing him, only to turn and crush Stalin's image in his famous "secret speech" to the Party Congress in February, 1956.

On the whole, this new contribution by Crankshaw is objective and illuminating.

Since Khrushchev's life was closely connected with Ukraine, the author of necessity dwells also on Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. It is only in this area that the author reveals a noticeable lack of knowledge, faltering with basic facts on Ukraine and Ukrainian history.

First of all, take the ethnic origin of Khrushchev. Admittedly, Crankshaw does not believe Khrushchev is of Ukrainian ethnic origin and background, which fact he underscores in a few places in the book. Yet he persistently refers to him and "his own Ukraine," "his Ukrainian flock," etc. There should be no mystery as to Khrushchev's nationality. We need only recall that on March 7, 1959, Khrushchev, addressing the Ninth All-German Workers' Party in Leipzig, un-

equivocally stated: "*I myself am a Russian. I come from among the workers and I naturally respect my nation. . .*" (Cf. *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, June 1 - 15, 1959).

Crankshaw writes that Ukraine, "until the Allied victory, was ruled by a German puppet, the *Hetman* Skoropadsky. There was no room in the Donbas for a man who felt himself neither a nationalist nor a pro-German" (p. 25). This stylistic lumping together of "nationalist" and "German" unfortunately suggests that the nationalists and the pro-Germans were equal in importance. This was not so, especially if one goes a step further and realizes that any pro-German sentiment was derived in the first place from an anti-Russian one.

We are surprised to read that "the predatory bands of mutinous peasants, soldiers and Ukrainian nationalists, who for years had terrorized the countryside, had been wiped out" (p. 36). Here, again, characterizing the nationalists as "predatory" hardly explains the strength of Ukrainian nationalism which, some three decades later, erupted into the astonishingly strong Insurgent Army (UPA). Yet Crankshaw readily recognizes the wont of Russian leaders to denounce "local patriotism" as "bourgeois nationalism" and "fascism" in order to heap upon the non-Russian nations the odium of popular hatred and suspicion. Moreover, on p. 52 Crankshaw draws a correct distinction between the Great Russians and the "Little Russians" (only to relapse into using the latter term interchangeably with "Ukrainian"), and recognizes the fact that "to this day many Ukrainians dream of their own sovereign state and despise the Great Russians as idle, reckless and submissive."

On p. 123 Crankshaw goes on to describe the "tenacity of Ukrainian patriotism" and how difficult it was for Trotsky and Lenin to conquer Ukraine in 1920. At this time Trotsky issued a famous instruction in which he ordered the Communist leaders in Ukraine to favor the independence of Ukraine in order "to take the wind out of Petlura's sails." The author also stresses that the "Ukrainization" of Ukraine in the early 1920's was a major concession to the restive Ukrainians. In the 1930's Moscow felt compelled to conduct a ruthless persecution of Ukrainian culture, and it was Khrushchev who was given the task of suppressing and Russifying the Ukrainians.

Crankshaw, then, is fully aware of the struggle of the Ukrainians and other non-Russian nations against Moscow for their national independence.

In characterizing the Ukrainians and their attitude toward the Soviet regime during the German occupation of Ukraine in 1941-43, Crankshaw divides them into four categories: a) those who got on with life as best they could, thus laying themselves open to being treated as collaborators; b) those who joined the partisans, more or less organized, cooperating with the Soviet armies; c) those who formed nationalist partisan groups, fighting for their own land, Ukraine, impartially against the Red Army and the Germans (a very large number); and those (mainly soldiers taken prisoner, or deserters) who volunteered to fight for the Germans against the Red Army under General Vlassov (p. 151).

The latter category needs some clarification. Although there were many Ukrainian prisoners of war in the Vlassov army, Vlassov himself was a Russian who saw himself heading a new non-Communist Russia, with Ukraine still enslaved by Moscow. Therefore, despite the heavy pressure exerted by the Nazis, no Ukrainian leader of any standing would cooperate with Vlassov.

Crankshaw stumbles quite badly in writing of Stepan Bandera:

There were many of these bands operating in the western Ukraine, but they were gradually mopped up by Beria's NKVD troops (who had air-

craft, river gunboats, heavy artillery, as well as rifles and machine guns). Those who were left, some scores of thousands, coalesced in the foothills of the Carpathians under a legendary leader, whether brigand or patriot is impossible to tell, called Stepan Bandera. On occasion Soviet Army formations had to be called out to reinforce the paramilitary police in major pitched battles. In due course Bandera was killed. But several years went by before the whole of Ukraine was pacified (p. 151).

Bandera most assuredly was not a "brigand" nor was he killed in Ukraine during the war. In point of fact, Bandera was assassinated on October 15, 1959, by KGB agent Bogdan N. Stashynsky, on the express orders of General Shelepin, the then head of that sinister organization. And he was killed in Munich. His killer, Stashynsky, defected to the West and confessed not only to the slaying of Bandera but also to that of another Ukrainian leader, Dr. Lev R. Rebet, also in Munich, on October 12, 1957. Stashynsky was tried by the German Supreme Court in Karlsruhe in the fall of 1962 and was sentenced to eight years at hard labor.

On the whole, however, despite some shortcomings, understatements or simple historical inexactitudes, Crankshaw's work is highly informative and embraces a proper perspective for the seeing of Khrushchev, the individual and the phenomenon, clearly. With this book Crankshaw reaffirms his standing as an able and perceptive Kremlinologist.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

WARSAW IN EXILE. Stefan Korbonski. New York and Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. \$8.75.

The present volume is the final book in a trilogy of memoirs by Stefan Korbonski. It follows his *Fighting Warsaw* and *Warsaw in Chains*. The author was one of the highest-ranking leaders in the Polish resistance movement against Hitlerism and later masterminded the Poles' resistance to Russian Communist imperialism. As leader of the Polish Peasant Party he had the overwhelming support of the Polish electorate despite a campaign of terror conducted by the N.K.V.D. against the forces of resistance. Korbonski's popular strength was demonstrated by the fact that in the election of Jan. 15, 1947, he received nearly 70 per cent of the votes cast by the whole Polish electorate.

While a member of the Polish *Sejm* Korbonski used parliamentary methods to initiate a vigorous opposition within the *Sejm* to Communist dictatorship. His activities led to the decision by Communists to strip him of parliamentary immunity and to have him arrested. Forced to escape to the United States of America by way of Sweden, the author has sought to fulfill his responsibility to the mandate he received from the Polish people by acting as a spokesman for Poland in the free world. In doing so he has become one of the leaders of the A.C.E.N.

Korbonski's autobiography surely commands our sincere admiration. He is an uncompromising enemy of communism and dictatorship, a courageous and inspiring personality completely dedicated to the cause of liberty for Poland and Eastern Europe.

He starts this third volume of memoirs with events surrounding his arrival in America and his early confrontation with the New World in New York City. There follows an analytic report of all the major world-wide political events in which he participated as leader or as a lesser official either among the Polonia of America and Canada or on a broader scale in the Assembly of Captive European Nations. Korbonski has had many opportunities to meet the leading statesmen of the world and especially those from the capital of the free world in Washington, D. C. He is, consequently, able to comment significantly about the political events that occurred between 1948 and the present. As an authority on Polish and East European politics, Korbonski is well-qualified to supply little-known facts, valuable interpretations and sidelights surrounding these events.

This book, which mentions in its final chapters also the Ukrainian struggle for freedom, is undoubtedly a great contribution to current history studies. Korbonski is an attorney, has a passion for facts, and a talent for making clear, concise formulations, so his book has the value of being well-written in addition to having the flavor of immediacy. In fact, some of the pages are brilliantly written. Overall, this work reflects the deep emotional involvement and total commitment to the cause of which he writes. It will stimulate a corresponding reaction from any historian who grasps all the consequences of Moscow's domination over Poland on the future of the whole of Eastern and Central Europe.

I must make some critical remarks, however and I shall start with an objection to the term in the introduction: "Polish-Russian War of 1920." Why does Korbonski use this historically incorrect and confusing terminology which is inspired by the Russian imperialistic school in America and which places the author in the position of accusing Poland of aggression against "Russia"? The fact is that that conflict was a war in which Poland and Ukraine were forced to ally themselves against Russian communist imperialism. Also it is a well-known fact that formations of the Don Cossacks participated in this war on the side of the Poles and Ukrainians.

Another inaccuracy I must point out occurs on page 56 where the author mentions a settler named Bohun who figured in events in the year 1610, but he neglects to mention the settler's Ukrainian nationality which is most significant in that it illustrates how the old Commonwealth embraced not only Poles and Lithuanians, but also the Byeloruthenians (Byelorussians), Ukrainians, and Jews.

My main objection to this book, however, is that Korbonski evaluates many of the political facts in a most politely diplomatic manner and abstains from any criticism of American policy in international affairs. He does this in spite of his obvious awareness and knowledge that the prime responsibility for the tragedy that has befallen Poland and Eastern Europe and, consequently, now threatens the whole free world belongs to our Department of State and its planning board.

If American public opinion is ever to awaken to a realization of the present danger facing the U.S. itself, some spoonfuls of very bitter medicine—the truth, the whole truth, and only the truth—must be meted out to the American people and their politicians. The much-avoided truth is that Poland, like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, was betrayed by America and its European allies. As the poet Gertrude Stein has said, a rose is a rose is a rose. Treason, betrayal,

treachery of an ally likewise remain before the tribunal of history as treason, betrayal, and treachery. It is a crime.

We have a saying in America that "crime does not pay." Let me add to that that political crimes also do not pay.

America, after World War II, was at the climax of her powers. The U.S. then had absolute air superiority and full monopoly of atomic weapons. Therefore, it is entirely believable that just one ultimatum to the gangster Stalin, one like Truman's ultimatum regarding the Iranian-Azerbaijani situation, and Poland, the Baltic States and even Ukraine and the Caucasus could have been saved. According to the promises set forth in the Atlantic Charter, all of Central and South Europe and China as well could then also have been spared communist domination. The betrayal of Poland and Eastern Europe was but the first step which has developed into the Eastern European catastrophe and continues to contribute in a negative way to the downfall of Korea, Cuba and, currently, Vietnam.

Another spoonful of truth America needs is that the separate nationality problems all over the world are part of one, in a larger sense, inseparable whole. To artificially categorize the great problem of the fate of nations under communist domination in such supposedly distinct problems as "the Assembly of Captive European Nations" and the nationality problem in the Soviet Union (thereby excluding Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Cossacks, and Idel-Uralians from Europe), and, lastly, into the national problem of Asia (thereby excluding the Asiatic part of the Soviet empire) is worse than nonsense. Attempting to achieve this kind of division of problems mortally weakens the inherent dynamism of revolutionary nationalism.

The noble idea of self-determination of nations is a child of democracy and liberalism. Only a common front formed by all the victims of Russian communist imperialism joined with the people of the entire free world in faith in a revolutionary democratic ideology can defeat Moscow and liberate all its colonies.

The Catholic University of America

ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI

PEACE OR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE? By Richard V. Allen. American Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1966, pp. 233.

With the purpose of enlightening the American public on the strategy and tactics of so-called international Communism, this work represents another milestone in the educational program of the American Bar Association. It really updates and revises the study made in 1964 under the title *Peaceful Coexistence: A Communist Blueprint for Victory*. Nonetheless, the book is must reading for every analyst of the Cold War. The previous study underwent four printings and over 40,000 copies. This one should do just as well since the revision and expanded research have entailed over 3,000 articles, books, addresses, reports and so forth in Communist literature.

An excellent foreword is provided by Bertram D. Wolfe, veteran writer and analyst of Red developments. He performs a most valuable service in this introduction by concentrating on the current illusions gripping the minds of our policy-makers and several public leaders, including President Johnson. His

passages are choice and penetrating. He writes, for example, "Our hopes and longings are likely to betray us again and again into a readiness to be deceived by those who have sworn the destruction of all we stand for. From the 'New Economic Policy' of Lenin (which was heralded in its day as a 'return to capitalism' or to a 'free market economy') to Stalin's 'Socialism in One Country' (which was hailed as an abandonment of the intention to extend Communist rule to other lands); from the 'Popular Front' and 'Collective Security' to the 'Grand Alliance' and 'One World'; from 'Peaceful Coexistence' to the 'Geneva Spirit' and the 'Spirit of Camp David'; on down to the latest illusions concerning the significance of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the introduction of a few elements of market regulation into centralized planning—the occupational hazard of the intellectual world of our campuses has been not to read too little but too much into involuntary changes, planned changes, and even tactical maneuvers and intentionally disarming verbal declarations." This summarizes beautifully the state of our academic environment today, to similar to that of the 30's.

Here's another cataloguing passage from Wolfe that whets the reader's appetite to plunge into the original contents of this work. "Each maneuver and slogan has been greeted as the long awaited 'fundamental transformation'; 'the sobering that comes from the responsible exercise of power over a great nation'; 'the response to the pressure of reality'; the modification of totalitarian power by the growth of a 'rationalist technocracy'; the 'sobering effect of privilege upon a new privileged class'; a 'feeling of national responsibility to Russia as against the aim of World Revolution'; 'the quiet digestion period of a sated beast of prey' no longer on the hunt; the 'diffusion of authority which could lead to a constitutional despotism'; the 'mellowing process that sooner or later overtakes all militant movements'; the 'sober second thoughts' which have come at long last 'from a recognition of the universal and mutual destructiveness of nuclear war'; the 'erosion' or even 'the end of ideology.'"

In this most fitting foreword, which sets the stage for the book, Wolfe emphasizes that these quotations are not from some physicist or biologist pursuing an intellectual hobby in world affairs but rather from the writings of highly respected Anglo-Saxon specialists in Russian history and Soviet affairs. I purposely restated the quotes here so that the reader can recognize how many of them are parroted in our daily papers and over the TV and radio media. The Russian masters in *Agitprop* should be gleeful over their products. Once again, with patience and the power of repetition they've successfully psychologized parts of the Western intellect into soft pulp. Much damage will result from this, but they still have to cope with invulnerable intellectual influences and the fine, driving instincts of what they call "the masses" who unquestionably, through the democratic process, will have their day.

For that day of resolutely deciding on winning the Cold War, the present work is necessary, instructive material. It is replete with documented quotations from Red sources and incisive interpretations by the author. The first chapter deals with "The New Communist Man," a theme that recurs in Red literature. Of course, the new man, ostensibly free and creative, can only develop under the guidance of the Communist Party. In theory, a problem arises between "Communist man" and "Soviet man" which doesn't occur to the author. There has been much more written about the *Homo Sovieticus*, which turns out to be a Russified robot, speaking the Russian language, lauding Russian literature, and glorifying the Russian Empire. Many non-Russian Communists, whatever their

motivations for being "communist," could scarcely stomach this. Thus, a contradiction confronts colonialist Moscow.

The following chapter on "Communist Humanism" shows all the typical Russian dialectics on "revolutionary humanism," as though Marxist *scientific* socialism can by definition accommodate any human ideals. The Russian contradiction of being against violence but also for violence is well pointed out. The succeeding chapters on "Education" and "Literature and Art" highlight the Russian process of indoctrination and the Party's propagandization of literature and art. Khrushchev's new technique of incarcerating rather than liquidating the literati receives adequate attention. The case of Valeriy Tarsis and his commitment to a mental asylum is just one case in point.

In the chapters on "The Communications Media..." and "Religion and Atheism" a good deal of familiar material is offered. About 7,700 newspapers and over 3,800 magazines circulate cheaply in the USSR. These constitute part of the propaganda apparatus of Moscow. The radio part consists of nearly 1,200 hours per day in 65 different languages, as the author mistakenly puts it, "used in the nation." In all of his writings he seems to have the typical American difficulty of differentiating between the concept of nation and that of state, which is most crucial to an understanding of the USSR. In the area of religion and atheism, the work concentrates on the Jews in the USSR and is terribly weak regarding the greater number of Russian genocidal cases in the empire. The examples of thinking on "Communist morality" follow the Leninist line. One so-called Marxist is quoted in these words: "Communists... must regard themselves as free, indeed morally obliged, to violate the principles of truthfulness, respect for life, etc., when it is absolutely clear that a great deal more harm would be done by adhering to such principles than by violating them" (pp. 44-45).

The documented evidence on the Red attitude toward the West is by and large well chosen and will be of considerable help to the reader. From an address by Khrushchev in 1963 we read, "And hatred for the class enemy is necessary because one cannot be a fine fighter for the people, for coexistence." Leonid Brezhnev, the Russian peace dove, has this to say, "It is only through tenacious class battles that the working class and the rest of the working people will achieve victory" (p. 58). His use of the term "working" means the professional revolutionaries trained in Red psycho-political warfare mills. As to Russian propaganda on "American imperialism" and the like, sufficient examples are provided, but the best of them, found in the annual Red protests against Captive Nations Week, are completely overlooked.

From chapter eight on, starting with "The Theory of 'Convergence'" and going through the whole section on "Peaceful Coexistence," the material is substantially the same as found in the previous study. Cherished by some in the West but completely ridiculed by Red theoreticians, the theory propounds an institutional blending of the socialist and capitalist systems. "A dream, perhaps a sweet dream, but one that will not come true," writes Solodovnikov, a Russian theoretician. "First, they ignore the fact that the social structures of these two countries are diametrically different" (p. 61). What he really means is the predominance of imperio-colonialism and Communist Party totalitarianism in the USSR. Even Professor Evsey Liberman, the advocate of profit accounting in the Soviet system, holds "it is impossible to rule out the conflict between the ideology of private enterprise and that of social management of production by means of the 'convergence theory'" (p. 64).

If one has read the first study, he'll find it most worthwhile to go through this one, with its many revisions and enlarged interpretations. The formula of "peaceful coexistence" has not changed since 1961, when Khrushchev defined it clearly in these terms: "the policy of peaceful coexistence, as regards its social content, is a form of intense economic, political, and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international arena" (p. 80). Appearance versus reality, Communism versus Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, are the essential points here which, unfortunately, the author overlooks, and his glossary at the end hasn't been improved in this respect. Nevertheless, with all its essential defects, the work is worth studying.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

ON TRIAL: The Soviet State versus "Abram Tertz" and "Nikolai Arzhak." Translated, Edited and with an Introduction by Max Hayward. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp. 183. \$4.95.

The position of the artist in society has never been enviable. For it is the nature and the function of art to question, to experiment, to criticize, to try the limits of that which is commonly thought feasible and permissible. On the other hand, the nature and the function of society is to preserve, to protect, and to set boundaries to human activity and expression. As a result, the artist often comes into conflict with society. This is true even in a liberal democratic society. But in an authoritarian dictatorial society, a society that maintains an official totalitarian ideology, the artist often unwittingly becomes a revolutionary. To him it may appear that he is only being true to his vocation, but to the power-holders of a totalitarian state it is clear that his art has become a treasonable activity. For such a state demands absolute obedience and conformity to an official ideology, and any criticism, questioning, or deviation in thought or expression is evidence of treason. Historically speaking, the proper word is *heresy*.

This, then, is the setting and the reason for the recent trial of the two Soviet writers, Andrei Sinyavsky (Abram Tertz) and Yuli Daniel (Nikolai Arzhak). A transcript of the essential courtroom testimony has been smuggled out of the Soviet Union, and Max Hayward, as usual, has done an excellent job as translator and editor. His forty-page introduction provides the biographical and literary background necessary for an intelligent reading of the proceedings in the transcript. Also valuable is his summary of Soviet and Western public reactions to the entire "affair." An appendix to the book contains a translation of an article in the January 22, 1966 issue of the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* by an "orthodox" Soviet student of literature. The article lambastes the literary quality of the writings of Sinyavsky and Daniel and depicts the two writers as the heirs of Dostoyevsky's despicable character Smerdyakov: a name-calling. A short bibliography of the relevant works of Sinyavsky and Daniel concludes the book.

The trial marks the first instance in Soviet history of writers being tried only for what they had written. It is also the first significant example of the so-called "return to socialist legality" after the mock trials of the Stalin era. But since for Communists, *law* is an expression of class ideology, the Soviet idea of legality is at variance with the usual Western understanding of that concept. The presiding judge, for example, is far from impartial, and often assumes the role of the prosecutor.

The basis of the proceedings against Sinyavsky and Daniel was not the fact that they published abroad and under pseudonyms, but that their writings served to subvert and weaken the Soviet political and social system through deliberate slander and defamation. Such an offense is punishable by Article 70 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code. It was the burden of the prosecution to prove *conscious intent* on the part of the defendants to subvert and weaken the Soviet system. Both authors maintained their innocence of this charge, although Daniel admitted partial guilt by acknowledging that upon publication he became aware of the fact that his writings were being used as anti-Soviet propaganda. Still he maintained that this was not his original purpose. Daniel's partial admission of guilt may help to explain his lighter sentence of five years imprisonment, as compared with Sinyavsky's seven years.

The examination of Sinyavsky and his final plea illustrate dramatically the problem of the artist and society in general and of the Soviet artist in particular. Sinyavsky, for instance, constantly protested that his literary words and ideas were being misinterpreted, quoted out of context, and that the thoughts and words of the fictional characters of his works were being assigned to himself—as his expression and his responsibility. He refused to admit the court's prerogative to view art in a political sense only. He insisted that he be properly understood as that which he is—an artist and not a politician. He claimed that it was not his fault or his responsibility that his literary creations were interpreted in an anti-Soviet manner by Western commentators. The court, on the other hand, insisted that the Western anti-Soviet interpretation was exactly the point of the entire trial, and the fact that he is an artist does not excuse his ignorance of such a politically detrimental possibility. This conclusion, moreover, is logically tenable, for Sinyavsky claims to be a good Communist and a loyal citizen of the Soviet Union.

What has happened here is that Sinyavsky at the time of the trial had not yet come to the realization that as a sincere artist and a loyal Communist he was living a contradiction. True art and Soviet Communism are incompatible. By their nature and function the two are exclusive of each other. Valeriy Tarsis, the author of *WARD 7*, who is much older than Sinyavsky and perhaps politically more astute, realized this well and from the start knew that he was rebelling against the entire Soviet system. This is the reason why he found no need to resort to a pseudonym in publishing his works in the West; whereas Sinyavsky and Daniel wanted to be free as artists and to remain loyal citizens of the USSR. They wished to lead two incompatible lives and consequently required two different names.

But let there be no mistake—it was not they who betrayed their society; it was their society that betrayed them. It was the perverse nature of their society that forced them to adopt pseudonyms and subterfuge in order to fulfill themselves in their vocation as true creative artists. It was not they, but their society that was in fact on trial. And the worldwide public reaction to the trial demonstrated conclusively that this indeed was the case.

WALTER ODAJNYK

STRATEGIC POWER AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. By Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. Pp. xii, 225. \$5.95, 44sh, 6d.

Although a weapon of science, the thermonuclear devices possess also a side capability—and one that may subject them to both praise and blame in the same breath. They have become high-priced instruments in the strategic power game; but this is certainly not to say that no government or ruler ever will dare to use their frightening potential. Commonly it is believed that Communist China will not be so deterred; it even is suggested that the West should “beat her to it.” But such conclusions betray indeed a grave lack of sophistication—a sophistication which, of course (and this the rub), Mao or his successors may or may not possess. Otherwise “the bomb” and its agencies for delivery: bombers, missiles, submarines, is an extravagant card held in a poker hand—a “wild” counter whose highest worth can be realized only by the most resourceful and skillful player.

Horelick (Rand) and Rush (Rand and currently Cornell) devote one-third or more of their foreign policy analysis to N.S. Khrushchev's well-nigh incredible bluff in the matter of the “missile gap” (1957-1961), Berlin, and Cuba. That K. lost, both objectively and personally, is not particularly the point; he might have won, and—had there been a really strong Soviet nuclear development in progress—essential time would have been gained for Soviet scientific supremacy. But the incidents basic to—and surrounding—the Khrushchev power plays offer clear substantiation of Horelick and Rush's theme: “Much of the political struggle involving strategic forces takes place within the limits of this area (that of the conflict of belief, intelligence, and fact) of uncertainty. Both the calculated “resolution” whereby an inferior power defends its outposts and the bluffs or deceptions that make it possible to win positions from an equal or more powerful opponent are facilitated by the *uncertainty* that encompasses modern strategic capabilities” (pp. 4-5) (italics added).

Khrushchev's fall and the assumption of power by Brezhnev and Kosygin has not greatly lessened the danger though the West would like to think so. “After a period of comparative quiescence in the cold war, they (the Soviet leadership) must again decide what political role to assign to their strategic forces...” For certain initiatives in the world Communist orbit have already been lost to Red China, polycentrism is rampant, and the 1959-1960 Berlin German problem could be resolved only by the construction of the infamous wall of August 13, 1961.

Yet certain successes, too, may be chalked up to K. and/or his policies: East Germany has become a leading industrial producer, trade with the USSR and the East Bloc has become not only respectable but “desirable” in the West, and the former unmitigated suspicion directed toward the USSR has, in many quarters, almost completely evaporated. Leading figures in American politics speak of “new solutions” and a possible *detente* (which is what K. could have had almost a decade ago if he had not embarked upon his gamble of bluster and bluff). Actually, it is moot whether K. himself considers his regime to have been a success or failure.

Strategic Power covers thoroughly the post-Stalin period, even essaying a few conclusions as to the Marshal's policies and peripheral program—far different from the wide-ranging and ebullient Khrushchev's. Little is to be

found, however, in regard to the satellites (except Hungary and East Germany) nor are Tito, the Baltic States, Ukraine, and Trans-Caucasus mentioned. All these surely figure in either the inception or execution of the USSR's foreign policy, which must, naturally, begin at home.

Strategic Power nevertheless is a well-documented and cogently stated work; the details relative to Berlin, Cuba, and the notorious missile gap deception are buttressed with the best primary source material and excellent editorial judgment. If, as the authors allege, "The fate of mankind may depend on (Soviet Russia's contemporary rulers) their choice," not only American citizens should inform themselves of these newer practices in the thermonuclear age but also so should those who are in positions of influencing others or actually hold power fulcrums in all kinds of offensive/defensive roles.

University of Montana

KENNETH V. LOTTICH

TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD. The Story of the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors. By Simma Holt. New York: Crown Publishers 1965, pp. xxiv + 312.

This is an American edition of a book published in Canada the preceding year and it tells an amazing, bizarre and often frightening story of a group of fanatics.

Who are the Doukhobors? It is hard to say, but while it is fairly certain that there are some Ukrainians among them, the sect sprang up in the eighteenth century, apparently just beyond the borders of Ukraine and from then on with their leaders they have been at odds with any secular authority whether in Russia or Canada where they idealize Mother Russia.

After some disturbances near Tiflis in 1895, the Doukhobors, claiming to be simple Christians under persecution, appealed to Leo Tolstoy and won his sympathy. He wrote *Resurrection* to get money for them and he persuaded his admirer and pupil, Aylmer Maude, to arrange for their transportation to Canada. Maude did as he was told and in 1899 four shiploads landed in Canada. They were soon followed by their leader Peter Verigin but almost immediately they accused the Canadian government of all the abuses with which they had charged the Czarist regime. Then they discovered the Canadian dislike of nudity and men and women of all ages have never lost the opportunity to stage nude marches and demonstrations. They had first gone to Saskatchewan but Verigin later moved them to British Columbia and for a half century during which there have been some splits and some have accepted the Canadian government, there has been the so-called Sons of Freedom who have made a cult of bombing and arson against not only other Dukhobors but non-Dukhobors as well. As each movement became wilder and less restrained, they have attracted much attention. Now Mrs. Holt, who has studied them intensively, believes that the Sons of Freedom are organized almost as a mafia or possibly the Ku Klux Klan or any other minority believing in and practicing violence but under the guise of religion.

She has been very successful in collecting material on their history in Canada and in finding the key to the murder of Verigin in a Canadian Pacific train in 1924. She describes well the maneuvers of his son Peter, then of the Archangel Michael and of the next leader of the Dukhobors, Sorokin, who has taken refuge in Uruguay. She has been less authoritative in tracing the history of the group in Russia. Thus they apparently have some poems of Hryhory Skovoroda but it

seems very unlikely that he spent years of teaching among them, although in his wanderings he may well in the 1780's have spent some time among them. There are points that are scarcely consistent as to their origin but they are equally obviously one form of that "mystical" movement in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which assigned divine authority to their leaders and followed them blindly, no matter what crimes they ordered or what excesses.

The volume is a lurid account of the gradual deterioration of a religious movement until it seems to be actuated now only by criminal interests and occupied with criminal acts while it is still able to deceive many idealistic believers in human rights as superior always to obedience to laws made by the voting of a free population. As such the book deserves real consideration on the part of all who believe in peace and quiet as the background for the improvement of society and the human race.

Columbia University

CLARENCE A. MANNING

MARXIST IDEOLOGY IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: ITS APPEALS AND PARADOXES. Edited by Milorad M. Drachkovitch. Published for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, California, by Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1966. Pp. xvii, 192. \$6.50.

This work delves into the fascination with the ideology of Marxism, its subsequent reinterpretation of that ideology, and its effect upon the contemporary world. In fact, in dealing with this phenomenon, the authors themselves give proof of the interest and awe compelled by the system of social control and organized deception.

The seven essays presented in this symposium are original papers and expanded comments first presented at the conference on "One Hundred Years of Revolutionary Internationals," held in October, 1964, at Stanford University and organized by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. The topics also are fascinating. They have been discussed by some distinguished names from the American and continental academic world: "Marxism in the Western World: from 'Scientific Socialism' to Mythology," by Sidney Hook (pp. 1-36); "Alienation: the Marxism of Contemporary Student Movements," by Lewis S. Feuer (pp. 37-59); "Marxism in Communist Countries," by Joseph M. Bochenski (pp. 60-75); "The 'End of Ideology' in the Soviet Union?" by Daniel Bell (pp. 76-112); "Marxist Economics in Retrospect and Prospect," by Gottfried Haberler (pp. 113-125); "Communist Economic Planning vs. Capitalism as a Model for Development," by Yuan-li Wu (pp. 149-158); and "Marxism and the Underdeveloped Countries," by Peter T. Bauer (pp. 149-158).

The collection is definitely not easy reading for the average student of "Marxism"; it is presented in the most stringent and esoteric academic styles. In this respect it will probably be found most valuable by the specialist in the field of "The Sociology of Knowledge" (dealing with the socio-cultural factors associated with thought and its various forms of expression). But these specialists have reason for deep gratitude to the publisher and the editor for making this work available to them, for not only the contents but also the large number of footnotes supporting each chapter (pp. 159-192) make this publication the best available approach to the "semantic fascination" of Marxist ideology, with emphasis on its two pillars—philosophy and economy—in the Western, Communist and "Third World" countries.

It is impossible here to capture the variety and richness of its ideas. Basically, however, we have a sharp attack on the "irrationality" of man, on the willingness of many contemporary leaders and their followers to bow to any authority proclaiming the Marxian authority of "reason."

There are, according to the authors, many conditions conducive to such irrational choices. Fortunately, for those who are pressed for time and unable to scrutinize the ever-growing flood of pro-and anti-Marxist literature, Dr. Drachkovitch summarizes the main features of each author's contribution in his able "Introduction" (pp. xi-xvii).

THE EMPEROR'S CHARIOTEER: A TALE OF THE GREAT DAYS OF CONSTANTINOPLE. By W. H. Spears, Jr., Chicago: Adams Press, 1965, pp. 264, \$3.95.

Author Spears has set himself the formidable task of writing a series of novels based on Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. *Constantine's Triumph* was the first of the series (1964); *The Emperor's Charioteer* is the second.

It is a novel about Constantinople's greatest age of splendor: the reign of the Emperor Justinian in the 6th century A.D. The story is focused on Alexander of Ephesus, son of a wealthy silk merchant whose career as a student of philosophy is ended abruptly when the Emperor Justinian closes the schools of Athens in 529 A.D. On the same day, Alexander learns that his rich father has been ruined by the Emperor's thieving tax collectors. He travels to Constantinople, the gaudy and glittering capital of the declining Roman Empire, where he drifts into the colorful and violent life of chariot racing, driving his four-horse chariot in the Hippodrome for fame and fortune—and revenge.

Woven into the fabric of this basic plot is the story of Monica, beautiful daughter of Hermias, outlawed professor of pagan philosophy. Monica meets Alexander at Athens when the schools are closed, and the two of them fall in love. But Monica's pagan father, forced to flee from the Christianized Roman Empire, takes her with him to Persia, where she encounters a strange fate in the form of a rapacious Persian aristocrat, a courageous and gallant eunuch and a weird sect of fanatics known as the Mazdakites, the "Communists" of the ancient world.

The story of Alexander and Monica covers 30 years of Roman history, beginning in 529 and ending in 559, when the Byzantine General, Count Belisarius, leads forth his little band of followers to drive the Huns back from the walls of Constantinople—with Alexander and Monica usually being in the thick of the action: the bloody street fights of the Greens and Blues, the plots and revolts against the hated Justinian, the campaigns of Count Belisarius against the Goths and Vandals, the devastating bubonic plague of 542, and the climatic siege of Edess in 544.

Addicts of the historical novel will take to this work; it is fast-moving (at the cost of clear delineation of the characters). In fact, Spears is really good at action, weak when he takes time out to preach. ("... I am choosing to support a ruthless despot against a horde of barbarians. But perhaps, someday, men will not have to choose between two evils," p. 264). All in all, above average.

University of Bridgeport

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"INVESTIGATION OF SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD," hearings. Select Committee On Standards and Conduct, United States Senate, Washington, D. C., June-July, 1966.

Bogdan Stashynsky, the Moscow-delegated assassin of the two Ukrainian patriots in exile, Lev Rebet and Stepan Bandera, has never received as much publicity as during the Dodd hearings in the summer of 1966. This is the official report of the hearings which the anti-communist Senator of Connecticut himself requested. It makes for fascinating reading and cannot but lead one to the obvious conclusion that the Senator is the object of a plot to destroy him and his work.

This first volume deals with the Senator's relationship with Julius Klein. The evidence shows nothing unusual or unsavory in the relationship. It does show the extent and danger of the Russian conspiratorial network as indicated by the whole Stashynsky case. Despite the fact that the case goes back to 1961-62, uncounted Americans have for the first time come to learn about it through these interesting hearings.

One of the testimonies in firm support of the Senator was given by the president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky. The concise testimony describes how the Senator was approached on the Rebet/Bandera murders as far back as 1960. A memorandum prepared in 1962 by Dr. Walter Dushnyck was inserted into the record as exhibit 14. It was unfortunate, as the testimony shows, that Dodd's loyal staff members did not heed Dr. Dobriansky's recommendation to print in full the entire Stashynsky case in 1965.

"CAPTIVITY OF EASTERN EUROPE SHOULD BE MORE IN OUR MINDS," article by Barry Goldwater. *Los Angeles Times*, Los Angeles, California, November 23, 1966.

Whether one likes him or not, Goldwater has been proven right on so many issues since 1964 that his recommendations are being given second thoughts by increasing numbers of Americans. Firm assistance to South Vietnam is the one most talked about, but other issues include inflation, Russian hypocrisy in "peaceful coexistence," tax-sharing with the states, captive nations and so forth.

This article brings up the 10th Anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution and the silence meted out to it by the Administration. "In astonishing contrast to the freedom fighters' heartbreaking cry for freedom as they lay dying in the streets was the silence that marked this nation's response," he writes.

His statements on Captive Nations Week require some qualification. "Each year," he states, "even the formality of a captive nations resolution, at least a

vocal sign of our commitment to freedom in Eastern Europe, becomes an empty gesture. It has been the practice of this administration not to point an accusing finger at the Soviets in these resolutions, as though Soviet troops occupying Eastern Europe simply doesn't exist." Substantially this is correct; however, the 1966 Captive Nations Week is the best on record yet, and though the empty gesture exists on the Administration level, it is very much a solid one in Congress and throughout the states. The Administration is merely isolating itself on this issue and cannot but pay the price for it somewhere along the line.

"UKRAINIAN PEOPLE ARE NOT RUSSIANS," a letter by Askold Skalsky. *The Sunday Bulletin*, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 23, 1966.

Education is an incessant process which this well written letter clearly exemplifies. You can always depend on some journalist to misidentify Ukrainians as Russians, despite all the unequivocal advertising beforehand. The recent performances of the Ukrainian Dance Company were so advertised, but it takes one James Felton to demonstrate his ignorance by talking about "Russia's" company and "these Russian dancers."

So, by analogy, a Chinese is Japanese to a Felton, and all that it requires to correct such foolish misidentities is precisely what this writer did. There will be many more Feltons in the years to come. The only remedy is patient education by this and other means.

"A MATTER OF GEOGRAPHY," a letter by Vera A. Dowhan. *The Washington Daily News*, Washington, D. C., November 3, 1966.

The educational point made above is poignantly stated in the opening paragraph of this letter. "Altho five years have elapsed since the Ukrainian Dance Company's visit to Washington, the interim period obviously has not been educationally fruitful for Milton Berliner, who today is as confused about Ukraine and Ukrainians as he was five years ago." The same misidentification is committed.

You can't tell, it may all result in Berliner's investigating a map of the USSR, even after five years. The writer suggests his doing this. What is important is the attention given to this subject in the papers. The average reader cannot but profit from it. In brief, the moral is keep writing, and those who do, are performing a real public service.

"UNITY AND PROGRESS—THEMES OF UCCA MEETING," a report. *Freedom's Facts*, All-American Conference to Combat Communism, Washington, D. C., November 1966.

Reporting on the recent convention of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, this monthly periodical covers the highlights of the October meeting. The banquet of more than 700 persons was addressed by Senators Paul Fannin of Arizona and Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut, the Honorable Liu Chieh, head of the Chinese U.N. Delegation, and the Honorable Nguen Duy Lien, Permanent

Observer of the Republic of Viet Nam to the U.N. The 9th Congress of UCCA passed resolutions dealing with every major international issue pertinent to the captive nations.

The report in this nation-wide publication also enumerates the winners of the Shevchenko Freedom Award. Members of Congress winning the award included the Hon. Barratt O'Hara of Illinois and the Hon. William G. Bray of Indiana. Those reelected at the Congress were Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky as president, Mr. Joseph Lesawyer as executive vice president, and Mr. Ignatius M. Billinsky as secretary. The policy of UCCA remains firmly anti-communist.

"A FREEDOM AWARD GIVEN TO TRUMAN," a news report. *The Kansas City Star*, Kansas City, Missouri, November 21, 1966.

With rather comprehensive coverage this report describes the presentation of the Shevchenko Freedom Award to former President Harry S. Truman in Independence, Missouri. The award was presented by Dr. Walter Dushnyck on behalf of both the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the Shevchenko Memorial Committee of America. In 1964, Truman served as chairman of the honorary memorial committee witnessing the erection of the Shevchenko statue in Washington.

As part of the report states, "The Shevchenko award was established four years ago in honor of Taras Shevchenko, the Ukraine's poet laureate and national hero, whose writings denounced Czarist tyranny in the 19th century." The citation honored Truman for leadership against Nazi and Communist aggression, humanitarianism and justice.

"ATATURK'S SOVIET POLICY," an article by Fethi Tevetoglu. Turkish Senate, Ankara, Turkey, Spring, 1966.

The writer of this interesting and revealing article is a member of the Turkish Senate and an ardent advocate of the liberation of the captive nations. In this essay he educes the main characteristics of the policy formulated and pursued by the leader of the Turkish nation, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in relation to Soviet Russia. In that post-World War I period the policy was a firm and unequivocal one, and could have had long-term meaning for the non-Russian nations now held captive in the USSR.

Ataturk minced no words when in 1919 he declared "the Turkish nation is ready to fight Bolshevism should the need arise." This, according to the writer, was not understood by the United States then, and consequently in its foreign relations Turkey moved closer to "the Russians against whom they had fought fourteen times during the last three centuries, for a total duration of forty-nine years." American concern for the Armenians, the British occupation of Turkey, and the failure of the West to bring self-determination to the subjugated nations in the area of the collapsed Russian Empire were matters that complicated the Turkish position, despite Turkey's firm opposition to Russian Bolshevism. Ataturk had no illusions about Moscow's pretensions toward Istanbul, its "Czargrad," "the priceless and indivisible pearl." Yet, because of Western failures toward Russian imperialism, he had to steer a course best suited for the development of his nation.

"THE AMERICAN 'KREMLINOLOGISTS,' THEIR ACTIVITIES AND INSTITUTES," an article by Emil Sip. *Slovansky Prehled*, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Prague, Czechoslovakia, No. 3, 1966.

Account is taken in this interesting article of the major sources of Kremlinological studies in the United States. The writer immediately distinguishes between "publications of ultra-Right organizations" and those of "universities and scientific institutes," which are supposed to be more "objective." What he means here is that the former exude perhaps more conviction and purpose than the Red totalitarians find less palatable. However, it cannot be denied that some extremist publications do present "facts in a crude fashion."

What is of particular note is his grouping of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* and its sponsor, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, with eleven other American institutes and publications as specialized sources in this field. This is not the first time that the *Quarterly* has been cited for its careful studies, nor will it be the last. The organ aims to maintain the highest level of proficiency in scholarship and intellectual opinion. And in the days ahead it will undoubtedly prove to be of still greater value and worth.

"BREATH TAKING UKRAINIANS," an article by P.W. Manchester. *Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, Massachusetts, October 22, 1966.

With no amateurish confusion of Russian and Ukrainian, this article adulates the recent performances of the Ukrainian Dance Company. The writer depicts the company as "the only folk dance ensemble offering serious competition to the famed Moiseyev troupe," which incidentally isn't completely Russian in membership and rendition. The critic is obviously enthralled by the Ukrainian presentation.

"The Ukrainians simply should not be missed," he says. "The charm and grace of the women," "those whirling Cossacks," "those Whalers," and the "variety of the prysladka" are some of the reasons he gives. All this is part of the cultural exchange program, but one often wonders how effective culturally it is when, after seeing it, an American blurts out "What lovely Russian dancers!"

"UKRAINIANS SEEM HAPPY WITH SOVIETS," an article by John Weyland. *Associated Press*. September 25, 1966.

Strange as it may seem, this piece can be read two ways. The one is as the caption suggests, the other is between the lines. The correspondent is aware of the millions who deserted the USSR for liberation in the last world war, of the Ukrainian independent "nation after the 1917 revolution," and of the fact that "Ukrainians speak and write a language different from Russian." In spite of all this, he feels Ukraine "shows no signs today of being a trouble center in the Soviet Union."

His reason for this is the spectacular postwar reconstruction of what provincially he calls "the Ukraine." Ukrainian income has supposedly increased by 41 per cent since 1959, and the economy of the republic is apparently experiencing a rapid growth. All this and more, according to the writer, "has

led its 45 million people toward acceptance of Moscow's 'foreign' rule.'"

Yet between the lines the writer leaves enough room for a reader to conclude that the Ukrainians only *seem* happy. He admits the prevalence of nationalism; as he puts it, "Some of the old feeling undoubtedly remains." Also economic backwardness, shabbiness, and a still low standard of living in comparison with the West overshadow in many areas the superficial mirth of the people. The fact is that there are as many arrests, charges of "bourgeois nationalism," and political disturbances in Ukraine yearly as anywhere else in the empire. After Hungary, no Westerner should expect spectaculars until the appropriate time arrives.

"POLITICS AND PATRIARCHS," an editorial. *Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, Massachusetts, September 14, 1966.

The warning given in this editorial can be applied in other ecclesiastical situations involving patriarchs, archbishops, and Moscow. The Russian Orthodox Church, states the editorial, "paradoxically offers the Soviet leaders a channel for a Russian voice among Orthodox communities outside the frontiers of the Soviet Union." The case cited is the recent defiance of a dissident group of bishops in the Middle East who ignored the wishes of the Patriarch of Antioch by installing a pro-Russian Archimandrite as Archbishop of Lotakia in Syria.

There is nothing new in Moscow's use of the Russian Orthodox Church or, for that matter, any other religious agency for its political aims. This case is just one among many. Nevertheless, the warning is well taken. In the Vatican, the World Council of Churches and in other spheres the Russian influence is being advanced through a variety of means. They bear close, skeptical watching.

"WHAT'S LEFT OF LIBERATION," an article by William F. Buckley, Jr. *The Wanderer*, Minneapolis, Minnesota, October 13, 1966.

William Buckley is a writer and speaker who minces few words and rarely pulls his eloquent punches. His target here is the American politician who says a great deal about the captive nations but does little about it. He ends by saying the "subject peoples will need to depend on God, rather than America politicians, to give them back their freedom." About slogans and words, the writer observes, "The Poles — or for that matter the East Germans, the Czechs, the Bulgarians, the Hungarians, the Yugoslavs, the Ukrainians — are increasingly satisfied by sloganized advertisements of the demands of conscience. They are not a lobby for national liberation."

Though there is some merit in Buckley's stand, the situation is not as black nor as simple as he leads one to believe. God can even work through the American politician to bring about liberation. Much is left of liberation to the present day, and with the further extension of Captive Nations Week and opportune circumstances in the near future, the solid cause of liberation will surely come into its own. Meanwhile, thank God for the keep-talking American politician, including Barry Goldwater who will again be an ardent spokesman in the Senate.

"ARCHBISHOP DEDICATES BYZANTINE RITE CATHEDRAL," an article by Charles Doe. *The Evening Bulletin*, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 17, 1966.

Numerous accounts were given of this historic event in organs across the country. The world's largest Byzantine Catholic cathedral was dedicated last October in the City of Brotherly Love. Archbishop Ambrose Senyshyn, Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Archeparchy of Philadelphia, laid the cornerstone of the cathedral. Indeed, the Archbishop has been chiefly responsible for this historic edifice. A gift from Pope Paul VI, a 30 pound block of Italian marble from the tomb of St. Peter in Rome was sealed in the stone.

As always, the Archbishop exhorted the over 10,000 persons attending "to pray for our brethren behind the Iron Curtain and for their church which is still being persecuted." This Ukrainian religious leader has maintained a strong, positive opposition to Red overtures calculated to soften the Church and to disrupt its ranks. *The Philadelphia Inquirer* and other newspaper organs carried similar reports on the occasion.

"DECLARATION OF METROPOLITAN NICODIM," a press conference release. World Conference on Church and Society, Geneva, Switzerland, July 22, 1966.

No finer example of the political prostitution of the Russian Orthodox Church is offered than this declaration by the head of its Foreign Affairs section. All the Red tunes are played: "sacred indignation before the cruel and unlawful actions of the United States in Vietnam," "the cruel racist regime of the Republic of South Africa and in Southern Rhodesia," "the valiant struggle of the peoples of the Latin-American countries for liberation," the USSR headed for "a classless, socialist society, which is free from exploitation, racial or other inequality" and so forth.

As before in the 30's, Moscow is making its pitch to subvert the spiritual foundations of the Free World. The World Council of Churches is but one medium. There are "sleepers" and agents at work in other media, including the Vatican. The real problem is not staging a dialogue, but rather having Free World spokesmen who are knowledgeable enough to counter and refute the fiction meted out by these Red mouthpieces. The Nicodims come with dirty hands and snakelike fabrications.

"DANCE: SPINNING, GRINNING, WINNING UKRAINIANS," an article by Clive Barnes. *The New York Times*, New York, October 14, 1966.

More favorable and accurate comment is poured on the Ukrainian Dance Company and its recent performances. This critic starts on the following note, "There may be more purely exciting dancers in the world than the Ukrainian Dance Company... but if such paragons exist, I am at a loss to recall them." The entire write-up is a series of critical adulation.

At the same time Walter Terry of *The World Journal Tribune* commented similarly under the title "Ukrainian Knees Have It"; James Davis of *The New York Daily News* viewed it all as a "Pretty Garden Show"; and Joyce

Warren of *The Washington Evening Star* a week later, on October 21, held the "Dancers From Ukraine Bring Precision, Artistry." About the program she wrote, "Could I have done that if I had been born Ukrainian and started early enough?" If the same passion were shown for the captive political status of Ukraine, the United States would have little to worry about from the so-called Russian Communist menace.

"ISRAELI DELEGATE TELLS U.N. UNIT SOVIET IS BIASED AGAINST JEWS," an article by Paul P. Kennedy. *The New York Times*, Oct. 13, 1966.

Gershon Avner, the Israeli delegate to the U.N., has charged Moscow with discrimination against the Jewish minority in the USSR. Nasimovsky of the USSR typically replied "slanders and lies." The Ukrainian delegate, Mrs. Vera M. Dmitruk, also denied any discrimination against the Jews in Ukraine.

It is not just a matter of discrimination but rather one of calculated genocide. The charge should seek the application of the Genocide Convention to the USSR. And not only Jews but all the other non-Russian nationals are being subjected to the subtle Russian population policy. It is regrettable that no one, including the U.S. delegation, has the courage to press this charge against the Russian totalitarians. The facts are available for the asking.

"ALLIANCE WITHOUT ALLIES," book review essays by Walter Dushnyck. *Catholic World*, New York, September 1966.

Viewing the Red threat in its global dimensions, any observer must take account of developments in Latin America. What happens or fails to happen there will bear some relationship to the family of captive nations. The writer presents an evaluational account of two books dealing with Latin America. The one by Victor Alba on *Alliance Without Allies: The Mythology of Progress in Latin America* is held as a nihilistic analysis, expressing gloom over the continent's prospects.

The other work, *Social Revolution in the New Latin America*, edited by John M. Considine, M.H. and the result of a symposium, is reviewed as a more balanced account with optimistic overtones. The one point deserving of constant emphasis is that opportunity for progress must always be preserved on the continent. And this means thwarting the plans of Havana and the Tricontinental Congress.

"USSR CELEBRATES END OF CATHOLICISM," a report. *The Tablet*, Brooklyn, New York, May 5, 1966.

How Moscow accomplishes its genocidal goals in the USSR is well illustrated by this commemoration in Lviv of the fraudulent reunification of the Ukrainian Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church. In Russian jargon "unification" means liquidation. In 1946 this is what exactly happened in Western Ukraine.

All of these points were adroitly brought out in this excellently written report. As the report states, "Catholic observers saw in the Lviv celebrations a tragic reminder of the fate that befell more than 5 million Ukrainian Rite

faithful when the Union of Brest-Litovsk, which brought their church back to Rome in 1596, was finally shattered." This story has not yet come to an end, as its ramifications are being observed in the Free World itself.

"THE CRITICAL DECADE, 1965-1975," an article by Stanislaw Strzetelski. *The Polish Review*, London, Great Britain, Spring, 1966.

Developed from a lecture delivered at the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in New York, this lengthy article attempts a prognosis for the decade ahead. It is filled with many fresh insights and observations. It is also marked by many oversimplified statements. The great danger, as the writer sees it, is "the glaring contrast between the practically limitless possibilities of progress and material well-being, and the irrational forces which threaten these possibilities with annihilation."

Curious, the extension of Moscow's empire and further loss of freedom are not cited as dangers. Also, to say unqualifiedly there is no defense against nuclear attack is completely inaccurate. The writer's point on a possible Russo-American alliance, perhaps directed at Red China, is well taken. But he doesn't consider the necessity of conditions we should and must impose by way of concessions. An interesting article, but carelessly sweeping.

"CHURCH AND STATE IN LATIN AMERICA," a book review essay by Walter Dushnyck. *The Catholic World*, New York, November, 1966.

The vital importance of a non-Communist Latin America to the Free World generally cannot be overemphasized. This essay dealing with a survey by J. Lloyd Meham on *Church and State in Latin America* stresses this point and shows, state by state, the problems confronting the Catholic Church in that area. As in the case of the democracies, it is basically a question of assessing and timing the shifts to more liberal, reformed situations.

"THE UNDERGROUND MOSCOW FEARS MOST," an article by Eugene Lyons. *The American Legion Magazine*, New York, April, 1966.

The contents of a State Department analysis of the Russian emigre NTS, prepared in the 50's, can easily be applied to this article, exploding its whole theme in the process. Members of this group have been caught on so many occasions to fabricate and concoct stories that a critical mind cannot but discount the pictorial display and "documents" furnished in the article. They could readily have been prepared in an ordinary artist's shop. The article appears to rehabilitate something which is practically dead and long discredited.

L.E.D.

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