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Society and Politics

The International System after the Cold War: Ukraine in the Context of European Transformation Processes

Serhiy Tolstov

U pheavals in the system of international relations have always been a feature of those observed eras of accelerated development of economic and socio-political processes, which mark the transformation from one period of history to another. During the twentieth century, turbulent, and sometimes particularly destructive, waves of change rolled over Europe at least three times – during and after the First and Second World Wars, and at the end of the 1980s–90s.

It was these last upheavals in Europe and Eurasia which were the most striking, as regards their pace and the scale of their consequences. Their most important landmarks were: the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution of the USSR, socio-economic transformations in Central–Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet republics, the gradual weakening of the Russian Federation, the implementation of geopolitical pluralism in Eastern Europe, Transcaucasia and Central Asia, and the preparation and initiation of the eastward enlargement of NATO and the European Union/Western European Union (EU/WEU). These changes put an end to former links and opened the door to new forms of cooperation and mutual dependence.

The development of individual countries of the former Soviet bloc proceeded along different courses. Most of the Central European countries opted for a fast-track transition to the standards of developed European states, aspiring to close as quickly as possible the gap inherited from the past. The states of Central Asia surprisingly quickly acquired specific features of post-feudal developing countries, and their state order became increasingly more reminiscent of the African and Asian ex-colonies of European states. And the European and Caucasian post-Soviet republics exhibit a wide range between those extremes – from Estonia and Lithuania, which confidently opted for an evolutionary course, to Azerbaijan, where the political order more and more closely resembles the oil-producing sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf.

The development of socio-economic differences between countries of the region was accompanied by geopolitical stratification. New political science terminology grew up, reflecting the functional division of the territory of the former Soviet bloc imperium into sub-regions: Central–Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Black Sea zone, and the 'post-Soviet space'. These divisions were not mutually exclusive; a given state might belong to several at once. Thus Ukraine, which is part of the post-Soviet space (the CIS and the Baltic republics), also belongs to the Black Sea zone The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Pact) and various structures of Central–Eastern Europe (Central European Initiative).

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The changes in the system of international relations in Europe over the past decade have been, in the main, gradual, reflecting the prolonged processes of states and multilateral institutions adapting themselves to Western and Euroatlantic inter-state communities which formed the dominating influence in post-bipolar Europe. Although one must be cautious about predicting what new European and world order will be in force in the early years of the twenty-first century, one may realistically expect that European and world international relations will be dominated for a long time to come by a renewed Euroatlantic collective power centre.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the transition of world international relations from a bipolar, strictly structured model to a system of polycentric (decentralised and multi-polar) international relations appeared almost inevitable. However, at the end of the decade the transition to a polycentric structure of international relations looks completely different from what could have been extrapolated from the experience of the 1950s, 1960s, or even the 1980s. Simultaneously, one can observe the ambiguity of the processes and relations within the community of the developed democratic countries, which clearly dominate the world economy and politics. The latter observation concerns the significant potential of the contradictions which continue to remain in the relations between them. These contradictions occasionally very distinctly rise to the surface in relations, although they are consciously restrained through the recognition of the principal, fundamental interests of the developed democratic communities and the origins of the principal global external threats they face – from countries and groups which do not belong to the system of asymmetrical communities and institutional structures, established by the developed industrial and post-industrial states.

The specific nature of the present European processes lies also in that the post-Communist countries are not only undergoing a change from one type of social, economic, and political order to another, they are also becoming differentiated with respect to models and directions of development. This reinforces the geopolitical stratification of what was until recently a more-or-less homogeneous space. In these circumstances, the qualitative nature of the transformation processes, which reflected the nature of the changes in individual states of the sub-region, has become decisively significant. In most countries, these changes have acquired a specific national and different, sometimes opposite orientation.

In summary, the course and actual consequences of the process of transformation are determined by the integrational prospects of individual countries of Central and Eastern Europe and their role in the system of regional relations. In spite of the almost unequivocal dominance of Western, Atlantic and Euroatlantic institutions, the present system of international relations and European security as a functional characteristic of these relations still preserves certain transitional characteristics. One may expect the culmination of the formation of these systemic relations to be determined by a state of determinacy of relations between the Euroatlantic structures and the countries of Eastern Europe, first and foremost Russia and Ukraine.

Particularities of the Transformational Processes

The transformation of the bipolar system of international relations resulted from the drastic weakening and, in effect, self-elimination of one of the two super-powers – the Soviet Union, which disintegrated into its constituent parts. Simultaneously, the role of the former Soviet bloc was also severely diminished both as regards the international balance of power and its own internal relations. But it was not only Russia, which successfully laid claim to be the legitimate heir to the USSR's seat on the United Nations' Security Council, and to Soviet obligations under the Strategic Arms Limitation treaties, which was significantly weakened. Simultaneously, the other post-Soviet states also suffered a steep, catastrophic decline in their joint total importance in the world economy and politics. This almost immediately reduced the present and potential opportunities of the former Soviet republics to influence the development of international relations and the ratification of fundamental decisions in matters of security.

Formally, the changes in Central–Eastern Europe in 1992–8, were, to a large extent, caused by the Soviet Union losing the Cold War as a result of the crisis of 1989–91, so that the bipolar system of international relations, typical of the period 1945–91, broke down. ('Crisis' in this context is used in the sense of a phase of drastic qualitative transformations leading to the loss by the international system of single dominant characteristics, composition and configuration of relations, and the acquisition by it of other qualitative parameters.)

The geopolitical changes of the late 1980s and 1990s were unprecedented in the post-World War II period. In the post-Communist countries, independence was accompanied by intra-system transformations which led to a certain dichotomy, or internal contradiction of the course of the transformation processes. One may point out several characteristics which formed the specific nature of the transformation of European international relations during the 1990s:

1. The union of the stage-by-stage and relatively protracted nature of the evolutionary changes in international relations, on the one hand, and their permanent nature – on the other, were a manifestation of the internal contradiction of the processes of post-crisis adaptation. In its turn, the permanent nature and mutual dependence of the changes in Central–Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space was to a significant degree enabled by internal economic and socio-political upheavals in individual countries, which in actual fact stimulated the continuation and hastening of the changes in international relations.

2. The adaptation of the subjects of European politics to this new distribution of powers had to a large extent the appearance of a 'natural' delimitation. Externally, the new international relations in Central–Eastern Europe and in the post-Soviet space appeared to have slowed down. However, the gradual nature and slow pace of the changes was mainly a matter of structural changes at the macro level, such as the break-up of Yugoslavia, the weakening of the influence of Russia, the expansion of the WEU and NATO, changes in the status and foreign-policy orientation of individual states, etc. The specifics of the situation lay in the fact that due to the unstoppable and all-encompassing micro-changes and internal transformations in

the Central–Eastern European and post-Soviet countries the distribution of power in the European and Euroatlantic space remained incurably volatile.

3. In brief, in the historic sense of the above events, the formation of the new European international relations developed an exceptionally rapid tempo. Several phases in this process may be distinguished by cardinal changes in the distribution of power among major states and institutions. It would have been virtually impossible to predict the scale, rate, and nature of the future changes, not only in the initial stages of transformation in the late 1980s, but even at the time of the OSCE Helsinki Summit on 9–10 July 1992 – the first transatlantic international forum after the demise of the USSR.

All this to some extent created the illusion that the macro-level transformations were spontaneous and 'natural', giving rise to the conclusion that the structures capable of assuming responsibility for international security had to be strengthened. This concept may be observed in the *Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change,* and the concluding Helsinki Summit Declaration 'Promises and Problems of Change', and the title of the Helsinki Declaration. The latter document (part III, article 52) envisaged the possibility of the OSCE using the 'resources and possible experience and special knowledge of existing regional and transatlantic organisations, e.g., the EU, NATO, WEU, and accordingly to appeal to them to grant their resources in support of the OSCE in the preservation of peace'.[1]

The contradictory reactions of the leading Euroatlantic states to the system changes in international relations and the processes of transformation in Eastern Europe were a result of their wariness regarding any attempt to tie the European order to binding international agreements, together with a desire to fill, as circumstances may permit, the power vacuum which had appeared in individual zones of conflict, e.g., the Balkans and Transcaucasia.

4. This sluggishness, gradual nature, and staged structure formed the fundamental difference between European and Eurasian processes of the 1990s from previous post-crisis transformations of the international system, which were usually settled by a specially formulated treaty.

From 1648 onwards, the bases of international order after a military crisis in Europe were usually implemented in the form of a treaty. The political and diplomatic settlements after the wars of 1790–1814, 1870–1, 1914–18, 1939–45 were of this type. These European crises differed in scale and duration; however, each, to a greater or lesser degree, introduced changes to the system-shaping mechanisms and structure of European international relations. After each war, a new balance of power (and a new system-shaping mechanism) were consolidated by an international treaty, which reflected the strengthened position of the victors. The subsequent period would then be characterised by the interface of contrary efforts – on the one hand endeavouring to strengthen the system enshrined in the treaty, and on the other – to undermine and destroy it.

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1 Helsinki Declaration. Part III 'Early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management (including fact-finding and rapporteur missions and OSCE peacekeeping), peaceful settlement of disputes', *Polityka i chas,* 1993, no. 6, p. 72.

5. The specific nature and simultaneously potential danger that the crisis of 1989–91 would spread were due to the absence of effective agreements between the principal participants ('actors') of European politics defining the fundamental parameters of the new security relations for an unspecified period. This was by no means the last and least factor contributing to the unprecedented nature of the European situation in the 1990s and the long (and still uncompleted) time-span of post-crisis adaptation.

One may argue whether or not the lack of any regulating treaty in the early 1990s was an accidental consequence of the excessive self-assurance of the Soviet leadership in the inviolability of the political regime of the USSR. There are good grounds to conclude that right up to December 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev did not dare to envisage the possibility that the USSR would disappear from the political map of the world. Interestingly enough, the same attitude prevailed in the US Administration of George Bush.[2]

But whatever the personal inclinations of the politicians of that era, the fact remains that when the Soviet Union fell apart, there existed no multilateral geopolitical agreements, which would set new parameters of European security relations after the Warsaw Treaty Organisation wound itself up. The only exception were the agreements on weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms in Europe. (The latter included the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 – NPT, the START-1 Treaty of 31 July 1991, and the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty of 1990). These arms control treaties were facilitated mainly by the fact that the prime mover in this field was the USA (the most powerful state in the post-bipolar world). Another exception was the peaceful reunification of Germany under the '4+2' agreement (1990), although the relevant legal documents lost much of their force after the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the absorption of the German Democratic Republic into the Federal Republic of Germany, and the disintegration of the USSR.

6. The 1989–91 crisis resulted in the disappearance of the Soviet sphere of influence, and was a direct pre-condition for the dismantling of the previous European order – the Yalta–Potsdam system.

7. The further changes in the European system of international relations consisted of a gradual expansion of the Western (Euroatlantic) sphere of political, economic, legal, and moral-ethical influence on the East of the continent – into the sub-region of Central–Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space. As far as the functioning and development of inter-state institutions was concerned, this process was implemented through the expansion of the Council of Europe, the diversification of the functions of NATO and later its expansion, the enlivening of the activities and expansion of the Western European Union, qualitative changes in the concept of European integration, and preparations for the future expansion of the European Union.

The reform of security relations was implemented, first and foremost, by the launching of extensive long-term programmes of multilateral cooperation, which

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2 Ye. Kaminskyi, A. Dashkevych, *Polityka SShA shchodo Ukrayiny* (Kyiv: Politychna dumka, 1998), pp. 349–92.

permitted existing institutions to be preserved, with, at the same time, a system of asymmetrical associated relations and influences being constructed under their aegis. One the one hand, this system of relations did not impose any formal limitations on its participants, nor stipulate any particular definition of victor and vanquished. On the other hand, conformity to the high standards of political democracy and economic development determined by the convergence of internal factors, as well as unconditional compliance with the rules of the Atlantic and Western European institutions became the passport to full-fledged participation in this system. Using the inertia of the Eastern European transformation processes, the countries of the Euroatlantic community consciously avoided defining the new order by treaties, although from time to time Russia pressed for this. For it considered, quite rightly, that such treaties would simply be an unnecessary obstacle to the strengthening of its own dominant position in Europe after the end of the Cold War, which was taking place without any special effort on its part.

8. In individual post-Socialist countries, the internal transformational processes developed different trends, which may be divided into four groups:

i) Countries in which internal transformation produced significant economic stability, and which opted firmly for a European course of development.

ii) Countries which implemented initial reforms, but did not attain significant economic success. The subsequent direction of their development needs still to be ascertained, and will depend on the state of affairs in the internal-political sphere.

iii) Certain Asian republics of the former USSR which attained a relatively stable economy and followed a course of political development, analogous to the post-colonial countries of Asia.

iv) Countries where transformation led to economic and social decline, so that their prospects for further development now seem inauspicious. These countries lack any definite vector for further evolution, which may well turn out to be determined by the accidental convergence of internal and external factors.

This breakdown allows one to assume the likelihood of the full integration of the countries in group i) and the majority of countries in group ii) into the Euroatlantic community in the fairly near future. Regarding the states of the third and fourth groups, then one may state further their inability to deal with trends of economic and social decline. Hence, they face a strong possibility of having to follow a course of 'third-world' development with all the problems and difficulties inherent in that status.

The New European System: Trends and Directions of Development

The disintegration of the Soviet sphere of influence was accompanied by a search for new forms of cooperation between the leading states of the West – the USA and countries of the EU. It may be shown that they managed relatively easily to avoid the predicted exacerbation of economic and political tensions, which it was feared would be triggered by the defeat of international Communism.

A discussion regarding the forms of cooperation between the countries of Western Europe and North America took place against the background of the

creeping decline of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which had been set up at the time of the formal dissolution of the USSR, and which contrary to the hopes of most Russian politicians did not evolve into a 'USSR Mark 2'. In particular, the changes in the perception during the 1990s of the role and prospects of the CIS confirmed Russia's inability to restore even partially the political potential of the USSR in the form of a 'collective' power centre under Russian control. When the Russian leadership finally grasped the fact that Russia was no longer able to control the processes taking place in the post-Soviet space, it was obliged to abandon its illusions about playing the game of 'mini-bipolarity' within the regional system of European international relations. A realistic assessment of the actual, limited possibilities of Russia formed the main content of the 'enigma' of Evgeniy Primakov as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1995–8); contrary to the fears of the West, he deliberately refrained from forceful methods of the geopolitical game directed against NATO expansion, but instead opted for the more complex tactics of protecting Russian interests whilst avoiding direct confrontation with the Euroatlantic structures.

Simultaneously, with the re-grouping of forces, there was a redistribution of functions and roles of the fundamental international organisational structures and communities:

a) In 1994, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was transformed into the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Its role in establishing the evolution of inter-state relations was significantly reduced in comparison with the period of the Cold War.

b) The Council of Europe has undergone a period of renewal. Its competence has been increased to deal with all the pan-European problems with the exception of security.

c) The development of European integration prepared the ground for the expected organisational strengthening of the Western European Union, and its gradual (initially normative-legal, and later also functional) re-orientation towards practical tasks in the sphere of responsibility and priority interests of the EU.

d) There was a major reform of NATO, particularly as regards the review and expansion of its functions and duties.

During the 1990s, there were extremely profound changes in the activities of Western military organisations. These included, first and foremost, the enlivenment of the political activities of NATO, its preparedness to respond to perceived threats, the establishment and implementation of 'Partnership for Peace' (PfP) programmes, the activisation, re-formation and expansion of the WEU, the creation of a Council of Euroatlantic Partnership, and the initiation in 1996–7 of new forms of sub-regional military-political cooperation with South-Eastern (Balkan) and Central Europe (within an 'improved' Partnership for Peace programme).

It is significant that the new system of European security relations which emerged in the 1990s was based on the Euroatlantic institutions established during the Cold War, without any radical changes to their structure. The evolution of these military-political communities and institutions did not envisage the abolition of their priority military-defensive functions. However, there was a rationalisation of the military means needed to implement their established defensive goals under new con-

ditions, while a number of new additional functions were formulated. The latter were mainly in the political, ecological, and peacekeeping fields. New structures were also established for wide-ranging cooperation with those countries which aspired to cooperate with NATO as 'partners'. It is significant that the political and military-political upheavals in the Euroatlantic space after the Cold War were not accompanied by changes in the intrinsic nature of the existing international institutions and multilateral structures. At the same time, most of these institutions experienced substantial (qualitative and sometimes quantitative) reorganisation. An exception was the creation of transitional structures, convened to unite the NATO states and their new partners from the former Soviet bloc. At the same time, during the second half of the 1990s, there was a gradual delimitation of functions and a more accurate definition of forms and methods of cooperation between the organisations responsible for security relations on three asymmetric levels:

• European (EU/WEU, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe, sub-regional organisations);

• Euroatlantic (NATO, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [EAPC], OSCE); and

• Transatlantic (NATO, OSCE, Joint Permanent Council of NATO–Russia, and, according to circumstances, G-7 and G-8, the sphere of competence of the latter is expanding to meet current global problems).

It is an interesting detail that at the purely European structural and functional level of cooperation in security one can observe a representation of institutions from all three of these.

On the one hand, this factor makes the European rung of key importance in the construction of a security system for the entire northern hemisphere (i.e., a system of relations on the transatlantic level, or, as was fashionable in the 1980s, 'from Vancouver to Vladivostok'). On the other hand, if there is a clash of basic interests of the main European states and inter-state communities, an excessive concentration of strivings in different directions and the presence of a great potential for rivalry is not the least of the factors making it difficult to adopt joint mutually-acceptable decisions on issues of European security. In other words, however harmonious the formation of a European security system with the participation of all important partners may be, it will require at least 1) a joint understanding of the end goals of the process; 2) taking into account the interests of the main participants at the level of the minimum necessary compromise; 3) a realisation that the similarity of interests of the members of the security system takes priority over existing differences with external forces, against whose negative influence the system guarantees to protect its members.

The interests of the members of the security system and their views on the goal of cooperation will be reinforced if the decision-making countries show a high degree of political and economic homogeneity. These considerations will play an important role in determining the competence of inter-state institutions and establishing the geographical parameters for expanding the system. The projection of these considerations on to the space of the present Central–Eastern Europe also enables one to envisage the possibility that in adverse circumstances, a new 'barrier' might appear in the east of Europe. In the course of time, such a frontier

could become extremely profound, due to the qualitative difference of security guarantees, political systems, and levels of economic development of countries on either side. In particular, any increase of political tension and economic instability in Eastern Europe could accelerate the deliberate self-isolation of integrated 'little Europe', that is the European Union and associated countries as a zone of stable economic development and spreading the standards of democracy, from 'Eurasia', in which at the beginning of the 1990s Zbigniew Brzezinski[3] predicted the possible appearance of a 'geopolitical black hole dominated by Russia'.

Before the Russian crisis of 17 August 1998, one might have queried such a conclusion from a theoretician of present-day geostrategy. Now it is evident that he was referring to internal crisis situations which could destroy the minimum incentives needed for internal development. For example, the emergence of a situation in which the problems facing a country cannot be solved by traditional political means and the government can only carry out day-to-day 'firefighting' measures, without any positive planning. The Russian crisis together with an affronted national consciousness and the geopolitical anomalies generated by the fall of the USSR may theoretically lead to such dangerous consequences as a radical change of political regime, culminating in the breakdown of the political system. Such dangerous developments in Russia would inevitably influence the establishment of a new 'eastern barrier'.

Another factor leading to such a result might be the synchronisation of the expansion processes of NATO and the EU. So far, these have remained different processes, although parallel and inter-related, sharing to some degree common foundations in transformation processes in 'post-Socialist' Europe.

Let us say, on the basis of certain observations, it is decided that the potential for transformation in Central–Eastern Europe has been, in effect, exhausted, and that any further change will entail transition to a condition of 'stasis'. In this event, NATO and EU expansion may be limited to those countries which meet the membership criteria of these organisations. To a certain extent, this would mean the preservation and stabilisation of the Euroatlantic space of integrated cooperation. Such a situation could be generated by the appearance of new threats of economic and political nature. At the geopolitical level, such a course of events would mean a major gulf between the integrated European space and the East-European periphery. Furthermore, in view of the preparation of the next phase of EU expansion and the ongoing and increasing problems of the community's budget, the need to determine the eastern boundary of expansion of integrated Europe is being raised more and more frequently in European discussions. The main point in dispute to date has been and remains whether Ukraine will be able to become part of the European integrated space, and how this may be achieved in view of the fact that the reform process has encountered a bottle-neck and the generally poor performance of its economy. The discussion has been sharpened by the slowing down of world economic growth and the reservations of numer-

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3 Z. Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century* (New York, 1993), pp. 207–8.

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ous European politicians, who propose that if the world financial crisis continues to get worse, the defensive mechanisms of the EU 'single space' should be strengthened, and attention focused on internal reform and the integration of the markets of the countries of Central Europe.

From the point of view of Ukraine's adjustment to European integration processes, it appears to be necessary to clarify the credible variants and forms of enlargement of the Western communities. There still remain certain doubts regarding the prospects of asymmetric synchronisation of NATO and EU expansion (i.e. expansion in the form of two simultaneous and self-enabled processes, according to which membership in the EU would be accompanied by an invitation to join NATO, and vice versa), as various individual political activists from the USA and Germany have warned. If the enlargement acquires this asymmetrically-synchronised form, the extension of EU membership to the current group of 'front-runners': Cyprus, Malta, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Estonia will acquire symbolic overtones, since it would, in that case, provide grounds for the accession of the Baltic states to NATO. Although the public debate about NATO expansion avoided discussing the further phases of this process, the asymmetrically-synchronised approach suggests that the second phase of NATO enlargement would concern only those countries which have signed partnership 'European treaties' with the EU (in Ukrainian political lexicon these countries are usually termed 'associated members' of the European Union). This group includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, all of which have been officially recognised as candidates for EU membership.[4] To date, there is still no certainty as to which criteria will predominate in discussions of further NATO expansion after the completion of the present, 'first' phase in March–April 1999: geostrategic (i.e. regarding stabilisation of the sphere of military-political control, military security, defence, etc.), or political-economic – (furthering the structural consolidation of a wide Euroatlantic community of developed states of Europe and North America, control over resources and other non-military factors). Probably, this aspect will depend on the wider situation of world politics – 'North–South' relations, the stance of China regarding international affairs, the situation in the Islamic world and the Middle East, etc., and in particular the processes in the transatlantic space, including the course of relations between the US, EU, and Russia. However, for Ukraine the monitoring of these tendencies is and will continue to be of prime importance, particularly as regards the interrelation of economic (non-military) and geostrategic (mainly military-political) issues.

Moreover, one has to remember the essential difference between the processes of NATO and EU expansion. NATO expansion was preceded by an intensive wave of 'Atlantic cooperation' in the form of the 'Partnership for Peace' (PfP) programme, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the staging of numerous multilateral and bilateral exercises as part of and 'in the spirit' of PfP, including a new generation of expanded and developed programmes. This helped put an

4 *NATO Guidebook* (Kyiv: Osnovy, 1997), p. 202.

end to the closed nature of national defence policies, involved new countries in 'Atlantic cooperation', and served as a factor for internationalisation.

EU expansion, on the other hand, was and is based on selectivity, caused by the need to preserve the effectiveness of the mechanisms of multilateral cooperation, strict adherence to legal and regulatory norms, the protection of the economic order, and high standards of living within a space of economic and political integration. For this process to develop under conditions of expansion (including to the east of Europe), it has been necessary to establish transitional preparatory mechanisms in the form of the Central European Zone of Free Trade (CEFTA), a system of treaties of various levels on association (with countries of Central–Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean), and on free trade with countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Exclusion or refusing to grant to some specific state membership of this 'integration space', or even a conditional 'preparatory class' automatically means the creation of barriers to protect the internal market of the community and its regulatory mechanisms developed over decades which in addition to their complexity (or due to their excellence) ensure the vitality and development of the EU.

The Euroatlantic Dichotomy:
Unity in Multiplicity

In the sense of the structure of international relations, 'post-bipolarity' (as a conditional definition of the world situation and the European system after the end of the Cold War) means a clear predominance of US influence in global policy issues, which in different regional situations is implemented by either the direct unilateral influence of this sole remaining superpower (e.g., in Latin America), through cooperation with regional allies (the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Australia), or through the mechanism of the integrated security system, which was set up in the period after the Second World War between the US and Western European on the basis of the doctrine of Atlantism.

In the first half of the 1990s, the influence of the US government on European processes was exerted in particular in the formulation of the political-ideological concept of 'engagement and enlargement', which to a significant degree influenced the course of transformation processes in Europe, and facilitated NATO's dominant role in the formation of a new European security system. All differences between the various Western European countries were consciously pushed into the background, and functional differences between existing Atlantic military-political cooperation structures and the expansion of the functions of the European Union in foreign and defence policies were not deemed significant. The active role of the Clinton Administration in initiating and directing the processes of 'enlargement' (uniting into a single channel the activity of all Atlantic and European institutions) was able temporarily to neutralise their internal differences; this undoubtedly contributed to the final success.

However, the acceleration of integration processes in Western Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, and the bringing in of former neutral and non-aligned states of Northern and Central Europe, and the prospect of a number of post-Communist Central European countries joining the European Union in the near future will

almost certainly lead to a regrouping of the structural components of the European system of security relations, and to a virtually automatic increase in the significance of the European integration community. This tendency in the essentially European conditions which arose after the Cold War provides little grounds for assuming that the military-political dominance of the USA will be preserved in its present form. It would make more sense to define US–NATO–EU relations as a gradual transformation of the doctrine of Atlantism in the direction of the establishment of more flexible forms of cooperation based on mutuality and the coincidence of the most fundamental interests of the partners in Europe and outside its borders in conditions of their joint political and economic dominance in the present world.

Thus, at the end of the twentieth century, the Atlantic community is assuming a distinct two-component structure, which has acquired even clearer characteristics after the introduction on 1 January 1999 in the majority of EU countries of a single currency. If the various interstate differences (which are inevitable in the new round of integration) are successfully resolved, the next step in the evolution of the EU has to be the raising of the level of internal consolidation in a broad space which will include EU member-countries and also the candidates for membership – the Central European 'associated countries'. From this point of view, the strengthening of cooperation of the EU countries as regards common foreign and security policies the establishment of a European security and defence system within NATO are now emerging as the next tasks, conditioned by the experience and logic of the entire previous development.

One may assume that the consolidation of the European integration space with the majority of post-Communist countries of Central Europe and the Baltic coming into the sphere of influence of the EU will change the format of European security, which will be more and more identified with relations within the borders of this space, and not the processes taking place over the entire geographical continent. To summarise, the parameters and borders of this 'enlargement' will depend on relations between the US, the EU, and Russia, and also on the course of economic and political processes in countries of Central–Eastern Europe, including the post-Soviet republics.

If this period of 'enlargement' of the zone of responsibility of the EU extends over a fairly long period of time, the main actors in the shaping of security relations at an essentially European level will be the US, NATO, EU/WEU, and Russia. The engagement of Russia in the dialogue on the problems of European security to a significant degree rests on its status as a former superpower at the times of bipolarity, and its existing status as a nuclear superpower–permanent member of the UN Security Council. It is worth stressing that the role of Russia (particularly as the nuclear successor of the USSR) in the European-level security system has twice undergone catastrophic reductions – in the periods 1989–91 and 1993–5. The financial-economic crisis of 1998 may well cause an even more significant drop in the Russian Federation's influence in Europe, though it must retain a minimum limiting influence arising from its membership of the nuclear club and its intrinsically important role in the system of Transatlantic relations. If the internal crisis and disintegration in Russia are exacerbated, the Euroatlantic community could be placed before an extraordinary, unthinkable situation, when it would be

compelled to plan and implement from outside measures to maintain control over strategic arms in a nuclear state – a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and to prevent their proliferation.

A simplified model of the functioning of European security may be made by reducing it to the most important actors so that the transition of the European security structure is presented as a tri-component scheme (USA, Western Europe, Russia). Moreover, the USA and Western Europe (EU/WEU) take part both as associated members of the Euroatlantic mechanism (which ensures them a critical superiority and control over the targeted course of processes), and also as individual actors. Regarding the latter capacity, there are grounds for envisaging a possible emergence of simple and multilateral combinations of 'interests' linking individual states (USA–UK, USA–Germany, France–Germany, France–Italy, France–UK, Germany–UK, etc.), or the appearance of more complex *ad hoc* groupings with the participation of Central–Eastern European states (such as the Weimar Triangle, consisting of Germany, France and Poland). However, the USA, the EU, and Russia will be the main actors in the European-level security system. Other European countries, independently of their geopolitical and bloc status, will play a greater or lesser role on the basis of their association with the principal actors in the process.

The new European security architecture will take shape according to scenarios determined by the interrelation of the influences of the most important structural components. An important role will be played by the nature of relations between the West and Russia, their treatment of the fundamental global problems, and the degree of dependence of Russia on the Western financial system.

At least up to 1996–7, the possible reaction of Russia to the processes of NATO and EU/WEU enlargement was a factor which had inevitably to be taken into account in the European security context. However, after the crisis of 17 August 1998, Russia's ability to block or interfere with the processes of European and Euroatlantic enlargement was virtually exhausted. The nature of Russia's future participation in the system of Transatlantic relations and Transatlantic security (in which European security will form the most important, although not the only component) now seems very dubious. On the other hand, the evolution of European security relations will be determined by the development of relations and redistribution of responsibility between the USA and the leading states of Western Europe – Germany, France, and the UK, which must affect the new delimitation of competence among NATO, EU/WEU, and the OSCE. Moreover, the essentially different reaction of the Russian government to the plans for NATO and EU/WEU enlargement clearly underlines that the Russian leadership is fully aware that these processes follow different directions. The Russian government did not perceive their unification as a threat to the geopolitical interests of Russia, first and foremost because it realised that the internal specifics of the process of EU enlargement could lead to the halting and reduction of plans for NATO enlargement. Partly for this reason, and due to a belief that EU/WEU enlargement would not be rapid, the Russian leadership issued no protests against the entry of countries of Central–Eastern Europe into the European Union.

The delimitation of the European and Transatlantic functional levels of international security will ultimately depend on the internal state and future role of

Russia. This is an important matter of principle for Ukraine, and will have a major influence on the possibility of Ukraine joining the European security zone, which ideally should coincide with the borders of the enlarged EU (including association relationships).

The future structure of Transatlantic-level security relations may be defined as four-component (including Japan) or even five-component (including Japan and, possibly, China). The asymmetrical joining to the Atlantic community of Japan and Russia would allow the formation of a solid northern-hemisphere system, built on the basis of Euroatlantic and European institutions, Transatlantic system of security. In such circumstances, Ukraine would smoothly and naturally fit into such a system, playing a special role in maintaining interrelations and balance between its individual components (Russia, Poland, Turkey, Romania, Moldova, the Caucasus, Transcaucasia).

Contrariwise, if Russia were to acquire the status of an alternative centre of power, the structure would automatically become more complex, including at the Transatlantic level due to the dichotomy of associated relations of cooperation and rivalry with such states as China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea (if it can overcome the present crisis), South Korea, India, and Pakistan. Ukraine's role in such a situation would be that of a buffer and interface of complex *ad hoc* factors. Under such conditions, its orientation towards each alternative centre of influence, including NATO or Russia, and the policy of balancing between them on the basis of even-handedness and/or neutrality, would take on a coloration very undesirable for internal security.

As for the states of Western Europe and North America, the continuation of their military-political cooperation into the twenty-first century will be stimulated externally by the presence of global challenges to the interests of the countries which are perceived to embody the present European, Euroatlantic civilisation. The appearance of such challenges outside the Atlantic community now and in the future makes cooperation between the USA and countries of the EU in a modified concept of Atlantism, a completely rational imperative.

Ukraine in the Context of European Security

The European security system could be developed either using the existing institutional mechanisms, or by establishing new ones. The current choice is to use the existing means, with multilateral adaptation of all countries which participate in the security system to the model of 'victors', and the further co-ordination, via these institutions, of international cooperation. This option envisages keeping to a minimum the possibility of creating new structures. A survey of the current situation shows that there exist in parallel:

• a system of collective Euroatlantic defence (comprising only the NATO member-countries) – on the one hand, and

• a more amorphous and asymmetric model of European and transatlantic 'security, 'cooperative security', which is still in the formation stage and to some extent conceptually vague on the other.

The general state of security of any neutral European state, including Ukraine, will show symptoms of instability if there exist no real forms of participation in existing multilateral structural cooperation and its primary systemic components. Undoubtedly just as important and positive is the fact that Ukraine has found a certain place in the process of reforming Euroatlantic-level security relations by signing, in July 1997, the Charter on Particular Partnership with NATO. This document will have a substantial effect on the definition of Ukraine's role in the European security system, not only under the present conditions, but also in the mid-term future. It has ensured a separate, albeit generally passive role for Ukraine in the European security system.

Assessing the role of the Charter and its effect on Ukraine's future foreign-policy prospects, one may make the following observations:

• If relations between NATO and Russia do not acquire confrontational overtones, if the state of the economic and political development of Ukraine fails to improve, and the further rapprochement of NATO and Ukraine slows down, the Charter would allow loyal relations of a quite high level between the Alliance and Ukraine to be maintained for a certain time, and their reduction for *ad hoc* reasons or considerations would be avoided.

• In this sense, for Ukraine the Charter could play an important positive role as a transition mechanism, assisting military reform, and facilitating the military-technological adaptation for raising the level of cooperation with the Alliance.

• The Charter stipulates a permanent mechanism of consultation, which under certain conditions (in the event of the emergence of a threat and with the concurrence of interests) may be used to ratify decisions on political support, and economic and military aid.

• The scale of this support, depending on the nature of the threat and external situation, may in the event of the concurrence of interests of the parties and the identity of the threat, approach the level of ally obligations.

• The Charter specifies forms of cooperation, describes prospective spheres of cooperation, and details its individual tasks.

• The Charter stipulates NATO's preparedness to adapt to new actualities in Europe, and to take into account the position of the partner-countries, particularly Ukraine, in the process of enlarging the Alliance.

• The Charter recognises Ukraine as an 'inalienable part' of the sub-region of Central–Eastern Europe. From this point of view, one may regard it as a unique document with, potentially, an important symbolic character.

Regarding the possible shortcomings of the Charter, analysts have noted, in particular, the following points:

• The initiative in interpreting the strategic content of the Charter will rest, in general, with the leaders of the Alliance.

• Ukraine's attainment of the status of a 'special partner' of NATO does not open a direct course to the collective defence system of the Alliance, although its implementation may allow the exercise of a level of cooperation sufficiently high for the initiation of negotiations on the expansion of cooperation.

• The status of a 'special partner' is an exceptional one. It may, to some extent, hinder or prevent Ukraine's joining sub-regional forms of military–political co-

operation, comprising states which have officially declared their desire to become members of the Alliance.

• The Charter avoids any more or less explicit definition of the political obligation of the parties, relying, instead, on a mechanism of joint consultations. This means that in a dialogue with NATO, the Ukrainian side will be represented by the appropriate structures of executive power (the President, the National Council for Security and Defence, ministries of foreign affairs, defence, matters of extraordinary situations, etc.). If Ukraine's internal situation develops more or less harmoniously towards European standards, this format may be considered sufficient. However, if internal imbalances increase and the economy continues to decline, public opinion (which is largely unfamiliar with the executive) is likely to be suspicious of its contacts with NATO, interpreting these as an attempt to establish secret links aimed at securing the interests of foreign intelligence agencies. Such suspicions would be rooted in the assumption that the NATO leadership is far less interested in the socio-economic stability of Ukraine, than in the military-political orientation of the Ukrainian executive, in the context of guaranteeing NATO's interests in the geopolitical balance in Eastern Europe, first and foremost in the context of relations between the West and Russia. The attitude of certain sections of the establishment of NATO countries regarding the prospects of an authoritarian regime being established in Ukraine may serve as a touchstone for the reliability of such assumptions.

At the same time, the text of the Charter lacks any 'escape clauses' which could serve as an excuse for Ukraine to reduce its participation in the measures of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the 'developed', or 'enhanced' PfP. This situation implies that in the event of positive political and economic development in Ukraine, the door will be kept open to a fuller inclusion in European processes of military-political integration will be kept open. With some reservations, one may voice a cautious expectation that a fairly high level of military-political cooperation with NATO (provided, of course, that the Western states are interested) may help stabilise the conditions of internal economic and political development of Ukraine.

In the mid-term plan (5–15 years), moves towards expanding Ukraine's partnership status, and its eventual attainment of full membership in European military and military-political structures, such as NATO and the WEU, should in general prove a means of ensuring its external and internal security, not so much by the improvement of its defence capability as by the securing of the stability of the democratic order and successful economic development.

The formation of a European security system depends on the nature of cooperation and the distribution of functional obligations between the existing European structures. Its ideal embodiment may prove to be a non-competing and mutually-complementary system of relations between NATO, the WEU, EU, and the OSCE. However, the policy of Western states in this sphere is driven by the well-substantiated belief that NATO is the only competent organisation capable of guaranteeing European stability. In practice, only NATO has armed forces and means sufficient for various operational responses to crisis situations.

The perceived certainty that a new security system must be constructed around NATO, together with a reluctance to become dependent in decision-making on Russia, were and continue to be reasons why during the 1990s the OSCE has come to play a secondary role in European security. While formally recognising the OSCE as an international forum for cooperation in matters of security, in practice the governments of EU countries and the USA have consciously avoided doing anything to develop an independent role for the OSCE in security matters with the exception of negotiations on arms control and reduction, and the establishment of OSCE missions to monitor crisis-prone regions.

The US government and the most pro-Atlantic leaders of Western European states have on the whole been satisfied with the 'cosmetic modernisation' of NATO as Europe's leading security organisation. This approach it appears will allow an Atlantic framework of security relations to be maintained, together with US influence in Europe, first and foremost at the transatlantic level of cooperation. Certain steps towards greater European autonomy and modes of behaviour (approval of multinational military tactical units which European countries will be able to use even without US participation) reflect the new relations between Western Europe and the USA following radical changes in the transatlantic balance of power. On the other hand, they reflect the aspiration of the US Administration to shed responsibility for the management of conflicts which fall outside America's sphere of national interests.

The USA remains and will continue to be the principal participant in European security due to the maintenance of its presence at the transatlantic level. In this form, the factor of US presence will not be significantly reduced by any re-distribution of mandates arising from the EU/WEU acquiring greater responsibilities in Europe.

During the 1990s and up to the autumn of 1998, the European policy of the USA was based on the recognition of the priority of relations with Russia. The Clinton Administration declared the need to dovetail a policy of NATO enlargement with the development of cooperation with Russia. In the specific conditions of the second half of the 1990s, this meant in effect recognition of Russian interests in the post-Soviet space. It was probably this approach at the Madrid Summit in 1997 that made the USA adopt a rigid stance on the limiting of the first wave of the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

On the other hand, the USA's reservations at that time about allowing Romania and Slovenia into NATO were apparently triggered by a desire to stop certain European states expanding their influence in South-East Europe. A certain slowing-down of the rate of enlargement of the Alliance was on the whole in the interest of Ukraine, giving its executive time and opportunity to adapt to the expected changes. However, the lack of clarity in the stances of the participants in the negotiations have so far made it difficult to forecast the further tactical line of the USA regarding the enlargement of Euroatlantic communities. Certainly, one may expect an increase in the role of the leading countries of the EU in decisions on the further enlargement of NATO.

On the US side, there will obviously continue to be an emphasis on demands for a more equitable and just division between the NATO allies of the expenditure asso-

ciated with the accession of new members. This redistribution will reflect the delimitation of responsibility between countries and military-political institutions at the three aforesaid levels of cooperation, including the European space. These issues will require a clearer definition in the new strategic concept of NATO after this is ratified by the 50th anniversary Summit of the North Atlantic Council in April 1999.

During the Cold War, NATO was a factor of global bipolarity and, with its opposite number the Warsaw Pact made up a system of power and political-ideological confrontation. In brief, the preservation and evolution of NATO reflected and embodied the victory of Western capitalism over Soviet Communism in the Cold War – a conflict which was waged, first and foremost, between states – the 'building blocks' of European (in the wider sense – Euroatlantic) civilisation. In this context, it should be recalled that the 'European civilisation', which has now spread world-wide, consists in fact of two branches – a Western branch, founded on Roman-Catholic/Protestant cultural and religious traditions, and an Eastern branch, which is heir to Byzantine-Orthodox traditions. Thus, on the one hand, victory in the Cold War gave the West an opportunity to restore a certain unity to European civilisation (providing the most acute internal differences could be overcome). On the other – the restoration of European unity acquired the nature of the gradual and non-uniform expansion of the Euroatlantic zone of influence into Central and Eastern Europe.

Current efforts to reform the security system in Europe are taking place not only using Western institutions – NATO, the EU, the WEU – but also largely on the basis of their engagement . One must stress, in particular, that today's attempts to review and correct sub-regional international relations in Central–Eastern Europe do not have an independent character, but are the consequences of the 1989–91 crisis (collapse of the Warsaw Pact, dissolution of the USSR). This means that subsequent changes had the (intermediate or final) nature of elements of post-crisis management during the process of adaptation of the international system and its players to new realities and a new distribution of power.

One may reasonably assume that the transition period will be determined by how long it takes for new levers of mutual-dependence and structural relations to develop in the new European system. Hence the rapid completion of the expansion processes ('engagement' and 'enlargement') will lead to the formation of a relatively uniform economic and political space, constructed on the basis of the extension of the principles of a developed market economy, political democracy, the concept of Atlantic cooperation in security, and the defence of the fundamental values of 'civilisation'. The basic completion of transition processes (side by side with an effective differentiation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) will mean the establishment in Europe of a new international order and the introduction of political regulation – a regime of control and responsibility, under the conditions of which the probability of new rapid upheavals and cataclysms (as existed under conditions of bipolarity) should be quite consciously limited.

The extremely rapid nature of the transformations in Central–Eastern Europe, and, by and large, their profound and radical nature was completely in accordance with the interests of Western states. Consequently, the latter saw no need

to hurry in establishing a new European security system. One should note that in the 1990s the European situation was constantly changing in the direction of the strengthening of the influence of institutions like NATO and the EU/WEU, in particularly as a result in the decline of Russia's role and the building up of the influence of Western inter-state communities in the post-Soviet space.

The similar direction of the processes of enlargement and engagement ruled out the possibility of a power-vacuum developing in Central–Eastern Europe (except, perhaps, in 1989–92, or the 'crisis years'). For this reason, Western governments pressed for a model of gradual, 'staged' changes, in which certain local crises (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo) had to submit to management by the application of forces far greater than what was militarily necessary.[5]

Russian government and parliamentary circles took a radically different view of the changes in Europe. From their point of view, Russia, which had inherited the formal status of a great power, and claimed to be the legal successor of the USSR, had suffered the most disastrous geostrategic blow. Taking as its starting-point the decline in Russia's economic, foreign-policy, and military-political strengths, the Russian government strove to do everything possible to limit the effects of the crisis of 1989–91. This explains the Russian government's determined efforts first to stop the process of NATO enlargement, and then to limit the expansion of the zone of influence of Western (Euroatlantic) institutions to Central Europe only. Throughout 1992–5, the Russian government structures made repeated efforts to introduce in the post-Soviet space a quasi-mechanism of 'collective' peacekeeping, and to establish a permanent military presence in the states of Transcaucasia and Central Asia.

However, the failure of the military campaign in Chechnya and the catastrophic economic decline of Russia at the end of the 1990s made it incapable of resisting, even by geopolitical power games, the growth of the influence of Western centres of power (as a result of the processes of 'enlargement' in Central–Eastern Europe, and implementation of the model of 'geopolitical pluralism' in the former Soviet space). However, predictions that the collapse of the USSR and pressure from the West would lead to a rapid collapse of Russia did not materialise. In spite of the acute financial-economic crisis of 1998, which largely discredited the pro-Western oligarchic model of economic development in Russian eyes, Russia has preserved its military-strategic potential as a nuclear 'great power', and still retains the internal capability for renewed economic development. Moreover, the appointment of the 'professional-technocratic' government of Yevgeniy Primakov led to a certain halting of the panic, and put a stop to apocalyptic and doom-laden predictions within the Russian establishment. Under these conditions, the Russian government may be expected to stabilise and balance the European security system by bringing into it certain Asian countries (China, India, Iran) selected so as to strengthen Russia's influence on the ratification of decisions at the global level, vital to its own interests.

At the same time, framing its policy towards the post-Soviet space, there seems little need for the West to take into account any 'permanent' military-political

5 *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (The White House, Washington, DC, February 1995); ibid., February 1996.

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structure within the CIS. A succession of agreements between Moscow and Minsk concerning the establishment of a 'union' confederate state was assessed by Russian observers at the end of 1998 as 'following the course of Primakov's proposed alliance with India and China, which also has the character of direct anti-American blackmail'.[6]

As regards the CIS, the rationale for its existence has so far been based on the maintenance of residual forms of multilateral dialogue between the heads of state and senior government officials, in order to resolve various contentious issues arising from the break-up of the USSR. Although the CIS as an institution may linger formally for some time in the guise of more-or-less regular meetings of heads of state and governments, there seems little chance of its developing any effective systemic levers, capable of activating its various organs into doing any practical work. The fragility of the CIS is the result of two factors: the conflicts of interest of its members and its permeability to outside influence. The priority of external relations over internal ones determined the political hopelessness of the entire project. The erosion of the CIS has been facilitated by the incorporation of post-Soviet countries into the economic and political relations of contiguous regions, the creation of international transport corridors and routes, particularly for the transportation of Caspian oil, etc.

Long-term relations will provide the background of an external source and a 'natural' boundary for the expansion of Atlantism (in the sense of a certain, specific orientation of political, military and economic cooperation between Western European countries and North America). In this context, relations between the USA and Russia, and also relations between Russia and France, and Russia and Germany will act as external conductors leading from the power field, in which relations of Atlantism will develop in the region of its primary expansion.

Another aspect of this issue consists of taking into account modern models of collective security, which, according to the interpretation of a number of Western researchers, in the absence of a clear enemy are becoming more and more like agreements for the mutual insurance of members. This modernised approach predicts that a multilateral system of mutual security against outside challenges and military, political, economic, and ecological threats can only gain from an increase in the number of its members (while its effectiveness – unlike the traditional bloc defensive and offensive structures of the past – will not be diminished by the inclusion of all interested parties facing common challenges and threats).[7] However, some warnings have been uttered about adhering to the principle that the members of such a system must be of a single type and mutually-compatible. This envisages that the states in such an organisation must meet the criteria of a developed market economy and stable political democracy (since, from the point of view of developed democracies of Europe and North America, the widening of such 'insurance' to countries with a high internal-risk level makes no sense, in view of the specific nature of the threats to their security and stability). Those who argue that during the period of constructing new pan-European security relations

6 L. Krutakov, 'Holovolomka', *MK v Ukraine,* 1999, 4 February, p. 6.
7 Ian Bellamy, 'Insuring Security', *Political Studies,* vol. xliv, no. 5, December 1996, pp. 872–87.

the methodology of efficient management should be applied, quite rightly predict that bringing other, diverse components into this system will require a review of the size of the contribution of the parties, how far they meet the existing standards, and the ratification of new criteria for reaction to various new forms of threat.

The Factors of the Foreign-Policy Process: Ukrainian Specifics

In the second half of 1998 and the beginning of 1999, public opinion in Ukraine was unable to make a proper assessment of the deterioration of Ukraine's prospects in comparison with those of its Central European neighbours. An important element of the political consciousness of Ukrainian society was the existence of significant discrepancies between the true economic and political situation in the state and society, and the mass imagination of the citizens.

The essence of these discrepancies between imagination and reality lay in the time-lag inherent in assessing the external dependency of Ukraine, the government of which in autumn 1998 was hovering on the brink of financial insolvency, or default. The executive branch might have declared bankruptcy at any moment, if the government had been unable to find the money needed for the current servicing of external debt. The state external debt, in its turn, in January 1999 amounted to US \$11,470 billion.[8] Under these conditions, Ukraine could be saved from defaulting only by credits from international financial institutions or direct aid from the leading industrially-developed countries which also have a considerable influence on the policy-making of international financial organisations.

In this respect, one can observe the influence of two essentially different trends in public opinion. On the one hand, there is the direct or indirect influence of the ideology of national liberation and close on a decade of propaganda of the ideas of sovereignty and independence at the state level. Ideological facts of 'national liberation' and 'anti-colonialism' have undoubtedly clouded the public's realisation that the unsound economic policy of successive Ukrainian governments had already brought the state to the edge of an informal dependence which, while free of the traditional attributes of imperial or colonial rule, may prove no less perceptible than direct *diktat* or rule from abroad.

On the other hand, it had become increasingly obvious that the majority of the Ukrainian bureaucratic and academic élite had failed to come to grips with the depth, probable outcome, and long-term prospects of the economic decline of the country. This is particularly true of the causes and consequences of the latest crisis which hit Ukraine's economy in the summer and autumn of 1998. The all-too-inadequate public perception of the economic, social and structural parameters of the crisis in Ukraine now was subjected to take inconsequential and excessively optimistic official communiqués which claimed that the fall of the Ukrainian currency in the summer and autumn of 1998 was, first and foremost, a knock-on effect of the Russian financial crisis, and that there were no intrinsic reasons for the economic decline in Ukraine to continue.

8 *Ukrainskaya Investitsionnaya Hazeta,* 1999, 16 February, p. 2.

One may go so far as to predict that if Ukraine's economic malaise continues, there may be a falling off of support from other countries (in particular, the USA, Germany, and Poland), and strengthening of the tendencies towards Ukraine's relative isolation.

As regards the potential and orientation of Ukraine's relations with other states and communities since the beginning of 1998, it may be said that, on the whole, these have been less intense than in 1997. One notable exception was the Black Sea region, where, due in no little measure to Ukrainian diplomatic efforts, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Pact (established in the form of a multilateral inter-state initiative in 1992) in 1998 finally achieved institutionalised form.

Any estimation of Ukraine's integration in the western direction has to a certain degree a conditional character, sine it attempts to bring together relations with NATO, participation in the measures and programmes of NATO/EAPC/PfP, and the state of relations with the EU. The rate of development of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO may be perhaps be best described as moderately intense. Contrariwise, relations with the EU, as a result of the latest crisis in Ukraine and Russia, have acquired the characteristics of a negative dynamic.

Relations between Ukraine and Russia and other former Soviet republics may reasonably be described as a slow disintegration – both as regards Ukraine and Russia, and between Ukraine and the majority of other CIS countries. On 27 February 1998, the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia signed an Agreement on Economic Cooperation between the two countries and a bilateral programme of development of economic relations from 1998–2007; this, however, had virtually no effect on the climate of Ukrainian–Russian relations, which continued to decline in intensity. As in previous years, the development of Ukrainian–Russian relations has been marked by significant anomalies. At the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998, the Presidential Administration of Ukraine made an attempt to raise the level of contacts between top officials of the two countries under the slogan establishing a 'strategic partnership'. Late February 1998 saw the first state visit by the President of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. However, those top-level contacts made no qualitative difference to Ukrainian–Russian relations over-all. They remained unstable – as the aftermath of the Russian 'Black Monday' of August 1998. President Yeltsin's incessant bouts of illness and frequent changes of leading individuals in the government and Presidential Administration also exacerbated the instability of inter-state relations which *de facto* showed little signs of the proclaimed 'strategic partnership'.

The ambiguities in the development of these relations and their instability are amply demonstrated by the scandalous history of the Russian Parliament's ratification of the Ukrainian–Russian Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation of 31 May 1997. In 1998–9, the CIS as a sub-regional international organisation was increasingly perceived as a rickety, temporary structure with no prospects. At the same time, political discourse in Ukraine referred more and more frequently to the fact that, according to the terms of the CIS Statutes, Ukraine is not, formally speaking, a member of that organisation. Ukraine's relations with individual former Soviet republics have become more and more differentiated. From 1997 onwards,

Ukrainian politicians and the media have spoken increasingly about the deep crisis in the CIS and the approaching disintegration of the latter. More and more, the Ukrainian political community has come to interpret the CIS not as an international organisation or pro-integration grouping, but as an ineffective institutional form of cooperation among the political leadership of the post-Soviet countries. In practice, a number of inter-state mechanisms and projects have grown up within the post-Soviet space, which under certain circumstances may become long-term structures for cooperation or even integrative communities. These include the interstate Russian–Belarusian Union, the five-sided Customs Union (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), and also the relatively new axis of cooperation – GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova).

A break-down of Ukraine's relations with the various former Soviet republics reveals:

• In spite of occasional temporary difficulties, relatively stable relations were maintained between Ukraine and Belarus, and between Ukraine and Turkmenistan, based on cooperation in economic interests.

• Relations between Ukraine and Russia have continued to disintegrate, as too have relations with certain other post-Soviet states, in particular, members of the Customs Union. Economic relations with Tajikistan have virtually ceased.

• The project for an oil-transport corridor from the Caspian to Western Europe with the participation of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and Poland all the surely has acquired priority status for Ukrainian policy in the Transcaucasian and Black Sea regions. The construction of its infrastructure promises good prospects for long-term cooperation in the framework of GUAM. Relations between Ukraine and Uzbekistan, which to date have largely been a matter of interested expectancy, may well become closer if and when the oil-transport corridor is established through Ukraine.

During 1998, in both Russia and Ukraine the attitudes of the main political parties towards Ukrainian–Russian relations have become more explicit. In Russia, hostility towards Ukraine was expressed by the ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and his Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, and by Yuriy Luzhkov, the leader of the 'Otechestvo' (Homeland) movement, who is also Mayor of Moscow and one of the prospective candidates in the forthcoming Presidential elections in Russia. In January–February 1999, Luzhkov managed to delay for almost three weeks the ratification of the Ukrainian–Russian Treaty of 1997 in the Council of the Federation (upper house of the Russian parliament). At the same time, there was a perceptible strengthening of cooperation not only between the leaders of the Communist Parties of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, but also between the leaders of the main left-wing factions and movements in the parliaments of both countries. A good example of this was the highly publicised and propaganda-conscious visit of a Ukrainian parliamentary delegation, led by Parliament Speaker Oleksander Tkachenko, to the Federal Congress of the Russian Federation in December 1998, which resulted in the ratification on 25 December of the framework Ukrainian–Russian Treaty by the State Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament).

Regarding Ukrainian policy on relations with the West and with Russia, it should be borne in mind that in the political life of Ukraine, both these directions exhibit fundamental differences between reality and propaganda. As a difference to the speculative-propaganda campaigns of the right- and left-wing parties, the acute problems of 'actual policy' get little public airing in their extreme, absolute forms.

Looking at the individual realistic groups of influence which proclaim support for the idea of the reintegration with Russia, of those represented in parliament only one openly advocates the union of Ukraine and Russia within a single state – the 'Communists for the restoration of the USSR', which consists of some 25–30 persons (headed by V. Moyseyenko) within the Communist Party of Ukraine faction. This slogan is also supported by individual fringe groups with no parliamentary representation, including the 'Communists-Bolsheviks', the 'Slavonic Party', the 'Rus'–Ukrainian Union', etc. In the policy documents of the left-wing parliamentary parties and the public speeches of their leaders, the concept of integration under the guise of a 'fraternal union of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus' is to be found in the programmes of the Communist Party and left-radical-populist Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. Support for this idea has also been expressed on numerous occasions by Oleksander Tkachenko, Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament and informal leader of the Peasant Party of Ukraine. His persistence over Ukraine's joining the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS and his increasingly vocal statements about the possibility that Ukraine will join the Russian–Belarusian political union in the near future are interpreted as the beginning of the first step in his campaign for the Presidential elections which, according to the Ukrainian Constitution, are due on 31 October 1999.

One should bear in mind, however, that in general the idea of a 'union of the three fraternal Slavonic nations' is used by the left-wing primarily to channel the widespread public feelings of social discontent and affronted national and human dignity, which are, in some sense, a sublimination of nostalgia for that former 'great state', the USSR, in which the population enjoyed a certain minimum of social guarantees. In the political discourse of Ukraine, polemicising on 'reintegration with Russia' has primarily a 'virtual' character, and is skilfully used by both left- and right-wing movements for the political mobilisation of their own electorate. However, if the economic crisis becomes even deeper and the miserable state of the population even worse, ideas of reintegration may acquire, in left-wing activity and propaganda, not only a virtual, but also a real character.

As for ideas of integration with the West up to 'membership of NATO', these too have acquired a specific interpretation in current Ukrainian political discourse. From 1996 onwards, at first *sotto voce* and subsequently louder and louder, the Kuchma Administration has proclaimed the aim of the future 'full integration' of Ukraine into 'European and Euroatlantic structures'. At the same time, although the executive branch in 1998 demanded that the European Union should grant Ukraine the status of associated membership, its representatives miraculously recognised the patent inability of Ukraine to meet the criteria of European integration. Furthermore, the worsening of the economic crisis in Ukraine in 1998 and the beginning of 1999 has widened the gap between Ukraine and the states of

Central Europe currently considered as front-runners for EU membership. Hence stressing the idea of the future integration of Ukraine into Europe in the absence of the measures required to bring its economic and social conditions up to EU standards can only lead to the disorientation of society, foreign partners, and those responsible for carrying out Ukraine's foreign policy.

A somewhat different situation developed in 1997–8 as regards Ukraine's relations with NATO. In general, these developed fairly successfully. Representatives of the Ukrainian executive branch, however, say that for various geopolitical, internal and foreign-policy reasons, under the present circumstances, the question of Ukraine actually becoming a member of NATO 'is not being put'. However, the attention which the present Ukrainian government pays to the development of intensive cooperation with NATO will clearly help create the preconditions for possible membership in the future. Out of all the political parties of Ukraine only two openly urge NATO membership – the Popular Movement of Ukraine (loudly, importunately and immediately) and the National-Democratic Party (usually in a veiled manner and only as a distant prospect). Apart from the left-wing (which routinely protests against exercises with the participation of NATO troops being held in Ukraine), the remaining parties more or less reserve their position as regards NATO membership and the expediency or otherwise of maintaining a non-aligned status.

Hence the issue of Ukraine's integration into European and Euroatlantic structures is bound up with the prospects and directions of the development of the Ukrainian state (and reflects the attitude to this latter problem of the representatives of various political and social groups). In this context, the prospect of Ukraine's membership in NATO shows all the symptoms of a 'deferred application', since even those who in principle favour Ukrainian membership realise that it is not a practical proposition for the immediate future. At the same time, there is a growing belief in the Ukrainian political community that the development of cooperation with NATO is for Ukraine an absolute necessity.

On 4 November 1998, the State programme of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO up to 2001 was ratified by Presidential decree. This was viewed as an important event, which to a certain degree compensated for the deterioration in Ukraine's international position as a result of the current economic crisis. If one analyses the issue of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO without preconceptions, then priority tasks would appear to include the creation in the future of the conditions for membership of Ukraine in NATO, and agreement of the political course between Ukraine and NATO in connection with the latter's eastward enlargement.

At the same time, the idea often voiced by Ukrainian politicians that NATO should give Ukraine additional security guarantees should surely be regarded as mere illusion, inherited from the times of Leonid Kravchuk. Hopes for such external security guarantees embody both a lack of understanding of the Washington agreement of 1949 (which makes no provision for the status of intermediate or associated membership of the alliance), and a disregard for the logic of NATO's functioning as a defensive alliance.

Such tasks as cooperation in the arms trade, agreements on military-technological policy, support for defence-related industry, and the formulation of joint con-

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ceptual principles of military policy are forms of cooperation important for Ukraine and beneficial for both parties. However, to be able to rely on them to the full, Ukraine would appear to need either full membership of NATO or a set of bilateral treaties of alliance with several leading NATO members to realistically count on them. No participation in joint operations and exercises would be able to compensate for the inferiority complex and loss of potential advantage which would arise if NATO's leading institutions declined to recognise the Ukrainian defence industry as at least a junior partner. Without the development of more-or-less equal cooperation in the field of military-economic relations, Ukraine's left-wing political parties will be able to carry out a successful anti-NATO propaganda campaign, accusing the NATO countries of, at the very least, insincerity and expansionism.

Ukraine's decision, in the early 1990s, to get rid of the nuclear arms on its territory inherited from Soviet times, has left perceptible psychological results in Ukrainian public consciousness, which are likely to persist for some considerable time. These include apathy, nostalgia for the nuclear weapons which were abandoned 'without cause', and, contrariwise, an inclination towards ideas of universal nuclear disarmament and the creation of a general system of international security, which would avoid war as a means of resolving conflicts. An outstanding illustration of this was the turbulent reaction of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine to the decision of NATO (23 March 1999) to commence bombing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Regardless of the fact that it has neither the means nor facilities to develop its own nuclear arsenal, the Ukrainian parliament the very next day (24 March 1999) proposed to the Cabinet of Ministers that it should draft a bill renouncing Ukraine's non-nuclear status and denouncing its various obligations under international law associated with that status.

It is quite possible that it was the appeal to subliminal impulses of the pacifist-idealistic type in the Ukrainian social consciousness, superimposed on general feelings of discontent and lack of confidence in the power structures, which was the secret of the success of the Green Party in the 1998 parliamentary general elections – a success which few, if any, could have foreseen.

One result of the economic crisis of 1998 in Ukraine was an increase in the sensitivity of the state to foreign policy matters, (spring 1997–summer 1998), which was characterised by a condition of relative equidistance and freedom of manoeuvre, attained as a result of foreign-policy successes of 1997.

Parameters of the Foreign-Policy Course

The prospects of Ukraine's integration into the system of European and Euroatlantic security relations are directly dependent on the interrelation between external, international, and internal factors. In particular, the adequate implementation of the tactical and strategic goals of the leading Western countries in matters of European security, the assessment of the coincidence and divergences of their interests, and the general orientation and parameters of the processes of NATO and EU enlargement in the near future are of primary importance. The nature of Ukraine's relations with the leading actors in European international relations in the near future will depend on the conditions of economic and political development.

Of particular importance are issues of the conceptual elaboration and doctrinal content of the policy of 'enlargement'. It appears that the initial, accelerated phase of 'enlargement' on the wave of inter-system transformation may be completed with the first phase of the 'physical' enlargement of NATO in March 1999. After this, the content of the processes of 'enlargement' will undergo differentiation and refinement. The political background of this differentiation may be formed by the relations of individual countries to the military operation of NATO against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, initiated on 24 March 1999.

This delimitation will lead to a greater differentiation of the NATO–EAPC–PfP cooperation spectrum, including on account of the limitation of the participation in it of a number of post-Soviet states. The discussion of the issues of EU/WEU enlargement and the establishment of a common space between the EU and countries of CEFTA will likewise be differentiated.

The closed and selective nature of EU enlargement will have consequences that are by definition negative for Ukraine. While in the unpropitious initial stage of 'enlargement', this process had an almost identical content also for countries of the Central–Eastern Europe and for Ukraine. However, in the future the majority of countries of Central–Eastern Europe will find themselves in the inner circle of European and Euroatlantic integration (i.e., for them the mutual interrelation of the processes of the enlargement of NATO and the EU/WEU will remain unchanged), while Ukraine will have only an asymmetrical linkage in the form of a special partnership with NATO against the background of unpropitious relations with the EU. In practice, this means the *de facto* isolation of Ukraine from the group of Central–Eastern European states and a qualitatively different rate for its inclusion in European integration processes.

In view of the current crisis in the Ukrainian economy, one must, alas, conclude that there will be an ever-deeper split between what are publicised as the principal proclaimed strategic foreign-policy guidelines and the actual trends in the development of the country.

The said paradox may be interpreted as a symptom of a crisis in foreign policy caused by the devaluation and possible abandonment of the announced foreign-policy goals due to Ukraine's obvious falling behind as regards the level of development. In its turn, this alienation may mean not only the loss of certain current qualitative conditions of development, but on the larger scale – the loss of Ukraine's historic chance of full-fledged entry into European and Euroatlantic communities.

The principal lesson of the 1990s is that the majority of countries of Central–Eastern Europe have won for themselves the ability to make use of the exceptional opportunity provided by the collapse of the bipolar system to facilitate their entry into the community of developed democratic societies; Ukraine, however, failed to make use of this chance to catch up with the countries of Western Europe. The state of the Ukrainian economy and the tendencies of internal-political life have had the effect of bringing closer the foreign-policy threat, while the question of the quality of development (as the overall situation of the state and society) is becoming a direct factor of national security. The continuing economic decline

now threatens irreversible consequences in the form of deindustrialisation and transition to the status of a poorly-developed state, whose economic and political conditions fail to meet the standards of European integration.

After the entry of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into NATO, Ukraine's falling-behind Central–Eastern Europe may acquire even more definite characteristics. However, the most important consequences for the European prospects of Ukraine will come from the entry of its western neighbours into the EU.

For Ukraine, the importance of entry into a single European space is not a matter of political ambitions; it raises the whole issue of survival as a developed and democratic European state. From this point of view, defining Ukraine's attitude towards the processes of NATO and EU enlargement is, first and foremost, a problem of establishing the guidelines, directions, and rates of its internal economic and political evolution.

Full inclusion in European and Euroatlantic integration processes is synonymous with entry into the community of developed democracies, which for the sake of its goals of self-preservation, the survival of European civilisation, and protection of the European economic model has set up a system of effective support for economic stability and high standard of living in its constituent states. If Ukraine's relative lag in comparison with countries of Central–Eastern Europe should become absolute, this would mean the all-too-likely geostrategic defeat and simplification of the principal declared foreign-policy goal of the Ukrainian state.

For the Ukrainian political community, different interpretations of the processes of NATO and EU enlargement are also important in order to avoid erroneous goals and unnecessary disillusionment. In view of the current inability of Ukraine to meet the criteria of the EU or even CEFTA, Western politicians now reckon Ukraine as belonging to the European periphery. Certain suggestions have been voiced, particularly within the EU, that there should be a return to the concept of a single policy towards Ukraine and Russia, an idea which Ukrainian diplomacy has stubbornly opposed throughout all the years of independence.

Hence it is clearly becoming expedient that a sharp line should be drawn between the spheres of military-political and economic integration. The indiscriminate nature of relations in the military-political field allows Ukraine to occupy an important role in the Euroatlantic system of cooperative security, the basis of which will be formed by NATO and the structures and mechanisms of multilateral cooperation associated with it. The new European security architecture will be to some degree different from the model outlined in the document 'Fundamental Directions of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine', ratified by the Supreme Rada on 2 July 1993.[9] In particular, the hope expressed in that document that pan-European mechanisms of collective security will be established proved somewhat premature. The complex of relations in the field of European security includes NATO as a defensive alliance, the associated mechanisms of the EU/WEU, a multilateral

9 'Postanova Verkhovnoyi Rady Ukrayiny "Pro osnovni napryamky zovnishnioyi polityky Ukrayiny", 2 lypnya 1993 r.', *Ukrayina na mizhnarodniy areni. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv (1991–1995 rr.). U 2-kh kn.*, book 1 (Kyiv: Yurinkom Inter, 1998), pp. 37–53.

process of cooperation in the framework of NATO–EAPC–PfP with the inclusion of regional (OSCE) and sub-regional organisations. Elements of pan-European collective security could be introduced (in theory) only on the level of the OSCE and, possibly, EAPC–PfP.

Active participation in this system should be described as indispensable, since, in spite of the contravening stance of Russia and Serbia, this system indubitably will have a pan-European character. Non-participation in it is equal to a state's refusal to defend its own interests. For Ukraine, this would also mean loss of the opportunity to neutralise the consequences of NATO and EU enlargement, which are expected to be adverse. This was clearly shown in the case of NATO's reaction to the situation in Kosovo in February–March 1999.

The state leadership of Russia has always been fully aware of the pan-European implications of the expansion of the influence and functions of NATO. This could be observed throughout the 1990s, and reached its apogee in March 1999, after the entry of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. In spite of its own foreign-policy propaganda and political rhetoric, the Russian government consistently ratified decisions on joining PfP, entry into the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), EAPC, the multinational forces of IFOR/SFOR in former Yugoslavia; in 1997 it signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation.

Moreover, Ukraine–NATO and Russia–NATO relations have fundamentally different parameters and obligations, which are now widely recognised. For Ukraine, the importance of cooperation on security issues with NATO and associated multilateral mechanisms is based on the maintenance of future prospects of entry into an integrated Euroatlantic community. Such cooperation will have a direct positive effect on the internal-political situation by its support for the principles of political democracy, economic stability, civil rights, and civilian control over the power-wielding ministries and departments. Maintaining the nature of PfP and the activity of the EAPC in Central–Eastern and South–Eastern Europe will be of ever-greater importance. The latter is a matter of bringing Ukraine firmly in to pan-European processes of security as an 'internal' and full-fledged (not external and peripheral) constituent.

The establishment, under the aegis of NATO, of a pan-European system of security cooperation will to some degree render irreversible the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, and will gradually shape a *post factum* model of regulating, which, for the reasons given above, proved impossible in the early 1990s. An insufficient grasp of the new European situation now developing makes it possible for certain political parties in Ukraine to utilise important issues of international politics for internal-political speculations. One should not say that a practice which is going on in present-day Europe is necessarily harmful. Internal-political debates provide superfluous evidence of the importance of forming a multilateral consensus at least as regards the principal issues of foreign policy.

The development of multilateral cooperation in European security has also brought about the devaluation of the traditional understanding of neutrality (including the contemporary modification of 'absolute' Swiss-type neutrality, which in its present form is not compatible with participation in the PfP and regional forms of

multilateral cooperative security). In the framework of relations of states in both directions of cooperation in security (NATO–EU/WEU and NATO–EAPC–PfP), the criteria of neutrality are subject to review and erosion, since 'traditional' neutrality is incompatible with the current forms of military-political integration, which have been expanding during the 1990s. These types of integration relations are distinguished within the NATO–EU/WEU framework by their greater intensity, even when there are significant differences, for example in the status of the USA, Canada, the UK, France, Norway, Turkey, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Ireland.

The degree of integration of military policies of the NATO partner-countries within EAPC–PfP, in which Ukraine participates, is significantly lower. There is also a place for various approaches, conditioned by the specifics of individual countries and the time-scale of participation in military-political integration, which for the majority is relatively insignificant. However, the tendency of development of security cooperation allows us to state that the integration potential and direction of multilateral cooperation determine the limits and transformation of the content of neutrality in response to intrinsically European problems. This provides hope that the new European system of mechanisms of collective security and collective reaction to internal and external threats may actually be implemented. It is indicative that the limitation of neutrality of European countries does not extend to external, non-European factors in reacting to which states, even EU members, preserve a greater degree of autonomy. The establishment of multilateral cooperation does not mean the abolition of differences in the perception of European security in the twenty-first century. The national concepts of individual countries are far from identical. However, it is only direct participation in the formation of new relations of cooperation and mechanisms of responsibility which can give European states the opportunity to defend their national interests, and implement their own perception of the future: a more harmonious and peaceful Europe. In particular, Ukrainian diplomacy continues to insist on the implementation of OSCE mechanisms in maintaining peace, as stipulated in the *Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change.*[10]

Periodically, there is a renewed discussion of what Ukraine's proclaimed non-aligned status actually means. However, under present conditions a renunciation of non-aligned status appears premature at the level of strategic thinking, and unjustifiable from the point of view of possible internal-political complications. The functional role of this non-aligned status is defined as an intermediate, transitional step between more stable forms of security, including membership in a multilateral defensive alliance (the maximum effective form), on the one hand, and internationally recognised and guaranteed neutrality (moderately effective), on the other. The two-pronged nature of Ukraine's foreign policy is facilitated by the specifics of its geopolitical situation and its simultaneous membership of two sub-regional zones – Central–Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space. One may assume that as a result of the development of contradictory processes of European cooperation in security, NATO and EU/WEU enlargement and the gradual fragmentation of the for-

10 Helsinki Declaration, op. cit., pp. 70–2.

mer Soviet space there will be a gradual change of emphasis requiring a prolonged transition period, with Ukraine lying in the field of influence of the alternative military-political strategies of NATO and Russia. The main thing is that Ukraine's non-aligned status in its present form, on the one hand, counteracts any effort by Russia to establish Eastern Europe as a military-political alliance alternative to NATO, and, on the other – does not hinder Ukraine's participation in Euroatlantic security structures, preventing its isolation. It is also clear that emphasis on Ukraine's non-aligned status will undoubtedly be reduced as Ukraine becomes part of the Euroatlantic security system and European integration processes.

The internal factors blocking economic growth in Ukraine will also retard integration into the Euroatlantic security system. Over a long period of time, these factors may force the political leadership to adhere formally to a non-aligned, 'multi-directional' foreign policy. Internal socio-economic circumstances *de facto* divide Ukraine from the more successful states of Central–Eastern Europe, for which the issue of participation in the new European security system has either been resolved already, or will be resolved in the near future. For Ukraine the continuation of social and economic decline will mean transformation into a poorly-developed country and the Latin American model of development, in which modernisation and the introduction of market regulation of the economy were implemented by means of several bursts of economic and political reform alternating with outbreaks of social tension, political anarchy, and the rule of autocratic dictatorial regimes.   ❏

The Development of the Ukrainian Language at the End of the Twentieth Century

Alexander Krouglov

I n the period since independence, many noticeable changes have taken place in the Ukrainian language. These changes can be described as taking place on two levels: status and corpus. Changes in the corpus planning of the Ukrainian language are a direct reflection of the past and present political, socio-cultural and economic transformations permeating Ukrainian society. In order to appreciate fully the origins and dimensions of the changes and tendencies in the language, a brief overview is required of the socio-political developments and status planning that have taken place over the last 10 years.

Principal Objectives of Soviet Language Planning

For nearly 60 years, Soviet linguistic policy developed and promoted at least five main objectives:

1. the imposition of Russian as the main language of science, technology and education, since other languages were thought to 'hinder' scientific and technological progress;
2. upgrading the status of Russian to that of the principal language or the language of wider communication within the former Soviet Union;
3. the gradual substitution of Russian for ethnic languages in the mass media;
4. the imposition of a Soviet, Russian-biased cultural identity;
5. the elimination of all national differences to create a new entity of 'Soviet people'.

Normativism became the principal method in both Soviet linguistic scholarship and language instruction. The normative changes of 1933, such as the elimination of the grapheme г (equivalent to the Latin script letter g) from the alphabet, modifications in inflectional patterns, as well as other alterations to the grammar, are vivid examples of a subjective approach to language planning. This demonstrates a complete disregard for the actual historical linguistic developments, a policy which transformed the language into an obsolete, *ersatz* tongue with limited use even in everyday speech.

One of the most striking changes was the enlargement of the lexicon by the creation and subsequent codification of a new bureaucratic language full of calques borrowed from Russian. Russian held the primary position (L1) and Ukrainian a secondary one (L2). All neologisms and calques of the time were produced in L1 then hastily adopted by L2. Although such lexical units were alien to the cultural environment of L2 speakers, they were ideologically motivated and therefore considered essential to the lexicon. Even the lexical elements Russian borrowed from other languages were first used and 'tested' for their appropriateness in L1 and then applied in L2. This state of affairs, as well as a similarity (though not identity) of cultures, gave rise to an unprecedented reproduction of L1 forms in L2.

Russification and the implementation of Soviet linguistic policy significantly restricted the spheres where Ukrainian was used. This forced devaluation of the Ukrainian language and culture, induced semantic and grammatical shifts, phonetic assimilation and lexical infiltration of Russian forms, which resulted in the development of what is known as *surzhik*, a mixed Ukrainian–Russian dialect.

Surzhikisation emerged because of two main factors:

(a) many native speakers of Ukrainian were displaced, moved to live either in Russian-speaking urban areas or in other Soviet republics, and had limited access to spheres in which they could support the development of their mother tongue;

(b) the social changes in the country did not afford sufficient opportunity for use of the mother tongue once the members of the Communist Party elite replaced Ukrainian with Russian.

Surzhik was used mostly by those Ukrainian speakers who made the attempt to adjust their idiolects to the new Russian environment, as, for example, when moving from the countryside to a city of predominantly Russian speakers. 'It was pathetic to watch peasant girls, who had come to work in Kyiv, struggling to speak Russian, lest they be ridiculed'.[1] Russian was considered a high language and Ukrainian a low one, a predominant attitude in Central and Eastern Ukraine. In some ways the Ukrainian language, 'as the language of the "lower" strata of the population (caretakers, maids, unskilled labourers, newly hired workers [from the villages], rank and file workers, especially in the suburbs)' was opposed 'to the Russian language as the language of the "higher", "more educated" strata of society'.[2] The Soviet mass media formed another influential factor in this change since the best programmes were produced in Russian, thus indirectly promoting ideologically-biased cultural values. The appearance and spread of *surzhik* signalled to the fact that Soviet-style bilingualism was merely a policy of ousting Ukrainian from all spheres of life and replacing it with Russian.

First Steps of the Ukrainian Language Revival

When *perestroika* and *glasnost* were adopted as the principal political orientations of the Moscow government, the position of Ukrainian had been so severely undermined that its future existence was questionable. The Chernobyl disaster of 1986 was probably the first catalyst of democratic change and national self-awareness in Ukraine. In early 1989 ecological and national issues became crucial in the formation of Rukh (the Popular Movement for Restructuring in Ukraine) and the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society. As well as committing themselves to ecological issues, national sovereignty and democratisation, these groups concerned themselves with promoting the status of the Ukrainian language. Because of their influence in the political sphere, as well as pressure from the introduction of new legislation on native languages in other Soviet republics, in October 1989, the pro-Soviet Supreme Council of Ukraine passed 'The Law on Languages in the

1 O. Grabowicz, (1992) 'Soviet collapse and Ukrainian independence', in Marko Pavlyshyn, Jonathan Clarke (eds.), *Ukraine in the 1990s* (Melbourne: Monash University, 1992), p. 141.
2 I. Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), p. 135.

Ukrainian SSR', which proclaimed Ukrainian as 'the state language'.[3] However, it was only in 1991 that Ukraine witnessed real changes within its own borders.

The coming of independence in 1991 opened up new possibilities for the revival of Ukrainian culture, language and a national church. The state of euphoria which prevailed in Ukraine during the first few years following independence allowed the government to introduce a number of changes. The most evident of these was in education, where a number of schools in Western Ukraine and Kyiv began to teach in Ukrainian. Ukrainians realised that their language has a future in a sovereign state and their children must be able to speak it. A change in attitude was evident in all spheres of life and even those professionals who could not previously speak or write in Ukrainian began to study the language. However, new difficulties arose, due to:

1. a lack of teaching staff who could instruct in Ukrainian;
2. insufficient numbers of textbooks in Ukrainian;
3. very few politically unbiased teaching materials.

Therefore, in order to implement a new government language policy and the educational programmes associated with it, it became of primary importance to retrain teaching staff and publish new text-books free of any ideological slant. Several schools in the East and South even began recruiting teachers from Western Ukraine.

It was recognised that there must also be a gradual change-over to Ukrainian as the language of tuition in higher education, with particular emphasis on teacher training colleges. The Ministry of Higher Education made several steps in this direction by retraining teaching staff, making Ukrainian language and literature compulsory subjects in entrance examinations, promoting research in Ukrainian studies and implementing other, similar measures.

In spite of all obstacles, Ukrainian has become the principal language of the state elite and dominates all public gatherings in Western and Central Ukraine. The introduction of Ukrainian into the armed forces has been gradual due to the fact that commanding officers were almost always trained in Russian. The situation is changing now and the number of Ukrainian speakers is constantly growing.

Language behaviour and social behaviour are closely related,[4] and neither can be altered very quickly. All innovations and reforms run counter to the desire for stability and are counter to current usage and inertia towards change. Therefore, psychological adaptation to change is a very slow process, particularly in a society with established traditions.

Undoing and Redoing the Changes of the Past

In the first half of the 1990s, in spite of all difficulties and lack of funds and publishing facilities, the National Association of Ukrainian studies in Kyiv, the Potebnya Linguistic Institute of Ukraine along with several universities published a number of

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3 'The Law on languages in the Ukrainian SSR', *Vidomosti verkhovnoy rady URSR*, no. 45, 1989, pp. 58–67.

4 Joshua Fishman, 'Language planning and language planning research: the state of the art', in Joshua Fishman (ed.), *Advances in language planning* (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), p. 6.

works on orthography, phonetics, morphology, syntax, lexicology, stylistics and culture.[5] All of these scholarly works promote normativism in language, based on prescriptivism and strict codification, while introducing changes and new approaches to various linguistic phenomena. A certain vacuum appeared in the area of lexicography with the absence of good Ukrainian dictionaries at the beginning of the 1990s. Another problem arose in this field when a number of lexicographers in Ukraine embarked on producing three-language dictionaries, where one of the languages was Russian. As a result, there appeared more calques from Russian even in those cases when equivalent Ukrainian lexical units or expressions already existed or had existed before the beginning of the original Soviet corpus planning.

The main achievement of the 1991 publication of *Ukrainian Orthography* was the reintroduction of the letter ґ, which was regarded not only as a victory over the Soviet corpus planning of the 1930s, but also as a result of an open attitude toward other languages, permitting an increased number of borrowings. There was a real phonetic need for the reintroduction of ґ into the alphabet because of the confusion over whether a pharyngeal [h] or velar [g] was required in the pronunciation of certain words. The new Orthography and reference grammars give clear recommendations when one or the other is to be used.

Other orthographic changes include the 'rehabilitated' use of an initial upper-case letter in words of religious origin, such as *Boh* 'God', *Bozhe Tilo* 'Corpus Christi', *Bozha Matir* 'Mother of God', *Syn Bozhyi* 'Son of God', *Svyatyi Dukh* 'Holy Ghost', etc. The *Ukrainian Orthography* of 1991 also provides much clearer explanation for compound word spellings, and recommends a wider use of the morphological ending u (-yu) for the genitive singular of second declension nouns, etc.

The changing political and economic structure of Ukrainian society has led to considerable shifts in the lexicon. A number of lexical items from the Soviet period became obsolete and eventually went out of use altogether, particularly those items designating specifically 'Soviet' phenomena: *agitpunkt* 'propaganda station', *heroy sotsialistychnoyi pratsi* 'hero of socialist labour', *komsomolets* 'member of the Young Communist League' *pioner* 'pioneer',[6] *pyatyrichka* 'five year plan', and others.

Many of the lexical units designating political and economic ideas have undergone considerable semantic shifts, e.g., *partiya* 'party', which in Soviet society referred only to the Communist Party but in current usage can refer to any political party. Other such semantic shifts are observed in words such as *demokratiya* 'democracy', which is no longer restricted only to 'socialist democracy', *kapitalizm* 'capitalism', yet another word that has lost its negative connotation. Some other words, which had been associated with the West before Ukrainian independence, are now used when referring to situations at home, e.g.: *kryza* 'crisis', *strayk* 'strike', *elita* 'elite', *koruptsiya* 'corruption', *bankrutstvo* 'bankruptcy' and

5 cf. Maria Pentylyuk, *Kultura movy i stylistyka* (Kyiv: Vezha, 1994); Maria Plyushch, *Suchasna Ukrayinska Literaturna Mova* (Kyiv: Vyshcha Shkola, 1994); Oleksandr Ponomariv, *Suchasna ukrayinska mova* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1991); Ludmyla Shevchenko, Volodymyr Rizun, Yuriy Lysenko, *Suchasna ukrayinska mova* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1993); Ivan Vykhvanets, *Hramatyka ukrayinskoyi movy. Syntaksys: pidruchnyk* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1993).

6 Member of the children's Communist organisation in the USSR.

many others. On the other hand words which had positive connotation during the Soviet period have undergone a reverse semantic shift, i.e. from positive to negative and are often used in specific words combinations, for example: *komunistychnyi* 'adj. Communist' is used in combinations like *komunistychna obluda* 'Communist phantasms', *radyanskyi* 'adj. Soviet' *radyanskyi imperializm* 'Soviet imperialism', etc. A number of word combinations created during the Soviet era are used ironically now: *politychno pidkovanyi* 'politically educated' (in the sense that the person knows how to please authorities), *moralno stiykyi* 'morally stable' (in the sense that the person is completely non-adventurous, conventional in social behaviour), etc.

Various new concepts have appeared requiring the formation of three types of new lexical means:

1. New native words:

a) created by native derivational morphology: *rozderzhavlennya* 'denationalisation', *rukhivets* 'member of Rukh', *tinovyk* 'entrepreneur of a shadow economy', etc.

b) stump compounds, which incorporate the truncated forms of one or more words: *oblderzhadministratsiya* (from *oblasna derzhavna administratsiya* 'regional state administration'), *kabminivskyi* (adj. from *kabinet ministriv* 'cabinet of ministers'). Another compound – *yevroremont* ('high quality repair work') – has become an everyday reality of colloquial Ukrainian speech. This concept is clear and used by the majority of speakers in urban areas of Ukraine.

c) acronyms: *UNIAN* (*Ukrayinske nezalezhne informatsiyne agenstvo novyn* 'Ukrainian independent news information agency'), *DAK* (*derzhavna aktsionerna kompaniya* 'state run company'), *VR* (*Verkhovna Rada* 'Supreme Rada').

2. Complete or direct borrowings from other languages. This group can be subdivided into five subgroups:

a) borrowings that keep their original spelling (usually English): *internet, e-mail, USD.* Some borrowings that keep their original spelling may be accompanied by an explanation or literal equivalent in Ukrainian, for example, *Green Card* (in the US sense) is often accompanied by Ukrainian literal translation, *'All-Inclusive'* may be either explained by a phrase in parentheses *vse vkhodyt do vartosti* 'everything is included in the price' or may be preceded by, for example, *forma rozmishchennya* 'form of accommodation', *EFF* is accompanied by *prohrama rozshyrennoho finansuvannya* 'Extended Fund Facility'. The number of words and abbreviations that keep their original spelling is growing and this tendency is becoming more and more acceptable.

b) borrowings which make use of existing Ukrainian phonemes: *menedzhment* 'management', *reketyr* 'racketeer', *kholdyng* 'holding', *trening* 'training', *singl*[7] 'single', etc. Teenagers or *tineydzhery* probably adopt more Western terminology. Here is an example from the newspaper *Khreshchatyk:*

7 This example also shows that native phonotactic rules are not always followed.

U roller-klubi ne tilky katannya. Pratsyuyut di-dzheyi, ye muzyka. Dekhto z ditey zaymayetsya grafiti – malyuye na stinakh.[8]

A roller club is not merely for skating. There are DJs and music. Some children go to graffiti classes, where they paint on walls.

As we can see from the text above words like roller club or DJ have become part of the vocabulary generally associated with teenagers. There is another borrowed item, *grafiti,* which is beginning to be used in the more formal newspaper style, while teenagers have been using this word for some time.

c) stump compounds incorporating either all truncated forms of one or more borrowed items: *narkokuryer* 'drug courier', *ekotsentr* 'eco centre'.

d) trademarks and brand names which have become common nouns identifying notions which did not exist in Ukrainian before, for example, *interlok* 'remote controlled central locking', or brand names which identify a specific product, e.g. *Mars, Snickers* or *Bounty.* This type of borrowing was popular even before the period of the undoing changes began. The appearance of copying machines in the 1970s brought *xerox* into the Ukrainian language as a lexical unit with a meaning 'a copying machine' and sometimes even a 'a copy', e.g.:

meni treba zrobyty xerox 'I have to make a copy';
De u vas tut xerox? 'Where is your copying machine?'

e) mixed type of formation – a combination of 1a and 2b or 1a and 2a: *post-perebudovnyi* 'post-perestroika/post-restructuring', *kuponizatsia* 'introduction of coupons'; *web.storinka* 'web page' (preserving the Latin script for the first element).

3. Borrowings with a semantic shift, e.g.: *offshornyi* 'offshore' (adj.) which is used in the Ukrainian language in the meaning 'tax-free', a term that has a limited semantic field when compared with that of its language of origin.

The Ukrainian language of the perestroika and post-perestroika period was still characterised by a restricted linguistic use of borrowed lexical items. Paradoxically there were, on the one hand, borrowings from English such as *biznes* [< 'business'], *ofis* [< 'office'], *menedzher* [< 'manager'], *menedzhment* [< 'management'], etc., which were used not only in commercial spheres, but also in everyday speech. However, their derivational possibilities were greatly limited. On the other hand there was other borrowed terminology such as *overdraft* [< 'overdraft'], *kliryng* [< 'clearing'], etc., units which were easily transformed into adjectives, e.g., *overdraftnyi, kliryngovyi* and was widely used in word combinations mostly by specialists in fields such as banking, accounting and finance. It appears that widely used borrowings were generally restricted to a single grammatical category,[9] while borrowed lexical items which were used to determine narrow, technical concepts could generate other grammatical forms. In the mid-1990s the

8 *Khreshchatyk* is a Kyiv newspaper, which belongs to the City Council. *Khreshchatyk,* no. 111, 7 September 1998, p. 10.
9 Alexandr Krouglov, 'Issues in translation and lexicography', *The Ukrainian Review,* vol. 42, no. 1, spring 1995, p. 24.

situation has begun to change with adjectival forms being derived from many widely used nouns, e.g., *biznes* > *biznesovyi, broker* > *brokerskyi, ofis* > *ofisnyi, audytor* > *audytorskyi.* This type of transformation has been somewhat slow due to the existence of Ukrainian equivalents. Also, it presumes the switch to their use by a large number of speakers. Nonetheless it is being hastened by the rapid socio-political and economic changes taking place in the country. At the same time even relatively recent terms are becoming obsolete such as *derzhpryimannya* 'state examination/acceptance', *demplatforma* 'democratic platform (in the Communist Party)' and *kuponizatsia* 'introduction of coupons' which are now used only when referring specifically to the period of perestroika.

A number of Western concepts have not found adequate lexical counterparts in Ukrainian. In such cases the descriptive approach is usually employed, e.g., 'cash point' or 'ATM' – *avtomatychnyi punkt/avtomat vydachi hotivky* [lit.: 'automatic machine giving out cash'], 'negotiator' – *osoba, shcho vede perehovory* [lit.: 'a person who conducts negotiations']. The growing 'Westernisation' of the entire society will inevitably result in the formation of an even larger stratum of borrowings in the language, especially once new notions become an everyday reality.

Significant changes have also appeared in the Ukrainian system of nominal address forms (AFs), where the politically marked AF *tovarysh* 'comrade' has been replaced by the original, politically neutral Ukrainian AFs *Pan* 'Mr', *Pani* 'Mrs' and *Panna* 'Miss' + surname. These forms already existed in the language but their use was restricted to describing relations in capitalist countries or pre-Soviet Ukraine. This substitution occurred very rapidly on the formal level, but their acceptance into everyday use throughout the country will take time, as speakers, particularly those in the East, need time for psychological adaptation. The AF *tovarysh* 'comrade' is now restricted to Communist Party meetings only or is used in its original meaning of 'fellow, mate, colleague'. Ukrainian AFs *dobrodiy* 'Mr, Sir' and *dobrodiyka* 'Mrs, Madam' have also been revived; their use is no longer limited to formal address at meetings as they are now being employed in everyday communication. Intermediate forms of address such as *Pani* 'Mrs' or *Pan* 'Mr' + first name, can be heard more often in western areas and are gaining popularity among speakers in central parts as well. The process of 'undoing the changes' in the nominal address form system has been fairly dynamic since most forms had been preserved unchanged in Western Ukraine.

Purist and Democratic Approaches in Language Development

Two main streams can be observed in the current development of the Ukrainian language: the puristic and the democratic. Purist or archaising tendencies are usually manifest among new nations. The representatives of purism are those who look to the past by trying to substitute already existing means of expression, both lexical and grammatical, with 'true' indigenous ones or with those which existed before Soviet corpus planning began to come into force. The proponents of purism want their language 'to be more than neat and trim and handy. They also want it to be "theirs", i.e., "like" them in some way, reflective of their individuali-

ty in some way, protective of their history in some way'.[10] For example, in lexicology it has been proposed to use words which were registered in Ukrainian dictionaries before 1933: instead of the word *kontrabanda,* a borrowed form, the word *peremytnytstvo* 'contraband, smuggling' has been suggested for use; instead of the expression *u diametri – poperechno* 'in diameter, diagonally'. The purists also promote the current use of words which are now out of date with advances in industry such as *hamarnya* 'foundry, forge', *stabarnya* 'foundry', *khybarnya* 'tannery'. In grammar, some sources of the mass media organs insist on the re-establishment of the -y ending in the genitive singular of so-called Feminine II nouns. Purism is a response to Russification, aiming at the 'linguistic cleansing' of most foreign (mainly Russian) lexical items.

There is also evidence of internal Westernisation, i.e. the tendency to use Western Ukrainian lexical items in the East. It is mostly concerned with items which may be similar to Russian, e.g.: the Ukrainian word *hazeta,* which is similar to Russian *gazeta,* is often replaced by the Western Ukrainian word *chasopys* 'newspaper', *tyrazh* > *naklad* 'circulation', *fotohrafiya* > *svitlyna* 'photograph', *zakhid* > *impreza* 'undertaking', etc. The analysis of our data shows that this trend is mainly confined to the Ukrainian mass media; however, the everyday use of these forms by speakers in Central and Eastern Ukraine seems to be still limited. Many Western Ukrainian lexical items were not included in the recently published two volume *English-Ukrainian Dictionary* by I. M. Balla.[11]

Ukrainian has always been characterised by an extremely restricted use of present active participles, which have lost their verbal characteristics and have been transformed into adjectives describing a process attributed to nouns. Their number is very limited. In the Soviet period there were attempts to introduce them into the language and even to broaden the scope of their use, often producing calques from Russian such as: *zaveduyushchyi otdelom* (Russ.) 'head of department' > *zaviduyuchyi viddilom* (Ukr.), *perevypolnyaushchyi plan rabochiy* (Russ.) 'a worker who exceeds the plan' > *perevykonuyuchyi plan robitnyk* (Ukr.), etc. They could be found in the style of the Soviet or Communist elite and a number of sources of the mass media opted for their use to 'diversify' their stylistic abilities. However, such 'participial innovations' were essentially foreign implants and are being forced out by current developments in the language.

The purists have identified many other items which they claim pollute the language. They analysed Ukrainian derivational models and found doublets representing the same concepts. Some of these doublets contain the morpheme -vod 'to lead', which is a component of words such as *vahonovod* 'tram driver' or *ekskursovod* 'guide', but, according to the purists, the use of -*vod* can hardly be justified in newly created words like *lisovod* or *rysovod* which have little to do with the semantic field of the verb 'to lead'. They are borrowings which had been derived from the Russian verb *razvodit* 'to cultivate' and became doublets of already existing Ukrainian items like *lisivnyk* 'forester' and *rysivnyk* 'rice-grower',

10 Fishman, op. cit., p. 23.
11 I. M. Balla (ed.), *English-Ukrainian Dictionary,* 2 vols. (Kyiv: Osvita, 1996).

formed according to original rules of derivation. They were also able to identify a number of artificially created borrowed lexical items, which violate the existing norms in the Ukrainian language and eventually excluded them from dictionaries compiled during the Soviet era.[12]

The democratic approach to undoing corpus planning is gaining more ground every year. It is aimed at reducing the limitations of language use while developing a variety of new expressive means which will eventually allow each individual to express his/her identity in a new way. This will enable speakers to avoid the stilted Soviet-type jargon of some sources of the Ukrainian media. These groups propagate 'the aspiration to create a modern and efficient language'.[13] Their primary objective is to democratise all spheres of language use, to fight stiffness of expression and allow stylistic overlapping, such as the use of less formal styles in various situations. Denormativisation has been kept in the background since the dominant tendency seems to be normativism and 'linguistic cleansing'. Firstly because normativism is deeply embedded in the tradition of Ukrainian schools, where students are taught only the normative language and any deviations are censured. 'All those who use the Ukrainian language as a means of communication must keep to literary norms. Every speaker is obliged to protect it from pollution, *surzhik* distortions'.[14] Secondly, it would be unrealistic to expect that linguistic dictatorship will be substituted by democratisation and creativity in a very short period of time. The slow acceptance of linguistic democratisation can be explained by the spread of *surzhik* and other factors which were a result of Soviet oppression and Russification.

Some organs of the Ukrainian mass media both in Ukraine and abroad have been at the forefront of undoing changes by coining neologisms, reintroducing the grammar that existed before 1933 and promoting linguistic creativity. Their impact, particularly that of radio and television, increased after programmes of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company ceased to be relayed in Ukraine. The decision of the Ukrainian government to end the transmissions evoked dissatisfaction in the predominantly Russian-speaking areas of the country's eastern and southern regions. There were a number of demonstrations and protests, and eventually some local authorities had to find funds to subsidise broadcasts of Russian programming. At the same time Ukrainian television has expanded its programming and is raising funds through advertising. Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers has drawn up a plan of action with special emphasis on the mass media, including the autonomous republic of Crimea, where the pro-Rukh news agency *Krymskiy Kuryer* has been reinstated, and since 1996 funds have been allocated to publish three Ukrainian language newspapers for children, teenagers and sports fans. The language policy of the Ukrainian government is being shaped during a very difficult time of economic instability, maintaining a balance between various political groupings, while targeting the new generation of young people who represent the future of the Ukrainian nation.

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12 Ponomariv, op. cit., p. 82.
13 Valter Tauli, 'The theory of language planning', in Joshua Fishman, op. cit., p. 65.
14 Plyushch, op. cit., p. 9.

Conclusions

The period since Ukraine achieved independence provides sufficient evidence to demonstrate that restoring the language to its original form before corpus planning began will be gradual and painful. Resistance will be encountered from certain layers of the population, while others will simply ignore it. The old Communist elite is still attempting to undermine all the language initiatives of the Ukrainian government. The Humanities Department of the Administration and the National Academy of Sciences pursue a policy of gradual change in the status and corpus of the language, which should be more consistent with the developments in society. Nevertheless, whatever linguistic strategy is to be followed, the language cannot be completely restored to its previous state, but will develop new tendencies while carefully preserving, reviving and using its past to enrich its expressiveness.

The main concern, though, was and to a certain extent still is the actual status of Ukrainian and the elimination of *surzhik*. The language's official status allows a more dynamic way of proceeding with undoing of corpus planning by dealing with two principal issues: de-Russification and the socio-political transformation and modernisation of Ukrainian which will allow it to cope with contemporary technological, socio-political, economic and scientific discourse. A strong national movement facilitated this process during the initial stages of independence. However, it would be unrealistic to expect significant changes in the immediate future, since speakers' usage changes very slowly and sometimes it can take generations to switch from one language to another or to eliminate a mixed jargon.

Undoing corpus planning in the Ukrainian language affects mostly three levels: orthography, lexicon and grammar. The principal area of change is no doubt the lexicon where there is an urgent need for 'cleansing', adequate restructuring and development. In this respect the role of education and mass media will grow to promote a consistent and creative approach to all language problems, which will eventually enable the practical implementation of revising the corpus planning of the past. ❑

New Ukrainian Cossacks – Revival or Building New Armed Forces?*

Olexander Hryb

This article argues that the revival of the Ukrainian Cossack movement embodies an attempt of the national-democratic forces[1] to establish a new model, or at least to set an example of the national armed forces in Ukraine as they were perceived within the newly created national state. Although this attempt clearly failed, it revealed the great potential for the Cossack movement to become a self-driving force in case that its revival was incompatible with the interests of other social actors or the state. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian leadership had to consider whether to create entirely new armed forces or Ukrainianise those already present on Ukrainian territory. The latter was achieved with remarkable success when the Soviet troops gradually took the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian state. Yet, the national revolution in Ukraine was only conceived when the national state was born after the failure of the Communist coup in Russia in August 1991. The leadership in Ukraine was either too hide-bound by the old Communist *nomenklatura* and ideology, or else too weak to take over political power on behalf of the democratic forces. This resulted in a situation where the revival of national traditions within the armed forces was effectively blocked, and the Ukrainian Cossack organisation *(Ukrayinske Kozatstvo)* became a force of its own.

It was the organisation of moderate nationalists – Rukh – which, in the 1980s, first came up with the idea of reviving Cossackdom. It used the popular appeal of the Cossack image to spread its pro-reform and pro-independence views in areas which were historically the cradle of Cossackdom, but which over the last two centuries had become highly Russified, and were resistant to any kind of nationalist Ukrainian movement. Rukh's action to celebrate the 500th anniversary of the Zaporozhian Cossacks[2] was highly successful, and led to the rebirth of Ukrainian Cossackdom in a contemporary setting. In September 1990, the Great Cossack Council (Rada) announced the creation of *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo*[3] (officially regis-

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1 The original term in Ukrainian – 'natsionalno-demokratychni syly' – includes a wide spectrum of political and civic organisations which appeared during and after Perestroika, following the general course of the new Ukrainian revival and excludes those extreme leftist and communist organisations opposing independent Ukraine.

2 Five hundred years of the Zaporozhian Cossacks was a symbolic date suggested by the leaders of the Cossack movement, and refers to the first-known mention of the Cossacks in historical sources. But the problem of chronology and the date of foundation of the Zaporozhian Cossacks is still a matter of historical debate. For the views of contemporary Ukrainian historians concerning Cossack chronology see: *Zaporozke Kozatstvo v ukrayinskiy istoriyi, kulturi ta natsionalniy samosvidomosti* (Kyiv, 1997).

3 *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* defines itself as a 'voluntary, independent, charitable, all-Ukrainian, national-patriotic, sport and defence, civic organisation of Cossacks in Ukraine', which includes 'Cossacks and their heirs…, citizens of Ukraine, Ukrainians from other countries, who share the idea of Ukrainian Cossackhood'. ('Code of Ukrainian Cossacks', *Ukrayinske Slovo*, 1996, 5 September, p. 3.)

tered as a public organisation on 17 March 1992). At first, Cossack organisations in various regions of Ukraine were established as parallel structures to pro-independence associations, in particular Rukh. Indeed, an Organisation of Free Cossacks *(Vilne Kozatstvo)* had been set up back in 1988 to support and protect actions and gatherings of the new democratic organisations at that time.

Gradually, both the Ukrainian opposition and the old political élite in Ukraine realised that they needed armed forces, other than those ruled from Moscow. As early as 1990, the old élite came up with the idea of creating a Republican National Guard. At the same time, city councils of western provinces, where the local elections had been won by national-democrats, established their own municipal police forces. By analogy to the national revolution of 1917, the first Congress of Ukrainian Officers was held on 27 July 1991. Officers who held pro-independence views called on the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet to establish the Armed Forces of Ukraine. But it was only after the Moscow coup and declaration of Ukrainian independence on 24 August 1991 that the Supreme Rada (parliament) issued a decree 'On the military formations of Ukraine'. A few days later, recruitment to the National Guard began, and as early as 29 August 1991 the troops of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs who were stationed in Ukraine were 'Ukrainianised' to create a basis for the new National Guard (later they effectively became a special security force under the control of the President). The same day, Lieutenant General Kostyantyn Morozov was appointed Minister at the brand new Ukrainian Ministry of Defence. On 11 October 1991, Parliament approved a resolution on the concept of national defence and the establishment of the national Armed Forces. By the beginning of 1992, most of the almost a million strong ex-Soviet troops in Ukraine has been 'Ukrainianised', and, despite objections from Moscow, persuaded to take a new oath of loyalty to the independent Ukrainian state. From the point of view of immediate military and political security, it was an obvious victory. However, in the long-term view, and as regards the security of Ukrainian society, this was far from being so. Ninety per cent of all senior officers and 70 per cent of general officers were non-Ukrainians; most of them being Russians. An unofficial survey of that time found that the majority of officers would not fight a conflict if the enemy were Russia.[4] Pro-nationalist politicians were highly doubtful of the reliability of the armed forces in view of the assumption that it was Russia which was the biggest threat to national security. During 1992, attempts were made to introduce a more 'national' character to the armed forces. At the beginning, Minister of Defence Kostyantyn Morozov took a hard line, making membership of the radicalised Union of Ukrainian Officers *(Spilka ofitseriv Ukrayiny)* a precondition for any promotion. At the same time, Vyacheslav Chornovil, a former leading dissident and by now Hetman of the Ukrainian Cossacks, called on Defence Minister Morozov to turn the Sumy Senior Officers' Artillery School into a Cossack military lyceum. Likewise, the Chief Otaman of the Ukrainian Cossacks Yevhen Petrenko called on President Leonid Kravchuk to submit a Bill to Parliament creating Cossack units within the National

4 Pavel K. Baev, 'Ukraine's Army under Civilian Rule', *Jane's Intelligence Review,* January 1996, p. 10.

Guard, the Armed Forces, the SBU (Ukraine's born-again KGB), the Border Guards, and the Internal Troops. Both Chornovil and Petrenko were elected to their positions by the Grand Cossack Council on 14 October 1991. In July 1992, Hetman Chornovil called on the Ministry of Defence to introduce into the structure of the Armed Forces Cossack cavalry units (a regiment in Kyiv and squadrons in the cities where the headquarters of Military Districts are located). Similar proposals were sent to the Commander of the National Guard Major-General V. Kuharets, as well as to the Central Committee of the Association for Ukrainian Defence *(Tovarystvo spryiannya oborony Ukrayiny)* a state-sponsored organisation encouraging the training of young people in sport and civil defence. The Chief Otaman of the Ukrainian Cossacks Petrenko drew up a memorandum for the Head of the Socio-Psychological Service of the Ministry of Defence, Colonel Volodymyr Mulyava, suggesting the establishment of joint military formations of Cossacks and National Service conscripts to 'defend river banks and sea shores where armed actions are possible, to maintain public order during natural disasters, to create special Cossack units for fighting the Cossack formations of other states, to create special Cossack units to operate on the territory of a hostile belligerent state'. To ensure the safety of Ukrainian borders and customs posts, Petrenko proposed that Cossack settlements be established in frontier areas. The Cossacks were particularly worried about the existence of the Russian Cossack formations being formed in the Odesa oblast. Hetman Chornovil reported to the Head of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) that a Russian Cossack organisation had been set up in Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi (Odesa oblast). One of the commanders of a Ukrainian army regiment was elected an Otaman of the (Russian) Odesa Cossack formation, which took an oath of allegiance to Russia's Don Army. The Ataman of the Russian Cossack Union O. Martynov was present at that ceremony. This pro-Russian Cossack formation was disbanded later the same year, 1992, but was set up again in 1994, as the *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* reported with some concern. Yet, pro-Russian Cossack leaders of the Odesa oblast could well claim to represent civic organisations reflecting the traditions of the historical *Novorosiyskoye Kazachestvo* (Cossack Organisation of New Russia), which had served the Russian Tsar. In order to put a stop to such claims, on 21 June 1992 the *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* performed the symbolic action of repudiating the oath of allegiance to the Russian Tsar taken by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in 1654. The idea was promoted by Rukh and the Ukrainian National Assembly, and attracted nearly 200 representatives from Cossack associations all over Ukraine. The event had considerable historic and symbolic significance, since it took place in the same town – now Pereyaslav-Khmelnytskyi – where a Cossack Grand Council under Khmelnytskyi had voted for Union with Muscovy and sworn allegiance to the Russian Tsar in 1654. The Deputy Speaker of the Ukrainian parliament was present, which gave the event more political flavour.[5] Soon after that Chornovil resigned from the post of Hetman, citing pressure of parliamentary duties. This brought to an end the first stage of the Cossack revival in Ukraine.

5 *SWB* SU/1419 B/17, 'Cossacks repudiate oath of allegiance to Russia', 29 June 1992.

On 13 October 1992, the Grand Council of Ukrainian Cossacks elected a new Hetman – General Volodymyr Mulyava.[6] He, too, had originally been a Rukh activist and a former lecturer of philosophy at a military academy. He was co-opted into the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence at its inception, and became one of the principal ideologists of the new Ukrainian Armed Forces. By the end of 1992, though, it became clear that an attempt to Ukrainianise the inherited Soviet officers' corps by means of the newly-created Socio-Psychological service of the Ukrainian MOD, which General Mulyava headed, had had little impact. The election of Mulyava as the Hetman of the Ukrainian Cossacks was symbolic, but the General himself was never accepted in the army. After this dismissal in May 1994, the Socio-Psychological Service underwent a radical transformation.[7] Yet, it is important to emphasise here that the main Ukrainian Cossack organisation has always been pro-statehood, and attracted the moderate spectrum of Ukrainian nationalists. This highlights a misunderstanding by Mark Galleotti, who believed that only after the repudiation of the oath in 1992 did official Kyiv accept the Cossacks as a pro-Ukrainian organisation, and no longer perceived them as a pro-Moscow fifth column.[8] It is far more important to distinguish between two different *modern* Cossack movements in Ukraine. In other words, there were mainstream Ukrainian Cossack organisations in Ukraine, which were united under the name *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo,* as opposed to a number of marginal Russian Cossack organisations, which were the offspring of a much better developed Cossack movement in Russia. Accordingly, the Ukrainian government did not *de facto* ignore these Russian organisations, which later triggered the remark by the Ataman of the Luhansk Cossacks Vladimir Fedichev when he said on Russian TV that 'the Ukrainian leadership ignored the problem of the Cossacks in Ukraine'.[9] An attempt by the Russian Cossack Ataman in Donetsk (I. Byelomyesov) to introduce the rule of the Don Army in the Proletarskiy district of the city at the end of 1991 does not seem to have been taken seriously even by the Don Army, namely, by Ataman S. Meshcheryakov, who had been approached on this matter. Both Meshcheryakov and the Ataman of the Kuban Cossacks Viktor Gromov also received appeals of the first Grand Council of the Ukrainian Cossacks a few months earlier. Gromov even replied to Hetman Chornovil on 13 November 1991, stating that the Kuban Cossacks had no territorial claims to Ukraine, and condemning the idea of creating a Cossack Republic of the South. Yet, on 14 May 1992, the Luhansk Council of Atamans of Don Cossack associations called on the Ukrainian parliament to introduce dual citizenship in the Luhansk oblast, to give official status to the Russian language, and to display in public the symbols of the Don Army alongside the Ukrainian ones. The Russian-language newspaper *Luganskaya Pravda* also reported that the Council of Atamans had requested the abolition of the customs posts on the border with the Don Army region, and for all Ukrainian army units to be prohibited on this terri-

6 *SWB* SU/1512 B/5, 'Chornovil resigns as Cossack Hetman', 15 October 1992.

7 *Rossiya,* no. 17, 4–10 May 1994.

8 M. Galleotti, 'A Military Future for the Cossacks', *Jane's Intelligence Review,* March 1993, p. 105.

9 *SWB* SU/1589 B/2, 'Cossacks on their attitude on ownership of land and participation in the army', 18 January 1993.

tory. On 23 May 1992, the Luhansk Rukh organisation condemned this statement of the Council of Atamans. On 30 May, the meeting of the Ukrainian Cossacks set up a Luhansk Cossack organisation as a part of *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo*. In fact, the confrontation between Ukrainian and Russian Cossacks in Ukraine had never disappeared completely, but tensions were eased, since none of the Russian Cossack organisations received significant support from Ukrainian society.

The presence of Russian paramilitary and sometimes armed formations in Ukraine naturally attracted the attention of the Ukrainian Security Forces. So, for instance, a National Guard colonel, Anatoliy Shmilo, wrote in an article 'The National Guard of Ukraine and its Enemies':

> Analysis of the situation shows that destabilising conditions could arise in the near future either in individual regions (Crimea, Donbas, etc.), or in several regions simultaneously. Were this to happen, reconnaissance-sabotage groups would infiltrate these regions, possibly under the guise of 'Cossacks', as happened in Transdnistria or in the present conflict in Abkhazia. Who will then defend Ukraine against these forces?[10]

The answer was, of course, not *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* or even the Armed Forces. The answer for Colonel Shmilo was only the National Guard. And, indeed, it was the National Guard which protected the Ukrainian border with the Transdnistrian Republic during the military conflict between this break-away republic and Moldovan armed forces.

Despite the fact that Ukrainian Cossacks considered themselves a part of the Armed Forces and were formally supported by the state, *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* never became anything more than a public, i.e. non-governmental organisation. So, for instance, although in August 1993 the Border Guard Service in Ukraine signed an agreement with *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* to form special units to defend the national borders, it was never realised. According to this agreement, regional Cossack otamans were supposed to form Cossack detachments to assist the 40,000-strong Border Guard in protecting the state borders.[11] No funds were allocated for Cossacks, and therefore, officially, no such detachments exist. The only border 'Cossack' outpost in Western Ukraine is a regular unit with a hundred conscripts including those from the Ukrainian Cossack organisations, which claim to have from 15,000 to 100,000 members nation-wide. One of the reasons for the fact that there is only this one regiment was the weak organisation of the *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo*. Not until early 1993 did Otaman Yevhen Petrenko issue an order to register members of the organisation, and to provide them with the relevant documents. On 6 March 1993, Petrenko ordered local Cossack organisations to prepare lists of conscripts for the Armed Forces, and to arrange with the relevant recruiting centres that Cossack conscripts be enrolled in separate military units. This, as well as another appeal to local Cossack organisations to provide the Otaman with lists of young conscripts capable of serving in the armed forces as junior officers, never received any effective response. *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* has

10 A. Shmilo, 'The National Guard of Ukraine and its enemies', *Ukraine*, September 1993, p. 5.
11 *SWB* SU/1782 C1/2, 'Cossacks to protect Ukraine's border', 1 September 1993.

not yet become a force of its own, unlike its Russian equivalent, or even another paramilitary formation in Ukraine – UNSO (Ukrainian National Self-Defence). This became particularly clear in Crimea, where the newly elected pro-Russian President of Crimea Yuriy Myshkov issued a decree on 16 May 1994 in support of the Russian Cossack revival. On 28 May 1994, an augmented Cossack Assembly was convened in Simferopol. It was organised by the Union of Cossack Armies in Russia and Abroad in support of the Crimean President Myshkov. The latter was proclaimed a 'Cossack president', and elected to the Cossack Council of the Union of Cossack Armies in Russia and Abroad. Representatives of the Don, Kuban, and Siberian Cossacks supported the idea of reviving the Russian Cossacks in Crimea.[12] By this time, a number of cases of arms smuggling from the Don Cossacks to Crimea had come to light.[13] As a result, on 31 May 1994 the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a statement about the crime situation in Crimea being exacerbated by the arrival on the peninsula of a considerable number of Russian Cossacks. This statement claimed that 'Crimeans do not support and do not understand the appearance of the Russian Cossacks, since the local police is capable of ensuring the reliable defence of public order with its own forces'.[14] The Crimean leadership took a different view. On 15 June 1994, the leader of the Don Cossacks Viktor Ratiyev signed a friendship and cooperation agreement with the Crimean President Yuriy Myshkov, stressing the historic closeness and 'indivisible' history of Russian Cossacks and the people of the republic of Crimea. To facilitate the establishment of a common economic space, the two sides committed themselves to opening a Crimean embassy in Novocherkassk and a Don Cossack embassy in Simferopol.[15]

The presence of *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* in Crimea was continuously ignored. For instance, when the Crimean organisation of *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo (Ukrayinske Zaporizko-Tavriyske Kozatstvo)* at the end of 1994 published in a local newspaper – *Yuzhnaya stolitsa* – its condemnation of the aggression of the 'Russian imperialist forces against the Chechen people', and criticism of the Crimean parliament for its intention to split the Black Sea Fleet,[16] two weeks later, the same newspaper published a statement by the (Russian) Crimean Cossack Union, denying the very existence of any other Cossacks in Crimea, except themselves. It was also stated that Crimean Cossacks had not published anything about the Russian–Chechen war.[17] Finally, the newspaper published a statement of the Crimean Otaman of *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* V. Tambovtsev-Lysenko, who explained that the Crimean organisation of the *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* had existed since summer 1992, and included local organisations from 14 districts of Crimea. As the paper's headlines

12 S. Pavliv, 'Rosiyski otamany demonstruyut loyalnist do "kozatskoho" prezydenta', *Shlyakh Peremohy,* 4 June 1994.

13 T. Kuzio, 'Para-military groups in Ukraine', *Jane's Intelligence Review,* March 1994, p. 125.

14 *SWB* SU/2013, 'Arrival of Russian Cossack in Crimea "complicating" situations', 31 May 1994.

15 *SWB* SU/2025, 'Cossacks sign co-operation agreement with Crimea', 18 June 1994.

16 'Chto vozmushchaet i bespokoit ukrainskoye kazachestvo', *Yuzhnaya stolitsa,* 30 December 1994, no. 52.

17 'Kazak kazaka vidit izdaleka', *Yuzhnaya stolitsa,* 13 January 1995, no. 2.

ironically noted, there were two Cossack organisations existing in two dimensions of the same administrative space.[18]

On 4 January 1995, the newly-elected Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma signed a decree on 'The revival of the historical, cultural, and economic traditions of the Ukrainian Cossacks'. This decree recommended that local authorities should support the activities of the Cossack organisations; it suggested that the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sport should organise Cossack festivals and sport competitions; it also required that the Ministry of Defence and the State Committee of Border Guards resolve the issue of conscripting Cossacks into special military units. The decree had little impact on the military. By that time, Ukraine had the first civilian Minister of Defence Valeriy Shmarov, who dropped the campaign to Ukrainianise the army, and tried to put his staff policy purely on a professional basis. He not only successfully marginalised the Ukrainian Union of Officers, but – significantly – even ordered the removal of the portraits of the 'glorious Ukrainian Hetmans' from the walls of the General Staff.[19] The rift between *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo*, as an attempt of the new Ukrainian political élite to provide national forces for the independent state, on the one hand, and the Armed Forces on the other hand, was made even deeper by the unwillingness of the old *nomenklatura* to accept the new ideology, despite the increasingly low morale of the existing armed forces.[20]

Dissatisfied with this situation, the Ukrainian Cossacks made an attempt to change the leadership and to dismiss Hetman Mulyava, as being unable to unite the different Cossack movements and foster Cossack interests in the armed forces. In November 1994, the Zaporozhian Cossacks split off as an independent organisation – *Viysko Zaporozke Nyzove* – from the 'official' organisation of the *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* in that region – *Zaporozka Sich*. This was the first serious blow to the Ukrainian Cossack movement. The leader of the 'separatists' O. Panchenko was expelled from the *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* by Mulyava. Yet, during the next Grand Council of the *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* in October 1995 an attempt was made to dismiss Hetman Mulyava by means of the 'Chorna Rada' – an alternative Cossack gathering, which as a historical institution dates back to late-medieval times as a means of overthrowing an unpopular leader. The rebel Cossacks elected an alternative Hetman, and annexed the archives and official stamps of the *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo*. Hetman Mulyava expelled these Cossacks too from the *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo*, and later they set up an independent *Zvychayeve Kozatstvo* (Cossacks of customary law). The latter attracted the core of those active members who were among the first to create and join the contemporary Cossack movement.

An attempt was made to achieve some kind of national-level organisational unity for the Cossacks in August 1996, when the Cossack leadership registered *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* as an international public organisation. Apart from the fact

18 'Kazaki pishut', *Yuzhnaya stolitsa,* 27 January 1995, no. 4.

19 Pavel K. Baev and Tor Bukkvoll, 'Ukraine's Army under civilian rule', *Jane's Intelligence Review,* January 1996, p. 9.

20 T. Kuzio, 'The Ukrainian Armed forces in Crisis', *Jane's Intelligence Review,* August 1995, vol. 7, no. 7, p .305.

that membership was now formally open to the Ukrainian diaspora, the new status reflected a legal attempt to claim that this new Union of all Ukrainian Cossacks was 'the legal successor to the all-Ukrainian public organisations of Ukrainian Cossacks'. The statute of the Ukrainian Cossacks was agreed with the Ministry of Defence, the Command of the National Guard, the Border Troops, the Civil Defence, and other ministries and departments in Ukraine.[21]

On 22 December 1996, the Ministry of Defence, now headed by Lieutenant General Oleksander Kuzmuk (previously commander of the National Guards), mentioned the Cossack organisation in its Directive No. D-41 'On the development of relations between the military command and public organisations'. The directive suggested to the military commanders of various districts and departments to collaborate with public organisations in the patriotic, cultural, and linguistic education of army personnel, and, particularly, in pre-conscription education. At the same time, however, the Directive, signed by the Minister of Defence, required the commanders to comply with the Ukrainian military doctrine, the law on the Armed Forces, and article No. 37 of the Ukrainian Constitution, which forbids the activities of political parties and movements in the Armed Forces.

Yet the unity of Cossack organisations appeared difficult to achieve. One of the most numerous and successful organisations was the Association of Cossacks in Ukraine *(Spilka kozakiv Ukrayiny),* which had supporters primarily in Central and Eastern Ukraine, and was led by the General Otaman of the Zaporizhzhya Host Oleksandr Panchenko. Panchenko claimed there were around 20,000 members in his organisation, which is effectively a rival to the *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo,* but with a similar ideology.[22] Other organisations which extended beyond a single region included the *Vilne Kozatstvo* (Free Cossacks) and the *Zvychayeve Kozatstvo* (Cossacks of customary law). Yet, only *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* is perceived as a national organisation.

Nevertheless, the Cossack idea became widely accepted in society. Cossack imagery became common in TV shows and all sorts of festivals and mass entertainment, as well as in cigarette and alcohol branding. By the end of 1996, the Institute of History at the National Academy of Sciences, with the support of *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo,* founded the Cossacks' Research Institute, which aimed at conducting research on the history of the Cossacks, as well as 'forming a nationally-conscious Ukrainian élite'.[23] On 5 July 1995, this Institute together with Kyiv State University and the Main Directorate for Education of the Ministry of Defence organised a conference 'Contemporary Cossack Pedagogy' to develop a programme for the pre-conscription education of Ukrainian youth, based on Cossack historical traditions. This programme was recommended to the Ministry of Education. Yet, in December 1997 Hetman Mulyava had to admit that, despite the Presidential decree of 4 January 1995, which requested the Ministry of Defence

21 V. Mulyava, 'Ukrainian Cossacks', *Ukrayinske Slovo,* 5 September 1996, pp. 3–4.

22 V. Puzhaychereda, 'Cossack movement is a reaction of the life conditions', *Den,* no. 92, 30 May 1997, p. 4.

23 'The Institute of History of Ukrainian Cossacks', *Vechirniy Kyiv,* 12 December 1997, pp. 2–3.

and other relevant structures to consider within three months embodying Ukrainian Cossacks into separate army units, no formal regulations were issued by the relevant institutions.[24] Moreover, the law on Cossacks, drafted by Hetman Mulyava and submitted to the government, was rejected in August 1998 by the Ministry of Justice, the Interior Ministry, the Customs Committee, and also the National Academy of Sciences, which had been asked to approve it. Hence, it was hardly surprising that before the next election of a new Hetman, the Kyiv regional Cossack organisation of the *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* expressed its mistrust of Mulyava. In an open letter dated 30 September 1998, the Kyiv Cossacks accused the Hetman of violating Cossack traditional law, failing to ensure free and fair elections, economic failure, and financial mismanagement. The Cossacks stated that because of the demagogic populism of Hetman Mulyava neither he personally, nor the *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* as a whole are taken seriously by the power structures. They also accused Mulyava of causing the disintegration of the Cossack organisation, and called on him to resign.[25] An attempt to postpone the election of a new Hetman did not help Mulyava, who also lost his seat in the Ukrainian parliament. On 31 October 1998, the Grand Council of the *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* elected a new Hetman – Major-General of the National Guard and MP Ivan Bilas. It is worth noting that Bilas was also head of the Union of Ukrainian Officers, and an active member of the All-Ukrainian Brotherhood of Veterans of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army). In other words, the new Cossack Hetman belonged to all those nationalist patriotic organisations, which were not in favour with the current Ukrainian political establishment. Hence one may predict that the *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* as a paramilitary organisation in the foreseeable future (under the current political leadership of Ukraine) will continue to be an unwanted formation of the national-democratic opposition.

The future of *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo,* the organisation which can realistically count on a few thousand active members, will, however, depend on its ability to find its own niche in the political life in Ukraine. Its Kyiv regional branch has already suggested creating a Cossack political party. The *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo* has established organisational structures, defined its legal status in society, and proved in this way its own viability. But the problem is that so far it has failed to find any sector of society with a positive desire to support its aims. The executive powers which have now established extensive and relatively reliable security forces do not need Cossack units, to say nothing of the fact that they do not have the money to maintain even the existing Armed Forces. The latter are consistently demoralised by under-funding, and are becoming more and more 'an army of theoreticians'. They have no incentive therefore to lobby on behalf of the Cossacks' establishing Cossack training for future conscripts, as under different circumstances they might have done. Across the board, as Ukrainian society struggles for survival in conditions of economic collapse, apathy is more and more prevalent. Yet, the experience of similar development in Russian society

24 O. Shapovalenko, 'Slavnykh Velykykh Pravnuky', *Vechirniy Kyiv,* 12 December 1997, p.3
25 *Kozatska Rada,* September 1998, no. 5, pp. 1–4.

suggests that sooner or later the Cossacks will find some group or groups to give them political and/or financial support. Members of the new Cossack General executive body include Serhiy Arzhevitin, the Head of the Association of Commercial Banks in Ukraine and now a Cossack Lieutenant-General. On 10 January 1999, Hetman Bilas organised a ceremony in which the Head of the National Bank of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko and some other leading representatives of the business community and bankers were inducted into the Cossack ranks. Bilas himself also decided to stand for the presidency of Ukraine as a candidate from the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists as well as the *Ukrayinske Kozatstvo,* although later he withdrew in favour of a single candidate from the national-democratic forces. In this way, Bilas has become the second Ukrainian Cossack Hetman to aim for the Ukrainian Presidency. His chances of success, or even of getting registered as a presidential candidate seem bleak, unlike 1991 when Hetman Chornovil was a major rival to the ex-Communist Leonid Kravchuk. Nevertheless, his attempt at the presidency indicates that the Cossack revival has created an institutionalised movement with a clear political discourse. The idea of Cossackhood lies at the heart of Ukrainian historical identity, and hence its appeal is likely to exist as long as the identity itself.   ❑

Family and Law in Ukraine: the International Dimension

Lyubov Pavlyk

F amily and marriage law occupies a particular place in international legal doctrine and practice; the Ukrainian state and society as a whole place considerable significance on these issues.

Marriage is a union between a man and a woman, entailing certain juridical consequences. However, forms of marriage are as diverse as its consequences, so that it is, practically speaking, impossible to produce a common description, which would apply to every case. All legal systems of the world specify various conditions which must be satisfied for a marriage to be valid: having attained a minimum age, the consent of third parties, the absence of close consanguinity or affinity, etc. Hence, freedom to marry as formulated in current doctrines is subject to certain conditions. Depending on which conditions are satisfied, a putative marriage may be:

1. valid, but not recognised (lack of consent of parents or guardians for the marriage of minors, etc.).

2. void (one of the couple is already validly married to a third party);

3. voidable (contracted in error or as a result of deceit).

Particularly complicated problems arise with 'inter-state' marriages, when the couple are citizens of different countries. The problems include choosing under which legal system and juridical conditions the marriage is to be contracted, and whether it will be considered valid under other systems.

The main legal systems in force in the world have adopted various rules for deciding cases in which different legal systems are in conflict.

One legal system rules that the decisive law is that of the place where the marriage was celebrated – *lex loci celebrationis.* This system is fairly convenient, since the place is easy to establish. Problems arise, however, in the case of marriages contracted by correspondence between persons in different countries. Some legal systems permit such marriages, e.g. under wartime conditions, when soldiers stationed abroad apply to marry a woman back home. In these cases, the law of the state of residence of the party accepting the proposal is taken to apply by analogy to the principle which holds for commercial agreements between persons resident in different countries.

However, the difficulty of this system lies in the fact that it enables the interested parties to contract a marriage in a place where the obstacles imposed by their domiciles do not apply, and thus to circumvent the barriers imposed by their national legislation. To avoid such situations, countries where *lex loci celebrationis* is in force have introduced legislation forbidding marriage to be contracted elsewhere than the place of domicile of the couple, as specified by their legislation on 'domicile'. The *lex loci celebrationis* system has become widespread in numerous Latin American states (Argentina, Paraguay, Mexico, Guatemala, etc.). With certain reservations, it is also recognised in England, France, and Germany.

According to the second system, private law which may be the law of domicile (Denmark, Norway, a number of Latin American countries) or the law on citizenship (the majority of other countries) is recognised as the competent law to regulate the conditions of marriage. And, finally, certain countries have adopted a combination of both these systems: simultaneous implementation of the law of citizenship and domicile, or of one of these laws together with the law of the place where the marriage was contracted. A similar situation applies in countries which ratified the 1902 Hague Convention on the Settlement of the Conflict of Laws concerning Marriage. In these countries, marriages are recognised as valid if they conform to the law in force in the place where they were contracted.

Another mandatory requirement regarding the form of marriage is the publication of banns or some legal equivalent, although if this requirement is not fulfilled, the marriage may be regarded as valid in all countries excepting those whose law has been broken. According to the Convention, a copy of the marriage certificate is to be sent to the appropriate authorities of the country of each of the couple.

The 1978 Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriage replaced the 1902 Convention as regards participating states, and introduced certain amendments to the requirements concerning the form of marriage. As in the 1902 Convention, the form of marriage is determined by the law of the place where it is celebrated, although where the 1902 Convention permits exceptions in favour of the national law of one of the spouses, these exceptions are also permitted by the 1978 Convention when the relevant conditions of citizenship or place of abode are satisfied by one of the spouses, or both spouses satisfy the requirements of domestic law, as defined by the rules on conflict of laws pertaining to the state where the marriage is celebrated. The Convention contains a list of marriages to which it does not apply. These are marriages performed by military authorities and on board a ship or aircraft, posthumous marriages, and 'common-law' marriages.

The form of marriage is regulated by the law of the place where the marriage is celebrated: *locus regit actum*. In the majority of countries, this means that to contract a legal marriage it is sufficient but not necessary to meet the requirements stipulated by the law on the celebration of marriages. The parties are given a choice between this law *(lex loci)* and their private law. In other countries, conforming to the law of the place where the marriage was celebrated is considered obligatory; here the norm – *locus regit actum* – is imperative. These states include Ukraine. Ukrainian law permits consular marriages of foreigners in Ukraine if at the time the marriage is contracted, the persons concerned are citizens of a state which has appointed an ambassador or consul.

In Ukraine, marriages contracted abroad according to the laws of the relevant states are recognised as valid. This means that a certificate of marriage between foreigners, issued by the competent authorities, is accepted as valid evidence of the marriage. In accordance with standard practice, a marriage between foreigners is considered valid if it is valid according to the law in force where it was celebrated, or else according to the private law of the spouses. Here we should explain whether and to what extent recognition of the validity of the marriage between foreigners contracted abroad may be limited by a reservation about public order.

Certain experts would argue that in resolving this issue one must take into account the existence of substantial differences between introducing a recognised procedure for the contraction of a marriage between foreigners within a country, and recognition of a marriage contracted abroad. Any *renvoi* to private law concerning the contracting of a marriage within a country should be limited only to matters of public order (e.g., in the case of an attempt to contract a polygamous marriage). On the other hand, a polygamous marriage contracted in some country where laws permit such a union may not be declared invalid in Ukraine.

The formalities necessary for a marriage to be recognised as valid are specified by international agreements. At present, a number of international agreements are in force in Ukraine regarding civil, family, and criminal law, as well as in consular conventions between Ukraine and foreign states.

The countries with which Ukraine has concluded such agreements are: China, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Poland.

In 1993, Ukraine concluded a multilateral Convention on legal cooperation and legal relations on civil, family, and criminal cases and a Protocol to it with member states of the CIS.

According to the Ukrainian law on international agreements and the law on succession, Ukraine has ratified the international agreements on legal cooperation concluded by the Soviet Union with the following states: Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, North Korea, Romania, Tunisia, Vietnam, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.

The agreements on legal cooperation provide identical regulations for issues of the family and marriage, taking into account the specifics of the national legislation of states which are parties to the agreements.

The Ukrainian Republic's Code on Marriage and the Family permits Ukrainian citizens outside Ukraine to celebrate a marriage not only in consulates and embassies, but also before the relevant authorities of foreign countries. These marriages, celebrated according to the form of marriage established by the law of the place where it was celebrated, are recognised as valid in Ukraine, provided the essential conditions for a marriage stipulated by Ukrainian legislation are satisfied.

The rules of Ukrainian legislation on the recognition of a marriage as void apply to marriages celebrated between Ukrainian and foreign citizens. The Code of Ukraine on Marriage and the Family contains no rules about the conflict of laws concerning the validity of a marriage contracted with a foreigner, however the practice of recognising foreign decrees of dissolution of the marriage is in force.

The formalities of divorce, like those of celebration of marriage, vary from country to country.

Only those marriages which are considered to be marriages in the country where the divorce petition is filed can be dissolved there by divorce. The choice of the law to be applied by a court depends on which criteria govern one or another legal system.

The majority of European and Latin American systems in principle resolve this issue in favour of the national law of the couple or the husband; however, in cases when the law refers to public policy, the 'law of the court' – the principle *lex fori,* is applied.

Regarding divorce, for example, the 1902 Hague Convention permits this only in the case when the national law of the spouses, and likewise *lex fori* provide for it, and if, in addition, the case in question exhibits grounds for divorce under both legal systems. If the spouses are citizens of different states, some legal systems apply the principle of residual common citizenship. Both these decisions may cause injustice to the wife in cases when prior to the marriage she was a citizen of a state which permits divorce, and by the marriage acquired citizenship of a state which does not permit divorce. Certain other legal systems apply the conflict-resolving principle of *lex fori* or *lex domicilii* ('place of residence'), which, as a rule, coincides with *lex fori*. Such a principle is in force in Austria, Greece, Denmark, Norway, and certain Latin American states: Chile, Ecuador, and Uruguay. In Anglo American law, *lex fori* operates.

The need for unified conflict-resolving rules in matters of divorce has led to the development and adoption of a number of international conventions. The 1902 Hague Convention on the Settlement of the Conflict of Laws Concerning Marriage established a dual *renvoi:* divorce should be permitted by national law and the law of the place of its formation.

The Hague Convention provides for a divorce issued in one contracting state to be recognised in another contracting state.

The Convention lists the conditions to be satisfied for the recognition of divorce or court divorce, made abroad.

Divorce cases in Ukraine are conducted according to Ukrainian legislation concerning the conditions and formalities of divorce. Hence, foreign law does not apply to the persons filing an application for divorce in Ukraine in the absence of some specific international agreement.

Divorces obtained by foreign citizens outside Ukraine according to the laws of the relevant states are recognised as valid in Ukraine. However, this rule does not extend to the consequences of divorces if these affect Ukraine.

The issue here is that certain consequences of such divorces may not be envisaged by Ukrainian law, e.g. an unconditional ruling depriving the guilty party of the right to bring up the children, matters of the receipt of maintenance from the former spouse, and the loss of it on contracting another marriage, etc.

The issues which concern the consequences of a dissolved marriage are resolved by the Ukrainian courts according to Ukrainian law, unless otherwise provided for by international agreement.

In cases when the marriage of a Ukrainian citizen to a foreigner is dissolved abroad according to the law of the state in question, this divorce is recognised as valid if at the time of dissolution of the marriage at least one of the couple was domiciled outside Ukraine.

If Ukrainian citizens domiciled outside Ukraine decide to terminate their marriage there, then the divorce will be recognised as valid in Ukraine providing it is in accordance with the requirements of the law of the state in question. This, however, does not deprive such citizens of their right to have the marriage dissolved in a Ukrainian court, or, if it is permitted, in the registry departments of consular offices of Ukraine.

All agreements of Ukraine on legal cooperation regulate the issue of the dissolution of marriage, and resolve it differently in various situations: in accordance with the law of citizenship of the couple, the law of the place of their last cohabitation, the law of court of the state where the divorce petition was filed, and the proceedings initiated.

The choice of rules made by the Ukrainian court regarding any particular divorce will be guided by the family/marriage legislation of Ukraine and its international agreements. The primary concern of the Ukrainian judge is how best to conduct the case to preserve the family and encourage the spouses to reconciliation. This is a requirement of Ukrainian legislation.

In cases when the spouses are of different citizenship, the issue arises of which law will determine the legal system to be applied to the matrimonial property of the said spouses.

A number of countries make provision for rules to resolve conflict of laws, established by statute or common law. For example, there is the Italian rule according to which the national law of the husband at the time of the celebration of the marriage is decisive. The spouses have the right to chose which legal system will apply only within the framework laid down by the domestic law to which the particular rule for conflict of laws applies.

The rules for conflict of laws in England and France differ from this norm. French law does not envisage a fixed rule to be applied irrespective of the wishes of the souses, but grants them the right to choose. If they do not choose any specific law, then the court bases its decision on their future intentions. In practice, this allows the French court the opportunity to apply the law of permanent domicile of the spouses, or their national law, or, indeed, whatever law seems most appropriate to the given case.

According to English law, the parties are also free to decide which system of law shall be applied. English law bases itself on the principle of unlimited autonomy of the will of the parties concerned. But English precedents, unlike French law, have established rules of conflict, which come into force if the parties do not select a specific law, or fail to agree on which law is to be implemented.

Unified norms dealing with the marriage and/or divorce of a foreign couple are contained in a number of international conventions.

Thus the international Convention on conflict of laws regarding the personal and property relations of spouses of 1905 adopted in the Hague regulates the individual relations of the foreign couples, basing itself on national laws. The norms of this convention are of a dispositive nature, and are implemented only when nothing else is stipulated by an agreement between the spouses. If no such understanding has been entered into and no agreement reached concerning it, then the property relations of the couple are determined by the private law of the state of domicile of the husband at the moment of the formation of the marriage.

Since in many states marriage contracts are considered to be the basic method of protecting the property interests of the intending spouses, the convention includes in Annex 1 procedures for introducing changes into such documents.

Matters of alimony are settled on the basis of the 1978 Convention on the Law applicable to Matrimonial Property, which allows the spouses a choice of the rules to and applied regarding parental rights and the disposal of their joint property.

Alimony and support matters for a foreign couple are to be resolved on the basis of the clauses in that Convention as regards alimony and support payments, including the support of illegitimate children.

As far as relations between the former spouses are concerned, the Convention of 1973 replaces the Convention on the law of child support of 1956.

The Ukrainian Family/Marriage Code is not in conflict with foreign law regarding personal and property relations. In a marriage, both spouses have equal rights; they may jointly choose to use the same surname or retain their pre-marital surnames, may freely choose their occupation, profession, and place of residence, jointly decide on the upbringing of their children, retain personal property rights, and by virtue of the marriage possess the right to acquire property jointly; this then becomes their joint matrimonial property. In addition, they are obliged each to contribute to the support of the other.

International agreements on legal cooperation pay particular attention to the rules governing the marriage of spouses according as they are citizens of one state or of two different states, and whether they reside in the same or different state. (If they reside in the same state, the law of that state applies; if they reside in different states and have different systems, the law of the state where they had their last place of joint abode will apply, or in the absence of this the law of the court where the petition was filed).

All international agreements of Ukraine are aimed at protecting the property rights of minor children and needy spouses.

The domestic legislation of Ukraine permits persons entering into marriage, or who are already married to draw up a matrimonial property agreement. In this regard, the spouses are free to choose the rules governing their joint property, and the provision of material support one to the other. ❏

History

The Universal of Union and its Historic Significance

Ivan Hoshulyak

One of the greatest misfortunes in Ukraine's long history was the prolonged partition of the Ukrainian lands between neighbouring states and empires. In 1883, the great West Ukrainian writer Ivan Franko expressed it thus: 'The deepest wound which now saps the strength from us here in Galicia – is the dismemberment of our land and our people, and our complete remoteness from the huge number of our brothers beyond the frontier'.[1] Indeed, even today, our on-going process of state building has not yet managed to eliminate the legacy of that protracted territorial, economic and cultural division of the Ukrainian people. To do so is a task, which will be with us for many years to come.

However, Ukrainian history can also show brighter moments – events which served as a spring-board for the activities of future generations, and which generated tasks and ideas, which shaped the course of Ukraine's long struggle for independence and statehood. One such event was the proclamation of the Universal of Sovereignty by the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) on 22 January 1919 in Kyiv, which, at least temporarily, united the two long-separated branches of the Ukrainian people.

This article presents a brief outline of the events which led up to that historic date, and assesses its historic significance. Such an appraisal is all the more important, in view of the inadequate treatment afforded it by certain scholars. It makes no claim to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject, since many of the issues involved are extremely complex and would well merit a lengthy treatise to themselves.

Although the Universal of Sovereignty may well be considered the culmination of a struggle for independence over many decades, we shall begin our account at the end of 1918, when the rule of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi was replaced by that of the ever-growing Directory, and the Ukrainian National Republic was restored. This initiated a qualitatively new period in the campaign for the sovereignty of the Ukrainian lands. This drew new strength from the ever-growing national-liberation movement of the Ukrainian people, on both sides of the frontier between the former Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires. The fall of the latter had meant the appearance on the political map of a second sovereign Ukrainian state – the Western Ukrainian National Republic. As Matviy Shapoval later wrote,

until the Ukrainian National Republic came into being, until then there could be no talk of a sovereign Ukraine, which could be created only on the condition that both parts of our land became free. The November revolution in Galicia and the November revolu-

1 I. Franko, 'Teperishnya khvylya i rusyny', *Dilo*, 1883, 29 September.

tion in Central Ukraine [i.e., the anti-Hetman uprising, raised by the Directorate] opened up this possibility of Union..[2]

Therefore, it was a matter of both symbolism and legitimacy that on the first day of the historic November uprising in Galicia [1 November 1918] the head of the General Military Committee in Lviv, Colonel Dmytro Vitovskyi, sent the Ukrainian National Union [UNS] in Kyiv a telegram stating the following: 'Lviv, occupied by Ukrainian forces, sends its homage to Kyiv – the capital of Sovereign Ukraine'.[3]

The notable Ukrainian poet Mykola Voronyi greeted the liberation of the Ukrainian lands, and in particular the formal entry of the Directory to Kyiv on 14 December 1918 with a poem entitled 'When you Love Your Native Land', which contained the following paean:

> The time has come, the hour is nigh,
> Kyiv smiles and Lviv shines bright!
> The yoke of Pole and Muscovite
> Free Ukraine casts off for aye.[4]

It was of considerable importance for the practical establishment of Ukrainian sovereignty at this time that the new state – ZUNR – was founded on the principle of sovereignty, aspiring to draw in all the Ukrainian territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Ukrainian National Rada, which proclaimed the establishment of Western Ukrainian statehood was composed of 33 Ukrainians from both houses of the Austrian parliament, 34 deputies from the Galician and 16 from the Bukovynan diets, as well as 3 representatives from each of the Ukrainian political parties. The only region not to be represented officially was Transcarpathian Ukraine, since it did not have its own deputies in the Hungarian parliament, or Ukrainian political parties. However, on 19 October the Konstantuanta received a memorandum from the Ukrainians of Hungary, which stated their aspiration to be included in the Ukrainian state. This document, which was read out publicly, concluded with the following words: 'You, our own true brothers, should stand behind us and unite us with yourselves. Our people are waiting for this salvation, so that we may at last free ourselves from the yoke of another nation'.[5]

Soon afterwards, on 3 November 1918, the yearning of the Ukrainians of Bukovyna to join in a Ukrainian state was clearly manifested at a national moot in Chernivtsi. The number of participants is given variously by different sources, but appears to have been between 10,000 and 40,000. The participants of this moot refused to have proposals for an 'Austrian' Ukraine and a 'Romanian' Ukraine foisted upon them, and firmly declared in favour of the self-determination of peoples, calling for the Ukrainian lands of Bukovyna to re-elect their governing bodies and to join Ukraine. The same day, the Bukovynan delegation to the Ukrainian

2 M. Shapoval, '22 sichnya (Spomyny i vysnovky)', *Trudova Ukrayina,* 1932, no. 7–8, p. 11.

3 *Vyzvolnyi shlyakh,* 1969, no. 1, p. 4.

4 *Ukrayinska stavka,* 1919, 1 January.

5 K. Levytskyi, *Velykyi zryv (Do istoriyi ukrayinskoyi derzhavnosti vid bereznya do lystopada 1918 r. na pidstavi spomyniv ta dokumentiv)* (Lviv, 1931), p. 118.

National Rada (established in Chernivtsi on 25 October 1918) proclaimed themselves to be the legitimate power in the Ukrainian part of Bukovyna.

The sovereignty of the Western Ukrainian lands was juridically asserted in the Provisional Fundamental Law on state independence of the Ukrainian lands of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, approved by the Ukrainian National Rada on 13 November 1918. 'The territory of the Western Ukrainian National Republic', stated the Law's second article, 'comprises the compactly ethnographic region lying within the frontiers of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy – that is the Ukrainian part of the former Austrian Crown lands of Galicia and Volodymyria and Bukovyna together with the Ukrainian parts of the former Hungarian counties… [which included Spiš, Zemplén, Beregszáz, and Maramureş] – as it is marked on the ethnographic map of the Austrian monarchy of Karl Chernih'.[6] That is, the ethnographic principle was taken as the basis for delimiting the borders of the new state.

In its very name, the Western Ukrainian National Republic proclaimed, on the one hand, the principle of sovereignty, in which it included all western Ukrainian lands, and on the other hand, demonstrated its inviolable ties to the whole of Ukraine, particularly with the tradition created by the Central Rada of the UNR. A proposal to call the new state the Galician Republic was soon rejected.

It was quite natural, therefore, that the newly-restored UNR and the newly-created ZUNR sought to be united, although there were many practical obstacles in the way. These included: the difficult international situation of both republics, which from the first days of their existence had suffered military aggression by their neighbours (RSFSR, Poland, Romania, etc.); the apathetic and often hostile attitude of the Entente powers towards the Ukrainian question, whose leaders often redrew the map of Europe at their own sweet will; and also significant differences in political, cultural, and every-day life caused by the enforced separation of the eastern and western Ukrainian lands for almost 600 years, together with the internal instability and the catastrophic split of the political forces in Central Ukraine; etc.

The Ukrainian National Union (UNS), whose initiative had led to the establishment of the Directory in mid-October 1918, produced a wide-ranging programme of drawing together a single Sovereign Ukraine, for which they hoped to enlist the support of international public opinion.

A declaration of the Ukrainian National Union on the internal and external situation of Ukraine, signed by the head of the Union, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, and its Secretary P. Didushko, stated that

> On the basis of the right of every nation to determine its national-state life, as was clearly declared in Wilson's peace programme, and on the historic and natural right of each nation to gather together into one whole those parts of it which have been torn away,

and

> The Ukrainian National Union considers it entirely natural and necessary to unite in a single Ukrainian state all the lands settled by Ukrainians, which until now, for various

6 *Konstytutsiyni akty Ukrayiny 1917–1920. Nevidomi Konstytutsiyi Ukrayiny* (hereafter *Konstytutsiyni akty Ukrayiny*) (Kyiv, 1992), p. 96.

historical and international political reasons, did not form part of the Ukrainian state, that is: Eastern Galicia, Bukovyna, Hungarian Ukraine, the Kholm region, Pidlyashshya, parts of Bessarabia with a Ukrainian population, parts of the ethnographically-Ukrainian Don region, the Black Sea region, and Kuban.[7]

This declaration was, essentially, an idealistic programme, embodying the proclamation of the ideal of sovereignty, to which all scattered parts of the Ukrainian people from the Carpathians to the Caucasian mountains ought to aspire.

The attitude of the UNS leaders to this issue was also spelt out in their reply to the Entente, dating from the beginning of November 1918, concerning the conditions on which the latter would give help to Ukraine. This stressed that, 'Recognition of the independence of Ukraine and the accession to it of Galicia, Bukovyna, Crimea, Kuban is non-negotiable, as too are the necessary guarantees of the rights of Ukrainian colonies in Siberia, Turkmenistan'.[8]

The first major step on the course to implementing this wide-reaching programme of sovereignty was to be the holding of an all-Ukrainian National Congress, which was scheduled to open on 17 November 1918 in Kyiv. The agenda of this Congress was to include: 1) the present international situation and prospects for the future; 2) the forms of state-building in Ukraine; 3) the economic policy of Ukraine; 4) agrarian reform in Ukraine; 5) the organisation of armed forces; 6) national self-determination in Ukraine. It is significant that in its rules concerning representation at the Congress, the UNS endeavoured to take into account the interests of all ethnographically Ukrainian lands, including the Don region, the Kholm region, Bessarabia, the Black Sea region, Kuban and Crimea, which, it was decided, should send their representatives through their National Councils. As regards Galician Ukraine, its population, as the resolution of the UNS stressed, 'will send a delegation representing all spheres of national life'.[9] Unfortunately, the government of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi banned the holding of the National Congress, thus sharpening still further its confrontation with the Ukrainian national-democratic forces and hastening the preparations for the anti-Hetman uprising.

As for the Directory itself, although its first official documents did not specifically raise the unity issue, it nevertheless tried from the very beginning to bring the largest possible area of Ukrainian lands under its rule. It was no accident that its official gazette, in which the various state laws were published, was called *Vistnyk derzhavnykh zakoniv dlya vsikh zemel UNR* (Herald of State Laws for all the Lands of the UNR). Further evidence of the Directory's attitude on the unity issue may be seen in the decision to convene a Labour Congress of Ukraine, which was envisaged as a proto-parliament of sovereign Ukraine. On 5 January 1919, the Directory ratified an instruction on elections to the Congress. This, together with an Annexe adopted later, stipulated that the Congress should include delegates not only from the UNR heart-land, as defined in the III Uni-

7 P. Khrystyuk, *Zamitky i materiyaly do istoriyi ukrayinskoyi revolyutsiyi 1917–1920 rr.* (Prague), vol. 3, p. 112.

8 Central State Archive of the Power Structures of Ukraine (TsDAOV), holding 3563, file 1, item 55, folio 32.

9 *Nova Rada,* 1918, 9 November.

versal of the Central Rada (20 November 1917), but also from the Kholm region, Pidlyashshya, Polissya, the ZUNR (Galicia, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia), the Khotyn, Akkerman, and Soroky districts of Bessarabia, which had a predominantly Ukrainian population. Finally, the stance of the Directory concerning the sovereignty of the Ukrainian lands may clearly be seen in its review (dated 9 February 1919) of the draft conditions for negotiations with the commanders of the Entente armies in Odesa, which it was hoped, would lead to a treaty with the Entente powers. In particular, one of the points was ratified by it in the following form: 'The Ukrainian National Republic is independent and sovereign on its ethnographic territories'. Furthermore, the Directory ratified annexes to it, which made the following points: 1) the Entente powers undertake to force the Poles to end their war with Ukraine; 2) the Entente powers guarantee the participation of the Ukrainian state at the Peace Congress on the basis of equality... 5) the Entente powers assist in the handover to the Ukrainian National Republic of the areas of Ukrainian settlement in Siberia and Central Asia... 7) The issue of the return of the Black Sea fleet to the Ukrainian state should be resolved at the Peace convention.[10] As we can see, the leaders of the UNR proposed a 'maximal' agenda, which included certain demands, which were quite unrealistic at that time.

The desire for sovereignty was even stronger among the Western Ukrainians, although from the very beginning there were being manifested also substantial divergences in the positions of the various political groups in Galicia on this issue. Those who actively demanded an immediate union with Great Ukraine included the Galician Social Democrats, students, some parts of the army, in particular the Sich Riflemen, and – for the most part – the workers. But the leaders of the Ukrainian National Rada and the majority of Western Ukrainian political parties, including the national-democrats and radicals, in view of the attitude of the Entente, initially focused on the idea of establishing a Ukrainian state within the framework of an Austrian federation.

On 18 October, the national-democrat Stepan Baran gave a special address to the Rada on 'Is the new state to strive for union with the Ukrainian State on the Dnipro immediately?'. After a turbulent 12-hour debate, a resolution was passed not to proclaim state unity with the Ukrainian state of the Hetman. Yevhen Petrushevych explained this by saying that President Wilson's Fourteen Points guaranteed the right of self-determination to the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy, while Russia was treated as a single nation and a single state. Thus union with the Hetman's Ukraine held the threat that the ZUNR could also end up under the rule of a 'single Russia'. The resolution was also undoubtedly influenced by the negative position of the Ukrainian National Rada towards the German occupation. So, too, did the fact that the UNS, which was at that time preparing a coup against Skoropadskyi, sent to Lviv an appeal not to unite with the Ukrainian state of the Hetman, so as not to strengthen the latter's position.

But the idea of the sovereignty of Ukrainian lands was becoming ever-more popular, particularly after the aforesaid decision of the Ukrainian National Rada.

10 TsDAOV, holding 1429, file 1, item 3, folio 16–17.

By the second day, an assembly of notables had convened in the hall of the National Home of Lviv, and this was soon transformed into a huge moot.

> Peasants, townspeople, workers and intelligentsia gathered from far-flung places and Godforsaken spots, from way out in the Hutsul country and from around Cracow, in order to express their concerted views on the destiny of their native land, and to confer about it. The mood of everyone was set on declaring the unity of all the Ukrainian lands with no distinction of frontiers.[11]

In order to work up widespread support for the idea of sovereignty, the advocates of immediate unity of the Western Ukrainian lands with Great Ukraine (first and foremost, the Social Democrats), set up a 'Committee of Unity of the Ukrainian Lands' in Galicia and Bukovyna. The Social Democrats were joined in this by one faction of the national-democrats, the radicals, the Sich Riflemen, students and other strata of the population. Kost Levytskyi, one of the leaders of the national-democrats, recognised that 'the idea of the unity of all Ukrainian lands, the whole Ukrainian people, was paramount at that time in the souls and thoughts of the Ukrainian people of Galicia'.[12]

One of the many examples of this was the meeting of representatives of village communities and organisations of the Drohobych district, held on 4 December 1918. This was attended by 186 delegates, representing 53 communities of the district, as well as a number of employees of the ZUNR. After reading a report on the activities of the Ukrainian National Rada in Drohobych, Semen Vityk stated that, 'Union with Ukraine is our only slogan, this is the most important political need of the moment, this is the question of our very existence, our state power'.[13] Opposing this idea, Vasyl Paneyko, the Secretary of foreign affairs of the ZUNR, attempted to explain why so far its union with Central Ukraine had not taken place. In reply, Vityk again stressed the need for immediate union, and tabled the following motion: 'The Congress of delegates of the Drohobych district considers the union of all Ukrainian lands into a single Ukrainian republic as an unequivocal necessity'. The participants passed it.[14]

The slogan of the union of Ukraine spread likewise among the people of Transcarpathia. The desire of the Transcarpathian Ukrainians for such a union is apparent from the mass meetings and moots in the region at that time. In particular, on 8 November 1918, a people's moot in Lubovn passed a resolution advocating secession from Hungary and union with Ukraine. The same day, the general assembly of the inhabitants of Yasin and the surrounding villages decided that the Hutsul region should be united with Ukraine. On 18 December, the regional assembly in Maramureş, rejected the urgings of supporters of union with Hungary, and unanimously voted for union with Ukraine. On 8 December, the people's assembly in Svalyava likewise urged unconditional union with Ukraine. Finally, on

11 V. Doroshenko, 'Zakhidno-ukrayinska Narodna Respublika', *Lieraturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, 1919, vol. 73, book 2, p. 165.
12 Levytskyi, op. cit., p. 98.
13 *Vpered* (Lviv), 1919, 3 January.
14 Ibid.

21 January 1919, the general assembly of Hungarian Ukrainians in Khust approved the union of their counties with Sovereign Ukraine.

In response to the unremitting upsurge of pro-sovereignty sentiment among the masses, on 10 November 1918 the Ukrainian National Rada obliged the State Secretariat of the ZUNR to take the necessary measures for the union of all Ukrainian lands into a single state. However, since the status of the Hetman's government was at that time unclear, there was no talk as yet of immediate union.

The successful Directory-led coup and the restoration of the UNR on the one hand, and the Ukrainian-Polish war in Western Ukraine on the other, expedited the process of union. Both Ukrainian republics rightly considered this to be the fulfilment of the age-old desire of the Ukrainian people for a state unity, which, at this time, would also help block Polish expansion into Ukrainian territory. Furthermore, the UNR leaders were counting on help from Galicia to solve their own complex military-political and state problems.

On 24 November, the ZUNR government took the decision to begin negotiations with the Directory concerning union. The following day, relevant mandates were drawn up and signed, and the ZUNR delegates left for Great Ukraine for talks with the Directory.

These resulted in the signing in Fastiv on 1 December 1918 of a Provisional Treaty on the future union (merging) of the two sovereign Ukrainian states into one. The first two points stipulated, in particular:

> 1) The Western Ukrainian National Republic hereby declares its unshakeable intention of merging, in the near future, into a single great State with the Ukrainian National Republic, that is, it declares its intention to cease to exist as a separate State, and instead to form with all its territory and population a composite part of the state integrity of the Ukrainian National Republic.
>
> 2) The Ukrainian National Republic hereby declares its unshakeable intent to merge, in the near future, into a single State with the Western Ukrainian National Republic, that is, declares its intention to accept the whole territory and population of the Western Ukrainian National Republic.[15]

The Provisional Treaty, which has been described as the 'first and fundamental act of sovereignty',[16] evoked the enthusiasm and approval of Ukrainian public opinion. In the days that followed, the campaign for national and territorial consolidation of the Ukrainians became intensified. Thus the Kyivan *guberniya* peasant convention of 21–24 December, at which Vynnychenko read out the content of the Provisional Treaty, stressed particularly that: 'The Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic should take all measures to help the working population of Galicia, Bukovyna, Kuban, and the Black Sea region in their fight for liberation, both political and social'.[17] Such principles, as one newspaper of the day put it, 'places our people at all free meetings everywhere around the whole, wide Ukraine'.[18]

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15 *Konstytutsiyni akty Ukrayiny,* op. cit., p. 108.
16 M. Stakhiv, *Ukrayina v dobi Dyrektoriyi UNR,* vol. 2 (Scranton, 1963), p. 41.
17 Khrystyuk, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 46.
18 *Ukrayinska stavka,* 1919, 2 January.

The ZUNR leaders gave the issue of union with Great Ukraine priority status, and accordingly strove to ratify the Provisional Treaty as quickly as possible. But military developments were against them. The Western Ukrainian government was soon compelled to leave Lviv and go first to Ternopil, and later Stanislaviv (now Ivano-Frankivsk). It was in the latter town that on 3 January 1919 at the first meeting the Ukrainian National Rada unanimously passed the resolution on the Union of the ZUNR and UNR. 'The Ukrainian National Rada', it stated,

> exercising the right to the self-determination of the Ukrainian People, proclaims solemnly the union as of today's date of the Western Ukrainian National Republic with the Ukrainian National Republic into a single, monolithic, sovereign National Republic.
>
> With the aim of effecting this union as soon as possible, the Ukrainian National Rada hereby ratifies the Provisional Treaty on union, concluded between the Western Ukrainian National Republic and the Ukrainian National Republic on 1 December 1918 in Khvastiv [Fastiv], and mandates the State Secretariat to begin immediately negotiations with the Kyivan legislature for the finalisation of the treaty on union.
>
> Until the Founding Meeting of a united Republic shall be convened, legislative power on the territory of the former Western Ukrainian National Republic shall be wielded by the Ukrainian National Rada.
>
> Until the same time, the civil and military administration of the mentioned territory shall be carries out by the State Secretariat, established by the Ukrainian National Rada, as its executive organ.[19]

Commenting on this document, the President of the Ukrainian National Rada, Yevhen Petrushevych, stated:

> The law just ratified will remain as one of the finest dates in our history. All along the path of union, our opinions have never been divided. Today's step will give support to the spirit, and will increase our strength. From today, there shall be only one Ukrainian National Republic for us. Long may it live.[20]

The UNR's ratification of union was celebrated with special solemnities in numerous towns and villages. Thousands of people took part in these events, at which the western Ukrainians expressed their will on the issue of the union of Ukrainian lands. On 12 January, for example, such festivities took place in Tovmach and Zalishchyky, on 14 January in Chortkiv, on 20 January in Drohobych, etc.

On 16 January, the Presidium of the Ukrainian National Rada and the Council of State Secretaries decided to send a delegation to Kyiv to give formal notification of the resolution of the Ukrainian National Rada of 3 January 1919 to complete the formalities of the union, and to take part in the Labour Congress of Ukraine. The ZUNR delegation was led by the Vice-President of the Ukrainian National Rada, Lev Bachynskyi, and included the state secretaries O. Burachynskyi, Dmytro Vitovskyi, Lonhyn Tsehelskyi, I. Myron, secretary of the Ukrainian National Rada Stepan Vytvytskyi, Semen Vityk, Ya. Olesnevych, I. Sandulyak, Teofil Starukh, Vasyl Ste-

19 *Visnyk derzhavnykh zakoniv i rozporyadkiv Zakhidnoyi Oblasty Ukrayinskoyi Narodnoyi Respubliky*, 1st edition, 1919, 31 January, p. 1.

20 M. Lozynskyi, *Halychyna v 1918–1920 rr.* (Vienna, 1920), p. 68.

fanyk, et al, *in toto* 36 persons. Significantly, it included representatives from all the Western Ukrainian lands, including Bukovyna (O. Bezpalko) and Transcarpathia (I. Myhalka, I. Patrus). The delegation arrived in Kyiv on 18 January, where it was warmly welcomed. The following day, there was a solemn meeting of the Directory and the Council of National Ministers of the UNR, which the Presidium of the ZUNR delegation also attended. The latter handed over to the Directory a letter of credence of the Ukrainian National Rada, the essence of which was the resolution of 3 January on the union of the ZUNR with the UNR.

The movement for union, which had arisen at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919 in Ukraine, reached its apogee in the last ten days of January. The centre of the movement was now firmly implanted in Kyiv. During those days, Kyivan newspapers were literally overflowing with headlines, articles, information, interviews, and other material on the union of the two Ukrainian republics. Particular note must be made of the publication of the Resolution of the Ukrainian National Rada of 16 January 1919 on the union of the ZUNR and the UNR. On 21 January, it was printed by *Robitnycha Hazeta,* and on 22 January by *Ukrayina, Nova Rada,* and other publications. This document also appeared in the first issue of the new journal *Zakon i pravo.*

The Ukrainian people eagerly awaited the Directory's reply to all this, and the opening of the Labour Congress, which was scheduled to ratify legislatively the union of the republics. This was originally planned to happen on 20 January. For this reason, on 19 January, some newspapers, particularly *Ukrayina, Robitnycha Hazeta,* and others, published an announcement (on the basis of the chancery of the Directory) that the solemn proclamation of the Act of Union of the Eastern and Western Ukrainian Republics would take place on 20 January at 11.00 a.m. on the Sophia Square, following which the Directory, together with representatives from the ZUNR, would leave for the Opera House for the opening of the Labour Congress. However, owing to the military situation, many deputies were unable to arrive on time, and these activities had to be deferred.

The Directory and the Council of National Ministers decided that the solemn celebration of the union of the ZUNR and UNR should take place on 22 January. It can hardly have been coincidental that this day was the first anniversary of the historic IV Universal of the Central Rada, by which the UNR was proclaimed an independent state. It thus became the date of a double national celebration – independence and union. The government entrusted the organisation of the festivities to the Minister of Education Ivan Ohiyenko, and allotted 100,000 karbovantsi to cover the expenses. A detailed programme of the celebration of the union was published in the press.

Late on 21 January, the issue of union was discussed, yet again, for almost 3 hours by a joint meeting of the Council of National Ministers of the UNR and the ZUNR delegation. After this, the government, held a short (45-minute) meeting, which ended at 12.30 a.m. on January 22, with the unanimous resolution: 'To ratify the Union of the Ukrainian National Republic with the Western Ukrainian National Republic'.[21] The Directory produced the final text of the Universal of Union later that morning.

21 TsDAOV, holding 1065, file 1, item 15, folio 82–82 recto.

Finally 22 January 1919 arrived, they day which was destined to remain forever in the history of Ukraine as a great national festival. From early morning, the city took on a festive appearance. Ukrainian flags flew on every government building. The entrance from Volodymyr Street to the Square was adorned with a triumphal arch with the ancient coats-of-arms of Ukraine and Galicia. Ukrainian military units began to arrive to the sound of martial music. People flocked in from far and wide, filling the entire Square and adjacent streets. From every church in Kyiv, religious processions emerged. At midday, members of the Directory and the government, deputies of the Labour Congress, the ZUNR delegation, and members of the diplomatic corps arrived in the Square. From St Sophia Cathedral came out clergy accompanied by banners. A military band played the Ukrainian national anthem, which evoked shouts of 'Glory!'.

The solemnities began with an address by the head of the Western Ukrainian delegation, Vice-President of the Ukrainian National Rada of the ZUNR Lev Bachynskyi. He stressed in particular,

> We are standing here, in this historic square of the capital city Kyiv, the legally and freely elected by citizen suffrage representatives from Western Ukraine, that is Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathian Rus', and we bring to you and assure you publicly before the entire people of Ukraine, before the entire world and before the face of history, that we, the Ukrainian people of the Western Ukrainian lands, being of one blood, one heart and one soul with the whole people of the Ukrainian National Republic, through our own will, wish and desire to renew the national state unity of our people, which existed of old under Volodymyr the Great and Yaroslav Mudryi, and for which strove our great hetmans – Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, Petro Doroshenko and Ivan Mazepa. From today, Western Ukraine becomes part of a single unsunderable body, a United and Sovereign State.[22]

The State secretary of the ZUNR, Dr Lonhyn Tsehelskyi, read out the letter of credence, which had been signed on behalf of the Presidium of the Ukrainian National Rada and the Council of State Secretaries. In order to bring home to the foreign diplomats present the international significance of the act, a member of the Western Ukrainian delegation, Dr Yaroslav Olesnytskyi, read it out in French.

After this, Bachynskyi handed the letter to the head of the Directory, Volodymyr Vynnychenko. The latter welcomed the delegation from Western Ukraine with a brief address, in which he stressed the historical significance of the Act of Union. For the corroboration of the ratification of the Provisional Treaty of 1 December 1918 and the Resolution of the Ukrainian National Rada of 3 January 1919, Vynnychenko asked Directory member Fedir Shvets to read out the Directory's Universal on Union (Act of Union of the UNR and the ZUNR).

In this historic document, the Directory welcomed the step taken by the Western Ukrainians, accepted their declared union, and indicated how it would be implemented. In particular, he stressed that,

> Henceforth, into one are flowing the two parts of Ukraine, cut off from each other for centuries – the Western Ukrainian National Republic [Galicia, Bukovyna, and Hungarian

22 Stakhiv, op. cit., pp. 53–4.

Rus'] and Central Great Ukraine. The age-old hopes with which lived and for which died the best sons of Ukraine have now been realised. Henceforth, there shall be a single independent Ukrainian National Republic. Henceforth, a Ukrainian people, liberated by the powerful effort of its sons, has the opportunity to build an indivisible, independent Ukrainian State for the good and happiness of all its working people.[23]

To make the Resolution and the Universal known to all the people who had gathered on the Square and around it, these documents were read out by special rhetors from rostra erected on all four sides. After the end of the reading, the numerous clergy, headed by Archbishop Ahapit, conducted a special service of intercession and celebration.

Then the Ukrainian troops and delegations, who had taken part in the festivities, moved off to the music of the military bands down Volodymyr Street to the Opera House, where the Labour Congress was due to open. From the balcony of the theatre, Arkadiy Stepanenko addressed those waiting below, and announced that the opening of the Congress would take place the following day. The procession continued. Vynnychenko and Supreme Commander Symon Petlyura, who were leading it, stopped outside the building of the Guberniya Zemstvo, where they gave a short address. Vynnychenko pointed out, 'Citizens, today is a day of a great national festival, a festival of the union of parts long separated by our enemies. Citizens, take heed, and protect your republic from enemies. Glory to it!'.[24]

The following day, at 4.45 p.m. the official opening of the Labour Congress at the Kyiv Opera House took place. We should like to stress that numerous errors persist about date of the opening of the Congress, not only in personal memoirs, but also in scholarly literature so far. Certain scholars date the opening of the Congress to 22 January, the majority rightly adhere to 23 January, while some even say that this took place on 24 January. It is little wonder, therefore, that the Labour Congress's ratification of the Universal on Union is likewise dated differently in various publications. A careful study of the issue in question, however, has made it possible not only to ascertain the time of the opening of the Congress, but also to establish that the following day, 24 January, there were no plenary meetings.

At that moment, more than 300 deputies, including the representatives of the ZUNR, were assembled there. In addition, there were many guests in the packed hall. These latter included members of the government, civil servants, representatives of the diplomatic corps, the military authorities, political parties, and civic organisations.

The Congress was opened by Volodymyr Vynnychenko, the head of the Directory. In his address, he briefly outlined the history of the anti-Hetman coup, rated the role of the Directory in convening the Labour Congress, and also touched on the issue of the union of the two Ukrainian states into a single state. After the election of the Presidium of the Congress and an address by its chairman, Semen Vityk (a representative of the Galician delegation), who stressed the immense significance of the Acts of Union, the work of ratification began.

23 *Ukrayina,* 1919, 24 January.
24 Ibid.

The chairman gave the floor to the secretary of the ZUNR delegation, Stepan Vytvytskyi, who read out the Resolution of the Ukrainian National Rada of 3 January 1919 on the Union of the ZUNR and UNR. Following this, the Congress secretary, V. Zlotchanskyi, read out the Directory's Universal of 22 January. The audience rose to their feet to hear those two documents. Lev Bachynskyi, Mykola Lyubynskyi, and Tymofey Starukh delivered messages of greetings. Then in reply to the chairman's question whether everyone present was in agreement with both Acts, all the delegates (with the exception of a few extreme left-wingers) rose from their seats as a sign of consent. After that, at 5.50 p.m., the session of the Labour Congress was adjourned. Thus, on its first day, the Congress virtually unanimously ratified the Act of Union of the two republics, which thereby acquired the force of law.

On the final day, 28 January, the Labour Congress ratified a decision to include in the membership of the Directory a representative of Western Ukraine, to strengthen democracy by drafting a law on elections to the all-national Parliament of the Great United Ukrainian Republic, and issued a categorical protest against the occupation of Ukrainian territory by armies of the Entente, Soviet, Polish, Don, Romanian, and other forces, as well as all attempts on the integrity, independence and sovereignty of the UNR. The ZUNR was then renamed the 'Western Province' of the UNR. A little later, the President of the Ukrainian National Rada, Yevhen Petrushevych, was elected to the Directory.

Thus, the union of the UNR and the ZUNR was based on historical, idealistic, and legal concepts. It was based on the just and deep-rooted aspirations of the whole population, and was given legal force by the appropriate Acts of the supreme legislatures of the two Ukrainian republics.

However, external circumstances meant that it could not be brought to fruition. The formal 'Union' was destroyed by a combination of factors, including, first and foremost, the aggression of Soviet Russia, Poland, and other states, and the Russian White Guards, together with the negative stance of the Entente powers towards the Ukrainian question. Not only did they refuse to recognise the Union of Ukraine, but they also fought against its very statehood. Only two weeks after the Proclamation of Union, the advance of the Red Army forced the Directory and its government to leave Kyiv, and a little later to abandon almost the entire territory of Ukraine. No less tragic was the fate of the ZUNR; shortly afterwards, it was occupied by Polish and other intervention forces.

Much harm, too, was done to the cause of statehood and union by the internal state of the Ukrainian people themselves: splits into warring political camps, interparty and intra-party fighting, civil war in Central Ukraine, and major differences on issues of the strategy and tactics for achieving national statehood between the leaders of the UNR and ZUNR.

Furthermore, one should recall that the creators of the Act of Union understood it in essence as a preliminary treaty on the union of the two republics. Its final implementation was to be postponed, according to the conditions as ratified, until the convening of an all-Ukrainian parliament – the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, which would adopt the fundamental laws of united Ukraine, establish

joint organs of state power, and thus complete the process of union. This, however, for the reasons already noted never took place. The Union proved impossible to accomplish, and this had a negative effect not only on itself, but also on the future fate of Ukrainian statehood *per se*. The latter was soon lost, and the Ukrainian lands were once again partitioned between neighbouring states.

This, no less than the political sympathies of individual authors, undoubtedly has contributed to that fact that throughout the past 80 years, historians have given diametrically opposed assessments of the Universal of Union, so making its further elucidation a major task for contemporary historians. Particular attention in this respect should be paid to the assessments and judgements of those who played an active part in the Ukrainian revolution of 1917–20s.

Thus in his article 'Dukh vikiv' (Spirit of the Times), written immediately after these events, Serhiy Yefremov considered that:

> On that day was formed and ratified an act of union of the two, hitherto sundered, parts of Ukraine. The national body, for so long rent apart and divided, made the last act in order to grow together, not only in spirit, for this had been done long since, but also in political forms.
>
> The act is truly historic. It completes our long previous history at the same time evoking thoughts of what is yet to be...[25]

The social democrat Isaak Mazepa in his work *Ukrayina v ohni y buri revolyutsiyi* (Ukraine in the Fire and Storm of Revolution) wrote thus:

> This proclamation of Ukrainian Union was a great historic act in the life of the Ukrainian people. But, in actual fact, it had only a declarative significance. For the final ratification of the act of the union of both republics, in accordance with the resolution of the Ukrainian National Rada of 3 January 1919, was to be effected only by a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, convened from the entire territory of Ukraine. Until that time, the Western Province of the UNR retained its own separate organs of power, both legislative and executive.[26]

The greatest criticism of the Act of Union came from one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries, Mykyta Shapoval:

> However, the conditions of this 'union' were such that the 'union' was fictional, and disunion a reality. Prior to a joint Constituent Assembly, Galicia was to go by the name of Western province of the UNR, but it was completely independent. The National Democrats wanted at all cost to have a separate province under their own sovereign rule, and the Directory agreed to everything, and did not even know that one state cannot tolerate a double authority.[27]

The reasons behind the 'Union' Shapoval saw, first and foremost, in the ideological and political motivations. 'Our November revolution', he wrote,

> was a social revolution, but in Galicia – only national-political. Our goal was – Socialism, but that of the Galician leadership was capitalism, hence it put forward demands for the

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25 S. Yefremov, 'Dukh vikiv', *Nova Rada,* 1919, 25 January.
26 I. Mazepa, *Ukrayina v ohni y buri revolyutsiyi 1917–1920,* vol. 1 (Prague, 1942), p. 87.
27 M. Shapoval, *Velyka revolyutsiya i ukrayinska vyzvolna prohrama* (Prague, 1928), pp. 224–5.

'sovereignty' of the ZUNR, hence it created double authority, and hence the act of union was deprived of internal logic, and hence in the Autumn of 1919 this union tragically fell apart.[28]

At the same time, one of the creators of the acts of union, the Galician Lonhyn Tsehelskyi, described the Universal of Union in highly positive terms. 'The day 22 January 1919', he pointed out,

> will remain indefinitely engraved in the history of Ukraine. It is such a date to be learnt by heart by Ukrainian children of generations to come, alongside such dates as the baptism of Rus', as the Battle of Kalka, as the Battle of Poltava, and the destruction of the Sich. For the first time, since the age of Yaroslav Mudryi, all Ukrainian lands have been theoretically and at least declaratively united together in a single state. This day will be, therefore, an inspiration for the Ukrainian people until it attains full union in an independent and united Ukraine. This comprises the significance of this event.[29]

The thoughts of another authoritative participant of the liberation struggle, Oleksander Shulhyn, also deserve attention. 'The Ukrainian National Republic', he stated on 29 November 1959 at a jubilee meeting in New York on the 70th anniversary,

> lives and will continue to live in the hearts of the whole of Ukraine. In the same way lives on the idea, proclaimed on 22 January 1919: we may have been separated by borders, but this Act has forever established: there exists a single Ukrainian nation.[30]

A scholarly, objective assessment was given by Matviy Stakhiv, who wrote:

> From the point of view of state law, the Act of Union of 22 January 1919 was fully legal and binding. The implementation of this act was laid down in detail and it simply remained to implement it in the stipulated manner: by the decision of the pan-national Constituent Assembly of the United Ukrainian National Republic, which was to receive for ratification the details of the autonomous decisions of the Western Province of the Ukrainian National Republic. It was only the war situation which prevented the implementation of the requirements of the Act of Union in detail. Nonetheless, the Act of Union itself was not only declarative, but legally binding.[31]

Summing up, we may draw the following conclusions. On the long and unbelievably difficult course of the Ukrainian people towards its ideal of the unity of all its lands into a single sovereign state, the union of the UNR and ZUNR is an event of great historic significance. Regardless of the failure, at that time, of the Ukrainian efforts to achieve independence and the consequent partition of Ukrainian lands between four states (and not two as was the case prior to the 1917 Revolution), 22 January 1919 will forever remain in the history of the Ukrainian people as the festival of the Union of Ukraine. This was one of the brightest moments in Ukraine's history, the pinnacle of achievements of Ukrainiandom of this era. The postulate of Union became, after this, a pan-Ukrainian dream, an

28 M. Shapoval, '22 sichnya', "Spomyny i vysnovky", *Trudova Ukrayina,* 1923, no. 7–8, p. 9.
29 L. Tsehelskyi, '22-ho sichnya 1919 roku', *Vyzvolnyi shlyakh,* London, 1979, book 1, p. 3.
30 Ed. V. Yakiv, 'Zbirnyk na poshanu Oleksandra Shulhyna (1889–1960), *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka,* vol. 186 (Paris–Munich, 1969), p. 177.
31 Stakhiv, op. cit., pp. 59–60.

inalienable part of all Ukrainian liberation programmes of the following period – from the national-communist to the conservative-monarchist inclusive. The huge sacrifices on the altar of freedom and independence taught Ukrainian patriots, everywhere that fate had scattered them, to see in their dreams and to fight for a single, united, free and independent Ukraine.

We shall be bold enough to state that the Universal of Union of the Directory of the UNR belongs to those, unfortunately, few bright and long-remembered achievements in the history of the Ukrainian people, moments which no future setback or tragedy can ever reverse. It not only helped significantly the growth of the national consciousness of Ukrainians, and the formation and consolidation of the Ukrainian political nation, but in the decades which followed became a real factor of the political struggle of all Ukrainian patriots for a sovereign, united Ukrainian state.

A profound and definitive scholarly elucidation of this event, the establishment of its legal character, and the external and internal barriers to its implementation remains a task for the future. Future work on the subject should pay particular attention to a comprehensive study of the pro-union movement, which at the end of 1918 and beginning of 1919 encompassed (although in a manner far from uniform) all ethnographic Ukrainian lands. This should include the attitudes to Union of the various political parties and tendencies in Ukraine, the implementation of realistic practical steps towards Union of the various branches and spheres of activity of the two republics, as well as the identification of all factors, both internal and external, which at that time obstructed the implementation of the Universal.   ❑

The Origins of the Ukrainian People

Volodymyr Baran

The origins of the Ukrainian people is one of the most complex, intricate, and – at times – distorted problems of the history of the Slavs, and of Ukraine, in particular. If we turn to historiography, we shall find works in which the Ukrainian people is viewed as part of other, neighbouring Slavonic peoples, and its territory – as part of Russia or 'Małopolska Wschodnia' (Eastern Poland Minor).

The integrity and sovereignty of the Ukrainian people, its historic past and place among the peoples of Europe, is well-supported by archaeological, linguistic, and written sources. What is required today is a sound analysis and assessment of these sources.

In the past, this question was raised by Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi, who in his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, did much valuable work on it.[1] It was also addressed in the works of Dmytro Bantysh-Kamenskyi,[2] Mykhaylo Maksymovych,[3] Mykola Kostomarov,[4] Volodymyr Antonovych,[5] Ahatanhel Krymskyi,[6] et al, who all offered their own interpretations of historic, linguistic, and archaeological sources.

Furthermore, during the twentieth century, the quantity of source material, particularly archaeological evidence, which by its very nature is almost inexhaustible, increased fifty-fold or more. As techniques improved, the capacity of archaeology to yield new information has significantly increased. The gathering of new archaeological data makes the accounts contained in old manuscripts clearer and more specific. Thus each new generation of scholars has contributed something new to the subject, as is illustrated by pre- and post-World War II works, particularly of Viktor Petrov,[7] Ivan Krypyakevych,[8] Yaroslav Pasternak,[9] Vasyl Dovzhenok,[10]

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1 M. Hrushevskyi, *Istoriya Ukrayiny-Rusy* (Lviv, 1904); D. Bantysh-Kamenskiy, *Istoriya Maloi Rossii so vremen prisoedineniya onoi k Rosiiskomu gosudarstvu pri tsare Aleksee Mikhailoviche* (Moscow, 1822), 4 vols.; N. I. Kostomarov, *Istoricheskie monografii i issledovaniya* (St Petersburg, 1872), vol. 1, p. 21; V. Antonovich, *Monografii po istorii Zapadnoy i Yugo-Zapadnoy Rossii* (Kyiv, 1885), p. 225.

2 Dmytro Bantysh-Kamenskyi (1788–1850). Historian, administrator of the office of Nikolay Repnin, the Kyiv military governor (1816–21), governor of Tobolsk (1825–8), and Vilnius (1836–7).

3 Mykhaylo Maksymovych (1804–73). Historian, philologist, ethnographer, botanist, and poet.

4 Mykola Kostomarov (1817–1885). Historian, publicist, and writer.

5 Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908). Historian, archaeographer, archaeologist, professor of history at Kyiv University, editor in chief of the publications of the Kyiv Archaeographic Commission, and head of the Historical Society of Nestor the Chronicler in Kyiv.

6 Ahatanhel Krymskyi (1871–1942). Orientalist, belletrist, linguist, literary scholar, folklorist, and translator. Full member of the VUAN and Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR and the Shevchenko Learned Society.

7 Viktor Petrov (1894–1969). Writer, literary scholar, archaeologist, and ethnographer; member of the Shevchenko Learned Society.

8 Ivan Krypyakevych (1886–1967). Historian; full member of the Shevchenko Learned Society and the Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR.

9 Yaroslav Pasternak (1892–1969). Archaeologist; full member of the Shevchenko Learned Society

10 Vasyl Dovzhenok (1909–76). Archaeologist and historian. Worked at the Institute of Archaeology of the Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR from 1938.

Markiyan Smishko,[11] Yuriy Shevelov,[12] et al, and of present-day archaeologists, historians, and linguists.

The origins of the Ukrainian people was discussed by the present author in the third volume of the 15-volume series *Ukrayina kriz viky* (Ukraine Through the Ages), which is being published with the assistance and under the general editorship of V. A. Smoliy of the National Academy of Arts and Sciences. (Some of the volumes, including the third, have already been printed, the remainder are due to appear in print by the end of 1999).[13]

We shall not dwell on attempts to identify the direct ancestors of the Ukrainians in the cultures of the past (Trypillian,[14] the culture of the nomadic Iranian-speaking tribes of the steppes, which are subsumed under the name 'Aryans'). This task at the present level of archaeological finds is unattainable, whatever our own wishes and those of populism may urge.

We shall ignore the ideologised 'imperial' version, according to which the Ukrainians as a distinct ethnos emerged only in the fourteenth–sixteenth centuries, following the Mongol yoke. In the light of modern complex interdisciplinary research, that theory has been thoroughly exploded.

We shall simply attempt here to outline our scheme of the ethno-cultural development on the territory of Ukraine and contiguous territories, on the basis of new archaeological evidence and re-assessments of the various written sources, on which the proponents of an almost primeval East-Slavonic ethnic unity and Old Rus' nationality base their arguments. Therefore, we shall begin our look at the origins of the Ukrainian people in the middle of the first century AD, from the point when Slavonic attribution of archaeological cultures, whose relics cover an extensive part of Eastern and Central Europe, is amply supported by written sources.

Three of these (Prague-Korchak,[15] Penkivka,[16] and Kolochyn), which have a local Slavonic foundation, were located at the very beginning of the early Middle ages (fifth century AD) on the territory of forest-steppe Ukraine, contiguous regions of Belarus, and what is now the Kursk oblast in Russia. The two southern cultures – Prague-Korchak and Penkivka, occupied areas where according to written sources (Jordanes, Procopius of Caesarea, Mauricius[17]) lived the Sklavenes

11 Markiyan Smishko (1900–87). Archaeologist; directed (1940–1 and 1944–51) the Lviv branch of the Institute of Archaeology of the Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR.

12 Yuriy Shevelov (b. 1908). Slavonic linguist, essayist, literary historian, and critic; full member of the Shevchenko Learned Society and the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences.

13 V. D. Baran, *Davni slovyany* (Kyiv, 1998).

14 Trypillian culture. A Neolithic–Bronze Age culture that existed in Right-Bank Ukraine ca. 4500–2000 BC. It is named after a site in the Kyiv province.

15 (Prague-)Korchak culture. An archaeological culture of the late fifth to seventh centuries AD. It was discovered near the village of Korchak, Zhytomyr county. It was a variation of the Prague culture of the middle of the first millennium AD and spread to Ukraine from the territories of present-day Poland, Czechia and Slovakia.

16 Penkivka culture. A group of sixth- to eighth-century early Slavonic settlements near Penkivka, Kirovohrad province.

17 Jordanes. A sixth-century Goth historian. He was the secretary of the military leader of the Alans, Gunthigis. He is the author of the chronicle *De origine actibusque Getarum* (551), a basic source on the history of the Goths, the Huns, and the tribes north of the Black Sea. It contains valuable information about the ancient Slavs.

and Antae.[18] The third – the Upper-Dnipro-Kolochyn culture – occupied the areas contiguous to Belarus, where Slavs gradually became integrated with the Balt population. At that time, elements of the Kolochyn culture and its precursor the Kyivan, appeared also in the Saratov trans-Volga. The north-eastern group of Slavs gradually spread and occupied the trans-Volga territories, integrating with and assimilating the Finno-Ugrians. This is corroborated by finds of the Imenkivska culture. Gradually, over the centuries the Slav element there increased, creating the conditions for the emergence of a new ethnos, which may be regarded as the genesis of the future Russian people.

The most intensive flows of Slav settlement during the migration of peoples of the sixth–seventh centuries were directed towards the south, towards the Danube basin area, to the borders of the Byzantine Empire.

In the fifth–sixth centuries, Slavs of the Prague-Korchak and Penkivka cultures reached the banks of the Danube, and certain groups crossed it, which is corroborated by the settlements on its right bank.

In the Danube basin, the Slavs split into two groups, and their further settlement continued in two main flows. One flow – the Antae with pottery of the Penkivka type – moved into the depths of the Balkan peninsula, and the second – the Sklavenes,[19] with Prague-Korchak vessels – moved up the Danube. In the sixth century, Slav settlements of the Prague culture emerged on the territory of Moravia and Slovakia.[20] After taking over the upper Danube basin, the Slav groups, perhaps under pressure from the Avars,[21] then moved further west and reached the upper Elbe. They fairly rapidly settled the Elbe–Saale interfluvial, where Slav settlements of the Dessau-Masigkau type are known, dating from the turn of the sixth–seventh centuries. The nature of the dwellings (square semi-subterranean dwelling with a stone oven) and the Prague-Korchak pottery leave little doubt that this region was settled by the same Slav population which occupied Moravia, Slovakia, and Czechia, that is émigrés from the territory of Ukraine.[22]

This implies that the great migration of the Slavs began from the forest-steppe regions of Ukraine, from where the Antae moved into the Lower and Middle Danube basin and the Balkan peninsula, to Greece; the Sklavenes – to the Middle and

Procopius of Caesarea (ca. 490–507). Byzantine historian, whose writings are valued as a source for sixth-century geography and history.

Mauricius Byzantine emperor, reigned 582–602.

18 Antae. The collective name used by the Gothic historian Jordanes, Procopius of Caesarea, et al for the East Slav tribes of the fourth–seventh centuries.

19 Sklavenes. The Greek name for West Slavs, used by Byzantine writers of the sixth–eighth centuries AD. This term distinguished the Slav tribes occupying the territory between the Dnister and the Danube from the Antae to the east. They practised agriculture, animal husbandry, craft manufacturing, and trade. The Sklavenes formed a strong confederation which was destroyed by the Avars in the second half of the sixth century.

20 D. Bialekova, 'Nove veasnoslovanske nalezy z Zuhozapadneho Slovenska', *Slavia Antiqua,* 1962, vol. x–I, pp. 97–148.

21 Avars. A large union of Turkic tribes. The Avars appeared in the steppes west of the Caspian Sea in the middle of the sixth century AD.

22 B. Krüger, *Dessau-Masigkau* (Berlin, 1967).

Upper Danube basin regions and the Elbe–Saale interfluvial. The bearers of the Kolochyn culture moved north and north-east. In the fifth–seventh centuries, in the Saratov Volga basin area emerged settlements of the Imenkivska people, who were ethnically a mixture of Finno-Ugrians and Slavs. It is clear, too, that only part of the Slav population of Ukraine migrated from it. The majority of the population – bearers of the aforesaid cultures – stayed put, although with some significant internal regroupings. In addition, in the sixth–seventh centuries another flow of Slavs – the bearers of the Dziedzice culture – moved westward from central and northern Poland to occupy the northern part of the Oder–Elbe interfluvial.

The great migration of Slavs, in the seventh–eighth centuries, is recorded in the written sources, and substantiated by archaeological relics. It resulted in their division into three fundamental groups: southern, western, and eastern. These later became further differentiated to become the ancestors of the present-day Slavonic nations. This historical process relates equally to all the Slavs – southern, western and eastern. The integration of the Slavonic migrants with the local populations on the new lands, and their gradual absorption of foreign substrata led to cardinal cultural and ethnic changes and the genesis of new Slav ethnoses, both in the Balkans and the trans-Danube, and in the Dvina and the Volga.

The Slav tribes which remained on their native territory, that is the Ukrainian forest-steppe, as well as the left-bank Vistula basin (Central Poland) developed their own cultural and linguistic status, distinct from those who had migrated, becoming separate linguistic units – proto-Ukrainians and proto-Poles.

There is no evidence, neither linguistic nor archaeological nor anthropological to corroborate the theory that prior to the second half of the ninth century there existed in the middle Dnipro basin a tribal group of Slav 'Rusy', which supposedly drew in all East Slav tribes, mentioned in the chronicles, and created a single East Slav ethnic community. The Polyanians[23] received their name (we would say, rather, additional name) of 'Rusy' only with the arrival in Kyiv of the Varangian-Rus'. Therefore the phrase from the Rus' Chronicle '... the Polyanians, who are today called Rus'...' can never have meant that the name 'Polyanians' is an age-old synonym of the name 'Rus''. At the end of the ninth century, as a result of certain historic circumstances – the establishment in Kyiv of the dynasty of the Varangian princes, the name 'Rus'' extended to include not only the Polyanians, but the entire population of the Kyivan state, ruled by the Rus'-princes. 'And there were with him [Oleh] Varangians and Slovenes and others, who are now known as Rus''.[24] A narrower understanding of this term by the chronicler concerns the central regions around Kyiv, the heartland of the Polyanians, where the rule of the princes had the greatest impact, and the Varangian warrior-bands, on which initially their rule relied, were the most numerous. Rus' in the wider sense comprised the entire population of the Kyivan-Rus' state, from the Vistula to the Volga.

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23 Polyanians. A Slavonic tribe that lived on the right bank of the middle reaches of the Dnipro river, between the tributaries Ros and Irpin. They are mentioned in the earliest, undated section of the Rus' Primary Chronicle/Povest vremennykh lit. The last reference to them is under the year 944.

24 *Litopys Rus'kyi. Za Ipatskym spyskom*. Translated by L. Makhovets (Kyiv, 1989).

The era following the Great Slav migration (eighth–tenth centuries) is characterised by the regrouping of the Slav tribes on the territory of Ukraine. The archaeological material indicates a migration of a part of the right-bank population to the left (eastern) bank of the Dnipro. Unlike the previous period (fifth–seventh centuries), when there were only two large Slav unions in the Ukrainian lands – the Sklavenes (Prague-Korchak culture) and the Antae (Penkivka culture), these later formations include seven different tribal groups, named in the chronicles.[25] These groups coalesced under the rule of princes, creating the conditions for the emergence of East Slav statehood.

One such semi-state formation – 'Valinyana' – the origins of which reach back to the era of the Sklavenes, encompassed in the seventh–eighth centuries the entire southern group of tribes west of the Dnipro. It is recorded by the Arabic author of the tenth century al-Mas'ūdī (d. 957) in his book *The Meadows of Gold and Mines of Gems*. He even names their prince – a certain Madzhak, whom the other Slav princes recognised as overlord. This has archaeological corroboration. The whole area from the middle Dnipro to the head waters of the Vistula yields relics of a single culture for the eighth–tenth centuries – the Raykiv culture. There are no signs of tribal differentiation. This union never became a full-fledged state. It disintegrated under the onslaught of the Avars. However, its existence, albeit brief, points to the genesis of state-building processes among the southern East Slavs, which would manifest themselves once again somewhat later in the Central Dnipro basin. The Polyanians now became the mainstream force in the area. They occupied a key place in relations with the Khazars,[26] to whom the Dnipro Slavs for some time paid tribute, and later with the Varangians. With the arrival of the latter, an East Slav state was formed around Kyiv – Kyivan Rus'. This was based on the southern group of East Slav tribes – the successors of the Sklavenes and Antae (ancestors of the Ukrainians), represented in the second half of the first millennium AD by the Prague-Korchak and Penkivka cultures and their successors the Raykiv[27] and Romen[28] cultures. The socio-economic development of these was higher than that of the other East Slav tribal groups, and hence the state-building processes were brought to a successful conclusion.

According to the Chronicles, the Varangian dynasty of the Ryurikide princes was 'invited' by the Slav–Finno-Ugrian union of the Volga basin. In the second generation, it moved to the Dnipro and united the Baltic and southern Black Sea trading hinterlands into a single state – Kyivan Rus'. It gradually became Slavi-

25 We regard the tribes of Dulibians, Buzhanians and Volynians, after L. Niederle and Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi, as a single formation, which changed its name in chronological succesion.

26 Khazars. Semi-nomadic, Turkic-speaking people that appeared in south–eastern Europe after the expulsion of the Huns in the fourth century and lived in the area until the eleventh century. Eastern neighbours of the East Slav tribes and then the Kyivan-Rus' state.

27 Raykiv culture. Centred around the village of Raykiv on the left bank of the river Hnylopyata, Berdychiv district, Zhytomyr oblast, Ukraine.

28 Romen-Borshcheve culture. A mediaeval culture the typology of which is based on Slavonic fortified frontier settlements of the eighth–tenth centuries, located in the upper reaches of the rivers Desna, Seym, Sula, Syol, and Vorskla.

cised, and in the tenth–eleventh centuries extended its power to comprise all East Slav tribal groups. Under Volodymyr the Great (ca. 956–1015) and Yaroslav the Wise (978–1054), Kyivan Rus' reached the level of a single territorial-political and legal organism with the attributes of federalism, characteristic of the time. During the following century, in the Kyivan-Rus' state, under the central rule of its Grand Princes, there was a natural development of the ethno-cultural processes, which had arisen as a result of the great Slav migration of the fifth–eighth centuries. The state structures – the Kyivan Grand Princes and their warrior-bands, and the single Byzantine-Christian faith and Church-Slavonic literacy, acted as centripetal forces so that for some time a certain relative political and economic stability was achieved. Unfortunately, many later historians treat this political situation as implying an ethnic unity which led to the formation of an (imaginary) Old Rus' nation. In fact, during the century or so that the Kyivan Rus' state flourished, the local ethno-linguistic and cultural differences of the various East Slav tribal groups remained distinct, a fact to which the geography of the area undoubtedly made a major contribution. These differences, in their turn, were a prime factor in the disintegration of the Kyivan state, which, in actual fact, should rather be termed empire of the Ryurikides.

The break-up of the Kyivan-Rus' state began after the death of Yaroslav the Wise. The newly-formed principalities, regardless of their dynastic ties, also grouped around certain cultural and economic centres (Polotsk on the Western Dvina, Volodymyr on the Klyazma, and Kyiv and Halych in the Dnipro–Dnister interfluvial). These preserved the various local ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural traditions, the origins of which go back to the era of the great migration of peoples, and became the motive forces of the processes which eventually produced the three East Slav peoples – Belarusian, Russian, and Ukrainian.

The name 'Ukraine', 'Ukrainians' may also be traced back to the era of the Great Migration. The name 'Antae', which appears at this time, seems to be derived from an Indo-Iranian root meaning 'borderlanders'. The names 'Ukraine', 'Ukrainians' have the same significance, and may be considered to be a Slavonic calque from 'Antae'.

Although during the later Middle Ages what is now Ukraine was still termed 'Rus'' (usually with some qualifier – 'Little Rus'', or 'Red Rus''), the name 'Ukraine' was eventually adopted to avoid confusion with other East Slav peoples, eventually, in 1991, being recognised world-wide as the name of the sovereign and independent Republic of Ukraine.   ❑

Arts and Culture

Shevchenko's 'Aral Sea' Poems – A Selection

During 1848-49, Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's national poet, found himself far distant from Ukraine. In 1847, he had been arrested for membership of the clandestine 'Brotherhood of Sts Cyril and Methodius', which held idealistic views on what nowadays are called human and civil rights, and which envisaged a future in which all Slavonic peoples would be freely united in a confederation of equals. Shevchenko was sentenced to 25 years service in a penal unit of the Imperial Russian Army, and Tsar Nicholas I added, in his own handwriting, a special rider to the sentence, specifying that Shevchenko must be closely supervised and forbidden to do any writing or drawing. (He was a talented artist, no less than a writer).

However, at that time, the Russian army, as part of the Imperial campaign to expand the south-east, was carrying out a survey around the Aral Sea, an inland salt-water body, which lies in what is today Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and which, of recent years, has been largely dried up due to ill-conceived Soviet irrigation projects on its feeder rivers. In the mid-nineteenth century, however, the Aral Sea had not yet fallen victim to planners and was an ecologically viable 'sea'. In spite of the imperial ban, the military authorities decided to utilise Shevchenko's skills as a draughtsman for making maps and topographical sketches. Once given access to writing and drawing materials, he was able, in secret, to continue with his own literary and artistic work, although what he produced had to be carefully concealed.

Owing to the clandestine conditions under which he had to work, many of his poems from this period remain fragmentary and unpolished. Nevertheless, this period gave rise to much of his finest work in the various genres most associated with Shevchenko's name – Cossack ballads, threnodies over the fate of Ukraine or of individuals (particularly unhappy women) who typify that fate, minor-key lyrics, and laments over his own misfortunes as an exile.

The translations which follow are by Vera Rich. They are taken, in some cases, (with certain revisions) from the collection *Song out of Darkness* (London, 1961), save for 'Kateryna had a house…', which was first published in *Taras Shevchenko: Poeziyi, Poems, Poésies, Gedichte* (Munich, 1961), and 'Together, we grew up of old…', which is previously unpublished.

* * *

* * *

Not for people and their glory,
Verses bright-embroidered, curly,
Am I writing. For no others
Than myself, I sing, my brothers!

And captivity grows lighter
For me, when I write them:
As from beyond the distant Dnipro
Words come winging, flying,
Taking up their stand on paper,
Weeping there and smiling
Like children, gladdening the soul,
Cheering and beguiling
The lonely, luckless soul. And happy,
I am happy with them,
Like a rich and prosperous father
With his little children.
I am glad and joyful then,
Entreat the Lord of heaven
That in this distant land my babes
Fall not asleep forever,
Let my aery children fly
To that dear land, their home,
Let them tell how hard it was
In the world for them!
And in that joyful family
My children will be welcome,
And, with grey head nodding gravely,
The father will becknon.
'Better if such children were not
Born!' will say the mother
But a young girl will think quietly:
'I have grown to love them!'

1848
Kos-Aral

* * *

Kateryna had a house
With a fine wooden floor;
And guests came to her from the Sich,
That stronghold famed of yore;
One was Semen Bosyi,
One was Ivan Holyi,
Ivan Yaroshenko one,
Bold and brave, a widow's son.
'Poland we have traversed,
And all Ukrayina,
Never have beheld a maiden
Like to Kateryna!'
One said: 'Brother, see,
Were wealth to come to me,
Then to Kateryna I'd
Give all my wealth as dower,
To spend with her one hour!'
And one: 'Friend, hear me right!
Were I a man of might,
Gladly for Kateryna I
Would lay down all my power,
To spend with her one hour!'
The third: 'Lads, hear my thought!
In this world there is naught
That for Kateryna I'd
Refuse to do, I vow,
To spend with her one hour!'

Kateryna pondered long,
To the third spake she:
'I've an only brother pining
In captivity,
In Crimea lost afar.
Whoever may betide
To find him, then to him, O Cossacks,
I will be a bride!'

Straight their steeds they mounted,
Journeyed forth together,
Rode they three for to set free
Kateryna's brother.
One perished in the waves,
Was drowned in Dnipro's tide,

Once the heathen foe impaled,
In Kozliv far he died;
Yaroshenko journeyed on,
Bold and brave, the widow's son,
From cruel captivity,
In Bakhchysarai he
Set her brother free.

The door creaked loudly in the dawn,
The Cossacks raised a shout:
'Rise up, Kateryna, rise,
Thy brother stands without!'
Kateryna looked, lamented,
And this word cried she:
'Not my brother, but my lover,
I have lied to thee'.
'Thou hast lied!'
            And Katrya's pretty
Head rolled instantly
To the ground. 'Come, brother, let us
Leave this evil place!' –
The Cossacks rode into the steppe,
With the wind to chase.

Katrya in the field they laid
To sleep for evermore,
And oaths of brotherhood the Cossacks
In the steppeland swore.

                    1848
                    Kos-Aral

* * *

This is not a lofty poplar
That the wind is swaying,
But a girl who, young and lonely,
Curses fortune, saying:
'May the deep sea drown you, fortune,
Underneath its waves,
Since you grant not, even now,
Someone I can love!
How the girls all kiss their sweethearts,
How they hold them close,
Embracing, and the love they feel,
Still I do not know …
And I shall never know. O mother,
Hard it is to live
A maiden, all one's life a maiden,
Never fall in love'.

1848
Kos-Aral

* * *

Both the valley stretching wide
And the gravemound soaring high,
Both the hour of eventide
And what was dreamed in days gone by
I shall not forget.

But what of that? We did not marry
But parted as we had been only
Strangers. Meanwhile all the wealth
Of those precious years of youth
Sped away in vain.

Now the two of us have withered,
I – a captive, you – a widow,
We walk – yet we are not alive,
We but recall those days gone by
When, of old, we lived.

1848
Kos-Aral

* * *

Once more the post has brought to me
Nothing, nothing from Ukraine!
For sinful deeds, it seems to be,
I suffer in this desert plain,
Punished by wrathful God. To know
The reason why is not for me,
I do not even wish to know! ...
But my heart weeps bitterly
When I recall what used to be,
Those days, those happenings that once rolled,
Although not joyful, over me,
In my own Ukraine of old.
Of old, great oaths they swore, and vowed
To be my brothers and sisters dear,
Until we parted like a cloud,
Without the holy dew of tears.
So in my old age, I go
Blaming again and cu— ... No, No!
From cholera they must have died –
Or else a scrap at least they'd try
To send, of paper ...
... Ah, from anxiety and grief,
That I might not watch them read
Their letters, there, beside the sea,
I'll take a walk along the seashore,
That I might distract my sorrow,
Might recall my dear Ukraine,
Sing a well-loved song again.
Men would tell them, men betray me; –
Song has good advice to say me,
Will advise, distract my grief,
And speak to me the blessed truth.

1848
Kos-Aral

* * *

A little cloud glides to the sun,
With crimson skirts spreading and trailing,
And beckons to the sun to sleep
In the blue sea; and with a veiling
Of rose swathes it and wraps it round
As mother does a baby,
Sweet to the eyes. And for an hour,
For a short hour maybe,
It seems the heart will find some rest,
With the Lord God speaking,
But mist like an enemy
Over the sea creeping,
Hides it and the rosy cloud,
And trailing dark behind it,
The grey-haired mist spreads it afar,
And shrouds your soul and winds it
With darkness dumb, so you cannot
Tell one path from another,
And you long for it, that light,
Like children for their mother.

                    1849
                    Kos-Aral

* * *

Together we grew up of old,
And in child's fashion, loved each other,
And as they watched us then, our mothers
Would say that, when the years had rolled,
They'd match us up ... We were not mated,
The old folk died, untimely fated,
And young, we parted, unconsoled,
Nevermore to come together.

For willy-nilly, I was ever
Borne off far and wide; but then
In near-old age back home life took me.
The village that had been brighter then
Somehow, now I was older, struck me
As having grown both dark and dumb,
And old, like me, it had become,
And it seemed in that village lowly
(It seemed to me) that all was wholly
Unchanged, none had been born or died,
All was as in a former tide,
Ravine and field, the poplar trees,
And there beside the well, a weeping,
Willow, like one sad vigil keeping,
In distant lone captivity;
The pond, the dam, and there the mill,
Beyond the wood flaps its wings as ever.
The green oak, like a Cossack, still
Seems to come from the wood, to revel
Below the hill; on the hill rises,
An orchard dark, and there, inside it,
In the sweet coolness there, together,
My old folk rest, as if in heaven.
Their oaken crosses are all tumbled,
The words beneath the rain have crumbled ...
Yet not with rain does Saturn do
His smoothing work, nor on carved wording! ...
So grant my old folk rest eternal,
With the saints ...

Is she living, too,
'Little Oksana?' I ask, turning
Quietly to my brother ...
'Who?'
'That little girl, with curly hair,
We used to play with long ago ...'.
'Brother, you must be joking so?'
'I am not joking ...' She went away, did
That Oksana, on the track
Of the soldiers, she went straying.
True, a year later she came back,
But, then! She brought a bastard home,
Shorn-headed. Sometimes, in the night
She'd sit beneath the fence and moan
Like a cuckoo, or she'd cry,
Or sing to herself softy grieving,
Or move her hands as if unweaving
Her plaits... then once more went away;
No one knows what happened after,
Died maybe, or just wandered daftly,
But what a girl she once was, hey?
What a beauty! Not poor, neither,
But God gave her no luck, you,
'He gave, but some one stole it, maybe,
And made a fool of God almighty'.

1849
Kos-Aral

Reviews

Nations Abroad. Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union. Charles King, Neil J. Melvin (Eds.) (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado/ Oxford, 1998), 240 pp.

This collection of essays, by scholars specialising in specific areas of the post-Soviet space, addresses – as the title implies – the impact on the foreign policies of the relevant states of the existence of a large number of persons of their own, eponymous 'ethnos' living beyond the frontier. The editorial convention adopted here interprets 'diaspora' not in its usual sense, of an ethnic community dispersed world-wide after having been forced, by persecution or economic pressures, to leave its traditional homeland, but as meaning any member of that ethnos living beyond the home-state. It, therefore, gives no special status to those communities who have not left their homeland, but whom – in the classic Hungarian phrase 'their homeland has left', i.e. inhabit an area contiguous with that homeland but separated from it by an international frontier. It makes no difference, therefore, between the status of Ukrainians living in, say, Chicago or St Petersburg, and those residing in Southern Bukovyna, although the latter, as a 'compact' community, with 'historic' residence in the area (more than 100 years) and a linguistic and/or cultural and/or religious identity distinct from that of the 'host-state', have acknowledged rights under the international conventions as 'national minorities'. Indeed, neither King in his Introduction nor King and Melvin in their conclusions make any reference to these Conventions – and, presumably, in their guidelines to the individual contributors, stressed that this unified approach should be adopted.

This clearly is a major flaw to the work. Although many of the ethnic problems of the former Soviet Union can be attributed to top-level decisions in Moscow – whether deliberate deportations or simply the deployment of what was treated as a single labour force – certain communities have some basis for claiming the status of 'national minority'. The Poles in western Ukraine, for example, would seem to have a *prima facie* case for claiming to be a 'national minority' with more than 100 years continuous 'compact' presence, and a distinct linguistic/cultural/religious identity. Whatever their Ukrainian 'host-population' may think of such claims, the various frictions, which, from time to time, arise between the two communities (for example, over the 'Eaglets' cemetery' in Lviv, where Polish students who fought against the forces of the Ukrainian Republic in 1920 are interred) clearly indicate that the Poles of western Ukraine consider themselves far more deeply 'rooted' there than, say, their co-ethnics in Kazakhstan, the majority of whom are

there as a result of Stalin's deportations during and after World War II. King maintains that there are 'compelling reasons' to 'broaden' the term 'diaspora' to include all ethnic groups living beyond the borders of their 'home state'. 'In fact', he says, 'it is only when we see traditional diasporas as a sub-set of a broader array of transborder communities that the most interesting and important features of internationalized ethnicity become evident'. But if this is done at the expense of ignoring the specific category of 'national minorities' as laid down in the relevant Geneva conventions, then one cannot but question the validity of this approach.

This approach is only partially followed by Andrew Wilson, the author of the chapter on Ukraine: while formally adhering to the Editors' preferred extended use of the term 'diaspora', his study 'seek[s] to analyze several different ways of living as a diasporic group'. Thus, within the 'eastern' diaspora (i.e. the former Socialist bloc), he distinguishes three main groups: Ukrainians living in Russia, where for 'for centuries' they have been in contact with Russians, and where 'they still exist in a Russian-language environment', Ukrainians living 'alongside Russians in third-party host-states where both are minorities', and 'Ukrainians in western host-states, such as Poland and Slovakia, where there are virtually no Russians but there are other historical obstacles to developing a Ukrainian diasporic identity'. He then makes a second division into Ukrainians who 'live in potential ethno-regional units, mostly contiguous to the Ukrainian border', those who 'live as a non-territorial cultural community or as isolated individuals', and 'nominal Ukrainians who live as members of other diasporic communities'. He makes the pertinent observation that what he terms 'ethnic entrepreneurs' are

> likely to find it easiest to mobilize individuals in the first type of community, especially if: first, the region in which they live is perceived to be an irredenta of the broader homeland; second, the diasporic community is still ethnically dominant in the region; and third, powerful symbols of past statehood or administrative status are attached to the ethno-region or there is some myth of attachment to the original "homeland"…

(These first two conditions, incidentally, are among the conditions defining a 'national minority' in international law).

He then proceeds to examine the various regions within Russia which can be considered as potential *'Ukraïna irredenta'*: the Kuban, East Slobozhanshchyna, and the lower-Volga and Don basins. All in the seventeenth–eighteenth centuries were settled by Cossacks, all, in the early years of this century were for a brief time the target of 'Ukrainization' campaigns, but all, Dr Wilson concludes, now have a predominantly Russian identity. He then considers two 'Non-Contiguous Territories' with a significant concentration of Ukrainians: the 'grey wedge' straddling the present Russian/Kazakhstan border and the 'green wedge' of the Russian Far East.

Dr Wilson's approach is undoubtedly pertinent. If a 'kin state' is to take an interest in its 'diaspora' (however defined) to the extent that it is prepared to take that diaspora into account in shaping its foreign policy, then it clearly needs to know what the demands of that diaspora upon it may be. (Thus, Hungary's relations with Slovakia and Romania during the 1990s have been significantly affected by the grievances of the Magyar minorities in those countries). Dr Wilson, as

those familiar with his other recent writings will recall, tends to take a somewhat minimalist view of Ukrainian national consciousness, whether in Ukraine or beyond the frontier. He likewise considers that it is mainly 'nationalist groups' in western Ukraine who are concerned with the diaspora – not the Kyiv government. The nationalists, he says, consider that '"[n]ational revival" at home and abroad' are 'mutually dependent processes', so that 'political mobilization' of the diaspora 'would act significantly to the strength of the national movement at home, which often feels like a minority in its own state'.

Successive governments in Kyiv have shown themselves unenthusiastic about providing or sponsoring the necessary 'mobilization'. Early calls for a deliberate 'in-gathering' of Ukrainians from the 'diaspora' of the former Soviet Union received no active response. The interim constitutional amendments of 1992 and the Constitution of June 1996 make no specific commitments to diaspora needs, the latter simply (in Wilson's words) 'declared loftily that "Ukraine provides for [*dbaie pro*] the satisfaction of the national–cultural and linguistic needs of Ukrainians who live beyond the borders of the state", but did not identify how this might be achieved'.

This reluctance to adopt a more 'aggressive diaspora' policy is attributed by Wilson to a number of reasons: reluctance to give grounds for justifying similar interference by Russia in Ukraine on behalf of the Russian 'diaspora' there, a declared intention of building a multi-ethnic 'civic' state, the large number of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in successive Ukrainian governments, the 'real complexities of Ukrainian identity abroad' (which, he says, the 'nationalists seriously underestimate' and the fact that 'Kyiv's main priority is managing its general relationship with Russia'. One factor he does not mention is the economic one: the need to provide homes, jobs, schools, and at least temporary financial assistance that a policy of 'in-gathering' would involve.

In the next essay in the collection, Sally N. Cummings discusses, for Kazakhstan, the difficulties of actively implementing an 'in-gathering' policy in conditions of post-Soviet economic disruption. The economic factor is also brought to the fore in Melvin and King's concluding chapter:

> [t]he costs of developing contacts with the diaspora – and the limited economic gains that such contacts are likely to bring – have meant that relations between kin-state and diaspora have often been more a matter of rhetoric and "moral support" than concrete policies buttressing the cultural or economic development of co-ethnic communities. Indeed, the kin-states of the former Soviet Union have been most willing to engage with their diasporas in instances in which the homeland has been the beneficiary and the diaspora the benefactor.

In other words, the post-Soviet states are more interested in their trans-Atlantic and West European diasporas than their co-ethnics in the former Soviet World.

The framework of this book means that Dr Wilson's study devotes relatively little space to this latter Ukrainian diaspora, which he sees as a model 'not necessarily... to be emulated'. '[T]he role of the western diaspora has been more problematic in Ukraine than elsewhere'. It derives mainly from western Ukraine, and people who left 'when it was under the Habsburgs or interwar Poland,

Czechoslovakia, and Romania. The eastern diaspora, by contrast, was populated by migrants from central, southern, and eastern Ukraine during the Romanov and Soviet periods'. The cultural gap between the two diasporas is, therefore, says Wilson, 'considerable... Ukrainians from Canada or the United States bemoan the "russification" of Kyiv, while Ukrainians who experienced Soviet rule resent their proselytizing approach'. As evidence of this 'gap', he cites the fact that '[r]eturnees from the west have occupied middle-ranking and advisory positions in Kyiv, but have not risen as high as in independent Estonia or Armenia'. But, to be meaningful, such a comparison would need to take into account both the professional and personal calibres of the 'returnees' themselves, plus the availability of 'local talent'. (The two countries he cites as particularly favourable to returnees' career prospects are, after all, the two smallest of the ex-Soviet states). What would be more interesting to know would be how successive Ukrainian governments perceive the political clout of the western diaspora – first and foremost, in the USA – whether to urge the West into giving more aid, or should Kyiv appear to be reneging on its commitment to democracy – to impose sanctions. For that question, even if less immediate than Russia's putative reactions, must surely enter into the political decision-making of any government in Kyiv.

Crisis and Reform. The Kyivan Metropolitanate, The Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest. By Borys A. Gudziak (Harvard University Press/Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1998), xv + 489 pp, illustr.

This is a major study of one of the key events in East-Slavonic history – the Union of Brest, which in 1596 brought under the primacy of Rome a majority of the dioceses of Byzantine-rite Christianity in 'Ruthenia' – the lands which now constitute Ukraine and Belarus. So important an event for the history of both Ukraine and Europe as a whole has, of course, already been addressed by many authors writing in a diversity of languages – as the extensive (33-page) bibliography to the current volume reveals. Indeed, one might at first glance wonder what new material or insights Dr Gudziak can have brought to the subject, or whether this book would turn out to be simply a useful and praiseworthy compendium of previous deliberations in this field. On a closer reading, however, this book is found to throw valuable new light on the subject, not by presenting new facts (which at this late date is hardly to be expected), but rather by his broad, multifaceted approach to the context in which the Union occurred.

The motivation for the Union can be interpreted in several ways: ranging from its being a fruit of the desire of Christians to heal rifts in what should be the unsundered Mystical Body of Christ, to a sinister result of Polish power politics and *Drang nach Osten*. For his part, Dr Gudziak sees it as arising in response to a number of 'Challenges' – the fall of Constantinople, and the consequent subjugation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate – in the things of this world – to Ottoman Turkish rule, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in Western Europe, the

growing political power of Muscovy, and the effects of Renaissance scholarship in Poland, the latter engendering (he notes) a comparison with the level of learning in Ukraine to the considerable detriment of the latter. The main thrust of his work, however, is to study in detail the 'broader context' of the Union, with particular emphasis on 'the relationship of the metropolitanate of Kyiv with its Mother Church, the patriarchate of Constantinople'. Such an approach, he observes, required him

> to abstain from premature judgment, confine the treatment to the circumstances, mindsets, and events predating or leading up to the Union, and maintain a sympathetic attitude towards the main protagonists – ultimately divided by the union into two camps – so as to understand their motives and actions.

Not, one may observe, an easy task!

'Why would the Ruthenian bishops trade Constantinopolitan for Roman allegiance?', Gudziak asks. The answer is necessarily complex. However, in brief, Gudziak's thesis is as follows.

• The 'Greek endowment to the barbarian Slavs', at the time of and subsequent to their conversion, was 'somehow incomplete', with a 'limited' legacy of learning, 'filtered through the medium of the Church Slavonic language'.

• The Christianity of mediaeval Rus' [Ukraine] 'cannot be readily categorized according to the Catholic–Orthodox dichotomy as it came to be articulated in post-Reformational, post-Tridentine, and modern terms... in medieval times both metropolitans and princes of Rus' on occasion entered into contact with the Church of Rome, recognizing its primacy', even though '[f]or the East Slavic Christian community the pre-eminent ecclesiastical and cultural point of reference remained Constantinople'.

• There was a 'progressive institutional decline of the patriarchate of Constantinople under Ottoman rule and an analogous organizational deterioration in the sixteenth-century Kyivan metropolitanate' so that 'relations between the patriarchate and the Ruthenian Church diminished to a formal minimum'. This resulted, on the one hand, in a movement for religious and spiritual revival in Ukraine led not by the hierarchy but by the lay 'Brotherhoods', and on the other, in a new 'solicitude' on the part of the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate for the 'ecclesial well-being of the Orthodox in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth'. This culminated in a key event – the visit of Patriarch Jeremiah to the East Slav lands in 1589.

• During this journey, Jeremiah was 'detained against his will' in Moscow and 'forced to elevate the Muscovite metropolitan to Patriarchal dignity'. To offset this, on his return journey, he 'conducted a program of reform in the Kyivan metropolitanate', which, on the one hand greatly contributed to 'the revitalization of the demoralized Ruthenian Church', but also led to the bishops of the latter coming

to 'resent the patriarch's involvement in the affairs of their province'. Jeremiah's reforms, in effect,

> put into question the role of the metropolitan in the Ruthenian hierarchy and the prerogatives of the hierarchs within the Ruthenian Church. Hoping to foster the revival of the metropolitanate of Kyiv, the patriarch instead undermined some of its central institutions.

• Developments in sixteenth-century Western Christendom, together with the recent invention of printing, generated a 'new discourse conducted in sophisticated as well as popular idioms', which 'could not be ignored', and which 'confronted the Ruthenian community with the full richness of the Western theological, institutional, and pastoral legacy to which the Kyivan Church had remained largely oblivious for six centuries'.

• This resulted in a wave of conversions from Orthodoxy to Roman Catholicism or various forms of Protestantism among the high-ranking laity, and a spill-over into the Ukrainian lands of the 'notion[s] of reform and the possibility of fundamental change in religious and social structures' pervading Western Christendom.

All this, Gudziak concludes, led up to a Union of the Churches in which 'the decision of the majority of the Ruthenian bishops to reject Constantinopolitan authority can be viewed as yet another example of early modern repudiations of received assumptions' – a summing up which appears to present the Union of the Ruthenian Church with Rome as a parallel not to the Tridentine Counter-Reformation but to the Reformation itself!

To follow Gudziak's arguments in detail the reader needs, if not a thorough grounding in East Slavonic ecclesiastical history, then at least a sensitivity to it and a good support system of basic data and time-charts. The former can only be provided by the reader him/herself. The latter, however, is well furnished by Gudziak: chronologies of popes, patriarchs (of Constantinople, Alexandria, Jerusalem and, eventually, Moscow), Metropolitans (of Kyiv, Halych, and Moscow), Papal Nuncios to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Emperors of Byzantium, Ottoman Sultans, Kings of Poland, Grand Dukes of Lithuania, and Grand Dukes and Tsars of Muscovy. The Articles of the Union are translated in full, and there is a useful appendix on the 'Historiography and Source Base' for the Patriarchate of Constantinople during the era in question. With these guides, and Guzdiak's careful exposition, the book provides a valuable account of this key episode in Ukrainian history which may be read with profit, not only by the expert in the field, but by all who, whatever their personal specialisation, have an interest in Ukraine.

Flora of Russia. The European Part and Bordering Regions.
An. A. Fedorov (Ed.) (A. A. Balkema/Brookfield, 1999), vol. I, 546 pp, 135 euro, vol. II, 323 pp, 95 euro

This is a translation into (American) English of a work, which first appeared, in Russian, in 1976. In spite of its title, the area covered includes, in fact, the entire European part of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, some of the plants catalogued do not seem to occur in Russia at all, for example, *Orchis coriophora nervulosa,*

which is specific to the water-meadows of the Dnipro. According to its introductory note, this book 'is intended to be the basic reference book for identification of plants by botanists, agronomists, teachers, students, and nature lovers'. In the case of the latter, they would have to be something more than amateurs; it is a specialist work, which makes no concession to the lay reader. Moreover, the extreme scarcity of the illustrations, and the fact that the few which do exist are black-and-white line-drawings, mean that for the most part identifications would have to be made on the basis of terse, verbal descriptions only. To the trained botanist, however, this book will doubtless prove valuable. At the same time, however, there are some oddities of translation which might prove puzzling even to the expert – thus *Orchis coriophora nervulosa* mentioned above is said to possess 'Flowers lacking the odor of plant bugs'.

FLORA OF RUSSIA
THE EUROPEAN PART AND BORDERING REGIONS

Volume I

Editor - in - Chief
An. A. Fedorov

Bernini's Cat. New and Selected Poems. By Gerda Mayer (Iron Press, North Shields, 1999), 108 pp, £6.99

Gerda Mayer, who was born in Karlovy Vary, came to England at the age of eleven, and, writing in English, has had a long and distinguished career as a poet. The present collection (her ninth), is very much a retrospective, including not only the artistic highlights of her previous books, but also poems which have for her personally a particular poignancy. In particular, it includes 'Make believe', addressed to her father, Arnold Stein, who escaped from a Nazi concentration camp, and was last heard of in Soviet-occupied Lviv in 1940. Factually, in a footnote, she remarks that 'It is thought he died in a Russian camp'. But in the poem, she dreams that, perhaps, somewhere, he might be yet alive (albeit at almost a hundred years of age), and that, by chance, her poetry might come into his hands

… say my verse was read
in some distant country,
and say you were idly turning the pages:

the blood washed from your shirt,
the tears from your eyes,
the earth from your bones,
neither missing since 1940
nor dead as reported later
by a friend of a friend of a friend…

quite dapper you stand in that bookshop
and chance upon my clues…

… write to me, father. ❏

the UKRAINIAN *review*

A
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